FOUCAULT’S ETHICS IN EDUCATION

by

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Abstract

Ethical questions are often posed to explore the relationship between and the responsibilities of actors to each other by adopting criteria. Ethical criteria engender assumptions about the actors by focusing on their responsibilities. Instead of relying on criteria, Michel Foucault’s writing and lectures contributed to an awareness of the activities we take upon ourselves as ethical subjects. Foucault’s ethics seeks to examine the possibilities of the constitution of the subject and the transformation of subjectivity. The topic of this conceptual research is the contribution of “care of the self” and parrhesia to ethics in education. Foucault offers an avenue of understanding the formation of ethical subjects in their educational interrelationships.
Preface

This thesis is original, unpublished and independent work by the author, Bruce Moghtader.
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Dedication

To my mother and mothers and to those whose love and care assists life.

This work is also dedicated to its own subject, Michel Foucault.
Chapter 1: Introduction

What is this action of the other that is necessary for the constitution of the subject by [her]/himself? ... What is this helping hand, this education, which is not an education but something different or more than education? (Foucault, 2005, p. 134)

Ancient and contemporary education owes much to Socrates’ advice to live an “examined life.” Education in this sense is an existential quest. Martha Nussbaum (2002, p. 290) proposed that by developing Socrates’ thought Stoic philosophers, such as Seneca, emphasized in education a “capacity to be fully human,” “by which he means self-aware, self-governing, and capable of recognizing and respecting the humanity of all our fellow human beings.” The ethics of contemporary education continues on this path of fostering an ethos that is subjective and participatory. The significance of each person’s contribution to the process of education, William Pinar (2011) stressed, assists an understanding of subjectivity “within” power relations (p. 32).

In this context, the works of philosopher Michel Foucault is of significance for education and developing ethical relations. Foucault’s scholarship explored the exercise of personal power in relation to the knowledge obtained in a culture. His early works, prior to 1978, engaged in questioning and making visible our vulnerabilities and limitations in his studies of discourse, knowledge and power. His later works, from 1978 to his death, advocated for a historical understanding of activities we take upon ourselves to form ourselves as ethical subjects. By studying the Greco-Roman philosophical practices, Foucault’s later works reintroduced the ancient ethical imperative of the “care of the self,” as the active day-to-day enactment of living an examined life.
In this thesis, I postulate that Foucault’s questioning of the ways we know ourselves and his questioning of the ways we conduct ourselves assists thinking and action in present educational ethics. By investigating Foucault’s ethics in education, this thesis explores the question: How do we form ourselves as ethical subjects? This along with other questions explored by Foucault works against a subject and object binary in education. This introductory chapter first addresses how Foucault’s ethics contributes to education. Second, it provides an overview of the chapters.

1.1 Foucault and Education

Foucault’s scholarship was an examination of how we know ourselves and what our relation is to knowledge. His work contributes to present theories on education, first by decentralizing the modern educational subject and second by considering the possibility of the formation of dispersed modes of ethical subjects. By questioning a universal understanding of ethical criteria, Foucault’s scholarship suggests that we withhold assumptions, to some degree, about the other and who the other is to be and become. He positioned curiosity in care as an avenue of enactment of the subject towards itself and others. By reawakening ancient philosophical and spiritual practices, Foucault entertained the possibility of self-formation. The possible strength of this perspective can be found in moving away from the conception of ethics as codes, rules and norms. The relevance of Foucault’s ethics to education highlights the inseparability of persons from their experiences and their active role in their own transformation.

Foucault problematized modern political power by reconstructing the activity of government as the conduct individuals undertake to govern themselves. In this context, Foucault (1984b) reawakened the ancient maxim of *epimeleia heautou*, “the care of the
self” or “the cultivation of the self” as the process of examining a truth about one’s self (p. 43). The “care of the self” highlighted the importance of philosophical activities as self-forming activities persons take upon themselves to transform their relationship to themselves and others. Foucault (2005) showed that throughout ancient history the “care of the self” accompanied the activity of knowing oneself as an active problematization of truths about oneself. In comparison to Antiquity, Foucault found, modern philosophy less concerned with the “care of the self,” but more concerned with knowing oneself.

Foucault’s early works provided the context to his later thoughts on ethics as an on-going destabilization of knowledge to attend to experiences. These works brought attention to subjugation and demonstrated Foucault’s unceasing concern for knowledge, practice and experience. By returning to Greco-Roman ethical practices, Foucault extended his early efforts to restructure the exercise of power. Where Foucault’s early works critique the generalized and universal understanding of self-constitution, the later works emphasized the importance of self-work and self-mastery. Foucault’s oeuvre is demonstrative of an ethic of transformation that aims to change the way we accept, reject and come to know ourselves by attending to the ways we take care of ourselves. He had no prescription, but a position in ethics that is subjective, philosophical, and spiritual. The challenge is to follow Foucault (1988a), since his “books don’t tell people what to do” (p. 15). In this sense people must decide for themselves.

1.2 Overview of the Chapters

The next chapter reviews Foucault’s philosophical methodology and methods. In his methods, Foucault was concerned with the reformation of subjectivity with an attention to intellectual history within the frames of critical theory. Chapter 3 provides a
review of current educational ethics by drawing upon the works of John Dewey and Nel Noddings to show the distinctive nature of Foucault’s contribution to education. Chapters 4 to 6 show both transformation and continuity in Foucault’s work. By mapping the archaeological, genealogical and ethical works it becomes evident that the ethical question of how we form ourselves as ethical subjects was the enduring theme in Foucault’s analysis of history. Chapter 4 follows Foucault’s search beneath history in his archaeologies leading him to the studies of power in works characterized as genealogies. Chapter 5 maps out Foucault’s rethinking about power and political participation that led to Foucault’s study of governmentality, subjectivity and ethics. Chapter 6 synthesizes the role of philosophy in Foucault’s conceptualization of “the care of the self” and parrhesia in education. Through the activity of Parrhesia, free speech and disclosing a relation of the subject to the truth, Foucault (2011) integrated “the practice of what could be called the government of oneself and others” (p. 8). From his perspective, parrhesia shifts a political exercise to a moral exercise. Foucault’s (2011) inquiries about knowledge, power and ethics undergo a transformation to “finally” arrive at “the modes of formation of the subject through practices of the self” (p. 9). Following Foucault, the aim of the thesis is to arrive at a destination where simple and universal understandings of ourselves as ethical subjects are complicated by an attention to what it is that we do, say and practice in education.
Chapter 2: Historian of Thought

My objective ... has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects. ... It was therefore necessary to expand the dimensions of a defection of power if one wanted to use this definition in studying the objectivizing of the subject. (Foucault, 2000, pp. 326-327)

This chapter examines Foucault’s overall objective in his histories about how we are made subjects. The purpose is to give an overview of his methodology and his unique contribution to philosophy. The following three sections describe Foucault’s aim of reading and rewriting of history, his historical and philosophical methods and methodology. First, I show that by writing different histories\(^1\) of the present Foucault destabilized a universal truth about ourselves. Second, I review the methodology and methods in Foucault’s evaluation of the truth and of what is said to be true about us in our historical transformation. He relied on different methods to examine the epistemological concepts and ontological limits of the modes by which we are made subjects. These methods assisted the assessment of modern practices. In the last section, I review Foucault’s contribution to critical tradition. For him, a critical attitude is not solely a methodology, but also an ethos embedded in the day-to-day activity and experience of persons.

2.1 The History Teacher

Taken together, Michel Foucault’s (1961-1984) writings, lectures and interviews are a demonstration of rethinking history, philosophy and practice. As such, his work cannot be viewed as separate periods as if to capture him in one photograph, book,

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lecture or interview. However, a chronological view of Foucault’s work assists to organize his teachings. Prior to 1978, Foucault attended to the individualization of the modern subject by making visible the influence of experts’ knowledge and the role of discursive power to form subjectivity. His writings and interviews contributed immensely to both the study of the subject in practices of knowledge and the institutional power that bonds the subject to specific set of practices. From 1978 onward, Foucault (2011) studied “the constitution of oneself as ethical subject” and the ways individuals conduct themselves (p. 339). These works are the continuation of his earlier efforts, expanding his attention to history and the ways human form and transform themselves in a given culture and time.

Foucault’s histories, histories of self-constitution, were concerned with how our practices shape us and how we transfigure our practices. His curiosity for change, revolt and activism led to a conceptualization of subjective power. This curiosity was motivated by a desire to change the "world, and to bring into question the relation between knowledge, the world, and the knowing subject" (Falzon & O'Leary, 2010, p. 2). One aim of writing creative histories was to seek possible ways of thinking and acting by recognizing the weight of the tradition on the present. Foucault’s works aimed to problematize accepted practices. In this sense, his writings contributed to an understanding of the limitations of the present and the possibility for different practices. Progress for Foucault is a labour of understanding our limits and transgressions in history. In this context, Deacon (2006) noted, “Foucault's oeuvre as a whole” helps education with “what might be called the past, present, and future of schooling, or, its development, its functions, and its prospects” (p. 177).
In Foucault’s histories, learning is inseparable from the exercise of power that constitutes and shapes the present. Learning from history means problematizing forms of knowledge that assume power belongs to a certain group and is exercised in a continuous motion. By making power and knowledge contingent in history, Foucault made modern assumptions about subjectivity and power vulnerable to historical disruptions. His historical narrations reconstructed the formations of knowledge and power in present experiences, making persons active in the process of reforming history. As a history teacher, Foucault planned “to generate doubt and discomfort, and to help simulate a wider process of reflection and action leading to other and more tolerable ways of thinking and acting” (Gordon, 2000, p. xvii). His works have been influential in education theory and practice in the past four decades, both introducing new questions to the field and rethinking some of its assumptions (Ball, 1990; Besley & Peters, 2007; Cahn, 2012; Popkewitz, 1997).

Calling Foucault an educator is not necessarily inaccurate. His works problematized what is accepted as the knowledge we grasp about ourselves and about the world. Foucault (2005) asked, “[h]ow can the world which is given as the object of knowledge (connaissance) on the basis of mastery of tekhne, at the same time be the site where the ‘self’ as ethical subject of truth appears and is experienced?” (p. 487). As a teacher who was concerned with experiences and practices, he read history with a suspicion of its facts about knowledge and persons as beholders of knowledge. By examining history he found certain processes and techniques constituted a power in knowledge. He extended this inquiry by studying how throughout history ethical subjects constitute themselves in relation to what they know about themselves. Foucault
(1988a) identified his scholarship within the “field” of the “history of thought”: “Between social history and formal analyses of thought there is a path, a lane—maybe very narrow—which is the path of the historian of thought” (p. 9).

Foucault’s characterization of himself as a “historian of thought” demonstrates a schematic continuity of his academic life. In this continuity, Foucault gave different answers about who we are. May (2006) argued, “Foucault addresses the question of who we are by appealing to history” (p. 15). Foucault’s historical studies aimed to explore the relation between who we are and who we can choose to become. Adopting a historical framework, he showed “that we cannot think or act without a framework, an order, of some sort”; meanwhile he argued, “that no such order is necessary, universal, or fixed, that every human arrangement is historical and finite” (Falzon, 2013, p. 283). In this context, from the beginning to the end of his work, Foucault elaborated on participation with history. For him, history could not be viewed as separate from persons and their present way of life.

For Foucault, persons are not contextualized as the product of history. Foucault’s histories are the history of the present (Hacking, 2002). In this present, the knowledge of the past is accompanied by a responsibility to reassess what we are today and who we may become tomorrow. In order to make visible the formation of practices, Foucault examined their creation in the context of history. His works bring attention to the ways of thinking that are undermined, forgotten or excluded. These works have an influential application to the way we know, imagine and conduct ourselves. May (2006) explained from Foucault’s perspective, “we are this rather than that as a matter of contingency, not necessity. We did not have to be this rather than that, which means, among other things,
that we do not have to continue to be *this*” (p. 11). By decentralizing the accepted values about who we are, Foucault’s efforts aimed at transformation of history and historical selves in the present context.

With his attention to present, Foucault (1996) wrote different histories about who we have become with the “hope” that his “books become true after they have been written not before” (p. 301). By rewriting history, he transfigured the limitations of the ways individuals become bound to themselves through specific practices, discourses, and modes of understanding. Foucault’s (1996) histories were written with the aim of “an interference between our reality and the knowledge of our past” in order to reconfigure our present ways of talking, thinking, and acting (p. 301). These histories examined the norms and practices to show how different understandings of the past can assist a transformation in the present.

The struggle of changing the past and future is existential in Foucault’s histories of the present. For Foucault, the past was “a tool with which” he would “intervene in the present for the sake of a future” (O’Leary, 2002, p. 96). In this sense, Foucault started a dialogue with history about truths of the past to reconstruct dispersed forms of power in the future. For example, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977) focused on the development of technologies\(^2\) of surveillance as instruments that form and exercise a disciplinary mode of subjectivity. He went further by showing how these technologies become institutionalized and how institutions contribute to technologies of government. This genealogy of the modern subject is an examination of authority that acts to shape experience and produce its subjects. It is within this context that the later Foucault

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\(^2\) Foucault's (1984) use of the word technology has its roots in the Greek word techne (craft or art), defined as "a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal" (p. 255).
(2005) departed from impersonal power to explore self-mastery through the technologies of the self.

Faubion (2011) noted the technologies of the self are “instruments of the self’s work on itself” towards a personal and subjective ethics (p. 48). In this sense, Foucault’s ethics objected to an “ethic, for which the ethical subject is a practitioner and so cannot be a maker, least of all a maker of himself” (Faubion, 2011, p. 48). Instead, Foucault (2005) returned to the beginning of the history of Western thought, to reawaken “the whole interplay between philosophy and spirituality in the ancient world” (p. 46). Foucault’s remembrance of Antiquity reimagined other possibilities and modalities in the present. Foucault (1998b) emphasized that Socrates’ educational recommendation of knowing oneself accompanied caring for oneself. He relied on the Delphic maxim of the “care of the self” and philosophical activities in Greek and Hellenistic traditions as modalities of exercises for knowing oneself and transforming this self.

By tuning his attention on ethics, both continuity and transformation is evident in Foucault’s works. In an interview, he disclosed, “I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, in Madness and Civilization or The birth of the Clinic, but power” (Foucault, 2000, p. 115). This comment appears at the cusp of Foucault’s political involvement with juridical and disciplinary bodies in France and Europe. A few years later, Foucault found power an incomplete concept without the subject, and set subjectivity at the center of his historical studies. Foucault’s (2000) “goal…has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundation of such analysis” (p. 326). This intentional claim called for a reevaluation of his efforts to produce a theory about power. He invited his readers to see the continuity in his work as the concern for
experience. Foucault (1984) explained his early and later aims were “[t]o study forms of experience… in their history” (p. 334).

Whether it is continuity or discontinuity, Amy Allen (2013) noted, Foucault’s thinking is an open-ended movement that takes us “beyond ourselves”:

Foucault’s thought from madness as the condition of impossibility of thought to disciplinary subjection to the Stoic idea of conversion [is] a movement that takes us from the subject as founded on the exclusion of madness through the constitution of the subject by means of its subjection to disciplinary power through governmentality to the relationship of self to self. (p. 350)

In this movement, Foucault (2000) noted, he did not “depend on a continuous and systematic body of data … [but] was inspired by a direct personal experience” (p. 244). This approach to thinking was not to transport his personal experience. He expressed his aim was to “make possible a transformation, a metamorphosis, that is not just mine [his] but can have a certain value, a certain accessibility for others, so that the experience is available for others to have” (Foucault, 2000, p. 244). This is true of his works about psychiatric institutions, medical knowledge, political spirituality and sexuality.

Fueled by personal experience, Foucault’s works are each related to his effort to interfere with the present way of thinking, in order to assist thinking differently. Moreover, his books are not solely an academic endeavor, but reflective of a personal struggle to transform his personal life. Foucault’s books, interviews and articles appear timely to what preoccupied him in life. For example, *Madness and Civilization* and *Birth of the Clinics* were attempts to understand psychology as a result of early work experiences in a mental hospital. Psychology was not a science for Foucault, but an
endeavor to understand personal conflicts and desires. On the other hand, *The Order of Things* is an assessment of scientific consciousness and a critique of the phenomenological approach that dominated intellectual work in France after the Second World War. *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is a clarification of archaeological method, a response to Foucault’s critics, and a further examination of discourse of knowledge in a given historical context.

Foucault’s archaeologies, looked beyond the production of knowledge, to bring attention to present experiences that accompany the dominant discourse. It is in the works to follow that Foucault became more active and articulate about the importance of experience and, how this experience leads to formation of knowledge and “forms of subjectivity in a particular culture”:

it was a matter of seeing how an “experience” came to be constituted in modern Western societies, and experience that caused individuals to recognize themselves as subjects of a “sexuality,” which was accessible to very diverse forms of knowledge and was linked to a system of rules and constraints. *What I planned, therefore, was a history of sexuality as an experience of sexuality, where experience is understood as the correlation, in a culture, between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture.*

(Foucault, 1985, p. 4, italics added)

Histories of sexuality are histories of experience, the private and public, and are concerned with the ways in which we recognize and constitute ourselves. Foucault conceptualized experience as a correlation between what we know, what we consider
normal, and how we form ourselves to study how we understand ourselves as desiring subjects and as subjects of desires.

Foucault was clear that he was not seeking answers to what one should do with desires, nor how one should live. Foucault’s (1997c) later works moved towards the exercise of ethics rather than a theory of ethics. He advocated for the role of philosophy, as an active exercise of one’s self to gain self-mastery, as it was present in ancient practices. Foucault’s works serve educational theory and practice to further the philosophical and spiritual aim of living an examined life. The need for philosophical understanding with attention to history has tangible applications in education. For example, Egan (2008) argued it helps student’s understanding of “power and the process by which it operate[s],” exposing the “mental landscape” about the ideas we hold about “the real truth” and “the real reality of things” (p. 71, italics in original).

2.2 Foucault’s Methodology and Methods

As Foucault’s history lessons are concerned with knowledge and experience, his methods are an exploration of contingency in history. These methods are an examination of the accepted truths, values and practices. Foucault, the scholar-artist, did not cling on to a fully satisfactory truth that will take his studies to a destination; nor is he lost in an observatory space. He lived with the tests of the present asking: What is knowledge? What is truth? What is politics? These questions aim at reconstructing what are culturally taken for granted as truth assumptions in a culture. The “notion common to all the work” Foucault (1988a) has “done … is that of problematization” (p. 257). The activity of posing questions to accepted games of truth, problematization, appears in early Foucault as the activity of deformation of the subject and in later Foucault as the
activity of transformation of the subject. Problematization is a method of defamiliarization applied to the history of thought, and in Foucault’s case it is extended to his own works.

Foucault’s (1997c) problematizations of the present followed the tradition of Immanuel Kant, and at the same time complicated the Kantian subjectivity. Kant was present throughout Foucault’s critical project. Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology accompanied by the first translation of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View comprised his complementary dissertation undertaken between 1959-1960 (Defert, Ewald, & Gros 2008, p. 9). In the text, Foucault (2008a) pointed out that the critical enterprise was accompanied by anthropology; attending to this, “Kant redoubled the effort of transcendental reflection through the constant accumulation of empirical knowledge of man” (p. 120). This very early critique was in direct conversation with the finitude of man in The Order of Things and the later ethical works by Foucault’s reworking of Kant’s deontological ethics.

Although Foucault adopted Kant’s critique, “the model of the critique” was “Nietzchian” ³ (Foucault, 2008a, p. 124). Foucault “derived his conception of archaeology from Kant” and examined the “necessity of a priori principles… the history of that which renders necessary a certain form of thought” (McQuillan, 2010, p. 43). On the other hand, he questioned the transcendental subjectivity. Foucault (1988c) “reject[ed] a certain a priori theory of the subject in order to” examine “the relationships which can exist between the constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices or power…” (p. 10). He showed what we can hope for is

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contingent and reconstructive from what has come before us. He showed there is “no a
priori that is not historical” (Veyne, 2010, p. 30).

Methodologically Foucault broadened the horizons of critical theory. This gives
Foucault his own stand in philosophy. It is interesting to note that the title of Dreyfus
was initially proposed as “Michel Foucault: From Structuralism to Hermeneutics”
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. vi). However, Foucault’s works include an examination
of history of thought, studying the extent that thinking shapes experience and practice.
He was not interested in deeper meaning or essence, but questioning our acceptance of
the familiar thoughts and practices. Although he studied the modern structures, his
questions engaged in “interpretive analytics” of our culture rather than of structures
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. viii). Foucault was interested in what defines us and how
definitions confine us. He was in continuous battle with norms, generalizability, and
universality of a sovereign notion of subjectivity for the sake of determining what we are
subject to and at what cost. He worked with the history of thought to make a coherent
understanding of ourselves complicated.

Foucault expanded the activity of critique to attend to the temporality in
knowledge. His methods examined what it is that we call a social construct. Once we
better understand its features and characteristics, how can we remake it, and if necessary
abandon it altogether. He never gave up on changing his thoughts, adjusting its means
and ends in relation to reality. “Against hermeneutics,” Besley and Peters (2007) noted,
“he argued the world had its own structure. Against structuralism, he argued the
materiality of linguistic practices constitute meaning. Against phenomenology, he
argued for the non-foundational historical construction of social phenomena” (p. 52). Foucault went beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, to reexamine what has become prominent in a culture. He challenged both individual and universal aspects of understanding ourselves to show that we are communal and subject to practices we engage with.

Patrice Maniglier (2013) noted Foucault’s archaeologies are attempts “to show that something—which is usually considered as timeless, inevitable, substantial, unquestionable—has in fact very precise historical conditions of possibility” (p. 104). To this degree archaeology is a method for uncovering contingency in practices, asking questions such as: during what historical time and based on what values did madness became a concern? And what empirical knowledge came to existence as a result of this concern? These questions are at the center of examining concepts and practices of knowledge, reason and power. Archaeology is a method that is not concerned with “contemplation” of concepts but with “undermining the foundation of pseudo-eternal concepts” by showing that concepts were not given (Maniglier, 2013, p. 104).

Where archaeology is an analysis of discourse to make apparent vulnerability in truth and knowledge, genealogy is an analysis of bodies in relation to social practice, a rethinking of power, and how power shapes the truth about subjectivity. Foucault (1994) disclosed he is “not developing a theory of power… [he is] working on the history, at a given moment, of the way reflexivity of self upon self is established, and the discourse of truth that is linked to it” (p. 129). He was concerned with the multiplicity in the way reflexivity of the self is established and can be reestablished. In this context, Foucault’s works are assessments of modern humanism, rather than an outright rejection of it. They
examine various forms of rationality to critique the modern understanding of individuals. “Foucault’s strategy,” Kelly (1994) noted, “is to argue that since forms of rationality have been made they can be unmade” (p. 373). The aim is not to arrive at a destination where struggles end, but where multiple rationalities emerge and gain legitimacy in a given culture.

Archaeology and genealogy are not separable from the art and literature in which Foucault immersed himself. His methods, as much as they are concerned with power and politics, are connected to art as a creative force that leads practice. Foucault explored the limit of experiences and transgressions articulated in the literary work of Antonin Artaud, Georges Bataille and Raymond Roussel. He also admired a generation of surrealist painters, writers and intellectuals. For example, he wrote a book on René Magritte's painting, *this is not a pipe*. Magritte’s painting of a pipe accompanies a text that tells us “this is not a pipe.” The negation in text is a possibility of re-representation of objects. Whatever we are looking at as the object of analysis is accompanied with a language that binds the object to a description. Words position interpretation from the angle through which we see objects and ourselves. The pipe and the image of the pipe are two different entities, but also the words affirming, negating and diverging from the image decentralize the observed. Foucault’s analysis brought attention to how the words and the images lack privileged status in forming a holistic understanding.

Foucault, too, was an artist. His works merged into the three domains of representation, re-representation and transformation of who we are. His methods questioned the stable images of the subject and rework the force of making a truth out of these images to highlight temporality in representations. He did so un-dogmatically and
humanly without humanizing. For example, Foucault’s image of man changed in his work. Foucault drew man as a subject, subjugated to discourses and knowledge that makes him/her an object of this knowledge. He pointed to the possibility of drawing different faces of man. Doing so, a possibility exists to problematize, rethink the assumptions about the self to self-correct. In this context, even though ethics and subjectivity became central concerns in later Foucault, these concerns existed in early thoughts that questioned what we do to the mad, sick and criminal; and how we shape ourselves as individuals and communities in practices of knowledge. Through these works, by looking at the history of experiences, Foucault encouraged the recognition of the many ways we view, present and represent ourselves. He cautioned us against the subject and object binary and advocated for seeing ourselves as beings that create their relationship to themselves.

In the later works, Foucault expanded and delimited his previous methods through re-describing the task of philosophy fitted for the present, voicing a concern for subjectivity and transformation. For example, in the last three lectures at the College de France, Foucault spoke of the role of philosophy in creating a mode of relationship persons practiced to conduct themselves before the emergence of moral codes in Christianity. During Antiquity and before the strengthening of the hermeneutic tradition, self-cultivation and self-examination were philosophical exercises that helped the individual to gain knowledge and apply this knowledge to life. This observation led Foucault (2011) to the study of “the constitution of oneself as ethical subject” where these exercises scaffold a modality of the “game of truth,” and “the courage to manifest the truth about oneself” (p. 339).
2.3 Critique

*I think that philosophy as ascesis, as critique, and as restive exteriority to politics is the mode of being of modern philosophy. It was, at any rate, the mode of being of ancient philosophy.* (Foucault, 2010, p. 354)

Philosophical critique, modern and ancient, is not only a systematic analysis of discourse, but also an exercise of the thinking subject. Foucault (2010) positioned philosophical critique as an activity exterior to politics and as an “exercise of the transformation of the subject by himself and of the subject by the other” (p. 353). Foucault’s (1997c) ethics disclosed a modality of relation through the definition he provided of critique as “a certain way of thinking, speaking and acting, a certain relationship to what exists, to what one knows, to what one does, a relationship to society, to culture and also a relationship to others that we could call, let’s say, the critical attitude” (p. 24). Critique then is more than an academic or scholarly posture or method, it is a certain way of being and a certain relationship to all that exists. Critique is the activity of social and personal transformation. Foucault (1988a) insisted, “criticism is absolutely indispensable for any transformation” (p. 155).

Foucault’s critical attitude developed along the lines of Kant’s critical philosophy toward the art of government in Enlightenment. However, Foucault (1997a), explicitly identified his critique with “an ethos”:

The critical ontology of ourselves must be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it must be conceive as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the
limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (p. 319)

In Foucault’s eyes, the “historical analysis of the limits” must be accompanied with “experiment[s]” in order to act on present limitations. Critique is then an ethical experimentation of what one encounters in oneself and its relationships. Foucault (2010) argued philosophy, modern and ancient, is a practice of critique: “a practice which tests its reality in its relationships” (p. 353). Critique is “an ethos” concerned with what we are and what we do in our life.

Critique sustained itself as a methodological tool in Foucault’s works as a result of perceiving Enlightenment a historical period that played a dual task of freeing and binding the individual to power relations. Foucault (1988b) found that the concerns of Enlightenment are with us today, by noting “the technologies of the self” and the technologies of the government “become one of the poles of modern philosophy” (p. 145). In this relation, Foucault found the Kantian question, “What are we today?” an important critical and ontological question. Foucault (2010) spent a considerable time with Kant’s (1784) text, Was ist Aufklärung? (What is Enlightenment?) (p. 7). It is a text where Kant emphasized the use of private reason. Foucault (2010) explored this text from two aspects. First, it addressed what is “the present as a philosophical event to which the philosopher who speaks of it belongs” (p. 12). In this manner, philosophical questioning itself is aware of its own present reality. Second, according to Foucault (2010), Kant’s text raises an ancient question of “what model of life to follow?” (p. 13). In this context, a polarity between Antiquity and modernity is established that can question the present values in comparison to the past. For Foucault (2010), “the question
of modernity arose with the question of what authority was to be accepted and the
question of the evaluation or comparison of values in this polarity of Antiquity and
modernity” (p. 13).

According to Foucault (1988a), Kant’s reflection on Enlightenment is
demonstrative in that the “philosopher can no longer avoid the question of the specific
way in which he belongs” to a “cultural totality characteristic” of his time and
“philosophy as the problematization of a present … characterize[s] philosophy as the
discourse of modernity on modernity” (p. 88). The French revolution occurred when
sensitivity to thinking allowed for the rise of certain questions to problematize the
country’s present and created a new mode of public participation in France. In this line,
Foucault (1988a) found the concern of “contemporary philosophy” under the influence of
Kant’s question: “what is the present field of possible experiences? This is not an
analytics of truth; it will concern what might be called an ontology of the present, an
ontology of ourselves…” an important question posed to modernity (p. 95). In relation to
Kant’s text, Foucault was interrogating the limits of experience and expanding the
techniques that individuals adopt to form themselves. From 1978 and onward,
Foucault’s lectures take the problem of government from a positive angle to include the
conduct of individuals. The attention to the conduct of persons helped Foucault to object
to the governing technologies, and stress the activities the subjects take to form
themselves, and deform the political power (McGushin, 2007).

Foucault’s (1997a) return to Antiquity occurs in the context of the Kantian
question of our present, reminding us in “Greek ethics people were concerned with their
moral conduct, their ethics, their relations to themselves and to others” (p. 255). This
concern for “relations” guides us to conduct ourselves by relying on “both a political and moral attitude” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 45). The reading of Antiquity is looking beyond the formation of moral codes in Christianity, triumph of reason in Enlightenment, and political power of liberalism and neoliberalism, to resituate philosophy as a critical practice upon the self. The question of the present is put against and along Socrates’ dialogues, *Alcibiades, Laches* and *Apology*, to revisit the role of philosophy as critique. This situates Kant’s question of the present with a focus on how we should constitute ourselves. Foucault (2007a) distinguished his position from Kant’s, thusly, critique is “[n]ot a critical philosophy that seeks to determine the condition and the limits of our possible knowledge of the object, but a critical philosophy that seeks the condition and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, transforming ourselves” (pp. 152-153). Critique is an attitude and activity of transforming the subject. Foucault followed Kant, but contested to Kant’s deontological ethics that binds us to our duties. In Antiquity, Foucault was seeking an ethics of self-transformation.

For Foucault (1997c), “[t]here is something in critique which is akin to virtue” (p. 25). By emphasizing ethics as a relationship to oneself, a critique that begins with oneself, he did not explicate a set of virtues, but highlighted the role of practices, askesis, that assisted self-formation of ethical subjects. Through this lens, Foucault expanded and diverged from the Kantian critique by focusing on philosophical ethos and positively positioning critique as the activity and attitude of the subject. Foucault (1997a) stressed that “we must obviously give a more positive content to what may be a philosophical ethos consisting in a critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing, through a historical ontology of ourselves” (p. 315). By relying on a historical ontology, his
critique is positively associated with the activity of reforming the way we relate to contemporary reality.

Foucault’s critical attitude questions what makes it possible for some specific ways of being to exist and to prevent other forms of becoming in the present. Foucault (1997a) introduced “a practical critique” that helps us question the ways we “constitute ourselves”:

criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search of formal structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making metaphysics possible; it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. (p. 315)

By reflecting on what we do, think and say, Foucault separated his critique from Kant’s transcendental critique. By bringing the genealogical and archaeological methods together, he invited his readers to conceive critique as a patient labor, asking for a reading of his efforts in archaeology and genealogy as part of the philosophical attitude and activity of restructuring the accepted norms. In Foucault’s (1997a) critique, philosophical attitude “has to define the forms in which the relationship to self may possibly be transformed” (p. 319). He was exemplary of this philosophical attitude, demonstrating publicly a transformation of himself in his scholarly activities.

Foucault’s critique transformed the Kant’s transcendental critique in order to make visible a historical critique of the present (Koopman, 2013, p. 212). Foucault (1997c) advocated for a historical inquiry that proposed a “definition of critique, the
general characterization: the art of not being governed *quite so much*” (p. 29, italics added). This way, ethical subjects can pose questions to their relations, alter their way of being and therefore establish different possibilities. In this context, Foucault (2011) expanded the question of “What is the present field of our experiences?” to “what is the present field of possible experiences?” (p. 20). In Foucault’s early and later critiques, he worked to accompany the knowledge of the self with the experiences of the self. Experience is the returning theme in Foucault’s critique and investigation of knowledge.

In an interview Foucault (1988a) noted:

> Knowledge can do nothing for transforming the world…. And I am sure I am wrong from a theoretical point of view for I know very well that knowledge has transformed the world. But …. I have the feeling knowledge can’t do anything for us and that political power may destroy us. All the knowledge in the world can’t do anything against that. (p. 14)

Foucault was not negligent of knowledge-based approaches as he admitted, “knowledge has transformed the world.” His effort was to make visible the effect of knowledge without critique; that it, at times, subjugates the subjects to political power. Critique in Foucault’s (2007a) view explored “how not to be governed *like that*, by that, in that name of those principles, with such and such objective in mind and by means of such procedure, not like that, not for that, not by them” (p. 28). Thus, critique helps each person to explore the possibilities to govern herself in a given context.

For Foucault (1988b), the techniques of self-governance leads to “another field of questions … the way by which, through some political technology of individuals, we have been led to recognize ourselves as a society, as a part of social entity, as a part of
nations or of a state” (p. 146). These questions brought forth the problem of the art of government, the emergence of the political economy, and interconnected web of power relations shaping modern thinking. However, by emphasizing the importance of personal conduct he brought attention to individuals’ power to transform themselves as ethical subjects. Foucault (1988b) insisted that his aim has not been to situate the subject as “a by-product” of a system but to search for the possibility of “a historical change in the relations between power and individuals” (p. 156).

“Change” is a possibility in the critical attitude of the “care of the self” as an ethical work to reposition our relation to ourselves. This change counters the normalizing grip of power by attending to experiences of how we come to know ourselves as individuals. It perhaps binds us to different exercises of power. The aim of critique in Antiquity, according to Foucault (1997c), was for “each individual, whatever his age or status, from the beginning to the end of his life and in his every action, had to be governed and had to let himself be governed” (p. 26). In this context, Foucault (2003) found critique essential as both an attitude and practice that “does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the way they are ... To do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy” (p. 172).

Foucault’s “practical critique” assists to question the ways we constitute ourselves by assessing how we govern ourselves as educational subjects inside and outside of schools. As “a philosophical ethos” that examines how we live, critique provides the framework of examination of experiences we take upon ourselves to form ourselves inside and outside of institutionalized schooling. It asks what is practiced in schools, what is privileged and what is silenced. This critical attitude assists
transformation of the present way of understanding ourselves in educational ethics and broadens the discourse of subjectivity in education. The next chapter addresses Foucault’s contribution to present educational ethics.
Chapter 3: Present Educational Ethics

The care for self implies also a relationship to the other to the extent that, in order to really care for self, one must listen to the teachings of a master. (Foucault, 1987, p. 118)

Foucault’s ethics explored how the relationship of the self implies a relationship to the other by attending to the teachings available. The implications of Foucault’s thoughts in education become more evident by reading his work along with contemporary theorists in education. Foucault’s ethics may contribute and advance educational ethics, if we were to take critique as “a certain way of thinking, speaking and acting, a certain relationship to what exists” in the present (Foucault, 1997c, p. 24). In this context, Foucault (2005) highlighted that the “care of the self” began in Socrates’ dialogues and “practice of philosophy” as a response to the “criticism” of “Athenian education” and its “lack of a strong, well regulated, and effective institution of passage from adolescence to adulthood” (p. 87). Contemporary education also faces concerns regarding the young and their participation in and transition to civic life. Among contemporary educational theorists, John Dewey (1965 & 2004) and Nel Noddings (2002 & 2005) are known globally for their works on educational ethics. Dewey’s attention to experience and Noddings’ attention to caring relationships complement Foucault’s care of the self. For this reason, they provide a frame for understanding what inspires educational theory in the present.

This chapter begins with Dewey’s (2004) challenge to the traditional conceptions of learning. I also highlight the transition in Dewey’s ethics from his early writings to his later writings with his growing emphasis on experience. Dewey’s philosophy of education aimed at broadening the horizons of educational ethics and attended to
individual growth in the context of the society. The second section focuses on Noddings’ (2010) destabilization of the male-centered understanding of morality by reminding educators of the importance of caring relations. Foucault’s thoughts are juxtaposed throughout the chapter not as solutions, but to provide an avenue of reflection on educational ethics. This juxtaposition highlights how Foucault’s approach to subjectivity can provide an additional perspective to education ethics. It also highlights how Dewey and Noddings can complement Foucault’s ethics.

3.1 Dewey’s Experiential Ethic

The scholarship of educational philosopher John Dewey advocated for changing the model of education that kept its participants at a distance. The participatory model of education that Dewey imagined for the future has made an immeasurable contribution to present education. It has reconstructed an orientation to active participation in education within the context of socialization that is sensitive to each individual’s growth. The limited focus on Dewey in this paper is on the notion of experience in his educational ethics. Although at times misappropriated, Dewey’s pragmatism brought hope for action and has created change in education. When accompanied with a cultural critique, his thinking assists learners and teachers with an active frame for participation in educational practices. Dewey’s efforts have assisted in the rethinking educational ethics given the inclusion of the experience of its participants, while moving away from disengagement.

Dewey and Foucault are similar in their focus, since both scholars contributed to understandings of aesthetics, inquiry, experience, democracy and freedom (May, 2011). Both scholars “agreed that thinking arose in the context of problems” and “the stakes involved something experiential and entailed a form of logic, in which the thinker could
not help but be involved” (Rabinow, 2011, p. 11). Dewey’s commitment to democracy and philosophy, Rocha (2012) noted, grew as a result of his concern for education and social life. In this context, Foucault also turns to philosophy as a practice of changing personal and social life. On the other hand, “Foucault's pragmatism does not focus on what works, but instead utilizes the concept of practices as a unit of analysis, and then asks how they work,” May (2011) noted, and “[t]his reintroduces a political element that sometimes goes missing in pragmatist thought” (p. 54).

In early writings, Dewey’s ethical imagination was in search of ideals for individuals in their social context. Dewey (1969) noted, “the best test of any form of society is the ideal which it proposes for the forms of its life, and the degree in which it realizes this ideal” (p. 249). Although in his later writings, Dewey moved away and became even hostile to idealism, naturalism persisted in his thinking. Dewey (2009) explained “[m]oral conceptions and processes grow naturally out of the very conditions of human life” (p. 354). In practice this naturalism took on an instrumentalist stance, where theories are tools to lead to further inquiry (Burke, 2013). Although, Dewey’s empirical naturalism is complex and orients to the conception of growth, the history of ethics has suffered from a simplistic naturalistic approach to bodies. Natural separations can be grounded based on observations of differences then these differences articulate and operate a set of ideals for individuals.

On the other hand, Dewey’s (1965) naturalism in his concept of “growth” was expansive since it brought attention to “many directions of experience” and acknowledged intentionality (p. 36). Dewey’s attention to growth in the educational context brought attention to the struggle of seeking different conditions for human life
and the possibilities made available in different forms of interactions. It also advocated that we must question the conditions of what we find natural when we lose sight of reconstructive effort. Foucault (1997b) stated this concern clearly a few decades after Dewey:

If you say that a certain human nature exists, that this human nature has not been given in actual society the rights and the possibilities, which allow it to realize itself…. And if one admits that, doesn’t one risk defining this human nature—which is at the same time ideal and real. (pp. 131-132)

Dewey was careful to not define human nature. On the other hand, with his commitment to social ideals the individual at times disappeared in early writings. For example, Dewey (1969) stressed: “The organism manifests itself as what it truly is, an ideal or spiritual life, [and] a unity of will. If then society and the individual are really organic to each other then the individual is society concentrated” (p. 237). It is evident that early Dewey viewed the individual as an organic part of society. This neglects, to some extent, the individuals who object to being seen as a product of society and knowingly or unknowingly deviate, rebel, undermine and recreate themselves and the society.

Similarly, Foucault’s early writings too gave a hint that individuals are the product of practices, rather than practitioners of change. In “Dewey’s ethics what is good for society is the good for the individual. On the contrary, he claims that morals are personal because they spring from personal insight, judgment, and choice and his normative moral vision is based on a faith in individual” (Pappas, 2008, p. 84).

As a result of Dewey’s attention to experience, his later works underlined a concern for democracy and an expression of subjectivity in social life. Dewey’s (2004)
attention to experience highlighted his efforts to reconstruct the role of education as a social and personal process that cannot be reduced to a normative activity. “Education,” Dewey (2004) insisted, “means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age” (p. 50). Growth was never an individualistic aspect of experience in Dewey’s view; rather it was social and dependent on others. Furthermore, “the ideal of growth” allowed Dewey (2004) to reimagine the task and the process of education as “a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience” (p. 73). In democratization of education, “as the continuous reconstruction of experience,” Dewey (2004) brought the self and society closer (p. 78). Pinar (2012) stressed, Dewey showed that education and society are “inextricably linked not only together but [also] to the psycho-social and intellectual lives of children” (p. 166). Dewey’s effort in rethinking experience aimed to reconstruct democracy inside and outside of schools.

When the individual is viewed in the context of aesthetic experience, Dewey (1980) sought a unity of experience that goes beyond societal concentration. In this context Dewey noted, “[e]xperience in the degree in which it is experience is heightened vitality. Instead of signifying, being shut up within one’s own private feeling and sensations, it signifies active and alert commerce with the world” (p. 18). Dewey (1980) insisted “experience is the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things…” (p. 19). Experience in Dewey’s aesthetics, similar to Foucault, is conceptualized as inseparable from political practice, concerned with conditions of life. Dewey’s “aesthetic experience,” Jay (2005) noted, can be seen as the “displacement” of politics by turning to imagination (p. 167).
Dewey (1965) saw experience as dependent on the criteria of continuity and interaction. The criterion of continuity meant “that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after” (p. 35). And within this continuity, Dewey (1965) pointed at the multidimensionality of growth “physically,” “intellectually and morally” (p. 36). The second criterion of experience is interaction as the activity of experimenting and interpreting what takes place in the environment. Interactions, emphasized Dewey, situate the individual in transaction with a social world that provides the reflexive conceptions of experience. The criteria of experience and situating persons in their social context allowed Dewey to push the boundaries of the private and public.

Similar to Foucault’s attention to practices, Dewey’s attention to experience was a leap to the greater context of socio-politics. Rorty (1982) saw Dewey and Foucault as “saying the same thing but putting a different spin upon it” (p. 205). Marshall (1995) disagreed and argued that Foucault and Dewey have radical differences in their approach and methodologies to social sciences and, hence, they speak of different visions and hope for the future. Unlike Dewey, Foucault argued “theory is always local and related to a limited field and cannot be totalized because even in its limited field of application it runs into walls or blocks which require another type of discourse” (Marshall, 1995, p. 141). The question of similarities and differences between Dewey and Foucault cannot be easily settled since they each lived in a different culture, place and time. However, Foucault’s ethics, with its attention to limit experiences, can act as supplementary to Dewey’s visions by highlighting the possibility of transformation. Foucault (2000) defined limit experiences, as experiences “through which the subject escapes from itself”
Limit experiences free the subject from formulated postulates. By changing the knowledge we have about ourselves limit experiences transform the relationships we have toward ourselves (Foucault, 2000).

Foucault moved beyond learning from experience to suggest that experience provides the limits and transgressions. This view emphasized a sense of entanglement and singularity with experience. In Foucault’s view, early experiences provide us with a possibility of self-creation and self-reformation. This way, change is a characteristic of the self that may comprehend or may not comprehend experiences. Instead of accepting transcendence as a given feature of experience, Foucault focused on how experience transforms the subject. With his suspicions of a given knowledge, Foucault made visible the contingencies that disrupt the normative and natural progression of ideals in history and the possibility of changing ourselves.

Rabinow (2011), who worked closely with Foucault, located the similarities and differences between Foucault and Dewey as the attempt to reconstruct ethics:

Foucault was not so far from Dewey’s general formulations of the relations of problems and thinking except that Foucault was not in search of a general formulation; quite the contrary. Foucault was in search of an anthropology of sorts; one in which anthropos was that being, whose constant quest was to invent forms in which logos and ethos could be made to meet the demands of the day. (p. 16)

Foucault, with his attention to knowledge, investigated the reconstruction of logos, the rational principles, to reform ethos, the moral character. Furthermore, by rejecting a general formulation, Foucault’s (1997a) ethics inverted the question of what part of one’s
self should one renounce in order to behave rationally, to “the opposite question: How have certain kinds of interdictions become the price required for attaining certain kinds of knowledge [savoir] about oneself? What must one know about oneself in order to be willing to renounce anything?” (p. 224). By proposing questions that have persisted in the history of the West, Foucault offered different directions to modern ethics. As a result, Foucault (2005) “arrived at the hermeneutics of the technologies of the self,” a body of practices that were never “organized into a body of doctrine like textual hermeneutics” (p. 15). This led to the conceptualization of ethics as the practice of the self upon itself, where philosophy and spirituality together lead to “transformation… in order to have access to truth,” rather than assuming truth is already inherent part of either the individual or society (Foucault, 2005, p. 15). With its attention to transformation, Foucault’s ethics can enhance the theory of experience proposed by Dewey.

Dewey’s orientation to imagining a different future made him the champion of democracy in modern education. “Dewey’s attention to education as essential to the achievement of a true democracy” is evident in his work, “[w]ithout a doubt, democracy in the United States, in this ideal sense, is practiced in a crippled manner, at best, and at worst, not at all” (Burke, 2013, p. 140). Pinar (2011) also noted, “Dewey’s coupling of democracy and education has been superseded by the fusion of business and schooling” (p. 9). As a result of this fusion, it was not only Dewey’s works but also pragmatism as a philosophical tradition that needed to be assessed. Cornel West (1999) suggested that “pragmatism is in need of a mode of cultural criticism that keeps track of social misery, solicits and channels moral outrage to alleviate it, and projects a future in which the potentialities of ordinary people flourish and flower” (p. 187).
Cultural criticism, questions society as a given to create different modes of participation in education. By examining the moral and political practices, critique enables an understanding of our activities as learners in the age of corporate liberalism. In his 1935 essay, “Liberalism and Social Action,” Dewey (2008) argued for such a cultural criticism. He warned against corporate liberalism and economic forces in directing the liberty of individuals. Similar to Foucault, Dewey’s (2008) critique was directed towards Jeremy Bentham’s calculated approach to morals, and the view Bentham held “that all organized action is to be judged by its consequences” (p. 14). However, Dewey’s warning was not heard. In this context, West (1999) argued “the first wave of pragmatism foundered on the rocks of cultural conservatism and corporate liberalism. Its defeat was tragic. Let us not permit the second wave of pragmatism to end as farce” (p. 187).

Koopman’s (2009) “transitional pragmatism” is active in addressing this concern by bringing William James, John Dewey (the first wave) and Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam (the second wave) together. Koopman (2009) uncoupled the first wave of pragmatism from its Kantian transcendentalism and analytic naturalism and recuperated the second wave from linguistic entanglement. He did so by following West’s (1999) suggestion and introducing a cultural-critique to pragmatism. Koopman (2009) resorted to Foucault’s genealogy, critique and problematization to formulate what it takes for pragmatisms to survive. In Koopman’s (2009) view, both philosophical approaches mutually need each other: “Pragmatism without genealogy has nothing to do, no work to perform, no problem to solve. Genealogy without pragmatism will saddle us with insoluble problems, not get us further, and accomplish very little” (p. 232).
Koopman (2009) relied on Foucault’s approach to assist pragmatism to address the complexity of relationships and power. The only limits in Koopman’s efforts may have been that in saving American pragmatism, he was abandoning the aim of European genealogy. As Koopman (2013) acknowledged, genealogy’s concerns are different from solving problems. Genealogy assists us with making problems. It makes problems out of practices that were not recognized as problems. Genealogy is the attempt to listen to history, as Foucault (1984) argued, to understand how certain solutions become grand theories. Pragmatism, on the other hand, as expressed by Koopman (2009, p. 232; 2013, p. 242) tries to “solve” problems. As long as pragmatism does not pose grand theories in solving problems, Foucault’s thoughts are supplementary to pragmatism. Koopman (2009) made this evident. One caution, however, is that since American pragmatism and continental genealogy take different routes, it is possible they may each lead us to different formulations and presentations of truth.

3.2 Relational Ethics

In the early 1980s, when Foucault was lecturing on ethics, Noddings was in the process of conceptualizing relational ethics as a response to a male-centered theory of moral development posed by the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. Following the works of the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget (1932), Kohlberg provided a stage theory of the development of moral reasoning in children (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983). Kohlberg (1974) formulated that moral development progresses through stages from: (1) an obedience and punishment orientation to authority, to (2) maintaining social-order to (3) an understanding of universal ethical principles. Kohlberg’s (1974) formulation of moral development outlined the stages in which reason matures in understanding its
relations to make moral decisions based on universal principles. However, Kohlberg’s theory left behind the significance of relationships in the development of moral reasoning.

In his research, Kohlberg took for granted that his construct of moral development valued the male perspective and neglected the female relational approach to moral and social dilemmas. Carol Gilligan (1982), Kohlberg’s strong opponent, argued Kohlberg’s theory and research perpetuated male-centered values, by neglecting the importance of relationships. Gilligan, in her critique of Kohlberg, encouraged understanding of gender differences between boys and girls in their approach to ethical dilemmas. She emphasized that girls approach moral dilemmas by an attention to relationships and social context. Noddings (2003), similar to Gilligan, began her works with the recognition of relationships. Noddings approached morality with an emphasis on caring and receptivity.

Noddings’ (2010) approach to ethics considered the maternal factor while addressing the importance of caring relationships over the lifespan. Her ethics decentralized moral universals and attended to the relations of participants. Noddings (2006), too, engaged with Socrates’ philosophical advice of self-understanding and self-examination, stating, “that the unexamined life is not worth living” (p. 10). However, Noddings’ notion of caring did not begin with Socrates or the Greeks. Noddings’ (2010) ethics of care began by “exploring a path to morality rooted in maternal caring” and she suggested that “we must look at instinctive caring, natural caring, and ethical caring” to better understand relational ethics (p. 33). This contribution to ethics is timely. It
emphasizes the importance of our interdependency to one another. It offers both a personal and a relational approach to morality.

In relational ethics the roots of moral life are traced to maternal instincts and the universal need of human babies for a caregiver. Noddings (2012) acknowledged the “language of care ethics has arisen largely from women’s experience, but that is not to say that it is not accessible to men” (p. 53). Noddings’ (2010) theoretical stand is distant from biological reductionism noting males too have become “invested in the lives of their offspring” (p. 15). For Noddings (2012), “the words care, attention, empathy, response, reciprocity, and receptivity all have special meaning in care ethics, and caring—far more than a fuzzy feeling—is a moral way of life” (p. 53). This “moral way of life,” if adopted, can schematically change our understanding and practice of how we care for each other in all levels of social structure. However, in Noddings’ (2002) view, caring practices start in small social settings such as at home and classrooms and then expand to greater social structures.

Starting from home, Noddings’ ethics is concerned with the relation between individuals, as well as individuals’ as moral subjects. In her analysis, caring is phenomenological and works based on an attention to the other (Noddings, 2002). This phenomenological stand works to critique a modern approach to solving moral dilemmas solely based on the ability of actors to reason. This critique is directed at Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning and his assumption that the endpoint of development is in rationality and the application of universal principles. Noddings (2010) clarified, “although reason is certainly necessary in the moral domain, it does not have to be reasoning on stated principles, and emotions also have a place in discussion of morality”
(p. 23). By emphasizing caring rooted in personal relations, Noddings’ moral education enables human liberation and social justice takes place through caring relationships in communities (Bergman, 2004).

Going beyond natural caring, Noddings (2003) argued the “obligation of educators, inside and outside formal schooling is to nurture the ethical ideals of those with whom they come in contact” (p. 49). The attention to nurturing constitutes moral subjects as those that are in relation with others and are responsible to care for others. Meanwhile, relational ethics acknowledges the complexity in relations:

- There is no intention to have anyone go through life as carer while others happily accept the role of cared-for. Carer and cared-for are not permanent labels but names for roles accepted in encounters. The issue is complicated, however, in unequal relationships such as parent-young child, teacher-student, and nurse-patient. In all of these relations, only one person can really serve as carer. Reciprocity is then almost entirely defined by the cared-for's response of recognition. (Noddings, 2012, p. 53)

As Noddings noted caring becomes “complicated” in “unequal relationships.” However, the carer relies on the “cared-for's response.” In relational ethics, recognition is more than a criterion or a cognitive calculation. It is a dialogic interaction. Noddings (1991) noted to care, “is not to act by rule but by affection and regard” (p. 52). At the same time, one cares because she/he takes the position to care; this is a pragmatic and practical view of caring, that if it did not exist, schools as educational environments would not serve their purpose.
Noddings (1991) was cognizant of the positions of actors and directionality of care in unequal relationships, such as student and teacher, and acknowledged that at times it may not be clear to the teachers whether they are “helping or hindering” their students (p. 51). She also acknowledged that unequal relationships are complicated when one exercises more power in making decisions by virtue of being contextually bound to care for others. However, Noddings (1991) noted these “relation[s] need not be one of interference and control” (p. 51). Caring ethics is concerned with “receiving the other,” rather than imposing limits: “If I care, I must consider the cared-for’s nature, his way of life, needs and desires” (Noddings, 1991, p. 45). With an attention to the other, relational ethics is inter-personal and inter-subjective.

In relational ethics, both parties are active. For example, the cared-for is an active participant in rejecting and/or accepting care in one way and asking for care in another way. The cared-for can also recognize care and, yet, choose to do otherwise. In this view, recognition at times includes a space for action and reversibility of the directionality of care. For example, when students or children recognize the efforts of the caregiver, through behaviors and intentional gestures, they demonstrate they are engaged in receiving the other. In Noddings’ (1995) theory, recognition is accompanied by the “criterion of engrossment” (p. 191). Engrossment takes place when recognition, attention and care are accomplished using a dialogue. Dialogue does not guarantee understanding the other; rather it helps us to work towards attending to the other for “a common understanding, empathy or appreciation… to guide our responses” (Noddings, 2005, p. 23).
Natural caring is a moral attitude and practice that turns away from an individualistic approach to morality and judging moral actions. Noddings (2002) opposed the Kantian ethical “logic” conceptualized as “a categorical imperative” (p. 30). By adopting ethical ideals based on character, she stressed the importance of caring. By emphasizing relationality, she objected to evaluating motivations in moral actions. Although she began with asymmetrical relations, Noddings’ theory included the effect on the recipient of care, and diverged from codification of morality based on a set of rigid principles. Noddings’s caring theory surfaced the importance of associations and positive attention in ethics. Caring is a process of becoming where relationships are equal, unequal, and not disclosed, but uttered and enacted at times buried in temporality. This enables agency, a capacity to exercise oneself in a given context, in children and students to be cared for, to rebel, even not recognize care at times and always remain worthy of care.

While “[c]aring is a way of being in relation, not a set of specific behaviors” (Noddings, 2005, p. 17), relations enact specific responses as activities that gauge caring. To some degree our experiences of who we are impose boundaries in the ways we take care of others, how others take care of us. Noddings (2002) clarified that the move toward natural caring, where inclination to care exists, requires active “sensitive cultivation” (p. 29). This sensitive cultivation, accompanied by recognition and reception of others, becomes complicated in the social structures that retain the male-dominated conceptions of what should be of value. Pinar (1991) highlighted the significance of gender in Noddings’ caring approach by noting, where “male makes virtue out of necessity” (p. 58), female’s “caring is at heart something added on” rooted
in experience (p. 59). In relational care, gender “differences go beyond socialization” Noddings (2010) noted, “and at least some can be traced to biological evolution” (p. 25).

Noddings’ efforts widened our understandings of the care that is needed to survive and to educate. Her theory moved beyond a mechanistic view of moral education that can be transmitted and evaluated. Instead, caring is embodied and practiced by people in their relations with others. Though Noddings’ care takes place in small communities, these small communities are contextualized on a national scale in interactions with other institutions. Noddings’ relational ethics works from the individuals to reconstruct institutionalized caring, where caring, to some degree, has become subject to the politics of schooling. For example, policies such as “No Child Left Behind” and “Race to the Top” demonstrate an expression of “care” that foster entrepreneurship values in education and neglect Noddings’ ethics of caring. This political force in education has direct influence on relationships and the development of the moral subjects.

In the context of policies that perpetuate individualism in morality, Noddings’ (2010) ethics of care can assist in reexamining the assumptions about individual autonomy (p. 100). By highlighting that autonomy is constrained, limited and vulnerable to its relationality to a place and history, it becomes possible to examine the recognition of care in current culture toward oneself and others. The inclusion of a self-care ethics aids in the recognition of power relations and assists in questioning what is taken to be natural and obligatory in ethics. In light of Noddings’ (2002) relational ethics, De Marzio (2006) argued for the inclusion of caring for oneself in educational ethics to assist self-cultivation in caring relationships. Foucault’s ethic of the “care of the self” aids both
educators and students in this context. By attending to how we take care of ourselves and become other to ourselves, Foucault’s works discern the constraints of autonomy in those who care and those in dialogue with their caregivers.

Foucault and Noddings share the similarity of moving away from deontological and utilitarian assumptions about moral subjects. Similar to Noddings, Foucault also expresses ethics as a way of life. For both scholars, ethics is not a body of codes, standards, norms and behaviors. Moral acts are rooted in relationships. Through this lens the differences between the two scholars become smaller, but some differences persist. Noddings’ ethics rooted in “[w]omen’s understanding of caring is different from the Greco-Roman ethics of self in that the differences with the self and between self and other are not objectified for the sake of self-mastery,” Wang (2004) noted, the “relationships, imbued with emotion, become one central thread to undo the masculine model of rational self-mastery” (p. 42). Compared to Noddings’ ethics with its reliance on the relation of individuals to each other, Foucault’s ethics relies on the labour of individuals on themselves. The roots of Foucault’s (1997a) ethics rest in a concern for practices with a purpose “of the transformation of truth into ethos” (p. 209). By attending to the formation of the moral subjects, Foucault studied how we are constituted in our relations with others and ourselves.

The difference between Foucault and Noddings is apparent in assessing how each view the formation of ethical selves. Foucault’s notion of the self is in flux and attentive to the experience of transformation. Foucault (1988b) proposed “[t]he main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning” (p. 9). This nominalist view of the self is deconstructive of the essentialism of the “self” as the object
of care, and constructive of possibilities of experiencing the self differently. Noddings, similar to Foucault, adopted a non-essentialist view of the self in her moral theory. However, for Noddings (2005) “self” comes about “in ways we judge” each other (p. 25). This is not far from Foucault’s construct of the self in his early works. Unlike Foucault, Noddings sees this positively through a window of caring where power and control dissolve to receive the other. Foucault abandoned his early position. The implication of claiming the self as not solely a substance, but also a form, leads Foucault to attend to the process of reformation in oneself in a given culture. This creative self is concerned with how different experiences lead to different ways of approaching knowledge.

Foucault’s ethics imagined that the “self/other relationship can be transformed into a subject/subject relationship,” Wang (2004) noted, “[f]or Foucault, care for others is already implied in care of the self” (p. 43). With an aim to reconstruct the moral and political exercises, Foucault’s ethics begins with the relationship to oneself. Pragmatically for education, “the care for others depends on the care for the self” (Wang, 2004, p. 37). De Marzio (2006) suggested as a result of this attention to self-development, Foucault underlined that “we can begin to retrieve the notion of care of the self as an aim of ethics education” (p. 125). It must be noted that, Foucault’s self-care ethics follows Socrates’ method of caring exercised in a dialogue with others. The cautionary offered from Foucault calls attention to the other that is not othering, identifying differences, for exclusion and silence.

Despite the differences and similarities in their approaches to ethics, Foucault and Noddings meet in their thinking of finding morality and politics together. For example,
the importance of practice and critique as it stood for Foucault is embedded in Noddings’ theoretical frame. Noddings showed us that thinking clearly about care is always in relation to the greater context of a place and culture. “Care” is more than a philosophy that is teachable for Noddings (2005), it is what we all do, some better than others and some more attentively than others. Some of us are born in homes where natural caring is available and we become active participants in it, while others must learn it. Our life experiences include both care and the abandonment of care. The hope is in finding a modality of care in schools where we are apprentices of a caring ethics and also learn from those who do not solely deliver care but demonstrate it in the way they live.

Along with Noddings’ relational ethics in receiving the other, Foucault’s ethics introduced a personal self-examination of how we should treat ourselves. His ethics encouraged taking responsibility to treat one another with care with respect for freedom. Foucault (1987) insisted, “[c]are for self is ethical in itself, but it implies complex relations with others, in the measure where this ethos of freedom is also a way of caring for others” (p. 118). This care is accompanied with curiosity and provides a framework of approaching ethics from multiple avenues of how we come to know ourselves as caring moral subjects. Adopting Foucault, along with Noddings, it becomes possible to examine the present conditions of how in general we learn to care for others and ourselves. This calls for an additional care in our conduct as ethical practitioners. This way caring for others is applied to ourselves.

The first section demonstrated Dewey’s objection to utilitarian ethics by focusing on experience. The second section highlighted Noddings’ effort in destabilizing understanding educational ethics as a body of codes and responsibilities. Noddings
(2010) acknowledged that virtue ethics and care ethics share a common characteristic by focusing on “moral agents,” but noted that “relation is clearly prior to virtue” in care ethics (p. 125). Foucault agreed with Noddings that duties and principles provide a limited understanding of the way moral subjects enact themselves. He however, began his relational ethics with a relationship with oneself. He also agreed with Dewey that utilitarian and calculated ethics provide a limited perception of ethical projects. By examining the moral relations subjects enact towards each other and also themselves, Foucault’s moral and political ethics supplements educational ethics with its attention to experience and relationships.
Chapter 4: Archaeology and Genealogy

All the practices by which the subject is defined and transformed are accompanied by the formation of certain types of knowledge, and in the West, for a variety of reasons, knowledge tends to be organized around forms of norms that are more or less scientific. (Foucault, 2007a, p. 151)

A review of Foucault’s early writings and public involvement as a philosopher activist demonstrates his concern with the constitution of the subject was present from the beginning of his works. His archaeologies, examined the role of scientific knowledge, and how its forms shape the relations and practices of modern selves. Examining the role of discourses he was led to the study of how certain types of knowledge transfigure social practices. Through, genealogies, Foucault examined the role of social apparatus, a set of strategies supported by knowledge, in conducting the physical body. Foucault (2007a) “tried to get out from the philosophy of the subject through a genealogy of this subject, by studying the constitution of the subject across history which has led us up to the modern concept of the self” (p. 150). Reviewing his works, it becomes evident that philosophy was not solely a thought experiment for Foucault, but was an active involvement with experience that also led to transformation of its subject, Foucault himself.

Foucault’s archaeologies and genealogies provide a context for understanding his later ethical concerns. This chapter begins by exploring Foucault’s (1965) study of the relationship of reason to madness from the Middle Ages to the present. Addressing the role of social structure in determining madness provides an opening for an examination of epistemic discourses in Foucault’s archaeologies. These works are the subject of the
second section. What follows next is Foucault’s attention to bodies and their conduct in genealogical works that aim to address the productive nature of knowledge and power. These works attend to the unobtrusive techniques of government. The move from discursive practices to non-discursive practices explores how power and knowledge constitute each other in their production of truth. Whether it is epistemic discourses or apparatuses of power, this chapter shows that Foucault’s questioning of the formation of the modern understanding of the subject and power destabilizes values and norms taken for granted in a given culture.

4.1 Madness and Reason

Foucault’s historicism turned to experience to challenge the notion of reason as timeless and history as progression. This way of looking at history questions practices to discover parts of the culture that are silent. Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization* (1965) was an analysis of the history of the experience of madness as the product of social factors. It begins with a description of leper houses in the Middle Ages in Europe. What is present is the “twin theme of spatial exclusion and cultural integration which structure all of *Madness and Civilization*” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 3). By examining the historical discontinuity in social changes Foucault showed how the relation of reason to madness changes at different times in history and how this relation made something different of madness at different times. It was changes in reason that sent madness to different lands; meanwhile reason marked its territory. The “ship of fools” sailed through the lands of reason, from one destination off to another. The ship saved the mad from drowning, but pushed them further away from the lands of reason.
Foucault traced madness from the time when it was public and present everywhere to modern medical treatments. Madness is that "fascination of man" that has led to establishing places such as "hospitals, prisons, [and] jails" for confinement and the taming of the “passions” (Foucault, 1965, p. 24). It is reason that takes care of madness in silence. It takes care of itself through dividing and multiplying practices. The movement of reason is admittedly framed in our values of what reason does, rather than what it hides or distances. Foucault asked what sort of values led to our reasoning about madness and whether what we have done to madness is reasonable. Both in *Madness and Civilization* and *The Birth of the Clinic*, reason was informed by conventional morality. Foucault (1965) wrote:

> [T]he locus of confinement, conferred upon it its power of segregation and provided a new homeland for madness, though it may be coherent and concerted, is not simple. It organizes into a complex unity a new sensibility to poverty and to the duties of assistance, new forms of reaction to the economic problems of unemployment and idleness, a new ethic of work, and also the dream of a city where moral obligation was joined to civil law, within the authoritarian forms of constraint. (p. 46)

From Foucault’s early position it is evident that moral obligations were developed in the 17th Century out of a concern for the public good. A certain ethics emerged as a result of the historical reconfiguration to address how the mad can be a burden to the employed. It was not only that the mad were unemployed, but also if they were medicated and confined, their separation benefited the working class. In Foucault’s (1965) view, with practices of confinement comes a “complex unity” and “duties of assistance” not to only
help the mad, but also to make reason more productive (p. 46). These concerns are not separate from the economy and cultural values that utilize a calculated ethical approach to tame madness.

The aim of confinement was to "organize" madness as the otherness of reason (Foucault, 1965, p. 71). The distance created between unreason and reason serves the purpose of dismantling the ability of madness to speak to reason. The isolation of the mad is still a fascination that continues, perhaps less with electric shocks, and more with pharmaceutical technologies. In this context, Foucault’s history showed how psychiatry slowly gained the status of a science that provided explanations, treatments and techniques for saving the mad. In Foucault’s view (1965), “confinement” beginning in the 18th Century introduced a new system of the transgression where the “sadism” of reason on the bodies of the mad is justified and associated with a humane way to treat madness (p. 210).

By examining the emergence of different practices in psychiatry, it is possible to detect their relation to ethical norms accepted in a given historical period. Foucault asked how these norms provide a trajectory to developing selves. And what conceptions of selves were present in different historical eras and what new conceptions replaced them? A historical questioning of norm and normal takes us beyond a modern conception of moral selves. Hacking (1990) noted to “use the word normal is to say how things are, but also to say how they ought to be. The magic of the word is that we can use it to do both things at once. The norm may be what is usual or typical, yet our most powerful ethical constraints are also called norms” (p. 163). Hacking (1990) continued, “[n]othing is more commonplace than the distinction between fact and value. … But for
much of the century before Durkheim and ever since, we have regularly used ‘normal’ to close the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’” (p. 163). Fifty years later since the publication of *Madness and Civilization* psychological knowledge continues to close the gap by defining the normal. In his book, Foucault highlighted how psychological trajectories were subject to discontinuities, but sustained their role in describing the forms of self-constitutions (Hacking, 2002). In the context of education, psychological concepts and practices have had an influential impact in the constructs and constitutions of educational selves (Sugarman, 2014).

Foucault argued for the inseparability of reason and madness by including the constraints each imposes on the other, but this work is not without drawbacks. It is important to question the feasibility of Foucault’s attempt to write a history of insanity (Derrida, 1978). There is difficulty in writing and doing justice to a history of a dialogue between madness and civilization. The question however may be worded by assessing whether such a dialogue existed. Reason certainly has contaminated madness; it continues to do so. Madness, reason, and civilization are modes of approaches to ourselves under changing society and Foucault’s book is a discussion of who we are, rather than a discussion of madness or reason (May, 2006, p. 40). The question of the feasibility of writing a history of madness is a question unsettled for many of Foucault’s critics. For example, historian, Eric Midelfort (1980) criticized *Madness and Civilization*, for “many of its arguments fly in the face of empirical evidence, and that many of its broadest generalizations are over simplifications” (p. 259). Midelfort (1980) questioned the quality of the historicism, rather its aim of reconstructing madness as the object of reason.
In response to the controversies, Foucault clarified that his work is different from the work of historians. He was “not interested in constructing a new schema or in validating one that already exists. Perhaps it is because my [his] objective isn’t to propose a global principle for analyzing society” (Foucault, 2000, p. 237). Foucault avoided a global frame of thought that could be generalized because such a frame would be a misunderstanding of history and the forces of contingencies. Gutting (2005) suggested that Foucault’s histories do not uncover and retell facts, nor do they provide empirical evidence. Foucault’s histories explored “four dimensions: histories of ideas, histories of concepts, histories of the present, and histories of experience” (Gutting, 2005, p. 7). These four dimensions are intertwined.

Framed by histories of concepts is the history of ideas about madness, medicine and psychiatry. These ideas are associated with the experience of madness, and do not appear independent from the knowledge and treatment of the mad. Although always under-development, ideas alter ways of thinking and seeing. The goal of archaeology is to give a “more fundamental understanding of the history of thought than do standard histories centered on the individual subject” (Gutting, 2005, p. 10). Foucault (2001) distinguished between the history of ideas and the history of thought in the following way:

The history of ideas involves the analysis of a notion from its birth, through its development, and in the setting of other ideas which constitute its context. The history of thought is the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience or a set of practices, which were accepted without question, which were familiar and ‘silent’, out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises
discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces crises in the previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions [sic]. (p. 74)

It is within this frame of history that Foucault attended to the “unproblematic,” “familiar” and “silent” experiences of self-constitution in a culture. His histories complicated a simplistic understanding of humanism by making visible its limits and how care engenders the subject of care. Foucault’s history of madness problematized our relations to psychiatric knowledge and its impact in shaping personal and communal trajectories. His critique moved beyond normalizing persons through categories and labels that limit their activities. He assisted questioning how certain practices of knowledge come about, how they are constituted and institutionalized as an expression of care. In assessing humanism, Foucault’s gaze turned to discourses of knowledge in his books titled archaeologies.

4.2 The Discursive Subject

In *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault emphasized changing knowledge about madness and its treatment. In his next book, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, the analysis focused on how at the beginning of the 18th Century medical processes formed and deformed an understanding of the body and mind in ways that previously were not present. Foucault focused on the institutionalization of the body through a “medical gaze.” He argued this gaze dehumanized the body and at the same time assessed and administrated its needs. Archaeology is an analytic method that looks at the formation of knowledge in history. This method enabled Foucault to study the historical development and transitions of modern sciences.
It was in his most popular book, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, that Foucault began his assessment of modern sciences. Foucault explained the roots of the modern sciences: linguistic theory, biology and political economy are in the structure of classical episteme in philology, natural history, and economics. From his perspective, the transition of knowledge did not occur independent of the changes in the ways we began thinking about the world and our tools to assess the world and convey the world to others. This transfiguration allowed new ways of knowing and becoming at different historical times. Foucault (1971) stated:

I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the *episteme* in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account, what should appear are those configurations within the *space* of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science. Such an enterprise is not much a history, in the traditional meaning of the word, as an “archaeology.” (p. xxii)

The phrases “criteria” and “rational value” highlight the weight put forth by practices of knowledge and the emergence of a so-called objective knowledge in human sciences. The above quote also made clear the aim of archaeology is not to retell history but to examine under what conditions and values certain approaches of knowledge emerge. Foucault studied how certain conditions led to the existence of a set of epistemic claims, and knowledge transfigures itself in the movement of history. Furthermore, he studied
how these conditions have an effect in constructing knowledge on the development of modern subjectivity.

In order to comprehend the status of the human sciences, we must first understand the contextual and conceptual frame from which they emerged. *The Order of Things* does this by positioning knowledge against the background of time beginning with the Renaissance up to the present day and pointing out discontinuity in the structure of knowledge. Thus, Foucault showed there are radical distinctions between 16\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} Century practices of knowledge. By attending to the status of what became known as empirical science, Foucault traced a transfiguration in discursive statements in the fields of knowledge. Guided by two aims, to unravel the position of knower to herself and examine the development of modern understanding of knowledge, Foucault (1971) questioned the orderly structures and the underlying production of scientific knowledge in modern history.

Foucault extended his critique of the human sciences to theories of subjectivity. He questioned Phenomenological-Marxist thinking in the work of his predecessor Jean-Paul Sartre, who became a prominent writer, philosopher and activist globally after the World War II. By drawing a picture of man as both a knower and the object of knowledge, Foucault positioned phenomenology, the dominant and growing movement of his time, along the continuum of positivism. This attack, directed at phenomenology extended to any theory that designated the subject as a supreme knower of the world. Foucault (1988c) refused the possibility of “a theory of the subject—as could be done in phenomenology and in existentialism—and that, beginning from the theory of the subject, you come to pose the question of knowing” (p. 10). Phenomenology, for
Foucault was subtle empiricism. The concern for him was the assessment of autonomy in the phenomenological approach to subjective experience and how one speaks and knows one’s experience. Foucault (1971) went further, by asking another question: “Does man really exist?” (p. 321). Foucault asked this question in light of his studies of the formation of new sciences. These sciences enable a form of reflexivity:

When natural history becomes biology, when the analysis of wealth becomes economics, when, above all, reflection upon language becomes philology, and Classical discourse, in which being and representation found their common locus, is eclipsed, then, in the profound upheaval of such an archaeological mutation, man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows. (p. 311)

Based on what transformations and what discourses, Foucault (1971) asked, have we come to know ourselves as subjects and as objects of knowledge.

Foucault reconstructed phenomenology as an extension of the objective scientific view that assumes we obtain knowledge as a result of analysis of personal experience. He created the space in which we become suspicious of the present knowledge we have about ourselves through perceiving ourselves objectively and/or subjectively. Foucault’s rejection was embedded in his doubts about a theory of the knowing subject. Knowing is articulated in language and language was Foucault’s preoccupation since the book was a study of the history of concepts, rather than the history of sciences. It is language, or living concepts, that allow Foucault to think about a “theory of discursive practice” making it possible to speak of different forms of experience (Foucault, 1971, p. xiv). He saw primacy in concepts, systems and structures as they provide the conditions of
possibility. *The Order of Things* questioned both the frame and the order through which the knowing subject grasps and becomes accustomed to the world.

Foucault (1971) was re-describing the position of knowledge in relation to the knowledge seeker in history. With this in mind, it is important to note that Foucault’s historicism continued to be unsettling to historians even after he clarified he was not a traditional historian. Gutting (1989) noted, “it seems that what most distresses historians are not Foucault’s specific interpretation of texts and authors but the use he makes of them in his constructive history” (p. 176). Foucault’s historicism conveyed a generalization of episteme in an era and he relied on history “not as evidence but as illustration” (Gutting, 1989, p. 176). His histories emphasized shifts in representation and the substance of knowledge in different historical times: Different aspects and perceptions of life are taken to be of value to the knowing subject. Furthermore, Foucault showed the role of culture in creation of knowledge and influences of the speaking subjects to convey and constitute themselves as beholders of knowledge. For him, we are subject to the discursive practices that we ourselves have created. Foucault (1971) is clear these discursive practices and their emergence are connected to an analysis of experiences in a culture (p. xxi).

It is easier to clarify this through an example of Foucault’s questioning of concepts and how it posed a challenge to positivist view of knowledge. For example, looking into statistical research in education one may ask, what roles do surveys play in educational practices? Are they not another form of testing and examining in our culture? What comes with survey questions is an opportunity for generalizability at the scientific level and surveillance at the societal level. What more do surveys do besides
making conclusions regarding demographics and explicating what is expected of a specific cohort, group and population? Surveys lead to construction of knowledge about persons who we are able to understand by examining their relation to a given population. The positivists see merits in telling how people respond to tests, presenting persons in charts and graphs and how/why the outliers stand on the margins of a normal curve. For Foucault (2007b), it is “statistics” and its appearance “in the eighteenth century” that “we get the idea” of individual in a “general curve” that “is fixed” to a population “and plays an operational role on the basis of the study of normalities” (pp. 62-63).

The analysis of survey data contributes to “knowledge” in the archive of education. It strengthens the position of the seer as beholder of knowledge based on the generalizability of the result. This knowledge at the institutional level becomes a reference for other researchers, distributed as “knowledge translation” for pedagogy of parents and guardians and contributes to arguments for policies and funding for public welfare. The creators of this knowledge argue for the need of more research in the same domain. At the individual level, this knowledge creates a way of seeing oneself that conveys a truth about the experiences of childhood and adulthood. It builds modes of self-reflexivity to behaviors that were not otherwise under the gaze of oneself and another. The so-called objective assessment forms subjective understanding, leading to more grounds to assess and be assessed, and to question one’s academic and educational fitness. As subjects of education become the objects of knowledge, Foucault helps educators ask, at what cost? By objecting to positivism and the belief that a view from nowhere is possible, Foucault’s archaeologies were examinations of the system of truth about experience.
In relation to subjective experience shaped by knowledge, *The Order of Things* brought forth an awareness of the enigmatic nature of language. Foucault (1971) asked, “What is language, how can we find a way round it in order to make it appear in itself, in all its plenitude?” (p. 306). The question of what is language is inseparable from the assumptions about knowledge, a question that leads to see how speakers themselves become subjects and objects of discourse. In this context, Foucault (1971) noted, knowledge is subject to historical conditions and limitations of language. As language becomes the central concern, so does the speaking subject.

According to Foucault, the empiricism and transcendentalism of the 18th Century let to a modern construal of subjectivity that cannot be viewed as separate from the cultural and historical forces of life. By focusing on the finitude of the knower, Foucault’s (1971) analysis conveyed that modern life has led to a division between the transcendental and empiricist subject. Although, he found persons irreducible to this division, he did not offer an alternative. As far as the analysis of concepts goes, Foucault (1971) succeeded to “reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge” (p. xi). On the other hand, by questioning the epistemological concept of man, Foucault aimed to expand the picture of ourselves by making visible how we have changed and continue to change ourselves in history. His skepticism of modern production of knowledge led him to question the construct of subjectivity to bring forth the limits of our language in the ways we know ourselves. His attention to power and bodies expanded this focus to experiences and the productive nature of knowledge.

There was a need for more clarity in Foucault’s most popular book. In October 1966, Foucault moved to Tunisia where he was “offered, for the first time, a chair in
philosophy” (Defert, 2013, p. 34). In Tunisia, he began his work in his next book, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, aiming to distinguish his method from structuralism. According to Defert (2013), at the end of 1966, Foucault began “forcing himself, according to Nietzsche’s vow, to become every day a little more Greek, athletic, tanned, ascetic, he begins a new stylization of his existence” (p. 35). *The Archaeology of Knowledge* was written in this context of physical and mental distance from what has come before Foucault in *The Order of Things*. Academically, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is a methodological clarification of approaching previous books and an articulation of the diversifying effect of discourse. Foucault clarified that archaeology helps to put certain assumptions aside about the primacy of man in ruling history by focusing on irregularities in history. Archaeology is a shift in focus from unity and continuity to rupture and discontinuity in the history of thought.

Archaeology leads to a “decentralization” of the subject. By opposing a search for origins, archaeology is an attempt to put the structure and history side by side to view where the thinker is. Archaeology “was the attempt to ascertain the rules governing the production of discourse for a given culture at a given time” (Paras, 2006, p. 33). Foucault’s aim was not to rely on structure to make something out of history: his “aim is most decidedly not to use the categories of cultural totalities (whether world-views, ideal types, the particular spirit of an age) in order to impose on history, despite itself, the forms of structural analysis” (Foucault, 1972, p. 15). *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is a book that clarifies that the aims of studying historical structures do not need to be associated with structuralism.
In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault expanded on the discontinuity in concepts and the historical transformation of discourse. To clarify, discontinuity is not a leap from one contained discourse to the next, but a return to questioning of the progression of history. It is done with the aim of making apparent the assumptions of “long-term continuities that are independent of the flux of human action” (Gutting, 1989, p. 247). Archaeology is the study of the very material, statement, documents and archives shaping thoughts. It makes visible the commonly accepted ways we conduct ourselves in relation to what we consider to be knowledge. In this context, Foucault readdressed his early concern in *Madness and Civilization* by asking: Who is an expert of knowledge? What are the practices of knowledge? Furthermore, how and why do certain statements follow as a result?

*The Archaeology of Knowledge* addressed the language and position of actors in relation to the practices of knowledge. For example, in modern schools one can find developmental psychologists, neuropsychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, counselors, sometimes nurses and police officers situated in the position of statesmanship for education. Their qualification is based on their access to a knowledge that describes experiences. It is necessary to ask what conditions are made possible as a result? And how their knowledge impacts the educational relationships of teachers and students? The aim is to determine whether “unities are already given” and “by what right they can claim a field that specifies them space” to discern whether they are not “the surface effect of more firmly grounded unities” (Foucault, 1972, p. 26). Foucault’s attention to grounded unities brought to the surface the multitude of what is constituted as knowledge and what knowledge does in a place and time. This restructuring led to asking for new
forms of theory and practice in a given culture. Where this is the hidden theme between the abstract lines of *Order of Thing*, it is clearly articulated in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*:

> The analysis of thought is always *allegorical* in relation to the discourse that it employs. Its question is unfailingly: what was being said in what was said? The analysis of the discursive field is oriented in quite a different way; we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements … and show what other forms of statement is excluded. (Foucault, 1972, pp. 27-28)

At the heart of examination of a theory of discourse rests the attention to occurrence of statements that lead to creation of more statements and legitimatization of a discourse. What is unique in this approach is the attention to not only what statements include but also what they exclude. Foucault (1972) summarized his aim “to show in accordance with which rules a discursive practice may form groups of objects, enunciations, concepts, or theoretical choices” (p. 181).

The premise of Foucault’s work so far proposed that systems of thought and discursive formations operate beyond those of grammar and logic. They operate beneath the consciousness of individual subjects defining a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given culture. The structure of scientific knowledge is not neutral. It operates based on a set of systemic values and practices at times unexamined. In this relation Foucault (1972) defined episteme as

> [t]he total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized
systems… it is a questioning that accepts the fact of science only in order to ask the question what it is for that science to be a science. In the enigma of scientific discourse, what the analysis of the episteme questions is not its right to be a science, but the fact that it exists. And the point at which it separates itself off from all the philosophies of knowledge (connaissance) is that it relates this fact not to the authority of an original act of giving, which establishes in a transcendental subject the fact and the right, but to the processes of a historical practice. (pp. 191-192)

The question is targeted at the existence of a body of knowledge conveyed as a science. Foucault’s question posed challenges to what legitimizes the existence of a science to be a science. The aim of archaeology was to make persons conscious of their role in creation of knowledge: how do we know ourselves. This is for the sake of becoming suspicious of the production of knowledge, its use and its power over life. Foucault was not saying it is contingency that creates knowledge, but investigating how contingency gives form and deforms the spiral of knowledge.

It must be noted that due to his attention to concepts Foucault, to some degree, omitted social factors in The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge. Although there is a hint of recognition that social influences “open up new fields for mapping of objects,” the method works solely on the level of the definition of objects, concepts and established authority (Foucault, 1972, p. 163). Meanwhile, as Foucault was gaining international recognition through his academic works on studying discourses he was also becoming an activist in life. The next section explores Foucault’s activism and scholarly work upon his return to France followed by a change in method. In genealogy,
Foucault worked to examine the values of our values and their effects on the body and soul.

4.3 The Non-discursive Subject

After the publication of The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault rethought the relation of critique to the social domain in works characterized as genealogies. Genealogy, an approach of examining truth in history, helped Foucault to add to the practices of knowledge, the social practices that govern activities of the human body. Foucault did not abandon the archaeological approach, “but rather integrat[ed] it into the study of the social, which had become a far more pressing and immediate-seeming concern to him than the history of the sciences” (Paras, 2006, p. 10). The turn in methodology was invoked by Foucault’s activism in Tunis, his ceaseless support for the students’ revolts in France, friendship with Gilles Deleuze and his studies on Nietzsche. Deleuze (1989) described this transition as a continuation of what is sometimes viewed as a split in Foucault’s work:

Archaeology put forward a distinction between two types of practical formation: the one ‘discursive’, involving statements, the other ‘non-discursive’, involving environment. … Naturally, environments also produce statements, just as statements determine environment. But the fact remains that the two formations are heterogeneous, even though they may overlap: there is no correspondence or isomorphism, no direct causality or symbolization. (p. 27)

As Deleuze noted archaeology and genealogy overlap, but they are also heterogeneous. Foucault’s change of method disrupted grouping him with structuralists by making more visible his reliance on genealogies. This turn in method is viewed as a movement from
analyzing of institutions and experts’ knowledge in *Madness and Civilization* and *Birth of the Clinics* to discourses and concepts in *The Order of Things* and *Archaeology of Knowledge* to a return to institutional practices in *Discipline and Punish*. Each book attended to the ways individuals are subject to power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).

Foucault’s political participation during the late 1960s in France marked the beginning of his public presence. Even though he was not in France during the May 1968 students’ revolt, the event had a profound effect on him. When he returned to France, he was deeply moved by the political involvement of students who were challenging the judicial system. As it was in the case of his books, in action, there was also an invested interest in rewriting a different history of the present, the present he experienced by his active participation in demonstrations. In action, he went as far as appearing beside Sartre during the protests in Paris (Miller, 1993). In thinking, he continued to problematize the hierarchical acceptance of power. Foucault argued, and showed, power is not a stable interlocked position but an interchangeable relationship. Being “personally involved in his theoretical object of study” led Foucault to conceptualize what power does: it merely organizes; it has dividing and multiplying effects (Dosse, 1997, p. 249).

Exercising this power, in February 1971, Foucault announced the formation of the *Groupe d’Information sur Less Prison* [Group for information on the Prison] (GIP) with the help and participation of Daniel Defert, Gilles Deleuze and a few others. This was a response to the news of a hunger strike by prisoners regarding the conditions of prisons. The work of GIP was to shine light on the conditions and operations of the prison system. This was a gesture to proclaim the scholar-activist stand that theory does
not express, translate, or serve practice; theory is inseparable from practice. A year later, Foucault and Deleuze appeared in an interview, connecting prisons to a web of power relations. Their thinking about theory was influenced by force of philosophy in changing social domain that was inline with Nietzsche’s active participation with history. From this emerged a historicism euphoric, forceful and active that demanded to alter the present. Genealogy, as inherent in Nietzsche, was not armchair historicism for Foucault and Deleuze; it was a process of participation with history in order to change it.

Nietzsche, a scholar of Antiquity, questioned the origins of values and morals. His perspective emphasized the processes by which a set of truth is established about persons in their history. Reading Nietzsche had opened doors for Foucault to take a different route from Marx and Freud for theorizing power: “[W]e have yet to fully comprehend the nature of power. It may be that Marx and Freud cannot satisfy our desire for understanding this enigmatic thing which we call power, which is at once visible and invisible, present and hidden, ubiquitous” (Foucault & Deleuze, 1977, p. 213). Nietzsche’s genealogy, among other things, was about discerning a dichotomy between facts and values and an abruption of commonly accepted powers. This allowed for a problematization of good, bad and evil in morality. Foucault furthered this effort by problematizing accepted practices.

Foucault’s genealogy examined the relations of power-knowledge and the creation of social determinants processes. “[T]he genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated” (Foucault, 1984, p. 78). Here, Foucault
was no longer looking at history of concepts but attending to the historical accidents, the fabrication of the facts that convey who we are, and writing a counter-history. Genealogy is a process “to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents” (Foucault, 1984, p. 81). The genealogical tools allow for displacement of the accepted truth within a given culture.

Genealogy looks deeper into discontinuities of history to discern the ontological making of man. It makes a different way of seeing history possible, by allowing history to be creatively and critically analyzed for the sake of offering other possibilities. “Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history” to speak of an injustice done by history (Foucault, 1984, p. 83). Genealogy is the practice of Foucault’s “epistemic commitment, on where historical inquiry does not pretend to be an ‘objectivity’ that would split off the past from explicit concerns manifest in the present, but rather seeks to problematize that very relation to the past” (Fillion, 2012, p. 67). The problematization of the past in the present continued for the remaining of Foucault’s life work.

Applying genealogy, in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault examined the relation of criminal bodies to the juridical system for the purpose of showing discontinuities in the laws of punishment. As punishment becomes more humane, it has become more inclusive through institutionalization. Foucault (1977) was disconcerted with the accepted, and timeless practices on the body and the soul of the individuals in relation to the existing knowledge of best practices of punishing criminals. This was a starting point for the book that showed “power and knowledge directly imply one another” (Foucault, 1977, p. 27). Power is not a hierarchy, nor a possession, but an
activity we exercise in relations. Foucault showed power is not a privilege, but a *technique*. Power becomes reality making, rather than part of the reality. It is an exercise of conduct inseparable from producing knowledge and truth about social actors and their actions. Power and knowledge constitute one another in complex relationships of formation and deformation of their subject. Together power and knowledge exercise what is considered legitimate and just in a given time.

*Discipline and Punish* demonstrated Foucault’s concern with the injustice of the Enlightenment and its force on modern disciplinary techniques. “The Enlightenment, which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines” (Foucault, 1977, p. 222). The 18th Century was the beginning of modern techniques attaining “a level at which the formation of knowledge and the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process” (Foucault, 1977, p. 224). The injustice of the Enlightenment revealed how socially accepted norms introduce a gentle way in punishment, one that forms “obedient individuals” (Foucault, 1977, p. 129). Foucault (1977) located power in the production of knowledge and institutionalization of subjectivity where disobedience becomes an act of hostility. In his view, the more punishment became “humane” the more “power” become constituted based on an “economic rationality that must calculate the penalty” (Foucault, 1977, p. 100). In this sense, Foucault wrote of conditions of power, rather than theories of power, and the possibilities these conditions determine for bodies. His assessment of power made visible the technologies of governance and possibilities of movement.

To give an example of technologies of governance, or turning the outward gaze inward to govern oneself, Foucault looked to the architecture of Jeremy Bentham’s
panopticon and by doing so examined the force of calculated and utilitarian ethics in modern society. The architecture of the panopticon in prisons engenders effortless surveillance, creating an environment where prison inmates cannot tell whether they are being observed and cannot see the other inmates. The panopticon utilizes individuality. Its judicial modality expands across institutions to administer beings. As a technique it serves a purpose of fulfilling the application of universal laws in modern society for individuals to conduct themselves based on a set of conditions. “Panopticism is no longer to see without being seen but to impose a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity” (Deleuze, 1989, p. 29). The placement of the individuals under “observation” as a new way of punishment is corrective and transformative. The panopticon is a modality applied beyond prisons. “Is it surprising,” Foucault (1977) asked, “that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” (p. 228). These places are the social apparatus’s of providing work, education and care. “[A]n apparatus,” Agamben (2009) explained, is “anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings…” (p. 14).

It is not only the prison that proceeded with a refined gaze on the operation of individuals, the economy of the gaze applied its techniques to form and deform practices of other institutions including schools. “The formation of the disciplinary society is connected with a number of broad historical processes—economic, jurico-political and, lastly, scientific” (Foucault, 1977, p. 218). Power is not localized in one domain or another; it multiplies to become the operating mechanism to connect pieces of reality together. For example, in the panopticon culture, the individual who is incapable of
compliance to the norms is taken care of by the institutions that directly limit conduct, prescribe regiments and outline a set of behaviors. The individual who is capable of compliance is subjected to the knowledge and existence of such disciplinary practices and is governed indirectly. The isolation of the criminal from the public to behind bars is the public pedagogy of the social inspectors that go about living outside of the bars, perceiving themselves free. They conduct themselves based on the knowledge of an existing set of rules. As one stands outside of the prison, one cannot help but feel the dual false liberty of inside and outside, each side of the wall delimits what freedom is. In this sense prisons produce a reality of truth about freedom. “We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’ it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact power, produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1977, p. 194).

The panopticon functions as a modality of power outside of prisons. It reinforces the “overlapping subjection and objectification” and the “individualization” in “human sciences” (Foucault, 1977, p. 305). Foucault (1977) targeted the narrowing gaze on individuals through practices and processes that are rationalized as humane and institutionalized in places such as prisons, schools and hospitals. The limits of the body and soul are framed in penal apparatuses and techniques of governing conduct by utilizing modern institutions. For example, Foucault (1977) noted, “through supervision and assessment, the penal apparatus will be able, in turn, to become medicalized, psychologicalized, educationalized” (p. 306). Assessment develops knowledge about subjects; it individualizes them by judging, measuring and comparing them with others.
It normalizes their identity by outlining what they need to be trained for what they need to develop and how they need to correct themselves (Foucault, 1977).

The aim of panopticism is not solely to punish the unruly most effectively but also to mediate dispersed modes of subjectivity effortlessly. The panopticon serves the application of normalizing judgment. It extends to influence the way we view ourselves, who we become, what we do to others and ourselves. The development of the hierarchical observational power works on homogenization and normalization of subjectivity. For example, Foucault (1977) explained “a double effect” of this power in the institution of schooling:

it distributed pupils according to their aptitudes and their conduct, that is, according to the use that could be made of them when they left the school; it exercised over them a constant pressure to conform to the same model, so that they might all be subjected to ‘subordination, docility, attention in studies and exercises, and to the correct practice of duties and all the parts of discipline’. So that they might all be like one another. (p. 182)

Foucault’s thoughts about disciplinary power are of relevance for the schooling of persons who, through supervision and assessment, become homogenized, normalized and institutionalized. In the context of education, Deacon (2006) noted, “discipline comes to be directed primarily at individuals and only secondarily at groups” and the aim is “not merely to confine but above all to correct, involving what Foucault called an inclusion through exclusion” (p. 180). Power penetrates individuals’ existence, their identity and future.
The study of the corrective nature of power in Foucault’s writings shifted from public practices to examine the role of public knowledge in perceived private exercises. If the discourse of law aimed to establish a public conformity that protects us against the unruly, the discourse of sexuality established conformity to what we do with our desiring bodies. In his next book, the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault (1978) sought to make visible the relationship of power, knowledge and sex. By questioning whether it is possible to separate public and private, Foucault (1978) made room for the subject of experience in the practices of knowledge and power relations. He cautiously moved away from a salient notion of power in sexuality that sought to liberate us, perhaps because power in *Discipline and Punish* was perceived as administrative. However, Foucault also extended what the previous book established. For example:

This history of sexuality, or rather this series of studies concerning the historical relationships of power and the discourse on sex, is, I realize, a circular project in the sense that it involves two endeavors that refer back to one another. We shall try to rid ourselves of a juridical and negative representation of power, and cease to conceive of it in terms of law, prohibition, liberty, and sovereignty. But how then do we analyze what has occurred in recent history with regard to this thing—seemingly one of the most forbidden areas of our lives and bodies—that is sex? (Foucault, 1978, p. 90)

The aim here was to show how the historical relationship between power and the discourse on sexuality are intermingled. As a result of this endeavor, it became apparent that private desires are inseparable from the public working of power. Desire is informed
and deformed by knowledgeable others whose truth games govern lives and bodies, to the extent we allow their knowledge to give form to our pleasures.

Freudian power came under inspection by the study of sexuality in the 17th Century. Foucault (1978) worked with a “repressive hypothesis” to show that before the psychoanalytic discourse, the Victorians freed themselves from the moral confinement of the “Victorian bourgeois” discourse (pp. 4-6). He was not interested in another theory of power to put sexuality in order but rather with an analysis of power in the private lives of men and women. Foucault (1978) was not interested in the question of “Why are we repressed? But rather, why do we say … that we are repressed? By what spiral did we come to affirm that sex is negated? What led us to show, ostentatiously, that sex is something we hide, to say it is something we silence?” (pp. 8-9). The production of knowledge since the birth of psychoanalysis proposed certain avenues of understanding ourselves; these avenues, Foucault argued, are only part of what we say and what we do. Foucault’s effort was to make other questions pertinent to the present understanding of private lives. Instead of establishing himself as an authority in the discourse of sexuality, Foucault’s (1988a) questions explored “the meaning people attached to their sexual behavior” (p. 287).

“What we must work on,” Foucault (1997a) clarified, “is not so much to liberate our desires but to make ourselves infinitely more susceptible to pleasure” (p. 137). He complicated the accepted notion that sexual desires are hidden and seek liberation. Furthermore, he made “visible the historical dimension of that supposedly ahistorical and universal entity called the body—to historicize that discursive space in which modern bio-power constructs the body as the natural ground of the desiring subject” (Halperin,
In writing a history of sexuality, Foucault problematized the history of desiring subjects and what they are told to do with their bodies as well as what they do to their bodies to satisfy its needs. Foucault’s histories of sexuality are the beginning of scrutinizing the whole-hearted acceptance of the regime of truth by including the experience of the persons in their activities.

Attending to experts of sexuality, one must examine what they say, including the vocabulary itself that informs thinking for the practitioners of pleasure to become spectators of their pleasures. The vocabulary of sexuality is a historical configuration of desire, the process of framing the activity and the product of pleasure. Foucault differentiated sex from sexuality:

So we must not refer a history of sexuality to the agency of sex; but rather show how "sex" is historically subordinate to sexuality. We must not place sex on the side of reality, and sexuality on that of confused ideas and illusions; sexuality is a very real historical formation; it is what gave rise to the notion of sex, as a speculative element necessary to its operation. We must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; … It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim—through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality—to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. (Foucault, 1978, p. 157)

By making visible the agency of sex is subject to a history of sexuality, Foucault attacked the individualization force of sex as something that will liberate us if only we fulfill and deploy it. In Foucault’s thoughts, sex does not bring liberation. He scrutinized the
agency of sex as an operation of sexuality and provoked thinking of sex as the activity of claiming the body and its pleasures. In pleasure, Foucault (1978) found a “possibility of resistance” (p. 157).

The truth about sex is not the discourse of sexuality, but its experience. This experience creates an avenue for resistance to the mechanism of the discourse. The relationship between pleasure and experience are central to the examination of discourses and understanding of the body. The body, prior to the modern day, had been conceived not as a site for pleasure, but a flesh. Approaching sex as experience helped Foucault, to some degree, separate sex from sexuality. In his view, sexuality, from Christianity to Freud, unfolded as a process of “having us believe that our ‘liberation’ is in balance,” the balance that is explicated differently at different times (Foucault, 1978, p. 159). This is the beginning of the affirmation of possibility to “counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies” that led Foucault (1978) to explore how persons exercise power in their given context (p. 157). Foucault’s thoughts on desire were not separate from education. They guide us remotely to examine what we find to be the value of knowledge in relation to pleasure in learning and experiencing oneself. Education, as an activity too, is conceived at times as that which liberates. Education’s pleasure rests in subjecting the body and mind to the activity of learning and providing the dialogue that necessitates the presence of the other.

Whether it is desire or pleasure, Foucault’s understanding of liberation from power in these years was incomplete. Jean Baudrillard was perhaps first to notice this. After the publication of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, in December 1976, Baudrillard sent an essay to the French journal Critique titled Forget Foucault.
Baudrillard (2007) wrote, “Foucault’s discourse is a mirror of the powers it describes. It is there that its strength and its seduction lie” (p. 30). The article was not published in the journal, but it came out as a book few months later. In his book, Baudrillard (2007) posed the notion that “power is dead,” in that it is “[n]ot merely impossible to locate because of dissemination, but dissolved purely and simply in a manner that still escapes us, dissolved by reversal, cancellation…” (p. 31). Baudrillard was pointing to the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* where power is a constituent part of desire and as a result it dissolves and disappears. Unlike Foucault, Baudrillard perceived power as an act of seduction, rather than desire: “power is something that is exchanged. Not in the economical sense, but in the sense that power is executed according to a reversible cycle of seduction” (p. 52).

Baudrillard (2007) criticized Foucault based on the notion that “power lures us and truth lures us on” and everything said about them leads to the effect of accumulation that feeds back to itself (p. 67). Power is that enigma we try to understand and in doing so we have already taken a position to address it and have become subject to its games. In this sense, Baudrillard (2007) argued that for Foucault politics never ends; I add, if this is so, it is because Foucault was an active participant in it. However, Baudrillard is interested in that “mysterious point where he [Foucault] stops and finds nothing more to say” (p. 76). Baudrillard needed to free himself from Foucault’s intellectual dominance. “Baudrillard hadn’t ‘forgotten Foucault’ to do him a service but to do himself a service,” Lotriger (2007) wrote in the introduction to Baudrillard’s book, and noted Baudrillard had “out-Nietzsched Foucault, even at Foucault’s expense” (p. 22). Foucault’s writings on power underwent a reworking in the years to come. The shift from politics to
spirituality and aesthetic life became visible in Foucault’s works from 1978 onward. Baudrillard’s text may well have contributed to this, as did the events surrounding the Iranian revolution.
Chapter 5: Power and Subjectivity

How can Foucault distance himself from creating the truth games he was criticizing in his studies of power? This chapter outlines some of the processes that helped Foucault to address this question. This chapter will also elaborate on the themes that gain prominence in his ethics: political spirituality, subjectivity and transformation. These themes rely on problematization as an exercise of changing the games of truth in a given culture, in one’s context. These themes, as they become prominent led to transformation of the subject, Foucault himself. This way the chapter demonstrates an ethics of transformation through rethinking power and subjectivity. Foucault serves as an exemplar student who in his singularity and dialogues with others examined and transformed his relations to what needed changing in his work meanwhile continuing the effort of participating in writing a different history.

The years of 1978-1980 mark another transition in Foucault’s view of politics and subjectivity that is central for understanding his conceptualization of ethics. First, in the Iranian revolution, Foucault found a political spirituality that assisted his movement towards the study of ethics. Second, I extend this observation to Foucault’s lectures delivered during these years to show governmentality and subjectivity gain prominence in his studies. This led to redefining the subject in his work. Third, after reviewing Foucault’s correction in approaching the subject, I discuss the continuity and transformation in his ethics as the activity of problematization. This chapter maps the transition in Foucault’s (1988a) work, since for him, “to work is to try to think something other than what one thought before” (p. 256).
5.1 Political Spirituality and Governmentality

There was a gap of eight years between the publication of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* and the second and third volumes. Although Foucault traveled for interviews and lectured in these years, his focus rapidly evolved from the condition of power to the making of modern power, biopolitics, moving to ethics and subjectivity. The Iranian revolution and studies of Antiquity mark a transition and transformation of his approach to power, conduct and government. The engagement with the Iranian revolution took place at the same time that Foucault (1997a) was lecturing and studying the problem of population and the formation of a political economy (p. 70).

The Iranian revolution was approximately two years of intense upheaval that preoccupied Foucault as he visited Iran before and after the revolution, meeting with Iranians and their officials, as well as meeting with their exiled leader, Khomeini, in Paris. As a result, Foucault was to find a “political spirituality,” something “the West has forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crises of Christianity” (Macey, 1993, p. 410). The political spirituality in the Iranian revolution assisted Foucault to rethink political power. In his first trip to Iran in September of 1978, Foucault interviewed the chairman of the association for the Defense of Human Rights and the first future prime minister of the Islamic Republic, Mehdi Bazergan. The interviewee highlighted the political along with the spiritual dimension of the Iranian revolt. The Iranian revolution began as the movement of re-envisioning the government by the people. As the days passed, Foucault became more engaged in an act of correspondence for French and Italian journals of the revolution and advocating for the people of Iran.
Following the Shah’s departure, the new government forgot its spiritual promises to the people and tortured those individuals politically involved in the previous regime. In an open letter, Foucault reminded Bazergan of their conversation regarding human rights duties. It is within the confines of this letter that one may find Foucault’s (2000) humanism:

It is necessary—imperatively so—so to give the person being prosecuted every means of defense and every possible right. Is he “manifestly guilty”? Does he have public opinion completely against him? Is he hated by the people? That, precisely, bestows rights on him. (p. 452)

These words showed an understanding of revolution and its many directions that hindered freedom. In Iran’s case, the revolution had gone astray as soon as the new state took place. As a result, Foucault’s thoughts on revolution and government rapidly changed during these months. At first, Foucault was whole-heartedly invested in Iran’s revolutionary power to overturn the existing political situation through the solidarity of the people, but slowly as the events unfolded he became critical of the Iranian revolution calling it “Khomeini’s revolution” for it no longer represented the people.

Although Foucault’s enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution wore off, he never conceived of revolution as liberation, but as a political activity to stand together for changing systems. Revolution in Iran was not for one person, for the coming to power of an ideology or a religion. It was for the people. “People do revolt; that is a fact. And that is how subjectivity (not that of great men, but that of anyone) is brought into history, breathing life into it” (Foucault, 2000, p. 452). Within these words no longer lay a notion of freedom, but a governmentality that is centered by the people, their subjectivity and
their role in changing history. As it was the case for Iran, it is “subjectivity” that brings something “into history.” The Iranian revolution showed that there was no guarantee the substituted regime would be more inclusive and/or just toward the people. However, Foucault (1988a) learned Iranians “change their subjectivity... renew their entire existence by going back to spiritual experience that they thought they could find...” (p. 218). After the Iranian revolution, the circular interconnection between governmentality, spirituality and subjectivity is more evident in Foucault’s lectures.

During the years of the Iranian revolution, Foucault’s lectures pursued the problem of forms of power by attending to the emergence of practices that ensure human power over life, an economical management of the biological life, which he called biopower. Biopower is the study of “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species become the object of political strategy, of a general strategy of power” (Foucault, 2007b, p. 1). Biopower uses disciplinary power through different instruments and techniques to sustain the wellness of the population and direct its mode of behaviors and relationships.

Biopolitics, biological and political practices of power, Foucault argued, allowed for the formation of a state power as a technology of governing population. This new form of rationality, in which persons need to be protected, enabled the state to take full responsibility for rules and regulations. Foucault (2007b) argued it was in the transfiguration of the art of government from the 17th Century to the 18th Century, that allowed the construct of population to change: “the population as a collection of subjects is replaced by the population as a set of natural phenomena” (p. 451). Approaching population as a set of natural phenomena allowed the state interventions to manage
people based on a mechanism of security. The modern state no longer controls, but since it finds freedom an inherit value of its systems, it manages and protects. The shift of attention to technologies of government assisted Foucault (2008b) in locating “the emergence of a particular type of rationality in governmental practices” (p. 3). This shift maps out Foucault’s transitional theory about power, a move from disciplinary power to an affirmative power concerned with conduct and governmentality.

Foucault’s 1978 lectures made minimal reference to the disciplinary power conceptualized in *Discipline and Punish*, where Foucault understood power within the exercise of institutions on bodies. In his lectures, Foucault demonstrated an understanding of power through protective technology of the state to govern life. This is the beginning of a new attention to the “forms of philosophical practice that reappeared in the sixteenth century as a result of …the problem of conduct/conducting oneself” (Foucault, 2007b, p. 230). This transition occurred on the cusp of a global recognition of Foucault as the man who studied power. This recognition posed a question: what is there to be done if power continues to be associated with biological, political and economical technologies, but not with the acting and speaking subject?

Foucault’s understanding of power was neither objective nor subjective. It had a schematic relation to practices. It was decentralized, lost in translation, as a reflection of the complexity of modern life:

Power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations …. Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing oppositions between rulers and ruled at the root for power relations. (Foucault, 1978, p. 94)
If Foucault was to take his own definition, he had to answer how people are governed if they are constituted as living and thinking beings. How would power come from below? Foucault was to reconstruct his views on power to elaborate on the activities of subjects and the problem of government. In this context, power is no longer placed at innumerable points, but as Baudrillard (2007) suggested it dissolves. Mobule (2014) noted Foucault’s work during these years was undergoing assessment: “Instead of approaching biopolitics from the notion of sovereign power,” Foucault “examine[d] the distance and differences between” biopolitics and governmentality (Muble, 2014, p. 83).

In his 1979 lectures, Foucault defined the word government as “the conduct of conduct” encompassing activities in government of self and others (p. 186). Posing this definition, he reworked the sovereignty of biopower and began to think of the subjective formation of power. Furthermore, Foucault decentralized governmental power by making visible how the modern era juxtaposed the question of liberalism with the concern of protection of life in the West. The lectures ended with a pressing need to study “the way in which the specific problems of life and population have been posed within a technology of government which, … since the end of the eighteenth century has been constantly haunted by the question of liberalism” (Foucault, 2008b, pp. 323-324). The skepticism of liberalism led Foucault (2008b) to view “liberalism as the general framework of biopolitics” that hides governmental interventions (p. 22). The critique of liberalism addressed the new technologies of government “that if one governed too much, one did not govern at all” (Foucault, 1984, p. 242). However the will to govern in modernized non-totalitarian societies was constituted based on protective practices of security and economical rationality of managing the needs of the population.
The move to governmentality expanded Foucault’s earlier analysis of power. From 1979 onward, “[t]he term itself, power, does no more than designate a domain of relations which are entirely still to be analyzed and what,” Foucault (2008b) “proposed to call governmentality, that is to say, the way in which one conducts the conduct of men [and women]....” (p. 186). In this regard, Foucault’s work is a continuous study of the “power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others, not ourselves as passive victims” (Hacking, 2002, p. 3). Meanwhile, in his 1980 lectures, Foucault (2014) made explicit the “shift” in the “notion of knowledge-power” “to develop the notion of government by the truth” (p. 12). Foucault (2014) explained that the “notion of government” seems to be “much more operational than the notion of power” enabling him to conceptualize the practices of power through “mechanisms and procedures intended to conduct men, to direct their conduct, to conduct their conduct” (p. 12).

The operational notion of power, government, emerged as a concern for the “manifestation of the truth,” since “power cannot be exercised without truth having to manifest itself, and manifest itself in the form of subjectivity” (Foucault, 2014, p. 75). In the 1980 lectures, Foucault (2014) focused on the “the government of men through the manifestation of truth in the form of subjectivity,” and continued by asking:

Why, in what form, in a society like ours, is there such a deep bond between the exercises of power and the obligation for individuals to become themselves essential actors in the procedures of manifestation of the truth, in the procedures of alethurgy needed by power? What is the relationship between the fact of being subject in relation of power, and a subject through which, and regarding which the
truth is manifested? What is this double sense of the word “subject”, subject in a relation of power, subject in a manifestation of truth? (pp. 80-81)

The concept “alethurgy” points to the manifestation of truth that is much more than making known. Applying displacement to his own notion of knowledge and power by focusing on truth and government, Foucault set a more direct focus on the relationship of the subject towards her own truth. In this sense, the subject contains a “double sense” of being both the subject of and subject to the truth. Foucault’s (2014) studies of Christian governmentality in the 1980 lectures highlighted that “specific techniques of establishing a relationship between subjectivity and truth are organized… in increasingly complex ways” (p. 311). During these years, Foucault moved back and forth between Christianity and the Greek practices of subjectivity and truth. This historical juxtaposition equipped Foucault with an expansion of the definition of the subject in his work.

5.2 Foucault’s Corrective Subject

Power in *Discipline and Punish* and the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* was conceptualized as the production of regulative influences and relationships. In these works, Foucault showed that power does not simply suppress or regress. From 1980 onward, he extended this conception of power to the techniques that make power available to individuals. “This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life” (Foucault, 2000, p. 212). This differs from the previous approach, but exists within the same framework of questioning individuality along with the exercise of power and knowledge. The shift now addresses the recognition of truth within the games of power by the subject in her relationships. Foucault (1982) specifically clarified that “[t]here are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence,
and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to” (p. 212). This definitional ground shows an interconnection of Foucault’s early work and his later work on subject and power.

The juxtaposed definition of the subject finds an interest in the ethico-politics dimension, in the later Foucault. By political dimension, Foucault (2007a) meant to explore “what we are willing to accept in our world—to accept, to refuse, and to change both in ourselves and in our circumstances” (p. 152). His new thinking in changing ourselves to change our circumstance is interconnected with practices of self-formation. This required a historical understanding of how previously we have changed ourselves with the intent of examining the ways we currently act towards ourselves. As a result, Foucault (1985) became concerned with “Western philosophy—to examine both the difference that keeps us” distant “from a way of thinking in which we recognize the origin of our own, and the proximity that remains in spite of that distance which we never cease to explore” (p. 7). This disclosure appeared in the footnote of the Use of Pleasure, Second volume of The History of Sexuality, where Foucault admitted he is not an expert in Hellenist or Latin text, but that he has been trying to gain familiarity with a thinking in which we can recognize ourselves as subjects.

Foucault’s search for a modality of change perhaps began as a result of asking different questions during the early 1980s. The new concern was not simply to understand subjectivity or an alteration of the modern notion of subjectivity but to more pragmatically ask how we know ourselves. Foucault (1998) asked:
How was the subject established, at different moments and in different institutional contexts, as a possible, desirable, or even indispensable object of knowledge? How were the experiences that one may have of oneself and the knowledge that one forms of oneself organized according to certain schemes? How were these schemes defined, valorized, recommended, imposed? ... In short it is a matter of placing the imperative to “know oneself”—which to us appears so characteristic of our civilization—back in the much broader interrogation that serves as its explicit or implicit context: What should one do with oneself? (p. 87)

The question of what one should do with oneself is the reoccurring theme in Foucault’s interviews, writings and lectures for the remainder of his lifetime. However, prior to this was the question of the constitution and recognition of the subject. These questions of how we establish and recognize ourselves are intertwined with the educational question of how do we know ourselves.

A theoretical shift was in process in Foucault’s (2014) work moving from the “subject” becoming the “object of knowledge” to the study of what “we call subjectivation, the formation of a definite relationship of self to self” (p. 231). Where the earlier questions concerned the role of experts knowledge and scientific objectivity in the government of selves, later Foucault “take[s] up the question of governmentality from a different angle: the government of the self by oneself in its articulation with relations with others (such as one finds in pedagogy, behavior counseling, spiritual direction, the prescription of models for living, and so on)” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 88, italics added). As it is evident this notion of government of self by oneself is in direct relation to
“pedagogy” and “models for living.” This becomes a question of learning, teaching and applying oneself, the government of self, in the relationship we have with others. Foucault’s concern for the constitution of the subject, since it is concerned with conduct, is a concern for governing oneself to be in service to oneself and others.

If there are techniques that institutionalize the self, Foucault (2007a) insisted, there are also techniques which permit the individual to perform, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in such a way that they transform themselves, modify themselves, and reach a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity…. (p. 154)

By 1980, Foucault spoke of the relationship of the ancient maxims “know thyself” and its interconnection with “care of the self” from Antiquity to early Christian practices of self-conduct. The exploration is important since throughout this history practices emerged in relation to these two maxims that inform and form the interpretation, thinking, theorizing and activity of the subject in the Western tradition. More specifically, Foucault (2005) showed that for Plato, “[t]here is a dynamic entanglement, a reciprocal call for the gnothi seauton and for the epimeleia heautou (knowledge of the self and care of the self)” (p. 69). He noted, there is a gradual disappearance from Augustine, to Descartes and to Husserl of the care of the self and a stronger emphasis to “know oneself.” In relation to the educational advice of “know thyself” there lies for Foucault another question that seems more important: What should one do with self-knowledge? Foucault’s (1991a)
effort was not to return to description of the character of the subject, but to clarify his earlier efforts to reconstruct phenomenology:

[P]henomenology tries to grasp the significance of daily experience in order to reaffirm the fundamental character of the subject. On the contrary,…the task of ‘tearing’ the subject from itself in such a way that it is no longer the subject as such, or that it completely ‘other’ than itself so that it may arrive at its annihilation, its dissociation. (p. 32)

Subjectivity is not the site of comprehension of this moment but the struggle of tearing away to become “other” to oneself. Subjectivity is a “limit experience” Foucault (1991a) “learned” from “Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Bataille” (p. 32). Limit experiences have “the function of wrenching the subject from itself” exploring the possibilities of “desubjectivation” (Foucault. 2000, p. 241). Subjectivity, articulated by Nietzsche, Blanchot and Bataille, is critical of the modern consumption of knowledge that binds the subject to universal norms, codes and calculations. Furthermore, they were suspicious of the preexisting knowledge about the subject as something ready to be experienced, explicated and discovered. Foucault’s attention to self-constitution appeared in this context to broaden the conception of the modern self. His concern was not to uncover or disclose a reality about the subject, but to consider how it can be possible to elaborate new types of subjectivity and new kinds of relationships. In order to do this, Foucault (1988a) asked: “How did we directly constitute our identity through some ethics techniques of the self which developed through Antiquity down to now?” (p. 146).

By studying the Greeks, Foucault detected “to care for oneself” and “to know oneself” were both present in philosophical exercises: “To care for the self is to know
oneself” (Foucault, 2005, p. 69). Furthermore, the “care of the self” gained prominence in Cynics, Stoics and Epicurean traditions through their philosophical exercises following the Greek culture. Foucault highlighted this primacy led to creating a culture where emphasis rested on caring for oneself and others. Foucault (2005) clarified he is not saying “self-knowledge is not involved” but “[a] different type of it is involved” (p. 420). The attention to self-knowledge, for later Foucault, rested on the self-mastery and the question of how subjects are constituted in their relation to themselves and others. Different modes of constitution come about as the result of experimenting with ethical boundaries that reconfigured self-knowledge and hence the relationship to oneself and others. In this context, the “care of the self” is a work to bring experience closer to knowledge for self-transformation.

Self-transformation is a visible theme in Foucault’s concern for the subject. It is visible not solely as a theme but as an exercise of examining his own work and self-correcting. Foucault (1997a) accepted:

Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others, and in the technologies of individual domination, in the mode of action that an individual exercises upon himself by means of the technologies of the self. (p. 225)

Foucault’s corrective self demonstrated an understanding of the necessary inclusion of the actions exercised on oneself. On the other hand, he continued to point to a thread in his work as the study of the history of experiences. “The experience of madness, the experience of disease, the experience of criminality, and the experience of sexuality,”
later Foucault (2010) insisted, “are important focal points of experiences in our culture” (p. 5). In relation to the study of experiences, the commonality between the early and later Foucault is the activity of replacement of what is visible with something that is silent. This was practiced towards his own works as well as towards history of thought. Foucault (2010) actively participated in “replacing the history of domination with the historical analysis of procedures of governmentality, and replacing the theory of the subject or the history of subjectivity with the historical analysis of the pragmatics of self and the forms it has taken…” (p. 5).

Although Foucault acknowledged the shifts in his work, he also pressed for an understanding of the continuity in his transformative labour. Koopman (2013) referred to the years of 1978-1981 as a period during which Foucault “was in the process of working out a distinction between self-liberation and self-transformation” (p. 175). The corrective self in Foucault finds ethics in the center of problematizing the commonly accepted notions of the subject. This ethics looks at philosophy as an activity to conduct and to care for oneself, and invite others to do the same. In his later works, Foucault is following a modality of care that is “inserted into the larger contexts of power and knowledge” (McGushin, 2007, p. 286). He relied on Socrates and Stoics as models who embodied and practiced this ethics.

5.3 Ethics, Problematization and Transformation

By adopting a new approach to the subject, Foucault planned to free ethics from the constraints of the other by bringing it closer to the struggles of the self. History of philosophical practices provided Foucault with the frames of ethical modality that can assist constitution of the subject. His stance is that philosophy is not only concerned
with love of wisdom, but is a work for freedom. In this way, philosophy as an activity is in conversation with politics, pedagogy and spirituality. Freedom is constrained, ephemeral and comes about as a result of problematization. Problematization poses, rather than answers, intertwined questions in ethics: How do we constitute ourselves in relation to the truth we know about ourselves? Problematizing the constitution of the subject anticipates the emergence of pluralized mode of subjectivity. Rather than explicating a single mode of being this approach reverses the gaze on applications of knowledge in pigeonholing the subjects. Furthermore, it constitutes an ongoing participation with truth in practices of knowledge.

“Problematization is the task of a history of thought against a history of behaviors or representations,” Foucault (1985) explained, “to define the conditions in which human beings problematize what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live” (p. 10). This conceptual frame of problematization was not separate for what Foucault often referred to in his later studies as the “art of existence.” The phrase meant “intentional and voluntary actions by which men [and women] not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being…” in Antiquity (Foucault, 1985, p. 10). “Art of existence” promotes self-transformation in a process of problematizing the conditions human beings live. Problematization, in the philosophical and spiritual practices of Greco-Roman era, assisted free subjects to govern themselves in relation to moral codes. The ethical aim of problematization was concerned with how individuals play an active role conducting themselves in relation to moral codes.
The attention to the Greco-Roman philosophy in later Foucault (1985) focused on “behavior of individuals in relation to rules and values that are recommended to them” since morality also “designates the manner in which” individuals “comply more or less fully with a standard of conduct, the manner in which they obey or resist an interdiction or a prescription” (p. 25). The “manner” in which individuals enact moral prescriptions highlights how they choose to conduct and constitute themselves in relation to the imposed codes. Foucault’s thesis highlighted, throughout history, subjects find themselves in relation to the limits of moral codes, and by bringing themselves under their own gaze, to the extent that it is possible, they problematize the rules and values imposed. Different mode of subjectivity emerged as a result of “differences” that have to do with the “mode of subjection (mode d’assujettissement): that is, with the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rules…” and “possible differences in the form of elaboration, of ethical work (travail éthique) that one performs on oneself, not only in order to bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behavior” (Foucault, 1985, p. 25). The emphasis on transformation is to converge self-awareness with self-formation. Foucault’s ethics added to the discourse of morality an attention to modes of becoming by attending to one’s daily practices to transform oneself as an ethical subject. He advocated for the possibility of practices of the self in relation to existing systems of values, rules and interdictions.

Foucault’s later texts explore the problematization of moral codes in the context of the history of sexual activities. He examined how individuals conduct themselves and relate to themselves and their partners in relation to the sexual moral codes. Meanwhile,
the books titled as *The Histories of Sexuality* are histories of “transformation.” In these texts, Foucault (1985) wrote of the:

history of the way in which individuals are urged to constitute themselves as subjects of moral conduct… concerned with the models proposed for setting up and developing relationships with the self, for self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself, for the transformations that one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object. This last is what might be called a history of “ethics” and “ascetics”, understood as a history of the forms of moral subjectivation and of the practices of self that are meant to ensure it. (p. 29)

By emphasizing a relationship with oneself, Foucault argued against moral obligations or criteria. Instead he argued the work on oneself through asceticism assists the formation and transformation of ethical subjects. Asceticism, as an active way of conducting one’s self, was an ancient exercise of attending to body and soul. Asceticism reemerged at different times throughout the history of the West as a form of “counter-conduct.” For example, the counter-conduct developed in Middle Ages to pastoral power, truth “extracted” and “conveyed as dogma,” was mysticism, “the privilege status of experiences” (Foucault, 2007b, p. 280).

Asceticism was the ground on which the reconstruction of ethics by Foucault opened the space for subjective experience. This subjective ethical perspective considered different ways in “thinking about power relations” (Luxon, 2013, p. 187). Given its reliance on philosophy as an activity that examines moral norms and codes, Foucault’s ethical frame is transformative of modern ethics. Foucault (2007b) found
“asceticism has a form of both internal and external challenge” (p. 273). This internal and external challenge was a new mode of problematization in Foucault’s critique. Problematization, as a philosophical exercise, assists each person within the context of their experience to ask how certain values gain prominence and how these values can be reassessed and reformulated. By attending to the entanglement of knowledge and power in day-to-day experiences, Foucault’s ethics reconstructed modern ethics with a political aim of changing ourselves.

To care for one’s self is both a moral and a political task that explores “how not to be governed like that, by that, in that name of those principles, with such and such objective in mind,” and also conduct oneself (Foucault, 2007a, p. 28). Critique, as mentioned in chapter 2 is not solely an academic stature, but an ethical attitude of self-examination of how one lives in her interrelationships. As an exemplar student, Foucault practiced this self-examination for the sake of transformations. In this context, his ethics as practicing oneself is in conversation with the concerns of modern education by assessing power relations and resituating subjective participation with knowledge in the process of education. Foucault’s ethics invites the assessment of persons by themselves about the ways in which they are urged to constitute themselves as moral subjects.
Chapter 6: Educational Ethics

*I am not a writer, a philosopher, a great figure of intellectual life: I am a teacher.*

(Foucault 1988b, p. 9)

The above quote highlights a confessional moment when Foucault chose an occupation and rejected other associations. Working within the lines of the previous chapter, this chapter takes Foucault as a teacher. I have planted his proposed ethics in education as a process where one finds, loses and transforms oneself in the activity of learning. Although ethics in education is an ambitious and ambiguous ground, Foucault saw ethics not solely limited to caring for others, although it certainly included others. In addition, ethics is more than a body of codes and obligations to be followed by teachers and students. Further, ethics is irreducible to political, technological and economical discourses and practices to govern a population. Foucault’s scholarship urges that among what already is, education should concern the care we take of ourselves in order to know and transform ourselves. Educational ethics, adopting Foucault’s (2011) view, can incorporate the “exercises one performs on oneself” and the “exercise of truth about oneself” in its conversation (p. 339).

The philosophical practices of the Antiquity play a major role in the construction of Foucault’s ethics. Greek ethics relied on askesis, a practice of self not for the sake of renouncing the world, as in Christian asceticism, but for the sake of building a relationship with one’s self and gaining self-mastery to live in an ethical manner (Foucault, 2001). In this context, ancient philosophy relied on active exercises of the self to bring to operation, and gave predominance, to caring for oneself and establishing a relation with the truth. This chapter examines Foucault’s ethics and its relevance for
education. It begins with a review of Foucault’s pedagogical ethics of the “care of the self” and the activity of *parrhesia* in dismantling politics. Second, the chapter explores the significance of philosophy as askesis in educational ethics. Third, it addresses the (dis)agreement between Pierre Hadot and Foucault in their readings of Antiquity along the line of the task of philosophy in the present.

### 6.1 Education, Not Politics

Foucault’s ethical conceptualization of the “care of the self” and truth telling emphasized a pedagogical and spiritual relationship. The historical roots of this ethics were demonstrated in Socrates’ dialogues with Athenians. Socrates’ quest for wisdom by living a philosophical life complicated the accepted conception of wisdom sold as education by the sophists. Following Socrates’ approach, the Epicureans and Stoics adopted philosophy as a way of life in practicing self-mastery of one’s conduct. In relation to social forces, Foucault’s current day reading of Antiquity argued for the role of philosophy as an avenue of detaching the subject from political power by strengthening the moral self. *Askesis* was “a training of oneself by oneself: this was one of the traditional principles to which the Pythagoreans, the Socratics, the Cynics had for a long time attributed great importance”; this training included “abstinences, memorizations, examination of conscience, meditations, silence, and listening to others” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 273).

These practices of conducting oneself are not individualistic or nihilistic approaches. The active training of oneself belongs to a culture and outlines what one does with oneself to gain a certain level of mastery over one’s passions. The spirit in which one works on oneself, takes care of oneself, is for the sake of conversion and self-
transformation. This is evident throughout the history of the West in pedagogy, government and religious practices. Foucault’s (1997a) insisted that it should not “be thought that pedagogy, government of the self, and salvation constitute three utterly distinct domains, employing different notions and methods; in reality there were numerous cross-overs and a definite continuity between the three” (pp. 89-90).

In relation to these three domains, Foucault’s philosophical ethos posed the possibility of rethinking political power by attending to complexity of relationships and awareness to subjectivity. For example, in the context of pedagogical relationships Foucault (1988c) brought attention to authority by saying he did not:

see where evil is in the practice of someone who, in a given game of truth knowing more than another, tells him [sic] what he must do, teaches him, transmits knowledge to him, communicates skills to him. The problem is rather to know how you are to avoid in these practices—where power cannot play and where is not evil in itself—the effects of domination which will make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of teacher, or put a student under the power of an abusive authoritarian professor, and so forth. I think these problems should be posed in terms of rules of law, of relational techniques of government and of ethos, of practice of self of freedom. (pp. 18-19)

Expressed in the last year of Foucault’s life, the above quote reflects the here and now of educational relationships. Foucault saw power as the problem between individuals, where institutional practices can change and power plays a role in practices of the self. As for subjectivity, it is persons in their contexts that play a game of constitution; what is at stake is “liberty” and “freedom,” as well as skills, knowledge and advice. In this
context, Foucault’s attention to Socrates dialogical pedagogy at the beginning of the history of Western thought highlighted that the care of the self accompanied self-knowledge.

The Delphic maxims of “know yourself” and “care of the self” played a pedagogical role in Socrates’ dialogues with Athenians before they concerned themselves with the city. Plato’s texts, *Alcibiades I* and *Laches*, are the focus of the later Foucault’s examination. In each text, Socrates’ dialogues are concerned with the operationalization of knowledge and skills as well as the virtues needed to engage in public life. It is in this context, that “care of the self” emerged as an ethical imperative in the Greek and Roman culture. “In Greek and Roman” Foucault (1988a) noted, “the injunction of having to know yourself was always associated with the other principle of having to take care of yourself, and it was that need to care for oneself that brought the Delphic maxim into operation” (p. 20). Foucault returned to *Alcibiades I*, a Socratic dialogue, because it revealed the axis of cultivation of the self in relation to knowing oneself.

*Alcibiades I*, is the text of Socrates’ dialogue with an Athenian youth named Alcibiades. Alcibiades wanted to engage in politics and public life but did not have the proper education and experience to engage in the affairs of the city. He became aware, through a series of questions by Socrates, that he lacked the education necessary to be involved in the government of the city. Near the end, Socrates told Alcibiades that he was still young and it is not too late to know himself and to take care of himself. “The need for the care of the self is thus inscribed not only within the political project, but also within the pedagogical lack” oriented to a specific moment of life: youth (Foucault, 2005, p. 37). *Alcibiades I* highlighted the importance of recognition of ignorance in
oneself that necessitates personal search for knowledge and truth. The dialogue also raised a worthy consideration of whether the virtues needed to govern the city can be taught.

The spirit in which Socrates approached Alcibiades is of interest to the modern readers in assessing Greek culture and the erotic love of boys. In Foucault’s (1988b) interpretation of the text, Alcibiades accepted “Socrates, not in a physical but in a spiritual sense” (p. 24). In Alcibiades I, Socrates dialogue shows the role of a teacher is to reawaken a search for knowledge in the context of one’s life. Socrates, unlike sophists, established relationships with his interlocutor and helped them to reassess themselves. Socrates’ dialogue and questioning brought Alcibiades closer to the examination of truth in his private and public life. Socrates reminded Alcibiades that it is not power or authority that he must seek to engage with the public life but justice and wisdom. The dialogue departed from value of knowledge for gaining political power to questioning what is knowledge and how does one takes care of oneself in order to combat one’s ignorance.

Foucault’s reading of Alcibiades I emphasized that at the beginning of the Western tradition concepts and experiences of constituting pedagogical relationships were intertwined as both philosophical and spiritual. The pedagogical relationships helped individuals to work toward self-mastery and actively engage in the assessment of the truth in their lives. This reading allowed Foucault to study the ways in which the “care of the self” developed, sustained and changed in the philosophical schools pioneered after Socrates. For example, the “care of the self” expresses urgency as an activity that overrides knowing oneself in Epicurean and Stoics. Foucault (1988b)
expressed that self-cultivation for stoics “involves various things: taking pains with one’s holdings and one’s health. It is always a real activity and not just an attitude” (p. 24).

Foucault (2005) argued that in Hellenistic traditions the “care of the self” gains prominence over knowing oneself. Furthermore, to conduct and care for oneself is no longer political and nor solely pedagogical but a medical activity. Foucault (1988b) emphasized: “For Socrates, occupying one with oneself is the duty of a young man, but later in the Hellenistic period it is seen as the permanent duty of one’s whole life” (p. 26). “Care of the self” in Hellenistic period developed as part of a medical model and “was substituted for Plato’s pedagogical model. The care of the self is not another kind of pedagogy…. One must become the doctor of oneself” (Foucault, 1988a, p. 31). This demonstrates that as an ethical imperative, “care of the self” gained prominence in the day-to-day conduct of persons. Its status as a medical model pointed to the urgency and importance of vigilant ethics, where one needed to become a doctor of oneself. The value of concern for the self is not to prepare oneself for future affairs, in adult life. One occupies oneself for its own end, at the present moment and throughout life.

In the Cynics and the Stoics, the Socratic method expanded from the individual to community practices with greater stress on the relationship of truth and one’s way of living. Conversion and transformation of the subject occurs as a result of self-work and examining one’s relationship to knowledge. In this context, Foucault (2005) rejected “the care of the self in the realm and form of the universal,” nor it is solely individual; the care of the self belongs to a community and it is “practiced within the group” (p. 117). In this context, philosophy as a practice relies on listening. The listener of discourse plays an active role in the process of dismantling universality. Since
“philosophy will be a discourse, will be real, only if it is listened to… [and] if it is accompanied, sustained, and exercised as a practice and through a set of practices” (Foucault, 2010, p. 246). The application of philosophical practice through listening rests on temporality of discourse and a possibility of continuous recreation of a self that was not once present. To care for one’s self assists applying one’s self to knowledge.

Historically the act of listening to philosophical theories was not merely to understand but enact a possibility of change in one’s way of life. Subjectivity called forth active enactment of accepting, rejecting and reworking discourse in one’s life. Logos, the rational principles, was to be applied. The pedagogical role of philosophy, as it was evident to Socrates, was not to teach how one listens to discourse, nor what one takes away as an exegesis. The aim of listening to a teacher or a master was not solely to become more knowledgeable. The “ancient pedagogy” functioned to be “limited, instrumental,” and “provisional,” Foucault (2014) continued, “its aim is to lead to a stage at which one no longer needs a director and is able to conduct oneself and be the sovereign director of oneself” (p. 267). The abilities developed by being under the direction of a teacher equipped one to self-examine one’s day-to-day conduct and work towards self-mastery.

Hellenistic philosophical traditions conveyed the importance of the relationship of the subject to herself in pedagogical, spiritual and ethical practices. In these traditions, philosophical practices were designed with an attention to the body. In these philosophical schools, Foucault (2005) noted, “[v]irtue must go through the body in order to become active. Therefore one must take care of one’s body, and askesis (ascetics) must include the body” (pp. 426-427). For Socrates it was the soul that was conceived as
the self and the site for examination and cultivation. In the Epicurean tradition philosophy was considered to be a permanent exercise of the care and attention to both body and soul regardless of one’s age. The importance rested in the moral vigilance that was present throughout one’s life. Foucault (1986) quoted Epicurus saying, “[l]et no young man delay the study of philosophy, and let no old man become weary of it; for it is never too early or too late to care for the well-being” (p. 46).

The relationships of the “care of the self” and truth telling, parrhesia, are intertwined in Foucault’s reading of the ancient philosophy. Each highlights a practice supplementary and vital to “knowing oneself”: one as the activity of conducting oneself and the other as a self-examination of truth about oneself. “Philosophical parrhesia is thus associated with the theme of the care of oneself (epimeleia heautou)” (Foucault, 2001, p. 24). In this context, Foucault explored the association of care and parrhesia in Plato’s Laches. Laches, a conversation about courage, education and training, took place between Socrates and two eminent Athenians. Foucault’s (2001) concern in the dialogue was the courage to tell the truth but also the recognition of “truth-telling teachers”:

In the political field we saw that there was a need for a parrhesistes who could speak the truth about political institutions and decisions, and the problem there was knowing how to recognize such a truth-teller. In its basic form, this same problem now reappears in the field of education. For if you yourself are not well-educated, how then can you decide what constitutes a good education? And if people are to be educated, they must receive the truth from a competent teacher. But how can we distinguish the good, truth-telling teachers from the bad or inessential ones? (p. 93)
The main concern is not who the teacher is, but how to recognize “a competent teacher” who tells the truth. Foucault (2001) relied on *Laches* to examine the ontological characteristics of the teacher, whose harmonic relation to truth, bios to logos, can function to conduct objective cross-examinations “of truth of the other’s existence” (p. 102).

*Laches* does not provide an answer to what education is the best for the individual; it grapples with the recognition of a teacher. In relation to this dialogue, Foucault (2001) outlined the role of the teacher: 1) “assumes an epistemic role,” 2) takes “a stand toward the city” and 3) “elaborate[s] the nature of relationship between truth and one’s style of life ...” (p. 106). The first two are associated with education in our modern day just as they were for Socrates’ dialogue with Alcibiades. The third aspect of the teacher’s pedagogical role, however, relied on *parrhesia* as “a practice, which tries to shape the specific relations individuals have to themselves... is not to persuade the assembly, but to convince someone that he must take care of himself and of others; and this means that he must *change his life*” (Foucault, 2001, p. 106, italics in the original).

The notion of conversion and transformation are interwoven in the pedagogical role of the teacher who tells the truth, who establishes a personal relationship to assist this self-transformation. This truth is not solely visible in discourse. It is demonstrated in the ontological character of the teacher and his/her way of life.

The pedagogical implications of *parrhesia* are not solely organized in a teacher-student relationship. The parrhesiast used frank-speech to question the sovereign during the Hellenic period. The truth-teller speaks to the weak and the strong. Since the parrhesiast was dependent on the competency and the context in which one spoke the
truth-teller qualification was secondary to his/her ability and experience of telling the truth. Hence, there was an element of courage involved in parrhesia for giving advice and being advised, but also for recognizing the truth for and in oneself. Foucault (2001) gave the example of Diogenes, a Cynic, when he confronts Alexander as a parrhesiast. The “main effect of parrhesiastic struggle with power is not to bring the interlocutor to a new truth, or to a new level of self-awareness; it is to lead the interlocutor to internalize this parrhesiastic struggle—to fight within himself against his own faults, and to be with himself in the same way that Diogenes was with him” (p. 133). In this context, the aim of parrhesia was to bring forth an attention to the struggle one has with oneself to conduct oneself regardless of his/her social status. This ontological stance is corrective of the political stance by applying oneself to oneself; subjective power attends to the way one lives in relation to the truth.

Parrhesia as the courage to tell the truth is also the test of truth as it applies to one’s life. The concern is not limited to pedagogical ends, but to invite someone in power, or seeking power, to examine the struggle within herself. Luxon (2008) clarified that part of the effort of destabilizing truth “may cause a person to be plagued again with doubt and uncertainty” and to “know that these uncertainties arise not for a lack of knowledge or of will,” but as a result of engaging with others (p. 399). Indeed, “Parrhesia gains ethical and political salience” as a practice of developing oneself not solely based on the ability to ‘dare to know’ but as the ability to ‘dare to act’,” Luxon (2008) added, “Parrhesia ‘educates,’ rather than ‘produces,’ individuals” (p. 379).

Daring to act is dynamically applied to oneself; in this sense the political becomes ethical. The “care of the self” transfigures ethics, a political action in itself that begins
with assessing and conducting oneself. In this context, Foucault’s (2001) conceptualization of *parrhesia* as an activity of truth telling connected the practices of self-examination to an active participation with others. The aims of examinations and diagnosis in Antiquity were not to evaluate the other, to determine positions in social institutions, or to map out life trajectories in early life. Tests helped to evaluate oneself in relation to oneself and living a life in accordance to one’s relation with the truth. This life as private as it may sound was conducted publicly to be in full view of others. Unlike the limited definition of tests and the measuring of success in modern education, Stoic philosophers viewed life as a test.

### 6.2 Philosophy as Askesis

In his later work, Foucault (2005) reconceptualized philosophy as a practice to take care of “oneself and others” (p. 136). Foucault (1986) clarified that “[t]he care of the self—or the attention one devotes to the care that others should take of themselves—appears then as an intensification of social relations” (p. 53). To care for one’s self has an ethical concern of strengthening of personal social relations. In Foucault’s (1986) view, this is participatory and done for the sake of:

- importance to the “private” aspects of existence, to the values of personal conduct, and to the interest that people focused on themselves. Thus, it was not a strengthening of public authority that accounted for the development of that rigorous ethics, but rather a weakening of the political and social framework within which the lives of individuals used to unfold. (p. 41)

Private, in this sense, highlighted familial and friendship relations, as these relations expand the margins of existence. In Antiquity, conducting oneself led to rigorous ethics
that indirectly formed resistance to political authority. As one cultivated the interconnection of knowing oneself and taking care of oneself, one reserved the projection of values upon others. Since one recognized this exists also in others, it became possible, to some degree, to uphold judgment of who the other is, or who he/she may become.

“Care of the self” is the title of the third volume of *The History of Sexuality*, the last book by Foucault. The examination of productive powers, biopower, in the first volume of *History of Sexuality* led to Foucault’s studies of how we cared for ourselves in Christianity and Antiquity. In biopower, political powers gain legitimacy to nurture “populations” and “provide them with comfort, fulfillment, pleasure, and happiness,” McGushin, (2007) noted, this led to Foucault’s attention to care for one’s “body, capacities, pleasures, comforts, and desires” not “integrated into the productive force of institutions and networks of power relations” (p. 12). Foucault observed that the art of government is constituted in biopower on the bases of care applied to selves. Moving away from disciplinary and judicial art of government, his self-care ethics is focused on a set of exercises, askesis, to work towards self-constitution. Along this path the questioning of the role of modern sciences, as it was in *The Order of Things*, continued for Foucault since “the ancient philosophical project of care was displaced by the modern scientific project of knowledge” (McGushin, 2007, p. 282).

In Antiquity, Foucault (2005) argued, philosophy was “the set of principles and practices available to one, or which one makes available to others, for taking proper care of oneself or of others” (p. 136). Philosophical schools following Plato, such as the Stoics, Foucault (2005) noted, strengthened “the practice of spiritual direction” and
“leading a communal life” (p. 138). In this sense philosophy as a practice mediated the relation of the subject to pedagogy and politics, since the two were intertwined in bringing the attention of the subject to herself. The ethical imperative of “care of the self” in philosophy finds applications with the twofold aim of transfiguring pedagogy and transcending politics. For Foucault (2010), in Antiquity the “practice of philosophy”:

is a way for the individual to constitute himself as a subject …. The mode of being of the philosophizing subject should constitute the mode of being of the subject exercising power. So it is not a question of a coincidence between a philosophical knowledge and a political rationality, but one of identity between the mode of being of the philosophizing subject and the mode of being of the subject practicing politics. (p. 294)

Philosophy as practice is not a political rationality, but its main concern is a “mode of being of the subject exercising power” (p. 294). It is here that the subject is not presumed, but one that discloses something of its relation through practicing philosophy. It is important to note that philosophizing takes different forms through Antiquity and Foucault did not give value to one school of thought over the other. In order to bring the role of thinking into living, Foucault’s work is descriptive, focusing on askesis or the activity of philosophy. For example, Foucault (2001) noted “in the Cynic tradition, the main references for the philosophy are not to the texts or doctrines, but to exemplary lives” (p. 118). In this tradition, the “philosophizing subject” tests her relation to truth, *parrhesia*, in its temporality to question collective habits through behaviors and attitudes, rather than explications in text.
Foucault (2010) insisted that philosophy’s “relation to politics, must not define for politics what it has to do. It has to define for the governor, the politician, what he has to be” (p. 295, italics added). As it was for the teacher, the politician relies on philosophy for an ontological constitution. For example, Foucault (2010) read in Plato’s letters that “philosophical truth-telling is not political rationality, but it is essential for a political rationality to be in a certain relationship…with, philosophical truth-telling, just as it is important for a philosophical truth-telling to test its reality in relation to a political practice” (p. 288). Foucault found the rule of philosophy as a practice of disclosing and speaking the truth in relation to political action. Philosophy tells the truth in the name of a critical analysis and considers the historical conjectures and consequences (Foucault, 2010). The concern at the birth of philosophy was not to develop a political rationality, but an ontological relation to oneself and to truth.

The main concern of philosophy as askesis in Foucault’s ethics is the enactment of the subject towards the present and the self-examination of the truth. In his lecture, titled “The Government of Self and Others I,” Foucault (2010) continuously stressed that the “concerns of philosophy is not politics…. Philosophy’s question is not the question of politics; it is the question of the subject in politics” (p. 319). Philosophy as a practice attends to the constitution of subject in relation to the recognition of truth. For example, in reading Socrates’ dialogue in Apology, Foucault (2010) noted parrhesia “may appear in the things themselves, it may appear in ways of doing things, it may appear in ways of being” (p. 320). However, the importance of this reading from Foucault’s concern with experience rested in the ancient attitude towards philosophy as giving form to one’s life as “one really is in fact, in one’s life, an agent of the truth” (Foucault, 2011, p. 320). And
in this sense, philosophy is informed by the practices of the self and an ontological relationship with a truth. Truth is spoken, but also gives form to the subject’s life. Foucault (2010) stressed *parrhesia* is the “function of philosophy” as “the possibility of speaking courageously and freely, and telling one’s truth courageously and freely” (p. 343). Truth is contested as in the case of Socrates, or leads to the transfiguration of the social domain in the case of the Cynics. For example, in the Cynics tradition *parrhesia* gained a “pedagogical framework” with dispersed effects on the public spectators faced by Cynics questioning of commonly accepted values of Athenians’ life (Foucault, 2010, p. 345).

Foucault was preoccupied with philosophy as an educational practice that leads to self-formation and reformation. The personal exercise of oneself works on the development of acts and practices. In this relation, askesis as an activity readily decentralizes acceptance of ready to hand knowledge by emphasizing examination of knowledge within the personal context. This does not neglect the importance of receiving directions, but queries the significance of deliberating on what one does with directions. Foucault (2014) noted that ancient pedagogy worked toward a position of self-sufficiency, but in contrast, Christianity introduced “the technique of direction… principally around the relationship of obedience” (p. 274). This change in the technique of direction “alters and inverts all its effects” previously established in Antiquity (Foucault, 2014, p. 275). It is not that the concern for self-mastery and self-examination disappeared as a result of Christian exercises. Foucault (1997a) noted, where the Stoics’ exercise focused on active administration of one’s self, “Christian exercises” were “much more concerned with thoughts than with actions” (p. 215).
Foucault’s reading of the Greco-Roman philosophical practices explored the modality of forming a relationship to oneself and others and decentralization of power by the activity of the subject. Foucault (2005) conceptualized philosophical practices with two objectives: “resistance to external events” and “training and strengthening courage” (p. 427). As noted earlier, the aim of caring for one’s self is to reconstruct the political and social framework in which modern subjects attend to the way they live. Philosophy, as it was in Antiquity, provides exercises not solely to gain access to knowledge about oneself but to examine knowledge and one’s relation to truth. Foucault (2005) emphasized philosophy as “askesis is a practice of truth” (p. 317) and through this window the relation between subject and knowledge “takes on a … certain spiritual value for the subject, in the subject’s experience” (p. 318). He also showed the changes in askesis as a practice of truth, throughout the history of the West. For example, where the thought exercise of the self in Plato brings the self “closer to the divine,” Foucault (2005) noted that for Stoics, “looking at oneself must be the constitutive test of the self as subject of truth, … through reflexive exercise of meditation” (p. 460).

6.3 Foucault and the Present Past

The conversations with Pierre Hadot, the French scholar of Antiquity assisted Foucault in his conceptualization of philosophy as an art of living. Situating Hadot’s critique of Foucault’s notion of aesthetic life, this section, helps clarify some of Foucault’s views about philosophy, spirituality and subjectivity in relation to a modern way of life. By their attention to philosophy and spirituality, Foucault and Hadot, provided an awareness of the mode by which we have come to recognize and constitute the subject throughout the Western history. By reviewing their perspectives, I hope to
show their similarities as well as differences in interpreting the past in relation to the present. This section is also an assessment of Foucault’s later works in relation to other philosophers—Socrates, Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, and Hadot—to show his distinctive contribution to living an examined life.

In his studies, Foucault found consistency among Socrates’ teachings and post-Socratic schools with their attention to knowledge to live a harmonious life. However, this orientation to knowledge in Socrates and post-Socratic schools took a different form in relation to “the right manner of life” in Foucault’s (2011) studies, and focused on incorporation “of the art of living and of the way of living, [in]… its philosophical foundations” (p. 246). In Foucault’s (1977a) analysis, the “‘care of the self’ [souci de soi] was, for the Greeks, one of the main principles of cities, one of the main rules for social and personal conduct and for the art of life” (p. 226). Foucault (1986) wrote, “it was this theme of the care of oneself, consecrated by Socrates, that later philosophy took up again and ultimately placed at the center of that ‘art of existence’ which philosophy claimed to be” (p. 44). The “care of the self,” “included not only the need to know… but to attend effectively to the self, and to exercise and transform oneself” before engaging with the affairs of the city (Foucault, 1985, p. 73). Foucault’s ethics followed Socrates’ attention to what we do with ourselves, what we consider knowledge, and the value of knowledge in ways that we transform ourselves.

Foucault relied on the temporality in the interpretation of the history of ethics to transfigure what once was and what now is the concern of ethics, mainly how should one live. This is evident in one of Foucault’s philosophical goals: to articulate a possibility of change in relation to the pressing needs of social life. He returned to Socrates as an
educator in addressing the political and moral questions of modern life. Socrates did not write books. We are to understand his dialogues and life through Plato’s writings. We know from these texts that Socrates guided his interlocutors by posing questions and leading them to an understanding of their lack of knowledge and encouraging them to know themselves. Socrates as a philosopher/teacher was attentive to the existential aspect of his interlocutor.

Socrates, the seeker of wisdom, was ironic and paradoxical. He declared, he only knew one thing: that is, that he does not know (Plato, 1899). One thing Socrates knows is that he does not know. This is inseparable from whether what Socrates knows and does not know is an explication that can be transmitted. Socrates’ approach to knowledge is a confession of what he knows. This confession stops further confessions about whether or not he is to be perceived in possession of knowledge. Socrates’ attention to language, “as an agent” and “doer of deeds” has captured the attention of philosophers and teachers (Talero, 2009, p. 19). As a lover of dialogue, Socrates found limits in language: “If I don’t reveal my views on justice in words, I do so by my conduct” (in Hadot, 1995, p. 155). Socrates’ attention to conduct encouraged a way of life in practice. To those who are seeking knowledge, he advised, to self-cultivate and pay attention to conduct.

Foucault positioned Socrates as an exemplary teacher who, by his conduct and words, brought different perspectives to his interlocutors. Socrates is enigmatic and his dialogues are the subject of reinterpretation of philosophers and educators that followed him. For example, Foucault spent one lecture in his final course to differentiate his position from Nietzsche on the interpretation of the last words of Socrates: “Crito, we
owe a cock to Asclepitus”⁴ (Plato, 1899, p.108). Nietzsche read, “[t]his ridiculous and terrible ‘last word’ means, for those who have ears: ‘O Crito, life is a disease’. Is it possible that a man like him … should have been a pessimist?” (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 272). For Foucault, death is not a cure, nor is life a disease. Socrates sacrifices a rooster to the god of medicine for a cure of his (and his disciples) soul(s) before death. Socrates’, “relation to himself and to the truth prevented him from listening to this false opinion [fleeing from the prison] and letting himself be seduced by it” (Foucault, 2011, p. 109; italics added). In the last years of his life, Foucault reworked the “care of the self” as an aesthetic way of life that diverged from conventional life and sustained an affirmation of spiritual exercises of self in relation to the truth.

In this context, Hadot’s scholarship of the spiritual exercises in ancient philosophy contributed to Foucault’s conceptualization of aesthetic way of life. Hadot’s (1995) review of spiritual practices of philosophical figures started with Socrates to Marcus Aurelius and ended with a reflection on Foucault’s work. In discussing Socrates, Hadot (1995) pointed to the immeasurable influence of Socrates on Western thought as a model of a sage that others, including Nietzsche, both inspired to become and tried to get away from. In relation to Marcus Aurelius, who along with Seneca are the Stoics referenced often by Foucault in his later work, Hadot (1995) wrote that theoretical discourse was an important part of their practice. For Marcus Aurelius: “Philosophy as it was lived and experienced thus implied continuous exercises of meditation and constant vigilance, in order to keep alive in one’s mind the principles taught by theoretical discourse” (p. 192). This is important since Foucault gave more emphasis to the act,

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⁴ The Benjamin Jowett (1817-1893) translation stated “I owe” in contrast to Edward Cope’s (1840-1897) translation stating “we owe.”
rather than the theories in his reading of Stoics. However, before this statement, Hadot (1995) acknowledged the Stoics had the understanding that “we are parts of the cosmos, and that we must make our desires conform to this situation. We no longer do ethical theory—the definition and classification of virtues and duties—we simply act in an ethical way” (p. 192). This is in line with Socrates’ response to the definition of justice as a conduct.

Turning to Foucault, Hadot (1995) noted, “Foucault is propounding a culture of the self which is too aesthetic. In other words, this may be a new form of dandyism, late twentieth-century style” (p. 211). This is a valid cautionary for Foucault’s readers. Foucault (2005) clarified that tekne tou biou, the art of living or a technique of existence, reflected the nuclei of Greek culture:

For a Greek, human freedom has to be invested not so much, or not only in the city-state, the law, and religion, as in this tekhne (the art of oneself) which is practiced by oneself. … And we have seen precisely how someone like Alcibiades, wanting to make a political career and direct the life of government, is reminded by Socrates of the principle of which he was ignorant: You cannot develop the tekhne you need, you cannot make a rational object of your life as you wish, if you do not attend to yourself. The epimeleia heautou is inserted therefore within the necessity of the tekhne of existence. (p. 447) The above quote responds to what Hadot saw as dandyism in Foucault’s work. It is more in line with what Hadot (1995) emphasized as the task of philosophy as a spiritual exercise. In these lines Foucault also displaced what is in place in the present by highlighting that one could not “make a rational object” of her life unless she attended to
herself. In this manner, Foucault reconstructed philosophy’s love of wisdom by introducing to philosophy a concern for human freedom and the possibility of reinventing oneself.

Hadot’s cautionary has merits for Foucault’s readers. Hadot (2006) was cognizant that “to write the history of thought is sometimes to write the history of a series of misinterpretations” (p. 14). This misinterpretation, however, plays a role in understanding and writing philosophy. Indeed, Foucault may have found the criticism a legitimate concern for clarification and revision, since he consistently applied critique to his own work. On the other hand, Hadot’s (1995) book, subtitled *Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, treated Foucault’s endeavor with respect in relation to the history of philosophy. Hadot positioned Foucault’s work as a continuation of meditative and spiritual exercises of philosophers following Socrates. In his critique of Foucault, Hadot was conscious of his own emphasis on spiritual exercises of the ancient life. In this sense, Hadot (1995) did not separate Foucault’s aim from his own by noting: “description of the practices of the self—like, moreover, my description of spiritual exercises—is not merely an historical study but rather a tacit attempt to offer contemporary mankind a model of life,” which Foucault calls “an aesthetic of existence…” (p. 208).

The stylization of one’s existence had a moral and political intention in Foucault’s text: to transform the constitution of the subject. In an interview, titled *An Aesthetics of Existence* given in the last month of his life, Foucault (1988a) once again stated his lifelong skepticism:
I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of subject to be found everywhere. I am very skeptical of this view of the subject and very hostile to it. I believe, of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity, on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, styles, inventions to be found in the cultural environment.

(pp. 50-51)

Foucault was skeptical of the notion of subjectivity imposed by a theory. Instead, he believed in practicing oneself. This practice countered the discourse of universal subject by attending to a day-to-day liberation of oneself bound to the cultural environment. Thus, the subject neither falls into a void nor acts out of a vacuum. She/he acts based on rules, styles and inventions in a given time and space. Studying Antiquity, Foucault argued that moral codes that are transmitted or widely accepted at one time become problematized through the practices of liberation and the enactment of subjects. These practices can gain dominance and may need to be changed by destabilizing the sovereignty of their own thinking. Much like Socrates, in Foucault’s ethics rests the possibility of change by examining one’s relation to oneself and others and attending to one’s conduct.

Hadot (2002) found a more technical misinterpretation in Foucault’s reading of modern philosophers, specifically, in relation to Descartes and Kant. Hadot argued that the practice of philosophy, as a way of life, is a concern present in the work of Descartes and Kant, whose efforts were under reconstruction by Foucault. By discussing Descartes’ *Meditations*, Hadot (2002) opposed Foucault’s understanding that “[e]vidence has been substituted for askesis” and saw Descartes’ *Meditations* as “exercise of the soul
within the tradition of ancient spirituality” (p. 264). In relation to Kant, Hadot (2002) reminded us that Kant was mindful of “the practical employment of reason” to “a certain way of life, inspired, in the last analysis, by the model of the sage” (p. 270). In Hadot’s view modern philosophy, in the works of Descartes and Kant, was not solely theoretical. Foucault’s ethics was inspired by Kant’s modern ethical question of what we should do. Foucault, however, contested to binding persons to their duties and constituting a universal understanding of the subject in answering this question. His problematization and practices of the self acknowledged the social factors constraining individual freedom, but also provide the frames in which ethical subjects participate in their social domain.

Foucault’s misinterpretation in relation to Descartes must be examined, not to respond to Hadot, but to consider Foucault’s stance in the lectures he delivered late in his life. Foucault accepted that Descartes’ Meditations were a great example of modern philosophy taking form as an activity. However, Foucault’s concern was the Cartesian method that allowed us to approach ourselves as if we are reading ourselves as subjects of spirituality. In Foucault’s (2005) view, spirituality “postulates that the truth is not given to the subject by a simple act of knowledge… for the subject to have right of access to the truth he [she] must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become to some extent … other than him[her]self” (Foucault, 2005, p. 15). Foucault accepted that philosophy and spirituality were interconnected in Antiquity as proposed by Hadot. It is for this acceptance that Foucault argued that modern philosophy and its relation to truth no longer addressed the importance of transformation of the subject in spiritual practices.

The concern for Foucault (2005) was the history of truth as it presents itself in the modern period “when it is assumed that what gives access to the truth, the condition for
the subject’s access to the truth, is knowledge (connaissance) and knowledge alone” (p. 17). Foucault examined the experiences that “knowledge alone” equips us with and as a result of this examination he decentralized the truth we tell about ourselves. He showed how we constructed a truth about the mad, sick and criminal and identified with a set of norms in our way of life. Foucault acknowledged that the subject is bound to normalizing and disciplinary control as long as it is assumed that the private realm of our reason has access to the truth. To care for oneself is to assess the problem of self-knowledge for oneself as demonstrated by Socrates, this intensified in Stoics’ practices of the self such as “examination of conscience” (Foucault, 2005, p. 463).

Foucault (2005) stated that knowledge was not the mere appropriation of what one knows, but how one lives and transforms oneself. In Hellenistic traditions the pedagogical role of the “care of the self” went beyond a preparation for the adult life. It became an ethical obligation that every person regardless of age apply oneself to one’s self. One came under the gaze of a master to learn how to take care of oneself, to transform oneself and become a master of this self, so he/she could help others. In the context of modern education, Foucault’s approach to knowledge assists our questioning of how students are both the subject and object of knowledge. How do they become subject to a set of procedures that assess their ability to learn? How the strengthening of the hermeneutics tradition that followed Greco-Roman tradition, has influenced the way we view knowledge and conduct ourselves? Foucault’s (mis)interpretation of the past helps us inquire into how students experience themselves in the process of knowing themselves and transforming themselves? His problematization of the past and present brings attention to the truth and conduct of contemporary education.
Chapter 7: Implications and Conclusion

Are we able to have an ethics of acts and their pleasures, which would be able to take into account the pleasure of the other? Is the pleasure of the other something, which can be integrated in our pleasure? (Foucault, 1984, p. 346)

The above quote demonstrates an aim of the “care of the self” in Foucault’s reconceptualization of Greco-Roman ethics was also concerned with the other. This concern for the other shows recognition of the other. Perhaps others too are in struggle to know themselves and take care of themselves. In educational ethics, this view advocates for curiosity and skepticism rather than giving answers for how others should live their life. Instead, what are their pleasures in educating themselves? Foucault was hostile to outlining implications of what one should do, what one should adopt as knowledge, what one should do to others. But he clearly advocated taking into account the pleasure of the other and the care for oneself. The work on oneself has a moral element that concerns the practices of the self and the pleasures of the other.

This thesis described how, from 1978, Foucault (2008b) began to conceptualize an action-oriented schema for changing the verdicts about self-constitution. The emphasis on the “care of the self” was connected with critique, a critique that we must first apply to ourselves. This demonstrated a desire for cultural change by emphasizing the ethical activity of each person. “People do revolt” perhaps beginning by revolutionizing themselves and attending to their own conduct (Foucault, 2000, p. 452). This way, we each mediate political power through active exercise of ourselves. With this stress on participation, Foucault posed problems to the modern understanding of
individuality and highlighted that as ethical subjects each person constitutes a power to govern and conduct herself.

In relation to contemporary education, Foucault’s ethics brings attention to how we recognize ourselves as subjects. This is especially important for leaving room for the dispersed mode of subjectivity in the activity of students and teachers. This recognition fashions practices of taking care of others and ourselves. In relation to educational ethics, Foucault’s ethics is supplementary to Dewey’s (1965) “seeing education in terms of life experiences” (p. 51). In addition, it includes a conversation about how interactions in a cultural environment are accompanied by the practices of the self. Foucault was seeking an orientation to self-mastery that, if misunderstood, could lead to neglect of responsibility to distant others. In this manner, Noddings’ relational ethics foregrounds a necessary receptivity of the other required in educational relationships.

Does Foucault’s labour dissolve the doublet of object and subject by focusing on the formation of the ethical subject? The answer Foucault provided is an exercise of oneself, askesis, to become a subject of truth in one’s life. In education, this exercise can include, and is not limited to, orienting to experiences of knowledge in order to transform oneself. As an example, the very activity of studying can be thought as the process of conducting oneself and taking care of oneself. Studying enables recognition that learning is an ongoing conversation with persons, texts and powers. In this context, parrhesia “outlines a set of concrete practices that school individuals in the arts of interpretive discretion required to make our partial understandings and particular claims politically and ethically robust” (Luxon, 2008, p. 379). The activity of telling the truth, hearing the truth and establishing a relationship with the truth is an educational practice that evokes
care and curiosity. This care is not dogmatic in producing the subjects it conceptualizes. Foucault (1997c) stressed that his critical attitude in ethics “is one possible route, again, among many others” in exploring how we form ourselves as ethical subjects (p. 26). It is admittedly partial. It includes the necessary space for personal-doubt in ethics.

This self-doubt is ethical and educational in gathering a better understanding of the value of knowledge in transformation of its subjects. Foucault (1985) was direct in asking “what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower’s straying afield of himself?” (p. 8). This perhaps shows Foucault’s recognition of finding himself as subject of and subject to knowledge. He emphasized the application of rethinking the self through philosophical activity is a “critical work of thought upon thought” not to legitimize “what one already knows,” but “attempt to know how and to what extent it is possible to think differently… undergo[ing] changes, and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication” (Foucault, 1985, p. 9). This was Foucault’s practice, to think differently again and again in his steady transformation.

To think for oneself is relational and creative. It examines one’s self for the sake of changing what one takes to be legitimate. The process of change is accompanied by self-creation and is inseparable from cultural experiences. In Foucault’s view, conversion is an inevitable occurrence as a result of experiences if we examine experiences as more than a simplistic appropriation. Moving away from sovereign power, at the cusp of economic and political controls of modern government, Foucault (1997a) was encouraging us to think differently about day-to-day experiences as moral
and political subject: “above all, we have to change ourselves” (p. 217). His ethical
problematization positions persons in their cultural context to be practitioners of ethics,
rather than idealist or pessimist in relation to their context.

Foucault (1984) did not suggest that he knows what the moral way is. He was
rather, concerned with “the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral
way?” (p. 355). In this context, he examined the modes of subjectivity and the ways we
may be able to alter the practices of ourselves. Although Foucault found the present
similar to the Greeks, in responding to whether the ancient Greeks offered a plausible
alternative to the present, his response was clear:

No! I am not looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution of a problem
in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people.
You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that’s the reason
why I don’t accept the word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of
problems, of problematiques. My point is not that everything is bad, but that
everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. (Foucault, 1984, p.
343)

Foucault’s genealogies are a “genealogy of problems” not “alternatives.” In this manner,
he was not concerned with providing solutions to modern ethics. However his attention
to the way of life elicits a vigilance of the relationship to oneself. In his studies of
Antiquity, Foucault was not looking for solutions but working toward our changing
understanding of our relationships and ourselves. Antiquity offered a modality of ethical
selves and the patient labour of gaining self-mastery through wakeful conduct. It is also
evident Greek and Hellenistic schools fostered the activity of keeping a suspicious eye on
the formation and transformation of the selves through self-examination. Foucault (1997a) stated “[t]he goal of he Greek schools of philosophy was the transformation of the individual” as one actively problematizes oneself (p. 184).

In outlining the implications of “problematization based on practices of the self,” we can find in Foucault (1985) his own transformation resulting “in a different way of thinking” (p. 12). Foucault’s own transformation led to a stylization in his private-public life in full view for others. For example, his concern for friendship, self-other relationship, grew as he was emphasizing the importance of the relation to oneself. The “parrhesiatic friendship” in Foucault’s work, Tom Roach (2012) noted, is the activity of “encouraging the friend to become self-sufficient” and friends avoid the “two great adversaries” of truth-telling: “flattery and rhetoric” (p. 28). Foucault’s (1997a) interest in friendship was more than a pedagogical relationship; it concerned pleasure, but went beyond it by advocating for an asceticism and devotion to one another. Friendship reconstructs the institutional relationship by disturbing hierarchy and emphasizing the importance of a sovereign life.

“The sovereign life is a life beneficial to others and, underpinned by the relationship of possession, enjoyment, and pleasure in oneself,” and Foucault (2011) described one of the forms this relation takes is that of teacher and student:

The teacher must not merely give the student lessons in skills, pass on knowledge to him, teach him logic…, and nor is this what the student demands from his teacher. A different relationship must be established between them, a relationship of care, assistance, and help. … The sovereign life is therefore a life of assistance and help to others (student or friend). But it is useful and beneficial to others in yet
another form: this is inasmuch as it is in itself a sort of lesson... given to
humankind by the very way in which one leads this life in full view of everyone.

(pp. 271-272)

It is evident the pedagogical implications of Foucalt’s work may take many forms. One
is between student and teacher, and resembles a “relationship of care.” In another form it
is “a sort of lesson,” because it is a care given indirectly to others, by the very way in
which one lives as an exemplar in full view of everyone.

Foucault lived such a life. His own transformation was not a hidden agenda. In
an interview at the end of his life, Foucault (1988a) disclosed: “I am not interested in the
academic status of what I am doing because my problem is my own transformation” (p. 14).
How can this transformation be educational? By acting as an exemplar. Foucault
(1984) explained self-mastery in the Hellenistic age was not for power over others, but a
way of relating to “people, who are also masters of themselves. And this new kind of
relation to the other is much more reciprocal than before” (p. 358). It is evident that the
concern is to reestablish reciprocity in relationships. This concern was established with a
consideration of the wider scope of power in governing others, that which finds it
legitimate to tell others how to live, what to learn and how to act. Webb, Gulson and
Pitton (2014) stressed one of the implications of the “care of the self” is a reworking of
the neoliberalism governmentality in education policy. As one works towards
transforming one’s self, one works to transform the notion of governmentality given in a
place.

Taking reciprocal relationships seriously, we must attend to the short falls in
Foucault’s ethics. One criticism by Cooper (2014) is that Antiquity’s “ethics of the self
is concerned exclusively [and] developed for free man” (p. 50). Aware of this fact, Foucault (1985) explicitly acknowledged that the Greek ethics “was an ethics for men: an ethical thought, written, and taught by men, and addressed to men—to free men, obviously” (p. 22). If this “ethics” was already applied only to free men, the men who were subjects and in charge of their conduct, why would Foucault emphasize that this ethics be reawakened again? This is a noteworthy criticism since Foucault’s studies of Antiquity did not argue for a male dominated view or a masculine model of self-mastery. Foucault (1985) noted that “[a]n institutional reference” “imposed” on women to participated in this ethics (p. 83).

First, as noted earlier, this does not mean that he is suggesting Antiquity provides us with an alternative, but rather showing, as a result of certain practices, the Hellenistic tradition transfigured Greek’s notion of subjectivity and Christianity also transfigured Hellenistic philosophical practices of self. By addressing the historical contingencies in his ethics, Foucault demonstrated the knowledge of ourselves is helping and hindering us to transform our relation to ourselves. Second, Foucault was indirect in his construction of ethics that sought subjective power at a time when we perceive ourselves to be free. “Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are ‘free’. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available” (Foucault, 2000, p. 342). Foucault’s ethics attends to subjectivity to ensure a restructuring of power is a possibility even when it is rooted deep in the social nexus. Foucault was guarding the free men and women against the constructed truth about themselves in modern life. We care for ourselves when we examine our relation to truth
and act in determining the boundaries of power by which we are governed and govern ourselves.

Another criticism to pose is that Foucault neglected the fact that in today’s society, some, because of their socio-economical status face potential difficulties to take care of themselves. In this context, Foucault questioned the value of the social position of the rich, whether they should cultivate their wealth or they should cultivate themselves. In the last lectures, Foucault became more interested in the Cynics way of life. He assessed the way in which Cynics actively sought poverty to contest social values. Foucault (2008b) did not suggest that we should seek poverty in our lives, but questioned the value imposed by the political economy since 18th Century liberalism in which individuals find and understand themselves as working agents of their economy and also define themselves economically. Foucault (2011) highlighted that Cynics actively sought the way of life that abandoned materiality. The Cynics’ reevaluation of the constructed social value of wealth took place as a public self-experimentation with the games of truth in their culture. The Cynics’ parrhesia in Foucault is “seen as manifold performance in which the realities, fractures, and potentialities of the present are spoken in order to proleptically create new truth” (Simpson, 2012, p. 114). This participation with truth is a work towards questioning, creating and recreating what becomes of value in a place.

The limitations above are valid concerns since they look for answers in works that were interrupted by Foucault’s death. Foucault managed to provide a conversation about the power we exercise as ethical subjects. To some degree he outlined how we previously have come to recognize ourselves as ethical subjects in our history. Foucault
(1998b) did not specify a set of applications to be tailored to education, nevertheless he brought attention to the role of persons in their “pedagogy,” as it was in Alcibiades I, “[t]o take care of oneself consists in knowing oneself” (pp. 25-26). Foucault also made visible how later philosophical schools such as the Stoics adopted the “care of the self” in exercising a mastery over oneself, a labour of the self upon itself. At first it seems “the care of the self” is an ethical vigilance one develops solely towards oneself. However, by asking and attending in such a way one holds back to ask: what are others to do with themselves? Are they also to take care of themselves to gain self-mastery over themselves? Foucault’s ethics is an ethics of showing rather than telling what one should do with one’s self.

With this in mind, one of the limitations of Foucault’s ethics is perhaps asking what are we to do when encountering others? In answering this, Noddings’ ethics of caring for others must accompany Foucault’s ethics of self-care, if we are to conceive Foucault’s ethics as an educational ethics. This accompaniment perhaps responds more sufficiently to the limitations listed above: the role of gender and the role of socio-economic structure of schooling. Education ethics requires not only the recognition of subjectivity, but also receiving the other, as Noddings has outlined, through a caring ethics that addresses the interdependency to one another. Aside from its limitations, the self-care Foucault conceptualized was historically perceived as an ethical imperative that benefited others; its strength lies in Foucault’s (1988a) approach to caring:

Curiosity is a vice that has been stigmatized in turn by Christianity, by philosophy, and even by a certain conception of science. Curiosity … suggests something quite different to me. It evokes “care”; it evokes the care one takes of
what exists and what might exist; sharpened sense of reality, but one that is never immobilized before it; a readiness to find what surrounds us strange and odd; a certain determination to throw off familiar ways of thought and to look at the same things in a different way; a passion for seizing what is happening now and what is disappearing. (p. 328)

In Foucault’s ethics, curiosity evokes care, and if we follow Foucault’s displacement, care is accompanied by curiosity. In this manner, care does not assume the subject it seeks to enact. Caring accompanies looking at the same things in a different way.

For educational ethics, Foucault’s ethics encourages the interrogation of experiences and the work we take upon ourselves to (trans)form ourselves. This ethics of transformation informed, even structured, Foucault’s life as both an exemplar student and an exemplar teacher. In his intellectual work, Foucault’s curiosity led to a labour of transforming himself and freeing himself from himself. It is plausible that if Foucault had lived for few more years he would still emphasize on “the care of the self” as strongly as he did in the last years of his life. This is the case, Helen Cixous recalled of her last conversation with Foucault: “That’s not it’, he said to me about his last volume, I’ve been mistaken. I have to re-cast everything. Go elsewhere. Do it otherwise” (in O’Leary, 2002, p. 171).
References


