THE RHETORIC IN HUMAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CASE OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

by

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, new notions on international security have arisen that suggest that the concept has evolved to include the security of individuals. However, the more traditional concept of international security as pertaining primarily to the security of states remains applicable to many current security crises. This thesis substantiates this argument by examining the international reactions to Nigeria’s Boko Haram security issue. This thesis finds that other states responded to the Boko Haram threat only when it extended beyond Nigeria to neighbouring states including Chad, Cameroun and Niger. The Boko Haram security threat was recognized as a common security threat when it began to affect Cameroun in particular. Therefore, this thesis argues that states likely respond to an existing security threat when it begins to endanger individual national territories. They acknowledge an existing security issue as a common security threat only when it extends beyond a single state into at least one foreign territory. The concept of human security in international security is therefore lacking adequate utilization during security crises and its correct application must be a strong focus within international security literature and policy.
Preface

This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, J. Ackah-Arthur.
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<td>AU</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project</td>
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<td>ANPP</td>
<td>All Nigeria Peoples Party</td>
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<td>CNARR</td>
<td>Commission Nationale d'Accueil, de Réinsertion des Réfugiés et des Rapatriés (Chad’s National Refugee Commission)</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>Global Terrorism Database</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person(s)</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
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<td>LRC</td>
<td>Luxembourg Red Cross</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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Introduction

For more than two decades, different notions on international security have emerged, suggesting that the concept has evolved to include the security of populations and not simply the security of states. The contention with the traditional view of international security is that security was perceived as pertaining exclusively to states in the Cold War era, but after the Cold War, the protection of individuals became more relevant. This thesis argues, however, that the conceptual progress on international security has not been matched by corresponding state action. It substantiates this contention by analysing international responses to the current Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria.

This thesis focuses on the following question: when does a national security issue become recognised as an international security issue? It explores when international attention is most likely to be drawn towards an identified security threat. It investigates the point at which other states recognize a common security threat, that is, the point at which they respond to an existing security threat. It argues that states mainly respond to an existing security threat when it affects more than one national territory. States, therefore, acknowledge an existing security threat as a common security threat only when it extends beyond a single state into at least one foreign territory.

Orthodox beliefs about security still hold because national governments are interested in security threats emerging within their individual borders. They remain very responsive to the security crises which threaten more than one national territory. Other arguments explaining that the international community is likely to respond to a security threat emergent within the national
system; developing into a humanitarian crisis situation; and generating significant refugee spill-overs into foreign lands are less accurate.
Conceptual Framework

This thesis focuses on international reactions to a particular security threat. Security has been defined differently by scholars (Baldwin, 1997; Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998; Goldstein, 2009; Leffler, 1990; Wolfers, 1952); basically, it is the absence of threats posing danger to the existence of referent objects. There have been, however, contested views on security at the national level and international level which have led to a shift from the traditional notion of international security to three different notions. This section proceeds by reviewing the evolution of the concept of international security from its traditional meaning into the three current notions. Each stage of the evolution is discussed in order to ascertain the implications for when states would be likely to respond to an emergent security threat if they adopted that particular view of international security. The section concludes with a brief summary of the main argument.

International security traditionally focuses on states (Haftendorn, 1991). It comprises threats to the security of states which pose challenges at levels beyond national territories (Anderson, 2012; Nasu, 2011). This means international security is about threats to individual states reaching out to other states or carried out by states towards one another. Soviet expansionism during World War II threatened the United States and led to an arms race between the two countries, creating problems of security for the two protagonists and for other states. Similarly, the current rise of terrorist groups and organizations within states are a major challenge to international security as such groups form networks which extend across many national borders and are globally linked to one another.

On this conception of international security, the state is the primary referent in the concept of security (Ayoob, 2005; Walt, 1991). Security first and foremost pertains to the state in
terms of threats to its functioning and survival. It is about the continuous existence of the state without significant threats which lead to its destruction as well as the protection of the state from the dangers that undermine such continuity. In other words, the central concept is national security, which refers to “state sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs and non-aggression” (Naidu, 2004, p. 33). It revolves around the conduct of the affairs of the state including the provisions which safeguard the performance of human activities, thus national security also pertains to the responsibilities of the state toward its inhabitants and population (Osisanya, 2015).

Correspondingly, for the proponents of this view, a national security issue is one that endangers the survival of a state or the integrity of its national territory. It consists primarily of threats emanating from components of war including military threats and the proliferation of arms (Walt, 1991, p. 213). Insurrections, rebel activities, terrorism and insurgency challenge state survival as they create chaos within the state and reduce the capacity of the state to function. Countries like Somalia and Sudan have been termed as failed states due to such recurrent civil strife and violence which seriously reduce the ability of those states to function. A national security issue therefore pertains to the abilities of the state to perform expected duties. It refers to the dangers which drastically destroy the performance of such duties and the role of the state within a territory.

Under this conception, an international security issue differs from a national security issue simply because it involves multiple states. This is because international security concerns more than one state, an indication that “the security of one state is closely linked to that of other states, at least of one other state” (Haftendorn, 1991, p. 9). It is about those threats whose scope “have inter-national, multi-national, or trans-national implications” (Anderson, 2012, p. 33).
According to the proponents of this notion of international security, any attempt to broaden the concept of security beyond threats to the state excessively expands the concept and ruins “its intellectual coherence” (Walt, 1991, p. 213). Put differently, a broadened and elastic concept of security undermines the “analytical utility” of the concept, thus, “delinking security…from the state…does no service” (Ayoob, 2005, p. 10).

This conception of international security leads to the following prediction of when an issue becomes recognised as an international security issue:

**Hypothesis 1: a national security issue is recognised as an international security issue when the security threat extends across national borders into more than one national territory.**

The threat will receive responses from other states when it is recognized as a danger to the individual security of those states. States will therefore more likely pay attention to a particular security matter which endangers their existence and security or reduces international security.

This thesis argues that states indeed react to security threats when their individual security or international security is jeopardized, but not beforehand. For example, the conflict between the Andanis and Abudus in northern Ghana that has been continuing for over a decade remains an internal security matter for the state of Ghana. As it has not spread to other national territories even though close to neighbouring Togo, there have been no state reactions. Those states close to the crisis reserve the right to take action the moment the conflict enters their territory because the crisis then threatens their existence and security. States that are geographically further removed from the crisis would also react in consideration of the maintenance and promotion of international security.
The first argument for developing the concept of international security beyond this traditional notion suggests that internal security matters emerge to disrupt security in the international system even before they cross borders. Like the traditional conception of international security, this conception is state-centric, but it argues that security issues within one state can affect the security of other states. Thus maintaining international security requires ‘‘inter-state cooperation in security issues’’ (Daase, 2010); it includes the offer of assistance to failing states and punishments to states which behave contrary to existing arrangements.

According to the proponents of this view, international security refers not only to the preservation of security of individual states but also to the preservation of the security and the stability of the international system (Daase, 2010; Palfreeman, 2004). The ‘‘community of sovereign states’’ is best protected from threats when states join collective security arrangements which offer collective assistance to each of them in the event of a foreign attack (Palfreeman, 2004, p. 6). This proposes that the international system is endangered and should recognise itself as threatened as soon as states face internal security crisis. States therefore should be proactive in responding to emergent security threats to provide the assurance of a degree of security for them.

This conception therefore suggests that states react towards a security threat even before it crosses national borders. The security threat emerges within a particular territory and affects its security but other countries provide prompt assistance and support in order to secure the environment of states. The threats to international security emerge from threats to national security; and, a security issue becomes an international security issue the moment it erupts within a national system.
The argument within this conception evolves into the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2: a national security issue is recognised as an international security issue when the security threat erupts within a national territory.**

However, there are reasons to doubt the possibility of pro-active security cooperation among states. Some states show capability in handling emergent crises while other states are less able to manage rising threats. The United States unilaterally handled the September 11 attacks in 2001 while France similarly managed the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack independently; indicating that those internal crises did not require urgent global assistance. The security situations would probably require immediate international assistance only if the state security systems cannot independently control the crisis. Moreover, the capabilities of the state in terms of countering a security threat or controlling a security crisis are subjective as there exists numerous economic, military, cultural and social standards considered as national competences. States therefore do not necessarily react to a security threat simply because it emerged within a national territory.

A second alternative to the traditional concept of international security takes issue with the view that the state is the main referent in the concept of security. The proponents of human security claim international security is best conceived as concerning the protection of people from threats that endanger them. The risks to human lives within a national territory originating from state actions (for example Libya in 2011) or state inability to offer protection and defence are therefore relevant concerns to international security.

On this conception, the focus of security has shifted from states to humans in modern times, with individuals now at the ‘forefront’ of security issues (Axworthy, 2001; Ispas, Cîrdei, & Negoescu, 2011; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). The new concept called human security
highlights the individual as a significant actor whose security is the most important end to which all other matters of state or society are subsumed (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007).

Correspondingly, this conception proposes that people are the focus in state security matters as they are vulnerable to many threats which affect their survival within the state. National security is thus the “safeguarding of a people…and way of life” (Jordan et al., 2009, p. 3). It pertains to the protection of people as well as the routine activities that are part of living. It implies the defense of people from ‘physical assault’ as their survival and livelihoods are crucial.

Nevertheless, national security as conceived by proponents of “human security” also concerns the state as its sovereignty must be preserved to ensure the effective performance of duties as “prescribed by society” (Grizold, 1994, p. 41). Many Somalis, for example, are internally displaced persons and refugees elsewhere because the instances of internal security crises have caused harms to the existence of the state of Somalia. Without a secure state, there can be no assurance for the security of that state’s citizens. Where the state is non-existent or non-functioning, protection for its people remains an illusion. Preserving the state’s “territorial integrity and upholding government's authority” (Navlakha, 2000) is thus necessary to not simply promote the existence of the state but in order to safeguard the operations and routine activities of the population.

For the advocates of human security, a national security threat is held to encompass “an action or sequence of events” drastically affecting inhabitants of the state in terms of quality of life (Ullman, 1983, p. 133). More specifically, it entails threats occurring over a certain period of time affecting individuals within the state by endangering their lives and/or drastically reducing
their living standards. This proposes that a national security issue erupts from the threats that jeopardize the security of the population within a state.

Under this conception, an international security issue differs from a national security issue as it involves a humanitarian crisis situation within a particular state that cannot or is not addressed nationally, suggesting the need for foreign assistance and support. Therefore, maintaining international security includes responding to exceptional security situations demonstrating state failure or incapacity to perform required duties towards its inhabitants (Pape, 2012; Bellamy, 2011; Woodward, 2012). It surrounds addressing those threats including mass atrocities which lead to a humanitarian crisis (Evans, 2009). Such threats remain “the world’s business” and “cannot be universally ignored” (Evans, 2009, p. 11). They are concerns warranting action by the international community should states fail in their primary responsibility to protect the population from danger (Woodward, 2012, p. 97). Humanitarian crises are thus problems which require “multifaceted, coordinated action between states” (Welling, 2007, p. 147).

This conception is summed up in the following hypothesis that:

**Hypothesis 3: a national security issue is recognised as an international security issue when the security threat generates a humanitarian crisis situation.**

The threat causes significant casualties, fatalities or deaths such that the population requires assistance from elsewhere. The international community therefore responds to the security threat in order to safeguard the affected population.

The international community should invoke the Responsibility to Protect in crisis situations only when the state demonstrates failure or inability to address the situation.
Nonetheless, it may not respond to humanitarian crises within national territories: empirically, not all such emergencies attract global attention. For example, the 100-day Rwandan genocide in 1994 which led to the deaths of about a million people did not receive significant global attention or assistance but the earthquakes that resulted in thousands of deaths and losses in Nepal and Haiti in 2015 and 2010, respectively, received such support from the international community. In all three cases, human lives and conditions supporting adequate living were destroyed but Nepal and Haiti attracted aid intervention because the harms caused to their inhabitants were acknowledged. In Rwanda’s case, international assistance was clearly needed as the government lacked the capability to tackle the crisis on its own but the international community did not react. This example illustrates the fact that threats to individuals are not always an international concern hence a humanitarian crisis is not an absolute factor to determine when states react to an existing security threat.

The third development in the concept of international security also emphasises the alternate notion that the concept of security pertains to individuals. The difference to the Responsibility to Protect conception is that this third conception focuses on the security of affected populations generated from an existing security crisis particularly refugees and asylum seekers (Bajoria, 2011; Leenders, 2008; Ngang, 2015; Toole & Waldman, 1993).

On this conception, as the international community has “waited too long” (Abramowitz & Pickering, 2008) to acknowledge dangers to the security of populations, security emergencies are frequent all over the world, leading to the establishment of such affected populations. The security emergencies create a cycle of problems in the international system as they demonstrate an “aggravating humanitarian crisis” (Leenders, 2008) culminating in problems for the affected state as well as other states. For example, the persistent conflict between the military and
Rwandan-backed rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo has resulted in an estimated 2.7 million displaced persons within the state while producing about 430,000 refugees in neighbouring states like Uganda (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], a). Similarly, the danger of violence resulting from the election dispute in Ivory Coast in 2011 produced over 100,000 refugees in Liberia (“Ivory Coast: Testimonies,” 2011).

Under this conception, it can, therefore, be inferred that security threats to human populations in one state generate human spill-over impact in other states. The threats affect a population within an individual state who eventually leave to settle beyond their countries of origin because their lives and living conditions are destroyed. Such populations who need “prompt and adequate” (Toole & Waldman, 1993) assistance from the international community because they “remain at risk,” (Bajoria, 2011) may contribute to increased burden of security within host countries. There may be potential problems of security and tensions between the locals and refugees within the host areas.

States usually remain critical about the consequences of such human spill-over effects for reasons including the impact on the economy, resources and infrastructure in host nations due to large refugee in-flows (Zetter, 2012); which lead to complications for security (Carreras, 2012). For example, in 2013 when Lebanon served as host to 445,000 Syrian refugees, there was a reduction in wages for both Lebanese workers and the Syrian refugees while housing options became limited due to the fact that available residences were full or over filled (Loveless, 2013). The burden fell on the Lebanese government to make provisions to sustain both the refugees and the estimated 4.2 million inhabitants in the country. States, therefore, likely react to the existing security threat in order to reduce such potential issues.
This argument implies an international security issue arises after a humanitarian emergency in the affected state has particularly created populations of internally displaced persons and the outflow of people into other territorial borders. It varies from a national security issue because it carries repercussions for other states as well.

This conception is summed up in the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4: a national security issue is recognised as an international security issue when the security threat develops into a crisis situation reproducing significant spill-overs of refugees into foreign territories.**

States, however, would normally address the spill-over impact other than pay attention to the existing security threat. They would mostly focus on implementing the measures which sustain the livelihoods of affected populations generated from a crisis suggesting little recognition of the security threat. The UN has recently partnered with a few African countries like Benin and Gambia to design programs which will accommodate the in-flux of refugees upon the rise of electoral violence within some countries (UNHCR, b). The programs are not directly aimed at stopping the occurrence of electoral violence. Therefore, the generation of significant refugee outflows during crisis situations may not always translate into international reactions towards an emergent security threat.

It is evident from the discussion that the concept of international security has seen significant progress since the last two decades. Nevertheless, there are important reasons to believe that in practice states’ international security policies remain state-centric. The progress of the concept is not necessarily manifest in its application. In fact, as the following section will
show, the expanded conceptions of international security described above do not - or at least do not consistently - generate earlier international reactions to crisis situations.
The case of Nigeria

The issue of terrorism in Nigeria offers empirical support for the argument that the international community remains most likely to address an emerging security threat when it goes beyond a single national territory. Terrorism in Nigeria is mainly caused by the activities of Boko Haram, a group committed to challenging state authority and security by imposing Islamic rules. This issue is generating growing instability on the African continent, especially within the West African sub-region. Boko Haram’s activities caused over 300 fatalities in 2009 (START, 2014) rising to an initial estimated 6,347 killings by the end of 2014 (Raleigh et al., 2010). These activities are spreading from north-eastern Nigeria to the central parts of the country and into other neighbouring states like Chad, Cameroun and Niger culminating in more than 120 incidents of attacks and over 1,355 fatalities in those states since 2012 (Raleigh et al., 2010). Boko Haram’s operations have also led to an outflow of over 100,000 Nigerian refugees into Niger, about 44,000 in Cameroun, and 2,700 in Chad since the start of 2014 (“Nigeria: UN agency reports,” 2014).

Nigeria’s security crisis thus typifies contexts where all four hypotheses suggest international reactions. The security situation, however, triggered different hypotheses at chronologically different periods, making Nigeria relevant in examining international reactions to a security situation. In 2011, Nigeria’s capability to handle the Boko Haram crisis was clearly lost thus suggesting international reactions to the security threat (Hypothesis 2). In 2012, the Boko Haram threat started generating a humanitarian crisis situation thus triggering international responses to the threat according to Hypothesis 3. In 2013, refugees and internally displaced persons were produced as a result of the Boko Haram crisis therefore calling for international responses to the threat under Hypothesis 4. It was only in 2014 that Boko Haram carried out
serious attacks in neighbouring Chad, Cameroun and Niger proposing international reactions to the security threat, thus triggering Hypothesis 1.

Towards providing an answer to the research question, the examination of Nigeria’s case is done qualitatively (Vromen, 2010) and unfolds longitudinally (Menard, 2002); exploring the sequence of significant attacks carried out by Boko Haram and accompanying international reactions. It advances by means of process-tracing (George & Bennett, 2005), and is guided by each of the four hypotheses to determine when the Boko Haram crisis received a reaction from other states. The period of 2009-2015 serves as the timeframe for examination as a result of the fact that Boko Haram became more active after 2009.

The international reactions to the Boko Haram crisis are focused on potentially responding states (other than Nigeria) grouped into two categories in order to better evaluate expected reactions. The first category comprises responses by surrounding states or individual African countries which are geographically close to the Boko Haram crisis as well as sub-regional and regional organizations like the ECOWAS and AU respectively. The responses refer to any aid support, military assistance or security arrangements provided for the purposes of improving the crisis situation. The second category includes responses by the wider international community including most notably Western states and international organizations like the UN. These responses also encompass the various foreign donations of aid, military support, logistics and equipment made available as well as the security arrangements and agreements put in place by those states towards mitigating the crisis.

Several sources of information for the Boko Haram issue exist, making it possible to triangulate the data (Jick, 1979). This thesis draws on the primary data from terrorism databases
such as the ACLED and the GTD to identify the most significant attacks, casualties and fatalities caused by Boko Haram between the specified time periods. To assess international reactions to Nigeria’s security crisis, it relies on government documents, official and unofficial documents of international organizations, journal articles, books, and media reports.

Based on this data, the following four sections argue that international reactions to the Boko Haram crisis were predominantly prompted by the extension of the security threat into neighbouring states. The number of sections reflects the four hypotheses elaborated above, though the exposition changes the order of the hypotheses to match the chronology of the Nigerian crisis. The first section argues that the emergence of the Boko Haram threat did not trigger significant international responses contrary to the notion that international reactions are likely given when a security threat erupts within the national system (Hypothesis 2). The second section establishes that the security threat did not receive significant international responses when it generated a humanitarian crisis situation (Hypothesis 3). The third section finds that there were no significant international responses to the security threat when it developed into a crisis situation producing significant spill-overs of people into foreign territories (Hypothesis 4). The fourth part confirms that the extension of the Boko Haram threat into other national borders was sufficient to elicit international reactions to the existing security threat (Hypothesis 1).

1. International reactions to Nigeria’s emergent security threat (Hypothesis 2).

According to Colonel Mohammed Yerima, Nigeria’s Director of Defence Information, Boko Haram has existed since 1995 under the title Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra.¹ Boko Haram

¹ See Onouha, 2012.
subsequently operated under different names such as Muhajirun, Nigerian Taliban, Al Sunna wal’ Jamma and the Yusufiya Islamic Movement (quoted in Solomon, 2015). The Islamic sect, known formally as Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, or People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad, was formally established in 2002 with such aims as the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate beginning in northern Nigeria and the extension of the Sharia law to rule the entire state (Chasmar, 2014).

After 2002, Boko Haram operations included attacks on state prisons as well as attacks on security forces like the police in northern Nigeria: Yobe state and Borno state (Mantzikos, 2014). Initially, however, Nigeria appeared capable of addressing the Boko Haram threat independently upon its emergence. Boko Haram often encountered the military and police during operations, which led to the arrest, killing and detention of members of the group. In periods when they escaped state security forces and went into hiding in neighbouring countries (for example when 5 members fled to Cameroon after a chase by the military in 2004), state authorities coordinated with those foreign security forces to ensure their arrest and deportation to Nigeria (“Timeline of Boko Haram attacks,” 2012).

In 2009, there were 700 reported fatalities due to the activities of Boko Haram in 5 states, namely Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, Gombe and Kano (Raleigh et al., 2010). After Boko Haram retaliated to the killing of 17 members, (“Timeline of Boko Haram attacks,” 2012) the deployment of Nigerian security forces to Borno state led to the apprehension and public execution of Boko Haram’s leader Mohammed Yusuf (Last, 2009). Other Boko Haram members were killed in the four-day battle with the state authorities. The death of Yusuf and other members appeared to signify Nigeria’s victory over the existing threat.
In 2010, however, Abubakar Shekau emerged as the new leader of Boko Haram (“Nigeria's Boko Haram leader,” 2014). The organization reaffirmed its presence through a major attempt to release captured members from the Bauchi prison (Raleigh et al., 2010), leading to the escape of 721 inmates. The government sent soldiers to checkpoints on major roads in Bauchi (Stearns, 2010) to enhance the security situation, while the state governor Isa Yuguda issued a warning for Boko Haram to leave or be “flushed out” (“721 inmates freed,” 2010). However, Boko Haram continued to attack state forces in different areas such as a military barracks in Abuja and carried out bomb attacks including two separate bomb explosions in the city of Jos killing more than 20 persons and injuring 74 others (Raleigh et al., 2010). It began attacking government officials and religious figures (Mantzikos, 2009, p. 65), extending the attacks to include religious groups and civilians (Raleigh et al., 2010). Awana Ali Ngala, the national vice-chairman of the ANPP was assassinated at his residence in Maiduguri, Borno state. Sheik Bashir Mustapha, an Islamic scholar, was killed in his home while about five churches holding Christmas Eve services in Maiduguri were attacked, leading to the death of a pastor and four others during one incident. Soldiers in Maiduguri drove Boko Haram away through fierce gun battles but the group later carried out at least four separate raids on civilians killing four persons on each attack (Raleigh et al., 2010). There were 75 known fatalities that year due to the activities of Boko Haram (Raleigh et al., 2010).

A year later, Nigeria was clearly losing control over the crisis when continuous attacks by Boko Haram in 7 other states namely; Adamawa, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Kebbi, Niger and the Federal Capital Territory resulted in 569 fatalities (Raleigh et al., 2010). Within the Federal Capital Territory, a bomb attack on the United Nations headquarters led to at least 18 killings. The Nigerian Senate passed its first Anti-Terrorism Act, which allows the state security agencies
including the police to confiscate property or vehicle without search warrants and enables judges to decide the detention of suspected individuals for a maximum period of 30 days as a public safety measure (Eboh, 2011). The Joint Task Force (JTF), which includes the Department of State Security, Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigeria Police Force, Defence Intelligence Agency and Nigerian Armed Forces (Mbah & Nwangu, 2014), was established under the code name Operation Restore Order I. It was tasked to restore law and order in north-eastern Nigeria particularly in Borno state where the crisis began. On the other hand, President Goodluck Jonathan reportedly ordered a state of emergency in 15 most affected local government areas in Plateau state, Borno state, Niger state and Yobe state (“Jonathan ends state of emergency,” 2012).

At this point, Boko Haram had clearly become more dangerous through the extension in forms, areas and targets of attack. Nigeria was facing an emergent security crisis, and its capacity to address the situation was in doubt as certain factors such as corruption by top officials and atrocities committed by the military bolstered the operations of Boko Haram (Maiangwa et al., 2012). In the north, while many suspects were killed or did not return to their communities, the property confiscated by the state security forces was returned to the traditional heads of the local communities for distribution to some supporters in those areas (Walker, 2012, p. 4). The conflicting information on the emergent threat raised doubts among the citizenry about the government’s abilities and prospects to handle the threat (Maiangwa et al., 2012, p.52). The government officials claimed negotiations with Boko Haram were challenging as the organization was “faceless” yet media reports stated former president Obasanjo had met and talked with Boko Haram members whose demands for a cease-fire were: compensation to the families of members killed by the police, an end to the killings and arrest of members as well as
the prosecution of the security forces responsible for the death of Yusuf in 2009 (‘‘Analysis: Hurdles,’’ 2012). The military’s use of force in handling the situation also led to the death of people who were not verified Boko Haram members as well as rape cases involving young women and theft of private property.

Nigeria affirmed state control of the crisis despite the apparent escalation of the security threat. President Jonathan reportedly described Boko Haram as a “local problem” (“Nigerian leader vows,” 2011) which would be brought under control. Without particular mention of Boko Haram, Jonathan further stated Nigeria “will work with the UN and other world leaders to ensure that terrorism is brought under control.” The Nigerian Defence Minister, Bello Halliru Mohammed, claimed the state security forces were “once again “on top” of the security situation in the north” (Fisher, 2011) thus there was no need for fear. However, the heightening of the crisis was a clear indication of the government’s failure to handle the existing security threat.

Nonetheless, there were no significant international responses to the Boko Haram issue though it was acknowledged as a threat to security. The president of the ECOWAS, James Victor Gbeho, viewed the activities of Boko Haram as a threat to regional security stating the regional security situation was “tenuous and of concern to all stakeholders” (ECOWAS, 2011). He further said the emergent threat of terrorism was a potential threat to ECOWAS regional development, international peace and security but no efforts towards military mobilization and assistance to Nigeria was mentioned or initiated.

Other international responses included the condemnation of the activities of Boko Haram with no particular reactions to the security threat. When the UN building was bombed, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon condemned the attack stating it was “an assault on those who devote their
lives to helping others” (“Security Council and Ban condemn,” 2011) while the Under-Secretary General for Security and the Deputy Secretary General were sent to Nigeria (“Nigerian leader vows,” 2011). The President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, expressed sympathies to the affected persons and the UN stating that the EU condemned the attack (European Union). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton, also expressed “most respectful condolences” to victims, the state, and people of Nigeria. After the 2011 Christmas Day bombings, Guido Westerwelle, German Foreign Minister, condemned the attacks calling them “cowardice” while the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, William Hague, said they were “cowardly attacks on families” (“Deadly Nigeria bomb attacks,” 2011). The White House Spokesman, Jay Carney, stated the attacks were “senseless violence and tragic loss of life,” the Vatican called the incidents “blind hatred” while Israel pledged medical aid to Nigeria (“Deadly Nigeria bomb attacks,” 2011).

Beyond these statements recognising Boko Haram issue as a security issue, however, the threat did not attract significant international responses even though Nigeria quite apparently did not control the crisis. As Nigeria consistently claimed to be in control of the security crisis, international efforts were constrained and the Boko Haram crisis remained a national security issue. Therefore, a national security issue does not necessarily become an international security issue even after it has clearly escaped the management capacity of the state in which it has emerged.
2. International reactions to Nigeria’s humanitarian crisis situation (Hypothesis 3).

As the state gradually lost control over the security crisis, a humanitarian emergency developed in Nigeria from 2012 onwards. At the same time, Boko Haram reportedly began extending activities and operations beyond the borders of Nigeria in the pursuit and achievement of the objectives of the organization by launching minor attacks in nearby states such as Chad, Niger, Mali and Cameroun (Raleigh et al., 2010).

In 2012, Boko Haram’s widespread operations from north-eastern Nigeria to the southern and central parts of the country resulted in 1,646 known fatalities in 21 states including Bayelsa, Benue, Edo, Enugu, Jigawa, Kogi, Lagos, Nassawara, Sokoto and Taraba (Raleigh et al., 2010). Many of the fatalities, however, still occurred in the northeast in Adawama, Bauchi, Borno, Kaduna, Kano and Yobe as these states were targeted at least ten times; showing that Boko Haram was still controlling those areas. The rise of the humanitarian crisis that year called for global reactions to the Boko Haram security threat.

Boko Haram bombed the offices of This Day, a newspaper agency in Abuja highly supportive of President Jonathan’s administration, killing at least four people (Eboh & Mohammed, 2012). Gun and bomb attacks in Kano resulted in at least 178 deaths but in response President Jonathan merely stated that the attempt at creating havoc was futile and that “the federal government will not rest until the perpetrators are brought to book…until these terrorists are wiped out” (Oboh, 2012). President Jonathan in June sacked General Andrew Azizi, the first southerner serving as Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, and replaced him with Colonel Sambo Dasuki, a native from the north (Anyadike, 2012). On July 18, the state of emergency declared the past year in the 15 local government areas was removed because the government
claimed the security situation in those places had improved (“Jonathan ends state of emergency,” 2012). Citizen vigilantes and armed groups emerged in areas like Maiduguri to help counter Boko Haram.

The security situation in the entire country, however, was signalling a rising humanitarian crisis despite the efforts of the government while Boko Haram remained active in the neighbouring states. At the end of 2013, the known fatalities were 2973 though 13 states namely; Adawama, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Federal Capital Territory, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Nassawara, Sokoto, Taraba and Yobe were attacked (Raleigh et al., 2010). The April attack on a military patrol in Baga (the headquarters of the MNJTF) resulting in the death of a soldier and injuring five others attracted a military response leading to the destruction of 2,275 buildings; mostly homes, and another 125 damaged buildings as well as the death of 183 people (“Nigeria: Massive Destruction,” 2013). The president declared a state of emergency in the most affected states; Borno state, Yobe state and Adawama state (“Jonathan declares state of emergency,” 2013) while an additional 3,000 troops were deployed to join the 5,000 troops already in the JTF. In August, the state deported at least 22,000 illegal migrants mainly comprising Chadians, Cameroonians and Nigeriens with the concern that these foreigners contributed to the escalation of the crisis (“FG deports 22,000,” 2013).

By 2014, the humanitarian crisis had clearly worsened when the activities of Boko Haram resulted in 7,711 known fatalities in Abia, Adawama, Akwa Ibom, Bauchi, Borno, Ekiti, Federal Capital Territory, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kogi, Lagos, Lake Chad, Niger, Plateau, Rivers, Taraba, Yobe and the borders with Diffa and the Extreme-Nord (Raleigh et al., 2010). Boko Haram during this period commenced the launch of increased and more dangerous attacks in the nearby states (Raleigh et al., 2010); demonstrating the internationalisation of the
security crisis. The official investigations into the crisis situation implicated state officials like Ali Modu Sheriff, the former governor of Borno state and his connections with the Chadian president Idriss Déby ("Exclusive: Secret Intelligence Report," 2014), suggesting that the crisis was politically motivated.

Boko Haram attacked a school in Chibok, Borno state between April 14-15, 2014, kidnapping over 230 schoolgirls ("Chibok abductions," 2014). Over 200 girls who could not escape from Boko Haram remained missing. The Nigerian military initially claimed knowledge of the location of the abducted girls but said it had resorted to non-use of force towards their rescue (Felix, 2014). The Nigerian police announced a $300,000 reward for the return of the girls ("Nigeria offers reward," 2014) while there was the declaration of a cease-fire agreement including the promised release of the abducted girls ("Nigeria and Boko Haram agree," 2014) between the military and Boko Haram.2 On the other hand, the raids launched by Boko Haram in Doron Baga and nearby villages led to 28 deaths and the kidnapping of at least 97 men and boys (Abubakar, 2014a) together with several women.

In contrast, the Nigerian army faced several challenges especially in the north-east including the lack of equipment and motivation, under-staffing, and corruption because some commanders allegedly saw the situation “as an opportunity to make money” ("Why we could not," 2014). As a result, the army personnel were reduced because many lost the morale to fight Boko Haram while some fled upon attacks in their units by Boko Haram disguised as civilians. The troops deployed to face Boko Haram reportedly had to bribe their superiors for more weapons before patrol missions as they were given “just 30 bullets” (Ahmed & Eckel, 2014, para. 7). Soldiers deployed on patrols and other duties did not receive timely payment, and when

2 Boko Haram denied the cease-fire agreement
they were paid, it was only a small amount of about $6 given for three days. As a result, some military officers defected to fight for Boko Haram while others failed to intervene in the midst of an attack, claiming that their orders are to “only open fire when attacked” (Ahmed & Eckel, 2014, para. 54).

When the Nigerian military did mount operations against Boko Haram, moreover, it employed very aggressive tactics. This led to the death of at least 1,200 males between 2013 and 2014 through extrajudicial means, with some dozen to hundreds killed through joint activity with the Joint Task Force (Amnesty International, 2015). When Boko Haram attacked the Giwa barracks in March 2014 leading to the release of the detainees, the military’s aggressive tactics resulted in the death of at least 640 men and boys mainly recaptured from the escape (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 6). The military thus contributed to the rising number of deaths during the humanitarian crisis.

The humanitarian crisis worsened further in early 2015: there were 2,135 recorded fatalities in Yobe state and Borno state (Raleigh et al., 2010) while Boko Haram still actively undertook serious operations and activities abroad. After Boko Haram carried out a second attack on Baga and 16 surrounding villages, there was an estimated death toll ranging from “dozens to 2000 or more” (Segun, 2015). The military, however, killed at least 200 Boko Haram members on January 25 after the organization launched a major attack in Maiduguri, Borno state (Obasi, 2015).

The international community initially demonstrated acknowledgement of the internationalisation of the crisis but later turned attention toward the humanitarian emergency;
perceiving it as an international security issue. However, the international community did not seriously respond to the existing security threat.

In 2012, the states close to Nigeria expanded the mandate of the Multi National Joint Task Force established in 1998 to include counter-terrorism (Musa, 2013). The MNJTF, which comprises armed forces from Niger, Chad, Cameroun and Nigeria, originally was tasked to ensure security in the Lake Chad region. At the global level, the government of New Zealand responded to the existing security issue by designating Boko Haram as a terrorist organization (New Zealand Police). These international reactions, however, excluded concrete action against Boko Haram.

A year after, Boko Haram was acknowledged mostly by western states as an international security threat when the government of the United Kingdom labelled Boko Haram as terrorists (United Kingdom, Home Office, 2015) together with the United States (United States, Department of State) and Canada (Public Safety Canada, 2014). The United States particularly placed a $7million reward for information leading to Abubakar Shekau (United States, Department of State, 2013) in recognition of the emergent threat of Boko Haram to international security as well as to western interests. These international actions were, nonetheless, without relevant responses to the security threat probably because there seemed to be cooperation between the neighbouring states and Nigeria on the Boko Haram issue.

In 2014, many statements were made, especially during the Chibok abductions, to the effect that there was a humanitarian emergency in Nigeria. The international community then begun to pay particular attention to the rising humanitarian crisis situation. These statements were not accompanied, though, by significant efforts aimed at destroying the security threat. The
UNSC demanded the “immediate and unconditional release” of the abducted schoolgirls asking the international community to “work closely with the [Nigerian] authorities to ensure their safe return” (“Security Council demands,” 2014). The AU condemned the abductions, calling on Nigeria, regional and international organizations to “join forces” to rescue the girls back to their families (African Union, 2014a). The EU requested the “immediate and unconditional release of the school girls and for those responsible to be brought to justice” (Council of the European Union, 2014). However, many of the girls still remained missing due to the fact that these statements were not translated into action towards the humanitarian crisis situation.

Among the western states, the United States and the United Kingdom originally refused to offer training and equipment support to the Nigerian military due to their concerns for human rights (Walker, 2014). However, a team of experts comprising negotiators, counsellors and military advisers arrived from the two countries to assist in finding the Chibok abducted girls (“Nigeria abductions,” 2014). The United States in particular, handed over supportive programs and measures towards finding the girls but they were reportedly not implemented by the Nigerian state officials (Cooper, 2015). The officials of the United States doubted Nigeria’s cooperation because the Nigerian military attended training sessions without the appropriate tools and equipment. They believed the Nigerian army was infiltrated by Boko Haram members thus there reportedly was no provision of raw data in their intelligence support to Nigeria in order to protect the sources of information (Cooper, 2015, para. 7). Nigerian state officials, on the contrary, expressed concerns about sovereignty in response to these accusations. Military spokesman Chris Olukolade stated that “no one should…use this security situation to usurp our sovereignty as a nation” and that “none of those empty allegations” against Nigeria “have ever been proved”
These challenges of cooperation and coordination therefore marred collaboration with Nigeria on the existing humanitarian emergency.

Again, from Australia, an international security adviser arrived in Nigeria to help broker a deal with Boko Haram in exchange for some of the girls (Powell, 2014) while the worldwide Twitter campaign dubbed ‘bring back our girls’ erupted with the involvement of well-known personalities like Michelle Obama (Sim, 2014). These reactions from the international community were still not turned into collective efforts aimed at destroying the security threat thus the existing threat of Boko Haram was still not properly recognised.

In August, 85 Nigerian hostages kidnapped during the Doron Baga attacks were saved by Chadian troops (Abubakar, 2014b) but this reaction showing the acknowledgment of the humanitarian crisis, however, affirmed absent specific efforts at countering Boko Haram.

Other international reactions that year suggested recognition of the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria and beyond. The UNSC designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization and imposed sanctions including an arms embargo and asset freeze on Boko Haram (“UN committee imposes sanctions,” 2014). The EU followed similar steps while the government of Australia (Australian Government) as well as the government of the United Arab Emirates labelled Boko Haram as a terrorist organization (“UAE publishes list,” 2014). Still, there was no mobilization of forces against the security threat.

The following year, there were still absent significant or specific international reactions to the Boko Haram security threat when there was no actual or immediate release of the 7,500 troops from the MNJTF including Benin for a 12 month renewable period authorized by the

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3 This deal was sabotaged
African Union (African Union, Peace and Security Council, 2015). This AU response which mainly showed acknowledgment of the widespread operations of Boko Haram still did not generate concrete action against the security threat.

The humanitarian crisis situation did not attract appropriate international reactions to counter the threat of Boko Haram thus the Boko Haram crisis continued as a national security issue. Therefore, a national security issue degenerating into a humanitarian crisis situation does not essentially become an international security issue.

3. International reactions to the rise of internally displaced persons in Nigeria and Nigerian refugees in neighbouring states (Hypothesis 4).

The Boko Haram security crisis began producing huge numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees from 2013 as the strategies for survival became limited in the targeted areas of attack. The general reports on IDPs in Nigeria said there were an estimated 3.3 million IDPs in 2013 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2013). The specific reports between 2014 and 2015, however, on IDPs generated as a result of the Boko Haram crisis demonstrated families were destroyed and many men had been killed since women and children (mostly up to 5 years) from north-eastern Nigeria were the most displaced.

In 2014, 77%⁴ of 389,281 IDPs found in 5 north-eastern states namely Taraba, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe and Adawama were identified as a result of the Boko Haram crisis (International

⁴ According to the IOM & NEMA reports, the IDPs were mainly found in Yobe state (125,991 IDPs), Adawama state (123,601 IDPs), Taraba state (81,790 IDPs)
Organization for Migration & National Emergency Management Agency [IOM & NEMA], 2014). A year later, in February, the crisis displaced 92%\(^5\) of 1,235,294 IDPs identified in the northeast as well as central parts of Nigeria in states like Plateau, Nasarawa, Abuja, Kano and Kaduna (IOM & NEMA, 2015a). In April, 94.05%\(^6\) of the 1,491,706 IDPs identified in the same areas in the northeast were displaced due to the Boko Haram issue (IOM & NEMA, 2015b). When the IDP population reduced to 1,385,298 in June in the same areas, 94%\(^7\) were displaced by the crisis (IOM & NEMA, 2015c).

Many of these IDPs did not settle in formal camps but lived in “makeshift settlements” among locals within the nearby host communities out of fear of an attack, the over population in camps (“Northeast Nigeria,” 2014) and the strict actions taken by state security forces in claiming buildings in which the IDPs found shelter. Only 7.6% were staying in camps (IOM & NEMA, 2014) in 2014 with this percentage increasing to 13% in February 2015 (IOM & NEMA, 2015a). The figure reduced to 10.1% in April 2015 (IOM & NEMA, 2015b) and to 8% two months later (IOM & NEMA, 2015c), indicating deteriorating survival conditions within the camps. The state, however, was yet to adopt the Kampala Convention ratified in April 2012 which aims to enhance the protection and assistance to internally displaced persons (African Union, 2014b).

Furthermore, the affected population which could no longer survive the challenges posed by the security situation fled into Chad, Cameroun and Niger where they also settled mainly within the local communities for their safety. In 2013, 20,000 people fled the Boko Haram crisis

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\(^5\) The highest number of IDPs came from Borno state (62%), Adamawa state (18%) and Yobe state (13%) 
\(^6\) The highest number of IDPs originated from Borno state (68%), Adamawa state (15%) and Yobe state (11%) 
\(^7\) These IDPs originated mainly from Borno state (80.22%), Adamawa state (7.55%) and Yobe state (6.70%)
into Cameroun, while 37,626 people comprising both Nigerien nationals previously resident in Nigeria and Nigerian citizens fled into Niger (UNHCR, 2014). As of July 2014, there were 50,000 refugees and Nigerien returnees in Niger, 20,006 refugees in Cameroun and 1,028 in Chad as a result of the Boko Haram crisis; while in December, the figures rose to 35,000 in Cameroun and 10,000 in Chad (UNHCR, 2014, p. 6), suggesting more populations were escaping into these states. In Cameroun, the arrival of 13,000 new refugees led to the registration of 18,475 Nigerian refugees in the Far North region: 7,685 in Mayo Tsanaga, 1,966 in May Sava and 8,824 in Logone-et-Chari; and 1,530 refugees within the Southwest (UNHCR, 2014, p. 10). The Cameroonian authorities established a settlement camp named Minawao for the refugees. In Chad, 681 refugees were registered by the CNARR a few months after about 1000 Nigerian asylum seekers settled on Choua Island on Lake Chad, 4 kilometres away from the Nigerian border (UNHCR, 2014, p. 19). In Niger, the estimated 50,000 refugees comprised children and “female-led households.” The refugees in Niger and Chad also settled among the locals. In these countries, the refugee population grew to over 200,000 in 2015: 100,000 in Niger (Nigerien returnees included), 74,000 in Cameroun, and 29,000 in Chad (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).

The international community especially intergovernmental organizations as well as the neighbouring states affected by the large in-flows of the Nigerian population into their lands recognized the refugee situation as an international security issue but this did not lead them to take serious action to address the Boko Haram security threat.

In 2014, the UN agencies such as the World Health Organization together with 16 international organizations including the International Relief and Development and the

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8 The figure was previously reported as 18,000 in south-west Chad by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Luxembourg Red Cross reacted to the refugee crisis by appealing for $34 million from the international community with the aim to provide humanitarian assistance to the refugees (“UNHCR and partners,” 2014). According to the report by the UNHCR, the humanitarian aid assistance was targeted at “Nigerian refugees and returning Niger nationals” displaced through the Boko Haram crisis (UNHCR, 2014, p. 3). The ‘Nigeria Regional Refugee Response Plan’ was created in order to organize support for “an inter-agency response to the refugee situation developing in south-east Niger, south-west Chad and northern Cameroon and to present the corresponding emergency programme needs” (UNHCR, 2014, p. 6, para. 1). These international reactions, which could have been in the form of requests and provisions of military assistance, technical and logistics support or coordinated planning for enhanced security in all the affected states notably Nigeria, shifted attention to the human spill-over situation and did not contribute to the destruction of the security threat.

The foreign agencies including non-governmental organizations and donors also established collaboration with the concerned countries: Chad, Niger and Cameroun, towards implementing sustainable measures for handling the large migration of people into those territories. There were “contingency plans” already drafted to cater for “responding to a possible further deterioration of the situation and increased numbers of forcibly displaced people” (UNHCR, 2014, p. 6, para. 4). The Boko Haram security threat appeared to be non-existent to these organizations whose projects were not tailored to control the security threat in Nigeria. None of the concerned states or the rest of the international community, however, reacted to the actual security threat due to the fact that through these actions by the foreign organizations, strong focus remained on the human spill-over situation.
Chadian borders with Nigeria were already closed in July 2014 during the outbreak of the Ebola virus (UNHCR, 2014, p. 19), suggesting initial restricted access by Nigerians fleeing into Chad. Nigerien officials chose not to establish refugee camps in Diffa as a measure of protection while factors such as limited access to water and land as well as food shortage constituted a major issue (UNHCR, 2014, p. 26). Cameroun’s concerns for internal security led to the establishment of the camp in Minawao so as to ensure the accommodation of influx of people and the movement of the refugees from the dangerous border localities (UNHCR, 2014, p. 10). Therefore, the attention of these concerned countries was removed from the actual security threat in Nigeria.

The following year, the international reactions were again characterised by a lack of appropriate responses to the Boko Haram threat. The UNHCR, together with 23 aid organizations appealed for $174.4 million for close to 200,000 Nigerians who escaped from the Boko Haram crisis into the neighbouring countries (“Aid agencies urgently appeal,” 2015). The second Nigeria Refugee Response Plan was drafted by these organizations in order to provide “a framework for how emergency assistance can be provided to meet the immediate humanitarian needs” of those populations escaping “violence in Northern Nigeria” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 6). It was aimed at “Nigerian refugees, returning Niger nationals displaced by conflict in Nigeria and host communities” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 3) meaning that the foreign aid organizations, which had increased in number, were still concerned over the refugee crisis happening in the other states. They remained focused on the mobilization of “support for an inter-agency response to the deteriorating displacement situation in Nigeria and neighbouring countries.” They, therefore, drew continuous attention away from the existing security threat to the growing effects of the Boko Haram crisis on conditions of survival in the affected countries.
Again, the EU provided relief assistance of €21million divided into €12.5million towards humanitarian assistance within the affected areas in Nigeria and €8.5million for refugees in neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Niger (Aworinde, 2015). Christos Stylianides, EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, reportedly stated “we are stepping up our humanitarian response to the call of those in the greatest need;” suggesting emphasis on the recognition of the deteriorating survival conditions of the affected populations (Aworinde, 2015, para. 3). Such international efforts, nonetheless, which were not directed at countering Boko Haram illustrated the security issue was still not properly viewed as a security threat.

The international community addressed the Boko Haram issue as a refugee crisis hence the security situation remained Nigeria’s internal security crisis. Therefore, a national security issue which develops into a crisis situation generating significant human spill-overs into foreign states does not inevitably become an international security issue.

4. International reactions to the extension of Nigeria’s security threat into nearby states (Hypothesis 1).

Between 2012 and 2015, while the Boko Haram threat in Nigeria developed into a humanitarian emergency and a refugee crisis, the security threat began to extend into Chad, Niger, Mali and Cameroun,\(^9\) generating serious attacks by Boko Haram which led to a high number of fatalities in 2014.

Minor incidents were recorded in 2012 in the nearby countries: there was one incident of attack and 15 known fatalities in Cameroon; one incident and two fatalities in Chad; two

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\(^9\) There are varied reports on the occurrence of attacks in these countries.
incidents of attack in Niger\textsuperscript{10} but no recorded fatalities; while there was one incident of attack and no recorded fatalities in Mali (Raleigh et al., 2010). A year later, Boko Haram carried out attacks in all these countries except Mali and Chad; Cameroun recorded two fatalities and two incidents including the abduction of a priest and a seven member family from France (“Italian priests,” 2014); while Niger recorded one incident of attack and three known fatalities (Raleigh et al., 2010).

There were, however, severe attacks in 2014 in the neighbouring states indicating the security threat was growing into a domestic security issue for those states. Boko Haram activity remained moderate in some states. It carried out four incidents of attacks with no known fatalities in Niger; two incidents and six known fatalities in Chad but no attacks in Mali (Raleigh et al., 2010). Chad received a warning from Boko Haram through a video message reported on June 5 on the participation of its state forces in the planned joint offensive with Niger, Nigeria and Cameroun to destroy Boko Haram (“L'enregistrement de Boko Haram,” 2014).

By contrast, Cameroon faced crucial attacks as there were 107 incidents and 1316 fatalities recorded (Raleigh et al., 2010). In April 2014, there was the abduction of two Italian priests and a Canadian nun\textsuperscript{11} from the town of Maroua (“Italian priests,” 2014). A month later, there was an attack in Waza resulting in the death of a Cameroonian soldier and the kidnap of 10 Chinese engineers (Kindzeka, 2014a). In July, there were major kidnappings of Cameroonian: Bieshair Hashimir and Bieshair Cavaye Yegue, teenaged sons of the traditional leader of Limani, Bieshair Mohaman, were initially kidnapped (Kindzeka, 2014b); Cameroon’s vice Prime Minister’s wife was kidnapped less than two weeks after, while Seini Boukar Lamine, a religious

\textsuperscript{10} Other sources claim Boko Haram carried out six other attacks in Dakoro
\textsuperscript{11} They were all freed after two months
leader and mayor of Kolofata, was also kidnapped together with five members of his family in a separate attack (Musa, 2014). Additionally, there were mid-October attacks in Amchide which led to the death of 8 Cameroonian soldiers and 107 Boko Haram members as well as the attack in Limani and Assighasia camp (“Cameroon soldiers desperate,” 2014).

Initially, there were severe challenges of coordination between Nigeria and the targeted bordering states on the issue of Boko Haram. There were communication problems with Niger, because the exchange of information was mainly through letters which took up to three days to arrive at the intended destination (Lewis, 2014). There was also unresolved border tensions with Cameroon while Nigeria accused the country of not being proactive in addressing the security threat and of serving as a “rear base and supply route” for Boko Haram (Felix, 2015). During planning meetings organized by the MNJTF, Nigeria’s participation through low-level representatives (Flynn & Felix, 2015) further demonstrated Nigeria’s limited commitment toward handling the existing threat multilaterally.

The following year, however, the attacks in the surrounding states persisted, emphasizing the widening scope of the Boko Haram threat. On January 5, 2015, Boko Haram issued a threat through a video message to Cameroon (“Boko Haram leader,” 2015) warning that Cameroon would experience Nigeria’s security crisis: there was one incident of attack and 11 fatalities recorded (Raleigh et al., 2010). In February, in Niger, there were two suicide attacks\(^{12}\) carried out by female Boko Haram members in Diffa (Massalaki & Nako, 2015) while there was a major attack in the village of Ngouboua in Chad killing a soldier and 4 civilians (Smith-Spark & Abubakar, 2015).

\(^{12}\) The death of the suicide bombers were the only known fatalities
Nevertheless, Nigeria’s cooperation and commitment to counter the threat was still significantly absent. The state was apparently more focused on the upcoming election which was postponed till March 28, 2015, due to security concerns (Nossiter, 2015). State forces ignored the request for joint operations from other states and refused to authorize foreign military operations (notably from relatively smaller countries like Chad) within Nigeria’s borders (Flynn & Felix, 2015).

The international responses originally showed the international community, especially the states attacked by Boko Haram paid particular attention to the incidents of attacks in their own borders thus there was no proper responses to the existing threat in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the severe and continuous attacks by Boko Haram carried out particularly in Cameroun were sufficient to elicit significant international reactions to the existing threat.

In 2012, recognising the threat of Boko Haram within Nigerien borders, Niger signed an agreement with Nigeria to enhance border security while announcing the start of joint patrols from Gaya to Diffa on the Chadian border (“Le Niger et le Nigeria,” 2012). Nigerien state officials destroyed the network of 15 suspected Boko Haram members planning an attack on the local military base in Diffa (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 41). A year later, they arrested an unknown number of trained Boko Haram members who returned from Mali into Niger with weapons and unconfirmed motives (Lewis, 2014). In 2014, the officials arrested some 20 Boko Haram members in Zinder and Diffa, recovering bomb manufacturing materials and foiling major plots of attacks such as the planned attack on a market and the kidnap of Diffa’s local governor as well as the central government representative called Inoussa Saouna (“Niger arrests 20,” 2014). They discovered a Boko Haram training camp where members of the organization were learning to use some long range anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, particularly the AA12
shot gun, and handed this information to Nigerian authorities (Soriwei & Ogundele, 2014). The Nigerien Defence Minister, Karidjo Mahamadou stated that Niger would not “provoke” Boko Haram but the organization would “regret it” in the event of an attack (Lewis, 2014). In May, Nigerien police arrested 14 Boko Haram suspects after the attack on a military patrol in Diffa (“Niger arrests fourteen,” 2014).

On the other hand, in 2014, Cameroon handed down 10 to 20 years prison sentences to some 22 Boko Haram suspects detained for about five months in Maroua (Musa, 2014). Cameroonian forces responded to the attack on Assighasia camp with two air strikes and heavy fire under ‘Operation Alpha,’ (“Cameroon air strikes,” 2014) signifying recognition of the Boko Haram threat as a serious danger to the security of Cameroonian territory. The state released 300 navy men into the Lake Chad region and deployed about 2,000 troops to the border with Nigeria (“Cameroon soldiers desperate,” 2014). The release of the navy troops was Cameroon’s contribution to the agreements with Nigeria, Niger and Chad (supported notably by France) to each deploy 700 troops to counter Boko Haram after a meeting in May 2014 in Paris. This Paris meeting suggested the recognition of the threat of Boko Haram not only to Nigeria but also to other states particularly the neighbouring countries. The other concerned states were committed to these agreements but Nigeria’s position was “unknown.”

Unfortunately, there is no reliable information regarding Chad’s reactions towards the Boko Haram threat within Chadian territory. However, Chad responded to the threat of Boko Haram in Cameroon after President Paul Biya in 2015 reacted to the warning threat from Boko Haram to Cameroon by calling for global assistance and coordinated responses to the Boko Haram crisis (Kindzeka, 2015a). Chad’s concerns surrounding the threat posed to its economy in
terms of imports and oil prices may have triggered such quick response to the call against Boko Haram.

Chadian officials released thousands of troops, armoured vehicles (over 400 vehicles during the first batch), and other military equipment into Cameroon after a parliamentary decision to send troops into both Cameroon and Nigeria against Boko Haram (Chimtom, 2015). Chadian forces deployed on land and in the air independently launched a military offensive in Nigeria in Malam Fatori, Borno state “shelling and bombarding” Boko Haram members staying in the palace of the district head and the local government office (“Chad troops,” 2015). Though Chad offered to cooperate with Nigerian troops after the second attack in Baga in order to capture the area, the Chadian forces who arrived in Dikwa, Borno state to fight Boko Haram were turned away13 by Nigeria’s military (Flynn & Felix, 2015). This Nigerian response reiterated the severe challenges of multilateral cooperation and coordination on the security threat.

From February to March 2015, there were mixed but significant international reactions towards countering the Boko Haram threat. The Economic Community of Central African States pledged to create $87 million emergency fund for countering Boko Haram (Ola & Felix, 2015). Niger agreed to send troops into Nigeria and imposed a state of emergency for 15 days while the Nigerien state security forces went from one house to another in search of Boko Haram suspects (Massalaki & Nako, 2015). Chadian troops reportedly seized two pick-up trucks, many ammunitions as well as small weapons and killed 207 Boko Haram members in Gambaru, Borno state after clashes between both sides led to the death of a soldier and nine wounded others (“Chad claims killing hundreds,” 2015). Cameroon, nonetheless, barred the pursuit of Boko

13 The Nigerian military said it was “planning air strikes.”
Haram members into Cameroonian territory and prohibited the entry of some Cameroonian forces into Nigeria as the officials maintained the Boko Haram issue was Nigeria’s internal security crisis, while Niger called the Nigerian military “cowards” (Flynn & Felix, 2015). There were still, therefore, severe limits of cooperation between these states and Nigeria on the existing security threat.

The next phase of international reactions to Boko Haram began when foreign military operations in Nigeria were officially launched on March 8, 2015. This was not a response to any particular activity of Boko Haram either in Nigeria or in the nearby states but signified the implementation of planned counterterrorism measures between the concerned states. Chadian and Nigerien forces arrived in Malam Fatori, which had previously been seized by Boko Haram (“How Niger, Chadian troops,” 2015). The foreign forces recovered Kalashnikov rifles (including some with the Nigerian army logo), rocket launchers and 12.7 calibre machine guns from Boko Haram who fled upon the arrival of the troops after scaring away the close to 30,000 inhabitants of the town (“How Niger, Chadian troops,” 2015). They also regained Damasak from Boko Haram and went into the town of Gasheger driving away at least 100 Boko Haram fighters. The threat of Boko Haram was therefore not only recognized but it also received significant international responses.

In sum, the Boko Haram issue became an international security issue when the security threat crossed the Nigerian border into Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Thus the eruption of the Boko Haram threat in Nigeria; the threat’s development into a humanitarian crisis situation; and the production of internally displaced persons as well as the refugee crisis were not sufficient to initiate appropriate international responses to the existing threat until Cameroun was seriously
threatened. A national security issue hence becomes an international security issue when the
security threat extends into another national territory.
Conclusion

This thesis has discussed the conceptual development of international security from the traditional notion to three different notions. It has focused on when there are actual international responses to a security issue recognised as a threat to international security and, has argued that, in spite of this conceptual development, international responses during security emergencies reflect the traditional notion of international security.

The case of Nigeria supports the contention that international security remains state-centric. Critically, the possible criterion for relevant international responses to an existing security threat is when the threat extends from a single state territory into another state territory. The international community recognizes a national security issue as an international security issue when it affects the territory of more than one state. Although interviews and extended field research would be beneficial to the examination of Nigeria’s crisis, the available evidence is sufficient to establish that the concept of human security as an alternative to the traditional notion of the concept of international security is yet to be properly applied during crisis situations. The human security concept has globally attained much focus without meaningful application within international security policy of states. There is, therefore, the need for strengthened focus on the correct utilization of this concept at the national level and international level as well as within international security policy and literature.

An important limitation of this study, of course, is the investigation of a single case. The examination and analysis of further cases, for example, the security crises in Mali and Syria would contribute further understanding into the dynamics of international reactions, notably in cases where the affected state endeavours to maintain the crisis at the domestic level.
Nonetheless, Nigeria’s political, geographical, economic importance and strengths in Africa together with the single case hence provides in-depth understanding into the usage and application of the concept of human security in international security.
References


