

MULTIMODAL RHETORICAL FIGURES

by

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Abstract

Rhetoricians have, for millennia, catalogued a set of persuasive techniques called rhetorical figures, but so far, they have examined them almost exclusively in the verbal modalities – i.e. in the written and spoken word. This paper shows how, in embodied contexts, figures also draw from bodily modalities to enhance their argumentative effects. Focusing on political speeches, I show how hand gestures are systematically incorporated into *antithesis*, a figure wherein contrastive phrases are framed in parallel form: *the stronger lead, the weaker follow*. Cognitive approaches to gesture provide my analysis with the tools to use gesture as a window into the embodied foundations of figures and their persuasiveness. I show how various features of gesture, including hand dominance, distance, and shape, allow speakers to channel the uptake of figures in terms of viewpoint and metaphor. With evidence that gestures are produced and perceived implicitly, my study suggests that persuasive aims are implemented by the subconscious mechanisms of multimodal cognition. I further show how multimodality participates in other figures, even in multimodal environments outside of gesture and speech, with each environment giving rise to a novel set of rhetorical affordances. These findings provide the initial steps toward a broader theory of multimodal rhetoric that examines how figures and other forms of persuasion originate from the body and evolve through the cultural and technological engineering of multimodal experience.

Preface

This project is the product of enduring collaborations with my supervisor, Professor Barbara Dancygier, in the English Department at UBC. Her insights into the project suffuse its overall trajectory, having inspired many broad shifts in my perspective. Professor Ian Hill, my second reader, was also instrumental in realizing the project through his astute and encouraging comments, especially regarding the history and study of rhetoric. The research project did not require ethics approval, and I am personally responsible for collecting all of the data, which I gathered from websites in the public domain. I am also entirely responsible for writing the manuscript, though my compositional choices were majorly guided by the comments I received from my committee. No publications to date have resulted from this thesis. On a final note, due to copyright restrictions, all of my original screenshots of gestures had to be removed. This was largely impacted by my need to graduate in time for my upcoming PhD, at the University of Pennsylvania, combined with the amount of time it takes to gain permissions. The published version of this MA thesis, as such, is unsatisfying, as much of my discussion is targeted at the direct analysis of in-text images. For this reason, I strongly encourage you to follow the links and sources I have provided so you can supplement your reading with the appropriate visuals, achieving the multimodal learning experience I was aiming to create.

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List of Abbreviations

CVP – Character Viewpoint

OVP – Observer Viewpoint

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As the most substantial work I have produced in my life so far, this thesis is the result of inspiration and positive influence from too many colleagues, friends, and family to name.

My appreciation for my supervisor Barbara exceeds words. This thesis would not have been realized were it not for her constantly astute insights and her unyielding faith in my potential, born out over countless hours of edifying conversation. Her friendship and support has been and continues to be absolutely instrumental to my intellectual development.

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I must also express my profound indebtedness to Randy Harris, my undergraduate supervisor and continuing mentor. His vision of rhetorical figures planted the intellectual seeds that have grown like vine to fill every crack of my worldview. I eagerly look forward to years of collaboration.

Passion cannot be sustained without the enduring support of beloved friends and family. I would like to thank my lifelong friend, Paul Reginato, for always stoking my fire with schema-rocking discussion. The same is true of my brother Nick, whose wholesome curiosity never fails to inspire me. Naila Kuhlmann, Taylor Willi, and my awesome friends at Green College were also essential to keeping me both grounded and driven over the past two years. My parents and grandparents also deserve the most heartfelt appreciation for listening to me and supporting me, without question, at all times, and for helping me to be silly in the most serious of moments.

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Chapter 1. Figures and the Gestures of Language

After the assassination of Julius Caesar, Rome's most powerful rhetorician, Cicero, sought to strengthen the rebellion not with daggers, but with words. His weapon of choice: style. He argued "the whole essence of oratory is to illuminate in some fashion all, or, at any rate, most of the ideas" through "ornaments of style," also known as rhetorical figures (46 BC: 408). Cicero defines figures as ways of arranging "words and combinations of words" to make arguments "stand out" for an audience (407). *Antithesis* is an example that Cicero uses throughout the *Philippicae*, a series of speeches that besmirch Mark Antony, a follower of Caesar. This figure foregrounds opposition by placing contrastive ideas in close proximity and in parallel form, as when Cicero writes: "The promises of Antonius are bloody, savage, criminal, hateful to gods and men, not lasting or salutary; ours, on the contrary, are honest, upright, noble, full of joy, and full of patriotism" (43 BC: 373). Since the time of Cicero and his predecessors, figures have been studied almost exclusively as verbal phenomena. Curious, though, is the fact that when Antony had Cicero assassinated for the *Philippicae*, he put a price not only on his head, but also on his hands (Butler 2002). He later pinned his hands to the same rostra where Cicero delivered his speeches, as a gruesome gesture toward his rhetorical power and its defeat.

Cicero's assassination is an indelible reminder that the hands are a vibrant vehicle of persuasion, a reminder that gains its pertinence in light of the fact that figures have been and continue to be dominated by a bias toward the written and spoken word. The earliest catalog of figures, the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, defines figures as ornaments of verbal language ([Cicero] 1954, 274).¹ Jeanne Fahnestock shows how this catalog undergirded the study of figures for millennia, with guiding influence over Cicero, Quintilian, and the Early Modern rhetoricians

(1999: 3-40). Historian Thomas Cole even ventures to define the classical concept of style as “the written word’s effort to do the work of the spoken word” (1991: 122). The effects of this bias are still visible today.² Fahnestock maintains that “figures are linguistic prompts ... No more, no less” (2004: 120). And Tindale writes that “figures are devices that use words to make striking effects” (2004: 60). It is, perhaps, for both historical and pedagogical reasons that figures have been readily defined as verbal artifacts, since the earliest rhetorical manuals, as Kennedy (1994) explains, were born out of the metalinguistic analysis of text and speech. That being said, the performance of rhetoric in general and of figures in particular does not occur solely through the verbal modalities. In real world contexts, rhetoric draws from the resources of multiple communicative modalities, alongside speech. In this essay, I explore figures as they would have emerged from Cicero on the rostra – live and embodied, charged by co-occurring gestures.

The classical study of gesture (*gestus*) was pursued under the subject of delivery, one of the most neglected canons of rhetorical theory. “Even though speech includes more than words,” Fredal notes, “rhetorical theory has (unnecessarily) restricted itself to *verbal* means of persuasion ever since arguments against delivery and performativity took root (as espoused by Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle)” (1998: 19). One of the first writings on delivery comes from Aristotle, where he deems gesture an “unworthy” subject of inquiry (Kennedy 1991, III. 1404a). In his discussion, he accuses gestures of manipulating emotions and distracting from rationality, earning no place in the study of proper argumentation. In recent years, scholars have resisted this verbal bias in the pursuit of what Corbett calls “Body Rhetoric” (1969: 292). The aim of this approach is to develop alternative accounts of classical and contemporary rhetorics that highlight those aspects of persuasion that are not reducible to words – i.e. “to all that comes to life only as the text is delivered” (Fredal 1998: 3). Graf (1991), Fredal (1998), Reynolds (1993), Crowley &

Hawhee (2004), for instance, show how gesture was a major concern for generations of rhetoricians after Aristotle, especially Quintilian, who developed the first full length book on the topic. Inspired by this approach, I undertake an embodied reading of rhetorical theory that reveals deep cognitive and communicative interconnections between gestures and figures.

The Latin *figura* was a translation of the Greek *σχῆμα* (*schema*), which referred to the notions of form or shape as they applied to language as well as bodily movement, appearance, and dance. It is clear from early treatises on rhetoric that the body provided a salient metaphor for figures. Quintilian, in commenting on the definition of figures, writes:

The term is used in two senses. In the first it is applied to any form in which thought is expressed, just as it is to bodies which, whatever their composition, must have some shape.

In the second and special sense, in which it is called a *schema*, it means a rational change in meaning or language from the ordinary and simple form, that is to say, a change analogous to that involved by sitting, lying down on ... or looking back. (1922, IX. I. 10)

He criticizes the first definition for implying that everything is expressed by figures, making the concept too general to be useful. But for the second definition, he expresses greater sympathy: “if, on the other hand, the name is to be applied to certain attitudes, or I might say gestures of language, we must interpret *schema* in the sense of that which is poetically or rhetorically altered from the simple and obvious method of expression” (IX. I.14). This essay shows how Quintilian’s description of figures as “the gestures of language” is more than a metaphor – that is, it shows how figures actually manifest in gestures, alongside their verbal delivery.

Classical rhetoricians attributed a substantial bond between gesture, speech, and the mind, with gesture referring to all forms of embodied communication, including gaze, hand movements, and facial expressions. Cicero believed that “every motion of the soul has its natural

appearance, voice and gesture” (55 BC, 3.126; qtd in Graf 1991: 40); and Quintilian believed that “gesticulation obeys the impulses of the mind,” with hand gestures being “almost as expressive as words” (XI.III.65, XI.III.85). However, despite viewing gesture and speech as related extensions of the mind, Quintilian drew sharp distinctions between their expressive capacities. He developed a prescriptive approach that recommends eighteen different hand shapes, each ascribed inherent and discrete attitudes for specific moments in an oration. This view suggests that the significance of gesture is largely emotional and largely independent of speech, with the expression of meaningful content being reserved for the verbal modalities alone. This prescriptive approach became the foundation for generations of gesture scholars, including John Bulwer, Gilbert Austin, and the entire elocutionary movement (Kendon 1981, 2004, 2007). As Graf summarizes, “the rhetorical system comes close to a dichotomy between word and gesture,” where gestures are said to “underline and amplify the message of language by stressing the emotional, non-rational elements,” but not to participate in the structure or semantics of rational arguments (1991: 41). This division persists today, even in the domain of Body Rhetoric, which adopts the notion of emotionally-driven, *non-verbal* communication to distinguish between bodily and verbal persuasion (Corbett 1971; Fredal 1998; Hawhee 2009). Parallel to these developments, a cognitive school of gesture studies has arisen with different assumptions, epitomized by David McNeill’s groundbreaking essay: “So you think gestures are nonverbal?” (1986). Through linguistic and neurocognitive methods, this field has revealed hand gestures to be intertwined with speech across all levels of language, from syntax to semantics. What it offers is a set of methods for using the hands as “a window into thought curtained” – i.e. as a window into the cognitive processes underlying speech (McNeill 2000: 143). So inspired, my study


harnesses cognitive methodologies to develop a multimodal account of antithesis, as the initial step toward the study of multimodal figures and of multimodal rhetoric more broadly.

Multimodal figures are figures that draw from the expressive resources of multiple communicative modalities, simultaneously (e.g. gesture and speech). Fahnestock argues that the persuasiveness of figures derives from their capacity to epitomize arguments – i.e. to summarize “the essential parts of a larger work” using a “diagram-like rendering of a relationship that constitutes the argument” (1999: 24). What I show is that multimodality enhances the capacity for figures to epitomize arguments by not only adding information to their argumentative form, but also by supplying novel rhetorical techniques for doing so. Consider the following antithesis from Obama’s *A More Perfect Union* speech, which will serve as the primary example throughout this essay. Obama’s speech was delivered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, during the 2008 Presidential election. It was written in response to an outbreak of media coverage regarding a set of racially controversial claims made by Obama’s Pastor. This controversy threatened Obama’s campaign, setting the contextual motivation for his speech. One of its major goals is to distance Obama from racist hypocrisy, something he ascribes to his political opponents. His antithesis reflects this aim: “Talk show hosts and conservative commentators built entire careers unmasking bogus claims of racism while dismissing legitimate discussions of racial injustice and inequality as mere political correctness or reverse racism” (2008, 23:36). Many analysts would study this antithesis only at the verbal level (Chilton 2004; Charteris-Black 2005; Klebanov et. al. 2010; Fetzer 2013; Kaal et. al. 2014). But when we include its multimodal context, we see that Obama’s gestures are essential to his antithesis and how it epitomizes his argument.

While delivering the words *bogus* and *legitimate*, Obama simultaneously uses his gestures to pair these words with polar regions of space.

Due to copyright restrictions, screenshots of these gestures are unavailable. There is a video recording on youtube: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWe7wTVbLUU>. The clip begins at 23 minutes and 36 seconds. To analyze the clip, I describe the gestures that occur alongside the bolded words.


unmasking **bogus** claims of racism



* This is a right hand gesture, on the right side of the body; the hand shape is open and is simulating the act of grasping.

Figure 1. Obama Antithesis (Unmasking)

legitimate discussion of racial injustice and inequality




*Left hand gesture, on left side; the index finger and thumb are held together.

Figure 2. Obama Antithesis (Legitimate)

His gestures highlight symmetrical locations that resonate with the syntactic symmetry of the [present-participle + adjective] form: ‘unmasking bogus’ and ‘dismissing legitimate’. Doing so heightens their contrast by foregrounding them against his body – a salient source of symmetry. This serves to distribute symmetry across multiple channels, simultaneously, enhancing its overall potency. Obama further exploits this symmetry through an extended sequence, when he delivers the words of his opponents, *political correctness or reverse racism*.

as mere **political correctness or reverse racism**



*Right hand gesture, fully extended into the right space; the hand is open.

Figure 3. Obama Antithesis (Political Correctness)

Political correctness and *reverse racism* do not conform to the [present-participle + adjective] form that defines this verbal antithesis. Yet the whole aim of his antithesis is to depict his opponents’ beliefs as racist and hypocritical. This requires embedding his opponents’ thoughts about racism in the preceding antithesis. This aim is not solely or even centrally epitomized at the verbal level. It is through his gestures that Obama connects, in visible space, his opponents’ words to the symmetrical form of his antithesis. While delivering his opponents’ words, Obama returns to his right hand in the right space, along the same symmetrical, horizontal axis. This serves to pair *political correctness* and *reverse racism* with the same space as *bogus claims*,

adding argumentative dimensions to the antithesis that are not captured at the verbal level. By returning to the right space, Obama conflates his opponents' words with the emotional and semantic negativity of *bogus claims*. This, in fact, is the point of his argument. His aim is not only to expose his opponents' hypocrisy, but also to emphasize their disreputability. To do so, his gestures erect two value poles, *bogus* and *legitimate*, and align his opponents with the latter. By implication, Obama aligns himself with the positivity of *legitimate*, which remains on the positive side of the axis. In this way, Obama's gestures are systematically incorporated into the trajectory of his antithesis and how it epitomizes his overall argument.³

By examining a number of antitheses from the domain of political discourse, I will show how gestures make substantial contributions to their argumentative functions. Political debate often requires speakers to defend their perspective, over and against the perspectives of others. As a device for epitomizing arguments, antithesis arises in political discourse as a viable means for capturing multiple opposing perspectives on a given issue. Under multimodal analysis, gestures prove to be instrumental to how antithesis represents multiple perspectives in accord with the speaker's aims. Creating value poles is just one of countless ways that gestures add perspective to antithesis. Every gesture is distinguished by its choice of the left or right hand, its configuration, its orientation, its movement, and more, and each of these parameters reveals a certain semantic and emotional perspective. As well, gesture can systematically deviate from speech in order to frame its uptake within elaborate argumentative sequences. The potential for persuasion that these techniques afford is readily apparent when considering that gesture is, according to the cognitive approach, largely implicit. "Gesture is perceived directly," as Kendon writes, "and requires no deductive processes leading to an inference" (2004: 15). Gestures channel the interpretation of speech by communicating directly to the perceptions of listeners.

The fact that they can communicate immense amounts of information about our perspective, while doing so, endows them with remarkable rhetorical force.

The argument to follow is organized into five sections. In Section II, I detail the rise of cognitive gesture studies and how its theories of *viewpoint* and *metaphor* provide a methodology for the study of multimodal figures. In Section III, I use these methods to show how various features of gesture, including hand dominance, distance, and shape, allow speakers to incorporate perspective into antithesis. In section IV, I show how these features are intertwined with the entire trajectory of antithesis, in the creation of climactic arguments that rely on information exchanges across modalities (what I call *multimodal arguments*). Together, these sections show how gestures enhance the expressive potential of antithesis, while providing a window into its embodied foundations. What these sections do not address, however, is how multimodality is rhetorical. In section V, I discuss how multimodality provides insight into the persuasiveness of figures and how the persuasiveness of figures provides insight into multimodality. I do so, in part, by applying my model of antithesis to other figures like the *antimetabole*, which appears in the reverse symmetry of the sentence above.⁴ Going further, I show how figures obtain across a diversity of multimodal environments, in addition to gesture and speech, with unique rhetorical affordances emerging in each set of conditions. The body is multimodal and the mind, as a result, is multimodal. A rhetoric focused on the body must account for the multiple modalities that structure experience and how they rhetorically interact. Incorporating multimodality into our account of figures will deepen our understanding of how figures emerge in real world, embodied contexts, as persuasive devices that harness the richness of multimodal experience.

Chapter 2: Methods

What most distinguishes classical and cognitive approaches is the transition from a prescriptive to a descriptive methodology. Amidst his prescriptive endeavors, Quintilian developed the first taxonomy of gesture, though it was notably minimal. The only distinction he explicitly draws is between gestures that “naturally proceed from us simultaneously with our words,” and gestures that depict some aspect of a concept through mimicry, as when depicting “a harpist by a movement of the hands as though they were plucking the strings” (88).⁵ These early descriptive efforts were lost for hundreds of years with the disappearance of Quintilian’s texts after the Roman period. It was only until 1416 that his treatises were rediscovered, spawning renewed interest in gesture. John Bulwer, a natural philosopher in the 17th century, was one of the first to revive gesture studies, taking it in a more descriptive, scientific direction. While he remained committed to “the oracle of Quintilian,” Bulwer believed that rhetorical prescriptions should be motivated by the ‘natural language of the hand’ – i.e. the gestures that emerge spontaneously in everyday communication (1644: 153). Gilbert Austin, in the 18th Century, was similarly committed to Quintilian’s approach, but he also advanced its descriptive features by developing a rigorous coding system that some have likened to the first “science of bodily order” (Spoel 1998; Hawhee & Holding 2010). This scientific approach, characterized by a descriptive focus on natural and spontaneous gestures, did not come into full fruition until the 20th Century, with the accessibility of audiovisual recording technology.⁶

The accessibility of audiovisual technology allowed researchers to record, isolate, and analyze multimodal data in its natural environment. Several anthropologists, including Gregory Bateson and Ray Birdchistell, began using videos to analyze body language in different cultural contexts. Informed by the mathematical theories of cybernetics, Bateson and others maintained a

stark separation between verbal and nonverbal communication, reserving the latter for “functions totally different from those of language,” relating to “matters of relationship – love, hate, respect, fear, dependency, etc.” (1968: 614). Hand gestures were not an explicit topic in their analyses or in the analyses of their contemporaries, though they did form an implicit category in Ekman & Friesen (1969). What united these researchers was an interest in how the body is synchronized with speech, as an independent form of communication. This perspective inspired up-and-coming researcher Adam Kendon to propose that hand gestures and speech are “two aspects of the same process of utterance” (1980). But as Kendon himself admits, these insights were not widely appreciated at the time (2007). Their significance only came to be understood in tandem with a paradigm shift in linguistics and psychology, now described as the ‘cognitive turn’ (Harris 1993; Kendon 2007). The major developments, with respect to gesture, occurred in response to the growing prominence of Chomsky’s view that grammar is innate and cannot be learned from adult speech. In response to this proposal, there was a rush of research using video to examine the utterances of children. These recordings exposed the extent to which gestures are vital for language acquisition, leading a number of linguists and psychologists to argue that gesture and speech are extensions of a shared set of cognitive processes (Bullower 1979; Bates 1979).

It was thus shortly after the 1980’s that the language of cognitive science entered the study of gesture. David McNeill, a rising linguist and psychologist at the time, entered the field and propelled it into disciplinary status with his major article – “So you think Gestures are NonVerbal?” (1985). This article dispelled the belief that gestures are predominantly emotional through an extensive analysis of spontaneous speech-synchronized gestures, elicited in laboratory settings. In 1992, he published *Hand and Mind* which synthesized decades of research

into his theory that gesture and speech arise from a common ‘growth point’ – i.e. an integrated cognitive structure consisting of both imagistic and grammatical information. He writes,

The gesture and the utterance are alike; yet they also are different, and each makes its own contribution to the whole. The total dynamic of the utterance is understandable as a transformation of the contrasts implicit in the image into the more systematic contrasts of the linguistic system, and this is in microcosm the process of thought in general. In this process, the gesture is an essential part of the content of speech. (1992: 250)

Elsewhere, McNeill (2005) likens the interaction of gesture and speech to a dialectic, a conversation wherein each brings something different to the table. Gestures bring implicit, visual information, and speech brings explicit, auditory information. Yet, despite their structural differences as modalities, McNeill notes that speech and gesture interface through a common set of cognitive relationships, including rhythm, iconicity, and metaphor. He distinguishes *beats*, gestures that are rhythmically matched with speech but which “do not present any discernible meaning,” from iconic and metaphoric gestures, which express content (80). Iconic gestures structurally resemble the concepts they depict, as with Quintilian’s harpist, whereas metaphoric gestures use spatial dimensions to depict the nonspatial aspects of meaning. Through these categories and their offshoots, McNeill crystallized the cognitive approach with his view that gestures “display mental content instantaneously, in real time” (2000: 143). The view to emerge was one in which “gestures are like thoughts themselves,” providing researchers from a range of disciplines with a uniquely observable window into the mind (1992: 12).

A wide audience of linguists, psychologists, and neuroscientists have since affirmed that gesture and speech are heavily intertwined in the mind and brain, with the gestures providing insight into their shared cognitive processes (Goldin-Meadow et. al. 1999a, 1999b; Alibali et. al.

2000; Goldin-Meadow & Wagner 2005; Iverson & Goldin-Meadow 2005; Özyürek et. al. 2005, 2007; Cook et. al. 2008; Holle et. al. 2008; Hostetter & Alibali 2008, 2010; Hubbard et. al. 2009; Kelly et. al. 2010; Kuhlen et. al. 2012). Cognitive linguists, in particular, have shown that iconic and metaphoric gestures can be used as a window into the embodied foundations of linguistic concepts (Sweetser & Parrill 2004; Lakoff 2008; Sweetser 2009). Their combined methodologies provide the conceptual tools for modelling rhetorical figures in multimodal contexts.

2.1 Cognitive Methodologies

Despite its internal diversity, cognitive linguistics remains broadly committed to the idea that language is anchored in the brain and the body. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, both founders of the field, wrote an essay in 2002 entitled “Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied Realism.” Embodied realism is a philosophical view which holds that the body and its manner of experience has determining effects over the nature of cognition and its use in language. Gesture was readily taken into this discipline as a way of studying how the structure of the body is incorporated into the production of meaning. From this approach emerge two theoretical tools that are especially relevant to rhetorical figures – *viewpoint* and *metaphor*. Together they provide the framework for multimodal antithesis and its cognitive foundations.

2.1.1 Viewpoint

Experience begins with the body. Our first ways of perceiving the world are dictated by our sensory systems and the kinds of information they can register and represent. Our first ways of acting in the world are similarly constrained by our body and the modes of mobility it facilitates.

Underpinning these bodily characteristics is the fact that the body is physically situated. Our senses provide a subjective impression of the world relative to our position within it. The body is the point through which we view the world. For this reason, cognitive theorists use the term *viewpoint* to describe our bodily situatedness and how it pervades language and thought.

Our embodied viewpoint is incorporated into an array of cognitive processes. At the most basic level, it underpins our sensory processing. But as Parrill explains, “The construct of viewpoint is applied to a wide range of phenomena, some of which are about physical location and some of which are about much more abstract conceptual structures” (98). As an example, the body is constitutively emotional, and emotions colour all aspects of language and thought. As Ishino (2007) writes, “language use always reflects the speaker’s evaluations, opinions, emotions, and attitudes; that is, their individual perspective” (243). Parrill adds that viewpoint also pertains to semantic dimensions – i.e. to “the way a language user is mentally simulating an event, including mental images, motor programs, and representations of mental states (both the conceptualizer’s own and those of other entities)” (Parrill 2012: 99). Viewpoint, as such, is stratified across perceptual, emotional, and semantic levels. Accordingly, both speech and gesture are equipped with a range of viewpoint markers for expressing each of these levels.

In speech, viewpoint is conveyed through a range of viewpoint markers – phonological, lexical, and grammatical – that each individually characterize perspective (Dancygier 2012a, 2012b). Consider the following sentence: “Off in the distance, I saw Sally and her boyfriend crash their boat into a complete stranger.” The prepositional phrase *Off in the distance* reflects the visual viewpoint of the first person narrator. Other features of the sentence additionally code for various aspects of emotional and semantic viewpoint. The phrase *Sally and her boyfriend* projects an intimate emotional relationship onto these characters. By contrast, the term *stranger*

suggests a lack epistemic familiarity and emotional intimacy between the narrator and the unnamed person. This example illustrates the extent to which even the simplest sentences require viewpoint and often several at that. These viewpoint markers are complemented by a range of gestural markers that add novel information to the overall construction of perspective.

In being a direct extension of the body, gesture inherits its viewpointed nature. For one, gestures cannot help but express emotion. Their speed, direction, fluency, and location can all reflect an evaluative perspective (Johansson 1973; Dittrich et al. 1996; Fox & McDaniel 1982; Gallagher 2005; Tomasello 2008; Poggi & Pelachaud 2008). Speakers can also associate words with particular gestures and particular points (i.e. *loci*) in the gesture space, allowing them to imbue these words with emotional and semantic perspective (Liddell 1990, 2003). For example, the gesture paired with a particular word can reveal the way a speaker is conceptualizing the associated concept. Consider the sentence about the boat crash. In it, the type of boat is ambiguous. But if a speaker were to gesture as if they were rowing, we would know that she was thinking about a rowboat and not a yacht. The same gestures can indicate whether the speaker is imagining themselves as a person within the boat, through what McNeill calls character viewpoint, or a person outside the boat, through observer viewpoint (1992: 118-25). Numerous studies confirm that, without being explicitly aware of them, interlocutors internalize these viewpoint markers into their model of speech (Merola 2009; Parrill 2010; Narayan 2012; Stec 2013; Gerofsky 2013; Debreslioska et. al. 2013). In the context of figures, these markers allow speakers to frame the uptake of viewpoint at the verbal level, sometimes with information not captured in speech. As a result, they allow speakers to enhance the number of perspectives antithesis can epitomize, while also enhancing its persuasive qualities.

When modelling the use of viewpoint markers in figures, however, we encounter issues not directly addressed by the studies above. The boat example I provided is conveniently idealized. It focuses on a fairly objective state of affairs. But much of language is not so simple. Human language largely refers to things and ideas that are not physically present or even perceivable. This is especially relevant when examining figures, since figures rely on the use of abstract patterns to epitomize equally abstract arguments. Consider this antithesis from the 2011 launch campaign of Canadian Liberal, Michael Ignatieff:

Folks, in the election that's coming up, there is a blue door. You go through the blue door and you get jails, you get corporate tax cuts, and you get miserable knocks-offs of the real article. But, you go through the red door and you get compassion, you get fiscal responsibility, and you get a government relentlessly focused on the real priorities of Canadian families ... there are only two choices. (qtd in Delacourt 2013: 313)

Here the antithetical form aids Ignatieff in dividing the political landscape into 'only two choices,' despite the existence of several other Canadian parties. By framing these two choices through a contrastive set of parallel sentences, Ignatieff expresses his belief that these choices are diametrically opposed. Additionally, by associating one side of the antithesis with positive connotations and the other with negative, it also reveals the choice he wants us to make – i.e. his emotional viewpoint. The question then arises: why do counterbalancing contrastive phrases reveal an oppositional viewpoint? And, furthermore, why is this antithesis couched in such abstract terms? He is not talking about an election happening here and now. He is talking about a future election that is 'coming up,' with the notion of space representing the progression of time. Even more strangely, the blue and red doors do not lead to a room, but rather to a future of policy decisions that might result from each party's win. Nevertheless, throughout this argument, there

is viewpoint. The election moves toward *us*. *We* go through the door. There is an embodied agent navigating this imaginary space. This example exposes the foundational role that viewpoint plays in even the most abstract uses of language. To account for how antithesis epitomizes such arguments, we must now turn to our second methodological tool – metaphor.

2.1.2 Metaphor

The leading approach to metaphor in cognitive linguistics, known as conceptual metaphor theory, was born out of the effort to account for how humans are able to mentally represent things that are not physically present or perceivable (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1991; Lakoff 1993; Feldman 2010, Dancygier & Sweetser 2014).⁷ While it has undergone various revisions and innovations, metaphor theory maintains that the brain supports abstract ideas by bootstrapping what it knows about being and having a body. To do so, the brain is said to map conceptual structure from a source domain, anchored in the body, to a target domain, in the abstract. Metaphor, in this picture, is not a linguistic artifact. It is more general than any particular expression. It is the set of conceptual couplings between source and target domain. Various expressions can derive from this mapping, each highlighting different relationships within it. Ignatieff's antithesis provides an illustrative example.

The first question that Ignatieff's antithesis raises is: why do contrastive phrases in symmetrical syntax symbolize oppositional viewpoint? Aristotle argued that antithesis persuades because of its link to embodied structures. He observed that humans embody opposite structures (e.g. left/right, up/down, front/back) which create preferences for certain limbs, directions, and movements (Lloyd 1966; Kennedy 1991; Sweetser 2004). These preferences, he argued, instill a cognitive affinity for value-laden asymmetry that antithesis exploits by foregrounding this

structure at the formal level. What Aristotle left unspecified was exactly how embodied structures map onto antithesis in the human mind. Metaphor theory specifies this process. Using a combination of metaphor theory and his own innovation, blending theory, Turner argues in his 1998 essay “Figure” that antithesis relies on embodied source domain mappings. Like Aristotle, he points out that the body is symmetrical along the horizontal plane but not the vertical. He goes further, however, in noting that, in experience, our bodily symmetry forces us to balance weight among our symmetrical limbs. When a difference in weight is introduced – i.e. an asymmetry – our balance may be upset. As a result, our perceptual viewpoint may tilt toward the side of our body with the added weight. By foregrounding this source domain at the formal level, antithesis is said to induce a shift in viewpoint toward a particular asymmetrical pair. More precisely, it is said to shift our viewpoint into alignment with the speaker’s perspective, in accord with her emotional and semantic framings.

The second question that Ignatieff’s antithesis raises is: how do we comprehend such abstract arguments? Metaphor theory addresses this question as well. Consider Ignatieff’s phrase, *in the election that’s coming up*. Here the election is conceived as a bounded object moving through time. An election is not, of course, a bounded object. It is a distributed network of people, events, artifacts, and so on. There is no single thing we can point at and say: ‘that is an election’. So to comprehend this concept, metaphor theory argues that it must be structured to interface with our embodied capacities. First, metaphor theorists look for evidence of primary metaphors, which are correlations among domains in experience that infants encounter early in development (Grady 1997). Among the first correlations we experience is the correlation between objects and our ideas about objects. Our development begins with the assumption that our experiences of the world are the world, that our ideas are the objects we experience – hence

our tendency to treat IDEAS AS OBJECTS and EVENTS AS OBJECTS.⁸ The phrase “in the election that’s coming up” also contains a metaphor for time. Here time is a line the election moves along. Movement along the line is the progression of time. There are many aspects of embodied experience that lead us to model time in terms of space (Winter et. al. 2015). Most fundamentally, we model time as a spatial structure because our experience of time, throughout our lives, is mediated by a body that consists of spatial structure. When accounting for Ignatieff’s argument as a whole, metaphor theorists would observe that primary metaphors can combine into complex, compositional structures (cf. Dancygier & Sweetser 2014). Traveling through Ignatieff’s doors moves us along a path into the future. Along this path, we encounter a series of objects including jails, tax cuts, and fiscal responsibility. These primary and complex metaphors are essential to figures and the arguments they epitomize.

After achieving considerable recognition, conceptual metaphor theory came under attack from scholars who accused its reasoning of being circular, since its only evidence for conceptual metaphors underlying language was language itself. Around the same time, McNeill’s vision of gesture was gaining recognition, and various researchers, McNeill included, were finding evidence of metaphorical gestures. Such findings allowed cognitive linguists to affirm that metaphors are more general than linguistic expressions, since they also appear in other modalities than verbal language. What is more, because gesture stems from the body, it affirms the role of the body as a source domain in metaphor production. Cognitive linguistics thus turned to gesture as a window into the embodied and cognitive foundations of metaphors. Collaboration across these disciplines has since developed into a rich multimodal approach to metaphor.

A multimodal approach uses gesture as a window into the cognitive processes underlying metaphor and its production in discourse (Lakoff 2008; Cornejo et. al. 2009; Wilson & Gibbs

2007; Müller 2008a, 2008b). Cornelia Müller, a pioneer of this approach, finds that gesture foregrounds the source domain of verbal metaphors and coordinates them over extended sequences. What this shows, on her account, is that metaphoricity “is a response to the communicative intent of the speaker and the interactive needs of the participants” (2008: 239). In other words, it is a response to the speaker’s aim of delivering a message “the way she or he wants a listener to hear it, and this,” Müller’s explains, “is what we as analysts may exploit” (239). In the sections to follow, I exploit gesture as a window into how speakers use antithesis to frame arguments in accord with viewpoint. Section III examines the gestural correlates of antithesis and how they foreground its source domain using various viewpoint markers, including dominance, distance, and shape. Section IV examines how these markers are coordinated with the entire trajectory of antithesis, in the creation of climatic multimodal arguments. And Section V discusses how figures provide an invaluable resource for studying the pragmatics of multimodal cognition and how it operates across a range of rhetorical contexts.

It should be noted that there are obstacles in applying cognitive approaches, based mostly on spontaneous gesture, to political discourse, where speakers typically operate with some form of gestural training. However, it is the case that (1) they are often advised to gesture what comes naturally, so long as it appears confident and relaxed; (2) their methods do not address the semantics of gesture as captured by cognitive approaches; and (3) their gestures are nevertheless received implicitly, maintaining their uniquely persuasive status (Atkinson 1984, 2005; Streeck 2008). As such, political discourse provides an exceptional resource for observing the acrobatic, rhetorical feats that largely spontaneous gestures can produce. Gesture depends, as Kendon explains, “upon the circumstances of use, the communicative purposes for which they are intended, and how they are to be used in relation to the other media of expression that are

available” (2004: 107). This fact, he elaborates, should compel us to “study the different conditions which constrain and facilitate the different forms that can be created by [gesture]” (107). Observed in political discourse, we observe a variety of gestural forms attuned to rhetorical purposes, attesting to the capacity for multimodal cognition to adapt to the rhetorical aims of the speaker, even under the most complex pragmatic conditions.

Chapter 3: The Gestural Correlates of Antithesis

Antithesis is traditionally defined, in the words of Fahnestock, as “a verbal structure that places contrasted or opposing terms in parallel or balanced cola or phrases” (1999: 46). For example: *the stronger lead, the weaker follow*. By foregrounding contrast against a uniform background, it is said to bias the listener to prefer one side over the other. The reason for this, Turner (1998) argues, is that it foregrounds an embodied source domain. The body is symmetrical along the horizontal plane but not the vertical, forcing humans to balance weight among their symmetrical limbs. When a difference in weight is introduced – i.e. an asymmetry – the balance is upset, pushing the body toward one side. The antithesis is said to simulate this experience by foregrounding semantic asymmetry against a symmetrical form, thus offsetting its formal balance. A multimodal approach directs our attention to how gestures foreground this source domain in the active delivery of antithesis.

Gesture is a domain where metaphors are made visible. In her multimodal approach, Müller (2008a, 2008b) shows that gestures display the same source domains of cooccurring verbal metaphors. This allows source domains to be “shaped by cognitive processes, such as the flow of attention and foregrounding of information, as well as by interactive constraints” (110). That is to say, gestures allow source domains to become a resource for pragmatic engagement, enabling the speaker to “tell a story the way she or he wants a listener to hear it” (111). This approach shows how gestures foreground the source domain of antithesis to rhetorically influence how listeners interpret the arguments in play. Upon analysis, we discover that gestures do so by framing antithesis in accord with viewpoint.

The gestural correlates of antithesis enact the same basic source domain, whereby contrastive terms are paired with opposite poles along the horizontal axis. But each antithetical

gesture differs in its use of viewpoint markers to foreground this source domain. For lack of space, I focus on dominance, distance, and shape, even though a number of other markers are relevant. Through these markers, we gain insight into the cognitive dimensions along which antithesis is construed with respect to viewpoint. “Gesture intervenes spontaneously on a less conscious level than speech,” Calbris writes, and as such, “it should enable us to reach further back into the genesis of the metaphoric process” (2008: 28). In this context, gesture allows us to observe how viewpoint is woven into the source domain of antithesis, into its genesis. Because gesture intervenes on a level less conscious than speech, it equips speakers with the capacity to add viewpoint to the online construal of antithesis, potentially below the awareness of recipients. Modelling these viewpoint markers is thus the first step toward understanding how multimodality offers rhetorical affordances that enhance the persuasiveness of figures.

3.1 Hand Dominance

In gesture and sign language, dominance is systematically involved in the construction of meaning (Liddell 2003; Sweetser 2009). It has been shown, for instance, that speakers tend, over two-thirds of the time, to gesture with their dominant hand during the delivery of ideas they emotionally support and the reverse for the nondominant hand (Casasanto 2009). The same researchers show that this emotional viewpoint obtains independently of hand use, with positive emotions associated with stimuli on the dominant side of the body. As evidence of its pervasiveness, Casasanto & Kyle (2010) examine over 3000 gestures from the 2004 and 2008 US presidential elections and uncover the same emotional pattern. Importantly, even if a speaker’s dominance is not known to an audience, the audience can still register the formation of

value poles (Streeck, J. 2008; Poggi & Pelachaud 2008). In the context of antithesis, these poles allow politicians to impose an emotional viewpoint on the concepts they pair with them.

Consider, again, Obama's antithesis from his *A More Perfect Union* speech: "Talk show hosts and conservative commentators built entire careers unmasking bogus claims of racism while dismissing legitimate discussions of racial injustice and inequality as mere political correctness or reverse racism" (2008, 23:36). Obama repeats two contrastive pairs, *unmasking bogus* and *dismissing legitimate*, which consist of the symmetrical syntactic form [*present participle + adjective*]. *Unmasking* implies that his opponents saw grand significance in the claims they were revealing, whereas *bogus* describes these claims as insignificant. The contrastive pattern repeats: *dismissing* implies an arrogant refusal to pay enough attention, whereas *legitimate* describes something that merits such attention. Because of their parallel form, the antithesis also highlights opposition among these contrastive pairs, achieving what Fahnestock calls a *double antithesis* (1999: 47). *Unmasking* involves making something apparent to the mind, whereas *dismissing* involves removing something from the mind. Similarly, *bogus* refers to something of dubious and offensive import, whereas *legitimate* refers to something of trustworthy and compelling import. Combined, these contrastive pairs ascribe contradictory racist views to Obama's opponents, while implying that he supports legitimate racial discussion and does not dismiss its importance. What we observe at the gestural level is a set of techniques for implementing this strategy implicitly.

While introducing his opponents, he pairs their names with a locus in his nondominant space, using his nondominant right hand (see Parry 2010 and Xaquín et. al. 2012 for dominance).

Talk show hosts and conservative commentators built entire careers




*Right hand gesture, beneath right shoulder; the index finger and thumb are touching, forming a ring (see Kendon 2004, pages 238-250, for a discussion of ring shapes).

Figure 4. Obama Antithesis (Talk Show Hosts)

He then extends his hand further into the right pole when describing his opponents' act of unmasking bogus claims.

unmasking bogus claims of racism




*Right hand gesture on right side of the body; the shape of the hand is simulating the act of grasping.

Figure 5. Obama Antithesis (Unmasking)

The negative connotations of *bogus* are thus paired with the right field of Obama's gesture space. But when he refers to *legitimate* discussion, a positive term, he transitions to his dominant hand.

legitimate discussion of racial injustice and inequality




*left hand gesture, on the left side; the index finger and thumb are held together.

Figure 6. Obama Antithesis (Legitimate)

By alternating hands, Obama exhibits the widespread use of dominance to encode emotional viewpoint. By pairing words of contrastive sentiment with opposite regions of space, he splits the horizontal axis into two value poles, creating an antithetical axis. These poles act as viewpoint anchors that allow him to layer an emotional valence on top of the words he pairs with them. He harnesses these anchors in a strategic sequence, when he delivers his opponents' words. While doing so, he returns to his nondominant hand, in the negative space.

as mere **political correctness** or **reverse racism**.



*right hand gesture, fully extended into the right space; the hand is open and is pushing an imaginary object further into the right space.

Figure 7. Obama Antithesis (Political Correctness)

By returning to his nondominant hand, Obama links his opponents' words to the same negative space associated with *bogus*, *unmasking* and *dismissing*. His opponents' words are consequently embedded in a context of negative associations stemming from Obama's viewpoint. Notice too that when Obama returns to the right pole, he extends his hand as far as he can into the negative space. This simultaneously engages the viewpoint marker of distance.


3.2 Distance

A number of studies and experiments illustrate that one of the primary metaphors in our cognitive repertoire is the association between similarity and proximity (Grady 1997; Casasanto 2008b; Winter & Matlock 2013). This metaphor derives from a cluster of embodied experiences, including the experience of perceiving similar things in close groups, such as trees in a forest or drops in the rain. In the gesture space, this plays out when words that are semantically similar are

held closer together and words that are contrastive are held further apart (Sweetser 1998; Casasanto 2008a). Consider the distance reflected in this gesture, by Jimmy Kimmel:

Due to copyright restrictions, screenshots of this gesture are unavailable. See a recording of the Jimmy Kimmel Live show, on Monday, September 30th, 2013. There is a recording on youtube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sx2scvIFGjE>. The clip begins at 34 seconds. To analyze the clip, I describe the gestures that occur alongside the bolded words.

Affordable Care Act or **Obamacare**



* the left hand moves from beneath the left shoulder to inside the left shoulder; the hand is flat and is perpendicular to the floor.

Figure 8. Kimmel Antithesis (Distance)

Using only his left hand on the left side of his body, Jimmy Kimmel gestures in support of his statement: “We asked people which one they thought was better: The Affordable Care Act or Obamacare” (0:33). Despite the unfortunate results of the survey, Kimmel himself knows that The Affordable Care Act and Obamacare are the same thing. We see here that the degree of contrast Kimmel perceives is reflected in the subtle distance of his gesture. In this sense, his gesture is an implicit cue for the irony of his argument.

By comparison, Obama displays substantial distance between *bogus* and *legitimate*. This distance increases when he delivers his opponents' words: *political correctness* and *reverse racism*. Neither phrase is conventionally contrastive or similar to *bogus* and *legitimate*. But by implicating them in the antithetical form, Obama is presenting them as if they are. This is what Fahnestock means when she explains that rhetorical figures are 'linguistic prompts' for constructing and epitomizing arguments. Figures provide templates that impose certain types of arguments onto a set of concepts. The major difference, in this case, is that this maneuver is not solely implemented at the verbal level. Obama's opponents' words break the formal symmetry of the verbal antithesis. They fall outside its [present-participle + adjective] form. It is at the level of gesture that they are linked to the value poles of his antithesis, thus implicating them in its argumentative form. Dominance and distance work together in this antithesis to integrate a multifaceted viewpoint into the verbal antithesis. They cooperatively transform the horizontal plane into an antithetical axis that can express semantic and emotional viewpoints through the same loci. This allows Obama to build up an increasing contrast, culminating in the climactic critique of his opponents' perspective, effectively epitomizing his argument.


Another salient viewpoint marker in multimodal antithesis is shape. Dominance relies on carving the gesture space into opposite poles, with a symmetrical, spatial structure; and distance relies on the shape of a line, which offers a gradient set of values for expression. In addition, speakers can incorporate different hand configurations into these parameters to further characterize viewpoint. An illustrative example is found in a multimodal antithesis produced by Hilary Clinton, where the shape of her hand adds crucial viewpoints to her argument that are not captured at the explicit level of speech.

3.3 Hand Shape

During the 2008 Democratic National Convention, Clinton delivers the following antithesis.

Due to copyright restrictions, screenshots of this gesture are unavailable. See a recording of Clinton's speech at the 2008 Democratic National Convention, in Denver, Colorado. There is a recording on youtube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MeFMZ7fpGHY>. The clip begins at 17 minutes. To analyze the clip, I describe the gestures that occur alongside the bolded words.


We need a president who understands we can't solve the problems of global warming
by giving **windfall profits to the oil companies,**



*two handed gesture, together forming the shape of a cup; they are positioned on the left side of the body.

Figure 9. Clinton Antithesis Part 1

while ignoring opportunities to **invest in new technologies**



*right handed gesture, in the shape of a cup; hand moves from beneath the left shoulder to beneath the right shoulder; while moving across the gesture space, the hand also moves down and up again, simulating weight.

Figure 10. Clinton Antithesis Part 2

Her antithesis obtains in the proximal contrast of ‘giving windfall profits to oil companies’ and ‘investing in new technologies’. She delivers the first phrase on her nondominant left side, and she delivers the second phrase on her dominant right side, thus creating two value poles (see Rotstein 2008 for dominance). While marking these poles, Clinton deploys a specific shape that adds to their viewpointed significance. The shape is called the *palm up open hand*, and it serves to present concepts as if they were objects, via the metaphor IDEAS ARE OBJECTS (Kendon 2004: 248-283). This metaphor allows speakers to imbue ideas with a number of physical properties that can reflect viewpoint. While holding ‘new technologies’, for instance, Clinton moves her hand up and down to depict an increase in imaginary weight. This activates the metaphor SIGNIFICANCE IS WEIGHT, which attributes greater relevance to ideas with greater weight. Clinton integrates this shape into her antithesis to enhance its argument. The source domain of antithesis relies on balancing limbs along the horizontal axis. The weight Clinton adds

to ‘new technologies’ literally tips her body and thus her viewpoint toward her preferred concept, in her positive side. In this way, Clinton uses shape to foreground the source domain of antithesis and adapt it to her viewpoint. Crucially, this shape also helps Clinton to induce this viewpoint in others. As Müller explains, “the Palm Up Open Hand is a communicative device for ... suggesting the expressed point of view as something towards which the participant should adopt a common perspective” (Müller 2004: 243). Altogether, Clinton’s example shows how speakers can use shape to metaphorically frame antithesis in accord with viewpoint, while enhancing its rhetorical capacity to induce this viewpoint in the minds of others.

3.4 Discussion

Political arguments are designed to deliver perspective. As a device for epitomizing arguments, antithesis delivers perspective accordingly. However, it does not do so exclusively through verbal form. Much of its epitomizing function relies on the viewpoint that gesture conveys. Through dominance, speakers split the horizontal axis into opposing value poles, and these value poles can mix with a range of metaphors to further characterize viewpoint. By marking distance along the axis, speakers can use SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS to represent degrees of contrast. As well, the shape of the hand can layer on additional metaphors like IDEAS ARE OBJECTS and SIGNIFICANCE IS WEIGHT, which add even more detail to the viewpoints involved. As a window into thought curtailed, gestures reveal the viewpointed dimensions that characterize the embodied source domain of antithesis. They also reveal how this source domain is selectively foregrounded to resonate with the speaker’s argument. As such, these markers are a window into the cognitive foundations of antithesis and its rhetorical effects.

Hand dominance reflects an embodied viewpoint that is woven into the horizontal axis and its use in antithesis. Up and down are perceived as absolute coordinates, whereas left and right are perceived as ego-centric (Piaget 1928; Elkind 1961; Regal 1996). When two speakers face each other, up and down are common to both. Up is where their heads are and down is where their feet are. Their left and right, however, are not identical. One person's left is the other's right. For this reason, the horizontal axis is inherently viewpointed. During experience, this instills a value association that underpins antithesis. Children develop sensorimotor skills by relying on their dominant hand. This results in patterns of neural development where the dominant hand becomes entrenched in circuits relating to motivation and reward. FMRI data affirms that adult brains process motivation and reward more heavily in the hemisphere that controls the dominant hand (Brookshire & Casasanto 2012). Traces of this value association ripple throughout culture. Mythologies, practices, and rituals around the world are based on metaphors of handedness, and the right hand is ubiquitously endowed with positive value, as the majority of people are right-handed (McManus 2002). In multimodal contexts, this emotional viewpoint is readily expressed in gesture, attesting to its intimate link with the horizontal axis and its foundation role in antithesis.

The use of distance also reveals a scalar logic underlying antithesis. Various scholars have attempted to ground the cognitive foundations of conceptual scales in the body, without examining gesture (Turner 1991, 1998; Davies 2008; Jeffries 2010; Israel 2011). Israel, in particular, models the grammar of polarity using two rhetorical figures, exaggeration and understatement. These figures are said to implement scalar reasoning, which is hypothesized to derive from the body's axes and their metaphorical uses (2011: 235). Exaggeration represents an increase in distance along a conceptual scale and understatement represents a decrease. Israel

identifies these relationships as “rhetorical strategies for the presentation of self in discourse” (110). Essentially, he identifies movement along a scale as a rhetorical mechanism for representing viewpoint. What the gestural correlates of antithesis reveal is that this movement is reflected in the actual movement of the hands, via the metaphor SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS, which is incorporated into horizontal axis and its expressive potential.

Lastly, and perhaps most fundamentally, the viewpointed foundations of antithesis derive from shape. As Sweetser writes, “we have no non-viewpointed perception of the world; our bodies are always asymmetrically constrained in visual and manual access to the world, as well as in motion – the space in front of us is accessible in a way that the one behind us is not” (2013: 240). Our embodied oppositions are one of the primary sources of viewpoint. The same fact is responsible for the viewpointed experience of tipping one way due to an asymmetry of weight. This experience is simulated by Clinton’s gesture, which gives more weight to the ideas she endorses, thus shifting her viewpoint toward them. Regarding external objects, shape is also built into viewpoint and its role in antithesis. In experience, the shape of an object can determine how we perceive and interact with it. Some shapes obscure vision, some are graspable, and so on. Through the metaphor IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, gestures can use shape as a way of revealing a semantic perspective on the contrastive concepts within antithesis. For instance, speakers may gesture as if two contrastive concepts are in separate containers, thus representing them as categorically exclusive, or they may gesture as if two contrastive concepts are different points along a scale, with a gradient of overlap in between. These are just a few examples of how shape participates in the cognitive foundations of antithesis and its expression in multimodal contexts.

Multimodality provides a unique window into the cognitive foundations of antithesis and how it expresses viewpoint. What gestures reveal is that the source domain of antithesis is not

solely defined by symmetry and weight. It is also defined by the viewpointed experiences these embodied features engender. In multimodal contexts, the body readily expresses its viewpoint on antithesis through gesture. This allows politicians to present a richer picture of the emotional and semantic perspective they have toward their antithetical arguments. Multimodality thus empowers antithesis to represent viewpoint in a multifaceted manner, thus enhancing its capacity to epitomize arguments of a complexly viewpointed nature.

So far, I have discussed how gestures allow politicians to capture their viewpoint on antithesis, thus enriching its epitomizing capacity. This capacity undergoes a quantum leap when considering the fact that politicians often use antithesis to represent multiple viewpoints, including those of different people. Politicians are entrenched in a network of viewpoints, real and imaginary, to which they must respond. This places pressure on them to incorporate multiple, competing viewpoints into their arguments. In the following section, I explore how multimodality is involved in epitomizing arguments at this level as well. A major finding, in recent years, is that gesture and speech can express multiple different viewpoints, in the same message. Politicians harness this capacity to create pairings between verbal and gestural markers, across modalities, that code for multiple different viewpoints. By organizing these crossmodal pairings into strategic, antithetical sequences, speakers can develop multimodal arguments that coordinate multiple competing perspectives in accord with the speaker's aims.

Chapter 4: Multimodal Arguments

In political debates, politicians are pressured to defend their viewpoints over and against the viewpoints of others. Their arguments, as a result, often incorporate multiple different viewpoints. Recent scholarship has discovered that both gesture and speech have the capacity to express multiple, different viewpoints, in the same message. Multimodal antithesis employs this capacity to integrate and interrelate multiple different viewpoints, simultaneously, within an oppositional argumentative structure. To illustrate, I examine two examples. First, I return to the Obama example and show how it coordinates gesture and speech to achieve a multimodal climax that epitomizes his argument. I then examine a speech by John Kerry, which contains an antithesis with a similar trajectory, spanning over eight utterances. The ability to produce and process such multimodal arguments is a testament to the sophistication of multimodal cognition and its capacity to adapt to rhetorical aims. At the end of this section, I discuss what this means for our understanding of multimodal cognition and its pragmatic complexities.

4.1 Multiple Modalities, Multiple Viewpoints

As a species that survives and thrives off social interaction, our viewpoint is inherently relational. We are highly attuned, from birth, to what each other's body language signifies about emotion, intention, and attention (Fox & McDaniel 1982; Gallagher 2005; Tomasello 2008). Gesture and speech emerge within this interpersonal environment as ways of communicating viewpoint. While perceptually we can only experience one viewpoint at a time, language allows us to combine multiple viewpoints in our accounts of experience, including those of other people. Numerous studies affirm that speakers adapt how they speak and gesture to

accommodate the viewpoints of others (Barr & Keysar 2007; Ishino 2008; Dancygier et. al. 2012; Kuhlan et. al. 2012; Wachsmuth et. al. 2013; Debreslioska et. al. 2013; Peeters et. al. 2014). Sweetser observes, “multiple viewpoints live in single minds and bodies” (2013). To manage and express the many viewpoints we cognitively sustain, both speech and gesture supply a variety of means for incorporating multiple viewpoints into a single message, with each offering different affordances based on their structure as modalities.

Through naming, quoting, and a variety of other means, speakers can use speech to construct complex narratives, inhabited by many viewpoints (Dancygier 2012a, 2012b). Consider the following three utterances:

I saw a stranger escape out the window.

Sally said she saw a stranger escape out the window.

Sally saw a stranger escape out the window.

In first utterance, the event is described from the viewpoint of a first-person narrator within the scene, marked by ‘I’. In the second, the event is described by Sally, who is quoted by an outside narrator. In the third, the two voices are intertwined: Sally’s description is nested in the voice of the narrator. In the first, the narrator is wholly responsible for the information provided. In the second, the narrator is not responsible – Sally is. This is the effect of indirectly quoting her, marked by ‘Sally said’. And in the third, the responsibility is shared. It is an example of what Sanders (2012) calls *implicit viewpoint*, where there are no signs of quotation to distinguish among the viewpoints. The term *stranger* could be from Sally’s viewpoint or the narrator’s. Imagine if the narrator had written: “I saw her cat jump from the ledge. Startled, Sally saw a stranger escape out the window.” This would reveal that the stranger is not a stranger from the

narrator's perspective. These techniques for representing viewpoint are often used to rhetorically distribute responsibility (Sanders & Redeker 1996; Sanders 2012). Sanders (2012) discusses an example where a journalist quotes an expert criminologist and then, after the quote, produces a set of unquoted sentences that could equally derive from either of them. This gives the journalist "a stronger explanatory legitimacy" by allowing her to borrow from the authority of the criminologist (93). In multimodal contexts, these tactics are enhanced by co-occurring gestures.


In Section III, I illustrated how gesture can express multiple dimensions of viewpoint via dominance, distance, and shape. Here I also discuss how they express character and observer viewpoints, akin to the narrative perspectives described above. While telling the story of a car crash, my hands may gesture as if I were driving the car, from the viewpoint of a character within the scene (also known as character viewpoint – CVP). My hands may also represent two cars bumping into each other, while I, the speaker, adopt the viewpoint of an observer outside the scene (also known as observer viewpoint – OVP). A unique feature of gesture is that, as a visual modality, it can express multiple different viewpoints, side by side. Parrill (2009) examines *dual-viewpoint* gestures, where speakers use their bodies to display two narrative viewpoints, in parallel – e.g. while depicting a car with her hands, from an OVP, the speaker's terror-stricken face may depict someone in the car, from a CVP. Sweetser (2013) further shows how dual-viewpoint gestures can express viewpoints that correspond to different people – e.g. a speaker's hands may grip an imaginary steering wheel, in depicting the driver, while her closed eyes depict the sleeping passenger. Up to this point, researchers have explored the ways in which gestures echo the viewpoints in speech, using data drawn mostly from casual conversation. Political discourse presents a different set of pragmatic conditions that generate a different set of gestural forms. Politicians are under immense pressure to frame their viewpoints positively and their

opponents' negatively. Their gestures respond to these pressures by expressing a different set of viewpoints from those in speech, so as to persuasively frame them. Multimodal antithesis allows us to observe how gestures deviate from speech to complement broader, argumentative structures. Analysis shows that gestures both resonate with and deviate from verbal viewpoints, with each crossmodal pairing serving a critical role in the development of antithesis.

4.2 The Multimodal Dynamics of Antithesis

The first artifact of analysis is Obama's antithesis, familiar from preceding chapters. The aim of his antithesis is to indicate the hypocritical and racist views of his opponents. His argument is that, while his opponents were self-righteously 'unmasking bogus' claims of racism, they were also negligently 'dismissing legitimate' discussion about the same issues. These descriptions are not quotations. They operate via implicit viewpoint, where it is unclear whether they come from Obama's perspective or his opponents', thus conflating their viewpoints. For Obama's antithesis to work, he has to persuade his audience that *unmasking* and *dismissing* are accurate depictions – i.e. true to the source. To do so, he gestures as if he were the source. While describing his opponents, he performs CVP gestures that represent the actions of unmasking and dismissing.

unmasking bogus claims of racism



*Right hand gesture, on the right side of the body; hand is open and simulating grasping.

Figure 11. Obama Antithesis (Unmasking)

While **dismissing** legitimate discussions of racial injustice and inequality



*Left hand gesture, on the left side; index finger is extended to a point and engaged in a swiping motion.

Figure 12. Obama Antithesis (Dismissing)

By performing the actions of *masking* and *dismissing*, Obama literally becomes his opponents in the gesture space, closing the gap between their actions and his descriptions. As Sidnell observes in his analysis of oral narratives, CVP gestures “erase the witness and obscure the subjective basis of an account” (2006: 406). They perform the rhetorical function of shifting responsibility

away from the speaker and toward the enacted source of information. In Obama's case, his CVP gestures resolve the ambiguous distribution of responsibility brought on by implicit viewpoint, by making his opponents the visible source of his account. At the same time, he embeds these CVP gestures in a context of implicit antithetical parameters that frame them in accord with his viewpoint, thus expressing multiple different viewpoints, simultaneously.

During his CVP gestures, Obama anchors them in his nondominant, negative space. This casts a negative emotional valence upon them, stemming from Obama's viewpoint. Obama then leaves the CVP mode to deliver *legitimate*, which he pairs with his dominant, positive space. Up to this point, there are multiple different viewpoints activated across modalities. Obama's verbal use of implicit viewpoint intertwines his viewpoint with those of his opponents. His use of CVP gestures then enacts his opponents' viewpoint within value poles defined by his own perspective. These multiple viewpoints are then recruited toward a final, climactic move that epitomizes Obama's argument. He argues that his opponents dismissed legitimate discussion *as* political correctness or reverse racism, implying that these terms derive from their lexicon and thus their viewpoint. While delivering these words, he gesturally returns to his nondominant space, linking them not only to his CVP gestures, but also to their negativity. This multimodal sequence epitomizes his aim of attributing a hypocritical and racist viewpoint to his opponents, while ascribing a more favorable perspective to himself. This last part is achieved by the fact that the only moment Obama's viewpoint is expressed on its own is when his gestures place *legitimate* in the left positive space. This suggests that Obama understands the importance of legitimate discussion and prioritizes it over the more negative perspective aligned with his opponents.

The following example from John Kerry reflects a similar argumentative trajectory, spanning over eight contrastive sentences. With the additional complexity of this trajectory

comes additional complexity in its rhetorical makeup. Kerry's antithesis was delivered at the 2012 Democratic National Convention. In light of the upcoming election, his speech focuses on contrasting Obama's viewpoint with the viewpoint of his republican competitor, Mitt Romney. One of his strategies is to represent Romney's views as internally dissonant and contradictory, thus undermining his legitimacy as a candidate. His following antithesis epitomizes this aim.¹¹

So on one side of this campaign, we have a president who has made America lead like America again. And what is there on the other side – an extreme and expedient candidate who lacks the judgment and the vision so vital for the oval office? ... You know, it isn't fair to say that Mitt Romney doesn't have a position on Afghanistan. He has every position. He was against setting a date for withdrawal. Then he said it was right. And then he left the impression that maybe it was wrong to leave this soon. He said it was tragic to leave Iraq, and then he said it was fine. He said we should have intervened in Libya sooner. Then he ran down a hallway to run away from the reporters who were asking questions. Then he said the intervention was too aggressive. Then he said the world was a better place because the intervention succeeded ... Mr. Romney here's a little advice, before you debate Barak Obama on foreign policy, you better finish the debate with yourself. (7:00)

At the verbal level, Kerry divides the presidential campaign into two metaphorical 'sides' that correspond to Obama and Romney. He then criticizes Romney for adopting a variety of contradictory positions regarding Afghanistan and other topics. Then, to demonstrate Romney's inconsistency, Kerry reports on his beliefs through a variety of means. The reports that include the phrase "he said" indicate that some form of quoting is intended, either as a direct quote or as a summary. The other instances manifest a form of implicit viewpoint, where Kerry is characterizing Romney's perspective without indicating their separation. For example, when

Kerry says that Romney “was against setting a date for withdrawal,” he does not frame it as a quotation. He frames it as a description of Romney’s viewpoint, making it unclear the extent to which he is imposing his own views onto Romney’s stance. Kerry then caps off this antithetical series by returning to his division of Obama and Romney. He does so with an utterance that reflects the aim of his antithesis, which is to contrast Romney’s internal debate with Obama’s diplomatic consistency. Throughout this argument, Kerry’s antithesis is complemented by a sequence of gestures that are instrumental to achieving his aim.

As Kerry verbally constructs the metaphor of ‘sides,’ his hands carve out actual sides in the gesture space. He then pairs the names Obama and Romney with loci in these opposing sides.

Due to copyright restrictions, screenshots of this gesture are unavailable. See a recording of Kerry’s speech at the 2012 Democratic National Convention, in Charlotte, North Carolina. There is a recording on youtube: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSgcETQ74Mg>. The clip begins at 6 minutes and 56 seconds. To analyze the clip, I describe the gestures that occur alongside the bolded words.

So on one side of this campaign, we have a **President** who has made America lead ...




* Right hand gesture, on the right side of body; hand is in a flat shape, roughly perpendicular to the ground, with a slight arch of the palm toward the ceiling.

Figure 13. Kerry Antithesis Part 1

As he utters *President*, he pairs it with a locus in the right field, using his dominant hand (see Casasanto 2009 for dominance). Kerry continues – “what is there on the other side?” First he issues a rhetorical question that criticizes the unnamed opponent: “an extreme and expedient candidate who lacks the judgment and the vision so vital for the oval office?” Then, upon revealing this candidate, he pairs his name with a locus in his negative, nondominant space.

... it isn't fair to say that **Mitt Romney** doesn't have a position on Afghanistan.




*Left hand gesture, reaching into left the space; hand is mostly flat, palm arched toward the ground, with the index finger extended to indicate a particular locus.

Figure 14. Kerry Antithesis Part 2

From its outset, Kerry's gestures combine multiple viewpoints, simultaneously. Obama's viewpoint is paired with Kerry's dominant space, and Romney's viewpoint is paired with his nondominant space, giving both an emotional valence stemming from Kerry's viewpoint. Pairing Obama and Romney with these diametrical loci additionally creates viewpoint anchors that sustain the evaluative framing. These anchors become expressive resources that Kerry recruits later on, at the climax of his antithesis. Leading up to this climax, he uses his gestures to impose an antithetical framework on Romney's perspective.

Before detailing Romney's views, Kerry clears the gesture space by spreading both hands out to the furthest poles. This gesture accompanies Kerry's accusation that Romney "has every position" on a number of foreign policy issues. His hands signify Romney's lack of discretion by opening to all the available loci and thus all the available viewpoints in the gesture space.

He has **every position**.




*Both hands are reaching into their respective spaces; the hands are flat, with a slight arch of the palms toward the ceiling.

Figure 15. Kerry Antithesis Part 3

This gesture serves to wipe the gesture space clean for the subsequent display of Romney's many positions. However, rather than indicating these positions by engaging loci from all available regions, Kerry does so along the antithetical axis. To mark the extended delivery of Romney's viewpoint, Kerry exhibits a known phenomenon whereby speakers reverse their dominant alignments when speaking from the perspective of someone else (Sweetser & Parrill 2004). This multimodal technique allows Kerry to impose an antithetical framework onto Romney's beliefs, while suggesting that it derives from Romney's viewpoint.

Kerry begins in the style of implicit viewpoint, where he is describing Romney's views without any sign of quotation.

He was **against** setting a date for withdrawal




*Right hand gesture, in the right space; hand is flat, palm arched toward the ceiling.

Figure 16. Kerry Antithesis Part 4

The word *against* marks negative content, and this negativity is paired with Kerry's positive, dominant space. Kerry then delivers a quote with polar sentiment.

Then he said it was **right**



*Left hand gesture, in the left space; palm is flat and perpendicular to the ground, with fingers slightly curled.

Figure 17. Kerry Antithesis Part 5

Here Kerry switches from the negativity of *against* to the positivity of *right*, which is paired with his nondominant, left side. The pattern continues:

And then he left the impression that maybe it was **wrong** to leave this soon



*Right hand gesture, in the right space; palm is flat and perpendicular to the ground; the hand is raised to the level of the face. The body and face are rotated to the right.

Figure 18. Kerry Antithesis Part 6

Before reaching the counterpart of the above phrase, Kerry inserts an additional phrase involving the negative term *tragic*. Since this term is negative, Kerry does not repeat the antithetical pattern by returning his hands to the left, positive pole. Rather, on his way to the left pole, he stops in the centre, maintaining the value consistency of each dominant space.

He said it was **tragic** to leave Iraq,



* Both hands are in symmetrical positions in the left and right space; the palms are facing the chest and the hands are flat; the hands are in front of the shoulders.

Figure 19. Kerry Antithesis Part 7

When the polarized counterpart arrives, Kerry reaches into the left space, continuing the pattern.


and then he said it was **fine**



*Left hand gesture, in the left space; palm is arched toward ceiling, below the shoulder.

Figure 20. Kerry Antithesis Part 8


He said we **should have intervened** in Libya sooner.



* The hands are facing each other in parallel, marking the walls of an imaginary box; they are located on the right side of the body and are perpendicular to the ground.

Figure 21. Kerry Antithesis Part 9

Then he ran down a hallway to run away from the **reporters** ... asking questions




*Right hand gesture, right space; the palm is facing the audience and the hand is moving away from Kerry, located at the height of his eyes.

Figure 22. Kerry Antithesis Part 10

Again, Kerry introduces a variation in the transition between antithetical counterparts. He builds upon the current phrase by adding narrative detail to its uptake. He momentarily introduces the viewpoints of reporters, using his hand to depict Romney running away from them. This aligns

Kerry with the viewpoint of those that Romney shamefully fled from. Kerry then disengages from this CVP, with the final antithetical pair.


Then he said the intervention was **too aggressive**.



* His body is rotated toward the right; the left hand is in front of left side of the chest and the right hand is reaching into the right space; the hands are arched toward the ceiling and are flat.

Figure 23. Kerry Antithesis Part 11

Then he said the world was a better place because the intervention **succeeded**.



*Left hand gesture, left side of the body; the four fingers are touching the thumb (see Kendon 2004, pages 238-250, for a discussion of this pinching shape).

Figure 24. Kerry Antithesis Part 12

While Kerry verbally delivers Romney's beliefs through a combination of implicit viewpoint and quoting, he uses his gestures to sort these beliefs into antithetical value poles. This epitomizes his aim which is to indicate Romney's internal conflict and to diminish his adequacy as a potential President. Within the antithetical framework that Kerry constructs, he quickly zooms in and out of the viewpoint of reporters, using CVP gestures to bolster the validity of his account. The series concludes when Kerry provides the capstone to his argument.


Mr. Romney here's a little advice: before you debate **Barak Obama**



*Right hand gesture, right side of the body; index finger pointing upward toward a particular locus.

Figure 25. Kerry Antithesis Part 13

you better finish the debate with **yourself**.



*Left hand gesture, left side of the body; index finger is performing a gesture symmetrical to the gesture performed in (28).

Figure 26. Kerry Antithesis Part 14

As he returns to expressing his own verbal viewpoint, Kerry also returns to his original dominance pattern. While doing so, he reactivates the viewpoint anchors corresponding to Obama and Romney. With his dominant hand, in the right positive space, he points to the locus paired to Obama, and with his nondominant hand, in the left negative space, he points to the locus paired to Romney. By returning to his original value alignments, Kerry achieves a moment of closure for the figure. The audience, in response to this climax, bursts into uproarious cheer, signifying enthusiastic agreement with Kerry's viewpoint.

4.3 Discussion

The analysis above shows how gesture and speech are not only capable of expressing multiple viewpoints – they are also capable of coordinating these viewpoints in the achievement of climactic multimodal arguments. What is more, it shows how gesture and speech do not simply mirror each other. Rather, they reinforce and deviate from each other at critical moments in a

broader argumentative trajectory. For instance, politicians use CVP gestures to shift responsibility to their opponents for verbal descriptions that support their argument. Politicians can also pair the verbal viewpoints of their opponents with gestural loci that correspond to their own emotional perspective. These are just two examples of how information exchanges across modalities can be essential to the epitomizing function of figures. By examining the cognitive processes that support such crossmodal exchanges, we gain insight into the complexity of multimodal cognition and its readiness to adapt toward rhetorical ends.

For speakers to produce and process multimodal figures, they must engage in a complex set of cognitive mechanisms. For one, speakers must engage in sophisticated forms of viewpoint distribution and compression. By creating value poles, speakers offload their emotional viewpoint into the gesture space where it can be sustained in memory as an expressive resource. Speakers can then embed multiple viewpoints into these poles through mechanisms of viewpoint compression. For instance, speakers map entire viewpoints onto single loci in the gesture space, transforming these loci into viewpoint anchors that can be reengaged, sometimes after six to eight utterances. Speakers can also represent entire viewpoints and groups of viewpoints using a single gesture, with only one part of the body, as when Obama condenses the actions of ‘conservative commentators’ into a single dismissive swipe. By associating different parts of the body and the gesture space with different viewpoints, speakers are able to create metonymic cues that reduce the cognitive load needed for each viewpoint. These are among several cognitive mechanisms needed to sustain multiple viewpoints in memory and attention, across modalities and over extended argumentative sequences.

Multimodal figures represent the acrobatic feats that multimodal cognition can perform in rhetorical domains. It is crucial to recognize that while the cognitive mechanisms detailed above

operate internally to the mind, rhetorical figures show how they are also attuned to the conditions of the outer world. Multimodal cognition is, at one level, involved in managing a network of viewpoints across gesture and speech, but at another level, it is involved in managing arguments so that they are persuasive to an audience. The mechanisms described above systematically complement the argumentative strategy of antithesis by emotionally framing and shifting responsibility among the viewpoints expressed in speech. Rhetorical figures are, by nature, rhetorical. They are not just another linguistic structure. They are designed to persuade, which raises the question of why they are persuasive, a question that is not often discussed of utterances in the cognitive literature. Examining the cognitive mechanisms underlying the construction and comprehension of figures provides substantial insight into the multimodal buttons they persuasively push. In the fourth and final section of this essay, I integrate cognitive and rhetorical methodologies into a theory of how multimodality enhances the persuasiveness of figures, as a window into the rhetorical dimensions of multimodal cognition more generally.

Chapter 5: Toward a Multimodal Rhetoric

Rhetorical figures are standardly viewed as primarily verbal phenomena, with gestures relegated to only emotional and rhythmic functions. The cognitive approach to gesture reveals that gestures interact with all levels of rhetorical figures through a shared set of cognitive processes, including metaphor and viewpoint. In Section III, I show how gestures enhance the expressive capacity of antithesis through a number of viewpoint markers, including dominance, distance, and shape. In Section IV, I show how these markers are coordinated with speech, over extended argumentative sequences, that allow antithesis to epitomize arguments at the level of multiple different perspectives. It is crucial to note, however, that even in the midst of cognitive approaches, irreducibly rhetorical questions remain. “A student of rhetoric is identified by the question he or she raises about symbolic behaviour,” writes Richard Gregg. That question is: “What are the actual or potential functions of symbolic inducement and what are the actual or potential consequences of those functions?” (1986: 137). In this final section, I reflect on the cognitive mechanisms underlying gestures with an eye toward the potential functions of symbolic inducement that they perform in the domain of figures.

A defining feature of multimodality is that it operates across implicit and explicit channels. Human memory and attention are limited in the amount of information they can suspend in consciousness, so a substantial amount of information is offloaded to implicit media for subconscious processing. “Just as grammar and phonology are mostly used in normal speech below the level of conscious control,” Lakoff explains, “so gesture, for the most part, is also unconscious and automatic” (2008: 284). A number of experiments confirm that gestures influence the semantic and emotional interpretation of speech without interlocutors being consciously aware of them (Özyürek et. al. 2007; Wu & Coulson 2007, 2014; Cornejo et. al.

2009; Hubbard et. al. 2009; Kelly et. al. 2010; Kopp & Bergmann. 2013). Lakoff even discusses evidence that gestures engage the mirror neuronal system in both speakers and listeners – a system of neurons that fires both when one is performing an action and observing an action (Cartmill et. al. 2012). While our understanding of mirror neurons is still in its infancy (see Hickock 2014), there is strong evidence that gestures induce embodied simulations in the minds of recipients (Holle et. al. 2008; Hostetter & Alibali 2008, 2010). This allows gestures to potentially stimulate simulations of the same embodied structures within both the orator and her audience. In the 17th century, John Bulwer made the rhetorical implications of this clear: “gestures invade the mind through the eye, and with easy accesses put themselves into the possession of the people” (1644: 160). As an implicit, visual medium, gestures are able to channel the uptake of speech by conveying information directly to the perceptions of listeners, inclining their cognitive activity toward convergent patterns of meaning construction. Their ability to express immense amounts of information about our viewpoint, while doing so, makes them an especially effective instrument of persuasion.

One of the main mysteries behind gesture is how, even though it is implicit, it is able to express substantial information, especially about viewpoint. This makes gesture a powerful tool of persuasion, as Quintilian observed centuries ago: “A conciliatory effect may be secured either by charm of style or by producing an impression of excellence of character, which is in some mysterious way clearly revealed both by voice and gesture” (XI. III. 153-157). Cognitive methodologies shed light on this mystery by showing how gesture and speech co-construct character through the coordination of viewpoint markers. What these methodologies do not discuss is how this capacity facilitates persuasion. According to Quintilian, the expression of character can give rise to a conciliatory effect – that is, a state of agreement wherein the audience

identifies with the speaker's perspective. The construction of character (also known as *ethos*) continues to be identified as one of the most persuasive strategies for achieving this effect, because of its direct link to trust, authority, and alliance (Hyde 2004). This is especially apparent in political discourse, where speakers undertake elaborate strategies for gaining the trust and allegiance of their audiences. The fact that gestures can construct appealing viewpoints from an implicit level reveals the depth of their persuasive potential. What figures afford for analysis is a multimodal environment where gestures implicitly incorporate viewpoint information into verbal arguments so as to steer their interpretation in accord with the speaker's perspective.

Persuasion is often challenged by the fact that specific messages are rarely if ever interpreted in a universal fashion. As Sweetser & Parrill explain, "linguistic signs are no more than the tip of the iceberg. They are but prompts to the evocation of a meaning which is very far from being determined by a particular linguistic sequence" (2004: 217). This makes it difficult to ensure that individuals, let alone entire audiences, will construe arguments in accord with a particular perspective. Rhetorician Kenneth Burke explains how rhetorical figures surface, under such conditions, as a means for securing reliable patterns of interpretation. He writes:

Many purely formal patterns can readily awaken an attitude of collaborative expectancy in us. For instance, imagine a passage built about a set of oppositions ("we do *this*, but *they* on the other hand do *that*; we stay *here*, but *they* go *there*; we look *up*, but *they* look *down*," etc.). Once you grasp the trend of the form, it invites participation regardless of the subject matter. Formally, you will find yourself swinging along with the succession of antithesis ... you are drawn to the form, not in your capacity as a partisan, but because of some 'universal' appeal in it. And this attitude may then be transferred to the matter which happens to be associated with the form. (1969; 58)

In his view, rhetorical figures provide reliable formal sequences that induce convergences in the pattern of reading and listening within audiences. They are said to guide listeners down particular lines of reasoning that carry argumentative significance, thus inclining audiences toward a common perspective on the content being delivered. Antithesis, for instance, is said to induce an oppositional mode of thinking that can be applied to any subject matter. My study shows how gestures are systematically recruited by antithesis to amplify the form of collaborative expectancy it creates. By offloading information to gesture, politicians are able to impart their viewpoint without subjecting it to the conscious scrutiny of an audience. Their message is less vulnerable to distortion as a result, increasing the chances that an audience will interpret the argument in terms of the perspective being delivered. In this way, gestures bolster the collaborative expectancy that figures induce by steering their interpretation in accord with implicit viewpoint information. McNeill once wrote that “Gesture is the injection of personality into language” (1992: 251). Viewed through a rhetorical lens, we arrive at the corollary: gesture is the injection of personality into the minds of others.

5.1 Future Directions

Multimodal antithesis provides a model that is applicable to a wide range of other figures, across a wide range of multimodal environments. Take the figure of *antimetabole*, for example. The antimetabole consists of a mirror reversal among lexical items – e.g. all for one and one for all. Like antithesis, the antimetabole also relies on embodied symmetry. But unlike antithesis, it need not express opposition. While opposition is one of the arguments it can construct, Fahnestock lists a number of other functions it can perform (1999: 122-56). As such, the antimetabole reveals how the same embodied relationships can epitomize different types of arguments. A

multimodal perspective shows how these different argumentative functions are accompanied by a different set of gestural correlates with a different set of cognitive dynamics. Consider this example from Kerry: “he refused to accept the false choice between force without diplomacy and diplomacy without force” (6:12). His claim is that Obama refused to accept that force and diplomacy are mutually exclusive options. But why did he use the antimetabole to make this claim? His gestures hold the answer.




Figure 27. Kerry Antimetabole Part 1




Figure 28. Kerry Antimetabole Part 2

While delivering the words force and diplomacy, Kerry gesturally places them in separate imaginary containers. This engages the primary metaphor IDEAS ARE CONTAINERS, which depicts these concepts as categorically separate. At the same time, his hands move from force to diplomacy and back again, from diplomacy to force. This reverse movement reveals the purpose of the antimetabole, which is to epitomize an argument from reciprocity, which Fahnestock describes as being an argument for the interdependency of two items (1999: 141-50). This argument reflects Obama's refusal to view force and diplomacy as separate options.

Compare Kerry's antimetabole with the following antimetabole produced by George Carlin in his comedy performance "Stuff": "Have you noticed that their stuff is shit and your shit is stuff?" There is an antimetabole here in the reverse symmetry of *stuff* and *shit*. At the same time, there is also a double antithesis. *Their* and *your* are viewpoint markers that can mark oppositional relations of possession (Dancygier 2008, 2009). In addition, the terms *shit* and *stuff* contrast oppositionally in terms of their emotional valence. Both contrastive pairs are arranged in symmetrical form. In this way, figures can stack. By combining antimetabole and antithesis, Carlin captures the idea that whether or not something is *shit* or *stuff* depends on your viewpoint. Multimodally, we see that his gestures are instrumental to epitomizing this argument. First he uses the word *stuff* to describe the perspective one takes toward the things that one owns:

there's never any room on the **dresser** for your **stuff**




*The right hand is holding the microphone to the mouth; the left hand is extended far into the left space, in a flat open palm shape, perpendicular to the ground. He is marking an imaginary barrier, in reference to the dresser.

Figure 29. Carlin Antimetabole Part 1

He then contrasts this with the perspective one takes toward the things that one does not own.

While he does this, he describes these things as *shit*.

Someone else's **shit** is on the **dresser**




*The right hand is holding the microphone to the mouth; the left hand is performing a 'thumbs up' gesture, with the thumb pointing toward the imaginary dresser.

Figure 30. Carlin Antimetabole Part 2

Carlin then condenses these opposing viewpoints into his antithetical antimetabole.

Have you noticed that **their stuff**

is shit



*The left hand is pointing the index
finger toward a locus in the left space


*The pointing index moves toward
the centre of the body

Figure 31. Carlin Antimetabole Part 3

The mic in Carlin's right hand interferes with his ability to create value poles through the use of dominance. So to depict the contrastive connotations of these terms, he traces a horizontal axis and pairs the words *stuff* and *shit* with its opposite endpoints. In contrast to Kerry's antimetabole, which places his symmetrical words within separate containers, Carlin pairs his symmetrical words with points along a conceptual scale. Then, while describing the things one does not own, he moves his hand from *stuff* to *shit*. This reveals how things are demoted from a category of positive value (*stuff*) to a category of negative value (*shit*), when viewed from the perspective of someone that does not own them.


Then, when describing things that one does own, Carlin flips his hand to an open palm, marking a shift in viewpoint. He then moves this hand in the opposite direction, along the scale.

and your shit



*The left hand rotates to an open palm shape, with the palm facing the ceiling. It is placed in the centre of the body.

is stuff?



*The open palm moves horizontally into the left space.

Figure 32. Carlin Antimetabole Part 4

Altogether, this multimodal figure epitomizes the argument that the value of things relies on whether or not one owns them – i.e. on one's viewpoint toward them. The audience, in response, bursts into resounding laughter. The fact that speakers can produce and receive such gestural feats, without conscious attention to their rhetorical dynamics, speaks deeply to the sophistication of subconscious processing in multimodal communication. For this reason, applying a multimodal perspective to figures immensely broadens our view of multimodal cognition and its pragmatic orientations.

In multimodal contexts, figures are multimodal. Speakers draw from the expressive resources of all available modalities to deliver their message in a persuasive manner. So far, I have examined how figures draw from certain features of gesture and speech. But these are only a fraction of the expressive resources available in multimodal contexts. A fully multimodal approach also explores the contributions made by eye gaze, head movements, prosody, and other

features of communication. Prosody, for instance, is tightly linked with gesture and can often be a salient cue for viewpoint (McNeill 1992, 2005). In Carlin's example, he raises his pitch to accompany the shift in viewpoint marked by the change in his gesture shape. Clark et. al. (2013) show that pitch expresses a number of conceptual metaphors, providing the initial steps toward a cognitive theory of its viewpoint significance. A fruitful direction for future studies would be to examine the contributions that these additional features of gesture and speech add to the epitomizing function of figures. The more dimensions we add, the more we will learn about the complexity of persuasion and the equally complex cognitive functions it relies on.

Going further, a multimodal approach explores interactions among modalities beyond just gesture and speech. Humans have developed a range of expressive technologies that change the conditions of multimodality. The invention of writing draws from both visual and auditory modalities, and despite our cognitive bias toward vision, speakers still use an internal voice that is vital to the reading process (Dehaene 2009). How does the relationship between these modalities give rise to rhetorical effects during reading? Research in cognitive poetics shows that poetry often emphasizes the phonetic layer of words, through rhyming and rhetorical figures, to override visual perception with auditory inputs, resulting in unique aesthetic effects (Tsur 2008). Such research paves the way toward an exploration of how figures exploit the interaction of sound and sight to generate rhetorical effects in the realm of the written word.

A multimodal approach can even extend beyond modalities that deal exclusively with words and their delivery. Visual poetry and comics, for instance, are a multimodal domain where image and text interact (Borkent 2012, 2014). Consider this famous comic, from the debut year of Schulz's *Peanuts* (Schulz 1950):





Figure 33. Peanuts Visual Antimetabole

PEANUTS © 1950 Peanuts Worldwide LLC. Dist. By UNIVERSAL UCLICK. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.

This comic embodies a visual antimetabole that incorporates both image and text. A fully multimodal approach is also concerned with the ways in which different modalities afford different opportunities for the artistic expansion of rhetorical figures. Turner and Steen (2013) propose a theory of multimodal grammar that goes so far as to include design strategies that occur in news broadcasting and digital media. In cataloging such design strategies, multimodal figures provide a promising target. Multimodal figures are rampant throughout news and digital media. Consider this multimodal antithesis, produced by Jon Stewart over The Daily Show.¹² He delivers this antithesis to juxtapose Bernie Sanders, a newly announced, democratic presidential candidate, with Hillary Clinton, the infamous political juggernaut. While delivering this antithesis both verbally and gesturally, an antithetical image is superimposed to Stewart's right, where Clinton and Bernie are placed in opposite poles of a symmetrical structure (2:34).

Due to copyright restrictions, screenshots of this episode are unavailable. See Episode 99, Season 20 (April 30th 2015) of the Daily show. To analyze the clip, I describe its visual features besides an asterisk.


He's basically running as the Anti-Hillary
She's an establishment centrist
He's an unapologetic leftist
Her campaign is managed to a T
He forgot his comb
She has almost 100% name recognition
He is somewhat lesser known



* In a digital frame, superimposed beside Jon Stewart, is an image of Clinton's face located next to an equally sized image of Sanders' face; there is a dividing line between them, splitting the rectangle into symmetrical halves.

Figure 34. Stewart Antithesis Part 1

As the antithesis continues, his video crew incorporates additional images that strengthen Stewart's argument and its comedic value. Immediately after uttering "He is somewhat lesser known," a visual display of the 'Bernie-O-Meter' fills the screen for viewers at home.




* There is an image of a dial with different phrases it can be turned to. Above it is the phrase ‘Bernie-O-Meter.’ The phrases represent different responses a voter could have when discussing their familiarity with Bernie Sanders. The phrases increase in the degree of familiarity they depict, in a clockwise manner, ending with: ‘Hello President Sanders!’

Figure 35. Stewart Antithesis Part 2

This image serves to hyperbolize the extent to which Sanders is lesser known than Clinton. Technology allows the audio stream of audience laughter to continue, while the visible space is momentarily extended into a digital space. Digital technologies thus unleash the adaptability of figures by majorly upgrading the number of modalities they can coordinate and the amount of information they can express. This technique of incorporating digital images continues throughout the rest of Stewart’s antithesis. First, the video stream returns to the studio


She has a **private server** in her home



*The screen returns to the original superimposed image, next to Stewart.

Figure 36. Stewart Antithesis Part 3

He owns a **VHS copy of Tootsie**



*An image of the VHS case for the movie Tootsie replaces the digital frame containing the faces of Clinton and Sanders.

Figure 37. Stewart Antithesis Part 4

Except this time, when the image is incorporated into Stewart's antithesis, it replaces the antithetical image of Sanders and Clinton, beside Stewart's body. This allows Stewart to gesturally interact with the image, through gaze, pointing, and so on, in addition to maintaining his verbal stream. Rhetorical figures thus adapt to even the most complex multimodal conditions,

harnessing the vast amounts of information they can represent. This attests to the startling sophistication of multimodal cognition, given the ability of audiences to immediately integrate and digest such multimodal dynamics, not only with ease, but with a chuckle.

These digital environments even allow for the verbal structure of rhetorical figures to be fragmented and distributed across modalities. While mocking Fox News anchor Sean Hannity, Stewart produces the following *chiasmus*, a figure that captures the reverse symmetry of the antimetabole but without the exact repetition of specific words (See endnote 4).¹³ First he orally describes Hannity as “the Arby’s of News,” while sitting beside an image of Hannity’s face. He then turns to the left to speak into a different camera, and hence a different viewpoint, when delivering the symmetrical counterpart to the chiasmus. This counterpart is delivered in both speech and text: “Arby’s, the Hannity of Roast Beef Sandwiches.” The transition from speech to text, in this environment, only scratches the surface of the multimodal dimensions in play. The transition also accompanies changes in music, colour, body language and more. A multimodal theory ultimately requires modelling how all of these features cognitively interact in the multimodal constitution of rhetorical figures.

Integrating multimodality into a holistic vision of figures results in a more robust ecological account of how figures occur in the real world. As embodied, viewpointed beings, much of the communication we engage in occurs in multimodal contexts, informed by multiple sensory and communicative channels. Indeed, language and its persuasive applications first emerged in multimodal settings. Language began as an oral system. Figures are said to have emerged under such conditions as a way of creating memorable messages that maintain their structure amidst the scrambling forces of cultural transmission (Fahnestock 1999, 2011; Tindale 2004; Harris 2013a). As an oral system, people needed to be within audible range to

communicate – that means they also had to be in visible range of each other’s body. In such contexts, figures would have been inextricable from body language and gesture, from their very origins. Cicero and Quintilian were among the first to propose that gesture is the origin of language, a position that is maintained by many linguists, anthropologists, and psychologists today (Kendon 1975, 2004; Tomasello 2008). If gesture is the origin of language, it must also be the origin of figures, which are a subset of the structures in language. Under this logic, it is no surprise that humans have developed elaborate strategies for incorporating gestures and other bodily features into the delivery figures, as they may have been doing so for millennia over. Today, we are technologically extending these strategies into new domains of multimodal interaction, opening a limitless expanse for future multimodal inquiry.

5.2 Conclusion

The hands of Cicero serve as a stark reminder that the life of figures consists largely in their delivery, by bodies to bodies, in real world contexts. Studying figures at the verbal level alone misses out on all of the rhetorical complexities that arise from multimodal interaction. A multimodal approach provides the tools to investigate the embodied and cognitive origins of figures, while expanding our capacity to account for the rhetorical nuances that result from each set of multimodal conditions. My study, in particular, shows how figures use gestures to manipulate the rhetorical dimensions inherent in embodied experience. These gestures display some of the general cognitive mechanisms involved in adapting embodied resources to rhetorical ends. Their capacity to implement multimodal arguments attests to the depth with which persuasive aims are woven into the functional structure of multimodal cognition. They also

provide a necessary framework for modeling the evolution of figures across technological domains, insofar as multimodal cognition remains anchored to embodied foundations.

Embodiment creates a mode of experience that precipitates rhetorical interaction. The body situates us in a particular location relative to the environment, enforcing a subjective perspective upon our experience. The body additionally determines crucial aspects of our perspective, including our emotional and semantic viewpoint. As persuasion is fundamentally about influencing viewpoint, it is essential for persuasive messages to engage the embodied foundations of perspective – i.e. our emotions, our attention, and our bodily ways of navigating the world. My study shows how figures use gestures to interface with the embodied foundations of perspective, as a way of influencing how it integrates into the online interpretation of speech. This embodied account sheds light on the apparent existence of figures across cultures, in suggesting that figures draw from aspects of the body that are universal to all humans (Chien & Harris 2010). In terms of understanding why figures are persuasive, my study suggests that figures influence the mind by harnessing the metaphorical foundations of perspective in multimodal settings. Their formal structures are sufficiently and perhaps optimally abstract to provide argumentative templates that multiple modalities can use, simultaneously. The fact that they are capable of coordinating these templates across implicit and explicit streams adds further depth to their rhetorical nature. The most profound implication of this finding is that rhetorical techniques are implemented in subconscious processing, potentially below the conscious radar of both speakers and hearers. Given the lack of evidence that politicians receive any training in gestural figures, it appears that they are capable of organizing multimodal arguments, independently of deliberate design. As such, multimodal figures reflect a set of subconscious

mechanisms that are pragmatically attuned to persuasive aims, attesting to the centrality of persuasion across various levels of cognition.

Technology is now enabling us to expand upon the conditions of multimodality and the rhetorical figures bred therein. A number of technological modalities have already been ingratiated into our everyday multimodal interactions, such as writing and film. In fact, if we accept the argument that figures originate in oral cultures, defined by the multimodal system of gesture and speech, then much of the rhetorical tradition's study of figures as textual devices is about the rhetorical engineering of multimodality. The rhetorical engineering of multimodality is destined to rapidly increase in the digital age, as the average person is capable of designing publicly accessible, multimodal spaces, involving music, videos, and website interfaces. What is more, we are on the cusp of seeing the broad scale production of fully immersive forms of virtual reality, which will undoubtedly change our collective sense of multimodal experience. In order to understand how people will adapt rhetorical figures to these new and emerging forms of multimodality, it will be essential to understand multimodal cognition and its embodied foundations. Kenneth Burke once wrote that, "man being generically a biological organism, the ideal terminology must present his symbolic behaviour as grounded in biological conditions" (1954: 274). Figures are multimodal because the mind is multimodal, and the mind is multimodal because the body is multimodal. The study of how gestures participate in figures is but the first step toward a broader theory of multimodal rhetoric that takes as its aim the grounding of rhetorical behaviour in our existence as multimodal, biological creatures.

Endnotes

¹ The *Ad Herennium* was falsely attributed to Cicero, which partly contributed to its influence on the rhetorical tradition. Its actual author is unknown. See Fahnestock (1999: 7), Conley (1990: 33), and Vickers (1988: 216).

² Contemporary rhetorical theory divides figures into *tropes* and *schemes*, based largely on Quintilian's reading of the *Ad Herennium* (Fahnestock 1999, 2011; Chien & Harris 2011; Harris 2013b). Each of these categories focuses on the conceptual and formal relationships that constitute verbal language. Tropes are semantically driven and schemes are formally driven. Metaphor and analogy are examples of tropes, since they rely on comparisons of similarity among concepts. The formal structure of a metaphor is not obligatory. *Life is a circus* and *Childhood reduces to a blur of dizzying merry-go-rounds* are both viable metaphors, even though they are syntactically different. *Schemes*, by contrast, rely on a specific formal structure. Antithesis is a scheme that relies on the parallel repetition of contrastive ideas within a symmetrical structure. Antimetabole is a different scheme that relies on reverse symmetry. It typically obtains when lexical items are located in a mirror reversal – e.g. *Ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country* (Kennedy & Sorenson 1961). The historical taxonomy of tropes and schemes is messy and under debate (Harris 2013a). For this reason, I will not delve into the differences between tropes and schemes. Future studies may explore how multimodality aids in the differentiation of these two families of figures.

³ See Section V, Part 2 of this essay for a discussion of how other features of multimodality, including gaze, head movement, and prosody, are also involved in figures, alongside gesture.

⁴ There is disagreement surrounding the definition of antimetabole, such that it is often confused with the figure *chiasmus* (Quinn 1982; Lanham 2012). As defined by The Silva Rhetoricae database (<http://rhetoric.byu.edu/>), chiasmus is a mirror reversal without exact repetition of words (i.e. of general ideas, themes, or grammar), whereas antimetabole is a mirror reversal involving the exact repetition of lexical items. An example of a chiasmus, supplied by Silva Rhetoricae, is Shakespeare's "Who dotes, yet doubts; suspects, yet strong loves" (*Othello* 3.3.). The idea of affection occurs in 'dotes' and 'strong loves,' and the idea of doubting occurs in 'doubts' and 'suspects,' forming an A B B A structure. Another example is the phrase – "It is boring to eat; to sleep is fulfilling" – where there is reverse symmetry in the grammatical sequence of the present participle-infinitive to the infinitive-present participle. A commonplace example of antimetabole is "when the going gets tough, the tough get going," where the reverse symmetry consists in lexical repetition. These are the definitions that I adopt as they are the definitions held by Fahnestock (1999, 2004, 2012), Tindale (2004), and Harris (2012).

⁵ See Kendon (2004: 85-90) for a more detailed reading of all the gesture classifications implicit in Quintilian's writing.

⁶ For lack of space, I am unable to discuss the entire chronology of gesture studies. See Kendon (2004: 17-84, 2007) for a fuller account.

⁷ For thousands of years, rhetoricians have discussed metaphor as a trope, a rhetorical figure that modifies semantics instead of form. Lakoff and others contrast their view to the rhetorical tradition, on the idea that rhetoricians reduce metaphor to a stylistic feature of language that bears no relation to everyday discourse or the foundations of thought. This view is certainly debatable since many rhetoricians draw direct connections between metaphor and the mind. Aristotle, for instance, argued that everyday speech consists of metaphors and that metaphors often guide our thinking (Kirby 1997), and Cicero wrote that metaphors “transport the mind and bring it back, and move it hither and thither,” alluding to a mental basis for metaphorical processing (407). That being said, it remains true that early rhetoricians did not propose a mental mechanism that produces metaphors. In conceptual metaphor theory, this mechanism is the formation of ‘cross-domain mappings’ from the sensorimotor cortex to the associative areas of the neocortex (Lakoff 2012). Conceptual metaphor theory is unique in its attempt to ground massive amounts of corporal data about verbal metaphors in embodied conceptual structures.

⁸ Capital letters are a convention used in cognitive linguistics to refer to a metaphor *as a cognitive mapping*, not a linguistic utterance.

⁹ Season 20, Episode 99, April 30 2015

¹⁰ Season 19, Episode 92, April 23 2015

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