THEORIZING AND ASSESSING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
IN KOREA AND CHINA

by

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Abstract

A process or event of communication should be both democratic and deliberative to be considered as “deliberative democracy”. An empirical case of deliberative democracy needs to establish a clear understanding of both deliberation and democracy not only to present a deliberative democratic case but to clearly demonstrate how deliberation can contribute to democracy. However, some empirical studies of deliberative democracy in and from South Korea and China interpret deliberative democracy differently, which can confuse readers’ conceptual understanding of “deliberative democracy”. I found two common problems of how the theory is applied and interpreted in the well-known cases from the two countries. The first is the scholars’ assertion that deliberation occurred, when the process was non-deliberative or generally non-deliberative. The second is scholars equating deliberation with democracy. The ambiguity between the two concepts can lead one to expect deliberation to generate democratic effects, even in non-democratic settings. However, non-democratic deliberation takes place in many cases without any democratic effects, which is evident in the cases presented in the given study.

A solid theoretical base can provide guidance to an ideal process and help locate shortcomings in a model, which is the reason why empirical studies are in great demand. I hoped to find such guidance in scholarly assessments, yet a plethora of different interpretations in the South Korean and Chinese cases provided little ground to understand what deliberative democracy could possibly mean. In the given study, I attempted to identify and clarify some of the confusion in the studies of deliberative democratic cases from South Korea and China, where many understandings seem to be in play.
Preface

This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Eon Joung Lee.
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Special thanks are owed to God and my family, whose have supported me with unconditional love.
Dedication

To Hyungjun and Onyue Yang
1. Introduction

1.1 Misinterpretation of Deliberative Democracy in Empirical Studies

Since the deliberative turn in democratic theory in the 1990s, (Dryzek 2002) deliberation has contributed significantly to the power and sophistication of democratic theory (Warren 2014, 1). In studies of deliberative democratic theory, the function of deliberation in democracy is viewed as a mode of “communication, preference formation, and collective will-formation” (Warren 2014, 4). In empirical studies of deliberative democracy, the question is “how”; that is, to what extent and in what ways can this mode of communication generate effects that could possibly enhance democracy. While theory may not need empirical studies, empirical studies require a good understanding of theory. Depending on one’s understanding of the theory, how an empirical case is applied and interpreted varies.

Some empirical studies of deliberative democracy in and from South Korea and China interpret deliberative democracy differently, which can confuse readers in understanding what it is. I found two common problems of how the theory is applied and interpreted. The first is the scholars’ assertion that deliberation occurred, when, in fact, the process was non-deliberative or generally non-deliberative, with a few deliberative moments. The second is scholars equating deliberation with democracy, in some cases, using the terms “deliberation” and “deliberative democracy” interchangeably. The ambiguity between the two concepts can lead one to expect deliberation to generate democratic effects, even in non-democratic settings. However, non-democratic deliberation takes place in many cases without any democratic effects, which is evident in the presented cases.

In order to identify reasons for such misinterpretations of deliberative democracy theory, I adopt a minimalist definition of deliberative democracy. A minimalist definition will provide a
baseline for judgment to distinguish deliberation from other forms of communication, and democracy from a non-democratic environment, regardless of the results and quality of the attempted deliberation. After a brief discussion of the theory, I will discuss the studies from South Korea and China in detail to clearly present and highlight the problems with how deliberation and democracy is applied and interpreted in these cases. Finally, in the assessment, I will discuss the political context of each country; some of the possible factors affecting the South Korean and Chinese governments’ implementation of participatory processes, resulting in unsuccessful or limited deliberations; and possible reasons for scholarly misinterpretations.

1.2 Definition: Difference between Deliberation and Deliberative Democracy

Empirical studies on deliberative democracy require a working definition of both “deliberation” and “democracy” as the etymological definition of deliberation can be interpreted in multiple ways. A clear definition in the English language becomes even more important for non-English speaking countries where a direct translation of the term “deliberation” does not exist. In such countries as South Korea and China, the term has been translated into words that either exist already or have been newly created by scholars. Yet, these translated words still reflect only a part of the multiple meanings “deliberation” may deliver in English.¹ As the word itself does not reflect its full meaning, an academic introduction of the definition and interpretation of “deliberation” is intrinsic for the understanding and implementation of deliberation and deliberative democracy, even more so for those countries where an

¹ The three mostly commonly used terms for deliberation in Korean language are 토의 (to-ui, discussion), 심의 (sim-ui, considerate opinion) and 숙의 (careful consideration). As the translated terms do not fully describe the meaning deliberation, academic studies are particularly important to understand the concepts of deliberation and deliberative democracy in South Korea. The Chinese word for deliberation is 协商 (xieshang), deliberative democracy is 协商民主 (xieshang minzhu). As the term for deliberation, 协商 (xieshang), can also be interpreted as consultation, the studies of deliberative democracy requires establishment of a clear definition of deliberation that would distinguish deliberation from consultation.
understanding of both the concept and application of deliberation relies heavily on academic studies.

Even in English, definitions of deliberation and deliberative democracy can vary based on what components a theorist considers to be an essential part of deliberation. For instance, theorists such as Cohen and Gutmann and Thompson consider binding decisions to be part of deliberation and Gutmann and Thompson also take reflexive effects as one of the essential components of deliberation. In this study, I adopt a minimalist definition by Mansbridge to distinguish deliberation from other forms of communication, “improve analytic clarity and make sense in the field.” (Mansbridge, 2) Among the many connotations the word carries, Mansbridge suggests a broad definition of deliberation. Deliberation is the “mutual communication that involved weighing and reflecting on preferences, values and interests regarding matters of concern.” (Mansbridge, 4)

Mansbridge’s definition has three parts. The first part of the definition is “mutual communication”, which requires some two-way communication and thereby, distinguishes it from a mode of communication by one individual. Such a definition provides a clear line of judgment for attempts at public consultation like government websites. Regardless of its purpose, if a website only provides means for individuals to post their opinions for government consideration, but does not incorporate any feedback from the government or show evidence of government consideration of public opinion, then kind of such public consultation cannot be considered deliberative. The second part of the definition is “weighing and reflecting”, which may be the most distinctive part of the definition relative to other modes of communications. As Mansbridge says, “weighing and reflecting” captures some of the elements of care and thoughtful consideration central to the constellation of meanings that in ordinary language adhere
to the term “deliberation.” (Mansbridge, 5) This part of the definition excludes a one-sided presentation of opinions such as a corporate lobbyist’s attempt at persuading politicians and residents in regards to the terms of his or her company. Unless the lobbyist presents both the pros and cons of his company’s position and engages in two-way communication with his counterpart, it is difficult to conclude there has been deliberation between the lobbyist and his counterpart. This part of the definition distinguishes deliberation from such forms of communication as negotiation, which lacks weighing and reflecting. Third, the object of reflection must be “preferences, values and interest on matters of common concern” which distinguishes deliberation from “talk on matters that involve the public collectively from talk of only individual or small group relevance.” (Mansbridge, 5) This concept is also essential to distinguish deliberation from such communicative forms as discussion, discourse, debate and consultation within a small group, which are terms frequently used interchangeably in South Korea and China. In this case, what would distinguish deliberation from other modes of communication is relevance. In this paper, I consider deliberation having all three components Mansbridge considers as part of the definition of deliberation. Thus, having one or two of the three components would not suffice in creating deliberation.

Apart from establishing a clear, minimalist definition of deliberation, we also need a good understanding about the functions of deliberation and what democratic effects it can generate. In many cases, from the studies in and from South Korea and China, scholars omitted explanations on the reasons why deliberation is expected to generate effects that would contribute to better democracy. In some cases, deliberation and deliberative democracy are used even

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2 For instance, the translator of “Between Facts and Norms” insisted on the term “Discussion Politics” even for his revised edition in 2010 (the first edition published in 2000). The Korean word used in the book is 토의 (to-ui), which has first and most common definition of “discussion”, but is also translated to debate and consultation depending on the context.
interchangeably. To this problem, Warren suggests separating definitions of deliberation and democracy. Although Warren focuses on the theoretical discussion of deliberative democracy, in the process he also points out there is a tendency for democratic theorists to think “in terms of “models of democracy” – a strategy that encourages us to center our thinking on a single mechanism or feature of democracy, such as deliberation or voting, and then overextends the claims for that feature.” (Warren 2014, 2) Instead, Warren suggests an alternative view, a “systems thinking in the theory of deliberative democracy” which simply means separating deliberation from democracy in terms of function and system as they belong to different categories.

“The guiding intuition is simple and straightforward: different political means and mechanisms—deliberation among them—have problem-specific strengths within democratic systems. We can theorize these problems as functional requirements of democratic systems, look at the available means for serving these functions, and then judge the mixes of means that would maximize their (systematic) democratic effects. If we develop this approach, then we will be able to understand (for example) the ideal role of deliberation, while also understanding that there are functions necessary to democracy that deliberation cannot and should not be expected to achieve.” (Warren 2014, 2)

Distinction between functions and systems will prevent equating deliberation with deliberative democracy as it will clarify the difference between functions of deliberation and features of democracy. According to Warren, a system must accomplish three functions to be considered as democratic; empowered inclusion, communication and collective will formation and collective decision-making. I only assess the first component, “empowered inclusion” in this study because without empowered inclusion, democratic communication and collective will-formation and democratic collective-decision making may not be possible. The collectiveness in the second and third features premises inclusion of the citizens. Democracy needs “a people” as a collective agent, with capacities to act… Without collective agency, democracy cannot exist.” (Warren 2014, 10)
Democracy bases its existence on “the concept of democracy, although protean, always makes reference to a determinate community of persons (citizens) – a “people” – who are collectively self-governing with respect to their internal and external affairs.” (Whelan, 13) In this notion, the justification of democracy and the ground for “collectively self-governing” derives from the notion that people are (or must be treated as) political equals. (Saward, 21) In democracy, citizens hold constitutional rights for political participation, if not possible directly, then through representatives.

“We might think of democratic processes as “beginning” with empowered inclusion, justified by a norm of inclusion, such as the idea that those who are affected (or potentially affected) by collective decisions ought to have some say, or a chance to have some say, over the decision (Young 2000, Goodin 2007). Democracies don’t simply include, however: they empower inclusion. It is not enough, for example, for a government to include by consulting its citizens; people who are (normatively) entitled to be included must have powers through which they can, as it were, demand and enforce their inclusions: through votes, legal standing, representation, vetoes, organized opposition, and so on. Generally stated, this function requires powers distributed to those who have claims for inclusion by virtue of being affected or potentially affected by collective decisions (Young 2000, Goodin, Habermas, Fung). The key democratic considerations with respect to this function have to do with the ways powers are distributed.” (Warren 2014, 9-10)

As Warren argues, the key in democratic inclusion is not mere inclusion of any citizen, but inclusion of those being affected or potentially affected by collective decisions, and those citizens having powers or a channel through which they can demand and enforce their inclusion. As we will see in the cases from South Korea and China, deliberations often fail to include those affected and citizens do not have powers through which they can demand and enforce their inclusion. Such government deliberations are undemocratic. If deliberation fails to include those affected by government decisions and those citizens do not have channels to influence government decisions or have their demands heard by the government, it means there is an absence of communication between the government and its citizenry.

Successful deliberations can increase legitimacy of the government, empower citizens
and heighten citizens’ share of accountability. (Warren 2002) The premise is inclusion of citizens. It is when citizens (especially those affected by collective decision) participate in deliberation that they gain a better understanding about the issue at stake and the government’s position. They are empowered to deliberate and influence collective decision, which altogether will enhance legitimacy of the government. Yet, there seems to be a consensus among deliberative democratic theorists that deliberation is taken neither as an alternative democracy to replace representative democracy nor is it a remedy for the democracies in crisis. (Chambers 2003, Warren 2002) Deliberation can only serve functions as a mode of communication that can potentially assist in empowerment and inclusion, but it cannot transform a non-democracy to a democracy. An undemocratic deliberation will only reflect the undemocratic government-citizen relations as it will exclude citizens throughout the process. I will measure inclusion through two categories; direct participation of the citizens or representation and evidence of the inclusion of citizens from the beginning to the end of the deliberation process. Citizen inclusion can be realized through direct participation of the citizens affected. However, recognizing that it is impossible for all citizens to deliberate at the same time, citizens can indirectly participate through representatives. “Citizen representative in deliberation in which citizens qua representative have some sort of decisional status, however, weak or strong that might be.” (Bohman, 76) The representatives must be selected as a “reasonably representative sample of the public affected by the issue.” (Bohman, 95) Additionally, if citizens or citizen representatives were allowed to participate in a part of the deliberation process, inclusion is also partial.

For each case, I will use a table that will allow for the judgment of both occurrences of deliberation and democracy, as well as, note the quality of each. For each feature of deliberation and empowered inclusion, I will first state whether or not it occurred and then note on the level
Table 1. Components of Deliberation and Empowered Inclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Deliberation</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Features (What it must consist)</td>
<td>Mutuality (Two-way communication)</td>
<td>Empowered Inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weighing and Reflecting (Thoughtful consideration)</td>
<td>Citizen participation (direct or representative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>Occurred/Not occurred</td>
<td>Occurred/Not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>High to Low</td>
<td>High to Low</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
*Notes
- For deliberation, the definition requires presence of all three qualities
- Overlap between preference on a common concern and inclusion
- Overlap between mutuality and duration of participation, deliberative moments can be included in a generally non-democratic process

I think there is an overlap between “preference on a common concern” and “empowered inclusion” because if those whose interest is affected by a particular issue which is the due reason for initiation of deliberation are excluded from participating in deliberation, level for both “preference on a common concern” and “citizen participation” would be marked as low. In other words, better deliberation requires better inclusion and better inclusion can only make better deliberation precisely due to this overlap. This is the part that shows what purpose deliberation can serve for democracy. On the other hand, better inclusion does not require those affected to be included in democracy. This is the reason why when presidential decisions change to a collective one by the president deciding along with a group of bureaucrats and experts are considered “more democratic”. It may still exclude the citizenry, or citizen representatives for those most affected by the decision. Another point of overlap is between mutuality and the duration of
participation. A process may include multiple occasions of deliberative moments where a group of participants are repeatedly included and excluded. In such a case, level of both “mutuality” and “duration of participation” will be marked as low. If the citizens are allowed to participation for the entire process of deliberation, there will be high mutuality and better inclusion. This is the reason why I assess “empowered inclusion” in two separate categories of physical inclusion (either directly or through representatives) and temporal or “duration” of inclusion.
2. Empirical Cases from South Korea

2.1. Deliberation to Solve Democratic Deficiency in South Korea

South Korea has many reasons to explore participatory mechanisms such as deliberative democracy. Behind its rapid economic growth and dramatic democratization, South Korea has been suffering a number of democratic deficiency problems. For instance, like many other representative democracies, South Korea is also facing the problem of voting rate decrease. Since the democratization started in 1987, six presidential elections, seven national assemblymen elections and six national local government elections were held, where a steady and rapid decrease of voting rate has been witnessed. A decreasing voting rate has been witnessed in many democracies, but South Korea’s voting rate is rapidly dropping two to three times faster than other countries, although there was a slight increase in the last elections in 2012 presidential election and 2013 national assemblymen elections. According to the Republic of Korea National Election Commission, South Korea has one of the lowest voting rates in the world, just above African countries. Voting rates do not demonstrate all the problems of a representative democracy, but it provides a glimpse of the “crisis” the South Korean democracy is facing today. A low voting rate is a manifestation of mounting citizens distrust and detachment from the government. The elected government’s lack of legitimacy and representation result in the government’s lack of power for good governance. Thus, the expected role of deliberation in Korea is similar to other representative democracies; overcoming the problem of a lack of

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3 According to the Republic of Korea National Election Commission, since the establishment of democracy in 1987, participation of voters in both presidential and general (National Assemblymen) elections dramatically dropped. For presidential election, it was as high as 89.2% in 1987, gradually dropped to 63% in 2007 then raised up to 75.8% in 2012, with the daughter of former dictator running as one of the candidates. For national assemblymen elections, participation rate was as high as 75.8% in 1988, dropped to 46.1% in 2008 and slightly raised to 54.2% in 2013. The problem is not only decreasing voting rate in general, but very low voting rate of the younger generations in their 20s and 30s and growing disappointment among them toward the politics. “Analysis of the 19th General Election Voting Rate” (제19대 국회의원선거 투표율 분석), Republic of Korea National Election Commission, 2012.
legitimacy and representation of the “democratically elected” government, through citizen participation. I will present two cases most studied as significant deliberative experiments in South Korea in by South Korean scholars. The cases will demonstrate which of the features they are missing for successful deliberation and reasons the government failed to achieve inclusion.

2.2. Case 1: The Food Waste Recycling Facility and Citizens' Jury System in Ulsan City

2.2.1. Background: The Dispute between the Government and the Residents

The Case of Food Waste Recycling Facility in Ulsan City is considered one of the first deliberative processes attempted by the government in South Korea for a dispute settlement between the government and residents directly affected by the government policy. In 1997, the National Assembly amended a law that prohibits direct burial of food waste. As the law was to be enforced from 1 January 2005, the local governments searched for new ways to deal with food waste. The Buk-gu (northern district) borough office in Ulsan city decisively selected a location for the construction of a food waste recycling facility, located one kilometer away from residential apartment areas. In December 2002, the residents in nearby areas formed an Emergency Resolution Committee (ERC) as they thought the prices of apartments would drop if the facility was constructed. Although the borough office sought for various ways to persuade citizens by holding TV discussions between the head of the borough office and the representative of the ERC, tensions did not diminish. Despite the opposition, the borough office started construction in December 2003. As a result, the ERC organized mass protests and demonstrations, occasionally involving physical violence.

As the local government election was approaching in April of 2004, the conflict became a nationwide hot issue while organized protests continued. In March 2004, the head of the borough
announced suspension of construction for further communication with the citizens. A series of TV discussions were held again and by suggestion of the mediation committee, both sides agreed to adopt a citizens' jury system in October 2004. Meanwhile, however, the construction company applied for an injunction for the interruption of construction. When the court announced acceptance of the application, residents resumed protests, in which five residents were arrested. Residents refused to send elementary students to school as a form of protest. Meanwhile, the ERC was dissembled and Resident Representative Committee (RRC) was newly formed. After a multiple consultations between the government and the RRC, a citizens' jury system was adopted in December 2004 under the condition of suspending the construction during the jury activity and that the citizens would comply with the jury’s final decisions.

2.2.2. Citizens’ Jury

The juries were selected from thirteen civil organizations both the government and residents could trust among twenty nine eligible ones. Three individuals were selected from each organization. In addition, three persons from the Catholic, Protestant and Education (school teachers) sectors were selected. In total, 43 juries were selected as committee members. The selection of the juries seems to reflect the government’s intention to form a capable, neutral, and reasonably representative body. However, the juries lacked representation for the residents most affected by the construction of the waste management facility. On the first vote prior to the juries’ activities started, two thirds of the juries voted in favor of the construction, demonstrating lack of representation.

From December 13 to 28, five meetings, public hearings and excursions to the construction site were held. On December 13, in the first meeting, the juries decided on the
procedures of meetings and created a detailed schedule of their activities. A moderator, a mediator and an assistant were nominated and an administrative assistance team was formed. On December 16, the second meeting was held. The residents affected by the construction testified and a question and answer session followed. The juries' discussion was held afterwards. On December 21, the juries visited the construction site and other food waste recycling facilities for field investigation. On December 23, a public hearing that residents' attended was held by the juries. There was an exchange of opinions between the borough office and the residents and a question and answer session of testifiers and juries were held. On December 28, after the residents gave their last testimonials, juries “deliberated” and drafted an agreement. In the final voting of juries, 31 voted in favor, 9 opposed and 1 abstained. As it had been promised, residents accepted the juries' decision. The district hall announced a statement of apology, promising the facility would stop running if any environmental problems should arise and the borough and construction company agreed to drop all the arrested and convicted residents. The recycling facility was constructed as the result, but was closed down after 26 months of operation because it was creating serious a odor and the borough office broke the promise to operate the facility in an environmentally friendly way.

2.2.3. Literature Review and Scholarly Debate

Most of the studies found on the issue provide positive assessments on the role of citizens’ jury for mediating the dispute between the government and residents in Buk-gu, Ulsan. For instance, Hyun-Suk Cho believes the given case “will serve as a milestone for theoretical discussion and practical implementation of deliberative citizen participation in future Korea.” (Cho 2000, 27) Cho argues that the citizens’ jury system in Ulsan was deliberative due to the following reasons. First, the citizens’ jury was a disinterested body allowed to communicate with
both the government and the residents. The juries were selected among the non-interest groups who were able to judge solely based on the information provided. They took into account citizen testimonies, field excursions and requested additional information when necessary in order to better decisions. Juries communicated with the residents, government officials and among themselves relatively freely. (Cho 2000, 21) Secondly, there was mutuality between the citizens’ jury and the residents because the juries invited the residents multiple times to testify. Juries were able to “sufficiently” evaluate the information gathered because there was mutuality. (Cho 2000, 22) Third, the jury meetings were deliberative, neutral and transparent and there was sufficient providence of information. A number of scholars agree on the third point. (Cho 2000, Jeoung 2011, Han 2005) Despite his analysis, Cho does not thoroughly explain why this case is distinguishably deliberative and democratic.

Another scholar, Jeong-Hwa Jeong, argues there was successful deliberation in the Ulsan case. Her assessment of deliberative democracy is based on three categories; participation (representation and inclusion), deliberation (quality of communication, fairness in participation) and decision (reflexivity, implementation). Jeong considers representation to be important because she believes fair representation is integral to inclusion. One of the confusing parts of her definition is that inclusion is part of her definition for deliberation and there is no distinction between deliberation and democracy. This implies that she considers that if there is deliberation, it automatically performs democratic functions.

Jeong points out that unlike other citizens’ jury models where members are chosen by random selection to represent the general public, in the Ulsan case, juries were selected from a limited pool of civil organizations. She discovered that the juries lacked representation because among the juries, 58% were from civil society sectors based in the Ulsan region, 65% were male
and 67% were in their 30s. The majority of the juries were males in their 30s working in civic organizations, which is not a good representation of a society. Another problem was a lack of communication between the juries. The citizens' jury held 5 meetings and spent 33 hours altogether, but a good portion of time was spent on the visit to the construction site and field investigations. For this reason, the lawyer hired by the residents requested for an extension of the juries' activities for better collection of information and technical assessment on behalf of the residents, but the government rejected the request. (Jeong 2011, 589) Jeong points out that the reason the juries voted in favor of construction was due to the fact that before the voting, the borough office gave a memo to the residents promising withdrawal of all lawsuits including a release of those arrested. The borough office also promised to deal with all financial charges and claims raised by the construction company against the residents for damages and delay of construction. This implies the juries easily made the decision in favor of the government, because it was evident that the residents agreed on the government’s terms. Although the residents accepted the terms, considering the fact that five residents were under arrest and that the juries were not representing residents’ voice, the process appears coercive and the government’s terms unfair.

Despite all her findings, however, Jeong concludes deliberation was of high quality. This is because she considers provisions of sufficient information for the juries, field investigations, active participation of juries, establishment of clear rules and procedures for the juries’ meetings and fair opportunities to speak as fulfilling features of deliberation. Also, Jeong evaluates the government’s effort to avoid enforcing a government decision and instead adopt citizen participation through a citizens’ jury system highly. She also thinks highly of the government’s provision of information to the juries when requested, as the government is notorious for not
releasing information to the public. However, Jeong fails to pinpoint that a citizens’ jury system was a tool unfit for the Ulsan case. The government needed a tool to facilitate or moderate deliberation between the government and the residents, not a disinterested body that deliberates among themselves. Had the juries been a mixed body of representatives from the residents and bureaucrats or a body elected by the residents, the juries would have had better deliberation and representation. In reality, a disinterested body composed of those least affected by the issue having a role to deliberate and make decisions created more grievances from the residents as they felt their voices were repeatedly ignored.

2.2.4. Assessment

In my assessment, I would like to highlight that there had been deliberation as the South Korean scholars noted, but it was an exclusive deliberation among citizen juries, who clearly lacked representation for the residents.

Table 2. Assessment of Deliberation and Inclusiveness in Citizens’ Jury of Ulsan Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Deliberation</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutuality (Two-way communication)</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighing and Reflecting (Thoughtful consideration)</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference on a Common Concern (Communication on a matter the participants are affected)</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowered Inclusion</td>
<td>Citizen participation (direct or representative)</td>
<td>Duration of participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes
- Possible occurrence of deliberation among juries, in jury meetings
- Juries lacked representation for the citizens whose interests were at stake, but an argument could be made that juries were also indirectly affected by the construction of the food waste management facility
- Minimum participation by citizens were allowed for testimony in jury meetings
The above table only assesses meetings of the citizens’ jury in which deliberation occurred. Deliberation, a process that involves two-way communication with thoughtful consideration on a matter of common concern, only occurred in the jury meetings. In terms of deliberation, there had been robust communication among the juries in the jury meetings. It is disputable whether or not the agenda was a matter of common concern for the juries as none of the juries were directly affected by the issue. However, it could also be argued that the matter was a common concern for all South Korean citizenry, including the juries, as the borough’s food waste management would affect the entire nation in one way or another. Although debatable, level of sharing the common concern is low and exclusion of those directly affected in the process weakens quality of deliberation. The talks among juries would not fully include or reflect the perspectives of those most affected by the issue, while including them was essential to diffuse the tension between the government and the residents and ultimately solve the problem. Direct participation of residents was limited to giving testimonials in the jury meetings. Juries’ did participate full time for the jury meetings and other activities of the citizens’ jury. However, level of inclusion is low as the juries lacked representation for the citizens. There was no meaningful communication between the government and the residents or between the juries and the residents. Instead, the government tried cooptation, providing terms the residents cannot easily decline.

2.3 Case 2: Development of Sihwaho Seawalls in Kyunggi Province

2.3.1 Background

Sihwaho is an artificial lake located in Kyunggi Province. It was created after the construction of four seawalls between the 1980s and 1990s and is surrounded by three cities - Sihung City, Ansan City and Hwasung City. It was named after two cities that entail the lake’s
head and tail, “Si” from Sihung City and “Hwa” from Hwasung City (“ho” means lake). Construction of the seawalls was to secure water resources and to create farmland in the region, but it led to serious environmental problems. It is also one of the problems passed down from the past dictatorship. The project of seawall construction started in 1975 when the dictator Park Jung Hee ordered a government assessment building seawalls in the region. It is known that the water treatment problem would be a particular concern if the seawalls are constructed due to the geographical characteristics, but the government ignored experts’ warnings to realize the dictator’s order.

The seawalls were constructed and the locked-in water started to rot. Over the years, environmental problems such as suffocation of fish in mass scale started to raise popular awareness and widely reported by media. In 1996, with the presidential order for the Ministry of Environment to come up with comprehensive solutions to improve water quality of Sihwaho, the government conducted various investigations and held meetings with experts. When the government tried to find an easy way out by releasing polluted water into the sea in 1998, tension intensified between the Korea Water Resources (public enterprise), citizens and environmental groups. When a group of twelve local civic organizations announced "Civil Statement" suggesting to make Sihwaho an ecological park, tension exploded between those arguing for development and those demanding preservation of Sihwaho and its adjacent areas. After a number back and forth between the government and civil society organizations, Sihwa Region Sustainable Development Council (hereafter the Council) was established in January 2004. The Council consisted of thirty four members, mostly professionals and members of civil society. It had two chairs from the Ministry of Construction and Transportation and Siheung Environmental Movement Alliance, 17 members from the government side (including 4 central government, 4
local government, 3 public enterprise and the chair from the Ministry) and 17 members from the non-government side (including 6 environmental organizations, 4 professionals, 3 city council members) and 4 assemblymen participating as advisory members. Residents living directly affected by the pollution and average citizens were excluded from the membership of the Council. The Council established their own rules and established the principle of "discussion, persuasion and compromise", in order to avoid quickly resort to voting. They held regular meetings for five years until it was disassembled on December 31, 2008.

The Council meetings maintained an open debate principle in order to guarantee transparency. The meetings were open to public, allowing external opinions and criticisms. The Council members were provided with all requested information from the government. In addition, the Council held seminars with experts and conducted fact-finding investigations for better information. The members of the Council formed a study group to “study” technical details about the development of Sihwaho area. After gaining a comprehensive understanding, the Council reached an agreement on Water Quality Improvement Roadmap, Air Quality Improvement Roadmap and the construction of Sihwa Multi-Techno Valley (MTV).

2.3.2 Scholarly Analyses on the Council meetings

Scholars' assessments on the role of the Council and deliberativeness of the Council meetings vary. Scholars such as Sung Man Hong and Jong Won Lee identify the Council’s role as a model of “deliberative governance” in South Korea that can contribute to consensus formation for a large scale national project. (Hong & Lee 2008, 21) Hong and Lee explains a successful deliberative process has a number of prerequisites such as an allowance of rational debate, an open mind to the modification of opinion through information and knowledge, mutual exchange of opinions and arguments, and a mutual respect and understanding of the agenda for
deliberation. (Hong & Lee 2008, 24) Based on this definition, Hong and Lee conclude deliberative governance in the Sihwaho case through the establishment of the Council has deep positive implications for South Korea’s (government) policy development. They believe the Council is an example of successful deliberation because in the process of the Council meetings, participants with different interests were able to enhance mutual trust and understanding through continuous communication and the exchange of information. (Hong & Lee 2008, 38) Through study groups and seminars with experts, the Council members were able to overcome the problem of “asymmetry of information.” There was a fair representation of all interested groups, and representation was guaranteed by having two chairs, one from the government and one from the non-government sector. This was a symbolic gesture to emphasize equality among all members. Lee and Hong argue because the Council was able to produce concrete agreements, which is a manifesto of consensus reached in the Council, it proves successful deliberation took place in the Council meetings. However, they fail to define what consist deliberation and its relation to good (democratic) governance. For instance, they says the Council held “in-depth discussion and question and answer sessions” (Hong & Lee 2008, 38), but does not elaborate on why it was in fact deliberation and not a string of discussions, as well as, how it contributed to the overall process of reaching a consensus as they claim. Furthermore, shifting the focus to “governance” rather than citizen participation, they shed overly positive light on the unprecedented inclusion of civil society in the government decision-making process. As they explain, the Sihwaho case is very different from other similar national projects such as the development of Saemangum mud flat and the Dong-gang (river) dam construction where the government made decisions by itself despite fierce popular protests. I also believe the government deserves praise for a new attempt to adopt a participatory mechanism although
citizen participation in the Council was limited to a number of civic organizations. However, Hong and Lee’s analysis fails to address some of the negative aspects of the Council and thereby, fails to provide a balanced and complete picture of the issue.

Scholars such as Jeong note that the Council had already lost representation at its formation, because not all groups were represented fairly. The purpose of the Council was to discuss and decide on the “how to” of developing the Sihwaho area. The Council excluded those against the development from the initial stage. In July 2006, thirteen civic organizations formed a committee against one of the development projects, Sihwa Multi-Techno Valley (MTV) and started an opposition movement whose protests continue to this day. Furthermore, the city council members were at first considered as representatives of the residents, but it was not long until the residents discovered the city council members were not delivering their demands to the Council. The Council meetings lacked neutrality, as the Korean Water Resources Corporation, a public enterprise, financed the Council meetings and the moderator of the meetings was an employee of the Corporation. This means that the government had substantial influence over the meetings (Jeong 2011, 18). Furthermore, the three main political bodies from Ansan City - Ansan City Council, Ansan City (local government) and Ansan Environmental Movement Alliance - withdrew from the Council prior to the final report for the Sihwa MTV that was submitted in March, 2006. It was because the agreement on MTV was going to be announced regardless of their opposition, so withdrawal was a clear indicator that Ansan City had no part in the agreement. The withdrawal of Ansan City is proof that the Council reached agreements regardless of one third of the non-governmental members’ opposition and that there was no consensus as Lee and Hong claim.

Contrary to her findings, however, Jeong considers there was high level of inclusion and
successful deliberation in the Council meetings. She believes the fact that members from various sectors were included for the negotiation with the government is highly significant. Jeong argues there was successful deliberation in the Sihwaho case for two reasons. First, there was transparency and sufficient information for the Council members to make an educated decision. The Council meetings were open to the public and results of the meetings were posted on its website. When civic organizations requested government information, it was provided. It was evident that the Council tried to enhance their understanding by inviting experts for briefings and holding study groups. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport started discussions with the Council without premise in order to build mutual trust and eliminate bias. (Jeong 2011, 17) Second, there was a high level of fairness in the process because even the organizations against the development could attend the meetings and freely share their opinions in the meetings. Jeong’s analysis indicates a robust exchange of information within the Council and an unprecedented openness to the public about the meetings. Welcoming attendance of the general public and organizations against the development deserves positive evaluation as a contribution to better inclusion. However, Jeong fails to explain if such robust exchange of information and openness influenced members’ understanding of the issue and also, the deliberation process of reaching an agreement. The system aimed for better inclusion, but as it was evident, those who disagreed with the government decision for Sihwaho development were either excluded in the beginning or left to withdraw in the process so that a decision could be made in favor of development.

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4 “시화호 개발과 이로 인한 환경문제는 일부 지역에 국한된 것이 아니라 전국적인 이슈임에도 불구하고 협의회에 참여할 수 있는 시민단체의 범위를 안산, 시흥, 화성시로 제한하였고 주민대표의 참여가 없었다는 한계가 있었지만 참여범위의 포괄성은 비교적 높은 수준에서 이루어졌다고 할 수 있다.” (Jeong 2011, 17) (“Despite the fact that development of Sihwaho and environmental problems due to it are not confined to certain regions but is a nationwide issue, but participation to only civil society was limited to only three cities of Ansan, Siheung and Hwasung and that there was no representation for the residents, still it could be considered that there was relatively high level of inclusion of participation.” My translation)
2.3.3 Assessment

Based on the observation, it could be concluded that deliberation had occurred in the Council meetings among the Council members. Meanwhile the Council members lacked representation and did not deliver citizen demands to the Council. Average citizens most affected by the lake pollution and development of the Sihwaho area were not granted membership of the Council, but were allowed to observe the meetings.

Table 3. Assessment of Deliberation and Inclusiveness in Sihwaho Case

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Deliberation</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>Mutuality (Two-way communication)</td>
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<td>Level</td>
<td>High</td>
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*Notes
- Deliberation only among the Council members
- The Council members lacked representation for the citizens whose interests were at stake, but had representation for a number of active civic (environmental) organizations and local governments
- Minimum participation by citizens was allowed for observation of the meetings

As a number of South Korean scholars claim, there has been robust exchange of information and discussion among the Council members, a process that involved two-way communication with thoughtful consideration on a matter of common concern. However, as the members were from the organizations that were already in favor of government’s idea of Sihwaho development, the Council can be characterized as an exclusive group without representatives from the oppositional groups, that also lacked representation for the citizens.
Although the government’s attempt to include non-government representatives into discussions and decision-making process must be recognized as a more democratic method relative to traditional government practices as government decisions made solely by the government. In addition, it must be noted that deliberation limited to the Council members and that the Council failed to incorporate citizens demands. Failure of the Council to include those in opposition of the development of the Sihwaho region as well as the citizens from deliberation hampers successful deliberative democratic communication to take place.
3. Cases from China

3.1 Why Deliberative Democracy in Authoritarian China

One of the most distinctive characteristics of Chinese “deliberative democracy” is that it is promoted by the non-democratic government, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to Beijing Review, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, highlighted deliberative democracy as the country’s chosen way to foster consensus among the people in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on September 21, 2014. Xi’s statement shows that not only does China believe it is more democratic than before, but its leadership is evermore determined to start China’s democratization through deliberation. Accordingly, China’s experimentation with deliberation has been more aggressive and extensive than any other Asian countries.

China has its own reasons as an authoritarian state to explore participatory, possibly democratic, mechanisms. The Chinese economy has become one of the biggest in the world. Financially empowered Chinese citizens now enjoy more economic freedom and power than before, but are still tied to authoritarian ruling that prevents them from enjoying as much political and social rights as in other parts of the world. Popular discontent toward the government has led to violent protests. "Mass incidents” of various sorts have become a major and continuing problem in China; the number rose dramatically, from 8,700 in 1993 to 180,000 in 2010. (Fewsmith 2013, 26-27) Encountered with growing popular dissatisfaction towards politics, which is potentially a threat to the leadership, the CCP explored various participatory practices including deliberation over the past two decades. For instance, China’s reform plan released after

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5 “Through a deliberative democratic system, such as political advisory bodies, the public are consulted when important state affairs are decided… Democracy is defined not only by people’s right to vote in an election but also the right to participate in public affairs on a daily basis.” Ji Jing, “Listening to the People” Beijing Review, March 2, 2015 http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2015-03/02/content_671396.htm Accessed on April 8, 2015
the CCP’s Third Plenum articulates that the party will continue to promote "deliberative democracy" as one of the three political reforms to take place. Interestingly, however, empirical cases show little evidence that democratization or deliberative democracy is taking place in China, but only limited deliberations under government control have been observed.

Although evidence shows such limited deliberations did not contribute much to China’s democratization, it does not mean they were ineffective. In fact, deliberations, consultations and other forms of communication between the government and Chinese citizens were effective, only contrary to democracy. In the following two cases from China, I intend to demonstrate how deliberative moments in China, praised as the cases of deliberative democracy by some scholars and (Chinese) media, are in fact, instances of limited deliberation with little to no democratic characteristics.

3.2 Case 3: Democratic Consultation Meetings in Xinhe Town, Wenling County, Zhejiang Province

3.2.1 Background

In Wenling County, citizen forums known as democratic consultation meetings (民主恳谈会), were held since 1999. (Fewsmith 2007, 1) They began “as an educational forum of rural agriculture modernization primarily which purpose is to adopt a kind of educational forms for the people to make face-to-face communication.” (Wu, 115) In Wenling, the experiment has been combined with budgeting in two towns of Wenling, Xinhe and Zheguo. 6 I will focus on Xinhe as it is considered one of the most successful cases of deliberative democracy in China.

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6 Such scholars as He Baogang considers these cases as unsuccessful cases of participatory budgeting. Yet I do not equal Wenling budgetary cases with participatory budgeting, as they are missing some essential features of the PB model, such as year-round duration of the process, transparency of the municipal budgeting.
There were a number of reasons why officials believed deliberative meetings would be useful in Xinhe. First of all, there was “lack of transparency in finance” which “has been one of the primary sources of corruption and popular discontent, at both the village and township levels. Yet cadres have still resisted making financial affairs more transparent.” (Fewsmith 2013, 149) Meanwhile, officials of Wenling County were looking for ways to empower the local people’s congress “to make it work more effectively and to make the deputies more powerful” by combining democratic consultations. (He 2011, 122-123) Local people's congresses are “generally inert bodies” whose constitutional powers rarely exercised. (Fewsmith 2007, 2) Lastly, Xinhe Township was able to adopt an innovative method because the officials were able to convince the Party Secretary to try a new model, who was known to be open minded and also because there was tension in Wenling due to the disputes over land acquisition, of which officials sought ways to prevent citizens from petitioning. (Fewsmith 2007, 2-3)

In order to build a model that serves all the government's needs, officials in Wenling consulted with experts such as Li Fan, the head of China and the World Institute (CWI, a Beijing based NGO) in order to make a working model, which resulted in a process resembling participatory budgeting. Ma Jun, a professor from Sun Yat-Sen University trained deputies in

7 “Local people's congresses at various levels are established through democratic election… The People's Congresses of the Townships, Nationality Townships and Towns Exercise the Following Main Functions and Powers:
- to decide, in accordance with the State plan, on plans for the development of the economy, cultural affairs and public services in their respective administrative areas; to examine and approve the financial budget and its implementation report in their respective administrative areas; to decide on plans for civil affairs in their respective administrative areas; and to adopt and issue resolutions within the scope of their functions and powers;
- to elect or remove, according to law, the principal and deputy leading members of the people's governments at the corresponding levels;
- to hear and examine reports on the work of the people's governments at the corresponding levels; and to annul inappropriate decisions and orders of the people's governments at the corresponding levels;
- to ensure the observance and execution, in their respective administrative areas, of the Constitution, laws, administrative rules and regulations and the resolutions adopted by the people's congresses and their standing committees at higher levels; and
- to protect the property owned by the whole people or collectively by the working people; and to protect the legitimate private property owned by and other legitimate interests of the citizens.”
Wenling prior to the initiation of the process. (He 2011, 125) The actual “democratic consultations” (Wu, Fewsmith) or “participatory budgeting” (He) were held from March 6th to 9th in 2006. The participants included 93 town members of the National People’s Congress and 193 villagers to “deliberate” on the township’s budget for the following year. (Wu 2009, 115)

The process consisted of three parts, which according to Fewsmith, function as the following. First, there was a preliminary review process. The newly established Finance and Economics Small Group (a branch group of the presidium of CCP whose members were nominated by the congress presidium, consisted of five members in 2005 and eight members in 2006) organized three groups, in which citizens were allowed to join on a voluntary basis, to review the town budget from the perspective of industry, agriculture and society. A report was produced based on group discussions. At the second stage, the people’s congress convened to examine the budget and the township government presented to them on the budget of the previous year and the following year. In addition, the three preliminary groups also reported on their views and delegates of the people’s congress raised questions. At this stage, ordinary citizens were allowed to audit the process and were expected to pass down questions to the delegates of the people’s congress, who would ask questions on behalf of them. In reality, it is reported citizens were allowed to ask questions directly. After the discussion sessions, delegates broke into groups (exclusive to delegates) to further discuss the budget and raise suggestions for revision. This is the part that could be considered as deliberation among delegates. Based on the delegates’ suggestions, the presidium proposed “budget amendments” (预算修正议案), which were voted by the delegates. (Fewsmith 2007, 2) The final stage was supervision of the budget implementation by the Finance and Economics Small Group, a dependent body of the presidium that held close ties with the township government.
As the result of the discussion process, some positive outcomes were observed. First, the township government revealed a portion of the budget (92.97 million yuan) broken down to 15 major categories and 110 sub-categories and presented it to the local people’s congress. The unprecedented disclosure of the government budget was considered a big step toward township’s budget transparency by many scholars and the media. Second, the delegates of the congress were allowed to take the draft budget out of the office and discuss it with their friends and colleagues, through which the budget was revealed to the public. Furthermore, the fact that the government held a multiple day meeting in order to incorporate citizens’ view on township budget and for the local people’s congress to meet several times to discuss and implement the budget were considered evidence of deliberation. Before, the congress would meet for one day each year to make decisions on the budget. (Fewsmith 2007, 3)

3.2.2 Academic Analyses on the Xinhe Model

According to the Chinese domestic media, Xinhe was a success story where both “democratic consultation” and “deliberation” (the two terms are used interchangeably in the article) were held successfully. Beijing Review article published in 2013 reports in retrospect, that Xinhe “took the lead” to “introduce the democratic consultation mechanism to local people’s congresses.”8 Apart from enhancing transparency in township budget, the Xinhe model allows delegates to revise and improve the previous years’ process. The model allowed any group of five or more delegates to submit a petition for revision. “In 2006 and 2007, there were 24 resolutions for revision of the budget (预算修正议案) raised, three of which ultimately passed. This may not seem like a large change, but it was nevertheless unprecedented.” (Fewsmith 2007, 4)

Such reflective features in the model were also considered innovative and democratic.

Could we consider the Xinhe model deliberative or democratic because it enhanced transparency of the township budget and the budgeting included reflective process? Scholars’ accounts are contestable. Many Chinese scholars believe the Xinhe model is democratic. For example, Li Fan, the designer of the model, assesses the model as democratic for the following reasons. First of all, the National People’s Congress’s (NPC) which was considered a “rubber stamp” with no significant role was empowered to supervise the entire process and facilitate the implementation of the budget. In Li’s opinion, NPC’s empowerment is democratic because NPC becomes a truly representative democratic body that incorporates public opinion into decision making. This is an internal reform of the local government system which enhances public voice and decision making power. Thus, although this reform remained at the town level, its meaning is very large. For this reason, it promoted the development of China’s grassroots democracy. Such a view is widely shared among Chinese scholars and media, which is consistent with the government’s position.

On the contrary, most scholars outside of China believe the Xinhe model was not a democratic process. He Baogang points out a systematic difficulty for deliberation to take place in such models that resemble participatory budgeting in China. He says, “In the context of

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“新河镇的改革在公共预算中突出了人的作用，将‘橡皮图章’的人大改造成一个有实际制约权力的人大，这样就在地方事务当中激活了人的作用，使得人大可以就此发挥更加积极的作用。这样一来，人大就不仅成了温岭市民主恳谈改革中真正代表民意的方面，而且这个改革又将原来民众只是可以恳谈，但没有权力的角色地位转化为和政府进行对话中的有权力的部分。因此，这个公共预算的改革将民主恳谈改变成了中国政治体制内部的改革，加大了公众在政府体制中的发言权和决策权。所以虽然新河镇的公共预算的改革只是在镇一级进行的，政府的层次不高，范围也不大，但是意义却非常大，推动了中国基层民主向纵深的发展.”

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authoritarianism, it is impossible to develop any independent form of public deliberation.” (He 2011, 126) He is one of the scholars who believe democratic effects are generated even from the Chinese government’s limited inclusion of citizen participation. However, for the case of Xinhe, He acknowledges deliberation only takes place among deputies. “Local People’s Congresses are the main organizations and actors in the PB (participatory budgeting) process. In Xinhe and Huian townships, deputies debate and deliberate on the budget.” (He 2011, 125) He considers the Xinhe case to be a model of participatory budgeting in China, but believes its biggest problem is civil society not being able to play an important role for deliberation as in Brazil. (He 2011, 126)

Similarly, Zaijun Yuan rejects the idea that the Xinhe model is a case of deliberative democracy. He thinks any form of deliberation in the process, if it had occurred, is insignificant. “(the case of Xinhe was) probably not “deliberative democracy” experiments even though they were called so. They were more like a kind of reform inside the people’s congress to strengthen their power of monitoring the local government. The deliberation held before the congress session was in fact not important. The defects of the cases are clear now… the experiments designed by Li Fan were most able to influence the government’s public policy with the strengthened congress power but the result of the deliberation held within the congress did not sufficiently reflect the people’s will.” (Yuan 2012, 88)

According to Yuan, deliberation among delegates was another one of the government's tricks to make citizens believe they had participated in deliberation and that their views had been shared and influenced the government’s decisions for the township budget. However, the connection between citizen participation and decision making remains absent. There was only limited inclusion of the citizens without any empowerment.

Joseph Fewsmith considers the process to be more consultative than deliberative. According to his detailed account of the model, there are some crucial limitations which prevents it from being a “democratic” model. He argues despite the innovative approach and the unprecedented openness to budgetary affairs at the local level, there are two particular problems in the model: the composition of the township people’s congress and the implementation of the
budget. Fewsmith finds representation problematic because among 230 of total participants, 45 percent were party members, village cadres and entrepreneurs. Also about one third of the 110 delegates of the local people’s congress consisted of township or village cadres and the other two-thirds were party members. Furthermore, considering that members of the congress are those “elected” from the candidates “selected” by the Party, the members lack legitimacy as democratic representatives. He claims “(P)erhaps it is best to view them as part of an expanded local elite, willing to protect local (elite) interests but not willing to challenge the prevailing order.” (Fewsmith 2013, 164) Apart from the representation problem, the model lacks transparency and a means to supervise implementation. The local people’s congress held meetings in the spring or even later, after a quarter or more of the year’s budget had already been spent. It implies the meetings were not held to review the year’s budget and pass the following year’s budget, but only a gesture to approve the decisions already made. Furthermore, there was no independent body to provide a check and balance system for the people’s congress. Although the Finance and Economics Committee was established to supervise budget implementation, considering that “its members generally come from the presidium of the people’s congress, and the presidium is too close to the township government to be truly independent” (Fewsmith 2013, 164), the Committee was clearly lacking neutrality to be an effective body to fairly assess and implement the budget.

3.2.3 Assessment

In Xinhe model, the citizens could attend the budget meetings and also have the opportunity to speak about the township budget at the initial stage of budget assessment. Some scholars emphasize this part to be both deliberative and democratic because of the allowance of citizen participation and opportunity to speak.
Table 4. Assessment of Deliberation and Inclusiveness in Xinhe Model

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<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Deliberation</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Features</td>
<td>Empowered Inclusion</td>
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<td>Mutuality (Two-way communication)</td>
<td>Citizen participation (direct or representative)</td>
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<td>Weighing and Reflecting (Thoughtful consideration)</td>
<td>Duration of participation</td>
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<td>Preference on a Common Concern (Communication on a matter the participants are affected)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
<td>Occurred (direct and representative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt-Citizen Communication</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High (representatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Meetings</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low (representatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
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*Notes
- Deliberation takes at two levels; at the initial stage of the meetings, deliberation includes citizen participants, but later meetings were exclusive to government officials.
- The government officials lack representation for the citizens, but are official representatives of the people in non-democratic China.

What we need to be careful about assessment of the Xinhe model is that there are two different stages of meetings which involve different group of participants for deliberation. The first stage is deliberation between the government officials and citizens in Xinhe. Although limited to the first stage of the budgeting process, an active question and answer session which involved two-way communication with thoughtful opinions on a matter of common concern did take place. At this stage, the level of inclusion could be considered high, as citizen participation was on a voluntary basis. After the first stage, however, there were another set of meetings exclusive to the members of the local congress and deputies. There is no evidence of whether or not citizens’ opinions have been taken into account in the latter meetings. At this stage, citizen participation was limited to none. Deliberation by representatives can also be considered inclusive of citizens and democratic if the representatives are representing the citizens. However, in the cases of China, the government officials lack representation. For this reason, in the case of
Xinhe model, it could be concluded that there were two different set of deliberations occurred, first one was democratic as it incorporated government-citizen deliberation and citizen participation was welcomed and encouraged. However, after the first stage, the government meetings were deliberative, but were exclusive to government officials. Although it is argued by the Chinese government that its government officials are “official” representatives of the citizens in China, but considering the fact that the government representatives were not elected by the citizens but mostly appointed by the Communist Party, the government deliberation cannot be considered inclusive of citizens through representatives the same way as in a democracy.

3.3 Case 4 : Public Debate on China’s Healthcare Reform

3.3.1. Background

Online public debate on China’s health care reform is another case where disagreements can be found in scholarly works about how to interpret citizen participation in online public space created by the Chinese government. Scholars’ views vary on citizen feedback (Balla and Liao 2013), public debate (Thompson 2009), consultations, discussions (Tang, Brixi and Bekedam), online consultation (Balla), consultation with limited deliberation (Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter 2012), and deliberation with democratic principles (Korolev 2014). After giving a brief account of the event, I will examine some of the different arguments by scholars as their views differ on whether or not it is deliberative or democratic.

After the Chinese government ceased the previous universal health care in 1979, China’s health care services became highly commercialized. The problem was that it became quite expensive and inefficient, reportedly about “50 per cent of urban residents and 90 per cent of rural residents lacked coverage of any sort.” (Balla and Liao 2013, 106) Furthermore, general
quality of medical service was put to question in 2000, when the World Health Organization reported that China “ranked third from last in “fairness in financial contribution” and overall 144th among 191 nations.” (The WHO Report 2000 in Thompson 2009, 57) In 2003, the system failure was extensively exposed with the outbreak of severe acute respiratory system (SARS), and it was clear that the government could not ignore the issue any longer. In early 2005, the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRCSC) and World Health Organization (WHO) jointly published a study entitled, “China’s Reform of the Medical and Health System.” It reported China’s health care system failure in great detail. (Korolev 2014, 158) In the same year, the Chinese government openly acknowledged the failure of the system and “the former minister of health Gao Qiang publicly apologized for the failures of the system.” (Thompson 2009, 58)

In 2006, the State Council formed the Health Care System Reform Coordination Small Group (the Coordination Group). This high-level committee was tasked with designing a health system that would provide universal coverage. In the process, the committee solicited reform proposals from a number of outside organizations, such as leading Chinese institutions and international organization such as the World Bank. (Balla and Liao 2013, 106) Experts and international organizations were invited to give seminars to the government and a number of national workshops were held by different government agencies in order to discuss directions of China’s healthcare reform and neutralize the disagreements among ministries with different vested interests. (Tang et al 2013, 164)

In May 2007, a top-level international conference was organized to allow all the invitees to present their visions and proposals on China’s future health systems. Several international experts on health systems development were also invited as discussants and reviewers on these
presentations. A working team was established under the auspice of a ministerial level leading group to review these proposals. Subsequently, the ministerial level leading group drafted its own health reform plan, which was reviewed at a cabinet meeting of the State Council on 10 September 2008. Meanwhile, the central government announced the broad outlines of a plan to reform the health system via the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) website. The plan laid out the objectives the system was expected to meet, such as providing urban and rural residents with access to basic health services, improving the sharing of information about matters of public health, promoting traditional Chinese medicine, and ensuring the safety and affordability of pharmaceutical products. Concurrent with this announcement, the NDRC opened a one-month feedback period, during which over 30,000 comments were submitted. “Based on the collected information, the Coordination Group has made more than 50 corrections to the draft.” (Korolev 2014, 168) In 2009, the Chinese government adopted a series of documents in intention of policy implementation to establish affordable basic healthcare for the citizens.10

3.3.2 Scholarly Analyses on Deliberative and Democratic Moments

What scholars consider unprecedented and possibly deliberative or democratic events could be identified in three parts; first is the public debate after the release of the DRCSC-WHO report, second is the inter-government debate, and third is the online consultation after the NDRC’s announcement of the government reform plan before finalization. First of all, the public

10 State Council passed two policy documents, d“Implementation Plan for Deepening the Reform of the Healthcare System” (2009–2011nian shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige shishi fangan 2009–2011(深化医药卫生体制改革实施方案). Soon after that, on 17 March 2009, the Chinese government adopted the “Guidelines on Deepening the Reform of the Healthcare System” (Guanyu shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige de yijian 关于深化医药卫生体制改革的意见) and “Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Deepening the Healthcare System Reform” (Zhonggong zhongyang, Guowuyuan guanyu shenhua yijian 中共中央、国务院关于深化医药卫生体制改革的意见)
debate after the DRCSC-WHO report was mainly created by media. In fact, the DRCSC-WHO report had received little attention from the public when it was initially submitted to the central government in 2005. However, when the major media outlets started to pick up the main arguments of the report and aired interviews with the experts and scholars who had been involved in making the report, the issue started to receive nationwide attention. (Korolev 2014, 158) High popular interest in the issue led to continuous debates among the scholars and experts, especially online, and their arguments were widely distributed by media.

Scholars such as Alexander Korolov believe the Chinese healthcare reform process to be a deliberative democracy realized in China at the national level. He interprets deliberative democracy by five qualities; inclusiveness, equality, transparency, reason and knowledge and transformation of deliberators’ preferences. In applying this definition, Korolev does not distinguish between deliberation and deliberative democracy, but uses the terms interchangeably, because he believes “different interpretations of deliberative democracy tend to converge on some basic features constituting good deliberation.” (Korolev 2014, 153) Based on this understanding of deliberative democracy, he argues that this is the first phase where “the health reform debate became an urgent issue, engaging the whole society in the process of deliberation,” quoting Chinese media. (Korolev 2014, 158) Although there is evidence of active scholarly debates and their views have been widely transmitted to average citizens nationwide, there is little evidence of citizen engagement in scholarly debate. Yet, Korolev believes the fact that scholars were able to freely engage in debates and for the general public to closely follow their views “indicates that professional arguments are effectively transmitted to

wider audiences, which broadens the deliberative space and makes the process more transparent and inclusive.” (Korolev 2014, 159)

During this time, the Coordination Group opened an official website of the NDRC on 26 September 2006 for ordinary citizens to post their opinions. By December, about 15,000 comments and suggestions were solicited, and the Coordination Group received 600 letters detailing public advice and comments. The Coordination Group systematized all of the feedback and compiled a booklet that was subsequently submitted to different ministries for reference. The government also opened a public hotline for soliciting opinions and direct communications on the issues of healthcare reform. Korolev believes the online solicitation is “another instantiation of inclusiveness and equality” (Korolev 2014, 162) having qualities of deliberative democracy. However, we must bear in mind that online solicitation mainly consists of one-way communication, where citizens post their opinions, but hardly receive any feedback from the government. Furthermore, citizens never find out whether or not their opinions were taken into account by government officials or if their opinions influenced decisions.

The second part is inter-government debate which took place from October 2006 to February 2008, after the establishment of the Health care Reform Coordinating Small Group (the Coordinating Group), involving sixteen ministries and commissions to be responsible for the process of reform. It is reported that there was fierce debates between different ministries, competing to benefit from the new government initiative and thus, proposing conflicting strategies from each other, about how to provide universal access to healthcare. For instance, the Ministry of Health (MOH) favored channeling the majority of government funding directly into public hospitals, but the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) argued for government funding to be channeled through public insurance. (Kornreich, Vertinsky and
When the inter-government debate reached a stalemate in the beginning of 2007, the Coordinating Group invited outside organizations such as Beijing University, Fudan University, DRC, the WHO, the World Bank, and McKinsey and Company, Beijing Normal University to submit proposals for reform. Among the reports submitted by them, the WHO report and the proposal by Zhongshan University, which the government solicited later in 2008 in response to criticism that consultation had excluded medical personnel, are known to have had considerable influence on Chinese health-care reform. (Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter 2012, 185)

The public discussion during this period was prompted by two key media reports. First, there was the interview with Ge Yanfeng, principal author of the joint DRC/WHO report, who argued that commercialization and marketization were the root causes of the failure of China’s health-care system. Second, there was the media coverage of a study by Li Ling on the adverse effects of privatization in June 2006. During this time, different ideological camps debated against each other, which according to Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter, “resembled” deliberation among intellectuals. (Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter 2012, 186)

“(T)his disagreement commenced as a brawl, with mudslinging between the two opposing factions, but, as its protagonists become involved in consultation with the government, the public debate evolved into a thorough discussion and exploration of policy options, and came to resemble deliberation… The newspaper Southern Weekend (Nanfang zhoumo 南方周末), Qinghua University, Unirule Institute of Economics and the State Council’s DRC held conferences and roundtable discussions on health-care reform. In addition, both the NDRC and the MOH sponsored meetings on health-care reform, during which intellectuals were invited to debate this issue. These forums offered intellectuals venues to introduce their ideas and to deliberate on China’s trajectory of health-care reform. Nevertheless, the scope of these deliberations was constrained. They were rather exclusive, involving only a small group of élite intellectuals, government officials and sometimes journalists whose core suggestions aligned with the specific preferences of contending bureaucracies.” (Kornreich, 186-187)

Unlike Korolev, Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter “contend that the government introduced participatory forums for the purpose of conducting consultation, yet the design of the arenas for
consultation created some space for a limited deliberation” and conclude that the consultation process in Chinese healthcare reform did not contribute to China’s democratic transition, but only to better governance. (Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter 2012, 176) The events they identify as deliberation in government consultations take place both in public and behind closed doors, but they are limited to government officials.

The third part of the debate is about the online public consultation held from October 14 to November 14, 2008. On October 9 2008, the NDRC posted its first draft of the reform plan to on its website for public revision and announced that the government would welcome suggestions from the citizens for a one month period. (Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter 2012, 192) During this period, a total of 35,929 comments were solicited; 31,323 submitted via internet, 548 by fax, and 4,025 by post. Among them, 55 per cent were from medical staff and 20 percent from peasants, migrant workers, and workers at different enterprises. (Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter 2012, 167) There is little contention among scholars about whether or not this online consultation is a case of China’s deliberative democracy; it is not. Yet, some scholars consider this period of online public debate as non-democratic but deliberative, while some scholars consider it non-deliberative but possibly democratic.

For instance, Min Jiang considers the Chinese government’s use of cyber spaces for public consultation as “authoritarian deliberation.” He believes in comparison to the past, citizens are gaining more access to government information and more opportunity to express their opinion. However, he disagrees any democratic functions are generated in the process. He says although many users of the online forum believe the forum and the internet as a freer space for public discussion of national affairs where citizens can provide input to influence government decision-making, in reality, “the government’s infrastructure and strategies to influence public
deliberation in the digital have strengthened, not withered.” (Jiang 2010, 14) The government can use the internet to manipulate and influence public debate, perhaps much more effectively with the increase of internet users and means to control online publicity. Despite recognition of the government’s tremendous power to influence public opinion in cyber space, Jiang still considers online public discussion “deliberative.” Jiang argues, “(H)owever, it is deliberative in the sense that argumentation and reasoning are used by local people to discuss collective problems where evidence is presented, solutions proposed and justified.” (Jiang 2010, 6-7). This means the online public debate may be at best deliberation among the users of the online public spaces, but it may not be deliberation between the government and the citizens.

On the other hand, a number of scholars consider China’s online public debate on healthcare reform as non-deliberative, but consultative. (Thompson 2009, Korolve 2014, Balla 2014, Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter 2012). Even Korolev, who believes the process of Chinese health care reform as China’s national level deliberative democracy realized, considers the government’s online solicitation to be consultation rather than deliberation because “while articulating alternative views of the reform, this activity, however, has limited impact and could not change the general conception of NHR, which had already taken shape at the previous stage.” (Korolev 2014, 167-168) Instead, he argues it had democratic impacts because “the very fact of inviting ordinary people to participate in the development of national-level public policy and creating channels for them to submit their grievances and demands to the policy makers on such scale is unprecedented in post-reform China.” (Korolev 2014, 168)

On the other hand, Steven Balla, who analyzed citizens’ comments submitted online, points out a lack of transparency in online consultation. He recognizes that it was unprecedented in the sense that the government solicited public opinion on a national policy to the general
public and the citizens were allowed to freely post their opinions. However, he notes that it does not indicate much about citizen participation and government-citizen relations because of the absence of communication between the government and the citizens online. “Due to the opacity of the Chinese policymaking process, little is known about the operation of online consultation.” (Balla 2014, 218) This means that there is no evidence that the government actually took citizens' opinions into account when making decisions.

“Following the convention of previous research on demographic characteristics, subjective motivations, and Chinese political participation, this finding has been interpreted as evidence that health system reform offered citizens the opportunity to gain exposure to democratic principles and the process of articulating interests, as opposed to inducing compliant behavior defined by the overarching presence of authoritarian constraints. This interpretation does not necessarily signal the potential of the Internet as an instrument for enhancing consultation and participation in Chinese politics as a general matter.” (Balla 2014, 227)

Balla further questions whether the online debates even had the function of sound consultation or inclusion. Despite the fact that the access to the Internet was open to all Chinese citizens and the number of users was over 30,000 (which is not insignificant), Balla discovered that those who posted comments on the NDRC website represent a limited set of socially advantaged, politically sophisticated Chinese citizens. (Balla 2014, 228) This means, those who need the universal healthcare the most such as those economically disadvantaged and those located in rural areas, were largely excluded from participation.

3.3.3 Assessment

China’s healthcare reform process consisted of various moments of public debate, consultations and the government’s efforts to listen to experts and citizens, which is regarded as unprecedented openness from the government side, reaching out to the public. In the process of China’s healthcare reform, two different sites of communication must be analyzed separately.
### Table 5. Assessment of Deliberation and Inclusiveness in the Healthcare Reform Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Deliberation</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>Mutuality (Two-way communication)</td>
<td>Weighing and Reflecting (Thoughtful consideration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt-Citizen Online Communication</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Meetings</td>
<td>Low (One-way)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes*
- Deliberation takes at two levels; online consultations prior to government deliberation, and deliberation at high-level government official meetings.
- The government officials lack representation for the citizens, but are official representatives of the people in non-democratic China.
- The number of the participants in the government websites is over 30,000, which can be an evidence of active citizen participation. However, online participants lack representation for the Chinese population, especially for those most affected by the healthcare reform.

The first site of communication is the government website, where the government invited citizens to provide their thoughtful considerations on the nation’s common concern of healthcare reform. However, the online communication was mostly one-way communication where citizens posted their opinions on government websites, but the government rarely responded. There is little evidence of the government taking public opinion into consideration for their decision making. Due to the lack of communication between the government and citizens, it could be concluded that consultation or solicitation was evident but deliberation did not take place between the government and citizens. Also, although some scholars consider online consultation as democratic because the Chinese government unprecedentedly and openly solicited citizen opinions and invited all Chinese citizens to provide opinions, considering that 60 per cent of Chinese citizens are still yet to be internet users, internet can hardly be considered as an inclusive
instrument for communications between the government and the citizens. (Balla 2014, 228) Online consultation is a useful tool for aggregating public opinion and is potentially inclusive but it was not a democratic tool for China at the given time of 2008. Approximately 30,000 individuals participated in posting their opinions, but they were hardly a representative body of the entire Chinese population, nor were the internet users representative of those most affected by the healthcare reform.

Where deliberation possibly occurred is in the closed door meeting of high-level government officials. It is reported that the government officials had active discussions in the meetings and sought for various expert opinions for a thoughtful consideration of the matter that was a serious concern for both the government and citizens. For this reason, although details of the official meetings cannot be found, it is likely that deliberation did occur among the officials. However, it is difficult to conclude that such deliberations were democratic. Despite the Chinese government’s claim that government officials are democratic representatives of the Chinese people (Yuan 2012), they lack representation on the Western standard of democracy. The official meetings were exclusive to the officials who lacked representation for the citizens. Thus it could be concluded that citizens were excluded from the deliberation between government officials.
4. Assessment

In the four cases studied, both similarities and differences were observed between the cases, but interestingly, more similarities were found between the cases from the same country. For this reason, for the summary of assessments, I will provide a general assessment on the South Korean Cases and a separate one for the Chinese cases.

Table 6. Summary of Case Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Ulsan Case</th>
<th>Sihwaho Case</th>
<th>Xinhe Model</th>
<th>Healthcare Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Citizens’ Jury</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Govt-Citizen Communication</td>
<td>Govt-Citizen Online Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberation</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low (One way)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowered Inclusion</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One distinctive feature of the Korean cases is that there was high level deliberation in the ad-hoc body whose members were selected by the government from the non-government sector. The citizens’ juries in the Ulsan case and the Council members in the Sihwaho case have such characteristics that they were composed of elite-centric individuals mostly from the sector of civil society, who were selected to make educated and disinterested decisions for dispute settlements between the government and citizens. Citizens were excluded from participating in the meetings, although they were able to observe the Council meetings in the Sihwaho case. In both cases, the participants clearly lacked representation for the citizens whose interests were affected. For this reason, for both cases, citizens continued protesting against the government.
during and after the activities of the deliberative bodies. Exclusion of citizen participation, but selection of an elite group for policy decisions on behalf of citizens “capable of making educated decisions for the best of the people” is a common practice in Korea. As observed from the two cases, lack of representation for the general citizenry only exacerbated popular grievances. However, deliberation did take place in the meetings of the Citizen’s Jury and the Council. As many scholars argued, there had been robust exchange of information for better decision and active discussions among the participants. The government’s effort for the inclusion of non-government sector into policy making process must also be recognized. Although limited to a selected group of individuals mostly from civil society, such an attempt to expand citizen participation in policy making process was unprecedented at the time of each event. For this reason, South Korean scholars provide positive evaluations on the new government initiatives and highly regard their significance as the role model and the precedence for the future democratic participatory mechanisms to be adopted by the South Korean government. However, I believe scholars’ generally positive evaluations on the cases that incorporated encouragements and compliments for the government initiatives avoided a fair critique of the cases, excluding guidance for better implementation of participatory mechanisms in the future. They also fail to analyze the root causes of citizen exclusion in policy decisions, which is a common government practice in South Korea.

According to one of the leading scholars of South Korean democratization, Choi Jang Jip, the practice of citizen exclusion in politics has been one of a number of old practices that the South Korean democracy inherited from past authoritarian regimes. “Reaching a compromise at a closed negotiation table in a rush, like [one is] pressed for time,” is a typical authoritarian

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12 For instance, the citizen representatives for participatory budgeting in Korea are selected by the government.
political practice used to exclude the general public. This was observed when the constitution in 1948 was established (nobody knows who wrote the constitution and the process to establish it), when the 1960 constitutional amendment was passed (a few individuals wrote and approved the amendment to start the dictatorship of Park Jung Hee before the general public found out), and in the negotiation of the 1987 constitutional amendment (the political negotiation to end the military dictatorship excluded representatives of the democratization movement) (Choi 2002, 140). Today, the same practice of quick decision-making by the government or by leadership (politicians and corporate leaders, without considering those whose interests are affected the most, is common in labor and social disputes. As was observed in the Ulsan and Sihwaho cases, the South Korean government finds an efficient way to exclude citizen participation by adopting supposedly democratic participatory processes, such as a citizens’ jury system or a deliberative committee. In the end, the government creates a positive and democratic image of the entire process of dispute settlement, as if the citizens were included or fairly represented, while having a shield (the body responsible for deliberation) that will take the flame of blame if things go wrong.

Another worrisome fact is that most of the government initiatives of participatory mechanisms occurred during ten years when the progressive administrations (Kim Dae Jung 1998-2003, Roh Moo Hyun 2003-2008) were in the office. Since the conservative administration took over the office in 2008, little can be found on the new government initiatives. Thus many empirical studies on deliberative democracy still use the cases from the past. Furthermore, the participatory initiatives adopted during the progressive administration were halted or are continued with little support from the government (i.e., participatory budgeting in Korea).\textsuperscript{13} The

\textsuperscript{13} Under the progressive administrations, participatory budgeting (PB) was introduced in Korea with some continuity as a part of the presidents’ effort for decentralization. In 2011, the National Assembly revised the Local
prenational system (five year term with no reelection) in South Korea allows discontinuation of initiatives started in previous administrations especially when the ruling parties shifts. It could be argued that the conservative administrations lack understanding of the importance of citizen participation in politics, but it is more likely that the conservative administrations intentionally displace initiatives by the progressive administrations to punish the opposition party.

In the Chinese cases, it was evident that the Chinese government was more open than the South Korean government in inviting and incorporating citizen participation, especially prior to government meetings and decision making. Despite active citizen participation, deliberations and consultations between the government and citizens occurred separately from the government deliberations.

In the Xinhe case, it was observed that ordinary citizens could participate in sharing their opinions and raise questions in open meetings with government officials in the initial stages of the budgeting process. In the healthcare reform case, on a few occasions prior to government meetings and decision making, the government invited citizens to post their opinions via the Internet. However, in both cases, citizen participation was limited to a few instances when the government invited citizens to share their opinion. In the healthcare reform case, the government’s solicitation of citizens’ opinion was mostly one-way communication. Citizens posted their opinions on government websites, but it was unclear whether the government took them into consideration for decisions. Citizen deliberation and sharing opinions were limited to a

Finance Law and made implementation of PB mandatory. By July 2012, among the total of 243 local governments, 241 governments (99%) adopted the ordinance for PB. However, only 60% of them have actually been implemented PB after adopting the ordinance. Some NGOs reported that there were cases some conservative politicians did not understand the need of citizen participation in budgeting after years of implementation. In an extreme case, politicians walked into a meeting with citizens in session to halt the process. (Lee 2013, 259).
period of time and a limited space mostly prior to exclusive meetings between government officials where separate deliberation took place in closed-door official meetings. For this reason, while government-citizen communications were observed in the processes, the instances needs separate evaluation.

The two cases from China also lacked democratic characteristics. In the Xinhe model, the first stage of the budgeting that incorporated citizen participation successfully included citizens and empowered them by allowing deliberation with the government. However, after the initial stage, citizens were excluded from the meetings and the decision making process was limited to government officials. In the healthcare reform case, although many people participated in the government website to deliver their opinions to the government, they were not allowed to deliberate about it with the government, not had they received proper feedback from the government. Because details and results of high-level official meetings are not shared with the public, it is unknown whether the citizens’ opinions that aggregated online were taken into consideration for the decision making.

A general understanding of China’s political history and culture can help us better comprehend the cases from China. He argues that deliberation among Chinese leadership for the good of the people has a long tradition in China, dating back to the time of Confucius. He calls it “Confucian deliberation”\(^ {14}\), in which deliberation is carried out by the “gentlemen” for the better of the people. According to He, “Confucianism lays down the foundations of private and public interest and the roles of officials and ministers as spokespersons for the people and rulers” (He

\(^ {14}\)“Confucianism advocated a balanced theory of deliberation: a society it was thought needed talk-centric politics, but pragmatic authoritarian form of discipline or control was also necessary. Only then could deliberation have its proper place in moral enterprise and politics. The concepts, ren (仁: benevolence, or humaneness), li (礼: ritual) and junzi (君子: gentleman) were three key terms frequently used in Confucius’s original texts. The domination of these terms indicated a political order in which the rule of gentlemen prevailed, the notion of duty was central, moral concerns override political bargaining processes, and harmony won over conflict. The practice of yi (deliberation) was carried out by junzi and regulated by the moral principle of ren and li.” (He 2014, 62)
Perhaps for this reason, Chinese government and Chinese scholars interpret “Chinese deliberative democracy” somewhat differently from conventional Western deliberative democracy theory. Some of the distinctive features of “Chinese deliberative democracy” include a requirement of an authoritarian organizer, in case a need arises to correct policies (today, the organizer must be the CCP because it represents the interest of the whole nation). It also requires recognition of a form of deliberative democracy that has been established in China for decades because the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference\textsuperscript{15} is a deliberative democracy institution (Yuan 2012, 75). The Chinese government’s and Chinese scholars’ unique understanding of deliberation helps us better comprehend why they call it deliberative democracy, even though deliberation is limited to the political leadership and bureaucrats. Considering that this deliberation excludes citizens from most of the decision-making process and lacks democratic functions, it can be concluded that the Xinhe budgeting and healthcare reform cases are not cases of deliberative democracy—even by a minimalist definition.

Many scholars evaluate the Chinese government’s citizen participation initiatives as a signal of the start of democratization in China. As of now, citizen participation in the government policy making process is quite limited. However, scholars believe whether or not the government intended, enhanced citizen participation will slowly transform the political environment more democratically to the point where the Chinese government will no longer be able to ignore voice from the citizens. However, as many other scholars also point out, such progress seems far from today’s reality. Enhanced citizen participation is limited to non-decision-making realms of politics and is mainly used to prevent further popular dissatisfaction rather than actually expand citizen’s role in politics. The government is using the participatory mechanisms to ensure the

\textsuperscript{15} The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is a political advisory for the CCP established by the CCP in 1949.
current elites stay in power by allowing some ventilation of accumulating demands to prevent explosions of dissatisfaction. Perhaps it is too early to evaluate the significance of deliberative initiatives for China’s democratization, but successful citizen inclusion and its positive democratic potential needs recognition.
5. Conclusion

For a process or event to count as “deliberative democracy,” it should be both democratic and deliberative. An empirical case of deliberative democracy needs to establish a clear understanding of both deliberation and democracy not only to demonstrate a deliberative democratic case but to clearly show how deliberation can contribute to democracy. However, it was evident that some scholars identified non-deliberative cases as deliberative and others considered cases to be democratic when they were deliberative but non-democratic cases. In some cases, scholars equated deliberation and deliberative democracy. In countries such as South Korea and China where the terms used to translate deliberation do not deliver the full meaning of the word “deliberation” in the English language, academic studies on deliberative democracy are particularly important in introducing the concepts of deliberation and deliberative democracy. Lack of theoretical explanation in empirical studies can lead to much more misunderstandings.

A solid theoretical base can provide guidance to an ideal process and help locate shortcomings in a model, which is the reason why empirical studies are in great demand. I hoped to find such guidance in scholarly assessments, yet a plethora of different interpretations in the South Korean and Chinese cases provided little ground to understand what deliberative democracy could possibly mean. For this reason, I attempted to clarify some of the confusion for readers of empirical studies on deliberative democracy focusing on cases from South Korea and China, where many understandings seem to be in play. Despite the complexity in empirical cases, a good theoretical understanding can prevent such confusions as was tested and proved in the four cases observed in the given study.
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