Pedagogical Thoughts on Knowing Bodies:

The Teacher Educator Encounters the *Elder* and the *Phronimos*

by

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Abstract

My dissertation is a study into the notion of embodied knowledge and is written from my perspective as a Settler-scholar studying and working at the University of British Columbia on unceded Coast Salish territory. In this dissertation I propose and develop a theoretical framework for teaching and learning working from Karen Barad's theory of *agential realism* that locates the real bodies of teachers and learners in the real places in which they exist. This framework emerges from my experience of teaching children, youth and adults in public schools, and my dialectical engagement with theory and practice over an extended period of time in this place. The core concept in this framework of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* considers the material and discursive aspects of the learning context, and attends to the centrality of embodied presence and ethical responsiveness in creating the conditions for transformative learning. To inform my theorization, I engage in Gadamerian hermeneutic analysis of both Aristotelian texts related to the embodied wisdom of the *Phronimos*, and of texts by Indigenous scholars in BC related to the embodied wisdom of the *Elder*. I draw on these texts as counter-perspective and challenge to the dominance of Western modernist theories and practices in education, and through *coloniality* scholarship argue that the lack of attention to the body in educational theorizing is related to historic and contemporary forms of privilege and oppression. I locate this study in teacher education and recognize that it is a place where hegemonic narratives and epistemological orientations might be drawn out and questioned. I explore the *complicated conversation,* as originally discussed by William Pinar that emerges from bringing Indigenous perspectives into meaningful engagement with mainstream teacher education. I consider the resistance of teacher candidates and educational structures to this conversation, and suggest self-reflexive practices that engage transparently with resistance and draw out the

problematic narratives and discourses in a Settler dominated society. I recommend practices of

social equity in teacher education that provide opportunity for teacher candidates and instructors

to understand themselves in complex ethical relations and as actively participating in material

and discursive practices in real places.

Preface

This dissertation is an original piece of work, but acknowledge I have relied on people and place. My dissertation was conceived and written on the ancestral, traditional, unceded and overlapping territories of the Musqueam, Squamish and Tsleil-Waututh First Nations, and I rely on being welcomed to study and write at the University of British Columbia (UBC) by Musqueam Elder Larry Grant as representing the Musqueam people's interests in this place, as well as the Department of Educational Studies, in the Faculty of Education at UBC.

I have significantly relied on an intellectual community within the Faculty of Education of professors, graduate students, staff and teacher candidates; as well as the enhanced opportunities provided by the Faculty of Education through the work of Jo-Ann Archibald, Associate Dean of Indigenous Education at UBC. There is a more specific contribution from Julia Ostertag to this research noted in Chapter 7. My reflections on my experiences with two groups of teacher candidates, as we participated in two phases of Julia's PhD project at her arts-based garden installation and reflective session, form a part of this dissertation as illustration of conceptual points.

In recognition of the cross-cultural work in this study and potential for my own misunderstanding, I submitted Chapters 4 and 5 to Indigenous scholars whose texts were the subject of my research for comments and corrective influence. I have incorporated their responses into my work in those chapters.

Part of my analysis in Chapter 3 was included in my Master's Thesis (2007) titled "Educating Heart and Mind: Fostering Ethical Emotional Learning in Elementary Schools". The specific parts that were included are my thoughts on Daniel Vokey's development of the notion of *non-relative intrinsic goodness*, as well as my thoughts about Steutel and Carr's discussion of the nature of *virtue ethics* as aretaic in contrast with commitments in deontological ethics.

This dissertation is a conceptual piece reliant on analysis of publicly available texts and as such did not require UBC ethics certification.

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Glossary

Aristotelian Ancient Greek Terms:

Aisthesis – the capacity for perception of the body-mind through contact with the world

Episteme – a capacity for theoretical knowledge of unchangeable objects

Kalon – a quality of being noble and fine

Phantasia – the activity of the mind playing with images and memories to create new thoughts

Phronesis – a capacity to know and act in practical ethical matters or practical wisdom

Phronimos – possessor of phronesis acquired from a long life of acting and knowing in
    contingent ethical matters.

Noetic – relating to nous, of nous

Nous – a capacity for unmediated apprehension of the body-mind, or intuitive non-dualistic
  reasoning

Sophia – a theoretically based capacity for knowing combining episteme and nous

Techne – a capacity for making and producing things through reasoning in variable matters (i.e.,
    architecture, medicine, bridge building)

Aristotle's Book Title Abbreviations in Citations:

De Anima – DA

Metaphysics – Meta.

Nicomachean Ethics – NE (abbreviated as *the Ethics* in text)

Posterior Analytics – PA

Gitxaała terms:

Bilhaa – abalone

Nabelgot – the condition of reincarnation

Syt güülum goot - being of one heart

WulE'isk – relatives (human and non-human)

Haisla terms:

Gyawaglaab – helping one another

Kglateeh – oolican grease

Kuqwajeequas – Haisla territory

Mus Magithl – female chief

Nuu-chah-nulth terms:

Ha – something that is close

Heeshook-ish tsawalk – everything is one

He-xwa – struggle for balance

Huu – something that is far

Qʷaasasa sqʷi, qʷaasasa iš, and qʷaasasa uƛ - that's the way it was, that's the way it is, that's the way it will be (qʷa – present moment)

Tsawalk – one

Okanagan terms:

Captikwl – type of story that embodies Okanagan ontology

Okanagan – ones from the land

Sqilxw – dream in a spiral

Stó:lō terms:

S'ólh Téméxw – sacred land

Shxwelí – spirit or life force

Stó:lō – river people

Technical Terms:

Agential Realism – theory of matter and meaning (Barad)

Aretaic – pertaining to excellence or virtue in the evaluation of human character (ethics)

Coloniality – a theoretical structure of oppression emerging from colonial systems of domination

Deontic – pertaining to the evaluation of human actions appealing to rules and principles (ethics)

Intra-actional – term conveying that every "thing" always already exists in relation (Barad)

Modernist/Modernity – a description or condition that references the period of 15th Century imperialism and related 17th Century Enlightenment thought and practices, as well as the domination of these perspectives, practices and conditions

Onto-epistemology – term conveying that epistemic commitments and ethical and ontological understandings are mutually constitutive, and refers to the study of practices of ethical knowing in being (Barad)

Rationalist Foundationalism - a belief that the foundation of knowledge is a discursive form of reason, and truth is derived from an abstract methodology reliant on discursive reasoning

Technical-Rationality – an atomistic and instrumental approach to complexity (Schön)

Western – descriptive word referencing onto-epistemological commitments of Western European origination, but not spatially limited to existing in Western European locations

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Elder Larry Grant and the Musqueam people for welcoming me to study on their territory, and all of the scholars that have shared their work in text and in person - this dissertation emerges from their ideas and this place. This dissertation is only possible through the incredible support and encouragement of all of the inspirational people I have had the good fortune to learn, talk, laugh, drum, walk, eat, teach and even garden with during this PhD event. My supervisor Daniel Vokey has seen me through a Masters and a PhD with incredible grace, intelligence, integrity and his treasured unique style. I am honoured by the commitment he has made to me. My committee members Michael Marker and Anne Phelan have helped me work through some of the more challenging times with humour and kindness. I would like to acknowledge Michael for his warm welcome into the community he has inspired around him, and the opportunity to learn in ways that have transformed my Settler perspective. I am thankful to Anne for her keen insight that helps me repeatedly realize that learning is never finished.

I have been fortunate to develop an incredible support network of graduate students and faculty at UBC. Amy Parent and Shayna Plaut have inspired me throughout this project and continue to do so. Julia Ostertag has been such a welcome surprise, and some of my most important moments were guided by her humour and keen mind. My time with Michael brought an incredible group of people into my life. Alana Boileau, Heather McGregor and Bill Balfe have shared the challenging parts of figuring out my Settler-scholar self with friendship and wisdom. Heather has made an incredible contribution to the ideas in this work every step of the way, and has been exceedingly generous with her time, insight and friendship. Alana is a gift in every sense of the word. Bill amazes me always. The brilliant duo of Brooke Madden and Marc

This dissertation is dedicated to the real people in the real places that are taking care of the land, humans and creatures.

Chapter 1: Teaching and Learning with Real People in Real Places

1.1 Introduction

My name is Jeannie Kerr and I am a Settler-scholar engaged in thinking, writing and teaching on the ancestral, traditional, unceded and overlapping territories of the Musqueam, Tsleil-Waututh and Squamish Nations. I greatly appreciate the welcoming I have received in this place. My parents immigrated to what is now known as Canada in the 1960s with my older sister, and I am of the Kerr Clan from the Scottish borderlands, and more recently Glasgow on my father's side, and the Couch family of Cork County, Ireland on my mother's side. I am the first of my family to be born in Canada. I attended elementary and secondary schools in a suburban area of Toronto developed for the increasing number of new immigrants in the early Trudeau era, but have spent most of my adult life in Vancouver. I left a career in corporate compliance and investor relations to become a teacher due to my desire to engage in work that provides service to communities. Since becoming a teacher in the late 1990s I have taught almost exclusively in schools located in culturally rich, vibrant communities that experience significant economic and political marginalization. I have been teaching and thinking about education, schooling and the relationships between poverty, schooling, racism and social inequity for a long time, and have sought to bring a critical and self-reflexive perspective to these reflections. My experiences as a teacher in these communities, as well as my graduate and post-graduate studies, have led me to question the beliefs I acquired growing up concerning what it means to know, live, learn and teach in a Settler nation-state with a popular narrative of itself as multicultural, tolerant and beneficent.

My masters and PhD studies at UBC in the Department of Educational Studies have given me the opportunity consider my educational concerns through a variety of onto-epistemological[1] perspectives. Without doubt, the most prominent shifts I have experienced have been epistemic,[2] and this inquiry calls attention to the importance of approaching educational questions and challenges through multiple onto-epistemological orientations to create space for enriched answers and the conditions of social equity. By using the words "conditions of" social equity, I draw attention to the idea that equity is a desired point of departure related to a way of being in social relations that must be supported by equitable practices, and not an elusive goal to be attained in the future.[3] I understand social equity as manifesting political, economic, material and ecological practices of equity in social entanglements. This inquiry also calls attention to the importance of engaging meaningfully with Indigenous perspectives as a practical condition of social equity in educational spaces in Settler nation-states, and considers the ethical requirements in this cross-cultural context emerging from violent relations that are both historic and ongoing. One of the important shifts that I have experienced is my growing appreciation for the significance of considering educational challenges and opportunities in ways that engage the heart and mind. This is to appreciate that knowing, and relating to ideas, is not solely an

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[1]   The term *onto-epistem-ological* is coined by Karen Barad to express the idea that our epistemological assumptions and commitments, and our ontological understandings, are mutually constitutive. Barad uses the

[2]   "Epistemology" is a term within Western philosophical traditions that has a specific meaning and history, and is generally concerned with arguments for the justification of propositional knowledge. In contrast, the notion of *epistemology*, as well as the related words *epistemic* and *epistemological*, tend to be used quite generally throughout the disciplines in the social sciences to refer to a theoretical and/or explanatory position for a research's/writer's understanding of "knowledge" and the ways this understanding informs their work and is shaped by ontological assumptions (Guba & Lincoln, 2004, p.17). While Guba and Lincoln refer to four research paradigms with contrasting epistemological-ontological assumptions, I extend this idea to traditions of thought and practice more generally. Throughout my dissertation, I use the notion of epistemology (and words related thereto) in the sense discussed by Guba and Lincoln as referring to theories of knowledge with corresponding ontological assumptions.

[3]   This discussion of social equity refers to Jacques Rancière's thoughts on equality and democracy. For these specific ideas I was influenced by Ross's thoughts on Rancière's ideas as quoted in Ruitenberg (2008). Ross posits we think about equality as a "point of departure" or "practice" rather than an elusive goal.

intellectual activity, but requires a holistic[4] engagement of the intellect and emotions of an experiencing body-mind in place and time. In this dissertation I will bring in my own stories of teaching and learning through short vignettes in each chapter as a way to express the complexity and multiplicity of the ideas, and to also provide a more enriched emotional and intellectual engagement with how I have lived these ideas in my teaching practice. The specific vignettes I will share in this dissertation emerge from my experiences over the course of a year with a group of grade 4/5 students in Vancouver, BC, about eight years ago, and will conclude with a group of teacher candidates at UBC that I worked with more recently.[5] I will consider the status of the vignettes within this conceptual work in the methodological discussions of Chapter 2.

Thus far, this first chapter has provided a brief introduction to my relationships to family and place, and my educational experiences and priorities. In the balance of this introductory section I will provide a more enhanced understanding of my educational priorities in relation to my study of embodied knowledge in this dissertation through a vignette and related discussion. Following this first section, there will be six further sections. The second section introduces my theoretical points of departure for this research; the third section considers the specific challenge this theoretical framework presents to dominant educational perspectives; the fourth section provides my research questions; the fifth section details and argues a rationale for this research; the sixth

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[4] I would note that the terms "holistic" and "wholistic" are often used in the same way and referencing similar ideas in Indigenous scholarship. In my view, both terms currently have the same common usage referring to a view that the parts of anything are only fully comprehensible with reference to the whole. I am using the term "holistic" in this dissertation to maintain alignment with the usage of the specific authors referenced in this work.
[5] The vignettes comes from my educational engagement with real people in real places, but I will use pseudonyms for student names and will not specifically identify the school where I worked as a teacher with the elementary students.

section locates this research in teacher education; and the seventh section provides the general structure of this dissertation.

In a classroom on the East side of Vancouver, mid-September...

*I'm sitting on the carpet in the front of the classroom as the students come in from lunch. I feel quite settled and happy as the room fills with energy and chatter. 27 children between the ages of 8 and 10 sort themselves out, finish conversations, and put things away in desks and the cloakroom, and start coming together on the carpet with me. I've known most of the children for several years, and some for only a couple of weeks. Taylor walks past me to the door. I've known Taylor since he arrived with his brother and mother from Bella Coola a few years earlier. As I glance at him, I can tell he's been playing some kind of sport, as usual, and obviously sweaty and in need of a drink. He stops and turns back to me and asks - "Is it safe to drink the water yet?" I look up at him and I'm about to answer "yes", but I'm completely struck silent. The very unusual boil water orders from the city were lifted yesterday, but I just realized, in that very moment, that I have no idea if it was ever safe to drink the water from the fountains in this 100+ year old building, and that I have never taken a drink from any of the fountains. In this moment, I experience a shift in consciousness of my relations and myself – to water, to the students, to myself, to knowledge and to equity. I see Taylor differently as I recognize that he does not have the same choices I have in our shared classroom. I'm more surprised that I have been so unaware of this difference in our lived experience in the same place. I look around the room and **see** the students again. Most of the students' families struggle economically – there is no extra money to send drinks to school. I feel my face getting hot and my stomach tightens, and the students have become silent in the space created by Taylor's question and my delayed response. I take a deep breath as I start to become aware of my ethical responsibility that has gone unrecognized. I had many plans for this school year, but now I know this school year will not be preplanned but will be emerging from the lives of the people in the room. Finally I respond to Taylor: "Actually I have no*

idea if the water is safe, but I think we all need to talk about the water." The class comes together quickly and I share my concerns and my lack of awareness, and I listen to what the students think and how they feel about all of this. We talk together about our next steps.

The significance of this vignette for this dissertation is twofold. First, my experiences with this group of students have framed my ideas of the desirable and the possible in teaching and learning. I spent the school year with these students immersed in the study, and sometimes the literal substance, of water. The school year was alive with passion, creativity and moments of brilliance, as we learned in relation to each other, new ideas, new creatures, new people and multiple locations on the land. We had planned to find out if the water fountains were safe, but we ended up exploring much more than the Western scientific preoccupations concerning water quality. We studied water in relation to place and creatures, and also the politics of access and the meaningfulness of water in multiple places and traditions. Now that I am working in teacher education at UBC almost a decade later, this vignette pulls together my ideas about what I want teacher candidates to consider as they are becoming teachers. This vignette is not meant to convey the beginnings of a blue print for desired ways to *perform* teaching, nor a demand to throw out the mandated curriculum. It is meant to help illustrate my ideas about the centrality in teaching of ethical relationships and embodied presence in creating the conditions for *transformative pedagogical encounters*. Second, this vignette also speaks to the perpetuation of the conditions of social inequity through well learned habits by those in privilege - such as myself and the many powerful players who direct educational contexts - of ignoring the material conditions of existence and circulating discourses that mark *real* bodies in the *real* places where

teaching and learning happens. This vignette illustrates that ignoring material conditions and circulating discourses in educational spaces is a practice that supports inequity, despite the good intentions of the teacher.

1.2   Theorizing Teaching and Learning: *Transformative Pedagogical Encounters*

In my view, teachers who encourage *transformative pedagogical encounters* centre the lived realities of the real bodies who have come together, and the power within these bodies for self-direction and movement, as a primary frame to think about teaching and learning. This means attending to the material conditions of existence, as well as the discourses that influence the opportunities and constraints that impact these bodies, and their relations, in the places they think, feel, nourish and more generally exist, in connection to broader social and global movements. Karen Barad's theory of *agential realism* inspires my ideas for the possibilities of understanding teaching and learning in this way. Barad is a physicist and feminist philosopher who shifts focus from questions of correspondence between language and reality, to matters of practices, doings and actions (Barad, 2008, pp. 122-123). I am drawn to the work of Barad in my theorization of the pedagogical encounter due to her focus on the material world, and how knowledge and meaning making practices of real bodies are related to being in the world through irreducible ethical entanglements (Barad, 2010, p. 265). In her theorization, Barad focuses on the ethical nature of the physical body in material relations, as well as the discursive practices by which bodies actively engage in the practices of knowing and becoming (Barad, 2008, p. 130, and Barad, 2007, p. 26; p. 265). Barad's theory of *agential realism* provides generative theoretical space where, in Barad's own words, it becomes:

possible to take account of material constraints and conditions once again without reinscribing traditional empiricist assumptions concerning the transparent or immediate given-ness of the world and without falling into the analytical stalemate that simply calls for a recognition of our mediated access to the world and then rests its case. (Barad, 2008, p. 141)

In Barad's framework matter and meaning are "inescapable entanglements" that are intertwined through practices of "being, knowing and doing" (Barad, 2007, p. 3). Barad draws on Judith Butler's central notion that discursive practices constrain the "doing" or performing of the material body, but Barad seeks to understand more "precisely *how* discursive practices produce material bodies" (p. 127). In her *agential realist* elaboration "phenomena" are the *intra-acting* movements of things that are always already in relation. Barad coins the term *intra-relational* to highlight the point that no thing can exist outside of relations: "reality is not composed of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena but things in phenomena" (p. 30). In her theorization, boundaries are constituted by material and discursive *agents* enacting an *agential cut* – as the "local condition of exteriority" within phenomena (p. 30). Barad states that these *cuts* are specific agential practices/intra-actions/performances that cause dynamic (re)configurations of the world and leave real marks on real bodies. The *cuts* by both material and discursive practices bring the world into its ongoing and differentiated becoming (p. 30). In Barad's theorization, agency is not an attribute of a subject or an object – it is the condition of intra-acting (p. 144). In this view, matter-bodies are not passive, but actively being and doing in the material and discursive constraints within which they are in relation.

From the focus on the material and discursive features of entanglements, Barad provides theorization that is helpful to understand ethical requirements in pedagogical relations. The requirement of the teacher from this view is to remain very present to material relations while attending regularly to more fine-grained understandings of the discursive relations in the context. This requires considering the discourses that possibly constrain understanding the relations between teachers, students and others in the context. It requires that I think about how I might be constrained or constraining others in my pedagogical relations, and attend to an idea that I may need to unlearn some problematic understandings through pervasive discourses in order to learn how to be ethical at all. I understand this as trying to address previously learned ideas that obscure my ability to discern in context, while always knowing that the need for this will always be required and never finished.

To provide an example with clear educational implications and relation to the subject of this dissertation, it is useful to draw on circulation of Settler discourses. Dwayne Donald (2012) elaborates the Settler interpretation of the colonial encounter on Indigenous territories as the *civilization* of land and people in wild and dangerous places, and then demonstrates that this interpretation morphs into the hegemonic devaluing of Indigenous peoples (p. 95). It is this story of Canada's nation building that is told in schools (p. 95), and normalizes the respective domination and privileging of Indigenous and Settler bodies. Susan Dion also draws attention to discourses that present stereotypical notions of Indigenous peoples that serve to portray Settlers as "perfect strangers" to Indigenous peoples in Canada (Dion, 2007, p. 331, similar to Donald, p. 91). These settler discourses of civilization/nation building, and separate social and physical realities, promote social inequities that are lived and experienced by bodies, and in the vignette,

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came together in the classroom. I have an embodied experience of privilege and was in regular

pedagogical relations with Indigenous students and families living in a materially impoverished

community. Settler discourses serve to constrain my ability to understand that my privileged

experience of eating healthy food and living in safe housing emerges from the violence and lack

of material comfort inflicted onto Indigenous bodies in that community. In this example, I was

ethically required to unlearn Settler narratives that justify domination and oppression so as to be

more present to the material relations of privilege and oppression that are occurring and in which

I am implicated. This unlearning and learning, is based in reading the work of authors such as

Dion and Donald, also by listening to wise, experienced people, and reflecting on my actual

experiences in classrooms. To be ready to unlearn and learn, requires that I understand myself in

relations that are material and discursive, and appreciate that I need to be always open and

inquisitive about these relations through dialectical involvement so as to interrupt the

perpetuation of these discourses and engage in equitable practices.

Barad posits that these material and discursive *entanglements* of beings in relation are constituted

by ethicality. She states that the entanglements are not an intertwining of separate entities, but

rather irreducible relations of responsibility (Barad, 2010, p. 265). As there is no inherent

separateness, the localized cuts create an 'otherness' and thus entails an obligation or

indebtedness to the other who is "materially bound to, threaded through, the self". In this sense,

an entanglement is not meant to refer to the interconnectedness of all things, but to the specific

material relations that bring about the ongoing differentiation in the world, and the ethical

responsibility of being entangled (p. 265). Barad clearly states that this is not the

superimposition of human values onto the ontology of the world, but that the nature of matter

entails an exposure to the 'other' that requires ethicality. As Barad states: "Responsibility is not an obligation that the subject chooses but rather an incarnate relation that precedes the intentionality of consciousness" (p. 265).

In this view, there is a sense of the importance of relationality between teachers, students, land, creatures, histories, and ideas; as well as a sense of ethical obligation in these relationships. The idea of transformation or change - that positive transformation should occur through education - is a common ideal, but in this light I am referring to transformations as cycles of events wherein teachers and students become changed in perspective and understanding of themselves, their conditions and their relations, through experience.

In thinking about transformation, I have been particularly influenced by the ideas of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Sharon Todd. I take up Gadamer's understanding of transformation as an event of understanding through experience. For Gadamer, participating in experiences is an ongoing integrative process where an encounter widens our horizon by overturning an existing perspective. In this view, an experience is not a thing you *have,* but something you *undergo* to overcome your subjectivity and be drawn into and changed by an encounter (Weinsheimer & Marshall, 2004, xiii).[6] Similarly, according to Todd, transformation is not reductively concerned with "the mere achievement of being educated into pre-defined roles or abilities, no matter how

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[6] The idea of overcoming subjectivity and being changed by an encounter is a significant and complicated feature of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. In essence, Gadamer is suggesting that a state of extreme subjectivity does not allow a person to see oneself as related and participating in an event. In this way overcoming subjectivity is to understand oneself in relation. Gadamer's German word for the notion of experience as something one undergoes in relation is *Erfahrung* and is distinctively contrasted with *Erlbenis* which refers to experience as an abstracted possession.

well intentioned they may be"; rather it is concerned with *becoming* in relation through remaining present – in place, body and time (Todd, 2010, pp. 4-5).

Barad's theorization that presents emergent knowing through experience as a "phenomenon" is significantly similar to Gadamer's theorization of emergent knowing through experience as an "event". Both authors decentre the subject, and centre an "event" or "phenomenon" as the possibility for the emergence of knowing. Also present in both theorists' work is the idea that emergence is an open possibility. There is a shared sense that knowing emerges in and through relations in a particular time and place. The view of pedagogical encounter that emerges from this theorization is one in which multiple entangled relations of matter as human beings (students, teachers, parents, etc.); non-human beings (books, plants, computer equipment, frogs, classroom walls, bacteria, etc.); in a particular place and time are materially present to each other. The knowing that emerges is understood through and constrained by these material entanglements, but also through various explicit and implicit circulated discourses (learning disabilities, learning outcomes, multiculturalism, recess, nationalism, colonial encounter, etc.). Significantly, knowing and knowledge emerge from these entangled relations and is not prefigured or predetermined in any way. The potential for transformative learning is located in the possibilities for openness in the encounter. Also, of specific significance, is that students are not positioned as passive recipients of propositional knowledge. The student is an active interpreting body who performs her agency through engaging in practices in the entangled relations of the teaching-learning context.

Considering teaching and learning as *transformative pedagogical encounter* differs significantly from pedagogical theories understood as delivery models for propositional knowledge, and puts a tremendous amount of responsibility on the teacher to remain present and morally responsive to the complex material and discursive features of the learning context. In teacher education, I attempt to help teacher candidates understand for themselves the ethical and complex nature of teaching and learning in terms of pedagogical encounter, and the opportunities it provides for transformation – for students, teachers and educational systems. I attempt to interrupt the pervasive conversations, supported by the current political climate, that reductively engage with educational questions in terms of standardization and outcomes (Phelan, 2011, p. 217). The purpose of my inquiry is to learn more deeply about how I might go about this work.

1.3   The *Transformative Pedagogical Encounter* as Challenge to Dominant Technical-Rational Educational Approaches

My vignette highlighting responsiveness to material conditions in a classroom, and my theorization of teaching and learning as *transformative pedagogical encounter*, could be seen to drastically challenge legislatively established notions about the way schooling should be enacted in Vancouver schools. The ultimate responsibility for education and schooling in Vancouver is the provincial government of British Columbia (BC) and is administrated through the Vancouver Board of Education (VBE). The BC Ministry of Education (the Ministry) provides the "prescribed learning outcomes" (PLOs), that they refer to as the "standards" that "outline the expectations for what students should know and be able to do at each grade level and within each subject area" (BCGOV, 2013, Curriculum). There are suggested resources and textbooks, for the schools that have funds to purchase these resources that integrate the expectations in the

PLOs. The proper way of going about schooling, in accordance with Ministry expectations, is to partition study into disciplinary categories such as Physical Education, Math, Art, Science, English (meaning literature), Social Studies, Personal Planning, etc. Each disciplinary subject that is highly valued academically has a textbook. All schools throughout the province of BC have the same PLOs and suggested textbooks and resources. *Schools* are given flexibility in determining "delivery" of the PLOs, and teachers are expected to use their "professional judgement and experience" with respect to "evaluation, reporting and student placement" (BCGov, 2013, Prescribed Learning Outcomes). Thus, the way schools are currently organized affords little official scope or flexibility for attention to local contexts and concerns.[7]

My critique of schooling in BC is not primarily directed toward the practices emerging from this codified and disciplinary way of going about schooling, but is specifically directed toward the epistemological assumptions that lay unexamined therein. In fact, I know teachers who create vibrant learning environments who rely on disciplinary categories to organize instruction, and also use textbooks to inform areas of study - without reducing the experience of learning to *outcomes*.[8] I also believe that many of the curricular documents that relate to the PLOs are imaginative and relevant to the educational priorities of students, teachers and parents in BC. That being said, the prominent concern I have with view is the assumption that the focus in education should be exclusively on the *what,* in a reductive sense of codified *whats* that are

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[7] I use the word *official* to emphasize the point that despite the constraints of the system of education in BC, teachers subvert, strategize and sometimes refuse to be formed by and perform this constructed image of the teacher.

[8] I would also note that there has been incredible tension for well over a decade between the Ministry and the teachers' unions throughout BC, which may in fact explain some of the official text from the Ministry that diminishes teachers' judgment to such a limited role as figuring out the ways to discern if a student has digested the PLOs.

questionably determined by the age-grade of the student. This leads to the next assumption -

that the *who* and the *where* in teaching and learning has little educational relevance. This reveals

a further assumption, that education should, or at least can be, appropriately managed through

this codified approach without concern for local context and the real bodies in educational

relationships. These assumptions result in a lack of appreciation for learning as a transformative

event with significant ethical implications, and a misguided view that learning is similar to the

swallowing whole of predetermined *outcomes*. These assumptions lead to miseducational

practices. These assumptions are miseducational in that they reveal a constrained view of

knowledge in education as being a collection of *things* that a teacher *delivers* to students, and

suggests a delivery model of knowledge referred to, following Donald Schön, as the *technical-

rational approach* (Schön, 1983, 1987). These assumptions also reveal an epistemological move

that obscures the body and place of potential oppressor and oppressed, and thus creates

conditions for social inequity. These epistemological concerns in relation to epistemic practices

that create conditions for social inequity will be a major focus of this dissertation and will be

taken up and discussed throughout. My point here is simply that this understanding of teaching

as *transformative pedagogical encounter* should replace the current common understanding of

teaching as transmission of pre-determined outcomes through codification. I fully anticipate

arguments against framing teaching and learning in this way, and will highlight and respond to

these arguments in Chapter 6 when I revisit my theorization after engaging with the texts that

will be the focus of this dissertation.

These ideas about *transformative pedagogical encounter* and the significance of real bodies in

real places, in combination with the institutionalized constraint of this view, fuel my inquiry. I

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started with many specific questions: Why have these codified views on knowledge in education emerged? From what source did they emerge? How are they supported? How are they perpetuated - by whom, and for what purposes? In trying to answer these questions I have realized that technical-rationality has a long history in Western thought and a deep connection to epistemic practices that create conditions of social inequity through the events of colonization.[9] The technical-rational approach is an inappropriate orientation to educational questions. The detailing of the ways it is inappropriate provides a strong rationale for thinking about educational configurations and challenges through the theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* and directs the requirements of understanding embodied knowledge in relation thereto. Engaging with these questions also provides a rationale for studying texts on embodied knowledge through onto-epistemological orientations that do not reflect a mind/body dualism. I will argue that the mind/body dualism is at the core of a technical-rational approach. In this inquiry I will study embodied knowledge through learning from texts by Indigenous scholars in BC, and also texts by Aristotle, and scholars working in his tradition.

1.4   Research Questions: Embodied Knowledge in the *Elder* and the *Phronimos*

The mind/body dualism, as a feature of modernist Western thought, is still prominent in research and education, and my research is directed at dissolving this dualism in teacher education. Consequently, in this dissertation I look to the texts of traditions of thought that do not enact a mind/body dualism, but forefront an idea of knowing as embodied. In this inquiry I will look to

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[9]   For related discussion on this topic in terms of neoliberalism see Eve Tuck (2013) and her discussion of neoliberal educational practices in the name of school reform that emerge from Settler colonialism, and Riyad Shahjahan (2011) for his discussion of how the neoliberal mechanism of "evidence based practice" can be seen as a promotion of colonial discourse and material relations of power.

Aristotelian texts that connect with an understanding of the embodied wisdom of the *Phronimos*, and texts by Indigenous scholars in BC that connect with an understanding of the embodied wisdom of the *Elder*. My choice of these texts is clarified and supported in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The following questions are the substance of my research on embodied knowledge in the context of teacher education, and each set emerges from addressing the previous set of questions. I engage these questions with a consciousness that such questions are raised and addressed in the context of a tradition of thought and being:

➢ *In what ways is the body significant to knowing (relation of body-mind) according to Aristotelian and Indigenous texts?*
➢ *In what ways might the relation of the body to a specific place be significant to knowing according to these texts?*

With a more theorized understanding of embodied knowledge from these texts, I will then raise the following questions with appreciation for the challenges in working across traditions of thought:

➢ *How might these understandings of embodied knowledge emerging from my analysis of the texts in this research inform my theorization of the transformative pedagogical encounter?*
➢ *What capacities and practices are suggested from my analysis of the texts, both generally and in the context of teacher education, as being important to creating conditions for transformative pedagogical encounters?*

With a more explicit link between theory and practices, and consideration of the nature of the suppression of Indigenous perspectives in academic contexts, I will then raise the following questions in relation to the context of teacher education in a Settler nation-state:

➢ *How might I create the conditions in a mainstream teacher education program for teacher candidates to listen to Indigenous perspectives in a self-reflexive way?*

➢ *How might programs of teacher education support teacher candidates in self-reflexive learning and practice?*

These research questions and the focus of my study on embodied knowledge are supported by a rationale that brings together literatures and theories not commonly considered together in educational scholarship. For my rationale I am bringing forward scholarship on technical-rationality and will argue it is based in a form of rationalist foundationalism that enacts a mind/body dualism and ignores the significance of the body in knowing. I will bring this together with coloniality scholarship that traces this lack of attention to the body as a product of colonialism and current epistemic practices that create conditions of social inequity. Together, the rationale for my study of embodied knowledge in the context of teacher education is found in the convergence of epistemic and social equity concerns that are both traceable to global and local colonial encounters.

1.5   Rationale for the Study of Embodied Knowledge

1.5.1   Technical-Rationality and Rationalist Foundationalism

1.5.1.1   Technical-Rationality

There is a general appreciation in education that teaching is a complex practice that is marked by a context of uncertainty - or as I prefer to call it, indeterminacy[10]. There is greater divergence on the question of how teachers, and/or those who have influence over teachers, should or can

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[10] My preference for the word "indeterminacy" in place of "uncertainty" emerges from my reading of Barad (2012, p. 13) and her view that indeterminacy is integral to what matter actually is and how it is understood – the im/possibilities are never closed. In my view, "uncertainty" is understood in a number of academic disciplines as an undesired state of limited knowledge that makes prediction impossible, and thus reflects a misguided, modernist intellectual position that certainty is a possible and desired state from which to know.

respond in this context. The idea that teachers' application of formulas, rubrics and checklists, that are derived from a body of *expert* objective knowledge that teachers *possess,* has been a widely accepted notion in Western ideas of teaching in the 20th Century (Furlong, 2000, p. 17). The current Ministry documents that generate discourse around 21st Century learning needs reinforces this perspective (BCGov2013, 21st Century Learning). There is an implicit assumption in this notion that the indeterminacy that is constitutive of dynamic and complex situations can be mitigated by theoretical rigour translated into codified practice.

In the 1980s, Schön identified this as an inappropriate *technical-rational* approach, and became one of its most notable critics. Schön defines technical-rationality as "instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique" (Schön, 1987, p. 3). Schön argues that teachers' knowledge is created in the teaching context, and therefore teachers' knowledge is attained through knowing and reflecting in action (p. 25). On this view, teaching practice is not derived from a body of expert knowledge, but is based on knowledge that is subjectively derived from teaching practice. Philosopher Joseph Dunne argues that the field of education has been "lured into a technical orientation that promises objectivity from the subjective; transparency of its procedures; replicability of its operations; generalisability of its findings; predictability which we can use to control; and the provision of unambiguous criteria for establishing accountability" (Dunne, 2005, p. 377). Currently, the technical-rational approach can be seen in demands for *evidence based practice* and identification of *best practices* as well as the PLOs in the local context of Vancouver and BC.

Dunne, elaborating on Schön's work, identifies *technical-rationality* as the mainstream

educational outgrowth of *rationalist foundationalism.* He argues that this technical orientation is

put forward as neutral, as in following principles of rationality that might be applied objectively

to any context, and therefore comes with unacknowledged bias and distortion based on

assumptions of the universality of rationality (Dunne, 1993, p. 7). There are forceful arguments

made by both Hans-Georg Gadamer and Alisdair MacIntyre that support Dunne's critique.

MacIntyre's influential work in moral theory argues that all reasoning takes place and is

intelligible in the context of a tradition (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 206). Gadamer argues similarly that

all knowing happens from our own horizon of understanding that is formed through the traditions

in which we exist, thus rejecting the position that there can be standards of rationality that are

objectively available to all people in all places and times (Gadamer, 2004, xx). Gadamer

undertakes to show that reason exists only in concrete, historical terms and can only be

dependent on the given context in which it exists (Gadamer, 2004, p. 277). Through considering

the emergence of rationalist foundationalism, and where it is promoted or refuted, it is possible

to understand it as a biased and non-neutral position growing out of Western historical events.

While noting that I will be covering a large territory in a fairly generalized way, the intent of this

next section is to show the historic shifts in Western thought that have influenced the formal

tendency of ignoring the body, and the material and discursive conditions of the learning body,

in Western educational contexts.

1.5.1.2 Rationalist Foundationalism

 The search for objective foundations of knowledge based in abstract reason occupied Plato in

Ancient Greece and reflects a position of *rationalist foundationalism.* At the core of rationalist

foundationalism is a belief that the foundation of knowledge is reason, and reason exists

objectively and not relative to any sort of context. Plato's theory of forms locates the notion of

the "good" in abstract, theoretical reasoning. The challenge to this claim came from Plato's

student Aristotle. Whereas Plato portrayed ethics as a subject matter that was part of abstract

theoretical understandings, Aristotle marks off ethical knowledge (or knowledge of the good) as

its own distinctive area of practically situated knowledge (Kraus, 2010). Aristotle rejects Plato's

argument that the good exists outside of any context (Kraus, 2010). By locating the good within

particular contexts and not abstractly, Aristotle marks off ethical knowledge as being particular

and concrete in lived experience and thus distinctly different from theoretical knowledge, and

thus Aristotle's position breaks with rationalist foundationalism.

Since Plato and Aristotle's time, both the aspiration to achieve objective, context independent

knowledge, and the futility of this aspiration, have been recurring themes in Western philosophy.

Stephen Toulmin argues that the skepticism concerning the existence of objective foundations of

knowledge is continued with a number of 16th Century philosophers working in the tradition of

Renaissance Humanism (Toulmin, 1990, x). Toulmin argues that there is a solid tradition

amongst these philosophers, working in a form of practical philosophy related to Aristotle, that is

reliant on the epistemological importance of particularity, orality, and locality in place and time

(pp. 31-34). Yet, these scholars were formulating their ideas in a period of competing religious

and intellectual dogmatisms – particularly between Catholic and Protestant viewpoints (p. 26), in

an era marked by a "politics of certainty" (p. 69). Walter Mignolo identifies the modern era as a

period marked both by competing theological certainties and disputes, and the emergence of the

self-consciousness of Europe as the distinctly *modern* centre point of global concern and

dominance and imperial aspirations (Mignolo, 2011, xii). Toulmin argues that Renaissance

Humanist epistemological thought was eclipsed in the modern era due to the instability in Europe

from the violence of the Thirty Years War and a desire to create social stability through

intellectual certainty (Toulmin, 1990, pp. 53-54).[11]

Toulmin argues that the politics of certainty and conditions of instability and violence in the 16th

Century led to the 17th Century Western *Enlightenment* - the project of establishing objective

foundations for knowledge that was taken up by such thinkers as Descartes, Locke and later

Kant. These scholars sought to establish *reason* as a methodology that exists abstractly and the

basis for the justification of knowledge (Bernstein, 1983, pp. 115-117). In this part of the

modern era, there was a marginalization of the idea that knowledge could be understood as oral,

particular, local, and timely, in favour of an understanding of knowledge as written, abstract,

universal and timeless (Toulmin, 1990, p. 34). The results of this shift are completely profound

for Western thought from the 17th to the 20th Century and are entrenched in a dominant, secular,

and positivist view of knowledge generation in modern life. Carey and Festa (2009) argue that

the rationalist foundationalism at the heart of Enlightenment epistemology simultaneously

centres its own perspective, while positioning any other epistemological orientation as

uncivilized, irrational, or superstitious (p. 8), thus making a strong connection between modernist

epistemology and global forms of social inequity.

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[11] It is worth noting that while both Toulmin and Mignolo problematize modernity, Toulmin places the timing of
modernity with the 17th Century European rationalization of the natural sciences, whereas Mignolo places the
start of modernity in European imperial/colonial aspirations in the 15th Century. My dissertation agrees with
Mignolo's timing and related focus.

The post-modern era in Western thought marks a period of questioning of the very possibility of objective foundations of knowledge, as was the project of the Enlightenment, and thus challenges foundational assumptions of the modern Western world. Some scholars look to Wittgenstein's later work to mark a beginning to the post-modern questioning (Peters & Marshall, 1999). The work of post-structuralist and continental philosophers also is understood as being involved in the shift to the post-modern era due to the questioning of the rationalist foundationalism at the heart of the modern agenda. There is a rejection in this era of dichotomies such as mind/body, nature/culture, subject/object that are seen as discursively created. There is also a common repudiation amongst contemporary scholars working in the tradition of Aristotle of the rationalist foundationalism upon which modern epistemology was constructed - "especially regarding those areas of human enquiry concerned with evaluative deliberation" (Carr, 1995, p. 140). This would **not** place the resurgence of the Aristotelian tradition in opposition to Western modern philosophy in the frame of post-modernism, since the tradition predates modernity, but instead positions Aristotelian philosophy in critical counter-perspective.

Bringing these thoughts back to contemporary educational contexts, there remains this familiar tension between the desire for certainty, and the recognition that uncertainty is inherent within the shifting and dynamic contexts of human activity. I am arguing that the technical-rational approach is the continued form of rationalist foundationalism that is a recurrent and misguided feature of Western philosophy. I am arguing that this approach, and the intellectual position that underlies it, emerges in a futile response to the indeterminate nature of dynamic contexts, and through ignoring important contextual features is unable to adequately respond to the particular demands of local contexts and obliterates the epistemic importance of the body in a particular

place, engaged in events of experience. In this way, it holds up the artificial dualism of mind/body that is the product of Cartesian Enlightenment epistemology. The local features of educational contexts are constituted by real bodies and real places that, in the interests of epistemic recognition and conditions of social equity, cannot be elided.

Returning to Dunne's analysis, he identifies the problem confronting contemporary education as technical-rationality inappropriately applied to understand and engage with educational contexts and challenges. I would argue that the problem is more extensive than this. Richard Bernstein points out that technical-rationality is not the fundamental problem for society – the real problem is domination (Bernstein, 1983, p. 156). This critique is in line with post-structuralist critiques of professionalism, and I extend this line of thought to the profession of teaching. As Morrell argues, professionalism is not just an individual or group concern over knowledge and standards, but needs to also be understood as a state representation of power reflecting the dominant ideology (Morrell, 2007, p. 18; see also Martimianakis, Maniate & Hodges, 2009, p. 833). In this way, constructions of teaching need to be analyzed with a view to understanding how technical-rationality is employed to maintain power relations through constraining accepted forms of knowledge and possibilities for teaching practice. In the next section I will draw on arguments by scholars working in the *coloniality* paradigm that argue that technical-rationality maintains hegemonic hierarchies and privilege that were established with colonization.

1.5.2   Coloniality-Modernity as Epistemic Hegemony and Social Inequity

These ideas concerning dominant epistemic practice in educational contexts that constrain thought and the tie to modernity are made more transparent in the arguments of Walter Mignolo

(2011), and a number of scholars working in the *coloniality* paradigm enunciated from the global south. This line of scholarship is also taken up in the Canadian educational context through the work of George Sefa Dei (2011a). Coloniality scholarship emerges from the dual understandings that there is a societal need for decolonization, and that decolonization cannot happen solely through Western European scholarship. Coloniality scholars critique post-colonial scholarship that does not call attention to the place of enunciation of thought, and stresses the epistemic requirement to centre thought from *the subaltern* through attending to the epistemic contributions of peoples of the global south and Indigenous traditions (Dei, 2011a, p.2; Grosfoguel, 2007, p. 212). Mignolo argues that modernity has a flip side that is relatively ignored in Western based scholarship. He argues that Western European modernity created an image of itself, in the time of the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras, as *Western Civilization*, and presumed itself as the arrival point of human existence and as the point of reference of global history (Mignolo, 2011, xiv).   Through these beliefs a problematic side of modernity materialized in an imperial structure of coloniality. He refers to this as the *coloniality-modernity* relationship which formed together in the mid 15th Century and established in space and time a perpetuating structure of racism and patriarchy "that created the conditions to build and control a structure of knowledge, either grounded on the word of God or the word of Reason and Truth" (Mignolo, 2011, xv; see also Deloria, 1973, pp. 275-281 for a more detailed discussion of the intersection of European colonial imperialism and Christianity).

Ramon Grosfoguel perhaps captures the idea of *coloniality* in an illuminating way when he states that what arrived in sovereign, non-European territories was not just a selection of representatives of a colonizing nation, nor just an economic system of labour and capital. What

also arrived was a complex world system embodied in "a European, capitalist, military, christian, patriarchal, white, heterosexual, male" who "established in time and space several entangled global hierarchies" (Grosfoguel, 2008, p. 5). Understood in this way, coloniality is a perpetuating spatio-temporal **structure** that imposes intersecting global hierarchies in terms of race, class, gender, sexuality, spirituality, economic system, and geography that organizes bodies into complex hierarchal social organizations. It is a system of inequity and privilege that moves through time and claims geographic spaces, and is perpetuated through material and discursive social practices and institutional structures. As Grosfoguel (2008) argues: "Coloniality allows us to understand the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the modern/colonial capitalist world−system*"*(p. 8).

Anabal Quijano extends the concept of *coloniality* and the *global hierarchies* to theorize a *colonial power matrix* organized around the socially constructed notion of race. Quijano argues that *race* is the key element of the social classification of colonized and colonizers. Unlike previous instances of colonization, "the superiority of the dominant under European colonialism became related to biological superiority, producing new social identities using physiognomic traits as external manifestations of their 'racial nature'" (Quijano, 2007, p. 171). Quijano goes on to argue that the produced geocultural identities formed the basis of distribution of work around the globe: The system of "salaried, independent peasants, independent merchants, and slave and serfs, was organized basically following the same 'racial' lines of global-social classification" and organized under a euro-centred world power (p. 171). Thus colonialism produced an economic power structure that classified the world's peoples into a hierarchy of superior

normalized bodies and inferior racialized bodies that was used as justification for the both the

benevolent and violent domination of *non-white* bodies by *white* Western European bodies.

Central to the coloniality paradigm is the notion that these intersecting hierarchies are supported

by modernist epistemology. Mignolo identifies the key to maintaining the invisibility of this

structure of domination and oppression is the *hubris of the zero point.* Mignolo argues that the

zero point is the epistemological location that places a privileged knowing body as occupying a

detached and neutral point of observation, and from this neutral place "maps the world and its

problems, classifies people, and projects what is good for them" (Mignolo, 2011, p. 118).

Grosfoguel adds to these thoughts through noting that the particular Western modernist view of

knowledge is able to dominate through masquerading as universal knowledge and present itself

as the god-like view of truth – "Its a point of view that conceals itself as being beyond a point of

view" (Grosfoguel, 2007, p. 214). As Quijano argues, the European paradigm of rational

knowledge, not only grew in the context of colonialism; it was a foundational part of the power

structure of domination (Quijano, 2007, p. 174). Acknowledging that modernity is coincident

and related to the rise of the nation-state, and coloniality was secured at that time, Boaventura

deSousa Santos argues current *globalizations* reflect the growing asymmetries of global power

originating in colonialism and discusses these asymmetries in the context of modernist

epistemology (Santos, 2009a, p. 109). Santos contends that we are globally in a situation of

epistemological monopolization that has produced a monoculture of *rigorous scientific*

knowledge that is inadequate to understand meaningful questions (Santos, 2009b). Santos argues

that we need to practice *epistemic recognition* when addressing our questions – recognizing both

the absences and emergences with regard to the presence of diverse knowledges and perspectives and the related tie to colonialism (2009b).

I started this section with a number of questions: Why have these codified views on knowledge in education emerged? From what source did they emerge? How are they supported? How are they perpetuated? - By whom, and for what purposes? I realized when trying to answer these questions that a full causal answer would be beyond the scope of any one text. Even so, the perspectives that I have chosen to share provide an important rationale for engaging in this study of embodied knowledge, that I derived from trying to answer those questions. What I have concluded is that the pattern of addressing the indeterminacy of complex contexts with codified knowledge based in an epistemology reliant on rationalist foundationalism is both a recurrent and reductive approach in Western philosophical contexts. It is an approach that obscures the body, as well as the place in which that body exists. This in itself is an important reason to focus on the body and the way the body-mind engages in knowing in context and place. Perhaps of greater importance, is the further argument that obscuring the epistemic importance of the body is actually a current practice of social inequity on a global scale. This theorization locates the lack of focus on the body, not as an innocent mistake, but a deliberate strategy related to colonial ventures and now global capitalist ventures. This strategic epistemic practice perpetuates the conditions of social inequity by obscuring the *locatedness* and embodied enunciation of real persons who seek to oppress "others", and to also deny enunciation to those "others". As my educational focus is as mutually concerned with epistemic issues as those of social equity, I conclude that this study of embodied knowledge in relation to *transformative pedagogical encounters* as crucial in both regards.

1.6   Locating this Research in Teacher Education

My research contributes to theorizing teaching and learning, and is specifically located in the research area of teacher education. My interest in these questions in the space of teacher education emerges from my frustration and disappointment of working in educational spaces where new teachers were entering schools preoccupied with performing teaching by codes and mandates and a seeming lack of appreciation of the educational richness that the students were bringing to the schools. I began to wonder about the relation between practices in teacher education and the attitudes and practices I was observing in new teachers. These thoughts prompted me to enroll in a PhD program at UBC where I could think more deeply about teacher education and the potential ways that teacher candidates are becoming subsumed into technocratic, reductive educational discourses. The courses I have been teaching in the teacher education program during my PhD program have provided opportunities to explore my ideas and concerns,[12] and have also called my attention to the place of teacher education as a site from which hegemonic epistemological orientations and narratives might be drawn out and questioned, and not unquestioningly brought into the space of public education. I will explore these points in more detail throughout this dissertation, but acknowledge that I locate this research in teacher education in recognition that practices in teacher education have the opportunity to make the invisible visible and create discussion where there is often intentional silencing.

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[12]   The courses I have taught in the Teacher Education - Bachelor of Education Program include: Philosophy of Education; Social Issues in Education; Ethics and Education; and the first generation of the recently mandated course titled Aboriginal Education in Canada. I am currently teaching the second generation of the Aboriginal Education in Canada course in two different cohort groups.

My intention is to engage teacher education in a *complicated conversation* as discussed by Anne Phelan with reference to William Pinar's elaboration of this notion from curriculum theory.[13] Phelan (2011) argues that research in teacher education has moved from a technical-rational framework of program effectiveness, to a form of research praxis that has often been constrained by institutional discourses and intellectual parochialism (pp. 211-212). She makes the important point that teacher education research needs generativity from engagement with political, cultural and social concerns and macro issues of power (p. 212). This project is an attempt to engage research in teacher education in this *radicalising* way through revealing the connections between epistemic practices that create conditions of social inequity, and the structures and practices in teacher education.

1.7   Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to my inquiry into embodied knowledge that I am undertaking to inform my theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter*. As a rationale, I have presented the problematics of a technical-rational approach both epistemically and ethically, the latter in creating the conditions for social inequity. The focus on rationalist foundationalism and the coloniality-modernity paradigm highlighted the unacceptable habit of obscuring the *who* and *where* in educational considerations and the need to practice *epistemic recognition* in addressing educational questions. I provided my more specific research questions and summarily note that the questions are concerned with learning from Aristotelian and

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[13]   Phelan (2011) discusses a needed *complicated conversation* in teacher education through considering Pinar's understanding of the *complicated conversation* in curriculum theory as exploration of curriculum as political, aesthetic, historical, theological, phenomenological and hermeneutic text (p. 213).

Indigenous texts on embodied knowledge, so as to consider how teacher education programs at UBC can support teacher candidates in engaging in a complicated conversation about teaching, learning, schooling and social equity. Within this conversation is a priority of focus on the real bodies and real places in which education/schooling is enacted, and an orientation that accounts for material and discursive features of educational contexts.

In Chapter 2, I will provide my methodological considerations for this research. I will outline the path that led me to engage with Aristotelian and Indigenous traditions to address my research questions and social equity concerns. I will also provide the context and reasons for my choice of textual analysis of Aristotelian and Indigenous scholarship, rather than ethnographic research in communities. At that point, I will only consider the challenge of a Settler-scholar engaging with texts based in Indigenous onto-epistemologies and will detail and address these thoughts in Chapter 4. In this work, I rely on Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics to guide my analysis of the texts, and I will elaborate my reasons for choosing this approach and the specifics within Gadamer's work that are particularly suited to the challenges of this research.

In Chapter 3, I will engage in Gadamerian hermeneutic analysis of Aristotelian scholarly texts related to the concept of embodied knowledge. My analysis will consider the multiple ways the body-mind comes to know, with specific attention to the embodied knowledge of the *Phronimos*, and the capacity of the body for *nous*. I interpret *nous* as involved in multiple capacities for perception and discernment by a knowing body engaged in forms of experience. I will specifically address the first two research questions related to the ways the body comes to know and the connection to place.

In Chapter 4, I will provide the elaborated consideration of myself as a Settler-scholar engaging in interpretation of Indigenous scholarly texts as noted previously, and Chapter 5 will follow with my engagement in hermeneutic analysis of the texts by Indigenous scholars in BC. This chapter will also be addressed to the first two research questions. My analysis will consider the multiple ways the body-mind comes to know, with specific attention to the embodied knowledge of the *Elder*, and the capacity of the body-mind for apprehending knowledge through practices and place.

In Chapter 6, I will return to my theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* and address my second set of research questions. I will discuss ideas and practices emerging from my analysis of the Indigenous and Aristotelian scholarship as being important to creating generative conditions from which transformative learning might emerge. I will also consider and address some potential critiques of this theorization. In the final chapter, I will then consider this analysis and the emergence of the final research questions addressed to the specific context of teacher education. I will discuss the complications and opportunities of bringing these ideas into the praxis of working with teacher candidates at UBC on the ancestral, traditional, unceded and overlapping territories of the Musqueam, Tsleil-Waututh and Squamish peoples in the Settler nation-state of Canada.

Chapter 2: Methodological Thoughts and Research Intersections

This chapter provides methodological thoughts on how I will go about knowing in this dissertation. My intention in this dissertation is to learn from Indigenous and Aristotelian scholarship on embodied knowledge to inform my theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* and my work with teacher candidates. My desire is not to locate myself as an isolated subject, and the texts as objects of learning, but instead to forefront my relation to the texts and the already ongoing material-discursive relations in which this research is located. I will highlight my path to this study and my selection of texts that serves to clarify my choice of key concepts in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, as a guide to my self-reflexive interpretation of texts in this dissertation. I will also discuss the status of the vignettes in the hermeneutic analysis, followed with a more detailed discussion of the Gadamerian concepts I am using in this dissertation. I will conclude this chapter by considering this research at the intersection of multiple lines of thought and inquiry that work to dissolve a mind/body dualism.

... the story continues in the classroom at the lunchtime break ....

> *The room is quiet as I sit on the couch eating some warmed up leftovers of chicken and rice, while a few students quietly catch up on some work. I am deep in thought considering how we can learn about the safety of the water in the school. So far, I have come up against problems. An internet search suggests that testing water is an expensive undertaking and we have no money, no equipment, and I have very little background in this area. The school district does not test the quality of water in the schools. I'm feeling a little hopeless and stuck as Harvey comes over and glances at my lunch. "No goat cheese today?" he asks, and I shake my head while thinking I need to remember to bring more to school. Despite not having cheese to share, he decides to sit down with me to chat. I share my dilemma with Harvey.*

"I'm not sure how we can find out about the safety of the water", I confess. "I don't really know how to test water and we will need special equipment that I can't afford to buy". Harvey is quiet for a moment and then he states quite directly "Well maybe instead of doing it ourselves, we can ask people to teach us what to do. Then we can do it and maybe they could lend us their stuff". I can see the incredible potential in Harvey's suggestion immediately, and I compliment him on his keen insight. Of course, what is needed is to be in relation with more people and learn from them, and so we proceed on that path. I look for possibilities and find out that UBC Trek is having a 'meet and greet' night to develop University-School partnerships. I develop a proposal, and try to find someone who would be interested. Through one enthusiastic professor I met that evening, our class developed a network of three graduate and 10 undergraduate science students with access to UBC facilities. In early February our class joined this amazing group of people for a one-week project during which we learned Western scientific principles and procedures for water testing; and undertook the first formal water testing study in the history of the Vancouver School Board. Yet this is only the beginning of our interest in water, and through this experience we become more interested in the local watershed, the ocean, and different ways to think about our relationship to water.

This particular vignette is intended to highlight my methodological priorities and the complication of addressing my research questions in the field of teacher education. First, the questions that guided our inquiry emerged from the material conditions of our existence in the class. We asked: Is our water safe to drink and how can we find out? Posing meaningful questions, and considering the ways such questions might be addressed, emerges from the path that is being followed. There is an entangled relation involving the question that emerges; the people asking the question; the relative importance of the question to the people asking it; and the method to address it. In this dissertation, the questions emerge and are addressed from my

own path, and I will highlight that path in this chapter. The complication that emerges is the degree to which I raise these questions with teacher candidates and colleagues, and whether or not this is actually a mutual concern. People engaged in teaching and learning in teacher education programs at UBC understand material conditions of social equity in different ways. In what ways might I be problematically imposing on teacher candidates and colleagues when I insist on engaging specific questions that are not shared?

This point also raises a complication of hierarchy and relationships with the students in asking questions. In the vignette Harvey and I have a caring and long-term relationship and we are mutually concerned with the questions and how to address them. Despite the mutuality of the interest in the questions, I am in a position of authority and responsibility with Harvey. Harvey and I are well aligned in our questions at this point, but what happens when we are not well aligned and I am in authority? I raise this aspect in foreshadowing Chapter 7 and the complicated conversation in teacher education. My research questions are raised in the context of working with teacher candidates at UBC, and the notion of my authority, and perhaps the lack of mutuality of concern about the questions, raises complications.

Second, is it possible to address currently puzzling questions through extending relations so as to *learn from* others? In this vignette, we needed to learn from others so we could understand how to address our questions about the safety of the water. In this dissertation, I need to extend my relations to learn from Indigenous and Aristotelian traditions of thought and practice to help address my questions. I am not *learning about*, but *learning from* these traditions so as to think more deeply about my particular questions. *Learning from* the texts, does not imply a lack of

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critical reflection, but it does require a suspension of judgment in encountering what is new so as to be open to really listening to the texts and avoiding impositions that serve to obscure the meanings. In my view, methods that allow for self-reflexive engagement with the question and the relations are required to address the material and discursive features of the entanglement.

In this vignette, we are not finished with our questions after engaging with one perspective. We learned from our new relations with UBC science students but then thought critically about our questions and the answers provided. There was a specific answer about the quality of the water in the fountains for physical health, but the specific answer (the water fountains were free from metals and harmful bacteria) generated more questions and required more critical thought and different perspectives. In this way, a final *answer* is not being sought, but further questions emerge from addressing questions. In this dissertation, I too am encountering new relations through the texts, I am thinking about how I can be open to learning from the texts, but also will be thinking critically about the ways these texts help me address my questions, and the new questions that will emerge.

2.1   My Path to Studying Embodied Knowledge through Indigenous and Aristotelian Texts

My dissatisfaction with codified approaches in education arose from my own teaching practice and my frustration with the institutional constraints that I view as impeding transformational learning in Vancouver schools. I became a teacher that strategized ways to push the structures and engage in learning that was appropriately attentive to the needs and circumstances of myself and my students and our relations – as I understood them. My dissatisfaction resulted in wanting

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to learn how I could articulate the limitations of what I felt were pervasive and miseducational institutional practices and a desire to engage with new ideas to guide my practice. My master's level graduate work started with an interest in Nel Noddings and her work in an *Ethic of Care,* and moved to Aristotelian practical philosophy and the notion of *phronesis* as embodied knowledge in moral relationships. Daniel Vokey has been influential in directing my understanding of the significance of Aristotelian *virtue ethics* both as an ethical orientation and in relation to my teaching practice. Dr. Vokey has also helped me to see how *virtue ethics* is a viable alternative tradition that provides a perspective from which to critique modernist thought.

Dr. Vokey mentored and advised my 2007 Masters thesis titled "Educating Heart and Mind: Ethical Emotional Learning in Elementary Schools"*,* which included conceptual analysis of the Aristotelian notion of *habituation.* This work centred the importance of both reason and emotion in a theory of knowing and learning through practice, and relied on the notion of the embodied wisdom of the *Phronimos.* In this work, I began to develop ideas from Vokey's (2001) notion of *non-relative intrinsic goodness* as well as the work of Nancy Sherman (1999) and Martha Nussbaum (1990) on the cognitive role of the emotions. Through working with these theories and ethics, I was seeking to understand ideas of knowing that were not limited to strictly rational explanations. The role of the body in knowing in context, and also knowing in relation to the 'good', were central concerns in this work. All of these efforts were dialectically influenced by, and influencing, my teaching practice with children at that time. My interest in incorporating spiritual practices such as meditation and yoga as part of teaching practice, and the challenge of doing so, were particularly relevant to my research interests then and now. At the same time, as

mentioned previously, I was encountering new teachers who seemed preoccupied with practices and thoughts that privileged a codified, technical-rational orientation to teaching.

In my return to graduate school in PhD studies, I started to think more clearly about the importance of place to embodied understanding, and the marginalization of these considerations in educational contexts. As a teacher in Vancouver, I have had a significant number of students from Indigenous communities throughout BC, and have learned a great deal from the students and the students' families. I also have a close friend who graciously shares her perspectives, as well as some of her traditional knowledge and practices, with me. Particularly, I have learned the significance of ethical relationality as a foundation to all ways of being, knowing and doing in learning relationships, and the significance of embodiment in place to these relations. In my PhD work, I started to learn to articulate and appreciate the contribution of Indigenous knowledges to my explicit epistemic perspective on teaching and learning.

Throughout my initial study and reflection in a doctoral seminar titled *Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Education* taught by Dr. Jo-ann Archibald, my appreciation for the parallels in Aristotelian and Indigenous scholarship became more vivid. I saw important parallels regarding the embodied wisdom of the *Elder* with Aristotle's notion of the embodied wisdom of the *Phronimos* – and the ways both provide a critical counter-perspective to the modernist view, while also providing generative thought on embodied knowledge. As I have been reading and thinking in more detail about both lines of scholarship, I have appreciated that both traditions transcend the mind/body dualism prominent in modernist scholarship, but also transcend dualisms in terms of reason/emotion, subject/object, and culture/nature. My work in this

dissertation will elaborate the ways that Indigenous and Aristotelian scholarship transcends these dualisms, and offer hopefully generative lines of thought concerning practices in teacher education. I have also observed that academic resistance and related rejection emerges in response to traditions, such as Indigenous traditions of thought and practice that do not segment the spiritual and the body from scholarly or educational inquiry. I view this resistance and rejection as symptomatic of ongoing epistemic hegemony in educational spaces. This move to consider the *Phronimos* and the *Elder* provides critique and challenge to this epistemic hegemony, as it is pervasively understood through the coloniality-modernity paradigm. All of these ideas will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter 7.

I would also acknowledge and anticipate questions about the ultimate compatibility of Aristotelian and Indigenous texts in a study that forefronts the importance of concerns of social equity in educational spaces. Aristotelian texts emerge from a social milieu of naturalized elitism, and Aristotle's references to citizens do not include women, slaves or children. This could be a fundamental problem as my study is as mutually concerned with the epistemic importance of the body as with matters of social equity in educational spaces - particularly with the entrenched intersections of dominance that emerges from Western imperialism. Thus, there may be, fundamental problems with taking up Aristotle's texts in my work from multiple angles. While I would acknowledge that elitism is a deeply problematic feature of Aristotle's texts, I believe I am taking up key Aristotelian notions informed by a commitment to social equity – a very different context than Aristotle's social milieu of normalized elitism. That is to say, I bring a different set of sensibilities to Aristotle's work through the social equity concerns of my inquiry. In this way, I see my engagement with Aristotle's texts as haunted without being

determined by their elitist elements. Notwithstanding my commitment to social equity, I see my perspective as also reflecting elitist assumptions absorbed from my social milieu, hence I continually seek to understand the implications of my own locations of privilege as a white Euro-descendant woman. Thus although elements of Aristotle's and my own ways of thinking are in tension with my dissertation's aspirations toward social equity, those very sensibilities offer the possibility for elitism to be revealed instead of ignored, normalized or accepted.

While I appreciate that Aristotelian scholarship will make a valuable contribution to this research through the focus on embodied knowledge, I also recognize the need to look to Indigenous traditions of thought to approach my research questions. As in the vignette, meaningful questions require multiple perspectives. I appreciate that Indigenous traditions are vibrant, living traditions and thus the embodied activities related to knowing within these traditions have evolved and refined over time *in practice*. My growing appreciation for the embodied, non-discursive aspects of knowing, that differ from the representation of knowing in linguistic texts, have specific significance to this research. In contrast, Aristotelian texts endure mostly in written form. The revival of Aristotelian texts has occurred after significant interruption and without guidance that can be traced back to Aristotle. Second, the idea of place-based knowledge is central to the BC Indigenous traditions of which I have become more familiar, and contains the idea that knowledge can be directly apprehended from the land itself and that the land is sentient. I believe that this brings out the importance of context in a very full sense, in contrast to an Aristotelian focus on contextual factors influencing embodied knowledge that seems more abstracted from an actual place.

My choice to look to Indigenous traditions of thought and practice in BC is also being undertaken due to my recognition of the importance of challenging the dominance of Western based thought through engaging in epistemic recognition as a research practice. As in the vignette in this chapter, Western based perspectives are informative, relevant and interesting, but, as with all perspectives and traditions, have inherent limitations. I am convinced that research that relies purely on Western based onto-epistemological perspectives reproduces the hegemony of Western thought and practice established through coloniality. I would argue that this hegemonic habit has constrained the opportunity for enriched thought on important questions to which research is greatly needed – including this research - while simultaneously reproducing Western epistemic dominance. I am not limiting these ideas to the modernist and positivistic strains of Western scholarship, but also to Western critical theory. Catherine Walsh identifies the geo-politics of critical thought, which continue to dominate from Western perspectives, without self-analysis of the location and relation to domination of the enunciation of knowing. In her analysis, the problem is not in and of itself with European thought, but with the lack of self-consciousness of its intimate relation to power in the modernity-coloniality structure (Walsh, 2012, p. 13), which results in the continued subalternization of "other" knowledges, philosophies and frameworks (p. 14). Walsh insists we name and consider epistemic spaces and places and the ancestors they invoke as a praxis of intervention and critique (Walsh, 2012, p. 12). Walsh argues that we need to appreciate that the enunciation and experience of knowing is significant and located, and that critical theory when continually represented from a similar location and ontology thus presents as an "ethno-philosophy with its own local history marked by gender, race, class, region, and so on (p. 13).

Sandy Grande (2004) makes important arguments for the need to disrupt the dominance of Western perspectives, particularly through engaging with Indigenous perspectives. Grande argues that Indigenous perspectives are vital both to critique dominant forms of being, knowing and doing, and to provide the potential for the emergence of transformative paradigms. As she states, Indigenous voices are vital "not because such peoples categorically possess any kind of magical, mystical power to fix countless generations of abuse and neglect, but because non-Western peoples and nations exist as living critiques of the dominant culture, providing critique-al knowledge and potentially transformative paradigms" (p. 65). I interpret Grande's arguments in line with George Sefa Dei's requirement to centre the positioning and authenticity of the knower attentive to colonial relations (2011a), and Boaventura deSousa-Santos requirements for *epistemic recognition* and the need to approach important questions through an ecology of knowledges (2009b). This is not to take on a romantic gaze at Indigenous knowledges, but a realization that complex questions far exceed Western understandings of the world (Santos, 2009b), and particularly required at this point in history are the silenced knowledges of the subaltern in the places where questions are raised (Dei, 2011a).

Thus, my methodological priorities for this research involve the need to practice epistemic recognition in relation to my research questions as suggested by Santos, but also to engage in detailed self-reflexive consideration of my positionality in the place where I raise my questions. I recognize that I am not innocent in this research, as "knowledge production is not an innocent or neutral project" (Dei, 2011a, p. 4). As Christine Ceci (2000) argues in relation to the demands of recognizing our positionality or "situatedness" in inquiry: "those who attempt to take the knowledge and leave the power behind or put it aside are, inadvertently or not, operating in the

realm of privilege; that seeming neutrality is itself a mark of privilege" (p. 71). Thus, Chapter 4 is focused solely on explicating and considering my implicated position in terms of power and privilege as a white Western Settler-scholar and my located attempts to engage ethically with Indigenous perspectives.

2.2   Exploring My Research Questions through Textual Analysis

My methodological thoughts for this dissertation involve addressing the challenge of how to learn from Indigenous and Aristotelian traditions in a way that will inform my interests in embodied knowledge in the context of teacher education. I choose to look to texts, instead of engaging in ethnographic work in communities, for reasons that arise out of the traditions themselves and specific historical relationships. Aristotle's original work emerged from a distinctly different historical period (about 325BC), and there has not been a social community that has been carrying out social practices in a continuous line with his thought from that time to the current time. Contemporary Aristotelian texts are also not emerging from a lived tradition and form of social life that extends beyond academic engagement. Theorists who take up Aristotle's work are in divergent academic communities and approach the texts differently - often based in their disciplinary interests. Philosophers of education who have a specific interest in Aristotle do not have a society, or regular meetings of which I am aware. These scholars tend to engage in a community via texts in academic journals, and thus I am following in this practice through looking to texts.

My decision to look to texts by Indigenous scholars instead of engagement in specific Indigenous communities is also based on the nature of the knowledge, but also historical relationships and

my own sense of ethical responsibility. My awareness and understanding of problematic

research practices and impositions by non-Indigenous researchers in conducting research in

Indigenous communities provokes me to think very carefully about how I might go about my

research in ethical and knowledgeable ways (Smith, 1999). My awareness that I may

misunderstand community Elders due to being raised and educated in Western based educational

and familial contexts was one consideration. I was similarly concerned that I might share

something from the community that is not meant to be shared in written texts outside of a

community. I also did not want to recreate unnecessary impositions on communities. Instead, I

have chosen to look to texts by Indigenous scholars who have deeply structured understandings

through membership in their Nations, and who publish scholarship that is meant to be shared

within and beyond the community. The scholars themselves provide a guide to the type of

knowledge from community that can be shared, and also provide guidance to non-community

members on the onto-epistemological commitments that underlie knowledge practices. These

scholars have an advanced understanding of academic discourses and are experienced in the

ways of the academy - thus ensuring I am not positioning *myself* as an expert about a Nation and

knowledge system from which I am learning.

The following are the scholars, scholars' Nations, and academic roles I am relying upon in this

work: ***Professor Jo-ann Archibald, Q'um Q'um Xiiem*** is from the Stó:lō River People and the

Xaxli'p First Nation (Lillooet). UBC – Professor, Associate Dean for Indigenous Education, and

Director of the Native Indian Teacher Education Program (NITEP). ***Professor Jeannette***

Armstrong is a traditional knowledge keeper from Sqilxw Okanagan Nation. Assistant

Professor UBC Okanagan and Executive Director of En-owkin Centre. ***Professor E. Richard***

Atleo, Umeek is a hereditary chief of the Nuu-chah-nulth Nation. Associate Adjunct Professor University of Victoria, and Research Liaison at the University of Manitoba. *Professor William A. Cohen*, member of the Okanagan Band and instructor through UBC Okanagan. *Professor Ethel B. Gardner, Stelómethet* is from the Stó:lō Nation. Associate Professor, University of Alberta. *Professor Kundoque Jacquie Green,* is from the Killer Whale clan of the Haisla Peoples. Associate Professor University of Victoria. *Professor Charles R. Menzies* is from Laxyuup Gitxaała. Associate Professor UBC.

2.2.1 The Status of the Vignettes in this Dissertation

In the introductory chapter I stated that I am bringing vignettes into this dissertation to express the complexity and multiplicity of the ideas, and to also provide a more enriched emotional and intellectual engagement with how I have lived these ideas in my teaching practice. Since this dissertation is a philosophical work based in hermeneutic analysis, it is important to be more explicit in the methodology section about the specific status that the vignettes occupy in the work. In my view, these vignettes provide greater texture to the theoretical ideas, as the vignettes meaningfully connect the ways I have embodied the concerns of this dissertation in the text of the dissertation. I would also argue that the vignettes highlight an authentic representation of knowing through attending to the embodied dimension of knowing that occurs through textual analysis. It could be argued that a theoretical work lacks an embodied dimension – all the work is in the head. In my view, the body and mind are intimately connected and new ideas are understood in relation to our memories of our body-minds engaged in experience. Thus, the vignettes are not merely instrumental to the discussion, but provide authenticity concerning the subject of this dissertation, through this methodological choice. Although,

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ultimately this dissertation is not an empirical inquiry, but an inquiry based in philosophical hermeneutic analysis incorporating memories of conceptually related embodied experience to inform the analysis.

A potential ethical concern is that through bringing in the vignettes, I am also bringing those with whom I had these experiences into this dissertation. Although the students and colleagues are anonymous in the vignettes, they are present in the work and in some way might want to know that their experiences are present in academic work beyond the context of the original experience. With regard to the elementary school students, the vignettes are from a year that the students were actually participating in another UBC research study that spanned the school year, and the students and parents had signed consent forms in relation to that study with that researcher. Thus there was a general expectation that the activities in the class that year would be discussed publicly beyond that year. As for the adult teacher education students who are the subject of the last vignette, the students were similarly part of Julia Ostertag's research project and also had an expectation that the activities of the class would be in some way publicly, yet anonymously, discussed.

2.3   Choosing Gadamerian Philosophical Hermeneutics

Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, most fully articulated in *Truth and Method,* provides conceptual strategies that are useful in my analysis of texts across traditions of thought and practice. In particular, and with great significance to this study, Gadamer provides the conceptual tools necessary for me to engage self-reflexively in this dissertation so that I can learn

from the texts in an ethical way.[14] My ideas on self-reflexivity emerge from Michael Marker

(2003) where he insists that researchers need to think about the ways they might be implicated in

their own research questions, and therefore attend to their research in relation to history,

hegemony and the self (p. 367). This perspective is similar to Ilan Kapoor's interpretation of

Gaytri Spivak's elaborations on self-reflexivity where she concludes that: "[Spivak's] project is

an appeal to acknowledge our complicities and unlearn our prejudices as a way of clearing the

space for the subaltern speech act" (Kapoor, 2004, p. 643, see also Andreotti, 2012, p. 21). I will

be following Gadamer's ideas on examining the fore-structures that I project onto the texts; the

hermeneutic circle; and horizons of understanding, as a way to engage self-reflexively in this

research. I anticipate that these ideas will address some of the major challenges in my research

that arise from the nature of the texts and my positionality.

I understand the Aristotelian and Indigenous texts to present differing interpretative challenges in

this dissertation. The Aristotelian texts are significantly distanced in historical time, original

language and emerge from a vastly different social milieu with particular elitist assumptions.

Further, these texts are interpreted and analyzed in different times and by scholars with differing

interests, assumptions and priorities. My challenges in analysis of the texts by Indigenous

scholars are that the texts emerge from traditions of thought with contrasting ontological

assumptions from the tradition in which I was raised and educated, and are complexly related to

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[14] In asserting that Gadamer can help me work self-reflexively in this dissertation, I note that there may appear to be some inconsistency. Gadamer is critiqued by Bernstein (1983) for his lack of attentiveness to issues of domination (p. 156), and yet my own ideas on self-reflexivity are understood as involving an analysis of myself in relation to history, power and domination. I understand Gadamer's ideas as providing me with tools for self-analysis that I can then use to inquire into my implicated position with respect to power and domination, and not that Gadamer would discuss these issues in this way.

me in an understanding of coloniality and colonial violence. Gadamer's texts on knowing through tradition, or *traditionary* knowledge, are specifically relevant to my attempts to learn from the texts in this research. Gadamer's explicit critique of modernist rationality provides helpful concepts aligned with my work, and provides me with concepts and ideas through which to approach the texts in this research.

Gadamer's methodological thoughts on interpretation are also closely aligned with the Aristotelian texts I am interpreting in this research. For Gadamer, Aristotle's understanding of the importance of the particular in knowing is a model of philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 320-321). Gadamer's ideas on hermeneutics are distinct in that he is not just concerned with the interpretation and understanding of texts, but with the event of that understanding in a particular moment of application in time and place (pp. 307-308). He argues that this is similar to Aristotle's thoughts on particularism in moral knowledge. As he states: "What interests us here is precisely that [Aristotle] is concerned with reason and with knowledge, not detached from a being that is becoming, but determined by it and determinative of it." (p. 310). In this view, the scholar does not stand over and above, or detached from the texts in Gadamerian hermeneutic thought, but knowledge emerges through the relation of the texts to the scholar in a particular place and time. While Gadamer does not overtly bring an analysis of power to interpretation, I would emphasize that I use Gadamer's work to bring a self-reflexive lens on my interpretation of the texts. My understanding of the texts involves thinking through the possible reasons for the emergence of the texts, my particular interests in and relationship with the texts, so as to possibility mediate, or at least understand, the effects of my

own impositions. Gadamerian concern with the relation of the interpreter to the texts provides useful conceptual tools for my interpretation of texts in this research.

2.3.1   Gadamer's Conceptual Tools – The hermeneutic circle, fore-structures of thought, and horizons of understanding

For Gadamer, a person's subjectivity is found in the fore-structures of thought, which influence how a person is able to perceive, understand and interpret. Drawing on Martin Heidegger's notion of the hermeneutic circle, he argues that through bringing our fore-structures into line with "the things themselves," we have an opportunity for understanding through a dialectical process within a circular structure. He reiterates Heidegger's idea that the hermeneutic circle: "is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated" but to appreciate the circular nature of human understanding (Gadamer, 2004, p. 268). Gadamer is not offering a prescription for understanding, but a description of the nature of human understanding.

Gadamer develops a normative ideal of the hermeneutic circle in his discussion of a "hermeneutic consciousness". In a hermeneutic consciousness, a person intentionally surfaces and examines fore-structures and allows them to be informed by the things themselves. He sees the movement of the hermeneutic circle as containing "ontologically positive significance" when informed by a hermeneutic consciousness (Gadamer, 2004, p. 269). Gadamer explains that a person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting onto the text. The interpreter will have particular expectations and hold meanings, which will change, based on the meanings that emerge from the interpretation. In this way the fore-conceptions, fore-havings, fore-sight (those

fore-structures with which we approach a text) will be replaced as we bring our subjectivity into relation with the things themselves. As he states:

> A person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him [sic] something.
> That is why a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start,
> sensitive to the text's alterity. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither
> 'neutrality'... nor the extinction of one's self, but the foregrounding and
> appropriation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices. ...The important thing is
> to be aware of one's own bias, so the text can present itself in all its otherness and
> thus assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings. (pp. 271-272)

Gadamer believes that the recognition that all understanding inevitably involves the prejudice derived in our fore-structures gives the hermeneutic problem its real motivation. I understand Gadamer to be arguing that a hermeneutically trained consciousness would have to explicitly examine the fore-structures "dwelling within", not to ignore nor bracket them, but to examine the meaning of the fore-structures in relation to the meanings perceived in the things themselves. This would be a first step in trying to understand the relations of meanings within the self and the things under consideration as being informative or not. It becomes a *questioning of meanings* to achieve greater understanding. Not any subjectively or objectively oriented understanding is possible, but any understanding is necessarily conditioned by the non-dualistic positioning of subject and object conceived as interrelated and needing to be perceived and understood in that way. Gadamer provocatively argues that the only problematic prejudice is the "tyranny of hidden prejudice that makes us deaf to what speaks to us in tradition" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 272).

To undertake hermeneutic analysis of the texts in this research, I have been and will continue to engage in the hermeneutic circle. I approach the texts with an acknowledgement that there are commensurable notions on embodied knowledge in both sets of texts, but that the worldviews of the traditions are distinct and incommensurable. By incommensurable I am drawing on the work of Bernstein, who argues that incommensurability is not of meaning but of the standards that are directed by the worldview of the tradition (Bernstein, 1983, p. 82). Bernstein specifically looks at the hermeneutic circle that is used by Gadamer to show a way to compare and understand incommensurable traditions that are based in different worldviews (Gadamer, 2004, p. 107). I therefore approach texts with awareness that the Aristotelian texts are based in Western thought, and thus contain ideas that will align more closely with some of my Western cultural assumptions and social position. As a result, I may be more likely to quickly accept some of the ideas in Aristotelian texts, and therefore need to consider these texts in line with my assumptions. In contrast, the distance in time and original language will present more distinct defamiliarization, and this will hopefully allow greater insight. In relation to the Indigenous texts, I approach the texts appreciating that I will be more likely to project Western based onto-epistemological assumptions and problematic Settler discourses onto the texts.

In terms of the Aristotelian texts, there are specific considerations around *temporal distance* and language translation. There is no simple definition of temporal distance, as Gadamer spends pages talking around it. I find Gadamer to be arguing that hermeneutics operates in between what is familiar and strange. Importantly though, this strangeness sometimes helps with interpretation because things familiar often can be less questioned, or able to be questioned, in comparison to what is strange to us. One of the things that operate in this way would be

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historically distanced objects and texts. Gadamer believes that temporal distance is a "positive and productive condition enabling understanding" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 297). Gadamer believes that temporal distance requires us to understand the context in which the text was created to overcome the temporal distance, but recognizes this desire and effort to overcome the temporal distance is generative in itself. In Gadamer's view interpretation of historical texts "does not depend on the contingencies of the author and his [sic] original audience ... because the meaning of the text goes beyond its author" (p. 296). With regard to the Aristotelian texts in this study, I am not trying to recreate Aristotle's understanding, but appreciating the value of Aristotle's contribution on embodied knowledge in line with contemporary challenges. In this I am working in a tradition of contemporary scholars who have found value in Aristotle's writings – particularly authors who seek to challenge modernist educational thought. My interpretive approach therefore mediates between Aristotle's translated texts (using multiple translations) and elaborated commentary on Aristotle's texts – with a consideration of when and where these translations and commentaries were produced, and the particular influences that would be historically relevant.

Gadamer refers to the perspective from which we understand a text, which is affected by temporal distance and the history of effects, as our horizon of understanding. He refers to a horizon as the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point (Gadamer, 2004, p. 301). Gadamer argues that, in trying to gain a hermeneutical consciousness regarding a *traditionary* text, we need to consider the text on its own terms. We must not try to understand the text in terms of contemporary criteria and prejudices "but within its own historical horizon ... so as to understand the significance of what it has to say to us (p.

302). This involves a suspension of judgment and search for a claim to truth, so that one is

trying to get to the knowledge and truth that is embedded in the text. Gadamer refers to this not

as moving into a different horizon, but as expanding our own horizon so that we see what is still

near to us and the historical horizon of the text at the same time (p. 303). Gadamer states:

> It takes a special effort to acquire a historical horizon. We are always affected
> by what is nearest to us and hence we approach the testimony of the past under
> its influence. Thus it is necessary to guard against over hastily assimilating the
> past into our own expectations of meaning. Only then can we listen to tradition
> in a way that permits it to make its own meaning heard. (p. 304)

Gadamer looks at this idea of gaining a fusion of horizons between past and present as one of the

major challenges for developing a hermeneutic consciousness. He stresses that our present

horizon is always already being formed and we are continually required to understand our

present horizon as it frames our understanding of other historical horizons. Gadamer believes

that a real fusion of horizons occurs when a historical horizon is projected and superseded

simultaneously, and that the ability to engage in this is the challenge of hermeneutics (p. 306).

In my view, the notion of *fusion of horizons* is fundamental to interpretation, and is influential in

how I will go about interpreting both the Aristotelian and Indigenous texts. Gadamer speaks at

length about the temporal horizon as the place in which a text is created, and the importance of

understanding the text in that context. But, I believe that Gadamer's emphasis on the importance

of tradition to understanding suggests that it would be illuminating to explore the onto-

epistemological horizon of text and interpreter. I believe that understanding traditionary

knowledge would involve understanding not only in time, but the onto-epistemological

framework in which the tradition is understood. My experience in engaging with Indigenous

scholarship has foregrounded for me the importance of understanding the onto-epistemological

field in which the texts find ultimate connection and meaning, as a way to allow the meaning of

the text to emerge. In this research I see myself as attempting to expand my onto-

epistemological horizon through learning from the Indigenous and Aristotelian scholars in this

research. As the vignette in this chapter highlights, I am bringing myself into relation with new

people and ideas so that I can *learn from* these people and ideas to think about my research

questions on embodied knowledge.

2.3.2   Gadamer - Knowing through Tradition(s)

A key concept in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics that has specific importance for this

dissertation is his development of the concept of *tradition,* and the related concept of

traditionary knowledge. As I have previously mentioned, for Gadamer, tradition is an

"Überleiferung" - or ongoing conversation (Weinsheimer & Marshall, 2004, xvi). Gadamer

argues that insights are acquired and things are known through tradition (xx).[15] Traditional

knowledge is thus understood as the beliefs that are considered true based on the standards of

justification as set by the tradition. In Gadamer's view, the texts that are part of a tradition are

not set in meaning, but continually signify new meanings in the changing historical contexts in

which they become interpreted (xvi). English does not have a verb nor adjective that maintains

the active verbal implication, nor a noun for knowledge that is carried forward in tradition, and

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[15]   MacIntyre is quite similar to Gadamer in noting that knowledge from traditions is fluid and unfixed but that all
reasoning takes place and is intelligible *only* in the context of a tradition (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 206). MacIntyre
argues that a tradition does not discard the past, but the present is only "intelligible" in relation to the past: "the
past... is corrected and transcended ... in a way that leaves the present open to being in turn corrected and
transcended by some yet more adequate future point of view" (p. 137).

thus the translators of *Truth and Method* use the term *traditionary* to bring forward the meaning of Gadamer's German word for knowledge through tradition understood as active and fluid to historical times (Weinsheimer & Marshall, 2004, xvi). In my view, acknowledging the influence of Gadamer, a tradition is the collective, historical and ongoing narrative in which texts become intelligible and meaningful, and traditionary knowledge is the fluid and actively changing knowledge that is accepted as true based on the standards of reasoning that arise from traditions of thought and inquiry which are called on to guide future oriented considerations. In this way a tradition is not anchored in the past, but instead links past, present and future. In this dissertation, the traditionary knowledge from Aristotelian and Indigenous texts is historical-contemporary, thus challenging the dominant Western societal assumption of a natural binary of traditional/contemporary through introducing the feature of timelessness in traditionary knowledge.

In this dissertation, I use the term tradition to refer to the setting of boundaries that people collectively recognize as containing the historical and ongoing narratives that frames intelligibility of experience. Such a boundary might be set culturally, or by modes of inquiry similar to Kuhn's paradigms. Such narratives frame the interrelated beliefs, assumptions, norms, standards and priorities of collectivities engaging in meaning making, and influence, and are influenced by, related practices. In this dissertation, such references are to Indigenous traditions and Aristotelian traditions. I also appreciate that within traditions are collectivities that necessarily make more refined distinctions and that such boundaries are at times flexible and contain within them other boundaries. In this research, I am learning from Gitxaała, Haisla, Nuu-chah-nulth, Okanagan, and Stó:lō traditions, as well as an Aristotelian perceptual tradition.

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I would also add that a person is not bound to a single tradition nor constrained to only engage with the world through membership in specific traditions, but that understanding is always mediated through the influence of tradition(s). As in the vignette, engaging with multiple perspectives provides enriched responses to meaningful questions. I see myself as understanding experience in and through my ancestral Scottish and Irish cultural traditions, but also in and through Settler traditions specific to the *Canadian* context as a child of immigrants to Canada in the early Trudeau era. Through my ongoing engagement with scholarship, I also see myself in and through related traditions that provide internal critique to Western onto-epistemologies (feminist traditions in material-discursive frameworks; critical theory; Western scientific traditions that critique Enlightenment ontologies; and Aristotelian traditions that critique modern moral theory). I am also influenced in and through my participation in the practices of the Mahayana Buddhist tradition. As with Gadamer's notions of expanding our temporal horizons, I would argue that it is possible to expand our horizon of understanding to engage with traditions of thought and practice, and to also critique our own tradition(s) from within. In this research, the notion of tradition is thus central to understanding my perspective as grounded in a Western based modernist tradition that I am attempting to critique from a position internal to that tradition, but also acknowledge the multiple traditions in which I recognize myself as participating and knowing through. In this dissertation, I am attempting to expand my horizon of understanding through engaging with the texts from Aristotelian and Indigenous traditions here in BC.

Gadamer's views on the centrality of tradition to understanding, and the fluid nature of traditionary knowledge, challenges contemporary views in Western society. In contemporary Western societies, and the places where such views are influential, *traditions* are often portrayed or understood as collectivities of members of religious groups or non-Western cultural groups that are rooted in the past, and members of these groups are in some ways constrained by their traditions. In Western academic contexts, traditions are usually portrayed as sources of prejudice and reflective of dogmatic beliefs. Often, knowledge from traditions is not viewed as knowledge at all, because it seems to lack objectivity and thus appears as more of a self-referential belief system. Stephen Toulmin argues, similarly to Gadamer, that this often-unexamined bias against tradition is rooted in the Enlightenment view that abstract reason has freed modern people from the supposed dogmatism and superstitions of tradition (Toulmin, 1990, p. 11, Gadamer, 2004, p. 274). Gadamer argues *tradition* became diametrically opposed to *reason* only in the Enlightenment view, which seeks an abstract rational justification for all knowledge (Gadamer, 2004, p. 280). In my academic experience at UBC, I often engage with Western scholarship and scholars that do not locate themselves in tradition(s), but assume a sort of rational neutrality and unlocatedness. In my view, this allows for hegemonic dominance of Western perspectives in academia through an assumed neutrality, and a singular faith in rationality that exceeds realistic expectations. As was provided in my introduction, my research is an attempt to reveal the problematic nature of rationalist foundationalism both epistemically and in relation to concerns of social equity. My study of embodied knowledge is through traditions that are not embedded in modernist Western thought, and are engaged as critical counter-perspectives.

An obvious concern in this view is that I have suggested that knowledge is always already understood through traditions, and that this knowledge cannot be critiqued from positions external to the tradition. Of course these ideas are likely problematic in a pluralistic society constitutive of multiple traditions with rival and incompatible views on social life, and also Western academic institutions with contradictory epistemic assumptions that are assumed as universal. As in the vignette, there is no sense that one perspective will answer our questions, but that different perspectives shed light on different aspects of questions. At the same time, in the vignette it is an open question as to the overall relevance of any perspective to any particular question. What are the relevant insights, and what makes these insights relevant? Of particular concern with my dissertation is my research might be seen as descriptive and without possibility for insight. I have noted that I am *learning from* the Indigenous and Aristotelian scholarship in this research, and thus it may be a concern as to how I might then engage critically with this scholarship. Bernstein raises this similar concern – How do we determine if the claims of a tradition are true and thereby distinguish rightful authority of a tradition from pseudo versions (Bernstein, 1983, p. 156)? I am also fully sympathetic to the question and share similar concerns. Is anything true or justified if it comes from the authority of tradition instead of detached rational justification? My specific concerns are with regard to the power of traditions to be oppressive and closed to any further clarification, and thus as providing conditions for the social inequities that are such a key concern in my dissertation.

My response to these concerns is actually the motivation for my dissertation on embodied knowledge. As was argued in the introduction to this dissertation, traditions that attempt to ground knowledge in objective (unlocated) forms of rationality have not created contexts that

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support forms of social equity with greater success than those provided by traditions that rely on embodied ethical relationality. Nor have these traditions based in rationalist foundationalism demonstrated the possibility of providing irrefutable answers to meaningful questions. In my view, it is thinking of rationality and tradition in a binary that actually creates the tension, which is exacerbated by seeking guarantees that are unattainable. Traditions are not arational, but contain rationality, and the desire to follow and participate in a tradition can be a rational choice. That said, there is no guarantee on knowledge from traditions, but traditions adapt and modify based on changing circumstances and contexts. As I have argued, knowledge from tradition is fluid and changing and not stagnant and locked in the past. Traditions are experienced through embodied engagement, and a person's intellectual-emotional discernment within experience promotes many responses including adherence, transformation or rejection. In the textual analysis I will also seek out perspectives from within the traditions that comment on the reliability of knowledge that is directly apprehended through experience. As in the vignette, I am learning from my engagement with the texts (as in new relations), not to be told a final answer to my questions, but as a perspective to engage with and consider in relation to my questions.

In my own research project all of these thoughts become important. My critical engagement, I would argue, will come from my engagement with the texts in light of my own participation in traditions. My skepticism of the epistemological assumptions of the Enlightenment tradition is based on my apprehension, through my lived participation in Western modernist life, which I have attempted to outline in this work. My interest in embodied knowledge, as well as my theoretical framework in this research, puts forward the idea that knowing is an engagement of a

body-mind in place and time. The embodied dimension of knowing is a conflicted appraisal of my experience of being born and raised in an Enlightenment tradition, which enacts a mind/body dualism, and offers abstracted, ordered and systematic ways of *solving* problems. This conflict motivates my adherence to traditions with which I identify, as well as my attempts to learn from Western traditionary knowledge, and my attempts to learn from Indigenous traditions in my region of the world. My research is directed at understanding the embodied dimension of knowing more clearly and is understood through membership and non-membership in traditions.

A final point is a potential concern that being an outsider to any Indigenous tradition means that I will not be able to really understand the texts by BC Indigenous scholars because I do not regularly participate in practices and locate myself as a member of any Indigenous tradition. I recognize that my understanding is limited in some ways because it is characterized as intellectual and academic and minimally participatory. My attempt in this dissertation is not to transpose myself into an Indigenous tradition to gain greater understanding, but more to expand my own horizon of understanding through an engagement with Indigenous scholarship. I recognize that I understand through a Western tradition of thought, but I am not enclosed in my tradition, and am capable of learning. It is my hope in this research that I can engage with Indigenous scholarship in a way that helps me learn so as to influence the practices in which I engage in mainstream teacher education. My attempts to recognize my limitations are also in relation to the material-discursive practices that have been suppressing Indigenous perspectives and peoples in my Settler nation-state context. I am required to think quite carefully about my limitations specifically as a non-Indigenous person, but one who is capable of acting ethically, learning, and appreciating the need for Indigenous perspectives in contemporary life.

Raising these questions in the space of teacher education introduces a complicated feature to my methodological concerns. Do the students, instructors, researchers, and staff in teacher education want to engage with my research questions? My research and practice in teacher education is intertwined and I am conscious of the need to raise these questions with my students and be supported by the structures of the teacher education program in engaging these questions. What if people in teacher education do not want to authentically engage these questions, and how does this intersect with my authority as an instructor and my role as a colleague? These complications will be taken up in Chapter 7.

2.4   Embodied Knowledge – The Place of Intersecting Questions and Lines of Inquiry

At the core of considering teaching and learning from the perspective of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* is a notion that the body and place of the teacher and students is of crucial importance. Due to the rationalist foundationalism in Western contexts and technical-rationality in directing research, as well as the hierarchies of coloniality, the study of embodied knowledge has been marginalized in Western academia. My belief that Indigenous and Aristotelian texts make important contributions to the study of embodied knowledge directs the focus of my research and I have made the connections explicit. I have also connected this study as working in common interest with theorists in the coloniality paradigm. Although, I also see multiple places that these texts intersect with questions raised by theorists concerned with embodied knowledge that are not working in Indigenous nor Aristotelian traditions, nor the coloniality paradigm. I locate this research in a space of intersecting questions and lines of inquiry. This is a space where this inquiry is informed by, and has the possibility of informing,

other conversations. Particularly, I find these connections in discussions of the role of intuition

and embodied cognition in moral theory; moral theory and curriculum inquiry drawing on

Wisdom traditions; philosophical phenomenology; philosophical ethical intuitionism; and

feminist post-structuralist thought. I will briefly identify the academic lines of inquiry and

nature of the relation to my research in this section.

2.4.1   Moral Theory and Enactivism in Psychology

My engagement with the literature on moral judgment in psychology connects with the

situatedness of thought and action of a body located in complex ethical contexts. The study of

moral judgment in 20th century psychology was influenced primarily by the theories of Piaget

and Kohlberg that focused on "conscious" and "rational" deliberation in moral judgment

(Newitt, 2009, p.1).[16] Currently, there is a general consensus in the moral psychology literature

that some form of intuition is involved with rational "processes" in judgment, but also general

disagreement on the way that involvement might be characterized (see Turiel, 2010 and *Human

Developmen*t editorials, 2010). Jonathon Haidt (2010) argues that the current debates in moral

psychology are concerned with the nature of the partnership between reason and intuition in

moral judgement. He asks: Are they equal partners, or is one more senior (p.183)? My inquiry

attempts to provoke the problematic nature of this kind of hierarchical and dualistic theorizing. I

see my work as connecting to the work of Francisco Varela on embodied cognition, also know as

enactivism (Varela, 1999). Varela draws attention to the mediated nature of reality where a

person embedded in a biological and cultural context distinguishes "what *counts* as a relevant

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[16]   I am using quotes around words to indicate that these words can have contested meanings in philosophy and
various critical theories, but are used in the psychological literature in a more or less agreed upon but not
explicitly defined way.

world". In Varela's view, the central issue is not reasoning, but being and acting, and our everyday ethical coping (p. 25). Similar to Varela, I am trying to avoid atomistic and competitive views of different ways of knowing (be it rational, emotional, intuitive or something else), and instead consider the nature of *relatedness* of different ways of knowing in embodied experience.

Generally speaking, descriptions of mature moral agency and the development of ethical expertise emerging from the empirical study of judgment within contemporary moral psychology are informative to understanding judgment in practice. My reading of key texts in the psychological literature on moral judgment that is not limited to a purely rational focus, suggest that the ethical expertise of the mature moral agent consists in a complex interaction of perceptual, emotional, intuitive, intellectual, and volitional capacities (Vokey & Kerr, 2011, p.11). My inquiry connects with these understandings and seeks to shift the focus of theorizing to also consider these findings not limited to a Western empirical lens and to forefront a socio-political consciousness.

2.4.2 Moral Philosophy/Curriculum Theory Engaging Wisdom Traditions

My interest in Varela's work is also aligned with avoiding a sole epistemic focus on Western paradigms in ethics and morality. There are a number of authors in ethics and curriculum studies who seek to inform Western based perspectives with insights from *Eastern* thought. My appreciation for the value of this approach comes through my PhD committee supervisor Daniel Vokey's work drawing together insights from Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Mahayana Buddhist thought and the challenges of working across these traditions. In his book, *Moral Discourse in a*

Pluralistic World, as well as later work that takes-up these themes, Vokey discusses and demonstrates both the importance of drawing on multiple perspectives, but also the ways that it is possible to engage with texts that are based in rival and incompatible accounts of social life. In this dissertation, my appreciation for the need for epistemic recognition, and thus engagement across traditions of thought, relies on an understanding of how others have gone about this work. In Chapter 1, I shared Boaventura de Sousa Santos' imperative that enriched responses to complex questions requires that researchers engage with multiple epistemic perspectives and not limited inquiry to Western frameworks. He insists that we engage in a practice of epistemic recognition. Vokey's work is in this vein. Similar to Vokey, Varela looks to the wisdom traditions of the East: Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism to bring in enriching perspectives through decentring Western contributions on ethics and thus interrupting Western dominance. This focus on *Eastern* thought is also taken up by curriculum theorists who seek to decentre the dominance of Western thought and bring enriched responses to curricular challenges. A particularly notable contribution is a volume put together by Claudia Eppert and Hongyu Wang titled *Cross-Cultural Studies in Curriculum: Eastern Thought, Educational Insights.* I see this type of work as connected with my own in that both seek out perspectives-scholarship that are based in contrasting onto-epistemological locations in relation to modernist Western thought. Further, engaging non-Western perspectives inform the limitations that arise from modernist ontologies that dominate Western educational settings.

2.4.3   Phenomenological Philosophy

The concern of the body in phenomenological philosophy in Modern Western contexts is identified with French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who places "the connection of the

lived body with meaning" as the centerpiece of his philosophy (Palermo, 2002, p.3). James Palermo locates Merleau-Ponty as a transitional figure between phenomenology and structuralism, due to his phenomenological approach that is theorized through the language of signification (p. 1). Merleau-Ponty's work examines the "connections between the lived-body, perception, *original meaning generation*, and the aesthetic object as a paradigm of the pedagogical encounter" (p. 3). For Merleau-Ponty our bodies are in dialogical relation with the world we perceive, which is influenced by shifts of our attention in the shifting frames of figure-ground and fore-ground (p. 5).

Sven Arvidson contributes to contemporary phenomenological understanding through studying the shifts of attention that occur within and around moments of the body engaged in knowing without specific awareness of rational thought. Calling on Aron Gurwitsch's theorizing, Arvidson studies the phenomenology of an intuitive moment. Gurwitsch argues that our attention shifts from *figure ground/foreground* within our consciousness where everything is organized along three dimensions: theme (the focus of attention – engrossment for the subject and independent from its background), thematic-field (the environment in which the focus exists) and margin (things that are co-presented, but not relevant at that time) (Arvidson, 1997, p. 44). Arvidson finds that, during an intuitive moment, there is a "sudden reorganization of the field of consciousness" - the thematic-field changes and the focus of attention zooms out to see the larger and new picture (p. 49). This brings a moment of clarity through the shift and presentation of a new theme. Arvidson believes that an intuitive insight from an embodied experience is not the "achievement of a process" but a *replacement* of themes in the field of consciousness and therefore departs with what came before it (p. 50). There are also parts of

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Varela's work on micro-worlds and micro-identities that make similar phenomenological based

theorizations (Varela, 1999, pp. 17-18). These phenomenological philosophical perspectives

inform my study through providing theorization on the relation of perception in context to shifts

of awareness. My inquiry may in turn provide ideas about the multiple ways the body-mind, and

its location in place, is implicated in identifying the focus of perception.

2.4.4   Philosophical Ethical Intuitionism

Michael Huemer's philosophical theory of *Ethical Intuitionism* informs my understanding of the

aspects of the body's evaluative capacities in experience. Michael Huemer (2005) states that

there is always a way things seem to us before we reason, and we can characterize this *initial*

appearance as intuition. In the case of ethical intuitions, these are intuitions whose content is an

evaluative proposition or moral fact that is not based on a prior belief, but is directly acquired

through a body engaged in experience (p. 102). Huemer provides the example *torturing puppies*

is wrong, to highlight that our negative evaluation of such an event is immediately known

through our body. Huemer (2008) argues that our relationship to moral facts is that moral facts

exist independently of our intuitions, "but our intuitions are our way of knowing about the moral

facts; the function of ethical intuitions is to correspond to the moral facts" (p. 371). In this way,

the torturing of puppies remains wrong, independent of our experience of it.

Huemer identifies himself as a metaethical *realist* in that he believes *good* purports to refer to a

property that is not relative or dependent on the opinion of others (Huemer, 2005, pp. 5-6). But,

Huemer also points out he is not an ethical naturalist in that he does not believe that evaluative

properties can be reduced to non-evaluative properties (such as good is what brings about the

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most happiness). He argues for *Ethical Intuitionism*, a view that specifically holds "that moral

properties are objective and irreducible. Thus, 'good' refers to a property that some things have,

independently of our attitudes towards those things, and one cannot say what this property is

except using evaluative language" (p. 6). He further argues the epistemological thesis that some

moral truths are known intuitively, as in directly (p. 6). Huemer's work is closely related to a

key and somewhat controversial concern regarding the body-mind's ability to apprehend

evaluations through experience that will emerge from the textual analysis.

2.4.5   Feminist Post-Structuralist Material-Discursive Theorizing

Alaimo and Hekman discuss post-structuralist theories and their limitations in supporting

analysis of materiality and the human body from a feminist perspective. The authors

acknowledge that the linguistic/discursive turn arising from post-structuralist theory allows for

deconstructions of dichotomies in modern thought regarding culture/nature, mind/body,

object/subject, and rationality/emotionality (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008, p. 1). At the same time,

the scholars point out that a post-structuralist orientation continues to operate with the

language/reality dichotomy, due to post-structural scepticism of modernity's claim of access to

the real and material (p. 2). The effect is that the focus on representation, ideology and discourse

excludes or evades the "lived experience and corporeal practice and biological substance" of

knowing (p. 4). The authors are clear that they are not rejecting post-structuralist thought and

insight, but making space for theorizing that gets to the substance of materiality, while

maintaining a critical stance toward modernist scientific materialism. These ideas inform my

research with generative ideas for connecting post-structuralist insights with consideration of a

real body engaged in meaning making. As Palermo argues, in Western thought, there has been a

shifting focus on "the lived body, the specular body, and the discursive body" (Palermo, 2002, p. 170). My study requires attentiveness to the discursive forces on a body without evading the actual experience of that body. As a result, my theoretical framework incorporates Karen Barad's theory of a*gential realism* as a material-discursive theorizing on embodied experience (Barad, 2008).

Through connecting my dissertation with these multiple conversations I am able to show how these conversations inform my dissertation, but also the unique features of my dissertation that provide an opportunity to also inform these conversations. In a sense, the intersecting point of these conversations is the critique of the radical mind/body dualism that has been a prominent feature of Western societies and scholarship since at least the time of Descartes. My choice to look to Indigenous and Aristotelian texts, informs my research with rich and extensive scholarship predating this dualism. This research makes a unique contribution to an ongoing conversation in philosophy of education regarding Aristotelian practical philosophy, but with greater attentiveness to the body. This research also contributes to a research practice of broadening a severely Western-centric tendency in educational theorizing by engaging with perspectives in Indigenous scholarship. The attentiveness to the epistemic significance of the land in relation to a knowing body, as a key feature of Indigenous scholarship, is also unique to educational theorizing in teacher education. My dissertation also theoretically links the study of embodied knowledge with concerns of social equity and thus is enmeshed in socio-political concerns.

2.5   Summarizing and Looking Ahead

In this chapter I have provided my methodological thoughts guiding this dissertation. Through highlighting my path to this research, I have elaborated my choice to study Aristotelian and Indigenous scholarship. More specifically, I appreciate that both lines of scholarship provide rich thought on embodied knowledge and similarly do not engage in perspectives that enact a mind/body dualism. My choice to engage in textual analysis of Aristotelian scholarship is based on the benefits of looking into the roots of Western scholarship prior to the imposition of modernist assumptions and commitments. In this choice I recognize and accept the challenges and limitations of relying solely on text-based Aristotelian scholarship, and the requirement to practice epistemic recognition, by engaging with traditions beyond those located in the West – particularly given the elitist elements of ancient Greek philosophy. My choice to engage with BC Indigenous scholarship, and not research in community, is based on my belief that Indigenous scholars in the part of the world in which I live will provide me with wise guidance in understanding located Indigenous perspectives that differ in ontological assumptions from my Western based assumptions.

My decision to work with key ideas in Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics is based on the challenges of interpretation of both sets of texts. Gadamer's notions promote a form of self-reflexivity in textual analysis that is particularly useful both in terms of the historical distance of the Aristotelian texts, and in the context of colonial realities and the potential of my Settler assumptions as impositions on the texts by Indigenous scholars. Further, Gadamer's basis of understanding being always already in tradition, and the porous nature of our identities within traditions, allows for a broader understanding of my work in this dissertation. I am seeking to

broaden my own understanding of teaching and learning through learning from Indigenous and

Aristotelian traditions of thought and practice. I have reflected on the ways that I am remaining

open and learning from the texts, yet thinking critically about my research questions. I have

concluded this chapter through considering the position of my research at the intersection of

multiple lines of thought that challenge the mind/body dualism and attempt to consider

embodied knowledge more deeply. In the next chapter, I will engage in the analysis of

Aristotelian traditionary texts on embodied knowledge.

Chapter 3: Hermeneutic Analysis of Aristotelian Scholarly Texts

In this chapter, I am learning from Aristotelian scholarship through hermeneutic analysis in the tradition of Gadamer, to enrich my understanding of embodied knowing or knowledge. My analysis will consider the multiple ways the body-mind comes to know, with specific attention to the embodied knowledge of the *Phronimos*, and the capacity of the body for *nous*. I interpret *nous* as involved in multiple capacities for perception and discernment by a body-mind engaged in forms of experience. Aristotle identifies five states (or intellectual excellences or capacities) by which we come to know, and I will frame the discussion with an understanding of the intertwined nature and distinctions of these states of capacity to know identified as *techne*, *episteme, phronesis*, *sophia*, and *nous.* I will pay more detailed attention to *phronesis*, understood as the ethical practical knowledge of the *Phronimos*, and the majority of the chapter will be directed at understanding *nous* due to its specific capacity for apprehension of knowledge by the body-mind in context. In this chapter, I will rely on a number of Aristotle's significant works: the *Nicomachean Ethics (the Ethics), De Anima,* the *Metaphysics* and the *Posterior Analytics*, and will engage with Aristotle's contemporary commentators on these works.

3.1   My Initial Thoughts – Approaching and Selecting the Texts

As I think about Aristotle's texts I am again aware of my historical distance from the texts; the difficulties of translation from Ancient Greek to English; and the Western historic tradition in which the translated texts are located. At times, historical distance can be generative, in that it can produce enough contrast to allow taken for granted assumptions to stand out quite clearly. In this case, the historical distance of the texts causes confusion over authorship and relation to other texts in Aristotle's work, rather than generative defamiliarization. The texts do not survive

in a neat package of clearly dated volumes with translations and interpretations widely agreed

upon. A further challenge in my analysis of *nous* emerges from using multiple texts by Aristotle

that have been translated at different times by different people with entirely different scholastic

interests. Throughout this chapter I will take up the challenges as they arise and deal with

inconsistencies and confusions through being quite explicit within the discussion of the texts.

One point that I will make ahead of time is that I will not translate key terms from the original

Greek, so as to avoid problems of differing translations of these key terms. I will clearly indicate

my interpretation of key terms, and will use these terms consistently. I will maintain key words

in Greek, even where various authors have provided translations, but will place [] around the

terms when I change a direct quote. Another methodological point is that, throughout my

analysis, I will be considering to what degree I might unquestioningly take up certain aspects of

Aristotle's work due to my ongoing affinity with his work, and shared Western based

assumptions.

...the story continues in our very full classroom …

Nahid tilts his head back and opens his mouth. His eyes are friendly and
anticipatory as Catherine smiles down at him and squeezes the sour lemon juice
into his mouth. He flings his head forward and squishes the features of his face
together. Harvey and Miguel pat him on the back and laugh as Nahid tries to
regain his composure. Catherine, an undergraduate science student from UBC,
apologizes through laughter for performing this right of passage that these group
members are eagerly awaiting. They all virtually ignore my presence as I take
pictures of them in this deeply personal and incredibly focused communal event. I
notice how clearly the group members are involved in attending to each other and
remain undistracted by the amount of activity and people in the room – including
the photographer entering their space. I walk around the room and take pictures of

my students engaged with the graduate and undergraduate UBC science students in
these very intimate teaching and learning events where bodies are so closely
packed together and intimacy exceeds the usual limits of classroom learning. I am
taking the time to dwell in this experience and the opportunity to think about
teaching and learning. I hear the buzzing chatter of people completely involved
with each other, but I am less attuned to the actual conversations. I feel the
excitement and the solidarity of the small groups engaging in such an embodied
and entangled way with each other and the materials of the experiments. I want to
watch and capture these images because I know that I am apprehending goodness
and witnessing ethical relations.

In this vignette, the undergraduate students are leading activities in small groups that the

graduate students and I have designed to help the grade 4/5 students learn about solubility of

substances in water, and the relationships between solubility and pH measurements. I too am

learning about solubility with the students, but I am also learning more deeply about direct

apprehension of the knowing body in teaching and learning relationships. The idea of these

planned learning experiences is to understand the acidity of liquids through the sense of taste and

experience of acidity as a sort of corrosion in our mouths. In planning ahead for these

experiences, we all (adults and children) wanted to make sure that embodied experience was a

significant part of learning the scientific principles and ideas around water quality and testing.

As I watched the actual experience, I appreciated that knowledge was emerging through

embodied participation. Actually tasting the lemon juice provided a more felt sense of

understanding acidity and corrosiveness than would be possible through description and logical

argument. The apprehension of acidity through the senses provided the opportunity to consider

and imagine the effect of acidity on water pipes – similar to their own mouths. The logic flowed

easily from the experience and the imagination. With regard to imagination, I am not thinking of some free flowing unrestrained imagination, but the intentional and cognitive manipulation of images in the mind. When I talk with my students later, they seem to have taken this in so easily: Of course water that measured high in acidity would be corrosive on the pipes and break them down! Of course the metals from the pipes would then be in the drinking water! Of course metal in drinking water is a problem!

The logical argument related to corrosion was deeply understood by these 9 and 10-year-old children, and was reliant on the felt apprehension of the body and cognitive/imaginative play in their minds. There was no argument or description that could actually come close to the apprehension of knowing that occurred from the material experience of acidity in the body through the physical sense of taste. During my observations, I was also learning more deeply about teaching and learning through my own felt apprehension of goodness that emerged from being in the presence of these students in ethical relations. I apprehended the goodness through discerning the relevant particular features of the entangled relations. I observed the emergent bodily gestures of smiles, slightly tilted heads, focused attention on each other, and supportive arms, and the comfort of moving into the intimacy of close space with others. I observed that the students were involved in being present to each other and the experience; confirmed for me by the lack of distractibility in a highly active confined space. There was no discursive argument that resulted in my conclusion that this is good teaching and learning, only my own apprehension in context through discerning the features in relation to the whole event. I also later engaged in many conversations with the students to confirm and extend my apprehensions. I knew that I was possibly observing the truth of something, but I also wanted to confirm my apprehensions

with the students. Did they feel the way I thought they did? Were they actually learning

something for themselves in a very experiential way? or Were they just having fun with each

other and learning nothing specifically about solubility and water? What else were they learning

through these entangled relations about ethical relationality and responsibility during these

activities? This story and my understanding of the story, provides the basics of my

understanding of embodied knowledge and direct apprehension of knowledge in context.

For Aristotle, the way by which we come to know is conditioned by what is to be known, and he

details five ways by which "the soul possesses truth" (NE 1139b15-17). Aristotle identifies the

five ways of knowing as *techne* (technical or productive reasoning), *episteme* (scientific

reasoning), *phronesis* (practical wisdom), *sophia* (theoretical wisdom) and *nous* (intuitive

reasoning). These brief bracketed translations by David Ross in his notes to the *Ethics,* provide a

very basic understanding and orientation to an interpretation of each, but are not enough to make

this elaborated study of *nous* comprehensible. Thus, in the following section I will briefly

elaborate my understanding of these intellectual virtues that intertwine with *nous* and each other.

3.1.1 **Four States of Capacities for Coming to Know – *Episteme*, *Techne. Phronesis* and *Sophia.*

3.1.1.1 *Episteme*

Aristotle portrays *episteme* as a sort of knowing about eternal aspects of the world that can be

accomplished through inductive or deductive reasoning and is capable of being taught through

demonstrations (NE VI. 3). As Aristotle states: "We all suppose that what we know is not even

capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know when they have

passed outside our observations, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of [*episteme*] is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal" (NE 1139b20-24). In thinking about eternal things, Aristotle is thinking about those things that do not change when not in immediate proximity. An example that resonates with my story is that the lemon juice remains acidic and thus corrosive whether I have the experience of lemon juice right now or not. But, as David Coulter (2013) argues, Aristotle, contrary to Plato's usage, removed the ethical from *episteme* as this involves human conduct and thus what is changeable and not eternal (p. 14). So, those things that could be otherwise and changeable are not the subjects of *episteme*. In Plato's time, *episteme* would be considered *real* knowledge, and would be contrasted against opinion, whereas Aristotle portrays *episteme* as something that could be a way of knowing that could be accounted for in syllogistic form (Dunne, 1993, p. 237). In my view, this would be a body of propositional knowledge that involves demonstrations either through words or mathematical symbols. *Episteme* is thus often translated as scientific reasoning.

3.1.1.2   *Techne*

Aristotle discusses *techne* as a capacity to make or produce things through reasoning, but in contrast to *episteme*, is concerned with things that are variable and not eternal. He provides the example of architecture to clarify that the variability arises from the reasoning and planning of the person engaged in a *technae*. Therefore, the variability emerging in the act of architectural planning results from the variability in the planning, and does not just emerge differently – the architectural plans should build the same building each time yet be responsively flexible to the features that place demands. As Aristotle states: "All [*techne*] is concerned with coming into being, i.e., with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is

capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made"
(NE 1140a10-14).

Techne is often translated as art, craft or skill, and is contrasted with *phronesis* as understood by
Aristotle as the reasoned state of capacity to act. Aristotle clearly distinguishes *techne* from
phronesis: "Making and acting being different, [*techne*] must be a matter of making, not of
acting" (NE 1140a15-16). Aristotle gives various example of *techne* such as shipbuilding, flute-
playing, and medicine, but as Coulter (2013) points out, *techne* develops from experience in a
generally unidirectional way in Aristotle's writings - from contriving and planning in the practice
of making, one develops a *technae* (p. 15). Dunne takes up these differences between *techne* and
phronesis in his book *Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the Lure of Technique*
motivated by concerns similar to my own that were raised in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
Dunne is concerned about the rise of technical-rational influence in the practice and theory of
teaching and learning, and seeking to draw attention to the distinction in Aristotle's texts on
phronesis/techne and philosophers who take up this distinction in different ways (Dunne, 1993,
p. 1). Although, as Coulter (2013) argues, in contemporary times *techne* is subsumed under a
modern understanding of *episteme* where the role of experience is detached from *techne*, and
what is left is a series of systematically sequenced discrete tasks, accompanied by a supremely
confident notion of resultant predictability and control (p. 15). Thus, dominant, contemporary
ways of thinking about teaching and learning in a technical-rational orientation subsume
Aristotelian *techne* and *episteme* inappropriately.

3.1.1.3   *Phronesis*

Phronesis is a key concept that is embedded in Aristotle's complex ethical theory mostly

articulated in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (or *virtue ethics*). It is also entangled throughout the vast

works that Aristotle produced. Specifically, *phronesis* has been interpreted into English words

such as practical reasoning, practical wisdom, moral discernment, moral insight and prudence

(Noel, 1999, p.273). As Jana Noel so astutely points out, these interpretations are meant to give

a fuller sense of the concept, but unavoidably imply "a different set of contextual and ethical

assumptions" (p. 273). My intent is to be clear about my ethical assumptions and commitments

that guide my interpretation.

In the context of contemporary education, *phronesis* is generally reclaimed in different ways.

Not only as a corrective to instrumentalist rationality, but most often with regard to the practical

disjuncture between the knowledge required for professional practice and legitimated forms of

knowledge (Kinsella & Pitt, 2012, p. 2). Hursthouse argues that there are two distinctive lines of

interpretation of *phronesis* that could be seen as representing the extreme sides of a continuum.

She identifies these positions as generalist and perceptual. In the generalist model *phronesis* is

portrayed as the propositional knowledge related to moral conduct that is possessed by the

Phronemos and achieved through a life of experience directed toward the good (Hursthouse,

2006, p. 286). In contrast, the perceptual model is one that frames *phronesis* as a capacity for

excellence in perception for discerning the relevant features of situations that is embodied in the

Phronimos (p. 287). My priorities in interpreting *phronesis* arise from my educational concerns

about technical-rational education and my appreciation for the particularist nature of practical

ethics that requires capacities for perception and discernment in context. My interpretation

emerges from a non-propositional orientation to *phronesis* that expands on a perceptual model.[17]

In my interpretation, Aristotle's texts on *phronesis* provide core ideas for a relational ethic.

Phronesis is an intellectual virtue (or excellence) that is concerned with the particularity of

ethical living in community that is underdetermined by codes, principles and standards and is

embedded as a key feature of *virtue ethics*. *Virtue ethics* is not primarily concerned with

establishing rules for correct behaviour, but with cultivating moral and intellectual excellences of

character that are directed to an ethical and flourishing life in community. Steutel and Carr

(1999) point out that, although there are philosophical disagreements of detail concerning the

more precise nature of *virtue ethics*, there is broad agreement that, as far it is appropriate to

construe ethics as deontic or aretaic, *virtue ethics* is aretaic (p. 8). Deontic judgments are related

to the idea of "duty", and such judgments as "stealing is wrong" or "you ought to tell the truth"

are deontic constructions (p. 8). In contrast, aretaic judgments are related to the evaluative idea

of "excellence" and such statements as "her devotion is admirable" or "spite is unbecoming" are

aretaic constructions (p. 8). Thus, deontic judgments are primarily concerned with the evaluation

of actions, and appeal to rules and principles; while aretaic judgments are concerned, not only

with actions, but also with "the evaluation of persons, their characters, intentions and motives"

(p. 8). Steutel and Carr also draw attention to the fact that aretaic appraisals have scalar

properties. They note that being good or admirable are comparative qualities, and therefore we

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[17] I acknowledge that my interpretation diverges from most commentators with my focus on relationality, and my support (although qualified) of Aristotle's realist metaphysics – placing me to the far side of the "perceptual" side of the continuum.

can be better or more or less admirable, whereas deontic appraisals ultimately bear a

resemblance to legal judgments where an action is considered basically right or wrong (p. 8).[18]

Aristotle clarifies that one cannot expect the same sort of precision in *phronesis* as in the exercise

of other intellectual virtues – and particularly differentiates *phronesis* from *episteme* and *techne*.

For Aristotle, this difference is due to the lack of fixity of the subject matter: "As we said at the

very beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter;

matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity…the agents

themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion" (NE 1104a1-5).

Aristotle also draws attention to the similar practical concern in both *phronesis* and *techne* - that

both states are concerned with reasoning in matters of practical affairs. Yet, Aristotle

differentiates *techne* as being a concern with making and producing things, and thus is not a

conducive state to knowing in practical human matters related to acting (NE 1140b4-5). Dunne

(1993) argues that it is the difference in ends and means that leads Aristotle to make this

distinction. According to Dunne, in production we have an end in mind outside of the maker and

we work toward that end through planning and account for our steps in a logical fashion. In

contrast, in human affairs there is no blueprint for our complex engagements with others and

understanding ourselves. In human affairs, the ends are internal to the engagement and are in

fact the end. Aristotle states: "while making has an end other than itself action cannot, for good

action (*eupraxia*) itself is its end VI, 5, 1140b607" (as cited in Dunne, 1993, p. 262). In my

view, that *phronesis* is differentiated from intellectual capacities that have more precision (such

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[18] The text in this paragraph is reproduced from my 2007 Master's Thesis "Educating Heart and Mind: Ethical
Emotional Learning in Elementary Schools"

as *techne* and *episteme*) is not a deficit to be overcome, but an acknowledgement of the challenge of coming to know in our ethical relations through the particularity of the context. A person is required to understand the particulars of the context in order to deliberate about one's judgment and action (NE VI, 7).

Phronesis is primarily concerned with harmonizing reason and emotion in the ethical life. I see this idea of balancing reason and emotions as a key feature of the embodied nature of teaching and learning in relation. Aristotle sets the stage for his discussion of *phronesis* through stating that excellence of character is concerned with making decisions involving a balance of right reason and right desire that results in good action: "Since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts" (NE 1139a23-26). Aristotle identifies *phronesis* as the intellectual virtue that completes each of the moral virtues and directs virtuous action in this harmonious manner. In this way, *phronesis* provides the excellence in deliberation needed to direct and prompt the actions of giving the right amount, of the right thing, for the right reasons, to the right person, on the right occasion (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 12). Further, *phronesis* requires one to act and not simply theorize – in the words "must pursue" it is clear that action is a key feature of *phronesis* in actualizing virtue. The embodied and practical aspect of *phronesis*, as action responsive to particular situations and relations, is emphasized in Aristotle's writing on the *Phronimos*. The *Phronimos* is the embodiment of wisdom through refined perception and discernment achieved through a lifetime of thoughtful participation in practical human affairs. As Aristotle states:

"regarding phronesis we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it" (NE 1140a24).

3.1.1.4 *Sophia*

Aristotle discusses *sophia* as the most finished of the five states of capacity to know. Whereas, in Aristotle's thought *nous* apprehends first principles (i.e., acids such as lemon juice have specific properties including qualities that can be apprehended through the senses); and *episteme* syllogistically enables demonstrations of knowledge reliant on the first principles (i.e., all acidic fluids are corrosive, this fluid is acidic, this fluid is corrosive); *sophia* is a theoretical based capacity for knowing that combines *nous* and *episteme*. To have and exercise the capacity for *sophia* is not to be wise solely with regard to a particular field or in a limited way (NE 1141a12), but to have broad theoretical knowledge and reasoning capacities. In my understanding, this would require not only having knowledge of lemon juice, but to have experience and thoughts about the nature of substances and change, and the causes of stability and change broadly. Often translated as philosophical wisdom or theoretical wisdom, in Aristotle's texts *sophia* is the capacity to "not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles" (NE 1141a17-20).

There is a sense of privileging of the theoretical that comes from placing the importance of *sophia* over *phronesis*, but in Aristotle's texts I do not understand this privileging as prioritizing disembodied knowledge. Aristotle is actually quite clear in various places that having *sophia* without *phronesis* does not make for a superior life. As Aristotle states: "that is why we say that Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have [*sophia*] but not [*phronesis*], when we see them

ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why we say that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult and divine, but useless" (NE 1141b3-7). The reason that Aristotle provides for the privileging of *sophia* over *phronesis* is that *sophia* is concerned with the highest objects (the world or universe) and *phronesis* is concerned with people. As he states: "for it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or [*phronesis*] is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world" (NE 1141a33-35). Thus, I read Aristotle's ideas on *sophia* as revealing a non-anthropocentric orientation, rather than a particular privileging of the theoretical over the practical in knowing in a worthwhile life.

3.2 *Nous.* The Fifth State of Capacity for Coming to Know– Location in Aristotle's Texts and Basic Understandings

With an introduction to *episteme, techne* and *sophia*, and a slightly more elaborated understanding of *phronesis*, it is possible to discuss and begin to understand Aristotle's theorizations concerning *nous* in a more comprehensible way. I first came upon *nous* in the *Ethics* and I became curious about the capacity of the *Phronimos* for this ability to directly apprehend knowledge in context undetermined by abstract forms of rationality. I understand *nous* to be involved in the sort of apprehension and cognitive imaginings that I have highlighted in the vignette in this chapter. In the vignette, both the students and I are apprehending knowledge, but there is a lack of discursive or rational argumentation. This raises the question for theories of teaching and learning, and particularly my theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter*: How might the body-mind go about learning through this direct apprehension in context? How might my evaluative apprehension differ from the students' apprehension of scientific first principles? Further, in the context of this research, the more

specific question: How does Aristotle theorize this sort of direct apprehension by the body-mind in context?

As I have tried to go more deeply into Aristotle's writings on *nous,* I have found that getting to the heart of it is confusing due to its entanglement with the other states for coming to know. Aristotle discusses *nous* in relation to *episteme*, *sophia* and *phronesis* throughout Book VI, and each time *nous* is discussed, the understanding changes in relation to the intellectual capacity with which it is discussed. Aristotle introduces *nous* in Chapter 6 as a capacity related to "grasping" first principles required in relation to *episteme*, and then in Chapter 7 as a capacity that combines with *episteme* to achieve *sophia*. Although, in Chapter 11 it becomes clear that *nous* is also related to *phronesis* - yet quite differently. Aristotle specifically discusses *nous* in relation to *episteme* as a capacity that "grasps the unchangeable and first terms", and then **contrasts** this with *nous* in relation to *phronesis* where *nous* "grasps the last and variable facts" (NE 1143b3-4).

Aristotle's words as translated by D. Ross suggest that, in terms of *phronesis, nous* is actually the perception of the particulars required for the deliberative capacity of *phronesis*. Yet, *nous* also seems to be implicated in the apprehension of universals. I am curious as to where and when *nous* might be implicated in the learning of the knowing body. As I mentioned in the introduction, Aristotle's discussions of *nous* are interspersed throughout a number of his works, which makes it difficult to comprehend in a unified way. Long and Lee (2007) provide a comprehensive interpretation of *nous* in an article that looks widely at Aristotle's thoughts on *nous* throughout his texts. It is these authors who have helped me find a path that extends

Aristotle's thoughts on *nous* from those starting in the *Ethics*. In the authors' look at *nous* in the *Ethics* they provide a more detailed explanation for how *nous* might be involved in the apprehension, not only of particulars, but also universals. Although the common translation of the *Ethics* by D. Ross and the related revisions of his translation clearly state that *nous* in relation to practical matters apprehends particulars, Long and Lee find an earlier and different translation. The authors look to an 1894 Bywater translation published by Oxford University Press which differently states that *nous* apprehends the ultimate particular premise as well "as the other premise" - which of necessity would refer to the universal (p. 394). The authors argue that this translation makes most sense in that the apprehension of a particular necessarily involves the apprehension of the universal under which it would be an instance. Long and Lee make the point that, in experience, everything has a unique and irreducible singularity, but perception turns a singular thing into an "individual" instance of something (p. 349). Long and Lee argue that perception of an "individual" becomes an instance of a "particular" when it is has the possibility of being subsumed under some sort of universal. In this way, particularity and universality necessarily occur simultaneously and therefore we should consider *nous* as apprehending particular and universal when it is of practical, contingent matters such as the concerns of *phronesis* (p. 357).[19]

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[19] Vokey (2001) makes the similar point that universals and particulars are co-determined in acts of perception following MacIntyre (p. 332).

3.3 My Path Through Aristotle's Works to Understand *Nous*

3.3.1 De Anima – *Aisthesis* and *Nous*

In the *Ethics* it is clear that perception or *aisthesis* is involved in *nous*, but it is not elaborated in detail in the *Ethics*. In the Long and Lee article the authors trace an elaborated understanding of *nous* to Aristotle's writings in *De Anima* on perception. In this section I will use the word *aisthesis* instead of perception, for similar reasons given previously – this is Aristotle's word in original Greek and thus contains broader and/or more nuanced meanings than contemporary accounts might provide. In my reading of *De Anima*, the central subject of the text relates to the question of what is involved in *aisthesis*, and the manner in which *aisthesis* relates to *nous*. In this section, I will point out the specific places where *nous* and *aisthesis* arise in *De Anima*, and then explore the rich and thoughtful scholarship that has developed out of these specific writings. I use Hamlyn's translation of *De Anima*, as most authors writing on *De Anima* directly mention his position and translation.

One source of potential confusion that might result from bringing *De Anima* into this inquiry is the completely different translation of *nous* in contrast to that found in the *Ethics*. I believe it is best to deal with this confusion before any other elaboration on meanings takes place. Whereas in the *Ethic nous* is most often translated as *intuitive reasoning* following the translation provided by D. Ross; in *De Anima nous* is often translated as *intellect* following from the 1907 translation by R.D. Hicks. I am initially concerned that, with such a drastic difference in translation of a key term, attempts to bring the two texts together may result in confusion. Although, I believe that the potential for misunderstanding is related to more current differentiation in meaning between *intellect* and *intuitive reasoning*. In looking at the current

Oxford Dictionary on line, *intellect* is defined as "the faculty of reasoning and understanding objectively, especially with regard to abstract matters: he was a man of action rather than intellect" (Oxford – on line). In contrast, my older 1976 print copy of the Oxford Dictionary provides a definition of intellect as "understanding", further defined as to "perceive the meaning", "grasp mentally" or "perceive the significance, explanation or cause of" (Sykes, 1977). In my view, the translation of *nous* in *De Anima* by Hamlyn takes up the word *intellect* similarly to intuitive reasoning, and thus is in line with the translation in the *Ethics*.

While the focus on *De Anima* here is more of an extension related to gaining clarity on Aristotle's work in the *Ethics*, I believe it is informative to understand the type of question that Aristotle was answering with his work in *De Anima*. While a number of scholars have taken up this work as one of the earliest attempts at a p*hilosophy of mind* (Hamlyn, 2002, ix), it is important to keep in mind that Aristotle was concerned not just with the mind, but with the soul. Richard Sorabji (1974/1993) points out that Aristotle's conception of soul needs to be understood *sui generis* as capacities in a living body for nutrition, sense-perception and thought (p. 163). Charles Kahn (1992) points out that philosophers call on *De Anima* in a way that positions Aristotle in some sort of contemporary conversation on the mind/body dualism. He argues that doing so misses the point, in that Aristotle's value is that he offers ideas on mind and body before a Cartesian dualistic framework is imposed (p. 359). Amelie Rorty (1992) argues that the scope of *De Anima* is much broader than any "contemporary philosophy of mind or contemporary philosophical psychology" - it is a metaphysical inquiry into the ontology of the "*psuche* and *nous* in living bodies" (p. 7).

In order to position *aisthesis* and *nous* in Aristotle's theory of the soul, I will provide a brief

contextual account of the relations of these concepts in his theory. In *De Anima* Aristotle states

that the soul is a first principle and a cause in three ways: movement (as in nutrition), *aisthesis*

and *nous* (DA II, 2). Movement, as in nutrition, refers to the nature of inception, growth and

decay involved in living beings. Aristotle writes that *aisthesis*, in relation to our senses, consists

in being moved and acted upon resulting in a qualitative change (DA 416b34) and is thus

understood as both a potential and an actual (DA 417b16). Aristotle specifies that the key

aspects generating movement are desire combined with thought (DA 433a17-18). *Nous* is thus

understood as the *aisthesis* of the mind motivated by desire and Aristotle writes that *nous* is

actually nothing before it thinks, and it is by nature potentially the objects of thought (DA

430a18-25). *Nous* and *aisthesis* are similar in that both are potentials that result in actual thought

or action.

3.3.1.1   *Phantasia* – The Movement from Perception to Thought by the Thinking/Feeling Mind

Of specific interest to my inquiry is Aristotle's introduction of *phantasia* as the mediating

movement between *aisthesis* and *nous*. This point addresses the question of how the movement

from perception to thought might be understood. Aristotle does not present *phantasia* as a theory

of any sort, but puts forward *phantasia* as accounting for the movement from *aisthesis* in the

senses to *noetic* thought (DA 428a24-30). Aristotle argues that *phantasia* are the imaginative

movements that come to us based on our sense perceptions that persist over time. Schofield

(1992) points out that imagination has at times been used as translation for *phantasia*, but this is

inconsistent grammatically and with Aristotle's thought (p. 252). Aristotle states that *phantasia*

are often images, as sight is our best sense faculty, but does not limit it to sight/image (DA 428b30). Nussbaum considers *phantasia* a crucial cognitive faculty in which an individual comes to perceive an object in the environment as a certain sort of thing (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 255). She argues that *phantasia* acts as an interpretive faculty between *aisthesis* and *nous* (p. 261). Bynum (1987/1993) argues that Nussbaum's reading of phantasia is most consistent with Aristotle and implies *phantasia* has three different capacities: 1) to interpret percepts and perceive objects as those of a certain sort; 2) to retain perceptual traces in the mind and manipulate them in various ways; and 3) to interpret perceptual traces and their combinations (p. 101). Bynum argues that the second and third capacities in *phantasia* should be understood as deliberative in that the result is thinking and judgment (p. 102). I would conclude that Nussbaum and Bynum are most consistent with Aristotle, in that Aristotle argues the potential for judgment is the function of thought and *aisthesis* (DA 432a15). I see these ideas as bringing out a more theoretical perspective on the students' perceptual experience with the lemon juice brought out at the beginning of this chapter, and the related ease by which the students were able to form thoughts and relate to demonstrations based on this sensual experience.

Malcolm Lowe (1983/1993) introduces a more refined consideration regarding *phantasia* and judgment that I believe is consistent with Aristotle, Nussbaum and Bynum. Lowe argues that discrimination is a specific type of judgment. Judgment in general is concerned with judging something to be the case. This would be in contrast to judging that something needs be or can be understood as an instance of something (p. 110). This idea of judgment as discrimination seems to capture the type of judgment that results from *phantasia*. Lowe further distinguishes between the mind acting *apprehensively*, whereby the mind acquires thoughts through experience of the

senses, and *autonomously,* which begins once the mind has thoughts (pp. 115-116). Lowe

concludes that the mind acting autonomously means that the mind is thinking of things in the

sense of Bynum's second and third classifications by means of the imagination (p. 122). Lowe

thus introduces an important cognitive dimension into apprehension of the body-mind that is not

reliant on discursive, rational argumentation through the cognitive role of *phantasia* as

discrimination and imaginative thinking.

Nussbaum (1990) makes a link between the role of the emotions in thought with both desire and

the deliberative aspects of *phantasia*. I would argue this is a crucial aspect of considering the

intellectual/emotional aspects of the knowing body holistically. Nussbaum acknowledges that

there are strong views (both ancient and modern) that the emotions obscure rationality, and that

imaginative thought can be seen to misdirect the emotions (p. 76). Despite this history,

Nussbaum stays in line with Aristotle's views and argues that to fully see a situation in all of its

features requires an acknowledgement that "[*aisthesis*] is not merely aided by emotions ... but the

emotions are themselves modes of vision, or recognition" (p. 79). Nussbaum argues that the

emotions thus contribute to "a full recognition or acknowledgement of the nature of the practical

situation" (p. 79). Nussbaum provides the idea of friendship approached from an intellectual

basis as being a disposition from which a person cannot be said to "fully know because the

emotional part of cognition is lacking" (p. 79). Nussbaum argues that the emotional response is

"part of what knowing, that is truly recognizing or acknowledging, *consists in*" (p. 79). In this

way Nussbaum brings out an important part of Aristotle's thoughts on desire as being involved

in the movement from aisthesis *to nous*. The role of the emotions in desire makes an important

link to the engagement in *phantasia*.   In this line of thought, I believe that Nussbaum articulates

an important extension of Aristotle's thought that is not detailed in *De Anima,* but is consistent with Aristotle's thoughts on the soul as he outlines them in the *Ethics* – that the rational and emotional parts of the soul are completely intertwined and involved in knowing.

These ideas about the intellectual and emotional aspects of knowing are understood as combining in the soul, and in my view, suggests a non-anthropocentric spiritual orientation to knowing in Aristotle's texts. Richard Sorabji points out that Aristotle's notion of the soul has more extensive meaning than the physical experience of the human body for nutrition, growth and movement, combined with the consciousness of the thinking mind (Sorabji, 1974/1993, p. 164). Sorabji clarifies that Aristotle inquires into the souls of plants and animals, thus understanding the soul as coextensive with life – with all life (p. 165). For Aristotle, the soul is not limited to the rational processes of the human mind/body, nor the intellectual/emotional experience of humans knowing the world. For Aristotle, life itself has meaning and importance and knowing is not limited to humans. In my view, Aristotle combines a reverence for life and ethical obligation with our emotional, intellectual, and physical experience of a world connected by life. What *spirituality* means is understood in many ways, some of which – particularly in current times – do not involve any specific religious frameworks (Glazer, 1999, p. 10). In my discussion here I am unable to extend these thoughts into a thorough articulation of my understanding of the spiritual nature of being. It must suffice to state that, in my view, spiritual orientations reflect a reverence for life, meaningfulness and connection and are not only understood through religious frameworks.

Thinking about *nous* in relation to *phronesis* also requires a consideration of *nous* in terms of the capacity of an individual for evaluative apprehension. The pivotal question being: How, according to Aristotle, does the body-mind apprehend the good to inform ethical thought and judgment? A key feature of *phronesis* is that discernment and related judgment is reliant on evaluative knowledge as first principles of the practical situation. Therefore, apprehension of features of the practical situation need to be concerned with evaluative features of the situation and the capacity of the body-mind to engage in this. Vokey (2001) distinguishes two forms of intrinsic goodness that can help bring an understanding to the aspect of evaluative apprehension theorized in *virtue ethics*. In one sense, something could be considered intrinsically good because it "affords satisfaction of a human interest or desire" (p. 258). In this way, something is considered intrinsically good in a relative sense. In a second sense, something could be considered intrinsically good because it "embodies or actualizes what *merits* being valued because it is good" (p. 258). In this way, it is good in a sense that is not relative to human interest. Vokey argues that Aristotle represents the virtues as having intrinsic goodness in this non-relative sense.

Vokey acknowledges that it is much easier to conceive the goodness of the virtues in relation to human interests or desires, but argues that the intrinsic goodness of the virtues is apprehended in the depth and quality of the human body's cognitive-affective response in experience (Vokey, 2001, p. 259). Vokey explicitly argues that the meaning of the position that the virtues are intrinsically good is rooted in the experience that something "*merits* a certain degree and kind of qualitative response" that is tied to loving virtues for their own sake (p. 259). He provides such examples of being profoundly moved in a positive way by witnessing or experiencing

compassion, and being profoundly moved in a negative way by witnessing or experiencing oppression (p. 263). In support of this interpretation, Vokey points to Aristotle's concept of *kalon*, which translates to something like "noble and fine" (p. 263). For Aristotle, it is with reference to the quality of human experience that we differentiate what is noble and fine from what is only pleasant or useful (p. 263). It is through an embodied direct apprehension in context, and not just through rational argument, that one can distinguish non-relative intrinsic goodness through experience.

The idea that we can apprehend evaluative features directly implies that a relational body-mind needs to be attentive to the present moment to apprehend the evaluative dimension of an experience. This is to appreciate that crucial aspects of *noetic* discernment, involve the intuitive capacity to discern evaluative features in the situation and necessarily require specific and sustained attentiveness. I would argue that this sustained attentiveness emerges from a spiritual orientation of reverence to the living world, and recognition of ontological ethical relation. Nussbaum and Vokey remind me that *nous* requires both the intellect and the emotions to discern the evaluative dimensions of experience. Vokey articulates that desire does not provide access to evaluative aspects of an experience, and Nussbaum clarifies that the role of desire is to engage our attention to remain present in experience, and provide opportunity for the emotions to indicate salience and thus value.

3.3.1.2   The Accuracy of *Aisthesis* and *Noetic* Thought

In *De Anima* Aristotle also considers the accuracy of *noetic* thought. This is an important consideration for my study particularly as the claim that knowledge can be directly apprehended

unreliant on abstract rational processes is contested (Siegel, 1995). It is therefore important to consider Aristotle's thoughts on the reliability of knowledge attained through direct apprehension. As was said earlier, Aristotle took *nous* to be the *aisthesis* of the mind, therefore we need to first consider his thoughts on the accuracy of *aisthesis*. In DA II, 7 Aristotle argues that the accuracy of *aisthesis* depends upon the objects of *aisthesis* being properly suited to the sense (i.e., the eyes would be the appropriate sense to discerning white). In DA III, 3 Aristotle refines this thought to argue that *aisthesis* is almost never fallible when of the appropriate sense, but that fallibility would be in relation to the incidentals to *aisthesis* related to movement and magnitude. He gives the example of the white figure at a distance – we are not mistaken that it is a white figure we see, but we may be mistaken about what that white figure actually is (DA 428a27).

Aristotle asserts that *nous* is always true (DA 428a10, and DA 430a26), but that it can be fallible in certain ways. Aristotle asserts that the potential for fallibility with *nous* relates to the nature of the correctness of objects of *nous* with that sense, and also the nature of the objects themselves (DA 430b31). There are two points that are important here. First, Long and Lee (2007) interpret Aristotle to be arguing that *nous* apprehends correctly the "what-it-is" according to its "what-was-being" (p. 363). This point refers to *nous* being accurate when *nous* is related to the correct object. I interpret Long and Lee to be arguing here that *nous* is of the correct object when its object is in some sort of active context that provides the object with intelligibility. Second, in DA III, 6 Aristotle asserts that it is the undivided objects that are appropriate to *nous* and "that which produces a unity is in each case [*nous*]" (DA 430b5). This would relate to the second point that the correctness of *nous* is in relation to the objects themselves. Long and Lee take up

this idea on the accuracy of *nous* from De Anima and trace Aristotle's line of thought back to the

Metaphysics IX, 10 and *Posterior Analytics* II, 19. In the next section, I will follow their line of

thought on the objects and accuracy of *nous* in those texts.

3.3.2   *Metaphysics* IX, 10 & *Posterior Analytics* II, 19 – The Objects and Accuracy of *Nous*

3.3.2.1   More Thoughts on the Accuracy of Nous

 Long and Lee (2007) argue that Aristotle's thoughts in the *Metaphysics* IX, 10 can be read as

arguing that the truth or falsity of noetic *aisthesis* rests with the being of the object and its

articulation. The authors argue that most scholars incorrectly read Aristotle's words in the

following section to mean that truth or falsity is derived from an object being simple or

composite.

> But with regard to composites, what is being or not being, and truth or
> falsity? A thing of this sort is not composite, so as to 'be' when it is
> compounded, and not to 'be' if it is separated, like 'that the wood is white' or
> 'that the diagonal is incommensurable'; nor will truth and falsity be still
> present in the same way as in the previous cases. In fact, as truth is not the
> same in these cases, so also being is not the same; but (a) truth or falsity is as
> follows--contact and assertion are truth (assertion not being the same as
> affirmation), and ignorance is non-contact. For it is not possible to be in error
> regarding the question what a thing is, save in an accidental sense; and the
> same holds good regarding non-composite substances (for it is not possible to
> be in error about them). (Meta.1051b22-28)

Long and Lee argue that Aristotle is asserting that truth and falsity relate to the *articulation* in

terms of the being of the object. They provide the following example: "Articulation and being

are intertwined such that when one says 'white wood', its truth is dependent on the wood being

white. On the other hand, when one simply says 'wood', its truth does not depend on it being combined with something" (Long & Lee, 2007, p. 361). In this way, it is not the substance as simple, but the articulation of features of the object as achieved through the type of contact one has with the substance. I believe that the authors draw my attention to an important consideration in terms of getting clear about the subject of *nous*. I believe that the subject of *nous* is not the simple or non-composite object of *aisthesis*, but the attempt to articulate what is simple about the object as specifically apprehended. To provide a specific example from the vignette earlier in this chapter, the truth of the lemon juice, by the sense of sight, would be apprehended as liquid. In contrast, the truth of the lemon juice, through the experience of taste, would be apprehended as acidic. Therefore, the articulation must specify what is known through the nature of the body's contact through the senses, and in a way that does not draw conclusions beyond that contact.

3.3.2.2 *Nous* as Apprehending First Principles as Causation

Long and Lee (2007) argue that a thorough appreciation of *nous* starts from considering this notion in the *Posterior Analytics* II (19), where *nous* is initially considered in relation to *episteme* (p. 351). I would agree with the authors on this point, as there is a fundamental characteristic of *nous* that is more clearly brought out in this section. The authors point out that the traditional interpretation of *nous* is that it is generally thought to provide immediate access to its objects, which would be crucial to answering logical difficulties in Aristotle's thought. Long and Lee state that, if *logos* are not at some point provided with this direct insight, then logos "would be caught in an endless retreat back into fundamental principles" (p. 348). Long and Lee trace *nous*

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back to the *Posterior Analytics* in which Aristotle establishes the conditions for a "particular kind of knowledge oriented toward universal and necessary truth" from *aisthesis* (p. 351).

> When many such [sense impressions] have come into being, a certain
> difference now becomes with the result that for some [animals] a *nous* comes
> to be from the retention of these sorts [of sense impressions], but for others it
> does not. For from a perception, memory comes into being, as has been said,
> but from many memories of the same thing experience comes into being; for
> memories that are many in number is a single experience. (PA 100a1-6) (as
> cited in Long & Lee, 2007, p. 351)

Recall in my interpretation of the *Ethics* that Aristotle clearly differentiates *nous* in relation to *episteme* and *nous* in relation to *phronesis*, but there seems to also be a fundamental characteristic in *nous* of a direct apprehension in both cases – an ability to intuitively grasp knowledge. I believe this point raises the following question: Since the apprehension of knowledge in *nous* is not based on a form of demonstration, is the knowledge gained from *nous* basically a-logical? One of the key arguments in Long and Lee's article is that *nous* should not be considering illogical or alogical, as it depends on logos. It is this last mentioned piece of text, they argue, that positions *nous* as a *hexis* (as in an active condition) wherein *aisthesis*, memory, experience and epagogue are reliant on logos, and give rise to *nous* (Long & Lee, 2007, p. 351). Long and Lee argue that this section should be interpreted to mean that there are logos in *nous*, but it is not apodictic and there are no logos at the moment of *nous* (p. 350). In other words, it is not that there is no logos operating in the noetic grasp of universals, but that the grasp of ultimate universals does not arise through demonstrable logos, but logos informs the lead up to *nous*.

My path through Aristotle's thoughts on *nous* arrives finally at Book I of the *Metaphysics*, Chapter 3. In keeping with the translation of the *Ethics* by D. Ross, I chose to use the on line version of Ross's translation of the *Metaphysics*. In the *Ethics,* Aristotle states that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject matter (NE 1104a3). In this section of the *Metaphysics* there is greater clarity as to what should be the subject matter of *nous*. As was mentioned previously, with reference to *nous* in the *Posterior Analytics*, *nous* is concerned with first causes and principles. In the following section of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle provides more specifics as to the nature of first causes as the subject matter of *nous*:

> Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of the original causes (for we say we
> know each thing only when we think we recognize its first cause), and causes
> are spoken of in four senses. In one of these we mean the substance, i.e., the
> essence (for the 'why' is reducible finally to the definition, and the ultimate
> 'why' is a cause and principle); in another the matter or substratum, in a third
> the source of the change, and in a fourth the cause opposed to this, the purpose
> and the good (for this is the end of all generation and change). (Meta. 983a24-
> 32)

Christopher Shields (2010) states that Aristotle's theory of original causes is found in his "mature" works and is often referred to as *Hylomorphism*. Shields argues that where possible an account of causation and explanation for something according to Aristotle requires an accounting of the four causes. Shields provides the example of a bronze statue of Hermes: the material cause would be the matter from which the statue was made (bronze); the formal cause would be the form in which the matter becomes determinate (the shape of Hermes); the efficient cause would be the sculptor who brought the shape into being; and the final cause would be the telos, or appropriate good end, which would be the honouring of Hermes.

As Aristotle develops this idea of *nous* as apprehending causation in the *Metaphysics*, he does

not specify the relationship of *nous* to *phronesis*, but is developing a more theoretical based *nous*

in relation to *episteme* and *sophia*. Keeping in mind that the question of whether or not this

connection with *nous* apprehending causation applies equally to *phronesis*, I would like to first

provide a brief clarification on what I mean by theoretically based *nous* in this section of the

Metaphysics. *Sophia* is generally portrayed in Chapter 2 of Book 1 of the *Metaphysics* as the

capacity of *nous* to apprehend the causes and first principles, combined with *episteme* as a

capacity related to theoretical knowledge of unchangeable objects (Parry, 2008). Aristotle is

quite clear that those who know the cause (the why) are superior to those who know the how:

"the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception

whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the masterworker than the mechanic, and

the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive

(Meta. 981b30-982a1). Clearly, Aristotle portrays *sophia* as the highest intellectual capacity

reliant on *nous* informing *episteme*.

3.3.2.3   *Phronesis***: The Good as a First Cause and Principle**

This portrayal of a theoretical based *nous* in the *Metaphysics*, leaves some uncertainty as to

whether a practically based *nous* is apprehending first causes, and further what this might imply.

In an earlier discussion from the work of Long and Lee (2007) recall that *nous* was apprehending

both particular and universal – the universals are the first principles and the particulars are

instances of the first principles. It would also be necessary in the example of practical situations,

that the nature of *phronesis* would imply that there would need to be apprehension of the good as

understood as a first cause in the practical situation. This would be specifically related to the fourth of Aristotle's causes. If we conclude that practically based *nous* apprehends first causes and principles as does theoretically based *nous*, then this implies that *phronesis* is a form of wisdom due to its reliance on *nous*. Aristotle clearly indicates that it is the answer to the "why" that provides the highest form of knowing, and because *nous* necessarily provides the answer to the why, it is a form of wisdom. Of course Aristotle would not have admitted that *phronesis* is the highest form of wisdom, and as was mentioned earlier, Aristotle's privileging of the theoretical over the practical has been criticized by Coulter and Weins (2002) as problematic to his *Ethics*. In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle states that theoretical kinds of knowledge are "more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive" and thus subordinates the practical to the theoretical (Meta. I, 1, 982a1). But, I would again caution interpretations of Aristotle's privileging of the theoretical and note the non-anthropocentric intent behind this view. As a result, I would conclude that *nous* is a capacity not just for the apprehension of first principles related to *episteme*, but also for the evaluative particulars informing ethical judgment as discussed in more detail by Vokey in terms of the apprehension of non-relative intrinsic goodness. Thus, on this interpretation, *nous* is the non-inferential capacity of the body-mind to know in complex ethical entanglements that does not rely on rational justifications. Returning to the vignette, my evaluative direct apprehension of the goodness of the learning situation was achieved through the unmediated apprehension of goodness as an ethical first principle, and was discerned through my perception of the particulars of the practical situation.[20]

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[20]   I acknowledge that this statement leaves the question open as to the potential source(s) of knowledge of the good. I do not take the point up here as, in my view, such responses emerge from the ontological assumptions and commitments of a tradition and greatly exceed what is possible to discuss within the current discussion.

3.4 Synthesis of Learning

3.4.1 Returning to the Research Questions: Learning from the texts

I am now turning to an examination of what I have learned through this analysis in terms of the initial research questions I posed in relation to the texts:

- *In what ways is the body significant to knowing (relation of body-mind)?*
- *In what ways might the relation of the body to a specific place be significant to knowing?*

Analysis of these texts has given me the opportunity to think more deeply about the different ways a person might come to know and the implications of the body in each. Aristotle's texts predate the Cartesian mind/body dualism and thus provide generative thought on the role of the body in knowing throughout his work. Aristotle's texts provide me with the opportunity to think through the idea that my approach to knowing should be specifically related to what is to be known. His differentiation of the intellectual capacities for knowing provides more specifics for thinking about the ways I might go about knowing when what is to be known is related to practical ethical acting; practical making or producing; scientific demonstrable principles; a theoretical understanding of the universe; and especially relevant to this chapter, the apprehension of knowledge by the experiencing body-mind. But, I also have appreciated that these ways of knowing are entangled, as what is to be known is similarly complexly involved. The apprehension of knowledge through experience in the world is involved and informs the other ways of knowing that Aristotle identifies. As has been shown in this chapter, this point becomes clearer through tracing the entanglements of *nous* throughout a number of Aristotle's texts on knowing.

Nous is shown to be complexly involved in *episteme, phronesis* and *sophia*. Aristotle portrays *nous* as a direct and unmediated apprehension by the body-mind – an intuitive grasp of first principles of knowing through direct experience. In relation to *episteme*, *nous* was described as apprehending first principles to inform scientific reasoning. At some point rational explanations must come to an end and there must be some kind of principles on which discourse and argumentation rely. Otherwise, reasoning would fall into infinite regress. *Nous* was shown as the capacity to provide access to knowledge that was not amenable to rational explanation, but on which rational explanations rely. Aristotle portrays *nous* as ascertaining these first principles of knowing. In relation to *sophia*, *nous* was shown as the capacity for apprehending first principles that would be combined with episteme to result in the emergence of the theoretically wise person.

Aristotle also describes *nous* as apprehending the particulars features of practical situations to inform ethical deliberation in *phronesis*. My practical and theoretical interests in *phronesis* is quite central to my desire to challenge technical-rational educational practices, and I was particularly interested in the *phronetic* aspect of *nous* in this part of my study. I found that the texts by Long and Lee made the significant point that the ability of a body-mind to discern a "particular" immediately involved the identification of the universal under which it would be subsumed. They argue that everything is irreducibly singular in its emergence, but when it is possible to understand the singular as a particular instance of something, one has already co-determined the universal. These points demonstrate that *nous* is involved in the ability to discern the particular and the universal and thus provides the particular and general premises for ethical reasoning in practically contingent matters. As in the vignette, my discernment of particular

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features of the students' bodies engaged in learning was co-determined with my view that the students were deeply engaged in learning. In my perspective, these points also provide insight into the irreducible relation of whole to parts as a requirement to apprehend a situation, event, or experience. Of significance is that discerning the particulars requires an appreciation of the whole to which the particulars are related, and *nous* could be seen as this capacity that allows for this kind of apprehension in the context of experience. It is an apprehension that relies on the significance of the entire situation, at the same time it identifies the specific particulars that inform a more comprehensive understanding.

In this chapter, *nous* is shown to be involved in the apprehension of first principles and the discernment of the particular and universal through the body-mind's capacities for sense perception. A body-mind engaged in experience relies on the senses, but the movement from sensations (touch, sight, sound, etc.) to these capacities for apprehension and discernment were shown to be mediated through *phantasia*. As I understand this through my reading of Nussbaum and her commentators, the idea is that our bodies absorb information from the world through our senses as we are engaged in experience, and after many experiences, traces can remain in our body-minds of these past and similar or contrasting experiences. As a result, the body-mind is apprehending, but also engaging in its own thoughts over time through play with these images. This reflects an intellectual/emotional and embodied participation that allows for the emergence of new thoughts that seem tied at the level of memory yet unreliant on a demonstrable logos. *Nous* is therefore not to be considered irrational, as intellectual processes are involved in *nous*, but not in the sense of explicit rational justifications for the particular insight. These thoughts

about the body-mind requiring an intellectual/emotional engagement I see as emerging from a reverent attentiveness.

Aristotle puts great faith in the accuracy of *nous* to unfailingly apprehend knowledge from experience with the world, but I would temper this claim in my own estimation. Long and Lee draw attention to the idea that, according to Aristotle, *nous* is apprehending directly from the world unmediated by rational discursive thinking or argumentation. While I appreciate the key point is that the truth of a noetic apprehension relies on the correct sense as well as a simple articulation, I would argue there is more at stake in *truth*. I would argue, base on Barad's theorizations regarding material-discursive entanglements that ideas about unmediated access to the real and material need to be tempered. I take the important point that *nous* is involved in apprehension from the world through the body-mind's experience in the world, but do not find that there is really a place that knowing is completely unmediated by discursive constraints. As I relayed previously through Barad's texts, discursive constraints are bound up with material realities, and I would construe that *nous* offers access to potential reality or the possibility of less mediated knowing. In appreciation for the discursive features of situations, there is a requirement to acknowledge that embodied knowledge is always discursively influenced and therefore mediated. The challenge is to try to think as clearly as possible about the material realities present in experience, through surfacing the discursive features of experiences and the influence on the possibilities for apprehension. Although, I would also acknowledge that this type of mediation differs from the mediation of a rational argument as justification, and completely follow Aristotle's thoughts on the important place of a form of knowing that is unreliant on rational justification.

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Initially, I thought that the idea of place would not be a strong feature of Aristotelian texts on embodied knowledge. My research question about the significance of place to knowing was conceived more in response to what I was learning from Indigenous perspectives. I had thought the importance of context in Aristotelian thought provided a somewhat abstract notion of place and thus not a distinctly important part of theorizing the knowing body. After analysis of the texts in *De Anima*, however, I would now argue that place is an important feature of embodied knowledge in Aristotelian thought. The discussion of *aisthesis* clarified for me the importance in Aristotelian thought of our senses apprehending the specifics of situations, and how understanding place is reliant on our senses. In this way, place is not an abstract concept, but actually a specific location held through the apprehension of our senses through which thoughts emerge and remain in our memory. In my understanding, it would be the sights, sounds, smells, textures and tastes of particular places that would become tied in the level of memory and become a key feature of understanding an event or phenomenon. Further, the crucial role in ethics of a sustained attentiveness to life in places suggests a greater role for place in Aristotle's thought than I had anticipated. Thus, place is not an abstract concept in Aristotelian thought as I had originally assumed, but a key feature in understanding any event or phenomenon. The priority of the particular in *phronesis* and *nous*, thus would importantly include the particulars of important places in which we think, nourish, move, feel and more generally exist with all life.

3.4.2   Reflecting on My Initial Expectation of the Texts and Looking Ahead

Aside from my expectation about the role of place, in Aristotle's texts, I also experienced another significant difference from my initial expectations. I had mentioned in the methodology

chapter, that, because of Aristotle's connections with Western thought, I might take up the ideas in the texts without questioning my own assumptions too intently. I actually did not find that happening in the analysis. Quite the contrary, the historical distance and complexity of Aristotle's thought made me think in much more detailed ways as I struggled with translations, unfamiliar terminology and unfamiliar texts and commentators. I also needed to think more imaginatively due to the theoretical thickness in the writing. While Aristotle's ideas are based in Western thought that privileges the knowing individual, I also appreciate that Aristotle's work offers a thorough critique of the modernist view of knowledge based in rationalist foundationalism and anthropocentrism through which I was raised and educated. Therefore, I did not feel that there was such close alignment of underlying assumptions as perhaps I would have thought.

In the next two chapters I will engage with the work of Indigenous scholars in BC to bring located perspectives to this research on embodied knowledge, and perspectives that are not within the confines of Western thought. Particularly, I found that in Aristotle's texts on *nous* there was not a thorough discussion on specific practices that might enhance the ability of the knowing body to apprehend in context. I am aware through past research that Aristotle engages in fairly limited discussion on the actual practices that would be involved in apprehending ethical knowledge through the body-mind.[21] Also, as previously mentioned, Aristotelian texts are not part of living traditions practiced in community. Therefore, in the next chapters my move to learn from Indigenous scholars is both to enrich the learning in this study through a body of work

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[21] Research here refers to the reading and writing of my Master's Thesis "Educating heart and mind: Fostering ethical emotional learning in elementary schools" (2007), and also my article "Habituation: A method for cultivating *starting points* in the ethical life" (2011).

that brings greater thought on practices enmeshed with theory; and also to enrich this study by not limiting theorizing within the confines of a Western orientation. I would also acknowledge that the importance of bringing Indigenous perspectives into my own educational theorizing relate to both epistemic and social equity priorities as argued in Chapter 1. In the following chapter I will start to engage with Indigenous texts through considering the complications of my engagement with the texts as a Settler-scholar, and in Chapter 5, I will engage in hermeneutic analysis of texts by BC Indigenous scholars to inform this research. In Chapter 6, I will consider the ways the texts I have chosen to study inform my ideas for the *transformative pedagogical encounter,* and think more specifically about the types of educational practices, both generally and in the context of teacher education, that are suggested through this research.

Chapter 4: My Approach to Engaging with Texts on Indigenous Knowledge

I realized when considering how I would select and approach texts from Indigenous perspectives on embodied knowledge that there was a matrix of complex considerations to which I would need to respond and think through. Specifically, I acknowledge that colonial impositions and hegemonies are historic and contemporary, and that the texts from Indigenous scholarship relate to local and global responses as resurgences against these conditions.[22] I also acknowledge that I am figured into this contemporary colonial hegemony both through my Settler positionality on Indigenous lands, and related privileging in almost all social contexts in which I participate in public schools and academia. In this chapter, I will highlight this complexity through detailing my considerations in the selection of texts for this inquiry as well as my approach to interpreting the texts. This chapter will build on my approach grounded in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics provided in Chapter 2, but will go into greater detail. Particularly, I will consider the texts in the historical context from which they emerge, and my relationship to this history. Additionally, I will consider the complexity of Indigenous knowledges, my limitations in being able to understand the texts, and my complex relationship to the texts. I will conclude by putting forward an organizing framework for my textual analysis.

> *... the story continues in a quiet corner of our classroom ...*
>
> *I watch the six students as they settle comfortably in chairs around this small table with their copies of the book "Island of the Blue Dolphins" by Scott O'Dell. I feel my usual mix of hope and unsureness as we settle into our small guided reading group. I*

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[22] I find this word "resurgences" provides a powerful orientation to the work of Indigenous scholars in contemporary academic contexts. I encountered this word and perspective in a 2005 article "Being Indigenous: Resurgences against contemporary colonialism" by Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel. As I read Indigenous scholarship I take up the spirit of that word to guide my understanding of the texts.

wonder if this book will capture their imaginations or fall flat. As I wait for the students, I second-guess my choice of this piece of historical fiction written in the 1960s. The students did choose this novel out of three options, but honestly there wasn't much choice – full sets of books are hard to come by in this underfunded school. I have to rely on a book room that has many "old classics" but seriously lacks current material. We are still intrigued by all things related to water, and I had presented this book as being about a courageous young woman's survival for almost twenty years alone on an island, accomplished through her traditional knowledge and intelligence. I told the students that her life depends on her knowledge of the water, land and animals and the strength of her character. I'm hoping that this book will help them think about the significance of water in their own lives and cultural traditions, and perhaps spur a project where we can bring in the parents and families. I organized activities to help them get ready to understand the time period of the mid 1800s and geographic location of the actual island, but today we're starting to read! As Lilly starts to take her turn, I feel each of us leaning into the table and towards each other. There is a sense we are on our own little island at this table. I try hard not to show my overflowing pride as the formerly reluctant reader Lilly confidently sits beside me taking her turn. She's carefully sounding out a place name, as Charlie puts the book on her lap and looks at me across the table. The other students sense Charlie's movement as well, and Lilly stops sounding out. Charlie's head is tilted down, but her eyes are looking up at me. I can I feel the intensity of her energy as she quietly asks me "Who is this girl"? While I'm thrilled that this new and quiet student is initiating her participation, my excitement is tempered because I'm not really sure what she's asking. I look at her thoughtfully and respond - "she's a girl who is native to this Island and her village is called Ghalas-at". From the look on Charlie's face I know I'm not telling her what she wants to know. "No" she replies softly and patiently: "What kind of girl is she? .... I mean is she like me"? I realize in a very humbling way that I have almost no idea what to say.

This vignette represents a pivotal moment for me as a teacher and a Settler. I realized in that moment that I had minimal language to speak about Indigenous perspectives and concerns with my students. I had little language, because I had not thought in any kind of depth about Indigenous perspectives, Indigenous-Settler relations and my own position and participation in problematic relations. I do not think it was a mere oversight that I had not questioned the conditions in this novel that required this young woman's "survival". Throughout my education, I had not been taught to draw any attention or analysis to the relation between colonialism and current challenges for Indigenous peoples and communities. I had also not thought about my position as a white, privileged Settler, nor my implicated position in ongoing hegemonic relations. At this time in my life, and in my teaching career, I had a very *multicultural* outlook that assumed the benefits of including the students' "cultures" and knowledges – accompanied by a well-ingrained habit of ignoring issues of history and power. In effect, I was a well-intentioned teacher who had simply "othered" all cultures and perspectives and acted as gatekeeper. In bringing a novel about a strong Indigenous woman into the classroom, I had no idea how problematic my good intentions actually were.

I had chosen a book about an Indigenous woman from the 1850s, written by a white man in the 1960s. The book raises some challenging questions: Are Indigenous peoples only leading exemplary lives in the past? Is it up to Settlers to tell their stories? The book is clearly well intentioned in trying to respectfully represent the main character and the Indigenous knowledge that contributed to her balanced approach to living that ensured her survival. At the same time, the author thoroughly ignores the colonial conditions that contextualize the story, as well as his entitlement to appropriate this woman's story. Despite both of our good intentions, this vignette

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demonstrates a reimposition of colonial silencing and "othering" in an educational setting as reflected in Charlie's utter confusion by what is not being discussed. Through an anti-colonial lens different questions emerge: Who are Indigenous peoples and why are they just "surviving"? Why are non-Indigenous peoples telling these stories – and why are they telling such old stories? This moment made a severe impression on me and I felt embarrassed and fraudulent with my students. I was and am fortunate to be in a community where people are willing to educate me. Through the help of the students, their families, Elders and friends, I began to think in more political ways both personally and generally regarding Settler-Indigenous relations, as well as my responsibilities in being a teacher in a Settler nation-state with a long practice of denial concerning colonial violence. As I approach my work in this dissertation, these responsibilities and desire for more equitable and honest relations are at the front of my mind. It is my desire to not limit my responsibilities to good intentions, and to develop a more responsible and self-reflexive orientation to my work in education and life as a Settler on Coast Salish territory.

4.1   Selection of Texts and Concerns about Interpretation

4.1.1   Considerations in the Selection of Texts

Narrowing down the texts that might be informative to the topic of embodied knowledge from Indigenous perspectives has been a challenge. I have thought and rethought the balances between gaining insight to the topic; my questionable ability to differentiate the texts; the author's relationship to his or her Nation; my implication in colonization and coloniality; and the prospects of appropriation of knowledges. In these challenges, I take Gadamer's lead in bringing forward the historical horizon in which the texts emerge and maintaining a radical negativity on my knowing. In this way, I am learning from the texts, and considering in a coherent way, how

these texts answer the *questionableness* of what it means to know in an embodied way. Ultimately, I am guided in the selection of texts by my recognition of two key features of Indigenous knowledges: that geographic location and ethical relationships matter fundamentally. As George Sefa Dei states: "Fundamentally, the Indigenous should be percepted as mostly about place-based knowing, an understanding of traditional sacred relationships between peoples and their cultures and cosmologies" (Dei, 2011b, p. 23).

In acknowledgement of the importance of place, I have chosen to limit my analysis to texts written by Indigenous scholars in BC. This choice is related to honouring the people from this place and the traditional territory on which I have been fortunate to live, work and think. From my readings in Indigenous scholarship I have understood that the land is not just a location, but also a sacred source of knowledge, as knowledge is ascertained from learning from relations that have been in a particular place from time immemorial. As Michael Marker states: "From an Indigenous perspective, the 'truth' not only needs to be placed within larger dimensions of history and power, it must be experienced in actual places on the landscape" (Marker, 2003, p. 370). My inquiry will be enriched through learning from the traditions that have developed from the landscapes in this part of the world.

The diversity of Indigenous traditions in BC is astounding and complex, and grows from varied histories, landscapes, languages, cultures and cosmologies. To refer to the traditions of the Indigenous peoples of BC I will use the recognizable term of *First Nations,* and will specify the Nation. From a Gadamerian point of view, by sourcing texts from specific First Nations, I am sourcing texts from different traditions. I believe this viewpoint recognizes the diversity of First

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Nations as being distinct traditions, but allows for recognition that First Nations traditions have some common ontological features in relation to indigeneity. I have chosen to keep to BC Indigenous scholars, because of relationships and networks of influence on UBC. I recognize that the idea of BC is a construction of an imaginary bordered area related to a nationalist framework (Marker, 2011a, p. 200), but I also recognize that networks of scholars in BC relate to the place of UBC. I believe this creates a relational network in a place, and I keep my choice of texts to BC scholars in response to this idea.

To reduce the chances that I will misinterpret texts, and to also avoid appropriating knowledge not meant to be shared in the academy, my goal is to keep to texts that are specifically addressed to the academy in a public way, and to Indigenous scholars that provide understandings on knowing from her or his own First Nation. In terms of relations, I am hoping for a decidedly close relationship between the scholar; the knowledge from the Nation; the Nation; and the text. For this reason I have chosen to learn from scholars who are communicating in publicly accessible forms, in a way that interprets *their* knowledge of *their* First Nation, to be understood within and outside of their Nation. Importantly, these scholars have deeply structured understandings through membership in their Nations and relationship with a specific landscape. These scholars also have an advanced understanding of academic discourses and thus are expert in the ways of the academy. In this way, the scholars' texts are chosen for being respected for their knowledge in both locations, and thus ensuring I am not positioning *myself* as an expert about a Nation and knowledge system from which I am learning.

This choice to focus on scholars writing about knowing from their own Nation is particularly related to my interpretative abilities and not a belief that the authors are somehow representing a pristine or pure Indigenous perspective from their Nation. Following Gadamer, and the ways that each of the scholars represents their work, I believe that we all know from a location in a tradition, and our traditions are not frozen in the past. The key idea for me is that there is nothing bounded, frozen or limiting when it comes to knowing through traditions. Each of the scholars are representing knowing through their traditions, but are also embedded in complex contexts and diverse relationships of power within networks of community; Indigenous scholars from global, provincial, national and local locations; professional organizations; membership in departments, faculties, associations and disciplines in higher education; and research interests and partnerships in specific locations. In this way, there really is no pure view, but instead there is responsiveness to contemporary contexts through fluid understandings that evolve through locations in multiple traditions. My focus on scholars writing about their own Nation, is related to my interpretative possibilities due to my positionality and my desire to avoid appropriations through my capacity for misunderstanding.

Noted here are the scholars who will inform my inquiry, as well as the texts that I have chosen to analyze. I am also including information as to the specific memberships to which these scholars identify as belonging with regard to their Nations and to their academic roles and locations. I will also provide a brief annotation of the texts to provide some context for the authors' work.

4.1.2 The Selected Scholars and Texts

4.1.2.1 Professor Jo-ann Archibald, Q'um Q'um Xiiem

Jo-ann Archibald is from the Stó:lō River People and the Xaxli'p First Nation (Lillooet). UBC – Professor, Associate Dean for Indigenous Education, and Director of the Native Indian Teacher Education Program (NITEP). Text: Book - *Indigenous Storywork: Educating the Heart, Mind Body and Spirit* (2008). This book emerged from Dr. Archibald's considerable research with Stó:lō Elders and storytellers on oral narratives as a significant component of Coast Salish knowledge systems. Her book provides a framework that demonstrates the power of stories to holistically educate when understood from an Indigenous perspective.

4.1.2.2 Professor Jeannette Armstrong

Jeannette Armstrong is a traditional knowledge keeper from Sqilxw Okanagan Nation. Assistant Professor UBC Okanagan and Executive Director of En-owkin Centre. Texts: Book Chapters – *A Holistic Education, Teaching's from the Dance House: "We Cannot Afford to Lose One Native Child"* (2000). This chapter emerged from a meeting of Indigenous educators on promising holistic educational practices in Indigenous education. Armstrong's chapter provides a model of the elements of the self in complex relations based in Okanagan knowledge as a way to understand and undertake holistic education. *Community*: *Sharing One Skin* (2005). This chapter emerged from an international forum on globalization, in which Armstrong shares her views on an Okanagan notion of community. *An Okanagan Worldview of Society* (2008). This chapter forms part of a book that engages with Indigenous teachings as a way to encourage a sustainable future. Armstrong discusses Okanagan perspectives on society and land as a way to contribute to this project. Interview *The Ones from the Land Who Dream* (2000). This interview

is focused on Armstrong's knowledge of Okanagan perspectives on prophecy as it relates to communal and intergenerational understandings of land, community, and self in complex spiritual and physical relation.

4.1.2.3   Professor E. Richard Atleo, Umeek

Richard Atleo, Umeek is a hereditary chief of the Nuu-chah-nulth Nation. Associate Adjunct Professor University of Victoria, and Research Liaison at the University of Manitoba. Texts: Books - *Tsawalk: A Nuu-chah-nulth Worldview* (2004). This book provides a Nuu-chah-nulth perspective on the nature of reality understood as "everything is one". Dr. Atleo provides the foundations for an Indigenous theory from his understanding of Nuu-chah-nulth cosmology and ontology that unite the physical and metaphysical, clearly distinguishing this perspective from Western ontological notions of holism. *Principles of Tsawalk* (2011). This book considers the foundational ideas in a theory of Tsawalk (one) from a Nuu-chah-nulth perspective, and provides this theory as an Indigenous orientation to both understand and address current global crises.

4.1.2.4   William A. Cohen

Willam Cohen is a member of the Okanagan Band. Instructor UBC Okanagan and Educational Consultant. Text: PhD Dissertation – *School Failed Coyote, So Fox Made a New School* (2010). Cohen's doctoral thesis examines the relevance of Okanagan knowledge, as understood as evolving through a web of relations, to educational and cultural aspirations of the Okanagan people. His dissertation seeks to identify, understand and theorize the transformational potential of Okanagan pedagogy through an Okanagan language immersion school.

4.1.2.5   Professor Ethel B. Gardner, Stelómethet

Ethel B. Gardner Stelómethet, is from the Stó:lō Nation. Associate Professor University of Alberta. Text: PhD Dissertation - *Tset Híkwstexw Te Sqwélteltset, We Hold Our Language High: The Meaning of Halq'emélem Language Renewal in the Everyday Lives of Stó:lō People* (2002). Gardner's doctoral thesis examines Halq'emélem language renewal in contemporary Stó:lō life. Her dissertation examines the historical demise and rise of language use; the spiritual relation of language and land; and the unifying effects of Halq'emélem language renewal.

4.1.2.6   Professor Kundoque Jacquie Green

Kundoque Jacquie Green is from the Killer Whale clan of the Haisla Peoples. Associate Professor University of Victoria. Text: Article – *Reclaiming Haisla Ways: Remembering Oolichan Fishing* (2008). Green's article highlights the importance of story as a way to understand Haisla identity and knowledge. Green articulates detailed stories of oolican fishing to illustrate the relationships between land, culture, knowledge and identity in a Haisla perspective.

4.1.2.7   Professor Charles R. Menzies,

Charles R. Menzies is from Laxyuup Gitxaała. Associate Professor UBC. Texts: Article - *Dm sibilhaa'nm Da Laxyuubm Gitxaała: Picking Abalone in Gitxaała Territory* (2010). Menzies describes the traditional harvesting practices of bilhaa (abalone) in Gitxaała territory and the problematic incursion by the non-Aboriginal commercial fishery. Menzies discusses Gitxaała society and cultural identity in relation to traditional practices and relationships. Article – *Standing on the Shore with Saaban – An Anthropological Rapprochement with An Indigenous Intellectual Tradition* (in press). Menzies considers social science research, and in particular the

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discipline of anthropology, as being more ethically and intellectually informed by an Indigenous practice of inquiry. He provides exegesis of a Gitxaała intellectual tradition of inquiry, and a mini-ethnography of responses to his related oral presentations, to argue the importance of self-reflexive intellectual practices in Western academies – with emphasis on the discipline of anthropology.

4.1.3   Important Concerns that Require Greater Consideration

Despite my attempts to think in greater detail about the selection of texts, due to my Settler positionality, I still may be enacting a potentially problematic interpretation in this inquiry. As was apparent in the vignette in this chapter, problematic impositions are not alleviated merely through good intentions. There is an historic and ongoing context of colonization, in which I am implicated, that involves the violent subjugation of Indigenous peoples and knowledges. Marie Battiste (2008) draws attention to the "long and devastating history of forcing Eurocentric values, beliefs, and knowledge on Indigenous peoples, and of displacing Indigenous knowledges, languages and cultures" in colonial contexts (p. 86). Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel reveal the ongoing structural nature of colonization that seeks to erase the histories and geographies that "provide the foundation for Indigenous cultural identities and sense of self" (p. 598). Dei (2011b) is similarly concerned about the deprivileging and marginalizing of Indigenous voices in the academy while "colonial hegemonic ideologies and Eurocentric discourses" dominate through "masquerading as universal knowledge" (p. 22). Marker and Linda Smith conclude that academic research by non-Indigenous scholars is broadly implicated in the domination and exploitation of Indigenous communities (Marker 2000, 2003; Smith 1999, 2005) and Menzies

draws attention to the related appropriations of Indigenous knowledges that is a key and ongoing feature of this relationship (Menzies, in press).

My intent in this dissertation is to avoid problematic textual interpretations that reinforce colonial hegemonies, while contributing to the many possibilities for thinking about the ways teacher education can be conducted with attention to supporting the conditions for social equity and the ways teacher education can relate to educational spaces beyond the academy in socially equitable ways. My ability to expand my horizon of understanding, so that I am able to learn from the texts, starts with the recognition of the historical horizon of coloniality from which these texts emerge as resurgences, and to which the texts respond. This position is in contrast to my position in the vignette where I thoroughly ignored the colonial context and violence from which the novel's plotline emerged. Further, my self-reflexiveness about my limitations through being raised in a modernist society dominated by rationalist foundationalism, empiricism and anthropocentrism, and doing this work in an institution broadly implicated in the marginalization of ideas that challenge the modernist agenda, helps to frame the possible fore-structures that I might impose on the texts.

I have mentioned my good intentions and positive hope, which are both important dispositions for an academic researcher, but are woefully inadequate alone, given an analysis of the historic and current practices of research in the academy involving Indigenous contexts and peoples. Often, good intentions are used to justify the harm that has been done to real people in real communities (King, 2012). As highlighted in the vignette, it is necessary to consider texts in terms of history and power in a self-reflexive way. In this inquiry, I will work through notions

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developed by Gadamer for interpretation of texts that respect tradition and traditionary knowledge, and carried out in ways that promote what I understand to be self-reflexivity as discussed in Chapter 2. Important in this regard is an appreciation that the texts are not understood as being the object of the philosopher's gaze (see also Menzies, in press, p. 7), but instead that I am working toward ethical relation with the texts. In this way I am *learning from* the texts in a self-reflexive mode as an ethical orientation to my inquiry. As part of this approach, I will detail my considerations according to the *Four Rs* of respect, relevance, reciprocity and responsibility (Kirkness & Barnhardt, 1991) as a way to articulate a practical consciousness of the history of problematic Indigenous-Settler relations that I thoroughly lacked in the vignette. The Four Rs were originally developed by Verna Kirkness and Ray Barnhardt in an analysis of contexts in higher education in relation to First Nations students, and were importantly written when these scholars were located at UBC. These Four Rs also provided the guidance for relations in a doctoral seminar I participated in led by Jo-ann Archibald titled *Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Education*, at UBC in 2009. I bring the Four Rs to my inquiry in appreciation for the ways the Four Rs have expanded my horizon for what it can mean to undertake inquiry in ethical relation in a holistic way.

4.2 My Considerations According to Kirkness and Barnhardt's Four Rs

4.2.1 Respectful

My work is positioned in teacher education in an anti-colonial framework that reveals the potentially contentious nature of myself as researcher and my ability to remain respectful. As a white woman of European origins, I am directly implicated in colonization, as I have grown in a society dominated by a modernist worldview to the detriment of Indigenous peoples' lives,

languages, cultures and lands. Throughout my life, I have experienced the privilege of having

my cultural assumptions validated in almost all of my social contexts. I have lived in apartments

and houses, attended schools and worked, and had the opportunity to enjoy my life on lands that

were in different ways violently appropriated from the peoples who recognize these places as

their sacred and ancestral territories. As the vignette reveals, as a Settler I have been subsumed

into problematic narratives that privilege a Settler way of seeing the world, that had left me

particularly blind to Indigenous perspectives that did not fall into line with these narratives.

Throughout my education I have been taught a narrative that justified the myriad forms of

violence to Indigenous peoples by policy and real people, and inappropriately justified my rights

to be on these lands and in this way. UBC, the *research intensive university* in which I study and

work, is located on unceded overlapping territories of the Musqueam, Squamish and Tsleil-

Waututh peoples, has been *endowed* without consultation or permission to the University by the

colonial government. Further, the history of research undertaken by universities such as this one,

is not only embedded in colonization, but is also, as Smith points out, a tool of colonization

through its deep connection to power (Smith, 2005, p. 87).

Given that the privilege I experience is through the exploitation of Indigenous peoples and

territories, and that my work is enacted in a colonial institution, how is it possible for me to

engage in research with Indigenous texts respectfully? My first thought is that I recognize and

understand the morally diminished position from which I start, and the desire to go forward in

much more respectful ways. In my view, one way I can be respectful is by considering the larger

place within which this analysis of texts is located. I am using the privilege that I have received

to interrupt and critique the dominant modernist worldview that directs institutional structures,

specifically around knowledge production, and that confer privilege problematically. I am also choosing to do so from within the University, recognizing the University as a prime site of conferral of privilege. Through revealing and actively questioning these Settler narratives and discourses, I have started to see what has intentionally been made invisible. I believe that engaging in this sort of questioning at the University invites others into questioning and challenging the structures of privilege and inequity at the University.

Another way I can remain respectful is through engaging with texts that Indigenous scholars have chosen to share in larger public and academic contexts. Specifically, I am not sourcing texts that are currently immersed in ongoing debates amongst Indigenous scholars. I refer here to the myriad ways in which Indigenous scholars are considering the praxis of *indigenizing* various dominant spaces in academia. Although, I also recognize that there may be aspects of the texts that could be brought into these debates, and that the texts may be the subject of debate outside of academic settings. That said, I am looking to texts by Indigenous community members/scholars who have made their work public and thus addressed to Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars. From my position of not being a member of any of the scholars' communities, I understand that the authors and texts are respected in community and academic settings, and see this as a respectful place for me to source texts (Archibald, 2008, pp. 18-19).

Respect also involves being knowledgeable about the nature of Indigenous knowledges, as well as my limitations, so as to not misrepresent the texts. As I am not Indigenous, and have been raised and educated in institutions and a society that embody a modernist worldview, it is clear to me that my understanding of Indigenous texts will always be partial and incomplete. To some

degree all of our understandings are partial and incomplete, but the incommensurable worldviews of the traditional texts in this research bring a distinct set of challenges to my own understanding in this research. More specifically, I do not regularly participate in an Indigenous community and learn from oral narratives, rituals, practices and ceremonies under the guidance of an Elder of Knowledge Holder. As far as I am aware, embodied participation is a key feature of learning and understanding within the standards of Indigenous traditions in BC. While as an adult I have participated in some rituals and feasts through networks of friends, my scholarly engagement has largely been textual and therefore limited in that kind of abstractness. From a modernist perspective, having a great deal of abstract, textual knowledge can position a researcher as an expert. My growing appreciation for the complexity of Indigenous knowledges, and the connection of these knowledges to ritual, practice, land, ceremony and community under the guidance of an Elder, makes it clear to me that I am always in a position of potential misunderstanding. This is not to imply that I am incapable of learning from Indigenous scholars in a transformative way, but to assert that there will always be the potential that I will misinterpret these texts through my lack of embodied participation, but also due to being raised as a Settler in Canada with narratives that misrepresent Indigenous knowledges. Therefore, to avoid misrepresenting texts here, it is important for me to engage with and learn from Indigenous scholars in a way that does not leave my work immune to corrective influence (Castellano, 2000, p. 31).

I have a number of ways to bring corrective influence to my work. My initial formal engagement with Indigenous scholarship began in 2009 under the supervision of Dr. Jo-ann Archibald with a small group of students in a seminar. This opportunity provided me with a

space to share my ongoing understandings, and work out the potential connections and contributions of Indigenous knowledges to my area of investigation - in a way that is open to corrective influence. Since that time I have remained connected to some of these students and continue to meet and share my writings and to read their writings as well. Also, Dr. Michael Marker has joined my supervisory committee to advise me academically, but with specific insights in Indigenous knowledges and the challenges of the clash between Indigenous and modernist worldviews. Similar to the relationships developed through my seminar with Dr. Archibald, a seminar with Dr. Marker has also resulted in a network of students with whom I attend talks, conferences and share ideas on an ongoing basis. Throughout the last four years of studying and teaching at UBC, I have also been fortunate to develop relationships that provide me with a place to discuss ideas and share writing on a regular basis. My text as you read it now, has already been through incredible rounds of feedback from a number of people, and has had a powerful collective influence on my learning through corrective opportunities. UBC in particular provides a generative environment, where numerous Indigenous scholars are on faculty and visiting regularly. Through these scholars, I have been provided with exceptional venues to discuss my understandings and share my work, and this leaves me in a position to learn as much as possible about Indigenous knowledges and to have circles of people who can provide corrective influence to my understandings. I have also sent my work in this chapter and Chapter 5 to each of the scholars and have received comments and assistance from at least half of the scholars.

4.2.2 Relevant

As Marker states: "Indigenous people did not come to the academy to play word and idea games...[but] in general, to have their stories forged into concrete change for their communities (Marker, 2003, p. 363). The idea of relevance speaks directly to this point, and requires that I ask myself in what ways my work might have relevance beyond an activity related to my own idiosyncratic academic curiosity. More specifically, for this inquiry to be relevant it needs to have the potential to benefit real people in real places. I believe that positioning my work in an anti-colonial framework reveals this sort of relevance. I view this inquiry as contributing to a decolonial influence on teacher education, through revealing the limitations (both academic and ethical) of the modernist influenced foundation of teacher education programs. In this way, I am undertaking my work in a way that seeks to keep connections between the struggle for decolonization, the role of the academy, and Indigenous community concerns, as recommended by Linda Smith in her analysis of ways to avoid perpetuation of colonialism (Smith, 2005, p. 88).

I also take the position that the benefits of this work relate to all people. While I appreciate that centring Indigenous perspectives in Western academia has benefits for Indigenous scholars and scholarship, it also benefits the academy and society. As Wenona Victor states: "Colonial ideologies such as eurocentrism, racism, oppression and hegemonic control are used to promote and sustain a colonial regime that denies equally the colonized and the colonizers of their full human potential" (Victor, 2007, p. 3). As was shown in previous chapters, the rationalist foundationalism at the heart of Enlightenment epistemology curtails possibilities for knowing through the abstract positioning of the knower in this perspective. The history of Enlightenment epistemology as a tool of colonization, and its perpetuation through a modernist framework,

reveals the moral shortcomings of a way of knowing that justifies and enacts violence on people, lands and communities. As a result, I bring forward ideas in this inquiry that reveal longstanding barriers to achieving an ethical and just society for **all** people. In terms of the vignette, the problem is not solely that I provided Charlie and other Indigenous students in my class with an unethical educational context that normalized violence directed at Indigenous peoples by Settlers, but importantly that I, **all** of my students, the community of the school, etc. were diminished by my (in)actions as shown in the vignette.

I view this inquiry as contributing to a decolonial influence on the academy more generally through revealing the limitations of modernist standards for knowledge production and thus interrupting the hegemony that it generally experiences. Enlightenment epistemology often assumes the universal backdrop of just being *epistemology*, without recognizing that all knowing happens within a tradition (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 206; Gadamer, 2004, xx). Through fore-fronting the notion that Enlightenment epistemology is a way of knowing that has grown out of Western cultures, and is perpetuated through a modernist worldview, I am attempting to decentre and interrupt the powerful centred position it occupies in the academy. As a result, my work has relevance through its potential to impact or challenge dominant frames in education. Educational institutions are real sites that enact coloniality and perpetuate ongoing marginalization and domination through potentially reinforcing colonial hegemony in the minds of teacher candidates. Teacher candidates enter the K-12 school system and then have the opportunity to continue the outgoing reach of coloniality. As a result, my contribution to critical discourses on epistemology in teacher education programs has the potential to interrupt the unquestioned reconstitution of coloniality in a systemic way.

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The relevance of my work is also through adding to conversations concerning Settler-Indigenous relations that seek systemic and personal decolonization. In terms of positionality, I take my lead from Paulette Regan as claiming an identity as *Settler* on traditional and ancestral Coast Salish territory. This is more than a social position, as it also enacts a political position by locating me in a critical counter-narrative to the story of Canadians as benevolent peacemakers (Regan, 2010, p. 1). While I have observed some scholars position themselves solely as non-Indigenous, I see this as a severely limiting orientation. If I were to position myself solely as *non-Indigenous*, I am only able to account for my position as being outside of an Indigenous tradition without acknowledging my complicity in the colonial project. The importance of recognizing my relationship to Indigenous peoples and the land, is foundational to my anti-colonial aspirations (see Haig-Brown, 2008, p. 16). As Dwayne Donald argues, there are deeply learned habits arising from the colonial experience in Canada that reinforce a notion "that Aboriginal peoples and Canadians inhabit separate realities" (Donald, 2012, p. 91). I have considered that engaging an anti-colonial orientation requires a much closer and prolonged look at the nature of my relations, and I hope to contribute to that discourse in this inquiry.

The idea of "decolonizing the mind" as raised by Franz Fanon, Alfred & Corntassel and Rauna Kuokkanen needs to not only focus on Indigenous peoples, but also decolonizing the minds of Settlers. Through identifying myself as a S*ettler*, and acknowledging the privileges that are conferred on me through my social position and whiteness, I allow for the potential for transformative change. This change can only come through dwelling in, but not remaining stuck in, emotions of denial and guilt. In this way, I read the texts by Indigenous scholars in a self-

reflexive mode as working towards decolonization of myself **and** the educational structures – holding up a mirror to myself, the dominant culture and the epistemological presumptions contained therein, to include an analysis of "history, hegemony and self" (Marker, 2003, p. 367; Marker, 2006, p. 2).

Finally, for my work to be relevant it needs to reveal that I have an appreciation for the complexity and diversity of Indigenous knowledges. There is a potential danger in this inquiry that I might foster an essentializing discourse about Indigenous knowledges or indigeneity quite generally. There are nuances and departures from particular places and traditions that I might miss due to my positionality. While I have found and continue to read about some of the fundamental similarities amongst Indigenous knowledges, I seek to ground my work in particular places and territories to avoid the abstract positioning that might detract from my understanding of the texts and thus impact the potential relevance of my work.

4.2.3   Reciprocal

To understand the contributions of Indigenous perspectives to my understanding of embodied knowledge, I am drawing on the writings of specific Indigenous scholars who work in academies. To understand a located Indigenous perspective I could have undertaken ethnographic research with Musqueam Elders, or analyzed available interview accounts with Elders where I currently live and work. I chose not to do this out of respect for communities and the likelihood that I might misinterpret accounts. I instead choose to rely on the writing of Indigenous scholars working at the space between Indigenous communities and academies who are intentionally writing and being read and listened to in the academy. This raises the following

question: In this context, to whom should I reciprocate and how should I go about it? I believe in some ways, my attempts to work toward decolonization of teacher education will be one way to engage in reciprocity through ensuring that what I am learning from the texts is put to good use and is not limited to my own learning.

4.2.4   Responsible

One important way for me to be responsible in this context is to consider in what ways I might be appropriating Indigenous knowledge. Celia Haig-Brown asks the critical question: "What is the relationship between appropriation of Indigenous thought and what I can only think to call "deep" learning particularly in light of current understanding of cultural appropriation" (Haig-Brown, 2010, p. 927)? Haig-Brown refers to deep learning in the way that a person can unconsciously acquire knowledge that transforms one's worldview, with the effect that it is now so incorporated that it changes how that person is able to see the world (p. 937). In this context, my question is: How can I avoid appropriating the insights of Indigenous scholars? For me, appropriation means to take as one's own. I think that in this context, it is my responsibility to continually acknowledge the scholars from whom I draw ideas, and be clear that such ideas are not my own. There is a greater difficulty underlying this, as Haig-Brown points out, in that certain insights may be unconsciously taken in. Therefore, it is my greater responsibility to be self-reflexive in critically considering from where certain transformative insights have been acquired and under what circumstances, and acknowledge this in my own texts. As Haig-Brown argues – it is important for the non-Indigenous scholar to remain vigilant about appropriation and not allow oneself the "luxury of inertia – continually posing the question to ourselves and our work" (p. 947).

Martin Nakata also addresses this concern about appropriation. Nakata (2007) in his theorizing of the cultural interface between Western and Indigenous knowledges hones in on the importance of not extracting Indigenous knowledge from the knower (p. 9). In thinking about this point, my decision to not focus on Indigenous knowledge generally, but to keep my analysis to specific Indigenous scholars writing about knowledge from her or his First Nation, and located in relational networks to UBC, is made partially for this reason. My work attempts to avoid appropriation by maintaining the connection between knower and known - not just by citing authors, but citing authors in their relation to a particular land and Nation. The analysis therefore promotes an idea of knower as not just individual scholar, but knower as belonging to a Nation, territory and place.

Another key responsibility in this work is to avoid essentializing discourses about Indigenous and Western perspectives and contexts. Particularly, I find it is challenging to portray the complexity of onto-epistemological perspectives when making comparisons of fundamental aspects between traditions that are based in differing worldviews. Sami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen recognizes the difficulty, and therefore uses these categories of Western and Indigenous as heuristics to deconstruct colonialism, while acknowledging the diversity within these categories. (Kuokkanen, 2000, p. 412). I may at times need to use these heuristics. I would add that landing or grounding the work in particular territories (Gitxaała, Haisla, Nuu-chah-nulth, Okanagan, Stó:lō) and in specific places (UBC) and particular thought (hegemonic and counter discourses) also helps to derail some of the essentializing that might happen. One prominent way I will try to avoid essentializing discourses is to provide in this dissertation a

textured and historical context to the idea that scholars generally label as "Western" or "Eurocentric". In my own texts, I distinguish the modernist worldview and its connection to Enlightenment epistemology from Western Europe, and differentiate this from critical and post-structuralist positions in Western intellectual traditions. This step should also help to work towards my analysis of my complicated fore-structures that I may impose on the texts. In general, I think it is important for me to write in ways that avoid or trouble closed binaries such as Western or Indigenous, or rely on stereotypical representations, through being very clear and transparent about how I take up these terms.

I am framing this discussion of my engagement with texts by the Four Rs in the hopes of engaging in ethical analysis of the texts. I do not think there is any guarantee that my work will be beyond critique due to these considerations. My work will still need to be exposed and re-exposed to corrective influence – a hermeneutic circle. I also do not think there is a possibility of coming up with some kind of rubric or *Four Rs checklist* based on these considerations, that will work for all Settler-scholars that research into Indigenous contexts at all times. These considerations arise in a particular place and time and relate to my personal history in relation to larger historical movements. I use the Four Rs as a self-reflexive heuristic as a Settler-scholar trying to engage in ethical research with Indigenous texts.

4.3   Additional Considerations in Developing a Framework

As a disclaimer, it is important to mention that the texts I am interpreting from BC Indigenous scholars are not texts specifically written on embodied knowledge. These texts are each written with their own particular focus – be it storywork, holistic knowledge, traditional ecological

knowledge, language revitalization, worldview, educational pedagogy, and so forth. My task

therefore is not quite so direct as to interpret texts that are intentionally specific to explaining

embodied knowledge. Consequently, I am locating particular discussions within the texts

concerning how it is a person comes to know, not through an abstracted mental process, but

through a physically present body engaged in some kind of experience. I am also not offering

any guarantees that the authors are claiming authoritative knowledge from their Nations. These

authors are providing interpretations of knowledge from their Nations to be understandable not

only to members of her or his Nation or other Indigenous scholars, but also to non-Indigenous

peoples. That said, these scholars are well respected in their communities and the academy, and

I come to the texts with the appreciation that I am not *learning about* various traditions of

thought, but that I am *learning from* these scholars.

One consideration that is worth fore-fronting at this point is my interpretation of the authors'

intent and understanding of her or his tradition in a historical context. As I have mentioned,

there is an historic and ongoing context of colonization to which these texts are related – and I

have described this as resurgences. I believe when I started reading the texts, I had thought that

the authors were in varying degrees recovering knowledge that had been violently suppressed. I

had in mind a timeline moving forward that involved an interruption. The difficulty, as I

understood it then, might be in how this knowledge from the past fits in the present – as such I

was imposing a binary in which the knowledge itself is understood as *traditional* (perhaps

implying belonging to another era) or *contemporary* (perhaps implying that the knowledge is

meaningfully part of culture now). At this point, I have been engaged repeatedly in a

hermeneutic circle with the texts by BC Indigenous scholars, as well as Gadamer's texts, and my

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ideas about what history means have been unsettled and my expectations have changed.

Through beginning to appreciate history more as a circular and non-linear context of experience,

I can see this engagement with traditional knowledge quite differently. I appreciate that the

scholars are not recovering some idea of a tradition that has been frozen in time and now

imposed in the present. Instead, I see these texts in repeating cycles of returning. This is closely

aligned with the Gadamerian notion of *traditionary texts* that recognizes the ever-present

challenge of reinterpretation of knowledge from tradition in changing contexts. I mention this

here, instead of after textual analysis, to provide the reader unfamiliar with this perspective with

the opportunity to think about the texts in a way that might not align with specific Western onto-

epistemological assumptions.

My decision on how to organize these texts is again based on a number of choices. My initial

inclination was to organize the analysis of texts at the level of specific authors. That would be

the way I have tended to do things based on my tradition working in the academy and the

organization of people at the top of the hierarchy. But, due to my evolving understanding of the

shared and collective sense of Indigenous onto-epistemological perspectives, it seems

problematic to centre individuals rather than themes and patterns. Also, I am choosing texts

based on the idea that there is something decidedly informative in these texts to the concept of

embodied knowledge that texts in Western intellectual traditions have not understood, realized or

considered. In this framework, it became important to me to organize the texts around themes

that highlight significant conceptual departures from multiple Western intellectual traditions.

In response to these challenges, I have decided to organize the texts on interwoven themes that I have developed from Michael Marker's work across a number of texts and disciplines. Marker's writings forefront a number of contrasts between Indigenous and Western onto-epistemological commitments around time, space, experience and relationships; that I have found instructive. Marker's texts draw out for me contrasting assumptions that may limit my potential to understand texts regarding Indigenous perspectives. Marker does not theorize these themes into a framework, and I have developed the organization of the themes from close analysis of his work and conversations with him about my interpretation. I will not engage in detailed analysis of Marker's multiple works due to the focus of the inquiry, but instead will organize the themes with titles and quotes from his work that draw attention to these themes. I look at these themes as metaphorical threads that will help me to analyze the texts as I trace these threads through the work of the BC Indigenous scholars in this research. To avoid repetition, I will present the themes and explanation in the following chapter, but will only specify here the reasons for my choice of Marker's specific work. First, I find that Marker negotiates a complex discussion of both Western and Indigenous onto-epistemologies without falling into binaries. Marker avoids either/or terms, but instead notes how specific notions are "distanced" from each other in contrasting ontologies. Second, Marker shows how Indigenous texts provide critique to the modernist worldview, but also how Indigenous perspectives are distinctly different from critical scholarship based in Western ontological assumptions. Marker's body of work thus provides a distinctive analysis that is not limited to a p*ostmodern* critique, but positions as an Indigenous counter-perspective. As a final point, Marker negotiates these discussions at UBC, thus providing a localized understanding of interrelated ideas that are helpful in showing the important contributions of Indigenous knowledges in this place.

Similar to my earlier clarifications about the importance of avoiding some kind of *pure* view in Indigenous scholarship, or isolating scholars from complex engagements, I understand Marker's work as complexly sourced and influenced. Marker draws upon his teachings from his grandfather based in Arapaho knowledge, and also his longtime work and relationships with Coast Salish Elders and community. As with quality scholarship, Marker's texts and thoughts display the entangled influence of global, national, and local networks of scholars (Indigenous and not), specific texts and subject matter (Indigenous and not), and disciplinary work in both the *smokehouse* and Western academies in history, education, literature and anthropology. My ability to discern the themes that I have brought forward via his work is through spending time talking with him; reading his work; learning from him in his courses; going to his public presentations; and reading the authors who influence him. Particularly, I note the prominent influence of such important writers/scholars as Vine Deloria, Jr., Oscar Kawagley, Linda Smith, Julie Cruikshank, Keith Basso, Donald Fixico, and Gregory Cajete. The organizing themes that I will present in the following chapter are thus developed through Marker's work, resulting from a myriad of complex sources, as well as my attempts to discern the themes that provide an Indigenous counter-perspective to both modernist ontologies and Western critical theory.

In this chapter, I have tried to provide greater understanding of the complexity of my entanglement as a Settler-scholar with Indigenous scholarship, and the ways I have tried to negotiate this complexity. In the following chapter, I will undertake an hermeneutic analysis of texts by BC Indigenous scholars that I have organized through theoretical threads that I have woven together to create an inter-related framework based on Marker's texts. In my view, this

framework will provide an understanding of embodied knowledge from Indigenous perspectives located in this part of the world, that will in turn enrich my understanding of the topic of embodied knowledge in a way that promotes *epistemic recognition*, promotes an *ecology of knowledges* in relation to my questions, and a more prominent focus on the role of place in the emergence of knowing through the body-mind.

Chapter 5: Hermeneutic Analysis of Texts by Indigenous Scholars in BC

In this chapter, I am learning from texts by BC Indigenous scholars through Gadamerian hermeneutic analysis, to enrich my understanding of embodied knowledge.

... the story continues in the North Shore mountains ...

I'm walking parallel to a stream with some of my students in the shadow of the mountains near Vancouver in the Lynn Canyon forest. The day is sunny and beautiful, but the air is cool as we're shaded from the warmth of the sun by the mountains rising on multiple sides and the thickness of the trees. The sound of our footsteps crunching twigs and the children's buoyant conversations overwhelm the muted sounds of the rippling water and chirping birds. I found this opportunity for a water field study in Lynn Canyon through looking on-line for opportunities to study water in the local watershed. The students are in four groups with volunteers and I'm with a small group. Our guide tells us that we will collect water samples, but need to have little creature beings with the sample. My group starts balancing on rocks in the shallow stream, as they angle to get in a position to scoop up a water sample. They are giggling and excited as they devise ways to capture some insects in their sample. Jin puts a leaf in her bucket to see if that will attract some creatures. I want to know more about what we're doing and how we'll test the water. We had done some pH testing, but I've also been hearing about all the technicalities of testing water from my UBC connections. "Excuse me," I politely inquire "what equipment will we be using to test the water"? Our guide tells me that you can assess the quality of the water through relationships, and that's what we're doing right now. I have the feeling that this man knows this place very well, and has spent years learning about this place. He tells me that we can know the quality of the water because the creatures will be developing as they should. He tells me to look out for water striders and larvae with a particular shape that he draws with his finger. He talks to the students about how to be careful in this place, and the relationships being in balance, but has little patience for noise and wants

the students to be quiet. I'm a little skeptical about the lack of equipment, but
enjoying the peace of the forest and the search for creatures.

I am sharing this vignette because it marks a shift in my thinking about the possibilities of how to know and teach in terms of place and relationships. Very much in the Gadamerian sense of *undergoing an event of understanding*, this experience changed my perspective about the possibilities of knowing and knowledge. After spending some hours with this guide and talking with my students, I realized I had some very ingrained assumptions about what counts as scientific study and knowledge - framed mostly in Western atomistic assumptions. Many years later, when studying Indigenous knowledges in a PhD seminar with Dr. Archibald, I remembered this man and this experience. I realized that this event destabilized my unquestioned certainty about the ways scientific knowledge is ascertained through bringing greater self-awareness of my taken for granted assumptions about knowledge and pedagogy. This experience thus helped me get ready to listen and learn from Indigenous perspectives in my current work. This vignette is thus an important reminder about my own challenge in this chapter of learning ethically from Indigenous perspectives that are based in onto-epistemological perspectives that are distanced from the Western based assumptions I acquired growing up in a Settler nation-state.

My hermeneutic analysis of the texts in this chapter will bring attention to the distinctiveness of each of the traditions and scholars, but will also work to show important interrelated themes in relation to indigeneity. I have developed these themes through analysis of multiple articles and chapters by Michael Marker, and view the themes as metaphorical threads that, when woven together, provide the support to assist me in learning from the texts in this research. In my view,

each of the themes highlights distinct onto-epistemological commitments that are distanced from

pervasive Western onto-epistemological assumptions, thus providing me with the opportunity to

forefront my own cultural assumptions and hopefully avoid projecting onto the texts in my

analysis. It is my position that there is a great deal to be learned by non-Indigenous scholars

from Indigenous knowledges, texts and scholars. This learning is required in appreciation for the

need for epistemic diversity in theorizing problems and potential responses that defy reductive

engagements, but also to provide critical counter-perspectives to forms of unlocated knowledge

production in academies and society quite generally. These organizing themes are to be

understood as interrelated and mutually reliant – woven in and through each other.

Sacred Landscapes – Knowing through Place
Circular Notions of Time – Knowing Through Returning
Experiencing Holistically – Knowing Through Balance
Stories and Orality – Knowing Through Ontology and Relationships
Being Ready – Knowing through *Ways of Being*
The Engaged Body – Knowing through Embodied Practice or *Ways of Doing*

The themes are meant to provide a framework for me to learn in more detailed and specific ways

from the scholarship. In my initial learning and organizing I have found thus far that this

framework is helpful, and has not constrained or created an imposition on the texts. Of course, I

am continually rethinking my impositions and make no final conclusions in relations thereto. At

this point, I am able to tentatively conclude this through the multiple rounds of feedback I have

received on this chapter – including feedback from some of the authors cited in this chapter. I

will rely in different degrees on the scholarship of Jo-Ann Archibald, Q'um Q'um Xiem;

Jeannette Armstrong; E. Richard Atleo, Umeek; William A. Cohen; Ethel B. Gardner,

Stelómethet; Kundoque Jacquie Green; and Charles R. Menzies. The previous chapter provided

more details on the authors' texts, and scholarly and community locations. In each section, I will

provide the theme and a quote from Marker's texts, which will serve to provide an understanding

of the theme. I will then engage in a hermeneutic analysis with the authors' texts in each of the

themes. My analysis, in itself, is my interpretation of the texts in accordance with the themes.

Due to the complications of writing, learning, and interpreting at the same time, I will provide

most of my considerations about what I have learned from the texts in a concluding section that

will provide a synthesis of my learning in relation to the first set of research questions. It should

be quite clear that the teachings offered in the texts greatly exceed the limits I have placed on this

inquiry.

5.1   Sacred Landscapes – Knowing through Relation to Place

> Indigenous languages often have a special word that references the holism of
> learning the landscape and the storied forms of the land that humans are
> connected to. In the northern straights Lummi language that word is *shelangen*. It
> means something like the way of life of the people as related to all things in time
> and space. These indigenous concepts don't translate into English easily, but they
> are referencing what Vine Deloria has called the "sacred geography. (Marker,
> 2011c, p. 11)

> Indigenous place-based knowledge requires understanding the moral proportions
> of oral traditions and long-sustained relationships with the land. It implies and
> prescribes particular forms of restraint and responsibility from communities and
> individuals that have a sense of belonging to the land. (Marker, 2004, pp. 102-
> 103)

The very close connection of land, sacredness and the Stó:lō people is brought out in Ethel

Gardner's work on language revitalization. In her PhD dissertation, Gardner reflects on a

discussion with a classmate in a Halq'eméylem linguistics class, on the Halq'eméylem words

S'ólh Téméxw. These words break down into S'ólh as meaning *our* and *sacred*, and Téméxw

meaning *land* or *world* – but importantly méxw is the word for the Stó:lō people and is

embedded in the word for land (Gardner, 2002, p. 55). According to Gardner, it is this structure

in the language that reveals the deep conceptual and reverent connection of the Stó:lō people to

the land. As Gardner states: "These interrelationships define our culture, define who we are as

Stó:lō people, and in other words, define our worldview" (Gardner, 2002, pp. 56).

Gardner also demonstrates, through quoting the words of Sonny McHalsie, how creation stories,

and related cultural practices, interlock Stó:lō people "with the land and the ancestors" (Gardner,

2002, p. 64). Sonny McHalsie is a researcher and cultural advisor for the Stó:lō Nation, and the

following is the excerpted quote from Gardner's dissertation:

> *Our elders tell us we have been here since time immemorial. They also tell us*
> *through sxwōxwiyám (stories and legends) that many of our resources were at*
> *one time our ancestors.. For instance, people at a village near Hope claim the*
> *sturgeon as their ancestor. ... One Legend common to all Stó:lō tells the story*
> *of the origin of the cedar tree.... So our resources are more than just resources,*
> *they are our extended family. They are our ancestors, our Shxwelí (spirit or life*
> *force). Our Shxwelí includes our parents, grandparents, great grandparents,*
> *cedar tree, salmon, sturgeon and transformer rocks... Our Elders tell us that*
> *everything has a sprit. So when we use a resource, like a sturgeon or cedar*
> *tree, we have to thank our ancestors who were transformed into these things.*
> *We don't like to think that our ancestors came over the Bering Land Bridge. We*
> *have always been here. (pp. 63-64)*

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Through McHalsie's words Gardner is able to draw the connection between land, story and spiritual relations to sentient beings of the landscape. I understand these relations as being dominated by ethical considerations, not for passive features of the landscape, but in the sense of how one should relate in good ways to sentient relatives. A person thus has an obligation to the features of the landscape similar to the obligations one would have to a relative such as a parent. The sense of obligation to the land and the relatives is shown through the words of giving thanks, but an appreciation that the words of thanks are heard in a sentient landscape. Also brought out is the centrality of Elders as the living conduit of knowledges through generations. Importantly, the Elders are shown to communicate the knowledge through creation stories, thus linking the creation stories to the ontological understandings of the Stó:lō people. The Stó:lō people understand that they have come from this particular place, and did not migrate to this territory.

The sense of Stó:lō identity as being deeply connected to the territory is also through the name the Stó:lō call themselves – Stó:lō is the word for the *River People*. According to the Coqualeetza Cultural Education Centre, the Stó:lō territory runs from Langley to 5 Mile Creek, on both sides of the Fraser River. As Gardner points out: "This River is our lifeway, our culture, and is deeply interconnected to our spiritual beliefs of a Creator and creation." (Gardner, 2002, p. 97). This connection is also experienced through the names of places on the river as body parts and the protocols established for respecting and interacting on the land (pp. 108-109).

Jo-ann Archibald, also of the Stó:lō Nation, makes the connection of the importance of land to knowing and identity through her writing on story. Archibald notes that the land is one of the important places for Elders to share knowledge through story such as protection of plants. Also, sharing stories in a place helps to make the spiritual connections in the story to the specific place on the land (Archibald, 2008, p. 73). Archibald also makes the connection to sacredness through describing how she offers students a rock to hold while sharing responses to oral story based on Stó:lō teachings: It is a "reminder of our connection to the earth and serves as a 'witness'... rocks have a lifeforce within" (p. 96). Again, the idea that landscapes are sentient, as in living and aware, is brought out.

Jeannette Armstrong of the Sqilxw Okanagan Nation also demonstrates this close connection between Okanagan people and the land. In her introduction of herself in an interview, I find a sense of Okanagan identity and related responsibilities as being constituted by the land. Armstrong observes a protocol of introducing herself through identifying the specifics of the land of her birth, as well as the birthplaces of her mother and father. Armstrong then indicates her responsibilities in relation to these places and powerfully ends this introduction with "So that is who I am" (Armstrong, 2005, p. 29). Armstrong identifies the Okanagan territory as between the Cascades and Selkirk mountain ranges, with the Columbia river flowing through it, with the Kettle River people in some of the northern parts of the Columbia River system, and the Okanagan Valley. The Okanagan Nation Alliance identifies the traditional territory as approximately 69,000 square kilometres with the northern area just north of modern day Revelstoke, BC, and the eastern boundary between Kaslo and Kootenay Lakes, the southern

boundary to the area of Wilbur, Washington and the western border into the Nicola Valley. (Okanagan Nation Alliance, 2004).

Armstrong points out that in the Okanagan language the same words refer to "our place on the land" and "our language". Armstrong notes that in an Okanagan worldview, the land is a teacher and thus also provides the language to speak through knowing the language for the plants, animals, seasons and geography on Okanagan territory (Armstrong, 2005, p. 31). Armstrong also identifies that, in Okanagan teachings, the "the body is the Earth itself" and makes the linguistic connection that the root syllables of the land and human bodies are the same - "We are our land/place... As Okanagan, our most essential responsibility is to bond our whole individual and communal selves to the land. Many of our ceremonies have been constructed for this" (p. 31).

From Armstrong's words, "we are the land/place" and her connection of this to ceremony, I understand that the close connection between the land and the Okanagan people is a performed and thus embodied knowledge. This sense of embodied relation to the land is also enacted in public forums. Armstrong states that communal decision making involves a community member as a "land speaker" - which is her role in the community: "I was fortunate in that I was trained and brought up as a land speaker in my community ... Each time a decision is made, even the smallest decision, my responsibility is to stand up and ask, How will it impact the land?" (Armstrong, 2008, pp. 70-71). That there is this lived embodiment of relationality demonstrates the reverence for the connection between the land and the Okanagan people. This reverence extends not only to the land, but to the plants and animals on the territory as well.

Charles Menzies, in his analysis of bilhaa (abalone) traditional harvesting in his Gitxaała territory, speaks quite similarly to the sense of obligation and relatedness to the land and the sentient relatives in Laxyuup Gitxaała. The territory, in Menzies' words "lies along the northern coastline of BC ...[and] extends from near the present day site of Prince Rupert southward more than 100 miles (Menzies, 2010, p. 214). Menzies points out that the approach to harvesting within Gitxaała society "is well encapsulated in the concept of syt güülum goot (being of one heart) whereby the relations of humans and our non-human relations coexist in the network of social obligations and responsibilities" (p .214). In this way the bilhaa is a "ranked member of Gitxaała society" (p. 216). This text reveals the deeply ethical sense of relatedness to the sentient beings of the landscapes, again similar to the sense of obligation one would have for a parent that should be shown to the relatives in the territory. Menzies also notes that the "bilhaa is embedded in the people's cultural traditions and narratives, their ceremonies, dances, songs and discourse" (p. 215). In this way, the knowledge of the territory is embodied, but is also embedded in the language through oral tradition.

While it seems that there are similarities amongst the authors' views thus far, Menzies and Butler importantly draw attention to the idea that the specifics of Indigenous knowledges are entirely unique to the territories and Nations from which they emerge. As the authors state: Indigenous knowledge of the ecology "is always embedded in a particular cultural and ecological context which shape it ... and is based in both cosmology and experience" (Butler and Menzies, 2007, p. 4). In this sense, knowing through place in Indigenous knowledges is at heart incredibly diverse in substance, and is influenced by diverse landscapes, sentient beings of the landscape, and the

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creation narratives that give the history of the specific territory. These unique features frame the

cosmology and ontology through which knowing happens, and that are then embodied through

songs, languages, ceremonies, etc. These ideas reveal that knowing through land is a highly

particularist activity, that requires attentiveness to the reciprocal relationships and related

obligations that form and evolve between the people and the sentient relatives as the features of

the landscape. The idea that comes out quite forcefully is that knowing comes through ethical

relations, and the relations are defined as being infused with spirit and intention.

5.2   Circular Notions of Time – Knowing Through Returning

> History, from an indigenous point of view then, is not a linear progression of
> people and ideas in time, but rather a spiraling of events and themes that appear
> and reappear within circles of seasons and that are identified in oral traditions.
> Of course, this does not mean that indigenous historical thought has no way of
> accounting for changes over time; it is only that the changes in both human
> societies and landscapes include characters and contexts that circulate to merge
> eras together in a non-linear fashion...[It is] a circular cosmology that sees new
> shapes of reality as returning versions of both ancestors and ideas. (Marker,
> 2011b, pp. 100-101)

In the previous section, the idea of knowing through land was shown to happen over time. But

there was the sense that time was not understood in the modernist sense of equally segmented

units moving forward in a linear progression. As Marker discusses, from an Indigenous point of

view, the notion of time seems to spiral in cycles and seasons. The embodied performance of

stories, ceremonies, songs, and rituals, in relation with the land, are returned to at specific times

in seasons. The performance reinforces an ontological understanding of reality as circular and returning.

Richard Atleo demonstrates that the idea of time as non-linear is embedded in the Nuu-chah-nulth language and ontology. According to the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, the ha'houlthee (Nuu-chah-nulth territories) stretches along about 300 kilometres of the Pacific Coast of Vancouver Island, from Brooks Peninsula in the north to Point-no-Point in the South, and includes inland regions. Atleo provides the expressions qʷaasasa sqʷi, qʷaasasa iš, and qʷaasasa uƛ translated as "that's the way it was," "that's the way it is" and "that's the way it will be". He notes that the root of qʷa translates as the present moment. Thus, these "expressions speak of linear time contained in the present moment ... past, present, and future are *tsawalk* – one" (Atleo, 2011, pp. 153-154). Atleo connects these common expressions in Nuu-chah-nulth language to the related ontology: "It may be that the greatest knowledge ... about the nature of reality is expressed in the wonder of the unknowable and the elegance (in the scientific usage of this term) of the mystery of reality, which has to do with the passage of time being in balance with the present moment" (p. 154). Atleo brings these Nuu-chah-nulth conceptions of time forward through a complex discussion concerning the perception that *what is close (ha)* and *what is far (huu)*. He notes that these concepts highlight the appearance of disconnection, but in fact underlie what is intimately related (p. 153). As I understand Atleo's work, I believe he is making the connection that time *appears* linear, and events *appear* quite distant, but in reality, time is holistic in that the past, present and future are intimately related in the present moment.

Ethel Gardner's texts add to this discussion by focusing in on the circular nature of time. Gardner shares the insight that, in the Stó:lō perspective, the teachings are revealed at the time of creation, and then "relived" and "reenacted" through embodied performance in story and ceremony. As a result "the time of creation is ever present in the now and in the endlessly repeating cycles of birth, growth, senescence, and death, followed by rebirth" (Gardner, 2002, p. 74). In this way, there is not a linear progression of getting to some final form of knowledge, but instead, a refined attentiveness that happens through a *returning* to the particulars that is gained from embodying the knowledge.

This idea of returning is also found in Menzies texts on central notions in Gitxaała intellectual traditions regarding continuity through reincarnation (Nabelgot). Menzies notes that in the Gitxaała view the notion of movement and change is linked to a cyclical understanding of time. In this view, time is something that "embodies change at the self-same moment as it is underscored by a deep sense of continuity" (Menzies, 2012, p. 22). To bring out these ideas he provides the example of the practice of inheriting names and the context and obligations that relate to the practice. The person inheriting the name needs to be seen to be worthy and capable of carrying the name and is capable of elevating or diminishing the name through the nameholder's actions (p. 33). As Menzies states: "Even though there is a strong sense that the name holder is in some way the reincarnated previous name holder, it is recognized that they are 'different' with each birth" (p. 23). I understand from these ideas that the practice of hereditary naming in the Gitxaała intellectual tradition is a public and shared opportunity of affirmation or transformation. It is an opportunity both for returning to valued ways as an affirmation and

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continuation of these values, but also an opportunity for transformation (either good or bad) in changing contexts.

Jo-ann Archibald's texts that detail how she came to learn in more depth about storywork with Stó:lō Elders reinforces this notion of returning, but as a way to refine knowing. As Archibald states: "Usually, wisdom is attributed only to Elders, but this is not because they have lived a long time. What one does with knowledge and the insight gained from knowledge are the criteria for being called an 'Elder'" (Archibald, 2008, p. 3). My attention here is drawn to the idea that *returning* is not mindless repetition over time – it is not just getting older that makes one wiser. It is the person's ability to pick up the nuances and departures over many repetitions, in changing contexts, that gives one wisdom and thus the recognition of being an Elder. Thus, as a person returns to the stories, rituals, and ceremonies, repeatedly though engaging bodily, a person learns more detail and specifics each time. In this way, returning creates the opportunities or conditions for wisdom. These ideas resonate quite deeply with Aristotle's conception of the *Phronimos* – particularly the notion that experience is required for ethical judgment.[23]

Archibald also brings attention to the generation of the continuing cycle of knowledge over time through the Elders, Knowledge Holders and Ancestors. As she states: "If one comes to understand and appreciate the power of a particular knowledge, then one must be ready to share and teach it respectfully and responsibly to others in order for this knowledge, and its power, to

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[23] The discussion of the *Phronimos* is in chapter 3 of this dissertation pages 78-79.

continue" (Archibald, 2008, p. 3). I understand this to mean that the knowledge itself contains power that generates its own movement via the Elders and Knowledge Holders. As the Elders recognize the power of the knowledge this propels the will to share the knowledge. The Elders, and traditional knowledge holders, thus are the living conduits and arbiters of the cycles of knowledge generation. Archibald also draws attention to a dream where the Elders who have since passed on, as well as other "old ones" who might be identified as Ancestors, provide her with guidance (p. 2). In her texts, I interpret that the Ancestors are also part of this returning cycle through communicating knowledge via dreams, and also through the Elders and Knowledge Holders.

This understanding of knowing through returning I think benefits from a glossary note in Bill Cohen's PhD dissertation on Okanagan education. In the glossary there is a term *Sqilxw*. Cohen identifies the word as the term for Indigenous people whose territory is located in the Southern interior of BC and North-central Washington. The term "literally translates as the dream in a spiral". This notion of the spiral I think captures the ideas discussed in this section of thinking of time as a repeating but differentiated circle. The spiral perhaps represents the type of cycle moving through time being discussed by Atleo, Gardner, Menzies and Archibald. The part of "dreaming" I will leave to the following section and take up in my analysis of Jeanette Armstrong's thoughts.

5.3 Experiencing Holistically – Knowing through Balance

> Although Indigenous modes of gaining knowledge can also be systematic, they usually involve connecting diverse points of reference that defy disciplinary or

methodological boundaries and draw on an individual's relationships to people, animals, the landscape, and an oral tradition framing a time-space arrangement. (Marker, 2004, p. 105)

In the Gitxaała perspective, kinship is the heart of society (Menzies, in press, p. 15). Menzies identifies the central concept of relatives (WulE'isk) as the force behind developing social networks within Gitxaała and adjoining Indigenous nations over millennia (p. 15). The Gitxaała approach to experience is thus found in managing the tension of "being between related/not related" (p. 34). Menzies notes that this differs considerably from mainstream Euro-American intellectual traditions where the central tension is between the individual and collectivities (p. 33). Menzies states that in Gitxaała, and other Indigenous traditions, the tension of being between related/not related encourages a collective focus on interconnections and social continuity, and entails a sense of reciprocal obligations in relation (p. 34). In this way, balance is understood as maintaining social continuity through recognizing via practices and protocols the affirmation of interconnectedness between relatives. This does not suggest a symmetrical understanding of balance, but one where tensions in relations are held in a way that works to maintain the coherence of the whole in harmonious relations.

In the Nuu-chah-nulth perspective, as Richard Atleo shares it, reality is understood as *heshook-ish tsawalk* – everything is one. Atleo clarifies that this idea of reality includes both the physical and metaphysical (Atleo, 2004, xiii). Atleo stresses that, from this orientation, the idea of maintaining *tsawalk* is framed on the notion of *how*: "How should one live and negotiate this creation? How does one balance and harmonize the disparate and contradictory elements of reality" (Atleo, 2011, p. 35)? The notion of balance refers to "all elements of creation" and

includes "people, forests, animals, and all other life forms – the river, estuary, inlet or ocean" (p.34). The struggle for balance is called he-xwa (Atleo, 2004, p. 23). Throughout Atleo's texts he repeats that the clues to achieving balance are found in the creation stories, and lived through the protocols that are derived from the creation stories (Atleo, 2004, pp. 10-12; Atleo, 2011, pp. 35-36).

Atleo provides an example of finding the clues, from the Nuu-chah-nulth creation stories and embodied protocols, regarding ways to bring balance. Atleo references the creation story of *How Son of Raven Captured the Day* and focuses on the part of the story where Son of Raven needs to travel from the physical world to the spiritual world, as well as the misperception of the separateness of the spiritual and physical worlds by the community. The problem of perception for Son of Raven and the community "is that they do not see the oneness of the physical and spiritual worlds" because they cannot see the spiritual world when located in the physical (Atleo, 2011, p. 35). Son of Raven receives the advice from the wise Wren that access to the spiritual world would require becoming a tiny insignificant leaf. Atleo advises that the story teaches that the spiritual and physical worlds are one, but also that "access to the storehouse of the non-physical realm can be achieved not via the egotistical approach but via the insignificant-leaf, or humble approach" (p. 36). He finds that *insignificance* here is both a moral way of being and a "natural description of human identity" that can maintain balance in an infinite universe (p. 36). The story captures the basic human drive for knowledge, but that the inflated ego gets in the way of true knowledge. Insignificance is then practiced through protocols for being humble in community. In this way, it is possible to avoid wikiiš čaʔmiihta – meaning the state of where things are out of balance or not in harmony (p. 34).

Archibald also speaks of the importance of holism and balance as she has come to understand it through learning about storywork. Archibald shares the story *Coyote's Eyes* as told and written by Terry Tafoya, that brings in the complex idea of seeing through different perspectives in order to achieve balance (Archibald, 2008, p. 10). Through the challenge of Coyote being out of balance with his mismatched eyes, Archibald makes connections to regaining balance through circular representations such as the medicine wheel and the sacred circle of life. In representing this relational, circular philosophy of knowing, Archibald advises that "the never-ending circle also forms concentric circles to show both the synergistic influence of and our responsibility toward the generations of ancestors, the generations of today, and the generations yet to come. The animal/human kingdoms, the elements of nature/land, and the Spirit World are an integral part of the concentric circles" (p. 11). Archibald points out the ways of acquiring this balance is through acquiring the knowledge embedded in cultural practice, and one key way is the oral tradition of storytelling (p. 11). In this philosophy, Archibald shows the prospects of interrelatedness of knowing through transcending linear notions of time, and binaries of animal/human, nature/land and physical/spiritual in order to more accurately perceive the interconnectedness of reality. I read her work as demonstrating that binaries are transcended through returning, responsibility, worldview and shared cultural practice such as the oral tradition of storytelling. I would venture that the idea of paying attention to experience without an overlay of concepts is pivotal in transcending binaries.

Of central significance to sharing cultural practice, Archibald details the teachings from her Stó:lō Elders through the metaphor of the woven strands of the cedar basket. In her text, she

identifies that the oral tradition is properly done through "storywork teachings of respect, reverence, responsibility, reciprocity, holism, interrelatedness and synergy" (Archibald, 2008, p. 2). According to Archibald, each of these elements represent strands of the cedar basket, that require weaving together and then provide the conceptual place where the stories and important teachings in the stories are held in a way that enhances their integrity. Throughout her writing, she returns to these notions, which I interpret as being the core of the dispositions required to maintain balance. This approach to balance is represented as serious work engaged in through the compassionate mind (p. 2), but also through physical presence (p. 77).

Balance is also shown to be achieved through oral tradition. Archibald makes the connection of orality to cultivating ways of listening and thus coming to know. Archibald points out that Stó:lō storytellers often refer to listening as requiring three ears – two on your head and one in your heart. She states: "Bringing heart and mind together for story listening was necessary if one was to make meaning from a story because often one was not explicitly told what the story's meanings were. Linking how we feel to what we know was an important pedagogy" (Archibald, 2008, p. 76). I understand through Archibald's texts that being in supported relations, and cultivation of listening with heart and mind, helps to foster balanced ways of understanding.

Gardner extends this discussion of balance and harmony through cultural practice through her focus on giving words of respect as a significant Stó:lō cultural practice. Gardner conveys that words of respect enhance harmony between people, land and relatives. Gardner draws connections between the practice of prayer in Western Christian perspectives to the idea of respect in the Stó:lō worldview, as she quotes Stó:lō Elder Joe Louis:

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The white people stop to pray; we stop to respect – the same thing you know. We respect the woods, the living trees in the woods. We drink the water, it's alive. We breathe the air, it's alive too – Respect it! And it seems like everything you respect helps you along in life, what you're gonna try and accomplish, see. That's the teaching of our old people here. (Gardner, 2002, p. 71)

Gardner (2002) states that "these daily rituals were reminders of the interdependent interrelationships of all things within creation and the importance of understanding that as humans we are only one part of the whole environment" (p. 71). Of significance, is that Gardner stresses that these relationships are seen as "sacred". I interpret these texts as conveying that the sacred rituals around words of respect are a cultural practice that enhances an ability to appreciate and acknowledge interrelationality and thus maintain balance through the embodiment of giving respect. The idea of *sacred* links back to ontological understandings of relatedness to features of the landscape. That these practices are not mere suggestions, but imperatives, is brought out through the text "Respect it!".

Armstrong represents similar ideas of balance and interrelationality through her model of the Dance House based in Okanagan teachings. In her model, the centre of knowing is represented by the Dance House with four concentric circles moving outward of self, family, community and land (Armstrong, 2000a, p. 36). The self is seen as being able to maintain balance through integration of the physical, intellectual, spiritual and emotional parts of the self, and each of these quadrants also needs to be understood as balancing not just the self, but also the family, community and land. From this model I understand the importance of the sense of embeddedness and interconnectedness of existence, and that a person's ability to embody these

understandings in the Dance House – as a location of cultural practice and celebration - leads to balance and harmony.

Armstrong also provides specific ideas of the nature of integrating the core aspects of the self. In my understanding of her texts, the Okanagan people have gone through transformations, and the third transformation shows the Okanagan as the "one's from the land who dream"(Armstrong, 2000b). She explains this idea more fully in this extended quote:

> We don't see dreams as accidental images that flash by when the intellect is on hold... The dream comes from a part of the mind that is continuously working, continuously trying to make a larger, deeper sense of the overall connection we have to everything. It is continuously giving us knowledge. The intellect is like a little robot that doesn't really know anything... If we put the intellect aside, then we can really hear the other, larger aspect of the mind, and we can learn how to work with that... In the dream state, knowledge is revealed that you don't come by logically. Somehow you know.... Suddenly they have a creative insight, and they don't know where it came from. It actually came from many of years of thinking and looking and analyzing and getting facts together. Then all of a sudden, something just clicks. (Armstrong, 2000b)

In my interpretation of this text I understand that, in the Okanagan view of balance, there is a need to think of the linear, rationalizing part of the intellect as something that needs to be intentionally quieted at times in order to understand reality in a more holistic and balanced way - that there is an intuitive ability to apprehend knowledge directly, but that this ability needs to be brought out through not letting the rational be the overwhelming process for obtaining knowledge. Armstrong also notes that these capacities for intuitive insight are cultivated through traditional practice - "We have people who have practiced and have processes to learn

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those abilities" (Armstrong, 2000b). From my understanding of Armstrong, rational analytic thoughts are necessary for understanding, but the directly intuitive ways of knowing need to be cultivated, and both ways of knowing are mutually reliant in coming to balanced understanding of reality. Bill Cohen's dissertation emphasizes these same points: "I have come to understand that 'just knowing' is connected to traditional ways of knowing, of being 'educated' in an Okanagan way of acquiring knowledge, responsibility and wisdom. Just knowing becomes an intuitive wisdom, a synthesis over a lifetime" (Cohen, 2011, pp. 109-110). These ideas about direct insight are a key focus of this inquiry and are taken up in specific ways in various parts of this dissertation.

5.4 Stories and Orality – Knowing through Ontology and Relationships

For indigenous people, the conduit for both learning and healing is the narrated past and the ways that their ancestors' relations with animals and plants merge into the present reality. Everything has a story connected to it that explains what it was before it arrived at the present moment. Creation stories affirm both the deeds of ancestors and the points of reference on the landscape. The land is alive and meaningful by reference to a past that affirms relations between humans and the natural world. (Marker, 2006, p. 11)

Creation stories and oral traditions that define the relationships of the human beings to the animals, spirits, and landscape give local indigenous knowledge its deep structure. One must reference this deep structure to some extent in order to view the boundaries of the people's traditional territory and, to a large extent, the spiritual core of the culture. For Coast Salish people, their cognitive maps contain stories of places where Xa:ls, the creator/transformer changed the forms of the world in specific ways to become the shapes of present day reality. (Marker, 2011c, p. 12)

Stories and orality have been prominent in all of the themes brought out so far. I believe the foundational connections between creation stories, land and ontological understanding of reality have been well established to this point. In this section, I will not repeat these ideas, but instead will focus on story and knowing. Particularly, I will focus on the idea of the truth of stories and the role of orality in stories as connected to relationships.

A very key understanding is that the stories are not to be understood as metaphors, but as Atleo states: "The stories are true" (Atleo, 2011, p. 2)! Atleo explains that other people can have different versions of creation and this is unproblematic because the Nuu-chah-nulth stories are referring to particulars of place and understandings that do not recognize the binary of the spiritual and physical. "Faced with the incomprehensible and mysterious creation, the ancient Nuu-chah-nulth, came to believe that their ability to comprehend it, both ontologically and epistemologically, was so comparatively insignificant as to make hegemony a concept with no basis in reality" (p. 2). Atleo states that the truth of the stories is evidenced in the ability of the stories to be a reliable guide for successful living over millenia in a particular place (p. 2).

In my understanding of Atleo's texts, there seem to be two reasons that creation stories in particular are true and not metaphorical. The first reason is that the teachings within the stories are embodied in cultural practice. Through the lived and thus performative aspect of the creation stories in cultural practice, the stories exceed metaphorical truth, and are truth lived in community in a specific place. The second reason is that the truth of the stories needs to be understood from a Nuu-chah-nulth perspective, and the criteria of making truth claims from

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within that tradition. Atleo acknowledges that the Nuu-chah-nulth claim to knowledge of

creation is a complete contrast to Darwinian explanations of how people in all places came to be.

I believe that Atleo is conveying that the Darwinian claim attempts to exceed its territory, both

through universalizing and through making claims to understand the infinite complexity of the

universe through a purely empirical process. I understand through Atleo that the Nuu-chah-nulth

creation story is making a different sort of truth claim. The truth of the creation story is a more

holistic sort of claim – a claim that is non-reductive through being strictly empirical, and the

empirical evidence is seen in the success of the knowledge from the stories to keep the Nuu-

chah-nulth successfully alive and well over millenia.

Archibald's storywork brings in the importance of the role of orality in story. As she points out:

"Whenever Indigenous oral tradition is presented in textual form, the text limits the level of

understanding because it cannot portray the storytellers gestures, tone, rhythm, and personality

(Archibald, 2008, p. 17). These thoughts clearly connect to the importance of embodiment of the

teachings in the story that live in the storyteller. Archibald stresses that there is something more

than a story that is moving between the storyteller and the listener: "The power of storywork to

make meaning derives from a synergy between the story, the context in which the story is used,

the way that the story is told, and how one listens to the story... This [story] energy is a source of

power that feeds and revitalizes mind, heart, body and spirit in a holistic manner" (pp. 84-85).

This would suggest that the intention of the storyteller and listener are important. The power that

lives in the story is held through the intergenerational role of the Elders and Storytellers in oral

tradition. Archibald points out that authority to hear and tell a story comes through the

completion of rigorous training, which involves learning through oral tradition (p. 78). This has

the effect of keeping knowledge sacred and keeps the power of story in control and responsive to the context and the good of the community.

Bill Cohen's interpretation of story from an Okanagan perspective makes a thorough connection between story and relationships. As he states, the stories occupy real places and can be seen in markers on the land. When the stories are told without reference and understanding of that place, then the stories appear as legends or myths with a quaint moral message at the end (Cohen, 2010, p. 105). Cohen makes similar statements to Atleo's about the reality of the stories. He states that the *Sqilxw Captikwl* stories "express patterns of human tendencies, good and bad, that connect to place and ways of long-term societal sustainability, the evolving knowledge that sustained the Sqilxw for thousands of years through dynamic and balancing relationships to mediate hegemonies, conflict, and nurture tolerance and diversity" (p. 92). This knowledge is not portrayed as static in the creation story, but that the stories become reinterpreted for evolving contexts over time and evolve in "symbiotic relationship with the territorial ecology and larger world" (p. 103). Underlying the evolution is a basic Okanagan understanding of values and relationships in that place. Cohen conveys this understanding as follows: "When a leader is struggling, making poor or self-serving decisions, the Elders would say he "doesn't know his Captikwl" (p. 108). I interpret this as meaning that the core Okanagan values are in the stories, but what is required is reinterpretations through evolving particulars. Embodied knowledge of the stories is thus required to be able to properly interpret the teachings in the stories and apply the teachings to changing contexts. I believe that Cohen's ideas reinforce a notion of stories being completely relational to place, humans, and non-human relatives, and also direct how to conduct oneself within these relationships.

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5.5   Being Ready – Knowing through *Ways of Being*

> From an Indigenous perspective the knowledge-seeker must go through a period
> of training that foregrounds his or her own self-reflection as part of many
> traditional protocols. Once the proper preparations and ceremonies have been
> observed, the individual can receive knowledge without harming himself or
> herself or the community. Knowledge is powerful and potentially dangerous if
> one is not ready to receive it properly; a deep and sublime sense of relationships
> is required. (Marker, 2004, p. 106)

The ideas of being ready for knowledge or ways to come to knowing, have to this point been

shown to be both communal and individual. The section on *knowing through balance* brought

out some of the significant ideas across all of the authors texts that reinforce knowing as needing

to emerge from a holistic sense of balance and good intention. This balance was portrayed as

being both a communal concern, and concern for the person as connected to the community. The

idea of underlying good intention was also prominent throughout the authors' texts. Particularly

significant in my understanding was Armstrong's model of the Dance House, which brought out

embodied cultural practices of celebration. I had the sense that joyfulness was part of honouring

good intentions and readiness for knowledge, and that this would be a significant way of *being* in

relation to *knowing*. The discussion of *knowing through returning* also emphasized this

important dimension of the communal nature and ethical foundation of being prepared for

knowledge through cultivating ways of being.

In this section, I would like to build on these ideas and describe some of the authors directed

texts on cultivating ways of being in preparation for knowledge. Atleo describes the ritual

practices of cleansing and prayer undertaken by his great-grandfather Keesta. These practices

involved abstaining from sex and food while performing ritual cleansing and singing prayer

songs for long periods of time (Atleo, 2004, p. 93). He observes that these practices are

connected with general health and well being, but also deeply related to cultivating certain

dispositions of character useful to living in balance. In describing the *vision quest*, he states: "it

takes determination, courage, endurance, patience, and faith to spend time in a forest or on a

mountain far from home, without food, warmth, or the company and security of relatives" (p.

92). Atleo emphasizes that the practices were not developed solely for reasons of health and

character though. This sense of readiness through cultivating certain dispositions was intimately

related to the intent of gaining knowledge from the spiritual world to guide life in the physical

world. Atleo explains that the period of ritual practice would continue until a sign was received

from the spiritual world, related to different purposes or needs in the physical world - such as

whaling or healing (p. 93). In this way, the ritual practices are about character, but also

completely intertwined with the connection to the spiritual.

The cultivation of certain dispositions of character is also intimately related to the creation

stories. Atleo points out that the creation stories are about the struggle for balance within the

tension of life forces, and highlight the need to cultivate wholeness, health and personal well

being. He advises that rituals and ceremonies are about this kind of preparation (Atleo, 2004, p.

23). As mentioned previously, the story of Son of Raven highlights the virtue of humility – as in

the insignificant leaf. Atleo brings out this theme again through the story *Aint-tin-mit Returns

Home*. In this story, the groom Aint-tin-mit must go through a series of challenges to show his

strength. Atleo advises that this is preparation of the body and mind to face the challenges of

existence to be ready for marriage (p. 41). In the story the hero Aint-tin-mitt is ultimately able to win the challenges by turning into slime. This again shows the disposition of humility through turning into the least as being the way to show greatness. Within this story the community prepares arrows that Aint-tin-mit uses to make a connection to the spiritual world, which he climbs up. Atleo advises that this part of the story is related to virtues of the community members – virtues related to remaining on a true and good path for the collective good (p. 47). He advises that these dispositions, valued individually and communally, such as modesty, perseverance, endurance, patience, kindness, desire for wisdom, generousity, and acceptance of gifts, are acted in ceremony and community (p. 14). He provides the example that in ceremonies a great chief has an identified speaker to communicate the extent of his territory and lineage because "it was taught one did not engage in personal boasting about oneself" (p. 14).

Archibald makes the connection between cultivating dispositions and readiness through her discussion of readiness in story listening. Archibald, in a similar way to Atleo, notes that the stories themselves are embedded with values (Archibald, 2008, p. 64), but also that the act of listening to stories cultivates valued dispositions. She notes that stories were told over extended periods of time – between 2 to 3 hours - "so children became accustomed to listening to stories for a long time" (p. 75). Archibald conveys that knowing how to listen through watching the storyteller and not talking while the story was being told, were important traits. These points also link to the strands of the storybasket mentioned earlier: respect, reverence, responsibility, reciprocity, holism, interrelatedness and synergy. As I understand it, these strands combine dispositions with foundational understandings about reality. Archibald notes that in listening to stories there is a "concomitant involvement of the auditory and visual senses, the emotions, the

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mind and patience" (p. 76). Storytelling thus cultivates certain valuable dispositions with foundational understandings that link heart, mind, body and spirit in coming to know.

Something that is becoming apparent to me throughout the texts is that there are similar portrayals of dispositions for character (or ways of being) and dispositions for knowledge acquisition (or ways of knowing). It is clear in the texts that valued ways of being must be lived and acknowledged in repeated ways to enable repeated and refined experience over time. If, for example, generosity is desired, it must be lived in practice in community and also ritualistically in ceremonies. In this I see the strong connection between *ways of being* and *ways of doing*. The authors also portray that cultivating these ways being and doing, assist with coming to ways of knowing - both in the sense of communal and individual readiness. The details of teaching of dispositions for coming to know in relation to spiritual knowledge seem more of a matter of private training and instruction – the details of which are not in the texts. As Archibald explains, certain knowledge is expressed orally and held sacred to control the power of that knowledge: "One of the Stó:lō cultural rules regarding spiritual/sacred experiences is not to talk about them" publicly or publish the stories (Archibald, 2008, p. 64). Atleo similarly notes that, since for the Nuu-chah-nulth the spiritual and physical worlds are one, and the practices derived from the spiritual world would not be specifically discussed: Specific practices "are not only family secrets but also 'oo' spiritually fearful secrets, which lose their power and effectiveness when revealed to others" (Atleo, 2004, p. 83). Similarly, I note that in the earlier section when Armstrong discusses cultivating dispositions for being able to intuit directly (Armstrong, 2000b), she only mentions that certain people are trained to cultivate this disposition. I believe the connection to the sacred explains why there is little in the texts specifically about the practices of

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cultivating dispositions for certain kinds of knowledge acquisition. This point also draws

attention to the learning of spiritual knowledge as relational, in that the teaching/learning

requires the particular combination of the right teacher, right learners, right lesson, right place

and right time.

5.6 The Engaged Body – Knowing through *Ways of Doing*

> The oral traditions, ceremonies, and rituals all reinforced not only ways of
> knowing, but also ways of being without separating knowing from being.
> (Marker, 2004, p. 106)

I am bringing this theme in at the end/beginning of the circle. This theme is not an end and a

summary – it is not the end of a linear journey. From my previous understanding of Gadamer

and Aristotle, and now also of Archibald, Armstrong, Atleo, Cohen, Gardner, Green, and

Menzies, understanding requires a continual returning and refinement. In this way, I am not

nearing the end of a linear exploration, but am nearing the ending and beginning of a circle of

understanding. My inquiry into Indigenous texts is specifically related to this remaining theme

of embodied practice, and throughout each of the themes, this fundamental notion of the engaged

body has been foundational. The interconnection of ways of being, doing and knowing, has been

unmistakable. The idea of a person that is coming to know through embodied participation in a

physical landscape, a landscape fully immersed in a spiritual energy that directs ethical relations,

puts forward a distinctive understanding of knowing and knowledge. Knowledge is understood

not as an abstract possession that can be universalized, but as part of the lived and fluid reality of

a body attentive to the particularity of a place through ontology developed in that place – it is an

embodied knowing. In exploring this remaining theme, I will focus on the idea of knowing through embodied practice.

Atleo writes quite specifically about the connection of ceremony and knowing. In earlier sections, I have noted some of Atleo's connections between the creation stories and community practices – such as teaching from Son of Raven and being humble in community practice and ceremony. Atleo also provides the example of specific ceremony to ontology. He notes that in the Nuu-chah-nulth ontology there is an inherent tension between creation and destruction, and this given state of reality translates into creative or destructive life ways that need to be managed (Atleo, 2011, p. 10). He notes that the community performed *remembrance ceremony* was created for this reason, and relates to the idea of needing to remain vigilant to the requirement of managing and appeasing these forces (p. 11). Atleo advises that the *remembrance ceremony* led to the practice of *t'apswiis* – "this involved little children of around four years old running down to the beach before breakfast to dive into the ocean" (p. 11) – understood as the first stage of preparation for a vision quest. I understand this last piece as embodied pedagogy.

Archibald also makes a similar connection between embodied practice, place and pedagogy. In her discussion of protocols in the longhouse she draws attention to Stó:lō Elders Frank Malloway and Shirley Leon, and these Elders' reflections on the longhouse as a place to embody and learn teachings (Archibald, 2008, pp. 71-72). As Archibald states: "The Stó:lō longhouse is associated with a strong spiritual practice that encompasses teachings about respect for all beings and living a healthy lifestyle. There are strict cultural protocols and rules about behaviour" (p. 71). Archibald provides text from Elder Frank Malloway on the importance of *witnessing* and ways to

do it properly: "in the longhouse, you're called to witness certain work, and when you get up to talk, you only talk about what you're about to witness. ... You don't talk about your achievements in life [when] called upon to witness a little job. That's really disrespectful" (p. 71). Archibald's quoted text from Shirley Leon also provides insight into the importance of ways of acting in the longhouse: "those people that got training in the longhouse, when they come here, you notice... they don't wait to be told to help clean or serve the Elders ... they just pitch in and start helping" (p. 72). Archibald draws attention to the idea that the longhouse could embody and be a site of learning values and teachings when it is not used for spiritual practices mentioned above.

Kundoque, Jacquie Green discusses specific Haisla practices in the *feast system*. Green explains that in the feast system there are important ceremonies such as naming, cleansing, memorial and other sorts of community-gathering events, and these various ceremonies sustain laws, traditional teachings and identity (Green, 2008, p. 13). Green pays specific attention to practices and understandings involved in the naming ceremony. Green notes in detail the specifics of witnessing and reciprocity:

> The feast hall teachings ... show that when witnesses are paid, they are responsible for remembering my name and any other 'work' that was done at the feast. ... The people in the feast hall watch and pay close attention because it is their responsibility not only to know the name given, but to also know where the name comes from. *Mus Magithl* states the name three times, either by singing it in a tune or speaking it in a loud voice. When she is done with sharing the history of the name, she is thanked and the name receiver repeats the teachings to all the witnesses in the feast hall" (p. 13).

Green draws direct attention to the relations between repetition in the oral tradition, the responsibilities of witnesses in sustaining this knowledge, and reciprocity in terms of honouring obligations.

Green's writing discusses the feast system, but substantially her article is concerned with the importance of reclaiming the traditional practice of oolican fishing. Green's writing about Haisla oolichan fishing and processing makes an important connection between knowing and traditional practices. I first came across Green's article in my seminar with Dr. Archibald, and I think it marked a fundamental shift in how I understand embodied knowing through practice. Green helped me to understand fishing and processing in a way I had never considered. As Green conveys: "The entire process of oolican fishing included teaching respect, honor, modelling our relationship with the land, the importance of family and community" (Green, 2008, p. 18). Green describes in detail the onerous and repetitive practices of harvesting and processing oolican into *kglateeh* (oolichan grease), as well the specific practices and responsibilities required of community members. She brings attention to the idea that it is through repetition that relationships and relational values develop. Green highlights that the communal nature of oolican fishing and processing developed important communal understandings: "Many diverse families were in the oolican camps. They helped each other with varied tasks; this helping is what our people call *gyawaglaab*, meaning 'helping one another". For Haisla people, oolican fishing generates this collective aspect throughout the community" (p. 19).

Importantly, these practices are not just happening anywhere, and involving any random sort of activity. The practices themselves are in a specific place and concern an important aspect of the

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Haisla identity. As Green iterates, the practices developed: "in *Kuqwajeequas* territory. This is where our existence as Haisla began, where the sustenance of our being evolves, and our creation story about our relationship to oolichans" (Green, 2008, p. 14). The work of harvesting and processing is shown as inter-generational, thus allowing for the teaching of the importance of specific places, practices, and stories. The traditional practice requires knowing and timing in accordance with the "functions of environment, seasons, weather, and animals", but also knowing how to be in terms of patience and respect so that everything "would be processed in the best way possible" (p. 18). The territory and practice is embedded in identity and the way to go about relationships with the land and community members, but also non-community members. Green highlights that the role of trading *kglateeh* in neighbouring territories has developed deep understandings of how to conduct respectful relationships based in notions of interdependence with those outside the territory (p. 19). Green's article helped me to understand Menzies discussion of bilhaa harvesting, which is in the section on knowing through land. When Menzies states that bilhaa is a "cultural keystone species" (i.e., has a role in shaping and characterizing Gitxaała identity) (Menzies, 2010, p. 215), I understand that statement more thoroughly from Green's texts detailing the relationships to oolichan.

Armstrong also relates to this idea of Okanagan identity being enmeshed with embodied intergenerational practice and the land. As Armstrong states: "In the work that we do, one of the things I've learned is the power of taking our young people out to the land to gather seeds or to gather our Indigenous foods" (Armstrong, 2008, p. 73). Armstrong discusses these practices in very similar ways to Green: "It's not just the work of collection but it's being with people, the

community and communing with each other. It is how the land communes its spirit to you: it

heals people and it does this in an incredibly profound way" (p. 74).

Armstrong also makes connection to the practices of celebration through ceremonies with the

spiritual dimension of knowing. As previously discussed, Armstrong's model of the Dance

House for Okanagan understanding centres on the idea of the place of celebration that brings

everything together. It is through the ceremonies that the celebration occurs.

> All of the huge and wonderful things that we see around us, our land and our
> people, cannot really be appreciated if we do not build cultural context through
> the ceremonies. ... If we look at the world through the eyes of generations past,
> to the time when ceremonies were constructed, we can begin to see how each
> ceremony helps us to sustain, maintain, and pass on those philosophical values
> that affirm family, community and land. The spirit is what brings the model
> together. (Armstrong, 2000b, p. 40)

Through my interpretation of these texts, I have worked towards a deeper understanding of the

contribution of ceremony and traditional practices to the possibility of embodied knowing.

Teaching and learning is portrayed as requiring embodied participation. I understand that

ethically important dispositions develop through embodied participation on the land, and are

reinforced through ceremonies, rituals and cultural practices. In these views, embodied

participation in places understood as infused with spirit (i.e., the land, on a river, the longhouse),

connect with a spirit that is always already interconnected with everything else. The chance to

participate in this connection, thus reveals understandings of the nature of reality, how a person

is embedded in this reality, and ways to maintain ethical connections.

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5.7   Synthesis of Learning

5.7.1   Returning to the Research Questions: Learning from the texts

I am now turning to an examination of what I have learned through this analysis in terms of the initial research questions I posed in relation to the texts:

➢   *In what ways is the body significant to knowing (relation of body-mind)?*
➢   *In what ways might the relation of the body to a specific place be significant to knowing?*

I want to be clear that I am not making any claims to Indigenous knowledges generally or attempting to generate a BC Indigenous paradigm. I am only synthesizing what I have learned from Indigenous perspectives in BC from these authors and texts. Importantly, I have learned more specifically about how aspects of knowing are understood in relation to other aspects. At the core, I have appreciated that the authors I have engaged in this part of the study portray their diverse traditional knowledges as mainly being sourced from and expressed through, *Elders*, Knowledge Holders, stories, the land, ancestors, rituals, ceremonies, songs, dances, drumming, language, dreams, visions, intellect and intuitions. All of these sources are provided as interconnected and ultimately related to the creation stories of a particular place, and express the wisdom of peoples who have inhabited that place from time immemorial on living in good, balanced and sustainable ways.

Of significance, the authors also locate themselves and their ways of knowing in contemporary contexts and influenced by the writings of other scholars both Indigenous and not, as well as experience in and out of communities. As such, these traditional Indigenous knowledges are always reinterpreted in contemporary contexts and are fluid and adaptive. Ultimately, the authors portray the knowledges in diverse ways, yet also reveal the rootedness in ontological

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notions that are quite similar. Thus, knowledge originates from the land, yet is in an ongoing cycle of being sourced and expressed through the people in a variety of ways, mainly arbitrated through the embodied wisdom of the Elders and Knowledge Holders. Importantly, the knowledge is held differently according to the roles and relationships of the knower in the community. The scholars each express her or his understanding of the traditional knowledge of their Nation based on who they are in relation to the community. In my view, the authors have each conveyed views of embodied knowledge in many senses. The knowledge can be seen to form an interconnected system through these sources and adapts itself through renewed expression in different contexts. I have appreciated the verb-like quality of knowing that the authors bring forward. Importantly, this fluidity is further encouraged as the knowledge is interpreted by individuals subjectively and by communities collectively, and is held and expressed again in the same way.

Also important from the perspectives discussed is the idea that repeated engagement with practices or *returning* reveals ethical and practical knowledge. All of the authors noted that there is a great deal of repetition in learning through the participation of the body in traditional practices, stories and rituals, and so forth. Through Archibald's words I understood this as not simply being *mindless* repetition for mastery of skills. The repetition is related to a notion of knowledge as layered - that one could work through layers of knowledge that are revealed through repeated exposure and experience of the body. The knowledge is related to practical skills, propositional knowledge and also ethical ways of being with others. The revelations of knowledge in ritual and ceremony are not portrayed primarily as metaphorical learning experiences, but performative - in that they embody ethical, practical and propositional teachings

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which are experienced by the individual and community. Thus, *revealing knowledge* through the practices of the body-mind is at times personal, but most often communal and concerned with maintaining an ethical core of intention.

There was also an idea in the texts that part of the repetition of the body in experience was to encourage the development of dispositions, or *ways of being*, that were helpful in revealing the layers of knowledge embedded in practices. These dispositions were related to achieving a state of awareness and attentiveness that encouraged maintaining presence of the body-mind with ethical intent in a balanced way. Through Menzies texts, balance was portrayed as managing tensions to maintain the integrity of the whole. Archibald's and Atleo's texts noted the importance of learning how to attend and listen within the context of an experience, and the importance of balancing the heart and mind so as to listen more attentively and deeply. In this way, the body-mind could be in a state of greater receptivity and ability to feel and think in a holistic way. The texts suggest that coming into relation with newness, and engaging with the familiar repeatedly, requires certain dispositions and levels of awareness to enable attentiveness and listening and thus transformational learning. These points connect strongly with the vignette in this chapter, where I engaged in an experience that helped cultivate my own capacities for listening to newness. In the vignette, I suspended my desire to impose on the learning context and let myself fully experience the study of water that the guide brought forward – I was remaining present to the experience. I also note in the vignette, that this experience in many ways helped me get *ready to listen* and thus learn from Indigenous scholarship. I will take up this point about *being ready to listen* in more detail in my discussion of my ideas for working with teacher candidates in the last chapter.

The authors' ideas about cultivating certain dispositions (or ways of being), could be characterized as being receptive or open and appreciative of ontological interconnectedness and the sacred nature of relations in the interconnected web of existence. I believe that all of the authors portrayed the basic understanding that reality is interconnected, and that to perceive otherwise would be to clearly misunderstand the nature of reality. I believe that Atleo detailed that such misunderstandings are likely due to our location in the physical world and our human limitations in trying to understand the infinite complexity of the universe - that one requires a disposition of humility in the face of immenseness. Archibald, I believe, comes into this discussion in noting that such misunderstandings from empirical observations lead to dualistic thinking and the creation of binaries such as animal/human, nature/land and physical/spiritual. Archibald notes that she understands the way to avoid misunderstandings is to transcend these binaries through understanding our bodies as located in a network of sacred relations and obligations. I understand the notion of sacred that is being conveyed is that which deserves embodied respect – or physical/intellectual manifestations of respect to the material and immaterial features of the world. All of the authors portray that, in a general sense, one needs to pay deep respect to all of the relations and recognize that the relations are *relatives* in a full sense of the word. In a fully interrelated sense, one is equally obligated to humans, trees, rocks, birds, ancestors, etc. Archibald notes that transcendence of dualisms happens through the compassionate mind combined with a physical presence – a uniting of body, mind, heart and intellect. In my understanding, this combines ways of being, doing and knowing in a framework of ethical relations in a spiritual/physical world.

These ideas on interconnectedness and relationships are really pulled together for me in Green's text. From Green, I understand how embodied knowing needs to be experienced within relationships. Her explanation of intergenerational aspects of knowledge flowing through embodied activity, brought out the importance of knowing being transferred in deeply caring relationships. The relationships of child-adult, oolican-fisher, Haisla-neighbour, people-land, were characterized not just as deserving respectful acknowledgement, but also as requiring the utmost care and attention as performed through the body. In my view, this illustrates the enmeshed connection of *knowing how to be* and *knowing how to do* in order to *know* anything. In this way, embodied knowing requires care and respect in relations of teacher-learner and knower-to be known. To me these thoughts also connected to the holistic perspective (physical, spiritual, emotional, intellectual) as a way to come to knowledge that was represented by all of the authors. Further, as Armstrong's model suggests, putting ceremony and celebration at the centre of it all in order to continue to embody the teachings with due attention to sacredness, and the repetition to continue to refine an understanding of knowing how to be with others in relationships.

Armstrong's discussion of the mind was particularly poignant to my ongoing attempts to understand how a body-mind comes to know through direct insight, and the ways direct insight is related to rational/linear aspects of thought. Her ideas on the importance of quieting certain linear aspects of the mind that interfere with more holistic understandings resonated with Aristotelian notions of direct insight into first principles that were discussed in Chapter 4. I am deeply interested in how rational thought is/can be integrated into an understanding of holistic thought, and how that might be cultivated by certain embodied practices. Particularly, as I

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recognize that rational/linear ideas of knowing on their own provide a severely limited

orientation to teaching, ideas about how embodied knowledge connects to holistic direct insight

in complex contexts are particularly significant. I note the centrality for all of the authors in

cultivating awareness and attentiveness through the activities of the body.

All of the authors in this chapter make fundamental connections to the relationship between the

body-mind and a particular place as being significant to knowing. I had fully expected that

relationship to land would be a significant feature of embodied knowing in the texts, and this

certainly was affirmed in my analysis. Land, in this sense, refers to the water, air and soil that

provides the home for creatures, humans and ancestors in a particular place. Both Gardner and

Armstrong make significant connections to the land and language, thus revealing an important

relationship between identity, knowledge and land. Throughout this chapter, I have tried to

emphasize that the texts relay that embodied knowing is always related to a particular place.

Each of the authors portray that, from the perspectives of each of their traditions, knowledge

emerges from the particular ancestral and traditional territory of each of their respective Nations.

This was not portrayed in a way that limits knowledge to particular territories, but that the

knowledge emerges from certain places and can be reinterpreted with attentiveness to differing

contexts in terms of time and place. The sacredness of the land or territory as a full relative,

similar to a grandmother or brother, brought out the significance of knowing through land as one

of knowing through ethical relationality with the land. A distinct and common thread through

the texts was the notion that the land itself is sentient and has intention. This last point

reconciles with some of Aristotle's thoughts in De Anima, but it is one that I find is distanced

from anthropocentric, dominant perspectives in academies. The separation of spiritual

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knowledge from secularized academic spaces is a very real feature of academic contexts. I will address this point in the final chapter when thinking about some of the challenges of bringing ideas from this research into teacher education at UBC.

5.7.2   Looking Ahead

In this chapter, I have learned from the scholars and texts that embodied knowledge is understood as an ethical way of being that directs ways of doing, and thus the potential for, and actuality of, knowing in the body, fundamentally related to a particular place. In this chapter, and also in the analysis of Aristotelian texts in Chapter 3, I have responded to the first set of research questions regarding embodied knowledge and the relation of embodied knowledge to land according to the texts of Aristotelian and BC Indigenous scholars. In the introduction to this research I also had identified a second and a third set of research questions. The next two chapters are addressed to those sets of questions respectively. In the following chapter, I will return to my second set of research questions to consider how my theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* has been informed by the texts analyzed in this research, as well as the pedagogical practices, both generally and in the context of teacher education, that would be suggested from my analysis. In the final chapter I will explore the opportunities and challenges of bringing my ongoing theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter,* and related practices, into the context of teacher education. I will consider ways to encourage self-reflexive practices in programs of teacher education at UBC.

Chapter 6: Returning to the *Transformative Pedagogical Encounter*

In this chapter, I am returning to my theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* and my ideas for teaching practice in response to what I have learned about embodied knowledge and place from the texts in this research. In this discussion, I will attempt to bring the Indigenous and Aristotelian texts in this research into a more cohesive conversation. I will consider the dualisms of mind/body, subject/object, reason/emotion and culture/nature that feature in technical-rational educational orientations as noted in Chapter 1, and the ways that the texts in this research help to transcend these dualisms in educational theorizing. I will also consider general educational practices emerging from my textual analysis and theorization, and also suggest educational practices specific to teacher education. I conclude this chapter by addressing and discussing some concerns that might be raised about engaging with teaching and learning in terms of the *transformative pedagogical encounter*. This chapter is specifically addressed to the second set of research questions noted in the introduction:

➢ *How might the understandings of embodied knowledge emerging from my analysis of the Aristotelian and Indigenous texts in this research inform my theorization of the transformative pedagogical encounter?*

➢ *What capacities and practices are suggested from my analysis of the texts, both generally and in the context of teacher education, as being important to creating conditions for transformative pedagogical encounters?*

...the story continues on a beach...

I feel the warm sun on my back as I search with the students, through the dry grass for garbage. We are at the shoreline near Vanier Park and the 'Kitsalano Coast Guard Station'. As I clean the shoreline, I have no knowledge that there was a

Squamish village called Senakw near this spot that was burned to the ground and the land taken by Settlers in 1886 and 1902. I'm also unaware that Kitsalano is reference to Squamish Chief Katsahlano. At this time in my life it's not yet important to me to trace the relationships of land and people to questions of sovereignty and equity. Our class is collecting garbage and recording data on the type of garbage that we find, which we will submit to an international advocacy group on ocean conservancy. This fieldtrip has emerged from our growing concern about safe water in the city of Vancouver, and our growing awareness of our relationship and responsibilities to global water concerns. This is an important event for our class, and I had to put a lot of thought into creating the conditions for learning to emerge. We are organized – we have clipboards, data sheets, pencils, bags for recyclables, bags for unrecyclables, sharps containers, tongs and latex gloves. I have helped the students think through the responsibilities and negotiations of working collaboratively. We have talked about safety – for ourselves and whatever we will encounter and the importance of being aware and using judgment. We've learned about the different types of garbage and potential sources from different waterway activities. We've learned about different species of animals at the shoreline and how they relate to each other and the land. It's been an engaging day – lots of garbage collected (about 50 pounds!), and more importantly lots of questions have been posed, addressed and new questions are emerging. I've seen the students make the connections between the distasteful reality of the pollution at the shoreline, dangers to the ecosystem, and their own habits of using plastic items. I feel my body getting tired and think I should start helping the students wrap up when ... "Oh no, it's dying!" cries Sabrina. I look at Sabrina and realize she's found a jellyfish that didn't go out with the tide and has been drying out in the sun for a period of hours. We stand around her in a small concerned group to talk about what to do. Our decision is to not interfere, but I feel the sadness in the group and myself and note our deflated postures. "It feels wrong to just let something die" says Sabrina. "Everything dies. Maybe that jellyfish will

be food for the crows so they can live" Tanh points out. We are immersed with
each other in a consideration of life, death and ethical responsibility.

I share this vignette as it brings out my ideas about *transformative pedagogical encounters* as contrasted with technical-rational educational approaches. This vignette draws attention to the importance of being present and attentive to relations and ethical obligations in creating the conditions for the emergence of knowing and the opportunity for transformative learning. It demonstrates the need for openness to possibility and the unacceptability of limiting the possibilities for learning through the prefiguring of "learning outcomes". There is no way I could have imagined the possibilities for learning that would happen on this day. On the other hand, if I had organized this day with a closed end in mind, there would have been no time to reflect on our own habits of knowing, being and doing related to the conditions of the shoreline and to grapple with the ethical entanglements that emerged through each other, the land and creatures. I would also argue that the students would not have been so thoroughly immersed in this experience if the idea for this fieldtrip had not emerged from their own interests, concerns, and the very real material conditions of the students' existence. In essence, there would have been less opportunity for transformative learning because we would have not been as passionately invested in the day, and would have had less opportunity to think, question, reflect, feel and negotiate in response to the unfolding of the day.

This vignette also illustrates that there were very important things that I did not know – specific histories and relationships on the land that are not acknowledged in the Settler discourses to which I had been subsumed at that time, and now continually seeking to interrogate. The

likelihood that certain aspects of events can be ignored or marginalized through discursive constraints requires a form of openness to learning on the part of the teacher and also highlights the problematics of prefigured "outcomes". I did not actually consider Settler narratives on this day, and this point is also meant to highlight that there are no guarantees in the *transformative pedagogical encounter* - but there is possibility through openness. Another major feature of this story is that I was participating in an event, and not objectively distanced, nor subjectively free to respond in anyway I desired. Despite my openness to emergence in the day and the lack of "objective" prefigured knowledge to be learned, I was not free to do whatever I pleased. I was attentive to creating the conditions for the emergence of *transformative pedagogical encounters*. I engaged in a lot of activities with the students and prepared a number of materials prior to this day, to help the students understand the context and relationships, and consider how they could engage with the context. This vignette also shows my entanglement in an event, relying on intellectual and emotional capacities to discern the changing and complex context of teaching and learning, and continually making decisions responsive to ethical concerns and obligations. This vignette also highlights the spiritual dimension of learning as we attended to the dying jellyfish and our understanding of ourselves in our ethical connection to a world of life and meaning.

Knowing through relations has been a key theme brought forward through the texts, and this is evident in the vignette. An appreciation that we know through our relations, and that we are always embedded in shifting entanglements of relations, means that there is an openness to possibility through emergent knowledge through shifting relations. The ideal is that emergent knowing will create a transformation in perspective that will be generative of new ideas,

concepts and practices, that will contribute to understanding and living in the world in enriched and ethical ways. In these relations, the teacher-student-other beings are not static identities, but there is opportunity to learn and teach for all beings in these entanglements. The formal teacher role therefore is not supreme knower and designated deliverer of abstractly formulated propositional knowledge. The teacher's role in this view is to attend to creating a generative, ethical context from which knowing and transformations might occur. In this vignette, I did bring predetermined curricula into the entanglement through a study of ecosystems, and I also shifted the possibilities of relations by changing learning locations, but I intentionally tried not to limit possibilities and created an opportunity for openness.

6.1   Transcending Dualisms through Indigenous and Aristotelian Texts

This vignette affirms a great deal of where I started in Chapter 1 in theorizing the *transformative pedagogical encounter.* This vignette also provides an opportunity to think about what I have learned from the texts – both what has been reinforced and what has shifted. I selected the texts in this research based on an argument that both of lines of scholarship transcend the mind/body dualism that is a prominent and problematic feature of technical-rational educational approaches. I also argued in Chapter 1 that dualisms of reason/emotion, subject/object, and culture/nature are problematically imposed in technical-rational approaches. In this chapter I will bring the texts into a generative conversation with my theoretical framework. I would acknowledge that there are important differences between the Indigenous and Aristotelian texts. In particular, there is the classical elitism that haunts Aristotle's work that is clearly not found in the scholarship of the Indigenous authors in BC that I have chosen to study. Also, the Indigenous texts all converge on the centrality of a spiritual dimension of knowing, whereas a spiritual orientation to Aristotle's

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work is uncommon in the texts of his non-theistic commentator's and is thus an orientation that I

have more specifically elaborated from Aristotle's original texts.[24] These differences

notwithstanding, I have chosen to integrate the discussion of the texts to provide a cohesive

picture of what I have learned through the work of the dissertation, but stress the need to

maintain an understanding of the distinctions. In this section, I will elaborate the specific ways

that my theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* is informed through the

analysis of the texts in this research. I will frame this discussion through highlighting the ways

that this research provides perspectives that transcend noted problematic dualisms.

6.1.1   Transcending the Mind/Body Dualism

The texts in this research locate practical knowing and teaching as embodied in the *Elder* and the

Phronimos. In this way practical, ethical knowledge is not separated from the knower, but

emerges from the body-mind participating in events of experience, and a sensibility that refines

over time through events of experience. In Aristotelian texts the requirements of *phronesis*

brought out the need for the body-mind to be deeply attentive to the particular features of

situations. *Nous* was shown to be a crucial capacity of the knowing body to discern the salient

particulars of situations through an intuitive grasp in lived context. Before my analysis of the

texts on *nous*, I had little specific idea of how to articulate and understand this *direct*

apprehension aspect of my theoretical framework. Through my analysis of the texts on *nous*, I

now have a more refined understanding of the *particular* as not being a singular object or

instance of something, but instead an object or instance of something that achieves salience

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[24] I refer here to commentators that are not interpreting Aristotle's work from within religious traditions such as Islam or Christianity.

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through the sensory inspired mental images that cohere in patterns over time. The notion of *kalon* brought out the evaluative dimensions of experience in terms of what is *noble and fine* as similarly being apprehended through refined experience over time.

The texts by the Indigenous scholars revealed strikingly similar notions to Aristotelian ideas about refined experience over time through the discussions of repetition and layered knowledge and the idea of *returning*. Through the scholars I have understood more deeply that repeated encounters with what is familiar provide generative opportunities for potentially transformative understanding and practical wisdom. The extensive discussions of dispositions, or *ways of being*, were also portrayed as foundational to engaging with experience, and were very closely aligned with excellences or virtues from the Aristotelian scholarship. As Archibald notes in her discussion of *Elders*, it's not just a getting older that makes one an *Elder*, but wisdom achieved from refined experience over time through a balanced disposition. In Aristotle's work, the idea of the *Phronemos* as embodying this kind of ethical knowing through *phronesis*, which I understand as a form of wisdom, resonates quite strongly with the notion of the balanced wisdom of the *Elder* as discussed by Archibald, also understood as a form of wisdom.

These ideas on returning and refining inform my theorization of the pedagogical encounter. I understand more clearly that the encounter is not always an encounter with newness, but pedagogically requires repeated encounters with what is already familiar. It is to refine knowing through repeated experience and attending to the nuances and departures and to appreciate the layers of knowledge in the encounter. In the vignette, the students and I already had developed ideas about causes of pollution at the shoreline, but during the fieldtrip we had the opportunity to

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examine our own practices in relation to what we had learned. As we find a plastic fork on the beach, we are moved to consider the last time we had take-out food and consider where that plastic fork ended up – in this way we come into thoughtful relation in context and thus know through our being. Also, the students and I already have an understanding of ecosystems and the relationships of animals and land in this location, yet the experience of being with a jellyfish as its dying refines and deepens this understanding of ecosystems and our ethical relations and ways to know and show respect in our entanglement. The experience allows us to engage in a transformative way though being in relation with the jellyfish and attending completely to the event of suffering. In this aspect, I am finding a place to discuss the spiritual dimensions of experience within my theoretical framework of teaching and learning in terms of attentiveness to the living world and our ethical relation.

In thinking about teaching and learning, discerning the particular requires that the teacher remain attentive to the features of the learning context and actively synthesize these features into patterns based in experience of generative learning contexts. Importantly, to discern these features of situations, the teacher must actually be *present* to the event and be responsive to the continually shifting features of the context. These dispositions and practices of attentiveness and presence emerge from a spiritual orientation. In relation to the vignette in this chapter, I was able to remain present to the context through being open and responsive, and not prefiguring the "learning outcomes" and activities. I was able to respond to the students' recognition of environmental issues and their own practices as they emerged, and was also apprehending the intense emotional state of the students and myself in response to the encounter with the dying jellyfish. My apprehension of the emotional intensity informed my apprehension of the

generative learning situation, and my encouragement to dwell in the experience. Discerning the particulars of supportive learning in a community of learners requires the teacher to have attended to these patterns, felt the emotional pull and value of these experiences, and to also have images and feelings in memory to relate these particulars to a whole situation. Providing the opportunities for students to also engage in discerning the features of situations through repetition would be similarly important.

6.1.2   Transcending the Reason/Emotion Dualism

The significance of the emotional pull and relations of memory to these experiences speak quite clearly to the ways these texts provide theorizations that also transcend the reason/emotion dualism. The idea of the body-mind discerning the particulars of situations and attending to patterns and memories in potentially transformative ways is similarly related to transcending the reason-emotion dualism. A strong feature of the vignette is the emotional pull of embodied experience and the transformative potential. In the Indigenous texts, the notion of balance as a disposition from which knowing can occur resonates with this experience of the jellyfish and an understanding of ecosystems. The jellyfish was no longer an abstract intellectual concept, but a suffering being with whom we came into relation. The idea that we are able to gain insight from experience through attending to an appropriate balance in the intellectual, emotional, spiritual capacities through our bodies is a key feature in the Indigenous texts. We negotiated the tension through experiencing as a group with compassionate minds. We were not swept away by emotions or intellectual reasoning, but stayed present and fully immersed in the moment with an ethical intent. Nussbaum and Vokey also draw similar attention to Aristotelian thought on the role of the intellect and emotion in coming to know. Nussbaum captured the idea that emotions

are intellectual and discerning, and Vokey argued that evaluative apprehension in context

requires this balance of emotional/intellectual engagement with experience. These ideas helped

me to understand more clearly the possibility that rationality is a feature of direct insight, but it is

a form of non-discursive rationality through embodied experience, and that knowing requires a

balance of the physical, emotional and spiritual as well as the intellectual aspects of existence.

The Indigenous scholarship centred on the performative opportunities for learning and the

Aristotelian scholarship centred on dwelling in experience for learning. I see both of these lines

of thought as converging on the idea that time and repetition experienced in the body-mind are

required for bringing in a balance of the physical, emotional, intellectual and spiritual in

learning. There is a sense that the body-mind needs to feel, experience and think cohesively, and

that transformative opportunities require time to unfold, as well as repeated opportunity. In the

vignette, we had to dwell with the jellyfish in an attentive way and feel the situation, and also

thoughtfully consider our responses. It was not possible to rush, and if we had done so, the

opportunity for transformation would have been lost.

6.1.3   Transcending the Subject/Object Dualism

Throughout this discussion there is a sense of relatedness and lack of significant distance

between the learner and the objects of learning. The salient point that emerges for me is that to

really learn something in a transformative way requires removing the distance between the self

and what is to be learned. These points arise in my methodological priorities from Gadamer, as

seeing learning as an "event", and through my theoretical priorities via Barad in seeing learning

as a "phenomenon". There is a coming together in these ideas of subject-object as involved in an

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event that potentially transforms all the entities in the entanglement, and also ascribes intention and activity to all entities in the entanglement. Thus my theorization and methodology in this research support transcending the subject/object dualism through this active relational focus.

Prior to my engagement with the texts in this research, I had considered the knowledge derived through embodied experience as being tied to the ethical apprehensions in and through relationships, and not specifically thought about the relationship between embodied experience and propositional or demonstrable knowledge. All of the texts in this research cohesively discussed embodied experience as being related to not only ethical relationality in contingent matters requiring the wise judgment of the *Phronemos* and the *Elder*, but also propositional knowledge on which the wise person would also rely. Each of the texts clearly discusses multiple ways of knowing. In Aristotle's texts he brings out the five states and capacities for knowing, and the Indigenous authors each discuss ways of knowing through land, returning, balance, and relationships. All of the texts clearly indicate that the body-mind is involved in all of the ways of knowing, because all of the ways of knowing are thoroughly integrated contextually. The vignette highlights this interconnectedness of the ways of knowing that are brought together through the bodies encountering each other, the land, the ecosystem, our memories of previous learning about ecosystems and responsibilities. There is no discernible practical way to pull these ways of knowing apart, and I have appreciated that my theorization needs to reflect the entangled nature of the ways of knowing.

I would argue that my interpretations of the texts on entangled and multiple ways of knowing ultimately offers a view of knowing that transcends a subject/object dualism. Propositional

knowledge is a way of knowing that is often understood as being able to be held abstractly from

the knower. Imagining a distance between knower and known creates the space in my view for

the subject/object dualism. Through entangling the ways of knowing, propositional knowledge

is no longer abstract but also in the body, and thus the dualistic understanding of subject and

object collapses. I recall in Archibald's texts her argument that the compassionate mind

collapses dualistic understandings, and I can see her point through this experience. Maintaining

an ethical concern for knowing within experience brings the body-mind into responsible

relations, thus requiring recognition of the lack of separation of subject-object and collapse of the

subject/object dualism – even with propositional knowledge.

These thoughts about ways of knowing and entanglements have reinforced for me the idea that

generative learning contexts are composed of objects and events in natural relations, and that

learning is impeded in contexts high in abstraction and composed of objects removed from

natural relations and place. In the vignette, the powerful transformative potential for learning

was derived from the context – and in this case it what the propositional knowledge of

ecosystems that encouraged the potentially transformative engagement. I believe that the depth

of learning that happens when outside of classrooms and participating in experiences that are not

contrived to reach particular conclusions and "learning outcomes" is crucial.

6.1.4   Transcending the Culture/Nature Dualism

My theoretical framework based in Barad's material-discursive framework starts from a position

that entangles the material world of existence with the discursive features emerging from human

traditions of social life. The texts in this research support this theorization with the priority of

the particular in Aristotelian scholarship, and the enmeshed connection of human and land in the Indigenous scholarship. The texts by Indigenous scholars have allowed me to think more deeply about knowing through land, not limited to the idea of land as the context of experience. The scholars have drawn my attention to the importance of considering what different places, and the networks of relatives in places, might be teaching about relationships and responsibility. My own traditional assumptions have limited my possibilities for being able to learn from the land in this way. I have long held assumptions about land as *property* and often under the control of humans. While I have had a sense of ecological responsibility towards land, and appreciation for beautiful places, I have not thought of the land as potentially being a teacher. I also have ideas in my mind of particular places moving me emotionally, both positively and negatively. I have experienced joy at the beauty of seeing the local mountains emerge covered in snow after being hidden in the fog for weeks, I have also experienced physical revulsion at witnessing land assaulted by mining and clear-cutting. Although, I have never thought about the potential for my apprehensions as emerging symbiotically through intra-acting with the land: Did the land let me know its joy at being revealed to the sun? Did the land communicate its disgust at being assaulted? Do these constructions anthropomorphize my understanding of land? How does the land feel and communicate on its own terms? I have learned from the Indigenous scholars in this work about the possibility that places can have awareness and intention, and this has great significance for the possibilities in my thoughts and theoretical framework on teaching and learning. I do not expect that I will have similar relationships with land as these scholars, but I see my own bias more clearly that has previously limited my ability to learn from the land. My theoretical framework has expanded to consider the place of learning, and the creatures, as alive

and potentially providing access to knowledge and communicating – I have more awareness of the possibility and thus will not foreclose the possibility.

I find that the notions of material-discursive considerations through Barad, and evaluative apprehension in context through Vokey, are well aligned with the perspectives of the texts by the Indigenous scholars. Particularly, I am referencing the performative dimension of knowing and the complexity of knowing in and through multiple relations – with plants, animals, etc. in a non-anthropocentric way. In the texts by the Indigenous scholars, it is not just a sense of ethical responsibility and awareness that is required in teaching and learning in relation, but also an apprehension of sacredness that captures the nature of relations. In the texts, the world is portrayed as animated with spirit and intention. The significance of immaterial dimensions of experience and knowing emerge in all of the texts, and the importance of this dimension resonates with my own understandings and participation in traditions. I also recognize the dominant practice in Western academic contexts of equivocating an appreciation for the spiritual aspect of being with participation in organized religion, and restricting both to the private sphere. I will consider how these views position Indigenous perspectives as difficult for academia, with attention to the context of teacher education, in the next chapter.

6.2   Ideas for Educational Practices Emerging from Analysis of the Texts

6.2.1   **General Educational Practices in Support of** *Transformative Pedagogical Encounters*

In a general sense, through engaging with the texts, I have been reaffirmed in the importance of focusing on pedagogy to draw attention to the embodied dimension of teaching and learning in

ethical relation. My theorization prioritizes the notion that learning emerges fluidly through multiple relations, and the texts in this research provide generative thought to the verb-like quality of knowing in relation, and the potential for transformative movements in thought and practice in participating body-minds.

I have considered a number of potential practices for **creating the conditions** for *transformative pedagogical encounters* in educational contexts generally. In my view, the key idea is that teachers need to be present and responsive to the teaching and learning context and attend to creating generative conditions for teaching and learning. My interpretation of the texts in this dissertation suggests creating teaching and learning contexts that are attentive to the specifics underlying the subject of study, and encouraging multi-sensory engagement that will be generative of theoretical understandings (i.e., if the waterways are a subject of study, then physically go to the waterways and engage the physical bodies with the questions). Further, educational experiences should highlight relationality and avoid a predominant focus on abstract concepts. There should be attentiveness to the nature of entanglements (both material and discursive) in the learning context. For example, interrogating discourses of economic development in relation to waterway activities and practices.

My interpretation of the texts would also suggest the importance of creating a context where multiple forms of expressing and working with ideas is available. Suggested through the texts on *phantasia* and *ways of doing*, students could be provided with opportunity to visually illustrate and poetically express sensory experience and relations. The connection of the emotional aspects of a situation to discernment in the context also suggests that learning would be enhanced

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through opportunities for dramatic play with ideas and principles. The role of the emotions in this sense would not just be an undirected emotional release, but an opportunity to consider the emotions in balance with the experience and the self. There could be an opportunity through drama to consider the range and nature of emotions that emerge in the experience in relation to the being of the student. The role of story I would think would be similarly powerful. I am just now appreciating that it is the combination of emotional valence and discernment of important specifics underlying theoretical understandings that would have been the particularly generative aspect for learning. Emotions are often viewed as distractions from rational understanding, and I appreciate the possibilities for emotions to pull us in unhelpful directions or obscure insight. But, as I have learned from the texts, the emotions are an essential element in discernment when in harmonious relation with the body-mind and spirit, and thus potentially generative intellectual capacities.

The focus on relationality and the importance of place and sensory engagement immediately suggest to me the importance of having students out of the classroom and in multiple relations in different places. I have suggested that students need to get out of classrooms to see the natural relations, rather than learning through an abstracted and atomizing orientation. Of course, it would also be necessary to get students ready to have some kind of self-understanding of to how to engage ethically with these relations. Practices for developing capacities for listening and attentiveness could be developed through providing opportunity for oral sharing of knowledge and witnessing in educational interactions. A significant piece of assisting students in this regard would be through the teacher embodying that respectful and humble orientation to knowing, through communicating a lived appreciation for the infinite complexity of understanding and

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making meaning. It would also be important to ensure there is sufficient time for students to appreciate the details and more subtle nuances that are particular to any encounter. Further, providing opportunities for students to return multiple times to aspects of educational experience to refine understanding and discernment would be suggested. Also, it is important to not assume that each student needs to know the same thing, but instead build community and complexity through the opportunities to explore and share divergent interests and strengths. The texts also suggest that attentiveness to building a community of supportive learners should be ritualized through embodied practices, but would also insist that the practices need to be developed in and through the learning community with recognition of the central place for celebration and joy.

6.2.2   Practices in Teacher Education Emerging from the Texts

As mentioned previously, I do not look at teacher education as a place where my ideas could or should be instrumentally put to use for purposes that are not related to the actual context. My ideas emerge from my work in K-12 schools and in teacher education – it is the context of my thoughts in the work of this dissertation. I also do not wish to promote a practice of considering teacher candidates as instrumental objects through which to obtain some elusive promise of social equity. I deeply respect the integrity of teacher candidates to engage with the questions in this research and make sense of these thoughts in and through their own traditions, backgrounds, histories, desires and interests. I locate my research in teacher education in order to consider how to create the conditions of socially equitable spaces within teacher education as a condition itself of social equity in the here and now.

Numerous capacities and practices have been suggested in support of creating the conditions for *transformative pedagogical encounters*. In this section, I am building from the ideas for practices that have already been discussed, and considering potential practices in teacher education at UBC. I am not trying to assert an Indigenous or Aristotelian approach to mainstream teacher education programs, or that this is possible or desirable. I am trying to think through approaches in mainstream teacher education that respond to the need for epistemic diversity attentive to the wisdom of traditions in those places. I note there are many practical possibilities that could emerge from this research, but I am also aware of challenges related to current educational structures; epistemic hegemony; and the potential for resistance to engage with these ideas and practices by teacher candidates and the formal systems and structures of teacher education. In this section I will only detail and consider the possibilities, and within that discussion, will address some of the structural challenges that can be negotiated. In the final chapter, I will discuss the challenges of epistemic hegemony and resistance, and ways to understand and think about these challenges in teacher education.

The following sections are organized to follow the themes of this research. The two major themes are *real people* and *real places*. In the section on *real people* I will follow some of the major themes emerging from the Indigenous scholarship.

6.2.2.1 Real People

This research highlights the idea that students[25] are not interchangeable abstractions, but are real people with their own histories, desires, priorities, beliefs and commitments. Students come to a teacher education program from their own horizon of understanding influenced by participation in traditions of thought and practice. Many students are not explicitly aware of their participation in tradition(s) and assume a universality of ways to come to knowing. Some students are very aware of the tradition(s) in which they come to know, and can experience conflict in academic institutions that marginalize and "other" the epistemic orientations that students recognize. These student orientations emerge from diverse responses to the dominant positioning of Enlightenment epistemological perspectives in academia that are naturalized and portrayed as neutral. My own particular challenge has been to unlearn the problematic assumption about the universality of *my ways of being, knowing and doing* as closely aligned with dominant assumptions. The structure of teacher education programs should provide opportunities for students to make sense of onto-epistemological assumptions and commitments, rather than encouraging students to get stuck in assumptions, or abused by the impositions of dominant assumptions. I am thinking here of being attentive in teacher education to how students' *ways of being, knowing and doing* are brought out, discussed and offered as an opportunity for students to consider, and return to repeatedly, to provide an orientation to refining teaching practice over time. In this view, programs should also consider how instructors and students become known to each other as complex people, and the ways the structures of the program influence the quality and nature of those relationships. Further, there should be a

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[25] When referring to students within this section, I am referring to teacher candidates. I will clarify and provide descriptions when discussing other student groups.

thoughtfulness about creating an openness within courses that provides opportunities for students to learn the things that they need to learn, thus rejecting the assumption that all students are the same and therefore need to learn the same things.

6.2.2.1.1   Returning

In actual practice in teacher education, students could be offered opportunities to articulate implicit and explicit assumptions on knowing, teaching and learning, and then repeatedly return to reconsider these assumptions throughout the program. The benefit of returning to refine understanding was a consistent feature of the Indigenous and Aristotelian texts. In terms of practices, the students could write biographies of themselves as learners and discuss these with others[26], and then follow by articulating their own theoretical orientation to teaching and learning. As students are brought into relation with diverse thoughts and orientations to teaching and learning throughout their practical and theoretical experiences in the program, they could be offered opportunities to repeatedly return to their own ideas, and continue to engage with others over time. Much like the work in this dissertation, students could engage in a theory-practice dialectic; a hermeneutic circle; a refinement of knowing over time; in ways that invite others to engage with them in a supportive learning structure. Importantly, these activities would be undertaken within a framework of ethical responsibility. Students would be encouraged to consider and engage in conversations with others about the ways their assumptions and commitments promote ethical relations.

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[26]   I have intentionally left this word as "others" to maintain a broad range of possibilities. Teacher candidates could discuss these ideas on teaching and learning with their practicum students, Elders, other teacher candidates, sponsor teacher, faculty associate, relatives, community members, mentors, etc.

6.2.2.1.2   Being Ready to Listen and Engage

From my own experience, an orientation of humility is a promising orientation to this sort of reflective work, and was emphasized for me in the work of Richard Atleo, and my experiences of this dissertation. In my work with teacher candidates I have not embodied this orientation, but instead have presented myself as the *knowing person* from whom the students could learn. I have learned that it would be helpful to speak with teacher candidates in ways that acknowledge the contingency of knowledge, and the contingency of my own knowing. When discussing ideas in class I could share the true stories of my own certainty as a teacher that resulted in humbling experiences through faulty assumptions, not fully understanding the context, and projecting my ways onto others (some of these stories are highlighted in this dissertation through the vignettes). I would conclude that it would be generative to reinforce the idea that we can only know from where and who we are, and that there are infinite levels of complexity that we can not even possibly consider; to appreciate that choosing to attend to particular things in a complex environment necessarily excludes other possibilities. Orner, Miller and Ellsworth (1996) discuss this point in terms of *excessive educational moments.* The authors highlight the notion that our attempts to contain and make meaning of educational practices, results in leaving something out. They stress that what we leave out is not merely accidental, but is a "symptom of histories of repression and the interests associated with those histories" (p. 71). My vignettes throughout the chapters of this dissertation have included those things that I, as a Settler, was making excessive to the learning context in which I was working. I would note that many important things were going on in the vignettes to encourage transformative learning to emerge, thus I felt that I could be sure of the benefits of my pedagogy. Although, my lack of awareness and attention to

problematic Settler-Indigenous relations, and my own participation in these relations, ultimately allowed for perpetuation of inequities within the context of my practice.

6.2.2.1.3   Holism/Balance

This research proposes that teacher education programs should attend to structuring a cohesive and balanced experience for students and instructors. In my own work with students in teacher education programs, I have witnessed some the struggles of students trying to make sense of a great number of experiences, texts and instructors in a dense timeframe, and with little idea of how to proceed – thus leaving students off balance. The texts in this research draw attention to the importance of attending to and understanding relations and ways to achieve balance. There needs to be a place in the program where students make sense of their multiple experiences within a larger appreciation of educational priorities and understandings for practice. Teacher education at UBC relies on a structure of multiple courses and multiple instructors, thus encouraging a fragmentation of educational ideas and experience for the students. In most cases, the instructors within a single cohort never meet each other, or the faculty associates, and thus design courses completely independently.[27] I would suggest that those who organize teacher education programs, or cohorts, should spend time considering the ways that their program can work against the fragmentation that is encouraged through the course structure, and find ways to ensure a balance of the emotions, intellect body and spirit in the ways students are invited to learn.

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[27] It could be argued that attentiveness to cohesion is through the design and specification of courses – that the requirements in each course, when taken as a whole, provide an experience for teacher candidates that in itself, and with the help of tutors, brings intelligibility. I would argue that the fragmentation of educational concepts and the physical separation of instructor and tutor bodies, severely limits a potential synthesis without specific attentiveness.

I would argue that there are many ways cohesion could be encouraged despite the fragmentation of courses. My own practicum experience at Simon Fraser University relied on a system where all courses were taught by the faculty associates until the practicum experiences were completed. All educational experiences were designed by the associates through guest instructors, guest speakers, working groups, field trips and the practicum sites. In the final term, after the practicum, we were encouraged to take courses that could expand our understanding in areas that we felt required more work – based on our judgment in conversation with tutors. I would argue that my research provides support to this organizational structure in teacher education – it encourages cohesion, relationships and judgment. Although I am of the opinion that cohesion is still possible in the structure of fragmented courses. I would argue that my experience working in a cohort that hosted bi-weekly meetings for the *team* to discuss the shared texts and student learning amongst the coordinators, instructors and associates promoted cohesion to a much greater degree. My experience in another cohort is also useful, where I attempted to respond to the lack of cohesion I was observing. For a final assignment in my course, I asked the students to describe and detail their assignment from a previous course, and then rework that assignment based on significant notions they had learned in our course together. I would say that cohesion could be encouraged to a greater extent if there were opportunities for instructors to actually plan this kind of work across courses in a purposeful way. This is not to assume that instructors will or should agree with one another, but to ensure that instructors are aware of the experiences of their students throughout the program and work to encourage intelligibility. Also, it would be helpful to have instructors teach multiple courses, while maintaining a balanced schedule, within the same cohort group.

Cohesion is also encouraged through bringing balance into the experience of the program. Archibald draws attention to practices of the body such as storytelling that encourage that balance of the heart, body, mind and spirit. Programs could be enhanced through attending to providing experiences that are not limited to text and lecture, and invite more fully embodied participation. Telling stories of teaching practice in oral practices is a way to bring emotions, shared understanding of practice and the opportunities for students to *witness* each other's stories. The inclusion of visual and dramatic arts also enhances opportunities to apprehend and express experiential knowledge of the body from the multiple experiences in the teacher education program. Recalling the work of Nussbaum, the non-discursive aspects of knowing through the senses, and the imaginative play with these images, invites an opportunity for making sense of experience through arts-based practices. Students could be encouraged to draw themselves in a teaching situation with their own students, and then to think through and discuss these images with others students. Photographic material from the practicum might also be a feature of this work. The point is to slow down the very fast-paced experience of the practicum, as well as enhance the details of a perhaps vague understanding of relevant particulars of learning situations. These activities provide opportunity for students to dwell in the details of teaching and learning, and consider what has significance for them, but to also explore the features that may be absent from their thoughts. Certain texts and articles could be used to have the students return to their representations, and perhaps reveal some of their unacknowledged assumptions. Importantly, discussing this work with other students provides the opportunity to think through what others have found significant, and to discuss aspects that might not have been considered previously. Attention to balance in the program is also through engaging the students

with multiple onto-epistemological orientations and not a one-sided adherence to Western

perspectives.

6.2.2.1.4   Relationships

My framework also suggests that attentiveness to working with students in a supportive learning

community should be a priority in teacher education. As Menzies points out, the tension of

being related or not related is the prime tension in a relational ontology (Menzies, in press, p.

34). In a program of teacher education that seeks to promote ethical relations, there should be

attention to the ways that the members of a learning community are maintained in supportive

relation. The distinct challenge of working through the ways that members can be silenced or

dominant should be considered. There is a distinct opportunity for encouraging supportive

learning communities in the cohort structure that exists at UBC, where a group of students stay

together and continue to work with a school and faculty associate during practicums. All of the

Indigenous scholars in this research emphasized that the physical experience of protocols,

practices and ceremonies enhanced ethical relations and community cohesiveness. Atleo

provided clarification that these practices are not to be considered merely representational or

metaphorical, but actually allowing the body to experience knowing in ethical relation. Also

noted by the scholars was the notion that practices, ceremonies, and protocols emerge out of

places and communities over time. It would be a promising practice in teacher education to

provide opportunities for the students and instructors to develop and experience collective

protocols and rituals for creating supportive learning communities within the cohort, with a

consideration for enhancing ethical relational practices. I do not mean that students should

appropriate the practices and ceremonies of BC Indigenous communities, but should consider the

practices that emerge from the collective knowledge and experience of the people thoughtfully

considering this together. A consideration for the role of celebration in creating community

could be considered and connect to formal program-wide practices. These thoughts on

supportive learning community could also extend to the students' experience in the practicum, as

they could think about ways to develop supportive learning communities in those places with

their students.

6.2.2.1.5   The Engaged Body

This research draws attention to the idea that the body is significantly related to knowledge and

knowing. The scholarship by Indigenous authors in this study draws out that verb-like quality of

knowing as being key to an event of learning. Aristotelian scholarship on *nous* makes similar

connections between the physical senses of the body to imaginative play in the mind. The idea

that we know through the participation of our body-minds suggests that teacher education

programs should discourage dualistic understandings of theory and practice. This is to

appreciate that not only do theory and practice continually feed into each other, but also that we

actually learn and know through our performance of practices. Students should be provided

opportunities to dwell in the performative aspects of teaching, perhaps through dramatic

restructuring of experiences of the practicum and opportunities to enact and experience different

responses. Students could be given the opportunity to feel their own bodies engaged in the

performance of teaching, but with time and space to think through, adjust and change responses

as needed. The benefit of dramatic work is that it generally produces strong emotional feelings

through a fully participating body and thus links emotional, intellectual and spiritual

understandings. The collaborative process of inviting others to *act* in this drama, could also

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provide an opportunity to enhance an embodied understanding of ethical experience in a supportive learning community. Of course, the actual practicum provides a generative space to consider the knowing body, and reflection with others on the felt quality of these experiences would be beneficial. A crucially important consideration in these reflective practices is a consideration of narratives and discourses that remove, limit, constrain and/or encourage certain performances and the ways teacher candidates understand their performances through these discourses.

6.2.2.2 Real Places

This research suggests the importance of place to creating generative learning opportunities. Perhaps the most important thought I have developed in and through my dissertation is that restricting the opportunities for students to learning in classrooms at UBC, and then teaching in classrooms in practicums, restricts the generativity in teacher education programs unnecessarily. Students should be learning in places on the land, in community and in public places through many teachers. Creating opportunities for the bodies of students to be in multiple relations through a variety of locations provides the opportunity to note distinctiveness and a more extensive range of particulars that influence teaching and learning. A prominent challenge in teacher education is helping students understand how to discern the relevant features of learning environments and act in ways that help them and their students learn and transform. Diverse experiences in multiple places help students move from seeing features of learning environments as isolated things, to an understanding of certain things as relevant particulars from which to understand the context. The ability to apprehend the good, as discussed via Vokey and Aristotle's texts, can be enhanced through these embodied experiences in different places.

Further, getting students out of classrooms can then help them consider the ways that knowing is experienced and expressed through land; human manipulation of land (i.e., gardens, streets, parks); other-than-human manipulation of land (i.e., beaver dams, water flows, birds nests, ant hills); architecture; visual arts; music, etc.; and to also gain exposure to the ways many people go about knowing, learning and teaching in diverse ways. These experiences provide opportunities to engage in knowing about teaching and learning, rather than having knowledge delivered to students in classes. This is not to say that there is no role for bringing important information to students, and no role for classrooms, I only mean to emphasize the point that students need to participate in making meaning in an active way, and classrooms limit the potential through abstracting students from real places.[28] Students need the opportunity to witness and experience connectedness in multiple relations rather than in conditions that promote abstraction. Providing the opportunity for teacher candidates to invite their own students to learn outside of classrooms is also generative to enhancing understanding of their teaching practice.

I would argue that teacher education programs need to assist students in critical exploration of the places of their practicum experiences. The place of the school is a real place with a history and multitude of complex relations that have been emerging over a long period of time. Places are entangled with discourses and narratives that are embodied by real people in that location. Students could be encouraged to research the ancestral territory on which the school sits, and the practices and ways of life that have been and continue to occur in that place. Particular attention

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[28] I am not trying to argue that classrooms are not real places. I have found that classrooms can actually be a wonderful place for a supportive learning community to create a shared space of thoughtful inquiry. I am trying to make the point that there are distinct limitations to classrooms as generative space because of the abstraction from a larger world of relations.

could be paid to the different ways that humans have and continue to make sense of this piece of land, as well as the relationship between the school and the local community. A critical consideration of land, and the physical and epistemological domination that occurs on and through land, should be a feature of teacher education programs. The land itself is entangled with humans in instances of both ethical and problematic entanglements that deny ethical relationality. The students could be invited to consider the evolution of the relationships between First Peoples and the waves of people that have come to the present day; as well as ethical relationality between peoples and beings on this land of the practicum school. Importantly, there should be detailed attention and analysis of the narratives and discourses that have encouraged the evolution of dominant practices in that place. This process could be initiated through considering the UBC teacher education program in relation to its location on Coast Salish territory as a critical place to investigate and explore together.

A distinctive thought about place that emerges in this dissertation through the texts of the Indigenous scholars is the notion of land as sacred. This view asserts that the relationships on and with land are constituted by ethicality, as the land is sentient and infused with spirit. The notion of land as sentient and animated with spirit emerges from a metaphysics that is sharply contrasted with dominant Western modernist views that direct institutions in a nation-state such as Canada. Frederique Apffel-Marglin (2011) and Toulmin (1990) both argue that the idea of a world animated with spirit is not alien to Western ontologies, but locates the *disenchantment* of the Western world as arising from seemingly irresolvable histories of religious conflict, from which Cartesian influenced Enlightenment epistemology emerged. In my view, these distinctions of the spiritual/material, and long-term violent relations of Settlers with Indigenous

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peoples, represent the most difficult challenges to enabling programs of teacher education to meaningfully engage with epistemic recognition – particularly with Indigenous onto-epistemologies. These ideas about land and spirituality introduce an important discussion of the challenges in bringing epistemic diversity and Indigenous perspectives into teacher education. The vignette in Chapter 5 highlighted the idea of *getting ready to listen* and this idea seems to be a powerful idea to consider in teacher education and will be taken up in the final chapter in relation to epistemic recognition.

6.3   Potential Concerns about the *Transformative Pedagogical Encounter*

I am reminded of a question that Michael Marker poses to me repeatedly with some noted and intentional sarcasm: "Well that all sounds great! Who could possibly disagree with you?!" His question repeatedly draws my attention to the fact that many people disagree with me, and it is important to consider the nature of the disagreements to attempt to address concerns about my theorization and related practice. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, my view of teaching and learning as *transformative pedagogical encounter* drastically challenges notions of education that are established in my Vancouver, BC context. I also appreciate that the established educational practices in many parts of the world influenced by modernist epistemic orientations and technical-rational educational approaches would also be drastically challenged by my views. Some people might reject my theorization as inappropriate due to assuming that I could not accommodate pre-planned curriculum that is an essential part of educational systems. Some people might reject my theorization as impossible in that it seems impractical with the institutional demands of schooling. I know of arguments that social equity is maintained in educational spaces through codified forms of practice to ensure equity of educational

opportunities. There are also arguments that educational demands are so complex, that new teachers would be unable to meet the educational needs of their students without predetermined curriculum codified by the grade/age of students. In this section, I hope to clarify and address some of these concerns.

In response to proponents of a technical-rational orientation to teaching and learning, I would make a few clarifications and an observation in response to concerns this theorization is either inappropriate or impossible. I will start with a couple of clarifications and follow with the observation. First, I am not arguing that all predetermined curriculum is at odds with my view of teaching and learning, and I am not arguing there is no value in considering curricula in terms of scope and sequence. There are a great number of insightful educational scholars and community organizers working both disciplinarily and inter-disciplinarily, who have developed a great number of thoughtful curricular documents, and have engaged in in-depth consideration of the conceptual relations of the curricular ideas. Also, formal curricular documents and plans are created in specific places by real people and thus often relate to the context in which students are located. The challenge is to understand when such documents are relevant to the educational priorities of the students, teachers, parents, and communities in which the bodies are actually located, and to structure ways within the context of the school and classroom to make sense of available curriculum in the local context. In my view, curriculum should not be mandated, but offered to schools and teachers as a suggestion with specific reasons and contextual clarifications. In my view, the priority for curriculum choices should emerge from the people in the context in thoughtful and regular conversation with those sponsored places that look to support the work of teachers and schools. Such a perspective also provides opportunity to

question how certain curricular documents implicitly or explicitly promote discourses that constrain possibilities for students and teachers to collectively consider the ways that the material conditions of students' and teachers' lives might be understood and broadened.

I would also clarify that I have a lived appreciation for the needs in teaching to have certain systems, checklists and procedures to organize aspects of teaching practice. I am specifically thinking about how a teacher might have a generative idea, but is lacking in any kind of organizational abilities to carry out the details that will actually create conditions for learning. Or, a school that has a vision for education within a particular community, but is lacking in capacity to organize how such collective work might be engaged. My view of teaching and learning is to appreciate that there are all sorts of things to be known and ways to know them. In teaching and learning every aspect of the situation is not *phronetic* emergence, but at times a sharing of a proposition; a demonstration of a scientific proof; a planning for a technical procedure, etc. My argument is that the overall consideration of any practice in teaching and learning must be subsumed under an appreciation that teaching and learning is at the heart an ethical, relational, contextual practice and the educational priority must always be considered in line with this view. This is not to discount or devalue thoughtful curricular ideas, but it is to argue against the unquestioned assumption that educational decisions and priorities are best made and decided by and through bureaucratic structures lacking knowledge of the intricacies and particularities of specific schools and classrooms.

It might also be thought that my view on teaching and learning is impossible given the priority that has been given to technical-rational approaches to schooling - even granted that, as I have

observed, there is a distance between policies aimed at producing specific practices and the actual practices that come into existence. In my experience, teachers respond to the constraints of formal authoritative demands through subversion, resistance, mediated acceptance and thorough support, based on their experiences; historical and current entanglements; and implicit and explicit personal and professional priorities. Students are very similarly engaged in these diverse orientations to authoritative demands and also in terms of diverse agential response. From my own observation, legislation and policy are not metaphorical puppet strings that control the performances of the body-minds of teachers and students. Teachers and students in classrooms are in relations with each other, parents and communities and place a great deal of priority on the local context of relations. When there is a conflict between local priorities and the policies of educational bodies invested with authority, there is a multitude of responses that might be engaged – acceptance being only one. My own experience is that I have engaged in teaching and learning in line with the *transformative pedagogical encounter*, and in a very public way have rejected a technical-rational performance of teaching. In so doing I have only had minimal attempts at interference from any educational organization or person invested with authority. My thoughts on strategies for engaging practices that openly resist authoritative control can be taken up at some other time. The point for now being that the argument that policy impositions make the *transformative pedagogical encounter* impossible does not stand up to my own observation and experience of the possible.

I want to briefly acknowledge a potential argument that might be seen to justify the codified way of approaching schooling that relies on concerns for social equity seen as a future goal. In acknowledging the complexity of teaching and learning, it might be argued that a codified view

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ensures similar educational opportunities for access to *knowledge* that might be highly rewarded and favoured in society. The idea of constructing curriculum from the material conditions of the students' lives potentially might ignore important knowledge and certain ways of being, speaking and doing that provide access and advantage to students in relation to educational and economic opportunities. As a result, a codified approach to education ensures that a student in an economically marginalized community will be afforded the same educational opportunities as a student in a more affluent and privileged community thus creating the opportunities for social equity. I would point out that, in my view, an approach to education that is sourced from the material conditions of the students' existence **includes** a critical concern for the ways of knowing, being and doing that are valued, and what it affords, in the society in which the students exist. This is to include students, teachers, parents, community and those who represent educational authority, in a critical conversation about how to move and challenge these structures, while ensuring that access and opportunity is not denied to students as a condition of social equity in the here and now. I would argue that engaging in practices that reinforce social inequity in educational spaces, such as codified technical-rational educational practices, are not justified through the elusive promise of social equity in the future.

A further concern that could be raised against my proposals is that constructing curriculum through lived experience puts too much responsibility on a new teacher, whereas a codified approach guarantees that a less experienced teacher can ensure that students are learning those things that will provide them with advantage and access. I look at this perspective as an attempt at making teaching *teacher proof*. While my study is directed at teacher education and not necessarily ways to develop in-service models, I would argue that a system of mentorship that

provides less experienced teachers with regular opportunities for conversation with experienced

mentors would address some of these concerns. This system of mentorship would rely on

opportunities at the school level to have conversations about the priorities of the school

community, students, parents groups and other teachers, and also provide mentorship from

outside the context of the school. I would also suggest that curriculum developers, both private

and governmental, consider ways to introduce curriculum through in-service sessions so that

teachers and school groups can participate in a conversation that helps them make sense of

curriculum for their own context and exercise appropriate judgment in relation thereto.

6.4   Summarizing and Looking Ahead

In this chapter, I have addressed my second set of research questions. I returned to my

theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* through discussing my analysis of the

texts by BC Indigenous scholars and Aristotelian texts in a cohesive way. I have found that my

theorization and educational priorities were mostly affirmed and expanded through analysis of

the texts. I also discussed the ways that problematic dualisms of body/mind, reason/emotion,

subject/object, and culture/nature emerging from technical-rational educational orientations are

transcended through my theorization as informed by the texts. I suggested both general

educational practices, and practices specific to working with teacher candidates that emerged

from my analysis.

Within the discussions of practices, I have noted the difficulties of bringing some of these ideas

into the space of teacher education. I particularly noted the dominant epistemic practice in

secular Western educational spaces of constraining consideration of the spiritual dimension of

experience. This assumption highlights the challenge of practicing epistemic recognition in academia, and in particular in programs of teacher education. As I have argued through a number of scholars, enriched answers to important educational questions are provided through practicing epistemic recognition in the places where such questions emerge. Such recognition is not possible by only recognizing and listening to those parts of traditions that align complementarily with dominant Western assumptions. This challenge is not only raised through concern about unfruitful epistemic practices, but also through concern about social equity where the perspective of the subaltern is suppressed through dominant perspectives. Thus my final chapter is addressed to this particular challenge: How is it possible for teacher candidates in a mainstream teacher education program in a Canadian Settler nation-state, immersed in dominant epistemic assumptions and commitments, to engage with Indigenous perspectives in a transformative way?

Chapter 7: Engaging in a *Complicated Conversation* in Teacher Education

Throughout this dissertation I have made an explicit link between epistemic practices and the conditions of social equity. I have argued that Western modernist epistemic perspectives offer a decidedly partial answer to meaningful questions, and the continued dominance of these perspectives is related to a *coloniality* structure of inequity and privilege established and continuing in the current time and particularly present in a Settler nation-state. I have argued that in the interest of epistemic generativity, and the conditions of social equity, academic researchers should practice *epistemic recognition* in addressing research questions. My attempt to practice epistemic recognition in research and practice in teacher education at UBC, through self-reflexively engaging Indigenous perspectives in this place, has been a key piece of this dissertation. Throughout this process, I have brought forward complex political, social and historical questions and perspectives into the research area of teacher education. Anne Phelan argues that research in "teacher education deserves a more complicated conversation that can extend current discussions to concerns about subjectivity (human agency and action), society, and historical moment" (p.213). In this chapter, I will discuss and consider the context and complications of engaging teacher candidates, and teacher education, in this complicated conversation.

In this dissertation I have also emphasized that teacher candidates should not be positioned as instrumental to obtaining conditions of social equity as may be desired and imagined in some future time and place. My theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* applies as equally to teacher candidates as students in elementary schools – all students are real people in real places with complex histories, desires, priorities and commitments and should be engaged

with an authentic openness to the complex meaning making that emerges through entangled relations. As I have argued, transformative learning requires an authentically open engagement. Therefore, the complications of my final set of questions emerges from the fact I am not trying to pedagogically manipulate teacher candidates into agreeing with my positions in this research that might be construed as a "learning outcome". I am also not encouraging research that seeks to engage with teacher candidates in that way. I am trying to consider the ways that dominant Settler narratives that misunderstand Indigenous peoples and Settler-Indigenous relations might be questioned, along with openly engaging the resistance to Indigenous perspectives that frames Settler contexts. I am trying to understand how I can focus attention upon problematic discursive conditions and material realities and encourage teacher candidates *to listen* to Indigenous perspectives in a self-reflexive way – a way that positions the self as related to history and power and how that has served to silence Indigenous perspectives in this place. I am hoping that my own experiences as an unsettled Settler might give me insight into my work in mainstream teacher education programs. This chapter is specifically addressed to understanding and addressing the third and final set of research questions raised in Chapter 1:

➢   *How might I create the conditions in a mainstream teacher education program for teacher candidates to listen to Indigenous perspectives in a self-reflexive way?*
➢   *How might programs of teacher education support teacher candidates in self-reflexive learning and practice?*

… the story continues in the Orchard Garden at UBC

I'm walking to a small section in the Orchard Garden[29] that Julia has directed my small group towards on this sunny, summer morning. I breathe in the fresh early morning air deeply as I raise my arms and stretch out my back in anticipation for the work to come. I feel thoroughly content and relaxed. My plans for bringing the teacher candidates in our course in Philosophy of Education out of the classroom and into a garden has been received enthusiastically and thoughtfully. On the way to the Orchard Garden, as a larger group of 20, we engaged in friendly and excited talk about developing our philosophical ideas on pedagogy into the space of a garden, and the chance to be out of the classroom. "I love gardening! I can't wait to see how I might work with kids in the garden" Andrea shares happily. Any concerns on my part that this activity might not be well received have completely dissipated and I'm eager to engage with the garden, the teacher candidates, and Julia's provocative research project located in the garden.[30] In response to my offer to provide service to the garden as a gesture of reciprocity for Julia's efforts on this day, we've all been directed to different parts of the garden to do weeding or harvesting in small groups of 4 or 5. I am particularly interested in the ways the teacher candidates will take up this ethical relation of reciprocity that I have learned from Indigenous peoples in BC. As I approach this section indicated by Julia with my group, my confidence leaves me at once and I'm momentarily frozen. I've encountered a melange of plants that, in my view, are growing all over each other without a discernible pattern. I have no idea what it means to weed in this spot that I don't recognize as a garden. In my mind, questions jump out: "Where are the rows?" "Where is the garden?" I sense the teacher candidates are looking to me for direction as to what to do, and feel anxious in my lack of knowing. I recognize my lack of capacity and look hopefully for Julia. I'm somewhat relieved as Julia makes her way over to us and explains that this is a

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[29] The Orchard Garden is an organic market garden and outdoor classroom providing collaborative, hands-on immersive, and experimental learning opportunities. See http://theorchardgarden.blogspot.ca/p/about.html

[30] Julia's installation titled "Threads sown, grown & given" is located in a large corner of UBC's 1/4-acre space of the Orchard Garden. The installation at this time depicted a classroom of 24 students desks meticulously plotted in a grid, with a teacher's desk at the front. The desks were grown from flax seeds, and the walls were cedar frames with upward growing beans and sunflowers for walls. Windows were hung from the cedar showing stark black and white images of historical school gardens in Nazi Germany and North American residential schools.

replication of a Mayan garden. She quickly advises what to do and goes back to
another group, but I'm still utterly lost. Fortunately, Garnet, a teacher candidate in
our group, intervenes and gives us all directions. She chats with us in detail about
each of the plants, how to grow and cook them, and her experiences in rural China
years ago with these plants, as we willingly carry out her instructions.

7.1   The Complicated Conversation Emerging in Cross-Cultural Spaces

I am sharing this particular vignette as it provides a lens to the cross-cultural work in this

dissertation, and the particular challenges of engaging Indigenous perspectives meaningfully in

teacher education. At the time of this vignette, I had been reading a vast amount of Indigenous

scholarship from scholars around the world, as well attending numerous talks and events by

Indigenous scholars at UBC over a period of years. I had also had the good fortune of being

mentored by brilliant Indigenous scholars at UBC. Through all of this, I had been developing an

appreciation for the importance of land and place to knowing. Also, I had been appreciating the

need for epistemic recognition through bringing Indigenous perspectives to inquiries and

thoughts within and about teacher education. In essence, I saw myself as fairly knowledgeable

through all of my reading and activities, and fairly self-aware of the potential imposition of

Settler narratives and Western modernist thought on my own educational assumptions in my role

as an instructor. In my thoughts and planning for teaching a class in Philosophy of Education, I

was hoping to bring these considerations together with a group of teacher candidates. I wanted

the teacher candidates to have this opportunity to expand their own ways of thinking about

teaching and learning. In essence, my plan was to question dominant assumptions on land and

pedagogy and to help teacher candidates get ready to listen to Indigenous perspectives in a

course not specifically designed by the academy to engage Indigenous perspectives.

In encountering a Mayan garden based in a relational ontology I realized, that despite my awareness of potential Settler impositions, and the desire to reveal and challenge these impositions, my decolonizing aspirations would always be a humbling work-in-progress. In this vignette, as I walked up to the garden, I fully expected to see neat and ordered rows arranged according to the rules of Euclidian geometry, and that my task would be to reimpose the order that *nature* had worked against by pulling out anything not in the confines of a row. Despite my desire to practice epistemic recognition, I paradoxically expected my culturally influenced ideas about a garden and land to be universal and that I would know how to be and act in the situation. I also expected that I would be the teacher due to my authorized role, yet in the shifting identities of teacher and learner, I emerged as the learner, and Garnet and the garden emerged as the teachers. In encountering this Mayan-based garden, with this group of students, I realized the depth of my assumptions and commitments from being raised and educated in a Western modernist society, and my tacit expectation that my ideas are universally understood and will be reflected back to me in my encounters. I also witnessed my incredible readiness to impose my ideas on others (the human and non-human others) from a very secure and problematic set of assumptions. My participation in Western social life, where my assumptions are continually privileged and reflected to me as neutral and universal, frames the challenges of engaging in these conversations and the power structure of the context. I share this vignette, as it marked a point where I began to more fully appreciate that practicing epistemic recognition requires continual self-reflexive analysis to avoid merely re-imposing one's own epistemic perspective to extinguish what is other, and the socially conferred power that enables that imposition.

In this chapter, I will discuss the context of epistemic recognition and dominance in academia and the ways I have seen this play out in teacher education. I will then consider how to engage teacher candidates with Indigenous perspectives in this complex context, recognizing that I am entering into an ongoing conversation. I will consider how to maintain the integrity of my theorization of the *transformative pedagogical encounter* with teacher candidates as I engage in this conversation. I will conclude this chapter with a discussion of my understanding of policy and my ideas for future research that emerge from this dissertation.

7.1.1 **The Dominance of a Secular Cosmology**

In my view, Toulmin, Vokey and Marker, together explain the dominance of modernist ontological assumptions in Western educational contexts that serve to marginalize meaningful engagement with Indigenous perspectives. My argument stresses that a secular cosmology emerges in modern institutions through dominant Enlightenment metaphysical assumptions, and cosmologies that do not align with a secular view, are marginalized from public institutional space. Invitations to Indigenous perspectives in academia are thus tempered. On one level Indigenous perspectives are invited and welcomed in a multicultural relativistic invitation, but when these perspectives present ontological notions that are contrary to dominant Western assumptions, the invitation is shown to be limited.

Toulmin (1990) locates the dominance of secularized public institutions as arising from the escalation of religious zealotry in the emergence of modern Europe, and the desire to establish foundations in rationality and a new "cosmology where the epistemological foundations could be guaranteed" (p. 83). Vokey explains the disenchantment of the Western worldview as emerging

through *forms of social life* that embody *mechanistic* ontological assumptions and commitments of Western empirical science. Vokey (2001) argues that the root metaphor of the cosmos as a machine emerged from the perceived success of Newtonian physics and brings with it deterministic, materialistic, reductionistic, and atomistic assumptions and commitments (p. 110). Significant for this discussion is the assumption in this view that "because the world-order is accidental and contingent, it is seen to be without inherent meaning or purpose (reference to Pepper 1942, p. 197), and thus the universe is "wholly indifferent, if not actually hostile, to human interests and desires" (p. 111). In the vignette, this is similar to my idea that nature would be working against the order imposed by the garden. Toulmin argues that there was a crash of cosmology and epistemology in the Western world through the devastation of the religious wars, and modern science arose to explain the new ordered relation of the natural world as stable and in dichotomous relation with the human world (pp. 112-113). Vokey explains that the intellectual culture of the Western world continues, through the rise of secularized institutions, to be shaped by mechanistic ontological assumptions, and those things that cannot be validated according to its "methodological canons still tend to be received sceptically if not dismissed or ignored" (p. 345).

7.1.2   Epistemological Collisions, Dominance and Difficult Knowledge

As was discussed in Chapter 1, these modernist epistemological commitments emerge with and through the structures of coloniality, and it is through this intersection that the challenges of bringing Indigenous perspectives meaningfully into educational spaces are fully understood. I would argue that Marker describes the *epistemological collision* that occurs when the mechanistic assumptions of modernist ontologies are challenged by Indigenous counter-

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perspectives in educational institutions. This challenge is shown not only in terms of epistemology, but the encounters are constituted by an Indigenous embodied moral challenge to colonial violence by real Indigenous peoples in real places.

In general, a great deal of Marker's work describes local educational conditions in the Pacific Northwest area of the United States, and the hostilities and conflicts that develop when Indigenous peoples assert both treaty rights and sacred relations to land. There is one particular context and incident that Marker analyzes and details that bring all of these ideas together in a cohesive way, that has enabled me to understand the complexity of these ideas in educational contexts. Marker (2006) describes the experience of the Makah people in Neah Bay and the community decision to pursue the traditional whale hunt, in the spirit of reclamation of traditional sacred practices and reassertion of treaty rights; and also the racist backlash by white Settlers in the community that ensued (p. 1). Within this contentious community context, Marker describes a 13 year old boy that was mistreated by classmates at the local school for asserting he wanted to grow up to be a whale hunter. The boy's mother, through discussion with the principal of the school, arranged to come to the boy's class to present an educational session on Makah beliefs, practices and treaty history (p. 7). The classroom session ended with an offering of whale meat. This educational session later devolved into angry complaints by white parents of the miseducational nature of the session, through portraying the session as religious beliefs being taught to their children without scientific basis (p. 7). The principal's decision on the matter was to grant that the parents could remove their children from class during any of these "cultural presentations" (p. 7).

In Marker's analysis, he finds that the parental claims rely on the assumptions of neutrality of a scientific worldview, but also emerge from a problematic history of colonial relations with Indigenous peoples and land in that place (Marker, 2006, p. 8). On one level there is an epistemic tension between the sacred and scientific ontological assumptions, and the power of educational institutions to reassert epistemic dominance in relation thereto. Marker argues that schools privilege a form of knowledge that presumes the cultural neutrality of science, and this is consistent with Vokey's analysis of the emergence and dominance of the mechanistic worldview. On another level, Marker points out that Indigenous peoples' presence stakes a claim to moral and epistemic preeminence based on ancient and sustained relationships to land (p. 5). He argues that the history of "Indian-White relations" is a narrative of colonization and subjugation in particular places, and also a "local history of ecological destruction and how the contemporary structures on the landscape surrounding the school and community were hammered into form" (p. 10). Marker's analysis demonstrates that the *invitation* by educational authorities in Settler nation-states to Indigenous knowledge exists in relations of power. Such invitations are extended conditionally, and require that the dominance of scientific *neutrality* and its preeminence remain unchallenged. Contrasting ontological assumptions introduced by Indigenous bodies are interpreted as challenges, and are met with a noticeable level of anger and resistance by Settlers in these dominated places. I would argue that Marker explains through this example, the ways that Settler authorities, communities and individuals problematically engage with Indigenous perspectives as *difficult knowledge*. By difficult knowledge I mean knowledge that manifests problematically as it references incommensurability, historical trauma and social breakdowns (Pitt & Britzman. 2003, p. 756). Marker also demonstrates that Settlers then avoid the responsibility of this *knowledge* by labeling Indigenous peoples as *difficult*.

7.1.3   Epistemological Collisions in Teacher Education

From my experience, non-Indigenous teacher candidates perceive Indigenous perspectives as *difficult knowledge* in varying degrees. I recently taught a course in teacher education that sought to meaningfully engage located Indigenous perspectives and shared Indigenous-Settler histories in Canada. I would point out that the opportunity to even have such a course and theme emerges from incredible efforts over an extensive period of time by BC scholars in education such as Jo-Anne Archibald and Lorna Williams, along with many people working in various capacities. In general, the course proceeded well and the students engaged with perspectives and texts, and there was some detailed questioning and examining of Settler narratives. I felt the students were engaging in a thoughtful way, but not a transformative way and was thinking of ways to deepen the experiences in the course. The structure of the cohort provided the opportunity to engage the candidates in workshops within the course, and so I took this opportunity to provide an experience that could engage us more thoroughly. I worked once again with Julia Ostertag to provide an opportunity for the students to consider themes related to land and pedagogy through participating in the next phase of her arts-based installation.[31] Julia invited a Musqueam Knowledge Holder to the session to discuss ideas of pedagogy and knowledge so as to bring these ideas into conversation with Musqueam perspectives. The students were generally more quiet than usual, and both Julia and I noted that the students had

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[31]   The next phase of Julia's arts-based installation "threaded conversations" was hosted by Julia in a room in the basement of the Scarfe Building at UBC and involved a visual display of the outdoor installation, the hanging windows and reflections by the previous group of teacher candidates. The plan for the students' participation in this phase was to engage in open conversation about the project and themes, and weave with the flax that Julia had harvested and spun.

generally avoided depth when engaging the themes of land, pedagogy and Indigeneity in the workshop.

That afternoon I had my regular course time scheduled, and I invited an Indigenous scholar to the course to extend the discussion into Indigenous perspectives on pedagogies and relationships in other places in BC. Prior to the scholars arrival I had shown a short film called *Pelq'ilc*[32] that traces a BC Indigenous community's resurgence and reclamation of language and formal education. The scholar arrived during the film, and after I introduced the scholar, he played a hand-made musical instrument and discussed learning, representation, practice and Indigeneity in educational contexts. The students had been generally invited from the outset to ask questions, but when the scholar discussed Indigenous notions of spirituality in terms of pedagogy, one table of students started a heated and prolonged questioning of the scholar. The mood and tone of this table of five students was passionate and in my view aggressive. One teacher candidate *advised* the professor that he should not use the word spiritual if he expected to speak about public education. I also noted a general level of passivity in many of the other students, shown through a lack of engagement with the ideas presented and the scholar himself.

I interrupted the questioning of the scholar due to the nature of the questions, which seemed to me to be more like demands to reform his ideas than actual questions. The scholar certainly could handle the questioning, but I felt that an invited guest had been shown a level of disrespect

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[32] "Pelq'ilc: Coming Home" is a 33 minute documentary by Celia Haig-Brown (York University) and Helen Haig-Brown (Tsilqhot'in Nation) emerging from Celia Haig-Brown's 1986 research with former students of the Kamloops Indian Residential School and asks the question "What is the place of education in the regeneration of culture?"

and I felt the need to intervene. Shortly after the class, an email arrived from a student that claimed to represent the cohort's dissatisfaction about both of the Indigenous guest speakers. While I did address this entire event as a learning opportunity in our next meeting, the point of sharing this story is to draw out the simmering and obvious anger of a number of students. In the email, the student advised that she could barely restrain her anger with the Indigenous guest speakers and felt insulted by both. In my view, there was something about an Indigenous body in the classroom asserting sovereignty, rights and knowledge that turned Indigenous knowledge into intensely *difficult knowledge* for some of the students, and resulted ultimately in anger and a demand to reform this knowledge – a clear feeling of resistance and path of action. I also noted that for many students, this knowledge manifested in avoidance through a surface level of engagement with ideas – which I would characterize as a somewhat toned down version of resistance. Again, there were also a small number of students who were thoroughly absorbed in the presentations, but I noted these students were looking at the floor in discomfort and passivity during the demanding questioning of the Indigenous scholar.

The responses of these students reminded me of an experience written about by Celia Haig-Brown (2008) when reflecting on the challenges of working in this cross-cultural academic space, and also myself at a different time. In Haig-Brown's article she recounts an experience of bringing Indigenous and non-Indigenous graduate students together on a panel to present on Indigenous based research projects to her non-Indigenous academic colleagues. The response by her colleagues to Indigenous peoples and perspectives in academic space was somewhat more politely veneered than my experience with teacher candidates, yet her paraphrasing of the aftermath echoes loudly: "*These presentations are too emotion-based, too focused on spirituality*

and some romantic and essentialist notion of an inviolable past" (Haig-Brown, 2008, p. 258). I would add that I do not excuse myself from this analysis. I managed to live a great deal of my life subsumed unquestioningly in problematic Settler narratives that could only be achieved through resistance to engaging with Indigenous perspectives. Haig-Brown also draws attention to the attitudes of her colleagues during the presentation, which I would argue are quite similar to my observations of some of my students. She recounts that there was little desire to enter into productive discussion, in that "responses took the form of harsh opposition" and a "desire to stop such work, to re-form it" (p. 258). I would argue that these moments detail resistance to difficult knowledges that manifest in refusals to know. As Cathryn McConaghy (2003) explains, drawing on the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan, these encounters are marked by "a passion for ignorance" (p. 17). McConaghy argues, from her experience in Australian Settler encounters in education that at the heart of this passionate refusal to know is an incapacity on the part of the individual to knowledge in which one is implicated (p. 17). I would argue there is a lot at stake, in relation to both the psyche of Settlers, and material benefits that have been conferred through privileged social positions that manifests complexly in these encounters. The cohesive narrative of the self as an ethical subject in a benevolent nation-state is at stake, and counter-narratives that challenge dominant Settler narratives quite likely resisted in both extreme and subtle ways.

To add to this complexity, are the diverse perspectives of the students and the claims to space within a Settler/Indigenous context. In my teacher education class, the majority of the students would not identify themselves as Settlers for various reasons. First, some of the students strictly identify as Canadians and resist any sorts of thinking of themselves as otherwise. One student let me know during class that she was troubled that I referred to myself as a Settler. Second, many

of the students are not born in Canada, nor do they trace ancestry to Europe and identify family

history as participating in settler colonization from European nations. There seems to be a

distinction within the space that centres on "whiteness" and relation to Europe that results in a

perceived distinction between understanding oneself as an Immigrant and the possibilities for

being an implicated Settler. This marking seems to last generations, where children of non-white

Immigrants maintain a distinction of being in a lineage of immigrants and not Settlers -

regardless of intense participation with the dominant culture and related material benefits.

Constructions of identity are complex and porous, but I bring these ideas to this discussion to

acknowledge that the positions of Settler and Indigenous are not exclusive and easily understood

locations in a nation-state such as Canada, and that whiteness needs to figure prominently in the

discussion. Although, resistance in educational spaces can also be taken up through positioning

oneself outside of the Settler/Indigenous interface – as being able to see oneself not actually

settling on ancestral Indigenous territory.[33]

7.2   Engaging Teacher Candidates in a Context of Social Equity

In my work with teacher candidates, I realize that a significant portion of teacher candidates I

come into contact with do not predominantly share my interest and priority for engaging with

Indigenous perspectives. Some teacher candidates, as I have shown, heartily resist this

engagement with a desire for extinguishment. A more common response is the position that

Indigenous perspectives are relevant only when anticipating the presence of Indigenous students

or parents in the educational space. My theorization of the *transformative pedagogical*

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[33]   I thoroughly recognize the differences in non-Indigenous peoples' positions in a Settler nation-state and am not
trying to elide these distinctions. Haig-Brown (2009) draws out the complication of the diaspora, and contrasts
Settling for profit and coming to Indigenous territories for reasons of famine, war and oppression (p. 9).

encounter argues that transformative learning requires a passionate engagement of questions emerging from the learner, and the need to respect and engage with the desires, commitments and questions of the learner. Thus, it may seem that *requiring* teacher candidates to engage with Indigenous perspectives, and my ability to impose this requirement on teacher candidates, might actually derail transformative opportunities. Further, requiring all teacher candidates to engage with Indigenous perspectives might be seen as actually creating inequitable practices within teacher education according to my own theorization, through imposing a particular agenda and desired set of outcomes. Further, it may seem that teacher candidates are positioned as instrumental to achieving some future imagined goal of social equity that I am entertaining. In essence, I ask this question: Might it be possible that the teacher candidates' resistance I have described is a logical response to an unethical demand on my part to engage questions for my purposes and commitments and not their own? Thinking through the subtleties of this question, causes me to pause and consider the impositions I may be making on teacher candidates.

I would argue that requiring teacher candidates to engage in a critical practice of questioning their own impositions is not contrary to my theoretical framework. Requiring teacher candidates to engage with Indigenous perspectives is a request to understand the material and discursive aspects of the context in which they desire to teach in a Settler nation-state, and is thus an essential ethical requirement for any teacher in this context. The challenge is that peoples in Settler nation-states have been immersed in inaccurate narratives that impose a view that Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada occupy separate realities, leading to faulty assumptions that Indigenous concerns, perspectives and realities should be the preoccupations solely of Indigenous peoples. I introduced Dwayne Donald and Susan Dion's thoughts on these

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dominating narratives and assumptions earlier in this dissertation. I will be taking up these ideas

again in this section, and consider the challenge of revealing these problematic narratives so as to

enable teacher candidates an opportunity to actually *listen* to Indigenous perspectives. I also

appreciate that Indigenous perspectives present contrasting onto-epistemologies that have

aspects, as I have demonstrated, that are heartily rejected in Western academic contexts.

Therefore, my more modest project is to reveal the need to engage with Indigenous perspectives

in mainstream academia, and consider how to help teacher candidates get ready to listen. In the

context of privilege I have tried to describe, this requires that non-Indigenous peoples listen self-

reflexively as I have tried to do in this dissertation following Marker's ideas on engaging history,

hegemony and the self (Marker, 2003, p. 367).

7.2.1   Practices of Social Equity in Teacher Education

Through the arguments of this dissertation, I have come to the conclusion that self-reflexivity

should be a central feature of teacher education programs as a practice of social equity in these

programs. In making this claim, I continue to engage teacher education in a *complicated*

conversation. I mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 1 that I view teacher education a place

where hegemonic epistemological orientations and narratives might be drawn out and critically

questioned, and not unquestioningly brought into the spaces of public education. I would

suggest that self-reflexive practices in teacher education, would be those practices in which

students and instructors can engage to critically self-question their assumptions; commitments;

beliefs; onto-epistemological orientations; multiple porous social locations; traditions of thought

and practice; and narratives in a Settler nation-state; so as to potentially interrupt recurring

patterns of thought and practice that promote social inequity and epistemic hegemony within the teacher education program.

I understand the work of both Dion and Donald, who each work and write on teacher education, as encouraging self-reflexive practices with teacher candidates, as I understand the notion of self-reflexivity through Marker. These scholars each trouble dominant narratives and discourses concerning Indigenous peoples and the ways these narratives and discourses encourage a denial of relationality between Indigenous peoples and Settlers/Settler dominated societies. Dion (2007) describes her work as a "critical pedagogy of remembrance" (p. 330). She invites students to write stories of their relations with Indigenous peoples, which she notes most often devolves into a "perfect stranger" orientation (p. 331). Then, drawing on Roger Simon's thoughts she invites students to draw images from their past and then juxtaposes this over time with work by Aboriginal peoples that inspire critical questioning of knowing, identity and representation, thus allowing students to self investigate their investment in and commitment to dominant discourses (p. 332). Donald (2012) provides an analysis of Indigenous-Settler relations that is similar to Dion's "perfect stranger" through developing the semiotic device of the "pedagogy of the fort". Donald argues that narratives and discourses about Canadian nation building and civilization devalue Indigenous peoples, and erroneously teach that Indigenous and Settler peoples occupy separate realities. I find that Donald's work helps students draw out and question dominant and often unchallenged problematic assumptions through the iconic fort image, and that students can critically relate the problematics of the fort imaginary to their own memories and relationships. I find Donald and Dion each provide ways to think about opportunities for students to encounter themselves through coming into relation with the

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otherness of knowledges and the otherness of themselves. I link their ideas meaningfully to the work of Marker (2003) and his insistence on considering Indigenous perspectives with an appreciation of history and power and the implicated position of the self in this consideration (p. 367). Marker's priorities promote a notion that we can learn ethically through appreciating the otherness of ourselves, and our forms of social life, in relation to power.

Haig-Brown (2009) also provides self-reflexive ideas for practice with teacher candidates that bring forward Indigenous perspectives in a context of highly diverse and complex social locations. Haig-Brown invites her students to write their own stories of the ways the students come to be in the place together – tracing ancestries of always being in that place, or the myriad ways the students have come to the place (p. 14). Haig-Brown's work is an invitation to participate in a "decolonizing autobiography" through sharing her own story of coming to be in a First Nations territory in Canada, and inviting students into narrating their own histories and paths. Her work highlights the opportunity to bring students into discussion of "race, colonization, Diaspora, class, gender and decolonization in ways that expand rather than shut down" conversation and learning (p. 15). I find Haig-Brown's practice provides me with a way to forefront my ethical struggles as a Settler as generative opportunities for my students, but with an appreciation of the responsibility to student vulnerability and diversity in complex historical relations. This is an opportunity to discuss together the complex ways we are figured in learning contexts within a Settler nation-state, and to consider our participation more thoughtfully and politically.

I would argue that resistance to Indigenous perspectives could be addressed through bringing Haig-Brown's decolonizing autobiographies together with analysis of Settler policy documents related to Indigenous peoples. I first thought of this approach when reading Ann Chinnery's (2010) work on *critical historical consciousness* in the context of teacher education, and her experience of working with the ideas of Roger Simon's Testimony and Historical Memory Project from the University of Toronto. In this work Chinnery drew teacher candidates' attention to Indigenous literature and testimonies of residential school survivors. In her paper, Chinnery shares her disappointment in that "the testimonies had apparently done little to shake up [teacher candidates'] negative (and often socially sanctioned) stereotypes ... the common feeling around the room was one of indifference and a thinly veiled moral superiority" (p. 400). Out of frustration, Chinnery decided to actually just read portions of the Indian Act of 1876; the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857; and sections from a bill put forward in 1920 by Duncan Campbell Scott, head of the Department of Indian affairs at that time (p. 400), which in turn ended up moving the students into more depth of engagement with problematic history that had previously been avoided (p. 400). Chinnery considered that the teacher candidates' indifferent response to the testimony of Indigenous peoples resulted from the saturated role of testimony in our society that had potentially desensitized students to the power of testimony (p. 401).

I would argue that the effectiveness of the role of Settler policy documents in unsettling teacher candidates might also be explained in another way. Recently, I had the opportunity to speak with Musqueam Elder Larry Grant at length about his thoughts on ways that I could work with teacher

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candidates in transformative ways.[34] Interestingly, Elder Grant advised that I should return to the documents in and related to the "Indian Act", but his explanation did not relate to the lack of power of testimony. Elder Grant advised that the documents gave non-Indigenous students an opportunity to see themselves and their society in ways they have been taught not to think about. The documents were written in a time where polite veneers are absent, thus bringing students into a less mediated encounter with the racism and elitism of Settler dominated society, and disabling the pervasive Settler narrative of the benevolent nation-state. Analysis of Settler policy documents has the effect of making visible the mechanisms and agents of oppression in Settler society. This interruption and critical questioning of Settler narratives creates the conditions whereby all students might develop the capacity to actually *listen* to the testimony and perspectives of diverse Indigenous peoples, and see these testimonies as speaking to societal problematics, always understood differently, yet demanding collective attention and ethical response.

7.2.2   Being Ready to Listen through Engaging Resistance

From the Indigenous and Aristotelian scholars in this research, and reflections on my transformative experiences as a Settler, I have learned about the importance of attentiveness to *being ready to listen*. I would venture that there should be attentiveness in programs of teacher education to potential ways to help teacher candidates get ready to listen to *difficult knowledge* as discussed in this section. I do not think it is possible to avoid resistance, and many benefits in

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[34] This was an unplanned meeting that lasted for 45 minutes during the dinner break at Vancouver City Hall on April 30, 2013 at a session I attended titled "The Changing Face of Racism". Elder Grant provided the welcoming on behalf of the Musqueam and shared his own experiences of the changing forms of racism in the Vancouver context. I view this *chance* meeting and the time that Elder Grant devoted to me as a gift. Elder Grant gave me permission to share his advice when I communicate these ideas publicly.

bringing the likelihood of resistance out in a transparent way. I am not talking here about well founded resistance that would emerge from being told how to think and what to believe, but resistance to engaging with open discussion of discourses and narratives that circulate and position us all in complex ways, and the ways we might understand this self-reflexively as an educational practitioner. Gert Biesta (2012) argues that resistance is a potentially generative feeling that emerges from our encounters with the material-discursive world, and it is how we work with resistance that determines its generativity. As he states: "The first thing that the experience of resistance teaches us is that the world we live and act in – and this includes both the material world and the social world – is not a projection of our mind but has an existence of its own" (pp. 94-95). He suggests that generative pedagogical encounters occur when teachers help students engage with their resistance through negotiating a middle ground where neither the student nor the "other" is destroyed (p. 95). Negotiating the middle ground is portrayed as avoiding a context where the student would need to be extinguished in the encounter with the other, but the student is also not open to extinguish the other.

The middle ground with non-Indigenous teacher candidates engaging Indigenous perspectives, as I understand Biesta's argument, would be worked at through respecting and maintaining the sense of self of the teacher candidate through inviting teacher candidates to speak and make sense of their resistance and ideas, and really listening to what they say so as to engage in an open conversation. At the same time, it would also require speaking with teacher candidates in a way that lets them see how they are imposing on Indigenous perspectives that emerge from circulating discourses, narratives and the limitations of any perspective. This would be similar to the situation in the vignette where I needed to think through my imposition on the garden. In the

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vignette, I created the unacceptable condition where a garden is no longer a garden. Through my impositions I extinguished the garden, and I then needed to work this out through considering the circulating ideas about what gardens are, and the power to enforce this understanding and present it as neutral. Recognizing my imposition and problematic relation in the vignette emerged from the felt quality of the experience – I was frozen and anxious. I would suggest that strong emotional reactions in these moments are generative to recognizing something meaningful is happening. Teacher candidates could be asked to pay great attention to their embodied emotional reactions to these conversations, as a guide to working in the challenging place of the middle ground. I am arguing here that it is important in teacher education to transparently discuss and think about the topic of resistance with teacher candidates as pedagogically generative and desirable, yet note the emotional and psychological challenges of maintaining and attending to the self and relations within the middle ground space.

I would suggest that teacher candidates could be invited to engage with Indigenous perspectives similarly to the ways I have engaged with Indigenous perspectives and ways of knowing, being and doing in my research. In this dissertation, I needed to *listen to* Indigenous perspectives in order to *learn from* them, and was not critically interrogating Indigenous perspectives from standards and criteria external to the traditions themselves. I listened by suspending my own dominant assumptions and commitments as unrelated criteria, and considered my educational questions through these perspectives in a way that sought a balanced coherence. I am considering here that there needs to be a suspension of disbelief, and willingness to try to understand one's questions through a different lens. In the vignette, this would be similar to the way the group followed Garnet's instructions to learn from her instead of interrogating her

perspective and casting doubt. Garnet also provided us with the context of her knowledge and

experience with practice, and shared her knowledge in an embodied way in relation, thus giving

the group embodied reasons to suspend our disbelief. The Indigenous scholarship and

perspectives that I sought are similarly framed. The Indigenous scholars who I have sought to

learn from in my research have reputations for thoughtful and respectful diligence to their work

in multiple contexts.

This substance of my research in this dissertation suggests teaching and learning requires time to

dwell in events and experiences, and the body-mind has capacities to apprehend in and through

experiences. For a non-Indigenous person, this would mean attempting to look at the world

through Indigenous perspectives, and feeling the embodied responses to knowing and thinking in

this way, as a way to expand one's horizon. I am not suggesting that a non-Indigenous person

can see and experience the world as an Indigenous person, or that people are pristinely located

only in one tradition of thought and practice. As Leroy Little Bear (2000) points out: "no one

has a pure worldview" (p. 85). I am suggesting that it is important to have greater self-

understanding of ourselves as non-neutral, located-persons participating in tradition(s) of thought

and practice. I would argue that it is from appreciating that premise self-reflexively one can start

to think about what might be learned from ideas emerging from other perspectives – through

attempting to think and act through the assumptions and commitments of those traditions. One

would be required to understand how the ideas in a tradition relate cohesively to that tradition of

thought and practice. In my view, the attempt to understand cohesively, and a suspension of

disbelief, are practices that assist people in getting ready to listen and thus be able to *learn from*.

This would also combine with dispositions of attentiveness and a willingness to suspend

judgement similar to *Peter Elbow* where people are invited to engage in methodological belief so as to participate in thinking through another perspective (Nicol, 2006, p. 36). I am arguing that from these dispositions and practices, and from an ethical intent, the challenge of engaging non-Indigenous teacher candidates with Indigenous perspectives can be considered – yet in terms of *transformative pedagogical encounters*, nothing is guaranteed.

Teacher education programs and instructors who attempt to take up self-reflexive practices such as these should be attentive to what is at stake for students, and consider ways to support students in this challenging work. Self-reflexive practices aim to encourage speech about those things that are not spoken, and make visible what has been intentionally made invisible. In my own experience of being a teacher candidate, and in spending time listening to teacher candidates, I would argue there is a general feeling of nervousness in anticipation of *performing* teaching in the public context of a practicum. This generally combines with a desire to be ready and confident in oneself and one's abilities. These desires for confidence and stability are very much at odds with the destabilizing influences of self-reflexive practices as well as non-codified approaches to teaching and learning. In my experience, these practices generally create a feeling of being out of balance and a period of regaining equilibrium is necessary as one tries to see one's previously familiar world through a shifting and unfamiliar orientation.[35] Teacher education program coordinators need to think about how to support teacher candidates in this kind of transition through attentiveness to the timing of self-reflexive activities and public requirements in schools. This research would suggest that teacher education programs start with

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[35] Cynthia Nicol (2006) provides an analysis of working with teacher candidates in ways that challenge dominant notions and practices in mathematics education (p. 33). Her discussion is strikingly similar to the dynamics I describe in this paragraph.

attentiveness to building a supportive learning community, then follow with transparency about the role in the program of self-reflexive practice and learning. I would suggest that the likelihood and generativity of resistance should be appreciated, and the timing for activities that may destabilize students, with the more public requirements of practicums, should be managed. Attention should also be paid to the diversity of students' participation in forms of social life and histories and the diverse ways that knowledge emerges as *difficult* for students.

7.3   Self-Reflexivity and Resistance in the Teacher Education Program

Self-reflexive work needs to be engaged throughout the courses, and not just viewed as a preoccupation of specific courses such as "Social Issues in Education" or "Aboriginal Education". Teacher education programs should enter into conversations within the program concerning the epistemic dominance of modernist perspectives within and between academic spaces in programs of teacher education. Resistance to epistemic diversity and meaningful engagement with Indigenous perspectives is not located only with teacher candidates, but is also a tension in academic contexts generally and teacher education more specifically. Self-reflexiveness is required by instructors in considering the instructor's own range of choices regarding readings, educational experiences and locations for meeting; and the ways that these choices emerge from participation in forms of social life. The instructors' willingness and ability to engage in epistemic recognition and engagement with Indigenous perspectives, as well as the more general concern of social equity, should be thoroughly considered and returned to. Specifically, instructors need to engage in analysis of their own resistance to these ideas and practices, and the ways that resistance reveals unexamined dominant commitments and assumptions. Cohort coordinators could bring instructors together in these conversations, and

provide space to explore ideas, practices and transparent discussion of resistance in a supportive, generative community. There should also be room to have these conversations across the academic spaces of teacher education programs, to provide a place to collectively think about the program as a whole and trouble the dominance of specific ways of being, doing and knowing that remain privileged and normalized.[36]

At UBC, the Faculty of Education is enriched through Jo-ann Archibald and her role as Associate Dean of Indigenous Education. I believe this recognized position, held by a highly respected scholar, provides a place and role where the faculty is wisely guided in the creation of generative spaces to do this work. Also, the First Nations House of Learning at UBC provides the space of Sty-Wet-Tan Hall to engage the community of UBC and beyond in these conversations through the architecture, practices and protocols of the place. In the 2012/2013 school year the Faculty of Education chose the theme "The Year of Indigenous Education"[37] and thus created cross-departmental spaces to bring more people across the faculty into these conversations. It has been my experience that a significant number of faculty, students and staff are asking new questions of themselves in the various academic roles they occupy, and reflect a genuine desire to know more about the shared histories and memories of this place and considerations for the role of education and themselves. Although, I have also recognized that familiar range of unreflective resistant responses I have seen in my own classes, where resistance ranges from blatant anger and a desire to reject or re-form Indigenous perspectives, to a detached

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[36] I have intentionally not taken up the resistance of the academy quite generally. I note academic structures as a prime site of resistance to Indigenous perspectives, but this theme moves beyond the current discussion of actors in situations in teacher education. In the final section I take a closer look at how local encounters shift larger policy and authority structures and would extend this discussion to that theme.

[37] A departmental link to the theme "The Year of Indigenous Education" is found at http://yie.educ.ubc.ca/.

and disinterested checking for text messages during an impassioned presentation. It is my hope

that these conversations and opportunities will continue in meaningful and generative ways

beyond this academic school year, and engaged in a self-reflexive way that is attentive to these

forms of resistance. My desire is for teacher education cohorts at UBC to participate in these

conversations in appreciation for the need for epistemic diversity as a practice of social equity in

teacher education. My hope is that teacher education programs become the places where

hegemonic epistemological orientations and narratives, that justify dominance and

marginalization, are drawn out and critically questioned, and a place where Indigenous

perspectives have the possibility of being listened to, and learned from. It is my desire that

programs of teacher education become a powerful place, where we can collectively *repair and

renew*[38] relations between Indigenous peoples and the waves of people who have come to

Indigenous territories in the place now called Canada. This repairing and renewing is not only

for the benefit of Indigenous peoples, but is similarly required for non-Indigenous peoples in

recognition of our shared reality. This work is required in the interests of influencing

educational systems that create conditions of social equity through practices that uphold and

respect ethical relations, and also to create the conditions for transformative learning required to

address those ongoing societal challenges that defy the reductive approaches in which we are

currently immersed in educational spaces.

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[38] This idea of "repair and renew" relations is very influential to the ways I envision my work and goals. The term comes from a presentation by Dwayne Donald on March 26, 2011 titled "On what terms can we speak? Aboriginal-Canadian relations as an educational priority" and is available at vimeo.com/21534649 and 61 minutes in length.

7.4   Understanding through the Spider's Web and Future Research

I generally note that my ideas in this dissertation do not align well with the formalized educational structures that are currently in place in BC. In arguing that ethical responsibility and embodied presence have educational priority, I am suggesting that curriculum and pedagogy should emerge from ethical relations with people and place. This argument, thus provides a distinctly broader role for the located teacher or instructor in terms of curricular decisions, and to a large degree turns the current educational system on its head in terms of priorities and generative ways to address educational challenges. This view shifts power and thus engenders a form of problematic resistance as soon as it is uttered. Further, I have argued that the educational system itself emerges from inequity and dominance and thus I have to wonder if the educational structures in a Settler nation-state are at all tenable with priorities of social equity. I have asked myself this question: Is the system of education so thoroughly beyond repair, and so thoroughly entrenched in epistemic monism and inequity that we need to scrap everything and start again? This raises a further question of who might be the "we" I have in mind? I am hoping that it has become obvious through this dissertation that there are many ways to reform educational systems through ethical relations. I also appreciate through this dissertation that *things* do not just start, but they emerge from sets of relations – so there is never really a beginning from which to start. I have been thinking about how new aspects and priorities might emerge from this troubled system, and realized I could only think through this complexity with a tangible metaphor that could provide a visual-visceral understanding that was amenable to transformative possibilities.

The metaphor I have developed to understand this complexity and the place of my work, is through a combination of the ideas of Reva Joshi and Bill Cohen on the nature of webs.[39] Joshi provides the image of a dream catcher to describe the relations of policy and practice. She describes the concentric rings of the dream catcher as representing the documents that form policy, such as teaching contracts; union agreements; curriculum documents by educational authorities; etc. She describes the lines that move through the rings (not always intersecting every ring) as the localized priorities that intersect with policies, such as concerns of sustainability; Indigenous rights and sovereignty; gender equity; physical access; etc. Joshi advises that actions of people in educational encounters take place in the spaces between the lines. I encountered Joshi's work at a public presentation, and during that presentation I recalled Bill Cohen's reliance on the spider's web as a guiding metaphor in his work. For Cohen, the spider's web is a "creative construct with many real and symbolic connections to knowledge, survival, sustainability, and the ecology" in his understanding of Okanagan knowledge (Cohen, 2011, p. 49). He notes that the dynamic, located features of the spider's web suggest the continual need to be aware of the related strands being held in tension in specific places; and the interplay of survival and creativity providing the impetus for a constant requirement to repair and renew (p. 52). I also would note that when I mentioned the idea of spider web to Julia Ostertag she revealed that the spider metaphor had coincidentally also made it into her thoughts and her arts-based installation. As a result, we collaborated on weaving a web in the next phase of her installation in the space at the Orchard Garden.

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[39] I encountered Reva Joshi and her ideas of understanding policies through a web at an invited session in the Department of Educational Studies at UBC on January 30, 2013.

Through thinking with Joshi and Cohen's ideas, and talking and weaving with Julia, I have found the spider's web provides a helpful metaphor for an understanding of the dynamic educational structure of policy, real people and lived priorities in real places. I see the concentric lines as the formal educational policies and documents, and the staggered bisecting lines as the specific concerns that intersect with policy. Through the geometric lines of the web, I can see the constructed nature of these educational spaces, and the potential to thoughtfully deconstruct and reform. I see the in-between spaces of the web as the place where educational practice actually happens – where education is *performed* by real people in real places. These spaces appear invisible, yet the structure of the web provides the visibility. I see these *performances* as occurring at specific intersections of policy-concern, and the place where tensions force the web apart, thus forming through the tension, and providing opportunities to emerge for repair and renewal. Understood in this way, policy does not determine actions. Policy attempts to make sense of priorities at a given time, in a given place, but has to reform in response to changing concerns as the policy is taken up.[40] As the spider constructs the web with awareness and responsiveness to place, policy developers should be very aware and responsive to place, and not attempt to impose policy developed elsewhere. Thus I see my efforts in this research as contributing to the work that goes on in these in-between spaces, and encouraging practices that push out the problematic constraints in educational spaces through policies designed in the Enlightenment mindset. My goal is to encourage policy that is understood as an attempt to make collective meaning through attention to place and relationships, and act as a point of reference to

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[40] An appreciation for the bi-directionality of power in the enactment and evolution of policy between local actors and educational policymakers was taken up in a recent essay in *Educational Researcher* by Julie A. Marsh and Priscilla Wohlstetter.

serve those relationships until such expected time as it needs repair or renewal. I also see my work as having the potential to inform policies that are experiencing increased and destructive tensions at the intersections with social equity, and in need of generative ideas for repair and renewal.

As I look forward to finishing this dissertation, and I promise that point is edging closer, I note that I have many emerging questions that would be positioned for future research projects. Rather than provide an exhaustive and comprehensive list, I would prefer to think about my own priorities that are emerging at this time, and the desire to engage in work that deals with complexity and ideas for practice that maintain a priority on ethical relationality, and the education of real bodies in real places. I have grown increasingly aware that I have been formally educated in ways that have encouraged me to unquestioningly take up privilege and resist acknowledging the violence and marginalization that has been the lived reality for many Indigenous peoples in Canada and globally. I would attribute one of the key strategies that maintained this ignorance, is the abstraction of unlocated knowledge and the lack of focus on real people in real places. Not just the real people who have been effected by societal dominance and aggression, but also the real people who have been the agents of violence and aggression and the mechanisms through which this has been accomplished. I believe that a great deal of my work in this dissertation has attempted to explain and address the role of education in reproducing the structure of coloniality through knowledge practices that promote abstraction and epistemic monism. My future plans involve how to engage in practices and research that reform education in a way that interrupts the pervasive coloniality structure and mind/body

dualism, and thus creates opportunities for transformative education that is both undertaken in equitable ways and also contributes to a more equitable society.

Through this research, and the relationships that have developed here, I find that I am particularly interested in the roles of both teacher candidates and university instructors working with teacher candidates. In terms of teacher candidates, I am more affirmed in my position of helping teacher candidates appreciate the shared reality of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada. From this perspective, I would combine the use of Settler policy documents that differentially positions peoples in Canada and attempt to oppressively regulate the lives of Indigenous peoples in Canada; with the students *decolonizing autobiographies*. The following questions are raised with an attentiveness to the idea that questions need to be geared to specific places:

- ➢ In what ways might the combination of autobiography and document analysis create generative self-reflexive space for teacher candidates?
- ➢ How do the diverse life histories and social identities of teacher candidates relate to forms of resistance to Indigenous perspectives and the practice of epistemic recognition?
- ➢ How do the diverse life histories and social identities of teacher candidates relate to their interpretations of Settler policy documents?
- ➢ How might the physical locations of reading documents and writing autobiographies interact with the potential for transformative learning?
- ➢ How might sharing anticipations of resistance to Indigenous perspectives during self-reflexive practice create generative space for teacher candidates?

I am also interested in how instructors can work together to create generative self-reflexive space for teacher candidates, yet also appreciate that many instructors do not prioritize or see the benefits of such work. The following questions are raised attentive to place:

➢ How do instructors make sense of social equity and epistemic recognition in their teacher education courses?

➢ How do instructors with a commitment to a disciplinary educational structure think about the demands of epistemic recognition?

➢ How do instructors who teach courses concerned with social equity envision teaching and learning in the rest of the teacher education program?

➢ What are generative ways to bring instructors together to consider social equity and self-reflexive practice across a cohort structure?

➢ How can sharing anticipations of instructor resistance to Indigenous perspective create generative possibilities to learning from Indigenous perspectives?

I anticipate that in approaching these questions I would engage collaboratively with other researchers interested in these questions in teacher education, and that such questions would be geared towards the people in that place. My evolving framework of the *transformative pedagogical encounter*, grounded in the work of Barad, and now expanded through engaging with the texts of Indigenous scholars in BC and Aristotelian texts and scholars, continues to be my framework for understanding my educational questions and practice. My future projects would most definitely lead to more philosophical and theoretical analysis in dialectical reflection on the *transformative pedagogical encounter*, and I plan to maintain my focus in the context of teacher education.

When Dr. Archibald hosts large educational gatherings at UBC she often invokes a teaching from the late Musqueam Elder Vincent Stogan that I have participated in countless times. She refers to this teaching as "Hands Back, Hands Forward".[41] In this practice we hold up our left

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[41] Archibald (2008) also refers to the "Hands Back, Hands Forward" practice in her book *Indigenous Storywork*, p.

hand palm up to receive knowledge and place our right hand palm down to share knowledge.

Each person connects their left palm down and right palm up in a way that connects everyone in

the room. I think this teaching is incredibly profound, and is an embodied practice of my ethical

and relational priorities in education and the perspective of knowing through our relations. I

appreciate that a lot of people have invested incredible time and energy in teaching me, and it is

my responsibility to share what I have learned in a responsible and ethical way. I am hoping that

in some ways this dissertation is an opportunity to share that knowledge with others in this sense

of "Hands Back, Hands Forward". In this spirit, I am looking forward to the opportunity to

continue to learn and teach with many others.

<p style="text-align:center">***... the story continues ...***</p>

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