Incorporation Policies, Identity, and Relationships between Host Societies and Immigrants

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Abstract

Immigration and the diversity it creates are at the heart of numerous debates in most Western liberal democracies. In order to manage this influx of newcomers, countries have chosen different strategies with different consequences. This dissertation considers the role of these strategies, specifically incorporation policies—policies whose goal is to incorporate immigrants in their new society—in the development of intergroup attitudes. It differs from past research by looking at the relationships between these policies on both hosts’ and immigrants’ attitudes. In doing so, it also argues for the inclusion of context when studying immigration attitudes and their causes.

The central question addressed here is whether some institutional arrangements are more likely to foster relationships between host societies and immigrants where both groups do not feel threatened by the other. This question is answered in three distinct studies each addressing different aspects of it, thus providing a more integrated view of these relationships. The first paper compares immigrant’s identification and acculturation orientations among ten immigration countries while the second considers the relationship between incorporation poli-
cies and cultural threat among host societies in 17 countries. The third paper focuses on a particular case, Canada, and tests whether diversity and ways of managing it can serve as building blocks for a transformed national identity.

Using observational and experimental data from three different datasets, the following studies establish a series of important findings including: (1) there is no difference across policy regimes in ethnic identification, immigrants in every policy regime tend to identify more with their ethnic group than with the majority; (2) only countries with open incorporation policies are able to foster integrationist attitudes among ethnic identifiers; (3) among host societies, open citizenship policies are associated with less cultural threat but multiculturalism policies are not; (4) citizenship policies also mitigate the effect of threat on anti-immigration attitudes, while more comprehensive multiculturalism policies have the opposite effect; (5) contrary to past research on priming of national identity, raising the salience of Canadian identity does not make Canadian respondents more opposed to immigration, in some instance it even makes them more acceptant of it.
This dissertation is an original intellectual product of the author, Charles Breton. The survey experiment reported in Chapter 4 was covered by UBC Ethics Certificate number H11-02181.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Contemplating the consequences of recognizing and embracing cultural diversity, renowned American historian Arthur Schlesinger was rather pessimistic about the prospects for the United States. In the *The Disuniting of America*, he wrote: “The multiethnic dogma abandons historical purpose, replacing assimilation by fragmentation, integration by separatism. It belittles unum and glorifies pluribus [...] One wonders: Will the center hold? Or will the melting pot give way to the Tower of Babel” (Schlesinger, 1991). These questions that Schlesinger asked in 1991 with a sense of foreboding, have since become ubiquitous in the Western world. Most of these countries now have to deal with ever-increasing diversity and its consequences. For instance, in the two decades after Schlesinger published his book, Italy, a country that had historically been a producer of migrants, saw the share of its population born elsewhere move from around 1% in 1991 to 9% in 2011. In traditional countries of immigration such as Australia or Canada, these
numbers are now above 20% (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment, 2013). Striking a balance between *unum* and *pluribus* and finding the best strategy to manage this diversity have thus become everyday questions, some of the most pressing issues at the center of the democratic life of immigration countries.

If politics is about who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1950), immigration and the integration of migrants are quintessential political issues. Not only are they about decision on how material resources are distributed, but they are also about how cultures and identities are coexisting, mingling, and transforming. In a way, these issues add to the *who gets* part in the well-known Laswell remark. Immigration and integration make politics also about *who is* what, when and how. It does so because immigration is transforming the image that citizens have of their country. It poses the question of the boundaries between “us” and “them”, boundaries that are both real and symbolic. They are real in the form of the different laws that govern access to citizenship and policies that embody a country’s choice of cultural accommodation policy. They are also symbolic in the sense that citizens of different countries form an image of what it means to be Canadian, American, or French. As a consequence, some people will be excluded of this “national group” on the basis of some characteristics (religion, language, race, etc.) that do not fit the shared conception of the nation. Ultimately, debates about who is in and who is out, are debates about identities. As Zolberg and Woon

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1More precisely, Australia’s foreign population accounts for 26.7% of its overall population while this proportion is 20.1% in Canada.
In what sense is Islam in Europe like Spanish in the United States? In that public debate surrounding the emergence of large immigrant groups identified by religion in the one case and language in the other are emblematic of larger issues of inclusion and exclusion, which in the last instance are about identity—of the host, of the newcomers, and, most importantly, of the social identities that will results from their prolonged interactions (Zolberg and Woon, 1999).

Given what is at stake, the challenges for immigration countries are numerous. They need to foster a sense of belonging among their immigrant population and create an environment in which they will feel welcomed, but they also need to reassure those among their native-born population that feel threatened by immigration whether for economic or cultural reasons. To face these challenges, immigration countries have chosen different paths. Historically, political science has devoted a great deal of effort trying to understand what explained these different choices of policies (e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Freeman, 1995).

In this study, rather than take these policies as the outcome needing explanation, I follow scholars who have recently turned their focus on incorporation institutions as a driver of attitudes (e.g. Bloemraad, 2006; Weldon, 2006; Koopmans, 2010; Wright and Bloemraad, 2012). Institutions — and those governing

\footnote{Throughout the text, I use incorporation policies to describe policies aimed at immigrants such as policies governing access to citizenship and cultural accommodation (e.g. multiculturalism). I try to not use the term integration policies to avoid confusion. In the analysis, integration is
immigration are no exception — can shape political conflict. They establish incentives for mobilization and set out rules for political discourse and behavior. Incorporation policies such as those dealing with citizenship and cultural accommodations play this role in the case of immigration. They send signals about who is in and who is out, and about which identities are encouraged and accepted in the public sphere. These signals are directed both at the host societies and at newcomers. Thus, the overarching goal of this dissertation is to better understand the role that institutions play in intergroup relationships between the host society and immigrants across countries of immigration.

To do so, I bring together political science research on immigration attitudes and incorporation policies, as well as social psychology literature on acculturation and social identity theory. Doing so gives us a more integrated view of these relationships, one where psychological characteristics and the context in which they translate into expressed opinions are taken into account. The overall objective of this dissertation can be subsumed under a single question: Are some institutional arrangements more likely to foster relationships where both the host society and the immigrant population do not feel threatened by the other, where the “us” vs “them” logic is replaced by a transformed “we”?

In a series of three papers, I look at both sides of this relationship and investigate the impact of incorporation policies on immigrant identification, on host societies’ feeling of threat and immigration attitudes, and on the possible transformed “we”?

used to refer to another concept, one of the four possible acculturation orientations—separation, integration, marginalization, and assimilation. I describe these acculturation orientations in the first empirical chapter.
formation of national identities. In the first two papers, I concentrate on two sets of policies, cultural accommodation policies—or multiculturalism—and policies governing the legal access to citizenship status. Using the same sets of policies to investigate both host societies’ and immigrants’ attitudes allows for a comparison of their respective influence on both groups. In the third paper, these policies are acting in the background and the goal is, in some ways, to look at their long-term effect, once they have made their way into citizens’ understanding of their nation.

This dissertation outlook is decidedly comparative. The first two papers directly compare attitudes across a series of immigration countries (ten in Chapter 2 and 17 in Chapter 3). This comparative focus is essential if we want to better understand the role of context in explaining attitudes, something that the large literature taking the United States as its source is not well-equipped to do. Although the third chapter looks more closely at a specific country, Canada, it does so with a comparative point of view by building on previous research done in the Netherlands (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007).

Methodologically, these papers are based on both observational and experimental data. Two chapters use large-scale comparative surveys and multilevel modeling to account for individual level factors while evaluating the role of contextual ones. The data used come from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) for host societies and the International Comparative Study of Ethnocultural Youth (ICSEY) for immigrants. The third chapter, concentrating on the Canadian case, is based on an experimental survey that I designed and that was conducted.
on my behalf by the survey firm Environics on a representative sample of English Canadian (N=1,500). Throughout the dissertation, a special effort is made to graphically display data and results while conveying as much information as possible. In doing so, I follow recent proposals encouraging the visual representation of results (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000; Gelman, Pasarica and Dodhia, 2002; Kastellec and Leoni, 2007). This also enables readers who may not have extensive knowledge of quantitative methods to better interpret the results that I present and evaluate the conclusions.

1.1 Organization and overview

The substantive chapters take the form of a series of three closely related but independent papers, each containing their own review of the literature, data, and analytical strategy.

The first paper directly engages with the questions raised by Schlesinger in the opening quote: are multiculturalism policies associated with a rejection of the host society’s identity by immigrants? Is there a policy arrangement that makes identification with the host more likely? In other words, the chapter addresses head-on whether there is a trade-off between identification with the ethnic group and relationships with the host society and whether this trade-off is created by certain policy regimes. These are important questions given the numerous debates—both theoretical and empirical—on the effect of incorporation policies on immigrants and the lack of consensus in the literature (see Dancygier and Laitin, 2014).

To answer them, I use a three-group categorization of countries based on mea-
sures of citizenship policies and multiculturalism policies (Wright and Bloemraad, 2012). These three groups — high citizenship/high multiculturalism, high citizenship/low multiculturalism, low citizenship/low multiculturalism — are then used as the basis for analyzing the relationship between policy regimes and identification processes. I show that there is no difference across these regimes in terms of ethnic identification and that immigrants in every policy regime tend to identify more with their ethnic group than with the majority. There are important differences however in the extent to which they identify with the majority. In line with arguments made by critics of multiculturalism, it is in policy regimes with high multiculturalism that we see the lowest level of identification with the majority. Countries that have open citizenship policies coupled with low multiculturalism are the ones most able to foster identification with this majority.

In this chapter, I also argue that identification is not the only element that matters in immigrants/host societies relationships. Starting from the idea that identification is not always necessary for a sense of belonging (Mason, 2010), I also look at different acculturation orientations — integration, separation, assimilation, marginalization — as well as how identification with the ethnic group translates into these orientations. What the results show, perhaps unsurprisingly, is that in every policy regime, ethnic identifiers are more likely to exhibit separation attitudes, that is, to embrace relationships with the ethnic groups while rejecting the majority in areas such as marriage and friendships. However, only countries that have open citizenship policies and comprehensive multicultural policies are able to foster integrationist attitudes among ethnic identifiers. Integrationist atti-
tudes mean that immigrants embrace relationships with both the ethnic group and the majority. This finding is robust to additional test looking more specifically at Muslim immigrants.

Indirectly, this first chapter also addresses another issue related to immigration: the feeling of cultural threat that some host society members experience when faced with immigrants. This feeling often comes from the belief that these immigrants are not “assimilating” to the larger society (Paxton and Mughan, 2006). Writing about the effects that immigrants’ ethnic identification may have on the larger society, Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001) write: “Clearly, the mobilization of group consciousness among the disadvantaged can force movement toward less inequality and more social justice. On the other hand, the enhanced expression of ethnic identification in one group tends to be emulated, often provoking resistance to change and the hardening of group boundaries” (91). Here, I show that some policy arrangements are more likely to encourage ethnic identification—and the positive psychological consequences that come with it—while also fostering integrationist attitudes that might make these boundaries between groups more porous. What this chapter does not do however is take into account the attitudes of the host societies themselves. These attitudes might also represent an important boundary.

This is what I turn to in the second chapter where the focus is on host societies, the feeling of cultural threat that some members of the majority might experience, and the effect it has on immigration attitudes. The literature coming from the social identity tradition is clear on the consequences of feeling that one’s group
identity is threatened, it leads to outgroup hostility (Brewer, 2001). In the context of immigration this means an increase in anti-immigration and anti-immigrants attitudes. As such, the second paper directly addresses cultural threat, its consequences, and the role that policy context plays in mitigating or reinforcing these consequences. In doing so, I bridge the literature on incorporation policies with the one on immigration attitudes, two literatures that have, in some ways, evolved in parallel paths. On the one hand, as I have mentioned before, the literature on policies has been more interested in explaining the divergence and convergence across countries than in exploring the consequences of these policies on attitudes. A move in this direction has recently taken place, but large-N research remains in its infancy. On the other hand, research on immigration attitudes has increasingly focused on the micro-foundations of attitudes such as threat and the mechanisms through which it translates into attitudes. Because of this focus on mechanisms and the single-country nature of most of these studies, they are not well equipped to deal with the possibility that the larger context in which these relationships are uncovered might also matter.

Scholars interested in these attitudes have investigated the impact of contextual factors, but few have done so while considering incorporation policies, the very policies that establish the context in which intergroup relationships take place (Sides and Citrin, 2007; Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009; Rustenbach, 2010). Yet, the institutional framework governing immigrant incorporation might condition how an individual reacts when hearing a foreign language or when reading news about the influx of low-skilled immigrants, two topics studied by the cultural
threat literature. The signal this individual receives when he is in contact with an immigrant from a different culture might not ring the same bell — or might not ring the ‘threat’ bell as strongly — in every context. Following the works of Wel- don (2006) on political and social tolerance and of Wright (2011) on definitions of the nation, I include multiculturalism policies and citizenship policies in an analysis of the determinants of feeling of cultural threat and of anti-immigration policies.

The analysis shows that citizenship policies and multiculturalism policies have different consequences when it comes to threat and anti-immigration attitudes. For instance, while open citizenship policies are associated with lower levels of cultural threat, multiculturalism is not. I also investigate their direct impact on attitudes toward three specific aspects of immigration and diversity: support for more stringent citizenship laws, opposition to government support for minorities, and support for more restrictive immigration policies. When it comes to these three measures, only multiculturalism policies matter, they increase opposition to government support for minorities.

Finally, I also investigate whether incorporation policies mitigate how cultural threat translates into anti-immigration attitudes. Across all countries under study, this relationship is unequivocal: cultural threat is associated with an increase in anti-immigration positions. Policies matter here again, but differently. While citizenship policies mitigate the effect of threat, multiculturalism policies reinforce it.

This second empirical chapter brings the focus on the role of context and raises
the possibility that some policies, by reinforcing norms such as inclusiveness, might influence immigration attitudes. Over time, they might even change the picture that some societies have of themselves. This is what I turn to in the last empirical chapter.

Focusing on a single country, the final paper examines the possibility of overcoming the “us” vs “them” dynamic. It does so while considering whether open incorporation policies can become the building blocks of a transformed national identity. Among immigration countries, Canada has often been considered the success story of immigrant incorporation and management of ethnic diversity. To explain these successes, some have argued that Canada has been able to build the idea of diversity in its narrative as a country (Kymlicka, 2003). For example, Bloemraad writes: “the success of Canadian multiculturalism—or the lack of retreat from it—stems from its integral role in Canadian nation building [...] At a certain level, multiculturalism makes Canadianism possible” (Bloemraad, 2006, 243). Put differently, authors suggest that inclusiveness is now part of the normative content of Canadian national identity and that what it means to be Canadian is to welcome immigrants. This hypothesis is at odds with findings from studies on national identity and its impact on immigration attitudes. The main conclusion coming from this literature is that identification with the national group is overwhelmingly linked with more opposition to immigration (e.g. Sniderman, Hagen-doorn and Prior, 2004; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wong, 2010). Some have hinted at the possibility that the meaning of national identities might influence this relationship (Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009; Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012). Canada
thus represents an ideal case to test these competing ideas. If there is one country
where we should expect national identity to lead to acceptance of diversity and
immigration, it should be Canada.\(^3\) In order to test these propositions, I replicate
— with some modifications — a well-known priming experiment conducted in
the Netherlands (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004). The objective of this
experimental design is to prime respondents’ identity as Canadian while leaving
the actual content of the identity to them. In other words, the prime is not de-
signed to increase the salience of some specific aspects of Canadian identity like
inclusiveness, but to bring this identity to the forefront before asking respondents
a series of question about immigration and multiculturalism.

The analysis shows that contrary to previous results obtained in the Nether-
lands, the “Sniderman” prime fails to increase anti-immigration attitudes among
Canadian respondents. A more neutral prime, designed to better isolate the effect
of national identity, decreases these exclusionary attitudes and makes respondents
more likely to agree that minorities should have the same political rights as Cana-
dians. These results are important for both the comparative study of national
identities and for our understanding of the Canadian case. In the latter case, I find
that a large number of respondents are experiencing a feeling of cultural threat,
which increases anti-immigration attitudes. Priming Canadian identity does not
counter-balance this feeling of threat. Thus, although Canadian national identity
does seem to be different in its relationship with immigration attitudes, some of

\(^3\)In fact, Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012) have showed that when it comes to pride in the
country and inclusive attitudes towards immigrants, the relationship is positive in Canada and
negative in the US.
the results should give pause to those emphasizing the “exceptionalism” of the Canadian case.

In the concluding chapter, I highlight other key findings while bringing everything together. I also address the larger implications for the literature on both attitudes formation and incorporation policies, but more importantly, for the democratic life of immigration countries. Combined together, the three chapters that follow offer a rich and integrated view of the relationships between host societies and immigrants. It does so by considering the impact of policies on “us” and “them” (whether seen from the immigrants’ or the hosts’ point of view), and by investigating the possibility for an inclusive “we”.
Chapter 2

Incorporation policies, immigrant identification, and acculturation attitudes

Despite statements from different World leaders declaring that multiculturalism has failed, the actual impact of incorporation policies on immigrants’ remains a disputed matter. Studies looking at the effect of these policies on different socio-political outcomes among immigrants often come to mixed conclusions (Dancygier and Laitin, 2014). For instance, some find that immigrants fare poorly in terms of job market integration in countries with multiculturalism policies and a generous welfare state (Koopmans, 2010) or argue that cultural assimilation measures might be necessary to promote socio-cultural integration (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010). Yet, others find that multiculturalism policies seem to fos-
ter engagement and political inclusion (Wright and Bloemraad, 2012) and that
dual citizenship does not have the negative effect that is sometimes suggested on
commitment to the host society (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010). These mixed
findings are in part a consequence of the diversity of outcomes studied and the
disagreement over their theoretical and practical value. In addition to a lack of
consensus on the outcome of interest, these contradictory findings in the literature
can also be attributed to the fact that large-N research on the impact of incorpora-
tion policies is still in a developing stage. As such, it is slowly moving away from
earlier trends where comparative studies of immigration policies were concerned
with policies as the outcome (e.g. Brubaker, 1992). Only recently have scholars
turned their focus on policies as an explanatory variable and most of them remain
small-N comparative research or case studies (Bloemraad, 2006; Weldon, 2006;
Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010; Koopmans, 2010; Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010;
Wright, 2011b; Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011; Wright and Bloemraad, 2012).
The gap is even more substantial when it comes to the impact of policies on im-
migrants themselves, where the lack of reliable data makes large-N studies even
more challenging. Immigrants represent a constituency that can be hard to reach
and there are often too few of them in nationally representative samples to allow
for meaningful statistical analysis.

Yet, political scientists studying ethnic diversity and its consequences have
not entirely shied away from investigating the role of institutions and policies.
For example, scholars interested in fractionalized societies have looked at the role
that institutions may play in fostering attachment to the state. They have done
so, however, with an emphasis on power-sharing institutions and in the context of multiethnic societies with important minority groups, such as Iraq (e.g. Elkins and Sides, 2007; Penn, 2008). Still, in those cases, countries that have more important power-sharing institutions do not create a stronger sense of attachment from either the majority or the minority (Elkins and Sides, 2007, 705) and ethnic minorities do tend to have lower levels of attachment than the majority. Similar to these highly divided countries, immigration countries face a need to foster attachment to the state among newcomers. It is thus crucial to evaluate whether state policies are fulfilling their objectives or whether, as some have claimed, they are failing.

Recent work by Wright and Bloemraad (2012) represents a first important step in understanding policies and their influence on immigrants attitudes and behaviors. Wright and Bloemraad look at a series of political attitudes among immigrants, such as political trust, satisfaction with government, and political participation. They then compare these outcomes across immigration countries that they divide in three distinct policy regimes. Here, I follow in their steps but concentrate on ethnic and national identity as well as on four different acculturation orientations. I argue that studying these outcomes is essential in understanding the impact of incorporation policies and in addressing the criticisms directed at them. First, critiques of multiculturalism often focus on questions of identity and of immigrants’ attachment to their new society while stressing the necessity of creating a common “we” (e.g. Bissoondath, 1994; Miller, 1995; Barry, 2002). Second, I argue that compared to some outcomes investigated by others, for example segregation and criminality (Koopmans, 2010), identification and acculturation ori-
Presentations are causally closer to incorporation policies and the mechanism linking the two is more straightforward. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the individual-level data used for the analysis come from immigrant teenagers, who, through school, are directly in contact with some of the policies investigated here.

More precisely, I examine the relationship between incorporation policies and immigrants’ attachment to their own ethnic identity and the identity and culture of their new society. I then move on to the relationship between policies and acculturation orientations. Are countries that enact multiculturalism policies observing less national identification among their immigrant population? Is easier access to citizenship a guarantee of identification with the host? What happens when these two policies are combined? How do these identification processes reflect on attitudes towards language choice or cultural traditions? Ultimately the question becomes whether there is a trade-off between identification with the ethnic group and relationships with the host society and whether certain policy regimes might actually create this trade-off while others do not. To answer these questions I use a dataset developed by social-psychologists whose original goal was to study immigrant youth well-being in a series of immigration countries, a survey that contains unique measures of identification and acculturation orientations (Berry et al., 2006).[^1] I combine these individual-level data with well-known indices measuring multiculturalism policies and citizenship policies at the country-level (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Howard, 2009).

[^1]: Although the full dataset contains data for twelve countries, only ten are used here. I explain this in more detail in the data section.
The present study makes several contributions to the literature on incorporation policies and immigrants’ attitudes as well as to the political debates surrounding these issues. First, I make the case that identity and acculturation orientations represent more worthwhile outcomes than some previously studied dependent variables. The argument is not that outcomes such as segregation or market labor participation are not important but that they often suffer from data limitations and the possibility of omitted variable bias. Second, the use of the ICSEY dataset allows for a direct test of the often-heard arguments against policies like multiculturalism made by some political theorists and politicians. The analysis directly addresses common worries about ethnic identification, commitment and sense of belonging to the large society.

Using graphical representations of these multilevel data, I show that despite the fact that a high level of multiculturalism policies and open citizenship favors stronger identification with the ethnic group and less identification with the host society, it does so while still fostering integrationist orientations. More importantly, in these countries that embraced multiculturalism and open citizenship laws, national identity is not a prerequisite for commitment to the larger society. The results that follow mean that critics of these policies who see them as a source of division are actually targeting policies that are associated with engagement.

The ICSEY data allows for a cross-country comparison of identification and the relationship between these identification processes and acculturation attitudes. However, its limitation — having data for only ten countries — means that the conclusions drawn are exploratory in nature. Nonetheless, they represent an im-
portant first step in understanding the effect that incorporation policy regimes can have on their primary target, the immigrants themselves.

2.1 Incorporation policy regimes

The recent move from single-case study and small-N comparative work to large(r)-N research in the study of incorporation policies has come in hand with attempts at quantifying these policies. Earlier comparisons focused on the distinction between the ethnic and civic origin of institutions (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Weldon 2006) but the insistence on this distinction has been criticized (Brubaker 1999; Shulman, 2002; Joppke 2005, 2010). Authors using the ethnic/civic dichotomy are often quick to note that countries’ laws and policies usually had both ethnic and civic components. Another consequence of adopting this distinction is that most Western countries can now be conceived as being part of the civic category even though they may differ extensively in their actual policy (Mahnig and Wimmer, 2000). Finally, a focus on the origins of policies can also obscure recent trends that have brought forward a liberalization of citizenship policies (Howard, 2006) and a move away from multiculturalism, especially in Europe (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). Similarly, in social psychology, both Berry et al. (2006) and Bourhis et al. (1997) draw attention to policies in their study of acculturation but do so with an emphasis on overarching ideologies or history without empirical evidence to support these distinctions. In this section, I explain how I distinguish between different policy regimes while grounding these distinctions empirically.
2.1.1 Measuring policy regimes

Incorporation regimes are built around a series of policies directed primarily at immigrants. Among these policies, cultural accommodation measures and citizenship access are two crucial sets of policies that are at the center of the debates surrounding how countries should deal with diversity and immigration.

Cultural accommodation policies are often referred to as “multiculturalism policies”, which can lead to some confusion because the term “multiculturalism” has taken on different related meanings. It has been used to refer to a normative political theory on how societies should deal with ethnic diversity (e.g. Taylor et al., 1994; Kymlicka, 1995), a personal attitude of acceptance toward diversity (Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar, 2008), a sociological fact (e.g. a multi-cultural country), and finally a set of government policies. In the context of the present study, multiculturalism takes on the last of these definitions: a set of governmental policies aimed at recognizing and accommodating cultural diversity (multicultural policies or MCPs).

Another set of policies, those governing access to citizenship, have been hypothesized to influence immigrants’ sense of belonging and identity. Citizenship here is understood in a limited sense, i.e. as a legal status, rather than the more comprehensive Marshallian sense, which for example also includes social rights (Marshall, 1950). Access to citizenship matters because when laws governing

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2 The objective of the present analysis is to look at the role of country-level policies. Arguably, sub-national policies and even municipal policies might also play a role. However, these country-level policies will set the tone and as such remain central (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010; Wright, 2011b).

3 For more on the different dimensions of citizenship see Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul.
citizenship are more open, they send a welcoming message to newcomers and perhaps reinforce a sense of membership. Understood in that sense, citizenship is also distinct from MCPs, since granting citizenship does not necessarily come with a recognition of different cultural practices. This distinction is made clear by the trends outlined earlier where MCPs have been heavily criticized while citizenship laws have become less restrictive (Howard, 2006).

In an effort to more accurately measure different incorporation policies, political scientists and sociologists have turned their attention to building a series of indices. MCPs and citizenship access are two areas where such indices have been developed and used empirically.

For multiculturalism, Banting and Kymlicka (2006) have built a comprehensive index composed of scores on eight different policy areas (MPI). These policy areas are: official affirmation of multiculturalism; presence of multiculturalism in schools curriculum; inclusion of ethnic representation in public media and licensing; exemption from dress code for minorities; funding of ethnic organizations to support cultural activities; funding of bilingual and mother-tongue instruction; affirmative action; and dual citizenship. A country receives zero point if it has not adopted a given policy, half a point if it has done so only partially and a full point if it has fully adopted it.

The Citizenship Policies Index (CPI) was elaborated by Howard (2009) and measures three aspects of citizenship policies: whether a country allows dual citizenship; whether it grants *jus soli* citizenship; and the minimum number of years (2008).
of residency that are required to acquire citizenship. In a comparison of different indices measuring citizenship policies Helbling and Bauböck (2011) consider Howard’s measure to be the simplest and find that although based on different indicators, these indices are highly correlated. In addition to these two policy areas, Goodman (2010) has also developed an index, CIVIX, that measures civic integration requirements in terms of country knowledge, language and culture. Goodman sees the CIVIX as complementary to a simple measure of access to citizenship like Howard’s. Her data show that as of 2009, a series of European countries had adopted more restrictive requirements. However, earlier results from 1997 show almost no variation among the 14 countries she studies (Goodman, 2010, 764). Because the individual data used here come from this earlier period and because Howard’s measure of citizenship access has been recognized for its parsimony and validity (Helbling and Bauböck, 2011), I concentrate on access and on citizenship as legal status.

Once we plot immigration countries based on these two indices, the picture that emerges in Figure 2.1 is one of three distinct groups of countries. One group with relatively low (or closed) citizenship policies as well as low MCPs (Low-Low), one with more open citizenship policies but few MCPs (High-Low), and finally a third group displaying both open citizenship policies and comparatively more MCPs (High-High).

Some modifications to the original policies datasets were necessary to produce this plot. First, I have recalculated values for all countries on the MCP and subtracted their score for dual citizenship, which is also accounted for in the CPI and
is conceptually closer to the latter. Second, some countries with a MPI score were not part of the original CPI, which only contains data for European countries. I followed Howard’s methodology to assign a score to these added countries.

Figure 2.2 only plots countries in the ICSEY dataset which will be used for the empirical analysis and discussed below. These graphs of policy regimes are similar to those in Wright and Bloemraad (2012) and based on a comparable strategy used by Koopmans et al. (2005).

The fact that the ICSEY dataset only contains data for two countries in the Low-Low category—Norway and Germany—is less than ideal. However, these two countries do represent the range of values in this group with Germany being the upper boundary and Norway close to the lower one.

These three different policy regimes are at the basis of the empirical analysis and serve as the main level-2 variable. Should we expect differences in identification processes across these regimes? Is the effect of ethnic identity the same across all three regimes and is it having the perverse effect attributed to it by critics of multiculturalism? I now turn to hypotheses on their possible effects on immigrants before giving more details on the individual data and the analytical strategy.

### 2.2 Incorporation policy regimes and immigrants

The study of incorporation policies has moved from theoretical debates about the foundations and justifications for one regime over the other to the debate over their empirical consequences. However, these new empirical investigations offer con-
This graph plots a series of immigration countries according to their values on two policy indices, the MCP index ranging from 0 to 7 (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006) and the Citizenship index ranging from 0 to 6 (Howard, 2006). Both indices are explained in the text.
Figure 2.2: Incorporation policies across contexts (ICSEY countries)

This graph plots the countries in the ICSEY dataset according to their values on two policy indices, the MCP index ranging from 0 to 7 (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006) and the Citizenship index ranging from 0 to 6 (Howard, 2009). Both indices are explained in the text.
traditional findings. One reason for these discrepancies in results is that scholars disagree on the outcome that should be studied. Bloemraad (2007), for example, argues that the aim of a policy like multiculturalism is the socio-political integration of immigrants in the form of citizenship and political inclusion rather than economic outcomes such as labor market integration. An opposing view is that of Koopmans (2010), who view economic outcomes as a valid dependent variable and shows that the combination of multicultural policies and a generous welfare state leads to poor labor market participation.

In this study, I follow Bloemraad and argue that in many cases the outcomes of interest are too far removed from the policies to lend themselves to meaningful analysis. In cross-country analysis of complex policies of the types that scholars of immigration study, the number of confounding variables rapidly becomes problematic, the possibility of omitted variable bias increases and readers are often left trying to unpack the “blackbox” of causality. Koopmans (2010) does show that multiculturalism is associated with outcomes such as high level of segregation and a strong over-representation of immigrants within the convicted criminal population, but he does not investigate the causal mechanism that would lead from multiculturalism policies to criminality or to ethnic enclaves. Although he does hypothesize that these outcomes are due to multiculturalism not creating strong incentives for language acquisition and interethnic contacts, he never gets at this mechanism directly.

I suggest that when confronted with survey data that only lends itself to correlational analysis, it might be better to concentrate on more immediate outcomes.
Here I look at two outcomes—identity (national and ethnic) and acculturation orientations—that are causally closer to incorporation policies. I then move on to an analysis of the interplay between the two, i.e. how identification affects acculturation orientations across contexts. I am not suggesting that the following analysis fully unpacks the causal mechanism linking policies to these outcomes, but that by looking at more immediate outcomes, the role of policies becomes more “conceivable”.

2.2.1 Ethnic and national identity

Critics of multiculturalism view it as a vector of division, reinforcing ethnic identities to the detriment of a sense of belonging, or in the words of Schlesinger (1991) as a “disuniting” force. On the other side of the debate, some political theorists argue that making these identities disappear would also mean making claims related to these identities impossible, create a less just society, and establish barriers to full participation in the public sphere (Young 1990, Taylor et al. 1994, Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2002, e.g.). In other words, both critics and supporters agree that multiculturalism should lead to more identification with the ethnic group, but they disagree on the consequence of this identification. One group sees it as leading to segregation and disengagement, the other as a path to meaningful participation. One thing they seem to agree on, however, is that societies still need some kind of common bond and a willingness from individuals to interact with one another.

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4Philosophical disagreements exist between these theorists of multiculturalism on a series of issues such as the theoretical basis for recognizing cultural diversity and the competing role of groups and individuals (see for example Joppke 2004).
A preconception that often tints these theoretical debates is that identification with the host and identification with the ethnic group are mutually exclusive. Before going further it is important to clarify what is meant by national and ethnic identity, two concepts that are multidimensional (see Abdelal et al., 2008). One useful understanding of identity proposed by Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001) is of a concept that has three dimensions: cognitive (identification as), affective (identification with), and normative (accepted criteria for group membership) (see also Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Brewer, 2001; Citrin and Sears, 2009). When studying identity choices, the focus is often on the first two. Clearly, however, it is the second dimension, identification with, that is seen as crucial for both critics and proponents of open incorporation policies.5

Although some scholars still conceive of ethnic identity and national identity as mutually exclusive (e.g. Penn, 2008), there is large agreement that they are on the contrary independent from one another (Liebkind, 2001; Phinney et al., 2001; Citrin and Sears, 2009). Research in social psychology sees the relation between national identity and ethnic identity through a two-dimensional model that recognizes that preservation of one’s heritage culture and identification to the host society are conceptually distinct and vary independently (Berry, 1997; Phinney et al., 2001; Liebkind, 2001; Citrin and Sears, 2009).

In theory then, identification with the host and identification with the ethnic group are independent from one another. However, it is clear that choices as to

5The relationship between incorporation policies and the normative dimension of national identity is also a question of interest, see Wright (2011b).
the importance given to each will be influenced by individual characteristics but also by policies, such as cultural accommodation policies or citizenship access. Citrin and Sears (2009) write that these policies are likely to influence the distribution of identity choices, but because they only look at the ethnic and national identification in the US, they cannot isolate the role of policies. At the same time, these single-country or small-N studies do give us some information on minorities’ identification choices. For instance, ethnic minorities do tend to have lower levels of attachment to the country compared with the majority (Elkins and Sides, 2007; Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012). Canada, often given as an example of the successes of multiculturalism, does not seem to match this pattern. Wright and Bloemraad (2012) show that ethnic identification is more salient in Canada compared to the US and that this attachment to the ethnic group is not linked with a rejection of the host society. Their conclusion is quite to the contrary: immigrants in Canada feel more attachment to their new country than their American counterpart. In that case, a policy like multiculturalism seems to be encouraging a double identification.

In terms of citizenship, more easily attainable citizenship should send a welcoming message to newcomers and incite identification with the host. However, Ersanilli and Koopmans (2010) find that it is not the case. Looking at France, the Netherlands, and Germany, they find that it is the former who is able to foster more national identification while Germany is the least capable of doing so. The country with the most open citizenship laws, the Netherlands, finds itself in the middle. Ersanilli and Koopmans do not account for cultural accommodation
policies where these three countries also significantly differ. What if a country sends the welcoming message associated with open citizenship without the deleterious effects attributed to multiculturalism by its critics? One expectation then is that countries with open citizenship but without MCPs should see a stronger identification with the host society and a weaker one with the ethnic group.

The literature points to contradictory possibilities when it comes to expectations for the other two regimes, those with either very limited MCPs and hard to obtain citizenship (Low-Low) and those with open citizenship and extensive MCPs (High-High). The argument behind countries making citizenship harder to access while also rejecting cultural accommodation is that this should incite immigrants to assimilate to the host society. Accordingly, if this logic holds, we should see immigrants in these countries adopt the host society’s identity to a greater extent. Conversely, scholars in the social identity theory tradition (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), argue that when group boundaries are considered impermeable an individual will choose to solidify relationships with his ingroup, in this case the ethnic group. According to social identity theory then, rather than fostering assimilation, countries with closed boundaries in the form of restrictive citizenship and low MCPs should increase identification with the ethnic group.

Competing expectations are also present when it comes to countries with relatively open borders and important MCPs. Opponents of such policies argue that they reinforce particular identities and offer no incentive to identify with the larger group. If they are right, countries in that group should see higher identification with the ethnic group and lower identification with the host. On the other side
of the debate, proponents argue that cultural accommodation policies encourage participation in the larger society and make it possible for ethnic minorities to recognize themselves in the larger group. Consequently, ethnic identity and national identity should both be strong in these countries.

The previous expectations are only about identification. What if we were to look at more concrete attitudes that are directly linked to the relationships an immigrant wishes to have with his own ethnic group and with the host? Perhaps identification with a group is not a prerequisite for a desire to interact with it, learn its language or even get involved in relationships like friendship or marriage. It is these types of relationships and choices made about them by immigrants that scholars in social psychology call acculturation orientations.

### 2.2.2 Acculturation

The concept of acculturation has seldom been used in political science and when it has, it is mostly as a synonym for assimilation. For instance, citing Fuchs (1990), Branton (2007) writes: “Acculturation, or cultural assimilation, refers to the process whereby immigrants assume the cultural values and norms of mainstream U.S. society” (see also Lien, 1994; De la Garza, Falcon and Garcia, 1996). In other fields, its meaning is quite different. The concept was first developed in anthropology dating back to Redfield, Linton and Herskovits (1936) who define it as “those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both” (149). This is also the understanding
in social psychology, where most of the immigration-related work on accultura-
\[ \text{tion is done. Although some conceptual ambiguity remains, scholars in social psychology have come to a consensus on its meaning and the processes behind it} \ (\text{Sam}, 2006). \] For them, acculturation refers to the changes that occur at the individual level when an immigrant experiences intercultural contact with his or her new culture (e.g. Berry, 1997). According to the model of acculturation developed by Berry (Berry, 1980, 1984), immigrants face two choices when entering in intercultural contact: they have to decide whether to maintain their ethnic culture and identity and whether relationships with the host should be pursued or if they should be avoided. Similar to choices about identification, these choices about relationship with the host and with the ethnic group are considered to be independent of one another.\textsuperscript{6}

The immigrant’s strategies on these two orthogonal dimensions will situate her in the realm of acculturation orientations. Figure 2.3 maps the four possible acculturation orientations based on these choices. Immigrants are displaying integrationist attitudes when they embrace relationships with both their ethnic group and with the host. If an immigrant only seeks relationships with his own group, he is separating himself from the host. Viewed through this model, assimilation becomes only one acculturation orientation, one where an immigrant rejects her own ethnic culture while embracing the majority culture and seeking relationships with the host only. Finally, rejecting both the ethnic group and the host

\textsuperscript{6}This particular model of acculturation orientation is not without criticism (Rudmin, 2003, 2009) but has also been partially vindicated (Schwartz and Zamboanga, 2008). See also Schwartz et al. (2010) for a review of the current debate.
leads to marginalization. This latter category has been criticized because it does not apply to many immigrants and because scales that attempt to measure it often have poor reliability and validity compared with scales for the other acculturation orientations (Cuellar, Arnold and Maldonado, 1995; Schwartz et al., 2010). Consequently, although I will display results for marginalization, I will not discuss at length the observed patterns.

**Figure 2.3:** Acculturation orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values relationships with own ethnic group</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>INTEGRATION</td>
<td>ASSIMILATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>SEPARATION</td>
<td>MARGINALIZATION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The case for acculturation as an outcome of interest partly rests on the argument that acculturation orientations can be conceived as measures of commitment and attachment to the host society that are distinct from a direct measure of identification. Most critics of multiculturalism stress the need for a strong common identity which will generate a commitment to the larger society and trust in co-nationals (Miller, 1995; Barry, 2002). Perhaps is it possible to see commitment and attachment as distinct from identification, an argument made by Mason (2010). If identification with the host is not necessary to foster a sense of connection with the larger society, it is conceivable that some policy regimes are more
conducive to such relationships.

In a revised model of Berry’s original acculturation model, Bourhis et al. (1997) suggest that these orientations do not emerge from a political vacuum and introduce policies as one of the explanatory factors driving acculturation orientations (373). What are the expectations for the relationship between policy regimes and acculturation orientations? First, we should observe more variation across policy regimes within each orientation than between them: integration should be the favoured orientation for all policy regimes and marginalization should be the least-favoured one (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012). When looking within orientation, expectations differ whether one adheres to the arguments of proponents of MCPs and open borders or with those of partisans of more restrictive policies. If the former are right, open policies should help minorities feel part of the larger society while encouraging the preservation of ethnic ties. Accordingly, these policies should increase integrationist attitudes. On the other hand, if partisans of more restrictive policies are right and open policies do not incentivize intergroup contact, we should see immigrants in High-High countries separate themselves from the larger society and opt to have relationships solely with their ethnic group. Conversely, Low-Low countries should promote assimilation more than other types of regimes because they reinforce national identity.

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For Bourhis and his colleagues, it is possible to divide incorporation policies into an ideological continuum with four ideal-types of state ideologies (pluralist, civic, assimilation, and ethnist). However, they do not derive specific expectations about the effect of these different ideologies on acculturation orientations and do not ground them empirically. These ideologies are analogous to the earlier work in political science dividing the conception of national definition as civic or ethnic and suffer from the same shortcomings.
and do not recognize ethnic groups’ cultural differences.

2.2.3 The interplay between ethnic identity and acculturation

One possibility that has yet to be investigated is that some policy regimes might be able to create a sense of belonging and commitment among its minorities without it being necessarily coupled with a strong identification with the host.

This is an important aspect of the relationship between ethnic group identification and attitudes toward the host society. If ethnic identification is strong but not coupled with a sense of commitment with the host, this could lead to undesirable consequences, such as a backlash among the majority. A country that is able to help minorities preserve their identity while also fostering a sense of belonging to the host society might be able to make this resistance from the majority less severe.

What should we expect as identification with the ethnic group grows? The answer to that question is at the basis of much of the criticism directed at policies that recognize cultural diversity. In terms of acculturation orientations, an increase in ethnic identification can have two competing consequences. On the one hand, it can lead to an increase in the value given to relationships with the ethnic group and a rejection of the host, i.e. it can increase separation attitudes. On the other hand, it can increase the value given to relationships with both groups, i.e. it can increase integration attitudes.

Policies are likely to come in play in determining which of these two outcomes an increase in ethnic identity will lead to. Low-Low regimes, for example,
are likely to make identification with the ethnic group and relationships with the host antithetical by not recognizing ethnic identities as legitimate in the public sphere and by making it hard to gain legal membership. In High-High countries, if proponents of MCPs are right, ethnic identity should be associated with integration. If critics are right however, a heightened sense of ethnic identity should lead to separation.

Of course, this will depend on the effect that policies have on identification itself. If restrictive policies are able to foster national identification and lower levels of ethnic identification, the fact that ethnic identification leads to separation should not represent an issue—few immigrants would fall in that category. However, if all regimes have similar levels of identification with the ethnic group, then how this identification feeds into acculturation orientations becomes crucial.

Finally, an increase in ethnic identity should also lead to a decrease in assimilation and marginalization attitudes since both these acculturation orientations presuppose that less value is given to relationships with the ethnic group.

### 2.3 Data and methods

In addition to the country-level data already described, the analysis employs individual level data from a dataset that has yet to be used in political science. After an overview of the ICSEY data, I move on to the strategy used for the analysis.
2.3.1 The international comparative study of ethnocultural youth (ICSEY)

The individual level data come from the International Comparative Study of Ethnocultural Youth (ICSEY). The ICSEY is a survey of 26 groups of immigrant youth (aged 13 to 18 years) in twelve countries and was conducted from the end of the 1990s to the early 2000s (for more details on the survey methodology see Berry et al., 2006, 2010). What makes this survey unique, in addition to its large sample of immigrants (N=5,366), is its focus on identity and different acculturation orientations among adolescents of immigrant background. The original goal of the ICSEY study was to look at the effect of these attitudes on a series of psychological and sociocultural adaptation measures. Here, instead of using these identity measures as explanatory variables, I employ them as the dependent variables and evaluate how they vary according to incorporation policies contexts when controlling for other individual level factors. Table B.1 in the Appendix gives key summary statistics for socio-demographic variables of interest.

The first two dependent variables are additive indices and measure identification with the host society and identification with the respondent’s own ethnic group. Conceptually, these identification measures are a mix of two of the three dimensions proposed by Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001). The first question—*I feel that I am part of...*—can be conceived as being about both the cognitive dimension of identity (identification *as*) and the affective dimension (identification *with*). All the other questions are measuring the affective dimension.\(^8\)

\(^8\)It is possible that some of these questions are more likely to depend on context in ways that
The four other dependent variables, also additive indices, measure the extent to which the respondents display attitudes in line with the four acculturation orientations explained earlier (see Figure 2.3). These attitudes are measured based on respondents’ preferences in five domains: cultural traditions, language, marriage, social activities, and friendship (Berry et al., 1989). Table 2.1 displays descriptive statistics for the dependent variables as well as the number of individual items that compose them (refer to the appendix for complete question wording).

### Table 2.1: Summary statistics of dependent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Nbr. of Items</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4307</td>
<td>.616</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority identity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4273</td>
<td>.536</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation att.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4308</td>
<td>.297</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration att.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4302</td>
<td>.738</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation att.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4306</td>
<td>.388</td>
<td>.217</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalization att.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4301</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variables are all indices ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 is the most positive value.

The ICSEY provides invaluable data but like any dataset it is not perfect. One issue when using cross-country immigrant data is that characteristics specific to a given immigrant group might influence the outcome. Ideally, a dataset would sample the same group in all countries or all groups in the countries that are part of the studies. In fact, the latter would be preferable to the former. Taking a sample of the same ethnocultural group in all countries could bias the result if the group has a different historical relationship with a given country, a colonial bias our results. For example, some might argue that it is less embarrassing and uncomfortable to be ethnic in High-High countries, and that as such, the embarrassed and uncomfortable people in these countries are different from the embarrassed and uncomfortable people in Low-Low countries. The results that follow are robust to versions of the dependent variables that exclude these more “context-dependent” questions.
relationship for example. Ersanilli and Koopmans (2010) face such a problem when they compare Turkish immigrants in Germany, the Netherlands, and France and find poor socio-cultural integration in Germany. They attribute this result to Germany’s strict naturalization regime, but one could argue that the relationship between Turkish immigrants and the German state is not comparable to the one between Turks and the French state. In sampling groups, the ICSEY dataset does a bit of both. It samples immigrants with a Vietnamese or Turkish background when possible — seven countries for the former, six for the latter — but also includes a large number of different groups to better reflect the immigrant composition of a given country. The only exception is the U.K. which only sampled immigrants of Indian origin, consequently the country was dropped from the analysis. Israel is also excluded because of its singular history. As stated before, dropping these two countries means that the analysis will be based on ten of the twelve countries included in the original dataset.

In addition to these identification measures, the dataset contains other socio-demographic variables such as respondents’ religion. With Muslim immigration being the target of most of the backlash against cultural accommodation and open borders, it allows for a more targeted investigation of this group in particular. The fact that respondents are teenagers is arguably another strength of the dataset. Teenagers are in the midst of forming their identity and their choices will be influenced both by their family— thus reflecting their parents’ orientations — and

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9Because the U.K. sample only contains respondents from one ethnic group, it is impossible to untangle whether the observed relationship is due to British policies or to characteristics that are specific to this group.
by educational programs. Lastly, although the ICSEY provides a sample for ten countries, this number remains insufficient to fit a multilevel model. I now turn to the empirical strategy that I will employ and explain it in more detail.

### 2.3.2 Visualizing multilevel data

Analyzing the effect of policies on individual attitudes across countries is inherently a multilevel enterprise. Respondents are nested within countries and their respective policy contexts and the goal is to identify the impact of these policies once we control for individual-level predictors of the outcome.\(^\text{10}\) For instance, scholars have used multilevel modeling to get at the effect of policies on tolerance (Weldon, 2006) or the effect of power-sharing institutions on political participation (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). In the present case however, two important assumptions of multilevel modeling are problematic. First, the asymptotic properties of maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) on which multilevel models rely necessitate a good number of cases (Bowers and Drake, 2005).\(^\text{11}\) With ten countries as the level-2 sample size, this is far from ideal.\(^\text{12}\) Second, MLE also assumes that these level-2 cases are a representative random sample of a given population. The ten countries in the ICSEY cannot be considered a random sample but rather more like a convenience sample, i.e. they are the countries for which

\(^{10}\)For more on the logic behind multilevel modeling see Gelman and Hill (2007) starting at p.251.

\(^{11}\)The same point is made by Sides and Citrin (2007, 495), who also rightfully highlight the fact that Quillian (1995) finds ‘fragility’ in his estimates when using multilevel modeling with only 12 countries (603).

\(^{12}\)On the importance of large level-2 sample, see Stoker and Bowers (2002), Maas and Hox (2005), and Stegmueller (2013).
we have individual-level data. Given these limitations, I follow the suggestions of Bowers and Drake (2005) and use graphical visualization of these multilevel data as the analytical strategy. Variants of this ‘two-stage’ strategy are employed by Wright and Bloemraad (2012) to study a closely related topic to the one under investigation here and by Sides and Citrin (2007) to look at opposition to immigration in European countries. Like them, I am investigating the relationship between policy contexts at the country level and a series of dependent variables at the individual level. For this reason, I regress these dependent variables on individual-level predictors when the data is pooled within policy contexts identified in Figure 2.2. I then graph the estimates and confidence intervals of the intercepts for each of the policy contexts. The different variables are coded such that the intercepts correspond to the predicted outcome for an immigrant who is 17 years old, has been in the country for 5 to 10 years, does not have citizenship and has parents whose training is in an unskilled profession. The justification for using such a hypothetical immigrant is similar to Wright and Bloemraad’s: it is exactly the type of immigrant about which incorporation concerns are more prevalent. This type of immigrant — without citizenship, short residence in the country, lower education/unskilled — is also less likely to identify with the host, making it a harder case for double identification (e.g. Walters, Phythian and Anisef, 2007; Zimmermann, Zimmermann and Constant, 2007). When adding other covariates

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13 I also estimated the following models using multilevel modeling. These multilevel models gave results that were substantively very similar to those displayed here. Because of the reasons outlined above, I only show results obtained via the simpler estimation procedure.

14 As a reminder, the dataset is composed of teenagers and 17 years old is the mean. The parents’ skilled or unskilled job training variable can also be seen as a proxy for parents’ education.
for further analysis, religion for instance, I specify it in the text.

One important point on which I diverge from Bloemraad and Wright’s analysis is that they only graph intercepts because they are not interested in the individual-level relationship between two variables and the variation in this relationship across level-2 units. Here however, one of the main objectives is to investigate how ethnic identity feeds into different acculturation orientations across contexts. Accordingly, I follow the procedure used by Bowers and Drake (2005) and also graph the slope coefficient for ethnic identity for each level-2 units in the last part of the results section to look at this relationship more specifically. Again, this is similar to the ‘two-stage’ procedure used by Sides and Citrin (2007). In the first stage, I estimate an individual-level model for each policy regime. These models include the same covariates specified earlier but also add ethnic identity. I then extract intercepts and ethnic identity coefficients to form a second ‘dataset’ where the unit of analysis becomes policy regimes. Finally, I plot these policy regimes’ intercepts and slopes for each acculturation orientation and discuss the patterns in light of the expectations outlined above.

2.4 Results

2.4.1 Ethnic and majority identity

Figure 2.4 plots the intercept values for identification with the majority and with the ethnic group when these identity measures are regressed within policy contexts. Throughout the analysis, all the dependent variables are continuous (from 0
Figure 2.4: Identification with ethnic and majority identity by policy contexts

These estimates and their confidence intervals are intercept values when ethnic and majority identification are regressed within policy contexts on individual-level predictors (see text for details on these predictors).
to 1) and the estimator is an OLS regression.

The first thing that stands out when looking at Figure 2.4 is that across policy regimes, immigrants tend to identify more with their ethnic group than with the majority group. This would indicate that no regime is able to foster a higher level of identification with the majority than with the ethnic group. Given that the hypothetical immigrant represented by this intercept does not have citizenship and has only been in the country for 5 to 10 years, this does not come as a surprise. As Bowers and Drake (2005) point out, if the dots and their confidence intervals are clearly stacked on top of one another, we would then have to conclude that there is no variation across policy regimes. In fact, this is what we observe with ethnic identification. There are no statistically significant differences between the three policy regimes. This, in itself, represents an interesting null result considering the arguments against High-High regimes stated earlier. These countries do not have a higher average of ethnic identification. Policies that are designed to decrease ethnic identification (Low-Low), do not appear to fulfill their promises either. Perhaps the difference is in the effect that ethnic identification has on other attitudes, I turn to this possibility in the last section of the results.

When we turn our attention to identification with the host, there clearly is variation. Here, immigrants in countries that have a high level of MCPs and relatively open citizenship laws identify less with the majority than in the other two types of regimes. As hypothesized, when the welcoming message of open citizenship is coupled with few MCPs, countries are able to foster more identification with the host society, but this identification still goes hand in hand with a high level
of ethnic identification. In other words, double identification is more likely in High-Low regimes than in the other two.

The ICSEY also contains a sample of majority youth that I use in order to assess whether the pattern observed in identification with the majority among immigrants is just a reflection of how people generally identify with the majority group in these countries. These intercepts are represented by the three gray dots that are lined up almost completely on top of each other to the right of the .75 mark. Clearly, the patterns observed among immigrants are not reflecting more general patterns in their new societies. Unsurprisingly, host members identify more with the majority than immigrants do, but there is no difference between policy regimes in identification with the majority among youth majority members.\footnote{In the case of majority members, I only control for age and parents’ formation has skilled or unskilled because the other control variables used for immigrants, citizenship status and time spent in country, do not apply.}

### 2.4.2 Acculturation orientations

Whereas identification was measured with questions about membership and pride, acculturation orientations are measured with a series of questions on marriage, cultural traditions, language, friendship, and social activities. Recall that acculturation orientations are based on the importance given to relationships with the ethnic group and the majority. For example, an immigrant is displaying an integrationist orientation if marrying a co-ethnic or marrying a host are both seen favorably. It is also important to remember that these orientations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In other words, it is possible for a given individual to see
integration as the preferred orientation and to strongly agree with the questions on integration, but to also agree, albeit less strongly, with questions measuring separation.

**Figure 2.5**: Acculturation orientations by policy contexts

These estimates and their confidence intervals are intercept values when the different acculturation orientations are regressed within policy contexts on individual-level predictors (see text for details on these predictors).

**Figure 2.5** plots the intercept values for each acculturation orientation when these orientations are regressed within policy regimes. Here again we see that there is no difference across regimes in terms of the preferred acculturation orientation. For all regimes, immigrants are more likely to see both relationships with the majority and with the ethnic group as important.

Where we see differences however is in the extent to which immigrants adopt
each acculturation orientation across contexts. For instance, immigrants in High-Low regimes exhibit more separation attitudes — they give more importance to relationships with their own ethnic group than with the host society. The opposite orientation, assimilation, does not vary significantly between regimes. Given that the logic behind restrictive policies is to encourage assimilation into the larger society, this null result is interesting: variations in citizenship policy and MCPs are not associated with significantly less or more assimilation attitudes.

Across all policy regimes, it is marginalization orientations that are the least embraced by respondents (valuing relationship with neither groups). Immigrants are more likely to display marginalized attitudes in countries with restrictive citizenship and low MCPs.

Looking at integration attitudes, it is in High-High countries that this orientation is more important on average. This is surprising in light of the previous finding on identification. Figure 2.4 showed that immigrants in High-High countries identified less with the host society but this rejection of the host does not seem to influence acculturation orientations. Immigrants in these countries are the ones seeking relationships with both the host and the ethnic group the most. Integration orientations decrease as we move from more inclusive to more restrictive policies, albeit only in increments of .04. Of course, integration is the preferred orientation across all policy contexts, but when interpreting this result in light of what the data on identification showed—that regimes have comparable proportions of ethnic identifiers—there seems to be something different going on in countries with extensive MCPs and open citizenship. The lack of identification with the
host does not seem to impede or diminish the importance given to relationships with the larger society.

2.4.3 Ethnic identity and acculturation orientations

I now turn to the interplay between identification with the ethnic group and acculturation orientations. The more precise question I seek to answer is whether identifying with the ethnic group makes it more likely to opt for one acculturation orientation over another and how policy contexts might influence this relationship. One of the fears of critics of multiculturalism is that a reification of ethnic differences leads to segregation and makes it impossible to foster a sense of belonging with the host society. Results have already shown that immigrants living in countries with open citizenship and a higher score on the MCP index tend to identify about as much as immigrants in other policy regimes with their ethnic identity but less with the majority identity. This could lead one to conclude that critics are vindicated in their fear of the loss of a common sense of belonging. However, when we look at the relationship between ethnic identity and acculturation orientations, another picture emerges.

Like previous figures, Figure 2.6 plots the different intercept values for each policy regime, but because the interest now lies in the effect of ethnic identity across policy regimes, it also plots the coefficient for ethnic identity. Recall that these values are coefficients when acculturation orientations are regressed within policy regimes on individual-level predictors. The other variables in the model are the same as those in previous sections. The ethnic identity index is centered at 0
Consequently, the intercept can be interpreted as the average level of a given acculturation orientation for a hypothetical immigrant at the mid-point of ethnic identification.

The first sets of results that deserve attention are the coefficients in the Separation panel. The concern that cultural accommodation, by reinforcing ethnic identity, will lead to a rejection of the host society or, at the very least, disengagement with it is not borne out empirically. Looking at the intercepts, the patterns observed in Figure 2.5 remain once we add ethnic identity, but the differences decreases when the identification is set at the mid-point. In fact, this is true for all within orientation differences. The slopes show that a stronger identification with the ethnic group is in fact associated with more separation attitudes. Contrary to the arguments against inclusive policies however, this relationship is not stronger in countries with high levels of MCPs and open citizenship. The fact that these countries are not different from the other regimes in their relationship between ethnic identity and separation is again an interesting null finding.

As should be expected, a stronger sense of ethnic identity is linked to lower levels of marginalization across the different policy contexts. Recall that marginalization orientations refer to an individual rejecting relationships with both her own ethnic group and with the host society. Immigrants from Low-Low countries still exhibit more marginalization attitudes on average but the relationship between ethnic identity and these attitudes is the same across regimes.

\footnote{Note that the difference between slopes for High-Low and Low-Low countries is statistically significant but not the one between High-High countries and the other two policy regimes.}
Figure 2.6: Acculturation orientations and ethnic identification by policy contexts

These estimates and their confidence intervals are intercept and slope coefficients when the different acculturation orientations are regressed within policy contexts on individual-level predictors (see text for details on these predictors). The slope coefficients are for ethnic identity. The dashed line indicates 0.
The results for assimilation are, to some extent, also in line with what was expected. We again see that on average, regimes do not differ significantly in the level of assimilation orientations displayed by immigrants. There are, however, differences in the impact of ethnic identification. A higher identification with one’s own ethnic group decreases assimilation orientations—that is attitudes and behavior that are favoring the host society and rejecting the ethnic group—but this relationship is weakest in Low/low countries and strongest in High-High countries.

The last panel, integration, is the most interesting one. After adding ethnic identification to the model, integrationist orientations are still the most likely orientation across regimes with all three intercepts hovering around .75. It is when we turn to the slope coefficients that we see interesting variation. The coefficient for ethnic identity is only different from 0 in countries with high levels of MCPs and open citizenship and the strength of the relationship is not trivial (.28).\footnote{The difference between High-High countries and High-Low countries is statistically significant (p=.02) as is the one between High-High countries and Low-Low (p=.003).} This means that only in countries with extensive MCPs and open citizenship is ethnic identity linked with more integrationist attitudes. Another way of putting this is to say that in Low-Low and High-Low regimes, the only acculturation orientation that sees a gain when ethnic identification increases is separation, whereas High-High countries see an increase in both separation and integration attitudes.

This is a striking result: only High-High countries are able to foster integrationist attitudes at higher levels of ethnic identification. In interpreting this finding,
it is important to keep in mind that there were no differences in the average level of ethnic identification across regimes. In other words, high identifiers are not more likely in High-High countries. What immigrants in High-High countries are more likely to do however, is to seek relationships with the host society in domains such as language, marriage and social activities.

2.4.4 Muslims

Debates around cultural accommodation have repeatedly been about Muslims’ religious claims. Consequently, they are often seen as a group that is harder—even impossible—to integrate in the larger society (Modood, 2005).\textsuperscript{18} Given their singular position in immigration debates, it is possible that Muslim immigrants explain some of the results above. Perhaps High-High countries are able to foster integrationist attitudes among ethnic identifiers because the immigrants in these countries’ sample are not Muslims. To test for this possibility we need to first look at the distribution of Muslim respondents and then at their identification and acculturation patterns.

In terms of sample composition, there is a total of 1057 Muslim respondents in the dataset, but they are not equally distributed across policy regimes.\textsuperscript{19} There are 497 Muslims respondents in High-High countries, 401 in Low-Low countries, but only 159 in Low-High countries. In other words, they form a larger proportion of the sample in Low-Low regimes (50%), followed by High-High regimes (30%)\textsuperscript{19}.

\textsuperscript{18}Empirically, the evidence for Muslim being harder to integrate has so far been mixed (Manning and Roy, 2010; Bisin et al., 2011).

\textsuperscript{19}Most of these Muslim respondents are Turks (60%), with the other two larger groups being Pakistanis (16%) and respondents from the Maghreb (10%).
and then High-Low regimes (9%). Still, this, in itself, does not necessarily put into question previous findings. One way in which the distribution of Muslim respondents would explain the differences across regimes observed earlier would be if Muslims identify more with their ethnic identity and less with the majority, with such identification leading to more separation and less integration. This pattern would also have to be true across regimes. If this is what we observed, it would be hard to make the case for policies as the explanation.

The size of the Muslim sample coupled with missing values on some variables — most notably “years spent in the country” and “parents’ job training”—limits possibilities for more fine-grained analysis. To verify that variation in the religious composition of each regime type is not at the basis of previous findings, I conduct the analysis but exclude the two variables containing a large number of missing values. Consequently, the analysis is based on a hypothetical immigrant that is 17 years of age and lacks citizenship.

Figure 2.7 plots the intercept for the two identity measures (ethnic and majority) as well as for the four acculturation orientations. In terms of identification with the majority and identification with the ethnic group, the pattern is the same as the one observed in the full sample analysis. Muslims immigrants in High-Low countries do identify even more with the majority but given the sample size, this identification is not different from the one seen in the full sample. In terms of acculturation orientations, there are no important differences across policy regimes and integration remains the favoured orientation.

Looking at the relationship between ethnic identification and acculturation dis-
played in Figure 2.8, we see that ethnic identification does generate more separation than it did in the full sample. However, integration is still high—around .75—for the three regimes. In other words, based on this cursory glance at Muslim immigrants, they display the same attitudes across policy regimes and thus, cannot explain by themselves the differences found in previous sections. Muslim respondents do seem to differ from other immigrants in the effect that ethnic identity is having on acculturation orientation, on integration more specifically. We do not observe the same positive relationship between identification with the ethnic group and more integrationist attitudes in High-High countries. That being said, we do not observe a negative relationship either. In High-Low and High-High countries the slope is not different from 0. Low-Low countries do however have a slope different from 0, but a negative one, meaning that in these countries increasing ethnic identification leads to less integrationist attitudes for Muslim immigrants.\(^{20}\)

In fact, when we look separately at non-Muslims and Muslims (results not shown), ethnic identification is increasing integration among non-Muslims in High-High countries but having no effect among Muslims while in Low-Low countries, it is having no effect among non-Muslims and decreasing integration among Muslims. In other words, Muslims do seem to be different from other immigrants in the effect that identification with the ethnic group is having on integrationist attitudes but there is also an important difference in this difference across regimes. The pattern observed in Low-Low countries is not due to the fact that they have a larger proportion of Muslim immigrants, but rather that unlike

\(^{20}\) Multivariate analysis confirmed these results.
Figure 2.7: Identification and acculturation orientations of Muslim respondents by policy contexts

These estimates and their confidence intervals are intercept values when the identity measures and the different acculturation orientations are regressed within policy contexts on individual-level predictors (see text for details on these predictors).
Figure 2.8: Acculturation orientations and ethnic identification of Muslim respondents by policy contexts

These estimates and their confidence intervals are intercept values when the identity measures and the different acculturation orientations are regressed within policy contexts on individual-level predictors (see text for details on these predictors). The slope coefficients are for ethnic identity. The dashed line indicates 0.
other policy regimes, these countries seem to be unable to mitigate the effect of ethnic identification on integration.

2.5 Discussion and conclusion

In 2007, before David Cameron became the British Prime Minister and was still Leader of the Opposition he stated that: “Multiculturalism has come to mean an approach which focuses on what divides us rather than what brings us together. [These policies] undermine the very thing that should have served as a focus for national unity—our sense of British identity” (Cameron, 2007). This statement was yet another example of politicians blaming policies that recognize cultural pluralism for a supposed decline in social cohesion. What often follows from these statements is a call for measures that are more assimilationist in nature. The results presented here show that contrary to Cameron’s assertion, a common identity does not seem to be necessary to “bring together” immigrants and their host society. Many immigrants displayed integrationist attitudes, that is a desire to have relationships with both the host and their own ethnic group, while identifying more with this latter group than with the majority. More importantly, the results also showed that if the main goal of incorporation policies is to foster these integrationist attitudes and socialize immigrants into the larger society, countries with open citizenship laws and extensive multiculturalism policies are the one best equipped to achieve it.

Focusing on identity and acculturation in three distinct policy regimes (High citizenship-High MCPs, High citizenship-Low MCPs, Low citizenship-Low MCPs),
I find that these regimes do not differ significantly in the extent to which immigrants identify with their ethnic group. Where they do differ is in their identification with the host. In line with critiques of MCPs, countries with open citizenship policies that also have cultural accommodation policies were less likely to promote national identification among their immigrant population. Countries with a combination of open citizenship—perhaps sending a welcoming message to newcomers—and few MCPs were the one most able to foster identification with the majority among their immigrant population.

I then introduced acculturation orientation as a concept that I argued can be conceived as the desire to cultivate relationships with the majority group and with one’s own ethnic group. Considering four different acculturation orientations, I showed that High-High countries were the ones most able to foster integrationist attitudes. It is in these countries that immigrants were more likely to see relationships with both the host and their ethnic group as important. These relationships encompass a wide-ranging set of situations such as friendship, language choice and marriage. On the other hand, it was the High-Low countries that displayed the highest average of separation attitudes, i.e. immigrants choosing only their ethnic group and rejecting relationships with the host. This latter result should not obscure however the fact that integration was by far the favoured orientations across all regimes.

The most striking finding is that only High-High countries seem to be able to create an environment in which ethnic identification is associated with more integrationist attitudes. In the other two regimes, the only acculturation orientation
that saw an increase with higher ethnic identification was separation. These results should help put to rest the worry that ethnic identification precludes commitment to the larger society. Although the evidence presented here is only a first step in understanding the link between policies and these outcomes, it demonstrates that it is in fact the case that ethnic identity is associated with less commitment to the majority but only in countries with policy regimes that do not have open citizenship and extensive MCPs. When we combine these results with those of Wright and Bloemraad (2012), who find that immigrants from these same High-High countries were not less likely than their counterpart in High-Low or Low-Low countries to be engaged in their political community, we have a picture at odds with the recurrent rhetoric against cultural accommodation policies. These findings also contradict, to some extent, those of research such as Koopmans (2010) and Ersanilli and Koopmans (2011). In these studies the focus is on outcomes that are far removed from policies whose first goal is the socio-political integration of immigrants (Bloemraad, 2007). The mechanism that links incorporation policies to outcomes such as higher rates of incarceration or residential segregation is unclear and the possibility for omitted variable bias high. This is why the findings about identification and acculturation orientations presented here are interesting: not only do they address directly the concerns about allegiances but these outcomes are causally closer to the policies under investigation. These finding are also important for the immigrants themselves since the psychology literature shows that integrationist attitudes are associated with well-being and adaptation (Phinney et al., 2001).
Of course, it is possible that these results are due to a selection bias causing Low-Low countries to have to deal with immigrants that are different—i.e. more difficult to integrate—than High-High countries. To test for this possibility, an additional analysis was conducted with the sample restricted to Muslim respondents, a group that has been presented as a hard case for integration. Overall, these immigrants do not differ significantly from the rest of the sample in their identification and acculturation orientations. In terms of the relationship between ethnic identification and integrationist attitudes, we again find that Low-Low countries differ from the other two. In these countries, integrationist attitudes decrease as identification with the ethnic group increases, while the relationship is not significant in the other regimes. In other words, when looking at Muslim immigrants the assertion made by many politicians that a turn away from multiculturalism would be associated with more commitment to the majority among immigrant groups is not borne out empirically.

I believe that in addition to these findings, the analysis provides several important contributions. Theoretically, it directly addresses the arguments made by both advocates and opponents of open citizenship access and MCPs by focusing on identity and acculturation orientations. The analytic strategy employed takes into account the multilevel aspect of the data and enables a straightforward presentation of the results. The fact that the data make it possible to separate Muslims and non-Muslims, a distinction that past research has not always been able to make (Wright and Bloemraad, 2012), does allow for a more fine-grained analysis and increases confidence in the results.
The analysis is not without its limitations. For instance, the particular analytical strategy oversimplifies variation in terms of policies by grouping countries in three separate policy regimes. In addition, the data on which this analysis rests are from the late 1990s to the early 2000s and the patterns observed might have change. For instance, new policies not encompassed by citizenship access or MCPs have been enacted and may have an impact on some of the relationships highlighted here. As mentioned earlier, one recent evolution of incorporation policies has been the introduction of a series of civic integration measures of the type studied by Goodman (2010) — for example, a stronger emphasis on language acquisition prior to arrival, citizenship ceremonies reinforcing identity elements, etc. (Joppke, 2004). Adding new policies to reflect the environment in which immigrants find themselves today is important for future research. However, data limitations are often not on the policy side but at the individual-level. Effort should be put into developing datasets that allow the comparative study of immigrants’ attitudes. The ICSEY dataset does provide measures for important outcomes such as identification and acculturation orientations, but it sampled immigrants in twelve countries, ten of which were actually used in the analysis. As is often the case when large-N research is developing, the hope is that we will soon have more individual-level data to combine with the already existing country-level measures to better establish the relationships that the present exploratory work has highlighted. Given what is at stake and the importance of these empirical questions, this is a necessary step.
Chapter 3

Incorporation policies, cultural threat, and host societies’ attitudes toward immigration

Recent decades have seen more and more migrants leaving their country of origin to find a better life in a wealthier country. This large movement of population has meant that the term ‘country of immigration’ can now be employed to describe most Western countries, even countries that, historically, had been producers of migrants (e.g. Ireland, Italy). Deciding how to best deal with this diversity has become an everyday question, one of the most pressing issues at the center of the democratic life of these countries. These debates around immigration have also come hand in hand with the rise of right-wing anti-immigration party, especially in Europe. At the center of this backlash against immigration is a feeling by some
that immigrants challenge and threaten their culture, values, and way of life. The fact that this feeling of cultural threat greatly influences one’s views on immigration policy is well-known (e.g. Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). Again and again, research has reasserted the overwhelming evidence that such threats act as influential forces shaping immigration attitudes (for a review Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

In the more general comparative literature on immigration and public opinion, scholars have increasingly paid attention to contextual factors—that is, country-level attributes—that might explain differences in anti-immigration attitudes or tolerance (e.g. Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Weldon, 2006; Semyonov, Rajman and Gorodzeisky, 2006; Wilkes, Guppy and Farris, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Crepaz and Damron, 2008; Hooghe et al., 2009; Rustenbach, 2010; Kirchner, Freitag and Rapp, 2011; Wright, 2011a). For instance, some have shown that policy regimes such as a comprehensive welfare state decrease host societies’ concerns over the economic consequences of immigration (Crepaz and Damron, 2008), but that a desire for less or more immigration is unrelated to larger demographic or economic circumstances (Sides and Citrin, 2007).

Here, I investigate the role of another important, yet relatively understudied, contextual factor: incorporation policies. The questions I ask is whether these policies that directly get at relations between host societies and immigrants have an impact on levels of cultural threat, on anti-immigration attitudes themselves, and finally, on how cultural threat translates into these anti-immigration attitudes. Two sets of policies are the object of inquiry: citizenship policies and multicultur-
alism policies.

I use individual-level and country-level data from seventeen different immigration countries and test three simple, but still unexplored hypotheses. I first re-establish the strong relationship between threat and anti-immigration attitudes but do so across the seventeen countries under study. I then show that more open citizenship policies decrease cultural threat among native-born population but that multiculturalism policies fail to do so. Finally, I demonstrate that citizenship policies are not only associated with lower levels of native born individuals’ feeling of threat, they are also mitigating the relationship between this feeling of threat and anti-immigration attitudes. Although the effect is not as strong, multiculturalism policies have the opposite consequence and reinforce the effect of threat on attitudes.

This analysis represents a first step in understanding the role of incorporation policies in explaining cultural threat and immigration attitudes. It emphasizes the need to pay attention to policies that are specifically designed to govern over intergroup relationships. Failing to include these policies in explaining host societies’ attitudes leaves aside an important aspect of immigration and its related attitudes: the context in which they are formed. The analysis and results presented here open up new possibilities in explaining the relationship between policies, threat and attitudes. In my concluding remarks, I also offer some suggestions to unpack the mechanisms behind the relationship uncovered here through observational data.
3.1 Theory

3.1.1 Cultural threat and attitudes towards immigration

Earlier work on threat and intergroup relations focused on what was deemed to be ‘realistic’ threats, that is threats that concerned material well-being and competition over resources most often in the form of employment or taxation (e.g. Blumer 1958; Hardin 1997). Most recent work that focused primarily on intergroup relations in the context of immigration differentiated between these realistic threats and threats that were more cultural or symbolic in nature (e.g. Citrin, Rein-gold and Green, 1990; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). These symbolic threats are threats to a group’s culture or values rather than to its materialistic well-being. Symbolic threats challenge the host’s identity and, in a logic rooted in the social identity theory tradition, increase outgroup hostility and opposition to immigration (Brewer, 2001; Huddy, 2001). Of course, as Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004) rightfully point out, symbolic threat and realistic threat are not mutually exclusive and can both drive attitudes toward newcomers. However, when stacked against each other in the context of immigration, cultural threat has repeatedly been showed to trump economic considerations and have a larger influence over intergroup attitudes (e.g. Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Harell et al., 2012).

Based on the more recent literature on threat and immigration attitudes, it is possible to further clarify the different forms of threat by moving away from the
traditional realistic/symbolic dichotomy and by making two important distinctions: a distinction between economic threat and cultural threat and a distinction between a threat that is sociotropic/collective in nature and one that is personal/individual. For example, opposition to immigration can be rooted in a worry that a society’s economy will suffer from the arrival of too many immigrants (economic sociotropic considerations) or because one fears the competition on the job market that these newcomers might represent (economic but individual) (e.g. Malhotra, Margalit and Mo, 2013). In most of the literature — and this research is no exception— cultural threat is often conceived as inherently sociotropic because threat is happening at the group level and is about abstract constructs such as culture and values. But an important point made by Newman, Hartman and Taber (2012) is that it is possible to imagine a more “realistic” threat that is also cultural, for example, repetitive interactions with newcomers who do not speak the host society’s language. In such a situation, the threat might become quite real and can be considered to be an example of a threat that is cultural in nature but also personal (see also Paxton and Mughan, 2006).

In the following, I do not differentiate between individual or collective cultural threat—although the questions I use to measure threat are more closely related to the latter. I do however distinguish between perceived cultural threat and perceived economic threat, while concentrating on the former. I also do not consider the self-interest argument that usually takes the form of a labor-market competition hypothesis. These personal economic considerations have repeatedly failed to explain anti-immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). One ex-
ception is Malhotra, Margalit and Mo (2013), who look at people in a specific occupation (high technology) and their attitudes toward a specific set of visas that are mostly given to skilled Indian immigrants thus directly challenging individuals working in high technology domains. Even in the case of these very specific visas however, the authors find that cultural threat largely explains opposition.

Some other individual factors will be associated with a higher likelihood of experiencing this feeling of cultural threat. Research continually highlights the dampening effect of education or the more important feeling of threat among conservative-leaning individuals. In sum, the literature on cultural threat offers many answers when it comes to understanding its ‘micro-level’ causes and the psychological mechanism through which it translates into policy position. This focus on the micro however, has left answers largely wanting when trying to assess the role of contextual factors.

For example, in their study of foreign language exposition and cultural threat, Newman, Hartman and Taber (2012) hypothesize that the feeling of threat stemming from the unease of having to interact with someone who does not speak the host society’s language, will “color perceptions of immigrants and influence attitudes regarding policies geared towards immigration”(638). Their experiment focuses on Americans and Spanish-speaking immigrants with the consequence that the context in which this cultural threat translates into attitudes toward immigration policies is constant. The emotions that a person feels in such a situation and the process through which these emotions move someone’s positions on policies directed at immigrants are without a doubt influenced by personal character-
istics. Yet, it is also possible that state policies that manage intergroup relations and immigrants’ integration as well as other contextual factors will influence these mechanisms if only at the margins.

Similarly, when Brader, Valentino and Suhay (2008) show that group cues—which in their experiment takes the form of a focus on Latino immigration—by triggering anxiety have an influence on people attitudes, they are also doing so in a specific context, the US. One could argue that the extent to which someone experiences anxiety when faced with an influx of immigrants is primarily driven by personal characteristics, but that the larger context might also alleviate or reinforce this sentiment and the impact it has on attitudes and behaviors.

3.1.2 The role of contextual factors

Most of literature focusing on symbolic threat is rooted in the social identity theory (SIT) tradition, where threats to the ingroup identity have been shown to generate outgroup hostility (Brewer, 2001). Interestingly however, past research on this type of threat and its consequences for immigration attitudes has not paid as much attention to another aspect of SIT: the idea that context matters. As Huddy (2004) writes about SIT: “One of the most powerful concepts to emerge from this research is the importance of the intergroup context, especially the salience of group membership. Context helps to explain why group membership can powerfully cue beliefs and action in one context and yet have no effect in another” (959).

This is not to say that the idea that macro-level factors or institutional ar-
rangements might influence political attitudes is new (see for example Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Kirchner, Freitag and Rapp, 2011). There is a neo-institutional ‘stream’ of literature on attitude formation and it has percolated to the comparative literature on immigration attitudes. Scholars have tried to come to terms with the possible influence of context in explaining these attitudes but few have done so while considering incorporations policies, the policies that are at the basis of intergroup relations.

For example, Rustenbach (2010) and Sides and Citrin (2007) both study the sources of negative attitudes towards immigrants in European countries but the country-level variables they include as contextual factors are all economic in nature (i.e. unemployment level, GDP, etc.) (see also Quillian, 1995; Wilkes, Guppy and Farris, 2008). Others have included measures of national definition (Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009), welfare provisions (Crepaz and Damron, 2008), or growth in the foreign-born population (Wright, 2011a; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, 2011). These studies all come to the conclusion that although individual characteristics are essential in understanding these attitudes, the ‘macro’ variables they introduce are also important contributing factors.

Theoretically, these contextual factors—whether economic or demographic—are all worthy of investigation. However, these are also factors whose impact on attitudes cannot be assessed without paying attention to policies whose role is to manage intergroup relations. These are the very policies that will increase or decrease the salience of group membership. In other words, incorporation policies such as citizenship policies or multiculturalism policies, are likely to influence the
effect of both individual and contextual factors on felling of cultural threat and on attitudes toward immigration, yet they have seldom been included as possible explanations.

Two important exceptions are Weldon (2006) and Wright (2011b) who both argue that policy regimes related to immigration matter. In line with the argument put forward here, Weldon writes that institutions have “important consequences for the nature of politics generally and interethnic group relations specifically” (Weldon, 2006, 331). While Weldon and Wright apply this argument to different outcomes, they use similar operationalization of policy regimes as explanatory factor.

Weldon focuses on the role of citizenship regimes. Based on distinctions in terms of cultural rights and legal requirements for citizenship (jus soli vs jus sanguinis), he identifies three ideal-types that he uses to classify countries: collectivistic-ethnic, collectivistic-civic, and individualistic-civic. Looking at 16 European countries, he finds that these ideal-types do in fact influence tolerance judgments and that countries whose citizenship laws are more civic than ethnic increase tolerance as do more individualistic policies. Interestingly, these regime types also condition the effect of individual factors such as ideology and satisfaction with democracy. Their relationship with tolerance is stronger (more negative) in collectivistic-ethnic regimes.

Similarly, Wright (2011b) concludes that over time multiculturalism policies appear to be linked with a more ‘ascriptive’ view of the nation. Between the year 1995 and 2003, countries with multicultural policies in place saw an increase
among their citizens of an ‘ascriptive’ definition of the nation, that is, respondents believing that a citizen of their country had to have some ascriptive characteristics such as ancestry to be considered a true citizens. In these two cases then, policies mattered.

3.1.3 Incorporation policies as contextual factors

Building on Weldon (2006) and Wright (2011), I also regard the institutional context in which these attitudes take form as being given by the citizenship regime in place and by the cultural rights granted to newcomers. Instead of trying to identify ideal-types, I unpack these policy regimes into two constitutive dimensions. Freeman (2004) also argues against seeing incorporation institutions as a coherent whole. This route overestimates the coherence of the policies in a given country and underestimates the convergence across countries. Rather, he argues, these policies and laws should be seen as a “multidimensional framework” needing unpacking. Consequently, I focus on the role of multiculturalism policies, which I define as a set of policies aimed at recognizing and accommodating cultural diversity, and citizenship policies, which I use in a limited sense, i.e. as a legal status. Understood in that sense, citizenship policies are distinct from multiculturalism policies, since granting citizenship does not necessarily come with a the recognition and support of different cultural practices. As will be clear when looking at country data, these policies do not always move in the same direction.

1I use citizenship in a limited sense here as opposed to a more comprehensive idea of citizenship in the Marshallian sense, one that would also include social and political citizenship (Marshall, 1950).
either. Countries with more easily accessible citizenship do not necessarily embrace comprehensive multiculturalism policies.

But why would these policies matter? The logic behind incorporation policies as explanatory factors is that immigration countries have come to different strategies when managing immigration. Some have decided to give citizenship to newcomers more easily while others have decided to make it more difficult. Some countries have decided to recognize the multicultural aspect of their society while others discourage ethnic minorities to make claims based on these identities. These policies’ first targets are the immigrants themselves but they also send a signal to the host society about who is welcomed and who is not, about what is encouraged in the public sphere and what is not, about which behaviors are celebrated and rewarded and which are not. These policies ought to influence native-born individuals’ views on whether immigration and diversity represent a threat. Not only that, these policy contexts might also mitigate the well-known effect of cultural threat on anti-immigration attitudes.

There are different possible mechanisms through which incorporation policies could influence threat perception and anti-immigration attitudes among the host society, even when these policies’ main target is the immigrant population. As stated earlier, more open policies might decrease the salience of group membership and group boundaries. Open policies send a message that newcomers are welcome and that their culture is valued. If this message gets to the host society, it should alleviate the perceived threat to the host’s own culture. Policies could also decrease feeling of cultural threat over time by reinforcing inclusiveness as
a norm or by transforming the host’s culture and identity as one that is formed around diversity. Canada has often been given as an example of a country that did such a thing (see Kymlicka, 2003; Joppke, 2004; Bloemraad, 2006). In this case, immigrants are not seen as a threat, but rather as the very elements that makes Canada distinctive. This is at odds with what critics of multiculturalism would expect. These critics would argue that multiculturalism, by reifying group differences, would decrease commonality between groups and increase feeling of cultural threat on both sides (e.g. Miller, 1995; Barry, 2002). Disentangling multiculturalism policies and citizenship policies enable a test of these propositions.

Policy regimes might also influence attitudes indirectly, again through their effect on norms. In fact, this is what Guimond et al. (2013) find in their study of multiculturalism policies and prejudice in four countries (US, Canada, UK, Germany). Their results show that policies do not have a direct effect on attitudes but that they do influence these attitudes through their effect on perceived norms.\(^2\)

In keeping with the idea of perceived norms, another possible mechanism through which policies might influence anti-immigration attitudes might be the product of a ‘negative’ consequence of these norms. More open policies that reinforce inclusiveness as a norm might increase social pressures and in doing so decrease expressed feeling of threat or expressed anti-immigration attitudes. This means that individuals living in countries where a norm like inclusiveness is more prevalent might be more likely to hide their true attitude. The difference between

\(^2\)In this case, only multiculturalism policies are considered and countries are divided in low (Germany), moderate (US and UK), and high (Canada) levels.
countries would then be due to a higher misrepresentation of true beliefs rather than a real difference in underlying attitudes (Weber et al., 2013; Breton et al., 2014). However, this possibility is outside the scope of this research, as is the theoretical and practical debates on whether a society is better off if people lie about their prejudices.

In terms of how threat translates into policy positions, more open policies might signal that even though one feels threatened by the arrival of new immigrants, this sentiment should not form the basis of one’s policy judgment. Different policies might not offer the same cues to individuals about how feeling of threat should influence their position on immigration issues. For example, countries with more restrictive policies might make cues more available in terms of how feeling of cultural threat should lead to more opposition to immigration. This is analogous to Weldon’s conclusion with regards to tolerance, where “in ethnic regime, the rules themselves may send signals indicating that ingroup identification is synonymous with outgroup rejection, but in civic regimes, the rules provide no such connection.”(2006, 344).

The observational data at the basis of the following analysis does not make it possible to identify the exact mechanisms through which policy regimes influence individual attitudes. Yet, it is an important first step in investigating the presence of these relationships across an important number of immigration countries. In doing so, I add to the neo-institutionalist literature on anti-immigration attitudes formation by filling the gaps on both the right-hand side and the left-hand side of the equation. On the dependent variable side, none of the previous studies directly
address anti-immigration positions or cultural threat. This is quite surprising given the central role of cultural threat in the current research on anti-immigration attitudes. On the policy context side, I make use of more fine-grained measures of policy and account for variation across as well as within countries by unpacking incorporation regimes into two distinct sets of policies. I describe these policies in more details in the data section.

### 3.1.4 Hypotheses

In the following analysis, I focus on three important ways in which incorporation policies might influence individual attitudes: by acting directly on threat and by acting both directly and indirectly on policy positions.

First, the strong relationship between threat and anti-immigration attitudes rests on psychological factors that should be present across context. In other words, people who see the arrival of newcomers as a threat to their culture or values should be more likely to express anti-immigration attitudes and to be opposed to policies whose aim is to help immigrants to incorporate in their new societies. This leads to hypothesis 1:

**H1:** Cultural threat will have a strong positive relationship with anti-immigration attitudes and this will be true for every country of immigration.

However, this feeling of threat should be influenced by the policies in place. If proponents of more open policies are right, these policies should have a direct
effect on threat by decreasing the salience of group boundaries and indicating to members of the host society that these newcomers should be welcome, that they do not represent a threat.

**H2:** *More open policies, both in terms of access to citizenship and multiculturalism, will be associated with lower levels of cultural threat.*

In addition to this direct effect of policies on cultural threat, they should also have a direct effect on policy positions.

**H3:** *More open policies, both in terms of access to citizenship and multiculturalism, will be associated with lower support for anti-immigration policy positions.*

Finally, these policies should also have an indirect effect. In the same way that Weldon (2006) showed policies reinforcing the impact of some individual characteristics on tolerance, policies such as multiculturalism and open access to citizenship should play a mitigating role.

**H4:** *More open policies, both in terms of citizenship and multiculturalism, will mitigate the relationship between cultural threat and anti-immigration policy positions.*

In the following analysis, I address how feeling of threat influences anti-immigration attitudes in three specific areas: stricter citizenship laws, opposition to government support for minorities, and support for more restrictive immigration policies. Looking at how contextual factors and cultural threat affect attitudes
toward important policies is essential in understanding attitude formation, but it is not without its pitfalls. One possible reason for the gap in the literature described above is the concerns regarding reverse causation. Incorporation policies are not proposed and applied in a political vacuum; more open incorporation policies are likely to stem from more open societies, making it hard to establish the direction of causality. Although the analysis that follows cannot fully set aside these endogeneity concerns, the focus on the mitigating role of policy regimes partially alleviates them. Specifically, Hypothesis 4 implies that more open policies will weaken the link between threat and anti-immigration attitudes or that the threat that one might experience will not automatically translate into more anti-immigration positions. One could still make the case that countries that have more open policies do so because cultural threat does not translate into anti-immigrant attitudes but such a case of reverse causation is harder to imagine and still lacks an explanation for the absence of an effect of threat on attitudes. In his study of contextual factors and tolerance, Weldon (2006) also recognizes the difficulty of establishing causality but argues that “there are good reasons to believe that institutions have a significant impact in tolerance judgments” (333). So while I acknowledge the concerns regarding the direction of these relationships, I believe that Weldon’s argument applies to immigration attitudes and that they are likely to be influenced by policies in place.
3.2 Data and methods

The data used for the analysis come from three different sources. The individual-level data come from the 2003 National Identity module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) while the country-level policy data come from Banting and Kymlicka (2006) for multiculturalism policies and from Howard (2009) for citizenship policies. I describe each in more detail below.

3.2.1 Individual attitudes data

The ISSP is a multi-country comparative survey conducted every year under a specific theme. For the analysis, I make use of their 2003 survey, which concentrated on national identity and issues surrounding diversity and immigration. Although the ISSP provides data for 35 countries, I only use seventeen countries that can be considered to be immigration countries. For example, I exclude Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. In addition to socio-demographic variables that will be used as covariates, the ISSP contains useful measures of attitudes towards diversity and immigration. Three indices built on these questions are central to the analysis.

Cultural threat. The first index measures feeling of cultural or symbolic threat. Following Wright (2011a), it is comprised of two statements tapping an individual’s vision of what immigration brings to her country. These statements are “Immigrants improve [country]society by bringing in new ideas and cultures” (reverse

\[3\]For a list of these countries and their sample see Table 4 in the Appendix.
coded) and “Immigrants increase crime rates” (both strongly agree to strongly disagree). To these two statements, I add a third one which again taps the feeling that some individuals may have about their culture and how it is threatened by newcomers. This statement is “It is impossible for people who do not share [country’s] customs and traditions to become fully [citizens of country]”. This third statement can be conceived as the opposite of the first one; it gets at a notion that a country’s customs and traditions need to be preserved and that newcomers who do not fit in cannot be part of the host society. These two statements are also similar to those used by Newman, Hartman and Taber (2012) to measure cultural threat. Although this measure builds on previous research, it is important to note that a statement mentioning customs and traditions is susceptible to context dependency. For example, arguing that a newcomer has to share a country’s customs and traditions may not mean the same thing when this country is Canada and when it is Austria. In other words, the attitude of a Canadian citizen saying that immigrants should blend in the Canadian society might be different from a Austrian citizen saying the same. Yet, agreeing that it is impossible for a newcomer to be part of a community without sharing its customs or without ‘assimilating’ is clearly related to notions of cultural threat (Paxton and Mughan, 2006). To get a

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4Adding this third item improves the scale’s reliability from .59 to .65.

5Newman et al.’s measure of cultural threat consists of a dichotomous variable where people choose between two statements “The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values” and “The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society”.

6A possible limit of this measure of threat is that it taps an expressed feeling of threat but does not account for general unease or deep emotions that are hidden from the researcher such as implicit attitudes (Perez, 2010, Malhotra, Margalit and Mo, 2013).
sense of the variation in levels of cultural threat based on this measure, Figure 3.1 displays country-level means. Seven countries fall on what can be considered the ‘non-threatened’ side of the index while only one, Norway, has a mean above .6.

Figure 3.1: Cultural threat – country means

This dot plot shows country level means for the cultural threat index. Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Source ISSP 2003.

Dependent Variables. The three indices that are used as dependent variables throughout the analysis measure attitudes toward three different sets of policies
directed at immigrants: stricter citizenship laws, government support for ethnic minorities, and more restrictive immigration policies (see appendix for exact question wording). The first index uses two questions and taps attitudes toward rules governing citizenship, more precisely *jus soli* citizenship and rights of newcomers. The second dependent variable uses two questions about governmental actions toward newcomers in terms of help preserving customs and traditions and financial assistance. Finally, the third index measures preferred level of immigration and government actions against illegal immigrants.

Again, to get a better sense of the variation across countries, Figure 3.2 contains bar graphs of country-level means for these dependent variables. A table with the summary statistics of the main indices is also in the Appendix (Table B.2).

As should be expected, there is variation between countries, but the differences between the extremes are relatively small. What is interesting however is the differences across questions. In the case of opposition to government support for minorities, only two countries fall in the more supportive category — with Spain doing so only barely. The second dependent variable measuring a desire for stricter citizenship laws, is the opposite. Countries all fall on the supportive side of the scale. Finally, the third index measuring support for more restrictive immigration policies is the one with the highest country means. Just by looking at these means we can conclude that across countries, host members are likely to agree to give rights to legal immigrants who are already in the country but also to oppose making it is easier for immigrants to get it in and to receive financial assistance.
These dot plots show country level means for the three dependent variables used in the analysis. Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Source ISSP 2003.
Another issue with these measures is that some of the questions used are relative to actual levels or actual policies. For example, one of the questions used in the restrictive immigration policies index asks whether the respondents think that immigration should be made easier than it is now. This measure is thus affected by the actual policies in place. Support for stricter citizenship laws does not have a relative statement while one out of the two items measuring opposition to government support for minorities is. The expectation is that the relationship between policies and relative statements should be weaker because policies have already played their role. An individual living in a country with very welcoming citizenship policies is less likely to believe that citizenship should be made even more accessible. I leave this relative/non-relative issue for now, but return to it in the results section.

**Control variables.** Throughout the analysis I also leverage some of the questions in the ISSP dataset to control for other variables that might drive either cultural threat or the two policy positions. These covariates include socio-demographic variables such as age, education, and whether an individual is a second-generation immigrant. They also include self-placement on the left-right ideological spectrum and three indices that have been used by past research on related topics. These indices are: importance given to national identity (Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009), economic threat, and ascriptive definition of the nation (Wright, 2009). Respondents whose both parents were not citizens of the country are considered second generation immigrants. The ISSP also asks respondents if they are citizens of the country in which they live. Because the study is about host societies’ attitudes, I drop non-citizens from the analysis.
The latter is a variable measuring how much a respondent adheres to a definition of the nation that is based on ancestry and birth (see Appendix for question wording).

The question then is whether policy contexts influence levels of cultural threat and whether the effect of threat on the two dependent variables varies across these policy contexts, once we control for these individual factors. In order to so however, we also need measures of important incorporation policies.

3.2.2 Country-level data

Incorporation policies. The main context-level variables are measures of incorporation policies, which means policies whose goal is the incorporation of immigrants in the host society. As mentioned earlier, the focus here is on two of these sets of policies: those governing the process through which an immigrant becomes a citizen and those dealing with the accommodation of cultural diversity.

In the following analysis, I employ two often-used indices measuring these two sets of policies: one measuring legal access to citizenship (Howard, 2006, 2009) and one measuring multiculturalism policies (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). These indices allow for a more fine-grained analysis of the independent effect of each sets of policies. They also make it possible to move away from the crude and outdated civic/ethnic distinction (Brubaker, 1999; Mahnig and Wimmer, 2000; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wong, 2010; Wright, Citrin and Wand, 2012). While in most country and for most people it is associated with opposition to immigration, this effect is dependent on the normative content of this identity (Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009). For example, Canadian national identity and pride in Canada are associated with more inclusive attitudes (Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012).
Shulman, 2002; Joppke, 2005, 2010) that other have used (e.g. Weldon, 2006) and account for a larger number of specific policies as opposed to just looking at *jus soli* versus *jus sanguinis* citizenship for example (e.g. Wright, 2011b).

For multiculturalism, Banting and Kymlicka (2006) have built a comprehensive index (hereafter MPI) composed of scores on eight different policy areas. These policy areas are: official affirmation of multiculturalism; presence of multiculturalism in schools curriculum; inclusion of ethnic representation in public media and licensing; exemption from dress code for minorities; funding of ethnic organizations to support cultural activities; funding of bilingual and mother-tongue instruction; affirmative action; and dual citizenship. A country receives zero points if it has not adopted a given policy, half a point if it has done so only partially and a full point if it has fully adopted it.

For legal access to citizenship, Howard (2009) combines three aspects of citizenship policies (hereafter CPI): whether a country allows dual citizenship; whether it grants *jus soli* citizenship; and the minimum number of years of residency that are required to acquire citizenship. Countries get a score between 0 and 2 for each of these three indicators for a possible total of 6.

The MPI is by far the most comprehensive index measuring multiculturalism policies and the most often-used. The CPI on the other hand is one of a multitude of indices measuring different aspects of citizenship. However, compared to these other attempts at measuring citizenship policies, Howard’s measure is by far

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9For example the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, http://www.mipex.eu) or the index developed by Koopmans et al. (2005). For a short review see Helbling and Bauböck (2011).
the most straightforward and parsimonious. Given that these indices are highly correlated (Helbling and Bauböck, 2011), I opt for parsimony.

In addition, some modifications to the original policies datasets were necessary. First, I have subtracted dual citizenship from countries’ scores on the MPI because it is also accounted for in the CPI and is conceptually closer to the latter. Second, some countries with a MPI score were not part of the original CPI, which only contains data for European countries. I followed Howard’s methodology to assign a score to these non-European countries. A table with country scores on each of these variables is in the Appendix.

In order to illustrate the variation in these two policy indices and their relationships with anti-immigration attitudes, Figure 3.3 shows the bivariate relationship between the two indices and the two dependent variables. As the figure clearly shows, in the aggregate, countries with more open incorporation policies do not have less—or more—anti-immigration attitudes than countries with more restrictive policies. None of these relationships come close to statistical significance.

In themselves then, policy context do not directly reflect citizens’ opinion about immigration laws and support for minorities. This results mirrors what Guimond and his colleagues found in their comparative study of the UK, the US, Canada, and Germany, where attitudes and policy context did not map clearly unto each other (Guimond et al., 2013). It is important to note however that this figure depicts the bivariate relationship and, as such, does not control for any other individual-level or country-level factors. But more importantly, these bivariate relationships do not rule out the indirect effect that policies might have on attitudes.
Figure 3.3: Bivariate relationships between aggregate public opinion and policy contexts

This scatterplot shows the bivariate relationship between the two policy indices and the two dependent variables. The dots are weighted country means with vertical line indicating 95% confidence intervals. Lines are fitted with an ordinary least squares.
This indirect effect might manifest itself by decreasing the level of cultural threat felt by citizens or by mitigating the effect of threat on anti-immigration attitudes.

**Country-level control.** Because the number of countries under study is limited, it is essential to be parsimonious in the inclusion of control variables at that level. In the analysis, I consequently add a third country-level variable that might influence policy attitudes and cultural threat, one that measures the immigration influx in a given country. Previous research is mixed on the effect of immigrant influx. Some have shown that rapid growth is linked with anti-immigration attitudes (Quillian, 1995; Wright, 2011), while Hooghe et al. (2009) found no effect for more than 20 different measures of immigration inflow on generalized trust. Yet, it makes sense intuitively that a larger influx of immigrants would increase the feeling of cultural threat among host societies. Using data from the OECD International Migration Outlook, I calculated the average annual change in the foreign born population for the 2000-2003 period (in percent) for each country used in the analysis. Rapid growth in the immigration population is also likely to raise the salience of the issue and increase feeling of threat (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008; Hopkins, 2010).

### 3.2.3 Analytical strategy

The main target of investigation is understanding the role of policy contexts in explaining individual attitudes. In other words, the goal is to understand the attitudes of individuals that are nested within a group—in this case a country—
and the impact of group-specific characteristics. There are also individual characteristics driving these attitudes and in fact, past research indicates that most of the variance is explained at the individual-level (e.g., Rustenbach, 2010). Consequently, in order to assess the role of policy contexts we need to control for these individual-level factors. In the following sections, I do this through two different strategies: multilevel modeling and a two-step graphical representation of the multilevel data. In doing so, I leverage the advantage of one method to balance the disadvantage of the other.

In most cases where individual-level data are nested within groups—whether this group is a school, a business, or a state—multilevel modeling is the ideal strategy. It allows to fit both the individual level and the country level at once (Gelman, 2005; Gelman and Hill, 2007). Multilevel modeling is especially warranted when an interaction between an individual-level variable and a group-level variable is expected, as is the case here with Hypothesis 4 (Gelman and Hill, 2007, 240).

However, multilevel modeling relies on maximum likelihood estimation and two important assumptions of MLE may be violated when using data such as the one used here. First, MLE demands an important sample size for its properties to work. This is not a problem at the individual-level, but at level 2, a sample of 17 countries might not be enough for MLE to fully ‘kick in’ (Bowers and Drake, 2005; Stegmueller, 2013). Second, MLE assumes that the analysis uses a random sample of a larger population. By using seventeen countries of immigration that are part of the ISSP dataset as the level-2 unit of analysis, the following models
rely on a sample more akin to a ‘sample of convenience’ than a random sample of countries. In order to make sure that the coefficients produced by the multilevel models are not a consequence of these shortcomings, I also use a graphical representation of this multilevel data (Bowers and Drake, 2005). This strategy implies working in two steps. First, I model individual predictors of the outcome on data pooled within countries. Second, I extract the coefficients of interest for each country and plot them against country-level predictors to look for a relationship. The weakness of this second strategy is not only that it is doing in two steps what multilevel modeling is doing in one, but that also that it makes it harder to ‘control’ for other country-level factors and to visualize these relationships. The logic behind using both strategies however, is that if they both display similar patterns, it will increase our confidence that the results are not artifacts of the specific method employed.

### 3.3 Results

In investigating the interplay between cultural threat, incorporation policies, and policy positions, I work in three steps. I first look at how the direct relationship between threat and anti-immigration attitudes varies across the countries under study. I then investigate whether more open policies are associated with lower levels of threats and finally look at the interaction between threat and policy contexts and its relationship with anti-immigration attitudes.

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10 For other applications to closely related topics of this 2-step visualization strategy see Citrin and Sides (2008); Wright (2011a); Wright and Bloemraad (2012).
3.3.1 Threat and anti-immigrants attitudes

The relationship between cultural threat and attitudes towards immigration and diversity has been well established. To highlight the strength of this relationship across context, Figure 3.4 plots predicted values from country-specific multivariate models of the three dependent variables. In order to isolate threat, the model includes other predictors of immigration attitudes that have been described earlier.

These country-specific plots clearly show that cultural threat is in fact associated with anti-immigration attitudes and that this relationship is linear. It does so unequivocally for all seventeen countries under study. In some cases this relationship is stronger (e.g. Sweden) or weaker (Iberian peninsula) but it is statistically significant in every country, in line with Hypothesis 1

There is no reason to believe that feeling of cultural threat would not lead to more anti-immigration attitudes in immigration countries and this simple multivariate analysis confirms this relationship. What this figure also does is reinforce our confidence in the relative cultural equivalence of the indices used to measure threat and anti-immigration attitudes. As I wrote earlier, one has to be cautious when using comparative dataset where questions can take on different meanings in different settings. For example, ethnic minorities and immigrants might not be seen as completely overlapping categories in every countries.\(^\text{12}\) There might be

\(^{11}\)For opposition to government support for minority the highest coefficient for threat is Sweden at .70 and the lowest is Portugal at .26. For citizenship laws, the highest coefficient is France at .54 and the lowest is Spain at .19. Finally, for more restrictive immigration policies the strongest relationship is in Finland (.6) while the weakest is in Spain (.28).

\(^{12}\)Although it is important to note that only one question used to build the indices refers to ethnic minorities rather than immigrants.
Figure 3.4: Cultural threat and immigration attitudes

These graphs plots predicted values based on a multivariate model for the three dependent variables for each country. Lines are LOESS curves with 95% confidence intervals. Continuous covariates are centered at their means, job status = unemployed, second generation = no, urban/rural = rural. For more details, see Model 1 in Table 3.3, Table 3.2, and Table 3.4.
slight variations in the interpretation of what “customs and traditions” or “ethnic minorities” means—something that we cannot test directly only with the ISSP data— but as Figure 3.4 makes clear, the relationship between feeling of cultural threat and anti-immigration attitudes is unequivocal. In other words, if there are cross-country differences in the way respondents are interpreting some of terms used, these differences do not lead to a change in the relationship between cultural threat and attitudes toward immigration and immigrants.

3.3.2 Threat and policy context

The second question at hand is whether cultural threat itself varies by policy contexts. As was clear by looking at the country-means, cultural threat does vary across country (from Norway at .63 to Canada at .43). What explains this variation? Although the focus is on policy contexts, feeling that one’s culture is threatened by diversity is not solely driven by these contexts and much of the variation will happen at the individual-level. In other words, if less education leads to higher levels of feeling of threat, countries that have lower education levels in the aggregate would also have higher levels of cultural threat. In order to isolate the role of policy contexts, we thus need to control for these individual-level predictors.

**Multilevel model.** Table 2 displays two models of cultural threat. In both models, continuous covariates are centered at their means to ease interpretation of the intercept. Although this is more important for Model 2, where country-level factors are introduced, I follow the same procedure for both models for the sake of
comparison. Binary variables (job status, urban/rural, second generation) are left as is. Throughout the analysis, these individual-level covariates remain the same (again, see Appendix for details on question wording).

The first model is an ordinary least squares that only accounts for individual level predictors of threat. All the covariates are in the expected direction and, with the exception of job status, statistically significant. After economic threat — a closely related variable — the strongest predictors of feeling of threat are ascriptive definition of the nation and importance of national identity. These are not surprising results given previous work looking at national identity and national definition (e.g. Weldon, 2006; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wright, 2011b,a).

However, the interest here lies in the relationship between threat and policy contexts. To evaluate the need to include this second level, I ran a separate random intercept model (not shown) without country-level predictors. This baseline (null) model had an intraclass correlation (ICC) of .18, indicating that 18% of the variance of threat is at the country level.\footnote{The ICC ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 means that the group conveys no information while 1 means that all members of a group are identical (Gelman and Hill, 2007, 258). Formally, the ICC is given by $\frac{\sigma^2_{\alpha}}{\sigma^2_{\alpha} + \sigma^2_{\gamma}}$ where $\sigma^2_{\alpha}$ is the variance of the second level residuals and $\sigma^2_{\gamma}$ is the variance of the lower level residuals. Given the intuitive importance of individual characteristics in explaining feeling of threat, the fact that 18% of the variance is explained by country attributes is quite important and clearly indicates the need to add this second level to the analysis.

Thus, in addition to the individual-level characteristics in Model 1, Model 2 also includes country-level variables for the model intercept. Here, I include
Table 3.1: Multilevel model of cultural threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual-level variables</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Country-level effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>−0.006***</td>
<td>−0.006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>0.380***</td>
<td>0.400***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right self-placement</td>
<td>0.126***</td>
<td>0.147***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job status</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>−0.023***</td>
<td>−0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of nat. id.</td>
<td>0.040***</td>
<td>0.103***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>−0.042***</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascriptive definition</td>
<td>0.090***</td>
<td>0.136***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-level variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Influx</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.043***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC policies</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cship policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.022**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.539***</td>
<td>0.653***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

The individual-level variables come from the ISSP. Age, Education and Left-Right self-placement are continuous variables. For the latter, the highest value means extreme right. Economic threat, importance of national identity and ascriptive definition are multi-item indices (see appendix for question wording). All these continuous variables are centered at their mean to make interpretation easier. Job status, Urban/Rural and Second generation are dichotomous variables where 1 means unemployed, rural, and second generation immigrant.
the two main explanatory variables—citizenship policies and multiculturalism policies—and one control variable that might also influence feeling of threat — the influx of immigrants. Adding these country-level variables reduce the unexplained variation between countries from 22% in the baseline model (not shown) to 12%. Coefficients for country-level factors indicate that citizenship policies are associated with a decrease in the feeling of threat, whereas the coefficient for multiculturalism policies is not statistically significant. The relationship between citizenship policies and threat means that for every extra point on the citizenship scale (0 to 6), cultural threat decreases by .02, which for an index that goes from 0 to 1, is relatively small but statistically significant. Immigrant influx is also linked with less cultural threat. This result is yet another one to add to the mixed findings when it comes to the role of growth in immigration and attitudes.

The two-step procedure. The next step is to look at this relationship without modeling the two levels at once and without relying on maximum likelihood estimation and its assumptions. To do so, I first model the individual-level model as was done in the first model of Table 2 for each country in the dataset. I then plot the country-specific intercepts against both policy contexts. Again, because we want to interpret the intercept, individual-level covariates that are continuous have been centered around their mean. Figure 3.5 shows these intercept plots for the two policy contexts.

14 Another model with an interaction between the two policy contexts was tested but this interaction was not statistically significant and did not change the coefficients of interest. Consequently, it is left out of the analysis.

15 An analysis was also conducted with the total percentage of the population that is foreign-born rather than the changes in this proportion. The model gave similar results and is not presented.
These two panels show the intercept for each country when cultural threat is regressed on individual-level predictors. The model is the same as Model 1 in Table 3.1. These coefficients are then plotted against multiculturalism policies and citizenship policies. The vertical lines around coefficient represent 95% confidence intervals. The line is fitted with an ordinary least squares.

The intercepts for each country can be interpreted as the average level of cultural threat for an individual whose position on the covariates are at the mean. In other words, an average-aged person with an average level of education, etc. The dichotomous variables have been left as is where 0 means unemployed, living in rural community and not being a second generation immigrant. The trends that emerge from these two plots is that both policies are associated with lower levels of cultural threat. The relationship is stronger for citizenship policies, but the two relationships are clear. However, the slope for multiculturalism is not statistically significant, while the slope for citizenship policies is -.016 (.006). In other words, both methods show similar patterns for the role of policy context in explaining
feeling of cultural threat. More open citizenship policies are associated with lower levels of cultural threat in line with Hypothesis 2, but multiculturalism is not. In addition, although this perception of threat is determined more by individual-level characteristics than by country-level policies, these country-level factors are still important enough to justify their inclusions when explaining feeling of cultural threat.

### 3.3.3 Threat, anti-immigration attitudes, and policy contexts

The fact that more open citizenship are associated with lower levels of cultural threat is an interesting finding in itself, but it raises the question of whether policy contexts are also associated with changes in anti-immigration positions. I now turn to the effect of policy context on the three policy position indices measuring support for stricter citizenship laws, opposition to support for minorities, and support for more restrictive immigration policies. Again, I work in two stages. The first is modeling the multilevel data to get at the country-level effects of policies when controlling for individual characteristics and the second is to analyze this data through the two-step graphical display.

**Multilevel models.** Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Table 3.4 each show three models of the three policy positions.

In all three tables, the first model is a simple ordinary least squares that includes individual-level predictors of anti-immigration attitudes. Model 2 then
Table 3.2: Multilevel model of support for stricter citizenship laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual-level variables</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Country-level factors</th>
<th>Full model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>0.382***</td>
<td>0.392***</td>
<td>0.447***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>−0.010</td>
<td>−0.034***</td>
<td>−0.036***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>−0.015***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right self-placement</td>
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<td>0.082***</td>
<td>0.080***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
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<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
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<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
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<td>Importance of nat. id.</td>
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<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascriptive def.</td>
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<td>0.043***</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-level variables</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC policies</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cship policies</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Influx</td>
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<td>−0.068</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat X MC policies</td>
<td>−0.017***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat X Cship policies</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.415***</td>
<td>0.414***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
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<td>13,533</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
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</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Table 3.3: Multilevel model of opposition to government support for minorities

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<th>OLS</th>
<th>Country-level factors</th>
<th>Full model</th>
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<td><strong>Individual-level variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
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<td>0.487***</td>
<td>0.577***</td>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>-0.00002</td>
<td>-0.00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
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<td>-0.033***</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right self-placement</td>
<td>0.145***</td>
<td>0.109***</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job status</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>0.193***</td>
<td>0.182***</td>
<td>0.187***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
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<td>Importance of nat. id.</td>
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<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ascriptive def.</td>
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<td>0.011*</td>
<td>0.010*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country-level variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC policies</td>
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<td>0.019*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cship policies</td>
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<td>-0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Influx</td>
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<td>-0.083</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.060)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat X MC policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat X Cship policies</td>
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<td>-0.036***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.586***</td>
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<td>(0.041)</td>
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<td>13,214</td>
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*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Table 3.4: Multilevel model of support for restrictive immigration policies

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<th>OLS</th>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.0002*</td>
<td>0.0002**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
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<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left-Right self-placement</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.094***</td>
<td>0.092***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
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<td>Job status</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>0.221***</td>
<td>0.206***</td>
<td>0.207***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
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<td>Importance of nat. id.</td>
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<td>0.068***</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ascriptive def.</td>
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<td>0.010*</td>
<td>0.009</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
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<td><strong>Country-level variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>MC policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
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<td>Cship policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration Influx</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Threat X MC policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.011***</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Threat X Cship policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.015***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
adds country-level predictors and Model 3 includes cross-level interactions.\footnote{Country-level interactions between the two policies and between policies and immigrant influx were also tested but were not significant.}

If we first pay attention to the OLS models, we see that cultural threat has a strong and statistically significant effect on these attitudes, as was expected. Note that in both cases it is also larger than the coefficient for economic threat. All the other covariates are in the expected direction. One coefficient from these individual-level models that requires more explanation however is education. The fact that it is positive might seem counter-intuitive given our expectations. However, recall that education is associated with lower levels of cultural threat and most of the difference observed between highly-educated and less educated people is accounted for in feeling of threat, in line with previous research (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2012). In fact, when we remove threat from the model, education becomes negative and significant.

Random intercept models without any country-level factors, i.e. just varying intercepts by country (not shown) indicated that 8\% of the variation on the stricter citizenship laws index was at the country-level, while it was 16\% for the opposition to government support for minorities, and 8\% for more restrictive immigration policies. These baseline models indicate that most of the variation is at the individual level, but that country-level factors are also important. Adding the country-level predictors (Model 2) also decreases the unexplained between-country variance. This unexplained between-country variance remains the same when we introduce interaction effects because we are not adding any new predic-
tors. In any case, when adding the interaction effect, the primary interest is not in predicting country-level attitudes but in the interaction coefficients themselves (Gelman and Hill, 2007, 283).

If we first look at results for attitudes toward stricter citizenship laws (Table 3.2), none of the coefficients for country-level factors included in Model 2 are statistically significant. In the model including interactions however (Model 3), the coefficient for the interaction between threat and multiculturalism policies is small but significant. What this means is that as the score on the multiculturalism index increases, the effect of threat on the dependent variable decreases. The coefficient for citizenship is also negative but not significant.

Table 3.3 displays coefficient for similar models when the dependent variable is opposition to government support for minorities. In this case, the results are slightly different. Looking at the country-level coefficients, we see that multiculturalism policies are associated with more opposition to government support for minorities, that is, multiculturalism is associated with exclusionary attitudes. The other contextual factors are not statistically significant. The third model includes cross-level interactions. This time both interaction coefficients are significant and in opposite directions. Here again, citizenship policies are decreasing the effect of cultural threat on anti-immigrant attitudes but multiculturalism is having the opposite effect, though the coefficient is much smaller.

The same is true for the model 2 and 3 in Table 3.4. The policies themselves are not associated with more exclusionary or inclusive attitude but the interaction effects are. Taken together, the results when we only add country-level effects
go against Hypothesis 3. We expected policies to have a direct relationship with attitudes and be associated with less anti-immigration policy positions. This is not the case. In fact, the only instance in which a policy has a statistically significant relationship with these anti-immigration attitudes—multiculturalism policies and government support for minorities—it is in the opposite direction.

To better visualize the statistically significant results for interaction effects, Figure 3.6 plots the predicted values across the range of cultural threat when citizenship policies and multiculturalism policies are at their minimum and maximum. This means 0 (Austria, Denmark) and 5.5 (Canada) for citizenship and 0 (Switzerland, Norway) and 6.5 (Australia, Canada) for multiculturalism. All the other predictors are set at their means.

These interaction effects partially confirm Hypothesis 4. Citizenship policies do in fact mitigate the effect of threat on anti-immigration attitudes and they do so both when the outcome is support for more restrictive immigration policies and when it is opposition to government support for minorities. In both these cases however, multiculturalism is pulling in an opposite direction and reinforcing the effect of threat rather than mitigating it—although to a lesser extent. When the outcome is support for restrictive citizenship policies, it is multiculturalism that is playing the mitigating role. As expected these effects are stronger when we exclude relative items from the indices. This only applies to the second index (support for minorities) because the other two indices either only have non-relative items (citizenship) or relative items (immigration). Results for the multilevel models of opposition to government support for minorities without the relative item
Figure 3.6: Interaction effect between threat and policy contexts on the three dependent variables
can be found in the Appendix.\footnote{Analyses were conducted to evaluate the role of outliers (e.g. Norway) in these relationships, results remain consistent with what is displayed here.}

**Two-step procedure.** Again, to insure that the patterns are also observed when not relying on maximum likelihood estimation and it assumptions, I represent graphically the relationships between policies, threat, and attitudes. I first look at the exclusionary impact of multiculturalism on attitudes towards government support for minorities. Similar to the logic behind Figure 3.5 which looked at cultural threat as the outcome, I run within-country regressions (i.e. Model 1 in Table 3.3) and then plot the country-specific intercepts against multiculturalism policies.

If the pattern observed in the multilevel model is confirmed, we should see an upward slope when we plot these intercepts against multiculturalism policies. This is exactly what we see in Figure 3.7. The relationship between these country-level intercepts and multiculturalism is clearly positive— that is, multiculturalism is associated with more opposition— and is statistically significant.

I now turn to the interaction effects from the third model in Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Table 3.4. This time, the interest is in the mitigating (or reinforcing) role of policies on the relationship between cultural threat and anti-immigration attitudes. In this case, rather than being interested in the intercept for a given model, the primary interest lies in the different slopes for cultural threat. One issue that arises however is that the interactions in those tables are in opposite
Figure 3.7: Country-specific intercepts against policy context — opposition to government support for ethnic minorities

The graphs show the intercept for each country when opposition to government support for minorities is regressed on individual-level predictors. The model is the same as Model 1 in Table 3.3. These coefficients are then plotted against multiculturalism policies. The vertical lines around coefficients represent 95% confidence intervals. The line is fitted with an ordinary least squares.

Consequently, if we plot the country-specific slopes against one set of policies, the other set of policies will be acting in the background thus making it unlikely that the slopes of these plots reach statistical significance. We would then be wrongly concluding that there is no relationship.\footnote{See Figure C.1 in the Appendix. It does in fact show much weaker relationships for the role of incorporation policies in mitigating (or reinforcing) the effect of threat on anti-immigration attitudes. The strongest relationship remains the mitigating effect of citizenship policies when the}
teraction then, we have to ‘control’ for one set of policies when looking at the other. In order to do so, I transform the policy indices in categorical variables and split the countries in three separate groups: high citizenship/high multiculturalism, high citizenship/low multiculturalism, low citizenship/low multiculturalism. No country has a low score on the CPI and a high score on the MPI. I regress the outcome on the predictors (Model 1 in the Tables) with data pooled within groupings. I then extract the intercept coefficients and the slope for threat and plot these group-specific coefficients.

Going back to the three groups described above, the coefficient for threat should be at its lowest when countries combine high citizenship and low multiculturalism scores. Given that the coefficients for the interaction between citizenship and threat was more substantial than the one for the interaction with multiculturalism, and that no country combines low citizenship with high multiculturalism, the strongest slope should be for countries with low scores on both indices, with countries having high scores on both indices falling somewhere in the middle. Lastly, based on the coefficients from the multilevel models, the differences in slopes should be more important when the outcome is opposition to government support for minorities. These are the patterns observed in Figure 3.8, confirming the results based on the multilevel models. The differences between the groups are in the expected direction, although the slope for high-low and high-high countries are not significantly different.

Overall, both strategies give similar results for all relationships of interest, outcome is opposition to government support for minorities.
Figure 3.8: Cultural threat and anti-immigration attitudes 2-step graphical representation

The graphs show the intercept and the slope coefficient for cultural threat when the dependent variables are regressed on individual-level predictors for each group of countries. The model is the same as Model 1 in Table 3 and 4. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
whether looking at threat itself, at its relationship with anti-immigration attitudes, or at the mitigating effect of policy regimes. Although multilevel modeling represents the preferable way of looking at nested data such as the one used here, the properties of the country-level sample (small, not random), violated assumptions behind the maximum likelihood estimation on which multilevel modeling relies. This is where a graphical look at the multilevel data proved useful and in this case, confirmed and increased our confidence in the results obtained through multilevel estimation.

3.4 Discussion and conclusion

The main objective of this research was to fill two important gaps in the immigration attitudes literature: the absence of incorporation policies as contextual factors explaining anti-immigration attitudes and the influence of such factors on cultural threat.

One of the reasons behind these gaps is that a recent focus on the microfoundations of cultural threat and the methodological decisions that come with it, has led the larger context in which these relationships take place to be largely overlooked. Of course, policies are present in studies comparing immigration attitudes across countries (e.g. Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012; Harell et al., 2012; Iyengar et al., 2013), but they are acting in the background and their role never assessed directly.

Given that the effects and the sources of cultural threat are now some of the principal objects of study for scholars interested in immigration attitudes, having
a better understanding of contextual factors and their influence is paramount. In
terms of policy regimes, the results above reinforce previous research (Weldon,
2006; Wright, 2011b). Like them, it reasserts that policies matter even if a great
deal of the variation is happening at the individual-level. Using two different
analytical strategies, I showed that more open citizenship policies are associated
with lower levels of cultural threat. The ‘inclusive effect’ of citizenship policies
is also present when the interest is in the relationship between threat and anti-
immigration attitudes. More open citizenship policies mitigate the strong rela-
tionship between threat and opposition to government support for minorities and
between threat and a desire for stricter immigration laws. These findings should
help emphasize the need to pay attention to context in intergroup relations, an as-
pect of these relations that has been highlighted by social-psychologist working
in the social identity theory tradition (Huddy, 2004).

Disaggregating policies in terms of citizenship and cultural accommodation
also proved essential because the two sets of policies used in the analysis turned
out to be both associated with attitudes but in opposite directions. Although multi-
culturalism policies do not seem to matter when the outcome is support for stricter
immigration laws, they are associated with more anti-immigration attitudes when
we consider government support for minorities. Multiculturalism policies were
associated with both more opposition to such a support and with a larger effect of
threat on it. These results would indicate that critiques of multiculturalism poli-
cies are partially right when they fear that such policies might reinforce group
membership and outgroup hostility. That this is the reason why multiculturalism
policies are associated with more opposition to government support for minorities cannot be tested with data such at the one used here. However, this finding coupled with Wright (2011b)’s conclusions that multiculturalism is associated with an increase in the proportion of individuals defining their nation based on ascriptive characteristics (ancestry, birth) means that more research is needed to understand how multiculturalism policies might reinforce these exclusionary positions.

As mentioned before, the economic context had previously been included in studies of immigration attitudes (Sides and Citrin, 2007; Rustenbach, 2010) without really being conclusive. The lack of data and the size of the sample made it impossible to test country-level interactions in the present analysis. However, given the results presented here, future investigations of economic conditions or any other country-level factors should also account for incorporation policies since they could play the same role that they are playing with regards to cultural threat: mitigating or reinforcing their negative effect on attitudes.

It is also important to note that, although the policies under study give a relatively complete picture of a country’s strategy in dealing with diversity, they do not exhaust the different types of policies that aim at managing immigrants incorporation. For example, countries have increasingly introduced civic integration requirements as part of their immigration or naturalization process such as country knowledge test and language requirements (Goodman, 2010). These policies were far less common when the ISSP data was collected but studies working with more recent data should work to include them in their measure of citizenship policies.
Finally, this research is a first attempt at understanding the contextual determinants of cultural threat and the role played by incorporation policies. I hypothesized as to which mechanisms would explain the relationships uncovered here but the observational data on which the analysis builds does not make it possible to specifically test these different mechanisms. This is what future research should do: continue to look at mechanisms that explain threat while also trying to unpack contextual effects. Experimental work is essential here but requires more effort because the focus is on context, a variable that can be difficult to manipulate. It might seem contradictory to insist that the next step is to go back to the mechanisms at play and to use experimental research to do so when it was precisely a focus on this type of work that, I argued, was responsible for the gap in the literature. On the contrary, this is an example of observational and experimental work complementing and reinforcing each other. Doing so would also help dealing with causality issues that are always a concern when studying political attitudes, political behaviors, and institutions. This question would also benefit from single-case studies looking at countries or sub-state entities that change their incorporation policies.

The fact that citizenship policies are associated both with lower levels of cultural threat and with a smaller effect of threat on anti-immigration attitude is a welcomed sign given that countries have increasingly moved away from an ethnic conception of citizenship (Mahnig and Wimmer, 2000) and liberalized their policies (Howard, 2006). In addition to this change in citizenship policies, some have hinted at a rejection of multiculturalism, especially in Europe, although it
remains to be seen whether this backlash is also observed in practice (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010; Banting and Kymlicka, 2013). These recent changes also mean that in this rapidly evolving environment, understanding how policies affect attitudes becomes even more essential.
Chapter 4

Making national identity salient

Are national identities inherently exclusionary or is it possible that some national identities act as encompassing forces that include newcomers? On the one hand research in Europe and in the U.S. seem to point to the former: people who care about their national identity and people who identify more with their nationality are more likely to have exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants (e.g. Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wong, 2010). On the other hand, the long-standing explanation for Canada’s success with immigration has been the central place played by immigration and multiculturalism in its national identity, making Canadian national identity an inclusive force. Although never tested empirically, this explanation seems to be vindicated by recent research showing that Canadians exhibit a different relationship between pride in their country and attitudes towards immigration (Citrin, Johnston and Wright 2012).
The starting point of this research is that all national identities do not have the same normative content and that, consequently, the effect of a given national identity on attitudes should be conditional on the norms associated with it. Echoing Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012) on the outcome of patriotism and chauvinism, national identity in itself should not be conceived as having a restrictive impact on attitudes towards immigration (see also Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009). Canada represents an ideal case to test these propositions because of the link that has been made between its national identity, multiculturalism, and immigration (Kymlicka, 2003; Joppke, 2004; Bloemraad, 2006). From a comparative point of view, if Canadian identity cannot have this inclusive effect, the prospects for other national identities playing such a role are dire. From a Canadian perspective, if raising the salience of national identity has exclusionary effects on attitudes toward newcomers, this would represent a challenge to the long-standing view of Canada as a success story of host society-immigrant relations.

Here, I test the possibility that some national identities might represent an inclusive force by building on a previous survey experiment done in the Netherlands (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004) and applying a modified version in Canada. This new survey experiment uses a randomly selected and nationally representative sample (N=1500), combining the internal validity advantage of the experimental method with the external validity of this type of sample. It also represents a hard test of the inclusiveness potential of Canadian national identity by using a priming strategy that does not assign a given normative content to the identity in question.
In what follows, I first clarify the different definitions and dimensions of national identity and how they relate to attitudes towards newcomers, emphasizing the importance of the normative content of national identity. I then derive hypotheses from the literature on national identity, social identity theory and from previous research on the Canadian case. Once this has been clarified, I describe the design of the survey experiment and then present and discuss the results. Comparing two different primes, this research demonstrates that making Canadian identity salient does not increase anti-immigration attitudes even when the prime used as treatment strongly reinforces boundaries between groups. A subtler prime, one that makes national identity salient without attaching any meaning to it, made respondents more inclusive in some instances. In addition to directly testing the effect of a salient national identity on attitudes toward immigrant and multiculturalism, this research demonstrates the need to pay attention to the content of national identity across contexts and opens up new directions for future research by offering a framework that can be replicated in other settings.

4.1 National identity, social identity theory and restrictive attitudes

National identity can be a slippery concept and a useful starting point in making sense of it is the important distinction proposed by Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001) between three dimensions of national identity. Their argument is that national identity consists of a cognitive dimension (identification as), an affective dimension (identification with) and a normative dimension. The latter refers to
“the particular set of ideas about what makes the nation distinctive—ideas about its members, its core values and goals, the territory it ought to occupy, and its relation to other nations” (Citrin, Wong and Duff, 2001, 75-76). When looking at citizens’ attitudes towards immigration, a measure of citizens’ identification with their country (affective) or as a member of their country (cognitive) is not enough. After all, strength of attachment or pride, in themselves, have nothing to do with attitudes toward immigration. The effect of attachment and pride will be a function of what this national identity means for respondents. We thus need to pay attention to the normative dimension of national identity. It is this normative content that will determine how an immigrant can fit in and that will draw a boundary determining where the immigrant finds herself vis-à-vis her new society. This attention to the content of identity is also central to viewing national identities as social identities.

4.1.1 National identity as a social identity

Most of the literature that identifies the restrictive impact of national identity is rooted in social identity theory (see for example Citrin et al., 2001; De Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Crepaz, 2008; Theiss-Morse, 2009, Wong, 2010). Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) contends that individuals’ sense of who they are is based on the groups

\[1\] In this, I disagree with Huddy and Khatib who write that “consistent with a distinction in social identity theory between identity and its meaning, national identity is less ideological than symbolic, constructive, or uncritical patriotism” (Huddy and Khatib, 2007, 70). It is not clear why meaning needs to be synonymous with ideology. I see meaning of national identity as similar to “constitutive norms” (Abdelal et al., 2008, 19) and “identity content” (Schildkraut, 2011, 6), which are central concepts in understanding national identities as social identities.
they think they belong to and that identification with these groups will have consequences for individual behaviors. For example, members will make theirs the concerns and goals of the group and will behave in order to increase the well-being of that group (Brewer, 2001). In addition, because their sense of self is linked to the group, members will tend to evaluate the group favorably to increase their self-esteem. Attachment to the group is also central because the effect of group membership and the internalization of group norms will depend on the strength of identification (for a review see Huddy, 2001). Viewing national identities as social identities is now common in political science (e.g. Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Schildkraut, 2011).

It is not surprising that most of the research that has emerged from this literature points to the restrictive impact of national identity since social identity theory offers clear hypotheses as to the effects of social identities on intergroup relations. For example, social identity theory suggests that the in-group favoritism associated with a social identity will lead to out-group hostility when one’s group’s identity is considered to be under threat (Brewer, 2001; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2008). Viewing national identity as a social identity also means that the content associated with this national identity and attachment to it will be important factors in determining attitudes towards outsiders (Schildkraut, 2011). First, national identities will always exclude some and not others; not everyone can be American or French and being American is seen as different from being French. The content of a particular national identity will set boundaries between the in-group and the out-group and
these boundaries will have clear implications at the individual level. For example, Wong (2010, 137) finds that respondents with a more restricted vision of who is part of the American community are more likely to be harsher on who qualifies for citizenship benefits. There is also evidence that hosts will evaluate newcomers based on their adherence to norms associated with this particular national identity (Schildkraut, 2011; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012). Making national identity salient should reinforce these boundaries.

One of the best demonstrations of the effect of this normative content on attitudes towards immigration comes from a survey experiment conducted by Sniderman et al. in the Netherlands (2004; 2007). In this study, one group of respondents had their Dutch identity primed resulting in what these authors have called a mobilization phenomenon (2004: 44): people who usually did not oppose immigration were more likely to do so after having received the treatment. Bringing national identity considerations to the fore reinforced the boundaries between groups and had an exclusionary effect on attitudes towards the outgroup, in this case immigrants.

It is important to emphasize that in this case it was Dutch identity that was primed. We should expect the treatment effect to be context dependent and vary depending on the norms associated with a given national identity. In other words, the prime brings an image of “Dutchness” in the respondents’ mind, it is directly connected to, as Anderson (1983) would put it, the imagined boundaries of the Dutch people, one where immigrants seem to be left out of the inner circle.

Although most of the research rooted in social identity theory concludes that
national identity represents a restrictive force, viewing national identity as a social identity does not make it automatically restrictive. In fact, social identity theory does offer potential mechanisms through which (or instances where) national identity may act as an inclusive force.

### 4.1.2 National identity as an inclusive force

Following Theiss-Morse (2009), there are at least two ways in which national identity may play an inclusive role and they are both related to its normative content\(^2\). The first one is derived from the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000) and is applied to the question of national identity by Transue (2007). The idea behind this model is that people can shift from an “us” vs. “them” dynamic by focusing on a superordinate identity that encompasses a more general “We”. Transue observes in a US metropolitan sample, that priming national identity among white respondents increases support for a tax raise directed at educational opportunities for minorities. He concludes that his results support “research from social psychology that shows that attachment to broader identities reduces intergroup bias rather than with theories that predict that raising salience of national identity would lead to hostility toward outgroups” (2007: 89). It is important here to pay attention to the identity of the outgroup. The design used by Transue does not bring immigrants to the respondent’s mind but rather African-American, more likely to be seen as part of the American society. Contrary to Transue’s argument, we cannot assume that every national identity has the po-

\(^2\)For more on what could potentially make American national identity inclusive, see Theiss-Morse (2009, 175-185).
tential to act as a superordinate identity that brings every ethnic group inside the “Circle of We” to use the words of Hollinger (1995). For example, Wright and Citrin (2011) tested if the Common Ingroup Identity Model could be applied to white Americans’ attitudes towards immigrants’ protest. A protest where immigrants were waving American flags (as opposed to Mexican flags) lessened the degree to which people said they were bothered by the protest but this small effect did not translate in any changes in opinion for specific immigration policies. It is possible that some national identities may act as superordinate for some groups but it will depend on the normative content associated with it: the normative content of American national identity seems to include African-Americans and the normative content of Dutch national identity clearly does not include immigrants.3

This leads to the second way in which national identity might a play an inclusive role: if the norms associated with it are themselves inclusive (Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Guimond et al., 2013). Identification with one’s national identity means following and internalizing the norms associated with it and as Theiss-Morse writes, “inclusiveness and appreciation of diversity can have significant effects on people’s willingness to accept marginalized group members as full members of the group” (2009: 183). These two mechanisms through which national identity can be inclusive are interrelated. For a national identity to act as a superordinate identity a degree of inclusiveness as a

3The question of whether all national identities can be made to be superordinate by insisting on the importance of immigration in their formation is a different but related question. In an experimental research with students, Esses et al., (2006) found that reinforcing the immigrant component of the Canadian and German identity had a positive effect on attitude towards immigrants for Canadians with a high score on a social dominance scale but a negative effect for Germans.
norm has to be associated with it. The Canadian “exceptionalism” idea supposes that the norm of inclusiveness of newcomers is associated with the Canadian national identity and that as such, it has the potential to act as a superordinate identity that includes immigrants. Making Canadian national identity salient should therefore also raise the salience of the norm associated with it and influence attitudes toward newcomers. The goal here is to investigate this possibility experimentally, where salience of national identity is manipulated.

4.2 The Canadian case

One of the main hypotheses to explain why Canada has been impervious to the backlash against multiculturalism is that the Canadian national identity is linked with multiculturalism and immigration. For instance, Will Kymlicka writes: “While the actual practices of accommodation in Canada are not unique, Canada is unusual in the extent to which it has built these practices into its symbols and narratives of nationhood” (2003: 375). Others have made a similar point (Joppke, 2004; Bloemraad, 2006). So far, the evidence presented to support this hypothesis has been based on observational data. According to many studies, support for multiculturalism in Canada is always high compared to other countries (Berry and Kalin, 1995; Parkin and Mendelsohn, 2003; Adams, 2007; Kymlicka, 2008). These results are presented as a proof that multiculturalism and immigration hold a central position in the Canadian national identity. However, the wording of this type of questions often makes them problematic. For example, questions that directly asked about support for multiculturalism might be subject to social
desirability bias or respondents might not know what the term multiculturalism signifies (see Breton et al., 2014). Even respondents who know what multiculturalism means might not understand the concept the same way. Some may interpret the question as being about multicultural policies and others may interpret it as being about the fact that Canada is diverse, that it is multi-cultural.

In fact, when we look at questions from the International Social Survey Programme that do not mention multiculturalism, we see that in 2003 only 29 per cent of Canadian respondents thought that ethnic minorities should maintain their distinct customs and traditions. On government giving assistance to ethnic minorities, 66 per cent of respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly. In other words, if we only use support for multiculturalism policies or for its principle, we do not see a distinctive Canadian position. Figure 4.1 places Canada in a comparative perspective based on these two questions. It clearly shows that if there is a Canadian exceptionalism, it is not on support for multiculturalism policies or for its principle.

In a recent study, Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012) make an important first step in testing the proposition that there is something different about Canadian national identity. Using observational data from the same ISSP, they find that pride in Canada is positively related to support for multiculturalism and that the relationship is the opposite in the United States. However, when only looking at attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism, Canadians are not more inclusive than Americans but rather less inclusive. This seemingly contradictory finding leads the authors to conclude that: “Canadian identity may foster an inclusive orienta-
Figure 4.1: Canada in comparative perspective

These bar graphs show country level means. Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Source ISSP 2003.
tion but in doing so it starts from a less inclusive base” (2012: 547). This caveat aside, pride in Canada does have a different impact on attitudes than pride in the US. This result should be taken with care however, mainly because the question they use to test support for multiculturalism is not optimal. It asks respondents whether it is better for society if ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions or if these groups should adapt and blend in the larger society. These two options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is not clear what is the underlying attitude of someone answering that minorities should keep their customs and traditions: is it because she supports multiculturalism or because she does not want these minorities blending in the larger society?

The authors also look at the relationship between the same pride index and anti-immigration sentiment. Again, Canada differs from the U.S. and exhibits a negative relationship. Canada, however, is not the only country where we can find a negative relationship between pride in the country and exclusive attitudes towards newcomers. The same data show that it is also true for France, Portugal and New Zealand.

In addition to this link between pride and more inclusive attitudes exposed by Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012), Guimond et al. (2013) show that Canada also differs in the perceived importance of the multicultural norm. Multiculturalism is

\[\text{More specifically, a question asking if immigrants should blend into the larger society is also problematic when it comes to context dependency. Saying that an immigrant should blend in the Canadian society is probably qualitatively different from asking an immigrant to blend into the Japanese society. In other words, the attitude of a Canadian citizen saying that immigrants should blend in the Canadian society might be different from a Japanese citizen saying the same.}\]

\[\text{This is based on a replication of the Citrin et al. study, but including all Western countries in the ISSP data rather than only Canada and the US. See Figure E.1 in Appendix.}\]
perceived by Canadian respondents as a norm endorsed by the population. The proportion seeing multiculturalism as a norm is larger in Canada than in the U.S., the U.K., and Germany. Again, however Canadians’ attitudes themselves are not that different from the attitudes of other Western countries. What seem to be different is the normative content of Canadian national identity and the inclusiveness that it promotes. It is this possibility that I test experimentally in the following pages.

4.3 Hypotheses

Based on the “national identities as social identities” literature and on the Canadian case, we can derive expectations about the effect of raising the salience of Canadian national identity on respondents’ attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism.

Social identity theory is clear on the effect of threat for out-group hostility. Accordingly, even if the normative content of Canadian national identity acts as an inclusive force, we should expect that:

**H1**: Respondents who feel like their national identity is threatened will be more opposed to immigration and multiculturalism.

The meaning of Canadian national identity should come in play however in the priming effect. Making respondents’ national identity salient before asking them questions on immigration should remind them of the norms associated with such an identity.
**H2:** Canadian respondents who receive the primes should not be more opposed to immigration and multiculturalism. In fact, one would expect them to become more supportive of both.

There is also the possibility that the priming effect will depend on some of the respondents’ characteristics. For example, respondents for whom national identity is important will have internalized its norms more thoroughly and the strength of attachment to the Canadian national identity should interact with the prime.

**H3:** Strong identifiers, those for whom Canadian identity is more important, should be more supportive of immigration and multiculturalism and we should see a more important treatment effect among them.

Finally, the prime should not produce the “mobilization effect” found by Sniderman et al. in the Netherlands. The Dutch results showed heterogeneity in the treatment effect: it was people who did not feel like the Dutch identity was threatened that became more opposed to immigration. In the Canadian setting, the expectation is that the prime will not have a negative effect and this should be true at all levels of “cultural threat”. However, this cultural threat may diminish the effect of the norms associated with Canadian national identity.

**H4:** Priming Canadian national identity should not have a negative impact on attitudes toward immigration and this should be true at all levels of cultural threat. The primes should have a stronger inclusive effect at lower levels of threat.
The logic here is not one of a ceiling effect—respondents having such a high level of opposition that they cannot be more opposed—at higher levels of threat since we expect the prime to have an inclusive effect. Rather, the priming effect might not be strong enough to counterbalance the effect of feeling of threat. Thus, the effect will be more important at low level of cultural threat. In order to test these hypotheses, the following section presents a survey experiment that builds on prior work by Sniderman et al. in the Netherlands (2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007).

4.4 Experimental design

One of the important objectives of the design is to prime respondents’ national identity without attaching meaning to it, to make respondents think about their national identity while letting them decide what this national identity means. In order to do so, the survey experiment unfolds in three steps: a pre-treatment question, a priming treatment, and a series of questions on immigration and multiculturalism (see Figure 4.2 for the complete design).

The first element of the design is a question that asks respondents if they feel like Canadian values are threatened. This question serves two purposes: it measures feeling of threat but also enables to control for a pre-existing bias against immigration without actually mentioning identity or immigration (Sniderman et al., 2004; 2007). The treatment is then block-randomized on answers to this question. The logic behind this manipulation is that Sniderman et al. found that it is the people who do not usually see immigration as a problem that are most influenced
**Figure 4.2:** Experimental design and question wording

**Pre-treatment question**

"These days I am afraid that Canadian values are threatened."

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Disagree somewhat
4. Disagree strongly

**Treatment**

**A- Sniderman**

"People belong to different types of groups. One of the most important and essential of these groups is the nation which you belong to. In your case, you belong to the Canadian nationality. Each nation is different."

**B- Question-as-Treatment**

"How important is your Canadian identity to you?"

1. Very important
2. Somewhat important
3. Not very important
4. Not important at all

**C- Control**

**Dependent Variables**

Q1: "Do you [as a Canadian (for condition A and B) / blank (for control)] think that allowing new immigrants to enter Canada should be made more difficult than it is now?"

Q2: "Do you [as a Canadian (for condition A and B) / blank (for control)] think that ethnic minorities should have the same political and social rights than the Canadian people?"

Q3: "From your point of view, [as a Canadian (for condition A and B) / blank (for control)], are all those different cultures in Canada a threat to our own values?"

Q4: "Do you [as a Canadian (for condition A and B) / blank (for control)] think that ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions?"
by the prime. This manipulation controls for a “feeling of threat”, an obvious confounder of the effect of priming national identity. One could argue that this question in itself represents a prime of the respondent’s national identity but this pre-treatment question and the prime were separated by 30 unrelated questions.

The treatment takes two forms (plus a control group): one group receives a vignette replicating Sniderman et al.’s study and another receives a question-as-treatment designed to prime the respondent’s national identity and to measure the strength of attachment to this identity. Using two different primes also allows for methodological advancement by testing the effect of different “strengths” of priming strategy. The vignette used by Sniderman et al. to prime national identity represents a strong prime that may be responsible for their results. Although their formulation mimics more closely what an anti-immigration politician might say, I argue that this prime is not a weak intervention or a “mere mention of consideration of collective identity” as they suggest (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007: 119). Telling respondents that each nation is different and reinforcing the importance of this difference sharpens the boundaries between groups. It is not isolating the effect of national identity but lumping it with the effect of strong and exclusionary wording. Respondents in the question-as-treatment condition are asked how important their national identity is to them. I contend that this represents a

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6 Randomization would potentially distribute this covariate equally among treatment group, but this was taken as a precaution. For more on the usefulness of blocking in experiments see Moore (2012) and Moore and Moore (2013).

7 Not surprisingly given the sample size, balance checks done on the distribution of covariates between the three groups confirmed that randomization produced balanced groups. Missing values were also balanced across treatment groups. Results are available upon request.
mere mention of national identity, one that is stripped of any normative content. A design that compares primes of different strengths makes it possible to test if indeed, a mere mention of national identity induces restrictive attitudes, or if these attitudes are only caused by the strong wording of a restrictive prime.

Once respondents have received the treatment, they are asked to answer four questions on immigration and multiculturalism. The first three of these questions come from Sniderman et al. and the fourth one comes from the International Social Survey Programme (National identity module). The first question is a direct measure of support for immigration while the other three measure different aspects of support for multiculturalism. These questions take two forms depending on the respondent being in either of the treatment groups or in the control group: a treated respondent is asked for her answer “as a Canadian”. In other words, the treatment can be conceived as consisting in a prime (a preamble or a question-as-treatment) plus a repetition of “as a Canadian” in following questions.

The survey experiment was conducted over the phone and administered to 1500 Canadian respondents by the polling firm Research House between June 12th and June 23rd 2012 as part of an omnibus survey. Respondents were selected through a random digit dialing sampling technique and they all reside in English Canada. The following analysis is based on the full sample, which means that it

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8For the sake of comparison, I have kept the question wording used by Sniderman et al. and by the ISSP even if these questions may raise the issue of the context dependence of terms such as ethnic minorities (see Crepaz 2008). The issue is that questions relating to “ethnic minorities” might not necessarily be interpreted as being about immigrants by every respondent in every country. However, because the first question measuring the dependent variable is about immigration, it is fair to assume that respondents will still be thinking about immigrants when they answer the following questions.

9All regions are represented except Quebec because it requires a different design. I discuss this
is not solely composed of white English-Canadians. An analysis was also done with a restricted sample (N= 1283), where I excluded respondents whose first language learnt and still spoken was not English and gave similar results.10

4.5 Results
Looking at the distribution of answers on the four questions on immigration and multiculturalism, we see that on two of them a “consensus” emerges whereas on the other two, Canadians appear to be far more polarized. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of preferences on these four questions in the full sample.

Surprisingly, the two questions on which there is a consensus point in different directions. 83 per cent of the respondents agree (strongly or somewhat) that ethnic minorities living in Canada should have the same political rights than other Canadians. On the contrary, 74 per cent disagree (strongly or somewhat) that ethnic minorities should receive government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions. It could be argued that the way this question is framed raises more opposition because it mentions government assistance. Some respondents may oppose it not because they do not want ethnic minorities to preserve their customs and traditions but because they do not want to see an increase in public spending. Nonetheless, a basic idea of multiculturalism as an integration policy is that the government should at least fund ethnic groups organizations to support cultural ac-

10In fact, these 199 respondents whose first language was not English cannot be distinguished from their English-speaking peers when looking at their distribution on the different questions. These results deserve more attention but are outside the scope of this paper. However, they are, to some extent, in line with what Bilodeau, White and Nevitte (2010) have found looking at Canadian immigrants’ regional loyalties.
Figure 4.3: Attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism

This figure shows full sample distributions on the four dependent variables.
tivities, bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006, 56-57). Here, the opposition to government assistance is more important than in the 2003 ISSP sample where 66 per cent of respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly with the same statement (see Figure 4.1). Respondents are more divided on the other two questions where 41 per cent believe that the different ethnic cultures present in Canada are a threat to Canadian values and 54 per cent believe that immigration to Canada should be made more difficult than it is now. Based on these results, one could argue that Canadians are not overwhelmingly welcoming of immigrants and that they definitely do not support a basic tenet of multiculturalism—government financially supporting ethnic minorities. These results are in line with what Citrin et al. have found using data from the ISSP, which led them to conclude that if there was a Canadian “exceptionalism” it was clearly not on basic attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism (Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012).

4.5.1 Threat

For a country that has often been labeled as one of the most successful in dealing with ethnic diversity, it is quite striking to see the proportion of Canadians who feel like their values are threatened. Almost 70 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that these days, Canadian values were threatened. Although fifteen years separate this research and Sniderman et al.’s, it is interesting to note that in the Netherlands it was 51 per cent who somewhat agreed or agreed strongly that the Dutch culture was threatened. Even more striking was the 33 per cent in
Figure 4.4: Threat and attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism

This figure shows the means on each question at each level of cultural threat. Answers have been rescaled from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the most restrictive position. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals about the mean.

the Netherlands who strongly disagreed with the statement compared to 9 per cent in Canada. Arguably, these respondents may feel that their values are threatened by something other than immigration but the relationship between feeling of threat and anti-immigrant sentiment is strong. Figure 4.4 plots the mean response for the four questions on immigration at each level of threat.

Following Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004), level of threat represents the answer to: “These days, I afraid that Canadian values are threatened”. Disagree strongly = low, Disagree somewhat = medium-low, Agree somewhat = medium-high, Agree strongly = high.

11
As predicted by Hypothesis 1, the more respondents’ feel like their values are threatened the more they are opposed to immigration and to multiculturalism. This is especially true for Question 1 and 3 where respondents at low level of threat and those at high level of threat find themselves on opposite sides of the mid-point in the 0 to 1 scale (the difference between agreeing and disagreeing with the statement). In the case of Question 1 for instance, it means that people who feel like Canadian values are threatened are more likely to think that immigration to Canada should be made more difficult than it is now. It is worth noting that the two questions where threat is having less of an impact are the ones for which respondents are either overwhelmingly inclusive towards immigrants (Question 2 on political rights) or exclusionary (Question 4 on government assistance). Even after controlling for known predictors of opposition to immigration (e.g. education), the “threat” measure remains a statistically significant predictor of restrictive attitudes. Consequently, we can be confident that this pre-treatment question is related to attitude toward immigration for most respondents and is not measuring, for instance, the feeling of threat that Liberal respondents may experience after years of Conservative government.

4.5.2 Importance of national identity

The question-as-treatment (QAT) prime was designed to test for heterogeneity in treatment effect at different levels of importance of Canadian national identity. Unfortunately, the distribution of answers to this question-as-treatment turned out

\footnote{Detailed models available upon request.}
to have little variance and makes it impossible to fully test Hypothesis 3. Only 18 respondents out of the 538 in this treatment condition answered that their Canadian identity was not very important or not important at all. In fact, out of these 538 respondents, a total of 426 said that their Canadian identity was “very important”. We can assume that people for whom national identity was important have received the treatment. Consequently, I dropped the 18 respondents for whom Canadian identity was not important from subsequent analysis\textsuperscript{13}

### 4.5.3 Priming

The norm of inclusiveness being an important feature of Canadian identity, the main expectation is that making this identity salient should increase inclusive attitudes. Looking at Figure 4.5 we see that it is not the case for question 1, 3 and 4 as well as for an additive index of the four questions (rescaled from 0 to 1).\textsuperscript{14}

Importantly, we do not see a restrictive effect either: the control group and the two groups who have received a prime do not differ in their attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism. When the means differ, they differ slightly and the difference is far from being statistically significant. Priming Canadian identity had an inclusive effect in one instance. When asking whether minorities should have the same political rights than the Canadians people, respondents in the QAT condition were more likely to agree than people in the Sniderman treatment and

\textsuperscript{13}For a discussion on the different impact of embracing and rejecting an identity and how it relates to the Common Ingroup Identity Model, see Transue 2007, 83-84.

\textsuperscript{14}When using the index, I dropped respondents with missing value on one or more of the four questions. The consequence is that the sample drops from 1473 to 1248 respondents. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.70.
This figure shows the means on each question by treatment condition. Answers have been rescaled from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the most restrictive position. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals about the mean.

in the control group. Both differences are statistically significant (two-tailed \( p = .046 \) and \( .016 \)) but the difference between the Sniderman condition and the control group is not (two-tailed \( p = .64 \)). This means that compared to the control group, asking respondents how important their Canadian identity was to them made them more inclusive but that reading them a preamble emphasizing the importance of belonging to the Canadian nation did not have an effect important enough to be detected with a sample of this size.

When looking at the other questions we see that the Sniderman et al. design replicated in part here had one peculiarity: it asked respondents if they felt like the
Dutch culture was threatened before the treatment and asked them after the treatment if they felt like all the cultures present in the Netherlands were threatening the Dutch culture. In Canada, as reported earlier, many respondents felt like Canadian values were threatened. If Canadian national identity played a truly inclusive role, we should see the prime having an effect on the second question. In other words, priming a Canadian respondent’s national identity should remind him of how this identity is built around immigration and multiculturalism and make him see all those cultures present in Canada as less of a threat. But here again, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect: the effects are small and not statistically significant. At high levels of threat, priming a respondent’s national identity with the Sniderman prime seems to make him feel more threatened (treatment means .57, control .49, two-tailed p = .08). One element that should be emphasized however is that adding “different cultures” as the threat to Canadian values shifts respondents to a more inclusive position: 31 per cent disagreed with the original threat statement compared to 58 per cent when the question includes “different cultures” as the threat. This result is likely due to a social desirability bias.

More importantly, Sniderman et al. (2004; 2007) found that priming national identity had an effect for people who, a priori, did not feel like the Dutch culture was threatened creating what they called the mobilization phenomenon. The prime made them more likely to agree that immigration should be made more difficult. Contrary to the Netherlands, and as expected, the prime increases the proportion of Canadians who strongly disagree with the statement. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect. Here, the means for the two treatment
groups are lower than the mean for the control group (.34 and .35 compared to .38) but these differences are far from being significant (two-tailed \( p > .6 \) for all differences). The effect size is also really small (\( d = .075 \)) whereas Sniderman et al. found a medium effect size (\( d = .48 \)) (see Cohen, 1988). It is important to note however that the Canadian sample only has 76 respondents at a low level of threat. With the effect size found in Canada, we would need a sample of 7698 respondents to reach \( p < .05 \). In other words, both the sample size at low level of threat and the small effect size in Canada compared to the Netherlands are responsible for this non-statistically significant result.

What we do see however is what Sniderman et al. referred to as a “galvanizing” reaction. Figure 4.6 plots the means on the four dependent variables by levels of threat for each condition.

Almost all of the differences in means for individual questions are not statistically significant. The only exceptions are the differences between the QAT condition and the Sniderman condition on question 2 (political rights) for high and low levels of threat. Both at low level and at high level of threat, respondents in the Sniderman condition were more opposed to ethnic minorities getting the same political rights than other Canadians compared to those in the QAT condition (High threat: QAT = .23, Sniderman = .32, two-tailed \( p = .04 \); Low threat: QAT = .07, Sniderman = .19, \( p = .05 \)). In both cases, the control group finds itself in the middle but without any statistically significant difference to the treatment groups. This makes it difficult to evaluate if this result is due to the QAT treatment having an inclusive effect, the Sniderman treatment having a restrictive effect or
**Figure 4.6:** Priming, threat and anti-immigration attitudes

This figure shows the means on each question by level of threat for the two treatment conditions and the control group. Answers have been rescaled from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the most restrictive position. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals about the mean.
both. Combining the four questions in an index, we again find that the only group that comes close to the usual threshold for statistical significance is respondent who agreed strongly with the suggestion that Canadian values were threatened and whose identity was primed through the Sniderman preamble (diff. = .066, two-tailed p = .056).\[^{15}\]

So far, results have been presented in a straightforward manner, in the form of “difference-in-means”. When analyzing experimental data, simple procedures are often preferable to more complex models that require assumptions (Dunning, 2010), but it can be useful to include covariates as control in a multivariate regression framework when these pre-treatment covariates strongly predict the outcome (Freedman, 2008; Green, 2009). The addition of these covariates improves efficiency and removes the variability of treatment effects estimators (Green, 2009; Dunning, 2010).

After controlling for feeling of threat, age, education and income, the treatment effects remain small and far from being statistically significant with one exception. In the interest of space, Table 4.1 shows results for bivariate and multivariate regressions for the anti-immigration index as well as for the question on multiculturalism policy, the latter being the only dependent variable where we see a statistically significant treatment effect.

For the multiculturalism policy question (Question 4), being in the QAT condition decreases the likelihood of strongly disagreeing with the statement that ethnic

\[^{15}\]The difference in means between the Sniderman condition and the QAT condition was not statistically significant (p = .14) and QAT vs. control (p = .42).
This table shows bivariate and multivariate regressions for Question 4 as well as for an index of the four questions. The mode of estimation depends on the outcome variable: ordered probit regression for Question 4 (a four-category variable) and OLS for the anti-immigration index (index moving from 0 to 1). Standard error are in parentheses.

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*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

minorities should receive government assistance by 8 per cent and increases the likelihood of being in the somewhat agree and strongly agree categories by 4 per cent and 2.5 per cent respectively. This result is interesting given that the multiculturalism policy question was the one where the average respondent had the most exclusionary position. Even though this is the only result that reaches the usual threshold of statistical significance, it is important to note that specifying multivariate models for the different dependent variables—not only the two shown in Table 4.1—always results in negative effects for the QAT treatment (more inclusive attitudes) and positive effects for the Sniderman treatment (more exclusive attitudes). The main point remains however, that even after controlling for covariates we still cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect in most cases and this is also
the case for models with interaction terms for treatment and feeling of threat.

To summarize, in most cases, priming national identity did not have a statistically significant effect on attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism. The effect sizes were small ($d < 0.1$) and were far from the conventional threshold for statistical significance making it impossible to reject the hypothesis of no effect. However, when the QAT prime had an effect, it made respondents more inclusive and inversely, when the Sniderman prime had an effect it was a restrictive one. The difference in the direction of the effect for the two primes is interesting and represents an important contribution. It shows that contrary to Sniderman and Hagendoorn’s argument, their prime does not represent a “mere mention of consideration of collective identity” (2007: 119) but rather reinforces boundaries. This is potentially due to the fact that the preamble reminds the respondent that nations are different and that this difference is a crucial component of national identity. However, it is important to note that in many instances even this highly restrictive prime was not enough to move Canadians in an exclusionary direction. On the other hand, a true “mere mention” of national identity—asking the respondent how important his national identity is to him—when it had an impact, made the respondent more inclusive. Finally, results presented here confirm once more the important link between feeling of cultural threat and opposition to immigration. The analysis also shows that priming the respondents’ national identity as Canadian either through the Sniderman prime or the QAT prime did not completely offset the exclusionary effect of feeling of threat on attitudes. The more people feel like their values are threatened the more they show anti-immigration
attitudes.

4.6 Discussion and conclusion

This paper investigates the relationship between national identity and exclusionary attitudes towards immigration in a Canadian context. The “real-world” importance of this question lies in the fact that the restrictive impact of national identity is what makes possible the “flash politics” surrounding immigration issues (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). Anti-immigration politicians use national identity as a mobilization tool to gather supporters and gain votes. One mechanism through which this chauvinistic discourse has an impact on attitudes is that it primes national identity among the population and moves or makes salient the imagined boundary of the nation. Results obtained by Sniderman and his colleagues in the Netherlands showed that this was particularly the case for people who were usually not opposed to immigration: priming their identity as Dutch made them more opposed to immigration. Replicating this experiment in Canada did not produce the same results. Although Canadians are not as welcoming of immigrants as would be expected from a country that prides itself on its successes with immigration, priming Canadians’ identity did not make them more opposed to immigration. However, in most cases, the prime did not make them more welcoming either.

This is surprising when considering recent studies showing that pride in Canada is positively related to support for multiculturalism (Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012) and that multiculturalism is also perceived as the accepted norm in the coun-
try (Guimond et al., 2013). It is important to note however that the design used here represents a hard test of the inclusive potential of Canadian national identity. The objective of this study was to see the picture that emerged when no content was attached to a national identity made salient other than the normative content attached by the respondents themselves. An easier test would have been to prime the inclusiveness itself or insist on immigration as a foundation of Canadian identity (see for example Esses et al., 2006). In addition, by letting respondents decide what it means to be Canadian we might be priming different conceptions of this identity. In most countries “multiple traditions” (Schildkraut, 2011) or different constitutive norms will coexist and priming national identity will have a different impact depending on which of these competing norms the respondent adheres to when thinking about immigration issues. It is highly possible that there is heterogeneity in what Canadians see as the normative content of national identity when it comes to the role of immigrants and that these different conceptions are canceling each other. This, in itself, presents a more complex vision of Canadian national identity than one that places immigration and multiculturalism as defining features. Future research could prime respondents’ national identity by asking them to list a series of keywords that they associate with this identity, making it possible to measure the content and pay attention to these “multiple traditions”.

Another possible explanation for the absence of more important treatment effects is that perhaps priming national identity has an asymmetrical impact on attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism: priming a restrictive national identity has a negative impact on attitudes but priming an inclusive national iden-
tity does not make these attitudes more inclusive. This idea of asymmetry in the effect of national identity is in line with what Citrin and Wright found in the U.S. (Wright and Citrin, 2011).

Small treatment effects aside, this research represents an important step in trying to make sense of how national identity and its normative content relate to attitudes towards immigration in a comparative perspective. Although it presents evidence for a single country, its aim is to highlight the need for more comparative work on the effect of national identity on attitudes (Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009, Wright 2011b). The results presented here show that national identities that have been able to include immigration as one of their defining aspects might not have the same effect on immigration attitudes. The role played by the normative content of a given national identity is somewhat in the background when looking at determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes in a given country and comparative work brings it to the forefront. The next step would be to extend the framework and apply it to other countries of immigration. The province of Quebec represents another interesting case because its citizens can identify both as Canadians and as Quebeckers. Quebec has also seen far more heated debates around immigration and integration than the rest of Canada. The province does not build its identity around immigration and multiculturalism but rather around the French language and interculturalism (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 18). These differences would make it possible to prime respondents’ identity as Canadians—hypothesized as being more inclusive—and as Quebeckers—hypothesized as being more exclusionary—and compare their effect on immigration attitudes.
Finally, this research also adds to the literature linking cultural threat with restrictive attitudes towards newcomers. Surprisingly, for a country that has presented diversity as one of its defining features, the number of Canadians respondents who feel like Canadian values are threatened is rather important. These results also demonstrate that priming Canadian national identity does not damper the effect of cultural threat. The strong relationship between this feeling and attitudes towards immigration is unequivocal and begs more research on the determinants of emotions such as feeling of threat and anxiety (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). This should give pause to Canadian triumphalism regarding its success with immigration and multiculturalism. One of the established findings in the literature on attitudes toward immigration is that cultural threat is one of the most important driving forces of restrictive attitudes. Consequently, Canadians’ attitudes towards immigration may not be as firmly and unequivocally welcoming as we might think. What the results presented here show however is that even with an important perception of cultural threat among the Canadian population, Canadian national identity does not have the restrictive potential of many of its European counterparts.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, I have offered a series of hypotheses pertaining to incorporation policies and the role they play in relationships between host societies and immigrants. To a large extent, each chapter’s conclusion reviewed their particular results and where they fit in the specific literature they each addressed. This final chapter will review the main findings and will do so while emphasizing the larger picture they give when considered together.

5.1 Motivations

One of the motivations behind this research was to bring the focus on context when studying immigration attitudes. Accordingly, this work is decidedly comparative even when it does not appear to be. For example, the third empirical chapter investigates the impact of national identity in a specific country, Canada, but does so with an eye on past studies, especially the work of Sniderman in the Netherlands
This chapter focused on the role played by the normative content of a given national identity, a dimension of national identity that is in the background when looking at determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes in a given country. It demonstrates that this content varies and that with this variation comes different effects of national identities.

The idea was also to bring together different literatures that do not necessarily talk to each other and have, in some ways, evolved in parallel paths. For example, political science, and more specifically political psychology, has imported many insights from social psychology, such as what social identities mean for intergroup relationships. Most of the work cited here about cultural threat and about national identities takes its source in the work of Tajfel and Turner on social identities (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Yet, political science research has not paid a lot of attention to context, an essential part of social identity theory in social psychology and an explanation for the salience—or not—of group membership (Huddy, 2004). I argued that the policies used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 establish the context in which intergroup relationships take place.

Other important insights from social psychology are useful for the understanding of host societies/immigrants relationships. For instance, the concept of acculturation attitudes, which represents an important research agenda in the discipline, has not been used in political science even if it represents a useful lens through which to study the choices (conscious or not) made by immigrants. Similarly, the
literature on ‘boundary-work’ in sociology (e.g., Barth, 1969; Lamont and Molnár, 2002; Bail, 2008) has touched on social identities and the role of symbolic boundaries but has not necessarily considered how official policies shape these boundaries on both sides of the host society/immigrants dyad. Bringing all these insights together made it possible to fill gaps in both the literature on incorporation policies and the literature on immigration attitudes and investigate how the former might affect the latter.

5.2 Main findings

The main overall finding is that policies matter and that they do so both for immigrants’ and hosts’ attitudes. The three studies were conducted with two sets of policies in mind: policies governing over the access to citizenship and cultural accommodation policies. Policy regimes that combine comprehensive multicultural policies and open citizenship policies increased the likelihood that immigrants seek relationships with the host even if they identify more with their ethnic group. Considering that all three policy regimes under study were associated with similar level of ethnic identification, the incapacity of the other policy regimes to foster integrationist attitudes is striking. This finding is also at odds with critics of multiculturalism who criticize it as a source of ethnic retrenchment when it is in fact linked with a higher desire for engagement with the host society.

On the hosts’ side, the results are mixed. While citizenship policies are linked with lower levels of cultural threat, one of the main drivers of anti-immigration attitudes, they do not seem to have a direct effect on these attitudes. They do
however, mitigate the strong effect of threat. Results are mixed because while citizenship policies are having this inclusive effect, multiculturalism is mostly pulling in the other direction. It reinforces the role of cultural threat, although to a lesser extent. Policies are giving cues to citizen as to what should influence attitudes toward immigration and the two policies investigated here are sending cues in different direction. Open citizenship policies seem to be weakening boundaries between groups while multiculturalism, in line with arguments presented by its critics, seem to be reinforcing them.

When justifying the use of acculturation orientations as an outcome, I suggested that countries that are able to foster integrationist attitudes among their immigrant population might be able to decrease the feeling of threat experienced by some members of its majority. Yet, when we compare immigrants and hosts and the role of multiculturalism policies on their respective attitudes, this is not the case. More inclusive cultural accommodation policies are necessary for ethnic identification and integrationist attitudes to come together but these integrationist attitudes on the immigrant part do not seem to be associated with less cultural threat on the hosts part. That being said this relationship is not tested directly.

Multiculturalism is not acting as an exclusionary force in every context however. Canada had often been presented has a great example of a country that was able to build the concept of immigration and multiculturalism into its national identity. The experiment at the basis of the third empirical chapter represents a first empirical test of this proposition. The hypothesis was at odds with past research in other settings and as such, faced a daunting task. The results show that
contrary to other national identities, raising the salience of Canadian identity does not make Canadians more opposed to immigration, even when the strategy used to raise the salience reinforces differences between groups. Granted, in this instance, the role of inclusive policies is not tested directly, and they are acting in the background. It remains to be seen however if Canada is truly “unusual” in this regard as Kymlicka argues (Kymlicka, 2003) or if other national identities have the possibility to play this inclusive role.

5.3 Implications, limitations, and future research

Each chapter considered limitations to their specific conclusions whether due to the design used or by choices over the outcome studied. Here I consider the limitations of this dissertation when considered as a whole. First, although I argue this dissertation gives us an integrated view of relationships between host society and immigrants relations, one could argue that these two sides of the equation are not fully integrated. For instance, the symbolic boundaries or the conception of the nation that a given citizenry embraces is only acting in the background when I look at the role of policies on immigrants’ identification. Clearly, how people define their nation or the different competing definitions (Schildkraut, 2011) will influence identification among immigrants. It is not possible to fit all of these country-level factors when we only have immigrant data from 10 countries.

As I hinted to earlier, the analysis makes it possible to compare the effect of policies on hosts and on immigrants but does not make it possible to look at their indirect effect on one group through their effect on the other. Policies, by fostering
integration among immigrants for example, will have an influence on the feeling of threat of host societies. This possibility is not tested directly here.

One limit is the use of only two sets of policies. As I argued, multiculturalism policies and citizenship policies, conceived in the manner herein, encompass important components of immigrants incorporation, but they do not exhaust the possibilities. As countries try to control who gets in by imposing new civic or language requirements, the effect of the policies studied in this dissertation might change. They still represent, in my view, an improvement over past research trying to cast countries into more general ideal-types. As I have argued earlier, and as Freeman (2004) has argued before me, doing so overestimate the coherence of countries’ regimes. For example, some previous research have used “philosophies of integration” (Favell, 1998; Bail, 2008) as institutions generating boundaries between groups. These philosophies defined as: “public ideologies about exclusion and inclusion of immigrants, that are created by [...] government” (Bail, 2008, 42) often do not account for the actual policies in place. Another consequence is that immigration countries that do not all have what these authors consider a clear philosophy of integration. Of the 21 countries studied by Bail, only eight have clear philosophies of integration.

Given the importance of the relationships investigated here, this dissertation is also a call for more data and for better data. This is especially true for immigrants. Debates over strategies on how to best incorporate immigrants often rest on poor empirical grounds. For these debates to be meaningful, it is our responsibility to develop sound analyses of immigrants’ attitudes and behaviors and to devote
resources to building better datasets. I do so here using a dataset developed by social-psychologists and put it to a different purpose but this dataset only covers ten countries. These ten countries do offer a good range of experiences with immigration, but the analysis would be solidified with more cases.

This study is a call to pay attention to context. The context in which immigrants and host societies come in contact, and the context in which national identities and their normative content is made salient. Recent development in experimental research has greatly advanced our understanding of the micro-foundation of some the attitudes investigated here. This experimental turn often means leaving aside larger contextual factors that are not easily controlled or manipulated. This is especially true of country-level context. Even when the context is not experimentally manipulated, comparing mechanisms across countries requires important resources and collaboration among many researchers as demonstrated by two recent studies (e.g. [Iyengar et al., 2013; Guimond et al., 2013]). Yet findings emanating from the three papers presented here are a good example of the essential back and forth between experimental work and cross-country observational studies. For example, the fact that comprehensive multiculturalism policies are associated with less identification with the host on the immigrants’ side and with a reinforcement of the effect of cultural threat on the host’s side calls for further investigation of the particular mechanisms that explain these relationships. As I noted in the conclusion of Chapter 3, this means devoting more efforts to come up with experimental strategies, whether in a natural setting or in a lab, to better understand what it is in these policies that generates these attitudes. In this regard,
there is also a place for case-studies and qualitative research like the work done by Bloemraad (2006) in Canada and the US. Focusing on the mechanisms should not stop scholars from doing more observational research and striving for better and more data. As I mentioned in the closing remarks of Chapter 2, this is especially true on the immigrants side of the equation. Comparative surveys of host societies are numerous—the ISSP, the European Social Survey, the World Value Survey—but often contain too few immigrants to enable large-N research. Given the central place occupied by immigrant outcomes in the debates over immigration, it is essential to have a better understanding of their attitudes and behaviors in response to policies. The results presented in Chapter 2 offer a first step in this direction and represent a good starting point.

The replication of the famous Sniderman experiment conducted in Chapter 4 is also a good example of how replicating previous work can help highlight different relationships in different contexts. The experiment opens up many other possibilities for replication in other countries or region where national identity might have varying effect. Other than replicating this exact priming experiment, future research could also try to test whether different national identities can be made to be more inclusive. Perhaps some national identities are more likely than others to encompass newcomers when inclusiveness is directly primed.

In addition, it is important to note that the outcomes studied here are all stated preferences. They do not account for deeper emotions that may be hidden—consciously or not—from the researcher (Pérez, 2010; Malhotra, Margalit and Mo, 2013). Pérez (2010) showed that these implicit attitudes are distinct from
other measures that are often used in immigration attitude research. Perhaps incorporation policies are also influencing these implicit attitudes, but it is also possible that the variations observed here are due to the salience of a social norm that makes people hide their true feelings.

5.4 Final words

Public opinion on immigration issues and the attitudes of immigrants themselves are issues that are of central importance for the democratic life of immigration countries. The studies presented here help us understand how policies matter in intergroup relationships. Immigrants and hosts both face challenges in these relationships. Immigrants have to fit in and hosts have to deal with the insecurities that this influx of newcomers may cause. As Benedict Anderson wrote in his seminal book *Imagined Communities*, a nation: “[...] is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1983). Immigrants will have to find their place in this “image of a communion” and hosts will have to learn to live with the idea that this image is not unalterable.
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Appendix A

Question wording

You will find below the question wording of the main items used in the empirical chapters. The question wording for questions used in Chapter 4 can be found in Figure 4.2.

A.1 Chapter 2

**Ethnic identity**
- I feel that I am part of [ethnic] culture...
- I am proud of being [ethnic]...
- I am happy to be [ethnic]...
- Being part of [ethnic] culture is embarrassing to me...
- Being [ethnic] is uncomfortable for me...
- Being part of [ethnic] culture makes me feel happy...
- Being [ethnic] makes me feel good...

**Majority identity**
- I feel that I am part of [national] culture..
- I am proud of being [national]..
- I am happy to be [national]..
Acculturation attitudes
Question: Here are some statements about language, cultural traditions, friends etc. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement by checking the answer that applies best to you. Answers are all 5-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree)

Separation
- I would rather marry a [ethnic] than a [national].
- I feel that [ethnic group] should maintain their own cultural traditions and not adapt to those of [national].
- It is more important to me to be fluent in [ethnic] than in [national lang.].
- I prefer to have only [ethnic] friends.
- I prefer social activities that involve [ethnic group members] only.

Marginalization
- I feel that it is not important for [ethnic group] either to maintain their own cultural traditions or to adapt to those of [national].
- I would not like to marry either a [national] or a [ethnic].
- It is not important to me to be fluent either in [ethnic lang.] or [national lang.].
- I dont want to attend either [national] or [ethnic] social activities.
- I dont want to have either [national] or [ethnic] friends.

Assimilation
- I feel that [ethnic group] should adapt to [national] cultural traditions and not maintain those of their own.
- I would rather marry a [national] than a [ethnic].
- It is more important to me to be fluent in [national lang.] than in [ethnic lang.].
- I prefer to have only [national] friends.
- I prefer social activities that involve [nationals] only.

Integration
- I feel that [ethnic group] should maintain their own cultural traditions but also adapt to those of [national].
- I would be just as willing to marry a [national] as a [ethnic].
• It is important to me to be fluent in both [national lang.] and in [ethnic lang.].
• I prefer social activities that involve both [national members] and [ethnic members].
• I prefer to have both [ethnic] and [national] friends.

A.2 Chapter 3

Opposition to support for ethnic minorities

• Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.
• Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.
  – Agree strongly
  – Agree
  – Neither agree nor disagree
  – Disagree
  – Disagree strongly

Support for stricter citizenship laws

• Children born in [country] of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become [country] citizens.
• Legal immigrants to [country] who are not citizens should have the same rights as [country]’s citizens.
  – Agree strongly
  – Agree
  – Neither agree nor disagree
  – Disagree
  – Disagree strongly

Support for more restrictive immigration policies

• Do you think the number of immigrants to [country] nowadays should be...
  – Increased a lot
  – Increased a little
  – Remain the same as it is
  – Reduced a little
  – Reduced a lot
• [Country] should take stronger measure to exclude illegal immigrants.
  – Agree strongly
  – Agree
  – Neither agree nor disagree
  – Disagree
  – Disagree strongly

Cultural threat

• Immigrants improve [country] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
• Immigrants increase crime rates.
• It is impossible for people who do not share [country’s] customs and traditions to become fully [country].
  – Agree strongly
  – Agree
  – Neither agree nor disagree
  – Disagree
  – Disagree strongly

Economic threat

• Immigrants are generally good for [country] economy.
• Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country].
  – Agree strongly
  – Agree
  – Neither agree nor disagree
  – Disagree
  – Disagree strongly

Importance of national identity

• How close do you feel to [country]?
  – Very close
  – Close
  – Not very close
  – Not close at all

• How proud are you of being a [country] national?
  – Very proud
  – Somewhat proud
  – Not very proud
  – Not proud at all
Ascriptive definition of the nation
Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [country]. Others say they are not important. How important to you think each of the following is?

- to have been born in [country].
- to have [country] ancestry.
- to feel [country].
- to respect [country’s] institutions and laws.
  - Very important
  - Fairly important
  - Not very important
  - Not important at all

The index is built by calculating the relative importance given to ascriptive elements (birth, ancestry) compared to achievable elements (respect for institution, feeling part of the country). This is then rescaled to range from -1 to 1 (see Wright, 2011b).
Appendix B

Summary statistics

Table B.1: Summary statistics of key socio-demographic variables - Chapter 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>4325</td>
<td>15.494</td>
<td>1.818</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1=Female)</td>
<td>4313</td>
<td>.546</td>
<td>.498</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in the Country</td>
<td>2684</td>
<td>9.397</td>
<td>4.884</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents’ occupation (1=Skilled)</td>
<td>2742</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>.491</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic lang. proficiency</td>
<td>4279</td>
<td>.653</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority lang. proficiency</td>
<td>4288</td>
<td>.857</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship (1=yes)</td>
<td>4054</td>
<td>.648</td>
<td>.477</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood comp. (1=Diverse)</td>
<td>4055</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>.587</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Number of items</td>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Cronbach’s alpha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural threat</td>
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<td>.53</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stricter citizenship laws</td>
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<td>20435</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to gvt support for minorities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19457</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive immigration policies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19546</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables are all additive indices that have been rescaled from 0 to 1, where 1 represent the most anti-immigration value. value.
### Table B.3: Country-level data - Chapter 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Citizenship policies</th>
<th>Multiculturalism policies</th>
<th>Immigrant Influx 2000-2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1322</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1358</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1637</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1217</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1038</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1781</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1416</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1514</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1189</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1143</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>US</td>
<td>1169</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Sample size represents the total number of respondents in the ISSP dataset. The Citizenship policies index is from Howard (2006, 2009) for European countries and has been replicated for countries that were not in the original dataset. The Multiculturalism policies index is from Banting and Kymlicka (2006) minus the score for dual citizenship (accounted for in the CPI). Immigrant influx is the average change in the % of the population that was foreign-born for the three-year period between 2000 and 2003.
Appendix C

Two-step approach - Chapter 3
**Figure C.1**: Country-Specific Coefficients for Threat against Policy Contexts

The graphs show the slope coefficient for cultural threat when the dependent variables are regressed on individual-level predictors for each country. The model is the same as Model 1 in Table. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. These coefficients are then plotted against multiculturalism policies and citizenship policies. The line is fitted with an ordinary least squares.
Appendix D

Multilevel model - Chapter 3
Table D.1: Opposition to government support for minorities - non-relative item

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Country-level factors</th>
<th>Full model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual-level variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>0.416***</td>
<td>0.400***</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>−0.052***</td>
<td>−0.053***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right self-placement</td>
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<td>0.114***</td>
<td>0.109***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC policies</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
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<td>Cship policies</td>
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<td>(0.015)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
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*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

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Appendix E

Canada in comparative perspective

**Figure E.1:** National Pride and Anti-Immigration Attitudes

The countries shown in this figure have a statistically significant negative relationship between “Pride in Country” and index of anti-immigration measures. The US and the Netherlands are added as a comparative and do not have a statistically significant relationship between these two variables. For details on the measure see Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012). Data source: ISSP 2003.