Abstract

This thesis takes up the question of resistance in light of the surge of social movements throughout the world in the past several years, including the Arab Spring, Occupy, Idle No More and Black Lives Matter. It seeks to advance a new conception of resistance related to paradox by critiquing activist and academic conceptions of resistance and by conducting close readings of the writings and actions of the West German feminist guerrilla cell Rote Zora. Its critiques highlight an inability of certain theories of resistance to deal with resistance transforming into a force of oppression, as well as these theories’ lack of connection to political practice. Out of these critiques emerge the ideas of biopolitical resistance, a diversity of tactics for intervening in oppressions integrated at the individual, social and political levels, and the idea of resistance as paradoxical, having the ability to resist itself.

These concepts assist in a close reading of Rote Zora’s writings and actions, which I undertake also using the tools of literary theory and criticism. I argue that Rote Zora promotes a concept of resistance involving paradox, and integrates a form of biopolitical resistance into their political practice. I situate them in the context of the politically tumultuous West Germany of the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s, which saw an explosion of militant activism and left-wing terrorism, as well as the rise of an autonomous women’s movement. I argue that Rote Zora offers an alternative to the dogmatic militancy practiced by their better-known contemporaries the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF). My argument is both theoretical and historical: it draws on Rote Zora to inform a critical concept of resistance that relates to practice, and it promotes a different understanding of militancy in West Germany than the ones which dominate academic discourse by including Rote Zora’s alternative mode of resistance in this history.
Preface

This is the original, unpublished, independent work of the author, Rowan Melling. Its focus is to develop a theory and practice of resistance related to paradox, through a close reading of the West German feminist guerrilla cell Rote Zora. As Rote Zora is all but neglected in the history of West German militant activism, this work is also an historical intervention into a context dominated by studies of the Rote Armee Fraktion. It draws on primary source documents from the FFBIZ Archive and Papiertiger Archive in Berlin, collected by the author in the summer of 2015.
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dedicated to Occupy San Francisco
Introduction

Mass resistance has had a resurgence in North America in the past several years. The Occupy movement in 2011, the Quebec student protests in 2012 and the continuing Black Lives Matter, Idle No More and anti-resource extraction movements all point towards a growing revolutionary spirit in Canada, Quebec and the USA. Suddenly, anarchism, Marxism, Indigenous sovereignty, a discourse of civil rights and an acknowledgement of police brutality have become public alternatives to the status quo. Indeed, these movements can be seen as part of a complex of social justice movements that span the globe, resisting austerity, globalized capitalism, racism, colonialism and environmental destruction. Examples from this global context include the Arab Spring of 2011, the Umbrella Revolution in China in 2014, the ongoing German Blockupy Movement, the ongoing anti-austerity movement in Greece and the global environmental movement. At a time when it is such a vital global force, resistance is a pressing subject of study.

My interest in studying resistance arose after the forced dissolution of the Occupy Movement in the Winter of 2011-2012. In part, this project was a way for me to process the intensity, joy and trauma of six months of active resistance in the streets of San Francisco and Oakland. But it was also an effort to better understand our collective project of resistance and where it could go in the future. In the aftermath of Occupy, it was clear that people were still deeply troubled by the systemic oppression and inequality in American society and politics, but our resistance to these injustices had not gone as far as we had hoped it would go. Most of us saw the need for continued resistance, but wondered how to keep going without the aid of a cohesive movement. Some founded squatting communities, others became teachers or healers, some started permaculture farms or other collective projects. None of us stopped practicing or
thinking about resistance in the years after Occupy. This project comes out of those years thinking about and experimenting with resistance. I approached the thesis with the idea that a better understanding of resistance could help to answer the questions we have been asking since Occupy, and that I am sure others will ask during and after their participation in similar movements. As such, it hopes to advance resistant causes into the future.

My experience at Occupy complicated my understanding of what resistance is. I joined Occupy to fight against government and corporate power, and saw my resistance as acting against a hegemonic and powerful injustice. After some time in the movement, though, I realized I was also resisting “Occupy” itself. It had its own kind of normativity that felt oppressive to me: the group-think, the insipid hand signals, the unquestioned platitudes, the pseudo-religious chanting. So at the same time that I was engaged in resistance against the corporatist-state as part of a movement, I was also resisting assimilation into that movement. For six months I was an active and dedicated member of Occupy San Francisco and felt immense love for my comrades there, even as I remained autonomous from the movement. Resistance became a strange and multi-directional experience for me. I experienced it as paradoxical and at odds with itself. This study also seeks to take this into account, and advance a concept of resistance that is entwined with paradox.

My paradoxical experience at Occupy points to the constant threat that resistance movements face: resistance against oppression risks becoming programmatic, and recreating oppression in a new form. Georg Büchner put it best in his play *Dantons Tod*: “Die Revolution . . . frißt ihre eignen Kinder” (25), “the revolution devours its own children.” As in the French translation. The title of the play in English is *Danton’s Death*.
Revolution, which is the subject of Büchner’s play, what begins as a resistance movement can turn on itself and reinscribe the tyranny that it initially resisted. This was arguably the fate of the Russian Revolution, as well as the Chinese, and continued to plague resistance movements throughout the 20th century and up to today. This tendency is a theme throughout this thesis and is, I argue, something that people engaged in resistance need to pay close attention to. Thought paradoxically, resistance has the ability to resist its own tendency to become dogmatic and oppressive. One of the goals of this thesis is to draw attention to this problem of resistance and promote a conception of resistance that addresses it in practice. The Occupy Movement did, in fact, take steps to address this. In being programmatically anti-programmatic (i.e., – refusing to issue demands), the movement embraced the paradoxicality that I will call for throughout this thesis. Occupy tried to remain in conversation with itself and with the outside world, to keep itself flexible to change and to multiple forms of expression. To me, it is actually a testament to the movement that I was able to resist it from within itself, and that it could embrace this paradoxical multiplicity.

However, this paradox of resistance is absent from many activist and academic accounts of resistance. In Chapter 1, I examine a variety of conceptions of resistance, keeping in mind the tendency of resistance to recapitulate oppression. Although all the examples I look at have something to offer, none of them, in my view, sees resistance as containing this paradox. To find a conception of resistance that does do this, I turn in Chapter 2 and 3 to the German feminist guerrilla cell Rote Zora. In my view, Rote Zora develops and practices a resistance that is based on paradox, and that is constantly aware of the danger of resistance becoming oppressive. I contrast this mode of resistance to that of their much better known contemporary militants Die
Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), who are a prime example of how a practice of resistance can become oppressive and dogmatic. Chapter 2 covers the historical background of Rote Zora and Chapter 3 gives a close reading of their writings and activities.

To undertake this reading, I use the tools of literary criticism. In my view, Rote Zora’s texts are nuanced documents that require close and careful reading in order to understand what the group was trying to do. Their texts show that Rote Zora was as much concerned with language as a mode and terrain of resistance as they were with practicing physical acts of resistance throughout the West German state. Using close reading, I am extending this tool of literary criticism to social movements, activist groups and resistance more generally. Close reading provides a way of interpreting the broader meaning of resistant activities, and of reading what kind of intervention these acts make into activism and oppression. In this way, this thesis argues more generally for an understanding of resistance as something that can be “read” and interpreted. It also suggests that texts can function as sites, sources and examples of resistance. Not only does this suggest that literary criticism is an important tool for understanding resistance, but it also promotes a broadening of resistance that extends to examples occurring in language, literature and art. Drawing on the theory and history that forms the basis for these close readings, my argument intertwines theory, history and text through the topic of resistance. This is a way of describing how theory becomes practice and of projecting this transformation into the future. In my view, promoting new theories of resistance is important, but it is not enough: it needs to be related to practice in some way. Close reading offers a way of interpreting theories and practices of resistance, while history provides examples of how theory can become practice. These examples can be projected into the future by those interested in resistance today.
Arising out of this project are new understandings in these three areas. As I elaborate in Chapter 2, the understanding of militancy from this period in German history is so utterly dominated by the RAF, that the RAF begins to blanket our understanding of militant resistance from this context. Bringing Rote Zora to light is a way of resisting this dominant narrative of history and bringing forward a new understanding. At the same time, it draws on Rote Zora to elaborate a new theoretical concept of resistance that is of practical use. Closely reading Rote Zora’s texts and actions to elaborate this concept of resistance also promotes a practice of reading resistance as part of literary criticism, and it suggests resistance as a category of literary analysis. Ultimately, however, I complicate all these understandings with the idea of paradox. The goal of this thesis is not to draw grand conclusions or to offer a programmatic account of resistance and how to study it. Rather it is to promote resistance as a paradoxical activity, that resists itself and interpretations of it. As such, this thesis aims more to inspire resistance in its readers, even resistance to the thesis itself. It pushes them to call its own practice of resistance into question, and take resistance down their own path.
Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework

“I am Pentagon. Which side are you gonna be on?”

- The Make Up, “I am Pentagon”

The topic of resistance has recently received a great deal of attention. It seems we live in an increasingly resistant world, in which a smooth functioning of power has become a disrupted fantasy of the past. As discussed in the Introduction, resistance has exploded onto the streets all over the world in the last decade. And resistance is increasingly studied both inside and outside of universities, in activism, philosophy, politics, anthropology, social justice, economics, sociology and history. In this chapter, I look at a range of recent ideas about resistance that describe what it is, how to understand it and how it is practiced. These perspectives vary from the philosophical, to the activist-theoretical, to more empirical studies in anthropology and sociology. Such a range shows that resistance is a contentious topic, but also one which has broad relevance. It cuts across the divide between university and society, and across disciplines within the university. This makes it all the more important to develop a nuanced understanding of resistance, and, given its relevance to political practice and social change, to develop an understanding that does something, that is tied to practice. This is what I aim to do in this chapter, by interpreting, comparing and critiquing a range of different views. To me, these views have not fully thought through the practical applications of their stances towards resistance. In studying resistance, this oversight is dangerous. Resistance always has the potential to become something monstrous, to reinscribe the tyranny it struggled against. To me, this danger arises from the logical implications of an incomplete understanding of resistance. I argue that this can be addressed through a different method and understanding of resistance, one that focuses on its
paradoxical nature.

Howard Caygill’s 2013 book *On Resistance* is one of the most recent works to grapple directly with the concept of resistance. His book presents an eclectic mix of historical resistances since the French Revolution, and analyzes them through the lens of his favourite theorist of resistance, Carl von Clausewitz. The book offers a broad survey of different historical ideas of resistance, and does service to activists and theorists alike in promoting the idea of a “capacity to resist” (*Widerstandsfähigkeit*). Taken from Clausewitz, this concept implies that the capacity to resist can wax and wane, and that anyone interested in practicing resistance should focus on developing this capability in themselves and their comrades, while depleting it in one’s enemies.

However, the book falters precisely on the question of resistance itself. Caygill’s impressive survey suggests a number of different theoretical and actual practices of resistance, but the term “resistance” itself slips away from him. To be fair, he gestures to the difficulty of defining resistance in the introduction to his book, writing: “a philosophy of resistance has itself to resist the pressure of concept-formation, of reducing the practices of resistance to a single concept amenable to legitimation and appropriation by the very state-form it began by defying” (6). This sentence, though, shows how slippery resistance is: in the very moment that Caygill shies away from a definition, he seems to unintentionally be falling into one. Namely, he thinks of resistance as being something exclusively directed against a “state-form.” This unintentional definition troubles Caygill throughout his work. It sets up a definition that he does not seem fully aware of, and does not fully account for. Indeed, his selection of historical instances of resistance (and precisely what this selection excludes i.e., the entire anarchist tradition of resistance) begs for a conceptual justification of why some examples speak to the question of resistance and
others do not. As soon as he shrugs off defining resistance, some kind of underlying definition seems to be taking hold and structuring his choice of examples.

Indeed, resistance slips so far from any conceptual ground in Caygill’s text that it often threatens to become what would seem to be its intuitive opposite: oppression or domination. Caygill emphasises Clausewitz’s *On War* (*Vom Kriege*, 1832) as the foundational text of resistance. Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that *On War* should really have been named *On Resistance*, suggesting that Caygill’s book of this name is really a rewriting of *On War*. This deep influence leaves him with a picture of resistance as an exclusively martial relationship between two enemies. In his effort to describe resistance, Caygill repeatedly recalls Clausewitz’s image of a duel between two wrestlers, in which each attempts to overcome the other’s “capacity to resist.” Here, resistance is something that both parties in this struggle do equally, suggesting a definition of resistance that does not take into account structural relations of power, let alone the possibility that resistance could involve multiple social relations and relations with oneself. This is resistance as a physically-embodied struggle between two enemies.

This picture of resistance leads him to the startling comment that, in a protest in Paris in support of Algerian Independence in 1960, “the police [were] called in to resist the anti-colonial demonstrations as much as the demonstrators [were] resisting the police” (5, Caygill’s emphasis). In this view, there is not so much an imbalance of structural power as an imbalance in the capacity to resist, an imbalance in ordinance. To enhance their capacity, protestors could acquire batons, tear gas, hand-cuffs and guns, but the implication is that police and protestors are on the same ground. Likewise, in his reading of Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” (“Vor dem Gesetz,” 1915), which serves as the “Afterword” to *On Resistance*, Caygill argues that the Doorkeeper,
with the full force of “the Law” on his side, is resisting the Man from the Country as much as the Man from the Country is resisting the Doorkeeper. According to Caygill, the story is really a Clausewitzian meditation on “the capacity to resist,” in which the Doorkeeper succeeds in the (martial) goal of nullifying his opponent’s capacity to resist, while vastly expanding his own capacity. In this view, resistance is a reciprocal play of forces, irrespective of context, in which s/he who dominates is “resisting” as much as s/he who seeks to overcome domination.

Yet all of the historical examples of resistance that Caygill explores throughout his book fit a more classic definition of resistance, in which a (usually leftist) underdog struggles against a dominant oppressor. Indeed, in the last paragraph of the book, he sets structural domination and resistance against each other as opposites, writing:

contemporary resistance . . . is engaged in defiant delegitimization of existing and potential domination . . . As reciprocals, domination and defiance are engaged in perpetual struggle in which resistance can never rest but must adopt a fresh posture with respect to strengthened counter-resistance. (208)

This view points towards resistance as something practised by oppressed people as a tool for fighting domination. The idea of “counter-resistance,” or the responses by a dominant power to acts of resistance, seems to depart from the martial duel of resistance described by Clausewitz, in which two opponents face each other on equal footing and resist the advances of the other. In this passage, resistance seems more like the struggle against domination, and “counter-resistance” seems like the tactics used in order to suppress this struggle. Despite his own examples troubling his martial focus, Caygill insists on sticking with a Clausewitzian definition of resistance throughout the book.
I think what Caygill is trying to point out in his focus on Clausewitz is that a practice of resistance, when it effectively achieves its goals, can come to occupy a dominant position over what it resists. In this abstract, dialectical view of resistance, the goal of resistance against oppression is not so much liberation, but rather domination over one’s enemy. In fact, Caygill’s Clausewitzian view seems to be celebrating this slide from resistance into oppression. In this view, the goal of resistance is domination. It is no wonder then that the anarchist tradition makes almost no appearance in Caygill’s text, although he discusses various Marxisms throughout. Anarchism appears in his text only in one tangential reference to Bakunin and – if one considers them anarchists – in his discussions of the Situationists and the Zapatistas. The idea of a specific (class) enemy, of resistance as a road to taking power, and of dominance-tomorrow as the goal of resistance-today fits snugly within the Marxist tradition. But this leaves out another kind of resistance, one which aims not to dominate an enemy, but to struggle against all oppression. This can even include, in my view, the oppression one might practice oneself, or have internalized into one’s subjectivity. Caygill’s discussion of the Zapatistas hints at the possibility of this kind of resistance. He writes that their “view of resistance [is] as an end in itself, as the goal and not a revolutionary means for arriving somewhere else” (186) and that “their enmity is to power itself, and their friendship is with and of resistance” (187). Though this calls for a broader idea of resistance, one that is more than just a martial struggle between enemies vying for dominance, Caygill sticks steadfastly to Clausewitz in his overall analysis.

Caygill’s book, however, is still quite fruitful: the idea of a “capacity to resist” that can be

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2 The Situationist International was a group of avant-garde artists, thinkers and revolutionaries active in Europe during the 1950s-1970s. Through their critiques of consumer capitalism, they developed a political practice of liberating everyday life from the social alienation of capitalist culture.

3 The Zapatista Army of National Liberation is a left-wing, militant revolutionary group, based in Chiapas, Mexico. Comprised primarily of indigenous people, the group has been engaged in active resistance to the Mexican state since 1994, fighting for self-governance and local control of land and resources.
fostered or depleted, for example, is extremely useful and important. As a concept, it could be
used to analyze why some periods of history are thick with resistance and others are not: it
acknowledges that resistance as an activity waxes and wanes throughout history. To me, this is a
call to study abundantly resistant situations and to try to understand what is different about them.
In our time, which seems so fertile for resistance, we may learn something from examining
periods of history with similar explosions of resistance. Likewise, Caygill’s book invites a
meditation on the relationship between resistance, war and domination. In his view, resistance is
all but synonymous with war: it is strictly oppositional, and its goal is to reverse domination by
becoming dominant oneself. In my view, this rigidly dialectical view traps resistance into an
overly-martial category, which does not have the flexibility to account for resistances that are not
so material. But these connections are still worth exploring. Though I think equating resistance
exclusively with war is an inadequate approach, it is important to acknowledge that resistance
can and does involve struggle or fighting. This quality of resistance could be developed further,
but thinking of resistance only in this way misses other aspects and potentials of resistance.
Caygill’s work also connects resistance and domination in an interesting way. He gestures to the
potential of a victorious resistance to become a force of domination over the enemy it once
resisted. Whereas he celebrates this process as the goal of resistance, I instead see it as a constant
danger of resistance that needs to be acknowledged and addressed. Ultimately, Caygill’s work
frames resistance too narrowly in its strictly binary take, and it misses other important aspects of
resistance. What he gestures to in his discussion of the Zapatistas – resistance for its own sake,
rather than being a strictly warlike relationship with an enemy – is a kind of resistance that I
want to explore further.
In their 2004 book *Multitude*, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt offer a more complex concept of resistance than Caygill’s, one that takes into account the relationship between resistance and subjectivity, as well as the nuances of an imbalance of power. Indeed, they emphasize subjectivity as an important arena for resistance. Arguing against thinkers like Hannah Arendt that the social is distinctly separate from the political, they suggest that these two realms of human experience are deeply intertwined (78). As such, resistance acts both on the political organization of society and on the subjectivities of its practitioners, suggesting that who we are as people is a political question: who we are is at least in part a question of our relationships to political power and how it structures society. Resistance, in their view, is not just an action taken against external enemies, but an opportunity to create new ways of being. In this light, they promote a form of resistance that “takes place on biopolitical terrain – in other words, it directly produces new subjectivities and new forms of life” (83).

This fuller idea of resistance is compelling, but *Multitude* develops it into a somewhat convoluted picture. At times the book seems to be offering a descriptive history of resistance and arguing about how the structures of history determine resistance, while at other times it seems to be arguing for a prescriptive tactical guide for how best to resist. These two voices do not always cohere, and sometimes even seem at odds with each other. In the last paragraph of the book, they write:

there is no need for eschatology or utopianism here . . . we can already recognize that today time is split between a present that is already dead and a future that is already living – and the yawning abyss between them is becoming enormous. In time, an event will thrust us like an arrow into that living future. (357-358)
This sentiment seems at once to disavow a kind of Marxist utopianism at the same time that it suggests a teleology of liberation and a future beyond the oppressions of the present. This divide runs throughout the book: is their argument a sweeping, classical Marxist view of the revolutionary movement of history, or a more anarchistic call to creatively seize the moment and make new and subversive forms of resistance? It seems to want to be both. Ultimately, I argue, their work slips into a formalist, Marxist perspective.

Similar to Caygill’s account, Hardt and Negri’s concept of resistance takes the Clausewitzian form of an epic battle between two global forces. Writing in the context of contemporary anti-capitalist activism, they call these enemies “Empire” and “the multitude.” But unlike Caygill, who sees resistance as equally practiced by both parties in the conflict, they equate resistance exclusively with the underdog: the multitude. They define the multitude as a new global class, characterized by simultaneous collective identity and internal multiplicity formed into a non-hierarchical, horizontal structure. Comprised of differences, the multitude is an organization of diversity: it “is not unified but remains plural and multiple” (99). This class arises in the context of a new stage of global empire, in which a pseudo-permanent state of war bars the possibility of democracy. As a class, the multitude has the potential to become a new resistant force, with a more liberatory form than any that came before it. Indeed, according to Hardt and Negri, this new form of resistance is already stirring within the multitude. They write a genealogy of resistance and argue that a new form of resistance has arisen over the last half-century. This is a democratic mode of resistance, both striving to resist the structures that preclude democracy in the world and trying to embody democracy in its own structure. In

4 Indeed, they make a strong break with Caygill’s concept of resistance as a duel between two enemies on equal footing, writing: “all notions that pose the power of resistance as homologous or even similar to the power that oppresses us are of no more use” (90).
embracing a leaderless, multiple organization, it differentiates itself from past, un-democratic forms, such as the hierarchically-structured “people’s army” (71). They critique the “undemocratic character” (79) of these earlier forms of resistance because of the tendency for “the forms of domination and authority we are fighting against [to] continually reappear in the resistance movements themselves” (79). Here, they anticipate the problem of resistance becoming its opposite and recapitulating oppression, which Caygill slipped into in his militaristic account. They even make this problem part of their explicit program, writing “we are trying to ensure that our dream of democracy and desire for freedom does not fall back to yet another form of sovereignty and wake up in a nightmare of tyranny” (355).

Their solution to this problem is that the multitude provides, for the first time in modern history, a new category of global solidarity and a new form of mass resistance which can avert this danger. In their genealogy of resistance, Hardt and Negri see the contemporary form of resistance as having overcome the anti-democratic pitfalls of the past: “this genealogy of wars of liberation and resistance movements . . . will lead us to see the most adequate form of organization and liberation struggles in the contemporary material and political situation” (68). This transition in the form of resistance is historically determined: to them, resistance in general changes from a hierarchical form in the early 20th century to a democratic form in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This transformation is caused by a change in the dominant mode of production, which, according to them, shapes practices of resistance in any given time: “the forms of movements evolve in coordination with the evolution of economic forms” (87). The recent growth in the production of immaterial commodities, such as ideas, affects, relationships and images demands a different mode of production, one which takes the form of a horizontal
network of work relationships. Starting after 1968, resistance, too, adopts a corresponding form, organizing itself into “polycentric” (82), horizontal networks. Polycentrality is a way of understanding a diversity of resistance movements, all in loose solidarity with each other, but with no single group dominating the others. Unlike the centralized people’s armies, such as that which Mao used to win the Chinese Revolution, these networks of resistance embody democratic values in their organization at the same time that they struggle materially for these relationships to become universal. Linking this mode of production to the new resistance movements, they argue that “the networks of information, communication, and cooperation – the primary axes of post-Fordist production – begin to define the new guerrilla movements” (82). According to Hardt and Negri, this form of resistance is the first to intervene in biopolitics in a liberatory way, that “increasingly its focus is internal – producing new subjectivities and new expansive forms of life within the organization itself” (83). Through the polycentric form of its organization, this new mode of resistance creates new, liberated subjectivities in its participants.

This narrative of the changing form of resistance culminates in the pro-democracy movements emerging in the 1990s and 2000s, such as the Zapatista and the anti-globalization movements. Highlighting polycentric organization and a focus on subjectivity as primary features of these resistance movements, they offer a compelling description of these recent manifestations of resistance, and they predict the organization of resistance movements that came after Hardt and Negri wrote *Multitude*, such as the Indignados and Occupy Movements. These were leaderless movements, diffuse yet unified, which took inspiration from each other without being explicitly connected. As a conception of resistance, however, Hardt and Negri’s stance is problematic. It conceives of resistance only in the most epic terms: a battle between two global
classes whose possibilities are wholly determined by the logic of history. To them, the relevance of resistance is on the macro-scale, always involved in the global showdown. They argue that “political action aimed at transformation and liberation today can only be conducted on the basis of the multitude” (99). By embracing this epic-scale determinism, their project of resistance becomes somewhat totalitarian. It does not so much open the possibility of resistance to occur in different forms and new arenas, but rather subsumes all resistance into an historically-determined, totalitarian project of absolute liberation. Resistance, to Hardt and Negri, necessarily means resistance to Empire: there is no resistance outside of this dialectic. This means, from the deterministic logic of their argument, that all resistance must necessarily stand with the multitude and be global in scale. Resistance to this “must” has no room in their epic narrative, which already determines resistance ahead of time. Not even the forms that resistance can take are really up for debate. To them, there are only two forms: Empire and multitude. In my view, their description of resistance is very rich: highlighting polycentrality as a resistant form, and emphasizing the creation of subjectivity as part of resistance bring out very important aspects of resistance. But Hardt and Negri subsume these ideas into such an epic project, that it begins to lose relevance in its grandiosity. Since these ways of thinking about resistance are only applicable to the battle between Empire and multitude, there is not any flexibility for thinking about them in other ways or contexts.

Because of their epic-scale determinism, Hardt and Negri also do not fully address the problem of resistance recreating domination. Instead of acknowledging the tendency of resistance to become oppressive itself and trying to deal with this possibility in their account, they argue that this new form of resistance will simply, for the first time in history, not have this
problem. If the multitude can embrace this form and engage in a class struggle, their hope is that this resistance will lead to “a world beyond every sovereignty, beyond authority, beyond every tyranny” (354). It will not turn on itself, because its form is purely liberatory and its success will be total. This is because the multitude, with its simultaneous “singularity and commonality” (105) has the potential to go beyond sovereignty and create a polycentric democracy of self-rule. Without a singular identity, they argue, the multitude can overcome the problems that past resistances have had of “perfect[ing] the form of the state, not destroy[ing] it” (355). Their argument is: it won’t happen this time. The stakes are high enough that “resistance” comes to mean nothing short of a global revolution towards a world beyond tyranny and resistance. To overcome the problem of resistance becoming tyrannical, they aim for a totalitarianism of liberation. I would argue that they, in fact, slip back into the problem of resistance recreating domination, in addressing it through totality. In order to deny that their project could itself become oppressive, they rely on a totalitarian thinking that already seems to be oppressive.

This problem remains unaddressed largely because of the convoluted voices in their text. In not really acknowledging their latent utopianism, they can have their cake and eat it too; but they skew the logic of their own argument. They claim to be non-utopian thinkers, yet at the same time they promote a form of resistance whose success will lead to a post-resistant, post-tyrannical world. It is by putting their faith in this utopian totality that they get around the problem of resistance becoming oppressive. This determinism prevents them from building resistance to the potential tyranny of the multitude into their model: the multitude is the liberatory model of resistance, why would it itself need to be resisted? There is no room here for resistance to resistance itself.
This is a slightly different trap than the one Caygill faces. Caygill stayed within the logic of the “people’s army” as a mode of resistance, of resistance as warfare: successful resistance leads directly to a new situation of domination over the enemy of that resistance. But this does not result in a utopian liberation because, for Caygill, there is always an enemy. Hardt and Negri see that this martial logic results in the institutionalization of resistance into an oppressive organization. But for them, this is only a problem of the form of that institution, not of resistance as such. Their genealogy of resistance offers Hardt and Negri a way out: as long as this new, polycentric form of organization becomes universal, there will not be tyranny in the world. They aim for a liberated totalitarianism, beyond enmity. To me, avoiding this kind of co-optation is not merely a question of finding the correct form for resistant organizations to take. Instead, it requires a fuller acknowledgement that this tendency is a part of resistance itself, regardless of form. The question is not to find a form of resistance that will avoid oppression, but rather to expect it to become oppressive, and be ready to resist it when it does.

This is where their idea of biopolitical resistance could help them if it were not so confined by determinism: as a way of resisting at the level of subjectivity, it could be a way of more generally resisting the dogmatic thinking that leads to institutionalization. For Hardt and Negri, it is not so broad a concept. To them, resisting biopolitically entails directly producing new subjectivities and new forms of life specifically against those produced by Empire. The term “biopolitics” comes from Foucault, who describes it as “the endeavor, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race . . . ” (“The Birth of Biopolitics” 203). For Foucault, this rationalization and management imprints itself into people’s subjectivities,

5 They do not use the term “biopolitical resistance,” but I extrapolate it from their work.
creating them as a controllable population, subject to power. The organization of bodies
determines subjectivities and those subjectivities reproduce that organization. For Hardt and
Negri, resistance can intervene in this process, both by directly creating alternative subjectivities,
and by creating different ways of organizing life than those promoted by Empire. Introducing
this terrain of resistance is an extremely important idea, and one of the strongest contributions of
their book. The concept has the potential to get away from the strictly oppositional narrative of
warfare that Caygill promotes, and to include people’s everyday lives in the concept of
resistance. Biopolitical resistance implies that resistance is not just something that is practiced
against a material enemy, but rather is a multi-directional intervention into how one’s self is
constructed, and what kind of society those selves produce. It emphasizes identity, thinking and
everyday life as shaped by practices of resistance.

However, though the concept has these potentials, Hardt and Negri’s description of
biopolitical resistance does not go quite this far. Their conception of biopolitical resistance
actually remains stuck in the Clausewitzian dialectic of enmity embodied in Empire vs.
multitude, and does not have the flexibility to bring resistance down to the level of everyday life.
To them, the ability to resist biopolitically is only made possible by post-Fordist modes of
production, and is strictly the result of this new form of labour producing a common ground on
which the multitude can base its identity. This functions through individuals creating a common
identity, together: “singularities interact and communicate socially on the basis of the common,
and their social communication in turn produces the common. The multitude is the subjectivity
that emerges from this dynamic of singularity and commonality” (198). In their view,
“singularities” (meaning individual people) collectively produce a common subjectivity, which
becomes the liberated subjectivity of the multitude. This, for them, is biopolitical resistance. As much as they claim that this model retains an organization of difference, it really seems to be about producing sameness – producing singularities with a subjectivity that is common to all. To me, this again shows a latent totalitarianism and the potential for this resistant project to become oppressive in its own way. In fact, a different conception of biopolitical resistance could help with this. If biopolitical resistance could also include resistance that individual people practice against multiple oppressions and not just be the epic struggle against Empire, it could become a much more varied and multi-directional practice of resisting dogmatic thinking in general. It could entail a constant calling into question and thinking against any force that structured subjectivity, even against the subjectivity created by resistant organizations like the multitude. In this way, it could give the multitude an internal dynamic of resistance, to guard against its collective identity ossifying and becoming institutional. Including individual practices in the idea of biopolitical resistance, as well as oppressions other than Empire, would thereby provide a way to intervene in the tendency of resistance itself to become dogmatic and oppressive. It would allow resistance to resist itself.

Hardt and Negri’s model of biopolitical resistance, however, remains a utopian project of defeating Empire, and is not interested in applying the concept in this way. For Hardt and Negri, biopolitical resistance is about fully overcoming the current regime of biopolitics and creating a new, totally liberated subjectivity. That is, the multitude will usher in a new biopolitical regime, which is already germinating in its own form of resistance; but although it will be a regime, it will not be oppressive. It will be a collectively-created regime of liberation and will not need to be resisted. This narrative of total victory does not conceive of resistance as locked in an
incessant struggle with power, but, somewhat like Caygill’s picture, sees resistance as a way of completely overcoming “the enemy’s power” (Hardt and Negri 69). Like Caygill’s vision of resistance as a way of totally annihilating the enemy’s capacity to resist, Hardt and Negri see “the enemy” as the source of all oppression, and view liberation as a question of totally overcoming this enemy. As such, the task of biopolitical resistance is to defeat Empire and to create a fully liberated subjectivity. This is only possible within the organizational form of the multitude. They do not see biopolitical resistance as an ongoing struggle to create new subjectivities in different contexts, but rather as a way of defeating the biopolitics of Empire and ushering in a new, “good” biopolitical regime.

Ultimately, I would argue that Hardt and Negri make a mistake similar to Caygill’s in making resistance overly Clausewitzian. *Multitude* depicts just two massive forces in the world: Empire and the multitude, oppression and resistance, evil and good. The logic of this battle highlights form as primary: if everyone who is resisting is on one side, and this side is the righteous cause, then the form of that side must become the future structure of society. In suggesting that all resistance is operating against Empire and with the multitude, they subsume resistance into a universal teleology. Although they repeatedly deny that their work is teleological, and they do indeed leave room for the failure of their project, it still slips into teleological thinking. Their work is not teleological in the sense that its project is predestined to succeed, but it is teleological in the sense that, for them, all resistance operates towards a universal end-goal. This thinking constrains the tactics of resistance to universalizing a certain organizational form. In the end, the multitude is not really so multitudinous. If they could resist the urge to create a total, utopian project, and instead describe the multitude as a tactic among
others, it would not be so problematic. I agree, for instance, that the polycentric form of organizing, a form based on free association and horizontally structured communities, has rich resistant possibilities that are not open to a hierarchical organization, but it seems counter-resistant to describe it as the Way to resist.

I also agree with Hardt and Negri that subjectivity is an important site for resistance to occur, but one of the main aspects of my theorization is that this kind of resistance is much more diverse and accessible than they imply, and does not have to be subsumed into a utopian project of total liberation. Direct action, bearing witness, resistant language, education and performance are all ways in which this kind of resistance can and does take place, in addition to the tactics that they promote, such as participating in polycentric organizations and creating affect through post-Fordist modes of labour. In fact, subjectivity as a site to practice activism is not a new idea. The Russian prince-turned-anarchist Peter Kropotkin formulated a similar but more open idea of biopolitical resistance in his 1902 book *Mutual Aid*, arguing that one’s environment and community can shape one’s being in liberatory ways. To him, humans have the innate potential to form horizontally-organized communities of free association, and can realize this potential in an environment that is conducive to this form of being. Kropotkin’s book turns against the dog-eat-dog ethics of social Darwinism, and instead argues that humans and animals have a much greater tendency to avoid competition than to strive for dominance. He cites numerous examples of animals working together, gathered from his extensive observations in the Siberian wilderness, such as bees sharing food and work, birds helping each other on their long, collective migrations and wolves hunting and sharing meat together. Moreover, he gives an equally exhaustive account of this tendency in humans throughout their history, from pre-settler
Indigenous societies, to medieval European guilds, to the labour unions cropping up in his time. To him, humans have the innate potential to form democratic organizations of mutual aid, but this potential is suppressed by the competitive society in which most humans live, and by a science and history that promote this misanthropic view of humanity. He writes:

history, such as it has hitherto been written, is almost entirely a description of the ways and means by which theocracy, military power, autocracy and, later on, the richer classes’ rule have been promoted, established and maintained…while, on the other side, the mutual aid factor has been hitherto totally lost sight of; it was simply denied, or even scoffed at. (248)

For Kropotkin, because mutual aid is systematically suppressed as both an idea and a practice, we do not acknowledge it as a human capacity. At best, we see its manifestations as rare moments of altruism, but never as a universal and evolutionarily-favored trait. This dominant way of thinking about mutual aid undermines our ability to practice it. Because we do not see ourselves as capable of being this way, we do not bother trying.

As a way of seeing human potential differently, Kropotkin’s book is a direct intervention in the creation of different forms of being. The book itself is resisting social Darwinist science, which “loudly proclaims that the struggle of each against all is the leading principle of nature and of human societies as well” (198). Social Darwinism encourages the creation of social organizations based on domination, or rather, argues that these forms are the only ones that humans are able to create. In arguing that mutuality is an innate part of humans and offering evidence for this claim from history and the natural world, Kropotkin is trying to open our subjectivities to the idea that we could practice alternative forms of being than the ones promoted
by our hierarchical environment and the dominant narratives of our society. Changing our conception of what it means to be human, what we mean by “nature” and what humans have been capable of throughout history fundamentally changes our current possibilities of socialized being. Likewise, different ways of socializing and of thinking about society offer a different view of human possibilities. To me, this way of thinking is a kind of biopolitical resistance. The book itself is a way of changing how people view themselves and other humans, while this changing of subjectivity opens people to the potential of creating different ways of organizing life, based on mutuality. For Kropotkin, human subjectivity and the environment form a feedback loop. An environment or society in which humans experience mutual aid will develop this trait in humans and allow them to see themselves as communal beings; while humans who see themselves as communal beings will be capable of creating societies of mutual aid. In his view, society and subjectivity are intertwined. A resistant intervention in one affects the other. His book begins this resistance by offering a different view of humans, and calls for this resistance to continue through the direct creation of societies of mutual aid.

In certain ways, this is similar to Hardt and Negri’s account. In *Multitude*, they argue that participating in polycentric organizations creates a subjectivity that is more interested in communality than domination, while Kropotkin argues that experimenting with non-hierarchical relationships of mutual aid will cause humans to see themselves differently and vice versa. Both *Mutual Aid* and *Multitude* see subjectivity as linked to how people relate to and organize with others, and see both these factors as changeable. However, there are a few key differences between these accounts. Kropotkin sees mutual aid as an innate potential that humans can tap into at any time in history. The ability to create non-hierarchical relationships and organizations
is biological for him. It just needs to be fostered in order to be practiced. Indeed, for him, we do it in small ways all the time. For Hardt and Negri, the possibility of creating different subjectivities and new ways of being is tied to post-Fordist modes of production. Participating in polycentric organizations is the primary tactic of biopolitical resistance, which, in their view, is only really accessible after the shift in modes of production occurring around 1968. Likewise, Hardt and Negri’s picture of polycentrality and biopolitical resistance is entirely bound up in their epic struggle with Empire. It only makes sense within their grand argument of contemporary class struggle. Kropotkin, on the other hand, sees a long history and pre-history of polycentric ways of organizing, in which groups co-exist rather than dominate each other, and sees this as a much more accessible aspect of humanity. Out of these two differences, Kropotkin’s stance emerges as much more flexible and translatable to different contexts. He suggests that different ways of being, organizing and thinking are always within reach, whereas to Hardt and Negri these are only to be found within the logic of the contemporary struggle against Empire.

Although Kropotkin offers a kind of utopianism, it is very different from Hardt and Negri’s. Kropotkin argues that mutual aid is an evolutionary advantage, and it will continue to evolve. It is the “chief leader towards further progress” (245) and he argues that “the unsociable species, on the contrary, are doomed to decay” (246). In his view the future will become more inclined towards mutuality, and less towards domination. However, he acknowledges mutual aid as just one innate potential of humans among others. In the introduction to Mutual Aid he writes “[this book] is on the law of Mutual Aid, viewed as one of the chief factors of evolution – not on all factors of evolution and their respective values . . . I should certainly be the last to underrate
the part which the self-assertion of the individual has played in the evolution of mankind” (24). He does not deny that humans also have the potential to be self-centred and cruel, but argues that this is only one aspect of humanity. For Kropotkin, the struggle of these innate potentials will continue: promoting mutual aid is an ongoing practice of resistance against the urge to dominate others, and against the belief that humans are essentially self-asserting. In his picture, humans are divided against themselves, and will likely continue to be so until they evolve into a biologically different being. Hardt and Negri, on the other hand, view the goal of biopolitical resistance as a totally liberated future beyond Empire and beyond resistance. They promote a future, liberated totality, that will no longer involve struggle or domination. To me, this utopianism blinds them to the potential of their own resistant project to become oppressive and dogmatic in its own way. Kropotkin’s kind of biopolitical resistance helps to guard against this by acknowledging the consistent human potential for oppression and by being prepared to resist it.

The anarchist activist and feminist Emma Goldman also develops a kind of biopolitical resistance in her formulation of direct action in her 1910 essay “Anarchism.” Like Hardt and Negri, she envisions a broad terrain of resistance that integrates the social and political: she calls for “the open defiance of, and resistance to, all laws and restrictions, economic, social, and moral” (65). To her, direct action is the primary tactic that integrates resistance to these different spheres of oppression. She writes that “direct action, having proven effective along economic lines, is equally potent in the environment of the individual. There a hundred forces encroach upon his being, and only persistent resistance to them will finally set him free” (66). Her text suggests that while direct action is effective in changing the material relations of society, it also has a productive and liberating effect on individual subjectivity; or, in the language of Hardt and
Negri, it is a way to resist biopolitically.

Though her text is utopian and sees a future revolution as a certainty (67), she does not defer freedom to an absolutely liberated future as Hardt and Negri do. Indeed, the strength of direct action for her is its immediacy, its power to liberate individuals as they practice it. Although she has faith that this tactic will help to “usher in the new Dawn” (67), her emphasis is not on the future, but on its liberatory potential in the now. Unlike Hardt and Negri, her project is not overly preoccupied with collectively creating a total, biopolitical regime of liberation. Instead, she argues in favour of individuals intervening in the production of subjectivity by power directly and sees a liberated future as following from this. Whereas Hardt and Negri see the liberation of subjectivity as the product of a future, liberatory, global organization, Goldman argues for a liberation of subjectivity in the present, and sees this as a way of working towards a utopian future. This gives Goldman’s account of what I call biopolitical resistance more flexibility than Hardt and Negri’s. Like Kropotkin’s, it is not a programmatic account based on responding to a certain mode of production. It is based on the productive power of individuals to take action to liberate themselves and each other, using a variety of open tactics.

But this focus on individual subjectivity does not mean that these activities are random or that they do not have a broader political effect. Goldman lists a long history of what direct action has accomplished materially, such as universal suffrage, the abolition of black slavery in America, trade-unionism and the General Strike. All of these are both material gains and ways of altering subjectivity: universal suffrage involves a different conception of democracy, abolition a different conception of race, trade-unionism a different conception of class, and the General Strike she describes as “the supreme expression of the economic consciousness of the workers”
She links these two aspects of resistance – the changing of subjectivity and the changing of material conditions – most strongly in her discussions of women’s liberation. To Goldman, women’s liberation must begin with individual women resisting in their own lives. She argues that “[a woman’s] development, her freedom, her independence, must come from and through herself” (“Women’s Suffrage” 211). This individual resistance at the level of subjectivity needs to happen before a broader, collective liberation can take place. Goldman criticizes resistances that work in the opposite direction, that resist politically as a means of liberating individuals after the fact. She argues strongly against the idea that emancipation can come from outside oneself. Critiquing the politics of women’s emancipation, she declares that “mere external emancipation has made of the modern woman an artificial being” (“The Tragedy of Women’s Emancipation” 214). In Goldman’s view, resisting politically requires that one first engage in resistance at the level of subjectivity. This liberating of subjectivity then continues through physical acts of resistance against the material conditions of society. In this picture, resistance begins with a biopolitical resistance, which opens subjectivity to resistant thinking, and remains entangled with it. Collective projects of resistance follow from the amalgamation of resistance at the level of individual subjectivity with resistance against the political and economic organization of society. For Goldman, resistance begins with the individual in their relation to themselves.

Kropotkin and Goldman suggest a wider field for biopolitical resistance to occur. They are also examples of this kind of resistance having its own history, one that is not strictly tied to post-Fordist modes of production, and one that will extend into the future. Reading Hardt and Negri, Kropotkin and Goldman together provides a concept of biopolitical resistance that integrates resistance at the level of individual, the social and the political, and invites resistant
interventions at any and all of these levels. Goldman argues that resistance starts with the individual in relationship to their own subjectivity and promotes tactics of directly engaging in this kind of resistance. Kropotkin inspires the idea that social relations are an important site for biopolitical resistance to occur. For him, the formation of subjectivity is in a feedback loop with how humans relate to each other socially, and this feedback loop can become a site of resistance. Hardt and Negri’s mode of biopolitical resistance involves an empowered, collective political organization working together to create its own collective, political identity, which will then shape the subjectivity of its members and of the planet. Together, these thinkers emphasize three levels of biopolitical resistance, which are all related: the individual, the social and the political.

To me, biopolitical resistance operates on all these levels at once, and each level is in tension with the others. How society is politically organized, what kinds of groups or social relations people create and how individuals relate to themselves all have implications on subjectivity, and all provide sites for resistance to occur. And likewise, subjectivity determines how one relates to oneself, what kinds of societies people build and what kinds of political organizations people produce. My model of biopolitical resistance suggests that individuals can always intervene in the creation of their subjectivity through tactics like direct action; that there is always the possibility to create and participate in different forms of collectivity and social life that are not wholly determined by politics; and that intervening in the political organization of society is a way to influence how society as a whole structures the subjectivities of its members. Allowing these three levels to operate in tension with each other provides a way of not letting any one mode of resistance become dominant and dictate to the others. It calls for a more paradoxical relationship of collectivity, that is formed through different levels of resistance, some
of which may be at odds with each other. Someone participating in a collective project of resistance, for instance, could also engage in an individual project of resistance that involved resistance to that collective organization. This layered way of thinking about biopolitical resistance goes beyond Hardt and Negri’s epic narrative, and allows resistance to include multiple manifestations of resistance within itself. It can even include resistance to the potential oppression of resistance itself.

The concept of “everyday resistance,” developed by James C. Scott, offers a description of resistances that slip through the cracks of grander narratives of resistance like Hardt and Negri’s. In *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, Scott universalizes a form of resistance that he observed while doing anthropological research on Malay peasants, documented in his earlier book *Weapons of the Weak*. His argument is that resistance is not only taking place in its most overt challenges to oppression, but is also constantly at work in manifestations that are invisible to a dominant class, such as foot-dragging, theft, gossip, religious rituals and folk songs. He refers to this “everyday resistance” as a “‘hidden transcript’ that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant” (*Domination* xii). This concept radically expands what could be considered resistance and empowers everyday actions with a broader political importance. It also provides a view counter to Hardt and Negri’s directional project of resistance and instead sees power and resistance as eternally struggling bedfellows. Scott describes resistance not as a programmatic project towards global liberation, but rather as an eternal practice of undermining power relations. There is no post-resistant future in Scott’s work, but there is no total domination by power, either. Resistance is a constant, but never absolute,

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6 He develops these ideas over three books, moving from anthropologically specific cases to a more universal theory. These books are *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia* (1976), *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (1985) and *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (1990).
To me, one of the most important results of Scott’s work is to challenge the idea that society is hegemonic and totalizing. He writes “a view of politics focused either on what may be command performances of consent or open rebellion presents far too narrow a concept of political life” (20), arguing that seeing politics as either a smooth functioning of hegemonic power or a revolutionary disruption of this power is a superficial view. Resistance is always going on; totalitarianism is never total. Indeed, he argues that what may appear to be deference on the part of an oppressed subordinate may actually be “artful manipulation” (34), to conceal the resistance that is actually taking place. Scott is a fundamentally anti-totalitarian thinker, promoting the view that resistance is always possible. In this way, he departs from the more dialectical narratives of Caygill and Hardt and Negri. Indeed, he would likely shy away from Caygill’s idea that resistance is a way of negating an enemy’s “capacity to resist,” and instead argue that this capacity is always there, even in relations of extreme domination.

Here Scott is not far from the anarchist theorist Mikhail Bakunin, who argues in *Marxism, Freedom and the State* that humans have an “instinct of revolt” (50). Bakunin’s idea is a way of responding to his contemporary Karl Marx’s dialectical materialism, in which Marx describes economic relations of exploitation as the motor that moves history. Bakunin argues that this is not the whole story, and that humans’ innate drive to rebel also needs to be considered as a factor in how change occurs. History is not just class struggle, but a more general urge to resist. However, Bakunin’s language around the “instinct of revolt” is problematically racialized, suggesting that different races and civilizations possess this instinct to different degrees. Scott does not biologize his account, but the two thinkers are similar in seeing resistance as a constant
part of human life. Like Kropotkin’s mutual aid, Bakunin’s revolt is an innate potential for humans that is always lurking below the smooth surface of the dominant narratives of history. Scott likewise sees resistance as something fundamental to humans, which is always present in any relation of power. It is not so much a calculated act against an enemy, but an integral part of human relations. This similarity to Bakunin positions Scott as also challenging a dialectical vision of history and resistance. For Scott, resistance does not necessarily arrive anywhere or produce something fundamentally new. It is “everyday,” not the utopian motor of history.

Given this non-dialectical stance, Scott differs from Hardt and Negri in emphasizing small-scale, multi-directional resistance, as opposed to their epic narrative of the oppressed vs. Empire. To Scott, oppression is multiple, not just manifested in the largest structures of the global order. Indeed, he points out that there is “domination within domination” (26), or the oppression of people by those who are also in an oppressed class: “power relations among subordinates are not necessarily conducted along democratic lines at all. Among the inmates of prisons . . . there frequently develops a tyranny as brutal and exploitative as anything the guards can devise” (26). This gets away from the dialectic relations of enmity that both Caygill and Hardt and Negri remain in. In Scott’s view, someone can be resisting in one direction while they oppress in another, or can be resisting multiple, conflicting oppressions at once. In Scott’s example of prison, for instance, all the inmates are resisting the guards and form a kind of collective of resistance. At the same time, certain inmates are resisting the oppression inflicted on them by other inmates, creating an internal dynamic of resistance and oppression within this collective. There is no single oppressive force that all resistance acts against, no clear enemy that one is locked in combat with, but rather a messy interplay of alternating resistances and
oppressions that stand in tension with each other. Resistance moves in multiple directions, and is not all part of a single movement against a universal oppression. Unlike Hardt and Negri, Scott leaves room for resistance to occur against a resistant organization from within its ranks. Scott’s theory fills the world with examples of resistance, and declares, in opposition to a totalitarian idea of power, that resistance is always possible.

Scott’s method is primarily anthropological, which offers an understanding of resistance that is descriptive, not programmatic. His work is not recommending a course of action, but is describing examples of resistant human behaviour. However, this begs the question, what is his work doing? As a theoretical intervention, Scott’s work succeeds in breaching the idea that hegemony is total, thereby opening a space for resistance to occur. In casting resistance as constantly active and oppression as never total, Scott’s view has an empowering effect on those interested in resistance, and has been taken up in this light by feminist, subaltern, queer and poststructuralist scholars (Vinthagen and Johansson 1). But this empowerment is not his explicit practice. The goal of his book is “to suggest how we might more successfully read, interpret, and understand the often fugitive political conduct of subordinate groups” (17). This establishes a different approach to resistance, an approach that studies, rather than practices, resistance: it sees resistance as something to be classified and examined, but not necessarily engaged in. As a call to study, it is a call to stand outside of resistance, and engage in an activity of classification. Here, Scott’s method becomes somewhat problematic. Unlike Hardt and Negri, his problem is in no way an overdetermined, programmatic account of resistance. Rather, he runs into trouble in the relationship between theory and practice. If the goal of the book is an enhanced capacity to interpret resistance, but it acknowledges resistance as a prolific part of everyday life that
everyone is involved in, where do the acts of theorizing and classification fit into resistance? How can the act of interpreting resistances remain disengaged from these seemingly universal relationships of resistance? If resistance is really a part of everyday life, can its researchers really stand outside of it? Not addressing these questions leaves Scott closed off from resistance as a practice, and renders his method somewhat at odds with what he is arguing. I will return to this problem below in my discussion of how people have responded to Scott’s work. But, for now, I do not want to downplay the resistant effect of Scott’s work, which is different from his method. In offering a radically expanded definition of resistance, his work depicts power as always contestable, never total, and opens up resistance as a much more abundant possibility.

Indeed, resistance now seems so abundant that Scott’s expanded definition has sparked a fierce academic debate over what qualifies as resistance, as Stellen Vinthagen and Anna Johansson show in their 2013 article “‘Everyday Resistance’: Exploration of a Concept and its Theories.” Vinthagen and Johansson summarize nearly three decades of debate on the topic of what should be labelled “everyday resistance,” and enter into it themselves, advocating a definition of “everyday resistance” as (i) a habitual practice (rather than a certain consciousness), (ii) something that is entangled with “power,” sometimes reinforcing and sometimes diminishing it, (iii) intersectional and not just engaging with a single power structure, and (iv) heterogenic and contingent on different contexts (39). One can see from this definition that certain issues remain contentious after decades of debate. Does everyday resistance have to be intentional, or can it be habitual? Must it always be directed against a hegemonic power? Must it be “successful” to count as resistance? Within these debates, Vinthagen and Johansson have the admirable goal of promoting a concept of resistance that is “open enough to identify and
incorporate unexpected resistance” (39). Like Scott’s own work, this new definition and the ones that came before it provide frameworks for detecting and classifying resistance.

Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner (2004) summarize a broader debate on the meaning of resistance in general, including the debate on the definition of “everyday resistance.” Their solution to the flurry of academic research labelling seemingly contradictory things as “resistance,” and the subsequent disagreement over the definition of the term, is a seven-part typology of resistance in its different forms. These are broken down by whether an act is intended as resistance, and whether it is recognized as such by its target and/or by outside observers. These seven types are overt resistance, covert resistance, unwitting resistance, target-defined resistance, externally-defined resistance, missed resistance and attempted resistance (544). The goal of this project is to make the classification of resistance in sociology easier and less contentious. They summarize a fierce debate over what actually “qualif[ies]” (542) as resistance, and argue that perhaps these debates could be resolved by thinking of resistance in terms of these seven types. This, they hope, will provide a way of studying resistance that incorporates a broad range of activities, but which does not muddle itself by labelling seemingly contradictory acts as “resistance.”

Although these efforts to encompass a wider range of activities into the study of resistance are important, the definitional frame of the debates gives the study of resistance a problematic scope. Like Scott’s, these approaches to resistance are focused on the importance of researchers being able to correctly “detect” (Vinthagen and Johansson 18) and “classify[ . . . ]” (Hollander and Einwohner 542) external examples of resistance for the purpose of study. As such, these debates seem to devolve (perhaps against their best intentions) into policing what
should and should not be labelled resistance, regardless of how its practitioners view it. But more importantly, these debates promote a strange idea of how scholars relate to resistance. The unspoken assumption of these definitional arguments is that resistance can remain a detached category of observation and analysis, and that, in discussing it theoretically, one does not oneself engage in a practice of resistance. In this view, researchers can remain outside of resistance, and play the role of uninvolved arbitrator on the acts that they observe. This unspoken assumption is implicitly an argument about what resistance is and where it takes place; by trying to remain detached from resistance and to classify its instances, these debates close off the possibility of resistance being a part of scholarship. Indeed, these debates suggest the potential for resistance to occur almost anywhere, from hairstyles (Weitz), to bodybuilding (St. Martin and Gavey 46) to telling jokes (Scott, 1995 xiii), anywhere except in the study of resistance itself. At root, this amounts to a tacit argument that the act of theorizing does not have a place in the practice of resistance. Based on the biopolitical model of resistance I developed above, theorizing does involve a practice of resistance. If theorizing is a way of influencing how people think, of changing their subjectivities, then it can also be a practice of resisting biopolitically. Indeed, as a stance on what resistance is or should be, theorizing about resistance is a way of determining practices of resistance and what they may or may not accomplish.

Critiquing this blind spot in the debates over the definition of resistance opens a path towards a different method for studying resistance. What the intensity and longevity of these debates show is that defining, typologizing or classifying resistance invites resistance to each new act of categorization. And the debates are not slowing down! In their urge to define or typologize resistance, these scholars are actually resisting the definitions of resistance that came
before them, and provoking future resistance to their own ideas. Theorizing resistance in this way is itself an act of resistance against other theorizations. This reveals resistance as paradoxical: defining resistance produces resistance to that definition. This means that resistance cannot be fully contained by whatever definition is placed upon it and, in resisting definitions of itself, is constantly appearing outside of itself. As soon as a definition is resisted, this act of resistance appears outside of that definition, and the definition no longer contains the full meaning of resistance. For a definition to be complete, it would not only have to take itself into account as part of resistance, it would also have to include resistance to itself within its own definition. Always interfering with its own study, resistance resists being studied by science. Any objectification of the concept invites resistance to itself as a definition. Resistance is like Heisenberg’s electron, whose position becomes more uncertain the more certain its momentum becomes, and vice versa. The more precisely we pin resistance down, the more it shows itself as not really being there.

This is not to say that the social sciences have nothing to offer to the study of resistance. It just means that we have to be careful with these tools, and not assume that simply applying them to resistance will result in a clear picture. History, sociology, anthropology and political science all can enrich the understanding of resistance by using the methods of their disciplines. But they could get a better handle on resistance if they resisted, in the final moment, the urge to present the total picture, the full classification, the strict definition. This is exactly the moment that resistance rears up outside of the picture presented, rendering it incomplete and at odds with itself. Resistance is not only the object, but also the subject of its definition. This points towards a method that uses resistance itself to study resistance, towards a deep entanglement of resistance
with scholarship. Using this method, we can give up on the idea that we can get outside of resistance or gain an objective vantage point above it. Instead, we can see ourselves as already engaged in practices of resistance, in its study and throughout our lives.

What does this method look like? The method has already begun; it has begun with resistance. In the work of others, it began with resistance to certain definitions of resistance, and in my work, it began with resistance to the empirical model of study, and to the urge to step outside of and objectify resistance. This initial resistance already reveals much of what is at stake. Resisting the tendencies of the social sciences reorients thinking about resistance: it already has an effect in practice on subjectivity as it relates to resistance. This effect is to intertwine resistance and thinking. In asking the question “what is resistance?,” resistance begins to reveal itself as an activity that is part of asking the question, not something outside the question of its meaning. It already begins to shape the meaning of resistance, and suggests that theorizing about resistance is also a practice of resistance that has an effect. As such, the method of studying resistance involves, in part, practicing resistance and being aware of this practice.

This suggests that the study of language is part of the study of resistance. If the study of resistance is a practice of resistance, and we study resistance through language, then it is necessary to look at the resistances going on through and against language. Indeed, the very word “resistance” seems to call for its own definitional rupturing: etymologically, it suggests a constant assertion of otherness. The word “resistance” comes from Latin, and means literally “to stand against” ( _re_ means “against” in Latin, and _sistere_ means “to take a stand”). Although this word does not suggest what is being “stood against,” juxtaposing the word “resist” with

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7 Etymological information taken from *The Oxford English Dictionary*.
8 The word has the same etymological break-down in German, where the word is *Widerstand*. 
“consist” (both sharing the root word *sistere*) provides a clue. *Con* means “with” or “together,” making it the opposite of *re* or “against.” *Consist* means “to stand with” or “to place together,” and also has the additional meanings of “stop” or “halt” in Latin. In contrast to its opposite “consist,” “resist” gains the qualities of differentiation and dynamism. To “stand against” implies another position against which one is differentiating oneself; the preposition “against” calls for an object that is in some way differentiated from the subject that is doing the standing. But in assuming this stance that differentiates itself from what is being stood against, resistance also stands for something. In asserting a difference to its object, the stance has some kind of positive content, a content that sets it apart from what one resists. This implies breaking away from some kind of consistency and creating a difference that stands out against a former uniformity.

Resistance is something that disrupts what is homogeneous. To consist, or “to place together,” suggests the negation of difference, or coherence within a group or category. Resistance is anti-consistent. If the two words could be described as urges, “consist” would be the urge to group together and categorize, whereas “resist” would be the urge to be different, to contend, to break categories. Part of “standing against” is creating something different from what is stood against. It is this being different that can be described as resistance.

Attempting to pin “resistance” down to any “consistent” understanding reveals the paradox of resistance. “To define” means literally to limit or to bring to an end (*de* implies completion, and *fin* means the limit or the finish). Defining implies a comprehensive limitation of meaning within boundaries, as well as a final settling of this meaning. But, as discussed above, any definition of resistance would need to build resistance to itself into its definition in order to begin to encompass resistance. That is, it would acknowledge that its boundaries are not
stable and its meaning is not settled. Resistance breaks itself as a category. As soon as it threatens to become consistent, resistance steps outside of itself. And yet, the act of resistance is to take a stand, to definitively assert itself. Asserting a definition of resistance means to resist other definitions of it. It “stands against” these definitions and takes a static character in its affirmative stance. Yet, by taking a stand as a certain definition, it is resisting other definitions, it is being resisted by them and it is preparing to take a stand against its own stance. A definition says that resistance is such and such a thing. When that definition is resisted, it still stands, yet in being unable to encompass the stance that stands against that definition, resistance as an activity is also outside of it. Resistance is involved in a dynamic of resistance to the limitation of its own definition. At the same time that it takes a static stand, it also reveals itself as multiple and ecstatic. It exists as a static-ecstatic paradox.

This understanding of resistance borrows terms from Martin Heidegger’s description of “ekstatisch[e] Zeitlichkeit” (437), or “ecstatic temporality,” in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger argues that existence is characterized by being temporally outside of itself: in-so-far as existence projects itself into the future, it is not at home in the present; and, burdened by the weight of its past, its being is determined by the history that it has left behind. Resistance is similar, in that its definition must be prepared for a future of resistances to this definition, and its present stance is a resistance to its past forms, which nonetheless still inform what it is. However, it also forms a static-ecstatic paradox in how its conception even in the present moment is always spatially multiple: resistance always implies multiple positions, some of which may be at odds with each other. For resistance, the spatial and temporal are intertwined. Resistance is always a stance, designating it as a spatial activity, but in its spatial stance, it always draws on and resists its past

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9 I refer to Joan Stambough's translation (415).
forms towards new resistances in the future. It is involved in its history and it is invested in the 
future. As a spatial stance that draws on and resists its past forms to project itself into the future, 
resistance as an activity stands outside of definition. If definition means to limit, to finish, to set 
final boundaries, then resistance in its spatial and temporal multiplicity is, paradoxically, the anti-
definition. It is defined by its indefinability; it is consistent in being inconsistent.

This is not just a question of language, however. The paradoxical nature of resistance also 
plays out politically, and indicates the main differences between resistance and revolution. 
Unlike the incessant productivity of resistance, always turning against itself and creating new 
forms, revolution aims for a new, static consistency under different rules. It might begin its 
project through resistance, through asserting a different way of thinking, of governing, or of 
sharing wealth from that of the status quo, but its goal is a dominance that strives for totality and 
egates difference. Revolution aims to replace whatever reality spawned it with a new reality of 
its own design: a new way of thinking, a new way of seeing the world, a new system. Resistance 
is much more slippery; it does not deal in end results. Its work is never done. It is the force that 
would disrupt even a utopia if that utopia claimed to have the monopoly on reality. It is a force 
that might have given Marx troubling dreams. The fantasy of a utopian end of history, of finally 
“arriving” at social justice, cannot dispel the urge to break with such a homogeneity. As soon as 
resistance ossifies into something institutional, it springs up against itself. It delivers a program 
that is anti-programmatic; it is anti-oppressive anti-oppression.

Where does the method of studying resistance go from here? What does this resistance to 
empiricism, consistency and strict definition look like as a positive project? This is a tricky 
arena: is there a method that would not provoke resistance to itself? Must the study of resistance
not be a resistance to method as such? What method of studying resistance would encompass also the resistance that this method would provoke? But these questions again lead to the empirical path, which erroneously tries to fully encompass resistance and to offer a picture of resistance that does not involve resistance as an activity. The mistake is in looking for one method that can encapsulate all aspects of resistance, or in attempting to definitively answer the question of resistance at all. Resistance is best studied through a practice of resistance, that builds resistance to itself into its method. It is best studied paradoxically. This means that the goal of this method is not a final definition, but rather a provocation to more resistance. The method is aware of itself as resistance and of the resistances that will spring up ecstatically outside of it. Embracing its indefinability does not signify failure and despair, but rather ecstatic celebration as these new resistances enrich resistance by adding to its meaning. This method takes the stance that resistance is both historical and productive. As new resistances take place, resistance resists the limitations of its own history, even as its history remains part of what it is. By resisting its own definition, it is constantly producing itself as a new entity and making its meaning more complex and paradoxical.

Paradox means what is contrary to or outside of thought or opinion. It allows the thinking of what does not seem possible to thought, and it allows thought to turn against itself. In this way, paradox is also a resistant form. Paradox resists general opinions on what is possible and true, and resists the institutionalization of its own thinking. It goes outside general understanding. As such, paradox stands against the ossification of thought. This is why paradox is uniquely endowed to think about resistance. Like resistance, it is dynamic. It goes into action as soon as opinion on something has become stable and consistent – even its own opinion. As discussed
above, resistance stands against its own definition as soon as the boundaries of this definition become final; that is, as soon as the act of defining becomes a definition. This is also the method of paradox: it is always outside the boundaries of what is thought. This allows the thinking of resistance in its necessary formulations. Resistance is programmatic about not having a program; it is an anti-oppressive anti-oppression; it is defined by not having a definition; it is consistently inconsistent; it is simultaneously static and ec-static. But perhaps most importantly, paradox gives resistance the ability to resist itself. In this way, resistance can avoid the pitfall of becoming an institutionalized form of domination, a problem that Caygill and Hardt and Negri point out and try to address. In my view, they failed to address this problem because they did not acknowledge the paradox of resistance. It is by resisting itself that resistance can avoid slipping into oppression.

If resistance is productive and is able to resist resistances that came before it, it presents the problem of a potentially limitless scope of study. Indeed, as I argued above drawing on Scott, we are entangled with practices of resistance in our daily lives. It is no wonder then, that there has been such a flurry of academic articles describing various things as resistance, as Hollander and Einwohner point out and seek to address. We can potentially find resistance anywhere. How can this study retain some kind of focus? It may seem strange at this moment to limit the work to a single case study, but this is precisely the move of taking a stand that will allow resistance to begin its work. We can only enter the static-ecstatic paradox of resistance in the initial act of standing against. But this act of taking a stand fully recognizes that this can never offer the full picture of resistance. In the moment that it sketches some boundaries around resistance, it already sees resistance slipping through the gates. It invites fresh resistances to its own
conception, and ecstatically celebrates this spur to enrich resistance and produce new forms. In the following chapters, I am resisting certain historical and political understandings of resistance by picking a case study that has been all but written out of history: the West German, feminist guerrilla cell Rote Zora. As I argue below, study of the context in which Rote Zora was operating (1970s-1990s West Germany) is saturated by research into their contemporary militants the RAF. This offers a lopsided view of resistance and militancy that itself needs to be resisted. But, more importantly, the group Rote Zora offers a highly developed theory and practice of resistance, one which is based, I argue, on the paradoxicality of resistance. In my view, they are practicing a method of resistance as paradox. Studying the group addresses resistance in two ways: it resists a stifling understanding of resistance and its history by drawing attention to Rote Zora and arguing that they are feminists, activists and theorists worth taking seriously, and it interprets the theory and practice of Rote Zora to contribute to a critical concept of what resistance is. It is both an historical and a theoretical argument.

The goal of this discussion is not a definitive answer to the question of resistance, but rather a paradoxical stance on what resistance is that hopes in turn to be resisted and overcome. It is both a theory and practice of resistance that resists ossified ideas about the history and meaning of resistance, at the same time that it advances new conceptions of resistance in this reinterpretation of the concept. At root, it is an argument for the intertwining of theory and practice, that believes reorienting subjectivity and thinking has an intense political power and a material effect in the world. Its goal is to change the way its writer and its readers conceive of resistance and their possibilities in relation to it, with the idea that this changed attitude constitutes a political effect. How we think about resistance changes how we practice it. And
thinking about resistance in this paradoxical way promotes a practice that exponentially produces further resistance. Resistance, in this view, is energetic and active. Through the tension that it is locked in with itself, it constantly creates itself in new forms, developing its complexity, broadening its range and increasing its intensity.
Chapter 2: Background on Rote Zora

“Hey Rote Zora, molli hier molli da molli hopssasa,

Hey Rote Zora, du machst, was uns gefällt.”

- Heiter bis wolkig, “Hey Rote Zora”

In order to see how this alternative theory of resistance as paradox might be put into practice, it is important to contextualize it in time. Thinking about it in history allows thinking about it in practice. This chapter turns to an historical context which was abundant with resistance: West Germany in the 1960s through the ‘90s. In doing so, it moves beyond the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 and sets up a context for understanding how paradoxical resistance can be put into practice. This is one of the goals of this chapter. It sets up the work that I continue in Chapter 3, where I offer readings of Rote Zora’s theory and practice of resistance.

The other goal of this chapter is to resist dominant narratives about the history of this period, which limit an understanding of resistance. In this way, I continue the method of using resistance to study resistance that I began in Chapter 1. As I elaborate below, these dominant narratives foreground the RAF as the paragon of militant resistance in West Germany. I seek to complicate this understanding of the history of resistance by focusing on a group which receives barely any attention in this history: the radical, feminist guerrilla cell Rote Zora. Acknowledging this group contributes to a different understanding of this period, which in turn provokes a more complex, heterogeneous idea of resistance. At the same time, bringing history into the theoretical discussion of resistance provides a bridge between theory and practice.

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10 In Chapter 3, I offer a close reading of the group’s feminism. Their own self-understanding was as a feminist group, which they make explicit in their self-interview. In response to the question “heißt das, daß ihr euch als feministinnen versteht?” one of the Zoras responds “ja, selbstverständlich gehen wir davon aus, daß das private politisch ist” (“Widerstand ist möglich” 40, nouns uncapitalized in original).
Post-war West Germany exploded with multiple resistances throughout the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s. While alternative youth subcultures such as the Halbstarken were active in the 1950s (for a detailed discussion, see von Dirke 9-28), it was not until the ‘60s that a new, revolutionary, organized left emerged that fundamentally rejected mainstream society and intertwined its radical subculture with a political program. Though similar revolutionary movements formed throughout the world in the 1960s, its German manifestation had a certain intensity. After the 1966 election in West Germany, the government formed as a coalition between the traditionally left-wing and right-wing political parties (the SPD and the CDU, respectively), with Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a member of the Nazi party from 1933 to 1945, as Chancellor. In the same year, the government passed emergency power laws, which allowed it to restrict democratic rights in times of crisis, such as freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assembly and the right to strike. Germany had recently rearmed itself, entered NATO and was occupied by American troops, whose compatriots were also stationed halfway across the world, fighting what many saw as a genocidal and imperialist war in Vietnam. At around this time, many young Germans began to discover the role their parents’ generation had played in the Nazi regime. In 1965, a high-profile trial against former Auschwitz guards took place in Frankfurt am Main. For many youth, this was their first exposure to the horrors of the Holocaust, radically shifting their perceptions of their teachers, government leaders and parents (von Dirke 36). In the same year, accounts of the American military’s bombing of civilians in Vietnam were widely publicized (Markovits and Gorski 53). With a generation of former Nazis in power, many West German youth at this time did not see their country as having moved beyond its Nazi past (Melzer, Death 42), and West Germany’s military alliance with the USA connected the country to America’s current war in
Vietnam. As West Germany struggled with its authoritarian past and present, the political stakes in the young nation were especially high.

Deeply disillusioned with West German society and politics, resistance in the 1960s took a stance outside the system, forming the Außerparlamentarische Opposition (APO). This “extra-parliamentary opposition” was not so much a single group, but a collection of radicals sharing a common enemy (Markovits and Gorski 47). Broadly speaking, the APO was against the Vietnam War, the emergency power laws and nuclear proliferation. This group was variously integrated with the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), which, under the influence of the student leader Rudi Dutschke, developed an explicitly revolutionary agenda throughout the 1960s. It put its hope in radical intellectual critique to spark a future revolution and to overcome West Germany’s authoritarian past. Influenced by Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China, the Black Panthers in the United States and the cultural critiques of the Frankfurt School, as well as by the sexual theories of Herbert Marcuse and Wilhelm Reich, these groups also embodied a radical, new subculture, involving a rejection of bourgeois aesthetics, a creation of new forms of art and a sexual revolution (for a detailed discussion, see von Dirke 29-66). The 1960s saw these intertwined cultural and political resistances develop into escalating acts of collective resistance, involving congresses, teach-ins, guerrilla theatre, civil disobedience and mass protest.  

This initial expression of mass resistance, embodied in the APO and SDS, did not last. In 1968, the activities of the APO and SDS peaked in a series of massive protests involving violent

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11 An interesting example of the combination of the cultural and the political is the connection of ‘Krautrock’ to the emergence of the urban guerrilla movements. Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike Meinhof, who would later go on to found the RAF, all hung out at the commune of the band Amon Düül in Munich in the late 1960s. According to members of the band, interviewed in the BBC documentary Krautrock: the Rebirth of Germany, the first attack of the future RAF members came out of frustration that the band’s countercultural practice did not go far enough towards revolution. The band also relates that Baader, Ensslin and Meinhof used Amon Düül’s commune as a safe house after escaping prison.
clashes with the police. Following this high water mark, the internal resistances of these movements ruptured into a fragmentary collection of radical groups, embodying different tactics and goals, alternately in solidarity and at odds with each other. The West German women’s movement arose out of the protests of 1968, and in turn broke into various feminist movements over the following decades. These feminist groups remained alternately engaged with and separate from traditionally left-wing groups. Likewise, the revolutionary left shot out in multiple directions, from the militantly extreme to the institutionally reformist to the playfully spontaneous. Some tried to mobilize the working class through Marxist-Leninist parties like the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands-Aufbau Organisation; others, such as the Jungsozialisten, followed the student leader Rudi Dutschke’s maxim of a “long march through the institutions” to reform power from within; others, like the members of Kommune 1 in West Berlin, “dropped out” of society and turned to individual authenticity as a way to overcome capitalist alienation; others, seeing the failure of the restrained tactics of the radical movements of the 1960s, embraced a militant approach, beginning with bombing, and escalating to kidnapping and assassination (Markovits and Gorski 57-58). Labelled alternately terrorists and revolutionaries, these militant groups pushed for a revolutionary movement that would fundamentally reshape German society. Numerous guerrilla groups formed in this explosive proliferation of resistance. Some were small and low-profile, such as Die Amazonen, mentioned below. Of these groups, four distinguished themselves by the extent of their operations and number of actions: the RAF, the Bewegung 2. Juni, the Revolutionären Zellen and Rote Zora.

Of all the militant political groups active in West Germany in the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s, the RAF receives the most attention and analysis.\(^\text{12}\) This is unfortunate. Though their tactics and
\(^{12}\) Charity Scribner (2015) devotes an entire book to analyzing the cultural reception of the RAF from the 1970s to
political writings were more sensational and excessive than those of other militants of their
time, focusing narrowly on this group limits a fuller understanding of militancy in this context.
Over-coverage of the RAF in comparison to other militant groups presents the danger of a
metonymical slippage, in which interpretations of the RAF can become blanket interpretations of
resistance in the West German militant left as a whole. As Tobias Wunschik writes in his 2006
essay on the Bewegung 2. Juni, quoting Klaus Weinhauer, “unter den terroristischen Gruppierung
der Bundesrepublik fand die *Rote Armee Fraktion* . . . die ‘größte öffentliche Resonanz’ und
wurde dadurch zum Synonym für den Linksterrorismus in Deutschland” (531). Charity Scribner
(2015) slips into this metonymical mode in her analysis of cultural responses to the RAF in *After
the Red Army Faction*. She writes that “the RAF spoke in the imperative; its agenda was concrete
. . . This grammatical code distinguishes the Far Left’s direct actions from much of the
postmilitant art and literature that has come after it” (189). A closer analysis of the differences
within the Far Left from this context reveals nuances that this slippage from the specific “RAF”

the present, noting that “the RAF’s fallout has registered in novels, poetry, plays, dance pieces, music,
exhibitions, films, and paintings” (6). She notes that this cultural focus is not limited to Germany, but that “the
RAF phenomenon is now global” (23). None of the other three major guerrilla groups operating at the same
time as the RAF – Die Bewegung 2. Juni, Die Revolutionären Zellen and Rote Zora – has received this kind of
cultural response. Indeed, Scribner writes of Rote Zora that “unlike the RAF, the group [Rote Zora] has received
relatively little critical attention, whether from artists or scholars” (210 n22).

The RAF also continues to dominate academic focus. Following dozens of other books on the RAF from
the last two decades, 2015 alone saw the publication of at least two major works on the group – Scribner’s *After
the Red Army Faction: Gender, Culture, and Militancy* and Patricia Melzer’s *Death in the Shape of a Young
Girl: Women’s Political Violence in the Red Army Faction*. Melzer’s work, however, does briefly mention other
groups from this time, such as Rote Zora, and analyzes women in the Bewegung 2. Juni alongside the RAF.
Given this analysis of both groups, however, the exclusive focus on the RAF in the title of the book is a
noteworthy example of how the RAF dominates the discourse. The monumental, two volume work *Die RAF
und der linke Terrorismus* (2006) includes only one section on “Andere bewaffnete Gruppierung in der
Bundesrepublik” (1: 7), consisting of just four essays out of a total of sixty-three, and none on Rote Zora. In
2011, Karin Bauer edited a special issue of *Seminar* called *Questioning the RAF: The Politics of Culture*, which
was devoted entirely to the RAF (though it too mentioned the Bewegung 2. Juni). None of the other West
German guerrilla groups has garnered this kind of academic attention. Though debates about the reasons for this
intense focus could fill volumes, extent of activity is not a reason: the Revolutionären Zellen alone were
responsible for more actions than the RAF (Markovits and Gorski 75).

13 The RAF’s tactics included bombings, kidnappings and murders, while their writing promoted anti-imperialist
guerrilla warfare in the “First World” to support “Third World” struggles.
to the general “Far Left” glosses over. Likewise, Jeremy Varon writes in the introduction to a chapter on the imprisoned RAF founders in his 2004 book *Bringing the War Home*: “virtually all the major acts of left-wing violence in the mid-1970s sought the release of prisoners or revenge against judges, prosecutors and police. Had the state’s reaction been less severe, the RAF’s armed struggle might neither have endured so long nor become so brutal” (254). Not only does this statement efface the numerous other targets of the militant left from this time and inaccurately portray the RAF as a centre around which the militant left as a whole focused, but the phrase “left-wing violence” slips seamlessly into “RAF” from one sentence to the next, as if they were the same thing. This kind of slippage and overemphasis poses the danger of prematurely dismissing other, different formulations of resistance from this time, which may be fruitful to examine today.

Indeed, equating the RAF with the “Far Left” of this time is especially problematic because criticism of the RAF, both contemporary and retrospective, generally sees their political practice as being counterproductive and synonymous with ideological terror. In his 1977 text “Mord darf keine Waffe der Politik sein,” Herbert Marcuse criticized the murder of capitalist officials by radical leftists as an ineffective and amoral dogma of violence. Jeremy Varon’s comparative analysis of the RAF and the American urban guerrilla group Weatherman in *Bringing the War Home* describes the RAF’s descent from lofty political ambitions and calculated tactics, to a private war and indiscriminate terror. His analysis also emphasizes how the RAF’s political project spiralled inward, focusing exclusively on using violence to free its

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imprisoned members, rather than to promote social change. Likewise, Charity Scribner argues that “without a viable agenda, members of the RAF shunted their energies from social change to self-obsession” (188), and she highlights “the failures of political extremism” (17) in her book. These critiques focus on an uncritical and dogmatic use of violence exemplified by the RAF, as well as the fruitlessness of such tactics. But this is not the full story of militant resistance from this context. In order to better understand both the context of West German left-wing militancy and the concept of resistance itself, it would be productive to look more closely at other modes of resistance practiced by West German urban guerrillas at this time. Not giving these other modes a larger acknowledgement yields a skewed picture of the Far Left, one which is dominated by the RAF and faces the danger of ossifying an understanding of its resistance as synonymous with unreflective, ideological terror. Other militant groups operating in 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s West Germany offer more critical and developed theories and practices of resistance than the RAF. By taking these groups seriously and incorporating them into the history of this context, this period can be better understood as one exploding with multiple, diverse resistances. Emphasizing different stances on resistance from this time helps to build a picture of resistance that is multiple, heterogeneous and in tension with itself. In my view, Rote Zora develops a theory and practice of resistance that is much more productive than the RAF’s. Understanding and emphasizing their history can build a different picture of resistance in this time period and today.

Rote Zora conducted forty-five bombings in West Germany between 1977 and 1995 with diverse targets, including pimps’ cars, sex-shops, genetic-modification research institutes and government buildings. They also published writings in *Revolutionärer Zorn*, *EMMA*, *Interim* and in their own pamphlets and zines. Despite their commitment to armed struggle, Rote Zora’s
actions never killed anyone; indeed, this was part of their critical praxis. For example, in their 1984 “self-interview” published with commentary in EMMA under the title “‘Widerstand ist möglich,’” one member of Rote Zora says “es gibt zig aktionen, die wir wieder verworfen haben, weil wir die gefährdung unbeteiligter nicht hätten ausschließen können” (41, nouns uncapsitalized in original). Likewise, the group’s ethos is described in a 1987 Süddeutsche Zeitung article in a similar way: “Zielrichtung aller Aktionen [der Roten Zora] sei es, hohen Sachschaden anzurichten, Personen aber nicht zu gefährden” (Rohm). Though readers may outright denounce property destruction of this kind, in my view it is worth trying to understand what Rote Zora was trying to do. One reason for this is that their destructive actions actually fulfilled political goals that shared broad support in the left and in the women’s movement. In 1987, they engaged in a bombing campaign against the German clothing company Adler, a firm which faced broad international opposition from feminists and the radical left. Adler had recently fired its female workers at a South Korean factory who had gone on strike for higher wages and better working conditions. This draconian strike-breaking initiated a broad-based, international protest campaign against Adler. But it was in response to Rote Zora and their smaller, sister organization Die Amazonen conducting a series of arson attacks against Adler department stores in West Germany that the company rehired its workers with higher wages and more rights. Despite this success, many in the protest campaign criticized the arson attacks (for a detailed discussion of the Adler campaign and its aftermath see Karcher 7-9). Such actions show a

15 In “‘Widerstand ist möglich,’” Rote Zora deliberately does not capitalize nouns. Throughout this thesis, I point out in my citations that the text is like this in the original.

16 This was widely reported at the time. For example, in a taz article from 29 September, 1987 titled “Adler macht Zugeständnisse,” Helga Lukoschat writes: “in einer ungewöhnlichen Pressemitteilung hatte Adler erklärt, man werde sich der ‘Gewalt terroristischer Gruppen’ beugen. Alle Forderungen der südkoreanischen ArbeiterInnen nach Lohnerhöhung, freien Betriebsratswahlen und Wiedereinstellung zwölf entlassener Aktivistinnen, die sich die ‘Rote Zora’ und ‘Amazonen’ zu eigen gemacht hatten, würden erfüllt werden.”
calculated effectiveness that the RAF did not have. Yet, it is really the concept of resistance that Rote Zora developed that merits special attention, one which promotes a dynamic, unceasing practice of fostering paradox and standing against ossification. This is the focus of Chapter 3, which analyzes the theory and practice of Rote Zora with two intertwined goals. One is to draw on the group to inform a critical concept of resistance; the other is to offer an historical understanding of Rote Zora as activists, theorists and feminists worth taking seriously. For now, I offer an historical context to situate these readings of Rote Zora’s theory and practice.

The group first used the name Rote Zora, taken from the children’s book *Die Rote Zora und ihre Bande* by Kurt Held, in an April, 1977 Anschlagserklärung. In this communiqué, the group takes responsibility for the bombing of the Bundesärztekammer in Cologne in retaliation for its support of the abortion ban (*Die Früchte des Zorns* 2: 606). Previously, the women who would go on to found the all-female group Rote Zora had published writing and conducted actions under the name “Die Frauen der Revolutionären Zelle.” The group had used this name to take responsibility for the 1975 bombing of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Karlsruhe, citing as grounds for the attack the court’s striking down of the law legalizing abortion (*Die Früchte des Zorns* 1: 122-124). These attacks came as part of a much broader campaign by the women’s movement to legalize abortion. As their earlier incarnation implies, Rote Zora emerged out of the larger guerrilla network the Revolutionären Zellen, one of the four major urban guerrilla organizations operating in West Germany in the 1970s, ’80s and ‘90s.

As suggested by their name, the Revolutionären Zellen was a plural organization of loosely affiliated cells sharing common political ideals and goals. The umbrella group began to form in 1973 in Frankfurt am Main (Markovits and Gorski 73-74), and collectively took
responsibility for more than 180 attacks between 1973 and 1993 (Karcher 5). In their politics, they differed from the hierarchically-structured, Marxist-Leninist RAF, and took on a horizontally-organized, self-determining structure, closer to the anarchistic politics of the Autonomist Movement, which was taking form at this time. Like the Autonomist Movement, the Revolutionären Zellen also criticized the RAF’s actions as being ineffective and extreme, and did not favour violence against people as a tactic. Instead, they favoured civil disobedience and property destruction (Markovits and Gorski 74).

Though originally formed as a cell within the Revolutionären Zellen, Rote Zora became increasingly independent from the umbrella group, largely because of the difficulties the women experienced organizing with men. They felt that patriarchy had penetrated even the most radical political organizations and that it was necessary for women to organize their own groups to subvert this internal oppression and to advance revolutionary feminist goals. They also criticized a gendered division of labour within radical groups, in which men concerned themselves with revolution and women with women’s issues (Karcher 6). Rote Zora did not see these issues as separate (see their text “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe” 18). Looking beyond a history dominated by masculine models of guerrilla groups, they took inspiration and their name from the 1941 children’s book Die Rote Zora und ihre Bande, which they saw as depicting a model for a radical women’s organization, fighting outside the law for their own freedom and in solidarity with the oppressed (“‘Widerstand ist möglich’” 39). The book, written by Kurt Kläber under the pseudonym Kurt Held, tells the story of a group of orphaned youths, organized by the wild and caring female protagonist Rote Zora into a collective of anarchistic bandits. Perhaps appealing to members of a generation of Germans haunted by the Nazi crimes of their parents, the orphans
live independent of adult authority and instead sustain themselves by practicing mutual aid and stealing from adult society. For the members of Rote Zora, building a radical group outside the law had hitherto been a “männliches vorrecht” (“‘Widerstand ist möglich’” 39), closed off to women by repressive gender relations. Held’s book, then, acted for Rote Zora as a kind of biopolitical resistance, offering a model for a women’s outlaw organization in a world where this seemed a gendered impossibility. Indeed, for Rote Zora, the gendering of the outlaw as male was false. To them, men could step outside the law, but women were always already outlaws, as law and order “sind grundsätzlich gegen uns [Frauen]” (“‘Widerstand ist möglich’” 39). They read Held’s protagonist as emblematic of women who fought for their freedom. In their view, such women had no choice but to become bandits, as they already stood outside the law and order of society, which operated against them.

This gendered critique of the outlaw put them in a paradoxical alliance with the male-dominated Revolutionären Zellen. Rote Zora chose their name also for its shared initials with the Revolutionären Zellen, as a way of maintaining ties between the groups and emphasizing their similar structure (“‘Widerstand ist möglich’” 39). At the same time, they increasingly distanced themselves from the umbrella group. Although they broke with the Revolutionären Zellen in 1984 to form a fully independent guerrilla organization, they continued to organize actions and publish writings with the group. Their gendered revolutionary analysis developed into a complex resistance. As women, they stood outside of and against the law, which excluded and operated

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17 Discussing Rote Zora in his history of European autonomous social movements, Georgy Katsiaficas (2006) offers another explanation, writing “it is not uncommon for autonomous groups to borrow images from the world of children to describe themselves. In a popular squatters’ song, the Hafenstrasse long relied on Pippi Longstocking to help explain how the houses miraculously remained occupied. In some sense, autonomous groups refuse to grow up: they refuse to shed their dreams of a better world or to conform to existing cultural norms such as marrying, living in nuclear families, and taking on careers. Their affinity for the pleasure principle – or at least their negation of the reality principle – is a salient part of their identity” (132).
against them. But they also resisted the gender relations which conceived of the outlaw as a male category. They found that this gendered vision of the outlaw recapitulated itself in their work with the Revolutionäre Zellen, with whom they simultaneously shared political goals and structures. At the same time, they resisted the elements of the women’s movement which sought to work exclusively within the law. As I elaborate in Chapter 3, this multiple resistance arising from their gender analysis involved a variety of paradoxical stances and shifting positions, that would come to characterize their method of resistance as a whole.

The year of Rote Zora’s first bombing attack was a time of deep crisis for the Federal Republic. Though the West German state had captured the founding members of the RAF in 1972, a new generation had taken their place, and numerous other leftist guerrilla movements had arisen. The government’s new counter-terrorism laws had aided the state in capturing the members of the RAF and putting them on trial, but were seen by many as draconian and unconstitutional (Varon 254-255). Laws included making support of terrorist organizations illegal, banning speech, censoring writers and publishing houses, barring discussion of political motives of the defendants during trial, and arresting lawyers suspected of supporting their RAF defendants. This climate provoked persecution of intellectuals, waves of warrantless police raids, the increasing surveillance of those in the activist left and the legislation of oaths of loyalty (for a detailed discussion of these laws, see Varon 254-289). Many in the radical left and in society more broadly viewed this as a troubling state response, and much of West German society reacted against them. The 1970s saw a rise in protest from civil rights groups, intellectuals and the grassroots, as well as a wave of left-wing violence in response to this state repression (Varon 254-255). This increase in violence reached a fever pitch during the “German Autumn” of 1977,
when a new generation of RAF guerrillas initiated a series of attacks, beginning with the April 7 murder of German Attorney General and ex-Nazi party member Siegfried Buback and culminating in the kidnapping of the industrialist and former SS Officer Hanns-Martin Schleyer on September 5. When the government refused to release the imprisoned RAF members, the RAF coordinated the hijacking of a German plane with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. A week later, on October 18, the imprisoned RAF leaders were found dead in their cells, apparently by suicide, though many suspected foul play. On the same day, the West German special forces raided the hijacked plane, which had flown to Mogadishu, killed all but one of the hijackers and freed the hostages. In response, the RAF kidnappers killed Schleyer, leaving his body in the trunk of an Audi near Mulhouse, France.

The events of the German Autumn became iconic of a deeply divided West Germany, troubled by its Nazi past. As Varon writes: “the RAF implicitly held that armed struggle against forces it deemed fascist would make up for the near-total absence of armed resistance by Germans to the Nazis” (249), while he points out that the state’s heavy-handed response to the RAF was motivated by a fear that leniency would result in a weak democracy, as vulnerable as the Weimar government had been to a fascist takeover (Varon 276). This dichotomy was also present in society at large. Many saw the RAF as a return of fascism, while many on the left saw the state’s draconian response to the RAF as recreating this troubling history. Both sides saw a return to Nazism in the other. It seemed that neither the RAF nor the state could mount an effective resistance to the spectre of Germany’s fascist past.

Rote Zora’s first attack came in the context of these turbulent events of left-wing violence and state repression. But their genesis as a group also came in the context of a strong and
autonomous women’s movement in West Germany, in which Rote Zora saw themselves as participants (“‘Widerstand ist möglich’” 41). This independent movement arose as part of the fragmentation of the student movements of 1968, after these movements showed themselves incapable of responding to the feminist resistances taken up by female members from inside the organizations. The internal division between women and the male-dominated radical movements of the ‘60s achieved iconic expression on September 13, 1968, when the national assembly of the SDS refused to discuss feminist concerns that had been publicly voiced at the assembly, and a well-known female leader in the SDS pelted the man chairing the meeting with tomatoes (Ferree 53). From then on, the women’s movement was defined by its radical break with male-dominated politics; indeed, as discussed above, this characterizes Rote Zora’s own break with the Revolutionären Zellen. In this way, the women’s movement arose from a paradoxical, self-productive resistance: as soon as the resistance of the male-dominated movements of the ‘60s ossified into an oppressive institution, women in these movements stepped outside of them to assume a new stance of resistance, both to society and to the movements themselves.

In its rejection of male-dominated politics, the West German women’s movement did not just break with the male-dominated radical left, but also with the state, which it saw as patriarchal. Ute Gerhard emphasizes that this was a politics of “nicht Separatismus, sondern Autonomie” (Gerhard 203, emphasis in original). This self-described autonomy signified independence not just from the male-dominated left, but from men altogether (Gerhard 203). Though there was also a liberal, reformist feminism pushing for equality and recognition from the state, the movement more generally rejected the liberal discourse of equal rights for women as merely making women “like men” (Ferree 93). As Myra Marx Ferree argues in her 2012 book
Varieties of Feminism, the West German women’s movement was very different from the more reformist women’s movements in Great Britain and the USA in its uncompromising emphasis on women’s self-determination and autonomy, and its rejection of liberalism. Whereas in the USA and UK the dominant feminist discourse was for equal rights within the existing society, the West German women’s movement rejected this kind of incorporation (Ferree 70). The goal of the autonomous women’s movement was women’s collective self-emancipation, without the involvement of or incorporation into patriarchal forms such as state, capital and hierarchically-structured social organizations. Its post-1968 break with the radical left was defined by an analysis of women’s oppression being as fundamental as class oppression, and of patriarchy being “the oldest, most fundamental relationship of exploitation” (Ferree 60). This view developed in the context of a heavily gendered division of labour in West Germany, where men could forbid their wives from taking paid work, and the state only allowed a woman to work if it would not interfere with her domestic duties (Ferree 74, 247 n64). While some people working for women’s rights at this time attempted to change society through petitioning the state with a discourse of equality, the more prevalent autonomous women’s movement responded to this climate by rejecting any compromise with the state, and by trying to build their own alternatives. Though this was a different approach from the women’s movements in the USA and UK, the West German women’s movement did take inspiration from abroad in many of their tactics such as consciousness raising and actively redefining the female gender (Ferree 66).

Their resistance in this period used a variety of tactics. According to Ute Gerhard, the central focus of the movement was violence against women. Women resisted this by founding Frauenhäuser18 and rape crisis centres, which not only helped women and children in need, but

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18 As Ferree points out, the German word “Frauenhaus” “stress[es] the commonality of helpers and helped, rather
also made public the endemic problem of violence against women and allowed women to
directly participate in empowering structures of mutual aid (Gerhard 205). Some members of the
movement also organized self-defence groups for women, so that they could confront violence
and abuse more directly (Melzer 58). Another main focus of the movement was mobilizing
against §218, the law banning abortion (Gerhard 203). Many women used direct action to
attempt to overturn this law, such as participating in journalist and EMMA magazine-founder
Alice Schwarzer’s massive campaign to publicly “confess” en masse to the “crime” of abortion,
as well as invading all-male parliamentary committees discussing the law (Ferree 63). The
movement also created space for lesbianism to enter the public sphere. In 1972, a group of
women within the gay rights movement in Berlin founded the organization Homosexuelle Aktion
Westberlin to advocate for lesbian political issues (Melzer, Death 62), and throughout the 1970s
there was a yearly, three-day lesbian festival in Germany (Ferree 69). Another focus was
gendered wage discrimination, and working women organized strikes throughout West Germany
during the 1970s to highlight gendered divisions within the working class (Melzer, Death 63).
Dissatisfied with a conception of womanhood and women’s oppression largely defined by men,
women also worked to give their gender their own definition, a process which also characterized
the women’s movement in the USA. Taking direct inspiration from American feminists, this took
the form of Selbsterfahrung groups, which sought to articulate women’s experience through self-
exploration (Ferree 66), as well as women’s festivals, which provided women with “ein neues
Wir-Gefühl” (Gerhard 202).

Integrated with all these efforts was the explosion of discursive production in the form of
than the ‘shelter’ (US) or ‘refuge’ (UK) language preferred in liberal political contexts . . . it was understood not
as a resource filling a gap in state services, but as a site in which all participants would be collectively
empowered” (95). Since translating this politically-charged word into one of its English equivalents would also
change the meaning of its politics, it is not really translatable.
novels, magazines, women’s presses and discussion groups, which highlighted women’s issues and articulated a new conception of gender (Ferree 66). Indeed, language became a key site for women to practice resistance. Many in the women’s movement sought to make women and lesbians more visible in the heavily gendered German language that often hid these groups. To make lesbians more visible, feminists often used the phrase “Frauen und Lesben,” implying solidarity but a difference of experience. Likewise, they attempted to change the grammatical rules of German to halt its erasure of women. As Ferree points out “adding even one man to a group of ninety-nine women singers converted them all into a masculine-gendered Sänger rather than feminine-gendered Sängerinnen. Feminists . . . pointed out the destructive consequences for women’s public visibility of such grammatical rules” (70-71). One of the tactics of the women’s movement was to use alternatives to this linguistic erasure. Speaking and writing a different German also implied a critique of language as something malleable rather than natural (Ferree 71). This linguistic intervention also highlights a political relationship between language, subjectivity and society. Such an integrated approach can be seen as a form of biopolitical resistance, intervening in the linguistic production of subjectivity and the possibilities for social organization that language provides. I will return to the question of language and biopolitical resistance in my discussion of Rote Zora’s writing in Chapter 3.

Though all these tactics were prevalent throughout the women’s movement, ultimately the movement became focused on women’s projects, creating social enterprises and spaces exclusively for women, such as women’s centres, bookstores, presses, daycares, shelters (Ferree 82) and squats (Melzer, Death 63). Melzer points out that many of these projects drifted away from the ethos of autonomy during the 1970s, as “more and more women’s groups began to rely
on state funds” (Death 57). Indeed, throughout the 1980s, the debate between autonomy or institutionalization became a point of contention within the women’s movement, leading to a “Schwäching des autonomen Flügels” (Gerhard 209). Rote Zora’s radical political intervention came in this context of fragmentation and, as discussed below, their militancy was partly a response to the tendency in the women’s movement away from its initially uncompromising politics of autonomy. In this way, they took the paradoxical stance of being both a part of and apart from the women’s movement, resisting its practice of resistance to elaborate their own. This paradox was heightened by how contentious violence as a political tactic was for the women’s movement.

The use of violence was hotly debated among feminists in Germany during this time, and the extent to which members of the German women’s movement advocated violence is hotly debated by academics today. Ferree emphasizes pacifism as the norm in the women’s movement, writing “feminists deplored revolutionary violence as the false pursuit of equality with men, claiming that RAF women and others sold out their own needs and perspectives to embrace a ‘masculine’ taste for destruction” (103-104). This view begins to hint at the paradoxical practice of Rote Zora’s own resistance, which performed a violence in the name of feminism. As women, this violence placed them outside of the limited way in which women were conceived of, both by society at large and by many in the women’s movement. However, Ferree’s account of how women responded to feminist violence only shows one side of the debate and serves to efface the violence practiced in the name of feminism. She does not mention Rote Zora or other militant feminist groups, and focuses only on the RAF’s use of violence, a group which, according to Patricia Melzer, did not make feminist concerns part of its political practice (Death 70). Melzer’s
2015 book *Death in the Shape of a Young Girl* is largely an argument against separating feminist politics from violence. Here, she highlights “the importance of resisting the creation of a one-dimensional cultural memory of feminist politics that declares alternative feminist positions to be inauthentic and unfeminist” (232). In an earlier essay, also titled “Death in the Shape of a Young Girl,” she argues that, since the 1970s, scholars have erased the extent to which violence and feminism merged during this time:

> Many of these ‘unnatural daughters’, far from being patriarchy’s pawn, perceived themselves as feminists and saw their participation in the armed struggle as a logical extension of their liberation as women, or thought of revolutionary movements as superseding feminist aspirations of equality. This troubling position rarely finds representation in Western scholars’ accounts of women’s activism – let alone of activism that is defined as feminist. (40)

In Melzer’s view, academics have made the “complex debates” among German feminists surrounding violence in the 1970s “invisible” (“Death” 35). This erasure mimics the metonymical slippage of the RAF coming to stand for West German militant resistance as a whole. It gives feminist resistance in this period a one-dimensional character, which equates it with pacifism and denies groups like Rote Zora a place in feminist and activist history.

Rote Zora’s reception by the women’s movement was far from homogenous. Instead, it provoked critical debates on the issue of violence. For example, the women’s rights organization Terre des Femmes publicly criticized Rote Zora for their attacks on the Adler company in August, 1987 (“‘Terre des Femmes’ gegen Rote Zora”), but they wrote an open letter a month later, after the attacks had proved successful, stating that “‘anscheinend haben die Bomben mehr
bewirkt, als der Verhandlungswille der Belegschaft je vermochte’” (quoted in “‘Bomben bewirkten mehr.’”). Their actions against Adler provoked an ongoing debate that extended into the 2000s (Karcher 8). The influential, feminist magazine EMMA also took an ambiguous position in relationship to Rote Zora, publishing their writings without condemning them in the terms Ferree describes. In their forward to their publication of Rote Zora’s self-interview “‘Widerstand ist möglich,’” the editor writes “daß emma [sic] die Positionen der ‘Roten Zora’ nicht teilt, müssen wir in diesem Blatt nicht betonen. Dennoch und gerade darum halten wir die Veröffentlichung und kritische Diskussion dieses Dokuments für wichtig” (39). Like the shifting position of Terre des Femmes, this is not so much a blanket condemnation of violence, but a critical acknowledgement and open discussion of different points of view. Melzer helps to contextualize these examples within the broader discourse on violence within the West German women’s movement. She writes: “while militant feminists seemed a minority within the autonomous women’s movement, their arguments were taken seriously and were debated by many women wrestling with the question of political violence more generally” (Death 71). Ferree’s exclusive focus on feminist pacifism seems to miss some of the story, and contributes to a narrative of the women’s movement which excludes Rote Zora. However, her emphasis that this was a trend in the women’s movement is important. It sets up Rote Zora’s gendered resistance as operating against all ossified ideas of what a woman “is,” even ideas coming from the women’s movement. I return to this discussion in Chapter 3. For now, it is important to emphasize that a fuller picture of this time is one containing a diversity of resistances and discourses on violence, some of which engaged productively with Rote Zora’s activities.

Perhaps as a result of these kinds of exclusions, Rote Zora has received more attention
from activists than from academics. Ann Hansen and Julie Belmas, who were active members of the Vancouver-based guerrilla groups Direct Action and the Wimmin’s Fire Brigade in the early 1980s, published a brief history of Rote Zora along with an English translation of excerpts from the group’s self-interview in the anarchist journal *Disorderly Conduct* in 2002. Their essay “This Is Not a Love Story: Armed Struggle against the Institutions of Patriarchy” compares Rote Zora’s activities with those of the Wimmin’s Fire Brigade, and emphasizes that liberatory, female violence has a rich “herstory.” Responding to arguments that women’s violence is an imitation and recreation of masculinity, they argue that violence is actually a longstanding and necessary part of women’s struggle for freedom and not something specifically male. Though it is unclear whether the Wimmin’s Fire Brigade was aware of Rote Zora in the early-1980s when both groups were active, some of the Canadians’ actions suggest solidarity with the German women’s movement: like Rote Zora, the Wimmin’s Fire Brigade targeted porn shops, and, recalling the SDS meeting in 1968 discussed above, Ann Hansen pelted her judge with tomatoes at her sentencing in 1983 (Hansen and Belmas).

Rote Zora also found support in the German autonomist movement and is celebrated in its activist histories. As a decentralized movement, the autonomist movement (in German referred to as the Autonomen) is perhaps best described as a tendency in activist politics, rather than as a single organization. Especially prevalent in West Germany in the 1980s, the politics of the Autonomen were characterized by anarchism, direct democracy, the liberation of everyday life, anti-fascism, decentralization, individual autonomy, dropping out of conventional society, a critique of authoritarian tendencies on the left and a diversity of activist tactics, including the creation of democratic social centres, direct action, property destruction, civil disobedience and
squatting. The movement could be described as a subset of anarchism, with a specific set of beliefs and strategies taking place in the German context. The movement drew on the theory and practice of the radical left from the 1970s and ‘80s, in Germany and beyond. A major influence was the Italian Autonomia movement\textsuperscript{19} of the late 1970s (Geronimo 46), which promoted a politics of direct action to reclaim life from capitalist alienation. This involved stealing rather than paying for goods, setting up social spaces based on direct democracy and rejecting bourgeois morals. Ultimately, Autonomia escalated into a nation-wide insurrection involving building takeovers and fatal clashes with the police. In Germany, the autonomists took inspiration from the Spontis (Geronimo 48), who also sought throughout the 1970s to use direct action to reclaim an immediacy in life that capitalism had taken away. The Autonomen combined political activism with a desire for immediate liberation in the realm of everyday life. In a way, they emphasized a kind of biopolitical resistance that took up political issues, such as the anti-nuclear movement, but which equally saw activism as a way to liberate subjectivity and social relations in more everyday, immediate ways (for a detailed discussion of the Autonomen, see Geronimo, 2012 and Katsiaficas, 2006). In *The Subversion of Politics*, autonomist activist and scholar Georgy Katsiaficas calls Rote Zora “perhaps the most successful of the various guerrilla groups” (132) and describes their politics as autonomist. In his account of the autonomist movement in Germany, *Fire and Flames*, Geronimo notes that many autonomists saw the Revolutionären Zellen and Rote Zora as “close to the [autonomist] movement” in the 1980s, while most distanced themselves from the politics of the RAF (127). This suggests that Rote Zora’s practice of resistance had much broader support in activist communities than other urban guerrilla groups did, and was even seen as part of a broader social movement.

\textsuperscript{19} Antonio Negri, discussed in the Introduction, was a leading member of the *Autonomia* movement.
As Katharina Karcher points out, Rote Zora continues to be an inspiration to contemporary activists, such as the organizers of the Red Dawns festival (Rdeče zore festival) in Ljubljana, Slovenia. Since 2000 the festival has occurred yearly and celebrates queer and feminist art and activism (Karcher 12). Although they disavow violence, the festival organizers cite Rote Zora as a strong influence and provide a brief account of the group on their website (“Red Dawns Herstory”). Karcher highlights the festival as evidence that Rote Zora continues to have an influence in activism and that this influence has the potential to grow. She writes “one does not have to agree with the tactics of the Red Zora . . . to productively engage with their history” (12), suggesting a future in which Rote Zora can be taken up in ways the RAF, marred by its dogmatic politics of murder, cannot really be.

Compared to their reception among activists, there is very little academic work on Rote Zora, in English or in German. Katharina Karcher (2015) is really the only person to have devoted much attention to them in the academic world. She has begun the task of bringing Rote Zora to light by calling for their acknowledgement as an important – but systematically ignored – part of feminist history. She points out that “feminist historians of the German women’s movement have ignored the group” (3) and that Rote Zora is also ignored by many contemporary feminist activists in Germany. The little other scholarship on Rote Zora hesitates to engage critically with them as theorists and political actors. Vojin Saša Vukadinović (2013) is very dismissive of the group and argues that they were not really feminists. To him, their practice should be understood as “frauenbewegt[e] Militanz” rather than as “Feminismus” (147), as, according to him, the group “war von Anfang an ein dezidiert theoriefeindliches Unterfangen” (149). I disagree with Vukadinović, who makes this argument without really engaging with Rote Zora means “dawn” in Slovenian and Serbian.

20 Zora means “dawn” in Slovenian and Serbian.
Zora’s texts. In Chapter 3, I return to Vukadinović’s claims after offering close readings of Rote Zora’s writings as providing theories on resistance, oppression and gender. Ilse Lenz (2010), whom Karcher mentions as the sole feminist historian who has acknowledged Rote Zora, also leaves open the question of how they should be understood in relation to the women’s movement. She describes answering this question as “kaum möglich bei einer so breit gefächerten dezentrierten sozialen Bewegung, die keine organisationalen Zuordnungskriterien anerkannte” (269). Unlike Vukadinović, Lenz does not want to dismiss Rote Zora, but she is also unwilling to make arguments for their broader acknowledgement as an important part of feminist history. In short, this sparse and largely dismissive academic response shows that Rote Zora has yet to be welcomed into an academic discussion of resistance, feminism or the history of German activism in a meaningful way.

My discussion of Rote Zora is indebted to Katharina Karcher’s work of initiating a broader acknowledgement of Rote Zora. I build on her argument that Rote Zora deserves a place in feminist history. In her essay “How (Not) to ‘Hollaback,’” Karcher offers a concise but thorough history of Rote Zora, and argues that they play a role in feminist struggles today, and that this role could be greater if they received more recognition. Her paper is an effort to break the feminist silence surrounding Rote Zora, while she acknowledges that this task can only be partially successful. While Karcher focuses on their relationship to feminism, I explore their theory and practice of resistance more generally. As theorists, I argue that they develop a compelling and nuanced idea of resistance, one that is important for both activists and academics to consider when thinking about resistance as a concept or a practice. I explore this in the next chapter. In my view, Rote Zora’s resistance is closely linked to paradox. They not only use
paradox to destabilize an oppressive patriarchy based on certainty and definition, but they also engage in a paradoxical resistance to their own resistance, similar to what I developed in Chapter 1. By seeing their own theory and practice as something they can resist, Rote Zora avoids becoming dogmatic and oppressive in their resistance. My hope is that an acknowledgement of Rote Zora as important theorists of resistance will also act as a way of resisting the picture of left-wing militancy in West Germany as being dominated by the RAF. To me, this period is better understood as exploding with a multiplicity of diverse resistances and militancies, not all of which are as counterproductive as the RAF’s. I hope that introducing Rote Zora’s concept of resistance can open room for more wide-ranging discussions of militancy from this context.

My analysis of Rote Zora in the next chapter brings together the theoretical discussion from Chapter 1 and the historical discussion from Chapter 2 with close readings of Rote Zora’s texts and activities. Drawing on the theory of resistance I developed in Chapter 1, I read Rote Zora’s resistance as being paradoxical and as containing elements of a biopolitical resistance. This situates these theories from Chapter 1 in an historical context and gives an example of how they can translate into practice. As an interpretation of resistance through close reading that situates this resistance in history, Chapter 3 extends literary criticism through the tool of close reading into theory and practice. It provides a way for understanding resistance, but also argues for an understanding of text as a form of resistant practice. As Rote Zora’s resistance is centred around gender, parts of my reading draw on Judith Butler’s notion of gender performativity that she puts forward in *Gender Trouble*. Returning also to Emma Goldman’s theory of “direct action,” I argue that Rote Zora’s resistance involves paradoxical gender performances and that this practice is a kind of biopolitical resistance. This reading also provides a model for translating
Butler’s theories on gender into a broader practice of resistance. I also draw on Butler’s and Goldman’s critiques of the women’s movements of their times to contextualize Rote Zora as feminist critics. This is not so much a discussion of whether their use of violence was effective and/or justified, although this is an important discussion for activists and academics to have. To me, it is necessary to first understand what Rote Zora was trying to do, to explore their theory and see how it translates into practice, rather than to leap to condemn their actions.

Analyzing the writings and actions of a collective, particularly one that spans decades and has a changing membership, offers unique challenges to elaborating a coherent philosophy. Not only do the views of the entity “Rote Zora” change over time, they are also not always sanctioned by all the members of the group at any one time. Their late text “Mili’s Tanz auf dem Eis” (1993), for example, which heavily informs my reading of the group’s politics, states plainly that not all members of the group contributed to or approved of its ideas. Similarly, below I argue that Rote Zora anticipates post-modernism in the way they discuss the concept of “woman” in certain texts; yet, some writings by the group have a much more rigid idea of woman as a collective subject. To me, the most interesting aspect of these differences and contradictions is that Rote Zora embraces them: change, contradiction, paradox and difference become key aspects of their practice of resistance. I read the very instability of their group identity as part of their political practice. They understand resistance as something dynamic and evolving, and they embody this spirit of change in their organization. Given this instability, I will refer to the group “Rote Zora” but always acknowledge that this term is itself unstable. To me, this instability is itself a form of resistance. Like the anti-definitional concept of resistance I developed in Chapter 1, the group identity of Rote Zora is both static and ecstatic. Rote Zora is simultaneously an
enduring moniker with a certain consistency, and an unstable term, describing something that is internally and temporally at odds with itself.

In my view, Rote Zora develops an unrestricted and nuanced vision of resistance, one which encourages a practice of paradox. They develop this practice by critiquing, on the one hand, dominant structures of oppression in the world, and on the other, dogmatic theories of resistance in the radical left and in the feminist movement, which seek to limit how people practice resistance. But they take this resistance further, and even turn it against their own practice of resistance. To me, this resisting of resistance is the paradoxical core of their practice. In this formulation, the possibilities of resistance are never rigidly prescribed, but always remain open to the new forms that resistance produces by resisting itself. Theirs is a resistance to all ossification and dogmatism, even their own. The view of resistance as a practice that generates possibilities is also woven into their feminist critique: according to Rote Zora, women’s internalization of a rigid and limited conception of what a “Woman” is, is a major source of their own oppression. As such, Rote Zora’s resistance performs a double move. The moment of militant resistance can break objectively with what a woman is supposed to be – passive, non-violent, reproductive – even as this resistance directly attacks material sources of oppression in the world. Their feminism involves a constant, direct production of new gender relations and a simultaneous attack on the structures that create oppressive concepts of gender.
Chapter 3: Feminism with a Bomb

“Das Ziel: der befreite Mensch, muß in den Mitteln erscheinen.”

- Herbert Marcuse, “Mord darf keine Waffe der Politik sein”

In interpreting Rote Zora’s theory and practice of resistance, this chapter uses close reading to integrate the theoretical discussion from Chapter 1 with the historical context elaborated in Chapter 2. Here I read a variety of texts from throughout Rote Zora’s two-decade history and also refer to actions by the group in these readings. In this way, I am relating these writings to the broader contexts of history and theory. My theoretical discussion from Chapter 1 assists in reading Rote Zora’s texts and elaborating their own theory and practice of resistance. The texts not only deliver a theory of resistance, but also function as examples of resistance in text. Situating the texts historically offers an example of how a theory of resistance as paradox can be put into practice, which I argue is what Rote Zora was doing. In showing how a paradoxical theory of resistance can be put into practice, and advocating this theory as an important approach to resistance, this integration of theory, history and text is also a way of making certain historical practices of resistance available today. Although I refer to more texts than these, my focus is on three: Rote Zora’s late text “Mili’s Tanz auf dem Eis” (1993), which is an historical self-reflection published two years before the group disbanded, and two texts from the height of their activities, their essay on gender and resistance “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe” (1981) and their self-interview “‘Widerstand ist möglich’” (1984).

The full title of Rote Zora’s publication, “Mili’s Tanz auf dem Eis – von Pirouetten, Schleifen, Einbrüchen, doppelten Saltos und dem Versuch, Boden unter die Füße zu kriegen,” suggests a nuanced and undogmatic view of militancy. As the pun in the title suggests, militancy
(Militanz) is an unstable dance on slippery ground, which can very easily collapse. The word “Einbrüchen” already hints at a paradoxical view of resistance, in which both meaning and political action can be at odds with themselves. The singular noun “Einbruch” can translate variously, with meanings such as “raid,” “incursion,” “cave-in,” “collapse” and “trespass.” This already invokes militant resistance as paradoxical and at odds with itself: it is a dangerous arena, in which successful incursion against oppression can just as easily be a collapsing of the fragile ice on which militancy tries to find its footing. The successful moment of militant resistance is also the very moment that it can cave in on itself.

As such, resistance becomes something to be done with the utmost finesse, as well as with embodied joy. Their title compares militant resistance to ice dancing, an activity in which one finds a precision of form and action out of the instability of constant motion. This implies that the path of resistance also sets its practitioners into a fragile dance whose instability is the very ground on which it can be precisely executed. This is a far cry from the juggernaut logic of a Marxist revolutionary end of history, which marches its way indomitably towards its destiny in a straight line. Quite the opposite: it is resistance as the rejection of the straight line, as embracing a multi-directional dance, doing back-flips or pirouetting in place before re-entering the slippery logic of life on ice. Resistance takes practice, it is fraught with the risk of falling, as well as the joy of dancing. It involves constant Schleifen: sharpening, polishing, refining. And like dancing, resistance is also a performance. A dance is not about the end-result, but rather about the feelings the dancer experiences and the performance itself. As I develop in this chapter, this idea of resistance runs throughout Rote Zora’s work and their history of political actions: not only is their theory of resistance linked to performance\textsuperscript{21} and to the experience of resistant action,

\textsuperscript{21} In Ulrike Meinhof and the Red Army Faction: Performing Terrorism, Leith Passmore argues that political
they also see resistance as a goal in itself. For Rote Zora, resistance is constantly in motion, always unstable yet always possible. It is more of a wild yet precise dance than a linear movement towards social change, and it certainly does not involve a fixed political imperative or direction to follow blindly.

Though “Mili’s Tanz” functions as a critical retrospective on the group’s activities over the previous two decades and has a softer tone than earlier texts, their earlier writings also demonstrate their careful consideration of militant resistance and its dangers. In their text “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe,” they write:


In a more direct way than “Mili’s Tanz,” this departs from the Marxist view that a future revolution will be the inevitable outcome of the unfolding logic of history, which many in the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s embraced, including the RAF (Varon, 55-56). For Rote Zora, a revolutionary movement is a chance, a possibility that must be opened, fostered and sharpened. In stark contrast to the RAF, they criticize a dogma of revolutionary praxis that promotes directly
attacking the central institutions of oppression with a blind faith in its inevitable success. Instead, they encourage a practice that moves along a path of increasing resistance to oppression: they want their attacks to build hope, to directly resist the idea that resistance is not possible, to open more people to the possibility of engaging in resistance. To do this, they promote attacking “Lebensverhältnisse,” or the oppressive living conditions of people within society.\textsuperscript{22} This is very different from the RAF, who, as Varon argues, “viewed resistance as a life-and-death struggle against an enemy that was absolute evil” and had “an attitude of kill or be killed” (241). Indeed, Rote Zora’s critique of declaring revolutionary war on state institutions can be taken as a direct criticism of the RAF. In contrast, Rote Zora’s resistance is careful and well-theorized.\textsuperscript{23} It is as much – if not more – concerned with the psycho-social impact of its actions as with its potential to change the world materially. Both as theory and practice it is involved in changing how people think about themselves and their potential to resist, as well as how society functions.

By intertwining the changing of subjectivity with the changing of society and politics, Rote Zora’s practice of resistance is analogous to the model of biopolitical resistance I developed in Chapter 1. Nowhere is this more apparent than in their feminist critique. In “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe” they argue that women’s oppression is maintained by the internalization of an oppressive concept of womanhood. They write:

\begin{quote}
Die Verinnerlichung des Frauseins als effektivste Form der Herrschaftssicherung läuft über subtile Formen der Verhinderung von Selbstbewusstwerdung durch Erziehung, Moral, Liebe, die Normen setzen und Anpassung erzwingen . . . So führt die Situation der Frau eher zur Aufgabe der Identität, zur Selbstzerstörung, als zum Kampf gegen ihre
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{22} For example, Rote Zora bombed the cars of pimps, in an effort to alter the violent power dynamic between men and sex workers.

\textsuperscript{23} Varon also points out the RAF’s dismissal of theory, writing “the RAF declared that all the crucial political imperatives concerned practice, not theory” (240-241).
Unterdrückung. (16)

To Rote Zora, the most effective form of women’s oppression is that which women practice themselves. It takes the form of establishing norms about women’s behaviour, which women then self-police. As a normalcy related to gender identity, women come to identify with their own oppression. This rules out resistance against oppression as part of this constricted gender identity. Part of Rote Zora’s feminist practice is to direct resistance at this rigid, internalized conception of what a woman should be, but they reject an over-emphasis on subjectivity and a politics of “persönliche Veränderung ohne Änderung der Gesellschaft” (“Jedes Herz” 17). To Rote Zora, subjectivity and the society that produces it are so intertwined, that they must be resisted simultaneously. This resistance involves directly breaking with one’s prescribed social role through practice, while that practice itself attacks the social relations that produce that role. Indeed, Rote Zora specifically notes that struggle against oppression is ruled out of the socially-prescribed identity of women. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, they resisted gender relations in which men could take on the role of “outlaw,” but women could not. As such, that women would engage in resistance itself is already the partial achievement of the goal of that resistance.24 If resistance is excluded from the oppressive definition of what a woman should be, then the very

24 Though they do not refer to Rote Zora, Colvin (2009), Melzer (2009) and Bielby (2012) all point out how destabilizing the image of the female terrorist in general was for West German society and its conception of gender. Colvin writes that “neither the government, nor the criminal justice system, nor the population at large was accustomed to the notion of women as perpetrators of criminal violence” (195). Melzer writes that “in the social drama that had been unfolding during the RAF’s activities, the ‘murderous girls’ (‘morderischen Mädchen’, as quoted in Steinseifer 2006: 362 – 3) of the RAF and other groups such as the ‘Movement 2. June’ (‘Bewegung 2. Juni’) created moments of destabilization of gender conventions: a deviance (violent female actors) within an already deviant framework (terrorism)” (36). Quoting Gilda Zwerman, Claire Bielby (2012) points out how transgressive violent woman are to the cultural imagination of the West: “If woman’s cultural role is to give life, the woman who is violent and potentially murderous is, at best, difficult to comprehend and, at worst (and in the words of Gilda Zwerman), ‘the ultimate pariah of the modern world . . . possessing an identity that exists outside the limits of political and moral discourse’” (1). They also highlight how the media tried to recuperate this paradox and turn it against the women’s movement, as in a 1977 Der Spiegel article which attributed female participation in terrorism to women being granted too much freedom (Melzer, “Death” 47).
act of women practicing resistance confronts this definition with a paradox.

In *Death in the Shape of a Young Girl*, Patricia Melzer argues that this was also the effect of the women of the RAF and the Bewegung 2. Juni, writing that their violence confronted West German society with a “cultural paradox” (135). Describing the women in these groups, Melzer notes that “some of them perceived themselves as feminists and saw their participation in the armed struggle as a logical extension of their liberation as women, while others thought of revolutionary movements as superseding feminist aspirations of equality” (4). Melzer’s argument in the book is that even though these groups did not really have an explicitly feminist agenda, the violent actions of their female members should still be understood as “feminist practices . . . whose gender constellations trouble, challenge and potentially redirect existing gender regimes” (237). In short, the “cultural paradox” does not need to be “‘consciously’ feminist” (237) for the action to have feminist reverberations.

Rote Zora takes the paradox further by making it an intentional and explicit part of their resistance and by using it not just to confront society, but also to disrupt internalized oppressions. To them, women resisting in any way – not just violently – breaks the patriarchal mold and allows women to practice different ways of being than those that have been determined for them. It is a form of biopolitical resistance with broad reverberations, for its practitioners and its witnesses. Indeed, Rote Zora is in many ways resisting the oppressive gender relations which allow men to become resistors, while women cannot. Rote Zora’s gendered resistance opens up the possibility of resistance to women and is, in this way, productive of itself. By resisting at all, women break the mold of “Woman” that they have internalized and expand resistance as a possibility of their gender. The initial act of resistance is a way for women to create a different
relationship with themselves that sees practicing resistance as possible.

This does not mean that Rote Zora is trying to develop an equally rigid, alternative conception of “Woman” based exclusively on violent struggle to replace the socially-acceptable conception. Their call is rather for different forms of resistance that open up gender relations in different ways. They write in “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe,” “wir sind nicht die Lösung des grundsätzlichen Problems, sondern ein Weg” (18). One of the Zoras also writes in their self-interview “wir denken nicht, daß [sic] [widerstand] in den formen ablaufen muß, die wir gewählt haben” (“‘Widerstand ist möglich’” 41). In my view, Rote Zora’s political practice, at least in these texts from the early-mid 1980s, seeks to destabilize the word “woman.” This view is apparent in their discussion of a passage from Through the Looking Glass in “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe.” In this passage, Alice is talking to Humpty Dumpty, who proudly insists that he can give a word an exact and pure meaning. Alice challenges him, suggesting the real question is whether it is possible to instead give words many different meanings. Humpty Dumpty replies: “Die Frage ist . . . wer der Herr sein soll. Das ist alles” (14, uncited in text). Rote Zora analyzes this passage, writing, “es ist tatsächlich die entscheidende Frage wer der Herr sein soll. Schon, daß es unmöglich erscheint zu sagen ‘wer die Frau sein soll’, zeigt, daß die weißen Herren es waren und sind, die den Menschen und Dingen ihre Bedeutung geben” (14). Here, Rote Zora is

25 Likewise, in an interview given in Oliver Ressler’s film Die Rote Zora (2000), Corinna Kawaters, a former member of Rote Zora, says “RZ [Revolutionäre Zellen] und Rote Zora haben auch niederschwellige Aktionsformen propagiert, also die Widerstandstruktur auf allen Ebenen. Dazu gehörte das Parolesprühen, das Zukleben von Türen von Sexshops, Kinoleinwände mit Farbbeuteln bewerfen, und viele andere Sachen.”
26 Rote Zora incorrectly cites the passage as coming from “Alice im Wunderland.”
27 Rote Zora’s German translation of this passage obscures the English original. In the original, Humpty Dumpty’s question is not “who is to be master” but “which is to be master” (124, my emphasis). Humpty Dumpty is asking whether words are the masters of their users or whether the users of words are masters of them. Rota Zora seems to interpret the German translation of the passage as questioning about who has the power to give words meaning. They emphasize that asking this question in a language that equates mastery with masculinity (“Herr”) already excludes women from having this power.
28 Here Rote Zora highlights the additional problem of race in the formation of oppressive gender relations. An in-depth discussion of Rote Zora’s comparative analysis of “First” and “Third World” women’s movements is
arguing that the giving of fixed and rigid meanings is an aspect of gendered oppression. The idea of meaning as Western culture and Humpty Dumpty understand it – fixed, exclusive, exact – is, in fact, a patriarchal idea. And, as Humpty Dumpty celebrates, it is (through the masculine word *Herr*) linked to a male-gendered domination or lordship. Alice challenges this view, suggesting that it could be possible for a word to simultaneously describe many different things, and may not need to be so limited. Against Humpty Dumpty’s question of “wer der Herr sein soll” Rote Zora poses the ambiguous question of “wer die Frau sein soll,” which questions both after what a woman really is, as well as women’s power in relation to men in determining meaning. Drawing on Alice’s challenge to Humpty Dumpty, this suggests an opening and pluralizing of the concept of “woman,” which could even put women in the position of being able to determine this for themselves. Indeed, it raises the idea that oppression is, in fact, linked to rigidity and constricted definitions. In this view, the word “woman” is still a term of solidarity and collectivity, but one which remains open to the limitless creation of additional meanings.

Rote Zora is not trying to replace one strict definition of “Woman” with another, but rather to set the stage for a radical expansion of what the word “woman” could mean. It is no wonder then, that they take inspiration from Lewis Carroll, a master of paradoxical indeterminacy. Drawing on Carroll, they promote expanding the definition of the word “woman” to mean many things at once. As women who practice militant resistance, they are directly intervening in this project by expanding the definition of “woman” to include the possibility of beyond the scope of this thesis, but their sensitivity to the differences between various women’s movements certainly informs the sentiment that there must be differences in the way women practice resistance. “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe” includes an uncited quotation that reads “‘es gibt nicht den einen und reinen Frauenkampf, sondern viele Formen von Frauenkämpfen und in jedem einzelnen sind immer mehrere Elemente in Bewegung, neben der Geschlechterfrage, die Klassenlage, die Nationalität, die konkrete Situation’” (14). Rote Zora’s changing stance on and relationship to the struggles of non-white women, in Germany and around the world, is a rich topic for further research.
militancy. This does not mean that all women need to be militant, that this new conception of “woman” should ossify and become dogmatic. Rather, their practice seeks to keep the possibility of militancy open and available for women. They write “die bewaffnete Form des Angriffs ist für uns ein unverzichtbarer Teil des Frauenkampfes” (“Jedes Herz” 18, my emphasis). They emphasize that armed struggle should be a part of women’s struggle, an available tactic. This is also a critique of the women’s movement's limitation of available tactics of resistance: Rote Zora suggests here that excluding militancy from the women’s movement means confining the definition of “Woman” to a necessarily passive being. They write:

Für uns ist es klar, daß der Frauenkampf nicht auf die Organisierung von Subversivität und Gegengewalt verzichten kann. Die Frauenbewegung hat schon allzu lange Analysen darüber geschrieben, daß Frauen dazu erzogen werden Gewalt zu erleiden, aber nicht sich zu wehren. Frauen werden darauf abgerichtet, sich in ihrer Ohnmacht einzurichten und die psychischen Zerstörungen, die dieses System anrichtet, mit ihrer Emotionalität zuzukleistern. (“Jedes Herz” 17)

In other words, by limiting the tactics of women’s emancipation, the women’s movement is perpetuating a concept of gender relations in which women passively suffer oppression while men are able to resist it actively. They emphasize this double standard of gender relations at the beginning of “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe,” arguing that even in the radical left, there is a gendered division of labour in which “Frauen übernehmen die Aufgaben der Infrastruktur, Männer machen die Aktionen” (14). Although they see this process as changing through the inability of oppressive gender relations to maintain themselves in the face of the sheer number of women actively involved in radical groups, they argue that these relations persist. In this way, the
radical left is complicit with patriarchy, and it too needs to be resisted by disrupting these gender norms. Rote Zora promotes a feminism in which women are not confined by any prescribed roles, and this means, necessarily, that the possibility of directly attacking the structures of their own oppression must be open to them. Not everyone has to do it, but it is important that someone confronts these gender relations with paradox in order to publicly open this as a possibility for all women. As a group of women involved in armed struggle against patriarchy in the radical left and in society as a whole, Rote Zora is performing this paradox and directly opening the concept of “woman” to new meanings.

However, as Katharina Karcher points out, Rote Zora did think of women as a collective subject at this time, leading them to make problematic statements of shared experience with women of different races and cultural backgrounds. Karcher analyzes Rote Zora’s explanation of their attack on the Philippine Consulate in Bonn in 1983 for its accused involvement in sex trafficking, writing that

the militant feminists declared that they wanted to express solidarity with Philippine women because the sexual objectification of women in Third World countries constituted an offence against all women, including themselves. By emphasising a shared experience of patriarchal oppression, the Zoras failed to account for the unspoken privileges of their identities. (76)

Karcher points out that, ten years later, in their text “Mili’s Tanz auf dem Eis,” Rote Zora acknowledged the different experiences of women from different backgrounds and that some of their critiques had been misdirected. My argument above that Rote Zora aimed to destabilize a rigid concept of “Woman” is not to say that they came early to more recent, intersectional forms
of feminism, which acknowledge the different oppressions experienced by women of different cultures; rather, I want to point out that their practice of resistance involves a critique of rigid or imposed concepts of identity and an attempt to resist how these structure subjectivity. This is less a descriptive and more a prescriptive statement: they are not arguing in their critique that all women have irreducibly different experiences, thereby making the concept of “Woman” problematic. Rather they are saying that a fixed definition of “Woman” is itself oppressive, whether this definition comes from the establishment or from a radical movement, and that women have the power to autonomously create their own sense of their gender identity, through practice.

To me, what Rote Zora is doing is actually very similar to the idea of gender performativity that Judith Butler develops in *Gender Trouble* (1990). She argues against any notion of “Woman” grounded in nature, pure self-identity or in an originary, pre-repressed world. Instead, she sees the unity of gender as an illusion: the idea of this unity is produced after the fact as a way of describing an artificial bundle of repetitive acts or performances in order to maintain heteronormative power relations. She writes “acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the illusion of an interior and organizing gender core, an illusion discursively maintained for the purposes of the regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive heterosexuality” (136). In other words, gender is being produced at every moment through the actions of people, and these actions are attributed to some kind of essential being as a way of regulating behaviour. This “essential being” does not lie within people, but is produced

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29 Clare Bielby (2012) draws on Judith Butler to analyze media representations of violent women in West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. There, she argues that “the media construction of the violent woman functions as an ideological tool to discipline and punish West German women at a period of profound anxiety about gendered identity and gender relations” (13). Whereas I analyze resistance to this disciplinary apparatus, Bielby analyzes its counter-resistance. Melzer (2015) also draws on Judith Butler to destabilize a universalized form of feminism and to describe the performative disruption of female terrorism as a feminist practice.
externally by the structures of power. The possibility of a subversive feminism, then, does not lie in creating an alternative, essentialist definition of “Woman” to grapple with the patriarchal definition (as she criticizes certain feminists for doing); rather it lies in enacting new and startling gender performances that break with prescribed gender roles. She emphasizes “the performatve possibilities of proliferating gender configurations outside the restricting frames of masculinist domination and compulsory heterosexuality” (141) and, drawing on Nietzsche, argues that “there need not be a ‘doer’ behind ‘the deed,’ but that the ‘doer’ is variably constructed in and through the deed” (142). In this view, the possibility of engaging in new performances and breaking with one’s prescribed gender is always open. One is never fully constricted by social categories but can always enact deeds that recreate the doer as someone beyond these categories.

Unlike Rote Zora’s revolutionary anti-capitalism, Butler’s performativity is not so integrated with a broader practice of resistance. Merely performing an alternative gender only goes halfway, for Rote Zora. Rote Zora’s gender-troubling performances are simultaneously direct attacks on the social relations and structures that produce rigid gender relations in the first place. Directly attacking these relations aims to destroy the structures that produce oppressive gender relations, while the attack itself is a resistant performance of a different concept of gender than the oppressive one which those structures produce. In this regard, Rote Zora is closer to Emma Goldman,30 whose emphasis on direct action, discussed in Chapter 1, involves changing individual subjectivity as part of a broader anti-capitalist intervention. For Goldman as for Rote Zora, the possibility of resistance in the first place requires a liberated subjectivity that is open to

30 Emma Goldman was a figure of some influence in the German women’s movement. The widely-circulated feminist magazine EMMA, which is still published today, was named after Emma Goldman (Ferree 76).
resistance, while engaging in resistance itself acts as a “doing” that can recreate the subjectivity of “the doer” as liberated from authority. Butler promotes action as a way of resisting oppressive gender relations, but does not integrate this resistance into a broader revolutionary project, as Goldman and Rote Zora do.

In certain ways, Rote Zora embodies elements of both Emma Goldman’s and Judith Butler’s feminist politics. A comparative reading of the three can help to flesh these out and to position Rote Zora within a broader discourse of feminist theory. In emphasizing activity over representation, Goldman’s own critiques of the feminist movement of her time share similarities with Rote Zora’s. In her essay “The Tragedy of Women’s Emancipation,” Goldman criticizes a concept of women’s emancipation based on equal rights as not going far enough towards liberating women’s inner lives and desires. Indeed, emancipation has, for Goldman, created new “internal tyrants” (221) that make women behave in newly oppressive ways: “the greatest shortcoming of the emancipation of the present day lies in its artificial stiffness and its narrow respectabilities, which produce an emptiness in woman’s soul that will not let her drink from the fountain of life” (223). Though she shares outmoded beliefs of her time – the 1910s – and refers to women’s “nature” (223) and other essentializing terms, Goldman is still arguing for women to create their own freedom and their own concept of their gender. She wants women to reject whatever prescribed notion of womanhood they have, whether it comes from the emancipation movement or from reactionary conservatives, and to follow their own desires:

All these busybodies, moral detectives, jailers of the human spirit, what will they say? Until woman has learned to defy them all, to stand firmly on her own ground and to insist upon her own unrestricted freedom, to listen to the voice of her nature, whether it call for
life’s greatest treasure, love for a man, or her most glorious privilege, the right to give birth to a child, she cannot call herself emancipated. (221-222)

Here, Goldman prioritizes a break with the internalized repression of women, and criticizes the women’s movement for constraining in new ways what women’s identity should be. Though hampered by the language of heteronormativity, the goal of Goldman’s politics is still for women to create their own liberated selves and their own worlds based on their desires. She argues against women taking on new, externally-constructed conceptions of themselves, writing: “[a woman’s] development, her freedom, her independence, must come from and through herself” (“Woman’s Suffrage” 211). She sees the seduction of a promised, external emancipation as potentially dangerous, in that it merely gives women a new socially-prescribed role to play.

This argument comes from a very different place than Butler’s, but the criticism is similar. Butler writes of her own work “this kind of critique brings into question the foundationalist frame in which feminism as an identity politics has been articulated. The internal paradox of this foundationalism is that it presumes, fixes, and constrains the very ‘subjects’ that it hopes to represent and liberate” (148). Both Goldman and Butler see a liberatory praxis as grounded in activity, activity which breaks confining social roles by directly acting outside of them. Both see these roles coming simultaneously from the conservative establishment and from the women’s movement itself. Goldman, though, does not develop a critical gender analysis, and so is not really trying to more broadly destabilize gender categories per se. Indeed, liberatory praxis, for Goldman, is won for the individual in the moment of direct action. Though it can inspire, it is not really shared. Rather, it is a deeply personal experience of freedom through

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31 Goldman refers to various ways in which the women’s movement does this, for example, through promoting wage-labour and decrying marriage, and through putting women in the moralistic role of “purifying politics” with their alleged essential goodness.
transgression, that each person must win for themselves. Butler, on the other hand, suggests a more public project, in which individuals publicly performing a different concept of gender helps to destabilize gender relations as a whole. As a public fracturing of gender relations, this destabilizes gender for everyone who witnesses the subversive performance. For her, it is not so much a question of experiencing a solitary freedom through transgression, as it is of publicly interrupting the social reproduction of fixed gender roles.

Arguably, Rote Zora promotes both these practices. Rote Zora emphasizes, like Emma Goldman, the personally liberatory effect of direct action:

*jede Frau, die schon einen Stein geworfen hat, die auf Anmache von Männern nicht mit Rückzug reagiert hat, sondern zurückgeschlagen hat, wird unser Gefühl von Befreiung nochvollziehen können, das wir hatten, als wir Sexshops zerstörten oder eine Bombe anlässlich des Urteils zum § 218 vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht zündeten. (“Jedes Herz” 18)*\(^32\)

Here, freedom is won both through physically destroying a structure that limits that freedom, and through the act of resistance itself: it is direct action. As discussed above, Rote Zora is also preoccupied with opening the possibility of this freedom to others, in showing through their actions that it is possible for women to fight back. In their self-interview, they write: “denn so wie jeder gewaltakt gegenüber einer frauen ein klima von bedrohung gegenüber allen frauen schafft, so tragen unsere aaktionen . . . mit dazu bei, ein klima zu entwickeln: widerstand ist möglich!” (“‘Widerstand ist möglich’” 41, emphasis in original, nouns uncapsitalized in original).

This effort to open resistance up for other women by doing it themselves brings Rote Zora closer

\(^32\) § 218 is the German law regulating abortion. Rote Zora’s first attack, under their earlier name “Die Frauen der Revolutionären Zelle,” targeted the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Court of Justice) for its upholding of the abortion ban. Their first attack under the name “Rote Zora” (1977) targeted the Bundesärztekammer (German Medical Association), which also supported the abortion ban (Karcher 5).
to Butler’s notion of gender performativity, and to her project of destabilizing gender categories by publicly transgressing their boundaries through activity. In a way, Rote Zora is promoting a synthesis of the politics of direct action and of gender performativity, that seeks, in the moment of freedom, to make this moment possible to others. Internalized, oppressive gender relations are broken both by directly acting outside of them, and by witnessing other people doing so. This suggests a nuanced resistance, in conversation with various feminisms and still relevant today.

Vojin Saša Vukadinović does not see Rote Zora as having such a developed theory and practice of resistance and describes them as being uncritical and dogmatic. As such, he rejects the claim that they are feminists. In his essay “Spätreflex. Eine Fallstudie zu den Revolutionären Zellen, der Roten Zora und zur verlängerten Feminismus-Obsession bundesdeutscher Terrorismusfahnder,” he argues that they did not grasp the nuances of the feminist theory breaking ground at the time of their activities:

Es waren andere Feministinnen, die mit Texten schwerwiegender nicht nur in linke Debatten einzugreifen wussten als es dem begrenzten politischen Verstehen der Roten Zora möglich war. Ihren Erklärungen fehlte die militante individuelle Dringlichkeit, Ironie und Präzision einer Valerie Solanas, die materialistische Analyse einer Shulamith Firestone, das Wissen um die psycholoanalytische Verfasstheit der Geschlechterdifferenz, das sich in den Texten von Luce Irigaray findet, vor allem aber ein Verständnis von Mann und Frau als historisch umkämpften und folglich veränderbaren Kategorien der Heterosexualität, was Monique Wittig in einer Reihe an Aufsätzen in den 1970er- und 1980er-Jahren ausgearbeitet hat. (148)

Vukadinović reads Rote Zora as shallow and lacking a solid critique and argues that they are not
feminists. Calling on these specific feminist theorists, he seems to set up an exclusionary canon of feminism, which one must cite to belong. While it is in the first place problematic to police who gets to be called a feminist and who does not, Vukadinović’s argument is also somewhat blasé. Firstly, he does not engage in close readings of Rote Zora’s texts and so offers little evidence for his claims of their uncritical dogmatism and inability to grasp feminist themes. Although Rote Zora’s tone is, at times, more punk rock than academic, they do make an argument towards gender relations being historically determined and changeable. Indeed, as I argued above, changing the internalized identity associated with the patriarchal concept of “Woman” is an important part of their practice. Rote Zora was critical of other feminists and the women’s movement for not pushing this change far enough. Also, as Katharina Karcher points out, by the 1990s Rote Zora had adjusted their feminist theory to acknowledge the different experiences of sexism that women of other races and sexualities faced (Karcher 7). Secondly, though Rote Zora may not fit snugly into the feminist traditions that Vukadinović cites, they share similarities with another feminist tradition, that of anarcha-feminism. This is a feminism that equates capitalism with patriarchal domination and argues that struggles against the two are inseparable. Vukadinović is correct to point out that Rote Zora was criticized at the time of their actions, but this suggests rather that their feminism was radically different from the mainstream of their time, not that it cannot be called feminism.

Yet, since I argue that Rote Zora offers a distinct alternative to the anti-theoretical RAF, it

33 Patricia Melzer notes in *Death in the Shape of a Young Girl* that this period saw a fragmentation of the term “feminist.” She argues that “the shared belief in gender relations as an oppressive regime that is in need of correction does not necessarily extend to a shared analysis of its roots and/or its relation to other systems of oppression” (9). Instead, she promotes a multiplicity of feminisms and seeks to “contribute to a reevaluation of a universalizing use of the term ‘feminist’” (10). Indeed, a major goal of her work is to resist a universal conception of feminism, arguing that this effaces any parts of history that do not fit into this term. I follow Melzer’s analysis, and see a universalized way of thinking about feminism as an exclusionary tool, silencing some women (like Rote Zora) while letting others be heard.
is important to consider Vukadinović’s picture of Rote Zora as anti-theorists\textsuperscript{34} and to search for evidence that might suggest this. Indeed, there are moments when Rote Zora threatens to do just what they criticize, to confine resistance to a rigid definition that does not leave room for different theorizations. After criticizing the feminist movement’s disavowal of violence and the resultant acceptance of the social role of women as powerless, they write (in large, bold letters) “Ohnmacht ist die Tarnkappe der Feigheit” (“Jedes Herz” 18). How does this radical proclamation fit in with their claim that they are “not the solution . . . but rather one way”? It is clear from “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe” that Rote Zora was immensely frustrated with the women’s movement for losing its revolutionary energy of the late-1960s and 1970s, and integrating itself into the structures of power.\textsuperscript{35} This line explodes out of that frustration. It is not so much a call to a specific path of resistance, but to resistance itself. Here, Rote Zora is criticizing both the autonomous women’s movement, which disavowed a discourse of equal rights in favour of women’s autonomous self-determination, and the more liberal women’s movement, which sought gender equality within the institutions of society. For Rote Zora, the strength of the earlier manifestations of the autonomous women’s movement had been its amalgamation of the personal and the political: “revolutionäre Sprengkraft lag in dem Bewußtsein der direkten Verbindung zwischen der Abschaffung des persönlichen Leidens und der Notwendigkeit einer sozialen Umwälzung” (“Jedes Herz” 16). In other words, they praise this early stage of the women’s movement for its biopolitical resistance, its combination of resistance at the levels of individual subjectivity, society and politics. To them, contemporary

\textsuperscript{34} He writes “Die Rote Zora sah sich nicht in der Rolle, vom Feminismus theoretisch zu lernen, und musste sich bereits qua ihrer Praxis gegen Theorie richten, weil die sonst gewonnen Erkenntnisse das gesamte Vorhaben der Organisation ad absurdum geführt hätten” (148).

\textsuperscript{35} As discussed above, an example of this is autonomous women’s projects taking money from the state (Melzer, Death 57). Rote Zora also highlights the example of the move to a “’neue Innerlichkeit’” (“Jedes Herz” 14) a turn inwards and away from a political engagement with society.
manifestations of the women’s movement had lost this integrated approach.

Instead, the autonomous women’s movement had, according to Rote Zora, sequestered itself from broader political issues and created a “Frauenpolitik auffrauspezifische Probleme” (“Jedes Herz” 17). That is, it stopped connecting women’s oppression to broader political issues. Its focus on self-help projects as a way to ease the suffering of women and its lack of analysis about how this suffering connected to society as a whole put the autonomous women’s movement in danger of co-optation, of becoming “fuktionierend[e] Rädchen” (“Jedes Herz” 17) in the system. At worst, according to Rote Zora, the movement totally abandoned its dedication to changing society and became a project “zur Illusion der Erreichung des persönlichen Glücks” (“Jedes Herz” 17). In other words, they saw the movement as working to change subjectivity without changing the social factors that produced that subjectivity. They call for an integrated resistance, akin to the biopolitical model I developed above, that sees society as productive of internalized oppression, and integrates resistance against both this production itself and the oppressive subjectivities it has created. Though Rote Zora praised the work that the autonomous women’s movement did, such as making public the extent of normalized violence practiced daily against women and merging a politics of feminism with a politics of autonomy (“Jedes Herz” 16, 17), they did not see the movement as confronting the system of women’s oppression with a fundamental paradox. Instead, in its withdrawal into women’s specific issues, they saw it as accepting its powerlessness (Ohnmacht) to change society, thereby taking on a complacent role within the system.

Likewise, Rote Zora criticized the branch of the women’s movement that sought women’s integration into society. If resistance means breaking with one’s social role and attacking the
structures that give these roles dominance, then (as Emma Goldman also points out) simply fighting for things like “equal rights” and integration is not really resistance. Resistance means to embody a radical paradox to these power structures, to simultaneously disrupt them and act outside the limits they impose on one’s being.\textsuperscript{36} Powerlessness (\textit{Ohnmacht}) to Rote Zora is to remain inactive and to passively take on a prefabricated social role, wherever this role comes from. Instead, they want to promote a politics of creative empowerment, in which women constantly determine themselves and the world they live in. In their self-interview, one of the Zoras highlights this problem in women’s struggles, writing:

\begin{quote}
   die schwierigkeiten fangen für uns da an, wo feministische forderungen dazu benutzt werden, in dieser gesellschaft “gleichberechtigung” und anerkennung zu fordern. Wir wollen keine frauen in männerpositionen und lehnen frauen ab, die karriere innerhalb patriarchaler strukturen unter dem deckmantel des frauenkampfes machen. (“‘Widerstand ist möglich’” 40, nouns uncapitalized in original)
\end{quote}

To Rote Zora, this is a passive and powerless position, which does not actually engage in resistance. To integrate into society as “equal” reinforces patriarchal structures while simply taking on a new, defined social role created by those structures. A woman CEO or a woman president is not engaging in resistance: she has merely been welcomed into one of the prescribed roles of patriarchal power, from which she reproduces that power and oppresses others. These critiques offer an alternative to the dominant feminisms in Germany at the time, but they by no means entail an anti-theoretical attitude, as Vukadinović argues. Instead, they are theoretically

\textsuperscript{36} An example of Rote Zora practising this comes through in their \textit{Anschlagserklärung} published in \textit{EMMA} in 1978. They write “In der Karnevalszeit, wo die ‘Liebe’ mal wieder hoch im Kurs steht und die Männer Frauen anmachen, haben wir uns auch mal unseren Weiberfastnachtsspaß erlaubt, nach der Devise: Mit List und Tücke hauen wir die Pornoshops in Stücke!” (Rote Zora, 1978). Here Rote Zora is simultaneously stepping outside of the prescribed women’s role of easy prey for men during the “Karnevalszeit,” as well as directly destroying an entity that produces the sexual objectification of women.
justifying their practice as a way of maintaining an integrated resistance that acts on individual subjectivity as well as on society more broadly. They criticize a theoretically-grounded practice that shies away from intervention in society, and tries to change the world exclusively through changing one’s own subjectivity. Though Rote Zora sees many paths of resistance, they see resistance itself as a necessary path.

Resistance, for Rote Zora, is something directed against what has ossified or what is prescribed. In their view, the dominant power structures seek to keep things rigid and well-defined, to offer only one available path. Resistance to this homogenous worldview means stepping outside of the smooth functioning of power and performing actions which explode the limits which that power sets: it means confronting those limits with paradox. This is clear in their performative interventions into gender relations and their encouraging other women to do this in their own ways. The theme of paradox also comes through in their more general discussions of resistance. In their self-interview, one of the Zoras writes “unterdrückung wird erst sichtbar durch widerstand” (“‘Widerstand ist möglich’” 40, nouns uncapitalized in original), suggesting that power can hide its oppression through normalizing itself, but it is exposed when resistance steps outside that normalcy and stands against it. Resistance is a way of confronting oppression with its own paradox. Their practice of resistance operates against any forces that seek to close, limit, cover-up, define and pin down: in short, their concept of resistance is one that always offers an exterior to any force that presents a unified totality. Resistance is, for Rote Zora, a way of opening possibilities beyond the rigidity of domination.

Indeed, the idea of paradox is built into the structure, style and language of their texts. Their texts often contain more than one voice, each saying different things. For instance, their
“self-interview” presents the voices of two Zoras, as well as the voice of the interviewer, which constantly calls their own actions into question. In “Mili’s Tanz,” they repeat this gesture, writing “wir repräsentieren nicht die Sichtweise aller Roten Zoras. Einige meldeten immense Widersprüche an . . . Auch unter uns existieren verschiedene politische Standpunkte und Schwerpunktsetzungen, die im Papier nebeneinander stehen” (2). Yet, despite this disclaimer, they continue to use the authorial “we.” The use of puns and words with double-meanings (discussed above) also embraces the idea of paradox, allowing multiple, often contradictory meanings to exist simultaneously alongside each other. In a way, these texts are also performances of a certain concept of resistance, one which cannot stay still or be pinned down to a single unity, but which experiments with different “ways” of resistance. This also helps to address the issue raised in Chapter 2, that it is difficult to describe the political philosophy of a group consisting of multiple, revolving members, who might change their views over time. But this changing of views over time, and the existence of members with differing views, is actually an integral part of their overall practice of resistance. In a sense, Rote Zora’s texts are examples of direct action in the realm of language. Taking inspiration from Alice, these texts are a living example of resistance against the idea that words and texts have an exact and pure meaning and that authorship embodies some kind of authoritarian permanence. Through their style, they directly disrupt a fixed and rigid view of language, while simultaneously arguing against singular understandings of meaning.

For Rote Zora, this view of language goes hand in hand with political resistance: language is an integrated aspect of biopolitical resistance. Without a fluid sense of language, systems of oppression can easily absorb resistance into their functioning, which thrives off of
rigid concepts and singular paths. Rote Zora cautions against women trying to “take power” without questioning how a singular understanding of the word “power” itself can recapitulate patriarchal forms: “die sprachliche Gleichsetzung (‘Macht der Herrschenden’ – ‘Macht der Frauen’) ist einmal Ausdruck dafür, wie wenig genau von uns verwendete Begriffe inhaltlich gefüllt bzw. reflektiert sind. Darüber hinaus spiegelt sich darin unser Verhaftetsein in patriarchalen Denkmustern” (“Mili’s Tanz” 7). They reject the idea of “taking power” and instead promote breaking out of the rigid dualisms of patriarchal culture:

Nicht nur Macht ist an Herrschaft gekoppelt, sondern auch Ohnmacht, nicht nur Sieg, sondern auch Niederlage, nicht nur Krieg, sondern auch ‘Frieden’, nicht nur Reichtum, sondern auch Armut etc. Diese Begriffspaare definieren sich jeweils über ihren immanenten Gegensatz, d.h. Macht existiert nur, weil Ohnmacht existiert und umgekehrt. Mit der Zielvorstellung, Macht zu überwinden, überwinden wir auch Ohnmacht, wenn Sieg keine Orientierung ist, kann auch die Niederlage nicht unser Denken und Handeln fesseln. (“Mili’z Tanz” 8)

This passage suggests that even resistance to patriarchy is structured by patriarchy itself. In order not to recapitulate the system it tries to overcome, resistance can rethink and transform the language and thought patterns of patriarchy, rather than trying to beat the patriarchy on its own terms. And if patriarchy functions by giving clear, singular meanings, then resisting patriarchal thinking and language means embracing paradox and multiplicity.

In this way, Rote Zora is sensitive to the danger inherent in militancy that Varon criticizes both the RAF and Weatherman for falling into: namely, recapitulating the violence and

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37 They write: “machtübernahme, durchgesetzt und abgesichert mittels eigenständiger militärischer Formationen, kennen wir in der Geschichte nur als patriarchalen Herrschaftswechsel” (“Mili’s Tanz” 7).
oppression of dominant power structures through their very tactics of resistance. Varon writes: “the central irony that haunted the urban guerrilla armed struggle groups was that, at times, they mirrored precisely what they claimed to oppose” (242). Through their critique of patriarchal language, Rote Zora is trying to guard against this danger. Most startling in this critique is Rote Zora’s rejection of “Sieg” (victory) as an orientation for people engaged in resistance. Yet, this follows from a philosophy of resistance that sees revolution as a chance to be nurtured and that rejects certainty as a patriarchal limitation. Victory implies a future static state in which resistance is no longer necessary, and reflects the Marxist belief in the inevitability of revolution. Indeed, Rote Zora points out the link between the German word for “domination” and patriarchy, emphasizing its male connotation by writing repeatedly in “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe” “HERRschaft” (16), suggesting that the very idea of dominance is based on the oppression of women. This means that a feminist program of resistance that aims for its own worldview to become “doMANant” merely recapitulates a patriarchal form. If resistance is paradox, multiplicity and open possibility, it can never be a complete, total project. Indeed, in the moment that resistance would declare victory and become dominant, it would have to begin resisting itself.

Rejecting a narrative of victory and dominance, Rote Zora sees resistance as a way or a path, an unfolding practice that moves in a direction, but is always open to change and to standing against itself. As discussed above, they in fact describe their militant practice as “ein Weg” (“Jedes Herz” 18), while in “Mili’s Tanz” they write “wir haben festgestellt, daß uns alte Analysemuster und Betrachtungsweisen in eine Sackgasse führen, daß wir uns nicht an linken Denkmustern orientieren, sondern neue Wege verfolgen wollen” (33) and “wir präsentieren euch

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38 My translation.
hiermit keine abgeschlossene Diskussion, sondern einen Einblick in einen laufenden Klärungsprozeß” (2). Rote Zora rejects stale forms of resistance that have ossified into dogmas of the left. Instead they embrace resistance as a process that is always prepared to turn on itself, that leaps out of itself the moment it stands still. Resistance is paradox itself, the inverse of patriarchal power, which seeks to keep things stable, rigid and defined. Resistance is a dance or a walk on a path, always in motion, never fixed, moving outside of itself with every new step. Their own critical practice reflects this: “darin alle Möglichkeiten auszuprobieren und auszureizen, ist nicht nur für die Stärkung der FrauenLesbenbewegung notwendig, es ist auch für unseren Lernprozeß wichtig” (5). Far from revolutionary dogmatism, Rote Zora’s practice of resistance is intimately bound to reflection, critique and an openness to change.

The goal of this resistance is to put certainty into question, whether the definition of the word “woman,” the inevitability of revolution, or the power of the patriarchal system. Even its own practices can never be fully sure of themselves, but must always be open to change, as Rote Zora notes: “auch unsere eigenen Maßstäbe müssen offengelegt, diskutier- und veränderbar sein, eigene Gewißheiten infragegestellt werden können” (“Mili’s Tanz” 18). Rote Zora’s resistance runs deep. It does not seek merely to combat the material conditions of oppression in the world; it also encourages people to think in patterns that are not oppressive to themselves and others. Indeed, it even guards against the possibility of its own resistance becoming oppressive by resisting it as well. It wants to show people that they can autonomously recreate themselves beyond the limits of the definitions given to them. In Rote Zora’s view, oppression begins when people wallow in the certainties created for them. It can only be broken by standing against these certainties and practicing possibilities outside of what is thought to be certain. Since these new
possibilities always hold the danger of becoming new, oppressive limitations, this process of resistance can never end. It is always ready to stand against even the certainties one has come to through resistance.

This process is not, however, a stern, programmatic method of guarding against certainty. Rather, it is playful, wild and funny, like Rote Zora’s namesake. It greets dogmatic thinking with fluid thinking, it confronts revolutionary logic with the individualized joy of resistance. At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed Rote Zora’s comparison of militancy and dancing. This image of resistance as embodied and exciting, as moving in all directions in a series of stances, as abandoning the serious, straight line ruptures dogmas and certainties in a joyful way. Rote Zora abandons the linear inevitability of Marxist revolution for a different kind of inevitability: a faith that each oppressed person will someday explode under the pressure into their own form of resistance. For Rote Zora, every heart is a time bomb, ticking towards resistance. A society filled with time bombs can maintain a normalized order on the surface but always contains the inevitability of rupture. Revolution is not certain, but neither is the current order of society. People can only take so much rigid dogma, whether from the patriarchy, from the revolutionary left or from the women’s movement, before they start to disrupt that rigidity. In this way, Rote Zora project themselves into the future: as long as there is still oppression, the time bombs are still ticking, and some of them are exploding into resistance. This resistance might take up Rote Zora’s own practice as a past form of resistance, but will resist the urge to turn their practice into dogma, and instead ensure that resistance, even to resistance itself, remains possible.

To me, this is an example of what a paradoxical mode of resistance can look like in practice. At the same time, the mode of resistance I read in Rote Zora’s texts and actions offers a
distinct alternative to the more dogmatic, teleological resistance of the RAF. This alternative does not see itself as so imperative or destined to succeed that it must take lives. In this way, the close readings conducted in this chapter build on the theoretical and historical discussions in Chapters 1 and 2, and offer a way of linking these approaches together. Situating these close readings in history provides a way of seeing how this theory of resistance functions in practice in a certain context. At the same time, the close readings are themselves a practice of resistance, adopting a stance against the dominant narratives about the history of militancy from this context, and opening up a broader and more nuanced, historical idea of resistance.
Conclusion

Rote Zora conducted their last attack near Bremen in 1995 (Karcher 9). They targeted the Lürssen shipyard, which produced boats to be used by the Turkish military during its war against Kurdish independence fighters (Rote Zora, “Ihr habt die Macht” 3). In their explanation for the attack, titled “Ihr habt die Macht, uns gehört die Nacht,” Rote Zora struggles with the ability of imperialism and patriarchy to recuperate resistance. They express sympathy for the goals of the Kurdish war of national liberation against Turkey, but criticize it for destroying the means of subsistence that give Kurdish women the independence to live outside the grip of patriarchy; likewise, they see the women’s movement in the “Metropolen” (7) as having led to fragmentation and individual liberation at the expense of non-white women. What began as real challenges to domination have, in Rote Zora’s view, been partially reabsorbed into a project of domination. They call for a new project of revolutionary solidarity, but struggle to articulate this solidarity in the face of fragmentation. The article’s tone is more downtrodden than their earlier texts. Gone is the vital declaration that “Widerstand ist möglich!” Instead they seek “einer kämpferischen und revolutionären Perspektive an[zu]nähern” (8). Resistance seems somehow more distant than it was a decade before. Reading this final text, one is reminded of their previous declaration in “Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe” that their existence as an armed cell is meant to open a perspective of hope and victory in themselves and others. Rote Zora’s resistance sustained itself on hope. Their method was to provoke more resistance, through inspiration and through the paradoxically productive mode of resisting resistance itself. For them, resistance made more resistance possible. The mid-1990s, however, marked the end of all the West German...
guerrilla movements that had arisen in the 1970s, as well as the modes of resistance that they had employed.

This does not really mark the end of Rote Zora, though. As noted above, Katharina Karcher points to the inspiration they have given to other activists, and argues that “one does not have to agree with the tactics of the Red Zora to see the activities of this group as part of the long and varied history of feminist movements and to productively engage with their history” (12). In light of my focus on their use of paradox, Karcher’s argument could be taken even further. Productively engaging with Rote Zora involves actively resisting the tactics and theories of the group, as they themselves did throughout their 20-year history. Indeed, an interview with a former member of Rote Zora, Corinna Kawaters, in Oliver Ressler’s 2000 film Rote Zora, also gestures to this: she highlights the intensely politicized context that Rote Zora operated in, and argues that the tactic of inspiring people to resistance through property destruction “war eine Widerstandsform, die der Zeit angepasst war.” She goes on to argue that:


She argues that the political climate of the 1970s and ‘80s was suited to Rote Zora’s tactics. The attacks could confront oppression in a fundamental way, which could also open people’s hearts and minds to the possibility of practicing resistance themselves. In her view, in an age of right-
wing terror, these kinds of tactics no longer achieve this effect. Conducting targeted bombings as a way to inspire resistance, to paradoxically undermine gender relations and to attack the structures of oppression no longer has the same resonance that it did in 1970s West Germany. Though their specific tactics may no longer offer a paradoxical challenge to the status quo, their more general project of resistance is still relevant. It can be both taken up and resisted, to promote new practices of resistance for a different context. A paradox is what stands outside thinking, but once something is thought, once it becomes opinion, it is no longer a paradox. The paradox steps outside again.

To me, this is what makes paradox such a compelling way of thinking about resistance. Thinking what is outside-thinking can only remain paradoxical for so long. Eventually this “outside-thinking” is absorbed into “thinking” in the very act of it being thought or performed. Looking at resistance in this way acknowledges that resistance can and likely will be recuperated or will become stale, but it can always take a new stance against a new state of domination. The possibility of being unintegratable does not so much lie in finding the single, irrecoverable stance, but in taking multiple stances. From this perspective, the important thing is that resistance happens, continues to happen and continues to open a ground for further resistance, not that it achieve some kind of total victory. It stands in tension with domination, but does not overcome it. It can be recuperated by domination, but can always assume a new stance. The two are morbid dance partners.

This provides a different way of thinking about activism, social movements and acts of resistance more generally. It gets away from a teleological discourse of “success” and “failure” and towards a concept of resistance that sees these acts as reverberating into the future, both
provoking and inspiring further resistance. The discourse of success and failure is actually a way of closing off resistance: whether resistance “succeeds” or “fails,” either category implies that resistance is now over. A more paradoxical vision of resistance, especially one that sees resistance as an everyday part of human existence, can appreciate acts of resistance as accomplishing something in themselves. In their very activity, they stand against domination and directly disrupt its claim to a normalized totality. As in Rote Zora’s theorizations, these acts of resistance make the potential for future resistance more abundant: they show that domination is not total and that engaging in resistance is possible. And, as resistance moves into the future, they form a history of resistance that future resistances can both draw on and resist. In this way, resistance becomes not a tool for taking power, but rather an act that functions as the inverse of domination. As domination seeks to keep things rigid and dogmatic, to create a totality out of itself, resistance always appears exterior to domination and thereby prevents its totality from ossifying.

The view of resistance as paradox has wide applications. In this thesis, I discussed it primarily in terms of gender relations, but also as a way of taking a stance on history outside of the general opinion. My case study of Rote Zora provided a way of thinking outside of the dominant narratives of the history of militant activism in the West German context. As it more generally applies to activism, it is a way of providing an internal dynamic of resistance to activist projects. Thinking of resistance as paradox allows resistance to operate not just against an external enemy, but also against resistance itself and the potential dogmas it may produce. A resistance that resists itself becomes multiple and takes various stances: it resists the urge to describe its own project as the way, because it acknowledges that other resistances are taking
place, even resistances to its way. Instead, like Rote Zora’s own description of their project, it becomes a way among others, that will likely change. This provides a non-dogmatic way of approaching militant activism. Seeing one’s resistant project as a way that will likely change does not mean that it cannot express conviction or take a militant stance, but a paradoxical mode of resistance is too flighty to embrace a dogma of violence, like the RAF’s. Yet, it equally resists a dogma of pacifism. This is not fence-sitting. Instead, it means being open to a diversity of tactics and carefully examining each act of resistance in context, acknowledging the resistance that it will provoke to itself and finding a resistant path through this thicket of stances. It is always possible for resistance to be violent, but also for violence to be resisted.

This thesis does not offer a program of resistance, or a narrative of revolutionary salvation. It does not really take the stance that resistance will arrive somewhere new and wonderful. Instead, it seeks to radically expand understandings of resistance and its possibilities by taking up resistance as a method for studying resistance. It applies this method to theory, history and the reading of texts as a way of both practicing and studying the practice of resistance. As a practice of resistance, this thesis aimed to transform understandings of theory, history and close reading. Chapter 1 offered a different way of approaching theories of resistance and of understanding resistance theoretically; Chapter 2 set the groundwork for thinking differently about a certain historical context of resistance; and Chapter 3 provided a different way of using the tools of literary criticism by applying them to social movements and to resistance more generally. In transforming the theory of resistance, the history of resistance and the scope of close reading as a method, my goal is to integrate these kinds of research into a single picture that can translate theory, history and text into practices of resistance. As an
intervention that aims to transform and integrate these methods, this is in itself a practice of resistance. Part of the goal of this layered approach is to reveal resistance in its complexity. It aims to show how the study of resistance can also be a way of using resistance to transform its study.

This integrated approach also offered in Rote Zora an historical model of how a paradoxical theory of resistance can be put into practice more broadly. As such, this thesis is also an invitation and model for people to take up its conception of resistance and put it into practice in different contexts. Although I resist becoming programmatic here, I do argue that resistance is better practiced paradoxically than dogmatically. I offer an anti-programmatic program. To me, Rote Zora is an exemplary model for doing this. Reading the group’s resistance within its historical context provides an example of what paradoxical resistance looks like. A paradoxical mode of resistance, however, also resists turning Rote Zora’s practice into dogma and merely repeating it verbatim. They provide a model, but not the way. As an “outside thinking,” paradoxical resistance responds in different ways to different oppressions, but in its abundant productivity, a paradoxical mode of resistance can easily move to different contexts, and open new ways to translate its theorization into practice and to practice itself in its theorization. In this way, this text itself functions as a source and site for paradoxical resistance to take place, which hopes to be taken up, resisted and translated into practice.
Bibliography


Ressler, Oliver, dir. *Die Rote Zora*. 2000. Film.


