Women's Descriptive and Substantive Political Representation: The Role of Political Institutions.

by

Grace Alexandra Lore

B.A. (Honours), The University of British Columbia
MSc (Distinction), The London School of Economics

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Abstract

This dissertation explores how political institutions shape the behaviour of women in politics. It asks whether the relationship between the gender of representatives (descriptive representation) and the representation of women's interests (substantive representation) depends on the institutional context.

Using prominent institutional perspectives a theory is offered for how the division or fusion of powers and electoral systems affect substantive representation in both individual behaviour and policy outcomes. When party ties are weakened and internal party competition increased, women do more to substantively represent women, while men focus on other unincorporated interests. Institutions affect policy outcomes, not only by affecting individual behaviour but also by determining how those actions are aggregated.

The theory is tested using a mixed methodological approach. Two datasets capture individual behaviour - an international survey of representatives and an original dataset examining representative's tweets. The results demonstrate that the gap between substantive representation by women and that by men is larger under the conditions of a division of powers and when electoral systems incentives the representation of unincorporated interests. Interviews and surveys with more than 90 legislators from 7 countries provide evidence of the causal mechanisms. The aggregate effect of the number of women on gendered policy outcomes is tested using data combined from a range of sources. The findings results are equivocal: institutions that facilitate individual action can also make policy change more difficult.

In short, institutions moderate the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation at the individual level and, to a lesser extent, at the aggregate level. This 'institutionalist turn' improves understanding of how, when, and why women act to represent women. The 'gender turn' in the study of institutions demonstrates the flexibility of the theories and the broad and consequential impact of institutions. There are implications that extend beyond gender to include other issues and identities not incorporated into the party system, such as ethnicity.

Preface

This dissertation is original, unpublished, and independent work by the author, Grace Lore.

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To my family, by chance and by choice.

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I hope by the time you care to read this, the work will be done.

Chapter 1: Introduction

> "The majority of feminist political science is broadly institutional in focus, yet does not use new institutional theory." – Kenny, 2007, 95.

This dissertation explores how political institutions shape the behaviour of women in politics. While the effect of political institutions on women's descriptive representation—the number of women—is well understood, the study of the substantive representation—the representation of women's *issues*—has occurred largely in an institutional vacuum. As a result, it has failed to benefit from institutionalist perspectives that clearly outline how political institutions shape behaviour and influence policy. Many of the field's most prominent scholars have observed (and bemoaned) the gap between the study of women's representation and institutionalism. Little has been done, however, to make use of existing institutional theories to explain how and when women act to represent women.

Moreover, although the inaugural work written on the topic (Dahlerup, 1988) explored the experience of women in Scandinavian countries, the empirical research has been Anglo-centric and astonishingly little comparative work has been undertaken. Related to the narrow scope of cases is the significant and problematic under-theorizing of the relationship between gender and the substantive representation of women. The individual women and men themselves and their agentic, strategic behaviour have not been given due consideration; analyses have failed to consider their conflicting and diverse roles and have focused too broadly on representatives in the aggregate. As a result, despite decades of research, conclusive statements and generalizations about the nature and effects of women's political representation remain elusive.

This dissertation takes seriously the call by Kenny, Krook, Mackay and others for an 'institutional turn' in feminist political science (Kenny 2007; Krook and Mackay 2011). It is an response to Celis's (2008) demand for a study of the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation that "take[s] context seriously" (116) and an answer to Driscol, Krook, Kenny, and Mackay appeal for a feminist institutional analysis "attentive to gender, strategy, institutions, power and change" (Driscol and Krook, 2009, 3; Franceschet, 2011; Kenny, 2007; Krook and Mackay; 2011).

To enable an institutional turn in the study of women's substantive political representation, a 'gender turn' in institutionalist approaches is also required. The institutional theories themselves are inattentive to gender and built around a universal, 'neutral' actor that is implicitly masculine. The autonomous, self-interested actor remains central, and market dynamics and calculations leave little consideration to care roles and responsibilities, unpaid labour, and dependence on the state (Geortz & Mazur, 2008; Krook & Driscoll, 2012). Yet existing institutionalist theories have clear implications for the representation of gender and other identities besides. Insisting on a 'neutral', 'universal' actor masks the applicability and power of the theories. A 'gendered turn', on the other hand, demonstrates the flexibility of the theories and the broad and consequential impact of institutions.

Incorporating gender also addresses an abiding concern with institutionalism: the endogeneity of the very institutions under study. Most political institutions were established before women were allowed to enter politics. To the extent that women's political participation was a matter of "add women and stir", institutions can be taken as exogenous. Contrast this with the relationship between institutions and, say, the distribution of political resources or the number and

significance of political cleavages; which causes which? Incorporating gender enables strong tests of theories of institutional impact, with implications beyond the case.

To bridge these two literatures, I situate the substantive representation of women by women squarely in the institutions within which it occurs. I theorize how women, as representatives, navigate institutional incentives and opportunities to meet diverse career and policy objectives. By structuring the context within which female politicians make choices over who and what to represent and how to do so with limited resources (time, money, political capital), institutions may encourage or discourage the representation of women by women. In doing so, institutions *moderate* the relationship between the gender of a representative and the attention to and action on gendered political issues. Simply put, the substantive representation of women by women may vary with the institutional context.

Incorporating a consideration of the institutional context into other theories has proved fruitful – first challenging and then improving existing concepts (for example see Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Huber, Kernell, and Leoni, 2005; Kedar, 2009). In *Voting for Policy, Not Parties*, for example, Orit Kedar (2009) argues that voting behaviour models - whether voters choose the party or candidate closest to their ideal opinion (proximity voting) or the most extreme candidate or party on their "side" of the left-right spectrum (directional voting) – must be attentive to the institutional context. Institutions, she argues, determine the relative costs and benefits of different voting strategies. Combining the two literatures thus improves voting models *and* increases our understanding of ways institutions affect political behaviour and outcomes. Given the well-established importance of both gender and institutions on political preferences and behaviour, linking these two fields offers significant opportunities to increase understanding of both women's political representation and institutions.

A principal-agent approach structures the analysis. While feminist academics have tended to see their methods as antithetical to or at least at odds with rational choice, others have recently called for a reconsideration of the objections to the methodological tool (Krook and Driscol, 2012). By remaining self-reflective of the masculine assumptions that under-pin the 'neutral' actors and by incorporating an explicitly gendered agenda, there exists an untapped opportunity for a conversation between rational choice and feminist political science (see also Goertz and Mazur, 2008). Krook and Driscol (2012) argue that rational choice improves on feminist explanations "by highlighting the micro-level interactions leading up to… decisions … and the ways in which political institutions – both formal and informal – shape the strategies and constraints of different actors." (19). By demonstrating the ways in which social identities matter and are neither antithetical to nor incompatible with rational choice, the approach used in this dissertation allows for a consideration of women as strategic political agents *and* challenges the gender-blindness of existing institutional work (Swers, 2002).

In what follows, I provide the framework for my research. I begin with a discussion of the key ideas, including descriptive and substantive representation, a note on the concept of critical mass, and what is meant by 'women' and by 'women's interests'. These sections grapple with difficult concepts; where possible I provide working definitions and in other instances simply make clear what has had to be bracketed in order to continue with the research.

I then discuss the state of the literature - when institutions are and are not considered and the clues inherent in the *gaps* in the literature. To turn attention to women as strategic actors whose behaviour must be understood as institutionally based, I outline the paths through which women end up in political office and engage in representation. The theorized career pathway is explicitly institutional and allows for a consideration of who becomes a representative and how and what

they do when they get there. A general argument about how institutions moderate substantive representation by structuring principal-agent relationships follows. As part of this, I introduce a concept called *unincorporated representation*, which parallels but expands on the idea of personal as opposed to party representation.

Chapter 2 offers a more specific theory on the anticipated effect of two institutions - the separation or fusion of powers and the electoral system. Both institutions are well known for structuring principal-agent relationships, generating incentives and opportunities, and affecting political outcomes (Carey & Shugart, 1992,1995; Cox, 1997; Dewan and Spirling, 2011; Duverger, 1954; Haggard and McCubbins, 2001; Hammond and Butler, 2003; Immergut, 1998, 2010 Strom, 1997, 2002; Tsebelis, 1995; Uslaner & Zittel; 2006; Weingast and North, 1989**)**. For example, the fusion of the executive and legislative branches and the practice of confidence votes in Westminster Parliamentary systems incentivize cohesive voting and party control. As a result, individual representatives have little autonomy over their vote and even the topics they address in speeches or introduce in legislation (Cox, 2005; Dewan & Spiring; 2011; Kam, 2001). Electoral systems can also structure incentives to follow party lines by determining the extent to which representatives rely on party or personal votes (Carey & Shugart, 1995). As I argue in the remainder of this chapter and more thoroughly in Chapter 2, these institutional features have clear implications for the representation of women's interests.

The remainder of this dissertation tests the theory using a mixed methodological approach. Chapters 3 and 4 use quantitative analysis and employ multiple datasets to test the moderating effect of the division of powers and electoral systems on political behaviour respectively. In Chapters 5 and 6 nearly 90 qualitative surveys and in-depth interviews with women in seven countries allow for a further test of the theory. Finally, Chapter 7 returns to quantitative analysis

to test the moderating effect of institutions on policy outcomes. Chapter 8 offers conclusions and directions for future research.

Women's Political Representation & Women's issues

This research uses the framework offered by Pitkin (1967) in *The Concept of Representation*, which distinguishes between descriptive representation and substantive representation.[1] Descriptive representation means *standing for* and refers to the make-up of a legislative body. In the aggregate, it means the number or proportion of women. Substantive representation indicates *acting for*, referring to the actions of individual representatives and collective decisions in legislative bodies. Although Pitkin did not view these two types of representation as necessarily mutually exclusive, she favoured a focus on substantive representation.

The notion that descriptive and substantive representation may be linked is not new and is in fact much older than Pitkin's work. John Stuart Mill argued, "in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the omitted is always in danger of being overlooked; and when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it directly concerns" (1967, 22). Since Pitkin's influential work, however, the assertion that a candidate or politician's gender is or at least can be relevant to what they do has been common, both among activists and academics (Phillips, 1995).

1 The term descriptive representation was originally coined by Griffiths and Wolheim (1960) before it was adopted by Pitkin (1967) (Mansbridge, 1999). In *The Concept of Representation,* Pitkin also discusses the formalistic uses of 'representation', beginning with Thomas Hobbes who uses the term to mean formal authorization or authority to act. She then discusses representation as accountability, wherein representation is understood as the arrangements or institutions which follow (terminate) it. Pitkin also explores symbolic representation which, related to descriptive representation, suggests an 'identification' and 'alignment of wills between ruler and ruled' (106, 108). I confine my discussions here to descriptive and substantive representation.

Defining 'Women' and 'Women's Interests'

The claim that 'women represent women' implies both that there is such a thing as 'women' and that there are 'women's issues' to represent. While the notion that women are under-represented is hardly a controversial idea, the idea that there is such a thing as women is not. Women are not a homogenous group but are further defined by race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation. The suggestion that 'women' constitute a group, masks these intersecting differences and inequalities and can operate in a hegemonic manner, favouring a definition of women that reflects the already privileged/dominant women (Phillips, 2010, Mansbridge, 1999). Women of colour, those facing poverty, and women with low levels of education, for example, are among the most under-represented in politics (Black, 2006; Crenshaw, 1991; McCall, 2005). Beyond an intersectional argument, since Simone Beauvoir (1953, 249) espoused that 'one is not born a woman, but rather, becomes one', there has been an effort to understand gender as something people do rather than something they 'have'. Gender has been conceptualized, for example, as a performance (Butler, 1990) or system (Rubien, 1975).

The theory and analysis offered in this dissertation, however is not possible unless one is able to speak about a group called 'women'. Iris Marion Young (1994) describes this problem in the following way:

> "On the one hand, without some sense in which "woman" is the name of a social collective, there is nothing specific to feminist politics. On the other hand, any effort to identify the attributes of that collective appears to under- mine feminist politics by leaving out some women whom feminists ought to include" (714).

To undertake this research I have had to bracket the question of how to define, or rather if one can define, women. In doing so I am not claiming that it is either possible or easy to

conceptualize women as a group, but rather that it is a necessary, if problematic, part of the research agenda.

Without a clear definition of ‘women’, how can one claim that there are ‘women’s interests’ in politics? To be sure, systematizing what exactly is in ‘women’s interests’ is as complicated and controversial as defining ‘women’ (for example, see Goertz & Mazur, 2008). As Phillips (1995) argues, this is not to say that there are not some issues that are gendered. While recognizing the heterogeneity of women and their experiences and the intersectional nature of oppression, women’s position in the unequal gender order, defined by a sexual division of paid and unpaid labour and relative exclusion from centres of economic and political power, does create distinct gendered interests.

Molyneux (1985, 1998) separates practical and strategic gendered interests; the former serving women’s needs generated within the current gender order while the latter seeks to permanently reposition women in society. This distinction differentiates, for example, between maternity and paternity leave - the former reinforces women as caregiver while also facilitating paid employment and the latter challenges the private/public division of labour by enabling caregiving by men. Other scholars distinguish between feminist policies such as affirmative action legislation and those policies that address more traditional areas of women’s interests such as childcare, maternity leave or family allowance (see Saint-Germain; 1989). These categories are not entirely clear-cut, and the boundary between the two depends, to a certain extent, on the timeline of the perspective taken; still the distinction is analytically useful.

Whether practical or strategic, feminist or traditional, ‘gendered issues’ are systematized as that arising out of women’s unequal position in the sexual division of labour or unequal access to

economic and political power; this includes feminist interests (see Saint-Germain, 1989). In particular, I follow Wängnerud (2000) who identifies women's issues in politics as those that 1) recognize women as a social category, 2) acknowledge the unequal balance of power between the sexes, and 3) aim to increase the autonomy of female citizens (see also Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; Grey; 2006).

The specific issues and polices considered throughout this dissertation fall within this definition but do not, of course, cover the range of issues that might. The decisions made over what to include and what to exclude are in some cases somewhat arbitrary and in other instances heavily influenced by available data. These decisions are, however, necessary part of the empirical research. Fortunately, much of the data – both qualitative and quantitative – rests on self-defined substantive representation where legislators have the opportunity to fill in the content of what it means to act for women. Moreover, some of the other quantitative analysis is informed by the insights from women themselves, using the policies legislators identified as important to women during interviews as the measure of substantive representation. This approach still does not cover the potential universe of women's issues and may bias the working definition and operationalization towards those important to women more likely to be represented in politics – white, educated, straight, middle/upper class, and cis-gendered.

Testing the Link Between Gender and Representation

The research exploring the link between Pitkin's concepts of descriptive and substantive representation can broadly be grouped into three broad categories: those that examine preferences and priorities, those that look at political behaviour of individuals, and those that consider policy outcomes; I discuss each in turn.

Preferences and Priorities

The idea that women represent women *depends* on a difference of priorities and preferences among men and women (Norris, 2001). If women and men do *not* differ in their political preferences or objectives, then it can hardly be said to matter whether it is men or women making political decisions. The political preferences of men and women are expected to differ as a result of a social context defined by patriarchy, unequal division of paid and unpaid labour and inequalities in access to power - economic, social, and political.

The empirical research supports the notion that women's and men's preferences and priorities differ. Historically, women were more conservative than their male counterparts but are now more likely to express views to the left of men (Studlar and McAllister, 1992; Inglehart and Norris, 2010).[2] When it comes to candidates and representatives, party affiliation is (unsurprisingly) the strongest determinant of opinions and priorities on general issues such as the level of free market economy, international relations, crime, and environmentalism. Differences do exist, however, *within* parties, with women being more 'left' than their male counterparts (Gidengil et al., 2003; Norris, 2001; Poggione, 2004; Vega and Firestone, 1995).

More importantly, significant differences have been observed between men and women (candidates, politicians, and voters) on gendered issues, such as affirmative action in politics, support for children and families, and equal opportunities in paid work (Bashevkin, 1993; Childs, 2002; Dodson, 2001; Erickson, 1997; Gidengil et al., 2004; Lore, 2008; Lovenduski, 1997; Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; Meier, 2008; Norris; 2001; Studlar and McAllister, 1992; Thomas,

2 McAllister (1992) suggests the change occurred in the 1960s in Australia while Inglehart and Norris (2010) estimate the timing closer to the 1990s in most industrialized societies. Inglehart and Norris suggest that women in developing countries are still more conservative than their male counterparts.

1991; Thomas and Welch, 1991; Tremblay, 1998; Young, 2002). Other empirical investigations have found that women feel that they represent women (and have a responsibility to do so) based on "a shared sense of identity and a concern for women's issues" (Childs, 2002, 150; see also Carroll, 2002; Childs, 2003; Celis and Childs, 2007; Freeman, 2002; Reingold, 1992, 2000; Tremblay, 2006**;** Wängnerud, 2000; Whip, 1991).

Discourse and Behaviour

While women may place a higher priority on women's issues, substantive representation explicitly requires *acting for*. Numerous studies have tested the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation by looking at behaviour, for example voting, the introduction of legislation, speeches, and statements. In general, these studies have found that women expand the political agenda to include women's perspectives, make speeches on women's issues, meet more frequently with women's organization, introduce more legislation related to women's interests, and are more likely to vote in favour of policies which support women (Bratton, 2005; Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Celis, 2006; Dodson, 2001, 2005, 2006; Kathlene, 1994, 2005; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez, 2007; McDonald & O'Brien, 2010; Reingold, 1996; Rosenthal, 2000; Saint-Germain, 1989; Swers and Larson, 2005; Taylor-Robinson and Heath, 2003; Thomas, 1991; Tremblay, 1998; Wängnerud, 2000; Wolbrecht, 2002). There are, however, several studies which have found no or very minimal relations between gender and behaviour (Barnello, 1990; Reingold, 2000; Vega and Firestone, 1995).

Policy Outcomes

Finally, a third way to explore the link between descriptive and substantive representation is to explore changes to policy and legislation. Policy changes, Dahlerup (1988) argues, are the "most crucial element" of substantive representation (283). Several studies find that women are more

successful than men at passing legislation on women's issues and that certain policy provisions are correlated with the presence of women (Bratton, 2005; Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Saint-Germain, 1989), including those on abortion regulation (Berkman and O'Connor, 1993), public funding for child care (Bratton and Ray, 2002), child support legislation (Case, 1998; Crowley, 2004), availability of maternity and childcare leave, family and old age services, health transfers to families and individuals, and total government expenditure (Bolzendahl, 2008, 2011; Kittilson, 2008).

A Note on Critical Mass

A focus on the number of women raises the possibility that there might be a critical mass effect, that a certain level of women's political representation (usually 30%) has to be achieved before changes in politics and policy will follow. While many activists and organizations committed to women's representation (for example see Equal Voice Canada; Global Database of Quotas for Women [GDQW], 2011; IDEA Network, 2005; United Nations, 1997) continue to focus on the necessity of a critical mass of 30%, the empirical research is at best ambiguous on this point. Several studies find support for the existence of a critical mass effect (McDonald & O'Brien, 2010; Saint-Germain, 1989; Sawer, 2012; Thomas, 1991), while others observe a non-linear relationship or no relationship at all (Beckwith, 2007; Berkman and O'Connor, 1993; Bratton, 2005; Bratton and Ray, 2005; Celis, 2006; Crowley 2004; Riengold, 2000; Towns; 2003; Thomas and Welch, 1991; Thomas, 1991). Most scholars have moved beyond the notion of a single critical mass at which change is observable (Celis and Childs, 2008; Childs, 2004, 2006; Childs and Krook, 2008; Dahlerup, 2006; Grey, 2002, 2006; Norris, 2001). As Dahlerup (1988) argued in her original contribution, identifying a critical turning point or a critical mass is not possible because, put simply, "politics is not physics'" (290).

Moreover there are two significant and related theoretical problems with the concept of critical mass. The first is that it ignores the process through which the individual women that collectively comprise the 30% come to be in politics and the second is that it does not theorize the incentives and opportunities they face and their strategic decision-making once they get there. As Childs and Krooks (2008) have argued: "despite the focus on actors in the critical mass theory, the broader context may limit or enhance opportunities for individuals to translate priorities into policy initiatives" (129). Childs (2006) goes as far as to "give up" on critical mass because "it … abstracts women representatives from the context in which they act as if numbers were everything" (162).

This dissertation does not, therefore, use the concept of critical mass, but instead focuses on the micro-level of individual behaviour. But this is not to say that numbers don't matter – indeed, the literature in this research demonstrates that they do, but it does not require a so-called 'turning' or 'tipping point'. As Bratton (2005) notes, "even if the distinctive behaviour and legislative success of female representatives do not depend on increasing the percentage of women within the legislature, an increase in female legislators who focus on policies relevant to women may change policy outcomes" (120; see also Curtin, 2006). In other words, the absence of a critical mass or turning point does not preclude a relationship between descriptive and substantive representation.

It is possible, however, that moving away from the concept of critical mass as a significant theoretical component of research may actually help us better understand when a threshold might matter. Celis, Childs Kantola, and Krook (2008) argue "a mere increase in the numbers of women elected – a critical mass – does not always translate automatically into policy gains for women, given various constraints related to party affiliation, institutional norms, legislative

inexperience, and the external political environment" (102) and it is these factors that this dissertation focuses on. In doing so, it may illuminate the conditions under which an increase in the number of women, or even a critical mass, results in substantive representation and when does it not.

Women's Representation & Institutions: The State of the Literature

Research on women's political representation cannot entirely avoid institutional context. For example, the relationship between proportional representation and women's *descriptive* representation is well known (Lijphart, 1991; IDEA, 2011; Krook, 2010; McIvor, 2003; Norris, 1997; Tremblay, 2006). Other analyses focus on how institutions are inherently gendered - systematically favouring typically masculine styles of behaviour and decision-making because women did not and were not expected to participate in politics at the time institutions were designed and adopted. (Carroll, 2001; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly; 1995; Duerst-Lahti, 2002, 2005; Hawkesworth, 2003; Kathlene, 1994, 1995; Kenny, 1996; Rosenthall, 2000; Sawer, 2004). Rosenthall (2000) argues that masculine behaviour of confrontational and aggressive politics has become conflated with institutional norms. Duerst-Lahti (2002) similarly claims that, to be effective, women have had to "perform" politics like their male colleagues. As a result "the masculine character then persist despite the female presence" (44).

In a few cases, the constraints and incentives imposed on individual women by institutions have been illuminated or used as an explanation of the behaviour of representatives (Childs, 2003; Gleb, 2002; Poggione, 2004; Rosenthall, 2002; Sawer, Tremblay, and Trimble, 2006; Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson, 2005). In most cases, however, the institutional context remains implied or assumed (Berkman and O'Connor, 1997). Where institutional considerations are explicit, the research, with a few exceptions, is not comparative nor are the comparative

implications for the link between the descriptive and the substantive representation of women considered (Rosenthal, 2002; Sawer, 2012; Swers, 2009). Those that are comparative are limited to two-case comparisons (Franceschet, 2011; Gelb, 2002; Tremblay, 2003; Young, 2000) or are oversimplified. In Sawer, Tremblay and Trimble (2006), for example, a four-country analysis consists largely of individual chapters exploring a single case.

In a field of under-theorized and single-case studies, three comparative and institutionally attentive pieces stand out. First, in *Feminists and Party Politics* (2000), Young explores the partisan strategies of the women's movements in Canada and the US and finds that the differing institutional contexts matter. In both countries, Young argues, the strategy can be described as a function of an interaction between the characteristics of the movement itself and the political opportunity structure. Canada's political system is defined by high party discipline and unity imposed on its legislators while the American system is "characterized by the autonomy of individual legislators to pursue their policy interests or agendas with little constraint from party leaders or organizations" (Young, 2000, 185). In response, the women's movement targets individual representatives in the United States while directing their efforts towards parties and party leadership in Canada. Young's work focuses on the behaviour of and strategies adopted by the women's movements, but her insights fundamentally say something about the incentives and opportunity structures facing women politicians. Pure presidential and Westminster Parliamentary systems generate divergent opportunities and incentives for women legislators to represent women's interest and this is what the women's movement is responding to.

Second, Gleb (2002) explores the differing political opportunity structures in the United Kingdom and the United Sates. Both countries experienced a notable increase in the number of women representatives during the 1990s; 1997 saw the election of 'Blair's Babes' in the UK and

1992 was dubbed the Year of the Women in the US. The increase in descriptive representation in the UK was more significant and has been attributed in large part to powerful and centralized parties. The Labour Party in particular used all-women shortlists (AWS) to significantly increase the number of women in their caucus. After the election, however, little was observed in the way of an increase in substantive representation (see also Childs, 2002, 2004). In the United States, descriptive representation was harder to come by because candidate-centred elections made powerful incumbents harder to replace. The smaller increase in women's representation in the U.S., however, may have been as good or better than the bigger change in the UK because "institutional realities of congressional seniority and relatively lax party control" (441) increased opportunities for the women elected to have a greater impact. While her insights are both unique and intuitive, Gleb's analysis is limited in that it is based solely on existing literature, comparing and combining studies of women in the United States and women in the United Kingdom.

Third, Franceschet (2011) looks at two presidential systems - Argentina and Chile - and argues that institutional differences between the two countries lead to divergent representation of women by women. Formal rules in the two countries, namely the degree of legislative power exercised by the executive and the "presence and location of policy gatekeepers who control the legislative agenda" result in differences in the link between descriptive and substantive representation (Aleman in Franceschet, 69). In Chile, women introduce less legislation and report feeling a lack of power due to an inability to introduce bills that affect the national budget - a constraint. They are, however, more successful in terms of passing their legislation *if* they "are willing to ally with the executive women's agency" (69), which can lobby the president and "help to move women's rights bills through the committee process and on to chamber debates" (70) – an opportunity. On the other hand, Argentine legislators did not report feeling the

constraint that Chilean women did and were more active in the introduction of gender rights because the executive has less dominance in the area of agenda-setting - an opportunity for women in the legislature. The president and leaders of legislative blocks, however, control the extent to which bills come before committees and thus there are constraints on the ability of women to affect final policy outcomes. In other words, in Argentina descriptive representation is more closely tied to substantive representation as policy outcomes rather than behaviour, while the opposite is true in Chile.

There are also several of the studies that use quantitative comparative analyses to explore the relationship between the number of women and policy outcomes have incorporated institutional variables. Bolzendahl (2011) includes an indicator for the number of veto points, including federalism, presidential system, bicameralism, and the strength of the judiciary. Kittilson's (2008) findings demonstrate that federalism hinders the expansion of maternity benefits but not childcare leave, a proportional electoral system reduces the benefits associated with childcare leave, but has little effect on maternity benefits or length of childcare leave. These analyses remain limited. Bolzendahl incorporates institutions as an *alternative* explanation rather than an important context that can increase or decrease the impact of women on policy outcomes. Kittilson argues that the "opportunity structure" needs to be considered because "political institutions mediate the relationship between women's parliamentary presence and policy outcomes" (326). The institutional indicators are not, however, interacted with the representation of women and so the results do not, in fact, illuminate whether there is a *mediated* effect between the number of women and the policy outcome.

Clues in the Gaps: Where do we Look for Substantive Representation?

Exceptions aside, a lack of comparative analysis plagues the study of descriptive and substantive representation. Interestingly, this is a function of scholars recognizing, if sometimes implicitly, that institutional variation can make a direct comparison misguided. In the absence of explicit comparative research, preliminary insights can be gained by comparing single or two-case studies. In fact, a simple comparison of *where* scholars look for evidence of substantive representation provides some clues to institutional differences in substantive representation. Table 1.1 takes a survey of the literature, grouping research by the division of powers and form of substantive representation. It is important to note, as already stated, the literature (at least in English), is extremely Anglo-centric; most, though not all, of the work studies Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Please see Table 1.1 at the end of this Chapter.

The first point worth noticing is that nearly half (48%) of the studies on parliamentary systems explore gendered differences in preferences, priorities, or thoughts on representation. The same is true for only 16% of studies looking at presidential systems. Poggione (2004) argues that looking at opinions to assess the effect of women's descriptive representation in the United States is more appropriate because "the policy impact of women legislators is mediated by legislative institutions and women's positions within them" (313). As a result, votes, proposed legislation, and policy outcomes are not reliable indicators of gender differences. It is not that Poggione is wrong – indeed, the representation of women in the United States may be mediated by women's seniority, re-election prospects, and their responsibility to their district or state. What is clear, however, is that this is a much greater concern in parliamentary systems.

The second important difference is the number of studies assessing substantive representation by looking at public behaviour, including the content of speeches, votes, and introduction of

legislation. These studies comprise 33% of those looking at parliamentary systems and a full 65% of those examining presidential systems. The differences are even more significant when broken down by behaviour. Of the studies on presidential systems, 24% look at the substantive representation through roll call and another 38% (a plurality) assess the introduction of legislation. On the other hand, the vast majority of the 33% of studies examining behaviour in parliamentary systems looking at discourse – what is said and by whom, including via early day motions (Childs and Withey, 2004) and oral questions (Bird, 2005, Erzeel, 2012).

Of the two studies that look at voting by representatives in parliamentary systems, one relies on surveys rather than roll call data (Skjeie, 2012) and the other is an attempt to explain why the new Labour women elected in the 1997 British election did *not* vote to support women's interests (Cowley and Childs, 2003). The failure to look for substantive representation in the votes cast by MPs is not an oversight, but rather an acknowledgment of the institutional constraints. Tremblay (2006) observes that "it is not possible to evaluate a representative's commitment to articulating women's various interests based on her voting record" in parliamentary systems such as Canada and Australia (127; see also Tremblay, 1998). Similarly, Lovenduski and Norris (2003) argue that voting records are not an appropriate tool for exploring preference differences between men and women in the United Kingdom; the high party discipline in the Westminster system is likely to overstate agreement between men and women. Roll call analysis, they argue, is more appropriate to the study of substantive representation and preference differences in the US Congress (see also Dolan, 1997; Swers, 1998). While this is passed over as a *methodological* question, it is, in fact, an observation on different incentives and opportunities.

Finally, few studies of either parliamentary or presidential systems look at the relationship between women's descriptive representation and policy outcomes, just 11% and 6% respectively. This is somewhat surprising given that Dahlerup's (1989) original contribution to the study of women elevated policy change as the most important component of substantive representation. Most of the research that looks at the introduction of legislation by women in presidential systems also assesses the success of women in passing legislation and finds that they are more likely to be successful (Berkman and O'Connor, 1993; Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Crowley, 2004 Saint-Germain, 1989). This is different, however, than exploring the relationship between the number of women and policy outcomes in an aggregate sense. Moreover, instead of focusing on the proportion of women over all, Berkman and O'Connor (1993) focus on the over-representation of women on committees dealing with abortion legislation and find this is one way women exert some influence over the final policy outcome. Similarly, Atchison and Down (2009), test the relationship between policy outcomes and the proportion of women in *cabinet* rather than the parliamentary legislatures. The limited and less direct attention to policy outcomes may indicate that it is not only the most important, but it may also be the most challenging aspect of substantive representation.

Collectively, these single country studies offer an indication that substantive representation may vary across political institutions. What is needed is an explicitly comparative and institutional approach that uses existing literature to theorize when and how women should be expected to act for women. Women *as* political actors with political objectives operating within and navigating through institutions need to be at the centre of the analysis. To do this, I outline the career paths and motivations of women and men in politics and the ways in which these are inherently

institutionally embedded as well as the ways in which they lead to gendered differences in the representation of women's issues.

From Self-Selection to Policy Outcomes: Substantive Representation & the Career Paths of Women Politicians

Women are, in a very simple sense, central to the study of the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation – the question in its most basic form is whether women do or do not act in a way to represent women. Women themselves are, however, also notably absent. Few studies consider the career path of politically ambitious women, take into account their agency, or understand women politicians as strategic actors. In other words, little thought is given to how women come to be in politics and the *process* through which their presence leads to the substantive representation of women. A well-theorized investigation which includes a conceptualization of the policy-making process, on a macro-level, and an understanding of the ways in which women themselves come to participate in politics and why they do what they do, on a micro-level, addresses this problem. This approach does not take women in politics as a given but rather asks how and why they come to be a part of the political process. Doing so draws explicit attention to *how and why* women affect political discourse, expand the political agenda, or affect policy outcomes, rather than simply testing whether they do or do not.

In her study of the ways in which the electoral geography affects political representation of the poor, Karen Jusko (2014) outlines five simplified steps in the democratic policy-making process:

> **Stage 1.** Preference Formation. Individuals form preferences on one or more policy dimensions.
>
> **Stage 2**. Mobilization. Parties and candidates opt into the political process, and the electorate turns out and supports the party or candidate of their choice.

> **Stage 3.** Elections. Votes are tallied, and seats are allocated according to the current electoral rules.
>
> **Stage 4.** Government Formation. Governments are formed, usually by the party that won a plurality of seats and potential allies.
>
> **Stage 5.** Legislation. Governments implement policy more or less in accordance with the preferences of those they represent.

Jusko argues that differences in anti-poverty policies may be attributed to any one of these stages, though her work focuses particularly on stage 3. I build on her approach here, by focusing on the *individuals* at each stage. I incorporate the micro-level experiences and actions of women at each of these stages and draw attention to the ways in which these stages are fundamentally gendered. This place women at the centre of the analysis and explores why they behave in particular ways and not others and why they pursue some objectives over others.

In my adaptation, five stages of career development are bookended by two stages, Jusko's first stage of preference formation, which sets the context and a final stage, Jusko's fifth stage of legislation becomes stage six, where the behaviour and preferences of legislators are aggregated into outcomes. These stages are fundamentally gendered. I have broken down stage 2 into two components – self-selection and successful nomination – and added a stage at which individuals make decisions about who and what to represent and how.

> **Stage 1:** Preference Formation. Individuals form preferences on one or more policy dimensions. Preferences include those on gendered issues and are expected to differ between men and women as a result of the unequal division of paid and unpaid labour and inequalities in access to power - economic, social, and political.
>
> **Stage 2a**. Self-selection. Individuals opt into the political process, choosing to run for nomination. Self-selection is more likely when parties or elites ask individuals to run. Women are less likely to self-select into politics than men and less likely to be actively recruited to do so by other political actors (Fox and Lawless, 2004; 2010).
>
> **Stage 2b.** Nomination. After women self-select, they must win the nomination for their chosen party. Research has shown that women often face more competition in primary

races and so "have to be better in order to fare equally well" (Lawless and Pearson, 2008).

Stage 3. Elections. Once a candidate, women must win election to office. In some contexts, once candidates, women are less likely to be elected than their male counterpart (Stambough and O'Regan, Studlar and Matland, 1999). In other instances, electoral quotas that require a minimum representation or other, less formal, affirmative action strategies result in distinct pathways to candidacy and perhaps election for women.

Stage 4. Representation and Agenda Setting. After election, women make choices on what issues to represent with scarce resources, including political capital and time.

Stage 5. Promotion. Women may seek and be offered promotions or other particularistic benefits, including cabinet and committee positions, or party leadership positions. In an effort to achieve greater equality, women have, in some cases, had greater success at promotion to higher posts than men. In 2015, of the countries in which women make up more than 40% of ministers, all have more women in the executive than they do in the legislature, meaning that a greater proportion of women are promoted to cabinet than are their male colleagues.

Stage 6. Legislation and Policy outcomes. The agenda setting of individual legislators and the votes they cast is aggregated into policy and legislative outcomes.

These steps depict the process through which women come to be in politics and may substantively represent women. It moves away from a simple approach that takes women in office as a given starting point. These career stages allow for an explanation of the steps women must navigate before they achieve office and what they must do to obtain promotion or realize other desired outcomes once elected. It gives due credit to women's political agency and draws attention to the incentives and opportunities that women have to represent women's issues.

The approach proceeds from the assumption that women are strategic political actors (Gertzog, 2002). I assume that women in politics have three distinct motivations (Muller and Strøm, 1997; Strøm, 1999).

1) **Women are vote seeking**: They seek votes first for nomination, and then election.
2) **Women are office seeking**: Women seek the benefits of office, including more rewarding and powerful appointments to cabinets or committees.

3) **Women are policy seeking:** They pursue policy, including policy addressing women's issues.

Women, like their male colleagues, act strategically to secure nomination, election, promotion, and re-election (objectives one and two) as goods in and of themselves and as necessary conditions for achieving their policy objectives (objective three). Importantly, this approach is explicitly institutionalist *and* gendered. Political institutions establish how representatives can or must pursue their political objectives and structure all five stages of representatives' career paths. Electoral institutions determine how one seeks and wins nomination, what one must do to get elected, whom politicians represent, and to whom they are accountable (Stage 2b and 3 and Motivations 1 and 2). To the extent that electoral institutions structure the likelihood of winning nomination and election, they will also affect the stage of self-selection. The rules of the institution establish who can do what and when, and thus affect the choices women make to represent particular issues over others and how they do so (Stage 4). Stage 5, promotions and other benefits, is similarly a product of the institutional context; institutions determine what rewards are available, the comparative worth they hold, and who has the power to dole them out. By determining how individual behaviour, such as voting, is aggregated into collective decisions on policy and legislation, institutions provide the rules for the final stage and affect how representatives pursue their policy objectives.

At the same time, gendered differences affect the resources prospective legislators have to pursue their vote-seeking and office-seeking objectives and the systemic barriers or opportunities they face while navigating the stages of the career path. Moreover, gendered differences in lived experiences manifest at stage 1 of preference formation and affect the *content* of the policy-seeking objectives.

In short, as representatives progress through the gendered stages of a political career in pursuit of their objectives, they must navigate institutions that incentivize some behaviour over others, enable some representational activities while explicitly prohibiting others, and require certain actions before or at the expense of others.

Using a Principal-Agent Framework

Across and within each of the steps of a political career, legislators must navigate a multiplicity of principal-agent relationships determined by the institutional context. A basic principal-agent model of representative democracy takes representatives to be the agents of a larger body of citizens (the principal), addressing their issues and acting on their behalf (Mezy, 2008). The principal authorizes the agent to do this by electing them and holding them accountable through re-election. In between this, the agent decides what to do, what to prioritize, and how to act. While Mezy argues that constituency control is at the heart of principal-agent approach to representation (25), the relationship can be much more complicated than that.

The evidence from the existing literature establishes that women often think of themselves as representatives of women; in other words, women representatives are, or at least can be, the agents of women. The presence of multiple principals in conflict is, however, not only possible but also probable. High party discipline and an obligation to vote with their party to pursue promotion or the passage of legislation, whatever the views of their constituents, is a clear indication that sometimes parties are the primary principals. Local party and constituency organizations also act as additional principals when they control nomination. An elected president operating alongside legislative party leadership can double the party principals to which legislators must respond (Samuels and Shugart, 2010). If large donations or campaign

assistance made election possible, organizations such as unions may serve as a competing principal.

Put simply, the extent to which women representatives are able to act on behalf of women as an agent depends on these other principals to which they have an obligation. Political resources are scarce resources and representatives must make choices about which principal to prioritize and which issues and interests to pursue. Where the tie to another principal is particularly strong or there are several competing principals, there will be limited space, time, and resources to dedicate to women's representation. When parties are functionally the primary principal for which representatives as agents are responsible, women will be unable to pursue interests independently and, as a result, the behaviour of women and men will be very similar. On the other hand, if women have greater independence from their political parties, women will take the opportunity to do more to represent women. Such ability to depart from a party line can also create incentives if women legislators are able to establish themselves as a principal for women and differentiate themselves from their competitors on this basis to cultivate electoral support. Party leaders remain predominantly male, but this is neither assumed nor necessary. Women, perhaps most notably Margaret Thatcher and Angela Merkel, have ascended to leadership positions. The 'party', however, includes not just the formal leader, but also those behind the scenes, those in party, but not legislative or executive, leadership positions and other powerful members. Moreover, women who are successful in leadership are likely to reflect the culture of the party; when parties do not focus on women's issues, women who prioritize these issues are unlikely to ascend to leadership.

An Alternative to Personal Votes: Unincorporated Representation

That institutions structure principal-agent relationships and thus affect behaviour is no way a new idea. As Carey (2009) argues, "institutional factors shape whether, and to what degree, legislators are also subject to pressures from other principals whose demands may conflict with those of party leaders" (92). What is new is that this has implications not just for the trade-off between the representation of constituency or particularistic interests, on the one hand, and party interests, on the other, but also for the representation of women's interests. While this research focuses on gender, the argument is much broader and includes a range of issues that are not fully incorporated into the party system – what I call "unincorporated representation".

To be clear, the notion of 'unincorporated representation' is a direct parallel to Carey and Shugart's (1995) 'personal representation'. When individual candidates do not or cannot rely on their party's success for election and re-election, they have incentives to cultivate personal support via, for example, pork barrelling or celebrity status. One can, however, also conceive of more general incentives for candidates and legislators to represent interests or issues other than that which their party dictates – what I term 'incentives for unincorporated representation' (IUR). Legislators may seek personal support, not by fostering traditional clientelistic relationships, but by distinguishing themselves as an agent for some other issue or identity not already absorbed into the party system.

The idea of *incorporated* issues is analogous to Lijphart's (2012) 'issue dimensions', which include socioeconomic issues, religious and linguistic, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, as well as support for the regime, foreign policy, and postmaterialist issues (76). Which issues are 'incorporated' vary significantly from one context to another and depend on the number and extent of social cleavages and the political institutions. For example, the socioeconomic

dimension is critical in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, while religious and linguistic dimensions are salient in Switzerland and Belgium. Moreover, party systems in some countries are defined by one dimension, while others include multiple dimensions.

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain the party system using a primarily sociological approach. Whether a new interest is incorporated into a political system, they argue, depends on the answer to the following question: "must the new movement join larger and older movements to ensure access to representative organs or can it gain representation on its own?" (27). In other words, the relative cost and benefits of mergers, alliances, coalitions, or going at it alone are key determinants of the translation of cleavages into the party system. It is the "intensity of the inherited hostilities and the openness of cleavages" (32) that, according to Lipset and Rokkan, determine the possibility of alliances.

An institutional perspective can be incorporated into Lipset and Rokkan's argument, since electoral institutions provide the context within which such mergers, alliances, competitive 'old' parties, and the possibility a new party will exist. Cox and Neto (1997) hypothesize that the effective number of parties can be explained by an interaction between institutional structure and the number of social cleavages. The logic is extended in Cox's (1997) *Making Votes Count*, where he argues that increasing permissiveness of an electoral system will not increase the number of parties unless the system had been acting to artificially limit the number of parties. In other words, unless there are a number of social cleavages for parties to exploit in the new electoral system, a change to a more permissive electoral system will not necessarily lead to a greater number of parties. Taagepera and Shugart made a similar argument a decade earlier – when there are more issues, more parties should exist to represent them. On the other hand, if the electoral system suppresses the number of parties, then the number of issues might also decrease

and one party may come to represent multiple interests from multiple issue dimensions: "one party may come to represent low-income *and* racial minority *and* urban interests, while another may present a package of high income and racial majority *and* rural interests" (66).[3]

The point here, however, is that the issue dimensions in the party system do not represent all the possible issue dimensions that *could* be incorporated into the party system. It is true that the electoral system may suppress the number of parties and, potentially, the number of issues incorporated, but there are additional factors that determine which issues remain unincorporated. First, if some groups that have been historically and systematically excluded from the political process, their interests may be what Mansbridge (1999) calls "uncrystallized in that they "have not been on the political agenda for long, candidates have not taken public positions on them, and political parties are not organized around them" (643). Second, many groups that have been formally integrated into the political system continue to face ongoing systematic and structural barriers to political participation, including resources, expertise, networks, and more. As such they are neither able to join nor influence an existing movement in any meaningful way, nor are they able to create a new political party however permissive the electoral system. Third, to the extent that membership in a group whose interests are not incorporated cuts across other social cleavages that are established and incorporated into the party system, opportunities to organize for incorporation is likely to be extremely limited.

In short, the dimensions that are incorporated do not represent the universe of potential issues that could be incorporated into the party system. Historic and present inequality and the entrenchment of a party system based on other issues means that not all issues will be

[3] There is a very large and established body of literature on this topic and most are not cited here including, for example, Taagepera and Grofman (1985). Others focus on how the issues incorporated into the party system play a critical role in determining the adoption of the electoral system (Boix, 1999; Cusack, Iversen and Soskice, 2007).

incorporated, regardless of the electoral system. Of those issues that are unincorporated, not all will depend on descriptive representation. Because the historical exclusion and ongoing systemic barriers to participation are often based on personal characteristics rather than ideas or ideology, many unincorporated interests are be related to identity politics and descriptive representation.

Mansbridge (1999) argues descriptive representation is important under conditions of inter-group distrust and where political interests are uncrystallized. The general approach is consistent with Mansbridge's argument that descriptive representation can and does matter in certain circumstances, but it moves away from normative argumentation. It shifts the focus from a question of the contexts within which blacks *should* represent blacks or women *should* represent women and toward a discussion of their capacity for substantive representation and the institutional context in which they are more or less able to do so.

In the words of John Stuart Mill, the 'natural defenders' are necessary if unincorporated issues, including women's issues, are not to be overlooked. But the presence of the 'natural defenders' is not sufficient – they must also have the capacity and opportunities to act. When institutions structure strong parties and representatives must act first and foremost as their agent, their behaviour will reflect the preferences and priorities of their party. When institutions facilitate what Carey and Shugart term 'personal' representation, representatives may instead focus on issues outside the party system and sell themselves as an agent for unincorporated interest.

Women's Issues as Unincorporated Issues

What makes women's issues unincorporated is that parties are neither organized around them nor have parties taken consistent and opposing positions on gendered issues: at elections, voters do not face alternative and opposing menus on gendered issues from which to choose. For example,

while they are politically salient issues, Mansbridge observes that parties have not taken distinctive and opposing views on women's interests like sexual harassment and men's violence against women. Mansbridge's focus is on the United States, but the observation holds true in other political contexts. As a result, it is *women* who are "more likely…to act as their descriptive constituents would like them to act" (207). Even in the case of abortion, there are Republican equivalents to the Democratic EMILY's List, like Wish List, which raises money and funds pro-choice candidates. It is true that Wish List is smaller and less influential than EMILY's List, and it is easier to find a pro-choice Democratic woman than a pro-choice Republican woman. But the more central point is that there are pro-choice Republican women and Republican organizations in a way that there are *not* socialist Republicans or Republican organizations.

There are several reasons women's issues remain unincorporated. First, the exclusion of women from the political process has been near universal until relatively recently and underrepresentation remains a worldwide phenomenon. Women and women's issues were relegated to the private sphere until the expansion of the franchise and so views on them are "developing in a relatively ad hoc way to meet a rapidly evolving situation" (Mansbridge, 1999, 646). Second, parties, legislatures, and positions of leadership continue to be dominated by men. Third, even after women themselves have been incorporated, incorporating gendered issues remains extremely difficult because of the ways in which they cut across existing cleavages. Women are not geographically concentrated, they are racially, religiously, and ethnically diverse, and, while women are more vulnerable to poverty, women and women's issues also span class divides.

In the absence of incorporation, the representation of women relies on a form of personal representation. Shugart (1994) himself suggests that the same institutions that facilitate personal

representation might be relevant to the political representation of women and minorities. While he does not use the terms and conflates the concepts, his argument is that, by facilitating women's substantive representation, opportunities for personal votes should increase women's descriptive representation: "The ability of members within a party to cultivate personal ties might facilitate the representation of women and minorities because, for example, a female parliamentarian can seek a personal tie to women within the district by devoting special attention to their concerns." (38). Once the personal tie is established, Shugart argues, women voters will support women and descriptive representation will increase. The concept of unincorporated interests turns Shugart's intuition into a clear alternative to 'personal' votes.

One important distinction between personal representation and unincorporated representation is worth highlighting. Women are expected to *want* to represent women more than men. I have argued that, because of differences at the preference formation stage, the content of policy-seeking objectives of men and women are expected to differ on gendered issues. In other words, unincorporated representation is not simply about vote or office seeking, but rather includes an element of policy-seeking. Purely personal or particularistic representation, on the other hand, is fundamentally vote and office seeking behaviour. It is true that a representative may engage in personal representation to achieve votes and office to pursue some other policy objective, and the actions undertaken are not done as ends in and of themselves. Unincorporated representation, on the other hand, may be both at the same time; in systems that allow it, women may address women's issues as a way to increase their personal votes and chances at electoral success *and* to pursue raise women's issues to the agenda as a good in and of itself.

While *unincorporated*, women's issues are still on a dimension on which there are conflicting positions. As a result, parties, candidates, and legislators do sometimes take positions on the

issue. The concept of unincorporated representation does not require that parties always or even often act in opposition to women's interests. Nor does it require that all parties oppose and support women's issues equally. Clearly, parties do differ and some ideologies, namely those on the left, are more compatible with some gendered issues, including anti-poverty policies, decommodification, proactive government strategies to address inequality.

To be clear, it is not that party does not matter - opportunities for ideological congruence are greater for parties on the left. Individuals self-select into parties because they have values that align with the party's policy positions and we should expect differences across the political spectrum in how often legislators (both men and women) act to represent women. To be explicit: women on the left are expected to do more to represent women than women on the right. But gender matters and women on the left, centre, and right will all want to do more than their party encourages its members to do. This is because important gendered differences exist within parties and can surpass partisan differences (Dolan 1997; Gidengil et al., 2003; Norris 2001; Poggione 2004; Vega and Firestone 1995). For example, women on the right report that representing women is more important to them than do men on the left (see Chapter 3 for more). As such, given the chance, when the bonds to their party are loosened, women will do more to represent women whatever part of the political spectrum they are aligned.

Institutions and The Representation of Women – An Interactive Effect

"Behaviour occurs in the context of institutions and can only be so understood."
- Immergut, 1998, 6.

The argument made here is that the effects of gender and institutions are *interactive, not additive*. Institutions are not concurrent or alternative influences on substantive representation, they are the context within which representation is embedded and as such *interact* with the gender of

representatives. To make this point clear, it is worth framing the effect of institutions as incentives/disincentives on the one hand and opportunities on the other.

Incentives

Institutions structure the incentives facing political actors by structuring how one is nominated and elected, to whom one is accountable (stages 2 and 3), and how promotion or power is achieved (stage 5). In doing so, they influence self-selection and shape behaviour and representation (stages 1 and 4). Institutions may incentivize the representation of women by facilitating a principal-agent relationship between women and their legislators or may disincentivize it by requiring legislators to follow the direction of party leadership as a primary principal.

These *incentives* for substantive representation still rely on *descriptive* representation. Because of gendered lived experiences, women in politics are more likely than men to see and respond to gendered issues in politics while men are expected to respond to the same institutional incentives by addressing other unincorporated interests. Further, the incentives to represent women are less for men simply because they are men. Voters often use the personal characteristics of candidates as informational shortcuts and voters may attribute a greater willingness and capacity to represent women's issues to women in politics (Matland, 1994; Matland and King, 2003; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan, 2009). As a result, even if men do respond to incentives for unincorporated representation by focusing on women's issues as candidates or once in office, the benefits will be smaller.

Opportunities

While incentives induce certain types of behaviours and disincentives reduce behaviour, opportunities *allow* actions and constraints *prevent* actions. Put differently, opportunities and

constraints are not about vote-seeking or office-seeking but are strictly about policy-seeking and acts of representation. Opportunities are important because institutions vary in the degree to which they encourage strategic behaviour or are strategy-proof, meaning that not all behaviour can be reduced to strategy. The unequal division of paid and unpaid work, prevalence of gender-based violence, and inequalities in access to political and economic power lead to differences at the first stage of preference formation. As a result, there are differences in men and women's *policy-seeking objectives* - women are expected more than men to *want to* add women's issues to the political agenda, increase the attention they receive, and pursue policy on these issues. In short, regardless of existing (dis)incentives, women are expected to *want* to represent women more than men and institutions determine the opportunities they have to do so.

In short, the anticipated difference in the substantive representation of women by women and that by men as moderated by the political institution reflects the divergent ways in which legislators may cultivate personal support. When institutions make space for representatives to engage in unincorporated representation, women are expected to do so (at least in potentially or in part) by representing women. Men, on the other hand, will respond to the same institutions by focusing on other unincorporated interests or perhaps by fostering more traditional clientelistic relationships.

As a result, the effect of institutions should be visible in two ways:

1) The behaviour of women will differ across institutions. Women in institutions that incentivize and enable unincorporated representation will do more to represent women than women in institutions where unincorporated representation is constrained or actively disincentivized.

2) The difference between the representation of women *by women* and the representation of women *by men* will vary across institutions. The gap between the action undertaken by women and that taken by men will be larger in institutions that incentivize and enable unincorporated representation; where they are disincentivized or constrained, the behaviour of women and men will be more similar.

Outcomes

The focus thus far has been on *individual* legislators and how institutions determine what they can, should, or must do. But legislative outputs are an important component of substantive representation. Looking at legislation moves from the micro-level of individual behaviour to the macro-level where preferences and behaviours are aggregated to reach legislative, policy, and budgetary decisions. It reflects the difference between what Childs and Krook (2006) call the feminization of the political agenda, where individual legislators raise women's issues and concerns, and feminization of legislation, where the actual political output is changed.

Institutions affect outcomes in two distinct ways. First, the impact of institutions on individual behaviour has clear implications for the aggregate. Where the gap between women and men is small, increasing the number of women will have a more limited impact. This is not to say that women won't matter – even under conditions of a small gap in the behaviour of men and women, the increased presence of women will shift discourse in a woman-friendly direction. When the difference is large, however, and women do much more than men to represent women, increasing the number of women (and by default decreasing the number of men) will result in a much more noticeable change in the substantive representation in votes, speeches, and legislative proposals. In other words, all else equal, institutions that facilitate and incentivize the representation of women's issues will lead to outcomes more attentive to women's needs.

All else, however, is *not* equal and speaking on women's issues or proposing or voting in favour of legislation does not necessarily lead to congruent outcomes. The second way in which institutions matter is the translation of individual behaviour into outcomes. As the "rules used to aggregate the preferences of individuals in the system into a choice of a policy" (Hammond and Butler, 2003, 147), institutions moderate the effect that the aggregate number of women has on policy outcomes (stage 5) at a given level of behavioural representation (stage 4). Institutions, for example, affect how easy or hard it is to depart from the status quo (is a simple majority sufficient?) and the feasibility of reaching policy decisions in the first place (how many individuals or groups must agree?) (Besley and Case, 2003; Carey, 2000; Haggard and McCubbins, 2001; Hammond and Butler, 2003; Tsebelis, 1995). If institutions make policy changes difficult, an increase in women's representation may not be accompanied by an increase in policy attention to women's issues, not because descriptive and substantive representation are not related but because institutions mute the potential effect.

Looking Forward: A Road Map

The remainder of this dissertation develops and tests a theory of moderating institutional effects on the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation. It explores the relationship between gender and the behaviour of individual representatives, on the one hand, and between the percentage of women in a legislature and policy outcomes, on the other. Chapter 2 uses the basic argument and framework to theorize about the moderating effects of a division of powers and the features of the electoral system. In particular, it theorizes how division of powers systems, proportional representation systems, and features of the electoral system which incentivize unincorporated representation will all lead to greater substantive representation by women, but not by men. Conversely, parliamentary systems, a plurality formula, and features of

the electoral system that *dis*incentivize unincorporated representation are theorized to suppress substantive representation by women. The anticipated effect on outcomes as the aggregation of individual behaviour is considered but is much less straightforward. Finally, the Chapter outlines a potential contingent relationship between the two institutions wherein, under the conditions of an SMP system, a division of powers is a necessary but insufficient condition for a 'personal' vote based electoral system.

Chapters 3 and 4 then test the impact of these institutions on individual behaviour using quantitative methods. Chapter 3 finds that the gap between the substantive representation of women by women and that by men is much larger under the condition of a division of powers than when powers are fused. Chapter 4 finds no evidence for a difference between PR and SMP systems but does substantiate the theory that features that incentivize unincorporated representation increase the amount that women, but not men, do to represent women.

Chapters 5 and 6 use qualitative methods to test the causal process. Interviews and surveys with more than 90 representatives and staff in six countries explore how women experience and navigate institutions. Chapter 5 establishes commonalities and shared sentiments that extend across countries, institutions, and parties. The findings presented in Chapter 6 demonstrate how these common sentiments and perspectives filter through the institutional context that leads to more or less action depending on the incentives and opportunities present. The results observed in Chapters 3 and 4 are confirmed; a division of powers and incentives for unincorporated representation magnify substantive representation of women by women. The null finding on a difference between PR and SMP is similarly confirmed; the theorized mechanisms do not operate as expected.

Chapter 7, the last substantive chapter, looks at policy outcomes. To do so, I use two unique datasets, both of which combine data from a variety of sources, including the Quality of Government dataset, the OECD, and the Comparative Agendas Project. The results indicate that women's overall representation increases the likelihood that a bill will address strategic gender issues, like family law or gender discrimination, but this is especially, and in some cases only, true under the conditions of a division of powers or an electoral system which incentivizes unincorporated representation. A division of powers does not have the same moderating effect on spending on family expenditure or parental leave wage replacement, indicating the difficulty in aggregating individual behaviour into departures from the status quo in these systems. On the other hand, electoral systems that amplify the amount women do to represent women are also found to increase the overall impact of women's representation on the same outcomes. Moreover, these electoral institutions enhance the impact of the number of women in cabinet in parliamentary systems.

The dissertation concludes in Chapter 8 with a review of the chapters and their key results. It also spells out several implications for the study of women in politics, the study of political institutions, and for advocates and activists concerned with women's representation.

A Note on Methods and Sources

The research in this dissertation uses a mixed methodological approach. Multiple quantitative analyses tests for the size and importance of the relationship theorized and each offer significant for the theory: the behaviour of individuals and the gap in substantive representation between women and men varies with the institutional context. The qualitative analysis, however, targets the mechanisms behind these differences and explains *why* women do more and men do less to represent women in some institutions than others. This section introduces briefly the data used

and the advantages of the combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Because of the number of datasets, varied sources, and the mixed-methods approach, the in-depth methodological discussion is contained within the Chapters.

Two datasets are used in Chapters 3 and 4 to test the importance and magnitude of the affect of gender on individual behaviour and the modifying affect of institutions. The first, the PARTIREP comparative MP survey, conducted between spring 2009 and summer 2010, reached representatives in 15 national and 58 regional parliaments. The survey, based on written questionnaires, captures self-reported behaviour and measures the extent to which representatives speak to or make proposals on women's interests, collaborate with others to pursue these issues, and meet with women's organizations. The dataset also contains a wide range of institutional variables based on publicly available sources. The data allow for a test of the moderating affect of both electoral systems and the division or fusion of powers. The test of the division of powers, however, is limit because few cases of a division of powers are included and none is a pure presidential system. To compensate, I also use a second dataset based on just three cases, but includes a pure presidential system (the U.S.) and two Westminster Parliamentary systems (Canada and the U.K.) and so allows for a more explicit test of the theory. This dataset includes content analysis of the tweets of almost all representatives in these institutions over a two-year period. The data is unique and was compiled especially for this research. Neither the Twitter analysis or the PARTIREP data offer a complete test of the theory, but taken together they support the theory.

The theory offered in this Chapter and expanded in Chapter 2, however, is not about mechanical institutional affects, but about the incentives and opportunities institutions generate for representatives. A qualitative analysis based on over 90 interviews and surveys with women

from 29 parties in seven countries complements the quantitative analysis by targeting of the causal process. The interviews allow for an assessment of whether legislators experience the institutional incentives and opportunities in the way theorized, by directly posing the question to the actors themselves. It gives women legislators the chance to articulate how they can go about representing women and whether they think it is in their interest to do so.

Interviews in different institutional contexts also test for, rather than assert, causal homogeneity (Bennett and George, 2005). The opportunities created by multiple votes or the constraints of a fusion of powers may be experienced by representatives to a greater or lesser degree depending on the other features of the institutional, political, or cultural context. Indeed, the interviews enable a deeper understanding of the role of institutions and, in doing so, contribute to a refining and further development of the theory.

The qualitative work also informs the final quantitative test. Chapter 7 returns to quantitative analysis to test the extent to which women's representation in the aggregate, that is, the proportion of representatives who are women, affects policy outcomes. The insights from the interviews and surveys presented in Chapter 5 allow me to operationalize 'women's policy interests' in a way that accurately reflects the issues that women representatives report are important to them. Two datasets are used, both of which are unique compilation of existing data from a variety of sources. The first used to test the moderating affect of a division or fusion of powers is based primarily on the Comparative Agendas Project. It includes information on the introduction and passage of legislation in six countries (Canada, France, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.) and is supplemented with data on women's representation. The analysis tests the extent to which the presence of women is associated with an increase in the likelihood that a law will address civil rights, gender discrimination, social welfare, family legal

issues, and strategic gendered issues. The analysis is somewhat limited because of different data collection practices in the seven countries included, but as a qualitative discussion of the data demonstrates, the *problems* with the data offer additional support for the theory offered.

The final dataset uses a number of sources contained in the Quality of Government data supplemented with private data on women's representation in legislatures from Pippa Norris. The cross-sectional time series data contains information on OCED countries over a 20-year time period and allows for a test of the effect of institutions, and women's representation on spending on family allowances, social exclusion, and parental leave. Additional data on women in cabinets in parliamentary systems provided personally by Amy Atchison enables a test of the effect of women in executives on outcomes and the moderating effect of electoral institutions.

Conclusions

This introductory chapter sets the stage for this dissertation by outlining a significant lacuna between the research on women's political representation and that on political institutions and the opportunities for bridging the gap. Moreover, it describes stages of political career and provides a framework for thinking through the anticipated effect of institutions on behaviour and outcomes.

Taking institutions into account may bring clarity to some of the ambiguities observed in the literature. During the 1990s, for example, when both the United States and the United Kingdom saw a notable increase in women's representation, the former also saw a increase in attention to and action on women's issues while the latter saw little achieved by the newcomers (Gelb, 2002). What explains this difference? Many studies find women representatives prioritize issues important to women and express a desire to represent women, but many others report a gap

between the reported feminist or pro-women attitude and actual behaviour (Carroll, 1984; Reingold, 2000; Tremblay, 1998; Trimble, 2006; Wängnerud, 2000). Why do women representatives' behaviour sometimes fail to match their expressed interests and intentions?

In addition to clarifying the existing literature, a focus on institutions enables a comparative approach and ensures a consideration of women *as political actors*. How does substantive representation of women and its tie to descriptive representation vary across countries? How do women navigate institutional structures and what must they do to become representatives? Once they are legislators, how can women represent women? Attention to these questions adds depth to the theory underlying the proposed tie between descriptive and substantive representation and brings attention to the mechanisms linking numbers to representation.

Table 1.1. Survey of the Literature

	Preferences and Priorities		Discourse and Behaviour				Policy Outcomes
	Preferences and Priorities	Thoughts on Representation	Contents of Speeches	Votes	Introduction of Legislation	Other	
Parliamentary **28**	Bochel & Briggs (2000) Campbell et al. (2010) Erickson (1997) Lloren and Rosset (2015) Lovenduski & Norris (2003) Meier (2008) Studlar and McAlister (1992)[4] Tremblay (1993) Tremblay & Pelletier (2000) Wängnerud (2000) **10 - 37%**	Childs (2002) Tremblay (2003) Sawer (2002) **3 – 11%**	Bird (2005) Celis (2006) Childs & Withey (2004) Erzeel (2012) Grey (2006) Tremblay (1998) Lore (2008) **7 – 26%**	Skjeie (2012)+ Cowley and Childs (2003)[5] **2 – 7%**	Tremblay (1998) **1 – 4%**	<u>Constituency work:</u> Childs (2001)+ General: Childs (2003)+[6] **2 – 7%**	Atchison and Down (2009) Martinez-Hernandez & Elizondo(1997)* Towns (2003) **3 – 11%**
Presidential **37**	Carroll (1984) Carroll (2002) Poggione (2004) Reingold (1992) **4 – 11%**	Tremblay (2003) Whip (1991) **2 – 5%**	Cramer Walsh (2002) **1 – 3%**	Barnello (1999)* Hill (1983)* Dolan (1997) Lloren (2015) Reingold (2000) Senti (1999) Swers (1998) Vega and Firestone (1995) Fredrick (2010) **9 – 24%**	Ballmer-Cao & Schultz (1991) Bratton (2005) Bratton & Haynie (1999) Fredrick (2010) Gerrity et al. (2007) Kathlene (2005) McDonald & O'Brien(2011) Saint-Germain (1989) Swers (2002) Swers and Larson (2005) Tamerius (1995) Taylor-Robinson & Heath (2003) Thomas (1991) Wolbrecht (2002) **14 – 38%**	<u>Campaigning</u>: Dolan (2005) Herrnson, Lay, & Stokes, (2003). <u>Committee work</u>: Norton (2002) <u>Constituency</u>: Richardson and Freeman (1995)+ Thomas (1990)+ **5 – 14%**	Berkman & O'Connor (1993) Crowley (2004) **5 – 6%**

[4] Find "little at all difference" between men and women except for on issues of women's advancement. Since this is exactly the type of issues this research is concerned about, I do not consider this a null finding.
[5] Discusses why the new women were the least likely to rebel.
[6] Vague discussion of whether they would make a difference.
* - no difference observed, + Uses surveys or interviews.

Chapter 2: Theorizing the Moderating Effect of Institutions

This chapter takes this basic argument and the framework offered in Chapter 1 to theorize the moderating effect of two institutions – the division of powers and the electoral system. Both institutions have been widely studied, and the impact on political behaviour, decision making, and outcomes has been extensively explored (Ames, 1995; Bowler and Fowler, 1993; Carey, 2007; Carey & Shugart, 1992; Cox, 1997; Cox & McCubbins, 2001; Downs, 1957; Duverger, 1959; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005; Haggard & McCubbins, 2001; Hix, 2004; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Kedar, 2009;Laver; 2006; Lijphart, 1994; Linz, 1990; Norris, 2004; Sartori, 1976; Strom, 2000; Sieberer, 2010; Tsebelis, 199;). These institutional analyses, however, have been blind to gender, employing the 'neutral, universal' actor. At the same time, the study of women within these political systems has largely ignored the impact of the institutional context.

When aspects of the division of powers have been considered, research has been confined to those that are "gender-focused" (Sawer, 2012), such as women's issues committees or intra and inter-party women's caucuses (Gonzalez and Sample, 2010; Grace, 2011; Steel, 2002). These gender-focused institutions, Sawer argues, "provide leverage beyond that of individual parliamentarians, who may have conflicting accountabilities" (322). What this limited institutional perspective fails to acknowledge, however, are the ways in which whether a system is presidential or parliamentary also structures the number and nature of legislators' various, and perhaps contradicting responsibilities. These conflicting roles and responsibilities and the implications for behaviour and policy have been widely theorized and tested. An extension of existing theories to include a consideration of

gender demonstrate that these seemingly gender-neutral institutional features have clear consequences for gendered representation.

Similarly, the effect of electoral systems on women's *descriptive* representation has been extensively studied, but as Tremblay (2006) notes "there is a conspicuous dearth of studies on their influence over the substantive representation of women" (502, see also Tremblay, 2003).[7] Electoral systems determine who is elected and how, who legislators represent, and to whom they are accountable. As such, structuring the incentives and disincentives facing representatives affects the behaviour of voters, candidates, parties, elected representatives, and governments. In doing so, the electoral system may also modify, that is suppress or enhance, the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation within parliamentary systems. Exploring how "electoral systems do or do not generate incentives for women to act in certain ways once elected" (Tremblay, 2006, 509) offers an opportunity to improve understanding of the relationship between gender and behaviour.

To fill these existing gaps, an explicitly institutionalist and comparative approach is needed to imagine and analyze a potential moderating effect of electoral systems and the division of powers on the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. I begin with an exploration of the division of powers, outlining why presidential systems do more than parliamentary systems to incentivize and enable the representation of women by women. I then turn to a discussion of electoral systems, distinguishing first

7 Proportional representation systems are a necessary, but insufficient condition for achieving a (comparatively) high level of women in politics (Lijphart, 1991; IDEA, 2011; Krook, 2010; McIvor, 2003; Norris, 1997; Tremblay, 2006). Party control over the nominations and elections is also found to increase women's descriptive representation (Thames and Williams, 2010; Valdini, 2012).

between single-member plurality (SMP) and PR systems and then using Carey and Shugart's (1995) classification of systems based on the incentives they generate for personal, as opposed to party votes. After discussing the division of powers and electoral systems independently, I consider the ways in which they interact and discuss how the nature of the electoral system is, in some respects, contingent on the division of powers. I then turn to an exploration of the effect of institutions on policy outcomes. The implications of these institutions for the relationship between descriptive representation and policy outcomes is much less clear than they are for behaviour.

The final section of this chapter discusses the institutional combinations in the seven countries included in the qualitative portion of this dissertation (Chapter 5). Doing so contextualizes the institutions as concrete systems in use rather than abstract and disjointed concepts.

Moderating Behaviour: The Division of Powers

In terms of the stages of the political career path, presidential and parliamentary institutions provide the venue within which behaviour occurs (stage 4), structure opportunities for promotion (stage 5), and determine how individual behaviour and preferences are aggregated into outcomes (stage 6). At these stages, institutional differences between presidential and parliamentary systems differently incentivize the representation of women. Because women operate within these institutions, the substantive representation of women by women is expected to vary with the divergent incentives and opportunities they create. As a result, research that has explored the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation *in presidential*

systems[8] is not directly comparable to those studying *parliamentary systems*.[9] The insights from one cannot simply be generalized to the other as if the women operate in an institutional vacuum.

In many ways, an understanding of the extent to which parliamentary systems differ from presidential systems and, in particular, how the former constrains the representation of women, is acknowledged in the literature. The acknowledgments are made, however, mostly in passing and without drawing out the appropriate comparative implications. In a book exploring women in parliamentary systems, Mackay (2006) argues "the relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation is by no means straightforward and is mediated by other factors, particularly in strong parliamentary systems by party identity and partisan loyalty" (177). In her assessment of women in politics in English Canada, Bashevkin (1993) acknowledges "independent feminism in a parliamentary setting cannot 'win' without moving its policy demands through party-controlled pipelines" (3). In research using in-depth interviews with Labour's so-called "Blair's Babes", Childs (2003) provides clues on the importance of the parliamentary context to the behaviour of and representation by a large influx of new women to the UK's House of Commons in 1997.

> "Any comprehensive account of the relationship between women's presence and the substantive representative representation of women in Westminster must also recognize that women MPs are party representatives" (197).

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[8] Including Barnello, 1999; Bratton, 2005; Kathlene, 1994; Reingold, 1992, 2000; Richardson & Freeman, 1995; Saint-Germain, 1989; Thomas, 1990, 1991; Thomas and Welch, 1991; Thomas & Wilcox, 2005; Vega and Firestone, 1995.

[9] Such as Beckwith, 2007; Bratton and Ray, 2002; Celis, 2006; Childs, 2003; Erickson, 1993; Grey, 2002; Lovenduski, 1997, 2001; Norris, 2001; O'Brien, 2012; Sawer, 2000, 2003, 2012; Sawer, Tremblay, & Trimble, 2006; Skjeie, 2012; Studlar and McAllister, 1992; Tremblay, 1998, 2003; Trimble, 1998; Tremblay & Trimble, 2003; Wangnerud, 2000; Young, 2002

> "In practice, the nature of the substantive representation is influenced by the representatives' party (at least where parties are dominant) as well as their gender identity." (197)

Most to the point, Childs states: "Whether women representatives seek to act for women is one question; determining whether they can, in practice, act for women, is another." (127).

Despite these passing acknowledgments and tentative assertions what is missing is an explicit theory that articulates *why* women are or are not able to act for women in different systems. There has been no systematic attempt to describe the conditions under which the descriptive representation of women should be expected to matter for substantive representation. In the absence of such a theory, the role of the institutional context is often ignored or obscured. Celis (2008), for example, calls for greater attention to context but speaks of female Members of Parliament and Congresswomen somewhat interchangeably, without due consideration to the importance of the contextual differences these women face. Moreover, the lack of comparative analysis has meant that the actual impact of a division or fusion of powers has not been tested.

Gleb (2002) offers one exception. In one of the few pieces of research that take the role of institutions seriously, she explores the differing political opportunity structures in the United Kingdom and the United Sates. Using existing literature in the UK, on the one hand, and the US, on the other, she provides some evidence for the impact of the division of powers on the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation. This section develops on Gleb's insights and offers an explicit theory; it lays out the key differences between presidential and parliamentary systems and the

expected effect on the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation

As outlined by Carey and Shugart (1992, 19), pure presidentialism is defined by four criteria:

1. Popular election of the chief executive.
2. The terms of the chief executive and assembly are fixed and are not contingent on mutual confidence.
3. The elected executive names and directs the composition of the government.
4. The president has some constitutionally granted lawmaking authority (such as a veto).

Based on this definition, the fundamental distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems is the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. This distinction has important implications for political behaviour, regime stability, and policy outcomes (Carey & Shugart, 1992; Cheibub, 2007; Cox, 1987; Haggard & McCubbins, 2001; Lijphart, 2012; Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Shugart, 2006; Samuels, 2007; Strom, 1997, 2000; Tsebelis, 2002) and has been conceptualized and theorized in a number of ways in the literature. As Carey and Shugart (1992) put it, the origins and survival of the legislature and the executive are fused in the parliamentary systems and separate when powers are divided. Developing on the ideas of Bagehot and Cox, they differentiate between (and within) the two systems on the basis of efficiency and representation. Cox and McCubbins (2001) focus on merged purposes and powers of the parliamentary system. Laver and Shepsle (1996) argue that because of this fusion, the most important role of legislatures in parliamentary systems is to make and break governments. Legislatures in presidential systems, on the other hand, maintain *legislating* as their primary purpose.

It must be noted that presidential systems vary significantly and the term ‘a division of powers’ is used to describe a heterogeneous group of political systems. Carey and Shugart (1992) offer a typology to distinguish between types of division of power systems based on the extent to which the survival of the assembly and the cabinet are absolute and the president’s authority over the cabinet (Carey and Shugart, 1992). In what follows my theory focuses on pure presidentialism (as defined above), allowing for an explicit theorization of the various mechanisms at play, including a vote of confidence or lack thereof, tied or separated electoral fates, the power to legislate retained by legislative branch versus concentrated in the executive, and opportunities for promotion to cabinet. The quantitative and qualitative analysis in subsequent chapters, however, does consider variation across systems. France, for example, has a popularly elected president, but parliament can still deliver a vote of non-confidence. In Switzerland, the executive is elected from within the legislative branch, but once in place does not depend on ongoing confidence. The ability of legislatures to form governments is much less powerful or meaningful in Switzerland than it is in parliamentary systems. The use of the ‘magic formula’, wherein the partisan breakdown of the executive is consistent regardless of electoral outcomes, and the practice of returning the same individual ministers to the government until they retire mean that the legislature’s decision is, for the most part, predetermined.

Efficiency and Representativeness

Carey and Shugart (1992) argue that, because the majority composition of the legislature determines the executive, parliamentary systems optimize ‘efficiency’- “the ability of

elections to serve as a means for voters to identify and choose among the competing government options" (7). This is particularly true under the conditions of an SMP electoral system. Just as they maximize efficiency, parliamentary systems also minimize representativeness - "the ability of elections to articulate and provide voice in the *assembly* for diverse interests" (8). As a consequence of the high identifiability of responsibility and clear government alternatives, parties are programmatic and use discipline to ensure compliance with the broader program and, as a consequence, minimize a focus on local concerns and the provision of particularistic goods. While Carey and Shugart focus on the constraint of localism and particularism, including pork and patronage, the analysis can be extended to consider the provision of other, non-national, 'goods'; the discipline and dictation by the party applies not just to local goods but to anything outside the party's agenda. In short, the pursuit of women's issues, like the provision of particularistic goods or logrolling, is constrained by the need for national, programmatic, and dominant parties.

On the other hand, presidential systems can deliver both efficiency and representation because voters elect two distinct agents: the legislative body can be representative while the executive ensures efficiency. As a result, Carey and Shugart (1992) argue, congressional elections can "turn more on the provision of particularistic services to constituents than on policy" (8). Again, the delivery of particularist goods is only one possible outcome. The broader consequence is that representatives have the freedom to determine the issues they prioritize and the interests they pursue because of their separation from the executive. While this may mean particularistic services, it may also include other issues, interests, and identities, including women's issues.

Fusion or Separation of Origins

Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue that in "every pure parliamentary system a vote for any particular legislator – or for the party's list – is indirectly a vote for that party's leader as candidate for prime minister. In a sense, a perfect correlation exists between the party's votes for executive and legislative candidates" (1). As a result, they argue, it is "relatively unproblematic to think of the party as the principal and the candidate as the agent" (124**)**. I argue that the primacy of this principal-agent relationship limits the opportunity for women to depart from their party to pursue women's issues. Further, the political incentives for (re)election for the executive and legislative branches are the fused and 'electoral separation of purpose' is, by definition, not possible in parliamentary systems. In these contexts, women are unable to distinguish themselves from each other and their male colleagues by acting as a representative for or an agent of women.

In presidential systems, Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue that separate origin means "politicians in the same party can face different and even conflicting incentives in the electoral arena" **(**9**)** and incentives are enhanced "for politicians in different branches of the same party to go their own way" (9). Because representatives and candidates running for a single party are not tied together as a single (if highly imperfect) agent, women are more able and, perhaps incentivized, to depict themselves as potential agents of women.

Fusion or Separation of Survival

Presidents, Samuels and Shugart argue, have little to fear from their party, but under a pure presidential system, the same is clearly true for individual legislators. In parliamentary systems, leaders can dissolve parliament, resulting in a costly and potentially risky election for individual legislators and use this as one tool to ensure

compliance with the national program; disincentives for dissent are clear. In presidential systems, on the other hand, dissent, noncompliance, or off-party representation does not necessarily carry the same risks. With this freedom, representatives can provide patronage, deliver local or particularistic goods, or may choose to dedicate their time and resources to women's issues.

Using these and other theories on the division of powers the following sections outline the expected moderating effect on women's substantive representation. Table 2.1 summarizes these arguments.

Speeches, Statements, and Other Forms of Discourse

Because of the fusion of their legislative and executive branches, governing parties in parliamentary systems have important carrots to induce certain behaviour from their members, including the issues they address in their speeches and statements. Opportunities for promotion (stage 5) can be critical to meeting both policy and office objectives; cabinet positions offer significant benefits to individuals including financial rewards, power and influence, and opportunities to pursue policy goals. Controlled by the governing party leader but available to members of the legislature, these posts can be used to motivate party members to use their speaking time in debates, statements, or oral questions to communicate the party line. Individual members who do so may be offered cabinet positions while those that do not may never receive such benefits (Strøm, 1997). An ambitious representative then, must "be willing to devote time and energy to party objectives, even if that means neglecting one's local constituency or supporting causes that have little local support" (Strøm, 1997, 169).

Women may use up their political resources securing lower-order goals of election and office before they can devote any to representing women's issues and pursuing those policy priorities. Even if women want to secure cabinet positions to address policy issues important to women, the incentives inherent in the system will mean their speaking time, voting record, and central political messaging will be dictated by the party. Moreover, because the government control the political agenda and necessary resources, if women want to pursue the representation of women, abiding by the party line is simply the most efficient (and in many cases only) way to successfully achieve changes to policies or legislation.

These mechanisms do not just affect the behaviour of members of the governing party. Instead, there are degrees of derogation from this government ideal on the opposition side. Opposition parties need to portray themselves as alternative governments, stable and strong. While the potential rewards are not as imminent, individual members need to consider their future opportunities for cabinet and similar positions. Using speaking time or public discourse opportunities for something other than party priorities may put such prospects in jeopardy should the representative find themselves part of the governing party in the future.

In addition to these incentives, parties also control *opportunities* to speak in parliamentary systems. If backbench members wish to speak on a debate, they must express their interest to their party officials (Parliamentary Education Service, 2007; Parliament of Australia, 2012). Parties act as gatekeepers not only by controlling access to higher office but also by literally controlling the parliamentary agenda. Simply put, in many cases parties determine who can speak on what and when and individual

backbenchers are correspondingly constrained in their ability to speak on issues of their choosing. Party control plays a role not only when the issue is in contradiction to the party position, but also if the issue is simply outside the party's key issue priorities and central messaging.

In presidential systems, the separation of powers means that ambitious women who seek executive positions do so outside the legislative arena (Strøm, 1997). As a result, these posts do not serve as incentives to induce particular party-friendly behaviour among legislators. Moreover, because the success of individual legislators does not determine the executive's electoral success, there is less imperative for all party members to be speaking from the same messaging and on the same priority issues. In the absence of such significant incentives to follow party leadership and parrot the party line, alternative incentives may encourage substantive representation of women.

In short, the prospect for promotion and additional benefits of office (stage 5) and the tied electoral fates (stage 3) in parliamentary systems induces particular behaviours (stage 4). As a result, parliamentary systems incentivize behaviour directed by and for the benefit of the party, disincentivizing and constraining the use of political resources for the representation of women. These mechanism do not operating in presidential systems and, as such, opportunities and incentives for unincorporated representation are greater.

Voting

The fusion of the executive and legislative branches in parliamentary systems leads to cohesive voting arising from party discipline and not just ideological congruence (Dewan and Spirling; Kam, 2001; Laver and Shepsle, 1996). As the survival of legislatures and governments is tied, backbench members of the government party are incentivized to

vote alongside their party to avoid a vote of non-confidence. Failing to do so could trigger an election, which is costly for both the individual and the party and may result in the loss of one's job. Opposition parties also have incentives for cohesive voting. Dewan and Spirling (2011) argue that by committing to vote cohesively *against* government proposals, opposition parties will force governments to appeal to their own party's median member which will, overall, move policy toward the opposition's ideal point. Kam (2001) argues that party discipline also offers a way for individuals to deal with the collective action problem of party reputation (though he does not use the term): discipline or the threat of it and the need to create stability and avoid elections offer members an excuse for voting for an unpopular policy.

Further, whether opposition or government, the 'carrots' of promotion discussed in the proceeding section also serve as a tool for parties to control voting. Those who dissent by, for example, voting against their party but in support of a policy that benefits women, are unlikely to receive benefits of higher office from either a current or potential future government. Cohesive voting is not just consistent with theory or the perceived institutional incentives; it is an empirical fact (Carey, 2007, 2009).

Occasionally party leadership offers members a "vote of conscience" or "free vote", meaning that they can vote as they choose and need not follow the party line. These votes sometimes overlap with gendered issues, notably abortion. On the other hand, they are rare, and their very existence demonstrates the power parties have in determining the vote cast by their members the vast majority of the time (Franks, 1997). In the United Kingdom, a three-line whip system signals to MPs when their attendance and vote is mandatory. Defying a three-line whip comes at the cost of expulsion from caucus. In

other cases, MPs have greater freedom to depart from the party line and may take the opportunity to either express the preferences of their constituency or their own moral conscious. In New Zealand, a vote of conscience has not been held for several years and in Australia, only 33 conscience votes have been held since 1949 (Green, 2012).[10] Bálint and Moire (2013) find that while there is not a marked gender difference in most conscience votes in Australia, there is in the case of abortion - most women voted for removing it from the criminal code while most men voted against it. Even when the notable disincentives for dissenting votes are weakened, however, incentives to vote with the party, such as the opportunity for promotion to cabinet, still exist (McGee, 1994; Maughan & Scully, 1997; Overby et al., 1998).

Importantly, this theory does not rest on the assumption that parties will always, or even often take positions *against* women's interests. Women are expected to support women's issues more than their party, whatever part of the political spectrum they are aligned. Even when parties take positive positions on women's issues, however, party discipline and partisan loyalties matter. Men are as compelled as women to support their party's position and so both men and women will vote in support of the women's issue. In other words, whatever the issue and whatever side of the issue the party falls, men's party-directed behaviour is not distinguishable from women's party-directed behaviour. The result is a very muted gendered difference in voting.

In contrast, Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue that in presidential systems "the separation of powers imposes electoral incentives that affect party organization in particular ways"

[10] The last vote of conscious was in 2012 and was on alcohol reform (New Zealand Parliament, n.d.).

(13). Put simply, parties are weaker as evident in the less cohesive on roll-call votes (see also Carey, 2009). Leaders do not have the same political resources to distribute to members to ensure compliance. Moreover, a direct election of the president also undermines party unity simply because it doubles the party principals trying to exert influence over individual legislators. If legislative and executive leadership disagree, legislators are pulled in more than one direction and the contradicting influence of principals further weakens cohesion (Carey, 2009). Moreover, in the absence of shared fate, the executive and the legislative branches can have "incentive incompatibility". While Samuels and Shugart focus on the implication for executive and legislative branches of a party, this incentive incapability also matters for individual legislators whose fates are far less tightly tied than in parliamentary systems. Individual legislators need not behave in concert and may even have incentives to differentiate themselves from each other. The dissolution of such tight, cohesive voting leaves room for women and men to vote differently on women's issues.

In summary, the institutional differences clearly structure the costs and benefits of voting in a legislature. Put in terms of the stages of a women's political career, voting with or against one's party has significantly different consequences for navigating the political system to achieve election and re-election (Stage 3) and promotion (Stage 5) in presidential systems than it does in parliamentary systems. The substantive representation of women by voting is constrained in parliamentary systems and facilitated in presidential system. In parliamentary systems, the absence of a gendered difference in voting habits means that descriptive representation is simply not that important to this form of substantive representation. On the other hand, given the freedom to depart from party

lines, a relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation as voting should be observable in presidential systems.

Introduction of Legislation

In presidential systems, the division of power means that legislatures have the responsibility and power to legislate (Carey and Shugart, 1992). Individual legislators can introduce and pass legislation if they can coordinate support from other members, including, of course, legislation addressing women's issues. Reingold (2000) argues that women in American state legislators have control over their own policy priorities, determining largely for themselves what kind of policy to propose or co-sponsor. Women, she argues, are not constrained by partisan demands or discriminatory coercion in making decisions on their policy activity, including where they dedicate their energy, time, and resources.

In parliamentary systems opportunities for women in opposition or on the backbench to substantively represent women by introducing legislation are significantly limited. The fusion of the executive and legislative branches means that the government is empowered to legislate as well as enforce and implement the law while the legislature's most important role is to make and break these governments (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Governments control the legislative agenda, determining what issues are presented to parliament to consider and introducing legislation that is likely to pass into law. Moreover serious restrictions exist on when and on what topics non-government members can introduce legislation. For example, backbench members cannot introduce legislation that involves the use of public funds. Further, the "confrontational game", particularly prevelant in Westminster systems, makes cross floor-cooperation on the

drafting and introduction of legislation on women's issues very difficult (Sawer et al., 2006, 4).

The same institutional features that limit opportunities for backbench women mean that women on the government frontbench, that is women in cabinet, have significant influence. Individual cabinet ministers in parliamentary systems have significant control over their portfolios and can pursue their policy priorities within their department (Atchison and Down, 2009; Laver and Shepsle, 1994). Moreover, because cabinet ministers, unlike backbenchers, can introduce legislation that does have spending implications, they have influence over a much broader spectrum of women's issues (for example, publicly funded childcare). The practices of party discipline and party loyalty mean that once a woman in cabinet opts to pursue a policy and the rest of government supports the policy, the likelihood it receives support from the legislative branch is exceptionally high and indeed much higher than for legislation introduced by women in presidential systems. Indeed, the proportion of women in cabinet in parliamentary systems has been found to have an effect on parental and maternity leave entitlements independent of the percentage of women in the legislature (Atchison and Down, 2009).

Presidential and parliamentary systems also offer differing opportunities and incentives for making amendments to proposed legislation so that they may more adequately address women's interests or needs. Decentralizing decision-making in the American presidential system increases opportunities for women to interject in the policy-making process. In Westminster parliamentary systems, women on committees may be confined in their ability to make changes at the committee stage in much the same way as they are

in expressing their opinions through votes or speeches. This is expected to be particularly true when party leadership acts as the gatekeeper for their delegates on committees.

In short, women on the backbench in parliamentary systems face significant disincentives for the representation of women. Further, their opportunities for influence are minimal. Women on the frontbench, however, have very real opportunities to represent women in a way that can translate into policy outcomes that improve the lives of women. As Atchison and Down (2009) put it - "individual legislators are likely to be relatively weak proponents of female-friendly social policy relative to their counterparts in cabinet" (Atchison and Down, 2009). Individual women in presidential systems lack the influence of cabinet ministers in parliamentary systems but have incentives and opportunities that women on the front bench lack. Table 2.1 at the end of this chapter summarize these arguments.

The theory outlined generates a number of observable implications. Chapters 3 provides more specific hypotheses based on the data available and tests the theory using a mixed methodological approach.

Discourse & Behaviour: Observable Implications

1. Women elected in parliamentary systems will address women's issues less frequently in representation acts (including oral questions, committees, debates, statements, voting, and the introduction of legislation) than their counterparts in presidential systems.
2. Because men will not respond to institutional (dis)incentives in the same way as women, the gap between women and men on these representational acts will be larger in presidential systems.

Women's Experiences of Political Institutions: Observable Implications

1. Women in presidential systems should feel that women are an important constituent, both in terms of their (re)election prospects and their obligations for representation.
2. Women in parliamentary systems are expected to feel limited in their ability to vote in favour of women-friendly policy or legislation if their party is voting against it.
3. Women on the backbench in parliamentary systems should feel constrained in their opportunities for proposing legislation addressing women's issues. Women in cabinet should perceive themselves having significant opportunities to raise the profile of and implement policies that address women's issues.

Moderating Behaviour: The Electoral System

The constitutional design is not the only institution that can influence the nature of representation or affect the number and strength of competing principals. As the set of rules that determine how citizens choose their government electoral institutions are "the most fundamental element of representative democracy" (Lijphart, 1996, 1). They are not, however, equally 'representative'. Instead, electoral systems may be "scaled to the degree to which they represent diversity" (Carey and Shugart, 1992, 9), which can include localism, in the form of policy or particularistic services, or group interests, based on ideology, ethnicity or religion. An extension of this logic to a consideration of gender demonstrates the ways in which electoral systems can also do more or less to facilitate the substantive representation of women.

In terms of the career paths and political motivations of representatives, electoral systems most explicitly determine how representatives win nomination, seek votes, and if and how they win elections (stages 2b and 3 and motivations 1 and 2). By affecting what one has to do to be elected and the chances of doing so successfully, they are also relevant to

stage 2a - whether women and men self-select into politics. Moreover, because they structure the relationship between legislators and voters, they determine who legislators represent and to whom they are accountable and thus impact behaviour at stage 4. Electoral systems also affect the number and type of parties and thus have an important influence on the formation of governments and the final stage - aggregation of individual preferences into policy outcomes.

Electoral systems are diverse and complex and conceptualizing the differences among them requires a consideration of several different dimensions. For example, electoral systems are often differentiated on the basis of the electoral formula (how votes become seats), the district magnitude (the number of representatives per district), and on the structure of the ballot (how voters express their preferences) (Blais and Massicotte, 1996). Some scholars offer alternative dimensions, including further dividing ballot structure into the number of votes a voter can cast and how much choice voters have between individual candidates (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005). Others look earlier in the process, including candidate selection rules as a critical dimension for understanding electoral systems and their effects (Carey and Shugart 1995; Hix, 2004).

I use two key conceptual distinctions to theorize the expected effect of electoral institutions on behaviour of individual representatives. First, I broadly compare proportional representation and single-member-plurality (SMP), focusing in particular on the strong geographic basis of the latter and higher district magnitude of the former. While saying nothing explicitly about mixed systems, the logic of the theory leads to divergent expectations for the behaviour of members elected under different electoral systems in mixed systems. Second, I use Carey and Shugart's (1997) framework for

differentiating systems that incentivize personal votes from those that incentivize party votes. This allows for a more complex consideration of electoral systems, discriminating between different proportional systems, for example.

Proportional Representation versus Single-Member-Districts

Carey and Shugart argue when parliamentary systems use single-member plurality, efficiency is at a maximum and representativeness at a minimal. Parliamentary systems that use proportional representation, on the other hand, are more inclusive of broad interests and can facilitate a greater representation of group interests, including ideologies, ethnicity, or religion (9). I identify two differences between single member plurality and proportional representation systems that are relevant to women's substantive representation – the strength of the geographic tie and district magnitude. A larger district magnitude has two separate implications – a lower electoral threshold (percentage of votes needed to win a seat) and a greater number of representatives per constituency. These differences affect the incentives and opportunities that legislators have to represent women.

Geographic tie of representation

As Carroll (2011) observes, the notion of 'women representing women' fails to take into account geography. Which women are represented? Unlike many other groups seeking representation (based on race or class, for example), women are in no way geographically defined. The extent to which representation is geographically defined will thus affect the incentives and opportunities to dedicate political resources towards representing women. SMP, in particular, lends itself to a conceptualization of representation in geographic terms (Mezey, 2008), that is, representatives are elected within and responsible to their

own clearly defined electoral district. A woman elected under SMP must respond to the particular interests of the geographic community rather than broader collective needs (Sawer, 1998). Due to limited resources (time for speeches, legislation to propose, etc.), she will be constrained in the acts of representation or resources she can dedicate to explicit women's issues (Erzeel et al., 2014; Tremblay, 2006).

While SMP systems can and do process broader conflicts of interest, such as class and race, they do so when these political issues *have a geographic base*. Neighbourhoods often contain a certain homogeneity of occupation and income, and as a result, a geographically based politics *is* class politics (see, for example, Rodden, 2010). In the United States, racial gerrymandering means that sometimes a geographically based politics is also a racialized politics. Women, on the other hand, have *no geographical concentration* - there is simply "no gender equivalent to a rural district or an African American district" (Reingold, 2000, 6). The time and resources necessary to represent the issues of the constituency, whether local, class, or racial, will leave little opportunity to focus explicitly on women.

Several studies find that women, much more than men, feel that they do (and should) represent women even in the absence of an electoral connection, a phenomenon Mansbridge (2003) calls *surrogate representation* (Carroll, 2002; Childs, 2002; Swers, 1998; Waring et al., 2000). Reingold (2000) argues that the tie women feel to their female constituents indicates that this institutional constraint is "rather weak" (220). Given the shared (if diverse and varied) experience and perspective and significant numerical under-representation, it should not be surprising that women representatives continue to feel connected to their female constituents, including those outside their district This is a

distinct argument from the claim the institutional constraints don't change behaviour and the fact that surrogate representation exists does not mean that women would not *do* more to represent women if greater opportunities or incentives were present**.** The expressed intention or desire to represent women may translate into greater action and more substantial policy changes when the electoral system allows for it. In fact, this may help explain the often-observed difference between what women say they represent and what they actually do or, as Carroll (1984) puts it, the gap between attitudinal and behavioural feminism (Reingold, 2000; Tremblay, 1998; Trimble, 2006; Wangnerud, 2000). Carroll explains this gap as follows: "too much emphasis on women's issues in a campaign might lead to speculation that the candidate is narrow in her interests and would not adequately represent all the people" (319).

In PR systems, on the other hand, the activity of representation is less geographically defined. The weakening of the conventional link between a representative and an electoral district can enable ties based on shared experiences and interests "defined by identity rather than geography" (Tremblay, 2006, 505). With less time and effort consumed by local concerns, there is a greater opportunity for representatives to address cross-boundary issues, including those of interest to women (Sawer, 2002). In short, the disincentive identified by Carroll is simply not as strong in PR systems because the institutional context is different.

District Magnitude

District magnitude is a key determinant of the proportionality of an electoral system and has been found to be a key determinant of women's descriptive representation (ACE Network, 2014; Rule, 1987; Norris, 2006; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). It also has two

distinct implications relevant to substantive representation. First, the electoral threshold determines how broad or narrow appeals to voters must or can be. Second, the greater the number of representatives responsible for one constituency, the greater the likelihood that constituents have a woman representative, which in turn increases the number of times they raise gendered issues to the legislators who have a responsibility and incentive to address them.

Electoral threshold

The high percentage of votes needed to win a seat in SMP systems requires legislators to reach beyond the electorate interested in women's issues and into the male electorate (so to speak) if they hope to be re-elected. The result is a clear disincentive to focus on women in particular or women's issues as such. On the other hand, under PR political parties may be more likely to support their candidates in advocating for women because of the electoral incentives to directly target specific electoral clienteles (Tremblay, 2006).

A recent example provides some support for the notion that district magnitude matters. In 2014, the Swedish Feministiskt Initiativ (Feminist Initiative) Party elected their first Member of European Parliament. The party received 4.3% of the vote, just surpassing the 4% necessary to win one of the country's 20 seats in the European Parliament. In a plurality system, the party would not have achieved any representation and, given the dim prospects for success, would have been unlikely to form in the first place.

Representatives Per Riding

Simply having more than one representative may affect incentives and opportunities for substantive representation. With multiple legislators looking out for the constituency's interests, an MP's burden to represent all interests of the geographic area and its residents

is decreased, creating an opportunity to dedicate resources to more specific and cross-constituency rather the geographic interests. Further, on gendered issues, such as sexualized violence or childcare needs, women may be more comfortable approaching a female representative (Childs, 2002; Tremblay, 2006). In a multimember district, the odds of having a female representative to approach are greater, thus increasing the options available to women voters and with it the number of times such issues are brought to the attention of representatives. If a woman represented by a man in a single member plurality system wishes to speak to or be represented by someone with whom they believe they share a common experience, they may approach a woman representative in a different electoral district (Mansbridge, 2003). This representative is not, however, their agent and her primary obligations are to her constituents. In a context of limited resources, providing assistance to a woman outside her constituency may come at the cost of representing an issue important to her constituency. As a result, she has few electoral incentives for the representative to offer assistance. Moreover, there are strict conventions in SMP systems that MPs do not assist the constituents of their colleagues so as not to interfere with the relationships between representatives and districts. At the same time, the women's local representative with whom she does have a principal-agent tie will not be made aware of the issue. In other words, in SMP systems, constituents will raise women's issues to representatives less often and, when they are raised to representatives in other districts, there are limited incentives for them to be addressed.

In sum, two women, one elected under SMD and the other elected under PR, both of whom prioritize women's issues more than their male colleagues, are nonetheless expected to behave differently because they operate within distinct incentive and

opportunity structures. Further, the gap between the representation of women's issues by women and that by men should be larger in proportional representation systems than in SMD systems. While the theory offered here focuses on a PR/SMD dichotomy, the implications for a Mixed Member Plurality (MMP) system are clear: representatives elected off the list will face different incentives and opportunities than their colleagues elected directly in a constituency. Please see Table 2.2 at the end of this chapter.

The theory outlined generates a number of observable implications.

Discourse & Behaviour: Observable Implications

1. Women elected under SMP will address women's issues less frequently in representation acts (including oral questions, committees, debates, statements, voting, and the introduction of legislation) than their counterparts in proportional representation systems.
2. Because men will not respond to institutional incentives in the same way as women, the gap between women and men on these representational acts will be larger in PR systems than in SMP systems.

Of course, the theory offered is not about the institutions per se, but is fundamentally about perceived incentives and legislators' experiences of political institutions.

Women's Experiences of Political Institutions: Observable Implications

1. Women in SMP systems should feel a tension between time spent representing women and representing their geographic constituency.
2. Women in SMP systems will perceive a disincentive to campaign on or speak to women's issues in speeches or other forms of discourse.
3. Women in PR systems should perceive themselves as having the opportunity to address women's issues in speeches, campaigns, and other forms of discourse.

Preliminary Evidence: Substantive Representation in PR and SMP Systems

Though largely theoretical, the proposed differential effects of SMP and PR electoral systems find some support in previously conducted research, both on representation

generally and on women's representation specifically. Bowler and Farrell (1993) find that in the European Parliament representatives elected under a candidate-ballot system (plurality) kept regular contact with their geographic electorate while those elected under party-ballot system (PR) focused more on groups of voters. Research on Germany's mixed member electoral system has found notable differences between MPs elected in districts and those elected via lists. Sieberer (2010) finds that district MPs are more likely to defect from the party vote (though this is only partially due to their territorial obligations). Others have observed that these MPs pursue more individualistic electoral campaigns (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008), place more emphasis on representing local interests (Klingemann and Wessels, 2001), and are more likely to sit on parliamentary committees dealing with local issues (Stratmann and Baur, 2002).

The tension between representing women and representing one's geographic constituency has been observed in several studies looking at SMP systems. Several of the UK MPs interviewed by Childs (2002:148-149) had been contacted by women constituents of male colleagues about gendered issues and, more importantly, she observed "a perceived tension between representing one's constituency and substantively representing women" (151). Carroll (2002) found that many Congresswomen believed women outside their district still looked to them as "their congresswomen". Most of the representatives also felt a responsibility to represent those women in addition to their districts, what one woman called "a pretty big burden" (53). In her analysis of United States Congress, Swers **(**2002) identifies and explores the tension women feel between their responsibility to represent women and the necessity to represent their constituency and "maintain the support of their partisan colleagues" **(**2006**)**. In Australia, a candidate for the Australian

Women's Party argued that "we tend to arrange our representative democracy around location… but not much around gender" (Kelly, 1997) even though gender, much more than location, has a profound effect on life (in Sawer, 2000).

Interestingly, in SMP systems, women often undertake more representational acts than their male counterparts, not just on women's issues but rather overall. Women have been observed to do more constituent work and express their desire to do even more (Richardson and Freeman, 1995; Thomas, 1990) and to make more speeches and statements than their male colleagues (per representative) on any issue (Lore, 2008). This gendered difference may reflect the responsibility and electoral incentive to represent one's geographic constituency paired with women's additional desire to represent women's issues.

Sawer (2000) observes that issues of domestic violence were raised three times as frequently in the Australian Senate as in the House of Representatives from 1981-1993, a difference she attributes to the higher proportion of women representatives. In 2005, women in the Senate worked across party lines to co-sponsor and pass a private member's bill, which lifted a ministerial veto on importing the RU486 "abortion" pill (Sawer, 2012). Only after it had passed in the Senate did the Prime Minister allow it to pass through the lower house (elected through AV) without division. Sawer again attributes this, in part, to the critical mass of women in the Senate. The theory offered here suggests, that in both, cases the proportional system used in the Senate may have exerted its own effect, quite separate from its effect on the *number* of women elected.

Unincorporated Representation

Carey and Shugart (1995) offer an additional way to think about electoral systems. Their analysis focuses specifically on the incentives generated for individuals to rely on either their own or their party's reputation for (re)election. A party's reputation, they argue, constitutes a collective action problem - all involved have an incentive to maintain a positive party reputation and a cohesive, strong front, but individuals also have an incentive to speak out against an unpopular position taken by their party to try to maximize their own support. Electoral systems, Carey and Shugart argue, structure the incentives that politicians face in navigating the tension between maximizing their party's votes and their own votes.

Four aspects of the electoral system are relevant: the degree leadership controls access to and rank on the ballot, vote pooling, and the number and type of votes to be cast by the individual voter. Carey and Shugart assign three possible values for each of the dimensions, with higher values indicating greater incentives for personal votes. First, incentives to cultivate a party vote are maximized when party leadership has control over the ballot. If candidates can access the ballot without approval from national leadership and voters can alter their rank on the list, the incentives and opportunities to cultivate a personal vote are much greater. The second characteristic, vote pooling, refers to the extent to which a vote is counted as support only for a candidate or whether votes are pooled to benefit a faction of candidates or the party as a whole. When votes are not pooled, individual candidates are elected purely on the votes they themselves receive. When votes are pooled, candidates' success depends on the support their party receives. Finally, the incentives for personal votes are the smallest in systems where voters have

one vote that they must cast for a party. Incentives to seek personal votes are greater when voters have multiple votes and are at their maximum when voters have a single vote that they must cast for one individual candidate. Combining these three characteristics, there are 13 (feasible though not necessary existing) combinations ranked from the lowest incentives for personal votes to the highest. A fourth characteristic, district magnitude, has the effect of amplifying the incentives created by other three other features.

By structuring the nature of representation - party or personal - electoral systems affect the relationship between constituents and their representatives, representatives and their parties. Legislators elected under party based systems must rely on their party for their re-election prospects and, as a result, need to follow their party's lead and direct their efforts to furthering their party's interests. With the bonds to party loosened, representatives in a personal vote system can build personal relationships. Politicians in these systems are more able to speak to issues other than those dictated by their party and have greater flexibility in voting, proposing legislation, and other behaviours.

Carey and Shugart mention national celebrity, particularism, and pork barrelling as potential pathways to personal support, but do state that their focus is the value of personal support, not how it is most effectively developed (419). The concept of 'unincorporated representation', including women's issues, offers an alternative. Given the freedom from their party, legislators can take the opportunity to pursue women's interests and in doing so distinguish themselves from their competitors by as an agent for women

Personal votes and unincorporated interest votes are not direct equivalent and several changes are made to the ranking of electoral systems. First, Carey and Shugart focus on party versus personal reputations at the *district level*, while I consider party reputation more broadly and do not limit the analysis to the district level. As outlined above, women are *not* geographically defined and so a consideration of the implications of unincorporated representation for women's substantive representation requires a national scope. Moreover, to reflect the difference between incentives for unincorporated representation and incentives for purely personal votes I make two adjustments to the scoring of the original framework: the first applies to the ballot dimension and the second to the vote dimension.

Ballot Dimension

The first adjustment arises out of a critique of the framework itself. The classification of 'ballot' as offered by Carey and Shugart does not capture the full range of combinations that might affect incentives for personal votes. The ballot dimension includes two components – the control leaders have over a ballot and the extent to which voters can disrupt a list. The intersection of these two dimensions yields four, not three, possible combinations. What is missing in Carey and Shugart's classification is a system where the list cannot be disrupted but where leaders do not control the ballot. If control over access to and rank on the ballot is local as opposed to national, there are clearly greater incentives for cultivating a personal vote even if voters cannot change the list once it is compiled. In other words, a system should score one if voters can disrupt the list *or* leaders do not have complete control over access to and rank on the ballot. Carey and Shugart's original framework ranks such systems as zero on this dimension. Countries like Canada and the United Kingdom where voters cannot disrupt the list of candidate (a

list of 1) but where local party members do have some control over nomination is scored '1' instead of '0' under this new classification.

Access to the ballot is not as simple as leader control versus individual politicians as entrepreneurs as Carey and Shugart (1995, 421) suggest. Rahat and Hazan (2001) take instead a much more multi-dimensional approach to evaluate access to a ballot. Their framework includes a consideration of the rules around who can be a candidate, who makes up the selectorate, and how territorially decentralized the process is. The former two range from exclusive to inclusive and the latter from national to local. Selection processes can also be determined by vote or by appointment. The features of the process have importance consequences for party control over candidates. When nominations are highly democratic, there is "a tendency [for candidates] to act in a manner that largely disregards the group(s) with which the candidate is associated (i.e. the party, the coalition, opposition, etc.); …[and] a drastic increase of the rather basic political trend toward individualist and populist politics" (313). Again, however, candidates might focus on unincorporated representation instead of individualistic politics. Indeed, Rahat and Hazan acknowledge that decentralization, for example, might be used to ensure the representation of women (or minorities or trade unions).

Rahat and Hazan paint a much more complete picture of the ways in which selection processes can vary and, as with Carey and Shugart's framework, there are clear implications for the representation of women as an alternative to personal politics. For simplicity's sake, however, I continue to use Carey and Shugart's simple categories. That said, in testing the theory offered I am attentive to the complexity provided by Rahat and Hazan where possible (Chapter 4 and 6).

0. Leaders have control over nomination and voters cannot disrupt the list
1. Voters can disrupt the list *or* leaders do not have complete control over access to and rank on the ballot
2. Leaders do have limited or no control over the ballot *and* voters can disrupt the list

Vote Dimension

While the theory can broadly be extended beyond the personal-party dichotomy, the representation of ideas or identities is simply not the same as securing political support on a strictly *personal* relationship. The second adjustment is a reflection of the way in which the representation of unincorporated interests is not an exact equivalent to a purely *personal* politics. Carey and Shugart classify systems where voters have multiple votes as having *lower* incentives for personal votes than those where voters have a single vote to cast for a candidate and "candidates are competing simultaneously for the same indivisible support of each voter" (422). In the case of women's representation or other unincorporated interests, it seems reasonable to expect that incentives might be greater when voters have multiple votes**.** Women voters don't vote on the basis of gender or women's issues alone, but if they can indicate several preferences, they may offer support for candidates who represent their policy preferences *and* who promise to further women's interests in the political arena. Women in these systems will have incentives and opportunities to substantively represent women. In other words, incentives for unincorporated interests in general and women in particular are greatest when voters have multiple votes to cast below the party level, lower when they have a single vote for a candidate, and the lowest when voters have a single vote for a party.

0. Voters have one vote to cast at the party level.
1. Voters have one vote to cast for an individual candidate.

2. Voters have multiple votes to distribute to candidates.

Polling Dimension

The polling dimension, which "measures whether votes cast for one candidate of a given party also contribute to the number of seats won in the district by the party as a whole" (421) remains the same as that offered by Carey and Shugart.

0. Votes are pooled at the party level.
1. Votes are pooled below the party level.
2. Votes are not pooled.

Incentives for Unincorporated Representation

These three dimensions are combined to create a classification of systems based on the incentives they generate for unincorporated representation. Incentives are highest when votes are not pooled, leaders do not control nominations, and when voters have multiple votes with which they can disrupt the presented lists of candidates. Incentives for unincorporated representation are at their lowest and incentives for party-based representation at their highest when voters have one vote to cast at the party level, votes are pooled, leaders control access to the ballot, and voters cannot disrupt the list.

District Magnitude

In the previous section, I argued district magnitude would increase opportunities and incentives for substantive representation, both because it lowers the electoral threshold and simply because more representatives per district increase the chances for a woman representative and enable specialization. Carey and Shugart, however, argue that the effect of district magnitude depends on the other institutional features: "In all systems

where there is intraparty competition, as M grows, so does the value of personal reputation. Conversely, in systems where there is no intraparty competition, as M grows, the value of personal reputation shrinks" (418). In party-based systems, as district magnitude increases, the party, rather than voters, increasingly becomes the primary principal to which representatives are responsible. On the other hand, when there are incentives for personal votes, "as the number of other copartisans from which a given candidate must distinguish herself grows, the importance of establishing a unique personal reputation, distinct from that of the party, also grows" (430).

Although incentives for unincorporated representation may grow alongside incentives for more traditionalistic personal representation, it is not at all clear that the number of representatives per district will have the same differential effect on the representation of women. Given the diverse ways a representative may cultivate a 'personal' vote, the competition between copartisans may manifest in other, non-party based approaches. If greater competition is the result of a larger district magnitude, it is more likely to take the form of divergent forms of representation, including the representation of women, rather than simply increasing the representation of women.

For summary, see Table 2.3 at the end of this chapter.

Discourse & Behaviour: Observable Implications

1. Women in systems that do not generate incentives for unincorporated representation (IUR) will address women's issues less frequently in representation acts (including oral questions, committees, debates, statements, voting, and the introduction of legislation) than their counterparts in systems that do.
2. Because men will not respond to IUR in the same way as women, the gap between women and men on these representational acts will be larger in when these incentives are at their maximum.

Women's Experiences of Political Institutions: Observable Implications

1. Women in systems that score high on IUR will perceive that it is in their electoral interest to represent women.
2. Women in systems that score low on IUR will feel constrained or limited in the amount of energy they can dedicate to represent women.
3. Women in systems that score high on IUR will seek preference votes or support in nomination as a candidate on the basis of representing women.

The classification adapted from Carey and Shugart enables thinking about differences among proportional and SMD systems beyond the simple dichotomy between the two. One could compare, for example, a system that includes some incentives for personal votes (like Congressional elections in the United States, which use a primary system) and a proportional representation system that encourages party vote (like the Spain where voters can only indicate their party of choice). For the sake of simplicity of theory development and testing, I keep the consideration of SMP vs. PR distinct from the consideration of incentives for unincorporated representation. In the cases of some of the empirical analysis in Chapter 4, I explore variation along the party-personal vote dimension *within* proportional systems because of certain features of the available data. The qualitative research in Chapter 6, does, however, enable a consideration of the implications for an interaction between the SMD/PR distinction and the party-personal vote distinction.

Preliminary Evidence – Substantive Representation in Personal and Party Systems.
As with the SMP-PR comparison, there is some preliminary evidence that incentives toward personal votes lead to a greater sense among candidates and legislators of being a

representative for women. In two American states, Reingold (2000) found that 34% of women representatives spontaneously mentioned women in a discussion of group representation. Two other studies, exploring countries where party control over access to the ballot is much higher (Canada and the United Kingdom), find that far fewer representatives mention women when asked about the meaning of representation or the nature of their mandate (13.6% and 11.8% respectively) (Childs, 2001, 2002; Tremblay, 2003). Further, Tremblay (2003) found that substantially more Senators than MPs in Australia cited the party system as a barrier to representing women. This difference, Tremblay argues, may be a consequence of party control - senators, more than MPs are "likely to view themselves as completely at the mercy of the party faction" (230). Where there is less voter capacity to influence the ballot, MPs see themselves more beholden to the party.

Substantive Representation & Descriptive Representation: In Conflict?

The effect of electoral systems on descriptive representation has been extensively studied, and so the focus here has been and will remain exclusively on the effect on substantive representation. It is worth, however, taking the time to explicitly compare the expected effect on descriptive representation with the expected effect on substantive representation. It has been well established that PR systems increase the number of women elected (Lijphart, 1991; IDEA, 2011; Krook, 2010; McIvor, 2003; Norris, 1997; Tremblay, 2006). I have offered a theory that suggests PR will also increase substantive representation by these women. On the other hand, research has established that descriptive representation is decreased when institutional incentivize personal votes and increased when there is greater party control (Thames and Williams, 2010; Valdini,

2012). In this case, then, institutional features oppositely affect descriptive representation and substantive representation.

Combining Constitutional Choices: Division of Powers and Electoral Systems

While the division of powers and the electoral system have clear and independent implications for the representation of women, they do not exist or operate independently in practice. The representativeness and efficiency of a political system depends not just on basic constitutional choice between a parliamentary or presidential system but also on its interaction with electoral systems (Carey and Shugart, 1992). Under a division of powers, systems that also use SMP are extremely efficient because of the smaller number of parties. For the same reason, representativeness is at a minimum. Carey and Shugart argue that despite the geographic tie of representation "politics in the districts from which members of parliament are elected can no longer focus so much as in the absence of party discipline on the stuff of legislative 'logrolling' and compromise… instead it must focus much more on nationally divisive but often not divisible concerns" (10). While the consequence of interest for Carey and Shugart is the diminution of local representation, the paramount importance of national agendas and corresponding national leader control and extreme party discipline also reduce opportunities for representation of women by women.

For the major cases included in this research, disaggregating the differential effect of the two institutions is very difficult. Canada and the United Kingdom are the major parliamentary systems used to compare a fusion of powers with the division of powers in the United States. While all three countries use SMP systems, there are substantial incentives to pursue personal votes in the latter that are absent in the two parliamentary

systems. A more ideal comparison would be possible if parties in the United States had greater control over nomination or if the electoral systems in Canada and the UK did more to incentivize personal votes by allowing voters to rank preferences (for example). Such a thought experiment, however, runs into a theoretical problem – a *personal vote* based SMP system is in contradiction with a parliamentary system. Carey does not make this argument and Shugart in either their 1992 or 1995 work, but a simple extension of their arguments makes the conclusion clear. Parliamentary systems that use SMP are defined by high party discipline to avoid votes of non-confidence and early elections, with the result that opportunities to engage in logrolling or provide particularistic services are extremely limited. A vote for the local candidate is, for all intents and purposes, a vote for the executive. Put differently, even before taking the particular features of the electoral system into account representatives have minimal (to no) opportunities to cultivate a personal, clientelistic basis of support. The extension to women's representation as one particular manifestation of a 'personal' base of support is simple. Individual legislators cannot cultivate votes based on the representation of women when their primary principal is the party and they have little capacity to deliver on any such representational promise.

In short, the party versus personal nature of the SMP system is contingent on the division or fusion of powers. In parliamentary systems, SMP systems are party-focused to match the institutional constraints on personal votes generated by the fusion of powers. In other words, a division of powers is a necessary condition for personal votes. The institutional features of a presidential system enable representatives to depart from the party line and to pursue an independent representational agenda, making the division of powers

compatible with a personal-vote based systems. The primary system in the United States gives voters an extra vote to cast and votes are not pooled. Fundamentally, though, if representatives campaign on a promise to provide particularistic or local goods or, importantly, policies important to women, they can credibly pursue these objectives (though the outcome is not guaranteed). Of course, a division of powers is not a sufficient condition for a plurality system to be based on personal votes. For example, the French semi-presidential system is much more party-vote based system than the United States. The point is, however, that presidential systems are not inconsistent with personal-vote based electoral system whereas parliamentary systems that use SMP are.

These sharp differences between presidential and parliamentary systems based on the trade-off between efficiency and representativeness draw attention to more subtle differences between parliamentary systems. Parliamentary systems which use proportional representation, are already more representative and less efficient than their SMP counterparts. The higher district magnitude increases the number of parties and with it the range of interests represented. At the same time, these parliamentary systems lose some of the efficiency as they frequently produce minority, multiparty, and coalition governments that reduce voters' ability to assess accountability and choose between governing alternatives.

The altered balance between efficiency and representativeness facilitates greater flexibility in the extent to which personal votes are incentivized. To be sure, Carey and Shugart's conceptualization of personal votes came at a later date and so the interaction

with parliamentary and presidential systems is not considered in their 1992 book.[11] Instead, they focus exclusively on the broad interests brought into the legislature by the greater *number* and *diversity* of parties. Parliamentary systems that use PR systems where parties maintain significant control over nomination and order on the ballot will indeed be representative in a way that reflects party composition. Parliamentary electoral frameworks that give voters multiple votes that they can use to change the order on the ballot can increase representativeness above and beyond a greater number and diversity of parties. Included in this broader sense of representativeness is, of course, the increased incentive and opportunity for women to represent women.

The impact of presidential systems also depends on the timing of elections between the executive and legislative branches. To the extent that executive and legislative elections are concurrent, parties may be more "presidentialized" if executive dynamics rather than the legislative dynamics drive elections (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, 127). If elections are separated, executive and legislative branches can campaign on distinctive issues, but if they are held concurrently, there is an expectation of 'fusion of purposes'. What is of interest in relation to unincorporated representation, however, is the *intra*-party competition – even if elections are held concurrently, the absence of a confidence motion still enables individuals to depart from the party line. Moreover, the extent to which concurrent elections result in a more cohesive party depends on the features of the electoral system, including whether ballots are fused. Finally, the timing of elections,

[11] In Carey and Shugart (1995), it is argued "that, *ceteris paribus*, personal reputation will be more important in a presidential than in a parliamentary system" (432). The model developed, however, "focuses exclusively on electoral rules, leaving the systematic incorporation of other variables, like constitutional system, to subsequent research." In Samuels and Shugart (2010), the Carey and Shugart (1995) classification of personal and party votes is used only to argue that the "separate origin of the executive and legislative branches has an analogous impact on political parties" (127).

Samuels and Shugart (2010) matter to the extent to which *presidential* rather than *legislative* candidates make appeals on the basis of personal or party votes. In short, the timing of electoral systems in presidential systems matters less to unincorporated representation than the difference between parliamentary and presidential systems and the nature of the electoral system itself. As a result, I do not include this aspect of variation in the analysis.

In summary, presidential systems that use proportional representation systems that facilitate unincorporated representation will result in the highest representation of women by women and the largest gap between women and men. Parliamentary systems that use SMP systems which (necessarily) incentivize party votes will do the most to disincentivize and constrain substantive representation of women and, as a result, will have the lowest levels of substantive representation by women and the smallest gap between women and men.

In the analyses that follow it is not always possible to disaggregate whether it is the features of the electoral system *or* the division of powers that leads to women in presidential systems to do more to represent women, but the point made here is that, in many ways, they are fundamentally linked. In the qualitative analysis, effort is made to consider in a more complex and integrated fashion the institutional features that incentivize or enable representation of women by women. The interviews allow for a discussion with, rather than about, legislators themselves and target their experiences of institutional incentives and opportunities to represent women. Representatives do not

experience the electoral system and the division of powers as separate entities but instead pursue election, promotion, and policy objectives in a single institutional context.

Moderating Outcomes: Presidential and Parliamentary Systems

There are two distinct ways that institutions can moderate the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation – through their effect on the behaviour of representatives and, independently, through their effect on the aggregation of that behaviour into outcomes. This section turns to the latter and asks how a division and fusion of powers differently translate individual actions into policy outcomes.

Parliamentary Systems: Unfulfilled Potential for Substantive Representation

While they are likely to minimize the substantive representation of women by women, Westminster-style parliaments, in theory, provide important opportunities for substantive representation as *policy outcomes* (Trimble, 2006). Because they are defined by government domination, *if* feminist policy objectives make it to the agenda of the governing party, parliamentary systems will result in more policy addressing women's issues. Parliamentary systems are decisive and efficient - once a proposal has been made by government party discipline means it is very likely to be enacted (Carey and Shugart, 1992; Chiebub et al., 2004; Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Strom, 2000; Tsebelis, 2002).

The lower decision-making costs *could* mean that an increase in descriptive representation and a preference for women-friendly policy among women legislators is quickly and easily translated into policy outcomes. Thus, if women's issues do make it to the agenda, government is both able and obliged to implement programs (Swer et al., 2006). As argued in Chapter 1, however, institutions affect outcomes in two ways – by

influencing behaviour and by aggregating that behaviour into outcomes. It is the former that poses the initial problems in the case of parliamentary systems. While parliamentary systems might provide efficient and predictable aggregation of behaviour into outcomes, their effect on behaviour means that these outcomes are likely *not* to include women's issues. As Peckford (2002) argues of the Canadian case, "the promotion of outside interests, particularly feminist in nature, enjoys little room in most parties, especially when the majority of those elected have been white, male and middle class" (10).

In short, while parliamentary systems may hold opportunities for substantive representation in the form of policy outcomes, these remain largely unfulfilled because of the ways in which the system affects behaviour. To the extent that a relationship exists between the numbers and substance of women's representation in parliamentary systems, it may be the number of women in cabinet that matter. These women, having satisfied lower-order objectives (nomination, election, promotion), may be more able to pursue their policy objectives and will have more institutional power to do so.

Presidential Systems: Veto Players and Indecisiveness

According to Lijphart (2012), consensus systems, defined in part by the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, lead to "kinder, gentler" democracy. Consensus systems, Lijphart finds, spend a greater proportion of GDP on social expenditure than their majoritarian counterparts, and so we might expect that presidential systems lead to substantive representation in the form of policy. As argued, presidential systems, more than parliamentary systems, do enable and encourage the representation of women by women through votes, discourse, and the introduction of legislation.

Institutions, however, also structure the aggregation of these individual actors. Using Tsebelis's (1995) veto player framework, Haggard and McCubbins argue that the extent to which policy decisions can be reached (decisiveness) and the extent to which those decisions are definitive (resoluteness) is a function of the number of effective veto players involved in decision making. A division of powers means there are multiple veto players and, as a result, decisions are harder to reach and the status quo more persistent. This logic can be extended to consider the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation and the moderating effect becomes evident: even if the number of women increases dramatically in a presidential system where decisiveness is low but resoluteness is high, an increase in the provision of women-friendly policies may not follow. In other words, although the behaviour of individual women may include the substantive representation of women, the institutional structure may minimize the extent to which this is translated into policy outcomes.

Tables 2.4 at the end of this chapter summarize these arguments.

It is difficult to make percise hypotheses on the affect of these two institutions on policy and legislative outcomes as the two ways in which the institution affects outcomes – by influencing behaviour and by determining the aggregation of behaviour into outcomes – do not operate in the same direction. For example, while Westminster parliamentary systems generate disincentives for representing women, if there are women within the executive intent on pursuing women-friendly policies, the parliamentary system offers an efficient means of doing so. On the other hand, while incentives and opportunities do exist for women in the American presidential system, the number of veto players can result in a status quo that is hard to change. In other words, there are significant reasons

to expect a limited relationship between the proportion of women in the legislature and policy outcomes in both presidential and parliamentary systems, though the exact institutional mechanisms differ.

Given these contradictory expectations, the theory does not lend itself to clear hypotheses like those about the expected effect of institutions on individual behaviour. In fact, even if institutions moderate behaviour and even if they affect the aggregation of that behaviour, *no* relationship may be observable between the number of women and policy outcomes. This complex relationship may explain why so few studies look for a correlation between the number of women and policy outcomes in either presidential or parliamentary systems (see Chapter 1). As a result, the empirical work in later chapters is much more exploratory when testing the impact of institutions on policy than when testing behaviour.

Table 2.5 at the end of this chapter summarizes these arguments.

Moderating Outcomes: Electoral Systems

Policy and Legislative Changes: Efficiency

Electoral systems affect the stability and efficiency of governments. While not without exception, PR tends to create minority or coalition governments while SMP systems produce single party majority governments (Gallagher, 2005). Similarly, systems that incentivize party votes lead to more cohesive voting than those that incentivize personal votes. In both cases, this leads to a greater number of active players who must agree on proposed legislation, making decision-making less efficient and the status quo more

persistent (Tsebelis, 2002). As a result, an increase in the number of women may not translate into policy outcomes, regardless of their individual levels of behaviour.

Parties and Party Systems

According to Duverger's law (1959), the psychological and mechanical effects of SMP systems should result in elections and governments dominated by two political parties, and while there do exist notable counter cases, systems using SMP do tend to have fewer effective parties in legislatures (Gallagher, 2005). Downsian logic (1957) suggests that where two parties exist, they converge on the median voter, towards the centre of the political spectrum. Proportional representation systems, on the other hand, create opportunities for parties on the left (Cusack & Soskice, 2007). Because of the affiliation with between the left and policies related to women's issues, proportional representation systems may lead to more substantive policy outcomes because of the parties elected rather than individual behaviour within the parties.

Institutions in the Real World

The institutions as introduced are somewhat abstract and disjointed. This section adds flesh to that skeleton and describes the institutions used in seven countries – Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These are the countries in which I conducted in-depth interviews with women representatives to test the theories. They do not, of course, represent all possible combinations of institutions, but there is important variation in the key independent variables – the electoral system, division of powers, and women's political representation.

The ranking on the vote and ballot dimensions are based on the incentives for unincorporated representation and reflect the adjustments made to Carey and Shugart's original concepts. Unless otherwise specified, information is based on the Interparliamentary Union Database (IPU) (2015), the Global Database of Quotas (2015), and the PARTIREP Dataset (2014). [12] Table 2.6 provides a summary.

Belgium

Belgium is a parliamentary system that uses a proportional representation system to elect 150 members to the federal parliament. There are 11 multi-member districts that have between 4 and 24 seats. Ten of the districts coincide with the country's ten provinces and the eleventh is made up of the Brussels Capital Region. Political parties do not run nationally but rather run either in Wallonia, Flanders, or the German-speaking region. Only in the Brussels Capital Region do voters have the choice between voting on a Walloon and Flemish ballot. Belgium is a bicameral system and since 2014 senators are no longer directly elected but rather are members of local and regional government or elected by their peers.

Incentives for unincorporated representation are moderate. Lists are compiled mostly at a regional or local level. Voters may choose between voting for a party and indicating a preference for one or more candidates within the same list. Preference votes are counted first as a vote for the party as a whole and position on party list matters more than the number of preference votes received. As a result, it is very difficult to disrupt party lists.

[12] The IPU was used as a source for world ranking of the representation of women, but the ranking themselves were reinterpreted. The IPU (2015) ranks countries that tie as taking up one spot. For example, Canada (as of September, 2015) was ranked 50th internationally but there are actually 61 countries in which women make up a higher proportion of representatives. To reflect this, I count Canada as 62nd.

Women make up 39.3% of the national parliament in Belgium, which ranks 18th internationally for women's political representation. Since 1999 a quota has been used to increase the number of women elected. Specifically, every list must reflect gender parity and the first two candidates on any list must not be of the same gender. Lists that fail to meet these requirements are not accepted by the electoral authorities.

Canada

Canada is a bicameral, parliamentary system and its 308 Members of Parliament are elected through a simple SMP system.[13] The upper chamber is unelected and is meant to represent the provinces.

Incentives for unincorporated representation are minimal. Voters have one vote to cast and so cannot indicate preferences among candidates. Moreover, because voters face a 'list' of one candidate, votes are pooled for the party. Local riding associations do have some control over nominations, though it is not absolute.

At the time, Canada ranked 62nd in the world for women's political representation with women comprising just 25% of MPs.[14] There are no legislated quotas, although some parties, notably the NDP, have internal goals for representation and procedures for encouraging the nomination of women and minorities.

Germany

Germany is a parliamentary republic that uses a mixed-member proportional system (MMP). There are at least 598 elected members, 299 elected from single-member

[13] In the election following the interviews (held in October of the same year, 2015) the number of MPs increased to 338.
[14] After the election, the representation of women increased marginally to 26%, putting Canada 60th internationally.

plurality constituencies and another 299 elected through list PR from 16 multi-member constituencies that correspond to the Länder. Lists for the election of PR MPs are closed and votes are cast at the party level. Seats are distributed using the Sainte-Laguë/Schepers method. To ensure that all parties receive the minimal number of seats that they are entitled to over-hang or balance-seats are possible. The upper house, the Bundesrat, is comprised of delegates from the Länder.

Incentives for unincorporated representation for those elected directly are similar to those in Canada – voters have a single vote to cast, and all votes are pooled, but there is some local control over nomination. Incentives for unincorporated representation are even less for those elected off the party lists – voters are pooled, lists are closed and established at the Land level, and the votes themselves are cast for the party and not for candidates.

Germany ranks 25th internationally for women's political representation and 36.5% of MPs in the Bundestag (lower house) are women. There are no legislated quotas, but most parties have voluntary quotas for the composition of the party lists.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands is a parliamentary system that uses a PR system to elect the 150 members of the Tweede Kamer.

Incentives for unincorporated representation are minimal. Although there are technically 18 multi-member districts, the lists are nearly identical and established nationally making the whole country effectively a single electoral district. Voters have a single vote to cast for an individual candidate, but all votes are counted first as a vote for the party. Seats are allocated among candidates according to the order in which they appear on the list unless

an individual candidate receives enough preference votes to meet 25% of the Hare quota. These 'preference votes' rarely change which candidates are elected - between 2002 and 2010 just six MPs were elected solely because of the personal votes they received (Andeweg & van Holsteyn, 2011). The upper house, known as the First House or Eerste Kamer, is comprised of representatives elected by the 12 states-provinces.

The Netherlands ranks 22nd internationally for women's political representation with women making up just over 37% of all representatives in the country's lower house. There is no legislated quota, but both the Labour and the Green parties use internal party quotas.

Switzerland

The 200 members of Switzerland's House of Representatives are elected from the country's 26 Cantons. Five cantons use SMP and elections are conducted using proportional representation in the remaining 21. When proportional representation is used, incentives for unincorporated representation are high; multiple votes can be cast for lists and can also be used to modify lists by crossing out or repeating names or voting for members of multiple parties, a practice known as *panachage.*

The government of Switzerland is composed of seven members representing five different parties, with the president chosen on an annual, rotating basis. There are no votes of confidence and rejection of a proposal from the government either by the Parliament or through a referendum does not constitute a government crisis nor does it necessitate ministerial resignations. The upper house, the Council of the States, represents the cantons.

Just over 30.5% of legislators in the House of Representatives are women, putting Switzerland 44th internationally. There are no legislated quotas and only the Social Democratic Party has internal quotas.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is a Westminster parliamentary system that uses an SMP system to elect its 650 members. Like Canada, incentives for unincorporated representation in the SMP systems are minimal.

The unelected upper house, The House of Lords, is mostly appointed by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister.

At the time of interviews, women comprised 22.6% of all MPs, putting the United Kingdom 71st internally. There are no legislated quotas aimed at increasing women's political representation, but the Labour party employs all women shortlists (AWLS) in 50% of winnable ridings.

The United States

The United States is a presidential system that uses single member to elect the lower house – the House of Representatives. The upper house, the Senate, acts to represent the interests of States. In contrast to the SMP systems in Canada and the UK, there are significant incentives for unincorporated representation. The use of the primary system means that control over nominations is local, voters have more than one vote to cast at different times, and there is no pooling in the first round.

Of the countries included in this study, the United States has the lowest representation of women (less than 20%) and ranks 96th internationally. There are no legislated or voluntary quotas.

Table 2.1. Division & Fusion of Powers - The Moderating Effect on Discourse & Behaviour

	Incentives & Opportunities	Disincentives & Constraints
Division of Powers	More freedom from party discipline and absence of incentives to follow party direction creates opportunities to address women's issues, including in speeches and votes. Women elected via support through EMILY's list or similar organizations will have incentives to address women's issues through speeches & statements. Increases opportunities to propose legislation and legislative changes to reflect women's interests. Opportunities for cross party cooperation on women's issues	
Fusion of Powers	Occasional "votes of conscience" may provide opportunities to represent women. Significant opportunities for women in cabinet to introduce and pass legislation.	To remain in caucus and access promotions to government, representatives incentivized to represent party interests, potentially at the expense of women's issue. Re-election ambitions similarly incentivize focusing communication on party priorities. All else equal, party reputation will be more important than personal reputation. Dissenting votes are very costly. Substantial disincentives exist for women to represent women or support policy through votes if doing so requires dissenting. More confrontational system disincentives cross-party cooperation on legislative proposals. Party leadership control over agenda, including who makes a speech or asks an oral question, constrains opportunity for discourse address women's issues. Fused executive and legislative branches mean government controls most introduction of legislation. This constrains individual women's ability to introduce legislation.

Table 2.2. SMP vs. PR: The Moderating Effect on Discourse & Behaviour

	Incentives & Opportunities	Disincentives & Constraints
Single Member Plurality		"Too much emphasis on women's issues in a campaign might lead to speculation that the candidate is narrow in her interests and would not adequately represent all the people" (Carroll, 1984**,** 319). Limited issues and identities can be represented in limited opportunities for communication. Focus on geographic area constraints time and space dedicated to women's issues. Being seen to represent women's interest at expense of geographic interests in votes cast may harm re-election. No incentive to deal with issues brought to attention of representatives by constituents in other districts.
Proportional Representation	Lower electoral threshold mean women are more able to seek votes on the basis of representing women. Opportunity to create and appeal to tie based on common experience & identity rather than geography. More able to dedicate time to addressing in speeches and other forms of communities women's issues because responsibility to represent geographic area shared with other representatives. With higher district magnitude & lower threshold, women may be able to make their votes, legislative proposals and speeches based on the opinions of their *women* constituents, rather than all constituents.	

Table 2.3. Unincorporated Representation & Party Votes: The Moderating Effect on Discourse & Behaviour

	Incentives & Opportunities	Disincentives & Constraints
Unincorporated Representation / Personal Vote Systems	Greater freedom from party direction on speeches and statements creates opportunities to focus on issues of choice, including women's issues. Freedom from party enables legislators propose and to vote in favour of women's interest. Incentive to differentiate themselves from other candidates (in and outside their party) and women can do so on the basis of gender representation.	
Party Vote Systems		Incentives largely about maintain party reputation through speeches and statements. Tie to party for election and re-election creates disincentives to make legislative proposals on topics other than those dictated by parties. Similarly, legislators need to vote with party, regardless of position, to ensure access to ballot and re-election. Dedicating time and resources to party agenda constraints those available to representing women. Party controls access to agenda and legislative priorities to maintain party reputation.

Table 2.4. Division and Fusion of Powers: The Moderating Effect on Outcomes

	Behaviour	**Aggregation of behaviour**	**Expected relationship between descriptive representation & outcomes**
Division of Powers	Higher levels of representation of women's issues by individual women.	High number of veto players leads to persistent status quo.	Moderate
Fusion of Powers	Lower levels of representation of women's issues by individual women.	Government control over agenda, tight party discipline, ensures most government proposed legislation is passed.	Minimal

Table 2.5. Electoral Systems: The Moderating Effect on Outcomes

	Behaviour	**Aggregation of behaviour**	**Expected relationship between descriptive representation & outcomes**
SMP	Minimal opportunities for the representation of women's issues. Notable disincentives to represent women's issues.	SMP likely to lead to majority governments able to efficiently change policy and legislation.	Low.
PR	Incentives and opportunities to represent women.	Minority governments create more veto players and preferences the status quo	Moderate.
Personal / Unincorporated Representation Vote Based Systems	High incentives and opportunities for representation of women's issues	More veto players due to more independent behaviour. Harder to depart from status quo and reach new decisions.	Moderate.
Party Vote Based Systems	Disincentives and constraints for the representation of women's issues	More cohesive voting and proposing of legislation, fewer veto players.	Low

Table 2.6: Institutions in the Real World

Division of Powers	PR	Vote Dimension	Ballot Dimension	Vote Pooling	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation
Belgium					
Parliamentary system. **Coalition Government**	Yes	Multiple votes to indicate preferences among candidates 2/2	List very difficult to disrupt. Most lists established at local or region level. 1/2	Maximum vote pooling. All votes counted first as votes for the party 0/2	3/6
Canada					
Parliamentary system. **Majority government.**	No	While voters' cast their single vote for a candidate, single they are voting for a party 'list' of one it is considered a single vote at the party level. 0/2	No 'list' disruption. Significant local control over the nomination of candidates. 1/2	Maximum vote pooling. All votes functionally counted first as votes for the party 0/2	1/6
Germany					
Parliamentary system. **Grand Coalition government.**	Mixed 299 SMP seats and at least 299 PR seats	Single vote cast at party level for PR list. SMP seats: Votes cast for a party 'list' of one and thus is considered a single vote at the party level. 0/2	No 'list' disruption for PR seats Some local control over the nomination of candidates. 1/2 – for SMP seats. 0/2 – for PR seats	Maximum vote pooling. All votes functionally counted first as votes for the party 0/2	1/6 – SMP seats 0/6 – PR seats

Division of Powers	PR	Vote Dimension	Ballot Dimension	Vote Pooling	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation
The Netherlands					
Parliamentary system. **Coalition Government**	PR	Single vote cast for an individual candidate. 1/2	List very difficult to disrupt. List established nationally. 0/2	Maximum vote pooling. All votes counted first as votes for the party 0/2	1/6
Switzerland					
Unique political system. Division of Powers	Mostly PR 5 SMP seats	Multiple votes can be cast within and across parties. 2/2	Panachage enables list disruption List established nationally, though require some support locally. 1/2	Maximum vote pooling. All votes counted first as votes for the party 0/2	3/6
The United Kingdom					
Parliamentary system.	No	While voters' cast their single vote for a candidate, single they are voting for a party 'list' of one it is considered a single vote at the party level. 0/2	No 'list' disruption. Significant local control over the nomination of candidates. 1/2	Maximum vote pooling. All votes counted first as votes for the party 0/2	1/6
The United States					
Presidential System	No	Multiple votes to be cast below the party level over time. 2/2	No leadership control over ballot. List determined by primary. 2/2	Votes are not pooled during primaries or for MMD election. 2/2	6/6

Chapter 3: Testing the Theory - Substantive Representation in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems

The separation of purposes, powers, origins, and survival generate greater opportunities for women to introduce legislation and collaborate with others to raise the profile of women's issues and incentivize such behaviour as a way to seek electoral and financial support. By contrast, in parliamentary systems, the carrots of promotion, the stick of dissolution of parliament, and the overlapping electoral incentives of the executive and legislative branches of parties limit the opportunities for women to act independently to represent women.

This chapter tests these propositions using quantitative methods and two datasets that capture individual behaviour. The first dataset based on the PARTIREP comparative MP survey, includes self-reported behaviour from over 2000 representatives across over 70 regional and national parliaments. This dataset allows for several tests of the theory. First, I assess whether the representation of women by women and by men varies across presidential and parliamentary systems. In both institutions, women do more than men to represent women, but the gap is larger when there is a division of powers. Second, I assess the extent to which the institutions differently affect legislators in left and right parties. The results indicate that it is men's behaviour that is institutionally dependent; in particularly men in the left do more to represent women when they are bound to their party in parliamentary systems. On the other hand, men in left parties take the freedom of presidential systems to do less to represent women. Finally, I explore whether the observed effect is due to institutions acting as filters – encourage some types of

individuals to opt into or out of politics – as incentive structures or both. The findings suggest institutions affect behaviour in multiple ways.

The second is a new dataset created for this research and analyzes the use of Twitter by representatives in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The analyses demonstrate that women, more than men, use Twitter to talk about women's issues, but women in presidential system do so much more frequently. Moving beyond the statistical analysis demonstrates the influence of women's organizations in the United States and formal, parliamentary roles in Canada and the U.K. Women who Tweet the most in the U.S. are heavily funded by groups like EMILY's lists, while the most prolific Tweeters on women's issues in Canada and the U.K. are government minister or opposition critics with official responsibilities for women.

The analysis in this chapter is a matter of trade-offs in the face of imperfect data. The PARTIREP data includes a large number of countries and depth in terms of the measures of substantive representation, but is limited in that there are few examples of systems that use a division of powers, and is pure presidential. The Twitter data, on the other hand, enables an explicit comparison between a pure presidential system and two Westminster parliaments, but is limited to only three cases. Despite the limitations in the data however, the results are consistently supportive of the theory. Chapters 5 and 6 take a qualitative approach to the question and allow for further triangulation of the findings. Throughout the chapter, however, I remain aware of the limitations of the data and discuss the implications of these limitations for the findings.

The Division of Powers and Individual Behaviour – The PARTIREP Data

The PARTIREP survey, conducted between spring 2009 and summer 2010, used written questionnaires and reached representatives in 15 national and 58 regional parliaments. The survey asked legislators about their thoughts on representation, their behaviour in parliament, and attitudes on democracy and governance. The dataset also contains a wide range of institutional variables based on publicly available sources. Details on the breakdown of respondents by country and institution are available in Appendix A, Tables A1 and A2.

Except Israel, all countries involved were located in Europe and variation of division of powers is somewhat limited. In total, 37% of the representatives in the PARTIREP survey are classified as elected in a system with some level of division of powers. Although the division of powers variable does not correspond exactly with the presidential/parliamentary division as theorized in Chapter 2, it does still allow for an initial test of the theory.

The survey does not include any pure presidential systems and there are only three semi-presidential systems – France, Portugal, Poland, Austria. Austria, however, is an almost pure parliamentary system by convention (Muller, 1999; Shugart, 2005) and so is grouped with the parliamentary systems for the analysis. The remaining three are "premier-presidential' systems (Carey and Shugart, 1992; Shugart, 2005) meaning the President selects the Prime Minister and Cabinet (although only without an investiture in France) but cannot guarantee that the cabinet of its choice stays in place. In France, but not in Poland or Portugal, the President has the capacity to dissolve the assembly.

Because of its unique features, Switzerland was also included in the 'division of powers' category, a choice consistent with similar research (Atchison and Down, 2009). Although the cabinet (the Federal Council) and the rotating positions of president and vice-president are chosen by and from the assembly, convention means that the composition, in terms both of parties and individuals, is largely pre-determined regardless of election results. The Federal Council comprises all the major parties and individuals are returned to cabinet in almost every case until they retire from politics. Furthermore, the principle of "non-responsibility" means that the Federal Council is independent from parliament in that the legislature cannot pass a vote to remove them from office.

Capturing Women's Substantive Political Representation

The PARTIREP survey asks representatives 1) how often they meet with women's organizations, 2) how often they spoke to and 3) how often they made proposals on issues of importance to women within their parliamentary group. Responses are coded on a five-point scale ranging from (almost) never to (almost) every week/meeting.[15] Representatives are also asked 4) whether they cooperated with members of other parties to promote the interests of women. Importantly, these questions ask about the representation of women within parliamentary groups and outside the visible, formal representation that occurs within a parliament, such as debates, votes, or the proposing of legislation. The data offer a unique insight of representation 'behind the scenes' and gives an indication about how representatives spend valuable time and political resources. Appendix Tables A3 shows the distribution of responses to these questions by gender.

[15] Responses: 1) (Almost) never 2) At least once a year 3) Every three months 4) Once a month 5) (Almost) every week/meeting.

The four individual measures of behaviour capture distinct actions and different ways in which representatives may promote women's interest in politics, but they fundamentally measure the same thing: when faced with limited resources for representation, how frequently do representatives act for women *outside the public view*. For this reason and because of good internal consistency responses are combined into one indicator, which ranges from zero to thirteen.[16] Table A4 in Appendix A shows the distribution of this variable by gender.

There is a notable concern with this approach, however: the intervals in the ordinal variables are neither consistent nor meaningful. Someone who reports meeting with women's organizations every week does so four times as much as someone who does so once a month and 52 times as much as someone who reports doing so once a year. The difference in the variable, however, is just 1 and 3 points respectively. Combine all these indicators exacerbates the problem. Scoring a thirteen on the combined behaviour variable, in other words, is much more than twice as much work as scoring seven. Two ordered logistic regressions were conducted to test the cut points and the indicator does appear to function as interval variable (see Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix A), but both the limitation and the nature of the scale should be kept in mind while interpreting results.

It is the nature of survey data that MP behaviour is self-reported. One major benefit of this is that it avoids the thorny issue of defining just what one means by 'women's issues and interests'. Rather than requiring women to address childcare or sexualized violence (for example), these measures allow representatives to define what it means to them to

[16] Cronbach's alpha score for the four measures is 0.75, indicating good internal consistency. Variable recoded from 3-16.

represent women and to report how often they do it. One issue with self-reporting, however, is a tendency to overstate the frequency of one's behaviour if one thinks they *should* be representing women. This problem might be greater among women or members of left wing parties who may feel greater expectations to represent women. Controlling for party affiliation (left or right) will help minimize the problem, but this limitation should be kept in mind while interpreting results. The variable has an overall mean of 4.0, though it varies substantially across the different parliament.

Women Representing Women

The data support the notion that it matters who representatives are – women more than their male colleagues want to and act to represent women. On average, women rank representing women a 6 out of 7 on importance, a full point greater than their male counterparts ($p<0.01$). This is true at all points along the left-right spectrum. Indeed, women on the far right feel more strongly about representing women than men on the far left (average of 6.2 out of 7 and 5.7 out of 7 respectively).

The behaviour of women reflects this difference. Women meet more often with women's groups. Within their parliamentary group, they speak to and make proposals on women's issues more frequently. And they are more likely to collaborate with other parties to promote women's issues ($p<0.01$). On the combined behaviour indicator, the average differs substantially between women and men (5.7 and 3.2 respectively, $p<0.001$). Approximately 50% of women score a 6 out of 13 or higher, compared to just more than 21% of men. A full third of men score a one or less, compared to less than 10% of women. Figure 3.1 shows the average behaviour for men and women by placement on the left-right spectrum. Across the political spectrum, women do more than men to represent

women and the gender gap in behaviour is similar from left to right. See Figure 3.1 at the end of this chapter.

Hypotheses

While it is clear that women do more to represent women, the question is whether this gender difference varies with the institutional context.

In line with the theory offered in Chapter 2:

1. Women will undertake more actions to represent women when there is a division of powers than when there is not.

And:

2. The gap between the behaviour of women and the behaviour by men will be larger when there is a division of powers than when there is not.

To test these hypotheses, I run a multi-level regression; the combined behaviour indicator is the dependent variable measuring the substantive representation of women, and three independent variables are included – the gender dummy variable, a division of powers dummy, and an interaction term between the two. The data are structured hierarchically, with individual MPs clustered within the legislatures in which they are elected. The chi-squared results and corresponding p-values indicate that a multilevel analysis is an improvement on a simple OLS regression.

To rule out alternative explanations and address potential confounding variables, I include two key controls - whether or not an MP belongs to a left wing party and an indicator of the feminist political culture within the parliament. Women's representation is higher in left wing parties and these parties are more likely to address social justice issues. Failing to include it in the analysis may inflate the relationship between gender

and the representation of women. Institutions with a more feminist political culture are likely to foster more substantive representation and to have a greater number of women representatives, partly because women feel more able to participate in the politics of such an legislature. Feminist political culture was estimated by creating an index based on several questions on gender equality and then averaging responses across a parliament.[17] Both indicators are included in the analysis, but are not displayed in the tables. The membership in a left party was statistically significant and positively related to behaviour while the coefficient for feminist political culture of the legislature did not have a significant effect.

Interpreting the Results

Given the interactions in the analyses, it is worth outlining what each of the individual coefficients tells us. First, the coefficient for the variable "woman" indicates the effect of being a woman in a parliamentary system. Put differently, it is the expected difference between men and women in parliamentary systems. The coefficient for the division of powers dummy indicates the effect of the institution on *men's* behaviour. Finally, the interaction variable can be understood as the differential effect of being a woman, depending on the institution *or* the differential effect of the institution, depending on gender. To understand the full effect of the institution on women's behaviour, the institution coefficient and the interaction term need to be combined. To understand the effect of gender in the institution under analysis the coefficients for gender and the

[17] The left-party dummy variable was created from the variable that asked respondents to place their party on the left-right spectrum, ranging from 0 to 10. An MP was deemed to be in a left-wing party if they placed their party between 0 and 5. To calculate feminist political culture, responses to four questions on gender equality were combined and averaged across a parliament. Questions include whether it's the government's responsibility to ensure equal opportunities, whether women's organization are no longer necessary, whether women and men enjoy real equality, and whether affirmative action is a legitimate measure to address under-representation.

interaction term need to be summed. The results appear in Table 3.1 at the end of this chapter.

Results

Figure 3.2 at the end of this chapter shows predicted behaviour and demonstrates clearly that individual behaviour varies by gender and institution. First, it is clear that in both presidential and parliamentary systems, women do more to represent women than do men. However, the gendered gap is substantially larger in presidential systems – while the behaviour of women does not differ significantly, men in presidential systems do much less than their parliamentary counterparts. As a result, the difference between men and women is much larger in presidential systems. In fact, the gender gap is 1.75 times as large under the conditions of a division of powers than under a fusion of powers. The evidence strongly supports Hypothesis 2. It does not, however, support Hypothesis 1; women do not do more in systems in which there is a division of powers than in systems where there is not. It is not that women take advantage of the freedom from their party to do more to represent women, but rather that men take the opportunity to do even less.

Robustness Tests

A series of robustness tests were performed on the analyses in Table 3.1. The multilevel model was restructured to group representatives in parties rather than parliaments. MPs were also regrouped hierarchically in parties, within parliaments, in countries. As an alternative, single level regressions with the errors clustered by parliament, country, and institution were run. Finally, an ordered logistic regression was run with errors clustered by parliament. The relevant coefficients for gender and the interaction terms remain mostly unchanged and statistically significant by the usual criterion. The coefficient for

the division of powers remains unchanged in half of the analyses. In the multi-level model that included parliamentary group, parliament, and country and the regression where errors were clustered by institution, the effect was no longer statistically significant. In the ordered logistic regression the magnitude of the effect was decreased substantially (though it remained significant, $p<0.001$). The results of all these robustness checks are contained in Appendix A, Table A7.

The Representation of Women by Women, Party Affiliation, and Moderating Effect of a Division of Powers

Chapter 1 argued that institutions should moderate the behaviour of women regardless of their party affiliation because although women opt into a party of their choice, given the chance, they will do more than the male colleagues *regardless of partisanship.* Of course, women on the left are expected to do more than women on the right, but both will want to do more than their party. As a result, women on the left and right will do more under a division of power where there are more opportunities and incentives and fewer constraints.

Hypothesis

3. The gap between the behaviour of women and men on both the left and the right will be larger under a division of powers than a parliamentary systems

To test this proposition left party membership is interacted with both gender and division of power. Figure 3.3 at the end of this chapter displays the predicted behaviour by gender, institution, and party orientation.[18]

[18] The regression results can be found in the Appendix A Table A8.

The results do not support Hypothesis 3: women's behaviour does not differ between presidential and parliamentary systems whatever their party affiliation ($p>0.10$). Instead, the story remains about men's behaviour and that the absence of party control in fact further reduces the amount they do to represent women. The gap in behaviour is largest between men and women in left parties when there is a division of powers and smallest between men and women in left parties when powers are merged. In other words, it is left-party control that induces the representation of women by men, who would otherwise do less. The difference between men and women on the right is also larger when there is a division of powers (2.56), but the difference in gender gap is small (just 0.38 lower in the absence of a division of powers). Taking into consideration the gender differences in preferences and priorities, the propensity of parties to the left to focus on women's issues, *and* the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems, these findings are consistent with the theory offered. The proposition, however, that it is women who respond to institutional incentives is not consistent with results. Men take the opportunity to do less to represent women when institutional freedoms from their party mean they do not need to.

Institutions as Filters, Incentives, or Both

So far the results have established basic relationships: institutions moderate the relationship between gender and substantive representation. But, as argued in Chapter 1, they can do so by at least two possible mechanisms. First, they may operate at the stage 2a – self-selection. Women who place a higher priority on representing women may choose not to opt into a political system where opportunities to do so are limited, either because their chance at election/promotion will be limited or because they will be unable

to reach their policy objectives around women's issues. On the other hand, women who find it personally important to represent women will be more likely to self-select into and then be successful in systems where doing so is both possible and encouraged. In other words, institutions can filter in or out politicians with certain policy preferences or political objectives.

To test this, I use self-reported importance of representing women as the dependent variable. If institutions are acting as filters then, on average, representatives should, on average, report that representing women is more important to them in the same institutions that I have argued facilitate and encourage the representation of women – systems with a division of powers. While such a finding would support the argument that political institution act as a filter, they do not establish causation. Establishing causation would require data on how important representing women is to those who opt out of politics and exploring whether this was a factor in the decision. Such an approach is beyond the scope of this research.

Second, institutions may operate at the later stages of (re)election or promotion. By determining how one is elected and to whom one is accountable, institutions may change the behaviour of individuals after they have opted into the political process. In systems which incentivize the representation of women, women will do more as a way to get (re)elected, whatever their preferences or priorities on women's issues. Put differently, the results in Table 3.1 should be robust to incorporating a control for how important it is for a legislator to represent women.

Hypotheses

If institutions moderate behaviour at both the self-selection:

4. Representatives elected in systems which facilitate the representation of women – i.e., systems with a division of powers - will report that representing women is *more* important to them than those elected under systems which inhibit representing women.

Institutions should matter *above and beyond* filtering in or out representatives based on preferences for representing women:

5. Controlling for the priority for representing women, the interaction between institutions and gender will remain significant and in the direction predicted.

Table 3.3 shows the results of the analysis testing Hypothesis 4.[19] Women place more priority than men on representing women ($p<0.001$), but this is especially true when there is a division of powers ($p=0.03$). By implication, women who rate representing women as more important self-select into systems with a division of power at a greater rate than they do into systems where powers are merged. Men's feelings about representing women do not vary with the institutional context.

To test whether institutions matter post-election, the analysis in Table 3.1 is repeated with the priority indicator included as a control. The results appear in Table 3.3, at the end of the chapter with the results from Table 3.1 included to enable stepwise comparison.

Priority for representing women is positively related to behaviour – unsurprisingly, the more important a representative feels it is to represent women, the more they do to represent women. All other coefficients shrink but only slightly, and all remain statistically and substantively significant. In other words, even controlling for self-reported feelings about representing women, women do more to represent women, indicating a responsibility or tie to women constituents above and beyond individual

[19] Regression results in Appendix A Table A9.

feelings on the issue. Moreover, holding these feelings constant, the gap between men and women remains larger where there is a division of powers. Even if some women are opting into or out of a political system based on the opportunities or incentives to represent women, institutions have an additional affect on behaviour of legislators once elected.

Discussion

Women do *not* do more to represent women under a division of powers than they do in parliamentary systems. But, as predicted, the gender gap is larger under a division of powers, particularly for men on the left. But the story is about men: given the freedom to act independently of their party, men respond by doing less to represent women. The 'neutral' masculine reference point is far from neutral –all behaviour is gendered, not just women's. This finding highlights the importance of considering *men's* behaviour when assessing the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. Even if women in two different politics systems act to represent women to the same degree or frequency, if men's behaviour differs there are important implications for extent to which substantive representation depends on descriptive representation. If men do less to represent women and the gap between women and men's behaviour is larger, the relative presence or absence of women will matter to the attention to women's issues. Put differently, in the aggregate, descriptive representation matters to substantive representation more under a division of powers but not because women do more, but rather because the gap between women and men is so much larger.

The test of the effect of the division of powers on the behaviour of men and women was undeniably imperfect. The analysis did not include a pure presidential system and the

four division of powers countries were diverse. The mechanisms behind the expected moderating effect exist to varying degrees in the countries included in the analysis. For example, election to a national parliament and good favour with party leadership is a way to pursue promotion and office-seeking objectives in premier-presidentialism systems like France. Further, though there are more limits on the dissolution of parliament under a division of powers, the prime minister and the president do have some capacity to do so. In other words, strict separation of origin and survival theorized to impact behaviour does not exist in these systems. The result of these limitations, however, should be a bias against the hypotheses; that the results remain consistent with the theory may speak to the strength and influence of the institutional incentives. Alternatively, some aspects of a division or fusion of powers that are relevant to the relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation remain under or untheorized.

Twitter – The Impact of Gender and the Division of Powers on Public Discourse in 140 Characters

Social media have become a political venue, used by representatives and citizens alike to express opinions, raise issues, and engage in partisan politics. As such, social media platforms may provide an additional medium for women legislators to advance women's interests. Twitter has become an increasingly popular space for political discussion, and use by candidates and legislators has increased dramatically (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2013; Enli and Skogerbo, 2013; Honeycutt and Herring, 2009; Java et a., 2007; Small, 2011). Academics have begun to study the use of Twitter as a political tool, but few studies examine the *content* of tweets, and little comparative work has been undertaken (Graham, Jackson, & Broersma, 2014). There is untapped opportunity to explore who is

talking about what, where, and with what frequency – are representatives talking about women's issues? Do women use the platform to talk about women's issues more frequently than men? Does this gender gap vary with institutional incentives and opportunities?

A Twitter analysis offers a unique test to the theory because the platform itself is outside the institution and does not vary with it, enabling clear comparability across presidential and parliamentary systems. While the act of tweeting is the same, the choice representatives make about what to tweet or retweet should still reflect the incentives and opportunities in the institutional system more broadly. If the parliamentary system requires the representative to be first and foremost the agent of the party, tweets should focus on party priorities and partisan politics. It is not that the use of Twitter by men and women will not vary, but rather that the gendered differences will be smaller. If incentives encourage and opportunities enable independence from party, Twitter may be one way in which legislators raise the profile of women's issues or construct themselves as an agent of women. In other words, although Twitter is itself outside the political system, the use of Twitter to address, discuss, or raise women's issues as a form of substantive representation should vary with the institutional context.

Twitter is not subject to the time or resource constraints of many other forms of representation – representatives can tweet multiple times a day (and many do) and are limited in their messaging only by the length of the tweet. Women in presidential systems may use Twitter as a low-cost way of meeting their obligations to women's organizations who fund their campaigns (for example), while using other activities, like introducing legislation, to focus on patronage, or party or local issues. Conversely, the highly visible

and public nature of Twitter - it is not uncommon for representatives to have more than 10,000 followers - makes the cost of tweeting about women's issues proportionality larger for women in parliamentary systems. Any departure from party priorities will be readily available to the representative's followers, party colleagues, and opponents. In essence, Twitter is an extremely low-cost act of representation for women in presidential systems and high-cost, low-benefit for women in parliamentary systems. As a result, gendered and institutional differences in substantive representation may be overstated when compared to more acts like speeches or votes. In short, the analysis is a most likely case.

The Data

A new and unique dataset was complied for this research. The work was done in collaboration with Public Discourse Analytics (www.pdanalytics.ca) as part of a broader project to monitor and score attention given to certain issues by representatives cross nationally. Tweets were collected from Members of Parliament in Canada and the UK and Representatives and Senators in the United States over a two-year period, though the specific time frame varied by country because of elections. All tweets were coded to indicate whether they addressed a women's issue based on whether they included key words or phrases. Key words include women or woman when not used in conjunction with man or men (i.e. women and men of the armed forces), as well as a series of words that indicate strategic gender issues including domestic violence, wage gap and pay gap, feminist or feminism. The French translation was also used in the case of Canada. To be clear, so-called women's traditional issues like maternity leave or childcare are not part of this analysis. The full list of words is in Appendix A, Table A10.

Tweets made by representatives in U.S. and the U.K. from November 2013 to November 2015 and by Canadian representatives between August 2013 to August 2015 were collected. Because of the elections that occurred in the US and the UK during these time periods, representatives from the UK and the US are limited to those who were elected in or before 2010 and 2012 *and* re-elected in 2015 and 2014 (respectively). While the data are available for individuals elected for the first time in 2014/2015 or who were defeated in that election, it is not possible to distinguish between tweets they made as public officials and those they made as private citizen. For newly elected MPs in the U.K. this means that the data would include four months worth of Tweets made as an MP and potentially more than a year and a half as a private citizen. As a result, they have been excluded from the analysis. The most problematic consequence is that there are no Liberal Democratic women from the UK included in the analysis.[20]

The unit of analysis is an individual representative and the dataset contains information on the gender of the representatives, the total number of tweets, the number of tweets addressing women's issues, and, finally, women's issues tweets as a proportion of total tweets. The dataset also includes the party and constituency of the representative, the relevant institutional data, and whether a MP was a Minister, Parliamentary Secretary, or Shadow Minister formally responsible for women's issues at some point during the period under analysis. The data do not include unelected members of the upper house from the two parliamentary systems. The total the data set contains 1,042 representatives - 243 MPs from Canada, 352 UK MPs, 86 US Senators and 361 US Representatives. The

[20] All sitting Lib-Dem women were defeated. In fact, following the 2015 the party has no women Members in the House of Commons. This means that Jo Swinson and Jenny Willott, who both served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Women and Equalities during this period, are excluded.

analysis includes almost all representatives who use Twitter – in just three cases (two in the UK and one in the US) were errors found that prevented the collection of tweets.

A general election took place in both the UK and the US over this time period. While the campaign for the 2015 Canadian election did not officially begin till mid August, the uncertainty of the start of the campaign meant that there was an election feel to the months toward the end of the time period. In other words, the presence of an election is consistent across the three countries. While it might be beneficial to examine a campaign period separately as a different test of the theory, the presence of an election in all three countries does not pose problems for the analysis.

The data include all original tweets, retweets, and @-replies. While original Tweets might be the best indicator of the Representatives interests, distinguishing between these different uses of the social media platform was not possible. More importantly, Retweets also provide important information - politicians and Twitter users more generally do not retweet everything in their feed or reply to every Tweet they receive and, as a result, both Retweets and replies indicate some attention to and interest in an issue (Boyd et al., 2010).

Hypotheses

The hypotheses are the same as those for the tests using the PARTIREP data.

6. Women in presidential systems will raise women's issues more through their use of Twitter than women in parliamentary systems.

Moreover, because women respond to the presidential institutional context by representing women more and men respond by doing less, and because the limited opportunities equally constrain women and men in parliamentary systems:

7. The gap between men and women will be larger in presidential systems and smaller in parliamentary systems.

However, given their specialized power and responsibility:

8. Ministers responsible for women's issues in parliamentary systems will use the platform more than their backbench counterparts.

Analysis

The estimation models are similar to those used with the previous two datasets. The dependent variable is the proportion of Tweets that address women's issues, and the key explanatory variables are gender, whether the representative is in a presidential or parliamentary system, and the interaction between the two. Given the expected unique effect of Ministerial or Shadow Ministerial positions, dummy variables for these are also included. To control for the anticipated effect of being a member of a left party (which should be associated both with the proportion of Tweets addressing women's issues and being a woman and potentially confounding the relationship), a simply left-party dummy variable is included. A multi-level regression is used and representatives are grouped within parties, within countries.

As before, the interaction effect makes it worth pausing to consider how to interpret the results. The coefficient for the variable 'woman' indicates the effect of being a woman on the proportion of Tweets that address women's issues *in parliamentary systems*. To determine the effect of being a woman in a presidential systems this coefficient is

combined with the interaction coefficient. The interaction itself indicates the *differential effect* of being a woman in the presidential versus parliamentary system. The coefficient for the institutional dummy indicates the effect of a presidential system on the proportion of men's tweets addressing women's issues.

Results

Women use a greater proportion of their Tweets to address women's issues – being a woman in a parliamentary system increases the proportion by 0.025. Given that the average (across all countries and parties) is 0.025 this is both statistically and substantively significant. Gender matters even more, however, in presidential systems, where being a woman increases the proportion of Tweets by 0.067. In other words, the effect of being a woman is almost three times greater in presidential systems. Unlike the analysis using the PARTIREP, men do not react to institutional freedoms in presidential systems by addressing women's issues less in their Tweets. The coefficient for the presidential dummy variable surpasses traditional levels of significance ($p>0.07$) suggesting that, at least in terms of this low cost act of representation, men are not responding to institutional incentives. In short, Hypotheses 7 and 8 are both supported, although the differential gap between men and women is, in this case, due to the increase in use of Tweets by women rather than the reduction by men. The results are displayed in Table 3.4 at the end of the chapter.

The evidence indicates that women in presidential systems use Twitter to address women's issues, while women in parliamentary systems do not use the social media tool for the same purpose to the same degree. Parliamentary systems do seem to offer opportunities to represent women, however, in the form of positions with formal ties to

women's issues, either as a minister responsible or as the critic or shadow minister whose role it is to hold the government to account on these issues. Being a minister increases the proportion of Tweets addressing women's issues by nearly 0.12 or nearly five times the increase associated with just being a woman. The effect of holding a position in opposition is slightly smaller (0.10). Given that the average proportion of Tweets addressing women's issues in parliamentary systems is just 0.02, these effects are massive. The number of representatives holding a ministerial or critic position is small, just ten in total, but the substantively and statistically significant results cannot be ignored.

Interestingly, after controlling for gender, institution, and ministerial positions, party orientation has a very small effect – increasing the proportion of Tweets by just 0.01, less than half the effect of being a woman in a parliamentary system and less than one-seventh of the effect of being a woman in a presidential system. Moreover, the p-value exceeds the 0.05 threshold (p=0.064).

Figure 3.4 found at the end of this chapter illustrates the results from Table 3.4. The figure makes clear the higher proportion of Tweets used by women in presidential systems than women in parliamentary systems. More striking is the size of the gap between women and men in presidential and how it compares to the smaller gap in parliamentary systems.

Robustness tests

To test the robustness of the results, I ran several additional tests. First, I dropped ministers, critics and the two highest Tweets from both the Republicans and the Democrats and repeated the analyses. Second, I included party dummy variables instead

of a simple left-right dummy and, third, I re-ran this analysis with the inclusion of country specific dummies. I then used a single level analysis with country and party specific effects clustering errors by country and then by institution. For the most part, results did not change in any relevant substantive or statistical way. The one exception is in the final mode, where errors are clustered by institution, the division of power variable is no longer significant. The results can be found compared to the results in Table 3.4 in Appendix A, Tables A11 and A12.

The results from this analysis clearly support the three hypotheses arising from the institutional theory. Women do more to represent women via Twitter than do men, but women do the most in Presidential systems. Moreover, because men's response to the institutional incentives is minimal at best, the gap between men and women in presidential systems is more than two and a half times as large as the gap between women and men in parliamentary systems. On the other hand, women (and they are all women) who hold official posts responsible for women's issues, whether in opposition or government, have unique and unparalleled opportunities to focus on women's issues.

Finally, Table 3.5 (at the end of this chapter) displays the proportion of Tweets by women in frontbench positions with specific responsibilities for women's issues, either as minsters in government or as shadow ministers in opposition and by women on the backbench. Women on the frontbench address women as a proportion of all Tweets between 3.5 and 4.25 times as much as their colleagues on the backbench – this is as large or larger than the magnitude of difference between women and men on the backbench (which ranges from 2.5 to 3.5). For comparison, I isolated the top two Tweeters on women's issues from each of the Democrats and Republicans and repeated

the analysis. The proportion of Tweets addressing women's issues for these four women is 3.24 times that of the remainder of their colleagues; these women were singled out *because* of their high proportion of tweets and yet this gap is smaller than that identified in the parliamentary systems. These women have no formal institutional obligation to address women's issues, but rather do so either by choice to meet policy objectives (reflecting opportunities) or to meet other objectives, including re-election (reflecting institutional incentives).

Potential limitations of defining women's issues

The analysis used here differs from the PARTIREP survey in that 'women's issues' are explicitly defined and constrained to limited list of 'feminist' issues. If women in the US focus more on these topics and women in Canada and the UK, for example, focus on gendered issues not included in the analysis it could create the appearance of an institutional effect. The inclusion of the term women (used in the absence of the word men) should minimize this problem - any tweet referencing women as a group is counted as addressing women's issues regardless of the other substantive content. Moreover, the analysis showed that the responsible cabinet ministers in both Canada and the UK use the key words with significant regularity indicating that they are important to the 'women's issues' portfolios in the country. There remains the possibility, however, that backbench women in Canada or the U.K. represent women by focusing on other issues and as such are substantively representing women's via their use of Twitter but not being measured as doing so.

Beyond the Statistical Analysis

A more in depth look at *who* is making Tweets provides further evidence for the theory. In Canada, Kelly Leitch held the position of Minister for the Status of Women for the entire period under analysis and uses a greater proportion of Tweets than any other women in her party, by a significant margin. The only MP who uses a greater proportion of her Tweets to speak to women's issues than the Minister is Mylène Freeman, opposition critic for the status of women for the left-wing NDP and one of the youngest MPs. Among the third party, the Liberals, Kristy Duncan, the party's critic for the issue uses the greatest proportion of her Tweets to address woman's issue. Interestingly, the second highest proportion comes from Carolyn Bennett, critic for Aboriginal Affairs. Given the importance of missing and murdered indigenous women during this time, it seems that Bennett used her position to raise women's issues within her critic portfolio.

In the UK, the most prolific user of Twitter to address women's issues is Helen Grant, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Equalities for the entire two- year period. She is followed closely by Maria Miller, the Minister for Women and Equalities for much of the period under analysis. In third place is Harriet Harman. While Harman did not hold a formal position for women's equality during the time, she is a former Minister for Women and was serving as Deputy Leader of the Labour Party. Having met objectives of re-election and promotion to cabinet and a position of party leadership, Harman may have been able to take the opportunity to continue to promote women's interests.

A look at the United States is equally illuminating. Chapter 2 argued that the relative freedom of legislators in presidential systems enabled non-party groups and organizations to support certain politicians based on a promise to or record of supporting their issues.

As a result, women elected via support through EMILY's List or similar organizations will have incentives to address women's issues. The analysis of Twitter offers significant support for this argument. The 12 Democratic women who use their Twitter the most to address women's issues have all received significant financial support from EMILY's List. The group is listed as the second most significant donor to Lois Frankel (giving $71,000 to the Florida Representative over her career) and the single most important donor to Julia Brownley (providing her with over $50,000 in over 15 years).[21] In fact, all 12 are featured on the organization's list of women they helped elect published to mark their 30th anniversary (EMILY'S List, 2015). This is no small feat - just 100 women elected to the House of Representative and another 19 elected to Senate were identified over the 30-year period - less than four federal representatives a year. Moreover, an average of 24% of the Tweets from these women address women's issues, higher than any single woman in Canada or the UK. Other women's interest organizations also give significant support to these top tweeters; "women's Issues" is listed as the second and fourth most important 'industries' supporting Julia Brownley ($504,081) and Lois Frankel ($226,881), respectively. Other top ten Tweeters supported financially by groups based on women's issues include Katherine Clark ($130,950) and Nita Lowley ($146,910).

The financial incentives to Republican women to address women's issues are notably smaller. Of the top 20 members supported by women's issues lobbies all were Democratic in 2012 and again in 2014. Kay Granger, one of the top Republican Tweeters, was supported by the Wish List (a Republican equivalent to EMILY's List)

[21] All data on campaign donations and financial support come from Open Secrets (2016).

with $1,352 (in 2010) and also received some additional money from other 'women's issues' industries. Similarly, the Republican VIEW (Value in Electing Women) PAC gave Susan Brooks $7,000. The difference in financial incentives may help explain the higher use of Twitter by Democratic women (average of 11% of Tweets address women's issues) compared to Republican women (average of 4% of Tweets address women's issues). Freedom from their party gives Republican women the *opportunity* to represent women and they use this opportunity to represent women, at least in part, via Twitter. Democratic women have the same opportunities, but they also have significant financial incentives to actively represent women. The result is not only a gap between women and men, but also a significant gap between Democratic women and their Republican sisters.

Discussion

Gender matters to substantive representation in both presidential and parliamentary systems. Women, more than men, use Twitter to raise women's issues and report acting to represent women by meeting with women's organizations, speaking to issues women care about, and making proposals to address these issues. But it matters more under the conditions of a division of powers than it does when powers are fused. Whether it is women taking advantage of institutional opportunities to depart from their party to represent women or men using the same opportunities to do less, the gap between the representation of women by women and that by men is larger in presidential than in parliamentary systems. The focus was on individual behaviour, but implications for the aggregate are clear. Under a condition of a division of powers, reducing the number of men and increasing the number of women leads to a more acts and Tweets addressing

women's issues. In parliamentary systems, where the behaviour of men and women is more similar and increasing the number of women in the legislature has a more muted effected.

The empirical tests in this Chapter are imperfect. The PARTIREP data covers a large number of countries, but it does not include a pure presidential system and only a small number of cases in which powers can be considered divided. These limitations are, in part, a function of "selection bias introduced by the world" (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, 135) - there are few pure presidential systems; of advanced 'western' democracies, the United States is the only one. Moreover, there are limitations in the availability of existing data; for example, the PARTIREP elite survey did not include North American countries. Conversely, the Twitter data are based on just three cases and extreme ones at that – two pure Westminster parliamentary systems and a pure presidential system.

The datasets are differently, and oppositely, limited and include different measures of substantive representation, but the results from both are consistent with the theory. In Chapter 6, the findings are triangulated with qualitative interviews that target the causal mechanisms. Moreover, the differences in data availability can, itself, provide some insight into the causal process. For example, in the United States, interest groups publish 'report cards' on the voting record of individual members of Congress as a way to hold legislators responsible and to provide voters with information to decide whom to support with their votes or donations. If one wanted to use such NGO or interest group reports to compare issue attention in the US and its parliamentary counterparts, one would find data availability a significant barrier. Report cards on the voting record of individual

representatives are extremely rare in both Canada and the UK.[22] Instead, interest groups publish *government* report cards and, during elections, party report cards. While this means that a quantitative analysis using this data would not be possible, a qualitative exploration of this difference corroborates the findings in this chapter and further supports the theory.

As way of illustration, the American Association of University Women (2015) is compared with the U.K. group End Violence Against Women (2015a). The former annually scores members of Congress on their votes on issues such as paycheck fairness, employment non-discrimination, and protecting women's health and the latter produces reports on government action against violence against women and girls. In 2015, the group's 28-page report did not contain the phrase 'member of parliament' but used the words 'minister' or 'government' 94 times. [23]

In the U.S. voting record reports are designed to lobby Members of Congress, raise political awareness, and to help voters with similar priorities to cast their ballot. The production and dissemination of this information suggests two things: first, it indicates that the behaviour of individual representatives *can* be affected by the public opinion and

[22] Exceptions include The National Fire Arm Association and Campaign Life Coalition in Canada.

[23] The choice of examples is somewhat arbitrary. Example of other American women's issues groups who distribute congressional scorecards include Planned Parenthood and NARAL. Canadian and British organizations that produced government report cards include West Coast LEAF, The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (2015), the Child Care Advocacy Association of Canada, the Fawcett Society, and End Violence UK. Examples outside women's issues in the U.S. include League of Conservation Voters, Christian Coalition, The National Rifle Association, The American Conservative Union, and Right to Life all provide similar information to their supporters. In Canada, the Suzuki Foundation, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, Dying with Dignity Canada, and Democracy Watch all produce government or party reportcards.

financial support of interest groups.[24] Second, it indicates that voters can be persuaded to support one candidate or another in a nomination race or general election based on their attention to and track record on a specific issue. Both speak directly to opportunities and incentives facing legislators in the US. Congressional representatives or nomination candidates have incentives to appeal to certain groups, to score high on their rankings, and perhaps to receive financial support. If voters use these resources to decide whom to support, legislators will respond to the interests as they pursue votes and office.

In the Parliamentary systems, the limited freedom of individual MPs to pursue issues *and* their limited capacity to create change means that individual report cards are ineffectual and organizations simply do not waste their time. Further, voters understand the power of governments and the influence of parties in legislating and cast their ballot primarily on the basis of party. As a result, party and government report cards are a much better use of resources in Canada and the U.K.

This claim made here, in many ways, mirrors that in Lisa Young's *Feminists and Party Politics* (2000). The women's movement, Young finds, targets individual representatives in the United States while directing their efforts towards parties and party leadership in Canada. Her insights and the different uses of 'report cards' across the two institutional types say something first and foremost about the incentives and opportunity structures facing women politicians. The quantitative analysis in this Chapter provided evidence of the outcomes: women do more than men to represent women, but the gendered difference is more significant in presidential systems.

[24] Many of the groups identified have campaign donation branches called Political Action Committees, including, for example, the National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund or the Planned Parenthood Action Fund.

Table 3.1. The Effects of Gender and Division of Powers

	Combined Behaviour Measure
Woman	1.848***
	(0.169)
Division of Powers	-1.164***
	(0.294)
Woman * Division of Powers	1.310***
	(0.291)
Constant	1.447
	(1.348)
Random Effect Parameters	
sd (parliament)	-0.348*
	(0.144)
sd (residual)	1.005***
	(0.016)
chi2	410.958
N	1924

Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.
Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.
Controls for feminist political culture and left party.

Table 3.2. Predicted Importance of Representing Women by Gender and Institution
Testing Hypothesis 4 and 5

	Fusion of Powers	Division of Powers	Gap
Men	5.65	5.44	0.21
Women	6.27	6.58	0.31**
Gender Gap by System	0.62***	1.14***	

*p=0.03, ***p<0.001

Predicted Importance of Representing Women on a Scale of 0 to 7 (not at all to very).

Significance and gaps determined by using margins pairwise comparisons option. Multi-level regression in Appendix Table A9.

Table 3.3. Effect of Gender & Division of Powers on Behaviour Controlling for Preferences

Testing Hypothesis 7

	Behaviour From Table 3.1	Behaviour Controlling for Preferences
Woman	1.848***	1.418***
	(0.169)	(0.168)
Division of Powers	-1.164***	-0.958***
	(0.294)	(0.278)
Woman * Division of Powers	1.310***	0.970***
	(0.291)	(0.287)
Importance of Representing Women		0.681***
		(0.051)
Constant	1.447	-0.918
	(1.348)	(1.282)
Random Effect Parameters		
sd (parliament)	-0.348*	-0.444**
	(0.144)	(0.147)
sd (residual)	1.005***	0.958***
	(0.016)	(0.017)
chi2	410.958	604.438
N	1924	1822

p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Multilevel regression, individuals grouped in parliaments.

Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.

Results controlling left party affiliation and feminist political culture.

Table 3.4. The Representation of Women via Twitter
The Effects of Gender & Institutions

	Tweets
Woman	0.025***
	(0.003)
Presidential System	0.011+
	(0.006)
Woman*Presidential System	0.042***
	(0.005)
Left Party	0.01+
	(0.006)
Minister	0.116***
	(0.014)
Critic	0.099***
	(0.014)
Constant	0.005
	(0.005)
Random Effect Parameters	
sd (country)	-21.854
	(14.326)
sd (party)	-4.977***
	(0.324)
sd (residual)	-3.506***
	(0.025)
N	1010
chi2	572.433

+p<0.10 * p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parties within countries.
Dependent Variable –Proportion of Tweets addressing women's issues

Table 3.5. Proportion of Tweets Addressing Women's Issues

	Ministers	Backbench	
Canada	0.17	0.04	4.25
UK	0.13	0.03	4.27
	Shadow Minister	Backbench	
Canada	0.15	0.04	3.78
UK	0.11	0.03	3.50
	Highest	All Others	
United States	0.28	0.09	4

Figure 3.1. Average Representation of Women by Gender & Self-Placement



Figure 3.2. Predicted Behaviour by Gender and Institutions



Displays predicted behaviour using Margins and the multilevel regression results in Table 3.1
Predicted behaviour on scale of 0-13. 95% confidence intervals shown.

Figure 3.3. Predicted Behaviour by Gender, Party Orientation, and Institutions



Displays predicted behaviour using Margins and the multilevel regression results in Appendix A, Table A8. Predicted behaviour on scale of 0-13. 95% confidence intervals shown.

Figure 3.4. Women's Issue Tweets by Gender and Presidential System



Displays predicted behaviour using Margins and the multilevel regression results in Table 3.4
95% confidence intervals shown.

Chapter 4: Testing the Theory - Electoral System and Women's Substantive Political Representation.

This Chapter turns to electoral systems. Proportional electoral systems increase descriptive representation, but do they also facilitate substantive representation? Features of electoral systems that incentivize unincorporated representation decrease the number of women elected, but does it increase the number of acts undertaken to represent women's interests?

This analysis proceeds as follows:

In the first set of sections the data, hypotheses, and results are presented:

- Explanation and summary of institutional variables in the PARTIREP Data.[25]
- Hypotheses.
- Discussion of results.
- Robustness tests, including restructuring multi-level models, clustering errors, and adding in party fixed effects.

An additional analysis targets the causal process directly:

- Testing the relationship between campaign preferences, gender, and behaviour.

The following sections explore the results in greater depth by incorporating additional explanatory variables and disaggregating the independent institution variables:

- Exploring the role of political parties.
- Institutions as incentives, filters, or both.

[25] The combined behaviour variable introduced in Chapter 3 is not revisited here, neither are the other controls. See Chapter 3 for full discussion.

- Disaggregating institutions to understand the effect of individual components of institutional variables.

Institution variables

First, I use a simple dummy variable to indicate a proportional representation system. The vast majority of representatives are elected through some form of proportional representation, with just 14.5% elected through single member districts (SMD), either plurality or majoritarian, including those in the UK, Germany, Hungary, and a number from Switzerland.

Second, I distinguish among PR systems based on the incentives they generate for unincorporated representation, that is, the extent to which parties or voters retain control over the election and re-election of individual representatives. While SMP systems can also vary along these dimensions, I focus exclusively on variation in PR systems for both theoretical and practical reasons. First, variation among PR systems is more substantial and consequential (Norris, 1997). Second, there is simply very little variation in SMP systems contained in the dataset; no SMP system either maximizes or minimizes the incentives for unincorporated representation. This problem is magnified by the lower number of women elected in SMP systems – the survey includes just 70 women elected by SMP.

There are three relevant dimensions to the incentives for unincorporated representation, access to and rank on the ballot, number and types of votes to be cast, and the extent to which votes are pooled first for the party.

The ballot dimension, as adapted from Carey and Shugart, has first been disaggregated into two dummy variables, whether voters can disrupt the list and whether there is local control over nomination. In both cases, one indicates greater incentives for unincorporated representation. Local control over nomination is, of course, just one dimension of the candidate selection process that matters. In a later section, I test the effect of an inclusive nomination process, where, on one extreme, all members of the electorate are able to participate and on the other, only one individual, like the party leader, selects the candidate. The results indicate that local control over nomination matters but inclusiveness does not.

These two dummy variables are tested individually and also combined into a new ballot dimension variable, where higher values indicate greater incentives to represent unincorporated interests, including women.

0: No local control over ballot, voters may not disrupt the list;

1: Local control over ballot, voters may disrupt the list; *or* no local control over ballot, but voters may not disrupt the list;

2 Local control over ballot and voters may disrupt order of list.

Table 4.1 at the end of this chapter shows the distribution of this variable across the two categories. Just more than 400 (21%) of the 1,835 cases for which information is available have some kind of local or regional control over the ballot but no ability for voters to disrupt the list. Only 171 cases (just over 9%) have national control over the list but an opportunity for list disruption. In other words, it is much more common to have local control over nomination but no list potential for list disruption than it is for access to

the ballot to be nationally controlled but for voters to retain some influence over list order. Coding the former cases as ‘0’ on the ballot dimension as Carey and Shugart’s original conceptualization dismisses the potential independent affect of local nomination on incentives to represent something other than the party. Overall a plurality of cases fall at 0 (39%) while approximately an equal number of MPs were elected in systems that either score 1 or 2 (about 30%) on this ballot dimension.

The second dimension departs slightly from Carey and Shugart in that categories 1 and 2 are the reversed to reflect the difference between purely ‘personal votes’ and the pursuit of votes through unincorporated representation. Like the ballot dimension, the vote dimension is on a three point-scale where higher values indicate greater incentives for unincorporated representation.

0: One vote to be cast for a party;

1: One vote to be cast for an individual candidate;

2: Multiple votes to be cast for individual candidates.

An equal proportion (approximately 44%) of MPs in PR systems were elected to a system that maximized party votes (scoring 0) as were elected to a system that maximized IUR (scoring 2).

Carey and Shugart’s classification also includes a third dimension – vote pooling. The coding in the PARTIREP data, however, does not reflect the original concept. All SMP systems are coded as having *no* vote pooling and thus maximizing the incentives for personal or unincorporated votes on this measure. This is a clear departure from Carey

and Shugart who argue that, in SMP systems, "votes are effectively 'pooled' across the whole party, where each party presents a fixed list containing the name of one candidate…. The party reputation, then, is at a premium relative to personal reputation" (421). PARTIREP is not alone in this mischaracterization; the widely used data created by Johnson and Wallack (2012) (for example, Thames and Williams, 2010) code SMP "as having no pooling since the votes for a candidate are not shared with any co-partisan" (10).

Not only does the coding in PARTIREP not reflect the original concept, but once the dimension is properly coded there is almost no variation; just 34 Irish MPs were elected in a system that pools vote below the party level, and no parliament in the sample would have scored a 2 out of 2 (indicating no pooling). The widespread misuse and misrepresentation of the original concept paired with the extremely limited variation of the variable in this wide reaching dataset calls into question the added value of this third dimension. For these reasons, this variable has been excluded from the analysis.

Leaving aside the pooling variable, I have combined the ballot and vote dimensions to create an indicator that captures the incentives for unincorporated representation. The resulting ranges from 0 to 4, where four indicates maximum incentives to represent women and other unincorporated interests and zero indicates maximum incentivizes to represent one's party. Approximately 30% of MPs elected through PR were elected in systems classified as maximizing IUR (scoring a 4 out of 4), a small plurality, 34% were elected in a system classified as a party vote system (scoring 0 out of 4), and the remainder fell between these two extremes.

Hypotheses

In line with the theory offered in Chapter 2:

1. Women in PR systems undertake more actions to represent women than women elected under SMD.

2. The gap between the actions undertaken by women and those undertaken by men to represent women are larger under PR than under SMD.

And among PR systems:

3. Women do more to represent women where a) voters can influence access to and rank on ballot or b) voters have multiple votes to cast for individual candidates, and c) most when both are true.

4. The gap between the behaviour of women and the behaviour by men to represent women is larger in systems where a) voters can influence access to and rank on ballot or b) voters have multiple votes to cast for individual candidates, and c) most when both are true.

To test whether the representation of women varies with the features of the electoral system, the multi-level regression used in Chapter 3 was repeated for each of the institutional variables. The combined behaviour indicator is the dependent variable measuring the substantive representation of women and there are three independent variables – the gender dummy variable, one of the four institutional variables (PR, ballot, votes, and combined IUR measure), and an interaction term with gender. The data were structured hierarchically, with individual MPs clustered within the parliaments in which they are elected. The same controls to address alternative explanations and spurious relationships – membership in a left-wing party and the feminist political culture of the legislature– are also used. Finally, country dummy variables were included in the analysis

but are not displayed.[26] When the country dummies were dropped, feminist political culture was statistically significant and positively related to behaviour. That many of the country dummies are significant and the feminist political culture no longer matters suggests that the country specific affects are capturing feminist political culture *and* other relevant country-level factors. None of these control variables are displayed in the analysis in this Chapter.

Results

Table 4.2 (found at the end of this chapter) displays the results. In each model, being a woman increases the frequency with which actions are undertaken to represent women by about two points ($p<0.001$). To put this in context, a two-point difference between women and men is the equivalent of meeting with women's groups every month as opposed to once a year or speaking to women's issues every meeting as opposed to just every three months.

In no case is the 'main-effect' coefficient of the institutional variable statistically significant. In other words, the representation of women *by men* does not vary with the electoral system. While this finding diverges with the results in Chapter 3, which found that men's behaviour does depend on the division of powers, it is consistent with the theory offered – men do not respond to incentives for unincorporated representation by substantively representing women.

The results offer no support for Hypotheses 1 or 2. *Women elected under PR do not do more to represent women than those elected under SMP*. Further, *the gap between the*

[26] The model for division of powers in Table 3.1 was not estimable with country dummies included.

behaviour of women and the behaviour of men does not differ across these two systems. In other words, neither men nor women do more (or less) to represent women's issues whether elected under a SMP or proportional representation. Reasons for this null finding are explored further in a later section.

The remainder of the interaction terms are statistically significant and in the predicted direction. The specific features of a proportional electoral system -- access to and rank on the ballot and the number and types of votes -- affect how much women in office do to represent women. In support of Hypotheses 3a-b, *women do more where the features of the electoral system incentivize the representation of women*; moving from the minimal incentives to represent women to the maximum, the ballot dimension increases women's behaviour by nearly a point and a half and the vote dimension by 0.83.

Both components of the ballot dimension have a moderating effect on behaviour; for example, in countries like Switzerland where control over nomination is local *and* voters can meaningfully disrupt the list offered by parties, women score 1.41 higher than women elected in closed list systems, such as PR MPs in Germany's mixed system. This difference is greater than meeting with women's groups four times a year instead of just once a year.

The variable for the vote dimension indicates that the number and types of votes available to voters also affects women's behaviour, though the effect is slightly smaller. Women in systems where there are multiple votes to distribute among candidates score 0.82 points higher on the 0 to 13 scale than women elected in systems where voters can only cast

their ballot for a party. This difference is just smaller than making a proposal on women's issues once a month as opposed to every three months, for example.

In support of hypothesis 3c, *women elected in systems that have the maximum incentives for unincorporated interests do more to represent women than do women in systems where the incentives are tilted towards party votes.* The coefficient, 0.308, indicates that women in systems that incentivize the representation of women (4 on the IUR measure) score on average 1.232 points higher than women who are in a party-vote system (0 on IUR). Interestingly, however, it does not seem that scoring high on both the vote and ballot variables does any more to incentivize the representation of women by women than scoring high on the ballot variable. It may be that there is a limit to the amount women can do, whatever the incentives, or simply that there is a diminishing marginal effect when the two dimensions are combined. Alternatively, it may be that if list disruption is not possible (either formally or practically) that the presence of multiple votes simply does not matter. I explore these questions in more detail in a later section.

The results also support Hypotheses 4a-c. Not only do women do more in systems that incentives the representation of women, but because men's behaviour does not differ with the institutional context, the overall gap between women and men is greater in those same institutions. Figure 4.1 at the end of the chapter displays the predicted behaviour and corresponding 95% confidence intervals by gender and institutional dimension. It makes visible both the increase in the representation of women by women when such behaviour is incentivized and the corresponding increase in the gap between the behaviour of men and that of women. For example, the affect of gender, which is the *difference in behaviour between men and women*, is nearly 75% larger in systems theorized to

incentivize unincorporated representation (gap between men and women 3.05) than in systems where the incentives are at a minimum (gap between men and women 1.75).

Robustness Tests

A series of robustness tests were performed on the analyses in Table 4.2. The multilevel model was restructured to group representatives in parties rather than parliaments. MPs were also regrouped hierarchically in parties, within parliaments, in countries. As an alternative, a series of single-level regressions were run with the errors clustered by parliament, country, and institution. Two ordered logistic regressions were run, the first multilevel with individuals grouped by parliament and the second with errors clustered by parliament. Finally, if structural characteristics of parties, rather than ideology, are a function of the electoral system *and* related the representation of women, then parties might be a confounding variable. To test this I incorporated party dummies into the original analysis. The relevant coefficients for gender and the interaction terms remain mostly unchanged and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$), except for the vote-dimension variable when errors were clustered by country ($p=0.14$) and by parliament ($p=0.067$). The campaign-preference, gender, and the interaction terms also change very little and remain statistically significant in all cases.

The results of these robustness tests are in Appendix B, Tables B1-B8.

District Magnitude: Does it Moderate the Moderating Effect?

Carey and Shugart argue that district magnitude has the effect of increasing whatever incentives are otherwise present; in systems that incentivize party votes, a higher district magnitude further increases the incentives. On the other hand, if personal votes are incentivized a higher district magnitude further increases the value of personal votes by

amplifying the competition between co-partisans. The theory in Chapter 2 argued that while this might be the case for strictly personal-votes or unincorporated interests in general, it was unlikely that district magnitude would have the same amplifying effect when it came to incentives to represent women. To test this, I turned the IUR variable into two dummy variables – one that indicates systems that incentivize the unincorporated representation (scoring 3 or 4 out of 4) and another that indicates systems that incentivize party representation (scoring 0 or 1). The analysis includes the interaction of these dummy variables with the district magnitude and, of course, with gender. The models are otherwise similar to those in Table 4.2.

To be clear, if district magnitude does enhance the incentives, the interaction between an IUR system, district magnitude, and gender should be positive. A positive interaction coefficient would indicate that incentives for unincorporated representation increase behaviour and increasingly so as distinct magnitude gets larger. The same interactions with party systems should be negative, indicating that incentives to represent the party decrease the amount that women do to represent women, and that they do so all the more as the district magnitude increases.

As Table 4.3 (found at the end of the chapter) indicates, however, the district magnitude has no significant effect on behaviour. Neither men nor women do more (or less) when district magnitude is higher and men's behaviour remains unaffected by incentives, regardless of the district magnitude. Moreover, the interaction between women and the incentives is no longer significant. Finally, the three-way interaction, which includes gender, party-incentives or incentives to represent women, and district magnitude, is insignificant. In other words, the moderating effect of institutions on the amount that

women legislators do to represent women does not itself depend on the district magnitude. The results do not directly challenge Carey and Shugart's theory but do indicate that an increasing district magnitude does not amplifying incentives or disincentives to represent *women*.

Targeting the Causal Process

The results provide strong evidence that women's behaviour depends on the degree to which an institution encourages personal or party votes. The theory offered, however, is fundamentally about perceived incentives and legislator's experience of electoral systems. A further test of the theory requires targeting this mechanism directly.

The PARTIREP survey contains a question asking respondents whether, given the choice, they would spend more effort and money on a their personal or their party's campaign on a scale from 1 (party) to 5 (personal). What this variable captures is how MPs perceive the incentives they face toward personal or party votes. In a later section of this chapter, this variable is used as a test of the causal process. More (41%) opted for their party (1 or 2) than their personal campaign (4 or 5) (just 26%) and a plurality of respondents would equally divide extra resources between their party and their personal campaign (selecting 3 on the 5 point scale).

The analysis above was repeated using this indicator. As outlined, respondents were asked where they would dedicate additional time and resources on a scale of 1 - all to the party campaign - to 5 – all to a personal campaign. This test is, in essence, a check of the causal process. The theory is not about multiple votes in and of themselves, but about the incentives it generates for legislators. Of course, the variable itself focuses on preferences

for a party versus a *personal* campaign, but the content of personal campaign is not specified and thus offers a broad indication about the potential for an alternative to party representation and party-based campaign. If the theory is operating as proposed, there should be a relationship between the perceived campaign incentives and the frequency with which women legislators represent women. The same should not be true for men.

Table 4.4 displays the results. As expected, when women say they would dedicate more resources to a personal rather than a party campaign, they do more to represent women, and when they say they would dedicate more resources to a party campaign, they do less. In fact, preferences for a personal campaign more than double the effect of gender - moving from the bottom of the scale (total preference for party campaign) to the top of the scale (total preference for personal campaign), increases the effect of gender from 1.17 to 2.51.[27]

In this case, however, the variable for perceived campaign incentives is itself statistically significant. What this indicates is that the amount men do to represent women is also, but oppositely, affected. Freed from their party obligations men use the opportunity to do less ($p<0.05$) while women take the opportunity to do more ($p<0.05$). Figure 4.2, found at the end of the chapter, displays the predicted behaviour for men and women on the two extremes of the scale and provides the relevant gaps in behaviour by gender and campaign preference. While women do more than men in both instances, the gap is twice as large when respondents prefer their personal campaigns.

[27] 1.17 is the coefficient for woman and 2.51 is the coefficient for gender plus the coefficient for the interaction effect (0.45) multiplied by 4 (the scale of the indicator).

The robustness tests run on the analysis in Table 4.2 were repeated on for this analysis. Results can be seen in Appendix B, Tables B1-B8. There are no substantial changes to magnitude or statistical significance to the variable of interest.

The Representation of Women by Women, Party Affiliation, and Moderating Effect of Incentives for Unincorporated Representation

Because women's issues are not incorporated into the party system and because gender gaps in preferences, priorities, and behaviour have been observed across the political spectrum, women should do more when party ties are loosened regardless of their particular party affiliation.

Hypothesis

5. Women respond to IUR by representing women regardless of whether they are a member of a party on the left or a party on the right.

The 'left party' dummy was added to the interaction term for the two main analyses – the first using the variable capturing incentives based on the institutional features and the second using the variable measuring campaign preferences. Figure 4.3 the predicted behaviour of legislators by gender, party, and incentives to represent women (multilevel regression results are in Appendix B Table B9).

The results are somewhat mixed. The *institutional* IUR variable matters only for women on the left. Freed from their party and able to rely on their personal reputation, women on the left score 2.4 points higher on the behaviour measure than their counterparts elected under a party vote based system (scoring 0 out of 4). This difference is nearly the equivalent of speaking to women's groups every month as opposed to every three months *and* making proposals on women's issues every meeting as opposed to every three

months. The behaviour of women on the right does not seem to depend on the institutional context in the same way.

The analysis using the MP's perceived incentives suggest the opposite. When women on the right report that they would chose to dedicate all their resources to their personal campaign they score 1.39 higher than when they would dedicated all the additional resources to their party's campaign. The behaviour of women on the left does not differ. Interestingly, the behaviour of men on the left *does* differ with the institutional context – relying on their party *increases* the amount they do to represent women while the freedom to depart from their party allows them to do less. These results are unsurprising given what we know about gender differences in preferences and priorities *and* the propensity of parties to left to focus on women's issues. Even though men on the left self-select into the party of their choice, they clearly want to do less to represent women than their party. Similarly, women on the right self-select into their party, but want to do much more to represent women than can when controlled by their party. When women on the right and men on the left are freed from tight party control, the latter uses this opportunity to do more to represent women and the former uses it to do less. It's clear that left parties do more to represent women, but it is also clear that the issue is not fully incorporated into the party system. Instead, it is the gender of the individual representative matters to attention to the issue; even when party control is at a maximum, women in right parties report doing more for women than men in left parties. Please see Figure 4.3 at the end of the chapter.

Institutions: Incentives, Filtering Systems, or Both.

The results in this chapter support the theory that features of proportional representation systems moderate the relationship between the presence of women and the representation of women's issues. It is not clear, however, whether the features of the electoral system act by encouraging or discouraging certain types of women to opt into or out of the political system or by encouraging or discouraging behaviour of those who do choose to participate. Chapter 3 found that the division of powers is positively associated with feelings about the importance of representing *and* that the division of powers, interacted with gender, is positively associated with behaviour even after controlling for feelings about representing women. In other words, the division of powers acts as a filter, encouraging women who prioritize women's issues to enter into the political system and also acts to incentivize certain types of behaviour, whatever the feelings are. It is anticipated that electoral systems operate the same way:

Hypotheses

6. Representatives elected in systems which facilitate the representation of women (PR systems and those which IUR are higher) will report that representing women is *more* important to them than those elected under systems which disincentivize the representation of women.
7. Controlling for feelings about the importance of representing women, the interaction between institutions and gender will remain significant and operate in the direction predicted.

Table 4.5 displays the predicted answer to the question "how important is it to you to represent women?" on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very) by gender and institution. Consistent with previous research women rank representing women as more important than do their male colleagues. Proportional representation has no affect on how important

it is to representatives, whether female or male, to represent women. This is unsurprising since electoral formula was found not to moderate the representation of women by women. On the other hand, representatives in systems which maximize incentives for unincorporated representation report that representing women is more important to them than do represetatives elected in systems which maximize party votes; this is true for both men and women, but it is particularly true for women. Women elected in institutions which enable and incentivize the representation of women rank representing women as more important to them than do women in other types of institutions and much more than men.

The results are suggestive of a role of institutions as filters - representatives, especially women, opt into political systems where they are able to achieve election/promotion by working on the issues important to them and where they have a chance to achieve their policy objectives. Of course, these correlations do not establish causation. For example, it cannot tell us anything about the preferences of women (or men) who opt not to enter the political process nor does it provide any clues for the reason behind such a decision.

To test whether institutions matter once legislators have self-selected (stage 2a) and won nomination and election (stages 2b and 3), the analyses in Table 4.2 are repeated with the variable capturing how important it is to the representative to represent women included as a control. Results are in Table 4.6, located at the end of the chapter, and displayed beside the original results from the original analysis to enable a stepwise comparison.

Unsurprisingly, reporting that it was important to represent women is positively related to behaviour. While the effect of gender decreases, it and all the interaction variables remain

statistically and substantively significant. In other words, even controlling for self-reported feelings about representing women, women do more in institutions that incentivize unincorporated representation. In short, even if some women are opting into or out of a political system based on the opportunities or incentives to represent women, institutions have an additional affect on behaviour of MPs once elected.

Looking In-depth: Understanding the Effect of Different Institutional Features

The results in this Chapter indicate, first, that institutions can and do matter for the substantive representation of women and, second, institutions moderate the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation because women, but not men, respond to institutional incentives. This section aims to understand which institutional features matter most by differentiating between the components of the ballot and vote dimensions and by using alternative measures to capture control over the ballot. All tables are found at the end of the chapter.

The Ballot Dimension

Run separately (Table 4.2), local control over nomination and an open list increases the amount women do by approximately one point (0.96 and 1.03 respectively). The coefficient for the ballot dimension, however, indicates that having both an open list and local control over nomination results in an increase in behaviour of just 1.4. In other words, the combination of the two components of ballot dimension is less than the sum of its parts.[28] This may simply be because the two institutional elements are highly correlated (0.95) - when the two components of the dimension are run in separate models

[28] Combining the coefficients for open list and local control over nomination (in the separate models in Table 4.2) gives 2.112 – greater than the 1.526.

the coefficient for the variable capturing ability to disrupt the list may also capture some of the effect of local control over nomination and vice versa.

When both components of the ballot dimensions and their interaction with gender are included in the analysis, the effect of each interaction is decreased (Table 4.7). Further, while the coefficient for each interaction is approximately one in the two separate analyses, when local control over nomination and ability to disrupt the list are run as separate variables in the same model, the latter matters more than the former (0.78 versus 0.64). Moreover, the p-value for local nomination increases slightly to 0.059. In short, both components of the ballot dimension matter, but it is the ability of voters to disrupt the list that has a greater impact. Two observations are worth making. First, given that local control over nomination is usually restricted to party members, it is not surprising that the ability of the general voting population to change the order of the list has a greater effect on behaviour. Second, the results support the adjustment to the ballot dimension offered in Chapter 2 and used in this analysis is an improvement on Carey and Shugart's original framework. Local nomination generates incentives for women to represent women even if list disruption is not possible; coding such systems as '0' underestimates the incentives representatives face. That said, it seems that the original logic behind Carey and Shugart's classification is correct - the ability to disrupt the list does matter more.

As discussed in Chapter 2, 'access to the ballot' is actually a very complex phenomenon that itself comprises various dimensions. In the analysis thus far, some form of local or district control (as opposed to regional or national) was used to capture the incentives to pursue off-party representation. The PARTIREP data also contains a measure that

captures the inclusiveness of the process (Hazan and Rahat, 2001). The variable indicates whether the selectorate, that is, the individuals or groups who select the candidate, is comprised of the party leader (or leaders), a party agency, or a broader segment of the population using some form of primary. The categories are ranked in this order to reflect the expected increasing incentives to represent unincorporated issues. The analysis in Table 4.2 was re-run using this as the institutional variable.

Party agencies themselves can vary substantially in terms of inclusiveness and decentralization, sometimes they are a small, central party committee and other times they take the form of a large convention. Rahat and Hazan warn "terminology used in each country is rarely equivalent, and hence one must be cautious when inferring the extent of inclusiveness based solely on what a particular party calls a specific agency" (302). A second analysis was rerun dropping those representatives who were selected by a party agency and simply differentiating between those who accessed the ballot via primary – the most inclusive process - and those who relied on party leadership – the extreme of an exclusive process. The results from both alternatives to the local nomination variable are displayed in Table 4.8. The original local nomination analysis from Table 4.2 is also displayed for comparison.

As with the other institutional variables, the selectorate indicator is never significant. What is more surprising, however, is that the interaction is never significant; neither women nor men do any more to represent women when access to the ballot is determined by a primary than they do when leaders alone have this power. The null finding may be due to the limitations of the data – only 14% of representatives are elected in systems that use some kind of primary and more than one third of these are UK MPs, a system which

otherwise incentivizes party representation. The results are nonetheless surprising; the inclusiveness of the selectorate does not matter, but the decentralized nature of it does – the more local the nomination, the more women do to represent women. Paired with the null finding on the difference between PR and SMP, these results suggest that a geographic tie of representation does *not* create disincentives to represent women. To the contrary, it may offer opportunities to pursue support on this basis via the nomination process.

The Vote Dimension

Carey and Shugart's original classification of the vote dimension was reordered to reflect the difference between pursuing vote based on clientistic relationships or personal celebrity and doing so on a broader identity-based, but non-party, representation. To test whether the data supports this theory-based decision, the analysis was rerun separating the effect of a single vote for a candidate and the effect of having multiple votes to distribute to candidates (Table 4.9). A single vote at the party level is the reference category.

A single vote to cast for an individual candidate simply has no effect on the behaviour of either women or men. Instead, all of the effect of the vote dimension is the result of having multiple votes to cast for candidates. These results support the decision to adjust the ranking of the vote dimension. A traditionally understood *clientilistic* relationship may be incentivized by a singular vote for *one* candidate that provides the individualistic benefits, but the pursuit of 'personal' votes on the basis of representing an identity or group interest is incentivized when there are multiple preference votes. Multiple votes allow citizens to indicate support for a representative of women's issues *and* another

representative who, for example, represents their geographic area or has a high public profile. This finding is a reflection of the fact that women are not just concerned with women's issues but, like men, they have a range of interests that determine how they cast their ballot.

Unincorporated Representation

Finally, the analysis was rerun using the vote dimension and the ballot dimension as separate variables in the same model (Table 4.9). In this analysis, as in the previous analyses, neither of the institutional variables are statistically significant indicating that men's behaviour is not affected by the institutional context. The vote dimension is statistically insignificant while the effect of the ballot dimension increases from 0.71 to 0.92. Women in systems in which there is local control over the ballot and the ability to disrupt the list score nearly two points higher than women in systems in which there is neither. Moreover, the effect of the ballot dimension is greater than the effect of the combined IUR variable (as seen in Table 4.2), suggesting that combining the ballot with the vote dimension reduces the effect of the ballot dimension. In other words, controlling for an open list and local nomination, the number of votes does not matter. From the perspective of institutionalized incentives, this makes sense - in the absence of some real impact over which candidate is elected (by affecting who accesses the ballot or what order candidates are elected in), it does not matter whether citizens have one or multiple votes, candidates do not have incentives to act on behalf of women (or other off-party representation).

Revisiting Hypotheses 2-3: Exploring the Null Finding

When it comes to the dichotomy between SMP and PR electoral systems, no difference in behaviour was observed. There are several possible explanations for this null finding. The first is that the key differences – strength of the geographic tie, district magnitude, and electoral threshold – do not have the effect theorized.

Second, variation among PR systems may simply be too great to observe a difference between PR and SMD systems. Qualitative research exploring women's experience in institutions may provide an alternative way to test the theory and, indeed, existing qualitative work provides some preliminary support. In her interviews with British MPs, Childs (2002) observed "a perceived tension between representing one's constituency and substantively representing women" (151). Similarly, Tremblay (2003) observes a difference in perception of representational roles between Australian senators (elected under a type of proportional representation) and Australian and Canadian members of parliament (elected under SMD). Chapter 7 further explores this question using in depth interviews.

Third, it may be that proportional representation incentivizes some behaviour to represent women, but not others. If this were the case, using the combined behaviour variable could yield statistically insignificant results. Erzeel et al. (2014), for example, find that both women and men in PR systems are more likely to act for women by speaking to their parliamentary group at least every three months, suggesting that this particular action is related to the electoral system. To test this, I repeated the multilevel regression models using the four the individual behaviours that comprise the combined measure; the results, in Table 4.11 located at the end of the chapter, are somewhat mixed.

Again, in contradiction to the findings of Erzeel and her colleagues, the effect of proportional representation on speaking about women's issues is neither statistically nor substantively significant.[29] PR does have a small effect on the frequency with which legislators make proposals on women's issues. In neither case is the interaction statistically significant, suggesting that any effect on behaviour does not vary by gender. Proportional representation is *negatively* related to the frequency with which representatives meet with women's organizations, although the effect is small (0.16 on the 5 point scale, $p = 0.06$). The interaction term is positive and slightly larger (0.26, $p = 0.06$). In short, men in proportional representation systems meet less frequently with women's organizations than men in SMP systems and women's behaviour does not vary. It may be that the geographic tie of representation encourages men to meet with women's organizations in their constituency, an incentive absent in PR. Women in PR systems do not respond to the *lack* of incentives in the same way as their male colleagues and continue to meet with women's groups. Finally, PR itself is positively correlated with collaboration on women's issues ($p=0.057$). Greater collaboration between representatives is not surprising given the expectation that proportional electoral systems contribute to a kinder, gentler politics (Lijphart, 1997). The interaction term, however, is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that the institutional effect does not increase the likelihood of collaboration for women any more than it does for men.

Differential affects of institutional features on specific forms of behaviour are part of the explanation of the null finding for Hypotheses 1 and 2. In many ways, this is unsurprising

[29] This difference is due, at least in part, to the different measure. While Erzeel et al. use a dummy variable indicating that the actor spoke at least once every three months to women issues the whole range of the scale has been used in this analysis.

– institutional features may encourage some, but not all, forms of substantive representation of women. If some institutions generate disincentives for representing women with, say, votes or legislative proposals, women should be expected to do less of that action (generating a negative correlation) and may instead dedicate more effort to alternative behaviour to represent women, like meeting with women's groups (generating a positive correlation).

Discussion: Reconsidering the Role of the Division of Powers and the Electoral System on Substantive Representation.

This chapter tested a theory of the role of electoral systems in the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation. The expected difference between SMP and PR systems was not observed, but the representation of women by women was found to vary with institutional incentives for unincorporated representation. Regardless of institutional context, men do less to represent women than do women. Moreover, their behaviour was immune to the institutional context, indicating that they chose other ways to cultivate personal support.

The analysis focused exclusively on the electoral system, but the results are relevant for those concerning the moderating effect of a division of powers (Chapter 3). To a significant extent, countries with a division of powers also have electoral systems that incentivize personal votes. The division of power systems included in the analysis in Chapter 3 include Switzerland, where the electoral system similarly provides maximum incentives to represent women. In the PARTIREP data the other two division of power systems with PR systems, include Poland, which scores two out of four on the incentives to represent women and Portugal, which scores zero. In other words, two of the three

division of power systems, which use PR, score higher than all parliamentary systems except one (Belgium). The Twitter analysis is limited to Canada, the US, and the UK – all SMP systems, but where the features of the electoral system result in divergent incentives to represent women. SMP systems were not included in the analysis in this chapter, but the implications are clear. If voters in the United States have more than one vote to cast and can control access to the ballot, the incentives exist to represent women may be a result of the electoral system rather than the division of powers.

Table 4.1. Distribution of Cases on the Ballot Dimension

	National	Local	**Total**
No List Disruption	747 (40%)	401 (21%)	1129
List Disruption	171 (9%)	566 (30%)	737
Total	899	967	1866

Table 4.2. The Effects of Gender and Electoral Institutions on Behaviour

		Proportional Representation Systems				
		Ballot Dimension				
	Proportional Representation	Local Nomination	Open List	Full Ballot Dimension	Vote Dimension	IUR
Woman	2.141***	1.840***	1.990***	1.733***	1.924***	1.754***
	(0.417)	(0.212)	(0.183)	(0.215)	(0.220)	(0.226)
Institution	0.282	0.09	0.391	0.255	0.013	0.131
	(0.256)	(0.305)	(0.407)	(0.240)	(0.245)	(0.148)
Women * Institution	0.199	0.962**	1.027**	0.705***	0.416*	0.308***
	(0.441)	(0.300)	(0.314)	(0.182)	(0.162)	(0.090)
Constant	3.116*	3.755*	4.102**	3.891**	3.905**	3.624*
	(1.358)	(1.483)	(1.447)	(1.487)	(1.496)	(1.520)
Random Effect Parameters						
sd (parliament)	<0.001***	<0.001***	0.000***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(0.000)	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(0.11)
sd (residual)	2.751***	2.744***	2.792***	2.738***	2.792***	2.743***
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
N	1924	1561	1654	1561	1640	1550
chi2	552.575	496.988	500.82	506.419	497.164	498.539

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.

Dependent Variable –Behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.

Results controlling for country specific effects, and feminist political culture.

Table 4.3. Testing the Effect of District Magnitude

	IUR	
	High	Low
Woman	1.976***	2.530***
	(0.236)	(0.290)
District Magnitude	-0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.007)
Woman*District Magnitude	0.001	0.014
	(0.005)	(0.013)
IUR	0.196	-0.262
	(0.323)	(0.378)
Woman*IUR	0.577	-0.667
	(0.399)	(0.391)
IUR*DM	0.004	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Woman*IUR*DM	0.015	-0.012
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Constant	3.820**	3.884**
	(1.471)	(1.435)
Random Effect Parameters		
sd (parliament)	<0.001	<0.001***
	(<0.001)	(<0.001)
sd (residual)		
	2.677***	2.677***
	(0.045)	(0.045)
N	1742	1742
chi2	533.963	533.72

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.
Low IUR indicates 0 or 1 (out of four) and high indicates 3 or 4 (out of 4).
Dependent Variable –Behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.
Results controlling for left party affiliation, country specific effects, and feminist political culture.

Table 4.4. The Effects of Gender and Campaign Preferences on Behaviour

	Behaviour
Woman	1.179***
	(0.347)
Campaign preferences	-0.269***
	(0.076)
Woman * Campaign preferences	0.441***
	(0.123)
Left Party	0.958***
	(0.148)
Constant	4.397
	(1.466)
Random Effect Parameters	<0.001
sd (parliament)	<0.001***
	(<0.001)
sd (residual)	2.790***
	(0.049)
N	1629
chi2	489.145
p	<0.001

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.
Dependent Variable –Behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.
Results controlling for country specific effects and feminist political culture.
Campaign preferences range from 1 (party) to 5 (personal).

Table 4.5. Predicted Importance of Representing Women by Gender and Institution

	SMD	PR	Institutional Gap	Minimum IUR	Maximum IUR	Institutional Gap
Men	5.56	5.56	<0.01	5.03	5.81	0.78***
Women	6.35	6.35	<0.01	5.61	7.11	1.49***
Gender Gap	0.79***	0.79***		0.58***	1.30***	

***p<0.001

Predicted Importance of Representing Women on a Scale of 0 to 7 (not at all to very).

Significance and gaps determined by using margins pairwise comparisons option. Multi-level regression in Appendix B, Table B10.

Table 4.6. The Effect of Institutions & Gender on Behaviour Controlling for Preferences

	Ballot Dimension		Vote Dimension		IUR	
	Table 4.1.	With Control	Table 4.1.	With Control	Table 4.1.	With Control
Woman	1.733***	1.278***	1.924***	1.405***	1.754***	1.278***
	(0.215)	(0.212)	(0.220)	(0.219)	(0.226)	(0.223)
Institution	0.255	0.119	0.013	-0.225	0.131	-0.008
	(0.240)	(0.233)	(0.245)	(0.244)	(0.148)	(0.146)
Woman * Institutions	0.705***	0.594***	0.416*	0.373*	0.308***	0.265**
	(0.182)	(0.177)	(0.162)	(0.158)	(0.090)	(0.087)
Importance of Representing Women		0.678***		0.676***		0.680***
		(0.056)		(0.056)		(0.057)
Constant	0.705***	1.003	3.905**	1.457	3.624*	0.972
	(0.182)	(1.468)	(1.496)	(1.476)	(1.520)	(1.495)
Random Effect Parameters						
sd (parliament)	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	(<0.001)					
		(0.000)	(<0.001)	(0.000)	(0.11)	(0.000)
sd (residual)	2.738***	2.597***	2.792***	2.658***	2.743***	2.602***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)
N	1561	1485	1640	1557	1550	1474
chi2	506.419	686.1	497.164	665.218	498.539	676.646

p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.
Dependent Variable – Behaviour 0-13 scale
Results controlling for left party affiliation, country specific effects, and feminist political culture.

Table 4.7. The Effects of Gender and Components of the Ballot Dimension

	Behaviour
Woman	1.745***
	(0.218)
Local Nomination	0.43
	(0.405)
Open List	0.166
	(0.306)
Women* Local Nomination	0.637+
	(0.329)
Woman * Open List	0.772*
	(0.345)
Constant	3.918**
	(1.487)
Random Effect Parameters	
sd (parliament)	<0.001***
	(<0.001)
sd (residual)	2.738***
	(0.049)
N	1561
chi2	506.97

+p=0.059 * p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.
Dependent Variable –Behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.
Results controlling for left party affiliation, country specific effects, and feminist political culture.

Table 4.8. Testing the Features of the Nomination Procedure

	Inclusiveness of Selectorate	Primary Vs. Leader	Local nomination
Woman	2.396***	2.358***	1.840***
	(0.204)	(0.214)	(0.212)
Nomination Procedure	0.084	0.683	0.09
	(0.228)	(0.937)	(0.305)
Interaction	-0.132	-0.391	0.962**
	(0.228)	(0.539)	(0.300)
Constant	3.426*	2.312	3.755*
	(1.494)	(2.130)	(1.483)
Random Effect Parameters			
sd (parliament)	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(<0.001)
sd (residual)	2.754***	2.740***	2.744***
	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.049)
N	1561	923	1561
chi2	482.146	299.02	496.988

p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.
Dependent Variable –Behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.
Results controlling for left party affiliation, country specific effects, and feminist political culture.
Results for local nomination the same as those in Table 4.2.

Table 4.9. The Effects of Gender and Components of the Vote Dimension

	Behaviour
Woman	1.964***
	(0.229)
Single Vote for Candidate	0.194
	(0.430)
Multiple Vote for Candidates	0.026
	(0.490)
Women* Single Candidate Vote	0.173
	(0.446)
Woman * Multiple for Candidates	0.828*
	(0.324)
Constant	3.894**
	(1.498)
Random Effect Parameters	
sd (parliament)	<0.001***
	(0.000)
sd (residual)	2.791***
	(0.049)
N	1640
chi2	497.752

+p=0.059 * p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.
Dependent Variable –Behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.
Reference category is a single vote cast for the party.
Results controlling for left party affiliation, country specific effects, and feminist political culture.

Table 4.10. The Effects of Gender and the Ballot and Vote Dimensions

	Behaviour
Woman	1.791***
	(0.227)
Ballot Dimension	0.208
	(0.269)
Vote Dimension	0.059
	(0.269)
Woman * Ballot Dimension	0.916**
	(0.340)
Woman * Vote Dimension	-0.227
	(0.304)
Constant	3.871*
	(1.528)
Random Effect Parameters	
sd (parliament)	<0.001***
	(<0.001)
sd (residual)	2.739***
	(0.049)
N	1550
chi2	505.11

p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.
Dependent Variable –Behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.
Results controlling for left party affiliation, country specific effects, and feminist political culture.

Table 4.11. The Effect of Gender and PR on Forms of Substantive Representation.

	Meet	Speak	Propose	Collaborate
Woman	0.604***	0.670***	0.565***	0.274***
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.059)
PR	-0.207*	0.213+	0.2+	0.069+
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.036)
Woman * PR	0.296+	-0.067	-0.026	0.007
	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.062)
Constant	2.470***	1.647**	2.791***	-0.410*
	(0.487)	(0.512)	(0.649)	(0.193)
Random Effect Parameters				
sd (parliament)	0.055**	<0.001***	0.151***	<0.001***
	(0.062)	(<0.001)	(0.045)	(<0.001)
sd (residual)	0.973	1.050**	1.152***	0.404***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.006)
N	2025	1983	2001	2079
chi2	773.553	283.715	232.333	304.568

Results display results from four regressions.

Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.

Results controlling for left party affiliation, country specific effects, and feminist political culture.

Figure 4.1. Predicted Behaviour by Gender and Institutional Features



Displays predicted behaviour using Margins and the multilevel regression results in Table 4.2.
Predicted behaviour on scale of 0-13. 95% confidence intervals shown.

Figure 4.2. Predicted Behaviour by Gender and Perceived Campaign Incentives
Testing Hypothesis 4



Displays predicted behaviour using Margins and the multilevel regression results in Table 4.4. Predicted behaviour on scale of 0-13. 95% confidence intervals shown.

Figure 4.3. Predicted Behaviour by Gender, Institution, and Party Orientation

Testing Hypothesis 5





Predicted behaviour on scale of 0-13. 95% confidence intervals shown.

Displaying predicted behaviour using Margins. Results from multilevel regression in Appendix B, Table B9.

Chapter 5: In Their Own Words[30]

The theory offered in Chapters 1 and 2 is fundamentally about women's and men's experiences of institutions and how these experiences interact with gendered differences in preferences and priorities. The following two chapters turn to the legislators themselves, and ask whether they see themselves as representatives and how they experience the institutions within which they operate. This chapter discusses the general methods and the advantages and limitations of this mixed methodological approach. This chapter also presents insights and experiences that women in politics share across political institutions and the political spectrum. In many ways, this chapter focuses on substantiating an assumption that has animated this research – women *want* to represent women and issues that disproportionately affect women *are* on their minds. In particular, I discuss how women understand their role as representatives of women, why women and men may have divergent preferences and priorities as legislators, and what it means to speak of 'women's issues'.

Methods

This qualitative research includes 73 interviews across a range of cross-national and institutional contexts and partisan orientations. I conducted interviews in seven countries with members of lower houses of national parliaments, the European Parliament, and, in some countries, subnational legislatures. All interviews took place between January and August 2015. Countries were chosen based on important variation in the key independent variables – the electoral system and division of powers, but options were limited by the need for respondents to speak English and for reasonable proximity for travel. The

[30] The fieldwork conducted in Chapters Five and Six are covered by the UBC Behaviour and Research Ethics Board for the completion of this dissertation (H14-02832).

institutional features of the seven countries – Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States – were introduced and discussed in Chapter 2 but are summarized again in Table 5.3. The Table, which can be found at the end of this chapter, also indicates the electoral system used for elections for the European Parliament in Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Most interviews were organized by emailing the representative's public email address outlining the research and requesting a meeting. Representatives were selected at random from lists of representatives available from the website of the institution. As Mosley argues (2013), to get a truly random sample scholars conducting interviews "will need to pursue various strategies … for instance following up repeatedly on requests for interviews" (18). Follow-up calls were entirely ineffective in securing interviews – in no case did calls to the legislator's office result in an interview. Legislators who were interested in participating did so after one or two emails and those who were not interested declined after the first email or never responded at all. In some cases (the US, the UK, and Germany) the small number of women elected and the low response and participation rates meant that nearly all women representatives were contacted.

In the US in particular, organizing interviews was extremely difficult. Just 3 (7 percent) of those contacted agree to participate in the study and one subsequently cancelled and was unable to reschedule. In the end, one interview was conducted with a Republican Congresswoman and another with a staff member of a Democratic Congresswoman. Through my attendance at a reproductive rights conference in Washington, DC several

contacts were made with state level legislators, four of who later participated in phone interviews.

Despite the attempts at a random sample, the large number of legislators contacted and the small response and participation rates raises some serious concerns of self-selection. Those who responded to my enquiry are most likely systematically different than those who did not; a legislator who spends the time and effort to complete an interview or survey about women's representation is likely to care more about the issue than those who choose not to participate. These concerns are kept in mind, but the problem should not be overstated. A number of representatives reported that they agreed to speak with me to make clear that "there was no such thing as a woman's issue" (MP 5, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015) while others seemed not to know the topic of the research when the interview began and/or were participating simply because their staff had agreed to it on their behalf. Even more importantly, the data from the interviews are "causal process observations" (Mosley, 2013) and focus less on outcomes like the frequency with which representational acts are undertaken. While the latter would almost certainly be overestimated with a self-selected sample, the ability to identify the opportunities and constraints, disincentives and opportunities that legislators experience in the institutional context should be unaffected.

Interviews lasted between thirty minutes to one and a half hours. Most were conducted in person, though some took place over the phone or on Skype. In person interviews were audio recorded with permission (no one declined) and supplemented in most cases with notes written immediately following interviews. Notes were taken during phone or Skype interviews and, when possible, the interviews were also recorded. Audio recordings were

transcribed in full. Surveys and transcribed interviews were then coded and organized using NVivo.

Conducting interviews in person makes the establishment of rapport easier and enables an assessment of information other than simply what the interviewee *says*. Indeed, interviews in Switzerland were illuminating not only because of what legislators said but also because of the public nature of the interviews and the behaviour of participants during our meeting (see Chapter 6). While the virtual interviews lack important contextualizing information and were more limited in depth and complexity, they were in many cases unavoidable because of the large number of countries included in the analysis and limited time I was in any one country.

Those who were not able to or were not interested in an in-person or phone interview were offered the opportunity to complete a short written survey. The UK survey can be seen in Appendix C. Slight changes were made to reflect institutional differences and correspondingly different observable implications in other countries. The short surveys were helpful in reaching legislators who were otherwise unavailable but contain less depth, complexity, and context than either the phone or in-person interviews.

All respondents were gauranteed confidentiality and anonymity. While standard practice, this was a critical component of the arrangement made with legislators who agreed to participate in the interviews. Because I was asking about perceived constraints and disincentives arising from the strength of principal-agent relationships with parties (for example), some answers may have had negative professional consequences. No participant asked to be quoted directly, though again respondents in Switzerland did react

differently to the promise of anonymity (Chapter 6). Moreover, a breach of confidentiality by one researcher can harm future scholars and the research community (Mosley, 2013).[31] Unfortunately, this confidentiality comes at the expense of transparency – none of the identities of the participants or transcripts of the interviews are available.

Bleich and Pekkanen (2013) call on qualitative researchers to use a "common sets of standards for reporting the reliability of their data so that readers and reviewers can judge the value of their evidence" (87). To this end, Table 5.1 also includes the response rate (the percentage who responded either positively or negatively to the request for the interview) and participation rate (the percent whom actually participated in the research) by country. While the former, which Bleich and Pekkanen call a "nonresponse bias" (86), is often not reported, it provides an indication of the representativeness of the sample, the extent of the self-selection problem, and the potential for bias.

Appendix C includes an interview methods table that contains as much information as possible about each interview within the confines of confidentiality – party, nature of interview (in-person, phone, Skype, or written survey), and whether the interview was recorded and transcribed. Notes also indicate whether the participant was contacted for a specific reason – for example, if the representative was contacted because of a referral rather than approached at random. Given the large number of interview requests made, only those that took place are included in Table C.1. A second table (Table C.2) contains breakdown of response and participation rates by party and institution.

[31] Such an issue was raised by two participants from the United Kingdom whose colleagues had been interviewed and then publicly quoted to determinant of their political career.

Methodological Advantages

These interviews fill in the gaps of the conventional quantitative research in Chapters 3 and 4 (Collier et al., 2004). By targeting the causal process, the qualitative analysis enables a testing of the fundamental assumptions of the theory. The use of interviews also allows for a second test of the differences between PR and SMP systems. Given concerns that the null finding between PR and SMP systems is the result of considerable variation among proportional representation systems, interviews with women in SMP systems and PR systems can clarify whether the differences theorized to matter – electoral threshold, district magnitude, and geographic tie – generate incentives, disincentives, opportunities, or constraints for the representation of women. Further, there were simply too few women in SMP systems to quantitatively test variation in personal and party votes among SMPa systems, the result of what King, Keohane and Verba (1994) call "selection bias introduced by the world" (135). Testing observable implications by interviewing women is less limited by the problem of degrees of freedom inherent in exploring more rare occurrences, such as the representation of women in SMD systems.

Methodological Limitations

In addition to representativeness of the sample discussed above, common concerns with interview research include the accuracy and quality of information obtained (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013). Berry (2002) notes that elite interviewees also often exaggerate their role. In an open-ended questionnaire, politicians may overestimate their impact or their desire or ability to represent women's issues. Moreover, legislators may wish to secure or protect their reputation or that of their party. Accuracy of reporting is another common concern, particularly in relation to demonstrative quotes. Throughout, I try to provide context as to the representativeness of the content and intensity of quotes. Where

possible, legislators' responses are triangulated using existing literature, outside groups (voting report cards by not-for-profits for example), and the quantitative analysis in Chapters 3 and 4.

The research is limited in scope as it includes only women legislators. While it was the original intention of this research to interview men as well as women, doing so was not possible. After several requests and follow-ups, it was clear that men were much less likely to offer any response. Only two men participated, both of whom were members of right parties and one of which held an extremely high profile post in his national parliament. Another man (in the UK) completed the written survey. The failure of men to respond or participate is hardly surprising if men are less interested in women's issues (as demonstrated by the PARTIREP data and supported by the input of their colleagues who participated in interviews). To ensure a significant number of interviews, effort was focused on confirming interviews with women. This limitation is significant; the quantitative research indicates that it is largely women's behaviour that depends on institutional incentives, but some of the results showed that men also (or only) responded to the context. In the absence of men's input, the in-depth interviews are unable to corroborate this.

The Interviewees

In total, 73 Interviews were conducted, including one with a Peer in the United Kingdom House of Lords, five with staff members, and 67 elected representatives. Another fourteen representatives completed a short written survey. Representatives came from 29

unique parties (not including parties represented at more than one level of government).[32] Nearly 80 percent of interviews or surveys were conducted with representatives elected to the lower or only house at the national level or their staff, another 18 percent at the European Parliament level, and in just five cases were participants elected at the subnational level. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the number of interviews and survey by country and institution.

The women interviewed represent fewer than 15 percent of all representatives contacted. A significant majority simply did not reply, and another 25 percent declined for a variety of reasons. Both the response rate and participation rate varied by country and are summarized by country in Table 5.1. Although most who responded but declined either provide no reason or simply said they were too busy, there were some differences in common reasons for declining which are illustrative of institutional constraints and dis/incentives. Consistent with the expectations of the importance of the geographic tie in SMP systems, Members of Parliament in the United Kingdom frequently declined because of the need to prioritize their constituents. One MP, who agreed to fill out the survey but not to participate in an interview, offered the following explanation:

> "Apologies, but in the run up to a General Election I can only offer interview opportunities to local students." - MP 11, United Kingdom, January 12, 2015.

The staff member for another MP replied:

> "I am sorry to say that because she gets so many of these kind of requests, she simply does not have the time to take part unless they are from one of her constituents." – Political Staff, United Kingdom, Personal Email, January 9, 2015.

[32] For example, members of the UK Labour Party were interviewed at both Westminster and the European Parliament. This is counted as one party.

No representatives elected in a PR system provided a similar reason. Members of Parliament in the Netherlands who declined reported that they did not have expertise in the area of women's representation and directed me to their party's spokesperson on women's issues. These types of responses point to the importance of specialization of roles in this system. In both Switzerland and Belgium, language was the primary reason given for a rejection. The problem was so significant among French-speaking Belgian MPs that, in the end, only Flemish representatives were interviewed.

Representatives in left parties make up nearly half of all interview participants and more than 75 percent of the respondents who completed the written survey. This is because women are better represented among left parties; once asked, women on the left were no more likely to participate than their colleagues on the right. Indeed, representatives in centre parties were slightly more likely to agree to participate than their colleagues in either left or right parties. Participation, of course, varied by country. In Canada, interviewees are mostly from the left NDP and centre Liberal party, and just two members of the governing Conservative party agreed to participate. In fact, Conservative women were much less likely to respond at all (74 percent did not). This is due both to the underrepresentation of women in the party's parliamentary caucus (just 17 percent were women) and the fact that many of the women in the party held a position in cabinet. In Switzerland, no one was willing to speak with me from the largest and right-wing Swiss People's Party (SVP). On the other hand, in Belgium, participants are split approximately evenly between parties on the left, centre, and right.

The women come from a diversity of ethnicities, races, and cultural backgrounds and some are immigrants. Several women who participated have visible or nonvisible

disabilities. Most, but not all, have children. None identified as gay, trans, or queer. Many are married and most indicate that their partners are men. Their professional and personal histories are equally wide-ranging; some grew up in poverty or lived in poverty as adults, others come from high profile and wealthy backgrounds. They are lawyers, teachers, doctors, professors, members of armed forces, labour leaders, former political staffers, police officers, students, activists, not-for-profit workers, diplomats and civil servants, stay-at-home mothers, and journalists. Their ages and tenure also vary; the youngest is just 24, serving in her current role for a mere three months while others have been elected to their current position for more than 20 years.

The remainder of this chapter discusses the general themes on women's political representation - how women understand their role as a representative of women, how they perceive their colleagues who are men on the same issues, why they believe women have divergent interest and priorities on gendered issues, and what they mean by 'women's issues'.

Representing Women

"*A representative of woman? Yes, absolutely, no doubt about it*." – State Representative, 2, United States, August 17, 2015.

"I don't think of myself as woman MP. I think of myself as an MP who happens to be a woman" – MP 5, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015.

The PARTIREP data showed that, when asked how important it is for them to represent women, nearly 80 percent of women ranked a six or seven out of seven and more than half picked the absolute highest score. The in-depth interviews, however, paint a more

complicated picture and illuminate diversities, challenges, and controversies among those who view themselves as representatives of women.

Most of the women interviewed see themselves as representatives of women and as having a responsibility to act in women's interests.

> "Everything I do is because I am a woman, it's for women, it's my base." - MP 3, Germany, February 26, 2015.
>
> "I think for me, in my career, it's always been a very important issue." – MP 9, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.
>
> "I think I've always thought it is a priority to further the cause of women because I think it's a man's world run by men" – MP 7, United Kingdom, January 21, 2015.

One American representative shared her belief that, in the absence of women representatives, like herself, acting to represent them, women would suffer:

> "If you're not at the table, you're on the menu." – State Representative, 3, United States, July 15, 2015.

Having said it is rarely their first concern. There are also women who feel more moderate about their role as a representative of women, using words like "somewhat", "to an extent", or "not to an extent". Some women identify their representation of women as part of a larger project of representing individuals and groups who face challenges, disadvantages, or barriers in society. Others reject the role explicitly.

> "Of course, I feel also as a woman. But that it is not my first item. I am more just the citizens of this country." – MP 3, Switzerland, March 10, 2015.
>
> "Yeah, but not to the exclusion of men. I am a woman, I bring a woman's perspective, but I'd like to think I am a representative of everyone." – MP 5, Canada, April 23, 2015.

> "It's not like I go 'what can I do for women today'". – MEP 8, United Kingdom, March 30, 2015.

> "I don't know. I am usually thinking of myself as someone who should… how should I put this… I am not your typical feminist. It's not like I am here to fight for feminist issues. I am here to fight for anyone who is at a disadvantage. Women is one of the groups that have a disadvantage." - MEP 5, Netherlands, March 10, 2015.

The representatives who have more ambiguous feelings about the representation of women often identify their interest in or responsibility to address *certain areas* where women were disadvantaged. For example, the first women quoted above (MP 3, Switzerland, March 10, 2015) followed up with:

> "…but of course there are issues where women are not treated as men or [issues] that touch especially women. But I am not a fighter for women's rights." – MP 3, Switzerland, March 10, 2015.

The responses of those who reject their role as a representative of women outright are often contradictory or paradoxical. When asked if she represented women, one UK MP responded "No, I don't think of myself as woman MP. I think of myself as an MP who happens to be a woman" but then went on to highlight how her own gendered experiences informed her politics.

> "It wasn't until my youngest was in her second year of school that I went back to work, I had 12 years at home. I thought those 12 years would be completely shallow, but in fact, I have drawn more on those years of experience in my job than I would have ever felt possible." - MP 5, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015.

She also attributes her active attention to sexualized and domestic violence to her personal exposure to survivors and attributed the underrepresentation of women to divergent care needs and responsibilities.

> "If women want to have their own children, this is an extremely difficult job to do. It's not family friendly in any way whatsoever. I think, undoubtedly, that make it a much bigger decision for a woman to take this job than it is for a man." - MP 5, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015.

A Dutch representative starts with this response:

> "I always say I was elected to represent the whole … everybody in the country. There are only 150 people here. Also people who do not vote, children for example. In that way, I don't feel a special responsibility [to represent women]."

She then follows up her statement by identifying cases where her experience as a woman mattered to her policy discussions.

> "But of course, I would [represent women] in discussions on childcare or schooling, I would bring in my experience as a woman, as a mother, as a mother of a girl as well. So I would bring in new points of view, and that's very important I think." – MP 10, Netherlands, February 6, 2015.

Another Dutch MP argues that there is no difference between her male and female colleagues and that 'women's issues' do not exist in politics. She goes on, however, to identify her own personal experiences as a woman and as a mother as critically important to her portfolio areas.

> "So I said to the people who were then drawing the portfolios, give me something I can… how do you say that… identify with. Otherwise I can't really be motivated… so I ended up doing all the medical [and] ethical issues around abortion. …. I also ended up with social affairs, particularly childcare. That was something they said that as a young woman with four children at home you can identify with this whole area. And I had asked for something I could identify with, otherwise for me it doesn't feel good." – MP 5, Netherlands, January 29, 2015.

One Swiss MP reports her concern with women's issues, but not a representative of women:

> "No. I am not [a representative of women]. But I am concerned with problems touching women because I am a woman. As we are only 30 percent women here, I am concerned with that topic. But I am not a representative of women."- MP 6, Switzerland, March 9, 2015.

One MEP representing the United Kingdom does not identify as a representative of women:

> "It's not me, I can't bang the drum for some sort of feminist crusade, I've come here to do my job. I haven't come here on a crusade for women." - MEP 8, United Kingdom, March 30, 2015.

Throughout the interview, however, she realized she had been acting to represent women, focusing particularly on women's sport and leadership.

> "It's not something I am really thinking about, but I guess it's just something that is a natural thing to me. I don't have to think about it to just go and do it. It's maybe just when other people ask me about it that I start to think about it. People like you. " - MEP 8, United Kingdom, March 30, 2015.

To be clear, even those who adamantly identify as a representative of women do not necessarily see themselves as feminists. Some representatives do use the term and identify their activism as feminism; one was even wearing a button that said "feminist". A staff member assisting with translation in one interview with a Swiss MP reports that she is "*the* feminist MP in French Switzerland" (MP 5, Switzerland, March 12, 2015).

> "It's not that I shy from the word feminist, I am overtly a feminist, and a proud feminist." – MP 5, Canada, April 23, 2015.

Others explicitly reject it:

> "I am not your typical feminist. It's not like I am here to fight for feminist issues." – MEP 5, Netherlands, March 10, 2015.
>
> "…me, myself, I am not a feminist at all." – MEP 1, Belgium, January 27, 2015.

> "I would never really describe myself as a feminist." – MEP 8, United Kingdom, March 30, 2015.

To summarize, most women see themselves as representatives of women, though it is not necessarily their first concern and acting for women is not synonymous with feminism. Moreover, the responses of those who are more ambivalent about or even reject their role as a representative of women, taken collectively, continue to point to the importance of their gender and gendered experience.

The Representation of Women by Men

"It's the thing of women to defend women. If you have women's issues they have to be defended by women." – MP 5, Switzerland, March 12, 2015.

Just as most women identify as representatives of women, most also agree that men were not. In fact, all women interviewed report that men do not represent women or were much less likely to do so than their female counterparts. The same was not true of the written surveys. When the surveys contained the simply question "do your male colleagues represent women", most (but not all) agree that they do. Given the option to elaborate on whether there are issues that women spend more time on than men, however, respondents point to issues like pay equity, violence, the environment, and social issues more generally.

While some individual men were noted as exceptions, the women interviewed say that the men in their legislature either can not represent women, because of their divergent life experiences or do not, simply because women's issues are not a priority. Others argued that some of their male colleagues actively oppose positive action to address gender inequality. When men do act to represent women, it is perceived as a self-serving

political move that corresponds with days like pay equity day or international women's day when "male members of the Parliament take the floor and that day they all try to show how feminist they are." – MP 7, Germany, February 23, 2015.

> "Unfortunately, men still do not fight in the front row when it comes to gender equality." – MEP 3, Germany, May 12, 2015.
>
> "My male colleagues? It's barely on their radar!! I've never seen a man running on improving the lives of women. It's very strange because men have daughters and women in their lives." - State Representative, 2, United States, August 17, 2015.
>
> "I do observe that women dedicate more time and energy than their male colleagues. They don't act to represent women." – MP 9, Switzerland, May 5, 2015.
>
> "On subjects like domestic violence because most of the victims, but not all, are women, you will occasionally get men standing up, but not often." – MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

A state-level senator reports that any time men do something supportive of gender equality they are commended and feels it is, in many ways, "the equivalent of men saying they were 'babysitting their own kids" (State Senator, United States, August 24, 2015).

One German legislator from a left leaning party reports her male colleagues often oppose women's issues that come before their party group. When asked if she thought women acted to represent women she states:

> "Yes, of course. I think they have more experience in the normal life, in the practical life, in every day life, than men do on these questions." – MP 6, Germany, March 26, 2015.

Her male colleagues, however:

> "…were against [allowing there to be a] real chance for women to become parliamentarians on this level….because they fear that they will lose their

> mandates. So they stabilize their own position. This is my own party. They don't want to get more women, they say 'no it's my constituency and I want to become once more a parliamentarian'." – MP 6, Germany, March 26, 2015.

Another German MP from a different party agrees that men's personal interests limited progression on women's issues.

> "In the party, all the leading positions are more or less men, men who hold onto their positions and are not yet ready to give their positions up." - MP 7, Germany, February 23, 2015.

On the other hand, some women report that men could be recruited as allies, even if they were unlikely to take up the issues themselves.

> "It's easy to recruit men to work on women's issues; everyone wants to be on the good side of women, because it's not that controversial." – State Representative, 2, United States, August 17, 2015.

Not surprising, the failure of men to represent women and their interest is viewed, at the very least, as disappointing.

> "I don't like it. I don't like that we are always with female colleagues in these parts of politics." – MP 6, Germany, March 26, 2015.

One British MP argues the "failure of feminism is that we haven't changed men, the way you'll get change is men arguing for it" (MP 3, United Kingdom, February 4, 2015). In other words, women's continued responsibility for women's issues is seen as a significant barrier to achieving equality and arriving at better policy.

Why Women Represent Women

Legislators shared several reasons for feeling that they are representatives of women. Most prominently, women identify how their personal experiences differ from their male colleagues in ways that are politically salient.

> "Sometimes, of course, because of our experiences in our life time, in daily life, we see different things, and we want different things." - MEP 2, Germany, May 27, 2015.

> "Well, yes of course [I represent women]. I know women's daily life." MP 7, Germany, February 23, 2015.

> "Women are still the primary care givers, so childcare has been an enormous issue for me. I was a young single mother. My husband and I split up when my son was ten months old. I was the primary care giver for most of my sons growing up years. Childcare was absolutely front and centre for me. [So is] support for families." – MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015.

> "Sometimes we have different options due to our experience with family, with children, with all the obstacles we have sometimes in our profession…To reach a higher level it's always a bit more difficult. All the more if you have children and you have to organize yourself, how to plan your family life, how to plan childcare. So we have different points of view, we have different experiences in the public." - MP 1, Switzerland, March 11, 2015.

> "When we were looking at legal aid, rape, domestic violence or domestic abuse, it does happen to men but less so. Women have more interaction with these things through friends or work or whatever it might be, so they know the situations, they know the scenarios, they know the stories. So they are much more likely to know how it will apply to policy." – MP 9, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

Although things are changing, the persistence of the unequal division of paid and unpaid labour remains relevant.

> "There are more stay at home dads than ever before, but women still win that one." – MP 13, Canada, April 20, 2015.

> "I can imagine if you are a man that takes care of the house all day then you reason in another way, but it's like this in society for the moment that most men don't… it's really like a cliché, but it's just like that." – MEP 1, Belgium, January 27, 2015.

Gendered division of paid work also matters. Women and men often come to politics with divergent professional experiences and use these experiences and expertise to inform their political priorities.

> "Most of the women I know being active in politics started working in fields which were related to their qualifications and personal experiences. This is why, in my opinion, women dedicate more time and energy to subjects like care, schooling, housing and the reconciliation of private and professional life than their male colleagues." – MEP 12, United Kingdom, May 5, 2015.

> "It's both the experience, usually from their previous career, but also personal experience. I mean, my female colleagues have all experienced how difficult it is to combine work and family" – MP 9, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.

> "[Women] have professional backgrounds in the softer sector or in the health sector or the educational sector." – MP 12, Netherlands, January 29, 2015.

> "I think women will speak to issues that they are most comfortable with. For some that, may be social issues, especially for some that have work experience in the area. There are quite a few women in parliament now who have worked in the voluntary sector, so they bring that experience with them." – MP 6, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

> "A lot of the women involved in politics have come from caring professions if you want to call it that - teaching, nursing." – Campaign Staff, Canada, April 21, 2015.

The under-representation of women itself also plays an important role in legislators' feelings about their representational duties.

> "Yes, I do view myself as a representative of women, yes, because women are so under-represented." – MP 2, United Kingdom, January 27, 2015.

> "I mean I don't only want to represent women – men and families [too]. [But], because there are so few women that it actually puts me in a position… it's really important for me to be a strong voice on that." – State Representative, 3, United States, July 15, 2015.

Not all think these gendered differences are a function of self-selection or personal preference. Some express concern that women are relegated to feminized policy areas because of an "expectation of competences", as much as real competences (MP 4, Belgium, March 19, 2015). Even those who think women themselves choose gendered issue areas share a concern that anticipation of gender-based policy interests could limit opportunities available to them.

> "I would say, first of all, women are picked out. It happened to me … for social policy. Professionally I was involved in agriculture, so really this is something male again, but they picked me out [of it] because they needed someone to be a good politician for social things. They were convinced because of my voluntary engagement that I could do that, so I did it. But for my male colleagues, they said 'okay that's your thing, we're done, we can concentrate on our things'. According to what I've heard from discussing with other women it's … quite often the same thing. I mean if the woman is an architect, she might be picked out to do construction of cities or so on. Usually, though, they say 'you are a mother, you know about family life, you do education or cultural things or maybe just female things or women's lib or whatever'." – MEP 2, Germany, May 27, 2015.
>
> "I have made the experience that many political actors, men like women, expect female politicians to cover topics such as social policy, education, etc. This is also why I have taken the conscious decision to work on economic policy, which are traditionally male dominated." – MEP 14, Germany, April 15, 2015.
>
> "It really depends, it's not that we women in politics [are] just [in]to family stuff. It's the corner where men put us mostly." – MP 1, Switzerland, March 11, 2015.

These interviews point to the representation of and tie to women constituents as a function of shared *gendered* experience rather than a shared sex (see also Childs, 2003). Women felt the need to represent women because of their own and other women's experiences arising out of the division of both paid and unpaid labour, the burden (and privilege) of care, and unequal access to power. Many simultaneously shared concerns that these inequalities are recreated when their interest in women's issues was assumed.

As the next section demonstrates, the reasons women feel a responsibility to represent women are echoed in the issues that legislators mention as important to women.

Women's Issues

When asked about the issues that they think are important to or disproportionately affect women, women raised issues that related to systemic and structural inequalities and women's vulnerabilities to poverty and violence. Men's violence against women was the most common issue raised, including trafficking, the sex trade (prostitution), female genital mutilation and, specific to Canada, missing and murdered indigenous women. Second most common are issues involving work and family, including childcare, maternity and parental leave, and the implications for pensions of differing career paths. Third, many focus on issues that explicitly involve equality – representation in politics and on boards, pay equity, rights, economic opportunities, quotas, independence, and emancipation. Finally, other care related issues are also common, including elder care, child welfare, housing, and health care including abortion access, maternal care, and midwifery.

Many women are quick to point out that "all legislation affects women directly or indirectly" (MP 4, United Kingdom, January 22, 2015). This is meant, on the one hand, to argue for the importance of a distinct gendered perceptive on broader issues like transportation, immigration, European Relations, the environment, taxation, and labour rights, and, on the other, to stake a claim for women, as much as men, in 'non-gendered' policy areas.

> "If you look at transportation, and you ask men to tell you what they think of as the most important issues concerning public transport they will tell you very

> logically it's the price of your train ticket and the reliability of the service. Women will tell you something completely different. Safety. Men are not concerned about their safety taking public transport, but women are."– MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

> **"**Sitting in an economic round table with my colleagues to blue sky a platform and I am the only women in the room, and they are going on about 'blab blah blah', and I say 'hey! Childcare, even dollar we invest we get a 1.70 back in the economy'." – MP 4, Canada, May 7, 2015.

Intersectionality: Representing Diversity among Women.

Just as women represent women because of perceived shared experiences, other aspects of identities and personal experiences also matter. Women identify themselves as representatives of youth, baby boomers, African Americans, and immigrants and particularly *women* among these groups. Some women mention women with families and children while others are explicitly concerned with older, single women, or young women without families.

> "If white women are being discriminated against because they are pregnant, you can bet black women are two fold. America gets a cold, and we get pneumonia." – State Senator, United States, August 24, 2015.

> "I always [wear] the woman hat and the immigrant hat, because I can relate." – MP 13, Canada, April 20, 2015.

> "I actually think very often young people and women … it's good to put them together. Young females have certain issues and especially young women in this crisis who are losing most from all the austerity measures." – MEP 3, Germany, May 12, 2015.

In most cases, the diversity of women is an important aspect of representation, but some feel it makes the representation of women difficult or even impossible.

> "Of course [I represent women]! And older women and divorced women. There is a lot of diversity there. So I can't promise women in general that I am their representative." – MP 10, Netherlands, February 6, 2015.

Representing women: Challenging and Problematic

Even for the women who adamantly identify as representatives of women, the role is challenging.

> "Sometimes I fail, sometimes I don't have the strength to do it, sometimes I am just tired of doing it, and I want someone else to step up to the plate."– MP 4, Canada, May 7, 2015.

The focus on women's issues as such is frequently viewed as problematic because it can minimize or ghettoize the issues, ignoring how they are part of a larger societal and policy picture.

> "Women's rights… It should be part of the bigger thing. We should tackle it in the context of the bigger thing" – MP 2, Belgium, March 18, 2015.

> "I never use the phrase women's issues; I talk about issues of concern to women. Women's issues might ghettoize whereas women are concerned about a range of issues, including social services, but also other things." MP 8, Canada, April 21, 2015.

> "… you are in danger of ghettoizing either women or women's issues into a particular area." – MP 6, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

Women's responsibility for these issues is also a source of frustration, particularly as it removes the responsibility from men and, in doing so, can recreate the problems the women were trying to resolve.

> "Every interview I have, every interviewer says 'it must be very difficult to combine this job with your family'. My husband, who is a paediatric cardiologist never ever gets asked this. … We [women in politics] do tend to think it's important because we are confronted with it … we have to declare our situation. We always have to explain." - MP 9, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.

> "These issues are very deeply rooted in society and men never have to answer to them. I always get asked, "oh I don't know how you do it" and men never get asked this. It makes it clear that they aren't expected to balance family and work… They are let off the hook for the policy areas too". – MEP 9, United Kingdom, April 15, 2015.

> "The other thing is you don't always want to keep them a women's issue; you want men to step up and take ownership of them as well. … it has to be a shared responsibility. On some of the things around women's political representation, I can make a it a gendered issue, I talk about it from a women's perspective." – MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015.

Women make clear that the division of labour on policy areas is not natural, but a product of existing inequalities.

> "I think we have to be careful…it is about socialization. [Women] certainly have different issues as a result of their own socialization. They find them more in social issues, in health issues, and you find less of them in financial issues. …It's all about power, where there is power there is a male issue." – MP 7, Switzerland, March 9, 2015.

> "Sometimes you hear that women are better at the social issues, and it's an assumption, but I think that men can be equally effective at both and should aspire to both and be encouraged to do both." – MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015.

Discussion and Looking Forward

This chapter set up the qualitative portion of this research, outlining the methodology and the advantages and limitations of the mixed method approach. It provided detailed information on the number and nature of interviews as well as the response and participation rates. After establishing the methodological approach, it presented some important themes on women's political representation.

Women across a range of parties, countries, and institutions experience the need to and the difficulty in representing women. They report wanting and feeling a responsibility to

represent women and the diversity among women because of their own and other women's lived experiences as defined by gender inequalities in access to power, vulnerabilities to violence, and unequal distribution of paid and unpaid work. At the same time, most women report, with disappointment and regret, that their male colleagues do not act to represent women.

The issues and interests raised as important to women are not surprising and are a function of the same factors that lead women to feel they have a responsibility to represent women. They range from issues related to traditional care issues to strategic or feminist interests aimed at resolving inequality. The diversity of issues raised justifies the choice not to provide a definitive list of 'women's interests'. It also underscores the advantages of representatives in the PARTIREP data where respondents were asked not how often they speak about gendered violence or childcare, but just how often they speak "to signal a situation in society that [they] consider disadvantageous for women" (PARTIREP, 2014). Women were able to determine for themselves when they were speaking to or making proposals 'women's interests' and the data thus reflect instances where women raise domestic violence, but also when they speak to the importance of safety on transit (for example).

From this open-ended qualitative analysis, however, there also arises the opportunity for a more informed quantitative analysis. In Chapter 7, where I test the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in the aggregate, I use these interviews to inform the operationalization of women's policy interests. In particular, I test the relationship between the percentage of representatives who are women and legislation address gender discrimination, social welfare, and family legal issues

(including men's violence against women) as well as spending on family allowance, social exclusion, and parental leave. These don't cover the totality of issues mentioned by the women who participated in these interviews, but do reflect the general trends.

In addition to sharing which issues they thought were most important to women, many of the respondents communicated their concern that a focus on 'women's issues' as such could ghettoize the issue, and others want to be clear that all issues are women's issues. Women want to both ensure that women's issues are mainstreamed and that they are not, as women, excluded from broader policy discussions. While the analyses in Chapter 3 and 4 established that some institutions do more to facilitate substantive representation than others, these interviews suggest that, regardless of the institutional context, women's issues are often considered 'outside' and are somewhat devalued. In other words, regardless of the institution, representing women is still an uphill battle.

The next chapter turns back to institutions and explores how the shared sentiments presented here filter through institution. In short, it asks which institutions make it easier and more productive for women to take *action* to match their beliefs on representing women.

Table 5.1. Qualitative Research in National & Subnational Legislatures

	Interview	Survey	Interview with Staff	Total
Belgium	6	0	0	6
Canada	13	0	1	14
Germany	7	2	0	9
Netherlands	14	2	0	16
Switzerland	8	1	0	9
United Kingdom	9	4	2	15
United States	5	0	1	6
Total	62	9	4	75

4 interviews in the United States were conducted with state level representatives. One interview in Belgium was conducted with a representative of the Brussels Parliament. One UK Interview is with Member of the House of Lords.

Table 5.2. Qualitative Research in the European Parliament

	Interview	Survey	Spoke with Staff	Total
Belgium	1	0	0	1
Germany	1	3	1	5
Netherlands	3	0	0	3
United Kingdom	6	2	0	8
Total	11	5	1	17

In one case in which a survey was completed, I also spoke with a staff member.

Table 5.3. Summary of Institutions

Division of Powers Most Recent Election	Women's Descriptive Representation	Lower House Electoral System		Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	EP Electoral system	Response and Participation Rates
		PR	Details			
Belgium Parliamentary System Coalition Government May 25, 2014	39.33 percent Ranks 18th globally. Legislated quotas. Lists must be 50-50 and the 2 top candidates on the candidate lists and the list of alternates cannot be of the same sex.	Yes	150 members11 multi-member districts (b/w 4 and 24 seats - number of seats based on total population). List PR. Using the d'Hondt method. Vote splitting is not possible, but voters can choose between indicating a preference for a party or for a candidate within that party.	Polling:0 Ballot: 1 Votes: 2 Total: 3	21 seats, in 3 electoral districts based on language. No vote splitting, but voters can indicate a preference.	20 percent of MPs contacted responded and 10 percent agreed to an interview.
Canada Parliamentary System Majority Government May 2, 2011	25 percent. Ranks 62nd globally. No legislated quotas, some voluntary party quotas.	No	308 members elected exclusively through SMP.	Polling:0 Ballot: 1 Votes: 0 Total: 1		42 percent of those contacted responded and 31 percent agreed to an interview.
Germany Parliamentary System Grand Coalition September 22, 2013	36.5 percent women. Ranks 25th globally. No legislated quotas, but a number of parties have internal quotas ranging from 30 percent of list candidates (CDU) to more than 50 percent (Die Linkspartei).	Mixed	At least 598 directly elected members. 299 members elected from single-member plurality constituencies. Another 299 elected through list PR from 16 multi-member constituencies corresponding to the Länder. Lists are closed and vote is cast at the party level. Seats distributed using Sainte-Laguë/Schepers method. Over hang possible.	Polling:0 Ballot: PR:0 SMP: 1 Votes: 0 Total: PR: 0 SMP: 1	96 MEPs, One national district, lists closed and blocked	40 percent of those contacted agreed to participate. 7 percent agreed to an interview.

Division of Powers Most Recent Election	Women's Descriptive Representation	Lower House Electoral System		Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	EP Electoral system	Response and Participation Rates
		PR	Details			
Netherlands Parliamentary System Coalition Government September 12, 2012.	37.3 percent women Ranks 22nd globally. No legislated quotas, but a number of parties have internal voluntary quotas (PvDa and Green).	Yes	150 members. Functionally one electoral district. Votes are cast for a candidate, though the votes are pooled. Candidates who receive 25 percent of Hare quota are guaranteed a seat if their party wins enough seats. Personal vote rarely changes party ordering.	Polling: 0 Ballot: 0 Votes: 1 Total: 1	26 MEPs elected one district. PR closed list but preferential vote can be cast.	55 percent of representatives contacted offered some kind of response and more than 33 percent agreeing to participate.
Switzerland Division of Powers October 23, 2011	31 percent women. Ranks 44th globally. No legislated quotas. SPD has internal quota of 40 percent.	Yes	200 members elected from 26 constituencies. SMP used in 5. PR in 21 constituencies using the Hagenbach-Bischoff method. Votes can be cast for lists or list can be modified by crossing out or repeating names. Voters can also split their ticket. ("panachage").	Polling: 0 Ballot: 1 Vote: 2 Total: 3		47 percent of those contacted responded and 28 percent agreeing to participate.
United Kingdom Parliamentary System Coalition Government May 6, 2010	22.6 percent women. Ranks 71st globally. No legislated quotas, the Labour party uses all women short lists in 50 percent of winnable ridings.	No	650 seats all elected through SMP.	Polling:0 Ballot: 1 Votes: 0 Total: 1	PR list closed and blocked, 11 national districts. FPTP used till 1999.	Nearly 37 percent of those contacted responded, but only 9 percent agreed to participate.
United States Division of Powers November 4th, 2014	19.3 percent women. Ranks 96th globally. No legislated quotas.	No	435 members seats all elected through SMP.	Polling: 2 Ballot: 2 Votes: 2 Total: 6		Approximately 36% responded and only 7.5 agreed to participate.

Information is based on the Interparliamentary Union Database (IPU) (2015), the Global Database of Quotas (2015), and the PARTIREP Dataset (2014).
Detailed breakdown of response and participation rate by party is available in Appendix C.

Chapter 6: Political Institutions in Women's own Words

The shared perspectives and experiences, of women in politics, while not universal, are striking. Similar thoughts on women's representation and women's interests do not, however, necessarily extend to *action* on the issues. How women see themselves as being able to *act* to represent women and change policy, and whether they believe it is in their interest to do so depends on the institutional context. This chapter takes the general themes presented in the previous chapter and explores how they filter through political institutions. It starts by looking at the difference between division of power systems and systems in which powers are fused. Women in the former share their experiences of pursuing women's interests through cross party cooperation and by proposing and sponsoring legislation. Women in the latter, on the other hand, report significant constraints and disincentives to act to represent women. As a result, substantive representation occurs almost exclusively outside parliament or out of sight. I then turn to women's experiences of electoral systems. The importance of features that facilitate unincorporated representation to women's ability to act in women's interests is clear. On the other hand, no evidence is found for the causal mechanism theorized to lead to differences between proportional and SMP systems.

The Division or Fusion of Powers: Women's Experiences in their own Words

Of the over 90 surveys and interviews conducted for this research, the vast majority took place in the context of a parliamentary system, including 30 representatives from the pure Westminster parliamentary systems of Canada and the UK. Just five interviews were conducted in the United States including with one congresswoman, one staff member of a congresswoman, and four state level legislators. I complement the interviews with

insights from the literature in part to compensate for the uneven distribution of cases. While insights from other parliamentary systems and the unique political system of Switzerland are included where relevant, the focus remains largely on the UK, Canada, and the United States.

This section proceeds in several parts. The first two focus on government and opposition backbenchers in parliamentary systems, both of whom face significant constraints and disincentives that limit substantive representation. As a result of the potential for a vote of non-confidence and the associated cost of an election and potential loss or gain of the absolute power of government, backbenchers remain primarily the agents of their party. These constraints are even more significant for opposition backbenchers who lack any real power. These constraints are paired with disincentives; ambitious representatives who seek party frontbench positions are disincentivized from departing from the party line or prioritizing non-party issues.

A third section looks at opportunities for substantive representation. Opportunities exist only when they do not threaten the supremacy of the party. As a result they are rare, lack real meaning, and occasionally rely on randomness. Moreover, opportunities differ between government and opposition backbenchers. Government backbenchers have opportunities behind the scenes as long as they 'behave' and limit public substantive representation. Opposition backbenchers do not have opportunities for influence with government behind the scene, but do have opportunities for substantive representation outside parliament that are not available to government backbenchers.

A fourth section focuses on the much more significant opportunities for women in the executive. Finally, a fifth and final section uses the interviews to address the opportunities and incentives in presidential systems. Because of the number of interviews conducted in parliamentary systems with backbenchers the first three sections are much more extensive than the latter two.

Parliamentary Systems –Backbench Constraints

"Everyone elected in parliament, especially constitutional parliaments and in parliamentary democracies, are supposed to be able to have input into the decision making. … [but] that's not going to happen." - MP 7, Canada, April 20, 2015.

Parliamentary systems are defined by significant constraints on individual behaviour; women follow the party line to avoid a vote of non-confidence and a costly election. Almost without exception, the women interviewed indicate the importance of direction from party leadership in determining what they do, how they vote, and even what they talk about.

> "In the speeches you give, in the interviews you do, your party's policy, platform and direction are critical." MP 9, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.
>
> "In some ways the decisions about what to do is made for you…you are expected to vote pro or con with regards to your party. This is not an absolute, some have voted against their party in cases, but it is almost always the case" - MP 4, United Kingdom, January 22, 2015.

Women often represent their party even when it contradicts their formal and official role as a representative of a geographic constituency.

> "British Politics doesn't allow for just doing whatever the constituents say – you are a representative of the party. My constituents see me as a representative of Labour party" – MP 2, United Kingdom, January 27, 2015.

One of the most significant manifestations of the constraints on the substantive representation is the inability of women to work together across party lines to promote women's issues. Women in both Canada and the UK report that while they occasionally speak with women across the aisle, it rarely, if ever, translates into visible substantive representation.

> "We feel we've got a loyalty first to the political parties rather than furthering other causes." – MP 7, United Kingdom, January 21, 2015.
>
> "Even when we talk, we have to bring it back to their party. We cannot work together to get something done." - MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

These observations are well supported by existing literature - it is not that cross-party cooperation on women's issues never occurs, indeed it does, but it is rare (Childs, 2003; Holli and Kantola, 2005; Lovenduski & Kamar, 2002; Peckford, 2002; Steele, 2002; Young, 1997). Most of the examples of cross-party cooperation involve the most explicitly gendered issues, including abortion, violence against women, and parliamentary procedures that affect women's political participation. But as one British Labour MP said "it doesn't happen much" (in Childs, 2003, 186). That collaboration occurs at all speaks to the policy-seeking objectives of women determined in part by shared gendered experiences.

The inability to collaborate and the sensitivity to potential or perceived departures from strict party loyalty is especially high in the context of a coalition or minority government and as an election nears. In these contexts, the risk of the dissolution of parliament and the potential loss or gain of the near absolute power that comes with a majority government is the highest.

> "I don't think we've actually exercised that cross-party female-thing properly because were in a coalition and the political landscape is quite tense. So party politics is very much the fore…It's particularly true at the moment. It's particularly true because the politics is very close. If we had a party with a 100 seat majority, there's more opportunity to do more of that sort of thing, oddly enough, because now you're too busy fighting other political parties." - MP 7, United Kingdom, January 21, 2015.

While constraints on substantive representation are a reality for all backbenchers, they are much more significant for members of the opposition.

> "You have no real power in opposition." - MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

One Canadian opposition MP puts it this way:

> "I don't care what political stripe it is; you can have a majority government that can be so unilateral in their approach to things." – MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015.

It is not about which party is in power, just that they are the party in power. In the context of a majority government, absolute executive power means a governing party needs not and so does not allow the opposition meaningful influence in the decision making process. Some women in other parliamentary systems share this experience. A Dutch MP reports that she can't "effectively propose bills or women- friendly policy because [she is] not in the majority in parliament" (MP 15, Netherlands, February 12, 2015.). A German MP, who had served as a minister in the parliament in her Land, says the difference between opposition and government was significant:

> "Here I am not in government so I can't do much. …Sometimes in the small things you have the possibility to do something in opposition." – MP 4, Germany, February 26, 2015.

One venue that is frequently cited as providing an opportunity to raise women's issues is committees, but members of the opposition parties quickly follow such statements with concerns about the limited influence they have. When asked about her opportunities to influence policy, one MP said it was "almost nonexistent. Even in committees" (MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015). The all or nothing power of majority governments meant that the majority doesn't "entertain amendments or debate even in committee" (MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015.). Even under the conditions of a minority government, opportunities to influence debate and outcomes via the committee process are constrained by the parliamentary system.

> "Even under the minority governments, there was too much competition. Everyone one-upping each other because you are in a fight for all the power" - MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015.
>
> "Committees should have been a place for us to influence policy [during the years of minority governments]. I think there was still too much competition between opposition parties. I think it was disappointing. I think that … again there is this stupid one-up-manship between the parties." - MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.

In short, in parliamentary systems, the concentration of power in the executive means that women are constrained in their ability to pursue women's interests. While limiting backbenchers in both governing and opposition parties, the constraints are much more significant for women in the latter.

Parliamentary Systems –Backbench Disincentives

The constraints facing women in both governing and opposition parties are paired with disincentives. Women who want to progress in a party from the backbench, where they are subject to party direction and discipline, to the frontbench, where they might have a chance to contribute to party positions and policy, must abide by the party line. To do

this, they must often use their limited time to support the party's priorities and contribute to the party's reputation.

> "You simply don't get into cabinet if you don't do what you're told and if you raise women's issues too much" - MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

> "You don't get into cabinet. You don't get promoted upwards because you are a woman and you don't do what you're told. Again this is most noticeable in this particular parliament and government; it's a majority government." - MP 7, Canada, April 20, 2015.

A Canadian MP reports her experience of being yelled at by her leader and the then Prime Minister for publicly raising concern over the representation of women on her party's frontbench.

> "I had the audacity, I guess, to be quoted in the newspaper as saying that it was disappointing that the nine parliamentary secretaries were all men. I got yelled at in caucus by the Prime Minister and then the next day it was all over the papers because all my colleagues had tattled." – MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.

Another Canadian MP shared that her colleagues were "hesitant to raise women's issues within caucus, lest they be diminished by it" (MP 3, Canada, April 28, 2015). To maintain their position and influence in the party and especially if they seek promotion to higher office, women in parliamentary systems must be extremely cautious in prioritizing women's issues.

Parliamentary Systems - Backbench Opportunities

Explicit Opportunities for Substantive Representation: Non-threating and Random

Explicit opportunities for the substantive representation of women exist only when they do not threaten party dominance. As a result, they are fundamentally limited in scope and

influence. Formal motions submitted to the UK House of Commons called Early Day Motions (EDM) offer one such example. Childs and Withley (2004) provide evidence that women sign and support EDMs that address women's issues more often than men do. In contrast to voting, EDMs are a "safe parliamentary activity" because they have few costs and take little effort (Childs, 2006, 160). For the same reasons, however, other interviewees referred to EDMs as "wall paper" (MP 5, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015) and even "lavatory paper" (MP 7, United Kingdom, January 21, 2015). They have also been described elsewhere as self-congratulatory, idiosyncratic, or so obvious as to be meaningless (Blackburn and Kennon, 2003, see also Childs, 2004). Moreover, of the EDMs submitted by MPs "very few are actually debated" (Parliament of UK, 2016).

> "[The EDM] doesn't go anywhere or do anything, they are like parliamentary wallpaper, and they will probably accumulate 3 or 4 thousand of these during Parliamentary session. A lot of people out there have unrealistic hopes that something is going to happen, and it doesn't. At the end of a parliamentary session, it's just wiped, and they start at number 1 at the start of a Parliamentary session." - MP 5, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015.
>
> "They never go anywhere, no really, they never go anywhere." – MP 7, United Kingdom, January 21, 2015.

Some women in Canada identify Private Member's Motions (PMM) and Private Member's Bills (PMB) as opportunities to represent women. One MP in particular points to a PMM she introduced (and was able to pass) that addresses the welfare of First Nations children, a topic she identified of interest in part due to her experience as a woman and a mother. There is a significant element of luck, however, involved in the introduction of the PMM – in this particular case, her number was drawn at random for debate. When another MP tried to work the motion into a Private Member's Bill, the Bill never came up for debate in the House of Commons. Several other MPs also mentioned

the role of randomness in determining who was able to do what during allotted opposition time.

Even when luck gives MPs the opportunity to propose and debate a PMM or a PMB, the impact is extremely limited.

> "Private Member's Bills and Motions, even when they pass it is difficult to actually get them implemented." - MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015.

According to the Parliament of Canada (2016) PMMs "make a declaration of opinion or purpose, without ordering or requiring a particular course of action." Moreover, "the government is not bound to adopt a specific policy or course of action as a result of the adoption of such a resolution since the House is only stating an opinion or making a declaration of purpose" (Parliament of Canada, 2016). Tremblay (1998) provides evidence that, in general, women put forward PMMs and PMBs that address women's issues more than their male colleagues, though neither gender did so often. More to the point of the theory, however, PMMs and PMBs only offered opportunities for substantive representation "because these elements of parliamentary activity may be considered negligible and of little substance" (Tremblay, 1997, 442).

In contrast to PMM or PMBs, oral questions receive significant media attention in parliamentary systems, arguably more than anything else that takes place within Parliament. Tremblay (1998) and Bird (2005) both find that women, more than men, use oral questions as a way to raise women's issues in parliamentary debate and to put them on the government's agenda. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, then, few women pointed to oral or written questions as an opportunity to substantively represent women. This is all the more surprising for women in the UK where there is dedicated time for questions to

the Minister responsible for Women and Equalities. When Oral Questions are mentioned, women also raise concerns about the extent to which the party controls the question period agenda and changed and modified questions members hoped to ask.

The Status of Women committee in Canada may provide a space for explicit substantive representation, but even here women are limited to work that does not disrupt the status quo. Young (1997) finds that an all-women Subcommittee that worked together towards feminist policy objectives were successful because they worked together without "threaten[ing] the primacy of party as the central policy forum" (8).

In the United Kingdom where there is no women's issues committee, Members have established several gender-motivated All Party Parliamentary Groups (APPG), including one on the topic of Women in Parliament, another on Women, Peace, and Security and a third addressing Women in Sport. Other relevant APPGs include those on Prostitution and the Sex Trade, Body Image, and Domestic Violence. In January of 2016, a new APPG on Women and Work was established by members of both the Labour and Conservative parties. The founders were motivated by a concern over the concentration of men in the roles of "chief executives, charity and business leaders, and campaign groups".

> "This must change and we plan to use our position as women in Parliament to work towards more equal representation." (Drummond & Phillips, 2016).

Unsurprisingly, it is women that take up these opportunities. Despite making up less than a third of all MP, all Officers for both the APPG on Women in Parliament and Women,

Peace, and Securities are women. And only one man serves as an Officer for the Women and Sport APPG.

These groups do offer an opportunity for MPs to speak to and raise the profile of women's issues as well as providing a space for cross party cooperation that is otherwise difficult. In 2014, for example, the APPG on Women in Parliament produced a report *Improving Parliament: Creating a Better and More Representative House* authored by 15 members representing the Labour, Liberal Democrat, Conservative, and Scottish National parties. Just two of the 15 were men. The report made several recommendations, including improving the predictability of the Parliamentary calendar and clarifying support for MPs with primary care giving responsibilities (11).

Despite the important, pressing, and substantive issues they address, the influence and visibility of these APPGs is marginal at best. These groups are "informal, cross-party, interest groups that have no official status within Parliament and are not accorded any powers or funding by it" (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 3, 2015). The gender based APPGs are just a few of the 385 registered groups, which includes the Wine and Spirit Group, Classic Rock and Blues, Brass Band, and Cider APPGs. Moreover, APPGs are forced to fundraise from businesses, NGOs, and charities and operate on extremely limited budgets. The APPG on Women in Parliament, for example, reported donations of approximately £20,000 in 2015 and the APPGs on Women, Peace, and Security and Women in Sport both listed just £6,000 in benefits in kind (UK Parliament, 2015). For context, the Cider APPG raised as much money as the Women and Sport and Women,

Peace and Securities APPGs and the Animal Welfare APPG has nearly five times the amount of funding as the APPG on Domestic Violence.

The use of informal, under-funded groups with minimal to nil infrastructure speaks to the limited opportunities for women to substantively represent women. In fact, one of the central recommendations of the APPG for Women in Parliament (2014) is to establish a Women and Equalities Select Committee "to raise issues that are a priority for women and review how women are impacted by Government policy. Women and Equalities Oral Parliamentary Questions already take place in the Chamber regularly and there is a Minister for Women at the Cabinet table, so it would be appropriate to have a Select Committee established" (11).

Opportunities for Substantive Representation: Out of Sight and Outside Parliament

Explicit opportunities are rare, lack real meaning, and often involve an element of randomness. In this context, the substantive representation of women by women often occurs out of sight or entirely outside parliament. For example, in Canada, women in both the Liberal and NDP parties point to the intra-party women's caucus as one way they can exert influence on the party. One MP reports that developing policies "that speak to the women of Canada" is one of the central roles of the women's caucus (MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.). Another MP describes the women's caucus as meeting to "fulfill those pieces that were missing in a full gender equality agenda" (MP 7, Canada, April 20, 2015).

> "We take on things, like the issue around the prostitution law, when it was struck down. How do we make sure that our values as women who support women who want to end violence against women but also respect the decisions and choices

> that women make and ensure that there are free choices and decisions." – MP 12, Canada, April 21, 2015.

> "We use women's caucus to build the women's platform, for example. Or to look at other issues that might not necessarily be part of the main platform but need to be pushed forward. We used it for a while to talk about gender-based analysis, gender budgeting, back a number of years ago; that was a while ago." - MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015.

Its members see the caucus as influential and impactful:

> "We've always been tough, we have always been strong, we've always been pushy." - MP 7, Canada, April 20, 2015.

> "I would say in my life, women's caucus has probably taken credit for not going into Iraq, for pay equity… In a larger caucus, when you've got 40 people all agreed on something it's hard for the leader not to listen, when you've got that solidarity and common position. So we have sometimes taken some pretty clear positions on things and that ended up having to be respected." – MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.

That there is a unique, if somewhat informal, intra-party body that takes on this task, however, speaks to the constraints on backbench women within parliament itself; a critical component of its success is that it is behind the scenes – issues are raised *without challenging party leadership and dominance.*

> "It has never leaked. It is one of the most confidential places on the hill to solve problems." - MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.

When it comes to these less visible opportunities, however, there are significant differences in those available to women who sit on government backbenches and those who are members of opposition parties. Women in governing parties can influence the executive behind the scene, but to do so, they must publicly stay with the party line. Women in the opposition, on the other hand, have no opportunity to influence the executive, but can seek opportunities outside parliament.

Opportunities for Substantive Representation in Government: Out of Sight

Backbench MPs in governing parties may themselves lack opportunities for independent and influential action, but many spoke about their ability to 'hob nob' with the ministers who do have opportunities to contribute to discourse and policy. A backbench member of the governing UK Conservative party states that she has been amazed by how easily she can bring forward issues to the Prime Minister. A Dutch MP whose party was part of the majority said she could pose oral and written questions as a way to represent women, but her real work is done behind the scenes reaching out to her counterparts in the other governing party and approaching the Minister.

Women in Canada reach out to and involve Ministers to ensure that their women's caucuses are not just talk shops but can have real impact:

> "We'd bring in Ministers for lunch and buy their lunch and give them shit and tell them what we thought." - MP 7, Canada, April 20, 2015.

In the UK, a British MP attributed a shift toward women and family friendly policy in the former Labour government to the women MPs:

> "No doubt, [Blair] was empowered to do things because there were more women around him, that he even thought of those things because women were around. This requires a critical mass of women" - MP 3, United Kingdom, February 4, 2015.

Interestingly, for women in governing parties, there seems to be a contradiction between private substantive representation and attempts at public substantive representation. Publicly raising issues, voting against the party in support of women, or spending time on issues other than government priorities, limits an MP's influence within the party and

behind the scenes. Publicly 'behaving', on the other hand, might increase opportunities to lobby for change and raise women's issues to the agenda.

> "If you are in government, you get to hob nob with the minister and get things changed, if you are not a serial revolter. You can be involved in changing things in a way you can't in opposition, but you can't speak out or vote the way you want!" – MP 3, United Kingdom, February 4, 2015.

Another MP, who served as one of her party's whips, points out that while the position gave her some important "access" it meant, by strict convention, that she did not and could not speak in the house (MP 7, United Kingdom, January 21, 2015). In short, her opportunities for substantive representation were further and formally limited, but the chance for behind the scenes influence increased. A second MP, who held the position of Whip for several years, requested to be removed from the role so she could speak in the house. She subsequently used several of her limited speaking opportunities to address domestic violence.

To summarize, - opportunities for substantive representation by women in governing parties reflects the primacy of executive power. For women to leverage this power, they must acknowledge and respect it, working behind the scenes and without being publically disagreeable or disruptive. If they can do this, they can influence party priorities and, at least some of the time, action taken by ministers.

Opportunities in Opposition: Outside Parliament

"*In opposition you may be freer to talk, but you can't make change. You always lose*" - MP 9, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015

Women in opposition parties face the same constrains and inconsequential opportunities as their government backbench colleagues, but are even further removed from the centres of actual power. All the power is concentrated in the executive - as one government backbencher in the UK says, women in opposition are constrained "because they simply cannot talk to the PM" (MP 9, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015).

Several of the former ministers contrasted their experience in government with that in opposition, as one put it - "it [has] been extraordinarily difficult" (MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.).

> "To be in opposition, it's completely different thinking. I am feeling like a decoration. If you like to play, it's nice. But if you like to get something done, for people on the streets, it's difficult." - MP 4, Belgium, March 19, 2015.

> "I think in opposition, you have to work very hard. You've got no civil service to support you. You have to do it all yourself, you have to think it up all yourself, you have to write your own speeches, you have to design your own policies, and you have to try to get some attention for them – otherwise no one knows what you are doing. In government, there is a huge civil service that is supposed to be doing what you want in terms of the preparing policy and preparing speeches and helping you get out there and sell them." - MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

To compensate for their limited influence within parliament, MPs regularly report that they turned outside parliament – to NGOs, citizen groups, and the media.

One Canadian MP in opposition says that given the constraints she faced, she is best able to make a difference by helping groups outside parliament make a case directly to government.

> "It's been very difficult laterally, and I would say my best work may be done outside these walls, helping stakeholders make a better case. On newborn and maternal health, the midwives came to me and said the millennium goals were [not being met]. You know, the perinatal mortality rate, it was the worst goal, the worst results and what were we going to do about it." – MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.

She goes so far as to remove herself from visible involvement, since being actively involved, she thinks, can do more harm than good to the cause:

> "I said I would be happy to host a round table here on the Hill, but I think it would better if it wasn't me, I think you need [name] who was the Conservative Senator to do it. I'll be there; I'll help you, but if you want to get this forward, it's better that it comes from someone on the Conservative side." – MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.

The representative's main capacity to represent women is not in public debates and policy discussions, but rather, as this MP put it, "it's helping people navigating a system even when it's stacked against me" (MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015). The representative is not seeking credit, in part because her limited power and influence means she is unable to make change for which she could take credit. Instead, the representative is prioritizing policy objectives and substantive representation for the sake of furthering women's interests.

A staff member to a UK MP who held cabinet posts while her party was in power makes similar claims. Despite sitting on the frontbench of the opposition, she turns not to parliament to address the gendered wage gap, but to the media.

> "The way we've been doing that is through media. The media is a big tool in this position. That is the way you reach out broadly and speak to and have a dialogue with people across the country. Well, actually, it actually influences government action because they think oh well, here's something we're being squeezed on and

> being attacked on for our record. [People] are aware of it and aren't happy, so we'd better get on and do something about it. Unfortunately, they haven't." – Staff 1, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015.

In this case the representative and her party seem to be pursuing both policy and vote objectives. By raising the issue in the media in a way that is critical of government, she seeks policy change *and* credit for raising the issue.

Even when the objective is explicitly to change legislation, those who are not in government are forced to turn to the media and the so-called 'third sector', charities, volunteer organization, and interest groups. In the context of winner-take-all parliamentary systems, opposition members cannot force anything from the majority (even when that majority is a coalition). Instead, they enlist the influence of groups outside parliament who might, come the next election, threaten to change that nearly absolute executive power from one party to another. In other words, instead of the Members of Parliament taking public interests and turning them into laws, opposition Members of Parliament turn to activists and ordinary citizens who exert pressure on the government to turn opposition proposals into legislation.

> "The other way you can do it is to make amendments to legislation. You can build campaigns around an amendment you make to a piece of government legislation. If you get a kind of campaign group together that is big enough or broad enough, so you can go to the third sector, if you get big charities on board that also have a platform then you can generate quite a bit of amendments. Occasionally you win them." – Staff 1, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015.

A Canadian opposition MP introduced a Private Member's Bill on the sales tax on tampons, raising the issue of taxation fairness and "gender bias" in legislation (MP 12,

Canada, April 21, 2015). Due to the randomness of the system, however, her 'number' did not come up and the bill was never debated. Instead, several activists "latched onto" the issue and collected tens of thousand of signatures in support of the PMB. Members of the opposition had been attempting to change the legislation for over ten years, but it was the public campaign that forced the government to change course.

Members of the opposition also turned to formal political institutions outside parliament to pursue substantive representation of women. The MP who introduced the PMM on the welfare of First Nations children pointed to the importance of the courts, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, and the Auditor General. In rulings and reports, these institutions have cited Parliament's expressed support of the Private Member's Motion and, in doing so, compelled action by government – something that a PMM cannot do even when it is passed unanimously. Another MP reported enlisting the Auditor General to assess equality in policy across several ministries.

> "We are supposed to have gendered based analysis of policy and legislation in this country. I guess 4 or 5 years ago, I asked Shelia Fraser, the Auditor General, if she would do a gendered based analysis across the system and she said 'yes! I think I can do that!' and she did. She found that it was wanting." – MP 12, Canada, April 21, 2015.

Representatives in opposition in other parliamentary systems similarly experienced the need to work out of sight. An MP in Belgium, who was extremely active on women's issues, states the constraints and opportunities clearly - to pursue legislation, she has two options. She could seek a majority in parliament, but doing so is "difficult... you also have the parliamentary agenda, you have to get on the agenda before you can think about

voting". Because the government controls the agenda, however, her second option is to work behind the scenes to encourage government to take the issue and put it in one of their bills. As her staff puts it, "that is good, but it is bad for [the representative]… well not bad, but less good because her name isn't on it anymore" (Staff, Belgium, March 16, 2015). In other words, the tie between descriptive and substantive representation is not visible via a simple assessment of who introduces what and when.

To summarize, in order to influence discourse and, even more, to affect policy, women on the opposition backbenches rely on unelected individuals and institutions, the media, and, in a somewhat reversed relationship, citizens. Ironically, women in opposition turn outside parliament because they lack access to the centres of power, but women in government cannot use the same techniques because they *do* have access to the centres of power; using the media or working with citizens against government decisions would significantly limit their influence and opportunities for promotion. In short, the experience of informal opportunities for substantive representation is fundamentally different for women in governing parties and women in the opposition.

Parliamentary Systems - Opportunities and Influence in Government

"*It is of course, in the end, trying to get to the place where you can change something, like the executive*" – MP 4, Germany, February 26, 2015.

The constraints, disincentives, and invisible opportunities that women on the backbench and particularly *opposition* backbench are contrasted starkly with the opportunities and influence that define women's experience in cabinet positions. Several of the MPs interviewed were former or current ministers and all identified the work they did to raise and resolve women's issues in their portfolio, whether by instituting gender-based

analysis or forcing a women's issue through cabinet. Lower profile roles still help women in the governing party influence decision-making. As one Parliamentary Secretary states, the position ensures she is "more connected to government decision making" (MP 6, Canada, July 6, 2015.).

Other MPs who were not ministers themselves pointed to those who were:

> "She [the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs] was a woman who always knew where she wanted to go and who she wanted to be. Of course at the point where she is now, the power she has now to change things is awesome. She has this reputation in the public because, in the course of the years we've had her in government, she is the minister who has actually realized policy… has reached so much and changed so much. Like minimum wage and we have fought for that for ages." - MP 4, Germany, February 26, 2015.

Women in ministerial positions have achieved their office objectives and use the influence that comes with it to pursue their policy objectives. Their power, however, is not absolute. As one former minister says "there is an innate conservatism, it's hard to make big changes" (MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015). Moreover, the tradition of cabinet confidentiality means that in many instances, this work happens behind the scenes in much the same way as the less influential work of their colleagues – "in Cabinet, you still have to persuade people" (MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.). Cabinet solidarity further means that if a member disagrees with a decision reached by cabinet, she is obliged to refrain from publicly speaking about or voting against the proposal. These constraints are similar to those facing women on the backbench and the potential costs include losing office. Despite these limitations, what is clear is that ministers have opportunities to represent women in ways that are simply denied those outside the executive.

Presidential Systems - Individual Opportunities, Collective Constraints

In contrast to parliamentary systems, women in presidential systems have significant opportunities to pursue the substantive representation of women. Where women in parliamentary systems report that they cannot simply vote as they please, women elected under a division of powers (including Switzerland) report voting as one way in which they represent women. While women in parliamentary systems rely on a lottery system to table a bill, women in the United States cite introducing and sponsoring bills as a critical component of representation. Although the sample was much smaller, every woman I spoke with in the United States had introduced legislation on some aspect of women's issues – from stalking to pregnancy-related work place accommodation.

One state-level senator reports that she wants to dedicate time to becoming an expert in a wide range of areas where there were few women (like tax policy), but she also "promised [herself she] would also introduce one or two bills on women's issues, because [she] wanted to make a difference" (State Senator, United States, August 24, 2015). Another state level representative has introduced 19 bills, 7 of which passed. While the bills included a range of topics (from fire fighting to housing tax policy), they also include a bill addressing child support and another on childcare costs.

When asked how to successfully pass the legislation they introduce, women in the United States report, like their parliamentary counterparts, that their work behind the scenes and with outside actors is critical. To get a bill passed, one state level representative reports, she has to work "behind closed doors to set the ground work on why the bill is needed" (State Senator, United States, August 24, 2015). For example, in an effort to pass a

pregnancy accommodation bill, the pro-choice representative approached anti-choice representatives and made her case on a pro-life basis – "if you are pro-life then the last thing you should want to do is have women to have to choose between breakfast and their pregnancy" (State Senator, United States, August 24, 2015). Another state level representative working on a breastfeeding bill argues that, behind the scenes, she has to work to get the support of "a lot of people that also have other things they want to do" (State Representative, 3, United States, July 15, 2015).

This differs, however, from the behind the scenes and extra-legislative work in parliamentary systems in that it is *complementing* public representational acts undertaken by the women themselves – the introduction of legislation. In other words, the constraints of parliamentary systems mean that the substantive representation of women is, when it happens, not visible. In presidential systems, in contrast, these public acts of substantive representation exist alongside additional, less visible, behind the scenes acts.

The differences between presidential and parliamentary systems are also clear in an assessment of cooperation between women in different parties. One Republican Representative, who stated she would not support spending government money on (almost) anything, including women's issues, cites an important example of cross party cooperation.

> "We found common ground on the stalking bill. She came to me and wanted a co-sponsorship on that. That is one where no money was involved and I was able to cosponsor that."

She continued:

> "If you can find a Democratic woman who is simpatico with you on one issue, you can often translate that into another. It's really good to be able to do that." – Congresswoman 1, United States, June 15, 2015

Not only are the opportunities for cooperation greater, but in the absence of strong party discipline and control, it is also necessary. One state level legislator reported that "inclusivity" of the process is key – "some people will oppose simply because they were not included" (State Representative, 2, United States, August 17, 2015). Another shares that "what often happens here is that the lead sponsor is whichever party is in control and then you find someone on the other side to go with you" (Congresswoman 1, United States, June 15, 2015).

The bi-partisan Women's Caucus is one key example of this cooperation and was raised as an important venue and tool for the substantive representation of women. When asked if the Caucus's influence comes from bipartisan composition, a Democratic staffer agreed "completely". The Caucus is "just 'women just getting things done'" (Congress Staff, United States, June 16, 2015).

The caucus does face constraints in the issues that it takes up, but these are ideological rather than institutional. One Republican Representative said that resolving issues is sometimes "hard because of disagreements on money" (Congresswoman, United States, June 15, 2015). A staff member for a Democratic Representative heavily involved in the Caucus said that the issues addressed have to be broad because of the bipartisan nature and the increasing size of membership.

> "We've gotten bigger and our priorities have gotten broader … We wouldn't want to say 'the women's caucus supports this' and for it not to be comfortable for a section. We don't want them to opt out. We want to be as inclusive as we can." – Congress Staff, United States, June 16, 2015

Focusing on explicit women's issues facilitates the bipartisan conversation as shared experience and exposure to gender inequality bridges the gap between the two parties.

> "Especially for the women's caucus, because we are trying to keep it bipartisan, the issues are very much *women's* issues. I mean, trafficking is one of our top priorities." - Congress Staff, United States, June 16, 2015.

Unsurprisingly, the group has mostly steered away from reproductive rights, but issues include domestic violence, international women's issues, women in the military, women's empowerment, and issues around children's health.

Several women mention committees as an important stage of the process in which they can intervene. A state level representative who was the only woman on the Judiciary committee in her state, landed the spot, in part, by drawing the Senate leader's attention to the lack of women. In a hearing on a bill on the role of religion in hospitals and the obligation of service providers to provide clear medical information on abortion, the Senator found herself unable to participate in the debate. After nearly an hour, she interjected herself into the debate by drawing explicit attention to her gender - stating that her "uterus had a question" (State Senator, United States, August 24, 2015).

Several existing studies have examined the effect of women on committees in the United States. Berkman and O'Connor (1993) find that women in American state legislatures secure committee positions that allow them to block anti-choice legislation, particularly when the number of women is low or the state leans towards restrictive abortion policy. Poggione (2004) hypothesizes that if legislators are hesitant to introduce or vote in favour

of a women-friendly policy that is unpopular with their constituents, they may utilize the opportunity of "less observable legislative arenas, like the committee stage, [to] actively work toward the objectives" (305). Importantly, however, the findings in both studies rest on the opportunities of individual female legislators in the United States to successfully intervene in the policy-making process through committees, which MPs in parliamentary systems said was significantly constrained.

The same institutional features that create these opportunities for women to represent women through votes, speeches, and the introduction of legislation, however, also make change extremely difficult. Only a small portion of all Congressional Bills pass through the chamber in which they are introduced and an even smaller portion eventually become law. Few women mentioned this in our interviews, though one woman's comment while speaking about a bill she introduced addressing men's violence against women is illuminating:

> "I think we got it passed twice. Did we get that passed? We'll have to check on that for you. Again, I can't remember." – Congresswoman, United States, June 15, 2015.

Women in presidential systems have greater incentives and opportunities for substantive representation than backbench women in parliamentary systems – they act in collaboration within and across parties, introduce and sponsor legislation, and vote for bills that address women's issues. The translation of this action into outcomes, however, is much more tenuous that it is for women in the executive in parliamentary systems.

Electoral Systems

Chapter 2 theorized how women elected in PR systems may be better able to represent women than those elected under SMP. It also suggested that women who can rely on something other than their party for (re)election use the opportunity to focus on women's issues and intra-party competition enables women to distinguish themselves as the agents of women. The quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 supported the latter but offered no evidence for the former. But the theory isn't about local control over nomination or closed PR lists per say, it is about the opportunities to represent women in the former and disincentives to do the same in the latter. This section turns to the women's *experiences of* electoral systems. Do women see themselves as having an opportunity to represent women? Do they perceive that it is in their interest to do so?

I begin by looking at the difference between women's experiences of electoral systems that incentivize party-based representation and those that encourage the representation issues not incorporated in the party system. As part of this, I consider the contingent relationship between a division of powers and electoral features that incentivize unincorporated representation, with the latter being a necessary condition for the former.

Finally, I revisit the PR-SMP distinction and provide evidence that the anticipated mechanisms - the geographic tie of representation, electoral threshold, and the number of representatives - are simply not operating as theorized.

Unincorporated Representation vs. Party Votes

Legislators in all countries view themselves as representatives of their party and acting to represent the party is not necessarily difficult. Women, after all, opt into the party of their choice.

> "First and foremost I am a member of the Liberal Party of Canada because I am a believer of the principles and values. So I don't have a hard time doing the things that Liberal Party wants to do." – MP 7, Canada, April 20, 2015.
>
> "I share the values of my party and its supporters, so naturally their views will be most reflected by my political action." - MEP 14, Germany, April 15, 2015.

The extent to which party is the *most important* influence of behaviour, however, and the extent to which it affects the representation of women, however, varies significantly with institutional features that tip the balance between party and unincorporated representation.

The Vote Dimension

This dimension captures the number and type of votes citizens have to cast; incentives for unincorporated representation are maximized when voters have multiple votes to cast for candidates and minimized when voters have a single vote to cast at the party level. Systems where a single vote is cast for a candidate fall somewhere in the middle. On this dimension, electoral systems in both Canada and the UK minimize incentives for unincorporated representation and maximize incentives for party representation on this dimension.[33] Indeed, in these countries, the importance of the party is high. Although their responsibility to their constituency is the first thing representatives mention, their

[33] Although voters technically indicate a preference for an individual candidate, parties in essence submit a 'list' of one candidate meaning that the vote is functionally for the party of choice (Carey and Shugart, 1995).

responsibility to their party matters more to what they actually *do* while in Parliament. In some cases 'representing the constituency' means representing the party *to* the constituency. When women are asked how they decide what to talk about, what interests to pursue, and how much time they dedicate to women's issues, their answers reflect the importance of party and the potential tensions this poses.

> "You balance [things]. Your job is to reflect [to] your constituency the position that your party takes nationally, but to reflect to parliament the needs of your constituency." MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.
>
> "Obviously, I want my party to do well. Whether or not you get elected and you can continue in your work, it partly involves what's happening in your community, that's a good part of it, but you know people, some people vote strictly along party lines. If your party is not doing well, you can be the best MP anywhere, but it doesn't necessarily mean you are going to be supported because people may not be supporting your party." - MP 5, Canada, April 23, 2015.

The United States scores higher on this dimension because the primary system gives citizens multiple votes. As a result, women in the US are much more likely to report that a focus on women's issues can help them get elected and re-elected. The one interview conducted with a state level representative from a *multimember plurality district* where voters have even more opportunity to indicate their preference between candidates offers further support. In her first election, she distinguished herself from her competitors, both Republican and Democratic, by focusing on her gender and including only her first name on her campaign signs. In each election, being a woman and focusing on women's issues has been a key component of her policy agenda and has won her votes. Further, she believes this would *not* be in the case if she were in a single member district where, after primaries, voters have only one vote to cast.

> "I simply could not use the issue to get as many votes if I were in a single-member district." - State Representative, 2, United States, August 17, 2015.

Contrary to the quantitative findings in Chapter 4, her experience does suggest that a larger district magnitude further increased her incentives for unincorporated references.

Party is also important under proportional representation. Indeed, representing the party often ranked higher than geography-based issues or any other issue or identity, including women. *How* important party was and *how* much it affected representation of women's issues, however, depended in part on the number and nature of votes citizens can cast.

Members of the European Parliament from the United Kingdom and Germany are elected off party lists and voters have one vote to cast at the party level (scoring 0 out of 2 on the vote dimension). Unsurprisingly, they identify their role as a representative of the party as the most important part of their job.

> "I definitely view myself as a representative of the Labour party." – MEP 7, United Kingdom, February 2, 2015.
>
> "Our party leader thought I would be just the right choice to go to Brussels; that's why I ran for the European Parliament." – MEP 2, Germany, May 27, 2015.
>
> "Absolutely. I represent the Labour party." – MEP 10, United Kingdom, May 11, 2015.
>
> "I am absolutely a representative of the Labour party." – MEP 11, United Kingdom, March 24, 2015.

One German MEP said that she was "absolutely a representative of my party. But not [of] party supporters" (MEP 3, Germany, May 27, 2015), suggesting that the 'party' is not the

same as those who vote for it. Instead, it is something bigger, a formal organization with some amount of power and influence.

In national elections, citizens in the Netherlands have one vote to cast for a candidate. While this generates slightly greater incentives for unincorporated representation (scoring 1 out of 2), it is hard to 'win' a voter's sole preference vote by representing women. Indeed, most women do not think that acting for women can help them win preference votes.

> "Within my portfolio area, I represent my party." – MP 4, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.
>
> "First, I represent every Dutch person… but I represent my party and my party's position because that's why you are here in Parliament" – MP 11, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.
>
> "I represent women, but first of all, I represent my party" – MP 2, Netherlands, March 11, 2015.

In Belgium, where voters can indicate a preference for more than one candidate within the same list (scoring 2 out of 2 on this dimension), there is greater opportunity to seek these votes on the representation of other issues and interests. The staff member of one Belgian MP reports that active work on women's issues "can definitely get [the representative] preference votes" (Staff, Belgium, March 16, 2015). Another MP reports that to win election she has "to present [herself] and put emphasis on things that [she is] more related to". In particular, she thinks that people might vote for her because of her focus on "youngsters or women or having a heart for animals" (MP 1, Belgium, January 15, 2015). More generally, she thinks that voters made selections within the list based on interests outside the party system, including women's interests:

> "If they care about women getting chances or getting promoted, then they would vote for the women, but if they care about animal welfare, they would vote like that." – MP 1, Belgium, January 15, 2015.

In Switzerland, not only do voters have the opportunity to indicate multiple preferences among candidates, but they can do so across and within lists, vote for one candidate more than once, or cross candidates out - a system known as *panachage*. The result is a significant weakening of party ties. When representatives do mention party identity and responsibility it is about ideas and values; women do *not* see themselves as representing their party in terms of defending their party's interests or doing their party's bidding.

> "I represent the values of the party. I chose my party [and the] group that I want to belong to. The group that I am on the list with, they have my values, they share my values, I share their values. That's true. That doesn't mean we always have to defend the same values or that we don't have discussions in our group or that we [all think and do the same thing]." – MP 1, Switzerland, March 11, 2015.

> "I am a representative of my Canton, but people who have elected me know that I am a liberal, so it was very clear what my goals are, what my values are, what the goals of our party are. You cannot say that we are representative of our party because the party is something very human and very… it's alive." - MP 6, Switzerland, March 9, 2015.

The ability of voters to split their vote and indicate multiple preferences clearly affects the incentives to represent women. One representative argues that representing women can help her get preference votes, in part because she was one of very few women running for election to Senate in her Canton. Another from a centre party believed that her focus on family policy allowed her to attract one-third of her votes from the far left and from the far right.

Ballot Dimension

The ballot dimension itself comprises two features - whether leaders control access to the ballot and whether voters may disrupt the ballot they are given.

Control over the ballot

Party control over the ballot clearly generates incentives for party-based representation. A German MP who ran both on her party list and for the seat in her constituency, shared that, because her party had no chance of winning the plurality seat, her re-election chances were fundamentally a function of where the party placed her on the Land list. A second MP echoed her point:

> "I feel more representative for my party than for me personally. But I think that's because we are small, and we have no chances to have direct candidates elected. You try to come up with your personality but you need the party around to have attention for yourself. I am in the same election region as [candidate name] who is 77 years old, and popular with the whole Germany … everybody [elects him] with 65/75% so I have no chance. …. So it's difficult…. So I go with the Green Party position in all election campaigns." – MP 4, Germany, February 26, 2015.

On the other hand, some local control over nomination provides important opportunities to cultivate personal support based on a focus on women's issues.

> "Where [representing women] is beneficial is in attracting support and solidifying support…the people who will knock on doors for you, raise money for you. So it helps attracting support in particular constituencies, but not in terms of the actual vote. It's not vote determining in any way. So childcare, for instance, a lot of women, who are feminists, care a lot about childcare. And the feminist community can be quite a mobilizing force, and they can help shore up your candidacy, but when you are going door to door, or speaking in the media, it's important to talk about things in a broader way… a less gendered way." - Campaign Staff, Canada, April 21, 2015.

One directly elected MP in Germany argues that local control over her nomination means she is more able to represent women than her colleagues elected off the list.

> "I think it's very important... it's very good… for a member of the parliament if you are elected directly. You have more authority and you are more independent from your party. To me, it's a very important point that I have support from the people in my constituency, and I am not so dependent to my party. Of course, I am a member of the party and I am committed to the party, but I am not so dependent on them." - MP 7, Germany, February 23, 2015.

Because of the direct support from her constituents, she is somewhat independent from her party. As a result, there are things she can do to represent women in her constituency, including attending protests, offering information sessions, inviting women to parliament, and organizing women's day events. Her colleagues elected off the list, on the other hand, are entirely dependent on the party for their electoral success.

Not only do these statements support the theory, but they also confirm the need to change Carey and Shugart's original coding of the ballot dimension. In it's original conception, systems in which there is some local control over *access* to the ballot but no opportunity for voters to *disrupt* the ballot score '0'. On the other hand, systems that allow list disruption but no control over nomination score a '1' and only systems which allow both score a '2' (indicating maximum incentives for personal votes). These interviews, like the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4, demonstrate that even if lists cannot be disrupted (like in Canada's SMP system), control over local nomination still facilitates unincorporated representation. In short, the new classification offered in Chapter 2 where a score of '1' on the ballot dimension indicates *either* control over nomination or opportunities for list disruption better reflects the incentives for unincorporated representation.

List disruption

The ability of voters to disrupt the list also has an influence on women's ability and incentives to dedicate time and resources to representing women's issues. In Switzerland,

where the opportunities for list disruption are the greatest, most women believe representing women can help them get re-elected.

> "I have to say to women, I defend your interests, I see your point of view, you're issues are important to me as a woman." – MP 1, Switzerland, March 11, 2015.

Of course, focusing on women is not a sufficient strategy for election and MPs are "also dependent on the votes of men" (MP 1, Switzerland, March 11, 2015). Some MPs are able to do this by reaching out to men *on* women's interests, highlighting the importance of the issue and what is in it for them.

> "I am also fighting for men to have the possibilities to work part time. It's a woman's interests and a man's interests so they can take more part in childcare if they have the possibility to work part time. So I also defend other interests that men might have, not every man, but there are [those interested in] these issues too. So equality, we have to have possibilities for both genders." - MP 1, Switzerland, March 11, 2015.

In Switzerland, how legislators participated in interviews was as illuminating as what they said. While several MPs in Canada and the United Kingdom asked for confirmation of confidentiality, interviews with Swiss legislators were conducted in the open, in hallways behind the plenary or in the members' coffee shop. One interviewee laughed when I told her I couldn't tell her whom else I was meeting with and, indeed, over the next few days she saw me interviewing other MPs both in and outside her party. During these public interviews, several legislators openly criticized their party's record on women's issues or the position men in their party had taken.

> "…also in the Socialist Party [it is] macho. It's the thing of women to defend women. If you have women's issues they have to be defended by women. It's because of the women that the Socialist Party is defending the women and

> equality. The men participate [less] in these issues." – MP 5, Switzerland, March 12, 2015.

One representative outlines how her position on quotas and family policy differs from her party's and how her ability to attract votes from supporters of other party's enabled her to take the position she did.

> "I have never been afraid of re-election because I know I make so many more votes than the second [candidate] my list. I am not mainstream. I am not mainstream at all. I make much more votes than the others of my party. It shows my way of looking at society is broadly accepted ….If you are convinced, if you look at the policy and it is the correct one for yourself, I don't care if I am mainstream or not I am just going to keep on going this way… I have to be in line with my constituency on the one hand and myself, my own philosophy on the other." – MP 4, Switzerland, March 12, 2015.

In the Netherlands and Belgium, voters can indicate a preference among candidates, but possibilities to disrupt the list are minimal. One MP who saw herself as a representative for women of her generation, makes the point explicit:

> "… it also has to do with the way our system works. To be honest, I don't know how many people, but I think only ten people in this parliament had the real right to be here because they got in on their own votes. The rest of our system, that's how it works, got in because their leader, the first on the list got so many votes. So, that's the same with me. Because of [leader], I got in and if I would have run my own campaign, I would have done totally different things. I see myself as representing my generation… But as it is, it is definitely my party [I represent]. It's a very strong connection with the party." – MP 5, Netherlands, January 29, 2015.[34]

A Belgian woman who received a very high number of votes was quick to point out that she became an MP, not because of her personal votes, but because she was on her party's

[34] The representative vastly overestimated the number of MPs who had won election on the basis of their own votes.

reserved list. When some of her colleagues were promoted to cabinet, she took one of their seats in Parliament.

> "You remain on the same spot. The only reason I became a parliamentarian in the end was because I was on… the reserve list. It's only after the government was formed and it was clear that [name] would become secretary of state that I came in. It really could not have happened otherwise. It's a very uncertain position on these lists. – MP 2, Belgium, March 18, 2015.

When voters lack real capacity to disrupt the list, the incentive is clearly to appeal to the party for a good spot on the list rather than appeal to voters personally on any particular issue, including representing women. A German MP, who sees herself as a representative of women, identifies the constraints in prioritizing these issues in her work as an MP. Over time, she improved her position on the list from over thirty to under ten by working in her party:

> "I have worked a lot in my state for my party, on the level of the state. You have to become known in the party. I have worked a lot with them. That's real. It takes a long time to get this position."

As a result, it was her party that she represented in the Bundestag:

> "First, it's for me it's to present the political opinion of my party. That's why I am working here at this level." – MP 6, Germany, March 26, 2015.

In short, when voters can disrupt the list, women have increased opportunities to act in women's interests and have electoral incentives to do so. When lists are closed, however, women prioritize the interests, opinions, and positions of their party.

Representing women when lists are fixed & leaders are in control

If voters cannot meaningfully disrupt the list and representatives and candidates rely on their party for access to and position on the ballot (scoring 0 out of 2 on the ballot dimension), it is still feasible for women to improve their ranking by actively working on

women's issues. Parties that prioritize social justice and left-leaning policies, for example, may reward representatives who focus on women's issues by placing them higher on the list in the next election. In most cases, however, women report that being active on women's issues, at best, does not affect them one way or another and, at worst, is harmful to their political career. This sentiment is not confined to one side of the political spectrum or the other, and, in fact, women on the left were more concerned about the negative consequences for their career. This is likely due to that fact that women who self-select into left parties want to spend more time representing women and to take more progressive or even feminist positions on the issues.

A German MP from a left party argues that her ability to 'represent women' is restricted to her party's women's organization and activities outside parliament. While in parliament itself, the incentives were clearly to do work more directly for her party. Another German MP from a right wing party who did not run for a constituency seat acknowledges that she relies exclusively on her party work for her position. When asked about the benefits of representing women she stated that there simply were none. Another MP on the left side of the spectrum was more direct in her survey, identifying that representing women was not particularly helpful to her career and that, because she must represent her party's policies and positions, she is not always free to pursue different interests.

Women legislators in the Dutch and European parliaments agree with their German counterparts – acting to represent women does not help their political careers. A German MEP from a left party shares that representing women could be harmful to her career and

wished she could spend more time on issues relevant to women. Another from a centrist party shares her surprise that "it didn't harm" her more:

> "I really must admit… although I don't like to say it, but it really is the case… I expected some disadvantage out of this, because I always was fighting for more women in our group and parliament and so on." – MEP 3, Germany, 3, 2015.

The same MEP thinks there are negative repercussions for being too active with her party's women's organization.

> "Some of my female colleagues are maybe members but never are active because they say 'I don't want to damage my political career'." - MEP 3, Germany, May 27, 2015.

A Dutch MEP who was at the top of her party's list in 2009, dropped to second behind the only other elected MEP from her party in the following election. The implications were more than just symbolic since there was no guarantee that two MEPs from her party would be elected. She attributes the change to a combination of the kinds of issues she and her male colleague focused on and internal party politics.

> "It was the issues I was focusing on but we [also] had internal party problems in the Netherlands. We lost national election where we went back from ten to four seats and I got hurt in the slipstream. …You could say that he and myself we have a very typical male-female division. He does climate and economy and transport, and I do development and civil liberties and human rights." – MEP 4, Netherlands, March 17, 2015.

In the context of difficult times for her party, her position as leader became uncertain in part because of the feminized issues she focused on. In another instance, however, she remembers competing with another woman in her party for one of the top three spots.

> "She was really big on the LGBT and women's issues. She made everything into a women's issues and an LGBT issue, which forced me once a while to compete."– MEP 4, Netherlands, March 17, 2015.

In other words, she was forced to outline her record on women's issues when another woman candidate demonstrated a clear commitment, but after a term in the European Parliament, she lost the top spot to her male colleague who focused on the economy and transportation.

It was not always the case that women felt it was harmful to their political career or their spot on the list. One German MP elected off the country list says that "most important to me is representing my party and women" (MP 8, Germany, February 25, 2015) and believes that representing women can help her win re-election. Another German MP said that it depends on the political party, arguing that the Green Party (not her party) is dominated by women and so she suspects that representing women helped legislators maintain or improve their spot on the list in that party. A Green MEP, however, found it much less clear-cut. When asked whether it could help in progress in her party or may harm her she said that she found it "very hard to give a clear answer" (MEP 3, Germany, May 27, 2015).

Vote Pooling

In the Chapter 4 analysis, I excluded Carey and Shugart's third dimension - vote pooling, which captures "whether votes cast for one candidate of a given party also contribute to the number of seats won in the district by the party as a whole" (421). I argued that the combination of the common misuse of the concept and the lack of meaningful variation across a wide range of cases calls into question its usefulness. The insights from the interviews, however, demonstrate the ways in which women's experience of the vote dimension depends on vote pooling.

For example, the voters electing MEPs in Belgium and the Netherlands have a single vote that they can give to either an individual candidate or to an entire party list. This system should generate slightly higher incentives for personal or unincorporated representation than systems where that vote must be cast for a party, but because votes for a candidate are counted first as a vote for the party, the party incentives remain extremely strong.

> "It's my party, in fact. I see myself as representing the goals and the programs my party is standing for. If I can add something to that as a woman, then I will do it. The first thing we do here is represent our party" – MEP 1, Belgium, January 27, 2015.
>
> "Definitely I am a representative of the Socialist Party." – MEP 4, Netherlands, March 17, 2015.
>
> "I don't represent my country; there is too much variation. I represent my party. I campaigned on my party platform." – MEP 6, Netherlands, February 6, 2015.

Even when multiple votes and opportunities for list disruption maximize incentives for unincorporated representation, as in Switzerland, candidates still rely on the number of votes their party receives.

> "It's this proportional system of election. I am on a list of my party and so campaign for the party because if the party does not have enough votes, then my seat is contested. So [I focus on] my party and my person. " – MP 3, Switzerland, March 10, 2015.

In the United States, on the other hand, there is no vote pooling during primaries; the vote cast by citizens during primaries matters *only* to the candidate and has no impact on the party's electoral fortunes as a whole. In the absence of joint electoral fate, competition between individuals in the same party are maximized. During these primaries, women can distinguish themselves from their colleagues by promising to act as an agent of women.

Put differently – in both the United States and Belgium, the vote dimension creates maximum incentives for unincorporated representation – voters have multiple votes to cast for individual candidates. The actual incentives this generates for unincorporated representation, however, is *higher* in the United States. In the absence of vote pooling, the fate of one primary candidate is independent of and actually in opposition to those in the same party. On the other hand, the practice of vote pooling means that even as they compete for preference votes, women in Belgium still share a fate with others running under their party banner – the number of seats the party wins depends on the total number of votes received by all candidates. While Carey and Shugart frame vote pooling as a third and separate dimension, it proves more useful when understood in interaction with the vote dimension.

The Tension Between Descriptive and Substantive Representation

The electoral incentives for the substantive representation of women are in tension with the established negative effect of the same institutions on women's descriptive representation. The interviews offer some insight into this tension. In Canada, participants indicated that some local control over party nominations in Canada enabled women to recruit volunteers and supporters on their demonstrated commitment to women's issues, but they also shared that the concentration of men in high profile positions in riding associations contributed to the under-representation of women among candidates. Greater leader and national control over the candidate recruitment, it was argued, would increase the number of women elected. Doing so, however, would remove the one of the few identified opportunities to generate personal support on the basis of representing women.

In the Netherlands where the weight of preference votes has changed over time, a suggestion by a Citizens Assembly in 2006 to increase the importance of personalized votes was met with real concern by some MPs for the implications on women's *descriptive* representation. One MP argued that men are simply more "boisterous" and ready to present themselves and their ideas to the media while women are more likely to work quietly toward solutions. If preference votes became more important in the election of MPs, she argued, fewer women would be elected.

Personal Electoral Systems and Division of Powers – A Contingent Relationship

The principal parliamentary and presidential systems under analysis in this chapter all use an SMP system, but the particulars of the electoral system result in divergent incentives to represent women. The nature of the data, however, means it is difficult to pull apart the effects of the division of powers, on the one hand, and the electoral system, on the other. As argued in Chapter 2, however, this is not simply an unfortunate feature of the cases under analysis but is indicative of a contingent relationship between a personal SMP system and a division of powers. The ability to successfully pursue votes on the basis of representing women or other unincorporated interests *depends on* the opportunities that exist under a division of powers. In a parliamentary system, representatives simply cannot cultivate personal support on the promise to represent women because the constraints inherent in the institutional context make delivering on such a promise extremely unlikely.

Women in both Canada and the UK indicate that a focus on women's issues does not help them as individual candidates. It does not sway voters, not because voters are looking for the traditional geographic representation from their Members of Parliament, but because

individual representatives are relatively powerless to guarantee a focus on women's issues. Voters vote for the party and in fact, there is little that individual women can do to change this.

> "Individual MPs only make a difference for about 5% of the vote. So what you do doesn't really matter if you've got even a moderately safe constituency. For me, that 5% is make or break." - MP 9, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.
>
> "Going door to door, I would probably discourage too much of that. If you go to a door and you say 'vote for me because I am really going to advance women's issues and blah blah blah', it's not going to do it for you." - Campaign Staff, Canada, April 21, 2015.
>
> "I think local issues are critical, but I don't think all the local issues in the world translate to a win at the ballot box. If you don't have a leader that is in the game, talking about the issues that are important, putting forward a platform that resonates with people and is capable of forming government, it doesn't matter. In some cases there are certain people who have this iconic, you know, they will get elected no matter what." Campaign Staff, Canada, April 21, 2015.

On the other hand, if the *party* focuses on these issues nationally, it can sway voters. Parties, unlike individual representatives, can credibly commit to follow through on a promise to focus on women's issues. Two interviewees in particular make the point that representing women can help parties, but not individuals. The first, a staff member to a UK Member of Parliament, says:

> "She will be doing quite a bit of campaigning on [women's issues] nationally with the party. She is involved in organizing the women's campaign nationally. On a local level, she will mainly focus on what she has done for all the people of Ashfield." - Staff 1, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015

The second, an MP from Canada puts it this way:

> "I think [women's issues] probably help bring people out to vote for me, but I don't think it necessarily sways voters, you know…. [But if] you're asking about the party, that's different. Nationally I think it's very important… like if you are

> applying a feminist lens to our economic platform, obviously the no brainer part is childcare." – MP 4, Canada, May 7, 2015.
>
> "So it helps the party nationally, but women's issues might not help you individually?"
>
> A: "Yeah, exactly." – MP 4, Canada, May 7, 2015.

The role of the party cannot be overstated. One MP in the UK reported she would not focus on women's issues in the upcoming campaign but would dedicate her time to local issues. When asked if her party would dedicate time to women's issues as part of its national campaign, she responded "I'm not close enough in to know what they are doing" (MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015). This is not the statement of a relatively junior MP; she is a former cabinet minister who has represented her constituency for nearly twenty years.

Women in the U.S., on the other hand, reported that focusing on women's issues could help them, as individuals, to win elections. These women could credibly commit to introducing and supporting legislation addressing women's issues.

> "Absolutely, my first campaign ad spanned race and gender and focused on work I did on the processing of rape kits. It's something I talk a lot about. People vote for the person, and women are a majority. I don't know why we would ever hesitate on that" - State Senator, United States, August 24, 2015.

> "I think if I were not strongly supportive of women's issues, my constituents would be suspicious of me. It doesn't have to be women's issues, but everyone does pick issues and for me it's women's issues" - State Representative, 2, United States, August 17, 2015.

This is not empty talk. The first representative quoted above had a voting record scored by a woman's group at 100% and the second introduced a number of bills on women's

issues in the most recent year (2015), including bills addressing childcare rates, campus safety, and pay equity day.

Literature on the behaviour of voters is consistent with this argument. Several studies, for example, find that under certain conditions, women in the US are more likely than men to vote for female candidates, a phenomenon known as the 'gender affinity effect' (Dolan 2008; see also Brians 2005; Cook 1994; Dolan, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2010; Goodyear-Grant 2010; King and Matland 2003;Paolino 1995; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Smith and Fox 2001; Tolleson-Rinehart 1992; Zipp and Plutzer 1985). Paolino (1995), for example, finds that women supported female candidates in the 1992 American Senate elections because they are concerned about the representation of women's interest in government. In Canada, however, gender affinity has no measurable effect on vote choice because women voters do not have the same incentives to vote for women candidates in Canada as they do in the US (Goodyear-Grant and Croskil, 2011). This difference in voter behaviour is a reflection of the incentives *facing politicians*. As individual women politicians in the US have greater opportunities to introduce legislation and vote in contradiction to their party, there are incentives for women's organizations to support candidates and for women voters to vote for them. In the parliamentary context in Canada, such expectations are unreasonable and, as a result, incentives for women to offer particular support to female candidates are limited.

Comparing EMILY'S List (EL) in the US with that in Australia provides an additional example. To access funding from the organization, women in Australia have to be an endorsed Labour candidate and have to have demonstrated a commitment to women's issues. EL Australia has been successful in increasing women's descriptive representation

and EL-supported women have held important positions in government and contributed to internal party reform (Sawer, 2006). Women supported by EL differ from representatives who do not receive funding from EL in terms of opinions on social issues, including a women's right to choose and the importance of social spending over tax cuts, but the impact on substantive representation is not clear. Sawer (2006) finds that EL women did play a role in raising the issue of violence against women in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They also played a role in the adoption of the so-called abortion pill and paid maternity leave, though in the case of the latter they were not able to prevent its cancelation a mere two years later. Summers (2003) has argued that "while EL has been able to exert some pressure on the women it supports, it's not enough to galvanise the women once they are elected" (214-215). Sawer (2006) similarly suggests that the organization has been unable to provide a form of accountability. While funding is allocated to women on the basis of their commitment to and track record of representing women, there "has not been any dedicated accountability measures for their parliamentary performance" (118). I argue that this is because the ability of the extra-parliamentary organization to provide some accountability for the promotion and representation of women's issues requires a particular institutional context, which is absent in the Australian case. Instead, the party remains the primary principal and there is little EL can do about this. As a result, while successful in electing more women with particular preferences for gendered policy outcomes, the ability to translate this into more substantive representation is constrained by the parliamentary institutional context in which the women elected are operating.

Revisiting the Null Finding: Proportional Representation and Single Member Plurality

The quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 found very little support for the theory that PR systems, as a whole, should do more to facilitate substantive representation of women by women, than SMP systems. One reason suggested for the null finding was that the significant variation among PR systems may simply overshadow any difference between PR and SMP systems. These qualitative, in-depth interviews offer an opportunity to explicitly target the causal mechanisms. The three causal mechanisms expected to result in a difference between SMP and PR systems – the geographic tie of representation, electoral threshold, and the number of representatives per district, are not found to be operating as theorized. The lack of an observable difference between PR and SMPs in the PARTIREP data is not a function of greater diversity in the former or of lower levels of women's representation in the latter. Instead, the substantive representation of women by women depends fundamentally on the opportunities to depart from one's party and incentives to distinguish oneself on the basis of representing women.

In the following sections, I use the interviews to demonstrate how the mechanisms themselves are not operating as expected and how differences can be better cast in terms of a party/personal tradeoff.

The Geographic Tie of Representation in Single Member Plurality Systems

"You dance with the one who brung you." - MP 5, Canada, April 23, 2015.

The geographic tie inherent in SMP systems does seem to constrain substantive representation by limiting time and resources available for other, non-constituency based forms of representation. One state legislator said that "yes, absolutely, no doubt about it" she represented women, but that "her constituency was the key thing" (State

Representative, 2, United States, August 17, 2015). While no representative used the word ‘constraint”, limitations and tensions were clearly identified by some using other words. One British MP said that she “tries to do both [represent women and her constituency]” but “with limited time and resources for everyone” (MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015). A USA state senator said that, because her district is black and white, urban and rural, wealthy and poor, she “has to know everything” and for that reason she her she spent “most of [her] time on strictly local district issues” (State Senator, United States, August 24, 2015).

Representatives identify their obligation to their geographic constituency as critical because it is their official responsibility, an obligation entrusted to them by their electorate. Moreover, they care about and *want* to represent their constituents. They also identified the issue of electoral accountability - quite simply, if their constituency does not re-elect them, they are out of the job. Framed in terms of career stages and objectives outlined in Chapter 1, focusing on their geographic constituency is necessary for election and re-election (stage 3) and meeting vote-seeking objectives, but also for women’s representation, agenda setting, and policy objectives (stage 4).

> “…if you don’t get elected you can’t be here. Never neglect home base.” – MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.
>
> “Politicians are powerless without constituency” – MP 4, Canada, May 7, 2015.
>
> “Well, I have to represent my constituents because that is my job.” – MP 5, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015.
>
> “First and foremost every MPs job is to represent their constituents, so you do that first and foremost.” – MP 7, United Kingdom, January 21, 2015.
>
> “I represent my constituents… I represent all of them. You represent what your constituency wants and needs.” – MP 7, Canada, April 20, 2015.

These are not empty words for representatives. Most state that the bulk of their work is spent on constituency issues, including a significant portion of the time when their legislature was in session and almost all of their time and effort when they were at home in their constituencies.

> "Well, you dance with the one who brung you, and that's the people of [constituency name]. So first and foremost I am thinking about what will the folks back home think. There may be some things that I wouldn't normally be engaged on, but because I know it's a priority in my community I am going to be involved." – MP 5, Canada, April 23, 2015.

> "[My job] is overwhelmingly constituency work." – MP 4, United Kingdom, January 22, 2015.
>
> "The one that takes up the bulk of my resources is undoubtedly representing constituents." - MP 3, United Kingdom, February 4, 2015.
>
> "The easy answer is that I represent the almost 140,000 members of my riding….I try to always have the riding hat on because without that hat, I am a nobody here. I keep that hat on all the time. Any bill I speak on, I always tie it back to how it affects home." - MP 13, Canada, April 20, 2015.

In some cases, representing the constituency also meant representing identities, ethnicities, or interests geographically concentrated in their constituency. In particular, some Canadian MPs focused on the Tamil, Indian, or Chinese communities, those living in poverty, or education in their "well educated" riding (MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.). In the UK, representatives mentioned Scottish or Irish identities and the importance of the working-class. In the United States, representatives mentioned race and class.

There were two women who say they are not representatives of women *because* of their explicit responsibility to their constituency.

> "No [I am not a representative of women]…when you become a member of parliament, you become a member for everybody, no matter this allegiance. It is very important to represent everyone in my riding." – MP 1, Canada, April 26, 2015.

> "To be honest, no. I don't think or feel that I am…. I am the only representative of my Canton because I am coming from a small Canton and we only have one national councillor, and that's me." – MP 2, Switzerland, March 10, 2015.

Despite this geographic tie, however, broader, non-geographic issues, including women's issues, play an important role in how legislators understand their representational role. Most women in SMP systems *do* view themselves as representatives of women. Moreover, many MPs do not explicitly view being a representative of women in tension with these responsibilities to their constituency. Those who answered the written survey almost exclusively responded 'no' to the question "are there tensions or trade-offs between representing women and representing any of the other groups identified?". More importantly, however, legislators identified addressing women's issues as part of their job as constituency representative. As Saward (2006) puts it, legislators read women's issues into their community.

> "I'm a representative of [riding]. That includes women." – MP 6, Canada, July 6, 2015.

> "I don't see them as mutually exclusive. Your constituents are 50% women as well. … There is no trade off I don't think." – Staff 1, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015.

> "I see my constituency as women, particularly young women." - MP 4, Canada, May 7, 2015.

In two UK cases, exposure within their constituency was the catalyst for their focus and active attention to women's issues.

> "In my constituency there is a very old refuge and that got me linked into it initially and then after years of hearing the stories… that's the thing; politics ends up being about what you are passionate about. So that's where it came from." – MP 9, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015

> "… [women's issues] is not the reason I came into politics. I came into politics to change the law on trade. I wasn't thinking at all about women. I had no idea there were so few women… [But] we didn't have a refuge, and we were basically exporting our domestic violence cases to other refugees. And I felt we should step up and provide a refuge and be willing to take victims in from other places because we had for many years used up beds in other places and it was our turn to give back. So I did a lot with Women's Aid and another domestic violence charity refuge. I've worked with Eve's project on trafficked prostitutes." – MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

Part of this representation includes meeting with constituency-based women's groups, supporting local shelters, and meeting with women constituents.

> "In my community, I work closely with women's organizations [including] women's shelters. There is also grass roots organizations that work with very low income women that face violence, there is a leadership group that has developed among very long income women, helping them develop leadership skills." – MP 5, Canada, April 23, 2015.

It isn't just women's issues that matter - women identify other "non-geographic constituents" (MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015), which includes a range of groups including environmentalists, the queer community, Indigenous Canadians, people with disabilities, older individuals, and professional groups. At the same time, broader geographical constituencies that extended beyond the formal constituency were also

important to representatives, including metropolitan areas of big cities, provinces, states, or regions, and the international community.

In short, the constraint of the geographic tie in SMP systems is minimal at best. These interviews are consistent with Saward's (2006) argument that there is simply no such thing as an objective constituency interest - whether geographically, class, or racially-based. The interests of a constituency, she argues, can be interpreted in a range of ways and, as a result, representatives *construct* their constituency and their political needs. The geographic tie of representation does not suppress the representation of women by women because female MPs can read women's issues into the range of issues important to their constituency and are alerted to women's issues while working on constituency issues.

Proportional Representation: Geography still matters.

"I am a representative first just by being elected by the people of my Canton" – MP 7, Switzerland, March 9, 2015.

Like their counterparts in SMP systems, women elected under PR, say they see themselves as representatives of women.

> "Yes. I am a representative of women as well. Not only if it comes to women's lib or gender equality, but also, for example, working conditions in transport issues." – MEP 2, Germany, May 27, 2015.
>
> "I do a lot of work with women's groups. I would always conceive of myself as an ambassador for women." - MEP 10, United Kingdom, May 11, 2015.
>
> "It's very important for me to represent women. I represent all women living in the EU." – MEP 15, Germany, April 7, 2015.
>
> "I am definitely a representative for and of women." – MP 1, Switzerland, March 11, 2015.

The mechanism of a weaker geographic tie, however, simply does not play out as expected. In almost all cases, there is a very clear geographically-based aspect of representation, although its exact form varies across countries and other institutional features.

In both Belgium and Switzerland, geographically based and politically salient language and cultural differences mean that geography is extremely important. Belgian MPs are elected from 11 electoral districts corresponding to the ten provinces and the Brussels-Capital Region. There are no national parties; instead, parties run lists of candidates in Flemish-speaking Flanders, French-speaking Wallonia, or in the much smaller German-speaking communities. Only in the Brussels-Capital region do all the major (French and Flemish) parties run and even then voters must choose to mark ballots that contain the lists of either exclusively Flemish or exclusively French parties. In short, geography and the identities, cultures, and languages that are geographically concentrated are fundamental to election and representation. Unsurprisingly legislators' understanding of their role as representatives and how they spent their time, resources, and political capital was influenced heavily by geography. One Belgian MP identifies the work she has done for and her influence in her city as the main reason she was placed relatively high up on her party's list.

> "Ghent is very important for me. I am elected in the city, but also the wider province. So you have to keep a special focus on topics [and] issues that are sensitive there." - MP 2, Belgium, March 18, 2015.

Her main geographic connection is to a smaller area (the city of Ghent) than the electoral district from which she was formally elected (East Flanders), but the importance of her

tie to the city could not be overstated. Still, the result was not a complete dismissal of women's concerns:

> "It is not how I see my role [representing women]. It does not mean that I don't see a lot of problems for women that still have to be tackled. I can also be part of tackling that, but it does not make me a representative of women. I am a woman! So in that sense [yes]… but not as something extra." – MP 2, Belgium, March 18, 2015.

When asked whom she viewed herself as representing, another MP and former minister who identified herself as a staunch representative of women and an active feminist, said:

> "It's the people of the region of Antwerp because I am elected there" – MP 4, Belgium, March 19, 2015.

Swiss representatives are similarly tied to a geographic area. First, there is the formal tie: legislators are elected in and to represent a Canton and this is very influential despite the proportional system used. Second, language and culture varies across the Cantons and makes Cantonal differences especially politically salient.

> "I represent a minority; the French speaking is a minority, so I have to be very careful about the future of my canton. So I represent the whole country, but my Canton, or French speaking Switzerland." - MP 6, Switzerland, March 9, 2015.
>
> "I represent especially my Canton." – MP 3, Switzerland, March 10, 2015.
>
> "I am a representative first just by being elected by the people of my canton." – MP 7, Switzerland, March 9, 2015.

In Germany, it was not so much the federal nature of the country but the features of the mixed system that reinforced the importance of geographic representation. Many of those elected as PR MPs also run as the representative of their party in an electoral district. In essence, the list provides a back-up opportunity for election for those in tough (or losing)

SMP races. As a result of this ‘dual candidacy’ phenomenon, list representatives have campaigned in and presented themselves as representatives of an electoral district. If they lose in their riding but are elected from the list, this geographic tie does not disappear. Representatives continue to present themselves as representatives for the district both because they are wary of seeming as though their expressed electoral commitment was just in the service of winning the election (which would be bad for their party and their personal electoral prospects), but also because they are genuinely tied to and invested in the area. The sentiment offered by one PR-elected MP is reflective of the perspective taken by most:

> “Representing my constituency is the most important to me.” – MP 8, Germany, March 30, 2015.

In fact, this tie of PR MPs to particular geographic areas is not just informal but is recognized by the Bundestag, which identifies an MP as “elected off the country list for constituency X” (Bundestag, 2015).

Several of the PR MPs in Germany read women’s issues into their constituency in the same way that their counterparts in SMP systems did. When asked if she acted to represent of women, one MP says:

> “Yes...I do it in my constituency… We have some meetings. We have [meetings] with other groups who are interested in improving the situation of women in my constituency. [I meet] with those who are engaged in improving the situation for women in my constituency.” MP 6, Germany, March 26, 2015.

Another states:

> “I always organize something in my constituency on March 8th [International Women’s Day], this year we have invited the Rwandan Ambassador” - MP 4, Germany, February 26, 2015.

In the European Parliament, the representational tie to member states is quite clear. In some countries (Belgium and the United Kingdom in this analysis) representatives are also elected to represent electoral districts *within* the country. For MEPs from the United Kingdom, the importance of geographic ties in the national SMP system seems to have influenced feelings of responsibility to one's electoral district.

> "Who do I represent? [Constituency name]. I see myself as representing 1) my constituency 2) the Labour Party and 3) my Parliamentary role. It's three pillars, but overall it's the constituency because if I am not elected none of this happens."- MEP 9, United Kingdom, April 15, 2015.
>
> "I am a representative of the UK. But I work for the people from the [constituency], that's the thing." – MEP 8, United Kingdom, March 30, 2015.
>
> "I represent my constituency, as large as it is!" - MEP 7, United Kingdom, February 2, 2015.
>
> "The constituents of the [name] region. That is the number one. It's the people who vote for you." – MEP 10, United Kingdom, May 11, 2015.

Only when the entire country makes up one electoral district is the geographic tie significantly weakened. In this case, women do seem to have more flexibility in their understanding of their representational roles. MEPs from Germany and the Netherlands, for example, are more likely to state they represented "all women across Europe" (MEP 15, Germany, April 7, 2015).

> "I represent people from other countries that share my views. I am elected on a national list, but to a European Parliament, and I pursue issues that reflect those values…. representing women is part of my role." – MEP 6, Netherlands, February 6, 2015.
>
> "It is a mixture of course. I really must admit that most important is for me Europe. European thinking. It's most important for me." – MEP 2, Germany, May 27, 2015.

In a written survey, one MEP identified herself as a representative of the women and youth of Europe more than of Germany. At an earlier in-person interview, her staff put it this way:

> "Of course, you are always somehow responsible for your constituency. But I would say because she is coming from the [European youth branch of her party] she sees herself as much more a young MEP representing the youth of Europe than an MEP representing Germany." – Staff, European Parliament, Germany, March 4, 2015.

In the Netherlands, where the entire country is functionally one electoral district, geography does not influence understanding of representation nor does it play a significant role in determining the behaviour of representatives. Unsurprisingly, Dutch representatives mention representing the whole country more than representatives from any other country.

> "I represent the whole of Netherlands actually." – MP 4, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.

> "First of all, every Dutch person. Of course you have your party perspective, but, in the end, you have to look at the total population, what is in their best interest and not all of them will agree that what we do here in this party is best for them." – MP 11, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.

> " After the party, then the focus is on all of Holland." MP 5, Netherlands, January 29, 2015.

Representatives in the Netherlands were also among the most likely to say they were representatives of women and that this component of their job was very important to them.

> "Yes, I am a representation for women struggling. I am very focused on women's issues." - MP 2, Netherlands, March 11, 2015.

> "I always represent women's interests and issues because I can't do otherwise." - MP 8, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.

When representatives do mention geography, the connection is not strong.

> "Well I am [from name of province] … it's about three hours by train. So during the week, I am here in The Hague, but I am not living that long in [region], so I am not really a [region]. The media in the area is interested in what I am doing here, so I have my own support there you could say so. The members of my party in [region] are interested in what I do here as well…. But really I represent my voters" – MP 13, Netherlands, January 29, 2015.

> "You spend more time in your area, you know the circumstances, you know the people, you live there, so you get the story from them. I can tell the story of what happens in [region], I can tell it to my colleagues here, so it's kind of a responsibility, but …you don't have the strict representation. …So it's a little bit of a responsibility, but you're not a strict representative." - MP 4, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.

Instead of talking about geographic constituencies, legislators in the Netherlands talked about representing those who voted for them, the ideas of their party, or their policy portfolio.

> "I know why I do the things I do, to make food affordable and safe, all of those things, the other policies as well. I don't have a constituency, I do have Labour party members, I speak to them on weekends about what we do here so they can tell their circles. But it's not the people I am here for." - MP 8, Netherlands, January 28, 2015.

> "I see myself as representing everyone who wants to vote for me." - MP 7, Netherlands, January 26, 2015

These findings run counter to the theory offered in Chapter 2. They are also in contradiction to the expectations of Tremblay (2006) and Sawer (1998) who also anticipated that the more diffuse geographic ties in proportional representation systems

would facilitate representation of women by women: "less time is consumed by problems of individual constituents or local issues and there is more scope for the representation of broader interests which cross geographical boundaries, including issues of equal opportunity for women and minorities" (Sawer, 1998, 52). With the exception of the extreme case in the Netherlands, where all 150 MPs represent the whole country, local issues frequently consume women in PR systems. Like their counterparts in SMP systems, however, women read women's interests into their constituency interests.

The Electoral Threshold

The high electoral threshold in Canada and the UK does seem to deter women from focusing on women's issues or relying on their track record of representing women when campaigning because it's simply "too narrow" a focus (MP 10, United Kingdom, January 8, 2015). Interviews in both countries were conducted within six months of a general election offering an opportunity to ask representatives about their campaign intentions and the kinds of issues they planned on addressing as part of their re-election strategy.[35] Women in both countries indicate that a focus on women's issues does not help them sway voters or win elections. Instead, interaction with constituents, individual casework, and local campaigning is how women perceived themselves as garnering enough support to win. As one British MP says "when it comes to the campaign, I'll talk about local issues" (MP 9, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015). Women clearly feel that it is in their interest to focus their energy during campaigns on local issues rather than women's issues. Moreover, to do this during elections, their efforts and scarce resources between elections is best spent establishing a record as their constituency's representative.

[35] Not all were running for re-election.

In Canada, a senior campaigner makes the point in no uncertain terms. In between elections, she argues, MPs must "[pay] attention to the local bridge, post office, road. You got to pay attention to that stuff" (Campaign Staff, Canada, April 21, 2015). Dedication of time and resources to women's issues, she argued, does not get candidates elected or re-elected:

> "It's not vote determining in any way…. when you are going door to door, or speaking in the media, it's important to talk about things in a broader way… a less gendered way." – Campaign Staff, Canada, April 21, 2015.

Some MPs, particularly those who identified themselves as representatives of women, were more tempered in their response.

> "I would never shy away from it, but I would say that it wouldn't be my driving force on the doorstep." - MP 9, Canada, April 22, 2015.

As argued in the sections above, however, this is as much a function of the *capacity* of these MPs to deliver on promises to represent women in parliamentary systems as it is a result of the high electoral threshold. The point is made clear by comparing these MPs with elected representatives in the U.S.: although the electoral threshold is higher, legislators report that focusing on women *can* help them get elected. Because of the institutional freedom from their party and incentives for intraparty competition, women in the U.S. can leverage their role as representatives of women and, once elected, can follow through on promises to pursue women's interests. It is the capacity to act independently of the party and not the electoral threshold that is the determining feature.

Diversity of opinions also existed across PR systems – while some women in PR systems reported that it was helpful to their re-election chances, others said it was detrimental or that it simply did not matter one way or another. Again, these differences are not a reflection of the electoral thresholds, but are instead a function of the party or personal incentives within the PR system. The practice of vote pooling means that the electoral threshold is much more relevant to parties than to individuals, meaning that it is unlikely to affect *individual* behaviour. The exception, of course, is when preference votes are a meaningful way to change the order of lists, allowing women to pursue personal votes by representing women.

Multiple Representatives

The final mechanism theorized to lead to a difference between PR and SMP is district magnitude. Magnitude was expected to matter by 1) decreasing the burden to represent all interests of the geographic area and thus creating an opportunity for specialized interests, including the representation of women and 2) increasing the chance that women's issues are brought forward to a representative who has the incentive to address them. As a result, having more than one representative per constituency was expected to increase the representation of women by women.

Women in PR systems do report that women and, more often, women's organizations approached them to raise concerns or seek assistance. A state legislator from a multimember district in the United States reports "a woman I had never met came to me and told me that she had been raped in college. She asked me to introduce legislation on it. She would never have asked a man" - State Representative, 2, United States, August 17, 2015.

More generally, however, evidence offered by interviews in SMP systems is somewhat mixed. Most women indicate that they think women were more likely to come to them *as women representatives* to raise concerns around issues like domestic violence, sexual assault, childcare, poverty, and breast cancer. Nearly as many, however, do not think women in their constituency come to them because they are women, even if some think it is easier for women to speak to them about certain issues.

> "Some people might speak to me about things they would not be comfortable talking to a man about. One constituent who was working on domestic violence in the community said she was more comfortable talking to me about her past as a woman." – MP 6, Canada, July 6, 2015.
>
> "I think they'd come to me anyway, as an MP; it's just a little easier for them to explain sometimes to a woman. For example, child abuse or if they were abused as a child, they'll feel very sensitive about that subject and perhaps a bit fearful of men and they find it a bit difficult to talk to them."- MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.
>
> "Yes, I think [that women come to me because I am a woman]. Sometimes. Occasionally we will see someone in the constituency… I mean, I think occasionally people don't think their own MP will get it." - MP 10, Canada, April 23, 2015.
>
> "No, I don't think [women come to me because I am a woman]. I wouldn't say that's happened at all." – MP 5, United Kingdom, January 19, 2015.
>
> "Women do come to see because I am a woman and because I am an African American woman. Especially if it has anything to do with rape or human trafficking… people will come in and we have very difficult conversations." – State Senator, United States, August 24, 2015.

While the surrogate model of representation remains popular in the literature, most representatives reported that women from outside their constituency did not approach

them with issues.[36] The institutional features may offer a partial explanation. In many cases, an email to a representative is returned with an automatic reply that offers a "polite reminder… [that] it is a strictly-adhered-to Parliamentary rule within the House of Commons that MPs only act upon communication from their own constituents" (UK MP, January 6, 2015). One Canadian automatic response stated "My constituents are my first priority. While I receive thousands of emails and letters from people across Canada each year, I have been elected to serve and represent the constituents of [riding]. Please check … to see if I am your Member of Parliament" (Automatic response, July 16, 2015). As one British MP explains it:

> "We're not allowed to see [other MP's constituents]. That's a strict convention. You can't poach other people's cases…. I have 83,000 electors and 100,000 constituents. They talk about making bigger constituencies, but my work is cut out for me at this size. I run surgeries on Fridays and Saturdays and they are mostly full." - MP 8, United Kingdom, January 20, 2015.

Similarly, many online contact forms for US representatives require a zip code in the representative's district to make initial contact. In other words, the institutional constraint is so explicit that women will not, or cannot, make contact with a representative other than their own, thus reducing the number of times that women's issues are raised to legislators.

Interviews with women in SMP systems are not sufficient to test the assertion that "on gendered issues…women may be more comfortable approaching a female representative" (Chapter 2). To more fully test this assertion, interviews with men in SMP systems are

[36] Surrogate representation is representation in the absence of a formal electoral connection (Mansbridge, 2003). Concept introduced in Chapter 2. See also Carroll (2002), Childs (2002), Swers (1998), Waring et al. (2000).

needed to assess the frequency with which issues like human trafficking, rape, abuse, or childcare are raised to them. Alternatively a survey of women who contact (and do not contact) their representative on certain issues could offer further illumination. If women will speak to their representatives regardless of gender, then a multimember district, where the odds of having a female representative to approach are greater, will not necessarily increase the frequency with which such issues are brought to the attention of legislatures.

Moreover, a larger district magnitude in a PR system is not a sufficient condition to increase the number of women legislators that women citizens could approach on gendered (and difficult) issues. A PR system where party control over the ballot is high and citizens cannot indicate preferences produces disincentives to act to represent women rather than the party, whatever the district magnitude. Further, the other institutional and political contexts can outweigh any potential benefits of a high district magnitude. In Germany, for example, the tie of PR members to a geographic constituency means that there simply aren't a large number of women to be approached from any part of the Land. German citizens whose SMP and PR representatives are both men have no more access to a woman representative than those in pure SMP systems.

In the Netherlands, representatives whose portfolios address women's issues report being approached by women and women's organizations, while those whose portfolios focus on other issues are approached less frequently. When they are approached by women who want to raise gendered issues, these MPs redirect them to those with responsibility for equality or emancipation portfolios. In other words, the extremely large district magnitude (all 150 members) does not create a greater number of women to approach

with gendered issues. Instead, the practice of MPs having specific policy portfolios means that there are a few key women to approach but women's issues are not raised frequently to all women MPs.

Conclusions

The qualitative evidence from more than 90 surveys and interviews with legislators and their staff echoes the quantitative results presented in the Chapters 3 and 4. Substantive representation is facilitated by institutions that enable representatives to depart from their party line, to pursue personal votes by representing women, and to distinguish themselves from their colleagues by committing to acting as women's agents. Under a division of powers, women can introduce legislation and pursue cooperation to further women's interests. In a fusion of powers, women on the backbenches must toe the party line while women on the front bench have significant opportunities to pursue women's issues. The interviews in the UK, Canada, and the United States support the argument that there is a contingent relationship between the division of powers and the electoral system. Under SMP, the division of powers is a necessary condition for personalized vote system. In Westminster parliamentary systems where powers are fused, women report that they are not able to pursue electoral support by promising to represent women because they simply cannot credibly commit to follow through.

More generally, when women rely on their party for (re)election there are few incentives for them to seek support from the electorate based on the representation of women. There are also significant disincentives for doing so – representing women limits time and resources one could instead dedicate to party work or the party's priorities. It is not that women in party vote-based systems never practice substantive representation, indeed they

do, but it is less frequent, more challenging, and less visible than in systems that encourage the cultivation of personal votes. Adding to the null finding in Chapter 4, the in-depth interviews found that the mechanisms anticipated to lead to a difference between PR and SMP were not operating as theorized.

In the absence of male participants, the research was unable to explore whether and how men experience and respond to these institutional incentives. As a result, it cannot offer confirmation of the expected and observed larger gap between the behaviour of women and the men in, for example, open list PR systems. This is particularly troubling in relation to the division of powers, since the quantitative analysis found that it was men reacting to the institutional opportunities by doing less to represent women, rather than women responding by doing more. This observation is likely to be particularly difficult to assess with interviews because it requires first that men be willing to participate (which they largely were not) and that they be willing to honestly answer questions targeting this mechanism. Men in Canada, for example, may be unwilling to admit that what they do to represent women is the result of party obligation and that, in the absence of this pressure, they would do less. Regardless, future research on the effect of institutions on the substantive representation of women would benefit from greater effort to interview men and explore how they experience (or not) institutional incentives and opportunities to represent women.

Overall, the qualitative research improves our understanding of women's substantive representation by including a large number of interviews and by taking an explicitly comparative, cross-national, and institutionalist approach. It demonstrates important commonalities across countries: women, by in large, view themselves as representatives

of women and understand this role in relation to the unequal division of paid and unpaid labour and access to power and resources. Violence against women, for example, was a common political priority and motivating factor for women representatives across all countries. At the same time, however, feelings about representation and capacity to act on behalf of women varied by institutional and political context.

Chapter 7: Women's Descriptive Representation, Institutions, and Policy Outcomes

The analyses so far, both quantitative and qualitative, have focused on individuals. Individual behaviour, the results show, depend on the interaction between the gender of the representative and the institutional context within which they are operating. This chapter moves from these 'inputs' to the political process, including meetings, speeches, and proposals, to the 'outputs'- legislation and policy. It asks whether there is a relationship between descriptive representation and policy outcomes and whether this too is affected by the institutional context.

The expected effect of institutions on behaviour was relatively straightforward, but because institutions can affect outcomes by influencing individual behaviour *and* by determining how individual behaviour is aggregated, the nature of the moderating effect on the relationship between descriptive representation and policy is less clear. No difference was found in the behaviour of women or men in SMP systems and those elected through PR, but these institutions are also expected to affect outcomes by affecting the frequency of majority, minority, or coalition governments and by influencing the types and number of parties that successfully elect candidates. Systems that incentivize party representation result in a smaller difference between men and women on the representation of women, but they are also more efficient at reaching decisions because parties can direct the behaviour of members. When it comes to division of powers, presidential systems enable individual women to represent women, but simultaneously making it harder to reach decisions that depart from the status quo, thus limiting the opportunities for this individual behaviour to translate into policy outcomes.

This chapter uses two datasets. The first looks at legislation and focuses on the division of powers. The data are limited, but the results support the theory. After presenting the analysis and findings, I consider what the data imperfections themselves tell us about the role of institutions. The second dataset assesses the impact of women's representation on policy outcomes like spending on family allowance and length of parental leave. This dataset allows for an investigation of the division of powers and the electoral system and enables an examination of the impact of women in the executive.

The Comparative Agendas Project: Legislation, Gender, and the Division of Powers

The introduction of legislation on women's issues is one thing, but passing it into law is another. Doing so depends not just on individual action, but on the ability to navigate the legislative process and on the aggregation of individual preferences. The data used in this section, compiled from sources and individuals associated with the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP), allows for a test for whether the presence of women in a legislature is associated with legislation that addresses these issues. The CAP codes and classifies activities and events in and outside legislatures, including bills, oral questions, media, and public opinion polling using 19 major topics, such as the domestic macroeconomy, environment, and education, and over 200 subtopics like "infant and children's health" or "freedom of speech". Topics are consistent and comprehensive and, as a result can be used to compare issue attention and priorities across time, countries, institutions, and representational activities.

To create a dataset that enabled a test of the hypothesized difference between presidential and parliamentary systems, I combined data from Canada (Soroka and Blidook, 2005),

France (Baumgartner, Brouard, and Grossman, 2009), Spain (Chaqués-Bonafont, Palau, and Baumgartner, 2014), Switzerland (Gava, Sciarini, Tresch and Varone, 2015), the United Kingdom (Bevan, John, and Jennings, 2011), and the United States (Alder and Wilkinson, 2008).[37] Some of the data were publically available through the researcher's or institution's webpage, but in other cases researchers generously shared their data.

While the research network and coding framework is international and the objective is to enable comparison, the choice of what to study is made independently by country scholars. As a result, the unit of analysis and years included varied by country. In the UK, France, and Spain data the unit of analysis is *passed* legislation and any legislation introduced but not passed is excluded. The data from the United States include all proposed bills, but also indicates whether the bills passed through each of the Senate or House. On the other hand, the Swiss dataset includes all proposed bills with no indication of whether they were successful. The Canadian data include *government* bills (to the exclusion of Private Members' Bills) without any indication of whether the bills passed. Given the centralized power of parties in the Canadian Parliamentary System and the rarity of minority governments (just more than 6% of the bills were introduced in a minority government situation), however, the vast majority of these bills are assumed to have passed.

[37] The French data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here. The Swiss data used here were originally collected by Roy Gava, Pascal Sciarini, Anke Tresch and Frédéric Varone, with the support of Swiss National Science Foundation (grant number 105511-119245/1 and project 'The Mediatization of Political Decision Making' sponsored as part of the National Center of Competence in Research 'Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century'), and were distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither SNSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.

Table 7.1 (see end of the chapter) displays the unit of analysis, years, and number of observations for each of the countries included. The analysis is limited, as the case may be, to the lower or only house.

Each observation was coded by identifying the major topics and subtopics relevant to the substantive representation of women. To capture gendered legislation, I use two major topics, two subtopics, and created a new classification for 'strategic gender issue'.

The first major topic (CAP topic 2) is "General Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties". While the title itself contains no indication of 'women's issues', it does indicate a bill or law dealing, in general, with equality and rights. The limitation, of course, is that this encompasses not only "gender and sexual orientation discrimination" (subtopic 202), but also "ethnic minority and racial group discrimination & voting rights" (subtopic 201) and even "anti-government activities" (subtopic 209) which includes the theory and practice of communism.

To illustrate, the following bills were coded under "General Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties":[38]

> "To amend the Educational Organizational Act to establish an Office of Women's Equity and to amend part A of title IV of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to provide grants to encourage gender equity throughout the education system in the United States." USA, 1993
>
> The Health and Social Care Act 2008 c.14 which included changes which would "provide for the payment of a grant to women in connection with pregnancy." UK, 2008.
>
> "Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public [Law to prevent the concealment of the face in public]" France, 2010.[39]

[38] The Canadian and Swiss data do not provide the title of the legislation.

But so were many bills completely unrelated to women's issues or gender-specific concerns:

> "Freedom of Information Act" UK, 2012.
>
> "A bill to eliminate the exemption for Congress or for the United States from the application of certain provisions of Federal law relating to employment and privacy, and for other purposes." USA, 1987.
>
> "De conservación de datos relativos a las comunicaciones electrónicas y a las redes [law on retaining data on electronic communications]." Spain, 2007.

To focus more specifically on women's issues, I used the subtopic code that distinguishes legislation that addresses gender and sexual orientation discrimination. Even here, however, gender and sexual orientation discrimination are indistinguishable. The following bills are coded as addressing gender and sexual orientation discrimination:

> "To prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, and for other purposes." USA, 1973.
>
> "An Act to render unlawful certain kinds of sex discrimination and discrimination on the ground of marriage, and establish a Commission with the function of working towards the elimination of such discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity between men and women generally; and for related purposes." UK, 1975
>
> "To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide more effective remedies to victims of discrimination in the payment of wages on the basis of sex, and for other purpose." USA, 2009
>
> "Loi autorisant la ratification d'une convention sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l'égard des femmes. [Law authorizing the ratification

[39] This law was coded as falling under the broad category of General Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties, but not under the more specific category on gender discrimination. The issue is controversial among women and feminists and it's coding may be contested (though I do not do so here). This is just one example of how the coding, even using a well structured and widely used system remains subjective.

of a Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.]" France, 1983

"Ley 11/1990, de 15 de octubre, sobre reforma del Código Civil, en aplicación del principio de no discriminación por razón de sexo [Law on reform of the Civil Code, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex.]" Spain, 1990.

The second major topic (topic 13), social welfare, includes issues like parental leave, childcare, assistance to poor families. Many of the subtopics included under this broader umbrella are those often associated with women in politics (Atchison and Down, 2009; Bratton and Ray, 2002; Grey, 2006; Kittilson, 2008; Tremblay, 1998) and include many of the topics mentioned to me by participants in the in-depth interviews (see Chapter 5 and 6).

"An Act to make provision in connection with the protection of children and vulnerable adults." UK, 2006.

"A bill to amend … the Social Security Act to reauthorize and improve the temporary assistance to needy families program, and for other purposes." USA, 2003.

"Loi d'orientation relative à la lutte contre les exclusions [Framework law on the fight against exclusion]" France, 1998.

The second subtopic of interest is "family legal issues"(subtopic 1208) under the major topic (1200) of "general law, crime, and family issues". The major topic is very broad and includes white collar and organized crime, court administration, riot preparedness and more. The more specific category on family legal issues includes child support requirements, domestic violence, sexual assault, and marital breakdown but also includes issues related to marriage requirements and adoption procedures. The opportunity to explore the frequency with which bills related to issues like domestic violence are

introduced is unique; men's violence against women was the most common issue mentioned by interviewees (see Chapter 5), but data on spending on or laws addressing violence are not available as frequently as on family allowance. Even combined with these other issues (like civil unions) the opportunity to explore gendered violence is important and rare. Bills coded under this subtopic include:

> "A bill to prevent Internet stalking and domestic violence." USA, 2011.
>
> "To improve services for victims of sexual assault and domestic violence." – USA 2012.
>
> "An Act to restate and amend the law relating to female genital mutilation; and for connected purposes." UK, 2003.
>
> "An Act to make provision for protecting individuals against being forced to enter into marriage without their free and full consent and for protecting individuals who have been forced to enter into marriage without such consent; and for connected purposes." UK, 2007.
>
> "Ley 35/1995, de 11 de diciembre, de ayudas y asistencia a las víctimas de delitos violentos y contra la libertad sexual. [Law 35/1995 of 11 December on aid and assistance to victims of violent crimes and against sexual freedom]." Spain, 1995.
>
> "Ley 27/2003, de 31 de julio, reguladora de la Orden de protección de las víctimas de la violencia doméstica [Law regulating the Order of protection of victims of domestic violence." Spain, 2003.

Finally, a fifth indicator was created to reflect most explicit women's issues and includes legislation or bill that addressed gender discrimination (and by default sexual orientation discrimination), parental leave, or domestic violence and family law. These issues, together, reflect what Molyneux (1985, 1998) call 'strategic gender issues'. Table 7.2 indicates the percentage of bills by country that address each of these five topics.

The CAP data from the United States includes information on the individual who introduced the legislation, including gender, but the rest of the CAP data contain no measure of women's political representation. To test the relationship between gendered legislation and descriptive representation, data on women's political representation, made available by Pippa Norris, was incorporated. Women's representation ranges from less than 1% in Canada in 1968, to 36% in Spain after 2004. Women's representation is much lower in the other countries and does not exceed 21% in Canada, the US, or the United Kingdom. In the period under analysis, no country used legislated quotas to increase the representation of women, though some parties have voluntary quotas.[40]

Analysis

As with the PARTIREP data, the analysis using the combined Comparative Agendas dataset is an initial, preliminary test of the theory. The varying units of analysis and the broad categories inherent in the Comparative Agendas Project make a strong test impossible. For example, the US data includes only legislation introduced and passed in the House of Representatives – in other words, it does not give a clear indication of *final* outcomes. Similarly, the Swiss data does not indicate the success or failure or legislation. As with the PARTIREP data, the institutional indicator is imperfect; the category 'division of powers' again includes France, a semi-presidential system, and Switzerland, a unique political system. Another challenge is posed by the data availability by country - 43% of all cases are American. To test the impact of this unequal distribution of cases across countries, I drop the US and repeat the analyses in a later section.

[40] Spain adopted legislated quotas that were first used in 2008. The legislation requires that all party lists demand have a minimum of 40% of both genders.

A single model tests whether the percentage of representatives who are women increases the likelihood that a bill or a law addresses a particular women's issue and whether any observed effect varies with the institutional context. The model is repeated five times with each of the independent variables. All analyses are restricted to lower houses. Logit regressions are used and, because observations are independent across but not within countries, errors are clustered by country. Country and year dummies are included as controls. All tables and figures can be found at the end of the chapter.

Results

The results appear in Table 7.3. The coefficient for women's political representation is positive and statistically significant for three of the five models - for civil rights legislation, legislation on gender or sexual discrimination, and strategic gender issues. No relationship appears for social welfare or family legal issues.

But for the two topics that are most explicitly and exclusively gendered -- family issues, and the combined strategic gender issues -- the institutional interaction is positive and statistically significant. What this means is that the presence of women increases the probability that a bill or law will address these three issues, but it does so only, or in the case of gender equality rights much more, when there is a division of powers. A division of powers itself *decreases* the probability that a bill will address any of these three issues. In a legislature with no women, the probability that legislation will address strategic gendered issues (for example) is lower in a division of powers system, but as the proportion of women increases, the probability increases much more dramatically than when powers are fused. A division of powers has a positive effect on the likelihood a bill will address social welfare, but the presence of women does not, in this case, matter.

The interaction is not significant in three of the models, including those testing the likelihood a bill will address civil rights, broadly and about gender in particular, and social welfare. Civil rights and social welfare are the two broadest categories and do the least to capture *gendered* issues and so it is less surprising that the expected results are not observed. The category for gender discrimination also includes legislation addressing discrimination the basis of sexual orientation. It may be that this is too broad to capture the substantive representation of women in particular.

The results for the other two independent variables are consistent with the PartiRep findings: descriptive representation matters to the likelihood a bill or law will address family issues or strategic gender issues, but it matters much more in systems with a division of powers than in systems without. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 depict the increase in probability that a bill or law addresses these two topics as the proportion of women rises.[41]

The Role of Individual Women

The American Policy Agendas Project includes the name and gender of the individual who introduced the legislation, enabling an assessment of whether, in the case of the United States at least, there is some evidence that *individual* women themselves are involved.

[41] The statistical models used to create this graph differ slightly from those in Table 7.3. The predicted probabilities were not estimable with the inclusion of country and year dummies and so they were dropped to create these figures. The estimations underlying the figures as well as a comparison with the original estimations can be found in Appendix D, Table D1. In the reduced models, the effect of women in parliamentary systems on strategic gender issues disappears and the effect of a division of powers systems is reduced. The differential effect between a division and a fusion of powers, however, is *smaller* in the models used to create the figures. In other words, the figures underestimate the difference between parliamentary and presidential systems that can be seen in the full models in Table 7.3.

Table 7.4 displays the proportion of bills overall as well as the proportion of each of the bills under the specific topics that are introduced by women. Between 1976 and 2008, women introduced fewer than one out of ten bills in the House of Representatives, consistent with their level of representation over this time. Women did not introduce any more or any less legislation on social welfare than they did in general, consistent with the insignificant coefficient in Table 7.3. On the other hand, women were responsible for 25% of family legal issues and 20% of all legislation address strategic gender issues. Moreover, despite never comprising more than 16% of representatives, women introduced 63% of legislation addressing gender equality and sexual discrimination. These results indicate that, at least in the United States, it is women who are disproportionately responsible for the introduction of legislation on gendered issues and, as a result, as the proportion of women increases so does the probability that a bill or law addresses a one of these gendered issues. Of course, there are incentives and opportunities to represent women *through* the introduction of legislation in presidential systems that are not present in parliamentary systems and, as a result, looking at the American context offers no insight into the specific role of individual women in the introduction of legislation in parliamentary systems.

Analysis without the US

Over 40% of observations in the dataset created were bills proposed in the US. To test whether the results were simply a function of the disproportionate influence of the US, I repeated the analysis after dropping the US from the analysis. There is a much more equitable distribution of cases across countries among the remaining five countries

(Canada, France, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK), with a maximum of 2,588 (26%) Acts of Parliament in the UK and a minimum of 1,420 (14%) laws from Spain. Table 7.5 displays the results, and for comparison also includes the original results from Table 7.3

Excluding the United States does little to change the results. The exception is that the representation of women in parliamentary systems no longer increases the probability a bill will address rights in general. The effect of a presidential system on the likelihood a bill will address a family legal issue or a strategic gender issue remains negative and of a similar magnitude and null for all other types of legislation. Most importantly, the interaction effect in the two models that address the most specifically gendered issues – family legal issues and strategic gender issues – remains positive and significant. The size of the effect is, however, smaller.

The Role of Political Institutions: Insights in the Form of Limited Data

As outlined above, there are significant differences in the data from various Comparative Agendas Project sources. While some of this variation undoubtedly has to do with individual researchers' expertise and interests, there are important clues to institutional differences inherent in the cross-country variation. The US Policy Agendas Project data includes all bills proposed by the *legislative branch* because, under the conditions of a division of powers, it is the role of Congress make laws. Further, the dataset includes the individual member primarily responsible for the introduction of the bill, because, again, it is these individual Senators or House Representatives who are able to engage in legislating. Moreover, *all* bills are included because many more are introduced than are passed. Indeed, just 4% of all American bills in the dataset used in this chapter eventually passed into law. This clearly highlights the ways in which a division of powers

differentially affects substantive representation in terms of behaviour, on the one hand, and outcomes on the other. While individual members of Congress are able to *introduce* legislation as a way to represent and pursue women's interests, the political system makes it very difficult for these bills to become laws that improve women's lives.

The data from Canada and the UK, on the other hand, are much more limited. The Canadian data include only government bills and contain no information on the individual who first proposed the bill. This data is not included because the fusion of powers means it is simply not important who introduced a government bill, just that it is a *government* bill. Not only do virtually all government bills become law, but as Malloy (2004) points out it has been "many years" since a one was defeated" (209). [42] Moreover, almost all bills that are passed are also government bills; fewer than four private members bills are passed for every 100 sitting days (sometimes as few as one) and for every 100 government bills there are only between three and eight private member's bills (Blidook, 2009).[43] The rare Private Member's Bill that is introduced and passed is extremely limited in scope because it can neither spend public money nor raise taxes.

Because the dataset on bills does not indicate the individual responsible, when the scholars behind the CAP data want to look at the relationship between constituency and the behaviour of legislator's, they do so using oral questions. Their explanation is illuminating:

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[42] Malloy argues that some government bills do not become law either because they run out of time in a legislative sitting or because the government does not push them forward for fear of failure or backbench dissent. In the second session of the 41st Parliament, fewer than 1 in 4 did not go become law and even under the minority conditions of the third session of the 40th Parliament 72% of government bills became law and among those that didn't, some were passed at a later date (for example the Canadian-Jordan Free Trade Act). (Parliament of Canada, 2016).

[43] Blidook (2009) has argued this is increasing over time.

> "Outside the US, however, the study of individual representatives' behaviour has been … difficult. In many cases, information on individuals' behaviour has been difficult to attain; moreover, in many countries there are relatively few observable policy venues in which individual legislators have an opportunity for anything other than toeing the party line" (Soroka, Penner, and Blidook, 2009, 563).

Even oral questions, however, do little to illuminated *individual* preferences. Questions are allocated to opposition parties based on their size with a few dedicated to government backbenchers. Parties strategize how to use these questions, a scare resource, and the topic and questioner is often dictated by party elites to meet party objectives. In the CPA codebook, Soroka (2009) states that the oral question data "is intended to allow users to track issue salience for parties, *or even* individual legislators, over time." (2, emphasis added). It is not that oral questions offer unlimited opportunities for individual MPs to pursue their preferred issue areas, but just "that Question Period presents more opportunity for individual behaviour by MPs than do the more tightly controlled legislative votes" (Soroka, Penner, Blidook, 569).

An assessment of the UK data paints a similar picture. The data include only Acts of Parliament and no information is available on the individual who introduced the bill. As in Canada, government bills are central and the individual involved is inconsequential. Russell and Benton (2009) report that just two pieces of government legislation were defeated in a 12-year period and over a ten-year period (2000-2010), just 5% of Private Member's Bills were passed. As a result, it would make little sense to include Private Member's Bills or to differentiate between introduced and passed Government Bills.

The impact of the institutional context on behaviour and, by extension, the availability of data has been acknowledged previously by users of the CAP. An article which uses the

data from the UK, the US, and Spain to test gendered differences in agenda setting looks at oral questions in the two parliamentary systems and introduction of bills in the United States. The focus on oral questions, Atkinson, Bevan, and Chaqués-Bonafont (2014) argue, is necessary because of the party discipline, centralization of agenda control, and primacy of cabinet when it comes to introduction of legislation.

A consideration of the CAP data from Canada and the UK - two pure Westminster parliamentary systems - and the US – a pure presidential system – highlights some insights in the absence of good, comparable data. It is important to note, however, that the data from the other two division of power countries, France and Switzerland, are much more limited. In the case of France this is due to the *semi-presidential* nature of the system and for Switzerland it may be simply that the data itself is rather sparse - including just the major and sub topics and whether the proposal is law or treaty.

Limitations aside, the analysis using these data provides further support for the theory that the division of powers moderates the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. The number of women represented matters much more to the likelihood that a bill will address a strategic women's issue, such as gendered violence or gender discrimination, in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems. The likelihood a bill addresses the broader categories was not affected by the representation of women in either system.

Gender, Institutions, and Policy Outcomes

This section turns from legislation to policy. It explores whether the percentage of women in a legislature is associated with spending on family expenditure and social

protection and the length and wage replacement guaranteed for parental leave and, of course, whether any observed relationship varies with the electoral system or the division of powers.

The Data

The dataset used in this section was created by combing several publically available datasets with the private data generously shared with me. The Quality of Government data provides a significant amount of information, including social spending data from Eurostat (2007) and institutional data from Johnson and Wallack (2007) and the Institutions and Election Project (Regan and Clark, 2010). Data on women's political representation from the Interparliamentary Union (2013) are supplemented with information made available to me by Pippa Norris, whose data covers more countries over a greater number of years. Data on women's representation in the executive in parliamentary systems made available by Amy Atchison are also included. Gauthier's Comparative Family Policy Database (2011) provides additional data on gendered policy outcomes, much of which originated from the OECD.

Overall, the dataset contains over 14,000 country-years, 212 countries over a 70-year period. Because the dataset is comprised of multiple data sources, the data available vary by year and country. Depending on the analysis, the number of observations ranges from 222 to 560.

Four policies are used in this analyses to capture 'gendered policy outcomes'. Three include some aspect of family – length of parental leave, wage replacement during parental leave, and government family allowance expenditure. In depth interviews with

representatives highlighted the importance of work-family balance to women in politics and much of the existing quantitative work has focused on some type of family policy (Bratton and Ray, 2002; Case, 1998; Crowley, 2004).

First, the length of parental leave refers to the number of weeks available to either parent following the birth or adoption of a child. Parental leave, as opposed to maternity leave (leave available to mothers only), challenges not only the division of paid labour by enabling both parents to balance work and family, but also, at least potentially, the division of unpaid labour, by enabling *either* parent to stay home. Further, maternity leave is often used as an economic policy while parental leave is often framed more as enabling caring.[44] Second, parental leave compensation is measured as the cash benefits associated with parental leave as a percentage of female wages in manufacturing. Compensation is important - if parental leave is not paid, few parents may be able to take the opportunity. Further, because of the gendered wage gap, replacement rates are important to take-up of parental leave by fathers (Moss, 2008; Rostgaard, 2002). Finally, the level of financial compensation reflects a valuing of care as work and an important contribution to the family and society. The third family-related measure captures government spending on families by measuring family allowance expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

The fourth measure captures government expenditure on social protection as a percent of GDP. Eurostat defines social protection as encompassing:

[44] For example, a document from the European Commission entitled *Strategy for Equality Between Women and Men, 2010-2015* acknowledges that "Inequalities between women and men violate fundamental rights", but the more significant focus remains the "heavy toll on the economy and result in underutilization of talent", including the need to move women into labour force and use the talent pool of women "more extensively and more efficiently" to meet European economic objectives (8).

> all interventions from public or private bodies intended to relieve households and individuals of the burden of a defined set of risks or needs, provided that there is neither a simultaneous reciprocal nor an individual arrangement involved. The list of risks or needs that may give rise to social protection is, by convention, as follows: Sickness/Health care, Disability, Old Age, Survivors, Family/children, Unemployment, Housing and Social exclusion not elsewhere classified**.**

While this indicator is not explicitly related to women, women are more likely to be vulnerable as single parents or as survivors in the case of the death of a spouse. They are also more often the caregivers for those receiving disability benefits, the sick, and the elderly. As a result, government provisions for social protection disproportionately affect women. Moreover, representatives mentioned several of these issues as those which women, more than their male colleagues, prioritize.

While these four measures offer some sense of the provision of gendered policies, they do not encompass the range of policy or legislative outcomes that (disproportionately) affect women. For example, there is no measure of the legality or use of affirmative action, no indication of the prevention of discrimination based on gender and nothing that captures public resources dedicated to the prevention of men's violence against women nor the legal or police resources dedicated to the protection and support for survivors.

Explanatory Variables – Descriptive Representation and Intervening Institutions

The primary questions are 1) whether the presence of women affects policy outcomes and 2) whether any observed effect varies across political institutions. As with the other analyses in this dissertation, there are three main explanatory variables - women's political representation, the political institution, and the interaction between the two. Women's political representation is measured as a percentage of the lower/only house. In the sample included in the analysis, women make up an average of 17% of

representatives, although it varies substantially over time and across countries from 1.3% in Japan 1986-1989 to 45% in Sweden 2002-2005. To test the extent to which it is women in cabinet that affect policy outcomes, the proportion of women in cabinet is added to several models. Like women's representation more generally, the proportion of women in cabinet varies from 0 in several countries in several years to 50% in Sweden between 1994 and 2001.

Several institutional indicators are used. Two indicators capture the effect of a division of powers; the first is a classification of political regimes by Cheibub et al. (2010). The original six-category variable was recoded into a simply dummy indicating whether a system is presidential or semi-presidential (1) or a parliamentary (0). About 38% of country-years are classified as presidential or semi-presidential. The second indicator targets more directly one of the mechanisms – the ability of the executive to dissolve the legislature (approximately 80% of cases). To be clear, the effect of the presidential system indicator should be the opposite of the effect of the indicator indicating the ability of the executive to dissolve the legislature, theorized to limit women's ability to represent women in parliamentary systems.

A number of indicators also capture features of the electoral system. First, a simple proportional representation dummy variable was created using the information from the Institutions and Elections Project. Mixed, majoritarian, and plurality systems were all coded as '0'.[45] Approximately 54% of all cases (country-years) use proportional representation systems; of the non-PR systems, 47% are mixed systems. Mixed systems are often grouped with PR systems simply because the point of a combined system is to

[45] Treating mixed systems as 0.5/1 or dropping them all together does not change the results.

compensate for the disproportionality of SMP systems. However, what is of interest is not the *proportionality* itself but the implications of the system for women's substantive representation.

Second, two indicators are used to capture the incentives towards personal rather than party votes, both of which come from the data made available by Johnson and Wallack (2007). The first indicator captures the ballot dimension. Unfortunately, the indicator uses the original Carey and Shugart coding and so does not reflect the changes made to the ballot dimension in Chapter 2 and 4. As a result, countries in which parties do not exclusively control access to the ballot but voters cannot disrupt the list (like Canada and the UK) are scored zero instead of one.[46] Just less than one third of cases maximize incentives for unincorporated representation on this dimension. A plurality (44%) score one out of two, indicating that parties control access to the ballot but voters can disrupt the list. Another 20% maximize incentives for the representation of parties, indicating that parties control access to the ballot and the list cannot be disrupted. For bicameral or mixed systems, the scoring for this variable is weighed by the proportion of seats elected under each electoral system.

The second indicator captures the vote dimension. It is a simple dummy that indicates whether or not voters can rank candidates *or* have multiple votes to cast to several candidates even if they can't explicitly rank them (just 15% of cases). The Johnson and Wallack dataset does have a variable that captures the vote dimension as originally conceptualized by Carey and Shugart, but the coding ranks systems in which voters have

[46] The Quality of Government data does not contain the necessary information to recode the indicator. It is not possible to differentiate between countries that score '0' on this dimension but do have some local control over nomination.

a single vote to cast for a candidate as creating greater incentives than systems in which voters have multiple votes. This ranking is in contradiction to the theory as offered (and supported in the PARTIREP analysis) – multiple votes to distribute among candidates generate incentives for the representation of women in a way that a single vote for a candidate simply does not. The 'rank' dummy more accurately captures the incentives to represent women as they were theorized in Chapter 2.

As with the PARTIREP data, vote pooling is not included because the coding of the variable does not reflect the original conceptualization offered by Carey and Shugart and thus does not offer an indication about incentives for party or personal (or unincorporated representation). Finally, the ballot and rank indicators are combined to capture total variable incentives for unincorporated representation. The indicator is rougher than that used in the PartiRep analysis but does approximate the theorized incentives to represent women.

In total, then, there are six institutional variables:

Presidential

1. Presidential or Semi-Presidential System (1) or Parliamentary System (0).
2. Executive can dissolve legislature (1) or not (0).

Electoral System:

3. Proportional representation system (1) or other (0).
4. Ballot Dimension, ranging from 0 to 2.
5. Vote Dimension, indicating whether voters can indicate a preference among candidates (1) or not (0).
6. Combination of Ballot and Vote to capture the incentives for unincorporated representation.

Several controls, guided by primarily by Kittilson (2008) but also by Atchinson and Down (2009), are used in all analyses. The first captures the proportion of cabinet posts held by a member of a left party; women's political representation is higher in left-leaning parties and left leaning parties are more ideologically consistent with the policy outcomes of interest. Public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP is also included to control for the extent to which a government is generous on all fronts and not particularly so on gendered policies issue. A simple dummy indicates whether the country is a member of the EU; member countries may have similar (and high) provision of parental leave because of European Parliament directives rather than national levels of women's representation (Atchinson and Down, 2009). Finally, both the birthrate and female labour force participation are included; both impact the need for family policy to facilitate or encourage work, enable higher birthrates, or both (Atchinson and Down, 2009).

Table 7.6 provides a description of the variables used, the countries and years for which the data are available, and the source of the data.

Policy Outcomes: The Effect of Women's Representation and Political Institutions

To test whether the presence of women in politics impacts policy outcomes and whether the effect varies across political institutions, I employ time-series cross-section analysis using random effects where each observation represents a country-year. While similar analyses have used time-series cross-section analysis with fixed effects (Bolzendahl, 2009, 2011; Kittilson, 2008), this is not appropriate in this case. First, variation across and not just within countries is of interest. Second, the political institutions are for the most part time-invariant and using fixed effects prevents an estimation of variation in the

dependent variables that is due to the institutions.[47] Because of the inclusion of the interaction terms, the institutional coefficients indicate the effect of the institution when women's representation is at zero. Men were theorized to respond to incentives for unincorporated representation by focusing on something other than gender issues and so the effect of the institutions on policy outcomes in the absence of women is an important test of the theory.

Four identical models, each using a different dependent variable capturing gendered policy outcomes, are run for each of the institutional indicators. Each model contains the representation of women and the interaction between this and the institutional feature. The broader availability of data means that the models testing the effect of incentives for unincorporated representation do not need to be limited to proportional representation systems. All models include the control variables listed in Table 7.6.

In total, eight models test the effect of the separation of powers on the impact of women, 16 models are run to test the impact of the electoral system, and another eight incorporate women in cabinet into the analysis. Although the larger dataset contains a wider range of countries, because of the various sources of data (including several OECD-specific sources), the countries included in the analyses are limited to OECD countries. The benefit of this more limited sample is that potential confounding variables related to democratic experience are controlled for (Kittilson, 2008). The analyses, which use social protection expenditure, include slightly fewer countries and years. Table 7.7 displays the

[47] The electoral system does change in New Zealand over the period and the score in the ballot dimension changes to Austria, Belgium, Italy, Japan, and New Zealand.

countries and years that are included based on the dependent variable used. Finally, the models that incorporate women in cabinet are limited to parliamentary systems.

Limitations of the Analysis

In Chapter 1, I argued that the effect of institutions on the representation of women constituted an important test of institutional theories because the problem of endogeneity is much less severe than it is, for example in the case of class relations. Institutions were, for the most part, adopted and entrenched not only before women were a part of the political process, but also before it was even considered a possibility. While true, over the long run some of the same factors that influence the adoption of certain political systems may also influence the representation of women, both descriptive and substantive. For example, a more conciliatory or consensus-based political culture may have led to the adoption of proportional representation and, such that when women were given access to the system, women are more likely to opt into it. Other country-specific factors might also affect the policy outcome, the number of women, and/or the institution. For example, in the case of culture of strong, traditional, family values, a real or assumed single-earner, and single-carer family structure may mean that fewer women enter politics *and* that less is provided for parental leave.

Despite these concerns, the analysis does not control for country-specific effects. Doing so is not possible because the institution does not vary within a country-year. The country fixed effects would be perfectly collinear with the invariant institutions that and half of the interaction of interest would no longer be estimable. The potential for a confounding country-level variable should be kept in mind when interpreting the results, but the problem shouldn't be overstated. A quick examination of the countries included in the

analysis indicates that any problem should be relatively minimal. The countries with institutions that enhance the relationship between substantive and descriptive representation do not necessarily create the conditions for women to enter politics or lead to the provision of more gender policy. For example, Switzerland's electoral system generates significant incentives for unincorporated representation, but women were not given the right to vote in federal elections until the 1970s and the last canton didn't extend the franchise until forced to do so in 1990. The United States operates under a division of powers and an electoral system that encourages unincorporated representation, but has low levels of women's descriptive and is hardly recognized for it's generous parental leave or social exclusion provisions. Similar stores can be told for Ireland and Australia.

Interpreting the Results

As with the previous analyses, the interaction makes interpretation difficult and it is worth discussing it in detail before presenting the results. First, the coefficient for the proportion of women in the lower house or in cabinet indicates the expected effect on the policy of a one-percentage point change in women's political representation. The interaction term indicates the differential effect of an increase in the representation of women by one-percentage point in the institution as opposed to outside the institution. To determine the total effect of a one-percentage point increase in the representation of women inside the institution, the coefficient for the representation of women is combined with the coefficient for the interaction term. The institutional indicator represents the effect of the institution when there are *no women*. For example, the coefficient for the

ballot dimension indicates the effect of a one-unit difference on the scale where higher numbers indicate *less* party control *when there are no women in the institution*.

The results examining the impact of a division of powers are displayed in Tables 7.8 and 7.9 and summarized in Table 7.10. Table 7.11 displays the results for the analysis in which women in cabinet in parliamentary systems are included. The models using the electoral systems indicators are displayed in Tables 7.12 to 7.15 and summarized in Table 7.16. Figure 7.3 depicts the results for the three dependent indicators for which the interaction term is statistically significant. Finally, Table 7.17 interacts the representation of women in cabinet with incentives to represent women. The results from this analysis are depicted in Figure 7.4.

Women's Political Representation, Division of Powers, and Policy Outcomes

The Effect of Institutions

The coefficient for the institutional variables are mostly insignificant, indicating that, in the absence of women, presidential and parliamentary systems do not provide significantly more or less parental leave and replacement wages or family allowance. Only in the case of social protection does the institution have an effect with less money spent in presidential systems and more spent in parliamentary systems.

Women's Representation in Presidential Systems

Women in parliamentary systems have a positive effect on the length of and pay for parental leave (in one of the two models), but do not have an effect on either social protection expenditure or family allowance.

The presence of women in parliamentary systems is indicated by the women's representation coefficient in Models 1 through 4 and has no effect in two cases (M3 and

M4) and a positive effect in the other two (M1, M2). In models 5 through 9, the effect of women on outcomes in parliamentary systems, where the executive can dissolve the legislature is indicated by the combination of the women's representation coefficient. Only in the case of length of maternity leave do women have a positive impact. The combination of the positive coefficient for the representation of women and the negative coefficient for the interaction term in Model 8 means that the presence of women in systems where the executive can dissolve the legislature has no impact on length of parental leave.

Women's Representation in Parliamentary Systems

The results on the effect of women in presidential systems are mixed. In half of the models using the presidential system dummy variable (M1 and M2), the interaction coefficient indicates that the presence of women in presidential systems has a *negative* effect on length of and pay for parental leave. On the other hand, the presence of women in presidential systems has no effect on expenditure on family allowances (M3) and a *positive* effect on social protection spending (M4).

The results of the four models (M5-M8) that use the executive's ability to dissolve the legislature are similarly mixed, though not inconstant with M1-M4. The representation of women in systems were the executive does not have this power (indicated by the representation of women coefficient) has a no effect on family allowance expenditure or the length of or pay for parental leave but does positively effect social protection expenditure.

These inconsistent results differ from those in the previous section, where a division of powers was found to increase the impact of women on the introduction of bills. Because

the CAP analysis was limited to lower houses, the data included US bills that had passed through the House of Representatives but may or may not have passed through the Senate and been signed into law by the President. The Swiss data gave no indication of whether a bill was passed. In other words, the positive results from the CAP analysis may reflect more the positive effect of a division of powers on individual opportunities to *introduce* legislation. The results in this section demonstrate the challenge of translating behavioural substantive representation into policy in a division of powers.

Parliamentary Systems - Women in Cabinet

The results in Models 1-8 and summarized Table 7.10 do little to clarify the relationship between women and policy outcomes in either presidential or parliamentary systems. In some ways this is not surprising since the institutions were expected have opposite effects on individual behaviour of women (positive in presidential systems) and on the aggregation of these behaviours (more efficient in parliamentary systems). In parliamentary systems, it is women in cabinet who are anticipated to have opportunities to represent women and effect outcomes. To test this, four more models were run limiting analysis to parliamentary systems and incorporating a indicator capturing the proportion of cabinet that are women. The variable measuring women's presence in the lower house has been left in the model. The controls remain the same.

The results are displayed in Table 7.11 and provide no support for the argument that the presence of women in cabinet matters to gendered policy outcomes. The coefficient for women's representation in the executive is insignificant in half of the models and where statistically significant the proportion of women in cabinet is *negatively* associated with family expenditure and social protection. Women's representation in the legislature has a

positive effect on the length of parental leave and wage replacement. Since the analysis was restricted to parliamentary outcomes, this is consistent with the findings in Model 1, 2, & 5. The presence of women in the legislature also has a positive effect on family expenditure, but the positive counteracted by the presence of women cabinet.

These findings are in contradiction to those offered by Atchison and Down (2009) who find that the proportion of women in cabinet is positively associated with maternity and parental leave. The reason behind this difference is not entirely clear, though Atchison and Down (2009) do include controls for the kind of welfare system – either Christian Democratic or Social Democratic, the former of which is positively and significantly related to maternity and paternity leave. Moreover, their analysis includes a three-point measure of federalism that negatively affects the dependent variable.

The next section turns to the impact of electoral systems, but I return to the question of women in executive positions in the final section to assess whether the impact of these women also depends on electoral incentivises and opportunities.

Women's Political Representation, Electoral Systems, and Policy Outcomes

Proportional Representation

The results in Models 13 through 16 suggest that women have a positive effect on parental leave length and pay, but no more so in PR systems than in non-PR systems. The interaction term is largely insignificant and in the model in which the interaction is statistically significant, the effect is negative and counteracts the expected positive impact of women on family allowance expenditure. A ten percentage point increase in women in non-PR systems increases the spending on family allowance by just over a tenth of GDP. In PR systems, however, the effect is zero.

Two factors are worth considering. First, individual behaviour was found not to depend on a proportional representation. Second, proportional representation systems are more likely to result in minority or coalition governments and the presence of additional veto players makes decision making more difficult. If women in SMP and PR systems behave similarly, women in SMP systems may simply be more able to translate their substantive representation of women into policy outcomes. This effect, however, is only found in the one model.

Incentives for Unincorporated Representation

The Representation of Women Indicator

In Tables 7.12 through 7.14, the coefficient for women's representation is insignificant in five of the 12 models and negative in another three. These results suggest that, in many cases, when electoral systems maximize incentives for party representation, women's descriptive representation does not matter or has a negative effect on policy outcomes. For example, length of parental leave and spending on social protection are unaffected by the level of women's representation when parties control access to and rank on the ballot (scoring 0 on the ballot dimension). Women's representation also does not affect spending on family allowances or social protection if voters cannot indicate a preference between candidates (a '0' on the rank indicator). Only in the case of the length of and wage replacement for parental leave do women have an influence when party votes are encouraged by a singular party vote. Parental leave pay is positively affected by the presence of women, even when incentives for party votes are at their maximum (parties control access to and rank on the ballot and voters cannot indicate a preference between candidates).

The Interaction Term

On the other hand, when institutional features incentivize unincorporated representation, women's presence has a positive effect on three of the four policy outcomes - the length of parental leave, the amount of money spent on family allowance, and spending on social protection. In other words, not only do these institutional features incentivize or enable individual women to undertake more actions to represent women but, in the aggregate, the descriptive representation of women is also associated with at least some policy outcomes. For example, a ten-percentage point increase in the proportion of representatives who are women is associated with a parental leave that is five weeks longer when parties do not control access to the ballot and voters can disrupt the list offered to (Model 17). Similarly, when voters can indicate a preference between candidates, a ten-percentage points increase in women's representation results in an increase in spending on family allowances of half of a percent of GDP (Model 23). A similar increase in women's representation in systems where there is no rank vote does not change family allowance expenditure.

These results support, in general, the theory offered. The exception is Model 22 where the interaction coefficient is *negative* and statistically significant, meaning the *positive* impact of women is negated. These results are counter to the rest of the results and the theory.

The Institution Indicators

The coefficients for the institutional indicators are statistically insignificant or negative in all but two cases. In the absence of women, the greater the incentives for unincorporated votes the *lower* the spending on parental leave wage replacement, family allowance expenditure, and social protection spending. This is not surprising; men do not respond to

incentives for unincorporated representation by representing women but focus instead on other interests or traditional particularistic relationships. In the absence of women, the priorities for spending and policy change lie outside these gendered policy areas.

Women's descriptive representation is all the more important in these systems. For example, all else equal, where IUR is at a maximum (3 out of 3) countries spend nearly 6% of GDP less on social protection than systems in which IUR is at a minimum (0 out of 3). However, an increase in women's political representation of 10 percentage points results in an increase in 1.05 percentage points in spending on social protection in the former, and a decrease of 1.29 percentage points in latter (Model 28). [48]

The exception is the positive effect of institutional features that incentivize unincorporated representation on the length of parental leave. When incentives are at their maximum, parents are entitled to 21 more weeks than when incentives are at a minimum. The gap, however, grows as the level of women's political representation increases: at 30% women's political representation, for example, systems that maximize incentives offer 35 more weeks than systems in which there are no such incentives.

Figure 7.1 depicts the relationship between the representation of women and the four policy outcomes in systems where IUR are at a minimum and when they are at a maximum. The graphical depiction shows the differential effect of an increase in the proportion of women represented and the results are clear – with the exception of parental leave wage replacement, descriptive representation matters much more to policy outcomes under the condition of personal votes than under condition of party votes.

[48] Interaction coefficient 0.077 multiplied by three (maximum of IUR) and then by 10 to reflect a 10-percentage point increase.

Women in Cabinet – The Role of Electoral Systems

Models 9-12 found, contrary to expectations and existing research, women in cabinet do not positively effect the provision of gendered social policy. Given the importance of electoral systems, however, this relationship needs to be re-evaluated. Women have greater opportunities and incentives to pursue women's issues when electoral systems facilitate departure from their parties, and it is reasonable to expect this mechanism to operate equally on women in the executive. In other words, it may be that these women have an effect on policy outcomes only when the electoral systems also facilitate substantive representation. Models 9-12 are rerun incorporating the combined IUR indicator into the analysis and interacting this with representation of women in cabinet. Table 7.17 displays the results.

Consistent with the findings that women in parliament do not matter under conditions of party vote systems, the representation of women in the executive has no effect on length of parental leave, wage replacement, and social protection when incentives for unincorporated representation are at a minimum. It may be that women in these systems are elected and re-elected and then promoted to cabinet when they follow the party line and as such do nothing to improve provision of gendered policies. Given the power of parties in these systems, even a post in cabinet might be not be sufficient to influence outcomes as an individual. Interestingly, the presence of women in cabinet when IUR is at a minimum is *negatively* associated with family allowance expenditure. If women's representation is symbolic in these cabinets, their minimal or negative impact is hardly surprising.

In systems in which there are greater incentives for unincorporated representation, the representation of women in cabinet is positively associated with the length of parental leave and family expenditure. Figure 7.4 displays these results. Only when electoral incentives to represent women are present does the representation of women in cabinet increase the policy under consideration.

To understand this interaction it is worth returning to the theorized career path of women from Chapter 1.

> **Stage 1:** Preference Formation. Individuals form preferences on one or more policy dimensions. Preferences include those on gendered issues and are expected to differ between men and women as a result of the unequal division of paid and unpaid labour and inequalities in access to power - economic, social, and political.
>
> **Stage 2a**. Self-selection. Individuals opt into the political process, choosing to run for nomination. Self-selection is more likely when individuals are approached by parties or elites and asked to participate.
>
> **Stage 2b.** Nomination. After women self-select, they must win the nomination for their chosen party.
>
> **Stage 3.** Elections. Once a candidate, women must win election to office.
>
> **Stage 4.** Representation and Agenda Setting. After election, women make choices on what issues to represent with scarce resources, including political capital and time.
>
> **Stage 5.** Promotion. Women may seek and be offered promotions or other particularistic benefits, including cabinet positions, committee positions, or party leadership positions.
>
> **Stage 6.** Legislation and Policy outcomes. The agenda setting of individual legislators and the votes they cast is aggregated into policy and legislative outcomes.

The analysis itself focused on the final stage, assessing the determinants of policy outcomes. The logic of including the representation of women in cabinet came out of the theorized differences between presidential and parliamentary systems – while women on

the backbench were expected to have limited to no influence on outcomes, women on the front bench were anticipated to be able to affect outcomes. It's important to note, however, that before these women were promoted at Stage 5 they sought nomination, election, and potentially re-election under conditions structured by the electoral system (stages 2 and 3). If the electoral system encouraged or enabled the representation of women, these women then have an effect on outcomes once they do achieve promotion to cabinet. Even before election or re-election, women are self-selecting into political systems, and the results in Chapter 4 suggested that the importance of representing women is higher among women elected in electoral systems which incentives the representation of women, suggesting that these institutions may filter in women who *want* to represent women. In other words, the women who reach cabinet in these systems may not only be incentivized to do more, but may want to do more to represent women. These factors may explain why it is only under electoral systems that enable or incentivize the representation of women by women that female cabinet members matter to policy outcomes.

Conclusions and Looking Forward

This Chapter moved from the individual level analysis of Chapters 3 through 6 to assess the extent to which there was a relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation of women in terms of the number of women in the legislature and cabinet and the policy outcomes. The results for electoral systems in this aggregate analysis were consistent with those in the individual analysis. Where the electoral system incentivizes the personal vote, by limiting party control over access to and rank on the ballot and by offering citizens a vote to indicating a preference, the presence of women

matters more. This was true both of women in the legislature's only or lower house and of women in the executive in parliamentary systems. Again, no meaningful difference was observed between PR and SMP systems. Although the difference between and relative benefits of SMP and PR remain front and centre in most discussions on electoral systems, it is institutional features that free individuals from their party and enable or incentivize the representation of women that have remained the critical difference.

The results using the two divisions of powers indicators were much less clear reflecting the two distinct ways that institutions can affect *outcomes.* Because presidential systems facilitate the representation of women by individual women, but for the same reasons are, in the aggregate, more prone to resoluteness than decisiveness, individual actions do not necessarily add up to policy outcomes. On the other hand, parliamentary systems constrain representation of women by individual women but facilitate efficiency in terms of reaching policy decisions. Despite this efficiency, however, even women in cabinet do not have a positive impact on policy outcomes *unless* they are operating under conditions of electoral systems that incentivize the representation of women. In other words, the potential power of the executive in parliamentary systems to affect gendered policy outcomes itself depends on the extent to which women in these positions are enabled and incentivized to represent women as the pursue their career objectives. If, because of the electoral system, they rely heavily on their parties, even the concentrated, near absolute power of the executive does not facilitate the representation of women by women in terms of policy outcomes.

Table 7.1. Cases: The Comparative Agendas Project Database

Country	Unit of Analysis	Years	Number of Bills
Canada	Government Bills	1968-2004	1851
France	Laws	1979-201	2391
Spain	Laws	1983-2008	1564
Switzerland	Proposed Bills	1978-2008	1420
United Kingdom	Acts of Parliament	1966-2012	2588
United States	Bills Passed through House of Representatives	1973-2008	7266

Table 7.2. Percentage of Bills/Laws Addressing Issues by Country

	Rights	Gender Equality	Social Welfare	Family Legal Issues	Gender Issues
Canada	1.8	0.2	1.3	0.8	1.0
France	3.0	0.5	1.7	3.6	1.1
Spain	2.6	0.5	1.3	1.0	2.0
Switzerland	2.4	0.4	3.7	0.2	1.5
UK	2.5	0.2	3.7	0.8	3.8
US	2.2	0.2	4.2	0.9	1.3
Total	2.2	0.2	4.0	1.1	1.4

Table 7.3. The Effects of Women's Representation and Division of Powers on Legislation

	Rights	Gender Equality	Social Welfare	Legal Family Issues	Strategic Gender Issue
% Women in lower house	0.043**	0.056**	0.021	0.082	0.068*
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.027)
Division of Powers	0.072	-0.449	1.154*	-2.872*	-1.928*
	(0.451)	(0.339)	(0.484)	(1.177)	(0.822)
Interaction	-0.002	0.008	-0.004	0.146**	0.086*
	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.054)	(0.039)
Constant	-4.316***	-6.190***	-4.478***	-6.965***	-5.812***
	(0.662)	(0.774)	(1.019)	(1.282)	(0.581)
N	16778	10509	16580	16257	16777

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Logit regression, errors clustered by country.

Dependent variable indicates whether the bill or law addresses the topic indicated.

Results control for year and country specific effects.

Table 7.4. Bills Passed In House of Representatives Introduced by Women in the United States

All Legislation	9%
Rights	13%
Gender Equality	62%
Social Welfare	8%
Family Legal Issues	16%
Strategic Gender Interests	20%
Women as Percentage of Congress: 9%	
Minimum Representation of Women: 3% (1976)	
Maximum Representation of Women: 16% (2006-2008).	

Years: 1976-2008. House of Representatives only.

Table 7.5. Dropping the U.S. - The Effects of Women's Representation and Division of Powers on Legislation

	Rights		Gender Equality		Social Welfare		Legal Family Issues		Strategic Gender Issue	
	With US	Without US	With US	Without US	With US	Without US	With US	Without US	With US	Without US
% Women in lower house	0.043**	0.023	0.056**	0.035*	0.021	0.004	0.082	0.083	0.068*	0.065***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.015)
Division of Powers	0.072	-0.138	-0.449	-0.683*	1.154*	1.136**	-2.872*	-1.593**	-1.928*	-1.188*
	(0.451)	(0.526)	(0.339)	(0.329)	(0.484)	(0.406)	(1.177)	(0.544)	(0.822)	(0.535)
Interaction	-0.002	0.007	0.008	0.016	-0.004	-0.004	0.146**	0.089***	0.086*	0.051*
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.025)
Constant	-4.316	-3.857	-6.190	-5.305	-4.478	-4.109	-6.965	-7.092	-5.812	-5.804***
	(0.662)	(0.688)	(0.774)	(0.377)	(1.019)	(1.041)	(1.282)	(0.981)	(0.581)	(0.216)
N	16778	9443	10509	4934	16580	9314	16257	9181	16777	9511

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Logit regression, errors clustered by country.
Dependent variable indicates whether the bill or law addresses the topic indicated.
Results control for year and country specific effects.
Result include US are the same as those in Table 7.1.

Table 7.6. Summary of Variables

VARIABLE	SOURCES
Gendered Policies	
Parental leave: Total weeks leave allowed for either parent after the birth of a child. Parental Leave Compensation: cash benefits associated with parental leave as a percentage of female wages in manufacturing Family Expenditure: Percentage of GDP paid to families through government family allowance programs.	Comparative Family Policy Database (2011), originally from various OECD sources.
Social Protection Expenditure: government expenditure on social protection as a percent of GDP	Comparative Quality of Government (2015), originally from Eurostat sources (2014).
Explanatory Variables	
Women's political representation: % of women in lower/only house Min: 1.3%, Max: 45%, Mean: 17.52% SD: 11.7 % of women in cabinet Min: 0, Max: 50%, Mean: 26.5 SD: 13.8	Pippa Norris personal dataset. Quality of Government Data (2015), originally from the Interparliamentary Union (2014). Amy Atchison personal dataset.
Proportional representation: Simply dummy indicates 1 if PR and 0 if majoritarian, plurality, or mixed system. PR or Mixed systems - 53.5%.	Quality of Government Data (2015), originally from Institutions and Elections Project (2010).
Ballot dimension: 0 - parties control access to the ballot and lists cannot be disrupted by voters 1 - leaders control access to the ballot, but lists can be disrupted, 2 - leaders to not control access to the ballot and voters can disrupt the list as presented. In mixed systems, data weighted by number of seats.	Quality of Government Data (2015), originally from Johnson and Wallack (2008).

Explanatory Variables (cont'd)	**SOURCES**
Vote dimension: Estimated using a simple dummy variable indicating whether voters can rank candidates or have multiple votes to indicate a preference.	Quality of Government Data (2015), originally from Johnson and Wallack (2008).
Incentives to Represent Women: Combination of Ballot dimension and vote dimension. Min: 0 Max: 3 Mean:1.3 SD: 0.83.	
Presidential Dummy 1: Presidential or Semi-Presidential System (35%) 0: Parliamentary System (65%)	Quality of Government Data (2015), originally from Cheibub et al. (2010).
Executive Can Dissolve Legislature: 1: Yes (80%) 0: No (20%)	Quality of Government Data (2015), originally from Institutions and Elections Project (2010).
Control Variables	
Proportion of cabinet positions held by the left.	Quality of Government Data (2015), originally from Swank (2014).
Total social public expenditure as a percentage of GDP.	Quality of Government Data (2015), data from OECD Social Expenditure Reference Series (2014).
European Union member Highest in 2015 when 12% of countries belong to the EU.	Variable created using information provided by European Commission (2015).
Proportion of work force over 15 that are women.	Comparative Family Policy Database (2011), originally from OECD (2009).
Birthrate per 1,000	Quality of Government Data (2015), originally from World Bank (2012).

Table 7.7 Cases By Model

Dependent Variable	Parental Leave, Parental Leave Pay, and Expenditure on Family Allowance	Public Expenditure on Social Protection
Countries	Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States	Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom
Years	1980-2005/2008	1990-2005

Table 7.8: Women's Representation, Presidential Systems, and the Impact on Policy Outcomes

	Parental Leave	Parental Leave Pay	Family Allowance Expenditure	Social Protection
	M1	M2	M3	M4
Representation of Women	0.723***	0.721***	0.004	-0.013
	(0.117)	(0.158)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Presidential System	28.936	10.701	0.266	-2.691*
	(19.067)	(11.451)	(0.252)	(1.101)
Representation of Women* Presidential System	-1.053***	-0.818**	-0.007	0.058**
	(0.206)	(0.274)	(0.006)	(0.021)
Constant	1.463	18.26	0.104	7.817***
	(16.365)	(17.035)	(0.334)	(1.390)
N	560	560	499	267

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Time-series cross-sectional analysis controlling for EU membership, total social expenditure, percentage cabinet left, female labour force participation, birth rate, and time.

Table 7.9. Women's Representation, Executive Dissolution of Legislature, and the Impact on Policy Outcomes

	Parental Leave M5	Parental Leave Pay M6	Family Allowance Expenditure M7	Social Protection M8
Representation of Women	-0.028	0.638	-0.004	0.276***
	(0.345)	(0.410)	(0.008)	(0.045)
Executive Dissolution of Legislature	9.561	-11.187	0.23	5.903*
	(25.792)	(12.501)	(0.350)	(2.292)
Representation of Women* Executive Dissolution of Legislature	0.743*	0.047	0.008	-0.275***
	(0.321)	(0.385)	(0.007)	(0.044)
Constant	7.118	23.619	0.047	1.637
	(25.986)	(18.759)	(0.418)	(2.660)
N	499	499	498	222

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Time-series Cross-sectional Results controlling for EU membership, total social expenditure, percentage of cabinet posts held by left parties, female labour force participation, and birth rate.

Table 7.10. Summary of Results for Presidential/Parliamentary Systems

	Parental Leave		Parental Leave Pay	
	Presidential	Exec can dissolve legislature	Presidential	Exec can dissolve legislature
Women's Representation	+	NS	+	NS
Institution	NS	NS	NS	NS
Interaction	-	+	-	NS

	Family Allowance Expenditure		Social Protection	
	Presidential	Exec can dissolve legislature	Presidential	Exec can dissolve legislature
Women's Representation	NS	NS	NS	+
Institution	NS	NS	-	+
Interaction	NS	NS	+	-

Results from Table 7.8 & 7.9, Models 1-8 are summarized in this table.

Table 7.11. The Effect of Women in Cabinet on Policy Outcomes

	Parental Leave M9	Parental Leave Pay M10	Family Allowance Expenditure M11	Social Protection M12
Representation of Women	0.974***	0.693**	0.008*	-0.015
	(0.171)	(0.250)	(0.004)	(0.021)
Women in Cabinet	0.037	0.016	-0.006**	-0.053**
	(0.107)	(0.163)	(0.002)	(0.019)
Constant	38.609	16.922	-0.765*	0.552
	(19.742)	(22.323)	(0.357)	(1.462)
N	337	337	301	144

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Time-series Cross-sectional Results controlling for EU membership, total social expenditure, percentage of cabinet posts held by left parties, female labour force participation, and birth rate.

Table 7.12. Women's Representation, Proportional Representation, and the Impact on Policy Outcomes

	Parental Leave M13	Parental Leave Pay M14	Family Allowance Expenditure M15	Social Protection M16
Representation of Women	0.565***	0.728***	0.012***	-0.007
	(0.163)	(0.212)	(0.004)	(0.019)
Proportional Representation	-33.312	8.21	0.53	0.259
	(18.822)	(10.141)	(0.276)	(1.325)
Proportional Representation* Representation of Women	0.315	-0.153	-0.017***	0.013
	(0.185)	(0.239)	(0.004)	(0.020)
constant	41.026*	13.77	-0.15	7.382***
	(19.112)	(18.014)	(0.359)	(1.853)
N	503	503	499	225

p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Time-series Cross-sectional Results controlling for EU membership, total social expenditure, percentage of cabinet posts held by left parties, female labour force participation, and birth rate.

Table 7.13. Women's Representation, the Ballot Dimension, and the Impact on Policy Outcomes

	Parental Leave M17	Parental Leave Pay M18	Family Allowance Expenditure M19	Social Protection M20
Representation of Women	0.197	0.667**	-0.014***	-0.027
	(0.181)	(0.240)	(0.004)	(0.016)
Ballot Dimension	6.786*	-7.528	-0.405***	-1.379***
	(3.172)	(3.909)	(0.072)	(0.407)
Ballot Dimension * Representation of Women	0.488***	-0.029	0.016***	0.050***
	(0.118)	(0.159)	(0.003)	(0.015)
constant	7.302	17.736	0.471	7.643***
	(15.786)	(16.285)	(0.315)	(1.607)
N	500	500	499	222

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Time-series Cross-sectional Results controlling for EU membership, total social expenditure, percentage of cabinet posts held by left parties, female labour force participation, and birth rate.

Table 7.14. Women's Representation, the Vote Dimension, and the Impact on Policy Outcomes

	Parental Leave M21	Parental Leave Pay M22	Family Allowance Expenditure M23	Social Protection M24
Representation of Women	0.668***	0.768***	<0.001	0.009
	(0.134)	(0.170)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Vote Dimension	-27.626	3.815	-0.351	-7.455***
	(28.138)	(13.192)	(0.371)	(1.800)
Vote Dimension * Representation of Women	0.638*	-1.366***	0.051***	0.388***
	(0.249)	(0.325)	(0.005)	(0.048)
constant	21.912	16.694	0.468	7.917***
	(16.711)	(16.431)	(0.306)	(1.501)
N	500	500	499	222

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Vote dimension is a dummy variable indicating a rank vote.

Time-series Cross-sectional Results controlling for EU membership, total social expenditure, percentage of cabinet posts held by left parties, female labour force participation, and birth rate.

	Parental Leave M25	Parental Leave Pay M26	Family Allowance Expenditure M27	Social Protection M28
Representation of Women	0.265	0.891***	-0.016***	-0.043**
	(0.167)	(0.220)	(0.004)	(0.015)
IUR	7.711**	-4.872	-0.395***	-1.959***
	(2.992)	(3.420)	(0.065)	(0.378)
IUR * Representation of Women	0.395***	-0.227	0.017***	0.078***
	(0.092)	(0.124)	(0.002)	(0.014)
constant	6.975	15.404	0.549	7.954***
	(15.830)	(16.047)	(0.309)	(1.587)
N	500	500	499	222

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
IUR is a combination of the vote dimension and ballot dimension to capture incentives to represent unincorporated issues.Time-series Cross-sectional Results controlling for EU membership, total social expenditure, percentage of cabinet posts held by left parties, female labour force participation, and birth rate.

Table 7.16. Summary of Results for Electoral Systems

	Parental Leave				Parental Leave Pay			
	PR	**Ballot**	**Vote**	**IUR**	**PR**	**Ballot**	**Vote**	**IUR**
Women's Representation	+	NS	+	NS	+	+	+	+
Institution	NS	+		+	NS	+	NS	+
Interaction	NS	+	+	+	NS	-	NS	NS

	Family Allowance Expenditure				Social Protection			
	PR	**Ballot**	**Vote**	**IUR**	**PR**	**Ballot**	**Vote**	**IUR**
Women's Representation	+	-	NS	-	NS	NS	NS	-
Institution	NS	-	NS	-	NS	-	-	-
Interaction	-	+	+	+	NS	+	+	+

Results from Table 7.12-7.15, Models 13 to 28 are summarized in this table.

Table 7.17. Women's Representation in Cabinet, Incentives of Unincorporated Representation, and the Impact on Policy Outcomes

	Parental Leave M29	Parental Leave Pay M30	Family Allowance Expenditure M31	Social Protection M32
Representation of Women	0.793***	0.522*	0.003	0.01
	(0.177)	(0.257)	(0.004)	(0.018)
Women in Cabinet	-0.236	-0.088	-0.014***	-0.026
	(0.131)	(0.201)	(0.003)	(0.019)
IUR	11.185**	-10.298*	-0.067	1.573***
	(3.430)	(4.000)	(0.060)	(0.453)
IUR* Women in Cabinet	0.381***	0.219	0.008***	0.03
	(0.096)	(0.147)	(0.002)	(0.018)
constant	1.917	-1.002	-1.705***	-1.397
	(22.992)	(21.110)	(0.312)	(1.100)
N	301	301	301	120

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

IUR is a combination of the vote dimension and ballot dimension to capture the incentives to represent unincorporated issues.

Time-series Cross-sectional Results controlling for EU membership, total social expenditure, percentage of cabinet posts held by left parties, female labour force participation, and birth rate.

Figure 7.1. Women's Representation, Division of Powers, & Family Legal Issues



Graph created using the Margins. Regression in Table 7.3 repeated without the country or year dummy variables. Results and comparison with original results in Appendix D Table D1.

Figure 7.2. Women's Representation, Division of Powers, & Strategic Gender Issues



Graph created using the Margins. Regression in Table 7.3 repeated without the country or year dummy variables. Results and comparison with original results in Appendix D Table D1.

Figure 7.3. Effects of Women in Legislasture and Electoral System on Policy Outcomes



Graphs the results from Models 25-28 in Table 7.15. Minimum indicates scoring a 0 out of 3 on the IUR indicator. Maximum indicates scoring a 2 or 3.

Figure 7.4. Effects of Women in Cabinet and Electoral System on Policy Outcomes



Figure 7.4 graphs the results from Models 29-32 in Table 7.17. Minimum indicates scoring a 0 out of 3 on the IUR variable. Maximum indicates scoring a 2 or 3.

Chapter 8: Conclusions

Women's presence in political institutions matters. Women, much more than men, think it is important to represent women and to address women's issues. They do so because of gender inequalities in access to power and resources, unequal distribution of paid and unpaid labour, and vulnerability to violence and poverty. In this way, the link between gender and the representation of women's interests is evident and so too is the problem of women's under-representation in politics: with fewer women present to raise and defend women's perspectives, politics and policy will not adequately address women's concerns.

To date, however, the study of the tie between women's descriptive and substantive political representation has been limited in a way that simplifies this relationship. This dissertation demonstrates that substantive representation is institutionally embedded and its relationship to descriptive representation depends on this institutional context. Although the existing literature on women and politics hints at the importance of institutions, it neither adequately theorize nor tests how institutions link the descriptive and substantive representation of women by women. The key is to focus on career paths and motivations. A principal-agent framework points to how women with limited time and political resources make choices over whom and what to represent. The literature has emphasized the trade-off between claims of the party, on the one hand, and the constituency or particularistic interests within the constituency, on the other. But many issues and interests are not merely local but that are also not fully incorporated into the party system. Prominent among these are women's interests.

Influential and well-established but gender-blind theories on two institutions in particular have clear implications for the substantive representation of women: the division or separation of powers and the electoral system. In the absence of a mechanism to dissolve the executive and legislative branches, the tie of individual representatives to their party is weakened and women use this freedom to do more to represent women. In parliamentary systems, on the other hand, the potential for votes of non-confidence mean that representatives are fundamentally the agent of the party and women are constrained in the amount of time they can dedicate to pursuing women's issues. When parties direct votes and legislation and control political messaging, the behaviour of women and men is much more similar.

In short, the descriptive and substantive representation are closely linked in presidential systems and much less so in parliamentary systems. The mixed method analysis support the assertion. The quantitative analysis establishes the basic premise - the gap between what women do to represent women and what men do is larger under the conditions of a division of powers. When analyzing self-reported behaviour, it is men that that are sensitive to the institutional context; the freedom from their party under a division of powers allows men to do less to represent women. Analyzing the content of Tweets, on the other hand, indicates that women in a division of power system use the public platform to raise women's issues like pay equity and gendered violence more than their sisters in parliamentary systems and much more than their male colleagues.

The qualitative findings establish the mechanisms behind the observed difference in behaviour. In parliamentary systems women on the backbench, particularly those in opposition, face significant constraints and disincentives. Where opportunities exist, they

lack meaning, involve an element of randomness, and are either out of sight or outside parliament. Under the conditions of a division of powers, on the other hand, women introduce legislation, cast votes, and work with members of other parties to address women's interests.

The second institution, the electoral system, is theorized to matter to substantive representation in two ways. PR was thought to create more incentives and opportunities for substantive representation than SMP systems because of the weaker geographic tie, the higher district magnitude, and the lower electoral threshold. Second, Carey and Shugart's (1992) conceptualization of the incentives for personal votes has implications for the representation of non-party based issues. Instead of (or in addition to) pursuing personal, celebrity, or clientelistic relationships, women, can differentiate themselves on the basis of representing women. As a result, systems that incentivize personal or unincorporated representation should increase substantive representation by women and systems that incentivize party-based votes should suppress it.

The anticipated difference between PR and SMP systems was not supported by any of the data in this dissertation. Women in PR systems do not report doing more to represent women than women in SMP systems and the gap in self-reported behaviour by men and by women does not vary across the two formulas. The qualitative analysis explains why – the mechanisms anticipated to lead to a difference between PR and SMP systems are not operating as expected. Geography continues to matter in proportional systems, a larger district magnitude does not necessarily increase the number of women that can address gendered issues, and a lower electoral threshold matters more for parties than individuals.

Instead, the data point to the ways in which women's behaviour, but not men's, depends on the incentives present for unincorporated representation *regardless* of the formula used. The quantitative analysis demonstrated that women do more in PR systemswhen there is local control over access to the ballot and voters have multiple votes with which to disrupt the list. Because men do not respond to these institutions in the same way, the gap between women and men is larger when an electoral system incentivizes unincorporated representation than when it facilitates party-based representation. The qualitative analysis clarifies the mechanisms between these findings. Women report that they cannot pursue election and re-election on the basis of representing women when it is parties that control their electoral fortune. Conversely, women in the United States and Switzerland in particular are able to secure nomination or win votes by acting in women's interests because it is voters that control their fates.

These moderating effects of both electoral systems and the division of powers differ across party orientation. In particular, women in right-wing parties and men in left-wing parties are especially sensitive to the institutional context. This is intuitive – men in left parties whose behaviour is dictated by their party do more than they would otherwise to represent women. On the other hand, the substantive representation by women in right-wing parties who are subject to their party's direction is more suppressed than it would otherwise be. Freed from these ties, men in left parties do less and women in right parties do more.

Institutions don't affect just individual behaviour; they also affect how that behaviour is aggregated into policy and legislative decisions. In the case of outcomes, however, the moderating effect of institutions is less straightforward. The same institution may

increase the substantive representation of women by individual representatives, but suppress the translation of that behaviour into policy changes that improve the lives of women. While a division of powers increases the effect of the proportion of women on the introduction of bills related to strategic gendered issues, the same is not true of spending in areas like family allowance. These mixed results are unsurprising and reflect the challenge of departing from the status quo when parties have more limited power and there are more individual players involved in decision making.

Electoral systems that incentivize unincorporated representation not only increase substantive representation by individual women but, in the aggregate, also enhance the relationship between the overall representation of women and policy outcomes. Moreover, the same institutions also increase the impact of women in cabinet in parliamentary systems. When electoral systems demand party representation, women that are elected and then promoted to cabinet do not have an impact on these gendered policy outcomes, but when unincorporated representation is facilitated a greater presence of women in cabinet has a positive influence on the length of parental leave and family expenditure.

To put it simply, the theory and quantitative and qualitative findings presented in this dissertation demonstrate that the substantive representation of women depends on an interaction between descriptive representation and institutions. This research has numerous implications for and insights into the study of women in politic, but also the study of institutions, as well as for advocates of women's political representation. I discuss each in turn, highlighting specific implications in each section.

Implications for the Study of Women's Political Representation

Gender matters and women report feeling a responsibility to represent women, but women are not just women, they are also strategic political actors with diverse roles, responsibilities, and objectives. Analyses that look at women's descriptive political representation and asks only 'do they or don't they' substantively represent women miss the ways in which women navigate incentives and opportunities in pursuit of votes, office, and policy. The extent to which women, as part of their broader activities as legislators, represent women and pursue their interests depends on the political institution within which they operate.

In some ways, this is a rejection of an agency versus structure dichotomy. Women are strategic actors, but they exercise their agency in the context of structured incentives and opportunities. In other words, they have interests, objectives, and preferences, but they must navigate the structure of institutions as they pursue their goals. When the institutional context within which they operate allows women to depart from their party and gives them an incentive to distinguish themselves from their competitors, women do more to represent women. On the other hand, when parties are strong, cohesive, and in control of the legislative agenda and of individuals' opportunities for (re)election, the substantive representation of women by women is constrained and disincentivized and, as a result, women and men's behaviour looks more similar. These observations lead to the first implication:

> ***Implication 1:*** *Individual women must be taken seriously as strategic and institutionally embedded political actors.*

The theory presented in Chapter 2 was neither new nor wholly original; rather it was based on adapted and nuanced institution theories that are well established and influential. The works of Carey and Shugart (1995) and Samuels and Shugart (2010) and others were extended to consider the implications for women's political representation. Similarly, on the career paths and political motivations of women in politics I adapted existing frameworks by Jusko, Strøm, and others to incorporate gendered experiences.. These rational choice and institutionalist perspectives are not incompatible with a gendered perspective; instead, the combination is fruitful and advances understanding of how and why women represent women. As a result:

> ***Implication 2:*** *Future work should look to existing institutionalist literature and other gender-neutral or gender-inattentive theories for additional insights into the effect of context on substantive representation.*

This dissertation answers the call from the literature on women's political representation for increased attention to context, strategy, and agency. It is, at the same time, a challenge to a parallel trend – a move away from a consideration of descriptive representation. Some scholars concerned about inattention to context have suggested moving away from a focus on descriptive representation to a broader consideration of the actors and contexts that matter to the representation of women's issues. This would be a mistake - gender matters, and it matters even more in some contexts than in others. In other words, incorporating context, agency, and strategy reinforces rather than undermines the importance of descriptive representation. Shifting the analysis "toward substantive representation as such: how it is done, who is implied, where it happens, and for what reasons" (Celis, 2015, 525) and moving from "critical mass to critical actors" (Childs and

Krook, 2006b, 2009) does not require letting go of descriptive representation. Moreover, done well, a study of descriptive and substantive representation is not just about women, but includes an assessment of men, how they do and do not represent women and whether institutions play a role. To summarize:

> ***Implication 3:*** *Women's descriptive representation - the overall level of women's political representation - must remain a central concern to those studying women's substantive representation.*

While primary, the tie between descriptive representation and substantive representation differs from one institutional context to the next. It looks different, for example, in the United States than it does in Canada because of the different institutional contexts. As a result, future research should be comparative, either in the analysis itself or, at the very least when considering the implications of the findings. Single-country studies should discuss the contextual factors that contribute to their results and consider what it may or may not mean for substantive representation in other cases.

> ***Implication 4:*** *The study of women's substantive political representation should take a comparativist approach.*

The role of the institutional context and the importance of comparative analysis may be particularly true for the study of critical mass. On the one hand, if there is a 'critical mass' of women at which behaviour and policy change, it likely varies from one institution to the next based on the effect of the institution on the relationship between gender and behaviour. On the other, if one of the ways a critical mass matters is by changing political culture, then the cost-benefit analysis strategic women in politics face when deciding how to dedicate political resources may change. Put differently, what a political institution might disincentivize in the absence of a critical mass of women may

become *incentivized* once a critical mass has been achieved. If this is the case then the moderating effect of the institution may itself depend on the aggregate number of women. In short, the existence of a critical mass may depend on the institutional context and the effect of the institution may itself depend on a critical mass.

> ***Implication 5:*** *Future research should re-evaluate and retheorize critical mass in light of the findings presented here. Future work could explore and test for potentially interactive relationships.*

Implications for the Study of Political Representation

Just as studying political institutions is critical for understanding women in politics, so is studying women critical for understanding institutions. Institutionalist theories are not helped by a universal 'neutral' actor, but are hurt by it; by not incorporating the identities of political actors, the applicability and insights of the theories are underestimated. Politics is part of a world that is gendered (and racialized, and heteronormative, and more) and theories based on a political actor that is abstracted from these realities leave too much on the table. Legislators' and voters' lived experiences matter, and it is possible to incorporate identities into an institutionalist perspective. As legislatures, representatives, and political agendas continue to diversify, explicitly incorporating identities is increasingly important.

> ***Implication 6:*** *Institutionalist perspectives should move away from the neutral, abstract, universal actor and seek to integrate identity politics.*

Beyond this general implication, this dissertation yields specific insights for the study of electoral institutions and the division or fusion of powers that were made possible by gendering the neutral actor. It demonstrates the ways in which the distinction between PR and SMP is an oversimplification of the effect of electoral systems and is, in many ways,

even misleading. It also points to the ways in which Carey and Shugart's incentives for 'personal votes' is actually just one manifestation of a bigger phenomenon of opportunities and incentives for issues and interests not incorporated into the party system. Finally, it illuminates a contingent relationship between a separation or division of powers and the electoral system. I discuss each in turn.

Proportional Representation vs. Single Member Plurality Systems

In *Choosing an Electoral System*, Lijphart and Grofman (1984) "come to regard the dichotomy between PR and plurality as misleading" (4). The research presented in this dissertation supports this claim. Despite persuasive theoretical reasons to expect that women will do more to represent women in PR than in SMP systems, the quantitative analysis found no difference. Interviews with legislators in PR and SMP systems further weakened the theory by demonstrating that the theorized mechanisms do not operate in the way expected. First, the strength of the geographic tie in SMP systems was anticipated to limit opportunities and incentives for the representation of women, but geography proves to be extremely influential in almost all PR systems included in the analysis. Interviews with women in PR systems in Switzerland and Belgium and with list MPs in Germany were full of local content, whether linguistic, cultural, or purely local. The extreme case of the Netherlands, where the whole country constitutes a single electoral district, is the only exception.

Second, a larger district magnitude was anticipated to increase the likelihood of multiple women representatives who could then be approached by voters who wanted to raise gendered concerns. But a larger district magnitude was not a sufficient condition; ties to a geographic constituency in Germany and the practice of holding an issue portfolio in the

Netherlands meant that there were simply not a multitude of women representatives to be approached on gendered policy issues. Finally, the effect of the smaller electoral threshold in PR systems depended on vote pooling – are voters casting a preference for parties or individuals? When votes are pooled, a lower threshold is relevant to parties, but not to individuals. If a lower threshold does not affect individual election prospects, it will not affect behaviour, including the amount women do to represent women.

In short, the interviews substantiated the absence of a statistical effect. The interviews brought out claims of 'home' and the importance of politically salient, local issues, including cultural and linguistic difference. They also highlighted how women experience the incentives, or more accurately the lack of incentives, for the representation of women generated by lower threshold. It is parties who benefit from lower thresholds and women's electoral success and thus behaviour depends not on the threshold but where they fall on the list and the extent to which voter's preference votes can change their list position.

Lijphart and Grofman's rejection of dichotomy between PR and SMP is based on several factors, including a more significant difference between majoritarian and non-majoritarian systems, the diversity of PR systems, including list PR and STV, and the varying degree to which PR systems actually achieve proportionality. The rejection of the dichotomy made here, however, is even more fundamental. The findings in this dissertation, both qualitative and quantitative, demonstrates that the key difference between electoral systems is not PR and SMP but rather how access to and rank on the ballot are determined and whether voters have multiple votes to express their preferences. It is not just that single member district systems that use plurality rules differ from those

that use majority rules, or that list PR differs from STV. Instead, there are significant and consequential differences among single-member districts using plurality rules. The key difference here is whether the electoral system is used in a presidential or parliamentary system. SMP systems nested in the latter have party-based system and so constrain substantive representation. In presidential systems, however, an SMP system that has open, contested primaries may enhance rather than suppress the representation of women by women. The same applies to list PR systems; if voters have multiple votes and can disrupt a list then a PR system may enhance substantive representation. If lists are closed, though, the PR system itself does nothing to increase the amount legislators do to represent women. As a result, the difference between the United States and the United Kingdom and between Switzerland and the Netherlands are more consequential than the difference between (for example) PR MPs and SMP MPs elected in Germany's mixed system. These observations lead to two implications:

> ***Implication 7:*** *The SMP/PR dichotomy should be, at a minimum, treated with caution.*
>
> ***Implication 8:*** *The study of the effect of electoral systems on the behaviour of representatives should be attentive to variation within systems as important as, and potentially more important than, variation across systems. In particular, the features of Carey and Shugart's ballot and vote dimensions must be taken into account.*

Extending and Adapting Carey and Shugart's Incentives for Personal Votes

Carey and Shugart's (1995) conceptualization of incentives to cultivate personal votes has been extremely influential and it is evident why. The conceptualization is adaptable, flexible, and illuminates political behaviour well outside what it was originally designed to explain. The theory and results of this dissertation are first and foremost a testament to

the importance of this piece, but there are also three key implications that modify or extend the original work. First, the introduction of the concept of unincorporated representation offers a theoretical extension of the original work. Second, the findings suggest some modifications to the original conceptualization, some of which are related to the difference between unincorporated and personal representation and some of which arise out of a critique of the original classifications. Finally, the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 and the qualitative interviews indicate that the dimensions may be more interdependent than Carey and Shugart theorize them to be.

Unincorporated representation

I offer "unincorporated representation" as a theoretical extension of the "personal vote." Carey and Shugart intentionally do not outline how a 'personal reputation' is most effectively developed, but focus instead only on the conditions under which a personal reputation is valuable. The value-added of the notion of unincorporated representation is that so-called 'personal' votes may be won not only by local celebrity or through pork-barrelling, but also by focusing on issues and identities that are not incorporated into the party system. Shugart (1994) hinted at this when he suggested that personal votes could increase women's representation, but he did not distinguish between substantive and descriptive representation. While 'personal votes' improve the former, descriptive representation is simultaneously depressed. The concept of unincorporated representation takes Shugart's original intuition and turns it into a clear, alternative concept that can be used to explain patterns of representation. While the focus was on gendered representation, the implications extend to other issues not incorporated into the party system.

> ***Implication 9:*** *Future opportunities exist to explore the implications of institutional features on the representation of unincorporated issues and identities other than gender.*

This research also improves on another body of literature that focuses on the how (and how many) social cleavages become absorbed into a party system. The issue dimensions that are incorporated into the party system do not reflect all the issue dimensions that exist. The concept of unincorporated representation looks at those that are not incorporated and explores how these issues and interests are still represented in and play a role in politics. As theorized in Chapter 1, the issues and interests that are unincorporated may be so because of historical exclusion from politics and ongoing inequality and systemic barriers to participation. Understanding if, when, and how these issues still find their way into the political process not only pushes this literature forward but is normatively important.

Modifications

Several modifications were made to Carey and Shugart's original classification in Chapter 2. The first reflects a critique of the ballot dimension. The ballot dimension is a combination of access to and rank on the ballot and Carey and Shugart argue that incentives for personal representation are maximized when parties do not control access to the ballot and the list offered to voters can be disrupted. Carey and Shugart, however, classify systems in which there is no list disruption, but leaders do not control access to the ballot as minimizing incentives in the same way as when there is no list disruption and leader's control access. The quantitative results indicate that this does not adequately reflect the incentive structure – local control over nomination does increase the amount women do to represent women and does so independently of opportunities for list

disruption. For example, women in Canada and those elected under SMP in Germany reported that substantive representation of women helped them win nomination, raise local funds, and recruit volunteers.

The re-evaluation of the logic of the original classification, paired with the confirming quantitative and qualitative findings suggest:

> ***Implication 10:*** *Future work that theorizes or tests the impact of the ballot dimension on representation should adjust the classification so that scoring a '1' out of '2' reflects the incentives generated either by the capacity for list disruption or control over access to the ballot.*

The second modification reflects not a criticism of Carey and Shugart, but rather a difference between unincorporated and personal representation. Incentives for personal votes are maximized when voters have a single vote to cast, but incentives for unincorporated representation are maximized when voters have multiple votes to distribute to individual candidates. This is because women's issues are just one set of issues among many that voters care about, and one dimension among many which representatives can compete for votes on. If a there is just a single vote to be cast, it is unlikely that the record or promise of the representative to focus on women's issues will be the deciding factor for a voter. On the other hand, when competiting for multiple preference votes, the representation of women is one consideration among many and legislators respond accordingly. The detailed analyses in Chapter 4 supported this adjustment. The substantive representation of women by women did not increase when a single vote could be cast for a candidate rather than a party, but did increase when there were multiple votes for which to compete. Interviews with women themselves confirmed this; only when there are multiple votes do women feel that it is to their advantage to

pursue preference votes on the basis of the substantive representation of women. In light of these quantitative and qualitative findings:

> ***Implication 11:*** *Future work using Carey and Shugart's classification should be attentive to the ways in which different institutions incentivize different kinds of 'personal' representation. Those focusing on unincorporated representation rather than personal celebrity or clientelism should adjust the coding of systems accordingly.*

Finally, the pooling dimension, which captures the extent to which a vote cast for a candidate also contribute to the number of seats their party wins, was not used in any of the quantitative analyses. This is because the coding of the indicator in the data did not, in any case, reflect the original concept. Johnson and Wallack (2008) and others code SMP systems like Canada and the United Kingdom as maximizing incentives for personal representation on the pooling dimension. Carey and Shugart are, however, clear that "votes are effectively 'pooled' across the whole party, where each party presents a fixed list containing the name of one candidate" (421). In light of this discrepancy:

> ***Implication 12:*** *Data and analyses that are inappropriately using the polling dimension should explain the decision to depart from the original concept.*

When properly coded there was very little variation on this dimension. With the exception of the STV used in Ireland, all electoral systems in the PARTIREP data pooled across the entire party. Although PARTIREP is only a sample of institutional contexts, the absence of unpooled votes is nonetheless diagnostic.

> ***Implication 13:*** *Given the limited variation, the usefulness of the pooling dimension should be reconsidered.*

Interactions and Interdependence between the Vote, Ballot, and Pooling Dimensions
Carey and Shugart consider the ways in which their dimensions – votes, ballot, and pooling - interact in two respects. The first is that there are certain combinations of the three dimensions that are not logically possible. For example, if citizens only have one vote to cast at the party level, it is not possible that, in the ballot dimension, voters can disrupt lists. The other way they consider an interactive effect is with regards to district magnitude: district magnitude, they argue, has the effect of amplifying the institutional incentives generated by the ballot, pooling, and vote dimension. Whether personal or party, the larger the district magnitude, the more significant the incentives will be. Chapter 4 added district magnitude to the statistical model, interacting it with the incentives for unincorporated representation and introducing a three-way interaction with gender. The results indicate that a higher district magnitude does not further increase the amount women do to represent women when there are incentives for unincorporated representation. This finding does not challenge Carey and Shugart's argument that a larger district magnitude magnifies existing incentives, but does demonstrate that behaviour is not correspondingly affected. This is because, when non-party votes are incentivized, candidates can pursue votes in a variety of ways, including, for example, clientelism, personal celebrity, women's interests, or other unincorporated issues. Since there are different ways the non-party votes can be pursued, a higher district magnitude does not increase behaviour to represent women and may not amplify any single form of non-party representation. As a result:

> ***Implication 14:*** *The amplifying effect of district magnitude on incentives should be distinguished from the effect on behaviour.*

The quantitative and qualitative analysis in this dissertation also points to the ways in which the other dimensions may be more interdependent than initially conceived. In Chapter 4 the vote and ballot dimensions were incorporated individually into the analysis to determine their relative effects. When this was done, the vote dimension indicator no longer had a significant effect on the behaviour of women and the effect of the ballot dimension was increased. If there is not a realistic chance that the votes cast will affect which individual wins a seat, then it does not matter if voters have a single or multiple votes to indicate preferences among candidates. For example, in Belgium voters can indicate multiple preferences among candidates while, in the Netherlands, voters have just one vote. In both countries, however, list disruption is extremely difficult and preference votes very rarely change who wins a seat. Interviews with legislators showed that, while women in Belgium thought they could attract preference votes by representing women, women in both countries did not believe that representing women could help get them elected. In short, Carey and Shugart argue that of the three dimensions "none is clearly more important than the others" (424), but the results in this dissertation suggest that, in fact, the ballot dimension may actually be the most important.

The qualitative research also indicated that the pooling dimension is better understood in relation to the vote dimension. For example, although votes are cast at the candidate level in the election of MEPs in Belgium and the Netherlands because these votes are pooled, the women themselves do not experience this as an equivalent to a vote cast at the party level. Women in the U.S., however, experience the single vote at the candidate level much differently because of the lack of pooling during primaries. Put simply, vote

pooling proves more useful in explaining the experience of the vote dimension than as a third separate dimension.

> ***Implication 15:*** *The interdependence and conditional effect of the three dimensions – votes, ballot, and pooling – should be reconsidered, theorized, and tested.*

Combining Constitutional Choices: The Contingent Relationship Between the Division of Powers and Electoral Systems

Separating the impact of the division or fusion of powers from the impact of the electoral system is very difficult. Countries in which powers are divided use electoral systems that incentivized unincorporated representation (most significantly Switzerland and the United States). At the same time, the parliamentary systems have more party-vote based systems, most notably the two Westminster Parliaments which use SMP. This, I argue, is not an unfortunate coincidence. Instead, it is a function of the contingent relationship between a fusion of powers, an SMP system, and a party-based electoral system. Because a vote for the legislature is a vote for the executive, individual representatives and candidates are first and foremost the agents of their party. Put differently, a fusion of powers generates incentives for—or more accurately, the necessity of—party-based representation. The features of the electoral system are simply consistent with this fact.

As Carey and Shugart (1995) argue "ceteris paribus, personal reputation will be more important in a presidential than in a parliamentary system" (432). In the absence of a mechanism to dissolve the executive and legislature reduces the need for party control over individual legislators. As such, if the electoral system facilitates independent action, individuals can campaign on and credibly follow through on promises to represent unincorporated issues. Put differently, under SMP, a division of powers is a necessary,

but not a sufficient condition for a personal or unincorporated representation based electoral system.

In some ways, this helps explain the confusion over and misuse of the pooling dimension. While the United States is classified as maximizing incentives for unincorporated representation by minimizing pooling during primaries, Canada and the United Kingdom, which use otherwise similar SMP systems, are (properly) classified as maximizing pooling and thus minimizing incentives for unincorporated representation. This difference is critical and fundamentally related to the division and fusion of powers. The primary system creates incentives for personal and unincorporated representation in the United States, but such a system could not be imported into a parliamentary system. To maintain governments and pass legislation, parties must maintain influence over their members.

This insight, in particular, is an important contribution made by this research. While not gender specific and in some ways peripheral to the central question of this research, it was made possible by extending existing institutional theories beyond the neutral actor. By considering how women pursue their political, personal, and policy objectives within institutional contexts that structure incentives and opportunities, this contingent relationship was made visible.

Implications for Activists and Advocates

The consequences of this research extend beyond academia. Those concerned with women's political representation have frequently recommended a switch to PR, but my findings complicate such simplistic recommendations. PR is not one thing and neither is

women's political representation. PR systems vary significantly based on whether lists are open or closed, how voters indicate their preference or preferences, and whether votes are pooled. These differences are not mechanical or minor details; they have consequences for both descriptive and substantive representation. The consequences, moreover, are conflicting – those that increase substantive representation can actually reduce descriptive representation and vice versa.

Features such as local control over nomination and preference votes may amplify the impact of the number of women in politics, but weakening the party's role has the effect of decreasing descriptive representation (Thames and Williams, 2010; Valdini, 2012). Given the political head start that many of their male colleagues have in the form of social capital, the so-called old boys club, incumbency advantages, and differential resources, including the gendered wage gap, women have a harder time overcoming barriers to participation when they rely on 'personal' rather than party votes. Where institutional features encourage party representation over personal or unincorporated representation, there may be more women elected, but these women do less as individuals to represent women's interests and, in the collective, they are less able to secure policy outcomes that are favourable to women.

A division of powers produces the same tension between descriptive and substantive representation. As Gleb (2002) argues, the increase in descriptive representation in the 1990s in the U.K. was more significant than that in the US because of the former's powerful and centralized parties. The Labour Party in particular used all-women shortlists (AWS) to significantly increase the number of women in their caucus. Gleb argues that, in the United States, descriptive representation was harder to come by because candidate-

centred elections made powerful incumbents harder to replace. The problem of personal-vote based electoral system for descriptive representation extends, however, beyond the incumbency. In the context of gendered inequalities in political and financial resources, the personal based electoral system as facilitated by the division of powers makes it harder for women to win nomination and election.

Both the quantitative and qualitative work presented here demonstrate that while the powerful and cohesive parties in parliamentary systems may lead to an increase in the number of women, they also limit opportunities and incentives for the substantive representation. In the United States, while it might be harder for women to succeed in the more individualistic process, once they become legislators they have opportunities and incentives to represent women, introduce legislation, and vote in favour of women's interests.

None of this is to say that activists should pursue institutions that facilitate substantive representation over descriptive representation. There are reasons that descriptive representation might matter regardless of the impact on substantive representation; equality of descriptive representation may, for example, been seen as an issue of democratic legitimacy or justice (Phillips, 1995). Those pursuing institutional reforms to further 'women's representation' must acknowledge the potential tension between the descriptive and substantive representation of women in politics. Activists must ask themselves what it is they hope to achieve and evaluate the institutions accordingly. They must also go beyond asking for proportional representation and instead be an active participant in the detailed discussion about how the system will operate. While rarely the focus of advocates or activists, this research suggests that questions about access to the

ballot, if or how voters can disrupt the order of the list provided to them, and the number of voter's citizens have to indicate their preference(s) clearly matter for women's political representation.

Implication 16: *Activists must consider the contradictory effects of some institutional features on descriptive and substantive representation and clearly outline their objectives accordingly.*

Implication 17: *To meet their objectives, activists concerned with women's political representation should aim to be engaged in the process of deciding the details of political systems and not just the formula.*

Final Words

This dissertation took a gendered approach to the study of political institutions and an institutionalist approach to the study of women in politics. It theorized the career path of women as strategic political actors and used well-established and influential institutional perspectives to hypothesize the interactive effect of gender and institutions on substantive representation of women. In doing so, it illuminated the importance of competing principal-agent relationships on the incentives and opportunities women have for acting to represent women. At the same time, it demonstrated the relevance of gender-neutral or implicitly masculine theories to gendered representation.

It is my hope that this research paves the way for an ongoing, dynamic, and fruitful exchange between institutionalism and identity politics. I also hope that it ensures that women as political actors remain central to any analysis that asks whether or not the under-representation of women matters. Finally, it is my hope that this research enables advocates and activists to consider the full range of consequences of institutions on

women's political representation, both descriptive and substantive, and equips them lobby for institutional reform to support women in politics.

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Appendix A: Supplementary Content for Chapter 3

Table A.1. PARTIREP Data: Representatives by Country

	Representatives	Frequency
Austria	227	9.8
Belgium	163	7
France	90	3.9
Germany	279	12
Hungary	99	4.3
Ireland	34	1.5
Israel	39	1.7
Italy	128	5.5
Netherlands	65	2.8
Norway	46	2
Poland	55	2.4
Portugal	118	5.1
Spain	272	11.7
Switzerland	604	26
United Kingdom	107	4.6
Total	**2326**	**100**

Table A.2. PARTIREP Data: Representatives by Institution

	Representatives	Frequency
Division of Powers	867	37.27
Fusion of Powers	1,459	62.73
Total	2,326	100
SMP	337	14.5
PR	1,989	84.5
Total	2,326	100
Ballot		
0	728	39
1	572	30.7
2	566	30.3
Total	1,866	100
Vote		
0	783	39.7
1	291	14.7
2	899	45.6
Total	1,976	100.0
Incentives for Unincorporated Representation		
Party	621	33.5
1	162	8.7
2	202	10.9
3	303	16.3
Personal	566	30.5
Total	1,854	100
Perceived Incentives for Personal Vote		
Party	393	21.4
2	570	31
3	295	16.1
4	123	6.7
Personal	393	21.4
Total	1,868	100.0

Table A.3. PARTIREP Data: Self-Reported Representation of Women by Gender

	Men	Woman	Total
Frequency of contact with Woman's organizations			
(almost) never	26	6.3	19.8
At least once a year	31.1	20.8	27.9
At least every three months	27.8	27.3	27.6
At least once a month	13.3	33.1	19.5
Every week	1.8	12.4	5.1
Total	100	100	100
And how often would you say you speak at the meetings of your parliamentary party about woman's issues?			
(Almost) never	51.8	26.6	43.7
At least once a year	18.7	20.4	19.2
At least every three months	17.5	29.7	21.4
At least once a month	7.8	15.7	10.3
(Almost) at every meeting	4.3	7.6	5.4
Total	100	100	100
And how often would you say you yourself bring a proposal to your parliamentary party on women's issues?			
(Almost) never	54.7	28.9	46.5
At least once a year	23.7	28.4	25.2
At least every three months	13.2	25.7	17.1
At least once a month	5.9	11.6	7.7
(Almost) at every meeting	2.6	5.4	3.5
Total	100	100	100
Collaborated with other party for promoting woman's interests			
Did not collaborate	88.9	66	81.6
Collaborated with other party	11.1	34	18.4
Total	100	100	100

Table A.4. PARTIREP Data: Self-Reported Representation of Women by Gender

	Men	Woman	Total
Mean	3.23	5.67	4.00
	(2.78)	(3.48)	(3.16)
Frequencies			
0	17.5	3.5	13.1
1	16.7	6.1	13.3
2	14.5	8	12.4
3	11.9	11.4	11.7
4	10	10.4	10.2
5	8.1	10.1	8.7
6	6.2	10.9	7.7
7	6.5	10.3	7.7
8	2.8	7.9	4.4
9	3.1	9.1	5
10	1.8	5	2.8
11	0.5	4	1.6
12	0.3	1.4	0.7
13	0.1	1.9	0.7
Total	100	100	100

Aggregate Behaviour Variable. Combines all variables in Table A3.

Table A.5. Testing Cut Points

		(P) cut point = cut point -1
Feminist Opinion	0.266***	
	(0.013)	
Cut 1	1.624***	
	(0.182)	
Cut 2	2.610***	<0.001
	(0.185)	
Cut 3	3.280***	<0.001
	(0.189)	
Cut 4	3.828***	<0.001
	(0.194)	
Cut 5	4.311***	<0.001
	(0.199)	
Cut 6	4.754***	<0.001
	(0.203)	
Cut 7	5.209***	<0.001
	(0.208)	
Cut 8	5.768***	<0.001
	(0.214)	
Cut 9	6.200***	<0.001
	(0.219)	
Cut 10	6.910***	<0.001
	(0.231)	
Cut 11	7.649***	<0.001
	(0.250)	
Cut 12	8.408***	<0.001
	(0.287)	
Cut 13	9.078***	<0.001
	(0.342)	
N	0.266***	
Pseudo r2	(0.013)	

Ordered logistic regression analysis.
Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.
Independent Variable – feminist preferences, minimum 4, maximum 20.

Table A.6. Testing Cut Points

Woman	1.143***
	(0.147)
Division of Powers	-1.658***
	(0.255)
Woman * Division of Powers	0.948***
	(0.200)
Left Party	0.533***
	(0.081)
Constant	-2.250*
	(1.035)
Cut 2	-1.262
	(1.027)
Cut 3	-0.595
	(1.016)
Cut 4	-0.027
	(1.015)
Cut 5	0.471
	(1.016)
Cut 6	0.926
	(1.016)
Cut 7	1.387
	(1.015)
Cut 8	1.96
	(1.020)
Cut 9	2.394*
	(1.023)
Cut 10	3.123**
	(1.015)
Cut 11	3.839***
	(1.035)
Cut 12	4.636***
	(1.058)
Cut 13	5.308***
	(1.067)

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
Ordered logistic regression analysis.
Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.

Table A.7. Robustness Tests

	Multilevel Regression		Regressions with Clustered Errors		
	Grouped by Party	Grouped by Party, Institution, & Country	Clustered by Parliament	Clustered by Country	Clustered by Institution
Woman	1.882***	1.867***	1.894***	1.894***	1.894**
	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.238)	(0.245)	(0.023)
Division of Powers	-2.356***	-0.912	-2.361***	-2.361***	-2.361
	(0.396)	(0.471)	(0.422)	(0.142)	(0.194)
Woman * Division of Powers	1.270***	1.274***	1.305***	1.305**	1.305*
	(0.291)	(0.290)	(0.348)	(0.321)	(0.037)
Left Party	0.669***	0.748***	0.842***	0.842***	0.842
	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.128)	(0.176)	(0.178)
Constant	4.206**	2.18	3.904*	3.904**	3.904
	(1.361)	(1.363)	(1.654)	(1.109)	(1.234)
Random Effect Parameters					
sd (country)		0.673			
		(0.177)			
sd (parliament)		2.672***			
		(0.048)			
sd (party)	0.406	0.151			
	(0.221)	(0.354)			
sd (residual)	2.714***	0.698			
	(0.048)	(0.145)			
N	1924	1924	1924	1924	1924
Chi2	445.883	355.443			

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.Dependent Variable combined behaviour measure, min 0, max 13. Controls for country-specific effects and feminist political culture.

Table A.8. The Representation of Women: Interacting party affiliation

	Behaviour
Woman	2.139***
	(0.297)
Division of Powers	-2.350***
	(0.363)
Left Party	0.801***
	(0.199)
Left Party*Division of Powers	0.016
	(0.318)
Women* Left Party	-0.34
	(0.357)
Woman* Division of Powers	0.354
	(0.490)
Woman*Left Party* Division of Powers	1.409**
	(0.512)
Constant	3.786**
	(1.343)
Random Effect Parameters	
sd (parliament)	-11.823
	(426.410)
sd (residual)	1.005***
	(0.016)
chi2	585.898
N	1924

p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Multilevel regression, individuals grouped in parliaments.

Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13. Results controlling for feminist political culture.

Table A.9. The Effects of Institutions & Gender on the Importance of Representing Women

	Importance of Representing Women
Woman	0.620***
	(0.073)
Division of Powers	-0.213
	(0.120)
Woman * Division of Powers	0.521***
	(0.128)
Constant	3.024***
	(0.549)
Random Effect Parameters	
sd (parliament)	-1.314***
	(0.151)
sd (residual)	0.186***
	(0.016)
Chi2	311.132
N	1958

p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Multilevel regression, individuals grouped in parliaments.

Dependent Variable – importance of representing women ranges from 0 ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘very important.

Results controlling for country specific effects and feminist political culture.

Table A.10. Twitter Analysis Key Words

English	French
women	femmes
woman	femme
domestic violence	violence conjugale
wage gap	écart salarial
pay gap	écart de remuneration
feminis(t)(m)	féminis(t)(m)
girls	filles
patriarchy	patriarche, patriacale
misogyn(y)(st)	misogynie
reproductive	reproductive
equal pay	salaire égal
sexualized assault	aggression sexuelle
sexualized violence	la violence sexuelle
Key words or phrases that exclude a tweet:	
men and women	hommes et femmes
men & women	hommes & femmes
women and men	femmes et les hommes
women & men	femme-homme

Table A.11. Twitter Analysis Robustness Tests

	Original	Excluding highest, Ministers and Critics	Country Specific Effects	Country & Party Specific Effects
Woman	0.025***	0.025***	0.024***	0.024***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Presidential System	0.011	0.011	0.008	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.024)
Woman*Presidential System	0.042***	0.033***	0.042***	0.041***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Left Party	0.01	0.01	0.01	
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
Minister	0.116***		0.116***	0.115***
	(0.014)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Critic	0.099***		0.099***	0.100***
	(0.014)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Constant	0.005	0.005	0.008	0.061*
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.029)
Random Effect Parameters				
sd (country)	-21.854	-22.459	-19.838	-30.639*
	(14.326)	(1636.122)	(521.577)	(13.191)
sd (party)	-4.977***	-5.032***	-5.029***	-30.720***
	(0.324)	(0.279)	(0.303)	(5.396)
sd (residual)	-3.506***	-3.829***	-3.506***	-3.524***
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
N	572.433	580.01	575.439	940.568
chi2	1010	996	1010	1042

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Multilevel regression analysis. Original model from Table 3.4.

Dependent Variable –Proportion of Tweets addressing women's issues

Controls for country and party fixed effects, no dummies were statistically significant.

Table A.12. Twitter Analysis Robustness Test2

	Errors Clustered by Country	Errors Clustered by Institution
Woman	0.022***	0.022***
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Presidential System	0.004***	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.007)
Woman*Presidential System	0.041***	0.041**
	(0.003)	(0.015)
Minister	0.118***	0.118***
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Critic	0.101***	0.101***
	(0.014)	(0.025)
Constant	0.061***	0.061***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
chi2	1269	1269

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Single level regression analysis. Controls for country and party specific effects.

Dependent Variable –Proportion of Tweets addressing women's issues

Appendix B: Supplementary Material for Chapter 4

Table B.1. Robustness Tests: Multilevel regression analysis grouping individuals by party.

		Proportional Representation Systems			
	Proportional Representation	Ballot Dimension	Vote Dimension	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	Campaign Preferences
Woman	2.136***	1.710***	1.910***	1.720***	1.187***
	(0.412)	(0.214)	(0.219)	(0.224)	(0.346)
Institution	0.283	0.129	-0.102	-0.006	-0.253***
	(0.271)	(0.241)	(0.202)	(0.132)	(0.076)
Woman * Institution	0.163	0.740***	0.399*	0.327***	0.428***
	(0.437)	(0.184)	(0.162)	(0.090)	(0.123)
Left Party	0.773***	0.841***	0.888***	0.861***	0.878***
	(0.146)	(0.162)	(0.159)	(0.163)	(0.160)
Feminist Political Culture	0.127	0.131	0.111	0.132	0.121
	(0.093)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.098)
Constant	1.063	1.073	1.608	1.127	2.071
	(1.334)	(1.465)	(1.474)	(1.524)	(1.399)
Random Effect Parameters					
sd (party group)	0.733*	0.730*	0.725*	0.713*	0.746*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
sd (residual)	2.748***	2.793***	2.741***	2.737***	2.788***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	1924	1677	1577	1577	1652
Chi2	380.90***	352.63***	347.55***	354.73***	345.35***

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Multilevel regression. Dependent Variable combined behaviour measure, min 0, max13. Results controlling for country specific effects and feminist political culture.

Table B.2. Robustness Tests: Multilevel regression analysis grouping individuals hierarchically by party, parliament, country.

		Proportional Representation Systems			
	Proportional Representation	Ballot Dimension	Vote Dimension	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	Campaign Preferences
Woman	2.136***	1.710***	1.910***	1.720***	1.187***
	(0.412)	(0.214)	(0.219)	(0.224)	(0.346)
Institution	0.283	0.129	-0.102	-0.006	-0.253***
	(0.271)	(0.241)	(0.202)	(0.132)	(0.076)
Woman * Institution	0.163	0.740***	0.399*	0.327***	0.428***
	(0.437)	(0.184)	(0.162)	(0.090)	(0.123)
Left Party	0.773***	0.841***	0.888***	0.861***	0.878***
	(0.146)	(0.162)	(0.159)	(0.163)	(0.160)
constant	1.063	1.073	1.608	1.127	2.071
	(1.334)	(1.465)	(1.474)	(1.524)	(1.399)
Random Effect Parameters					
sd (country)	0.702	0.818	0.77	0.815	0.756
	(0.179)	(0.219)	(0.196)	(0.218)	(0.189)
sd (parliament)	0.074	0	0.056	0.043	0.001**
	(0.691)	(0.005)	(0.810)	(0.097)	(0.002)
sd (party)	0.727	0.666*	0.686	0.684	0.726
	(0.145)	(0.133)	(0.150)	(0.134)	(0.139)
sd (residual)	2.682***	2.670***	2.731***	2.673***	2.722***
	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
N	1924	1530	1640	1519	1629
Chi2	331.846	318.283	305.836	310.984	304.875

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, min 0, max 13.
Effects controlling for country-specific effects and feminist political culture.

Table B.3. Robustness Tests: OLS Regression, Errors Clustered by Parliament.

		Proportional Representation Systems			
	Proportional Representation	Ballot Dimension	Vote Dimension	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	Campaign Preferences
Woman	2.141***	1.727***	1.924***	1.745***	1.179*
	(0.501)	(0.321)	(0.344)	(0.335)	(0.519)
Institution	0.282	0.327	0.013	0.153	-0.269**
	(0.185)	(0.178)	(0.294)	(0.150)	(0.088)
Woman * Institution	0.199	0.763**	0.416+	0.335**	0.441*
	(0.557)	(0.224)	(0.221)	(0.114)	(0.167)
Left Party	0.862***	0.902***	0.969***	0.933***	0.958***
	(0.133)	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.147)
Constant	3.116	3.901*	3.905*	3.623*	4.397*
	(1.742)	(1.641)	(1.726)	(1.707)	(1.737)
R2	0.223	0.253	0.233	0.251	0.231
N	1924	1530	1640	1519	1629

+p=0.064* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

OLS regression, errors are clustered by parliament.

Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.

Results controlling for country specific effects and feminist political culture.

Table B.4. Robustness Tests: OLS Regression, Errors Clustered by Country.

		Proportional Representation Systems			
	Proportional Representation	Ballot Dimension	Vote Dimension	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	Campaign Preferences
Woman	2.141***	1.727***	1.924***	1.745***	1.179
	(0.163)	(0.326)	(0.386)	(0.337)	(0.665)
Institution	0.282	0.327	0.013	0.153	-0.269*
	(0.268)	(0.153)	(0.232)	(0.114)	(0.109)
Woman * Institution	0.199	0.763**	0.416	0.335**	0.441*
	(0.342)	(0.198)	(0.272)	(0.106)	(0.171)
Left Party	0.862***	0.902***	0.969***	0.933***	0.958***
	(0.194)	(0.191)	(0.167)	(0.188)	(0.185)
Constant	3.116*	3.901**	3.905**	3.623**	4.397***
	(1.443)	(1.132)	(1.051)	(1.121)	(1.017)
R2	0.223	0.253	0.233	0.251	0.231
N	1924	1530	1640	1519	1629

p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

OLS regression, errors are clustered by country.

Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.

Results controlling for country specific effects and feminist political culture.

Table B.5. Robustness Test: OLS Regression, Errors Clustered by Institution.

		Proportional Representation Systems			
	Proportional Representation	Ballot Dimension	Vote Dimension	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	Campaign Preferences
Woman	2.141*	1.727**	1.924***	1.745***	1.179*
	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.124)	(0.264)
Institution	0.282	0.327*	0.013	0.153	-0.269*
	(0.095)	(0.043)	(0.015)	(0.082)	(0.080)
Woman * Institution	0.199	0.763*	0.416**	0.335**	0.441**
	(0.077)	(0.094)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.089)
Left Party	0.862	0.902*	0.969**	0.933**	0.958*
	(0.207)	(0.138)	(0.075)	(0.129)	(0.213)
Constant	3.116*	3.901	3.905*	3.623*	4.397**
	(0.093)	(1.265)	(0.639)	(1.135)	(0.851)
R2	0.223	0.253	0.233	0.251	0.231
N	1924	1530	1640	1519	1629

*p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

OLS regression, errors are clustered by institution.

Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13.

Results controlling for country specific effects and feminist political culture.

Table B.6. Robustness Tests: Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis Grouped by Party

		Proportional Representation Systems			
	Proportional Representation	Ballot Dimension	Vote Dimension	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	Campaign Incentives
Woman	1.270***	1.048***	1.134***	1.038***	0.667**
	(0.261)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.221)
Institution	0.034	0.186	-0.007	0.078	-0.181***
	(0.159)	(0.161)	(0.150)	(0.095)	(0.049)
Woman * Institution	0.2	0.525***	0.312**	0.244***	0.295***
	(0.275)	(0.118)	(0.102)	(0.058)	(0.079)
Left Party	0.540***	0.584***	0.607***	0.600***	0.607***
	(0.085)	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.094)
Cut 1	-1.882*	-2.312*	-2.223*	-2.195*	-2.447**
Cut 2	(0.885)	(0.972)	(0.950)	(0.991)	(0.930)
Cut 3	-0.909	-1.384	-1.308	-1.267	-1.542
	(0.884)	(0.970)	(0.949)	(0.989)	(0.929)
Cut 4	-0.25	-0.733	-0.67	-0.613	-0.902
Cut 5	(0.884)	(0.969)	(0.948)	(0.988)	(0.928)
Cut 6	0.312	-0.184	-0.144	-0.068	-0.369
	(0.884)	(0.969)	(0.948)	(0.988)	(0.928)
Cut 7	0.807	0.368	0.393	0.486	0.17
Cut 8	(0.884)	(0.969)	(0.948)	(0.989)	(0.928)
Cut 9	1.26	0.829	0.836	0.947	0.612
	(0.884)	(0.970)	(0.948)	(0.989)	(0.928)
Cut 10	1.719	1.302	1.296	1.418	1.082
Cut 11	(0.885)	(0.970)	(0.949)	(0.989)	(0.928)
Cut 12	2.294**	1.882	1.856	1.989*	1.65
	(0.885)	(0.970)	(0.949)	(0.990)	(0.929)
Cut 13	2.734**	2.302*	2.270*	2.408*	2.051*
N	1924	1530	1640	1519	1629

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Multilevel ordered logistic regression, individuals grouped within parliaments.

Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13

Results controlling for country specific effects and feminist political culture

Table B.7. Robustness Tests: Controlling for Party Specific Effects

		Proportional Representation Systems			
	Proportional Representation	Ballot Dimension	Vote Dimension	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	Campaign Preferences
Woman	2.092***	1.796***	1.987***	1.834***	1.346***
	(0.395)	(0.213)	(0.217)	(0.223)	(0.343)
Institution	0.222	0.282	0.027	0.089	-0.153*
	(0.275)	(0.218)	(0.187)	(0.113)	(0.077)
Woman * Institution	0.22	0.607***	0.340*	0.255**	0.378**
	(0.420)	(0.181)	(0.160)	(0.089)	(0.121)
Left Party	0.084	0.158	0.158	0.147	0.187
	(0.189)	(0.211)	(0.210)	(0.213)	(0.209)
constant	1.649	0.972	1.507	1.194	1.809
	(2.776)	(2.870)	(2.897)	(2.909)	(2.804)
Random Effect Parameters					
sd (country)	0.21	0.112	0.201	0.17	0.17
	(0.176)	(0.285)	(0.182)	(0.203)	(0.217)
sd (parliament)	2.566***	2.572***	2.600***	2.574***	2.600***
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.047)
sd (party)	1924	1561	1640	1550	1629
	870.013	769.18	787.859	749.601	784.116
sd (residual)	2.092***	1.796***	1.987***	1.834***	1.346***
	(0.395)	(0.213)	(0.217)	(0.223)	(0.343)
N	0.222	0.282	0.027	0.089	-0.153*
Chi2	(0.275)	(0.218)	(0.187)	(0.113)	(0.077)

* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, min 0, max 13.
Effects controlling for party-specific effects and feminist political culture.

Table B.9. The Representation of Women: Interacting Party Affiliation

	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation	Campaign Incentives
Woman	1.761***	1.030**
	(0.226)	(0.351)
Institution/Incentive	0.107	-0.094
	(0.157)	(0.101)
Left Party	0.761**	1.771***
	(0.243)	(0.359)
Left Party*Institution/Incentive	0.041	-0.332**
	(0.097)	(0.126)
Woman*Institution/Incentive	0.238	0.432**
	(0.123)	(0.136)
Woman*Left Party*Institution/Incentive	0.373**	0.201
	(0.121)	(0.163)
Constant	3.677*	4.103**
	(1.521)	(1.468)
Random Effect Parameters		
sd (parliament)	<0.001***	<0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
sd (residual)	2.742***	2.784***
	(0.049)	(0.049)
N	1550	1629
chi2	499.96	498.254

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Multilevel regression, individuals grouped in parliaments.

Dependent Variable – combined behaviour measure, minimum 0, maximum 13. Results controlling for country specific effects and feminist political culture.

Table B.10. The Effects of Institutions & Gender on the Importance of Representing Women

		Proportional Representation Systems		
	PR	Ballot Dimension	Vote Dimension	Incentives for Unincorporated Representation
Woman	0.789***	0.537***	0.587***	0.545***
	(0.187)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.097)
Institution	0	0.192	0.331**	0.211***
	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.063)
Woman * Institutions	0.005	0.323***	0.214**	0.146***
	(0.197)	(0.079)	(0.069)	(0.039)
Constant	4.475***	4.588***	4.046***	4.211***
	(0.599)	(0.647)	(0.635)	(0.656)
Random Effect Parameters				
sd (parliament)	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***	<0.001***
	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(<0.001)
sd (residual)	1.214***	1.195***	1.196***	1.194***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
N	1958	1592	1673	1580
chi2	468.318	458.238	474.848	465.211

p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Multilevel regression analysis – individuals grouped in the parliaments.
Dependent Variable – Reported Importance of Representing Women from 1(of no importance) to 7 (of great importance).
Controls for feminist political culture, left party, and includes country dummies.

Appendix C: Supplementary Material for Chapter 5

Note: The following survey was the core survey used for respondents from the UK. The survey was modified to reflect institutional differences and in a few instances specific questions were included based on the individual respondent.

Written Survey

Please fill out the following questions and return to Grace Lore, PhD Candidate at **lore.grace@gmail.com.**

All responses are completely confidential and will be reported anonymously.Your participation is entirely optional. By filling out this form you consent to participate in the study. For more information please see the other attachments in this email. If you would like to see the final dissertation, please let me know.

Thank you very much for your participation.

How important is it to you to represent women and to address women's interest in parliament?

☐ Not at all ☐ Somewhat ☐ Moderately ☐ Very

What kinds of actions do you take to represent women? Check all that apply.

☐ Make statements in Parliament

☐ Introduce bills

☐ Raise issues during debates on bills

☐ Raise issues within cabinet

☐ Vote in favour of bills that support women's interests

☐ Speak to or make proposals on women's issues Parliamentary party

☐ Assist women constituents

☐ Assist women outside your constituency

☐ Meet with women's organization from your constituency

☐ Meet with women's organization outside your constituency

☐ Work with members of other parties to represent women.

Do your colleagues represent women?

Female colleagues: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Male colleagues: ☐ Yes ☐No

What other kinds of groups and interests do you represent? Please click all that apply.

☐ Constituents

☐ Party supporters

☐ My Province

☐ Professional groups

☐ Other social groups (based on race, region, or religion, for example)

☐ Class groups

☐ The country as a whole

☐ Other

How do you feel about the amount of time you spent representing women's interests?

☐ I spend too much time focusing on women's issues.

What prevents you from doing less?

☐ I do as much to represent women as I would like to.

☐ I wish I could dedicate more time to representing women.

What prevents you from doing more?

What are the most important groups for you to represent? Please select 2 only.

☐ Constituents

☐ My party or party supporters

☐ Women

☐ My province

☐ Other social groups (based on race, region, or religion, for example)

☐ Class groups

☐ The country as a whole

☐ Other

Please explain:

Does the work you do for your constituents or party limit the time you can spend on women's issues?

☐ Yes ☐ No

Please explain:

Have you ever campaigned on a promise to or record of representing women's interests?

☐ No ☐ Yes

Please explain:

Does representing women help your political career?

☐ Yes, representing women can help me get re-elected.

☐ Yes, representing women helps me progress in my party and into government.

☐ No, representing women is not particularly helpful to my career.

☐ No, representing women can be detrimental to my political career.

Do you identify with any of the following statements? Check all that apply.

☐ I have been able to promote women's interests as a member of cabinet.

☐ Women's interests do not differ much from men and by focusing on the interest of the country and my constituency I am represent women.

☐ Because of cabinet solidarity I have had to prioritize party policies and priorities over women's issues.

☐ My job is to represent my constituents so I focus on their interests and issues.

☐ It is my responsibility to represent women's issues because women are under-represented in politics

☐ I have been encouraged to vote in a particular way on a bill involving women's interest.

☐ I must represent my party's policies and positions and so I can't always pursue different interests.

Table C.1. Interview Methods Table

Role	Institution	Party	Sampling Notes	Date	Format	Audio Recording	Transcription
MEP	European Parliament - Belgian Representative	NVA		January 27, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
Activist	European Parliament - Belgian Representative	NA		March 24, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Notes
MEP	European Parliament - German Representative	FDP		May 27, 2015	Skype Interview	No	Notes
MEP	European Parliament - German Representative	Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen		May 12, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MEP Staff	European Parliament - German Representative	Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen	MEP completed survey. Was offered the opportunity to meet with Staff	March 4, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MEP	European Parliament - Dutch Representative	GroenLinks		March 17, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MEP	European Parliament - Dutch Representative	SP		March 10, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MEP	European Parliament - Dutch Representative	D66		February 6, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
MEP	European Parliament - UK Representative	Labour		February 2, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MEP	European Parliament - UK Representative	Conservative		March 30, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MEP	European Parliament - UK Representative	Labour		April 15, 2015	Skype Interview	No	Notes
MEP	European Parliament - UK Representative	Labour		May 11, 2015	Skype Interview	No	Notes

Role	Institution	Party	Sampling Notes	Date	Format	Audio Recording	Transcription
MEP	European Parliament - UK Representative	Labour		March 24, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MEP	European Parliament - UK Representative	Conservative		May 5, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MEP	European Parliament - UK Representative	UKIP		March 25, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Notes
MEP	European Parliament - UK Representative	United Kingdom Sinn Fein		May 29, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MEP	European Parliament - German Representative	SPD		April 15, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MEP	European Parliament - German Representative	SPD		April 7, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MP	Belgian Chamber of Representatives	NVA		January 15, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Belgian Chamber of Representatives	CD&V		March 18, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Belgian Chamber of Representatives	Ecolo-Groen		March 16, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Belgian Chamber of Representatives	SPA		March 19, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Belgian Chamber of Representatives	NVA		January 14, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP Staff	Belgian Chamber of Representatives	CD&V	Met with staff after MP cancelled	March 16, 2014	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	NDP		April 26, 2015	Phone	No	Notes

Role	Institution	Party	Sampling Notes	Date	Format	Audio Recording	Transcription
MP	Canadian House of Commons	Conservative		April 21, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	Liberal		April 28, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
MP	Canadian House of Commons	NDP		May 7, 2015	Phone Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	NDP		April 23, 2015	Phone Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	Conservative		July 6, 2015	Phone Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	Liberal		April 20, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	Liberal		April 21, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	NDP		April 22, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	Liberal		April 23, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	Liberal		April 23, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	NDP		April 21, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Canadian House of Commons	NDP		April 20, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
Campaign Staff	Canadian House of Commons	NDP		April 21, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed

Role	Institution	Party	Sampling Notes	Date	Format	Audio Recording	Transcription
MdB	German Bundestag	CDU/CSU		February 26, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MdB	German Bundestag	CDU/CSU		March 27, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MdB	German Bundestag	CDU/CSU		February 26, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MdB	German Bundestag	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)		February 26, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MdB	German Bundestag	SPD		February 27, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MdB	German Bundestag	SPD		March 26, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MdB	German Bundestag	The Left Party		February 23, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MdB	German Bundestag	SPD		February 25, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MdB	German Bundestag	The Left Party		March 30, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	VVD		February 6, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	PvdA		March 11, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	D66		February 11, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	VVD		January 28, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed

Role	Institution	Party	Sampling Notes	Date	Format	Audio Recording	Transcription
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	VVD		January 29, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	PvdA		January 29, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	D66		January 26, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	PvdA		January 28, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	PvdA		January 28, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	VVD		Feburary 6, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	VVD		January 28, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	PvdA		January 29, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	D66		January 29, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	VVD		January 29, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	SP		February 12, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	Dutch Tweede Kamer	PvdA		February 11, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MNC	Swiss Federal Assembly, National Council	SP		March 11, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MNC	Swiss Federal Assembly	FDP-Liberale		March 10, 2015	In-person	Yes	Transcribed

Role	Institution	Party	Sampling Notes	Date	Format	Audio Recording	Transcription
MNC	Swiss Federal Assembly, National Council	FDP-Liberale		March 10, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MNC	Swiss Federal Assembly, National Council	CVP		March 12, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MNC	Swiss Federal Assembly, National Council	SP		March 12, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MNC	Swiss Federal Assembly, National Council	PLR		March 9, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MNC	Swiss Federal Assembly, National Council	GPS		March 9, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MNC	Swiss Federal Assembly, National Council	CVP		March 12, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MNC	Swiss Federal Assembly, National Council	CVP		May 5, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Labour		May 6, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Labour		January 27, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Labour		February 4, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Labour		January 22, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Conservative		January 19, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Labour		January 20, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed

Role	Institution	Party	Sampling Notes	Date	Format	Audio Recording	Transcription
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Conservative		January 21, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Conservative		January 20, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Conservative		January 20, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP Staff	United Kingdom House of Commons	Labour	Met with staff after MP cancelled	January 21, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
Peer	United Kingdom House of Lords	Labour	Recommended by a Labour MP who was unable to participate	January 20, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Labour		January 8, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Conservative		January 12, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
MP	United Kingdom House of Commons	Labour		January 14, 2015	Written Survey	NA	NA
Former MP Staff	United Kingdom House of Commons	Labour	Personal Contact	January 19, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
MP	United States House of Representatives	Republican		June 15, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed
Deputee	Subnational Belgian Representative	MR	Contacted as leader with women in politics activist group	March 3, 2015	In-person Interview	Yes	Audio Transcribed

Role	Institution	Party	Sampling Notes	Date	Format	Audio Recording	Transcription
Senator	State Level Senator	Democrat	Meet at Centre for Reproductive Rights conference	August 24, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
Representative	State Level House of Representative	Democrat	Meet at Centre for Reproductive Rights conference	June 29, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
Representative	State Level House of Representative	Democrat	Meet at Centre for Reproductive Rights conference	August 17, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
Representative	State Level House of Representative	Democrat	Meet at Centre for Reproductive Rights conference	July 15, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes
Congresswoman Staff	United States House of Representatives	Democrat	Met with staff after MP cancelled	June 16, 2015	Phone Interview	No	Notes

Table C.2. Response Rates by Country and Party

		Contacted	Responded	Agreed	Response Rate (%)	Participation Rate (%)	Interview	Survey	Notes
Belgium	CDV	8	3	2	38	25	1	0	Met with staff after 1 MP cancelled
	cdH	3	1	0	33	0	0	0	
	Ecolo-Groen	5	1	1	20	20	1	0	
	MR	10	1	1	10	10	1	0	Interview was with subnational representative
	NVA	19	2	2	11	11	2	0	
	Open VLD	6	2	0	33	0	0	0	
	PS	7	1	0	14	0	0	0	
	SPA	7	2	1	29	14	1	0	
	TOTAL	**65**	**13**	**7**	**20**	**11**	**6**	**0**	
Canada	Conservative	19	5	2	26	11	2	0	
	Liberal	10	7	5	70	50	5	0	
	NDP	19	8	8	42	42	7	0	Meeting with 1 MP was cancelled
	TOTAL	**48**	**20**	**15**	**42**	**31**	**14**	**0**	
Germany	Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen)	24	10	2	42	8	1	1	
	CDU/CSU	71	24	4	34	6	3	1	Meeting with 1 MdB was cancelled
	SPD	59	27	4	46	7	2	0	Meeting with 1 MdB was cancelled. 1 survey not completed
	Die Linke	24	9	2	38	8	1	0	Meeting with 1 MdB was cancelled.
	TOTAL	**178**	**70**	**12**	**39**	**7**	**7**	**2**	

		Contacted	Responded	Agreed	Response Rate (%)	Participation Rate (%)	Interview	Survey	Notes
Netherlands	CDA	5	2	0	40	0	0	0	
	D66	5	5	4	100	80	3	0	One survey not completed
	PvdA	21	10	7	48	33	5	1	One survey not completed
	PVV	3	1	0	33	0	0	0	
	SP	4	2	1	50	25	0	1	
	VVD	17	10	6	59	35	6	0	
	TOTAL	**55**	**30**	**18**	**55**	**33**	**14**	**2**	
Switzerland	BDP	1	1	0	100	0	0	0	
	CVP	5	4	4	80	80	2	1	Meeting with 1 MP was cancelled
	EVP	2	1	0	50	0	0	0	
	FDP	5	3	3	60	60	2	0	Meeting with 1 MP was cancelled
	GLP	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	GPS	2	1	1	50	50	1	0	
	PLR	2	1	1	50	50	1	0	
	SP	11	4	2	36	18	2	0	
	SVP	7	3	0	43	0	0	0	
	TOTAL	**38**	**18**	**11**	**47**	**29**	**8**	**1**	

		Contacted	Responded	Agreed	Response Rate (%)	Participation Rate (%)	Interview	Survey	Notes
United Kingdom	Conservative	50	19	5	38	10	4	1	
	Labour	88	32	8	36	9	7	3	Met with 2 staff, one after 1 MP cancelled. Met with 1 Peer
	Liberal Democrats	7	4	0	57	0	0	0	
	TOTAL	**145**	**55**	**13**	**38**	**9**	**11**	**4**	
United States	Democrats	74	23	6	31	8	5	0	Includes 4 state level representatives. Met with 1 staff after Congresswoman canceled. Second Congresswoman canceled and did not reschedule.
	Republicans	24	11	1	46	4	1	0	
	TOTAL	**98**	**34**	**7**	**35**	**7**	**6**	**0**	
European Parliament	Belgium	6	3	1	50	17	1	0	
	Germany	25	15	4	60	16	2	3	Met with Staff of MP who also completed Survey
	Netherlands	10	5	3	50	30	3	0	
	UK	28	14	8	50	29	6	2	
	TOTAL	**69**	**37**	**16**	**54**	**23**	**12**	**5**	

Appendix D: Supplementary Material for Chapter 7

Table D.1. Models Used for Figures 7.3.

	Legal Family Issues Full	Legal Family Issue Margins	Gender Issue Full	Gender Issue Margins
% Women in lower house	0.082	-0.029	0.068*	-0.005
	(0.053)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Presidential	-2.872*	-2.167**	-1.928*	-1.573*
	(1.177)	(0.751)	(0.822)	(0.635)
Interaction	0.146**	0.101**	0.086*	0.064*
	(0.054)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.030)
constant	-6.965***	-3.588***	-5.812***	-3.629***
	(1.282)	(0.650)	(0.581)	(0.610)
N	16257	16777	16777	16777

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Margins models drop year and country specific effects from full models. Full models are those found in Table 7.3