COMPLETING THE NORM LIFE CYCLE: THE POST-TREATY INVOLVEMENT OF
NGOS IN THE MINE BAN TREATY AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

by

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the post-treaty stage, specifically, how these organizations contribute to the development of a norm. This paper challenges previous literature which has contended that the role of NGOs is limited to the earliest stages of norm development. It focuses on two case studies. First, the Mine Ban Treaty and International Coalition to Ban Landmines show that NGOs not only act as norm entrepreneurs but expand their role in the post-treaty stage, furthering the norm cascade and contributing to norm internalization. Second, the Chemical Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition show that NGOs may be absent during the emergence of a norm, yet can form late into the post-treaty stage and still play a role in contributing to the later stages of a norm’s development. Throughout, this paper highlights the importance of NGOs in international agreements.
Preface

This thesis is the original, unpublished, intellectual work of the author, Erica Sandhu.
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1. Introduction

In a 1998 issue of Foreign Policy, PJ Simmons argued that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important yet complex role in global politics, noting that governments must “[learn] to live with NGOs.” While NGOs have undoubtedly become important actors, there still exists debate regarding their specific roles and functions. In other words, it remains unclear as to “how and when” (Haddad 2013, 187) NGOs matter. Specifically, in the realm of international treaties and norm development, advocacy NGOs have come to play an important role in both the pre and post-treaty stages. Existing literature has engaged in depth with NGO activity and influence in the pre-treaty stage, highlighting the role of advocacy NGOs as “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, Wexler 2003), as well as the influence of NGOs in issue framing and agenda setting (Rutherford 2011, Joachim 2003). However, with the exception of Haddad (2013), very little attention has been paid to understanding what happens to NGOs after the emergence of a norm (Haddad 2013). This understanding is most relevant in the area of international treaties, as in certain cases, NGO activity has been successful in treaty establishment, yet what these NGOs do in the post-treaty stage (i.e. after norm emergence) is an area that remains largely unexplored.

Haddad (2013), in her recent article, points to three possible paths that advocacy NGOs may follow once they achieve goals (e.g. norm advocacy, treaty establishment), thus challenging existing literature (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998) which has assumed that “NGOs exercise their greatest impact on norm change during the early stages of norm emergence” (Haddad 2013, 187). First, the NGO may become inactive or “disband” (Haddad 2013, 187), second, the organization may take on a new issue (e.g. skills transfer), and third, it may expand its goals (i.e. mission expansion). As Haddad notes, mission expansion occurs as a result of an organization’s
“normative commitment” to an issue (e.g. treaty), as NGO activity will continue to play an important role in the post-treaty stage.

Expanding upon Haddad’s argument, this paper attempts to further conceptualize NGO activity post-treaty. Whereas Haddad demonstrates that NGO activity expands in the post-treaty stage, it remains unclear as to what these NGO activities actually mean in relation to the norm’s development. Specifically, I draw upon Finnemore & Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle, where a norm develops through three stages: emergence, cascade, and internalization. I argue that NGOs often continue to play an important role in furthering the norm cascade, as well as promoting internalization of the norm within states, and that these processes can occur simultaneously.

Further, I highlight another path to NGO involvement post-treaty, where advocacy NGOs emerge late into the post-treaty stage, that is, when a norm has already been established, and when a treaty has been accepted and ratified by the majority of states. In this alternative scenario, advocacy NGOs have little to no involvement in the pre-treaty stage, therefore playing no role in the early stages of norm emergence, yet are active in the later stages of norm development. This can be the result of a norm violation, or lack of full compliance among states.

To conceptualize NGO activity post treaty, I examine two case studies, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, also known as the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Whereas the MBT has been widely cited as an NGO success story (Rutherford 2011, Cameron 1998), reflecting the role of NGOs as norm entrepreneurs, the case of the MBT also supports Haddad’s argument of NGO mission expansion post-treaty. As I will outline, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a coalition of over twelve hundred organizations, was not only successful in achieving the common goal of a ban on antipersonnel landmines, but continues to demonstrate a normative commitment to the MBT and
expand its scope of activities. Further, as I add, the IBCL’s activity post-treaty is best conceptualized as both furthering the norm cascade (i.e. horizontal spread of the norm), and promoting the internalization of the norm within states parties. The Chemical Weapons Convention, on the other hand, challenges existing arguments as well as that provided by Haddad (2013). Using the case study of the CWC, I demonstrate that despite the absence of advocacy NGOs in the pre-treaty stage, these NGOs can emerge post-treaty, even in the least likely of circumstances, that is, in the presence of a pre-established, strong norm. For example, in 2009, the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition (CWCC) was founded by a group of NGOs who expressed a desire to be involved in the treaty, as well as demonstrate their normative commitment to the CWC. I show that because states have recently realized that the norm against the use of chemical weapons has not been fully internalized and is not as far along the norm cascade as had been previously thought, they have expressed a need for NGO advocacy. Therefore, the CWCC will be able to play a role in furthering the norm cascade and internalization of the norm despite being absent during the earlier stages of norm development. This case challenges existing arguments regarding “how and when” NGOs matter (Haddad 2013) and highlights an alternative path to the involvement of advocacy NGOs in international treaties. In particular, NGO activity and advocacy is not solely limited to the earliest stages of norm development, as advocacy NGOs can emerge in the post-treaty stage (i.e. during the norm cascade and internalization) and still play a role.

In what follows, I first highlight existing arguments regarding the role of advocacy NGOs in international treaties and provide a background to Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) model of norm development. I then examine Haddad’s argument, providing a more detailed overview of her analysis. Next, I analyze the case of the Mine Ban Treaty and ICBL, confirming Haddad’s
argument regarding NGO post-treaty mission expansion as well as providing a conceptualization of the ICBL’s activities. Following, I highlight an alternative path to NGO post-treaty involvement with the case study of the Chemical Weapons Convention and CWCC. As mentioned, this paper contributes to existing literature which has sought to understand the roles and functions of NGOs, and attempts to fill the gap on scholarship regarding NGO activity post-treaty. Further, by expanding on the work of Haddad (2013) and drawing upon Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), we see that NGOs play an important role in the norm cascade and internalization stages, as their influence is not limited to the early stages of norm emergence and adoption. Most studies have focused on NGO involvement in a treaty’s establishment, yet have overlooked what happens after a treaty’s entry into force. Further, this paper shows that even in an unlikely scenario, advocacy NGOs are able to emerge late into the post-treaty stage, long after a norm has already been established, and still play a role in the later stages of norm development.
2. Theoretical Argument: Advocacy NGOs and the Norm Life Cycle

Over the past two decades, non-governmental organizations have received significant scholarly attention. It has long been established that NGOs are important actors in global politics, being labelled as a “third force” where they are “inserting themselves into a wide range of decision making processes from international security to human rights to the environment” (Florini 2000, 2). As Keck and Sikkink (1998) have argued, the international system is no longer one in which states are autonomous, insulated actors, as transnational social movements and NGO activity have come to influence the decisions of states. “The range of these groups’ work is almost as broad as their interests. They breed new ideas; advocate, protest, and mobilize public support; do legal, scientific, technical, and policy analysis; provide services; shape, implement, monitor, and enforce international commitments; and change institutions and norms” (Matthews 1997, 53). As will be later discussed, these activities are carried out in both the pre and post-treaty stages.

In addition to their diverse range of activities, NGOs themselves are diverse as there is no single definition of non-governmental organizations, and the term is still contested amongst scholars. Vakil (1997), who has attempted to provide a “taxonomy” of NGOs, notes that literature often uses the term NGO interchangeably with private voluntary organization (PVO), and non-profit organization (NPO). Scholars have further classified groups of NGOs as coalitions (Haddad 2013), transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1999), social movements, and “epistemic communities” (Haas 1989). In an effort to define NGOs, Gordenker and Weiss, (1995) claim that NGOs are “durable, bounded, voluntary relationships among individuals to produce a particular product, using specific techniques” (18). Similarly, Khagram et al. (2002) view NGOs as “private, voluntary, nonprofit, groups whose primary aim is to
influence publicly some form of social change” (6). Moreover, Bellman and Gerster (1996) highlight three categories of NGOs, first, non-profit organizations engaging in advocacy and lobbying, second, trade unions and business associations, and third, research institutions such as universities (6).

Specifically, this paper is concerned with advocacy NGOs, defined as “NGOs striving toward a normative change” (Jordan & Tuijil 2000, 2052), or what Keck and Sikkink have referred to as “transnational advocacy networks,” that is “[a] network of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation” (1998, 1). These networks of NGOs operate both domestically and across borders, and “[build] new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations” (Keck & Sikkink 1-2). Both the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition (CWCC) are thus examples of transnational advocacy networks. While some scholars (Jordan & Tuijil 2000) have strived to distinguish these organizations from those which provide services, Haddad (2013) argues that advocacy NGOs can be either supply-side (“provid[ing] public goods or services alongside or in lieu of governments”) or demand-side (“conduct[ing] advocacy in order to change norms and government policies”) (2011, 190), or a hybrid of both. She echoes an earlier claim by Keck and Sikkink (1998), who see normative beliefs as the foundation for both supply side and demand side organizations (in Prakash & Gugerty 2010). As a result, advocacy NGOs can be seen as “collective actors that seek to fulfill both normative concerns and instrumental incentives” (Prakash & Gugerty 2010).

Because advocacy NGOs are motivated by normative goals and concerns (Prakash and Gugerty 2010, Haddad 2013, Muller & Wunderlich 2013), they have come to be active participants in the realm of international agreements and treaties (i.e. legal norms). Specifically,
they play an important role in the creation of international norms, often acting as “norm entrepreneurs” who possess “strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896). A norm, that is, “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 891) is often transformed into a legal statute or forms the basis of a treaty, and advocacy NGOs play a large role in the dissemination and promotion of these norms (Reimann 2006), both pre and post-treaty.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle (1998), a norm is developed over three different stages, “norm emergence,” “norm cascade” (i.e. norm acceptance), and lastly, “norm internalization.” NGOs are said to play the greatest role during the initial stages of norm emergence, while in the last stage of internalization their role is replaced by “law, professions, and bureaucracy” (898). For example, during the first stage, NGOs acting as norm entrepreneurs will bring a certain issue to the attention of the international community, thus engaging in issue framing and agenda setting. During the process of issue framing, NGOs “deliberately package and frame policy ideas to convince each other as well as the general public that certain policy proposals constitute acceptable solutions to pressing problems” (Campbell 1998 in Joachim 2003, 251). In other words, normative ideas are framed in a way that they will “resonate with relevant audiences” (Payne 2001, 39). Similarly, during agenda setting, NGOs bring a specific issue to the attention of the international community (i.e. cognitive agenda setting), as well as shape popular conception of the issue (i.e. norm agenda setting) (Rutherford 2000).

After the emergence of a norm is the second stage, that is, the norm cascade, or the general acceptance of the norm among states. This occurs once the norm reaches a “tipping point” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 895), being accepted by a “critical mass” of actors (typically one-third of states). Once in the cascade stage, the norm continues to be adopted by more and
more actors (i.e. states), as there is a “rapid diffusion of norm-consistent behavior among a relatively large number of states around the world” (Nagtzaam 2009, 74). This transition from norm emergence to the cascade stage is not automatic and may be relatively slow. In an example provided by Sikkink (1999) she highlights this variation, noting that in the case of women’s suffrage, it took eighty years for the norm to emerge, and another forty years for it to cascade, while the issue of violence against women went from emergence to cascade in less than twenty years.

Finally, at the very end of the norm cascade is the last stage of norm development where the norm becomes internalized. In this stage, the norm is widely accepted among states and adopts a “taken for granted quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic” (264). The norm essentially becomes second nature to states, and is observed “because governments now regard compliance to be appropriate behavior” (Price 1998 in Muller & Wunderlich 2013, 4). As Segerlund (2010, 28) notes, the move towards internalization is a “continuation of the processes involved in the norm cascade,” where states hold a consensus around the definition of the norm and its content, “as well as increasing compliance in the behavior of the actors concerned.” However, it is important to note that internalization is not inevitable, and there is no guarantee that the norm will progress to this stage.

Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) conceptualization has been widely accepted by scholars studying the development of international norms and treaties, as well as the role of NGOs in this development. Particularly, it is now assumed that advocacy NGOs often play a prominent role in norm emergence, and become less relevant once the “tipping point” is reached. Haddad (2013), however, has called this in question, arguing that the role of NGOs is not solely limited to norm emergence, as NGOs will continue to play a role after a treaty’s entry into force (i.e. after the
tipping point). In other words, NGOs do not disappear or disband after the first stage of a norm development, or once a treaty enters into force, but rather expand their mission and function (Haddad 2013). Further, as I will point out, these NGOs will actively continue to promote the internalization and cascade of the norm in the post-treaty stage, especially when states deem them useful.

To illustrate this argument, Haddad (2013) examines the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), a coalition of over 2,500 civil society organizations that was established in 1995, which is “working in partnership to strengthen international cooperation with the ICC” (ICC Now 2013). As she highlights, the CICC, which started out with 25 member organizations, expanded significantly following the entry into force of the Rome Statute. For example, from the year 2000 to 2003, the CICC’s membership grew by 1000 organizations. This expansion of the CICC was in tandem with the growth of the ICC, in that “as the CICC perceived shortcomings or needs of the court, it expanded its mission to meet those needs” (Haddad 2013, 192). Having already accomplished its goal of the creation of the ICC, the CICC now works toward “building a credible functioning justice system,” as well as “advocating for efficient and strategic public information and outreach for the court,” and promoting universal ratification (ICC Now 2013). This mission expansion reflects the coalition’s “normative commitment to the Rome Statute” (Haddad 2013). Moreover, as Haddad notes, the CICC now holds a service-provision function, and does not solely engage in advocacy efforts. Therefore, despite the transnational advocacy model of norm development (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) “that predicts NGO involvement only in the earliest entrepreneurial stages,” (Haddad 2013) NGOs are able to undergo mission expansion as well as organizational change well into the post treaty stage (i.e. after norm emergence).
Haddad’s account of NGO mission expansion post-treaty is conceptualized as a move from demand side (in the pre-treaty stage) to supply side. She does not, however, provide an understanding of what this post-treaty NGO activity means in relation to Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle. In other words, does NGO activity post-treaty contribute to the norm cascade, or the norm’s internalization? In an effort to conceptualize specific NGO activities, I argue that in the post-treaty stage, advocacy NGOs can simultaneously contribute to the norm cascade as well as the internalization of the norm. I therefore expand on the work of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as well as Haddad (2013).

As mentioned, once the norm reaches the tipping point it will cascade and then move onto the last stage of internalization. I argue that the norm cascade and internalization do not have to be seen as two isolated stages in a norm’s development. Rather, it is possible for the norm to go through both the cascade, as well as be internalized simultaneously. For example, the norm cascade, what Finnemore and Sikkink regard as the “rapid diffusion” (1998) of the norm among states, can be understood as the horizontal spread of the norm. As I will highlight, NGO efforts to promote universalization (i.e. signature and ratification) are contributing to this horizontal spread, or norm cascade. While the norm is cascading, it is also being internalized by states who have already entered into the treaty (i.e. accepted the norm). A norm becomes internalized when it is second nature to a state, and the people within that state. This process can thus be visualized as the vertical (or top down) penetration of a norm within a state. NGO activities such as public outreach and advocacy (e.g. promoting awareness), as well as monitoring compliance and accountability contribute to this internalization within individual states.
The argument that NGOs can simultaneously contribute to the norm cascade and internalization of the norm “after the tipping point” is largely contrary to Finnemore & Sikkink’s norm life cycle model. Both cases in this paper challenge the assumption that the role of NGOs is limited to the earliest stage of norm development, that is, norm emergence. Further, I question existing literature regarding the formation of advocacy NGOs, specifically when they are expected to emerge, and under what circumstances. While advocacy NGOs (or transnational advocacy coalitions) are expected to be “first movers,” (Prakash & Gugerty 2010), “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998), “norm brokers,” and “norm makers” (Acharya 2004), this may not always be the case. It is possible that advocacy NGOs may form around a long-standing norm, and be of service to a treaty long after its entry into force, despite being absent during the early stage of norm emergence. I therefore argue that there are not only three paths that advocacy NGOs may follow in the post treaty stage as Haddad (2013) claims, but also a fourth path. In this alternative path, advocacy NGOs can play a role in the norm’s cascade and internalization, especially if states express a need for their involvement.
3. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines allow us to further understand the role of NGOs post treaty. Like the example of the CICC mentioned in the last section, the ICBL’s experience is characterized by mission expansion and organizational change, as the coalition expanded its role and scope of activities following the entry into force of the MBT. Therefore, this case confirms Haddad’s argument of post-treaty mission expansion as a result of NGOs normative commitment to the treaty, and most importantly, highlights that the role of NGOs is not limited to the first stage of norm development. Specifically, in relation to Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) “norm life cycle,” I will show that the ICBL’s activity post treaty is best conceptualized as promoting the norm cascade, as well as the internalization of the norm within states that have already ratified. Therefore, advocacy NGOs not only play a role in the norm’s emergence and eventual “tipping point,” but also ensure the continuation of the norm cascade and internalization.

It is nearly impossible to not mention the role of the ICBL in the creation of the MBT. The treaty, “a legally binding international agreement that bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines” was “made from below” (Anderson 2000, 93), as NGOs played an essential role in bringing the issue of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) to the attention of the international community. As Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated at the time, “[no] other issue in recent times has mobilized such a broad and diverse coalition of countries, governments, and nongovernmental organizations. Much of this momentum has been the result of the tremendous efforts made by NGOs to advance the cause to ban mines.” (in Cameron et al. 1998)
Unlike other arms control treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which were introduced by major states, the MBT is considered a “non-great power” treaty (Bower 2012) as it lacked the support of major states and NGOs acted as the “issue initiator” (Rutherford 2011). Namely, the landmine issue was born when NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, working in the developing world saw landmines as a serious problem which not only hindered their work but more importantly, were killing thousands of civilians (ICBL “A History”). In 1992, six organizations- the Vietnam Veterans Foundation, Medico International, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Mines Advisory Group, and Physicians for Human Rights, working alongside the ICRC, came together to form the ICBL and introduce the issue to the international community (ICBL “Ban History”). Although the ICBL was loosely organized, made up of a diverse coalition of NGOs, its advocacy efforts were always focused on a single, clear goal, that is, a complete and comprehensive ban on anti-personnel landmines (Rutherford 2011). Moreover, each NGO retained power over how they could most effectively reach this goal. This multi-dimensional, “networked organizational model with a strategic emphasis on coalition building” (JSC 2003) was a contributing factor towards the ICBL’s success.

3.1 Pre-Treaty Norm Emergence

Following Haddad’s method of analysis, it is first necessary to understand the pre-treaty role of the ICBL and the nature of their activities in order to examine the degree to which the coalition of NGOs expanded their mission in the post-treaty stage. As Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) model of norm development, predicts, the ICBL played a significant role in the first stage (i.e. norm emergence), as it introduced the issue of land mines to the international community. Scholars have thus acknowledged the way in which the ICBL acted as a “norm entrepreneur”
(Price 1998, Wexler 2003, Cameron 1998), successfully reframing the military-security issue of landmines as a global humanitarian issue (Price 1998, Dechaine 2005, Wexler 2003, Rutherford 2011). This is in line with Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) who see framing as the “central mission” of norm entrepreneurs during the first stage of norm development (in Payne 2001, 38). As Gruskin highlights, NGOs were responsible for bringing the issue of landmines to the attention of the international community, as “despite [their] considerable history, little had been recorded about the use of these weapons [landmines] until they attracted the attention of the media and humanitarian groups” (2005, 574). Further Rutherford notes that, “until NGOs formed the ICBL, APLs and mine warfare remained a relatively unknown subject outside the mine community” (2011, 10).

The ICBL continued to play an essential role in the six years leading up to the signing of the MBT. During this time, the coalition not only continued their demand-side activities (e.g. promotion of the norm), but also engaged in “supply-side” (Haddad 2013) functions, as they organized conferences, continued providing victim assistance, as well as knowledge and expertise. Most importantly, the ICBL, in 1993, organized the first of international conference on landmines in London, England, with the second conference being held in Geneva the following year (ICBL “Timeline”), and the third in Cambodia in 1996. By this time, however, the ICBL had realized that working through other forums such as the United Nations and Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) would not lead to a complete ban. It was at this time that the Canadian government, in a show of commitment to the ICBL and their goal, organized the Ottawa Landmine Ban Conference which set the momentum towards a complete ban (also known as the Ottawa Process) (Rutherford 2011). As Sigal notes, “as Canada firmed up arrangements for the Ottawa strategy session, more and more countries
decided to participate,” (2013, 101) thus signaling a lean towards acceptance of a universal norm to ban landmines. A process in which NGOs were the key actors. What started off as an effort between NGOs and a few like-minded governments would eventually reach a tipping point.

As a result of the ICBL’s efforts along with state allies, the Mine Ban Treaty- the most comprehensive conventional weapons prohibition- became open for signature on December 3, 1997 and was signed by one hundred and twenty two states (ICBL “Ban History”). Soon after, the ICBL developed an action plan to secure the forty ratifications needed for the MBT entry into force (Rutherford 2011) which occurred on March 1, 1999, signifying the codification of an international norm against the use of landmines. The IBCL, alongside the Canadian government, were the primary actors whose efforts led to the treaty’s entry into force. As predicted by the norm life cycle model (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998), a critical mass of actors who support the norm is required. While in the case of the MBT, states producing landmines and great powers did not support the treaty, this did not hinder the eventual cascade. By the end of 1999, ninety three states had ratified (ICBL), thus signaling the growing acceptance of norm against the use of landmines, and the ICBL’s continued efforts in this stage. As Sikkink (in Katzenstien 1996) has noted, the ban on landmines moved from norm emergence to a norm cascade with great speed. This would not have been possible without the efforts of the ICBL.

3.2 Post-Treaty Norm Cascade and Internalization

Like the CICC’s success in the creation of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), the ICBL had achieved its stated objective of a complete and comprehensive ban on landmines. The forty ratifications which led to the treaty’s entry into force did not, however, signal the end of the ICBL. In line with Haddad’s (2013) prediction, the ICBL did not disband once the MBT entered into force, but rather expanded its mission, the scope of its activities, as
well as its membership. The ICBL not only played a role in pre-treaty norm entrepreneurship (i.e. norm emergence), but as I will identify, the ICBL continues to demonstrate its commitment to a universal norm against the use of landmines, playing a key role in the furthering of the norm cascade and internalization. In particular, the ICBL’s normative commitment to the MBT is expressed through three specific activities in the post-treaty stage: monitoring (e.g. accountability), service provision, and universalization campaigns. As will be discussed, these activities are playing an important role in pushing the norm against the use of landmines further along the cascade and promoting internalization of the norm within specific states. In other words, NGO post-treaty activities are contributing to both the horizontal spread of the norm (i.e. cascade) and vertical penetration (i.e. internalization).

Firstly, the ICBL occupies an important position in the treaty monitoring process. The launch of the Landmine Monitor in 1998 represented the coalition’s first major mission expansion and its desire to continue to be active in the post-treaty stage. “The Monitor” is a yearly publication that “provides civil society monitoring on the humanitarian and developmental consequences of landmines” providing research, new developments, supporting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, providing information for government planning and policy, as well as acting as an advocacy tool (ICBL, “The Monitor”). Although it is not an official inspection and verification regime, The Monitor “has become the de facto monitoring regime for the MBT” (ICBL 2012), and is targeted towards governments, NGOs (including the ICBL itself), academics, the media, as well as the general population.

While implementation accountability is not an unexpected NGO activity per se, in the case of the IBCL, it reflects the organization’s continued normative commitment to the MBT. Moreover, by monitoring compliance, the IBCL is promoting internalization of the norm within
states that have already ratified. For example, full internalization implies behavior by habit, where a norm becomes second nature to a state, as well as the individuals within that state. Signature and ratification of a treaty do not mean automatic internalization. It is only when states demonstrate continued commitment, and full adherence to the norm (i.e. treaty) that complete internalization is possible. Because of this, NGOs have a role to play in monitoring compliance and accountability, and ensuring that states parties are not merely paying lip service to the treaty. Paul Hannon’s (the executive director of Mines Action Canada) remarks at the time of the Landmine Monitor’s introduction reflect this role:

“We want to make sure that this is a treaty that is implemented in a more thorough and effective way than others, and if it isn’t, we’ll know why. We have to keep challenging and keep watching governments to make sure that there is no slippage and none of them back off on their obligations.” (1999 in Thompson)

The most recent MBT review conference, held in Maputo in June 2014 further reflects the ICBL’s role in promoting internalization within states parties. Specifically, the ICBL decided that the “theme” of the conference would be “completion” (i.e. that states parties complete their treaty obligations within 10 years of the third review conference and remain committed to the norm) (ICBL 2014). This represents a departure from past “themes” which have emphasized victim assistance and universalization, in that the ICBL now realizes that only when states parties complete their MBT obligations will other states begin to imitate (i.e. enter into the treaty and adopt the norm). In other words, internalization of the norm among states parties will promote and further the norm cascade (i.e. horizontal spread of the norm).

Second, the continued service provision function of the ICBL is promoting internalization of the norm within states parties and contributing to treaty strength. For example, following the MBT entry into force, the ICBL increased its emphasis on victim assistance and humanitarian
mine clearance (JSC, 2003), working alongside states parties. The Survivor Network Project, launched in 2012, is one such initiative, where “networks of landmine survivors collaborate to develop victim assistance objectives” (ICBL 2012). The project intends to “respond to the needs and interests of survivors” and enhance participation in the MBT. Furthermore, in the area of mine clearance, the ICBL has launched both domestic and international campaigns helping states reach their mine clearance deadlines (i.e. comply with treaty provisions). These activities not only reflect that the ICBL remains of service to the MBT, but also promote treaty strength and compliance, as “mine awareness activities” and “assistance to mine victims” are included in Article 6 of the treaty (AP Mine Ban Convention, Article 6). By working with states to comply with treaty provisions, the ICBL is thus ensuring that states parties are not simply paying lip service to the treaty but are actively working towards internalization of the norm against the use of landmines.

Alongside the ICBL’s efforts to promote internalization of the norm within states party to the MBT is the simultaneous promotion of the norm cascade (i.e. horizontal spread of the norm). As I have earlier mentioned, during this stage, “the norm cascades” or spreads through the rest of the states (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 895). The ICBL’s strong universalization campaigns promote this spread of the norm among initial holdouts. To reemphasize, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have argued that socialization is one of the “dominant mechanisms” (898) driving a norm’s progression through the cascade stage. Through socialization, “norm leaders” or “socializing agents” convince other states to adopt “norm consistent behavior. This occurs as a result of a “dynamic of imitation.” Undoubtedly, alongside states parties, has IBCL has acted as (and continues to act as) a socializing agent in the post-treaty stage.
Specifically, the ICBL is encouraging the furthering of the norm cascade through their universalization campaigns. These activities include:

- writing lobbying letters to decision-makers;
- visiting countries to meet with government and parliament representatives;
- holding meetings with diplomatic representatives in Geneva and capitals;
- encouraging States Parties to raise the issue in their dealings with states not party;
- and raising awareness in the media and general public of concerned countries.

For example, in their campaigns and statements, the ICBL has continually emphasized that holdouts need to “get on the right side of humanity” (HRC 2012). This shaming technique is essentially what Kenneth Waltz has referred to as “ridicule for deviation,” a common method of socialization (in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902). Further, as Finnemore and Sikkink note, a state’s adoption of a new norm may be the result of a process “analogous to peer pressure among countries,” and states will respond to peer pressure due to their desire for “legitimation, conformity, and esteem” (903). As the ICBL’s efforts illustrate, however, it is not only states that socialize and pressure, but also advocacy NGOs.

The case of the United States further sheds light upon this dynamic. In particular, the ICBL has undertaken a variety of initiatives and public campaigns pressuring the United States, under the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations to enter into the MBT. In line with the socialization technique of shaming (Risse 1998), the ICBL has accused the United States of “failing in its humanitarian duty” (2013). Additionally, the ICBL has ridiculed the U.S. for deviation, pointing out that “the U.S. continues to opt to stand outside the Mine Ban Treaty, alongside notable outsiders, instead of inside it with all of its NATO and European Union Allies” (ICBL “Statement on Universalization” 2013). The IBCL has been a successful socialization agent, as very recently, in the closing statements of the third review conference in Maputo, the
United States announced their decision to sign the MBT. This was largely the result of decades long campaigning, lobbying, and pressure by the ICBL. As American ambassador Douglas M. Griffiths announced, the U.S. is “diligently pursuing solutions that would be compliant with the convention and that would ultimately allow us to accede to the convention” (2014). While the ICBL continues to push for the U.S. to make a stronger commitment, there is no doubt that the U.S. no longer desires to remain an outsider. Further, US support for the treaty is evidence that the norm continues to cascade, largely as a result of the ICBL’s efforts.

In sum, there is no doubt that the ICBL has expanded its efforts and functions in the post-treaty stage. While its initial goal of a complete ban on anti-personnel landmines was achieved in 1998, the ICBL continues to expand its mission, launching new campaigns and initiatives each year, as well as increasing its membership. Not only was the ICBL responsible for the emergence of the norm against the use of landmines, but its role as a socializing agent has promoted the norm’s cascade through states. Further, the IBCL continues to promote internalization of the norm within states party to the MBT, monitoring compliance and accountability. The case of the ICBL thus complements Haddad’s argument that NGOs continue to play an important, enhanced role in the post-treaty stage, pushing the norm through the later stages of development. Further, we see that cascading and internalization are not two, isolated processes, but can occur simultaneously.
4. The Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition

The Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition represents another path to NGO involvement in international agreements and norm development. It shows that despite the absence of advocacy NGOs in the pre-treaty stage (i.e. norm emergence), it is possible for these NGOs to emerge late into the post-treaty stage (i.e. after the tipping point) and still contribute to the later stages of the norm’s development.

In what follows, I highlight that even in the presence of a strong, long standing norm against the use of chemical weapons, the CWCC can contribute to the cascade and internalization of the norm. Specifically, through their public outreach efforts and role in the CWC review conference, the coalition is contributing to the internalization of the norm within states parties. Additionally, the CWCC’s role in promoting universalization of the treaty may contribute to the horizontal spread of the norm, that is, the norm cascade. Further, I show that the CWCC has been able to emerge in the post-treaty stage and has had the opportunity to play a meaningful role because states have realized the need for NGO advocacy. This is for two reasons. First, the room for public outreach and advocacy exists as the chemical weapons norm has not been fully internalized within states parties. Second, the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime in 2013 led states to realize that the CW norm is not as far along the norm cascade as had been previously thought. Because of this, it is likely that the CWCC will continue to expand its presence in the pre-treaty stage.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) became open for signature in January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April, 1997. The Convention “aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by states parties” (CWC Preamble). One hundred and thirty countries signed the CWC in 1993, and sixty-five had ratified by April 1997. As of 2014, the Chemical Weapons Convention has been signed and ratified by 98% of states, thus exhibiting higher numbers of ratification in comparison to other weapons of mass destruction treaties such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as conventional weapons treaties such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (MBT). In addition to being an international treaty banning chemical weapons, the CWC also established an implementing body- the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Currently, the OPCW has 190 Member states who work towards a collective goal of entirely eliminating chemical weapons, and “preventing chemistry from ever again being used for warfare,” (“About the Convention” OPCW 2013) thus contributing to an overarching aim of strengthening international security.

The origins and development of the Chemical Weapons Convention are significantly different from that of the Mine Ban Treaty. One key difference is the level of NGO involvement in each treaty’s development. Advocacy NGOs were almost non-existent in the development of the CWC as well as during the ratification stage. Whereas NGOs were responsible for bringing the landmines issue to the attention of states, a long-standing norm against the use of chemical weapons had already been in existence prior to the CWC (Price 1995), therefore providing no need for advocacy NGOs to act as norm entrepreneurs. For example, prior to the CWC, the 1925 Geneva Protocol had banned the use of chemical weapons in war. Subsequently, the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention included CW, in that “each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognised objective of effective prohibition of Chemical Weapons…” CW
remained on the agenda of the Geneva Conference in 1978 (renamed the Conference on Disarmament in 1980) where negotiations on the convention began. Despite the decades long negotiations on the CWC, states held a collective desire to ban chemical weapons and much of the disagreement lay in regards to the verification regime (OPCW 2012). While advocacy NGOs were not present during these negotiations and treaty developments, the chemical industry, as well as science and knowledge based organizations were actively involved.

First, the role of the chemical industry cannot be overlooked. Whereas the Mine Ban Treaty has been referred to a “partnership” between governments and NGOs (i.e. the ICBL), the CWC has been referred to as an “industry-government coalition” (Carpenter, 118 in Morel & Olsen 1993). For example, worldwide, the chemical industry displayed a strong commitment to obtaining a chemical weapons ban and worked closely with states during treaty negotiations. Industry actors from leading corporations such as DuPont and Monsanto were widely present during talks regarding the establishment of a verification regime (Tucker 2011), and were shown to be in support of the CWC’s requirement that states-parties declare chemical industries that produce high risk chemicals (Arms Control Association 2003) and conduct on-site inspections.

Second, knowledge based, “supply-side” organizations contributed to the CWC’s development. Most noteworthy of these organizations was Pugwash, a group which held conferences (i.e. Pugash Conferences) to bring together government officials, policymakers, scientists, academics, industry, and NGOs, providing a forum for discussion. Specifically, The Pugwash Chemical and Biological Warfare Workshops (est. 1959) “were instrumental in bringing together technical experts, official negotiators, and industry and academic experts to help lay the framework for the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention” (Nobelprize.org). The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is another supply-side organization who played an important role in the CWC, as it is responsible for publishing a number of reports regarding chemical weapons (CW) disarmament, as well as was actively involved in negotiations regarding the CW verification regime (Roberts & Lancaster 1994).

Therefore, while non-state actors did play a role in the initial stages of the CWC, this role was not advocacy oriented. States welcomed organizations such as SIPRI and Pugwash in the CWC negotiations because of their supply-side nature. These organizations did not play a role in advocacy activities such as public outreach initiatives or campaigns promoting signature and ratification. This is not only a result of the nature of these NGOs (i.e. they are not “advocacy” NGOs), but also because states wanted the CWC. In contrast to the ICBL which had to actively campaign in order to convince states to support their cause, states were already working towards a ban on CW. In other words, there was essentially no need for advocacy in the pre-treaty stage, so NGOs did not form around the cause. The widespread support for the CWC is for two reasons:

First, the pre-existing norm against the use of chemical weapons (Price 1995) explains why states supported a ban and why advocacy NGOs did not form. As Richard Price (1995) has argued, there exists a historical “taboo” against the use of chemical weapons, thus explaining the international community’s acceptance of a ban. The OPCW has noted that “the history of the serious efforts to achieve chemical disarmament that culminated in the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention began more than a century ago,” beginning with an agreement between France and Germany in 1675 to ban the use of poison bullets (OPCW). Therefore, the “tradition of practice that forbids the use of CW [chemical weapons] and characterizes it as an
abnormal behavior among the society of states” is one that existed prior to the CWC (Price 1995, 103). Unlike the issue of landmines, where even in 1994, there was a general consensus among states that their use was legal and acceptable (Rutherford 2011), chemical weapons had already been regarded by states as “morally illegitimate” (Price 1995, 73). As a result, there was no need for NGOs to coalesce around the goal of chemical weapons disarmament and act as norm entrepreneurs.

Secondly, states were accepting towards the CWC (thus limiting the need for NGO advocacy) because of the generally low costs that a ban on chemical weapons would pose to the majority of states. In other words, because only a small group of states were in possession of chemical weapons, and had the ability to develop them, a ban on their use would not incur significant costs to states. As Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) have pointed out, regulatory treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention “that prescribe reductions in a collectively dysfunctional behavior” (380) often display high levels of acceptance because of the fact that “most treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement” (380). It is safe to expect that without the Chemical Weapons Convention, the majority of states would not possess chemical weapons, use them in warfare, or begin development programs. This argument not only applies to the widespread acceptance of the treaty, but also explains why the CWC exhibits very high numbers of ratification (only six states have not ratified the treaty) despite the absence of NGO advocacy efforts. Furthermore, even states such as the United States and Russia, holding the largest chemical weapons stockpiles, were in support of the CWC. This shows that even though CW destruction would incur costs, the potential benefits of becoming party to the CWC (e.g. not being a treaty outsider,
stopping the proliferation of CW) would outweigh these. In sum, states did not need advocacy NGOs to convince them of the potential benefits (and generally low costs) of the CWC, therefore these organizations did not form during the negotiation, signing, and ratification stages.

4.1 NGO Emergence Post-Treaty

Despite the CWC being an unlikely case for the involvement of advocacy NGOs, in 2009, twelve years after the treaty’s entry into force, Global Green USA and Green Cross International came together to form the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition (CWCC). This “global network of NGOs” (CWCC: “Founding Document,” 2009) was established as a result of the efforts of Dr. Paul Walker, Director of the Environmental Security and Sustainability Program (ESS) of Green Cross International, who now acts as the director of the CWCC. Walker was motivated by the lack of civil society involvement in the treaty, as well as the lack of public awareness regarding the CWC and CW proliferation, especially in relation to other weapons proliferation treaties (i.e. the MBT). Specifically, the CWC Coalition’s aim is to “help network, coordinate, and expand civil society involvement in the abolition regime” as well as achieve universal ratification and raise public awareness of the issue (Green Cross). The CWCC’s normative commitment to the CWC is further reflected in the coalition’s mission statement:

The Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition (CWCC) is an independent, international body whose mission is to support the aims of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to supplement the efforts of the member states of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with focused civil society action aimed at achieving full membership of the CWC, the safe and timely elimination of all chemical weapons, preventing the misuse of chemicals for hostile purposes, and promoting their peaceful use.
4.2 Norm Internalization

While the CWCC is a relatively new organization, a majority of their efforts are directed towards contributing to the internalization of the anti-CW norm within states parties. In other words, while the norm against the use of chemical weapons is strong and widely accepted (Price 1995), it has still not been completely internalized, therefore, a need to ensure compliance exists. Further, internalization implies that the norm becomes second nature to a state and its public. The coalition’s national public awareness and outreach activities contribute to this internalization. This includes media commentaries, blogs, and participation in television or radio programmes on CWC related issues. In addition, the CWCC conducts “advocacy programs necessary to build political commitment in various countries and regions” (CWCC 2009). Like the ICBL’s involvement in the MBT Review Conferences, the CWCC has also gained entry into the CWC Review Conferences, playing a role in verification and treaty/norm compliance. All of these activities contribute to the internalization of the norm within states parties. The CWCC is thus working to ensure that states remain committed to the CWC, and eventually internalize the norm to the degree that monitoring and public advocacy is no longer necessary.

4.3 Norm Cascade

Another key goal of the CWCC is to promote universalization, what I have conceptualized as the furthering of the norm cascade, or horizontal spread of the norm. While the CWC has been ratified by 98% of states, Israel, Myanmar, Angola, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan remain outside of the treaty. Until the treaty holds full ratification, the norm cannot be said to have fully cascaded. As I will later discuss, states that remain outside of the CW treaty regime, such as Syria (prior to ratification), possess the potential for norm violation, thus
hindering the cascade. Working alongside states parties, the CWCC holds the potential to contribute to universalization efforts, namely, leading campaigns within these final holdouts (with the exception of North Korea). The coalition’s involvement during the Third CWC Review Conference (2013) has also allowed them to take part in universalization efforts. This involves working alongside states parties and the OPCW to effectively implement the Action Plan for Universality (OPCW 2013). In addition, CWCC’s annual conference has also focused on strengthening the CWC through universalizing membership (Green Cross Intl 2013).

4.4 States need for NGOs

The CWCC’s involvement in advocacy and outreach, treaty monitoring, as well as universalization efforts reflect the ability of NGOs to contribute to the norm cascade and internalization. However, the degree to which the CWCC can be of service to the treaty and promote the norm’s development depends on whether states see a need for advocacy NGOs in the post-treaty stage. Unlike the ICBL which holds a high degree of legitimacy, the CWCC must prove its usefulness to states. As the remainder of this paper highlights, in the last two years, states have expressed a desire to bring NGOs into the CWC treaty regime. This is because some states have failed to meet treaty provisions (e.g. destruction deadlines), and because of the recent use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime in 2012 and 2013. These occurrences have led states to realize that the anti-CW norm is not as far along the norm cascade as previously thought, and that the norm is not fully internalized within states parties. As a result, there is a need for NGO advocacy in the latter stages of norm development, despite the absence of such organizations in the earlier stages of the norm. It is thus likely that the CWCC’s role will
continue to expand in the post treaty stage, and we are already seeing evidence of its increased role since the organization’s inception in 2009.

By comparing documents from the 2013 review conference with those from the two earlier conferences in 2003 and 2008, we see that it was only in 2013 that states began to express a need for NGOs to be incorporated into the CWC regime. For example, during the third conference (2013), it was highlighted that,

“ethical norms rooted in the Convention need to be widely disseminated: to the general public, and, especially among scientists, engineers, and academics. Outreach, education, and public diplomacy should feature more prominently on the organisation’s agenda…”

It was further noted that there is a “determination to maintain the convention’s role as a bulwark against chemical weapons, to that end to promote, inter alia, outreach, capacity building, education, and public diplomacy, and a “desire to improve interaction with the chemical industry, the scientific community, academic, and civil society organizations engaged in issues relevant to the convention” (CWC Third Review Conference, Agenda Item Nine). This desire to include NGOs had not been previously expressed in the first and second review conferences. As I argue, states are now beginning to realize that the norm is not as deeply internalized within states parties and as far along the norm cascade as had been previously thought. Because of this, there is a need for the CWCC’s advocacy efforts.

Firstly, states have begun to express a need for NGO advocacy because the norm against the use of CW is not fully internalized within states parties. As Kelle (2013, 144) points out, “the [third] conference comes at what some perceive to be a critical juncture in the CW
prohibition regime’s evolution, for the destruction of declared CW arsenals—although not yet complete—has reached a point where decisions need to be taken by OPCW member states about the regime’s future and possible changes in the prioritization of the various regime’s goals.”

For example, several states, including the U.S. have failed to meet the 2012 deadline for the destruction of CW stockpiles. This implies that the norm has not yet been fully internalized, because if it were indeed internalized, states would not be failing to meet the deadlines and comply with treaty provisions. In other words, the vertical penetration of the norm is incomplete. This was highlighted at the third review conference as a statement expressed that “national implementation of the convention needs to improve globally” and that “any international treaty is only as good as its domestic implementation” (CWC Third Review Conference Opening Statement 29, 2013). OPCW director Ahmet Uzumcu further emphasized that more effort is needed to internalize the norm, stating that “the future calls us to strengthen verification, to use our institutional experience and expertise acquired over many years, in helping states parties implement their obligations more fully.” Therefore, as Kelle (2013, 146) further notes, “it [has been] often erroneously assumed that the CW problem has been solved with the establishment of the CWC,” as there is still work to be done. Most importantly, this highlights that a need for NGO advocacy still exists, and states have come to realize this. For example, at the High-Level Meeting on the CWC held in 2012, Bulgaria’s statement expressed the need for “increasing interaction between all stakeholders,” specifically non-state actors. Likewise, Lithuania expressed the need for “raising awareness,” highlighting its involvement with civil society to “promote international debate on the issue [of CW]” (2012). The CWCC’s
efforts directed towards ensuring compliance and accountability (i.e. internalization of the norm within states parties) thus have a role to play.

Second, the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime in 2012 and 2013 led states to realize that the norm against the use of chemical weapons was not as far along the norm cascade as had been previously thought. This also explains why states have more recently expressed a need for NGOs. In July 2012, the Syrian Foreign Ministry reported the possession of chemical weapons, promising to only be used against “external aggression” (ACM 2013). Soon after, in December 2012, seven people were allegedly killed by a chemical weapon attack carried out by the Syrian regime. During the Third Review Conference, this norm violation was strongly condemned. Specifically, the OPCW stated that “chemical weapons in the context of Syria is a serious concern” and that “[the] case also illustrates how important it is to secure the universal acceptance of the Convention.” Because promoting universalization is one of the CWCC’s main goals, the norm violation by the Syrian regime will allow states to realize the CWCC’s efforts are necessary, and that there is a need for NGO advocacy to promote the horizontal norm cascade. The second use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime in 2013 further established this need and enhanced the CWCC’s role. For example, during the CW destruction process in Syria, it has been noted that the CWCC undertook significant efforts to increase transparency by communicating information to the public, especially through the internet and social media, as well as press releases to the media (Green Cross Intl. 2014). The Syrian incidents have thus resulted in an increased role for the CWCC, as states are realizing the organization’s importance in promoting the norm cascade and universal acceptance of the anti-CW norm.
5. Conclusion

After a norm’s “tipping point,” NGOs continue to play a role. This is true in the case of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, where the advocacy coalition expanded its mission after the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, and worked towards promoting the cascade and internalization of the international norm against the use of landmines. NGO mission expansion in the post treaty stage, however, is not the only path to NGO involvement in treaties. As this paper has argued, it is possible for advocacy NGOs to emerge in the post-treaty stage even in the most unlikely circumstances, that is, in the presence of an established norm and where advocacy NGOs did not play a role in norm emergence and adoption. The Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition serves as an example of advocacy NGOs emerging far into the post treaty stage and still being able to contribute to the norm’s cascade and internalization. Because states have acknowledged that a need for NGO advocacy exists, it is likely that the CWCC’s role will continue to expand.

There are several implications here for the study of advocacy NGOs and norm development, as well as the general involvement of NGOs in international agreements. First, one must not assume that advocacy NGOs disband after they have completed their original mission aims. Second, the importance of NGOs cannot be limited to the earliest stages of norm development. Third, the norm cascade and norm internalization can occur simultaneously. Finally, advocacy NGOs may emerge late into the post-treaty stage, even in the presence of an established norm. Further, the unique scenario that allowed the CWCC to expand its role does not completely restrict its application to another case study, but rather allows us to consider whether a norm violation and failure to meet treaty provisions will lead to the emergence of advocacy NGOs, or enhance their role.
While this paper has sought a more comparative approach to understanding NGO involvement in international agreements, focusing on two successful arms control treaties, future studies may seek to examine alternative treaty regimes. Further, it will be worth continuing to pay attention towards the ICBL and CWCC, and whether the ICBL will continue its mission expansion in the future and undergo further organizational change, as well as whether the CWCC will gain more involvement in the CWC alongside states. Most importantly, this paper has shown that NGOs play an important role in the development of international norms, therefore, the importance of these non-state actors cannot be overlooked.
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