

(POST)POLITICAL POWER AND INTERNATIONAL SPORT: EXAMINING THE
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE'S JOURNEY TO PERMANENT
OBSERVER STATUS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the United Nations (UN) have had an ongoing relationship over the past 80 years that culminated in granting the IOC Permanent Observer status at the UN General Assembly in 2009. This is an honor usually reserved for quasi-states and inter-governmental organizations: very rarely do non-governmental organizations (NGO) obtain this position. This dissertation critically examined the links between the IOC and the UN in a bid to gain an understanding of how and why the IOC obtained this status at the UN. Four research questions guided this study: (i) How, and in what contexts, has the UN engaged with the IOC in the past; (ii) Why/how is the UN currently engaging with the IOC; (iii) How/Why did the IOC obtain Permanent Observer status at the UN General Assembly; and (iv) What are the potential implications of the partnership between the IOC and the UN?

In my pursuit of these questions, I drew in particular from the work of Dorothy Smith and Michel Foucault to aid my underlying examination of how forms of knowledge are socially constructed in ways that privilege some groups over others. The work of these theorists supported my attempts to contribute especially to the emerging field of research focused on inequitable power relations within and around the Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) ‘movement’.

My findings demonstrated that there were various factors at play that have influenced the relationship between these two organizations, including the neoliberalization of development, the global power of sport, and processes of legitimation for both the IOC and the UN.

PREFACE

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIPS	Association Internationale De La Presse Sportive
CAS	Court of Arbitration for Sport
CIFP	International Fair Play Committee
CONI	Italian National Olympic Committee
ECOSOC	The United Nations Economic and Social Council
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GAISF	General Assembly of Internationals Sports Federations
IE	Institutional Ethnography
IAAF	International Associations of Athletics Federations
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICAS	International Council of Arbitration for Sport
ICSPE	International Committee of Sport and Physical Education
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
IHHFC	International Human Fact-Finding Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOC	International Olympic Committee
ISF	International Sports Federation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINEPS	Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NOC	National Olympic Committee
OCOG	Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PGA of NOCs	Permanent General Assembly of National Olympic Committees
QDA	Qualitative Document Analysis
SANOC	South African National Olympic Committee

SDP	Sport for Development and Peace
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Science and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOSDP	United Nations Organization of Sport for Development and Peace
WADA	World Anti-Doping Agency
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

My research begins with the decision made by the United Nations (UN) to appoint the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as Permanent Observer at the United Nations General Assembly in 2009. This is a position usually reserved for quasi-states and intergovernmental¹ organizations.² Rarely do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) obtain this status. The decision to award an international sporting organization this status sits in amongst various other actions taken by the UN in the past 20 years that place sport in a position to serve as a tool to achieve its global development goals. The UN now has an Office of Sport for Development and Peace (UNOSDP) housed in Geneva, Switzerland. The UN has also created conferences³, official resolutions⁴ and engages in media outreach to promote peace and development through sport around the world. While these developments are being touted as extremely positive by UN members,⁵ this dissertation has taken a much-needed critical look into the UN's relationship with the IOC, and into the ways that the concept and practice of sport is constructed and mobilized in this relationship.

Of course, it is now widely accepted and stressed by many sociologists that sport

¹ An organization is usually considered intergovernmental if its membership is composed of two or more states. Most of these organizations also have to have a Treaty that is ratified in international law, but it is not a requirement (United Nations General Assembly 64th Session, A/64/144, *Observer Status for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in the General Assembly*, (14 July 2009), www.undocs.org/A/64/144)

² Byron Peacock, "'A Virtual World Government unto Itself' Uncovering the Rational-Legal Authority of the IOC in World Politics," *Olympika* 19 (2010): 41–58.

³ e.g. International Conference on Sport and Development, 2003; UN-IOC Forum, 2010; UN Event on Children, Sport and Development, 2014

⁴ e.g. 'Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic Ideal, 1993; 'Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace, 2003; '6 April the International Day of Sport for Development and Peace, 2013

⁵ Ingrid Beutler, "Sport Serving Development and Peace: Achieving the Goals of the United Nations through Sport," *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (July 2008): 359–369.

does not always have a positive influence on society.⁶ More recently, the use of sport as a tool for development and peace initiatives has been critiqued, with several scholars demonstrating that sport often does little to address existing social inequalities⁷ — and others convincingly arguing that sport is inextricably linked to the reinforcement of many unbalanced power relationships.⁸ Following these broad arguments, my research seeks to fill a gap in the literature by examining the burgeoning partnership between the largest sports organization and most well-known international development organization in the world — a partnership that has received almost no research attention, critical or otherwise, to date. Specifically, and while we know that sport does not always have a positive impact on international development initiatives, we have yet to examine and/or fully understand the role that the IOC plays in the burgeoning global politics of Sport for Development and Peace (SDP).

Purpose

The purpose of this study was two-fold. First, my aim was to investigate the historical relationship between the IOC and the UN, paying particular attention to why and how the IOC and the UN began to partner with one another. Second, I aimed to examine factors that may have played a role in enabling the IOC to obtain a Permanent Observer seat at the General Assembly. This involved exploring relations of power amongst the IOC and the UN and analyzing the UN-IOC relationship within the changing political, social and economic

⁶ Coalter, “The Politics of Sport-for-Development: Limited Focus Programmes and Broad Gauge Problems?”; Guest, “The Diffusion of Development-through-Sport: Analysing the History and Practice of the Olympic Movement’s Grassroots Outreach to Africa.”

⁷ Coalter, “The Politics of Sport-for-Development: Limited Focus Programmes and Broad Gauge Problems?”; Simon C Darnell and David R Black, “Mainstreaming Sport into International Development Studies,” *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (April 2011): 367–378; Roger Levermore and Aaron Beacom, “Reassessing Sport-for-Development: Moving beyond ‘mapping the Territory,’” *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 4, no. 1 (March 12, 2012): 125–137.

⁸ Robert Redeker, “Sport as an Opiate of International Relations: The Myth and Illusion of Sport as a Tool of Foreign Diplomacy,” *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (July 12, 2008): 494–500.

context. I was particularly attentive to the ways that the rise of neoliberal capitalism may have influenced UN decision-making processes when it came to the Permanent Observer status of the IOC. The broader goal is to consider how this partnership and the IOC's position as Permanent Observer may impact broader sporting and international development communities, and how this partnership is reflective of broader socio-political developments. My specific research questions are as follows:

- How, and in what contexts, has the UN engaged with the IOC in the past?
- Why/how is the UN currently engaging with the IOC?
- How/Why did the IOC obtain Permanent Observer status at the UN General Assembly?
- What are the potential implications of the partnership between the IOC and the UN?

To address these questions, I engaged in a qualitative study utilizing tenets of Institutional Ethnography (IE). IE informed this research both theoretically and methodologically. Dorothy Smith indicates that the purpose of IE is to “look out beyond the everyday to discover how it came to happen as it does.”⁹ Because of the historical nature of this research project, the vast majority of the research focused on analyzing texts. I utilized the IOC historical archives in Lausanne, Switzerland, the online UN document system, online IOC documents, mass media reports, and other materials to aid in collecting data for this research.

This research is informed by a social constructionist approach to knowledge, where I aimed to challenge truth claims, to question how we know what we know, and to produce

⁹ Dorothy E Smith, “Introduction,” in *Institutional Ethnography as Practice*, ed. Dorothy E Smith (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), p. 3.

alternative forms of knowledge. Michel Foucault, a social philosopher, has influenced social constructionist thinking through his analyses of power and knowledge. Foucault argued for uncovering claims of truth by asking ‘what purpose do they serve’ rather than questioning whether or not they are in fact true.¹⁰ This is where I have also utilized tenets of IE to assist in unearthing some of these claims to truth and to examine how they came to be.

Context: UN, Development Goals and the IOC

Before introducing the chapters of this dissertation, I provide an overview of the context in which this study has taken place. The contexts surrounding the evolution of both the UN and the IOC are especially important to examine in order to get some understanding of how these organizations came to be and the role they play in global society. This section begins to set the stage for questioning how these two organizations came to work together, and how sport — and the IOC more specifically — came to be promoted as a tool to achieve goals of international development.

United Nations. The UN is an international organization that was founded after the Second World War in a bid to maintain peace through international cooperation.¹¹ The UN was modeled on an earlier peace organization called the League of Nations, which survived for two decades and disbanded in the same year the UN was founded. By 1945 the charter of the UN had been developed and signed by fifty nations from around the world.

Negotiations regarding the management of the organization began in San Francisco, California during the first conference. It was decided that Member States¹² would each have

¹⁰ Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader*, New York, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1984).

¹¹ Alf Ross, *Constitution of the United Nations: Analysis of Structure and Function* (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2008).

¹² Member States are countries that have signed on to become members of the UN.

one vote for decisions being made at the UN General Assembly.¹³ The four main purposes of the UN are:

To keep peace through the world; to develop friendly relations among nations; to help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, to conquer hunger, diseases and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each other's rights and freedoms; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve these goals¹⁴

The UN now has 193 Member States and is made up of six main bodies; the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat. The objectives of the UN now also include eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs were the result of a resolution developed during the Millennium UN Summit in New York, September 2000, entitled the 'UN Millennium Declaration'. This declaration contained a set of goals to be achieved by 2015:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development¹⁵

Sport has been one of the tools identified by the UN as being an aid in achieving the goals.¹⁶

In 2003, the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace released a policy document arguing that sport presented a "natural partnership for the United

¹³ Ross, *Constitution of the United Nations: Analysis of Structure and Function*.

¹⁴ United Nations, *United Nations at a Glance* (NY, United States of America: United Nations, 2012), <http://www.un-ir.org/UNatGlance.pdf>. 12

¹⁵ UN Millennium Project, ed., *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieving the Millennium Development Goals*. (USA: Earthscan, 2005), <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/MainReportComplete-lowres.pdf>. p. xi.

¹⁶ Beutler, "Sport Serving Development and Peace: Achieving the Goals of the United Nations through Sport."

Nations system” and that “sport is a powerful vehicle that should be increasingly considered by the United Nations as complementary to existing activities.”¹⁷ In September of 2010, the IOC created a report that identified the ways in which they believed that the IOC and its partners were assisting in achieving all of the MDGs.¹⁸

The International Olympic Committee. The IOC is a non-profit and non-governmental organization, which holds supreme authority over the Olympic Movement. It was founded in 1894 by Pierre de Coubertin, a French aristocrat, who wished to revive the ancient Greek Olympic Games of peaceful sporting competition. Since its revival, the Summer Olympics have turned into the largest sporting event in the world.

When it was first formed, de Coubertin relied on his own personal finances as well as the social and financial influence of other members to operate the organization. Much of the IOC membership today still consists of aristocrats and others with elite societal and political influence. The IOC has 205 member countries that can participate in the Olympic Games and have their own National Olympic Committee (NOC). IOC membership is made up of 100 individuals, who have voting rights at the IOC Sessions.¹⁹ The Executive Committee consists of 15 members who control the majority of the affairs associated with the Olympic Movement. The IOC remains a self-recruiting body and current members vote in new members. None of the IOC members are paid although expenses are known to be generously covered.²⁰

¹⁷ UN Inter-agency Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace, *Sport as a Tool for Development and Peace. Towards Achieving the United Nations Development Goals*. (United Nations, 2003). p. v.

¹⁸ International Olympic Committee, *The Contribution of the International Olympic Committee to the Millennium Development Goals*, 2010.

¹⁹ These 100 individuals come from 73 different countries, but it is important to note that IOC members represent the IOC in their countries and not their country at the IOC.

²⁰ Duncan Mackay, “David Owen: IOC Members Look to Be in Line for an Increase in Expenses - along with More Transparency,” *Insidethegames.biz*, (April 3, 2015),

IOC members and Presidents are nominated and voted in by fellow members by secret ballot during IOC Session meetings. In the past, the Presidential term was unlimited. At present, a President is initially elected for an eight-year term and is eligible to be elected for an additional four-year term. This system has protected much of the historical power of the IOC, which remains to this day predominantly western-led.

The end of World War II saw a rise in new nation-states, particularly from Africa, seeking to create NOCs and to participate in the Olympic Games. While participation in the Olympic Games was granted and encouraged, it was not until 1963 that the first (black) African – Sir Ade Ademola from Nigeria - became an IOC member.²¹ To this day, approximately 40 percent of the IOC's members are European. The IOC did not have a female member until 1981. Currently, females make up approximately 20 percent of the voting members at the IOC.

The IOC holds full legal rights over the Olympic Games, with established worldwide registration of trademarks (the interlocked rings, flag, flame, and motto). It also requires that every member and participating country in the Olympic Movement abide by the *Olympic Charter* and stated ideals of Olympism or risk being ousted from the organization and banned from participation in international Olympic events. Having said this, the IOC is reluctant to comment on political goings on. Individual members must swear an Olympic oath to abide by IOC policies and rules and are considered volunteers who represent the IOC and the Olympic movement in their country (and not delegates of their country in the IOC).²²

The ideals of Olympism have been associated with the Olympic Movement since its

<http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1026523/david-owen-ioc-members-look-to-be-in-line-for-an-increase-in-expenses-along-with-more-transparency>.

²¹ Richard Espy, *The Politics of the Olympic Games, Volume 13* (University of California Press, 1979).

²² Jean-Loup Chappelet and Brenda Kubler-Mabbott, *The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The Governance of World Sport* (Taylor & Francis, 2008).

inception. It has been described as a movement that engenders values of humanism, peace, and internationalism.²³ Despite the fact that several researchers demonstrated that, given the way they are currently organized, the Games do not exhibit these values,²⁴ these ideals have become instilled as the dominant ideology and continue to be used by the IOC and Olympic host cities to promote the Games.²⁵

The IOC and the broader Olympic Movement have long been associated with development initiatives. However, as Guest suggests, “most of their outreach efforts were (and still are) focused on helping developing countries to improve their sports infrastructure and Olympic level performance.”²⁶ Also, the IOC’s history does not always reflect a dedication to social justice — recognizing that various scholars and others have convincingly shown how they have been implicated in ignoring and arguably taking part in the abuse of human rights²⁷ and the reinforcement of gender roles to the detriment of women.²⁸ Furthermore, the IOC’s organizational structure means they cannot be held accountable to anyone but themselves.²⁹ Knowing some of the historical and current actions of the IOC and the Olympic movement, scholars have argued for the continued critical examination of the

²³ International Olympic Committee, *Olympic Charter* (International Olympic Committee, 2014), http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf.

²⁴ John Horne, “The Four ‘Knowns’ of Sport Mega-Events,” *Leisure Studies* 26, no. 1 (2007): 81–96; Helen J Lenskyj, *The Best Olympics Ever? Social Impacts of Sydney 2000* (Albany: State university of New York Press, 2002); John Milton-Smith, “Ethics, the Olympics and the Search for Global Values,” *Journal of Business Ethics* 32, no. 2 (2002): 131–142.

²⁵ Kevin Young and Kevin B. Wamsley, *Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games* (Elsevier JAI, 2005).

²⁶ Guest, “The Diffusion of Development-through-Sport: Analysing the History and Practice of the Olympic Movement’s Grassroots Outreach to Africa.” P. 1341.

²⁷ Matthew C Gutmann, *The Romance of Democracy: Compliant Defiance in Contemporary Mexico* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002); John Horne and Garry Whannel, *Understanding the Olympics* (Routledge, 2012).

²⁸ Helen J Lenskyj, *Inside the Olympic Industry: Power, Politics, and Activism* (SUNY Press, 2000).

²⁹ Maurice Roche, “The Olympics and ‘Global Citizenship’,” *Citizenship Studies* 6, no. 2 (2002): 165–181.

IOC's role in international development and peace initiatives.³⁰

Key Contributions

The aim of this study is to contribute to academic literature by both filling a gap in the current SDP and critical sport research, and also by bringing together much needed critical discussions between political scientists, international relations scholars and critical sport sociologists. As will be explained in the literature review, sociologists of sport have long been engaging in critical examinations of sport in society. Which is to say, they have problematized many of sport's current uses — and especially (recently) its use as a tool in international development.³¹ Despite this, there is little existing research that examines the role of the large institutions such as the IOC and the UN in influencing this area of development.

I hope to change this with this study by critically examining the growing role of the IOC in international development. It has been my aim to uncover how and why the IOC is sitting at the UN General Assembly as Permanent Observer and to ask questions about who really benefits from this. The reasons for doing this research have been numerous, but I argue that there is a pressing need for critical sport scholars to engage in critical dialogue with the leaders of international organizations that are engaging with the IOC and other international sports organizations with little consideration for the potential impacts. The UN holds much power over the international community and unabashedly promoting the role of the IOC in international development could influence many others to do the same. I suggest in this dissertation that there are a range of potential problems with this situation.

³⁰ John Hoberman, "The Myth of Sport as a Peace-Promoting Political Force," *SAIS Review* XXXI, no. 1 (2011): 17–29.

³¹ Coalter, "The Politics of Sport-for-Development: Limited Focus Programmes and Broad Gauge Problems?"; Darnell and Black, "Mainstreaming Sport into International Development Studies."

Organizing This Dissertation

In the second chapter of this dissertation, the ‘literature review’, I offer more detail about the linkages between the IOC and the UN. This is where I also review other pertinent literature that critically examines sport as a concept and sport’s usage as a tool to achieve international development goals. This is also where I further develop my theoretical approach to the research, which involves examining Foucauldian and Gramscian theories of power. This is followed by chapter three, my ‘methods’ chapter, where I discuss my methodological approach to this research. In this chapter I also specifically describe how I collected and analyzed the data for this project.

The fourth chapter, the first of my ‘findings’ chapters, provides a brief overview of what it means to be a Permanent Observer at the UN General Assembly. This is where I examine the other five NGOs that have obtained this status more closely. I also examine the immediate details involved in the IOC’s bid to obtain Permanent Observer status in 2009. This includes examining what individuals and/or Member States of the UN were involved in this process and why they were involved. Furthermore, the chapter also provides some detail about the current IOC UN Permanent Observer representative, Mario Pescante, and sets up the question of why and how the IOC (and Mario Pescante specifically) were able to attain this position at the UN General Assembly.

The fifth chapter focuses on the history of interactions between the IOC and the UN. In this chapter I draw especially on an analysis of Minutes of meetings, correspondence, and press releases from the 1950s until the 1980s from the IOC archives in Lausanne, Switzerland. This chapter reveals the way in which the IOC responded to and interacted with the UN throughout its history. This is where I examine the rationalizations for interacting

(and not interacting) with the UN from the perspective of the IOC. This chapter also examines the political and economic context in which the IOC was operating at the time that may have influenced the IOC's interactions with the UN. It is important to note here that while the IOC may have changed the way it interacted with the UN over time, the findings seems to suggest that their reasons for and attempts to obtain and maintain power and authority over international sport remained consistent.

In the sixth chapter, I examine the IOC's status as an organization. This section focuses on the internal strategies the IOC has utilized in the past to present itself as more than simply an NGO organizing a sporting competition. This is important to consider as context for the IOC obtaining Permanent Observer status at the UN, which is something that NGOs do not generally achieve. I go on to argue that it was the IOC's 'uniqueness' that enabled them to effectively distinguish itself from other organizations. This chapter examines three different ways in which the IOC has sought to achieve this unique authority: organizational, moral and legal. I demonstrate here how the IOC drew on these different forms to establish an authority that surpasses many other NGOs and an authority that potentially enabled them to be viewed by the UN as an organization that deserves special recognition.

The seventh chapter is where I examine the external context that helped position the IOC and the concept of sport as appealing to the UN. This chapter focuses on the political and economic climate within and around the UN, and also the ways in which this climate was and is beneficial to the IOC — and to viewing sport as a potential tool to be utilized by a development organization. This section utilizes the political theory of neoliberalism to assist in explaining the context leading up to, during and after the eventual decision to provide the

IOC with Permanent Observer status at the UN.

In the eighth chapter I engage in an in-depth theoretical analysis of the previous four chapters. Specifically, this is where I bring in theoretically-driven discussions about power and legitimacy and also get into discussions around the role of sport in society more generally.

Finally, the dissertation concludes with the ninth chapter. In this chapter I synthesize all of my findings and provide a concluding analysis. I also discuss potential implications of this research and looks towards future research that may be conducted in this area.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter locates this research within the current literature by providing a theoretical overview and discussion of the types of studies that have already been undertaken in this area to date. The first section focuses on my theoretical and ontological approach to the research. This is where I discuss Foucault's conceptions of power, truth and knowledge and Gramsci's concept of hegemony in more detail, and consider how they are relevant to the purpose of my research. This is also where I introduce Dorothy Smith's analysis of relations of power. The second section examines critical sociological literature that begins to unpack the concept of sport more generally. This is also where I look at the ways in which sport has been used as a tool for development. Reviewing this literature helps to contextualize my study by highlighting some of the ways in which researchers have examined the promotion of SDP. The final section examines some of the literature that has examined the IOC and the Olympics as an organization and as a philosophy. This review provides the basis for beginning to question why and how the IOC was able to obtain Observer status at the UN General Assembly, while ultimately demonstrating the gaps that exist in current research on the topic.

Theoretical Approach

In this research, I am especially influenced by the work of Michel Foucault and his theorizing of the concepts of power and governmentality. I also draw upon Gramsci's concept of hegemony to assist in analyzing my findings. I acknowledge that these two theorists are not always thought to be compatible. However, I argue in this dissertation that they have both provided useful tools to theorize the workings of power in different and supplementary ways that I would not have been able to do utilizing one theory alone. The

aim is to deconstruct claims of truth by engaging in in-depth contextualized research to uncover how these truths came to be, and whom they serve to benefit.

Foucault developed techniques to uncover regimes of truth that pervade society. He stressed that to challenge power and these regimes of truth was not to get at an ‘absolute truth’ (for that does not exist), but the key was in “detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time”.³² With this in mind, the research presented in this dissertation has sought to unpack the ways in which the IOC has presented its organization to others to assist in questioning the regimes of truth that the IOC has created in order to be viewed as an appropriate organization for the Permanent Observer seat at the UN General Assembly.

One of the techniques Foucault adopted to examine this was genealogy, a historical mode of inquiry quite different from traditional historical analyses as its purpose is never intended to find ‘facts’ — but instead to examine how a system of thought in the present day came to be by tracing its origins and deconstructing these origins for their deeper meanings. Andrews explains that “genealogy opens up new avenues of inquiry for sports researchers, because it enables sport to be viewed as a object of discourse”.³³ A Foucauldian analysis of sport and of sporting organizations enables the researcher to uncover the role of power in these sporting institutions and to examine how particular knowledges (regimes of truth) around sport and development came about, and whom they serve to benefit.³⁴

For example, and as will be explained in more detail further on in this section, several critical sport sociologists have disputed the popular discourses that surround the Olympic

³² Rabinow, *The Foucault Reader*. p. 75.

³³ David L. Andrews, “Desperately Seeking Michel: Foucault’s Genealogy, the Body, and Critical Sport Sociology,” *Sociology of Sport Journal* 10, no. 2 (1993): 148–167. p. 162.

³⁴ Pirrko Markula and Richard Pringle, *Foucault, Sport and Exercise: Power, Knowledge and Transforming the Self* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).

Games, namely the idea that sport promotes moral values or that Olympism promotes peace and internationalism.³⁵ It has been argued that these morally oriented discourses are utilized by the IOC in order to legitimize their practices. The dominance of these discourses are not necessarily linked to what is ‘real’ rather they develop into regimes of truth because of the ways in which they are presented alongside the hegemonic power of the IOC. Despite this tenuous link to reality, these discourses still remain hegemonic and have arguably enabled the IOC to maintain its dominance over global sport and growing dominance in international development. This dissertation builds on previous critical research by questioning the IOC’s claims to truth and their use of these hegemonic discourses to maintain and obtain power. This dissertation also examines how these regimes of truth came to be. This is where Foucault’s concept of power through governmentality becomes useful.

Foucault explained that power is constituted through discursive activities that create knowledges and then go on to develop these regimes of truth.³⁶ Foucault’s work is especially useful in guiding analyses of power relations that are not so obviously linked to traditional exercises of power. Rather, he was interested in examining power as it is dispersed in everyday rules, language and institutions. He examined disciplinary forms of power that are not necessarily repressive — operating in such a way that people learn to discipline themselves without external force. This conception of power helps to explain how the IOC is able to develop regimes of truth that support their conceptions of the role of sport and specifically of Olympic sport in society.

A Foucauldian conception of power also enables us to comprehend the “political

³⁵ Dikaia Chatziefstathiou and Ian P. Henry, *Discourses of Olympism: From the Sorbonne 1894 to London 2012* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); John Hoberman, “Toward a Theory of Olympic Internationalism,” *Journal of Sport History* 22, no. 1 (1995): 1–37.

³⁶ Rabinow, *The Foucault Reader*.

significance of popular cultural activities, such as sport, fitness and leisure activities.”³⁷

Rather than viewing sport as apolitical or ‘neutral’ because of the reasoning that it is not necessarily linked with the state apparatus, Foucault understands everything as political and as having political significance. Therefore, a Foucauldian analysis of sport or sports organizations enables researchers to consider sport as an activity that acts to discipline bodies in certain ways. This type of analysis would not consider simply the outcome of individual specific sporting interventions as either beneficial or problematic, but would consider the overall apparatus to examine the political ideologies involved and the regimes of truth being utilized and developed.

Foucault coined the concept of ‘governmentality’ to help examine how these regimes of truth came to be. Rather than viewing power as operating in a top down and coercive manner, Foucault explained how it operates in a much more diffuse and decentralized manner — wherein power is exercised through various institutions (such as the IOC) and through techniques of social control that operate on the individual body, not as forms of domination but through this method of governmentality. Governmentality in essence describes the “process through which individuals shape and guide their own conduct (and that of others) and are instilled with a willing acquiescence to surveillance and self-monitoring...”³⁸

In his understanding of power, Foucault recognized the use of the body as a contested terrain in which power struggles were fought. He popularized the notion that the body was an important aspect to controlling or disciplining people as a way of exerting and producing

³⁷ Markula and Pringle, *Foucault, Sport and Exercise: Power, Knowledge and Transforming the Self*. p. 16.

³⁸ Jessica Francombe and Michael Silk, “Pedagogies of Fat: The Social Currency of Slenderness,” in *Sport and Neoliberalism*, ed. David Andrews and Michael Silk (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2012). p. 225.

power. Foucault examined how bodies were controlled and measured, trained and punished in different ways throughout history. Researchers have explained how certain forms of sport can operate as sources of governmentality, wherein sport is seen to constitute “a powerful cultural technology and a core disciplining force of a nation”³⁹ through the body.

Chatziefstathiou and Henry examine how Olympism, in particular, works as a source of governmentality in a modern society.⁴⁰ De Coubertin had envisioned the philosophy of Olympism to promote a certain way of living, to provide a predetermined set of values and principles for an individual to live by.⁴¹ This Olympism philosophy (or discourse) has now survived for over 100 years and is utilized with even further reach and control to promote the disciplining of the body in a certain way. This dissertation utilizes Foucauldian conceptions of power to assist in examining the ways in which the IOC, the UN and also broader global sporting mechanisms operate to normalize and promote certain ideas of sport, Olympism, and international development — and how these now taken-for-granted ideas influence how we view these organizations and the role that they play in global equitable development.

While Foucauldian conceptions of power have been utilized by many critical researchers, there have been some critiques of his analyses that are important to recognize and take into account. Foucault’s writings are almost always exclusively focused on men, and he failed to theorize a gendered conception of discipline and power. While many feminists (particularly poststructural feminists) have drawn on and extended Foucauldian concepts, this arguably remains one of the shortcomings of his research.⁴² In a similar light, Foucault’s work has been critiqued by postcolonial feminist theorists who argue that

³⁹ Chatziefstathiou and Henry, *Discourses of Olympism: From the Sorbonne 1894 to London 2012*. p. 250

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Sigmund Loland, “Coubertin’s Ideology of Olympism from the Perspective of the History of Ideas,” *OLYMPIKA: The International Journal of Olympic Studies* IV (1995): 49–77.

⁴² Markula and Pringle, *Foucault, Sport and Exercise: Power, Knowledge and Transforming the Self*.

Foucault's claim that power is always accompanied by resistance assumes that everyone has a 'voice' and ignores the "repressive power of colonialism and patriarchy"⁴³ (post-colonial theory is discussed in more detail further on in this chapter). Despite these critiques, many researchers have found Foucauldian analyses of power and knowledge to be useful when engaging in critical work, especially when looking at the ways in which discourses are utilized to maintain and obtain authority.

Gramsci, Foucault and Critical Sports Studies

While utilizing Foucault's conceptions of power has proven useful in questioning and examining some of ways in which the IOC has maintained and obtained power and control, there are also some other perspectives of power that have been utilized by critical sport researchers that are also relevant for this research. For example, Gramsci's theory of hegemony has been utilized by several researchers to examine the way in which power relations are negotiated between subordinate and dominant actors. Darnell explains how hegemony theory has been useful for his research on SDP initiatives "because it reminds and illustrates that the social organization of sporting practices and the social and political meanings ascribed to sport are particular and the result of negotiation between actors within relations of power."⁴⁴

The hegemonic framework explains how dominant groups maintain control over subordinate groups through establishing consent. In this dissertation I have utilized the theory of hegemony alongside Foucault's conceptions of power to help explain the ways in which the IOC is able to maintain power and control through negotiations of consent. It is

⁴³ Cheryl McEwan, *Postcolonialism and Development* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009). p. 69.

⁴⁴ Simon Darnell, *Sport for Development and Peace: A Critical Sociology* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012). p. 23.

these negotiations that have been of interest in a bid to understand how the IOC maintains a level of legitimacy and authority. While Gramsci moved beyond Marxist theory, his conceptualization of power aligns more closely to Marxist understandings when compared to Foucault's explanations of power.⁴⁵

Gramsci refined Marxist theory by suggesting that “hegemony was not solely dependent on economic modes of production and structures but on the ability of the rulers to convince the ruled on the legitimacy of their system of beliefs”⁴⁶ through cultural, political and economic practices. In this way, Gramsci opens up the potential to examine institutions such as the IOC, wherein power may not necessarily (or solely) lie in its links to economic modes of production but also its position as a dominant cultural institution.

Gramsci argued in particular that it is important to acknowledge that power relations are in constant flux between coercion and consent — recognizing that in a successful hegemonic system coercion is no longer required. Gramsci also explained that “for a group to be hegemonic, it must be strongly positioned, not just in relation to other groups, but in relation to the economic, political and cultural conditions that allow it to put itself forward as leading.”⁴⁷ This theorizing of power involves an examination of the broader institutional conditions to assist in explaining what types of conditions are in place in order for something to be considered hegemonic. For example, several researchers have utilized the concept of hegemonic masculinity to examine sport as a site for upholding societal patriarchal structures

⁴⁵ Toby Miller, “Michel Foucault and the Critique of Sport,” in *Marxism, Cultural Studies and Sport*, ed. Ben Carrington and Ian McDonald (Routledge, 2009).

⁴⁶ Richard Pringle, “Masculinities, Sport, and Power: A Critical Comparison of Gramscian and Foucauldian Inspired Theoretical Tools,” *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 2005. p. 259.

⁴⁷ Jonathan Joseph, *The Social in the Global: Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2012). p. 40.

through reifying violence and male aggressiveness.⁴⁸ Similarly, researchers critically examining the rise of the use of sport as a tool for development and peace have also utilized hegemony theory to “illuminate the political and cultural economy of sport, development and SDP.”⁴⁹

I have chosen to utilize both Foucault’s and Gramsci’s theorizing of power in order to discuss the IOC and its power relations. Some have argued that the differences between Foucault and Gramsci are irreconcilable,⁵⁰ however, I agree with other researchers who have argued that concepts developed by these theorists can be used together to develop a more in-depth analysis that may not be achieved by utilizing one perspective.⁵¹ I argue that neither theorist provides a complete understanding of power or authority — suggesting instead that both have been useful to understand power, in different ways. I am interested in examining both an institutional level of power and also the everyday interactions that may influence this power. In this way, Gramsci and Foucault have both developed concepts that provide a useful framework for analysis of this research.

In this dissertation I have found Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to be useful in helping analyze the broader institutional context, where I examined the IOC’s struggles with power as an international sporting institution in changing political, economic and social contexts. On the other hand, I have also found Foucault’s concept of governmentality — and

⁴⁸ Raewyn W Connell, *Masculinities* (University of California Press, 1995); David Rowe, “PLAY UP: Rethinking Power and Resistance in Sport,” *Journal of Sport & Social Issues* 22, no. 3 (August 1, 1998): 241–251.

⁴⁹ Simon C. Darnell and Lyndsay Hayhurst, “Hegemony, Postcolonialism and Sport-for-Development: A Response to Lindsey and Grattan,” *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 4, no. 1 (March 12, 2012). p. 112.

⁵⁰ Rick Gruneau, “The Critique of Sport in Modernity: Theorizing Power, Culture, and the Politics of the Body,” in *The Sports Process: A Comparative and Developmental Approach*, ed. Eric Dunning, Joseph Maguire, and Robert Pearton (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1993), 85–109.

⁵¹ Pringle, “Masculinities, Sport, and Power: A Critical Comparison of Gramscian and Foucauldian Inspired Theoretical Tools.”

his theorizing of discourse and knowledge within this concept — to be additionally useful to examine the more nuanced techniques that operate within these modes of power. For example, hegemony helps to explain the broader structural issues of power in discussing the rise of neoliberalism such as the impact and role of the free market, privatization and welfare cuts, whereas governmentality “...provides a detailed account of the technologies by which neoliberalism works through the governance aspect and its micro-level operation,”⁵² such as the focus on individualization of responsibility and freedom. These conceptualizations of power have been useful in examining the ways in which the IOC and the UN have both navigated the emerging neoliberal context and help to explain how and why decisions were made at different points in time throughout their histories.

Institutional Ethnographers also adopt some of Foucault’s work on discourse and power, wherein discourses are argued to play an important role in relations of ruling. Dorothy Smith extended Foucault’s conception of discourse to emphasize the role of the social in their formation and the way in which they are taken up. Smith’s understanding of power and relations of ruling are used alongside Foucault’s and Gramsci’s theoretical analyses throughout my dissertation. I discuss IE in more detail and explain how it fits with my theoretical framework in chapter three when I explain my methodological approaches.

In the next section, I engage in a theoretical and historical discussion about the role of sport in our society in a bid to provide a background to the critical discussion of sport in international development. This context highlights some of the discourses and ideologies that the practices of sport engages with.

⁵² Joseph, *The Social in the Global: Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics*. p.41.

Sport

Sport in all of its forms is deeply embedded in the way in which local and global societies operate in the modern world. In contemporary mainstream culture, the term ‘sport’ is often promoted and perceived as a positive phenomenon.⁵³ Despite these ideals, critical sport scholars have warned that sport is far too often represented in positive terms,⁵⁴ and that sport commonly has less than ideal impacts on society.⁵⁵ It has been argued by some that sport should be viewed as ‘neutral’ or an ‘empty form’,⁵⁶ where, depending on how it is used, it can either have a negative or a positive impact or both at the same time.⁵⁷ Arguably, this idea of sport as ‘neutral’ is what makes sport so powerful.

Nauright questions these views of sport as neutral or moral by explaining that the “history of modern sporting forms and organizations [, however,] demonstrates clearly that sports have become key components of the public relations machine whereby public discourses reify the wonders of capitalist accumulation and growth as the only legitimate path to development and measure of success.”⁵⁸ Similarly Guttman explains that sport is inherently repressive and a “mirror image of capitalist tendencies.”⁵⁹ We need only look at its history and the way in which it is currently used to uncover this. Even the Olympic Games, which had been attempting to remain (or at least promote itself as) one of the last bastions of

⁵³ Beutler, “Sport Serving Development and Peace: Achieving the Goals of the United Nations through Sport.”

⁵⁴ Peter Donnelly, “Sport and Human Rights,” *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (July 2008): 381–394; Guest, “The Diffusion of Development-through-Sport: Analysing the History and Practice of the Olympic Movement’s Grassroots Outreach to Africa.”

⁵⁵ Allen Guttman, “Sport, Politics and the Engaged Historian,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 3 (July 1, 2003): 363–375.

⁵⁶ John MacAloon, “Interval Training,” in *Choreographing History*, ed. Susan Leigh Foster (Indiana University Press, 1995), 32–53.

⁵⁷ Donnelly, “Sport and Human Rights.”

⁵⁸ John Nauright, “Sport and the Neo-Liberal World Order,” *Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies* 6, no. 2 (October 1, 2014): 281–288. p. 283.

⁵⁹ Guttman, “Sport, Politics and the Engaged Historian.” p. 364.

amateur sport, now sells “...every conceivable space and service to corporate donors and their brands.”⁶⁰

While the term ‘sport’ is used to describe many types of physical activities from all over the world, most mainstream sport has specific western, masculinist, and colonialist origins, and some sports have been used to promote various repressive political regimes.⁶¹ Competitive, rule-based sport, became popular in 19th century Britain as an activity for school boys to develop ‘moral character’ and produce “leadership and team work skills required by the dominant class.”⁶² British and French colonial powers also used sport as a tool to assimilate and build the ‘moral character’ of indigenous peoples of colonized countries.⁶³ Giulianotti describes British sports as “‘civilising’ instruments of cultural genocide, as the ‘human movement’ cultures of colonized people were purposively eradicated or systematically co-opted into colonial sporting models.”⁶⁴ Dyreson describes how sport has been consistently used throughout history as a type of social technology to shape modern cultures into a specific mold.⁶⁵

Dyreson argues that by the 1920s and 1930s capitalists were utilizing sport as a way to control the masses and to construct the idea of ‘modern nationalism’.⁶⁶ It was around this time that global sport became institutionalized through the creation of various international sporting organizations, most notably the IOC. These international sports organizations

⁶⁰ Tony Collins, *Sport in Capitalist Society: A Short History* (Routledge, 2013). p. 120.

⁶¹ Guttmann, “Sport, Politics and the Engaged Historian.”

⁶² John Horne et al., *Understanding Sport: A Socio-Cultural Analysis* (Routledge, 2012). p. xiv.

⁶³ Guest, “The Diffusion of Development-through-Sport: Analysing the History and Practice of the Olympic Movement’s Grassroots Outreach to Africa.”

⁶⁴ Richard Giulianotti, “Sport, Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution: A Contextual Analysis and Modelling of the Sport, Development and Peace Sector,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34, no. 2 (February 2011): 207–228. p. 210.

⁶⁵ Mark Dyreson, “Globalizing the Nation-Making Process: Modern Sport in World History,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 20, no. 1 (March 8, 2003): 91–106.

⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 94.

continued to promote and reinforce western hegemonic powers and engaged in many colonialist, racist, sexist, and politically repressive tendencies.⁶⁷ The most famous example of this was when Adolf Hitler, with support from the IOC, utilized the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936 to promote the Nazi regime. Even after the decolonization processes that occurred throughout the 1970s onwards, the IOC leadership has remained western/euro-centric, who, even though they may have changed some policies have never given up their hegemonic powers.⁶⁸

While the worldwide popularity of modern sport is often taken-for-granted, it is important to acknowledge that these sorts of histories are embedded in the way in which sport is viewed and utilized in the 21st Century, and has implications for those impacted by SDP initiatives. Furthermore, the growing power of a capitalist market throughout the 21st century has arguably impacted the way in which sport is utilized and performed in the modern day. Modern sport has become so intertwined with capitalist neoliberal ideals that it is difficult to separate one from the other. Collins writes that modern sport “offered a metaphor for life in a world in which the capitalist market reigned supreme.”⁶⁹ Perhaps this flourishing relationship should not come as such a surprise, as the competitive, individualist values promoted by sporting institutions are very compatible with the ideologies promoted by neoliberal capitalists. The IOC itself has reaped huge successes by linking the Olympic Games with capitalist ideologies. It is these types of relationships that the IOC has built that have to be questioned and examined closely when engaging in research on their links with international development.

⁶⁷ Ken Foster, “Alternative Models for the Regulation of Global Sport,” in *The Global Politics of Sport*, ed. Lincoln Allison (London: Routledge, 2005).

⁶⁸ Aki Hietanen, “Towards a New International Sports Order?,” *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 5, no. 4 (1982): 159–174.

⁶⁹ Collins, *Sport in Capitalist Society: A Short History*. p. 120.

In sum, and the point to be taken from this section that is especially pertinent to this dissertation is that when the UN promotes the use of sport as a tool to achieve their MDGs (and beyond) and engages in a partnership with the largest sports organization in the world, it is imperative to ask critical questions about the historical role of sport in politics, and to consider how answers to these questions might help us to better understand sport's positioning in contemporary society.

Critical Sociological Examinations of the IOC

There have been many critiques of the IOC's current rendition of the Games. Some have suggested that the IOC does not live up to its goals and values as outlined in the *Olympic Charter*.⁷⁰ Of course, this critique is necessarily limited in the sense that these commentators have already taken-for-granted the idea that the Olympics and the IOC could have a positive influence on society — but that it is corrupted. I argue here that we need to rid ourselves of these taken-for-granted ideas about the Olympic Games, and question their involvement in human rights and international development in the first place. For example, Mark Perryman, a British academic, wrote an essay titled '*The Good, the Bad and the Orbit*'. This was a critical essay examining the 2012 London Olympic Games including some alternatives to make the Games better, such as, "the Olympics should not be flogged off to the highest bidder as a logo to sell fast food that makes you fat, fizzy drinks that rot your teeth and credit cards that lead to a lifetime of high interest-rate debt."⁷¹ In this quote, Perryman suggests, like many other scholars,⁷² that the Olympic Games and the IOC are different from these corporations that sponsor the Games — and that underlying some of the

⁷⁰ Mark Perryman, "The Good, the Bad and the Orbit," in *London 2012: How Was It for Us?*, ed. Mark Perryman (Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 2013), 13–42.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 19.

⁷² Chatziefstathiou and Henry, *Discourses of Olympism: From the Sorbonne 1894 to London 2012*; MacAloon, "Interval Training."

negative issues is an organization that represents “all that is good about sport.”⁷³

Interestingly, he described his recommendations as enormously radical. However, if we think about what is being suggested here, it is not a radical re-imagination of sport at all — but simply a re-affirmation of the idea that the Olympic Games are inherently good.

It is these types of critiques of the Olympic Games and perhaps of the global sporting industry more generally that enable the IOC to continue to present itself as a force for good in the world, despite a wealth of counter-evidence. Perhaps it is the hegemonic status of these types of critiques that have limited our ability to ask important questions — such as why does the IOC have a seat at the UN General Assembly, and what are the possible implications of this.

The IOC continues to present its event and its role in the world as something that is beneficial to society. Specifically their promotion of the ideology of Olympism has, according to Chatziefstathiou and Henry been described as “a social philosophy which emphasizes the role of sport in world development, peaceful co-existence, international understanding and social and moral education.”⁷⁴ Hoberman explains how these discourses surrounding Olympism and the Olympic Movement that were so heavily promoted and heralded by the founder, Pierre de Coubertin — have seemingly stalled in-depth critical examination of the IOC and the Olympic Movement, as research focuses on how the Olympic movement achieves or does not achieve their ethical ideals rather than asking questions about what the Olympic Movement actually is in the first place.⁷⁵ Hoberman posits that the 1936 Berlin Olympics have been “widely misunderstood as an isolated lapse on the

⁷³ Perryman, “The Good, the Bad and the Orbit.” p. 18.

⁷⁴ Chatziefstathiou and Henry, *Discourses of Olympism: From the Sorbonne 1894 to London 2012*. p. 250.

⁷⁵ Hoberman, “Toward a Theory of Olympic Internationalism.”

part of the IOC...”⁷⁶ He continues and explains that Nazis and the IOC shared an ideological compatibility, which made them willing partners. While links to Fascism within the IOC leadership might be waning, there are other practices within the IOC that have been questioned by other critical researchers.

For example, the IOC has long claimed to promote internationalism and frame sport as a universal language that cuts across all cultures. According to several researchers, however, these claims have been used to “mask their [the IOC’s] national intentions.”⁷⁷ The strong focus on national identity at the Olympic Games is difficult to ignore — which is why scholars like Dyreson have questioned how this identity making contributes to cross-cultural understanding, and have explicitly argued that the promotion of national identity tends to give nationalism “new vigour and increased power.”⁷⁸ This manner of operating reinforces difference across cultural and nation state lines, where support of an athlete depends much more on what country she is linked to rather than her performance. Furthermore, the entire staging of the Olympic event is often used to exert the power of the host nation. For example, US President George W. Bush used the Salt Lake City Olympics to promote US nationalism in response to the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Towers in New York.⁷⁹ Silk and Falcoux relay an interview with President George W. Bush just before the Winter Olympic Opening Ceremony where he stated that the Salt Lake City Olympic Games were “a statement of peace and unity in re-establishing nationhood...and a chance to move beyond the evils.”⁸⁰

Sitting closely alongside this promotion of nationalism is the role of capitalism that

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 17.

⁷⁷ Dyreson, “Globalizing the Nation-Making Process: Modern Sport in World History.” p. 95.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 102.

⁷⁹ Michael Atkinson and Kevin Young, “Terror Games: Media Treatment of Security Issues at the 2002 Winter Olympic Games,” *OLYMPIKA: The International Journal of Olympic Studies* xi (2002): 53–78.

⁸⁰ Michael Silk and Mark Falcoux, “One Day in September/a Week in February: Mobilizing American (sporting) Nationalisms,” *Sociology of Sport Journal* 22, no. 4 (2005): 447 - 471. p. 458.

impacts all aspects of the sporting event. Although it is not a secret that the Olympic Games is a huge commercial enterprise, the IOC still works hard to present itself as different from a traditional corporation and engages in actions that demonstrate an attempt to hide its commercial tendencies. For example, the IOC has rules in place that limit advertising within the Olympic venues. This includes advertising by athletes themselves and/or other advertising around the stadiums. The IOC claims that the Olympics are the only major event in the world that keeps venues free of commercial messages. The publically stated reason for this is to provide athletes and the audience with a clean uninterrupted space to focus on the sporting events and to protect the integrity of the Olympic Games and the ideals of Olympism.⁸¹ On the other hand many scholars have argued that this is simply a capitalist decision made to protect Olympic sponsors — i.e., to ensure that individuals, corporations or organizations that are not paying to be sponsors cannot utilize this event for marketing. Despite its political ideals linked to Olympism, the IOC is now more closely accountable to the sponsors and corporations that keep the Olympic enterprise running. Nauright explains that: “The Olympic Games are more about selling consumer processes and dominant political ideologies than about promoting peace and social justice.”⁸² At the same time, presenting itself as a peace-promoting organization is important to get these corporations to want to align themselves with the Olympic Games. It is these close ties to organizations that operate for profit that make the IOC different from any other organization that has a seat at the UN General Assembly.

There are other aspects of the IOC’s organizational status that set it apart from the other public organizations at the UN General Assembly. Even though the Olympic Games

⁸¹ International Olympic Committee, *Olympic Charter*.

⁸² Nauright, “Sport and the Neo-Liberal World Order.” p. 284.

are funded in part by public taxpayers, the IOC as a sporting organization is considered by law a ‘private club’ where it is treated as a voluntary body. As Foster states, “they are not publically accountable and cannot be held to the same legal standards of fairness in their governance that would apply to publically funded organizations.”⁸³

The IOC has also been linked to various corruption scandals and has been shown to be a corrupt organization. However, and because the organization does not engage in transparency practices, these corrupt behaviours often go unnoticed — since it is ultimately up to investigative journalists or whistleblowers to uncover these practices. For example, in 1998, a few years before the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics, allegations of bribery payments involving IOC members and Olympic bid committees were made. In 1991, several IOC members and their relatives had received over \$400,000 in financial aid and scholarships from the Salt Lake City Bid Committee (SLOBC) in exchange for their votes. After this was made public the IOC were forced to expel ten of their members and reprimand several more.⁸⁴

After the bribery scandal came out before the Salt Lake City Olympic Games, in 1999, US House of Representatives demanded that the IOC become a signatory to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) ‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction.’⁸⁵ The effect of this would have made bribery of an IOC member punishable under US law.⁸⁶ However, and perhaps ironically, considering the IOC’s new position as a Permanent

⁸³ Foster, “Alternative Models for the Regulation of Global Sport.” p. 69.

⁸⁴ Richard W Pound, *Inside the Olympics* (Canada: John Wiley and Sons Canada Ltd., 2004).

⁸⁵ Byron Peacock, “‘A Secret Instinct of Social Preservation’: Legitimacy and the Dynamic (re)constitution of Olympic Conceptions of the ‘good,’” *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (April 2011): 477–502.

⁸⁶ Thomas A. Hamilton, “Long Hard Fall From Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal, The,” *Marquette Sports Law Review* 21 (2010): 219.

Observer (ostensibly limited to public organizations) the OECD responded to the request by stating that, because the IOC did not correspond to the definition of what it means to be a public international organization, it could not join the Convention.⁸⁷ This presents just one example where the IOC's organizational status might limit the ability for public oversight.

This needs to be considered when the IOC is viewed as an appropriate organization to partner with an international development organization. The next section focuses on research that has critically examined the use of sport as a tool to achieve international development goals — recognizing that several researchers have highlighted some of the potential issues with linking this industry to these ideals.

Sport for Development and Peace Literature

While several researchers point out that sport has been utilized for development initiatives for more than a century,⁸⁸ the concept of SDP is a relatively new one, particularly in the realm of international development. In the past two decades, the 'SDP movement' (as it is described by Kidd, 2008)⁸⁹ has grown immensely, with many NGOs now set up solely to provide SDP-focused programmes around the world. International development agencies, transnational corporations, and also high-performance sports organizations such as the IOC have all jumped on board to promote, support, and create SDP programmes.⁹⁰ SDP has been defined as an effort to utilize sport as a tool to aid development goals,⁹¹ and is often used as a catch-all term to refer to “organizations and programmes that now employ sport to meet

⁸⁷ US Government, “Hearing: The Olympics Site Selection Process 106-88” (Washington, DC: Wahington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg60363/html/CHRG-106hhrg60363.htm>.

⁸⁸ Guest, “The Diffusion of Development-through-Sport: Analysing the History and Practice of the Olympic Movement's Grassroots Outreach to Africa.”

⁸⁹ Bruce Kidd, “A New Social Movement: Sport for Development and Peace,” *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (July 2008): 370–380.

⁹⁰ Beutler, “Sport Serving Development and Peace: Achieving the Goals of the United Nations through Sport.”

⁹¹ Kidd, “A New Social Movement: Sport for Development and Peace.”

development goals.”⁹²

The term peace is often included when we talk about and examine sport for development initiatives, as seen in the moniker ‘sport for development and peace’. In his book, *Sport and Peace: A Sociological Perspective* Brian Wilson explains how the term peace is associated with different meanings in different contexts, but is commonly used by organizations and individuals in sporting contexts “...who are concerned with issues around inequality, and are driven to address problems like sport-related violence and conflict.”⁹³ It is not always clear how different SDP organizations view peace and development. However, we do see that SDP organizations often refer to the UN MDGs as the development and peace goals of their organization. That is, their engagement with SDP is aimed at achieving one or some aspects of the MDGs. In order to understand SDP, we need to examine the term development more generally.

Development and Postcolonial Theory

The concept of development has a long contested history, and can broadly be defined as “the organized intervention in collective affairs according to a standard of improvement.”⁹⁴ Black, who utilizes this definition of development in his work, recognizes that there are wide ranging perspectives on what constitutes ‘improvement’, and explains that “virtually all serious development scholars are deeply ambivalent about the very idea of development in its institutionalized forms.”⁹⁵ Although development interventions do sometimes have beneficial outcomes, it is important not to take the concept for granted as

⁹² Darnell and Black, “Mainstreaming Sport into International Development Studies.” p. 367.

⁹³ Brian Wilson, *Sport and Peace: A Sociological Perspective* (Oxford University Press: Canada, 2012). p. 205.

⁹⁴ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions* (London: Sage Publications, 2001). p. 3.

⁹⁵ David R. Black, “The Ambiguities of Development: Implications for ‘development through Sport,’” *Sport in Society* 13, no. 1 (January 2010): 121–129. p. 122-3.

inherently beneficial to its intended recipients. One cannot genuinely define SDP or development more generally without acknowledging the power relations embedded within their existence.

It is argued that SDP practitioners have done little to account for some of the critiques of international development ideologies. This may be linked to the fact that these practitioners often rely on development organizations for funding.⁹⁶ Additionally, SDP practitioners are also “latecomers to the ‘development’ enterprise and have not had the opportunity to reflect on some of the key challenges to development thinking that other ‘development’ organizations now well established and after years of international scrutiny have had.”⁹⁷ These implications of sport-related development would seem to be highly pertinent — especially considering sport’s own relationship with a similar history of colonialism and western-centric ideologies that may work to impede any attempts at achieving goals of equitable global relations. The IOC’s own historical role in development initiatives has been critiqued for its colonial tendencies. Guest writes about the Olympic Movement’s grassroots outreach to Africa, where de Coubertin viewed the African continent as ‘troubled’ and as something that could be ‘developed’ through the promotion of Olympism and participation in Olympic sport.⁹⁸

Postcolonial theorists have also worked to critique the concepts of development by highlighting the western and colonialist assumptions that are so often embedded within these

⁹⁶ Coalter, “The Politics of Sport-for-Development: Limited Focus Programmes and Broad Gauge Problems?”

⁹⁷ Rebecca Tiessen, “Global Subjects or Objects of Globalisation? The Promotion of Global Citizenship in Organisations Offering Sport for Development And/or Peace Programmes,” *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (April 2011): 571–587. p. 579.

⁹⁸ Guest, “The Diffusion of Development-through-Sport: Analysing the History and Practice of the Olympic Movement’s Grassroots Outreach to Africa.”

development interventions.⁹⁹ This theoretical tool has also proved useful for scholars examining SDP interventions — as they attempt to uncover the underlying purposes of them, and to ask questions about ‘who really benefits’. Although postcolonialism has diverse definitions, it generally “refers to either a condition, or a set of approaches and theories that have become ways of criticizing the material and discursive legacies of colonialism that are still apparent in the world today, and still shape geopolitical and economic relations between the global North and South.”¹⁰⁰ Postcolonial theory seeks to examine these power relations to determine “who creates ‘knowledge’ about other places and peoples and the consequences of this knowledge...”¹⁰¹ Some postcolonial theorists are influenced by Marxist perspectives, specifically as “it draws on the political economy approaches of Marxism to explore how dominant groups in society come to exercise power and authority over less powerful or subjugated groups.”¹⁰² Postcolonial theorists extended Marx’s theorizing to incorporate the racialization of class differences.

Postcolonial critiques challenge us to problematize how we view the world, “particularly the ‘homogenizing of the South into the ‘Third World’, and [to] challenge the unacknowledged and unexamined assumptions at the heart of western disciplines that are profoundly insensitive to the meanings, values and practices of other cultures.”¹⁰³ Similar to Foucault, some postcolonial theorists highlight the role of discourse in shaping the world that we take for granted. Discourse is “the ensemble of social practices through which the world

⁹⁹ Simon C. Darnell, “Playing with Race: Right to Play and the Production of Whiteness in ‘Development through Sport,’” *Sport in Society* 10, no. 4 (July 5, 2007): 560–579; Lyndsay M C Hayhurst, “Corporatising Sport, Gender and Development: Postcolonial IR Feminisms, Transnational Private Governance and Global Corporate Social Engagement,” *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (April 2011): 531–549.

¹⁰⁰ Sarah Radcliffe, “Re-Thinking Development,” in *Introducing Human Geographies*, ed. Paul Cloake, Philip Crang, and Mark Goodwin (London: Arnold, 1999). p. 84.

¹⁰¹ McEwan, *Postcolonialism and Development*. p. 23

¹⁰² Ibid. p. 27.

¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 120-121.

is made meaningful.”¹⁰⁴ These practices influence how we come to see the world, which is embedded in relations of power. Therefore, it is important to uncover who has access to creating knowledges and to ask whom they serve. While many postcolonial scholars have been influenced by Foucault’s writings of power and discourse, it is important to recognize that postcolonial scholars have also critiqued Foucault’s writings as being Eurocentric, and ignorant of the powers of colonialism and patriarchy.¹⁰⁵

In utilizing postcolonial theory to analyze SDP interventions, one would attempt to unpack some of the dominant discourses surrounding sport and development to examine some of the ways in which it perhaps perpetuates dominant power relations. This type of research recognizes that patriarchy and colonialism are embedded in the history of sport (including Olympic sport) and in development and continue to be utilized to legitimate their existence. A postcolonial approach to examining SDP interventions requires that the researcher questions relations of power and highlights the importance of examining the context within which these SDP interventions take place.

Current dominant SDP initiatives have been described as having neo-colonial leanings, and as seeking to “impose the values of the west on the disadvantaged of developing countries.”¹⁰⁶ For example, Hayhurst adopts a feminist postcolonial approach to examining SDP interventions targeting girls and women in the South.¹⁰⁷ Hayhurst describes how this approach enables us to examine interventions that “seem benevolent and perhaps rather harmless on the surface,” with the goal of “deepen[ing] our sensitivities to the impacts

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 121.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Tiessen, “Global Subjects or Objects of Globalisation? The Promotion of Global Citizenship in Organisations Offering Sport for Development and/or Peace Programmes.” p. 581.

¹⁰⁷ Hayhurst, “Corporatising Sport, Gender and Development: Postcolonial IR Feminisms, Transnational Private Governance and Global Corporate Social Engagement.”

such initiatives might have on subalterns and the social and economic inequalities they face.”¹⁰⁸ This helps us recognize that western-dominated SDP interventions (even with the ‘best’ intentions) can unwittingly play a role in continued global inequalities. It also highlights the role that gender plays in these interventions. Saveedra, who also utilizes a feminist postcolonial approach, explains that “seeking to empower females through sport is somewhat paradoxical given that the world of sport can be a bastion for male privilege and power...as well as furthering EuroAmerican hegemony vis-à-vis the global South.”¹⁰⁹

Postcolonial perspectives recognize that development is all about power, and rather than taking the ostensibly positive purposes of development interventions for granted, a postcolonial researcher would ask “who has the power to write histories and to represent other people and places”¹¹⁰? What are the consequences of this? And who really benefits? This approach enables us to take a step back to really interrogate SDP interventions. Many SDP interventions are controlled and operated by organizations/individuals from the global North that are utilized to achieve development goals in the global South.¹¹¹ Research has also found that SDP interventions often align with dominant approaches to development “that take place in hegemonic relations in which privileged groups (nations, citizens, corporations) maintain a position of benefit and accrue over others...”¹¹² The previous section highlighted the IOC’s elitist and western-centric ideologies, knowing this, it is important that we consider critical examinations of SDP as the IOC attempts to align itself with an

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 545.

¹⁰⁹ Martha Saveedra, “Dilemmas and Opportunities in Gender and Sport-in-Development,” in *Sport and International Development*, ed. Roger Levermore and Aaron Beacom (UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). p. 124.

¹¹⁰ McEwan, *Postcolonialism and Development*. p. 9.

¹¹¹ Tiessen, “Global Subjects or Objects of Globalisation? The Promotion of Global Citizenship in Organisations Offering Sport for Development And/or Peace Programmes.”

¹¹² Darnell, “Power, Politics and ‘Sport for Development and Peace’: Investigating the Utility of Sport for International Development.” p. 57.

international development organization.

Sport in Development and Peace Initiatives

There are several reasons why the promotion of sport has garnered so much attention in the area of international development. Hartmann and Kwauk speak to this when they argue that the dominant approach to SDP:

...plays off a long-standing, idealized belief in sport as a powerful, pro-social force for character building and self-discipline. These development ideals were revalorized and accentuated in the late 20th century with the emergence of neoliberal ideologies...¹¹³

These researchers suggest that values promoted within sport closely resemble those values promoted within neoliberal type development, such as individualism, competition and free enterprise, which is why, they argue, that sport has become such a popular tool to promote certain types of development initiatives. Other researchers have also linked SDP with promoting neoliberal ideologies — with a particular focus on changing the individual rather than addressing structural inequalities.¹¹⁴

SDP interventions are embedded in western, colonial, and patriarchal histories. Research that does not problematize these histories in the context of SDP are unavoidably ‘one-sided’ and deceptive. For example, Beutler promotes SDP practices on the basis that “sport as an international language, can build bridges between people, help overcome cultural differences, and spread an atmosphere of tolerance.”¹¹⁵ She adheres to dominant ideologies around sport that view the concept as apolitical and inherently positive. While

¹¹³ Douglas Hartmann and Christina Kwauk, “Sport and Development: An Overview, Critique, and Reconstruction,” *Journal of Sport & Social Issues* (July 29, 2011). p. 4.

¹¹⁴ Giulianotti, “Sport, Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution: A Contextual Analysis and Modelling of the Sport, Development and Peace Sector”; Guest, “The Diffusion of Development-through-Sport: Analysing the History and Practice of the Olympic Movement’s Grassroots Outreach to Africa.”

¹¹⁵ Beutler, “Sport Serving Development and Peace: Achieving the Goals of the United Nations through Sport.” p. 359.

Beutler does acknowledge that sport does not always have beneficial outcomes, she fails to accept that sport might play a role in exacerbating negative values and rather sees sport as simply at the whim of ‘society’ in this respect:

While it is recognized that sport is a reflection of society and therefore may also encompass some of the worst human traits, including violence, corruption, discrimination, excessive nationalism, human rights abuses, cheating and drug abuse, these negative aspects of sport by no means outweigh the potential positive benefits.¹¹⁶

This perspective on sport and of SDP intervention — which aligns with dominant rhetoric promoted by most SDP organizations — completely ignores any potential influence sport has on society, limiting potential critical discussion around sport. SDP research needs to acknowledge the historical, social and political context of sport in general and of SDP interventions more specifically in order to offer a more balanced assessment of the potential impacts it has on our society. The fact that the UN has so wholeheartedly and uncritically embraced sport as a tool to be used to achieve goals of development and peace influences the SDP sector. It also influences the ways in which sporting organizations, such as the IOC, are viewed as potential partners in this area. With this in mind this dissertation has sought to question the role of the IOC at the UN General Assembly and the potential implications involved in having an elite, private sporting organization involved in promoting sport in assisting development and peace initiatives.

In doing this I am guided by a range of other researchers who have taken a more critical approach to analyzing SDP initiatives.¹¹⁷ These researchers acknowledge that sport’s

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p. 363.

¹¹⁷ Coalter, “The Politics of Sport-for-Development: Limited Focus Programmes and Broad Gauge Problems?”; Darnell, “Power, Politics and ‘Sport for Development and Peace’: Investigating the Utility of Sport for International Development”; Guest, “The Diffusion of Development-through-Sport: Analysing the History and Practice of the Olympic Movement’s Grassroots Outreach to Africa”; Hayhurst,

‘mythopoeic’ status (as Coalter describes it) as inherently positive continues to be widely promoted by some academics, sports organizations, development initiatives and NGOs. The IOC has played a large role in this, recognizing that its widely promoted discourse of sport as engendering values of humanism, peace and internationalism¹¹⁸ has become instilled as the dominant discourse, and continues to be used to promote the Olympic Games around the world. We are all influenced by these discourses and we most likely have all played a role in celebrating sport one way or another. This means that recognizing some of the negative consequences of sport in amongst dominant rhetoric can sometimes be challenging.¹¹⁹ This is why it is important and useful to engage in a social constructionist approach to this research as a way of highlighting ideological notions of sport generally, and questioning the IOC’s role at the UN specifically.

In critically examining SDP interventions, many researchers have found that it is this dominant view of sport — and the lack of a balanced approach to assessing SDP — that works to limit some of the benefits these interventions may have.¹²⁰ For example, Darnell utilized Gramscian hegemony theory to examine the perspectives of western SDP volunteers. He found that their perceptions of these SDP projects were embedded within the dominant ideology “that sport participation and increased opportunities to be physically active, furthers the successful participation of the world’s poor and marginalized within capitalist regions.”¹²¹ This way of thinking aligns with neoliberal development philosophies that arguably do more

“Corporatising Sport, Gender and Development: Postcolonial IR Feminisms, Transnational Private Governance and Global Corporate Social Engagement.”

¹¹⁸International Olympic Committee, *Olympic Charter*.

¹¹⁹ Donnelly, “Sport and Human Rights.”

¹²⁰ Hartmann and Kwauk, “Sport and Development: An Overview, Critique, and Reconstruction”; Chiaki Okada and Kevin Young, “Sport and Social Development: Promise and Caution from an Incipient Cambodian Football League,” *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 2012.

¹²¹ Darnell, “Power, Politics and ‘Sport for Development and Peace’: Investigating the Utility of Sport for International Development.” p. 70.

to benefit those with power already rather than the intended subjects of these interventions. Black acknowledged that the overall belief in the transcendent power of sport in SDP interventions limits the ability of organizations and individuals to critically reflect on the potential impacts that dominant development and sport discourses could have.¹²² Both Darnell and Black acknowledged that, as it stands, SDP programmes may do little to challenge dominant discourses that contribute to global inequalities.

While there is a lot to critique in analyzing SDP initiatives that uphold dominant sporting ideologies, researchers have, at the same time, suggested that counter-hegemonic approaches are a possibility. For example, Darnell suggests supporting SDP approaches “...that would engage directly with the political economy and the relations of dominance that produce the need for development in the first place.”¹²³ Darnell and Hayhurst also argue that sport is “socially and politically ‘malleable’”¹²⁴ — and therefore it has the potential to promote alternative and marginalized ideologies and viewpoints. I do appreciate the potential for sport to be counter-hegemonic and to have the potential to assist in creating positive social change. At the same time, I am wary of celebrating this potential when there is little evidence that sport does bring about positive and long-lasting social change.¹²⁵ Furthermore, I am wary of the potential for sport to trouble relations of dominance when the IOC (an institution that promotes hegemonic sporting ideologies) continues to be viewed as the leader of global sport, and is now closely associated with development initiatives through its relationship with the UN.

¹²² Black, “The Ambiguities of Development: Implications for ‘development through Sport.’”

¹²³ Darnell, “Power, Politics and ‘Sport for Development and Peace’: Investigating the Utility of Sport for International Development.” p. 71.

¹²⁴ Simon C. Darnell and Lyndsay M. C. Hayhurst, “Sport for Decolonization: Exploring a New Praxis of Sport for Development,” *Progress in Development Studies* 11, no. 3 (June 21, 2011): 183–196. p. 193.

¹²⁵ Jean Harvey, John Horne, and Parissa Safai, “Alterglobalization, Global Social Movements, and the Possibility of Political Transformation Through Sport,” *Sociology of Sport Journal* 26, no. 3 (2009): 383–403.

Other researchers have been equally critical in concluding their analysis of SDP.¹²⁶ Tiessen explains that “when deployed as a development tool, sport is rarely accompanied by a deconstruction or even questioning of the predominant international development objectives.”¹²⁷ In order to come to these conclusions, it has been important for researchers to examine the social, political and economic context in which these interventions take place. SDP interventions both impact and are impacted by their contextual surroundings.

Sociologists of sport and others working from a range of critical perspectives emphasize the importance of the context when examining discursive activities in order to uncover some of the inequitable power relations.¹²⁸ One of the contextual influences that shape SDP interventions is funding. In the current neoliberal climate, funding for social programmes has decreased, making it incredibly difficult for NGOs to obtain the funding they require. Furthermore, neoliberal ideologies and policies are influencing who the funding goes to.¹²⁹ While a grassroots organization may be interested in challenging hegemonic ideologies of development, they are often tied to funding opportunities that dictate the way in which their programme is managed. Coalter pointed out that more well-known international development goals (e.g. MDGs as outlined by the United Nations) have more funding and might influence some SDP programmes to adhere to these goals to the detriment of local

¹²⁶ Fred Coalter, “Sport-for-Development: Going beyond the Boundary?,” *Sport in Society* 13, no. 9 (November 2010): 1374–1391; Hartmann and Kwauk, “Sport and Development: An Overview, Critique, and Reconstruction”; Hayhurst, “Corporatising Sport, Gender and Development: Postcolonial IR Feminisms, Transnational Private Governance and Global Corporate Social Engagement”; Okada and Young, “Sport and Social Development: Promise and Caution from an Incipient Cambodian Football League”; Tiessen, “Global Subjects or Objects of Globalisation? The Promotion of Global Citizenship in Organisations Offering Sport for Development And/or Peace Programmes.”

¹²⁷ Tiessen, “Global Subjects or Objects of Globalisation? The Promotion of Global Citizenship in Organisations Offering Sport for Development And/or Peace Programmes.” p. 579.

¹²⁸ Markula and Pringle, *Foucault, Sport and Exercise: Power, Knowledge and Transforming the Self*; McEwan, *Postcolonialism and Development*.

¹²⁹ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

needs.¹³⁰ Managers of sports programmes may also be influenced to engage in development rhetoric simply to obtain funding — without having the resources or expertise to ensure they are, in fact, of any benefit to anyone other than themselves.

High performance ideologies that are so often associated with sport also influence the focus of SDP programmes.¹³¹ Kidd warns that there are often pressures to adhere to these ideologies to obtain support and funding to the detriment of altruistic objectives.¹³² Global sports organizations that have been focused on high performance sport, such as the IOC, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), and International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) are often funders, creators, and/or promoters of SDP programmes. Hoberman argues that “neither the IOC nor FIFA have met the minimum ethical and humanitarian standards required for international organizations to have credible peace promoting effects.”¹³³ It is because of these factors that their role in promoting SDP has to be questioned. Connor and McEwan examine the IAAF’s foray into development practices and argue that: “The IAAF is engaging in First World development rhetoric, epitomized by neo-liberal modernization theories of development.”¹³⁴ Explaining that, the IAAF is more focused on promoting its own sports and organization rather than ensuring

¹³⁰ Coalter, “The Politics of Sport-for-Development: Limited Focus Programmes and Broad Gauge Problems?”

¹³¹ Lyndsay M.C. Hayhurst and Wendy Frisby, “Inevitable Tensions: Swiss and Canadian Sport for Development NGO Perspectives on Partnerships with High Performance Sport,” *European Sport Management Quarterly*, 2010.

¹³² Kidd, “A New Social Movement: Sport for Development and Peace.”

¹³³ Hoberman, “The Myth of Sport as a Peace-Promoting Political Force.” p. 18. In late May, 2015 nine previous and current FIFA members were indicted in connection with an investigation conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation into wire fraud and money laundering. This included allegations of receiving over \$150 million in bribes over 24 years. Alongside this case, Australia, Colombia, Costa Rica and Switzerland have all opened criminal investigations into FIFA officials for corruption. The investigations are still ongoing. (“Blatter not to testify in the US” *Swissinfo.ch*, (July 14 2015), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/fifa-probe_blatter-not-to-testify-in-the-us/41547018)

¹³⁴ James Connor and Melissa McEwen, “International Development or White Man’s Burden? The IAAF’s Regional Development Centres and Regional Sporting Assistance,” *Sport in Society* 14, no. 6 (August 20, 2011): 805–817. p. 806.

benefits for the participants. Knowing the context in which these interventions take place enables us to examine the power relations that are embedded within them, to uncover their underlying purposes and whom they really serve.

Some researchers have critiqued this global view of SDP interventions. Lindsey and Grattan argue that this perspective overstates the Global North's role in SDP programmes and ignores the agency of local grassroots SDP programmes led by those from the Global South.¹³⁵ They call for a de-centred approach to SDP research that examines programmes in their localized settings rather than simply examining the broader social, political and economic contexts. While I see the benefits of engaging in case-study research of SDP programmes that is able to examine the organization, management, and impacts of individual programmes, I agree with Darnell and Hayhurst and Levermore and Beacom's arguments that an emphasis on local development programmes limits the understanding of broader power relations at play, which is especially important considering the persistent inequalities that plague both sport and development.¹³⁶

Despite the well-developed arguments for research that takes into account the social, historical, economic and political contexts of SDP, very few researchers have actually examined the organizational linkages between two of the most influential organizations in this area, the UN and the IOC. As the most prominent international development organization, the UN plays a leading role in influencing the structure and focus of

¹³⁵ Iain Lindsey and Alan Grattan, "An 'international Movement'? Decentring Sport-for-Development within Zambian Communities," *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 4, no. 1 (March 12, 2012): 91–110.

¹³⁶ Darnell and Hayhurst, "Hegemony, Postcolonialism and Sport-for-Development: A Response to Lindsey and Grattan"; Levermore and Beacom, "Reassessing Sport-for-Development: Moving beyond 'mapping the Territory.'"

development programmes (big or small) around the world.¹³⁷ Furthermore, the IOC, one of the largest and most well-known international sports organizations, holds much influence over global sport.¹³⁸ While researchers have briefly highlighted the potential power and influence of both of these organizations in SDP,¹³⁹ research has yet to examine the way in which these two organizations have come to work together and why. Furthermore, no research has examined in detail how and why the IOC was able to obtain Permanent Observer status at the UN General Assembly.

All of this research highlights the importance of treading carefully into the SDP domain. This is an area that requires careful research into the way in which SDP interventions are currently impacting and could potentially impact goals to achieve equitable global relations. My research has aimed to fill a gap in this area by examining the partnership between the IOC and the UN. Looking in particular, at the way in which the IOC is playing a role in international development initiatives and why. Up to this point there has been little research that has examined the growing role of the IOC at the UN, as a result little is known about how this relationship developed and the role this partnership could potentially play in the future of the governance of sport and international development.

Organizational Linkages

Before moving on it is important to examine why organizations seek to collaborate with one another, especially organizations that may not traditionally be seen as compatible, such as the IOC and the UN. Sport management researchers have been interested in looking at why and how these collaborations occur and in what contexts, to help explain what makes

¹³⁷ McEwan, *Postcolonialism and Development*.

¹³⁸ Coalter, "The Politics of Sport-for-Development: Limited Focus Programmes and Broad Gauge Problems?"

¹³⁹ Ibid.; Hoberman, "The Myth of Sport as a Peace-Promoting Political Force."; Peacock, "A Virtual World Government unto Itself Uncovering the Rational-Legal Authority of the IOC in World Politics."

a partnership successful (or not).¹⁴⁰ There are many reasons an organization might be interested in associating itself with another organization. These connections, or partnerships, bring new challenges and opportunities to sport (globally and locally) that are useful to examine to understand why and how they occur.

Babiak describes organizational partnerships as “voluntary, close, long-term planned strategic action between two or more organizations with the objective of serving mutually beneficial purposes in a problem domain.”¹⁴¹ Researchers have explained that we have seen an increase in the number of these organizational linkages (and partnerships) especially as globalization has “...unleashed new sets of ‘interdependency chains’ ... [and] networks that have (inter) connected people from distant parts of the globe.”¹⁴² Other researchers have highlighted the influence of neoliberal economic policy in encouraging the creation of partnerships – specifically between not-for-profit organizations and corporations. Frisby, Thibault and Kikulis describe how these types of partnerships are becoming more and more common within leisure service departments in local governments as they struggle to “fulfill their mandate under conditions of economic constraint, political pressures and increased demand for services.”¹⁴³

Partnerships are not always successful and it is specifically these new linkages between organizations with potentially different values that present challenges and/or power

¹⁴⁰ Kathy Babiak, “Determinants of Interorganizational Relationships: The Case of a Canadian Nonprofit Sport Organization,” *Journal of Sport Management* 21 (2007): 338–376; Kathy Babiak and Lucie Thibault, “Challenges in Multiple Cross-Sector Partnerships,” *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (December 12, 2009): 117–143.; Wendy Frisby, Lucie Thibault, and Lisa Kikulis, “The Organizational Dynamics of Under - managed Partnerships in Leisure Service Departments,” *Leisure Studies* 23, no. 2 (February 18, 2004): 109–126.

¹⁴¹ Babiak, “Determinants of Interorganizational Relationships: The Case of a Canadian Nonprofit Sport Organization.” p. 339.

¹⁴² Joseph Maguire, *Sport and Globalization*, 2009, http://assets.sportanddev.org/downloads/81_sport_and_globalisation.pdf, p. 4.

¹⁴³ Frisby, Thibault, and Kikulis, “The Organizational Dynamics of Under-managed Partnerships in Leisure Service Departments.” p. 109.

imbalances that might limit partnership potential. For example, Hayhurst and Frisby examined partnership tensions between sport for development NGOs and high performance sport organizations.¹⁴⁴ These researchers found that the different goals of these organizations – with one aiming to increase sport participation for all and the other focused on elite sports participation – made it challenging to create a successful partnership, although, the NGOs did concede that the legitimacy of the SDP movement was enhanced through links with the more well-known and well-financed high performance sport organizations. Similar to Hayhurst and Frisby, Babiak and Thibault wrote about the growing need for non-profit organizations to collaborate with corporations to aid economic sustainability. They explained that these types of partnerships can be a challenge because of “the location of the organizations within competing sectors (e.g. public, commercial and other nonprofit).”¹⁴⁵

For the most part, the literature that has examined organizational partnerships (perhaps rightfully) assumes that partnerships are engaged in for productive reasons — to achieve a specific goal or goals, and the organizations involved are assumed to be working closely together to achieve these goals. Reflecting on this, it is not entirely clear whether the IOC and UN could be described as being in a partnership in these terms — while the UN and IOC have highlighted some broad goals and ideals in their Permanent Observer application and in a few speeches, the purposes for their organizational linkages remain somewhat obscure and unfocused. Furthermore, it is also not clear how much they collaborate to achieve mutual goals. While most of the partnership literature within sport has focused on the whether or not these partnerships have been successful, this dissertation is less concerned with the potential success in the collaborations between the IOC and UN and is more

¹⁴⁴ Hayhurst and Frisby, “Inevitable Tensions: Swiss and Canadian Sport for Development NGO Perspectives on Partnerships with High Performance Sport.”

¹⁴⁵ Babiak and Thibault, “Challenges in Multiple Cross-Sector Partnerships.” p. 119 - 120.

interested in how and why the IOC applied for PO status, to question some of their underlying purposes and to question why the UN would embrace this relationship.

The next section examines the methods that I have utilized for my research.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I describe my methodological approach and outline the data collection strategies for this dissertation. This is also where I examine my preferred qualitative methodologies and in doing so reveal and describe my epistemological and ontological assumptions. To do this I will, first, discuss IE in more detail, and explain the ways in which this method of inquiry has informed my research. Then I move on to discuss the data collection and analysis process. This chapter concludes with a discussion of reflexivity and the role of the researcher.

Qualitative Methodologies and Institutional Ethnography

The term ethnography in IE “highlights the importance of research methods that can discover and explore...everyday activities and their positioning within extended sequences of action.”¹⁴⁶ Influenced by IE, I have engaged in the extensive analysis of texts to obtain data useful in examining the ruling relations embedded within the IOC-UN partnership.

IE is based on several tenets of the epistemological position of social constructionist researchers — especially in the way in which it views the social development of knowledge and the belief that “discursive resources and constraints affect social life and social forms.”¹⁴⁷ However, some institutional ethnographers¹⁴⁸ have argued that there are a few key differences that are important to acknowledge. For example, McCoy emphasized that institutional ethnographers and constructionist researchers often have different analytical

¹⁴⁶ Marjorie L DeVault and Liza McCoy, “Institutional Ethnography: Using Interviews to Investigate Ruling Relations,” in *Institutional Ethnography as Practice*, ed. Dorothy E Smith (UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006). p. 18.

¹⁴⁷ James A Holstein and Jaber F Gubrium, “The Constructionist Analytics of Interpretive Practice,” in *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (CA: Sage Publications, 2011). p. 351.

¹⁴⁸ Liza McCoy, “Institutional Ethnography and Constructionism,” in *The Handbook of Constructionist Research*, ed. James A Holstein and Jaber F Gubrium (Guilford Press, 2008).

goals. IE researchers are more interested in “producing detailed descriptions of institutional processes that are shaping the circumstances...”,¹⁴⁹ whereas typically, constructionist research would focus on the way in which “...organizers frame issues and make public claims.”¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, the focus of qualitative interpretive inquiries adopted by social constructionists tends to be on individual experience and on obtaining information about the perspectives of the interviewee. In contrast, IE focuses on the organizational and institutional processes to uncover relations of ruling.

Moreover, and similar to IE research, the documents analyzed in this study took on a more dominant role — as texts are considered paramount to enabling the ruling relations of an institution. Having said this, I also used methods associated with more traditional (i.e. not IE specific) forms of qualitative inquiry. Therefore, I pull from IE and other literatures to develop my methodological approach to this research.

Institutional Ethnography: Background and Definition

IE was initially developed by Dorothy Smith, a Canadian, feminist sociologist, as an alternative method of inquiry to the dominant forms practiced in sociology. She proposed a ‘sociology for women’ that started in the actualities of women’s lives rather than writing from the ‘rulers’ perspective. IE looks at the underpinning processes involved in establishing ruling relations, spaces of privilege and marginalization — and offers researchers a method that has transformative potential.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 711.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 711.

¹⁵¹ Dorothy E Smith, “Introduction.”

Smith describes IE as a method of inquiry.¹⁵² In this way it is both a theoretical and methodological framework developed to examine the social organization of knowledge. Smith explains that “institutional ethnography is committed to discovering beyond any one individual’s experience including the researcher’s own and putting into words supplemented in some instances by diagrams or maps what she or he discovers about how people’s activities are coordinated.”¹⁵³ The institution in this context is based around the coordinated activities of people that form a distinct function.¹⁵⁴ IE is based on the premise that women continue to be excluded from ‘ruling’ institutions, and that these institutions develop structures of knowledge that influence the way in which individuals experience the world. Researchers commonly utilize IE to inform a critique of these structures, and in doing so attempt to unpack them from a women’s standpoint to understand what role these ruling institutions play in their everyday worlds.¹⁵⁵ Smith’s IE developed from her own experiences as a working single mother. She realized that these experiences have been completely excluded as subject positions in traditional sociological research.

Women’s standpoint is a notion which Smith adopts that “does not identify a position or a category of position, gender, class, or race within the society, but it does establish as a subject position for IE as a method of inquiry, a site for the knower that is open to anyone.”¹⁵⁶ Standpoint is where the IE begins. It starts from people’s experiences and looks beyond that to examine how these experiences are informed by institutional processes and relations of ruling. ‘Relations of ruling’ are the “rules of consciousness and organization that

¹⁵² Dorothy E Smith, “High Noon in Textland: A Critique of Clough,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (1993): 183–192; Dorothy E Smith, *Writing the Social: Critique, Theory and Investigations* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Dorothy E Smith, *Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for the People* (Oxford, UK: AltaMira Press, 2005); Smith, “Introduction.”

¹⁵³ Ibid. p. 1.

¹⁵⁴ Smith, *Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for the People*.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 10.

are objectified in the sense that they are constituted externally to particular people and places.”¹⁵⁷ It is these relations of ruling that are of interest to institutional ethnographers who want to unveil the broader relations that coordinate our actions.

While most institutional ethnographies begin with an experience, some institutional ethnographic work engages with organizational work processes as their point of entry. In this type of IE, the researcher “knows about a set of administrative or professional practices and sets about studying how they are carried out, how they are discursively shaped and how they organize other settings.”¹⁵⁸ This is the type of IE that my research resonates with — where the aim was to understand some of the institutional processes within the UN and the IOC that influenced the decision to accept the IOC as Permanent Observer to the UN General Assembly.

The ontology behind IE is the idea that ‘the social’ coordinates people’s lives. This position was developed from Marx’s theoretical concept of ‘social relations’, with social relations referring in this instance to the role of the social in relations of ruling. Marx’s view is useful for demonstrating how “ideologies build on categories that express and are grounded in actual social relations.”¹⁵⁹ The ruling relations involve the broader social relations around us — and include not only the people close to us, but also “corporations, government, professional settings...universities, public schools, hospitals, and clinics and so on and so on.”¹⁶⁰ These all work to coordinate our everyday activities. IE seeks to uncover

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 13.

¹⁵⁸ DeVault and McCoy, “Institutional Ethnography: Using Interviews to Investigate Ruling Relations.” p. 22.

¹⁵⁹ Dorothy E. Smith, “Ideology, Science and Social Relations: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Epistemology,” *European Journal of Social Theory*, 2004. p. 454.

¹⁶⁰ Smith, *Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for the People*. p. 18.

this problematic “to look out beyond the everyday to discover how it happens as it does.”¹⁶¹

Influenced by Foucault’s conception of discourse, Smith describes how discourse plays an important role in relations of ruling. Following Foucault, Smith sees discourses as being “located in systems of knowledge and knowledge making independent of particular individuals.”¹⁶² Smith and Foucault were also similarly compelled to question the power relations involved in the creation and dissemination of discourses, and sought to examine the discursive events that developed them — as opposed to focusing on the basis of knowledge as coming from the individual. The role of text-based discourses in enabling relations of ruling is an important feature of IE. Smith extends Foucault’s theorizing about discourse to place emphasis on the way in which actors are active participants in creating and utilizing these texts.

Institutional ethnographers argue that texts play an important role in our modern society as our activities are so often coordinated through texts. Smith posits that without texts, corporations (and organizations such as the IOC) could not function. In IE, text is considered data that is not separate from its origins, but is part of the processes of governance and activities that take place. Smith explains that texts “create this essential connection between the local of our (and others’) bodily being and the translocal organization of the ruling relations.”¹⁶³ Rather than taking the knowledge in these texts for granted, an institutional ethnographer seeks to unpack the social relations that brought them to be.

IE and the Study of the IOC as the UN Permanent Observer

This research has utilized the principles of IE to delve deeper into understanding the

¹⁶¹ Smith, “Introduction.” p. 3.

¹⁶² Smith, *Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for the People*. p. 17.

¹⁶³ Ibid. p. 119.

partnership between the IOC and the UN: how this partnership came to be, how the IOC came to sit as Permanent Observer at the UN General Assembly, the discourses utilized in the decision-making process, and the potential implications of this. Principles of IE are used to begin to unveil the ideological nature of sport and of the IOC to gain an understanding of why and how it is used by the UN. Traditionally, the institutional ethnographer begins her research from the margins and then moves toward the “centers of power administration” to examine the relations of ruling in that context.”¹⁶⁴ My research does not begin from the margins, rather, it begins from the centers of power in a bid to question and examine the ways in which processes within the centers of power potentially impact the margins.

It is important to note that while the tenets of IE began with Smith’s studies of women’s work at home, she posits that the approach has a wide application — where the key purpose is to discover ‘how things are put together’.¹⁶⁵ The framework that Smith devised is useful for inquiry “from any standpoint in daily life, especially standpoints outside the relations of ruling.”¹⁶⁶ Thus, an IE is not limited to engaging in research solely with and about women, although this has been one of its intended uses. Rather, the purpose of IE is more generally focused on establishing a methodology that is capable of unpacking the relations of ruling embedded within everyday experiences and engaging in a critical analysis of this. The overall aim of many IE projects is “to reveal the ideological and social processes that produce experiences of subordination.”¹⁶⁷

My research begins with the decision made by the UN to award the IOC Permanent

¹⁶⁴ Marjorie L DeVault, *Liberating Method: Feminism and Social Research* (Temple University Press, 1999). p. 48.

¹⁶⁵ Smith, “Introduction.”

¹⁶⁶ James L Heap, “Introduction,” in *Knowledge, Experience and Ruling Relations*, ed. Marie Campbell and Ann Manicom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). p. xv.

¹⁶⁷ DeVault and McCoy, “Institutional Ethnography: Using Interviews to Investigate Ruling Relations.” p. 19.

Observer status at the General Assembly. I then move to trace the broader role of sport and the IOC at the UN in order to examine how this decision came to be, and what discourses were utilized to explain and encourage these actions. Eastwood writes about her experiences in undertaking an IE within the UN to investigate forest policy negotiations, explaining how “it would be hard to not see the UN as a textually mediated organization.”¹⁶⁸ The UN is a global organization with four different locations around the world and is made up of many different bodies that are all interconnected within this larger framework. The UN relies on documents to disseminate decisions, ideas, rules and so on and so forth. These texts are then disseminated not only within the organization, but also often to the international media, international NGOs, and national governments who then go on to disseminate these texts yet again. The role of texts for international organizations such as the UN and the IOC are paramount to develop relations of ruling — which is partly why I have argued that the ontological principles of IE provide a useful methodological approach to engage in this research.

Part of the IE project is to unpack the ideological nature of concepts that have become abstracted from their meanings, and to examine the implications of these abstractions.¹⁶⁹ In examining documents and the actions of people, the institutional ethnographer asks: what discourses are being utilized to coordinate activities? what is being made invisible in these documents, and how has this come to be? In order to engage in an in-depth IE, the researcher must have some access to the actual activities carried out. This is usually obtained through observations, or in-depth interviews with people involved. Because of the historical nature of the research conducted for this dissertation, I have utilized certain

¹⁶⁸ Lauren Eastwood, “Making the Institution Ethnographically Accesible,” in *Institutional Ethnography as Practice*, ed. Dorothy E Smith (UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006). p. 182.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

types of documents to replace and/or supplement observations and interviews. These include the minutes of IOC/UN meetings, private letters, memos, and draft copies of official documents. While reading these documents is obviously different than observing the meetings, these documents were able to, I suggest, reveal a great deal about what was occurring behind the scenes in these historical meetings that were not open to the public. I have also engaged in seven informational interviews with individuals from the UN and the IOC who are involved in some way with the partnership between the IOC and the UN. The goal of these interviews was to provide additional information about the role of the IOC at the UN to use alongside the archival documents.

Critiques of IE

There have been some critiques of Smith's proposed method of inquiry. Postmodern feminists have criticized Smith's use of women's standpoint because, they explain women, are not a unified category, but are further categorized by race, class, heterosexism, globalization and so on.¹⁷⁰ Smith has frequently responded to these critiques by emphasizing that the way she utilizes women's standpoint is not restricted to the category of a certain type of woman and is open to diversity.¹⁷¹ The point, she explains, is not solely about the experience from one women's standpoint and generalizing from that experience, "rather the idea is to develop inquiry into the social relations in which that experience is embedded, making visible how it is put together and organized in and by a larger complex of relations (including those of ruling and the economy)."¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland, *Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices* (London: Sage Publications, 2002). p. 75.

¹⁷¹ Smith, "High Noon in Textland: A Critique of Clough."

¹⁷² Ibid. p. 184.

Smith's IE has also been critiqued for its focus on analyzing dominant knowledges.¹⁷³ Hill Collins argues that while Smith has made many inroads into deconstructing these objectified knowledges, IE as a method of inquiry is necessarily limited by its focus on them. Hill Collins posits that there is an "absence of alternative standpoints on social reality developed by subordinate groups."¹⁷⁴ These alternative standpoints, she argues, provide important sites of resistance against dominant knowledges. While I certainly agree that alternative standpoints are important to uncover and examine, I would argue that it is still important to deconstruct these dominant knowledges to enable the creation of alternatives.

IE's ontology of the notion of truth and knowledge also differs from postmodern theorists where IE researchers argue for recognizing "the discursive nature of sociological knowledge without relinquishing the right to speak the truth about social reality."¹⁷⁵ I take the view in my research that knowledge is socially constructed and cannot be separated from the social context in which it is derived.¹⁷⁶ However, at the same time, I argue for use of knowledge to generate social change. So, while I believe that knowledge is linked to specific social contexts I also believe that it can transcend and be applied in a variety of contexts.¹⁷⁷

Textual Analysis

Institutional ethnographers highlight the role of texts in mediating social life in modern society.¹⁷⁸ The term texts is used to "refer to words, images, or sounds that are set in a material form of some kind from which they can be read, seen, heard, watched, and so

¹⁷³ Patricia Hill Collins, "Transforming the Inner Circle: Dorothy Smith's Challenge to Sociological Theory," *Sociological Theory* 10, no. 1 (1992): 73–80.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 77.

¹⁷⁵ Randall J. Hart and Andrew McKinnon, "Sociological Epistemology: Durkheim's Paradox and Dorothy E. Smith's Actuality," *Sociology* 44, no. 6 (2010): 1038–1054. p. 1040

¹⁷⁶ Donna Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1991).

¹⁷⁷ Ramazanoglu and Holland, *Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices*.

¹⁷⁸ Anssi Perakyla, "Analyzing Talk and Text," in *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (London: Sage Publications, 2005).

on.”¹⁷⁹ As I have mentioned earlier, the UN and the IOC are organizations that rely on texts to disseminate and record information. These texts provide important insight for my research in several different ways. Private letters and meeting minutes provide insight into what was occurring behind the scenes as decisions were being made. Press releases, and conference proceedings provide information on the way in which the IOC and UN choose to present themselves to the public. Policy documents and resolutions present the type of information the IOC and UN wish to be disseminated and taken up by others. All of these texts have been useful in gaining an understanding of the discourses and ideologies engaged in by the IOC and the UN in promoting their own organizations and their partnership and ultimately in accepting IOC Permanent Observer status.

I obtained access to the IOC Archives in Lausanne, Switzerland through a grant I received from the Olympic Studies Centre¹⁸⁰. This enabled me to study archival documents from the IOC that would have otherwise been inaccessible to me. In the summer of 2013 I worked at the Olympic Studies Centre archives for two weeks to collect the documents for this project (these documents are included in the list below)

With this background, the specific texts utilized in this research are outlined below:

- **IOC Archives**

- o Minutes

- IOC Session (1952 – 2010) – Meetings took place one to three times a year, 76 meeting minutes were examined in total (Minutes length ranged from 10 – 200 pages)
 - Executive Board Meetings (1945 – 1982) – Meetings took place one to five times a year, 81 meeting minutes were examined in total (Minutes length ranged from 3 – 141 pages)

¹⁷⁹ Dorothy E Smith, “Incorporating Texts into Ethnographic Practice,” in *Institutional Ethnography as Practice*, ed. Dorothy E Smith (UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006). p. 66.

¹⁸⁰ The grant was called “The Olympic Studies Centre Postgraduate Research Grant Program 2013”

- Miscellaneous
 - E.g. Memos, Correspondence, Press Releases, Conference minutes, speech transcripts, Partnership Agreements (150 documents over 300 pages in total)
- **UN Documents**
 - E.g. Minutes of meetings, Resolutions, Press Releases, Correspondence (Accessed online via documents.un.org, un.org and various un affiliated websites)
- **Other Online Documents**
 - Research documents (e.g. Documents from the UN Research Institute on Social Development), Olympic Reviews, Press Releases and media, Speeches, organization websites (e.g. Olympic.org)
- **Reference Books, Biographies and Auto-Biographies**
 - About Boutros Boutros Ghali, Kofi Annan, Juan Antonio Samaranch, and Lord Killanin
 - History of the role of Physical Education at UNESCO
- **Expert Informational Interviews**
 - In addition to gaining access to the IOC Archives in Lausanne, I spent 3 months working as an unpaid intern at the UNOSDP from April 2013 until August. The Office is located at the UN Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. While working in this position I was able to obtain access to UN employees who had been involved with partnering with the IOC in one form or another. I conducted five interviews with UN employees from different UN organizations: UNOSDP, UN Women, UNICEF, World Health Organization (WHO), and UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ I contacted several more UN employees from different UN organizations for potential interviews but I either did not receive a response or they declined to participate in the study.

- While researching at the IOC Archives I engaged in one interview with an IOC employee, and I also conducted one interview with an IOC member via email when I returned to Vancouver.
- These interviews were conducted to provide additional information to assist in my research process and also to provide potential leads for research that I had yet to examine. For example, one interviewee highlighted the role that both Kofi Annan (former UN Secretary General) and Adolf Ogi (former Switzerland Prime Minister and former Under-Secretary General for the UNOSDP) played in promoting SDP and the IOC at the UN.

For institutional ethnographers, it is important to gain an understanding of the broader ruling relations involved. These texts have been analyzed to examine who made a range of decisions – pertaining to sport in and around the UN and/or the IOC, what assumptions were made in the decision-making processes, what power relations were involved in the development of these texts, and what are the potential implications. The ultimate aim is to gain an understanding of how “local understandings and explanations, are brought into being.”¹⁸² Texts have not been utilized simply as factual sources of information (i.e. to provide background and context) as they often are in more conventional forms of ethnography,¹⁸³ rather texts have been seen to represent much of the way in which our social worlds are created. It is important to identify the context in which a text is developed, and to keep it within that context when engaging in the analysis.

There are several limitations when engaging in a document analysis. Most importantly, the researcher cannot foresee the way in which texts are taken up in different contexts. Therefore, without interviewing potential users/readers, the researcher cannot predict the impact these texts potentially have on others. In some institutional ethnographic

¹⁸² Marie Louise Campbell and Frances Mary Gregor, *Mapping Social Relations: A Primer in Doing Institutional Ethnography* (Rowman Altamira, 2002). p. 90.

¹⁸³ Perakyla, “Analyzing Talk and Text.”

projects, of course, the researcher is able to develop an understanding of the impacts of texts through interviewing individuals who are impacted by them.¹⁸⁴ However, access to both creators and readers of texts is not always possible — especially in cases where texts are distributed globally. Smith explains that there is still a great deal of information and analysis to be done within a text without having access to the potential reader. For example, “You may be able to find out quite a bit about how the text enters into the organization of a sequence by exploring traces of how it was put together, and how it projects organization into what follows.”¹⁸⁵ Additionally, you will also be able to engage in an analysis of what was left out of these texts, and why.

I eventually chose texts as my major source of data as much of my research was focused on historical actions and decisions that are only now accessible through texts. As noted earlier, I did engage in some interviews to fill in the gaps in my textual research, but I did not rely solely on the information gleaned from the interviewees to inform my research.

Interviews

Semi-structured interviewing is a common ethnographic technique that encourages study participants to speak openly and freely about their opinions and thoughts.¹⁸⁶ Interviews offer much more in-depth information that may not be possible with other types of data collection strategies. They also allow for unexpected data to emerge from perspectives other than the researcher’s that can prove crucial to the depth of information gathered. As Perakyla explains: “the interview is also a convenient way in overcoming distances both in space and time; past events or faraway experiences can be studied by interviewing people who took

¹⁸⁴ Smith, “Incorporating Texts into Ethnographic Practice.”

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 72.

¹⁸⁶ Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods* (SAGE Publications, 2002).

part in them.”¹⁸⁷ Thus, interviewing can make past decisions and actions accessible that may not have been recorded in any other manner.

Interviewing for an IE can look a little different from traditional ethnographic interviewing. As DeVault and McCoy explain, IE “investigators use informants’ accounts not as windows on the informants’ inner experience, but in order to reveal the “relations of ruling” that shape local experiences.”¹⁸⁸ The purpose of IE interviews is therefore to identify connections between the local and the translocal — to gain an understanding of the institutional processes and power relations involved. For this research, I conducted interviews with some of these IE principles in mind. Specifically, the interviews were focused on getting more information about how the IOC came to be invited on as Permanent Observer to the UN.

Practically speaking, the process of interviewing for IE is similar to that of other qualitative interviewing techniques. All of the interviews followed a general guide to ensure the flexibility “to develop questions as new themes emerge in the course of the interview.”¹⁸⁹ The questions posed were generally opened-ended, meaning that the interviewee had an opportunity to expand on the questions asked.

The five UN employees that I interviewed were contacted via email with a contact letter and letter of consent attached. I conducted three of these interviews in person at their offices at the Palais de Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. The two additional interviews were conducted over the phone as the headquarters of their organizations were in Paris, France and New York, USA. Each interview ranged from 45 minutes to 90 minutes in length and all

¹⁸⁷ Perakyla, “Analyzing Talk and Text.” p. 869.

¹⁸⁸ DeVault and McCoy, “Institutional Ethnography: Using Interviews to Investigate Ruling Relations.” p. 15.

¹⁸⁹ John Amis, “Interviewing for Case Study Research,” in *Qualitative Methods in Sports Studies*, ed. David Andrews, Daniel S. Mason, and Michael L. Silk (Oxford, UK: Berg Publishers, 2005). p. 108.

agreed to audio recording. Each interview began with a discussion of how their specific organizations partnered with the IOC and what that involved. The interview then progressed into questions about the IOC's presence at the UN more generally, and what they thought of the IOC's status as Permanent Observer at the UN General Assembly.

The IOC employee I interviewed was provided a contact letter and letter of consent via the IOC Library representative that I had been in contact with. This individual was present in Lausanne, Switzerland when I was there and I engaged in an interview with her in her office at the IOC Headquarters. Before I began the interview, the interviewee read and signed the consent form. The interviewee agreed to audio recording. The interview lasted 60 minutes. This interview was focused on obtaining information about the IOC's desire to obtain UN Permanent Observer status in the late 2000s as this was something that was not addressed in the documents I had available to me.

The final interviewee was found via a suggestion from the IOC employee. This individual is an IOC member who was involved in the process of obtaining Permanent Observer status for the IOC. The IOC member was contacted by email by the IOC employee. This email was sent with my contact details, the consent form and contact letter. I was then contacted by this IOC member who mentioned that he preferred to do the interview in writing, as this would enable him to respond in his first language and I could go get this translated. I sent him the interview questions in English and he responded to these questions in his own language. I then had the interview translated by a colleague of mine. This interview was 10 pages in length (single-spaced, including questions). Open-ended questions were chosen to allow for the most comprehensive response. The questions also focused on the specific details about Observer status that I was not able to obtain from the first

interviewee.

The questions that I asked the interviewees were informed by the research I had already gathered from the documents, and these interviewees were chosen because of their involvement in this area.

These interviews presented a few challenges. Because all interviewees were currently associated with IOC in some way (either employed by or in a partnership with the organization), I had to accept that the answers to my questions would generally be supportive of IOC work and would probably not reveal all of the intricacies involved in decision-making processes. However, because the IOC's Executive Board meetings are closed to the public, and the minutes are not made available until they have been released under a 30-year embargo, these interviewees were able to reveal some information that was not available elsewhere. I utilized the interview transcripts both as data for this research and also as a stepping-stone to assist in further research within this project. For example, the interviewees provided details about the process of becoming a Permanent Observer that I was unaware of, so I then proceeded to engage in research to find out more information about this process.

In the end I used these interviews and the documents to support my attempts to construct an alternative interpretation of 'reality' that takes into account marginalized ways of thinking. In this way, I am not aiming to develop a 'reflection' of the opinions of the interviewees, but to interpret their responses through a critical lens.

Data Analysis

Data collection and analysis in many qualitative research projects occur simultaneously, continuously informing each other. Researchers utilizing IE (and/or some other forms of qualitative inquiry) generally do not use formal analytic strategies in data

analysis.¹⁹⁰ Rather, the researcher is encouraged to focus on developing a story from the data to make the research both understandable and convincing.¹⁹¹ The ontological assumptions of IE influence the analysis process. As I have laid out in the sections above, IE is focused on the social creation of knowledge and seeks to uncover the ruling relations that coordinate these knowledges and actions. Thus an analysis of the data aims to identify the ruling relations embedded within the texts to examine further ‘how something happens as it does.’¹⁹²

Data analysis and collection was a constant back and forth process throughout my research. I began analyzing texts as I gathered them. This allowed me to identify any relevant issues and to reflect upon them while continuing to collect data.¹⁹³

My analysis consisted of reading and re-reading the texts several times over to become familiar with the data. It was important for me not to lose the context in which the data was embedded. Therefore, I developed a map of the texts to identify where each text came from and how it was connected with other texts. The purpose of my analysis was to create an account of how the historical partnership between the IOC-UN developed. This included examining what and who was involved in providing the IOC with Permanent Observer status at the UN. Important in this analysis was seeking out the broader relations of ruling that were and are involved in these decision-making processes, and the potential implications of this.

In analyzing the texts I took an approach similar to that of what Altheide, Coyle,

¹⁹⁰ DeVault and McCoy, “Institutional Ethnography: Using Interviews to Investigate Ruling Relations”; Perakyla, “Analyzing Talk and Text.”

¹⁹¹ Campbell and Gregor, *Mapping Social Relations: A Primer in Doing Institutional Ethnography*.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Andrew C. Sparkes, “Autoethnography and Narratives of Self: Reflections on Criteria in Action,” *Sociology of Sport Journal* 17, no. 1 (2000): 21–43.

DeVriese and Schneider have called Qualitative Document Analysis (QDA – also known as Ethnographic Content Analysis (ECA)).¹⁹⁴ QDA is described as a type of analysis where “the researcher immerses himself or herself in the materials and asks key questions about the organization, production, relationships and consequences of the content...”¹⁹⁵ In QDA, the researcher does not have all of the specific themes in mind when analyzing the research, rather the researcher is open to finding new themes within the data that may not have been thought of beforehand.

In my research, I began by collecting texts at the IOC Archives in Lausanne Switzerland. Initially, all texts referring to the United Nations, a UN affiliated agency and/or any individual who was associated with the UN were considered relevant. From the initial readings of the texts, new topics emerged. This is when I broadened the document collection to include (among others) documents about: apartheid, IOC legal status, Court of Arbitration for Sport, and Olympic symbols. These topics were considered useful in examining the broader power relations involved in IOC decision-making that were not necessarily directly linked to interactions with the UN. I continued to add to the topics (keywords) throughout my data analysis and this process did not end until I had written the majority of the research findings for this Dissertation.

Along with an intense reading of the texts the analysis included a continual expansion of the texts until I felt that I had an in-depth understanding of the situation and the context within which it occurred. The IOC meeting minutes were incredibly useful texts that covered an exhaustive range of issues and topics that ended up providing important contextual material for this research project. I also made extensive use of the UN online document

¹⁹⁴ David Altheide et al., “Emergent Qualitative Document Analysis,” in *Handbook of Emergent Methods*, ed. Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2008).

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 135.

system, which stores the majority of texts that the UN creates. In retrieving documents from this site I started by searching for documents that contained the keyword: Olympic. This keyword covered discussions about the International Olympic Committee and the Olympic Games. I also expanded my search to cover documents discussing the status of Permanent Observers more generally.

In my search for additional texts I utilized the broader World Wide Web to obtain access to documents that carried important additional information about topics uncovered from the initial collection of documents and also about the context in which the issues under discussion were occurring. This is where information about some of the more recent topics were collected as access to IOC Executive Board meeting minutes and also the miscellaneous documents were unavailable after 1982.¹⁹⁶

The majority of the data were collected and analyzed concurrently. The miscellaneous documents collected at the IOC Archives were photocopied there and taken back to Canada for analysis. Because I was only at the IOC Archives for two weeks and because the majority of the documents were only available as hard copies, I decided to spend the entire time collecting/photocopying as many documents as possible and limited the analysis for this period. I spent 10 days from 9am until 5pm collecting the IOC archival documents for this project. After all of these documents were collected I began to group them under relevant topics of research, the list included:

- UN Economic Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- International Committee of Sport and Physical Education (ICSPE)

¹⁹⁶ IOC Executive Board meeting minutes (alongside miscellaneous documents) provided much of the behind-the-scenes information about how decisions were being made at the time. While I have access to IOC Session minutes through to 2010 these are much more polished and contain fewer discussions and background information that proves incredibly useful for this type of analysis.

- UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- World Health Organization (WHO)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- International Labour Organization (ILO)
- Olympic Resolution
- Protection of Olympic words and Symbols
- Apartheid¹⁹⁷
- Legal status
- UN Secretary-General

I created a single MS Word document for each of these topics and within it I provided a brief summary of each document that fell under the topic, the date it was created, and the author of the document. These documents were all filed in chronological order.

The IOC Minutes were analyzed in a similar fashion, although, I did not attempt to analyze everything that was found in the Minutes. I limited myself to reading through all of the minutes and highlighting relevant sections for further analysis. The Minutes were available as pdf documents, and each relevant section was highlighted and a comment was recorded next to the section providing a keyword, and if necessary, an additional comment.

Following this initial analysis I began to create a historical timeline utilizing Prezi software.¹⁹⁸ In this timeline I combined data from the miscellaneous documents with the relevant data collected in the IOC minutes. Everything was compiled along a chronological timeline from 1920 to 2010. The documents were separated into two categories. The first category focused on context and the second was directly linked to UN-IOC interactions. This

¹⁹⁷ The issue of apartheid in South Africa was a major topic of discussion at the IOC throughout the 1960s and 1970s, which is why I chose to highlight this as a specific topic.

¹⁹⁸ Prezi is a visual presentation software and storytelling tool for presenting ideas on a virtual canvas.

timeline enabled me to view the interactions within the context of what was occurring at the time. For example, I was able to see more clearly the change in focus and direction when a new IOC President came into power. In this way I began to analyze how decisions were being made by examining who was involved and by looking at the broader social, economic and political context of the time.

From this I began to develop the story for this research project that focused on key points in time where relations of ruling became visible. I was most interested in examining situations when the IOC found itself in moments of crisis, as it was apparent in these moments that the motives and principles underlying decision-making were often illuminated. While many of us are aware of the outcomes of IOC decisions as they are made public, very rarely do we get to see the context behind the decision-making. It was these situations that helped to peel away the publicly-stated ideology and purpose of the IOC and its popular Olympic Games, to reveal an organization that was primarily concerned about its power and autonomy from governments.

Reflexivity

Similar to other qualitative inquiries, intense reflexivity was called for in this research. Reflexivity is understanding how you are related to the study, and how you affect and in turn are affected by the research.¹⁹⁹ As a researcher I am linked to relations of power that need to be considered. Because IE seeks to uncover everyday practices, it is important for the researcher to be conscious of not taking these practices for granted, and to continually critically examine their own assumptions. This means ensuring that I do not unknowingly take up the dominant perspectives that I am researching, within the literature, from

¹⁹⁹ Patton, *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*.

interviews, and through other texts. Therefore, it was important for me to be reflective about the role I play in this inquiry and to acknowledge my own “personal biography and how it shapes the study.”²⁰⁰ The reader is invited to question “is there adequate self-awareness and self-exposure for the reader to make judgments about their [the researcher’s] position”?²⁰¹

I am a 29 year old, white, female graduate student. It is my aim to engage in research from a critical perspective, which also means that I am committed to uncovering how knowledge is colonized. However, I recognize the complexities involved in this as I have been and am currently involved in the colonization of knowledge myself as a University researcher, and as a white, western woman. I am not an insider to the perspectives of those that have experienced and are experiencing colonization. While I aim to work towards the de-colonization of knowledge in the context of SDP initiatives, this research has to be problematized considering my social status in the world. That is to say, I have to recognize that I, too, adopt and participate in some of the master narratives surrounding sport. Throughout the research process, I have engaged in constant reflexivity to review the potential assumptions I make about the concept of sport.

On the other hand I do also have several characteristics that place me as an outsider. As a feminist and from my own experiences as a woman I have felt and critiqued the role that sport plays in supporting patriarchal, heteronormative and western ideologies. While there have been improvements in eliminating sexism and racism in sport, I argue it is still a long way off and rather than being viewed as a tool to achieve these goals I view sport as being part of the process that upholds these ideologies.

In the next five chapters I present my research findings.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 182.

²⁰¹ Laurel Richardson, “New Writing Practices in Qualitative Research,” *Sociology of Sport Journal* 17, no. 1 (2000): 5–20, p. 16.

CHAPTER 4: HOW DOES AN ORGANIZATION OBTAIN PERMANENT OBSERVER STATUS?

Before delving into the more in-depth analyses of how and why the IOC obtained a Permanent Observer seat at the General Assembly, I spend time in this chapter outlining what it means to be a Permanent Observer at the General Assembly – and also considering what other NGOs have this status and what immediate actions took place in order to make this happen. For example, I explore questions about who was actively involved, and how was the decision made on the ground to specifically award the IOC with Permanent Observer status. With this goal in mind, I spend the first part of this chapter examining the concept of Permanent Observer status in more detail. Noting here that currently only five organizations that are not considered intergovernmental have this status, in this section I take a closer look at how and why these few organizations have become Permanent Observers. The second part of this chapter focuses more specifically on the IOC, as I begin to provide a background understanding of how the IOC obtained this status in 2009 and who was involved.

History of the UN Permanent Observer

Originally the concept of the Permanent Observer seat at the UN General Assembly was created to enable sovereign states that were not full members of the UN to attend and sit in on the assemblies. For example, Switzerland was a Permanent Observer from 1946 until 2002 when they obtained full member status at the UN.²⁰² Currently, the Holy See²⁰³ and the State of Palestine are the two non-Member States that hold this status. Gradually over the

²⁰² Switzerland was reluctant to join the UN from the beginning as it saw the organization as being incompatible with its own neutral status. A referendum on member status was held in 2002 and this made it possible for Switzerland to reconsider their position.

²⁰³ The Holy See is the universal government of the Catholic Church that is situated in the Vatican City in Rome, Italy. The Holy See is considered a sovereign state in international law and the Vatican City is its sovereign territory.

years, the UN began to allow intergovernmental organizations and also a small number of NGOs with varying degrees of statehood or sovereignty to obtain this status. As of 2014, over 70 organizations sit as Permanent Observers at the UN General Assembly. Five of these organizations are considered ‘other entities’ on the UN website, which means that they are neither intergovernmental organizations, nor sovereign non-Member States. Some of these organizations are considered NGOs (including the IOC).

There are no formal rules in the UN Charter that outline the process undertaken to become a Permanent Observer – a practice that dates back to 1946 – however it was commonly known that this status was only available for non-Member States and intergovernmental organizations. This changed, when in 1990 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) became the first NGO to obtain this status. The ICRC is considered a non-governmental organization that works to “provide protection and assistance to the victims of international and non-international armed conflicts.”²⁰⁴ The General Assembly decided to invite the ICRC on as a Permanent Observer because of its special status provided within the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions is a set of international treaties that calls for the protection of war victims. 166 States are party to this agreement, which was signed on 12 August 1949. The letter written to the UN General Assembly states that these treaties “assign duties to the ICRC that are similar to those of a Protecting Power responsible for safeguarding the interests of a State at war...”²⁰⁵ It was clear that the request for status for the ICRC was framed in a way to reinforce that the ICRC was not just another international NGO and in some respects could be considered an intergovernmental organization because

²⁰⁴ UN General Assembly 45th Session, A/45/191, *Observer status for the ICRC in consideration of the special role and mandates conferred upon it by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, (17 August 1990), www.undocs.org/A/45/191.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

of its ratification in an international treaty.

In 1994, another NGO obtained Permanent Observer status, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta. This organization, once again, had confusing attributes that separated it from other NGOs. For example, the Sovereign Order of Malta has been in existence for nearly 1,000 years, and while it has no territory or population, it does have diplomatic relations with over 64 States. Today it is considered a humanitarian organization that provides assistance around the world to those in need. As this case was being discussed at the General Assembly it became clear that several Member States did not support the proposed resolution. Significantly, the USA cited serious concerns that numerous other NGOs would start seeking Permanent Observer status if this were to be accepted.²⁰⁶ Similarly the UK representative did not support the proposal and suggested that the ICRC was a unique situation.

Despite the cited concerns the resolution was passed. This occurred yet again when the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC – not to be confused with the ICRC) obtained PO status later in the year in 1994. Willetts (2000) explains that this was the first case where the organization in question had “no special legal status”,²⁰⁷ and thus could not be realistically considered as ‘different’ to other NGOs – although the IFRC’s close organizational ties to the ICRC may have been a factor in the decision. Several more member-states expressed concerns over support of this proposal²⁰⁸ although they were not able to stop it from being accepted. By December 1994, a resolution (49/426) was adopted by the General Assembly that decided: “that the granting of observer

²⁰⁶ UN General Assembly 48th Session, A/48/PV.103, *103rd Meeting*, (24 August 1994), www.undocs.org/A/48/PV.103.

²⁰⁷ Peter Willetts, “From ‘ Consultative Arrangements ’ to ‘ Partnership ’: The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN,” *Global Governance* 6 (2000): 191–212.

²⁰⁸ UN General Assembly 49th Session, A/BUR/49/SR.2. *Summary Record of the 2nd Meeting*, (21 September 1994), www.undocs.org/A/BUR/49/SR.2.

status in the General Assembly should in the future be confined to States and to those intergovernmental organizations whose activities cover matters of interest to the assembly.”²⁰⁹ This declaration essentially put a block on any further NGOs from being recognized.

Despite this ratified resolution passed by the General Assembly, two more organizations with disputed intergovernmental status have been invited onto the General Assembly as Permanent Observers: The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the IOC. The IPU is an organization of Parliaments, created in 1889. In 2002, the UN 6th Committee decided to provide the IPU with Permanent Observer status because of its continued role with the UN and considering its unique status as a world organization of parliaments.²¹⁰

The IOC obtained Permanent Observer status in late 2009. In its application the IOC was described as an organization that was “founded with the purpose of placing sport at the service of humankind and with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.” The application did not claim that the IOC was an intergovernmental organization, however it did state:

The IOC is a non-profit organization with a membership that spans the entire globe. The Olympic Movement is a conglomerate of 205 NOCs; International Federations that govern individual sports, such as FIFA and the IAAF; the countries organizing the Olympic Games; the five Olympic continental associations; and the millions of sports persons around the world whose interests constitute a fundamental element of its very existence and actions²¹¹

Unlike the other organizations, the IOC is strictly non-governmental, wherein governments

²⁰⁹ UN General Assembly 49th Session, A/49/PV.84, *84th Meeting*, (9 December 1994), www.undocs.org/A/49/PV.84.

²¹⁰ UN General Assembly 57th Session, A/57/574, *Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations: cooperation between the United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union*, (18 October 2002), www.undocs.org/A/57/574.

²¹¹ UN General Assembly, 63rd Session, A/63/235, *Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the sixty-third Session*, (4 December 2008), www.undocs.org/A/63/235.

are not allowed to interfere with its organizing. The IOC has spent its entire existence actively seeking autonomy from any governmental control over the organization. So while the other organizations that have obtained Permanent Observer status have staked some claims to inter-governmentality, the IOC is not able to, and has not done so. Despite this glaring lack of intergovernmental status, and rather, one could argue, a fundamentally anti-governmental stance in its organizing, the IOC still succeeded in obtaining Permanent Observer status. The quote also suggests that the IOC is a representative organization made up of millions of individuals from around the globe — while one could argue that millions of individuals are involved with the IOC or the Olympic Games in one way or another — the claim obfuscates the point that the IOC is a small private organization where only 100 individuals are voting members of the organization.

I argue here that these decisions deserve more examination as it is not overly clear how and why these few seemingly disparate organizations have been awarded this status. For example, in 1994, the USA and the UK were highly concerned about bringing the IFRC and the Sovereign Order of Malta on as Permanent Observers. These countries did not support the applications based on the argument that they were not intergovernmental. This occurred again when in 2009 (around the same time IOC obtained Permanent Observer status), the Council of Presidents of the General Assembly requested Permanent Observer status and the United States representative cited the 49/426 resolution and claimed that this organization did not achieve intergovernmental status therefore they could not support the proposal.²¹² The Council of Presidents of the General Assembly was subsequently not invited on to become

²¹² United Nations, Legal Committee debates texts on Observer status for Council of Presidents of the General Assembly, Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, *Meetings Coverage*, (9 December 2009), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal3382.doc.htm>.

Permanent Observer. At the same time however, the USA and the UK had, a few months earlier attached their support to the IOC's proposal in October of 2009; conveniently, ignoring their own oft-cited resolution 49/426 that barred NGOs from becoming Permanent Observers.

While it is unclear why these countries made their decisions, what is clear is that they seem to be making these decisions based on personal political preferences rather than based on democratic policy. In other areas of the UN, NGOs have the opportunity to obtain some level of consultative status, which is based on policy guidelines and requirements. The UN General Assembly is one of the last bastions where this is not officially considered possible. Willetts (2000) described the handling of Permanent Observer status at the General Assembly as "confused and inconsistent."²¹³ Currently these decisions are made on an undemocratic and ad-hoc basis, where Member States are not required to make decisions abiding by any policy so they can choose according to their own political agenda. This should raise questions as to whether an NGO with political values different to that of a powerful member state would ever be able to obtain this status.

Furthermore, without an official Permanent Observer policy in place, there are no principles to ensure that the organization aligns with UN values. This may not be so important with an intergovernmental organization that has States as members of that organization (in these cases Member States are then expected to keep these organizations in line) but the UN has no control over organizations that do not have governments as their members. The IOC is arguably the only organization that has Permanent Observer status that has strictly no links to government at any level and therefore, no obligation to abide by

²¹³ Willetts, "From ' Consultative Arrangements ' to ' Partnership ' : The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN," p. 196.

international treaties. To account for this lack of control over NGOs, other areas of the UN (where NGOs can obtain consultative status) have created policy guidelines to ensure these organizations abide by fundamental values. For example, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has a set of guidelines created in 1996.²¹⁴ There are 70 principles outlined in total that an NGO is expected to abide by or risk being refused consultative status or have their status suspended. The UN ECOSOC website summarizes the requirements:

To be eligible for consultative status, an NGO must have been in existence for at least two years, and have an established headquarters, a democratically adopted constitution, authority to speak for its members, a representative structure, appropriate mechanisms of accountability and democratic and transparent decision-making processes. Additionally, the basic resources of the organization must be derived in the main part from contributions of the national affiliates or from individual members.²¹⁵

It is unclear whether the IOC would be able to obtain consultative status through the ECOSOC under these principles (it does not have a democratically adopted constitution and most of the contributions are derived from corporations, not its members); unlike the majority of other international NGOs the IOC has never held this status.

While the UN has been working to increase its democratic engagement with civil society organizations, the way in which a very limited number of NGOs are obtaining observer status at the General Assembly should be viewed as undermining this goal. The stated purpose to engage with more NGOs was to “reduce the democratic deficit in global governance,”²¹⁶ this will not be achieved through this ad hoc assigning of certain NGOs a

²¹⁴ United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/1996/L.25, *Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations*, (17 July 1996), www.undocs.org/E/1996/L.25.

²¹⁵ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Record number of NGOs seeking participation in the UN*, (31 January 2011), <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/ecosoc/ngos-applications-ecosoc.html>.

²¹⁶ Peter Willetts, “The Cardoso Report on the UN and Civil Society: Functionalism, Global Corporatism, or Global Democracy?,” *Global Governance* 12, no. 3 (March 8, 2006): 305–324, p. 308.

‘special’ status that other NGOs cannot obtain. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the IOC is an elite, western-led organization whose constituents are made up of a maximum of 115 voting members and corporate sponsors – who do not have votes per se (although one member is the CEO of Olympic sponsor Samsung) – however do hold bargaining power as the main source of income for the IOC. Despite the fact that the IOC has claimed it represents millions of sportspersons across the globe, these individuals are not its constituents, they do not have a vote or any power over the decisions being made by the IOC Executive (the organizational setup of the IOC is explained in more detail in chapter six).

We must ask why the IOC was considered an appropriate organization for this position. It is not an intergovernmental organization, nor does it have similar attributes to one. It is also not a human rights organization or an organization with experience around international development. Before going on to the next four chapters where I discuss this question in more detail, the next section provides a brief background to the immediate years before the IOC obtained this status and this is also where I highlight the exact process the IOC went through when they finally obtained the status in 2009. In talking with several interviewees it became clear that the IOC’s position at the UN may have been greatly assisted by two individuals in particular who played a role in promoting sport (and the IOC) at the UN in the 2000s preceding the successful request for IOC status. I discuss these individuals and their apparent roles below.

Kofi Annan and Adolf Ogi: A Sporting Friendship

The success of the IOC’s campaign to become a Permanent Observer seems to have been greatly assisted by the unlikely friendship that was formed between the Secretary-General of the United Nations (at the beginning of the new millennium), Kofi Annan and the

ex-Swiss Prime Minister and soon to be UN Special Advisor of Sport for Development and Peace, Adolf Ogi. Ogi first met Annan when he was the Swiss Minister of Defense in 1997.

In 2014, at the release of Ogi's autobiography, Annan expressed:

This encounter was the beginning of a beautiful friendship. I knew he shared my view about the unique power of sports. I believe that he believes as I do in this ability and sports ability to overcome differences and mobilize and inspire people of all ages and backgrounds. That is why as Secretary-General I had no hesitation in appointing him as the first UN advisor on Sport for Development and Peace, a role he served with distinction for 7 years. Our aim was to ensure sport was not a by-product of development but one of its engines. Some people of course thought we were asking too much of sport, they reminded us rightly that it above all was an activity to be enjoyed but this is to underestimate its power to bring people together, there is after all no more universal language.²¹⁷

Ogi had long been a promoter of sports and in 1998 he successfully requested that his position as Minister of Defense in the Swiss government be extended to include sports.²¹⁸

Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott (2008) point out that "Ogi made a commitment to improve the conditions of the IOC and those IFs [International Sports Federations] that were headquartered in Switzerland."²¹⁹ Ogi had also been the president of the Candidature Committee of the city of Sion for the Winter Games, a candidature that failed at the 1999 IOC vote. In 2000, Ogi had hoped to become an IOC member. However, he became the first nominated candidate to be rejected by the IOC membership.²²⁰ This made him available for

²¹⁷ European University Business School. "EU's launch of Adolf Ogi's English-Language Biography, with Special Guest Kofi Annan," *YouTube* video, 1:37:55, February 28, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=li_YsayIIWk.

²¹⁸ From 1998 Ogi's position was known as the Minister of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports.

²¹⁹ Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott, *The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The Governance of World Sport*. p. 108.

²²⁰ It is unclear why, but some hypothesize that Ogi was hindered by his nationality as Switzerland already had 4 IOC members (the 2nd largest number behind Italy).

the UN position that Annan recommended him for.²²¹

In 2001, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan created the position called “the UN Special Advisor of Sport for Development and Peace.”²²² The Special Advisor’s official role is: “to reach out further to the world of sport and more systematically and coherently encourage the use of sport as a means to promote development and peace.”²²³ With Ogi now sitting as the first Special Advisor for Sport for Development and Peace at the United Nations, it provided the IOC with yet another positive connection within the UN circle to promote its desired status. Both Ogi and Annan were huge supporters of SDP initiatives and Annan became the first Secretary-General to attend the Olympic Games in 2002 at Salt Lake City. The successors of both these two leaders were no different. In 2007 Ban Ki-Moon became the UN Secretary-General and Wilfried Lemke the Special Advisor of Sport for Development and Peace. Ki-Moon continued the tradition of close partnership with the IOC as he attended the Beijing, London and Sochi Olympics and also partook in the 13th Olympic Congress held in 2009 in Copenhagen. It was in this context that the IOC first made the request to obtain Permanent Observer status in 2008.

Frattoni, Pescante and the Request

In 2008, with the assistance of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Mission of Italy at the United Nations put forward a request for the inclusion of an additional item on the agenda of the 63rd General Assembly Session on 26th of November 2008.

²²¹ It is unclear whether Annan had specifically designed the Special Advisor of Sport for Development and Peace position for his close friend Ogi after he lost the IOC vote that many had expected him to get. Two interviewees mentioned that Annan created this position for Ogi, but that is personal opinion.

²²² This position holds the status of ‘Under-Secretary-General of the UN’ which is a high ranked position at the UN and only 50 others within the UN organization hold a similar position.

²²³ UNOSDP, “Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace, *United Nations Office of Sport for Development and Peace*, accessed April 2015, http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/sport/home/unplayers/special_adviser.

Franco Frattini, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs created the letter concerning the request for Permanent Observer status for the IOC at the General Assembly. An interviewee from the IOC explained that Mario Pescante, an IOC member and now the IOC representative to the UN and Frattini, were the individuals who drove the negotiation process for IOC Permanent Observer status at the General Assembly. Frattini wrote in his letter to the UN:

I believe it would be of particular importance if the UN could grant IOC observer status in the General Assembly. Sport is an important tool for development and peace, and IOC can support the UN in pursuing its mandate ²²⁴

The letter goes on to highlight the IOC's significance as organizer of the Olympic Games, and also covers the interactions with the UN in the past. These include: Olympic peace resolutions adopted by the UN since 1993 and resolutions that promote sport as a means to promote education, health, peace and development. The letter also covers the partnerships the IOC has with UN organizations, referring for example, to IOC links with UN peacekeeping missions, UN Development Programme, ILO, UNICEF, UNAIDS, UNESCO, UN Environmental Programme, WHO, World Food Programme, UNHCR. It also states that the IOC contributes to the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals. Six of these goals are specific areas in which the IOC has claimed to help: eradication of extreme poverty, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and promote women, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, develop global partnership for development.²²⁵

Frattini himself had personal and professional links to the IOC. He was the Foreign

²²⁴ UN General Assembly, 63rd Session, A/63/235, *Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the sixty-third Session*.

²²⁵ Ibid.

Minister from 2008 to 2011 for the Berlusconi cabinet in Italy, and was also Berlusconi's delegate for the Turin Winter Olympic Games in 2006. Significantly, Frattini worked alongside Pescante, an IOC member, who was an Italian politician from the same political party and also worked on the Turin Winter Olympics.

The interviewee revealed that the application process was not easy, and it took at least two years of behind the scenes negotiations with Member States to get them on board. She implied that the IOC did not want to put forth an official request without the knowledge that it would be supported by the majority of the Member States. Some Member States had, in the past, vowed not to provide Permanent Observer status to NGOs — and the IOC had to convince these Member States that they were an exception. I asked the interviewee why the IOC did not seek consultative status with the ECOSOC (the traditional trajectory for NGOs wanting to influence the UN). She responded:

Being another NGO among the world of NGOs in the UN was not really a very good tool for our own purposes. Besides that our status as an NGO is you know, we are little bit a hybrid organization, so we didn't really fit into that.

So, in this sense, it seemed that the IOC does not really see itself as an NGO. This fits with my findings from historical research, where the IOC has consistently sought to present itself as an intergovernmental organization, even though it does not operate as one. The interviewee stated that:

The IOC was similar but different to all of these exceptions and therefore a sort of challenge for Member States to accept that we would be among them but slightly different, but because of the aura of the IOC, they could also see that there was no point for us to join the NGO community within ECOSOC

The initial letter from Frattini in 2008 asked for acceptance into the 63rd Session of the General Assembly. This was unsuccessful (it is not clear why). A second request was sent in by the Italian Permanent Representatives in July of 2009 that was supported by 46

Member States²²⁶ and it was recommended by the Sixth Committee to be sent through to the 64th Session of the General Assembly for acceptance.²²⁷ In October 2009, the request was finally heard by the UN General Assembly. Five Member States expressed some concern about the issue of setting a precedent for other NGOs being able to apply for Observer Status. However each of these Member States ultimately joined the consensus that the IOC should be awarded this status. The President of the General Assembly announced that the application would be adopted and also explained that a precedent had, in fact, been set that could not be altered. The IOC was awarded Permanent Observer status without a vote on October 19 2009.²²⁸ On the 15th of March, 2010, IOC Vice-President, Mario Pescante was appointed Permanent Observer representative for the IOC at the UN General Assembly by the Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon.²²⁹

The Peculiar Role of Mario Pescante

Pescante, who pushed for Permanent Observer status for the IOC alongside his colleague Frattini at the UN, had been a member of the Italian Parliament since 2001. Pescante has been an IOC member for over 20 years, and part of the Italian Olympic Movement for the past 40 years. He became President of the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) in 1993 until he resigned in 1998 because of a doping scandal that he was allegedly involved in.²³⁰

²²⁶ UN General Assembly, 64th Session, A/64/145, *Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the provisional agenda for the sixty-fourth Session*, 14 July 2009, www.undocs.org/A/64/145.

²²⁷ UN General Assembly, 64th Session, A/64/458, *Observer status for the International Olympic Committee to the General Assembly*, 15 October 2009, www.undocs.org/A/64/458.

²²⁸ UN General Assembly, 64th Session, A/RES/64/3, *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 October 2009*, 22 October 2009, www.undocs.org/A/RES/64/3.

²²⁹ United Nations, *New Permanent Observer of International Olympic Committee presents appointment letter*, 15 March 2010, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/bio4177.doc.htm>.

²³⁰ Andrew Warshaw, "Football: Drugs in Serie A – Italy sinking deeper into scandal," *The Independent* (London: Independent Print Ltd.), October 13 1998, <http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football-drugs-in-serie-a---italy-sinking-deeper-into-scandal-1178042.html>.

In 1999, Pescante was identified in a World Anti Doping Agency (WADA) document²³¹ and in Italian legal documents as being involved in protecting and promoting blood doping in elite Italian athletes. A leading Italian prosecutor, Pierguido Soprani, came to the conclusion that high-ranking CONI officials had been involved in this criminal organization for decades. In the end because “too much time had elapsed between the alleged activities and the prosecution, Soprani had to dismiss the case but insisted that his request does not diminish the social and criminal non-value of the activities proved.”²³² Around the same time, in 1998, CONI’s anti-doping laboratory was being investigated by Italian officials, the lab had to be closed when it was found that less than 30% of urine samples from Italian athletes were actually tested, and positive tests had been found to be covered up. Less than six months after having been accused of involvement with the blood doping scandal, Pescante was elected as a member of Berlusconi’s political party and subsequently became the under-secretary of the Minister of Cultural Heritage and Activities in 2001. In 2004, he worked alongside Frattini as the Italian Government supervisor for the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Turin. While Pescante was forced to resign as President of CONI after the various doping allegations, he remained an IOC member and became an IOC vice-president in 2009.²³³

Why Pescante was considered an appropriate candidate to represent the IOC at the United Nations is important to consider. WADA (who released the document about Pescante’s role in the Italian doping scandal) works alongside UNESCO, a UN Agency to combat doping and to promote fairplay in sports. UNESCO assisted in creating the first

²³¹ Letzia Paoli and Alessandro Donati, “*The supply of doping products and the potential of criminal law enforcement in anti-doping: An examination of Italy’s experience*”, (WADA, January 13 2013), <https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/world-anti-doping-program/paoli-and-donati-report>.

²³² Ibid. p. 21.

²³³ Ibid.

international legal anti-doping document called ‘The International Convention Against Doping in Sport.’²³⁴ The complete lack of concern (on the IOC’s behalf) in promoting Pescante as an appropriate candidate might not be that much of a surprise – especially for critical sport sociologists who have written about questionable IOC activities and individuals for the past 50 years. However, I did find it somewhat surprising that I could not find any evidence from the media or those working at or with the UN who publically expressed any concern or even highlighted the irony of having an IOC representative at the UN who had previously been charged with aiding blood doping.

This initial examination of what it means to be a Permanent Observer and how the IOC became one, raises more questions than answers. The Permanent Observer role clearly is not open to all organizations and I am still curious as to why the IOC was considered appropriate for this role when it is clearly not intergovernmental, nor is it a human rights organization. Furthermore, while there is a historical relationship between the IOC and the UN and there were individuals that promoted the IOC’s status at the UN, it still does not adequately explain the eventual outcome. The remainder of this dissertation unpacks some of the underlying reasons for this decision by examining the historical, social and political context within which this decision occurred. The rest of the chapters of this study problematize and examine the IOC’s role at the UN. This next chapter focuses on the history of the relations between the UN and the IOC.

²³⁴ UNESCO, “*UNESCO and WADA*”, accessed April 2015, <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/anti-doping/unesco-and-wada/>.

CHAPTER 5: BACK TO THE BEGINNINGS: HISTORY OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE IOC AND THE UN

The main goal of this chapter is to uncover and explain some of the reasons why the IOC began partnering with the UN and its affiliated organizations. While today we frequently hear about interactions between these two organizations through press releases, my research was able to reveal some reasoning that would not be acknowledged or evident without delving into the IOC minutes and personal correspondence. For example, I found that the IOC was for a long time very reluctant to partner with the UN or any of its affiliated organizations as it felt that its power over international sport could be under threat. In fact, it seems that the IOC only began to interact with UN agencies from the 1980s onwards after it realized that it could not continue to maintain this power over international sport without at least acknowledging other organizations working in this area. These strategic decisions were being made under the guise of increased awareness and concern for international development goals. However, the vast majority of discussions were focused on obtaining and maintaining hegemonic power over international sport, and also maintaining autonomy from governmental interference.

To inform my thinking about why and how the recent IOC and UN partnerships came about, I analyze in this chapter the interactions between the IOC and the UN (and its affiliated organizations) throughout history. I utilized data that were collected at the IOC archives in Lausanne, Switzerland, which predominantly included IOC Executive Board and Session Meeting Minutes. I also utilized other documents available at the IOC Archives. These included IOC correspondence with UN organizations, national governments and also between members. Data gathered from the online UN document system, IOC website and

biographical books were also utilized. The IOC Executive Board meeting Minutes and the other IOC archival documents provided some of the most detailed information required for this part of the research. These documents are held under a 30-year embargo — which meant that 1982 was the last year available for data collection. I point this out as these documents contained detailed information about the IOC's thoughts on partnering with the UN, which was centrally important to this research. Lacking this 'insider' analysis, the years after 1982 have been covered here in less complex detail, although the last 30 years are still of importance in understanding how and why the IOC manages its relations with the UN today — and are still closely studied here using other sources.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Each section focuses on one of the three IOC Presidents that held power during the era I have analyzed. These Presidents are: Avery Brundage (1952 – 1972), Lord Michael Killanin (1972 to 1980), and Juan Antonio Samaranch (1980 – 2001). Interactions between the IOC and the UN over the past 10 years are briefly discussed as well in order to provide additional information on the trajectory established by these figures.

Each of these Presidents had a major influence on the decisions being made during the time of their reign. They were also all presented with different challenges that they had to grapple with, which impacted on their partnership work with the UN. These challenges are a focus of this chapter as they provide insight into the workings of the IOC and, more importantly, their work with the UN. In particular, the responses to these challenges reveal some of the key values of the organization — which look to be predominantly focused on obtaining power and authority more than the desire to support participation in sport and physical activity around the world.

This historical analysis demonstrates that the perceived challenges faced by the IOC were often reducible to concerns that the IOC's power over international sport was being threatened. During Brundage's and Killanin's eras, many IOC members believed that the UN, and specifically the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), was overstepping into the IOC's area of expertise. This was cause for concern among the IOC members and created some tensions between the IOC and the UN. The IOC's response, especially during the Brundage years, was to ignore the UN's attempts at collaboration. Slowly this perspective changed as the IOC saw the need to interact with other international organizations in order to maintain power over international sport. By the time Samaranch came into power interactions and collaborations with the UN were numerous. While the IOC's desire for power and autonomy did not change, its tactics did — and it seems through this reading of the documents that the IOC has been highly successful in achieving these goals.

Avery Brundage (IOC President: 1952 – 1972)

Up to the 1950s there were few recorded interactions between the IOC and the UN system. However, this changed as UNESCO began to show an interest in sport and physical education. This section focuses on the era of Avery Brundage, the IOC President from 1952 to 1972 — and especially on the way in which the IOC dealt with this new interest from UNESCO in the area of sport. As this section will demonstrate, many of the IOC's actions were linked to their desire to maintain authoritative power over the Olympic Movement and to protect the relative autonomy of international sporting organizations from governments and national politics. The IOC members' protection over the Olympic Movement meant that, for a long time, they were not willing to collaborate with UNESCO and other UN affiliated

organizations.

UN, Human Rights and Sport: UNESCO's First Foray into the Sporting Arena

The 1950s presented some of the first occasions that sport, recreation, and play were mentioned by the UN and its affiliated organizations. This was also a time when Human Rights discourses became exceedingly popular with the UN and other international development organizations. In 1952, UNESCO²³⁵ recognized sport as a tool for education and became the lead UN agency for Physical Education and sport.²³⁶ Furthermore, in 1959 the UN declaration on the Rights of the Child recognized every child's right to play and recreation. The declaration states: "mankind owes the child the best it has to give," and asserts "the child shall have full opportunity for play and recreation which should be directed to the same purposes as education."²³⁷ At this stage mentions of sport were intertwined with ideas of play, physical education and recreation for children.

These growing links between recreation, play and sport with human rights ensured that UNESCO in particular was encouraged to get involved in examining these phenomena on a global scale. While they had been identified as the lead sport and physical education agency for the UN, UNESCO admittedly had little experience in this area.²³⁸ It was around this time, in the early 1950s, that UNESCO was keen to seek out an organization that could represent the UN on these activities. Some people considered the IOC for this position. However, many UNESCO members were concerned that the IOC was lagging in its philosophical and educational goals as its focus was on organizing an elite sporting

²³⁵ UNESCO was officially formed 1945 but its mandate can be traced back to 1921 during the era of the League of Nations.

²³⁶ UNESCO. "International Conference Sport: World without barriers", (18 May 2012), <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002163/216396e.pdf>.

²³⁷ UNGA, "Declaration of the Rights of the Child", (1959), http://www.unicef.org/lac/spbarbados/Legal/global/General/declaration_child1959.pdf.

²³⁸ Steve Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport* (UK: John Wiley & Sons, 1996).

competition. This view was highlighted when, in 1953, the IOC's application for consultative status at UNESCO was declined due to the concern that the IOC was not an appropriate representative for UNESCO as the agency for sport and physical education.²³⁹

At the UN it was agreed there was a gap in the area of expertise on sport and physical education, and UNESCO and the World Health Organization (WHO) were asked to assist in creating an international organization focused on these subjects. UNESCO and WHO cooperated with sport and physical education researchers and officials from around the world to create what would become the International Council for Sport and Physical Education (ICSPE) in 1959. UNESCO made it clear that it hoped that ICSPE would “become the co-ordinating agency for all international and national bodies interested in sport and Physical Education.”²⁴⁰ ICSPE was to be “a worldwide promoter of research and communication in the broad areas of sport science and physical education.”²⁴¹ The ICSPE and UNESCO made it clear that they were keen to collaborate with the IOC, and they invited the IOC to conferences and wrote letters of support. However, at this stage, the IOC declined all invitations and acted as if they did not want to be involved.

For example, UNESCO held a conference on sport, work and culture in 1959 in Helsinki, Finland and IOC members were invited to attend. The IOC President announced in a private letter to two IOC members that he doubted whether this conference would be useful at all, and left it up to individual members to decide whether they would like to attend or not.²⁴² It was clear that the IOC was not interested in involving themselves with these other organizations, and they did not attend any of the other organized conferences hosted over the

²³⁹ Ibid. It is not clear why or how the IOC applied for consultative status at UNESCO.

²⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 51.

²⁴¹ Ibid. p. 2.

²⁴² Otto Mayer, “*Letter to IOC members Rangell and Frenckell*”, IOC Archives, (Lausanne, Switzerland, 31 January 1959).

next couple of years as official delegates.

At these conferences, UNESCO was not shy in discussing its critique of organized high performance sport. At the 1959 conference in particular, much of the talk veered towards critiques of the “raising of the high-level performer to god-like status” and also to the undemocratic style of operation in many international sports organizations.²⁴³ These perspectives perhaps explain the reluctance of the IOC to get involved. Brundage, in particular, was very protective about the way in which the Olympic Movement operated, and felt that UNESCO was unfairly focusing their critiques on the IOC.²⁴⁴ These clashes of ideology around the organization of sport continued between the IOC and UNESCO (and ICSPE) over the next 20 years and played a part in the limited collaborations between these organizations over this period.

The Olympic Movement vs. ICSPE and UNESCO

Throughout the next few years, the ICSPE continued to make several unsuccessful attempts to collaborate with the IOC. It became clear that the IOC was concerned that the ICSPE and UNESCO were attempting to take over the organization of international sport.²⁴⁵ While the IOC continued to decline official invitations to meetings they did make sure an IOC member attended any meetings in an unofficial capacity to report back on the content and to defend the IOC if necessary.²⁴⁶ This way the IOC could be sure they were aware of exactly what was going on, despite refusing to actively participate.

In 1962, several organizations including the ICSPE and UNESCO were discussing the issue of political interference in sport. Several sporting events had to be cancelled

²⁴³ Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*. p. 63.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Author Unknown, *Letter to Avery Brundage*, IOC Archives (Lausanne, Switzerland, June 5 1962).

²⁴⁶ Otto Mayer, *Letter to IOC member Jorge Vargas*, IOC Archives (Lausanne, Switzerland, 8 April 1962).

because governments refused entry to participants of certain nationalities. The Olympic Movement was impacted by this, as were other International Sports Federations (ISF). Both the World Basketball Championship and the ICSPE International Conference had to be cancelled in Manila because individuals from communist countries would not be allowed into the Philippines. At this time ICSPE and UNESCO expressed interest in hosting an event to discuss these political issues, intending to invite all interested ISFs and in particular the IOC. The ICSPE was hopeful that this would finally be an opportunity to work alongside the IOC on an issue that concerned both of their organizations.²⁴⁷ However, the IOC disagreed and eventually decided to host their own meeting on the same topic and it was decided that the presence of ICSPE and UNESCO was not required. The IOC subsequently excluded UNESCO and the ICSPE from even obtaining observer status at this meeting.²⁴⁸ The IOC President expressed his reasoning to the ICSPE, stating that “the IOC is very jealous of its independence and has therefore always been very wary of becoming involved in politics through association with any other organizations.”²⁴⁹

Throughout 1963, IOC members continued to express their concerns about the role of the ICSPE. On 5 June 1963, a letter written to the IOC President from Willi Daume, an IOC member, highlights the concerns that at ICSPE meetings they will be delving into topics that “undoubtedly belong to the competence of the IOC and of the ISFs.” The letter continues: “To my mind the IOC should do everything to defend its position in the international public and by doing so, also to defend the reputation of the Olympic Movement and mainly of the sport.” Daume also questioned whether the IOC should attend and/or support any of the

²⁴⁷ Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Avery Brundage, “Letter to IOC Executive Board”, IOC Archives, (Lausanne, Switzerland, 12 July 1962).

events held by the ICSPE because of their actions.²⁵⁰ The IOC President responded to Daume, agreeing with his concerns and raised his own doubts about the newly created organization — noting that the ICSPE was intended to be a meeting of sports professors, but instead “has been pushing more and more into fields that are already covered by the National Olympic Committees (NOC), ISFs, and the IOC.” He finished by stating that UNESCO funded the ICSPE, and as UNESCO is a political organization, “we believe that great caution should be exercised by NOCs and International Federations as well as the IOC.”²⁵¹

In 1963, the ICSPE created the International Fair Play Committee (CIFP) in collaboration with the International Association of Sports Press (AIPS) and UNESCO. The Committee was intended as a response to the ongoing violence, chauvinism, and commercialism seen in sports by rewarding fair play behaviours.²⁵² At the ICSPE meeting in Paris in October of 1963, it was decided that the Fair Play trophies should be named after the founder of the Olympic Movement, Pierre de Coubertin.²⁵³ The reason for this, according to the ICSPE, was that Coubertin was a Frenchman and also because 1963 represented the 100th anniversary of the modern Olympic Movement and they wanted to celebrate this occasion.²⁵⁴ When the IOC was invited by UNESCO to collaborate in handing out these awards, it refused.²⁵⁵ A year later, the 1964 Madrid meeting Minutes show that the IOC again refused to participate in the awards. According to Grosset and Attali (2011), the IOC saw the Committee as competition and did not appreciate the way these other organizations were

²⁵⁰ Willi Daume, “*Letter to IOC President*”, IOC Archives, (Lausanne, Switzerland, 5 June 1963).

²⁵¹ Avery Brundage, “*Letter to Willi Daume*”, IOC Archives, (Lausanne, Switzerland, July 6 1963).

²⁵² CIFP, “*History*,” *International Fair Play Committee*, n.d.

²⁵³ Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*.

²⁵⁴ Author Unknown, “*Letter to Avery Brundage*”, IOC Archives.

²⁵⁵ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (14 October 1963. Baden Baden, Germany), DVD, IOC Archives.

encroaching on their turf.²⁵⁶

The ICSPE and UNESCO continued in their critique of international elite sport and more specifically of the Olympic Movement at a conference in Paris in October of 1963. An article written by the *London Times* stated that at this conference the Director General of UNESCO, Rene Maheu, “bluntly challenged the sporting world to open its eyes to the hypocrisy of ‘shamateurism’”. The article also noted that Maheu “called for an end to the chauvinistic exploitation of international competition.”²⁵⁷

The IOC took this as direct criticism of its practices. The IOC President, Brundage, proceeded to write a letter to the French NOC, emphasizing the danger of such an article and stating that he now felt justified in his refusal to “participate in the work of this organization with its political background.”²⁵⁸ The letter continues to make Brundage’s position very clear:

You have my sympathies because of the difficulties your NOC must have, operating in a climate²⁵⁹ where there is such an appalling and lamentable ignorance of basic and fundamental Olympic principles and of amateurism itself, a climate where such monstrosities as ‘paid amateurs’ are advocated, where they propose State sponsorship of athletes, and where they think amateurism is dead²⁶⁰

At this point in time, it was clear that neither the IOC nor UN organizations were particularly fond of each other. At the same time though, divisions within the Olympic Movement were also becoming evident. I am referring in particular to the division between those IOC members with voting power, and some of the newer National Olympic Committees (NOC) with little official power. These internal divisions seem to have played

²⁵⁶ Yoan Grosset and Michael Attali, “The International Institutionalization of Sport Ethics,” *Society* 48, no. 6 (October 12, 2011): 517–525.

²⁵⁷ Author Unknown, “Amateur status in Olympics ‘hypocrisy’”, *London Times*, October 29 1963.

²⁵⁸ Avery Brundage, *Letter to French National Olympic Committee*, IOC Archives, (Lausanne, Switzerland, 30 November 1963).

²⁵⁹ The ICSPE and UNESCO were housed in Paris, France.

²⁶⁰ Brundage, *Letter to French National Olympic Committee*.

an important role in eventually forcing the IOC to decide whether to remain an organization simply concerned with elite Olympic sport, or to claim control over all international sport. As we shall see, this was a turning point that seems to have huge significance in getting a reluctant IOC to begin to interact with other UN organizations in a bid to maintain control. Interestingly, it was the political issue of South African apartheid policies that triggered divisions within the Olympic Movement, which played a role in encouraging the IOC to interact with UN organizations.

The Role of South African Apartheid in the Olympic Movement

South Africa introduced racial segregation laws known as policies of apartheid throughout the 1950s. By 1960, it was clear that no black athletes would be included in the South African Olympic team. While the IOC Executive Board was keen to ignore this political issue, as they were still convinced that sport was above politics, the African NOCs (some of whom were new to the Olympic Movement) pushed the IOC to make a stand against these racist activities. In 1964, at an IOC session, the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC) was asked to prove it was against apartheid to ensure their participation in the Tokyo Olympic Games to be held that year. In the end SANOC did not prove this in time, and the IOC did not invite them to participate.²⁶¹

Despite not participating in the Tokyo Games, SANOC was still part of the Olympic Movement at this time. African NOCs and their supporters²⁶² demanded that the IOC exclude SANOC from the IOC General Assembly in Rome and to furthermore suspend SANOC from the Olympic Movement because of its discriminatory policies. At this time, NOCs had little

²⁶¹ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (26 – 27 June 1964). Lausanne, Switzerland. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁶² Supporters tended to include communist countries such as the Soviet Union.

official power in the decisions being made for the Olympic Movement and their only available move was to threaten to boycott the Games.²⁶³ The IOC President was disappointed about this pressure and made the comment that these ‘newer’ NOCs from Africa did not realize that politics are not a part of sport. At the same time he recognized that now that they had made their demands, the IOC could not be seen as ignoring them.²⁶⁴ In 1965, at the Madrid IOC Session Meeting, the NOCs declared that SANOC would be suspended from participating in any NOC meetings in the future (not the same as IOC meetings).²⁶⁵ Despite these declarations coming from the NOCs, it is clear from IOC Minutes in 1966 that representatives of SANOC were still present at IOC General meetings.

Unlike the NOCs, the IOC Executive Board was still reluctant to suspend SANOC and decided not to make any decision for another year. The IOC President, Avery Brundage, continued to express his belief that the apartheid regime was a political issue that should not interfere with international sporting relations.²⁶⁶ Thus, the IOC Executive Board continued its attempts to stall the suspension of SANOC.

In February of 1968, IOC members ignored the requests of the NOCs and voted to invite SANOC to send a mixed-race team to the Mexico Olympic Games.²⁶⁷ African NOCs and their supporters subsequently threatened to boycott the Games. The IOC quickly realized that its reputation was at stake, and that the presence of South Africa at the Games could become quite controversial. The President eventually hoped that SANOC would decline the

²⁶³ Furthermore there were no black African voting members of the IOC.

²⁶⁴ Avery Brundage, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, (22 October 1966), Mexico City, Mexico. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁶⁵ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session. (6 – 9 October 1965). Madrid, Spain. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁶⁶ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session. (24 – 30 April 1966). Rome, Italy. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁶⁷ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session. (1 – 5 February 1968). Grenoble, France. DVD, IOC Archives.

invitation voluntarily thus “solving the desperate situation in which the IOC found itself”.²⁶⁸ In the end, the IOC was forced to withdraw SANOC’s invitation. It was emphasized by the IOC Executive Board at the next meeting that this did not mean SANOC was suspended or expelled; they were simply not invited because of international political intervention.²⁶⁹

In 1969, African NOCs and other supporters again requested that SANOC be banned from the Olympic Games once and for all.²⁷⁰ Six years after the initial request, the IOC finally voted to officially withdraw recognition of SANOC at the IOC Session in Amsterdam in 1970. This vote went through by 35 to 28. IOC executive member and South African, Mr. Reginald Honey, was asked by the Executive Board to stay on. The IOC Executive Board claimed that he was not a representative of South Africa but an individual member. However, Honey was the IOC’s only tie to South Africa and they wanted to make sure that this connection was not completely severed.²⁷¹ This ban on SANOC remained in place (despite protests from several IOC Presidents) until 1992.²⁷² This issue is discussed further in the following chapter.

The IOC Executive Board’s reactions to the issue of South Africa demonstrate its perspective at this time: sport should be above politics and IOC members should do everything to stop political interference if they could. Talking at the IOC Session in Lausanne 1968, Brundage stated, “he deplored the deep division he was sure existed within

²⁶⁸ Avery Brundage, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, (20 – 21 April, 1968), Lausanne, Switzerland, DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁶⁹ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session (7 – 11 October 1968). Mexico City, Mexico. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁷⁰ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (23 – 27 October 1969). Dubrovnik, Croatia. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁷¹ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session (12 – 16 May 1970). Amsterdam, the Netherlands. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁷² Maureen M Smith, “Revisiting South Africa and the Olympic Movement: The Correspondence of Reginald S. Alexander and the International Olympic Committee, 1961-86,” in *Olympism the Global Vision: From Nationalism to Internationalism*, ed. Boria Majumdar and Sandra Collins (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008).

the Committee which threatened to wreck the Movement and which was to a great extent due to the actions of some of its own members.”²⁷³ In this situation, the IOC Board felt ‘forced’ to deny SANOC participation in the Olympic Movement, not primarily because of apartheid policies but because of threats of boycotts by NOCs. The IOC was critical of the behaviour of NOCs and this issue demonstrates the way in which the NOCs utilized their minimal power to achieve their objectives. The NOCs were demanding more influence and the IOC was struggling to maintain its control over the Olympic Movement.

The Changing Face of the Olympic Movement: NOCs and ISFs Demanding Power

This increasing demand for power coming from constituents within the Olympic Movement was a major turning point for the IOC. The IOC grappled with the desire to maintain authoritarian control over the movement on the one hand, and on the other hand the slow realization that this control was alienating constituents and could have dire consequences for the overall power of the Olympic movement. While on the surface the pressure from NOCs and ISFs could be viewed as a success in terms of democratization of the movement, somehow the IOC still achieved its desire to maintain the dominant position it held over international sport. It was through careful and strategic decision-making that the IOC also eventually began to secure the support of the Director General of UNESCO and some of UNESCO’s western constituents.

NOCs and ISFs had, up until the early 1970s, very little official power over decisions made by the IOC. Although the South African decision was most definitely influenced by pressure from African NOCs and their supporters, this occurred without an organized body. In 1966, the NOCs looked towards creating an organization to represent them. For them, this

²⁷³ Avery Brundage, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, (20 – 21 April 1968).

would mean that they would be able to meet and share information and also come to IOC meetings with a common agenda. NOCs as well as ISFs had at various times requested more funding from the IOC and also requested more meetings with the IOC without success. Both the NOCs and ISFs felt that they did not get the support they needed and this provided them with the impetus to create their own representative organizations.²⁷⁴ IOC members were very concerned about this. While members publicly claimed to be okay with these organizations meeting with one another, they did not support the creation of a permanent representative body for either the NOCs or ISFs.²⁷⁵

In regards to the formation of a Permanent General Assembly of NOCs (PGA of NOCs), an IOC member expressed that this “could be extremely dangerous for the Olympic Movement as inevitably politics would enter into sports.”²⁷⁶ The IOC was concerned that this would give NOCs more power within the Olympic Movement and it was not willing to concede this. By the 1967 IOC Executive Board meeting, IOC members had decided to create their own solution and organized a special section for contact with NOCs during IOC meetings, and therefore announced that there was no need anymore for the PGA of NOCs.²⁷⁷

Around the same time the ISFs were also attempting to create a permanent body: from this point on, the General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF) was proposed to represent them at IOC Sessions. Unsurprisingly, IOC members again thought this was unnecessary. GAISF requested recognition from the IOC in 1967, however the IOC

²⁷⁴ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (22 October 1966). Mexico City, Mexico. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (11 – 13 February 1967). Copenhagen, Denmark. DVD, IOC Archives.

rejected their request.²⁷⁸ Again in 1968 at the IOC Session in Grenoble, the IOC members held the view that “by trying to set up a super-organization, [the ISFs] constitute a threat to the IOC and to the Olympic Movement, all the more since such an organization would seem to be claiming competence and money which belong to the IOC.”²⁷⁹ ISFs also requested the establishment of an Olympic Congress, which would include the IOC, NOCs and ISFs. However, in the 1968 IOC Executive Board Minutes it is noted that the IOC President thought this was a “waste of time and money” and rejected the request.²⁸⁰

It was clear that the IOC was unwilling, at this point, to give up any power, or change its organization, which for all intents and purposes was authoritarian in its practices. These critiques coming from NOCs, ISFs and also the media during the 1960s had the IOC President concerned that the organization was in ‘grave danger’. This concern only worked to have the IOC attempt to tighten its grip over its constituencies. In a confidential letter to IOC members, the President wrote about some of the issues that plagued the IOC and the Olympic Movement. He urged IOC members to stick together, and never to publicly critique the Olympic Movement. He suggested, “the Executive Board must be empowered to censure disloyal members and request resignations.” He finished the letter by stating, “the strength of the IOC which has charge of the Olympic Movement has always been freedom, the independence, and neutrality of its members.”²⁸¹ This message came on the back of the outspoken debates of the South African issue and the NOCs and ISFs public requests for change. The IOC President made it clear he wanted to ensure this would not happen again.

²⁷⁸ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (2 – 8 May 1967). Tehran, Iran. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁷⁹ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session (1 – 5 February 1968).

²⁸⁰ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (26 – 27 January 1968). Lausanne, Switzerland. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁸¹ Avery Brundage, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board, (22 – 23 March 1969), Lausanne, Switzerland, DVD, IOC Archives.

However, over the next few years, the IOC gradually began to realize it could no longer maintain this position. The next section shows how the GAISF and PGA of NOCs were willing to collaborate with others outside of the Olympic Movement to obtain the support they were not receiving from the IOC. This presented yet more concerns for the IOC, as they were convinced this could mean the end of their reign over the Olympic Games.

IOC Desperate to Hold on to Power

Despite the IOC's seemingly staunch position on its control over the Olympic Movement, the actions taken by NOCs and ISFs meant that the IOC could not continue to ignore them for too long. In an ironic twist, while the IOC was busy closing itself off from organizations such as ICSPE, GAISF and the PGA of NOCs, it seems that it might have unintentionally encouraged these organizations to collaborate with one another without the IOC's involvement. In June of 1969, the President of the ICSPE, Philip Noel Baker was invited to present a paper at the General Assembly of International Sports Federations. Following this, Oscar State a GAISF representative attended the November meeting of the ICSPE Executive Board as an observer.²⁸² This was to be the beginning of collaborations between GAISF and ICSPE. As one might guess, the IOC was very concerned about this partnership and what it potentially meant for the future of IOC dominance over world sport. The partnership between the ICSPE and GAISF turns out to have been an unintended, yet important turning point in the history of collaboration between the IOC and ICSPE and other international organizations, specifically UNESCO.

At the IOC Executive Meeting in Lausanne in 1970, a discussion was held about the meetings between GAISF and ICSPE. Concerns were raised about the fact that the ISFs were

²⁸² Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*.

already contemplating “the idea of organizing, possibly with the support of the UNESCO and the respective governments, World Games, both for the youth and open.” IOC members discussed the fact that NOCs and ISFs were potentially looking to UNESCO and ICSPE because the IOC had “consistently ignored the problem.” The IOC member reporting on the situation stated “I do not feel that these activities could ever substitute the importance of the Olympic Games, but it is evident that they might be realized without the control of the IOC, and that they would inevitably cause the separation of the controlling forces of sport in the world.” In the IOC’s opinion this would lead to the dangerous position in which sport would no longer be controlled by the autonomous bodies in each area, but by governmental physical education agencies. These issues were a concern for the IOC and they had to decide what to do to ensure the autonomy of the IOC and its continued power over international sport.²⁸³

The IOC had realized that it was no longer possible to ignore the demands of the NOCs and ISFs. An IOC member, General Jose de Clark, presented two options at the 1970 Lausanne meeting in February: the IOC could be content with simply being the organizer of the Olympic Games, this would mean that it would have to be ready to give up some of its authority over amateur sport that occurred outside of the Olympic events. If this were the case, the IOC could not control the actions of the ISFs in their collaborations with UNESCO or ICSPE. Or, the second option was that the IOC’s authority could be maintained if it was prepared to get involved in the direction of sport outside of the Games. In this scenario, the IOC would still have to consider the interests of its members, which included the NOCs and ISFs; however, it would be able to dictate the partnerships and the direction it wanted to go

²⁸³ Jose Clark, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, (21 – 23 February 1970), Lausanne, Switzerland, DVD, IOC Archives.

in.²⁸⁴

The biggest concern for IOC members seemed to be the potential ‘take over’ — of control over global sport — by governmental organizations if the Olympic Movement could not get along. Thus, the IOC chose to maintain and grow their level of authority over amateur sport to ensure the autonomy of the Olympic Movement. Their focus would be to create a unified Olympic Movement that could not be infiltrated by governments. It seems that only at the point where they were concerned about losing power did the IOC consider making concessions for the demands of their broader constituency.

Brundage was especially against the idea of a more democratic Olympic Movement. He continued in his refusal to recognize the PGA of NOCs and attempted to find ways to break it up. Brundage stated that if any IOC member associated himself with this organization then he would like them to hand in their resignation.²⁸⁵ One IOC member, Major Padilha, suggested that they not allow the PGA meetings to take place at the same time as the IOC meetings. This way NOCs would struggle to afford to meet and therefore “die a natural death.”²⁸⁶ President Brundage gave a speech to the IOC at the Luxemburg meeting in 1971, which again contained numerous threats to individuals who spoke out against the organization:

The President reminded members it was their duty to uphold and to defend the actions and the general policy of the IOC and not to organize parallel organizations or to criticize, in any surroundings, the organization of which they were members...he particularly drew attention to...rule 12, of which a more strict wording will be studied

²⁸⁴ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC. (21 – 23 February 1970). Lausanne, Switzerland. DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁸⁵ Avery Brundage, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, (9 September 1971) Munich, Germany. DVD, IOC Archives; This threat was rather futile as many IOC members admitted that they had attended PGA meetings and no one did resign over this issue.

²⁸⁶ Sylvio Padilha, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, (9 September 1971), Munich, Germany. DVD, IOC Archives.

with the idea of ensuring the complete loyalty of IOC members.²⁸⁷

Unfortunately for the IOC, every ISF was already a member of GAISF. The IOC had to accept the situation and was eventually forced to acknowledge them and negotiate with them, all the while still refusing to officially recognize the organization.

The ISFs and NOCs did finally have some success when they convinced President Brundage to agree to host an Olympic Congress, even though he clearly expressed his expectation at the 1970 meeting in Amsterdam that the Congress would be a waste of time.²⁸⁸ However, he conceded that if the IOC did not organize the Congress then another organization most certainly would. The Congress was viewed as a venue where NOCs and ISFs could be included in the discussions of the Olympic Movement. This was significant because up until this time they had not been allowed to participate in IOC meetings, and had struggled therefore to have their perspectives heard and considered. Brundage placed parameters on the Congress, stating that this was to be led by the IOC only, and no voting would be allowed to take place. By dragging its feet, the IOC managed to convince the ISFs and NOCs that they should postpone the Congress until 1973, despite having organized it for 1971.²⁸⁹

Brundage's struggles against democratization of the Olympic Movement continued until the end of his Presidency in 1972. While the Olympic Movement has never become fully democratic, the creation of these two representative organizations, GAISF²⁹⁰ and the

²⁸⁷ Avery Brundage, Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session, (1971), Luxembourg, Luxembourg, DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁸⁸ Avery Brundage, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, (8 – 16 May 1970), Amsterdam, the Netherlands, DVD, IOC Archives.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ GAISF is now known as Sport Accord.

PGA of NOCs²⁹¹, forced the IOC to realize it could no longer operate without collaboration. This realization extended to organizations outside of the Olympic Movement, and as the new President took over, the IOC started to take a more collaborative approach when encountering what they perceived as threats to its authority.

Lord Killanin (IOC President: 1972- 1980)

In 1972, it was time to elect a new IOC President. Brundage had been at the reins now for 20 years and the IOC had learnt to operate under his authoritarian and conservative leadership. He was very concerned about the direction the Olympic Movement was moving in and he did not leave in good spirits. Furthermore, political issues kept being thrust at the IOC, which he found appalling. Brundage chose to retire in 1972. IOC members chose Irishman Lord Killanin as his successor. Lord Killanin had been an IOC member for over 20 years, and had been Senior Vice-President since 1968. Killanin seemed more willing than Brundage to democratize the Olympic Movement and to cooperate with other organizations. Like Brundage, he was wary of the UN and of political issues in sport. At the same time though, relations between the IOC and UNESCO and ICSPE in particular improved under his tenure.

UNESCO and its Growing Role in International Sport and Physical Education

During the 1970s, UNESCO became even more involved in the world of sport and physical education. Their education mandate now included issues of sport (and not just play and recreation as it had done since 1959) and they were therefore expected to begin organizing around sport. While UNESCO had assisted in creating ICSPE and still funded it, it was no longer content with having an external organization controlling their sport and

²⁹¹ PGA of NOCs is now known as the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC).

physical education mandate.²⁹² UNESCO began to organize conferences and meetings and presented themselves as experts on sport and physical education, in particular in the area of the education of youth. The IOC remained cognizant of UNESCO's agenda, and there were several occasions during the 1970s where the IOC felt that UNESCO threatened to take over the role as the leader of international sport.

Lord Killanin and the Director General of UNESCO, Rene Maheu met for the first time in 1973 in Lagos, Nigeria. This meeting was initiated by an African NOC member. At this point in time the IOC had still not expressed its interest in collaborating, and Maheu was openly critical of amateur competitive sport. Both leaders left the initial meeting with little positive to say. Lord Killanin describes in his autobiography how skeptical he was of UNESCO as an organization and how he was aware that some representatives were eager to 'take over' the organization of the Olympic Games.²⁹³ For his part, the Director General reportedly left the meeting "feeling that his assessments had been correct, and that there was little to be gained from seeking collaboration from the IOC".²⁹⁴ While this first meeting appeared to have failed in finding common ground between the two organizations, UNESCO's expanded interest in sport meant that the two organizations could no longer ignore one another.

'Sport for All' and the IOC Backlash

In the late 1960s, ICSPE began talks with other organizations to bring together Ministers of sport and physical education from around the world. UNESCO was approached with this idea in 1971 and took over the organizing aspects of this conference. Bailey shows

²⁹² Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*.

²⁹³ Lord Michael Killanin, *My Olympic years*. (1983, Martin Secker & Warburg Limited: UK).

²⁹⁴ Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*. p. 183.

that ICSPE was not happy with UNESCO taking over, as they felt the idea was theirs and they should organize such a conference themselves. It seemed that UNESCO was keen to take a lead in this area and no longer wanted to leave it to other organizations.²⁹⁵ In 1974, UNESCO organized a meeting of experts in Belgium. This meeting was convened to provide the basis for preparation of the documents for the first major conference of ministers.

At this meeting the term ‘sport for all’ was discussed. The ‘sport for all’ concept was to provide a new methodology for physical education. This concept incorporated the idea that sport provided life long general education of moral values that would be important to every child’s learning in all aspects of their schooling. It was explained that this change in thinking about sport would be a long-term undertaking “and involved, in all parts of the world, a great number of difficulties and of philosophical political, socio-economic and educational problems.” This ‘sport for all’ idea was to provide the basis for discussions at the first conference. The meeting considered that “UNESCO should take the exceptional opportunity offered by this conference to reaffirm the role of physical education and sport in the education of the young in the context of life-long education.”²⁹⁶ This meeting demonstrated UNESCO’s ambition to become a leader in the sport and physical education community, and also promoted the concept of ‘sport for all.’

The first International Conference of Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport (MINEPS) took place in April of 1976 in Paris at the UNESCO headquarters. UNESCO had taken full charge of the conference and left ICSPE with little to do.²⁹⁷ The conference was attended by 101 Member States and Associate

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Minutes of the meeting of Experts (16 – 21 December 1974). Liege, Belgium. IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

²⁹⁷ Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*.

Members and the theme was “The role of Physical Education and Sport in the Education of Youth, in the Context of Lifelong Education.” Also present were three intergovernmental organizations and 16 non-governmental organizations. The IOC was in attendance and the President, Lord Killanin, spoke at the opening of the conference. Killanin took this opportunity to recall the principles of the Olympic Movement and to deplore “the infringements to which they had been subjected. He claimed that competitive sport and sport for all are complementary”, and assured UNESCO of the cooperation of the IOC.²⁹⁸

At the beginning of this conference, it seemed this might be an opportune time for collaboration between UNESCO and the IOC. However, at the end of the meeting several resolutions were passed that the IOC was most unhappy about. In particular, proposals to discuss democratization of sport and the commitment made by UNESCO to create a Permanent Assembly of Ministers of Sport and Governmental Officials were not supported by the IOC. There was to be a full UNESCO meeting in Nairobi later that year to set up this Assembly. The IOC president stated at the Montreal IOC Executive Board meeting in July 1976 that “this could be construed as an attack on the autonomy of the IOC, the ISFs, and the NOCs.”²⁹⁹ Presumably the IOC President was nervous about the call to democratize global sport, which was something the IOC did not want; the IOC wanted to remain the organization in charge of global sport.

Other IOC members also expressed their concern about the resolutions in letters written to the IOC President. IOC member, Raymond Gafner, wrote that some of the final resolutions “could quickly become very dangerous for the freedom of international sport and

²⁹⁸ MINEPS General Report (April 1976) Paris, France. IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

²⁹⁹ Avery Brundage, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, (10 – 31 July 1976), Montreal, Canada. DVD, IOC Archives.

of the Olympic Movement.”³⁰⁰ At the IOC Session in Montreal in July 1976, “Mr. Daume [IOC Member] felt that UNESCO was challenging the IOC and that the Olympic Games might be taken away from it entirely.”³⁰¹ IOC members were instructed to warn NOCs and officials of their country (who attended the Nairobi meeting) that these decisions were not to be supported. Despite IOC efforts to thwart the UNESCO proposals, the UNESCO General Conference went ahead in Nairobi, and the Permanent Intergovernmental Committee on Sport and Physical Education was approved and created. Furthermore, UNESCO agreed to adopt a new resolution, which stated, that UNESCO would “involve itself in studying the problem inherent in international sporting competitions.”³⁰² The IOC was clearly not pleased with these decisions. An article in a German newspaper quoted IOC member, Willi Daume, as saying that “the development in Nairobi progressed in a direction we feared and warned against” and that he considered UNESCO’s decisions as “a challenge to the IOC and the International Sports Federations.” Daume finished by saying “if UNESCO exceeds its field of responsibility there will be a fierce reprisal.”³⁰³

The article stated that these new initiatives were largely directed by representatives of UNESCO from communist and developing countries who were dissatisfied with the structure and mode of operation of the IOC and the ISFs, which was predominately western-led. Developing countries did not have voting power within the Olympic movement at the time and the democratic nature of UNESCO provided an opportunity for these countries to express their opinion about the way in which international sport was being organized.

³⁰⁰ Raymond Gafner, “Letter to IOC President”, (19 May 1976), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³⁰¹ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC. (10 – 31 July 1976). Montreal, Canada. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁰² Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*. p. 160.

³⁰³ UNESCO Commission challenges ‘free sport’, (13 November 1976), *German Newspaper*, IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

Despite this pressure, western representatives within UNESCO were staunch IOC supporters.

After the conference, several western countries sent letters to their NOCs to reinforce their support and distance themselves from decisions made by UNESCO. For example, the Office of Foreign Affairs in New Zealand told the New Zealand Olympic Committee that few western countries voted for the decision to urge UNESCO to take a more active role in sport.³⁰⁴ This demonstrated the divide between individuals from communist and developing countries and western countries who had the largest percentage of voting members at the IOC.

The ICSPE realized that the actions of UNESCO were detrimental to their (and UNESCO's) efforts to collaborate with the IOC, and therefore took the initiative to set up an informal meeting with the IOC President to see if they could smooth over the controversy. At this meeting ICSPE agreed to "do all it could to head off this challenge to the international non-governmental sports organizations, in return for which the IOC would increasingly support the admirable UNESCO 'sport for all' philosophy enshrined in its new Charter for Physical Education and Sport."³⁰⁵ This agreement seemed to be a positive development for all involved, and in particular for the IOC as it was most concerned that UNESCO was threatening the IOC's autonomy and attempting to take over international sport. Obtaining a close ally of UNESCO, the ICSPE, to ensure this would not happen, would have been considered quite useful. At the same time, the ICSPE was concerned about the future of its own organization, and to obtain the support from the largest sporting organization in the world would have been a useful lifeline to them as well.

³⁰⁴ Brian Talboys, Letter to President of the New Zealand National Olympic Committee, (19 May 1977), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³⁰⁵ Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*. p. 160.

From Controversy to Collaboration: IOC and UNESCO

After the situation at the MINEPS conference, it was clear to the IOC Executive Board that they had to collaborate with other organizations and they felt they should be the ones to initiate the meetings and conversations in order to ensure it maintained control over amateur sport.³⁰⁶ This decision was one that seemed to pay off for the IOC as it managed to maintain its power over international sport and secure UNESCO's public support at the same time. In November of 1977, the Director of the IOC, Monique Berlioux, held a meeting with the new Director General of UNESCO, Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, at the request of the IOC President. In her report of this meeting, Berlioux stated that she had informed the Director General that "the IOC, ISFs and NOCs were very interested in UNESCO's steps to develop sport, that they all welcomed the efforts undertaken with regard to school sport and even university sport, but that competitive sport, indeed 'sport for all', was the concern of the sports organizations which had shown their worth in this field for almost a century."³⁰⁷ This statement suggests that the IOC was not open to having UNESCO delve into matters of 'sport for all', despite the fact that UNESCO's mandate now including this issue.

M'Bow's response suggested that UNESCO was willing to cooperate completely with the IOC, and that they had no intentions of stepping on the IOC's toes. The Director General assured Berlioux that UNESCO planned to invite the IOC to all sports meetings, and also to make sure that there was no overlap in the work being done. Thus, a tenuous agreement to collaborate had been made. However, this was not to be the end of the tug of war over who held the power over world sport.

³⁰⁶ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session (15 – 18 June 1977). Prague, Czech Republic. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁰⁷ Monique Berlioux, "Report on visit with Director General of UNESCO," (24 November 1977), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

In 1978, the IOC made the decision to announce its leadership over the ‘sport for all’ issue. Nearly a year after UNESCO and ICSPE declared their interest in this area, it was not merely coincidental timing that the IOC now wanted to be a part of it. The IOC was fiercely protective of its power over international sport, and it had become clear to them over the past decade that other organizations had perceived a gap in the IOC’s competencies. Now that UNESCO was becoming a formidable force in this area, the IOC was openly concerned about the potential impact it could have on its own autonomy and powers. One response to this perceived threat was to proclaim itself as the leading player in the ‘sport for all’ movement, which is exactly what the IOC did — much to the concern of ICSPE and UNESCO. As Bailey (1996) states, “A Declaration that further distanced the IOC from UNESCO was issued in March 1978 by the Olympic Tripartite Commission³⁰⁸...The Tripartite Declaration clearly brought the concerns of these three groups out into the Sport for All and PE world – beyond the organization of the quadrennial festival of sporting competition of the Olympic Games.”³⁰⁹ UNESCO and the ICSPE did not appreciate the IOC’s involvement in what they considered their area of expertise.

Despite the continued disagreements, it appeared that the leaders of both UNESCO and the IOC could see merit in collaborations. In 1978, when a newspaper article suggested that the animosity between UNESCO and IOC was the result of a misunderstanding,³¹⁰ both the IOC and UNESCO were pleased to put these issues behind them. Furthermore, at a meeting in May in 1978 with the Director General of UNESCO, the IOC President received assurances yet again that UNESCO had no intentions to clash “with the IOC or ISFs or usurp

³⁰⁸ The Olympic Tripartite Commission was comprised of representatives of the IOC, NOCs and ISFs.

³⁰⁹ Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*. p. 156.

³¹⁰ International Herald Tribune, *UNESCO, IOC steer away from confrontation*, (24 May 1978), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

any of their autonomy.” The President was also assured that while UNESCO had discussed the need for democratization in sport, the Director General would make sure that this focus would not be on the Olympic Movement but rather would be focused on the organization of sport in developing countries.³¹¹ After the meeting the IOC President sent a letter to M’Bow expressing his “delight at the positive view their partnership is receiving.”³¹² M’Bow responded by stating how pleased he was with their recent contacts and their friendly and open conversations between the two organizations.³¹³ While the relations between these two leaders were cordial, it was clear that some UNESCO Member States were not at all pleased with the IOC and the Olympic Movement.³¹⁴ However, Mr. M’Bow and western Member States assured IOC members that any attempts of ‘interference’ with organizations of international sport would be thwarted.

While these meetings were a far cry from earlier attempts at collaborations, it is important to note that both leaders were still wary of each other. Lord Killanin consistently emphasized the importance of the independence of sport in speeches given at UNESCO meetings. Killanin specifically described the Tripartite Declaration on sport for all as a ‘tactic’ to “disarm the idealists [of UNESCO].”³¹⁵ The Declaration, in Killanin’s opinion, established the necessary position of the Olympic Movement in all discussions around sport, and stated clearly the responsibilities of UNESCO – which, were, according to Killanin, specifically in education. Meanwhile, the newly created Intergovernmental Committee for

³¹¹ Avery Brundage, *Letter to IOC Director*, (13 May 1978), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³¹² Avery Brundage, *Letter to the Director General of UNESCO*, (30 May 1978), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³¹³ Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow, *Letter to IOC President*, (29 June 1978), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³¹⁴ Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 69.

Sport and Physical Education of UNESCO³¹⁶ continued their discussions and critique of the current organization of world sport.

In September of 1978, UNESCO hosted a meeting with NGOs whose special field was physical education and sport. The IOC, GAISF, PGA of NOCs, ICSPE and several others were in attendance. In the final report it was declared that all misunderstandings between the Olympic Movement and UNESCO had been laid to rest. It was agreed then that “these momentary misunderstandings had arisen because of a lack of information by all concerned.”³¹⁷ UNESCO emphasized that its first aim was to “reinforce international cooperation in order to promote physical education and sport by harmonizing and fostering the convergence of governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental initiatives.”³¹⁸ It seemed that UNESCO and the IOC had come to an understanding and were ready to cooperate with one another.

It is unclear at this point whether all UNESCO representatives were happy with this eventual agreement. UNESCO had several Member States (coming from mostly African and communist countries) that wanted to push to democratize international sport and even potentially take over the organizing of the Olympic Games. So it seemed that although many nations were unhappy with the way in which the IOC operated, the concerns that were raised were being swept under a rug. Specifically, IOC support from the UNESCO Director General and western countries ensured this was no longer on the agenda.

The ICSPE had assisted in ‘calming the waters’ between the IOC and UNESCO after

³¹⁶ At this point it was still an interim intergovernmental committee until the next UNESCO General Meeting

³¹⁷ UNESCO, ED-79/WS/6, *Final Report. Consultation amongst non-governmental international organizations whose special field is physical education and sport*. (14-15 September 1978, UNESCO).

³¹⁸ Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, *Draft report of the tripartite meeting*, (12 December 1978), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

the UNESCO Nairobi resolution was released. Through their outreach to the IOC, they finally secured an agreement with the IOC to collaborate, something which they had been attempting for the past decade. The IOC was still reluctant to throw themselves into a partnership, but similar to the UNESCO situation, they realized that they could no longer afford to ignore other organizations if they wanted to exert their autonomy and power.

United Nations Declaration Against Apartheid

While the late 1970s was a time when the IOC's interactions with UNESCO became more and more positive, the IOC had new concerns about the UN General Assembly's interference with international sport. In 1976, the UN convened an Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports. On the 14th of December in 1977, the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution Against Apartheid in Sport, aimed at reaffirming "the importance of effective international action to abolish apartheid in sport and in all other fields."³¹⁹ This Resolution eventually formed the basis of a Convention adopted in 1985. The IOC seemed to be very concerned about this development as they felt that the Resolution might impact the autonomy of international sport, in that governments were the ones signing onto this resolution. The IOC President wrote to the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, on August 9, 1978 to request more information and he mentioned that: "I can see danger of unnecessary conflict between governmental sources and the sporting bodies in this respect."³²⁰ He also reiterated that the IOC had already suspended South Africa for being in breach of IOC rules.

Upon receiving the Draft Convention, the IOC President again wrote to the UN

³¹⁹ United Nations, A/32/P. 102, *International Declaration Against Apartheid in Sports*, (14 December 1977), www.undocs.org/A/32/P.102.

³²⁰ Lord Michael Killanin, *Letter to Secretary-General of the United Nations*, (9 August 1978), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

Secretary-General on September 1, 1978, to reiterate his concern with the potential sanctions proposed in the draft. The IOC was adamant that “sanctions should be the responsibility of the sporting bodies concerned as currently [is in place] and not political sanction by governments.”³²¹ Yet another letter was sent to the Secretary-General in December of 1978. This time Killanin presented the position of the Tripartite Commission, which makes up the IOC, NOCs and ISFs and they requested a meeting with Dr. Waldheim at his earliest convenience. The letter read: “if such a Convention was adopted, it would have the most dreadful consequences.”³²²

In January of 1979, the Secretary-General finally responded and accepted the meeting request. He suggested that the Tripartite Commission meet directly with the Ad Hoc Committee.³²³ At this time the IOC also obtained a legal opinion regarding the Convention document. This legal opinion claimed that “It is obvious that the Convention envisaged would have at least two kinds of consequences: 1) considerable strengthening of state control over sport and its organizations in ‘liberal’ countries and 2) direct effect on the size of sports participation, even as spectators, at international meetings such as the Olympic Games.” Thus, in summary, the Convention was considered by the IOC as a “direct threat to the Olympic Games” and “the freedom of sport and signifies very serious State interference in the field of sport.”³²⁴ This legal opinion provided the IOC with obvious cause for concern.

In April 1979, the IOC President wrote to thank the Secretary-General for setting up the meeting with the Ad Hoc Committee, which had taken place a few days earlier. However,

³²¹ Lord Michael Killanin, *Letter to Secretary-General of the United Nations*, (1 September 1978), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³²² Lord Michael Killanin, *Letter to Secretary-General of the United Nations*, (13 December 1978), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³²³ Kurt Waldheim, *Letter to the IOC President*, (17 January 1979), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³²⁴ Legal Opinion, *IOC Legal opinion of International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports*. IOC Archives, (30 January 1979), Lausanne, Switzerland.

the letter suggests that the IOC still had misgivings about the Convention since no agreements had been made about how to move forward, as Killanin stated: “At this stage I would prefer not to make any comments other than to express anxiety about the effect of such a Convention.”³²⁵

At this time, the IOC sent out several letters to IOC Members, NOCs and ISFs, informing them of what was happening with the proposed Convention. Killanin emphasized that if this Convention were to be adopted, it “could open the door to pressures exercised by governments on NOCs in order to boycott or refuse their teams to participate in competitions on political grounds. He went on to suggest that this could threaten the unity of the Olympic Movement and, in the IOC’s opinion, weaken the forces opposing racism and apartheid in sport.”³²⁶ All NOCs were reminded that they should not allow their athletes to participate in competitions with South Africa or Rhodesia in order to prevent the UN from interfering.³²⁷ The NOCs were also urged not to give in to government pressure and were reminded that boycotting an Olympic Games was against IOC rules and they could therefore be suspended for doing so.

The Tripartite Commission released a Memorandum intended for the Ad Hoc Committee Against Apartheid in Sport. In this Memorandum, the Commission repeats that it was concerned about Article 11 of the resolution³²⁸: “they believe that this article poses a very grave danger, not only to regular international sporting contact around the world, but also to the Olympic Games. The Tripartite Commission...fervently ask the Ad Hoc

³²⁵ Lord Michael Killanin, *Letter to Secretary-General of the United Nations*, (25 April 1979), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³²⁶ Lord Michael Killanin, *Letter to NOCs*, (20 March 1979), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³²⁷ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session (5 – 7 April 1979). Montevideo, Uruguay. DVD, IOC Archives.

³²⁸ Article 11 stated “State Parties shall use their best endeavors to ensure compliance with the Olympic principle of non-discrimination and the provisions of this convention and, to this end, they shall take all necessary action to ensure that their nationals refrain from participating in all sports events which include individuals or teams from a country practicing apartheid.”

Committee to give the most serious consideration to their request for deletion of this article from the proposed convention.”³²⁹ These two Committees met again in August, however, it was clear that they had differing opinions on the issue. The Ad Hoc Committee perspective was that if they were to contribute to the struggle against apartheid people must make sacrifices. The Tripartite members did not agree with this as they repeatedly stated that this Convention would hurt innocent athletes and not those practicing apartheid.³³⁰

The concerns about this draft Convention continued to be debated at IOC meetings and took up a lot of their discussion time. One IOC member praised the President for his initiative in partnering with UN organizations such as UNESCO, suggesting that this could be used to help them through their current concerns.³³¹

The decisions surrounding the creation of the Convention Against Apartheid in Sports had been made by the UN without much input from the IOC. The IOC wanted to change this to make sure that in the future they would be included in the decision-making process. Arguably, the IOC wanted to ensure that other organizations were not taking actions that could potentially hurt the autonomy and power of the Olympic Movement. The Convention was eventually ratified in 1985, much later than the Ad Hoc Committee had anticipated. There is no longer any mention of the issue of apartheid and the UN’s resolution in IOC Minutes or letters.³³² However, in 1980, as what looks to be a potential response to this Convention, the IOC, under the helm of newly elected President, Juan Antonio Samaranch, began to request support from the UN and its Member States to ensure that the

³²⁹ Tripartite Commission, *Letter to the Ad Hoc Committee on drafting of an International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports*, (4 May 1979), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³³⁰ Minutes of the meeting of the Tripartite Commission and the Ad Hoc Committee on the drafting of an International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, (n.d., New York, USA) IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

³³¹ Nikolai Andrianov, Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session, (5 – 7 April 1979), Montevideo, Uruguay. DVD, IOC Archives.

³³² Note that I only had access to the EB Minutes and correspondence documents until 1982.

autonomy of the Olympic Movement would be supported and that governmental politics would not have a part to play within it.

Juan Antonio Samaranch (1980 – 2001) and Beyond

In 1980, Lord Killanin announced his resignation and the IOC elected Juan Antonio Samaranch to take over as IOC President. Samaranch took an alternative approach to ensuring autonomy from governments and ensuring the IOC's control over international sport. Instead of attempting to ignore other international organizations, the IOC began a relentless campaign to obtain support from the UN and its Member States to ensure that the autonomy of the Olympic Movement would be supported. Their interactions with different UN organizations exploded at this point in time. At the 1984 IOC Session in Los Angeles, Samaranch stated in his opening speech that the IOC had increased the number of relations with international governmental organizations such as UNESCO and ICSPE "I am convinced that by acting in this way, we shall reply more exactly to the aims set for us by our founder whilst strengthening our influence and prestige."³³³ Unlike Killanin and Brundage, Samaranch felt that seeking out partnerships with governmental organizations, specifically the UN, would actually help legitimize the IOC as an organization.

The IOC began creating formal partnerships with many different UN organizations. These included the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and also other UN projects such as working on the UN proclaimed International Year of the Youth in 1985. The IOC also participated in the sports conferences organized by the UN.

³³³ Juan Antonio Samaranch, Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session, (25 – 26 July 1984), Los Angeles, USA. DVD, IOC Archives.

Throughout the 1980s, Samaranch spearheaded a campaign in an attempt to get the UN General Assembly to adopt a Resolution denouncing political interference in sport (namely, at the Olympic Games). This request looks to have been a response to the UN's Convention against apartheid in sports — as the IOC was upset at the UN's involvement in dictating sport policy. The campaign was ultimately unsuccessful, but demonstrated the beginning of a culture in which the IOC utilized (or attempted to utilize) the UN General Assembly to adopt Resolutions in their favor (this failed resolution will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter). It demonstrated the IOC's disdain for governmental involvement in international sport, and its desire to keep politics out of the Games if they interfered with its organization. It is perhaps ironic that the IOC sought cooperation from a political organization (i.e. the UN) in order to attempt to create a document that discouraged political involvement in sport and the Olympic Games.

In 1993, (again) under Samaranch's instruction, the IOC created the International Development and Cooperation Department. This department was to deal solely with the IOC's relationships with international organizations, in particular the UN. The interviewee I spoke with at the IOC Headquarters explained that the individual in charge of the International Development and Cooperation Department at the time had previous experience working at the UN and understood how this development organization could make sense as a partner for the IOC. The interviewee described two specific reasons for partnering with the UN. One was linked to building a social development program, and the other was concerned with building international relations. This Department solidified the ongoing relations with UN agencies and throughout the 1990s the IOC continued to extend its collaborations. They were now also interacting with the UN International Drug Control Programme, UN Refugee

Agency, International Telecommunications Union, UN Development Programme, UN Food and Agriculture Programme, the World Bank and the International Labour Organization.

In 1993, at the IOC's request, the UN adopted a resolution called the Olympic Truce for the first time. This resolution had been put forward by the IOC to promote peace during the Summer and Winter Olympic Games (this Truce is discussed in more detail in the next chapter). This resolution continues to be adopted every two years and signed onto by the majority of the Member States at the United Nations. At this time, it meant that the IOC was now regularly interacting with the political bodies of the UN, and statements about Olympism started to be compared to the principles of the UN. Boutros Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary-General from 1992 to 1996 and known supporter of the Olympic Games and IOC, was quoted saying:

The Olympic Ideal is a hymn to tolerance and understanding between people and culture. It is an invitation to competition, but competition with respect for others. In its ways, Olympism is a school of democracy. In other words, there is a natural link between the ethics of the Olympic Games and the fundamental principles of the United Nations.³³⁴

In 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted another resolution instituting 1994 as the International Year of Sport and the Olympic Ideal on the occasion of the IOC's centenary — again at the request of the IOC. This resolution was passed on the basis that there would be no expenditures made by the UN or its' Member States, and no requirement of setting up an administration structure (UN General Assembly 1993). Essentially, this was an opportunity for the IOC to achieve a heightened level of legitimacy and media coverage. In 1995, for the first time in history, an IOC president was invited to address the UN General Assembly to

³³⁴ Olympic Review, *The IOC and the United Nations*, (1995), <http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1995/oreXXV5/oreXXV5q.pdf>, p. 1.

discuss the ‘Olympic Ideal’. This was also the first time that an NGO with non-status within the UN and its representative received special attention from the 185-member state General Assembly.

Despite the gains being made by the IOC inside the UN at this time, the interviewee I spoke with who had worked in the IOC administration since the early 1990s, explained that “internationally sport on the political and UN agenda was [still] pretty low...so it was a bit difficult to go and knock on the UN institutions doors and basically sell to them that sport could be a useful tool for them to address their own issues and at the same time support us in our objective which is broadly to enable more people to have access to sport and physical activity.”

One of Samaranch’s strengths was the way in which he consistently linked the ideals and goals of the IOC and of the Olympics to the principles of the UN. He often described how the two organizations were ‘fighting’ together on various political and human rights issues. For example, he made several statements concerning apartheid where he mentioned the IOC’s role in defeating it — at the same time mentioning the UN as well. In a speech at the UN he stated:

One of our [UN and IOC] proudest achievements of recent years is to have fought, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Olympic Charter, against the ignoble policy of apartheid which held sway in South Africa, and to have made an essential contribution to its abolition. Like the UN, despite occasionally bitter criticism, the IOC never weakened its position until apartheid was defeated...To change the world one has first to bring about change in its people, and it is probably in this respect that the role of sport as a philosophy comes into play, by promoting an ideal of overall personal development whose paragon is Olympism.³³⁵

As described in chapter four, when Kofi Annan became the UN Secretary-General in 1997, he reiterated this similarity between the two organizations. In a 1998 publication of the

³³⁵ Olympic Review, *Samaranch at the United Nations*, (1995), <http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1995/oreXXV6/oreXXV6e.pdf>, p. 7.

Olympic Review, Annan was quoted as saying:

The Olympic ideals closely resemble those of the United Nations, namely the search for peace and understanding between nations and peoples. The presence of the United Nations flag at all Olympic events is a reminder of the joint aims of the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee³³⁶

As Secretary-General, Annan was a fierce supporter of the IOC and the Olympic Movement and pushed for sport to be used as a tool to achieve UN development goals.³³⁷ In 2001, Annan created the position Special Advisor of Sport for Development and Peace to be seated at the United Nations in Geneva. By the new Millennium, the IOC and the Olympic Games had become so intertwined with the ideas of peace and development at the UN that in the year 2000 when the UN developed its Millennium Declaration,³³⁸ number ten on the signed declaration was focused on urging Member States to observe the Olympic Truce and to support the IOC “in its efforts to promote peace and human understanding through sport and the Olympic Ideal.”³³⁹

The interviewee I spoke with at the IOC explained that the UN had become more and more interested in utilizing sport as a development tool over the last 20 years. She suggested that this was a result of the IOC’s international reputation and the legitimacy the IOC brings as a partner:

We [the IOC] are fortunate enough to be in a privileged position and have been so for many years. People tend to come to us because of the aura, because of the legitimacy we bring as a major international sports partner, so engaging with us is always appealing.

³³⁶ Olympic Review, Sport and Human Rights, (1998), <http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1998/oreXXVI24/oreXXVI24i.pdf>. p. 14.

³³⁷ United Nations, “*Right to Play belongs to everyone, Secretary-General tells Olympic aid forum*”, UN Press Release, (11 February 2002), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8119.doc.htm>.

³³⁸ This declaration came out of a conference of world leaders at the UN Headquarters and later adopted as a Resolution as the UNGA. The Declaration was designed to announce a reaffirmation of a commitment to the UN Charter and also contained an outline of goals focused on upholding international human rights all over the world.

³³⁹ UN General Assembly, A/55/L.2, *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, (8 September 2000), <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>.

And also because of the growth of the number of international non-governmental organizations working in sport for development around the world made it easier for the IOC to convince the UN of the importance of sport.

As Samaranch handed over his IOC Presidency in 2001 to Belgian, Jacques Rogge, relations with the UN continued to develop. In 2003, the UN General Assembly voted to pronounce 2005 as the Year of Sport and Physical Education.³⁴⁰ Ban Ki-Moon became the first UN Secretary-General to participate in an Olympic Congress in 2009 in Copenhagen, Denmark, and to carry the Olympic Torch in the lead up to the London Olympic Games in 2012. He was also the first Secretary-General to address the IOC Session in 2014 in Sochi, Russia.³⁴¹ It was under the leadership of Ki-Moon that the IOC eventually achieved Permanent Observer status in 2009.

Theoretical Reflections

Looking through the history of the IOC, it has to be noted that partnering with the UN was not always top priority – and that it was often even frowned upon. The IOC was, and continues to be, very protective of its autonomy — and for a long time considered any association with overt political organizations as something that should be avoided at all costs. However, eventually, in order to maintain its hegemonic power over the Olympic Games, the IOC felt forced at various points in time to collaborate with UN organizations and to make some changes to their organizing practices. While some of the actions the IOC took were reactions to internal and external pressures, the Executive did come to realize that

³⁴⁰ United Nations, *Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace*, (2003), <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/453/21/pdf/N0345321.pdf?OpenElement>.

³⁴¹ Ban Ki-Moon, *Full transcript of Secretary-General remarks at joint press conference with Mr. Thomas Bach, President of the International Olympic Committee*, (6 February 2014), <http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=3294>.

interactions with the UN might actually assist with safeguarding the IOC's power over international sport. The IOC was quick to exploit this potential, and by the time Juan Antonio Samaranch came into power in 1981, the IOC was an eager partner to various UN organizations.

What is interesting to note in this chapter, is that the goal to maintain and obtain power never changed throughout the three Presidencies explored over the last 50 years. What did change were the tactics used to obtain and maintain this power. So while from an outsider perspective it may seem like the IOC transformed itself to become palatable to UN Agencies, the IOC really did not have to change all that much. In fact, and as you will read in the next few chapters, the IOC managed quite successfully to maintain its autonomy and power – and to become even more powerful through its partnerships with various UN Agencies.

What this history seems to suggest is that the IOC Presidents and Executive members were primarily concerned about maintaining this power over international sport — and it seems to have only been an after thought (at first at least) that partnering with the UN could aid in achieving peace and development goals. In other words, this was part of their hegemonic strategy to obtain consent whilst maintaining power. For example, in the late-1970s Killanin pushed the IOC to declare its leadership on the issue of 'sport for all', which was a stated strategic approach primarily enacted so that the IOC could exert authority over this area, and thus remove the threat of UNESCO. With numerous SDP organizations in the world today, it is interesting to look at the way in which this part of the history developed, specifically, the leadership of the IOC in this area.

From the IOC's perspective, this could be viewed as an enormous success. The organization has had to give up little power and, in fact, is now viewed by many (such as the UN) as the leader of the 'sport for all' movement. This is within a context in which

UNESCO had originally refused to view the IOC as a leader in this area in the 1950s because of its lack of philosophical and educational goals and its focus on elite sporting competition.³⁴²

Similarly, these findings revealed how the IOC was concerned about maintaining or creating a particular public image. IE highlights the influence that textual-based discourses has on how we view an organization and the development of particular types of knowledge through these texts. The types of discourses engaged in within publically disseminated texts seem to be especially important to the IOC. Specifically, these texts in many respects presented opportunities for the organization to shape the way they were viewed and received by the general public. An example of the importance of text was revealed in the letters that were sent between the IOC President, Lord Killanin and the Director of UNESCO, Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow in 1978. In these letters, both Killanin and M'Bow reflected on a media article that had announced that the animosity between the IOC and UNESCO was a result of a misunderstanding. Curiously, both Killanin and M'Bow seemed especially pleased about this article and the way it presented both organizations to the public — as cooperative rather than critical of one another. This public image seemed more important to both of these leaders than what was going on behind the scenes where several UNESCO Member States were still actively attempting to change the way in which the IOC was organized.

The findings suggest that the ways in which the IOC was presented to the public (through textually-based discourses) was perceived (by the IOC) to be more important to them than it was for the IOC to engage in a genuine partnership,³⁴³ These findings demonstrate that while

³⁴² Bailey, *Sciences in the Service of Physical Education and Sport*.

³⁴³ Which Babiak defines as: "voluntary, close, long-term planned strategic action..." Babiak, "Determinants of Interorganizational Relationships: The Case of a Canadian Nonprofit Sport Organization." p. 339.

the IOC did begin to engage with the UN and UN affiliated organizations the organization still engaged in strategies that would ensure it maintained as much power as possible over global sport.

By examining the conversations that were occurring behind the scenes — through internal IOC minutes and/or personal correspondence — one can begin to see the strategic decision-making that was occurring to control discourse about the IOC and to maintain and obtain hegemonic power over global sport (and beyond) as it became a vehicle for development. This type of analysis reveals the complexities involved in the actions that are presented to the public realm and helps us understand how and why the IOC operates in the way that it does. This strategic focus of the IOC continues to be discussed in the following chapter where I examine in further detail some of the tactics that the IOC has utilized to obtain and maintain legitimacy and authority, which in turn has enabled the IOC to be viewed as a deserving candidate of Permanent Observer status.

CHAPTER 6: IOC'S STATUS AS AN ORGANIZATION: TACTICS TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY

This chapter examines the way in which the IOC worked to maintain and improve its legitimacy as a unique (and powerful) organization throughout the past 60 years. I argue that while separately the range of legitimacy-focused activities may not be particularly significant in terms of contributing to the status of the IOC, together, they arguably have provided the structure/context that has enabled the IOC to be viewed as an organization worthy of Permanent Observer status at the UN General Assembly. This chapter draws on research findings from IOC and UN documents, websites, and available academic literature to discuss the different activities engaged in by the IOC since the 1950s that have worked to improve their status, and specifically to improve the ways in which the IOC and the model of sport it champions is viewed and approached by others in the world of international development.

Specifically, and in the following sections, I take a look at some of the different activities that the IOC has engaged in to maintain and improve its organizational, moral and legal authority as an organization. The first section focuses on the organizational structure of the IOC and the way in which this has enabled the IOC to maintain and obtain organizational authority over much of the Olympic Movement and over the international sporting industry. This includes examining the structure of the IOC as an organization, looking at where the authority lies and how that authority is maintained. This is also where I look at the monetary influence of the IOC, and examine how the IOC has managed to become one of the richest sporting organizations in the world, its wealth surpassing the GDP of many third world

countries.³⁴⁴

In the next part of this chapter I examine the IOC's moral authority and how it is linked to its promotion of Olympism and Olympic sport as a peace-promoting global activity. These ideals of Olympism have been closely linked to the IOC and the Olympic Games ever since de Coubertin established the modern Olympics in 1896.³⁴⁵ Despite many changes in the way in which the Games are organized today, Olympism still plays a very important role in the IOC organization as a marketing tool, and is utilized in many different ways to protect its authority over international sport and autonomy from governmental involvement. In this section, I expand on the concept of Olympism and explain how it has been manufactured by the IOC. I also go into more detail of specific events where the IOC has worked to obtain moral authority throughout its history.

In the final and third part of this chapter I discuss different ways in which the IOC has attempted to obtain unique legal authority. While the IOC is a non-governmental sporting organization that organizes a mega-sporting event, through the eyes of the law in Switzerland, (where IOC headquarters is housed), the IOC holds unique legal status that provides it with special assistance and opportunities that have enabled it to become what it is today. Here, I demonstrate how the IOC worked diligently to obtain this special legal status and discuss how this has impacted its authority over others.

The IOC has also engaged in various other actions that are attempts to provide it with more legal authority than what would be generally expected for an NGO. The IOC has worked diligently to protect the Olympic symbols at the international level in an attempt to maintain control over anything that contains the name 'Olympic' or its symbols. In the

³⁴⁴ Lincoln Allison and Terry Monnington, "Sport, Prestige and International Relations," *Government and Opposition* 37, no. 1 (January 2002): 106–134.

³⁴⁵ Loland, "Coubertin's Ideology of Olympism from the Perspective of the History of Ideas."

1980s, the IOC created a Court of Arbitration for Sport so that sporting disputes would have to go through it rather than the traditional government led court systems. The IOC has repeatedly attempted to obtain a declaration signed by UN Member States to protect the Olympic Games from political interference. These actions have all worked to provide the IOC with more legal (and political) authority, which has aided in the now widespread view of the IOC as a powerful and successful organization.

All of these three factors – organizational, moral and legal authority - influence each other and have worked to provide the IOC with authority and power that extends much further than its organizing of the Olympic Games. Below, I offer a detailed discussion each of these factors. In doing so, I begin to demonstrate that the IOC has not simply been given the status that it holds today, but has worked tirelessly to create this status and present itself to the world as more than an international NGO in order to obtain this influence.

Organizational Authority

The IOC and in particular its Executive Board holds all organizational authority and control over the Olympic Movement. Combined with its legal and moral authority, this has enabled the IOC to obtain an immense amount of power and control over its wealth. The IOC is declared the supreme authority over the Olympic Movement, and it holds full legal rights over the Olympic Games — with established worldwide registration of trademarks (the interlocked rings, flag, flame, and motto). It also requires that every member and participating country in the Olympic Movement abide by the *Olympic Charter* and stated ideals of Olympism — or risk being ousted from the organization and banned from participation in international Olympic events. With this background, I explore in this section some of the ways the IOC is organized and the role that this plays in providing the IOC with

a perceived sense of authority and power.

The IOC operates as a private organization, governed by its individual members. New IOC members are nominated and voted in by current members through elections. This, as pointed out by Forster and Pope “has led to an extraordinary set of biases in the IOC membership, including unexpectedly high proportion of IOC members belonging to European and Arab aristocratic and royal families.”³⁴⁶ As it stands today, about 40 percent of the IOC’s 100 members are European and about 60 percent of the 15 Executive Board members are European. Some of the wealthiest countries and royal families in the world are represented at the IOC. Within the IOC membership there are ten members of Royal families and three of these members are Heads of State: Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, Henri, and Prince of Monaco, Albert II. Several more members of the IOC have close links to their national governments as they are currently or have previously been politicians. Some IOC members also have close links to multinational corporations, for example currently, the Chairman of Samsung, Lee Kun-He, the Senior vice-President of NBC Sports, Alex Gilady, the Chairman of Electronic Arts, Lawrence Probst III and the chairman of Popular Inc., Richard Carrion are all IOC members.

Despite the fact that a number of IOC members are linked with national governments, officially, members are not allowed to represent the views of their governments at the IOC — rather they are described as volunteers who represent the IOC and Olympic Movement in their country.³⁴⁷ In fact, if IOC members are indisputably influenced by their governments they can be ousted from the IOC.

³⁴⁶ John Forster and Nigel Pope, *The Political Economy of Global Sports Organisations* (Routledge, 2004). p. 98.

³⁴⁷ Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott, *The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The Governance of World Sport*.

The IOC currently represents 205 NOCs from around the world, yet only just over a third of those nations (74) are represented as individual voting members - not all NOCs have voting rights at the IOC. So while the IOC may be viewed and present itself as a global and representative organization from the outside, it does not operate as one. There are a maximum of 70 ‘independent members’ and another “45 who officiate as a result of the office they hold (usually President) of an International Federation (IF), a National Olympic Committee (NOC), or a member of the Athletes Commission (15 for each category).”³⁴⁸ Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbot point out that the athlete representatives are the only IOC members who are democratically voted into the IOC by other Olympic athletes.

The organizing structure could be described as an oligarchy, in that the power and authority rests with just a small number of people out of the overall membership; namely the Executive Board of the IOC, which is made up of 15 members who are voted in by secret ballot by fellow members. The undemocratic structure of voting also contributes to the domination of what you could call the ‘power elites’, in that it creates an enormous potential for power for just a few of the individuals that sit at or near the top of the IOC organizational structure. These individuals (or ‘power elites’) are in a position to single-handedly shape and lead the decision-making processes within the organization. This is in contrast, for example, to a democratic organizational structure where all constituents of that organization have the opportunity to participate in that decision-making process. This is why, in the previous chapter, the Presidents of the IOC were the focus of each historical moment, as their personal goals and values hugely influenced the direction of the organization. Furthermore, within this organizational structure there is a dearth of accountability, in that the IOC is not directly

³⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 20.

accountable to anyone but itself and only “symbolically accountable to the international organizations and movement that it has created.”³⁴⁹ This has provided the IOC and its members with an immense amount of power with little concern for repercussions over the ways in which they utilize this power.

Alongside the organizational structure it is important to consider the incredible wealth associated with this organization as this has enabled the IOC to become even more powerful and influential. Before the commercialization of the Olympic Games in the 1980s, the IOC had very little money and relied on the wealth and generosity of its members. This had worked for de Coubertin when he initially created the organization in 1896. However, by the 1960s and 1970s, the Olympic Games were becoming much larger and more prestigious and the IOC was struggling to maintain its authority over the movement. This all changed in 1980s in the era of commercialism and with the dedication of the then IOC President, Juan Antonio Samaranch to the development of the IOC as a ‘brand’ and a lucrative enterprise. At this time, the IOC successfully trademarked its Olympic symbols through the unprecedented Nairobi agreement in 1981 (this is discussed in more detail later in this chapter); this provided the IOC with an opportunity to obtain increasing amounts of income through exclusive sponsorship programs. Furthermore, the IOC began to privatize the broadcasting rights to TV corporations around the world. By 2012, at the time of the London Summer Olympic Games, broadcasting rights alone produced nearly US \$4 billion,³⁵⁰ and sponsorship deals had added up to nearly US \$1 Billion. The IOC takes in all of this money and subsequently has the authority to spend it how they see fit. Keep in mind that this is a not-for-profit organization and IOC members are required to reinvest all of the income that they

³⁴⁹ Roche, “The Olympics and ‘Global Citizenship’.” p. 171.

³⁵⁰ Callum Murray, “Olympic Games Set to Break \$8bn Revenues Barrier in Four-Year Cycle Ending with London 2012,” *Sport Cal* 27 (2012): 7–9.

receive into their organization and not use it for their own benefit.

With this enormous amount of wealth, comes a great deal of authority and power. The IOC has become the leader of international sports, exactly because of this power. For example, much of this income that the IOC receives is reinvested into the individual ISFs that are the representatives of the sports played at the summer or winter Olympic Games. There are many more ISFs wanting to be at the Olympics than there are spots for them. This has meant that the IOC is now able to dictate to a large extent, how these ISFs operate and organize. So while the Olympic Games only feature a small number of the sports participated in worldwide, the IOC's power is far reaching, and therefore has been described by many (including itself) as the leader of global sport. Similarly, NOCs also benefit from the wealth of the Olympic Movement. However, because the IOC has control over this wealth they are therefore able to dictate the ways in which these NOCs operate and influence their decision-making processes. NOCs are only able to have at maximum 15 voting IOC members — which is 14 percent of the entire number of voters on the IOC. Maureen Smith explained that historical IOC documents demonstrated “the immense powers of the IOC in choosing which countries could be recognized by the international sport community and who would be the beneficiaries of much-needed financial aid to establish and develop their Olympic programs.”³⁵¹

The IOC has begun to reveal basic financial information on their website, although the general public and many of its own constituents within the Olympic Movement are not privy to the details. Forster and Pope (2004) point out that “...one of the paradoxes of the GSOs [Global Sports Organizations, aka ISFs] as public interest, non-profit organizations is

³⁵¹ Maureen M Smith, “Revisiting South Africa and the Olympic Movement: The Correspondence of Reginald S. Alexander and the International Olympic Committee, 1961–86,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 23, no. 7 (November 2006): 1193–1216.

their opacity. They offer the public less financial information than the listing requirements of the world's stock exchanges.”³⁵² Furthermore, the Executive Board meetings continue to be conducted in private and the meeting Minutes are placed under an automatic 30-year embargo. This enables the IOC to make decisions away from public scrutiny, and enables them to choose the way in which they would like to present themselves. Whereas most not-for-profit organizations' finances are officially audited on a regular basis and scrutinized by the public, the IOC and other ISFs have managed to operate enormous sums of wealth in relative secrecy.

The number of elite, wealthy individuals sitting at the IOC has most likely helped to provide the IOC with a sense of authority and power over other organizations. This also most likely assisted the IOC in obtaining contacts at the UN General Assembly and in obtaining the support of Member States at the UN General Assembly. Unlike many other international NGOs, the IOC represents and supports the status quo of the dominant class. Furthermore, the IOC has control over a commodity that many governments want to get a hold of, or at least be a part of, the Olympic Games. In this sense, the IOC holds power over national governments. This is seen when host cities and countries of Olympic Games change their local and national laws to abide with the IOC Charter. Alongside the IOC's efforts to obtain organizational authority, the IOC's insistence that the Olympic Movement promotes moral values has also greatly assisted it in its quest for hegemonic authority over global sport.

Moral Authority

Moral discourses have been associated with the Olympic Movement since its inception. The Olympic Movement is described in the IOC Charter as a movement that

³⁵² Forster and Pope, *The Political Economy of Global Sports Organisations*. p. 101.

engenders values of humanism, peace, and internationalism, and the goals of Olympism are to “place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view of promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.”³⁵³ This ideology of Olympism is consistently utilized and promoted by supporters of the Olympic Movement to justify the importance placed on the Olympic Games. The concept of ‘Olympism’ links this sporting event with educational missions that are seemingly moral and beneficial to all those who are touched by the Olympics. During a speech in the year 2000, Samaranch, the IOC President at the time, described that: “the goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practiced without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity, and fairplay.”³⁵⁴

Aside from invoking Olympism ideologies in nearly every IOC speech, the concept has also been utilized in several IOC generated programs created to promote the Olympic Games. For example, ‘Celebrate Humanity’ was a media campaign created during the 2004 Athens Olympics that used elite individuals to spread a positive message about the Olympic Games. This campaign, as described by the IOC, “...resonated with the truth that the Olympic ideals – the values of hope, friendship, and fair play, dreams and inspiration, joy in effort – are universal, shared by all.”³⁵⁵ The IOC and supporters of the Olympic Movement seem to have successfully linked the Olympic Games with these moral ideals of Olympism. Despite this, several researchers have provided evidence which demonstrates that the Games

³⁵³ International Olympic Committee, *Olympic Charter*.

³⁵⁴ Olympic Review, *The Olympic Truce*, (2000), <http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/2000/OREXXVI33/OREXXVI33zn.pdf>.

³⁵⁵ IOC, *Celebrate Humanity*, (2004), http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_902.pdf.

do not exhibit these values, given the way they are currently organized.³⁵⁶ Lenskyj states that “The Olympics have long failed to represent ideals of fair play, equal opportunity, or international harmony, if indeed they ever symbolized these values.”³⁵⁷ At the same time, Lenskyj explains, these mythologies are still utilized to promote the IOC’s role at the UN as an organization committed to global equitable development. Similarly, Millington and Darnell found that the developmental values of Olympism have been used by the IOC on their website to gain supporters for hosting the Olympic Games in Low Middle Income Countries such as Brazil.³⁵⁸

As was discussed in the previous chapter, in the 1970s, at a time when UNESCO was becoming more and more interested in promoting a ‘sport for all’ philosophy through education, the IOC began to attempt to get their ideologies of Olympism injected into the UNESCO projects. The IOC had originally looked to ignore UNESCO’s efforts, however, some IOC members were beginning to see the potential benefits it could bring to the Olympic Movement. For example, Willi Daume, the IOC Vice-President stated in his ‘Aide Memoire’ addressed to IOC members: “Since UNESCO is a specialized agency of the UN on education, it is proper and necessary that IOC work very closely in encouraging the fair play committee activities. Mr Brundage refused to associate the IOC with the Committee, which was wrong.”³⁵⁹ Daume also stated the IOC should request that the UNESCO Commission

³⁵⁶ Horne, “The Four ‘Knowns’ of Sport Mega-Events”; Lenskyj, *The Best Olympics Ever? Social Impacts of Sydney 2000*; Helen J. Lenskyj, “Reflections on Communication and Sport: On Heteronormativity and Gender Identities,” *Communication and Sport* 1, no. 1–2 (December 12, 2012): 138–150; Milton-Smith, “Ethics, the Olympics and the Search for Global Values”; Young and Wamsley, *Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games*.

³⁵⁷ Lenskyj, “Reflections on Communication and Sport: On Heteronormativity and Gender Identities.” P. 271.

³⁵⁸ Robert Millington and Simon. C. Darnell, “Constructing and Contesting the Olympics Online: The Internet, Rio 2016 and the Politics of Brazilian Development,” *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 49, no. 2 (September 9, 2012): 190–210.

³⁵⁹ Willi Daume, *Aide Memoire*, (1970) IOC Archives. Lausanne, Switzerland.

established in each country to work closely with the NOC and to request UNESCO's information department to insert regular features on the Olympic Movement in its publications which are circulated in all institutions concerned with education. Daume wanted to see the creation of an Olympic Day to be celebrated all over the world on the same day as the United Nations' (day), he emphasized "It is very important that the world community should know that the Olympic Movement is the best religion for international understanding and that the bible should be ready and taught."³⁶⁰

The continued widespread broadcasting of these moralistic values has encouraged the popular belief that this sporting event has a positive impact on communities around the world and that it is something that should be uncritically promoted. This has arguably enabled the IOC and the Olympic Movement to escape relative scrutiny of its actual impact in promoting equitable global relations through their stated commitments to 'Olympism'. Some authors argue that the development of the Olympic ideology has "given rise to a spectacular over-estimation of their [the Olympic Games'] value to the cohesion of the world community"³⁶¹ making it difficult to critique the problems associated with this mega-event. Morgan suggested that at the Sydney 2000 Summer Olympics, there was the public perception that "to have expressed indifference towards the Games ... would have been akin to covering up some severe moral deviation."³⁶² It has also enabled immense IOC control over host cities under the pretense that this is needed to ensure that the moral integrity of the Olympic Movement is upheld. In its bid to present the Olympic Games as an event with moral values, the IOC also is careful to frame itself as a leader of moral issues that are being linked to

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ John Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral Order* (New Rochelle, NY.: Aristide O. Caratzas, 1985). p. 6.

³⁶² George Morgan, "Aboriginal Protest and the Sydney Olympic Games" *Olympika* XII (2003): 23–38. p. 24.

international sport. Below is an example of how the IOC publically announced itself as the leader against apartheid in sport in the late 1980s. In this situation the organization managed to frame an issue — that had in reality, been far more complicated for the IOC — in such a way to present itself as the moral authority.

Re-creating History: Apartheid and the IOC

In the 1980s, the IOC presented itself as the leading organization that was organizing against apartheid in Sport. At an IOC-led conference in 1988 on Apartheid and Sport it was claimed that the IOC had created an anti-apartheid principle that all organizations were now adhering to.³⁶³ *The Olympic Review* in 1988, a magazine published by the IOC, reported on the conference stating: “The IOC stresses the pivotal role which it has played for more than 30 years in the effective fight against the scourge of sport. The IOC became the first International Sports Organization to exclude South Africa because of Apartheid.”³⁶⁴ The IOC President also received an exceptional mention from the Chairman of the UN Anti-Apartheid Commission for his action in this field.³⁶⁵ While these actions may seem morally motivated on the surface, looking back at the history of this issue it becomes clear that the IOC was re-creating history in its favour.

The Olympic Review and the IOC Meeting minutes in 1988 suggested that it was the IOC Executive Board’s decision alone to suspend and eventually expel South Africa from participating in the Olympic Movement in 1970. As stated in the IOC Minutes in Seoul:

In accordance with the Rules of the *Olympic Charter* which denounced racial

³⁶³ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session (30 August – 01 September 1989). Puerto Rico. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁶⁴ *Olympic Review, Against Apartheid in Sport*, (1988), <http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1988/ore249/ORE249f.pdf>; The International Table Tennis Federation was actually the first ISF to respond and sever ties with the South African Table Tennis Union in 1956.

³⁶⁵ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session (1989). Puerto Rico.

discrimination, the IOC had assumed the role of guide and defender of peace and of human dignity in its denunciation of apartheid...In 1961 when South Africa had become a Republic the IOC had written to the NOC of South Africa requesting strict adherence to the principle Rules of the Olympic Movement.³⁶⁶

What the IOC left out of this public statement was that back when this issue first arose, the IOC Executive Board members were very reluctant to take any action against apartheid, and it was only the pressure coming from the African NOCs that forced the IOC Executive Board to acknowledge the issue.

Put simply, and as was discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, in the early 1960s it was clear that the IOC wanted no part in expelling the South African NOC from the Olympics and it was actually the pressure from African NOCs and from the global press that forced the IOC to take action against them. While South Africa had been disinvited to the Tokyo Games in 1964, the NOC was still not expelled nor suspended and South African NOC officials still participated in Olympic Meetings.³⁶⁷ Brundage, the IOC President at the time, was unwilling to acknowledge that the IOC should be expected to deal with apartheid issues and he was critical of the pressure from African NOCs to do something about it. Other researchers have noted that the IOC did not appreciate the African NOCs insistence to exclude South Africa. M. Smith writes: “Efforts made by African NOCs in the forms of motions and proposals often times faced skepticism by their IOC counterparts, who did not fully comprehend the state of sport in Africa or the role governments and politics played in African sports.”³⁶⁸

In the Mexico 1966 IOC Session Minutes, Brundage is recorded as saying “Apartheid

³⁶⁶ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session (13 – 16 September 1988). Seoul, S. Korea, DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁶⁷ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session. (6 – 9 October 1965). Madrid, Spain. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁶⁸ Smith, “Revisiting South Africa and the Olympic Movement: The Correspondence of Reginald S. Alexander and the International Olympic Committee, 1961-86.” p. 113-114.

is a political affair and has nothing to do with sport as such. Brundage warned, however, that especially many new African Olympic Committees in new African countries do not understand that one cannot use sports as a stick for achieving political objectives.”³⁶⁹ Despite continuous pressure from NOCs to expel SANOC from the Olympic Movement, the IOC did not do so until 1970³⁷⁰. Even then, the IOC member vote was not unanimous and only went through by 35 to 28.

These new statements made by the IOC in the 1980s, in announcing itself proudly as the leading organization against apartheid, seems to suggest that the IOC felt that there was some benefit to them in appropriating these actions and taking control over how the issue was approached. In a bid to maintain this ‘leadership’ status over apartheid and sport, IOC members in the early 1990s were adamant that they should be the first organization to open the door to South Africa participation when the time was right, as noted by prominent IOC member Judge Mbaye at the 1991 IOC Session in Birmingham:

Judge Mbaye noted that the policy of the President had always been that, as the IOC had been the first to close the door of sport to South Africa, it should be the first to re-open it. The IOC should not follow the lead of others but set its own agenda, and establish its own policy. The IOC had made a major contribution towards eradicating apartheid from sport and helping South Africa move towards a multi-racial society, and it should not now follow the dictates of any other bodies in making its own decisions...³⁷¹

At another IOC Session in 1989, the IOC congratulated itself on the success of its campaign ‘Olympism Against Apartheid’, the Minutes noted: “Here too, the IOC now serves as an example and model, and its influence, importance and reputation can only benefit as a

³⁶⁹ Avery Brundage, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, (22 October 1966), Mexico City, Mexico. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁷⁰ For more information on South Africa’s struggles against apartheid in sport see: Kidd, B. From quarantine to cure: The new phase of the struggle against apartheid sport. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, (1991) 8, 33-46.

³⁷¹ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session, (June 13 – 16 1991), Birmingham, UK. DVD, IOC Archives.

result.”³⁷²

This loudly vocalized commitment against apartheid that was occurring by the 1980s seemed to be viewed as an opportunity for the IOC to reinforce its status as a leader in international sport and to link sport with moral values. This commitment, while still incredibly important, was by this stage something that was supported by nearly all International Sports Federations and also governments around the world; so the fact that the IOC publically announced itself as the leader in this area at this time, was not only a questionable proclamation but also (arguably) politically redundant as almost all sports organizations were already in support of denouncing apartheid. In the late 1970s, the UN had already convened an Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports,³⁷³ which the IOC was aware of.³⁷⁴ Regardless of the situation that occurred behind the publicity, in capitalizing on this issue, the IOC was able to present itself as the ‘moral leader’ in international sports. As you will see in next section, the IOC again utilizes terms and concepts to link their sporting event to moral ideals and values, this time through the promotion of what is referred to as the ‘Olympic Truce’.

The Olympic Truce

The Olympic Truce is a concept created by IOC members in the early 1990s that again utilized this notion that the Olympic Games promoted moral values, this time through safeguarding world peace during the Games. The ‘Olympic Truce’ is now a declaration signed by the majority of Member States at the UN General Assembly before every Olympic

³⁷² Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session (1989). Puerto Rico.

³⁷³ United Nations, A/32/P. 102, *International Declaration Against Apartheid in Sports*, (14 December 1977), www.undocs.org/A/32/P.102.

³⁷⁴ For more information on this topic see chapter 5 on the history of interactions between the IOC and the UN

Games. In the declaration, the IOC calls upon states, governments and specifically the UN and its specialized institutions to decide that:

...during a period from the 7th day before the opening of the Olympic Games until the 7th day after the end of these Games, the Olympic Truce shall be observed...During this period all armed conflicts, and any acts related to, inspired by or akin to such conflicts, shall cease, whatever the reason, cause or means of perpetration thereof.³⁷⁵

This declaration came from a myth of the ancient Olympic Games in Greece where a truce “forbade invasions of Olympia and prohibited anyone from stopping any athlete or spectator on the way to or from the Games...”³⁷⁶

The modern day declaration was the brainchild of Samaranch, the IOC President at the time. In the 1992 Minutes of the IOC Session in Barcelona, IOC member, Judge Mbaye noted that the Executive Board had received a certain number of proposals relating to an initiative for peace. Mbaye noted that:

Although this might be criticized by some as a quixotic gesture, an Executive Board member had rightly pointed out that in the search for peace nothing should be overlooked. The IOC could ignore those who thought such a gesture pretentious or worthless as it now had a position of respect as an organization³⁷⁷

In this case again, the IOC has worked towards creating a concept, the ‘Olympic Truce’ and framing it in a way that fits with promoting their moral ideals in order to gain authority. While no one can really determine whether the ancient commitment to an Olympic Truce was based on morality or simply put in place for pragmatic reasons [to enable athletes to arrive at the Games without issue],³⁷⁸ the IOC has specifically chosen to link this ancient truce to the modern morality of promoting peace. Despite the fact that this modern Truce has

³⁷⁵ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session. (21 – 23 July 1992). Barcelona, Spain. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁷⁶ Ramón Spaaij, “Olympic Rings of Peace? The Olympic Movement, Peacemaking and Intercultural Understanding,” *Sport in Society* 15, no. 6 (August 30, 2012): 761–774, p. 762.

³⁷⁷ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session (1992), Barcelona.

³⁷⁸ Spaaij, Olympic Rings of Peace? The Olympic Movement, Peacemaking and Intercultural Understanding.

as yet to stop any warring countries, this stated commitment from the IOC and the request that governments sign onto it has enabled them to be viewed by others as an organization against war and interested in promoting peace.

The IOC's moral position is consistently emphasized through these types of links and is further entrenched through the use of elite persons who announce their beliefs in Olympic ideologies. For example, in 1998, Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the UN at the time, had his message published in the IOC's *Olympic Review*, where he claimed:

The overwhelming reaffirmation of the Olympic Truce by the 52nd General Assembly of the United Nations recommitted Member States to taking fresh steps toward the promotion of human rights, constructive dialogue and the search for durable and just solutions to contemporary problems. This message was more than a symbol; it expressed the international community's real desire for a peaceful world united against violence. I call upon nations to observe the Olympic Truce. I am convinced that in this observance and by working with the IOC to promote the Olympic Ideal, we will draw the world's attention to what humanity can achieve in the name of international understanding.³⁷⁹

This message further links the concept of the Olympic Truce to the promotion of human rights, suggesting it has potential to promote peace. Despite the fact that Annan announced that this message was more than a symbol, in reality this declaration has yet to have any discernible impact on warring states during the Olympic and Paralympic Games or beyond. Most recently, Russia, militarily invaded another country just days after they hosted the Olympic Games and during the hosting of the Paralympic Games in 2014.

The Olympic Truce was just one of several attempts that the IOC has made to associate itself with the UN throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Previously, the IOC had attempted to get a declaration signed by the UN General Assembly that was focused on

³⁷⁹ Olympic Review, *Olympic Truce*, (1998), <http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1998/oreXXVI20/oreXXVI20o.pdf>

denouncing boycotts against the Olympic Movement. These declarations were unpopular and did not get signed. It was not until after this failed attempt that the IOC came up with the Olympic Truce declaration, and this time Member States signed the agreement. After this success, and at the IOC's request, 1994 was proclaimed the International Year of Sport and the Olympic Ideal by the UN. Also, in 1995, for the first time in history, the UN devoted a day and a half to discussing the Olympic Ideal and Samaranch was invited to talk at the UN General Assembly. In his speech, Samaranch highlighted the IOC's role in contributing to the abolition of apartheid in South Africa. He also emphasized the educational power of sport and the role of Olympism in the potential to change the world for the better.³⁸⁰

Legal Authority

Similar to the IOC's attempts to link its organization to moral ideals, the IOC has also worked diligently to ensure that this organization has obtained as much authority as it can through legal means, sometimes even stretching federal laws in Switzerland to ensure its autonomy over national governments and also to ensure the safeguarding of its growing financial empire. Forster describes autonomy in the context of discussing global sporting organizations as "the ability of a governance organization to make its own rules without any constraints being placed upon that ability by other governance organizations or institutions."³⁸¹ While the IOC is a private, non-governmental, not-for-profit organization, legally it holds a unique status in Switzerland that provides it with some power and authority similar to that of a public intergovernmental organization (IGO). An organization is considered intergovernmental if it is made up of two or more sovereign states and its

³⁸⁰ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session. (15 – 18 July 1996). Atlanta, USA. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁸¹ John Forster, "Global Sport Organizations," in *Sport Governance: International Case Studies*, ed. Ian O'Boyle and Trish Bradbury (Routledge, 2013). p. 260.

structure is generally based on an agreement between these states.³⁸² Furthermore, the IOC has also sought international trademark protections, created its own Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and has attempted to get Conventions passed at the UN General Assembly that would protect the Olympic Games against political interference. All of these attempts at obtaining power go above and beyond what is generally expected from an NGO. It is exactly these activities where the IOC is consistently required to present itself as more than an NGO, that perhaps has influenced others to view them as unique from other NGOs. This is an important point to consider as it is highly unusual for an NGO to obtain a Permanent Observer seat at the General Assembly and the very few that do hold this status all have a unique history that separates them from other NGOs.

Switzerland and International Sports Federations

Switzerland offers many international NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations favourable conditions to set up their headquarters in the country. The IOC has had its headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland since 1915. The IOC is considered a non-profit, non-governmental organization, however, similarly to many other ISFs, it presents a very different organizational structure when compared to many other traditional non-profit organizations found around the world. The conditions in Switzerland mean that ISFs can be defined as non-profit but they are not required to make any of their documents, financial or otherwise, available to the public. Because of its status as a non-profit in Switzerland, the IOC and other ISFs are exempt from Swiss anti-corruption laws.³⁸³ They are also exempt

³⁸² The UN is considered an intergovernmental organization. On the other-hand a non-governmental organization (NGOs) is a group that is made up of members who are individuals or other organizations (that are not represented sovereign states).

³⁸³ Simon Bradley, Swiss set to get tough over sports corruption, *Swiss Info*, (2 October 2014), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/new-rules_swiss-set-to-get-tough-over-sports-corruption/40801520.

from paying taxes on their yearly revenues as Swiss federal tax law allows for exemptions to be granted to corporate bodies that pursue “public service goals” or are acting in the “public interest.”³⁸⁴ While this issue has caused some controversy within the Swiss government, they have stated that it is in Switzerland’s best interest to continue to supply this tax break as there is much competition to house large international organizations around the world, and they would not want them to leave Lausanne as their coveted home base.³⁸⁵

In Switzerland, the IOC has held varying levels of legal status throughout the years it has been there. In the beginning, it was simply viewed as a private club that was supported financially by its members and it held no official legal status. However, as the IOC became more and more prominent, the IOC Executive began to realize the potential benefits certain forms of legal status would provide. By 1923, the IOC was receiving some benefits in terms of tax exemptions and customs advantages. But it was not until the early 1980s, when the IOC began to push for an official legal status that would secure its position in Switzerland. The legal status was also becoming important in order for the IOC to be able to apply for trademark protections, which it was seeking to protect the use of the Olympic symbol and emblems. In order to be able to apply for these protections the IOC had to be recognized as an international institution. This was the initial impetus to apply for a specific status, however, the IOC was also keen to obtain the benefits that this status would allow by the Swiss Government.³⁸⁶

In the late 1970s, the IOC made a formal request to the Swiss Government to be

³⁸⁴ Samuel Jaberg, How Switzerland champion champions, *Swiss Info*, (25 January 2010), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/specials/switzerland_for_the_record/world_records/How_Switzerland_champions_champions.html?cid=8149794.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (25 – 26 January 1978). Tunis, Tunisia. DVD, IOC Archives.

recognized as an international organization. This would provide them with similar benefits as the UN. In 1978, the Swiss Government refused this request because the “notion of a non-governmental international organization does not exist in Swiss fiscal law.”³⁸⁷ The IOC was requesting a status that would have placed it under a Decree that was reserved for intergovernmental organizations, which was, consequently not applicable to the IOC as an NGO. The Minutes of an Executive Board meeting in Lausanne in 1980 demonstrates that the IOC made a threat to move its headquarters to another country if it was not successful in obtaining this status. It was not until 1981 that the IOC finally obtained the status it was after. The IOC was now legally recognized as an international NGO based in Switzerland.³⁸⁸ In IOC Minutes it was stated, “for the IOC to be given such recognition would be creating legal history, as normally this status was only awarded to organizations as a direct result of government treaties.”³⁸⁹ The IOC now enjoyed further exemption from paying taxes, were able to hire international staff, had fewer customs restrictions, and also had some juridical immunity.³⁹⁰ The IOC and other ISFs benefit from Switzerland’s law in that, as non-profits, they are exempt from anti-corruption investigations.

It is important to note that this specific status was not exactly the same as the status granted to other intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN. While the IOC now had some of the same benefits as the UN, the IOC was different in that it is still viewed as a private organization under the law. Mrkonjic explains that the IOC and other ISFs in Switzerland “are associations subject to national private law whose terms of constitution and

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (9 April 1981). Lausanne, Switzerland. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁸⁹ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (21 – 23 April 1980). Lausanne, Switzerland. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁹⁰ Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott, *The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The Governance of World Sport*. p. 107.

organization are formalized in the Swiss Civil Code.”³⁹¹ During his speech at the General Assembly of International Sports Federations in 1981, Samaranch announced this success and stated that he wished to “underline that this is the first firm demonstration of the world importance of the Olympic Movement. I am sure that each member of our family will benefit from this.”³⁹² This statement made it clear that the IOC was seeking increased authority and legitimacy through this status.

The IOC’s status was assisted by Adolf Ogi, a prominent supporter of the IOC who worked in the Swiss Government. Ogi was intent on developing an attractive policy to encourage the IOC to stay in Switzerland and for other ISFs to create their headquarters in Switzerland.³⁹³ In 1998, the Federal Council recognized the IOC as an organization that pursues a public purpose. Specifically “it declares that it promotes physical education, mutual understanding and peace, and that it has an important economic impact for the region where it is seated.”³⁹⁴ In 2000, the tax exemption for the IOC was finalized, and in 2008 this tax exemption was extended to all other ISFs under the assumption that they also promote physical education, mutual understanding and peace.

The legal environment that Switzerland is able to provide the IOC and other ISFs has been incredibly helpful in enabling the IOC to become as wealthy and powerful as it is today. It has also enabled the IOC to be viewed as ‘unique’ compared to other NGOs, potentially setting it apart when being considered for Permanent Observer status. Despite its status as a non-profit organization, this position in Switzerland has enabled the IOC to keep its finances

³⁹¹ Michael Mrkonjic, The Swiss regulatory framework and international sports organisations. In: Jens Alm, ed. *Action for good governance in international sports organisations*, (2013), Copenhagen: Play the Game/ Danish Institute for Sports Studies, 128–132.

³⁹² Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (2 – 4 December 1981). Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. DVD, IOC Archives.

³⁹³ Mrkonjic, “The Swiss regulatory framework and international sports organisations”.

³⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 130.

private, which means: “they are not publicly accountable and cannot be held to the same legal standards of fairness in their governance that would apply to publicly funded organizations.”³⁹⁵ Furthermore, because the IOC has status as a private international organization, it is exempt from the jurisdiction of national courts — an exemption that extends to NOCs and the Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOG). At the 2010 Winter Games in Vancouver, Canada, this meant that despite a legal commitment to gender equality in the Canadian Constitution, the Games were able to host an event (the ski jumping) that was open only to male athletes as the courts recognized the IOC as a private international organization, which was not subject to the Canadian constitution.³⁹⁶

Alongside this special legal status in Switzerland, the IOC has also attempted to obtain international trademark protections that were considered unusual for an international not-for-profit NGO. This again benefited the organization financially, and also made it possible to apply for further protections in the 2000s when they requested international website domain name level protections from the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names (ICANN).

Trademark Protections and the CAS

While the IOC was working diligently at protecting its autonomy and power over the Olympic Movement, making sure that no governments would interfere with the independence of international sport, the IOC was, at the same time making requests that required governmental support and advocacy. In the 1970s, the IOC wanted desperately to protect the Olympic emblems and symbols from the use of unauthorized others and most

³⁹⁵ Foster, “Alternative Models for the Regulation of Global Sport.” p. 69.

³⁹⁶ Margot Young, “IOC Made Me Do It: Women’s Ski Jumping, VANOC, and the 2010 Winter Olympics, The,” *Constitutional Forum* 18 (2009). p. 95.

importantly from commercial exploitation. The IOC had already attempted in 1955 and 1960 to propose a diplomatic conference to prepare an International Convention for the protection of Olympic Emblems,³⁹⁷ but these plans fell through due to lack of interest on the part of the governments consulted.³⁹⁸ In the 1970s, the IOC attempted again to organize one of these conferences, and yet again their plans were stalled. Obtaining an International Convention was an ambitious goal as the only other NGO to enjoy the protection of its emblem in this way was the ICRC.³⁹⁹ In 1977, the IOC again looked at ways of creating an International Convention for the protection of Olympic emblems, this time the IOC members looked to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to organize a conference to protect its symbol. WIPO is one of the 16 specialized agencies of the UN, it is “the global forum for intellectual property services, policy, information and cooperation.” WIPO organizes diplomatic conferences in order to negotiate international treaties amongst UN Member States regarding international intellectual property rights.⁴⁰⁰

The IOC required a member state to initiate the WIPO request to propose a convention to protect the Olympic symbols. The IOC initially petitioned Swiss officials to apply to WIPO to register the Olympic symbol. Through this, the IOC successfully obtained protection under the Madrid Agreement. This agreement enables organizations to register their trademarks, which provide some legal benefits. However, the IOC was not satisfied

³⁹⁷ A diplomatic conference is the traditional method utilized by the UN and various other inter-governmental organizations to negotiate and adopt international treaties or conventions. (www.legal.un.org). An international convention is an agreement that results from a diplomatic conference. These are generally formal statements and only the States that agree to adopt the convention are expected to abide by them (i.e. it is not something that all states are automatically expected to uphold). Conventions are utilized as a form of international law.

³⁹⁸ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session. (1960). Rome, Italy. DVD, IOC Archives; Note that the IOC had been working on protecting the Olympic symbols since the 1920s.

³⁹⁹ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session. (1 – 5 February 1968). Grenoble, France. DVD, IOC Archives; The ICRC's emblems are protected in the internationally ratified Geneva Conventions.

⁴⁰⁰ WIPO, “*what is WIPO?*”, www.wipo.int.

with this Agreement and wanted more specific protection, similar to that of the ICRC.⁴⁰¹

Thus the IOC petitioned again to get a Member State to send in a request for the creation of a specific Convention concerning protection of the Olympic symbol at the next diplomatic conference of WIPO.⁴⁰²

In 1978, Kenyan officials agreed to make the application. At this point in time the IOC also requested letters of support from other national governments, as they would be required to sign on to the treaty in order for it to have any legal clout.⁴⁰³ After an initial lack of interest, the Conference was held in 1981 in Nairobi, Kenya, and the Treaty for the Protection of the Olympic symbols was signed by 24 countries.⁴⁰⁴ The Nairobi treaty is an attempt to ensure the protection of the Olympic Symbol so that it cannot legally be used without the IOC's authorization in all countries that have ratified this treaty.⁴⁰⁵ NOCs of countries that have not signed onto the treaty are required by the IOC to make every effort to support the creation of a national protection for the Olympic symbol and emblems. Host cities are required to create additional legislation that protects the Olympic trademark, emblems, and Olympic words. This legislation must protect against ambush marketing⁴⁰⁶ and the host city/cities must provide legislation ensuring all Olympic venues and areas around these venues are 'clean' of any commercial promotion not officially sanctioned by the

⁴⁰¹ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session, (1978), Tunis, Tunisia.

⁴⁰² Scott G Martyn, "An Uncomfortable Circle of Knowledge: An Examination of the Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol," *Fourth International Symposium for Olympic Research* (1998).

⁴⁰³ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session, (1978), Tunis, Tunisia.

⁴⁰⁴ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session. (29 September – 2 October 1981). Baden Baden, Germany. DVD, IOC Archives

⁴⁰⁵ Robert K. Barney, Wenn Stephen R, and Martyn Scott G, *Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism* (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2004).

⁴⁰⁶ This is an advertising technique where a company or brand attempts to associate itself with an event without playing to be an official sponsor.

IOC.⁴⁰⁷ To this day, the Nairobi treaty remains one of only 26 treaties administered by WIPO globally.

It is not an understatement to say that this treaty, and other legislation that works to protect the Olympic symbol, has transformed the IOC's financial status to a hugely wealthy organization that boasts US\$8 billion revenue over a 4-year period.⁴⁰⁸ The vast majority of the IOC's revenues are distributed back into the 'Olympic Movement' (namely the OCOGs, the NOCs and ISFs⁴⁰⁹) the remainder is spent on IOC administration. The overwhelming majority of this income comes from the selling of broadcasting rights and from a commercial sponsorship program. Without this exclusive protection over the symbols, emblems, and Olympic words, the IOC would not possess the vast amounts of capital and have such enormous income potential.

Alongside trademark protections, the IOC has also sought exclusive protection over website domain names (e.g. www.olympic.org). Domain names can become hugely lucrative for the owners of them. The IOC, unwilling and perhaps unable to purchase all domain names that utilize Olympic words in all potential languages, requested that they be protected by legislation that would require any domain name that utilized Olympic words and commercially benefited from the site to hand the rights over to the IOC. It is extremely unusual for a non-governmental and non-profit organization to request this type of protection. ICANN is the organization responsible for domain name system management, this organization provides protections to organizations and resolves domain name disputes.

⁴⁰⁷ Leonard Glickman & Evan Eliason, "Brand protection, trademarks, and the event that shall not be named: Event-specific legislation and the Olympic Games – Part 3 of 3," *LawInSport* (09 September 2013), <http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/intellectual-property-law/item/brand-protection-trademarks-and-the-event-that-shall-not-be-named-event-specific-legislation-and-the-olympic-games>.

⁴⁰⁸ Murray, "Olympic Games Set to Break \$8bn Revenues Barrier in Four-Year Cycle Ending with London 2012."

⁴⁰⁹ It is unclear how the revenue of the IOC is spent once it is distributed to NOCs and ISFs as they all have different ways of reporting their financial statements.

In 2012, the IOC in collaboration with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) presented a proposal to ICANN to obtain protections from outside use of second-level domain names that were similar to their organizations names. This request had been made through government lobbying and had to obtain support from the non-commercial stakeholders of ICANN.

This kind of protection is highly unusual for organizations to successfully obtain, and it was specifically stated that this decision would not open opportunities for other international NGOs to obtain similar protections. It may have been a smart move on the IOC's behalf to align with the IFRC as recommendations focused on the humanitarian and philanthropic benefits that these organizations provide. Specifically, the decision stressed the importance of protecting domain names of the Red Cross during disasters in case fake websites popped up to benefit from disaster relief drives.⁴¹⁰ Furthermore, the Governmental Advisory Committee recommended that the IOC and IFRC obtain special protections as it would "reflect the legal protections enshrined in the Geneva Convention in relation to the Red Cross/Crescent, and the Nairobi Treaty in relation to the IOC."⁴¹¹ This shows how the Nairobi Treaty conferred by WIPO enabled the IOC to be framed as 'different' to other NGOs and therefore a deserving participant of further 'special' protections.

Despite clear support from the Government Advisory Committee, the Report of Public Comments reflected significant opposition to the proposal to provide the IOC and

⁴¹⁰ Heather Dryden, Letter to Stephane Van Gelder (Chairman of the GNSO Council): Re: Protecting the IOC and Red Cross/Red Crescent names in New gTLDs, *ICANN – Governmental Advisory Committee* (14 September 2011), <https://gacweb.icann.org/display/GACADV/New+gTLDs>.

⁴¹¹ Catherine R. Easton, "ICANN's Core Principles and the Expansion of Generic Top-Level Domain Names," *International Journal of Law and Information Technology* 20, no. 4 (September 24, 2012): 273–290, doi:10.1093/ijlit/eas013. p. 284.

IFRC special protections.⁴¹² One commenter, Dr. Konstantinos Komaitis, the chair of ICANN's Non-Commercial Users Constituency, expressed concern about the "failure to distinguish between the requests made by the International Olympic Committee and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and treat them as two separate issues." He supported the IFRC request but had this to say about the IOC:

[The IOC]...is an organization, which receives a great amount of sponsorship deals which ensures "more than 40% of Olympic revenues" (some of its commercial partners include SAMSUNG, COCA COLA, GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE), MCDONALDS, VISA, and PANASONIC) and its role, albeit significant within the sports industry, should not be mixed with humanitarian or public interest values⁴¹³

Other commenters⁴¹⁴ expressed similar opinions and disagreed with the proposal that claimed the IOC engaged in humanitarian activities. Commenters were also concerned about the way this process was created in a top-down approach, as the IOC had the support of government members, rather than going through the usual grassroots application. Most commenters felt that the names of both organizations already benefited from adequate protections and thus the special protection was unnecessary. Furthermore, concerns were raised that these special protections would not be made available to other deserving humanitarian organizations and questioned why the Red Cross and/or the IOC should receive special treatment.⁴¹⁵ Despite substantial opposition from the public, the Generic Names Supporting Organization voted in

⁴¹² ICANN, "Proposal to protect International Red Cross and International Olympic Committee Names at the Top Level in New gTLDs," *Report of Public Comments*, (8 May 2012), <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-comments-ioc-rcrc-proposal-08may12-en.pdf>.

⁴¹³ Konstantinos Komaitis, "Comments submitted regarding proposals for protection of International Olympic Committee and Red Cross/Red Crescent names at the top-level," *ICANN Forum*, retrieved 20 April 2015 from <http://forum.icann.org/lists/ioc-rcrc-proposal/pdfd0GtrfHi7k.pdf>.

⁴¹⁴ From the report of public comments

⁴¹⁵ ICANN, "Proposal to protect International Red Cross and International Olympic Committee Names at the Top Level in New gTLDs."

the affirmative to provide protections to the IOC and Red Cross in March of 2012.⁴¹⁶ Many of those opposed to the application abstained from voting in protest.

This type of unique legal protection over website domain names is just another example of the ways in which the IOC has managed to obtain a legal authority that surpasses the rights of many other NGOs. It sets them apart and subsequently these legal protections are then used to request further authority. For example, the Nairobi Treaty conferred by WIPO was cited as a reason the IOC should be able to obtain further website protections in the ICANN proposal. The IOC and supporting governments focused on highlighting the IOC's humanitarian contributions to society in order to obtain these special protections. It is unclear how these special protections enable the IOC to further their 'humanitarian objectives'. However, what is clear is that it enables the IOC to further limit anyone outside of the Olympic Movement from benefiting monetarily or otherwise from utilizing Olympic words or images in any shape or form without the explicit permission from the IOC. This increasing authority provides the IOC with enormous wealth, which contributes to its power over global sport and politics. Another strategy the IOC has utilized to maintain control over the Olympic Movement is to create its own arbitration tribunal where it could control abidance to its own policies and rules rather than relying on governments to do this for them.

Court of Arbitration for Sport

In 1981, President Samaranch first came up with the idea of creating an arbitration tribunal that would assist in the resolution of sporting disputes in a timely manner. This came to be known as the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) — despite not having the legal clout of a court — the IOC liked the prestige linked to the word rather than it simply being known

⁴¹⁶ Kevin Murphy, Olympic showdown spells doom for ICANN, *Domain Policy*, (19 March 2012), <http://domainincite.com/8216-olympic-showdown-spells-doom-for-icann-film-at-11>.

as a Tribunal.⁴¹⁷ The goal of the CAS was to ensure that problems within sport were dealt with ‘in-house’ rather than by national legal authorities that posed a threat to the status and authority of the IOC and other sporting organizations.⁴¹⁸

Originally, the IOC controlled the CAS and the IOC appointed all of its members. However, in 1993 the Swiss Federal Tribunal recommended that the CAS become more independent from the IOC and at this time the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) was created to take over the organization. ICAS is made up of 20 board members (most of whom are chosen by the IOC, NOCs and ISFs). This board then chooses the arbitrators, of which there are about 300 throughout the world. The CAS “currently handles nearly 300 cases each year, 35 percent concerning doping and 40 percent concerning player transfers (mostly within football).”⁴¹⁹ Despite this distance from the IOC, the IOC is still the main funder of the CAS.

The creation of the CAS provides the IOC with enormous amount of power and prestige. No other NGO in the world has this type of authority.⁴²⁰ While the CAS does provide useful benefits to the world of sport, for example, the CAS is present at every Olympic Games to resolve disputes as quickly as possible so as not to interfere with the course of the competitions. However, the creation of the CAS has also played a role in the normative acceptance of the rules set up by the IOC and other powerful ISFs (e.g. FIFA). This has provided the IOC with indisputable authority over global sport.

The CAS can only uphold the rules of sport by disciplining those that break them,

⁴¹⁷ Minutes of the IOC Executive Board Meeting, (10 – 11 July 1982), Madrid, Spain, DVD: IOC Archives.

⁴¹⁸ Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott, *The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The Governance of World Sport*.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid, p. 129.

⁴²⁰ Ken Foster, “Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence,” *Entertainment and Sports Law Journal (UK)* 3 (2005).

and cannot question the rules themselves.⁴²¹ Although the CAS is officially independent from the IOC (with the creation of ICAS), the CAS supports the hegemony of the IOC and does not necessarily provide global sport with an arena to democratically question the decisions being made and the rules that govern them. For example, before an athlete is allowed to take part in international sporting competitions (e.g. the Olympic Games) they are required to sign an agreement that they will not take legal action against the ISFs, and instead forces them to take any disputes to the CAS.⁴²² Foster explains how this waiver “denies athletes access to national courts and leaves them dependent on the arbitrary justice of the International Sports Federations themselves”.⁴²³

A decision that is made by the CAS can be appealed to the Swiss Federal Court, but only for very limited reasons (and in rare cases) that are linked to procedural error.⁴²⁴ Gurovits explains that: “this means, in particular, that a CAS award cannot be challenged on the merits of the case.”⁴²⁵ Put simply, the vast majority of the time the CAS decision is final. This demonstrates the power of the IOC, where, not only are other sports organizations and athletes abiding by CAS decisions, but the CAS also enjoys official recognition from the Swiss government as an arbitration panel. Foster explains that: “this allows the private regimes of international sporting federations, such as the IOC or FIFA, to be legally unaccountable except by arbitration systems established and validated by those very same

⁴²¹ John Forster, “Global Sports Organisations and Their Governance,” *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society* 6, no. 1 (January 11, 2006): 72–83; Scott Jedlicka, “The Normative Discourse of Anti-Doping Policy,” *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 6, no. 3 (August 29, 2012): 429–442.

⁴²² Ken Foster, “Is There a Global Sports Law,” *Entertainment Law* 2 (2003).

⁴²³ Ibid. p. 50.

⁴²⁴ Andras Gurovits, “The Court of Arbitration for Sport TAS/CAS,” *Lecture held at the Swiss-Russian Forum* (27 September 2012) Zurich, http://nkf.ch/en/publikationen_suche/fachgebiete.php.

⁴²⁵ Ibid, p. 6.

private regimes.”⁴²⁶

This desire to obtain legal protections and capabilities was linked to the IOC’s adamancy that sport should operate without the political interference from governments. Around the time of the proposed creation of the CAS, the IOC and the Olympic Movement had been dealing with political boycotts of the Olympic Games, and political actions at them, for example, the 1968 black power salute in Mexico City, and the tragic murders of Israeli athletes in 1972 in Munich. While the CAS provided the IOC with increased control over the members of the Olympic Movement, there was little that the IOC could do in response to governmental decisions to boycott an Olympic Games. In an attempt to obtain control over these governments the IOC made an appeal to Member States of the UN General Assembly to sign onto an International Convention to ensure that political interference stayed outside of the Olympic Games.

Protection Against Political Interference

In response to political boycotts of the Olympic Games throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the IOC Executive Board discussed the possibility of creating an International Convention of the Olympic Games that would be signed by Member States at the UN General Assembly. The Convention would require governments to discourage political interference in sport and to guarantee that governments would not boycott the Games for any political reasons. The International Amateur Cycling Association created a draft of the Convention, which was shared at the 1981 Executive Board meeting and Congress in Baden Baden.⁴²⁷ This was also the time when the UN General Assembly was drafting a Convention

⁴²⁶ Foster, “Is There a Global Sports Law.”

⁴²⁷ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (29 – 30 September 1981). Baden Baden, Germany, DVD, IOC Archives.

against Apartheid in Sport. It is unclear whether the IOC's proposal was a response to this, however, it is clear that the anti-apartheid Convention raised several concerns among IOC members, specifically that governments were interfering in sport.

The draft was introduced by talking about 1980 as “a year of crisis for the Olympic Games”. In the draft it was explained that this crisis was caused by external political factors generated by governments and then concluded that:

If it is political factors which threaten the Games, it should be political factors which guarantee them too, protect them, because being a world movement, an institution historically formed as an expression of supranational, suprapolitical and extrapolitical ideas, the Games are at the same time a political significant moderating factor.⁴²⁸

The draft then went on to claim that “Their [the Olympic Games'] destruction, their amputation would signify an impoverishment of mankind...”⁴²⁹ The IOC requested that governments sign onto the following:

No government may intervene between an NOC and the IOC. No government may take over the rights of an NOC concerning the Olympic Games...No government shall undertake or encourage any boycott of the Olympic Games, nor shall it try to influence the choice of venues for the Olympic Games.⁴³⁰

By 1982 the IOC sought to have the Convention adopted by the UN at their next General Assembly. The IOC approached the five countries presiding over the regional groups of the UN to enlist their support and that of other countries.⁴³¹ The IOC also asked NOCs to contact their governments to obtain their support.⁴³²

In a letter sent to all NOCs, the IOC president suggested that the declaration “provides a unique opportunity for NOCs and the IOC to work with national governments

⁴²⁸ Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC (30 – 31 October 1980). Lausanne, Switzerland. DVD, IOC Archives.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session. (27 – 29 May 1982). Rome, Italy. DVD, IOC Archives.

⁴³² Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC. (1982) Madrid.

toward a goal which will benefit the entire Olympic Movement and international sport. If pursued positively and diligently it may also result in a contribution to world peace and understanding.” The letter also provided answers to potential questions that NOC representatives may be asked when they encouraged their national governments to support the declaration. This included the question “Is this proposal primarily an ‘anti-boycott’ initiative?” the response to be given was:

It is extremely important to understand that this proposal is not primarily an anti-boycott proposal. It is not a response to past actions, but instead, a forward-looking proposal designed to achieve a long-standing objective of the IOC. It represents a common interest of all athletes, states and the Olympic Movement in having Olympic principles reaffirmed by a supreme policy making body as proof of an international entente on this point.

The most critical element of the declaration is described as being the “desire to keep the Olympic Games free from the effects of international tensions.”⁴³³

IOC President Samaranch sent a letter the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar requesting that he put the Declaration on the UN General Assembly agenda for 1982. Samaranch was adamant that the declaration would have the “overwhelming support” from Member States.⁴³⁴ The Secretary-General declined the request, suggesting that it should be put forward by a Member State.⁴³⁵ In October of 1982 at the IOC Executive Board meeting, the President announced that the draft resolution for the protection of the Olympic Games had suffered a few set backs, most notable was the fact that certain member countries⁴³⁶ [of

⁴³³ Olympic Review, *Protection of the Olympic Games*, (1982), <http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1982/ore178/ORE178n.pdf>

⁴³⁴ Juan Antonio Samaranch, *Letter to UNSG Javier Perez de Cuellar*, (18 June 1982), IOC Archives. Lausanne, Switzerland.

⁴³⁵ Javier Perez de Cuellar, *Letter to Juan Antonio Samaranch*, (29 June 1982), IOC Archives. Lausanne, Switzerland.

⁴³⁶ These member countries were not named by the IOC President.

the UN] were recommending that the inclusion of the declaration be postponed.⁴³⁷

In 1983, efforts to obtain the support of the UN General Assembly for the Convention were abruptly halted. Mr. Dick Pound, an IOC member stated that “the proposal did not carry enough support to be adopted without major problems or changes which would be unacceptable.” And furthermore “Several countries had told the IOC to consider very carefully the risks involved in proposing such a Declaration.”⁴³⁸ At the 1984 IOC Session in Los Angeles, the Executive Board announced that it would look into the possibility of reintroducing the Declaration once again. This was discussed in the midst of announcements of boycotts of the Los Angeles Olympic Games.⁴³⁹ In response to the reinstatement of the proposal, the New Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange wrote a letter to the Secretary-General of the NZ Olympic Committee (which was then passed on to the IOC) stating that he did not “believe that it is realistic to expect the world’s most politicized forum to adopt a resolution calling for politics to be kept out of the Olympic Games.” He went on to say: “I would have to say that I have real doubts about the wisdom of the IOC’s opening itself up to United Nations involvement – some might say meddling – in its affairs, even if only in indirect ways.”⁴⁴⁰ Despite NZ’s negative response the IOC went on to attempt to gain supporters for the resolution. A letter written by the IOC President to the US Olympic Committee suggests that the IOC had received agreement from Spain, India, Romania, Tunisia, France and Ivory Coast for this resolution.⁴⁴¹

⁴³⁷ Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC. (10 – 13 October 1982). Lausanne, Switzerland. DVD, IOC Archives.

⁴³⁸ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session. (26 – 28 March 1983). New Delhi, India. DVD, IOC Archives.

⁴³⁹ Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session. (25 – 26 July 1984). Los Angeles. DVD, IOC Archives.

⁴⁴⁰ David Lange, *Letter to Tay Wilson (SG of the NZOC)*, (14 October 1985), IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

⁴⁴¹ Juan Antonio Samaranch, *Letter to the President of the USOC, Robert Helmick*, (20 September 1985), IOC Archives. Lausanne, Switzerland; While the IOC President claimed to have this support from these countries I did not find any evidence of this in my Archival research.

In 1986, the IOC again submitted the Resolution for the Protection of the Olympic games to the UN. The President had met with the Secretary-General and they hoped that it would be possible to present a concrete proposal to the next IOC Session. He declared that it would be helpful if IOC members could contact government authorities and foreign affairs ministers in order to support this resolution, which (in the IOC President's opinion) could be very positive in encouraging maximum participation in the Olympic Games.⁴⁴² While it is known that the resolution was never adopted in this earlier form, my research did not reveal whether it was officially presented or if the idea was quashed beforehand. Efforts to protect the Olympic Games continued, however, and in the 1988 Minutes of the IOC Session in Seoul it was announced that the Council of the Olympic Movement created recommendations and declarations to be considered at the 1988 MINEPS conference and the meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for Physical Education and Sport (CIGEPS). A similar resolution was also going to be presented to the UNESCO General Conference in the following year.⁴⁴³

Because the IOC has placed a 30-year embargo on the IOC Executive Board meeting Minutes, it is not clear if and/or how the organization continued in its quest to obtain signed protection for the Olympic Games from the UN Member States. We do know, however, that in late 2014 the UN adopted a resolution —as announced by the IOC — that provided protection for the Olympic Games. I provide more detail about this resolution below.

On 31 October 2014 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution titled 'Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace'. While a similar titled

⁴⁴² Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session. (4 – 6 June, 1985). Berlin, Germany. DVD, IOC Archives.

⁴⁴³ Minutes of the meeting of the IOC Session. (14 – 16 September, 1988). Seoul, South Korea. DVD, IOC Archives; While both the MINEPS conference in 1988 and the UNESCO General Conference in 1989 expressed support for the Olympic movement, support for the protection of the Olympic Games specifically, is not present in either of the conference documents.

resolution had been adopted several times over the past 10 years, in this particular case the IOC maintained that a ‘historic milestone’ had been reached because of the addition of this statement that the UN General Assembly: “Supports the independence and autonomy of sport as well as the mission of the International Olympic Committee in leading the Olympic Movement.”⁴⁴⁴ This statement looks similar to the earlier attempted resolution for the protection of the Olympic Games that had failed several times throughout the 1980s because of lack of Member State support. In 2014, the IOC’s goal of UN recognition of the autonomy of sport and of the IOC was finally achieved.

In the lead up to this resolution, the IOC President, Thomas Bach made speeches that emphasized the need for political autonomy, for example in one speech made in front of the UN General Assembly he stated: “Regardless of where in the world we practice sport, the rules are the same. They are recognized worldwide. But to apply this ‘universal law’ worldwide and spread our values globally, sport has to enjoy responsible autonomy. Politics must respect this autonomy” he went on to urge Member States: “In the mutual interest of both sport and politics, please help to protect and strengthen the autonomy of sport.”⁴⁴⁵ The IOC Permanent Observer representative, Mario Pescante made a similar speech at the UN General Assembly on 20 October 2014 presenting the agenda item titled ‘sport for development and peace’ within this speech he highlighted that the IOC was interacting more and more with political institutions and individuals but emphasized that:

These relationships must be built on the foundation of mutual respect that protects the autonomy of sport. Sport is unique. It is guided by truly universal principles. These

⁴⁴⁴ UN General Assembly 69th Session, A/RES/69/6, *Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace*, (10 November 2014), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/6

⁴⁴⁵ Thomas Bach, “Statement on the occasion of the adoption of the Resolution ‘building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal’,” *69th Session of the UN General Assembly*. (6 November 2013), New York, USA. p. 3.

universal principles of sport are based on globally recognized ethics, fair play, respect and friendship. Government interference dismantles this global framework and renders sport ineffective as a tool for positive change⁴⁴⁶

The IOC seems to have been slowly paving the way for the statement of autonomy to be adopted within yet another sport for peace resolution. While the statement is not legally binding and we have yet to see if it will have any impact on the way sport is organized, it does perhaps demonstrate the ways in which Member States are more willing to go along with this line of thought than they had been in the 1980s.⁴⁴⁷ In response to the adoption of the resolution the IOC interpreted the autonomy statement by saying (in a press release): “This clearly implies that full participation at sporting events is encouraged, and that in turn boycotts are incompatible with this UN request for respect of the values of sport.”⁴⁴⁸ Perhaps it was easier for Member States to accept this resolution at this time as we have not seen boycotts of the Olympic Games for the past 30 years.

The legal authority of the IOC was enabled by its unrelenting focus on obtaining special legal rights and also by creating systems that enable it to control the actions and rights of others. One could even argue that the IOC holds even more power than some nation states, as they are not accountable to anyone but themselves. This is important to consider, as this type of legal power is not something that many other NGOs would ever be able to obtain. Yet in this case, the IOC has managed to create an environment in which this type of authority is normalized and expected.

The creation of these systems of control are rooted in a disciplinary power system

⁴⁴⁶ Mario Pescante, “Presentation of the agenda item on ‘sport for development and peace’,” *UN General Assembly*, (20 October 2014), New York, USA. p. 1.

⁴⁴⁷ The UN documents show that no member state expressed any concerns about the adoption of this resolution.

⁴⁴⁸ International Olympic Committee, *Historic milestone: United Nations recognizes autonomy of sport*, (03 November 2014), <http://www.olympic.org/news/historic-milestone-united-nations-recognises-autonomy-of-sport/240276>.

where the IOC can be viewed as forcing adherence to its ideas through legal means. At the same time though this system of control has contributed to the IOC's power over international sport and now its growth into the arena of international development. For example, the role of the CAS is now rooted in the international sporting system as national governments have recognized the authority and jurisdiction of the tribunal. Along the same lines as the CAS, the IOC also created the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which is an organization that dictates policies around doping in sport. WADA is now used by national governments to inform their own policies in this area.

On the surface the IOC's legal authority may seem appropriate considering its role in organizing a large international sporting event. However, once you begin to see the ways in which the IOC's control actually extends far beyond the organization of the Olympic Games you can begin to question the need and potentially the consequences of this authority. Because the IOC is a private NGO, access to these systems of control, means that the organization's power is immense. The organization is not a democratically elected government, nor does it have a broad base of constituents that have the power to question its form of governance. The next section presents a theoretical reflection of the IOC's organizational, moral and legal authority and questions its hegemonic position in global sport and the strategies it has utilized to be viewed as such.

Theoretical Reflections

The IOC's continuous commitment to linking the Olympic Games with world peace through the concepts of Olympism and the Olympic Truce has enabled them to be viewed as an organization that has similar goals to the UN — despite the lack of compelling evidence

that the Olympic Games do, in fact, promote peace at all.⁴⁴⁹ The IOC and the Olympic Movement's effective efforts to attain and maintain moral authority has perhaps assisted the IOC in getting so close with the UN, and now having a seat as Permanent Observer at the General Assembly.

Utilizing Gramsci's theoretical concept of hegemony to analyze the IOC's attempts at obtaining moral authority, one can begin to view these strategies as a way for the IOC to obtain control through the consent of the populace. In this sense, power and control is not maintained through coercive or legal means, but by convincing others of the moral legitimacy of the Olympic Movement. However, the IOC does struggle to maintain this type of moral authority, as the links of Olympic sport to the promotion of moral values is arguably tenuous — a point that is not lost on many more critical journalists who have covered the Games and IOC over the years. For example, investigative journalist, Andrew Jennings has written several books outlining the spread of corruption throughout the IOC organization in the 1980s and 1990s.⁴⁵⁰ Moreover, and as I outlined earlier in this dissertation, many researchers have stated that there is no evidence that the Olympic Games are linked to the promotion of any kind of moral behaviour.⁴⁵¹ Furthermore, there are few similarities between the organization of today's Olympic Games and the historical myths and ideologies that the IOC relies on to promote its moral authority, such as the goals of de Coubertin when he created the 1896 Games, or the Truce that was put in place in the ancient Olympic Games.

With this background, a Foucauldian analysis can also help to further explain how

⁴⁴⁹ Hoberman, "The Myth of Sport as a Peace-Promoting Political Force"; Roche, "The Olympics and 'Global Citizenship'"; Kristine Toohey and Anthony James Veal, *The Olympic Games: A Social Science Perspective* (CABI, 2007).

⁴⁵⁰ Andrew Jennings, *The New Lords of the Rings: Olympic Corruption and How to Buy Gold Medals* (Pocket Books, 1996); Andrew Jennings and Clare Sambrook, *The Great Olympic Swindle: When the World Wanted Its Games Back* (Simon & Schuster, 2000).

⁴⁵¹ Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral Order*; Lenskyj, "Reflections on Communication and Sport: On Heteronormativity and Gender Identities."

this moral discourse promoted by the IOC became part of a regime of truth that is accepted and recognized by many when we think and talk about the Olympic Games. From a Foucauldian perspective, having the power and control over the ways in which discourses are presented and taken up are often seen as more influential in creating a regime of truth than whether or not that discourse actually presents a reality. This helps to explain how these three types of authority (organizational, moral and legal) build on one another — even if the discourse of Olympism is critiqued or questioned (by academics or otherwise), the IOC has continued to build institutional power through legal and organizational means that influence the way the Olympism discourse is taken up by others.

In examining the IOC's authority in this manner one can begin to see the significance of all of these different attempts that the IOC continually makes to obtain more authority and power in different aspects of their organizing. Examined separately perhaps some of these events might not seem overly significant. Yet when examined together, and located within the broader contextual environment, it becomes clear that there is an apparatus of power that is dispersed and decentralized, but works together to afford the IOC (and through extension — global sport) more control over creating these regimes of truth.

The discourses that the IOC has tirelessly engaged in to promote its moral legitimacy have also contributed to the normalization of the idea that sport can be utilized as a moral instrument in international development initiatives. This undoubtedly has made the IOC seem like an attractive partner for the UN, an organization focused on global development. While the IOC is certainly not the first or only organization to have linked sport to moral ideals or to international development, the organization has arguably been the most successful in utilizing these ideas to promote itself. This is discussed in more detail in the

final chapter of the findings.

These organizational, moral or legal systems of power are put in place by the IOC to consistently re-affirm and uphold their claims to power over sport. The IOC has systematically managed the way people view the organization through these systems of control that have then become so normalized that the IOC's power has so often become hegemonic. Peacock (2010) argues that the IOC derives much of its power from its adoption of these types of rational-legal bureaucratic forms: "the IOC has long mimicked public IGOs [intergovernmental organizations] and though it has remained consciously and conspicuously nongovernmental, it has nevertheless sought a similar level of legitimation."⁴⁵² I build on this argument here by examining how these different rational-legal bureaucratic forms perhaps might have assisted the IOC to obtain Permanent Observer status at the UN General Assembly.

I also argue that these rational-legal bureaucratic forms may have assisted the IOC in creating its own regimes of truth around Olympism (for example) that have been used to serve the organization in its ascension to power. The goal in this chapter has been to uncover some of the ways in which the IOC has created these regimes of truth so that we can begin to see some of the processes that have been engaged in to obtain the power that they hold today. The popular notion of the IOC and the Olympic Games as a moral institution has been based on the IOC's careful management of the truth. By pulling these truth claims from the power relations that uphold it, we can begin to engage in analysis of how the IOC obtained Permanent Observer status that is not merely based on what the IOC presents to the world but on an in-depth examination of the practices that the IOC engages in to create these

⁴⁵² Peacock, "A Virtual World Government unto Itself" Uncovering the Rational-Legal Authority of the IOC in World Politics." p. 45.

discourses.

The IOC engages in many different actions to legitimate its status as a strong player in international politics. In the next chapter, I examine the influences of the political and economic context that may have made the IOC an appealing organization to take a Permanent Observer seat at the UN General Assembly.

CHAPTER 7: UNITED NATIONS: GLOBAL POLITICS, NGOs AND SPORT

This chapter examines the external context that potentially had an influence on why the IOC obtained Permanent Observer status. This involves looking at the social and political context surrounding the UN in the lead up to the decision. First, this chapter examines the struggles of legitimacy that the UN faced throughout the 1990s, which was exacerbated by the growing popularity of neoliberal policies. This context is important to consider as it may have played an important role in creating an environment where the IOC was viewed as an attractive partner to the UN. The neoliberalization of international development also meant that there was a huge growth of the number of NGOs working in the area of SDP. This similarly paved the way for increasing interactions between NGOs and intergovernmental organizations such as the UN. This chapter finally examines how sport has come to play a role at the UN, and begins to question why sport would be appealing as a peace and development tool within this context of the neoliberalization of development.

The United Nations: Struggles of Legitimacy and Power

In the early 1990s, when the world had finally come out of the Cold War, the UN began engaging in more ambitious missions to promote peace and provide much needed humanitarian aid in states involved in conflicts. Unfortunately, several of these missions became horrendous failures, with Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia representing some of the most horrific of these.⁴⁵³ These specific cases (Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia) all represented ongoing civil wars that had become increasingly violent and necessitated the aid of outside countries in order to provide humanitarian relief and to assist in attempting to end the violence. At this point in time, the UN was viewed as the organization (with the assistance of

⁴⁵³ Stephen F Burgess, *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros Ghali 1992 - 1997* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2002).

its Member States) that could provide this type of assistance. Unfortunately, the UN's response to these cases was critiqued as being highly inadequate — thought by some to (at best) slow down the peace process, and at worst to contribute to prolonging the genocidal atrocities. Unlike before, where the attitudes of nations during the Cold War could be blamed for inadequate assistance from the UN, in these instances, the legitimacy and relevancy of the UN itself was being questioned. The UN had arguably begun to take on more difficult missions that were more complex than before and as a consequence the failures had much more horrendous outcomes.⁴⁵⁴

The failures were attributed to many different things, including the actions of the Secretary-General at the time.⁴⁵⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was the Secretary-General of the UN from 1992 until 1997, had attempted to take the UN into a new direction after the end of the Cold War. He was intent on increasing the number of peacekeeping missions dramatically in a bid to reassert the UN's influence. Unfortunately, and as a result the UN became overextended and nearly went into bankruptcy.⁴⁵⁶ For example, a report states that “in 1988, the UN operated just five peacekeeping missions, but at its peak in 1993, it had 18.”⁴⁵⁷ Furthermore, support of the peacekeeping missions waned as Member States did not have the political will to commit the resources that the increased number of missions necessitated. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Secretary-General did not prove to be popular with the several Member States, specifically, the United States of America (USA), which openly

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵ Kofi Annan, *Interventions: A Life in War and Peace* (Penguin Publishing Group, 2012).

⁴⁵⁶ UN Security Council, A/1999/1257, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*, (15 December 1999), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20S19991257.pdf>.

⁴⁵⁷ Emel OsmanCavusoglu, “Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Journal of International Affairs* IV, no. 4 (1999), <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/EmelOsmanCavusoglu.pdf>. p. 3.

criticized and challenged Boutros-Ghali's decisions.⁴⁵⁸

The difficulties involved in gaining cooperation from Member States also seemed significant in contributing to the UN's failed peacekeeping goals.⁴⁵⁹ Some of the most powerful Member States at the UN, such as the USA, were becoming more and more reluctant to get involved in these missions, especially after the loss of life the USA and Pakistani troops experienced in Somalia in 1993 (this is discussed in more detail below). This tension between the UN and several of the Member States contributed to the UN's struggle to gain any kind of agreement over these situations. This meant that often the peacekeeping missions were deployed with minimal resources and personnel, which looks to have contributed to many of the failures of the UN peacekeeping missions.⁴⁶⁰ Because the UN relies on the cooperation of Member States to maintain legitimacy and power, these events and indeed the behaviour of its Member States had detrimental consequences on UN operations and public faith in the UN was shaken.⁴⁶¹

Struggling to maintain the support of its constituents is a consistent issue for the UN when attempting to make decisions. Member States have their own agendas and their own constituents to please, and often are in disagreement with one another. These disagreements limit the UN's capacity to take action. Furthermore, the UN relies on funding and resources from Member States and if the most powerful Member States (such as the USA who are supposed to contribute a large amount of the funds and resources) are not on board with a mission, the UN has to work at a limited capacity — furthering their chances of failing and

⁴⁵⁸ Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, (March 1996).

⁴⁵⁹ Annan, *Interventions: A Life in War and Peace*.

⁴⁶⁰ UN Security Council, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*.

⁴⁶¹ Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton University Press, 2008). p. 2.

thus potentially limiting their impacts on the ground.

For example, the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia in the early 1990s had initially received major support and resources from the USA. However, and as a result of various deadly incidents in Somalia, the USA eventually pulled its support. In 1991, Somalia was engulfed in civil war that was violently escalating. It had been estimated that over 4.5 million Somali civilians were in direct danger of dying from disease and starvation because of lack of resources as a result of these wars.⁴⁶² The UN Security Council had already endorsed an operation to provide humanitarian relief and to monitor a ceasefire in 1991. However, the much-needed supplies were not reaching many Somalis because the ceasefire was being ignored. As a result, the Security Council authorized the Mission called ‘Operation Restore Hope’, a USA led operation that had assistance from other national armies. While the UN sanctioned this operation, US forces controlled it. The goal of this mission was to create a secure environment to enable UN humanitarian relief and efforts to reach Somali civilians.

Despite the insistence made by USA forces that this mission was to be commanded by the USA and not the UN, the USA was required to work closely with UN agencies already in Somalia, and with UN headquarters.⁴⁶³ During the mission in Somalia, USA leadership had changed hands from George Bush Senior to Bill Clinton. It was at this stage, in October of 1993, when 18 USA Rangers who were deployed on the mission were trapped and killed by Somali militiamen.⁴⁶⁴ The deaths of these soldiers were a shock to the USA

⁴⁶² United Nations, *The Blue Hemets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, 3rd ed. (United Nations, 1996).

⁴⁶³ Burgess, *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros Ghali 1992 - 1997*.

⁴⁶⁴ Known as the Battle of Mogadishu, or Black Hawk Down. A Pakistan and Malaysian soldier were also killed, and around 90 soldiers from USA, Pakistan and Malaysian were injured in this mission. It has been

public, and under increasing pressure from USA politicians, Bill Clinton decided to withdraw USA forces from Somalia by March 1994 before the mission was completed. Despite the efforts made by the USA and other UN Member States the mission was considered a failure, as it had not been able to create sustainable access for the deployment of humanitarian relief. The USA blamed this incident and the failed mission on the UN, and subsequently became wary of providing resources to UN missions.

The Government of the USA enacted a strict policy after the events in Somalia that limited its support for UN peacekeeping more broadly.⁴⁶⁵ Because the USA is the largest donor country to the UN and the most powerful Member State, this had a huge impact on the support of the subsequent missions in Rwanda and Bosnia in 1994 and 1995 respectively.⁴⁶⁶ Bosnia and Rwanda presented cases of genocide, where one group of people was intent on eradicating another group of people. Despite these atrocities, the UN lacked effective decision-making abilities, and therefore engaged in severely limited actions. An independent report commissioned by the UN found that the UN response to the Rwandan genocide was wholly inadequate. The report read: “The responsibility for the failings of the United Nations to prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda lies with a number of different actors, in particular the Secretary-General [Boutros Boutros-Ghali], the Security Council, UNAMIR⁴⁶⁷ and the broader membership of the United Nations.”⁴⁶⁸ The report made it clear that the previous incident in Somalia and the overburdened peacekeeping missions contributed to the

reported that around 2000 Somali’s were killed and wounded in this battle, this number included civilians.

⁴⁶⁵ This policy came as a result of a Presidential Decision Directive 25 that was created by President Bill Clinton.

⁴⁶⁶ UN Security Council, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*.

⁴⁶⁷ United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.

⁴⁶⁸ UN Security Council, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*, p. 30.

lack of trust and political motivation for Member States to commit themselves to future UN Peacekeeping goals.

Similarly, the UN's failure in protecting Muslim Bosnians from genocide in 1995 was viewed as yet another incident where the UN was found incapable of achieving its goals. In the early 1990s after the fall of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was experiencing a fierce civil war, which turned into an ethnic cleansing campaign where non-Serb Bosnians were targeted for eradication. By 1993 the town of Srebrenica became a target for the Serbs who surrounded the town and its largely Muslim Bosnian inhabitants. Bosnian locals were severely concerned for the well-being of these residents and the UN forces who were stationed there assured them that they would never be abandoned as the town was announced as a 'safe area' by the UN Security Council. Despite this commitment made by the UN, in June 1995, the town was overrun by Bosnian Serbs who then proceeded to kill over 8,000 Muslim civilians (mainly boys and men). Despite its promises, the UN simply did not provide adequate protection in terms of personnel and resources. The UN Secretary-General had been unable to convince Member States to commit to the number of personnel needed and thus they were again working severely under capacity,⁴⁶⁹ which arguably resulted in these failings.

These combined events had huge impacts on how the UN was viewed by the public. Furthermore, because of their perceived failures in Somalia, the USA had made the decision to no longer involve itself in peace enforcement operations.⁴⁷⁰ The USA was the leading force on the Security Council, which could have encouraged international military action; however, in both cases, they hung back and waited until it was much too late.⁴⁷¹ These

⁴⁶⁹ United Nations, A/54/549, *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 – Srebrenica Report*, (1998), www.undocs.org/A/54/549.

⁴⁷⁰ Burgess, *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros Ghali 1992 - 1997*. p. 76.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

peacekeeping atrocities, under the leadership of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as UN Secretary-General, arguably ensured that the UN declined in legitimacy and importance in the early 1990s and also contributed to the severe financial crisis that the UN was to experience a few years later. Through the eyes of the global public, the leadership of the UN was dwindling, and people seriously questioned its usefulness in this newly globalizing world.⁴⁷²

The USA had critiqued many of the operations of the UN for some time now, not just because of the disappointments of the peacekeeping missions, but also because the one-country one-vote system that the UN General Assembly abides by. This system had allowed the balance of power to drift toward countries of the Global South and the East in UN decision-making. This was especially evident during the 1960s when the ‘Group of 77’ was founded. This Group was made up of 77 developing countries within the UN with the intent that they work and vote together at the UN to serve their joint interests.⁴⁷³ The USA responded by refusing to make its payments to the UN in full since the 1980s and also requiring that the funds they were providing be used for specific issues, and not others.⁴⁷⁴ The USA refusal to make UN payments and also non-payments from other countries contributed to the financial crisis that the UN experienced in the 1990s and continues to experience today. It has reached the point today where the “UN is unable to even minimally meet its official mandate.”⁴⁷⁵ This political, economic context has arguably contributed to the need for the UN to associate themselves with NGOs that are able to seemingly achieve UN goals with their own funds, or with more financial efficiency than what the UN could be capable of.

⁴⁷² Peter R Baehr and Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations at the End of the 1990s*, (Macmillan, 1999).

⁴⁷³ Burgess, *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros Ghali 1992 - 1997*.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ Sangeeta Kamat, “The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a Neoliberal Era,” *Review of International Political Economy* 11, no. 1 (February 2004): 155–176. p. 163.

Furthermore, the difficulties in achieving agreement amongst Member States to take action continue. Most famously, in the early 2000s the USA and allies engaged in war with Iraq without the sanction of the UN Security Council. The UN was severely critiqued by both supporters of the war and those who were against it.⁴⁷⁶ People felt that the UN had failed in its responsibilities to either stop the war, or to authorize it. It was in this context that the UN decided to engage in less controversial activities, that are cheaper, and seemingly politically neutral, such as sport. Further into this chapter, I will explain why sport has perhaps become so appealing to the UN and how the political and economic context has contributed to this.

Popularization of Neoliberalism and its Impact on the UN

Neoliberalism is a theory of political economy that has become the dominant ideology underlying policy decision and directives in western capitalist societies over the past 30 years. Proponents of neoliberalism argue for a decreased role of the state in global economic market activity. The idea is that this increases economic competition, which in turn promotes a healthy market economy around the world. A free market, proponents argue, should allow for fair and equal competition and have a ‘trickle-down’ effect on wealth distribution. Harvey (2005) describes that neoliberalism “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”⁴⁷⁷ Within a neoliberal world everything is linked to economic calculation, including the well being of a community. These ideals have vastly influenced the way that we operate as a society.

Neoliberal policies have resulted in the withdrawal of social welfare programs and

⁴⁷⁶ Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*.

⁴⁷⁷ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. p. 2.

social health policies, decreases in public education funds, weakening of labor unions, exploitation of workers, increase in power of corporations, deregulation of the market, global ‘free’ trade policies, increased market competition and much more.⁴⁷⁸ All of these changes occurred in a bid to maximize economic profitability and efficiency.

Some critics have convincingly argued that neoliberalism, as an economic practice, has benefited a few elites to the detriment of many.⁴⁷⁹ It has arguably resulted in increasing social inequalities, both locally, within a nation and globally, between nations. While neoliberal ideologies were often followed in the name of globalized development, much of the global South has not seen any change in their impoverished condition.⁴⁸⁰ Neoliberalism has been described by many as an abominable failure once the political and economic ideology was put into practice. Neoliberal theory is based on a society where inequalities do not exist and where everyone has an ‘equal’ opportunity to get their piece of the economic pie; they just have to work hard to get there.⁴⁸¹ What neoliberal theory completely ignores are the realities of our global world: inequalities are rife, and as a result neoliberal policies have simply increased these inequalities. In addition, many of the promoted policies were also inequitable. For example, the concept of ‘free trade’ never fully existed, as Northern countries often protected their own goods by creating trade barriers.⁴⁸² These trade barriers that exist in Northern economies have been found to cost countries in the Global South hundreds of billions of dollars of potential earnings.⁴⁸³

With this background I argue in the following sections that neoliberalism has played

⁴⁷⁸ Jamie Peck, *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁴⁷⁹ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ McEwan, *Postcolonialism and Development*.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ David Sogge, *Give and Take: What's the Matter with Foreign Aid?* (London, UK: Zed Books, 2002).

a role in enabling the IOC to gain the interest of the UN to the point where they are now sitting at the General Assembly as a Permanent Observer. There are several neoliberal-related factors that play a role here, as I will show. These include: the increasing role of NGOs in international development, and sport's 'fit' with neoliberal ideologies. Firstly, I provide a quick overview of how neoliberal policies have affected the UN — which opened up the UN to collaboration with civil society organizations.

The UN organization had been struggling financially for a long time, not solely because of lack of legitimacy as described above, but also as neoliberal policies became mainstream and for-profit corporations benefited when few others did. This meant that the UN had to look to change the way in which it operated. All around it, at the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), neoliberalism became the dominant agenda. There are several factors within this rise of neoliberalism that may have influenced the UN's decision to bring on the IOC as Permanent Observer. Firstly, at the same time that neoliberal policies were making their way into the UN organization, the UN began opening itself up to partnering with civil society organizations. In the neoliberal context this made sense. The UN had little money and required support and expertise from elsewhere in order to survive. The number of NGOs partnering and consulting with UN organizations grew dramatically over the last 20 years and this may have played a role in opening the UN up to working with a civil society organization like the IOC.

Furthermore, it may have been the neoliberal context that made the IOC particularly appealing compared to other organizations, not least because it is extremely wealthy and led by a group of elite individuals — but also because of the focus of the organization, which is the comparatively un-contentious practice of sport. Sport is furthermore an attractive

neoliberal development tool, particularly in the way that the IOC promotes it — as having moral, individualistic values.

Impact on the UN

As an organization primarily focused on social development and not necessarily from a market economy perspective, the UN struggled in the formative years of neoliberalism. Up until the 1980s the UN was considered “the most legitimate institution of global covenants.”⁴⁸⁴ However, as the global economy began to be viewed as the most important factor in human development, the authority of the UN began to wane and other institutions such as the WTO, IMF and the World Bank (known as the Bretton Woods institutions)⁴⁸⁵ came into the forefront. At the same time, the USA was refusing to repay its debts to the UN and thus the organization was forced into a crisis of legitimacy and power.

The Bretton Woods institutions were eager proponents of neoliberal policy. Kamat explains that: “a central mandate of these institutions is to enable free market conditions, in other words, policies that strengthen trade liberalization and the private sector globally. Therefore, a prime objective of the institutions of economic governance is to ensure a good investment climate for transnational corporations.”⁴⁸⁶ These institutions differed from the UN in that they “are not representative bodies, and instead are dominated by a small group of northern ministers, academics and consultants.”⁴⁸⁷ This meant that representatives of western countries that have been some of the biggest supporters of neoliberal policy could enact these policies with little institutional challenge from voices of the non-western world. It was in this

⁴⁸⁴ Kamat, “The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a Neoliberal Era.” p. 163

⁴⁸⁵ The IMF and WB were set up in 1944 at an international meeting of 43 countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA. The WTO was set up in the early 1990s. These institutions were intended to encourage global economic cooperation and to help re-build a shattered post-war economy.

⁴⁸⁶ Kamat, “The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a Neoliberal Era.” p. 164.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 163.

climate that the UN began to turn to transnational corporations and NGOs to aid in their work and help achieve their peace and development goals.

The willingness of the UN to begin to engage with civil society actors has often been promoted as a positive move from the viewpoint of those involved in enhancing global human rights. However, it is important to point out that these actions came about from the pressures of a neoliberal world. The UN was struggling to maintain its finances, as were other governmental initiatives all over the world that were dedicated to promoting the social and economic welfare of their citizens. While the UN Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, stated that the UN turned to civil society organizations because they were interested in listening to the voice of global citizens⁴⁸⁸ — the truth is that much of the incentive came from the fact that the UN could no longer achieve much of its mandate, as it was nearly bankrupt. This interest in creating partnerships between public and private institutions is a neoliberal development and something we have seen increasingly at all levels of governance around the world. Furthermore, the immense growth in the number of NGOs can also be linked to neoliberal developments and something that has enabled the increase in private-public partnerships. This is explained in more detail in the next section.

Privatization and Increasing Role of NGOs in Development.

The number of NGOs in development doing development-related work around the world has increased immensely in the last three decades.⁴⁸⁹ This has largely been the result of

⁴⁸⁸ United Nations, "Global networks 'the most promising partnerships of our global age', Secretary-General tells fifty-third annual DPI/NGO conference," *Press Release*, (28 August 2000), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000828.sgsm7517.doc.html>.

⁴⁸⁹ Peter Willetts, *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance* (London: Routledge, 2010).

globalization⁴⁹⁰ and of neoliberal cutbacks to social provisions traditionally provided by the state.⁴⁹¹ NGOs have often stepped up into the void left by governments in attempts to minimize the negative impacts to individuals and communities. While many view NGOs as a positive reaction to decreasing government assistance — academics have pointed out the role that they have played (often unwittingly) in the privatization of these social provisions, thus further supporting neoliberal policy.⁴⁹² Furthermore, it would be naïve to believe that all NGOs have altruistic goals in mind. Their goals are sometimes unclear, they tend to be western-led, undemocratic, and are financially unaccountable to anyone but their donors. Harvey has called NGOs the ‘Trojan Horse’ of neoliberal policy — in that, NGOs have “in some instances...helped accelerate further state withdrawal from social provision.”⁴⁹³ The UN has responded to this increasing role of NGOs by encouraging collaboration between private sector and governments, further privatizing the development sector.⁴⁹⁴

At the UN, NGOs would normally be encouraged to apply for consultative status at the ECOSOC. If accepted, they are ranked into three categories depending on their status and expertise, which affects their opportunities for participation. When Kofi Annan became the Secretary-General in 1997, he began a campaign to increase the involvement of both civil society and the private sector in UN organizing. There are now hundreds of NGOs that hold some level of consultative status at the ECOSOC.

The increased number of NGOs at the UN is appealing to the UN for several reasons. First, it enables the UN to expand their activities without wholly having to rely on their own

⁴⁹⁰ Karsten Nowrot, “Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations under International Law,” *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 6, no. 2 (1999): 579–645.

⁴⁹¹ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ David Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism* (Verso, 2006). p. 52.

⁴⁹⁴ John Gerard Ruggie, “United Nations and Globalization: Patterns and Limits of Institutional Adaptation, The,” *Global Governance* 9 (2003).

limited funds. Second, it ensures that those NGOs associated with the UN focus their capacities on achieving goals decided on by the UN (e.g. The MDGs). Finally, inviting NGOs on as consultants could be viewed as a legitimating strategy for the UN to obtain democratic credentials.⁴⁹⁵

Encouraging partnerships with NGOs could be viewed as a positive move, in that the UN was now ostensibly interested in collaborating with civil society organizations. However, it is important to point out that the term NGO (and civil society organizations) was coined by the UN to describe all organizations that are not linked to governments. This includes charity and non-profit organizations as well as multinational corporations that operate for profit. This has caused much controversy as the organization dedicated towards international human rights opened itself up to collaborating with organizations who had accruing profit as their bottom line.

In this economic and political climate one can begin to understand how the IOC may be viewed as appealing to the UN. The IOC has achieved a certain moral authority that many other multinational corporations do not have access to through their stated ideals of Olympism and links to peace. Unlike many humanitarian not-for-profits they are wealthy and importantly they do not have controversial (i.e. marginal) opinions about political issues — that is to say the IOC does not critique the status quo. Furthermore, it can be argued that sport itself presents a development tool that is conducive to neoliberal ways of thinking.

Sport and Neoliberalism

It is within this neoliberal context that the UN began to unabashedly embrace sport as a tool for peace and development. In the early 2000s, the UN created a policy document

⁴⁹⁵ Jens Steffek and Maria Paola Ferretti, "Accountability or 'Good Decisions'? The Competing Goals of Civil Society Participation in International Governance," *Global Society* 23, no. 1 (January 7, 2009): 37–57. p. 38.

examining the ways in which sport would aid in achieving the MDGs. In 2001, the UN Secretary-General appointed a special advisor on Sport for Development and Peace (SDP), and subsequently a UN office on SDP was created, with offices both in Geneva and New York. There has also been a proliferation of conferences, resolutions, reports, and calls of action made by the UN, often in collaboration with the IOC and coinciding with an Olympic Games to promote sport as a tool for development and peace.

I argue in this section that sport presents an appealing development aid that supports neoliberal ideologies, but at the same time also appeals to those seeking alternative development approaches that are focused on social change. In turn, I suggest that we can see in these developments some of the reasons why the IOC, and sport in general, is now so wholeheartedly welcomed into the UN family.

Sporting ideologies, including those associated with the Olympic Games, are closely linked to the ideals promoted by neoliberalism, such as individualism and competition. Sport has long focused on the importance of individual responsibility and the disciplining of the body. Sports scholars who have examined this through a Foucauldian lens have explained how these discursive activities can serve as devices of biopower: a way of controlling the populace through bodily discipline.⁴⁹⁶ Biopower as explained by Hardt and Negri is central to neoliberal globalization and ‘Empire’, the new political order.⁴⁹⁷

Neoliberal ideologies link personal responsibility, such as the disciplining of the ‘fit’ and ‘healthy’ body, with morality. A moral person is someone who engages in ‘self-care’, who provides for their own needs and ambitions and does not require interference from the

⁴⁹⁶ Markula and Pringle, *Foucault, Sport and Exercise: Power, Knowledge and Transforming the Self*.

⁴⁹⁷ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Harvard University Press, 2009).

state.⁴⁹⁸ The Olympic Games represent the epitome of these ideals, where the fit body has been intertwined with moral concepts of peace, universalism, and humanity. The Olympics are associated with the idea that individual success can be attained through the disciplining of one's body in an appropriate manner. The sport arena thus could be viewed as a space in which bodies are disciplined to adapt to these neoliberal ideals.

Moreover, sport is often viewed as an educational tool — that can be useful for teaching individuals how to persevere, work hard, and compete with one another. It is also commonly argued that sport can enhance one's self-confidence and encourage positive social interactions.⁴⁹⁹ Importantly, and as authors like Redeker suggest what sport does not do is encourage in-depth critical examination of the broader social injustices and does not offer tools to engage in radical social change.⁵⁰⁰ Hoberman argues that “sport is the greatest ‘pacifier’ there is. The function of sport, then, is to lower the socio-political temperature while raising the psychic temperature of the sportsman, when this is appropriate.”⁵⁰¹ Sport fits with the status quo and rarely questions hegemonic ideologies,⁵⁰² especially Olympic conceptions of sport. This may make sport an appealing development tool for those perpetuating dominant ideologies. The ongoing myth of sport as ‘neutral’ is associated with this application of SDP.

The IOC and the Olympic Games have for a long time promoted sport as universal and as above politics. With this in mind, openly expressed political opinions and critiques are considered unacceptable at an Olympic Games. For example, two African American athletes

⁴⁹⁸ Wendy Brown, *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2009).

⁴⁹⁹ United Nations Office of Sport for Development and Peace, “Contribution of Sport to the Millennium Development Goals,” 2010.

⁵⁰⁰ Redeker, “Sport as an Opiate of International Relations: The Myth and Illusion of Sport as a Tool of Foreign Diplomacy.”

⁵⁰¹ Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral Order*. p. 34.

⁵⁰² Darnell, “Power, Politics and ‘Sport for Development and Peace’: Investigating the Utility of Sport for International Development.”

who were involved in the now famous black power salute during a medal ceremony at the 1968 Olympic Games were forced to leave the Games at the request of the IOC president.⁵⁰³ More recently a South Korean male soccer player was denied his medal at the 2012 London Olympics for displaying a political sign during a soccer match.⁵⁰⁴ This idea of Olympic sport as an arena outside of politics is purely mythical. Despite this, it has influenced the way in which people view sport and the Olympic Games. The IOC works diligently not to engage in political discourse or adopt political stances. By not taking any overt political or moral stances the IOC does not present a threat to any nation state. It is paradoxical, however it seems that the IOC's apolitical agenda may have supported them to gain them Permanent Observer status, a position that affords them international political influence.

The functions described above identify some of the ways in which the neoliberal ideologies reflected by the IOC and the Olympic Games may have made the IOC a more appealing candidate for Permanent Observer status. However, neoliberalism cannot account for all of the actions taken by the IOC and the UN in their partnership. For example, and while neoliberal theorizing assists in understanding some of the appeal of the IOC to the UN, it does not fully explain how it came to be that this specific NGO was invited and accepted by the majority of Member States to sit as a Permanent Observer; a position that is officially blocked to organizations that are not intergovernmental in any way.

Conclusion

The findings in this chapter reveal how the broader political and economic context may have influenced the hegemony of the IOC and how it is perceived by organizations such

⁵⁰³ Douglas Hartmann, *Race, Culture, and the Revolt of the Black Athlete: The 1968 Olympic Protests and Their Aftermath* (University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁵⁰⁴ Andrew Das, "South Korean denied medal over politics," *New York Times*, (11 August 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/sports/olympics/southkorean-soccer-player-park-jong-soo-denied-medal-over-politics.html>.

as the UN. The political ideology of neoliberalism clearly has an impact on the way the UN is organizing. This has meant that organizations such as the IOC, and popular phenomena such as sport, do become appealing (albeit surprising) allies. The next chapter engages in a theoretical discussion of the findings of the previous four chapters and also delves deeper into looking at what makes the IOC an attractive partner to the UN.

CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSING THE RELATIONS OF RULING: IOC, UN AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

In this chapter I develop a theoretical discussion of the findings of the previous four chapters. This is where I turn to theorists who have critically examined power and relations of ruling to assist in my examination of the role of the IOC and the UN. In particular, I have utilized Foucault's discussions of power and discourse and Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and ideology. This is also where I refer back to Smith's methodological discussions about textually-mediated relations of ruling. This theoretical analysis aims to bring more insight into how and why the IOC has obtained and maintained hegemonic power throughout its history, and more specifically, how and why they are viewed as an organization worthy of a seat at the UN General Assembly. This chapter also discusses what is revealing about this decision in the broader political international development context.

The Ruling Relations of the IOC

As I began research into the ruling relations of the IOC and the UN, I had questions about what and who helped to make the decisions that ultimately assisted the IOC to obtain the Permanent Observer seat at the UN General Assembly. In order to answer these questions IE insists that the researcher examines the broader context to gain an understanding of how the ruling relations operate and to help think about why and how things happen the way that they do. Through examining historical texts from the IOC archives I found that decisions were often being made in response to the IOC feeling threatened that the organization was losing power over global sport. For example, the IOC announced itself as a leader in the 'sport for all' movement in the 1970s as a strategic move to keep other organizations such as UNESCO at arm's length. Understanding why and how these types of decisions are made is important and reveals that the IOC was more concerned with upholding the ruling relations

rather than actually promoting the sport for all concept.

There was very rarely even a mention of who would be impacted by this focus on ‘sport for all’, in fact (despite the attractive moniker suggesting otherwise), there were simply no discussions about what this new focus would actually mean to the everyday lives of people around the world. Even looking more generally, the focus of the conversations in the IOC Minutes and in personal correspondence was consistently about how the IOC could maintain its dominance over global sport, through legal, organizational and/or any other means. Any discussion about the impact of the Olympic Games on everyday lives remained abstracted to adhere to the IOC’s ultimate goal of maintaining hegemonic power. This can be seen in the South African decision, in the sport for all decision and also in the decision to provide NOCs and ISFs more voting power within the IOC. By examining these decisions and how they came to be we can begin to see a pattern, where the IOC seems simply to be concerned with power-broking, and the bid to get a seat at the UN General Assembly should be viewed within this context.

I drew on Dorothy Smith’s methodological and theoretical arguments to help me in questioning the taken-for-granted assumptions that we hold around the IOC, the UN and sport in general. The IOC’s role as Permanent Observer could be viewed as ‘common-sense’ if we accept their role in international development and their leadership in global sport. However, once we begin to unravel and question the organization itself and what it represents we can begin to ask questions about what have we had to accept or ignore in order to enable the IOC to get to this point.

The findings suggest that having the IOC represent global sport at the UN is a win for the IOC but perhaps should not be seen as a win for sport around the globe more generally. SDP researchers have already highlighted the potential implications of SDP that upholds

hegemonic western ideologies and this situation presents similar problems. In order to understand how the IOC has come to be so widely accepted and perhaps taken-for-granted I turn to Foucault and Gramscian theorizing of power in the next part of this chapter.

The IOC and its Discursive Strategies

As discussed in chapter two, Foucault developed a notion of power that is fundamentally different to Marxist or Gramscian understandings of power. Foucault argued that power is not something that some people have and others do not. Rather, power is considered to be everywhere and a diffuse part of the social fabric. In Foucault's theorizing, power is seen as a productive force. He argues that groups and individuals become influential because of different ways in which they utilize discourses.⁵⁰⁵ Discourses are defined as "a group of statements [that] define the practices that people engage in everyday life."⁵⁰⁶ These discursive practices form knowledge, which then acts as a form of influence over others.

My findings reveal that the IOC and its supporters engaged in various discursive practices at different points of time throughout history that assisted the organization to obtain and maintain authority over global sport. For example, one of the most well known discourses mobilized by the IOC pertains to the concept of Olympism: the idea that the Olympic Games and Olympic sport promotes positive moral values and global peace. Promoting sport as a moral institution did not begin with de Coubertin, nor is it limited to discussions about the Olympic Games. However, de Coubertin and subsequent promoters of the IOC and the Olympic Games have relied on this discourse, what one might call 'the philosophy of Olympism', to create their legacies and to ensure the ongoing success of the Olympic system. Despite many critiques that suggest the link between Olympic sport and

⁵⁰⁵ Markula and Pringle, *Foucault, Sport and Exercise: Power, Knowledge and Transforming the Self*.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 52.

morality is unfounded, this discourse still dominates thinking around the Olympics and the organization that controls it. My findings reveal that this discourse is one that is diligently and continuously shaped and promoted by the IOC, presumably in a bid to ensure its hegemonic position.

These discourses have become so normalized that they arguably have become what Foucault termed a ‘regime of truth’, which is to say that as a society we accept these discourses that link the Olympics to promoting moral values as true and we constantly engage in actions that make the discourse function as the truth. From a Foucauldian perspective, one could argue that this discourse maintains its dominance through the active engagement with it, not just by the IOC, but also by the general public, including the writing of this dissertation. In order to actively question and critique this discourse I have had to accept the power behind it. This can be seen in the ways in which the majority of sport sociologists have critiqued the IOC, who for the most part, tend to accept the discourse of Olympism to criticize the ways in which the IOC adopts the discourse. While of course we need to examine and critique the disconnect between the concept of Olympism and the organization of the IOC — but at the same time — we need to give ourselves the room to critique and/or question the use of the discourse in the first place.

The IOC’s promotion of the Olympics and Olympic sport as moral and as an important moral educator in our society has arguably enabled the IOC to obtain power and give sport as a social institution access to facets of our society that may otherwise be inaccessible to sport or commercial organizations more generally. The discourse of sport, and of Olympism more specifically, as being linked to promoting moral behaviour and peace has become so hegemonic that many audiences — like the UN — willingly ignore any evidence that suggests otherwise.

In chapter six, the findings demonstrated the ways in which the IOC diligently attempted to obtain legitimacy in many different ways – not just by announcing itself as a moral institution, but also through legitimating legal and organizational practices. These are important to consider here, as these legitimating practices further normalize the IOC's institutional authority and hegemonic power. Foucault argued that knowledge (which is derived through the development of discourses) that is linked to power assumes an authority of 'truth' and has the power to make itself true. This theorizing of power and of knowledge helps to explain how all of these legitimating practices play a role in ensuring the IOC has maintained its hegemonic position despite many critiques of the organization.

The success of this discourse, as revealed in chapter six in the discussion of the power behind the concept of Olympism has enabled the IOC to control discussions about the Olympic Games. The idea here is that the IOC is already presumed to be a moral and legitimate institution and all discussions that either promote or critique the organization are based off of this acceptance. This is an important point to consider when asking questions about how the IOC was able to obtain a seat at the UN General Assembly. It is arguable that the discourse around Olympism as a peace promoting force and as a moral instrument has enabled the IOC to be viewed as a legitimate organization, worthy of a UN Permanent Observer seat. Without this discourse and the power emanating from it, the IOC would simply be a sporting organization with many commercial ties. Most likely this would not have been enough to promote it to such an unusual position within the UN General Assembly.

While this theorizing helps to explain how the IOC is able to continue to utilize a discourse that arguably has limited ties to the Olympic Games, it still cannot fully explain why this has enabled the IOC, a sporting institution, to achieve a status that many other

organizations (that promote similar morally valuable discourses) have not been able to achieve, and it is here I turn to the idea of the ‘sporting society’.

Hegemony and the ‘Sporting Society’

Levy and Egan suggest that Gramsci’s most significant insight was that “hegemony rests on a broad base of consent...”⁵⁰⁷ not simply on the coercive control of a small base of the elite. This is relevant to discussions about the IOC and the Olympic Games as the IOC struggled to obtain this type of control and power simply through coercion of ‘the masses’. But the fact is that sport is already a popular cultural artifact all around the globe. Individuals from the most marginalized communities participate in sporting activities as do individuals from the most elite echelons of our society. In other words, the IOC and Olympic Games aside, the popularity of sport already holds hegemonic status in our modern world and it is already accepted as a legitimate cultural pastime. The IOC benefits from this hegemonic status of sport and its hegemonic struggle lies with (as explained before) promoting Olympic sport and its values as being morally superior.

The results of this dissertation demonstrated that the IOC has become involved in global politics, social justice issues, and international development in order to remain or become relevant — I want to suggest, moreover, that perhaps one of the reasons critique of the role of the IOC on these issues has remained limited is because we benefit from it ourselves. This is where we can see the ways in which power acts in productive ways — as a sports-mad society, we do not want sport to become irrelevant. Redeker compares sport to the role of religion in modern society; he argues that sport parodies religion, however, it does

⁵⁰⁷ David L. Levy and Daniel Egan, “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Corporate Political Strategy: Conflict and Accommodation in the Climate Change Negotiations,” *Journal of Management Studies* 40, no. 4 (June 2003): 803–829. p. 805.

not provide for any “spiritual or intellectual message.”⁵⁰⁸ While I agree with Redeker that the popularity of global sport could be described as similar to the status of religion, I do not agree that sport does not provide a message. This dissertation has revealed that the IOC has worked tirelessly to create a message, to develop a purpose for sport, beyond what happens on the field or court. Arguably, the message of Olympism, moral values, humanity and peace are what make the Olympics so well received. Similar to religion, global sporting institutions (in this case the IOC) rely on this message to keep sport relevant.

A Foucauldian analysis would reject the idea that power is exerted from one direction, but rather, argues that power is a productive force that is present everywhere. Context and history becomes incredibly important when adopting this analytical approach. When using this approach one is not content with examining the IOC, alone, as a powerful institution exerting its hegemony over others. Rather, I argue here that there is something about the context within which the IOC operates that works to produce and reproduce the hegemonic power that the IOC is able to exert. This context involves neoliberal, consumerist, capitalist, sporting ideologies that have assisted in producing the IOC empire we see today.

I am arguing here that the IOC’s promotion of the discourse of the Olympics as a moral institution is perhaps so readily taken up by others because of our own desires to have sport be a morally useful concept. This is especially important in our neoliberal society, where activities tend to be measured against their productive social value. When things in our lives are calculated for productivity and relevancy, it is no longer enough to have sport be considered simply as a leisure activity — we want it to mean more. Cremin terms this idea, the ‘Culture of Crisis Industry’ (COCI) which he explains: “evokes and manipulates

⁵⁰⁸ Redeker, “Sport as an Opiate of International Relations: The Myth and Illusion of Sport as a Tool of Foreign Diplomacy.” p. 495.

anxieties about economy and ecology for the purpose of selling products and services with ethical and ecological signifiers.”⁵⁰⁹ An example Cremin used to explain this idea was the increasingly popular practice of linking art to causes of social justice, where art could now be justified through its seeming links with helping socially excluded individuals and the “trickier issue of justifying art according to its intrinsic merits could be avoided.”⁵¹⁰ I argue that we are seeing a similar situation with these increasingly noble claims that link sport with helping people out of poverty (for example), which then enable us to ignore the perhaps more pressing questions of: why are people living in poverty in the first place, and also, why does sport play such a large role in our society?

In this sense, the IOC is not alone in its desire for sport to stay relevant and legitimate, the IOC holds control over a cultural activity that much of the globe has a vested interest in. While the specific focus on Olympic sport may not be ideal for all, the IOC’s diligent work on promoting sport as a useful tool to aid international development does assist in maintaining hegemonic dominance of sport more generally in a neoliberal climate. Perhaps that is why, rather than questioning why the IOC is sitting at the UN General Assembly in the first place, we are more likely to turn our focus to what more the IOC should and could be doing to ensure continued global dominance of sport.

It is perhaps ironic, but the findings suggest that critiques of the IOC and of the Olympic event look to have increased the authority of the IOC. In many ways the IOC successfully integrated the language utilized in critiques to further their own cause. This is described in more detail in the following section, where I discuss the idea of the IOC’s successful post-political agenda, in which they adopt progressive ideologies in ways that

⁵⁰⁹ Colin Cremin, “The Social Logic of Late Capitalism: Guilt Fetishism and the Culture of Crisis Industry,” *Cultural Sociology* 6, no. 1 (December 14, 2011): 45–60. p. 46.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid, p. 52.

work to maintain their dominance on the world stage.

Post-Politics and the IOC's Dominance

The IOC's consistent responses to the critiques of the organization effectively de-politicized them by acknowledging them and 'appeasing' the critics, but not engaging with them. Žižek coined the term 'post-politics' to describe this process of de-politicization.⁵¹¹ This occurs throughout politics where an issue is acknowledged by those with power, and is not politically engaged with to create change, but rather is used to uphold current power relations. It works to create the façade that an issue is important and being dealt with, without actually having to create political change. If we take a look at the issue of apartheid in South Africa again, when in 1980 the IOC proudly announced its role in denouncing apartheid. The IOC's focus on South Africa's apartheid policies suggested that the IOC promoted diversity and did not tolerate racial discrimination in any form. They referred back to the *Olympic Charter* often to reiterate its commitment to this matter. What these statements managed to ignore — by focusing on South Africa as a singular issue — was the fact that racial discrimination is a broader universal problem that occurs in many countries that participate at the Olympic Games. It also managed to ignore the fact that no black Africans had voting rights at the IOC at that time. The IOC found a way to maintain hegemonic authority whilst at the same time controlling critics who were pushing for revolutionary change.

Similarly, the IOC's venture into the 'sport for all' ideology could also be explained using the lens of post-politics. Throughout the 1970s, UNESCO was becoming increasingly critical of the elitist Olympic Games and began engaging with sport through its own policies around education and the idea of a right to play for all. When the IOC recognized this as a

⁵¹¹ Slavoj Žižek, "Against the Populist Temptation," *Critical Inquiry* 32, no. spring (2006): 551–74.

threat to its authority it announced that the IOC now too was a leader in this area. While this may have encouraged the IOC to, for example, give more funding to NOCs of poorer countries, there was no change to the elitist sporting system that the organization had been built upon. This again demonstrates the use of this post-political agenda, where the IOC looked to adopt (or coopt) the critical voices — attempting to create change around them — for its own benefit.

This post-political agenda looks to have become a useful technique for the IOC to obtain more and more authority in different areas. Once you begin to examine the IOC's responses to critiques (of the organization) throughout history you begin to see the pattern that might help explain why the IOC has become so involved in international development and peace initiatives. The IOC's foray into this area is often described as a 'natural fit' linked to Olympic ideals. However, the findings in this document reveal another explanation that aligns more closely with the IOC's desire for power and authority over others.

It seems that whenever the IOC's hegemony came under threat — from either critics of the IOC or others who adopted an alternative approach to sport — that the IOC would begin to seek broader consent by acknowledging the very discourse that they were being criticized with. So, rather than succumbing to the critiques, the IOC managed to adopt them and announce them as part of the Olympic agenda. In this sense, the IOC has been successful in their aims to maintain and obtain hegemonic authority over global sport, to the point where the critiques of the organization are now intertwined with the idea of what the Olympics 'is'.

This theorizing might help to explain why the IOC was considered an appropriate organization for a Permanent Observer seat at the UN General Assembly. The IOC's success in linking its organization to discourses around human rights and moral values must be

appealing to the UN, an organization that attempts to do the exact same thing. While one might argue that the UN — as an international development organization — has far greater legitimacy in this area than the IOC does, chapter seven in this document demonstrated that the UN has struggled with this legitimacy over the past 30 years. At a time when the UN is no longer able to achieve all of its objectives, specifically in the neoliberal climate, this legitimacy is something that needs constant attention. Arguably, the UN itself engages with the post-political agenda, to appease its constituents and in attempts to demonstrate that it still remains a relevant and important organization that is committed to peace and equitable development. In this context, the IOC is an appealing organization to have as an ally, one that does not disrupt the status quo, nor attempt to push for revolutionary change. But at the same time, one that looks to be engaging with similar goals as the UN and thus could assist with legitimacy building.

As demonstrated in chapter seven, sport arguably provides the ideal post-political tool to help achieve UN goals. It is uplifting and popular, and at the same time works to depoliticize and pacify. It provides the perfect morally appropriate image of a child in poverty, smiling with her new piece of sporting equipment, all the while allowing the broader contextual environment to be ignored. The choice of the IOC as a Permanent Observer reveals a lot about the UN's priorities and values. And perhaps, this choice was not as surprising as I had originally suspected, but rather part of a broader structural process of the neoliberalization of international development.

In my final chapter I summarize my findings and analyses and begin to look ahead at how we can build on this research and continue to critically examine the role of sport and of the IOC within global international development.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

I had several purposes in mind in writing this dissertation, but first and foremost I wanted to begin a dialogue that critically examined the growing role of the IOC at the UN. I had come across a number of academic articles and books that had critically examined the IOC as an organization — that had questioned its links to peace and morality, and critiqued its role in promoting sport and physical education. However, when engaging in this research, I realized that very few researchers had taken note of, let alone examined the role of the IOC as Permanent Observer at the UN General Assembly, nor its growing partnership with the UN in other areas. What struck me most about the IOC's appointment as Permanent Observer was the fact that this was a position that was made available to a very small number of NGOs — usually under the caveat that these NGOs had strong ties to governments, and provided important expertise to the UN's international development agenda. I was intrigued, that in amongst all of the important research being done that had questioned the IOC's commitment to human rights, that the IOC could still be appointed to a unique and powerful position at an international institution that works to uphold and promote these human rights.

In this final chapter I examine some of the implications of my findings. In doing so, I refer back to my original research questions and also reflect on some of the methodological and theoretical approaches that I utilized throughout my research. Following on from that I discuss some of the limitations of this research and my recommendations for future research that builds on this dissertation and hopefully continue the dialogue that I have begun.

Implications of Findings

My main overarching research goal was to investigate how and why the IOC obtained Permanent Observer status at the UN General Assembly. To aid in addressing this question I

also aimed to examine how the UN has engaged with sport and the IOC in the past and in what contexts, why and how the UN is currently engaging with sport and with the IOC, and how the partnership with the IOC came about. My final research question was examining the potential future implications of this decision to bring the IOC on as a Permanent Observer at the General Assembly.

I adopted a qualitative methodological approach to answer my research questions. It is here that I pulled from concepts of IE to develop my methodology further. My goal was to examine in detail how and why certain decisions were made by the IOC and by the UN in order to uncover the power relations embedded within them. As the presence of the IOC at the UN has become normalized and justified through press releases, conferences, agreements and photo opportunities, this type of approach — of intense text-based research — was considered incredibly important to the study. It was my goal to examine the ways in which the IOC made decisions throughout its history in a bid to obtain a more in-depth understanding of how they came to be involved with the UN.

It was my aim to utilize parts of IE that specifically highlighted the importance of examining how certain discourses are created through texts that are then used to promote certain claims to truth. For example, a major focus in my research was to examine 50 years of the IOC's decision-making, found in the IOC meeting Minutes that I collected at the IOC Archives in Lausanne, Switzerland. While from previous research I knew of many of the decisions that had been made by the IOC at different points in time (and had also read critical analysis of some of these decisions), the process of the way in which the IOC made these decisions had remained unclear. Using some of the techniques outlined by IE researchers, such as bringing text to the forefront of the study, I was able to focus on looking at how certain decisions got made and why.

This process of decision-making became important to this research as I began to uncover more information about how the IOC and the UN came to partner with one another. This is how I began to notice patterns in the reasoning that the IOC gave when discussing the relationship with the UN and its affiliated organizations. While the partnership now seems to be positive and mutual, examining the history makes it clear that the IOC was not always willing to interact with the UN or its affiliated organizations for fear that they would lose control over the organization of the Olympic Games.

The findings demonstrated that there were several turning points throughout the IOC's history that influenced their decisions to interact with the UN. The IOC is very protective of its autonomy and for a long time considered any association with overt political organizations as something that should be avoided at all costs. However, eventually, in order to maintain its autonomy and power over the Olympic Games, the IOC was forced, at various points in time to collaborate with UN organizations and to make some changes to their own organizing practices. While the tactics of the IOC changed throughout the years, I found that what motivated their decision-making remained the same — which was obtaining and maintaining hegemonic power over international sport.

Throughout the analysis of the texts it became clear that the IOC adopted various impression management techniques to present the organization and the Olympic Games in a certain manner. In particular, by associating the IOC and the Olympic Movement with discourses around moral values, the IOC seems to have normalized this linkage — despite the fact that a number of well-known researchers have disputed this discourse. Arguably, leaders in the international development community do know about the IOC's questionable practices and its questionable role in promoting human rights and global equitable development. However, these alternative knowledges of the IOC continue to be drowned out

by this popularized rhetoric that has been relentlessly promoted by the IOC itself.

Throughout the data collection and analysis period it became clear that this claim to moral authority was one that the IOC has become quite reliant upon. While I may have questioned the role of the IOC as Permanent Observer at the UN General Assembly because of its seemingly lack of expertise on issues of equitable global development, the IOC itself continues to work to convince those with power that they have authority in this area. Looking back throughout the IOC's history one can begin to see how this tactic has been utilized to combat critique of the IOC and the Olympic Games as chauvinistic, discriminatory, and elitist. For example, I explained in the second findings chapter how the IOC managed to frame the issue of South Africa and apartheid in a way that made it seem like the IOC was a leader against discrimination, when in actual fact the IOC had been very reluctant to get involved in making changes to South Africa's involvement in the Olympic Games when this issue first became evident in the 1960s.

I found that similar techniques were utilized by the IOC in order to obtain increasing legal and organizational authority over international sport. This has been achieved through the creation of the CAS, special legal status from the Swiss government, and through various applications to protect its symbol and emblems. These rights, conferred upon the IOC, can be compounded with its undemocratic and elitist-organizing structure to explain the IOC as the extremely powerful organization that it is. It has come to the point where nearly all organized sport (nationally and internationally) is controlled by the IOC in some way or another, via IOC rules and policies that have been adopted by hundreds of sporting organizations around the world.

This control and power has undoubtedly had an impact on the way others view the IOC and the Olympic Movement. In chapter three I found that many of the characteristics

and actions of the IOC mimic that of a government of a sovereign nation. This is seen in their demand for unique legal status and control over their constituents. These structures that the IOC has created are presented as natural and necessary for the ‘protection’ of the Olympic Movement. It has resulted in an immense amount of control, which is difficult to change, as, unlike many other sovereign state governments, the IOC is not accountable to anyone but itself. Again, unlike other governments the IOC is not bound by sovereign limits, it promotes its ideals as universal and uncontestable.

While the IOC’s commitment to human rights and global equitable development may be questioned, there are many other characteristics that have been identified that perhaps make the IOC an appealing partner to the UN. It holds control over international sport, it presents itself as a universal and moral organization, it is wealthy and importantly its members are made up of powerful elite individuals who are well connected to national governments and multinational corporations. The IOC does not present a challenge or threat to the UN in ways that many other NGOs perhaps would.⁵¹² While this type of organization may seem antithetical to the UN’s goals, it is important to acknowledge that the UN is made up of many different Member States from around the world that have very differing perspectives on human rights and international development. This means that rarely does an organization get through to the inner circle of the UN unless it is not considered a threat to the authority of any of the most powerful Member States.

The context surround the UN is incredibly important in examining how the IOC came to be viewed as a useful partner to UN institutions and then eventually how the IOC could be viewed as an appropriate candidate for Permanent Observer status. In examining the political economic context of the UN one issue became exceedingly clear, that the UN has been

⁵¹² Such as challenging the hegemonic power relations at the UN for example.

struggling to maintain its authority and legitimacy as the leading institution in international development. The struggles of authority and legitimacy were compounded by actions of its constituents, some of whom refused to pay their dues, but one of the greatest underlying issues that cannot be ignored is the role of neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism has influenced the way in which the UN operates and how it views success in international development. The UN can no longer realistically survive without the assistance of what the UN has named civil society organizations. While the UN has stated that the reason for the increase in interactions with civil society organizations is because of the UN's interest in becoming more democratic; the reality appears to be that many of these partnerships have been formed out of necessity. This acknowledgement of civil society surely assisted the IOC in developing partnerships with UN organizations.

Furthermore, the IOC fits in nicely with neoliberal ideals – and could itself be described as a neoliberal organization – in that unlike many other non-profit NGOs, this organization was not borne out of grassroots origins; rather it is and has always been governed by elite individuals. The IOC also purports to represent a non-political agenda and rather adamantly argues that sport and the Olympic Movement is strictly apolitical. In this sense, the IOC does not present a threat to any of the Member States sitting at the UN General Assembly as it does not propose to critique certain political or humanitarian ideologies, nor does it argue for certain alternative ideologies that many humanitarian and international development NGOs often do.

The IOC's role in international sport also looks to have helped the organization to obtain Permanent Observer status. When we consider how popular the Olympic Games are around the world we can begin to see that the IOC holds control over an incredibly appealing marketable commodity. The UN has struggled for legitimacy over the past 30 years and

perhaps partnering with an organization that organizes one of the most popular events in the world may have been viewed as a way to become appealing to global citizens. Sport arguably provides a positive respite to those concerned about humanitarian crises and the state of international development. In chapter eight I also wrote about the ways in which sport itself could be viewed as a neoliberal development tool.

Sporting values often reflect values of neoliberalism, such as individual responsibility, competition, and self-discipline of the body. I argue here that sport should be seen as both a reflection and an instrument of neoliberal ideology. Sport as a development tool is cheap and does not encourage questioning of broader political issues that resulted in the need for these development agendas in the first place. Taking into account all of these different factors one can begin to see how the IOC may have been appealing to the UN, and also why the UN may have been appealing to the IOC. I argue that the IOC did not obtain Permanent Observer status because of its expertise in the area of international development, rather, I argue that the IOC has managed to obtain this status for reasons that are more linked to its perceived role as an elite and powerful organization that controls global sport.

In the previous chapter I brought together the findings and engaged in a theoretical discussion to help explain how the IOC became such a hegemonic power and what assisted it to obtain Permanent Observer status. This theoretical examination further questions the findings and how they relate to the IOC's position as a participant at the UN General Assembly. While both IOC and UN leaders have described the partnership as 'natural', this chapter unveils an alternative explanation that points to a perceived necessity from both sides to maintain hegemonic power over global sport and international development.

Limitations and Future Research

While this research has been able to examine some the reasons the IOC may have obtained Permanent Observer status at the UN General Assembly, there is still much further research needed in this area. Firstly, it would be useful to examine what the IOC actually does at the UN in its role as Permanent Observer. My own research revealed some preliminary findings in that I discovered that while the IOC is provided with a permanent office at the UN New York headquarters, the IOC does not have a representative that utilizes this office. Mario Pescante resides in Italy and performs most of his duties from there. This raises questions as to how much the IOC actually participates in UN General Assemblies and why the IOC wanted this status if it was not going to make use of some of its privileges. Further research could examine more closely which General Assemblies the IOC turns up to and what debates they take part in. The IOC is also able to submit proposals and circulate documents. It would be useful to find out if the IOC has made use of these privileges at the UN.

Furthermore, while my research has covered very broadly which UN organizations the IOC held partnerships with, this research was not able to examine in detail what these partnerships entailed. For example, in these partnerships does the IOC provide funding? Does it partake in on the ground interventions on behalf of the UN? Does it have good relations with all of these organizations that they partner with? and have these organizations perhaps thought about the potential implications of partnering with an organization that might not have the same values as their organization? For example, does UNESCO question the IOC's focus on high performance elite sport? It would also be important to find out if there are actually any UN organizations that are unwilling to partner with the IOC and for what reasons.

UN affiliated organizations have in the past critiqued some of the IOC's actions and choices, it will be important to engage in research that examines whether or not the UN and its affiliated organizations still engage in this much needed critique now that the IOC sits at the General Assembly. Perhaps this position as Permanent Observer will enable the UN to put additional pressure on the IOC to change some of its current practices to align with UN values. However, this remains to be seen and it might also be just as likely that the UN will act more of a champion of the IOC.

The situation of the Permanent Observer at the UN General Assembly is also an understudied area. Little research to date has examined the role that Permanent Observer.⁵¹³ play. Willetts was able to go into some detail, however, we do not know specifically why some NGOs are able to obtain this status and why others are not.⁵¹⁴ My research has been able to uncover some of the contradictions that occur when Permanent Observer status is given and when it is not, I have also been able to problematize the decision to provide the IOC with this status. In research on the role of NGOs in international development, this Permanent Observer status looks to be an important issue to discuss. This status is currently the only access made available to non-Member States to participate in General Assembly meetings, which means that NGOs have very little access to this important area of UN decision-making. Potentially it could be argued that if the IOC was able to obtain this status, other NGOs should also be allowed to apply in the same way. There are many international NGOs that engage in important humanitarian and human rights work that do not currently have a say at this level. This situation of the IOC could be utilized to point out unfair contradictions and to put pressure on the General Assembly to become more open to NGOs.

⁵¹³ Permanent Observers have free access to most General Assembly meetings and have the right to speak at General Assemblies for example.

⁵¹⁴ Willetts, *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance*.

Concluding Remarks

This research has provided an in-depth analysis of the role of a global sporting organization at the largest international development organization. In my opinion this relationship should have been problematized in more detail before the IOC was able to obtain Permanent Observer status at the UN General Assembly. The IOC is a private, elitist and western-centric organization that is unaccountable to anyone but itself. Its actions have been critiqued and questioned by researchers and global citizens alike. Despite all of this, the IOC has managed to create an environment wherein it holds power and dominance over much of the global sporting community. It has also managed to silence its critics by engaging in constant legitimating strategies that work to convince others that the IOC's power is normal and necessary.

It remains to be seen whether the IOC's close links to the UN will have long-term impacts on the way in which national governments promote sport and physical activity policies. However — and while the IOC's ties to the UN may have initially come as a surprise (considering the IOC's historically anti-political stance) — this dissertation has demonstrated the IOC's focus in continuously expanding its power and authority. The IOC's role at the UN provides the potential for the IOC to participate in, and lead governmental discussions around population health, physical activity and sporting investments. Considering the IOC's historical actions — and its elitist, western-dominated perspectives — we should all be wary of its involvement at the UN and the potential impact this may have on the direction of governmental funding and policies.

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