BRITISH COOKBOOKS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF TASTE 1660-1760

by

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I investigate the ways in which cookbooks published in Britain between 1660 and 1760 helped to shape conceptions of physical and aesthetic taste. I propose that in the early and mid-eighteenth century aesthetics and cookery were neither parallel phenomena nor completely distinct from each other, but public discourses that intersected and changed over time. These intersections helped to define many of the modern notions of subjectivity, professionalism, and disciplinarity with which we are familiar today. The central works I consider are the cookbooks of Hannah Woolley, Mary Kettily, Hannah Glasse, Ann Cook, and Martha Bradley. Examined within the background of an expanding print culture, these texts show that cookery was a multifaceted and critical form of writing.

Following Jürgen Habermas' theory of the conceptual zones of the eighteenth-century, I argue that cookbooks were crucially and self-consciously aware of the porous nature of the intimate, private, and public spheres in which they circulated and that this awareness determined the way cookbooks constructed and critiqued ideas of taste. Female cookery authors were engaged with similar concerns around tasting, judgment, and subjectivity as philosophers like Locke, Shaftesbury, Hume, and Kames. I begin with the origins of the printed cookbook, demonstrating how early examples of the genre looked back to an embedded and indistinct domestic realm, while at the same time anticipating the public private division reinforced by print. I then uncover the ways in which female cookery book authors, unlike their male contemporaries, took up empiricist philosophy in order to construct taste as a sensory experience of judging subjects, before examining how this construction of taste was interpreted as transgressing boundaries of gender and privacy. In my final chapter, I show how taste transforms from an embodied, local phenomenon, to one that is public and critically engaged, and ultimately
how taste in cookery is disciplined out of the public sphere, becoming linked only with the reproduction of food.
Preface

This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Erin MacWilliam.
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Dedication

For my father
Introduction: The Century of Taste

George Dickie has called the eighteenth century the “century of taste” or, more specifically, the “century of the theory of taste” (3). Taste was indeed a subject of wide concern and considerable discussion between 1660 and 1800. For the most part, however, critics have treated taste in the eighteenth century as a philosophical, moral, critical, and political concept. Recently, historians and literary scholars have begun to consider how the eighteenth century saw taste as a physical experience, and how eighteenth century people ate, drank, relished, and savoured. This recent work has been primarily aimed at complicating, if not undermining, our own sense of taste as a purely intellectual or aesthetic ideal and to seeing it anew as a physical, and therefore political as well as gendered experience. This dissertation differs from this work in that it will trace the development and transformation of taste as both an intellectual category and a physical experience by analysing the form and function of an important genre in which taste was both embodied and discussed: cookbooks. The following chapters read a set of cookery texts from 1660 to 1760 in their literary, historical, and philosophical contexts to tell a story of the public culture of taste production through cookery. This project is not intended to be a review


of philosophical concepts or a history of cookbooks. Rather, it analyses eighteenth-century cookbooks as a literary and print culture phenomena, tracing taste as it is constructed in texts as well as in homes, on tables, and in bodies. The focus will be on the cookery books themselves, and not on food as a symbolic or material product.

Cookbooks constituted a significant part of the print culture in the eighteenth century. Gilly Lehmann tells us that the total print run of cookbooks in Britain from 1700-1800 was over five hundred thousand (65). Yet studies of eighteenth century cookbooks, such as Lehmann’s work on British housewives and cookery, have tended to focus on the history of cookery and domesticity rather than examining the texts as a genre and aesthetic category that helped define taste in the public sphere. Other scholars have used cookbooks to explore aspects of women’s domestic life or as examples of women’s writing peripheral to the scholar’s main arguments. In contrast, cookery books will be my central primary texts, and I will perform close readings of them in order to document their crucial role in the transformation of taste between 1660 and 1780. In the cookbooks I will analyse, I suggest the authors were viewing the kitchen and domestic space as an important site where tastes both physical and aesthetic were contested. I propose that the concept of taste being worked out by cookbook authors was one that transformed over the century. It is this, rather than the material or food culture aspect of the genre that I will explore. I aim to tell the story of this transformation of taste in context, and show how the discourses of cookery, aesthetics, and empiricist taste intersected in order to shape that change. I argue that cookbooks helped to establish an epistemology of taste, defining not only the way people cooked and ate but also how cookbook readers knew, read, produced, and consumed inside and outside the home, and that were involved in what I call the cookery mode as a way to reconcile body and self with culture.
In using the term *mode* to categorise cookery writing so broadly, I am following Anthony Low’s use of the term in *The Georgic Revolution* (1985) to describe the georgic. Low uses the term “mode” because genre limits him to literary characteristics: “like pastoral, georgic is primarily a mode rather than a genre. It is an informing spirit, an attitude toward life, and a set of themes and images rather than anything so definite, say, as a four-book, didactic poem of two thousand lines on the subject of agriculture” (7). As a type of writing that is concerned with food and labour, and is often didactic, georgic is an appropriate companion mode to cookery. As Low does with Georgic, I want to define cookery as more than an assemblage of elements; indeed, the type of standardised cookbooks we are familiar with today did not begin to emerge until the middle of the eighteenth century, as I will document in my fourth chapter. Cookery is not just a type of writing. It could be a practice of daily life, a profession, or a way to signify social hierarchy, gender, or nationality. As a mode that uses preparing and consuming food to explore questions of physical and aesthetic taste, the cookery mode incorporates not only the genre of cookbooks, but also other genres such as philosophy, poetry, and periodicals.

While cookbooks are a genre, and the language of cookery is a discourse, I will treat cookery as a *mode* because it is a more expansive field than both genre and discourse. The term “discourse,” is commonly defined after Foucault as a system of relations of signs that condition and to a great extent determine the attitudes and beliefs of those who use them in any given period (*The Archéology of Knowledge* 131). Cookery is a site of contestation between different, often divergent discourses of taste: publicity and privacy, aesthetics and domesticity, and consumption and production. In other words, it was *in* the broad domain of the cookery mode and through the process of re-signifying objects, subjects, and ideas that philosophers, essayists, and cooks came to formulate various discourses of taste, sometimes metaphorically overlapping
them and sometimes strictly distinguishing them. It was through the broader domain of the
cookery mode that the genres and discourses that comprise “cooking” and “taste” came into
being. Cookery is a mode because it does encompass both physical and aesthetic discourses of
taste. These two types of taste appear in the cookery mode in the earlier part of the century, but,
as I will argue in my final chapter, the cookery mode eventually splits, and aesthetic and physical
taste become separate discourses.

Critics and historians usually associate taste in the eighteenth century with aesthetic
judgment. In this reading, the canonical philosophers and writers on aesthetic taste, as well as the
subject who deploys taste tend to be male: Joseph Addison, Edmund Burke, John Gilbert
Cooper, Alexander Gerard, William Hogarth, David Hume, Francis Hutchison, Lord Kames,
John Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, Richard Steele, and Thomas Reid. These writers attempted to
determine the nature of taste, exploring for example whether it was an internal and instinctive
sense, a type of imaginative sense, or one of association. Dickie describes their work as "an
attempt to give an account of [experienced] objects and of the pleasure and displeasure taken in
them" (3). This account employed a foundational hierarchy of senses, privileging sight and
hearing over the bodily senses of taste and touch. As Carolyn Korsmeyer points out, this
tradition of philosophical inquiry "moves rapidly to issues of aesthetic discrimination regarding
objects of art and to questions about relative preference and standards for artistic judgements...the literal sense of taste has rarely caught the attention of philosophers except insofar as it
provides the metaphor of aesthetic sensitivity" (1). Korsmeyer also notes that, importantly,
going back to Aristotle, this sensory hierarchy is also gendered, with the cognitive sense of sight
and sound characterised as masculine, and the bodily senses of taste, touch as smell characterised
as feminine (33). The philosophy of taste in cookbooks treat both senses of taste, physical and
aesthetic, as more than metaphors for each other. Rather, they constitute a broad relation of sensations, experiences, and values that problematize the hierarchy of taste assumed by the primarily male philosophers without abandoning their civilizing aims. Thus the investment in the physicality of taste is not an alternative to taste but rather a way of re-imagining the various discursive relations that comprise “taste” within the cookery mode. Accordingly, my dissertation reads cookbooks as a primarily private and female-gendered discourse operating outside of or sometimes in a contentious relationship to the dominant discourse of aesthetic taste. Yet, in spite of this contentiousness, both discourses operated within a cookery mode that was itself part of a wider domain of public knowledge and debate.

As this preliminary description indicates, my dissertation’s theoretical framework draws on two significant critical fields in addition to the existing mainly historical work on cookbooks: studies in public and counterpublic spheres, and the critical and historical study of taste. These theories interrelate within the primary texts of my dissertation rather than form a separate theoretical section. Previous scholarly work on cookbooks has enabled me to focus on the way eighteenth-century cookery books shaped taste in concert with philosophy, literature, and periodical culture. I am indebted to Gilly Lehmann’s 2003 text *The British Housewife: Cookery Books, Cooking and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain*. I have relied on Lehmann’s historical information and bibliographic study of key primary texts. Sandra Sherman’s 2010 *Invention of the Modern Cookbook* also provided useful background on the development of the genre. Sherman focuses on the generic changes to cookbooks in the period, highlighting the way authors create culinary authority in printed rather than manuscript texts, marketing strategies, and culinary nationalism. My own work, however, aims to move away from culinary history to examine the more theoretical implications of cookery books in the period, specifically the way in
which the genre engaged with print culture. Along these lines, Sarah Pennell’s work on manuscript circulation and material culture in early modern England had aided my work on the early printed cookbook. Specifically, Pennell’s theories of manuscript cookery text circulation have contributed to my analysis of spheres in which early printed cookery books operated.

To map how ideas around taste circulated and understand how a print genre aimed mainly at private female readers could have public cultural currency, I will use theories of publics and print culture initiated by Jürgen Habermas and modified by critics such as Jon Klancher, (The Making of English Reading Audiences 1790-1832, 1987) Nancy Fraser, (“Rethinking the Public Sphere”, 1992) Michael Warner, (Publics and Counterpublics, 2002) and Michael McKeon (The Secret History of Domesticity: Public, Private and the Division of Knowledge, 2005). My print cultural framework comes from the work of Clifford Siskin (The Work of Writing: Literature and Social Change in Britain 1700-1830, 1998), John Brewer (The Pleasures of the Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century, 1997), and J. Paul Hunter (Before Novels: the Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English Fiction, 1990), among others. As all four authors observe, both the number of literate readers, but especially the number of available printed texts increased during the eighteenth century. Brewer describes the period thus: "Books, print and readers were everywhere. Not everyone was a reader, but even those who could not

read lived to an unprecedented degree in a culture of print, for the impact of the publishing revolution extended beyond the literate” (187). Cookbooks were read, bought, and circulated by literate and non-literate readers alike, and, as I will demonstrate throughout my dissertation, cookbook authors engaged with print culture outside of the cookery genre, borrowing forms from or making connections to autobiography, poetry, periodicals, and philosophy.

In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1963), Habermas famously defined the eighteenth century public sphere as the location where, aided by the rise in print culture, private bourgeois citizens established what can be described as public opinion though discussions of politics and public affairs. Conceptions of the private and the public in the eighteenth century are critical to the development of both public opinion and print culture, and with the construction of the modern subject. Habermas argues that we can only begin to speak of public option beginning in late-seventeenth-century Great Britain, and that a reading public came together in theoretically inclusive spaces such as the coffeehouse to form this opinion. Following Habermas, scholars often theorise the eighteenth century as the era when the public sphere of politics became conceptually separate from the private sphere. This public sphere is constituted by private people. Habermas opposed this new category of publicity to a private sphere of subjectivity directed at an audience, which was itself distinct from (although imperfectly) a domestic and female-gendered “intimisphere.” Habermas’ intimisphere is approximately aligned with the emerging category of the domestic as described most fully by Michael McKeon in *The Secret History of Domesticity: Public, Private and the Division of Knowledge* (1995). In simple terms, the intimisphere and the domestic are “more” private than the private. While the private sphere is the internal space of the home and family, the intimisphere is the truly intimate spaces embedded within it such as the bedroom and the kitchen. In Habermas’ scheme, “privacy” is
really public domain, one’s inner or subjective life that nevertheless leaves the domestic and intimate arenas to others. Both of these spheres are also conceived of as feminized spaces dominated by a different order of intimate subjectivity. In my dissertation I propose that, in part, through cookbooks, certain concepts of taste were worked out within the intimisphere, and then move into the private and public spheres. I argue that as the private sphere becomes the new space of publicity, the domestic ‘intimisphere’ begins to move into the space vacated by the private, though the colonization of the public sphere by the domestic still blurs the boundaries of the various spheres.

These categories are important to my study because the cookery mode borrows many of its features from these internal spaces. Habermas describes how “on the one hand, the society now confronting the state clearly separated a private domain from public authority and [...], on the other hand, it turned the reproduction of life into something transcending the confines of private domestic authority and becoming a subject of public interest” (24). This transformation Habermas outlines correlates with the way cookbook authors like Mary Kettilby and Hannah Glasse begin to treat cookery, a topic with domestic and private associations, as a public concern in which intimate subjectivity was a crucial part. I will use McKeon’s *The Secret History of the Domestic*, and his argument that that separation out of the domestic from both the private and the public spheres in the later seventeenth century is integral to the development of public opinion and the concept of a public sphere. I will employ his theory of development of domestic as a distinct category to map the implications of cookery’s often intimate and ‘domestic’ status on its readers and print culture. While both Habermas and McKeon’s theories of privacy and intimacy have been critiqued as all-encompassing conceptual frameworks, the cookbooks that I focus on demonstrate an awareness of these categories as Habermas and McKeon outline them. For
example, in my second and third chapters, I will focus on the ways in which cookery book authors use issues of physical tasting as a way to mediate between personal subjectivities (which originate in the intimisphere) and social or public standards.

Aided by the work of critics such as Klancher, Warner, and Fraser, who suggest that counterpublics work to disturb the boundaries Habermas defines, I also explore the way some authors locate mid-eighteenth century cookery within a private type of ‘counterpublic,’ and the resulting resistance to that positioning. Michael Warner has described counterpublics as spaces that provide opportunities for conversation and opinion that, though they remain within the context of the public sphere, are still removed from the public authority. Warner envisions counterpublics as spaces of conflict within dominant culture. In my reading, however, the cookery counterpublic is not necessarily or directly opposed to dominant culture but is still distinct from it. One of the reasons for its distinctness is its gender: the public/private dichotomy associates public with masculine and private with feminine. I aim to demonstrate how the gendered dynamic between public and private is central to the cookery mode, and how the way cookbooks locate taste impacts the way cookery promotes subjectivity.

To clarify the way these different spheres intersect in the cookery mode, I also consider the ways the mode helped to construct the new epistemologies and subjectivities contemporary with it. I will focus especially on the way the cookery mode bridged and then later disentangled notions of physical and intellectual taste, the material and the immaterial, and production and consumption. More specifically, I will argue that, although aesthetic taste and bodily taste are separate, the cookery mode links metaphorical and physical tasting to construct both individual subjectivities and public taste. This union is ultimately severed, however, and separate discourses of taste as theory and taste as practice reinforce the distinction between the two types of taste.
By treating taste in this respect, I follow the important recent work of Denise Gigante and Timothy Morton who have examined taste as a sensation in the physical body as well as an aesthetic principle. They theorize that because eighteenth-century taste is both bodily and aesthetic, it allowed individuals to realize their own empirical (sense-based) subjectivity and connect their personal tastes to societal ones. Morton’s *The Poetics of Spice* (2000) and *Shelley and the Revolution in Taste* (1995) analyse the way writing about food becomes a figurative strategy or ‘discourse of diet’ that encompasses aesthetics, morality, and subjeckhood, although Morton’s focus is later than the temporal scope of my project. In *Taste: A Literary History* (2005), Gigante proposes that the British Empiricists rethought the gap between the mind and the senses that had been a mainstay of philosophy since Plato. Our sense of reality, the empiricists believed, comes from our sensual interaction with the world. However, our senses are unreliable. Thus, we combine our sensations into ideas which we then, in turn, associate and categorize into system of thought which supplement the inadequacy of the senses. In eighteenth-century philosophy, then, physical experience, such as eating, provided opportunities to think about cognitive experience, a type of "embodied cognition" (6) that they called taste. At the same time, Gigante makes clear, taste is also the name for a system of perception, judgment, and understanding that, while based in sensory experienced (through association, origin, or metaphor) is also distinct from it, a social or moral rather than a purely physical category.

While there are two different types of taste, aesthetic and physical (or what Gigante refers to as gustatory taste), Gigante proposes that their connection is more than metaphorical, and that “the matter of representations of gustatory taste finding their way into aesthetic philosophy” (23) reflects the way that subjective discernment constructs subjectivity. As such, she proposes that deploying metaphors of taste reflects that the eighteenth culture of taste was “a particular
manifestation of that public sphere” (24). Gigante thus connects the discourse of physical taste as it appears in print culture with the subjectivity of private individuals who make up the public sphere. The “creative power of taste” is thus both “a trope for aesthetic judgement” and a force that has an “essential role in generating our very sense of self” (2). In *The Temporality of Taste* (2012) James Noggle makes the related argument that taste is once a social (produced over time) and an individual (produced immediately) phenomenon.

Gigante’s analysis of the intersections between literary, culinary, and aesthetic metaphors of taste from the mid-seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries also informs my approach to cookery texts as a generic record of taste in transition, as does her focus on the ways taste is constructed differently by different genres, such as poetry and philosophy. She continually emphasises the importance of the gustatory as a defining concept for eighteenth century conceptions of taste, arguing that the eighteenth century Man of Taste was required “not only to be tasteful, to exercise taste in the form of critical discernment, but to express himself tastefully and make his taste available in positive printed form for a public of consumers” (51). Gigante suggests that the tasteful subject should engage with both production and consumption. I use these models to help me examine how the cookery mode constructs embodied systematic practices of taste for readers in cookbooks, as well as in philosophy, poetry, and novels. By working with these theoretical models, I track how the tastes written into cookbooks and other genres in the cookery mode might have impacted readers’ concepts of their self and relationship to culture.

My dissertation traces the evolution of the cookery mode and the discourses of taste that emerged from and alongside it through four chapters in two main fields from approximately 1660 to 1760: first, its operation in print culture, the separated-out domestic, and the public
sphere and second, its formal and ideological diffusion and transformation in cookbooks and other print genres. I read the print networks in which the cookery mode circulated, and trace the way theories of taste and cookery moved between public, private, and intimate spheres. I also correlate notions of embodiment to the concept of taste as it evolved through the first half of the eighteenth century. While my chapters are divided chronologically, the divisions are suggestive and determined by theme rather than strict dates. The first chapter outlines the transformation of the public sphere as conceived by Habermas; the cookery texts of Hannah Woolley, who published works between 1661 and 1674; and the cookery books’ relationship to the changing status of domesticity theorised by McKeon. My second chapter details emerging empirical ideas of taste in cookery books, philosophy, and periodicals: it documents the shift in British national taste from of aristocratic spectacle to one of embodied judgement from about 1700 to 1730 and shows how the effort to conceive of a distinctly British taste produced significant points of overlap and contention in the three genres. Chapter three focuses on the ways cookery texts engaged with public debates over the relation between gender and taste, and the resistance to that model of engagement outside of the domestic realm in the 1740s and 1750s. My fourth chapter, in which I discuss works from the 1740s to 1770s, will show how the problem of identifying a taste standard, as put forward by Hume and taken up by other philosophers, is resolved in part by the systems in tastes constructed in cookery books, and the resulting division of the theory of taste from the practice of taste. I will focus my reading of cookbooks on five authors who address issues of taste, writing, publicity, and domesticity in a deliberate and thoughtful way. Although elements of the transformation I outline appear in many other texts, Hannah Woolley, Mary Kettily, Hannah Glasse, Ann Cook, and Martha Bradley are the most self-conscious about
the fact that they are participants in a cultural debate about the origins, qualities, methods, and standards of taste.

In order to understand how cookery constructed taste within culture, I begin by considering the sites where discourses of cookery operated. Tracing the shift from manuscript recipe collections, which circulated within families, to printed texts which circulated more widely, I examine the cookery texts of Hannah Woolley as a way to understand how this generic transition relates to the transformation of the public sphere described by Habermas, and the related separation-out of the domestic sphere theorised by McKeon. Habermas defines the bourgeois public sphere as a “zone” in coffee houses, in salons, and in circulating periodicals, among others, where individuals could debate ideas and establish shared opinions. This idealised public sphere, however, was facilitated by the supposedly autonomous subjectivity of the private and intimate spheres. McKeon’s work expands on the characteristics of the intimate sphere more specifically, as a conceptual and physical location roughly equal to what he terms the domestic. McKeon proposes that at the same time as the public sphere was becoming distinct, and a divide between public and private realms was becoming more absolute, the domestic realm was becoming a sphere separate from both, autonomous in its own right though not economically independent. The domestic, he argues, becomes a place of explicit intimacy and subjectivity.

The social spheres Habermas and McKeon define are important to my reading of Hannah Woolley, because she is writing about and in a domestic that is not yet separated out. The way in which she discusses subjectivity and personal tastes, then, is linked to the spatial and conceptual qualities of her domestic zone. Woolley’s works, The Ladies Directory (1661); The Cook’s Guide: or, Rare Receipts for Cookery (1664); The Queen-Like Closet (1670); The Ladies’ Delight: or, a Rich Closet of choice Experiments and Curiosities (1672); and A Supplement to
The Queen-Like Closet (1674) present cookery as embodied and integrated into daily life. This characteristic of her work is pre-modern in the sense that Woolley does not distinguish between the public, private, and intimate. Her writing offers a concept of taste that is manifested in its local practice, and reflects what McKeon describes as the domestic embedded within its larger community. She constructs taste as local and embodied. As Sarah Pennell has argued, manuscript cookbooks passed down within families often claimed to exposed secret knowledge, concepts McKeon associates with the pre-modern domestic (“Perfecting Practice” 237). However, in cookery’s transition from familial manuscript to repetitive, standardized print versions, that type of taste separated from its locality in communities of shared knowledge. Taste emerges from the daily practice of domestic labour, and is lived and material. As such, in Woolley’s formulation of taste there is no separation between the aesthetic and the bodily aspects of taste. Throughout her texts Woolley gestures towards an emerging public realm and a separation out of domesticity even as she promotes an undifferentiated construction of taste. This is especially clear when Woolley’s own texts are compared with the ‘forged’ Woolley by her publisher Dorman Newman which represented the domestic sphere as more sequestered. Cookbooks like Woolley’s gained authority through their connection to a manuscript format where textual circulation was within private social networks, an intimacy somehow waylaid in a print culture where Woolley complained about substandard plagiarism and appropriation of her work: her publisher printed modified versions of her works without consent (Lehman 49). Despite their domesticity, however, recipe books are still circulating texts: Woolley’s works both look back to a more intimate genre and anticipate the cookery mode’s emerging publicity that brings embodied taste into the public sphere.
My second chapter will examine the eighteenth century movement away from the classical philosophical distinction between mind and body (and senses) towards a developing idea of embodied aesthetic taste, and the ways in which the cookery mode is part of that transformation. Cookbooks like The Queen’s Closet Opened, originally published in 1655, and continually printed until 1713 and T. Hall’s The Queen’s Royal Cookery, published from 1709-19, exemplify a type of taste that was aristocratic, continental, gendered male, and decidedly not embodied or subjective. These court cookery texts emphasise spectacle, presentation, and pedigree rather than physical taste. However, cookbooks such as Mary Kettily’s 1714 A Collection of above Three Hundred Receipts in Cookery, Physick, and Surgery move away from French, court-influenced cookery to locate taste in the domestic bourgeois body. While the aristocratic male chefs wrote texts that construct taste as cosmopolitan and a performance of its own elegance, Kettibly re-situates taste against this formula, reflecting a larger shift from a performative model of taste to an epistemology of sense-based discernment. While the aristocratic model of taste can be imitated and replicated, an empiricist construction of taste depends on an individual’s subjective engagement with what she tastes. I argue that, beginning with Locke’s 1689 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and his thesis that ideas are created through the senses, the empiricist idea that knowledge emerges from sensory engagement is part of the transition from the court-cookery model to a more subjective conception of taste. This individual idea of taste is what enters the public sphere in the form of cookbooks like Kettily’s, as well as in works like Swift’s 1704 Tale of a Tub, Steele’s Tatler (1709-11), and Addison and Steele’s Spectator (1711-12).

In this chapter I also show how philosophical works, cookbooks, poetry and periodical writing address ideas of subjectivity and tastefulness by way of overlapping interests in the
cookery mode. In their analyses of the mechanisms of taste, early empiricist philosophers such as John Locke and Francis Hutcheson regularly locate the foundation of aesthetic judgment in the physical body, specifically in the tongue and palate. For example, Locke continually returns to the tasting senses throughout his writing to note the way in which humans understand their world through the senses. But for both philosophers, however, taste was also a form of higher judgment, a civilizing and socializing force with its genesis in the body but with significant moral and even political effects beyond purely physical discernments or distinctions like sweet and bitter. Yet, after Locke, philosophers continued to employ metaphors drawn from the cookery mode to show how this taste was produced via the individual’s engagement with things he consumed. In particular, I focus on the idea that taste is a quality that can be refined to an ultimate goal of discernment or ‘relish,’ a term used by Locke’s student, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury. His *1711 Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, uses taste as one of its fundamental paradigms and both bodily and aesthetic taste as media of refinement or corruption. Shaftesbury takes up Locke’s description of immediate taste sensation of sweet or bitter and applies it to an instinctive aesthetic and moral sense. Interrogating taste in this way uses sense-based empiricist knowledge to theorise a reflexive and individual aesthetic judgment. The palate itself sometimes becomes the site of not only reflex judgment but also reflective discernment though its ability to become either refined and morally superior or gluttonously indiscriminate and morally suspect. Just as empirical philosophy criticised courtly taste, cookbooks like Kettilby’s pick up on this critique to reformulate cookery on an empirical model, foregrounding the taste of the cook herself over a model of taste like the aristocratic chefs. In doing so, I will argue, she positions her writing in the category of public taste. Similarly, in the periodicals *The Tatler* and *The Spectator*, Joseph Addison and Richard Steele
brought these concepts of individual taste to the public sphere, and used both empiricist models and the cookery mode to do so. Kettilby’s cookery book refers to Steele’s *Tatler*, and that reference, along with her emphasis on her readers’ individual palates, indicates that she shares his desire to cultivate public taste.

My third chapter will discuss how these related notions of individual subjectivity and public taste within the cookery mode becomes complicated by issues of gender and the status of domesticity. The dynamic between public and private is integral to the way the cookery mode circulates and constructs taste. The chapter shows how the cookbook, a genre that in Britain is both authored by and gendered as female, counters bounded public and privates and public, counterpublic, and intimate spheres. Cookbook authors bring intimate, domestic, and personal taste into the realm of public opinion and print culture. I argue that cookbook authors sought to cultivate forms of taste within the feminized ‘intimisphere’ to rival those of the masculine private sphere (as Habermas defines it) and thus to problematise the idea of a separated-out domestic. The intimacy of cookbooks enhance their ability to promote individual and subjective tastes, while the genre’s public intrusions create collective, public tastes. Yet this movement between spheres was contentious: the cookbook authors Hannah Glasse and Ann Cook present opposing views about the roles of the cook and mistress of the house in the public sphere. Glasse and Cook replace the embedded and embodied taste of the late seventeenth century present in Hannah Woolley, and the aestheticized modelling of taste in the early eighteenth-century court cooks, with a textually mediated conversation in the public sphere. Both authors are acutely aware of the fact that their (public) domestic readership is now thoroughly integrated into new standards of taste and genre. I use theories of the counterpublic as described by Michael Warner and Nancy
Fraser to analyse cookbooks’ position as distinct from but not necessarily directly opposed to dominant (male) culture.

The idea of counterpublics complicates Habermas’ idea of a single public sphere in the eighteenth century and the idea that the boundaries between intimate, private, and domestic spheres were rigid. By virtue of their association with the domestic, and their female authorship, cookery texts are already not part of dominant discourse. The public/private dichotomy associates public with masculine and private with feminine: as such, Glasse’s presence in public taste discourse is necessarily counterpublic, as is Cook’s satirical critique of Glasse. Yet Hannah Glasse’s 1747 *The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy*, the most successful cookbook of the century, explicitly locates its subjective ideal of taste in public print culture. Glasse is self-conscious about her form, noting that she is choosing simple diction in order to provide cookery for that is easy to follow, and critiquing the complex court-cookery methods that limit the ability of female cooks to participate in taste. Despite her stated goals of universal reader access, however, Glasse still suggests that the mistress of the house, rather than a hired cook, is the reader whose taste subjectivities are being cultivated. Glasse’s claims to public taste construction were attacked by Ann Cook. Cook’s 1755 *Professed Cookery* appears to be trying to reclaim the genre, directly confronting Glasse both in verse and in a lengthy essay criticising her recipes in detail for their ingredients, methods, and audience. Cook’s text, I argue, suggests that Glasse cannot participate in the public sphere proper, and because of cookery’s domestic and gendered associations, is a transgressive counterpublic. Yet Cook’s work, which tries to re-establish the embodied and local tastes of Hannah Woolley, still must participate in the public print culture that the cookery mode is now part of.
My final chapter explores how a domesticated and empirical idea of taste becomes formalised by the cookery mode distinct from but also in relation to the emergence of aesthetics as the discipline devoted to taste’s cultural and social functionality. In the wake of technological advances in agriculture and print, which made production and reproduction both easier and more mechanical, aestheticians like John Gilbert Cooper, Edmund Burke in his *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, (1757) and Alexander Gerard began to treat taste as a formal discourse of judgment completely separate from material practice or purely physical experience. But it was David Hume, especially in his 1757 essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” who directly addressed the problem of taste’s status within the public sphere: as the conflict between Hannah Glasse and Ann Cook demonstrates, society is too full of individual judgments and cultural differences for a standard of taste, be it physical or aesthetic, to be finally determined. Glasse and Cook’s disagreement about the extent to which women producing taste in the home could participate in public conversations about taste exemplifies the public sphere as a zone of debate. Rather than providing a forum where collective standards could be formalised, the flourishing of subjectivity in the public sphere prevented consensus. The final transition I observe in the transformation of taste in cookbooks is a separation between taste as judgement or theory and taste as physical and material, or practice. I argue that this shift from standard to system and the division of labour that resulted from it were in part helped by cookbook authors who made disciplinary divisions between the practice of cooks and the theory of philosophers.

The separation between theory and practice also lead to the creation of systems of taste reproduction that would enable practitioners to duplicate certain individual tastes appropriately in spite of their potential individuality. Rather than determining a standard of taste, discourses and ultimately systems of taste were created to order and structure taste. Clifford Siskin has
argued that the system was the most important genre for knowledge production in the eighteenth century. Understanding taste as an aesthetic or philosophical concept became the responsibility of expert philosophers and gentlemen. Cookery, by contrast, entirely eliminates the subjective interpretation of taste and even the participation of the female cookbook reader who, in previous iterations, had constituted its consuming subject. Cookery books like Martha Bradley’s *The British Housewife* (1756), Sarah Phillips’ *The Ladies Handmaid: or, a Compleat System of Cookery*, (1758) William Verral’s *A Complete System of Cookery* 1759, and Catherine Brooks’ *The Complete English Cook; or Prudent Housewife* (1765) provide systematic instructions for their readers. The text’s systems externalize internal judgment through their imagined material objects (tasted food), eliminating the element of subjective taste judgement from cookery. In this respect, cookbooks become manuals of reproduction that barely consider or assume different subjective individual tastes, in much the same way that art manuals become tools of practice distinct from the discourse of aesthetics. In his 1752 *The Analysis of Beauty*, for example, the artist William Hogarth outlines an aesthetic system for artists to reproduce.

I then discuss Adam Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), Henry Home, Lord Kames’ *Elements of Criticism* (1762), and Kames’ later agricultural manual, *The Gentleman Farmer* (1776). These works reinforce the division between theory and practice, and suggest that judgement comes from knowledge and observation. Smith asserts that the world of production is systematically divided into tasks, but that understanding the system as a whole is the purview of philosophers. Similarly, Kames describes the gentleman’s theoretical and managerial responsibilities in discerning systems: in *The Gentleman Farmer* the gentleman of refined taste and scientific expertise oversees the farm while the lower-class labourers employ his methods. The transition from standard to system overwrites the relationship between material and aesthetic
taste production. As a result, cookery books are no longer a genre that participates in the cultivation of taste.
Chapter 1: Hannah Woolley and the Practise of Taste

During the second half of the seventeenth century cookbooks began to appear in the form of printed single-author texts rather than handwritten manuscript compilations. Manuscript compilations authored by women and passed down through families over generations were used as source texts by authors to create works for printed publication (Appelbaum, Lehman, Pennel, Sherman). This chapter will examine an early example of the way cookery writing, particularly cookery writing by women, changed in the late seventeenth century. This change influenced the changing definitions of taste over the course of the eighteenth century. In her Restoration-era works the prolific Hannah Woolley, one of the first authors to publish a printed cookbook and the first female author to put her name on a title-page (Lehman 41), offered a philosophy of taste that looked ahead to the new world of public, authorial cookery even as it looked back to an older mode that emphasized the importance of domesticity in daily life. Writing in and shaping a developing genre, Woolley negotiated her position as an author and practitioner in her texts by looking both backward to manuscript tradition and forward to the printed texts. She situates her model of taste and cookery in an embodied and undifferentiated domestic space. The embedded locality of Woolley’s taste practice, as described in her works, is characteristic of a pre-modern

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4 In “Rhetoric and Epistemology in Early Printed Recipe Collections” Robert Appelbaum sees manuscript cookery texts as a rhetorically persuasive documents connected to oral tradition. Gilly Lehman identifies the origins of many recipes in printed texts in manuscript collections. Sandra Sherman outlines some of the domestic manuscript antecedents to early modern printed cookbooks in the first chapter of Invention of the Modern Cookbook (2010), highlighting the ways in which the often close knit communities of manuscript cookbooks produced personalized manuscript collections, and how printed texts used generic features of these manuscript collections in order to bolster their authority (1-16). In Perfecting Practice? Women, Manuscript Recipes and Knowledge in Early Modern England,” Sarah Pennell complicates Sherman's assertions by arguing that manuscript authority was achieved, in part through continued practice. Pennell observes that manuscript texts often functioned as dowries, and in addition to facilitation the exchange of domestic information, were “a crucial medium of female association, conversation, and friendship” (242).
realm that does not distinguish between public, private, and intimate spheres in the way that will become standard in the early eighteenth century.

To make sense of how Woolley negotiated an early-modern intimate sphere of manuscript circulation and the emerging public sphere mediated by print publication, I will survey the formulation of public and private in English society and print culture during the period as described by Jürgen Habermas. Habermas does not devote extensive space to the dynamics of the intimisphere, a subdivision of the private sphere often associated with the domestic, so Michael McKeon’s work on the ways the intimisphere and private become distinguished from the public will help me trace the intricacies of the private/public relationship in the eighteenth century. By doing so, I seek to illuminate the ways Woolley’s writing both anticipates and challenges the dynamic relationship between taste, print, and publicity in the eighteenth century.

1.1 The Public and Private Spheres

In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1963), Habermas defines the eighteenth century public sphere as a space where, bolstered by print culture, private bourgeois citizens could discuss literature, politics, and public affairs to create what became known as public opinion. These discussions often occurred in meeting spaces such as the coffee house. Habermas writes that by 1710 London already had 3,000 coffeehouses, and “Just as Dryden surrounded by the new generation of writers joined the battle of the ‘ancients and moderns’ at Will’s, Addison and Steele a little later convened their ‘little senate’ at Button’s [coffee house]... as in the salons where intellectuals met with the aristocracy, literature had to legitimate itself in these coffee houses” (32-3). Within physical locations like coffee houses, and literary spaces like
printed journals, this collectivity of ideas fostered an arena for debate and opinion formation about self, nation, literary criticism, and, my primary concern for this study, issues of taste.

Habermas models his conception of the public sphere on the social structures of the Greek city-state, where the sphere of the \textit{polis} was distinct from the sphere of the \textit{oikos} (household). In this configuration, it was (male) citizens’ “private autonomy as masters of households on which their participation in public life depended. [...] Status in the \textit{polis} was therefore based upon status as the unlimited master of an \textit{oikos}” (3). However, Habermas argues, as the market economy replaced household economies, and private religion replaced State religion (through the Reformation) “civil society came into existence as the corollary of depersonalised state authority. Activities and dependencies hitherto relegated through the framework of the household economy emerged from this confinement into the public sphere” (19). As a result of this shift, Habermas notes, starting in Britain in the middle of the seventeenth century “public” becomes a concept that replaces “world” and “mankind” (26). The bourgeois tradesmen and their gentle patrons become the bourgeois, a “reading public” (23) of reasoning (male) subjects who constitute “a sphere of private people come together as a public” (27) separate from the sphere of public authority, the State (‘police’) and Court. Divided from this sphere of public authority is the public sphere of politics and of letters and the reading public, which is further distinguished from a private sphere with an imbedded intimisphere.

The idealised bourgeois public sphere described by Habermas exists not only in coffeehouses but is “formed in the theatres, museums, and concerts” (43). Yet Habermas hypothesises that coffeehouses especially “preserved a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether” (36). The idealised public is not restricted to spaces outside the home, however, although homes are, in practice, less
inclusive arenas. For Habermas the architecture of the domestic dwelling in the eighteenth century created a public space within the home: “the family room became a reception room in which private people gather to form a public” (45). The dynamic between intimacy and publicity in a single zone reflects the symbiotic relationship between the two. Indeed “The sphere of the public arose in the broader strata of the bourgeoisie as an expansion and at the same time completion of the intimate sphere of the conjugal family. Living room and salon were under the same roof; and just as the privacy of the one was oriented toward the public nature of the other, and as the subjectivity of the privatised individual was related from the very start to publicity, so both were conjoined in literature that had become ‘fiction’”(50). Habermas’ public sphere is an ideal space of conversation in which there is no status, in contrast to the home in which status persists, although in practice rank was preserved on the public sphere. Paradoxically, the public sphere is modelled on the conversational dynamic of the domestic.

Both the public and imbedded private zones within the home are spheres where the experiences of the individual is paramount, because “the public’s understanding of the public use of reason was guided specifically by such private experiences that grew out of the audience-oriented subjectivity of the conjugal family’s intimate domain [intimisphere]” (Habermas 28). Habermas then posits that “the subjectivity originating in the intimate sphere of the conjugal family created, so to speak, its own public” (29). This indicates that experiences of subject and

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5 In *The Social Life of Coffee: The Emergence of the British Coffeehouse* Brian Cowan discusses how, although the public sphere of the coffeehouse theoretically eliminated distinctions of rank, in practice this “was not meant to promote social ‘levelling,’ as many of the early detractors and modern historians of the coffeehouses have assumed, but it was rather a means by which the genteel manners of the new metropolitan ‘town’ were to be distinguished from what were perceived to be the excessive and stifling formalities of the past” (102). Markam Ellis observes that “The polite coffeehouse of Steele’s *Spectator*, as was apparent to all Londoners of the time, was not a real place. Even his own examples furnished him with ample evidence that coffeehouse society did not actually cohere with this utopian vision. It was always an argument, and an idea, not a reality” (*The Coffeehouse: A Cultural History* 203).
audience within the intimisphere are the foundation of those in public. The intimisphere is, for Habermas, a model for the public, and each layer of increasing publicity is always reflecting back on the dynamic forged in the private. Even as Habermas makes these distinctions, however, he does not always clearly delineate between public, private, and intimate spaces.

At the same time, though, conceptions of the private and the public in the eighteenth century are for Habermas enmeshed with both public opinion and print culture, and with the construction of the modern subject. Habermas opposes this emerging bourgeois publicity to a private sphere of “audience-centered subjectivity” (28), which he further distinguishes imperfectly from an ‘intimisphere’ of domestic feeling, commonly gendered female and opposed to the male public sphere. Bourgeois publicity can be (and very often is) opposed to the broad category of the private, which is further subdivided by the domestic ‘intimisphere.’ Habermas argues that in the eighteenth century, “the ancient meaning of ‘private’—an inevitability imposed by the necessities of life—was banned, or so it appears, from the inner region of the private sphere, from the home, together with the exertions and relations of dependence involved in social labour. To the degree to which commodity exchange burst out of the confines of the household economy, the sphere of the conjugal family becomes differentiated from the sphere of social reproduction” (28). While the public sphere reflects characteristics of the private sphere, and the private sphere characteristics of the intimisphere, they are still separate realms. The subjectivity

Jeff Weintraub outlines four major ways of distinguishing between public and private in his chapter “The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction,” delineating Habermas’ distinction as attempting “to use the public/private distinction as a dichotomous model to capture the overall pattern of social life in a society—as opposed to using one or another version for specific and carefully defined purposes—are always likely to be inherently misleading... this, just as the ‘public’ realm (and politics) cannot be reduce to the state, the realm of social life outside the state (and its control) cannot simply be identified as ‘private’” (15).
of the intimisphere, for example, is both familiar and familiar, while the subjectivity of the private sphere is directed towards an audience of others.

Habermas’ text does not examine the intimisphere in detail, but because the intimisphere becomes so closely associated with cookery, it is crucial to map its position in relation to the public and private sphere in order to understand how cookbooks constructed taste. Michael McKeon’s work on domesticity in this period provides a useful way to understand the ways in which cookbook writing functioned in a transitioning cultural landscape. In *The Secret History of Domesticity: Public, Private, and the Division of Knowledge*, McKeon examines the concept of privatization from the English revolution to the rise of the domestic novel at the end of the eighteenth century. The category of the domestic is central to McKeon’s argument. McKeon conceives domesticity as a type of privacy that is sometimes, but not always, a subcategory of privacy, roughly equivalent to Habermas’ intimisphere. He proposes that “if the modern separation of the public from the private is the division of knowledge,...the coalescence of the category of domesticity is perhaps its most visible and resonant expression” (xx). As the private subject becomes the basis of public opinion, the domestic sphere nurtures private subjectivity. Domesticity, as McKeon defines it, “can only make sense as separate from the public,” (xxi) and, he argues, public and private only become separate, and conceived of as such, in modernity.

McKeon’s narrative of the modern division between public and private begins with the same concept of the subject that Habermas uses to explain how individuals operate in publics. For McKeon subjecthood emerges from the English Revolution, and the ‘devolution of absolutism.’ By the devolution of absolutism, McKeon means the process by which, after the English Civil Wars and the execution of Charles I, the kingdom could be understood as separate from the king and the state disembodied from the monarch. Consequently, the state and subject
become separate because the patriarchal family can no longer be analogised with the patriarchal state. This movement from being subject to an authority to being self-reflexive “is like the separation of the knowing subject from the object of knowledge because it involves an experience of detachment, an awareness of oneself as a singular entity over against the context of one’s customary and taken-for-granted embeddedness”(McKeon 12). Taken-for-granted embeddedness, a pre-separate private/public state, is the degree to which an individual is embodied within and indivisible from his or her community of home, profession, and state. McKeon asserts that the movement from embedded to ‘separated out’ or disembedded is the process through which individuals are able to cultivate subjectivity. He uses the term ‘separated out’ to emphasise the shift from public and private as distinct from one another to separate from one another, dividing what had previously been conceived as parts of a whole.

In addition to noting the effect of the Revolution on public and private divisions, McKeon, like Habermas, observes the influence of Protestantism (the devolution of the Pope’s absolutism), and especially Puritanism, on the new privacy. He argues that “Puritanism made conscientious self-scrutiny central to salvation, providing modernity as a model of how authority might be identified, through interiority, as authenticity” (35). Direct and personal access to the Bible in Protestantism underscored individuals’ liberty and private self-government, and thus strengthened their sense of subjective interiority. The combination of the rise of Protestantism and the devolution of absolutism results in a delineation between public and private and a separated-out domestic realm. McKeon extends the public/private split to the following cultural constructs: the estate is bisected into the public state and the private estate; religion into

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7 McKeon borrows the term “disembeddedness” from the sociologist Anthony Giddens’ 1991 text *Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Giddens uses the term to describe how modern social practices are shaped by contexts outside the local.
institutional/cultural religion and individual/ personal belief; subjecthood into subjection to another and autonomous subjectivity; knowledge into external sense impressions and internal creative imagination; and finally the individual into the indivisible/collective and the independent/singular. Each of these pairings separates the economy and the family from the state and enhances individual subjectivity.

Within the separated out category of the private McKeon proposes further categories. For example, while the family and the economy are both ‘private’ in contrast to the state, “conceived in relation to each other, however, the household and the economy provide a paradigm case of the opposition between the public and the private” (McKeon 170). This is in part because as the national economic model moved away from domestic and agrarian bases, there was a “concomitant withdrawal of women from work deemed economically productive,” (170) further privatizing the home 8. And housework, even though it might be labour, is unwaged and therefore can be deemed unproductive. McKeon also notes that separating work from housework demonstrates how marketplace ideals become part of the values of civil society as a whole (180). The gendered extra-economic status of the domestic home, despite the reality that female housework is necessary for the economy, further divorces it from the public. In addition, the home is also separated into public and private through the Habermasian ‘salon’ that acts as a medium to “channel the discourse of the private realm to the greater realm of the public” (111). As a result, the division between public and private sphere is physically mapped on the space of the home in locations defined as public (the salon) and private (the kitchen).

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8 The withdrawal of women from economic work has been disputed. Amanda Vickery explores some of the types of labour women participated in within and outside of the home and with and without their husbands in in *The Gentleman’s Daughter: Women’s Lives in Georgian England* (1998). Vickery’s later *Behind Closed Doors: At Home in Georgian England* (2009) details the practice of housewifery using primary sources such as letters and household inventories and account books.
McKeon draws from his trajectory of separation a theory that domesticity “is evidently not only a social but simultaneously an epistemological practice” because “the separation out of domesticity transvalues it from a means to an end, from an instrumental signifier to a self-sufficient signified within which formal domestication may proceed (or such is the promise) with augmented efficiency” (327). The result is that the public becomes an empirical, disinterested and non-local “mode of judgment,” (342) in other words, the space of the subject rather than subjectivity. The public sphere provides subjects the opportunity to transcend the local and the private in order to participate in “common knowledge” (McKeon 342). Thus, McKeon concludes, the only way for women to participate in the public sphere from inside the domestic is “by partaking in the [idealised Habermasian] public sphere of reading and writing published texts” (466). Craig Calhoun concurs that “anyone with access to cultural products—books, plays, journals—had at least a potential claim on the attention of the culture-debating public” (Calhoun 13) but also observes a problem with a (non-economic) domestic point of entry: it replaces the “critical activity of public discourse by a more passive culture consumption on the one hand and an apolitical sociability on the other” (23). The perceived passivity also leads to a perceived lack of agency for both women and the domestic. Genres considered domestic, such as children’s books, conduct books, cookbooks, and novels authored by women, even though they address public concerns, are separated out from the space of the subject even as they circulate through public print culture.

In order to recover the process by which public and private become thoroughly separated, McKeon pays special attention to the status of privacy, and specifically domestic privacy, before it becomes a detached category. The ‘secret history’ of domesticity that McKeon constructs in his text is what he describes as the “‘prehistory’ of that category before it emerges, as either a
term or an idea, in the modern usage with which we are familiar” (xx). This history is ‘secret’, in part, because it is what McKeon describes as tacit rather than explicit knowledge. He defines tacit knowledge as traditional knowledge that is so culturally embedded that it becomes a part of everyday culture and daily life (xix). As a result, tacit knowledge is not as open to examination because of its embeddedness. In contrast, explicit knowledge, because it is able to be separated out, is able “to separate itself from its object of knowledge sufficiently to fulfill the epistemological demand that what is known must be divided from the process by which it is known” (xix). It is important to note that this transition from tacit to explicit ways of knowing requires the newly-separate private to inform a public realm that can only exist as a result of private subjectivities (324). The pre-modern private, still under the influence of absolutism, does not acknowledge the existence of a modern ‘subject’.

Because I aim to trace the transformations the cookery mode undergoes in the eighteenth century, and the ways that transformation is informed by changes in the dynamics of publicity, privacy, and domesticity, I also want to start with the ‘prehistory’ of the cookery mode. Yet, in my perspective the lines between these public and intimate domains are not as clear as McKeon describes. In cookbooks printed between the Restoration of 1660 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the period McKeon identifies as the beginning of the separating-out of the private, the domestic intimisphere is still embedded within its larger community. In this pre-modern construction, I see the domestic as a category that encompasses the activities of daily life centred on the home. Even as the domestic begins to become separated out, however, there is still contamination between public, private, and intimate. The intimisphere Habermas identifies is a domestic sphere, but one, I argue, more narrowly associated with individual subjectivities and less with the care of body and home. The bracketing of the intimate and domestic zones
Habermas and McKeon identify, and the terminology they use to identify each, are particularly indistinct and overlapping in the cookery genre. Cookery is a type of labour that becomes explicitly private, domestic, and gendered, but, in early printed cookbooks, does not yet display the bounded characteristics of privacy. Rather, the labours of domestic life, including medicine, sewing, and serving, along with cooking, are distinct from public life but not yet a separate category. The texts of Hannah Woolley illuminate the positioning of a cookery mode in transition from a tacit to explicitly private function of daily life.

1.2 From Manuscript to Text

Hannah Woolley was the most published author of the late seventeenth century (Lehman 48). A domestic servant to an aristocratic household renowned for her medical skills, Woolley lived from approximately 1622 and died around 1674 (Consindine, Hobby Virtue of Necessity 166-7). She wrote five cookery books covering a diverse range of household practices that were encapsulated in the not-yet-separated-out domestic. Woolley’s texts are *The Ladies Directory* (1661, rpt. 1662); *The Cook’s Guide: or, Rare Receipts for Cookery* (1664); *The Queen-Like Closet* (1670, rpt. 1672, 75,81,85); *The Ladies’ Delight: or, a Rich Closet of choice Experiments and Curiosities* (1672), a compilation of her previous works; and *A Supplement to The Queen-Like Closet* in 1674 (rpt. 1681, 84). The range of topics Woolley’s texts cover becomes more expansive over the course of her writing career. Her earliest text, *The Ladies Directory*, is her shortest and most narrowly focused work, as it covers only preserves, confectionary and a selection of healing waters, while her later texts, specifically *The Queen-Like Closet* and its later *Supplement*, are both longer and more varied in scope. Three texts often attributed to Woolley, *The Gentlewoman’s Companion* (1673 rpt. 1675, 82), *The Accomplish’d
Ladies Delight (1675), and The Complete Servant-Maid (1677), are unauthorized texts based on her published works. The most blatant of these unsanctioned works is The Gentlewoman’s Companion, subtitled A Guide to the Female Sex. It has her name on the title page but was apparently printed from her manuscript without her knowledge by her publisher Dorman Newman (Lehman 49).

Hannah Woolley’s texts were written in a pre-modern realm. The intimisphere represented by Woolley displays the taken-for-granted embeddedness (McKeon 12) of this realm in its undistinguished presentation of her profession and the genre of cookery. Woolley constructs a type of taste that is local and embodied. As such, in Woolley’s formulation of taste there is no separation between taste as desire and taste as function, or between the aesthetic and the bodily aspects of taste. I argue that this integration emerges from Woolley’s textual proximity to manuscript cookbooks, her locality, her characterization and evaluation of her own professional practice, and her emphasis on embodied health. Nevertheless, throughout her four (non-compilation) texts Woolley gestures towards an emerging public realm and a separation out of domesticity even as she promotes an undifferentiated construction of taste. This is especially clear when Woolley’s own texts are compared with the ‘forged’ Woolley9 and with the work of her contemporary Robert May, both of which reflect a more sequestered domestic sphere. Taste for Woolley does not emerge from her authorship as an arbiter of taste but is cultivated in the practice of lived domesticity.

Several scholars have addressed Woolley’s writing, although none have focused on her works in the context of the shifting status of the domestic. For example, Jennifer Summit has

9 Although the second edition of The Gentlewoman’s Companion printed with Woolley’s consent by a different publisher is identical to the first unauthorized text (Lehman 49), the narrative voice differs so greatly from her other texts that I would argue, in agreement with Elaine Hobby, that it is not reflective of her taste ideology.
argued that the epistolary models Woolley provides in her final text, *A Supplement to The Queen-Like Closet*, which discuss household service, produce a “rhetoric of property” (203) that constructs the household as a centre of writing and civility, and illustrate the dynamics between various household servants. Lynette Hunter describes Woolley’s texts as capitalizing on the popularity of household manuals from the 1640s on (“Books for Daily Life”). Margaret J.M. Ezell has recently written on the illustration of Woolley, and the various texts attributed to her, arguing that the construction of an author during the 1660s and 70s is the result of complex and varied relationships between authors, publishers, booksellers, and readers, and Wendy Wall touches on Woolley in her article on the connection between literacy and early household writing (“Literacy and the Domestic Arts”). Julia Reinhard Lupton characterises Woolley’s cookery instructions as “shelter writing,”¹⁰ that brings secrets of judgment and intuition from the *oikos* to a public audience, but I seek to question the degree to which Woolley’s writing sees the domestic as a sequestered zone. The most significant contributions to scholarship on Woolley have been by Elaine Hobby, who provides a detailed bibliography and textual history in her 1989 *Virtue of Necessity: English Women’s Writing 1649-88* and her 1995 chapter “A woman’s best setting out is silence: the writings of Hannah Woolley.” In both, Hobby compares Woolley’s own works to the unauthorized and publisher-authored text. Hobby notes the focus of early twentieth century authors on the text Woolley claims she did not write, and attributes it to a desire to construct Woolley as a model of feminist education. My focus, however, is the ways in which those differences indicate Woolley’s conception of the domestic sphere.

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¹⁰ She borrows this term from Susan Fraiman, who uses it to describe the escape or shelter domestic space can provide against a threatening outside world.
Habermas argues that the rise of print culture and resulting access to printed materials was one of the catalysts for the development of the public sphere. McKeon gives print greater primacy, seeing it as the “very mechanism by which the tacit is made explicit,” (49) and therefore the medium that disembeds the public from the private. The transformation of handwritten recipe collections to printed books, Robert Appelbaum similarly suggests, created a public language to “regulate and supplement the language of food” (3). Hannah Woolley’s texts, while printed, display elements of the pre-public hand-written manuscript genre, as was common for cookery books in the mid seventeenth century (Lehman 41). Organized around grouped but randomly ordered recipes, her texts “suggest that Woolley simply transcribed a manuscript collection, perhaps her own, perhaps belonging to one of her employers” (Lehmann 48). Interjections and self-reference typical of a familial manuscript are present throughout her texts. Her works thus occupy a liminal position between manuscript and print, remaining connected to the traditional knowledge of manuscript collections assembled collectively over generations at the same time as they display characteristics of modern and explicit knowledge. Woolley’s cookery books are printed books that are still characterized by the tacit privacy of the family manuscript cookbook.

The way Woolley’s conceives her role as an author is informed by the intimate nature of the manuscript collection in addition to the locality of her practice and reputation. Although Woolley does not provide her own autobiography until A Supplement to The Queen-Like Closet, her final text, her presence is evident well before she relates her history. Elaine Hobby notes Woolley’s characteristic erratic style when comparing her style to that in the counterfeit The Gentlewoman’s Companion, commenting that
it is impossible to predict when an issue of moral or political significance might surface in her text, to know when it will be moved on from, or to decide whether this interspersal of practicality and ethics is the result of authorial strategy. The result, which comes increasingly to characterize Woolley’s later books, is that readers find themselves encountering observations about gender division, or about poverty, or about the meaning of language, or about the lives of women and of the author in particular, in between or in the midst of instructions about the proper running of home and family (“A Woman’s Best Setting Out” 191).

The form itself exemplifies the interpenetration of the domestic before its separation out from public life. What seems to be Woolley’s authorial meandering is essentially typeset marginalia in a still formalizing genre. The transition from manuscript to print was not always one way: Gilly Lehman has proposed that the manuscript collection of Rebecca Price (1660-1740) “shows how receipts circulated from manuscript to print and back to manuscript; in other words, printed cookery books simply reproduced on a larger scale the established mode of transmission of new receipts. Exchanges between manuscript and print were not entirely in one direction, and each enriched the other” (47). Wendy Wall observes that “early modern noblewomen, gentlewomen, schoolmasters’ [as Woolley was at one point] and merchants’ wives… avidly wrote, read, annotated, cited, and exchanged recipes as part of daily life” (“Literacy and the Domestic Arts” 396). This practice likely did not disappear with the presence of printed texts. Readers were potentially inserting their own marginalia into the text and transcribing recipes into their own collections, inscribing the text into their own writing (as well as cooking) practice. Thus the readers’ intimisphere included both the production of food and the reproduction of text.
Printed cookery books like Woolley’s gained authority in part through their connection to a manuscript format where texts were circulated within private social networks. Sandra Sherman characterises manuscript cookery books as a “gated communities” in which “domestic knowledge is shared and preserved among individuals who know, or know of, each other, and can be trusted to know whereof they speak” (“Printed Communities” 37). This type of intimacy is potentially lost in a printed text, as the personal connection between author and reader is mediated at greater distance. This remove could mean that printed recipes could potentially be fraudulent, a reality that Woolley encountered. As I will discuss, she complained about substandard plagiarism and appropriation of her work in her final text, describing her treatment by her publisher as “abuse” (A Supplement to The Queen-Like Closet 94). Even with the distancing potential of print, however, Sherman argues that printed household management and recipe texts still attempted to adapt and extend the community of manuscript collections (38; 39) This type of community building is evident in Woolley in the way she emphasises her local labours and resulting reputation as a trusted practitioner. Her status as an author is secondary to her practical contributions. In each of her texts Woolley characterizes herself as a reliable, tested practitioner in all aspects of household management. In her first work Woolley is careful to contrast the recipes in her cookbook, which are taken from her “own Practice”, with the recipes of other writers who take from the “credit of others” (Ladies Directory A2). Here Woolley foregrounds her first-hand knowledge based on personal domestic experience over any type of print-based authority.

11 Despite her complaints, Woolley herself borrows verse about fishing (Ladies Delight 124) that previously appeared in Thomas Barker’s Barker’s Delight: The Art of Angling (29: 1653) to embellish her section on salmon.
Woolley’s texts recall the locality of manuscript communities through the elements of repetition and copying present in how the cookery books themselves get used. This is because a cookery book reader literally copies and reproduces what she reads. As a result of its pragmatic function, the cookbook genre is, as Sara Pennell sees it, epistemological because recipes create culinary knowledge through practice. Pennell proposes that the reading practitioner becomes the temporary author of the recipe through her duplication of its teachings. In the transitional period between text and manuscript, she argues, “culinary publications, perhaps the most unprotectable of unprotected texts in a volatile print culture lacking effective copyright restrictions, gained authority through connection to a traditional format in which continued recipe circulation depended upon belief in shared social and intellectual credibility, but in which continual practice, rather than the circulation, was the primary means of knowledge authorization” (252). Woolley’s texts participate in this type of circulated and perpetually useful knowledge. Her first text, *The Ladies Directory*, contains “pleasant employment for both winter and summer” (*Ladies Directory* A3-4). The seasonal bills of fare Woolley provides are reproducible for generations, and suggest that there is and will always be, as she writes, a cyclical “time and a season for all things” (*Queen-Like Closet* 313). The back page of *The Ladies Directory* held by the University of Glasgow Library (see image below) has even been used by its owner like a family bible to record births almost one hundred years after its original publication.
Because of their perpetual and communal use, texts like Woolley’s are always partly pre-public. This is because, as Michael Warner argues, “in order for a text to be public, we must recognize it not simply as a diffusion to strangers but also as a temporality of circulation,” (94). Cookbooks are repeatedly atemporal. The element of recurring practice and implied teaching relationship is intimate and repetitive compared to temporalized outward circulation. Despite their intimate qualities, however, printed recipe books are also texts with a wider type of circulation than family manuscripts. In other words, Woolley is looking back to a manuscript genre at the same time that she is looking forward to a public form. Although her recipes can be perpetually reproduced, Woolley acknowledges that style and taste change: “there are new Modes come up nowadays for eating and drinking, as well as for clothes, and the most knowing of you all may perhaps find somewhat here which you have not already seen” Queen-Like Closet 340). Her recognition of the emergence of public opinion in print culture, her interest in what is
‘new’ (and therefore temporal), and her positioning of her text into a gap in general knowledge demonstrates how Woolley looks forward to a public readership.

Even in writing to a readership outside of her own community, the locus of knowledge in Woolley’s ‘printed manuscripts’ is in their successful reproduction rather than in Woolley’s authorship. Preparing recipes, not writing or reading recipes, is the site where knowledge is created. The preface to The Ladies Directory uses the word ‘practice’ repeatedly, referring to the labours of both herself and her readers and privileging actual production over the recipes themselves. Woolley makes sure to refer to the fact that her skills have been verified by people in her community and that her readers have the opportunity to consult her personally. She writes that she will publish another book if this one is “generally accepted on, as it is by those who know both me and my practice herein” (Ladies Directory A4), and that she is available for personal consultation by enquiring for her where the books are sold. Woolley concludes her introduction by asking readers to complete the community of reproduction, “beseeching you all to try the reality of my Endeavours, by your Practice herein” (A5). In the introductory letter to general readers in her second text, The Cook’s Guide, she references the “Promise, that if [The Ladies Directory] found Acceptance” (A6) she would publish a follow-up text. The acceptance has been achieved through “trial of my first” (A7), again implying a network created through repeated labours. Woolley concludes The Cook’s Guide with a similar missive connecting credibility to practice: “I hope you will say I am better than my word; for here are two hundred very good Recipes added to what was before; I pray practice them carefully, and then censure or esteem” (101). Here she both emphasizes the role of the reader in knowledge authorization, and suggests that though her text is printed, it still maintains the open-endedness of a manuscript compilation that is added to over time.
Despite the practice and community-based elements of her texts, Woolley’s move from manuscript to print does in part involve notions of emerging publicity. The cookery genre’s evolution from a family manuscript model to a printed model results in a self-consciousness about style and taste in writing and cooking, features suggestive of the influence of public opinion. She links these qualities and associates both with good cooks, who “aught ... to have a very good Fancy: such as one, weather Man or Woman, deserves the title of a fit cook” (Queen-Like Closet 333). After following her advice, her readers will ideally possess these characteristics. Her fit cooks are both male and female, and, in contrast with male-authored recipe collections intended for professionals, her works adapt complex and costly dishes for a larger and more diverse readership (Lehman 55-6). Woolley explains that her recipes are written so that they will not be “confounding the Brains with multitudes of words, to little or no purpose, or vain expression of things, which are altogether unknown to the Learned as well as the ignorant: This is really imparted for the good of the FEMALE SEX” (Queen-Like Closet 157). At the same time as she looks backward to intimate communities of cooks, Woolley suggests her text is also for an emerging female reading public who look to authorial models outside of their own networks.

Woolley suggests both a pre-public reading community and a proto-public audience in her cookbooks. This gesture is evident in the development of paratextual materials from her first to her second text. Woolley’s addition of introductory materials to her second work implicates a less localised characterization of readers. Her continuation of The Ladies Directory, The Cook’s Guide, is specifically addressed to “Ladies and Gentlewomen” on the title page, and is dedicated to her employer, Lady Anne Wroth. While The Ladies Directory has no dedication, and only a short introductory epistle addressed “To all LADIES AND GENTLEWOMEN” (A2), The
Cook’s Guide has the dedication to Lady Wroth, an introductory letter to the daughter of the woman her text is dedicated to, and another letter to “all Ladyes and Gentlewomen in general” (A6). Woolley acknowledges the additions in her general letter: “The reason why I sent it amongst you without the Protection of some Noble Person, was, because I would not seem to force a Favour altogether undeserved; but since it is so generally accepted on, as I find it is, I hope you will rather Commend than Blame my Modestie” (A7). Outside of Woolley’s pretensions to modesty, her first text is written in a way that seems to assume that she is writing to a community that can actually consult her personally, and will accept her word that she “had the Honour to perform such things for the Entertainments of His late Majesty, as well as for the Nobility” (Ladies Directory A2-3), a phrase that is also repeated on the cover page under Woolley’s name. In The Cook’s Guide, Woolley’s name is listed alone, presumably because her name would now be recognised, but also because her connection with the Wroth family signed by the dedications can stand in for her status in the community. Woolley's good taste is both sanctioned and located within this community.

1.3 Class, Value, and Labour

One of the implied audiences in The Cook’s Guide is upper class ladies who will learn how to teach their servants rather than cook themselves. In the introductory letter to Lady Wroth’s daughter, Woolley asserts that “it is a miserable thing for any Woman, those never so great, not to be able to teach her servants” (A4). Robert Applebaum suggests that with this type of claim Woolley is positioning her audience in “a kind of surveillance that, apart from the vicarious pleasures it afforded, put one in more control over food practice, though at an imaginary remove from actual cooking” (10). The reader is located in an intimisphere that is both
secret (with private knowledge of the intimacies of the kitchen) and on display within the intimate realm (to an audience of servants), anticipating the audience-oriented construction of subjectivity that Habermas argues is crucial to the formation of the public sphere. Woolley’s stated aim indicates a wider conception of housework as a type of knowledge that permeates every sphere of existence. As a result, Woolley does not distinguish between upper and lower-class readers: every class of woman requires forms of tutelage appropriate to her circumstance. For Woolley and her readers, educating and managing others is a central part of domestic labour. When cookbooks begin to be aimed mainly at servants themselves, as I will illustrate with my case studies of later cookbooks, the type of audience that Woolley is addressing will change. Michael McKeon sees this audience transition from upper to lower class, which also includes a transition to solely female audiences, as marking cooking’s “devolution to the domain of the private and the female” (487). He proposes that “the history of cookbooks provides a case study in the productivity of the gendered division of both labour and knowledge. The category of housewifery was first conceived and published as a subcategory of husbandry and thereby seen as part of the province of estate management. With social mobility and urbanization, cookbooks began to be separated out from this general province toward the end of the sixteenth century and directed at a female audience” (486). Woolley’s late seventeenth century cookbooks have still not fully undergone this transition, as her domestic is not thoroughly privatized and separated out from public knowledge. She can address a wide-ranging audience because her intimisphere is still imbedded in the wider community.

Woolley’s prefatory letters exemplify the way her readership is constructed as both a real-world community and as a group linked through text rather than familiarity (a reading community). Her modes of address suggest both an intimate and what is beginning to be a
separated and self-conscious relationship between Woolley and her reader and between her reader and the reader’s servant. The discourse Woolley uses to address her reader recalls the oral exchanges and personal annotations that would have been part of education in household management before the printed cookbook. Sandra Sherman proposes that printed domestic texts in the early eighteenth-century “marketed themselves by adapting—indeed extending—ideas of community, imparting a sense that (like the manuscripts) they would insert readers into a community, ‘a context’ relevant to readers' lives” (“Printed Communities” 38). Many of Woolley’s recipes repeat phrases that immerse the reader in the text. For example, the phrases “as you please,” “when you think it is enough,” “if you will,” and “what else you please” act as refrains throughout her works.

For Woolley, then, cookery is a continually refining and improving process that happens in the practice of the cook herself. This is similar to the way the cookery genre functions: both Sherman and Sarah Pennell observe that the epistemology of ‘recipe’ implies reciprocal exchange. Sherman notes that “the idea of recipere—to give and receive, to act communally—organizes these texts as collective, gratefully received testimony; as such, each text imparts value to recipere in the domestic lives of its reader/writers” (“Printed Communities” 38). In the same vein, Pennell proposes that “recipes are the ultimately fluid text, through which practice can be constantly refined, but in which form the reproduction of actions can never be perfected. Indeed, the Latin root of recipe in recipere, to receive, embodies the mobility of the information carried by the text” (239). The ‘openness’ of Woolley’s texts promote an engaged relationship between reader and author that is both intimate in its second person directive to reveal “choice secrets” (Ladies Delight A3) and, even in its audience of many ‘yous’, directed to a community rather
than a public. Repeated practice in the text is always intimate compared to any outward observation and circulation.

Later, however, Woolley writes texts that suggest progress towards the modern privatization of her genre, or its ‘devolution’, however much they are still pre-modern. The full title of her third text, *The Queen-Like Closet; or Rich Cabinet: Stored with all manner of RARE RECEIPTS*, published in 1670, nearly ten years after her first, implies that her recipes offer clandestine knowledge, a ‘secret history’. McKeon theorises that the allusion to a closet references the publication of Charles I’s private letters in 1645, a collection titled *The King’s Cabinet Opened: or Certain Packets of Secret Letters & Papers, Written with the King’s own Hand* (482). This publication, McKeon argues, highlighted the separation between Charles I’s public and private identities, such that “the public cabinet of state secrets devolves into the private absolutism of the epistolary self” (483). *The King’s Cabinet Opened* gained a companion text in 1664 with *The Queen’s Cabinet Opened: Incomparable Secrets in Physic, Chyrurgery, Preserving, Candy, and Cookery*. The text was published while Henrietta Maria was in exile, and was purported to be based on her private papers. (McKeon 486). McKeon observes that Hannah Woolley was almost certainly inspired by its publication when she released her own *Queen-like Closet*, and suggests that the ‘closeting’ of contents implied through the titles of both texts distances domestic from general knowledge (487). By locating its contents in a material and secret site within the home, the title of the text makes the author’s promise to initiate the reader into a private space of household secrets explicit. McKeon suggests these titles signify a key moment in both the devolution of domestic cookery from the public to the private domain and the gendering of domestic labour as female. In *The Queen-Like Closet*, Woolley dramatizes the transgressive revelation of knowledge the text apparently offers, along with the personal
connection usually required to gain it, when she remarks that “I am blamed by many for divulging these Secrets, and again commended by others for my Love and Charity in so doing” (341). By implying that transferring information from a community to a reading public via print reveals secrets, Woolley does in part garrison her genre in the intimisphere.

The separation out of the domestic resulted not only in its labour being gendered female, but also defined as unproductive, because even when waged it was not part of the public economy as it did not involve products for trade. As a result, the productive economy of the market is defined as public while the unproductive economy of the household is defined as private (McKeon 179). As an author writing during the period where the domestic is becoming disembedded, and earning money from texts about household labour, Hannah Woolley defines the value of her own work in relation to the locations of its practice. By quantifying her labours, Woolley asserts the productive value of domestic worth at the same time as she does not characterize it as private. She builds her own authority in the emerging print culture through her references to her material practice in her community. Woolley leverages her skills for status and remuneration, describing her exceptional domestic labours while petitioning the reader to provide her with income to continue them. Woolley solicits her desire for domestic teaching employment and makes earning money an open concern throughout her works. While she published five different texts and continued to write until her death, the twice-married author produced cookbooks mainly during the times she was widowed (Considine). The timing of Woolley’s publications to periods when she was without the financial support of a husband suggests that earning money was one of her main motivations. As a result, Woolley’s texts illustrate a complex relationship between labour, knowledge, and income, one whose public value is informed by the intimacy of the exchange. For example, when she lobbies for
employment, Woolley associates private tutelage with a higher level of both skills acquisition and earning potential that she argues can not be achieved through a simple reader/text relationship.

Woolley’s commentary continually accords a higher worth to her practice than her writing. This implies that her value is added to by employing her skills rather than through writing. Her status is not achieved through authorship. She is explicit about the connection between her direct transfer of knowledge, labour, and financial compensation multiple times in her text. Woolley weaves specific price quotations for her in-person domestic instruction throughout her recipes, for example 40s to teach preserving, where she includes asides about how much better her instruction would be in person. For example, in A Supplement to The Queen-Like Closet she proposes her availability as a tutor, claiming

I have set down every thing as plain as I can; and I know there are many who have done things very well by my Books only: but you may imagine that if you did learn a little by sight of my doing, you would do much better; For if my Pen can teach you well, how much better would my Tongue and Hands Do? ... So that in my opinion you would not lose by having some personal Acquaintance with me; neither would I willingly lose my time and labour in informing you: Therefore I beseech you let it be thus;

Be pleased to afford me some of your Money;

And I will repay you with my Pains and Skill (45).

Woolley highlights and elevates the exchange through her use of genre, writing in verse to emphasise the relationship she desires. Her use of metonymy to refer to her didactic text (“my Pen”) while she references her tutelage in synecdochical terms (“my Tongue and Hands”) suggests a hierarchy of body over text and a closer association between the body, oral
transmission, and domestic skill. Her writing is unable to adequately represent the material labour of her producing, consuming, and teaching tongue and hands.

While Woolley’s public writing has earned her an income, in this instance, and many others, she privileges intimate domestic tutelage over her pedagogical text and attaches a higher economic value to direct communal exchange. The result is that her reader is both distanced from her instruction because she is only a reader, yet invited into her confidence as a potential student, even if that is not a feasible possibility. This is the type of authorial strategy that brings aspects of family manuscript collections into printed texts. Woolley implies that knowledge is located in the author’s and readers’ own practice of the recipes, not the text. Sarah Pennell has argued that “the validity of the early modern recipe is only partly dependent upon the authority of the person who originated it, and who could once been said to own it, [so that] such recipes had to be constantly used, in order to be validated” (“Perfecting Practice” 238). Woolley is able to maintain her authority over her reader, however, by foregrounding her actual preparation of the recipes over her printed transmission of them.

Woolley claims ownership of the exchange value of her domestic labour and knowledge in a way that shows the shifting fiscal worth of housework. For example, in her Supplement to The Queen-Like Closet, which appeared after the publication of an unauthorised text bearing her name, Woolley directly criticises her publisher for his theft, quoting the selling prices of texts to support her argument that her intellectual work should have earned a profit. While transitioning between instructions on how to decorate a chimney with greenery in the summer and a section on female conduct, she takes the time to describe how she was wronged, and assert possession of her writing: “I will never disown what I do Write, nor am I willing to own what I write not” (93). She mentions her previous advice to young ladies, and her hopes to expand on in it further in her
next book, sold to Newman for 1s and sold by him for 2s 6d. She further claims that Newman prevented her from suing him and did not treat her fairly, so she makes sure to “let all People know that I was abused in that his late printed Book” (94). By placing her complaints before her section on proper behaviour (specifically that of parents to children), Woolley underlines the public, moral dynamics of intellectual property at the same time as she locates this morality in the home. By providing prices, she claims her own value at the same time as she shows how it is exploited in the market. Woolley is clear about her earning potential, this time connected to how she is perceived by readers rather than by those in her own community.

Despite her valuation of her writing, throughout her works Woolley constantly reminds her reader that her text only substitutes for the real labour of instruction. These interjections act to validate her recipes by giving them a defined worth and by connecting them to her own physical practice. At the same time, however, they undermine her written advice by elevating personal tutelage over textual knowledge. Woolley's idea of taste exists on the border between two conceptions: one built on public notions of authorized tastefulness and one built on familiarity and community. The public circulation and printing of recipes differentiates taste as a category of judgement detached from the practice of taste Woolley values in the domestic. Typical of her focus on the material over the textual, she suggests that her advice is at its most valuable and reliable not in print, but in an intimate exchange. By attributing the monetary value of her text to her labour within the household, Woolley makes it clear that her work, and the text itself, is not yet part of a separated-out (and thus unwaged) domestic. As McKeon observes, “the gendered division of labour... is a classic and seemingly clear instance of the ideological distinction between public and private—in this case, between public work and private labour. In this system, as many feminists have noted, gender, labour, and publicness are so closely aligned
that they seem synonymous” (37). Yet, in addition to her own insistence of the value of her domestic service, the dedication to Woolley’s second text seems intended to contradict the idea of female labour as non-work because it is within the domestic. In The Cook’s Guide Woolley writes that she has “sent forth this book to testifie to the scandalous World that I do not altogether spend my Time idely” (A2). She argues that her labour within the household should be seen as valuable, although because of its significance to a successfully run household, not because it is public. She argues against the idea that domestic work is a separate category of labour because of its location. The publication of her book acts as a testimony that her occupations constitute work, but although her text advertises her skills, its appearance in print does not make them public. It rather implies that domestic labour has always been a part of everyday life that should not be segregated or devalued. Woolley attempts to establish that her domestic labour is work, and renders all of her labours, especially her personal instruction, worthy of monetary compensation and therefore, in her construction, both valuable and encompassing her taste ideals.

1.4 Medical Secrets

Woolley’s own valuation and reputation as an author doesn’t come from the selling prices of her texts, but through her success as a practitioner, measured through her status in the community. In each of her texts Woolley characterizes herself as a reliable, tested practitioner in all aspects of household management. Good taste, for Woolley, is thus related to the value or utility of practise in the home. In her first work Woolley is careful to contrast the recipes in her cookbook, which are taken from her “own Practice”, with the recipes of other writers who take from the “credit of others” (Ladies Directory A2) and possibly from reading rather than doing.
Here Woolley foregrounds her first-hand knowledge based on her personal domestic experience over any type of print-based authority.

A central part of her practice-based status comes not from what constitutes modern domestic activities, but from her medical labours. Much in the way that the pre-modern home interpenetrates its community, Woolley does not recognize distinctions between her advice on cooking and her advice on healing. In the same way, cookery and medicine are not separate disciplines, nor do they require separate genres. Indeed, “the bulk of the inclusions in receipt or household books [manuscript collections] reflect broad culinary, medical, and other domestic interest” (Pennell “Perfecting Practice” 240). There is no difference between eating and health, as both are needed to maintain the body. As such, a sense of a subject-reader who eats according taste is absent, as the body that needs food to live takes precedence.

All of Woolley’s texts contain medical as well as culinary recipes. Her medical receipts range from cures for freckles and consumption in her first text (Ladies Directory 21) to prescriptions to stop bleeding and aid childhood rickets in her Supplement to The Queen-Like Closet 26). The formal result is that the interwoven medical content and her own asides throughout remain a key feature through all her texts and read as privileged invitations into a circle of knowledge. Given both her own training in medicine (she describes herself as a physician and a surgeon rather than a midwife or healer), which she outlines in her final text, and the standard presence of cures in household manuscript texts, her probable source, Woolley’s material is consistent with her genre and experience. What is notable, however, is that her most comprehensive account of her authority as a practitioner comes from her portrayal of her talent in medicine (as opposed to simply healing) rather than the tasks like cooking and sewing that would become part of the bounded domestic. Woolley describes her medical education as part of
a larger autobiography she provides in *The Supplement to The Queen-Like Closet*. She published this work as an addendum to the original text, but also, as she states, to reassert her own identity as a reliable practitioner after the fraudulent text was published.

Woolley provides detailed biographical information about herself in this work (her fifth and last), for the first time, demonstrating an increased awareness of the impact of reputation and personal history on her new public identity as an author. She does this, however, at the same time as she foregrounds her local notoriety and labours by providing anecdotes of her medical practice. Woolley perhaps writes her own story in depth for the first time in response to the history ascribed to her in Dorman Newman’s unauthorised *The Gentlewoman's Companion, or a Guide to the Female Sex*. When read in concert with Woolley’s response, the falsified text exhibits more characteristics of both modern print culture and a domestic that is clearly separated from the public realm. As such, Newman’s construction of Woolley as an author, his categorization of her skill set, and structural organization points to the ways in which print facilitated the emergence of public, private, and intimate as categories. Woolley’s answer to Newman, in the form of her *Supplement*, resists the narrative of author as arbiter of taste and domestic knowledge as ‘secret’.

Although Woolley published the *Supplement* as an add-on to *The Queen-Like Closet*, the contents of which she describes as ‘secrets,’ supporting McKeon’s thesis of the separating-out domestic, she retreats from classifying knowledge this way in the *Supplement*. Woolley’s supplemental response suggests that, in her own formulation, domestic knowledge is not yet detached from public knowledge. The *Supplement* begins with verse, a genre, unlike domestic manuals, associated with the emerging public sphere as well as private writing. Her poetic prelude not only condemns Newman but also describes her position as a writer. Woolley
explicitly identifies her readers as female, and then reminds the reader about her original work while clarifying her relationship to its contents:

LADIES, The last I sent unto your view,
The Queen-like Closet I presented you;
And in it such rare Secrets I may say,
In no Book you will find (though read you may.) […]
My study was to impart to others free,
What God and Nature hath informed me. […]
Servant to Ingenuity I’ll be,
Such Ladies shall command all Arts from me.
Nothing from them I’ll hide that’s in my heart,
To wait on them I think it is my part (A2).

In her verse Woolley alludes to the negotiation between secret and shared knowledge that her writing makes. While still describing the contents of *The Queen-like Closet* as revealed secrets, Woolley stresses that her mission to share her knowledge is a service to others. By doing so, she implies that while her field is moving into a category of separation, the information she is conveying is essential and therefore should not be ‘hidden’ knowledge. Here, as in all of her writing, even though her audience is gendered, she defines her work as everyday (embedded) pragmatics rather than the purview of the hidden and intimate. Woolley reemphasises this in her epistle to the reader, which begins by summarizing the contents of the preceding text, condemns the idea of domestic secrets. She remarks that while “Some are of the mind that they value nothing but what is *far fetcht, dear bought, or hard to be had*, and will rather prize those things which are kept secret, though if known, are but simple,” (A4) her own instructions will make
information clear. Woolley’s use of italics indicate that while she does employ the convention of recipes as transgressing secrecy (cf. Sherman “Whole Art” 116) in earlier texts, she does not, in fact, see her texts as participating in the transition from tacit to explicit knowledge.

Along with discussing how she transmits knowledge, Woolley uses the metaphor of service multiple times in her opening verse to describe her writing process. By doing so she again characterises her authority as practice-based rather than text-based. Her lines “To boast, to brag, tell stories in my praise/ That’s not the way (I know) my Fame to raise” (A2) seem to be a direct response to the authorial Woolley created in The Gentlewoman’s Companion. Dorman Newman’s version of Woolley is a highly gendered authoress writing in a narrowly domestic genre. The author’s biography created for The Gentlewoman’s Companion, as Elaine Hobby observes, “more closely resembles the conventions of romance than those of autobiography” (187) in its embellished and elaborate phrasing. For example, the Companion’s biographical section details her prowess in needlework, music, and reading, and how Woolley “learned hourly courtly phrases and graces, so how to express myself with the attendency of a becoming air” (Companion 13). While Woolley does have a connection to nobility, describing how at seventeen, she “had the fortune to belong to a Noble Lady in this Kingdom [Lady Anne Maynard] till I Married, which was at twenty four years” (Supplement 8) her own description of her education focuses on her domestic and medical skills. Her own works also describe their audience as both ladies and gentlewomen, or in the case of The Queen-Like Closet, “all Ingenious Persons of the FEMALE SEX” (title page), not differentiating between upper and lower class readers, while Newman’s appears to focus on a more upper-class readership. The lack of distinction that Woolley herself makes between upper and lower class readers illustrates
the degree to which she views her tutelage as mutually necessary and unstratified. Woolley is not a private, professional subject, but rather a practitioner who provides assistance as needed.

Woolley’s successful practice and its tangible results serve to testify for her authorial pedigree. Her own autobiography contains a detailed description of her medical practice. *The Supplement to The Queen-Like Closet* summarizes both her training and experience in medicine. Woolley relates that she learned medicine from her skilled mother and sisters, adding to her knowledge with information from books, and from male physicians who attended her mistress. She combines unwaged and familial female knowledge with professional and waged, male knowledge. Woolley describes how, from age seventeen to twenty-four, she had her mistress’ “Purse at my command to buy what Ingredients might be required… she procured such knowledge for me from her Physicians and Chirurgions… and also bought many Books for me to read, that in short time… I soon became a Practitioner” (*Supplement* 8). In her texts Woolley always links her medical and domestic writing back to her occupation, emphasising that the advice she give has its basis in her own household experience. By doing so, Woolley grounds her writing in the everyday pragmatic of a domestic realm that is not separate from daily life. She shapes her persona as an author as part of a local and personal narrative. Her text is authoritative because its author is engaged in the continual maintenance of both her own home and the homes of her community. She writes that “I have been Physician and Chyrurgion in my own house to many, and also to many of my neighbours, eight or ten miles round” (*Supplement* A5). By mobilising her medical skills to a wider geographical area, Woolley creates a community of homes centred around her own. Her ‘domestic’ text, even through its subtitle, *A Little of Everything*, thus affirms the ways in which, for Woolley, household labour is not yet a separated-out discipline. As well, by avoiding a more standard autobiography and structuring her own
around her receipts, she emphasises an atemporal narrative that is oriented both to her past actions and forward to the future action of herself and her readers.

In contrast, in the unauthorised *Gentlewoman’s Companion*, the biography provided alludes to medical proficiency but foregrounds other tasks. Most of Newman’s book concerns female conduct rather than medicine or even cookery, and sections such as “What qualifications best become and are most suitable to a Gentlewoman” (29), “Of the Gait or Gesture” (37), and “Of New Fashions” (62), come before the cookery and medical recipes. *The Gentlewoman’s Companion* concludes with sample letters and dialogues such that the recipes are literally ‘bounded’ by what McKeon refers to as a “proto-‘bourgeois’ gentility” that values “female idleness,” and where “women’s work was increasingly oriented toward ‘female’ accomplishments, while cheap wage labour did much of what had once been the inside work of wives” (177). This hierarchical divorce of public and private knowledge is clear in the introductory biography. Here the author proclaims: “the things I pretend greatest skill in, are all works wrought with a Needle, all Transparent works, Shell-work, Moss-work, also cutting of Prints, and adorning Rooms, or Cabinets, or Stands with them” (*Companion* 10). This claim is followed by a list that ranks preserving and banquet-setting above “making Salves, Ointments, Waters, Cordials; healing any wounds not desperately dangerous” (*Companion* 11). The statement of competency implies that the scope of Woolley’s medical practice is limited to minor tasks and does not infringe upon the duties of the (male) physicians that Woolley compares herself to in *The Supplement*. The shift in focus from medicine to needlework suggests that the publisher Woolley so maligns, Dorman Newman, is positioning his unauthorized text in the category of private domestic knowledge rather than the undifferentiated domestic pragmatics of
Woolley. As a result, Newman’s unsanctioned text concentrates on proper female conduct, along with the ‘non-productive’ (without market value) and gendered labour of food preparation.

In Woolley’s own telling her narrative is based on her skills rather than her person as in the unauthorised ‘autobiography’. She provides, for instance, a list of people she has cured so that the reader may “be pleased to take notice of what cures I have done, that you may be assured of my ability” (Supplement 8). She invites the reader to participate in the process of authorising through practice. Woolley’s material skills and the tested results of the recipes, cures, and domestic duties themselves become a recommendation. The Companion’s version of Woolley is a fable of pious and skilled womanhood. In contrast, the Supplement’s Woolley, while not less idealised, emphasizes the ministrations of her skills, not their acquisition. She writes her identity based on her private, actual labours, which, as well as her texts, become embedded in the community through practice. Even tutorials on needlework refer back to work she has actually done which, like her recipes for food, she brands as unique: “this kind of work I have wrought often... in all sorts of stitches... and many fancies which were after my own fancy, not at all to imitate others; for there is nothing I hate more, than to work as a child doth after a sampler” (Supplement 59). By critiquing imitation, Woolley indicates that she expects her readers to take their reading beyond direct imitation of her instructions to their own interpretive practice, thus becoming a part of the network she constructs.

Woolley’s emphasis on embodied experience is perhaps why, in her autobiography, she privileges her medical expertise above all other forms of domestic knowledge. In her earlier texts, medicinal cures are placed between and beside recipes for household care and food preparation, a receipt for consumption water following one for lemon syrup and glove perfume (Ladies Delight 19-20). While characteristic of a manuscript-transitional text, the organization
suggests that care for the physical body was a thoroughly integrated component of domestic management. In Newman’s version, the cures are clearly segregated by their own introduction and a conclusion that directs the reader to consult other (male authored) texts on botany and anatomy by doctors and scholars. Female knowledge in The Gentlewoman’s Companion has clear limits, and transmission of knowledge is textual and disembodied.

Woolley’s own administration of cures to the surrounding neighbourhood, as her testimony attests, involves a locality of circulation mediated through bodies before text. The “Several Women who had sore Breasts and sore Nipples, I cured”, the “Girl about twelve years of age being taken with a Lethargy... which in a few weeks I did perfectly cure”, and the “Cancer in the Nose I have cured” (Supplement 10;11;12) are all part of Woolley’s philosophy of health. She presents no boundaries between medicine, cookery, and other domestic arts, since each one is necessary to maintain a functioning body. Woolley states that it is “altogether as necessary that you should know how to keep your Bodies in health, to preserve your Eye-sight and your Limbs, as it is to Feed or Clothe your self” (Supplement 13). The lack of separation between recipes for remedies and recipes for dinners marries the tasting body with the healthy body. Woolley’s texts’ holistic treatment of the self emphasises the community of reader’s experience by making their physical body the centre of the text. This embodied materiality is the primary pre-modern quality of all of Woolley’s writing. If the modern social imaginary is “relatively disembodied, mediated rather than face to face, disembedded from the substratum of physical presence and practices,” (McKeon 107), then the social imaginary that Woolley is writing into is embedded, physical, and privileges face-to-face over mediated interaction.

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12 Michael McKeon borrows the term ‘modern social imaginary’ from philosopher Charles Taylor, who, building on the work of Jürgen Habermas and Benedict Anderson, uses it to define the collective understanding of common people within a society.
While Woolley describes her textual medical education as something that took place before she began her own practice, in Newman’s version the texts take precedence: “So I, when I was to write of Physick and Chyrurgery, have consuled [sic] all Books I could meet with in the kind” (A5). Similarly, the introduction to Newman’s The Gentlewoman’s Companion, bases the authority of the work by citation of textual sources. The writer attests

I will not deny but I have made some use of that Excellent Book, The Queens Closet; May’s Cookery; The Ladies Companion; my own Directory and Guide. Also, the second part of Youths Behaviour, and what other Books I though pertinent and proper to make up a Compleat Book… and to that end I did not only make use of them, but also of all others, especially those that have been lately writ in the French and Italian languages (A4).

This type of citation is at odds with Woolley’s recurring reference to her experiential knowledge base, and claim that her first work, The Ladies Directory, “though but little, containeth more than all the Books that ever I saw printed in this Nature” (A2). “May’s Cookery,” one of her supposed sources for Woolley, undoubtedly refers to Robert May’s The Accomplished Cook, or, The Art and Mystery of Cookery. May’s text, originally published in 1660 (the year before Woolley’s The Ladies Directory), went into five editions by 1685 and was the first major English recipe book released after the Restoration (Jaine). As a popular male contemporary, the contrast between May’s and Woolley’s cookery writing illustrates the extent to which Woolley’s taste is pre-modern. Like Newman’s forgery, May’s work looks to authority outside of the community practitioner.

The biography of May by W.W. that begins his text provides the particulars of his training in France and his employ in noble households. While Woolley also served and was
trained in a noble family, as I have described, her career after she married was much more varied. In his own preface May writes that “without my fosterage and bringing up under the Generosities and Bounties of my noble Patrons and Masters, I could never have arrived to this Experience” (A5). May’s training has provided him access to household knowledge; thus he will take care “that in the Book, as in a Closet, is contained all such Secrets as relate to Preserving, Conserving, Candying, Distilling, and Such rare varieties as they are most concerned in the best husbandring and housewifering” (A5). His allusion to his book as a closet, and his conflation of husbandry and housewifery in a text that governs the household proper rather than the entire estate suggests that May’s text has divided domestic from other knowledge. However, Sandra Sherman observes that in May’s Accomplished Cook, along with “the commonplace claim that the text is transgressive, disclosing closely held ‘Secrets,’ is a more original suggestion that the text (hence the reader) is self-sufficient; the reader can absorb culinary data without anyone around to make practical sense of it” (“Whole Art”116). Sherman sees this claim13 as a challenge to the system of apprenticeship that May was trained in, but I would also argue that it makes print, rather than in-person exchange, or even manuscript circulation14, the site of authority, a distinction that suggests he sees the categories of public and private as separate.

May characterises his taste as an archetype both of science and method and aristocratic male palate. He writes “it hath been my task to denote some new Faculty or Science, that other have not yet discovered; this the Reader will quickly discern by those new Terms of Art which he shall meet withal throughout this whole Volume” (A5). A poem by James Parry that precedes the

13 From May’s preface: “To conclude, the diligent peruser of this Volume gains that in a small time as to the Theory, which an Apprenticeship with some Masters could never have taught them” (A6).
14 Tom Jaine notes that Robert May worked for Elizabeth, countess of Kent, who compiled a medical and a cookery book (The 1653 A True Gentleman's Delight) from her household manuscript collections. May used her cookery book as a source for his Accomplished Cook.
recipes describes May’s instructions as engaging “Mathemcicks” and “Geometrick
Proportions,” (B) rules of taste based on formulae. The other poet who praises May, John Town,
reinforces this assessment when he describes May as “So universal… Italian, Spaniard, French,
he all outgoes/ Refines their Kickshaws, and their Olio’s” (B2). Rather than Woolley’s locally
embedded taste, in both his introduction and orderly, digression-free instructions, May typifies
himself as a cosmopolitan professional (he even claims that he is writing to testify to the
“Laudableness of our Profession” (A5)) who offers textual models for cookery and taste.
The boundless taste and undivided labour and the union of palate and health that characterise
Hannah Woolley’s cookery writing will begin to be replaced by texts that, like Robert May’s,
reflect the movement from generalised household knowledge to a “division and subdivision into
multiple categories of knowledge” (McKeon 3). May’s writing style and continental experience
are predecessors to the male-authored court-cookery books that will become a notable early
eighteenth century culinary standard. As well, in the public sphere, in correlation with the
separation out of the domestic, McKeon proposes, emerges the “the separation of the object of
knowledge from the subjective means by which it is known” (12). This “contractual detachment”
runs parallel with the philosophy of empiricism and “recalls the separation that grounds Locke’s
empirical epistemology” (McKeon 12). In my second chapter I will explore how, with the
formalisation of the categories of public and private and the disembedding of subject and object
in empiricism, cookery texts become a genre that promotes the development of subjective and
individual tastes. With the court cookery texts as a conversion point, taste transitions from
Woolley’s embedded and undifferentiated model to one that is distinguished and public.
Chapter 2: Mary Kettilby, Court Cookery, and the Philosophy of Relish

In 1714 Mary Kettilby published a cookbook entitled *A Collection of above Three Hundred Receipts in Cookery, Physick, and Surgery*. Published continuously until 1759 (Lehmann 96), Kettilby’s *Collection* was incredibly popular, mainly because, unlike those of her aristocratic male contemporaries, it provided clear, accessible recipes using readily available ingredients. The triumph of texts like Kettilby’s was to move cookbooks away from French, court-influenced cookery to locate taste in the domestic bourgeois body. They thus played a crucial part in the shift in the conception of eighteenth-century taste, as both cookbooks and empiricist philosophy reacted against a French model of taste as solely aesthetic by emphasizing individual subjectivity. In her preface, Kettilby carefully distinguishes her practice from that of chefs who work for the aristocracy: “the Directions relating to Cookery are Palatable, Useful, and Intelligible, which is more than can be said of any now Publick in that kind; some great Masters having given us Rules in that Art so strangely odd and fantastical” (ix). She wishes that, rather than preparing elaborate dishes, “Ladies would strive to adorn their characters by becoming (to use the judicious Mr. Bickerstaff’s phrase) Notable women” (vi). Kettilby’s distinction between “notable women” and “great Masters” suggests that her differentiation of aristocratic and domestic taste is also a distinction of gender. But her reference to Richard Steele’s *Tatler* indicates that she is writing, if not in the same genre as the male-authored periodical, then with the same intent: to cultivate public taste that goes beyond physical tasting. In this chapter I will show how Kettilby responds to the courtly male texts by cultivating a subjective model of taste within print culture.

The primarily aristocratic, male formulation of taste Mary Kettilby is re-situating taste against is exemplified in cookbooks like the royal chef Patrick Lamb’s *Royal Cookery; or The
Complete Court-Cook, published in 1710; T. Hall’s The Queen’s Royal Cookery, published from 1709-19; and Charles Carter’s 1730 Complete Practical Cook. Their texts sign their aristocratic connections both in their recipe titles and their history of consumers. Hall’s text includes receipts with a supposedly royal pedigree such as savoury broth “as it was made from the Queen on Mornings” (28) and small cakes “which are much esteemed at Court; the King himself hath eat of them” (43). Carter’s title page provides his qualifications as “Cook to his Grace the Duke of Argyll” and states that his recipes have been “approved by divers of the Prime Nobility”. Since Carter’s is a later text, he does advertise that the dishes are “fitted for all occasions”, but qualifies that that statement with the caveat that they are “more especially for the most grand and sumptuous entertainments”. His preface details his extensive experience as a cook for the nobility in the earlier decades of the century, and states that he provides illustrations so that “a Nobleman or Gentleman will be enabled at a View to pick and chuse what services he likes for any particular Occasion” (viii). Because their emphasis is on a discerning but performative and visual palate, these types of cookbooks highlight the result of their recipes, especially the elegant presentation, rather than the practical lessons in preparation and physical tasting that will begin to be emphasised by their (often female) successors. Rather than the “Rules in that Art”(ix) Kettilby accuses the court chefs of providing, her cookbook with provide guidelines that allow the reader to cultivate and refine her own taste.

Along with eighteenth-century empiricist philosophy, the new cookbooks construct taste as a cultural agent, in part by making cookery and food a site of mediation between personal taste and social standards. In his article “Textual Culture in the History of the Real” (2007), Clifford Siskin argues that the Enlightenment idea that the world could be known occurred in part because the physical circulation of printed books foregrounded the benefits of material
things over received ideas. Both cookbooks and philosophy about the senses are already mediating the real (food and physical tasting) through writing. Writing about taste then promotes subjectivity through the empiricist process of mediating the real through the senses. In the eighteenth century, cookery becomes taste’s key mode of and medium between self and culture. Cookery, then, is an aesthetic as much as a gastronomic mode. Terry Eagleton notes that “the distinction which the term ‘aesthetic’ initially enforces in the mid-eighteenth century is not one between ‘art’ and ‘life’, but between the material and immaterial: between things and thoughts, sensations and ideas” (13). But cookery, as both a practice and rhetoric, is the method that reconciled the sensations of tasting bodies with tasteful subjects and cultural agents. I propose that taste functions as an access point between individuals and culture, and that in the eighteenth century the idea of taste transitions from something to be observed and imitated to something that originates in the palate of the subject. Cookbook authors and philosophers employed the cookery mode in order to implicate bodily and sensory judgements in the creation of individual and then public tastes. As Denise Gigante argues, metaphors of physical taste are prevalent in philosophy not simply because they provide a useful comparison between gustatory and aesthetic taste, but because bodily taste has “an essential role in generating our very sense of self” (2). The cookery mode is thus uniquely suited to mediate between the two types of taste.

Beginning with Locke’s 1689 *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, and his concept that ideas and identity are created through the senses rather than innate ideas, this chapter will trace the early eighteenth-century movement away from the classical philosophical distinction between mind and body and towards a developing idea of embodied aesthetic taste in the first part of the century. I will examine how this idea is developed and disseminated through the cookery mode both in cookbooks and in philosophical works by Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville,
and Hutcheson. In addition to the way cookbooks and philosophical texts use the cookery mode, works such as Swift’s 1704 *Tale of a Tub*; Richard Steele’s *Tatler* (1709-11); Steele and Joseph Addison’s *Spectator* (1711-12), and Pope’s 1731 “Epistle to Burlington” (often referred to as “Of False Taste”) exemplify the interrelationship between cookery and aesthetic taste. The correlation of culture, society, and taste in these texts reflects the larger shift from a performative model of taste to an epistemology of sense-based discernment. The artificial taste of the aristocratic court cooks is challenged by the empiricist appeal to a subjective engagement with the world of sensations. Cookbooks like Mary Kettelby’s explore the possibility of mediating bodily taste through cooking in order to facilitate a judging subject who uses physical taste as a way to define their subjectivity.

In what way, though, is empiricist philosophy concerned with cooking or eating? Surely this is a fundamentally different concern from the “taste” that through the eighteenth century could become a by-word for aesthetic judgment and social civility. What needs to be stressed is that, in the texts I will discuss, the concept of taste that develops is often described as a civilizing and socializing force that has its genesis in the body. In order to analyse the mechanism of aesthetic judgment or taste, early eighteenth century philosophers regularly locate that power of judgment in the physical body, specifically in the tongue and palate. Denise Gigante proposes that by the eighteenth century the physical becomes a way to enter into the cognitive experience; this type of ‘embodied cognition’ becomes taste (6). She reads the “Enlightenment culture of taste” as a reaction against Hobbes’s *Leviathan* society governed by individual appetites or aversions where taste “would train this appetite into a metaphorical endeavour—a taste for this or that” (5-6). Even when eighteenth-century writers do not align bodily tasting with cognitive judgment, the evaluative aesthetic process is often defined as a sense reaction rather than
cognition, namely a sixth aesthetic and moral sense that ‘tastes’ beauty like it tastes sugar. This sense of beauty is sometimes extended to a faculty for evaluating both aesthetics and morals in an instinctive way. In addition, the palate itself sometimes becomes the site of not only reflex judgment but also reflective discernment: the palate is to become either refined and morally superior or gluttonous and morally suspect. This type of embodiment differs from the body implied in seventeenth-century cookbook authors like Hannah Woolley; while Woolley makes the body the unifying local site of taste, the empiricist body is detached from the local in order to become a site of judgment. The appeal in Kettilby is not to the local and physical community, but to the public through print culture: the tasting subject becomes a “Notable woman.”15 As well, in empiricism reflective bodily taste is distinguished from the cravings of appetite, but as Gigante argues: “aesthetic taste was at once instinctual and guided by certain fixed rules that taste philosophers set out to identify” (7). This chapter explores the ways philosophers used bodily taste in both sensing and evaluative ways as a paradigm of aesthetic judgement, and the ways in which cookbooks draw on their discourse to cultivate ‘readers of judgment’. In Woolley the subject of taste functions as a locality; the ‘cultivators’ of empiricist taste extract the body of the subject from the locality to make the body itself the site of a general, individuated judgement. For example, in Locke the tasting senses provide both evidence for and a way of theorizing the way in which humans understand their world through sensory experience. He portrays children as primarily tasting rather than thinking beings: they know even before they are verbal “the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter... that wormwood and sugarplums are not the

15 Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* theorises the way in which nations are conceived, in part, through the rise of literacy and print culture such as newspapers and the novel.
same thing" (65). Locke's assumption is that the sensual and embodied act of tasting is one of the primary experiences of the self, and that as such it provides a foundation of all understanding.

Locke’s student, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, extends the immediate taste sensation of sweet or bitter, or natural discernment, which Locke describes to an instinctive aesthetic and ultimately moral sense that is non-reflective. In his philosophy, gentlemanly ‘Shaftesburian’ taste is described as an inherently receptive and discerning quality. His 1711 *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* uses the metaphor of physical taste as one of its fundamental paradigms and both bodily and aesthetic taste as media of refinement or corruption. Shaftesbury breaks with Locke’s concept of epistemology as the central goal of philosophy and substitutes morals in its place. As a result, physical taste preferences and their aesthetics have moral implications. In Shaftesbury, bodily taste appears in two opposing ways: as gluttony or as relish. The drives of gluttonous appetite are in conflict with the development of the relish of a tasting and discerning gentleman. Unlike Locke’s categories of sweet and bitter, which are not moral or aesthetic oppositions, but ways of constructing knowledge, tastes in Shaftesbury can construct internal moral codes, and the goal is to refine tastes to a fine relish, a term that Shaftesbury uses to signify critical taste. Like Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson also explores the epistemological function of taste, positing that aesthetic taste is a universal sensory reaction to pleasing stimulus. His 1725 *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Idea of Beauty and Virtue* theorises an internal faculty of taste that is a “sense of beauty wholly different in nature from the cognitive external senses” (Dickie 123). In contrast to both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, in Mandeville’s 1714 *The Fable of the Bees*, good taste is what is economically rather than morally or aesthetically valuable.
Developing out of the model of inherent taste as exemplified by Shaftsbury and Hutcheson, the cookery mode begins to address eating as part of the act of self-definition and cultural location that occurs through the sense of taste. Specifically, the tasted aesthetic becomes a self-determining type of subjectivity. In this way, taste allowed subjects to mediate the relationship between their bodily and intellectual selves and culture (often print culture) at large. The evolution of the cookbook genre reflects the changing attitudes towards taste. For example, when Patrick Lamb’s *Royal Cookery* was issued in 1710 with an emphasis on court cookery, its aristocratic style was not as popular as Mary Kettilby’s 1714 work. Lamb’s court-cookery cuisine failed to gain the same audience reach as Kettilby, likely a cook or housekeeper, whose cookbook went through seven editions and was continually published for 45 years without any aristocratic pedigree. In contrast, Lamb’s work was only reprinted three times over 21 years (Lehman 96). As a reaction to the change in public taste, in 1716 Lamb’s text was amended to include new, less expensive recipes rather than sumptuous visual feasts. Lamb’s preface notes that the second edition will contain recipes for “private Gentlemen” rather than “Princes and Great Men” (3) and now tries to defend his work against “one or two peevish cynics” who see his work as promoting “Epicureanism” and an “Art of Gluttony” Still, even with the revisions his cookbook was not as popular as Kettilby’s text in which the subjective idea of the active utility of food takes priority over food's theatrical presentation.

It is important to note, however, that the relationship between the various ideas of taste that developed in the cookery mode was motivated by historical factors. These changing attitudes about taste were underwritten by the emergence of British nationalism in the period after the passing of the Act of Union in 1707, a nationalism that often asserted itself in opposition to France, as Linda Colley has argued: “after 1707 [the British] came to define themselves as a
single people not because of any political or cultural consensus at home, but rather in reaction to the Other beyond their shores” (6). In addition, in terms of food and the health of the nation, “Scandinavian countries remained liable to famine into the nineteenth century. So did France. [...] Most Britons [...] did not starve (Colley 38). When the excess of French-influenced courtly cookery is linked with starving Frenchmen, British taste seems doubly superior. David Simpson notes that "since at least the Restoration of 1660... the British national character had been defined chiefly in terms of its difference from the French" (64). In cookery more specifically, Lisa Wood has argued that “discourses around food construct and reinforce a form of patriotic nationalism” (616) and that “the popularity of English cookery books by women... reflects the growing dominance of bourgeois values from those of the luxurious ancien régime of French aristocrats and the revolutionary innovation that followed it” (620). In terms of taste, James Noggle’s analysis of writing about landscape gardening by Gilpin and Walpole suggests that both authors link the individual and experiential taste to “Britishness” and national identity (64-67). In this context of growing nationalism and anti French sentiment, however, I propose that the influence of empiricist thought and its relationship to the individual subjectivity is a major impetus of changing ideals of taste in cookery books. It is in this reaction to the type of gluttonous and disembodied taste associated with French tastes that cookbooks and philosophy meet.

2.1 Court-Cookery and Aristocratic Taste

The early eighteenth-century culinary landscape, as Lehman describes it, was polarised not only by aristocratic versus ‘domestic’ taste, but by gender as well: “during the years 1700-1730, two groups of authors rivalled each other: male chefs working for the aristocracy or for royalty, and women authors who were either housewives or cooks and housekeepers working in
gentry households” (81). T. Hall, Patrick Lamb, and Charles Carter are three male chiefs who exemplify the French-influenced courtly model. Their cookbooks describe a cosmopolitan taste that is centered in a performance of its own elegance, and aim to assist the reader’s imitation of that model.

T. Hall’s 1709 *The Queen’s Royal Cookery* attempts to differentiate itself from other cookbooks by suggesting that it contains only “Things wholly new and useful” rather than “old and antiquated Receipts,” (A2) a phrase that appears in Roman font in order to stand out from the italicized preface. The appeal to newness is theoretical rather than practical, as Lehman notes that many of the receipts were taken from other sources (92). What is evident, however, is that Hall is attempting to create an ideal of ‘new’ taste: his text is “wholly Modern” (A3) which he associates with “People of the highest Quality” (A2) and opposes to “superfluous Trifles” (A3). The new taste emphasised is French: readers learn to “Stew Beef the French Way,” (A3) “Collar Beef the French Way” (6) “Stew Pidgeons after the French manner” (14) “make a French pudding,” (34) “make Fritters in the French Fashion” (41), “Dress an Eel with Ragout, the French Way” (43) and serve “Veal the French Way” (71) among others. These types of receipts are differentiated from those that are more typically English, which provide no indication as to origin or are given titles such as “Eels baked the common Way,” (77) suggesting that it is the French receipts that make the text “wholly Modern”. Some receipts are also marked as coming from specific French chiefs who work for the “people of the highest Quality” Hall mentions in the preface. Hall gives instructions on how to “Pickle Capons like my Lady of P——’s French

Cook” (15) or make “Excellent Pies of Red Deer” such as those made by “Sir K—— D—— ’s French Cook” (22). These attributions position the culinary style within an aristocratic circle and imply that consuming the dishes is a way of virtually joining the court community, by participating in the trappings of luxury.

Hall’s text begins with a clear idea of what constitutes good taste in his new formulation, the true “ART of Cookery” (A2). He asserts that “Variety is the best grace of a feast, or the best way to please the most delicate palate” and that in his text readers will find “a different and pretty kind of Variety, to adorn several dishes” (A2). The idea of variety and delicacy are expressed visually rather than bodily: Hall’s cookery aesthetic conflates taste with sight. His text will allow the reader to produce “a different and pretty kind of variety, to adorn several Dishes” (A2). Variety is for adornment rather than flavour. Hall emphatically promotes French cookery and foregrounds the credibility of others (in name and pedigree rather than in physical tasting) over the individual palate of either the cook or the reader. Unlike Hannah Woolley, who emphasised her personal history through bibliography and relates her own practical experience to authorise her recipe, Hall relies on the authority of both nobility and the vogue for French cuisine.

By linking specific recipes to named individuals, either gentry or their chefs, Hall establishes a collective idea of taste that is also aristocratic and cosmopolitan. It is strongly influenced by the culinary practices of the European continent: although most of his references are to the French, he mentions Italy and Holland as well. Readers are familiarised with how to prepare a Turkey like Sturgeon or Brawn, my Lady C—— her way” (16), “Monsieur S. Ebremond’s Way of stewing Oisters,” (33) “My Lady H—— ’s way to make a Caraway Cake,” (42) “To make a good Cake as Sir K. D—— ’s Housekeeper made for him” how “My Lady M—
— boileth a Capon with White-Broth thus” (83), and “My Lord of St. Alban’s Way to boil Beef most tender and short” (93). He names the individual either in the title of the receipt or the beginning of the actual instructions itself, emphasising the lineage over the outcome. This appeal to authority supports the promise Hall makes in his preface to provide receipts that are “daily the Practice of every Nobleman’s and Gentleman’s kitchin, as well as Taverns, Eating Houses, and other Places” (A2) and implies that he is producing a model for taste that is practiced in the homes of the nobility and then disseminated and aspired to down the social scale.

The most pedigreed of the court-cookbook writers was Patrick Lamb, who was born in 1650 and began his career as an aristocratic chief at age 11, working for the Royal kitchen at Whitehall. His first position was the “youngest child of the pastry” at 12, and advanced through titles such as “child of the queen consort's kitchen,” “master cook to the queen consort,” “office of sergeant of his majesty's pastry in ordinary,” and eventually master cook to the monarch in 1683. Lamb held this post until his death in 1708 or 9 under James II, William and Mary, and Anne, all of whom had coronation feasts arranged by Lamb. Lamb’s Royal Cookery; or, The Complete Court Cook was published posthumously in 1710 and was probably compiled from his own papers. As an English cook, Lamb’s success is unusual given that French cooks were standard for the aristocracy at the time (Pennell, DNB). Lamb is described on the title page of his cookbook as “Near 50 Years Master-Cook to their late Majesties King Charles II, King James II, King William and Queen Mary, and to Her Present Majesty Queen ANNE,” clearly establishing his monarchist allegiance in periods of upheaval, and using his royal pedigree to authorise the text.

The full title of Lamb’s cookbook is Royal Cookery; or, The Complete Court Cook, Containing the Choicest Receipts IN all the particular Branches of COOKERY Now in Use in
the QUEEN’S PALACES of St. James’s, Hampton Court, and Kensington, Windsor. The word “PALACES,” which is both capitalized in full and set in a much larger typeface than any other word on the title page, provides a spatial orientation for the recipes, locating the cookery in the visual spectacle of court. Lamb’s title page also advertises the “near Forty Figures (curiously engraven on Copper) of the magnificent Entertainments at Coronation, Instalment, Balls, Weddings &c. at Court: Also Receipts for Soupes, Jellies, Bisques, Ragoo’s... &c,” foregrounding the images of table settings over the instructions themselves. Compared to Hall’s text, which has only one image, and Carter’s texts, which include similar engravings but placed after the text proper, Lamb intersperses his serving diagrams between the receipts. The following image shows the serving diagram for a Queen’s Dinner (5).

![Image removed due to copyright](image)

Figure 2: Patrick Lamb’s Royal Serving Illustration, 1710
By including images like these, Lamb emphasises the relationship between the aesthetic taste of etiquette and presentation and the physical taste of the food itself that the text expresses. The preface combines the multiple types of tastes through language by introducing the receipts as a “visionary treat,” (A3) in an introduction that, like “a short Bill of Fare” seeks “to prepare... Appetites... beforehand,” (A2). The text itself is a vicarious experience because it “consists of a Sett of Entertainments as nice and delicate as any Court or Country can boast of,” (A2) even for readers who neither attended the banquets Lamb organized nor will replicate them after reading.

The receipts themselves also focus on visual as much as physical taste, providing details for presentation as well as preparation. For example, the instructions for making an Olio (a version of a ragout, with a similar ‘mixed’ quality) ask the cook to “take the fry’d Roots, the Fat being clean taken off, lay them handsomely, with your Spoon, in all the Vacancies and hollow places round and over your Olio,” (34) “put it in a Silver Cup or China Bason [...] and] take care that none of your liquor run over the Rim of your Dish” (35). Other receipts describe the type of container that the dish should be served in as well as the final presentation. Each receipt includes the italicised phrase “So serve it,” a repetition that, as opposed to Hannah Woolley’s dialogic readerly addresses, prescriptively highlights staging over eating. The instructions for each dish are significantly longer and more complex than Woolley’s or even the other court cooks. In this way reading the receipts along with the integrated illustrations becomes a way to experience cookery visually; the text itself is something to be savoured at length. This type of visual experience reinforces a hierarchy between low (bodily) and high (aesthetic) tasting.

The disembodied taster is located at a critical distance from which to evaluate taste. Continuing from the description of his feasts as “nice and delicate,” Lamb’s preface employs
language of precision and discernment to establish its elevated, courtly tastes. In contrast to the female audience of a text like Hannah Woolley’s, the ideal reader here is male. He possesses both an independent and gentrified English taste. Lamb expects his male reader will form his own opinion of the text’s advice on cookery, and “judge for himself, after he has tasted the several Dishes” (A3). This statement acknowledges the variations in individual taste at that same time that it creates an expectation that the resulting judgements will be positive. Although the text’s context is aristocratic, its taste will attempt to occupy a middle ground between catering to “asceticks who keep Lent at Christmas” and whose “vicious Palate is, by no means, a proper Judge of Tastes” (A3) and teaching “the Rich and Lazy how to grow fatter, by ranging Epicurism under the several Heads of Jellies, Soupes, and Pottages” by promoting an “Art of Gluttony” (A4). The author of the preface then associates this moderated taste with a national English palate, comparing contemporary banquets to the gluttony of ancient Rome and stating that Lamb’s goal was to “represent the Grandeur of the English Court and Nation” (A4). The author also proposes that by eating at the type of banquets Lamb provides instructions for, foreign visitors could obtain a “Relish of our Magnificence” (A6) as these types of dining events are the most effective way to represent national identity.

Despite this nationalist posturing, the recipes and style of Lamb’s text are decidedly French. Yet, because Lamb was English, held a royal position, and defined his taste as such, he seems to have attempted to associate his style with Englishness. Gilly Lehman observes that Lamb is mentioned well after the publication of his cookbook in a 1736 Universal Spectator and that “it is paradoxical to see Lamb presented here as an upholder of good patriotic English fare, since he was one of the leading practitioners of French court-style cuisine” (89). However, the Universal Spectator article, which quotes Lamb’s preface directly, uses Lamb’s mis-association
with Englishness to mock Epicureanism, style over substance in cookery, and the “ill Taste prevailing among the English Quality” (109). The article describes an encounter with an ‘acquaintance’ whom the author finds “with a Pair of Compasses in his Hand, drawing Circles on a Paper” because he was “thinking of the Absudiries [sic] I remarked once at a High Sheriff’s Feast, where there was an Abundance on good Meat spoiled in the Dressing, and placed on the Table without the least Symetry [sic]” (110). Presumably the revised table setting the acquaintance is mapping, which he describes in great detail, resembles the illustrations found throughout Lamb’s text, as he cites him as an exemplar of the Art of Cookery. Through the “inveterate Folly” of the acquaintance, the article is mocking both Lamb and the overly elaborate characteristics of court-cookery, which attempt to be justified through their positive association with national reputation. The article severs that association in favour of a financial one, as it ends with Dryden’s translation of Juvenal: “But when poor Rutilus spends all his Worth,/In hopes of getting one good Dinner forth,/ ’Tis downright Madness” (112). The anti-Mandevillian argument is that the excess of court taste that Lamb promotes is ‘ill Taste’ because it favours luxury over substance.

Charles Carter’s 1730 *The Complete Practical Cook: or, a new System of the Whole Art and Mystery of Cookery* is decidedly a court-cookery text, and promotes a programmatic approach to imitating its elaborate style. On his title page Carter asserts that his has been “lately cook to his Grace the Duke of Argyll” and that his receipts will enable the reader to be able to cook in “Courtly and Grand” manner (n.p.). His audience are “gentlemen,” and Carter outlines how he practices a male art of cookery learned from the experience he gained working for nobility such as the Duke of Argyll and Lord Whitworth, in addition to his father: “to say nothing of the Foundation given to me by my late Father... who was excellent in this Profession,
and had extracted the Quintessence of the Art from a long Race of Predecessors, all practical Cooks of some Eminence” (a1). He implies that his style of taste is a gentlemanly art learned from both precedence and experience, effectively removing it from the female purview by making it a professional patrimony.

At the same time as he links his style to English aristocracy, he implies that his style is French-influenced by dedicating his text to William-Anne Keppel, the Earl of Albemarle, known as the “Spendthrift Earl” (Spain n.p.). The Earl of Albemarle lived in epicurean splendour at the Paris Embassy, and is described by Horace Walpole as keeping “an immense table there, with sixteen people in his kitchen” (qtd in Spain n.p.). Despite Carter’s French methods Lehmann notes that Carter demonstrates “that he understands the way in which the French had developed a modular system” (174) of cookery. Carter still describes himself as an English cook, acknowledging the vogue for French cookery yet condemning those who subscribe to it uncritically:

   to this assuming Ignorance of some, and impolitic Reservedness of others, is it owing, that a good ENGLISH COOK is often slighted, and some of our most hospitable Nobleman and Ladies cannot think themselves well serv’d, ’till they have sent to a neighbouring Kingdom for a Cook, who indeed by the Poverty of his Country (compar’d to ours) and the Variousness of Humour of this flippant Inhabitant, whose Gouts are perpetually changing, is push’d so much upon his Invention, that he may be sometimes be allow’d to surpass (on English Materials especially) with his mimicking Vivacity, the sounder-taught Native, especially where Nature is to be disguised and lost in Art, and the Palate is to be puzzled rather than pleas’d (a).
Here Carter begins to establish his criteria for good taste. He suggests that despite trends, there is an unchanging standard of taste, linked to a patriarchal lineage of professional cooks, and that the standard is based on a ‘natural’ preparation of basic ingredients learned through inheritance and experience. Carter describes his scientific methods of experimentation and evaluation: his travel has “given me Opportunities to get an insight into the Customs and Modes of different Nations, and to chose, with some Distinction, from all, what might gratify the most elegant and various Tastes” (a1). While he acknowledges foreign influences, he implies that his judgement is the result of his superior and discernment that is able to select only the finest methods and ingredients. Carter’s pedigree has enabled him to evaluate the field and construct a guide to taste that incorporates the finest methods and flavours, which he concretises and aestheticises through his text.

Carter’s preface states that his cookery book will facilitate this standard of taste through specific, methodical instructions based both on his lineage and personal experience. Carter’s use of the term “rules” repeatedly though his preface underscores a prescriptive standardization of cookery. His text is indeed “methodically dispos’d” (a3) compared to other similar works, as it is organized programmatically from “broth and gravy before going on to dishes requiring the use of these essentials” (Lehmann 183-4) and is unique in that it provides both an index and a glossary to provide “a brief Explanation of the Foreign or Technical terms that occur throughout the Work” (Carter a4). Carter’s diagrams of table settings, which appear at the end of the text, are also more formulaic than Lamb’s interspersed and varied images, as they are organised in chronological order and use a consistent scale to represent table and plate size. By setting up his text in this manner, Carter proposes that cookery is a social art form that will allow gentlemen to “entertain their Friends with grand and sumptuous Repasts” (n.p.) and aligns it with other
aristocratic pursuits. Carter’s programmatic text, then, seems to be aiming to set a model of taste that allows readers to participate through mimicry in a courtly ideal. He positions his expertise into a knowledge gap in the area of cookery: “it will be allow’d, that no Art can be said less to have reach’d Perfection than this, and that none is more capable of Improvement; and, of Consequence, that none can, with more Justice, challenge a Right to a kind Reception than Treatises of this Nature, which shall be found to be drawn up with Art and Judgement, and the Rules whereof shall be” (n.p). He describes his text as a “treatise” and uses philosophical diction to argue that cookery is in need of standardization to be consistent with other art forms.

Carter describes how, if he educates readers about courtly cookery, they will have no difficulty preparing simpler dishes after learning the more complex methods: “tho’ there is here nothing omitted that may please those who have not he highest Taste of elegant Eating, yet that the following Rules are chiefly calculated for the more Grand and Sumptuous Manner of Entertainments; for ’twill be very easy for an ordinary Cook, when he is well-instructed in the most Elegant Parts of his Profession, to lower his hand and any time” (n.p.). Carter asserts a hierarchy of cooking styles as well as using language such as “calculated” and “Rules” that suggest taste can be defined and quantified through writing such as his cookbook. Carter uses his preface to define his philosophy of taste and argue for the value of cookery as an art form. In order to do so, he sets up an opposition between his precise and methodological approach and the work of other cooks whom he characterises as dishonest and secretive. Other cookery books have been “stuffed with affected nostrums, which every one of the least practice knew before” and “the Masters of the Profession have always study’d to keep to themselves the most useful and noble Mysteries of their Art” (n.p.). Carter has written his text because “if Gentlemen were made a little acquainted with some of the Sovereign Rules of this Noble Art, they would the less
depend on the unartful Management of a dark-proceeding, and often ignorant Juggler, who, under the Cloak of Reserving to himself the Secrets of his profession, is only affecting a fallen, and perhaps, saucy Pre-eminence in his Way, to conceal his ignorance” (n.p). Carter again uses the diction of standardization and royalty (“sovereign rules”) to highlight the value of his text. He also suggest that rendering his knowledge into print is the way in which taste can become a formal model, “because no eminent Practical Cook before, ever cared to publish what he knew of the Art” (a4). By doing so, Carter is aligning his philosophy of cookery with courtly art forms like architecture and landscaping.

The excesses of court-cookery, along with the excesses of courtly taste more broadly, became targets of criticism for their ostentation and vulgarity. Alexander Pope addresses this crisis of taste in his “Epistle to Burlington” published in 1731, the year after Carter’s text. Pope sets up a “Lord Timon,” likely a composite of several individuals (Damrosch 2535) as an exemplar of ostentatious taste. In his opening description of his argument, Pope outlines his purpose as illustrating “the false taste of magnificence,” specifically in “books, in music, in painting, even in preaching as prayer, and lastly in entertainments” (2536). The epistle opens by setting up the central metaphor of taste as both physical and aesthetic:

'Tis strange, the miser should his cares employ
To gain those riches he can ne'er enjoy:
Is it less strange, the prodigal should waste
His wealth to purchase what he ne'er can taste?

\[17\] In his 1996 article “Taste And Use: Pope’s Epistle to Burlington” Julian Ferraro examines Pope’s revisions to the opening lines of the poem and their impact on the meaning of the word taste. Ferraro argues that by moving from “for which he has no Taste” to “what he cannot taste” and finally to “what he ne’er can taste”, Pope develops both meanings of taste in order to emphasise the physical yet also leave “room for the suggestion that the impediment is not lack of ability but lack of opportunity” (143).
Not for himself he sees, or hears, or eats;
Artists must choose his pictures, music, meats: (lines 1-6).

Here Pope uses consumption to touch on the disconnect between display and use value that is so apparent in the court-cookery books, while at the same time depreciating music and visual art by aligning them with the lesser art of cuisine. The feast that he satirises later in the poem dramatises the hypocrisy of culinary pageantry:

    But hark! the chiming clocks to dinner call;
    A hundred footsteps scrape the marble hall:
    The rich buffet well-colour'd serpents grace,
    And gaping Tritons spew to wash your face.
    Is this a dinner? this a genial room?
    No, 'tis a temple, and a hecatomb.
    A solemn sacrifice, perform'd in state,
    You drink by measure, and to minutes eat.
    So quick retires each flying course, you'd swear
    Sancho's dread doctor and his wand were there.
    Between each act the trembling salvers ring,
    From soup to sweet wine, and God bless the King.
    In plenty starving, tantaliz'd in state,
    And complaisantly help'd to all I hate (151-164).

The extremes of presentation are such that the diners never actually get to taste the meal that is displayed so elegantly for them. The paradoxical state of hunger amidst plenty suggests the inherent problem of taste without substance, using the dual senses of ‘taste’ to signify the
inherent absence at the centre of artifice. James Noggle reads this conflict as Pope's recognition that the immediacy of physical taste is dangerous because it is instinctive, yet powerfully corrective because of its immediacy. Sensory taste’s direct response, despite its dangers, can still be a force “against the passionate mediation of the corrupting power of social fantasy and luxury” (45). Pope implies that true taste is authentic or actual value as manifested in the physical, namely the subjective discernment of the taster. Because Lord Timon does not use his own taste to make choices he is ultimately left hungry. The distinction between empty and actual (physical) taste becomes critical for the empiricist philosophy of engaged and sensible taste. The aristocratic model of cookery had become a touchstone for a critical re-imagining of taste.

2.2 Empiricism and the Philosophy of Public Taste

The continental, artificial model of taste promoted by Hall, Lamb, and Carter is one that can be imitated and replicated. The distinctly British empiricist construction of taste, however, depends on an individual’s subjective engagement with what she tastes. The empiricist taste I discuss in this chapter develops from John Locke's 1689 *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. He asserts that the human mind does not possess innate ideas, but is an "empty cabinet" (65) that must be furnished with ideas received through the senses. This central premise is predicated in part through observations Locke makes about the great variations in human taste. Significantly, Locke uses the sense of taste as an example of difference, because his theory of thought is that our ideas proceed from our primary sensual (taste, touch, scent, smell, sight) experiences of the world. If taste is a fundamental sense of opposition, then it follows that taste is the most ‘judgmental’ of the senses. In the first pages of the *Essay*, Locke notes the problem of
the vast discrepancy between human tastes and addresses it by connecting intellectual to bodily
taste. He explains "everything does not hit alike upon every man's imagination. We have our
understandings no less different than our palates; and he that thinks the same truth shall be
equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the
same sort of cookery: the meat may be the same, and the nourishment good, yet every one not be
able to receive it with that seasoning; and it must be dressed another way, if you will have it go
down with some, even of strong constitutions” (9). This connects the physical sense of taste to
personal discernment and implies that the senses are the origins of preferences both culinary and
intellectual. There is, then, for Locke, no methodological difference between the way a
philosophical ideology and a preference for asparagus are constructed in the mind, for “the mind
has a different relish, as well as the palate” (247). Taste is the sense of subjectivity, because it is
the sense that facilitates individual discernment and difference. In this way, the subject’s own
sensory experience of taste determines value rather than basing value on aristocratic standards.

In the Essay Locke continually returns to examples of a tasting (and often infant) mind to
illustrate how basic taste responses of sweet and bitter are the types of sensory responses that
generate entire epistemologies because “blue or yellow, bitter or sweet can never be false ideas,”
(350). The centrality of Locke’s fundamental flavour opposition appears in the method of
analysis Roland Barthes sets up to theorise food consumption: “we can see that signification [...] 
does not involve kinds of products, but flavours: sweet and bitter make up the opposition in
signification, so that we must place certain units of the system of food on that level” (22-3). Our
ability to distinguish between two flavours that are diametrically opposed to one another as
infants forms a thought process that makes assessments based on associations that are
pleasurable (sweet) and displeasing (bitter). The importance of basic bodily taste in both authors
suggests that the act of eating constructs meaning apart from the implications of any meal or dish as a whole. Cookery that foregrounds one type of flavor, then, is making meaning as a recipe.

The extended metaphor of the tasting palate is one of the foundations of Locke's theory of the mind. Both the mind and the palate rely on the senses to act as conduits through which the outside world is understood. Locke continually returns to the tasting senses throughout his argument to provide both evidence and a method to theorise the way in which humans understand their world. He portrays children as primarily tasting rather than thinking beings: they know even before they are verbal "the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter... that wormwood and sugarplums are not the same thing" (65). Locke's assumption here, and in his use of eating to explain differences in both individual preferences and cultural understanding, is that the sensual and embodied act of tasting is one of the experiences that provides the foundation of all understanding. For Locke, our knowledge of the more complex ideas such as "two bodies cannot be in the same place [and] it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be" can be understood as truth because of our childhood experience that "bitterness is not sweetness" (67). Locke asserts this idea repeatedly to explain and substantiate his theory of cognitive development, asking "Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter?" (92). It is the "primary qualities" (135) of objects experienced through the senses that generate thoughts; “the secondary exist in things only as modes of the primary” (137), but it is the secondary qualities of objects, because of the way they engage the senses, that create understanding. For Locke, then, philosophical taste is built through reflection on the
binary experience of bodily taste.\textsuperscript{18} Locke’s example of disgust and its lack, namely that "there are places where they eat their own children," (79) a disgust based on morality rather than physical taste, is located outside of the sensing body and therefore cannot act as an organising system in the same way. Eating without tasting is the most dramatic example of the lack of universal taste standards or innate principles.

In his 1711 \textit{Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times}, a collection of essays, Locke’s student, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Earl of Shaftesbury, extends the immediate taste sensation of sweet or bitter that Locke describes to an instinctive aesthetic and ultimately \textit{moral} sense that is non-reflective. Taste is Shaftsbury's fundamental paradigm, and \textit{Characteristics} uses both bodily and aesthetic taste as media of refinement or corruption. Sensory disgust or pleasure in a subject becomes aestheticized moral taste. Shaftsbury breaks with Locke’s concept of epistemology as the central goal of philosophy, substituting moral conduct and aesthetics in its place. Laurence Klein argues that for Shaftesbury "the development of moral sensibility was inextricably linked with that of aesthetic sensibility" (Klein ix). In his \textit{Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author}, Shaftesbury describes knavery, the term he uses to express dishonest and duplicitous behaviour, as “mere dissonance and disproportion,” (93) stressing the connection he makes between moral conduct and artistic judgement. In Shaftesbury, the interplay between moral and aesthetic taste and between mind and body demonstrate how a moral palate can be refined through the body. Physical taste preferences and their aesthetics thus have moral implications. In the \textit{Characteristics}, the tongue can be an organ of moral sense. Throughout these essays,

\textsuperscript{18} Derrida similarly speculates that a similar opposition between like and dislike (rather than sweet and bitter, although they behave in similar ways) is the way taste is made. In his 1981 essay “Economimesis”, Derrida suggests judgment emerging from disgust could be “the origin of pure taste” because an individual’s revolted taste reaction “can no longer be situated \textit{in} a typology of the body but seeks to organize all the sites” (16) in the same way that sweetness and bitterness becomes a cognitive system.
Shaftesbury uses metaphors of physical taste, and I will examine these instances in order to establish the connections he makes between the physical and the aesthetic.

Shaftesbury uses manners to reform appetite into taste. Klein argues that the term that best describes the type of morality Shaftesbury is attempting to cultivate is ‘politeness’, and, as such, Shaftesbury helps to “delineate both the continuity and the break between the courtly world explored by Norbert Elias and the public sphere described by Jürgen Habermas” (14). Elias’s theory of the ‘civilising process’ proposes that the development of table manners in Europe from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century emerges from courtly society and is a continually refining process emphasising the interaction between shame and delicacy (115) and the suppression of the animal in favour of civility (121). Denise Gigante picks up on Elias’s descriptor to describe the way taste functions in the period: “Garnering the authority left over from the divine, taste became the most vivid strand of complex civilising process in which individuals were taught to regulate themselves, and their motivation appetites, from within” (7). Terry Eagleton also notes the importance of social behaviors in Shaftesbury: his “unity of ethics and aesthetics, virtue and beauty, is most evident in the concept of manners. Manners for the eighteenth century signify that meticulous disciplining of the body which converts morality to style, deconstructing the opposition between the proper and the pleasurable” (41). Shaftesbury’s “knavery,” the term that he uses to describe unmannerly conduct, is the absence of morality and social graces. His use of the term ‘knave’ implies “a boy or lad employed as a servant; hence, a male servant or menial in general; one of low condition” and could be used in opposition to a knight (OED). Using ‘knavery’ as a descriptor in Shaftesbury’s figuration of manners implicates the courtly world, but Shaftesbury’s concept of politeness is part of the public sphere rather than the court: “A public spirit can come only from a social feeling or sense of partnership with
humankind... there is no real love of virtue without the knowledge of public good. And where absolute power is, there is no public” (50). As Klein notes, Shaftesburian manners bring courtly conduct to the emerging public sphere. Bitterness here not only stands as a metaphor for what is disgusting but also shares sensations with the experience of courtly hypocrisy, or the discrepancy between the visual and the actual.

The type of civility supposed to exemplify taste in Habermas’ public sphere is cultivated not in the court but in the theoretically more inclusive space of the coffeehouse. The importance of a sphere of communal food or drink consumption in addition to the political background (the rise of the absolute monarchy in Elias and the separation out of the public sphere from the world of the court in Habermas) to both Elias’ and Habermas’ theory makes social tasting crucial to how politeness is developed. For example, Elias uses the rise of the fork as a key example of how manners evolve through progressive reform. The fork, along with the napkin and spoon, is a utensil that gains purpose through “direct social intercourse [...] where functions are gradually defined... forms sought and consolidated” (107). Diners use forks not to avoid dirty hands or illness, but “because it is distasteful to dirty one’s fingers, or at least to be seen in society with dirty fingers” (Elias 126). Distaste, here, is both bodily, connected by the ritual of eating, where “the fork is nothing other than the embodiment of a specific standard of emotions and a specific level of revulsion” (127). Yet distaste is also highly social, the use of the fork becoming standard through courtly imitation and dissemination. The intimate and body-based disgust Locke refers to as an organizing principle of taste is made public and socialised through etiquette and ritual.

Bodily taste appears in Shaftsbury in two opposing ways: as gluttony or as relish. He describes how the drives of gluttonous appetite are in conflict with the development of the relish of a tasting and discerning gentleman. Unlike Locke’s categories of sweet and bitter, which are
not fundamentally moral or aesthetic oppositions, but ways of constructing knowledge, tastes in Shaftsbury can be deployed and cultivated to construct moral codes. In his essay on common sense, Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, which discusses communal civility, Shaftsbury associates gluttony with both childlike appetite and immoral action, again using knavery to define this type of conduct: “when men begin to deliberate about dishonestly and, finding it goes less against their stomach, ask slyly why they should stick at a good piece of knavery for a good sum, they should be told, as children, that they cannot eat their cake and have it. When men indeed are become accomplished knaves, they are past crying for their cake” (60). In this example the knave is not only gluttonous but, by allowing his cravings to take over, corrupt. However, Shaftesbury uses the metaphor of digestion in two ways: it is both what serves as conscience and what causes the ultimately victorious craving for immorality. In Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author, the appetites that are inherent in children (which in Locke have them preferring sweet over bitter) do not act here to build a system of understanding but instead restrict its development: “For Appetite, which is the elder brother to Reason, being the lad of stronger growth, is sure, on every contest, to take the advantage of drawing all to his own side” (84). Shaftsbury is not speaking solely metaphorically about the urge to act immorally. The use of cake as a substitute for financial gain implies that there is a bodily urge that is elemental and elementary, as well as aesthetically problematic. The developmental diction of child and elder brother also indicates a hierarchy of refined over instinctive taste. Knaves who act on their bodily urges suffer bodily consequences. Gluttony, then, is a form of taste that does not adhere to the distinction between good/honest and bad/deceptive. In the Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, immoral subjects, whose “voluptuousness” and poor taste is, in part “founded in the Palate” display bodily and gastrointestinal symptoms of their behaviour: “It may be observed in
those, who by Excess have gained a constant Nauseating and Distaste, that they have
nevertheless as constant a Craving or Eagerness of Stomach. But the Appetite of this kind is false
and unnatural; as is that of Thirst arising from a Fever, or contracted by habitual Debauch” (220).
The unnaturalness of the appetite of the knave is not that it exists, but that though indulgence it
becomes perpetual and insatiable. In order to make taste moral, it must be made discerning.

Shaftesbury also uses scripture to exemplify the connection he is making between
hunger, tasting, and moral conduct. In Soliloquy he contrasts simple tasting with the relish of
understanding. For instance, Jesus’ disciples, for whom “the best doctrine could not go down
without a treat and the best disciples had their heads so running upon their loaves, construe every
divine saying in a belly-sense” (126) demonstrate the perils of instinctive taste. The disciples,
like children and knaves, seek the immediacy of satisfaction inherent in bodily consumption.
Instead, Shaftesbury argues, human nature can only be improved if “the sole measure and
standard [is] taken from moral rectitude and from the discernment of what is sound and just in
the affections. For if the tree is known only by its fruits, first endeavour must be to distinguish
the true taste of fruits, refine my palate, and establish a just relish in the kinds” (133). In both of
these examples Shaftsbury is writing about interpreting the gospel, emphasising that the material
and tasting body has a moral imperative. The “belly-sense” Shaftesbury is referring to is the
‘puffed-up’ but misleading “leaven of the Pharisees” (Matt 16.6 KJV) and the “true taste” he
references is the ability to make moral choices and interpret both scripture and prophets
correctly. By referencing Matthew 7:15-20 in his metaphor of tasting fruit, Shaftesbury alludes
to the biblical chapter as a whole, which begins “Judge not, that ye be not judged” (Matt 7.1
KJV), again linking the restrained development of judgement with refined physical taste.
Shaftsbury’s concerns with both discernment as a matter of eating and physical taste are reoccurring motifs in Jonathan Swift’s *Tale of a Tub*, originally written in 1690 (Ross xiii) and published in 1704. In the tale Swift’s persona addresses and satirises the development of Christianity and the conflict between Catholicism, Radical or Reform Christianity, and Anglicanism personified as three brothers Peter, Jack, and Martin respectively. Swift uses Lord Peter’s transubstantiated cookery to criticise Catholic doctrine. Peter pretends that his dry bread crust is “the quintessence of beef, mutton, veal, venison, partridge, plum-pudding, and custard” (55-6) and to which his brothers react with confusion:

> My Lord,” said he, “I can only say, that to my eyes and fingers, and teeth and nose, it seems to be nothing but a crust of bread.” Upon which the second put in his word. “I never saw a piece of mutton in my life so nearly resembling a slice from a twelve-penny loaf.” “Look ye, gentlemen,” cries Peter in a rage, “to convince you what a couple of blind, positive, ignorant, wilful puppies you are, I will use but this plain argument; by G-- -, it is true, good, natural mutton as any in Leadenhall Market; and G--- confound you both eternally if you offer to believe otherwise (56-7).

It is absurd to say that bread is mutton, just as it is to say flat bread is the flesh of Christ. For the brothers to believe their tastes must contradict what their (Lockean) senses are telling them, an error in both eating and interpretation. If, as they eat the bread they believe it has become mutton, they are aligning and incorporating their tastes to a communal belief, heightened by the spiritual implications. Maggie Kilgour’s theory of bodily incorporation argues that eating is “the most basic model for all forms of incorporation” both because the external becomes internal but also because “the need for food exposes the vulnerability of individual identity” (6). Peter’s attempt to force his brothers to mis-eat (and believe in transubstantiation) tries to subsume both
their sense of taste and their autonomy. For Kilgour aesthetic taste, “focuses upon discrimination and division, so that the tongue can also be a symbol which represents [...] separation. Intellectual taste is associated with choice and control, the mastery of what is eaten by the eater” (9). Swift’s tale, like Shaftsbury’s goal of a just relish, promotes interrogative and critical taste.

In her article on food imagery and gluttony in Tale of a Tub Leslie Mechanic argues that depictions of over-embellished eating illustrate a “lack of discrimination” (23) in both meals and reading. In the tale’s introduction Swift’s narrator refers twice to “men of taste,” (1, 4) or appreciative readers who will understand the satire. The narrator also anticipates that his treatise will “fall plumb into the jaws of certain critics (as I think they are called) which stand ready open to devour them,” (28) disparaging the act of consuming without tasting. In the text’s Digression in Praise of Digressions the narrator denounces “the late refinements in knowledge running parallel to those of diet in our nation, which among men of a judicious taste are dressed up in various compounds, consisting in soups and olios, fricassee, and ragouts [...] and the ] fashion of jumbling fifty things together in a dish” (69). Like Shaftsbury’s similar condemnation of ragouts and fricassee, the comparison implies that over-mediated and embellished learning and food lead to indiscriminate taste because the subtleties cannot be sensed19. As in Shaftsbury’s allusions to the idea of true taste and judgement in the Gospel of Matthew, however, Swift’s example is more than a metaphor because of the emphasis, as in his bread-mutton parable, on the power of the bodily sense of taste to make accurate judgments.

19 Mixed and jumbled dishes are also associated with French cuisine: in Technologies of the Picturesque: British Art, Poetry, and Instruments, 1750-1830 (2008) Rob Broglio points out that “the English find suspect the French’s cuisine’s transformation of ingredients such that items are not identifiably related to how they appear in nature. French food changes nature into complex elements of culture... in contrast, the English keep their food close to its natural state. By doing so, the Englishman is a ‘brute,’ a part of the nature he devours, while he is also a masculine figure showing his dominance over the rest of nature” (182).
Shaftesbury’s opposition of belly and palate imposes a type of mind-body dichotomy on the gustatory metaphor without leaving the digestive tract. Taste on the tongue is about discernment, while digestion in the stomach is involuntary and therefore non-judgemental. It would follow, then, that the type of tasting that an individual performs can act as a way to manage their appetites. This type of contrast indicates that refining taste for Shaftsbury is not only about controlling bodily appetites with mental reason, but developing the appetites themselves to “form within our-selves what in the polite World is called a Relish, or Good Taste” (Miscellany III 404, his emphasis). The solution is not only restraint but also manners, table or otherwise, or what Terry Eagleton reads in Shaftsbury as “that meticulous disciplining of the body which converts morality to style, deconstructing the opposition between the proper and the pleasurable” (41). In that way the palate can function as reasoning and moral agent, an “Enlightenment culture of taste” that can “train [...] appetite into a metaphorical endeavour—a taste for this or that” (Gigante 6). Imposing manners on taste requires the imposition of the social onto the body.

The goal of refinement though manners and politeness is to turn appetite into relish. Shaftsbury uses the term relish throughout the Characteristics to describe a minutely attuned taste. The first definition of relish, both in the Oxford English Dictionary and in Johnson’s dictionary (1755) concerns eating rather than aesthetic taste. The subsequent definitions identify relish as a taste that is distinct or minute, and would require a precise palate to recognise or experience; a liking or delight; and a “power of perceiving excellence.” Johnson quotes Locke’s use of the term as an example of how is it used to describe elemental flavours: “sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salt are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of creatures, but in the
different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal" (Locke 124). Shaftesbury’s use of relish implies that he is using the term to signify not only, as Johnson defines it, “the effect of anything on the palate” but Johnson’s subsequent delineation of the term as a “small quantity just perceptible” and the “power of perceiving excellence,” definitions Johnson exemplifies using quotations from the Spectator. Combining these denotations allows Shaftesbury to ascribe the power of judgement to bodily taste.

Shaftesbury describes how a gentleman can therefore enjoy the “repasts of Literature and Science” (Miscellany I 340) because “the Taste of Beauty, and the Relish of what is decent, just, and amiable, perfects the Character of the Gentleman, and the Philosopher” (Miscellany III 407). The metaphor of relish refines the metaphor of physical taste to a higher degree of subjectivity. Relish represents desired taste because it is critical, and “a legitimate and just taste can neither be begotten, made, conceived or produced without the antecedent labour and pains of criticism” (Miscellany III 408). Relish is a process (because it perfects) and it requires effort to cultivate. Relish implies that the taster can identify individual parts of a whole and therefore judge the final composition, whether it is dinner, poetry, or a painting, yet the figurative nature of the term makes physical taste ever-present. Earlier in his Characteristics, Shaftesbury espouses the power of sociability to produce morality. Yet in his discussion of social gatherings, he uses cookery discourse to emphasise communion and connects developing morality, and social and aesthetic relish, to interactions of physical tasting. For “if eating or drinking be natural, herding is so too. If any appetite or sense be natural, the sense of fellowship is the same” (Sensus Communis 51). However, “It is in small communities where men can better “taste society and enjoy the common good” (Sensus Communis 52). The ‘natural’ urges of eating and grouping together can be further refined into smaller groupings with finer tastes.
Shaftsbury’s description of modern fashions in cooking illustrates this connection between physical taste and moral and aesthetic judgement, and the distinction between simply eating and tasting. He begins by describing how carving an entire animal at the table has gone out of style:

It was the Custom of our Ancestors, perhaps as long since as the days of our hospitable King Arthur, to have nothing served at Table but what was entire and substantial. It was a whole Boar, or solid Ox which made the Feast. The Figure of the Animal was preserved entire, and the Dissection made in form by the appointed Carver, a Man of Might as well as profound Craft and notable Dexterity; who was seen erect, with goodly Mein and Action, displaying Heads and Members, dividing according to Art, and distributing his Subject-matter into proper Parts, suitable to the Stomachs of those he served. In latter days ’tis become the Fashion to eat with less Ceremony and Method. Everyone chooses to carve for himself. The learned Manner of Dissection is out of request; and a certain Method of Cookery has been introduced; by which the anatomical Science of the Table is entirely set aside. Ragouts and Fricasseees are the reigning Dishes, in which everything is so dismembered and thrown out of all Order and Form, that no Part of the Mass can properly be divided, or distinguished from another” (386).

In addition to the anti-French implication of the comparison (for ragouts and fricasseees are Gallic imports, and Arthur represents a prototypical Englishness) the theory of taste presented depends on the ability to separate the whole into parts and judge both how they are composed and combined. In this way, then, Shaftsbury does continue the Lockean project of knowledge as

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20 Ben Rogers argues that “all cultural identity is closely bound up with food and cooking” (2), and that roasted beef represents English national identity, particularly one asserted in contrast to French foreign luxury and gourmandision (Beef and Liberty: Roast Beef, John Bull and the English Nation 2003).
a conglomerate of sensual experiences, albeit sense reactions to be dissected and evaluated rather than digested. The doctor George Cheyne takes a similar although less philosophical and more medical approach in his 1733 *The English Malady* where he complains that “the ingenious mixing and compounding of sauces with foreign spices and provocatives are contrived, not only to rouse a sickly appetite to receive an unnatural load, but to render a natural good one incapable of knowing when it has enough” (51) and blames illness on a conglomerate of tastes signifying cosmopolitanism, excess, and possibly even moral corruption.

What Shaftesbury mourns in his example of dining in the days of King Arthur, however, is a type of social gathering that foregrounds both collectivity and distinction. The ceremony and method are social and culinary: eating is a social and physical practice. The courtly male carver figures prominently in the example as a model for rank, order, and cultivated taste. The art of carving is a vehicle to perform relish as he disembodies and distributes the meat based on his skill and his ability to discern the needs of each diner. Shaftesbury implies that the act of dining together within a prescribed system of politeness is a method to cultivate tastes that are individual but socially sanctioned. When the ordered method of carving and distribution is lost, both the meal and the diners lose their social role and taste of relish as they distribute the meat without any organizing principles. Denise Gigante observes, however, that the transition from this type of collective dining style to individual servings enhanced opportunities for subjectivity: “during the Century of Taste, as the consumptive unit shrunk from the larger group of family to the individual, the opportunity opened up to the expression of personal style through the discretionary consumption of food, words, and other consumables... An analogy can be found in the evolution of the dinner table itself: as the common trencher, accessed by means of knives, fingers, and communal spoons gave way to individual flatware settings... the larger communal
meal broke down into discrete units or samplings, allowing individuals to exercise taste preference” (67).

In contrast to Shaftesbury, the philosophy of taste in Bernard Mandeville's 1714 treatise *The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits* (which was expanded twice after publication) depends not on aesthetic relish but economic prosperity. Mandeville argues that a nation of moral Shaftburian tasters would be a nation without profit: it is often vice, specifically the gratification of appetites, which benefits the public good. For while “Law-givers and other wise men...have laboured... to make the People they were to govern, believe, that it was more beneficial for everybody to conquer than indulge his Appetites” (81) “private vices by the dextrous management of a skilful politician may be turn’d into publick benefits” (371). Appetites and immoral behaviour provide jobs and encourage trade. What Shaftsbury would term voluptuous taste, often manifested as “a surfeit, or excess of eating and drinking” (212) in Mandeville is the economic engine of Britain, even though George Cheyne still complains twenty years later that “since our wealth has increas’d, and our navigation has been extended, we have ransack’d all the parts of the globe to bring together its whole stock of materials for riot, luxury, and to provoke excess” (29). In *The Fable of the Bees* the moral or medical problems with gluttony are ameliorated through economics. Gluttony is one of the most profitable tastes because "no creature can subsist without food... therefore the first and fiercest appetite that nature has given them is hunger" (216). The gluttony that Mandeville highlights, however, is focused not on sheer volume of food, for "there are many great Epicures that will refuse to eat or drink more than their heads or stomachs can bear," (144) but on the 'value added' luxuries of imported liquor or a table with "many courses" with a "choice variety of dainties not easily purchas’d, and ample evidence of elaborate and judicious cookery" (171). In this way,
Mandeville's description of private gustatory vice is not necessarily in conflict with Shaftsbury's refined relish, as both are equally expensive and therefore both publically beneficial.

While high taste has the potential to unite the two philosophers, the connection between private vice and public benefit in *The Fable of the Bees* dramatically reworks Shaftsbury’s model of productive company as the means to improve taste and promote morality. Shaftsbury asserts that “the opposite of sociableness is selfishness” (53) and “a public spirit can come only from a social feeling or sense of partnership with humankind... there is no real love of virtue without the knowledge of public good” (50). Denise Gigante highlights the different way Mandeville and Shaftesbury address appetite: Mandeville’s vision of the state as “an organization of clashing appetites in which the civic “bee” [...] seeks] to satisfy private desires (appetites and aversions) in a consuming, and increasingly consumerist, crowd [...] is] counter to the ideal of the *sensus communis*, promoted by Shaftsbury and other taste philosophers as a community united in a tasteful harmony of feeling” (7). In addition, in the *Ideology of the Aesthetic*, using Shaftsbury as an example, Terry Eagleton observes that in the eighteenth century moral standards become “personal sensibility; taste, affect and opinion testify more eloquently to one’s participation in a universal common sense than either moral strenuousness or ideological doctrine”(32). Eagleton argues that this naturalises the aesthetic as political order. This happens through taste in a parallel way in Mandeville by replacing the public good of morals with the public good of a highly-functioning economy. In Mandeville, the theory that public good is the product of vice makes sociability and selfishness collaborate rather than conflict and makes selfish rather than social affections the foundation of a successful society. In both Shaftesbury and Mandeville, however, despite their critical difference, tastes and appetites are basic building blocks of society, be they self-serving cravings or social relishes.
Francis Hutcheson’s 1725 *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Idea of Beauty and Virtue* continues Shaftsbury’s project of associating aesthetics with virtue and begins with a Lockean foundation of knowledge through sensory experience. However, for Hutcheson these external sensations result in an inner sense of beauty. Hutcheson’s reaction to Locke’s conclusion that there are no innate ideas based on variations in taste, and therefore “all our relish for Beauty and Order, is either from prospect of Advantage, Custom, or Education” (Hutcheson 66) is to suggest that, to the contrary, there is an internal sense of beauty that behaves in a similar way to the other five senses. The internal sense is “a passive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety” (67). The ideas of beauty produced through the sense are “antecedent to all Custom, Education, and Example” (70). In Hutcheson variations in taste preferences result from external motivations or deterrents and are sensory reactions rather than intellectual choices. This use of mental process is how George Dickie delineates the differences between Locke and Hutcheson: Hutcheson’s internal sense is not Locke’s “cognitive notion of reflection” but “a responsive or reactive mental property” that “responds to pleasure when external senses perceive certain properties” (Dickie 7).

Hutcheson’s *Inquiry* also uses the metaphor gustatory taste to illustrate its theory of aesthetic taste. Both are based on sensory reactions rather than culture or reflective analysis, because while “Fear of Death, or Love of Life, may make us chuse and desire a bitter Potion, or neglect those Meats which the Sense of Taste would recommend as pleasant... yet no prospect of Advantage, or Fear of Evil, can make that Potion agreeable to the Sense, or Meat disagreeable to it” (26). Hutcheson’s sense of beauty behaves like the physical sense of taste but it is based on *internal* rather than external sense. The positive sensation that arises from beautiful objects that he theorises is beauty amidst variety, which, like the experience of the sensation of sweetness, is
universal and can be stimulated without knowledge of the ways it is achieved. An individual receives the “Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man’s Taste may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, though he be ignorant of the Forms of the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite these Perceptions in him” (35). For Hutcheson the mechanism of aesthetic judgement is the same as the mechanism of physical taste. It is the qualities of objects themselves that produce the reaction. However, Hutcheson’s sense of beauty is an internal sense with an inherent standard or evaluation as part of the tasting process. This distinguishes the judgment of taste in Hutcheson from the variable empiricist judgments of Locke.

The philosophy of taste in Locke, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and especially Shaftesbury helped shape the discourse of eighteenth century aesthetics and judgement. The periodical writings of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele published in The Tatler and The Spectator also attempt to define and describe taste and bring its discussion into the public sphere. David Marshall describes Addison and Shaftesbury’s shared concern with taste as an interest in “regulating and, more importantly, in forming the public relish” (634). Marshall also notes the distinction both authors make between arbiters of taste and the active practice of taste creation despite differences in their audiences (middle class and aristocratic respectively) and distrust of the idea of public taste. Marshall describes this “preoccupation with taste” as the result of a “shift in aesthetic criteria from rules to sensibility” (637). While much of the aesthetic criteria offered in The Spectator relates to literature rather than cuisine, the tasting palate does appear as part of Addison and Steele’s explorations of taste.

One of The Spectator’s stated aims is “to banish Vice and Ignorance out of the Territories of Great-Britain [and] to establish among us a Taste of polite Writing” (245, #58). Addison and Steele often appeal to the palate to define taste and illustrate their arguments, using instinctive,
sensory-based responses to contrast good taste with fanciful taste. In issue number 70, this is described as the “Perfection of Simplicity” rather than the “Gothick Manner,” the first being that that which “pleases all Kinds of Palates” and the second a “wrong artificial Taste” (297). In number 195 Addison condemns artifice and excess in eating, describing “a fashionable Table set out in all its Magnificence” where he imagines he sees “Gouts and Dropsies, Feavers and Lethargies, with other innumerable Distempers lying in Ambuscade among the Dishes” (265). The elaborate visual taste of court-cookery has bodily consequences: the type of maladies that George Cheyne warned against. Addison suggests a positive correlation between sumptuous display and flavour and describes good taste as natural rather than artificial. He proposes that multiple ingredients, particularly “saucers of an hundred ingredients” (265), are responsible for a “variety of Tastes” that “occasion Excess… and create a false Appetite (265). The subject of Addison's criticism is on display in the aristocratic cookbook. For example, Charles Carter’s section on fowl in his Complete Practical Cook instructs the reader to prepare poultry in this excessive manner. The fifteen recipes Carter gives all involve multiple ingredients, sauces, and diverse methods of presentation. A French sauce that Carter suggests for geese, turkey, or capons is described as “A la Mode de Blois” (56), likely referring to the royal residence the Château de Blois, and contains over ten ingredients. Other suggestions are to present fowl in ox bladders, with a mixture of oysters and nuts in the shape of the bird, or with truffles and artichokes. In all of Carter’s receipts, the suggested style of preparation takes precedence over the ‘meat’ of the dish, exemplifying the artificial taste that Addison critiques.

Like Shaftesbury, Addison also addresses the difficulty of creating rules for both aesthetic and bodily taste. In both number 195’s discussion of extravagant feasts and number 409’s essay on taste he avoids listing specific standards for either, acknowledging that just as “it
is impossible to lay down any determinate Rule for Temperance, because what is Luxury in one may be Temperance in another” (265) it “is very difficult to lay down Rules for the Acquisition of such a Taste as that I am here speaking of” (529). He extends the metaphor of taste from the palate precisely because it expresses both individual subjectivity and natural (bodily) limitations. In number 409, Addison’s most detailed examination of taste, he writes:

   Most Languages make use of this Metaphor, to express that Faculty of the Mind, which distinguishes all the most concealed Faults and nicest Perfections in Writing. We may be sure this Metaphor would not have been so general in all Tongues, had there not been a very great Conformity between that Mental Taste, which is the Subject of this Paper, and that Sensitive Taste which gives us a Relish of every different Flavour that affects the Palate. Accordingly we find, there are as many Degrees of Refinement in the intellectual Faculty, as in the Sense, which is marked out by this common Denomination (527).

The commonality Addison highlights between the two types of tastes suggests he is grappling with similar questions about judgement as the empiricist philosophers. All of the writers address the often conflicted relationship between natural or instinctive taste and refined or cultivated taste. Like Shaftesbury, Addison suggests that along with reading “the most Polite Authors” sociability, specifically “Conversation with Men of a Polite Genius” (529) is a method of refining literary and intellectual taste. As in the consumption of food, it is the movement from the instinctive sensing response to a subjective evaluation (in consideration of past reading and conversation) that results in true relish.

   In The Spectator number 447, Addison uses a more specific culinary metaphor to describe the development of refined taste. Referencing Francis Bacon, he observes that “our Taste is never pleased better, than with those things which at first created a Disgust in it. He
gives particular Instances of Claret, Coffee, and other Liquors, which the palate seldom approves upon the first Taste; but when it has once got a Relish of them, generally retains it for Life” (70-71). Addison uses this culinary example to expand his argument about reading challenging texts that are initially displeasing. Here the process of taste acquisition is one where the instinctive sense of the body is mediated through labour and process. The reoccurrence of metaphors of eating and consumption, however, suggest that bodily taste is a key part of becoming a man of taste. One cannot have a proper relish of literature and art without a proper relish of cookery. It follows, then, that cookery is a key medium for refining taste and developing subjectivity.

2.3 Mary Kettilby and the Rise of Subjective Taste

Richard Steele’s periodical The Tatler uses the persona of Isaac Bickerstaff to offer observations and criticisms to “an Audience of all who had any taste” (iv). When Bickerstaff’s letters are mentioned in a cookbook preface, as they are in Mary Kettilby’s, they signal that the text might also aim to “expose the false Arts of Life, to pull off the Disguises of Cunning, Vanity, and Affectation, and to recommend a general Simplicity in our Dress, our Discourse, and our Behaviour” (Steele v). Kettliby’s culinary collection will help the reader to become the same “Notable women” (vi) she associates the Tatler with helping to develop, especially because her text gives instruction in both frugal cookery and healing ministry. Her A Collection of above Three Hundred Receipts in Cookery, Physick, and Surgery, published in 1714 with a second edition in 1719, foregrounds its role in improving the taste of its female readers. In the preface Kettilby describes her intended audience as the “Young and Unexperienced Dame, who may from hence be Instructed in the Polite Management of their Kitchins” (A11) and her ingredients
as plain rather than “most Rare and Costly” (A12). As in *The Tatler*, essential or ‘sensible’ taste is the goal.

Mary Kettilby’s text exemplifies the type of cookery that the *Universal Spectator* praises over Patrick Lamb’s elaborate French Epicurism. Just as empirical philosophy sought to distinguish an individual, discriminating British taste from the excesses of the continental, artificial, and courtly taste, cookbooks like Kettilby’s foreground the distinctive taste of the cook herself over a model of taste. In her cookbooks, Kettilby censures the false publicity and spectacle of court cookery with a new discourse of publicity. She implies that true publicity, or relish, maintains a connection to the intimate, and that good aesthetic taste is the union of public opinion with domestic sense. Kettilby’s work is much shorter than any of the aristocratic texts, and has fewer variations for preparing types of dishes like fish or fowl, resulting in a text that reads as a guide to taste rather than a prescription for taste. Her greater economy of style puts choice in the hands of the reader rather than the text. Kettilby begins by connecting the worth of her work to its functionality, distinguishing her text from courtly cookery by situating physical and aesthetic taste in relation to utility, which is itself a manifestation of private discernment. The usefulness and value of a cookery book, Kettilby claims, “depend upon the Integrity and Care of the Writers, the Pains they take Themselves, and the good Help and Assistance they can procure from Others” (A4). The contributors to usefulness are the labours of the writer, without which the text “must necessarily deceive the Reader; [or] be deceived Themselves” (A4). By opposing experience with deception, Kettilby implies that there is a tangible, sensory-based taste

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21 In *The Civilizing Process*, Norbert Elias describes how in Germany, after the middle of the eighteenth century “the self-legitimation of the middle classes by virtue and accomplishment becomes more precise and emphatic, and the polemic against the external and superficial manners to be found in the courts becomes more explicit” (10). I see a similar reaction (informed by empiricism) against courtly and French taste playing out in Mary Kettilby’s text.
that governs her work in addition to its aesthetics of utility. In the court-cookery texts, in contrast, the absence of this subjective taste results in a model of taste that is illusory and unreliable, as it circumscribes the reader’s ability to judge the text and its recipes.

Like Hannah Woolley’s much earlier texts, Kettilby’s cookbook is aimed at a domestic-centred female audience, named on the title page as “Good Wives, Tender Mothers, and Careful Nurses,” and places the individual palate at the centre of taste. The preface centers the (female) body in a local circulation, using its cures, for example, for “the assistance of some Poor Neighbouring Woman in her Painful and Perilous hour” or for the “dressing of a Poor Man’s Wound” (A7). Kettilby specifically connects these types of charitable ministrations with “the Fair Sex” and suggests that they have a natural predisposition to good works, at the same time being careful to note that her advice will not interfere with the public work of male doctors or clergymen. Limiting the role of the housewife in this way moves the site of taste out of the communal locality, as it is imagined in Hannah Woolley, and into the kitchen overseen by the tasting palate of the “notable” individual and discriminating, though eminently sociable cook. What is clear from her preface is that Kettilby is connecting the practice of good taste with the practice of charity, a type of taste that is both useful and moral. Kettilby’s association of cookery and good works in her preface recalls Shaftesbury’s aesthetic morality. She suggests that taste is a sense that is fulfilled in active engagement rather than mimicry.

To assert her practical and moral emphasis Kettilby moves away from aristocratic taste to locate her taste in the public sphere as defined by Habermas: she aims to create a text worthy of “a Publick Reception” (A4). Rather than claiming to be the work of a single author, the title page emphasises the idea of collectivity and attributes the text to “several hands.” The preface describes how “a Number of very Curious and Delicate Housewives Clubb’d to furnish out this
Collection” (A11), suggesting the development of a new type of taste model that is collaborative rather than prescriptive, bringing the collective manuscript text to the public sphere. The visual aesthetics of writers like Patrick Lamb have been replaced with an aesthetics of ethical service in Kettilby: readers will learn “the Art of Adorning their Tables with a Splendid Frugality” (A11) rather than with formal dishes. Kettilby uses the term ‘art’ to dismiss the complex court-cookery style the way writers like Lamb aestheticise taste by providing “Rules in that Art so strangely odd and fantastical” that they “spoil a good dish,” (A10) presumably by obscuring ‘natural’ taste with over-seasoning and presentation. In contrast, Kettilby describes her own directions as “Palatable, Useful, and Intelligible” (A10), in contrast with “Nostrums” that “fail us in the Time of Trial” (A5). Other recipes are described as ‘nostrums,’ or quack remedies, because, by favouring style over taste, they do not actually function. In her own cookbook, Kettilby emphasises a motif of proven (and public) efficacy throughout her work to authorise her taste, rather than attributing authority to pedigree. Instead, her recipes are authorised “from a long and repeated Experience” (A10). Practice, specifically the collective experience of housewives, becomes pedigree.

Although Kettilby attempts to distinguish her text from courtly cookery, her receipts still demonstrate the methods of cookery common in the aristocratic texts, particularly those that separate sweet from savoury, influenced her compilation. Whereas “sugar was first known in England as a spice and as a medicine” (Mintz 79) and was used to flavour savoury dishes, it fell out of favour as a seasoning in meat dishes. Lehmann observes that Kettilby’s first edition follows this trend and does not include sugared dishes, but her second edition, which has a second section with additional receipts, does. By appending a section that includes receipts such as Plum-Porridge, which calls for beef as well as sweet prunes, and “sugar to your taste” (8)
Kettilby champions individual taste and utility over prescriptive court-cookery performance. In both prefaces, she notes the irony “that a Poor Woman must be Laugh’d at, for only Sugaring a Mess of Beans; whilst a Great Name must be had in admiration, for Contriving Relishes a thousand times more distasteful to the palate” (A11). Kettilby defends the practice of sugaring savoury dishes in part by aligning it with simplicity and female tradition, and also makes the ‘Poor Woman’ herself (rather than the presumably male ‘Great Name’) a site of taste. In relation to empiricist concepts of simple tasting, the fundamental quality of sweetness represents an elemental, if infantile, bodily craving, while more complex flavours suggest a mediation of appetite. Read in this way, empiricist taste is further inscribed in Kettilby’s theory of cookery through receipts that engage sensory preferences. In addition, the contrast between female cooks and male chefs underscores the gendered dynamic of public, private, and intimate, and intimate subjectivities associated with the feminised intimisphere. As Steven Mennell describes, “whenever a technically more elaborate, socially more prestigious cuisine has begun to develop, it has necessarily involved differentiation both technical and social from the everyday cookery of the majority of people. Since the latter is generally associated with women cooks, it is highly likely that any process of social differentiation will involve distancing from the food of the lower orders and from the women who cook it” (201). The triumph of Kettilby’s cookery narrows the gap between cooking and eating, between the kitchen and the dining room, and between physical and aesthetic taste.

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22 In his essay ‘Old Spice: William King, Culinary Antiquarianism, and National Boundaries’ on William King’s 1708 pro French-aristocratic satire The Art of Cookery, Timothy Morton observes King’s criticism of the English use of Sugar as seasoning in the line "The French our Relish help, and well supply / The want of things too gross by Decency," suggesting that the "older taste for sugared meat was giving way to [French] garlic" (97).
Kettily’s recipes often end with options for the reader to modify the instructions to her own taste, emphasising personal subjectivity over the authority of the author. Many of the recipes in the second edition of her cookbook end with suggested additions that the reader can choose or not, depending on her preference. This repeated appeal to the individual taste of the reader-cook is typically given for seasonings, for example “Salt and Sugar to your Taste” (40); “you may shred the Peel very fine… if you like it” (59); “put in a pound of Candy’d Orange, Lemon, and Citron-peel, or more, if you desire it very rich” (69); and “sweeten it to your Taste,” (71). By both giving specific directions for preparing the dish proper, and leaving variations and seasoning up to the reader, Kettily’s instructions balance the philosophy of an ideal public taste with the variations of individual taste. In addition to her balance between guidelines and suggestions, Kettily alludes to the feeling subjective tastes can carry by using the term “love” to describe the flavour inclination of personal preferences. For example, she proposes that, when making sausages, “if you love Oysters, half a pint shred to this quantity, gives it a rich Taste” (26) and only suggests adding shallot to stewed oysters “if you love it” (28). A recipe for pickled walnuts uses the reverse reaction: “Three or four Cloves of Garlick do well, if you do not dislike the Taste” (36). She acknowledges the possibility of either love or aversion inherent when using strong flavours, and therefore the inescapability of primary sense reactions as described by Locke.

In addition to leaving space for the tastes of her readers, Kettily’s recipes also occasionally provide her own commentary, highlighting her role as editor and arbiter of taste for the communal or “clubb’d” text. In a recipe for Orange Pudding she ends with “Some People only grate in the Peels raw, and leave out the Juice; but I think the above-written way is the most Grateful and Pleasant” (44). Discussing variations of Panada (bread soup), she remarks “Some
season with Butter and Sugar, adding Currants, but the first [lemon seasoning] is the most grateful and innocent” (57). By opposing her own taste with ‘some people’s,’ Kettilby indicates that even though tastes vary, some are still better than others. The recipes that provide her own opinion are operating within the same ‘public taste’ field as issues in The Spectator: recognizing and promoting subjectivity while guiding readers towards refinement.

By 1730, court-cookery was falling out of fashion, a shift that was linked to rising nationalism as much as it was to a desire for simple cuisine. For example, Charles Carter’s The Complete Practical Cook: or, a new System of the Whole Art and Mystery of Cookery work was not successful, (Lehmann 96) and so, in response, Carter published another cookery book in 1732, two years after his first. His second work tempers his masculine court-cookery approach with a broader, simplified, style. Entitled The Complete City and Country Cook: or, Accomplish’d Housewife, this text is aimed at both female and male readers. It widens the court audience to humbler domiciles, and targets housewives in the title, suggesting that the style of taste forwarded in Carter’s first text was too narrow for public taste as it was being practiced. In addition to simplifying his receipts, Carter advertises on his title page that he has appended what is likely a manuscript collection: “Near two hundred of the most approved Receipts in Physick and Surgery for the Cure of the most common Diseases incident to Families: The Collection of the Noble Lady Deceased”. By incorporating medical receipts as well as simplifying his cookery instructions, Carter ostensibly ‘feminizes’ his text by linking it back to the tradition of female-authored cookery books and centering it in the domestic rather than courtly realm. The

23 In All Manners of Food: Eating and Taste in England and France from the Middle Ages to the Present, Stephen Mennell observes that “the eclipse of the distinctively ‘courtly’ English cookery book after Lamb (1710), Smith (1723) and Carter (1730) may seem to coincide almost too neatly with the accession of the Hanoverians in 1714 and the diminution of the political and social role of the English court (124). He notes, as documented in the daily bills of fare for court, a decline in both French language and culinary influence (124).
manuscript receipts, for example, include instructions for “the Mistress of the House or House-keeper” to prepare “good English Wines and potable Liquors of our own Growth and Production, not inferior to those of France, Spain, or Portugal, in Goodness and Agreeableness to English Constitutions” (viii) and the preface praises the bounty of Great Britain, comparing it to the “Land of Canaan” (vii). This manifesto of taste is more insular and subjective than in his precious work, bringing its standard back not only to Carter’s own discernment, but all “English Palates” as “nice Judges of good Eating” (vii).

This second text also loses Carter’s previous dedication to an aristocratic epicure, and, while it does allude to Carter’s international service of the nobility in the preface, praises a more domestic and national taste in lieu of cosmopolitan influences. Carter still emphasises that his style of cookery is a standardised art for those who serve gentlemen, as in his first text, for the “Publick Good” is written so that “Gentlemen be made acquainted with some of the stated Rules of the Art” (iv). However, in this work Carter also addresses female readers, both gentlewomen, the “Mother of a Family” (viii) and housekeepers, and uses the idea of housewifery in opposition to that of luxury. When he describes the diagrams of an elaborate banquet table setting that appears in addition to the simplified monthly versions of those in his earlier text, he states that the design of this Piece is rather to promote good Housewifery than Luxury, not so much to prompt to Epicurism, and gratifying capricious and fantastical Palates, as to instruct how to order those Provisions our Island is furnished with, in a wholesome, natural, decent, nay, and elegant Manner... to order them so that they may delight the Eye, and gratify a reasonable Palate as well as satisfy the Appetite (xi).

Carter’s concept of taste in this example contrasts foreign luxury with domestic moderation, and suggests balance between visual and bodily taste, as well as between instinctual and tempered
appetites. Gilly Lehmann suggests that the 1730s mark the emergence of a new culinary style based on experience in the kitchen, and Carter’s second text demonstrates a notable shift away from prescriptive taste to the experiential palate of the reader, even in a text that is still participating in a courtly taste model.

Mary Kettiby's enduring popularity, and the need for Carter to adjust his text to reflect the changing expectations of his readership, reflect a political as well as a philosophical shift toward an English empirical taste. The idea that reading a cookery text can help cultivate discernment, and epistemologies of judgment, however, suggest that Kettiby is locating her authority in the public sphere, the realm of criticism. By seeking collective approbation for her model of taste, Kettiby opens up the possibility for disagreement and debate. My next chapter will address the problems of bringing feminised and cookery-linked taste judgments originating in the intimisphere into the public sphere.
Chapter 3: Hannah Glasse, Ann Cook, and the Location of Taste

Joseph Addison and Richard Steele’s writing in *The Tatler* and *The Spectator* treated the cultivation of taste as a significant discourse for the public sphere. Cookery writing like Mary Kettilby’s, reflecting the ways empiricist philosophy was addressed by periodical print culture, positioned their bodily tastes as part of this discussion. As I outlined in my first chapter, the early eighteenth-century saw a strengthening distinction between public and private and the rise of the public sphere theorised by Habermas, along with the corresponding transition from an embedded to a separated-out domestic proposed by McKeon. This cultural shift, I argue, means that the often bodily concepts of taste central to the intimisphere move into the private and public spheres. Because, as Habermas suggests, the private sphere of the subject becomes a new space of publicity, the domestic intimisphere can penetrate the space vacated by the private. This shift in conceptions of privacy and intimacy is especially apparent in the cookery mode, as cookery writing incorporates elements of public, private and intimate arenas. However, Habermas’ notion of the public sphere has been critiqued and re-formulated by other theorists since its publication. These reformulations are important to my study of the cookery mode's operation because they complicate an idealised and masculine public. One of the reasons for this dynamic is cookery's gendered and intimate associations: even as the cookery mode enters public discourse, the public/private dichotomy associates public with masculine and private with feminine.

While public, private, and intimate spheres are becoming more clearly defined in the eighteenth century, at the same time they are also becoming subject to cross-contamination and restructuring. Critics such as Michael Warner, and Nancy Fraser propose that counterpublics work to shift and complicate boundaries as Habermas defines them. This chapter will examine two cookbook authors, Hannah Glasse and Ann Cook, who attribute different notions of privacy.
publicity, and intimacy to cookery. Hannah Glasse's construction of taste in *The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy* (1746) makes a concrete separation between the intimate and the public within the home. Glasse makes the mistress of the house a public subject and the mediator of the three zones through her text-aided tastefulness. Ann Cook wrote *Professed Cookery* in 1754 as a rejoinder to Glasse's work; her critical response redefines Glasse's public space as a transgressive counterpublic. Cook's assessment of *The Art of Cookery* takes particular issue with Glasse's pretensions to subjecthood, and uses her own cookbook as a public forum to do so. Rather than succeeding in repositioning cookery in the domestic, however, by using the space of print culture to make her critique Cook’s text ends up occupying a counterpublic space as well.

### 3.1 Cookbooks, Publics, and Counterpublics

Most critics concur that the idea of a singular, universal, and inclusive eighteenth century public sphere is not an accurate reflection of the period. Miranda Burgess remarks that, in fact “eighteenth-century Europe may be conceived as harbouring not just the overarching categories ‘public’ and ‘private,’ but also unnumbered clusters of smaller, more specified publics, which cooperate within their groups to help fuse or to break apart the public of the whole” (397). A rigid distinction between private and public in the period is equally problematic. Michael Warner posits that “even the most extreme separation of spheres turns the home and its adjunct spaces into a functional public for women—spaces that can be filled with talk and with the formation of a shared world,” (37) and that “women in many places also elaborated parallel or informal economies—private, but public in the sense that they lay beyond the home. These developments were simultaneous with the rise of separate-sphere ideology, not simply later reactions against it” (38). In practice, public and private were not separate but diffusive and permeable. The terms
‘public’ and ‘private’ themselves, as Lawrence Klein observes, can have multiple interpretations even as they are opposed to one another.

To address this complexity, Warner developed the concept of counterpublics to examine and critique Habermas’ framing of the public sphere. Warner theorises that counterpublics and privates create a space that “against the background of the public sphere, enables a horizon of opinion and exchange; its exchanges remain distinct from authority and can have a critical relation to power; its extent is in principle indefinite. Counterpublics are, by definition, formed by their conflict with the norms and contexts of their cultural environment, and this context of domination inevitably entails distortion” (56; 63). Counterpublics, along with a more pluralistic map of publicity and privacy, are one way of accounting for the more diverse reality of eighteenth century citizens, particularly female citizens.

Nancy Fraser concurs with Warner, arguing that in the eighteenth century “the bourgeois public was never the public. On the contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counterpublics, including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women’s publics, and working-class publics” (116). However, despite the presence of multiple and counterpublics, Fraser notes that the official bourgeois public sphere was still the method through which political power became hegemonic. The bourgeois public is explicitly gendered, with engrained “masculinist gender constructs” characterised by a “rational” style that serves to define and distinguish an “emergent elite” (114). This method of distinction further amplified the masculinity of the liberal public sphere and fostered a social system where “new gender norms enjoining feminine domesticity and a sharp separation of public and private sphere functioned as key signifiers of bourgeois difference from both higher and lower social strata” (115). Discussing the relationship between public, private, and the domestic, Lawrence
Klein writes that “generally in the eighteenth century, the distinction between the private and the public did not correspond to the distinction between home and not-home. Two implications result. First, privacy was ascribed to forms of life that we would consider public. Second and more important, people at home, both men and women, were not necessarily in private. Even if, then, women spent more time at home, they were not necessarily spending more time in private” (104-5). Sayla Benhabib proposes that the outcome of any such social schematic where public and private are set against one another is “a binary opposition” that becomes “part of a discourse of domination that legitimizes women’s oppression and exploitation in the private realm” (93). The resulting power imbalance is not only political but cultural. It impacts the print culture dimension of the public and gives domestic or feminized genres lower status. These types of genres illustrate the co-existence of both defined and contestable borders between public and private.

In female-authored cookbooks and domestic manuals that describe its operation, cookery is conceived as a private and gendered discourse. The sphere of cookery is not part of the bourgeois male public sphere. Instead, cookery operates outside of the dominant culture and discourse in private female domestic space. The location of taste is important to the way taste promotes subjectivity, because subjectivity is fostered in the intimisphere. However, the cookery mode also exemplifies the permutations between public, private, and intimate spheres that existed despite their theoretical separation. While clearly part of the domestic intimisphere, cookbooks constitute a significant part of the print culture in the eighteenth century. Cookbooks use the private discourse of the cookery mode as a way to reconcile body and self with culture. Like the privately formed public identity of the ‘Man of Taste,’ the cookery mode, while
centered in the private realm of the kitchen, is also a public genre in which the preparation and eating of food is transformed into culture.

As I demonstrated in my preceding chapter, the cookery mode was used in empiricist philosophy as well as in fiction, poetry, and periodical writing to address issues of taste. For example, in his 1791 *Life of Samuel Johnson*, James Boswell relates that Johnson, who “boasted of the niceness of his palate,” asserted that

I could write a better book of cookery than has ever yet been written; it should be a book upon philosophical principles. Pharmacy is now made much more simple. Cookery may be made so too. A prescription which is now compounded of five ingredients, had formerly fifty in it. So in cookery, if the nature of the ingredients be well known, much fewer will do. Then as you cannot make bad meat good, I would tell what is the best butcher's meat, the best beef, the best pieces; how to choose young fowls; the proper seasons of different vegetables; and then how to roast and boil, and compound (377).

The response to Johnson’s observations, as recorded by Boswell, is that “Mrs. Glasse's Cookery, which is the best, was written by Dr. Hill. Half the trade know this” (377). Johnson is apparently unsurprised by the supposed authorial subterfuge. His comments imply that Hannah Glasse’s gender and relegation to a private realm of knowledge is what has made her unable to write a truly excellent cookbook. Johnson continues with his explanation:

This shews how much better the subject of cookery may be treated by a philosopher. I doubt if the book be written by Dr. Hill; for, in Mrs. Glasse's Cookery, which I have looked into, salt-petre and sal-prunella are spoken of as different substances whereas sal-prunella is only salt-petre burnt on charcoal; and Hill could not be ignorant of this.

However, as the greatest part of such a book is made by transcription, this mistake may
have been carelessly adopted. But you shall see what a Book of Cookery I shall make!

...women can spin very well; but they cannot make a good book of Cookery” (377).

For Johnson, even with tongue in cheek, good cookery apparently requires a level of scientific, public knowledge inaccessible to domestic female authors like Glasse, a housewife. However, Johnson’s detailed response, and his careful reading and knowledge of the text, even though it is unlikely he would have cooked from it, suggests that cookery is a discipline of public importance, rather than domestic female dialogue. Such is the public currency of the text that he is able to refer to it by Glasse’s name and expect his audience to be familiar with the work. Johnson’s observations demonstrate how the gendered dynamic between public and private helped create and disseminate the cookery mode. In this example the cookbook is more than a simple instruction manual, but a part of the science of both chemical and aesthetic taste. Johnson was not the only male intellectual with knowledge of cookbooks. Wendy Wall reads Samuel Pepys’ possession of cookbooks as an example that the texts could be read for pleasure or even fantasy (52). The cookery mode can operate outside of the kitchen and home.

In my reading, printed cookery writing in the mid-eighteenth century can be associated with private, public, and counterpublic spheres in addition to the domestic. It not necessarily directly opposed to dominant culture but is still distinct from it. One of the reasons for its distinctness is gender: the public/private dichotomy associates public with masculine and private with feminine. This was the case for the mostly female writers and readers of cookbooks in the eighteenth century, as they were participating in public print culture within the intimacy of the domestic. The intended readers of female-authored cookery books also locate their sphere of influence. Gilly Lehman’s history of cookbooks in Britain in the period describes the difference between the female authors’ audience and the audience of the few male writers. As I explored in
my section on court-cookery, while male authors assumed a professional audience, women modified complex French or professional recipes for a more diverse kitchen audience. Lehman also chronicles the downward shift in audience throughout the century: the books were “aimed largely at the gentry class at the beginning, at the middle classes and a growing readership amongst servants by its end” (61). While servants were always responsible for cooking, the responsibility for cookery management could become more hands-off as a result. This decent resulted in an even greater class divide between the readers of male-authored cookbooks and female-authored cookbooks.

As I discussed in my first chapter, printed cookbooks are generically related to manuscript cookbooks, which were often passed down within families and purport to reveal secret or hidden knowledge (Pennell, “Perfecting Practice”). These manuscript texts, and published works such as Hannah Woolley’s that were based on them, predate the separation out of the domestic and the emergence of public and private as separate categories. In addition manuscript texts, Lehman reports, also co-existed with printed cookbooks. As such, their interpenetrative constriction of domesticity persists as a generic marker. Like the voyeuristic intimacy of the epistolary novel, printed cookbook collections allow the reader access to undisclosed information from an expert practitioner. In her work on eighteenth-century gender and genre, Elizabeth Cook notes that “eighteenth-century epistolary fictions allow us to examine the Enlightenment ideal of a Republic of Letters precisely because the letter-narrative exposes the private body to publication. The letter-narrative is formally and thematically concerned with competing definitions of subjectivity: it puts into play the tension between the private individual, identified with the specifically gendered, classed body that necessarily commits it to specific forms of self-interest, and the public person, divested of self-interest, discursively constituted,
and functionally disembodied. This is the citizen-critic who is the proper subject of the Republic of Letters” (8). A related type of intimacy is at play in the cookbook, with its palimpsestic generic origins in family manuscripts and pedagogical relationship between reader and author.

Conversely, the intimate knowledge that cookbooks provide is at odds with their repetitive, standardized formulae and claims to be “complete” compendiums of knowledge. This standardisation increased over the eighteenth century: the arbitrary and sometimes absent organization of Hannah Woolley is replaced by stricter thematic sections. Thus, cookbooks claim at once to publicize individual secrets and to standardise individual taste. Jeff Weintraub’s analysis of the theory and politics of the public/private distinction proposes that “any notion of ‘public’ or ‘private’ makes sense only as one element in a paired opposition” (4) and that there are “two ways in which private can be contrasted with public: “what is hidden or withdrawn versus what is open, revealed, or accessible” and “what is individual, or pertains only to an individual, versus what is collective, or affects the interests of a collectivity of individuals” (5). Following this definition, cookbooks fit both categories. They contain secret or privileged information and practices and assume one-to one guidance in the privacy of the kitchen. It is this secrecy and intimate exchange, residual markers of manuscript texts, that provide the potential for counterpublic insurgency. At the same time, however, cookery texts are aimed at the kitchens of the nation and are written for publics of both servants and the middle class. Cooking and cookbooks belong to the category of domestic labour and public work at the same time that they circulate as texts forming publics and public opinions. They are part of the uncompensated work of the domestic, yet are key participants in the economy of both booksellers and paid servants.

Cookbooks engage with both cultural and physical labour within the domicile and are part of emerging middle-class domestic ideology. Published circa 1750, the works of Hannah
Glasse and Ann Cook continue the genre of cookery books that model a type of distinguished public taste as seen in authors such as Mary Kettelby. Just as Kettelby’s reaction against aristocratic male taste in the form of emphasizing subjective individual taste, cookbooks like Hannah Glasse’s position the author’s domestic concerns in public print culture. Hannah Glasse’s 1746 *The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy*, the most successful cookbook of the eighteenth century, is an important example of the relationship between cookery writing and taste in the public sphere. Its popularity is clear: by 1755 the title was in its fifth edition and it was printed continually until 1843. In addition to its proliferation and cultural prominence (as illustrated by Samuel Johnson’s reference to Glasse I cited earlier), Glasse’s text also influenced other cookery writers. In response to Glasse, Anne Cook, a professional cook and innkeeper, wrote the less successful 1754 *Professed Cookery*. Cook’s work is a detailed attack of Glasse both personally and stylistically. *The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy* and *Professed Cookery* demonstrate the extent to which cookery had become a public concern. Glasse and Cook replace the embedded and embodied taste of the late seventeenth century present in Hannah Woolley, and the aestheticized modelling of taste in the early eighteenth-century court cooks, with a textually mediated conversation in the public sphere.

In their cookbooks the rivals Glasse and Cook demonstrate that they are both acutely aware that their readership, and the cookery mode itself, is now thoroughly integrated into new standards of taste and genre that are national as well as local. These issues, and the way each writer conceptualises taste, are connected to the different ways each author locates her work in intimate, public, or counterpublic spheres. Despite the fact that, as I will explain, the problems Cook had with Glasse have personal origins, the conflict between the two authors revolves around issues of genre, style, and ultimately taste, both aesthetic and physical. In her response to
Glasse Cook takes issue with the way *The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy* defines her reader as a type of public subject, thus overstepping the distinctions of gender and discipline that the public should delineate. Unlike Hannah Woolley, Glasse clearly distinguishes between the kitchen and the rest of the home, and between the intimate and the public spheres. Cook also makes these distinctions, but sees the role of female cooks, and cookery in the public sphere, as less subjective. While Glasse positions her reader and cook as a gendered public figures, in Cook’s text the cookery mode occupies a counterpublic realm. These two texts, and their relationship to one another, demonstrate how the cookbook genre and its reading audience transforms since 1670, and how these changes allowed cookery writing to act as a forum for debates about the location and qualities of taste.

### 3.2 Hannah Glasse and the Parlour Reader

Hannah Glasse was baptized in 1708 and died in 1770, the illegitimate daughter of Isaac Allgood of Northumberland and Hannah Reynolds, his London mistress. When her father’s wife died, the then sixteen-year old Glasse went to live with her Grandmother in London. She married John Glasse secretly in 1724 and had ten children, only half of whom survived infancy. In order to supplement her family’s finances, she opened a dressmaking shop and began writing *The Art of Cookery* in 1745, and received 202 subscriptions for the first edition. Glasse’s husband died in 1747, before the release of the second edition of the text, and by 1754 she was bankrupt. She was imprisoned for debt in 1757 and was likely released soon after (Robb-Smith). Glasse was “a housewife rather than a professional cook, and... she wrote her book with the aim of making money” (Lehman 110). Although Glasse wasn’t a ‘professional,’ her text is written in a way that
constructs her as a distinguished expert, and she places cookery in the public sphere though her measured and judgemental treatment of taste.

Aside from *The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy* Glasse also published *The Servants Directory* and *The Complete Confectioner* in 1760. Her treatment of domestic service and confectionary in distinct texts indicates that they are separate categories of knowledge, and perhaps less public concerns than cookery ‘proper’. Domestic service and confectionary are also fields associated with different social classes: while many women running households distanced themselves from food preparation, confectionary was still an upper-class skill (Lehman 144). Unlike Hannah Woolley’s works *The Art of Cookery* focuses mainly on cookery rather than household management and medicine. While the narrowing scope of the cookery book is a part of the evolution of the genre that takes place from Woolley to Glasse, *The Art of Cookery* is the most notable and popular example of an attempt to change the genre’s style. By narrowing scope I mean the shift from texts that deal with all aspects of running a household to texts that focus only on cookery. This specialisation process exemplifies what McKeon identifies as the separation of knowledge. The division of single into multiple categories of knowledge is reflected in the subjects of Glasse’s three texts.

*The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy* includes sections on cooking for the sick and for ship’s captains; purchasing goods at market; and recipes for extermination and distilling; however, its stated goal was to make fashionable recipes economical both in cost and description. *The Art of Cookery* was first published anonymously, although it proclaimed that it was “by a Lady” on the title page. In her opening Glasse characterises her ‘Lady’ as a champion of textual and tasteful discernment through her clear outline of what type of work she has produced. To do so, she uses the first person ‘I’ repeatedly to emphasise that her methods
originate from a tasteful individual. She introduces the reader to her approach by describing her recipes for entertaining. Woolley treats these cookery instructions theoretically, as opposed to the practical instructions she will provide later in the text, in order to demonstrate what makes her text different. She does this to demonstrate how her approach to cookery aligns with her aim to educate readers in simple and economical taste. By using food production to exemplify not the recipe’s result but her approach to writing and cookery, Glasse prioritises aesthetic over bodily taste.

Glasse’s attention to style and genre shows an attempt to position her text within a public conversation about taste, insofar as her operation within it is limited by gender and subject. The introduction demonstrates Glasse’s awareness that cookbooks are a genre with existing conventions, while explicitly detailing how she will detour from these. Her description of rival texts characterises the older genre as elaborate and impractical, likely referring to court cookery works. Glasse also suggests that she is addressing an audience she anticipates has expectations about cookbooks and familiarity with other similar texts. In doing so she imagines a domestic readership that has formed a distinct public opinion about the quality and function of cookery text. Glasse begins her work by declaring that

I believe I have attempted a Branch of Cookery which Nobody has yet thought worth their while to write upon: But as I have both seen, and found by Experience that the Generality of Servants are greatly wanting in that Point, therefore I have taken upon me to instruct them in the best Manner I am capable; and I dare say, that every Servant who can but read will be capable of making a tolerable good Cook, and those who have the least Notion of Cookery can’t miss of being very good ones. If I have not wrote in the
Glasse links her writing technique to her intended audience and desired results. Like Mary Kettilby’s 1714 *A Collection of above Three Hundred Receipts in Cookery, Physick, and Surgery*, Glasse’s *Art of Cookery* will privilege accessibility and clarity over culinary grandeur. Her implied reference to other cookery texts (those that do not provide the type of instruction she intends to give) demonstrates that she expects her audience’s pre-existing opinion of cookbooks to parallel her own. She proposes that she is satisfying a need that her audience might not yet have recognized they have, although it is one that they will share with other members of their reading public. The mutual opinion Glasse imagines for this public is based around formal characteristics of instruction and writing.

Hannah Woolley’s texts were directed at readers of all classes who require her instruction to perform tasks in their daily lives. While Woolley specifically mentions assisting upper class women who will be managing servants, Glasse’s introduction indicates that the audience has transitioned to the servants themselves, or ‘the lower Sort’, as she identifies them. However, Glasse’s use of the pronoun “them” to refer to servants indicates that the text is still directed at the lady of the house. This suggests that it is this female manager who will be aware of public opinion about cookbooks and domestic writing. Like Woolley and Kettilby, Glasse's text will be a tool to help teach servants, yet she draws greater rhetorical attention to the ways her writing connects to the practice of reading. In addition, the text’s audience is twofold: the reader, or upper class lady, is a member of the public sphere, while the practitioner, or servant, is a member of the domestic sphere. Gilly Lehman proposes that Glasse “recognized that a woman’s social ambition was to become a lady of leisure who no longer spent hours in the kitchen instructing
her servants” (114) and that this ambition could be enabled by cookbooks. In her introduction Glasse also introduces the idea that reading (even imperfect reading of semi-literate servants) will replace practice as the pedagogic method, an idea that Hannah Woolley avoided by privileging her personal tutorials over her texts. This moves the site of epistemology from the body to the page, distancing the public from the intimisphere.

The entire preface to The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy indicates not only that Glasse is conscious about the conventions of the cookbook genre, specifically their discourse and intended audience, but to a corresponding public opinion about the way in which cookery and cookbooks operate. Her cookbook will move away from the type of instructions that would be for the lady of the house, such as designs for table setting or “the Oeconomy of her Family” because “every Mistress does, or at least ought to know what is most proper to be done there” (iii). Glasse explains that she has narrowed the range of domestic advice in comparison to more expansive earlier cookbooks so that she will not infringe on the purview of the lady of the house. She repeats this idea twice, emphasising that directing “a Lady how to set out her Table... would be impertinent, and lessening her Judgement in the Oeconomy of her Family” (iv). Glasse does not provide this type of guidance because it would infringe on the function of the Lady of the house as a subject. While complimenting the reader on her own knowledge, Glasse distinguishes between the duties appropriate for various classes of women, and attempts to displace the management of cookery, if not its actual preparation, out from the intimisphere and into the public purview. Her text thus moves from the local domesticity of individual households to a public field of cookery, separating out the concerns of cookery from the more intimate space of knowledge of the lady. This lady is the private subject who is capable of judging taste in the public sphere and transferring her knowledge to her household as necessary.
Part of the way Glasse characterises her new methods of writing and cookery is in opposition to French recipes and techniques, which were often gendered male and associated with aristocratic and Whig tastes (Mennell). As I discussed in my second chapter, these aristocratic tastes were performative rather than subjective. In *The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy* Glasse addresses her audience as if they share her convictions about English cuisine, making her female readers the generating locus of public opinion about culinary nation-building and simplified style. Her introduction details recipes differently than they are rendered in instructional section of the text: here she writes about the process of preparing sauce in an expository rather than instructional way in order to demonstrate the follies of French cooking and gentlemen who would “rather be imposed on by a French Booby, than give encouragement to a good English cook,” as she “shall not gain the Esteem of those Gentlemen” instead desiring to “gain the good Opinion of my own sex” (iii). She is writing against the perceived excesses of both male chefs and male taste. By making her stylistic choices both political and feminine, Glasse positions her readers in the public despite their gender. Yet, Glasse’s explicit gendering of her reading public, and her foregrounded tasteful subject perhaps indicate that her gendered connection to the (female) domestic has enhanced that subjectivity.

Wendy Wall writes that “in producing cookbooks for a prosperous household managed by the housewife, English writers made domesticity a public concern. Specifically, they transferred the work of specialists to an imagined heterogeneous male and female population unified in their shared interest in up-to-date household work” (25). The more distant management and new method of writing and cooking pushes cookery writing, if not the kitchen itself, into a textually mediated public space. One of the results of this emerging publicity is that the medical element that was such a large component of texts like Woolley’s has been pared
down to a few recipes for broths for the sick. This removes the reader from the responsibility of actually caring for the ailing body, leaving that responsibility to a professional male doctor.

While Woolley argued that maintaining the body in health involved both culinary and medical interventions, Glasse states she does not “pretend to meddle here in the Physical Way; but a few directions for the Cook... will not be improper to make such Diet, etc. as the Doctor shall order” (233). Medicine has been separated out as a male discipline, so Glasse moves her text’s focus from the individual body to the public. Care for the intimate physical body is subsumed into maintenance of an imagined public body.

Glasse’s introduction attests that by cultivating a servant audience she will need a different vocabulary. While Hannah Woolley does state that she attempts to make her instructions as simple as possible (in *The Queen-Like Closet*), Hannah Glasse explicitly and specifically outlines the ways her writing style will make her text more accessible for teaching servants. She states that she will write ‘little pieces of bacon’ instead of ‘lardoons’(i), allowing the text to stand alone and replacing the need for the reader to consult anyone for help. Glasse also outlines her intent to modify the expected content as well as diction, for example removing both the “odd jumble of things that would quite spoil a good dish” (i) along with any expensive or extravagantly used ingredients, especially those typical of French cooking. She authorises her reader to borrow and modify French cuisine according to her judgement. Glasse’s sense of audience is specific: she knows that she will not satisfy (male) readers who like French cooking, and admits that “it little concerns” (iii) her. She also implies that the domestic knowledge of female readers precludes them from being fooled by French tastes, observing that

A Frenchman, in his own Country, would dress a fine Dinner of twenty Dishes, and all genteel and pretty, for the Expence he will put an English Lord for dressing one Dish… I
have heard of a Cook that used six Pounds of Butter to fry twelve Eggs; when every
Body knows, that understands Cooking, that Half a Pound is full enough, or more than
need be used (iii).

The “every Body” Glasse refers to suggests not only a shared opinion, but a shared opinion of
Englishwomen and English Ladies, whose practical knowledge and good taste would never use
ingredients wastefully. She doubts she will gain “the Esteem of those Gentlemen: However, let
that be as it will, it little concerns me; but should I be so happy as to gain the good opinion of my
own Sex I desire no more” (iii). Glasse genders her reading public by contrasting their practice-
based good taste with male folly. She correlates form, content and audience through her generic
modifications to both manuscript-based cookbooks and court cookery books.

The type of mistress-servant relationship that Glasse’s text encourages is evident in the
illustration that precedes a later edition of her text. The frontispiece to the 1775 edition of The
Art of Cookery (see Figure 3 below) shows a lady sitting at a table outside of the kitchen with the
cookbook in front of her; she has copied down a recipe onto a separate sheet and is handing it to
her maid to take into the kitchen. In this image Glasse’s readers are depicted in a cross-class
relationship, one of the characteristics of the idealized public sphere. However, the illustration
and introduction suggests that this text will replace the need for intimate personal instruction
which instead takes place in the realms of print. Textual transmission and transcription replaces
the kitchen as the site of exchange. The mistress does not enter the kitchen, but sends her written
transcription instead. Glasse’s writing belongs only to the domain of public reading, not the
domestic kitchen, and because of this the cookery book itself does not enter the kitchen. The
kitchen is only partly visible through the doorway at the side of the image, rows of plates and a
butchered goose evoking the often unseen labour of the crowded kitchen, which is separated
from the panelled walls and elegant furnishings of the lady’s room. Another serving woman is at the kitchen counter engaged in active food preparation. There is a clear divide between the space of the home depicted that, like a salon, belongs to the public, and the intimate space of the kitchen that is only glimpsed. The kitchen can only participate in the domain of the public through the mediation and arbitration of the mistress. The mistress determines the tastefulness of her own household by interpreting the text. She uses the text to enable her own judgment and discretion.

In addition to the serving women and the gentlewoman, the image also depicts a portrait of a gentleman on the wall, presumably the master of the house. The portrait complicates the relationship between the mistress and her servants. His placement suggests he is in a position of surveillance over the wife in the same way she is of the servant, who also observes her from

Figure 3: Frontispiece to *The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy*, 1775
below. The gentlewoman’s relative position defines the status of the subject as such: she both
judges and watches and exists by being judged and watched herself. She is a gendered public
figure who does not stoop to the level of the maid by entering the kitchen, but at the same time
knows her place in relation to her husband. The subject of Glasse’s text is an observed,
anglicised mistress who does not use embellished language or infringe on the practice of
medicine by male doctors. Four lines of verse below the image further illuminate the role of the
mistress:

The FAIR, who’s Wise and oft consults our BOOK,

And thence directions gives her Prudent Cook,

With CHOICEST VIANDS, has her Table Crown’d

And Health, with Frugal Elegance is found.

The adjectives used to describe the mistress and cook, ‘wise’ and ‘prudent’ respectively, attribute
discernment to both women. However, prudence connotes a concrete application of judgement
that wisdom does not: the OED defines both as “having or exercising sound judgment,” but adds
“in practical or financial affairs” to the entry for prudence. The book is the medium through
which the mistress can have her cook enact her taste. The final lines of the verse again oppose
the domain of the public sphere with the domestic sphere: the cook is responsible for the ‘choice
viands’ and ‘health,’ while adorning a table with ‘frugal elegance’ (elegance tempering the
budgetary concerns) is the property of the mistress. Glasse depicts a distinct and gendered public
space within the home for her reader, and provides her with the means to separate herself from
the domestic realm through textual communication.

The exchange being illustrated contrasts with the kind of pedagogical relationship
Hannah Woolley’s texts encouraged both by teaching ladies to become effective tutors
themselves and by advertising Woolley’s personal services as a tutor. It is important to note, as Patty Seleski observes, “that the domestic ideology of the middle class which overlay maidservants’ experience of their workplace emphasized the personal relationship and shared gender experience between maids and mistresses should not obscure either the fact that the domestic economy of the middle-class household was also a form of political economy or the that mistress/servant relationship was as its core a labour relationship” (147). Glasse’s text enables a greater separation between the familiar interaction of lady and servant than in Woolley, and highlights the labour relationship at play. Here personal intimacy is transferred into written form and the text itself becomes the tutor. The image and the dual audiences of servants and ladies are grouped in a way that indicates that they belong to clearly divided spheres rather than equal recipients of the ‘universal’ knowledge of the manuscript-based cookbooks.

The cookery style cultivated in Glasse’s female public came to define public opinion about the genre. For example, William Verral’s 1759 A Complete System of Cookery, published fourteen years after Glasse’s, is strongly criticised in an article in the October 1759 issue of The Critical Review at the height of the Seven Year’s War. The author, possibly Smollett, denounces the work’s French recipes as a system of politics rather than cookery and posits that the text “may be supposed to be a political system trumped up in favour of our inveterate enemies the French” (284). Verrall’s offensive French style is dismissed in favour of “the ingenious Mrs. Glass” and “the venerable Martha Bradley of Bath”(287). Here female authors have become the arbiters of English taste.

Although Glasse clearly has become synonymous with a new style of English cookery, it is her writing rather than the cooking itself that constructs taste. While she purports to be anti-
French, her cookbook actually uses many French recipes, a practice which she defends in this way:

I have indeed given some of my Dishes French Names to distinguish them, because they are known by those Names: And where there is great Varity of Dishes and a large Table to cover, so there must be Variety of Names for them; and it matters not whether they be call’d by French, Dutch, or English Names, so they are good, and done with as little Expense and the dish will allow of (iv).

Glasse again privileges the qualities of her writing style and diction over the actual food itself. She maintains that her focus is on economy and simplicity in both writing and cooking, one of the reasons why elaborate French dishes are maligned. At the same time, however, she is also pointing towards the material results of the recipe rather than its name, directing her reader’s attention away from the text and towards the results it will produce. When she relates Indian or Dutch recipes she does not qualify the instructions in the same way. In Chapter III, subtitled “Read this Chapter, and you will find how expensive a French Cook’s Sauce is” (105) the opening recipe for Partridges concludes with “this Dish I do not recommend; for I think it an odd jumble of Trash... but such Receipts as this, is what you have in most Books of Cookery yet printed”(105). Glasse seemingly uses recipes such as these to serve as a contrast to her own simple recipes, but presents many “ragoos” and recipes for “Pain Perdu”(163) and “Peas Francoise”(203) without commentary. She is aware of audience expectations for cookbooks, and at the same time privileges her own critical practice over their critical reading: “Plain and Easy” is a method for reading and cooking.

The ‘plainness’ of Glasse’s text curtails the fluid relationship between reader and text. Knowledge is transferred rather than exchanged. While Glasse, like Hannah Woolley, does allow
for her readers to modify recipes to their own palate, she also sets down strict “rules” (13-14) for food preparation. For example, she leaves it up to the reader whether they want to skin their roast of mutton, but while “that you may do just as you please... be sure always to take the Skin off a Breast of Mutton” (2). Glasse’s reader is allowed less flexibility because her “Design is to instruct the Ignorant and Unlearned ... that the most illiterate and ignorant Person, who can but read, will know how to do every Thing in Cookery well” (1). Her reader is expected to align her tastes with public opinion. There are few remnants of the reflexive reader from the manuscript-proximal cookery book who brings her own embodied experience to the text. Now, reflexivity happens through print, and its corresponding public, as well as through practice. Woolley’s work engages with readers through experience, whereas Glasse’s engages through text. Glasse substitutes Woolley’s collaborative intermediated space of the kitchen-based community with her cultivation of taste. For Michael Warner “the notion of a public enables a reflexivity in the circulation of texts among strangers who become, by virtue of their reflexively circulating discourse, a social entity” (11-12). One of Glasse’s readers who became part of this social entity and circulation of texts was Anne Cook.

### 3.3 Anne Cook and the Kitchen Reader

Ann Cook did not receive Glasse’s deviations from cookery-book conventions in *The Art of Cookery* well. Cook’s 1755 *Professed Cookery* attempts to reclaim the genre from non-professional writers like Glass who, in championing a gendered public subjectivity, have transgressed the boundaries that the public should define. The titles of the two works illustrate their different perspectives: Glasse seeks to collect and refine recipes for a wider reading public, while Cook writes to a trade audience. Glasse emphasises tastefulness (art) while Cook focuses
on practice. Cook’s public textual response to Glasse makes her methods of writing, more than the actual recipes and their products, its main focus of dispute. Cook’s work criticises the way Glasse’s text attempts to transfer her knowledge into an accessible text and position cookery in the public sphere. She takes up The Art of Cookery’s pedagogical aims and supposedly clear instruction, the fractured relationship between Glasse’s own practice and writing, and, ultimately, its premise that cookery knowledge can be transformed from an embodied and intimate domestic practice to a textual public standard. In doing so, I argue that, rather than returning cookery to the domain of the intimate, Cook actually occupies a counterpublic realm. Professed Cookery is a satirical and oppositional rejoinder to The Art of Cookery.

Ann Cook’s biography has been used to explain her antagonism towards Glasse. Cook was likely born in the 1690s, and died sometime after 1760. A professional cook and innkeeper (with her husband John Cook), she describes herself as “Eighteen Year’s Cook, and Mistress of an Inn” (Cook ix). Like Hannah Glasse, Cook was also in debtor’s prison, ostensibly because of the continuing persecution of Cook and her husband by Lancelot Allgood, Hannah Glasse’s half-brother. Although Glasse was illegitimate, she appears in the pedigrees for her father’s (Isaac Allgood’s) family, and many of the subscribers of the first edition of The Art of Cookery were Allgood relatives, (Dodds 47) so she was still strongly connected to the family. The feud between Glasse and Ann Cook has been attributed to Glasse’s relationship with the Allgoods: Cook and her husband quarrelled with Lancelot Allgood, a sherrif and later MP for Hexham country, over disagreement about payment for expensive wine for an event they hosted at their inn (Dodds). The acrimonious relationship between the Cooks and Allgood is thought to be the motivation for Ann Cook’s hostility towards Glasse’s work (Dodds; Lehmann 114-15).
Although her issues with Glasse likely had personal origins, Cook chooses to use genre and style as her main method of critique. Setting aside familial conflict, I read Cook’s response to Glasse as imagining the gendered public space of Glassè’s text as a potential counterpublic sphere. If, as Glassè was clearly aware, the public sphere is a realm in which disciplines are distinct, Glassè has transgressed the divisions the public should delineate by defining her reader as a public subject. If Glassè is truly the “Lady” author of the first few editions, then she should not be infringing on the purview of a public ‘man of taste.’ Cook associates Glassè’s social position, and therefore distance from food preparation with deceit: “Look at the Lady in her Title Page,/How fast it sells the Book, and gulls the Age” (vii). In contrast, Cook styles herself as a professional keeper of cookery in its rightful place. The byline under her name on the cover page describes her as a “Teacher of the True ART of COOKERY” clarifying Cook’s stance that pedagogical practice is the rightful medium for knowledge transfer.

Cook supports her critique of Glassè’s ‘simple’ writing style and pretentions to public subjectivity by beginning her cookbook with a direct attack on Glassè in the mode of literary culture: verse. She precedes her text with a lengthy poem berating Glassè’s style, originality, and the idea that she would endeavour to teach serving maids how to cook. Cook’s poetic turn is not unique: Hannah Woolley also used verse to preface her own rebuttal to her plagiarised work in A Supplement to the Queen-Like Closest (1684). In her poetic introduction, however, Woolley criticised her unscrupulous publisher, and focused on her perceived duty to her women who have been undermined by the unauthorised text: “To wait on them I think it is my part/ And to confirm to them what I have writ/ Fearing no Censures ‘mongst them that have wit” (A2). While Woolley’s concern is her own reputation as a practitioner and her duty to her audience as such,
Cook’s subject is the practice of cookbook writing itself and the suitable domain of a female cook.

In *Professed Cookery*, Cook blurs the divisions between the individual and her writing by transposing them, through her critique of Glasse, into the sphere of public opinion where counterpublics are formed. Because Glasse stresses text above all, Cook critiques Glasse as if she and the text are one. Rather than address flawed recipes within her own recipes as Glasse does throughout her text, contrasting her techniques or ingredients with others’, Cook condemns Glasse in her poem and in an essay instead. By garrisoning the critique from the recipes proper, the debate is transposed from the kitchen to the page and from bodily to aesthetic taste. In Cook, the cookery mode enters the realm of public opinion as opposed to public subjectivity. The separation out seems like an attempt to insulate the practice of cooking itself from the public sphere, exemplifying Cook’s slippery relationship to cookery’s increasingly public status. By moving the critique to the prefatory poem, she has in part divided issues of writing and aesthetic taste from issues of cooking and bodily taste. For example, her poem starts by dismissing the idea that a text could teach cookery effectively. Cook begins by addressing Glasse’s primary claim that *The Art of Cookery* could replace direct instruction of servants such “that Each ignorant Maid/ By reading it, is Mistress of the Trade;/ Shall know to do the Art of Cook’ry well/ Examines not for Judgment, Taste, or Smell” (iii). Cook highlights the apparent disconnect between reading and tasting that is present in Glasse’s text. Her critique indicates that, for Cook, the act of readership cannot contain the bodily experiences of taste and smell which seemingly inform correct judgment and therefore artful cookery. Mastery of the expertise necessary to become a “Mistress of the Trade” is something Cook implies cannot be textually mediated or transferred.
Cook’s verses critique Glasse in multiple ways. She accuses her of plagiarism (“she steals from every Author to her Book” (iv)), and poor cookery (“Can Cream be thought a proper Sauce for Fish?” (v)). Gilly Lehmann also observes that Cook must have been familiar with Vincent LaChapelle, the French source of many of Glasse’s recipes (116), and so Cook rightfully takes issue with the way Glasse hypocritically both embraces and condemns French dishes. What appears to concern Cook most, however, is Glasse’s gestures to extensive knowledge and what Cook perceives as transgression in bringing them to print in a stylised manner. For example, Cook observes that “Well has she marketed her little Wit/ By a great Artifice link’d close to it” (iv). Here Cook proposes that Glasse’s writing has “marketed” her recipes in such a way that it has obscured the fact that the recipes give ineffective instruction or produce inedible food. Cook implies that Glasse’s writing effaces a tangible practice of cooking and tasting from the cookbook writing and reading process.

The absence of true taste is further exemplified for Cook by Glasse’s small section of remedies. Cook mocks Glasse’s minor foray into food for the sick, reduced from the detailed practice-based advice of Hannah Woolley to a brief chapter of broths and cordials: “Says, she meddles not in the Physick Way/ But Nurse and Cooks must her Precepts obey” (v). The connection between cookery and medicine in Hannah Woolley’s texts was mediated through Woolley’s reliance on local and embodied practice. Eliminating this medical aspect, then, exemplifies the extent to which Glasse has, according to Cook, removed the tangible elements of cookery from her work, replacing them with a textual and virtual rather than tested and actual practice. The narrowing focus of the cookbook from the late seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century, specifically the streamlining of remedies and general household advice in favour of recipes proper, facilitates the de-domestification of the genre. If cookery is to become a public
concern, it must necessarily divorce itself from its domestic and intimate associations. For Cook, however, the delicate dynamic between the familial intimisphere and the public space of working cooks has somehow been ruptured by recipes that employ new techniques of writing. It is the writing as much as the difference of recipes themselves that is problematic. By reframing her instructions for a general audience in simplified and standardised formats, Glasse has seemingly eliminated the intimacy of personal experience, re-categorising the space of cookery out of the embodied locality of the domestic and into public print culture.

In case the reader cannot guess whom she is criticising from her reference to Glasse’s title or methods, Cook makes sure to make her poem’s subject explicit. Glasse published the first few editions of her cookbook as “a Lady,” so Cook asks “What Title can be due to broken Glass?” (viii), alluding to Glasse’s failure as a cookbook author as well as her illegitimacy. The genre of Cook’s libellous poetry, harsh enough to be categorised as Juvenalian satire, is perhaps modelled after Dryden’s 1682 Mac Flecknoe or Pope’s 1718-42 Dunciad, only bemoaning the decline of culinary rather than literary culture, standards, and style. Dryden’s concern is ignorant readers unable to discern between good and bad writing, and likewise Cook’s concern is also with poor taste and discrimination. While in Mac Flecknoe the hack Richard Flecknoe has begot Thomas Shadwell, Glasse’s faulty text will produce “progeny of Lady Blunder” (vi) who will spread her anti-gospel of cookery. Dryden even uses a metaphor of tasting to illustrate Shadwell’s lack of wit: he is a gives him a “mountain belly”, (line 193) a “tympany [swollen abdomen] of sense” (line 194) filled with gas, but for Cook the inflated results of pretension in a cookbook are literal as well as metaphoric. She proposes that Glasse’s readers will physically suffer from bad recipes: “If Epicures full of such Meat should cram/ Their stomachs they might
lose” (v). Cook reminds her reader that bad cookbook writing has physical consequences, reinserting the body into her stylistic debate.

Cook’s method of representing her problems with Glasse suggests she finds Glasse’s emphasis on and combination of publicity and style particularly transgressive. Cook’s reoccurring refrain is that Glasse’s most significant indiscretion is producing a cookbook that attempts to generalize and professionalize what should be, for a housewife, matters of intimate domesticity:

A Lady Claims such skill in dressing Meat
Prescribes to Lords and Ladies what to eat;
From what she does collect makes up a Book,
Assumes the Author and the sov’reign Cook
Can Seed of Noble Blood, or renown’d ’Squires,
Teach Drudges to clean Spits, and build up Fires? (iii-iv).

The housewife Glasse has overstepped bounds of her knowledge and has “collected,” as opposed to composed or created, a text. By doing so, she has eliminated bodily practice from her work, making her labour textual. Cook inserts the less ‘tasteful’ elements of domestic labour to mock Glasse’s pretensions to sovereign of taste in the household. Rather than preserving the incongruent historical unity of a family manuscript cookbook wholly into print, like Woolley, or relating recipes from career service, like Cook, Glasse’s movements toward publicity and her laxity of practice has apparently not only taken over what should be the rightful dominion of a gentleman, but also deprofessionalised the “Cook’ry Art” which is, according to Cook, both a “Birthright and a Blessing” (iv).
Although Cook seems to retreat from the function of cookbooks as taste producers in print culture, beginning in a poetic genre positions her text firmly within the public sphere: *Professed Cookery* is publically participating in a critical debate. Cook’s choice to use this type of critical and responsive verse within her cookbook suggests that despite her insistence on the bodily domesticity of cooking, standards of cookery and cookbook writing have become public concerns. The poem’s allusions to Glasse’s work also suggest that Cook expects her audience to be aware of *The Art of Cookery* and of the cookbook’s participation in eighteenth-century print culture. Her readers would have to be familiar with Glasse’s work either directly or indirectly to understand the critique Cook is forwarding. Cook alludes to the public sphere of print culture into which she feels Glasse has inserted her cookbook as one where informed cookery criticism has been absent: “So many Criticks in Novel and Hist’ry/ Yet very few knows ought of the Cook’s Myst’ry”(vi). She suggests that public sphere responses to the genre cannot be effective because critics are missing knowledge of the intimate domestic practice of cookery. Cook’s poetic refutation is continually resisting its necessarily public position.

Cook’s opposition to Glasse’s work because she has not truly ‘written’ her text supports Cook’s emphasis on the important relationship between her own experience, text, and critical practice. The opening lines of her poem, “If long Experience make all Fools wise/ It will enable me to criticize”(iii) make her out to be one of the “few” critics that have the authority to evaluate a cookbook. In contrast to her own writing, Cook describes Glasse’s authorship as assembly rather than ‘real’ authorship borne out of practice:

Here, there, and yonder Cook’ry Fragments gathers,

And dresses up her Daw in borrow’d feathers:

Adds to her Pickings up a Cook’ry Guess,
Commits the grand Affair into the Press:

Cries, of all Books yet printed her’s th’ best,

Read it but Maids, and soon your Dinner’s dress’d (vi).

Unlike cookery books like Woolley’s *The Queen’s Closet Opened*, which invites readers into an intimate space of knowledge, Cook reads Glasse’s *Art of Cookery* as centrifugally transforming cookery into a style rather than a practice, replacing cooking with reading. Cook repeatedly uses the term “illiterate Maids” to describe Glasse’s readers, emphasising the problems of interpretations she finds between cookbooks and cooking. Glasse has collected fragments rather than authored a text, and her incoherence and trumpery has been authorised by the text’s printing.

Cook argues that Glasse has disrupted the division of knowledge, therefore disrespecting the boundaries of public and private. Cook compares Glasse’s over-publicization to crossing roles of profession and gender into the masculine public sphere:

And in the Art of Cook’ry shall proceed.

Famous Artist, great Kitchen Director,

Why might she not as well turn’d Architector?

Laid Plans for Houses, set forth Rules and Lines,

And bid the Ploughman build up her Designs.

Delude illit’rate Men as well as Maids

To profess’d Builders and Masters of Trades (vii).

Cook’s point is that Glasse’s tasteful cookery missives are as ludicrous as a female tradesman. Cookery is as separate from public taste as food production is from architecture. In fact, Cook warns, this type of cookery book could result in readers “getting publick Reprimand” (viii) as it
overreaches the domestic. Because The Art of Cookery and the role of a mistress is removed from the intimate sphere and is overly ‘public’ and stylized, Cook implies that Glasse’s work can delude readers in a way not possible for texts still centred in a local domestic. While Ann Cook earns a wage through her profession as an innkeeper, her work is still bounded by the privacy of a kitchen space and her writing is apparently for an ‘intimate’ public. Glasse’s text abides by no such restrictions.

Although Cook denounces Glasse’s methodological pretentions, Cook herself works around genre in an inventive way. While Glasse’s unity and simplicity of style flattens and smoothes over the diversities of the domestic, Cook attempts a series of distinct genres within her cookbook in order to account for the text’s varying concerns and possibly to separate domestic from public issues. After beginning her text with verse, she brackets her actual cooking instructions, which take up about forty percent of the total work, with a seventy page position essay that examines Glasse’s culinary failings more specifically, and a hundred page fictional/biographical narrative entitled “A Plan of Housekeeping” (published in the second and third editions only) that dramatises Cook’s own life and the cultivation of a domestic servant. Each respective genre serves a different function. In Professed Cookery the verse prologue address aesthetic taste, the essay serves as a close reading and critique of methodology, the recipes give pragmatic guidance, and the concluding fictional narrative helps cultivate the character of a cook. For Ann Cook, then, the idea of cookery in its entirely can only be expressed through multiple genres, while recipes themselves should be formulaic and practice-based.

Cook’s “Essay on the Ladies Art of Cookery” criticises Glasse’s recipes in detail for their ingredients, methods, and implied audience. She begins by contrasting her own practices (“my Way”) for roasting and boiling with “The Lady’s” (2), in a dialogic redressing of method,
countering each of Glasse’s techniques for preparing meat with her. Cook then presents some of her own procedures in a narrative rather than instructional form, again to both refute Glasse and to introduce her own epistemology of cookery before her technical recipes proper. She refers to Glasse throughout as “the Lady,” using phrases like “The Lady bids” and “This Lady adds” (2) to enhance the sense of debate and remind the reader that she is opposing cookery labour to taste leisure. Like her poem, this separation out of criticism from the actual recipes into a separate essay acts to divide her counterpublic criticism from intimate cookery.

After establishing her style of both cookery and writing, Cook begins a close reading of over thirty of Glasse’s recipes page-by-page. Using specific recipe titles and page numbers, she systematically criticises each dish by comparing and contrasting the two texts. The cited pagination demonstrates Cook’s attention to detail and reliable critique while underlining the disconnection between kitchen and page. This type of writing practice expects the reader to be either familiar with Glasse’s recipes and style or have her cookbook in front of her for comparison. While Cook reacts against Glasse’s public style, her own audience would only be able to make this type of intertextual comparison if they already constituted a reading public. The projected readers of her analytical essay exemplify the way Michael Warner defines publics: “publics are essentially intertextual frameworks for understanding texts against an organized background of the circulation of other texts, all interwoven not just by citational references but by the incorporation of a reflexive circulatory field in the mode of address and consumption” (16). Even as she seeks to curtail Glasse’s catholic form and overt publicity, Cook’s essay works within the type of field Warner describes, suggesting that her attempted re-domestication of cookery is, in fact, a counter-public practice.
Friction between writing and practice or between the imagined kitchen and the actual kitchen is always present in a pragmatic document like a cookbook. Cook alludes to this when she concludes her essay with “had I not her Instructions lying before me, I must acknowledge I should have been like St. Thomas, for his Unbelief” (68). In Cook’s reading, Glasse’s writing has divorced cookery from personal, embodied experience such that it becomes unreal. Cook also challenges the notion that the serving women (who Glasse attempts to help with her simplified discourse) will be able to read at all. She pities the poor “illiterate maid” (3) who follows Glasse’s instructions to butter a roast pit, and the “Illiterate and Ignorant” who “may very easily err in proportioning the proper Distance of the Spit from the Fire” (6) because text is not sufficient to prevent literal burns. Cook procures multiple examples of the failed results of following Glasse’s recipes for everything from pigeon roasting to artichoke dressing in order to demonstrate Glasse’s text does not function in the real space of the kitchen.

Cook finds Glasse guilty not only of style over substance, but an absence of reason, or common sense that originates, once again, in the repeated practice of food preparation rather than writing. For example, she directly quotes Glasse’s claim that she aims to teach the unlearned, dismissing it as a “puff” (39), because writing cannot succeed without a basis in practice. This is practice that Glasse is apparently lacking. For example, “In her Calf Head Surprise, the Teacher proposes a Task, that she cannot perform herself, if she do it as she has prescribed to others” (16). A recipe for a neck of mutton contravenes the primary empiricist categories of bodily taste “by calling black white, sweet bitter, bitter sweet, unwholesome wholesome” (33). Cook suggests that in promoting an observed and judging taste, Glasse has distanced herself too far from actual tasting. When Cook reviews Glasse’s recipe for roast pig, she testifies that “if I has seen the Operation made on it at the first, without reading the Orders, I would certainly have
though the Cook had broke out of *Bedlam*: For none in their Senses could perform Cookery so inconsistent with reason” (20). The dual meaning of ‘senses’ as both taste and smell and as mental well-being applies here: Glasse’s writing is apparently as senseless as a consumer of her recipes would need to be.

The final element of Cook’s text is her “Plan of Housekeeping”. The title and the way the section begins suggest that it will be the type of conduct-book appendix on household management not uncommon in other cookery books. Instead, it is a story based on Cook's own domestic history, interwoven with the story of another less skilled cook who becomes educated by Cook, at one point during a discussion over tea. Cook writes “Statesmen have private Interviews in Politicks, Merchants in Commerce, so let ours be upon the Art of Cookery” (198). In this intimate gathering, the young maid learns about the proper care and feeding of chicken for her mistress’ kitchen. Later she learns new recipes in the same narrative form as the essay. In her fiction these types of knowledge exchanges are personal rather than text-based. While the narrative describes the alleged persecution of Cook's husband by Glasse's half-brother, the focus is on pedagogical domestic relationships where one woman (Cook) is tutoring another in the domestic arts, which encompass the whole range of household maintenance inside and outside of the kitchen. Cook’s narrates a domestic that is still somewhat embedded into the practice of daily life. The story offers more support to Cook’s premise that cookery knowledge cannot be taught through text alone, but is transferred most effectively through domestic and personal exchanges between women. In addition to explicating her defence of the intimacy of cookery, her writing is also trying to expose Glasse to censure while at the same time, like Woolley's biography, attempting to redeem her reputation. Yet by encasing her recipes in essays and fictionalised
narration, her form grapples with the location of cookery, and its movements towards and away from an intimate subjectivity.

Despite Ann Cook’s multipronged attacks, the success of Glasse’s style made it the standard for the cookery mode for some time. Twenty years after the publication of The Art of Cookery, Elizabeth Raffald’s 1769 publication, The Experienced English Housekeeper, openly promoted Glasse’s accessible and economical approach in the introduction. Where Glasse wrote for servants through the lady of the house, Raffald writes to readers employed as housekeepers or cooks who therefore require, even more so than with either Woolley or Glasse, “as plain a Style as possible” (ii). The genre of cookbooks evolved in response to its public. Cook’s condemnation of Glasse’s plagiarism did not affect the accepted concept of cookery book standards. For example, Mary Cole’s 1788 Lady’s Complete Guide broadcasts its borrowing, from other cookbooks, the textual practice criticised by Cook, and sells itself as an anthology or “library of cookery” (i). Cole writes that she “has attentively perused every publication on the culinary art” (i) and promises to acknowledge her various sources for recipes. Cole aims to be both complier and editor, procuring the best of the genre. Her partridge soup, for example, cites five cookbook authors (including Raffald and Glasse) as sources. This attempt at canon formation suggests cookbooks are an established genre with a reading audience and a conception of value.

The cookbook genre allows ideas to be exchanged and debated in a virtual public forum. The concerns of this public, however, are both part of the increasingly separate domestic sphere and likely to be portrayed as inconsequential by the dominant public. For example, number 51 of The Rambler (1750) contains a letter from ‘Cornelia’ who asks whether she “shall throw away the books which I have hitherto thought it my duty to read, for the lady’s closet opened, the
complete servant maid, and the court cook, and to resign all curiosity after right and wrong, for the art of scalding damascenes without bursting them, and preserving the whiteness of picked mushrooms” (141). The cook being mocked, Lady Bustle, is made ridiculous not only because of her culinary fixations, but because of the secrecy with which she conducts them. Using a family manuscript cookbook, or “oracle” with recipes “concealed by the manner of spelling,” (140) she bakes in secret, taking “the ingredients privately into her own closet” (139). Even though cookbooks are widely read, their titles instantly recognizable, and are prominent enough to be mocked in a journal of the dominant public sphere, they still carry the stigma of privacy from their origins, their gendering, and their domesticity.
Chapter 4: The Division of Taste

As I detailed in my preceding chapters, the discussions about taste carried out in both periodicals and cookery books by writers such as Addison, Steele, Glasse, and Cook were contentious and diverse. I have discussed how the transformation of the public sphere, as theorised by Habermas, and the corresponding separation out of the domestic, or intimisphere, from both the public and private sphere, as theorised by McKeon, gave rise to both a public sphere of disinterested and diffuse judgement, and a domestic realm of embodied, local tastes. The early manuscript texts of Hannah Woolley, for example, fostered taste as a part of lived and practiced domesticity that is embedded in all aspects of life. As the domestic transformed into a bounded zone after the Revolution, however, (McKeon) writers of cookery texts sought to insert their bodily interpretation of taste into the public sphere, bridging the space between intimate, private, and public spheres by mediating physical taste through writing and cookery instruction.

In my second chapter I discussed how cookery authors such as Mary Kettilby took up empiricist ideas about taste in her writing in order to engage with the genre of public taste. However, the participation of female cookery book authors in print culture negotiations about judgement was not always well received. In particular, as I detailed in my third chapter, Hannah Glasse and Ann Cook disagreed about the extent to which women producing taste in the home through cookery and domestic management could participate in public conversations about taste. The result of this conflict was that, rather than providing a forum where collective standards could be formalised, the flourishing of subjectivity in the public sphere prevented consensus. This diversity of option about taste was the problem that mid-eighteenth century philosophers, particularly Hume, attempted to explicate.
Hume methodically outlines this problem in his 1757 essay “Of the Standard of Taste”: the public sphere encompasses too much difference to function as an arena for creating standards of taste judgment. Hume illustrates his problem of taste with a parable taken from Don Quixote. In the tale, two men are mocked after they judge the flavour of wine differently, one pronouncing the wine to have a hint of iron, and the other a trace of leather. Yet, when the cask is drained, they discover that a key with a leather tie is the origin of their differing impressions:

It is with good reason, says Sancho to the squire with the great nose, that I pretend to have a judgment in wine: This is a quality hereditary in our family. Two of my kinsmen were once called to give their opinion of a hogshead, which was supposed to be excellent, being old and of a good vintage. One of them tastes it; considers it; and, after mature reflection, pronounces the wine to be good, were it not for a small taste of leather, which he perceived in it. The other, after using the same precautions, gives also his verdict in favour of the wine; but with the reserve of a taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish. You cannot imagine how much they were both ridiculed for their judgment. But who laughed in the end? On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom an old key with a leathern thong tied to it (234-5).

By manifesting the contradictions inherent in individual judgement in the key, Hume implies that although taste is potentially objective, it is still difficult and perhaps even impossible-to-discern. Although both tasters are ostensibly correct, in that their individual judgements of the wine were both derived from the same material object, the parable also shows that “the organs of internal sensation are seldom so perfect as to allow” for a definitive standard to be determined (241). The presence of the key in the wine suggests that nature could be the origin of defining factors in individual tastes. But differences in judgment, like those debated in the public sphere, will
always arise, according to Hume, because individual tastes have not yet become disciplined enough to comprehend all of the nuances of the material world.

In this final chapter, I will examine a mid-eighteenth-century cluster of philosophical and cookery texts that attempted to delineate the formalized criteria that would resolve the multiplicities of human judgement observed most poignantly and skeptically by Hume. Despite these authors’ reluctance to reduce subjectivity with claims to universality, in their works they grapple with the problem that that standard of taste needed to be located in something outside of a moral sense. Hume in his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) and “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757), John Gilbert Cooper in his *Letters Concerning Taste* (1755); Alexander Gerard in his *Essay on Taste* (1756); Edmund Burke in his *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757); and Adam Smith in *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), rather than arguing for the existence of an overriding taste ideal, sought to explain the differences caused by subjective judgments by creating the categories, disciplines, and sciences that allow agents to discern and define the plethora of possibilities in nature, such as is illustrated by Hume’s key. The resulting transition moves from attempting to determine a standard of taste to creating discourses and ultimately systems of taste to organize, categorize, and make hierarchies of taste. In his 1752 *The Analysis of Beauty*, for example, the artist William Hogarth creates a system of aesthetics, outlining methods to allow artists to reproduce beauty in a methodical way for the sake of consumers.

But transition from the problem of the standard of taste to systems of taste also entailed a crucial division in the public discourse that surrounded the issue and that directly involved cookery writers. On one hand, systems became instruments for the production and reproduction of knowledge as theorized by Clifford Siskin. In two related essays, “The Problem of
Periodization: Enlightenment, Romanticism and the Fate of System” (2009), and “Novels and Systems” (2010), Siskin proposes that “The System” was the pivotal eighteenth-century genre for knowledge production (“Novels and Systems 204) and identifies a system as “something that embodies things” (“Problem of Periodization” 105). Siskin observes, for example, that in the first edition of Johnson’s Dictionary (1755), where system or its variations appear 122 times, Johnson both defines system as the “reduc[tion]” of “many things” into a “regular” and “uni[ted]” “combination” and “order,” and implies that “essays entail a less regular ordering or reduction of things than systems do” (“Novels and Systems 204). On the other hand, this rise of systems in the eighteenth century also helped to entrench concepts of consumption or reception that distinguished “taste” from its production. Peter De Bolla argues that this process is especially marked when taste is systematized as an aesthetic category. By disciplining taste through standardization, as De Bolla has observed in The Discourse of the Sublime and his article “Toward the Materiality of Aesthetic Experience”, taste became a way for writers to connect the virtual (or the imagination) with the real. Taste could be used to mediate the real and the virtual, De Bolla suggests, because it is a bodily sensation that resides in the space between sense perception and mental process. It is both actual and imagined, and, “once taste has been asserted, and its overriding powers of arbitration assented to, the cohesiveness of society within which it stands as the marker for a commonality of external experience and internal sensation—a sign of the man of taste—is assured” (77). In other words, defining a standard of (virtual) taste allows for a network where individuals can participate in (actual) social manifestations of those standards such as reading or cookery. This system, however, can only be understood and formulated by the cultural management of the expert philosopher, scientist, or gentleman, and not the cook or farmer.
My aim in this chapter is to make clear that the shift from standard to system and the division of taste that resulted from it were in part helped by cookbook authors who, working within the larger discursive nexus of taste, but also more particularly on its most physical manifestation in the preparation and presentation of food, make disciplinary divisions between the practice of cooks and the theory of philosophers. After Hume, aesthetics becomes a discipline of pleasure, contemplation, and judgment which could be applied to food or table settings, but only in accordance with aesthetic standards otherwise applicable to music and art, although not universally, and not in relation to qualities in objects themselves. Cookery, by contrast, became a discipline devoted to the reproduction of food and devoted to objective qualities separate from aesthetic judgment. The cookery book authors writing just after Hogarth make similar attempts to The Analysis of Beauty to formalize taste through disciplinarity, and create systems of cookery to organize physical tastes and enable their production. This transition was informed by changes in technologies of measurement and agriculture, for example, that allowed reproduction to occur more easily and mechanically, without theoretical expertise on the part of the producer. I see mid-eighteenth-century cookbooks as an example of the reduction of many things into order, as they embody taste in textual systems rather than in the physical self. These cookbooks, I will argue, display generic features of system as a way to manage the variable standard of taste, and allow readers to reproduce individual tastes that have been authorised by the cookbook. By doing so, the cookbook reader is no longer a subjective agent in the interpretation or formulation of taste. Both Martha Bradley’s 1200 page The British Housewife (1756), and Sarah Phillips’ The Ladies Handmaid: or, a Compleat System of Cookery (1758) provide instructions that are prescriptive rather than descriptive. With these authors, cooking becomes a scientific practice rather than a theoretical concern, the responsibility of philosophers and consumers.
Bradley and Phillips’ approach means that the text itself, and the technology of the formal recipe, replaces the cook who was once both producer and judge as the arbiter of taste. Cookery, in the form of uniform and reproducible recipes, becomes a means to reproduce uniform sensations. By facilitating taste’s imagined material manifestation, the texts’ systems—what we call recipes—externalize internal judgment through their imagined material product: tasted food. However, this systematization comes at the expense of the subjective individualism of the cook. In order to achieve this system of taste, the cookbook authors distinguish the labour of reproduction (in this case, cooking) from the field of judgement. Along with a hierarchy of theory and practice, systematizing taste in this way also genders the categories. Bradley and Phillips disassociate cookery from the debates in which Hannah Glasse and Mary Kettilby had been lively participants in. In Bradley and Phillips’ cookery books women replicate taste but do not create it. In contrast to the genre’s earlier engagement with subjective tastes, the practice of cookery is removed from the space of mediated cultural judgment. As a result, the later texts describe cookery as a reproductive activity where women simply mimic taste as practitioners rather than judge taste as subjects. In this chapter I will trace the way that, following the agenda of the philosophical writing, cookbook authors achieve a systematic standard by disengaging the act of cooking from the field of judgement cookery previously encompassed. The sphere of publication in which cookery and the philosophy of taste had formerly circulated together is now divided into disciplines.

Ultimately, in both cookery and philosophy systems of taste were leveraged to distinguish theory from practice. In cookbooks more specifically, the growing philosophical distinction between principles of taste and rules for its re-enactment informed the transformation of cookery writing from a creative to a didactic genre. In philosophy, Adam Smith’s *Theory of*
Moral Sentiments (1759) and The Wealth of Nations (1776), along with Henry Holm, Lord Kames’ Elements of Criticism (1762) and The Gentleman Farmer (1776) followed the movement to resolve the problem of standard by systemizing the very divisions that the advent of systems had inspired. In particular, Smith’s concept of the division of labour into tasks or disciplines, and the resulting divide between those who perform tasks and those who conceive of the system as a whole, asserts the separation between practice and theory. The result is a division of labour between production and contemplation. The division of labour is also present in Kames, as he divides and assigns critical and practical labours based on class. In both his philosophical and agricultural texts, Kames points to the possibility of using knowledge based on observation to synthesize subjective individual tastes in a cohesive societal and textual framework: a system of taste. The resulting framework in Smith and Kames separates theory from practice, and the theorist from the practitioner.

4.1 Hume and the Problem of the Standard of Taste

As I have discussed in my earlier chapter, the eighteenth century man of taste was conceptualised through though his embodied aesthetic sense, cultivating judgment though sense-based discernment. Later philosophical texts, however, use these individual reflexivities to formulate uniform methods of evaluation instead. Written in 1756, Alexander Gerard’s Essay on Taste begins by supporting the concept of an internal sense of beauty. He then, however, imposes that internal sense onto a didactic aesthetics. Aesthetic taste for Gerard is in part natural but needs to be “assisted by proper culture” to reach “full perfection,” (1) implying that he supports the theory that ‘true’ taste can be achieved by adhering to correct principles. He uses uniformity amidst variety as a guiding principle of beauty, but adds perceptions such as novelty, sublimity
and harmony to his prescriptive formula of judgment. Rather than using bodily taste as a way to analyse the mechanisms of judgement, the senses of taste Gerard focuses on are sight and hearing. Gerard’s emphasis on sight and hearing facilitates his move away from taste as a reflex or bodily judgment. He thus concludes that “the completest union of the internal senses, is not of itself sufficient to form good taste [...] they must be aided with judgement, the faculty which distinguishes things different, separates truth from falsehood, and compares together objects and their qualities” (85). For Gerard taste is not the property of the sensing individual but of the critic who will subject “materials to a regular induction, reduce them into classes, and determine the general rules that govern them” (177). He gives gentlemen of relish the important task of creating, through experimentation, a discourse of taste for less delicate and tasteful individuals to use.

Rather than exploring the origins of taste, because they indicate that a reflex taste is problematic, Gerard’s Essay on Taste focuses on objective precepts and criticisms provided by superior tasters as the means to shape external taste. These rules eliminate the need to rely on a subjective and reflexive internal system of taste. Peter de Bolla observes that Gerard seems to have difficulty describing the way tastes are sensed and the way those sensations can be described. More specifically, de Bolla suggests, the problems Gerard has with describing how taste operates are the result of his belief that “taste is not a temporalized process at all, but, ... a discourse, a form of representation, a means by which the inner and outer worlds are organized into coherence: in terms closer to the analyses of Gerard and Burke it is a figuration, a trope” (86). In my reading, this implies that taste thus requires “authors” to form and organize this discourse. DeBolla goes on to argue that Gerard’s essay also divorces “the descriptive model from the objects it describes” by “making taste a form of sensation which is activated by the
working and exertion of the imagination. Taste is, in this manner, the product of the confrontation between the imagination and the real” (84). In de Bolla’s reading, Gerard theorizes an internal sense of taste as something that actively constructs meaning rather than something that is the result of simply sensing and evaluating objects. By extending individual tastes, namely sensed experiences of objects, to a social context of principles, taste becomes a way to connect the virtual with the actual. The divide Gerard emphasises between reflex and critical taste opens space for process of distinction used to create systems, but does not go so far as to create one.

Before his essay on taste, written immediately after Gerard’s, suggested the possibility of an existing, if remote, aesthetic standard, David Hume’s 1748 *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* extended Locke’s empiricist exploration of the material conditions of thought. Dabney Townsend describes Hume as a sceptic and radical empiricist, as well as someone who was viewed as an atheist by his contemporaries (2). M.A. Stewart also notes that for Hume’s contemporaries his scepticism and “searching critique of our faculties and our fundamental beliefs addressed questions few were inclined to ask, with a subtlety few could fathom” (48)

David Hume, along with Francis Hutcheson (who I discussed in my second chapter), Adam Smith, and Henry Home, Lord Kames (who I will discuss later in this chapter), was a central figure of the Scottish Enlightenment. The Scottish association is important because, as Roger Emerson details, the national contexts were distinct from England: in particular, Scotland was extremely poor, and with complex physical geography that was difficult to cultivate and limited the impact of agricultural and industrial improvements. Emerson goes on to explain that as a result of these issues, coupled with the number of genteel citizens who had been educated abroad and those who had benefited from University reforms starting in the 1690s, “thinkers and improvers… became numerous enough to change the institutional mix in the country” (19).
Smith and Kames, for example, address improvements to industry and agriculture. Hume’s Scottish context perhaps underscored the division between material and aesthetic, which, in a country with challenges in agriculture and food supply, were conceptually distinct.

Although Hume’s primary contribution to the discourse of taste is widely known to be his essay on the standard, nevertheless Hume does discuss the epistemological problems underlying that discourse in several of his earlier philosophical works. In the *Treatise of Human Nature*, for instance, Hume returns to Locke’s example of the pineapple to emphasise that our ideas come from our senses, in this case, taste\textsuperscript{24}. In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke proposed that a child could have no concept of the taste of an oyster or a pineapple had he not experienced them (111), and in the *Treatise*, Hume reiterates that "We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pineapple, without having actually tasted it" (53). The mechanism of physical taste is an analogy for how ideas are shaped in the mind, and Hume returns to examples of tasted objects to explain the relationship between sensation and ideas.

In *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, his revision of the treatise, Hume argues that ideas are the result of mixing, compounding, separating and dividing our sensory impressions of the world. As a result, he concluded, ideas are always less ‘lively’ than sensations, for “all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words... it is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses” (37). The major implications of this theory are first, that sensory responses are the foundation of judgment, and second, and that these senses are multiple and unlimited. Hume does not believe that our direct knowledge of immediate experiences translates

\textsuperscript{24} For a detailed reading of taste and Locke's pineapple, see Sean R. Silver's "Locke's Pineapple and the History of Taste" (2008).
to systems of understanding. In his essay on taste published a decade later, Hume explores the
possibilities of arriving at a standard for evaluating taste. Rather than provide a solution,
however, Hume still identifies material objects as the source of taste variations. Taste has a real
basis in the object, but this basis cannot be discovered, and thus remains unknowable.

Hume begins his 1757 “Of the Standard of Taste” by positioning his argument within the
context of the contemporary debate about taste in the public sphere, remarking that “the great
variety of Taste, as well as of opinion, which prevails in the world, is too obvious not to have
fallen under every one’s observation” (226)²⁵. Hume is clear that he expects his audience to be
familiar with the diversity of opinions that surround the discussion of aesthetic standards, and
also to recognize that this diversity is common even among men of similar education and
prejudice. Hume argues that two things complicate the idea of a universal standard of taste: the
“different humours of particular men” and “particular manners and opinions of our age and
country” (243), and that, even after ruling out issues of sensory defects or external situations, “a
certain degree of diversity in judgement is unavoidable, and we seek in vain for a standard, by
which we can reconcile the contrary sentiments” (244). Sentiment, Hume posits, is always
diverse and “always real” (230), precisely because it is immediate: only the object itself is static.
As a result, Hume turns to physical taste as a way to explain not only difficulty of standardising
individual taste judgement, but to elucidate the gap between perception and objects. Amidst the
“caprice of taste” (233) a measure exists. If an object is deemed pleasing, there must exist “some
particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric... calculated to
please” (233). When an individual does not react with pleasure, Hume concludes, it is not

²⁵ Maureen Harkin describes Hume’s account as addressing “the troubling fact of mass deviations from a standard of
approved taste” (172).
because universal principles of taste do not exist, but because the individuals’ sensory organs are defective, another material cause undermining universality. George Dickie has argued that “Hume makes no attempt to claim that there is a faculty of taste; he merely says that taste involves sentiment, that is, taste depends on intrinsic valuing” (123) and that Hume realized “the enormous difficulty involved in supporting the view that there is a faculty of taste, that is a view that there is a specific mental structure or combination of mental structures that functions where matters of taste are concerned” (123-4).

According to Hume, the imperfections of human sensation along with the vagaries of situation “throw a false light” (234) on perceived objects. Hume proposes that although perceptions of bodily taste are as varied as judgments of beauty, the qualities of the sensed object never change. Although both Locke and Hume believed that the source of taste in objects was unknowable, while Locke uses the distinction between sweet and bitter learned in childhood as a founding premise of understanding, Hume takes up the same analogy to underscore the fruitlessness of uncovering the source of tastes. Hume argues that “to seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an enquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter,” (230) implying that because the two tastes are understood as existing in sensations rather than objects they can never be verifiable. While he defines the organs of perception and their cognitive processing as the location of tastes (plural), Hume suggests that the elements of singular objective taste are found outside the body. Using flavour as his touchstone, he reiterates that although beauty is a secondary quality as difficult to measure as sweetness, it is still one that is somehow a part of substances themselves: “though it be certain, that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature
to produce those particular feelings” (235). Although taste has a real basis in an object, this basis cannot be discovered.

As I discussed in my second chapter, Hutcheson and Shaftesbury use metaphors of physical tasting to theorize the ways in which individuals engage with and understand the outside world. Shaftesbury particularly uses physical tastes to explore how preference and appetites can lead to the development of cultured, moral gentlemen. For Hume, however, taste does not provide this outcome. Denise Gigante reads the end result of Hume’s empiricism, unlike the man of taste in Shaftsbury, as “a collection of tasteful appetites that do not cohere into an actual person of taste” (60). By focusing on the tasted object and the tasting organs, then, Hume’s analysis remains specific rather than global. He eclipses the promise of connoisseurship and public sphere concurrence with the tasted object. In his example of the key in the wine, a definable physical item renders the specifics irrefutable and perpetually manifest, as well as perpetually varied. It is an experiment that cannot result in a discoverable conclusion, and therefore no precepts of what is beautiful and tasteful. Following Hume's analogy of the key, then, the potential for a standard of taste being formed by a consensus of critics or public opinion must be only “seeming unanimity” (227), because it always disappears when specifics, particularly those of terminology, are examined.

Hume links the material specificity of the key and sense organs with the immaterial variations of individual judgements that undermine general moral unanimity. However, he also uses this parable of physical discerning, constructed as an experiment with known characteristics, to conclude that there is potential for objectivity. Although taste principles have not yet been “methodized, or reduced to general principles; though no excellent models had ever been acknowledged; the different degrees of taste would still have subsisted” (236). In other
words, he suggests it is possible for a measurable system of taste to exist, whereby different
tastes correspond to different qualities or objects. In this way Hume shows the way towards
standardising taste that other philosophers such as Kames will pick up on by suggesting that
there are “general rules of beauty” (235). At the same time, however, Hume acknowledges that
this standard is difficult to actually define, as only a “very delicate palate,” (236) or sensitive
taste organs, can accurately discern beauty. These individuals have “delicacy of taste, whether
we employ these terms in the literal or metaphorical sense” (235). They are like Shaftesbury’s
gentlemen of relish, for whom practice improves taste and a “delicate taste of wit or beauty... the
source of all the finest and most innocent enjoyments,” (236) yet for Hume even their refined
critical judgments do not have the potential to create an objective standard of taste. Where
Gerard allowed for the possibility that a standard of taste could be arrived at, for Hume taste can
never be formalised in this way.

English works contemporary with Hume continued his project to analyse the workings
and evaluations of taste, but they also attempted to account for the variability of judgements that
for Hume undermine the idea of a universal standard. After Hume’s problematization of the idea
of standard, philosophers revived taste as a discourse. For example, John Gilbert Cooper’s
Letters Concerning Taste, the first book-length study of taste, was published in 1755. Influenced
by Shaftesbury’s Characteristics, as was his 1745 poem “The Power of Harmony,”
26 Cooper defines taste as an internal sense with three distinct properties: “that internal sense we call
TASTE (which is a Herald for the whole human System, in its three different Parts, the refin’d
Faculties of Perception, the gross Organs of Sense, and the intermediate Powers of Imagination)

26 Robin Dix details Cooper’s bibliography in his Oxford Dictionary of National Biography entry
has as quick a Feeling of this secondary Excellence of the Arts, as for the primary Graces; and
seizes the Heart with Rapture long before the Sense, and Reason in Conjunction, can prove this
Beauty by collating the Imitations with their Originals” (7). His outline of the machinations of
sensation locates taste in the arrangements of objects. Cooper also proposes that excellent
intellect, physical senses, or imaginative capability does not always result in an individual with
good taste. Despite this Humean caution, he still posits that a proportional balance of intellect,
sensation, and imagination that produces tastefulness, defining taste as arrangement of attributes
in an individual. Cooper uses Addison to illustrate his ideal of judgment as equilibrium: though
he was “no great Scholar; he was a very indifferent Critic, and a worse Poet; yet from the happy
Mixture… he was bless’d with a Taste truly delicate and refin’d” (30). While he modulates his
ideal of sensory tasting with the concept of balance, Cooper still implies that there is a standard
of good taste. That standard, however, is measured not by the qualities of the object, but the
quality of the perceiver, and thus takes the form of a discourse.

Edmund Burke also reworks Shaftsbury and Hutcheson’s theory of a sixth
aesthetic/moral sense. In A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime
and Beautiful he defines the aesthetics of an object through the emotional responses it provokes.
For the revised 1759 second edition of the Enquiry, Burke added an introduction on taste that
outlines the basis of his aesthetic theories. Burke defines taste as “that faculty, or those faculties
of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgement of the works of imagination and
the elegant arts” (13). Burke then develops a threefold theory of aesthetics that originates from
the body’s primary sense reactions and is subsequently moderated by imagination and reason.
Burke uses Locke's primary sensual opposition between sweet and bitter as a starting point to
explain how thoughts are created through bodily sensations: “all men are agreed to call vinegar
sour, honey sweet, and aloes bitter; and as they are all agreed in finding these qualities in those objects, they do not in the least differ concerning their effects with regard to pleasure and pain. They all concur in calling sweetness pleasant, and sourness and bitterness unpleasant” (14). Burke associates positive and negative associations with bodily taste. He also uses examples such as “a sour temper” and “a sweet condition” (14) to illustrate how sense reactions are then extended to the way more complex judgments, aesthetic and otherwise, are expressed. By using flavour as a metaphor, Burke implicates the palate in universal judgement and thus in his discourse of aesthetics.

But while Burke acknowledges that sweet and bitter are universal oppositions, and establishes instinctive positive or negative reactions to sensation as the first level of taste, he goes on to explain how the subsequent perception of those sensations is not always congruent with the original stimulus. To demonstrate the difference between the faculty of tasting and taste preference, or “the natural and the acquired relish” (14) Burke relates how “a man frequently comes to prefer the taste of tobacco to that of sugar, and the flavour of vinegar to that of milk; but this makes no confusion in tastes, whilst he is sensible that the tobacco and vinegar are not sweet, and whilst he knows that habit alone has reconciled his palate to these alien pleasures” (14). Variations in taste, he argues, are not the result of differences in sense, because “the whole ground-work of taste is common to all,” (22). Instead, these differences emerge “either from a greater degree of natural sensibility, or from a closer and longer attention to the object” (21), a theory of superior distinction that mirrors Hume’s discussion of delicate palates. Burke develops this scheme to explain why, although sense reactions form the base of his concept of taste, aesthetic judgment is not a sixth sense but the result of knowledge and reason refined through
socialization acting upon sensations. The first reactions of sense, such as tasting sweetness and responding with pleasure, are the genesis, but not the totality of aesthetic judgement.

For Burke the secondary and tertiary reactions to sensed taste are where “the best taste differs from the worst” (25). Here Burke is referring to aesthetic taste, so, as in Cooper’s *Letters Concerning Taste*, the palate is therefore not the location of taste. This is why Burke concludes that smells and tastes, even bitter ones, cannot be sublime by themselves but must be “moderated, as in a description or narrative” in order to display the sublime “principle of moderated pain” such as in the phrase “to drain the bitter cup of fortune” (78). However, Burke does propose that sweetness is “the beautiful of the tastes” (140) not only because of its pleasing flavour but because of its smooth and regular globe-like form. Burke probes the metaphor of sweet sights and sounds to discover a common formula for the beautiful. He speculates that all pleasing sensations, such as the taste of sweet liquors, the feeling of marbles, and the taste and touch of water and oil have similar smooth shapes. This implies that the beautiful, unlike the sublime, does have the potential to be a primary sensed and unmediated ‘palate’ taste. Although he arrives at different conclusions, Burke’s deconstruction of the process of discrimination shares the impetus towards classifying tasting as Hume and Cooper. Cooper, Burke, and Gerard make the contingent standards of taste a critical discourse. The task of creating systems is taken up by those involved in discourses, rather than principles of taste.

4.2 Taste as Practice, Taste as System

While Burke and Gerard, as I have explained, were outlining a discourse of taste, other writers, such as the artist William Hogarth and the cookbook writers Catharine Brooks, Sarah Phillips, and Martha Bradley, sought instead to think about taste as a practice of reproduction.
distinct from theory. The difference between discourse and system here is crucial. While a discourse measures taste values within a sensory field in which basic responses are always assumed, a system produces taste as knowledge, art or food for senses or palates whose responses are not guaranteed, as Hume made clear, but which might be rendered predictable under certain defined or narrowed conditions. The generic shift towards systematic organization and categorization in art and cookery was contemporary with similar changes in technologies of measurement in the mid-eighteenth century: Miranda Burgess has noted that “the publication of Johnson's Dictionary coincided with a period of rapid changes in the history of global transportation and of Britain's participation in it. Developments ranged from feats of engineering to advances in systems management. Prominent among the latter were administrative responses to lessons learned from the experience of provisioning and moving troops in wartime... among the former, canal systems within Britain rapidly expanded from the 1750s” ("On Being Moved: Sympathy, Mobility, and Narrative Form” 304). Ron Broglio has related how the Jacobite defeat at Culloden in 1746 was delayed because of the need to create more accurate maps, a setback that prompted George II to commission a survey of the Scottish highlands in order to have more effective control over the area. These maps became the starting point for the National Ordinance Survey of Great Britain, a project that created, rather than represented, spatial and social boundaries through standardised maps (Technologies of the Picturesque 53-4). Stephen Daniels proposes that eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century mapping and surveying improvements provided a “visual model for expanding the scope of landscape” (62) that allowed artists such as J.M.W. Turner to depict British topography with a greater density of physical and cultural information (“Re-Visioning Britain: Mapping and Landscape Painting 175-1820” 68). And, as David Landes has detailed, there were dramatic improvements in the lunar method of ocean
navigation, enabled by the development of the sextant and Tobias Mayer's 1757 and 1758 lunar tables (*Revolution in Time*). All of these technologies of measurement redistributed the "things" they measured into categories and thus systems. The comprehensive and systematic recipe book, then, as a medium for regulating and measuring taste like Hogarth’s guidelines for producing art, became cookery's answer to Hume's story of the key. While Hume resisted system and left standard unknowable, cookery books embraced system as a way to encode standard.

Systems, as Siskin argues, were an Enlightenment goal: “comprehensive knowledge of a world that could be known. Both the actual genre of ‘system’, as well as the manifestations of its spirit in similarly ambitious attempts at comprehensiveness from encyclopaedias to treatises, are widely recognized markers of Enlightenment aspiration” (“The Problem of Periodization” 103). Siskin defines the technology of the Enlightenment as writing, describing its forms as tools, and its procedures as the way those forms mixed, resulting in the creation of disciplines. (“The problem of Periodization” 102). Siskin goes on to follow the transformation of system and its division into disciplines in the 1790s, and after. I will examine the generic markers of system that appear in cookbooks in the 1750s and 60s as a way to respond to the problems of a standard of taste cause by variability. Rather than re-establishing a meta-standard or discourse of taste, artists, philosophers, scientists, and cooks created distinctions, hierarchies, disciplines27, and systems. While the cookbooks I discussed in my earlier chapters displayed characteristics of multiple genres (poetry, periodical writing, and philosophy, for example), and maintained the less formulaic organization of the manuscript cookbook, the texts by Brooks, Phillips, and

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Bradley I will address here are part of the genre of system itself. Cookbook authors used the technology of writing to create systems of taste. In “The problem of Periodization” and “Mediated Enlightenment: The System of the World” Siskin attributes the growth of system in the eighteenth century, particularly between 1740 and 1780 to the rise of Newtonian ideas, namely that the universe could be understood because it was a system, and observes that the genre was the book rather than the debate-inviting journal article. He describes Smith’s 1759 *Theory of Moral Sentiments* as a master system with smaller systems embedded within it. In “Novels and Systems,” Siskin proposes that systems within systems, like those in *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, became the mode through which knowledge was produced.

A good example of how systems operate in contrast to discourses of taste is William Hogarth's 1752 *Analysis of Beauty*. Hogarth’s modelling and rigid principles exemplify the development of archetypes of taste in philosophy. The designations he makes illustrate the idea of practice-in-system, and reflect the shift Ron Broglio proposes occurred in aesthetics as a result of technological changes. Broglio argues that in the second half of the eighteenth century the inscription of technology that changed natural objects into simple distinct objects with characteristics that humans could comprehend and define. As have the critics I mentioned earlier, he describes how the period “saw a rise in the variety and accuracy of tools used to measure and represent objects in nature including chronometers, surveying instruments, meteorological classification systems, and classification systems for animals. These technologies were not developed with aesthetics in mind, but their principles were adopted by artists who searched for means of translating what they saw onto paper” (16). Broglio concludes that the correlated

28 Robert Mitchell identifies four variations of eighteenth-century systems: a genre of literary production, an explanation of the nature of reality, an organized institution, and, finally, a meta-system that relates the first three types of system (“Adam Smith and Coleridge on the Love of Systems”).

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“move from things (with their opaque materiality) to objects (as intelligible and abstract sums) brings nature into culture and imbues elements of nature with a halo of social meaning” (15).
This corresponds to the shift from Hume’s problem of the standard of taste to the systems proposed by Hogarth as, as I will argue, cookery book authors. More generally, Broglio suggests that empiricist experimentation, by attempting to make objects known, quantifies and socialises these items as a result.

The potential for a system of taste is taken up and expanded in detail by Hogarth in *Analysis of Beauty*. Focussing on aesthetics, Hogarth’s standard follows Francis Hutcheson’s theory of uniformity amidst variety, and applies it to the creation and evaluation of art and design. Hogarth defines beauty as “variety with simplicity” and expands the attributes of beauty to six named principles: “fitness, variety, uniformity, simplicity, intricacy, and quantity” (23).

While Hogarth acknowledges that perceptions of beauty are impacted by fashions, he still maintains that a foundation for judgment based on set standards exists. Despite this, by creating guidelines for taste the prescriptive and often didactic nature of the text implies that an inner sense of beauty is unlikely, since individuals must be educated, as his text demonstrates, about the principles of taste. Written by an actively practicing artist, *Analysis of Beauty* defines a standard and provides models of instruction that can be reproduced by readers. His definitions and illustrations provide a way for mimicry without a delicate palate and superior taste.

While Hogarth’s formulae allowed him to claim a ‘natural’ universality of beauty, his principles, as do those in the cookbooks I will discuss, systematize artistic production in a way that makes taste seem comprehensible rather than endlessly variable. Hogarth’s rules of art produce a system to attempt to resolve the problem of the subjectivity remaining in taste epistemologies like Hume’s. To a great extent, this resolution was achieved by means of
ideology. Hogarth’s philosophy of art also extended to constructions of categories of nationalism, which he notably depicted through food. In *Beef and Liberty: Roast Beef, John Bull and the English Nation*, Ben Rogers describes Hogarth’s resentment “of the way English art aped foreign fashion and hated being dependent of rich patrons” and explains how he “wanted the creation in England of an independent and respected school of naturalistic painting, unaffected by what he saw as the pretentiousness and formality of European art” (91). Hogarth’s 1748 painting of the Gate of Calais, titled “O, The Roast Beef of Old England,” after the song in Fielding’s *The Grub-Street Opera*, depicts a side of beef being brought to an English tavern while starving Frenchmen look on in hunger. In this image, Hogarth associates English identity with hearty food and a natural aesthetic, both products that could be reproduced from systems of cookery and art.

In the same way that Hogarth could define his response to his practice by asserting and delimiting its ideological associations, cookery writers achieved a new systematic standard by making the practice of cookery, like Hogarth's practice of art, ideologically consistent as well as connected to codes of gender. Cookery was thus distinct from the theoretical valuation of taste. Whereas Hogarth was able to maintain connections between production and taste ("analysis" and "beauty") the cookery writers could not. This is because the formal disciplining of cookery proceeds as it is *gendered* as a female activity. As a 'natural' category, gender is used to define

29 In *The Work of Writing* Siskin notes that by associating the beautiful with women and the sublime with men, Burke created a binary that renders the subordination of women part of “universal human nature,” or the natural system. In addition, “the divisions of labour and knowledge which his discourse on the sublime help articulate can this appear as naturally inevitable, rather than, in part, the products of the very hierarchy of genders they reproduce” (71). Various critics, including Burke's contemporaries, have discussed his gendered oppositions: in *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* Terry Eagleton discusses Wollstonecraft’s critique of Burke's gendered separation of beauty from moral truth. In his article “The public prospect and the private view: the politics of taste in eighteenth-century Britain” John Barrell is careful to observe that “women were almost entirely out of the question” (81) when it came to the ability to produce abstract ideas and possess taste.

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separations between the individual discernment and management of the lady of the house
Hannah Glasse articulated in her *Art of Cookery* is supplanted by works where prescriptive
governance comes directly from the text rather than being mediated through the reader’s taste.
Cookery books written along this model reflect philosophical writing that aims to define taste, rather than periodical writing that aims to cultivate taste. They are titled to suggest they provide the means to achieve a standard of taste: Martha Bradley’s *The British Housewife* (1756), Sarah Phillips’ *The Ladies Handmaid: or, a Compleat System of Cookery* (1758), William Verral’s *A Complete System of Cookery* (1759), and Catharine Brooks’ *The Complete English Cook; or Prudent Housewife* (1765) all purport to contain thorough instruction. These works, instead of promoting critical engagement, make cookery a reproductive rather than a creative endeavour. In these texts, the authors create systems that instruct the reader in ways to reproduce the type of standards that Hume found unknowable. In relation to Hume's story of the wine cask, cooks become responsible for producing the key, not tasting the wine.

All the authors offer systems of cookery that are written to provide comprehensive templates for the reader to replicate. Through their instruction, these texts attempt to answer the problem of the standard of taste raised by Hume, Cooper, Burke, and Gerard, by, like Hogarth, delineating an objective model for taste reproduction. The culturing of nature Ron Broglio identifies as a significant inclination of eighteenth century technologies of measurement and classification systems is at work in recipe books that emphasis greater specificity and disciplining of taste. The result of this disciplining in the feminized sphere of the kitchen, though, is to limit female cooks from using cookery as a medium of subjectivity.

Published in 1758, the year after Burke’s *Philosophical Enquiry*, Sarah Philips’ *The Ladies Handmaid* exemplifies cookbook writers’ turn away from a cookery discourse as part of
public conversation about domesticity and towards systems dictating uniform prototypes of household management. The title page of The Ladies Handmaid designates the text’s contents as a “Complete System of Cookery on the Principles of Elegance and Frugality wherein the useful Art of Cookery is rendered plain, easy and familiar.” The full title outlines the way the reader will follow taste’s production through the text’s progression from principle to system to reproduction. Philips characterizes her genre as a system based on principles. The principles Philips claims to employ are that of elegance and frugality. A text written “on the principles of Elegance and Frugality” suggests an existing doctrine of taste provides the basis for her system of cookery. The pairing of these two values points the idea that these standards are understood and that the instructions that follow are meant to clarify and fulfil them. Importantly, Philips’ principle of taste is not based on tenets of physical tasting, the variations of which Hume identifies as so problematic. Instead, Philips avoids the complications of individual palates and locates taste in formulaic preparation and presentation of food, not its consumption. She describes her method as providing the elements of good housewifery (title page). By following the prescribed system, the housewife can become an arbiter of taste derived not from her own subjectivity, but through Philips’ objective formulae.

The Ladies Handmaid is organized by recipe type and geared towards use, with clear and straightforward recipes, bills of fare for each month, marketing (shopping) directions, and a table of contents. Other than a short preface, there is almost no authorial commentary on the recipes themselves, either to provide variations or editorial remarks. It is as if the move towards standardization has extended to the author herself, as her opinions become codified rather than explicitly expressed. A comment that does appear, however, offers the possibility of variations in taste preferences not in the housewife or cook, but in those she is serving. At the end of a receipt
for mutton broth Philips remarks that “Some love it thickened with oatmeal, others with rice, and others with bread” (301). The “some” she is referring to are the subjects who are allowed individual taste variations amidst the collective critical consensus of the cookery text. In cookbooks such as Mary Kettibly’s, uses “your Taste” (40), “if you like”(59), and “if you desire” (69), placing the cook herself is in charge of this judgment, rather than those she is serving. The second person, and the related possibility of alternatives chosen by the cook herself, hardly appears in Philips’ text. This phrasing, which gives the consumer as opposed the cook alternatives, effaces the role of the female cook. It reinforces a gendered separation between the public sphere of the dining room and the intimate zone of the kitchen.

Philips’ distinction between her reader cook and those she is serving also appears in her preface “To the Ladies” (A2). Here she again separates the role of tasters, described as modern philosophers and implicitly male, from the housewives and female cooks who will use her text:

It needs very few arguments to persuade people to prefer a good dinner to a bad one; and there are but few modern philosophers that would prefer an insipid meal to a well dress’d and elegant entertainment. I can venture to assert that those feminine arts practiced in the frugal management of the provisions of a family, are of more intrinsic value than some admired branches of literature (A2).

This passage highlights several notable categories of taste, genre, and gender that Philips is constructing. She identifies the enjoyment of a meal as a critical and philosophical practice by classifying her dinner guests as modern philosophers. In addition, by describing the qualities of a good dinner as an accepted standard among her audience, Philips suggests that her text is partaking in an established system of taste. Finally, by asserting that housewifery is intrinsically more valuable for women than literature, she detaches the feminine practice of taste, specifically
food preparation and household management, from the masculine practice of taste as a critical public contribution\textsuperscript{30}. Instead of virtual tastes, the housewife should focus on the “provision” of bodily taste for others.

The segregation between physical and critical tasting continues in Catharine Brooks’ 1765 \textit{The Complete English Cook; or Prudent Housewife}. Brooks’ prefatory letter “To the Ladies” asserts that “Cookery being one of the most necessary Accomplishments required for the fair Sex” (1) has made it necessary to write her text, associating the completeness of the text with the totality of domestic management that women should be responsible for. The text’s frontispiece illustration, (Figure 4), depicts a large kitchen with two female cooks at work and a male servant bringing in game, captioned with a quotation from Proverbs 31: “She looketh well to the ways of her Household and eateth not the Bread of Idleness”. Choosing this verse from the chapter on the conduct of women allows Brooks to capitalize on its metaphor of bodily incorporation: it indicates the text will aid the housewife in embodying both the product and practice of her labours. In the image, the divided employments of provisioning, cooking, and baking, show practice in practice: the tasks at hand all represent components of larger systems of both household, taste, and morals (implied by the quotation from Proverbs). The rows of dishes arranged by size and the mechanical spit in use suggest order and technology have been inscribed on the practice of taste. In contrast, in the image from Hannah Glasse’s text, Figure 1 in

\textsuperscript{30} In \textit{Gender and the Formation of Taste in Eighteenth-Century Britain: The Analysis of Beauty} Robert W. Jones notes that beauty, a concept belonging within the concept of taste, “became in the eighteenth century a contested term used to signify a woman’s public presence,” and that there was a “central conjunction between eighteenth-century accounts of taste and the account of woman’s social presence” (7) that positioned women as corrupting and ornamental. Beauty, then, became an aesthetic category that precluded women participating as agents of criticism rather than objects of judgement. In \textit{Making Sense of Taste: Food & Philosophy}, Carolyn Korsmeyer extends the superiority of higher senses (sight and hearing) over lower senses (taste and smell) to a gender hierarchy privileging male over female (30). She also notes that the social roles of women as cooks and servants contribute to his hierarch (36).
Chapter 3, which also displays orderly plates, the kitchen is glimpsed only from the side. The focus in on the exchange between the lady of the house and her cook, and these women dominate the frame. In Brooks’ image, the kitchen itself dominates, and the cooks are small elements of a larger system at work. The rabbits being brought in on a pole and the framed painting of woods over the fireplace suggest that nature is being actively managed. The female cooks are illustrated in the act of reproducing the text’s instructions, and the male servant in provisioning, yet all, as a result of either class or gender, are duplicating rather than creating. *The Complete English Cook; or Prudent Housewife* will allow this scene to be recreated in kitchens across the nation.

![Image removed due to copyright](image-url)

Figure 4: Frontispiece to *The Complete English Cook*, 1765
The system of good taste of the female cook for both Philips and Brooks is that of moral industry and service. In contrast, the male chief William Verral’s 1759 *A Complete System of Cookery*, while no less programmatic, ascribes system to his meticulous instruction in French cuisine rather than running a household. Accordingly, Verral claims his purpose is “to shew, both to the experienced and unexperienced in the business, the whole and simple art of the most modern and best French Cookery; to lay down before them such an unerring guide how it may always be well managed, and please the eye as well as the taste of every body” (ii). The entirety of Verral’s text is recipes; in contrast, Brooks includes instructions for marketing, laundry, and medicine (making clear that she is not infringing on a doctor’s role) as well as cookery. Her receipts will, “with very little Practice render the Reader; what the Title very justly expresses, viz a Complete English Cook and Prudent Housewife” (1). Verral’s reader will be able to produce dishes, but Brooks’ reader will actually *become* a prudent housewife. The difference in *A Complete System of Cookery* is that the system at work is focused on the interplay of ingredients in recipes, rather than the system of cookery and household as a whole. Ron Broglio ascribes that difference to nationality, writing that “the English find suspect the French’s cuisine’s transformation of ingredients such that items are not identifiably related to how they appear in nature. French food changes nature into complex elements of culture... in contrast, the English keep their food close to its natural state” (182). I see Verral’s attention to the chemistry of cookery as suggesting a gendered division of knowledge, where the intricacies of flavor are too close to work of theory to be addressed by female writers. All three writers’ ‘complete systems,’ however, provide a textual prototype for taste.

The most exhaustive of these programmatic texts, Martha Bradley’s two volume *The British Housewife*, was published in weekly instalments numbering over 1200 pages in 1756.
Bradley’s lengthy work is exceptionally comprehensive-- but only within a curtailed scope. Bradley styles her system of taste as an integral part of domestic life by structuring the work around the twelve months of the year, dictating specifics of ingredients and methods rather than developing the palate of the cook herself. As Gilly Lehmann notes, Bradley was a professional cook from Bath, whose intended audience was “as wide a readership as possible: the master and mistress of a household, and their servants, from the housekeeper and cook down to the farrier and the gardener” (126). She notes Bradley’s uncommon inclusion of hostess serving instructions as an example of the totality of her scope. Lehmann goes on to classify *The British Housewife* as a French-inspired work that uses its modular culinary style as a foundation while also adding variations to customary recipes. Bradley, then, demonstrates the ideal of reproducing rather than creating theories of taste. What is most notable about her text, however, is not its cookery methods but its methods of composition. *The British Housewife* is a highly rhetorical and structured work in which Bradley pays as much attention to her writing as to her recipes. It is organised by months of the year and includes all of the necessary tasks a housewife would need to do in each month. Each month is further divided into chapters, sections, and articles. In addition, by following the text chronologically, the reader would be able to learn how to cook from instructions that build difficulty sequentially. This latitude is only possible in a text that divorces cookery from the field of critical taste.

Bradley builds her text from multiple sources: she uses a seventeenth-century manuscript collection by Lady Hewet, Patrick Lamb, and Hannah Glasse, among others, adding personal commentary and modifications as she saw fit (Lehmann 85; 126; 222). Her varied sources come from three distinct manifestations of the genre, and Bradley combines them to create a systematic compendium of recipes and cookery writing. Using a manuscript text links her to
early authors like Hannah Woolley, while Patrick Lamb exemplifies the excess of French court-
cookery, and Hannah Glasse the discerning lady of taste. By doing this, Bradley essentially
anthologises a century of physical and stylistic tastes in a single work.

![Image removed due to copyright]

**Figure 5: Title Page to The British Housewife, 1756**

Her comprehensive approach is evident in the textual overflow of the title page, seen above,
where she claims to provide “what is necessary to be done in the *Providing for, Conducting,* and
*Managing* a FAMILY throughout the Year… compleating the careful Reader, from the highest
to the lowest Degree, in every Article of *English* Housewifery.” Bradley’s subtitle delineates a
theory of housewifery that synthesises food production with domestic administration. In addition
to providing, conducting, and managing, the range of verbs that appear on Bradley’s title page
span a dizzying range of domestic tasks: marketing, chusing, roasting, dressing, carving, setting,
pickling, distilling, and trussing, among others. This is a text of practice: verbs implying critical work, such as tasting or discerning, are absent. Although Bradley is not the only cookery book author who claims to provide all the essential information readers will need, *The British Housewife* is a truly encyclopaedic text in both length and latitude.

Starting with January, Bradley aims “to conduct the Cook and Housekeeper throughout the Year” (A2). She proceeds by beginning, as she does for every month, with a list of common ingredients, along with definitions and explanations for each. Before starting, however, she clarifies her approach for her reader, ending with a description of the function of eighteenth-century system:

We shall here by way of Introduction to the rest, lay before her a general List or Catalogue of Fresh Provisions, that she may in one View see her Store; and we shall, in their proper Places, enter more particularly on their Qualities and Choice. This is to be considered as a Chapter of Rembrance [sic] rather than Instruction. It contains what every one knows, but none is ever to forget (A2).

While other cookery writers did acknowledge their writing style, for instance in Hannah Glasse’s references to her simplified vocabulary, Martha Bradley is the most explicit about her methods of composition. For example, by identifying her lists as catalogues, which Bradley does several times, she suggests she will be providing a level of detail beyond a simple record of items. The variations of nature’s tastes have been ordered and understood in a way that recalls the model of taxonomy described by Carl Linnaeus in his 1735 *Systema Naturae*. Bradley’s own terminology is supported by the painstaking specifics she provides and continues to add to for each ingredient and for each method of cookery. Her article on anchovies includes the fish’s scientific name, *encrasicholus*; fishing seasons, methods, and locations; flavour; purchasing advice; and use.
While some of the information would be useful for a cook, particulars such as how fishermen attract anchovies as night exceed the norms and necessities of the genre. Instead, The British Housewife aims to be totalizing document that produces a defined and complex domestic domain through text. The text’s exhaustiveness, however, obscures the narrowness of scope that its domestic actually contains.

Bradley’s rhetorical moves always suggest that the text is building a vast store of knowledge that reflects an already-established standard of taste or “what every one knows” (A2) but which it is the exclusive taste of the disciplined cook to reproduce. She achieves this by writing each month’s chapters, sections, and articles as progressions of the previous month’s, and by making this strategy overt:

This is in one View a general Table of these Provisions, and may be called A Bill of Fare for the Year. It is the first Thing the House-keeper should have before her Eye, because it should be always in her Memory. None of the Catalogues here are compleat in the lesser Articles, for that is the Business of the succeeding Parts of the Book, in which we treat of the Months in which the Things are particularly in Season; and there it would have loaded and perplexed the memory” (5)

Bradley continues to remind the reader of her process throughout her text, for example signposting her procedure as a critical component of effective instruction: “the great Number of Articles will necessarily render this a long Chapter, but we shall separate it into several Divisions” (19); “we shall deliver the particular Rules for separate Things under these several Articles” (33); and “As we are now entering upon those Dishes that have particular Ingredients in them, we shall make it a Rule first to explain what they are, before we give the Receipts in which they are ordered to be used” (51). This technique affirms that Bradley sees the reader’s
awareness of genre and organization as a crucial part of her understanding of the contents. Writing form and function are indivisible from each other in her text.

In addition to foregrounding style, Bradley chooses diction that reinforces a sense of taste as system. Rather than using the first and second person singular pronouns of “I” and “you” in her receipts like most other cookery texts, in *The British Housewife* Bradley uses the first person plural and third person singular pronouns of “we” and “she” (or “the cook/the housekeeper”). Her selection of pronouns both suggests the text reflects an authoritative critical consensus on domestic taste, while also displacing the reader from an intimate relationship where the author is addressing and teaching her individually. Instead, she is subsumed into a universal “British housewife” who is able to reproduce the systematic “Rules” and “Methods,” (Bradley’s most frequently repeated terms) that characterises the text. This diction entirely overwrites individual differences in taste. Her use of phrases like “esteemed by many” (326) and “this is a general and universal observation” (453) reinforce her writings as a national model for female home labour. Bradley also uses and defines precise vocabulary such as “cut up,” “thigh,” “unbrace” and “rear” to describe carving a turkey, woodcock, duck, and goose respectively. Combined with her persistent cataloguing, her meticulous program of instruction and her technical vocabulary contribute to the impression that *The British Housewife* is formalizing a paradigm of domestic practice.

Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Bradley’s formal methodology specifically recalls the system of taste devised by Hogarth. In her chapter on placing dishes, she confirms that she is participating in this conversation when she alludes to Hogarth and his equally programmatic *Analysis of Beauty*, published four years before her text. Contrasting the typical English square or rectangular table with the French oval or round table, Bradley writes: "a great Painter had
lately wrote to prove that there cannot be Beauty in strait Lines: The Table we use are composed of such, and the Example was never more fully illustrated. The Form of the Table compels us to set the Dishes in the same Manner, that People may have room for their Plates, and thus all becomes ungraceful” (70). Bradley takes up Hogarth’s theory that the serpentine Line of Beauty is the most aesthetically pleasing form and applies it to table setting. She also alludes to his (and Francis Hutcheson’s) championing of “variety,” throughout the text as rationale for including multiple methods, flavours, dishes, or out-of-season preserves. Bradley’s explicit reference to philosophical aesthetics demonstrates conclusively the extent to which her cookery book is part of the emerging genre of taste systems.

But before she gives instructions for setting a table with two to thirteen dishes using Hogarth’s principles of beauty, Bradley explains her rationale, writing “to please the Palate is one Design of this Branch of Study, and to please the Eye is the other” and that the aim of this section is to lead the reader “toward the improving the common method by a proper and reasonable Imitation” (69). Bradley clearly divides even the domestic labours that are part of her cookery system into subtasks and subsystems: the palate is separate from the eye, and the judgement of each is separate from the production and service of food that pleases them. Nowhere is the reader expected to discern this knowledge on her own, but to imitate the rules laid down in the text. Most importantly, Bradley asserts that these formulae to follow are components of a “Branch of Study” that has theorised taste by examining the operations of its subdivisions. The reader need only follow the single branch of study that has been outlined for her. By mimicking what has been laid out for her, and “by complying with these Rules the Housekeeper will always avoid Blame” (71).
The British Housewife, along with the other systematic cookery books from the 1750s onward, marks the end of the cookbook as a genre that encouraged active participation in taste. Going forward, cookbooks eschew the cultivation of intimate and public tastes that distinguished the vibrant cookery mode in the early part of the century, and become simply guides to be followed. This discourse of taste does not disappear, however. From the 1750s to the 1770s, Adam Smith and Henry Home, Lord Kames, follow the distinction the cookery book writers make between practice and theory and production and consumption. Both Smith and Kames will emphasize that knowledge and judgement come from observation as opposed to practice. Their writing mirrors and fulfills the divisions I have documented occurring in Hogarth and the cookery writers.

4.3 Taste as Theory

The division of labour between consumption and production apparent in the cookery books I have discussed is theorized in greater detail by Adam Smith and Henry Home, Lord Kames. While Bradley, Phillips, and Brooks, along with Hogarth, present textual systems, Smith and Kames conceive of systems beyond the level of practice, a perspective not accessible to female writers of cookery texts, or indeed to readers engaged in the act of reproduction rather than theory. To explore the distinction between concept and practice in the later eighteenth century, John Barrell has used taste in landscape and landscape painting to describe the type of political and theoretical authority available to certain individuals. Complex ideas, he argues, can only be understood by the expansive generalist, rather than those engaged in labor. He compares the gentleman observing a panoramic landscape, painted or actual, from a prospect that allows his to observe and “abstract the general from the particular” (91). This viewpoint allows Smith
and Kames to do what the cookery books cannot: perceive the entirety of systems as a whole, rather than only participate in one as an agent within it. As a result, true taste is removed from the imitative labours of cookery, and can belong only to the gentleman spectator who observes and theorises.

Adam Smith’s 1759 *Theory of Moral Sentiments* does not focus on the material qualities of taste. Smith takes up this question of the standard of taste by replacing Shaftsbury’s and Hutcheson’s internal aesthetic and moral sense with a sympathy-based model of morality based on the individual’s reactions to the feelings of others. For Smith, a similar process of fellow feeling works to align tastes: “we... judge of the propriety or impropriety of the sentiments of another person by their correspondence or disagreement with our own” (23). Smith also proposes, however, that mutual sympathy can make individuals more likely to accept people with opposite tastes to their own. Unlike Hume, who stressed the problems of seeming unanimity between individual perceptions, Smith locates taste within a framework of opinion and fellow feeling. Smith’s system of sentiment thus replaces a sensory model entirely, whether it is a model of judgment resulting from an internal sense (Shaftsbury, Hutcheson) or a model of judgment resulting from reflection upon external senses (Locke, Hume). This occurs as a result of the way Smith’s theory of sympathetic judgment devalues expressions of appetite and the body to privilege the social over the physiological. As a result, for Smith aesthetic and bodily taste cannot be linked. We can have no sympathy, but only “peculiar disgust” and “aversion for all the appetites which take their origin from the body” because “we cannot enter into them”

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31 In "Mediated Enlightenment: The System of the World," Siskin argues that the Scottish Smith was reacting to the final defeat of the Jacobites in 1746 after the 1745 rising: by following Isaac Newton's model of writing systems to understand the world, rather than producing knowledge through the debate and conversation of the public sphere, he could create master systems that asserted a category for Scotland and its thought.
(34). Because it is impossible to participate in what another tastes, Smith concludes that bodily sensations are not sympathetic.

Smith continues to emphasise a divide between physical sensation and aesthetic sense in his epistemology of judgement. To illustrate his distinction, he describes how an individual avoids re-entering his or her own bodily sensation after it has been experienced and the appetite satiated: “the object that excited them ceases to be agreeable: even its presence often becomes offensive to him... he can now as little enter into his own passion as another person. When we have dined, we order the covers to be removed” (34). Unlike Hume’s key, Smith's culinary metaphor is one that removes food and the tasting body’s role from aesthetic judgment entirely. Taste and judgment are also divorced from Smith’s discussion of food in his economic manifesto *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). In that text, he uses food as a function of economics rather than taste because “food is always, more or less, in demand” (201). That demand thus mitigates an individual’s ability to form judgements. In addition, Smith explains, food “not only constitutes the principle part of the riches of the world, but it is the abundance of food, which gives the principle part of their value to many other sorts of riches” (237-8). This value is based on the basic bodily need for food, although he notes that food cannot be accrued because it rots. As well, food cannot become a significant luxury because “the rich man consumes no more food than his poor neighbour” and unlike houses, dress, or ornaments, “the desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human stomach” (224). As hunger always remains governed by the needs and restrictions of the physical body it remains, for Smith outside of the realm of sympathy and taste.

Smith’s separation between physical and bodily taste is a logical continuation of his theory of the division of labour that he outlines in the opening chapters of *The Wealth of Nations*. 
Smith describes the world of production as systematically divided into tasks or disciplines for the purpose of reproduction. The world of consumption, however, is largely unaware of these divisions, and it is only the philosopher, not the agents with the divisions, who can see the entire operation as a single system. Smith describes this observer as an inventor of machinery that allows labor to proceed with greater efficiency:

many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe everything; and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects (18).

The ‘idle’ philosopher who sees everything but does nothing has theory as his occupation, a task which trumps the physical consumption as the basis of taste. Those engaged in the production of food, both in agriculture and in cookery, are not part of the philosophy of taste. Smith notes that farming, and, I would argue, household management, “does not admit of so many subdivision of labour, nor of so complete a separation of one business from another, as manufacturers” (12) in part because of the variations in tasks required for the different seasons of the year. Even so, in cookbooks like The British Housewife, Martha Bradley works to divide the labours of cookery through monthly chapters.

The role of the man of taste is pivotal to the work of Henry Home, Lord Kames. His writing covers tastes both literary and literal, and addresses the difficulties caused by conflicts

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32 In "Mediation and the Division of Labour," deBolla observes that the division of labour in Wealth of Nations requires technology (both machinery and task division) that then makes segments of a larger entity subject to mediation. The labour then becomes segmented forms, but does not establish the system as a whole. I see this as analogous to the division of labour in cookery books such as Bradley's, where the system of taste is reproduced, but not theorized, in dishes, methods, and seasons.
between internal and external senses by subjecting them to the discernment of the experienced gentleman. Kames published his aesthetic treatise *Elements of Criticism* in 1762. This diverse text addresses literary criticism as well as the problem of the standard of taste. It is notable for its distinction between what he terms real versus ideal presence (68), specifically the original sensory reaction (real presence) versus the revisited or reflected sensory impression (ideal presence). Kames’ treatment of the differences between the real and the imaginative, as well as his interest in agriculture, make his writings useful for understanding the transition of thought around taste, sense, and materiality in the second half of the century. In both *Elements of Criticism* and his 1776 *The Gentleman Farmer*, Kames realizes the separation between the field of criticism and the realm of practice as the means through which taste can be understood, defined, and replicated. Kames bases this division between judgement and reproduction along class lines: theory is the realm of the gentleman and practice the labourer. I want to argue that, as implied in the philosophies I previously discussed, and as more explicitly expressed in Kames, this divide is gendered as well as classed. Thus realized, the experimental and experiential work of judgement is the sole property of the man of taste.

Kames addresses taste directly in his chapter in *Elements of Criticism* on the “Standard of Taste”. Like Smith and Hume, he highlights the importance of sympathy to taste, and, like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, classifies taste as an internal sense. However, Kames both rejects and embraces the literal and figurative meanings of the term:

“That there is no disputing about taste,” meaning taste in its figurative as well as proper sense, is a saying so generally received as to have become a proverb. One thing even at first view is evident, that if the proverb hold true with respect to taste in its proper meaning, it must hold equally true with respect to our other external senses: if the
pleasure of the palate distain a comparative trial, and reject all criticism, the pleasure of
touch, of smell, of sound, and even of sight, must be equally privileged (719).

Kames uses this observation to illustrate the problem with sense perceptions and judgement,
namely that if there is no way to criticise sensory reactions, then “there is no ground of censure
against any one” (719). He resolves the problem of taste variability identified by Hume by
proposing a class-based answer to the problem of discrepancies in preferences.

After pronouncing that variations in taste derive from the varying roles individuals have
in society, Kames supposes that superior taste is necessarily limited. Nature, he writes, “hath
wisely and benevolently filled every division with many pleasures; in order that …the different
branches of business, whether more or less agreeable, be filled with hands: a taste too refined
would obstruct that plan; for it would crowd some employments, leaving others, no less useful,
totally neglected” (720). In this formulation, then, only a privileged few have the sensory
means to begin to understand the workings of taste. Knowledge and judgment come from
observation rather than practice. Kames also associates less refined taste with the body,
suggesting that the act of physical work or consumption itself displaces a capacity for judgement.
The societal stratification leads him to suggest, most directly in The Gentleman Farmer, that
individuals free from the constrains of labour have the skills to divine the systems of taste
present in nature, and to create the means by which they can be reproduced. But in the Essay on

33 In Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (1979) Pierre Bourdieu posits, in a reversal of Kames,
that taste judgments or aesthetic dispositions are the learned behaviours that result from social position. For
Bourdieu aesthetic taste is a way for individuals to distinguish their social class. Taste “distinguishes in an essential
way, since taste is the basis of all that one has—people and things—and all that one is for others, whereby one
classifies oneself and is classified by others” (56). Bourdieu uses bodily taste as a primary epistemology of
aesthetics, speculating that “it is probably in tastes of food that one would find the strongest and most indelible mark
of infant learning, the lessons which longest withstand the distancing or collapse of the native world and most
durable maintain nostalgia for it” (79).
Criticism he had already written that “those who depend for food on bodily labour, are totally void of taste; of such a taste at least as can be of use in the fine arts” (726) and warns that those who overindulge in food (in his words, “tend to voluptuousness” (726)) corrupt not only their aesthetic but also their moral taste. For Kames, the dominance of physical taste adulterates critical ability because it will eventually “extinguish all the sympathetic affections, and... bring on a beastly selfishness” (726). Bodily senses are so polluting that they reduce an individual to animalistic urges and erase the facility for moral and aesthetic sensitivities.

Despite the challenges inherent in variant tastes, difficulties Kames describes as “insuperable” (721), he nevertheless posits that a universal notion of taste must still exist. As Kames ascribes taste differences in individuals to nature, he proposes that there is therefore a measure against which we assess taste. For example, if a taste conforms to that common ideal, then we “intuitively conceive a taste to be right or good” (722). This idea of a common ideal, he suggests, “however languid and cloudy” (726), is the only existing measure of taste. Kames argues that this must be discoverable because “what is useful, must have a foundation in nature” (721). He concludes that “if we can reach that foundation, the standard of taste will no longer be a secret” (721). Because nature itself isn’t varied, its systems will be able to be understood by individuals with a “delicacy of taste” improved through the vigours of “education, reflection, and experience” (727). Nature is itself the ultimate system, and by divining its organizational structures, or method of “distributing things into genera and species” (721), gentlemen of enlightened sensibilities will be able to “unfold” (728) the principles of taste.

Before Kames outlines the dynamic of taste differences, he gestures towards the ways in which they may be overcome by exploring the process through which sensations can be aroused. He begins his section “Emotions Caused by Fiction” in his larger chapter on “Emotions and
Passions” by distinguishing between sensed objects and our relived perception and description of such objects. In this meditation on the function of imaginative prose he discusses how these recalled and reproduced sensations, which he terms “ideal presence” (67), has as much influence on an individual as actual sensations, or what he terms “real presence” (67). Kames describes ideal presence as “a waking dream” (68), which is, in well-crafted fiction, “the means by which our passions are moved” (69). As manifested in forms of art, Kames observes that “many rules of criticism depend on ideal presence” (68). Ideal presence is therefore a benchmark against which art can be evaluated. For Kames, fiction that achieves ideal presence through language has the power to influence individuals and society in positive ways: it “strengthens the bond of society, and attracts individuals from their private system to perform acts of generosity and benevolence” (74). Ideal presence is the means through which individual differences of taste (the source of Hume’s anxiety) can be overcome through the appreciation of the psychology of taste reproduction.

Kames proposes that it is fiction specifically that has the ability to “generate passion” (66). This makes realizing ideal presence his standard of taste for literature. The refined taste he attributes to a natural class system created by sense difference appears in this section as a “relish and concern” (76) prompted by tasteful fiction. Kames uses the term relish in a similar way to Shaftesbury, although he divorces refinement more strongly from gustatory taste. However, Kames concludes by connecting sensory engagement and excellence in literary taste to social improvement: the amusements of reading “by cheering and sweetening the mind, contribute mightily to social happiness” (77). By using a metaphor of physical taste, Kames emphasises the intuitive response that he argues is the origin of taste standards, and the means by which standards of taste can be deployed for edification. In his description of writing that achieves this
goal of ideal presence, however, he makes a gendered division between those who provoke or produce sensation and those who judge it. To explain his concept of ideal presence, he relates how recollecting his observations of a woman weeping over the loss of her only child produces the same vivid emotions as the actual experience. In this instance, the role of the “beautiful woman” (67) in distress is no different from an inspiring object or moving poetic passage in that she is the object that stimulates rather than the subject who evaluates and defines.\(^\text{34}\)

The distinctions Kames makes between real and ideal presence and between class, senses, and bodily taste also appear in his agricultural manual *The Gentleman Farmer*. In this text, Kames claims to have constructed his treatise on the production of food by marrying the real practice of food production with scientific theories while reinforcing the divide between the two on the basis of class. The work’s subtitle delineates the type of method that he uses to characterise a gentleman farmer, describing his text as “*An Attempt to improve AGRICULTURE, By subjecting it to the Test of Rational Principles*”. By referring to rational principles, Kames indicates that his methods will be based on programmatic experimentation rather than textual research. To further position his work’s distance from other in the genre he adds the first line of Juvenal’s *Satire*, “Semper ego auditor tantum,” or “shall I always remain a listener” to his title page. This choice suggests that Kames wishes to imply that he has been compelled to produce a book that covers what others have not. In his preface he explains that he needed to contribute to the genre because other writers “deliver their precepts from a study lined with books, without even pretending to experience” (vii). The same epigraph is also used for *The Tatler* Number 197

\(^{34}\) In a similar vein, in *Romantic Identities: Varieties of Subjectivity, 1774-1830* Andrea K Henderson describes how the conception of childbirth in the eighteenth century eliminated the active participation of the woman herself in labour. As a result, Henderson argues, sexual reproduction became something women did, but could not have agency in.
(July 11-13 1710), in which Mr. Bickerstaff complains about the proliferation of men without any sense of judgment who quote from texts “without the least taste of Knowledge or good Sense.” In the same periodical issue Bickerstaff goes on to conclude that “it seems therefore a fruitless Labour to attempt the Correction of the Taste of our Contemporaries.” Whether or not Kames was aware the epigram was used in that issue, its presence in and Kames and Steele’s *Tatler* is still clearly meant to allude not only to bad writing, but to bad taste in both writers and readers. While Steele is not convinced that “profound Blockheads” (*Tatler* #197) can ever be redeemed, Kames’s introduction seems optimistic about the potential of his writing to function as a corrective for both agricultural method and its gentlemen practitioners.

Kames positions the practice of agriculture as having a similarly edifying effect as tasteful fiction. He mirrors his proposal in “Emotions Caused by Fiction” that fiction contributes to altruism and social happiness when he remarks that “no other occupation rivals agriculture, in connecting private interest with that of the public” (xvii). Kames clarifies that outside of food production and the prospect of exercise, Agriculture provides the combination of “hope and fear,” necessary “to every occupation that can give a lasting relish” (xvi). This construction illustrates the way Kames connects refined taste to an individual’s emotional response. His epistemology of taste and perception is shared by his philosophical text. Kames description of the experience of farming is comparable to the way he details literary engagement in *Elements of Criticism*:

> It is by means of ideal presence that our passions are excited; and till words produce that charm, they avail nothing… A chain of imagined incidents linked together according to the order of nature, finds easy admittance into the mind; and a lively narrative of such incidents, occasions complete images, or in other words ideal presence: but our judgment
revolts against an improbable incident; and if we once begin to doubt of its reality, 
farewell relish and concern (76).

In both texts Kames implies that gentlemen will benefit from and enjoy both reading and farming 
because of their virtuality, by which I mean the degree to which they simulate sensations (hope 
and fear and excited passion respectively) not physically linked to the activities of sowing or 
reading. As a pastime only, rather than as a profession or necessity, agriculture can be an 
exercise of tasteful enlightenment.

Like Kames’ theory that internal taste sensations are best provoked by literature that 
conjures the real, he states that *The Gentleman Farmer*’s basis in experience makes it superior to 
and more reliable than other works. This gesture recalls Hannah Woolley’s assertions in her 
early cookery writings, and Ann Cook’s attempts to critique and distinguish herself from Hannah 
Glasse through an appeal to practice. In the case of the cookery writing, experience is what 
authorises the writing by grounding its teachings in embodied practice. In Kames, experiential 
knowledge is what creates good taste both figuratively (a text that is tasteful) and literally (food 
production). He positions his theory of agriculture as an intervention in genre as much as 
practice. As such, his readers must be capable of understanding both. In his dedicatory letter to 
Sir John Pringle, President of the Royal Society, he appeals to Sir Pringle’s discernment and 
critical taste to evaluate the text accordingly: “your sanction, my friend, will ensure it a gracious 
reception, from a body of learned men, who have distinguished your literary merit by the greatest 
honour they have to bestow” (iv). In doing so, he defines his audience as practitioners of 
ariculture other than “those who depend for food on bodily labour” (*Elements* 726) who have 
naturally coarser taste preferences. *The Gentleman Farmer*’s two distinct sections, the “Practice 
of Agriculture,” and the “Theory of Agriculture,” make Kames’ division of labour explicit.

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Kames continually reinscribes the hierarchy between those who actually farm and reproduce and those who, like himself, participate in agriculture as observing and managing improvers. He allows that farmers have been able to, through generations of lived experience, determine effective methods without a theoretical understanding of nature. However, Kames looks to the science of agriculture, and its underlying natural system of chemistry, still in its “infant state” (290) as the only way farmers will be able to improve. In his introduction to Part II of *The Gentleman Farmer* on the “Theory of Agriculture,” he uses a discourse of experimentation to detail the occupations of the gentlemen farmers. In the concluding line of his chapter on taste in *Elements of Criticism*, he asserts that “to unfold these principles [of taste] is the declared purpose of the present understanding” (728), and applies the same verb to the task of understanding husbandry, writing “in order to unfold the theory of agriculture, the nature of plants ought to be studied” (290). The term “unfold” implies that the gentleman farmer is uncovering rather than creating a set of rules that already exist. These rules are the natural qualities of objects that in *The Gentleman Farmer* are soil, weather, and plants rather than food, art, or poetry as in *Elements of Criticism*. While Kames concedes that “in dipping into theory, a complete system is far from my thoughts, and far above my reach” (291), relying on theory is still the best way to approach an understanding of nature’s systems.

Kames defines agriculture as “chief of arts” (v) because it best combines “deep philosophy with useful practice” (v), and it is this categorisation that recalls his philosophy of literature’s societal function. Kames suggests that his theory of ideal presence in fiction has the potential to create “useful rules in criticism” (*Elements* 76), and argues that his agricultural methodology has produced similar results. In *The Gentleman Farmer* Kames claims that by doing so he has “reduced the theory of agriculture into some sort of system more concise at least,
and more consistent, than has been done by other writers”” (xii). As in cookery books like Martha Bradley's, this idea of system creation is a way of approaching Hume’s standard of taste through method and writing, fixing it not only through system, but through class and gender hierarchies, and a rigid divide between theory and practice. Again, Kames makes it clear that theory and practice are the responsibilities of different types of individuals. Kames’ distinction between the gentleman farmer and the practicing farmer who reproduces his theories is paralleled in the cookery genre. As I discussed, cookery texts published in the 1750s and 60s claim to be practical systems that will facilitate the reproduction of taste that has been outlined by others more knowledgeable. Where cookery texts formerly engaged with philosophical matters of taste, they now only offer models for reproduction. I have attempted to demonstrate that the systemization of the cookbook relates to the transformation of taste from standard to system in the period, and that cookery is crucial part of the story of that change.
Conclusion: The Transformation of the Cookery Mode

In this dissertation, I have argued that the conception of taste changed significantly from 1660 to 1760, and that cookbooks were an important part of that transformation. Over four chapters, I have traced in how cookbook authors constructed taste as an embodied practice of lived domesticity, as a discerning and publically located subjectivity, and, finally, as a system that delineates a model for physical taste separate from subjective judgment. I have argued that the locations of the cookery mode were crucial to these shifts in the conception of taste, and that the diverse eighteenth century cookbook genre engaged with ideas from other forms of print in ways that shaped new epistemologies of taste and aesthetics. In doing so, I hope to have complicated the idea that eighteenth century taste was a masculine conversation, and demonstrated the extent to which female writers participated in the public discourse of taste through writing about cookery.

My first chapter began with the origins of the printed cookery text in manuscript format, and the ways in which the familial, local, and practice-based qualities of that genre informed the cookbooks of Hannah Woolley. As an author, Woolley struggled with the constraints of emerging print culture. I argued that her battle over her intellectual property and the way she was represented in print indicate that Woolley was resistant to a construction of taste that was not linked to her lived status as a practitioner of both cookery and medicine. Where her publisher constructed a forged autobiography that described Woolley a model of female domesticity, and validated the recipes through printed source materials, Woolley tried to demonstrate that her worth as an author and tutor was intrinsically tied to her own skills as they had been demonstrated to her surrounding community. Despite her tendency to characterize her text’s knowledge as secret, a quality McKeon associates with a domestic realm that is becoming
separated out from both public and private spheres, in part on the basis of gender, Woolley does not characterize her writing as sequestered or bounded. Instead, it points towards a taste that is distributed in the bodies of those practicing it.

In my second chapter, I explored the ways in which an aristocratic, French, and male model of taste was reformulated by female cookbook authors. I argued that, in concert with eighteenth-century empiricist philosophy, cookbook authors such as Mary Kettilyby began to construct taste as something that was part of the sensory experience of a tasting subject. In contrast to aristocratic chefs like T. Hall, Patrick Lamb, and Charles Carter, for whom cookery was a visual spectacle, Kettilyby re-imagines taste on individual and critical lines. Her model of taste, I proposed, shared goals with the philosophy of Shaftesbury and the periodical writing of Addison and Steele. All sought to refine appetites into tastes, a process that requires an individual to cultivate critical awareness of his or her sensibilities. Cookery, as Kettilyby presents it, is one method of creating tasteful members of the public.

In my third chapter, I proposed that the public conflict between two cookery writers, Hannah Glasse and Ann Cook, demonstrates the extent to which the public role of cookery discourse was contentious. Using the model of counterpublics, a critical intervention into Habermas’ divisions between private and public, I illustrated the positions of resistance both Glasse and Cook took to the dominant discourse of gender, cookery, and the intimate realm. Glasse takes for granted that cookery, because of its connection to embodies taste, plays a part in the formation of subjects, and that she is addressing a public readership. Print, and its corresponding public, is where Glasse sought to cultivate taste, but it is a taste that originates in the body of the subject. Cook’s response to Glasse asserts that she has transgressed boundaries of gender and of sphere by bringing cooking and bodily taste into the public realm of aesthetic
taste. Despite Cook’s anger, however, I suggested that by addressing these issues in print, she is demonstrating just how public cookery discourse has become.

In my concluding chapter, I examined the way in which the problems Cook identified in Glasse, namely that she was bringing cookery into a public realm of taste and aesthetics where it didn’t belong, inform a rigid separation between cookery and philosophy. I argued that in the 1750s and 60s, while aesthetics become a discipline of theory and judgment, cookery became a mode solely concerned with the reproduction of food, and not the cultivation of tasteful subjects. Hume’s skeptical argument in “Of the Standard of Taste,” that a standard of taste could never be achieved resulted in a disciplinary divide between theory and practice. I demonstrated that this division was informed by both changes in technology, and by a re-inscription of gendered task divisions. As a result, cookery books become models for mimicry and no longer ask the reader to engage with bodily and aesthetic subjectivities. These types of cookery texts, like Martha Bradley's, provided encyclopaedic and exhaustively complete instructions to be duplicated within the domestic realm, rather than engaging ideas of subjective taste and suggesting connections between domestic and public spheres, as I argued works like Mary Kettilby's and Hannah Glasse's did. I then showed how this split was a central concern of the philosophy of Lord Kames, who, in both *Elements of Criticism* and his agricultural manual *The Gentlemen Farmer*, expresses a similar division between those who do the theoretical work of understanding and creating systems, and those who reproduce them.

The shift from attempting to uncover a standard of taste to creating systems of taste that foreground strict boundaries on the scope of the cookery mode resulted in the narrowing of the genre of cookery books in the nineteenth century. These divisions even changed the way earlier cooks, who had not subscribed to the systematic distinction between judgment and production
were perceived within it. In Dickens’ *Household Words*, for example, the August 4th 1855 issue proposes Hannah Woolley as a model of domestic conduct. Describing the text with the forged autobiography published by Dorman Newman without Woolley’s consent, *The Gentlewoman’s Companion and Guide to the Female Sex*, the article highlights conduct above all else: the rules for eating at table, suggested dress, and duties of servants. Woolley’s occupation is described as someone who “initiated young ladies into the mysteries of the still and stewpan, together with the more pleasant arts of making rock-work, wax-work, cabinet-work, bugle-work, upon wires or otherwise, together with marvelous flowers of various colours, made of wire and isinglass” (18). Woolley is constructed as an example of conduct appropriate to her station and gender, and an illustration of the “pleasant traits of domestic life in the past, and of the kindly feeling that existed between mistress and servant” (22). Cookery and taste are largely absent, as the divide between aesthetics and food reproduction overwrites the need to engage with issues of cooking. There is simply no need to debate cookery in print. Cookery, then, is also no longer a mode of subjectivity, and the subjectivity cookbooks create for their readers is transformed into subjection and a loss of female authority.

By way of conclusion, however, I want to suggest that exploring the ways in which the cookery mode is used in other genres such as the domestic novel could be a productive avenue for future study. While Sarah Moss’ *Spilling the Beans: Eating, Cooking, Reading and Writing in British Women’s Fiction, 1770-1830* addresses the role of food and eating in the novel, it does not engage with issues of embodiment and subjectivity. Rather, Moss limits her discussion to the symbolic function of food and appetite, and does not explore the connections between eating and drinking in fiction to aesthetics or interiority. But the novel might nevertheless be a productive vehicle for exploring those connections. For example, Richardson’s *Pamela*, a touchstone for
studies of eighteenth-century fiction had both an authorized and an unauthorized sequel depicting Pamela’s domestic life after marriage. The sequels suggest questions about the role of women in public and domestic life and how these roles shaped and were shaped by controversial notions of taste.

In John Kelly’s unsanctioned sequel *Pamela’s Conduct in High Life*, Kelly’s text changes the one of the central features of Pamela, amending Richardson’s narrative of a low-born servant gaining status through moral virtue to one where Pamela’s noble ancestry is revealed. This modification impacts the way readers engage with the text. It converts the fable of reward from one resulting from conduct to one resulting from pedigree. As a result, reading is rendered more passive: Kelly invites his readers to simply enjoy the luxuries of Pamela’s new existence as Mrs. B. Notably, *Pamela’s Conduct in High Life* often involves eating and drinking, as Kelly describes the meals that are now part of her courtly lifestyle. Kelly’s version of taste, like the French court-cooks, is visual and performative. He provides details for his readers about meals and table settings that offer a different type of aspirational voyeurism than Richardson portrays in Pamela’s letters. For example, the newlyweds dine on “a very rich Soupe, four Ortelons, a white Fricassee of two small Chickens, and a Ragout of Veal Sweet-breads. Every thing was elegantly dressed, and all the Service Plate, with the finest Damask Linnen” (9), and Pamela enjoys the benefits of her new position by sharing “Coffee, Tea, Chocolate, Diet Bread, Rusk, Bread and Butter, and butter’d Toasts for Breakfast” (19) with her parents. Kelly foregrounds Mr. B’s tastes over Pamela’s, for example a supper that “was answerable to Mr. B—’s fortune, and refined Taste” (23). He also mentions Mr. B’s excellent taste in wine throughout the text. Keymer and Sabor attribute Richardson’s choice to publish his own sequel in part to these descriptions of excess. Richardson’s critique of Kelly’s sequel published in the Gazetteer “led
with an extract from Pamela’s Conduct, tauntingly interspersed with Richardson’s sarcastic
notes. The chosen scene… shows Pamela bumpering wine from a pint glass while heavily
pregnant” (Keymer and Sabor 61). In *Pamela’s Conduct in High Life*, eating and drinking stand
in for what Richardson might describe as true taste.

Richardson’s own sequel, *Pamela in her Exulted Condition*, describes Pamela’s behavior
as a wife, mother, and mistress of a house. The companion text is also written in letter form,
although Richardson adds Pamela’s journal, written for Polly Darnforth. Terry Lovell
characterizes the circulation of her journal thus: “the events and conduct of her subsequent
marriage, and her ordering of her household are not only described in minute detail, but inscribed
within a form which brings the debates of the public sphere regarding the proper conduct of the
private, into the home, whilst opening the home, as well as private articulations of the inner self,
to the critical regard of the public sphere” (36). Despite this detail, Richardson is still clear that
Pamela’s value is not in her duties as a housewife but as a writer. At the beginning of the text
Lady Davers anticipates the objections Pamela might have to writing letters now that she has a
house to manage. She reminds Pamela that “the Station you are raised to, does not require you to
be such a domestic Animal” (40) and asks her to

consider yourself… as the Master-wheel, in some beautiful Piece of Mechanism, whose
dignify’d grave Motion is to set a-going all the Under-wheels, with a Velocity suitable to
their respective Parts. –Let your Servants, under your Direction, do all that related to
Household Oeconomy: They cannot write to entertain and instruct as you can (40-41).

In this passage Richardson describes a physical system that generates motion through the sheer
force of the character of its “master-wheel”. While in the preface Richardson claims the text
provides “Rules, equally New and Practicable, inculcated throughout the Whole, for the General
Conduct of Life” (A2), he does not actually give practical instructions. Rather, he suggests that learning to improve the self is what enables a woman to learn to conduct her household. Through her letters, he conflates the edifying power of writing with the character of Pamela herself. Writing, rather than cookery, is the medium that connects and regulates bodies to culture. Perhaps this domestic genre, then, is the location to which the subjectivities formally cultivated by the cookery mode relocated.
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