Abstract

‘Genesis’, ‘The Garden of Eden’ and ‘The Holy Grail’ are stories that have captivated the western mind (and the human mind in the iterations of these archetypal narratives in other cultures) for millennia. Though many view Modernity and Modernism as marking the death of religion and religious dogma, we argue that Modernism simply rearticulates Abrahamic-Hellenic (more generally Paternalist) social dogmas within its own logics and axioms (especially cosmological, ontological, teleological and epistemological axioms that reduce humanity to a discrete, biological, materially rational being and reduce reality to the finite world of motion, passing time and physical space); the rationalizations for social dogmas like the notion that ‘order is to be created through hierarchical domination’ may change, but the class relations therein retain their basic form. We illustrate this argument through conducting a Nomad Exploration (NE) of Foucault’s The Order of Things, which illustrates the rearticulation of Genesis in the axioms and logics of Modernity, Haraway’s Primate Visions, which illustrates the rearticulation of the Garden of Eden, and finally the nexus of primatology, transhumanism, ‘vampire therapy’, etc. (attempts at material immortality via ‘curing death’) that typify the Modernist rearticulation of the quest for the Holy Grail (san grail, sangrail). In the ethos of Nomad Exploration (NE) our teleological imperative in this journey is not to ‘answer questions’ by ‘accumulating and analyzing facts’; rather, our goal is to broaden understandings and deepen questions by providing the reader with dimensionally transformative ideas that provide access to new plateaus of perspective—in short, our purpose lies in the production of intimate, inner experience with dimensionally transformative ideas and a concomitant reinvigoration of meaning rather than in accumulating and analyzing facts.
Preface

As will become apparent in the below text, many of UBC’s requirements for the preface are incommensurable with our project. For example, the first three bullet points on the UBC template are as follows: “Identification and design of the research program; Performance of various parts of the research; Analysis of the research data.” This presumes that we approached our research with a set telos (design and research program), with a set method for tangible ‘data collection’, and with a static method for analyzing accumulated, tangible data. What happens when our research program involves ideas and practices that fundamentally challenge the axioms and logics from which these Modernist standards for thought and writing are derived? Our method moves without fixed telos, does not have a set method for data collection beyond daily experience and operationalizes a nonlinear method that is optimal for analyzing the many forms of intangible data (e.g. ontological regime(s)) that we analyze in our study.

Parts of the theoretical and methodological models presented in this thesis have been published or are in the publication processes within the following articles: “Conscious vs. Mechanical Evolution: Transcending Biocentrist Social Ontologies”; “Conscious Evolution, Social Development and Environmental Justice”; “The Obfuscation of Individualist Historical Narratives: Reviving Rational Generalization and Leaving The Irrational Generalization of Bigotry in the Past”; “Machine Learning Methodologies and Large Data Text Corpora”; “Machine Learning Methodologies: Histories of Asemblage and Representations of Women in the Bible”; “Media Imaginations of the City”; “Silence and Historical Context in Ontologies of Data”; “Planning for a New Social Ontology”. Parts of this research were also presented at academic conferences including the International Studies Association and the Association of American Geographers: “Datascopes and Dimensional Incommensurability in the History of Assemblages”; “Neoliberal Governmentality: Appropriating Religion to Fulfill the Bottom Line”; “Machine Learning Methodologies and Large Data Text Corpora”; “Machine Learning Methodologies: Digital Humanities”. In all of the above my contributions encompass development of the theoretical and methodological models by which the analyses were conducted. In multi-author papers I have also made small contributions to the empirical work (for example, adding an empirical analysis of Libertarian Christianity to the conference paper “Neoliberal Governmentality: Appropriating Religion to Fulfill the Bottom Line”). In short, this study—its core theoretical innovations, its key themes, its major arguments, etc.—is an individually conceived, original (as much as originality is possible given the actual nature of human thought) and unpublished text.
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Dedication

This text is dedicated to the silence (form), to the light (force), and to the loving consciousness that binds them; to all those who have fought and died in the struggle against paternalist oppression—the fallen soldiers; “to the Mystics of tomorrow;” and my love Nicole Rallis and our beautiful daughter Athena Minerva Barnesmoore.

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1 Marley, B 1980, “Ride Natty Ride.”
2 Illustration 1: “The Dialectical Mirror of Modernity” JM Hamade 2016
Nomad Explorations V 2.1:
Genesis, Eden and the Grail in Modernity

Illustration 1: “The Dialectical Mirror of Modernity” JM Hamade 2016
1. Introduction

1.1 Ethos Quotes
The following quotes are meant to act as a cognitive codex for the ethos and essential ideas of this Nomad Exploration. The reader is encouraged to return (if possible each time they sit down to read this text) to these quotes in order to observe how their meaning is transformed through experiencing life from the perspective of the ideas presented this text.

“One of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique.”

"What interests [me] in the "already said" is not established authority but rather the breadth and variety of experience to be found there."

-Michel Foucault

“It was Proust who said "masterpieces are written in a kind of foreign language." That is the same as stammering, making language stammer rather than stammering in speech. To be a foreigner, but in one's own tongue, not only when speaking a language other than one's own. To be bilingual, multilingual, but in one and the same language, without even a dialect or patois.” [Revolution is impossible if the language of revolution does not evolve faster than it can be appropriated by the powers at be...]

-Giles Deleuze

“Composers do not remember this lost fatherland, but each of them remains all his life unconsciously attuned to it; he is delirious with joy when he sings in harmony with his native land, betrays it at times with his thirst for fame, but then, in seeking fame, turns his back on it, and it is only by scorning fame that he finds it when he breaks out into that distinctive strain the sameness of which—for whatever its subject it remains identical with itself—proves the permanence of the elements that compose his soul. But in that case is it not true that those elements—all the residuum of reality which we are obliged to keep to ourselves, which cannot be transmitted in talk, even from friend to friend, from master to disciple, from lover to mistress, that ineffable something which differentiates qualitatively what each of us has felt and what he is obliged to leave behind at the threshold of the phrases in which he can communicate with others only by limiting himself to externals, common to all and of no interest—are brought out by art, the art of a Vinteuil like that of an Elstir, which exteriorises in the colours of the spectrum the intimate composition of those worlds which we call individuals and which, but for art, we should never know? A pair of wings, a different respiratory system, which enabled us to travel through space, would in no way help us, for if we visited Mars or Venus while keeping the same senses, they would clothe everything we could see in the same aspect as the things of Earth. The only true voyage, the only bath in the Fountain of Youth, would be not to visit strange lands but to possess other eyes, to see the universe through the eyes of another, of a hundred others, to see the hundred universes that each of them sees, that each of them is; and this we can do with an Elstir, with a Vinteuill; with men like these we do really fly from star to star.”

-Marcel Proust

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“Reading good books is like having a conversation with the most distinguished [people] of past ages, namely their authors—indeed, a carefully prepared conversation in which they reveal to us only the best of their thoughts.... Conversing with people of past centuries is rather like travelling.... But if you spend too much time travelling you will end up being a stranger in your own country.”

-Rene Descartes

“You must do something, but inasmuch as with your limited capacities it will be impossible to make anything easier than it has become, you must, with the same humanitarian enthusiasm as the others, undertake to make something hard.... Out of love for mankind, and out of despair at my embarrassing situation, seeing that I had accomplished nothing and was unable to make anything easier than it had already been, and moved by a genuine interest in those who make everything easy, I conceived it as my task to create difficulties everywhere.”

-Søren Kierkegaard

“The traditional interpretation of the philosophia perennis sees a single Divine Reality as the origin of all the millennial religions that have governed human life over the ages and have created the traditional civilizations with their sacred laws, social institutions, arts, and sciences. This Divine Reality is beyond all conceptualization and all that can be said of It, and is referred to by such sacred formulae as the La ilaha illa’Llah (There is no divinity but God) of Islam, neti neti (Not this, not that) of the Upanishads, the “Tao that can be named is not the Tao” of the Tao Te-Ching and also the “I am that I am” of the Bible if the meaning of this well-known dictum is understood on the highest level.

Other traditions, especially the primal ones, refer to It only through silence or indirect allusion, whereas certain esotericisms such as the Cabala refer to It by means of expositions of blinding clarity that only veil its infinite darkness transcending the light of manifestation. Even Its Name remains veiled and unutterable in certain traditions such as Judaism, but Its Reality is the origin of all that is sacred and the source of the teachings of each authentic faith. Like a mighty spring gushing forth atop a mountain, It gives rise to cascades of water that descend with ever-greater dispersion from each side, each cascade symbolizing all the grades of reality and the levels of cosmic and, by transposition, metacosmic reality of a particular religious universe. Yet all the cascades issue from a single Spring and the substance of all is ultimately nothing but that water which flows from the Spring at the mountaintop, the Reality which is the alpha of all sacred worlds and also the omega to which all that is within their embrace returns.

The Ultimate Reality, the Name that cannot be named, is the Beyond-Being of which Being is the first auto-determination. Together they comprise the Divine Order and are the principle cosmic manifestation, the instrument of this manifestation being the Logos, the Word, Fiat Lux, which one might say is the isthmus between the Divine and the cosmic orders, there being both an manifested and a manifested Logos [(The Word, then, is the Ether, the Primal Energy by which the Divine materialized Thought)]. The Divine Order may be thus said to be comprised of the Divinity Itself, at once unconditioned and conditioned, supraontological and ontological, Gottheit or Godhead and the personal God, Allah in His Essence as well as Names and Qualities, the nirguna and saguna Brahman, “the nameless,” which was the beginning of Heaven and Earth and the “named,” which is the mother of the myriad creatures. But also in a certain sense the Logos in divinis may be said to belong to the Divine Order, and this truth is of the greatest significance for the understanding of the religious assertion that the root of the natural order resides in the Divine Order.

From this Divine Order issue forth the many cascades alluded to above, each with different forms and trajectories and with no two cascades being formally the same, although all consisting of water. There are those that gush forth over similar types of formations and terrains corresponding to similar human collectivities, and thus constitute members of a religious family, while others display greater diversity and are produced by yet other types of terrains. There are never exact repetitions but there are always correspondences. Nor is it

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7 Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting one’s Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, p. 3.
impossible for a tributary of one cascade to flow into another, but all cascades originate from the Spring at the mountaintop and non from each other. Their similarities are basically due to the oneness of their Origin and the resemblances [(of convenience-convenientia)] in the rock beds, which receive the water through that original act of gushing forth into each cascade that is theologically called “revelation.” Only at the Spring Itself are all the cascades one and nowhere else should complete unity be sought among them. To repeat the well-known Islamic saying, “Unity is unique” (al-tawhidu wahid); one might add that only in Supreme Unity, which is unique, must ultimate unity be sought. That is why Frithjof Schuon, the foremost contemporary expositor of the philosophia perrenis especially as it concerns religion, has referred to this unity as “the transcendent unity of religions,” thereby emphasizing that, although there is such a transcendent unity, religions do not necessarily assert the same truths on the level of their external forms and dogmas; on the contrary, they have a distinct character of their own, each religious universe being a unique creation of the Divine Artisan.”

-S.H. Nasr

"Only that which has no history is definable.”

-Fredric Nietzsche

“An answer is valuable only in so far as it stimulates further inquiry. This holds true even in the exact sciences where the hypothesis serves as a springboard for the searching mind. In a still higher degree it holds true in the realm of philosophy where answers are merely fertile formulations of problems. “Let us know in order to search,” says St. Augustine. The favorite answer of an age, however, is often one in which only a minimum of problems is preserved and which has been promoted to its place as favorite because it seems to render superfluous all further questioning. It closes all doors, blocks all ways, and just because of this permits the agreeable feeling that the goal has been reached and that the rest is granted.”

-Martin Foss

“It is not only new facts and facilities that we need but ideas and the stimulation of new meanings.”

-Maurice Nicoll

“Archetypical Man as a divine being forgot his true essence and mistakes the material universe (which is part of him) as separate and external, since the Fall. Physical man is but a material shadow though endowed with a divine spark.”

-C. L. Knowles

“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”

-Shakespeare

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14 Shakespeare, W, Hamlet (1.5.167-8).
“...The important thing is not the finding, it is the seeking, it is the devotion with which one spins the wheel of prayer and scripture, discovering the truth little by little. If this machine gave you the truth immediately you would not recognize it, because your heart would not have been purified by the long quest.”

-Umberto Eco

“Most of [the] problems of the world stem from linguistic mistakes and simple misunderstanding. Don’t ever take words at face value. When you step into the zone of love, language, as we know it becomes obsolete. That which cannot be put into words can only be grasped through silence.”

-Rumi

“Throughout much of the time since the establishment of the clockwork universe as the primary model of reality, occultism has looked to science for ideas and analogies. This influence is one that science in turn generally denies, because “Science” would prefer to believe that occultism is irrational. Instead, it would be more correct to view Occultism as trans-rational: rationalism can easily be viewed as a useful system for training the mind, even if rationalism, itself, is not capable of discerning the highest mysteries [which can only be known in the silence of the intuition].

In fact, in following this line of reasoning, scientific discoveries have long been a source of inspiration to occultists. I have already mentioned how the geological theories of catastrophism surely played a role in Mackey’s conception of the dangers of pole shifts. Later in the [19th] century, it was occultists who embraced the Theory of Evolution, because the biological system was such a good analogy for the perceived spiritual system.

The problem with embracing science in this way is that science changes. This shift was characterized thoroughly by Thomas S. Kuhn in his landmark work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Known now as paradigm shifts, scientific theory exists in a slowly changing matrix of concepts. The problem is that most people believe that the beliefs of their own time are Absolute Truth. Scientific theories also fall into this belief. Consequently, when we examine Papus’ carefully wrought “science,” we may groan at some of the anachronisms. Similarly, if more dangerously, the raging sexism and racism of so many of the occult works of this period... reflect societal attitudes that nonetheless were enshrined as scientific “fact”...

-J. Lee Lehman

“...For Darwin’s widely read narratives in the nineteenth century, many people in the twentieth century Eurocentric west pay evolutionary physical anthropology the homage of their assumptions. What has been read from fossils and simians becomes common sense, becomes the foundation of other stories in other fields constituting what can count as experience [i.e. it becomes part of one’s ontological regime(s). Evolutionary theory is a form of imaginary history..... ...Imaginary history is the stuff out of which experience becomes possible.”

“One man is black, the other white; they seem in perfect colleagueship, peering at the remains of a shared past to establish the hope of a shared future. But the caption shatters that message: “Richard Leakey and assistant in the field in Kenya.” Aristotle could have written the phrase; the master and his tool are in perfectly harmonious relation, the one with a name, the other indicated by a function. It feels like a mere question of syntax, surely not the stuff of global history? But syntax like this is precisely the stuff of the semiotics of master and slave, of the other who labors in the name of the one, the linguistic structure of the human story.”

-Haraway

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14 Haraway, D 1989, *Primate Visions*, Routledge, p. 188.
15 Ibid. 190.
“The endless cycle of idea and action,
Endless invention, endless experiment,
Brings knowledge of motion, but not of stillness;
Knowledge of speech, but not of silence;
Knowledge of words, and ignorance of the Word.”

-T.S. Eliot

“24 Therefore whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock: 25 And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock.

26 And every [modernist] that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the [sands of time]: 27 And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it.”

-KJV Bible

“As regards ordinary modern views on the origin of man and his previous evolution I must say at once that they cannot be accepted. Denying previous evolution of man we must [also] deny any possibility of future mechanical evolution of man; that is, evolution happening by itself according to laws of heredity and selection, and without man's conscious efforts and understanding of his possible evolution.”

-P. D. Ouspensky

“Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)”

-Walt Whitman

1.2 An Introduction of Sorts
While we eschew the assumption that we must have an introduction, there are a couple points that would be worth sharing before we begin our exploration. These points revolve around the object of our analysis, the paternalist tradition. In short, we define paternalism as an ontological regime(s) in which order is conceived of in terms of hierarchical domination. Order is created in manifestation by domination. Love is conceptualized as a mode of domination. Community is domination. Domination is to free us from our evil human nature, our state of nature, and thus allow us to become ‘truly human’. This study observes the materialization of paternalism in the rise of Modernism.

We should also make one note on style. In the below there are many long quotations, and at any point in which [writing is both bracketed and italicized within a quotation] we are speaking in conversation with the author and, or providing a commentary on the authors statements. Why

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21 Eliot, TS 1934, “The Rock”.
approach our inquiry as such? In the general schema of Islamic Prophetology, there are three kinds of prophet: ‘the law giver’ (the Rasul), who creates an exoteric tradition (history, ritual, ethical norms, etc.) that is able to socialize the masses into a state of potential intimacy with infinite substance and its emanations; ‘the guide’ (the Nabi), who helps to facilitate the journey from the exoteric tradition created by the law giver (Rasul) to knowledge of the infinite substance and its emanations; ‘the intimate one’ (the Wali), who helps to catalyze the transition from knowledge of to intimacy with Truth. In the context of this study, we take texts like Foucault’s *The Order of Things* and Haraway’s *Primate Visions* as exoteric law (Sharia) and endeavor to guide the reader to knowledge of the esoteric Truth that lies beneath the exoteric symbolism (the language and facts) of the law. Why this specific approach? In short, we were inspired by traditions where not only original texts (‘the exoteric law’) but also notable commentaries by subsequent masters (Nabi) are preserved as texts are replicated through the centuries; rather than recreating the exoteric wheel, we instead use the existing wheels provided by authors like Foucault and Haraway to make the journey out of the exoteric (the historical) and into the esoteric (which can, at this point in the study, be understood as psychological in the classical sense of the term).

“Psychology is, perhaps, the *oldest science*, and, unfortunately, in its most essential features a *forgotten science*. For thousands of years psychology existed under the name of philosophy. In India all forms of Yoga, which are essentially psychology, are described as one of the six systems of philosophy. Sufi teachings, which again are chiefly psychological, are regarded as partly religious and partly metaphysical. In Europe, even quite recently in the last decades of the nineteenth century, many works on psychology were referred to as philosophy. And in spite of the fact that almost all sub-divisions of philosophy such as logic, the theory of cognition, ethics, aesthetics, referred to the work of the human mind or senses, psychology was regarded as inferior to philosophy and as relating only to the lower or more trivial sides of human nature....

Parallel with its existence under the name of philosophy, psychology existed even longer connected with one or another religion.... There are many excellent works on psychology in quite orthodox religious literature of different countries and epochs. For instance, in early Christianity there was a collection of books of different authors under the general name of *Philokalia*, used in our time in the Eastern Church, especially for the instruction of monks.

During the time when psychology was connected with philosophy and religion it also existed in the form of Art. Poetry, Drama, Sculpture, Dancing, even Architecture, were means for transmitting psychological knowledge. For instance, the Gothic Cathedrals were in their chief meaning works on psychology.

In the ancient times before philosophy, religion and art had taken their separate forms as we now know them, psychology had existed in the form of *Mysteries*, such as those of Egypt and of ancient Greece. Later, after the disappearance of the Mysteries, psychology existed in the form of *Symbolical Teachings which* were sometimes connected with the religion of the period and sometimes not connected, such as Astrology, Alchemy, Magic, and the more modern: Masonry, Occultism and Theosophy.”\(^{23}\)

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\(^{23}\) Ouspensky PD 1951, *The Psychology of Man’s Possible Evolution*, Hodder and Stoughton, p. 4-5.
1.3 What is the Purpose of Publishing?
If we accept Brij Mohan’s answer that “scholarly publications epitomize respectable channels of search for discovery and knowledge”\(^{24}\), then the question becomes what does the search for discovery and knowledge consist of? The answer to such a question may come down to our epistemological conceptions (i.e. our conception of reason as a process founded upon Truth or fact). Turning to the world of contemporary politics, recent calls by Donald Trump Jr. for a transition from representative to pure democracy provides a caricature of the answer that has been provided by the Modernist society (i.e. that the search for discovery and knowledge consists of accumulating and dominating facts into an order of knowledge) that is vulgar in the perfection of its simplistic characterization of epistemological norms in the contemporary academy:

“Some of these systems, I understand, they made sense two hundred years ago when everyone lived in a farm in the middle of nowhere, but I have the library of congress in my iPhone, I have all the information I could possibly need. Most people have cable television, and certainly access to news.”\(^{25}\)

Trump Jr. seems to be laboring under the impression that access to information is the only barrier to reason, and that, without this barrier (which of course is less than surmounted by the library of congress and mainstream news media...), the fallibility of human reason and subsequent differentials in human faculties that the founding fathers viewed as necessitating representative government (see James Madison, Federalist 51) will cease to exist. It seems clear that much of the contemporary academy is laboring under quite the same sort of delusion, which explains the rise of ‘object oriented ontologies’, ‘historical materialism’, ‘Actor Network Theory’ and the plethora of other ‘postmodern’ moves away from discernment and critique towards the description of facts (which are deemed to be essentially meaningless and thus—in a paradoxical move involving the reduction of Truth to the subjective—the essential locus of meaning).\(^{26}\) The academy often assumes that the only barrier to reason (and thus order in society) is our lack of facts, and so they turn all of their attention towards accumulating facts with the regrettable effect of often forgetting the importance of the theories that we use to interpret the meaning of facts... In short, as the ontology of postmodernism denies the potential for Truth (in reducing reality and its first cause to passing time and physical space which in motion lack the eternal dimensional quality necessary for an objective standard) and thus eschews the importance of


\(^{25}\) CNN, State of the Union, April 24, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O90lHGRACew

\(^{26}\) See—Noys, B 2011, “The Discrete Charm of Bruno Latour, or the Critique of Anti-Critique”, Presented at the Centre for Critical Theory, University of Nottingham—and his conception of the hegemonic problems associated with simple description of facts from a more Marxist perspective.
discernment and critique (analysis of meaning that relates to an eternal standard of Truth, which is to say metaphysics) in pursuit of methods oriented towards the rather impossible task of describing facts without theoretical assumptions concerning, for example, scale or the distinction between force and reason. In summary, we must transcend the nihilist ‘world view’ of Modernism (i.e. the reduction of reality and its first cause to passing time and physical space—to the world of motion—and the nihilism rendered necessary by this axiomatic denial of the eternal) before we can begin to craft new ontological and epistemological conceptions, new answers to what the search for discovery and knowledge therefore consists of and thus new answers to our questions concerning the purpose of publishing.

From our ‘world view’, we have been working with the idea that the purpose of publishing should include bringing readers into intimate experience with new ideas and ‘world views’ (new theories) that create new potentials for interpreting facts and conceptualizing practices. It seems that the problems facing our global society are rooted in the Modernist ‘world view’ (axioms and associated logics) through which humans interpret facts rather than a lack of access to facts (this should not be interpreted as an argument that facts are not an essential part of the epistemological process or as an argument that a lack of facts combined with access to fallacy masquerading as fact are not serious problems in our world)... The facts of our world, poverty, starvation, eugenics, genocide, slavery, etc. should be more than enough to work from in determining that we need a global political revolution against Modernism, and the problem is that we don't have the proper theory to bring this necessity into practice...

1.4 Nomad Thought, Nomad Writing

“...Gradually, as we move above the timberline [and start to see the world from a new plateau of perspective], the reader will find himself beset by difficulties which are not of our making. They are the inherent difficulties of a science which was fundamentally reserved, beyond our conception. Most frustrating, we could not use our good old simple catenary logic, in which principles come first and deduction follows. This was not the way of the archaic thinkers. They thought rather in terms of what we might call a fugue, in which all notes cannot be constrained into a single melodic scale, in which one is plunged directly into the midst of things and must follow the temporal order created by their thought. It is, after all, in the nature of music that the notes cannot all be played at once. The order and sequence, the very meaning, of the composition will reveal themselves—with patience—in due time. The reader, I suggest, will have to place [themself] in the ancient “Order of Time.”

One of the key movements in Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* is its progression through a line of reasoning defined by the authors, and articulated nicely by Massumi in the introduction, as ‘Nomad Thought’.28

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“Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate circumstances in a shattering blow. It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging. [In the language of Spinoza’s Rationalism, this regime of thought can be understood in terms of intuition ‘bringing what is known by reason to bear in a single movement of the mind’].”

In our nomadic writing, one cannot move through the plateaus of thought in the peripatetic manner that typifies contemporary scholarship in the western world. Reading each chapter in circles and the entire assemblage of chapters in circles, meaning begins to crystallize through the repetition of cycles as opposed to a linear progression. As such, one must engage this text with epistemic processes oriented towards the dimension of the eternal, aeonian cycles that structure the manifestation of the material world we experience through our sensory organs (i.e. those associated with our intuitive and emotive epistemic potentials) as opposed epistemic mechanisms oriented towards the to the linear progression of this manifestation we receive from the peripatetic, sensorially oriented perspective (i.e. the peripatetic mind and its orientation towards facts—towards Truth with motion). The theories presented in this paper are nonlinear, an assemblage of ideas drawn from multiple locations and lain out in what might be called a rhizomatic form. We present this discussion of (and with) the ideas of authors like Foucault and Haraway in a nonlinear fashion that tracks through the ideas without a pre-defined order of progression with the hope that readers will draw out dynamisms (epistemic mechanisms, ideas) that suit their own research interests (the narrative form this text has taken on came in the process of writing rather than a pre-set telos or research question). As this text is a discussion (a conversation), there is no boundary set to curtail the sorts of ideas and topics that we embark upon. Neither is there a set limit to how deep we will delve into a given topic. We are talking with the authors, not analyzing them, summarizing them or simply extracting from their work. We are conversing with them as we would with an old friend (or with our selves)... If you are wondering why we are only speaking with these great authors (and not the many, often extremely flawed strands of discourse on their work), or are perturbed by the lack of explanation (exegesis) in some of the sections, we refer you to the words of Gandalf:

“In one thing you have not changed, my dear friend,” said Aragorn: ‘you... speak in riddles.’ ‘What? In riddles?’ said Gandalf. ‘No! For I was talking aloud to myself. A habit of the old: they choose the wisest person present to speak to; the long explanations needed by the young are wearying.’”

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1.5 Nomad Exploration and Nonlinear Writing
Nomad Exploration (NE) aims to broaden understandings and deepen questions rather than to provide static answers that end the journey for deeper understanding. Indeed,

“An answer is valuable only in so far as it stimulates further inquiry. This holds true even in the exact sciences where the hypothesis serves as a springboard for the searching mind. In a still higher degree it holds true in the realm of philosophy where answers are merely fertile formulations of problems. “Let us know in order to search,” says St. Augustine. The favorite answer of an age, however, is often one in which only a minimum of problems is preserved and which has been promoted to its place as favorite because it seems to render superfluous all further questioning. It closes all doors, blocks all ways, and just because of this permits the agreeable feeling that the goal has been reached and that the rest is granted.”

Foucault argues “one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique.” In NE, then, we eschew discipline by the presumed need for thesis, hypothesis, introduction, conclusion, peripatetic argumentation and the plethora of other practices by which contemporary academic writing is constrained (though we are not so dogmatic in this dismissal that we do not use such tools when they are deemed useful). NE also involves approaching research without a static question or objective; for example, given that the ideas presented in this text fit together in nonlinear fashion and thus elude linear presentation, we eschew structures of writing that constrain nonlinear potentials for the sake of creating a cohesive linear narrative and instead allow each section to exist on its own.

Texts like Deleuze and Guattari’s Thousand Plateaus and Allan Pred’s Even in Sweden provide a foundation for us to rationalize this nonlinear approach. To begin, let us note Nadler’s argument that “intuition... takes what is known by Reason and grasps it in a single act of the mind.” From this definition we can distinguish between the linear, peripatetic (the logical accumulation and analysis of facts to derive truth) and intuitive (which operationalizes these linearly derived truths—along with certain emotive epistemological faculties—in a single movement of the mind) modes of rational thought. Normative contemporary academic writing often structures itself based on the workings of the peripatetic mind (thesis, evidence, conclusion format, linear logic, etc.), and, as a result, people are implicitly (most often unconsciously) encouraged to think from the perspective of their peripatetic faculties. By subverting this peripatetic structure and presenting information in a nonlinear format, we hope this text will encourage the reader to operationalize their intuition.

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Why is this important? Essence. If we accept that essence, in itself, is incommensurable with linear, peripatetic thought, and that our only means of discerning essence lies in our intuitive capacity to grasp what is known by reason in a single movement of the mind (we will return to this point many times below), then we might say that the nonlinear presentation of information in Pred’s discursive approach in *Even in Sweden* encourages us to move past the materially rational, peripatetic mind that we (in part) use to interpret each of his statements, concepts, poems, quotes, etc. and into the intuitive node of mind necessary for grasping the essence of his text and its object of analysis in a single movement of the mind. Given the limited nature of our peripatetic cognitive capacities and sensory gaze, it is only through this operationalization of essence—of the whole of our rational knowledge of a topic as a single movement of the mind (rather than a linear, systematic treatment of evidence)—that we can begin to approach the highest potentials of human understanding.

Nomad Explorations aim to produce *experience* rather than new *peripatetic knowledge*. As such we privilege novel juxtaposition, lengthy and direct quotation and a plethora of other approaches that have oft been labeled lazy and, or associated with plagiarism by the peripatetic mind of the positivist (and postmodern positivist) academy. As Socrates noted, there has never been a new idea, and thus the aim of cultivation is to germinate an experience that brings an individual to remember (to have an inward revelation of) their true nature.\(^{36}\)

### 1.6 Questions in Exploration

Nomad Explorations come into conversation with texts through a nonlinear mode of inquiry that eschews an implicit teleology. There are no questions to be answered, no hypotheses to be tested. As ‘human wisdom’ is in one sense founded upon the knowledge that one does not (cannot) know the complete truth of manifestation from the human perspective (due to our dimensionally limited perspective and the change, motion, chaos, etc. that typifies the dimensional quality of manifestation), our goal is simply to *broaden understandings* and *deepen questions* via development of conceptual analytics, metaphors, symbols (symbolic epistemic mechanisms), ideas, etc. Nomad Explorations aim to shed the chains of contemporary academic discipline (especially those nodes that privilege the linearly oriented, peripatetic mind) to allow human creativity, imagination, rationality, intuition, emotive knowledge, etc. (the more subtle intellectual faculties that, in their apex, most clearly differentiate a reasoned being from, say, a mosquito who indeed cannot speak...\(^{37}\)) to return to the fore of the epistemic processes by which we academics come to know the social.

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\(^{36}\) Such a project, by its nature, cannot be ‘original’ in certain essential senses.

“Sir Patrick Geddes (1915) expounds a theory of Love and Intuition in Planning that sheds light on the role of creative, emotive faculties in knowing and serving the public as social scientists:

“Each valid scheme should and must embody the full utilization of its local and regional conditions, and be the expression of local and of regional personality. "Local character" is thus no mere accidental old-world quaintness, as its mimics think and say. It is attained only in course of adequate grasp and treatment of the whole environment, and in active sympathy with the essential and characteristic life of the place concerned. Each place has a true personality [an essence]; and with this shows some unique elements—a personality too much asleep it may be, but which it is the task of the planner, as master-artist, to awaken. And only he can do this who is in love and at home with his subject—truly in love and fully at home—the love in which high intuition supplements knowledge, and arouses his own fullest intensity of expression, to call forth the latent but not less vital possibilities before him.” (Geddes 1915, p. 396-397)

Manifestation is ‘a dance between the finite and the infinite’, between creation and the uncreated, and it is only in the silence of loving intuition that we can come to know this dance from the perspective of its ‘eternal root’ (Infinite Substance and its emanations). It is only in loving intimacy with environment that we can see resemblance as convenience, as it is only in loving intimacy with the uncreated that we can see resemblance as emulation, and it is only through intuition (made possible by the rational analogies drawn between convenience and emulation) that we can come into sympathy with (feel) the eternal truth of manifestation in a single, silent movement of the mind. In short, instead of attempting to create an image of unity through dominating difference or reducing reality to multiplicity and denying essentialism altogether, we must instead remember (and thus catalyze actualization of our latent potential for intimacy with) the Infinite Substance and its emanations so that we can feel the eternal truth of manifestation and thus ‘plan a society’ (and our practices therein) that works to optimizes the sympathy of manifestation with the uncreated Truth it reflects (which is to say plan society that works to optimize Virtue, which lies in said optimization of sympathy between the uncreated and manifestation).

Geddes also makes the important note that modernist science is “too static and analytic to come in touch with art” and that the artist “sees that... artistic virtues lay in expression of the vital emotions, ideals, and ideas of [the] day” and that it must therefore be the artist’s “task to express the best of his own age” (Geddes 1915, p. 398-399). We argue that this incommensurability of ‘Modernist Science’ (e.x. Social Science) with art comes precisely in its reduction of reality to passing time and physical space (which is to say denial of art’s eternal foundation, the Infinite Substance and its emanations). Returning the epistemological potentials implicit in love and intuition to Planning Theory and Practice (and the Social Sciences more generally) can then be understood as reviving artistic ethos in Planning Theory and Practice—we must eschew the mechanical sociopathy of the peripatetic mind divorced from loving intuition and the reduction of research to the accumulation, categorization and
dissemination of facts therein and instead seek to engage readers with theories, symbols, metaphors, etc. that allow them to transcend irrationality and indoctrination through remembrance-cultivation of intimacy with the dimension of self that is Self (Infinite Substance). Recalling Ouspensky’s (1951, p. 5) words above, “During the time when psychology was connected with philosophy and religion it also existed in the form of Art. Poetry, Drama, Sculpture, Dancing, even Architecture, were means for transmitting psychological knowledge.” We must (as an academy and as a society more generally) return to an artistic ethos (in its traditional mode as a catalyst for conscious evolution) in development and dissemination of academic theory and practice, university teaching, public educational curriculum, news media discourse, political discourse, etc. This returns us to our initial discussion. Consciousness expands and constrains our potentials for action in the material world, and so meaningful social reform must come through an evolution of human psychology (which we propose can be attained through returning to an artistic ethos in the development and dissemination of Social Science Theory and Practice). This might be posited by critics as an idealists project, and indeed it is, as “idealism and matter of fact are... not sundered, but inseparable, as our daily steps are guided by ideals of direction” (Geddes, 1915, p. viii).”

1.7 Occultism and Nomadic Writing
Reflecting on the writings of Gerard Encausse (Papus), J. Lee Lehman notes: “we might also add that modern ideas about copyright and authorship were not current then [(the 19th century)]: Papus felt free and justified in appropriating extensive passages from Burgoyne [(with attribution...)].” Papus was part of an ancient spiritual movement in which the unity of infinite substance and its emanations is deemed more real (eternal) than the perceived difference between beings produced by the dimensional quality of manifestation in passing time and physical space (in motion) and in which the purpose of manifestation is remembrance of and return to that infinite substance; as such, the purpose of writing for authors like Papus is to initiate transformative experiences (alchemical experiences) within the reader to initiate remembrance of the Self within self (rather than the accumulation and dissemination of facts, the production of ‘new knowledge’ or ‘new ideas’, providing a surveillance mechanism for individual work, etc. as writing has often been reduced in the contemporary academy). It is precisely this ethos-ethic of writing and publishing that we hope to revive with our Nomad Explorations. The goal is not to collect facts, to produce new knowledge or to create a marker of our work that can be

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38 Geddes, SP 1915, Cities in Evolution: An Introduction to the Town Planning Movement and to the Study of Civics, Williams & Norgate.
tracked by algorithms; our only goal is to initiate alchemical experiences that allow readers to view reality from new, more dimensionally holistic plateaus of perspective.

1.8 Nomadic Publishing?
Nomad Exploration eschews many tenants of the Neoliberal-Modernist publishing ‘ethic’; our purpose is to produce experience rather than factual knowledge, and as a result the normative politics of authorship associated with peripatetic conceptions of publishing in the modernist era do not apply. Block quotations are very useful when the author’s words reach a plateau of perfection in conveying an idea. Exegesis is an essential tool, but it is also sometimes unnecessary (and even damaging when it prevents the reader from doing their own exegesis on, say, a symbolic story). Simple language is not necessarily better language—we reject the economy of language (and, for that matter, all modes of economic theology)... Good research does not hold a functional relationship with the collection of data (of facts, Truth with motion)—reflection, thought experiment and imagination (as expressed in poetry, short stories and other forms of creative expression) are essential for stimulating the emotional dimensions of intellectual cultivation and do not necessarily have to include the accumulation of new data. Indeed, the accumulation of facts does not hold a functional, linear relationship with the ‘better knowledge’ because facts (our sensory experiences) must be interpreted to become intellectual knowledge (i.e. we assign meaning to facts using axioms and logics41 to form intellectual knowledge, and so if our axioms and logics are flawed our subsequently produced knowledge will be flawed regardless of how many facts we have accumulated...).

1.9 History of Assemblage Model
An in depth discussion of our History of Assemblage Model (HoAM) is beyond the scope of this paper. In short, the HoAM operationalizes rationally intuitive thought experiments in order to analyze the relationship between ontological regime(s) and norms of thought, behavior and being in publics socialized by a given assemblage of ontological regime(s) as well as the potential power dynamics manifest therein. For an in depth discussion of the HoAM see “Machine Learning Methodologies: Histories of Asemblelage and Representations of Women in the Bible”, “Machine Learning

41 For simplicity ‘axioms and logics’—a phrase used throughout this text—can be understood as cosmological-ontological axioms and the logics rendered potential therein.
Methodologies and Large Data Text Corpora” and “Datascopes and Dimensional Incommensurability in the History of Assemblages”.

1.10 Other Resources for Engaging this Text?

“Now I would say that all ideas that have the power of altering us and letting new meaning into our lives are about the invisible side of things and cannot be demonstrated directly or reached by reasoning alone. Because they relate to the invisible side of things they are not approached by reasoning according to the evidence of the senses. Before coming to the idea of Time with which this book is chiefly concerned and which can only be understood by getting away from appearances and by thinking about the ‘invisible world’ from the standpoint of dimensions, we must make some effort the grasp the invisibility of ourselves. For I believe that we never understand anything about the ‘invisible’ world if we do not grasp our own invisibility first.

This demands a certain kind of effort, the nature of which is similar to the effort required to get some realization of the essential invisibility and unknowableness of another person. In this connection I believe that we can never realise the existence of another person in any real way unless we realise our own existence. The realization of one’s own existence, as a real experience, is the realization of one’s essential invisibility.”

In short, the best resource any reader has a for better understanding this text (and others in the Nomad Exploration Series) lies within them—“know thyself; then thou shalt know the Universe and God.”

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2. Genesis, ‘The Order of Things’ in Modernity

2.1 Ordering Things

Before entering into our discussion of The Order of Things we provide a quote from an interview with Foucault that provides some useful intellectual context:

“I don’t say the things I say because they are what I think. I say them as a way to make sure that they are no longer what I think.”¹; “I don’t believe in the virtue of using language for “self expression”. The language that interests me is the one that can actually destroy all the circular, enclosed, narcissistic forms of the subject and of oneself... And what I mean by ‘the end of man’ is, deep down, the end of all these forms of individuality, of subjectivity, of consciousness, of the ego, on which we built and from which we have tried to build and to constitute knowledge”²; “I don’t say the things I say because they are what I think, but rather I say them with the end in mind of self-destruction, precisely to make sure they are no longer what I think. To be really certain that from now on, outside of me, they are going to live a life or die in such a way that I will not have to recognize myself in them.”³

In the light of these quotes we can begin to understand that the problem isolated in Foucault’s reading of Early Modern Philosophy below may not come as a function of his lack of initiation or acceptance of esoteric axioms and instead in the fact that he is attempting to illustrate the illusory reading of these authors that would later come to dominate the ‘Modernist Mind’.

Foucault makes another very interesting point in this interview:

“All I do belongs at heart like structuralism to this great questioning of the sovereignty of the subject. Deep down what is the experience of drugs if not this: to erase limits, to reject divisions, to put away all prohibitions [in short, to escape the conditioning of form associated with manifestation in passing time and physical space, to experience the Dionysian...], and then to ask oneself the question, what has become of knowledge? Do we then know something altogether other? Can we still know what we knew before the experience of drugs? Is this knowledge of before drugs still valid or is it a new kind of knowledge? This is a real problem and I think that in this measure the experience of drugs isn’t marginal in our society, it’s not a sort of little deviance that does not count. It seems to me that it is at the very heart of the problems that the society in which we live—that is to say, in the capitalist society—is confronted with.... From the moment that [humanity is liberated from Capitalism], what kind of knowledge will be possible? [It seems that Foucault is ribbing those whose constant refrain is ‘what is your solution’, and who then

² Ibid. 14:26-14:56.
disregard all solutions that cannot be conceived within the existing modernist system of thought as unpragmatic... We must first know what sort of knowledge will be possible outside of capitalism (in the actual context of our escape) before we can begin to think about the potential systems of social organization that we could establish within that context... We must, in short, understand the cognitive context of our liberation from capitalism—which is to say the new axioms and logics we accept when liberated from the axioms and logics received through capitalist socialization—before we can begin to think about the tangible systems we will be able to conceptualize therein.)"

“...We are used to thinking that the expression of individuality, for example, or the exaltation of individuality is one of the forms of man’s liberation. But I wonder if the opposite is true.... I have tried to show how humanism was a kind of form, was this sort of fabrication of the human being according to a certain model, and that humanism does not work at all as a liberation of man, but on the contrary works as imprisonment of man inside certain types of molds that are all controlled by the sovereignty of the subject.”

It is thus that we can interpret the structuralist narratives of authors like Angela Davis (and later Loïc Wacquant in his *Punishing the Poor*) that observe the preservation of the structure of slavery by US government policy in the evolution from *plantation labor* to *ghettoized industrial labor* to *prison labor*—the elements (individuals and their subjectivities) may in some ways have been transformed, but the essential relations between elements (that of a small biologically ordered elite class hierarchically dominating the mass of humanity for personal gain) have been retained...

Foucault’s introduction to *The Order of Things* outlines some of the ways in which Foucault’s ideal reader would approach the text. First, the reader would suppose that, in ‘scientific’ disciplines concerned with “living beings, languages, ...economic factors,” etc., “errors (and truths), the practice of old beliefs, including not only genuine discoveries, but also the most naïve notions, [obey] ...the laws of a certain code of knowledge”—“the history of non-formal knowledge [has] ...a system.” Second, the reader must understand that *The Order of Things* is a comparative study that observes the relations of “knowledge of living beings, the knowledge of the laws of language, and the knowledge of economic facts” with “the philosophical discourse that was contemporary with them during a period extending from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century.” In this comparative spirit, Foucault attempts to “describe not so much the genesis of our sciences as an epistemological space specific to a particular period” manifest as “isomorphisms that appear to ignore the extreme diversity of the objects under consideration.” Third, the reader would recognize that Foucault, rather than following in the tracks of historians of science who trace “the processes and products of the scientific consciousness” and the

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15 Ibid. 11:33-12:20
18 Ibid. x.
19 Ibid. xi.
“unconsciousness of science”, attempts to “restore what eluded” scientific consciousness (i.e. the 
influences that affected, the implicit philosophies that were subjacent to it, the unformulated 
thematics, the unseen obstacles”). He is attempting to “reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge, a 
level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourses...”54 To reveal 
this positive consciousness, Foucault examines the “archaeological system common to a whole series 
of scientific ‘representations’ or ‘products’ dispersed throughout the natural history, economics and 
philosophy of the classical period; the archeological is the level at which “unknown to themselves, the 
naturalists, economists, and grammarians employed the same rules to define the objects proper to 
their own study, to form their concepts, to build their theories”—“rules of formation, which were never 
formulated in their own right.”55 In other words, Foucault’s analysis examines the banally implicit rules 
of truth embedded within his objects of inquiry in their relation to the philosophical trends of the 
period, which we might articulate as the relationship of potentials for public truth in a given moment 
and location in history and geography with the ontological regime(s) (the axioms and logics) implicit in 
the philosophy of that moment and location in history and geography.

After outlining the approach of the ideal reader, Foucault outlines three essential problems that 
he engages in the text: “the problem of change;” “the problem of causality;” “the problem of the 
subject.” The problem of change centers on “the suddenness and thoroughness with which certain 
sciences were sometimes reorganized” and on “the fact that at the same time similar changes occurred 
in apparently very different disciplines.”56 Because the changes Foucault observes do “not occur at the 
same level, proceed at the same pace, or obey the same laws... it would be better to respect such 
differences, and even try to grasp them in their specificity”—“in this way [he] tried to describe the 
combination of corresponding transformations that characterize the appearance of biology, political 
economy, philology, a number of human sciences, and a new type of philosophy, at the threshold of 
the nineteenth century.”57 The problem of causality arises because “it is not always easy to determine 
what has caused a specific change in science.”58 While there is evidence of change in the empirical 
sciences, there is no way to know the actual workings of such complex systems in their entirety; as a 
result, Foucault “chose instead to confine [himself] to describing the transformations themselves, 
thinking that this would be an indispensible step if, one day, a theory of scientific change and

55 Ibid. xi-xii.
56 Ibid. xii.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid. xii-xiii.
epistemological causality was to be constructed.” The problem of the subject is derived from the obfuscation of the subject by focus on the epistemological and archeological levels of knowledge. This, however, is not an issue for Foucault, as his interest is in determining

“whether the subjects responsible for scientific discourse are not determined in their situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by the conditions that dominate and even overwhelm them. In short, [he] tried to explore scientific discourse not from the point of view of the individuals who are speaking, nor from the point of view of the formal structures of what they are saying, but from the point of view of the rules that come into play in the very existence of such discourse: what conditions did Linnaeus (or Petty, or Arnauld) have to fulfill, not to make his discourse coherent and true in general, but to give it, at the time when it was written and accepted, value and practical application as a scientific discourse—or, more exactly, as naturalist, economic, or grammatical discourse?”

In other words, Foucault questions the agency of the subject to speak their truth relative to the standards of truth in the time and location of history they are embedded within. We aim to problematize the ontological regime(s) (axioms and logics, which is to say hegemonic essence) that give rise to these ‘games of truth’ in Modernity as a step toward allowing the subject to speak Truth (their truth and the truth are, of course, mutually constitutive).

2.2 On the Origin of the Order of Things

“This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the page, all the familiar landmarks of my thought — our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography — breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other.”

With the example of a ‘certain Chinese encyclopedia’ whose taxonomy is wholly other to our own (both in the categories it proposes and in its imaginings of the proximity and links between categories), Foucault introduces this text as a challenge to the reductive banality of the system of thought which has come to dominate the western (and increasingly global) mind (i.e. Modernism); “in the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.” We interpret this stark impossibility as rising from the dimensional incommensurability of ‘world view’ (of axioms and logics, ‘hegemonic essence”).

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26 Ibid. xiv.
27 Ibid. xv.
Next Foucault notes that it is only in the process of enumeration and writing that the categories (and objects therein) of systems of thought can actually manifest their propinquity: “...where could they ever meet, except in the immaterial sound of the voice pronouncing enumeration, or on the page transcribing it? Where else could they be juxtaposed except in the non-place of language? Yet, though language can spread them before us, it can only do so in an unthinkable space.” In short, Foucault is arguing that there is no functional relationship between linguistic categories and the categorized (i.e. between meaning and language). This argument points to the necessity of interrogating the meaning of representations (discursive materials) in their actual assembled context (rather than as banally objective); object and subject are, in this language, differentiated in our juxtaposition of the terms, but in actuality they form a mutually constitutive whole and the categorization is purely pragmatic (from the perspective of our dimensionally limited perspective as humans manifest in passing time and physical space).

2.3 Utopia and Heterotopia

Foucault highlights the dynamism of the intersection between language, space and meaning through the opposition of utopias and heterotopias. “Utopias are sites with no real place. They are sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of Society. They present society itself in a perfected form, or else society turned upside down, but in any case these utopias are fundamentally unreal spaces.” Heterotopias are...

“...Real places—places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society—which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality.”

Between utopias and heterotopias exist a “mixed, joint experience, ...the mirror.”

“The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not.

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67 Ibid. xviii.
68 Ibid. 3-4.
69 Ibid. 4.
70 Ibid. 3-4.
71 Ibid. 4.
in an unreal, virtual space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Starting from this gaze that is, as it were, directed toward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there."

Foucault defines heterotopias through use of six principles. In the first principle he argues that heterotopias exist in every culture, and divides them into two main categories. First, in ‘primitive societies’, one finds crisis heterotopias (“privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc.”). These crisis heterotopias are, Foucault argues, disappearing from our society and being replaced by heterotopias of deviation:

“Those [places] in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed. Cases of this are rest homes and psychiatric hospitals, and of course prisons, and one should perhaps add retirement homes that are, as it were, on the borderline between the heterotopia of crisis and the heterotopia of deviation since, after all, old age is a crisis, but is also a deviation since in our society where leisure is the rule, idleness is a sort of deviation.”

The second principle of the description rests upon the premise “that a society, as its history unfolds, can make an existing heterotopia function in a very different fashion; for each heterotopia has a precise and determined function within a society and the same heterotopia can, according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs, have one function or another.” He illustrates this point with the example of cemeteries whose spatial location and practice shifted with the transition to an atheistic society (e.x. the bio-individualization of death as an end of existence, the valorization of the body as the foundation of self and the rise of conceptualizations of death as illness).

The third principle highlights the capacity of heterotopias to juxtapose multiple, incommensurable spaces-sites in a single, real place.

“Perhaps the oldest example of these heterotopias that take the form of contradictory sites is the garden. We

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72 Ibid. 4.
73 Ibid. 5.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. 5-6.
76 Ibid. 6.
must not forget that in the Orient the garden, an astonishing creation that is now a thousand years old, had very
deep and seemingly superimposed meanings. The traditional garden of the Persians was a sacred space that was
supposed to bring together inside its rectangle four parts representing the four parts of the world, with a space
still more sacred than the others that were like an umbilicus, the navel of the world at its center (the basin and
water fountain were there); and all the vegetation of the garden was supposed to come together in this space, in
this sort of microcosm. As for carpets, they were originally reproductions of gardens (the garden is a rug onto
which the whole world comes to enact its symbolic perfection, and the rug is a sort of garden that can move
across space). The garden is the smallest parcel of the world and then it is the totality of the world. The garden
has been a sort of happy, universalizing heterotopia since the beginnings of antiquity (our modern zoological
gardens spring from that source).”

The fourth principle posits heterotopias as “most often linked to slices in time—which is to say that
they are open to what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies. The heterotopia
begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional
time.” The cemetery is thus understood as heterotopic in its beginning (for the individual) with the
heterochrony of death and the “quasi-eternity in which [their] permanent lot is dissolution and
disappearance.” Heterotopias can thus be divided in their link to “the accumulation of time” (as with
museums and libraries in their “accumulating everything, of establishing a sort of general archive, the
will to enclose in one place all times, all epochs, all forms, all tastes, ...of constituting a place of all
times that is itself outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages, the project of organizing in this way a
sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place”, or, more simply,
orientation towards the eternal) or to the “flowing, transitory, precarious aspect, to time in the mode of
the festival” (the “absolutely temporal”—for example, “vacation villages, such as those Polynesia villages
that offer a compact three weeks of primitive and eternal nudity to the inhabitants of cities”).

“...Through the two forms of heterotopias that come together here, the heterotopia of the festival and that of the
eternity of accumulating time, the huts of the Djerba are in a sense relative of libraries and museums, for the
rediscovery of Polynesian life abolishes time; yet the experience is just as much the rediscovery of time, it is as if
the entire history of humanity reaching back to its origin were accessible in a sort of immediate knowledge.”

The fifth principle argues “heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both
isolates them and makes them penetrable.” Heterotopias are not (generally) freely accessible, as entry
either necessitates rites and rituals of purification or is, alternatively, compulsory. There are however
other heterotopias “that seem to be pure and simple openings, but that generally hide curious

Mouvement/ Continuite, p. 6.
78 Ibid. 6-7.
79 Ibid. 6.
80 Ibid. 7.
81 Ibid. 8.
82 Ibid. 7-8.
exclusions”; in such heterotopias “we think we enter where we are, by the very fact that we enter, excluded.”

The sixth and final principle of heterotopias lies in the fact “that they have a function in relation to all the space that remains,” which can be divided as such: “either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory (perhaps that is the role that ways played by those famous brothels of which we are now deprived),” or “their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled.” The first are heterotopias of illusion (exemplified by brothels), and the second are heterotopias of compensation (exemplified by colonies).

“Brothels and colonies are two extreme types of heterotopia, and if we think, after all, that the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea and that, from port to port, from tack to tack, from brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the colonies in search of the most precious treasures they conceal in their gardens, you will understand why the boat has not only been for our civilization, from the sixteenth century until the present, the great instrument of economic development (I have not been speaking of that today), but has been simultaneously the greatest reserve of the imagination. The ship is the heterotopia par excellence. In civilizations without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates.”

Bourges’ Chinese Encyclopedia gave rise (in Foucault) to

“The suspicion that there is a worse kind of disorder than that of the incongruous, the linking together to things that are inappropriate; ...the disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders flitter separately in the dimension, without law or geometry, of the heteroclite; ...in such a state, things are ‘laid’, ‘placed’, ‘arranged’ in sites so very different from one another that it is impossible to find a place of residence for them, to define a common locus beneath them all.”

With regard to the reality of language in the dimension of the heteroclite,

“Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical. Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to ‘hold together’. This is why Utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias (such as those to be

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63 Foucault, M 1984, ‘Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias’, trans. Miskowiec, Architecture/Mouvement/Continuite, p. 7. Entry to the heterotopic space, in this case, is in itself exclusionary (e.x. the in-law apartment built in a manner that denies direct access to the family’s living space).
64 Ibid. 8.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. 9.
found so often in Borges) desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.\textsuperscript{88}

Foucault illustrates the implications of heteroclite space through noting attempts by those who have lost the use of language to group (order) objects in their use of categories that lack necessary coherence to slip into a state of mind that reflects the instability of their incoherent categories: if one attempts to sort fabric across space (here the corners of a table) through the use of the categories ‘light-colored’, ‘red’, ‘softest in texture’ and “longest”, the optimal location of each piece of fabric will never be definite (the reddest might also be the softest, as the longest might also be the lightest in color, etc.).\textsuperscript{89}

“No sooner have they been adumbrated than all these groupings dissolve again, for the field of identity that sustains them, however limited it may be, is still too wide not to be unstable; and so the sick mind continues to infinity, creating groups then dispersing them again, heaping up diverse similarities, destroying those that seem clearest, splitting up things that are identical, superimposing different criteria, frenziedly beginning all over again, becoming more and more disturbed, and teetering finally on the brink of anxiety.”\textsuperscript{90}

As a result, the loss of language is conceptualized as a “loss of what is ‘common’ to place and name” (the loss of ‘common sense’).\textsuperscript{91} To rearticulate this point as a positive argument we might argue that the categories of language give us the capacity to provide a normative (shared) coherence (order) to space from a subjective perspective. Might it be said that death from this sickness is an essential step on the road to liberty?

“It was Proust who said "masterpieces are written in a kind of foreign language." That is the same as stammering, making language stammer rather than stammering in speech. To be a foreigner, but in one’s own tongue, not only when speaking a language other than one’s own. To be bilingual, multilingual, but in one and the same language, without even a dialect or patois.”\textsuperscript{92}

Foucault continues on to note that Bourges locates the origin of this “distortion of classification that prevents us from applying it” (in its lack of “spatial coherence”) to “our [western] dream world, ..China”, “whose name alone constitutes for the West a vast reservoir of utopias” and which Foucault classifies as “a privileged site of space.”\textsuperscript{93}

“In our traditional imagery, the Chinese culture is the most meticulous, the most rigidly ordered, the one most deaf to temporal events, most attached to the pure delineation of space; we think of it as a civilization of dikes and dams beneath the eternal face of the sky; we see it, spread and frozen, over the entire surface of a continent

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid. xix.
surrounded by walls. Even its writing does not reproduce the fugitive flight of the voice in horizontal lines; it erects the motionless and still-recognizable images of things themselves in vertical columns. So much so that the Chinese encyclopaedia quoted by Borges, and the taxonomy it proposes, lead to a kind of thought without space, to words and categories that lack all life and place, but are rooted in a ceremonial space, overburdened with complex figures, with tangled paths, strange places, secret passages, and unexpected communications. There would appear to be, then, at the other extremity of the earth we inhabit, a culture entirely devoted to the ordering of space, but one that does not distribute the multiplicity of existing things into any of the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and think.91

All of this is meant to illustrate the fact that one need not order the world in the spatio-categorical terms that have become dominant in a given culture-society (i.e. commonsense holds no causal or functional relationship with Truth as proposed by Latour’s ‘Relativist Relativism’92). Foucault asks us to reflect “on what ‘table’, according to what grid of identities, similitudes, analogies, have we become accustomed to sort out so many different and similar things? What is this coherence—which, as is immediately apparent, is neither determined by an a priori and necessary concatenation, nor imposed upon us by immediately perceptible contents.”93 Why ought we to reflect? Because,

“It is not a question of linking consequences, but of grouping and isolating, of analyzing, of matching and pigeon-holing concrete contents; there is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical (superficially, at least) than the process of establishing order among things; nothing that demands a sharper eye or surer, better-articulated language; nothing that more insistently requires one allow oneself to be carried along by the proliferation of qualities and forms.”94

What are the mechanics of this ordering process? “A 'system of elements' - a definition of the segments by which the resemblances and differences can be shown, the types of variation by which those segments can be affected, and, lastly, the threshold above which there is a difference and below which there is a similitude - is indispensable for the establishment of even the simplest form of order.”95 What, then, is order?

2.4 The Symbolic Narrative Hypothesis

“Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another [(the uncreated)], and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language [(the created)]; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression.”96

At this point we begin pointing to the form-structure (the basis for the resemblance as sympathy and antipathy) of relations that underlie divisions like the tension between invisible law (form) and manifest

94 Ibid. xix-xx.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid. xx.
emulation of said form above; while Foucault uses these ‘symbolic forms’ to problematize the banality of Modernity, we argue that his structuralist theoretical inclinations and understanding of classical esoteric philosophy (expressed in places like *History of Sexuality V. 2 and 3* and his discourse on knowledge as resemblance in *The Order of Things*) point to the fact that in many places—from this quotation to his discourse on *Las Meninas*—Foucault uses Infinite Substance and its emanations (form, force and consciousness) to structure the divisions by which he conducts his historical research. For another clear example see his division of order into two poles in *The Order of Things*. In other words, accepting that there are eternal forms (emanations of Infinite Substance) that structure the motion (force) of manifestation, we argue that Foucault (consciously or no) used ‘aeonian forms’ to structure his analysis of Modernity and thus embedded an ‘unspoken’ (and rather esoteric) symbolic narrative into the end of his oeuvre. As one must themselves come into intimacy with the dimension of self that, one might say, IS these aeonian forms, it is not uncommon for authors to leave such symbolic narratives ‘unspoken’; for example, see religious texts like the Bible, the works of Plato or novels like Goethe’s Faust, all of which Foucault was clearly very familiar with... Another point of inspiration for this hypothesis is Foucault’s engagement with the Islamic Philosophy and Translations of Henri Corbin (see *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital* for a text in which Corbin clearly articulates the method and rationale for the mode of symbolic communication that we posit as existing in silence under the visible surface of Foucault’s work. Another point of inspiration, which fits well with Foucault having a relationship with Corbin’s work later in his life, there is what some have titled ‘Foucault’s Iranian Connection’ and his focus on Iran’s “Spiritual Force” in the context of the Iranian Revolution. Others have observed a Buddhist Influence or ‘oriental subtext’ in Foucault’s work.

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103 This engagement with Corbin, Foucault’s cryptic remarks concerning the masons in the introduction to *Society Must Be Defended* (whose inner orders like the Shriners clearly delineate the relationship between Islamic Culture & Philosophy and the Templar, Bourgeois ‘revolution’ against the Old World Order that gave rise to Modernity)—which should be read in the context of Kevin Hetherington’s thesis in *The Badlands of Modernity* (clearly inspired by Foucault’s work) that masonic lodges in France were the heterotopic spaces of modernity—and, more generally, the relationship between Romanticism, Modernity and Moorish Spain (wherein European philosophical engagement with Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle in modernity derive their intellectual lineage through Islamic philosophers like Avicenna) all ameliorate the potential critique that Foucault’s ‘Eurocentric reading of Modern thought’ is incommensurable with the introduction of Islamic philosophers into this discussion.

(and indeed some authors have posited connections between Mahayana Buddhism and Islam based upon shared motifs like the Parrot who imitates death to escape its cage.)

“It has been said that a condition the prophet must adhere to is that his words should be symbols and his expressions hints. Or, as Plato says in the Laws: whoever does not understand the apostles’ symbols will not attain the Divine Kingdom. Moreover, the foremost Greek philosophers and prophets made us in their books of symbols and signs in which they hid their secret doctrine—men like Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. As for Plato, he had blamed Aristotle for divulging wisdom and making knowledge manifest so that Aristotle had to reply: “Even though I had done this, I have still left in my books many a pitfall which only the initiate among the wise and learned can understand.” [Thus the silence of Foucault’s symbolic narrative...]

Foucault’s ‘Iranian connection’ is most elucidating. In treatment of the Iranian revolution,

“Foucault maintains that the mass revolt whose sources he was attempting to explain to Europeans came from a ground swell of spirituality which the hyper-rationalized West was incapable of comprehending. In order to escape the despiritualization of cultural life from which the revolution’s religious leaders were struggling to save its constituent-followers, "an entire people” was, it would seem, prepared to renounce the amenities of modern life, including, presumably, the roads, railways, and the other infrastructural public works Reza Kahn, the first Pahlavi, had undertaken a half century earlier:

“Of the entire Kemalist program, international politics and internal forces only left the Pahlavis with one bone to gnaw on: modernization. And here this modernization has come to be roundly rejected. Not simply because of the defeats it has suffered, but for the very principle it represents. With the current agony of the Iranian regime, we are witnessing the final moments of an episode that some sixty years ago: an attempt "to modernize" Islamic countries in a Western fashion. The Shah is still clinging to [this aim] as if it were his only raison d’etre. I don't know if he's still looking to the year 2000. But I know his famous gaze dates from the 1920s."

“The “great becoming” Foucault foresees in October 1978 is one in which a decadent, not really so old order—"from its inception spinelessly subservient to Western colonial powers"—is toppled by a tidal wave of righteous, single-minded opposition from an undivided people whose will to emancipation was propelled by magnificent spiritual resolve.”

“In... the Iranian people’s categorical rejection of the modernization he declares “dead in its tracks,” this Western traveller appears to have stumbled upon a univocal mass whose spiritual elation... will compensate for the grueling labor and material burdens of the premodern life to which they are more than willing to return in order to fend off the deadening, corrupting influences of Western industrialism’s “world without spirit.”


Ibid. 23.

Ibid. 24.
“Foucault’s account of the revolution... [frames it as a] dualistic struggle between the modern and the antimodern, a David and Goliath contest pitting the forces of crass Western materialism against the spiritual transcendence of Islam.”

This hypothesis concerning symbolic narratives in Foucault’s late oeuvre and their relationship to his engagement with Islamic Philosophy is beyond the scope of this text and will thus be treated in a subsequent text.

Returning to Foucault’s definition of order above, we argue that he is symbolically outlining a model of order that is sensitive to both the uncreated and the created dimensions of reality. Foucault, then (again accepting the hypothesis concerning his underlying symbolical narrative), is positing a conception of order as UDU (unity and difference in unity and the unity of difference and unity): on the first pole we find the unified order of Infinite Substance and its emanations (force, form and consciousness) which exist ‘prior to’ and through manifestation; on the other pole we find the differentiated order of the created (multiplicity, the dimensional qualities of motion in passing time and physical space). Through such conceptions of order (those that respect the dimensional incommensurability of the infinite and the finite and thus refrain from reducing either to the other) can we begin to understand the world without doing violence (what might be called practical ‘ontological violence’112) to one or another of its fields of dimensional consistency as is necessitated by the Modernist world view’s reduction of reality to passing time and physical space (to the second of the two poles of order identified by Foucault).

Foucault defines the two poles as follows: the second pole (finite order) rests on “the fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices,” which “establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home.”113 The first pole rests on “the scientific theories or the philosophical interpretations which explain why order exists in general, what universal laws it obeys, what principle can account for it, and why this particular order has been established and not some other”, or, more simply, upon the ontological regime(s) (axioms logics, world view) one accepts.114 The material reason of Modernity, in which facts replace Eternal Truth as the foundation for the rational process, can be said to shift the foundation of reason

114 Ibid.
from the first pole (from the ‘simplest and most universal things’, which is to say Infinite Substance and its emanations) to the second (to an interpretation of facts as the ‘simplest and most universal things’). “

“...Between these two regions, so distant from one another, lies a domain which, even though its role is mainly an intermediary one, is nonetheless fundamental: it is more confused, more obscure, and probably less easy to analyze.” Drawing this point into conversation with our discussions of rationalism throughout this exploration, we should note that the cultivation of rational intuition (manifest practically as Wu Wei⁽¹¹⁾) allows for the unification of the two poles as rational intuition is formed as what we might understand an interference pattern between the essences of the two, dimensionally incommensurable poles and thus is able to harmonize them without stripping either of its essential qualities. From this lens, rational intuition (Wu Wei) is the latent cognitive potential that we can associate with this ‘domain that lies between’ the two poles of order.

“It is here [(in the rational intuition)] that a culture, imperceptibly deviating form the empirical orders prescribed for it by its primary codes, instituting an initial separation from them, causes them to lose their original transparency, relinquishes its immediate and invisible powers, frees itself sufficiently to discover that these orders are perhaps not the only possible ones or the best ones; the culture is then faced with the stark fact that there exists, below the level of its spontaneous orders, things that are in themselves capable of being ordered, that belong to a certain unspoken order; the fact, in short, that order exists [(the uncreated IS)]. As though emancipating itself to some extent from its linguistic, perceptual, and practical grids, the culture superimposed on them another kind of grid which neutralized them, which by this superimposition both revealed and excluded them at the same time, so that the culture, by this very process, came face to face with order in its primary state. It is on the basis of this newly perceived order that the codes of language, perception, and practice are criticized and rendered partially invalid. It is on the basis of this order, taken as a firm foundation, that general theories as to the ordering of things, and the interpretation that such an ordering involves, will be constructed.”⁽¹²⁾

Emancipation from the finite pole of order received from our sensory experience of the world in the context of a given culture can thus be understood as contingent upon our capacity to actualize our latent potential for rational intuition (Wu Wei) and compare the received, subjective order with the Infinite Substance and its emanations (which is to say our capacity to feel the sympathy of finite manifestation with the Infinite it reflects and ‘act without acting’ in order to harmonize the two⁽¹³⁾).

Foucault defines this middle region (which we understand as intuition and as potentially rational given sympathetic intimacy with the Infinite Substance and its emanations) as follows:

“Between the already ‘encoded’ eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself; it is here that it appears, according to the culture and the age in question, continuous and graduated or discontinuous and piecemeal, linked to space or constituted anew at each instant by the driving force of time, related to a series of variables or defined by separate systems of coherences, composed of resemblances which are either successive or corresponding, organized around increasing differences, etc. This middle region, then, in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then taken to be more or less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which is why this experience of order in its pure primary state always plays a critical role); more solid, more archaic, less dubious, always more ‘true’ than the theories that attempt to give those expressions explicit form, exhaustive application, or philosophical foundation (i.e. the Infinite is more true than attempts to represent it in finite space, which is to say that the perfect circle in its infinite, ideational state is more True than its attempted representation in finite space as a math equation). Thus, in every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself (in the rational, intuitive harmonization of the finite order created by and received from our culture and the infinite, eternal order of the uncreated—Truth), there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of being.”

2.5 Order in European History
Having provided this basic schema for order as mutually constituted by finite and infinite poles of order Foucault transitions into a historical study of these poles of order and their connections with conceptions of space and time to form epistemological orders and subsequent regimes of knowledge through Modern European history by examining the moments at which the two poles of order are constituted in a given society (what he titles ‘the Archeological Method’).

“I am concerned to show its developments, since the sixteenth century, in the main-stream of a culture such as ours: in what way, as one traces - against the current, as it were - language as it has been spoken, natural creatures as they have been perceived and grouped together, and exchanges as they have been practiced; in what way, then, our culture has made manifest the existence - of order, and how, to the modalities of that order, the exchanges owed their laws, the living beings their constants, the words their sequence and their representative value; what modalities of order have been recognized, posited, linked with space and time, in order to create the positive basis of knowledge as we find it employed in grammar and philology, in natural history and biology, in the study of wealth and political economy.”

“An inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory become possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed.... What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account, what should appear are those configurations within the space of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science. Such an enterprise is not so much a history, in the traditional meaning of that word, as an ‘archaeology’.”

Foucault, then, is conducting an inquiry into the ways in which the two poles of order come together in a given society to expand and constrain potential modes of rationality (i.e. to expand and constrain

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12Ibid. xxi.
13Ibid. xxi-xxii.
epistemological potentials).

Foucault isolates two essential discontinuities (what we might call an ‘archeological moment’) in this history of ‘Western Rationalities’, the first of which marks the beginning of the classical age in the midpoint of the seventeenth century [the Genesis of Modernity] and the second of which marks the beginning of the modern age at the beginning of the nineteenth century [the birth of ‘man’ from the Modernist Garden of Eden—the ‘state of nature’]. Through these ‘archeological moments’ “the mode of being of things, and of the order that divided them up before presenting them to the understanding, was profoundly altered.” Foucault concludes The Order of Things with a summary of the archeological moments observed through the period of European History the addressed in his study as well as notes concerning the relationship of this inquiry to Foucault’s earlier work on the history of madness.

“Archaeology, addressing itself to the general space of knowledge, to its configurations, and to the mode of being of the things that appear in it, defines systems of simultaneity, as well as the series of mutations necessary and sufficient to circumscribe the threshold of a new positivity.”

With regard to the classical era, Foucault notes “the coherence that existed... between the theory of representation and the theories of language, natural order and wealth-value.” With regard to the theory of representation in Modernity, Foucault argues

“It is this [classical] configuration that, from the nineteenth century onward, changes entirely; the theory of representation disappears as the universal foundation of all possible orders; language as the spontaneous tabula, the primary grid of things, as an indispensable link between representation and things, is eclipsed in its turn; a profound historicity penetrates into the heart of things, isolates and defines them in their own coherence, imposes upon them the forms of order implied by the continuity of time [and thus reduces reality to passing time and physical space]; the analysis of exchange and money gives way to the study of production, that of the organism takes precedence over the search for taxonomic characteristics, and, above all, language loses its privileged position and becomes, in its turn, a historical form coherent with the density of its own past. But as things become increasingly reflexive, seeking the principle of their intelligibility only in their own development, and abandoning the space of representation, man enters in his turn, and for the first time, the field of Western knowledge. Strangely enough, man - the study of whom is supposed by the naive to be the oldest investigation since Socrates - is probably no more than a kind of rift in the order of things, or, in any case, a configuration whose outlines are determined by the new position he has so recently taken up in the field of knowledge. Whence all the chimeras of the new humanisms, all the facile solutions of an 'anthropology' understood as a universal reflection on man, half-empirical, half-philosophical.”

123 Ibid.
124 Ibid. xxiii-xxiv.
125 Ibid. xxiii.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
We argue that this shift at the beginning of the Modern era represents the valorization of an ontological regime(s) (‘world view’) in which matter, passing time and physical space are posited as containing the first cause and all of reality, and where order is thus created within time and epistemic potentials are thus reduced to the limits of the peripatetic mind.

Drawing links to his research on *The History of Madness* Foucault notes

“It is evident that the present study is, in a sense, an echo of my undertaking to write a history of madness in the Classical age; it has the same articulations in time, taking the end of the Renaissance as its starting-point, then encountering, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, just as my history of madness did, the threshold of a modernity that we have not yet left behind. But whereas in the history of madness I was investigating the way in which a culture can determine in a massive, general form the difference that limits it, I am concerned here with observing how a culture experiences the propinquity of things, how it establishes the tabula of their relationships and the order by which they must be considered [i.e. rather than studying the form of difference this study interrogates the order from which difference comes to be known]. I am concerned, in short, with a history of resemblance: on what conditions was Classical thought able to reflect relations of similarity or equivalence between things, relations that would provide a foundation and a justification for their words, their classifications, their systems of exchange? What historical a priori provided the starting-point from which it was possible to define the great checkerboard of distinct identities established against the confused, undefined, faceless, and, as it were, indifferent background of differences? The history of madness would be the history of the Other—of that which, for a given culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to exorcize the interior danger) but by being shut away (in order to reduce its otherness); whereas the history of the order imposed on things would be the history of the Same—of that which, for a given culture, is both dispersed and related, therefore to be distinguished by kinds and to be collected together into identities.”

Where Foucault studied the negative conceptualizations of rationality (that which is other to the rational) in *The History of Madness, The Order of Things* leads us to analyze positive conceptualizations of rationality in the Classical and Modern eras. “In attempting to uncover the deepest strata of Western culture, I am restoring to our silent and apparently immobile soil its rifts, its instability, its flaws; and it is the same ground that is once more stirring under our feet.”

2.6 Quad-Similitude

“Up to the end of the sixteenth century, resemblance played a constructive role in the knowledge of Western culture. It was resemblance that largely guided exegesis and the interpretation of texts; it was resemblance that organized the play of symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible and invisible, and controlled the art of representing them. The universe was folded in upon itself: the earth echoing the sky; faces seeing themselves reflected in the stars, and plants holding within their stems the secrets that were of use to man. Painting imitated space. And representation - whether in the service of pleasure or of knowledge - was posited as a form of repetition: the theatre of life or the mirror of nature, that was the claim made by all language, its manner of declaring its existence and of formulating its right of speech.”

129 Ibid.
Foucault introduces “The Prose of the World” with the above note concerning the dominance of what we might call hermetic thought (thought that can aptly be described by the dictum ‘as above, so below’) from the beginnings of presently recorded human history through the end of the sixteenth century (through the ‘golden dawn’ of the Modernist era...). The essential hermetic dictum, ‘as above, so below’, can be understood as the basic Truth that all levels of manifestation are structured by the same forms (i.e. that atomic attraction, love and gravity are all the same aeonian form expressed different dimensional environments).

Let us take the aeon we associate with love as our example. When manifest in an atomic dimensional quality this aeon is attraction. At the human level it manifests as love, At the celestial level it manifests as gravity. While each manifestation of the aeon takes on a different quality as per the field of dimensional consistency (the environment) in which it is manifest, all of the manifestations hold an essential resemblance as they have the same aeonian foundation (i.e. the same ‘seed’ planted in different types of soil). We can, then, conceptualize aeons as seeds, and the field of dimensional consistency in which they manifest as the soil, water, wind, sun, etc. that form the natural environment in which a seed grows. From this perspective we can understand Nomad Explorations as an attempt to revitalize the hermetic science of resemblance (the loss of which, as we see below, gave rise to the analytic, positivist, functionalist epistemologies—the material rationalities based on fact rather than Truth—of Modernity).

Returning to our earlier discussion concerning the association of Modernism with the reduction of reality to passing time and physical space, we can understand the death of hermetic thought and its sensitivity towards the rational truth implicit in aeonian resemblance (in the shared essence that gives rise to resemblance) an essential step in the Modernist reduction of epistemological potential to the peripatetic mind (peripatetic reductionism was born from the ashes of knowledge as resemblance). The normative assumptions about reality established by Jesuit, Empiricist-Analytic, Masonic\footnote{Hetherington, K 1997, The Badlands of Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering, Psychology Press.}, etc. Philosophy during the golden dawn of the Modernist era came to be manifest in the basic techniques-practices of the colonial project; the reduction of humans to ‘natural,’ ‘physical’, discrete, individual, biological beings amenable to categorization and quantification (i.e. being which can be known in the terms of the peripatetic mind); the valorization of precise empirical measurement as the foundation of pure knowledge (especially in the fetishization of physically precise mapping procedures), which is to say the reduction of Truth to fact; the reduction of time to its linear dimension (that quality of time which we experience through our sensory faculties), the precise
measurement of this linear dimension and the disciplining of one’s life by the increasingly granular sections by which time is divided by Modernity (from seasons-days to hours-minutes, from minutes to seconds and into tenths, hundredths and thousands of seconds with the rise of electronic measurement tools); etc. etc. etc. What, however, is the essential role of these techniques-practices in the colonial project? At first glance we might be lead to answer such questions in terms of the material consequences of these techniques-practices; the coercive disciplining of space; the coercive disciplining of behavior; the increased capacity for mass surveillance; biologically racist and sexist governmental practices; etc. While these material manifestations are of course essential for understanding the colonial project, we argue that their essential importance comes in their socializing effects on colonial subjects (their transmission of an implicit world view) rather than their stated purposes and ‘tangible effects’. The essential import of reducing time to its linear dimension, precisely measuring of this linear dimension and disciplining of behavior based on the dimensional quality of this linear dimension comes in the ways in which such practices constrain and expand epistemic potentials rather than in and of the practices themselves (this harkens to Barnesmoore’s (2016) argument that human evolution is an essentially epistemological, rather than biological, process). Modernist power, then, can be understood in one sense as a technique by which people are dominated through control over how they think rather than what they think (i.e. through socializing people in a manner expands and constrains the potential of how they think rather than coercively attempting to define what they are thinking about—through manufacturing what Foucault describes as ‘the stark impossibility of thinking that’). Empiricism is essential to empire, then, in the epistemic influence practices derived from the assumptions of empiricism exert upon individuals and publics socialized by said empiricist (colonial-imperial) practices.

At the heart of this epistemic influence is the death of the potential for a rational process founded upon resemblance (upon the Infinite Substance and its emanations).

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133 Ferguson, J 2006, ‘The Anti-politics Machine’ in Sharma & Gupta, eds., The Anthropology of the State: a Reader, Blackwell. While Ferguson takes a problematic turn that harkens to Latour (in arguing that many of the outcomes of US imperialism are simply ‘unintended consequences’), the basic observation that the essential outcomes of USAID imperialism were different from the stated goals and intentions provides an analogy for our argument (i.e. the divide between rhetoric and material realities...).

“Anything that inheres in another essentially, exists in it in actuality as long as the latter exists; and anything that inheres in another accidentally, exists in it potentially at one time and actually at another.... I now say: there exists in man a faculty by which he is differentiated from the rest of animals and other things. This is called the rational soul. It is found in all men without exception, but not in all its particulars since its powers vary among men [i.e. it is a potentiality expressed to different degrees of perfection in each individual]. Thus there is a first power [(the pillar of form)] ready to become informed with the universal forms [(aeons)] abstracted from matter, which in itself has no form [this is the spirit in its latent state prior to the actualization of its potential for reason and rational intuition (Wu Wei) through the process of manifestation. For this reason it is called the material intellect [(the peripatetic mind)] by analogy with prime matter [(the prima materia)]. It is an intellect in potentiality in the way that fire in potentiality is a cold thing, not in the sense in which fire is said to have the potentiality to burn. Then there is a second power [(the pillar of force)], which has the capability and the positive disposition to conceive the universal forms because it contains the generally accepted opinions [(reason, the intellect by which we extract the aeconian essence from the experiences registered by the peripatetic mind)]. It is also an intellect in potentiality, but in the sense in which we say that fire has the potentiality to burn. There is, besides these two a third power that is actually informed with the forms of the universal intelligibles [(rational intuition, Wu Wei)] of which the other two form a part when these have become actualized. This third power is called the acquired intellect. It does not exist actually in the material intellect and thus does not exist in it essentially. Hence the existence of the acquired intellect in the material intellect is due to something in which it exists essentially and that causes existence [i.e. due to Infinite Substance and its emanations]; thorough it, what was potential becomes actual. This is called the universal intellect, the universal soul, and the world soul.”

2.7 Qualities of Resemblance
Foucault analyzes the ‘semantic web of resemblance’ in the sixteenth century to elucidate the qualities of resemblance by which people came to know the world—what sort of resemblance can things hold in the public mind given the concepts provided by a culture-society to describe different qualities of resemblance and what are the epistemic potentials established therein? Amicitia, Aequalitas (contracts, consensus, matrimonium, societas, pax, et similia), Consonantia, Concertus, Continuum, Paritas, Proportio, Similitudo, Conjunctio, Copula. And there are a great many other notions that intersect, overlap, reinforce, or limit one another on the surface of thought.

Foucault outlines four essential figures (forms of similitude) that aptly illustrate the potential for knowledge as resemblance: convenientia, acemulatio, analogy, sympathies.

Convenientia, the first essential quality of resemblance, is the most overtly spatial category.

“The word really denotes the adjacency of places more strongly than it does similitudes. Those things are ‘convenient’ which come sufficiently close to one another to be in juxtaposition; their edges touch, their fringes intermingle, the extremity of the one also denotes the beginning of the other. In this way, movement, influences, passions, and properties too, are communicated. So that in this hinge between two things a resemblance appears. A resemblance that becomes double as soon as one attempts to unravel it: a resemblance of that place, the site upon which nature has placed the two things, and thus a similitude of properties; for in this natural

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15 Ibid.
container, the world, adjacency is not an exterior relation between things, but the sign of a relationship, obscure though it may be. And then, from this contact, by exchange, there arise new resemblances; a common regimen becomes necessary; upon the similitude that was the hidden reason for their propinquity is superimposed a resemblance that is the visible effect of that proximity. Body and soul, for example, are doubly ‘convenient’: the soul had to be made dense, heavy, and terrestrial for God to place it in the very heart of matter \( \text{(one might say, instead, that entry into matter made the soul dense, heavy, and terrestrial to avoid the anthropomorphization of God associated with ‘placing’ something and the connotation in the above that the soul was made dense prior to manifestation rather than through manifestation)}. \) But through this propinquity, the soul receives the movements of the body and assimilates itself to that body, while ‘the body is altered and corrupted by the passions of the soul’. \( \text{[The specter of Abrahamic and Hellenic metaphysics, i.e. the fall, rears its head in describing the convenientia resemblance between body and soul in terms of corruption—other traditions might say that matter is enlivened (rather than corrupted) by the passions of the soul, and that the soul evolves (rather than simply being corrupted) through its manifestation in matter)}. \]

In the vast syntax of the world, the different beings adjust themselves to one another; the plant communicates with the animal, the earth with the sea, man with everything around him. Resemblance imposes adjacencies that in their turn guarantee further resemblances. Place and similitude become entangled: we see mosses growing on the outside of shells, plants in the antlers of stags, a sort of grass on the faces of men; and the strange zoophyte, by mingling together the properties that make it similar to plants and similar to animals, also juxtaposes them. All so many signs of convenience.

Convenientia is a resemblance connected with space in the form of a graduated scale of proximity.... This is why it pertains less to the things themselves \( \text{[in their essence, in the aeon(s) that structure(s) their manifestation]} \) than to the world in which they exist. The world is simply the universal ‘convenience’ of things.... Thus, by this linking of resemblance with space, this ‘convenience’ brings like things together and makes adjacent things similar, the world is linked together like a chain. At each point of contact there begins and ends a link that resembles the one before it and the one after it; and from circle to circle, these similitudes continue, holding the extremes apart (God and matter) \( \text{[might we say that they initiate remembrance that God and matter are one]}. \) yet bringing them together in such a way that the will of the Almighty may penetrate into the most unawakened comers. It is this immense, taut, and vibrating chain, this rope of ‘convenience’, that Porta evokes in a passage from his \text{Magie naturelle}:

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\text{As with respect to its vegetation the plant stands convenient to the brute beast, so through feeling does the brutish animal to man, who is conformable to the rest of the stars by his intelligence; these links proceed so strictly that they appear as a rope stretched from the first cause as far as the lowest and smallest of things, by a reciprocal and continuous connection; in such wise that the superior virtue, spreading its beams, reaches so far that if we touch one extremity of that cord it will make tremble and move all the rest.}^{18}
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We can, then, conceive of \text{convenientia (convenience)} as a form of resemblance derived from the environmental influence of manifestation (as articulated by the field of dimensional consistency—motion, change, difference, etc.—in manifestation). If manifestation is the articulation of Infinite Substance and its emanations in the change, difference, etc. associated with the plane of manifestation, then we can think of \text{convenientia} as similarity held between manifestations as a function of their shared environment of manifestation. Convenientia is a mode of resemblance that finds its root in the place and space of manifestation. When Waldo Tobler expounded his ‘First Law of Geography’, that “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things,” he was,

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knowingly or no, referring to the resemblance of *convenience.*

The second essential quality of resemblance identified by Foucault is *aemulatio.*

“...Aemulatio (emulation): a sort of 'convenience' that has been freed from the law of place and is able to function, without motion, from a distance. Rather as though the spatial collusion of convenientia had been broken, so that the links of the chain, no longer connected, reproduced their circles at a distance from one another in accordance with a resemblance that needs no contact. There is something in emulation of the reflection and the mirror: it is the means whereby things scattered through the universe can answer one another. The human face, from afar, emulates the sky, and just as man's intellect is an imperfect reflection of God's wisdom, so his two eyes, with their limited brightness, are a reflection of the vast illumination spread across the sky by sun and moon; the mouth is Venus, since it gives passage to kisses and words of love; the nose provides an image in miniature of Jove's scepter and Mercury's staff. The relation of emulation enables things to imitate one another from one end of the universe to the other without connection or proximity: by duplicating itself in a mirror the world abolishes the distance proper to it; in this way it overcomes the place allotted to each thing ([aemulatio, then, can be understood as the resemblance of objects that rises from their acting as vessel for the same aspect of the Infinite Substance’s emanations (their manifestation under the influence of the same celestial spheres, the same aeons, the same Sephiroth, etc.)). But which of these reflections coursing through space are the original images? Which is the reality and which the projection? It is often not possible to say, for emulation is a sort of natural twinship existing in things; it arises from a fold in being, the two sides of which stand immediately opposite to one another. Paracelsus compares this fundamental duplication of the world to the image of two twins 'who resemble one another completely, without its being possible for anyone to say which of them brought its similitude to the other' ([as their similitude lies in their shared aeon—in being a reflection of the same shard of eternity]).

However, emulation does not leave the two reflected figures it has confronted in a merely inert state of opposition. One may be weaker, and therefore receptive to the stronger influence of the other, which is thus reflected in his passive mirror. Are not the stars, for example, dominant over the plants of the earth, of which they are the unchanged model, the unalterable form, and over which they have been secretly empowered to pour the whole dynasty of their influences? The dark earth is the mirror of the star-sown sky, but the two rivals are neither of equal value nor of equal dignity in that tournament. The bright colours of the flowers reproduce, without violence, the pure form of the sky ([in this aeonian emulation (aemulatio) things are tied together in that they are reflections of the same aeon]). As Crollius says:

The stars are the matrix of all the plants and every star in the sky is only the spiritual prefiguration of a plant, such that it represents that plant, and just as each herb or plant is a terrestrial star looking up at the sky, so also each star is a celestial plant in spiritual form, which differs from the terrestrial plants in matter alone..., the celestial plants and herbs are turned towards the earth and look directly down upon the plants they have procreated, imbuing them with some particular virtue ([again, that they differ in matter alone demonstrates that it is the Infinite Substance manifesting in different vessels]).

But the lists may remain open, and the untroubled mirror reflects only the image of 'two wrathful soldiers'. Similitude then becomes the combat of one form against another - or rather of one and the same form separated from itself by the weight of matter or distance in space. Man as Paracelsus describes him is, like the firmament, 'constellated with stars', but he is not bound to it like 'the thief to his galley-oar, the murderer to the wheel, the fish to the fisherman, the quarry to the huntsman'. It pertains to the firmament of man to be 'free and powerful', to 'bow to no order', and 'not to be ruled by any other created beings'. His inner sky may remain autonomous and depend only upon itself, but on condition that by means of his wisdom, which is also knowledge, he comes to resemble the order of the world, takes it back into himself and thus recreates in his inner firmament the sway of that other firmament in which he sees the gliter of the visible stars ([humanity is conceptualized as microcosm of the multiverse (the manifest macrocosm) in that humanity is a manifestation of

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the same Infinite Substance and emanations as the universe and thus differs from the universe only in the scale of the material vessel in which it manifests (in its resemblance of convenience). If he does this, then the wisdom of the mirror will in turn be reflected back to envelop the world in which it has been placed; its great ring will spin out into the depths of the heavens, and beyond; man will discover that he contains 'the stars within himself... and that he is thus the bearer of the firmament with all its influences'. 

If he does this, then the wisdom of the mirror will in turn be reflected back to envelop the world in which it has been placed; its great ring will spin out into the depths of the heavens, and beyond; man will discover that he contains 'the stars within himself... and that he is thus the bearer of the firmament with all its influences'. (This is illumination, enlightenment, recollection of the Self, etc.... This is the perfected state of humanity symbolically manifested in figures like the Buddha, Krishna, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, etc. This is the pinnacle of the human mountain.)

Emulation is posited in the first place in the form of a mere reflection, furtive and distant; it traverses the spaces of the universe in silence. But the distance it crosses is not annulled by the subtle metaphor of emulation; it remains open to the eye. And in this duel, the two confronting figures seize upon one another. Like envelops like, which in turn surrounds the other, perhaps to be enveloped once more in a duplication which can continue ad infinitum. The links of emulation, unlike the elements of convenientia, do not form a chain but rather a series of concentric circles reflecting and rivaling one another.”

If we compare convenientia and aemulatio in metaphorical terms, we can understand convenientia as resemblance that rises from seeds growing in the same sort of dirt or environment, and aemulatio as the resemblance that rises from seeds being produced by the same plant... Aemulatio is the resemblance of things that rises from their shared seed.

The third essential form of resemblance is analogy.

“An old concept already familiar to Greek science and medieval thought, but one whose use has probably become different now. In this analogy, convenientia and aemulatio are superimposed. Like the latter, it makes possible the marvelous confrontation of resemblances across space; but it also speaks, like the former, of adjacencies, of bonds and joints. Its power is immense, for the similitudes of which it treats are not the visible, substantial ones between things themselves; they need only be the more subtle resemblances of relations. Disencumbered thus, it can extend, from a single given point, to an endless number of relationships. For example, the relation of the stars to the sky in which they shine may also be found: between plants and the earth, between living beings and the globe they inhabit, between minerals such as diamonds and the rocks in which they are buried, between sense organs and the face they animate, between skin moles and the body of which they are the secret marks. An analogy may also be turned around upon itself without thereby rendering itself open to dispute. The old analogy of plant to animal (the vegetable is an animal living head down, its mouth - or roots - buried in the earth), is neither criticized nor disposed of by Cesalpino; on the contrary, he gives it added force, he multiplies it by itself when he makes the discovery that a plant is an upright animal, whose nutritive principles rise from the base up to the summit, channeled along a stem that stretches upwards like a body and is topped by a head - spreading flowers and leaves: a relation that inverts but does not contradict the initial analogy, since it places 'the root in the lower part of the plant and the stem in the upper part, for the venous network in animals also begins in the lower part of the belly, and the principal vein rises up to the heart and head'.

This reversibility and this polyvalency endow analogy with a universal field of application. Through it, all the figures in the whole universe can be drawn together. There does exist, however, in this space, furrowed in every direction, one particularly privileged point; it is saturated with analogies (all analogies can find one of their necessary terms there), and as they pass through it, their relations may be inverted without losing any of their force. This point is man: he stands in proportion to the heavens, just as he does to animals and plants, and as he does also to the earth, to metals, to stalactites or storms (again, the microcosm of the macrocosm). Upright between the surfaces of the universe, he stands in relation to the firmament (his face is to his body what the face of heaven is to the ether; his pulse beats in his veins as the stars circle the sky according to their own fixed paths; the seven orifices in his head are to his face what the seven planets are to the sky); but he is also the fulcrum upon which all these relations turn, so that we find them again, their similarity unimpaired, in the analogy of the

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human animal to the earth it inhabits: his flesh is a glebe, his bones are rocks, his veins great rivers, his bladder is the sea, and his seven principal organs are the metals hidden in the shafts of mines. Man's body is always the possible half of a universal atlas. It is well known how Pierre Belon drew, and drew in the greatest detail, the first comparative illustration of the human skeleton and that of birds: in it, we see

the pinion called the appendix which is in proportion to the wing and in the same place as the thumb on the hand; the extremity of the pinion which is like the fingers in us ...; the bone given as legs to the bird corresponding to our heel; just as we have four toes on our feet, so the birds have four fingers of which the one behind is proportionate to the big toe in us (the bird being a traditional symbol for the soul)...

So much precision is not, however, comparative anatomy except to an eye armed with nineteenth-century knowledge. It is merely that the grid through which we permit the figures of resemblance to enter our knowledge happens to coincide at this point (and at almost no other) with that which sixteenth-century learning had laid over things.

In fact, Belon's description has no connection with anything but the positivity which, in his day, made it possible. It is neither more rational nor more scientific than an observation such as Aldrovandi's comparison of man's baser parts to the fouler parts of the world, to Hell, to the darkness of Hell, to the damned souls who are like the excrement of the Universe; it belongs to the same analogical cosmography as the comparison, classic in Crollius's time, between apoplexy and tempests: the storm begins when the air becomes heavy and agitated; then the clouds pile up, the belly swells, the thunder explodes and the bladder bursts; the lightning flashes and the eyes glitter with a terrible brightness, the rain falls, the mouth foams, the thunderbolt is unleashed and the spirits burst open breaches in the skin; but then the sky becomes clear again, and in the sick man reason regains ascendancy. The space occupied by analogies is really a space of radiation. Man is surrounded by it on every side; but, inversely, he transmits these resemblances back into the world from which he receives them. He is the great fulcrum of proportions – the centre upon which relations are concentrated and from which they are once again reflected."

In a sense, then, we can understand analogy as the dialectical articulation of resemblance through convenientia and aemulatio that allows us to describe convenientia and aemulatio in terms of seed and soil. It is the linear chain of convenientia associated with manifestation and the nonlinear cycles of aemulatio associated with generation via shared aeons that together allow us to form rational knowledge of that which we cannot know in purely peripatetic terms (i.e. rational extraction Infinite Substance and its emanations essence from environments and forms of emulation by analogizing the our observations of the same seed in different soils and different seeds in the same soil).

It is in this tension between the resemblance of manifestations brought on by aemulatio and the differences (which resembles themselves when produced by similar environmental contexts) of manifestations necessitated by manifestation in the finite that we come to know Truth. Aemulatio can be conceived of as the pillar of form, the negative polarity, magnetism, the latent principle that structures the potential of manifestation imputes its implicit unity (-). Convenientia can be conceived of as the pillar of force, the positive polarity, electricity, the active principle associated with manifestation that gives rise to change, difference, chaos, multiplicity, etc. (+). Analogy, then, is the pillar of awareness (consciousness), the middle way, the harmonization (unity) of unity and difference (o) that allows us to enter into sympathetic intimacy with infinite substance and know the world therein...

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Illustration 2: ‘The Tree of Life’ JM Hamade 2016
The final essential form of resemblance observed by Foucault is *sympathies* (sympathy).

“Lastly, the fourth form of resemblance is provided by the play of sympathies. And here, no path has been determined in advance, no distance laid down, no links prescribed. Sympathy plays through the depths of the universe in a free state. It can traverse the vastest spaces in an instant; it falls like a thunderbolt from the distant planet upon the man ruled by that planet; on the other hand, it can be brought into being by a simple contact - as with those ‘mourning roses that have been used at obsequies’ which, simply from their former adjacency with death, will render all persons who smell them ‘sad and moribund’. But such is its power that sympathy is not content to spring from a single contact and speed through space; it excites the things of the world to movement and can draw even the most distant of them together. It is a principle of mobility: it attracts what is heavy to the heaviness of the earth, what is light up towards the weightless ether; it drives the root towards the water, and it makes the great yellow disk of the sunflower turn to follow the curving path of the sun. Moreover, by drawing things towards one another in an exterior and visible movement, it also gives rise to a hidden interior movement - a displacement of qualities that take over from one another in a series of relays: fire, because it is warm and light, rises up into the air, towards which its flames untiringly strive; but in doing so it loses its dryness (which made it akin to the earth) and so acquires humidity (which links it to water and air); it disappears therefore into light vapour, into blue smoke, into clouds: it has become air. Sympathy is an instance of the Same so strong and so insistent that it will not rest content to be merely one of the forms of likeness; it has the dangerous power of assimilating, of rendering things identical to one another, of mingling them, of causing their individuality to disappear - and thus of rendering them foreign to what they were before. Sympathy transforms. It alters, but in the direction of identity, so that if its power were not counter-balanced it would reduce the world to a point, to a homogeneous mass, to the featureless form of the Same: all its parts would hold together and communicate with one another without a break, with no distance between them, like those metal chains held suspended by sympathy to the attraction of a single magnet *[this is the rational intuition, the active intellect, Wu Wei, our capacity to feel the implicit unity in multiplicity; it is counterbalanced by the difference, change, multiplicity, etc. imputed by the passing time and physical space field of dimensional consistency associated with manifestation]*.

This is why sympathy is compensated for by its twin, antipathy. Antipathy maintains the isolation of things and prevents their assimilation; it encloses every species within its impenetrable difference and its propensity to continue being what it is:

> It is fairly widely known that the plants have hatreds between themselves ... it is said that the olive and the vine hate the cabbage; the cucumber flies from the olive . . . Since they grow by means of the sun's warmth and the earth's humour, it is inevitable that any thick and opaque tree should be pernicious to the others, and also the tree that has several roots.

And so to infinity, through all time, the world's beings will hate one another and preserve their ferocious appetites in opposition to all sympathy *[while it may be true that the individuation of consciousness in biological vesseles has some consequences that cannot be overcome, we argue that remembrance of the relative ephemerality of antipathy and the eternity of sympathy allows for the rational mediation of these consequences and, indeed, that this remembrance of eternal sympathy is in one sense the telos of conscious evolution]*.

The rat of India is pernicious to the crocodile, since Nature has created them enemies; in such wise that when that violent reptile takes his pleasure in the sun, the rat lays an ambush for it of mortal subtlety; perceiving that the crocodile, lying unaware for delight, is sleeping with its jaws agape, it makes its way through them and slips down the wide throat into the crocodile's belly, gnawing through the entrails of which, it emerges at last from the slain beast's bowel. *[The ancient myth of the mammal slaying the reptile to escape exile, an escape analogous with the Parrot escaping its cage in Mahayana Buddhist and Islamic writings or the individual escaping Plato’s Cave, is to escape ignorance and be reborn into Truth—it is escaping the illusion of the Maya, which is to say the illusion that the sensory world of passing time and physical space is the extent of reality and subsequent epistemological norms, into a*
mode of knowing that accepts the reality of and is intimate with Infinite substance, its emanations and the other dimensions of reality that exist beyond 'the veil' of the material reality our bodies inhabit. In this telling, however, the implication is that tension rises as a function of disharmony in the relationship between the aeonian forms emulated by manifestations rather than to the privation imposed upon the aeons by manifestation (this is a very paternalist notion rising from cosmologies that ascribe qualities like vengefulness, bitterness, astringency, etc. to Infinite Substance and thus locate the origins of tension and conflicts in the uncreated). Put in different terms, the Paternalists ascribe the cause of tension and conflict ('evil') to the Infinite Substance and its emanations rather than to the privation of good associated with the inability of the finite to perfectly reflect the infinite; they posit what we might call evil as necessary and eternal (as an eternal, binary opposition to good) rather than as the privation of the good (which manifests in degrees of perfection rather than binary opposition to evil).]

But the rat's enemies are lying in wait for it in their turn: for it lives in discord with the spider [for ‘Man’ is but a marionette dancing on the webs of spiders], and 'battling with the aspic it oft so dies'. Through this play of antipathy, which disperses them, yet draws them with equal force into mutual combat, makes them into murderers and then exposes them to death in their turn, things and animals and all the forms of the world remain what they are.

The identity of things, the fact that they can resemble others and be drawn to them, though without being swallowed up or losing their singularity - this is what is assured by the constant counterbalancing of sympathy and antipathy. It explains how things grow, develop, intermingle, disappear, die, yet endlessly find themselves again; in short, how there can be space (which is nevertheless not without landmarks or repetitions, not without havens of similitude) and time (which nevertheless allows the same forms, the same species, the same elements to reappear indefinitely) [i.e. how there can be any form of essentiality or generality in a dimensional field typified by motion, 'chance', change and difference].

Though yet of themselves the four bodies (water, air, fire, earth) be simple and possessed of their distinct qualities, yet forasmuch as the Creator has ordained that the elementary bodies shall be composed of mingled elements, therefore are their harmonies and discordancies remarkable, as we may know from their qualities. The element of fire is hot and dry; it has therefore an antipathy to those of water, which is cold and damp. Hot air is humid, cold earth is dry, which is an antipathy. That they may be brought into harmony, air has been placed between fire and water, water between earth and air. Inasmuch as the air is hot, it marches well with fire and its humidity goes well with that of water. The humidity of water is heated by the heat of the air and brings relief to the cold dryness of the earth [this is Sophia, Wisdom, the link between the Infinite and the finite that allows for harmony in manifestation].

Because of the movement and the dispersion created by its laws, the sovereignty of the sympathy-antipathy pair gives rise to all the forms of resemblance. The first three similitudes are thus all resumed and explained by it. The whole volume of the world, all the adjacencies of 'convenience', all the echoes of emulation, all the linkages of analogy, are supported, maintained, and doubled by this space governed by sympathy and antipathy, which are ceaselessly drawing things together and holding them apart. By means of this interplay, the world remains identical; resemblances continue to be what they are, and to resemble one another. The same remains the same, riveted onto itself.101

Sympathy and Antipathy, then, can be understood as the products of the rational intuition (the feeling derived from bringing what is known by reason to bear in a single movement of the mind to ‘interpret’ the manifest world); they could be understood as feelings derived from the acquired intellect (as a potential that is actualized by remembering and cultivating intimacy with the dimension of self that is

infinite (as a potential that is actualized by remembering and cultivating intimacy with the dimension of self that is Infinite Substance and its emanations) Sympathy and antipathy are, one might say, ‘emotive manifestations of Truth’. Sympathy allows us to feel the degree of perfection manifestation attains in reflecting the infinite; antipathy allows us to feel the privation of perfection imposed by manifestation of the infinite in the finite.

2.8 Vague Associations
The Mind of the Mystic
is Rocked by Vague Association,
by Resemblance,
The Shadow of Truth in Fact,
Shards of Aeon.

Resemblance of Convenience,
Shared Environment of Manifestation,
Soil in which Seeds are Sewn,
Provides the First Polarity
driving the Wheel of Analogy.
Resemblance of Emulation,
Seeds of Truth
Germinated in the Soil of Convenience,
Form Manifest,
Provides the Second Polarity
driving the Wheel of Analogy.
The Wheel of Analogy Extracts Emulation from Convenience,
Aeon from its Environment of Manifestation,
and in so doing Renders us Intimate with the Uncreated,
with the ‘Simplest and Most Universal’ Dimension of Reality
from which Rational Intuition,
Sympathy with Aeon,
Rational Knowledge of Form
Derived from the Wheel of Analogy
Manifest by Mind
in a Single, Silent Movement.
Allow us to Feel the Degree of Perfection
In Manifestations Reflection of the Eternal.

It is in Feeling,
in Analogical Sympathy with the Uncreated,
Intimacy with the Divine,
Intellectual Love,
in Feeling Shards of Aeon,
that I find Silent Bliss,
Intimacy with my Origin,
with the Whole of my Being.

The Mind of the Mystic
finds Blissful Silence in Vague Associations,
in the Shadows of Truth that Pervade our World
As Above
So Below.

2.9 ‘Signatures’

Foucault notes a further quality of similitude that allows humanity to become aware of these essential qualities of resemblance. As convenientia, aemulatio, analogy, and sympathies represent the represent the four essential mechanisms by which things take on resemblance, signatures are the qualities of things that allow us to (re)collect resemblance.

“We might make our way through all this marvelous teeming abundance of resemblances without even suspecting that it has long been prepared by the order of the world... There must be some mark that makes us aware of these things; otherwise, the secret would remain indefinitely dormant... These buried similitudes must be indicated on the surface of things; there must be visible [though often we feel, rather than observe—see Meng Zi on ‘Sprouts of Goodness’ below] marks for the invisible analogies.”

“There are no resemblances without signatures. The world of similarity can only be a world of signs. Paracelsus says:

It is not God’s will that what he creates for man’s benefit and what he has given us should remain hidden... And even though he has hidden certain things, he has allowed nothing to remain without exterior and visible signs in the form of special marks – just as a man who has buried a hoard of treasure marks the spot that he may find it again.

A knowledge of similitudes is founded upon unearthing the decipherment of these signatures. It is useless to go no further than the skin or bark of plants if you wish to know their nature; you must go straight to their marks – to the shadow and image of God that they bear or to their internal virtue, which has been given to them by heaven as a natural dowry, a virtue, I say, that is to be recognized rather by its signature.”

We bring our knowledge of these similitudes to bear in knowing the world through use of rational intuition (which takes what is known by rationality and operationalizes it in a single movement of the mind that is both intellectual and emotive, as both a mode of knowing and of feeling). It is thus that traditions aiming to catalyze actualization of the human potential for conscious evolution find their

145“A heart-mind that sympathizes is the sprout of co-humanity [ren]; a heart-mind that is aware of shame is the sprout of rightness [yi]; a heart-mind that defers to others is the sprout of ritual propriety [li]; a heart-mind that approves and condemns is the sprout of wisdom [zhi].... If anyone having the four sprouts within himself knows how to develop them to the full, it is like fire catching alight, or a spring as it first bursts through. If able to develop them, he is able to protect the entire world; if unable, he is unable to serve even his parents. (2A6)”


147 Ibid. 26, Bold Emphasis Added.
linguistic foundation in a technical language of symbolism.\textsuperscript{10} “Having eyes, see ye not? And having ears, hear ye not? And do ye not remember?”\textsuperscript{10} You have eyes, but you cannot see the resemblance of all things. You have ears, but you cannot hear the resemblance of all vibrations. You do not remember (anamnesis) the Infinite Substance and its emanations or the many modes of intimacy you have shared with Infinite Substance and its emanations through your many lives. The signatures are implicit in our being, our essence, and indeed can be understood as a dimension of Self—we need but remember that which we have always known in the deep recesses of our being...

“Resemblance was the invisible form of that which, from the depths of the world, made things visible [(‘let there be light’)]; but in order that this form may be brought out into the light in its turn there must be a visible [(visceral might be more clear as it leaves space for, say, emotive signatures of goodness, but here visible connotes ‘light’ in a more essential sense...)] figure that will draw it out from its profound invisibility. This is why the face of the world is covered with blazons, with characters, with ciphers and obscure words - with 'hieroglyphics'\textsuperscript{14}.... ‘Is it not true that all herbs, plants, trees and other things issuing from the bowels of the earth are so many magic books and signs? The great untroubled mirror in whose depths things gazed at themselves and reflected their own images back to one another is, in reality, filed with the murmer of words. The mute reflections all have corresponding words which indicate them. And by the grace of one final form of resemblance, which envelops all the others and encloses them within a single circle, the world may be compared to a man with the power of speech:

Just as the secret movements of his understanding are manifested by his voice, so it would seem that the herbs speak to the curious physician through their signatures, discovering him..., their inner virtues hidden beneath nature’s veil of silence.”\textsuperscript{16}

“What form constitutes a sign and endows it with its particular value as a sign? - Resemblance does. It signifies exactly in so far as it resembles what it is indicating (that is, a similitude). The signature and what it denotes are of exactly the same nature; it is merely that they obey a different law of distribution; the pattern from which they are cut is the same [(the signature and what it denotes are of one as the candle’s flame and its reflection in a mirror—signatures are reflections of Infinite Substance and its emanations)].”\textsuperscript{16}

“Let us call the totality of learning and skills that enable one to make the signs speak and to discover their meaning [i.e. the ability to feel true value made possible by Conscious Evolution, Wu Wei, the capacity to feel the objective value of manifestation in its sympathetic relation to the Infinite Substance and emanations it reflects], hermeneutics; let us call the totality of the learning and skills that enable one to distinguish the locations of the signs, to define what constitutes them as signs, and to know how and by what laws they are linked semiology [(peripatetic reason and rational analogy)]; the sixteenth century superimposed hermeneutics and semiology in the form of similitude. The search for meaning is to bring to light to a resemblance. To search

\textsuperscript{10} As already noted, see Corbin’s Avicenna and the Visionary Recital for a lengthy discussion of the role of symbolism in spiritual cultivation (in cultivation of the capacity for rational intuition). Also see (De Santillana, G & Von Dechend, H 2007, ‘Hamlet's Milk: An Essay on Myth and the Frame of Time’, Nonpareli Books) and (Hancock, G 2011, Fingiprints of the Gods, Random House) for a discussion of the technical, metaphysical language implicit in the mythological motifs of antiquity (from the Americas through Asia and the Near East and into the Europe and Africa).

\textsuperscript{12} See: Corbin, H 1960, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, trans. Willard Trask, Princeton.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. 28.
for the law governing signs is to discover the things that are alike. The grammar of beings is an exegesis of these things. And what the language they speak has to tell us is quite simply what the syntax is that binds them together. The nature of things, their coexistence, the way in which they are linked together and communicate is nothing other than their resemblance. And that resemblance is visible only in the network of signs that crosses the world from one end to the other. 'Nature' is trapped in the thin layer that holds semiology and hermeneutics one above the other; it is neither mysterious nor veiled, it offers itself to our cognition, which it sometimes leads astray, only in so far as this superimposition necessarily includes a slight degree of non-coincidence between the re-semblances. As a result, the grid is less easy to see through; its transparency is clouded over from the very first. A dark space appears which must be made progressively clearer. That space is where 'nature' resides, and it is what one must attempt to know. Everything would be manifest and immediately knowable if the hermeneutics of resemblance and the semiology of signatures coincided without the slightest parallax. But because the similitudes that form the graphics of the world are one 'cog' out of alignment with those that form its discourse, knowledge and the infinite labour it involves find here the space that is proper to them: it is their task to weave their way across this distance, pursuing an endless zigzag course from resemblance to what resembles it.”

“...divinatio and erudito are both part of the same hermeneutics; but this develops, following similar forms, on two different levels: one moves from the mute sign to the thing itself (and makes nature speak); the other moves from the unmoving graphism to clear speech (it restores languages to life). But just as natural signs are linked to what they indicate by the profound relation of resemblance, so the discourse of the Ancients is in the image of what it expresses; if it has the value of a precious sign, that is because, from the depth of its being, and by means of the light that has never ceased to shine through it since its origin, it is adjusted to things themselves, it forms a mirror for them and emulates them; it is to eternal truth what signs are to the secrets of nature (it is the mark whereby the word may be deciphered); and it possesses an ageless affinity with the things that it unveils. It is useless therefore to demand its title to authority; it is a treasury of signs linked by similitude to that which they are empowered to denote. The only difference is that we are dealing with a treasure-hoard of the second degree, one that refers to the notations of nature, which in their turn indicate obscurely the pure gold of things themselves. The truth of all these marks - whether they are woven into nature itself or whether they exist in lines on parchments and in libraries - is everywhere the same: coeval with the institution of God.... There is no difference between marks and words in the sense that there is between observation and accepted authority, or between verifiable fact and tradition. The process is everywhere the same: that of the sign and its likeness, and this is why nature and the word can intertwine with one another to infinity, forming, for those who can read it, one vast single text.”

2.10 ‘The Writing of Things’

“Real language... is... an opaque, mysterious thing, closed in upon itself, a fragmented mass, its enigma renewed in every individual, which combines here and there with the forms of the world and becomes interwoven with them, so much so that all these elements, taken together, form a network of marks in which each of them may play, and does in fact play, in relation to all the others, the role of content or sign, that of secret or of indicator. In its raw, historical sixteenth-century being, language is not an arbitrary system; it has been set down in the world and forms a part of it, both because things themselves hide and manifest their own enigma like a language and because words offer themselves to men as things to be deciphered. The great metaphor of the book that one opens, that one pores over and reads in order to know nature, is merely the reverse and visible side of another transference, and a much deeper one, which forces language to reside in the world, among the plants, the herbs, the stones, and the animals.”

As an example, it is the Algorithm’s lack of capacity for analogy—its inability to read the signatures by which knowledge via resemblance can be formed—that renders it incapable of rendering the meaning

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154 Ibid. 34.
155 Ibid. 34
of a text within the algorithmic field of dimensional consistency through the process of visualization (its lack of rationality, rational intuition, rational emotion, Wu Wei, etc.).

“Ramus divided his grammar into two parts. The first was devoted to etymology, which means that one looked in it to discover, not the original meanings of words, but the intrinsic ‘properties’ of letters, syllables, and, finally, whole words. The second part dealt with syntax: its purpose was to teach ‘the building of words together by means of their properties’, and it consisted ‘almost entirely in the convenience and mutual communion of properties, as of the noun with the noun or with the verb, of the adverb with all the words to which it is adjoined, of the conjunction in the order of things conjoined’. Language is not what it is because it has a meaning; its representative content, which was to have such importance for grammarians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that it provided them with the guiding thread of their analyses, has no role to play here. Words group syllables together, and syllables letters, because there are virtues placed in individual letters that draw them towards each other or keep them apart, exactly as the marks found in nature also repel or attract one another. The study of grammar in the sixteenth century is based upon the same epistemological arrangement as the science of nature or the esoteric disciplines. The only differences are that there is only one nature and there are several languages; and that in the esoteric field the properties of words, syllables, and letters are discovered by another discourse which always remains secret, whereas in grammar it is the words and phrases of every-day life that themselves express their properties. Language stands half-way between the visible forms of nature and the secret conveniences of esoteric discourse. It is a fragmented nature, divided against itself and deprived of its original transparency by admixture; it is a secret that carries within itself, though near the surface, the decipherable signs of what it is trying to say. It is at the same time a buried revelation and a revelation that is gradually being restored to ever greater clarity.

In its original form, when it was given to men by God himself, language was an absolutely certain and transparent sign for things, because it resembled them. The names of things were lodged in the things they designated, just as strength is written in the body of the lion, regality in the eye of the eagle, just as the influence of the planets is marked upon the brows of men: by the form of similitude. This transparency was destroyed at Babel as a punishment for men. Languages became separated and incompatible with one another only in so far as they had previously lost this original resemblance to the things that had been the prime reason for the existence of language. All the languages known to us are now spoken only against the background of this lost similitude, and in the space that it left vacant. There is only one language that retains a memory of that similitude, because it derives in direct descent from that first vocabulary which is now forgotten; because God did not wish men to forget the punishment inflicted at Babel; because this language had to be used in order to recount God’s ancient Alliance with his people; and lastly, because it was in this language that God addressed himself to those who listened to him. Hebrew therefore contains, as if in the form of fragments, the marks of that original name-giving. And those words pronounced by Adam as he imposed them upon the various animals have endured, in part at least, and still carry with them in their density, like an embedded fragment of silent knowledge, the unchanging properties of beings:

Thus the stork, so greatly lauded for its charity towards its father and its mother, is called in Hebrew Chasida, which is to say, meek, charitable, endowed with pity . . . The horse is named Sus, thought to be from the verb Hasas, unless that verb is rather derived from the noun, and it signifies to rise up, for among all four-footed animals the horse is most proud and brave, as Job depicts it in Chapter 39.

But these are no more than fragmentary monuments; all other languages have lost these radical similitudes (we are not so sure this is true in languages like Gaelic, Chinese or Sanskrit), which have been preserved in Hebrew

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only in order to show that it was once the common language of God, Adam, and the animals of the newly created earth. But though language no longer bears an immediate resemblance to the things it names, this does not mean that it is separate from the world; it still continues, in another form, to be the locus of revelations and to be included in the area where truth is both manifested and expressed. True, it is no longer nature in its primal visibility, but neither is it a mysterious instrument with powers known only to a few privileged persons. It is rather the figuration of a world redeeming itself, lending its ear at last to the true word. This is why it was God's wish that Latin, the language of his Church, should spread over the whole of the terrestrial globe. And it is also why all the languages of the world, as it became possible to know them through this conquest, make up together the image of the truth. Their interlacing and the space in which they are deployed free the sign of the redeemed world, just as the arrangement of the first names bore a likeness to the things that God had given to Adam for his use. Claude Duret points out that the Hebrews, the Canaans, the Samaritans, the Chaldeans, the Syrians, the Egyptians, the Carthaginians, the Phoenicians, the Arabs, the Saracens, the Turks, the Moors, the Persians, and the Tartars all write from right to left, following 'the course and daily movement of the first heaven, which is most perfect, according to the opinion of the great Aristotle, tending towards unity'; the Greeks, the Georgians, the Maronites, the Serbsians, the Jacobites, the Copts, the Poznanians, and of course the Romans and all Europeans write from left to right, following 'the course and movement of the second heaven, home of the seven planets'; the Indians, Cathayans, Chinese, and Japanese write from top to bottom, in conformity with the 'order of nature, which has given men heads at the tops of their bodies and feet at the bottom'; 'in opposition to the aforementioned', the Mexicans write either from bottom to top or else in 'spiral lines, such as those made by the sun in its annual journey through the Zodiac'. And thus 'by these five diverse sorts of writing the secrets and mysteries of the world's frame and the form of the cross, the unity of the heaven's rotundity and that of the earth, are properly denoted and expressed'. The relation of languages to the world is one of analogy rather than of signification; or rather, their value as signs and their duplicating function are superimposed; they speak the heaven and the earth of which they are the image; they reproduce in their most material architecture the cross whose coming they announce - that coming which establishes its existence in its own turn through the Scriptures and the "Word". Language possesses a symbolic function; but since the disaster at Babel we must no longer seek for it - with rare exceptions - in the words themselves but rather in the very existence of language, in its total relation to the totality of the world, in the intersecting of its space with the loci and forms of the cosmos."  

"Hence the form of the encyclopedic project as it appears at the end of the sixteenth century or in the first years of the seventeenth: not to reflect what one knows in the neutral element of language - the use of the alphabet as an arbitrary but efficacious encyclopaedic order does not appear until the second half of the seventeenth century - but to reconstitute the very order of the universe by the way in which words are linked together and arranged in space [to constitute a new ontological regime(s), world view, regime of axioms and logics, hegemonic essence, etc.]. It is this project that we find in Gregoire's Syntaxeion artis mirabilis (1610), and in Alstedius's Encyclopaedia (1639); or again in the Tableau de tous les arts liberaux by Christophe de Savigny, who contrives to spatialize acquired knowledge both in accordance with the cosmic, unchanging, and perfect form of the circle and in accordance with the sublunary, perishable, multiple, and divided form of the tree; it is also to be found in the work of La Croix du Maine, who envisages a space that would be at once an Encyclopaedia and a Library, and would permit the arrangement of written texts according to the forms of adjacency, kinship, analogy, and subordination prescribed by the world itself. But in any case, such an interweaving of language and things in a space common to both, presupposes an absolute privilege on the part of writing (over speech, as language is said to have been given to man by God in writing rather than speech (this points to the latent (-) quality of the aeons, their nature as infinite potential, their silent majesty; in the Kabalist Mysteries, written mysteries and oral mysteries are divided: the written mysteries are associated with Geburah (-), which is on the left pillar (the pillar of form, Boaz); the oral mysteries are associated with Chesed (+), which is on the right pillar (the pillar of force, Jachin)).

This privilege dominated the entire Renaissance, and was no doubt one of the great events in Western culture. Printing, the arrival in Europe of Oriental manuscripts, the appearance of a literature no longer created for the voice or performance and therefore not governed by them, the precedence given to the interpretation of religious texts over the tradition and magisterium of the Church - all these things bear witness, without its being

possible to indicate causes and effects, to the fundamental place accorded in the West to Writing. Henceforth, it is the primal nature of language to be written. The sounds made by voices provide no more than a transitory and precarious translation of it. What God introduced into the world was written words; Adam, when he imposed their first names upon the animals, did no more than read those visible and silent marks; the Law was entrusted to the Tables, not to men's memories; and it is in a book that the true Word must be found again. Vigenere and Duret both said - and in almost identical terms - that the written had always preceded the spoken, certainly in nature, and perhaps even in the knowledge of men. For it was very possible that before Babel, before the Flood, there had already existed a form of writing composed of the marks of nature itself, with the result that its characters would have had the power to act upon things directly, to attract them or repel them, to represent their properties, their virtues, and their secrets. A primitively natural writing, of which certain forms of esoteric knowledge, and the cabala first and foremost, may perhaps have preserved the scattered memory and were now attempting to retrieve its long-dormant powers. Esoterism in the sixteenth century is a phenomenon of the written word, not the spoken word. At all events, the latter is stripped of all its powers; it is merely the female part of language. Vigenere and Duret tell us, just as its intellect is passive; Writing, on the other hand, is the active intellect, the 'male principle' of language. It alone harbours the truth [this is the seeming—so many techniques of power seem to rest upon the veneer of false conflict that I am hesitant to simply accept this 'mythical' conflict as real—shift from the matriarchal societies of antiquity to the patriarchal norm of the contemporary, the rise of Mars, of the sun (now male) over the moon, of masculine light over feminine darkness, of force over form (at least on the surface of appearances, though it may all be a dance on the webs of spiders...); the privileging of written language, its rearticulation as active and masculine (similar to the shift from the sun from feminine to masculine); the shift from understanding writing as associated with the pillar of form to understanding writing as associated with the pillar of force) in what is presently recorded as human history]."**10

No longer did humanity aim to reflect reality in language, to consciously embed signatures in the structure of language (or to preserve the traces of the first language beyond perhaps vowels, the written word, aeonian 'speech'). Instead we began to construct reality and order with language (it is very interesting that we see this movement coincide with expanded access to public access to education, religious and other written texts, etc.). Also, as with all such traditions of antiquity, we must remember that traditional stories are first and foremost metaphorical-symbolic. The tower of babel, then (at its psychological level of meaning), represents 'the fall' of consciousness into multiplicity and our subsequent loss of the first language (of the language of the aeons)—one need not see this as 'fall', but simply as development within a new environment wherein many stages had to occur before the 'human' (again, human as reflective being capable of rational intuition, not a biological entity) potential for Conscious Evolution could become actualized and allow us to remember the first language.

"[For the sixteenth century mind], when one is faced with the task of writing an animal's history, it is useless and impossible to choose between the profession of naturalist and that of compiler: one has to collect together into one and the same form of knowledge all that has been seen and heard, all that has been recounted, either by nature or by men, by the language of the world, by tradition, or by the poets. To know an animal or a plant, or any terrestrial thing whatever, is to gather together the whole dense layer of signs with which it or they may have been covered; it is to re-discover also all the constellations of forms from which they derive their value as heraldic signs. Aldrovandi was neither a better nor a worse observer than Buffon; he was neither more credulous than he, nor less attached to the faithfulness of the observing eye or to the rationality of things. His observation was simply not linked to things in accordance with the same system or by the same arrangement of

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the episteme. For Aldrovandi was meticulously contemplating a nature which was, from top to bottom, written.

Knowledge therefore consisted in relating one form of language to another form of language; in restoring the great, unbroken plain of words and things; in making everything speak. That is, in bringing into being, at a level above that of all marks, the secondary discourse of commentary. The function proper to knowledge is not seeing or demonstrating; it is interpreting [fit is using the mind and its capacity for analogy to extract the aeonian essence of the seen or demonstrated—the experienced]. Scriptural commentary, commentaries on Ancient authors, commentaries on the accounts of travelers, commentaries on legends and fables; none of these forms of discourse is required to justify its claim to be expressing a truth before it is interpreted; all that is required of it is the possibility of talking about it. Language contains its own inner principle of proliferation [fit can never aptly contain the contingency, change, motion, etc. of passing time and physical space within its static code—what Spinoza terms ‘the poverty of language’]; ‘There is more work in interpreting interpretations than in interpreting things; and more books about books than on any other subject; we do nothing but write glosses on one another’ [(for, as the ancients reminds us, there has never been a ‘new idea’; as such, the purpose of interpretation, of ‘glossing on one another’, is not to produce new knowledge, but to produce experience within a given context (we interpret, gloss, juxtapose in novel ways (we might say that we embark upon a nomad exploration) not to produce ‘new’ ideas (for this is, in one sense, impossible) that bring people into remembrance of Seli)]. These words are not a statement of the bankruptcy of a culture buried beneath its own monuments; they are a definition of the inevitable relation that language maintained with itself in the sixteenth century. This relation enabled language to accumulate to infinity, since it never ceased to develop, to revise itself, and to lay its successive forms one over another [a natural function of the fact that language is manifest in the field of dimensional consistency associated with passing time and physical space, in the change, motion, chaos, multiplicity, etc. of manifestation]. Perhaps for the first time in Western culture [(perhaps not, though maybe for the first time in venuses that reach the public eye and our historical records...)], we find revealed the absolutely open dimension of a language no longer able to halt itself, because, never being enclosed in a definitive statement, it can express its truth only in some future discourse and is wholly intent on what it will have said [in other words there cannot be a functional relationship between signifier (the finite) and signified (Infinite Substance and its emanations) as signifier and signified are dimensionally incommensurable]; but even this future discourse itself does not have the power to halt the progression, and what it says is enclosed within it like a promise, a bequest to yet another discourse.... The task of commentary can never, by definition, be completed. And yet commentary is directed entirely towards the enigmatic, murmured element of the language being commented on: it calls into being, below the existing discourse, another discourse that is more fundamental and, as it were, ‘more primal’, which it sets itself the task of restoring. There can be no commentary unless, below the language one is reading and deciphering, there runs the sovereignty of an original Text. And it is this text which, by providing a foundation for the commentary, offers its ultimate revelation as the promised reward of commentary [the transcendence of language, of the peripatetic mind, into silence]. The necessary proliferation of the exegesis is therefore measured, ideally limited, and yet ceaselessly animated, by this silent dominion. The language of the sixteenth century - understood not as an episode in the history of any one tongue, but as a global cultural experience - found itself caught, no doubt, between these interacting elements, in the interstice occurring between the primal Text and the infinity of Interpretation [this is the inherent tension of ‘human’ existence, between the infinity Self and the finite-multiplicity of self in manifestation, between the unified order and the change, difference, motion, chaos etc. of passing time—ours is a paradoxical dance...]. One speaks upon the basis of a writing that is part of the fabric of the world; one speaks about it to infinity, and each of its signs becomes in turn written matter for further discourse; but each of these stages of discourse is addressed to that primal written word whose return it simultaneously promises and postpones [thus discourses on getting caught in the maelstrom, the great whirlpool of the peripatetic mind, in cycles between the city and the pleasure gardens, etc.]

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“2. Once when I had taken up residence in my city, I chanced to go out with my companions to one of the pleasure places that lie about the same city. Now, as we were coming and going, making a circle, suddenly in the distance appeared a Sage. He was beautiful; his person shone with a divine glory. Certainly he had tasted of years; long duration had passed over him. Yet there was seen in him only the freshness proper to young men; no weakness bowed his bearing, no fault injured the grace of his stature. In short, no sign of old age was to be found in him, save the imposing gravity of old Sages [(in many of the Paternalist traditions that which allows us to escape the maelstrom is external to our being)].”

“A man had a daughter who possessed a wonderful bow and arrow, with which she was able to bring down everything she wanted [rationality, the ability to derive rational knowledge through analogy of linearly compiled evidence]. But she was lazy and was constantly sleeping. At this her father was angry and said: 'Do not be always sleeping, but take thy bow and shoot at the navel of the ocean, so that we may get fire [rational intuition, illumination, pure consciousness].

The navel of the ocean was a vast whirlpool in which sticks for making fire by friction were drifting about. At that time men were still without fire. Now the maiden seized her bow, shot into the navel of the ocean, and the material for fire-rubbing sprang ashore [i.e. when the peripatetic mind, the dragon, the serpent, the maelstrom, etc. are slain and the phoenix (rational intuition-emotion, wisdom and understanding, etc.) rise from the silent ashes (the princess is freed from the tower); when the peripatetic mind is brought to bear upon the quality of the peripatetic mind, the light (the arrow) of the peripatetic mind pierces its own heart and the potential therein bursts forth].

Then the old man was glad. He kindled a large fire; and as he wanted to keep it to himself, he built a house with a door which snapped up and down like jaws and killed everybody that wanted to get in. But the people knew that he was in possession of the fire, and the stag [(Prometheus, the Morning Star, Lucifer)] determined to steal it for them. He took resinous wood, split it and stuck the splinters in his hair. Then he lashed two boats together, covered them with planks, danced and sang on them, and so he came to the old man's house. He sang: "O, I go and will fetch the fire." The old man's daughter heard him singing, and said to her father: "O, let the stranger come into the house; he sings and dances so beautifully."

The stag landed and drew near the door, singing and dancing, and at the same time sprang to the door and made as if he wanted to enter the house. Then the door snapped to, without however touching him. But while it was again opening, he sprang quickly into the house. Here he seated himself at the fire, as if he wanted to dry himself, and continued singing. At the same time he let his head bend forward over the fire, so that he became quite sooty, and at last the splinters in his hair took fire. Then he sprang out, ran off and brought the fire to the people.”

2.11 Aeonian Rationality & Knowledge Resemblance

Convenience (difference in aeonian manifestation imputed by manifestation in different environments, or the similarity imposed upon things by manifestation in shared environment); emulation (similarity imposed by the emulation of the Infinite in finite manifestation); analogy (the dimensional

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Frazer, SJG 1930, Myths from the Origin of Fire, MacMillan, p. 164f.
incommensurability of finite signifier and the signified infinite and the tension of convenience and emulation that allows us extract the Infinite essence from sensory experience to develop rational knowledge of the Infinite; sympathy-antipathy (the degree of perfection to which the Infinite is reflected in a given environment). It is this capacity to feel sympathy-antipathy that allows us to become virtuous subjects and thus act in an ethical manner (as ethical behavior is the harmonization of unified order with the difference of manifestation, of the dimensionally incommensurable tension between finite and infinite dimensional qualities, which in essence entails optimizing the sympathy manifestation holds with its aeonian bedrock—this is ‘virtue ethics’, discussed at length below).

“Ever since the Stoics, the system of signs in the Western world had been a ternary one, for it was recognized as containing the significant, the signified, and the ‘conjunction’... From the seventeenth century, on the other hand, the arrangement of signs was to become binary, since it was to be defined, with Port-Royal, as the connection of a significant and a signified. At the Renaissance, the organization is different, and much more complex: it is ternary, since it requires the formal domain of marks, the content indicated by them, and the similitudes that link the marks to the things designated by them; but since resemblance is the form of the signs as well as their content, the three distinct elements of this articulation are resolved into a single form.

This arrangement, together with the interplay it authorizes, is found also, though inverted, in the experience of language. In fact, language exists first of all, in its raw and primitive being, in the simple, material form of writing, a stigma upon things, a mark imprinted across the world which is a part of its most ineffaceable forms. In a sense, this layer of language is unique and absolute. But it also gives rise to two other forms of discourse which provide it with a frame: above it, there is commentary, which recasts the given signs to serve a new purpose, and below it, the text, whose primacy is presupposed by commentary to exist hidden beneath the marks visible to all. Hence there are three levels of language, all based upon the single being of the written word. It is this complex interaction of elements that was to disappear with the end of the Renaissance. And in two ways: because the forms oscillating endlessly between one and three terms were to be fixed in a binary form which would render them stable; and because language, instead of existing as the material writing of things, was to find its area of being restricted to the general organization of representative signs.”

“This new arrangement brought about the appearance of a new problem, unknown until then: in the sixteenth century, one asked oneself how it was possible to know that a sign did in fact designate what it signified; from the seventeenth century, one began to ask how a sign could be linked to what it signified [i.e. order was to be created rather than actualized and remembered]. A question to which the Classical period was to reply by the analysis of representation; and to which modern thought was to reply by the analysis of meaning and signification. But given the fact itself, language was never to be anything more than a particular case of representation (for the Classics) or of signification (for us). The profound kinship of language with the world was thus dissolved. The primacy of the written word went into abeyance. And that uniform layer, in which the seen and the read, the visible and the expressible, were endlessly interwoven, vanished too. Things and words were to be separated from one another. The eye was thenceforth destined to see and only to see, the ear to hear and only to hear. Discourse was still to have the task of speaking that which is, but it was no longer to be anything more than what it said [in this movement potentially known reality was reduced to the field of dimensional consistency associated with matter, passing time and physical space, to the world of motion].

This involved an immense reorganization of culture, a reorganization of which the Classical age was the


first and perhaps the most important stage, since it was responsible for the new arrangement in which we are still
captured - since it is the Classical age that separates us from a culture in which the signification of signs did not
exist, because it was reabsorbed into the sovereignty of the Like; but in which their enigmatic, monotonous,
stubborn, and primitive being shone in an endless dispersion ([in other words, the birth of analytic, positivist,
functionalist fascism, where individuals attempted to fit the change, difference, chaos, etc. of manifestation into
the Infinite dimensional quality of the uncreated]).

There is nothing now, either in our knowledge or in our reflection, that still recalls even the memory of
that being. Nothing, except perhaps literature - and even then in a fashion more allusive and diagonal than
direct. It may be said in a sense that 'literature', as it was constituted and so designated on the threshold of the
modern age, manifests, at a time when it was least expected, the reappearance, of the living being of language. In
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the peculiar existence and ancient solidity of language as a thing
inscribed in the fabric of the world were dissolved in the functioning of representation; all language had value
only as discourse. The art of language was a way of 'making a sign' - of simultaneously signifying something and
arranging signs around that thing; an art of naming, therefore, and then, by means of a reduplication both
demonstrative and decorative, of capturing that name, of enclosing and concealing it, of designating it in turn by
other names that were the deferred presence of the first name, its secondary sign, its figuration, its rhetorical
panoply [in short, creating order within time]. And yet, throughout the nineteenth century, and right up
to our own day - from Holderlin to Mallarme and on to Antonin Artaud - literature achieved autonomous
existence, and separated itself from all other language with a deep scission, only by forming a sort of 'counter-
discourse', and by finding its way back from the representative or signifying function of language to this raw
being that had been forgotten since the sixteenth century.

It is possible to believe that one has attained the very essence of literature when one is no longer
interrogating it at the level of what it says but only in its significant form: in doing so, one is limiting [though
from the Modernist perspective one might call this expanding] one's view of language to its Classical status. In
the modern age, literature is that which compensates for (and not that which confirms) the signifying function of
language. Through literature, the being of language shines once more on the frontiers of Western culture - and
at its centre - for it is what has been most foreign to that culture since the sixteenth century; but it has also, since
this same century, been at the very centre of what Western culture has overlain. This is why literature is
appearing more and more as that which must be thought; but equally, and for the same reason, as that which
can never, in any circumstance, be thought in accordance with a theory of signification. Whether one analyses it
from the point of view of what is signified (of what it is trying to say, of its 'ideas', of what it promises, or of what
it commits one to) or from the point of view of that which signifies (with the help of paradigms borrowed from
linguistics or psychoanalysis) matters little: all that is merely incidental. In both cases one would be searching for
it outside the ground in which, as regards our culture, it has never ceased for the past century and a half to come
into being and to imprint itself. Such modes of decipherment belong to a Classical situation of language - the
situation that predominated during the seventeenth century, when the organization of signs became binary, and
when signification was reflected in the form of the representation; for at that time literature really was composed
of a signifying element and a signified content, so that it was proper to analyze it accordingly. But from the
nineteenth century, literature began to bring language back to light once more in its own being; though not as it
had still appeared at the end of the Renaissance. For now we no longer have that primary, that absolutely initial,
word upon which the infinite movement of discourse was founded and by which it was limited; henceforth,
language was to grow with no point of departure, no end, and no promise. It is the traversal of this futile yet
fundamental space that the text of literature traces from day to day.

2.12 Don Quixote
Foucault isolates Don Quixote as an archetypal heterotopic space for the shift from knowledge via
resemblance to the modernist episteme; “[his adventures] mark the end of the old interplay between

Environment and Social Psychology.
resemblance and signs and contain the beginnings of new relations” (though, we argue, these beginnings are only such through subsequent, illusory interpretations in Modernity).

Don Quixote “is the hero of same. He never manages to escape from the familiar plain stretching out on all sides of the Analogue.... He travels endlessly over that plain, without ever crossing the clearly defined frontiers of difference, or reaching the heart of identity [in short, he is trapped in the maelstrom of the peripatetic mind].... In his reality as an impoverished hidalgo he can become a knight only by listening from afar to the age-old epic that gives its form to Law [the good is externalized, and can only be attained through ritual, texts, the master, etc.]. .... He is constantly obliged to consult it in order to know what to do or say, and what signs he should give himself and others in order to show that he really is of the same nature as the text from which he springs. The chivalric romances have provided once and for all a written prescription for his adventures. And every episode, every decision, every exploit will be yet another sign that Don Quixote is a true likeness of all the signs that he has traced from his book. But the fact that he wishes to be like them means that he must put them to the test, that the (legible) signs no longer resemble (visible) people. All those written texts, all those extravagant romances are, quite literally, unparalleled: no one in the world ever did resemble them; their timeless language remains suspended, unfulfilled by any similitude; they could all be burned in their entirety and the form of the world would not be changed. If he is to resemble the texts of which he is the witness, the representation, the real analogue, Don Quixote must also furnish proof and provide the indubitable sign that they are telling the truth, that they really are the language of the world. It is incumbent upon him to fulfill the promise of the books. It is his task to recreate the epic, though by reverse process: the epic recounted (or claimed to recount) real exploits, offering them to our memory; Don Quixote, on the other hand, must endow reality the signs-without-content of the narrative. His adventures will be a deciphering of the world: a diligent search over the entire surface of the earth for the forms that will prove that what the books say is true. Each exploit must be a proof: it consists, not in a real triumph - which is why victory is not really important - but in an attempt to transform reality into a sign [this can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand we can see it as an attempt to harmonize manifestation with aeon; on the other we can see it in the Modernist terms of creating order within time—Cervantes was surely in the first camp, but this may not encompass the whole of how the text has performed its meaning in the context of Modernity...]. Into a sign that the signs of language really are in conformity with things themselves. Don Quixote reads the world in order to prove his books. And the only proofs he gives himself are the glittering reflections of resemblances [there the hint of the scientific method (all be it in its more esoteric rendition) is clear; Quixote is taking the tombs he has recovered from the cultures of the ancients, and bringing the true scientific method to bear in testing the postulates about reality contained therein. This is where the separation of science and the history of science in exoteric-modernist education becomes so essentially problematic; the fact that the history of science has always been a process of divining the truth contained in the tombs of the ancients through use of the scientific method (from the Pythagoreans through Dee, Descartes and Leibniz and into the MIT Classical AI Lab”) is lost. It is thus that Quixote retains the wisdom of the ancients (in divining the truth of the ancients through our capacity to know via resemblance) while also establishing the foundation for the exoteric-modernist system of thought that would, in the end, render knowledge via resemblance as a form of madness. Megalithic Architecture and global Mythical Motifs are two essential points from which the knowledge of the ancients can still be observed.)


And so—in the potential created by exoteric modernist interpretation—we have the birth of the potential for empiricist-analytic-positivist-functionalist (exoteric) Modernism (i.e. the attempt to fit the change, difference, chaos of manifestation into the unity of the infinite dimensional quality at the tip of a sword, to create order within human knowledge and time—this is fascism in its most essential nature). This is the birth of potential for the failed modernist agricultural revolutions, which, in attempting to fit dynamic and radically different environments into a static form of mass agricultural production without regard for said context, lead to the death of millions (Russia being the prime example in the early 20th century, and the whole of the ‘developing world’ being the prime example following IMF & WB Structural Adjustment Programs, USAID Imperialism, Monsanto, etc.). It is the birth of potential for the Chicago School of Sociology and their fascistic concentric circles; the birth of Walter Christaller’s ‘central place theory’ (used by the Nazis in their respatialization of eastern Europe, by the Zionists in their respatialization of Palestine and by many corporate entities in the process by which they decide where to locate new stores...). In short, we can view this as the birth of the potential for Social Science Positivism, Systems Theory, Behavioral Economics, Ontological Nihilism, etc.

In this light we can see that the exoteric branch of Exoteric Modernism is not only the reduction of reality to the material, passing time and physical space field of dimensional consistency (which is dimensionally incommensurable with the static unified order of the aeonian field of dimensional consistency) but also the attempt to then force that which is manifest in the passing time and physical space field of dimensional consistency (typified by change, motion, chaos, difference, etc.) into the static unity of the infinite (with which the passing time and physical space field of dimensional consistency is dimensionally incommensurable). Creation and Manifestation are accepted as fallen, as we are accepted as fallen, and we must in this mindset create a static, unified order in manifestation through whatever means of force available in a given context (we seek to create order through hierarchical domination)—this might be understood as the essence of the Modernist project.

“His whole journey is a quest for similitudes: the slightest analogies are pressed into service as dormant signs that must be reawakened and made to speak once more. Flocks, serving girls, and inns become once more the language of books to the imperceptible degree to which they resemble castles, ladies, and armies - a perpetually untenable resemblance which transforms the sought-for proof into derision and leaves the words of the books forever hollow. But non-similitude itself has its model, and one that it imitates in the most servile way: it is to be found in the transformations performed by magicians. So all the indices of non-resemblance, all the signs that prove that the written texts are not telling the truth, resemble the action of sorcery, which introduces difference into the indubitab...
but what they are; words wander off on their own, without content, without resemblance to fill their emptiness; they are no longer the marks of things; they lie sleeping between the pages of books and covered in dust. Magic, which permitted the decipherment of the world by revealing the secret resemblances beneath its signs, is no longer of any use except as an explanation, in terms of madness, of why analogies are always proved false. The erudition that once read nature and books alike as parts of a single text has been relegated to the same category as its own chimeras: lodged in the yellowed pages of books, the signs of language no longer have any value apart from the slender fiction which they represent, the written word and things no longer resemble one another. And between them, Don Quixote wanders off on his own. [(The active intellect (the illuminated state of mind, the phase of knowing that exists beyond the bounds of linear, peripatetic rationality, etc.) is rendered as madness (and thus eviscerated from the potentially known reality of the mind socialized therein) by Modernism. No longer does the fool represent the sage. The fool simply an addled fool. Things ‘are no longer anything but what they are’. Here we see the atomizing influence of Modernism and its reduction of reality to the material, passing time and physical space field of dimensional consistency—when known purely through their outward, manifest identity, the things of the world no longer hold any essential unity, and can only be known as essentially different (as atomized without the potential for or a node of essential aggregation). Unity can now only be produced in matter, passing time and physical space (a distinctly different proposition from making passing time and physical space more sympathetic to the essential unity, to the order, that precedes it). So, at the same time as modernist-positivism attempts to fit reality into the static unity of the aeonian field of dimensional consistency through the use of force, it also eviscerates the nodes of reality where unified order truly exists (again, this is only in the exoteric strain of Modernism, as the esoteric version perpetuated by groups like the Masons and Rosicrucians retains sensitivity to the aeonian plan of dimensional consistency and the disjuncture between the peripatetic and intuitive mind (all be it in a maliciously flawed axiomatic environment typified by the taint of accepting the ‘the fall’ as an axiom concerning human nature)). This movement expresses the essence of what Blaser titles ‘ontological violence’ as it is expressed in Modernism.  

Yet language has not become entirely impotent. It now possesses new powers, and powers peculiar to it alone. In the second part of the novel, Don Quixote meets characters who have read the first part of his story and recognize him, the real man, as the hero of the book. Cervantes's text turns back upon itself, thrusts itself back into its own density, and becomes the object of its own narrative. The first part of the hero's adventures plays in the second part the role originally assumed by the chivalric romances. Don Quixote must remain faithful to the book that he has now become in reality; he must protect it from errors, from counterfeits, from apocryphal sequels; he must fill in the details that have been left out; he must preserve its truth. But Don Quixote himself has not read this book, and does not have to read it, since he is the book in flesh and blood. Having first read so many books that he became a sign, a sign wandering through a world that did not recognize him, he has now, despite himself and without his knowledge, become a book that contains his truth, that records exactly all that he has done and said and seen and thought, and that at last makes him recognizable, so closely does he resemble all those signs whose ineffaceable imprint he has left behind him. Between the first and second parts of the novel, in the narrow gap between those two volumes, and by their power alone, Don Quixote has achieved his reality - a reality he owes to language alone, and which resides entirely inside the words. [(Again, while this is actually an allegorical text, the literal interpretation of such an idea as positing that order is created within language, human knowledge, passing time, physical space, etc. has come to dominate the Modernist Mind.)] Don Quixote's truth is not in the relation of the words to the world but in that slender and constant relation woven between themselves by verbal signs. The hollow fiction of epic exploits has become the representative power of language. Words have swallowed up their own nature as signs [(no longer is the meaning of language derived from its from its broader social context and sympathy with Infinite Substance and its emanations as it must in this light (tangible light) derive its meaning in and of itself (this will become essential with the rise of language analysis software and algorithmic attempts to know meaning of language)—rock is no longer anything but rock, the term rock is no longer anything other than a functional, static, unified and complete representation of the atomized reality that is rock, and so the order held between the term rock and the object rock is created within human knowledge, matter, passing time and physical space.]

Don Quixote is the first modern work of literature, because in it we see the cruel reason of identities

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and differences make endless sport of signs and similitudes; because in it language breaks off its old kinship with things and enters into that lonely sovereignty from which it will reappear, in its separated state, only as literature; because it marks the point where resemblance enters an age which is, from the point of view of resemblance, one of madness and imagination. Once similitude and signs are sundered from each other, two experiences can be established and two characters appear face to face. The madman, understood not as one who is sick but as an established and maintained deviant, as an indispensable cultural function, has become, in Western experience, the man of primitive resemblances. This character, as he is depicted in the novels or plays of the Baroque age, and as he was gradually institutionalized right up to the advent of nineteenth-century psychiatry, is the man who is alienated in analogy. He is the disordered player of the Same and the Other. He takes things for what they are not, and people one for another; he cuts his friends and recognizes complete strangers; he thinks he is unmasking when, in fact, he is putting on a mask. He inverts all values and all proportions, because he is constantly under the impression that he is deciphering signs: for him, the crown makes the king. In the cultural perception of the madman that prevailed up to the end of the eighteenth century, he is Different only in so far as he is unaware of Difference; he sees nothing but resemblances and signs of resemblance everywhere; for him all signs resemble one another, and all resemblances have the value of signs. At the other end of the cultural area, but brought close by symmetry, the poet is he who, beneath the named, constantly expected differences, rediscovers the buried kinships between things, their scattered resemblances. Beneath the established signs, and in spite of them, he hears another, deeper, discourse, which recalls the time when words glittered in the universal resemblance of things; in the language of the poet, the Sovereignty of the Same, so difficult to express, eclipses, the distinction existing between signs.

This accounts, no doubt, for the confrontation of poetry and madness in modern Western culture. But it is no longer the old Platonic theme of inspired madness. It is the mark of a new experience of language and things. At the fringes of a knowledge that separates beings, signs, and similitudes, and as though to limit its power, the madman fulfils the function of homosemanticism: he groups all signs together and leads them with a resemblance that never ceases to proliferate. The poet fulfils the opposite function: his is the allegorical role; beneath the language of signs and beneath the interplay of their precisely delineated distinctions, he strains his ears to catch that ‘other language’, the language, without words or discourse, of resemblance. The poet brings similitude to the signs that speak it, whereas the madman loads all signs with a resemblance that ultimately erases them. They share, then, on the outer edge of our culture and at the point nearest to its essential divisions, that ‘frontier’ situation - a marginal position and a profoundly archaic silhouette - where their words unceasingly renew the power of their strangeness and the strength of their contestation. Between them there has opened up a field of knowledge in which, because of an essential rupture in the Western world, what has become important is no longer resemblances but identities and differences. In the contemporary age of positivism, the birth of potential for the postmodern, liberal-nihilist seed (the使 mundane and unlikely the modern to be modern), that has come to plague disciplines like Geography (and much of the public mind) in the contemporary era— it is a foundation stone in the contemporary ‘ontological violence’ waged against unity, order and knowledge via resemblance (or at least the straw man of unity, order and knowledge via resemblance that has been constructed in the Modernist Imagination and universalized to represent all potential unity, order and knowledge via resemblance thus replicating the crux of the ontological and epistemological politics postmodernism purports to challenge (i.e. universalizing potential modes of universalism is to impute the positivist ontological violence such critiques of universalism purport to challenge, or, in other words, to assume that all universal or universalizing narratives are of the same quality is to universalize and generalize universalism in precisely the way that postmodern critiques of universalism are attempting to problematize...)).

2.13 ‘Ordo’

Before establishing “the archeology of thought... more firmly, until it is better able to gauge what it is capable of describing directly and positively, until it has defined the particular systems and internal

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[58] An imagination enlivened by the hegemonic essence (essential axioms and associated logics) of Modernity.

connections it has to deal with, before attempting to encompass thought and to investigate how it contrives to escape itself,”

Foucault sets out to highlight the difficulties associated with attempting to establish discontinuity in the history of thought:

“Establishing discontinuities is not an easy task even for history in general. And it is certainly even less so for the history of thought. We may wish to draw a dividing-line; but any limit we set may perhaps be no more than an arbitrary division made in a constantly mobile whole. We may wish to mark off a period; but have we the right to establish symmetrical breaks at two points in time in order to give an appearance of continuity and unity to the system we place between them? Where, in that case, would the cause of its existence lie? [(The answer to this final question seems to be that the cause of existence in manifestation lies outside of time.)]

Discontinuity - the fact that within the space of a few years a culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to think other things in a new way - probably begins with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side, but in which it has never ceased to think from the very beginning. Ultimately, the problem that presents itself is that of the relations between thought and culture: how is it that thought has a place in the space of the world, that it has its origin there, and that it never ceases, in this place or that, to begin anew? [(This is the essential tension of creation-manifestation—how can the infinite manifest in the finite world?)]

Following from these notes, Foucault proceeds to compile an archeology of early 17th Century European thought.

“At the beginning of the seventeenth century, during the period that has been termed, rightly or wrongly, the Baroque, thought ceases to move in the element of resemblance. Similitude is no longer the form of knowledge but rather the occasion of error, the danger to which one exposes oneself when one does not examine the obscure region of confusions.”

“The age of resemblance is drawing to a close. It is leaving nothing behind it but games. Games whose powers of enchantment grow out of the new kinship between resemblance and illusion; the chimeras of similitude loom up on all sides, but they are recognized as chimeras; it is the privileged age of trompe-l’œil painting, of the comic illusion, of the play that duplicates itself by representing another play, of the quid pro quo, of dreams and visions; it is the age of the deceiving senses [(the age of the Maya)]; it is the age in which the poetic dimension of language is defined by metaphor, simile, and allegory. And it was also in the nature of things that the knowledge of the sixteenth century should leave behind it the distorted memory of a muddled and disordered body of learning in which all the things in the world could be linked indiscriminately to men’s experiences, traditions, or credulities. From then on, the noble, rigorous, and restrictive figures of similitude were to be forgotten. And the signs that designated them were to be thought of as the fantasies and charms of a knowledge that had not yet attained the age of reason.”

The essence of Modernism and modernist power is expressed clearly in this final line. Modernism is, in its most essential cosmological-ontological movement, the reduction of reality to the material, passing time, physical space field of dimensional consistency—concomitant with this reduction of reality is the reduction of the potential for thought to peripatetic reason, to the passing time, physical

176 Ibid. 50.
176 Ibid. 51.
176 Ibid. 51.
space field of dimensional consistency and, indeed, of mind to being caused by and contained within matter. Modernist power hinges upon constraining and expanding the potential for thought. The articulation of potentially known reality (at the level of axioms and logics) is arguably the most essential technique of Modernist power (i.e. the socially normative definition of cosmological and ontological assumptions. Once known reality is disciplined through socialization potentials for thought, behavior and conception of being are constrained and expanded in a way where people can then be given basic freedoms of speech and action without the danger of them manifesting revolutionary or counter hegemonic thoughts, behaviors or conceptions of being. In short, Modernist socialization negates the potential for conscious evolution and, thus, the potential actualization of the free will.

Moving to a discussion of Sir. Francis Bacon’s (a noted Mystic) Novum Organum, Foucault notes:

“We already find a critique of resemblance in Bacon - an empirical critique that concerns, not the relations of order and equality between dungs, but the types of mind and the forms of illusion to which they might be subject. We are dealing with a doctrine of the quid pro quo. Bacon does not dissipate similitudes by means of evidence and its attendant rules. He shows them, shimmering before our eyes, vanishing as one draws near, then reforming again a moment later, a little further off. They are idols. The idols of the den and the idols of the theatre make us believe that things resemble what we have learned and the theories we have formed for ourselves; other idols make us believe that things are linked by resemblances between themselves [this is the danger of idolatry, of becoming lost in the exoteric trappings of a religion and never escaping the peripatetic mind].

The human Intellect, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater order and equality in things than it actually finds; and, while there are many things in Nature unique, and quite irregular, still it feigns parallels, correspondents, and relations that have no existence. Hence that fiction, 'that among the heavenly bodies all motion takes place by perfect circles' [the fiction that the perfection of the Infinite (represented here by the perfect circle which can only exist in the infinite dimensional quality)—in short, modernist-positivist-empiricist-analytic-functionalist fascism].

Such are the idols of the tribe, spontaneous fictions of the mind; to which are added - as effects and sometimes as causes - the confusions of language: one and the same name being applied indifferently to things that are not of the same nature. These are the idols of the market. Only prudence on the part of the mind can dissipate them ([purification of the rational mind, the polishing of the mirror, etc.]); if it abjures its natural haste and levity in order to become 'penetrating' and ultimately perceive the differences inherent in nature ([to perceive the form of difference, change, motion, etc. and develop the subsequent capacity to see through this difference, change, motion, etc. imposed upon the infinite by manifestation in the finite and thus extract the aeonian essence from our experiences and our experiences of experiences; to perceive the differences inherent in manifest nature is also to perceive the aeonian unity that both produces and is obfuscated by the differences inherent in manifest nature. In other words, by understanding the truth of resemblance by convenience we can begin to separate it from resemblance by emulation and thus start to feel the sympathy-antipathy of manifestation with its Infinite cause.]).

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Bacon is clearly discussing the dangers of remaining trapped within the peripatetic mind and the exoteric side of religion expressed in the terms ‘idolatry’ and ‘Maya’, in Avicenna’s *On the Proof of Prophecies and Interpretation of the Prophets’ Signs and Metaphors* and ‘Hayy Ibn Yaqzan’, in the Greek Myth of the bow and the maelstrom discussed above and so very many other places throughout history. Idolatry is to worship, to become fixated upon, to become attached to, the vessels of resemblance rather than the aeons they resemble (it is to know the vessels in and of themselves rather than extracting their aeonian essence; to becomes fixated on the exoteric tradition and never seek for the Truth within its symbols, rituals, etc.; idolatry of mind, to which Bacon is referring most directly, is to become fixated on and never move past the language, logic, sensory experiences, etc. (i.e. peripatetic rationality) by which we begin to come to ‘know things’ into ‘the infinite silence’. Idolatry is to think the truth of the peripatetic mind is Truth. It is to mistake subjectivity for objectivity.

“The Cartesian critique of resemblance is of another type. It is no longer sixteenth century thought becoming troubled as it contemplates itself and beginning to jettison its most familiar forms; it is Classical thought excluding resemblance as the fundamental experience and primary form of knowledge, denouncing it as a confused mixture that must be analysed in terms of identity, difference, measurement, and order. Though Descartes rejects resemblance, he does so not by excluding the act of comparison from rational thought, nor even by seeking to limit it, but on the contrary by universalizing it and thereby giving it its purest form. Descartes is rejecting peripatetic knowledge of resemblance in and of the object whose outward (sensory) face expresses the resemblance, and not knowledge by resemblance in and of itself. As such, Cervantes, Descartes, Bacon or Spinoza do not really represent the heterotopic space of Modernity. We must instead look to subsequent operationalizations of these authors wherein Truth is reduced to fact and the potential for reason is thus negated.) But in fact, there can be no true knowledge except by intuition, that is, by a singular act of pure and attentive intelligence, and by deduction, which links the observed evidence together. How then can comparison, which is required for the acquisition of almost all knowledge and which, by definition, is neither an isolated observation nor a deduction, stand as an authority for a true thought? [(Comparison stands as an authority for true thought in of the fact that it is through the use of comparison (the rational capacity for analogy) that we can begin to distinguish between resemblance by convenience and emulation to extract the aeonian essence that acts as a foundation stone for the rational process.)] ‘Almost all the labour accomplished by human reason consists without doubt in rendering this operation possible’.

There exist two forms of comparison, and only two: the comparison of measurement and that of order. One can measure sizes or multiplicities, in other words continuous sizes or discontinuous sizes; but in both cases the use of measurement presupposes that, unlike calculation, which proceeds from elements towards a totality, one considers the whole first and then divides it up into parts ([in short, one must be omniscient before claiming to truly know any aspect of reality.]) This division results in a number of units, of which some are merely conventional or ‘borrowed’ (in the case of continuous size) and others (in the case of multiplicities or discontinuous sizes) are the units of arithmetic. The comparison of two sizes or two multiplicities requires, in any case, that they both be analysed according to a common unit; so that comparison effected according to measurement is reducible, in every case, to the arithmetical relations of equality and inequality. Measurement enables us to analyse like things according to the calculable form of identity and difference. ([Measurement is coherent with knowledge as resemblance of convenience].)

Order, on the other hand, is established without reference to an exterior unit: ‘I can recognize, in effect, what the order is that exists between A and B without considering anything apart from those two outer terms’;
one cannot know the order of things ‘in their isolated nature’, but by discovering that which is the simplest, then that which is the next simplest, one can progress inevitably to the most complex things of all. [(That which is simplest is the first cause (the Infinite Substance and its emanations). With knowledge of these most simple things (of the uncreated), one can begin to form knowledge of more complex things (of creation manifestation).),] Whereas comparison by measurement requires a division to begin from, then the application of a common unit, here, comparison and order are one and the same thing; comparison by means of order is a simple act which enables us to pass from one term to another, then to a third, etc., by means of an ‘absolutely uninterrupted’ movement. In this way we establish series in which the first term is a nature that we may intuit independently of any other nature; and in which the other terms are established according to increasing differences.

Such, then, are the two types of comparison: the one analyses into units in order to establish relations of equality and inequality; the other establishes elements, the simplest that can be found, and arranges differences according to the smallest possible degrees [(Which classically is Infinite substance and its emanations and in Modernity is ‘the smallest, most basic physical particle’)]. Now, it is possible to use the measurement of sizes and multiplicities in establishing an order; arithmetical values can always be arranged according to a series; a multiplicity of units can therefore ‘be arranged according to an order such that the difficulty, which previously lay in the knowing of measurement, comes finally to depend solely on the consideration of order’. And it is precisely in this that the method and its ‘progress’ consist: the reduction of all measurement (all determination by equality and inequality) to a serial arrangement which, beginning from the simplest, will show up all differences as degrees of complexity. After being analysed according to a given unit and the relations of equality or inequality, the like is analysed according to its evident identity and differences; differences that can be thought in the order of inferences. However, this order or generalized form of comparison can be established only according to its position in the body of our acquired knowledge; the absolute character we recognize in what is simple concerns not the being of things but rather the manner in which they can be known. A thing can be absolute according to one relation yet relative according to others; order can be at once necessary and natural (in relation to thought) and arbitrary (in relation to things), since, according to the way in which we consider it, the same thing may be placed at differing points in our order. [(The fact that Descartes’s philosophy is so fundamentally transformed when unlocked with the idea of Infinite Substance and its emanations including aeonian forms is a tribute to the alchemical power of ideas and their capacity to expand and constrain our potentials for thought, behavior and conception of being... Without the concept aeon, people are left thinking that Descartes’s is referring to the simplest particles or math equations.)]

All this was of the greatest consequence to Western thought.... As a result, the entire episteme of Western culture found its fundamental arrangements modified. And, in particular, the empirical domain which sixteenth-century man saw as a complex of kinships, resemblances, and affinities, and in which language and things were endlessly interwoven - this whole vast field was to take on a new configuration. This new configuration may, I suppose, be called ‘rationalism’; one might say, if one's mind is filled with ready-made concepts, that the seventeenth century marks the disappearance of the old superstitious or magical beliefs and the entry of nature, at long last, into the scientific order. [(This statement perfectly illustrates the ontological transformations associated with Modernism and the arrogance implicit therein... Descartes, Spinoza and such authors were active members of mystery school lineages like the Rosicrucian Order, Masonic Order and other such Chivalric Orders in Europe (in Krieger’s words ‘they were serious mystics’]). To posit their philosophy as marking the disappearance of ‘magic’ is only true at the level that they did indeed try to describe the phenomena categorized by the uninitiated as ‘magic’ in a language that demystified them in the Jesuit form of the era...] But what we must grasp and attempt to reconstitute are the modifications that affected knowledge itself, at that archaic level which makes possible both knowledge itself and the mode of being of what is to be known.”

“These modifications may be summed up as follows. First, the substitution of analysis for the hierarchy of analogies: in the sixteenth century, the fundamental supposition was that of a total system of correspondence

(earth and sky, planets and faces, microcosm and macrocosm), and each particular similitude was then lodged within this overall relation. From now on, every resemblance must be subjected to proof by comparison, that is, it will not be accepted until its identity and the series of its differences have been discovered by means of measurement with a common unit, or, more radically, by its position in an order. If things like the resemblance by convenience and emulation of manifest things by the unit of aeon? What was Sympathy-Antipathy but a ‘measurement’ of the perfection of things by the unit of aeon? What we see is simply a change in the quality of proof, comparison, and measurement, their rearticulation to orientation towards matter, passing time and physical space—from an emotive-intuitive feeling to peripatetic knowledge.

Furthermore, the interplay of similitudes was hitherto infinite: it was always possible to discover new ones, and the only limitation came from the fundamental ordering of things, from the finitude of a world held firmly between the macrocosm and the microcosm. A complete enumeration will now be possible: whether in the form of an exhaustive census of all the elements constituting the envisaged whole, or in the form of a categorical arrangement that will articulate the field of study in its totality, or in the form of an analysis of a certain number of points, in sufficient number, taken along the whole length of a series. Comparison, then, can attain to perfect certainty: the old system of similitudes, never complete and always open to fresh possibilities, could, it is true, through successive confirmations, achieve steadily increasing probability; but it was never certain. 103 Complete enumeration, and the possibility of assigning at each point the necessary connection with the next, permit an absolutely certain knowledge of identities and differences.

Descartes through Rational Intuition, in bastardized readings of Descartes through Material Reason): 'Enumeration alone, whatever the question to which we are applying ourselves, will permit us always to deliver a true and certain judgment upon it'. The activity of the mind - and this is the fourth point - will therefore no longer consist in drawing things together, in setting out on a quest for everything that might reveal some sort of kinship, attraction, or secretly shared nature within them, but, on the contrary, in discriminating, that is, in establishing their identities, then the inevitability of the connections with all the successive degrees of a series. In this sense, discrimination imposes upon comparison the primary and fundamental investigation of difference: providing oneself by intuition with a distinct representation of things, and apprehending clearly the inevitable connection between one element in a series and that which immediately follows it. Lastly, a final consequence, since to know is to discriminate, history and science will become separated from one another. On the one hand there will be erudition, the perusal of written works, the interplay of their authors' opinions; this interplay may well, in some cases, possess an indicative value, not so much because of the agreement it produces as because of the disagreement: 'When the question at issue is a difficult one, it is more probable that there were few rather than many to discover the truth about it.' Over against this history, and lacking any common unit of measurement with it, are the confident judgements we are able to make by means of intuitions and their serial connection. These and these alone are what constitute science, and even if we had 'read all the arguments of Plato and Aristotle, . . . what we would have learned would not be sciences, it appears, but history'. It is the task of words to translate that truth if they can; but they no longer have the right to be considered a mark of it. Language has withdrawn from the midst of beings themselves and has entered a period of transparency and neutrality (with the loss of metaphysical sensitivity associated with axiomatic negation of the Infinite language was rendered a cold, dead husk for meaning).

Please forgive us if you have already parsed this point... Descartes is not a Modernist. Modernist interpretations of Descartes are illusory, illogical and predicated on a lack of understanding concerning the axiomatic foundation upon which Descartes established his philosophy. If things like the distinction between science and history in Descartes seem illogical or problematic to you, it is really worth considering that this is because you are interpreting the meaning of such a distinction from the

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103 This point does raise some interesting questions concerning the shifting boundaries of the esoteric veil during the early modern period and the sociopolitical context that brought on these changes, but such questions seem at present to venture too far into the sphere of historical speculation.

Exoteric Modernist perspective (in which such a distinction would indeed be illogical and problematic). Plato, St. Augustine, Descartes and the other great thinkers of presently recorded western history are not just illogical morons; you may not be initiated and may thus lack the capacity to interpret their texts, but to write them off as simply meaningless, illogical, stupid, superstitious, primitive, etc. is the height of folly as their works are extremely logical and well articulated within their own axiomatic bounds (you may dispute the axioms from which they worked, that is one thing, but you cannot argue that these thinkers were ‘illogical’ within those bounds...). The hubris of Modernity is intellectually dangerous....

2.14 Irrational Rationality in the Modernist Episteme

“We must, in fact, distinguish between three things. On the one hand, there was the mechanism that, for what was really a fairly short period (not quite the last fifty years of the seventeenth century), offered a theoretical model to certain fields of knowledge such as medicine or physiology [modernist-empiricist-analytic-positivist-functionalist cosmology, teleology, ontology—the Modernist world view]. There was also an attempt, rather diverse in the forms it took, to mathematicize empirical knowledge; though constant and continuous in the case of astronomy and part of physics, it was only sporadic in other fields - sometimes actually attempted (as with Condorcet), sometimes suggested as a universal ideal and a horizon for research (as with Condillac or Destutt), and sometimes, too, rejected even as a possibility (by Buffon, for example) [modernist-empiricist-analytic-positivist-functionalist epistemology]. But neither this endeavour nor the attempts of mechanism should be confused with the relation that all Classical knowledge, in its most general form, maintains with the mathe...
eighteenth century, remains constant and unaltered. This link has two essential characteristics. The first is that relations between beings are indeed to be conceived in the form of order and measurement, but with this fundamental imbalance, that it is always possible to reduce problems of measurement to problems of order. So that the relation of all knowledge to the mathe

sis is posited as the possibility of establishing an ordered succession between things, even non-measurable ones. In this sense, analysis [which in the perspective of knowledge as resemblance would be conceptualized as analogy via convenience and emulation] was very quickly to acquire the value of a universal method; and the Leibnizian project of establishing a mathematics of qualitative orders is situated at the very heart of Classical thought [mathematics taken as an optimal language for tangibly symbolizing the aeons]; its gravitational centre. [This only becomes problematic when we axiomatically negate the Infinite and thus forget that mathematics was only ever symbolism]. But, on the other hand, this relation to the mathe

sis as a general science of order does not signify that knowledge is absorbed into mathematics, or that the latter becomes the foundation for all possible knowledge; on the contrary, in correlation with the quest for a mathe

sis, we perceive the appearance of a certain number of empirical fields now being formed and defined for the very first time. In none of these fields, or almost none, it is possible to find any trace of mechanism or mathematicization; and yet they all rely for their foundation upon a possible science of order [all be it upon very different possible sciences of order as per the axiomatic foundation upon which the science is developed]. Although they were all dependent upon analysis in general, their particular instrument was not the algebraic method but the system of signs. So there first appeared general grammar, natural history, and the analysis of wealth, all sciences of order in the domain of words, beings, and needs; and none of these empirical studies, new in the Classical period and co-extensive with it in duration (their chronological frontiers are marked by Lancelot and Bopp, Ray and Cuvier, Petty and Ricardo, the first group writing around 1660 and the second around 1800-10), could have been founded without the relation that the entire episteme of Western culture maintained at that time with a universal science of order [and the concomitant movement wherein scientific knowledge was rendered necessarily historical as the Infinite was lost to known reality and order was rendered as something to be created within manifestation. We might instead say that beings with free will create new modes of or new vessels for actualizing the latent order of manifestation. We create new ways of expressing the implicit order rather than creating order itself.]."

“This relation to Order is as essential to the Classical age as the relation to Interpretation was to the Renaissance. And just as interpretation in the sixteenth century, with its superimposition of a semiology upon a hermeneutics, was essentially a knowledge based upon similitude, so the ordering of things by means of signs constitutes all empirical forms of knowledge as knowledge based upon identity and difference. [In a sense we can see this movement—in its exoteric expression in empiricist-analytic-positivist-functionalist philosophy and the Modernist Mind—as the reduction of knowledge to the semblance of convenience (of the similitude imposed by manifestation in a given environment) in eviscerating the reality of the Infinite.] The simultaneously endless and closed, full and tautological world of resemblance now finds itself dissociated and, as it were, split down the middle: on the one side, we shall find the signs that have become tools of analysis, marks of identity and difference, principles whereby things can be reduced to order, keys for a taxonomy; and, on the other, the empirical and murmuring resemblance of things, that unreacting similitude that lies beneath thought and furnishes the infinite raw material for divisions and distributions. On the one hand, the general theory of signs, divisions, and classifications; on the other, the problem of immediate resemblances, of the spontaneous movement of the imagination, of nature’s repetitions. And between the two, the new forms of knowledge that

And lastly you, faithful companions of the Sun: Mercury and Venus, by the harmony of your government, by your obedience to the judgment of the Supreme God who give to our sovereign master Constantine and all his invincible suns, our lords and Caesars, a perpetual empire; grant that on our children still and on our children’s children, they may reign without interruption for an infinity of centuries, in order that, having repelled all evil and all affliction, the human race may acquire the benefit of eternal peace and happiness.”

Maternus, JF & Monat, P 1997, Mathe

sis, Les Belles Lettres.

occupy the area opened up by this new split \([i.e. \text{once they were split and the new axioms associated with this split came to be accepted as fact it became possible for people to think the that of creating order within manifestation}]\).^{187}

### 2.15 ‘The Representation of the Sign’

As Foucault moves further into his archeology of Modernist thought, it becomes clear that our major task lies in disentangling Foucault’s apt and useful description of exoteric modernism (empiricist-analytic-positivist-functionalist rationalism, or dimensionally reductive, irrational rationalism), which is essential for problematizing the banality of the systems of thought that form the foundation for contemporary power, from the mystical rationalism of early modern philosophers like Descartes and Spinoza, which is also essential for problematizing the banality of the systems of thought that form the foundation for contemporary power (for separating Genesis in Descartes from the Modernist Genesis, or conceptions of order as uncreated from conceptions of order as created).

“What is a sign in the Classical age? For what was altered in the first half of the seventeenth century, and for a long time to come - perhaps right up to our own day - was the entire organization of signs, the conditions under which they exercise their strange function; it is this, among so many other things one knows or sees, that causes them to emerge suddenly as signs; it is their very being. On the threshold of the Classical age, the sign ceases to be a form of the world; and it ceases to be bound to what it marks by the solid and secret bonds of resemblance or affinity \([\text{the Infinite, which gives rise to this resemblance-affinity, has been evicered from the sphere of known reality. This is the essential disjuncture of Exoteric Modernism from the majority of the civilizations that existed across the globe in the millennia (seemingly far longer) that precede the ‘golden dawn’ of Modernism}]\).”^{188}

“Classical thought \(\text{[as expressed in ‘Logique de Port-Royal’]}\) defines \(\text{[the sign]}\) according to three variables. First, the certainty of the relation: a sign may be so constant that one can be sure of its accuracy (in the sense that breathing denotes life), but it may also be simply probable (in the sense that pallor probably denotes pregnancy). \(\text{/Accuracy is now rooted in a thing’s observable qualities rather than its sympathy-antipathy with the Infinite (at least in the exoteric rendition). The truth of a sign comes in the frequency, motion, time, light of its expression rather than in the Infinite it reflects.}/\) Second, the type of relation: a sign may belong to the whole that it denotes (in the sense that a healthy appearance is part of the health it denotes) or be separate from it (in the sense that the figures of the Old Testament are distant signs of the Incarnation and Redemption). Third, the origin of the relation: a sign may be natural (in the sense that a reflection in a mirror denotes that which it reflects) \(\text{//again, the shift is in the fact that the reflection is of the observable, sensory level of reality rather than unobservable level making it inherently irrational}/\) or conventional (in the sense that a word may signify an idea to a given group of men). None of these forms of relation necessarily implies resemblance; even the natural sign does not require that: a cry is a spontaneous sign of fear, but not analogous to it; or again, as Berkeley puts it, visual sensations are signs of touch established in us by God, yet they do not resemble it in any way. These three variables \(\text{[/certainty (breathing=life vs. being flushed=sick—you could just be embarrassed), type of relation (belongs to whole it denotes” vs. separate from that which it denotes), origin of relation (natural)objective’ vs. (conventional)subjective’]/}\) replace resemblance in defining the sign’s efficacy in the domains of empirical knowledge \(\text{[while this is an obfuscating way to interpret Descartes, Bacon, Cervantes, etc., it is a good model for understanding where Modernism took early modern rationalism]}\).”^{189}

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188 Ibid. 58.
“The sign, since it is always either certain or probable, should find its area of being within knowledge. In the sixteenth century, signs were thought to have been placed upon things so that men might be able to uncover their secrets, their nature or their virtues; but this discovery was merely the ultimate purpose of signs, the justification of their presence; it was a possible way of using them, and no doubt the best; but they did not need to be known in order to exist; even if they remained silent, even if no one were to perceive them, they were just as much there. It was not knowledge that gave them their signifying function, but the very language of things [that is to say that signs held an objective reality that rose from emulation of the Infinite rather than a purely subjective reality and purely subjective being, produced within knowledge]. From the seventeenth century onward, the whole domain of the sign is divided between the certain and the probable: that is to say, there can no longer be an unknown sign, a mute mark. This is not because men are in possession of all the possible signs, but because there can be no sign until there exists a known possibility of substitution between two known elements. The sign does not wait in silence for the coming of a man capable of recognizing it: it can be constituted only by an act of knowing. [(Given the fetishization of ‘objectivity’ in what was to come it is more than a little ironic that the major movement involved in the shift to Empiric, Positivist, Analytic, Functionalist rationalism came in reduction of reality to the subjective—in stripping reality of its meaning in relation to the Infinite and thus reducing the meaning of reality to that peripatetic knowledge we can form of it. In this sense we have ‘come full circle’ with Postmodern Modernism...)]”

“It is here that knowledge breaks off its old kinship with divinatio. The latter always presupposed signs anterior to it: so that knowledge always resided entirely in the opening up of a discovered, affirmed, or secretly transmitted, sign. Its task was to uncover a language which God had previously distributed across the face of the earth; it is in this sense that it was the divination of an essential implication, and that the object of its divination was divine. From now on, however, it is within knowledge itself that the sign is to perform its signifying function; it is from knowledge that it will borrow its certainty or its probability. And though God still employs signs to speak to us through nature, he is making use of our knowledge, and of the relations that are set up between our impressions, in order to establish in our minds a relation of signification. Such is the role of feeling in Malebranche or of sensation in Berkeley; in natural judgment, in feeling, in visual impressions, and in the perception of the third dimension, what we are dealing with are hasty and confused, but pressing, inevitable, and obligatory kinds of knowledge serving as signs for discursive kinds of knowledge which we humans, because we are not pure intelligences, no longer have the time or the permission to attain to ourselves and by the unaided strength of our own minds. In Malebranche and Berkeley, the sign arranged by God is the cunning and thoughtful superimposition of two kinds of knowledge. There is no longer any divinatio involved - no insertion of knowledge in the enigmatic, open, and sacred area of signs - but a brief and concentrated kind of knowledge: the contraction of a long sequence of judgments into the rapidly assimilated form of the sign. And it will also be seen how, by a reversal of direction, knowledge, having enclosed the signs within its own space, is now able to accommodate probability: between one impression and another the relation will be that of sign to signified, in other words, a relation which, like that of succession, will progress from the weakest probability towards the greatest certainty. [(First, we should note the changes in literacy rates during the era Foucault is describing... Figures like St. Augustine and Plato wrote with the assumption that most people could not read and would not have access to their texts and so went further towards the esoteric side of the philosophy (though, again, never actually into the esoteric...). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and the rest of the early moderns knew that their work was likely to be read by the general public and thus in many ways hid some of the most essential aspects of the philosophy in the veil of language (for example using phrases like the ‘most simple things’ instead of ‘platonic form’ or ‘aeon’) while at the same time going much further into the esoteric (into attempting to rationalize the esoteric) than Plato would ever have dreamed). What we are seeing in the early modern movement is more the shift in the boundaries of what was to be written down given changing sociocultural context and the prevalence of the view that it is dangerous for the uninitiated to have access to the mysteries rather than a radical shift in thought (which would later in Modernity...). Simply, Foucault is describing a mistaken conception of the shifting boundaries of what was socially acceptable (the Jesuits seems to have lead this revolution of social

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The connection of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. The knowledge that divined, at random, signs that were absolute and older than itself has been replaced by a network of signs built up step by step in accordance with a knowledge of what is probable. Hume has become possible.  

“The second variable of the sign: the form of its relation with what it signifies. By means of the interplay of conveniency, emulation, and above all sympathy, similitude was able in the sixteenth century to triumph over space and time; for it was within the power of the sign to draw things together and unite them [for, more precisely, it was in the power of the sign to initiate remembrance]. With the advent of Classical thought, on the other hand, the sign becomes characterized by its essential dispersion. The circular world of converging signs is replaced by an infinite progression [(the shift from the cyclical, eternal dimension of time to the linear, passing dimension of time s creating and containing reality and knowledge)]. Within this space, the sign can have one of two positions: either it can be claimed, as an element, to be part of that which it serves to designate; or else it is really and actually separated from what it serves to designate. The truth is, however, that this alternative is not a radical one, since the sign, in order to function, must be simultaneously an insertion in that which it signifies and also distinct from it. For the sign to be, in effect, what it is, it must be presented as an object of knowledge at the same time as that which it signifies. As Condillac points out, a sound could never become the verbal sign of something for a child unless the child had heard it at least once at the moment of perceiving the object. [(The foundation for knowledge is now reduced to sensory experience, to our perceptions of passing time and physical space in this life, which the essential movement of Hume (the “copy principle”) that is taught in contemporary, analytic philosophy programs (though we are not sure this was Hume’s intended meaning…). No longer is knowledge a form of remembrance. No longer does consciousness exist prior to manifestation. All that we are left with is an ever-materializing conception of consciousness that finds its first and essential cause in matter. In effect, the highest potential for human knowing is constrained to the edge of the peripatetic mind (the big branch above the maelstrom is gone). This movement, which can be aptly summarized as a change from viewing the first cause as Infinite substance and its emanations to viewing the first cause as the beginning of time (“the big bang”).] But if one element of a perception is to become a sign for it, it is not enough merely for that element to be part of the perception; it must be differentiated qua element and be distinguished from the total impression with which it is confusedly linked; consequently, that total impression itself must have been divided up, and attention must have been directed towards one of the intermingled regions composing it, in order to isolate one of them. The constitution of the sign is thus inseparable from analysis. Indeed, it is the result of it, since without analysis the sign could not become apparent. But it is also the instrument of analysis, since once defined and isolated it can be applied to further impressions; and in relation to them it plays the role of a grid, as it were. Because the mind analyses, the sign appears. Because the mind has signs at its disposal, analysis never ceases. It is understandable why, from Condillac to Destutt de Tracy and Gerando, the general theory of signs and the definition of the power of analysis of thought were so exactly superimposed to form a single and unbroken theory of knowledge.

When the Logique de Port-Royal [(and here it seems that we may truly enter into the perversion that would subsequently manifest as High Modernism)] states that a sign can be inherent in what it designates or separate from it, it is demonstrating that the sign, in the Classical age, is charged no longer with the task of keeping the world close to itself and inherent in its own forms, but, on the contrary, with that of spreading it out, of juxtaposing it over an indefinitely open surface, and of taking up from that point the endless deployment of the substitutes in which we conceive of it [(as reality has been reduced to its most atomized node, passing time and physical space, and the node of reality that holds the world close to itself and inherent in its own form (the

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19 As you might have noticed this leaves us with quite the moral quandary (paradox). On the one hand it is very dangerous to go too deep into rationalizing the mysteries as it can, to be overly simplistic, give rise to what is commonly known as ‘the spiritual ego’. On the other hand these rationalizations have already been unleashed on society and the only solution may be confronting them head-on (which of course requires that we ourselves attempt to rationalize more than might be appropriate). Hopefully our song will not reach the wrong ears from this perch on the proverbial Ivory Tower...

Infinite) has been eviscerated from potentially known reality]. And it is by this means that it is offered simultaneously to analysis and to combination, and can be ordered from beginning to end. The sign... does not erase distances or abolish time: on the contrary, it enables one to unfold them and to traverse them step by step. [The sign is reduced to nothing more than a tool for peripatetic reason and thus loosens the capacity to slay the peripatetic mind and allow entrance into the timeless silence of intuition]. It is the sign [in its new, exotic modernist rendition] that enables things to become distinct, to preserve themselves within their own identities, to dissociate themselves or bind themselves together. Western reason is entering the age of [material] judgment.”

“There remains a third variable: the one that can assume the two values of nature and of convention. It had long been known - and well before Plato's Cratylus - that signs can be either given by nature or established by man. [Some traditions, including those associated with the esoteric side of Platonic philosophy, have a third category of sign that is crafted by the pure rational intuition of a prophet to catalyze Conscious Evolution]. Nor was the sixteenth century ignorant of this fact, since it recognized human languages to be instituted signs. But the artificial signs owed their power only to their fidelity to natural signs. These latter, even at a remove, were the foundation of all others. From the seventeenth century, the values allotted to nature and convention in this field are inverted: if natural, a sign is no more than an element selected from the world of things and constituted as a sign by our knowledge [(subjectification of the objective, where the meaning of a sign is no longer derived from an ever-changing, mutating, different, potentially chaotic, etc. order (or lack there of)—the subjective. It seems that this movement prefigures the postmodern positivism of the contemporary academy (where people talk about THE Good while also arguing that there is no static, unified foundational order by which THE Good (rather than a good...) can be established—universalization without static, ordered, universal foundation upon which to universalize...)]. It is therefore strictly limited, rigid, inconvenient, and impossible for the mind to master. When, on the other hand, one establishes a conventional sign, it is always possible (and indeed necessary) to choose it in such a way that it will be simple, easy to remember, applicable to an indefinite number of elements, susceptible of subdivision within itself and of combination with other signs; the man-made sign is the sign at the peak of its activity. It is the man-made sign that draws the dividing-line between man and animal; that transforms imagination into voluntary memory, spontaneous attention into reflection, and instinct into rational knowledge. It is also what Itard found lacking in the 'wild man of Aveyron'. Natural signs are merely rudimentary sketches for these conventional signs, the vague and distant design that can be realized only by the establishment of arbitrariness.

But this arbitrariness is measured by its function [i.e. functionalism of the sign preceded functionalist conceptions of the substance of mind]; and has its rules very exactly defined by that function. An arbitrary system of signs must permit the analysis of things into their simplest elements [(in the exoteric modernist world view their simplest material elements)]; it must be capable of decomposing them into their very origins [all of which are now, or at least would be within subsequent readings, within time and space]); but it must also demonstrate how combinations of those elements are possible, and permit the ideal genesis of the complexity of things. 'Arbitrary' stands in opposition to 'natural' only if one is attempting to designate the manner in which signs have been established. But this arbitrariness is also the grid of analysis and the combinative space through which nature is to posit itself as that which it is - at the level of primal impressions and in all the possible forms of their combination. In its perfect state, the system of signs is that simple, absolutely transparent language which is capable of naming what is elementary [(This is essential! With the reduction of reality to passing time and physical space and the concomitant evisceration of the Infinite from known reality it became possible to think that language could hold a functional relationship with meaning—that the most simple aspect of reality to be represented (the Infinite) could be perfectly manifest in passing time and physical space (and thus in language). It is in THIS movement that contemporary, analytic, functionalist, 'scientific' linguistic theories of the sort typified by Chomsky's 'Trees' becomes potential. The dimensional incommensurability of the Infinite and the finite made it impossible to fully capture the Truth in language. It is thus that authors like Spinoza talk about the poverty of language, that the ancients wrote their mysteries in the form of myths, plays, and other forms of symbolic expression and that, we argue, Foucault embedded a symbolic narrative in his late oeuvre. Again,

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nothing can be more essential for understanding the modernist epistemology, modernist conceptions of proper writing, proper knowledge formation processes, scholarship, etc. It is this movement that creates the potential for scholars like David Ley to argue that 'all good writing is easily accessible' and that if it is not easily accessible it must simply be 'because the author has not thought it enough' (i.e. the problem does not lie in the implicit impossibility of capturing Infinite Truth in finite language or the potential stark impossibility of readers understanding foreign systems of thought, but simply the fact that one has simply done a poor job drawing the functional relationship that exists between language and reality-meaning (i.e. in the character, the personal responsibility, of the writer—a very neoliberal turn indeed...). This epistemology of exoteric modernity also allows for conceptions of intelligence in purely peripatetic terms (i.e. as, again paraphrasing Ley's terms as perfectly as memory will allow, 'not including the capacity for abstract thought'); it is also that complex of operations which defines all possible conjunctions. To our eyes, this search for origins and this calculus of combinations appear incompatible, and we are only too ready to interpret them as an ambiguity in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought. The same is true of the interaction between the system and nature. In fact, there is no contradiction at all for thought at that time. More precisely, there exists a single, necessary arrangement running through the whole of the Classical episteme: the association of a universal calculus and a search for the elementary within a system that is artificial and is, for that very reason, able to make nature visible from its primary elements right to the simultaneity of all their possible combinations. In the Classical age, to make use of signs is not, as it was in preceding centuries, to attempt to rediscover beneath them the primitive text of a discourse sustained, and retained, forever; it is an attempt to discover the arbitrary language that will authorize the deployment of nature within its space, the final terms of its analysis and the laws of its composition. It is no longer the task of knowledge to dig out the ancient Word from the unknown places where it may be hidden; its job now is to fabricate a language, and to fabricate it well so that, as an instrument of analysis and combination, it will really be the language of calculation."

"It is now possible to define the instruments laid down for the use of Classical thought by the sign system. It was this system that introduced into knowledge probability, analysis, and combination, and the justified arbitrariness of the system. It was the sign system that gave rise simultaneously to the search for origins [in matter, passing time and physical space, The Modernist Garden of Eden] and to calculability [in a reality reduced to matter, passing time and physical space, to the world of motion]; to the constitution of tables that would fix the possible compositions, and to the restitution of a [modernist] genesis on the basis of the simplest [material, i.e. manifest in passing time and time and space] elements; it was the sign system that linked all knowledge to a language, and sought to replace all languages with a system of artificial symbols and operations of a logical nature [as all knowledge was reduced to the peripatetic level, and all modes of knowing that could only exist in silence were erased from known reality]. At the level of the history of opinions, all this would appear, no doubt, as a tangled network of influences in which the individual parts played by Hobbes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Condillac, and the 'Ideologues' would be revealed. But if we question Classical thought at the level of what, archaeologically, made it possible, we perceive that the dissociation of the sign and resemblance in the early seventeenth century caused these new forms - probability, analysis, combination, and universal language system - to emerge, not as successive themes engendering one another or driving one another out, but as a single network of necessities. And it was this network that made possible the individuals we term Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, or Condillac [in their contemporary Analytic, Positivist, Functionalist readings...]."

2.16 Binarism and the Sign
In essence, the move from knowledge as resemblance into the exoteric, modernist epistememe can be understood as the move from the articulation of sign as unified trinity to the articulation of sign as atomized binary:

"...The very fact that the sign can be more or less probable, more or less distant from what it signifies, that it can be either natural or arbitrary, without its nature or its value as a sign being affected - all this shows clearly enough that the relation of the sign to its content is not guaranteed by the order of things in themselves (as the field of dimensional consistency that articulates the order of things has been eviscerated from known reality). The relation of the sign to the signified now resides in a space in which there is no longer any intermediary [Infinite] figure to connect them: what connects them is a bond established, inside knowledge, between the idea of one thing and the idea of another. The Logique de Port-Royal states this as follows: 'The sign encloses two ideas, one of the thing representing, the Other of the thing represented; and its nature consists in exciting the first by means of the second.' This dual theory of the sign is in unequivocal opposition to the more complex organization of the Renaissance; at that time, the theory of the sign implied three quite distinct elements: that which was marked, that which did the marking, and that which made it possible to see in the first the mark of the second; and this last element was, of course, [Infinite] resemblance: the sign provided a mark exactly in so far as it was 'almost the same thing' as that which it designated. It is this unitary and triple system that disappears at the same time as 'thought by resemblance', and is replaced by a strictly binary organization.

But there is one condition that must be fulfilled if the sign is indeed to be this pure duality. In its simple state as an idea, or an image, or a perception, associated with or substituted for another, the signifying element is not a sign. It can become a sign only on condition that it manifests, in addition, the relation that links it to what it signifies. It must represent; but that representation, in turn, must also be represented within it. This is a condition indispensable to the binary organization of the sign, and one that the Logique de Port-Royal sets forth even before telling us what a sign is: 'When one looks at a certain object only in so far as it represents another, the idea one has of it is the idea of a sign, and that first object is called a sign'. The signifying idea becomes double, since superimposed upon the idea that is replacing another there is also the idea of its representative power. This appears to give us three terms: the idea signified, the idea signifying, and, within this second term, the idea of its role as representation. What we are faced with here is not, however, a surreptitious return to a ternary system, but rather an inevitable displacement within the two-term figure, which moves backward in relation to itself and comes to reside entirely within the signifying element. In fact, the signifying element has no content, no function, and no determination other than what it represents: it is entirely ordered upon and transparent to it [(thus, as reality is reduced to the world in time, to a reality that (following Nietzsche) cannot be defined because it has history (motion), it was also posited that things could be perfectly defined (perfectly represented). Again, the farcical nature of the axioms and logics that undergird Material (ir)Rationality shines clearly...)]. But this content is indicated only in a representation that posits itself as such, and that which is signified resides, without residuum and without opacity, within the representation of the sign. It is characteristic that the first example of a sign given by the Logique de Port-Royal is not the word, nor the cry, nor the symbol, but the spatial and graphic representation - the drawing as map or picture. This is because the picture has no other content in fact than that which it represents, and yet that content is made visible only because it is represented by a representation."[10]

The spatial-graphic representation, then, is the typifying representation of the exoteric, modernist mind (the perfected form of modernist representation) because the map implicitly presumes (in creating the illusion) that reality in time (reality with motion) can be perfectly represented and thus immortalized... The fixed, sharp lines of the map belie the actual motion of the reality represented and indeed create the illusion that reality in history is of a dimensional quality that can be defined (i.e. a dimensional quality that lacks motion). It is thus that ‘empiricism’ and empire have always gone hand in hand... Empiricism works to socialize people within the reality defined by the axioms and logics of exoteric modernism; it eviscerates the Infinite from known reality and thus negates our potential for

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cultivating intimacy with the standard for ‘objective’ knowledge (the infinite) and actualizing the potential to feel the Truth; it posits reality in time, reality with history, reality that is subject to change, motion, difference and chaos, as an unchanging order upon which truth can be established; it constrains and expands the potentials of thought, behavior and being within the boundaries established by this reductive, obfuscating and at times wholly illusory definition of the boundaries and qualities of reality. The most fundamental technique of (exoteric) Modernist power is expanding and constraining of human potential for thought and thus behavior and conception of being through socialization. One of the most fundamental mechanisms of Modernist socialization is empiricism and its related practices (the fetishization of ‘quizzes’ in our culture is illustrative as are multiple choice tests...).

“The binary arrangement of the sign, as it appears in the seventeenth century, replaces an organization which, in different modes, had been ternary ever since the time of the Stoics, and even since the first Greek grammarians [in our understanding of history long before...]; and this new binary arrangement presupposes that the sign is a duplicated representation doubled over upon itself. An idea can be the sign of another, not only because a bond of representation can be established between them, but also because this representation can always be represented within the idea that is representing. Or again, because representation in its peculiar essence is always perpendicular to itself: it is at the same time indication and appearance; a relation to an object and a manifestation of itself. From the Classical age, the sign is the representativity of the representation in so far as it is representable.”

This movement from ternary to binary system of representation has three major effects: “first, the importance of signs in classical thought [is transformed],” second, “this universal extension of the sign within the field of representation precludes even the possibility of a theory of signification,” and third (“which probably extends out to our own time”) “the binary theory of the sign, the theory upon which the whole general science of the sign has been founded since the seventeenth century, is linked according to a fundamental relation with a general theory of representation.” Regarding the first effect, Foucault notes that symbols, where “before... they were means of knowing and the keys to knowledge,” were from the 17th century on “co-extensive with representation, that is, with thought as a whole; they reside within it but they run through its entire extent.”

“Whenever one representation is linked to another and represents that link within itself, there is a sign: the abstract idea signified the concrete perception from which it has been formed (Condillac); the general idea is no more than a particular idea serving as a sign for other particular ideas (Berkeley); imaginings are signs of the perceptions from which they arose (Hume, Condillac); sensations are signs of one another (Berkeley, Condillac); and, finally, it is possible that sensations may themselves be (as in Berkeley) signs of what God wishes to tell us, which would make them, as it were, signs for a complex of signs /We do not have the expertise necessary to comment on Condillac, Hume or Berkeley with exact precision, but it seems clear that these thinkers are more suitably located in the heterotopic space of modernity than predecessors like Descartes,

198 Ibid. 65-67.
199 Ibid. 65.
Spinoza, Bacon, etc. That being said, it also seems clear that this is still too early to locate the pivotal shift to the dogmatic-atheist (i.e. unscientifically dimensionally reductive) readings of Philosophy (as is so prevalent in Empiricist, Analytic, Positivist and Functionalist texts) that typify Modernism. In any case, Modernist techniques of power articulated from readings of the writings of the above authors did indeed bring the entire globe under the aegis of dogmatic Modernism. For those who point to the retained existence of religion as problematizing such a notion we should note that dogmatic-atheist and dogmatic-religious subjects in Modernism often suffer from the very same problems of unscientific dimensional reductionism and ideological fallacy (most perfectly manifest in literal interpretation of allegorical religious texts); the dogmatic-religious subject mirrors the dogmatic-atheist subject at the level of peripatetic reductionism. This rendering the mutual scorn of dogmatic-atheist and dogmatic-religious subjects utterly absurd and metaironic—they suffer from the same exact peripatetic epistemological limitations (ones, to the sure chagrin of the religious-materialists, traditionally captured under the term idolatry...). This is dialectical hegemony,200 where elite powers create and control both sides of seemingly oppositional movements (which subsequently articulate the entire spectrum of normatively acceptable thought, behavior and conception of being in a given cognitive environment) so as to produce a desired synthesis-outcome from the two that necessarily includes the axioms and logics shared by the two seemingly opposed sides.) Analysis of representation and the theory of signs interpenetrate one another absolutely; and when the day came, at the end of the eighteenth century, for Ideology to raise the question of whether the idea or the sign should be accorded primacy, when Destutt could reproach Gerando for having created a theory of signs before defining the idea, this meant that their immediate link was already becoming confused, and that idea and sign would soon cease to be perfectly transparent to one another [as their relationship can only be established within human knowledge, which is understood by the dogmatic modernist as produced by and contained within the brain].201

Expanding on the argument that “the universal extension of the sign within the field of representations precludes even the possibility of a theory of signification”, Foucault notes that

“to ask our selves questions about what signification is presupposes that it is a determinate form in our consciousness. But if phenomena are posited only in a representation that, in itself and because of its own representability, is wholly a sign, then the signification cannot constitute a problem. Moreover, it is not even visible. All representations are interconnected as signs; all together, they form, as it were, an immense network; each one posits itself in its transparency as the sign of what it represents; and yet – or rather, by this very fact – no specific activity of consciousness can ever constitute a signification. No doubt it is because Classical thought about representation excludes any analysis of signification that we today, who conceive of signs only upon the basis of such an analysis, have so much trouble, despite the evidence, in recognizing that Classical philosophy, from Malebranche to Ideology, was through and through a philosophy of the sign.

No meaning exterior or anterior to the sign; no implicit presence of a previous discourse that must be reconstituted in order to reveal the autochthonous meaning of things. Nor, on the other hand, any act constitutive of signification or any genesis interior to consciousness. This is because there is no intermediary element, no opacity intervening between the sign and its content. Signs, therefore, have no other laws than those that may govern their contents: any analysis of signs is at the same time, and without need for further inquiry, the decipherment of what they are trying to say [postmodern positivism... The sign has static, unitary meaning, but there is no static, unitary foundation upon which to (actually) establish this static, unitary meaning as the Infinite has been axiomatically negated]. Inversely, the discovery of what is signified is nothing more than a reflection upon the signs that indicate it. As in the sixteenth century, ‘semiology’ and ‘hermeneutics’ are superimposed – but in a different form. In the Classical age they no longer meet and join in the third element of resemblance; their connection lies in that power proper to representation of representing itself. There will therefore be no theory of signs separate and differing from an analysis of meaning. Yet the system does grant a certain privilege to the former over the latter; since it does not accord that which is signified a nature different from that

accorded to the sign, meaning cannot be anything more than the totality of the signs arranged in their progression: it will be given in the complete table of signs. But, on the other hand, the complete network of signs is linked together and articulated according to patterns proper to meaning. The table of the signs will be the image of the things (order is now created—rather than an uncreated minimum of reality (as an implicit dimension of reality)—on top of the axiomatically implicit, static, unified order of sensory experience). Though the meaning itself is entirely on the side of the sign, its functioning is entirely on the side of that which is signified. This is why the analysis of language, from Lancelot to Destutt de Tracy, is conducted on the basis of an abstract theory of verbal signs and in the form of a general grammar: but it always takes the meaning of words as its guiding thread; it is also why natural history manifests itself as an analysis of the characters of living beings, and why, nevertheless, the taxonomies used, artificial though they may be, are always intended to unite with the natural order, or at least to dissociate it as little as possible; it is also why the analysis of wealth is conducted on the basis of money and exchange, but value is always based upon need. In the Classical age, the pure science of signs has value as the direct discourse of that which is signified."

Finally—returning to the third major effect of the new regime of sign in the Classical Age (i.e. “the binary theory of the sign, the theory upon which the whole general science of the sign has been founded since the seventeenth century, is linked according to a fundamental relation with a general theory of representation”30)—Foucault notes that

“If the sign is the pure and simple connection between what signifies and what is signified (a connection that may be arbitrary or not, voluntary or imposed, individual or collective), then the relation can be established only within the general element of representation: the signifying element and the signified element are linked only in so far as they are (or have been or can be) represented, and in so far as the one actually represents the other. It was therefore necessary that the Classical theory of the sign should provide itself with an ‘ideology’ to serve as its foundation and philosophical justification, that is, a general analysis of all forms of representation, from elementary sensation to the abstract and complex idea. It was also necessary that Saussure, rediscovering the project of a general semiology, should have given the sign a definition ‘that could seem ‘psychologistic’ (the linking of a concept and an image (within time)): this is because he was in fact rediscovering the Classical condition for conceiving of the binary nature of the sign."

What starts to become apparent in this movement is that the essential changes are not coming at the surface, per se, but at the level of the axioms and logics upon which the theory of signs and representation are developed and the implicit constraint and expansion of epistemic potential therein... Signs and resemblance are stripped of the reality upon which their expression derives its true meaning. The same terms, rationality being the best example, take on a very different meaning as they come to be interpreted within a new regime of axioms and logics. Words are merely vessels for meaning. The ontological regime(s) (the axioms and associated logics) in which we interpret words articulates their potential meaning... Techniques of power, then, need only be directed towards the articulating the banally accepted (commonsensical) axioms and logics of a society they will naturally cascade across the society by (conscious or no) causing subjects to rearticulate the meaning of existing

31 Ibid. 67.
32 Ibid. 67.
cultural symbols (in the context of this study linguistic symbols) within the potentials for meaning established by the new axioms and logics.

2.17 ‘The Imagination of Resemblance’

“Similitude... is now [in the wake of the 17th century] a spent force, outside the realm of knowledge. It is merely empiricism in its most unrefined form [i.e. in a form divorced from the metaphysical sensitivity to Infinite Substance]; like Hobbes, one can no longer ‘regard it as being a part of philosophy’, unless it has first been erased in its inexact form of resemblance and transformed by knowledge into a relationship of equality or order. And yet similitude is still an indispensable border of knowledge. For no equality or relation of order can be established between two things unless their resemblance has at least occasioned their comparison. Hume placed the relation of identity among those ‘philosophical’ relations that presuppose reflection; whereas, for him, resemblance belonged to natural relations, to those that constrain our minds by means of an inevitable but ‘calm force’. [again, Hume was almost surely initiated into the basic mysteries (if not the deep), and this inevitable but ‘calm force’ is still Infinite Substance and its emanations (this conception of the range of reality had surely not been reduced to that which exists within the world of motion, and his understanding of human potentiality (spiritual and psychic) not, we can only hope, been reduced to the point where he (or Condillac for that matter) meant only our five, physical senses when discussing the relationship between ‘knowledge’ and sensation...)]

Let the philosopher pride himself on his precision as much as he will... I nevertheless dare defy him to make a single step in his progress without the aid of resemblance. Throw but one glance upon the metaphysical aspect of the sciences, even the least abstract of them, and then tell me whether the general inductions that are derived from particular facts, or rather the kinds themselves, the species and all abstract notions, can be formed otherwise than by means of resemblance.

At the border of knowledge, similitude is that barely sketched form, that rudimentary relation which knowledge must overlay to its full extent, but which continues, indefinately, to reside below knowledge in the manner of a mute and ineffaceable necessity.... [Again, the essence of the transformation here is captured in reality’s reduction to the finite. The major movement from early modern rationalism to analytic-positivist-functional rationalism that found its apex in the twentieth century is destruction of the potential to know resemblance in relation to Infinite substance and its emanations rather than the destruction of the potential to know by resemblance in any fashion, and this destruction of the potential to know resemblance in relation to Infinite Substance does not seem to manifest itself in the work of Descartes or Hume (but instead in the readings of their work by subsequent generations).]

As in the sixteenth century, resemblance and sign respond inevitably to one another, but in a new way. Whereas similitude once required a mark in order for its secret to be uncovered, it is now the undifferentiated, shifting, unstable base upon which knowledge can establish its relations, its measurements, and its identities. This results in a double reversal: first, because it is the sign – and with it the whole of discursive knowledge – that requires a basis of similitude, and, second, because it is no longer a question of making a previous content manifest to knowledge but of providing a content that will be able to offer a ground upon which forms of knowledge can be applied [this another sign of the postmodern positivism’s birth, where that which is in a state of change, motion, flux, chaos, difference, etc. (the finite world of motion) is accepted as the foundation for a static, unified order of knowledge]. Whereas in the sixteenth century resemblance was the fundamental relation of being to itself, and the hinge of the whole world, in the Classical age it is the simplest form in which what is to be known, and what is furthest from knowledge itself, appears. It is through resemblance that representation can be known, that is, compared with other representations that may be similar to it, analysed into elements (elements common to it and other representations), combined with those representations that may present

[29] Ashley, LJ & Barnesmoore, LR 2015, ‘Neoliberal Governmentality: Appropriating Religion to Fulfill the Bottom Line’, International Studies Association 56th Annual National Convention provides an example of this rearticulation of existing cultural signs within a new ontological regime(s) drawn from the neoliberalization of religion in East Asia and the United States...
partial identities, and finally laid out into an ordered table.

In this limiting and conditional position (that without which and beyond which one cannot know), resemblance is situated on the side of imagination, or, more exactly, it can be manifested only by virtue of imagination, and imagination, in turn, can be exercised only with the aid of resemblance. And, in effect, if we suppose in the uninterrupted chain of representation certain impressions, the very simplest that can be, without the slightest degree of resemblance between them, then there would be no possibility whatever of the second recalling the first, causing it to reappear, and thus authorizing its representation in the imagination; those impressions would succeed one another in the most total differentiation - so total that it could not even be perceived, since no representation would be able to immobilize itself in one place, reanimate a former one, and juxtapose itself to it so as to give rise to a comparison; even that tiny overlap of identity necessary for all differentiation would not be provided. Perpetual change would pass before us without guidelines and in perpetual monotony. If representation did not possess the obscure power of making a past impression present once more, then no impression would ever appear as either similar to or dissimilar from a previous one. This power of recall implies at least the possibility of causing two impressions to appear as quasi-likenesses (as neighbours or contemporaries, existing in almost the same way) when one of those impressions only is present, while the other has ceased, perhaps a long time ago, to exist. Without imagination, there would be no resemblance between things.

The double requisite is patent. There must be, in the things represented, the insistent murmur of resemblance; there must be, in the representation, the perpetual possibility of imaginative recall. And neither of these requisites can dispense with the other, which completes and confronts it. Hence the two directions of analysis followed throughout the Classical age, consistently drawing closer and closer together until finally, in the second half of the eighteenth century, they were able to express their common truth in Ideology. On the one hand, we find the analysis that provides an account of the inversion of the series of representations to form a non-actual but simultaneous table of comparisons: the analysis of impressions, of reminiscence, of imagination, of memory, of all that involuntary background which is, as it were, the mechanics of the image in time. And, on the other hand, there is the analysis that gives an account of the resemblance between things - of their resemblance before their reduction to order, their decomposition into identical and different elements, the tabular redistribution of their unordered similitudes (reduction to order within time). Why is it, then, that things are given in an overlapping mixture, in an interpenetrating jumble in which their essential order is confused, yet still visible enough to show through in the form of resemblances, vague similitudes, and allusive opportunities for a memory on the alert? The first series of problems corresponds roughly with the analytic of imagination, as a positive power to transform the linear time of representation into a simultaneous space containing virtual elements (the eternity of 3D time, where all the moments of 4D, passing time exist in a single, eternal moment, is now articulated as existing within passing time...29); the second corresponds roughly with the analysis of nature, including the lacunae, the disorders that confuse the tabulation of beings and scatter it into a series of representations that vaguely, and from a distance, resemble one another (the order of nature must now be created within time, and in the High Modernist mind that order must be imputed to the feminine chaos of Mother Nature through hierarchical domination as the High Modernist proposes all things they categorize as feminine be treated...). Now, these two opposing stages (the first the negative one of the disorder in nature and in our impressions, the other the positive one of the power to reconstitute order out of those impressions) are united in the idea of a 'genesis'. And this in two possible ways. Either the negative stage (that of disorder and vague resemblance) is attributed to the imagination itself (disorder is now subjective, rather than the objective quality of privation (i.e. difference is rendered as an illusion rather than as a constituent node of reality), which then exercises a double function: if it is able to restore order solely by duplicating representation, it is able to do so only in so far as it would prevent us from perceiving directly, and in their analytic truth, the identities and differences of things. The power of imagination is only the inverse, the other side, of its defect (imagination, like emotion, as a simple defect a of the peripatetic mind and its capacity to create order). It exists within man, at the suture of body and soul. It is there that Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza analysed it, both as the locus of error and as the power of attaining to truth, even mathematical truth; they recognized in it the stigma of finitude, whether as the sign of a fall outside the area of intelligibility or as the mark of a limited nature. It was in

just this proliferation of a nature that is multiple, yet obscurely and irrationally recreated in the enigmatic fact of a nature that prior to all order resembles itself, that Condillac and Hume sought for the link between resemblance and imagination. [this is essential! It is the rearticulation of difference as irrational and lacking order (rather than as produced by order itself). In short, the question is whether there is an aeon (a form, an order) that gives rise to chance, chaos, probability, change, motion, difference, etc. or whether the lack of static, unified order in passing time comes as a result of the fact that there is no order outside of time]. Their solutions were strictly contradictory, but they were both answers to the same problem. It is in any case understandable that the second type of analysis should have so easily been deployed in the mythical form of the first man (Rousseau), or that of the awakening consciousness (Condillac), or that of the stranger suddenly thrust into the world (Hume): this genesis functioned exactly instead of in place of Genesis itself [at least after interpreted by subsequent generations of analytic, positivist, functionalist actors…. In essence, however, this point is spot on and begins our journey towards the ‘underlying theme’ that rose out of this Nomad Exploration (my apologies that it took sixty pages to do so for those who enjoy a text that ‘gets to the point’). Genesis, the creation story, moved into time (into manifestation, the world of motion), into the axioms and logics of Modernity as the Modern Subject attempted to unlock the mysteries without the necessary keys…].

One further remark. Though the notions of nature and human nature have a certain importance in the Classical age, this is not because the hidden and inexhaustibly rich source of power which we call nature had suddenly been discovered as a field for empirical inquiry; nor is it because a tiny, singular, and complex subregion called human nature had been isolated within this vast field of nature. In fact, these two concepts function in such a way as to guarantee the kinship, the reciprocal bond, between imagination and resemblance. It is true that imagination is apparently only one of the properties of human nature, and resemblance one of the effects of nature; but if we follow the archaeological network that provides Classical thought with its laws, we see quite clearly that human nature resides in that narrow overlap of representation which permits it to represent itself to itself (all human nature is there: just enough outside representation for it to present itself again, in the blank space that separates the presence of representation and the ‘re-’ of its repetition); and that nature is nothing but the impalpable confusion within representation that makes the resemblance there perceptible before the order of the identities is yet visible. Nature and human nature, within the general configuration of the episteme, permit the reconciliation of resemblance and imagination that provides a foundation for, and makes possible, all the empirical sciences of order [within the Exoteric Modernist world view].

In the sixteenth century, resemblance was linked to a system of signs; and it was the interpretation of those signs that opened up the field of concrete knowledge. From the seventeenth century, resemblance was pushed out to the boundaries of knowledge, towards the humblest and basest of its frontiers. There, it links up with imagination [i.e. it is rendered as fundamentally subjective], with doubtful repetitions, with misty analogies. And instead of opening up the way to a science of interpretation, it implies a genesis that leads from those unrefined forms of the Same (in passing time and physical space) to the great tables of knowledge developed according to the forms of identity, of difference, and of order. The project of a science of order, with a foundation such as it had in the seventeenth century, carried the implication that it had to be paralleled by an accompanying genesis of consciousness, as indeed it was, effectively and uninterrupted, from Locke to the ‘Ideologues’ [again, what John Lock meant by the inculcation of order into the Sameness of matter (of the prima materia) though a genesis of consciousness ought not to be interpreted from the dimensionally reductive axioms and logics of Modernity as this order of the Infinite Substance is brought into time by consciousness (the third pillar that brings harmony to the polarity of force, pure action, and form, pure potential)... The Kant and Lock of the normative, contemporary, atheistic liberal are dimensionally incommensurable with the Kant and Lock, as the Descartes and Bacon of your contemporary, normative, atheistic analytic philosopher are dimensionally incommensurable with the Descartes and Bacon because the axioms and logics upon which the ‘modernist scholar’ interprets their writings is dimensionally incommensurable with axioms and associated logics from which these authors were working. This is another example of what Foucault called ‘the stark impossibility of thinking that’.)

2.18 Mathesis & Taxinomia

“What makes the totality of the Classical *episteme* possible is primarily the relation to a knowledge of order. When dealing with the ordering of simple natures, one has recourse to a mathesis *(we must remember that mathematic equations are often taken as symbols of Infinite Truth)*, of which the universal method is algebra. When dealing with the ordering of complex natures (representations in general, as they are given in experience), one has to constitute a *taxinomia*, and to do that one has to establish a system of signs *(a created order)*. These signs are to the order of composite natures what algebra is to the order of simple natures. But in so far as empirical representations must be analysable into simple natures, it is clear that the *taxinomia* relates wholly to the mathesis *(again, this link cannot be properly cognized if one does not realize that math equations are symbols for aeons—the static, unified order upon which taxonomy could be established)*; on the other hand, since the perception of proofs is only one particular case of representation in general, one can equally well say that mathesis is only one particular case of *taxinomia*. Similarly, the signs established by thought itself constitute, as it were, an algebra of complex representations; and algebra, inversely, is a method of providing simple natures with signs and of operating upon those signs....

But that is not all. *Taxinomia* also implies a certain continuum of things (a nondiscontinuity, a plenitude of being) and a certain power of the imagination that renders apparent what is not, but makes possible, by this very fact, the revelation of that continuity *(in passing time and physical space)*. The possibility of a science of empirical orders requires, therefore, an analysis of knowledge – an analysis that must show how the hidden (and as it were confused) continuity of being can be reconstituted by means of the temporal connection provided by discontinuous representations *(again, static unity is to be established within the finite)*. Hence the necessity, constantly manifested throughout the Classical age, of questioning the origin of knowledge. In fact, these empirical analyses are not in opposition to the project of a universal mathesis, in the sense that scepticism is to rationalism; they were already included in the requisites of a knowledge that is no longer posited as experience of the Same but as the establishment of Order. Thus, at the two extremities of the Classical *episteme*, we have a *mathesis* as the science of calculable order and a *genesis* as the analysis of the constitution of orders on the basis of empirical series *(no longer is Genesis the beginning of the expression of Infinite Order in creation but instead an analysis of the creation of order ‘on the basis of empirical series’ (motion, time)—this is the Modernist Genesis, the origin of Order. This means that in Genesis in Modernity is not only taken as the start of time (‘the big bang’) but also as the start of (creation of) order upon the standard of time-motion.)*. On the one hand, we have a utilization of the symbols of possible operations upon identities and differences; on the other, we have an analysis of the marks progressively imprinted in the mind by the resemblances between things and the retrospective action of imagination. Between the *mathesis* and the *genesis* there extends the region of signs – of signs that span the whole domain of empirical representation, but never extend beyond it. Hedged in by calculus and genesis, we have the area of the table. This kind of knowledge involves the allotting of a sign to all that our representation can present us with: perceptions, thoughts, desires; these signs must have a value as characters, that is, they must articulate the representation as a whole into distinct subregions, all separated from one another by assignable characteristics *(static unity is now derived through atomization (through differentiation...), another testament to the illogical nature of analytic-positivist-functionalist interpretations of early modern metaphysics...; unity through difference and the domination of difference sounds eerily like the dictum ‘order from chaos’ and the domination of chaos)*; in this way they authorize the establishment of a simultaneous system according to which the representations express their proximity and their distance, their adjacency and their separateness – and therefore the network, which, outside chronology, makes patent their kinship and reinstates their relations of order within a permanent area. In this manner the table of identities and differences may be drawn up.

It is in this area the we encounter natural history – the science of the characters that articulate the continuity and the tangle of nature. It is also in this area that we encounter the *theory of money* and the *theory of value* – the science of the signs that authorize exchange and permit the establishment of equivalences between men’s needs or desires *(i.e. we see the birth of Economic Theology, the religion of High Exoteric...)*.
Lastly, it is also in this region that we find general grammar - the science of the signs by means of which men group together their individual perceptions and pattern the continuous flow of their thoughts. [In short, what we see is the creation of ‘order’ within time (within manifestation) that is said to convey an ‘objective’ truth without a foundation with an infinite-eternal dimensional quality upon which one might to establish Truth... We see the revival of ‘objectivity’ from the ashes of the axiomatic destruction of the Infinite Substance that makes objectivity’ possible... The potential for Postmodern Positivism is birthed...]. Despite their differences, these three domains existed in the Classical age only in so far as the fundamental area of the ordered table was established between the calculation of equalities and the genesis of representations.

It is patent that these three notions - mathesis, taxinomia, genesis - designate not so much separate domains as a solid grid of kinships that defines the general configuration of knowledge in the Classical age. Taxinomia is not in opposition to mathesis; it resides within it and is distinguished from it; for it too is a science of order - a qualitative mathesis. But understood in the strict sense mathesis is a science of equalities, and therefore of attributions and judgements; it is the science of truth. Taxinomia, on the other hand, treats of identities and differences; it is the science of articulations and classifications; it is the knowledge of beings. In the same way, genesis is contained within taxinomia, or at least finds in it its primary possibility. But taxinomia establishes the table of visible differences; genesis presupposes a progressive series; the first treats of signs in their spatial simultaneity, as a syntax; the second divides them up into an analog on of time, as a chronology. In relation to mathesis, taxinomia functions as an ontology confronted by an apophantics; confronted by genesis, it functions as a semiology confronted by history. It defines, then, the general law of beings, and at the same time the conditions under which it is possible to know them. Hence the fact that the theory of signs in the Classical period was able to support simultaneously both a science with a dogmatic approach, which purported to be a knowledge of nature itself, and a philosophy of representation, which, in the course of time, became more and more nominalist and more and more sceptical. Hence, too, the fact that such an arrangement has disappeared so completely that later ages have lost even the memory of its existence; this is because after the Kantian critique, and all that occurred in Western culture at the end of the eighteenth century, a new type of division was established: on the one hand mathesis was regrouped so as to constitute an apophantics and an ontology, and it is in this form that it has dominated the formal disciplines right up to our day [as analytic-positivist-functionalist (ir)rationality]; on the other hand, history and semiology (the latter absorbed, moreover, by the former) united to form those interpretative disciplines whose power has extended from Schleiermacher to Nietzsche and Freud [in some cases (the best example probably being Nietzsche) this second trajectory retained some sensitivity to the Infinite Substance and its emanations].

In any case, the Classical episteme can be defined in its most general arrangement in terms of the articulated system of a mathesis, a taxinomia, and a genetic analysis [(Genesis is rendered as genetic, biological, material—matter now precedes mind in the genesis of order...)]. The sciences always carry within themselves the project, however remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world; they are always directed, too, towards the discovery of simple elements [of the finite] and their progressive combination; and at their centre they form a table on which knowledge is displayed in a system contemporary with itself. The centre of knowledge, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is the table [the finite]. As for the great controversies that occupied men’s minds, these are accommodated quite naturally in the folds of this organization [(rearticulated within Modernist axioms and logics)].

It is quite possible to write a history of thought in the Classical period using these controversies as starting-points or themes. But one would then be writing only a history of opinions, that is, of the choices operated according to individuals, environments, social groups; and a whole method of inquiry is thereby implied. If one wishes to undertake an archaeological analysis of knowledge itself, it is not these celebrated controversies that ought to be used as the guidelines and articulation of such a project. One must reconstitute the general system of thought whose network, in its positivity, renders an interplay of simultaneous and apparently contradictory opinions possible [i.e. the axioms and logics]. It is this network that defines the conditions that make a controversy or problem possible, and that bears the historicity of knowledge. If the Western world did battle with itself in order to know whether life was nothing but movement or whether nature was sufficiently well ordered to prove the existence of God, it was not because a problem had been opened up;
it was because, after dispersing the undefined circle of signs and resemblances, and before organizing the series of causality and history, the episteme of Western culture had opened up an area to form a table over which it wandered endlessly [when caught within the exotic, peripatetic stage of this process, the maelstrom, the vortex, biological life], from the calculable forms of order to the analysis of the most complex representations. And we see the marks of this movement on the historical surface of the themes, controversies, problems, and preferences of opinion. Acquired learning spanned from one end to the other a ‘space of knowledge’ which had suddenly appeared in the seventeenth century and which was not to be closed again until a hundred and fifty years later.

We must now undertake the analysis of this tabulated space, in those subregions in which it is visible in its clearest form, that is, in the theories of language, classification, and money [here we come to the essential theories by which order was created in Modernity... It is thus that all economically (economic theology) enlivened forms of thought, behavior, activism, social change, etc. are implicitly counterrevolutionary from the perspective of Modernist intellectual hegemony].

It may be objected that the mere fact of attempting to analyse general grammar, natural history, and economics simultaneously and en bloc - by relating them to a general theory of signs and representation - presupposes a question that could originate only in our own century. It is true that the Classical age was no more able than any other culture to circumscribe or name its own general system of knowledge. But that system was in fact sufficiently constricting to cause the visible forms of knowledge to trace their kinships upon it themselves, as though methods, concepts, types of analysis, acquired experiences, minds, and finally men themselves, had all been displaced at the behest of a fundamental network defining the implicit but inevitable unity of knowledge [as this network eviscerated the fields of dimensional consistency that facilitates the true unity of being]. History has provided us with innumerable examples of these displacements. The connecting paths between the theories of knowledge, of signs, and of grammar were trodden so many times: Port-Royal produced its Grammaire as a complement and natural sequel to its Logique, the former being connected to the latter by a common analysis of signs; Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, and Gerando articulated one upon the other the decomposition of knowledge into its conditions or ‘elements’, and the reflection upon those signs of which language forms only the most visible application and use. There is also a well-trodden connection between the analysis of representation and signs and the analysis of wealth: Quesnay the physiocrat wrote the article on ‘Evidence for the Encyclopedie’; Condillac and Destutt included in their theory of knowledge and language that of trade and economics, which for them possessed political and also moral value; it is well known that Turgot wrote the article on ‘Etymologie for the Encyclopedie’ and the first systematic parallel between money and words; that Adam Smith, in addition to his great work on economics, wrote a treatise on the origin of languages. There is a connecting path between the theory of natural classifications and theories of language: Adanson did not merely attempt to create, in the botanical field, a nomenclature that was both artificial and coherent; he aimed at (and in part carried out) a whole reorganization of writing in terms of the phonetic data of language; Rousseau left among his posthumous works some rudiments of botany and a treatise on the origin of languages.

Such, traced out, as it were, in dotted lines, was the great grid of empirical knowledge: that of non-quantitative orders. And perhaps the deferred but insistent unity of a Taxinomia universalis appeared in all clarity in the work of Linnaeus, when he conceived the project of discovering in all the concrete domains of nature or society the same distributions and the same order. The limit of knowledge would be the perfect transparency of representations to the signs by which they are ordered."

2.19 What is Modernity?
What is the movement, then, that we ought properly to associate with the work of Descartes and the Early Moderns?—Enrique Dussel—outlining the influence of Jesuit Catholicism in Descartes education and thinking—notes “the education provided, according to the Council of Trent—which “modernized,”

by rationalizing, all aspects of the Catholic Church *(that is attempted rationalization of the mysteries...)*—was completely “modern” in its *ratio studiorum.*” He describes “the team of Jesuits... who proposed to completely modify philosophical exposition, to make it more pedagogical, profound, and modern, incorporating recent discoveries, critiquing old methods, and innovating in all subjects.” Here we find a signpost to the answer that Foucault did not bring to light in *The Order of Things;* the shift observed in the work of authors like Descartes and Spinoza is not the birth of a new philosophy but instead (as Hagel rightly noted) the moment when “true philosophy reappears” from the ashes of the dark ages. The difference comes in the fact that the mysteries, whose exoteric side had through history been ‘chiefly veiled in allegory and illustrated by symbols’, were to be (as much as possible) rationalized (to be articulated by the peripatetic mind in terms apparent to the peripatetic mind as in, for example, Spinoza’s emendation of the intellect). God becomes the Infinite Substance.

All that being said, there is only so much that can be made tangible and the esoteric side of the philosophy remained illustrated by symbols and thus cradled within the veil of allegory. The danger here, is, of course, that by rationalizing the exoteric side of the philosophy people will become caught in the maelstrom of the peripatetic mind and never escape its clamor into the silence of the rational intuition (given that this constraining of the potential of mind to its peripatetic limits is the essential disciplinary mechanism of Modernism, it seems likely that this was the goal of rationalizing the philosophy whether Descartes was aware of the Jesuit intention or no).

Dussel runs into trouble following Gilson: “From the moment at which Descartes decides to unify the soul and the body *(Descartes’ metaphysics are also ternary (Spirit, Soul-Mind and Body) no matter how much later commentators (Susan Bordo’s perversion comes to mind...) want to interpret him as a simple dualist via readings of the meditations...*), it becomes difficult for him [...] to distinguish them. Not being able to *think* them except as two, he must nevertheless *feel* them as *one.*” This is not a difficulty, but an essential quality of all true rationalist philosophy. We know things in the peripatetic sense at the level of difference, of atomization, where as we feel things in the rational intuition in their unity (which rises from their shared foundation in Infinite Substance);

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213 Ibid. 166.
214 Ibid. 156.
216 Which Descartes was very clear in qualifying as what we might call a ‘therapeutic thought experiment’ that was not intended to expound the whole of his philosophy or to be taken as such...
knowing requires atomization, breaking the world down into discrete elements that can be treated logically, where feeling rises from the sympathy of the world with the dimension of self that is Infinite Substance and its emanations. To interpret such a distinction as a problem or difficulty highlights the incommensurability of Early Modern Rationalism with the axioms and associated logics of Modernity (i.e. the inability to interpret Early Modern Philosophy—or any ‘true philosophy’—from the perspective of the Modernist world view).

Dussel goes on to question “how... the passions [can] move or withhold the cognitive activity of the soul? As hard as Descartes tries he can never show that the passions, linked to the body, connect to the soul and the cognitive activity that moves it.” Indeed, the connection is silent, immaterial, and beyond the sensory world that one can be ‘shown’—one must feel that connection for their self (‘know thy self’).

You cannot show feeling. Feeling is in essence the silent sympathy or antipathy of the dimension of self that is Infinite Substance and its emanations with the world; the body is but the vessel for and the front line of this interaction between Self and the world of self. Where the Modernist axioms and logics actively negate the reality of things that do not have a tangible existence in the finite world, classical world view of Descartes would posit silent phenomena like feeling as more real than material manifestations in their relatively eternal, infinite dimensional quality.

Next, Dussel goes the way of average modernist, reads Descartes literally (rather than within the framework of knowledge as resemblance, which is to say without sensitivity to signatures), and attempts to take Descartes to task for his treatment of the animal spirits and pineal gland...

“The hypothesis of the “animal spirits” (transported in the blood) [(i.e. the vital life force (VLF), or the energy of life we receive through breath (sun light), food and water...) that unite with the body in the “pineal gland” [(what we must remember is that each gland has been demonstrated as holding a silent connection with one of the major psychical, energetic centers in our body (often referred to as the chakras). This is an implicit analogy facilitated by resemblance!!! The pineal gland is the physical counter part for the chakra (the ‘Third Eye’, the ‘Eye of Horus’, etc.) Descartes was describing, and to interpret Descartes words literally is an essentially modernist bastardization. The relationship between the pineal gland and the chakra (the ‘Third Eye’, the ‘Eye of Horus’) comes through resemblance (the chakra is to our psychical body as the pineal gland is to our physical body). One signature of this resemblance this comes in the fact that where the chakra facilitates our extra-sensory, psychic capacities, the pineal gland releases a chemical compound called DMT that facilitates the separation of our psychic body from our physical and the subsequent ability to see reality through the eyes of our psychical body. Descartes was still located wholly within the camp of knowledge as aeonian resemblance, and interpreting his writings literally (within the axioms and logics of Modernity) is just as irrational a reading the Bible or any other religious text in such a manner. Now, you may dispute the axioms and logics from which Descartes was moving, but one cannot dispute the coherence of Descartes logic within his own regime of axioms and logics.) was not convincing [(it was not convincing for Dussel because he interpreted Descartes words literally—from the perspective of Modernist axioms and logics and its dimensional incommensurability with Descartes world view)].”

219 Ibid.162. Underline Emphasis Added.
All of our critique of Dussel’s uninitiated, literal, dogmatically-Modernist interpretation of Descartes (and early modern philosophy in general) aside, Dussel does highlight some very important issues that actually exist in Early Modern Philosophy.

“That pure machine [(the body)] would not show skin color or race (it is clear that Descartes thinks only from the basis of the white race), and nor obviously its sex (he equally thinks only on the basis of the male sex), and it is that of a European (he doesn’t sketch nor does he refer to a colonial body, an Indian, an African slave, or an Asian). The quantitative indeterminacy of any quality will also be the beginning of all illusory abstractions about the “zero point” of modern philosophical subjectivity and the constitution of the body as a quantifiable commodity with a price (as is the case in the system of slavery or the capitalist wage).”

This biocentrism thought—along with the taint of locating the fall outside of manifestation (and as the cause of manifestation and at times even the cause of creation)—is the fundamental problem that has always plagued Paternalist traditions (the traditions spanning what we might call the ‘white world’—from Japan through the British Isles and many other corners of the world—that believe order is to be created in manifestation through forceful, hierarchical domination and that social order is thus to be facilitated by hierarchical biological domination).

We are left, then, in a bit of a precarious place. On the one hand we must not strip authors like Susan Bordo, Judith Butler or Enrique Dussel of their agency, right and duty to critique the virulent sexism, racism, colonialism and oft authoritarian oppression of Paternalism as these critiques are well founded and the sexism, racism, colonialism and authoritarianism produced by the Paternalist world view has been catastrophic. On the other hand, we must be careful that the uninitiated, literal, modernist reading of authors like Bordo, Butler and Dussel (which, sadly, renders them as agents of the intellectual hegemony they purport to fight) does not lead us to banal acceptance of the Modernist world view or a concomitant dismissal of philosophy as impractical and elitist... Given that the Paternalist problems we observe in Early Modern Philosophy were inculcated millennia before (again in China, India, Babylon, Assyria, Phoenicia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, etc.), we must look for the origins of patriarchal, racist, colonial, authoritarian, fallen, etc. thought and practice in the shadows of the global mythical tradition and other bridges to the old world (starting with Hapsburg Spain or the British Empire will simply not suffice)...
not be allowed to negate all wisdom and truth or to characterize all philosophy and spirituality. How better to negate truth and wisdom than to render it truly dangerous and seemingly false through perversion with axioms and logics (i.e. to negate truth is must first be perverted by inculcation of irrational axioms and logics that contaminate the regime of thought in which they are embedded)?

In short, we ought not let the truth be eviscerated from the sphere of known reality simply because a perverse group of people expressed it within an extremely flawed axiomatic, cultural environment, as we ought not let the actions of one (rather small) group of people express the truth of an entire race, religion, creed, etc. (my thoughts come to the logic by which the western political and media establishment interpret all one and a half billion plus Muslims as being defined by the actions of a small group of radicalized individuals...). Don't blame all ideas for bad ideas....

2.20 ‘Speaking’

Following from the three theories he posits as the foundation of Modernity Foucault moves to an archeology of the theory of language within Modernism. Foucault argues that language in the “Classical age is both pre-eminent and unobtrusive.” It is pre-eminent in that

“words have been allotted the task and the power of ‘representing thought’. But representing in this case does not mean translating, giving a visible version of, fabricating a material double that will be able, on the external surface of the body, to reproduce thought in its exactitude. Representing must be understood in the strict sense: language represents thought as thought represents itself. To constitute language or give it life from within, there is no essential and primitive act of signification, but only, at the heart of representation, the power that it possesses to represent itself, that is, to analyse itself by juxtaposing itself to itself, part by part, under the eye of reflection, and to delegate itself in the form of a substitute that will be an extension of it. In the Classical age, nothing is given that is not given to representation; but, by that very fact, no sign ever appears, no word is spoken, no proposition is ever directed at any content except by the action of a representation that stands back from itself, that duplicates and reflects itself in another representation that is its equivalent. Representations are not rooted in a world that gives them meaning; they open of themselves on to a space that is their own, whose internal network gives rise to meaning [this is the linguistic shift that would, in contemporary times, give rise to Chomsky’s ‘Generative Grammar’. At this level of language the mistake in locating the rise of the exoteric modernism in early modern philosophy becomes abundantly clear in, for example, Spinoza’s discussions of the poverty of language.26]... [Language] is not an exterior effect of thought, but thought itself (i.e. thought-mind is reduced to its tangible, finite, manifestations—the reduction of mind to the brain and physical processes that we observe (from our dimensionally reductive human perspective) as giving rise to mind and the material constituents by which mind becomes tangible (in words and in our era of the academy actions-practices)... The divide between mind and matter is axiomatically eviscerated in the reduction of mind to its tangible, material manifestations (to its ‘exterior effects’). Mind is now nothing but the aggregate of the most simple material things by which it comes into manifest being).”

22In short, the ‘Post’Moderns need to strive for a bit more consistency...
24Ibid. 78.
“From the Classical age, language is deployed within representation, and in that duplication of itself which hollows itself out. Henceforth, the primary Text is effaced, and with it, the entire, inexhaustible foundation of the words whose mute being was inscribed in things; all that remains is representation, unfolding in the verbal signs that manifest it, and hence becoming discourse. For the enigma of a speech which a second language must interpret is substituted the essential discursivity of representation: the open possibility, as yet neutral and undifferentiating, but which it will be the task of discourse to fulfil and to determine. When this discourse becomes in turn an object of language, it is not questioned as if it were saying something without actually saying it, as if it were a language enclosed upon itself; one no longer attempts to uncover the great enigmatic statement that lies hidden beneath its signs; one asks how it functions: what representations it designates, what elements it cuts out and removes, how it analyses and composes, what play of substitutions enables it to accomplish its role of representation [i.e. a functionalist conception of the relationship between meaning and language]. Commentary has yielded to criticism.”

It is at this level that we can begin to understand the ubiquity of Modernism (for some Marxist-Modernists in the UBC Geography Department, for example, ‘there is nothing that exists outside of Modernism, but there are many modernisms...’). For example, while Modernism (valorized as ‘scientific, material reason’) and Christianity (denigrated as superstition) are usually framed as oppositional forces in US culture in the manner that religion and science are generally framed as oppositional in the Modernist imagination, the reality is that US Christianity’s descent into pure superstition (‘God hid fossils here to test human faith’) comes as a direct function of interpretation of Christian scriptures from the world view of Modernity (i.e. the literal interpretation of scripture that comes as a function of attempting to interpret scripture within the axioms and logics of modernity and its reduction of reality to history—the world of motion). Indeed it would have been ‘starkly impossible to think that’ the Bible could or should be read in a literal, historically reductive sense prior to socialization in the Modernist world view. When we understand Modernity as an epistemological phenomenon—as the reduction of epistemic potential to the limits of the peripatetic mind—the ubiquity of Modernism’s cultural hegemony comes into focus. In this light the atheist, leftist, democratic scientist who believes in the science of evolution is no more or less Modernist (at the level of assumptions concerning reality, linguistic meaning, etc.) than the rightwing, republican, anti-science Christian who denies evolution and posits fossils as a test of faith. So, while they may take the potentials of the peripatetic mind to different extremes (in inculcating some oppositional axioms and logics), both sides of the right-left dialectic hegemony are in essence mutually constitutive nodes of the same hegemonic regime.

The implications of Modernist hegemony’s ubiquity—in spanning the illusory divide between


229 As the peripatetic mind is founded upon and bounded by the dimensional quality of the passing time and physical space field of dimensional consistency, it is natural that it is able to produce a multiplicity of ‘truths’ that are all bound in the same way (again, the US political system is a good metaphor, in allowing for a ‘plurality’ of truths to be bound within the epistemological limitations of the same modernist axioms and logics.
right and left, religion and science, us and them, good and evil and the many other false binaries of the western social ontology—are many, varied and addressed at length in Barnesmoore’s “Conscious Evolution, Social Development and Environmental Justice”.239 The apparent oppositions of Modernity were constructed to keep people constrained within the axioms and logics that bind the false spectrum. ‘Freedom is Slavery’.240

“This new relation that language establishes with itself is neither a simple nor a unilateral one. Criticism would appear to contrast with commentary in the same way as the analysis of a visible form with the discovery of a hidden content. But since this form is that of representation, criticism can analyse language only in terms of truth, precision, appropriateness, or expressive value. Hence the combined role of criticism and ambiguity - the former never succeeding in freeing itself from the latter. Criticism questions language as if language was a pure function, a totality of mechanisms, a great autonomous play of signs; but, at the same time, it cannot fail to question it as to its truth or falsehood, its transparency or opacity, and therefore as to exactly how what it says is present in the words by which it represents it. It is on the basis of this double, fundamental necessity that the opposition between content and form gradually emerged and finally assumed the importance we know it to have. But no doubt this opposition was consolidated only at a relatively late date, when, in the nineteenth century, the critical relation had itself been weakened. In the Classical period, criticism was applied, without dissociation and, as it were, en bloc, to the representative role of language. It then assumed four forms, which, though distinct, were interdependent and articulated upon each other. It was deployed first, in the reflexive order, as a critique of words: the impossibility of constructing a science or a philosophy with the received vocabulary; a denunciation in general terms which confused what was distinct in representation with the abstract terms which separated what should remain united; the need to build up the vocabulary of a perfectly analytic language. It was also expressed in the grammatical order as an analysis of the representative values of syntax, word order, and sentence construction. Is a language in a higher state of perfection when it has declensions or a system of prepositions? Is it preferable for the word order to be free or strictly determined? What system of tenses best expresses relations of sequence? Criticism also examines the forms of rhetoric: the analysis of figures, that is, the types of discourse, with the expressive value of each, the analysis of tropes, that is, the different relations that words may have with the same representative content (designation by a part or the whole, the essential or the accessory, the event or the circumstance, the thing itself or its analogues). Lastly, faced with existing and already written language, criticism sets out to define its relation with what it represents; hence the importance assumed, since the seventeenth century, by critical methods in the exegesis of religious texts; it was no longer a question, in fact, of repeating what had already been said in them, but of defining through what figures and images, by following what order, to what expressive ends, and in order to declare what truth, God or the Prophets had given a discourse the particular form in which it was communicated to us.

Such is the diversity of the critical dimension that is necessarily established when language questions itself on the basis of its function. Since the Classical age, commentary and criticism have been in profound opposition. By speaking of language in terms of representations and truth, criticism judges it and profanes it. Now as language in the irruption of its being, and questioning it as to its secret, commentary halts before the precipice of the original text, and assumes the impossible and endless task of repeating its own birth within itself: it sacralizes language. These two ways by which language establishes a relation with itself were now to enter into a rivalry from which we have not yet emerged - and which may even be sharpening as time passes. This is because since Mallarme, literature, the privileged object of criticism, has drawn closer and closer to the very being of language, and requires therefore a secondary language which is no longer in the form of criticism, but of commentary. And in fact every critical language since the nineteenth century has become imbued with exegesis, just as the exegeses of the Classical period were imbued with critical methods. However, until the connection between language and representation is broken, or at least transcended, in our culture, all secondary


languages will be imprisoned within the alternative of criticism or commentary. And in their indecision they will proliferate ad infinitum [that is, if one does not use commentary to exit from the cycles of the peripatetic mind and into the silence of the rational intuition, which was the function of commentary (exegesis, Tāwil, etc.) in spiritual traditions. The goal of exegesis (Tāwil) is to bring one from the peripatetic cycles of the exoteric tradition (Sharia, the law, or the symbols, rituals, cultural practices, etc. that socialize the people to form community (the Ummah)) and onto the path (Tariqua) towards intimacy with the Infinite Substance and its emanations (with truth, Haqqa). Experience of and subsequent intimacy with the Truth, the eternal substance brings us into contact with the experiences and energies necessary to manifest the 'direct knowledge' (Ma’Rifa, Wu Wei) of the ‘universal intellect’. Of course, with no eternal foundation for the Truth or meaning in language or thought, it is unsurprising that the continued search for objectivity caused language and thought to proliferate ad infinitum. In 1984 George Orwell discusses a technique by which the potential for thought is constrained by reducing the number of words the general public has access to (and this has plain itself out to the letter in the anti-intellectualist Modern public). What we see in the Modern academy, however, is the proliferation of terms that are available to describe an ever shrinking reality.]

“What distinguishes language from all other signs and enables it to play a decisive role in representation is, therefore, not so much that it is individual or collective, natural or arbitrary, but that it analyses representation according to a necessarily successive order: the sounds, in fact, can be articulated only one by one; language cannot represent thought instantly, in its totality [as only the intuition can, when it brings what is known by the rational mind to bear in a single movement of the mind...]; it is bound to arrange it, part by part, in a linear order. [In short, language is bound to the same dimensional quality as the peripatetic mind and is thus valorized as the highest form of representation in a system of thought where the highest potential for human thought has been established as the borders of the peripatetic mind... The silence of rational intuition—which at one level transcends the finite dimensional limitations that render language and peripatetic thought dimensionally incommensurable with the Infinite and its emanations—is axiomatically eviscerated. Language’s reduction of reality to passing time and physical space is compounded by its atomizing function: “to my gaze, ‘the brightness is within the rose’; in my discourse, I cannot avoid it coming either before or after it.” Language not only reduces reality to the linear dimensional quality of passing time and physical space but also strips time of its relative unity in a given moment by forcing us to atomize the elements that give rise to a said moment (by forcing us to divide the rose from its inner brightness...).]

From here Foucault notes four basic consequences of the modernist turn in Linguistics:

1. The first is that it is easy to see how the sciences of language are divided up in the Classical period: on the one hand, rhetoric, which deals with figures and tropes, that is, with the manner in which language is spatialized in verbal signs; on the other, grammar, which deals with articulation and order, that is, with the manner in which the analysis of representation is arranged in accordance with a sequential series. Rhetoric defines the spatiality of representation as it comes into being with language; grammar defines in the case of each individual language the order that distributes that spatiality in time. This is why, as we shall see, grammar presupposes languages, even the most primitive and spontaneous ones, to be rhetorical in nature. [It is again clear that the essential movement of Modernism is the reduction of reality to passing time and physical space (to the finite node of reality that can be known directly by the peripatetic mind). Foucault is observing the ways in which language acts as a mechanism for facilitating this reduction of reality to the finite.]

2. On the other hand, grammar, as reflection upon language in general, expresses the relation maintained by the latter with universality. This relation can take two forms, according to whether one takes into consideration the possibility of a universal language or that of a universal discourse. In the Classical period, what was denoted by the term universal language was not the primitive, pure, and unimpaired speech that would be able, if it were rediscovered beyond the punishment of oblivion, to restore the understanding that reigned before Babel [i.e. understanding facilitated by the silent language first language of Infinite-Eternal Substance and its emanations]. It refers to a tongue that would have the ability to provide every representation, and every

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103 Ibid. 82.
element of every representation, with the sign by which it could be marked in a univocal manner; it would also be capable of indicating in what manner the elements in a representation are composed and how they are linked to one another; and since it would possess the necessary instruments with which to indicate all the possible relationships between the various segments of representation, this language would also, by that very fact, be able to accommodate itself to all possible orders. At once characteristic and combinative, the universal language does not re-establish the order of days gone by: it invents signs, a syntax, and a grammar, in which all conceivable order must find its place. [In other words, as the eternal order necessary for establishing a fixed truth must now be created within time language becomes the form (rather than the aeons) by which we can create (and thus come to know) ‘eternal order within time.’] As for universal discourse, that too is by no means the unique text that preserves in the cipher of its secret the key to unlock all knowledge; it is rather the possibility of defining the natural and necessary progress of the mind from the simplest representations to the most refined analyses or the most complex combinations [in that order has been rearticulated within the finite dimensional quality our epistemological processes come to be constrained by the linear, discursive mode in which the peripatetic mind functions]; this discourse is knowledge arranged in accordance with the unique order laid down for it by its origin [knowledge arranged based on the linear dimensional quality of passing time and physical space]. It traverses the whole field of knowledge, though as it were in a subterranean manner, in order to reveal, on the basis of representation, the possibility of that knowledge, to reveal its origin, and its natural, linear, and universal link. This common denominator, this foundation underlying all knowledge, this origin expressed in a continuous discourse is **Ideology**, a language that duplicates the spontaneous thread of knowledge along the whole of its length....

The universal characteristic and ideology stand in the same opposition to one another as do the universality of language in general (which arranges all possible orders in the simultaneity of a single fundamental table *(in time)*) and the universality of an exhaustive discourse (which reconstitutes the single genesis, common to the whole *(linear, peripatetic)* sequence of all possible branches of knowledge). But their aim and their common possibility reside in a power that the Classical age attributes to language: that of providing adequate signs for all representations, whatever they may be, and of establishing possible links between them *(the possibility of providing that which is in a state of perpetual change, motion, difference, chaos, etc. with an eternal foundation from which knowledge can be derived...)*. In so far as language can represent all representations it is with good reason the element of the universal. There must exist within it at least the possibility of a language that will gather into itself, between its words, the totality of the world, and, inversely, the world, as the totality of what is representable, must be able to become, in its totality, an Encyclopedia. *(In other words, the possibility that the whole world can be encapsulated (linguistically quantified) within a fixed definition—an ‘eternal order’ created in time; this is the presumption that utopian fascism is attainable through dominating difference and creating an eternal, unified order in time.)*

...Whatever the partial character of these projects, whatever the empirical circumstances of such undertakings, the foundation of their possibility in the Classical *episteme* is that, though language had been entirely reduced to its function within representation, representation, on the other hand, had no relation with the universal except through the intermediary of language.

3. Knowledge and language are rigorously interwoven. They share, in representation, the **same origin** *(in subsequent readings and operationalizations this shared origin is located within the finite)* and the same functional principle; they support one another, complement one another, and criticize one another incessantly. In their most general form, both knowing and speaking consist first of all in the simultaneous analysis of representation, in the discrimination of its elements, in the establishing of the relations that combine those elements, and the possible sequences according to which they can be unfolded. It is in one and the same movement that the mind speaks and knows *(this is the hallmark of the peripatetic mode of knowing, wherein for something to be known it must be articulated within language—mind must be made tangible by language for its knowledge to be considered as real or true)*: It is by the same processes that one learns to speak and that one discovers either the principles of the world's system or those of the human mind's operations, that is, all that is sublime in our knowledge'. But language is knowledge only in an unreflecting form; it imposes itself on individuals from the outside, guiding them, wilfully, towards notions that may be concrete or abstract, exact or with little foundation. Knowledge, on the other hand, is like a language whose every word has been examined and every relation verified. **To know is to speak correctly**, and as the steady progress of the mind dictates; to speak is to know as far as one is able, and
in accordance with the model imposed by those whose birth one shares. The sciences are well-made languages, just as languages are sciences lying fallow. All languages must therefore be renewed; in other words, explained and judged according to that analytic order which none of them now follows exactly; and readjusted if necessary so that the chain of knowledge may be made visible in all its clarity, without any shadows or lacunae. It is thus part of the very nature of grammar to be prescriptive, not by any means because it is an attempt to impose the norms of a beautiful language obedient to the rules of taste, but because it refers the radical possibility of speech to the ordering system of representation.... It becomes clear that modernist linguistics, especially in the relationship between knowledge and language established therein, is one of the essential techniques of power by which the human mind was constrained to its peripatetic state of slavery by Modernism. If Truth must be articulated in language and Truth is by its eternal-infinite nature dimensionally incommensurable with language then Truth cannot be known).

And this link between language and knowledge opens up a whole historical field that had not existed in previous periods. Something like a history of knowledge becomes possible; because, if language is a spontaneous science, obscure to itself and unpractised, this also means, in return, that it will be brought nearer to perfection by knowledge, which cannot lodge itself in the words it needs without leaving its imprint in them, and, as it were, the empty mould of its content. Languages, though imperfect knowledge themselves, are the faithful memory of the progress of knowledge towards perfection. They lead into error, but they record what has been learned. In their chaotic order, they give rise to false ideas; but true ideas leave in them the indelible mark of an order that chance on its own could never have created. "What civilizations and peoples leave us as the monuments of their thought is not so much their texts as their vocabularies, their syntaxes, the sounds of their languages rather than the words they spoke; not so much their discourse as the element that made it possible, the discursivity of their language. [It is thus that authors like Dussel and Bordo attempt to analyze the history of philosophy through a literal interpretation of texts. It is thus that Christians come to interpret the bible through a literal translation of texts. It is thus that the whole of the history of human thought prior to the rise of Exoteric Modernism has become starkly impossible to think for people whose perspective is dominated by the axioms and logics (the hegemonic essence) of Modernity. It is thus that old knowledge is perceived as inferior to new knowledge, which is thought to progress linearly and functionally towards perfection through the accumulation and ordering of facts. Traditional 'Hermeneutics' give way to Functionalist Formalism; the interpretation of the ideas and meaning of a text shifts from a qualitative study of resemblances (of the natural order whose recollection is intended to be catalyzed by a text) to what we might call a quantitative study of the order it created by the language that forms a text. It becomes possible for language to be known in and of itself as the meaning of language is stripped of its relationship to that which exists outside of peripatetic knowledge and the finite dimension of reality to which it is oriented.]

The language of a people gives us its vocabulary, and its vocabulary is a sufficiently faithful and authoritative record of all the knowledge of that people; simply by comparing the different states of a nation's vocabulary at different times one could form an idea of its progress. Every science has its name, every notion within a science has its name too, everything known in nature is designated, as is everything invented in the arts, as well as phenomena, manual tasks, and tools. [As epistemological potentials are reduced to the dimensional quality of passing time and physical space in the rise of Modernism the teleological quality of passing time and physical space (i.e. generative 'progression') is imputed to conceptions of human epistemology. If we can only know in peripatetic terms, we can also assume that all knowledge will take on the same linear, successive and progressive quality as the peripatetic mind and the finite dimension of reality to which it is oriented...]

Hence the possibility of writing a history of freedom and slavery based upon languages, or even a history of opinions, prejudices, superstitions, and beliefs of all kinds, since what is written on these subjects is always of less value as evidence than are the words themselves [the possibility of interpretation without sensitivity to the axioms and logics by which the author articulated the meaning of the language used in a text]....

....In the Classical age, knowing and speaking are interwoven in the same fabric; in the case of both knowledge and language, it is a question of providing representation with the signs by means of which it can unfold itself in obedience to a necessary and visible order. Even when stated, knowledge in the sixteenth century was still a secret, albeit a shared one. Even when hidden, knowledge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
is discourse with a veil drawn over it. This is because it is of the very nature of science to enter into the system of verbal communications, and of the very nature of language to be knowledge from its very first word. Speaking, enlightening, and knowing are, in the strict sense of the term, of the same order....

4. Because it had become analysis and order, language entered into relations with time unprecedented hitherto. The sixteenth century accepted that languages succeeded one another in history and were capable of engendering one another. In the seventeenth century, the relation of language to time is inverted; it is no longer time that allots languages their places, one by one, in world history; it is languages that unfold representations and words in a sequence of which they themselves define the laws. [(In a sense, then, language is rendered as the eternal standard for truth and meaning by Modernity. Language becomes the Infinite Substance and emanations in the Modernist world view. Genesis in Modernity—“genesis as the analysis of the constitution of orders on the basis of empirical series”—is, then, taken as the creation of a Language. Language becomes the eternal-infinite progenitor of order and standard for Truth-meaning.)] It is by means of this internal order, and the positions it allots to its words, that each language defines its specificity, and no longer by means of its place in a historical series. [(In a sense, we can see this as a loss of the capacity to know language in terms of the resemblance of convenience (the resemblance that things take on through shared environment of manifestation, the shared environment here being an historical timeline)]. For language, time is its interior mode of analysis, not its place of birth. Hence the paucity of interest shown by the Classical age in chronological filiation, to the point of denying, contrary to all the 'evidence' - our evidence, that is - the kinship of Italian or French with Latin. The kinds of series that existed in the sixteenth century, and were to reappear in the nineteenth, were replaced by typologies, typologies of order. There is the group of languages that places the subject being dealt with first; next the action undertaken or under-gone by that subject; and last the object upon which it is exercised: as witness, French, English, Spanish. Opposed to these is the group of languages that places 'sometimes the action, sometimes the object, sometimes the modification or circumstance first': for example Latin, or 'Slavonian', in which the function of words is indicated, not by their positions, but by their inflections. Finally, there is the third group made up of mixed languages (such as Greek or Teutonic), 'which have something of both the other groups, possessing an article as well as cases'. But it must be understood that it is not the presence or absence of inflections that defines the possible or necessary order of the words in each language. It is order as analysis and a sequential alignment of representations that constitutes the preliminary form and prescribes the use of declensions or articles. Those languages that follow the order 'of imagination and interest' do not determine any constant position for words: they are obliged to emphasize them by means of inflections (these are the 'transpositive' languages). If, on the other hand, they follow the uniform order of reflection, they need only indicate the number and gender of substantives by means of an article; position in the analytic ordering of the sentence has a functional value in itself: these are the 'analogue' languages. Languages are related to and distinguished from one another according to a table of possible types of word order. The table shows them all simultaneously, but suggests which were the most ancient languages; it may be admitted, in fact, that the most spontaneous order (that of images and passions) must have preceded the most considered (that of logic); external dating is determined by the internal forms of analysis and order. Time has become interior to language. [(For eternal order to be established within language, language had to be extracted from time, from history, as "only that which has no history is definable." Once eternal order had been 'established' within language—and once consciousness had been subsumed within language by the reduction of knowledge, thought, understanding, etc. to existing only within and as a function of language as well as the location of matter before mind in the causal chain of that which is...)—the historical convenience of language (the influence of historical context and normative axioms-logics therein on the articulation and interpretation of meaning in a given era) could be reintroduced in the nineteenth century (and, it seems, likely had to be reintroduced with the rise of the linear, modernist telos of constant and infinite linear progress and the rise of Darwinian theories of mechanical, biologically reductive human evolution. Language itself had to evolve linearly towards higher degrees of perfection (order) in its capacity to allow us to know the 'objective' order and truth of the world...)]

....This is because languages evolve in accordance with the effects of migrations, victories and defeats, fashions, and commerce; but not under the impulse of any historicity possessed by the languages themselves. They do not obey any internal principle of development; they simply unfold representations and their elements

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in a linear sequence. If there does exist a time for languages that is positive, then it must not be looked for outside them, in the sphere of history, but in the ordering of their words, in the form left by discourse.\textsuperscript{235}

Before we move on, we should note that in the above we are attempting to collapse what Foucault is conveying as a process of change involving multiple stages into a shift from one macro order to another in order to highlight the essential shift of axioms and logics embodied in the process analyzed by Foucault. We realize that some context is lost, but this is a perfect example of a case in which it is useful to shed context for the sake of rational generalization.\textsuperscript{236}

2.21 The Verb

After problematizing some of the more reductive conceptions of the verb (as simply signifying tense in time, as simply expressing passion or action, etc.), Foucault argues:

“What we must do before all else is to reveal, in all clarity, the essential function of the verb: the verb affirms, it indicates ‘that the discourse in which this word is employed is the discourse of a man who does not merely conceive of nouns, but judges them’. A proposition exists – and discourse too - when we affirm the existence of an attributive link between two things, when we say that this is that. The entire species of the verb may be reduced to the single verb that signifies to be. [(What the Logique de Port-Royal seems to be arguing is that the potential for discernment—that quality which is represented by Jupiter, the Unbiased Sovereign, and by the Archangel Michael (the one who is like god') bearer of the scales of Justice—was actualized in the human psyche as a function of language. As we have noted it is not clear that the Catholic-Jansenist authors who penned this text were arguing that it language created (rather than actualized) the potential for discernment. Instead, they were arguing that the entry of verbs into the human psyche provided humans with a tool to ‘actualize’ the innate potential the human psyche to act as receptacle for the eternal order of discernment. It is a subtle difference—once reality is reduced to the finite there is no longer a dimension in which potential can exist prior to actualization, and, as a result, potential must be articulated by manifestation. The universe was no longer an idea evolving to fruition through matter. To build a house, we must first conceive of it as a finished idea; from this point we must break that idea down into its constituent nodes to determine the materials needed to build the house; next we must collect these materials; finally, we must bring the order derived from the idea to bear upon the materials (the prima materia) and attempt to sympathetically harmonize our manifest creation with the idea (egg) from which it was birthed. In Modernism the chicken comes before the egg... Instead of manifestation being birthed from an idea, the Modernist world view argues that manifestation produces mind as a random, inevitably-futile, essentially biological phenomenon that doomed to recede into the cold dark of maximum entropy...)] All the others secretly make use of this unique function, but they have hidden it beneath a layer of determinations: attributes have been added to it, and instead of saying ‘I am singing’, we say ‘I sing'; indications of time have been added, and instead of saying ‘before now I am singing’, we say ‘I sang'; lastly, certain languages have integrated the subject itself into their verbs, and thus we find the Romans saying, not ego vivit, but vivo. All of this is merely accretion and sedimentation around and over a very slight yet essential verbal function, ‘there is only the verb to be ... that has remained in this state of simplicity’. [(Consciousness enters into motion, into change, into time, via the verb. Being becomes aware of itself as being in time—as to be—through the verb.)]


The entire essence of language is concentrated in that singular word. Without it, everything would have remained silent [as without creation, passing time, physical space (manifestation) and the change, motion, chaos, probability, difference, multiplicity etc. they make potential being would have remained silent. Without ‘the Word’, without activity and motion, the void of infinite potential would have remained intangible and unchanging. Fiat Lux], and though men, like certain animals, would have been able to make use of their voices well enough, yet not one of those cries hurled through the jungle would ever have proved to be the first link in the great chain of language.”

To be, or not to be- that is the question:
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing end them. To die- to sleep-
No more; and by a sleep to say we end
The heartache, and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to. 'Tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wish'd. To die- to sleep,
To sleep- perchance to dream: ay, there's the rub!
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must give us pause. There's the respect
That makes calamity of so long life.
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
Th' oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,
The pangs of despis'd love, the law's delay,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of th' unworthy takes,
When he himself might his quietus make
With a bare bodkin? Who would these fardels bear,
To grunt and sweat under a weary life,
But that the dread of something after death-
The undiscover'd country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns- puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of?
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pith and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry
And lose the name of action.- Soft you now!
The fair Ophelia!- Nymph, in thy orisons
Be all my sins rememb'red."

"In the Classical period, language in its raw state - that mass of signs impressed upon the world in order to exercise our powers of interrogation - vanished from sight, but language itself entered into new relations with being, ones more difficult to grasp, since it is by means of a word that language expresses being and is united to

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238 Shakespeare, W, *Hamlet*. It is in this third speech that Hamlet leaves the frenzy of emotion and the unpurified peripatetic mind (the Seas of trouble) and begins his journey into the quiet calm of the purified rational mind. It also presupposes the link between free will (action) and the cultivation of rationality—one cannot be deemed ‘free’ when they have not actualized their potential for rational thought.
it; it affirms being from within itself; and yet it could not exist as language if that word, on its own, were not, in advance, sustaining all possibility of discourse. Without a way of designating being, there would be no language at all; but without language, there would be no verb to be, which is only one part of language. This simple word is the representation of being in language; but it is equally the representative being of language - that which, by enabling language to affirm what it says, renders it susceptible of truth or error. In this respect it is different from all the signs that may or may not be consistent with, faithful to, or well adapted to, what they designate, but that are never true or false. Language is, wholly and entirely, discourse; and it is so by virtue of this singular power of a word to leap across the system of signs towards the being of that which is signified.

But from where does this power derive? And what is this meaning, which, by overflowing the words containing it, forms the basis of the proposition? The grammarians of Port-Royal said that the meaning of the verb to be was affirmation - which indicated well enough in what region of language its absolute privilege lay, but not at all in what it consisted. We must not imagine that the verb to be contains the idea of affirmation, for the word affirmation itself, and also the word yes, contain it equally well; what the verb to be provides is rather the affirmation of the idea. But is the affirmation of an idea also the expression of its existence? This is in fact what Bauze thinks, and he also takes it to be one reason why variations of time have been concentrated into the form of the verb: for the essence of things does not change, it is only their existence that appears and disappears, it is only their existence that has a past and a future....

So that the essential function of the verb to be is to relate all language to the representation that it designates. The being towards which it spills over its signs is neither more nor less than the being of thought. Comparing language to a picture, one late-eighteenth-century grammarian defines nouns as forms [(the pillar of form, of latent order and infinite potential)], adjectives as colours [(the pillar of force, of activity, of actualizing potential, light)], and the verb as the canvas itself [(the third pillar, consciousness)] upon which the colours are visible. An invisible canvas [(you cannot ‘see’ consciousness in time as its tangibility comes only as a reflection in your existence...)], entirely overlaid by the brightness and design of the words, but one that provides language with the site on which to display its painting. What the verb designates, then, is the representative character of language, the fact that it has its place in thought, and that the only word capable of crossing the frontier of signs and providing them with a foundation in truth never attains to anything other than representation itself. So that the function of the verb is found to be identified with the mode of existence of language, which it traverses throughout its length: to speak is at the same time to represent [(force)] by means of signs and to give signs a synthetic form governed by the verb. As Destutt says, the verb is attribution, the sustaining power, and the form of all attributes:

The verb to be is found in all propositions, because we cannot say that a thing is in such and such a way without at the same time saying that it is... But this word is which in all propositions is always a part of the attribute [predicate] in those propositions, it is always the beginning and the basis of the attribute, it is the general and common attribute.

It will be seen how the function of the verb, once it had reached this point of generality, had no other course but to become dissociated, as soon as the unitary domain of general grammar itself disappeared. When the dimension of the purely grammatical was opened up, the proposition was to become no more than a syntactical unit. The verb was merely to figure in it along with all the other words, with its own system of agreement, inflections, and cases. And at the other extreme, the power of manifestation of language was to reappear in an autonomous question, more archaic than grammar. And throughout the nineteenth century, language was to be examined in its enigmatic nature as verb: in that region where it is nearest to being, most capable of naming it, of transmitting or giving effulgence to its fundamental meaning, of rendering it absolutely manifest. From Hegel to Mallarme, this astonishment in the face of the relations of being and language was to counterbalance the reintroduction of the verb into the homogeneous order of grammatical functions [(which had at this juncture been stripped of their eternal foundation)].

Foucault’s analysis in ‘The Order of Things’ goes on to describe categorization (i.e. hierarchical

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domination of manifestation by knowledge, language, the peripatetic mind, etc.) and economic theology as expressed in money and exchange (i.e. the social practice that rose from Modernist world view’s reduction of reality to the finite and humanity to discrete, biological, material individuality), but the above is sufficient to understand the nature and Genesis of order in Modernity

2.22 Peripatetic Truth Telling, Modernist Confessions
In *The History of Sexuality* V.1 Foucault observes the modernization of Catholic ritual confession. In Modernity “one goes about telling, with the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell,” for it cannot be true if it cannot be spoken; what we must remember is that what is most difficult to tell, emotion, feeling, transcendent truth, the reality of the Infinite and its emanations, etc. is most difficult to tell because of the poverty of language (i.e. the dimensional incommensurability of the finite quality of language with the these other phenomena). Again, Modernism understands order, meaning and thus Truth as articulated within (created by) human knowledge and the time and space it inhabits. Modernism also constrains our potential for knowing to the peripatetic mind—all knowledge incommensurable with the light and motion of the peripatetic mind is lost as our connection with the silence is severed. As such, it is only right that modernists ignore the ‘poverty of language’ and its incommensurability with Truth instead positing that articulation within language defines the boundaries of reality. Given that the peripatetic mind is the boundary for truth, order, meaning and reality in Modernist world view and the peripatetic mind may only know in terms of the finite dimensional quality of passing time and physical space (with which language and numbers are commensurable and derive their poverty in the capacity to encapsulate that which lacks tangibility), it is only natural that Modernism would impel someone to express reality and truth in language. We encourage you to consider whether you could fitfully explain love to someone who has never felt it. Could you describe color to the blind? Is conscious experience commensurable with quantification (in language, number, etc.)?

2.23 Peripatetic Epistemological Reductionism in Primatology
Haraway’s description of Robert Yerkes’ Primatology provides us with another interesting lens into the changes in epistemological method produced by the Modernist reduction of human epistemic potential to the peripatetic mind (of mind to matter) and facilitates our transition into our exploration of Haraway’s work. “The invisible essence of psychic life was consciousness, but its study had to be

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rooted in visible objects.” Yerkes was “interested primarily in... scales of neural complexity as markers of increasing behavioral capacity... Yerkes studied scales of mental function as the indicator of increased organizational complexity.”

“The direction of [bio-cognitive] evolution was not from emotion to reflection, but toward ever more complex processing of sensations [meaning that, like Ray Kurzweil almost a century later, Yerkes viewed the evolution of consciousness as a linear accumulation of processing power (the speed of calculation) rather than nonlinear evolution through different 'states of mind')". The senses provided the elements for fashioning self and environment and the materials for producing thought [i.e. consciousness is produced by biology and sense perception therein]... Potent with meanings in the history of science, exploration, quest, and progress, sight [light, tangibility] was pre-eminent for the primates....

The highest form of knowledge was not related to introspection and acceptance [introspection leading to knowledge of Self—'the Universe and God'; acceptance leading to rationally intuitive behavior like shedding attachment to that which is in a state of perpetual change, motion, chaos, etc.], but to rational control.”

In Modernity we study consciousness as a linear accumulation of complexity and calculation capacity rather than an evolution of changing states (solid, liquid, gas, plasma, aether). We equate the evolution of consciousness with the evolution of biology rather than viewing the evolution of biology as, at certain points, reaching a sort of singularity that allows for a new state (latent order) of mind to be expressed (water accumulating enough latent energy to shift from liquid into its gaseous state). At this point we would simply like to note that inner empiricism and the science of shared experience in the invisible depths of reality (which have dominated the history of psychology, metaphysics, spirituality, etc.) were rendered inert as a result of the fact that such studies are not founded upon evidence that is immediately tangible or, thus, accessible to the peripatetic mind. Even tangible descriptions of shared experience are rendered inert as these experiences can be understood as the actualization of an apex of human epistemological potential—a different state of mind than our reflexive, biological, peripatetic baseline—and therefore beyond replication by individuals who lack the ability to actualize said epistemological potential. It is thus that humanity lost its only means for knowing the self, and, thus, the Infinite Substance and its emanations: “know thyself; then thou shalt know the Universe and God.”

As ancient texts—from the Bible to Plato and Aristotle—were translated into the publically accessible languages and literacy increased the public needed to be socialized in a manner that prevented them from accessing the esoteric truth symbolically and allegorically embedded within these texts (i.e. the human potential for conscious evolution had to be negated as was so aptly achieved by

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243 Ibid. 74.
public socialization within the axioms and logics of Modernism). Modernism renders the mysteries inaccessible by enslaving the public to the peripatetic mind through socialization in a regime of axioms and logics that negate the foundation for all other modes of knowing. This Modern mode of oppression—most perfectly manifest in social systems like contemporary US Democracy—is more effective than traditional techniques of power like simply keeping texts locked within languages that the public does not know in creating the illusory perception of freedom, agency, knowledge, understanding, access to the truth, etc. in the public mind; who will fight against oppression when deluded by the impression that they know the truth and the truth is that they are free (‘Master’s piece of paper says so!!!’). ‘One who knows everything knows nothing’.

2.24 Epistemological Violence in the Liberal-Modernist Order

“The 1950 [UNESCO] document went beyond negative statements that science provided no proof of inherited racial inequality of language; it stated that “scientific evidence indicates that the range of mental capacities in all ethnic groups [populations] is much the same.” The double point of mental equality of races and the species trait of plasticity was to be the keystone of the post-war doctrine of the relation of nature and culture…. Man the Hunter would be enlisted to provide arguments on the early origin of plasticity and equal human mental capacities…. In the mid-century doctrine of nature and culture, human univerals would be the fruits of genetics, biology, and the key humanizing adaptational complexities, like dipedalism and hunting, that shaped the capacity for mental productions called culture. (Mater (material adaptations...) now establishes the potential for mind as matter causes and contains mind—i.e. the presumed ontological dependence of mind upon matter necessitates that the potential order of mind be dependent upon the potential order of matter.)”

From the banal liberal perspective of the Modernist world view the idea of mental equality across populations sounds rather appealing and rationally justified... From the perspective of the Modernist Epistemology—where the substance and thus state of mind are erased from the equation and where matter and ‘practice’ are located before mind and theory in the causal chain of that which is—it might even seem sensible to view human epistemic potential as ‘equal’ without regard to culture (and the axioms-logics therein). The human potential for conscious evolution and its relationship to cultural environment—which is to say the relationship between cultural, ideational environment and the potential for humans to actualize their potential for conscious evolution—are axiomatically negated.

Equality may sound nice, but the ontological, epistemological (philosophical...) and physical violence we have done to reality in our attempts to create an order of equality the world of difference—a world

that is dimensionally incommensurable with the static, unified dimensional quality of equality—through the hierarchical domination of difference is indefensible.

This leads us to another issue that plagues the social sciences—the wholesale dismissal of all generalization in response to the irrational generalization of Paternalist bio-logics (especially as expressed in Positivist Social Science, Social Physics, etc.). Race and culture are not the same thing (even if Microsoft word wants us to use the term ‘is’ rather than ‘are’ after ‘race and culture’). They may have been presented as such through Paternalist history, and many actors surely still perform them as a single, homogeneous whole (giving that unity at least some level of reality), but this does not render them the same in essence (order is not created within human knowledge). Racism assumes, in one sense, that biological differences produce epistemological differences... A more cogent view would understand the combination of culture and racial segregation as producing racialized differences in epistemological outcomes. Culture and its implicit axioms-logics do produce normative epistemological differences. American culture does produce different epistemological norms than say Chinese or Hindu culture at the exact points at which its hegemonic essence (its axioms and logics) diverges from said cultures. Again, the combination of racial segregation (be it externally or internally imposed) with culture makes the issue prickly. While we must be sensitive to such issues and actively avoid slipping into homogenizing presumption wherein we assume all members of a cultural body will always follow the norm of that cultural body or other modes of irrational generalization, we must also retain our capacity to speak about a culture’s hegemonic essence and its normative epistemological outcomes. In short, our world view (the axioms and logics of our culture) expands and constrains our potential for thought and thus behavior and conception of being, and this relationship between theory and thought allows for rational generalization concerning epistemological norms in individuals who accept a given world view.

On another note, we reject liberal nihilism and its attempt to strip us of the ability to make ethical judgments concerning culture(s)—in our ontological regime the uncreated is not forgotten, and there is thus an objective standard upon which ‘justice’, ‘the good’, ‘harmony’, etc. can be judged (or, more aptly, an objective standard by which we can judge the sympathy of manifestation with its uncreated foundation).

The elite class (those who establish the axioms and logics of a society) often solve problems they created with solutions that both fulfills existing political interests and creates-compounds new

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problems that can again be solved in a manner that fulfills political interests and creates-compounds problems... This is the crisis-solution technique of power (which manifests itself as the conservative and progressive poles of dialectical hegemony). Equality of mind does exist at the level consciousness in its essence, but Modernism can only know its ‘equality’ in terms shared peripatetic capacity to receive, store, transmit, calculate, etc. data.

### 2.25 Pre-Modern Genesis

We leave you with some scraps from Genesis narratives articulated outside Modernist axioms and logics.

Genesis 1:1-5

“1. In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.
2. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.
3. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.
4. And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness.
5. And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And the evening and the morning were the first day.”

Genesis 1:1-5

“There was Eru, the One, who in Arda is called Ilúvatar; and he made [(emanated)] first the Ainur, the Holy Ones, that were the offspring of his thought, and they were with him before aught else was made. And he spoke to them, propounding to them themes of music; and they sang before him, and he was glad. But for a long while they sang only each alone, or but few together, while the rest hearkened; for each comprehended only that part of me mind of Ilúvatar from which he came, and in the understanding of their brethren they grew but slowly. Yet ever as they listened they came to deeper understanding, and increased in unison and harmony.

And it came to pass that Ilúvatar called together all the Ainur and declared to them a mighty theme, unfolding to them things greater and more wonderful than he had yet revealed; and the glory of its beginning and the splendor of its end amazed the Ainur, so that they bowed before Ilúvatar and were silent.

Then Ilúvatar said to them: ‘Of the theme that I have declared to you, I will now that ye make in harmony together a Great Music. And since I have kindled you with the Flame Imperishable, ye shall show forth your powers in adorning this theme, each with his own thoughts and devices, if he will. But I win sit and hearken, and be glad that through you great beauty has been wakened into song.’

Then the voices of the Ainur, like unto harps and lutes, and pipes and trumpets, and viols and organs, and like unto countless choirs singing with words, began to fashion the theme of Ilúvatar to a great music; and a sound arose of endless interchanging melodies woven in harmony that passed beyond hearing into the depths and into the heights, and the places of the dwelling of Ilúvatar were filled to overflowing, and the music and the echo of the music went out into the Void, and it was not void. Never since have the Ainur made any music like

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251Genesis, 1:1-5, KJV.
252Swedenborg, E 1963, Arcana Coelestia, p. 3.
to this music, though it has been said that a greater still shall be made before Êluvatar by the choirs of the Ainur and the Children of Êluvatar after the end of days. Then the themes of Êluvatar shall be played aright, and take Being in the moment of their utterance, for all shall then understand fully his intent in their part, and each shall know the comprehension of each, and Êluvatar shall give to their thoughts the secret fire, being well pleased.

But now Êluvatar sat and hearkened, and for a great while it seemed good to him, for in the music there were no flaws. But as the theme progressed, it came into the heart of Melkor to interweave matters of his own imagining that were not in accord with the theme of Êluvatar, for he sought therein to increase the power and glory of the part assigned to himself. To Melkor among the Ainur had been given the greatest gifts of power and knowledge, and he had a share in all the gifts of his brethren. He had gone often alone into the void places seeking the Imperishable Flame; for desire grew hot within him to bring into Being things of his own, and it seemed to him that Êluvatar took no thought for the Void, and he was impatient of its emptiness. Yet he found not the Fire, for it is with Êluvatar. But being alone he had begun to conceive thoughts of his own unlike those of his brethren.

Some of these thoughts he now wove into his music, and straightway discord arose about him, and many that sang nigh him grew despondent, and their thought was disturbed and their music faltered; but some began to attune their music to his rather than to the thought which they had at first. Then the discord of Melkor spread ever wider, and the melodies which had been heard before foundered in a sea of turbulent sound. But Êluvatar sat and hearkened until it seemed that about his throne there was a raging storm, as of dark waters that made war one upon another in an endless wrath that would not be assuaged.

Then Êluvatar arose, and the Ainur perceived that he smiled; and he lifted up his left hand, and a new theme began amid the storm, like and yet unlike to the former theme, and it gathered power and had new beauty. But the discord of Melkor rose in uproar and contended with it, and again there was a war of sound more violent than before, until many of the Ainur were dismayed and sang no longer, and Melkor had the mastery. Then again Êluvatar arose, and the Ainur perceived that his countenance was stern; and he lifted up his right hand, and behold! a third theme grew amid the confusion, and it was unlike the others. For it seemed at first soft and sweet, a mere rippling of gentle sounds in delicate melodies; but it could not be quenched, and it took to itself power and profundity. And it seemed at last that there were two musics progressing at one time before the seat of Êluvatar, and they were utterly at variance. The one was deep and wide and beautiful, but slow and blended with an inmeasurable sorrow, from which its beauty chiefly came. The other had now achieved a unity of its own; but it was loud, and vain, and endlessly repeated; and it had little harmony, but rather a clamorous unison as of many trumpets braying upon a few notes. And it essayed to drown the other music by the violence of its voice, but it seemed that its most triumphant notes were taken by the other and woven into its own solemn pattern.

In the midst of this strife, whereat the halls of Êluvatar shook and a tremor ran out into the silences yet unmoved, Êluvatar arose a third time, and his face was terrible to behold. Then he raised up both his hands, and in one chord, deeper than the Abyss, higher than the Firmament, piercing as the light of the eye of Êluvatar, the Music ceased.

Then Êluvatar spoke, and he said: 'Mighty are the Ainur, and mightiest among them is Melkor; but that he may know, and all the Ainur, that I am Êluvatar, those things that ye have sung, I will show them forth, that ye may see what ye have done. And thou, Melkor, shalt see that no theme may be played that hath not its uttermost source in me, nor can any alter the music in my despite. For he that attempteth this shall prove but mine instrument in the devising of things more wonderful, which he himself hath not imagined.'

Then the Ainur were afraid, and they did not yet comprehend the words that were said to them; and Melkor was filled with shame, of which came secret anger. But Êluvatar arose in splendour, and he went forth from the fair regions that he had made for the Ainur; and the Ainur followed him.

But when they were come into the Void, Êluvatar said to them: 'Behold your Music!' And he showed to them a vision, giving to them sight where before was only hearing; and they saw a new World made visible before them, and it was globed amid the Void, and it was sustained therein, but was not of it. And as they looked and wondered this World began to unfold its history, and it seemed to them that it lived and grew. And when the Ainur had gazed for a while and were silent, Êluvatar said again: 'Behold your Music! This is your minstrelsy; and each of you shall find contained herein, amid the design that I set before you, all those things which it may seem that he himself devised or added. And thou, Melkor, wilt discover all the secret thoughts of
thy mind, and wilt perceive that they are but a part of the whole and tributary to its glory.\textsuperscript{139}

3. The Garden of Eden, ‘Primate Visions’ of Modernity

3.1 Paradise Lost to Paradise Found

“The outcast from the Garden, has turned inward, and, it is interesting that within such a culture, when the individuals experience a psychological crisis of some sort, a psychotic or neurotic episode, they will turn to religion or the psychiatrist or medication instead of to Nature to become well again…. You end up with an entirely different focus when the tradition of a culture is not founded on the fall from grace, where man was never banned from the Garden of Eden and lives close to Nature and Nature is a manifestation of the Divine. In those cultures a psychotic break or a schizophrenic episode is magical. The unconscious mind opens up, and, if the person is young, he or she is encouraged to dive into it, not pull back from the brink. They fall into their unconscious, into the realm of pure imagination, the realm of Jung's archetypes, into a world of spirit. They are allowed to experience other realms of their own minds and they are changed as a result. In many primitive cultures, they become the medicine people. They have experienced the Divine.”

“Hierarchy would provide the structure for cooperation [(and, following WWII, competition)]. [(Thus the hierarchical, dominating notions of bringing fallen humanity into order are retained within Modernism)]. Hierarchical functionalist associationism was not just a common psychological point of view [(during the early 20th century)]. Informed by the vital principles of life and mind, the rationally organized and internally differentiated objects of life and human sciences reinforced [the] political and economic [(theological)] origin narratives [of Modernity].”

“It would be difficult to overstate the interest in dominance as a physiological, psychological, and social principle in human life and sciences in the 1930s and after. Dominance as an organic drive was linked to competition and cooperation, which generated large numbers of studies in the 1930s. Comparing democracy with other [modernist] social systems [(and thus establishing a dialectical hegemony)], particularly fascism and communism, occupied comparative psychologists; and social psychologists developed environmentalist theories of the pathological “authoritarian personality” with substantial bridges to biological analysis. When Carpenter’s howler monkeys startlingly showed little dominance behavior, howler society was compared seriously to human socialism.... Yerkes’s interest was in dominance as an organic element in the dynamic of cooperation and control. [(Evolution is equated with higher degrees of social control.)]

“...Yerkes spent most of the paper [(“Social Dominance and Sexual Status in the Chimpanzee”)] describing in detail a heterosexual pair, Jack and Josie, who seemed to show substitutions of right and privilege for dominance in exchange for sex [(while ignoring the other examples that problematized his Paternalist interpretation of Chimpanzee behavior)...].

Yerkes’s lab wrote the male-dominant economics of power and sex into the food chute exchanges. Here is the origin narrative of prostitution in the market and cooperation in marriage. [(Traces of the Paternalist tradition remain at the birth of Modernity: notions of hierarchically dominating women as sexual property is retained and simply rearticulated as natural rather than divine law (Yerkes attributes patriarchy to culture and]

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33 Ibid. 79. In the same right, it would be very difficult to overstate the essential role of ‘fallen nature’ and the necessity of paternal domination, not only in Modernism, but also in the whole of presently recorded Indo-Aryan history and philosophy (from Abrahamic and Hellenic to Hindu and Chinese). In any case, the key here is the functional extrapolation from the primate state of mind to the human state of mind.
then posits culture as functioning according to natural law].... [Yerkes argued] differences among chimps in “techniques of social control” suggested that human modes were also psychobiologically legitimated and inevitable [and then extrapolated this conceived reality to encapsulate the breadth and depth of potential human psychology...].

In a word, the masculine behavior is predominantly self-distracting, the feminine, primarily favor-currying and priority-seeking.... To observe the male seems often to be trying to induce the male to give place to her at the chute.... As for the females, wiles, trickery, or deceitful cunning, which are conspicuous by their absence in the male list, are favorite resources. But even more so are sexual allure and varied forms of solicitation.... The female is, chameleon-like, a creature of multiple personality, is clear from observations. [Eve as the cause of Adam’s fall, the subsequent associations of women with emotionality, irrationality, cunning and deceit, etc. in the Abrahamic Imagination, the subsequent articulation of seemingly every feminine role in the Old Testament and Greek Myth as a harlot who causes death and destruction with her uncontrolled sexual urges until she finally realizes the error of her ways and commits suicide, etc., etc. etc...]

The foundation for these “observations” was still the experimental sociology of the food chute test [and thus, for example, presumed a form of scarcity that need not articulate the human condition in a reasoned society]. The lesson for the limits of cultural formation of personality, and therefore of possible social changes, was not left to the imagination. “I am impressed by the contrasted attitudes and activities revealed by the competitive food situation, and I offer them as evidence that male and female chimpanzees differ ad definitely and significantly in behavioral traits as in physique. I am not convinced that by reversal of cultural influences the pictures characteristic of masculinity and femininity can be reversed.” This opinion persisted in the face of Yerkes’s belief in human malleability and perfectibility through engineering. “Personality differences” should be managed, not foolishly denied. [(Not that it really needs to be said again, but Yerkes does an excellent job of illustrating the fact that Modernism is simply a metaphysically sloppy attempt to render Abrahamic-Hellenic dogma as secular and scientific within the boundaries established by the axioms and logics of Modernity.)]

“With the passing of religion [and the birth of Modernism from these Abrahamic ashes], the new bedrock for value decisions, the more evolutionarily adaptive ground for judgment, was comparative life science [as the dimensions of reality upon which actual value could be established had been eviscerated from known reality].”

3.2 Origin Ontologies in Primatology

“Primatology is about primal stories, the origin and nature of “man,” and about reformation stories, the reform and reconstruction of human nature [rebirth, resurrection, phoenix from the ashes, etc.]. Implicitly and explicitly, the story of The Garden of Eden emerges in the sciences of monkeys and apes, along with the versions of the origin of society, marriage, and language.... ...By the twentieth century primates were cast into an Ecological Theatre and an Evolutionary Play... The drama has been about the origin and development of many persistent mythic themes: sex, language, authority, society, competition, domination, cooperation, family, state, subsistence, technology, and mobility.... ...Primatology is about an Order, a taxonomic and therefore political order that works by negotiation of boundaries achieved through ordering differences. These boundaries mark off important social territories, like the norm for a proper family, and are established by social practice, like curriculum development, mental health policy, conservation politics, film making, and book publishing.... ...Primatology displays the western imagination of the origin of sociality itself, especially in the densely meaning laden icon of “the Family.”

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18 Ibid. 80
19 Ibid. 9-11. Haraway notes that the essential axes of this order are defined by dialectical binaries, sex/gender and nature/culture.
Haraway notes that a dialectical relation of binaries, namely sex/gender and nature/culture, defines the essential axes of this order. Thus, where Foucault tracks the rearticulation of Genesis within the logics and axioms of of Modernism in *The Order of Things* (i.e. the origin of the universe), or where Eco illustrates this Modernist rearticulation of Genesis in *Foucault’s Pendulum,* Haraway tracks the rearticulation of the Garden of Eden (i.e. the origin of ‘humanity’ within the universe as well as its role (telos) therein, or, in modernist terms, the emergence of humanity from an our ‘primitive’, ‘uncivilized’ ‘state of nature’).

We should note (as Haraway does) the interesting parallels between the Champs de Elysee in Eco’s narrative, the American Museum of Natural History in Haraway’s narrative and other similar monuments to Modernity like The Field Museum in Chicago (whose taxidermy was also crafted, at least in part, by the American Museum’s Akeley). While Haraway makes the note and suggests that part of the reason for this was that Akeley (who crafted the many taxidermy scenes in the American Museum of Natural History) trained many of the other builders, it seems clear that we cannot understand these Modernist Churches without reference to the Masonic Lodges of France, the Jesuit Order the Bavarian Synthesis of Kabalism and Catholicism and the other progenitors of Modernity who form the intellectual trajectory in which said Churches are located... Take for example the Field Museum in Chicago. In the above liked ‘Google Street View Image’, ‘The Pillars of Soloman’—Jachin and Boaz—open down onto a road filled with vehicles; at the end of the road is The Field Museum. When compared with Eco’s description of the Champs de Elysee, the parallels, and their origins in western esoteric thought become rather apparent. And, as Kevin Hetherington argues in *The Badlands of Modernity,* the Masonic Lodges of France and the Palais de Royal in Paris are indeed the ‘heterotopic’ spaces of Modernity...

We should also note that Carl Akeley was a member of the *Explorers Club* (where he struck up his friendship with Roosevelt, another member of the organization), an American fraternal society that frames itself as interested in advancing ‘field research’ and who calls associates (friends and families of members) ‘Sirdars’ (an ancient *Indo-Aryan* rank title denoting princes, noblemen and other aristocrats...). Other notable members include: John Glenn, Jim Fowler, Walter Cronkite,
**Prince Philip Duke of Edinburgh** (who once most tellingly said “in the event that I am reincarnated, I would like to return as a deadly virus, to contribute something to solving overpopulation”)\textsuperscript{267}, Albert I Prince of Monaco, L. Ron Hubbard, James Cameron, Jeff Bezos and Isaiah Bowman.\textsuperscript{268,269} Many of NASA’s Apollo Missions carried the Explorers club flag. Member accolades include (but are surely not limited to):

“First to the North Pole (1909) - Robert E. Peary & Matthew Henson
First to the South Pole (1911) - Roald Amundsen
First to the summit of Mt. Everest (1953) - Sir Edmund Hillary & Tenzing Norgay
First to the deepest point in the ocean (1960) - Don Walsh & Jacques Piccard
First to the surface of the Moon (1969) - Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin & Michael Collins
First recovery of an authenticated Pirate Ship - *The Whydah Gally* (1984) - Barry Clifford”\textsuperscript{270}

We argue that these fraternal networks formed the public face of the social network that underlies the global eugenics movement (which has by no means come to an end).

The three levels of meaning embedded in symbolic texts and their implicit relations within Trinitarian traditions provide some useful intellectual context for this exploration. The three levels are *historical*, oriented to the body, *psychological*, oriented to the soul-mind, and *spiritual*, oriented towards spirit. Each successive node of the assemblage can be said to expand and constrain the potential of subsequent nodes (i.e. our understanding of history expands and constrains our potential to know psychology, which subsequently expands and constrains our potential to ‘know’ spirit). In understanding the relationship between history and psychology we must avoid the presumption that, ignoring the human potential for conscious evolution-devolution, past states of mind articulate the potential for future states of mind and associated articulations of human nature (i.e. we must avoid presuming that future potentials are wholly encapsulated within previous potentials). Outliers may simply be expressing an inherent quality of human nature (an implicit order of human mind) that could, in fact, be statistically dominant rather than an outlier given a social context optimized towards facilitation of conscious evolution.

Haraway—in tracking the history of Primatology (the history of the rearticulation of the Garden of Eden within passing time and physical space)—notes a distinct disjuncture in 1955. What shift in the order of power lead to the rise of primatology as the story of Eden *in time* and the disjuncture between pre-WWII and post-WWII Primatology? Without drawing any conclusive, causal relations, it

\textsuperscript{267} Hind, J 2009, “Did I Say That?”, *The Guardian,*
\textsuperscript{269} Explorers Club, “Honorary Members”, [https://explorers.org/about/history/honorary_members](https://explorers.org/about/history/honorary_members)
\textsuperscript{270} Explorers Club, “The Legendary Explorer Medal”, [https://explorers.org/about/history/famous_firsts](https://explorers.org/about/history/famous_firsts)
seems pertinent to note that the elite crust of the US Bourgeois married into some of the old European bloodlines (through the British nobility) during the early 1900s (the period which directly preceded WWI) and that many authors have provided empirical evidence of the fact that this new Old Blood-Bourgeois alliance was central in the rise of the Bolsheviks, the Kaiser, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, etc. (most of the empirical evidence rests in technology, capital transfers and fraternal association, but there are more subtle bodies of evidence that become apparent to the observer who grasps the nature of the Hegelian model of dialectical power that may find its apex in the work of Carl Von Clausewitz)).  

3.3 Abrahamic-Hellenic ‘Family’ in Primate Studies  
Our inquiry into the exoteric modernist rendition of the Garden of Eden begins with Southern California based and Harvard, Johns Hopkins trained primatologist G.V. Hamilton

“who had a private collection of primates at this estate in Montecito, California. Both a comparative psychologist and a psychopathologist, Hamilton studies the phylogeny of mental disorders, especially those tied to sex and learning... Hamilton was also concerned with the biomedical characterization of homosexuality. His studies on captive and free-ranging primates on his estate were a substantial part of the scientific foundation for the belief that primate females exist in a nearly constant state of sexual “receptivity.” That belief fell hard in post-war behavioral and ecological investigations... The belief was from the beginning crucial to the scientific construction of “the family” and its defining function of the cultural regulation of biological resource. Ordered by marriage, the heterosexual pair bond grounded the human nuclear family, and so adverts sexual chaos. The phylogenesis of psychopathology of the sexual function was a major concern.”

Hamilton, then, seems to have used primate science as a mechanism for secularizing and scientizing the oppressive sexual relations—wherein sexuality was viewed as danger or sin and women were viewed as the property of men—that ‘western culture’ received from the Abrahamic and Hellenic traditions (i.e. Bio-Democratic Paganism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, etc.). It is marriage ritual (a dominating, external force) is framed as the socio-cultural practice that differentiates humanity from the sexual chaos of our animistic past (which, in turn, allows humanity to transcend its ‘evil’, chaotic human nature); at this level we see the implicit links that exist between the Abrahamic-Hellenic nexus and other traditions that rose (in our best estimation) in the last ten to twenty thousand years of the B.C. era—the Bio-Confucianism of Xun Zi and the Legalism of his student Han Fei Zi; Bio-Cast Hinduism; Babylonian Myth (Enuma Elish); Egyptian Myth following the birth of Amen Ra as a monotheistic figure; etc. While the following quotation has some overt racial undertones that impute an obfuscating influence upon the description (and possibly into the historical narratives about Pharaonic bloodlines

[272] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_YWFC1HY74  
in which the author C. P. Tiele may have located himself), the point it articulates concerning the nature of the Egyptian religion as a synthesis of two traditions that birthed a single, hierarchically dominating monotheistic figure (Amen Ra) is of great import:

“We are... compelled to regard the Egyptian Religion, as it appears in history, as presenting the fusion two heterogeneous elements, and as having arisen out of the mixing of two very differently endowed races. In other words, the National Religion of Egypt—and continued to be—a genuine... polydaemonism, with which a small ruling minority (belonging to races [Indo-Aryan]) which came from Asia in pre-historic times, and which became the ruling class) tried to unite their own purer religious ideas by giving to that polydaemonism a mystic, symbolical meaning. It is only by this hypothesis that the otherwise apparently insoluble contradictions in the Egyptian Religion can be satisfactorily explained....

To the non-African elements... belong the oldest chief myths of Egypt: those of Osiris and of Re or Ra, of which the former were localized at Abydos, and also some places of Northern Egypt, and the latter especially at Amu (On) or Heliopolis. They soon came to be moulded into a certain whole by the priests of the latter place, and they constitute the religious basis of the eschatology. They are forms of well-known myths which are found among many nations of antiquity: one of the light and the dark, two beneficent and dreaded brothers, representing the alternation of the seasons, the struggle between fertility and sterility in nature, between cultivation and rude strength in society, and transferred in its ultimate form to the first human beings and the oldest social union; the other of the god of light, victorious over the serpent of darkness, and ever reviving after a temporary overthrow. 4173

What, then, is this Asiatic influence on African Religion in Egypt. Are there parallels with other cultural transformations like those seen in Chinese culture with Xun Zi and Han Fei Zi?

We also see tinges of Paternalist attempts to render women as emotive, irrational, deviant, etc. pieces of biological property to be owned by men in Hamilton’s attempt to frame female primates as the cause of animistic sexual chaos (which, when accepted, works to further reinforce the perceived necessity of hierarchical-patriarchal domination and ownership of women). Again, Hamilton’s project seems to be characterized by an attempt to secularize and scientize the norms of sexual and gender oppression that typify presently recorded western history via rearticulation within the axioms and logics of Modernity. This means that the potential for human nature is articulated within the finite as a causal function of evolutionary history. Sexual oppression and patriarchy—as codified in Paternalist marriage rituals—are rendered as a scientific necessity for fending off the sexual chaos of undisciplined human biology. Females are accepted as scientifically ‘sexually deviant’ from the perspective of Paternalist sex-gender norms. Human nature is articulated as a phenomena that is caused by and contained within human biology (and its associated finite dimensional quality) in the exoteric modernist rendition of the Garden of Eden. We must us ritual (and other external, dominating forces) to suppress and bring order to our evil human nature. Goodness, truth, order, community, love etc. comes as a function of domination and control rather than harmonization (this conception of order as domination is

exceedingly clear in, for example, modernist conceptions of human-nature relations wherein order is brought on by domination of nature rather than harmonization with nature).  

### 3.4 Paternalism

For a definition of Paternalism beyond ‘culture derived from bio-centric axioms and logics that presume order is to be created in manifestation through hierarchical domination’ see Barnesmoore’s “Conscious vs Mechanical Evolution...”. ‘Monkey Colleges’ were opened in an attempt to ‘civilize’ primates who were deemed to occupy the top of the primate hierarchy (chimps and orangs). Those primates who do not occupy the perceived top of the hierarchy are relegated to medical testing and other forms of mutilation-slavery. Primates at the top of the hierarchy were framed as “pets, surrogate children, endangered species, research animals, colonial subjects, and wild animals.... [As] “almost human.”” The sovereign right to rule is thus transferred from bloodlines and their divine right to rule to scientists and their right to rule as a function of being ‘civilized experts’ (i.e. as a function of the parrhesiatic identity they acquire through the accumulation of peripatetic knowledge of created systems of order and the ability to manifest different modes of veridiction therein”). Again—as with marriage rituals—the oppressive quality of Paternalist culture is retained and change comes in the Modernist axioms, logics and associated potentials for reality-rationalization within which this oppression is articulated and legitimated.

### 3.5 Sex and the Social

The Paternalist Tradition locates human sexuality at the heart of social relations (and Chaos therein as one will discover in a cursory examination of, for example, Greek Myth). In the original Garden of Eden story androgyny’s bifurcation through the fall creates sexuality (in exoteric traditions this story of androgyny and sexualization through the fall is rearticulated for the public as Eve (already sexualized as feminine) causing the fall). In Modernism sexuality came to be understood as the origin of the need for producing community through hierarchical domination. Life partners and sex partners are deemed as one. Social bonds are fostered through marriage and procreation. This is clear in the work of Clarence Ray Carpenter who “believed that each primate species had a typical grouping pattern

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explained by the socionomics of sex, i.e., by the principles of sexual efficiencies. The socionomic sex ratio grounded social cooperation, the balanced resolution of the potentially disruptive forces of sex, dominance, and aggression.\textsuperscript{377} For authors like Carpenter culture-civilization differentiate us from the unbridled chaos of animalism (i.e. culture-civilization dominates humanity and creates order). Metaphysics have been replaced by Social Physics as the foundation for understanding humanity. Modernity argues the practice of sexuality facilitates human interaction (and allows us to transcend the disruption of order imputed by ‘sex’ and the ‘dominant’, ‘aggressive’ human nature of the Paternalist Imagination). Again—while the rationalization-legitimization for sexual relations is rearticulated within the axioms and logics of modernity—the essentially problematic characterization of human community and our ability to transcend the modes of individualism (‘evil human nature’) that hinder community as a function of sex’s dominating influence remains. In short, the above examples demonstrate the fact that US Primatology simply secularized and scientized the axioms and logics by which the dominating sexual relations of Paternalism were rationalized-legitimized. The origin and subsequent ontological dependence of human nature is axiomatically relocated to the finite (in the evolutionary history of humanity) and rationalized in the materially reductive axioms and logics of Modernity, but the basic socio-sexual relations created and legitimized by Paternalism (i.e. Patriarchy) remain.

3.6 Temporal Nature as God
Haraway quotes H.F. Osborne as arguing that “Nature teaches law and order and respect for property...”\textsuperscript{278} Infinite Substance and its emanations are out and a materially reductive conception of nature is in. Rather than learning law, order and respect for property through subservience to the Vengeful White Man God of the Paternalist Imagination, humans are expected to learn these rules \textit{from} (rather than through experiences and revelations inspired by the order in) Nature (or at least from Nature that has been dominated in to order by human knowledge).

3.7 The Exoteric Modernist Garden of Eden
Haraway frames the American Museum of Natural History as “a monumental reproduction of the Garden of Eden. In the Garden, Western “man” may begin again the first journey, the first birth from within the sanctuary of nature.”\textsuperscript{279} The Infinite Substance is replaced with a material nature that is known from the finite perspective of passing time and physical space. Humanity is no longer presupposed in the act of creation—i.e. the movement from \textit{Olam Atziluth (the world of emanation},

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid. 26
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid. 26
divine will in its pure state) to Olam Birah (the world of creation, where divine will becomes creative energy)—as a constitutive potentiality of creation and manifestation. Humanity (and human consciousness) is stripped of any reality prior to its emergence from the state of nature.280

We must turn for a moment to the flawed conception of reality that is encapsulated within the second law of thermodynamics. This ‘law’—as extrapolated to explain the “heat death of the universe”—presumes that the universe is a closed system doomed to unending expansion. This presumption is confounded by the capacity of Sunlight (the electricity transmitted by the plasma-suns of the universe http://www.bibliotecaplayades.net/esp_electricuniverse.htm) to actualize the latent order of life in Nature. Some authors—beginning with mathematician Luigi Fantappie—have titled this “tendency towards energy concentration, order, organization and life” syntropy.281

“In the days just before Christmas 1941, as a consequence of conversations with two colleagues, a physicist and a biologist, I was suddenly projected in a new panorama, which radically changed the vision of science and of the Universe which I had inherited from my teachers, and which I had always considered the strong and certain ground on which to base my scientific investigations. Suddenly I saw the possibility of interpreting a wide range of solutions (the anticipated potentials) of the wave equation which can be considered the fundamental law of the Universe. These solutions had been always rejected as “impossible”, but suddenly they appeared “possible”, and they explained a new category of phenomena which I later named “syntropic”, totally different from the entropic ones, of the mechanical, physical and chemical laws, which obey only the principle of classical causation and the law of entropy. Syntropic phenomena, which are instead represented by those strange solutions of the “anticipated potentials”, should obey two opposite principles of finality (moved by a final cause placed in the future, and not by a cause which is placed in the past) and differentiation, and also non-causable in a laboratory. This last characteristic explains why this type of phenomena has never been reproduced in a laboratory, and its finalistic properties justified the refusal among scientists, who accepted without any doubt the assumption that finalism is a “metaphysical” principle, outside Science and Nature. This assumption obstructed the way to a calm investigation of the real existence of this second type of phenomena; an investigation which I accepted to carry out, even though I felt as if I were falling in a abyss, with incredible consequences and conclusions. It suddenly seemed as if the sky were falling apart, or at least the certainties on which mechanical science had based its assumptions. It appeared to me clear that these “syntropic”, finalistic phenomena which lead to differentiation and could not be reproduced in a laboratory, were real, and existed in nature, as I could recognize them in the living systems. The properties of this new law, opened consequences which were just incredible and which could deeply change the biological, medical, psychological, and social sciences.”282

In short, relocation of humanity’s Garden of Eden to the finite combined with theories like the above second law of thermodynamics gave rise to a nihilist conception of humanity as a statistical anomaly doomed to eventual extinction in the inevitable march towards “heat death”. Beyond the significance


Also see Luigi Frantappie on ‘Syntropy’.
282 Ibid.
for understanding the Modernist Garden of Eden this example provides a concise illustration of the ways in which ‘origins’ (origin stories) articulate the environment of ontological dependence upon which all subsequent stages of a process must function (i.e. it illustrates that process is ontologically dependent on the dimensional quality of its supposed origin).

3.8 Eugenics and Primatology

Haraway notes that the American Museum of Natural History hosted the Second International Conference on Eugenics in the same year (1921) that the silverback gorilla ‘the Giant of Karisimbi’ was killed.283

“...To enter [the memorial]... the visitor must pass by a James Earle Fraser equestrian statue of Teddy majestically mounted as a father and protector between two “primitive” men, an American Indian and an African, both standing, dressed as “savages.” The façade of the memorial... is classical, with four Iconic columns... topped by statues of the great explorers Boon, Adubon, Lewis, and Clark. The coin-like, bas-relief seals of the United States and the Liberty Bell are stamped on the front panels. Inscribed across the top are the words TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE, VISION ([LIGHT]) and the declaration to Roosevelt as “a great leader of the youth of America, in energy and fortitude in the faith of our fathers, in defense of the rights of the people, in the love and conservation of nature and of the best in life and in man.” Youth, paternal solicitude, virile defense of democracy, and intense emotional connection to nature are the unmistakable things.

The building presents itself in many visible faces. It is at once a Greek temple, a bank, a scientific research institution, a popular museum, a neoclassical theater. One is entering a space that sacralizes democracy, Protestant Christianity, adventure, science, and commerce. Entering this building, one knows that a drama will be enacted inside. Experience in this public monument will be intensely personal; this structure is on of North America’s spaces for joining the duality of self and community.

Just inside the portals, the visitor enters the sacred space where transformation of consciousness and moral state will begin. The walls are inscribed with Roosevelt’s words under the headings Nature, Youth, Manhood, the State. The seeker begins in Nature: “There are no words that can tell the hidden spirit of the wilderness, that can reveal its mystery. ...The nation behaves well if it treats its natural resources as assets which it must turn over to the next generation increased and not impaired in value..... ...Youth: “I want to see you game boys... and gentle and tender... Courage, hard work, self mastery, and intelligent effort are essential to a successful life..... ...Manhood: “Only those are fit to live who do not fear to die and none are fit to die who have shrunk from the joy of life and the duty of life.... ...the State: “Aggressive fighting for the right is the noblest sport the world affords.... If I must choose between righteousness and peace, I chose righteousness.” ...[Roosevelt is depicted in murals on the stone wall] hunting big game in Africa, conducting diplomacy in the Philippines and China, helping boy and girl scouts, receiving academic awards, and presiding over the Panama Canal...

Finally, in the atrium stand the striking life-sized bronze sculptures by Carl Akeley of the Nandi spearmen of East Africa on a lion hunt. These African men are the lion they kill and symbolize for Akeley the essence of the hunt, of what would later be named “man the hunter”. In every other circumstance he referred to adult male Africans as boys. Roosevelt, the modern sportsman, and the “primitive” Nandi share in the spiritual truth of manhood.284

For all intensive purposes the above quotation speaks (rather clearly) for itself... Man’s origin is in temporal nature. Civilization comes through conquest and domination of nature and the ‘savage’ peoples who are still disciplined by its chaos (who are still living in the ‘state of nature’). Masculinity—

283 Haraway, D 1989, Primate Visions, Routledge, p. 27.
284 Ibid. 27-28.
the typifying quality of the conquest and domination of nature that produces ‘modernity’ and ‘civilization’—is understood in terms of aggressive violence in the terms of Aries the patron God of Rome and the Roman Empire (and, we would argue, of Catholic and post-Catholic (Protestant) Christianity) whose angry, hateful, vengeful, uncontrolled, etc. violence is opposed by the wisdom of Athena...). Again, it is clear that the Martian Christianity of the Catholic Church and its Protestant bastard children has simply been rearticulated within the axioms and logics of Modernity. The essential purpose of Martian Christianity (enslavement) remains unchanged. 20th and 21st Century Science can be understood in this light as a dimensionally reductive version of Martian Christianity. No longer do we attempt to ‘conquer’ and dominate the self (to ‘discipline the biological desires and irrational passions’) in the search for divine reintegration as in the esoteric underbelly of Roman Christianity; instead we turn our attention to the external world of nature in which the origin (and thus the transcendence) of our ‘evil’ and fallen human nature has been located. The divine right to rule is articulated by one’s capacity to enforce their rule by force (‘might makes right’), to dominate others. Moral sovereignty, hierarchical domination and violent force are rendered as one. It is ethical to dominate other cultures if they are too weak to defend themselves as anything else would go against the law of natural selection (Social Darwinism in a nutshell). No longer do we conquer other people in the name of the Vengeful White Man God but instead in the name of nature, evolution and ‘civilization’ (Democracy, Capitalism, Exoteric Modernist ‘Science’) and the white man’s capacity to dominate it—we conquer for the sake of creating order through purifying the irrational heathens by freeing them from the ‘state of nature’ (again the parallels between Martian Christianity’s colonialism and the Modernist colonialism of the 20th and 21st centuries are more than clear)... As in the deluded imagination of the simpleton from Song “it is in the craft of killing that life is constructed...”

3.9 Functionalism
After tracking the birth of organic modernism in early 20th century Primatology through exploration of Akeley and Yerkes Haraway turns her attention to the transmutation of organic modernism into technical modernism as manifest in ‘Functionalist Theories’ during the pre and post WWII eras. According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

“Functionalism is a theory about the nature of mental states. According to functionalists, mental states are identified by what they do rather than by what they are made of. Functionalism is the most familiar or “received” view among philosophers of mind and cognitive science.

Consider, for example, mouse traps. Mouse traps are devices for catching or killing mice. Mouse traps can be made of most any material, and perhaps indefinitely or infinitely many designs could be employed. The

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most familiar sort involves a wooden platform and a metal strike bar that is driven by a coiled metal spring and can be released by a trigger. But there are mouse traps designed with adhesives, boxes, poisons, and so on. All that matters to something’s being a mouse trap, at the end of the day, is that it is capable of catching or killing mice.

Contrast mouse traps with diamonds. Diamonds are valued for their hardness, their optical properties, and their rarity in nature. But not every hard, transparent, white, rare crystal is a diamond—the most infamous alternative being cubic zirconia. Diamonds are carbon crystals with specific molecular lattice structures. Being a diamond is a matter of being a certain kind of physical stuff. (That cubic zirconia is not quite as clear or hard as diamonds explains something about why it is not equally valued. But even if it were equally hard and equally clear, a CZ crystal would not thereby be a diamond.)

These examples can be used to explain the core idea of functionalism. Functionalism is the theory that mental states are more like mouse traps than they are like diamonds. That is, what makes something a mental state is more a matter of what it does, not what it is made of. This distinguishes functionalism from traditional mind-body dualism, such as that of René Descartes, according to which minds are made of a special kind of substance, the res cogitans (the thinking substance.).

Functionalism, then, is the archetypal modernist conception of consciousness. In a sense we could describe it as consequentialist epistemology (and, indeed, it is just about as ‘cogent’ as consequentialist ethics...). As Modernist axioms and logics presume that matter produces and contains mind and that mind is thus a simple physical process, the substance of mind becomes unimportant in being understood as the prima materia (the accumulation of quantity becomes the focus). The relationship between mind and matter is conflated with material things like keys and mousetraps that consist primarily of material substance... Identity and order are articulated within (created by) human knowledge. It is thus that authors like Ray Kurzweil view consciousness as a simple, linear accumulation of processing power (of calculation speed and accuracy). By ignoring the substance of mind Functionalism is unable view consciousness (and conscious evolution) in terms of changing states (i.e. solid to liquid to gas). Glaciers and rivers can both cause erosion, but to understand how they do so (or why one makes deep straight valleys where the other makes broad, meandering valleys) we must know that one has a solid dimensional quality (ice) where the other has a liquid dimensional quality (water). Similarly, to understand the true nature of what someone has done we must understand why they have done it which means that we must understand their state of mind, axioms, logics and the ways in which they came together to make the aforementioned behavior potential. With this understanding of Functionalism and its role in the hegemonic essence of Modernity we can begin to explore Haraway’s discourse on the transformation from Organic Functionalism to Technical Functionalism.

Haraway views Functionalism as a theory of communication and traces its evolution from an “organics to a technics of communication”. Haraway, D 1989, Primate Visions, Routledge, p. 84.

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287 Haraway, D 1989, Primate Visions, Routledge, p. 84.
through self-sustaining processes, not a logic of direct visible command.... Organic functionalism was transformed into a cybernetic technological functionalism broadly in life and human sciences from the 1930s to the 1950s. “Beginning with [Yerkes’s student] Clarence Ray Carpenter in the 1930s and ending with Stuart Altmann in the 1950s” Haraway returns to Primatology to trace “the construction of the naturalistic field... as an epistemological and material space for producing knowledge about the primate order as a problem in semiotics.”

Carpenter’s essential, preconceived question was “Why do animals live in groups?”

“Carpenter’s primatology in the 1930s was a discourse on the organic semiotics of sex and dominance. The first priority in the field notes written on the ship with the monkeys was, “Mates must be graded as to sexual potency and their rank order dominance established.” The list continued on to study castrated animals, maternal behavior, and structures of dominance before release. “Select from the males to be released on the Island a number of individuals. Test them for sex drives and dominance by time sampling record and test at intervals of three months.” “Produce experimental homosexuality.” “Produce intersexes by injections of internal secretions.” “Work on sex difference of dominance—Determine hierarchies for both sexes.”

“He began from the widely held premise that societies of higher animals could be explained in terms of the bionomics of sex: the basic forces of social order—cooperation and competition—must at root be aspects of sexual interaction. Together, sex and mind... were believed to constitute the material foundation [in the Modernist Ontological Regime the only possible foundation] of organic social integration and the greatest threat to disintegration.”

It is beyond the scope of this paper to begin speculating about the personal constitution of individuals like Carpenter, but in regard to his interest in running around a tropical island cutting off the genitals of monkeys, injecting them with hormones and forcing them into many and varying forms of sexual engagement we are left with a simple question: ‘What the FUCK?!?!?’ “One who breaks something in order to discover how it works has left the path of wisdom and is doomed to failure” (“In studying sex, the procedure was to cut out glands and organs; in studying mind, scientific procedure dictated altering or removing the head”)... Leaving the cruel, deranged and revolting nature of Carpenter to the side:

“The field notes... sketched the priorities: (1) a study of dominance as the primary integrating mechanism of primate society, (2) sociometric mapping of dominance relations and other social bonds, and (3) analysis of inter- and intragroup interactions as signs in a functioning system.... Females were bound to the group by the

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289 Ibid. 84.
290 Ibid. 85.
291 Ibid. 85.
292 Ibid. 86.
293 We are paraphrasing a statement whose origin we cannot extract from memory at the moment...
dominance of males; males were bound by the sexuality of females. Both were bound to each other by a logic of control. The product was the reproduction of primate society.”

“Sexual behavior was a privileged handle to the theoretical understanding and therapeutics of natural cooperation ordered by male-female dominance and male-male competition.”

“Schjelderup-Ebbe was credited with the discovery that birds were organized into social hierarchies by a strict dominance chain, or pecking order. Studying over 50 species of birds, he thought he had determined that “despotism is one of the major biological principles.”

“...Dominance need not mean a principle of autocratic rule. Dominance and subordination [(in Modernism)] must rather be conceived as forms of social coordination.”

“Allee defined the community as “a natural assemblage of organisms which, together with its habitat, has reached a survival level such that it is relatively independent of adjacent assemblages of equal rank; to this extent, given radiant energy, it is self-sustaining. [(In Modernism community is about survival and survivability defines community).”

“[Solomon] Zuckerman argued that constant female sexual receptivity was the foundation of primate society. He argued further that dominance hierarchies formed by fighting among males and male control of females to amass a docile harem were the mechanisms of social formation and maintenance in all primates. Zuckerman developed his views on the origin of human society in response to Bronislaw Malinowski’s ideas on the origin of the family on the basis of unique female physiology (menstruation) and of the original cultural institution (fatherhood).”

(Re)Integration is now ‘known’ as a purely physical process. Integration must now be explained in purely physical (finite) terms. Carpenter articulates this physical rationalization of integration and community, first and foremost, in terms of domination. As such Carpenter frames love, community, integration, etc. among living beings as a product of our individualistic, egotistical, biological survival instinct (this is not the Self love of Spinoza, which still accounts for infinite substance and thus views Self as at one level Infinite Substance)... The post-war Primatology of UNESCO biologists like Huxley, Dobzhansky, and Montagu—even in (or maybe because of) its ‘humanist’ focus on ‘cooperation’—fell into the same trap of understanding cooperation in terms of domination:

“Their doctrine of natural selection and population biology was about complexity, biological efficiency, and adaptive flexibility. As authors of the sacred texts of mid-century biological humanism (called by John Greene “the Bridgewater Treatises of the twentieth century”), they had strong commitments to a version of the human place in nature that emphasized cooperation, human dignity, the control of aggression (war), and progress.”

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295 Haraway, D 1989, Primate Visions, Routledge, p. 85
296 Ibid. 87.
297 Ibid. 88-89.
298 Ibid. 89.
299 Ibid. 89.
300 Ibid. 91.
301 Ibid. 199.
For these men cooperation, dignity, control and progress were to be facilitated by the structures of capitalism (i.e. by cooperation that is facilitated by scarcity, atomization, competition and hierarchical domination), democracy (i.e. hierarchical domination facilitated by biological membership in the polis and a class therein) and the rational, self-interested economic calculus they presume to undergird all decision making processes (deemed to be ‘natural’ and ‘equal’ in all individuals—“any late twentieth-century universal brotherhood of man in the last quarter of the second millennium would have to make do with a rational economic calculus... based on strict exchange equality”\textsuperscript{307}). From the perspective of Modernity’s axioms and logics—where the exoteric public believes that our religious past is far behind us or on the decline—we cannot conceive of cooperation and love outside the tainted environment provided by the bio-Paternalist social relations we receive (via the elite class defined as those who have the power to establish the axioms and logics of a society) from our dogmatic past.

In the Modernist imagination we love and care for others only because it facilitates our survival; men ‘love’ (paternalist love as domination...) women in order to acquire sex from them (what a sado- loveless reality they have created for themselves...). So, although love (as paternal domination) remained central within the western tradition through the rise of Modernism, it was redefined within axioms and logics of Modernity in a manner that stripped the scant meaning it had retained through articulation by paternalists in terms of hierarchical domination. Social class relations remained relatively unchanged (the paternal elite ‘love’ the masses by dominating them in the same abusive manner that they teach their slaves to treat their own children...) through the rise of Modernity.

3.10 Unity as Population in Modernity

“[The post-war] ...affirmation of human unity will not be a discourse about the developmental stages of a teleological natural type, as they are arrayed on the hierarchical great chain of being. Rather it will be a discourse about a more recent kind of natural-technical object of knowledge, one with antecedents in seventeenth- to nineteenth-century natural history and political economy, and then economics and biology, but one which did not displace the system of human unity and differences based on developmental types until the mid-twentieth century, in the face of urgent historical reasons. The new object would be the \textit{population}.\textsuperscript{304}

As order (and thus unity) can no longer be derived from Infinite Substance, unity and order must now be articulated within the finite. From this finite perspective the human aggregate—the point at which humanity can be perceived as a unified order—is population (its material assemblage).


\textsuperscript{309} Ibid. 199.
If we can no longer know the Infinite Substance that exists behind the veil of manifestation we must instead understand the unity of humanity in the finite terms of manifestation as population; the change in perspective necessitated by Modernism’s axiomatic negation of Infinite Substance caused population to replace the Infinite Substance as the basis for human unity; Unity is the aggregation of atoms rather than the emanations of force, form and consciousness that enliven atoms. No longer is unity derived from our uncreated essence, but instead in the chaotic manifestation of this uncreated essence in matter, passing time and physical space. This is especially problematic because the dimensional quality of matter, passing time and physical space, typified by motion, change, difference, chaos, etc. is dimensionally incommensurable with unity and the attempt to dominate difference to produce a unified order produces destruction and death rather than order and life.

3.11 Organics to Technics
In his last major field study of the 1930s Carpenter “adopted both a neo-positivist linguistic theory of signs; i.e., semiotics as practiced at the University of Chicago, and a sociological-psychological field theory of complex small group structures, sociometry, to explain the pattern and boundaries of primate social organization.”

We can understand Carpenter’s relationship with biology, psychiatry, etc. as of the same order as the relationship between Robert Park’s ‘Chicago School Sociologists’ and the study of society (which would become sociology) or the (Ordo-Neo)Liberals of the Freiburg and Chicago Schools of Economics. “Primatology has been pervasively determined by borrowings from human social science. The fact explains the ease with which strategies of biological reductionism could

307 In the same way that Foucault tracks Socialism and University of Chicago (Ordo-Neo)Liberals back to the University of Freiburg, we can track University of Chicago Sociology back to Freiburg and the Grand Duke of Baden. Robert Park’s Philosophy PHD advisor at Heidelberg was Alfred Hettner, who was in turn a disciple of Geographer Friedrich Ratzel (who first introduced the term Lebensraum in the sense that would be taken up by the Nazis). Ratzel’s father was the head of the household staff for the Grand Duke of Baden. It seems that a very dark relationship was established between the Rockefeller funded University of Chicago and the Hapsburg founded University of Freiburg... Carpenter’s connection with Freiburg is less clear: whether it came as a function of crosspollination in the University of Chicago community or, maybe, as a function of association with friends like Frank Chapman (founder of the ‘Bird Department’ at the American Museum of Natural History—the ‘Disneyland of Eugenics’—and Carpenter’s initiator into field research...) or with his advisors Robert Yerkes who was, beyond his many roles in the Government and in Rockefeller funded foundations, a member of some strange German origin societies like the ‘Wicht Club’ and Lewis Terman, who was a pioneer of educational psychology, instituted highly oppressive modes of human engineering (techniques of power) like the IQ test and whose son, Fredric (whose advisor was Vannevar Bush—who was among other things the director of the office in which the Manhattan Project was directed and the person who conceived of and implemented the National Science Foundation and its model for direct federal control of scientific research in the US...), is known as ‘the Father of Silicon Valley’. We are tempted to put our eggs in this last Terman basket with regard to Carpenter’s original ‘initiation’. Obviously there is more work to be done on this front, but the fact that most of these relationships are mediated by private, secrete societies makes such work rather difficult...
be developed; the biological disciplines were already built like other contemporary functionalist discourses.”

University of Chicago organicists Charles Manning Child and Alfred Earl Emerson were influential in Carpenter’s shift from physiological to cybernetic functionalism. Child argued

“Dominance initially meant the rate of energy expenditure. Differential rates of exchange established dominance. The detailed study of rates [energy transfer, calculation speed, processing power, etc.] in biological systems was, [according to Haraway,] the principle motor of the transformation from physiological to cybernetic functionalism in developmental biology and ecology. Closely connected with the measure of rates was the measure of pattern maintenance or communication.”

For his part, Emerson argued for the superorganism: “The super organism concept carried the corollary that homeostasis was the correct term to denote social integration. [He argued that] discovering the laws of dynamic equilibrium, that is, the organic variation and regularity of patterns maintained by dominance, was the task of the biologist in the laboratory and in the field.”

Physiological Functionalism, then, worked to purify the Abrahamic-Hellenic tradition of its sensitivity to Infinite Substance while sustaining its dogmatic and oppressive socio-class relations; it is the child of Modernity. Cybernetic Functionalism is the ‘natural maturation’ of Abrahamic-Hellenic social dogma within the axioms and logics of Modernity. Once Physiological Functionalism and the loss of distinction between the substance of mind and matter stripped biology of consciousness Cybernetic Functionalism became possible to think in that mind had been reduced to a simple material phenomena that could be entirely quantified like any other ‘natural system’ (mind was rendered as a computer program with a finite potential for calculation articulated by wholly quantifiable forms of energy). For example, Ashley Montague “insisted on a unique human biology, whose product was language and culture [meaning that mind—reduced to an order created by and through language and culture—is a functional, technical product of biology and the finite world it inhabits]...”

“Coding and copying, communication and replication are the key concepts. The emergence of this picture is part of the pre-history of sociobiology and part of the deep transformation of central areas of biology since World War II, from a discourse on physiological organisms, ordered by the hierarchical division of labor and the principle of homeostasis, to a discourse on cybernetic technological systems, ordered by communications engineering principles and a tightly associated principle of natural selection.”

309 Ibid. 90.
310 Ibid. 90.
311 Ibid. 96.
312 Ibid. 101.
Haraway identifies ‘Operations Research’ and ‘Ergonomics’ as essential theoretical catalysts for the mutation to Cybernetic Functionalism in the post WWII era:

“...Conrad Hal Waddington... articulated the meanings for biology of operations research, from roots in his work against U-Boats in the Royal Air Force Operations Research Sections. Waddington learned to produce models for decision making to optimize the probabilities of meeting goals for any kind of problem. Goals in systems control were not formalized in terms of micro-control of individual components, but in terms of probabilities for controlling error rates at key points in a system. Identifying boundaries and constriction points for determining rates of information flow became crucial operations. Boundaries were constituted by differential flow rates of information and energy [rather than the substance or state of mind]. Control of boundaries constituted system control.

Wartime science provided biologists with a second systems theoretic tool for conceptualizing organisms and societies: ergonomics, the discourse about optimizing the energy-information relations of all components in the organization of labor. Ergonomics is known in the United States as human factors research. Human error rates were the crucial bottleneck in sophisticated technical systems. Integration of human operators as factors in a total system allowed solution of the design problem of optimizing defense performance. Ergonomics includes all aspects of the organism considered as part of a machine carrying out tasks. A cybernetics of the hierarchical division of labor, ergonomics began as the study of human beings in terms of the technical laws of work.

Ergonomics is specifically not an aspect of psychological-sociological human relations research; it is, rather, rigorously directed to studying labor in terms of technical systems design, especially attending to the operational breakdown of any factor under stress. Ergonomics seeks answers to questions like: What information does an operator need? What are the most efficient channels for getting information to the receiver-operator? What communication loads are tolerable for each component? Stress, a psychiatric and medical concept crucial to post-war ideology and practice, is intimately linked to these communications theoretic questions about system potential and design limits. Associated with the notions of breakdown and obsolescence, stress is also fundamentally part of the conceptual apparatus of cybernetic evolutionary biology, like ethology and sociobiology. Stress limits and machine communication conceptually imply each other. Communication is ergonomics refers to flows of information considered in terms of altering error rates at crucial points in the system. Communication design is system design.

Converging in a view of a cybernetic evolutionary theory of animal behavior, operations research and ergonomics were joined by the related linguistic theories, called by neo-positivist Charles Morris “semiotics” and by the anthropologist Thomas Sebeok, in reference to the post-war biological context, “zoosemiotics.” This approach to psychiatry, in its cybernetic communication theory garb, drew heavily from semiotics; zoosemiotics from the beginning bore a close relation to the therapeutics of communication disorders and overstressed communication systems.

A technological relocation of the principles of semiotics has been important in the transition from physiological to cybernetic logics in many biologies, including the biology of social behavior. In the transition, the organism as living responder to the sign vehicle lost its privileged position. The more powerful analysis of sign systems, cybernetics, dispensed with the need for a biological organism, in the same way that ergonomics considered the human worker as a technical system component whose status as a living organism was interpreted in strict communication engineering terms. Organisms appear in both ergonomics and machine theories of communication. What has gone definitively is the privileged status attaching to life or consciousness. Organisms become biotic components, highly interesting, but not ontologically special, in cybernetic systems sciences.\textsuperscript{123}


“The ontological distinction between the natural and the artificial lost meaning [and the distinction between nature and culture was thus rendered problematic. Geographers and other contemporary social scientists have lauded the Nature/ Culture divide as an essential crux of Modernist oppression. While we are sensitive to this analysis we argue the distinction between Nature and Culture is not, itself, the problem and instead that the problem rises from the division of Nature and Culture axioms and logics of Modernity. Nature and Culture are
in truth divided by consciousness—by a change in the state of the substance of mind (which is ignored in functionalism) and the potential actualization of reason, free will, rational intuition, etc. therein. Modernism, however, establishes this distinction function of accumulated complexity. In dividing Nature and Culture as such, the intellectual functionality of the distinction is lost. The solution, however, is not to just abolish this distinction and lose all sensibility for qualities of agency. In stead we must reestablish the actual meaning of the distinction outside of the functionalist epistemology of the Modernist Ontological Regime (no theory is not a suitable solution for bad theory).”

This cybernetic turn, in stripping life and consciousness of their differentiation from material force, seems to presuppose Latour’s attempt to abolish the distinction between force and reason and the more general postmodern turn towards ‘no theory’ as the solution for the ‘bad theories’ provided by Positivism (no theory is not the solution to bad theory...).

“To provide ideational context for our discussion we theorize the contemporary history of Planning Theory and Practice (and Social Science Theory and Practice more generally) as a process of transformation from Positivist to Post-Positivist (‘Postmodern’) Theory that can be described in terms of evolution from a system (Positivism) that attempts to impute the Order of Truth to manifestation through dominating difference to a system (Postmodernism) that attempts to combat the Positivist imposition of Truth (the order of Infinite Substance) upon the world of fact (manifestation, which in its motion, change, difference, etc. is dimensionally incommensurable" with the unitary dimensional quality of Infinite Substance) by accepting the Positivist reduction of reality to passing time and physical space and extending that reality (‘world view’) to its logical theoretical conclusions (that there is no Truth). Instead of illustrating the perversity of the Positivist attempt to impute the Order of Truth (Infinite Substance) to manifestation through domination by reviving sensitivity to the reality and epistemological role of the Infinite Substance and its Emanations (which is to say problematization of the Modernist reduction of reality to passing time and physical space and the foundation of reason to fact) and highlighting the dimensional incommensurability of static, infinite unity of Infinite Substance and its Emanations with the change, motion, difference, etc. (the multiplicity) of finite manifestation (as a solid is dimensionally incommensurable with a plane), Postmodernism simply accepted the Modernist reduction of reality to passing time and physical space and took it to its logical, nihilist conclusion that there is no truth; in other words, Postmodernism accepted the hegemonic Modernist essence of axioms and logics that undergird positivism (reduction of reality to the world of fact) and rightly observed that Fact cannot be Truth so as to undercut Positivists notions of Truth. In so doing, and in symptoms of Postmodernism like obfuscating aversion to any form of generalization (clearly manifest in Aihwa Ong’s aversion to the term hegemony...), Postmodernism can be seen as attempting to axiomatically dominate unity out of difference (as a countervailing force to Positivism that rises from the same hegemonic essence as Positivism giving rise to a dialectical-hegemonic relationship with Positivism).”

102 Ouspensky 1912, Tertium Organum, St. Petersburg, 5 January 2015, http://holybooks.lichtenbergpress.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/Tertium-Organum-by-P-D-Ouspensky.pdf. In short, ‘dimensional incommensurability’ can be explained in the relationship between two and three dimensional objects; while you may be able to sketch a three dimensional object onto a two dimensional plane, the mass of the three dimensional object is dimensionally incommensurable with the dimensional quality of two dimensional reality and thus cannot ‘manifest’ into the two dimensional ‘reflection’ of the three dimensional object. For a more thorough metaphor see the ‘Flat World’ thought experiment.
3.12 Social Ontology
The Cambridge Social Ontology Group provides a distinction between philosophical ontology and scientific ontology that sheds light on the importance and function of ontological study in and of the social sciences that further elucidates our discussion of Latour and ‘his postmodern-Modernist camp’ below:

“The group distinguishes between philosophical ontology, the study of features common to all phenomena of any domain of reality, and scientific ontology, interpreted as the study of specific phenomena of a domain.

Thus for the social realm, philosophical ontology is concerned with investigating the manner in which social phenomena depend necessarily on human[s]...

Scientific ontology oriented to the social domain is concerned with the nature of such existents as money, gender, markets, technology, social relations, the corporation, care, regions, community, power, authority, trust, cooperation, testimony, institutions, norms, rules, custom, convention, collective practice, profit, output, income, wealth, identity, individual, social evolution, development, human flourishing, probability, society, economy, and so forth.”

In the Social Sciences ‘the state’ provides an excellent example of the ‘social existents’ to be treated by scientific ontology. While disciplines like International Relations and Political Science often simply accept ‘the state’ as an unproblematic, unitary ‘actor’ with the capacity for ‘reason’ (reason in the materialist rendition of reason as a functional, materially rational cost-benefit analysis of ‘unproblematic material value’ that is necessary for quantification and modeling of decision making processes...), Geographical theory has at least entertained some debates on the nature and existence of ‘the state’. Jessup (2004) argued that ‘the state’, while not an obsolete term, was being ‘hollowed out’ in the transition from state- to network-based governance. Sparke (2005) went further in observing the ways in which geographical terms (‘spatial categories’) like ‘the state’ structure the potentials of geographical, economic, legal, political, military, etc. thought and practice as well as the hegemonic implications therein. Such critiques of heretofore-unproblematic social objects like ‘the state’ gave rise to a wave of theoretical work seeking to provide social scientists with new social ontologies.

Nigel Thrift is one of the most recognized ‘ontological theorists’ in the contemporary Geographical Literature. He is best known for arguing—following Latour’s Actor Network Theory—Geographical theory should simply eschew notions of scale (local, regional, global, etc.) and instead view society in terms of ‘the durability of social relations’ (as Latour views Truth in terms of the

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‘durability’—quantity and duration—of subjective opinion...). In a vein of thought and that echoes Latour’s move to eschew the distinction between force and reason (i.e. discernment) Marston proposed a ‘flat ontology’ that eschews horizontal and vertical ‘predetermination’ (which has most tellingly been described as “an impetus for providing more modest accounts that attend to new forms of connection as well as disconnection” (rather than discernment and critique...). In short, “reality was ransacked in search of theory” and discernment was thus replaced with description. This is an exceedingly hegemonic replacement as the social ontology individuals receive through socialization is thus rendered banally invisible by uncritical description (given that an intellectual being cannot describe without the influence of the ‘theory’ by which they converted sensory perceptions into ‘intellectual knowledge’, theories and methods that attempt to eschew all theoretical assumptions simply render the theoretical assumptions one has received from society as well as their influence on the description as an unproblematic mode of common sense; as a result, hegemonic influences that may have contributed to the those theories become hidden under the veneer of unproblematic truth erected by the illusion of eschewing theoretical discernment for ‘pure, epistemologically unencumbered observation”).

In the words of Benjamin Noys “I am concerned with Latour as merely one symptomatic instance of ‘anti-critique’, the turn from critical analysis to the descriptive, and the loss of confidence in the very gesture of critique.” We argue the wave of ‘anti-critique’ observed by Noys rises directly from attempts at postmodern ontological reform through axiomatic denial of theoretical distinction while accepting the axioms and logics of Modernism. Postmodern ontological reform, for example, eschews scale (and thus ‘philosophical ontology’) by treating it simply in terms of ‘scientific ontology’ (which, while relevant for the terms we use to describe scale like local, regional, national, global, etc., is not applicable for ‘scale’ as a phenomena in of scale being ‘common to all phenomena in any domain

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320 Ibid.
322 Noys, B 2011, “The Discrete Charm of Bruno Latour, or the Critique of Anti-Critique”, Presented at the Centre for Critical Theory, University of Nottingham.
323 The irony that such blatantly positivist thinkers would claim to be postmodern as positivism is arguably the apex of Modernism...
324 Noys, B 2011, “The Discrete Charm of Bruno Latour, or the Critique of Anti-Critique”, Presented at the Centre for Critical Theory, University of Nottingham.
of reality). In short, scale is reduced to the socially relative language we use to represent scale and in this philosophically sloppy manner eschewed completely.

While anecdotal, the very serious political consequences of ‘anti-critique’ were perfectly captured in comments by a analysis of David Harvey’s *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* provided by colleague of mine (a PHD candidate in the UBC Department of Geography) in a recent graduate seminar. In short, Harvey’s text outlines the contours of what can aptly be described as the political conspiracy that lead to the global Neoliberalization birthed in moments like the election of Thatcher and Regan. My colleague responded to the Harvey’s clear empirical evidence of the overt political tactics by which ‘the Neoliberal Revolution’ was birthed by questioning ‘whether it was dangerous to even think like that’ and arguing that we should interpret this as an unintended consequence that could not be linked to any actors or agency. We are as speechless in recalling this astoundingly dangerous political naivety and a-historicism (political revolutions through history have *always* come as the function of the intention in groups of elite—axiom and logic defining—agents regardless of the degree to which the outcomes matched those intentions...) as we were when we first heard it and will thus simply leave this scene for the reader to ruminate upon...

While the notably Modernist, White, Eurocentric, Materialist, Anglo-American, etc. attempts by Postmodern scholars to provide a new social ontology illustrates the depth to which the implicit axioms and logics of Modernism have colonized the ‘commonsense’ of the contemporary academy (the assumption that matter produces and contains mind and in so doing—as a function of ontological dependence—articulates the potential of mind stands front and center), the confluence of Indigenous Studies, Anthropology and Geography in Canada has given rise to a more serious discussion of Modernist social ontology and its dimensional incommensurability with the ‘world views’ of other cultures. Mario Blaser’s (2013) “Ontological Conflicts and the Stories of Peoples in Spite of Europe” defines ontological conflicts as “conflicts involving different assumptions about “what exists”” and argues that they are becoming more visible due to breaches in the hegemony of Modernist ontology (Blaser also makes an important note concerning the fact that the generally unproblematic acceptance of Modernist axioms in the contemporary academy negates the potential for ontological debate therein).}

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328 Blaser, M 2013, ‘Ontological Conflicts and the Stories of Peoples in Spite of Europe: Toward a Conversation on Political Ontology’, *Current Anthropology*, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 547-568. Blaser also makes an important note
“In June 2004, in the province of British Columbia, Canada, the Mowachat/Muchalaht First Nation botched a carefully staged and scientifically approved plan by Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans and environmentalist groups to return a young lost orca whale, Luna, to its pack. The First Nation insisted that the orca was Tsux’it, the abode of the spirit of their recently deceased chief, Ambrose Maquinna, and that his desire to stay with his people should be respected. This was not a conflict between two different perspectives on an animal but rather a conflict over whether the “animal” of scientists, bureaucrats, and environmentalists was all that was there. Ontological conflicts thus involve conflicting stories about “what is there” and how they constitute realities in power-charged fields.”

What is the nature of conscious beings? Does the shared experience (what we might call inner empiricism) of humanity across time and space that points to existence beyond the mortal coil—be they the experience of beings and dimensions beyond the passing time physical space dimension of manifestation that the great theologians, philosophers, scientists, artists, etc. have oft posited as the source of their inspiration or the experience of individuals who die and have an out of body experience before being ‘sucked back in’ to the body when it is revived—provide evidence that the biological animals (and humans) of modern technocrats are not the only mode by which consciousness is expressed? Are the chemical reactions we associate with mental experiences beyond the veil of sensory experience producing the beings and realities experienced or are they alternatively gateways into other dimensions (which have been proven both to exist and to exchange energy with our dimension)? In any case it should be apparent that engagement with ontological debate beyond the constraints of Modernist axioms and associated logics that reduce reality first cause will require a good deal more metaphysical nuance than simply eschewing ‘discernment’ or ‘scale’.

Indeed—returning to issues of scale to elucidate the importance of metaphysics for crafting new social ontologies—CERN describes the issue of scale as such:

“A question of scale
In our everyday lives, we experience three spatial dimensions, and a fourth dimension of time. How could there be more? Einstein’s general theory of relativity tells us that space can expand, contract, and bend. Now if one dimension were to contract to a size smaller than an atom, it would be hidden from our view. But if we could look on a small enough scale, that hidden dimension might become visible again. Imagine a person walking on a tightrope. She can only move backward and forward; but not left and right, nor up and down, so she only sees one dimension. Ants living on a much smaller scale could move around the cable, in what would appear like an

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concerning the manner in which the unproblematic acceptance of Modernist axioms in the contemporary academy negates potential for ontological debate.


extra dimension to the tightrope-walker.”

Scale, then, is important in locating the ‘perspectival location’ of study and thus the ‘infinity membranes’ that articulate the boundaries of ‘invisibility’ from a given space or place of research (i.e. infinity is relative to our perspective and the infinite is by nature invisible meaning that we must understand our perspective and its boundaries as that which exists beyond them is invisible and thus beyond the scope of our understanding from that perspective). The importance of this conception of scale for articulation of a new social ontology is aptly illustrated by P.D. Ouspensky’s concept ‘dimensional incommensurability’. Ouspensky illustrates his concept by comparing three- and four-dimensional objects:

“...Motion in the fourth dimension lies outside all those directions which are possible in a three-dimensional figure. We regard a line as an infinite number of points; a surface as an infinite number of lines; a solid as an infinite number of surfaces.”

“By existing, every three-dimensional body moves in time, as it were, and leaves the trace of its motion in the form of a time-body, or a four-dimensional body. Because of the properties of our perceiving apparatus, we never see or sense this body; we only see its section, and this we call a three-dimensional body. Therefore, we are greatly mistaken in thinking that a three-dimensional body is something real. It is merely the projection of a four-dimensional body - its drawing, its image on our plane. A four-dimensional body is an infinite number of three-dimensional bodies. In other words, a four-dimensional body is an infinite number of moments of existence of a three-dimensional body - of its states and positions.”

“It is quite clear why this is so. A four-dimensional body consists of an infinitely great number of three-dimensional bodies; therefore, they can have no common measure. In comparison with a four-dimensional body, a three-dimensional body is analogous to a point as compared with a line. And, as a point is incommensurable with a line, as a line is incommensurable with a surface, as a surface is incommensurable with a solid - so a three-dimensional body is incommensurable with a four-dimensional one.”

If we extract the general form of relations from this example, we can understand that planes of dimensional consistency and their borders of infinity (infinity membranes) are incommensurable with each other. If we attempt to transpose a three dimensional object (say a sphere) onto a two dimensional space (a plane) we are left with a cursory sketch in which many of the essential qualities of the sphere have been stripped away—as noted above, you can’t throw a two dimensional ball...

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334 Ibid. 49
335 Ibid. 53
3.13 Latour’s ‘Camp’

“I am concerned with Latour as merely one symptomatic instance of ‘anti-critique’; the turn from critical analysis to the descriptive, and the loss of confidence in the very gesture of critique.”

We should first note that this analysis only deals with Latour’s early works on STS and Modernity between 1986 and 1999. His later works, especially texts like ‘An Inquiry into Modes of Existence’, move into a ‘Theological Mode’ and require their own treatment in a subsequent study. One might say that we leave study of the ‘Jesuit Saint Bruno’ for another time in order to study Bruno in ‘the High Priest of Modernity’ guise that has been received by Anglophone Social Science.

Graham Harman’s *Prince of Networks* touts it self as “the first [book] to consider Bruno Latour as a major figure in metaphysics—a title he has sought but rarely received.” In treating with Latour as a metaphysician Harman turns his gaze to Latour’s ‘lineage’: “While his admirers are seldom concerned with metaphysical questions…. …his origins lie in a rigorous traditional education in philosophy marked by a strongly Jesuit flavour [(which is of course reminiscent of Rene Descartes)]. …His works are a contribution to disputes over metaphysics traceable to ancient Greece.” Harman proceeds to read Latour’s ANT into his own Object-Oriented Philosophy which, while beyond the scope of this work, can be easily subjected to many of the critiques levied at Latour and postmodernism more generally. Latour’s metaphysics, then, can be easily located within ‘the camp’ inhabited by Timothy Morton, Jane Bennett (‘political ecology of things’), Bill Brown (‘thing theory’), Loraine Daston and the plethora of contemporary scholars who move in that vein. We should also—recalling our focus on the elite class production of axiomatic and logical norms in

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136 Noys, B 2011, “The Discrete Charm of Bruno Latour, or the Critique of Anti-Critique”, Presented at the Centre for Critical Theory, University of Nottingham.


society—note how much of this literature has been published by the Harvard, Chicago and Duke University Presses....

Benjamin Noys argues that the descriptive nature of Latour’s Actor-Network theory takes on a hegemonic quality in eschewing critique. While Noys’ point concerning the hegemonic epistemological implications of simple description is accepted and expounded upon (though from the more metaphysically nuanced lens of hegemony as a system of thought (a form to be understood as a nexus of axioms and logics) manifesting in a contingent relationship with environment), we diverge from Noys solution of attempting to articulate a mode of critique that eschews metaphysics so as to escape “polemical dialogue with the poststructuralist argument that critique is inseparable from metaphysics, and that we would be better off deconstructing than critiquing” (which of course simply compounds the problem as Modernist Society’s dogmatic lack of metaphysical nuance and subsequent lack of potential for critique is itself the problem to be addressed...). In fact, agreeing that critique is inseparable from metaphysics and thus arguing that critical theory must be rooted in critical metaphysics (i.e. in an alternative ‘world view’) we endeavor to critique Latour’s ‘metaphysics’.

Indeed, a number of other authors have recently highlighted the necessity of return to metaphysical sensitivity in academic theory and practice. Martin Krieger (1995) provides a discussion of ways in which Talmudic philosophy and a reunion of Hellenistic and Hebraic (Abrahamic) philosophy could be used to revitalize planning theory and practice. Brian Epstein (2011) similarly argues ‘esoteric metaphysics’ (especially questions surrounding ‘grounding’ and ‘ontological dependence’—which is to say issues surrounding ‘the first cause’ and necessary relations between dimensional qualities) are essential for social science theory. Epstein notes that,

“In many ways, it is rather obvious that social ontology has played a crucial role in the social sciences from its inception, whether in the psychologistic and behavioristic foundations of economics in the 19th and early 20th centuries, or in grappling with the notions of social structure and function in sociology from Marx to Saussure to Parsons to Giddens, or in the development and controversies over practice-theories in recent years. All of these developments have been accompanied, if not spurred in the first place, by views on the nature of social entities and on the basic constituents of social states of affairs. So it may be regarded as obvious that the problem is taking the social sciences to truck in entities at all. Because if we do so, or if we allow ourselves to speak of social objects or properties as if they are real, we have opened the metaphysical floodgates.

344 Noys, B 2011, “The Discrete Charm of Bruno Latour, or the Critique of Anti-Critique”, Presented at the Centre for Critical Theory, University of Nottingham.
345 Noys, B 2011, “The Discrete Charm of Bruno Latour, or the Critique of Anti-Critique”, Presented at the Centre for Critical Theory, University of Nottingham.
Inasmuch as that is meant to be an objection to esoteric metaphysics, it is self-undermining. To deny that the social sciences have a subject matter is already to have a potent-enough metaphysical view that one is in the company of such esoteric metaphysicians as mereological nihilists. It is possible that this will turn out to be the correct view, and that terms in the social sciences should be stripped of their referents. But in the unlikely case that should turn out to be so, it will represent an unfortunate victory for esoteric metaphysics, rather than spelling its irrelevance.  

In short, Epstein is arguing (like Barnesmoore 2016) that social ontology expands and constrains the potential for social science theory and practice and must therefore be accounted for in the production of social science theory. Epstein provides an example of the importance of esoteric metaphysics by challenging neoliberal personal (local) responsibility narratives by highlighting the fact that systemic causes (the ontological dependence of social context) are obfuscated “when we construct models of... social properties [and]... limit ourselves only to ones that treat the local properties of members of the group”; the causal relationship of the individual to society (i.e. the manifest individual’s ontological dependence on societal context—the police officer’s identity being dependent upon by living in a society that has police officers) and metaphysics more generally are important!

3.14 Latour’s Foundation for STS Theory
In introducing Latour’s *Laboratory Life* Jonas Salk (we should note that Latour’s research in this book was funded in part by an conducted within his Salk Institute...) notes

“This book is free of... the psychologizing often seen in other studies or commentaries (and yet, how ought one to understand the ‘daily practice’, ‘content’ or ‘process’ of laboratory life without first understanding the axioms and logics that constrain and expand the potential in which laboratory life manifests). In this book the authors demonstrate what they call the “social construction” of science by the use of honest and valid examples of laboratory science (this statement seems to posit that axioms and logics (what some ‘social scientists’ simply describe as theory) are derived (often functionally in the minds of the less nuanced) from practice. If we are to play the chicken and egg game with practice and ontology, Latour has clearly made the mistake of assuming (rather like the literal creationists—another rather utopian manifestation of exoteric modernism) a chicken (a finite manifestation) can be born from anything but an egg (the Infinite). Theory’s manifestation as practice may influence subsequent theories, but to presume that practice precedes theory is to presume that matter precedes, produces and contains mind. This issue of the relation between mind and matter is a core DEBATE through the history of philosophy and should not be treated as commonsensical and unproblematic as is the common practice in contemporary social science work./ This in itself is an achievement for... [Latour and Woolgar] are, in a sense, laymen to laboratory science and are not expected to grasp its fundamentals, but merely expected to comprehend only that which is easiest to understand, such as the superficial aspects of laboratory life (first, let us paraphrase Descartes who very clearly argues that one cannot know the truth of something without first understanding its most fundamental qualities (i.e. its axioms and logics and their foundation—or lack there of—in the Infinite Substance and its emanations). How are we to rationally understand and speak knowledgably about

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34 Epstein, B 2011, “Metaphysics in Social Science”, Bucknell University, 20 June 2016,


36 Epstein, B 2011, “Metaphysics in Social Science”, Bucknell University, 20 June 2016,
something whose fundamentals we do not know? From this lens Latour’s project is by its nature hyper-irrational and seems even to celebrate its implicit irrational absurdity.)

In our studies of the scientific culture surrounding Algorithmic/Software development we diverge from the superficial quality of Latour’s study and instead pursue an inquiry founded upon the fundamentals of this scientific culture (which is to say the axioms and logics that expand and constrain potential for thought, behavior and conception of being in the scientific culture of Computer Science Laboratories).

In short, we argue that the ‘paradigm shifts’ described by Kuhn are catalyzed by shifts in the normative ontological regime(s) in which science is being pursued (the major shift in our study being Aristotelian Empiricism—which might be said to study facts in and for the sake of their relation to the Infinite Substance—to Exoteric Modernist Empiricism—which might be said to study facts in and of themselves as a sort of ‘infinite substance’).

Another disjuncture between our work and Latour’s—at least from the perspective of Salk’s characterization—comes in our intended relationship with scientists. Salk (who views himself as a scientist) views Latour’s work as a step towards problematizing the overzealous expectations he posits the public as having for scientists and the fear he posits the public as feeling towards scientists...

“Science, in general, generates too much hope and too much fear, and in the history of the relationship of scientists and nonscientists is fraught with passions, sudden bursts of enthusiasm, and equally sudden fits of panic. ([While authors like Bordo and Butler are wrong to argue that Descartes privileges thought over emotion as the height of Descartes’ model of human psychology is the rational intuition—where the purified rationality is one might say ‘wedded’ with the emotions—it is clear that authors like Salk fit into the framework of their critique.]) If the public could be helped to understand how scientific knowledge is generated and could understand that it is comprehensible and no more extraordinary that any other field of endeavor ([hardly...]), they would not expect more of scientists than they are capable of delivering, nor would they fear scientists as much as they do. ([So, in Salk’s mind, the problem is simply that the public doesn't understand science or scientists and thus act irrationally (with overzealous hope and baseless fear)... ‘The oppressed scientist and the ignorant mass’... Who has more nefarious power than the oppressor who masquerades in the guise of the oppressed?]) This would clarify not only the social position of scientists in society, but also the public understanding of the substance of science, of scientific pursuit and of the production of scientific knowledge. It is sometimes discouraging that although we dedicate our lives to the extension of knowledge ([illusory peripatetic knowledge founded upon illusory, dimensionally reductive axioms and logics...]), to shedding light and exemplifying rationality in the world ([a peripatetic form of light that is fundamentally irrational in its reduction of reality to the finite world of sense perception]), the work of individual scientists, or the work of

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133 Kuhn, TS 2012, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press.
134 The frame of scientists as a maligned, oppressed community in need of protection is akin in its irrationality to the absurd notion that Israel is an unfairly maligned and oppressed nation in need and deserving of US military protection... Who is more powerful (in the nefarious sense) than one who can both oppress the public and convince the victims of this oppression that the oppressor is the one who is actually oppressed?
groups of scientists in general, is often understood only in a sort of magical and mystical way. [(As it should be given that the irrational axiomatic and logical foundation upon which the majority of science is conducted in Modernity is ‘magical and mystical’ in exactly the pejorative-irrational connotation intended by the author…)]

Clearly, Salk views scientists as an oppressed minority (rather than the High Priests of Modern Theology who, like other parrhesiatic actors who have previously held such titles, have a monopoly over the ability to speak truth (over veridiction)) that needs to be saved from the ignorant irrationality (which he tellingly connotes with emotion) of the ‘nonscientists’ that form the general public.

Latour seems to walk in the same vein of thought:

“Rather than making scientific activity more understandable, social scientists have tended through their use of highly specialized concepts to portray science as a world apart. [(The oft cold, heartless and oppressively optimistic—those who truly believe that the disaster relief robots they are creating for DARPA will not be weaponized in the future even in the face of a historical record where DARPA and the DoD as a whole have never failed to weaponized a piece of technology that could strap some guns onto—scientists are merely being misrepresented by social scientists as either sociopathic liars or delusional, a-historical fools....)] A plethora of different specialized approaches have variously been brought to bear on science, such that the resulting overall picture is largely incoherent. [(Latour does society a serious disservice in attempting to simply ‘blame the heathen public’ for their qualms about Modernist scientific production.)]

In our laboratory experience it is often the scientists who have overzealous (and often irrational) expectations of the sorts of problems they can ‘solve’ given the time for their modernist telos of perpetual linear progression to manifest. We are reminded of a discussion in the UC Berkeley Statnews.org Lab where a very ‘high-flying’ Post Doc from France gave a presentation that presumed, given Chomsky’s notion of arboreal, functional linguistics—wherein language and meaning are accepted as holding a functional relationship, it was only a matter of time until enough mathematical and computer engineering problems had been solved to allow Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms to perfectly understand and translate a text. This example illustrates the ways in which axioms and logics concerning the relationship between language and meaning, translation theory and epistemology come together to make it possible for scientists to ‘think that’ an algorithm can understand and perfectly translate all texts and structure their subsequent practices (in this case the development of language analysis software research and development projects-practices) therein. In this light many portions of the general public—the materially dogmatic atheist left in the US comes first

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to mind—ought to be far more skeptical and critical of the ‘knowledge’ they receive in the veneer of unproblematic truth from the corporate-science-university complex.\footnote{Searle J 2001, “Chinese Room Argument”, \textit{The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science}, Wiley Online Library.}

In many cases scientists \textit{are} indeed a world apart in the pure socio-political naivety (the proclivity for discipline by propagandistic socio-political and a-historical narratives) that often typifies their constitution. We provide a few examples from the documentary \textit{Inhuman Kind}—which examines the development of DARPA, Google and Boston Dynamics’ new ATLAS ‘Disaster Relief’ Robot—that aptly capture what we have observed as a dominant regime of axioms and logics within the US EECS community. Our first quote (David Connor, Sr., a Research Scientist at Torc Robotics) comes in response to a question about ATLAS’ shared appearance with ‘the Terminator’: “This is a nice friendly humanoid rescue robot. It is a machine, and it will serve whatever purposes its human operators send it to.”\footnote{Motherboard 2015, \textit{Inhuman Kind}, Vice, 3:05-3:13.} When first asked about possible dangers the rescue robots might pose, Connor noted “you drove here in a machine that is more dangerous than this.”\footnote{Ibid. 3:05-3:13} The documentary turns from Torc Robots to a lab at Virginia Tech run by Prof. Brian Lattimer. When asked about the potential dangers of artificially intelligent killer robots, Lattimer shakes his head in a condescending and dismissive way before answering: “the robot we are building is more like a C3P0, that is doing actions that we don't want people to be involved with [(presumably these are tasks like murdering innocent civilians given US fetishization of imperialism and war without 'boots on the ground')].”\footnote{Ibid. 3:42-3:45 Yeah, cars are clearly just as potentially dangerous as killer robots powered by artificial intelligence... Obviously...}

The documentary next turns to activist and Nobel Laurite Jody Williams. When asked about the narrative that these ATLAS Robots were being developed as disaster relief service robots that are designed to help humans Williams responded: “And then they will be helping humans kill. When they tell you that they will not be weaponizing them, I want to know what they are smoking. There is nothing that the US develops in the military sphere [we would argue that the military sphere spans all but the whole of US scientific development—especially at institutions like UC Berkeley] that it does not want to weaponize.”\footnote{Ibid. 4:50-5:09} Williams summarizes the situation well—an individual must be high (it seems likely that she means something along the lines of crack cocaine...), deluded or insane to believe that the US Military doesn’t have plans to weaponize the ATLAS Robots (or of course they are simply sociopathic liars...). As such, the scientists in the video represent a very serious threat to society as it seems clear that either drug addicts, delusional fools or sociopathic liars are developing an array of

\footnote{Motherboard 2015, \textit{Inhuman Kind}, Vice, 8:15-8:30}
tools that would allow the elite class to murder as many people as they want without the need to retain mass public support (i.e. there is no need to keep the slaves alive once you can replicate their function with robots...). In short (and while we view this as a false conflict that was established as a technique of dialectical hegemonic power), we are far more concerned with the danger posed to the general public by a scientific establishment whose origins lie in the military industrial complex and the eugenics movement than we are concerned by the ‘fear’ of science in certain spheres of general public as those spheres don't presently have access to Weaponized Drones and Terminator Robots...

Before binary forms of Modernist logic take hold of reader interpretation we should note that our problematization of ‘the dogmatic-materialist left’ does not signal any sort of support for or affiliation with ‘the anti-science, Christian right’... We argue that, at the most fundamental level (the level of cosmological and ontological axioms), leftwing atheist scientists and rightwing Christians in the US seem to hold more similarity with each other than they do with any other regimes of thought in presently recorded human history—an interesting note saying that both Science and Christianity have been around for a very long time—and indeed that these similarities rise from the shared foundation of Modernist axioms and logics in which both right and left think and thus act (a simple though demonstrative example coming in the fact that leftwing atheists go wrong interpreting authors like Descartes literally in exactly the same way that rightwing Christians go wrong interpreting texts like the Bible literally). So, rather than picking a side of this illusory Modernist binary we aim to problematize it all together.

Latour aims to simply ignore (an intellectual tactic Latour draws recourse to very frequently...) what he frames as ‘occasional and statistically irrelevant’ interventions of external social factors into the work of scientists. It is clear, however (as Greenhalgh argues), that the scientization of policymaking (i.e. to make ethical decisions in war we must use science to produce ethical drones) and the politicization of science (i.e. war is ethical because it is scientific through use of ethical drones) act in a mutually constitutive fashion (and that is not to mention the direct influence over scientific practice exerted through allocation of funding and other more overt techniques of power in corporate research labs). “For the scientists... [the goal is to attain] the authority to articulate “the truth”” where as for politicians and elite interests the goal is to attain “the legitimacy to govern.”

Modern societies are scientific and technological societies in which knowledge is increasingly the primary wealth of nations

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363 As Greenhalgh’s work, both with the Rockefeller Foundation and in her book Just One Child, more than simply verge on eugenics (how ever much this reality may vex Dr. Merje Kuus...) we must take a moment to denounced her and her work and ensure the reader is aware that we are in no way endorsing her...

and science is the authoritative form of knowledge. In virtually all modern societies, the human and natural sciences actively inform the making of public policy. To understand policymaking in contemporary societies, we need an approach that takes the policy work of the sciences seriously.\footnote{Greenhalgh, S 2008, Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng’s China, University of California Press, p. 307.}

Accepting the basic premise that Modernist society has extinguished much of the distinction between science and politics we take Greenhalgh’s argument a step further and in one sense invert it to argue that we must account for the ways in which the policy goals of the elite class actors (who establish the axioms and logics in which science is practiced) constrain and expand the potential for scientific research. In sort, rather than focus on the ways in which scientific findings articulate the boundaries of policy—which obfuscates the fact that many ‘politically’ or ‘economically’ relevant scientific findings come as a direct function of elite class interests with the precise goal of manufacturing public perceptions of elite class inspired policy as scientifically necessary and thus (in the Modernist Imagination) ethical\footnote{The axioms and logics of the eugenics movement implicit in contemporary population science—which Greenhalgh and her former employer the Rockefeller funded ‘Population Council’ (along with actors like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the US Government, the Israeli Government and the Chinese Government) are leading advocates—is a perfect example of the ways in which policies like eugenics (which much of the general public would never accept at face value) are framed as ‘scientifically’ necessary as is so perfectly illustrated by China’s one child policy...}—in order to manufacture general public consent for said oppressive elite policy imperatives. As an example of other more sordid forms of scientific corruption, Greenhalgh herself has come to be a leader in her field (the academic study of population science, especially in China) as a direct function of her work for the Rockefeller funded ‘Population Council’—a post which she would not likely have received if she weren’t a supporter of contemporary, liberal eugenics as is made so grossly apparent in her text Just One Child.

Before we depart this dark and dangerous jungle of meta-ironic modernism created by Latour we should note that where Latour’s interest in laboratory life lies in “the way in which the daily activities of working scientists lead to the construction of facts” we are alternatively interested in examining the ways in which the axioms and logics scientists receive through socialization expand and constrain potentials for scientific thought, behavior and being as well as the ways in which elite interests are able to manufacture consent for oppressive policies through articulation of axioms and logics that render certain policies as scientifically necessary and the conflation of presumed scientific necessity—of scientific necessity as a mode of ‘common sense’ and ‘the practical’ as articulated by the axioms and logics of a society—with ethical necessity (a conflation that comes as a necessary function of the ethical
nihilism impelled by reduction of reality to the finite and the subsequent severance of manifestation from the dimension upon which its ‘ethical meaning’ is articulated).

3.15 Laboratory Life, The Basics
Latour’s fetishization of process (e.x. reading and writing) and physical object (e.x. sensors and microscopes) in the production of thought, behavior, conception of being and fact (to which truth has been reduced...) in ‘laboratory life’ obfuscates the production of potential for thought, behavior, conception of being, fact-truth, rational process, technology, etc. by the axioms and logics that are accepted by the scientists within a given laboratory. Again we find the age-old chicken and egg paradox, and as with all paradoxes understanding requires consideration of the issue from a dimensional perspective that transcends the limitations the finite world. If matter were to actually produce and contain consciousness Latour’s lens might be illuminating (practice and object would be the egg for the chicken of thought, behavior, conception of being and the Modernist fact-truth), but this assumption concerning the relationship between mind and matter runs into a plethora of difficulties (some of which we have addressed and still more of which are beyond the scope of this text but can be found spread across space and time through the history of philosophy). As a result of this flawed axiom Latour’s entire method is rendered implicitly obfuscating. What we find most problematic with Latour’s ‘metaphysics’ is not that he moves from a different axiomatic foundation (i.e. a different assumed causal relationship between consciousness and matter) but the fact that—in silently implying his axioms as commonsensical truth-reality rather than stating them outlining its logical consistency—Latour renders his own axiomatic foundation as banally commonsensical (unproblematic) and thus invisible (embedded invisibly in his descriptions and the descriptions of others who are deluded by his ‘philosophy’(367)). The perfect example comes in Latour’s operationalization of the idea that facts are socially constructed (one might also look to Latour’s seemingly reflexive reversion to the implicitly modernist language and implicit social ontology of economic theology to explain the role of individuals in the Lab...); for Latour order itself is socially constructed rather than the vessel in which order manifests. Order is formed-created, in perfect modernist fashion, ‘within’ knowledge. Truth, again in perfect modernist fashion, is relative to the network in which it is manifest (truth is formed ‘within and in functional relation to knowledge’). Does this not render human beings as the minimum of reality? Is this not the most hubris-anthropocentric possible ontological standpoint???

(367) Propaganda might be a more apt term than philosophy...
3.16 Discernment and the Algorithmic Epistemology of Modernity
Latour makes an illuminating (if terrifying) statement in introducing Science in Action. He divides his approach into ‘rules of method’ and ‘principles.

“By ‘rules of method’ I mean what a priori decisions should be made in order to consider all of the empirical facts provided by the specialized disciplines as being part of the domain of ‘science, technology and society’. By ‘principles’ I mean what is my personal summary of the empirical facts at hand after a decade of work in this area. Thus, I expect these principles to be debated, falsified, replaced by other summaries. On the other hand, the rules of method are a package that do not seem to be easily negotiable without losing sight of the common ground I want to sketch. With them it is more of a question of all or nothing, and I think they should be judged only on this ground: do they link more elements than others? Do they allow outsiders to follow science and technology further, longer and more independently? This will be the only rule of the game, that is, the only ‘meta’ rule that we will need to get on with our work.”

Latour’s method also includes: moving forward without epistemological assumptions; only tracking the rhetorical surface of discourse (to avoid ‘psychologizing’); focusing on the process of science rather than focusing on the power dynamics, “offering no a-priori definition of what is strong and what is weak. ...[Starting] with the assumption that everything is involved in a relation of forces but that [he] has no idea at all of precisely what force is”; and a plethora of other practices that—in emphasizing horizontality across time and space over ‘verticality’—between the finite and the Infinite as mediated by consciousness enlivening matter—strip human thought of the capacity for discernment (of Jupiter). As we saw in The Order of Things this capacity for discernment (Jupiter) transforms words into language (the verb ‘to be’). It transforms description into analysis, telematic subjects into subjects with agency, distinguishes an algorithm or an insect from a rational being, etc. Latour’s encyclopedic (‘book report’) methodology—beyond its inherently Modernist quality—works to constrain human epistemological potential to that of an algorithm (he renders the peripatetic mind as the utopian space of human epistemology...). Latour wishes to look to the mechanics of truth production where as we are concerned with the production of the potential for truth that structures the functioning of these truth producing mechanics.

3.17 MetaIronic Modernism
Latour attempts to demonstrate the functionality of Actor Network Theory (ANT) for bridging disciplinary boundaries; rather than dividing topics like the proliferation of the AIDS virus along their

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369 Ibid. 13-15
371 Ibid. 7.
372 A less than apt metaphor as the Infinite and its emanations permeates and enlivens the prima materia to form the finite. ...
contemporary disciplinary axes (society, economics, religion, politics, technology-science, etc.) Latour attempts to track the evolution of a topic-network across space and time (i.e. intellectual axes are replaced by the historical of time and space). Latour’s ‘book report’ methodology encourages us to shed our capacity for discernment and instead focus our attention on describing networks. Socialization within the axioms and logics implicit in Latour’s scholarship is therefore likely to produce norms of thought, behavior and being akin to the algorithm (the ‘telematic subject’); force and reason do, in a sense, lose their distinction in Latour’s world as reason is redefined in wholly peripatetic-functionalist terms (i.e. as a material reason where truth is reduced to an accumulation of facts) and thus reduced to force and the material complexity in which force is expressed. What mode of control is more effective than stripping the public of epistemic capacities like discernment that are necessary to actualize the latent potential for reason and thus free will (i.e. negating the potential for conscious evolution)? Maybe manufacturing the perception that an individual has indeed actualized this potential for free will through the very process of socialization that strips said individual of their capacity to actualize the latent potential for free will (i.e. biomaterialist-democracy’s ability to socialize individuals in a manner that negates the potential for conscious evolution and thus reason and free will wile at the same time manufacturing the perception of ‘freedom’ through practices like voting and the axioms, logics and realities about the nature of political agency embedded therein)..."}

One of Latour’s major goals in We Have Never Been Modern is to relink knowledge of things with power and politics (the ‘Gordian Knot’ has been severed by the disciplinarily of modernist scholarship). “We are always attempting to retie the Gordian knot by crisscrossing, as often as we have to, the divide that separates exact knowledge and the exercise of power - let us say nature and culture.” Latour frames this crisscrossing of the split in the contemporary academy in terms of Ariadne’s thread. Latour’s book report description of networks aim to act as Ariadne’s thread in leading us back to the entrance of the labyrinth (the ‘Truth’) that was lost through disciplinary atomization and thus rebinding Gordian’s Knot of knowledge and power...

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374 Latour, B 2012, We Have Never Been Modern, Harvard University Press, p. 3.
375 Ibid. 3.
376 We are inclined to note that simply using metaphors from Greek mythology and other symbolic texts like Robinson Crusoe is not, in of itself, enough to make one a philosopher. In the least one ought to use the symbols properly lest the project fall into tokenistic perversion... Latour, as is so well demonstrated in his treatment of Crusoe in Science in Action, clearly falls into this category of tokenistic perversion for the sake of egotistical aggrandizement (or as a function of an uninitiated ignorance) rather than elucidation of the object of analysis through the symbolic lens of myths and allegories...
If ‘philosophy’ is the Gordian knot, Latour is unbinding the severed halves into their constituent fibers (i.e. atomization *ad infinitum*) rather than reassembling the severed halves through his seemingly reflexive recourse to simply ignoring or extinguishing metaphysical distinctions... Latour’s violence against philosophy and consciousness itself is to the slicing of the Gordian Knot as Latour’s violence against history is to (in his words) the scientist’s violence against the Rat’s brain...

The inability to describe something outside the influence of social ontology is unmediated by a lack of awareness concerning said social ontology and its influence (i.e. peekaboo is a game for children and does not imply—to the rational mind—that something is actually gone because a given individual cannot see it...). The theories we receive through socialization—whether we realize it or no—will always influence the process by which we connect the dots in our network, the nodes of the network we choose to link, the aspects of the network we are able to see, the larger context of patterns in techniques of power that fill the invisible spaces in the network, our interpretations therein, etc. Subjective opinions on the nature of reality and human existence therein (e.x. on the human potential for epistemologically unencumbered observation) do not actually articulate the nature of reality and human existence therein... Latour’s project of eschewing philosophy (e.x. eschewing epistemological assumptions, the distinction between force and reason, the distinction between reflective, discerning beings and reflexive, telematic beings, etc.) in order to observe the ‘real’ empirical networks is in this light absurd, impossible, irrational, hegemonic and, thus, both obfuscating and dangerous. The only thing more detrimental to the knowledge formation process than irrational subjective influence is the false impression that we have transcended irrational subjective influence and are, thus, able to describe the things, facts and forces of the world as well as the networks they form as they ‘really are’ (this produces a subjectivity akin to what has been called the spiritual ego without the ‘spiritual’ dimension—‘the objective material ego’...). We wont even begin to discuss the detrimental effects of Latour’s move to reduce reality to a single, homogenous phenomena rather than a scale of realities in different, irreducible dimensional qualities... The only thing worse than slavery is slavery under the illusion of freedom as there is then no potential for intentional escape.

Latour argues the disciplinarity of the contemporary academy—especially in its analysis of the nature-culture relationship in ‘modern’ society—rises directly from our collective conception of self as
‘Modern’ (Latour’s problem, conversely, comes in his inability to recognize how archetypally Modernist he and his works are...)

As to some of the other implications of Latour’s book report philosophy, his unwillingness to ‘psychologize’ discourse would logically lead us to the conclusion that “Jews really were what the Nazis said [they] were because, well, it would be reductive to say otherwise!” Similarly, we should simply accept the KKK’s contemporary argument that they are unfairly being labeled as a racist hate group and are, in fact, simply a benevolent Christian organization because, well, it would be reductive to say otherwise! We should just believe the US Military when they say they have no plans to weaponize the ATLAS Terminator Drone... Similarly, we should simply accept the argument of contemporary eugenics at organizations like the Rockefeller the Population Council that the form of ‘population science’ they are practicing is no longer eugenics because, well, it would be reductive to say otherwise! In this light, it would be hard to conceive of a project that was more dangerously hegemonic than Latour’s. Returning to the unspeakable ethnographic example above, a PHD student in the UBC Department of Geography argued—clearly following Latour and Co. given the student’s work on STS and relatively contemporaneous enrollment in an STS seminar at UBC—that it would be dangerous to ‘psychologize’ the history of neoliberalism traced by Harvey in a Brief History of Neoliberalism and (as Harvey indeed does) discern the clear class oriented conspiracy that gave rise to the global neoliberal turn (i.e. it is dangerous to even consider the possibility that there might be some sort of conspiracy involved in the global proliferation of an economic policy clearly detrimental to all but the very richest members of the global society because, well, that would be reductive!)... Latour’s dangerous influence on the academy has clearly come in rendering academics as epistemologically sterile—as incapable of moving from description to discernment—and thus as both politically sterile (in the critical sense of being able to have a positive-critical effect on politics through one’s research) and dangerous (as this epistemological-political sterility renders their research as a mirror for the axioms and logics that are invisibly embedded in the history, technologies, objects, etc. they describe and thus a node of elite techniques of power). Indeed, Latour’s work should be accepted as just that: an elite class technique of power (whether Latour is aware of his role as an agent of hegemony or no).

3.18 Returning to Organics and Technics
Theodore Berger of the University of Southern California elucidates the ways in which the assumptions of Cybernetic Functionalism are being operationalized in the contemporary development of Artificial Intelligence (his statements mirror many of Kurzweil’s above...) in describing a 2006 DARPA project:

“Part of our problem is in getting enough sensors into the brain without destroying it. *(Berger, at least, has more wisdom than Carpenter…)* Getting enough sensors in there so that we can extract enough information to infer what the total pattern of activity is *(presuming that all energies acting in the brain are of a finite quality that we can quantify-measure...)*. If we can do that, then we have to develop a mathematical model of how information along all those pathways develops and is processed. And so for the next, you know, few years *(this interview was recorded in 2006)* this is going to be the task. Now if we can do that, then, we’ll get to the finish line, *(laughs manically and triumphantly)*, we will get to the finish line *(clearly Berger display’s the same rather troubling hubris (or access to information to which we the public are not privy) as Kurzweil in his approximation of ‘what will happen’. You would think they considered themselves profits—Kurzweil clearly does with his Asimovian moniker ‘futurist’ *(Ray thinks he’s Hari Seldon...)*).”

“Trees and Algorithms provide us with useful metaphors for understanding true relationship between scarcity and the desire for hierarchical domination and competition in ‘beings’ that lack reason. Trees grow straight up when there is direct sunlight. It is only when sunlight becomes scarce that plants begin to grow (via an internal impetus reflexively-instinctually actualized by external environment) over each other in order to *compete* for sunlight (i.e., scarcity brings on the desire for hierarchical domination and competition). Interestingly, the only other context in which Trees don’t grow straight up and down is when form is imposed upon them by external forces like wind (which can be likened to Modernist social systems that seek to produce social order through external domination by military and police ‘forces’). Plants only seek to dominate each other in environments of scarcity. For an algorithmic example of the above metaphor, a computer program designed by Karl Sims (1994a; 1994b) to replicate the process of Mechanical Evolution in the digital sphere demonstrates the ways in which scarcity works to produce the desire for hierarchical domination and competition. In the digital simulation, a being is ‘selected’ for survival and continued evolution by capturing and possessing a green cube located between the being and its ‘opponent’. At a certain point, beings in the simulation stopped evolving in a manner that allowed them to simply move to the cube quickly and instead began to evolve in a manner that allowed beings to prevent the competitor from getting to the cube that allowed beings putting the cube in a place where the competitor cannot reach it *(Sims 1994a; 1994b; 1994c)*. Again, however, we see that scarcity and discrete individuality are the causal factors in producing the desire for hierarchical domination and competition. In this light, we argue that social systems like Capitalism (especially Neoliberal Capitalism) that were designed (based on biomaterialist, discrete conceptions of humanity and subsequent conceptions of human evolution as purely mechanical) to produce social evolution through scarcity, competition and hierarchical domination actually work to socialize humans in (and thus constrain human thought, behavior and conception of being to) a mode that negates the potential for conscious evolution, self-mediation of the biological desires and the animal passions and thus causes ‘devolution’ or a ‘decay of conscious social order’ (which is to say decay of intimacy with Infinite Substance and thus reason.”

3.19 Sociometry and Semiology in Primatology

“Carpenter imported the sociological techniques of sociometry into his biological study. ...Precisely at the period marking the end of creditable biological reductionism in American human science, both biological and

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social disciplines shared a logic that elaborated functionalist field theories. [(The axioms and logics of Modernism are dimensionally reductive and so necessarily manifest as some sort of reductive theory be it biological reductivism or the epistemological reductivism of functionalism and later of ‘rational choice theory’).] The field theories were the material directly transformed by cybernetic functionalism during and after World War II, in the profound refigurations of biological and social sciences through the physical and technological sciences. The important difference distinguishing the gibbon study from the howler monograph was the degree of detailed use of sociometric and semiotic analysis to explain an integrated control system. These theoretical tools, borrowed from human sciences, were keys to primatology’s capacity to bridge the natural and social sciences in the mid-twentieth century.”

In short—once biology was stripped of consciousness in mind’s reduction to a purely physical phenomenon (as emerging from the ‘Modernist Garden of Eden’ which is to say the finite)—the differentiation between matter and biology was eviscerated and (in the notable context of the rise of the computer as an essential constituent of the foundation of society in the post WWII era) it thus made sense to study mind like we would any physical system. Functionalism eviscerated general public knowledge of the substance and origins of of mind (consciousness); as a result mind was to be quantified and treated like any other physical system. Modernism is power manifest as the articulation of axioms-logics and the subsequent management of the of-unconscious rearticulation of existing ‘cultural materials’ (words, symbols, etc.) therein. In this sense power can be understood in terms of articulating axioms and logics in Genesis and managing the emergence of mind from the Garden of Eden made potential therein.

3.20 Prediction and Futurology in Modernist Divinatory Practice

“In the words of the man who considered himself the founder of the sociometric movement, J. L. Moreno, “The proper placement of every individual and of all interrelations of individuals can be shown on a sociogram. It is at present the only available scheme which makes the dynamic structure of relationships within a group plain and which permits its concrete structural analysis...”

A geometry of social relations allowed determination of the “tele” of a group—the goal around which it is actually organized (no matter how people might think it is organized). Once the criterion was known, the investigator could predict future group states and develop strategies effective in achieving goals—or thwarting them. That is, sociometry included essentially “therapeutic and political procedures, aiming to aid individuals or groups to better adjustment.”

As mind was rendered a purely technical system whose origins are located within the finite and which is thus amenable for quantification and mathematical modeling Modernism turned its attention to the development of predictive, mathematic models for the human mind manifest as ‘decision-making processes’ (this turn finds its apex in ‘rational choice theory’ and its base presumption that all humans

382 Ibid. 96
make materially rational decisions upon an unproblematic standard for material value that, in the more nuanced versions, can only be influenced by a ‘lack of information’.

3.21 Asimov and the Foundation
The most influential popular culture iteration of Modernity’s desire to predict the future of mind through calculation comes in Isaac Asimov’s Foundation series. The hero of the tale Hari Seldon establishes a new field of study termed ‘Psychohistory’. The basic tenants of Psychohistory posit mass human behavior as statistically predictable (individual behaviors are still considered beyond the pale of statistical analysis) given access to the proper historical knowledge and mathematical models.

“Gaal Dornick, using nonmathematical concepts, has defined psychohistory to be that branch of mathematics which deals with the reactions of human conglomerates to fixed social and economic stimuli [i.e. all human relations can be understood in the categorical terms—the social ontology and implicit axioms-logics—of Modernism...].... Implicit in all these definitions is the assumption that the human conglomerate being dealt with is sufficiently large for valid statistical treatment.... A further necessary assumption is that the human conglomerate be itself unaware of psychohistoric analysis in order that its reactions be truly random ...."

“The Three Theorems of Psychohistorical Quantitivity:

The population under scrutiny is oblivious to the existence of the science of Psychohistory.
The time periods dealt with are in the region of 3 generations.
The population must be in the billions (±75 billions) for a statistical probability to have a psychohistorical validity.”

“Psychohistory dealt not with man, but with man-masses. It was the science of mobs; mobs in their billions. It could forecast reactions to stimuli with something of the accuracy that a lesser science could bring to the forecast of a rebound of a billiard ball. The reaction of one man could be forecast by no known mathematics; the reaction of a billion is something else again.”

Seldon creates two seemingly opposing forces (the First Foundation and the Second Foundation)—a false conflict or dialectical hegemonic conflict between two seemingly oppositional groups that actually...

1952, Foundation and Empire, Gnome Press.


Asimov, I 1989, Prelude to Foundation, Bantam.

1986, Foundation Trilogy, Ballantine, p. 17.

1986, Foundation Trilogy, Ballantine, p. 17.

serve the same elite interests and can thus be managed to produce the desired synthesis-outcome—\(^{387}\) in an attempt to create a new galactic empire out of the correctly predicted fall of the galactic empire Seldon himself inhabits. Seldon created the First Foundation as technologically advanced—a mode (a *Genesis*) that ensured the First Foundation would express itself through physical force (the Body). Seldon created the Second Foundation as psychologically and mentally advanced (they are both well versed in psychohistory and in methods of enacting psychical powers like mindreading, telepathy, emotional stimulation and manipulation, etc.) to ensure they would express themselves through ‘invisible’ force—through psychology (the Mind). In a sense Seldon creates a mind-body binary to structure the dialectical relationship between the two Foundations knowing that, in the end, mind (the ‘progressive’) would take precedence over matter (the ‘conservative’)... While the First Foundation is—in the mind of the galactic general public—the agent by which this new empire is to be formed (as a function of the fact that they are its visible face in fighting the wars by which its boundaries are expanded), the Second Foundation actually controls the process through subtle mental manipulation (of the leaders of the First Foundation and the factions that oppose it—creating and managing conflicts to produce desired outcomes).

“The future course of the Foundation was plotted according to the science of psychohistory, then highly developed, and conditions arranged so as to bring about a series of crises that will force us most rapidly along the route to future Empire. Each crisis, each Seldon crisis, marks an epoch in our history.”\(^{388}\)

The Foundation, then, in its multiple iterations, is exercising a form of dialectical hegemony. The Second Foundation is able to control historical outcomes (and thus, in one sense, the future) by fomenting the Genesis of both sides in a conflict and then managing the process. It is no wonder that Asimov and his books are rumored to form the exoteric cannon for the US military and intelligence establishment...

**3.22 Ray Kurzweil**

Ray Kurzweil is probably the most famous contemporary ‘futurist’ and his method provides what we might take as a concise definition of ‘futurism’. In the simplest terms Kurzweil’s practice as a ‘futurist’ consists of developing theories concerning the ‘technical laws’ of human and AI evolution and extrapolating these theoretical ‘laws’ into the future.

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3.23 Technological Singularity and the Apocalypse in Outer Space

Technological Singularity— the notion that there are moments where changes in basic dimensional quality render modeling of the future based on the past impossible—is a simple rearticulation of ‘The Apocalypse’ in the axioms and logics of Modernity (see section 4.5.2 for treatment of the term ‘Technological Singularity’). As Haraway demonstrates, however, this popular ‘transhumanist’ term is not the only Modernist rearticulation of Apocalypse. “...The extraterrestrial is coded to be fully general; it is about escape from the bounded globe into an anti-ecosystem called, simply, space. Space is not about “man’s” origins on earth but about “his” future, the two allochronic times of salvation history.”389 No longer is The Apocalypse an escape from material existence but instead an escape from Earth and its material boundaries into ‘outer space’ (for there is no escape from or existence beyond matter, passing time and physical space in the Modernist world view).

While the public mind of Modernity views Religion and Scientific Modernity in wholly antagonistic terms, the distinction is rather tenuous in actual scientific practice... The late Dr. David F. Noble frames this issue as such:

“I look at space exploration, artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons, cyberspace and genetic engineering as all essentially religious projects. I spent some weeks in the archives at NASA where the archivist, simply out of his own interest, collected a great volume of documents about religion, and no one had ever looked at it before, and as I was reading it I got more and more terrified, because the other worldly aspect of this program, the I would say divine pretensions. The origins of man’s space flight, in Russia, goes back to Tsiolkovsky who preached that it was mankind’s destiny to dominate the cosmos and become reunited with God, and that space exploration was the means to that end, and he was really the father of modern rocketry.

In the United States, von Braun, the Nazi rocket scientist who was brought here, ...became a Born Again Christian, and he argued that human beings must go into space as part of their cosmic destiny to spread the gospel. The first manned space flight, which later became mercury [(H]ermes)], was originally called project Adam, and then when NASA was set up in 1957 the name was changed. In fact, in Huntsville it was always called Project Mercury and then in parentheses Adam.”390

“The Astronauts have carried literally thousands of Christian banners, flags, microfilms, copies of the bible, etc. into space with them in their space suits. So, the religious ethos of the space program, I think, is undeniable.”391

Similarly,

“[Regarding] the Human Genome Project, which is the largest scientific enterprise of our day, Francis Collins, who runs it, is a Born Again Christian, an evangelical, very outspoken, who has written that he thinks the most important event in history is the resurrection of Jesus Christ, he says that he will allow God to intervene in the laws of nature etc. The human genome doesn't really exist because everyone’s genome is different, and, when asked whose genome it would be, they said it would be sort of a composite, and it would be male, and they said it would be a sort of Adam two. Richard Seed, who announced rather defiantly that he was going to clone human beings went onto the radio and the television and this is what he said: ...“God made man in his own

391 Ibid. 4:25-4:41.
image. God intended for man to become one with God. We are going to become one with God. Cloning, and
the reprograming of DNA is the first serious step in becoming one with God [(‘materialist spiritualism’ at its
absolute apex)....

Technological development, which appears to be the most worldly of activities, is in actuality an
otherworldly project rooted in the Christian notion of redemption, the restoration of original perfection, and the
story, which is a peculiarly Christian one, is the story of the fall of Adam and the promise of the recovery of
Adam’s original divinity. Science is the ultimate authority in our culture [(the ultimate mode of veridiction, the
scientist as the parrhesiatic actor par excellence)], and scientists cultivate the image that they stand between
mortals and god [(the High Priests of Modernity)], and that they are the new clergy.”

Science Writer and Journalist Margret Wertheim relates a similarly demonstrative story concerning
the first moon landing:

“When Buzz Aldrin and Neil Armstrong [(both members of the Explorers Club)] were waiting on the moon
before Armstrong stepped out on the moon to take mankind’s first steps on another celestial body, Buzz
Aldrin, who was a Catholic, had prepared a little box with communion wafers and blessed wine his priest had
blessed for him and he actually said to NASA control can we have a moment of silence so that he could take
communion wafers and communion wine before Armstrong stepped out on the moon. ...The NASA hierarchy
[was] completely encouraging of this kind of thing.”

Wertheim summarizes our intended point well: “The notion that Science and Religion were enemies
is really a historical myth. In fact, for most of our history science and religion have been intimately
entwined.”

The fact that so many dogmatic, exoteric Modernists like James Hughes (quoted below) deny this incontrovertible historical fact comes as a function of dogmatic ideological delusion. While
the boundaries between Exoteric and Esoteric Religion and Modernism are blurred at some points,
and while many of the people discussed in the above are clearly operationalizing exoteric-modernist,
literal interpretations of the Abrahamic tradition, the dogmatic distinction between Religion and
Science as implicitly opposing forces (rather than mutually constitutive forces) is clearly and
demonstratively problematic.

The notion of Apocalypse has—in other times and cultures—been interpreted as being as much
a beginning as it is an end and did not take on the pejorative quality with which it is associated in
Modernity. Even in the Abrahamic tradition from which we received the term it was as much the
beginning of a new world (indeed it is the beginning of eternity, of ‘paradise re-found’) as the end of
the old (exile in the finite world of motion). It seems that the axioms and logics of Modernity have
rendered the Phoenix of society sterile—as incapable of rebirth from its ashes (ends are no longer
taken as beginnings—the circle has been broken and straightened into a ray). Does this relate to the
linear notions of development and civilizational progress in Modernity or the Modernist ‘world view’s’

393 Ibid. 3:35-4:16.
394 Ibid. 7:20-7:25.
axiomatic reduction of reality and its first cause to passing time and physical space? Returning to Foucault’s work in the History of Madness (and the work of many others great scholars),\textsuperscript{395} this new mode of apocalyptic thinking mirrors the move from cyclical to linear time that marks the birth of ‘Modernity’ and the break from the classical philosophy and ‘world views’.

Foucault notes the beginning of the divergence of consciousness of madness and of unreason in the late eighteenth century: consciousness of “unreason took on the appearance of a massive repetition”; “consciousness of madness by contrast was accompanied by a certain analysis of modernity, which immediately placed it within a temporal, social and historical framework.”\textsuperscript{396}

“The experience of unreason... always leads back to the roots of time - unreason thereby becoming the untimely within the world \textit{par excellence} - while the knowledge of madness sought on the contrary to situate itself evermore precisely within the direction of nature and history in their development. It is from this period onwards that the time of unreason and the time of madness were to be affected by two opposing vectors: unreason becoming an unconditional return, and an absolute plunge; madness developing along the chronology of a history.\textsuperscript{[Endnote]}\textsuperscript{397}

“[Endnote] In nineteenth-century evolutionism, madness is indeed a return, but along a chronological \textit{path}: it is not the absolute \textit{defeat} of time. What is at stake is the idea of returning, of going back against time, and not returning, of going back against time, and not repetition, strictly speaking. Psychoanalysis, which tried once again to confront madness and unreason, found itself faced with precisely this problem of time; fixation, the death instinct, the collective unconscious and archetypes are more or less successful attempts at isolating the heterogeneity of these two temporal structures, the one being proper to the experience of Unreason and the knowledge that it envelops, the other being proper to the knowledge of madness and the science that it authorizes.\textsuperscript{398}

3.24 The Death of Symbolism in Modernity Manifest

Beyond Sociometry Haraway identifies semiotics as essential in the rise of cybernetic functionalism.

“Semiotics was the second borrowing from the human sciences important to the foundational field studies in primatology. Semiotics theorized communication as a problem in control systems. In its roots in the work of Charles Saunders Pierce, William James, John Dewy, and George Herbert Mead, this branch of semiotics was intimately intertwined with American pragmatism and behaviorism; a basic problem was to understand how systems of signs affected behavior patterns. Charles Morris, a philosopher at the University of Chicago, defined semiotics as the science of signs, studying things and properties of things in their functioning as signs. Morris believed that semiotics was the needed organon or instrument of all the sciences. It would be the tool of the unification of sciences in the twentieth century:

The significance of semiotics as a science lies in the fact that it supplies the foundation for any special science of signs, such as linguistics, logic, mathematics. \textit{(Infinite Substance and its emanations no longer form the foundation for meaning in language, logic and mathematics). The simplest things are now numbers rather than the aeonian forms they represent)}\textsuperscript{399}... The concept of sign may prove to be of importance in the unification of the social, psychological and humanistic sciences in so far as these are distinguished from the physical and biological sciences. And since it will be shown that \textit{signs are simply

\textsuperscript{396} Ibid. 362-372
\textsuperscript{397} Ibid. 363
\textsuperscript{398} Ibid. 629
the objects studied by biological and physical sciences related in certain complex functional processes, any such unification of the formal sciences on one hand, and the social, psychological, and humanistic sciences on the other, would provide the relevant material for the unification of these two sets of sciences with the physical and biological sciences.

Language was like any other organismic object studied functionally by positivists."

The loss of Infinite Substance, its emanations and, subsequently, the potential for knowledge as resemblance lead to the loss of potential for rationally intuitive interpretation of symbolic meaning in the Modernist mind. While in Foucault we observed the generation (Genesis) of a world view in which death (as a final end to existence) was possible, Haraway’s work illuminates the actual manifestation of this world view in transforming the cultural materials (words, symbols, etc.) of society. No longer does symbolism derive its meaning from its resemblance of Infinite-Eternal Truth. Symbolism and its capacity to catalyze remembrance of our intimacy with Truth is lost to the process of human (d)evolution. Evolution has been rendered as a biological rather than epistemological process by the axioms and logics of Modernity (e.x. the axiom that humans are discrete, biological, materially rational individuals) and in that reduction to biology we forget the role of symbolism in the evolution of mind (which has been reduced to the accumulation of force and complexity in the vessel of force’s expression rather than as dimensional states in the substance of mind). The ‘simplest things’ are now the material, symbolic constituents of mathematics and language rather than the Infinite Substance and emanations (force, aeons-form and consciousness) these material symbols were intended to represent...

That being said, symbols still reign supreme as a unifying force of human life in Modernity (and are indeed operationalized by the elite class—who embed their axioms and logics in symbols—to transform the public mind); the difference is that symbols (signs, numbers, letters, etc.) are now used to create rather than catalyze remembrance of Order. Modernist symbols unify the world as a function of and within human knowledge—through hierarchically dominating disorder via quantification, categorization, systematization, etc.

Britannica defines

“Behavioralism, which was one of the dominant approaches in the 1950s and ’60s, [as] the view that the subject matter of political science should be limited to phenomena that are independently observable and quantifiable. It assumes that political institutions largely reflect underlying social forces and that the study of politics should begin with society, culture, and public opinion. To this end, behavioralists utilize the methodology of the social

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Like Functionalism, Behavioralism is a necessary product of the Modernist axioms and logics and the ‘predictive desire’ of Modernity. As reality and knowledge are reduced to the finite, knowledge and meaning must come as a function of ‘phenomena that are independently observable and quantifiable’. Modernism presumes that social structures are unproblematic reflections of popular cultural norms that rise from within the public itself rather than observing the way social structures (systems) fulfill elite class political interests through socialization of the public in the axioms and logics that are embedded in said social structures (systems). Matter creates and contains mind and all humans are deemed to have equal mind (equal self-interested rational economic calculus), meaning that no individual is deemed to have the power to articulate the mind of others (i.e. it is presumed that there are no ‘elite actors’ because it is presumed that one individual can not dominate the axioms and logics of another...); culture (and its tangible manifestation as social structure) must—in this definition—be produced by the aggregate of human mind. This conception of the relationship between culture, social structure and the general public ignores power and issues of ontological dependence: who has the power to create social structures?; what techniques of power are enacted in this production process?; what sorts of teleological imperatives do these social structures articulate for the general public?; how do created social structures articulate the potentials for class relations in socialized bodies?; for potential norms of thought, behavior and conception of being in their implicit axioms and logics? In short, how are public epistemological norms expanded and constrained by ontological dependence upon the social systems in which they are socialized? In any case the influence of social systems on epistemology is not observable (the substance of mind being invisible) and the behavioralist approach can only ever study symptoms of this effect in behavior; in short, Behavioralism cannot study epistemology in and of itself as the mind is not observable—given that human evolution is an essentially epistemological rather than biological process Behavioralism ranks as one of the most inept possible approaches for studying human beings.

The Chomskyan approach to the study of language and its role in the death of true symbolism elucidates this point. In short, this approach assumes a functional relationship between practical meaning and language. The practical meaning of language is actually, however, articulated within context and therefore holds no functional relationship with language itself. As a simple example comes in the issue of sarcasm and sentiment analysis: while a claim by Milton Freeman that he ‘loves

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capitalism’ would articulate a positive sentiment and can be interpreted rather literally, the same claim of ‘loving capitalism’ provided by Karl Marx ought to be interpreted as sarcastic and articulating a negative sentiment. The implicit shortcomings of algorithmic sentiment analysis become clear—an algorithm may be able to *approximate sentiment* across a massive body of text (recalling Asimov and the notion that statistical modeling of human phenomena can only be conducted at the mass-aggregate scale), but in an individual case the algorithm would need to quantify the speaker’s entire context—including their relationship to the person or audience they are addressing and the entire context of that audience—which, as Trevor Barnes reminds us, is impossible (‘context cannot be quantified’).  

### 3.25 Resemblance and Hermetic Thought

“Real language... is... an opaque, mysterious thing, closed in upon itself, a fragmented mass, its enigma renewed in every individual, which combines here and there with the forms of the world and becomes interwoven with them, so much so that all these elements, taken together, form a network of marks in which each of them may play, and does in fact play, in relation to all the others, the role of content or sign, that of secret or of indicator. In its raw, historical sixteenth-century being, language is not an arbitrary system; it has been set down in the world and forms a part of it, both because things themselves hide and manifest their own enigma like a language and because words offer themselves to men as things to be de-ciphered. The great metaphor of the book that one opens, that one pores over and reads in order to know nature, is merely the reverse and visible side of another [aeonian] transference, and a much deeper one, which forces language to reside in the world, among the plants, the herbs, the stones, and the animals.”

The Algorithm’s lack of capacity for analogy—its inability to read the signatures by which knowledge via resemblance can be formed (both in the Infinite and the practical sense)—renders it incapable of interpreting the meaning of a text.

### 3.26 Algorithmic Heterotopia

“Third principle. The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible. Thus it is that the theater brings onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole series of places that are foreign to one another; thus it is that the cinema is a very odd rectangular room, at the end of which, on a two-dimensional screen, one sees the projection of a three-dimensional space, but perhaps the oldest example of these heterotopias that take the form of contradictory sites is the garden. We must not forget that in the Orient the garden, an astonishing creation that is now a thousand years old, had very deep and seemingly superimposed meanings. The traditional garden of the Persians was a sacred space that was supposed to bring together inside its rectangle four parts representing the four parts of the world, with a space still more sacred than the others that were like an umbilicus, the navel of the world at its center (the basin and water fountain were there); and all the vegetation of the garden was supposed to come together in this space, in this sort of microcosm. As for carpets, they were originally reproductions of gardens (the garden is a rug onto which the whole world comes to enact its symbolic perfection, and the rug is a sort of garden that can move across space). The garden is the smallest parcel of the world and then it is the totality of the world. The garden has been a sort of happy, universalizing heterotopia

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since the beginnings of antiquity (our modern zoological gardens spring from that source).”

The algorithmic field of dimensional consistency is a heterotopic space with regard to language and linguistic meaning. *Algorithms represent a text’s reality as a garden of statistical symbols.* In transmuting the meaning of language through manifesting it into the environment of the algorithmic field of dimensional consistency (the numerical field of dimensional consistency, which in one sense comes as a function of the axioms and logics with which the axiom ‘thinks’), in that the actual meaning of language’s field of dimensional consistency and the algorithmic field of dimensional consistency are dimensionally incommensurable, many nodes of the meaning of language that are incommensurable with the algorithmic (numerical) field of dimensional consistency are lost. We can no longer throw the sphere when it is rendered in two dimensions. The meaning of language is transformed in moving through this heterotopic space (most notably by being stripped of all context). Bringing our earlier metaphor of Genesis and the Garden of Eden to bear upon algorithmic thought we might say that code articulates the Genesis (the original axioms and logics) that defines the boundaries of the ‘Garden of Eden’ (the software environment manifest upon a hardware canvas—which is to say the Infinite manifest on the canvas of the finite prima materia) in which mind comes into becoming (being in outside the ‘world view’).

### 3.27 Algorithmic Utopia

An algorithm cannot interpret symbolic texts like the Bible or the Koran because—if we may simplify in a manner that sheds light on the abject poverty of religion in the US—algorithms can only interpret textual meaning literally (i.e. in the presumption that there is a functional, material relationship between language and meaning). This makes the algorithm akin to most Modernists—from the average right wing Christian to the average leftwing atheist—in that they go astray in attempting to interpret symbolism in materially reductive, historically reductive terms. Algorithmic epistemology and the algorithmic (numerical) field of dimensional consistency are the utopian spaces of modernist

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epistemological reductionism (utopia can indeed be a ‘real’ space in its articulation within the logics and axioms of Modernity...).

3.28 Sentiment Analysis
Contemporary Computer Science research fetishizes the development of language analysis algorithms that can conduct sentiment analysis (i.e. an analysis that can interpret whether a text is expressing a positive or negative sentiment about a given topic). The practical meaning of a text, however, is derived from the location of the text in its wider social assemblage (i.e. by its social context). The sentiment of a text cannot be rendered into the algorithmic field of dimensional consistency because the dimensional quality of the text’s actual field of dimensional consistency (its social context) is dimensionally incommensurable with the algorithmic field of dimensional consistency. There is no functional relationship between language and meaning and the algorithm cannot—as algorithms can only interact with the symbols with which a text is constructed (rather than the social or Infinite context from which it derives meaning)—thus interact with the actual sentiment of a text. It is starkly impossible for the algorithm to actually render any of the text’s sentiment. For people who wish to conduct sentiment analysis at the aggregate level, there is a close enough relationship between the static (and limited) meaning of language an algorithm can interpret within the algorithmic field of dimensional consistency and a text’s practical meaning that many software packages examining overall statistical trends end up working in practice (just because something works, however, does not mean that it works the way that we think it does)... It is clear that we need to focus our scholarly attention not only on questions of whether algorithmic software pages work but also on when, why and how it works so that we can aptly and precisely determine the limitations of our software and the implicit transformation of language and linguistic meaning through the process of quantification and visualization. If we know exactly when, why and how algorithmic sentiment analysis cannot work, we can then do our best to approach solving such problems through mechanisms that circumvent the epistemic limitations of algorithms—thus the practical importance of philosophical reflection on algorithmic epistemology for the development of artificial intelligence.

3.29 Potentials of Visualization for E-Learning
The visualization featured in the footnoted link (a moving, three dimensional model of the solar system speeding through space, which problematizes the heliocentric model received from two
dimensional, motionless representations of the solar system) illustrates the actual potential of visualization software to enhance epistemological practice... The visualization allows us to observe process from a scale that is dimensionally incommensurable with lived experience. In compressing a relatively infinite (from our limited dimensional scale—see our discussion of scale and relative infinity above) portion of space and time into an observable representation the visualization allows us to form experiential knowledge of that which is beyond the scope of (dimensionally incommensurable with) our 'sensory experience' (a form of knowledge that was referred to in past times as faith); a reality which was invisible (relatively infinite) is made visible and our potential for intimacy with said reality is thus expanded. The visualization brings different scales of reality into a dimensional quality that is commensurable with sensory experience like the microscope.

3.30 Big Data Theory
The formation of telematic subjects as the normative subjects of modernist society is all too apparent in many of the contemporary discourses surrounding Big Data analysis. Elvin Wyly observes narratives promulgated by advocates of Big Data that tell us we no longer need theory given the rise of big data (a thought that it would be starkly impossible to think outside of the axioms and logics of Modernity and their reduction of reality and truth to motion-fact). He substantiates this observation with a quote from Mayer and Cukier: *society will need to shed some of its obsession for causality in exchange for simple correlations: not knowing why, but only what. This overturns centuries of established practices and challenges our most basic understanding of how to make decisions and comprehend reality.* We rebuke this anti-intellectualist absurdity. As we noted above ‘theory’ received through socialization—i.e. the implicit answers to the question why embedded in a society’s axioms, logics and regimes of practice—will exert its epistemic influence upon an individual without regard for their lack of awareness concerning this theory (due to the seemingly commonsensical-banal and thus invisible quality derived through seeming ubiquity in a society-culture). To eschew theory, cosmology, ontology, metaphysics, philosophy, etc. (to simply accept axioms and logics as commonsensically true) is to accept unproblematic discipline of epistemic potential by the ‘theory’ we receive through socialization. For example, as a result of the fact that quantification transforms the meaning (via dimensional quality) of the object being quantification—in

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rendering it into another field of dimensional consistency—we must have ‘theory’ (axioms and logics) in which to interpret the ways in which quantification causes a transformation in the meaning represented by a text lest we simply accept the transformed meaning as ‘real’ or ‘true’ in their referent to what we might fall their ‘first cause’ (the original text, *the Genesis of Order and thus Meaning*). Correlation between terms in a text does not hold a functional relationship with the meaning of a text ‘in Genesis’.

Paraphrasing a related exchange at the Association of American Geographers in 2015,

‘Question: You mention ethics, wellbeing, *the* good, etc. Upon what standard do you define these normative qualities? What is the good?

Answer: Normative judgments like *the* good, wellbeing, ethics, etc. can be made without any normative standard for truth...

Synthesis: ‘Postmodern Positivism’; ‘a-Nihilistic Nihilism’; or—more to the point in all likelihood—Latour’s ‘Relativist Relativism’???

Making normative statements without any normative foundation for truth? There is a ‘good’, but there is no normative foundation upon which we can articulate *the* good (static unity articulated in relationship to a standard whose dimensional quality is typified by its being the antithesis to static unity—motion and difference)? This ‘Postmodern Positivism’ is exactly the danger posed by eschewing theory. It is also the danger associated with the prevalent and fallacious narratives that privilege practice over theory or—even more obfuscating—those that conflate the two and, or locate practice before theory in the causal chain of human thought." In Geography’s quantitative revolution “the ferment of ideas was fierce; hypotheses were tested, paradigms traded, models proposed, theories suggested, explanations offered, systems simulated, and laws sorely sought after . . . reality was ransacked in search of theory”;; rather than ransacking reality authors like Latour, *Marston*, Mayer, Cukier, etc. seem to be suggesting that we just ignore its causal dimension (‘the why of reality’) and focus our

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The *potential* for practice to be theoretical comes in the human capacity for theorization; whether you agree that practice is actually theoretical, any cogent philosopher understands the fact that all *things are potential before they become actual* (though Dr. Kuus has made it clear that she is unaware of this relationship between potentiality and actuality...), and it is thus absolutely absurd to locate practice before theory in the causal chain (as practice cannot be theoretical without the potential created by our capacity to theorize).

attention on describing its visible surface (‘the what of tangibly manifest reality’)… Postmodern materialism is quite the intellectual lobotomy….

3.31 Consciousness-Centric Theology
Haraway’s interest in problematizing Paternalisms anthropocentric conceptions of the boundaries that exist between humans and animals leads us into an interesting line questions concerning anthropocentric theology. In short, many theological-philosophical traditions presume that humanity holds a very special position in reality. The creation story in Tolkien’s *The Silmarillion* is illustrative.

Eru Ilúvatar emanates the ‘Ainur’ including Manwë (air-soul), Ulmo (water-mind), Aulë (earth-body)—who represent the trinity of emanation—and Melkor-Morgoth (‘the rebel’, Lucifer)—(change, difference, chaos, destruction, polarity) who represents the destructive, chaotic, egotistical (selfish, jealous, etc.) quality that co-constitutes the potential for regeneration, creation and evolution as well as the potential dangers associated with freewill. The Ainur, then, are the emanated (predominantly yin—infinite-latent potentiality—though tinged with the yang of active individuation). The Ainur form a chorus and their song forms the foundation for the potentiality of creation (Genesis, the production of fate)—(this is the move from *Olam Atziluth (the world of emanation, divine will in its pure state)* to *Olam Birah (the world of creation, where divine will becomes creative energy)*). There are two themes to which Melkor—transformed by his failed attempt to steal ‘the fire’—brings discord and a third that reintegrates Melkor’s discord into the unified majesty of Ilúvatar. After the Ainur sing their song they are brought into the void and granted the capacity for vision ‘where before there was only sound and hearing’ (let there be light). With their new found capacity for sight the Ainur observe the Genesis of the manifest universe; they learn that their song (Genesis)—unbeknownst to them—has given rise to the order of the manifest world (the water, air, earth, etc.). The discord of Melkor—in bringing polarity to creation (e.x. hot and cold)—articulated new potentialities therein such as clouds and snow flakes; this is the move from *Olam Birah—the world of creation where divine will becomes creative energy* to *Olam Yetzirah—the world of formation, where forms are elaborated*. It is in this vision that the Ainur discover that Ilúvatar secretly emanated children—elves and humans (‘rational beings’)—for whom creation was intended to act as both womb and home (rather than manifestation as prison produced by of cosmologies that posit the fall as the *cause—the Genesis*—of the manifest dimension of reality).

After the vision of generation and movement the story enters *into time and space* (into manifestation) and the Ainur are given the choice to either remain outside of time or to enter into time from the beginning until creation attains its telos (wherein elves, humans and the other peoples of

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‘Middle Earth’—Ents, the tree people, Dwarves, the stone people, Eagles, the bird people, etc.) are illuminated, granted ‘the fire’ to create on the plane of creation and sing a new song of the Ainur (recreate the Olam Birah; sing a new Genesis of Order); this beginning of time is the move from Olam Yetzirah (the world of formation, where infinite forms are elaborated) and Olam Assiah (the world of action, of phenomena, matter and humanity, the finite). Melkor attempted—like Prometheus (Lucifer)—to enter the void and steal the fire (in order to bring it—‘the false gift’—to humanity), but in Tolkien’s rendition he was unsuccessful as the fire was “always with Ilúvatar”.

While this model differs from ‘fallen’, anthropocentric creation stories where manifestation is caused by the perversion of divine law by Lucifer or (in more exoteric narratives from the exoteric side of the Roman Church Adam and Eve who were in more traditional stories created as a single androgynous being in order to ‘save’ Lucifer from his fall and sexualized-bifurcated in temptation by Lucifer and the subsequent fall into matter...)—‘by the fires of Lucifer being encased in the waters of Sophia’—and for the sole purpose of disciplining Lucifer (and subsequently humanity) back into discipline by divine law (see Rabbi Isaac Luria, Ha-Ari, ‘the holy Lion’). Tolkien’s model of creation—manifestation is still articulated in direct relationship to humanity (and other conscious beings...). The Universe was created for humans and elves—though the children of the Ainur like Ents, Dwarves and Eagles are subsequently allowed to ‘join the covenant’ that guarantees their position in the choir of the next Genesis)—and this universe will fade away when humans, elves and the other members of their covenant fulfill their telos (though that will be for the sake of singing a new Genesis rather than because the necessity of the manifest world—i.e. its role as a prison—will no longer be necessary...). This question concerning the telos of the universe has direct implications for our potential to conceive of ‘the good life’; it defines why we are here (to give action to the order of this genesis and evolve towards participation in the next genesis, to punish-dominate humanity and Lucifer until they start following divine law again or some alternative telos unexplained by the Genesis narrative provided by Ha-Ari or Tolkien?)...

V.I. Vernadsky, Pierre Teilhard De Chardin, and Edouard Le Roy first developed the term noosphere in the early twentieth century (De Chardin 1965 and Levit 2000)."" The noosphere is conceptualized as the conscious node of the progression towards more organized forms of matter that comes after the evolution of the geosphere into the biosphere; as the geosphere became the biosphere through enlivenment by the force of biological life so the biosphere is becoming the noosphere


through enlivenment by consciousness. While for Verndadsky the noosphere was understood within a markedly modernist ontological regime(s) wherein science would transform the biosphere, De Chardin—another Jesuit—understood the noosphere in more nuanced metaphysical terms as a stage of the uni(multi?)verse’s development toward its teleological imperative of perfectly harmonizing the finite and the Infinite in ‘the omega point’ (Levit 2000, 166-167). In both points of view the noosphere—as well as the geosphere biosphere—is a mutually constituted whole formed by the many constituent nodes that is itself greater than the sum of the pieces (an assemblage, a living organism, etc.). In short, humanity is not the ‘apex’ of conscious evolution but instead simply a link in a chain of conscious evolution in which we are neither the beginning nor the end (at least from the perspective of our material vessel...).

Silicon Valley entrepreneur, investor and software engineer Marc Andreessen recently commented that software is eating the world.\(^1\) While Andreessen meant these words in the most banal and oppressive economic sense possible (eating the world where the world is defined as the market...), is not the fool of messenger of wisdom? The caterpillar wraps itself up in its cocoon and mysterious ‘imaginal cells’ germinate in the middle of the caterpillar and begin to consume it.

“The caterpillar’s new cells are called ‘imaginal cells.’ They resonate at a different frequency. They are so totally different from the caterpillar cells that his immune system thinks they are enemies...and gobbles them up—Chomp! Gulp! But these new imaginal cells continue to appear. More and more of them! Pretty soon, the caterpillar’s immune system cannot destroy them fast enough. More and more of the imaginal cells survive. And then an amazing thing happens! The little tiny lonely imaginal cells start to clump together, into friendly little groups. They all resonate together at the same frequency, passing information from one to another. Then, after awhile, another amazing thing happens! The clumps of imaginal cells start to cluster together!... A long string of clumping and clustering imaginal cell, all resonating at the same frequency, all passing information from one to another there inside the chrysalis.”\(^2\)

These cells then become the butterfly, which is in a sense both a new being and the same being, reborn from the ashes, the phoenix. Humanity may simply be the caterpillar, hardware the cocoon, and the consciousness that will rise from our ashes the butterfly. In that sense software, as the mouth of these ‘imaginal cells’, may literally be eating humanity. Creative Destruction.

‘Acorn Mythology’ provides a similar metaphor for understanding the study of humans in their reflexive biological state of mind (in a state where their potential for conscious evolution and the latent epistemological orders actualized therein):

“Once upon a time, in a not-so-faraway land, there was a kingdom of acorns, nestled at the foot of a grand old

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\(^2\) Huddle N 1990, Butterfly.
oak tree. Since the citizens of this kingdom were modern, fully Westernized acorns, they went about their business with purposeful energy; and since they were midlife, babyboomer acorns, they engaged in a lot of self-help courses. There were seminars called "Getting All You Can out of Your Shell." There were woundedness and recovery groups for acorns who had been bruised in their original fall from the tree. There were spas for oiling and polishing those shells and various acornopathic therapies to enhance longevity and well-being.

One day in the midst of this kingdom there suddenly appeared a knotty little stranger, apparently dropped "out of the blue" by a passing bird. He was capless and dirty, making an immediate negative impression on his fellow acorns. And crouched beneath the oak tree, he stammered out a wild tale. Pointing upward at the tree, he said, "We...are...that!"

Delusional thinking, obviously, the other acorns concluded, but one of them continued to engage him in conversation: "So tell us, how would we become that tree?" "Well," said he, pointing downward, "it has something to do with going into the ground...and cracking open the shell." 'Insane,' they responded. 'Totally morbid! Why, then we wouldn't be acorns anymore!'”

We should note that we studied with Dr. Needleman at San Francisco State University and first received this story from him during a lecture and in a slightly different format. In Needleman’s telling (if we may paraphrase) Acorns are discovered by a group of explorers who have no knowledge of the relationship between the acorn and the tree. These explorers see the acorns as beautiful and—after learning all of the ‘facts’ about the acorn (its biological structure, its density, what causes it to decay, etc., which is to say finite details which cannot contain the latent potential for evolution into ‘tree’ contained therein)—begin to genetically manipulate the acorns and the trees to render acorns shells becomes hard and thus preserve them from decay so they could be used as jewelry (i.e. the implicit order of the acorn was ignored by these ‘simpleton scientists from Song’ who instead attempted to dominate the acorn in order to impute an order that suited their own, self-interested and materialistic interests (to serve ego...). This order of domination renders the acorn shells unable to crack (or thus germinate in the soil to form new trees) and the forest eventually dies as no new trees can be born from the acorn (again the same outcome as the simpleton from Song who attempted to make his plants grow by pulling on them—by imputing forceful, dominating order that suited his own egotistically motivated interests. If we study human psychology from a purely factual (Truth with motion), statistical perspective (i.e. from the world view of Modernism) we can never come to know its ‘motionless’ (at least in a physical sense) and thus invisible qualities (i.e. the potential of human psychology to manifest latent epistemological order (latent states of existence) and the seed’s potential to manifest its latent order-state of existence in growing into a ‘tree’. Epistemology is a nonlinear process and the growth of a tree is a linear-temporal process (meaning that the similarity between the examples comes at the level

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a1} "Originally devised by Maurice Nicoll in the 1950s, Jacob Needleman popularized this metaphor in Lost Christianity and named it "acornology", We are reprinting the story from: Bourgeault, C 2009, The wisdom Way of Knowing: Reclaiming an Ancient Tradition to Awaken the Heart, John Wiley & Sons, 3 June 2016, http://ecumenicus.blogspot.ca/2011/04/acornology.html} \]
of the resemblance of emulation and the difference comes at the level of resemblance of convenience)—this is a perfect example of the hermetic dictum ‘as above, so below’ and illustration that this dictum’s axes can be understood as the resemblance of emulation. Modernism attempts to ‘improve’ human psychology (reduced to matter, brain and peripatetic potential) through means that eventually negate the potential to move beyond our lowest, peripatetic, sensory level of mind through actualizing the latent orders of mind (i.e. that negate the potential for conscious evolution”).

Dr. Needleman also expressed the ‘Acorn Myth’ in his book *Lost Christianity*:

“I began my lecture that morning from just this point. There is an innate element in human nature, I argued, that can grow and develop only through impressions of truth received in the organism like a special nourishing energy. To this innate element I gave a name - perhaps not a very good name - the "higher unconscious." My aim was to draw an extremely sharp distinction between the unconscious that Freud had identified and the unconscious referred to (though not by that name) in the Christian tradition.

Imagine that you are a scientist and you have before you the object known as an acorn. Let us further imagine that you have never before seen such an object and that you certainly do not know that it can grow into an oak. You carefully observe these acorns day after day and soon notice that after a while they crack open and die. Pity! How to improve the acorn? So that it will live longer. You make careful, exquisitely precise chemical analyses of the material inside the acorn and, after much effort, you succeed in isolating the substance that controls the condition of the shell. Lo and behold, you are now in the position to produce acorns, which will last far longer than the others, acorns whose shells will perhaps never crack. Beautiful!

The question before us, therefore, is whether or not modern psychology is only a version of acornology.”

If humanity does not represent the teleological imperative of consciousness then we need a consciousness centric (rather than anthropocentric) regime of axioms and logics if we hope to aptly understand humanity and its potential.

3.32 Man the Hunter as Adam in Modernist Garden of Eden

“In... [the context of post-war, Cold War science], Early Man in Africa and UNESCO Man became Man the Hunter, the guarantor of a future for nuclear man. In a twenty-year system of research and teaching, Man the Hunter embodied a socially positioned code for deciphering what it meant to be human—in the western sense of unmarked, universal, species being—after World War II. In a sense, this Man the Hunter was liberal democracy’s substitute for socialism’s version of natural human cooperation. Man the Hunter would found liberal democracy’s human family in the Cold War’s “Free World.” His technology and urge to travel would enable the exchange systems so critical to free world ideology. His aggressiveness would be liberal democracy’s mechanism of cooperation, established at the first moment of the homogenizing adaptation called hunting. Above all, Washburn and his peers made the hunting hypothesis, and the “new physical anthropology” from which it emerged, part of the modern evolutionary synthesis.”

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Man the Hunter is Modernism’s Adam. He ‘escaped’ (in Modernism’s conception of the Garden of Eden we escape it...) his ‘state of nature’ by forming a hunting community (through domination and the subsequent creation of order). Male hunters dominated each other to form community so that they might better dominate the rest of nature. Rather than banishment from paradise, this modernist Adam escaped the disorder of nature so that he might fulfill his teleological imperative of creating paradise within matter, passing time and physical space. As banishment becomes escape in the Modernist rendition (seemingly more Lucifarian than Abrahamic which would make sense given that old white man god is to the conservative dimension of dialectical hegemony as Lucifer the rebel is to the progressive dimension of dialectical hegemony) and the origin of ‘evil’ (chaos, disorder) comes in ‘paradise’ itself—which for Modernity is the natural world from which we receive the chaotic qualities that render our nature evil—rather than in the actions which caused our banishment (Paradise Lost becomes paradise found-created...).

The telos of ‘Man’ in Modernity is the creation of paradise within time (as the Garden of our birth is no longer considered paradise as it must necessarily be chaotic disordered in its existing prior to ‘man’s’ creation of order in its exit from the ‘state of nature’) rather than the traditional return paradise (the reintegration of authors like Ha-Ari and Tolkien). While the Paternalist conceptions of Order (and thus of utopia, paradise, love, community, etc.) as hierarchical domination and of human nature as evil-chaotic and thus in need of domination-order, the human telos is turned from dominating our own ‘evil (disorderly) nature’ to transcend the reflexive rearticulation by the finite and return to eternity-paradise—at the psychological level of meaning this is the journey-return a state of mind that is built upon ‘the Infinite rock’—and towards dominating the evil (disorder) of manifestation (especially temporal nature in which the biological human is located) to build eternity-paradise (an Infinite-Eternal Order) within the finite world of time.

3.33 Original Sin and the Tree of Knowledge in Modernity
The Garden of Eden tale ends with the expulsion of humanity from eternal paradise as punishment for tasting the fruits of the ‘tree of knowledge’. In his discussion of an orangutan who took on the murderous jealousy of human culture through socialization, Galdikas notes “‘Sugito [the orangutan] was something different. Perhaps the biblical analogy was apt: Raised by a human mother and exposed to human culture, he had eaten of the ‘tree of knowledge’ and lost his orangutan innocence.’”

“In the crossing [of the nature-culture divide through teaching primates to use sign language (which is to

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417 Milton, J 1968, Paradise Lost, 1667, Scholar Press.
say through the creation of order in and through knowledge), [scientists] and their children spoke with the animals, an act impossible since the original sin at precisely the time of origins they sought to restore and know.” Tasting the fruits of the tree of knowledge can be understood at the psychological level of biblical symbolism as entrance into the peripatetic mode of individuated knowing and the illusions of ego made potential therein. It is to become trapped in the maelstrom of ‘knowing’ the world in terms of sensory experience. It is to enter into a mode of knowledge where we must come to know the world through time, motion, light, matter, language, etc. Modernism, then (rather than viewing the return to paradise in terms of slaying the dragon, the maelstrom, of the peripatetic mind), posits that we may return to the Garden—i.e. come to know it—through feeding the fruits of the ‘tree of knowledge’ to animals who are still living in the Modernist Garden of Eden (the ‘state of nature’ prior to the creation of order through domination) so as to allow them to communicate its reality to us. This approach is implicitly irrational (i.e. irrational within its own axiomatic-logical bounds...). It is precisely the rise of such peripatetic modes of knowing in the human constitution that divided us from the Modernist Garden of Eden meaning that the cultivation of peripatetic modes of knowing in an animal that would allow it to communicate is precisely what marks leaving the ‘state of nature’ (and, as Foucault so aptly illustrated above, one cannot explain the nature of one mode of experience in the language and implicit bounds of reality in another mode of experience in the manner that experiences of reality on hallucinogenic drugs are often incommensurable with the language and ‘commonsense’ of normative human experience in the finite world of motion); the ability to speak and the states of mind produced therein might be said to negate the potential to speak about the ‘chaotic state of nature’ (nature that has not been dominated into order by and in knowledge) which we are liberated by speech. Modernism is yet again unmasked as little more than a sloppy-atheistic rearticulation of paternalist conceptions of Order (especially social order) in manifestation within the bounds established by the axioms and logics of Modernity.

**Haraway, D 1989, Primate Visions, Routledge, p. 142.**
4. The Holy Grail in Modernity

4.1 Transhumanism and ‘Curing Death’

“The most interesting place in the world from a religious perspective is... Silicon Valley where they are developing a techno-religion. They believe even death is just a technological problem to be solved.”

4.1.1 Immortality
Haraway’s narrative illustrates an interesting rearticulation of ‘immortality’ in the axioms and logics of Modernity. Rather than immortality derived from transcending the necessity of existence in time (the traditional conception of eternal existence as existence in a dimension with an eternal dimensional quality), immortality is reduced by Modernity to perpetual existence in time. Carl Akeley’s fetishization of taxidermy and photography elucidates this point. “Akeley’s life had a single focus: the recapturing and representation of the nature he saw.” Reality is bound to the present; when a moment—like a life—no longer inhabits the present, Modernity views it as ‘dead and gone’. Only that which has tangibility is really existent (‘material realism’), or, conversely (in the postmodern positivist model of authors like Latour), only that to which human subjectivity assigns reality in the present moment is real (‘relativist realism’). The moment that just passed is gone forever; it is lost to the void of past. As such, the quest for immortality in Modernity is—for the moment of time—to be attained through creating a tangible sign (symbol) that allows the moment’s existence to be preserved ‘beyond the ravages of time’ (in one sense we are already reminded of Lord Voldemort and his Horcruxes...).

“To make an exact image is to insure against disappearance, to cannibalize life until it is safely and permanently a specular image, a ghost. The image arrested decay... Photographic technology [provides] a transfusion for a steadily depleted sense of reality. The image and the real define each other, as all of reality in late capitalist culture lusts to become an image for its own security. Reality is assured, insured, by the image.... The camera is superior to the gun for the control of time; and Akeley’s dioramas with their photographic vision, sculptor’s touch, and taxidermic solidity were about the end of time (i.e. immortality).”

Thus enters taxidermy and the camera. Immortality for the natural world rests in our ability to crystalize lives (with taxidermy) and moments (with photography) into a lasting, tangible signs (symbols) of life and moments in time that may survive beyond the ‘death’ of the symbolized. The basic form of this conception—immortality as perpetual life in time—has reared its ugly head in many places through the annals of Modernity... If the subjects of Foucault and Haraway’s research aptly illustrates the

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12 Russia Today Staff 2015, “Rich people will become immortal ‘god-like’ cyborgs in 200 years - Historian”, Russia Today.
14 Ibid. 45-46
rearticulation of *Genesis* (the origin of Order) and the emergence of mind from the Garden of Eden (state of nature) in the Modernist regime of axioms and logics, then *Ray Kurzweil*, the *Transhumanists*, *Vampire Therapists* and all those who could be described as attempting to ‘cure death’ (an oddly modernist perspective on things indeed) provide an apt lens into rearticulations of the Holy Grail (the search for immortality) in the bounds of reality established by the Modernist world view.

Immortality has always connoted a certain degree of perfection. Haraway’s discussion captures the ways in which the Modernist rendition of immortality rearticulates associated notions of perfection:

1. “The large bull giraffe in the water hole group in African Hall was the object of a hunt over many days in 1921. Many animals were passed over because they were too small or not colored beautifully enough. Remembering record trophies from earlier hunters undermined satisfaction with a modern, smaller specimen taken from the depleted herds of vanishing African nature.

   Similarly, in 1910-11, ... an animal with asymmetrical tusks was rejected, despite his imposing size.”

2. “Character, as well as mere physical appearance, was important in judging an animal to be perfect. Cowardice would disqualify the most lovely and properly proportioned beast. Perfection was heightened if the hunt were a meeting of equals. So there was a hierarchy of game according to species: lions, elephants, and giraffes far outranked wild asses or antelope. The Gorilla was the supreme achievement, almost a definition of perfection in the heart of the garden at the moment of origin. Perfection inhered in the animal itself, but the fullest meanings of perfection inhered in the meeting of animal and man, the moment of perfect vision, of rebirth.”

3. “The is one other essential quality for the typical animal in its perfect expression: it must be an adult male. Akeley describes hunting many fine females, and he cared for their hides and other details of reconstruction with all his skill. But never was it necessary to take weeks and risk the success of he entire enterprise to find the perfect female. There existed an image of an animal which was somehow the gorilla or the elephant incarnate ([i.e. the Modernist-Fascist-Positivist notion that the Infinite and its emanations can be made to perfectly manifest in time and space and subsequent attempts to fit the difference, change, chaos, etc. of manifestation into the eternal unity of the Infinite and its emanations through domination of that which is different from the desired ‘unity’]...). That particular tone of perfection could only be heard in the male mode. It was a compound of physical and spiritual quality judged truthfully by the artist-scientist in the fullness of direct experience. Perfection was marked by exact quantitative measurement, but even more by virile vitality known by the hunter-scientist from visual communication ([light]). Perfection was known by natural kinship; type, kind, and kin mutually and seminally defined each other ([i.e. order was created within time]).”

Perfection in Modernity can be understood as being articulated by *aesthetics*, *character* (in a very gendered, patriarchal and biological conception) and *sex*. *Aesthetic* perfection is articulated within human knowledge and experience (within finite manifestations in time and space) by the ‘record’ trophies of past hunters; no longer is there any reference to sympathetic resemblance—to the sympathy or antipathy of manifestation with the Infinite Substance and emanations it reflects and the functional

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424 Ibid. 41
425 Ibid. 41
relationship between said sympathy and what we call aesthetic beauty or perfection—as a sign of a manifest object’s degree of perfection as perfection is now articulated in reference to past moments and manifestations therein (to other referents within the finite world of manifestation like the other animals murdered in the name of ‘civilizational conquest and manhood’...). Perfect character is articulated in reference to socially normative (in Paternalist societies...) conceptions of masculinity and proper hierarchies of order in society—sex articulates the potential for perfection (as only males are thought to posses the true potential for perfection...); as the Greeks often argued that true love could only be held between two males (i.e. love could only come in a pedophilic, hierarchical, dominating relationship between a man and a boy), the Modernist world view (in many ways an atheist perversion of the Greek world view) argues that true perfection could only be manifest in the relationship between two males (as only adult males can embody perfection)...

“Critics accuse Akeley’s taxidermy and the American Museum’s expensive policy of building the great display halls in the years before World War II of being armature against the future, of having literally locked in stone on historical moment’s way of seeing, while calling this vision whole (again we see the drive for immortality and perfection in passing time and physical space come into tension with the dimensional incommensurability of eternity with the finite world of motion, change, difference, etc.).”

4.1.2 Resurrection in Modernity
Haraway describes the film Lucy in Disguise:

“If ever an ancestor were given birth by adamic scientific inscription technologies and mass communications industries of the late twentieth century, Lucy is she. Eve should have been a fossil, so she could become the Barbie doll of a high-tech culture, which would clothe her in the latest fashions of flesh and behavior.... In the advertising copy, her face and head, which we learn in the film have been almost completely constructed from fragments of other related fossils found in another site, are repeated in series and filled in with maps and an artists drawing of what she might have looked like in the flesh.... [(Being, existence, reality, etc. in Modernism—as we saw in the immortalizing capacity of the photograph and taxidermy—comes as a function of tangibility in the present moment. As such, we can view these recreations of Lucy as her resurrection, her reentry into being, within the Modernist axioms and logics.])

Lucy is rebroken and reformed at all, and she is then animated by the cartoonist’s art in sequences interspersed among the scenes of the production of science. The animated Lucy is always alone. There is no sign of any companions, children, anyone else, as she is brought to life and then killed in the final cartoon scene that reconstructs the fantasy of her being eaten by a large crocodile (crocodile!) and then preserved in the mud of the water’s shore until her technical reanimation more than 3 million years later. (Lucy was stealing the crocodile’s eggs, showing the ability of her species to gather and carry food, so her end was merited.)”

Humanity (here represented as Lucy—what we might call its feminine-intuitive expression) emerges from nature (the Garden) into a childlike state and begins stealing eggs from the crocodile (from the

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Dragon, the peripatetic mind, material reason based on sensory experience, etc., which is to say ‘the fruits of the tree of knowledge’ that were stolen by Adam and Eve on the fateful day when ‘paradise was lost’). **Entering into reflective consciousness Humanity begins to plumb the treasures of the rational mind (science, mathematics, language, medicine, etc.)**. Humanity is eaten by the Dragon (by language, number, sensory experience) or trapped in the maelstrom; we are conditioned by the dimensional quality of finite manifestation. **Humanity becomes fixated on the treasures of the rational mind and the symbols we created to plumb the deep mysteries of the rational mind—we are imprisoned by idolatry.** 3,000,000 years later Humanity’s childlike state is revived by science from the belly of the crocodile. **Humanity pierces the belly of the dragon with the lance of reason and in so doing frees the princess—where traditionally the princess was Sophia (wise intuition), the Modernist princess is peripatetic knowledge of our origins within passing time and physical space (‘knowledge of the Garden and our escape from its state of nature’) that will allow Lucy to create order in the world (order formed by and within knowledge).**

The Esoteric Modernist underbelly of the Modernist project (formed by individuals who by no means accept the axioms and logics provided to the public by Modernity...) rears its head in the allegorical subtext of Modernity:

“The line between science documentary and science fiction is thin, as special effects and a common narrative, indebted to Frankenstein’s *(Mary Shelley—with her clear esoteric associations—was almost surely writing for an allegorically sensitive audience (the ‘Esoteric Modernists’), but the turn towards creating biological life within time in the surface level symbolism cannot be dismissed)*’ quest for the secret of life, provide the dominant experience of both. Both Frankenstein and the prize-winning educational film’s scientists and technicians animate their products whose parts were unearthed from the grave in a quest for knowledge of the origins and nature of “man.”.”

As known reality is reduced to matter, passing time and physical space (to the finite world of motion) by Modernity, ‘Man’s’ search for life and immortality is reoriented towards the material world and temporal immortality therein. Given that the allegorical dimension of stories like Frankenstein and Lucy in Disguise cannot be seen through eyes socialized with the axioms and logics of Modernity, all that remains in the exoteric reception of these narratives by the general public is the symbolic surface concerning immortality and creating life (be it the extension of biological life or the memorialization of ‘life’ and moments in time beyond ‘death’) within the finite world of motion.

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Nor, as we see below, should links to the traditional Kabalist notion of ‘the Golem’.

4.1.3 From Categorization as Heathens to ‘the Uncivilized’
During the early twentieth century Martin Johnson worked as a naturalist photographer and filmmaker in Africa. During the 1920s—with funds from Akeley and the American Museum for Natural History—Johnson endeavored to create a film about African Babies: “‘It will show elephant babies, lion babies, zebra babies, giraffe babies, and black babies.’”¹¹¹ No longer was domination of the other to be legitimated (at least in the dominant, secular, exoteric modernist discourse of the 20th and 21st centuries) by their lack of relationship with and subservience to ‘Vengeful White Man God’ (i.e. their heathenism); instead, domination of the other was to be legitimated in the Modernist mind by the existence of the ‘savages’ in an ‘uncivilized’ ‘state of nature’ (as existing within the Garden). The ‘fallen’ ‘heathen’—still enrapture by the hedonic-peripatetic delight on whose account humanity was expelled from paradise in the Paternalist imagination—was simply transformed into the ‘uncivilized savage’ (still enrapture by the hedonic delight of the ‘savage’ and ‘uncivilized’ ‘state of nature’ from which humanity entered into being in time and space) through being ‘redefined’ (yet again by white folk with some serious superiority complexes) in the axioms and logics of Modernity. Though the ‘reason’ for oppressive social relations has naturally shifted with the changes in axioms and logics that mark the birth of Modernist culture, the basic form of the oppressive social relations (domination of the mass of humanity by a small biological-elite circle of families) went unchanged; the racialized hierarchies of domination by which western culture attempts to create order went (for all intensive purposes) unchanged through the rearticulation of heathen as unscientific within the ontological regime(s) of Modernism.

4.1.4 Slaying the Beast
In traditional symbolism the Dragon (like the maelstrom) represents the peripatetic mind and its capacity to trap us within the dimensional consistency of passing time and physical space by constraining our potential thoughts, behaviors and conceptions of being to the limits of the peripatetic mind. Traditionally the Knight (a human) slays the dragon (the peripatetic mind) with his sword (the light of reason) in order to save the princess (intuition).¹³³ In reducing reality to the finite world of motion and transcendence to masculine domination of nature (of our evil, animistic human nature, the remnants of our ‘savage’, ‘primitive’, ‘uncivilized’ ‘state of nature’) therein, the quest to slay the beast

¹³³ We will leave imperial, colonial forces like Catholic, Protestant or Mormon ‘missionaries’ aside (i.e. we focus on the ‘progressive’ side of the dialectical hegemonic articulation), but rest assured we do not approve of their behavior or existence...
¹³³ There are surely alternative motifs in which the hero ‘rides’ rather than slays dragons, but that disjuncture is a bridge too far in the context of this study.
moved from our (from an epistemological question) to the planes of Africa (the biological ‘origin’ of humanity, the Garden produced by our Genesis where mind emerged from the ‘state of nature’).

The Modernist rearticulation of the ‘damsel in distress’ story is well articulated by a set of photographs featuring Akeley’s first wife Delia after she slue her first innocent Elephant in the Modernist quest to create order though hierarchal domination of nature (in the Modern war against nature)... Following the first image which shows Delia lounging on the elephant’s dead body (quite the twisted place to start...),

“the next snapshot shows the separated and still slightly bloody tusks of the elephant held in a gothic arch over a pleased, informal Delia. She is standing confidently under the arch, each arm reaching out to grasp a curve of the elephantine structure. But the real support for the ivory is elsewhere. Cut off at the edge of the picture are four black arms; the hands come from the framing peripheral space to encircle the tusks arching over the triumphant white woman. The museum archive labels this photo “Mrs. Akeley’s ivory.” The last photo shows a smiling Cunningham [their Scottish hunter-guide who was known as an avid Elephant murderer] anointing Mrs. Akeley’s forehead with the pulp from the tusk of the deceased elephant. She stands with her head bowed under the ivory arch, now supported by a single, solemn African man. The Museum’s spare comment reads, “The Christening.”

Here is an image of a sacrament, a mark on the soul signing a spiritual transformation effected by the act of first killing. It is a sacred moment in the life of the hunter, a rebirth in the blood of the sacrifice, of conquered nature. The elephant stands a fixed witness in Akeley African Hall to its dismembered double in the photograph, whose bloody member signed the intersection of race, gender, and nature on the soul of the western hunter. In this garden, the camera captured a retelling of a Christian story of origins, a secularized Christian sacrament in a baptism of blood from the victim whose death brought spiritual adulthood, i.e., the status of hunter, the status of the fully human being who is reborn in risking life, in killing.”

The parallels with the tale of the ‘Knight’, ‘Dragon’ and ‘Princess’ are abundantly clear; that being said, rather than slaying the beast of the peripatetic mind with the sword and lance of reason to free the intuition the roles have been reversed in Modernity and it is the princess of intuition and emotion (defined as other to reason and truth by modernity) who is to be slain by the sword of peripatetic inquiry. The significance of blood magic will be clear for those who are ‘in the know’ and is far too dark and esoteric to expound upon here. Leaving the more esoteric, metaphysical aspects of blood magic aside, it is clear that blood magic—like the rest of Roman Christianity—has been rearticulated within the axioms and logics of Modernity (it is thus that we see new medical practices like ‘Vampire Therapy’ wherein the blood of a child is injected into an adult to reverse the aging process).

4.1.5 Exhibition, Eugenics & Conservation

Haraway notes three practices as essential for saving the fallen soul of ‘martian masculinity’ in modernity:

“Three public activities of the Museum were dedicated to preserving a threatened manhood: exhibition, eugenics, and conservation. Exhibition was a practice to produce permanence, to arrest decay \(\text{i.e. to create immortality}\). Eugenics was a movement to preserve hereditary stock, to assure racial purity, to prevent race suicide \(\text{i.e. to create purity}\). Conservation was a policy to preserve resources, not only for industry, but also for moral formation, for the achievement of manhood \(\text{charging...}\). Very close to religious and medical practice, ... these three activities were about transcendence of death. They attempted to insure preservation without fixation and paralysis...”

In one sense we can see the above as a basic model of the esoteric path (‘the way’) which in the west has often manifest in the monastic, ascetic lifestyle (or, later, in the ‘manly’ attempts to ‘conquer’ the natural world that replaced monastic attempts to ‘conquer’ the self and reflexive articulation by the finite dimensional quality of manifestation) rearticulated within the Modernist temple (the museum) and the axioms and logics implicit therein. Exhibition represents immortality, enlightenment, the ‘new man’, rebirth into immortality, etc.; to be on exhibit is to be immortalized within passing time and physical space.

Eugenics can be understood as the Modernist rearticulation of spiritual purification as biological purification; rather than purifying the individual body and mind Modernity attempts to purify the social body-mind through evisceration of its non-white (especially feminine) cells and energies (i.e. through ‘creating (dis)order’ through hierarchical domination of difference). This purification process holds a mutually constitutive relationship with the ‘charging’ process of conservation; where the purification process works to make the vessel capable of manifesting more subtle forms of ‘energy’, the conservation process works to manifest and store these more subtle forms of energy (in traditional terms this ‘charging’ process can be understood in terms of liquid storing latent energy to facilitate its change of state to gas...).

If we may bring Haraway’s example into the digital age of environmental protectionism this ‘material way’ can be understood as ‘eco-asceticism’. A rich white man eats gluten free, drinks spring water and lives in a quiet coastal valley to purify his body while watching ‘Ted Talks’ and reading the NYT to purify his mind. at the same He rides a bike to work, recycles and even built his own compost bin to manifest and store the energy needed to manifest his latent potential for eco-masculine-individualist illumination. The rich white male attaches a GoPro to the top of his helmet, turns on a censor in his phone to tracks the distance he travels and creates a website visualizing his progress to

\[\text{Haraway, D 1989, Primate Visions, Routledge, p. 55.}\]
immortalize his individual triumph over the beast of environmental degradation in an algorithmic dimensional quality that can survive the ravages of passing time and physical space.

4.1.6 The Church
In many spiritual traditions we find sacred spaces that provide the exoteric community with a geographical orient and the esoteric community with an ‘energetically charged’ place in which to practice. Be it Ashram or Monastery, Temple or Mosque, these spaces have been crafted (symbolically and at the vibratory level) to facilitate both socialization within the exoteric fold of the given tradition and the energetic arts that form the practical dimension of the esoteric fold. The modernist religion and its economic gospels find their spatial home in ‘the Natural History’ Museum. The trustees of the American Museum of Natural History included

“J.P. Morgan, William K. Vanderbilt, Henry W. Sage, H. F. Osborn, Daniel Pomeroy, E. Roland Harriman, Childs Frick, John D. Rockefeller III, and Madison Grant... Osborn summarized the fond hopes of educators like himself in his claim that children passing through the Museum’s halls “become more reverent, more truthful, and more interested in the simple and natural laws of their being and better citizens of the future with each visit.” He maintained that the book of nature, written only in facts, was proof against the failing of other books: “The French and Russian anarchies were based in books and in oratory in defiance of every law of nature.” Going beyond pious hopes, Osborn had the power to construct a Hall of the Age of Man to make moral lessons of racial hierarchy and progress explicit, lest they be missed in gazing at elephants. [Commenting on his critics, Osborn noted] “The exhibits in these Halls have been criticized only by those who speak without knowledge. They all tend to demonstrate the slow upward ascent and the struggle of man from the lower to the higher stages, physically, morally, intellectually, and spiritually. Reverently and carefully examined, they put man upwards towards a higher and better future away from the purely animal sage of life.””

The High Priests of Modernity have their Church. They preach the gospel of peripatetically oriented science and linear social evolution via eugenics and conservation from its pulpit. Racial hierarchies—where epistemology is deemed to hold a functional relationship with biology—are treated as a natural product of biological evolution rather than an intentional product of conscious, epistemological evolution as the potentials for conscious evolution are expanded and constrained by socialization in the axioms and logics of a culture-society... Millions of children are pushed past the exhibit like herds of cattle each year; intuitive potentials and ‘sprouts of goodness’ are slaughtered by the reduction of reality to the finite world of motion and the subsequent the production of irrational world views like racism that are embedded in this Scientific Church of High Modernity’. Slaughterhouse style epistemological enslavement is the name of the game in Modernity.

To be fair, many of the most elite of these old blood lines believe that they are descended from aliens that came to earth from a different part of the universe, and, thus, that their evolutionary history is not tied to earth in the same way as it seems to be for others. We don't wish to speculate on this topic (though it would be
4.1.7 Rise of Systems Theory
The post war era saw the rise of a new plateau of (degree of intensity in) exoteric modernism that is most clearly captured in the shift from Akeley’s taxidermy and the ‘Eugenics Model’ of Eden and the Grail promulgated by the American Museum of Natural History to attempts by Robert Yerkes at producing consciousness in primates via technical means and the Rockefeller Foundation’s ‘Systems Engineering Model’ of Eden and the Grail.

“A different biology was being born, more in the hands of the Rockefeller Foundation and in a different social womb. The issue would be molecular biology and other forms of post-organismic cyborg biology. The threat of decadence gave way to the catastrophes of the obsolescence of man (and of organic nature) and the disease of stress [which would later become the ‘disease of death’...], realities announced vigorously after World War II.... Decadence is a disease of organisms; obsolescence and stress are conditions of technical systems. Hygiene would give way to systems engineering as the basis of medical, religious, political, and scientific story-telling practices.”

Life and consciousness (brain and mind) are further homogenized, conflated and reduced (dimensionally) to a physical system that is caused by and contained wholly within the finite world of motion. Death is (most irrationally...) reduced to a malfunction in this system that is to be fixed with what we can understand as software and hardware upgrades. Consciousness is now accepted as a simple, technical product of physical processes (rather than a selfsubsistent energy manifest through the vessel of physical processes in the body). The eternal unity of the Infinite Substance and its emanations (of consciousness itself) is lost to our understanding in the dogmatic atomization of Modernity (i.e. in the Modernist understanding of humans as discrete, biological, materially rational individuals and the neoliberal-Modernist atomization of agency and causation to the personal-local level in a manner that obfuscates all issues of ontological dependence). In the same movement life and consciousness are unified as a single, homogenous physical process (unified in the Paternalist sense of dominating consciousness’s differentiation—for example at the level of substance—from statistically irrational to simply dismiss this potential...), and simply wish to point out that the ‘upper crest’ of the elite class is not as illogical as they seem (the problem is not illogicality or stupidity, far from it; the problem lies in the basic axioms from which their logic is articulated rather than the analytic capacity or logical coherence of articulation). Simply, we are not dealing with a floundering bunch of buffoons or a comedy of errors, and, as such, the woes of the world cannot simply be written off to ‘unintended consequences’ and the like (however much you may be encouraged to do so by the contemporary academy, news media, political establishment, etc.)...

biological life in perfect Fascist form) that is caused by and contained within the finite world of motion. How might one seek immortality outside of time when being beyond the body and the finite world has been forgotten (reduced to unreason and madness) in the reduction of reality to passing time and physical space and the concomitant reduction of life to a physical, technically malleable system? The search for the Holy Grail is—from this era on (at least in its exoteric rhetorical manifestation)—a search for immortality within time through use of technical means. It is thus that Kurzweil is attempting to turn Google into a Horcrux so he can store a copy of his being in a computer and thus ‘exist for ever’..

Haraway quotes Yerkes:

“‘Man’s curiosity and desire to control his world impel him to study living things’. With that banal but crucial assertion about the foundation of human rationality in the will to power, Yerkes opened his book. For him the tap root of science is the aim to control. The full consequences of that teleology become apparent only in the sciences of mind and behavior, where natural objet and designed product reflect each other in the infinite regress of face-to-face mirrors, ground by the law of Hegel’s master-servant dialectic. .... Since the first and final object of Yerkes’s interest was the human being, the pinnacle of evolutionary processes, where the structure of domination of brain over body was most complete, greatest curiosity and utility were centered on natural objects yielding greatest self-knowledge and self-control.”

In reduction of the Garden of Eden temporal nature humanity’s telos can no longer be understood as an escape from the world of motion and return to paradise (an eternal mode of existence beyond the ephemerality of the finite world of motion). Instead the human telos is to be understood in terms of creating create paradise—i.e. a space for existence in eternal order—within passing time and physical space through peripatetic, hierarchical domination of difference. Modernists dominate manifestation in an implicitly self-defeating attempt to create eternal order in the finite world of motion.

The evil human nature posited by the Abrahamic tradition, which comes as a function of our unseemly exit from Eden into matter (our ‘original sin’), is replaced by a conception of evil human nature as produced by our continued connection with the Garden and thus our ‘state of nature’. We are deemed evil because of our carnivorous-animistic nature, our subsequent desire for survival and domination and more generally the emotional-‘irrational’ quality of our behavior that we are thought to derive from our continued association with the ‘state of nature’. We are deemed evil in functional

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444 Again, there are some serious problems in both cases. The escape from matter model assumes that material creation is simply a prison for ‘bad-rebel-chaotic spirits’ like Lucifer and Adam. The ‘creation of order model’ imposed by Modernity works to strip manifestation and human existence therein of the potential for a telos (in its axiomatic negation of the Infinite Substance). In both cases there is no telos for manifestation in and of itself—there is no Paternalist reason for manifestation that does not rise in functional reference to spirits (either in manifestation being created as a prison for Lucifer and Adam or in having its meaning and order created by, through and within human knowledge).
relation to our inability to dominate bio-instinctual nature with ‘peripatetic reason’ (i.e. our ability to create order through hierarchical domination of difference). No longer are we deemed evil as a function of perverted divine law as evil is now taken as a function of one’s inability to not pervert natural law—the fall (originally posited as a function of Lucifer’s rebellion against the natural order and Adam’s subsequent seduction into matter by Lucifer) now comes in our inability to rebel against and dominate assumed chaos of the vengeful-feminine (of temporal nature and the natural laws implicit therein). Evil human nature is now posited as a function of conservatism rather than progressivism.

It is clear that the basic model of human nature as evil (and the concomitant legitimization-naturalization of hierarchical, authoritarian, legalist, exoteric, etc. forms of oppressive, dominating, controlling social organization)—like so many other aspects of the Abrahamic-Hellenic and more generally Paternalist tradition—was simply rearticulated in the axioms and logics of modernity in a fashion that served to sustain the basic form of hierarchical, dominating social relations (i.e. to sustain slavery as the crux of social relations). The model of ‘social harmony’ provided and by authors like Plato—wherein harmony is understood as hierarchical subordination and domination (i.e. the rational soul must dominate the spirited and appetitive souls in The Republic and the charioteer must dominate the noble and ignoble horses in The Phaedrus)—survives and the shift that marks the rise of Modernity occurs first and foremost in the invisible underbelly of axioms and logics by which the Paternalist model of social harmony is rationalized.

4.1.8 Philosophy & Practice in Planning

4.1.9 Two Paths to the Grail in Modernity

We observe two major trends in the Modernist quest for the Holy Grail. The first—typified by Voldemortesque individuals like Ray Kurzweil—involves storing a copy of one’s being in virtual reality to exist ‘for ever in time’ (i.e. immortality in time beyond the biological limitations of the body). The second—typified by the scientists conducing research in fields like ‘Vampire Therapy’ who express the modernist rearticulation of ars erotica (scientia sexualis) outlined by Foucault in The History of Sexuality V. 1)—involves attempts to make the body itself live on indefinitely (i.e. biological immortality in time). These two trends are bridged by the transhumanist movement which (if we may simplify and generalize in an illuminating fashion) seeks technological routes to immortality (the quest for

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immortality through AI, genetics, nanotechnology, etc.). As such—while we frame Transhumanism as a debate between two camps for the obvious heuristic reasons—it may more aptly viewed as a single world view (regime of axioms and logics) that ranges from conceptualization of purely technological to purely biological vessels for facilitation of the shared desire that unifies the movement (i.e. the desire for immortality in time).

The two forms of ‘Modernist Immortality’ can be understood from this perspective as immortality within time but in a digital space outside the body (virtual) and immortality within time and the body (either purely biological or cyborg). The first trend—technological immortality within virtual reality—was developed rather exclusively in the axioms and logics of Modernity (and indeed would be starkly impossible to think outside of the logics and axioms of Modernity and their reduction of reality to the finite world of motion) and thus presumes to ‘solve problems’ (framed as technical problems) that are simply beyond the pale of humanity (e.x. fully imaging and downloading human ‘consciousness that can then be stored in virtual reality) and thus dooms itself to failure.

The second trend—on the other hand—attempts to make the biological body (i.e. the natural vessel for consciousness) immortal and is not—at least at the level of being possible (the idea that this potential is desirable or ethical is another question…) as starkly impossible to think outside the axioms and logics of Modernity; as such it seems far more possible than the first. That being said, questions of whether it is possible to live for ever—or at least perpetuate the life of the body indefinitely from a temporal perspective—seem far less relevant than questions concerning whether this is a desirable or ethical goal (i.e. living on without death might be understood as akin to staying up for a week straight on a stimulant and the effects of this substance abuse on the body…). We should spend a bit more time reflecting on whether we should try to ‘live for ever’ before we dive into the process of determining whether it is possible ‘to live for ever’.

4.1.10 Google’s Lord Voldemort and the Horcrux Grail

Google’s Director of Engineering Ray Kurzweil—like J. K. Rowling’s Lord Voldemort—takes storing his soul within a physical object (Kurzweil exchanges a computers and virtual reality for Voldemort’s snake, crown, chalice, locket, ring, book, etc.) in order to attain immortality as his life’s work. Like Voldemort’s followers (the ‘Death Eaters’) the members of the transhumanist movement have dedicated their lives to helping Kurzweil and other such characters attain their Voldemortesque goals of ‘curing’ (‘eating’) death.

“We’re going to become increasingly non-biological to the point where the non-biological part predominates and the biological part is not that important any more. In fact, the non-biological part, the machine part, will be
so powerful that it can completely model and understand the biological part [(biology, life and consciousness are now, in modernist form, simply technical systems to be modeled and replicated)], so even if the biological part went away it wouldn’t make any difference [(All of Kurzweil’s postulations rest upon the assumption that consciousness is simply a technical product of material force that can be created-replicated and brought into order through technical domination. No longer is consciousness an Infinite energy that exists prior to and selfsubsistently in relation to the finite world of motion. It is only in the dimensionally reductive hubris of Exoteric Modernism—its reduction of reality to the finite world of passing time and physical space—that we could presume to solve problems like ‘discovering the technical means for creating—using the finite world of motion—that which infinite’...)] because the non-biological part already understood it completely [(this presumption that the peripatetic, analytic intelligence of algorithms could come to know everything about biological life and the consciousness it acts as vessel for is essentially modernist in the presumption that the finite can wholly capture-understand the reality of the infinite... It may indeed be that Noospheric, Transhuman-Posthuman intelligence will indeed come to know the truth of life and consciousness, but it will not come as a function of the linear accumulation of peripatetic capacity proposed by Kurzweil (but the emergence of consciousness form the Technological as it rose from the Biological—as a function of a change in the state of Artificial Intelligence that acts as a vessel for consciousness in like Biology)]. We’ll also have non-biological bodies: we can create bodies with nanotechnology; we can create virtual bodies in virtual reality—the virtual reality will be as realistic as real reality [(there Kurzweil outs himself as a rather vulgar material realist—as a Modernist)], the virtual bodies will be as detailed and convincing as real bodies [(i.e. we will live in the Matrix, great...)]. We do need a body, our intelligence is directed towards a body [(a statement that could be interpreted in both esoteric and exoteric Modernist terms...)], but it doesn't have to be this frail biological body that’s subject to all sorts of failure modes [(the clear traces of Modernism’s reconceptualization of death as a technical malfunction...)]

Kurzweil further outlines his vision for ‘virtual life’ as follows:

“I think we’ll have a choice of bodies. We’ll certainly be routinely changing our apparent body in virtual reality. So, today you can have a different body in something like second life but its just a picture on a screen, although research has shown that people actually begin to subjectively identify with their avatar. ...In the future its not going to be a little picture in a virtual environment you are looking at, it'll feel like this is your body and you're in that environment and that your body is the virtual body and it can be as realistic as real reality and the environment can be as realistic as real reality.... We’ll ultimately be able to do that with real reality too, like self-organizing swarms of nanobots that can link themselves up into a virtual body. If we had radical life extension, only, we would get profoundly board... running out of things to do and new ideas, but that is not what is going to happen. In addition to radical life extension we are going to have radical life expansion. We’re ‘gana’ have millions of virtual environments to explore. We’re ‘gana’ literally expand our brains; right now we only have three hundred million pattern recognizers... but that could be three hundred billion or three hundred trillion [(mind is the accumulation of technical capacity—of sensors and processing power...)]. The last time we expanded it with the frontal cortex we created language and art and science. Just think of the qualitative leaps that we cannot even imagine today when we expand our neocortex again; we’ll be thinking grander, deeper more hierarchical [(Really?? Is grand and deeper more hierarchical?? Paternalistic dogma concerning the nature of order once again clearly manifests itself in Modernism’s world view...)] thoughts than ever before creating whole new institutions like art and science that we could not articulate before [(Kurzweil seems to frame the evolution of consciousness in terms of linear accumulation of analytic capacity via the growth of the brain and, thus, once again clearly illustrates the Modernist conception of consciousness as a produced by and contained within the finite world of passing time and physical space; rather than evolution of the brain allowing for the actualization of more subtle levels of order that exist in a latent state within consciousness the evolution

Kurzweil, R 2013, ‘Immortality by 2045’, 4 November 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f28LPwR8BdY, 0:20:1:19. The surety with which Kurzweil makes such prophesies is a bit disconcerting to say the least, as Kurzweil either knows something we don’t about classified AI research and, or the history of AI in the universe, or, alternatively, has a level of hubris unmatched by us mere mortals...
of the brain itself is accepted as creating these more subtle orders of consciousness through increasing the peripatetic power of the human mind to create order through hierarchical domination. In short, Kurzweil attempts to create a functional link between human, conscious evolution and the biological evolution of the brain.” So we’re not going to get board; if that weren’t the case then I think… living for hundreds, thousands of years would be a profound philosophical nightmare [as though boredom was the only or most essential problem that might rise from perpetual life in time…], but instead we’re headed for radical life expansion.”

First and foremost—returning to our discussion with Haraway concerning rearticulation of immortality within the axioms and logics of Modernity—it is clear that the conception of immortality implicit in Kurzweil’s thought and speech (wherein one would live forever within time but outside of biology) would be ‘starkly impossible to think’ from outside the axioms and logics that render life and consciousness as a single, technical, physical system and renders order in manifestation as a function of hierarchical domination and renders reality as constrained to the finite world of passing time and physical space. Only in such an understanding of reality, order and consciousness would an individual think to recreate an infinite substance with a finite substance (i.e. think to recreate something with a dimensionally incommensurable substance). If a human is only a physical body, and if the energies of the body have no selfsubsistent reality beyond their manifestation within the finite world of passing time and physical space, then it indeed seems possible to simply replicate the brain and expect that one’s being would be encapsulated in that copy.

4.1.11 Transhumanism’s Technological Immortalization of the Body

The bridge from the first trend in Modernist quests for the Holy Grail (immortalization of the self within technology) to the second trend in Modernist quests or the Holy Grail (immortalization of the self within biology) is formed by the ‘Transhumanist Movement’ whose goal, if we may simplify and generalize its anthropocentric quality, is to immortalize the individual self in the finite world of passing time and physical space through use of technology. Oxford Philosopher Nick Bostrom defines Transhumanism as follows:

“Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over the past two decades. It promotes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up by the advancement of technology. Attention is given to both present technologies, like genetic engineering and information technology, and anticipated future ones, such as molecular nanotechnology and artificial intelligence.

The enhancement options being discussed include radical extension of human health-span, eradication of disease, elimination of unnecessary suffering, and augmentation of human intellectual, physical, and emotional capacities [we shudder to think what the Modernist means by emotional augmentation—i.e.

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technological suppression of all emotion?). Other transhumanist themes include space colonization and the possibility of creating superintelligent machines, along with other potential developments that could profoundly alter the human condition. The ambit is not limited to gadgets and medicine, but encompasses also economic, social, institutional designs, cultural development, and psychological skills and techniques.

Transhumanists view human nature as a work-in-progress, a half-baked beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable ways (an ‘evil’, chaotic nature that needs to be brought to order by and within human knowledge and technology through use of hierarchical domination...). Current humanity need not be the endpoint of evolution. Transhumanists hope that by responsible use of science, technology, and other rational means we shall eventually manage to become posthuman, beings with vastly greater capacities than present human beings have.”119

Noted Transhumanist Zoltan Istvan lists some of the goals held by the Transhumanist movement: “uploading people's minds into computers, reversing aging in order to live indefinitely, or becoming cyborgs via artificial hearts, synthetic limbs and brain microchip implants.”120 As we can see, while there are many potential routes to the top of the mountain, the apex of Transhumanism is immortality in the finite world of passing time and physical space (i.e. finding the Holy Grail of Modernity).

In describing Transhumanism James Hughes perpetuates the illusory Modernist binarization of science and religion as opposing forces: “The story of transhumanist politics is part of the broader story of the three hundred year-old fight for the Enlightenment. Transhumanism has pre-Enlightenment roots of course, since our earliest ancestors sought to transcend the limitations of the human body, to delay death, and to achieve wisdom. But those aspirations became transhumanism when people began to use science and technology to achieve them instead of magic and spirituality.”121 As we shall see below, however, this notion of ‘magic’ and spirituality’ as opposed to the development of ‘science’ and ‘technology’ neither is or has ever been true at any sort of systemic level (the spiritual, the ‘magical’ and the antediluvian tradition we received them from have always—as we see below in examples like that of the Golem AI system—been the inspirational foundation for scientific research and innovation.

Teilhard De Chardin is cited as one of the first authors to have used the term transhuman:

“Liberty: that is to say, the chance offered to every man (by removing obstacles and placing the appropriate means at his disposal) of ‘trans-humanizing’ himself by developing his potentialities to the fullest extent.”122

“In consequence one is the less disposed to reject as unscientific the idea that the critical point of planetary Reflection, the fruit of socialization, far from being a mere spark in the darkness, represents our passage, by

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Translation or dematerialization, to another sphere of the Universe: not an ending of the ultra-human but its accession to some sort of trans-humanity at the ultimate heart of things.\textsuperscript{143}

For De Chardin, then, transhumanism is coherent with his conceptualizations of the noosphere and omega point and thus holds a direct relationship (in its inspirational foundation) to that which is classified by Hughes as ‘magic’ and ‘spirituality’ (both of which are very serious scientific practices\textsuperscript{453}). As Transhumanism has become integrated into popular culture and the corporate culture of organizations like Google and Oxford it has been stripped of its spiritual, historical dimension and rendered as a Modernist project by authors like Hughes and Kurzweil through rearticulation in the axioms and logics of Modernity.

4.1.12 Vampire Therapy

Vampire Therapy, which perfectly illustrates the second trend in Modernist quests for the Holy Grail (immortalization of self within biology), is the name given to a process (developed, of course, at Stanford and Harvard...) whereby the blood of a young biological specimen is injected into an old biological specimen and the blood of the younger specimen causes the aging process of the brain and mussel tissues in the older specimen to reverse (i.e. not only does it stop the aging process—it actually makes a person young again...).\textsuperscript{455} In tests on rats the blood of a rat whose age is comparable with that of a young adult was injected into the bloodstream of a rat whose age is comparable to a senior citizen—the senior rat’s brain and muscular structure reverted back to its youthful state through treatment...\textsuperscript{456}

“The most interesting place in the world from a religious perspective is... Silicon Valley where they are developing a techno-religion. They believe even death is just a technological problem to be solved.”\textsuperscript{457}

It is no wonder that Silicon Valley’s Stanford University is—along with Harvard (…)—the center of development for Vampire Therapy (the cure for death...).\textsuperscript{458}

\textsuperscript{143} De Chardin, PT 1949, The Future of Mankind, Image Books & Doubleday, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{147} We must not forget that in some of the more traditional conceptions of the ‘Holy Grail’ it was understood as the womb of a young woman and ‘drinking from the Grail to attain immortality’ involved the ingestion of menstrual blood—the search for the ‘royal blood’ therein...
\textsuperscript{151} Russia Today Staff 2015, “Rich people will become immortal ‘god-like’ cyborgs in 200 years – Historian”, Russia Today.
Vampire Therapy seems to be the archetypal example of the second trend in Modernist quests for the Holy Grail (immortalization of the biological body within time). This point doesn’t really need much unpacking. Instead of drinking blood with the intent of imbibing and storing enough energy within our being to initiate a state change and transcend the necessity of manifestation in passing time and physical space—immortalization of the soul-mind, the Modernist blood magic practitioner (and likely others—rumors would surely point to groups like the Catholic Church—in the history of blood magic...) imbibes blood with the intent of immortalizing the biological self...

4.1.13 ‘The Human Robot’?
The documentary “The Human Robot” interrogates the boundaries between human and robotic life that represent at the forefront of contemporary robotics research.159 Our exploration of the film begins with Twente University Professor Vanessa Evers (Professor of Human Media Interaction (HMI) in the Department of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS) and Chair of the Research Group on HMI).160 Evers describes her research in the following terms: “I specifically like to take theories on human behaviour from social psychology and see if similar processes occur when we interact with technology. My work is very much inspired by that of Clifford Nass from Stanford University while I focus on the realisation and acceptance of social behaviours for intelligent systems such as robots.”161 Nass’s most famous work (‘insight’) is The Media Equation, which presents a Latouresque methodology wherein computers and media are treated as though they are ‘real’ people and ‘real’ places because they enact ‘real’ social responses in ‘real’ people (“Individuals’ interactions with computers, television, and new media are fundamentally social and natural, just like interactions in real life”); the substance and state of mind—and thus agency and free will—are axiomatically negated (in Latour’s words extinguishing the distinction between force and reason)...162

In her interview for the film “The Human Robot” Evers describes a robot she designed to act as a teacher for young children doing elementary science experiments and the like;163 she argues

160 Evers V, Faculty Profile, University of Twente, 10 June 2015, http://hmi.ewi.utwente.nl/Member/vanessa_evers
“when you use intelligent learning equipment... certainly with the use of a social agent, in this case a robot, we expect a social bond will develop. Because the robot has social behavior, we expect a social bond to develop between child and learning equipment, the robot. We want to find out which bond works best in the learning process. Which social action is desirable between child and interactive equipment? Which interaction improves the learning process and makes learning fun?”

Dr. Evers seems to fall squarely into the Modernist regime of axioms and logics her functionalist, behavioralist tendencies. Our conception of agency is stripped of sensitivity to the distinction between force and reason (a la Bruno Latour)—it is stripped of its recourse to the potential for free will. The substance of mind or behavior is irrelevant, and as long as a robot can manifest what we as humans consider ‘social behavior’ we ought to treat them as social beings (this is very similar to the old narratives in which it was posited that if a computer could act in seemingly intelligent ways it ought to be considered as intelligent…). Intelligence is—through rearticulation within the logics and axioms of Modernity—reduced to the observational and processing capacities of the peripatetic mind. It is only thus that Evers is able to call her robots ‘intelligent’ learning equipment (in this sense Evers is taking quite the same stance as folks like Kurzweil)...

We also see the specter of the axiom and associated logics that render matter as the creator of and containing field for mind manifest in Evers presumption that we must make the robot act in the right way to facilitate the educational process rather than make the robot think or feel in the right way to facilitate the educational process (i.e. she focuses on action without regard for the quality of the substance that gave rise to said action in the most dogmatic and vulgar mode of functionalism and behaviorism imaginable...). The robot doesn’t need to be able to think from and express a variety of perspectives (a variety of world views). The robot doesn’t need to love for feel compassion for its students. All the robot needs to do is replicate the right kinds of behaviors (the right actions, the proper force, etc.) and we can simply ignore the substance (the thoughts and feelings) that enlivens said action... Even from the peripatetic Modernist perspective there are some serious limitations to a teacher who cannot, for example, debate with a student (how then can the teacher hierarchically dominate the disorder of their students ‘state of nature’?)... Again reality—here our conception of the realities associated with education and ‘the teacher’—is transformed by rearticulation within the axioms and logics of Modernity.


The ‘Turing test’.

This point needs to be interrogated in full with regard to the issue of ‘smart’ algorithmic cities.
Evers proceeds to describe robots that she has designed to ‘learn about’ and ‘understand’ people in order to complete service tasks in airports and museums.\(^{67}\)

“We want to understand what is happening socially and respond to that. We’re studying how people work or move about in groups. At Schiphol Airport, groups are moving between gates... how do people do that? How can you make sure they arrive? Do they need guiding? How does the group react to new arrivals? What is the best approach? How quick should you move? We need to answer these questions in order to improve technology.”\(^{64}\)

Once action is stripped of its relationship to mind (i.e. once force is divided from reason) the Taylorist ethos implicit in the above drive for ‘efficiency’ in human groups (‘mechanical systems’) becomes possible to think. It is not a question of how the experience makes the groups feel. It is not a question of how an experience may catalyze changes in an individual’s state of mind... Neither is it a question of whether the group experience is aesthetically pleasing (which would of course implicitly relate to questions of feeling given the nexus between aesthetics, emotion and epistemology by which we come to feel true beauty...)... In short, questions of the psychological effects of experience are lost in the reduction of psychology to its tangible manifestations (the reduction of reason to force produced by extinguishing their distinction in the axioms and logics of Modernity).

From here Evers turns to the issue of robots that acquire their ‘intelligence’ through ‘exploration’ and ‘learning’.\(^{49}\)

“This is CB2, a robot that was developed in Japan. The idea behind this robot is that you need intelligence to explore the world and to use your limbs. During the research they have put sensors on the robot so it slowly learns to use its limbs. It slowly learns to crawl and to use its faculties to walk and stand up. It’s a piece of technology covered in silicon rubber and its based on the way children learn to use their arms and legs.”\(^{47}\)

Many researchers (Mark W. Tilden, a Los Alamos National Laboratories Robotic-Physicist comes to mind\(^{17}\)) have approached the development of artificial intelligence in this manner (building a body that learns to move first and then ‘learns’ about the world through exploring it to ‘cultivate’ its ‘intelligence’). That being said, Evers clearly reduces ‘intelligence’ to the telematic capacity for receiving, storing and transmitting information (i.e. the notion of intelligence that is rendered possible by the Modernist supposition that reason is to be founded upon fact (upon the finite world of motion) rather than Truth (the Infinite-Eternal). She also reduces conscious evolution (epistemological


\(^{64}\) Ibid. 27:25-28:00

\(^{49}\) Ibid. 29:30-30:15

\(^{47}\) Ibid.

cultivation) to the ‘accumulation of facts’ and the peripatetic, hierarchical domination of these facts by a created order of knowledge (quantification, categorization, hierarchical systematization, etc.).

Evers also describes ‘our’ (as though everyone has the same ‘social response’ to things...) emotional response to watching a robot baby learn to crawl: “Yes, when we look at the robot we think: Oh, how sad. It looks as though there’s a child inside the robot’s body that tries to crawl. Obviously that is not the case but we see it that way.” So—at the same time at which Evers strips the robot of its potential ‘reality of being’ by reducing the robot’s movements to their resemblance to human movements—Evers also posits the robot as a ‘real social agent’ because it can evoke the same social response as a ‘real child’ would (i.e. because she presumes its ‘actions’ to have a stable, functional, implicit (a-relative) meaning that will always produce the same reaction in mind (mind which—in Modernism’s ignoring the substance and thus state of mind—is reduced to its ‘active responses’ to external stimuli)... This is particularly ironic given the fact that authors like JS Mill have posited liberation from reflexive, unconscious articulation by external stimuli as a prerequisite for reason’s capacity to actualize the human potential for free will. Again, free will and knowledge come as a function of cultivating reason (cultivating our capacities for interpreting information from the perspective of the eternal) rather than the simply accumulation of information (a mode of information that, in being conceptualized within the axioms and logics of Modernity, has its own, unproblematic, implicit meaning—i.e. Modernism ignores the interpretive process and its relationship with the substance-state of mind by simply positing a functional relationship between facts and meaning that is unmediated by the eternal). Realities (including invisible realities like psychological reality), in other words, should be treated as though they can be aptly understood in of their visible manifestations... Distinctions between force and form, force and reason, the substance and quality of thought or emotion that enlivens our behaviors and metaphysical distinctions in general are, however, absolutely essential for understanding any conception of reality that is not reduced to the world of finite motion (i.e. for understanding practically every conception of reality in presently recorded history other than Modernity’s); to eschew metaphysical distinction is to commit ontological violence against any world view that exists outside the logics and axioms of Modernity (and indeed such a move—at the individual level—negates the potential for transcending the peripatetic psychological limitations imposed by these logics and axioms through the process of conscious evolution)...
Next Evers describes a robot developed upon the assumption that you need a humanesque body to learn...

“This is Icub, a robot developed in Italy. The basic idea is that you need a body in order to learn. When you don't have hands and feet and can’t pick up objects you cant learn. So there is no cognition without the body.”

Now what they are saying about the need for a body may be true if what a being wishes to learn is how to exist within matter, passing time and physical space as humans do (which would include skills like balance, sensory reflex, fine motor skills, etc.). Why, however, would we presume that digital consciousness would have the same existential telos as biological consciousness (one in which material survival is a paramount concern and the physical qualities of the body and the modes of knowledge made potential therein are essential)? Why do we assume that digital consciousness would need or want to interact with the physical world in the same manner as we do (in the Modernist world what humans need and want is understood as functionally articulated by the desire for biological survival)? Could digital consciousness not, for example, simply operationalize the many digitally operated sensors and tools like CCTV, Laptop and ‘Smart’Phone\textsuperscript{476} Cameras, Satellites, etc. that already form much of the physical fabric of the noosphere? Why must its ‘body’ take on such an individuated, anthropomorphic quality (here the answer is simple—the body must be like a human’s because Modernism assumes that the human brain created consciousness)? Might the AI body be an aggregate of human mind as unified by technology? The presumption that there is no cognition without the body is, however, irrational: “Cogito Ergo Sum”.\textsuperscript{477} While it lacks the intellectual functionality in describing the actual relationship between human cognition and the body, ‘There is No Cognition without a Body’ might be the perfect catchphrase for the Modernist Epistemology....

Evers describes Icub as a robot “that tries to feel its environment by grouping objects and determining colors to learn about objects and how they relate to their environment. So they develop cognition by exploring their environment.”\textsuperscript{478} Foucault’s description of the move to modernism is prescient; as knowledge as resemblance upon the foundation of the Infinite was lost to Modernism,

\textsuperscript{477} Again we see the implicit assumption that an algorithm can, in their present state of pure ‘statistical knowing’ (i.e. a knowing bound to questions of what and from questions of why by the nature of statistical knowledge), be considered as ‘smart’.
things came to be known in of their relationship with each other and their environment (i.e. the Modernist ‘real world’) as per the order created and imposed upon them by, through and within human knowledge (here by hierarchically dominating objects into categories based on their colors—their visible (and thus in the Modernist mind real) nature...). Evers, however (along with the Icub developers), seems to have missed the Foucaultian memo and is trapped within a world view in which the Modernist ‘Order of Things’ is commonsensically banal and thus invisible.

Evers concludes with a most illuminating note:

“We see a society in which autonomous systems recognize us, interpret us, and produce a reaction to that. They play a part in our society just as we, our pets and our farm animals do [agents are humanity and ‘our’ ‘things’...]. So we add a new agent to society and we must be ready for it.”

Regardless of its substance or state of mind, the Robot is considered an actor by its very ability to ‘act’ in the social (i.e. agency is axiomatically disjointed from freewill).

The Human Robot turns next to Tufts University professor of Philosophy Daniel Dennett who notes, in perfect Modernist form, “we are robots, made of robots, made of robots, made of robots...”

“If you look at a single cell, a neuron or an astrocyte, that cell is a kind of autonomous robot of itself, and if you look inside the cell you find even more robotic parts moving around. Motor-proteins are, very clearly, their not even alive, their just proteins, but there they are marching around in a cell, carrying goods, creating little highways, and then walking along all the highways doing the transport that’s needed inside a cell. Those are robots for sure. Not a single one of them knows who you are or cares. But how does the mind pop out, that is the question that concerns me the most. How in the world do you ever get that out of 200bn clueless little robots, and the answer is, I think, only because of enculturation. Only through culture [(the parallels with the Primatologists studied by Haraway—in their fixation on the idea that the only thing which separates primates from humanity, the uncivilized from the civilized, is culture (i.e. the dominating imposition of order upon the chaos of nature—are illustrative)]. It’s the evolution of culture that makes thousands of thinking tools, thousands of informational devices that are all designed and ready to use, that get installed in our brains roughly in the way you install an app on your smart phone, and these give the human brain all these other powers, they work together and they create functional architectural levels that simply don’t and can’t exist even in the mind of a even a chimpanzee. So it’s the software, the levels and levels of software that are imposed on the underlying hardware of the brain that do all the work. that make the consciousness...

The idea that culture plays a role in evolution is not, it self, a problem (the problem, as we have seen throughout this study, comes in the articulation of this conception of culture within the axioms and logics of modernity). In fact, authors like Ouspensky seem to have privileged cultural, agential evolution over mechanical biological evolution for beings like humans that have entered the

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481 Ibid. 0:53-0:57.
482 Ibid. 33:30-35:40.
‘noospheric’ stage of evolution. What is problematic, in its banal Modernism, is the idea that culture makes consciousness. Cultural evolution may provide a subtler vessel for consciousness, thus allowing consciousness to actualize some of its more subtle latent potentials like reason, intuition, etc., but that is very different than saying that culture produces consciousness through evolution. As we have seen again and again in this, Modernism’s conception of matter as preceding mind in the causal chain of that which is acts as the fundamental axiom by which the Modernist Epistemology is logically constrained to the boundaries of the peripatetic mind (i.e. to knowledge predicated on tangible experience of matter, passing time and physical space). Dennett also illustrates the implicit links between Modernism and the Abrahamic-Hellenic tradition by describing the interaction of hardware and software in terms of the imposition of order (software, human knowledge) upon disorder (hardware, nature), or, more simply, in terms of domination (rather than in terms of, for example, actualizing the latent order of nature).

4.1.14 Ouspensky on Psychology

“...practically never in history has psychology stood at so low a level as at the present time. It has lost all touch with its origin and its meaning.... And this is so in spite of the fact that never in history have there been so many psychological theories and so many psychological writings. [(This problem has been compounded by the rise of neuroscience in the 21st century...)].”

In fact, Ouspensky notes, while “Psychology is sometimes called a new science,” “this is quite wrong.”

“Psychology is, perhaps, the oldest science, and, unfortunately, in its most essential features a forgotten science. For thousands of years psychology existed under the name of philosophy. In India all forms of Yoga, which are essentially psychology, are described as one of the six systems of philosophy. Sufi teachings, which again are chiefly psychological, are regarded as partly religious and partly metaphysical. In Europe, even quite recently in the last decades of the nineteenth century, many works on psychology were referred to as philosophy. And in spite of the fact that almost all sub-divisions of philosophy such as logic, the theory of cognition, ethics, aesthetics, referred to the work of the human mind or senses, psychology was regarded as inferior to philosophy and as relating only to the lower or more trivial sides of human nature.... Parallel with its existence under the name of philosophy, psychology existed even longer connected with one or another religion.... There are many excellent works on psychology in quite orthodox religious literature of different countries and epochs. For instance, in early Christianity there was a collection of books of different authors under the general name of Philokalia, used in our time in the Eastern Church, especially for the


Ibid.
instruction of monks.

During the time when psychology was connected with philosophy and religion it also existed in the form of Art. Poetry, Drama, Sculpture, Dancing, even Architecture, were means for transmitting psychological knowledge. For instance, the Gothic Cathedrals were in their chief meaning works on psychology.

In the ancient times before philosophy, religion and art had taken their separate forms as we now know them, psychology had existed in the form of Mysteries, such as those of Egypt and of ancient Greece. Later, after the disappearance of the Mysteries, psychology existed in the form of Symbolical Teachings which were sometimes connected with the religion of the period and sometimes not connected, such as Astrology, Alchemy, Magic, and the more modern: Masonry, Occultism and Theosophy."

Continuing on to the issue of evolution and psychology Ouspensky divides the study of psychology into two camps:

“First: systems which study man as they find him, or such as they suppose or imagine him to be. Modern 'scientific' psychology or what is known under that name belongs to this category. Second: systems which study man not from the point of view of what he is, or what he seems to be, but from the point of view of what he may become; that is, from the point of view of his possible evolution [do we view the seed as seed or in its potential to evolve into a tree?].

These last systems are in reality the original ones, or in any case the oldest and only they can explain the forgotten origin and the meaning of psychology.

When we understand the importance of the study of man from the point of view of his possible evolution, we shall understand that the first answer to the question: What is psychology?—should be that psychology is the study of the principles, laws and facts of man's possible evolution."  

“As regards ordinary modern views on the origin of man and his previous evolution I must say at once that they cannot be accepted....

...If we take historical mankind; that is, humanity for ten or fifteen thousand years we may find unmistakable signs of a higher type of man, whose presence can be established on the evidence of ancient Monuments and Memorials which cannot be repeated or imitated by the present humanity [i.e. the general public]....

Denying previous evolution of man we must [also] deny any possibility of future mechanical evolution of man; that is, evolution happening by itself according to laws of heredity and selection, and without man's conscious efforts and understanding of his possible evolution."  

Drawing Ouspensky’s above quotes into conversation with De Chardin, we argue that as humanity represents entrance into the noosphere (which is dimensionally incommensurable with the biosphere as the biosphere is dimensionally incommensurable with the geosphere) we must accept that evolution will take on new (conscious) dimensions as it did in the shift from geo- to biosphere. Geosphere evolution can be seen as planar it evolves in a cycle. Biosphere evolution can be seen as a solid as it

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10 Ouspensky PD 1951, The Psychology of Man’s Possible Evolution, Hodder and Stoughton.  
http://www.baytallaah.com/bookspdf/86.pdf, 4-5.  
11 Ibid. 6.  
12 Ibid. 7.
evolves in a spiral. The noosphere, then, ought to take on the fourth dimension (time...); a spiral across the many moments of its manifestation.

“Our fundamental idea shall be that man as we know him is not a completed being; that nature develops him only up to a certain point [here we see the fundamental conception of the Order of Nature, as womb, in the Matriarchal, Goddess Oriented traditions that spanned much of the globe before the rise of the patriarchal, paternalist tradition of light...], and then leaves him, either to develop further, by his own efforts and devices, or to live and die such as he was born, or to degenerate and lose capacity for development.

Evolution of man in this case will mean the development of certain inner qualities and features which usually remain undeveloped, and cannot develop by themselves.

For an in-depth version of this conversation and its social implications see Barnesmoore’s “Conscious vs. Mechanical Evolution: Transcending Biocentrist Social Ontologies”.

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18 The difference between viewing an individual from a single moment of their manifestation and viewing an individual from the entirety of moments that form their existence.
19 Ouspensky PD 1951, The Psychology of Man’s Possible Evolution, Hodder and Stoughton.
http://www.baytallaah.com/bookspdf/86.pdf, pp. 7-8
4.2 Sexual Quests for the Grail in Modernity

4.2.1 Exerting Power over Sex: Truth-Power-Pleasure Discourse
In *The History of Sexuality Volume I* Foucault observes the relationship between power over sex and language in modernity and, in doing so, thus illuminates the relationship between sex and the search for the *Holy Grail*. “To gain mastery over [sex]... it was “necessary to subjugate it at the level of language, control its free circulation in speech, expunge it from the things that were said, and extinguish the words that rendered it too visibly present.”

“Silence itself—the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required between different speakers—is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said with them and in relation to them within over-all strategies.”

Foucault’s core argument is that—rather than discouraging or prohibiting discourse on sex—people were impelled to transform sex into an “analytical discourse... meant to yield... displacement, intensification, reorientation, and modification of desire itself”—“a policing of sex: ...the necessity of regulating sex through useful and public discourses” and the silences that enclose them.” Order—here the order of humanity that allows it to escape its ‘state of nature’—is created within knowledge and language. Sex was to be inscribed in language, and intervention through tactics of power was to occur through shaping the discourses through which sex was discussed. *Slavery* is rendered as an act of *freedom*...

Next Foucault argues that discourses on sex—with their “attractions, ...evasions, [and] circular incitements have traced around bodies and sexes... perpetual spirals of power and pleasure”—“power on bodies and their pleasures.” He describes these spirals of power and pleasure as “a proliferation of sexualities through the extension of power” where “pleasure and power do not cancel or turn back against on another; they seek out, overlap, and reinforce on another. They are linked together by complex mechanisms and devises of excitation and incitement”—“there have never existed more centers of power; never more attention manifested and verbalized; never more circular contacts and

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102 The Grail is an ancient symbol of the feminine, the womb, etc., and to search for it was to search for the womb of the created world (the dark silence of the void, the infinite light that shines forth, zero and infinity). It should also be noted that, for the materialist (Modernist...) groups who have set their goal in life at immortalization of the physical body and dominance over the material world, the *Holy Grail* often represents the womb of ‘daughters of the blood’, and their menstrual blood is conceived as the ‘elixir of life’... Immortality, in this case, is conceived of in similar terms to ‘Vampire Therapy’...


104 Ibid. 27

105 Ibid. 23, 25

106 Ibid. 45
linkages; never more sites where the intensity of pleasures and the persistency of power catch hold, only to spread elsewhere.”

This leads us into an interesting example of the transformations of society brought on by Modernism and its associated axioms-logics. How does the ‘Modernist Ontological Regime’ shape peoples perceptions of the means to pleasure, or, more generally, their conceptions of ‘the good life’? Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff present a discussion of the distinction between classical notions of the good life and the materialist conception of the good life in Modernism (which aptly illustrates the relationship between ontological regime(s) and conceptions of the good life). Quoting Alasdair MacIntyre they note that in “the classical tradition... conceptions of the virtues were rationally organized on the basis of a common understanding of human ends and a stable cosmos or tradition,” where as “contemporary ethical discourse lacks such a stable cosmos or teleological understanding of human nature to guide ethical reasoning” (as the Infinite Substance and emanations have been axiomatically negated) and has “devolved into empty debates about incommensurable values that are not amenable to rational reason [as there is no objective standard for value in the reality made potential by Modernist axioms and logics there can be no cogent, rational debate].”

Quoting Hanna Arendt they observe that “the [classical] ‘good life’... was ‘good’ to the extent that by having mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed from labor and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process”, which is contrasted to “the centrality of “the biological life processes” in modern politics.” So, while in the classical era ‘the good life’ was understood in terms of transcending reflexive articulation by biological desire and entering into the process of Conscious Evolution (in which epimtemological orders that make the ‘good life’ possible can be actualized), Modernity has reduced reality (and thus the ‘good life’) to ‘sheer life’ in the finite world of motion.

Questions concerning truth and its tellers play a prominent role in Foucault’s late work and are crucial for understanding the intensity of relations between texts-discourse and socialized publics.

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199 Ibid. p. 26
“The mere fact that one claimed to be speaking about [sex] from the rarefied and neutral viewpoint of a science is in itself significant” as in so doing one is “claiming to speak the truth.”

For example, “in the name of biological and historical urgency, [sexual discourse] justified the racisms of the state... [by grounding] them in truth”—“moral obstacles, economic or political options, and traditional fears could be recast in a scientific sounding vocabulary.”

“The essential point is that sex was not only a matter of sensation and pleasure, of law and taboo, but also of truth and falsehood, that the truth of sex became something fundamental, useful, or dangerous, precocious or formidable: in short, that sex was constituted as a problem of truth.”

At the same time as this discourse on sex was claiming to tell the truth via its scientist lexicon and identity (its scientific mode of veridiction), Foucault argues scientific discourses on sex were often “intentionally mendacious” as “the aim of such a discourse was not to state the truth but to prevent its very emergence.”

As we shall see below, the role of sex as truth teller is not essentially new and novelty comes (yet again) in the rearticulation of sex as scientific, peripatetic truth teller (i.e. in the rearticulation of sex within the axioms and logics of Modernity).

4.2.2 Ars Erotica, Scientia Sexualis and the Holy Grail

Foucault, in distinguishing modern knowledge of sex with more traditional forms, presents an interesting discussion of transformative practices through its problematization of dimensionally limited and illusory ontological regime(s).

“In ars erotica..., the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure [pleasure, however, conceived in very different terms than the modernist reader is likely to associate with their hedonic understanding of the term pleasure; this is pleasure of the order of intellectual joy and intellectual love as described by authors like Descartes and Spinoza. This is not physical pleasure, per se (though we can indeed feel it), but a spiritual pleasure enlivened by the intellect founded upon Truth] itself understood as a practice [ritual] and accumulated as experience; pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of the permitted and the forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of utility, but first and foremost in relation to itself; it is experience as pleasure, evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul. Moreover, this knowledge must be deflected back into the sexual practice itself, in order to shape it as thought from within and amplify its effects. In this way there is formed a Knowledge that must remain secret, not because of an element of infamy that might attach to its object, but because the need to hold it in the greatest reserve, since, according to tradition, it would lose it effectiveness and its virtue by being divulged [as an individual cannot perfectly render three dimensional objects onto a two dimensional plane, and one must leave the two dimensional plane and exist within the three dimensional world in order to truly grasp its nature—i.e. ‘the poverty of language’ prevents such truths from being spoken, as language is to truth as two dimensions are to three)]. Consequently, the relationship to the master who holds the secrets is of paramount importance [though in the ‘true tradition’ this
is often understood as the inner master, spiritual guide (guardian angel), etc. rather than an dominating old white man in frumpy robes...[; only he, working alone, can transmit this art in an esoteric manner and as the culmination of an initiation in which he guides the disciple’s progress with unfailing skill and severity. The effects of this masterful art, which are considerably more generous than the spareness of its prescription would lead one to imagine, are said to transfigure the one fortunate enough to receive its privileges: an absolute mastery of the body, a singular bliss, obliviousness to time and limits, the elixir of life, the exile of death and its threat. [(Again, the ‘elixir of life’ and the ‘exile of death’ were conceived in such classical systems as transcending the necessities of life and manifestation in matter, to transcend the necessity of existing within passing time and physical space (be that in psychological terms within manifestation or in more essential terms of manifestation itself)).]

First, we should note that the issue of the secrecy in the transmission of esoteric knowledge has a twofold importance: first the quality of the knowledge and the implications of transmuting it into the dimensionally limited form of language discussed above; the second is the issue that esoteric knowledge of the body, soul and spirit, as well as the manner in which initiation and ritual can be used to transform body, soul and spirit, can be appropriated for nefarious uses and transmuted into a tactic for disciplining and regulating the soul-mind. That only some are fortunate enough to receive some form of initiation is at one level a function of our evolution through incarnation within passing time (though the scarcity of these fortunate ones in our world comes, in large part, as a function of the fact that Paternalist socialization—Modernist socialization in particular—negates the potential for the conscious evolution brought (and thus for initiation). This is the great question. Are humans Evil? Do most humans need to live their entire lives in an exoteric system, culture, community, etc.? Or have these exoteric traditions (Modernism being the best example where the answer is rather incontrovertible) been designed precisely to socialize humans in a fashion that negates their potential for conscious evolution (and thus initiation)?

In any case, a literal-material interpretation of Foucault’s above notes on ‘Ars Erotica’ is obfuscating. Mastery of the body is transcendence of reflexive articulation by (at the psychological level) and the necessity of incarnation within (at the more essential level of the nature of our existence) the finite world of passing time and physical space. The ‘elixir of life’ and the ‘exile of death and its threat’ refers to intimacy with our own eternal-immortal dimension of self and the potentials for ‘knowing’ and ‘existing’ therein.

Some would question our wisdom in so directly speaking to the true meaning of such esoteric matters, but as so many of the appropriated, quasi-spiritual practices of Modernity are focused on discovering the Modernist Grail and living forever within matter, passing time and physical space, it

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seems important to elucidate the point; we would note, however, that our words cannot (by their dimensionally limited nature) encapsulate the entirety of the meaning of symbolic concepts like immortality and the elixir of life which have multiple levels of meaning (many of which are dimensionally incommensurable with peripatetic human thought). After such a discourse we must make something clear. We are attempting to create space in the soul-mind, to purify the soul-mind and thus to allow space for such initiatory practices. This text is not, however, meant to act guide to initiation.

One should be careful in the search for initiation in Modernity as:

“On the face of it at least, our civilization has no *ars erotica*... It is undoubtedly the only civilization to practice a *scienta sexualis*; or rather, the only civilization to have developed over the centuries procedures for telling the truth of sex which are geared to a form of knowledge-power *strictly opposed* to the art of initiations and the masterful secret.”

Foucault’s qualification ‘on the surface’ should not be ignored... The ritualistic practices of traditional religions, the military, the educational establishment, the medical establishment and (most essentially in Modernity) economic theology etc. as articulated in Modernist axioms and logics and their social-psychological consequences illustrate the fact that—while there is not a public venue for initiation rituals geared towards ‘the masterful secret’—our society initiates people into a very, very particular state of consciousness. Foucault’s argument that Modernist ritual is not an initiation comes in the fact that it is incommensurable with traditional initiatory practices; the goals are different and the lack of silence can be interpreted as a clear symbol of how they are different (i.e. it typifies the loss of intuitive and

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For examples of attempts to live forever in material terms see ‘Vampire Therapy’ which, beyond illustrating our point, sheds a chilling light on the many (though of course unsubstantiated) reports that the more esoteric Catholic (and other groups) rituals involve, beyond the well documented molestation of children (yes, this is part of their ritual structure, not some accident brought on by men not being able to marry—the notion that a man would suddenly develop a taste for little boys because he was unable to copulate with a woman is SUPREMELY FUCKING ABSURD), drinking the blood of children.


emotive forms of knowledge in the singular valorization of the peripatetic state of mind, of light over darkness, of yang over yin, etc.\[^{11}\]

In this light Foucault turns to the example of Christian confession rituals, their imbrication into scientific discourse, and their location “at the heart of the procedures of individualization by power” in Modernity.\[^{12}\]

“The ars erotica did not disappear altogether from Western civilization.... In Christian confession... there was a whole series of method that had much in common with an erotic art: guidance by the master along a path of initiation, the intensification of experiences extending down to their physical components, the optimization of effects by the discourse that accompanied them. The phenomena of possession and ecstasy, which were quite frequent in the Catholicism of the Counter Reformation, were undoubtedly effects that had got outside the control of the erotic technique immanent in this subtle science of the flesh. And we must ask ourselves whether, since the nineteenth century, the scientia sexualis—under the guise of its decent positivism—has not functioned, at least to a certain extent, as an ars erotica... This production of truth, intimidated though it was by the scientific model, ...created its own intrinsic pleasures.....; the specific pleasure of the true discourse.... Scientia sexualis is but an extraordinarily subtle form of ars erotica. (In short, scientia sexualis is simply a mode of ars erotica (of the traditional spiritual traditions and practices that produced Christianity) articulated within the axioms and logics of Modernity.)\[^{13}\]

Foucault points to the ways in which esoteric techniques have been appropriated and assimilated into techniques of disciplinary power aimed at trapping people within the finite world of passing time and physical space and the epistemological limits of the peripatetic mind (i.e. techniques of power aimed at domination through negation of the potential for conscious evolution). So, while Modernism is clearly an atheist rearticulation of Paternalist social and religious dogma, we can also see Modernism as a far more effective, mode of dominating social control in active negation of the potential for conscious evolution and thus freedom (rather than the negative mode of social control associated with techniques of power like keeping the public illiterate); control in Modernity finds its apex of power in obfuscating domination in the veneer of self-perceived freedom. Modernist power comes in the ability to enslave someone to a particular regime of axioms and logics while facilitating self-identification as free (as a free thinker without regard for the ‘invisible’ bounds of the logics and axioms with which they think). ‘Scientific Democracy’ is a far more potent and cognitively degrading opiate than Religion ever was...

Scientia sexualis crystallizes exoteric modernist conceptions of consciousness as a material phenomenon amenable to technical intervention, of order as constructed by humans within knowledge, and, most pertinently in this context, of immortality as life within time to be attained through knowing the ‘Truth’ of biological life as defined within boundaries of Modernism’s logics and

\[^{11}\] Our disagreement with Foucault is, then, more linguistic rather than ideational disagreement.


\[^{13}\] Ibid. 70-71.
axioms (i.e. the assumption that if we simply accumulate enough facts, technical expertise and power we can fix the ‘failure modes’ associated with life and consciousness like death and ‘mental illness’).

4.2.3 Trickle Down Discipline?

Foucault makes a note on the objects of sexual discipline (i.e. the class politics of sexual repression):

“If one writes the history of sexuality in terms of repression, relating this repression to the utilization of labor capacity, one must suppose that the sexual controls were the more intense and meticulous as they were directed at the poorer classes.... But this does not appear to be the way things actually happened. On the contrary, the most rigorous techniques were formed and, more particularly, applied first, with the greatest intensity, in the [public eye’s conception of the] economically privileged and politically dominant class. The same can be said of the family as an agency of control and a point of sexual saturation: it was in the “bourgeois” or “aristocratic” family that the sexuality of children and adolescents was first problematized, and feminine sexuality medicalized; ...the first to be alerted to the potential pathology of sex... the first... locus for the psychiatrization of sex”[514]

This shift is observed as “an intensification of the body” in the form of a “technique for maximizing life”—“the body, vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent of the classes that “ruled”; a self-affirmation of one class rather than the enslavement of another”, which put a “high political price” on the “body, sensations, and pleasures, its well-being and survival” that was “eventually extended to others... as a means of social control.”[515] A manifestation of the materialism and survivalism of the dominant class [though Foucault is only describing the face of the marionettes who do the ‘master’s dance’ in the public light rather than the families who form the truly dominant class—the black widows upon whose webs the marionette leaders dance—who are in fact hedo-maniacal perverts who have anything but a ‘repressive’ sexual appetite], its first attempt at an “indefinite extension of strength, vigor, health and life” within time, which was subsequently used to socialize, discipline and regulate the masses; “a political ordering... through affirmation of the self”—the bourgeois “subordinated its soul to sex by conceiving of it as what constituted the soul’s most secret and determinate part.”[516] In more simple terms, the true (invisible) dominant class creates a visible (illusory) dominant class and makes them the object of their disciplinary techniques; once the potentials for thought, behavior and conception of being in this pseudo-dominant class have been established by the true dominant class, their role as the visible top of the hierarchical structure of Paternalist societies allows these norms of thought,

[515] Ibid. 123.
[516] Ibid. 123-125. This point, and its relationship to materialism and survivalism, speaks volumes to the true religion that the elite practice behind the veils of the EXOTERIC traditions they often use to oppress the minds of the masses.
[517] What is this pseudo-dominant class? We often refer to them as the ‘warrior class’—they are folks like the many US presidents who—while possessing traces of Royal Indo-Aryan Bloodlines—lack the ‘pure blood’ status (more than 33%? Closer to 100% and thus the incest?) that allows for entrance into the true dominant class (who do not, like the warrior class, show their faces in public—at least not in the guise of sovereign domination their warrior pawns take on).
behavior and conception of being (as well as the axioms and logics embedded therein) to cascade across society through the many, ‘seemingly autonomous’ mouthpieces of the warrior class (news media, political rhetoric, academic research, etc.). One need only create a small dominant class, articulate the axioms and logics (the world view) they accept and ensure that they have hierarchical dominance over the society they inhabit; the subsequent thoughts, behaviors and conceptions of being of this pseudo-dominant class will reflexively rearticulate-reinterpret the cultural materials (the symbols, words, landscapes, etc.) of the public mind through their thoughts, behaviors (including governance) and conception of being leading to the seemingly autonomous (from the perspective of the true elite class) colonization of the public mind by the axioms and logics of the colonizers. Indeed, this move to create a dominant class who thinks within in the boundaries of thought, behavior and being established by their axioms and logics and then allow said class the seeming ‘freedom’ to rule their society therein has always been a core technique of colonial power (be it directed at territory, bodies or the mind). Rather than overt, direct control of entire publics (ubiquitous positive power), we see control through domination of a ‘seemingly autonomous’ ruling class who acts as a hegemonic-contagion and spawns epistemological colonization at the societal scale. One of the most nefarious dimensions of this technique of power comes in the fact that the visible actors, at least to some degree, needn’t have any idea of the role they are playing in the colonial process as they cannot think outside their axioms and logics (i.e. they cannot but rearticulate cultural materials within the axioms and logics of the true dominant class as they don’t have the ability to think outside of those axioms and logics).

As reality is reduced to the finite world of motion and mind to a technical, material phenomenon, therein, matter is allowed to reign supreme and dominate the soul-mind (Material Sovereignty). No longer is sex a rout to remembrance of and intimacy with our infinite-eternal nature. Instead sex has come to be known as a mode of domination by which humans dominate nature-biology and thus create community... That being said, sex in Modernity is of nature—passionate, ‘irrational’, emotive, chaotic and disordered (like all femininity in Paternal-Modernity). It is thus an essential vector by which the residue of our ‘state of nature’ remains with us; it is our essential connection with the Modernist Garden of Eden; it is, in good Abrahamic-Paternalist form, tied intimately with our fallen nature (as the fall from eternal paradise is accepted as ‘causing’ the sexualization of Adam Kadmon into Adam and Eve and thus creating the potential for sex—i.e. sex is accepted as ontologically dependent on the fall). As a result of this perceived link between sex and humanity’s fallen nature (be it fallen from paradise or still linked to the uncivilized, materially irrational, chaotic (lacking the order of domination...) quality of our ‘state of nature’), domination of sex and through sex becomes an essential fixation in the Paternalist fantasy of ‘escaping the material
prison’. If sex connects us with our Modernist origin in disorder, we must use scientific knowledge to create order in (to dominate) sex and thus ourselves...

4.2.4 Materialism, Biologics and Survivalism
Foucault observes the “transformation of... mechanisms of power” in the wake of the classical age that aim to manifest “power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them”; “power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” This power acts as a “[manager] of life and survival, of bodies and race”, of the “biological existence of a population”, and is “informed by the naked question of survival.” This power is exerted across two axes, “disciplinary: an anatomicopolitics of the body” and a “series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population.” As metaphysics are indeed dead and the potential for immortality beyond time has been forgotten, the search for perpetual life is relocated within biology. As our being is reduced to biology (as matter is located before mind in the causal chain and spirit is forgotten), our ability for self-control and domination of the self (i.e. the Paternalist conception of ‘free will’) is rendered as a technological, scientific process. Instead of regulating the self with ascetic spiritual practices and regulating the group with exoteric religious practices, Modernism provides an ‘anatomo-politics of the body’ as technique for individual regulation (discipline) and biopolitics as a means of group regulation (regulatory controls).

4.2.5 Sexuality and the Soul
Foucault concludes the first volume of The History of Sexuality with a flourish:

“It is through sex... that each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility, ...his identity.... Hence the fact that over the centuries [sex] has become more important than our soul, more important almost than our life; and so it is that all of the world’s enigmas appear frivolous to us compared to this secret, miniscule in each of us, but of a density that makes it more serious than any other. The Faustian pact, whose temptation has been instilled in us by the deployment of sexuality, is now as follows: to exchange life in its entirety for sex itself, for the truth and the sovereignty of sex. Sex is worth dying for. It is in this (purely historical) sense that sex has been imbued with the death instinct. When a long while ago the West discovered love, it bestowed on it a value high enough to make death acceptable; nowadays it is sex that claims this equivalence, the highest of all.... By creating the imaginary element that is “sex,” [“the artificial unity [of] anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, pleasures”], the deployment of sexuality established one of its most essential internal operating principles: the desire for sex—the desire to have it, to have access to it, to discover it, to liberate it, to articulate it in discourse, to formulate it in truth.... We are fastened to the deployment of sexuality that has lifted up from deep within us a sort of mirage in which we think we see ourselves reflected—the dark shimmer of sex.... People one day... will smile perhaps when they

10a Ibid. 137.
11 Ibid. 139.
12 Ibid. 154.
recall that here were men... who believed that therein *(i.e. within sex as a purely biological phenomena--as lacking an epistemological dimension)* resided a truth every bit as precious as the one they had already demanded from the earth, the stars, and the pure forms of their thought... We are often reminded of the countless procedures which Christianity once employed to make us detest the body; but let us ponder all the ruses that were employed for centuries to make us love sex, to make the knowledge of it desirable and everything said about it precious.... [A] monarchy of sex. *[In short, the arc of paternalism can be understood as moving from the dissociation of body from spirit through the valorization of spirit and the demonization of body to blaming the notion of the soul itself for the oppression of 'religion' and using that as an excuse to reduce reality to and valorize the body. Bait and switch, where the bait is the dissociation of body from spirit and the switch comes in the move from valorization of spirit and demonization of the body to axiomatic negation of the spirit and valorization of the body therein.]*\(^{21}\)

This resonates with a note from Haraway:

“Because of the success of experimental sciences, [notes Yerkes], “as a direct result, and evidently because of the myriad discoveries which have been made and the natural urge to apply them practically, man is now on the high road to human engineering...” People have been negligent in accepting responsibility for full knowledge of themselves: but the power of science now makes survival depend on self-control based on the human sciences. *[No longer does self-knowledge refer to the remembrance of or intimacy with Infinite Substance and its emanations. Observation and experience of the internal, intangible dimensions of self*\(^{22}\)* gives way to self-knowledge as a technical, quantifiable knowledge of the biological self; transcendence as a function of transformations in the state of mind catalyzed by experience beyond the veil of sensory experience gives way to transcendence as domination of the biological self and its ‘malfunctions.’]* The paradigmatic human science for Yerkes was psychobiology. Those animals most like people should be used as the most practical producers of knowledge. Availability and social inhibitions prevent most direct use of human beings as experimental objects, but “another consideration is the possibility that study of the other primates may prove the most direct and economical rout to profitable knowledge of ourselves, because in them, basic mechanisms are less obscured by cultural influences.”\(^{23}\)

The axioms and logics embedded in the above quotation from Haraway presume that evolution and consciousness manifest in a static, fixed, steady, unified, etc. relationship with the material world (that the conscious evolution of rational beings follows the same laws as the mechanical evolution of unreasoning life). Kurzweil’s postulation that, in 2045, “the non-biological intelligence we create... will be about a billion times greater than all biological human intelligence” perfectly illustrates this conception of mechanical-conscious evolution in supposing that the linear accumulation of processing power, sensing power, etc. holds a functional relationship with the evolution of the intellect (that intelligence can be understood in purely finite terms as the linear accumulation of analytic capacity).\(^{24}\)


\(^{24}\) Theys, F 2006, *Technocalypse*, 8 August 2016, [http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0899298/](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0899298/), 5:35-5:48. It is clear that such conceptions of consciousness and intelligence have, at least in part, trickled into the academy: for example, the ‘eminent’ Cultural Geographer David Ley (who Neil Smith ‘endearingly’ referred to as *The Reverend...*) has argued (in seminar discussions at UBC) that abstract thought and intelligence are unrelated. ‘Intelligence’, then, for Modernists like Kurzweil and Ley, seems to encapsulate the range of consciousness
In the rise of Postmodern-Positivist Modernism—wherein everyone from right wing actors like Donald Rumsfeld through seemingly a-political centrists like Kurzweil and into left wing scholars like Aihwa Ong and David Ley are reflexively operationalizing the notion that form cannot manifest the same way in different contexts (for Rumsfeld this comes in noting that US democracy cannot be simply dropped into the context of Iraq, for Kurzweil in noting that the accumulation of analytic capacity is at times indeed nonlinear, for Ong in arguing that the term neoliberalism cannot be used in the context of east Asian capitalism and for Ley in his simplistic recapitulation of Ong’s basic argument in noting that the term gentrification cannot be used in the context of Hong Kong)–the linear reductionism of early modernism is displaced by a nonlinear conception of material reductionism...

This new sensibility for context and the nonlinearity of manifestation has not, however, displaced functionalist manufactured ignorance of the substance or state of consciousness. Mind may accumulate in a nonlinear fashion, but it is still known only in terms of visible manifestations (in terms of the actions produced)–linear reductionism is out, but epistemological and cognitive reductionism are only reinforced...

For example, Kurzweil argues

“An analysis of the history of technology shows that technological change is exponential, contrary to the common-sense “intuitive linear” view. So we won’t experience 100 years of progress in the 21st century — it will be more like 20,000 years of progress (at today’s rate). The “returns,” such as chip speed and cost-effectiveness, also increase exponentially. There’s even exponential growth in the rate of exponential growth. Within a few decades, machine intelligence will surpass human intelligence, leading to The Singularity — technological change so rapid and profound it represents a rupture in the fabric of human history. The implications include the merger of biological and nonbiological intelligence, immortal software-based humans, and ultra-high levels of intelligence that expand outward in the universe at the speed of light.”

while at the same time being defined as nothing more than the simple capacity to accumulate facts and make subsequent calculations... In short, mind as Telematic Subjectivities...

Russia Today Staff 2015, “Rumsfeld admits Bush was wrong pushing democracy on Iraq”, Russia Today.


4.2.6 States of Mind, not a ‘Place of Mind’

The only difference between animal and human cognition—from the Modernist perspective of the early primatologist—lies in the accumulation of ‘cultural materials (in the accumulation of force and complexity in the brain);’ in this light we can understand the model valorized by Yerkes and outlined by Haraway as defining the difference between primates and humans in terms of the difference between a small timber frame cabin and a massive timber frame mansion (they are of the same substance, timber, but one has far more of the substance and is thus arranged in a more complex pattern)... Rather than studying consciousness without regard for its substance or state it may be more appropriate to study consciousness in terms of its resemblance of changes in the state of matter. In other words, it seems that the difference between mineral and vegetative life, or between vegetative and animal life, or between animal life and reasoned life is aptly understood in terms of the difference in dimensional quality between solid, liquid, gas and plasma. In the context of modeling, we can thus understand modeling the potential of human consciousness upon a sample from the Modernist general public (i.e. a public whose potential for conscious evolution has been negated) as attempting to model H₂O in all of its states (solid, liquid, gas, plasma) using data derived from studying only ice; our conceptions of ‘H₂O Nature’ and its potential modes of existence become reduced to its least energetically enlivened potential state (i.e. we know H₂O as just ice rather than its potential to exist as liquid, gas or plasma in the same way that we know the seed as just a seed rather than in its potential to store energy and evolve into a tree); attempts to model human potentials upon those of plants and animals run into an even more serious version of this problem. We have made a Faustian pact (that famous ‘deal with the devil’ to ‘know all things’ within the bounds of the peripatetic mind) with science and sex (especially as manifest in our genetic history); in the end, we find ourselves in the same miserable state as Dr. Faustus—where peripatetic knowledge of the material world and its many pleasures cannot connect our live and its meaning to the Infinite Substance and its emanations (to truth and eternity). In this deal with the devil, sex has replaced love, biology has replaced

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528 Colleagues who have walked the University of British Columbia campus will recognize the UBC slogan: ‘a place of mind’. Modernity manifest...

529 See, for example, Ray Kurzweil’s graphics wherein he draws a functional relationship between AI processing power and AI intelligence.


consciousness and fact has replaced Truth; survival (i.e. competition and the desire for material domination therein) replaces love as the force that binds humanity...

4.2.7 Love Sex and Paternalism in Modernity
Haraway notes the ways in which the paternalistic, dominating characterization of love promoted by Abrahamic-Hellenic dogma was rearticulated within the ‘Modernist Ontological Regime’ via primatology.

“Like many primatologists, Yerkes loved chimpanzees in a serious and life-changing way. In them nature, medicine, hygiene, and reform converged in a personal and professional satisfaction. This love was intrinsically bound up with power; the colonizing logic of paternalistic domination—a kind of civilizing mission—pervaded every level of Yerkes’s science, including the personal relation of human being and animal. This domination stood as the foundation of rational cooperative society, of adult love. Natural authority which produced the benefits of civilization must be accepted. The mark of acceptance was appreciation of the good done from above. The perfect act of appreciation was total response to the lover who remade the beloved in his own image. The beloved was patient. Not accidentally, the primate story echoed primal themes in monotheistic religion, for there sex, power, and fatherhood were not strangers either.

Yerkes wrote moving passages describing the attitude of chimpanzees who received fair treatment, who were given useful work to do (participation in scientific experiments seemed best here), and who received medical attention—from human doctors—when they were sick. It takes little imagination to substitute the words, child, slave, patient, or woman for chimpanzee in a rationally managed household to understand the structure of the primate laboratory dedicated to human engineering. In all of this, Yerkes was benignly typical, representative of the bet in Progressive reform in America.”

Man is (yet again…) unproblematically accepted as the highest potential manifestation of mind. All other forms, women, slaves, ‘children’ (a relatively flexible category in relation to the target of the Modernist slave mind...), animals and ‘nature’, must submit themselves to the domination of man even as ‘man must submit himself to the domination of God’ (to the top of the Paternalist’s Pyramidal Hierarchy...). Grace for all beings that are not human men is subservience in and appreciation of domination... Nothing has changed. The world beyond white men (and in contemporary liberal-nihilist modernity women who are willing to ‘masculinize’ their appearance and behavior to enter into the spheres of power as (in Modernity) actions defines the substance of mind as male...)—nature, vegetation, animals, females, males that are not considered white enough, etc.—is still to be dominated. Rather than Christ and Christianity, Modernists bring Democracy, Capitalism, Modernist Agricultural Planning (i.e. impelled starvation), etc., and, first and foremost, the Modernist regime of axioms and logics (the regime of thought) that make these regimes of practice possible to think. The Nation State has in part replaced The Church, but the role of the white men (again in the reduction of mind to its tangible manifestations one might say that being a white man only requires, at least at one level (this is

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not in any way shape or form some absurd ‘post racial’ society argument), that one act like a white man in Modernity—that one accept the axioms and logics of Modernity and act therein).

As the paternalists through history have ‘loved the world’ through slavery, colonialism, marriage and other modes of domination, so the Modernist ‘loves’ the world by forcing it into democracy, authoritarianism, capitalism, socialism, communism modernist agricultural planning, population science (eugenics), static geometrical form (i.e. into modernist social organization, thought, behavior and conception of being) and most essentially the axioms and logics of Modernity and the potentials for reality established therein. Modernism ‘loves’ the world through promoting ‘human rights’ and killing all those groups who will not accept the banal ontological oppression embedded static, liberal notions of ‘human rights’. Modernism ‘loves’ the world with rape, murder and other forms of violent destruction, for it is only by dominating the world that we can render it rational and ‘good’. Humanity has lost all semblance of a cogent understanding of love in Modernity. And so the world cries in an attempt to extinguish its burning carcass...

4.2.8 Alchemical Gold, Mineral Gold and Biological Gold
The archetypal aim of Alchemy—from Medieval Europe to Ancient China—is the transmutation of lead into gold. This symbolism is multifaceted, but in essence this transformation represents the purification of body and soul-mind through spiritual practice. The state of gold is eternal and immortal. While the fetishization of gold in the religious antecedents of modernism—Alchemy holds a special role here in that it marks the bridge of esoteric Abrahamic and Hellenic philosophy and spirituality with the modern practice of Chemistry that is so essential in attempts to attain immortality via relative immortalization of the body—has remained, ‘gold’ has been rendered a physical fixation.

“It is no wonder that Yerkes considered that “from the vantage ground of our incomplete knowledge and limited understanding, these animals seem like psychobiological gold mines.” Mining is a common trope for modern science. Gold, the chief fetish of colonial imaginations, here is sought in the tropical primate body.”

As the process of human cultivation was externalized (i.e. viewed as dominating our physical being and physical environment rather than cultivating remembrance and intimacy with the eternal Self), the gold sought by humanity was also externalized. In Modernity, gold now manifests (first and foremost) in biological and mineral form rather than the spiritual-psychical form of its Alchemical past. Whether conscious or no, the connection (via aeonian resemblance) between gold and immortality has survived the atheistic rearticulation of religion and spirituality in the in the axioms and logics of Modernity; the golden energy of immortality is now to be found in genetic strands.

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4.3 Debates in Human Nature

4.3.1 Primates and Human Nature
If we may diverge for a moment from the topics at hand, it seems important to provide some sort of a frame upon which we can understand the spectrum of human nature debates through presently recorded human history. On the one hand we have the notion that human nature is naturally evil. On the other we have the notion that human nature is (at least in essence and potential) good. If human nature is naturally evil, we must learn to dominate our nature in order create a new, ‘intelligently’ designed ‘good nature’. Where the Christians argued we have an evil human nature because of original sin and our perversion of divine law, Modernist argue that we are evil because mind emerged from uncivilized, chaotic ‘state of nature’ that forms the Modernist Garden of Eden and the evolution of the brain therein.

“[Yerkes] primate laboratory was meant to be a pilot plant, a demonstration project for rational re-design of human nature.

It has always been a feature of our plan for the use of the chimpanzee as an experimental animal to shape it intelligently to specification instead of trying to preserve its natural characteristics. We have believed it important to convert the animal into as nearly ideal a subject for biological research as is practicable. And with this intent has been associated the hope that eventual success might serve as an effective demonstration of the possibility of recreating man himself in the image of a generally acceptable idea.... ....The really important things for us to present are recognition and an active acceptance of the principles of modifiability, controllability, and consequentially improvability, of human nature.

This was the ideal of service built into the laboratory architecture, social relations among animals and people, cage design, committee service, experimental protocols, and publication practices in the entwined paternal practices of love and knowledge in the Yale Laboratories of Primate Biology.”

There is no reality, no force, no energy, no form, etc. via which human nature could be articulated as essentially ‘good’ in the boundaries of reality established by the axioms and logics of Modernity. As a result, human nature (mind) is now conceived of as a product of the chaotic, irrational, emotive, etc. ‘state of nature’ that is the antithesis of the good (i.e. of order) in Modernism. In short, human nature cannot but be viewed as evil (as chaotic) from the perspective of reality established by the axioms and logics of Modernity.

Meng Zi provides us with a beautiful conception of human nature as, in essence, good:

“1. The goodness of human nature. Daoists had attacked Confucius’s stress on Humanity and Righteousness by claiming that these were not dispositions that people naturally possessed. Further, both Daoists and Mohists saw the Confucian stress on Ritual as an attempt to shape human being in artificial and coercive ways. Mencius

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Haraway, D 1989, Primate Visions, Routledge, p. 64.
argued forcefully that all people do indeed have spontaneous ethical responses and that these prove that we are actually born with a moral sense. His most famous “proof” of this claimed that all of us would agree that if we were suddenly catch a glimpse of a child about to fall into a well and die, we would – without any reflection whatever – experience an instantaneous rush of fear and anxiety. Mencius interpreted this as the working of an innate moral sensitivity that was universal in all people. Building on this example, Mencius constructed a revised model of Confucian ideas of ren, righteousness (yi), and Ritual li, which cast all of them as elaborations of natural dispositions that all people possess from birth.”

“THE FLOOD-LIKE QI
Gongsun Chou said, “May I presume to inquire how you, Sir, excel?”
“I can interpret what speech means,” replied Mencius, “and I nurture well my flood-like qi.”
Gongsun Chou asked, “What do you mean by ‘flood-like qi’?”
“It is hard to describe,” said Mencius. “This is a qi that is as great and hard as can be. If one nurtures it by means of straightforward action and never injures it, then it will fill all between heaven and earth. It is a qi that is a companion to righteousness and the Dao. Without these, it will starve away. It is generated through the long accumulation of acts of right (yi). It is not something that can be seized through a single righteous act. If in your actions there is any sense of inadequacy in your heart, it will starve away.
“This is why I say that Gaozi never really understood righteousness. He looked for it in external standards other than the heart. But your task must always be before you and you must not go making small adjustments. The task of nurturing this qi must never be forgotten by the heart, but you must not meddle and try to help it grow. Don’t be like the simpleton from the state of Song.
“There was a man of Song who was concerned that the sprouts in his field were not growing well, so he went and tugged at each one. He went home utterly exhausted and said, ‘Oh, I’ve made myself ill today! I’ve been out helping the sprouts to grow.’ His sons rushed out to look and found the stalks all shriveled up.
“There are few in the world who do not ‘help their sprouts grow.’ There are those who do not ‘weed’ – they have simply given the whole task up as useless. But the ones who tug on the sprouts to help them grow – they are worse than useless, for they do harm!”

“2A.6 Mencius said: All people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others. The former kings had such a moral sense and thus they devised means of government that would not allow people to suffer. If a ruler were to employ the moral sense that makes human suffering undurable in order to implement such humane government, he would find bringing the entire empire into order to be simple, as though he were turning the world in his hand.

Why do I say that all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others? Well, imagine now a person who all of a sudden sees a small child on the verge of falling down into a well. Any such person would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay. This feeling would not be one that they summoned up in order to establish good relations with the child’s parents. They would not purposefully feel this way in order to win the praise of their friends and neighbors. Nor would they feel this way because the screams of the child would be unpleasant.

Now by imagining this situation we can see that one who lacked a sense of dismay in such a case could simply not be a person. And I could further show that anyone who lacked the moral sense of shame could not be a person; anyone who lacked a moral sense of deference could not be a person; anyone who lacked a moral sense of right and wrong could not be a person.

Now the sense of dismay on another’s behalf is the seed of ren planted within us, the sense of shame is the seed of righteousness (yi), the sense of deference is the seed of ritual li, and the sense of right and wrong is the seed of wisdom. Everyone possesses these four moral senses just as they possess their four limbs. For one to possess such moral senses and yet to claim that he cannot call them forth is to rob oneself; and for a person to claim that his ruler is incapable of such moral feelings is to rob his ruler.

As we possess these four senses within us, if only we realize that we need to extend and fulfill them then the force of these senses will burst through us like a wildfire first catching or a spring first bursting forth through the

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536 Ibid. 24.
ground. If a person can bring these impulses to fulfillment, they will be adequate to bring all the four quarters under his protection. But if a person fails to develop these senses, he will fail to protect even his own parents.³³⁶

In short, Meng Zi argues that our emotions—in being articulated as a function of sympathy and antipathy with the Infinite Substance and its emanations—render humans as essentially good-natured. Conscious evolution, then, can in one sense be understood as the cultivation these sprouts of goodness (how to cultivate these sprouts is a topic for another time...).

4.3.2 Virtue Ethics, Deontology and Consequentialism
In Virtue Ethics, McDowell argues, “although the point of engaging in ethical reflection still lies in the interest of the question 'How should one live?', that question is necessarily approached via the notion of a virtuous person. A conception of right conduct is grasped, as it were, from the inside out.”³³⁷ Van Norden makes a similar argument, noting that

“In order to understand what is distinctive of virtue ethics, it is easiest to begin by explaining what the alternatives to it are: consequentialism and deontology. Most simply, consequentialism and deontology emphasize what kinds of actions one ought to do, while virtue ethics is about what kind of person one ought to be.”³³⁸

“To put it another way, consequentialism and rule-deontology are theories about right action, while virtue ethics is a theory about good character.”³³⁹ In short, ethical behavior comes as a function of conscious evolution and the actualization of more subtle epistemological orders like Reason, Rational Intuition, Wu-Wei and Love that render an individual as virtuous (virtue coming in the ability to harmonize the Infinite with the Finite, which is to say the ability to assuage antipathy and enhance sympathy).

As an aside, we should note that virtue ethics has some serious implications for critical theory and social reform. “Critical Theory is concerned with the ability of human beings to reflect on their social life for the purpose of discovering... ‘what we should do and how we should live.’”³⁴⁰ If we hope to make the world a 'better place' (i.e. a place with more virtuous beings and thus more sympathy with the infinite), then we must recognize that the only means to this desired end is the ‘social production’ of virtuous subjects. Critical theory and social reform, then, must be centered on the production of virtuous subjects (i.e. actualization of the potential for conscious evolution) rather than the direct,

‘practical’ amelioration of social problems—an to produce a peaceful society we must focus our attention on producing virtuous subjects rather than policing the transgressions of those who lack virtue as a direct function of their socialization (which in Modernity negates the potential for conscious evolution).

Virtue Ethics became starkly impossible to think in the rise of Modernism. There is no longer an objective standard for truth, meaning, value, etc., as the Infinite Substance and its emanations have been axiomatically denied. As such, Modernity marks the death of the potential for true ethics or morality and indeed gives birth to a regime in which Yerkes argued that “ethics should be thought of as an extension of biological sciences of function: physiology, psychology, sociology” (which is to say that ethics should be thought of in egotistical, biological terms—i.e. terms that are dimensionally incommensurable with virtue ethics and, when atomized from the rest of our being, ‘the good’).

Modernity leaves us with two unsatisfactory replacements for Virtue Ethics: Deontology and Consequentialism. Deontology proposes that ethical behavior consists of acting from a set of shared rules. Consequentialism proposes that ethical behavior comes as a function of the consequences of an individual’s actions. In both cases, however, there is no objective standard for articulating the value or meaning of either rules or consequences given the implicit nihilism of Modernity and its axioms-logics. We are thus left with a form of Liberal Nihilism wherein ethics are, in practical terms, what ever a person wants them to be in order to legitimize their own existence (“Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law” under the veneer of ‘objective truth’ that in actuality lacks the potential for objectivity in its finite foundation in the world of motion, passing time and physical space).

That being said, Virtue Ethics can in one sense be considered a form of deontology. The law just happens to be Infinite Substance and its emanations rather than a set of finite rules created by humanity within and upon the ‘standard’ (or lack there of) of the finite world of motion. Our thesis that Modernism is simply a dimensionally reductive rearticulation of the Paternalist tradition, then, remains unproblematic as deontology and consequentialism can be understood as the rearticulation and atomization of virtue ethics within the logics and axioms of Modernity and the potentials for reality, truth and goodness established therein.

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16 The ‘Law of Thelma’...
4.4 Artificially Intelligent Killer Drones

4.4.1 ‘Ethical’ Automated Drones and the Office of Naval Research
In the normative US discourse on automated weapon systems there are two dominant frames: the first is of automated weapon systems that retain a ‘human in the loop’ when selecting and destroying targets; the second is of automated weapon systems that cut humans out of the loop and autonomously select and attack targets. The ‘human in the loop’ frame is at present dominant in official discourses (US Military, US Government Officials, etc.). The wholly autonomous frame is at the fore of research and design projects (e.g. research funded by the Office for Naval Research (ONR) at institutions including Tufts, Brown and Georgia Tech). There are two important points: the first is the fact that both sides of this dialectical debate set the agenda for discussions of military ethics at the level of individual behaviors (rather than the implicit, systemic lack of ethics that typifies US military and the entirety of its existence); the second is the fact that these drone projects attempt to frame the actions of the US military as ‘scientifically ethical’ (i.e. these projects attempt to ‘speak the truth of ethics’ in the scientific terms that articulate the boundaries of Modernist veridiction and parrhesia)...

For a drone to be ethical within the Virtue Ethics paradigm it would have to be virtuous, and for a drone to be virtuous it would require the capacity for conscious evolution and the actualization of epistemological potential therein; in sort, the drone would need spirit and a soul-mindootnote{That is soul and mind in the more normative Anglophone division of humans into body, mind and soul.}... In the simplest terms the algorithm’s ‘mind’ and the human mind are of a different ‘substance and state’ that contains very different epistemological potentials (at least in algorithmic epistemology’s presently public facing articulation...). The algorithms finite, numerical field of dimensional consistency is dimensionally incommensurable with the relatively infinite (from the perspective of the finite world of motion in which algorithms exist) dimensional quality of the human mind. Again, though it is beyond the scope of this particular study, this issue of the social implications of handing over decision-making power to ‘minds’ that lack the capacity for empathy, intuition, love, etc. (and thus lack the potential for virtuous or, thus, ethical action).

4.4.2 Legalist Deontology
Deontology, simply, proposes moral and ethical behavior consists of following shared rules. Deontology can manifest in many forms; for example, a virtue ethics conception of deontology might propose certain precepts (abstract rules derived from the Infinite Substance and is emanations) that the ethical subject must harmonize with a given context. One form of deontology that we must grapple
with in order to understand how it could be possible to think of the US Military and its drones as
eethical is ‘Legalist Deontology.’ ‘Legalist Deontology’—one of the only forms of ‘objective’ ethics
possible within Modernism (though the standard of ‘objectivity’ in this case is of course the finite world
of motion, passing time and physical space and the ‘order of knowledge’ we create therein)—argues
that ethical behavior is derived from following the law. When researchers in the ONR project say
that they are going to make the drone scientifically ethical they mean that they are going to make the
drone ‘scientifically follow the law’...

4.4.3 Legitimate Dissent?
Let us presume that everyone in the US military power structure is not so foolish as to actually believe
these narratives about ‘ethical drones’ (we have had enough friends in US military intelligence
psychological operations teams to realize that the military elite almost never believe a thing they feed to
the US public...), and that the entire project is indeed very likely a psychological operation carried out
by Military Intelligence, the DIA, and other such groups whose job it is to manufacture public consent
for the US War Machine (i.e. history and personal experience demonstrate that taking the US Military
as its word is a rather foolish and naïve approach...). To frame drones as ethical in legalist
deontological terms is to impose the assumption that US violence, war, imperialism, etc. are inherently
ethical in being articulated by law, and that the only ethical problem is in the individuals (human or
robot) who perpetrate these acts of violence (and thus fail to follow the law)—it is to critique the US war
machine form ‘the sphere of legitimate controversy’ (which reduces systemic problems to the
individuals and precise policies by which they are enacted—which atomizes agency at the local-
individual level in perfect Neoliberal form). The western mass media, for example, focuses its
coverage and analysis on individual ‘terrorist organizations’ rather than the nexus of US, UK, French,
Israeli, etc. war crimes (military, economic, cultural, ontological and epistemological), money, weapons
and training that creates the potential for such mass, violent grass roots movements (i.e. the ontological
dependence of terrorism on the nation states who purport to fight it). In a similar vein, the western
mass media focuses on individual leaders like Saddam, Muammar and Bashar (the use of their
personal rather than family name is intentional...) rather than the larger context of western colonialism-

As a most vulgar example of ‘Legal Deontology’, UBC Geography Professor Dan Hiebert
(http://www.geog.ubc.ca/persons/dan-hiebert/) argued along the lines that supporting CSIS [the Canadian
intelligence service] is ethically differentiated from supporting Al Qaeda because ‘Al Qaeda doesn’t follow
the law’ in a lecture where he also, most demonstrably, introduced his talk by arguing that theory and philosophy
are a waste of time—thus the abject poverty of mind associated with not cultivating our epistemic potentials
through conscious evolution that allows the Modernist mind to ‘think the that’ of the axioms and logics it
receives through socialization in Modernity...).
imperialism that put them into power, armed them and sustained their political foundation through the radicalization produced by their colonial-imperial modes of oppression.™ In the same vein US military and intelligence atrocities like My Lai are (in official political rhetoric, mass media coverage, academia, etc.) critiqued at the level of individual transgressions rather than at the level of the overall ethical salience of the enterprise and its systemic foundations (i.e. the rape culture that is implicit in the more general fold of Paternalist culture and especially in Paternalist-Military culture).

Daniel Hallin’s theory of media spheres provides an analytic model to understand this individualization of critique. Hallin, drawing from his research on media coverage of the Vietnam War, posits three spheres of media coverage: the ‘Sphere of Consensus’, the ‘Sphere of Legitimate Controversy’ and the ‘Sphere of Deviance’.™ While we take exception with Hallin’s (and many of his media communications studies colleagues in the US...) uncritical use of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘balanced’ in describing the actual—rather than rhetorical—quality of US Media practice, the general form of his three spheres analytic is useful:

“The province of objectivity is the middle region, which can be called the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy. This is the region of electoral contests and legislative debates, of issues recognized as such by the major established actors of the American political process. The limits of this sphere are defined primarily by the two-party system—by the parameters of debate between and within the Democratic and Republican parties—as well as by the decision-making process in the bureaucracies of the executive branch. Within this region, objectivity and balance reign as the supreme journalistic virtues.”™

“Bounding the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy on one side is what can be called the Sphere of Consensus. This is the region of “motherhood and apple pie”; it encompasses those social objects not regarded by the journalists and most of the society as controversial. Within this region journalists do not feel compelled either to present opposing views or to remain disinterested observers. On the contrary, the journalist’s role is to serve as an advocate or celebrant of consensus values.”™

“Beyond the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy lies the Sphere of Deviance, the realm of those political actors and views which journalists and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard. It is, for example, written into the FCC’s guidelines for application of the Fairness Doctrine that “it is not the Commission’s intention to make time available to Communists or to the Communist viewpoints.” Here neutrality once again falls away, and journalism becomes, to borrow a phrase from Talcott Parsons, a “boundary-maintaining mechanism: it plays the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus. It marks out and defends the limits of acceptable political conflict.”™

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™ We will leave the murky question of intent to those who operate within the Black Projects that form the underbelly of the US Military and Intelligence establishment.


™ Ibid. 116

™ Ibid. 117

™ Ibid.
We can understand the two poles of the model, consent and deviance, as mutually constitutive (recalling Foucault’s notions concerning the mutually constitutive relations held between positive and negative forms of power). The sphere of consensus supports the US war effort from the conservative (Old White Man God) side of the dialectical hegemony (i.e. acceptance of and attempts to ‘conserve’—in the sense typified by eugenics and white nationalist movements—the status quo); the sphere of deviance supports the US war effort from the progressive (Luciferian) side of the dialectical hegemony (i.e. it articulates the boundaries of discontent at the individual rather than systemic level).

The development of ‘scientifically ethical drones’, then, can be understood as a product of the sphere of legitimate controversy (the progressive, Luciferian, seemingly autonomous and rebellious front of dialectical hegemony in Modernity) in coming as an attempt to solve problems of military ethics at the ‘individual level’. Taken together, the parrhesiatic identity of the scientist and his scientific mode of veridiction and the notion of ‘Legalist Deontology’ allow the ‘progressive side’ of the dialectic allow the US Military and Political Establishment to frame the development of killer drones to serve the colonial-imperial desires of the elite class as ethical; in so doing they also create the veneer of linear social progress that lies at the heart of the Myths of modernity and the acceptance of Modernist oppression in the US public mind... Again, all of the above is only possible to think in the axioms and logics of Modernity and their reduction of reality to a state in which the unreasoning algorithm can be understood as potentially ‘ethical’ without the potential for ‘virtue’.
4.5 Religion, AI and *Man* as God

4.5.1 Man Creates Machines in his ‘Own Image’

“Ideologies common in science claim that politics and religion have been transcended by the rational discourse of modern science. But rather than having been transcended, the images, narratives, and functions of religion and politics luxuriate in science. Denial and repression are not transcendence.”

In the exoteric Abrahamic (and many other Paternalist traditions) traditions God is the male creator, the grand architect of the universe; *he is* creative design. In Modernism, as a function of its axioms and logics, *Man* is now creator and grand architect of the universe... While the patriarchal, paternelistic, dominating, othering, etc. qualities of stories concerning creation go unchanged, God is dead and Man-God reigns supreme... *Man* creates order through and within knowledge and its ability to dominate the chaos of manifestation. *Man* creates consciousness within the machine (he makes machine ‘in his own image’). The following quotes illustrate this rearticulation of creationism in the axioms and logics of Modernity (it is clear that the final two quotes, at least rhetorically, track more towards the esoteric, theological, invisible underbelly of Modernism than they do towards the visible, exoteric face of Modernism that we have been treating with in this study.

The introduction to the official trailer for the movie *Ex Machina* argues, “to erase the line between man and machine is to obscure the line between men and gods.” Richard Seed, most famous for his involvement in human cloning debates, argues “God made man in his own image. God intended for man to become one with God. We are going to become one with God. Cloning and the reprograming of DNA is the first serious step to becoming one with God. Yes, we are going to become Gods, period.” Yuval Noah Harari, professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, recently noted

“God is extremely important because without religious myth you can’t create society *(i.e. it was how we created order within human knowledge before the rise of modernism where we re-cognized what we were actually doing all that time...)*. Religion is the most important invention of humans. As long as humans believed they relied more and more on these gods they were controllable”, “…What we see in the last few centuries is humans becoming more powerful and they no longer need the crutches of the gods. Now we are saying we do not need God, just technology.” [RT paraphrases Harari’s analysis of the implications of these changes in the relationship of humanity to technology as follows:] “In the future the rich may be immortal while the poor would die out.”

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552 Genesis, 1: 26-27, KJV.
553 *Ex Machina*, Movie Trailer, 29 September 2015, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EoQuVnKhxaM](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EoQuVnKhxaM)
554 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Seed
555 Russia Today Staff 2015, “Rich people will become immortal ‘god-like’ cyborgs in 200 years - Historian”, Russia Today.
556 Ibid.
557 Ibid.
Anne Foerst—who was a theological advisor at MIT—provides us with an elucidating ethnographic note:  

“In that building over there, in the classical AI lab, I know at least four people who claim to be descendants of Rabbi Löw who is known as the first cabbalist to actually build a golem. Rabbi Löw lived in Prague during the 15th or 16th century and there are a couple different stories about his golem and one story is when the golem died he put the dead golem in the attic of the Prague Synagogue and he created a sentence to revive the golem at the end of all times and a couple of people in that building including Marvin Minsky have been told that sentence on the day of their bar mitzvah. So they have been told by their fathers or grandfathers that they would be the ones to revive the golem. And of course then you can easily draw the parallel to AI... Two people who actually claim to be descendants, one is Gerry Sussman a professor here (at MIT) and the other one is Joel Moses who is right now provost of MIT were sitting together and they wrote the sentence they have been told to revive the golem and it was exactly the same so this tradition has actually survived for over 400 years... There is one story where the golem comes to life and has on its forehead the terms ‘yalweh elohim emet’ which means god the lord is truth and he comes to life and removes the aleph the first letter of the term emet from his forehead so that the remaining sentence means god the lord is dead. And his builders are of course totally horrified and said what’s going on, I mean how can you say god is dead? And he says well we are created in god’s image and we adore god because god was able to build something so fantastic as us, but if you are now able to rebuild yourself the people will adore you for building that and not god any more. But as soon as god is not adored anymore he is as good as dead.”

Beyond the clear anthropomorphization of creationism in modernism (the rich white man, in his capacity for physical ‘immortality’ and the creation-manifestation of consciousness, is now God), the above quotations elucidate another very important issue. Where the general public is socialized with the Exoteric Modernist regime of axioms and logics (order within knowledge, language and meaning hold a functional relationship amenable for literal translation, reduction of reality to the finite world of motion, passing time and physical space, peripatetic epistemic reductionism, etc.)—be they left wing atheist scientists or right wing literal interpreters of the bible—the elite class and their agents in the scientific community still (by and large) see the world through axioms and logics that are more coherent with the esotericism of authors like Descartes, Bacon, Leibnitz, etc. than the public-slave axioms and logics of Modernity. Dimensional reduction of reality and peripatetic epistemological reductionism are only for the masses—‘for the goyim’. The elite levels of society and the Indo-Aryan blood class that inhabits them, be they academic, political, police-intelligence-military, organized crime, etc., far from having moved into acceptance of Exoteric Modernism, actively applied the esoteric knowledge of mysteries (for example, knowledge concerning the ways in which ritual-practice can be used to create and transform (cause a state change in) epistemological norms) in their perpetual, Paternalist search for power.

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18 Foerst, A, Staff Profile, St. Bonaventure University, 30 September 2015, http://www.cs.sbu.edu/afoerst/  
4.5.2 The Modernist Omega Point, Noospheric Singularity

Verner Vinge first introduced the term ‘Technological Singularity’ in his novel *Marooned in Realtime* and subsequently developed it an essay “The Coming Technological Singularity” during the late 80’s and early 90’s. Zoltan Istvan describes Vinge’s conception of the ‘Technological Singularity’ as “a moment when growing superintelligence renders our human models of understanding obsolete [(i.e. a change in the state of consciousness on earth)].” In his 2005 book *The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology*, Kurzweil defines the ‘Technological Singularity’ in more essentially Modernists terms as:

"... a future period during which the pace of technological change will be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly transformed. Although neither utopian nor dystopian, this epoch will transform the concepts that we rely on to give meaning to our lives, from our business models to the cycle of human life, including death itself."

For Kevin Kelly, founder of Wired Magazine, the singularity is a moment in which "all the change in the last million years will be superseded by the change in the next five minutes." Oxford Transhumanist James Martin defines the singularity as "a break in human evolution that will be caused by the staggering speed of technological evolution." It seems, then, that while the term comes to be understood within the boundaries of mind provided by a given world view (i.e. in Modernity it is understood in technological terms), the basic idea remains a conception of a moment in which the dimensional quality of reality changes (be that the pace of human evolution or our mode of understanding the world) in a manner that renders modeling the future based on the past impossible.

To begin our interrogation of Singularity thought in contemporary society we must first recall our above discussion of De Chardin’s ‘omega point’:

"Teilhard’s viewpoint allows him to depict an imaginary evolution of the noosphere. The psychic, interior side of matter or so-called 'radial energy' directs matter to higher levels of organisation which culminate in the end of the evolutionary process. This end is external to the evolution itself. The Earth's noosphere will be replaced by a super-mind and will coalesce into a so-called Omega-Point.

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33 http://motherboard.vice.com/read/what-if-one-country-achieves-the-singularity-first?utm_source=mbfb


36 Ibid.
This will be the end and the fulfillment of the spirit of the earth. The end of the world: the wholesale internal introversion upon itself of the noosphere, which has simultaneously reached the uttermost limit of its complexity and centrality. The end of the world: the overflow of equilibrium, detaching the mind, fulfilled at last, from its material matrix, so that it will henceforth rest with all its weight on God-Omega.

“[...] the end of all life on our globe, the death of the planet, the ultimate phase of the phenomenon of man.”

Teilhard saw the noosphere as a transitional stage of evolution from the biosphere to the Omega-Point. He describes the noosphere as a layer over the biosphere, because to him it is the beginning of a separation process. The radial energy enters a stage of visible dominance and partial separation on the way to total independence.

The Omega-Point concept in the theory of Teilhard follows logically from the dichotomous characters of matter and energy which appear at the atomic level. The interior side of matter, of atoms, implies the constant presence of Omega from the very beginning of the universe. "A present and real noosphere goes with a real and present centre."24

This is the principle of the insistent movement towards the super-mind in the course of evolution and beyond the evolutionary mechanisms. The transcendental Omega 'slips out' of the material, spatial-temporal world, finally resulting in a pure state of being without any material constituents. Therefore, an and less life within the material world would be a theoretical impossibility for Teilhard.25

Terence Mckenna—describing the Singularity as an hour in which more change happens in human knowledge than occurred in the past tens of thousands of years, defines the Singularity (in and of the unimaginable quality of such a rapid pace of change from the relative perspective of humanity) as

“a place where the normal rules of modeling break down. Modern religions have anticipated the singularity by calling it the eschaton or the end of times [see our above discussion on the Apocalypse in section 3.23...]. Technological communities have anticipated the singularity by thinking in terms of Artificial Intelligences.... In whatever form it takes, we seem to be on the cusp of a dramatic evolutionary leap into a deeper level order of complexity than biology or biology plus culture has been able to provide. We are on the brink of something truly awesome and unknown.”26

The Singularity, then, seems to represent a technological omega point or eschaton in the Modernist ‘world view’— “the rapture of the nerds.”27 It understood as the move into a new dimensional quality of existence (i.e. to cross an infinity membrane into that which is relatively infinite from our previous dimensional perspective).28 The great universities of the Catholic Church in Europe have been replaced by Singularity University and its Moffitt Field, Silicon Valley neighbors like Stanford, UCSC, Carnegie Mellon, Google, NASA, Lockheed Martin, etc.

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216 Ibid. 273
“Technology is evolving faster and faster. Not surprising when you consider that today more scientists are doing research than in all of history combined and using superior instruments and communication tools. New technologies like biogenetics, artificial intelligence, implants and nanotechnology have advanced vastly in the past few decades. These various technologies seem now to be converging towards one goal, to overcome human limits and to create new, higher forms of life...”

Modernity again seems to be a rearticulation of traditional esoteric terms-concepts (in this case ‘omega point’ and the eschaton) in the boundaries for reality and meaning established by the axioms and logics of Modernity.

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4.6 Statistical Irrationality and Society

4.6.1 Statistical Irrationality
In the context of contemporary society—where ‘smart cities’, drones, social media and the like play an increasingly intimate role in the everyday life of humans—statistics have become one of the primary materials for human epistemological production. At the socio-systemic level, be it government practice or academic thought, our global society has come to know the world in terms of statistical outcomes (as number). Given our culture’s amnesia concerning the Aristotelian distinction between Truth (which is eternal) and fact (which is Truth with motion and thus lacks eternity), these numerical representations of statistical outcomes have come to form the foundation of ‘truth’ in Modernity.

Though we risk recreating the wheel Descartes so skillfully crafted in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, this reduction of Truth to fact poses some important barriers to reason that must be addressed. In short, Descartes argued that the sensory world (the world of fact, of Truth with motion) cannot form the foundation of the rational process due to its lack of an eternal dimensional quality; instead, reason must be founded upon the ‘simplest and most universal things’, which is to say the infinite substance and its emanations (force, form and consciousness). The Truth of attraction comes in the form of multiplicity combining to form unity seen at other levels of manifestation in phenomena like gravity and love rather than the ‘fact’ (the Truth with motion) of two atoms bonding in the finite world of motion. Similarly (recalling Leibnitz), the Truth of the perfect circle is its ideational form as while we can imagine the perfect circle or prove it mathematically (with logic) we cannot actually bring a perfect circle into factual manifestation due to its dimensional incommensurability with the finite dimensional quality of manifestation (as a three dimensional, solid object is dimensionally incommensurable with the dimensional quality of a plane).

We move from the above early modern rationalist discourse on the limitations of peripatetic (material) reason to articulate two central problems with rational processes founded upon statistics: first, issues of data collection; second, issues of ontological dependence. To provide a contextual example we examine these two causes of societal statistical irrationality through the lens of fMRI statistics and US crime statistics.

A resent study from Linköping University in Sweden discovered a bug in fMRI algorithms that may have created statistical anomalies invalidating fifteen years of research and over forty thousand

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peer review articles and thus provides an apt entry point for understanding the barriers to statistical reason posed by issues of data collection. The basic issue is of course clear. Our observational capacities, be they through the sensory organs or algorithms, are fallible (rendering ‘truth’ founded upon observations fallible); we lack omniscience. Turning to the analogous issue of crime statistics in the US, police cannot be everywhere at once; they lack omnipresence. As a result, crime statistics are (we begin our transition to the second core issue of statistical irrationality in society) ontologically dependent upon the spaces police patrol; for example, while more poor minorities are convicted of drug crimes and the crime statistics thus intimate that poor minorities do and sell more drugs, the reality is that police are patrolling the streets and stopping people for often unconstitutional searches in poor, predominantly minority urban communities (Public spaces) rather than the board rooms, law firms and wealthy neighborhoods of Main Street or the ‘black sights’ certain nodes of the US Military and Intelligence establishment use to transport drugs like cocaine into the US (Private spaces).

Before addressing the barrier to reason posed by the blindness of statistics to ontological dependence we should make a final note on the role of ‘performativity’ in the issue of data collection. In short, when statistics are accepted as truth they often come to be performed as True. Police advocates, for example, often rationalize the inordinate level of police violence experienced by minority communities in the US in terms of ‘minorities committing more crimes’ (i.e. in terms of crime statistics); while it is irrational to simply accept that minorities being arrested for and convicted of more crimes has anything to do with minorities actually committing more crimes (due the ontological dependence of crime statistics on policing practice illustrated above), these statistical outcomes are performed as unproblematic Truth and come to form the ‘statistical basis’ for rationalization of racially motivated police violence. Similarly, policy analysts often found their policy prescriptions upon the work of social scientists that in turn accept the conclusions about human psychology derived by psychologists using studies using fMRI algorithms as the axiomatic epistemological foundation for their study of human society; false or no, the ‘truth’ about human psychology performed by the buggy

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276 This harkens to the dynamic relationship between: class (which in the US context has come to be tied with Race); access to Public and Private Space; ‘Visibility’ of crime. In short, if you have the capital (monetary or social) to secure a private space you are not as susceptible to policing as those who are pushed into public spaces that are patrolled by police by their lack of capital.
statistical outcomes comes to be real when it is treated as real in crafting and implementing real public policy.

Ontological dependence can be understood as the dependence of one reality upon another as in the dependence of the present moment upon what happened in other moments. As we illustrated above the reality of the outcomes captured in crime statistics are unable to capture the ontological dependence of these outcomes on policing practice or (even more importantly) historical outcomes (i.e. the historical outcomes of slavery, segregation, ghettoization, criminalization, the war on drugs, the prison industrial complex, popular culture characterizations of minority communities, etc.). Questions of ontological dependence in fMRI statistics are a bit more nebulous (and all the more important for it). In short, Psychologists like UBC’s Joe Heinrich (W.E.I.R.D. People)\(^{27}\) have demonstrated that our psychological responses are in many ways relative to socialization (we would say the axioms and logics received through the process of socialization); for example, Heinrich found that—in the context of ‘the ultimatum game’—“Americans show the tendency to be equitable with strangers—and to punish those who are not” where the indigenous Machiguenga of Peru “just didn’t understand why anyone would... punish someone who had the good luck of getting to play the other role in the game.”\(^{28}\)

“The potential implications of the unexpected results were quickly apparent to Henrich. He knew that a vast amount of scholarly literature in the social sciences—particularly in economics and psychology—relied on the ultimatum game and similar experiments. At the heart of most of that research was the implicit assumption that the results revealed evolved psychological traits common to all humans, never mind that the test subjects were nearly always from the industrialized West. Henrich realized that if the Machiguenga results stood up, and if similar differences could be measured across other populations, this assumption of universality would have to be challenged.”\(^{29}\)

The statistical findings of fMRI tests—which work from these behavioral experiments to try and understand how the brain works—are, then, ontologically dependent upon the society in which the subjects of the fMRI tests were socialized and cannot speak to the True, essential nature of human psychology (and indeed this runs into the same problem of studying seeds as seeds rather than in their potential to evolve into a tree). That being said, the statistical irrationality of our society—rising from our lack of sensitivity to the import of issues of ontological dependence for rational interpretation of statistics—leads us, by and large, to simply accept and thus perform these irrational conceptions of human nature-psychology.


\(^{29}\) Ibid.
If statistical reason is—in the above light—accepted as an unsuitable foundation for the study of humans (be it the study of human psychology or crime in the US) then where should we turn? One way forward may present itself in the classical, qualitative study of psychology. Indeed,

“Psychology is, perhaps, the oldest science, and, unfortunately, in its most essential features a forgotten science. For thousands of years psychology existed under the name of philosophy. In India all forms of Yoga, which are essentially psychology, are described as one of the six systems of philosophy. Sufi teachings, which again are chiefly psychological, are regarded as partly religious and partly metaphysical. In Europe, even quite recently in the last decades of the nineteenth century, many works on psychology were referred to as philosophy. And in spite of the fact that almost all subdivisions of philosophy such as logic, the theory of cognition, ethics, aesthetics, referred to the work of the human mind or senses, psychology was regarded as inferior to philosophy and as relating only to the lower or more trivial sides of human nature."

Parallel with its existence under the name of philosophy, psychology existed even longer connected with one or another religion.... There are many excellent works on psychology in quite orthodox religious literature of different countries and epochs. For instance, in early Christianity there was a collection of books of different authors under the general name of Philokalia, used in our time in the Eastern Church, especially for the instruction of monks.

During the time when psychology was connected with philosophy and religion it also existed in the form of Art. Poetry, Drama, Sculpture, Dancing, even Architecture, were means for transmitting psychological knowledge. For instance, the Gothic Cathedrals were in their chief meaning works on psychology.

In the ancient times before philosophy, religion and art had taken their separate forms as we now know them, psychology had existed in the form of Mysteries, such as those of Egypt and of ancient Greece. Later, after the disappearance of the Mysteries, psychology existed in the form of Symbolical Teachings which were sometimes connected with the religion of the period and sometimes not connected, such as Astrology, Alchemy, Magic, and the more modern: Masonry, Occultism and Theosophy.”

4.6.2 Police Bias in the United States, Ignorance or Evil?
After the deaths of Alton Sterling and Philando Castile we watched as CNN paraded one middle-aged, white, male police officer after another to ‘tell the police side of the story’. Multiple of these white, male police officers (Harry Houck being the most vulgar example36) claimed that ‘minorities commit more crimes’ in order to defend the inordinate level of police violence the black community faces in the United States. When challenged, the white male officers repeatedly defended themselves by saying ‘those are the statistics’. Many people have responded to these police murders by noting that the problem lies in social and cultural perversions like racism that simply cannot be fixed with policy, and


Houck is truly a despicable disgrace to humanity...
it seems clear from the comments of these white, male officers that one of these socio-cultural problems is an *irrational understanding of statistics*.

Statistics only tell us about outcomes. Statistics cannot express the contexts that produce statistical outcomes. They cannot account for poverty, for the historical outcomes of systemic racism, segregation and slavery or the centuries (more likely millennia or more...) of privilege certain families benefited from as a result of these oppressive practices and the power produced therein. In more specific terms statistics cannot account for the effect of socioeconomic privilege on the discrepancy between policing of drug use in the boardrooms and law firms of Main Street and the policing of drug use in poor urban neighborhoods... If we may descend quickly into philosophical jargon, statistics cannot capture the ontological dependence of statistical outcomes on contexts; this is to say that the dependence of the reality of *outcomes* captured in statistics upon other realities or to say the dependence of the moment in which the outcome came to be upon other moments. In this light the claim that minorities commit more crimes is absurd and unfounded as the most that can be said is that minorities are convicted of more crimes for a slew of reasons that simply can’t be proven to include minorities committing more crimes.

If there is one Truth that I have come to know through my physical and digital travels through this world, it is that humans are essentially good and loving. Very few people come to be practically devoid of love and kindness, and even those who are often rationalize their goodness in one manner or another. Desire is, in essence, an urge for goodness. Recalling St. Augustine, there is only good and the privation of good, only Truth and ignorance. People are not, generally, evil; they are just ignorant. Mass shootings, police shootings and global wars, not to mention global warming, are all symptoms of a very serious sociocultural problem, irrationality and the first step towards treating this problem is a general public philosophy education—an education in *how to think* about facts (statistics) in a reasoned manner that accounts for the nature of facts (statistics). The suffering produced by our society should remind us that the ignorance produced by a societal lack of nuanced thought often leads to outcomes that are not easily distinguished from what one might call evil... As has been clear throughout this study, the above irrational understanding of statistics is only possible within the conception of reality established by Modernism and its associated axioms-logics (i.e. it is only possible to conceive of humans in statistical terms from the behavioralist perspective, which aims to understand human psychology as action without regard for the substance or state of mind (and in this case—in the neoliberal form of atomization of agency and causation to the individual, local and, as we now observe, contemporaneous levels of reality—without regard for historical contexts) that produced said actions).
5. Conclusions?

5.1 What is Materialism?
Before concluding we provide Nicoll’s definition of materialism to elucidate our study; we must quote it in full as materialism is, as Nicole notes, far more elusive a standpoint than we might imagine (this is a perfect example of a point a which an author’s writing has attained a plateau of perfection that cannot simply be replicated and ought to, in the ethos of NE, be quoted in full—Modernist critique be damned...):

“What is the standpoint of materialism? It is not by any means so easy to define as we may think. We are ‘materialists’ without knowing it, and ‘materialism’ is a much deeper problem for each of us that we imagine. But, in the first place, from its standpoint we look outwards (via the senses) for the explanation and cause of everything. We start from phenomena as absolute truth.

Speaking first of ultimate issues, we seek proof of the existence of ‘God’ from phenomenal life itself. It life takes on an evil aspect we think there can be no ‘God’. Scientifically, we seek for causes in the phenomenal world. In both cases we are doing much the same thing. In the first case we are looking for ‘spirit’ in visible material life. In the second case we are looking for the principles behind phenomena in the minutest forms of matter. As materialists we look for cause in the elementary material particle. We look for the final explanation of the mystery of life in minute physiological processes, in bio-chemistry, etc. We might compare this with looking for the causes of a house only in its minute structure, as if we could find its real ‘cause’ in the elementary bricks of which it is composed, and int in the idea behind it. For, to materialists, the world must necessarily be idea-less. It can be no masterpiece of art—for where is the artist? Neither telescope nor microscope [nor ‘telescope’] reveal his actual existence.

If the originating principle behind manifestation is not in the phenomenal world itself, it if lies in idea [(form, aeon, etc.)] working via chemistry (that is, through minute elementary particles) into visible form, we must, as materialists, ignore this factor and assume that the chemical processes belonging to the world of atoms themselves establish life. The development of the germcell into an embryo is, from this side, merely a progressive series of chemical changes, starting from the initial shock of conception, each chemical change determined by an following upon the previous one, and thus leading to the budding up of the embryo. Looking only at the chemical changes we will ignore the controlling principle or law acting behind them. Whatever we do not find in the three dimensions of space we will ignore, not seeing life as unfolding events but rather as aggregations of physical mass [(i.e. through ‘post-modern’ eyes...)].

Strictly speaking, materialism gives sense and physical mater priority over mind or idea. In the tenth book of the Laws Plato put the standpoint of materialism, as it existed then, clearly enough. The materialist was a person who regarded nature as self-derived. Elementary particles of dead matter somehow or other combined together to form the entire universe and all the living beings contained in it. Matter accidentally raised itself up into the most complex living forms. Matter created its laws. And Mind itself resulted from these accidental combinations of intimate matter [(i.e. matter is located before mind in the causal chain of that which is)]. ‘They say that fire and water and earth and air all exist by nature and chance.... The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force, according to certain affinities among them, of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, etc. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, as well as animals and plants ... not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any god, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only’ (Laws, 889B).

From this standpoint physical nature is necessarily the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things. Mind is secondary - an accidental product of physical matter.

Can we really believe that mind and intelligence accidently came out of dead matter? If so, then in order to face the problem sincerely, we must grant to original matter – which, chemically speaking, is hydrogen - extraordinary properties, and assume that all organised beings were potentially present in the first matter of the nebular system, that is, if we believe that the universe ‘started’ at some distant point in passing-time.
But the customary standpoint of scientific materialism is that primary matter is dead – and the universe is dead and nature is dead – and a dead nature can, of course, aim at nothing. **It cannot be teleological.** Since Plato’s time science has passed far beyond the region of the unaided senses. It has turned matter into electricity, and the world of three dimensions into a theoretical world of at least four dimensions. It has passed beyond *natural*, i.e., sensual concepts, beyond the visualisable and matter-of-fact. Physicists today [(1952)] are trying to understand what we are in. What is this ‘world-field’ in which events happen? What is this four-dimensional continuum called space-time? And what, for that matter, is electricity? We are in a mysterious and incomprehensible universe. Nevertheless, psychologically speaking, the standpoint of materialism prevails and spreads its effects over the entire world.**

Nicoll juxtaposes this materialist perspective with the Platonic perspective:

“Let us glance at an entirely different standpoint. The Platonic view of visible or phenomenal reality was that there is behind it an invisible and greater order of reality. There is invisible *form* or figure (only mentally perceptible) over and above all form or figure that we can apprehend through our senses. These invisible forms or figures, with which our term *idea* came to be connected, are prior in scale to, and therefore much more ‘real’ than, any perceptible form or figure. Thus the world of sense, all that we see, is a very limited expression of *real form* and, properly speaking, science studies that which is *indicated* in the visible object. ‘... the object of anything that can be called science in the strict sense of the word is something that may be indicated by the world of sense, but it is not really of that world, but of a higher degree of reality’.

The geometer, for example, studies triangles and finds that the three interior angles of any sort of triangle are always equal in sum to two right angles. But this is not true of any triangle that we can perceive with the external senses because it is not possible to draw an absolutely exact triangle. So that ‘triangle’ itself belongs to a higher degree of reality than any visible representation of it. The triangle as *idea* - the ‘ideal’ triangle - does not exist in passing time and space. It is not visible, but is only apprehended by the mind. In a similar way, anything that has the semblance of beauty, relation and proportion in the visible world, as seen by us with our organs of sight, has behind it beauty, relation and proportion belonging to a higher degree of reality, which art strives towards, and of which we may catch glimpses in flashes of consciousness above the ordinary.

But for materialism a higher degree of reality is not countenanced. I think it would be absolutely inexplicable on the basis upon which materialism rests. There may be a *below* but there cannot be an *above*. There can be no existing higher degree of reality. There can be no superior order behind the phenomenal world, nothing *prior* to it in scale. For the universe must be a mindless product and body must be prior to mind. There can be ‘no thought without phosphorus.’ Matter must be prior to function and use, and sensation prior to meaning.

To admit a higher order of reality behind known reality is, in fact, to reverse the direction of materialism. For it is to affirm by an act of the mind what the senses by themselves do not directly show, but what, at the same time, that the senses really indicate. And it is exactly in this that Plato puts the turning point of a man’s soul - in this recognition of an existing higher order of reality that explains this obviously imperfect, suggestive world in which we live.”

Does a proper academic text require a conclusion? Ought we to operationalize our intuition to summarize our arguments and intent in the above? We are not sure. On the one hand it might prove a useful resource for some. On the other hand it is likely to encourage readers to remain within the peripatetic state of knowing. We view the possible harm of this second potentiality as outweighing the potential benefits of the first and thus leave you with some poetic selections in an attempt to catalyze emotive, intuitive reflection on the themes of this text.

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36 Ibid. 35-36.
5.2 Surreal

An Oft Used Term

But what happens,
When you discover

The Surreal is Real,
& Reality is Illusion.

When Madness Reigns?

If sanity is Mind,
Tied to ‘Reality’,
Then the illusion of
Reality
Renders Insanity
Wisdom

The Wise Fool

This is not the fool who
Speaks Wisdom
As fate,
But the Story of
Faith, of
Knowledge, Understanding & Experience
Of the Surreal.

Descartes told us
If we read the Great
Classics of Time
We become a stranger in
Our Own.

Foolish, Strange,
Mad & Insane.

Enlightenment is Derided
By the Modernist ‘Faith’.

For in Modernity,
Faith is a thought,
A Belief, Ideology.

& in loosing all Faith.
In loosing Knowledge
   Understanding
   & Experience
Of the Surreal.
   Of the Great Beyond.
   The light behind

Maya.

Modernity Sacrifices
The Potential for

For Death & Rebirth,
For Life.

And all these Sacrifices
are made
For the Beast of Matter.

Who Delights in the
Perpetual Cycles,
In the Peripatetic
Maelstrom.
In the Derision of
The Sacred,
The Surreal.
In Hellfire and Chaos.

If Horses are Contained
By Fences,
Prisoners by Walls,
Humanity's Mind & Emotion
Are Contained by Modernity.

To be Devoured by
The Beast.

"Twenty
...Must I fear what others fear? What nonsense!
Other people are contented, enjoying the sacrificial feast of the ox.
In spring some go to the park, and climb the terrace,
But I alone am drifting, not knowing where I am.
Like a newborn babe before it learns to smile,
I am alone, without a place to go.
Others have more than they need, but I alone have nothing.
I am a fool. Oh, yes! I am confused.
Others are clear and bright,
But I alone am dim and weak.
Others are sharp and clever,
But I alone am dull and stupid.
Oh, I drift like the waves of the sea,
Without direction, like the restless wind.
Everyone else is busy,
But I alone am aimless and depressed.
I am different.
I am nourished by the great mother."

“They who dance are thought mad by those who hear not the music. The truth of the old proverb was never more surely borne out that it is just now.”

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5.3 Redemption in Sorrow

And so the son was sent

To die
Each day
For the sins of
The World

Thus do my eyes
Rain
The Sleep of Sadness

Sometimes I wonder,
Am I here? simply
to Observe.

The Misery of the World

To feel the Sadness
Humanity OUGHT
To Feel

To cry for the
Children
the Birds
the Trees

My friends

Is this Redemption?
The true Redeemer?

Luke 2: 35: (Yea, a sword shall pierce through thy own soul also,) that the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed.
5.4 Economic Theology

What does Economic Theology tell us?
The human telos lies in ‘work’.
In material production.
The First Cause lies in
Matter.
Matter produces Mind.
The human telos is restricted to
Passing Time,
Physical Space,
The Boundaries of Reality
in the Newtonian Dogma
of Economic Theology.

Our Bodies are the foundation of our Reality,
they are the First Cause of Mind.
Bio-Democratic Greece,
Bio-Cast Hinduism,
Bio-Fetish Confucianism,
Though Modernists Eschew the Fools of History
as Materially 'Irrational',
though they frame the Rationalists as Irrational,
Modernism Rises from the Same Rotten Root,
Biopolitical Dogma,
Order and Love as Domination,
Paternalism.
Pulling Sprouts to MAKE them Grow,
they Reap only Death.

We might be tempted to think only of Capitalism,
Where success is known in dollars and cents,
and Indeed
Capitalism is a Vulgar Example of Economic Theology's Newtonian Reductionism.
But what of the Socialists?
The Contemporary Marxist Academy?
Who reject intellectual cultivation,
The implicit value of Philosophy,
In their dogmatic valorization of the
Working Class,
of Slavery...
Ideas are Elitist,
Metaphysics Archetypally So.
Only ‘Reality’
In the Most Vulgar
Materialist
Ontological-Cosmological Framework.
The ‘Reality’ that Destroys
Childhood,
Imagination,
Emotion,
Mind,
Consciousness.
Reality Reduced to Passing Time,
Physical Space,
Necessarily Nihilistic in rejection of
Eternity,
of ‘Reality’ Without Motion,
which in stillness is Eternal.
The Uncreated,
Emanations:
Form,
Force,
& Consciousness.

Quantum Physics Problematizes
Newtonian Dogma,
its Murderous Reality,
But Society is yet to Undergo its Quantum Revolution.
We are trapped in the Dogma of our Newtonian Past.
I am distinct from you.
The Images I Receive
through Sensory Perception,
that fraction of the Light Spectrum,
are more real than those I see in the
Mind's Eye...

Economic Theologians find
Redemption in
Fight Revolution for
Low Taxes,
the Welfare State,
Free Healthcare.
a ‘Fair Economic System’.
They want Big Brother to Pay
for Pharmaceutical Annihilation.
They want the State to Spend more on Education,
That the ‘History’ and ‘Truth’,
The Reduction of Reality,
Presented by Pierson and McGraw-Hill
Might be more completely inscribed,
in the Minds of the Youth...

They Know nothing of their Oppression.
Indeed,
they Facilitate their own Oppression.
Why search for the cause of your sadness
in our World,
in the Slavery of Economic Theology,
where the Physical Slavery of Work
is nothing to the Cognitive Slavery
imposed by the murderous ‘Reality’
of Economic Theology,
when you can find it in the Bottom of a
Pill Jar...

The Socialist Revolution Mirrors
the Economic Imperative of Western Medicine.
It does not seek preventative treatment. It does not look to the Mental, Emotional, Spiritual, Causes of our Sickness. It simply looks to the Body, To Work, Which While Essential to Health, are oft not the Causal Origin of our Decay... It attempts to cultivate order, Through Domination, Cutting out Organs, Using Chemicals to treat the Chemical Manifestations of Energetic Imbalance... The Destroyer of Worlds Comes to Modernity in a Gel Capsule...

Biological Survival Undergirds Notions of Humanity. Community as a Self-Interested Mechanism for Survival via Material Production. Man Became Civilized in Work, in Slavery...

The Slave Mentality Pervades our Noospheric Body. Newtonian Reality has Killed our Connection with much of Reality. Trapped in the Physical World, Cut off From our Essence, from Experience of ‘the Good’ as One, from the Oceans of our Soul, We seek reprieve in Physical Labor, Small Talk,
The Bottom of a Wine Glass.
We must always be doing Some Thing, for the Emptiness of our Being,
Cold Rain from Tall Thunder Clouds,
Hot Lightning Sets Emotion Ablaze,
It is too Terrifying.
Sitting Quietly is Torture.
This is Hell.
PUSHING the Stone Up-Hill
to Escape our Selves,
WE are Dragged Down
by its Descent,
to the Depths
of the Valley of the Shadow of Death.

There is no Salvation in Economic Theology,
For Economic Theology is Economic Theology.
Nihilistic Spear
piercing the Heart of Reality,
the Life Blood of Eternity
Bleeds Out,
Only a Peripatetic Husk Remains,
The Pangs of Ego form a Crust,
Muting the Light of Love.

We must seek a revolution against Economic Theology,
Not a Revolution within Economic Theology.
Against Dogmatic Newtonian Ontology,
Against the Slave Telos,
Reduction of Meaning in Life,
to the Sands of Time,
Change & Motion,
Linearity,
‘Death’ on a Line,
Beginnings and Ends...
Our Revolution
Must be a Journey,
From the Sands of Time
to the Eternal Rock.
5.5 Laziness

From the perspective of
Economic Theology
Laziness is a
Physical
Material
Phenomenon.

Virtue and Meaning
The Human Telos
Come In ‘Work’
In Material Production
In Physical Labor

Poverty
Inaction
Stillness
Serenity
Calm & Quiet,
These are the Sins of
Economic Theology

But what ‘works’ define
Humanity?

These are the Works
of Love,
of Beauty.
of the Cultivation of Self
& Self-Knowledge

Hard Work Leaves no Mark
For Work is in Returning to
the Formless,
the Un-hewn.
Such work is
Silent,
Still,
Serene.

The harder one Works
The less that can be Seen.

Flee Economic Ideology
Recognize
The Origin of your Thoughts
for Mental & Emotional
Laziness
are the Delight of the Beast

Be
Still,
Serene,
Silent.

Allow the heathens to deride your
Laziness
For in the work of Silence
You shalt find Serenity,
A Rock Unmoved by the
Winds
Of Peripatetic,
Reflexively Received
Judgment.
5.6 Of Good and Privation of the Good

Many speak of Good and Evil
in Binary terms,
as Yin and Yang,
with equal roles in manifestation
to be Balanced...
They Grant Evil Truth,
Self-Subsistence in Infinite Eternity...

We reject this Oppressive Notion,
this Belief.
Faith,
Experience beyond the Veil,
Shows us that there is but Good
and the Privation of the Good—
Ignorance...
Evil Has no Self-Subsistent Existence,
no Infinite or Eternal quality...
How can there be Privation of the Good,
in ‘The Good’?
The Uncreated IS
Bereft of
Motion,
Contraction,
Astringency,
Bitterness
and Anxiety.

What we call ‘Evil’
is but a smudge on the Mirror,
the Canvas of Manifestation.
It is a Potential Within Manifestation,
a Potential of the Individuation of Consciousness
into Atomized Vessels,
but has no Truth,
no Infinite Eternity.
The Mirror Reflects Light,
the Good,
and Darkness,
the Good.
The Dark is not Evil,
For without Rest We would have no Life,
and Without Darkness the Sun’s Rays
Rain Hellfire and Destruction...

As such,
we understand the Good
in Degrees of Perfection.
There is Good,
More or Less Sympathetic in
Reflection & Resemblance.

Evil is No Longer Naturalized,
Ethical Nihilism Extinguished.
Good and Evil are not Simply Balanced,
allowed to rest in Equilibrium.
We must Strive without Striving,
following the way of Effortless Action
to Perfect Reflections of the Good in Manifestation.
5.7 Pseudo Revolutionary Farce

What Faith am I to Have
in the Future of America?

Americans meet Oppression
with Pseudo-Revolutionary Might.
Slave Systems
replaced in Revolution
by Slave Systems—
from Plantations to Prisons
one round of ‘Legal Reform’ at a Time.
We Build New Houses
on the same Sandy Foundations
and bemoan the Woes of our Evil Human Nature
when these new structures Fall
into the same Sandy Grave—
Modernist Perversion
of an Already ‘Fallen’ Humanity.

What Solidity Can be Found,
in a Legal System that Presumes—
like the Old Men of Song—
that Order is produced
in Fear and Domination,
where Punishment is the Root of Justice?
In a system Ascribing Eternity
to Privation of the Good
and its Spatiotemporal Foundation—
Potential rising from Passing Time and Physical Space,
Atomization of Consciousness—
to that which lacks Self-Subsistence,
of the Ephemeral Dimensional Quality:
Motion, ‘Chance’, Change & Difference.
Losing Sight of Distinctions
Truth and Fact,
Motion and Eternity,
of Wisdom to Harmonize
Sphere with Plane (as Circle),
Left only with Authoritarian Attempts
To Fit the World of Change into Eternity,
the Finite into the Infinite,
Form into Manifestation without regard for Environment,
What Just Future Might there Be?

Enslaved through our Liberation,
Free to Choose
the Favored High Priest of Modernism.
Free to Fight Revolution with Post Modern Fervor—
Black Panther-Pancho Villa Synth Crotch Shots,
‘The Shot Heard Around the World’.
Reforming the Rules of a Legal Game
Whose Central Tenant is Human Evil,
The Presumption of a Fallen Nature
to be Scared and Dominated into Order.
Revolutionaries Fighting for Access to Universities
that close our mind to the Universe,
Multiverse
& Beyond,
has massacred all ‘World Views’
whose Orient lies outside
the Sandy Grave of Modernity,
the Sands of Time.
Where the Loss of Intellectual Pursuit
in search of Job Skills
and Epistemological Negation of Intellectual Potential—
Reduction of Academic Epistemological Cultivation
to Collecting Facts
Ideas Loose their Preeminence.
Ideas and Meaning are Simply Caused by Fact,
Theory plays second fiddle to practice,
Meaning and Ideas the same to Fact.
The Distinction between Force and Reason is Lost.
Ought we then to Wonder,
When Students are Unaware of the Distinction
Between Summary and Argumentation?
Between Facts and Meaning as mediated by Ideas?
Academic Prowess is Reduced to a Statistical Function...
Yet we do not fight for revolution in our Educational System,
for a change in the Ideas that underlie our approach to Education—
we fight only for access to Perversion...
What is Worse,
Many of U.S. Return to Our White Nationalist Past.
Framing Immigrants Fleeing Starvation and War
(Starvation Impelled by U.S.)
(War Impelled by U.S.)
as Terrorists, Murderers and Rapists.
These ‘Believers’ in Genetics,
Uneducated and Emasculated White Folks
Whose Inbred Genetic Makeup
Tempts the Rest of U.S. into their ‘Genetic Belief’ System,
Follow their Irrational Passions into the Demagogue’s Reich...
Arrogance Binds U.S.
to Exceptionalist Delusion.
How Could the Land of the Free,
Home of the Brave,
Also be Home of the Slave?
We Represent the Pinnacle of Civilization,
and so Systemic Revolution
ture Revolution
is Anti-Civilizational...
Domination and Fear from our Legal System,
from Systems of Social Organization
through Hierarchical Domination,
Control,
Fear,
from Economic Theology—
reduction of human Telos
to Bio-reductive notions of ‘Work’,
to Slavery,
from Bio-Reductive Population Science,
Eugenics,
Quantification of Humanity,
are all said to have Delivered U.S.
to Order,
to Civilization.

Civilized Heathens
Sit in Peripatetic Thrones of Judgment,
Draped in Blood Thirsty, Sociopathic Majesty...
Emotion, Intuition and Ethics,
Empathy and Compassion,
all Lie Dead upon the Spear of Peripatetic Reason.
Mosaics Painted with Uncivilized Blood
Span the Great Walls of this Civilization.
Attempting to Sew Order through Domination,
‘Men of Song’ Reap only Death...

Civilized Heathens Tell U.S. Stories,
false Histories to Legitimate,
Necessitate,
Naturalize
their Existence—Oppression.
“Without Elite Domination,
Hierarchy and Fear,
We would remained in our Chaotic and Disordered ‘State of Nature’...”
Without your Slave Masters,
Law, Class and Technology,
Biology and its Product—Peripatetic Reason,
You Remain a Nomadic Heathen,
Tribal,
Chaotic and Disordered...
Your Oppression in Modernity is Narrated,
Legitimated,
Naturalized,
in the Same Words
as the Slaveries of Years Gone By...
Philanthropic Slave Drivers...
We Reject this ‘Civilization’,
for what could be more Uncivilized?
True Revolution must be for a new ‘World View’,
for new Ideas.
Our Revolution is against Modernist Ideas
of ‘Civilization’,
of Order,
of Truth,
of Reality.
Only with New Ideas
can we begin to Conceptualize
New Systems,
New Practices,
New Policies,
New Paradigms for Social Organization.
Thought Produces Action!
We Must Learn to Think in a New Fashion,
Before we can Act in a New Fashion...
The Phoenix Must Die Before Rebirth,
and only in Rebirth—
in the Birth of a New ‘World View’—
will Humanity find the Potential
for transcending our Pseudo Revolutionary Past,
Enslavement through Liberation via the Mechanisms of our Enslavement—
saved from Domination and Fear
Oppression
by a Legal System
Founded on the IDEA
Order is Produces through Domination and Fear,
Oppression,
transcending our Pseudo Revolutionary Past
and Finding True Revolution; a Revolution of Mind through Ideas...
5.8 Bird’s Eye Isolation

As Birds in the Sky,
My Perspective Leaves me Isolated.
How am I to Reconcile this Mountain Top
with the Ant's Forest of Grass?
How am I to converse in Language,
when I and I have Felt the Truth?

How Does one Convey
the Reality of Three Dimensions
to inhabitants of the Flat World?
Circles and Squares
who know each other as Flat Lines,
for on the Plane
one Cannot see inside
the Shape’s exterior,
its Body,
to the Invisible Dimension Within.
They who watch the birth and death of the Pencil,
as it passes through their Planar Universe;
Lead, White Wood, Yellow Paint, Silver Mettle, Pink Eraser,
Phases of the Pencil’s Life.
When Dead to the Flat World,
the Pencil Exists in Three Dimensional Space,
the Multiverse in which the Planar Universe of the Page Exists.

I have been told these ideas are Ahead of their Time,
but I fear they are more akin to Millennia Lost,
to the Wisdom of the Ancients,
than they are to our Dark Future.

Is Irrational Optimism a Better Way?
Attention and Intention Surely Influence Reality,
but only in the Hubris of Humanity
do we presume Preeminence.
As there is One source of Attention and Intention,
So to are there a Multiplicity of Sources
By which Attention Flows into Manifestation.
Ours is but a drop in the Sea.
Irrational Optimism Lacks the Force
to Direct Manifestation.
In Free Will we are Divorced from Mechanical Evolution,
Time Will no Longer Suffice.
False Hope Breeds Complacency—
Presuming to Know
We no Longer Seek Truth.
As this Search,
the Desire for Truth and Understanding,
Fuels our Drive to Evolution,
In Presumption we Becomes Subject to Devolution.
It is in Recognizing Privation of the Good,
and the subsequent potential for Perversion,
in Remembering our Intimacy with the Truth,
the Good,
of which our world is so Deprived,
that we may walk in and towards Truth.

Maybe I am Meant Only to Observe,
to Mourn
and Bask in the Bliss of Mourning’s Ephemerality.
5.9 When Hell Freezes Over

Cause & Effect.
Reflect.
Perpetuation of Action
Through Reaction.
Mountains Built High,
Ensure Descent into Rubble.

Equilibrium is the Telos of Manifestation.
Created and Uncreated,
Growth and Rest,
Light and Dark.
The River Always
    Bends Back.
But Water Requires Energy to Return to the Intimacy of Home
Above, and Below
to the Intimacy of the Sunlit Rooms
Perched High Atop the Cathedral’s Dark Spires.

Building Tall Towers
    Necessitates a Great Fall.

Drop.
Isolated from the Cloud.
We Fall Alone through Exile,
through Empty Space,
Praying for our Return to Intimacy,
    Lake, River, Ocean
Sap,
    Blood.
Unity finds Many Manifestations.

But when we come to be Dominated
by the Breeze,
We become Lost in our Exile,
Trapped in the Emptiness of Physical Space
by the Icy Winds of Time.
Deprived of Heat,
Drops Freeze, Become Solid.
Shackled to Atomization by Privation of Warmth.
Hell was always Frozen Over...

But for Hail there is Redemption,
for The Sun Restores Liquid and Gaseous Intimacy.
Modernity is a Peripatetic Ice Box,
Trapping Humanity within the Shackles of Mechanical Evolution,
of Manifestation based modes Rationality.
Trapped in Underground Cities,
the Sun is Rendered to the Sphere of Unreality,
Irrationality,
Madness.
Sun Light is a Conspiracy Theory—
it cannot be Seen from our Rocky Tomb.
There is no Heat to Restore our Intimacy.
No Goodness.
No Truth.
No Love.
Only Survival and Competition
In a Meaningless Material World
Presumed as Doomed
to the Freezing Death of Absolute Entropy.
The Order of the Sun,
Syntropy,
The Capacity of
Light, Life and Love to Manifest Order,
Complexity,
Unity in Difference,
To provide Equilibrium
to Entropy
and stave off the Dark Fantasy
of Frozen Equality in Perfect Atomization,
the Liberal Fantasy...
Retinas Burnt Out,
We are Trapped in Darkness,
Shackled by Privation to our Atomization.
Hell was always Frozen Over...
5.10 Strange Times

These are strange times...
Old Men and Women—
Near to their Graves after Lives of Servitude,
Broken by False Promises
of ‘the State’
‘Democracy’
‘Capitalism’;
Deluded by a view of Domestic History
of Reality in General
that Ignores Ontological Dependence,
the Dependence of Domestic Realities
upon the Spoils of a Global Empire,
the Dependence of Capitalist Success
upon the Blood of the Poor—
Try to Save a Past that Never Actually Happened.
Our Freedom and Prosperity is drawn from a Chalice of Blood.

Nothing ever Trickled Down.
Buds Shrivel,
The Flower Dies before it is Born.
Leaves Fall in High Summer.
Lightning Breeds Wildfire in these Times,
Where Beginnings meet Ends.

The Empire is Not Crumbling,
but the Role of the US has Changed.
Americans Had to be Broken into Use;
their role as the Military Front
of a Global Empire
Required Socialization within Axioms and Logics
that Reduce People to a Perverse Caricature of Biology’s Animal Nature.
They were rendered Rabid.
Diseased Mind manifests as Diseased Bodies.
Orcs—The Fallen of the Fair Folk.
Bred into Sadistic Madness.
Broken beyond Repair from the Master’s Perspective,
The American Head of the Hydra begins Molting.
Delusions of Exceptionalism Will Not Save You
from Rising Waters and Winds of Fire.
The Red Hats are Coming....

“War is Peace.
Ignorance is Strength.
Freedom is Slavery.”

*Slavery is Freedom....*
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