THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION AS A SITE OF SELF-POSITIONING: INTERSECTING IMAGINATIONS OF CHINESE INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS AND UNIVERSITIES IN JAPAN

by

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Abstract

This study examines the construction of Chinese international students’ identities in the context of the internationalization of two Japanese higher education institutions. It employs a case study design. Two Japanese higher education institutions were selected because they had large international student bodies and English-medium programs. Both of these characteristics are central to recent Japanese internationalization policies and programs. At each institution, interviews were conducted with: 1) Chinese international undergraduate students; and 2) faculty and staff members who held leadership positions at their institutions in the area of internationalization. By using the concepts relating to imagination, the study analyzed how students saw their identities and future possibilities in and through their participation in international education in Japan. It also investigated how the institutions saw their social existence and translated it into their internationalization discourses and practices.

An analysis of the intersection of the faculty/staff participants’ accounts of internationalization and international students’ stories illuminated the challenges and the potential of internationalization. Firstly, the findings revealed that the imaginations of both the institutions and students were shaped by their social positions and dominant social imaginaries of globalization. How the institutions with contrasting levels of academic prestige and international students with different socio-economic backgrounds participated in internationalization illuminated their self-positioning strategies in a competitive world. The closely linked self-positioning strategies of the institutions and students indicated the challenge of internationalization in disrupting the existing material and ideological conditions.

Secondly, students’ stories indicated the potential and the limitations of the institutional environments, which are marked by many international students and the use of the English
language. Some students described their transformative learning experiences emerging from the social, cultural, and political complexity of Japanese society and of their institutional settings. However, the majority of students tended to be disengaged from such complexity by seeing themselves living in an imagined pristine multicultural community on their campuses and feeling detached from the rest of Japanese society. The study concludes that internationalization in the paradigms of competition and a “creation of cultural diversity and a containment of cultural difference” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 208) holds limited potential for social transformation.
Preface

This dissertation is an original intellectual product of the author, H. Tsukada. The fieldwork reported in Chapters 5-8 was covered by the Certificate of Approval (Minimal Risk) by The University of British Columbia (UBC) Office of Research Ethics Behavioural Research Ethics Board (BREB) on November 1, 2010. UBC BREB Number: H10-02630.
# Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................. ii
Preface .................................................................................................................... iv
Table of Contents .................................................................................................... v
List of Tables .......................................................................................................... ix
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................. x
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ xi
Dedication .............................................................................................................. xiii

**Chapter 1: Introduction** .................................................................................... 1
  - Research purpose and questions. ........................................................................ 5
  - Theoretical framework ....................................................................................... 6
  - My personal trajectory to the research ............................................................. 8
  - Research design ................................................................................................ 13
  - Layout of the dissertation .................................................................................. 14

**Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework** ................................................................. 18
  - Globalization and internationalization: Conceptual problems ....................... 19
    - Manifestation of the problems of internationalization at a macro level .......... 21
  - Imagined communities ..................................................................................... 25
  - Social imaginary ............................................................................................... 27
    - Social imaginary in policy ............................................................................ 29
  - Social imaginary in globalization and internationalization ............................. 30
    - Internationalization within a Western imaginary of globalization ............... 33
    - Internationalization within a neoliberal imaginary of globalization .......... 34
      - International organizations as policy actors .............................................. 36
        - Competition and cooperation .................................................................. 38
  - Internationalization at an institutional level .................................................. 40
    - Imagined communities for students ............................................................. 41
    - Imagined communities for higher education institutions ........................... 42
  - International students’ identities ..................................................................... 42
    - Imagination in global student mobility ......................................................... 43
      - Biographical solution of systemic contradictions ...................................... 44
        - Global student mobility as a manifestation of a classed imagination ....... 45
          - Students’ imagination embedded in a neoliberal imaginary of globalization .. 46
            - International students’ identities in contact zones ................................. 48
              - Imagined communities in contact zones ............................................ 48
              - Self-positioning in a contact zone ....................................................... 50
        - Summary .................................................................................................. 51

**Chapter 3: Historical, Social, and Policy Contexts of Internationalization in Japan** 54
  - Historical roots of the discourse of kokusaika .............................................. 55
  - The discourse of kokusaika ............................................................................. 56
    - Nationalism in the discourse of kokusaika .................................................. 58
      - Cultural nationalism: The nihonjinron ...................................................... 59
      - Political nationalism .................................................................................... 61
    - Critical debates on nationalism in the discourse of kokusaika ..................... 62
Chapter 7: International Students’ Identity Formation through Global Mobility

Growing up with images and memories from Japan.
Studying overseas as a common, possible, and ideal life option.
Japanese universities initiating the imagination of Japan as a destination country.
Pursuit of solution versus prestige.
   Coming to HGU: A biographical solution of systemic contradictions in China.
   Convenient solution to the competitive university entrance exam in China.
   Strategic solution to the future labour market competition.
Coming to CILA: “Because it’s famous.”
Japanese higher education system as a sorting and reproductive mechanism of class.
Emerging imagination of a life as transnationals: Desire for a “colourful life.”
Desire for a tourist life style: “Over the world!”
Longing for the imagined West as elsewhere.
Life between privilege and a lack thereof.
Commodification of international education experiences.

Summary.

Chapter 8: International Students’ Identity Formation through Experiences in Japan

Overview of the contexts of students’ experiences in Japan.
International institutional environments versus “real Japan.”
   A Japanese-speaking community versus an English-speaking “fantasyland.”
   Questions of Englishization.
Life with/in Chinese communities: “Yappari chūgoku kujin (Of course, Chinese).”
   Institutional mechanism for the formation of a national group identity.
   The imagination and specificity of “the same background.”
   Detached sense of self from Chinese students or China.
Self-positioning with Japanese peers as Other.
   Japanese peers as Other: “The Japanese don’t care about education.”
   Marginalization by Japanese peers: “We are not the same as them, they think.”
Self-positioning with socio-political tensions in Japan.
   Experience of being “other Asians”: “Japanese people really like Western people.”
   Life in political tensions.
   Acceptance of socio-political tensions in Japan: “It doesn’t trouble me.”
   Missed and emerging learning opportunities for socio-political engagement.
   Missed opportunities in international-student-friendly institutional settings.
Emerging learning opportunities in on-campus and off-campus contact zones. ........ 273
Summary .................................................................................................................. 276

**Chapter 9: Discussion of Findings and Conclusion** .............................................. 279
Emerging imagined communities in global student mobility ................................ 282
Actors’ aligned self-positioning within global and domestic systems .................. 284
Creation of cultural diversity and students’ dis/engagement .................................. 290
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 295
Implications ............................................................................................................... 297
  Implications for practice ......................................................................................... 298
  Implications for policy ........................................................................................... 301
Contributions ............................................................................................................ 306
Limitations .................................................................................................................. 307
Suggestions for future research ................................................................................ 309
Reflection ..................................................................................................................... 311

**Bibliography** ......................................................................................................... 315

**Appendices** ........................................................................................................ 347
Appendix A: Third party recruitment request (English) ........................................ 347
Appendix B: Third party recruitment request (Japanese) ......................................... 350
Appendix C: Invitation letter for faculty/staff members (English) .......................... 353
Appendix D: Invitation letter for faculty/staff members (Japanese) ....................... 355
Appendix E: Consent form for faculty/staff members (English) .............................. 356
Appendix F: Consent form for faculty/staff members (Japanese) ............................ 358
Appendix G: Invitation letter for international students (English) ......................... 360
Appendix H: Invitation letter for international students (Japanese) ....................... 362
Appendix I: Invitation letter for international students (Mandarin) ....................... 364
Appendix J: Consent form for international students (English) .............................. 366
Appendix K: Consent form for international students (Japanese) ........................... 368
Appendix L: Interview protocol for faculty/staff members (English) ...................... 370
Appendix M: Interview protocol for faculty/staff members (Japanese) ................. 373
Appendix N: Interview protocol for international students (English) ..................... 376
Appendix O: Interview protocol for international students (Japanese) ................. 379
Appendix P: Original Japanese quotes ................................................................. 382
List of Tables

Table 1 Overview of international student participants .......................................................... 140
Table 2 Individual international student participants ............................................................. 141
Table 3 Educational and professional backgrounds of student participants' parents .......... 216
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHCE</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Council on Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CILA</td>
<td>College of International Liberal Arts (pseudonym)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Canadian dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLE</td>
<td>Fundamental Law of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATS</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade in Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>HGU</td>
<td>Hokuto Global University (pseudonym)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IELTS</td>
<td>International English Language Testing System</td>
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<td>JASSO</td>
<td>Japan Student Services Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JET</td>
<td>Japan Exchange and Teaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METI</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOEFL</td>
<td>Test of English as a Foreign Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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My journey as a doctoral student at a university in a foreign country has been a privilege and a liberating experience. At the same time, the day-to-day experience of unlearning what I had previously learned and acquiring a new set of cultural and theoretical languages has been like sinking and swimming alone in a dark, deep, and turbulent ocean. However, as I finally pull my head above the water and see the shore, I feel that all the memories of those who have been part of the journey are coming back to me. There is nothing that makes me feel more humbled and grateful.

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Dedication

To two unique women, Akan and Dottie, who loved me and taught me what it is to live true to myself. And to my nieces, Sae and Hina, and my nephew, Yūgo, for your futures.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In the 1980s, following Japan’s remarkable economic success in the global market, numerous words referring to kokusai (international) began to appear in Japanese society as fashionable buzzwords, including kokusai jin (international person), kokusai shakai (international society), and kokusai kankaku (international sensibility). The popularity of these words seemed almost uncontainable. To illustrate the peculiar popularity of these words, Ebuchi (1997) pointed to the prevalence of business names listed in the telephone directory that included the word, kokusai, including even “kokusai pachinko” (international pachinko) parlors and “kokusai dorai kurîningu” (international dry cleaning) (p. 38). The term, kokusaika (internationalization), also emerged alongside these kokusai buzzwords and became a popular slogan in educational and economic reforms during this time in Japan.

Today, these kokusai-related words have lost their novelty, and the slogan of kokusaika in the area of education reforms in Japan has also been subject to scholarly criticism and skepticism. For example, internationalization has come to mean different things to different actors in Japan. As Goodman (2007) states, “Everyone supported the idea of ‘internationalisation,’ but what was exactly meant by the term was far from clear” (p. 72). As I discuss in greater detail in subsequent chapters, other scholars have looked deeper into the multiple meanings of kokusaika and discovered that not only have multiple ideologies (e.g., nationalism), realities, and practices been smuggled into the vague, and yet still popular, slogan of kokusaika, but these ideologies, realities and practices are often competing and paradoxical (Kubota, 1998, 2002; Mochizuki, 2004; Tsuneyoshi, 2011; Yoshino, 1997). Despite the vague and incoherent conceptualizations of kokusaika, kokusaika remains central to Japanese higher

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1 Arcade game
education reforms, and the higher education policies and practices that were informed by the discourse of kokusaika set the stage for this dissertation.

The contemporary process of kokusaika in Japanese higher education and the popularization of the discourse in Japan began under the administration of former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. In 1983, the Japanese government launched the 100,000 International Student Plan under the slogan of making an “international Japan (kokusai kokka nihon)” (Rivers, 2010, p. 443). This policy aimed to increase the number of international students at Japanese higher education institutions to 100,000 by the year 2000. Since then, increasing the number of international students has been a main pillar of the internationalization of the Japanese higher education system. Twenty-five years later, in 2008, the Japanese government announced a subsequent international student policy, the 300,000 International Student Plan, with the goal of hosting 300,000 international students by the year 2020 (Ministries of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology [MEXT]; Foreign Affairs; Justice; Health, Labour and Welfare; Economy, Trade and Industry; Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 2008).

Just as the Japanese government intended, the number of international students at Japanese higher education institutions continues to rise. In 2009, the number reached its highest point in history, 132,720 students,\(^2\) which includes those who are enrolled in graduate schools, universities, junior colleges, professional training colleges, and university preparatory courses\(^3\) (Japan Student Services Organization, 2010c). Over 75% of these international students are enrolled in undergraduate or graduate programs offered by Japanese universities. Over 90% of international students come from Asian countries, and students from the People’s Republic of

\(^2\) Includes 11,546 short-term (less than six months) non-degree-seeking international students.

\(^3\) University preparatory courses are for those who have had less than 12 years of high school education in foreign countries.
China⁴ constitute by far the largest international student population in Japan, accounting for 59.6%, followed by Korea (14.8%) and Taiwan (4.0%) (Japan Student Services Organization, 2010c).

When international students are key actors of kokusaika, what are their actual experiences of kokusaika in Japan? What do their experiences in Japan mean to them? What does kokusaika look like when seen from international students’ points of view? Some may also wonder how Japanese universities interpret the meaning of kokusaika and implement it and for what purpose. Others may wonder why kokusaika has attained such a high level of popularity in Japan despite lacking a clear definition.

As I demonstrate in Chapter 3, the literature on kokusaika and its historical development process emphasizes that kokusaika has been the basis of Japan’s self-positioning strategy. However, there still is a dearth of knowledge about the self-positioning strategies of the other major actors of kokusaika who are considered in this study, namely Japanese universities and international students, and the intersections between the institutional and student actors. These research gaps can be summarized in the following three points. First, studies have demonstrated that Japanese universities see internationalization as a way for them, and for Japan more generally, to position themselves in the domestic and international arenas of higher education and research (Goodman, 2007; Tōhoku University, 2008; Yokota, Ōta, Tsuboi, Shiratsuchi, & Kudō, 2006). While these studies provide a valuable overview of Japanese higher education institutions’ approaches to internationalization, there are few qualitative studies on the matter. As a result, existing knowledge about how Japanese universities see their position and seek to position themselves, through internationalization, in the world of higher education in Japan and

⁴ Includes Hong Kong and Macau. I will use the term China hereafter in this dissertation.
beyond, lacks depth. In addition, as mentioned above, increasing the number of international students has been a major focus of internationalization policies in Japan for nearly three decades. Yet, we still know very little about how institutional actors involved in internationalization view the Japanese government’s internationalization policies and international students and then translate their view into institutional discourses and practices of internationalization.

Second, numerous scholars, primarily in Anglo-Saxon country settings, have framed international students’ participation in international education as an identity construction process. They have studied how international students work to position themselves in the world through their participation in international education (Baas, 2010; Doherty & Singh, 2005a; Rizvi, 2005; Waters, 2009a) and how they identify themselves in relation to host country communities (Beoku-Betts, 2004; Doherty & Singh, 2005a; Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Koehne, 2005). These studies locate international students in unequal power relations within the international field of higher education (Altbach, 2004) and in the host society. There are few equivalent studies that examine Japan as a host country, even though scholarly attention has focused on the significant presence of Asian international students in Japan, particularly those who are from China, their motivations for coming to Japan, and their experiences in Japan (Asano, 1997; J. Chen & Takataya, 2008; Duan, 2003; Shiratsuchi, 2007; Tsuboya, 2010). These studies tend to be descriptive and offer little analysis of the power relations that are part of these students’ experiences. As a result, it is unclear how these students exercise their agency to position themselves in and through their international education in Japan.

Third, studies about the internationalization of Japanese universities and international students’ experiences in Japan have been conducted in isolation from each other. Consequently, there is a lack of contextualized understanding of international students’ experiences and identity
construction in the current internationalization of their host universities in Japan. Connecting international students more closely with their Japanese universities is important when Japan and Japanese universities invoke the popular slogan of *kokusaika* to recruit more international students. When we have a window into how *kokusaika* is understood from these stakeholders’ points of view, we will finally be able to start understanding in a more tangible way the meaning of *kokusaika*, including both its challenges and its potential.

**Research purpose and questions.**

Based on the research gaps identified above, this study examines the construction of international students’ identities in the context of the internationalization of Japanese higher education institutions. While investigating the internationalization from the institutions’ points of view, the study analyzes how international students experience the internationalized Japanese university settings and how they position themselves in and through their participation in international education in Japan. By exploring the intersections of the internationalization of Japanese universities and the construction of international students’ identities, the study aims to uncover some of the challenges and potentials of the internationalization of Japanese universities that might not have been discussed in the existing literature. The questions that guide the inquiry are as follows:

1) How do Japanese universities see their social existence and translate it into their internationalization discourses and practices?
   a) How are international students positioned in the universities’ internationalization discourses and practices?
   b) What is the relationship between the internationalization of the universities and the internationalization policies of the Japanese government?
2) How do international students see their identities and future possibilities in and through their international education in Japan?
   a) What drives international students’ desire to participate in international education in Japan and specifically at Japanese universities?
   b) How do international students experience and position themselves in Japanese universities and Japanese society?
   c) How do their experiences in Japan shape how they imagine their futures?

**Theoretical framework.**

Imagination is an overarching concept in this study. Imagination should not be equated with illusion or fantasy, and while it can be a property of individuals, it can also take a collective form. Appadurai (1996) distinguishes imagination from fantasy, and describes that a collective form of imagination can lead to action, as follows:

The idea of fantasy carries with it the inescapable connotation of thought divorced from projects and actions, and it also has a private, even individualistic sound about it. The imagination, on the other hand, has a projective sense about it, the sense of being a prelude to some sort of expression, whether aesthetic or otherwise. Fantasy can dissipate . . . , but the imagination, especially when collective, can become the fuel for action. It is the imagination, in its collective forms, that creates ideas of neighborhood and nationhood, of moral economies and unjust rule, of higher wages and foreign labor prospects. The imagination is today a staging around for action, and not only for escape. (p. 7)

Highlighting the collective form of imagination and its role in social processes, scholars have developed concepts such as imagined communities (Anderson, 1991) and social imaginary
The concepts of imagined communities and social imaginary resonate with each other because both concepts express our imaginative capacity to perceive our social existence and our future possibilities. As I will elaborate in Chapter 2, while the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, there is a nuanced difference between them, and I use the two concepts to understand different aspects of internationalization.

Anderson (1991), who introduced us to the concept of “imagined communities,” argues that what we think of as nations are in fact imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (p. 6). For Anderson, this is to say that communities are a socially constructed idea, rather than a reflection of reality. “Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). While Anderson’s original conceptualization of imagined communities is concerned with explaining the role of imagination in nation-building and nationalism, Norton (2001) applies the concept to an educational setting. Specifically, Norton uses the concept to understand how we see our social existence and invest in learning in order to belong to a new community, transcending time and space. As Anderson sought to understand why people’s sense of belonging to an imagined political community (the nation) became so powerful that millions were willing to sacrifice their lives for the imagined community, the role of the individual is not absent in his conceptualization of imagined communities. However, while Anderson’s focus is on explaining the mechanisms through which people’s collective sense of belonging to a nation as an imagined community was developed (e.g., territories traversed by pilgrimages and print), Norton’s use of the concept of imagined communities emphasizes individuals’ desire and agency to belong to their envisioned communities. I draw on Norton’s use of imagined communities to
understand how actors in the internationalization of Japanese higher education see their social existence in relation to their imagined communities, as well as to immediately accessible communities, and how they exercise their agency to affiliate themselves with the communities they aspire to join.

By contrast, the concept of social imaginary solely refers to a collective form of imagination and emphasizes a normative sense of our social existence shaped by hegemonic ideology and discourse, while also holding out the possibility of an alternative imaginary to counteract hegemony (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). I use this concept to explain how and why actors in the internationalization of Japanese higher education have come to imagine the possibility of joining particular communities. I also turn to this concept to illuminate how and why certain internationalization policies and practices have become dominant in Japanese higher education. In essence, by using these ideas relating to imagination, I illustrate self-positioning strategies of the actors involved, namely Japan, Japanese universities, and international students, and the imaginations that they bring into the process of kokusaika.

My personal trajectory to the research.

My doctoral studies, including this research project, reflect my own struggle to find my voice and sense of self that were lost in my naïve and uncritical participation in the benign discourse of the internationalization of higher education. I spent my adolescence in the 1980s in Japan immersed in the popular discourse of kokusaika. As the discourse of kokusaika implies a positive change or even progress, internationalization meant nothing but a “good thing” to me for a long time. I still recall, during my first study abroad experience in Ontario in 1995, the thrill of thinking about many future possibilities opening up to me. I learned to speak English, I had a friendly host family who treated me as part of their own family, and I became friends with
wonderful people from different parts of the world, people with whom I would have never met if I had stayed in my rural hometown in Japan. I could not imagine anything more exciting. In 2000, I embarked on my Master’s study in the United States with a goal of working in the field of international education, and I landed a position as an International Student Advisor at a predominantly white university in 2002. I was excited about the opportunity to work as part of the very same world of internationalization of higher education that had brought so many incredible learning opportunities to my life.

However, five years later, I left the job feeling confused, disappointed, and frustrated. On the one hand, I was, and always will be, grateful for the opportunities and support to learn and grow during those years. On the other hand, I was frustrated with the lack of critical engagement of international educators, including myself, in their work. And yet, due to my insufficient analytical language, I could not spell out what I felt was problematic. Only after six years have I finally come to understand what those feelings were, why they mattered, and how they now relate to this study.

The international student office where I worked referred to international students as “cultural informants,” and often invited them to be guest speakers at various intercultural understanding workshops for university faculty and staff members. I also on occasion served as one of the speakers. Initially, it was refreshing and empowering to know that international students’ stories like mine were heard and valued. However, as I established my professional and personal life in the United States, I started to see myself more as a member of American society than as a guest or a cultural informant. Yet, I gradually learned that a non-white non-native English-speaking foreign woman did not easily qualify for such membership. At the end of the day, I was still seen as different, exotic, or “interesting.” With a growing awareness of my
marginal social position within American society, I began to feel that it was not enough to simply appraise cultural informants’ “interesting” cultural perspectives and their resilience in the face of all the challenges of living in the United States. I once asked my colleagues why it was that we would not do anything differently, especially in light of the stories the students told. Since we were not making any changes in our work to support our students better, I felt as if we were listening to their stories only for our own sake, either to enjoy their authentic cultural narratives or to put ourselves in a safe position of being an “open-minded host” with listening ears. After some discussions, however, we concluded that any change needed to begin with “baby steps.” During my entire time working in that office, we hardly went past the mere baby step of just listening.

My time in the United States coincided with the 9-11 terrorist attacks and the aftermath. My colleagues passionately argued against the US government’s tightening of immigration measures insisting on the value of diversity that international students brought to American universities. However, as my office increasingly engaged in international student recruitment after 9-11, several questions began to surface in my mind: Why do we need more diversity? Isn’t this country already diverse enough? How are we engaging with the diverse people around us, including domestic minority students? Nevertheless, I did not know what I wanted to achieve by challenging my colleagues’ good intentions to welcome, rather than block, more international students.

Bennett and Bennett (1994) succinctly explain the shared sentiment, which I myself could not articulate at that time, regarding diversity in the field of international education and its disengagement from domestic diversity in the United States as follows:
It may even be suggested that international program administrators somehow find it easier or “safer” to deal with “exotic” learners from faraway places than to confront the very complex issues of domestic oppression of people of color, gays, lesbians, and women. (p. 150)

Within this paradoxical sentiment, I could not find a space for a critical dialogue that would go beyond comfortable cultural learning. I wanted to engage in the social and political complexity of international students’ identities and experiences, and I realized that talking about power relations, such as the issues of privilege, was essential for that. Yet, I did not know how to initiate and deliver conversations on such socially contentious issues in an effective manner. My attempts at such conversations more often resulted in silencing rather than empowering myself. With a few exceptions, my colleagues would usually conclude those conversations by politely thanking me for sharing my thoughts. They would also attribute my sensitivity to insidious power relations to my Japanese cultural background, which emphasizes “reading between the lines,” and ensuring that I did not question their motives or integrity. The confusion and frustration that I felt at that time were very similar to those of a teenager awakening to contradictions in society and yet having no adult to talk to about it.

Despite my colleagues’ good intentions and kind words, I left the office wondering if my existence there meant anything more than having a traditional Japanese doll sitting at the front desk. My presence there was welcomed and even celebrated as long as I acted as an appreciative guest or a cultural informant without problematizing anything. I was rewarded well for playing the role. In return, however, I lost my voice and sense of self as an international student, educator, and above all as a human being.
This marginal sense of self that I felt in the United States, and in a slightly different way in my subsequent life in Canada, led me to wonder how much I really knew about international students in Japan, the country I still called home. Rather than critiquing North American society, where I felt powerless, studying international students in Japan seemed to be a more sensible choice for me. The combination of the research context (Japan) and the subject group (international students) resonated most with my sense of self at the time. Yet, during my research process, I wondered numerous times whether I was the right person to conduct this research, and I still wonder to what extent the sense of resonance and belonging that I felt to the research subjects was just part of my imagination.

Nonetheless, this research project has taught me about the interrelated nature of the internationalization of higher education which is embedded in the web of global and local power relations. My research participants, the country of Japan, all the people with whom I worked in the United States, and myself all form a constellation of actors of internationalization occupying multiple social positions and constituting different power relations with one another. For example, on the one hand, as an international student and in many other capacities, I often find myself in a marginal position in North America due to my racial, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. On the other hand, I am endowed with tremendous privilege; I am a globally mobile student from a so-called developed country, and I am pursuing a doctoral degree at an English-speaking Canadian university that occupies a privileged position within the uneven global field of higher education (Altbach, 2004). This set of privileges puts me in an elevated position in relation to many international students in Japan, particularly those who come from developing countries. With this particular researcher subjectivity that I bring to the study, I situate international students, Japanese universities, and Japan in global and local power
relations. This study represents my humble first attempt to understand the complexity of internationalization and the actors in it, instead of uncritically promoting internationalization merely as a “good thing” or even as a requirement of globalization.

**Research design.**

This study employs a case study design (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2003). Using the extreme-case selection method (Gerring, 2007), I selected two private Japanese higher education institutions that have been extremely successful in implementing the ideas of internationalization proposed by the Japanese government. The institutions that I selected are: Hokuto Global University (HGU) and the College of International Liberal Arts (CILA) of the Kasuga University. These institution names are pseudonyms. HGU and CILA were established, after the year 2000, as “international” institutions that: a) recruit a large number of international students and faculty members; and b) provide degree programs that can only be completed in English, both of which are still rare in the Japanese higher education system, and which recent Japanese internationalization policies and programs have aimed to promote further.

While similar in some ways, the two institutions hold contrasting institutional profiles. CILA is part of the Kasuga University, a prestigious comprehensive university located in one of Japan’s urban areas. In contrast, HGU is a smaller and less prestigious university located in a rural area.

The study targeted two participant groups at each institution: international students and faculty and staff members. For the international students, by adopting purposeful sampling (Creswell, 2007), I selected the most representative international student population at Japanese higher education institutions, namely, those who were self-funded degree-seeking undergraduate students from China who were also humanities and social science majors enrolled at private
I further narrowed down the sample group to those who were in or beyond the third year of their undergraduate studies. I made this selection based on the assumption that these more senior students, compared to students at earlier stages of their studies, had more time to make sense of their experiences in Japan and to contemplate their future plans. As to faculty/staff participants, I selected individuals who held leadership positions at their institutions in the area of internationalization, whether it was in student recruitment, academic affairs, career support, or central administration.

I administered semi-standardized interviews (Berg, 2007) with the two groups of participants who qualified using the above sampling criteria: 27 international students (15 at HGU and 12 at CILA); and 15 faculty/staff members (seven at HGU and eight at CILA/Kasuga).

I provide further details of the study, including the methodological approaches and my data collection and analysis strategies, in Chapter 5.

**Layout of the dissertation.**

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical foundation for the study. To articulate why the concept of imagination is crucial in internationalization research, I begin by problematizing how internationalization is conceptualized in relation to globalization in major international scholarly debates. The rest of the chapter introduces key concepts: imagined communities, social imaginary, and associated concepts, and discusses how I use them in the study.

Chapter 3 presents the historical, policy, and social contexts of the internationalization of Japanese higher education. I illustrate the historical process in which the discourse of *kokusaika* was developed as Japan worked to elevate its position in the world, and more specifically in relation to the West, since the Meiji era (1868-1912). In so doing, I explain how and why the discourse has gained popular consensus in the country while accommodating a paradoxical
notion of nationalism. I also analyze Japan’s major international student policies of the past three decades and provide an overview of the Japanese higher education system and the demographics of international students in Japan.

Chapter 4 presents three domains of existing empirical literature relevant to the study: the internationalization of higher education institutions, global student mobility, and international students’ identities. In my discussions of the literature, I apply the theoretical concepts described in Chapter 2 and integrate the social and policy contexts of the internationalization of Japanese higher education presented in Chapter 3.

Chapter 5 explains the methodology of the study. In addition, in this chapter, I provide details of the study’s research process, including sampling strategies, as well as details on the two cases, the participants, and data collection and analysis procedures.

In the subsequent three chapters (Chapter 6, 7, and 8), I present empirical findings of the study. In Chapter 6, I describe, based on my site visits and on faculty and staff participants’ accounts, the physical institutional environment and the genesis of each institution, respectively. In addition, based on my interviews with faculty and staff participants, the chapter addresses the first research question, “How do Japanese universities see their social existence and translate it into their internationalization discourses and practices?” as well as related sub-questions.

Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 present findings based on interviews with international student participants. Chapter 7 focuses on their identity formation through their global mobility and responds to the two sub-questions of the second research question: “What drives international students’ desire to participate in international education in Japan and specifically at the Japanese universities?” and “How do their experiences in Japan shape how they imagine their futures?” I highlight international students’ classed identity formation through their participation in
international education at the two different Japanese higher education institutions, as well as the institutions’ involvement in the development of the students’ future imaginations.

Chapter 8 focuses on the sub-question under the second research question, “How do international students experience and position themselves in the Japanese universities and Japanese society?” I illustrate how international students see communities around them, such as their Chinese peers and Japanese peers, and how they identify themselves in relation to them. I also discuss how student participants experience the socio-political climate in Japan and engage or do not engage with their peers in discussions about socio-political issues in Japan or in the wider world. Based on their accounts of their experiences or lack of these experiences, I discuss not only how they see their social existence but also what constitutes some of the emerging and missed learning opportunities in the internationalized university settings.

Chapter 9 integrates the findings from the previous three chapters and interprets them by drawing on the relevant literature. I highlight three themes that emerged from my explorations on the intersections between international students and their host institutions. First, I discuss how imagined communities are expressed in students’ narratives on their global mobility and how the institutions form part of the students’ imagination. Second, I discuss alignments between how the institutions imagine their own future possibilities through internationalization and how students imagine their possibilities through their participation in international education in Japan. Third, I discuss theoretical and practical problems that arise from the institutions’ strategies of creating cultural diversity through the recruitment of international students and the creation of English-medium programs, and I do so by comparing the institutions’ intentions and students’ engagement in the cultural diversity created on the Japanese campuses. I then integrate some of the challenges and potential that I discovered in my study’s findings into my discussions on the
study’s implications for internationalization policy and practice in Japan. The chapter also addresses the contributions and limitations of the study, followed by suggestions for future research. I close with my personal reflections.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

To theorize interactions between actors in higher education at the global, national, and local levels, Marginson and Rhoades (2002) focus on the role of agency, specifically, “formal agencies and collective human actions” at each level (p. 289). By formal agencies, they refer to entities or organizations at each level, such as international organizations, governmental units, and higher education institutions. By collective human actions or agency of collectivities, they mean, “the ability of people individually and collectively to take action (exercise agency)” (p. 289). According to the authors, the interactions between the actors at different levels are reciprocal and multidirectional. I use these understandings to locate the Japanese government, universities, and international students in a context in which multidirectional forces of influence at the global, national, and institutional level interact with one another. I turn to the notion of imagination in order to connect, as well as to unpack, the agency exercised by collective and individual actors at the different levels in the dynamic interaction process. The notion of imagination allows us to explore what guides and drives our individual and collective agency based on how we see ourselves in relation to others and how we see possibilities for action.

The purpose of this chapter is to develop the study’s theoretical foundation around the notion of imagination based on theoretical arguments by key theorists and educational researchers. I demonstrate how the notion of imagination can help us conceptualize internationalization, international students’ identities, and the relationship between the two. The organization of the chapter is as follows. First, I outline key issues and debates on internationalization in order to provide the broad context for this study. In doing so, based primarily on Rizvi and Lingard’s (2010) conceptualization of a social imaginary of globalization, I suggest that the concept of social imaginary has been missing from our understanding of
globalization, internationalization, and the relationship between the two. Second, I develop the theoretical foundation for social imaginary and imagined communities based on the literature that theorizes these concepts or applies them to educational research. Third, to set up the broad theoretical contexts for my study, I apply the notion of the social imaginary to the conceptualization of globalization, internationalization, and the relationship between the two. Fourth, I narrow the focus of the discussion to internationalization policies and practices at an institutional level and the implications for these policies and practices of social imaginary and imagined communities. Finally, I shift the focus of the discussion to international students: how imagination, both in collective and individual sense, works to shape how they see their social existence and the possibilities for the future in relation to others in the world as well as in their immediate social context.

**Globalization and internationalization: Conceptual problems.**

Internationalization is both an “expression of and response to the contemporary processes of globalisation” located within historical and political contexts (Rizvi, 2006a, p. viii). Globalization is often framed as a descriptive phenomenon, and in the major literature on internationalization of higher education (Altbach & Knight, 2006; Altbach, 2004; Huang, 2007; Knight, 2003; van der Wende, 2001), internationalization is often framed as a response to empirical changes brought about by globalization as seen in the global flows of technology, economy, knowledge, and people. For example, Altbach (2004) defines globalization as “the broad economic, technological, and scientific trends that directly affect higher education and are largely inevitable” (p.5). Based on the empirical understanding of globalization, he defines internationalization as “specific policies and programmes undertaken by governments, academic systems and institutions, and even individual departments or institutions to cope with or exploit
globalisation. Internationalisation describes the voluntary and perhaps creative ways of coping” (p. 6).

Knight (2012) further elaborates that internationalization has two interrelated pillars: “at home” and “abroad.” The former refers to campus- and curriculum-based efforts to include the intercultural and international dimension in teaching and learning, research, and extracurricular activities. The latter refers to cross-border education involving “the movement of people, programs, providers, policies, knowledge, ideas, projects and services across national boundaries” (Knight, 2012, p. 23). The newly emergent branch campuses, online education programs, double- and joint-degree programs, and franchise programs are also included in this category.

On the one hand, describing internationalization in relation to descriptive accounts of global changes is appropriate and useful at times. On the other hand, it is not sufficient when we try to make sense of and grapple with problematic issues of internationalization today. Over the past few decades, internationalization has brought about new opportunities and benefits, but it has also undergone significant changes and has resulted in some negative consequences. One troubling aspect of these consequences, as Knight (2012) states, is that “Often they are at the macro level and become an implicit part of the culture or environment of international education without being questioned” (p. 21). I argue that the problems of internationalization have remained implicit and unquestioned because debates on internationalization have seldom addressed its relationship to implicit and normative aspects of globalization. We need to unpack the grand normative forces underpinning internationalization today in order to grapple with problems in internationalization and begin to imagine alternative ways of internationalization.
Below, I describe the major problematic changes in internationalization at a macro level in order to demonstrate that internationalization is not just a value-neutral response to empirical changes that globalization has brought to the field of education. In doing so, I argue that internationalization has always been a response driven by political and economic interests that are entrenched in the world’s uneven power configurations. Then, following primarily Rizvi and Lingard (2010), I suggest that the concept of social imaginary be integrated into our understanding of globalization and internationalization.

**Manifestation of the problems of internationalization at a macro level.**

According to a 2005 International Association of Universities survey of higher education institutions in 95 countries, both developing and developed, commercialization and commodification of education was identified as the number-one risk of internationalization (Knight, 2007). The dramatic shift of internationalization’s rationale and approach towards a market model has caused a great deal of concern and has promoted a great deal of debate among scholars (Altbach & Knight, 2006; Knight, 2007, 2009, 2012; Stromquist, 2007; Teichler, 2004; van der Wende, 2001). This shift can be observed, for example, in the intensifying global competition to recruit high tuition international students by higher education institutions, particularly those in English-speaking Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (Gürüz, 2008). In addition, to take advantage of the growing international higher education market, “foreign degree mills (selling ‘parchment’-only degrees) and accreditation mills (selling bogus accreditations for programs or institutions), and rogue for-profit providers (not recognized by national authorities)” have all emerged (Knight, 2009, p. 9). Moreover, international students are not only a source of revenue but they are also a human resource. Countries such as Australia, Canada, and Japan take a skilled-migrant approach to lure
talented international students, retain them after graduation, and then incorporate them into the labour force in order to support the development of these countries’ knowledge economies (P. Brown & Tannock, 2009; Gürüz, 2008; Ōta, 2012).

Moreover, there is intensifying competition among higher education systems and institutions across the world for name recognition and prestige in international university rankings (Marginson, 2006). According to Marginson (2006), the world of higher education is a site of production of “positional goods” that provide national higher education systems and institutions with access to social prestige and income-earning. Yet, the competition takes place in a winner-takes-all paradigm. As Altbach (2004) describes, major research-oriented universities, particularly those that use English, are concentrated in the Global North. They attract more talented students and scholars from all over the world, produce more knowledge, distribute their knowledge widely through major international academic journals (which are predominantly in English), and consequently accumulate more knowledge and resources. Their academic knowledge, language, standards, and practices have become the dominant academic norm that other higher education systems in the rest of the world emulate. After all, those higher education systems and institutions that have prestige in the global higher education community can leverage that prestige to obtain more revenue (Marginson, 2006).

One of the most significant and tangible consequences of the uneven global higher education market is that high-status higher education systems and institutions attract more international students from around the world and gain significant income. In fact, according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2012), the top host countries in 2010 are the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and France. The largest host country, the United States, alone attracts 684,714 international students, which
accounts for 19.2% of the world’s international student population (UNESCO, 2012). In the United States, international students brought in over $20 billion in 2010 (NAFSA: Association of International Educators, n.d.). In Australia, education is the third largest export sector and earned $12 billion in 2007, mostly from international students attending higher education institutions in that country (Marginson, 2009).

By contrast, less powerful countries in the uneven international academic arena lose not only their intellectual and cultural autonomy but also the educated human resources that are crucial for their national development. In the realm of global student mobility, China is the largest sending country, sending 562,889 students abroad, followed by India (200,621) and Korea (126,447) in 2010 (UNESCO, 2012). Even though new terms such as “brain circulation” and “brain sharing” have been invented to address some of the benefits and increasing complexity of the recent global mobility, there is a unchanging fundamental fact of global mobility: developing countries are losing the highly educated to more developed countries, and the flow of highly educated has never worked in the other direction (P. Brown & Tannock, 2009; T.-M. Chen & Barnett, 2000; Knight, 2012). Accordingly, although the rhetoric of the internationalization of higher education implies the notion of “global engagement as two-way flows premised on mutual cultural respect,” Marginson (2006) asserts that, “the reality is different. Global competition in degree programs is an export-import market in positional goods, characterized by uni-directional student flows and asymmetrical cultural transformations” (p. 18).

Referring to these unequal power dynamics, Altbach and Knight (2006) focus on the newly emerging commercialization and commodification trend in internationalization and

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5 The currency is not specified in the source.
6 The currency is not specified in the source.
express their concern that the aim of internationalization is shifting from serving a public good to a private good of the “profit center” (p. 35). Knight (2012) elaborates on the shift, saying “What is unexpected and somewhat worrisome are the different ends (rankings, profit, soft power) and some of the values (competitiveness, commercialization) that are now linked to internationalization” (p. 22). For example, for Knight, the original idea of facilitating global student mobility was to help students from developing countries to complete a degree and return home. Twenty-five years ago, it would have been unimaginable that it would evolve into a competitive multi-million dollar international student recruitment business.

However, it must be remembered that internationalization in the past was not necessarily a benign or value-neutral project serving a global public good. Internationalization has always been underpinned by a particular ideology (Stier, 2004) located within the world’s unequal power relations (Altbach, 2004). Currently, even though international development cooperation upholds a seemingly-benevolent vision of creating a better world, it does not escape the skepticism that it is often operated within the rich world’s ethnocentric and imperialist paradigm: “‘[Developing countries] can learn from us’ i.e., ‘we have little to learn from them’” (Stier, 2004, p. 89).

The worldwide marketization trend in internationalization described above does not work to amend existing global inequalities but rather maintains or exacerbates them. Brown and Tannock (2009) contend that the intensifying global competition for international students is in essence driven by “national self-interest, not a concern with global responsibility or the interests of other nations” (p. 385). As I will describe more fully later, the trend is informed by neoliberal ideologies, which view and treat education and students as a means for national and global economic competitiveness (Forstorp, 2008; Spring, 1998, 2008; Torres & Schugurensky, 2002).
Then, obviously, internationalization is not a value-neutral response merely to empirical changes that globalization has brought to the field of education. It has been entrenched and implicated in the uneven power configurations in a world with particular political and economic interests.

What has received scant attention in debates on globalization, internationalization, and the relationship between the two is the role of imagination guiding and driving the agency of higher education actors at the global, national, and local levels. Descriptive accounts of globalization mask why globalization and internationalization are happening in the way they are, who is making the changes in internationalization and for what purposes, and how those changes have gained public consent as a legitimate response to globalization (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010).

The understanding of internationalization grounded in globalization as a self-evident descriptive phenomenon constrains not only our understanding of internationalization but also our imagination for how internationalization could take other forms. Below, I discuss social imaginary and imagined communities, two concepts I use in this study to operationalize the notion of imagination.

**Imagined communities.**

As explained in Chapter 1, following Norton (2001), I borrow Benedict Anderson’s (1991) concept of imagined communities as an analytical tool to understand how we create a new sense of social existence for ourselves in a world with new or different people, values, meaning, and system, transcending time and space. In other words, an imagined community refers to an “imaginative construction of the future,” as well as to a “reconstruction” of the past (Norton, 2001, p. 164). In this regard, the concept of imagined communities has been applied to various areas of educational research to analyze, for example, how students’ imagined communities impact their investment in learning (Norton, 2001) or study abroad (Fong, 2011),
how educational institutions’ imagined communities shape their policies and practices (Kanno, 2003), and how an education institution space as an imagined community affects people’s sense of inclusion or exclusion in that space (Quinn, 2005; Shircliffe, Dorn, & Cobb-Roberts, 2006).

As manifested in the internationalization of higher education and in growing global student mobility, how we imagine our social existence and our possibilities often transcends national borders. Appadurai (1996) locates the notion of imagination within the globalizing context, which is characterized by the disjunctures of the flows of different scapes, namely ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes. Today, we live amid the rapid, massive, and irregular global flows of people, technology, capital, electronic media and information, ideas and ideologies. Moreover, there are eduscapes: the global flows of education which involve the flows of the other scapes (K. V. Beck, 2008; Caluya, Probyn, & Vyas, 2011; Kynäeslahti, 2003; Luke, 2006). These flows of scapes allow imagination to become a “property of collectives,” not only for a limited number of elites, but also for ordinary people (Appadurai, 1996, p. 8). It does so by enabling them to share and consume goods, ideas, images, education, and so forth in a collective manner and to “imagine and feel things together” at a global scale (Appadurai, 1996, p. 8).

Yet, it is important to note that our imagination is not always wide open to any possibilities but rather is always socially situated. Extending Anderson’s (1991) notion of imagined communities, Appadurai (1996) explains the scapes as the “landscapes” and the “building blocks” of our “imagined worlds, that is, the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe” (p. 33). The scapes are “not objectively given relations . . . but, rather, . . . deeply perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors”
(Appadurai, 1996, p. 33). Then, imagined worlds can be understood as an expression of how we as individuals or groups assess our current positions in the world and translate the images of our social existence into our future possibilities and actions. This is also to say that we have different levels of access to our imagined communities depending on our social positions (Norton, 2001).

I ground my analysis of the internationalization of the Japanese higher education system and international students in this socially situated notion of imagined communities in a global context, in other words, how the actors involved (i.e., the Japanese government, Japanese universities, and international students) imagine their social existence in relation to real and imagined communities around them and how they exercise their agency to align themselves to the communities of which they aspire to become part.

**Social imaginary.**

How we imagine our social existence and possibilities are also embedded in social imaginaries that carry a particular ideological discourse permeating our broader society. While ideology is a system of beliefs, norms, values representing a particular interest of a group of people, social imaginary facilitates the process of translating ideology into actual material practices that steer our collective sense of how we fit into the world, what is normal, and what is possible (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). Therefore, in this study, I draw on social imaginary to explain a normative and factual context in which actors in the internationalization of Japanese higher education (i.e., the Japanese government, universities, and international students) imagine joining particular communities as possible and normal. I also turn to the concept of social imaginary to understand how and why certain internationalization policies and practices have become dominant in Japanese higher education.
The role of social imaginary is central to Charles Taylor’s (2004) theorization of the formation of Western modernity. According to Taylor, social imaginary worked to develop the new notion of moral order held by some influential thinkers into the norm and practice shared by an entire society. Social imaginary thus worked to bring individuals together to form a political entity with the shared understanding of moral order that is characterized by the rights and obligations that allow them to live together. Thus, social imaginary can be understood as:

the way in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations. (Taylor, 2004, p. 23)

The normative aspect of social imaginary resonates with Pierre Bourdieu’s (1997) concept of “habitus,” which refers to individuals’ embodied background understanding that dictates their perceptions, behaviors, actions, and so forth. Yet, according to Taylor (2001), social imaginary occupies a space between a theory and habitus. Social imaginary is not explicitly expressed in theoretical or doctrinal terms, but rather refers to a more taken-for-granted idea shared among people. At the same time, while developed in habitus, social imaginary is more explicitly expressed than habitus, in forms such as daily rituals, symbols, and artwork. As such, social imaginary is more explicitly expressed and is more collective than habitus. Today, electronic media also plays an increasingly significant role in the expression of social imaginary by offering “new resources and new disciplines for the construction of imagined selves and imagined worlds” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 3). As such, social imaginary brings together both normative and factual understandings of our relation to the world.
Social imaginary in policy.

As in our everyday practices and images, social imaginary is embedded in discourse that is informed by a particular ideology and enables, through hegemonic and authoritative power, a particular imagination of our social existence and practices. By implication, social imaginary is embedded in policies. Therefore, the concept of social imaginary has been deployed in education policy research to explain how and why a certain educational policies and practices have come to be seen by the public as normal and legitimate (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010; Rizvi, 2006b). This study also turns to the concept of social imaginary to understand how and why certain internationalization policies and practices have become dominant in Japanese higher education.

Policy does not refer only to actual policy texts. Policy has two dimensions: policy as text and policy as discourse (Ball, 1993). According to Ball (1993), while policy as text refers to the actual words used in policy documents and policy speeches, policy as discourse constructs “certain possibilities for thought” (p. 14). The notion of policy as discourse is underpinned by the idea that broader social and institutional discourses frame policy texts based on perceived problems. Ball elaborates, “We are the subjectivities, the voices, the knowledge, the power relations that a discourse constructs and allows. . . . We are spoken by policies, we take up the positions constructed for us within policies” (p. 14). In this way, policies uphold a certain value and political interests that are informed by a certain discourse.

However, as Rizvi (2006b) argues, the above theorization of policy as text and discourse does not adequately explain what gives policy authority. Rizvi seeks the explanation in social imaginary as explained below:

In my view, social imaginaries play a major role in making policies authoritative, in securing consent and becoming legitimate. They provide the backdrop against which
people develop a common understanding that makes possible common policy practices and a shared sense of legitimacy. They bring together factual and normative aspects of policies, and enable people to develop a shared understanding of the problems to which policies are proposed as solutions. (p. 198)

As such, policy as discourse presents problems and possible solutions in ways that represent certain values and preferences and frames the context of policy text. Social imaginaries enable the policies to work with authority and legitimacy by circulating a certain possibility for thought in order to develop a popular consensus about the problems and solutions presented by the policies.

In sum, in this study, I use the concept of imagined communities to examine how the actors involved in the internationalization of Japanese higher education see their social existence in relation to others and exercise their agency to participate in the communities they aspire to join. For example, the Japanese government’s internationalization policies, Japanese universities’ internationalization practices, and international students’ decisions to study overseas all signal the imagined communities they aspire to join. More specifically, these policies and decisions signal how they imagine the world in which they see themselves living, how they think they fit in the world, and how they aspire to position themselves differently. In order to contextualize their imagined communities, I draw on the idea of social imaginary that provides a normative and factual context against which the actors imagine their participation in particular communities as their possible and legitimate future possibilities and actions.

**Social imaginary in globalization and internationalization.**

I problematized earlier that globalization as the context of internationalization has been largely defined in descriptive terms. In this section, using the concept of social imaginary, I aim
to conceptualize the internationalization of higher education based on a more holistic understanding of globalization. I ground my analysis of internationalization in the conceptualization of globalization by Rizvi and Lingard (2010). According to them, there are at least three ways to understand globalization. Noting that the three ways are not mutually exclusive, they explain that globalization can be understood:

- as an empirical fact that describes the profound shifts that are currently taking place in the world;
- as an ideology that masks various expression [sic] of power and a range of political interests; and
- as a social imaginary that expresses the sense people have of their own identity and how it relates to the rest of the world, and how it implicitly shapes their aspirations and expectations. (p. 24)

This conceptualization of globalization is consistent with Appadurai’s (1996) aforementioned notion of the flows of scapes that involve both factual and normative global flows. Then, internationalization can be understood as a driver of eduscape that is crisscrossed with other scapes involving factual and normative global flows.

To develop a theoretical understanding of internationalization based on the above understanding of globalization, I present below how internationalization has been embedded in two interrelated social imaginaries of globalization: a Western imaginary and a neoliberal imaginary. However, two caveats need to be made before proceeding. First, I do not intend to claim that these are the only social imaginaries operating in the internationalization of higher education. I use these two imaginaries as an entry point to unpack the hegemonic factual and normative forces underpinning internationalization at the macro level. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, the imaginaries are highly relevant to the case of Japan because they connect the historical and contemporary internationalization processes that Japan has undergone.
Second, as Appadurai’s (1996) notion of “vernacular globalization” (p. 10) suggests, globalization happens in the clash between top-down and locally-specific bottom-up forces, and so the flows of influence are multidirectional among various higher education actors at the global, national, and local levels (Lingard, 2000; Marginson & Rhoades, 2002; Singh, Kenway, & Apple, 2005). For example, I will discuss below how international organizations act as powerful policy actors and exert strong influence over educational policy-making across the world with a neoliberal imaginary of globalization. Nonetheless, the relationship between international organizations and educational policy development in each country is complex and two-way, rather than top-down. Globalization does not equal homogenization and the death of the nation states’ role and power in higher education policy making (Dale, 1999; Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008). Nation states deploy the international organizations’ neoliberal discourse as a hegemonic policy device in order to develop a neoliberal imaginary in their own policy contexts and legitimize their policy ideas, texts, and practices while incorporating their particular histories, politics, and cultures (Rizvi, 2006b). Likewise, Western hegemony in the globalization process does not always work in a one-way manner, and does not always equate with Westernization. As I will present in the next chapter, internationalization of education in Japan is an excellent case to illustrate how Japan has worked to develop its national identity in relation to the West without actually becoming the West.

That being said, the existence of dominant historical, political, and economic forces in the field of higher education should not be completely dismissed but rather more clearly articulated. The purpose of presenting Western and neoliberal imaginaries of globalization in what follows is not to present a simplistic and deterministic view of internationalization. Rather, it is to articulate the historical, political, and economic power configurations of the world in which
internationalization is embedded. In other words, the purpose is to articulate how our imagination, which is involved in the internationalization of higher education, is socially situated and constructed.

*Internationalization within a Western imaginary of globalization.*

As discussed earlier, the internationalization of higher education unfolds on an unequal field of global higher education. More specifically, it has been located within a sense of global interconnectivity that is built upon historical colonial power relations in which the West is central. In this dissertation, I refer to this particular understanding of global interconnectivity as a Western imaginary of globalization. Internationalization is an expression of and response to globalization, which has historical roots in Western imperialism and colonialism (Forstorp, 2008; Luke, 2006; Spring, 1998).

In the conceptualization of eduscape and internationalization, Luke (2006) goes back to the European model of educational institutions established across the world by the British Empire, the Dutch East Indian Company, and the Spanish Conquistadors to train local elites for the colonial bureaucracies. Likewise, after the Second World War, many Asian countries developed their higher education systems following the academic practices and ideologies of Anglo-Saxon countries as a way to modernize. To date, their internationalization policies and practices tend to be developed through the mere copying of policies of the Anglo-Saxon model (Deem, Mok, & Lucas, 2008; Mok, 2007).

For example, as a way to internationalize, more non-English-speaking countries adopt English as the language of instruction and adopt curricula from Anglo-Saxon countries (Altbach, 2004; Deem et al., 2008; Huang, 2007; Kubota, 2009; Mok, 2007; Tsuneyoshi, 2005). Moreover, according to Mok (2007), academics in non-English-speaking countries are pressured to publish
in English, preferably in Science Citation Index and Social Science Citation Index journals, to demonstrate their “mastery of international standards” (p. 446). However, those indices were developed largely based on English-speaking Western countries’ scholarly systems, and as a result, an uneven academic playing field has developed in the academic world (Altbach, 2004).

As a result, higher education systems in English-speaking Western countries tend to dominate the production and distribution of knowledge and further accumulate intellectual, human, and economic capital and prestige, and the process manifests neocolonialism (Altbach, 2004). Consequently, the inequitable world system of higher education under Western cultural hegemony is perpetuated (Altbach, 2004; Deem et al., 2008; Mok, 2007). The internationalization of higher education in non-English-speaking Western countries can be understood, at least in part, as an expression of their agency to participate in the international community of higher education informed and defined by Western standards, practices, and values. In other words, this community is located in a Western imaginary of globalization.

**Internationalization within a neoliberal imaginary of globalization.**

Internationalization today is also embedded in what Rizvi and Lingard (2010) call a neoliberal imaginary of globalization. The neoliberal imaginary of globalization is informed by a neoliberal ideology that:

rests on a pervasive naturalization of market logics, justifying them on the grounds of efficiency and even ‘fairness.’ It emphasizes the notion of choice, and privileges ‘lean’ government, privatization, deregulation and competitive regimes of resources allocation over the notions of a centralized state. It stresses global regimes of ‘free trade,’ applying to both goods and services, even to services such as health and education that were traditionally marked by their highly national character. (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010, p. 51-52)
Informed by this particular ideology, globalization is interpreted as global economic interconnectivity and interdependence, in which economic interests and market logics are prioritized over other concerns, such as moral and political concerns.

The Western and neoliberal imaginaries of globalization work hand in hand to complicate the internationalization of higher education today. The modern global economy is built upon colonial power relations, and internationalization is entrenched in the historically uneven global power configurations (Forstorp, 2008; Spring, 1998). According to Ball and his colleagues, policy as text and policy as discourse work in a policy cycle, and the following three contexts interact with one another in the cycle in a non-linear manner: 1) the context of influence that gives rise to the production of a particular policy; 2) the context of policy text production; and 3) the context of policy practice (Bowe, Ball, & Gold, 1992). While a policy cycle used to be bounded within national borders, today the process has been increasingly globalized (Lingard, 2000; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010; Vidovich, 2007). In an education policy cycle in the era of globalization, economic- and market-oriented international organizations exert significant power to construct a neoliberal imaginary of globalization. Instead of colonizing land, they spread a new form of colonialism by disseminating the neoliberalist norm that the deployment of the free market mechanism is the best and most efficient solution to society’s problems (Spring, 1998). The nation states and geo-political coalitions, particularly in the West, use the neoliberal discourse of the knowledge society as a survival strategy for the perceived economic threat (Forstorp, 2008). They also emphasize the role of higher education as a strategic tool to secure privileged access to the knowledge society, while transferring manual labour to other parts of the world (Forstorp, 2008). The internationalization of higher education is embedded in the particular imaginary of globalization that sustains uneven global power relations. Below, I will
briefly explain two major mechanisms through which a neoliberal imaginary of globalization is developed and spread around the world: international organizations as policy actors, and competition and cooperation strategies.

*International organizations as policy actors.*

Economic- and market-oriented international organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are influential policy actors in a policy cycle pertaining to the internationalization of higher education (Bassett, 2006; Henry, Lingard, Rizvi, & Taylor, 2001; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010; Rizvi, 2004; Spring, 1998, 2008). They use channels such as conferences, publications, rounds of trade negotiations to disseminate their neoliberal interpretation of globalization by describing, largely in economic terms, the challenges that globalization poses to education. They frame higher education as a commodity and as an instrument that serves the requirements of the global knowledge economy.

The aforementioned shift in the internationalization of higher education toward a market-based model is entrenched in the neoliberal imaginary of globalization largely constructed by international organizations. Today, education is one of the 12 service sectors in the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS promotes education as a commodity to be sold and bought freely across national borders by removing existing barriers. As a result, the internationalization of higher education, more specifically cross-border education, is increasingly viewed within the free-trade framework (Altbach & Knight, 2006). In this regulatory context, the mobility of education programs and providers has grown significantly, whereas in the past student mobility constituted the major aspect of mobility in cross-border education (Knight, 2012).
The involvement of the WTO/GATS in the field of education is controversial. Concern has been raised that trade liberalization as promoted by the GATS could potentially dominate the higher education agenda in member countries and undermine the role of higher education as a public good (Altbach, 2002; Knight, 2002; Rizvi, 2004; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). However, the OECD’s Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (2004) naturalizes and justifies the shift towards the commodification of education. They argue the GATS is not the only factor promoting cross-border education and that cross-border provision of education as a trade commodity is inevitable and unstoppable.

Moreover, the OECD intervenes in the policy discourse of member countries with their anticipatory policy agenda in order to direct the countries’ attention to a common likely future that they themselves define. The OECD presents its deterministic view of globalization in largely neoliberal terms and sets the agenda for higher education policies with its instrumentalist view of education (Henry et al., 2001; Lingard & Rizvi, 1998). For instance, in Education Policy Analysis: Focus on Higher Education 2005-2006, the OECD (2006) calls for a renewed emphasis on internationalization policies in higher education by presenting, in economic terms, challenges and opportunities caused by globalization. In terms of opportunities, the OECD highlights the economic benefits arising from cross-border education as a rationale for enhanced internationalization policies. In terms of challenges, they turn member countries’ attention to the increasing competition between countries and between institutions to attract international students and academics. In this way, the OECD normalizes the promotion of the internationalization of higher education as a survival strategy in the global knowledge economy. The OECD develops "anticipatory policy convergence" across different countries’ policies and
attempts to achieve their policy agenda, which is to have education across the world serve the requirements of the global economy (Dale, 1999, p. 13).

*Competition and cooperation.*

Competition and cooperation are another set of mechanisms through which a neoliberal imaginary of globalization has become dominant in educational policy-making throughout the world (Rizvi, 2006b). Competition and cooperation have also become the conceptual and operational paradigms for the internationalization of higher education. The Bologna Process in Europe (Robertson, 2006), which was followed by the Campus Asia project in China, Korea, and Japan in 2010 (McNeill, 2010; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, n.d.-d), illustrate these paradigms. As seen in the Bologna Process and Campus Asia, higher education systems in different countries bring their different higher education systems together in order to enhance the mobility of citizens as learners and human resources.

Van der Wende (2001) separates competition and cooperation into two paradigms of internationalization; the former, competition, being the dominant strategy Anglo-Saxon countries have brought into the global higher education market, and the latter being the other countries’ response to this competition. However, they are not separate but rather interdependent paradigms, for cooperation at the end of the day is for the sake of competitiveness in the global higher education market (Ferlie et al., 2008; Rizvi, 2006b). Taking the case of the Bologna Process, Rizvi (2006b) asserts:

[The Bologna Process] assumes the importance of Europe-wide commitment to neo-liberal reforms in higher education. While it does not completely support liberalization and deregulation of higher education, its main objectives are nevertheless informed by a
market logic – the need for the European system to become a more effective and efficient player in the highly competitive global market in higher education. (p. 203)

Moreover, beyond these national-level initiatives, higher education institutions also develop regional or international networks of elite institutions through cooperation and competition. As seen in Universitas 21 (n.d.), a worldwide network of 24 research-intensive universities, higher education institutions simultaneously cooperate and compete in the same markets for the best students, academics, and resources (Ferlie et al., 2008).

Thus far, I have discussed how discourses of globalization - informed by neoliberal ideologies - have shaped a dominant social imaginary. This social imaginary expresses a sense of global interconnectivity that disproportionally emphasizes economic aspects of globalization. International organizations have been deeply implicated in locating the policy cycle for internationalization within the neoliberal imaginary of globalization. As a result, among governments and higher education institutions, there has been a shared understanding that the internationalization of higher education is a tool not only to meet the demands of the global knowledge economy but also to exploit opportunities provided by the global higher education market. In addition, the internationalization of higher education is located within a Western imaginary, as well as within the neoliberal imaginary of globalization, both of which are based on unequal colonial power relations. In other words, internationalization reflects a collective imagination of global interconnectivity developed through a historical and political process in which uneven global power relations are constructed and sustained. Conversely, then, to challenge and transform the prevailing social order, we need an alternative social imaginary with which to understand our relationship with the rest of the world. The first step is to articulate that the dominant social imaginaries enable and constrain not only our current internationalization
practices but also our imagination of how internationalization could otherwise exist in the future (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010; Rizvi, 2006b).

**Internationalization at an institutional level.**

My discussion so far has focused on how the internationalization policy cycle has been encapsulated within Western and neoliberal imaginaries of globalization at the macro level. Now, we shift the level of analysis to the institutional level. If internationalization is an “expression of and response to the contemporary processes of globalisation” (Rizvi, 2006a, p. viii), how do higher education institutions see global interconnectivity and their social existence within it? How do they translate this understanding into their internationalization policies (both as discourse and text) and practice in order to better position themselves within the global context? How do social imaginaries of globalization that are developed in broader educational policy and social contexts impact how higher education institutions see their social existence and coordinate their internationalization policy and practice?

While acknowledging the notion of imagination that constitutes education institutions’ present image of *who they are*, in the present tense, as a community, I place greater emphasis in my discussion on the future-oriented aspect of imagination because of the purpose of this study. To understand why and how higher education institutions pursue internationalization the way they do, we need to understand who they *aspire to become* through internationalization. The ways literature describes the imagined communities that higher education institutions aspire to become through internationalization can be divided into the following two separate but interrelated categories: the communities that institutions imagine their students will join in the future, and the communities that the institutions themselves aspire to join in the global higher education community.
**Imagined communities for students.**

As for students, Kanno (2003) describes how educational institutions hold collective visions of imagined communities for their students and how these future visions impact institutions’ policies and practices. She states, "Schools . . . envision imagined communities for their students: what kind of adult the students will grow up to be and what communities they will join in the future” (p. 287). How universities internationalize their policies and practices can be seen as a reflection of the communities they envision their students joining in the future.

For instance, Knight (2012) grounds the rationale for “internationalization at home” in the future vision that students, both those who are and are not globally mobile, are going live in a “more interconnected and culturally diverse world” (p. 23). Based on this broad vision of students’ imagined community, she states: “Universities . . . have the responsibility to integrate international, intercultural and comparative perspectives into the student experience” (p. 23).

Alternatively, when students’ futures are imagined within a neoliberal imaginary of globalization, the world in which students are going to live can be compared with what the OECD (2008) describes as follows: “Indeed, as world economies become increasingly inter-connected, international skills have grown in importance to operate on a global scale. Globally-oriented firms seek internationally-competent workers versed in foreign languages and mastering basic inter-cultural skills to successfully interact with international partners” (p. 54).

Accordingly, if universities see their students’ futures in the global market, they will coordinate their internationalization policies and practices along the lines of skill development so that their students can become productive members of the global economy.
**Imagined communities for higher education institutions.**

The internationalization of higher education institutions can be understood as a reflection of the communities to which institutions aspire to belong in the global higher education community. The literature suggests that institutions’ imagined communities are often located in the global higher education market that is embedded in neoliberal and Western imaginaries of globalization. Within these particular imaginings, institutions aspire to better position themselves in the stratified and uneven global higher education community through internationalization (Dixon, 2006; Stromquist, 2007). In addition, the ways institutions imagine their communities are intertwined with locally specific factors, such as cultural and historical contexts and institutions’ positions in the higher education system at national and international levels (Chan & Dimmock, 2008; Huang, 2007; Stensaker, Frølich, Gornitzka, & Maassen, 2008).

In this study, I examine the imagined communities manifested in Japanese universities’ internationalization policies and practices by looking into what type of imagined communities they envision for their students and for themselves. I contextualize my analysis in the social imaginaries of globalization that were developed in broader policy and social contexts, as well as in the uneven power configurations. I also include those factors in my analysis of their imagined communities.

**International students’ identities.**

As I deploy the concept of imagined communities to understand the internationalization of higher education institutions, I also draw on it as an entry point for unpacking the construction of international students’ identities. To understand who they aspire to become in and through their international education experiences, I look into their imagined communities, as manifested in their decision to study overseas, their experiences in the host country, and their future
aspirations. At the same time, I address the implications of the social imaginaries of globalization for the formation of their imagined communities. I attempt to analyze international students’ identities within these complex and often paradoxical contexts that consist of both material and discursive conditions at the global and local levels.

Below, I separate the discussion on international students’ identities into two parts. First, I locate their identity construction in global student mobility in order to understand what drives them to participate in international education and how their imagined communities manifest in their decision to study overseas. Second, I shift the discussion to international students’ identity construction during their sojourn. By framing their host country and institutions as “contact zones” (Doherty & Singh, 2005b; Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Pratt, 1998), I discuss how international students see themselves and try to position themselves in the host society.

*Imagination in global student mobility.*

Earlier in this chapter, I described the persistent flow of global student mobility at the macro level, from the Global South to the North, and to English-speaking countries in particular. Even though we cannot dismiss the importance of understanding the overall picture of global student flows, debates on global student flows have been criticized for taking an instrumental and positivist approach that objectifies students’ human behaviors and experiences (Baas, 2010; Kell & Vogl, 2012). Baas (2010) argues, “Mobility should not only be understood as merely physical, but also as having a mental dimension, one that is heavily embedded in how people imagine life elsewhere” (p. 182). Similarly, Fong (2011) refers to students’ moves across national borders “not only as a physical journey but also as a journey from one category of personhood to another” (p. 14).
Building on the work of these scholars who address the mental aspect of student mobility, this study frames global student mobility as an expression of students’ pursuit of new identities, driven by their imagination of who they would like to become though international education in Japan. Using the idea of imagined communities, I seek to understand what kinds of communities students aspire to join through studying overseas. However, as discussed earlier, how we imagine our social existence and possibilities is not necessarily wide open, but rather socially situated in material and normative conditions (Appadurai, 1996). Then, how students seek international education opportunities can be understood as an expression of how they perceive their material and normative conditions and translate it into how they imagine who they are and who they would like to become through studying abroad.

*Biographical solution of systemic contradictions.*

According to Ulrich Beck (1992), in modern society individuals discover their identities individually by developing their own life styles and biographies as reflecting on the life circumstances and configurations of power relations in which they are located. Individuals have to make strategic choices and take risks as they develop their own biographies. Institutional connections and fractures, such as those between family life and wage labour, and between education and employment, “continually produce frictions, disharmonies and contradictions within and among individual biographies. Under these conditions, how one lives becomes the “biographical solution of systemic contradictions” (U. Beck, 1992, p. 137). A biographical solution mirrors the “rule-based nature of imagined communities” (Kanno & Norton, 2003, p. 244). Anderson (1991) argues that a nation as a community is imagined because it is thought of as a bounded, sovereign, and fraternal entity in which all the members share the same set of rules and norms. People’s understanding of the rules and norms, in turn, has implications for the social
imaginaries in which they are immersed.” In other words, biographical solutions represent complex – and often contradictory – ways people combine normative and factual aspects of their lives and translate them into future imaginations and actions.

Doherty and Singh’s (2005a) empirical study of Asian international students enrolled in preparatory programs at an Australian university demonstrates those students’ biographical solution of systemic contradictions. Their investment in English learning in Australia signals how they see their social existence in Asia embedded in neoliberal and Western imaginaries of globalization. They pursue mastery of English as both a cultural distinction that is unattainable in their home countries, as well as a requirement for becoming a competitive member of the world community. Accordingly, in this study I frame students’ desires for studying overseas as their biographical solution to systemic contradictions, in which social imaginaries are entrenched. I address how international students see their social conditions and exercise their agency to respond to these conditions.

Global student mobility as a manifestation of a classed imagination.

Even if one decides to move across the globe as a biographical solution to systemic contradictions, it is important to recognize that global mobility is not a life choice available to everyone. Bauman (1998) states that global mobility is a stratifying phenomenon in that it distinguishes between “tourists” and “vagabonds.” On the one hand, Bauman (1998) explains that tourists are privileged, globally mobile individuals who have “the means to become choosers” and can move based on their decisions in contemporary consumer society (p. 86). On the other hand, for Bauman, vagabonds move by being forced by someone else’s decision. Economic or political refugees are good examples. They move for different reasons, but the reasons are rooted in external conditions that are beyond their control.
By extending the notion of tourists, who combine leisure and travel, Kenway and Fahey (2007) define those who combine education and travel as “student tourists.” Student tourists commodify mobility, knowledge, and experience for their careers in the global economy while establishing a consumerist traveling lifestyle through consuming goods, place, and culture (Kenway & Fahey, 2007). Thus, privileged students accumulate additional cultural and social capital through international education and better position themselves in the global economy, which is also linked to class reproduction (Rizvi, 2005; Waters, 2009b). Global student mobility takes place in a classed space.

*Students’ imagination embedded in a neoliberal imaginary of globalization.*

This study contextualizes students’ imagination not only within their material conditions but also within the social and educational discourses in which they are immersed. According to Bauman (1998), in a contemporary consumerist tourist society that subjugates its members to engage as consumers, people are driven to attain a tourist lifestyle that is enabled and symbolized by wealth. They “perceive the world as a food for sensibility – a matrix of possible experiences . . . and they map it according to the experiences occasioned” (Bauman, 1998, p. 94). The value of the tourist society resonates with consumerist cosmopolitanism, which is based on neoliberal ideologies, assumes the world as a single free market, and celebrates globally mobile individuals and cultural diversity (Rizvi, 2005). Calhoun (2003) also refers to this value using terms such as “actual existing cosmopolitanism” and “the class consciousness of frequent travelers.” However, such a tourist lifestyle is available only for those who align themselves with the value of the consumerist tourist society and who can afford to pursue their individual interests without systemic constraints (Bauman, 1998; Calhoun, 2003).
By implication, student tourists, who are immersed in this tourist society’s consumerist ideals, imagine the world as a map of opportunities for education and career, as well as for traveling. As I discussed earlier, the internationalization of higher education has been embedded in a social imaginary that disproportionally emphasizes economic global interconnectivity (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). Neoliberalism demands “enterprising individuals” who can make a continual enterprise of themselves to meet the changing demands of the economy (Apple, 2001, p. 414). Schools act as sites that produce neoliberal subjectivities, where students take up the neoliberal narratives of individual responsibility and work pragmatically and strategically to use their education to better position themselves in the economy (Demerath & Lynch, 2008; O’Flynn & Petersen, 2007). In this study, it is particularly important to look into the implications of the internationalization of Japanese higher education as it is embedded in the neoliberal imaginary of globalization, and specifically to look for how students imagine their positions and futures in their normative institutional contexts as well as in the broader society.

In sum, how students seek education opportunities across the globe can be understood as an expression of how they perceive their factual and normative conditions, and how they translate those perceptions into their imagination of studying overseas as a possibility to attain a new identity. Using Beck’s (1992) concept of a biographic solution of systemic contradictions, I examine how students assess their life conditions at both the local and global levels. I also address how hegemonic social imaginaries inform their imagination. By bringing together the material and normative conditions of these students’ lives, I aim to illustrate the process through which they develop the imagination of their positions in the world and exercise agency to attain a new identity through education abroad.
**International students’ identities in contact zones.**

In addition to examining students’ decisions to pursue international education opportunities, this study is concerned with how their experiences in their host countries contribute to shaping their sense of identity. I situate my investigation in what Pratt (1992) calls a “contact zone,” a site of historical and cultural power struggles. As Pratt (1998) applies the concept to describe the types of dynamic interactions in a diverse university classroom setting, some scholars (Doherty & Singh, 2005b; Kenway & Bullen, 2003) have also framed the internationalized university setting as a contact zone. I apply the concept not only to a host university setting, but also to the off-campus society to contextualize the university setting and international students’ experiences within Japan’s broader social context. Using the concept of contact zone, I analyze how international students make sense of their experiences in Japan as a contact zone and translate their sense-making into their sense of identity.

**Imagined communities in contact zones.**

Rooted in a post-colonial perspective, Pratt (1992) explains her coinage of the term contact zone as “an attempt to invoke the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect” (p. 7). For Pratt (1992), in contact zones, while subjects are in “radically asymmetrical relations of power,” they are constituted in and by their interactive, rather than diffusionist, relationship with one another (p. 7). Elsewhere, she elaborates on subjects’ self-representations in contact zones as follows:

Being the “other” of a dominant culture involves living in a bifurcated universe of meaning. On the one hand, one must produce oneself as a self for oneself. That is
survival. At the same time the system also requires that you produce yourself as an “other.” (Pratt, 1999, p. 40)

This line of theorization of identities in contact zones implicitly necessitates the construction of an imagined homogeneous Other in contrast to that of Self.

Literature supports the construction of an imagined homogeneous Other in contrast to that of Self in a contact zone, despite the diversity among the constituencies in the contact zone. For instance, dominant social groups construct an essentialized and innocent imagined community for themselves as a Self by masking unequal power relations with the Other (Bhabha, 1990; Doherty & Singh, 2005b). Doherty and Singh (2005b) argue that dominant groups “sanitize places of the historical legacy of unequal power relations” to construct “pristine accounts” of their culture (p. 55). In addition, according to Bhabha (1990), a dominant society essentializes not only their own culture but also other cultures as well. He problematizes that a dominant society tends to respond to cultural diversity by constructing cultural differences in an essentialized manner based on their ethnocentric norms without acknowledging unequal power attached to the differences. Bhabha (1990) calls it a “creation of cultural diversity and a containment of cultural difference” (p. 208). He explains:

Although there is always an entertainment and encouragement of cultural diversity, there is always also a corresponding containment of it. A transparent norm is constituted, a norm given by the host society or dominant culture, which says that ‘these other cultures are fine, but we must be able to locate them within our own grid.’ (p. 208)

Thus, the construction of imagined communities is at work in contact zones. In a contact zone, homogeneous Self and Other are imagined despite the heterogeneity of the contact zone.
Self-positioning in a contact zone.

In contact zones, colonizer and colonized, or dominant and non-dominant groups, are not engaged in polarized and unidirectional power relations. Instead, identities are constructed in a reciprocal exchange of influences, and representations of Self and Other are in constant negotiation. Pratt (1992) refers to such an identity negotiation process as transculturation, by which she means to describe “how subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture” (p. 6).

Pratt’s idea of transculturation resonates with Hall’s (1990) notion of cultural identity as a “matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’” (p. 225) and Bhabha’s (1990) notion of “hybridity,” which refers to the “‘third space’ which enables other positions to emerge” (p. 211). What these ideas of identity by Pratt, Hall, and Bhabha have in common is that identity is constructed through our active acts of self-positioning. Bhabha elaborates on how one exercises agency in a given situation to generate a hybrid identity as follows: “Hybridity is precisely about the fact that when a new situation, a new alliance-formulates itself, it may demand that you should translate your principles, rethink them, extend them” (p. 216). Yet, while scholars acknowledge the role of agency, they also locate identities within the asymmetrical power configurations of contact zones, and that these configurations were developed in historical processes. For Hall, “Identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past” (p. 225). This theorization of identity resonates with the socially situated nature of people’s imagination (Appadurai, 1996). How we imagine our social existence is situated within historically constituted power configurations of contact zones.
Hence, to understand the construction of international students’ identities, I examine first, how they imagine that they are currently positioned, and second, how they act to position themselves within the contact zones in their host society. To do so, I address how imagined communities are expressed by international students as well as by their host society, and how international students negotiate how to position themselves in the contact zones. In the analysis, I acknowledge that how students imagine new identities is, to some extent, if not entirely, conditioned by power configurations of the host society that are rooted in historical power relations. Moreover, as discussed earlier, their identity construction is layered with their class privilege, which has enabled them to be globally mobile students, and with the systemic contradictions imposed on them. Furthermore, how they see their relationships with the rest of the world and the meaning of their education is often informed by the dominant discourse of the neoliberal imaginary of globalization. As such, I attempt to analyze international students’ identities within these complex and often paradoxical contexts that consist of both material and discursive conditions at the global and local levels. Therefore, the focus of my inquiry about international students’ identities is on how they see their positions in the complex material and discursive contexts, and how they negotiate with those contexts to establish the positions that represent who they want to become.

Summary.

This study is concerned with the construction of international students’ identities in and through their international education experiences in Japan. In particular, it explores the intersections between their identity construction and the internationalization of Japanese higher education. The internationalization of higher education, which enables and expands global student mobility, takes place against the backdrop of globalization. However, as discussed in this
chapter, the policy discourse and practice of internationalization have been based heavily on an empirical aspect of global changes, such as the rapid development of information technologies and global flows of people. This empirical aspect masks the ideological aspects that promote particular political and economic interests. Using the concept of social imaginary, I seek to explain how certain ideologies get translated into our sense of how we are related with one another, what is considered normal, and what is possible, and consequently how they shape and enable our common social practice. Because of a neoliberal imaginary of globalization, we internalize an economic sense of global interconnectivity as the inevitable or natural context, and we conceptualize and implement the internationalization of higher education based on this particular normative contextual understanding. Moreover, the neoliberal imaginary of globalization is deeply rooted in a Western imaginary of globalization. And this imaginary, in turn, is built upon the world’s unequal colonial power relations. The emergent marketization trend and persistent Western cultural hegemony in the internationalization of higher education cannot be fully understood unless we understand the role these social imaginaries play. I therefore locate actors in the internationalization of Japanese higher education (i.e., the Japanese government, universities, and international students) within these social imaginaries as a broad normative and factual context against which they perceive their sense of social existence and their futures.

To articulate how the actors see their social existence and translate that self-understanding into concrete action, I draw on the concept of imagined communities. Using the concept, I aim to explain how Japanese universities and international students imagine their social existence in relation to real and imagined communities around them, and how they exercise their agency to align themselves with the communities they aspire to join. However, as I
discussed earlier, one’s imagination is socially situated within his or her material life conditions, which are embedded in global and local power configurations and social imaginaries. To paint a more complete picture of the specific context of international students’ experiences in Japan, my next task will be to outline the context of Japanese higher education and the historical and contemporary issues and debates about the internationalization of Japanese higher education.
Chapter 3: Historical, Social, and Policy Contexts of Internationalization in Japan

The purpose of this chapter is to embed this study within the historical, social, and policy contexts of the internationalization of Japanese higher education. Throughout this chapter, I demonstrate that the internationalization of Japanese higher education has represented Japan’s socially situated imagination (Appadurai, 1996) of the country’s position in the world, as well as its aspiration to improve this position. At the same time, I show how Western and neoliberal imaginaries of globalization have been woven into Japan’s discourses and policies of internationalization. Finally, I illustrate the implications of domestic circumstances, such as demographic changes, the state of the economy, and the higher education system, for the internationalization of Japanese higher education.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. First, I explain how the discourse of internationalization has been constructed and circulated in Japan since the Meiji era (1868-1912). For Japan, the internationalization of education was a vehicle for the development of a modern national identity. The process of modernization through internationalization was driven by Japan’s perception of its position in the world and its desire to establish itself as a modern nation by catching up with the West. Second, I illustrate how the historical roots of the internationalization of Japanese education have generated paradoxical internationalization policies and practices in Japan today. Third, I discuss two major international student policies that have played a key role in the internationalization of Japanese higher education since the 1980s. Fourth, I provide an overview of the Japanese higher education system and its close relationship with the economy. Lastly, I close the chapter by providing demographic information on international students in the Japanese higher education system and society.
Historical roots of the discourse of kokusaika.

The internationalization (kokusaika) of education has been Japan’s national strategy for positioning itself in the world, and it reflects how the country imagines its existence and its relationship with the rest of the world. The history of kokusaika dates back to the Meiji era, when Japan ended over two hundred years (1639-1854) of self-imposed isolation from foreign influences and began its modernization process. A guiding notion in Japan’s modernization was the imperative of “catching up” with the West (Mochizuki, 2004; Rappleye & Kariya, 2011). Japan’s modern national identity as Self was developed based on its imagination of the West as the civilized Other, and as the universal point of reference (Mochizuki, 2004; Rappleye & Kariya, 2011). Japan aspired to establish its Self identity in the world as a modern nation in relation to the Western Other, and the internationalization of education became a leading vehicle for Japan’s self-positioning strategy.

As Rappleye and Kariya (2011) meticulously document, during the Meiji era, intellectual leaders such as Yukichi Fukuzawa and Eifu Motoda argued intensely over whether Japan should adopt material, but not spiritual, civilization from the West, or vice versa. However, despite their disagreement, both camps worked within the Western paradigm of civilization toward the goal of internationalizing Japanese education. Mochizuki (2004) contends that they cooperated because both camps uncritically embraced Western racial hierarchies in their urge to create a modern Japanese identity and tried to “elevate the Japanese race (either via cultivation of national pride or via assimilation of Western Enlightenment values)” (p. 209). Japan’s complete defeat in the Second World War devastated its national pride, and it subsequently focused on pursuing material parity with the West through “‘GNP-ism’ – growth as political ideology” (Rappleye &
As a result, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Japan achieved remarkable economic growth.

**The discourse of kokusaika.**

In this social context, the discourse of *kokusaika* emerged and gained popular consensus in Japanese society in the 1970s and 1980s. The emergence of globalization is often provided as a reason for the rise of the term *kokusaika*, not only in educational policy debates but also in Japanese public debates during this time. However, it should be noted that globalization was not necessarily completely new to Japan. As Rappleye and Kariya (2011) argue, Japan has been attuned to the West ever since the Meiji era, far earlier than when globalization is commonly believed to have “arrived” in Japan. In other words, Japan has long had a sense of connection with the world, more precisely with the West. While being embedded in the Western imaginary of globalization, the new sense of global interconnectivity that the Japanese public started to feel in the 1970s and the 1980s is a neoliberal imaginary of globalization. By attaining economic parity with the West, Japan enjoyed the euphoric feeling of an elevated sense of self in the world.

Following the country’s tremendous global economic success, Japanese political leaders and education policy makers declared that Japan had finally completed the process of catching up with the West (Rappleye & Kariya, 2011). However, according to Rappleye and Kariya (2011), for Japan, completing the process of catching up with the Western Other meant a loss of models to follow or emulate. The end of the reference to Other was followed by decades of “lost wandering” in search of Japan’s self-identity, and of the future vision of education. When Japan experienced the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s and entered a long period of economic recession, it blamed the catch-up model of the recent past and sought to replace it with neoliberal reforms (Rappleye & Kariya, 2011).
This does not mean, however, that neoliberalism has completely replaced the preexisting catch-up model of internationalization. For one thing, both the catch-up model and the neoliberal reforms are underpinned in Japan by the idea of competitive self-positioning. Furthermore, as explained earlier, the spread of the neoliberalist norm in social and educational reforms across the world, including in Japan, is based on colonial power relations (Forstorp, 2008; Spring, 1998), and policies and practices of internationalization as Westernization has persisted in Japan (Mok, 2007). The introduction of English as the language of instruction and the quest for creating world-class universities, informed predominantly by Anglo-Saxon standards and ideologies, are prime examples (Deem et al., 2008; Mok, 2007).

As Kariya and Rappleye (2010) argue, the rhetorical use of globalization and an educational response to it, which is often framed as kokusaika, mask the distinction between globalization’s “real” and “imagined” impact on education. The discourse of kokusaika has been constructed within this conceptual ambiguity. Yet, rather than being a sign of conceptual failure, this ambiguity is a product of the complex historical process in which Japan saw its position in the world and sought to develop a modern Self by catching up with the West.

To complicate the matter further, the complex historical roots of kokusaika manifest the paradoxical ideologies and practices of internationalization today. Below, I present the simultaneous promotion of nationalism and kokusaika. The counterintuitive combination of nationalism and kokusika demonstrates that the internationalization of Japanese education has continued to be a site of struggle where Japan tries to define its Self identity in relation to the Western Other without becoming completely Western. In other words, kokusaika represents Japan’s biographical solution to systemic contradictions in the world.
Nationalism in the discourse of kokusaika.

According to Yoshino (1997), nationalism can be categorized into two types: political nationalism and cultural nationalism. The former is produced and distributed by the state, including through formal education, whereas the latter is produced, distributed, and consumed through an informal and market-oriented process (Yoshino, 1997). In Japan, both forms of nationalism have been promoted under the popular discourse of kokusaika. The combination of internationalization and nationalism is paradoxical because, on the one hand, internationalization suggests a notion of internationalism (Rivers, 2010; Stromquist, 2007), which, according to Kosterman and Feshbach, “focuses on international sharing and welfare, and reflects empathy for the peoples of other countries” (as cited in Rivers, 2010, p. 446). On the other hand, nationalism suggests “a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance” (Kosterman and Feshbach as cited in Rivers, 2010, pp. 446–447).

Numerous scholars have grappled with unpacking the paradoxical involvement of nationalism in kokusaika in Japan (Kariya & Rappleye, 2010; Kubota, 1998, 2002; Mochizuki, 2004; Rivers, 2010; Yoshino, 1997). Below, building on these scholars’ literature, I elaborate on cultural nationalism and political nationalism to show the complexity of the discourse of kokusaika. I then present critical scholarly debates on the matter. Building on these scholarly debates, I argue that internationalization has always been a part of Japan’s historically rooted desire to join the “imagined international community” largely embedded in the Western imaginary of globalization. Concomitantly, I argue that the inclusion of nationalism in Japan’s internationalization is an expression of Japan’s desire to assert its national identity and to avoid becoming completely Western in the imagined international community.
Cultural nationalism: The nihonjinron.

According to Yoshino (1997), the discourse of nihonjinron (“theories on the Japanese”), which emerged and became popular in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, played a key role in promoting cultural nationalism against the backdrop of the popular slogan of kokusaika. The discourse of nihonjinron emphasizes the distinctiveness of Japanese culture and society, and it contributed to developing a shared sense of Japaneseness among the mass public (Yoshino, 1997). The paradoxical popularization of both the nihonjinron and kokusaika reflects Japan’s historical pursuit of modernity based on Western civilization and of its Self identity while simultaneously emphasizing its cultural difference from the Western Other (Kubota, 1998, 1999, 2002; Mochizuki, 2004; Yoshino, 1997).

Yoshino (1997) contends that cultural nationalism promoted by the discourse of nihonjinron was different from nationalism promoted by narrow-minded pre-war nationalist ideologues who aimed to manipulate mass psychology among the Japanese with a sense of cultural superiority. According to Yoshino, the producers and distributors of the nihonjinron consisted of a wide variety of thinkers, including journalists, critics, writers, and business elites. Yoshino describes them as well-intentioned internationalists whose primary aim was to explain Japan’s economic success and its lack of social problems (such as crime and social divisions) as being attributable to the unique virtues of Japanese society and national character. Believing that learning about the distinctiveness of one’s culture would be the first step toward better intercultural understanding, they aimed to cultivate a large number of internationally-minded Japanese (Yoshino, 1997). The consumers of the nihonjinron were also driven by their desire to internationalize their knowledge for practical purposes, such as improving their ability to communicate with their international business counterparts (Yoshino, 1997). As such, the
nihonjinron became a subject of study within fields such as intercultural communication, and gained popularity among students, businessmen, and others.

Although it was promoted through the slogan of kokusaika, the nihonjinron was constructed specifically in relation to the West rather than in relation to the broader world. In the nihonjinron, the Western Other remained a universal point of reference to define Japaneseness. The nihonjinron identifies the following three characteristics as keys to the uniqueness of Japanese society and culture: 1) groupism, vertical stratification, and dependence, in contrast to Western society, which is characterized by individualism, horizontal stratification, and independence; 2) non-logical and non-verbal communication patterns, in contrast to Western communication patterns, which are characterized by logical and linguistic presentation; and 3) the uni-racial and homogeneous composition of society (Yoshino, 1997). In these characteristics, it is evident that the nihonjinron presents an essentialized idea not only of Japanese culture and society but also of the West. Yoshino (1997) explains that the nihonjinron reflected its producers’ perception of Japan’s position in the world in terms of civilization:

Japanese elites long perceived themselves and their culture to be on the “periphery” in relation to the “central” civilizations (first that of China and then of the West) and constructed and reconstructed Japanese identity by stressing their “particularistic” difference from the “universal” Chinese and Westerners. . . . Because of their perception of being on the periphery, Japanese elites tended to see it as natural to adapt themselves to the more “universal” ways of the West. (p. 141)

Thus, despite the completion of catching up with the West, in the construction of the nihonjinron, we see the continuation of Japan’s historical trajectory to attain an equal position to the West. The homogenized imagination of Self located in the periphery, and of the West as the
superior Other, which had been Japan’s framework for modernization, now became its framework for internationalization.

**Political nationalism.**

Under the national slogan of *kokusaika*, political nationalism was also promoted in Japan through educational policy debates and reforms. Educational policy debates and amendments since the mid-1980s addressed the urge to foster Japanese identity and love of country through education, and to do so against the backdrop of globalization. For example, an education reform council, the Ad Hoc Council on Education (AHCE) (*rinji kyōiku shingikai*) (1984-1987), issued influential reports in 1987 advocating for instruction that taught students about Japan’s uniqueness and fostered their love for the country. As Kariya and Rappleye (2010) mention, the AHCE was launched by then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was a leading advocate of *kokusaika* in Japan. Roughly two decades after Nakasone’s AHCE, nationalism successfully found its way into the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education (FLE) (*kyōiku kihonhō*) in 2006. *Goals and Principles of Education, Article III, 5* of the revised FLE addresses the point that education is expected to “foster an attitude that respects tradition and culture and love of the national homeland that fostered them, an attitude that respects other nations and contributes to peace and development of the international community” (as cited in Kariya & Rappleye, 2010, p. 45). In this statement, it is clear that a nationalistic sense of Self is juxtaposed against the Other in the “international community.”

According to Mochizuki (2004), such a nationalist approach to internationalization was opposed by Japanese “progressives,” which consisted of Japanese leftist groups, including Socialist and Communist Parties, and the Japan Teachers Union (*nikkyōso*). The progressive camp advocated “the need for ‘genuine’ internationalization,” which upheld common themes
such as human rights and democracy, with the educational reforms instituted under the post-war Allied Occupation (1945-1952) (Mochizuki, 2004, p. 205). However, the conservative state’s nationalistic approach to internationalization constituted the “actual” internationalization, while the progressive camp’s approach remained “ideal” internationalization (Mochizuki, 2004). Nevertheless, the opposing ideals of internationalization, embraced by the progressives were combined with the conservative state under the popular slogan of kokusaika.

Critical debates on nationalism in the discourse of kokusaika.

The simultaneous promotion of political nationalism, on the one hand, to solidify a core Japanese national identity, and internationalization, on the other, to promote the opening up of the Japanese education system and society to people from around the world, is a problematic paradox because it does not accommodate the increasing diversity in Japanese society and people with a different sense of belonging. Kariya and Rappleye (2010) eloquently argue:

Rather than “imagining,” say, what changes Japanese society would need to undergo to transform itself into a place to welcome immigrants or attract the best and brightest students and scholars worldwide, the discourse on educational reform has been largely dominated by a belief in the need to strengthen Japanese identity and love of country. Operating under the surface usage of the term “internationalization,” we find not the anticipated permeability but an immune response along Japan’s cultural-cum-political borders. (p. 45)

In addition, as Yoshino (1997) points out, cultural nationalism focusing on the unique qualities of the Japanese could result in overlooking commonalities shared by Japanese and non-Japanese people, thereby hampering intercultural communications and internationalization.
Aside from these critical debates, what also deserves equal recognition is that the paradoxical involvement of nationalism in internationalization in Japan is a historical product of Japan’s effort to establish its identity as an equal member of the West without becoming Western (Kubota, 1998, 1999, 2002; Mochizuki, 2004). This can be interpreted to mean that internationalization was, in one sense, Japan’s “biographical solution of systemic contradictions” (U. Beck, 1992, p. 137). As a nation that has always seen itself as occupying a low position among the hierarchy of colonial powers, the discourse of kokusaika has been Japan’s strategy: neither to subjugate the nation to the West nor to seek a counter-hegemony against the West; it was to accommodate the hegemony of the West by becoming one of the equal members of the West and to convince the West and other nations of its position based on a distinct cultural heritage. (Kubota, 1998, p. 300)

Understandably, the discourse of kokusaika, despite its paradoxes, succeeded in becoming a popular national slogan because the discourse “harmoniously” embraced the tension between Westernization and nationalism (Kubota, 1998, p. 300).

To be clear, it is not my intention to justify nationalism, camouflaged with kokusaika, merely as Japan’s strategy for coping with Western hegemony. Neither is it my intention to uncritically accept the paradoxical discourse of kokusaika, which upholds intercultural understanding on the one hand, and either a nationalistic or well-intended emphasis on Japaneseness on the other. Rather, my intention is to shed light on the historical complexity in which Japan developed kokusaika in parallel to its national identity. Only when we understand the complex, albeit paradoxical, involvement of nationalism in the discourse of kokusaika in Japan, can we attain a contextualized understanding of the internationalization of Japanese higher education today. Therefore, like Mochizuki (2004), I argue that dismissing the discourse
of kokusaika as a mere manifestation of Japan’s nationalism or ethnocentrism is too simplistic and could unwittingly result in participating in the colonial discourse of Western modernity and progress. Mochizuki contends:

Many critics of Japan’s internationalization have reproached Japan for being chauvinistic, but they have not criticized Japan’s conceptual complicity with the Western colonialist discourse, let alone the cultural hegemony the West tenaciously asserts. . . . . When we as comparative and international education researchers attack internationalism based in “Japaneseness” without challenging internationalism based in “Western-ness” or the notion of the universal West, the ultimate convergence of the Japanese model of internationalization with Western models is construed as an evolutionary march toward a global village. Ironically, this approach leaves no possibility for countries of the nonwhite Other to become “international” without becoming “Western” despite its emphasis on “genuine” internationalism and cosmopolitanism. (p. 218-219)

Thus, what the debate on kokusaika also needs to scrutinize is the very debate itself, which is on “an evolutionary march toward a global village” based on the Western paradigm (Mochizuki, 2004, p. 219). Otherwise, we cannot begin to imagine an alternative internationalization in Japan that is not constrained by the Western imaginary of globalization. In this study, I therefore embed my understanding of the internationalization of Japanese university education within the complex historical construction of the discourse of kokusaika.

**Englishization as a way of internationalization.**

One concrete manifestation of Japan’s preoccupation with the West under the slogan of kokusaika is “Englishization,” the promotion of increased use of English and English language
education as a way to internationalize (Tsuneyoshi, 2005). According to Kubota (2002), the discourse of *kokusaika* played a central role in promoting foreign language teaching and learning in Japan, with a disproportional focus on English. For example, then Prime Minister Nakasone, who upheld *kokusaika* as a national slogan in Japan in the 1980s, launched the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme with the ambition of placing a native English speaker in every public school in Japan (McConnell, 2000). In 1997, the preliminary report (*kongo no ryūgakusei seisaku no kihon hōkō ni tsuite*) by the governmental committee on international student policies (*ryūgakusei seisaku kondankai*) addressed the goal of attracting more international students and scholars to Japanese universities and advocated the establishment of English-medium programs at Japanese universities (Tsuneyoshi, 2005). In addition, Englishization became an integral part of the 300,000 International Student Plan in 2008. The Plan proposes increasing the number of courses conducted only in English in order to attract more international students, thereby promoting the “globalization of universities” (MEXT et al., 2008). Moreover, the Global 30 program, which was launched in 2009 to support the 300,000 International Student Plan, poses a more concrete goal for universities selected for the program: “Establish courses at the universities selected through which English-only degrees can be obtained: 33 undergraduate courses and 124 graduate courses over the next 5 years” (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, n.d.-b). The underlying assumption of these policies is that English is essential to internationalize Japanese higher education.

As Anderson (1991) describes the role of language as a medium through which people imagine their belonging to a certain nation as an imagined community, English has been a way

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7 The term, *eigoka*, which is literally translated as “Englishization,” was first coined by Yoshino (2002) in Japanese to refer to the spread of the use of English in non-English-speaking countries. However, in this dissertation, I follow Tsuneyoshi’s (2005) use of the term “Englishization” to mean the increased use of English specifically in the context of internationalization.

> In this community, it is assumed that communication takes place mainly with people from the economic and military powers of the West, particularly the USA. Consequently, English, typically regarded as the international language, has become the focus of teaching and learning. (p. 19)

This particular understanding of the English language is underpinned by Japan’s perception of the racial power hierarchy in the imagined international community, which is connected to Japan’s Self identity development process in relation to the civilized Other, the West (Kubota, 1998, 2002; Rivers, 2010). Elsewhere, Kubota (1998) elaborates on what English has historically meant for Japan:

> It is argued that by learning English, the Japanese have internalized . . . Anglo-Saxon views of the world. . . . The non-native speaker of English, or the Other, is viewed as uncivilized and inferior to the Anglo speaker of English. Learning English, a language of the “civilized,” has been one of the means for the Japanese to identify themselves with Westerners. Here the Japanese identity is split – although the Japanese are Asians, they have wished to identify themselves with Westerners, and their Asian self as well as other Asian peoples have been perceived as the inferior Other. (p. 298)

As such, for Japan, just as internationalization was a way to establish its modern national identity, English has been a means to elevate its status in relation to the West, thereby becoming an equal member of the imagined international community.

The desire to be part of the international community by using the English language is prevalent throughout Japan, from universities to the economic sector. For example, a Japanese
national university, Yamanashi University, recently announced its goal of teaching almost all courses in English by 2016. Their explanation for this goal illuminates its desire “not to be left out (grōbaruka ni noriokureru koto naku)” by the international community: “We would like to establish an environment to nurture talented students without being left out by globalization” (“Shūshoku yūri, fuan,” 2012). Moreover, in April 2013, the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) education reform panel (kyōiku saisei jikkō honbu) proposed to Prime Minister Shinzō Abe that minimum Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) scores be set as a requirement for admission into and graduation from universities in Japan (“Daigaku nyūshi,” 2013). This proposal is primarily driven by the idea that English skills are key for human resources to adapt to the global economy and therefore necessary for the Japanese economy’s revitalization (Yoshida, 2013).

A part of the economic sector has preceded these drastic education reforms on English. Some large Japanese companies such as Rakuten (an online shopping mall) and UNIQLO (a clothing retail store) recently announced their decision to shift their official language from Japanese to English (Maya Kaneko, 2010). While reactions from the media and scholars are a mix of praise (Newman, 2011; “Rakuten’s English drive,” 2012) and criticism and skepticism (Botting, 2010; Torikai, 2010), the companies maintain that English is key to their survival in the global market. Their belief is based on the idea of English as a tool to keep their businesses part of the international community. As we will see in this study’s findings, Englishization in the economic sector provides impetus and a justification for Japanese universities to further Englishization.
Critical debates on Englishization.

The imagined international community manifested through Englishization in the Japanese education system has prompted critical scholarly debates (Kubota, 1998, 2002; Rivers, 2010; Tsuneyoshi, 2005, 2011). Among those debates, the critiques that are most pertinent to this study are first, those that deal with English’s mismatch with the “real” cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity in Japan, and second, those that deal with the creation or reinforcement of the essentialized Self-Other dichotomy.

As for the first problem, scholars (Kubota & Mckay, 2009; Kubota, 2002; Tsuneyoshi, 2011) claim that English does not reflect the actual cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity that exists in Japan. For example, as mentioned earlier, over 90% of the international students who are enrolled in Japanese higher education institutions come from Asian countries (Japan Student Services Organization, 2010c). Moreover, Koreans and Chinese are the largest groups of registered foreigners in Japan, accounting for over 56% of the country’s registered foreigners as of 2009 (The Immigration Bureau of Japan, 2010). In addition, the revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1990 created an influx of South Americans of Japanese descent who immigrated to work as foreign labourers. As a result, in Japan’s public elementary and secondary schools, Portuguese speakers constitute the largest group of students whose mother tongue is not Japanese (Tsuneyoshi, 2011). Thus, it is abundantly clear that the idea that English is the international language, and that one needs it to communicate with the international community, is an imagined social construct in Japan. Therefore, by referring to the uncritical promotion of Englishization, Tsuneyoshi (2011) asserts, “The image of an ‘internationalized’ Japanese, meaning someone who can speak English is what is ‘imagined’ – something that is clearly at odds with the realities of multicultural Japan” (p. 121).
The second problem of the imagined international community, in which English is central, is the creation or reinforcement of the essentialized Self-Other dichotomy between the Japanese and the Anglophone communities. As Rivers (2010) states, “Most of Japan’s internationalization to date has imagined the other as being a Caucasian English speaking Westerner” (p. 451). Kubota (2002) describes the discourse of kokusaika as having been promoted with the assumption that the model for English should be standard North American or British varieties. Combined with another assumption of Englishization - that learning English promotes intercultural or international understanding - English language teaching in Japan resulted in presenting, in an essentialized manner, only cultural differences between Japan as Self and Anglophone countries as the Other (Kubota, 2002).

In addition, there is a concern that teaching in English in non-English-speaking countries could jeopardize the academic quality. de Wit (2012) states that the language shift is not as simple as switching the language of instruction from one language to another. The language shift, moreover, involves a cultural shift and requires structural support, including finding faculty members who are fluent in English and establishing an English-language support system for students and faculty (de Wit, 2012). Therefore, de Wit argues,

Teaching in English is not synonymous with internationalisation but only one of several instruments related to it. But if that instrument is being used we need to address the quality concerns that are related to it. Universities should think more strategically about when, where, how and why they should transfer programmes from being taught in their mother language into English (or any other second language).

There is scant literature on the implications of Englishization for the quality of teaching and learning at Japanese universities. Yet, Nunan’s (2003) study reports that a lack of the English
language proficiency among English teachers is one of the major challenges in English language education in schools in the Asia-Pacific region, including in Japan. Finding instructors who can teach university-level courses in English to Japanese university classrooms is thus a predictable challenge for Englishization in Japan.

In sum, Englishization is a manifestation of Japan’s imagination that English is the international language, and reflects Japan’s historically rooted desire to join the international community as an equal member to the West. Consequently, consistent with the nihonjinron, Englishization has constructed an essentialized Self-Other dichotomy between Japan and the West. All in all, despite the goal of Englishization as the promotion of international or intercultural understanding, the uncritical promotion of Englishization keeps Japanese communities obsessed with joining the imagined international community rather than engaging with the real diverse communities in Japan and beyond (Kubota, 2002; Rivers, 2010; Tsuneyoshi, 2011). In addition, another problem of Englishization is that it is promoted while its implications for the quality of teaching and learning are unknown.

As I will elaborate in Chapter 9, my intention of presenting these critiques is not to deny the need to teach or learn English. Without English language skills, it is difficult to engage in critical dialogue on the language’s global prevalence with native speakers who benefit from the global power of English. Nor is it my intention to advocate uncritical promotion of Englishization in the name of internationalization. Rather, what is necessary, as Kubota (1998) argues, is “both critical awareness of the power of English and communicative skills in English” (p. 304). With both, English becomes a tool for social transformation (Kubota, 1998, 1999).

Thus far, I have laid out the historical and conceptual foundation of the internationalization of Japanese education. I have illustrated that internationalization is deeply
rooted in Japan’s modern identity development vis-à-vis Western civilization and that the historical roots manifest in the paradoxical involvement of nationalism and Englishization in internationalization. By unpacking the paradoxes of nationalism and Englishization in internationalization, I have demonstrated two conflicting desires driving internationalization in Japan: the desire to join the imagined “international community” embedded in the Western imaginary of globalization; and the desire to assert its national identity to avoid becoming Western in the imagined international community. I now turn to the policy context of the internationalization of Japanese higher education since the 1980s in order to examine internationalization in Japan in more concrete terms.

**International student policies.**

In this section, I present two international student policies that have been the cornerstone of the internationalization of Japanese higher education: the 100,000 International Student Plan and the 300,000 International Student Plan. Both of the policies were initiated by the Japanese government and represent more than higher education reform policies. They reflect Japan’s self-positioning strategies in the world. I show how the policies have been shaped both by Japan’s socially situated imagination of its current and future position in the world, and by social imaginaries of globalization developed and circulated at the global level.

**The 100,000 International Student Plan.**

In 1983, then Prime Minister Nakasone, a strong advocate for *kokusaika*, launched the 100,000 International Student Plan with a goal of hosting 100,000 international students by the year 2000. Hosting international students has been a central aspect of the internationalization of Japanese higher education institutions since then (Yokota et al., 2006). The policy’s goal was
extremely ambitious considering that in 1983 Japan hosted only 10,428 international students (Japan Student Services Organization, 2010c) and that the Japanese higher education system did not have sufficient infrastructure to accommodate a large number of international students (Suhara, 2002).

Japan’s concerns with its economic and political relationship with the rest of the world provided strong impetus for the creation of this ambitious policy. With Japan’s increasing economic power in the world, internationalization became a particularly important concern for the Japanese government in the 1970s and 1980s. Among pressures from international organizations such as UNESCO and OECD (Ehara, 1992), it was a report by an OECD mission that visited Japan in 1970 in particular that played a critical role in shaping that country’s notion of internationalization (Kitamura, 1989; Kurimoto, 1997). The report, titled Review of National Policies for Education: Japan, included a chapter on Education for World Participation that forcefully made the case for Japan to become a contributing member of the world through the internationalization of its education system. It made this case as follows:

Today there is a need for new attitudes. The world can no longer be seen simply as a market in which skills and raw materials can be acquired and products sold. Internationalism has acquired a new meaning. A hundred years ago, after the Meiji restoration, Japan entered the international stage sending Japanese abroad to learn and work on behalf of their country. Today, the demands made on Japan, as on the other Member countries, are for international participation on behalf of the world. (as cited in Kurimoto, 1997, p. 88)

Based on this perspective, the OECD report made recommendations for improving foreign language teaching, officiating study abroad, and opening up Japanese educational institutions to
foreign students. These recommendations for Japan to open its education system to students from around the world can be explained by the large gap in the number of international students in Japan compared to other developed countries. Comparative data on the number of international students in various countries in 1970 are not readily available, but according to a report prepared by a committee responsible for Japan’s international student policy, Japan hosted only 10,428 international students in 1983, while the number was 311,882 in the United States, 119,336 in France, and 52,889 in the United Kingdom (Suhara, 2002).

In response to the 1970 OECD report, guidelines for the internationalization of higher education were issued by the Academic Council in 1973 and by the Central Education Council in 1974 (Yokota, 1993). The private sector reacted favourably, and in 1979, the education committee of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (keizai dōyūkai) issued suggestions for improving the education system in order to produce well-prepared human resources to work in the international community (Kurimoto, 1997).

Finally, in 1983, Japan launched the 100,000 International Student Plan under the Nakasone Administration. The policy is constituted by recommendations made in two reports that were produced by a committee Nakasone commissioned to consider education for foreign students in the 21st century. One of the reports, produced in 1983, was called “teigen (proposal),” and articulated the goal of hosting 100,000 international students by the year 2000 (Terakura, 2009a). The other report, in 1984, was called “tenkai (development)” and specified long-term plans to achieve the goal, first by designating the period between 1983 and 1992 as an infrastructure development period, and second by designating the period between 1993 and 2000 as an expansion period during which the number of international students would be allowed to grow because of this enhanced infrastructure (Terakura, 2009a). To achieve this, the Japanese
government significantly expanded the budget for promoting international student admissions from 7.7 billion yen (approximately 77 million Canadian dollars [CND]) in 1983 to 53.2 billion yen (approximately 532 million CND) in 2003 (C. Ishikawa, 2006).

According to Ebuchi (1997), the primary focus of the 1000,000 International Student Plan was “international development aid (taigai enjo)” as an “expected role (hatasu beki yakuwari)” that “Japan in the world (sekai no nakano nihon)” could play (p. 128). This focus mirrors the 1970 OECD report that demanded that Japan make more international contributions, and there is scholarly consensus that the policy’s prime focus was on meeting the educational needs of neighbouring Asian countries (Ebuchi, 1997; M. Ishikawa, 2011; Takeda, 2006; Terakura, 2009a; Walker, 2005). In fact, the policy relied on the government budget for Overseas Development Assistance to cover scholarships for Japanese government-sponsored students and for some primarily self-funded students from other Asian countries (M. Ishikawa, 2011). In addition, some countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, sponsored their own students to study in Japan as part of their countries’ development strategies (M. Ishikawa, 2011).

However, some scholars claim that the policy was intended not only as an extension of international development aid, but also as a political strategy for Japan to better position itself in the world. Pointing to Japan’s history of pursuing its modern national identity by referring to Western civilization, Mochizuki (2004) argues that the ultimate aim of Japan’s policy was to play a “civilizer’s role” for international students from developing Asian countries. According to Mochizuki, Japan’s policy goal was to “be recognized as a ‘civilized’ nation” that could make intellectual contributions to the world while at the same time strengthening the country’s “symbolic power and cultural authority” to impress the West (p. 215). In a similar vein, Japan was conscious of its position in the international competition for international students.
policy’s ambitious numerical goal of 100,000 international students reflected Japan’s desire to catch up with another non-English-speaking country, France, which had approximately 120,000 international students in 1983 (C. Ishikawa, 2006). Suhara (2002) puts it simply, asserting that the policy was a statement about Japan’s national dignity as an economic giant; otherwise, it was hard to understand the rationale for the policy’s highly ambitious numerical goal.

Japan finally achieved the goal of hosting 100,000 students in 2003, three years later than originally intended. Despite various interpretations of the policy’s rationale, the shift from the initial policy to the subsequent 300,000 International Student Plan in 2008, is often described as a shift “from ‘aid’ and ‘train and send home’ to ‘proactive recruitment’ for ‘boosting competitiveness’” of Japanese universities and the economy (M. Ishikawa, 2011, p. 210).

The 300,000 International Student Plan.

Scholars consistently identify the declining domestic student population and the emergence of the global knowledge economy as the two major contextual factors that gave rise to the 300,000 International Student Plan and its associated internationalization policies and programs (M. Ishikawa, 2011; Terakura, 2009a; Yonezawa, Akiba, & Hirouchi, 2009). Indeed, the decline in the size of Japan’s domestic student population intensified the need to seek international students as future human resources to support the country’s economic competitiveness. In 1992, the domestic student population of 18-year olds in Japan was 2.05 million, which declined to 1.21 million in 2009 and by 2024 is estimated to decline further to 1.09 million (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, n.d.-a). Therefore, it is expected that Japan will need to bring in up to 30 million foreigners by 2050 in order to maintain its current living standards and level of economic output (Johnston, 2008). Within this
significant demographic change, international students have come to be seen not only as students but also as potential members of the labour force to support the Japanese economy.

According to Tsuruta (2003), two summits, one held in Cologne in 1999 and the other in Tokyo in 2000, played a key role in directing the attention of higher education policy debates among the G8 countries, including Japan, to the emergence of the global knowledge economy. At the Tokyo summit, the Education Ministers and the Member of the European Commission responsible for Education were joined by participating observers from the OECD and UNESCO, and emphasized points that had been made in the 1999 Cologne Charter: 1) “education and lifelong learning provide individuals with the ‘passport to mobility’”; and 2) “’adjusting to flexibility and change’ is needed due to the shift from a traditional industrialized society to an ‘emerging knowledge society’” (Tsuruta, 2003, p. 121). As such, education has been clearly defined in economic terms as a tool to expand global mobility and to meet the changing needs of the global knowledge economy.

Against these domestic and global backdrops, then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, in his speech at the 169th Diet in January 2008, proposed the “Plan for 300,000 Exchange Students” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2008). Subsequently, in July 2008, six ministries issued the aforementioned 300,000 International Student Plan (MEXT et al., 2008). The new international student policy is therefore not solely a higher education policy but also a national policy involving multiple actors from various domains, such as immigration, labour, economy, and foreign affairs. Yet, given that Prime Minister Fukuda introduced the policy in the speech section titled “Creating an Economic Society with Vitality,” the policy in particular focuses on enhancing Japan’s economic competitiveness in the world. The policy states, “As a part of the ‘global strategy’ to open up Japan to the whole world and expand flows of people, goods, money
and information between Japan and countries in Asia and other regions in the world, Japan will aim to accept up to 300,000 international students by the year 2020 (MEXT et al., 2008). As seen in this statement, the policy emphasizes an empirical aspect of globalization and frames Japanese higher education and international students as vehicles for enhancing Japan’s mobility in globalization, more specifically in a neoliberal imaginary of globalization. In addition, as previously described, the new policy explicitly promotes Englishization as a way to internationalize Japanese universities, which is a clear manifestation of a Western imaginary of globalization.

In particular, the policy is distinguished from the 100,000 International Student Plan in that it describes international students as “high-quality” human resources. Moreover, the policy is coordinated with other policies and programs that consistently frame international students and internationalization in economic terms. Below, I elaborate on these two new economic aspects of the policy, but only after noting that while this new international student policy is driven by neoliberal principles, the policy’s primary focus is not on expanding national revenues from accepting international students as customers, as is the case in the United Kingdom, or as a source of export revenue, as is the case in Australia (Terakura, 2009b). It is undeniable that sustaining Japanese universities in the face of the rapid decline of the university-age population is part of the policy’s rationale. Yet, the primary focus of the new policy is recruiting and retaining a large volume of international students as highly skilled human resources rather than treating them as a revenue source (Terakura, 2009b). For the fiscal year 2008, the Japanese government budgeted approximately 40,000 million yen (approximately 400 million CND) to

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8 The translation adopted from the *Outline of the Student Exchange System: Study in Japan and Abroad* by the Student Exchange Office, Student Services Division, Higher Education Bureau of MEXT (2008a).
accept Japanese government-sponsored international students, to provide financial support for self- or otherwise-financed international students, and to enhance accommodations for international students (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2008a).

*International students as “high quality” human resources.*

What is most noteworthy about the 300,000 International Student Plan is that it focuses on recruiting and retaining international students as “high quality” human resources (kōdo jinzai) for the Japanese economy. Two issues need to be highlighted. First, the new policy targets “high quality” international students, whereas the priority of the previous international student policy was on expanding the “quantity” (Terakura, 2009a). The intention of the 300,000 International Student Plan is that, “Efforts should be made to strategically acquire excellent international students” (MEXT et al., 2008). The discourse of the “quality” of international students emerged in the context of Japan’s rapidly expanding international student population, which was a result of the 100,000 International Student Plan, and it magnified the problems associated with international students in Japan (Lassegard, 2006; Terakura, 2009a). These problems included international students whose real intent of coming to Japan was employment rather than education, their low degree completion rates, and illegal overstays. However, many of the problems can be attributed to the flawed Japanese higher education system and visa screening procedures (C. Ishikawa, 2006; Lassegard, 2006). Nonetheless, the shift in focus from the quantity of international students to their quality has been a highly debated policy issue in Japanese higher education, and it has become a particular concern for Japan as global competition for “brains” (zunō kakutoku kyōsō) intensifies (Terakura, 2009a).

Second, whereas international students had been deemed “guests” who would return home after graduation (Kurimoto, 1997), the 300,000 International Student Plan now treats
international students as potential human resources for the Japanese economy. The policy proposes the enhancement of career support for international students so that they remain in Japan to work. The policy sets forth the measure, “Promoting acceptance of international students into society after graduation or completion of courses” as a way to promote the “globalization of society (shakai no gurōbaruka)” in Japan (MEXT et al., 2008). The measure calls for collaboration between government, industry, and academia to facilitate enhanced internship opportunities and job-hunting support, and flexible visa extension process.

However, it should be noted that the policy envisions international students’ post-graduation stays as temporary. On the one hand, the policy upholds the goal of the “globalization of society.” On the other hand, as Rivers (2010) rightly problematizes, the policy, not to mention its confused use of the terms globalization and internationalization,⁹ does not propose the enhancement of opportunities for international students to live in Japan permanently. The policy only proposes extending the period of time these students are permitted to stay in Japan and maintaining contact with them after they return home. This lack of commitment to integrating international students into Japanese society on a permanent basis is consistent with the persistent resistance against increasing the number of immigrants, as opposed to relying on temporary foreign labour, by the Diet, bureaucracy, and business leaders, who are represented by the powerful business-lobbying group, the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) (Johnston, 2008). Rivers therefore contends that the internationalization of Japanese higher education is based on Japan’s self-serving nationalistic ideologies. Regardless of whether we should interpret the resistance to immigration as a manifestation of Japanese leaders’ nationalistic desire to maintain

⁹ See Burgess, Gibson, Klapakhe, & Selzer (2010) for how the term kokusaika (internationalization) has been overtaken by the term grōbaruka (globalization) in internationalization policy texts in Japan.
the homogeneity of Japanese society, it is undeniable that the policy is self-serving and strives to fulfill the country’s economic needs without making a commitment to the lives of international students.

Nonetheless, supporting international students’ careers in Japan is a new feature that the previous international student policy did not have. This change reflects a significant paradigm shift in Japan’s international student policies: from an international development aid model to a self-serving national strategy model that emphasizes the recruitment and development of high quality human resources (Terakura, 2009b). This policy shift is evidence of the 300,000 International Student Plan adopting the neoliberal imaginary of globalization.

Supporting policies and programs.

The 300,000 International Student Plan is supported by a number of policies and programs. Firstly, in 2009 the MEXT launched the Global 30 Program, which selects 30 “core” universities for internationalization from among more than 750 universities in Japan. The selected universities are expected to “play a major role in dramatically boosting the number of international students educated in Japan” (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, n.d.-b). To that end, the program annually supplies each selected university with 200 to 400 million yen (approximately 2 to 4 million CND) for five years, and in return each selected university is expected to recruit 3,000 to 8,000 international students (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, n.d.-b). So far, 13 universities (seven national universities and six private universities) have been selected for the program10 (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 2009).

10 Due to the Government Revitalization Unit Scrutinizing Public Projects (jigyō shiwake), initiated by the Hatoyama Administration in September 2009, the budget for the Global 30
In addition, as the OECD (2006) encourages, the 300,000 International Student Plan is coordinated with other policies and programs. For example, the Asian Gateway Initiative by the Cabinet Office (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2007), the Career Development Program for Foreign Students in Japan by the MEXT and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (n.d.), and the Economic Growth Strategy by the METI (2006) consistently refer to the internationalization of Japanese higher education as a strategy for enhancing Japan’s economic and research competitiveness, and they also refer to international students as human capital to support the Japanese economy. This policy coordination strategy resonates with what Ball (1993) calls a “policy ensemble” of different policies referring to each other through the use of certain words and concepts, thereby generating a hegemonic policy discourse (p. 14). Likewise, these policies and programs that are coordinated with the 300,000 International Student Plan consistently describe higher education and international students as a means to enhance Japan’s economic competitiveness in the global knowledge economy. As such, the 300,000 International Student Plan, together with these programs and policies, are located in the neoliberal imaginary of globalization.

**Discussion.**

Central to both the 100,000 International Student Plan and the 300,000 International Student Plan is that the internationalization of Japanese higher education has been Japan’s self-positioning project in the world, rather than being only a matter of higher education reform. This internationalization policy trajectory, along with national self-positioning, is consistent with the historical tendency since the late 1860s to see the internationalization of Japanese education as a program was reduced (Nemoto et al., 2009). As a result, the call for applications for the remaining 17 slots has not been announced as of November 23, 2012.
way to modernize. This observation leads us to conclude that the internationalization of Japanese education has always been a means through which Japan pursues its aspirations to participate in the international community.

Yet, rather than simply labeling it as a self-serving nationalistic project to fulfill the country’s identity needs (Rivers, 2010), internationalization in Japan requires a more nuanced understanding. It needs to be understood as an expression of Japan’s socially situated imagination (Appadurai, 1996) of how the country perceived its position in the world’s power configurations, and how it has aspired to better position itself. At the same time, it is difficult to accept as plausible that recent internationalization, which is preoccupied with global competitiveness and human resource development, is a self-evident or inevitable response to changing socio-economic and political contexts (M. Ishikawa, 2011). As Japan’s modern national identity development was informed by the discourse of Western modernity, both the 100,000 International Student Plan and the 300,000 International Student Plan were significantly “spoken by” discourses outside Japan’s national boundaries. The former policy was constructed based on how Japan should participate in the international community, at least as prescribed by the OECD. Later, the idea of the international community became more heavily informed by neoliberal ideologies of global interconnectivity. While incorporating needs and circumstances within the national borders, the subsequent policy, the 300,000 International Student Plan, upholds the need for Japanese higher education to serve the global knowledge economy. Some scholars problematize the Japanese government’s and universities’ skewed pursuit of international competitiveness and call for increased attention to the educational value of internationalization (Yonezawa et al., 2009). Nonetheless, in the literature on the
internationalization of Japanese higher education, critical debates on the neoliberal shift regarding the purpose of education (Rizvi, 2007) are scarce.

**The Japanese higher education system.**

Now, let us turn our focus from internationalization policies to the Japanese higher education system in relation to its changing domestic environment. The post-war Japanese higher education system was developed in a close relationship with the Japanese economy and is now encountering unprecedented challenges due to the changing economic and demographic contexts. To contextualize the understanding of the internationalization of Japanese universities, I will illustrate these contextual changes and challenges as I provide an overview of the higher education system and its close relationship with the Japanese economy. Although international students are the focus of this study, the following discussions include issues concerning Japanese students because they constitute a significant student group not only as stakeholders in the Japanese higher education system but also as counterparts to the international student population.

In Japan, there are 86 national universities, 1190 local public universities, and 589 private universities (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2008b). Because private universities make up such a large proportion of all universities, they enroll over 73% of the overall post-secondary level students in Japan, including both domestic and international students at both the undergraduate and graduate levels (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2008b). While Japan’s private universities contribute to mass higher education, primarily at the undergraduate level, national universities play a significant role in research and graduate-level education (Motohisa Kaneko, 2004).

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11 Japanese national universities used to be directly operated by the MEXT. In 2004, however, as part of the neoliberal Structural Reform (Yokoyama, 2008), they were incorporated to become “national university corporations” with increased autonomy and new managerialism (Ōba, 2007).
The massive private university sector in Japan is a result of the increasing demand for higher education after Japan’s economic growth in the late 1950s, and of the Japanese government’s disproportional investment in national universities (Motohisa Kaneko, 2004). The continuing excessive demand for higher education has generated fierce competition for university admissions and intensive cramming, referred to by the infamous name, “entrance exam hell” (juken jigoku). The Japanese higher education system thus became stratified primarily based on the selectivity permitted by university entrance exam scores. To respond to criticisms about the one-dimensional assessment of universities, new indicators were created to measure the quality of Japanese universities from different perspectives (Yonezawa, 2002). Nonetheless, the Japanese university ranking based on student selectivity has been too entrenched for too long for those new indicators to have much effect (Yonezawa, 2002). With a few exceptions, national universities, particularly former imperial universities, generally occupy the top tier, and the vast majority of private universities are ranked in the middle to lower levels of the hierarchy (Asahi Shinbun Shuppan, 2009).

However, due to the shrinking size of the 18-year-old cohort, higher education institutions have become too numerous. As a result, the massive private university sector’s position, particularly among lower-ranking universities, has become vulnerable (Akabayashi, 2006). In 2009, 46.5% of private universities in Japan could not fill their seats (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, n.d.a). Except for those who seek admissions to the small number of the most prestigious universities, being admitted to a university has become easier, and the “entrance exam hell” has become a thing of the past. The change can be seen in the numbers; The percentage of applicants admitted to colleges or universities was only 51.7% in 1990, but rose to 81.8% in 2005 (Kariya & Rappleye, 2010).
A close relationship with the Japanese economy.

Aside from the rapid decline in the number of the 18-year-olds, changes in the Japanese economy have dramatically changed the landscape of the Japanese higher education system. The competition for university admissions used to be driven by the popular belief that entrance into a good university would lead to a good job, which in turn would lead to a good life. The belief was supported by two characteristics of traditional Japanese employment practices: the mass graduate recruitment system and the life-long employment system (Kariya & Rappleye, 2010). Japanese companies used to, and still do to a lesser extent, recruit their annual quota of new employees from soon-to-be school or university graduates and hire them for a lifetime. The hierarchical higher education system worked as a mechanism for sorting university graduates into different segments of the employment market, which resulted in an obsessive social focus on educational credentialism (gakureki shakai), or what Dore (1976) called “diploma disease.” At the same time, the close linkage between the higher education system and the labour market provided an incentive for students to study hard to enter a good university while also fueling the competition for university admissions.

Japanese employment practices, which relied heavily on the university entrance exam to sort the talent level of prospective employees, contributed to shaping a particular lifestyle of Japanese university students. In the traditional lifetime employment system in Japan, employers invested in their employees’ training after employment (Ellington, 1992). Therefore, academic achievements, or a lack thereof, during university rarely affected students’ employability. For many Japanese students who were finally free of the pressure to pass their university entrance examinations, four years of university meant time to enjoy freedom (Ellington, 1992). Moreover, non-academic activities such as student clubs and part-time jobs have become central to Japanese
university students’ lives. Japanese universities have thus become subject to severe criticism for merely acting as employment agents to meet the demands of the capitalist society, rather than as academic or educational institutions (McVeigh, 2002, 2005).

However, the smooth school-to-work transition for university students in Japan was disrupted by changes in the Japanese economy (Kariya & Rappleye, 2010). As economic stagnation set in Japan in the 1990s, the Japanese government launched a series of neoliberal reforms called the Structural Reform (kōzō kaikaku), which was introduced by the Hashimoto Cabinet (1996-1998) and extensively promoted by the Koizumi Cabinet (2001-2006) under the slogan, “reform without sanctuaries (seiiki naki kaikaku).” As part of the reforms, the Koizumi Cabinet deregulated labour market policies in 2003 to allow companies to engage in non-standard employment practices and to keep the Japanese economy competitive in a rapidly changing global economy. In line with the neoliberal agenda, Japanese companies adopted the policies to hire more part-time (arubaito), dispatched (haken), and contract (keiyaku) workers, while still maintaining the long-standing custom of offering lifetime employment. As a result, Japanese companies started to hire fewer school or university graduates as full employees (sei shain) instead of laying off middle-aged employees. Consequently, the linkage between university entrance examination success and a secure life with lifetime employment was broken.

It has been a common employment practice in Japan for university students to attain job offers before graduation in April, which is the beginning of the new fiscal year in Japan. However, in October 2010, the ratio of prospective graduates from Japanese universities with a job offer (naitei ritsu) for the following April was 57.6%, the lowest percentage in history (Hanano & Yoshida, 2012).
The fractured connection between university and employment, combined with the “easier” admission to universities, has resulted in deteriorating motivation to study (Kariya & Rappleye, 2010). The aforementioned “relaxed” lifestyle of Japanese university students has not changed, and the amount of time that they spend on studying has remained very small. In 2006, the average time that college or university students – including graduate students – in Japan spent on schoolwork\textsuperscript{12} was only three and a half hours per day\textsuperscript{13} (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2006). Moreover, the declining number and percentage of Japanese university students going abroad to study has been interpreted as Japanese students becoming more inward-looking (uchimuki) and has caused concern among those policy-makers who promote the development of global human resources (The Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development, 2012). Accordingly, in 2011, the MEXT launched a new project called the Project for Promotion of Global Human Resource Development in collaboration with the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, n.d.). This project is widely known as Global 30 Plus. While the Global 30 Program, launched in 2009, focuses on enhancing inbound student mobility, the Global 30 Plus focuses on the outbound student mobility by encouraging Japanese students to study overseas.

Meanwhile, Japanese companies are turning elsewhere to scout for prospective employees. Many see ambition, aggressiveness, and English skills as lacking among Japanese university students and have thus started recruiting international students who studied at Japanese universities or graduates from top universities in other Asian countries. Chinese students are particularly popular among Japanese companies due to the growing Chinese market.

\textsuperscript{12} This includes classes and homework.
\textsuperscript{13} The time spent on schoolwork by the same category of students was three hours and 40 minutes in 1986, and three hours and 29 minutes in 1991 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2006).
On the one hand, this new trend has attracted considerable media attention ("Firms fight," 2010, "Firms turning," 2010, "Japanese corporate giants," 2010, "More Japanese companies," 2010; McNeill, 2011). On the other hand, it is too early to gauge the pervasiveness and persistence of this emerging trend in Japanese companies’ hiring practices. For one thing, it remains unknown to what extent Japanese companies are open to hiring new types of employees. For instance, some argue that Japanese companies’ rigid and inflexible job-hunting system and their lack of interest in hiring Japanese students who had studied abroad are some of the major causes of the aforementioned Japanese students’ reluctance to study overseas, rather than the students’ inward-looking mentality (Burgess, 2013; Kakuchi, 2012). The development of Japanese companies’ hiring trend and its implications for the Japanese higher education system, including Japanese and international students, will deserve scholarly attention in the future.

**Demographics of international students in Japan.**

To add a final contextual layer to the study, I provide information on the demographics of international students in Japan. Below, I contextualize the international student population first within the Japanese higher education system and then within the broader social context.

According to the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO) (2010c), 132,720 international students were enrolled in Japanese higher educational institutions as of May 2009. The countries that send the largest percentage of international students to Japan include China (59.6%), Korea (14.8%), and Taiwan (4.0%). Approximately 90% of international students in Japan are self-funded. The distribution of male and female international students in Japan is roughly equal.

International students’ degree level, type of institution, and field of study reflect the aforementioned characteristics of the Japanese higher education system, namely the different
roles and the distribution of national and private universities in Japan: A small number of national universities focus on graduate-level education and research, while the massive private university sector enrolls the majority of undergraduate students. According to JASSO (2009), over 90% of the international students in Japan are degree-seekers, and approximately 26% and 48% of degree-seeking international students are at the graduate level and at the undergraduate level, respectively. While over 60% of graduate-level international students in Japan are enrolled in national institutions, and over 50% of them study in scientific fields, over 80% of undergraduate international students in Japan are enrolled in private institutions, and over 80% of them study social sciences and humanities, 56.2% and 24.9% respectively. Chinese students constitute the largest international student nationality group in Japan, and 87% of them are degree-seeking. Out of these degree-seeking students, 68% are enrolled in undergraduate programs as of 2009.

As discussed earlier, the 300,000 International Student Plan (MEXT et al., 2008) aims to promote post-graduate employment for international students in Japan. Undergraduate programs in Japanese universities are the largest pipelines through which international students move into the Japanese labour market. According to JASSO (2010b), in 2008, 3,873 undergraduate international students remained in Japan for employment, while 672 and 2,063 international students graduating from doctorate and master programs, respectively, remained in Japan for the same reason.

14 Data on international students’ majors by degree levels and institution types were obtained through personal correspondence with JASSO in June 2010. The data are from the fiscal year 2009.
15 Ibid.
16 This figure, 3,873, accounts for 34.9% of all international students graduating from undergraduate programs in Japan. The remaining undergraduate-level international graduates stayed in Japan for education (26.8%) or other reasons (14.4%), returned home (22.4%), or moved to a third country other than Japan and their home country (1.4%).
In 2008, out of the international students who changed their residence status in Japan from student to employee, Chinese nationals represented the largest group, accounting for 69.3%, and over 75% of them were in the visa category of “specialist in humanities/international services” (The Immigration Bureau of Japan, 2009). This visa category suggests that those Chinese workers engage in businesses that deal with China or other Chinese speaking regions of the world, and thus make use of their bilingual skills and their Chinese cultural backgrounds (Liu-Farrer, 2010).

In sum, the majority of international students in Japan study humanities and social sciences at the undergraduate-level at private universities. Chinese students are by far the largest nationality group among international students who study at Japanese higher education institutions and who enter the Japanese labour market after graduation. In other words, Chinese international students play a significant role in fulfilling one of the major goals of the 300,000 International Student Plan: to retain international students for employment in Japan after graduation.

**International students in Japan’s cultural diversity.**

In 2009, the proportion of Japan’s registered foreigners, \(^{17}\) including international students, was only 1.71% (The Immigration Bureau of Japan, 2010). These statistics appear to confirm the long-held myth of Japan being a homogeneous country. However, the low proportion of foreign residents in Japan is not necessarily an accurate reflection of Japan’s actual

\[^{17}\text{Foreigners registered under Alien Registration Law. This population is comprised of permanent residents (24.4\%), special permanent residents (who were forcibly relocated to Japan from former colonies and their offspring) (18.7\%), spouses of Japanese nationals (10.2\%), long-term residents (10.1\%), college students (6.7\%), dependents (5.3\%), specialists in humanities/international services (3.2\%), trainees (3.0\%), engineers (2.3\%), pre-college students (2.1\%), and others (14.0\%).}\]
cultural diversity. Firstly, the demographic category “Japanese” can include a diverse group of people. There have been historically and systematically marginalized populations in Japan, such as the Ainu (indigenous people in Hokkaido), Okinawans (indigenous people in Okinawa), and the burakumin (a social minority group occupying the bottom of the Japanese social order, which had been developed during the Japanese feudal era) (Weiner, 1997; Willis & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008a). Currently, Japan does not track statistics on its population’s self-reported ethnic or cultural origins. Therefore, Japanese citizens who are not culturally or ethnically Japanese (e.g., the Ainu, Okinawans, people of mixed heritage\(^{18}\)) have no way to report their identity other than “Japanese” (Willis & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008b). In addition, once foreign nationals take on Japanese nationality, they are counted as “Japanese” (Tsuneyoshi, 2011). Each year between 2003 and 2012, 10,000-to-17,000 foreign nationals in Japan acquired the status of naturalized citizen (Ministry of Justice, n.d.).

Secondly, even among the population of “registered foreigners,” there is diversity, such as “old comers,” who came to Japan mostly from Japan’s former colonies in Asia before or during the Second World War, and “new comers,” who arrived in Japan since the 1980s mostly as foreign labour. Lastly, the largest nationality groups among foreign residents in Japan are Chinese (31.1%) and Koreans (26.5%) (The Immigration Bureau of Japan, 2010), which means that many ethnic minorities and foreigners in Japan are visibly indistinguishable from ethnic Japanese (Tsuneyoshi, 2011; Willis & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008b). International students in Japan are located in a nuanced demographic context of Japanese society, because homogeneity has been imagined for so long, while real diversity is often hidden, invisible, or unknown.

\(^{18}\) Children of mixed heritage can acquire Japanese nationality from either parent.
International students currently occupy a small segment of the foreign resident population in Japan, accounting for only 6.7%\(^{19}\) in 2009 (The Immigration Bureau of Japan, 2010). With the 300,000 International Student Plan, there is potential growth in the number of not only international students but also of those international students who enter the Japanese labour market and choose to live in Japan for a period after graduation. The actual pace of growth and the duration of individuals’ stays in Japan have yet to be documented.

\(^{19}\) This does not include those who are enrolled in non-higher-education institutions, such as a high school, a professional training school, or a language school (2.1%).
Chapter 4: Literature Review

In the previous chapter, I explored the discourses and policies of internationalization at the national level with a particular focus on Japan, and did so in order to provide a contextual overview of the internationalization of Japanese higher education. In the current chapter, I shift the level of analysis to the institutional and student levels. This chapter is organized along the lines of the key components of this study: 1) the internationalization of higher education institutions; and the construction of international student identities in and through 2) global mobility; and 3) international education experiences in host countries. For each area, I will provide a review of the relevant empirical studies beginning with countries other than Japan before narrowing the focus to the Japanese context.

Internationalization of higher education at the institutional level.

In the previous chapter, I showed that internationalization has been Japan’s self-positioning strategy and reflects its “biographical solution of systemic contradictions” (U. Beck, 1992, p. 137) in the world, including in the global higher education market. Literature on the internationalization of universities in Japan and in other parts of the world also shows that internationalization is a self-positioning tool for universities in the uneven international and domestic fields of higher education. The literature suggests that universities’ internationalization approaches reflect their socially situated imagination of their current and future positions in the domestic and international higher education fields.

In Chapter 2, I introduced two interrelated types of imagined communities that higher education institutions aspire to become through internationalization: the communities to which institutions imagine their students will belong in the future, and the communities to which the
institutions themselves aspire to belong in the global higher education community. As for the former, even though the meaning of global citizenship is highly contested (Bowden, 2003; Parekh, 2003; Roman, 2003), numerous scholars have called for curriculum reforms and education programs to prepare students to future global citizens, and this is based on the prediction that students will live in an increasingly interdependent world (Agnello, White, & Fryer, 2006; M. Evans, 2006; Hanson, 2010; Nussbaum, 2002; Sheppard, 2004). Yet, it is not clear whether such an imagined global community for students is the central impetus for higher education institutions to internationalize their institutions and their approach to education.

The literature often discusses – and does so explicitly - internationalization in terms of higher education institutions’ positioning in the world at the domestic, regional, or international levels (Cantwell & Maldonado-Maldonado, 2009; Chan & Dimmock, 2008; Dixon, 2006; Stensaker et al., 2008; Stromquist, 2007). The literature suggests that many higher education institutions’ imagined community is located within the global higher education market, which is embedded in neoliberal and Western imaginaries of globalization. Within these particular imaginings, institutions aspire to better position themselves in the stratified and uneven global higher education community through internationalization.

For example, Stromquist’s (2007) case study of a private research-intensive university in the United States reveals that for that university, internationalization was in essence an international positioning strategy guided by the principles of neoliberalism, namely, marketing and competition. Stromquist concludes that internationalization was “an expression of economic and technological globalization in which university ‘entrepreneurs’ are not merely looking for more contracts and contacts with industry but, ultimately, are concerned with establishing regular international sites and presence” (p. 102).
However, how higher education institutions imagine their positions in the global higher education community and approach internationalization are embedded not only in a neoliberal imaginary but also in a Western imaginary of globalization. For example, Dixon’s (2006) case study of an international joint program between universities in Australia and Thailand illuminates the intersection between the neoliberal and Western imaginaries of globalization. How the universities saw their positions in the international higher education community and in the partnership relationship were informed by the two social imaginaries of globalization. Both of the universities entered the partnership with the desire to become competitive players in the global higher education community. However, they were driven by different concerns because of their different positions in that community. The Thai side was driven to acquire Western knowledge and pedagogy from their Australian counterpart in order to join the international higher education community. Their concern was social mobility and status through the acquisition of Western qualifications, which would be served by the partnership. In contrast, the Australian side already had an established position in the international community. Their interest was primarily in financial gain through commodification of their knowledge and pedagogy. These findings demonstrate how higher education institutions imagine their current and future positions in the global higher education community are rooted in the world’s colonial power relations, as well as in the contemporary market paradigm of higher education.

These two case studies by Stromquist (2007) and Dixon (2006) reveal an interesting yet concerning overlap that suggests that a neoliberal imaginary of globalization is disguised in the benign discourse of internationalization. Their institutions in both of their studies highlight a benevolent and useful aspect of their internationalization activities, such as intercultural understanding and international collaboration. Stromquist and Dixon problematize how the
innocent discourse of internationalization masks the economic link between internationalization and globalization. As Stromquist puts it succinctly, “At the university level, globalization is manifested by what is termed by insiders as ‘internationalization’” (p. 81). Similarly, Dixon argues that her participant institutions are unwittingly participating in the neoliberal discourse of globalization in the name of internationalization when they should be critically scrutinizing their involvement in it.

As such, the neoliberal and Western imaginaries of globalization provide a broad context against which higher education institutions imagine their position in the world and try to reposition themselves through internationalization. Yet, at the same time, locally specific contextual factors also matter. For example, an empirical study of higher education institutions in Scandinavian countries demonstrates that despite the one-dimensional economic focus of internationalization policies at the national level, higher education institutions’ geographical locations (i.e., urban, rural) and institutional status (i.e., university, college) dictate their internationalization needs and strategies (Stensaker et al., 2008). In addition, internationalization reflects institutions’ historical and political contexts. A comparative study by Chan and Dimmock (2008) of two universities in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong provide a good example. The Hong Kong university’s aspiration for internationalization was to “enhance its capacity to act as ‘a gateway between mainland China and the global community,’” reflecting that city’s desire to develop a new national identity in relation to mainland China (Chan & Dimmock, 2008, p. 190). For the university in the United Kingdom, internationalization was primarily for its international positioning, as British universities always have been seen as “outward looking” ever since the colonial time of the British Empire (Chan & Dimmock, 2008, p. 191).
These findings point to the intersection between social imaginaries and imagined communities in higher education institutions’ internationalization policies (as both text and discourse) and practices. These policies and practices reflect their socially situated imagination of their current positions and future possibilities in global and local higher education fields. Their different approaches to internationalization illuminate how they imagine the higher education community around them and how they see their position in relation to this community, as well as how they see their future possibilities from their particular vantage point. While their imagined communities are influenced by numerous locally specific factors, they are simultaneously entrenched in the neoliberal and Western imaginaries of globalization.

The internationalization of Japanese universities.

For Japanese universities, internationalization is a self-positioning strategy, both for the universities themselves and for Japanese society. According to a Tōhoku University (2008) survey of all four-year higher education institutions in Japan (response rate 82.5%), nearly 80% identify “human resource development,” “academic exchange,” “the enhancement of the recognition of Japanese culture and society in the world,” and “the improvement of Japan’s competitiveness in science, technology, and economy” as the rationales for the internationalization of Japanese higher education. Based on the survey’s results, Yonezawa, Akiba, and Hirouchi (2009) conclude that Japanese universities see internationalization as a tool to enhance the competitiveness of Japanese society in research, technology, and economy.

However, the literature also reveals that Japanese universities’ self-positioning strategies through internationalization are strongly influenced by their institutional type and their position in the hierarchy of the Japanese higher education system (Goodman, 2007; Tōhoku University, 2008; Yokota et al., 2006; Yonezawa et al., 2009). In the previous chapter, I described how the
Japanese higher education system is highly stratified based on admission rates and how the massive private university sector and the small national university sector play different roles: the former provides undergraduate education to the mass public, and the latter focuses on research and graduate-level education (Motohisa Kaneko, 2004). Reflecting these characteristics, studies constantly demonstrate that the focus of elite universities’ internationalization tends to be on enhancing the international dimension of education and research and on international profile-building. Elite national universities in particular tend to focus on international competitiveness in research, with an eye to improving their world university ranking. According to the aforementioned Tōhoku University (2008) survey, the majority of national universities in Japan can expect to receive some external funds, with 91.9% expected to receive funds for international cooperation and research and 50.0% expecting to receive research funds from foreign governments and international organizations. In contrast, among private universities, only 45.3% expect to receive international cooperation and research funds, and only 18.2% of them expect funds from foreign governments and international organizations. Yokota et al. (2006) observe that, under the emergent competitive funding allocation system, as seen in the Global 30 Program, which privileges large and prestigious universities, internationalization is likely to reinforce the existing stratification of the Japanese higher education system.

In contrast, the focus of private lower-ranking universities, which make up the majority of Japanese higher education institutions, tends to be on filling their approved enrollment quotas with international students. Filling the enrollment quota is the key to many institutions’ survival in the face of a rapidly shrinking college-age cohort, because they will not be able to receive government subsidies if those quotas are not filled (Akabayashi, 2006; Tōhoku University, 2008).
However, it should be noted that Japanese universities, regardless of whether they are national or private, tend to expect income from government subsidies for enrolling international students, rather than from tuition fees paid by international students themselves. In the survey by Tōhoku University (2008), 32.4% of national universities and 51.1% of private universities in Japan said that they expected governmental subsidies for enrolling international students, whereas only 17.6% of national universities and 31.6% of private universities in the survey responded that they expected income from tuition fees paid by international students.

This trend contrasts starkly with universities in other countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, which directly profit from higher tuition fees paid by international students. In Japan, international and domestic students pay similar fees (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007). The fact that Japanese universities do not (or cannot) charge higher tuition fees to international students is indicative of Japan’s peripheral position in the uneven global higher education market (Altbach, 2004), where universities in Western English-speaking countries can attract international students even though they charge high tuition rates. In addition, as Huang (2007) describes, Japan’s position in the global higher education market means that its universities tend to import more educational programs and services, especially English-language products from Western countries, than they export. This is despite the emerging trend of some Japanese universities, particularly private universities, exporting their educational programs through double- or joint-degree programs with foreign universities (Huang, 2007).

Current research (Goodman, 2007; Yokota et al., 2006) concludes that international students are a financial and administrative burden for some Japanese universities. According to Goodman (2007), this is particularly the case at Japanese private universities with middle- and
lower-level academic prestige. Goodman explains that this is firstly because the majority of the international students come from developing countries in Asia, especially China, and require financial support from the universities. Secondly, those international students whom middle- and lower-ranking Japanese universities can attract are not the most competitive students. While some universities, particularly those at the lower level, are desperate to recruit any international students so that they can maintain enrolment numbers, some are ambivalent about the benefit of international students. They cannot necessarily expect to boost their international image, let alone gain financially, given the level of international students they can attract.

Japanese universities’ pursuit of international profiling and competitiveness for little direct financial gain shows that the immediate drive for their self-positioning in the higher education community is for symbolic reasons, rather than materialistic ones. Mochizuki (2004) concludes that Japanese universities’ strong desire for international profiling and standards, which provide few financial incentives, is consistent with pre-war Japan’s motivation to colonize other Asian countries for a “status symbol,” unlike their European counterparts whose primary interest in colonization was in the colonies’ resources (p. 207), although it is beyond the scope of this study to examine whether Japan had any material interest in its colonies. It can also be argued that Japanese universities can envisage privileged access to income-earning through their improved positions in the international higher education arena. Nevertheless, the contrast between the immediate incentives that universities in Japan can expect from internationalization and what their Western English-speaking counterparts can expect suggests that the global higher education market is an uneven site of self-positioning struggle for universities from across the world. In addition, within the national borders, Japanese universities’ self-positioning through internationalization is embedded in the stratified higher education system. Their
internationalization strategies are expressions of their socially situated imagination within these power relations at both the national and international levels.

**Global student mobility.**

From this point on, I shift the level of discussion to the student level, specifically international students. I explore prior empirical studies that address how international students construct their identities in and through their global mobility and their experiences in the host country. I begin with a literature review of global student mobility, and then narrow the focus to the global mobility of Chinese students, who are this study’s target group.

As discussed above, internationalization is often a self-positioning strategy for nations and institutions and reflects their socially situated imagination of their current positions and future possibilities in the world. Likewise, the literature suggests that students’ desire to move across the globe is an expression of their socially situated imagination of how they feel they are positioned in the world and how they could possibly position themselves differently to broaden their life options. Their global moves reflect their “biographical solution of systemic contradictions” (U. Beck, 1992, p. 137) in the uneven international higher education and labour markets. Numerous empirical studies reveal that international students’ decisions to study in English-speaking Western countries are driven by their desire to have privileged access to the global labour market, where Western educational qualifications are more highly valued than those of their home countries and English has dominant symbolic power (Doherty & Singh, 2005a; Matthews & Sidhu, 2005; Waters, 2006a, 2006b).

In addition, international students’ pursuit of education abroad reflects their biographical solution to the perceived limits on the life options available in their home countries, at least compared to the perceived possible life options elsewhere in the world. According to studies by
Baas (2010) and Fong (2011), global student flows from developing countries to developed countries reflect their imagination of a better life abroad, pointing to their desire for upward social mobility. Fong argues that for her Chinese student participants, developed industrial countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia and Ireland are one imagined community that is a paradise of material abundance and freedom. They believe that studying in one of those developed countries will lead them to a better life with improved socio-economic conditions.

Yet, it is noteworthy that both Baas (2010) and Fong (2011) argue that many international students are not necessarily seeking a permanent life abroad by completely leaving their home countries behind. Consistent with Ong’s (1999) notion of flexible citizenship, their studies demonstrate that students are rather pursuing flexibility, which would allow them to exercise their agency to select their life options. Baas (2010) describes that “temporariness” and “indefiniteness” are what international students are aiming to gain control of through their participation in international education (p. 176). Global student mobility therefore needs to be understood as an “aspirational affair” with international students being “in the process of becoming transnationals” who have flexible life options (Baas, 2010, p. 12).

While students may be driven to seek international education opportunities based on their perceived lack of life options in their home countries, it is important to note that their desire for global mobility does not always stem from their lack of privilege. As described in my earlier discussions on student tourists based on Kenway and Fahey (2007), students’ global moves are in fact possible because of their privileged social position, for global mobility is not a life choice available to everyone (Bauman, 1998). Thus, the idea of moving across the globe in pursuit of education needs to be understood as a classed imagination.
Student tourists, moreover, can not only become globally mobile professionals but also occupy privileged positions in the political, economic, and intellectual systems of their home countries when they return (J. J. Lee, Maldonado-Maldonado, & Rhoades, 2006; Waters, 2006b). Thus, global student flows contribute to the reproduction of class, separating the globally mobile from the immobile at both global and local levels. In addition, as Lee, Maldonado-Maldonado, and Rhoades (2006) describe, global student flows are part of the neocolonial way that developed countries exert their influence through educating elites from developing countries. Thus, global student mobility is entrenched in socio-economic and colonial power relations within and across national borders.

In addition, how students imagine their social existence and future possibilities are contextualized in international education located within the neoliberal imaginary of globalization (Ong, 2006; Rizvi, 2005). For example, Rizvi’s (2005) study of Asian international students in market-oriented international education in Australia illustrates how the students commodify their international education experiences to better position themselves in the global labour market based on an economic sense of global interconnectivity.

These studies show the complexity of international students’ identity construction. On the one hand, they exercise agency to develop a new identity through participating in education abroad; on the other hand, their identity construction is embedded in the global and local socioeconomic systems and spoken by the dominant neoliberal discourse of globalization. Whether or not they are conscious of it, they are subjugated to, while also benefitting from and sustaining, the existing neoliberal discourse and neocolonial system. To fully understand their identity construction through global mobility, both how they see themselves in their given
socioeconomic, political, and ideological contexts and how they exercise agency to imagine and attain a new identity needs to be explored.

**Chinese international student mobility.**

According to UNESCO (2009), in 2007, China was the largest sending country, with approximately 562,889 students overseas, or 15.8% of the world’s mobile student population. According to Duan (2003), Chinese people’s exposure to the outside world after the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) greatly inspired their desire to study abroad. Duan explains that after the Cultural Revolution ended, a diversity of information, ideologies, and values began to be introduced to China from other countries, and this exposure to the outside world made it possible for young Chinese people to compare their life circumstances with those of their counterparts overseas. As such, it became possible for them to imagine their life overseas and their pursuit of their individual life goals. Fong’s (2011) recent study of young Chinese students illustrates how they imagine a “better life” in developed countries as an essentialized imagined community and aspire to belong to that community through studying in the imagined developed world.

Objective factors have also helped more Chinese students pursue their imagined futures overseas. To more fully meet the increased demands by Chinese people to study abroad, in 1981 the Chinese government started to remove restrictions on self-funded students going overseas (Duan, 2003; Shiratsuchi, 2007). In the past, study abroad was only available for a limited number of elites on government-related scholarships, but the new and freer regulations of self-funded students made it possible for members of the broader Chinese public to study abroad. In addition, more recently, according to Shiratsuchi (2007), the Chinese government’s effort to expand higher education opportunities in China has stimulated Chinese people’s desire for higher education not only domestically but also internationally. Between 1999 and 2007, while the
higher education enrollment rate in China grew by 18.9%, Chinese student global mobility rate rose by 15.3% (UNESCO, 2009). Economic factors also played a crucial role. During the same period of time, the country’s Gross Domestic Product per capita more than doubled from 2,154 dollars in 1999 to 5,564 dollars in 2007\textsuperscript{20} (The World Bank, n.d.). For Shiratsuchi, the fact that 90% of China’s mobile students are self-funded can be attributed to that country’s economic growth, as well as to Chinese people’s increased desire for higher education. Moreover, China’s one-child policy, which was implemented in 1979, has made it possible for many Chinese families to finance their only child’s study abroad (Fong, 2011; Shiratsuchi, 2007). Thus, within the past few decades, study abroad has become not only a desirable option for more Chinese people, but also a possible life option due to China’s dramatic socio-cultural, political, and economic changes.

\textit{Historical relationship between China and Japan.}

According to Takeda (2006), the history of Chinese students going to Japan to study dates back to the late 1800s, with the number reaching 8,000 before the relationship between the two countries was strained by repeated wars. The relationship was finally normalized in 1972, but to this date, the political relationship has been volatile. To contextualize the flow of Chinese students to Japan within the historical relationship, I provide a brief overview of the China-Japan relationship in this section.

The conflict between China and Japan has been shaped primarily by Japan’s wartime aggression in Asia, including China. In 1931, the Imperial Japanese Army invaded the northeastern area of China known as Manchuria and Japan’s colonization of China lasted until the end of the Second World War. The Nanking Massacre in 1937 marked an especially

\textsuperscript{20} Both of the dollar figures are in current international dollar.
traumatic memory of this occupation. In the massacre, it is estimated that the Imperial Japanese Army killed at least 200,000 Chinese civilians, including children (McNeill, 2007). In addition, the Japanese army raped Chinese women who were held as sex slaves, and whom the army referred to as “comfort women.”

The tension between them becomes particularly acute when it comes to the issues of recognition and interpretation of Japanese war crimes. For example, nationalistic-minded Japanese politicians, such as current Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, have denied that Japan institutionalized the sex slavery of comfort women in the former colonies, and he has supported the revisions of Japanese high school history textbooks to whitewash accounts of Japanese war crimes (McNeill, 2007). In addition, nationalistic Japanese political leaders visiting Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japan’s war dead, including those convicted of war crimes during the Second World War, always creates an uproar in China and in Japan’s other former Asian colonies.

The most recent and significant conflict between China and Japan is the territorial conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands\(^1\) in the East China Sea. The conflict exploded in September 2010 when a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats collided in the water near the islands and Japan arrested the captain of the Chinese boat. Following then Tokyo Mayor Shintarō Ishihara’s expressed intent to purchase the islands from their private Japanese owner, the Japanese government purchased three of the disputed islands. In 2012, Japan’s nationalization of the islands triggered anti-Japan sentiment in China which snowballed

\(^1\) The islets in the East China Sea are called the Senkaku Islands in Japanese and the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese.
into massive anti-Japan protests and resulted in violence and property damage to Japanese businesses in numerous Chinese cities (“Anti-Japan rallies expand to 85 cities,” 2012).²²

**Chinese international student mobility to Japan.**

Despite the unsettled historical relationship between China and Japan, the massive influx of Chinese students into Japan started in the early 1980s, following the normalization of China-Japan relationship in 1972 (Duan, 2003). In the 2006 academic year, Japan was the third-most popular destination for Chinese students. China sent 86,553 students to Japan that year, while sending 126,498 students to the United States and 87,588 students to Australia (UNESCO, 2012).

In addition to the socio-cultural, political, and economic changes in China that I described above, changes in Japan played a role in increasing the flow of Chinese students. While Chinese people began imagining their future overseas after the Cultural Revolution, the 100,000 International Student Plan was launched in Japan in 1983. To achieve the Plan’s goal of 100,000 students, Japan significantly loosened work permit regulations for international students. As a result, it became possible for Chinese students from middle-income families to work and study in Japan (Duan, 2003; Suhara, 2002). Consequently, within the year between 1985 and 1986, the number of international students from China rapidly increased from 2,730 to 4,418,²³ and Chinese students became the largest international student nationality group in Japan, surpassing Taiwanese and Korean students (Duan, 2003).

However, for many Chinese students, Japan is not necessarily their first-choice destination, unless of course they have a specific academic interest in Japanese language, culture,

²² Some contend that the anti-Japan protests were caused by young Chinese who grew up with the Chinese patriotic education and found in the protests an opportunity to vent their frustration with the level of socio-economic disparity in Chinese society (Endō, 2012).
²³ This does not include international students enrolled in Japanese language schools.
and society (Asano, 1997; Fong, 2011; Yokota, 2009a). Yokota’s (2009a) survey of university students in China articulates this point. For the vast majority of the students majoring in Japanese, Japan is their first-choice destination (87%). However, for the vast majority of students in other majors, the United States (54%) is their first choice, followed by the United Kingdom (12%). Only 6% of them chose Japan.

While Tsuboya (2008) acknowledges that a mix of factors motivate Chinese people to go to Japan, her study suggests that the destination may be a secondary concern for many Chinese people who aspire to leave China. In her multiple-choice survey of Chinese people living in Japan who initially arrived as students, their top reason for going to Japan was to acquire specialized knowledge, and that was the case for over 50% of the respondents. However, when asked about their reason for leaving China, over 40% of said they “wanted to see the outside world; wanted to go anywhere overseas,” and over 20% of the respondents noted their dissatisfaction with social and labour conditions in China. The major reasons for choosing to go to Japan and to leave China are not specifically because of some attraction to Japan. In fact the reasons unrelated to Japan exceed Japan-specific reasons, such as “wanted to study Japanese” or “wanted to work in Japan,” which account for less than 20% of the total. Asano’s (2004) study and Tsuboya’s follow-up interviews with transnational Chinese people support the assertion that Chinese people’s dissatisfaction with socio-economic conditions in China is a strong factor motivating them to leave China. This finding also coincides with Fong’s (2011) study that reveals that Chinese people’s desire to leave China is because they imagine a “better life” in the developed world, including in Japan.

The literature further illustrates that Chinese people’s choice to study in Japan reflects their strategies to navigate the uneven socio-economic and academic systems not only in China
but also across countries (Asano, 2004; Fong, 2011; Tsuboya, 2008). Previous studies indicate that for many Chinese students, while financing studies in English-speaking developed countries is far beyond their reach, Japan is one of the few developed countries that is accessible to them (Asano, 2004; Fong, 2011). Coming to Japan is thus a compelling solution for some Chinese people, particularly when they are interested in something specific to Japan. At the same time, it can also be a convenient or compromised solution, as Fong reports her participants’ view of Japan as the “most convenient, lowest cost, and easiest option” (p. 46). I discussed earlier that global student flows contribute to the reproduction of class stratification between the globally mobile and immobile (J. J. Lee et al., 2006; Waters, 2006b). These previous studies on Chinese students’ decisions to come to Japan add another layer to our knowledge about the class reproduction process through global student mobility: destination countries sort globally mobile students into different levels of class stratification based on the uneven global higher education market.

**International students’ experiences and identity formation in the host society.**

With the concept of imagined communities, the literature addresses how international students construct their identities in their host society in two ways. The first is according to how the host society imagines international students as a community, in contrast with how the society imagines itself as a community. The second is according to how international students negotiate with the “given” imagined communities by the host society. Below, I will present these two related sets of literature in order to show the interactive nature of international students’ identity development in the host society as a contact zone. Then, I will move on to present the literature on international students in the Japanese setting.
**Imagined international student community by the host society.**

Studies on the relationship between international students and their host society show that the host society constructs apolitical, essentialized, and fixed imagined communities both for themselves as a Self and for international students as the Other (Devos, 2003; Doherty & Singh, 2005b; Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Koehne, 2005; Matus, 2006; Rhee & Sagaria, 2004). Devos (2003) succinctly states, “Both the international and the local become homogenized – the international because it is foreign and exotic – and the local because it is ‘not other’” (p. 164). For example, Rhee and Sagaria’s (2004) critical discourse analysis of a major publication that focuses on US higher education, the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, reveals the discourse permeating the construction and maintenance of the US higher education system’s imperial subject position as an educator of world leaders. According to Rhee and Sagaria, American imperialism as a self-identity is constructed while subjugating international students as the inferior Other who come to learn from them. Similarly, Devos’s study reveals that Australian academics put themselves in a superior position as “guardian of academic standards” while locating international students in an inferior position as a threat to Australian academic standards (p. 165).

Yet, as much as host country communities may marginalize, denigrate, or disparage international students as the Other, their attitude towards the Other is often conflicted, for they need the Other as a source of revenue (Devos, 2003; Matus, 2006; Rhee & Sagaria, 2004). Moreover, international students’ identity is homogenized for a “creation of cultural diversity and a containment of cultural difference” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 208). For example, a critical analysis by Matus (2006) of the United States’ policy discourse of international students after the attacks of September 11, 2001 elucidates that international students are homogenized subjects: they are
non-immigrant foreigners, they are a source of danger, or they contribute to cultural diversity. She contends that international students’ subject position as a representation of cultural diversity “constitutes a compensatory notion of inclusion rather than a recognition of who these diverse group of people are” (p. 89). She continues:

Identity is treated as a concept that promotes unity. As cultural diversity is acknowledged and highlighted within the university and bureaucratic rhetoric, it provides a sense of inclusion to the individuals represented by the international students community. This model of identity tends to be essentialised and the complexities of human dynamic interactions are trivialized, as is evident in International Days, and Cosmopolitan Clubs that are celebrated on campuses. (p. 89)

This rhetoric of international students as a symbol of cultural diversity is underpinned by the assumption that the host society is a non-diverse homogenized Self. This in turn puts those who do not fit the dominant cultural norms of the host society in the homogenized position of the Other under the name of unity of diverse cultures.

Thus, host societies construct fixed and homogenized imagined communities for themselves as well as for international students they host. In doing so, they mask the reality that the actual constituencies of the communities occupy diverse, and often unequal, social positions and engage in dynamic human interactions. This mechanism illustrates “acts of purification or sanitization in contact zones” (Doherty & Singh, 2005b, p. 55) and provides a significant backdrop against which international students see their social existence in their host society.
International student community as imagined by international students.

Studies demonstrate that international students do not always passively submit to the essentialized subject position given to them by their host society. Rather, international students actively construct a third space for their hybrid identities in their host society as a contact zone.

As described above, host societies construct imagined communities for themselves as a Self, and for international students as the Other. As a result, numerous studies report international students’ experiences of being “othered” by their host communities in the form of marginalization, discrimination, and the like (Beoku-Betts, 2004; Gareis, 2012; J. Lee & Rice, 2007; Lyakhovetska, 2004; Sawir, Marginson, Deumert, Nyland, & Ramia, 2008). Yet, empirical studies also show that international students construct an imagined community for themselves as a Self representing their sense of sameness or solidarity, despite the actual diversity amongst them (Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Koehne, 2005; Schmitt, Spears, & Branscombe, 2003). According to a study by Schmitt, Spears, and Branscombe (2003), international students tend to identify with the international student community in response to their shared experience with their host society, which marginalizes or excludes them based on their international student status as the Other, rather than on other attributes such as their nationality.

Some may interpret international students’ homogenized sense of Self as a manifestation of their passive subjugation to the identity as the Other given to them by their host communities. However, according to the literature, international students’ self-identification with the group is not entirely passive. Studies have found that by accepting and appropriating the given category of international student as the Other, international students develop their sense of Self in a way that provides them with a sense of belonging, solidarity, and protection in a foreign society (Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Koehne, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2003). Therefore, international students’
identification with the given group category can be interpreted as a third position they develop through negotiation between the host country’s culture and their home cultures. International students can, to some extent, choose not to identify with the given international student identity and instead choose to assimilate into the dominant culture of the host society. Bhabha (1990) argues that negotiation includes the full spectrum of our engagement with political power relations, ranging from “compromise or ‘selling out’” to subversion or transgression “even when we don’t know we are negotiating” (p. 216). As such, international students’ self-identification with the group identity or other identities can be understood as a manifestation of their identity negotiation regardless of whether and to what extent they are conscious of it.

That being said, the international student community as a self-identity encounters a dilemma. On the one hand, self-identification is international students’ pragmatic coping strategy in an inhospitable host society environment (Schmitt et al., 2003). What’s more, their alignment with the international student community can be interpreted as their resistance to assimilating into their host country’s culture (Kenway & Bullen, 2003). On the other hand, self-identification with the international student community runs the risk of creating a homogeneous space where they perform and reinforce their difference from the host society (Kenway & Bullen, 2003). Consequently, they may unwittingly consent and contribute to what Bhabha (1990) calls a “creation of cultural diversity and a containment of cultural difference” in their host society (p. 208). This dilemma reminds us that identity negotiation occurs within existing power configurations of the contact zone.

The international student community as a self-identity, as I have discussed in this section, is constructed upon the Self-Other dichotomy between international students as one singular group and their host society as another singular group. However, it needs to be remembered that
Contact zones are heterogeneous not only in terms of the constituencies but also in terms of their perspectives and how they position themselves (Kenway & Bullen, 2003). The contact zone perspectives include the various social positions that international students see themselves occupying in the contact zones. The literature demonstrates that international students negotiate based on how they feel they are represented in their host countries, such as in racial, gendered, or the Third World Other terms, to construct their sense of self (Beoku-Betts, 2004; Kenway & Bullen, 2003). Their negotiation includes resistance, acceptance, and appropriation of these various subject positions given by their host society (Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Koehne, 2005).

In addition, how international students imagine their social existence and position themselves in contact zones goes beyond the representations given by their host society. For example, Tsuboya’s (2008) study of transnational Chinese people’s identities in Japan addresses the complexity of how international students see their social existence. Using Robert Merton’s concept of reference groups, Tsuboya’s study examines transnational Chinese participants’ identities in Japan by specifying who their reference groups are and how they describe their relationship with each reference group. The two points illustrated in the study are noteworthy for my study. First, as seen in some of the participants’ reference groups, such as the globally immobile Chinese and American society, their reference groups can transcend their immediate social space in Japan. Second, reference groups can be either real or imagined. While some of the participants’ reference groups are relatively narrowly defined groups that exist in their immediate social space, such as their Japanese colleagues in Japan, their reference groups can also be essentialized group categories representing imagined communities. Their reference groups include very broadly defined groups, such as the globally immobile Chinese, and imaginary groups with whom they have had no or very limited direct contact, such as European
or American society. Thus, the examination of international students’ identities should not be limited to the Self-Other dichotomy only between international students and their host society. Rather, we should be attentive to multiple ways international students imagine their social existence in and outside their immediate life space.

As seen so far, previous studies indicate that international students construct a third space for their hybrid identities in their host society as contact zone. They do so by negotiating how they are represented by their host society and by incorporating real or imagined reference groups into their self-positioning. Being in a new cultural and social environment in their host country, they can experience having “choice of identity” (Kenway & Bullen, 2003, p. 15) and reinvent new identities for themselves (Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Koehne, 2005). However, the invention of hybrid identities can be paradoxical and restricted, as well as liberating, to various degrees (Koehne, 2005). As Koehne (2005) describes, the possibility of becoming a new person gives international students a sense of freedom. They can leave their past behind in their home countries and become who they want to become. At the same time, occupying a third space that belongs to neither their home culture nor the host culture gives them a sense of isolation and dislocation (Koehne, 2005).

**International students’ experiences and identity formation in Japan.**

Now, let us shift the focus of the discussion to previous studies of international students, particularly Chinese students, in Japan. Overall, the literature on international students in Japan is descriptive, and there has been a dearth of empirical studies that articulate how international students feel they are positioned by the host society and how they act to position themselves in Japan. However, I will address some key issues concerning international students in Japan in order to suggest areas of further exploration.
According to Yokota (2009b), the major challenges that international students encounter in Japan, in order of importance, include high living expenses, learning the Japanese language, and finding housing. Chinese students also identify these challenges in the same order. Some of these challenges could be lightened to some extent as international students stay in Japan longer, become more fluent in Japanese language and culture, and build social connections in Japan. However, a number of studies of international students in Japan reveal that neither a mastery of the Japanese language nor the length of time in Japan correlates positively with their sense of adjustment to or positive attitudes toward Japanese society (Iwao & Hagiwara, 1988; Tanaka, Takai, Kōyama, & Fujihara, 1994; Tsai, 1995). These studies consistently show that students from Asia, particularly those from less developed Asian countries, experience more adjustment difficulties than students from other regions of the world, particularly developed Western countries. It is well documented that international students from Asian countries perceive their treatment from Japanese people as discriminatory, at least in comparison to the way their white Western counterparts are treated (Asano, 1997; Duan, 2003; Iwao & Hagiwara, 1988; Suhara, 1996; Sun, 2004; Xu, 1996).

Creighton’s (1997) explanation of different social categories of race in Japan is helpful in understanding this disturbing phenomenon. Creighton explains that groups of foreigners in Japan are often differentiated along the racial continuum of white, yellow, and black, in which Whites are placed in the most privileged position, and Blacks are considered inferior and low-class.

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24 The study by Yokota (2009b) is an analysis of the survey results by the JASSO (2008) about self-funded international students in Japanese higher education institutions. The breakdown of the survey data by international students’ nationality group is not available in the data provided by the JASSO, which conducted the original research, but it is available in Yokota’s work. Therefore, in this section, I refer to Yokota to compare Chinese students and other international students in Japan or to describe Chinese students’ issues specifically.
While Whites and Blacks are apparently outsiders in this schema, non-Japanese Asians are in an ambiguous yet clearly inferior outsider position. Creighton describes,

Other Asians are not considered similar enough to spark a kindred identity, nor distant enough to provide an appropriate contrasting Other. The marginality of other Asians makes them problematic and contributes to a Japanese tendency to look down on them.

(p. 225)

The racial stratification makes better sense when it is contextualized within Japan’s trajectory for modernization, in which the country uncritically accepted the colonial racial hierarchy in an effort to establish a modern national identity by achieving material parity with their Western Other (Mochizuki, 2004; Rappleye & Kariya, 2011). Creighton therefore explains that as Japan attained economic affluence and became a modernized nation, mainstream Japanese have come to see themselves in the image of the White category, which represents economic, political, and cultural power. Consequently, the Japanese tendency to look down on non-Japanese Asians has persisted.

With regards to Chinese students in particular, according to Duan (2003), there has been a persistent phenomenon of Chinese international students in Japan tending to develop an anti-Japan attitude due to their experience of discrimination in Japan. This phenomenon, which he calls, “ryūnichi han-nichi (staying in Japan, anti-Japan),” surfaced in the early 20th Century when Japan had the first influx of Chinese students, and the phenomenon was magnified again in the 1980s with the second influx of Chinese students (Duan, 2003). Duan attributes this phenomenon not only to Japanese people’s racial and class discrimination toward non-Japanese Asians as explained by Creighton (1997) above, but also to the unresolved historical conflict between China and Japan. Duan explains that Chinese students’ negative views of Japan are
rooted in Japan’s continuous denial of its invasion in China during the war as well as China’s anti-Japan education, which, in his view, demands a critical reflection on part of both China and Japan.

More problematically, derogatory or discriminatory attitudes towards non-Japanese Asians are publicly tolerated in Japan. For example, Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara held onto his position as governor for four terms between 1999 and 2012, despite making racist remarks against non-Japanese Asians living in Japan and overseas. In particular, he is known for calling people from the former Japanese colonies sangoku jin, which literally means “people from third countries,” and refused to apologize for the problematic remark (“Sangokujin’ label was regrettable,” 2000).

Thus, international students’ experiences and identities are embedded in a socially, politically, and historically specific context in Japan. However, as noted earlier, previous studies on international students in Japan tend to be descriptive rather than critical or analytical, and little is known about how international students in Japan interpret and position themselves in the given context. As a rare example, Liu-Farrer’s (2010) study articulates how Chinese newcomers to Japan, many of whom originally came to Japan as international students, experience privilege as transnational corporate employees, on the one hand; but on the other hand, they also experience prejudice as immigrants who represent a racial and cultural Other. However, other studies that touch on the relationship between international students and Japan’s difficult social context tend to focus on how to support their cultural learning or psychological coping (J. Chen & Takataya, 2008; Murphy-Shigematsu, 2002; Xu & Kageyama, 1994). Despite their good intentions, these studies are inclined to take a paternalistic approach that places host community members in a benevolent position of “helping” international students adjust to the dominant
Japanese culture or cope with injustices that Japanese society imposes on them. Suhara (1996) and Duan (2003) are unusual among scholars in that they advocate transforming the side of Japanese society rather than international students. Suhara calls for transforming Japan’s historically rooted desire to detach itself from other Asian countries in order to join the West. For this transformation to happen, he contends that it is essential to develop a shared understanding of the history between the Japanese and Asian international students in Japan. Duan also maintains that there is clearly a need for reconciliation at a governmental level.

**Summary.**

In this chapter, I have explored three areas of literature pertinent to this study: 1) the internationalization of higher education institutions; and the construction of international student identities in and through 2) global mobility; and 3) international education experiences in host countries. In this concluding section, I will identify the research gap in each area.

Firstly, as I discussed in the previous chapter, for Japan, internationalization has been a self-positioning strategy embedded in neoliberal and Western imaginaries of globalization. Likewise, the literature reviewed in this chapter shows that within these particular imaginaries, higher education institutions, including Japanese universities, also work to better position themselves in the uneven global higher education communities through internationalization. In addition, studies on the internationalization of Japanese higher education demonstrate that the institutional type (i.e., national, public, or private) and position in the hierarchical Japanese higher education system dictate institutional approaches to internationalization.

However, these observations of the internationalization of Japanese universities are based heavily on quantitative studies. These quantitative studies are helpful in illustrating the overall patterns of Japanese universities’ approaches to internationalization. They also suggest that
Japanese universities’ approaches to internationalization reflect their socially situated imagination of their current positions and future possibilities in the uneven domestic and global fields of higher education. However, because of the lack of studies offering qualitative accounts of internationalization from Japanese universities’ point of view, it remains unknown how Japanese universities see their existence in the domestic and global fields of higher education and translate this viewpoint into their discourses and practices of internationalization. In addition, even though Marginson and Rhoades (2002) theorize that players in higher education at different levels (i.e., global, national, and local) exercise agency and interact with one another in a multidirectional way, we do not know how Japanese universities interact with the recent national internationalization policies as both discourse and text (Ball, 1993) in a concrete manner. This research gap calls out for an institutionally specific qualitative study on the internationalization of Japanese universities in order to deepen existing knowledge about internationalization in Japan. In addition, an institutionally specific knowledge about the internationalization of Japanese universities will allow us to locate international students’ experiences in the institutionally specific contexts of internationalization.

Secondly, to summarize the literature on global student mobility, global flows of students take place in the uneven international higher education arena located within neoliberal and Western imaginaries of globalization. On the one hand, international students often pursue international education opportunities due to systemic constraints in their home countries or greater value attached to Western education credentials and language (i.e., English) in the uneven field of international higher education. On the other hand, they are not entirely passive subjects in the global and local systems. While being influenced by the systems, they are simultaneously
active agents who capitalize on their class privilege to accrue social and cultural capital through international education and enhance their life options that transcend national borders.

However, in the vast majority of studies on worldwide, region- or country-specific student flows (T.-M. Chen & Barnett, 2000; Gürüz, 2008; Kell & Vogl, 2012; Shen, 2007; Yokota, 2009a) as well as in qualitative studies on globally mobile students (Baas, 2010; Doherty & Singh, 2005a; Fong, 2011; Rizvi, 2000; Tsuboya, 2008), the primary unit of analysis is country or global region. They explain why students decide to leave their home countries and to which countries or regions they go. As governments take an increasingly active role in international student recruitment (Gürüz, 2008) in what Brown and Tannock (2009) call a “global war for talent,” university actors’ various interests and strategic approaches to international student recruitment have attracted some scholarly attention (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Stromquist, 2007; Tōhoku University, 2008). Moreover, universities in non-English-speaking countries launch English-medium programs as a way of internationalization, including through international student recruitment (Kuwamura, 2009; Tsuneyoshi, 2005, 2011; Yoshino, 2009). Nonetheless, the intersection between universities’ intent and students’ intent has seldom been explored. As a result, we do not know how and why international students choose a certain higher education institution in a destination country and how their choice of institution is related to their future imaginations.

Thirdly, on the one hand, international students’ identity formation has been much studied in English-speaking Western country settings in terms of both how the host society views international students and how international students represent themselves in the host society. On the other hand, there are few equivalent studies of Japan as a host society. Existing studies about international students in Japan give us an overview of what international students mean to
Japanese universities or to Japan based mostly on quantitative studies or analyses of international student policies in Japan (Duan, 2003; Goodman, 2007; Kinmonth, 2005; Lassegard, 2006; Terakura, 2009a; Tōhoku University, 2008; Yokota et al., 2006; Yonezawa et al., 2009).

However, in most of these studies, international students’ voices are absent.25 At the same time, empirical studies have investigated international students’ experiences in Japan (Asano, 1997; Iwao & Hagiwara, 1988; Sasaki, Cho, & Tei, 2012; Suhara, 1996).

Yet, studies on the internationalization of Japanese universities and international students’ experiences in Japan have been conducted in isolation from each other. Consequently, there is a lack of understanding about international students’ experiences within the context of internationalization of their host universities in Japan. Bridging the internationalization of Japanese universities and international students’ experiences is important when Japan and Japanese universities recruit more international students in the name of internationalization. The dearth of educational research that examines the intersection between internationalization and international students is concerning, especially when major actors of internationalization, international students, particularly those from Asian countries, experience racism and discrimination in Japan. In addition, while the existing literature portrays international students as victims of discrimination or xenophobia in Japan, little is known about how they see their social existence in Japan and how they work to position themselves in Japan as a site of struggle embedded in historically formed unequal power relations.

Therefore, my study examines how Chinese international students develop their identities through their experiences in institutionally specific contexts of internationalization by framing Japanese society and universities as contact zones. By exploring the intersections of the

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25 The exception is the study by Lassegard (2006), which includes 11 international graduate students’ accounts of their experiences at three national universities in Japan.
internationalization of Japanese universities and the construction of international students’ identities, I hope to uncover some of the challenges and potentials of the internationalization of Japanese universities that might not have been discussed in the existing literature.

Before presenting the methodology of the study, I would like to reiterate the research questions based on the research gaps articulated in this section.

1) How do Japanese universities see their social existence and translate it into their internationalization discourses and practices?
   a) How are international students positioned in the universities’ internationalization discourses and practices?
   b) What is the relationship between the internationalization of the universities and the internationalization policies of the Japanese government?

2) How do international students see their identities and future possibilities in and through their international education in Japan?
   a) What drives international students’ desire to participate in international education in Japan and specifically at Japanese universities?
   b) How do international students experience and position themselves in Japanese universities and Japanese society?
   c) How do their experiences in Japan shape how they imagine their futures?
Chapter 5: Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodological concepts, study design, and the actual processes I used to pursue the inquiry. First, I explain the methodological concepts that I adopted for the study and how I grounded the study design in these concepts. In particular, I elaborate on how the concepts pertain to the case study design and interviews as a major source of data. Second, I present the cases and participants. Along with the selection criteria and recruitment strategies, I describe the two Japanese universities as the case institutions and two participant groups (i.e., faculty/staff members and Chinese international students). Third, I detail the data collection processes for the three sets of data: institutional documents, interviews with faculty/staff participants, and interviews with student participants. In addition, I articulate the role of my researcher subjectivity in the data collection processes and how I negotiated my subjectivity with my participants. Fourth, I illustrate the steps I took through for data analysis. Lastly, I discuss the trustworthiness of the inquiry process and product, the strategies I took to increase the level of trustworthiness, and the limitations of the trustworthiness.

Methodological approach and study design.

To understand the construction of international students’ identities in the context of the internationalization of Japanese universities, this study employed a case study design. The case study method is appropriate for understanding contextual conditions that might be highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study (Yin, 2003). It allows a researcher to study a phenomenon in a bounded context and to produce a case description and case-based themes (Creswell, 2007; Merriam, 1998). Specifically, this study adopted a multiple embedded case study design, which involved multiple cases and multiple units of analysis within each case (Yin, 2003). Two
Japanese universities served as the cases, and the internationalization discourses and practices and international students were the units of analysis within each case.

Instead of viewing knowledge as something fixed and to be found by accessing a certain source of data, I grounded my study in the constructivist paradigm. In contrast to a positivist paradigm, which assumes that there is single, fixed, and measurable truth that is independent of time and context, the constructivist paradigm assumes that reality is socially constructed and that there are multiple realities (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1998; Mertens, 1998). The constructivist paradigm fits this study’s purpose, which is not to discover the truth about the construction of international students’ identities, such as what kinds of contextual factors have causal effects on their identity formation, but rather to gain a contextualized understanding of how international students make sense of their circumstances and experiences and translate those circumstances and experiences into their sense of identity. Corresponding to the ontological assumption that realities are socially constructed, the epistemological assumption of the constructivist paradigm is that knower and known interact and co-create understandings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Mertens, 1998). This paradigm therefore opts for a qualitative and interactive mode of data collection, such as interviewing and observations.

A case study typically involves diverse sources of information, such as interviews, documents, and observations because multiple sources can complement each other to provide a fuller picture of the case (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2003). Accordingly, for this study, interviews with international students, interviews with faculty and staff members, and institutional documents served as the sources of data.
In this study, interviews constitute a major source of data, and interviewing is considered to be a collaborative process, in which reality and meaning are constructed through interactions between interviewers and interviewees (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, 2003; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Mishler, 1991; Talmy, 2010). Interviews are not a pipeline for knowledge transmission but a site for the production of knowledge, in which both interviewers and interviewees are “necessarily and unavoidably active” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2003, p. 68). In other words, as well as rejecting the view of interviewees as “passive vessels of answers” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 7), this approach to interviews acknowledges that “interviewers are deeply and unavoidably implicated in creating meanings that ostensibly reside within respondents” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2003, p. 68).

A case study whose data source is interview as a collaborative process would draw questions about its generalizability, that is, whether or to what extent the knowledge produced through the collaboration between particular individuals in a particular case can inform anything outside the case. I will discuss this issue further in the section on trustworthiness toward the end of this chapter, but it should be noted at this point that, like Lincoln and Guba (1985), this study rejects the notions of internal validity and external validity. The former – internal validity - assumes a causal relationship between independent and dependent variables, and the latter – external validity - presumes the generalizability of the causal relationship to and across different types of contexts, such as different populations, settings, and times. Rather, what this study seeks to achieve is transferability, which presumes that the extent to which the findings of one study can be applied to another context is “an empirical matter, depending on the degree of similarity between sending and receiving contexts” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 297). The original investigator in the sending context cannot know or have control over to which context the study
findings are applied. Then, what is crucial to ensure transferability is the provision of enough details of the case in order to allow the readers in the receiving context to determine the extent to which the findings can be applied to the situations of their concern (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 2002; Stake, 2000). Details of the case includes the interview process and products, and, as Holstein and Gubrium (2003) emphasize, articulating the “what” and “how” of meaning production in interviewing. Therefore, in this chapter I will provide details of the cases, the participants, and the data collection and analysis processes.

Cases.

The majority of international students in the Japanese higher education system are studying at private universities offering humanities and social science undergraduate programs. For this study, I selected two universities from this pool of universities based on the extreme-case selection method (Gerring, 2007). Because concepts or phenomenon are often defined by their extreme ideal types, the extreme-case selection method selects cases that offer the most extreme example of a phenomenon of interest (Gerring, 2007). Accordingly, I chose two private Japanese universities with humanities and social science undergraduate programs that are extremely successful in materializing the ideas of internationalization that have been proposed by the Japanese government. This selection was also based on the expectation that those extreme cases would allow a glimpse into the realities of internationalization, which the Japanese government aspires to implement at more Japanese universities in the future.

I judged the level of success of internationalization at Japanese universities based on how much the universities’ actions were consistent with the 300,000 International Student Plan (MEXT et al., 2008), because this policy has been central to the Japanese government’s recent initiatives to internationalize Japanese higher education. There are primarily two new aspects to
this international student policy, at least compared to the previous policy, the 100,000 International Student Plan issued in 1983. One is the strong emphasis on the integration of English into the university system both in the admission process and in teaching. The other is that the new international student plan emphasizes the integration of international students into the Japanese labour force after graduation. Given these two new emphases, I set forth the following case selection criteria for this study.

1. University type and programs. I selected private Japanese universities offering humanities and social science undergraduate programs.

2. The number of international students. Because increasing the number of international students is the goal of the 3000,000 International Student Plan, I selected universities whose international student enrolment figure is among the highest in the Japanese higher education system.

3. The high degree of integration of English into the admissions process and curriculum. I selected universities that had undergraduate programs, which meant that applicants could apply with proof of English proficiency and were not required to provide proof of Japanese language proficiency, and that they could complete their degrees primarily in English.

4. Strong career support for international students. I selected universities that had proactive initiatives on career support for international students as well as for domestic students.

5. Accessibility. I selected universities with which I had access in order to facilitate data collection for the study.

I identified two cases that not only fulfill all of the criteria noted above, but also contrast with each other in terms of their levels of academic prestige and their geographical locations. As
described earlier, academic prestige is a significant factor that affects Japanese universities’ approaches to and practices of internationalization. In addition, a university’s geographical location is considered to be a significant factor that not only shapes the environment of international students’ experiences but also affects the university’s ability to attract international students. For example, the Kantō region, which includes Tokyo and surrounding metro cities, attracts approximately 50% of international students in Japan (Japan Student Services Organization, 2010c). I therefore selected a prestigious private university and a less prestigious private university located in urban and rural areas, respectively. I chose these cases in order to explore the diversity of internationalization practices at different Japanese university settings and to have a sharp point of comparison to better understand each case. Yet, I limited the number of cases to two primarily because of the limitation of resources available to the study in terms of time and money.

The two cases are: the College of International Liberal Arts (CILA) at Kasuga University as a case of a prestigious university located in an urban area; and Hokuto Global University (HGU) as a case of a less prestigious university located in a rural area. These names I use for the institutions are pseudonyms. Below, I will introduce each case.

**College of International Liberal Arts at Kasuga University.**

CILA is an undergraduate college housed within Kasuga University. Kasuga University is a large comprehensive private university located in an urban area of Japan. It has long history, and it has held top-level academic prestige in Japan. The university consists of a large
The number of international students at Kasuga University is among the largest among Japanese universities. However, the proportion of international students is as low as 2% at the undergraduate level due to its massive domestic student population. The vast majority of international students at Kasuga are enrolled in humanities or social science programs, and Chinese students are the largest nationality group among international students at Kasuga, accounting for over 40% of the international student population. Kasuga has a long relationship with China. Kasuga established a department specifically for Chinese international students in the early 1900s, and many Chinese political leaders and scholars went to Kasuga to study.

Internationalization is central to Kasuga University’s current strategic plan. The plan aims to broaden the university’s academic prestige beyond Japan and into the global arena by increasing, for example, the number of international students, foreign faculty members, study abroad programs, and English-medium courses.

CILA is ahead of these internationalization initiatives. It was founded after 2000 as an undergraduate liberal arts program with a goal of educating “global citizens,” according to the program’s website. CILA has internationally diverse student and faculty communities, and its international student population is the largest in terms of both number and proportion among all of Kasuga University’s undergraduate programs. Over 50% of the entire undergraduate international student population at Kasuga is located at CILA. CILA enroll nearly 3,000

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26 The case institutions’ data presented in this chapter are drawn from the data that were available at the point of this study’s case selection, which took place during the summer and fall of 2010, unless noted otherwise.
27 For a point of reference, the top-30 numbers of international students at Japanese universities range from 3,568 to 670 as of May 2010 (Japan Student Services Organization, 2010a).
students, and approximately one-third come from countries other than Japan. CILA attracts students from over 30 countries, and the largest international student nationality group is Korea (44%), followed by China (30%) and Taiwan (7%). CILA is a popular program especially among Chinese students, and those enrolled in CILA account for over 17% of the entire undergraduate international degree-seeking student population at Kasuga and approximately 57% of the Chinese undergraduate degree-seeking students at Kasuga. In addition, approximately one-third of the faculty members at CILA are foreign nationals representing 11 countries. Moreover, 80% of the faculty members (both foreign and Japanese faculty members combined) at CILA hold doctoral degrees from foreign universities.²⁸

Just as the college website states, the college is characterized as having, “a multilingual bent focused on English in both research and student life,” English is the major language of communication and instruction at CILA, which does not require applicants to provide a Japanese proficiency test score. In addition to academic transcripts from all the high schools attended and a certificate of graduation, the application requirements for admission to CILA include an English essay, a certificate of results of university entrance qualification examinations and other standardized tests (e.g., Scholastic Aptitude Test, Baccalaureat), and an English proficiency test score (e.g., TOEFL, International English Language Testing System [IELTS]). CILA also has April and September admissions to accommodate various countries’ different academic year systems.

Aside from its commitment to nurture logical thinking and communication skills through liberal arts education and discussions in a small classroom setting, CILA emphasizes the importance of language learning. The college has slightly different language requirements for

²⁸ According to Staff W at CILA in June 2012
two groups of students: native Japanese speakers and non-native speakers. At CILA, approximately 70% of the students are native Japanese speakers, and the rest are non-native Japanese speakers. While native Japanese speakers are required to take 15 credits from English and other language courses, non-native Japanese speakers are required to take 24 credits from Japanese courses, three credits from English courses, and four credits from other language courses. In addition, a one-year study abroad is a requirement for native Japanese speakers, while it is optional for non-native speakers.

While Kasuga University has a career support office for its entire student population, CILA has recently opened its own career support office. The office was opened as part of the Good Practice program by the MEXT, which supports Japanese universities creating high-quality and distinctive educational programs (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, n.d.-c). The office provides career support for CILA students, including those who would like to go on to jobs and those who would like to pursue post-graduate studies in and outside of Japan. Of the 2009 CILA graduates (domestic and international students), approximately 70% were employed, while 10% went on to attend graduate schools in Japan, and 4% went on to attend graduate schools outside of Japan. Some of the major employers of CILA graduates are large internationally-operating Japanese companies in manufacturing, finances, and commerce. Foreign corporations are also listed as recruiters of CILA graduates.

*Hokuto Global University.*

HGU is a contrasting case to CILA, despite the fact that both institutions are newly established as international institutions. In contrast to CILA, HGU is located in a rural area in Japan, and its academic prestige is medium level according to a major university ranking entitled *Daigaku rankingu 2010 (University ranking 2010)* (Asahi Shinbun Shuppan, 2009). Unlike
CILA, which is housed within the old comprehensive Kasuga University, HGU is a small university established specifically as an international university. HGU is comprised of two colleges, one of social studies and one of business. The university’s vision embraces the promotion of freedom, peace, and international understanding. Under this vision, human resource development to educate the world’s future leaders is a central goal for both colleges. Even though both of the colleges have undergraduate and graduate programs, over 95% of the HGU student population is undergraduate, and the undergraduate student population is slightly below 6,000, which is about twice the size of the CILA student population.

International student enrollment at HGU in terms of both number and proportion is among the highest in the Japanese higher education system. Over 40% of the university’s student population are international students representing about 100 countries, and over 95% of international students come from Asia. Chinese students are the largest international student population, accounting for 28% of the international student population, followed by Korea (25%) and Thailand (8%). In addition, HGU faculty members have diverse backgrounds. Approximately 45% of permanent faculty members at HGU are foreign, representing 26 countries. Also, over 40% of Japanese faculty members hold degrees from foreign universities.29

Unlike CILA, which adopts English as the primary medium of instruction, HGU has a bilingual system. At HGU, both Japanese and English are media of instruction and campus communication. An applicant to HGU can select either one of the languages, and the selected language determines application requirements and language course requirements after the student is admitted. The application requirements for international applicants include academic transcripts, an application essay, recommendation letters, and language proficiency test scores

29 According to Faculty B at HGU in July 2012.
(i.e., TOEFL or IETLS for applicants in English and the Japanese Language Proficiency Test or the Examination for Japanese University Admissions Certificate Score for applicants in Japanese). To attract students from around the world, HGU opens admissions twice a year, in April and September.

At HGU, the majority of undergraduate courses are offered in both English and Japanese, and students can take courses in either language. However, students are subject to specific language course requirements depending on whichever language that they chose upon admission. Students who applied in English enter an English track and can complete their course work in English, while still being required to take at least 24 credits from Japanese language courses. Conversely, those who applied in Japanese enter a Japanese track and can complete their course work in Japanese while still taking at least 20 required credits from English language courses. These two language tracks at HGU attract contrasting student populations. While 96% of Japanese students are on the Japanese track, 87% of international students are on the English track.\(^{30}\) With regards to Chinese students, 82% of them are enrolled on the English track.\(^{31}\)

HGU boasts that it offers strong career support for its students and that its graduates have a high rate of employment. HGU offers students career development programs and counseling, and in the academic year 2009, over 90% of both domestic and international students who sought a job were successfully employed. Moreover, HGU has earned the Japanese government’s recognition and hosts a number of government programs on human resource development for university students in Japan, including a career development program for Asian international students.

\(^{30}\) According to Staff E at HGU in July 2012.  
\(^{31}\) According to Staff G at HGU in July 2012.
In sum, both CILA and HGU demonstrate what the current Japanese internationalization policies aim to achieve. They have an internationally diverse student body and strong career support for both domestic and international students. In addition, even though the two institutions have different language policies, both provide an option for applicants who do not have Japanese language skills to apply and complete most of the coursework in English. The Japanese language credit load for HGU students on the English track is the same as the Japanese language credit load required for non-native Japanese speakers at CILA.

Participants.

There are two groups of participants in the study. The first is university faculty and staff members who informed me about their institutions’ internationalization discourses and practices as the context of international students’ identity formation. The second is international students. When the researcher is an outsider, as was the case with me, approaching a “gatekeeper” is a common strategy to gain access to the site and to potential participants (Creswell, 2007, p. 125). I therefore requested that the gatekeepers with whom I had contact facilitate third-party participant recruitment on my behalf (See Appendix A, B for the request letter). I explained the selection criteria for each of the two groups of participants to these gatekeepers and asked them to identify the most appropriate and eligible staff/faculty participants and the most appropriate venue(s) where recruitment messages and consent forms might be seen by potential international student participants (e.g., email lists, bulletin boards). The gatekeepers played a pivotal role recruiting participants for the study. They not only granted me access to their institutions but also determined the venues where I could contact potential participants. For example, while I was allowed to post my invitation flyers in public spaces in their institutions, my invitation message could not be distributed to all the potential international student participants through a channel
such as a student email list. In addition, the gatekeepers introduced me to some potential student participants and provided advice on where to find more participants on their campuses. Below, I will describe the selection criteria and recruitment procedures for each group of participants.

**Faculty and staff members.**

I selected “elite” individuals who were “influential, prominent, and/or well-informed people” in the area of internationalization at their institutions (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 113). On the basis of their areas of expertise in internationalization, they would be expected to be able to report on their institutions’ “policies, past histories, and future plans” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 113). Accordingly, I selected those faculty and staff members who held or have held a key position in policy formation or implementation in the following areas:

- The internationalization of the institution (i.e., Kasuga University, CILA, and HGU)
- International student services, recruitment, and/or career support (at CILA and HGU)

Because CILA is part of Kasuga University, I targeted faculty and staff members who played leadership roles in internationalization at both Kasuga and CILA. I did this in order to understand how Kasuga’s overall institutional internationalization initiatives were related to internationalization at CILA, and vice versa. In addition, I selected leaders in international student services, recruitment, and career support at CILA and HGU in order to understand how each institution viewed and served their international students.

Potential participants for this group were identified by the gatekeepers, and some additional participants were introduced to me by participants. Potential participants were contacted with an invitation letter (Appendix C, D) and consent form (Appendix E, F), both of which were prepared in English and Japanese. All who were contacted agreed to participate in the study.
In total, I recruited 15 faculty/staff participants: seven (Faculty A, B, C; Staff D, E, F, G) at HGU and eight (Faculty S, T, U, V; Staff W, X, Y, Z) at CILA and Kasuga University. These participants were leaders in the areas of student recruitment and admissions, academic affairs, career support, or administration at both HGU and CILA. Additionally, participants included leaders in the university-wide administration and programming for internationalization at Kasuga University. Many of the participants at HGU, CILA, and Kasuga University have worked at their institutions in different capacities throughout their careers. Also, they often work closely with other offices within their institutions. Therefore, their knowledge of the internationalization of their institution was comprehensive rather than being limited to their current roles. In the interviews, they often drew on their knowledge and experiences gained through their past and current roles, and through their collaboration with other offices. Due to their broad areas of expertise demonstrated in their interviews, and to ensure their confidentiality, I chose not to identify each faculty/staff participant by specifying their current position.

**International students.**

For international student participants, I used purposeful sampling (Creswell, 2007), targeting the largest international student group not only in Japanese universities but also in the Japanese labour market after graduation. As described earlier, this international student population in Japan is:

- from China,
- degree-seeking undergraduate students,
- enrolled at private universities,
- humanities or social science majors, and
- self-funded.
The participant selection criteria were narrowed to include only those who are from mainland China, a country with which Japan has had a close geopolitical relationship and student exchanges (Duan, 2003) long before China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macau was restored in 1997 and 1999, respectively. This decision is primarily to allow me to facilitate focused analysis given that I did not have enough resources to recruit a substantial number of student participants representing each region or country and to adequately analyze their data by taking their varying social, cultural, and political backgrounds into account. In addition, this student participant group was further narrowed to those who were in or beyond their third year of undergraduate studies, based on the assumption that these students, compared to those at earlier stages of their degrees, would have had more time to make sense of their experiences in Japan and to develop their future plans.

For this group of participants, I prepared an invitation letter (Appendix G, H, I) in English, Japanese, and Mandarin and a consent form (Appendix J, K) in English and Japanese. Although I cannot speak Mandarin, I prepared the invitation letter in Mandarin in order to inform the participants about the study in their mother tongue and to attract their attention to the study. The Mandarin invitation letter for international students was translated from English to Mandarin by a native Mandarin speaker, and another native Mandarin speaker verified and modified the translation.

Also, I offered 1,000 yen (approximately 10 CND) to each student participant. Generally, unless participants are truly in need of money, providing them with this type of financial reward would be considered unnecessary and unlikely to make a difference either in their willingness to participate or in the quality of the interviews (Weiss, 1995). In this study, however, I was an outsider to the participants’ group and had no affiliation with their institutions. Moreover, I had a
very limited time at each institution to develop a rapport with them during my data collection. To help overcome these challenges, I offered a small honorarium as a way to encourage interested participants to respond to my invitation. I judged that the amount was too insignificant to motivate participation by those who were uninterested.

The gatekeepers at both institutions suggested that utilizing Chinese students’ social networks would be the most efficient strategy for recruiting potential international student participants. Therefore, starting with the student participants introduced to me by the gatekeepers, I conducted snowball sampling in which participants are asked for referrals of other potential participants (Berg, 2007). I asked my participants to let their friends know about my study, using the invitation letter and the consent form, and to have them contact me if they were interested. The strategy helped me learn about with whom the participants were close, and through what connections. When I realized that I had too many participants with similar backgrounds (e.g., too many female participants), I asked my participants to introduce students who had different backgrounds. At HGU, students were usually willing to help me recruit student participants through their network of Chinese friends. Some participants would say things such as, “How many participants do you need? Let me know if you want more participants.” As a result, approximately 75% of the HGU student participants were recruited with snowball sampling.

At CILA, however, snowball sampling did not work as effectively. It was partly due to the timing of my visit to CILA, which happened shortly before the exam period. Some students explained their reluctance to introduce their friends to me, saying that their friends were very busy preparing for their exams. Instead, they recommended that I visit classrooms to recruit more student participants, particularly those in economics courses. Five instructors in different
courses, including but not limited to economics, allowed me to make an appearance either in the beginning or the end of their class period. I made a brief announcement about the study and distributed my invitation flyers to the students in the room. I recruited approximately 65% of CILA student participants by visiting those classes. In the end, I had 15 student participants at HGU and 12 student participants at CILA. Table 1 presents the overview of the student participant population, and Table 2 presents a list of individual student participants.

Table 1 Overview of international student participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HGU (15 participants)</th>
<th>CILA (12 participants)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td>5 male; 10 female</td>
<td>3 male; 9 female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>20-22 years old</td>
<td>20-23 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year in program</strong></td>
<td>3 students in third-year; 9 in fourth-year</td>
<td>7 students in third-year; 5 in fourth-year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length of stay in Japan</strong></td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>3-4 years (See the Other row below for exceptions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major</strong></td>
<td>4 students in social studies; 11 in business</td>
<td>All in liberal arts, but eight participants identified economics as their special area of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area of origin</strong></td>
<td>9 from urban cities, 1 from a small city, and 5 from medium-size cities in eastern China</td>
<td>11 from urban cities and 1 from a medium-size city in eastern China (See the Other row below for exceptions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>All but one participant were enrolled in the English track at HGU</td>
<td>Three participants had spent 4-10 years outside China before university. Two of them spent 5-7 years of their childhood in Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 2 Individual international student participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Year in program</th>
<th>Area of origin (City size, location)</th>
<th>Interview language</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HGU Student Participants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, North Coast</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fei</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Medium, North Coast</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jie</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Medium, South East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mana</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Medium, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meng</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peiyao</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Small, North Coast</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruo</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tao</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiao Ming</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaozhi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Medium, East</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ting</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, North Coast</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Medium, North Coast</td>
<td>Japanese &amp; English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongyan</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CILA Student Participants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengyi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, North</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Transnational upbringing, including in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiao</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mao Mao</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Medium, North East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan Nan</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiang</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Urban, North</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Transnational upbringing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Si Jing</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, North East; Moved to urban, East</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Transnational upbringing, including in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiao Han</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, East; Moved to urban, South East</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaotao</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiang Hong</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinmei</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Urban, South East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Urban, North</td>
<td>Japanese &amp; English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongling</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Urban, East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As seen in the tables, many participants had shared characteristics. Firstly, female participants were overrepresented. There were two- and three-times more female participants than male participants at HGU and CILA, respectively.\textsuperscript{32} Secondly, the majority of participants came from urban cities in provinces located along China’s east coast. CILA participants were more likely to come from urban cities, compared to HGU participants. Thirdly, the majority of the participants had academic interest in business or economics. Fourthly, the vast majority of the participants came straight to Japan after finishing high school in China and had no or a very limited command of Japanese. Hence, they had been in Japan for approximately three or four years and were in their early 20s at the time of the interview.

There are two primary exceptions. Three CILA participants spent between four and ten years in one or more countries outside China before going to the university in Japan, and two of them spent over five years of their childhood in Japan. Another exception was one HGU participant who was enrolled on the Japanese track at HGU, while all the other HGU participants were on the English track.

\textbf{Data collection.}

I spent approximately two weeks at each institution doing data collection: From December 6, 2010 to December 21, 2010 at HGU; and from January 11, 2011 to January 25, 2011 at CILA in Kasuga University. Below, I will detail my data collection processes for the study’s three sets of data, namely institutional documents, interviews with faculty/staff participants, and interviews with student participants.

\textsuperscript{32} The proportion of female participants is slightly higher than the proportion of female students among Chinese international students at HGU. The data of the CILA counterparts are unavailable.
Institutional documents.

Before, during, and after my case site visits, I collected institutional documents about each institution that included websites, brochures, and books published by the institutions. Those documents provided information on each institution’s history, organizational chart, mission statement, strategic plan, student demographic information, and so forth. I used the documents to supplement and substantiate the institutional information provided by faculty/staff participants in their interviews. In addition, at each case site I took pictures and notes to record my observations of the campuses and surrounding areas that shaped the physical and cultural context of each institution. In this dissertation, I integrated the information gained from these materials into the descriptions of each case to contextualize accounts provided by participants.

Interviews with faculty/staff members.

I conducted 13 interviews with 15 faculty and staff participants in total at the two institutions. In two instances at CILA and Kasuga, I interviewed two participants together based on the participants’ preference. Each interview was conducted in the language of the interviewee’s choice, either English or Japanese. All the participants chose Japanese, except for Faculty B at HGU and Faculty T at CILA, who chose English. Each interview lasted approximately 60 minutes.

I adopted semistandardized interviewing as the structure of the interviews because it allows participants to describe their worldviews in the way that makes sense to them while still covering the topics of the study’s interest (Berg, 2007). In order to explore each interviewee’s area of expertise, I prepared three sets of interview questions depending on the interviewee’s responsibility (See Appendix L and M for the interview protocol): 1) internationalization of the entire university, namely Kasuga University and HGU (Section A in the protocol); 2)
internationalization of CILA (Section B in the protocol); and 3) international student services, recruitment, and career support at CILA and HGU (Section C in the protocol). However, I found in the course of my data collection that many faculty/staff participants possessed broad areas of expertise that went beyond their current responsibilities and adjusted the interview questions as needed. The interviews took place in participants’ offices or meeting rooms.

I digitally recorded all the interviews to ensure accuracy of information (Creswell, 2007) and for referential adequacy (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In addition, I took notes during and immediately after each interview to keep track of what had been discussed during the interview and to record inaudible aspects of the interview, such as the social settings of the interview. After each interview, I reviewed the recording and summarized the interview in the language used in the interview. I transcribed some parts of the interview verbatim when the participant spoke in a distinct or illuminative way, and I included the quotes in the summary. I then emailed the summary to each participant so that he or she could make changes in the information provided in the interview. I also sent email inquiries to some participants for clarification or additional information.

**Interviews with international students.**

I conducted semistandardized interviews with 27 international students in the language they chose, either English or Japanese. As seen in Table 2, 15 participants chose English, 10 participants chose Japanese, and two participants used a combination of Japanese and English. Each interview lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes and explored the student’s background, motivations for studying in Japan, on- and off-campus experiences in Japan, and how he or she made sense of the experiences to develop a sense of identity and future aspirations (See Appendix N and O for the interview protocol for international students).
All the interviews took place on campus, including in an empty classroom, a school cafeteria, a student lounge, or a seating area in the hallway. The small conversations that I had with participants while we looked for an available space for the interview and as we walked from our interview site to our next destinations provided a brief yet valuable opportunity to develop a rapport with the student and to gain additional understanding of them. The conversation topics included which language they preferred to use in what kind of situation, what they talk about with their families on the phone, and why they liked certain professors. Also, some participants took the opportunity to ask questions about me, which in turn gave me insight into how they might have perceived me and what might have motivated them to participate in the study. I took field notes summarizing these small conversations after the interview.

The interviews were transcribed verbatim and summarized in the language used in the interview. The summary included quotes that expressed the participant’s perspectives on the topics discussed in a distinct or illuminative way. I sent both the transcript and summary to the participant via email so that he or she could make changes to the information provided in the interview. The rest of interview procedures, including note taking during and after the interview, the recording protocol and follow-up inquiries for additional information or clarification, are the same as described above in the interview procedures for faculty/staff participants.

**Researcher subjectivity.**

My process of data collection was a clear case of an interviewer being “deeply and unavoidably implicated in creating meanings that ostensibly reside within respondents” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2003, p. 68). If I as an interviewer had been active in creating meanings with my respondents, articulating my subject position was essential to allow a contextual understanding of the interviews as a knowledge production process. This is especially the case in a cross-
cultural research context like mine. Banks (1998) offers a typology of cross-cultural researchers that identifies the researcher’s insider or outsider status in his or her own original social group (the indigenous-insider or the indigenous-outsider) and in another social group (the external-insider or the external-outsider). However, in my data collection processes, I was convinced that my status was never fixed in one category but rather multidimensional and relative to my participants. They interpreted and reacted to various aspects of my identity differently, as did I to my participants, both consciously and unconsciously.

For example, I am an indigenous-outsider in Japan. I grew up in Japan as a mainstream Japanese, but I have spent over a decade in North America. I can be seen therefore as an outsider in Japan to some degree, although my outsider status is not necessarily negative but rather privileged. This particular outsider aspect of my identity helped me develop a rapport with some of my student participants because we shared the “international student” status or because in their eyes I was not a “regular Japanese.” In addition, some of the student participants who hoped to study or work in North America seemed to react positively to the aspect of my identity associated with North America or a transnational lifestyle. They were curious about my life path and my experiences in North America and related to me, for example, by talking about their hopes or plans to apply for graduate school in North America, their fond memories of visiting the United States, and their desire to keep moving around to different countries. They might have seen me as a member of a community, either a transnational community or North American society, to which they felt a sense of belonging or aspired to establish their belonging.

However, I was an external-outsider in relation to my student participants when it came to national, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds, age, and institutional affiliation. In particular, my status as a Japanese citizen posed challenges to me in accessing and understanding students’
honest views on sensitive issues, such as Japanese people’s discriminatory attitudes towards non-Japanese Asians and the unsettled historical and political relations between China and Japan. It took a conscious effort on my part to overcome these challenges. Before the interviews, I made it explicit to student participants that I was interested in hearing both positive and negative accounts of their experiences in Japan. To encourage them to share their honest thoughts with me, I shared with them in generic terms that I had both favourable and critical views of Canada through my various experiences as an international student in that country. I also mentioned that through my years spent overseas, I had come to see both the positive and negative sides of Japan from the outside. When participants kept offering positive or indifferent accounts of their experiences in Japan during the interview, I offered a counter narrative on whatever topic was being discussed and then asked them what they thought about that. The counter narratives were often other international students’ or other foreigners’ negative perspectives of Japan which I had learned about in the literature as well as from public discourse, such as that Japan is a closed society to outsiders. This strategy often proved to be effective in encouraging students to elaborate on why they made sense of their experiences in Japan in the way they did and what their time in Japan meant to them. This is not to claim that I succeeded in accessing my participants’ most honest stories. My intention here is to lay out how I as a researcher negotiated not only my subjective positions but also the meaning of the interview conversations with them in the context of the relationship that we developed in the interview.

Data analysis.

The interview data analysis was initially conducted by separating groups of participants within each case in order to allow themes distinct to the case to emerge. That means that I had four sets of interview data to analyze: international students’ data from the two cases, and
faculty/staff members’ data from the two cases. For each set of interview data, I followed the analysis process developed by Auerbach and Silverstein (2003), which allows both inductive and deductive ways of analysis. Based on the summary document that I created for each interview, I compiled ideas repeated by two or more participants with corresponding quotes that expressed the idea and grouped repeating ideas into themes. I then grouped themes into theoretical concepts. When the organizing principle of themes could not be explained by a theoretical concept that I brought into the study, I described how the themes fit together or used an illuminative phrase from an interview that highlighted the idea underlying the themes.

Then, in order to collate data from the two cases, I combined both cases’ participant group’s interview. In other words, I combined international student interview data from the two cases. Likewise, I combined faculty/staff member interview data from the two cases. As I merged the cases, I paid attention to differences and similarities between the cases. For example, I focused on a theme or theoretical concept addressed consistently by participants in both cases, as well as how participants in one case expressed a certain theme or theoretical concept more strongly or with a distinct nuance compared to those in the other case. I drew on interview data from the other participant group, institutional documents, and my field notes to make sense of the similarities and differences between the cases as well as to gain a comprehensive understanding of each case. Further, in order to determine the challenges to and potential of internationalization in each case or across cases, I examined consistency and inconsistency between students’ accounts of their experiences and the institutional data gained from faculty/staff interviews and the institutions’ documents. The analysis process continued throughout the writing process.
Trustworthiness.

As described earlier, this study rejects the notions of internal validity and external validity based on the assumption that there is no single, tangible reality. To achieve internal validity, study findings must demonstrate a one-to-one causal relationship with that reality. However, as Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue, confirming the corresponding relationship with the reality is “in principle impossible” because it is impossible for the inquirer to know “the nature of that ultimate tangible reality” (p. 294). Moreover, to prove external validity by testing, in different contexts, the causal relationship found in the original context, the criteria of internal validity and external validity must, by their definition, be placed in a trade-off situation. Accordingly, following Lincoln and Guba, this study aims to demonstrate “truth value” by adequately representing multiple constructed realities.

Credibility.

Lincoln and Guba (1985) identify four criteria of trustworthiness: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. First, according to Lincoln and Guba, to enhance the overall credibility of the construction of the findings, it is crucial to conduct a member check. I followed up with each participant with the interview summary outlining what was discussed in the interview and including corresponding quotes. Also, I contacted them for clarification or additional information as needed. While some students did not respond to my follow-up emails, all faculty/staff members did. In addition, I triangulated data from interviews and documents to build a coherent justification for each theme, as well as to confirm the accuracy of the data. Moreover, during the interview and the interpretive and analytical process, I played the devil’s advocate toward the data and interpretation to check the plausibility of the findings and to test for misinformation. According to Kvale and Brinkmann, “when conflicting
knowledge claims are argued in a conversation” (p. 253), the communicative validity is enhanced. Accordingly, when student participants kept offering their positive perspectives of Japanese society or of their experiences in Japan, I would offer a counter perspective and ask them to respond. Similarly, when I found contradictions in their accounts at different points in the interview, I asked for their explanations either during or after the interview.

Despite these efforts to establish the credibility of the inquiry and findings, some limitations need to be noted. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest prolonged engagement as one of the activities to increase the probability that credible findings will be produced. However, due to the limited time and money available to my study, the opportunity for prolonged engagement to become oriented to the study context and to build trust with participants was limited. In particular, my limited knowledge of the Chinese culture and language posed a significant challenge to the breadth and depth of both the interview conversations and the data analysis. For example, had I possessed sound knowledge about regional cultural and socio-economic differences in China, I might have been able to identify the implications of those regional factors for students’ stories.

To try to overcome these limitations, I not only conducted follow-up inquiries during and after the interview, member checks, and triangulations, but I also made a constant and conscious effort to ask my participants to elaborate on their backgrounds and the local culture of their institutions. Even without an explicit request from me, some participants also explained their life contexts assuming my lack of knowledge due to my status as an outsider to their culture. These descriptions in turn served as valuable data that illuminate how they viewed their life contexts.
Transferability.

Earlier in this chapter, I addressed the importance of offering rich descriptions of the cases and the interview process and product in order to establish transferability. Yet, to ensure the confidentiality of the case institutions and participants, I had to balance transferability and ethical considerations, and thus to some extent had to sacrifice the former for the latter. The case institutions in this study are extreme cases in Japan. Even one small piece of information about an institution can lead to the identification of the institution, particularly for those who are familiar with Japanese universities. Therefore, in this dissertation, I had to minimize the provision of specific details of the institutions, such as the exact number of international students at each institution and exactly where the number is positioned in the ranking of Japanese universities. In addition to the institutions’ factual information, some descriptive details of the institutions also had to be compromised for the same reason. During my fieldwork, I was amazed by how small details of the physical environments of the institutions contributed to shaping nuanced, yet distinct, institutional cultures and students’ everyday experiences at both institutions. However, I abstained from describing colourful details of the institutional environments while ensuring I illustrated aspects of the environments that served as a significant context for the findings. Moreover, when I drew information from the institutional publications, such as university websites, brochures and the like, I did not provide the information sources because the sources include the names of the institutions.

As for participants, protecting faculty/staff participants’ confidentiality required particular care in this study. Within each case, there were a very limited number of “elites” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999) who were responsible for a particular area of internationalization. Therefore, I did not provide their detailed profiles. The only identification factors revealed in this
dissertation are the type of their position (i.e., Faculty or Staff) and their institutional affiliation (i.e., HGU, CILA, or Kasuga). Fortunately, I found it unnecessary to provide their profiles because they possessed broad areas of expertise and what they discussed in the interviews often went beyond their present responsibilities. In addition, I did not provide their other biographical information, such as their age, gender, and nationality, because revealing those factors can jeopardize the confidentiality of those who were minorities in the “elite” group. At any rate, those factors were beyond the scope of my analysis in light of the study’s purpose.

For student participants, providing more detailed profiles was more necessary than was the case for their faculty/staff counterparts. In addition to Table 2, where I listed students’ profiles, I provide some additional background information on some of the students as necessary for the successive findings chapters. Nonetheless, once again, I limited such provisions to only when the information was essential to understand their stories.

As such, the limited provision of the details of the cases and participants is a limitation of the study in terms of transferability, but the limitation is inevitable for the sake of confidentiality. In addition, even though I avoided describing many specific details of the cases and the participants, I provided enough details that allow the readers to draw “analytical generalization,” which “involves a reasoned judgment about the extent to which the findings of one study can be used as a guide to what might occur in another situation” (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 262).

**Dependability and confirmability.**

As I went through the above steps, I could also establish the dependability and confirmability of both the process and product of the inquiry to the point at which I could

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33 The institutional affiliation identified as “CILA/Kasuga” in the dissertation refers to the participant who had a dual position in both CILA and Kasuga at the point of the interview.
ascertain that the “bottom line” of the inquiry could be verified (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). For example, when I played the devil’s advocate during the interview, participants seldom ever reversed their standpoint. Rather, they elaborated further on their perspectives. Moreover, the findings from faculty/staff interviews within each case were highly consistent, and they were also supported by the institutional documents. The consistent data allowed me to find consistent themes of internationalization discourse and practices at the institutions. Student interviews also revealed recurring themes that reflected their institutional contexts or the relevant literature, even though the level of consistency varied depending on the theme. Moreover, I engaged in persistent observation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) as much as possible in order to enhance the depth of the inquiry by identifying and assessing crucial atypical factors as well as factors relevant to the problem. In the following findings chapters, I present not only consistent themes found in the data, but also some atypical findings that inform important issues that the majority of the participants seem to have overlooked or did not address explicitly. In the end, the processes described thus far have led me to feel certain enough that it is unlikely that another researcher with the same questions would receive significantly different responses from the same participants and result in completely different conclusions.

**Summary.**

The study deploys a case study design, and I selected two private higher education institutions in Japan: HGU and CILA within Kasuga University. Both HGU and CILA recruit a large number of international students and faculty members, and provide degree programs that can only be completed in English: two features that are still rare in Japanese universities and that the Japanese government aims to promote further. While the two institutions share these similarities, they have contrasting institutional profiles. CILA is housed within Kasuga
University, a comprehensive elite university located in an urban area of Japan. In contrast, HGU is a small university of lower academic prestige located in rural Japan.

Besides institutional documents, interview data constitute the major source of the study. At HGU and CILA, I conducted semistandardized interviews with 15 faculty/staff participants who are leaders of internationalization at their institutions and 27 international students. The student participants are from mainland China, self-funded, and in the third or fourth year of their undergraduate programs.

For data analysis, I followed Auerbach and Silverstein (2003) and compiled repeating ideas that were later grouped into themes and then to theoretical concepts. I first analyzed data from each institution separately and then combined the two cases in order to see differences and similarities between the cases. I also looked into consistency and inconsistency between institutional discourses and practices of internationalization based on faculty/staff interviews and international students’ accounts of their experiences in order to identify challenges and potentials of internationalization at the institutions.

In the following three chapters, I will present the data. Chapter 6 presents findings from faculty/staff interviews to address institutional discourses and practices of internationalization. Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 present findings based on interviews with international student participants. Chapter 7 addresses international students’ identity formation through their global mobility. Chapter 8 focuses on examining how international students position themselves in the Japanese universities and Japanese society.
Chapter 6: Institutional Discourses and Practices of Internationalization

In this chapter, based on 13 interviews with faculty and staff participants\(^{34}\) (seven participants from HGU; eight from CILA/Kasuga\(^{35}\)), I examine the institutions’ discourses and practices of internationalization. The primary goal of the chapter is to answer the first research question, “How do Japanese universities see their social existence and translate it into their internationalization discourses and practices?” and the sub-questions. At the same time, it aims to describe the institutional stage for international students’ experiences in Japan.

By drawing on Appadurai’s (1996) interpretation of Anderson’s (1991) concept of imagined communities as “perspectival constructs” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 33) of socially situated actors, I explore how the institutions see their current positions and future possibilities in local and global contexts. More specifically, I investigate how their socially situated notions of imagined communities manifest in their institutional discourses and practices of internationalization. The analysis of the institutions’ internationalization discourses and practices includes their relationships with two other major players in the internationalization of Japanese higher education: international students and the Japanese government. I examine how international students are positioned in the discourses and practices and how the Japanese governments’ internationalization policies are related to the institutions’ internationalization endeavours.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first two sections are dedicated to articulating the institutions’ contexts in order to contextualize their similar and contrasting

\(^{34}\) In this chapter and the following chapters, quotes from interviews conducted in Japanese are translated into English. The translated quotes are accompanied by footnotes in capital alphabet, and the original Japanese quotes are provided in Appendix X.

\(^{35}\) Four of the faculty/staff participants at CILA/Kasuga were interviewed as pairs as per their request.
discourses and practices. The first section briefly illustrates the institutions’ physical environments where their discourses and practices are located. The second section presents the genesis of the international institutions in order to explain what gave rise to these new international institutions. I present different institutional contexts, actors, and the ideas of internationalization that were all involved in the creation of the institutions. The third section describes the institutions’ reciprocal relationships with the national policies for the internationalization of Japanese higher education. Both institutions preceded and informed the creation of the Japanese government’s recent internationalization policies, the Global 30 Program in particular. In return, the national policies for internationalization have legitimized the institutions’ internationalization practices. However, reflecting the different positions that the institutions occupy in the hierarchy of the Japanese higher education system, participants at these institutions see different financial benefits flowing from the policies. The fourth section articulates the institutions’ discourses and practices of internationalization. I focus on the two areas of internationalization that are central to both the Japanese government’s recent internationalization policies and the institutions’ identities as international institutions: a large international student body and English-medium education. While both of the institutions position themselves as international institutions by differentiating themselves from other Japanese universities, they see different futures for themselves based on their different positions in the stratified Japanese higher education system. The institutions expect international students to play different roles with respect to their contrasting institutional goals. Yet, despite the different futures for themselves, they also imagine a similar future for their students and construct their campus environments accordingly by recruiting many international students and providing English-medium education.
**Physical institutional environments.**

The differences in the discourses and practices of internationalization between the two institutions are embedded in their contrasting physical environments. HGU is a new campus in a remote area of Japan. The small yet spacious campus shows HGU’s cohesive culture as an international university. Once on the campus, we see diverse students speaking different languages everywhere. In the campus’s centre, students are calling for donations for flood victims in Pakistan. Inside the school cafeteria, there are booths promoting study tours to different countries, and international students from those countries sit at the booths to talk to people who are interested. When I visited the campus for my fieldwork, HGU was hosting the university’s hallmark event series, the World Culture Week (pseudonym), which showcases and celebrates cultural diversity on campus, and Africa and Japan were the week’s target cultures. Banners advertising the event were posted everywhere, and the school cafeteria served African dishes as well as regular dishes, including Japanese food and halal food. The week’s highlight was an evening event featuring students’ stage performances, and the university’s central auditorium was full for the event. The evening event included a slide show, narrated by students, of African tourist sites, comical theatre plays on an African village life and on a legendary mid-1800s samurai, Ryōma Sakamoto, and stage shows of singing and dancing to African and Japanese music.

Whereas HGU is an entirely international university and located in an isolated rural area, CILA is a newly established college that forms part of Kasuga University, an old and large comprehensive university in an urban area of Japan. The campus is large yet crowded with many old department buildings that are reminders of Kasuga’s long history. The new high-rise CILA building sits in the campus’s central location, and many languages are heard within and around
the CILA building. However, the atmosphere of the rest of the campus is predominantly Japanese. Unlike HGU, where the same set of information about campus events is shared across the campus, signboards on the Kasuga campus are flooded with flyers promoting a wide variety of on- and off-campus events and student clubs. Within walking distance of the campus, there is a busy train station surrounded by high-rise buildings, and more upbeat urban areas are only a few minutes away by train.

Thus, CILA as an international college is layered with a traditional Japanese university environment and Japanese city life, whereas HGU as an international university stands in isolation from the rest of the Japanese social landscape. HGU’s physical environment carries a clear, consistent, and shared institutional culture as an international university throughout the campus. In contrast, the culture of CILA is less visible or pervasive because it is embedded within diverse environmental factors both within and outside Kasuga University campus. Now let us turn to why and how these institutions were established in these particular contexts.

**Genesis of the two international institutions: context and impetus.**

The genesis of both institutions informs what underpins their current institutional discourses and practices, as well as what gave rise to their creation in the first place. Participants at both institutions often refer back to their beginnings to explain not only the impetus for their creation as international institutions but also the rationales and goals that shape their institutional practices and cultures.

HGU was built as a centennial project of Hokuto University, a private university run by Hokuto Academy which operates several educational institutions in Japan. The planning team of the centennial project developed a plan to create an international university in the mid-1990s when Japan experienced a considerable increase in the number of international students as a
result of the 100,000 International Student Plan launched in 1983. In this context, according to a participant who was involved in the planning, the planning team set forth three goals called the “three 50’s”: 1) to have international students from 50 countries; 2) to have 50% of the student body come from overseas; and 3) to have 50% of the faculty come from overseas. The participant explains that these three quantitative goals were “the most symbolic expressions of our ideas of internationalization” (Staff D, HGU).  

   Economic interests and support at the regional and national levels also gave rise to HGU’s creation. According to a faculty participant, the idea of founding HGU came about as a “marriage of convenience” between Hokuto University and the prefecture where HGU campus was to be established (Faculty B, HGU). The prefecture’s governor at that time was interested in turning the prefecture into a regional economic hub and needed a world-class university for university-industry collaboration. The prefecture’s interest aligned with Hokuto University’s interest in creating a new university. In addition, HGU had both visionary and financial support from a nation-wide powerful business community, the Japan Business Federation, known as Keidanren. Leaders of Keidanren were involved in generating and supporting the vision of creating a university that trains and supplies human resources to Japan’s globalizing economy. According to Staff F, Keidanren also contributed approximately 4,000 million yen (approximately 40 million CND) to HGU as scholarship funds for international students from developing countries.

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36 Faculty/staff participants are identified in this dissertation using the following codes. An individual participant’s identifier is followed by his or her institutional affiliation (e.g., “Faculty A, HGU,” “Staff W, Kasuga”):
- At HGU - Faculty A, B, C; Staff D, E, F, G.
- At CILA and Kasuga University - Faculty S, T, U, V; Staff W, X, Y, Z.
In contrast to HGU, which was created as a new university with external economic impetus and support, CILA was created as a new department within the existing academic institution system of Kasuga University. CILA combined and enhanced the two areas of education, namely, international education and liberal arts education, that already existed to some extent at Kasuga. Internationalization was one of the pillars of the strategic plan Kasuga issued in 2000, and English-medium education was central to their internationalization initiatives. Kasuga had launched some English-medium graduate programs and intended to expand its English-medium programs to the undergraduate level as well. By offering courses in English, Kasuga envisaged the ability to attract more international students. As HGU set forth quantitative goals for international student recruitment, CILA also aimed to have one-third of its students in the new undergraduate department come from overseas.

The liberal arts aspect of CILA emerged from both critical reflections on the past and anticipation for the future of the Japanese higher education system. Firstly, one of the critical reflections was of the systemic flaws that would impact the ability to effectively deliver liberal arts education in the Japanese higher education system. The Standards for the Establishment of Universities by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture\(^\text{37}\) specified the minimum credit requirements for an undergraduate degree for each category of courses, such as liberal arts, foreign languages, and specialized subjects. In the past, undergraduate students enrolled in Japanese universities having selected a major, and then completed their liberal arts education course credits in their first two years of study, and their major subject course credits in the last two years. However, under the Deregulation of University Act in 1991, the distribution of credits for each category was abolished. As a result, the number of liberal arts courses at many Japanese

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\(^{37}\) This was restructured in 2001 as the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT).
universities decreased, including at Kasuga. A faculty participant explained that liberal arts education in Japan failed because it was seen as a “necessary evil” that impeded the preparation of specialists whose major had been determined upon admissions (Faculty T, CILA). In addition, a lecture format in a large classroom, which was a common style for many liberal arts courses at Japanese universities, was seen as ineffective and undermined the purpose of liberal arts education in Japan.

Despite these systemic flaws, some faculty members at Kasuga insisted on the importance of liberal arts education, and Kasuga also envisioned a clearer division of roles for undergraduate- and graduate-level education at Japanese universities. As is the case in the United States, Kasuga anticipated that Japanese universities would be increasingly expected to cultivate well-rounded individuals by exposing them to a broad set of perspectives and knowledge at the undergraduate level, and then focusing on specialized education at the graduate level. Thus, based on the critical reflections on and future prospects for liberal arts education in Japan, Kasuga established CILA. CILA was designed to allow students to explore different fields of studies throughout their undergraduate programs and to learn in relatively small-sized class environments, which they did by charging higher tuition fees than other departments at Kasuga.\(^{38}\)

In sum, CILA was created within Kasuga’s existing institutional system, and its creation as an international liberal arts college was part of Kasuga’s evolution as a university. In contrast, HGU, while affiliated with Hokuto Academy, was created as an independent university, and external economic players gave strong impetus and support to its establishment. The different contexts and impetuses for the establishment of these institutions are reflected in the differences

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\(^{38}\) The annual tuition fee for CILA is 1,602,500 yen (approximately 16,025 CND), which is approximately 350,000 yen (approximately 3,500 CND) higher than other social science and humanity undergraduate programs at Kasuga University.
in their relationships with the Japanese government’s internationalization policies and in their institutional discourses and practices, as I describe below.

**Institutional relationships with national policies on internationalization.**

Participants’ comments on the Japanese government’s internationalization policies reveal a reciprocal relationship between the institutions and the policies: While both institutions take a leading role in implementing the policies, they also gain the power of legitimacy because the policies themselves emulate their own internationalization practices. However, participants at both institutions view the financial benefit of the policies differently, based on their different institutional settings and academic prestige, something that suggests the hierarchy of Japan’s higher education system has important implications for the institutions’ internationalization.

As mentioned earlier, the two institutions were established as international institutions from their point of inception. Instead of following the government’s internationalization policies, the two institutions have been playing a leading role in Japan’s internationalization policies. This fact contrasts sharply with the majority of cases in Japan, where universities internationalize their existing structures and practices based on national policies on internationalization. In a discussion about the Japanese government’s recent internationalization policies, the vast majority of participants at both institutions expressed pride in having played a pioneering role in the internationalization of Japan’s higher education. They often refer to the Japanese government’s Global 30 program as a copy of their institutional models, such as the provision of English-medium courses and having a large international student body. For example, one participant boasts, “If you look carefully, the subtext of every questionnaire [in the application form for the Global 30 program] was, ‘How much are you like HGU?’” (Faculty B, HGU). They also intend to continue to be a leading figure in the internationalization of Japanese higher education. For
example, asked about CILA’s future direction, a participant responds assertively that, “CILA is leading this new direction. This is the new direction. And, I think, I know, there are other universities, which are sort of following this trend” (Faculty T, CILA).

While the two institutions have led the policies, the policies have in return given them the power of legitimacy. Indeed, it is because of the policies that the two institutions are no longer marginal within Japan’s higher education system. The Japanese government’s policies have built a shared notion of internationalization into a norm and a requirement across the Japanese higher education system, and this social imaginary has given CILA and HGU legitimate and influential power.

Moreover, in the same way, CILA has gained legitimacy and influential power within the broader Kasuga University community because of the government’s internationalization policies. According to Staff Y at CILA, CILA used to be a marginal department within Kasuga, but given the impact of the policies, that is no longer the case. By referring to the recent government policies, such as the Japanese government’s Global 30 program and the 300,000 International Student Plan, the participant elaborates on the gradual yet remarkable change that these policies have brought to Kasuga:

At Kasuga, [the benefit of the internationalization policies] is obvious. When we were trying [to implement internationalization] on our own, we often had push back [from the rest of the Kasuga community] in many ways. For example, when we requested, “Could we write this in English, too?,” they would say, “Your department is the only one [that needs English]. Why don’t you do it only in your department?” It was like that, but once Kasuga joined the Global 30 program, everyone has to do it. . . . Our practice used to be
seen as a special practice only in a small part of the university, but there is a spreading awareness that everyone has to do it now.iii (Staff Y, CILA)

This story exemplifies how the Japanese government policies have worked to build a social imaginary of internationalization, Englishization in particular, as normal and necessary among people at Kasuga.

However, in some aspects CILA and HGU benefit in different ways. The most tangible difference manifests in their different levels of access, or at least their perception of accessibility, to government funding. In the past, government funding used to be equally distributed to national universities. However, under the neoliberal higher education reforms, including the incorporation of Japanese national universities in 2004, the Japanese government distributes funding to national, public, and private universities on a competitive basis.

In one sense, all the participants at Kasuga and CILA who discussed the policies’ funding implications welcomed the recent policies based on their confidence in being able to take advantage of the competitive funding scheme. The following statement by a participant is exemplary.

Recent policies are pretty nice. The government funding that used to automatically go to national universities is gradually decreasing, and the money is now used as competitive funding. So now it is possible for us to apply and get the funding by working hard on proposal writing. For sure, I think that many faculty members who are made to do the work do not like it. [laugh] But for a university like Kasuga that has a mission and passion [for internationalization], [laugh] I think it’s great that we can apply for competitive funding or whatever.iv (Faculty V, Kasuga)
Further, another CILA participant criticizes as ineffective the Global 30 program, which selects and distributes funding to as many as 30 universities. He states that Japan should adopt a more concentrated funding allocation system for internationalization. In these participants’ accounts, Kasuga’s privileged position and its confidence to be able to benefit from the recent internationalization policies are obvious. They attribute their confidence and motivation for more competition to their prestige and their large and established institutional infrastructure.

In contrast, all the participants at HGU, who discussed the funding implications of the current policies, expressed a negative view of the funding distribution system as inequitable. They criticize the government’s funding allocation system for favouring large prestigious universities. These HGU participants’ accounts suggest that academic prestige and institution type and size dictate the accessibility, or at least their perception of accessibility, to government funding.

As seen above, HGU and CILA both feel that they are leading figures of the national policies on internationalization. In return, they benefit from the policies by gaining legitimate power as international institutions. The reciprocal relationship between the government policies and the institutions demonstrates what Marginson and Rhoades (2002) call a “glonacal agency heuristic”: the flows of influence between higher education actors at global, national, and local levels are not top-down or one-directional but interactive and multi-directional because of agency exercised by actors at each level. However, the contrasting ways the two institutions perceive the policies’ financial benefits show that higher education actors operate within their locally specific conditions, that is, their differing social positions within the hierarchy of the Japanese higher education system. Below, let us see further how the way these institutions see
their social existence and future possibilities is reflected in their institutional discourses and practices of internationalization.

**Institutional discourses and practices of internationalization.**

As discussed earlier, internationalization often represents a country’s or higher education institution’s self-positioning strategy (Goodman, 2007; Mochizuki, 2004; Tōhoku University, 2008). Likewise, as expressed in participants’ descriptions of their institutions as “an international university that happened to be in Japan” (Staff D, HGU) and “being open to the world while located in Japan” (Faculty U, CILA), the interview data demonstrate that the international aspect of their institutions is central to their institutional identity, distinguishing them not only from other Japanese universities but also from the rest of Japanese society. Both institutions practice internationalization in order to establish a distinctive, namely international, identity by embracing features that many other Japanese universities do not yet possess: a large international student body and English-medium education. Below, I present how the institutions approach these two features.

**Diverse student body with international students.**

How participants describe international students shows the different communities the institutions imagine for themselves and for their students. First of all, interview data reveal that for both institutions, their large and diverse international student body is essential in realizing their identity as international institutions. In addition, participants consider international students to be essential to creating multicultural environments on their campuses. They imagine that their students will live in a multicultural environment in the future and that a multicultural environment cannot be created without international students. Yet, the institutions imagine
different communities to which they belong through establishing different types of competitiveness, and international students are key to their pursuit of institutional competitiveness. HGU and CILA pursue economic competitiveness and academic competitiveness, respectively. HGU participants’ comments express their strong desire to establish a firm ground as a supplier of global human resources for Japanese industries, which suggests their sense of social existence being grounded in Japan. In contrast, Kasuga, including CILA, seeks to advance their academic prestige within Japan to international academic communities in Asia and beyond with international students. Below, I will discuss these imagined communities by referring to the interview data.

For institutional identity as “international” institutions.

Given that when they were established, both institutions had numerical goals for the size of their international student populations, a large body of international students has been an integral part of their identities as international institutions. As one participant laughingly says, “Without international students, we would be just any ordinary university” (Staff E, HGU), international students give these institutions a special identity factor that distinguishes them from other Japanese universities. Both institutions’ websites and brochures highlight their diverse international student bodies as one of their major characteristics.

However, as much as international students constitute the institutions’ identities as international institutions, the institutions in fact have an ambivalent stance toward “international students” as a student category. While acknowledging particular issues and benefits that international students bring to the institutions and to Japanese society at large, two participants at each institution express their reluctance or resistance to labeling international students as such. What underpins their ambivalence is a critical view of the longstanding and pervasive discourse
and practice at Japanese universities that view and treat international students as “a symbol of internationalization, counterparts of international communications, or guests” (Staff W, Kasuga). In other words, they are aware of the need to move beyond tokenistic or Othering discourse and practice.

This critical awareness is layered with their identity as international institutions. For example, the following statement by a participant represents his ideological notion that being international should be normal at international institutions:

I think we should not label international students as such. Even though we are in Japan, as long as we label ourselves as an international university, regardless of whether our students are Japanese, Chinese, Korean, or say Russian, I think we probably should see them just as students. (Staff G, HGU)

In addition, a few CILA participants note the practical difficulties of dividing their students into either domestic or international categories. CILA attracts students with transnational walks of life, including Japanese students who grew up overseas and those students who were raised by non-Japanese parents in Japan.

Thus, the two international institutions have an ambivalent or reluctant relationship with the label of “international students,” in both a practical and ideological sense. On the one hand, they to some degree rely on the presence of international students for their identity as international institutions. On the other hand, the institutions are hesitant or unable to label international students as such due to the very international character of their institutions.

For a multicultural learning environment: The creation of a “small world.”

Notwithstanding the dilemma of seeing and treating international students as special, both HGU and CILA are keen on recruiting more international students from different parts of the
world. The two institutions’ common rationale for having international students is to create a multicultural learning environment. Participants’ accounts of the need to create such a learning environment exemplify two kinds of imaginations that are addressed in the literature. First, Kanno (2003) argues that schools’ practices and policies are driven by an imagined community to which the schools imagine their students will belong in the future. Interviews with faculty/staff participants reveal that they feel that the multicultural learning environments on their campuses represent the community to which they imagine their students will belong in the future. While using different terminologies, such as international understanding or communication skills, participants at both universities in essence uphold the educational goal of preparing their students to live and work with people from different parts of the world. Second, the creation of these multicultural learning environments resonates with what Bhabha (1990) calls a “creation of cultural diversity and a containment of cultural difference” (p. 208). The institutions’ idea of a multicultural learning environment is defined primarily by international differences that international students embody, such as languages, cultures, and appearances that are different from those in mainstream Japan. As McConnell (2000) describes, “importing diversity” by bringing people in from overseas has been Japan’s model of internationalization, and the construction of diversity at the two institutions is underpinned by the imagination of Japan as a homogeneous society and international students as representing cultural diversity.

The following participants’ comments about their campuses illustrate the imagined community they envision for their students’ future lives and the construction of cultural diversity on campus. For example, one participant describes the HGU campus as a “small world” (Staff E, HGU), and participants at both institutions consistently express pride that their students represent different parts of the world, basing this pride on the assumption that their students’
future careers will require them to work with international counterparts. The following comments by Faculty C at HGU are particularly illuminative. He asserts, “I think that the world in which our students are going to live will be like HGU, in essence”xi (Faculty C, HGU), and further elaborates on the HGU’s campus environment as follows:

We have a . . . multicultural learning environment so we have cross-cultural communications every day, and I think that’s HGU’s strength. So, it’s like we are somewhere abroad every day. When our [Japanese] students return from their home [after a break], they say things like, “It was weird that everyone was Japanese!” [laugh] . . . I’m not saying that a Japanese student community and a Chinese student community are doing something together without segregating themselves from each other. But, there is such a space, regardless. [To be on our campus] is like walking around New York City. We hear different languages everywhere. The point is that there is such a space on this campus 365 days a year.xii (Faculty C, HGU)

What is especially illuminative about Faculty C’s comments is that he imagines that HGU’s students will live in a community that is like “abroad,” which, in his view, is unlike homogeneous Japanese society. He considers that such a multicultural environment is essential to prepare students for their imagined future community, regardless of whether the desired learning actually occurs.

While echoing the sentiment that students will live in a multicultural society in the future, another participant expresses even more confidence than Faculty C that the presence of diverse students itself has a positive learning impact on the campus community at Kasuga, including CILA, as follows:
On Kasuga’s main campus, you can easily find foreigners of [CILA], and you hear languages other than Japanese. When you compare the campus with other Japanese universities, the difference is obvious. As a university, providing such a space is important. [Our intention is] to provide such a space and let students think. We are not going to tell them what to do. If they are put in such an environment, they would think for themselves what they need to do to play an active role in society for 30-40 years after graduation. xiii (Faculty S, CILA/Kasuga)

These two participants’ accounts elucidate the “creation of cultural diversity” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 208). As seen in the participants’ references to the presence of international students and the different languages they speak, international students are positioned as a symbol of cultural diversity in the institutions’ imagination. An underlying assumption of this creation of cultural diversity is that Japan is a culturally and ethnically homogeneous society; therefore, diversity needs to be imported from overseas. Instead of highlighting locally specific diversity that exists in a given region or in Japanese society, the institutions strive to replicate cultural diversity that exists somewhere else, such as New York City, by importing a particular form of diversity, namely international cultural diversity.

It is thus intriguing to consider what the institutions expect their students to learn from their multicultural campuses. As discussed throughout this section, participants at the two institutions consistently believe in the learning potential of their multicultural campuses. The following comment by Faculty C is the most elaborate and representative of the belief shared by the participants. Asked to describe the meaning of having a large proportion of international students, he responds:
I think, first of all, that there is meaning in the fact that there are walking dictionaries, or I may say walking materials or teaching materials, everywhere [on this campus]. . . . When we teach only Japanese students, we get only Japanese people’s ideas, but when we have students from other countries, our world is broadened. We can get broader perspectives, and it’s possible to think out of the box. I think we are offering such learning opportunities, especially in classrooms of instructors who take an interactive teaching approach.\textsuperscript{xiv} (Faculty C, HGU)

As this comment refers to the role of a particular teaching approach in enhancing the learning potential in a multicultural learning environment, not all participants necessarily assume that a multicultural environment alone automatically broadens students’ perspectives. In fact, a few participants mention the challenge of mixing Japanese students and international students, and both institutions make efforts to enhance the learning potential of their culturally diverse campuses by promoting student interaction. For example, CILA offers small-size classes to allow for more discussions and has begun a peer mentoring program. In addition, HGU offers a variety of extracurricular activities to promote student interaction, and has created a system that does not extend financial support to a student club whose members represent only one country. However, at the same time, as seen earlier, some uphold to various degrees the learning potential that is supposedly inherent in a multicultural learning environment.

The following participant’s anecdote offers valuable insight into the challenge of bringing about an intended learning outcome from such a multicultural campus environment. According to Staff W, at Kasuga, there is an emerging debate on the need for a paradigm shift in internationalization, from the promotion of international cultural exchanges (kokusai kōryū), which is primarily concerned with entertaining international students as guests, to the promotion
of multicultural co-living (*tabunka kyōsei*), which advocates treating international students as equals, rather than as special members of the Kasuga student community or Japanese society. A group of Kasuga students recently conducted a survey of 300 Kasuga students asking whether they thought multicultural co-living was practiced effectively at Kasuga, and Staff W illustrates a typical survey interview correspondence as follows: “‘Do you think that we are doing well with multicultural co-living?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Why?’ ‘Because there are many international students, and I see them speaking many different languages’” (Staff W, Kasuga). The participant problematizes that students tend to interpret the mere presence of international students and international cultural exchange activities as an indication of successful multicultural co-living. I cannot assess or predict a success or a failure of Kasuga or other multicultural campuses in a deterministic sense using only this anecdote. However, the anecdote suggests an unintended learning outcome of a multicultural campus. More importantly, it raises a question about the extent to which mere exposures to such an environment could lead students to think deeply about cultural diversity. I will come back to this question when I discuss how international student participants experience and interpret their multicultural campuses in the subsequent findings chapters.

Thus far, I have described two common themes that emerged from faculty/staff interviews at both institutions: international students are seen as essential to maintain their institutional identity as international institutions, and these institutions had to prepare students for the multicultural community in which they are expected to live in the future. Now let us look at the contrasting themes between the two institutions.

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39 See Burgess (2004), Chapman (2006), and Tai (2007) on the emergence and development of and critical debates about the discourse of *tabunka kyōsei* in Japan. Burgess also provides a brief critique of *kokusai kōryū* events in internationalization.
For economic competitiveness: A “treasure house” for global human resources.

The interview data with faculty/staff participants reveal that the two institutions pursue different types of competitiveness with their international students in order to establish their positions in different types of communities. In the interviews with HGU participants, what is strikingly consistent and clear is that they view international students as potential global human resources. HGU participants’ comments suggest that the institution aims to enhance its institutional competitive edge as a supplier of global human resources by supporting Japan’s position in the global economy. The community in which the institution sees itself is the Japanese economy against the backdrop of the global market, and these participants envisage HGU as being an active player in the Japanese economy by supplying global human resources.

In contrast, at CILA and Kasuga, such an economically driven discourse and practice are less prevalent, if not absent. The enhancement of academic competitiveness through international students as global talent is a more forthcoming theme in the CILA and Kasuga participants’ comments. CILA, together with Kasuga, seeks to advance its elite position within the Japanese higher education system into the international academic community in Asia and beyond.

In what follows, instead of presenting data by institution, I present how the two institutions approach economic and academic discourses and practices on international students. In doing so, I intend to highlight the differences between the two institutions while presenting some overlaps in each set of discourse and practice. I will begin by discussing the institutions’ economic discourse and practice with international students. Discussions on academic competitiveness will follow in the next section.

One commonality between HGU and CILA in terms of their economic discourse and practice of international students is that both take advantage of Japan’s growing demand for
global human resources to carve out an institutional advantage in the Japanese labour market and in the international student recruitment market. The institutions capitalize on Japanese companies’ increasing sense of urgency that they cannot survive in the globalizing economy without incorporating the international labour force. Interestingly, participants attribute the growing demand for international student graduates in the Japanese labour market not only to the globalizing economy but also to the recent social phenomenon, mentioned above, of apathetic and inward-looking Japanese youths. A CILA participant elaborates on the dramatic change taking place in Japanese companies’ hiring preferences:

This year, it seems that Japan as a whole is really pushed by, say, a wave of internationalization. Companies have become aware that they have to be globalized. Yet, Japanese students are inward looking, and they are not really willing to go overseas. I would say that Japanese companies were probably not outward looking, either, but I’m surprised by how much they could have changed just in one year. Last year, companies were like, “We want those who are Japanese and have international experiences.” I think their honest reason was because those students could speak Japanese [laugh] and understood Japanese culture to some extent. But this year, the companies are like, “We are fine with international students.” It may sound odd, but they even say, “We prefer international students [to Japanese students].”** (Staff Y, CILA)

According to this participant, until last year, CILA asked Japanese companies to go to CILA to recruit their graduates, but things have since changed: This year, more Japanese companies invite themselves to have recruitment seminars at CILA. CILA welcomes Japanese companies’ growing demand for global human resources, particularly international student graduates, and have enhanced their career support for their international, as well as domestic, students. CILA
started hosting career support events specifically for CILA students starting in 2009 because university-wide career-related events hosted by Kasuga tended to target primarily Japanese students.

Similarly, HGU participants boast the high reputation of their international graduates among Japanese companies. The following participant articulates what Japanese companies particularly value about international students:

Academic skills, motivation for work, and language skills: Japanese students cannot beat international students in these three areas. Japanese students cannot win in international competitions in these areas. [Japanese companies] tell us that HGU is a supplier of excellent human resources for them. It doesn’t matter to them whether the students are Japanese or not, but they say that international students are great in particular.\^{xvii} (Staff D, HGU)

However, another HGU participant, Staff F, argues that the recent popularity of international students in the Japanese labour market is not necessarily because of Japanese students. He emphasizes that it is because international students are simply unique and outstanding compared to Japanese students who have grown up in the same domestic education system. He states, “International students understand their home countries, and yet they jumped out of their home and are thriving in Japan as minorities. What is outstanding about them is their keenness, I guess\^{xviii} (Staff F, HGU).

Nonetheless, against the backdrop of Japan’s current economic and social context, participants, including Staff F, welcome the fact that their institutions are well positioned in the chain of supply and demand of global human resources. They have a large pool of international students who are not only fluent in the Japanese language and culture but also offer the qualities
that Japanese industries find hard to find among Japanese students. They also take advantage of
Japan’s increased demand for global human resources in their international student recruitment.
Specifically, they lure international students into their institutions with potential career
opportunities in Japan and channel them into Japanese industries upon graduation.

However, the two institutions differ significantly from each other in the extent to which they focus on the economic discourse and practice with international students. The vast majority of HGU participants explicitly and repeatedly frame international students as global human resources for the Japanese economy and HGU’s role as serving the aforementioned perceived need for global human resources. What is remarkable about HGU participants’ comments, compared to the comments by CILA/Kasuga participants, is that they often frame HGU’s role in relation to Japan, or more specifically to the Japanese economy. Their comments suggest that while being an international institution, HGU holds a strong sense of social existence in Japan against the backdrop of the globalizing economy, and their view of international students is located within this particular sense of social existence. The following comments by an HGU participant, Staff G, are exemplary. On the one hand, he says that the overall mission of HGU as an international institution is “preparing human resources who can contribute to sustainable development of the region”\textsuperscript{66} wherever they are and whatever their nationality is (Staff G, HGU). On the other hand, however, he articulates HGU’s mission for international students, and what the institution wants international students to be for Japan, as follows:

Speaking of international students, I think our university sees its role as making them become interested in and understand Japan, Japanese culture, Japanese history, and so on. Some may become Japan fans and stay in Japan, and some may return home and act as
bridges between their home countries and Japan. I think our role is to prepare them for playing such a role.\textsuperscript{xx} (Staff G, HGU)

The following participant echoes HGU’s role as being one of global human resource development, and he emphasizes its contribution to Japan as follows:

Preparing global human resources has a really broad effect. It is not only for international students but also for Japanese students who learn with them and for the community surrounding the university. It’s not only about educating international students and making them a bridge between their home countries and Japan. There is a more significant meaning for Japan’s national positioning in the world in the future.\textsuperscript{xxi} (Staff E, HGU)

Even though he could not elaborate further on what a “more significant meaning for Japan’s national positioning in the world” is, the significance of this comment is that the participant spells out the institution’s role regarding international students, namely, that international students should play an important role regarding Japanese students, the surrounding campus community, Japan’s relationships with their home countries, and most importantly, Japan’s position in the world.

Moreover, two other participants put HGU’s role with international students in more explicitly economic terms. One of them, Faculty A, suggests that HGU’s role is shifting from one of producing “bridge human resources”\textsuperscript{xxii} who can work in other countries using their language skills, to one of producing “innovation human resources who can generate new economic value”\textsuperscript{xxiii} through mixing multiple cultural values (Faculty A, HGU). He asserts, “I think that [producing innovation human resources] will greatly contribute to Japanese society, or to the global economic community, more broadly speaking”\textsuperscript{xxiv} (Faculty A, HGU). For the other
participant, Staff F, HGU’s role is simpler. Asked about HGU’s responsibility to international students, he responds, “I may not be speaking of responsibility, but our hope is that [international students] love Japan and enter Japanese companies” (Staff F, HGU).

In these comments, these participants reiterate that they want international students to love Japan, work in Japan, or act as a bridge between Japan and their home countries. To various degrees, these comments point to the participants’ nationalistic ideas that are primarily concerned with serving Japan’s economic or identity needs. Yet, it is important to contextualize their desire and sense of mission to serve Japan. Staff F explains that the idea of preparing global human resources for Japanese industries has always been HGU’s mission supported by a powerful business federation, the Keidanren, which provided significant visionary and financial support to HGU’s establishment. The involvement of Japan’s economic players in the institutional foundation suggests that HGU’s sense of social existence is strongly grounded in the Japanese economy and is, to some extent, a manifestation of their socially situated imagination rather than of their sheer nationalistic desire.

As described earlier, both HGU and CILA take advantage of expanded career opportunities in Japan for international students in their international student recruitment. However, what is particular about HGU is that the institution’s public reputation is dependent upon their international students’ post-graduation employment success. In contrast, as I will describe in the following section, CILA and Kasuga participants assume their positive public image based on Kasuga’s established academic prestige in Japan, and none of them describes international students or their career success as the basis of their institutional reputation. An HGU participant, Faculty C, describes HGU’s reliance on international students’ career success as follows:
You know, the media says, “HGU’s employment rate is great,” but what is great is international students so they push the average rate [of HGU graduates’ employment rate], and Japanese students’ rate goes up by following [international students]. That’s a bit curious [phenomenon]. When international students’ [employment rate] drops, Japanese students’ [employment rate] drops, too. (Faculty C, HGU)

Therefore, Faculty C explains that it is HGU’s “business judgment” that they invest in career support especially for their international students because their success in the job market is the key for HGU’s public image, and subsequently for their marketability in the student recruitment market both in Japan and abroad.

HGU invests in producing global human resources by weaving career development into the curriculum and campus life. The career office visits classrooms to urge students to prepare for their careers as early as possible. For example, the office visits a freshman course called “Introduction to HGU” to facilitate successful HGU graduates discussing how they spent four years at HGU to land the jobs they wanted. The office also visits Japanese language classes for first-year international students to emphasize the importance of learning Japanese to increase their career options. Moreover, the office works to create new internship arrangements for their students with about 100 companies per year.

The popularity of HGU graduates among Japanese industries is borne out by the numbers. In spite of the campus’s remote location, the university attracts approximately 350 companies every year for on-campus recruitment of their prospective graduates. Participants explain that the university’s diverse student body is attractive to Japanese companies because they can recruit students from different countries all at once. An HGU participant boasts,
“Companies want global resources. They want those who can work overseas. From their point of view, HGU is a treasure house\textsuperscript{xxviii} (Staff D, HGU).

Compared to HGU, economic discourse and practice of international students as global human resources is less pronounced at CILA and Kasuga. As described earlier, CILA does take advantage of the growing demand for global human resources in Japanese industries to boost their institutional competitiveness in both the international student recruitment market and the Japanese labour market. However, few CILA/Kasuga participants explicitly frame the production of global human resources as CILA’s role or contribution to Japan or the Japanese economy. Neither do they see international students’ employment as the key to their institution’s reputation. Moreover, at CILA, career development is not as ingrained in their curriculum or campus culture as it is at HGU. Rather, as we will see next, CILA is more deeply embedded in Kasuga University’s endeavour to enhance its academic competitiveness in a global context.

For academic competitiveness: “It’s OK that we become like Wimbledon.”

In contrast to HGU, whose sense of social existence is grounded in Japan, and more specifically in the Japanese economy, Kasuga, including CILA, sees itself as a leading member of the Japanese academic community and envisages advancing its leadership position first to Asia and then to the rest of the world. To illustrate what Kasuga imagines, a participant describes its goal of internationalization as follows: “We are cognizant and proud of our central position in Japan, of course, but we are now trying to extend the position to become a central university in Asia”\textsuperscript{xxix} (Faculty V, Kasuga). According to this participant, the idea underpinning the goal is the, “co-creation of knowledge in Asia Pacific”\textsuperscript{xxx} (Faculty V, Kasuga), which has been the key theme of internationalization at Kasuga since the 1990s. He explains the concept of “co-creation” as follows:
The word, “co-creation [kyōsō]”\textsuperscript{40} of course . . . refers to the idea of competition to some extent. Well, competitiveness may be a more appropriate term. We of course would like to become a competitive university and produce internationally competitive human resources in global society or in Asia Pacific. So we approach the goal through “co-creation.” I mean, not through competition but rather through partnership or cooperation with other universities, we would like to prepare such human resources.\textsuperscript{xxxi} (Faculty V, Kasuga)

To achieve the goal, Kasuga, for example, partners with other top Asian universities for double-degree programs, exchange programs, and research collaboration. A faculty participant describes CILA as the “core of internationalization”\textsuperscript{xxxi} (Faculty U, CILA) at Kasuga, and notes that CILA plays a central role in the internationalization of Kasuga University for academic competitiveness.

International students are positioned within Kasuga’s institutional internationalization strategy. Even though cooperation is a valued notion in the internationalization of Kasuga, as described above, its desire to be competitive cannot be understated. The following participant’s statement explicitly illustrates Kasuga’s ambition to establish international competitiveness with international students:

I often say that it’s OK that we become like Wimbledon. There is no longer a British player in Wimbledon [the tennis tournament], but it’s the top tournament in the world, right? Then, there is no need for our students and faculty members to be Japanese. As long as we offer good education and research in the name of Kasuga University, we don’t care where our students and faculty members come from.\textsuperscript{xxxiii} (Faculty S, Kasuga/CILA)

\textsuperscript{40} The term co-creation [kyōsō] has a double meaning: It phonetically refers to the idea of competition, while also referring to the idea of co-creation in writing.
Further, the same participant justifies this “Wimbledon approach” by noting that Kasuga is a private university, which is distinct from national universities in that only the latter that are obliged to educate Japanese citizens due to their reliance on support from tax revenue. He explains:

At Kasuga University, 10-something percent of our money comes from the government, but if so, what that means is that we are good as long as 10-something percent of our students are Japanese. We have decided to become matter-of-fact about it. . . . The point is that we are going to turn Kasuga into a university that competes in the world.xxxiv

(Faculty S, Kasuga/CILA)

This statement makes a stark contrast to HGU, which strives to serve Japan’s economic needs. Kasuga’s sense of identity is more independent from Japan than is HGU. In Kasuga’s pursuit to become an internationally competitive university, neither the university’s national affiliation nor the university members’ nationality is an issue. Yet, it should be noted that Kasuga is not necessarily reliant on international students per se to establish their academic competitiveness. While being eager to recruit talented international students, participants at both Kasuga and CILA also proudly refer to the excellence of their Japanese students as giving them a competitive advantage.

Kasuga’s strong desire to become competitive in the international academic arena is elucidated when it is juxtaposed against how HGU participants discuss academic matters in relation to their international students and institutional goals. In contrast to Kasuga, which aims to extend its established academic competitiveness from the Japanese higher education system into Asia and beyond, HGU aims to raise its academic standards to a level that will be recognized by the international academic community. To be accepted by the international higher
education community, the following participant considers that HGU needs to distance itself from the tarnished image of Japanese universities:

   Everywhere in the world, people know that Japanese universities’ education is crap, but we want to push HGU’s level to the level where people would say, “But HGU is great!”  
   We would like to be accepted [by universities in other countries] in forms of dual-degree agreement and so forth.\textsuperscript{xxv}  (Staff D, HGU)

This description suggests that HGU sees itself as competing within the Japanese higher education system, rather than within a broader global higher education market. It strives to move above the Japanese higher education system in order to establish a legitimate position within an international higher education community.

   In addition, while HGU participants vigorously defend their international students’ academic excellence, they see international students more of a solution to a problem than as players in the university’s academic competitiveness within the international academic community. In contrast to Kasuga, which seeks to enhance its international academic competitiveness with international students, the idea of pursuing international academic competitiveness is barely present in HGU participants’ accounts of international students. Rather, three HGU participants consistently put international students in the role of leading Japanese students. They expect their international students, who hold a clear sense of purpose and work hard to achieve it, to stimulate Japanese students’ morale, including academic motivation. For example, one of the participants says that because HGU’s Japanese students are exposed to hardworking international students, they study for longer hours than the average Japanese university students. In addition, another participant hesitantly states: “I’m not sure how to put it, but in a way, I tend to view international students as, or expect them to be, those who
pull up Japanese students\textsuperscript{xvi} (Staff G, HGU). As such, at HGU, international students are seen as a stimulus or solution to Japanese students’ low levels of motivation, rather than as players that will enhance the institutions’ academic competitiveness. This finding resonates with the earlier finding about HGU’s reliance on and investment in international students’ employment rates, and its impact on their Japanese counterparts’ employability, and consequently, on its overall institutional reputation.

All in all, what emerges from the comparison between the two institutions in their economic and academic discourses and practices is HGU’s permeating reliance on and investment in international students for building the institutions’ capacity in both economic and academic domains. In particular, by serving the emerging need for global human resources in the Japanese economy with their large and diverse international student body, the institution strives to establish its institutional identity as a supplier of Japan’s global human resources. In addition, for HGU, international students are \textit{the} key players, not only in enhancing its institutional competitiveness but also in dealing with the challenges posed by their Japanese counterparts, be it their lack of academic motivation or their lack of attractiveness in the labour market. As a participant puts it, “This university’s life is over without international students\textsuperscript{xvii} (Staff D, HGU).

For Kasuga, including CILA, international students are important players in enhancing its competitiveness in both the Japanese labour market and the academic communities in Asia and the broader world. In addition, for CILA as well as for HGU, international students are essential for their institutional identity as international institutions and to create a multicultural learning environment on campus. However, in contrast to the case of HGU, we do not hear in CILA/Kasuga participants’ comments that the institution is as reliant on international students
for its institutional existence or competitiveness as is HGU. Rather, international students are
described as those who *enhance* the institution’s existing competitiveness at the international
level. The institution is keen on advancing their established elite position within the Japanese
higher education system to Asian and broader international academic communities, and they are
determined to accomplish this goal by recruiting talented students from around the world.

*Use of languages: Japanese and English.*

The use of English is a major characteristic of the two institutions, especially in light of
the fact that English as the language of instruction is still rare in the Japanese higher education
system, particularly at the undergraduate level. As explained in the previous chapter, while
English is the major medium of instruction at CILA, HGU allows students to choose the
language of instruction, either English or Japanese. However, despite these different language
systems, interviews with faculty/staff participants reveal that both institutions choose to use
English in their educational settings based on the same imagination: English is *the* language of
the international community that the institutions envision they and their students will join in the
future. This imagination is consistent with the literature that argues that increased use of English
under the banner of internationalization is driven by the desire to belong to the imagined
international community where English is *the* international language (Kubota, 2002). In other
words, this imagination reflects Japan’s long-time obsession with the idea of “catching up” with
the West as a universal point of reference (Kubota, 1998; Mochizuki, 2004).

Participants’ imagination of English as the international language suggests that they see
themselves located in Japan and occupying a peripheral position in the world as a non-English-
speaking, non-Western country. Then, their choice of English as a language of instruction can be
interpreted as a reflection of their socially situated imagination of their marginal existence in the
world. However, the institutions strategically use a combination of English and Japanese as a competitive advantage in the international student market and for students’ employability. In this section, I will first show how the imagination of English as the international language manifests in how participants describe their language policies. Second, I will discuss how the two institutions use a combination of English and Japanese to enhance their competitiveness in the international student recruitment market.

*Different language policies with the same imagination.*

The two institutions have different language policies for particular reasons. According to an HGU participant, the philosophy underpinning HGU’s bilingual policy is not to make one language dominant. Unlike traditional Japanese universities, where Japanese is the only language of instruction, HGU’s bilingual policy goes against the assimilationist idea of making the minority (i.e., non-Japanese speakers) adjust to the majority (i.e., Japanese speakers). In addition, two HGU participants share the critique of newly emerging English-only programs at Japanese universities, such as those offered at CILA. They criticize those English-medium programs for primarily targeting an audience of Japanese students and for making it their aim to raise Japanese students’ English competency, which they feel is too narrow. One of them champions HGU’s bilingual policy by saying that it has a broader audience and educational aim than an English-only program.

As the HGU participants note in their criticism, one major aspect of CILA’s language policy that significantly differs from HGU’s is that Japanese students have no choice but to learn in English. Participants at both institutions acknowledge the challenge of improving some Japanese students’ academic and oral English skills. Nonetheless, Faculty S at CILA/Kasuga insists that English is a “must-have” skill for Japanese students today:
When our students graduate, a certain percentage of them, which I don’t know yet now, will be sent overseas or work with international counterparts. Then, being able to communicate their ideas in English is a must for them. They have to, no matter what. In this sense, speaking about Japanese students, my answer to “Why English?” is, “You can’t go out there without English.” It’s as simple as that. (Faculty S, CILA/Kasuga)

This statement articulates the view that English is not a matter of choice but a requirement for everyone. In addition, Faculty S asserts that English is the most effective language to make their education and research transparent to the rest of the world and to enhance their competitiveness in the international academic arena.

Despite these two differing language policies, both institutions are driven by the same imagination expressed by Faculty S above: English is the language of the community to which students will belong in the future. Of the participants who discussed the use of English at their institutions, all of them accept English as the international language in an as-a-matter-of-fact manner. While a few of them acknowledge the controversial nature of the idea, no participant raised critical or questioning thoughts on the notion. Staff F at HGU is the most frank and articulate participant in expressing his acceptance of, and sense of urgency to accept, English as the international language. Even though he mentions his awareness of the concerns about losing linguistic and cultural diversity in the world, he concludes: “Just talking about the field of business, now that English has become the common language, we probably have no choice but to go with it.”

His acceptance of English with little reservation is underpinned by his sense of urgency for the Japanese economy to keep up with the global market. In a discussion on the recent trend, in which some major Japanese companies have changed the common language of
their workplace from Japanese to English, he justifies the trend by stating: “[If we do not follow the trend.] Japan as a whole will be told ‘sayonara (goodbye)’ by the global market.”

Participants’ accounts reveal that once English is accepted as the language of the community in which students are going to live in the future, it does not matter who is actually involved in the international community created on their campuses. A CILA participant articulates his idea of the relationship between English and CILA as an international institution as below:

Because the stage [of our education] is open not only to one country but also to the world, language becomes a major issue. I know it is controversial, but English is one of the world’s common languages in the 21st Century, so to speak. . . . In our educational environment, our students come mainly from Asia, but they also come from America, Europe, and other Middle-Eastern countries. We use English at our institution as a common language, as a medium of education and research. That’s what the term “international” in “international liberal arts” refers to. . . . I guess, what internationalization means is that education and research are open to the world while we are in Japan. (Faculty U, CILA)

This explanation implies the idea that English allows the institution to be international regardless of who their students or audience may be. An HGU participant, Faculty A, also expresses the same idea in his justification of the use of English at HGU. He, however, argues that teaching Japanese students in English undermines their learning because they can learn deeper when they are taught in Japanese. Yet, neither English nor Japanese is the mother tongue for the majority of international students at HGU. He justifies the contradiction by maintaining that English is the “second-best” option, if not the best option, to accommodate diverse students from all over the
world. Thus, while the two institutions have different language policies, they share the same imagination that English is *the* language that they should use when it comes to dealing with non-Japanese-speaking students and audience, whoever they may be.

*English and Japanese for institutional competitiveness.*

The above participants’ perception and acceptance of English as the international language suggest that they see the Japanese language in a subordinate position in the world to English, especially in the global economy. Then, their choice of English as a language of instruction can be interpreted as reflecting their socially situated imagination of their marginal existence in the world as institutions in a non-English-speaking, non-Western country. Yet, at the same time, the institutions strategically use the combination of English and Japanese as their competitive advantage in international student recruitment.

While being cognizant of English-speaking countries’ powerful attraction and privilege in the international higher education market, both institutions take advantage of the two languages, English and Japanese. Participants at both institutions consistently describe that the removal of a Japanese language score from their admission requirements has broken the long-standing barrier for many international students to come to Japan to study. By targeting international students who already attained a certain level of English competency, the institutions lure them with the potential to learn another foreign language, Japanese, while still studying in English. They appeal to those prospective international students using the value of Japanese language skills for the future employment market based on Japan’s strong presence in the global fields of business and technology.

For example, the following participant’s explanation of how CILA appeals to prospective international students illuminates the institution’s strategic use of English and Japanese. As he
describes, “CILA gives [international students] an opportunity to study in English, pick up Japanese language at the same time, and . . . in that respect, to become more kokusai jin (international person) than going to America” (Faculty T, CILA). To elaborate on what he means by “become more kokusai jin,” he adds that students are exposed to Japanese culture and international cultures within CILA as well as to the two languages. In this way, the institution fuels students’ aspirations to “become more kokusai jin,” and at the same time, enhances their potential to become unique and competitive international institutions in a non-English-speaking country. Their strategic use of Japanese resonates with what Marginson and Rhoades (2002) call the “glonacal agency heuristic,” which emphasizes the agency that higher education players at the global, national, and local levels exercise, and that influences are interactive and reciprocal, instead of one-directional or top-down.

Summary.

In this chapter, I have discussed the discourses and practices of internationalization based on interviews with faculty and staff participants at the two institutions. By using the socially situated notion of imagined communities (Appadurai, 1996), I have explored how the two Japanese institutions imagine their position in relation to others at the local and global levels, which communities they may be able to join in the future, and how they exercise their agency to participate in the imagined communities. In addition to addressing how international students are positioned in the institutional discourses and practices of internationalization, I have examined the relationship between the institutions and the internationalization policies of the Japanese government.

I have also shown that the English-medium programs, combined with an emphasis on the Japanese language and their large international student bodies, have been central to the two
institutions’ discourses and practices of internationalization ever since their foundation. Their construction of such an institutional space represents the community that they envision both for themselves and for their students. For themselves as higher education institutions, they envisage establishing their status as international institutions in order to distinguish themselves from other universities in Japan and beyond. Also, they imagine that their students will live in an English-speaking multicultural community in the future, and they strive to prepare their students to succeed in that future community.

The construction of such international institutions reflects the institutions’ two kinds of imagination. Firstly, the two institutions’ perceived need to create multicultural learning environments with international students illuminates their imagination of Japanese society as one that is homogeneous. Some participants are critical, given their institutional identities as international institutions, of seeing international students as “different” or “special.” Nonetheless, in the two institutions’ discourses and practices of internationalization, international students are in essence positioned as a means of what Bhabha (1990) calls a “creation of cultural diversity” (p. 208). Secondly, although English is not the language spoken by diverse peoples living in Japan, including international students (Kubota, 2002; Tsuneyoshi, 2011), the institutions’ urge to integrate English into their educational settings indicates their sense of peripheral social existence as institutions located in Japan, a non-English-speaking, non-Western country. Being entrenched in the Western imaginary of globalization, they align themselves with the imagination that English is the international language to become legitimate members of the international higher education community.

Yet, while the institutions’ imaginations of their social existence, their futures, and their students’ futures tend to be constrained by the position that Japan occupies in the existing global
power relations, they also strategically take advantage of the Japanese language. By offering opportunities to learn Japanese while offering English-medium courses, they lure prospective international students who aspire to develop an international outlook with an additional foreign language, Japanese.

Another commonality between the two institutions can be found in their reciprocal relationship with the Japanese government’s recent internationalization policies. The creation of the institutions preceded the creation of recent internationalization policies, such as the 300,000 International Student Plan and the Global 30 Program, and the Japanese government referenced these two institutions as models for their policy-making. As a result, the government’s policies have legitimized the two institutions’ internationalization practices, which are still new to the Japanese higher education system.

Despite these similarities, the two institutions seek to position themselves in different communities by pursuing different types of competitiveness with international students. The findings indicate that their different positions within the hierarchical Japanese higher education system shape their socially situated imaginations about their financial relationships with the Japanese government’s internationalization policies and their future possibilities. CILA’s position, because it is affiliated with Kasuga, is one of long-established prestige in the Japanese higher education system. From this privileged vantage point, Kasuga, including CILA, seeks to advance its established prestigious position within the Japanese higher education system to the international academic community in Asia and beyond. International students are important players in the enhancement of the institution’s academic competitiveness on the global stage. They perceive that they are well positioned to take advantage of increased government funding opportunities and to become a leading university in the international academic community.
In contrast to CILA, which already sees its position already as sitting atop the Japanese higher education system and imagines its future position as a leading university in Asia and beyond, HGU’s imagination is rooted in Japan. As a new and less prestigious university, HGU’s imagination for the future is largely informed by the anticipated needs of their founding partners, Japan’s economic players. While HGU does not perceive itself as well positioned in attaining government funding as their CILA/Kasuga counterparts, they aggressively capitalize on the Japanese economy’s emerging need for global human resources. HGU aims to establish its position as a supplier of global human resources for Japanese industries, and international students are key players in this endeavour.
Chapter 7: International Students’ Identity Formation through Global Mobility

In this chapter, based on interviews with 27 Chinese international student participants (15 from HGU, and 12 from CILA), I discuss how these students construct their identities through their participation in international education in Japan. I specifically focus on their identity formation, first through their global mobility from China to Japan, and subsequently after their graduation. The focus corresponds to the two sub-questions of the second research question, “What drives international students’ desire to participate in international education in Japan, and specifically at the Japanese universities?” and “How do their experiences in Japan shape how they imagine their futures?” With these questions, I examine what motivated the student participants to study in Japan and at their respective Japanese institutions, and how they translate their international education experiences into their imagination of future possibilities. Following scholars who view global student mobility not only as physical flows of people across national borders but also as a manifestation of people’s imagination to attain a new life, and thereby a new identity (Baas, 2010; Fong, 2011), in essence I explore who participants aspire to become by studying in Japan.

The chapter is organized by five themes that emerged from the interview data. The first two sections present what kinds of ideas participants had about Japan - and more broadly about studying overseas - before going to Japan for their university education. I do so to provide the normative underpinnings of their decisions to go to Japan. In the first section, I illustrate cultural and historical images of Japan to which they have been exposed from an early age. In the second section, I show that they grew up in socio-economic and geographical proximity to global

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41 I use the terms “participants,” “students,” or “student participants” interchangeably thereafter in this chapter and next chapter, unless noted otherwise.
mobility, which shaped their normative notion that studying overseas is a common, possible, and ideal life option. In the third section, I demonstrate that despite their familiarity with Japan and their proximity to global mobility, it was the Japanese institutions themselves that played a significant role in implanting in many students’ imaginations the idea of studying in Japan as a future possibility and in turning that imagination into reality. In the fourth section, I present contrasting findings on what attracted participants to the two Japanese institutions in order to show that participants in the two institutions were driven by different desires and needs embedded in their life circumstances in China. In the previous chapter, by drawing on the idea of a socially situated notion of imagined communities, I demonstrated how the Japanese institutions, occupying different places in the hierarchical Japanese higher education system, seek to affiliate themselves with different communities through internationalization. Likewise, while CILA participants were strongly driven to affiliate themselves with CILA as an internationally prestigious institution, HGU participants were attracted by HGU as an easy and strategic solution to their life circumstances in China. By articulating their contrasting choices of university, I illustrate a socio-economic gap between the two student groups and how the gap was sorted into and reproduced in the two Japanese institutions of different levels of prestige. In the fifth section, I discuss how students imagine their post-graduation lives. I illustrate various desires and concerns that drive them to attain a life with flexible and transnational life options and how they seek to attain such a life.

In the following presentation of the findings, I provide some quantitative information that indicates the proportion or number of student participants to whom the finding I am presenting applies. I need to clarify that this is a qualitative study, and my intention is not to substantiate the validity of the findings with the quantitative information. The student sample size for this study
is too small to claim any statistical significance. Moreover, I adopted semistandardized interviewing (Berg, 2007); therefore, I did not pose the same questions to every participant in exactly the same way, although each interview followed the interview protocol outlining the areas of exploration. As a result, there is a possibility that a certain number of participants said or did not say a certain thing just because I asked or did not pose a certain question in a certain way. Nevertheless, in the process of my data analysis, I noticed notable contrasts between students at the two institutions on certain themes, and that the contrasts were coherent. In addition, I realized that whether I paid attention to institutional differences could lead me to different conclusions. For example, 10 participants may voice the same view, but it suggests different meanings depending on whether the 10 participants or the vast majority of them represent either one of the institutions or equally represent both institutions. The former case suggests a particular difference between the institutions. In addition to exploring different institutional factors that explain the gap, I also explored other possible commonalities among the students sharing the same view, such as gender or prior international experiences, before finally framing the gap as an institutional one. As such, my intention to present quantitative information is primarily to provide a comparative view, albeit not the most numerically accurate one, between the two student groups.

**Growing up with images and memories from Japan.**

According to Appadurai (1996), people are immersed in rapid, massive, and irregular global flows of scapes: ethnoscapes (people), technoscapes (technology), financescapes (capital), mediascapes (media and information), and ideoscapes (ideas and ideologies). These flows of scapes enable them to share and consume goods, ideas, images, and so forth in a collective manner, and to develop a social imaginary with which they can “imagine and feel things
together” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 8). Student participants’ stories in this study articulate that they grew up being immersed in these global flows that carry culturally and historically specific images and memories of Japan. Their ideas of going to Japan to study are embedded in a particular understanding about Japan and the relationship between China and Japan.

A participant expresses her sense of geographical proximity between Japan and China by saying, “I don't feel I’m going abroad. I just have a feeling, maybe [Japan is] another city in China” (Mao Mao, female, CILA). Yet, for participants, Japan has been a close country, not only in a geographical sense but also in other ways. Asked about where their idea of going to Japan to study came from, they often refer to stories from their childhood involving the images and memories that they used to have of Japan. For them, Japan was a country that was not entirely foreign to them. From an early age, even without having visited Japan, they grew up being exposed on a daily basis to various sorts of information about and images of Japan from multiple sources. The sources include Japanese cartoons, dramas, news, history textbooks, and stories from their family members who had direct experiences with Japan through travel, businesses, or the Second World War. It would be an overstatement to suggest that these images and memories of Japan alone directly drove their desire to study there. Rather, their prior imagination about Japan served as a normative foundation for them to think of it as a possible or even ideal destination for their studies.

Some participants’ relationships with Japan were indirect while others’ were more direct and personal. The most common stories that participants share are their memories of enjoying Japanese pop culture, such as anime (Japanese movies and television animation), manga (A Japanese genre of cartoons, comic books, and animated films), and dramas, and watching news about Japan. They describe their ideas about Japan that were formed through these sources, and
the ideas are consistently positive, such as Japan as a clean country, with polite people, advanced technologies, and strong business industries. For example, a participant elaborates on where such positive ideas about Japan come from:

Actually, our generation, those Chinese, I think, whether aware of it or unconscious of it, I think we actually receive a lot of cultural information about Japan. We grow up in the age where actually everywhere is filled with Japanese *anime*. [laugh] And, . . . [we grew up in the age when] China opened up to the world. I think that Japan was probably one of the first few countries who poured over a large amount of investment in China. So, actually the presence of Japan is very strong in the mind of our generation, I guess. (Xiao Ming, male, HGU)

As he refers to Japanese *anime* and Japan’s investment in China’s development, the flows of mediascapes and financescapes between China and Japan are present in Chinese youths’ daily lives, contributing to their sense of closeness to Japan, however abstract or virtual the idea may be.

While some participants have gained these abstract ideas of Japan through impersonal sources like media, others had images of Japan through more direct and personal sources. For example, two participants from each institution describe their parents encouraging them to study in Japan because they admired Japanese businesses and work ethic, based on their own experiences working in Japan or with their Japanese business counterparts. In addition, two CILA participants actually spent their childhood in Japan. One of them, Chengyi, describes Japan as his “second home,” even though his childhood memories in Japan are vague (Chengyi, male, CILA). Compared to Chengyi, Si Jing’s sense of connection with Japan is stronger and more personal. She describes, “My feelings for Japan are really strong,” which
she further explains, “For example, when I saw Japanese people abroad, I felt, ‘Uh, I want to talk to them,’ or something like that” (Si Jing, female, CILA). According to her, her sense of belonging to Japan grew stronger as she began to feel marginal in her later life in China and Canada. These stories demonstrate that they grew up in the midst of the flows of ethnoscapes and that they developed concrete connections with Japan to various degrees.

Nonetheless, participants’ prior images and memories of Japan were not all positive, innocent, or nostalgic given the historical and on-going political tensions between China and Japan. Five participants refer to sources of their negative images of Japan as coming from their history education and grandparents who had wartime memories. The student’s quote below expresses how strongly negative historical memories of Japan have been shared and maintained in Chinese people’s minds:

Mao Mao: [Japanese people] are cruel. [laugh] Cruel, and because wars, some kind of, um, bad memories, sad memories, and Chinese people hated to be conquered by Japan . . . so [pause] when I was young, I was really influenced strongly by this kind of stereotypes and ideas. So at that time, I thought Japanese peoples are cruel, and they are not friendly. . . .

Hanae: Um-hum. So who gave you those ideas?

Mao Mao: From the history books. Because we can see quite a lot of pictures and the text describes, . . . you can be strongly shocked or impressed by that kind of things. (Mao Mao, female, CILA)

For some participants, such negative images of Japan were simply a source of concern before going to Japan, but the concerns were eventually surmounted by other benefits of going there to study. However, for two participants, the mixed images of Japan as a cruel country, on the one
hand, and as a successfully developed country, on the other, generated curiosity and confusion. They explain that their desire to make sense of Japan’s contradictory sides contributed to their decision to study there. For example, Meng, who grew up listening to wartime stories from her veteran grandfather, states, “People may not like Japanese people, but no one denies that Japan is the strongest country in Asia. So I’m just curious. I want to know why. I want to get into Japanese people and find the reason” (Meng, female, HGU). These students’ stories indicate the significance of historical implications to global flows of scapes between China and Japan. In addition, as I will discuss in next chapter, participants’ prior knowledge about the historical relationship between China and Japan informs how they experience and interpret their day-to-day social interactions in Japan to various degrees.

As seen thus far, student participants had begun to form their imagination of their relationship with Japan in a generationally, culturally, and historically specific manner long before they even landed there for their university education. As we will see in the following, their prior imagination of Japan served as a normative foundation, rather than as an independent motivational factor, to make them think of Japan as a possible or even ideal destination for their university education. What actually brought them to Japan were their privileged socio-economic and geographical backgrounds, which put them in relative proximity to global mobility, as well as the Japanese institutions’ zealous recruitment efforts.

**Studying overseas as a common, possible, and ideal life option.**

As Appadurai (1996) states, global flows of scapes have made it possible not only for elites but also for ordinary people to imagine their relationships with others and what is normal and possible on a global scale. At the same time, global mobility of people in the contemporary
consumer society is a stratifying phenomenon, as Bauman (1998) distinguishes, for example, “tourists” from “vagabonds.”

All the student participants in this study enjoy a certain degree of class privilege that qualifies them to be tourists who have “the means to become choosers” (Bauman, 1998, p. 86). In addition to the fact that the majority of them come from major cities in the prosperous coastal area of eastern China, they grew up in a certain level of socio-economic class in which global mobility is relatively normal and accessible. In this environment, even long before having decided to study abroad, the idea had already been implanted in their minds as a fairly common life path, even if they had not specifically imagined themselves studying overseas in the future.

Student participants’ stories reveal that the idea of studying overseas was not totally foreign to them. The majority of participants grew up being surrounded by globally mobile people or people with international ties, such as their high school peers going to foreign colleges, high school English teachers from other countries, and family members engaged in international businesses. They most commonly attribute their inception of the idea to study overseas to their high school environment. Most of the participants learned English from an early age, and 11 participants, 10 of whom are HGU participants, attended high schools that are so-called “foreign language schools,” where emphasis is placed on foreign language education, English in particular. Many others went to high schools that they described as top-level high schools, many of whose graduates go to foreign universities, particularly in English-speaking countries. For example, Xiang Hong elaborates on the implications for the idea to study overseas of the environment of her upbringing:

**Studying outside of China . . . is because Shanghai is a kind of international city so many of my friends, my classmates, they studied abroad maybe from middle school and high**
school. So I have been in that kind of environment. So it made me feel like going abroad is kind of a good idea, and [if I study abroad,] I can know many things I won’t know if I just stayed there in China forever, and I can meet a lot of interesting people and know what kind of life others on the earth are living. Yeah, it’s quite interesting for me. (Xiang Hong, female, CILA)

Xiang Hong’s reference to Shanghai as an international city and her globally mobile school peers remind us that participants in this study represent a very particular subset of the Chinese population that has better economic, social, and geographic access to global mobility.

In addition, it is important to note that these students’ parents were often behind the creation of studying overseas as a norm, or even an expectation. For example, Zhongyan’s comments below about the parents of students in her high school environment illustrate a pervasive parental expectation that their children will study overseas.

Zhongyan: I was studying in a foreign language school. . . . I think most of the purpose of our parents is kind of to [send their children] overseas . . . I think perhaps 80% of our students in [my high school] go overseas. . . . And most of us [go] to the USA, and then the rest to Germany or France, and Japan, so.

Hanae: So just being in that high school was kind of --

Zhongyan: Pressure.

Hanae: Pressure for you?

Zhongyan: Um-hum.

Hanae: So you felt you were expected to go overseas?
Zhongyan: Actually, that's an idea from my mother. She thinks that . . . I’d better go overseas to see something different. Because when I was in my third year of high school, . . . HGU came to our high school, and then they recruit students, and my mother said, “Oh, there's a chance!” (Zhongyan, female, HGU)

Just as Zhongyan’s mother was keen on sending her daughter overseas, it is not unusual for participants to mention that it was their parents who first learned of and became excited about their Japanese universities. The parents learned about the universities through the universities’ recruitment visits to their children’s high schools, through the internet, or through friends.

However, as we will see in the rest of this chapter, there are some differences between the students at the two Japanese institutions, and one of the differences is in their level of proximity to global mobility. CILA participants grew up with greater access to global mobility than their HGU counterparts. Over 70% of the CILA participants had either traveled or lived outside of China before going to Japan for university education, and most of them had visited two or more foreign countries. In contrast, over 70% of their counterparts at HGU had never left China prior to going to Japan for university. Consistent with the different levels of access to global mobility between the two participant groups, five HGU students state that they had never thought of going overseas to study until HGU came to their high schools for recruitment, while there was only one participant at CILA who made the same remark. This gap suggests that while both groups of participants grew up in an environment where global mobility was a norm, they saw themselves in different positions in relation to globally mobile communities around them.
Japanese universities initiating the imagination of Japan as a destination country.

As seen thus far, student participants grew up with abundant images and memories of Japan in an environment where the idea of studying overseas is not foreign. However, except for two participants who actively sought the opportunity to study in Japan, the ideal destination for many of the student participants was not necessarily Japan but Western countries, English-speaking countries in particular. Participants repeatedly describe those Western countries’ popularity over Japan among Chinese people in general. Nan Nan’s anecdote from her father’s visit at a study abroad fair in China illustrates Japan’s lack of popularity as a destination country. She describes what brought her father to Japanese universities’ booths at the fair as follows: “Because [the university booths from] the US and Europe were really crowded, xlvi [laugh] and he found Japanese universities. There were not many people so he went there and gathered information” (Nan Nan, female, CILA). Another participant also describes those Western countries’ popularity at her high school, which was a foreign language school. She states, “Asian countries are not popular in our high school. Usually we consider American, Australian [universities]. . . . Our teachers usually just say, ‘Go to America, go to Australia, and go to European countries’” (Ming, female, HGU). What underpins the popularity gap between those Western countries and Japan is the normative idea that education in the Western countries is better than in Japan. For example, to a question asking which countries he had in mind as his study destinations, Fei responds in a matter-of-fact manner: “Initially, I was thinking of the US, of course. They have higher academic levels compared to other countries” (Fei, male, HGU).

Interestingly, on the one hand, the majority of student participants deemed those English-speaking Western countries as ideal destinations for their studies. Moreover, in their high schools, it was common for graduates to go to universities in those Western countries. On the
other hand, there are not many participants who gave a serious thought to applying for universities in foreign countries other than Japan, and only three participants actually applied to universities in other countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, or Singapore. In the participants’ stories, there is no overwhelming reason why they did not pursue their studies in a country other than Japan. The reasons include, for example, that those Western universities are far from China, they charge high tuition fees, they have academically demanding admission requirements, and they pose logistic constraints, such as the fact that the Scholastic Aptitude Test and TOEFL are not offered at all or frequently enough in some of their home cities in China.

Participants’ reasons for choosing to go to Japan greatly vary as well, and they usually provide multiple reasons rather than a single reason. Yet, one major overlap in participants’ stories is that they were first enticed by the opportunity to study in Japan when they came in contact with the Japanese institutions through their high schools. In other words, rather than choosing Japan as a destination country and from there selecting a Japanese university out of many Japanese universities, they instead were attracted to the specific Japanese universities that they encountered at their high schools. While some participants learned about their Japanese institutions through sources such as the internet and family connections, the majority, 80% of the HGU participants and 50% of the CILA participants, learned about and were admitted to their Japanese universities through their high schools in China. Their high schools had strong ties with their respective Japanese institutions, and the Japanese institutions regularly visit their high schools to hold orientation sessions for students and parents, and in some cases, to conduct entrance exams as well. CILA also has an admission quota for students recommended by certain high schools in China, with which CILA has a trusting relationship. In addition, CILA advertises
their summer camp for prospective international students though those high schools. The week-long summer camp includes a visit to Tokyo Disneyland as well as to the Kasuga University campus. A CILA participant, Xiao Han, says while chuckling that the reason she attended the summer camp was because she wanted to go to Tokyo Disneyland, but as a result, she learned about CILA and decided to go there to study. Much like this case, the Japanese institutions’ zealous recruitment efforts at high schools in China played a significant role in implanting the idea of studying in Japan as a sensible and viable future option in participants’ imagination. As we will see next, however, participants were attracted to different benefits of their respective Japanese universities, which spoke to their different needs and desires.

Pursuit of solution versus prestige.

Participants reported being attracted to various characteristics of the two institutions. For example, three CILA students mention that they were attracted to the liberal arts program, which did not require them to choose a major upon admissions, because they wanted to explore different fields of study. In contrast, an HGU participant, Xiaoshi, who was admitted to liberal arts colleges in the United States and the United Kingdom, states that one of the reasons she chose HGU was because she wanted a more specific major than liberal arts. Also, Nan Nan at CILA, who was admitted to both CILA and HGU, chose CILA because she did not want to live in a rural area like that of HGU. Nonetheless, these reasons are fairly minor and trivial. A more outstanding theme that emerged from their narratives on “Why HGU?” or “Why CILA?” was that they were driven by different needs and desires. In short, in Beck’s (1992) terms, HGU participants’ decision to come to HGU represents their “biographical solution of systemic contradictions” in China (p. 137). Their stories reveal that HGU met their sense of urgency and material needs to come to terms with their challenging life circumstances in China. By contrast,
CILA participants were consistently and strongly attracted by the institution’s prestige. For them, coming to CILA was a choice rather than a solution to a challenge. In the following subsections, I will discuss each student group’s desire and needs in depth.

**Coming to HGU: A biographical solution of systemic contradictions in China.**

To explain why they decided to come to Japan, HGU participants repeatedly refer to two fierce types of competition affecting massive numbers of young Chinese. One is the nation-wide university entrance exam called gao kao, and the other is the competition in the job market for university graduates. A participant explains:

If I stay in my home country, I'll face a really huge competition in . . . a national college entrance examination. It's a large pressure. That does not necessary guarantee, after you finish a degree at a Chinese institute, a very promising future, I guess, because of simply the competition. (Xiao Ming, male, HGU)

As this quote shows, HGU participants repeat the same storyline: Gao kao is extremely competitive, and yet there is no guarantee of a job even if they graduate from a good university in China. Their stories demonstrate that they perceived the international education opportunity presented by HGU as a convenient and strategic solution to the systemic contradictions in China.

**Convenient solution to the competitive university entrance exam in China.**

First of all, the gao kao was difficult enough for students to bear, let alone the subsequent competition in the job market in China. According to student participants and faculty and staff participants at HGU, many of the students come from one of the top high schools in their regions in China. Nonetheless, students repeatedly stress the enormous stress and pressure that they felt from the gao kao. As Zing puts it simply, “I think I probably just wanted to escape [to HGU]” (Zing, female, HGU), and six HGU participants frame their applications to HGU as a way to
escape from the gao kao or as a way to avoid failing the gao kao. The following story by another participant, Meng, represents these participants’ sense of vulnerability to the gao kao and their desperate search for a spot in a university. She begins her story by stating that she had not thought of studying overseas until two weeks before HGU came to her high school, and continues:

I wanted to go to other universities in China. Yeah, but . . . we had an exam [at my high school], and my teacher told me that my score was not as high as the level [for the Chinese universities]. So I just think about, “What should I do? Where should I go?” And, I don't want to take the test [gao kao]. . . . It's really hard. It's really tough. I don't want to go through it. So I think there are two ways. One way is to go abroad; and the other way [being going to a Chinese university], I have already lost my chance so I just think about going abroad. (Meng, female, HGU)

HGU met the desperate needs of these HGU participants like Zing and Meng who did not feel confident about succeeding in the gao kao.

I described earlier that the vast majority of HGU participants learned about and came to HGU through their high schools. They also state that having received admissions from HGU before having to take the gao kao was a part of the reason they did not take the gao kao or explore options to study in other countries. These stories imply that, instead of actively seeking a way out of the gao kao, they took advantage of the well-timed and conveniently-arranged entries into HGU as an easy solution to avoid it. For example, recollecting HGU’s visit at his high school, Tao explains that he came to HGU because it was easy:
First of all, [HGU] was kind of easy to get in. [silence] I thought it was strange because I was admitted only with a twenty-minute interview, [laugh] but for sure, it involves much less risk than applying for a Chinese university. (Tao, male, HGU)

Entering HGU was easy for participants not only academically and emotionally, but also financially. Six participants identify HGU’s financial support as one of the major reasons they chose to go there. All HGU participants were offered 30-100% tuition reduction for four years upon admission, and 12 of them received a tuition reduction of 50% or higher. Three participants even received a 100% tuition reduction. Thus, for HGU participants, admission meant an easy and affordable ticket to university education without having to take the gao kao.

Strategic solution to the future labour market competition.

HGU participants’ stories about their motivation to go to HGU also reveal their keen sense of the need to stand out in China’s massive labour market. Jie’s explanation of why her father sent her to HGU, which she labels, “Chinese thinking,” clearly illustrates the point. She explains:

He realizes that because China has the hugest populations so if I’m just like anyone else, [say if I] study in China, then there will be a less chance for me to get a good job after I graduate. So . . . he’s like, “If my daughter goes overseas, then that makes her special,” or like at least, I can have some advantage when I'm going to job hunting markets, right? (Jie, female, HGU)

As Jie’s father sought a way to make her “special,” for HGU participants, coming to HGU was not only a convenient solution but also a strategic one to China’s competitive labour market. They opportunistically and strategically used the conveniently-arranged opportunity to study at
HGU to attain special advantage that the majority of Chinese students do not have, namely an international education experience.

More specifically, HGU participants tied the opportunity to gain a combination of language skills - Chinese, English, and Japanese - to their employability in China or elsewhere. For example, after listing Japan’s geographical proximity to China and HGU’s affordability, Ming continues to list other factors that attracted her to HGU as follows:

And then, how to say, I can study Japanese, like, it's my third language. If you want to find a good job in China, you . . . at least have to be able to speak two languages, English and Chinese. If you speak a third language, you will have a very good job. . . . And, a high salary, of course. (Ming, female, HGU)

Similarly, Xiazhi echoes the value of the opportunity to acquire multiple foreign language skills by highlighting the Japanese language’s uniqueness compared to other ubiquitous languages, such as English:

Japan uses Japanese, not English, French, or Spanish. . . . There are few other countries that use Japanese. If I come to Japan, I can learn Japanese. I may not be able to beat Chinese students from top Chinese universities in many areas, but I thought that, if I learn Japanese, I might be able to beat them. Everyone can speak English, of course, but there are not so many people who can speak Japanese. (Xiazhi, male, HGU)

This quote represents HGU participants’ eagerness to put themselves in a competitive position in relation to their Chinese peers, particularly those who graduate from top-level Chinese universities. They envisaged that Japanese language skills would give them a unique competitive edge in the future job market.
Just as one participant refers to the Japanese language as, “a very powerful language” (Xiao Ming, male, HGU), participants’ perceived value of the Japanese language is underpinned not only by its uniqueness but also by its association with Japan’s economic power. The Japanese economy has been in stagnation since the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, the idea of Japan as an economic power or a developed country is pervasive in participants’ descriptions of their prior images of Japan, and they linked the image of Japan to their future career prospects. For example, Zhongyan explains why she chose to study in Japan: “I see [Japan] as the second biggest economy [in the world] so I thought maybe there are opportunities for [my] career” (Zhongyan, female, HGU). Including this participant, the vast majority of participants state that they did not have a clear post-graduation plan when they decided to study in Japan. Nonetheless, they anticipated that studying in Japan might give them access to global economic power, thereby better career chances and working conditions than those offered to the mass public in China.

All in all, while HGU participants have had relatively privileged access to global mobility, their motivation to study in Japan was driven largely by the challenging life circumstances in which they found themselves in China. For them, the international education opportunity at HGU meant not only an academically, logistically, and financially convenient solution to having to take the gao kao, but also a strategic solution to the severe labour market competition in China. Their decision to come to HGU reflects their opportunistic and strategic effort to occupy an advantageous position in the labour market in China, Japan, or elsewhere.

**Coming to CILA: “Because it's famous.”**

The vast majority of CILA participants explicitly state that the major reason they chose CILA was because Kasuga University is very famous in China. They assessed that CILA was the
most famous, and therefore the best, choice for them out of the universities to which they had been admitted or likely to be admitted to in China, Japan, and other countries. For example, after listing the other universities to which she had received an offer of admission in China and the United Kingdom, Nan Nan concludes, “Kasuga is the best,” and she adds simply, “Because it’s famous” (Nan Nan, female, CILA).

For most CILA participants, going to CILA was more a choice representing their desire for prestige than a biographical solution to systemic contradictions in China. As I mentioned earlier, half of CILA participants entered through their high schools. For them, the conveniently arranged admissions to CILA were undeniably a relatively easy and convenient solution to the fierce competition in the university entrance exam, gao kao. For example, Xiang Hong, who was admitted to CILA through the admission quota assigned to her high school, describes her admission to CILA as a “short-cut” to a university (Xiang Hong, female, CILA). However, regardless of whether participants entered CILA through their high schools or found CILA’s information through other sources such as the internet, they had known of Kasuga University as a prestigious Japanese university, and they pursued the opportunity because of that prestige. In addition, a few participants were not able to be selected for the admission quota for CILA in their high schools, but they still applied for CILA independently.

Moreover, at CILA, except for one participant, none of the participants base their decision to come to CILA on their fear of failing the gao kao, as was the case with their HGU counterparts. The following CILA participant’s comment shows that even if she saw the very top-ranked Chinese universities being out of her reach, she could still choose a university for higher prestige and for better quality of education:
I can enter good universities [in China], but I cannot enter the best one. It’s really
difficult. My parents have always wanted me to enter a good university. I have also
wanted to enter a good university, but it is really hard to enter a good university, say one
in the top-five. My level is around the top-20. Then, I cannot get good education in China
so it’s better to go to a good university abroad and get good education there. I came to
Japan for a better chance.⁴ (Wei, female, CILA)

She continues to explain that CILA has higher academic prestige than any of the Chinese
universities that she had the opportunity to attend.

Much like the above comment by Wei, four other CILA participants decided to go
overseas for better quality of education than that which they could have possibly had in China.
Yet, as I mentioned earlier, Japan is not the most popular destination country for most of the
participants. Nonetheless, CILA’s prestige compensated for Japan’s less attractive position in the
global higher education market. CILA participants were attracted to CILA’s prestige more than
anything else, as a CILA student asserts the reason why she chose CILA as: “I came to Japan not
because I wanted to come to Japan, just because CILA is in Japan” (Xiaotao, female, CILA).

Further, in contrast to HGU participants who were driven by their urge to equip
themselves with unique skills or experiences to become marketable in the competitive job market
in China, such a sense of urgency can hardly be found in CILA participants’ accounts. Chengyi
is the only CILA participant who explicitly mentions that he took the issues of employability into
consideration when he was selecting a university. Yet, again, Kasuga’s prestige, rather than skills
or experiences he anticipated acquiring in Japan, was the dominant factor in his decision. To
explain why he chose CILA instead of another Japanese university that offers a program similar
to CILA, he describes:
I thought that, to get a job somewhere in the future, I had better go to a university that is famous, well, that has a higher brand name. That’s why I chose Kasuga. Even if I return to China, I think there are quite many people who have at least heard of the name, Kasuga University.\textsuperscript{lii} (Chengyi, male, CILA)

By now, it is abundantly clear that prestige is what matters most to CILA participants. Indeed, in CILA participants’ reasons for deciding to go to CILA or Japan, aside from their common interest in CILA’s prestige, there is no other significant overlap. In HGU participants’ stories, it was a consistent theme that their decision to go to HGU was a biographical solution to systemic contradictions in China. In contrast, a lack of systemic contradictions felt by CILA participants is a common aspect of their stories. They could pursue their desire for a prestigious university education with few systemic constraints, and they could afford that option. Even though the estimated annual expenses at CILA are 525,820-yen (approximately 5,250 CND) higher than those at HGU,\textsuperscript{42} only a half of CILA participants received a scholarship or a 20-50% tuition reduction from Kasuga University. Despite the higher cost and limited financial support at CILA, there were only a few CILA participants who mentioned financial issues as a matter of concern in their selection of a university.

\textit{Japanese higher education system as a sorting and reproductive mechanism of class.}

The contrast between the two student participant groups suggests that their choice of university is closely linked with the hierarchical higher education system in Japan and that the higher education system works as a sorting and reproductive mechanism of international students.

\textsuperscript{42} Calculated based on the respective institutions’ brochures for prospective students. HGU: tuition 1,349,000 yen plus living expenses 1,327,680 yen. CILA: tuition 1,602,500 yen plus living expenses 1,700,000 yen. The tuition fees are the same for both domestic and international students at both institutions.
students’ socio-economic class. Their family backgrounds support a socio-economic class gap. As seen in Table 3, CILA participants have parents with slightly higher educational and professional backgrounds than their counterparts at HGU. For example, while 84% of CILA participants’ parents hold a junior college or a higher education degree, 63% of the HGU counterparts have parents with the same educational qualifications. In addition, while 63% of CILA participants’ parents hold an occupation that belongs to the category of professional, business owner, managerial-level employee, or specialist employee, the same can be said of only 27% of HGU students’ parents. The majority of HGU participants’ parents are non-managerial/-specialist employees.

Table 3 Educational and professional backgrounds of student participants’ parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education background</th>
<th>HGU</th>
<th>CILA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate/Junior college</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school or below</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data unavailable</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional background</th>
<th>HGU</th>
<th>CILA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional (e.g., Professor, Medical Doctor)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Owner</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial-level employee/ Specialist (e.g., Engineer)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees (Incl. Teacher, Civil Servant)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None (Incl. Housewife, Retired)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data unavailable</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, student participants at both institutions represent a particular population in China that enjoys privileged access to global mobility. They come from a place where pursuing higher education overseas is considered relatively common, possible, and ideal. However, their differing prior international experiences, reasons for selecting their respective Japanese institutions, and family backgrounds reveal a socio-economic class difference between the
privileged Chinese students at the two Japanese institutions. The hierarchical higher education system in Japan thus works as a mechanism through which privileged international students’ classed identities are sorted into more detailed class strata and reproduced.

**Emerging imagination of a life as transnationals: Desire for a “colourful life.”**

We have thus far explored student participants’ identity formation at the beginning stage of their global mobility by looking back on their decisions to leave China for Japan and how they ended up at their respective Japanese universities. Now let us shift our attention to their stories about their futureimaginations in a forward-looking manner, namely, how they imagine their futures after graduation.

I asked all participants about their short-term and long-term plans after graduation. Between the participant groups at the two institutions, there are few remarkable differences in terms of how they imagine their future plans either for the short- or a long-term. As for their immediate future after graduation, the majority of participants (nine participants at each institution) consider staying in Japan as an option even though the level of commitment to the option varies from working on job-hunting in Japan to just thinking about staying in Japan as one of many options. Half of them consider going to graduate school in Japan, and the other half consider working in Japan. The rest of the participants who do not consider staying in Japan hope to attend graduate schools in other countries; mostly in North America or the United Kingdom, with one mentioning Hong Kong, and one mentioning France. Two students consider returning straight to China to work as one of the possibilities, but the reason given for working in China right after graduation is to enhance their qualifications for graduate school in North America or the United Kingdom where prior work experiences are highly valued.
As for long-term plans, approximately half of the participants imagine themselves eventually returning to China, although they are not sure when they might return because they are open to various future possibilities. Due to China’s one-child policy, the vast majority of participants do not have siblings, and they repeatedly express their strong sense of attachment and responsibility to their parents. In addition, due to China’s rapid economic growth in recent years, some anticipate that China will be able to offer them desirable market chances and working conditions in the future. The other half hope to live in a foreign country on a permanent basis or to keep moving around to different countries.

These are highly tentative plans that are open to a wide variety of alternative possibilities. However, their imagination of the future consistently includes multiple possibilities that transcend national borders. They imagine living in different countries, engaging in a career that involves international travel, or working in a transnational context even if they eventually settle in China. Enhancing their life options is what they are looking for, however tentative and uncertain the options may be. Baas (2010) describes that global student mobility is an “aspirational affair” of students “being in the process of becoming transnationals” in pursuit of flexible life options (p. 12). He argues:

Being a migrant, a transmigrant or, for that matter, a transnational are not just observable end-states where people meet the definitions attached to them. These are processes in which people are on their way to imaginary arrival points that are constantly rewritten under changing circumstances. (p. 182-183)

Likewise, my study has found that students are driven to develop their futures with transnational life options, rather than arriving at a certain destination or achieving a particular goal.
However, one subtle issue needs to be articulated: For participants in this study, to live as transnationals is a life option that is emerging, rather than a pre-existing goal that brought them to Japan. Few participants in my study had clear ideas for their distant future when they went to Japan. Even though the majority of the participants grew up with some degree of proximity to global mobility, few of them frame their original decision to go to Japan as a strategy to become transnational. CILA participants in particular grew up with the idea that studying overseas is not only normal or ideal but also possible. Nonetheless, even if studying overseas might have been a very possible life path for them, their stories show that their imagination to live as transnationals in the future has grown to be seen as a possible life option through their international education opportunities in Japan. They see their experiences in Japan as having opened a door for them to become transnationals with an array of life options. A CILA participant, Xiaotao, candidly describes how her experience in Japan has brought her a “colourful life.” She explains what she means by that:

I can still go back to China to find a job, and I think I can find a job in China, of course. I can still [go] back to that so-called normal life. I can choose it, but I can also choose other ways of life. (Xiaotao, female, CILA)

This comment implies that, for her, having a choice is what matters more than the actual options. Besides returning to China to lead a “so-called normal life,” she has other options, whatever they are and wherever they are located. International education in Japan has given her the choice that transcends national boundaries.

Even those who consider returning to China eventually imagine themselves working in a transnational environment in China, such as multinational corporations, trade businesses, or international development organizations. For example, at the point of the interview, Xiao Han
was applying for a job at a multinational corporation branch in Japan. She explains that one of the reasons she wants to work for a multinational corporation is because she thinks that she may be able to work at a branch in China in the future without changing her job. Again, for her, her time in Japan means that it has broadened her life prospects. As she puts it:

If I had stayed in China, I would have probably gone straight to a grad school, and I’m not sure, but if I had stayed in China, I don’t know if I would have gone to a multinational corporation. But when I look at me now, my job-hunting is going pretty well so I’m starting to feel hopeful. The best thing for me about having come to Japan is that I have gotten a chance to enter a multinational corporation, and I have acquired Japanese language skills, too. Speaking of my career, I think my life has changed.

(Xiao Han, female, CILA)

Xiao Han embraces the idea that her international education opportunity in Japan has enabled her to see a future possibility that she might not have even imagined if she had stayed in China. Similarly, participants capitalize on their experiences in Japan to broaden their future prospects in ways that transcend national boundaries. As I described earlier, participants have had a certain level of class privilege to be able to become tourists who have “the means to become choosers” (Bauman, 1998, p. 86). They utilize this privilege to enhance their privilege even further in the form of transnational life options, or in other words, to establish a “colourful life.” However, as we are going to see next, this emerging transnational life path is layered with their consumerist desire for a tourist life style, longing for the West, privilege or a lack thereof, and strategies.

Desire for a tourist life style: “Over the world!”

According to Bauman (1998), contemporary consumer society praises tourists who can afford to travel across countries, and they are essentially “sensation-seekers and collectors of
experiences: their relationship to the world is primarily aesthetic: they perceive the world as a food for sensibility – a matrix of possible experiences” (p. 94). By extending Bauman’s notion of “tourists,” Kenway and Fahey (2007) define “student tourists” as those who combine education and travel. For Kenway and Fahey, educational travels take a form of “traveling life-stylization” through the consumption of goods, place, and culture (p. 169), and participants’ stories demonstrate that their international education experiences in Japan have been deeply embedded in Japanese consumer society. In discussing what makes them feel glad about having come to Japan, it was not rare that participants listed not only traveling but also shopping experiences in Japan, describing how exciting it was for them to buy what was not easily available in China, such as anime books, video games, and fashionable clothes. Through international education in Japan, they have attained a life with access to materials and experiences that are not accessible to globally immobile Chinese. Their imagination about their transnational future is to some degree underpinned by their consumerist desire to further develop their tourist lifestyle.

Xinmei is one of the participants who expresses a strong desire to keep moving around to different countries to experience for pleasure those countries’ cultures and places. She labels herself as “cosmopolitan.” Asked about what attracts her to living as a cosmopolitan in many places, she answers, “I think that I will get bored with a certain place after a long time. [chuckle] So that's why I just want to go somewhere new that I've never been to so I can have some different experience” (Xinmei, female, CILA). With the hope of living as a cosmopolitan, she is applying for a graduate school in the United Kingdom, where she is looking forward to enjoying the theatre. Zhongyan is also allured by a tourist life style in a similar way with Xinmei. In her explanation of why she wants to attend a graduate school in the United States and how she wants to live afterwards, she expresses her desire to “see more places” and to “travel around”:
Zhongyan: I want to go to the US just because I want to learn something from the US and have... different experiences because I've already spent three years and one more year, in total four years, in Japan. And, I like to see more countries... two years in the US, and another two years in Canada.

[laughing] Over the world!

Hanae: Go over the world. That's what you want to do? That's your ideal?

Zhongyan: Yeah, I'd like to travel around just to see different things. (Zhongyan, female, HGU)

For participants like Xinmei and Zhongyan, international education is not only education but also a medium through which they attain a lifestyle informed by the value of the consumer tourist society.

_Longing for the imagined West as elsewhere._

The proportion of those who consider going to graduate schools in English-speaking Western countries, either right after their studies in Japan or after working in either Japan or China, account for one-third of the entire participants at each institution. While two participants explicitly express their desire to emigrate to those Western countries, the rest of the participants who wish to study in those countries are open to a chance to stay there for an indefinite period after their graduate studies.

Participants’ reasons for wanting to go to those Western countries are multifaceted. For one, they uphold the normative understanding of American universities’ superiority to universities in other countries, suggesting that their imaginations are entrenched in a Western imaginary of globalization in which the West holds a dominant position. In addition, they also combine practical considerations, such as time and money required for a graduate program. For
example, Xiang Hong explains why she hopes to go to a graduate school in a North American or a European country as follows:

Because, you know, the world’s best universities are in America, and I am kind of interested in how they are learning things there. Besides it takes you maybe two years or more in Japan to finish a graduate school, but if you do a really hard job, you can finish it in one year in England or in some European countries. So, it costs less than [chuckling] what will cost in Japan, so. (Xiang Hong, female, CILA)

As Xiang Hong compares graduate schools in Japan with those in Europe or the United States, participants often describe Western countries as a counter-point of reference to Japan or China. They describe what Western countries can offer and what Japan or China cannot. However, how participants imagine their future possibilities in those Western countries is not always informed by their substantial experiences in or factual knowledge about those countries. Rather, they are sometimes allured by an idea of participating in the West as an imagined community that projects a rosy picture to them. For example, Mana, who plans to go to a graduate school in the United States after her undergraduate studies in Japan, expresses her adoration of a life in the United States based on her experience in a study trip to the country:

I went up from the airport, and an American guy just smiled to me and said, “Hi, how are you doing?” And, I felt, oh, so good! It's America! You know? . . . They are very nice, so yeah. It made me feel happy every day, yeah. They’d say hello to everyone they met. . . . I just love the way Americans live, yeah. Their lifestyle is quite, you know, wonderful to me. (Mana, female, HGU)

While her exhilarating encounters with friendly gestures of people in the United States have led her to conclude that she likes how Americans live, she has not been immersed in life in that
country. During the study tour, she was with her peers and professor from HGU, and that was the only time she visited the United States. Also, another participant, Zhongyan, describes her imagination of the United States as a country of freedom with less competition than in China when she explains what attracts her to the United States:

Zhongyan: I like the atmosphere in, how do you say, foreign countries but not in China. It's kind of free . . . I like . . . freedom or liberty. I think the society, I mean the US society, is quite, you know, [pause] . . . I'd say the atmosphere.

Hanae: So you don't think China is as free as the US?

Zhongyan: Yeah. The pressure about working . . . we have a large population [in China], right? And, we have huge amounts of undergraduate students. So many people are competing with you. (Zhongyan, female, HGU)

It is not my intention to claim that Zhongyan’s idea of a life in the United States as being less competitive and more relaxed than that in China is entirely imagined with no factual evidence. This is her perception that has been informed by her experiences and knowledge that she has accumulated throughout her life, experiences and knowledge to which I do not have full access. Yet, what I intend to highlight is this: much as Zhongyan states that she likes the atmosphere of the United States, and Mana mentions, she adores how Americans live, how these participants imagine their life paths is, to varying degrees, based on an essentialized imagination of the West, rather than on specific factors of a particular Western society. When they think of going to a graduate school, they consider Japan or elsewhere, and the West is the elsewhere. On the one hand, they are attracted to some specific features of graduate schools in those countries, such as a high reputation and graduate programs that can be completed in a short amount of time. On the
other hand, participants’ stories demonstrate a significant role that their imagination of the West plays in the construction of their life paths.

*Life between privilege and a lack thereof.*

As seen thus far, participants certainly enjoy their international outlook developed through studying in Japan - be it a chance to lead an exciting life of international travels, to the opportunity to engage in international businesses, to the chance to live in a Western country - that seems to offer better life conditions and opportunities than they would have in Japan or China. Their imagination of transnational futures, in which their physical location does not completely dictate their lives, is to some extent driven by their desire for a tourist lifestyle that entails myriad life options and opportunities across the world map. At the same time, their desire to lead a transnational life is also underpinned by systemic contradictions in China. I discussed earlier in this chapter that many HGU participants’ decision to go to Japan was their biographical solution to systemic contradictions in China, and that this finding is not applicable to how CILA participants describe their own decisions to go to Japan. However, how HGU and CILA participants imagine their futures after graduation suggests that both participant groups do not see themselves completely free from systemic contradictions in China. They aspire to keep their options open across national borders so that their future will not be restricted by the economic and political conditions in China.

The most common systemic contradiction that participants raise is the competitive job market and difficult working conditions in China. Even though participants went to Japan to gain a competitive edge that would make them stand out in China’s job market, the vast majority of participants express their desire to stay outside China for a while, at least until the Chinese
economy becomes more mature and establishes better working conditions. For example, a participant explains her future plan to stay overseas, Japan or elsewhere, as follows:

It’s not like I don’t want to go back, but [chuckle] to be honest, umm, salary in China is quite low, and my parents have spent so much money for my education here. And also like, you know, we have so many good students in China. It’s so competitive to get a good job there. (Xiaotao, female, CILA)

In addition, a few participants mention the political condition in China as an issue of concern for their future. Jiao is the most outspoken participant on this matter. He expresses a strong wish not to return to China. He explains:

Once you are in a land of freedom, you can’t go back to such a place [like China]. . . . I don’t like the communist party in the first place. . . . I don’t know how I can go back and live in a country like China where you can’t even use Google. (Jiao, male, CILA)

As this comment implies, Jiao has gotten a taste of freedom in Japan, but no participant included political issues in China as his or her reason for deciding to go to Japan to study. Rather, it seems that their experiences in Japan introduced them to a life that is not currently possible in China and enabled them to imagine living outside China for a longer period of time, rather than returning straight to China, be it for better economic chances or political freedom. They strive to capitalize on their privileged access to international education in Japan to make their lives as free as possible from systemic contradictions in China.

**Commodification of international education experiences.**

How student participants make sense of their experiences in Japan and imagine their futures exemplify their strategic use of international education in Japan. They commodify their global mobility and the knowledge and experiences that they have gained in Japan in order to
become unique and marketable subjects in the global economy. The language skill set of Chinese, English, and Japanese is what makes participants think of themselves as unique and competitive in the labour market. For example, Meng articulates the point by emphasizing the importance of having an irreplaceable skill. In describing what she thinks is the most meaningful about her experience in Japan, she asserts:

Here, I can learn both Japanese and English. I think it's also a good way for me because I think in this society . . . the most important thing to find a job is not how good you are but you cannot be replaced by others. I think people who can speak Japanese and English [pause], this kind of people are not so much [common], and [pause] yeah, I should be the one that cannot be replaced. (Meng, female, HGU)

As seen in this statement, students constantly find the meaning of their experiences in Japan in what their future competitors are not likely to possess. Because Japanese was a new language for the vast majority of the participants upon their arrival in Japan, they have invested their time and effort to varying degrees in acquiring Japanese. Besides taking the Japanese language courses that are required by their programs in Japan, some participants have made a considerable effort to improve their Japanese, such as by taking extra Japanese courses and participating in student clubs or part-time jobs to increase their opportunities to speak Japanese. Some participants even chose to be interviewed for this study in Japanese so they could practice their Japanese. Even though their level of fluency in Japanese varies, they see Japanese as a unique addition to their language skills and describe their language skill set as their “advantage.”

Next to language skills, cross-cultural experiences in Japan are the most frequently mentioned asset by participants. For example, Mana asserts that her ability to deal with “other
“culture things” nurtured in the multicultural environment at HGU is an advantage in her future career in China. Asked to elaborate, she responds:

There are more and more foreigners in China because the whole world tries to invest in China. So I can still deal with foreigners in China. So maybe it's my advantage, you know? I have experience in dealing with foreigners, but others don't have such experience, you know? So I think I can work better than others in dealing with foreigners.

(Mana, female, HGU)

Her descriptions and references to “dealing with foreigners” lack specificities and may lead one to question the depth of her cross-cultural experience and understanding. As I will discuss in depth in the next chapter, how and to what extent students participate in cultural and social experiences in Japan varies. Nevertheless, what is common among participants is that no matter how superficial or substantial their actual cross-cultural experiences and awareness may be, they commodify the fact that they have lived and studied in another country. Through commodifying their privileged global mobility and the knowledge and experience that they have gained in Japan, participants accumulate their cultural capital to prepare themselves for working across national and cultural boundaries.

However, there is a subtle difference between HGU participants and CILA participants in how they describe themselves in relation to the future job market. HGU participants tend to claim to be more competitive than others by framing what they have gained in Japan as what others, particularly those who are in China, do not have. Some CILA participants also do so but not as explicitly and consistently as their HGU counterparts do.

One possible explanation for the contrast is the different institutional discourse and practices of internationalization at the two institutions. As described in the previous chapter,
HGU’s approach to internationalization is heavily geared toward the production of global human resources by weaving career development throughout the curriculum and campus life. In contrast, at CILA, such an economically driven discourse and practices of international education are less pronounced. As studies demonstrate the direct impact of neoliberal discourses and practices in educational settings on students’ sense of self (Demerath & Lynch, 2008; O’Flynn & Petersen, 2007), there is a possibility that HGU’s economically driven discourse and practice influence how HGU students view themselves. For example, an HGU participant responds to a question about how she feels she is perceived by HGU as follows: “I’m a global human resource. . . . My teachers always tell us, ‘We want you to work as global human resources.’ I would like to become such a great person on a global stage someday” (Chen, female, HGU). This is a rare statement that points to the direct impact of the institution’s discourse on a student’s sense of self and future aspiration. However, this candid comment explains to some extent why HGU students constantly describe themselves as marketable commodities. They are entrenched in the particular institutional culture of HGU that is invested in producing global human resources. In other words, the gap between students at HGU and CILA suggests that institutional discourses and practices impact how students understand who they are and who they want to become in the world.

**Summary.**

In this chapter, I have discussed what motivated student participants to go to Japan to study and how they translated their international education in Japan into their imagination of future possibilities. I have articulated commonalities and differences that emerged from students’ stories at HGU and CILA. Students at both institutions grew up being exposed to both positive and negative images, information, and stories about Japan. In addition, the vast majority of
participants at both institutions came from affluent coastal cities in China and lived in an environment where the idea of studying overseas was not entirely foreign. Moreover, their stories demonstrate that the Japanese institutions played a significant role in implanting the idea of studying in Japan as a sensible and viable future path in their future imagination. The majority of participants at both institutions did not originally consider Japan as a desirable destination compared to other Western English-speaking countries. However, the Japanese institutions succeeded in recruiting them by utilizing their strong connections with participants’ high schools in China.

However, when it comes to what it was that attracted students to their respective Japanese institutions, the two student groups provide contrasting stories. For the majority of HGU participants, their decision to come to HGU represents their biographical solution of systemic contradictions in China: extremely competitive entrance to universities and no promising job prospects afterwards. They took advantage of the conveniently arranged admissions to HGU through their high schools as an easy solution to the fiercely competitive university entrance exam in China. They also took it as a strategic solution to their future job market with the idea that their international education experiences in Japan, including their Japanese language skills, would give them a unique competitive edge that the majority of their competitors would not have. Moreover, HGU’s generous financial support worked as a strong motivational factor for them to go to HGU. In contrast, CILA participants were consistently attracted by its prestige more than anything else. For them, going to CILA was more of a choice than a solution to a challenge posed by their life circumstances in China. In addition, finances were not an issue of concern to the majority of them, despite CILA’s higher cost and lower financial support for international students than offered by HGU. With these contrasting needs and desires expressed by the two
groups of student participants, I have shown that the two Japanese higher education institutions with different levels of prestige work as a sorting and reproductive mechanism of international students’ social class.

The majority of participants went to Japan without any clear plans for their lives after graduating from their Japanese institutions, and their future plans are still open to a wide range of possibilities. Their stories demonstrate their emerging desire to develop flexible and transnational life options, rather than to be settled in a certain place, to belong to a particular group of people, or to achieve a specific goal. Even if they are to settle in China, they imagine engaging in a transnational career that involves international travel or working with international counterparts. On the one hand, their imagined future as such is informed by China’s economic and political conditions. They are driven to keep their life options open so that their lives are not constrained by life options available in China. On the other hand, their desire for a transnational life is often layered with their consumerist desire for a tourist life style and their longing for experiencing English-speaking Western countries as a counter-point of reference to Japan and China.

The two participant groups at the two institutions commonly see that their international education opportunities in Japan have enabled and broadened their imagination for a future filled with an array of life options that transcend national boundaries. In particular, they see the combination of their language skills and cross-cultural experiences as valuable assets. However, compared to CILA participants, HGU participants more consistently and explicitly commodify their international education experiences in Japan to distinguish themselves from others, which suggests the implications of HGU’s economic discourse and practice of committing to preparing global human resources.
Chapter 8: International Students’ Identity Formation through Experiences in Japan

This chapter continues the presentation of findings from interviews with student participants. In the previous chapter, I discussed how students’ imagined futures and new identities are expressed through their participation in global mobility from China to Japan and through their future plans after graduation. While the chapter’s focus was on students’ self-positioning in the world in a global sense, this chapter focuses on their self-positioning at a local level. Based on the research question, “How do international students experience and position themselves in the Japanese universities and Japanese society?,” I examine how students see themselves positioned by, and how they seek to position themselves in relation to, others in their institutional settings and in broader Japanese society, both of which I frame as contact zones (Doherty & Singh, 2005b; Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Pratt, 1998). In doing so, I address how imagined communities manifest in participants’ stories as a way to articulate how they identify themselves in relation to others.

This chapter consists of five sections. In the first section, I describe some of the characteristics of the contexts in which HGU and CILA participants’ everyday experiences are located. In Chapter 6, I briefly described physical environments of the two institutions. In this chapter, I elaborate on similarities and differences between the institutions based on students’ stories. In the second section, I illustrate how students imagine a boundary between their international institutions and the rest of Japanese society. I highlight that the English-speaking environments at their institutions play a particularly significant role in shaping their imagination of Japanese society as Japanese-speaking Other in their minds. In the third section, I show that despite each institution’s diverse student body, the majority of participants tend to associate primarily with their Chinese peers and imagine that there is homogeneity among Chinese
students. I also show how the two institutional settings are implicated in participants’ identification with the Chinese student community in both similar and different ways. In the fourth section, I discuss participants’ self-positioning in relation to their Japanese peers. Their stories illuminate that their interactions with their Japanese peers - by whom they feel being othered and who they also see as Other - reciprocally shape their sense of identity in Japan. Lastly, in the fifth section, I situate their self-positioning within the socio-political climate of Japanese society in order to elucidate the complexity of the internationalized institutions and Japanese society as contact zones. Overall, students’ stories demonstrate that they tend to place a mental and social distance between themselves and Japan’s socio-political issues, and that their international institutional settings in fact contribute to the distance. Yet, at the same time, some participants’ stories show how their engagement in Japanese society has led to transformative learning moments for them. In discussing students’ stories on their engagement, or lack of engagement, in Japan’s socio-political issues, I address some of the challenges and learning opportunities found in internationalized institutions and in Japanese society as contact zones.

**Overview of the contexts of students’ experiences in Japan.**

The students’ stories illustrate that while students at HGU and CILA are located in somewhat similar international institutional settings in Japan and at the same time, they nonetheless experience contrasting institutional and social settings in their everyday life. At HGU, as a participant states, “HGU will never run out of student activities” (Wang, male, HGU), the university hosts numerous student events and student clubs. In particular, HGU participants often refer to the aforementioned World Culture Week to describe the highlights of their experiences in Japan. The series is organized by country or region, such as Chinese culture or African culture, and students’ stage performances are central to the event series. For one
participant, participation in the event series was a joyful experience: “I saw many events and performances by HGU students from different countries. I could see many scenes that I would have never been able to see in China. I felt like I traveled around the world” (Tao, male, HGU).

In addition to cultural events on campus, HGU students’ life spaces overlap to a large extent on the small campus in a remote rural area. Approximately half of HGU participants work or have worked on campus, mostly in positions that require Chinese language and cultural knowledge, such as being a Chinese teaching assistant. Moreover, at least for the first year, HGU participants lived in an on-campus dormitory where over 70% of the residents are international students.

HGU participants occasionally interact with off-campus local communities such as short-term home stays with Japanese families or summer English camps with Japanese children. However, when they start an off-campus part-time job, internship, or job-hunting, they are more profoundly exposed to Japan’s off-campus communities. Their off-campus experiences tend to be local, rather than transnational or international. Two-thirds of HGU participants have had off-campus part-time jobs, and their part-time jobs tend to be in local businesses, such as restaurants or convenient stores. Only two participants have taken part-time jobs that have an international or transnational aspect. One of them worked for a company that engages in trade with China, and the other worked in international guest services at a hotel. In addition, one HGU participant has participated in an internship program at a Japanese company that has a global market.

In contrast, CILA participants’ experiences are less centralized in CILA and spread out throughout the Kasuga University campus and the surrounding city. Their stories show that their daily experiences are layered with multiple communities: CILA as an international department, the rest of the Kasuga University community, and the surrounding city. First of all, unlike HGU, CILA hosts few student activities, according to participants. Few CILA participants mentioned
any particular event organized by CILA. However, CILA is part of the large and vibrant campus community of Kasuga University, which hosts numerous events and student clubs of various kinds. The ways and extent to which CILA participants are involved in those on-campus activities vary, and as I presented in Chapter 6, Kasuga University is making efforts to internationalize the entire university. Nonetheless, as I will discuss later in this chapter, CILA participants consistently state that Japanese students and their language and culture are dominant in Kasuga University student communities outside CILA.

In addition, CILA participants live in diverse life spaces. Approximately half of CILA participants have lived in off-campus dormitories, where both domestic and international Kasuga University students live. However, most of them moved out after the first year due to the long commute to the campus. They now live in one of the various housing options across the city, such as dormitories for students from different universities or apartments in different neighbourhoods. Further, all CILA participants except for one have had a part-time job, but none of them has worked on campus. They engage in various types of off-campus part-time jobs. Thus, compared to HGU students, CILA students’ life spaces are less confined within CILA and scattered across Japanese society in a decentralized manner.

CILA participants’ lives in Japan have a strong transnational dimension. Firstly, at CILA, there is a strong presence of students who grew up overseas or went through an education system that is not of their home country, such as international schools or International Baccalaureate programs. As mentioned earlier, three CILA participants have had such a transnational upbringing. Likewise, there are two groups of Japanese students, those who have a transnational background and those who do not, and the latter group is called jun-japa, which is a shortened
form of *junsui-Japanese* (pure Japanese). One CILA participant explains below how commonly the label is used at CILA and who belongs to the group:

Xiaotao: We kind of have some phrase, a special phrase in CILA, like *jun-japa.* . . . I didn’t know this word, but my Japanese friend taught it to me and said, “Oh, are you still from CILA? You didn’t know that?” . . .

Hanae: Uh, I see. So, *jun-japa* stands for people who were born and raised here [in Japan]?

Xiaotao: Born and raised here and also attended local schools because we have a lot of Japanese students who attended international schools here, so. (Xiaotao, female, CILA)

In contrast, no HGU participant mentioned the term *jun-japa* or its equivalent or antonymous term or described HGU students with or without a transnational background.

Secondly, CILA participants’ work experiences have stronger connections with transnational businesses than HGU participants’. Four CILA participants have had internships with Japanese companies in China, and two participants’ part-time jobs are on marketing research about the Chinese market for Japanese companies. In addition to such direct engagement in transnational businesses, one participant works part-time as a Chinese tutor for Japanese business people who do business with Chinese counterparts. Another participant works for a restaurant in an area where many Chinese people live, and the owner of the restaurant is a Vietnamese immigrant who grew up in Taiwan and speaks Chinese. Thus, while CILA students are in daily contact with Japanese communities, national boundaries are blurred in their on- and off-campus experiences. As well as CILA being an international institution, its urban location,
which attracts many internationally mobile people and transnational businesses, offers these transnational opportunities to CILA participants.

**International institutional environments versus “real Japan.”**

Despite these differences between CILA and HGU, student participants at both institutions consistently view their international institutional environments as special. As Wang states, “HGU is not real Japan”\(\textsuperscript{lvii}\) (Wang, male, HGU), and participants often juxtapose their institutional settings against the rest of Japanese society, which they refer to as the “real Japan.” In other words, their stories about their experiences in Japan illustrate an imagined boundary between what is and what is not real Japan. In their imagination, their institutional setting constitutes an international community and the rest of Japanese society is the Japanese community.

Xiaotao is the most articulate participant on the imagined boundary. She describes that CILA is “not like a typical Japanese university” by highlighting that Japanese culture, language, and population are not dominant at CILA:

> [At CILA,] we don’t care about *sempai-kōhai* relationships (hierarchical relationships between juniors and seniors),\(^43\) and also for language, we speak English. And also, we have not only Japanese professors [but also professors from other countries]. Even Japanese professors, they have an experience of studying abroad or living abroad so they are also international. (Xiaotao, female, CILA)

However, when participants leave their institutional settings and encounter a situation in which Japanese cultural norms, practices, and language are dominant, they realize how unique their

\(^{43}\) It is customary in Japan for those who are of junior status to speak and act to show their modesty and respect to those who are of higher status, such as senior students, senior colleagues, or older people.
institutional settings are. Xiaotao came across such a situation, which she describes as “so Japanese,” when she had an internship at a Japanese bank in Shanghai. She explains the work environment as follows:

[The bank where I interned] is totally different from CILA, you know, that is Japanese. . . . Even though it is in Shanghai, all the buchō (general manager) and kachō (section head), they are Japanese people. They only speak Japanese, and they are so Japanese. You know, you are not allowed to speak in the office, you are not allowed to eat anything in the office, and even though you are so tired, even though it is your break time, you have to pretend you are studying something or you are so busy. [chuckle] But they are still nice, yeah, because they give us a lot of professional classes . . . about a bank and their business, and we learn a lot . . . At the time, I finally found, “Oh, that is the Japanese way!” (Xiaotao, female, CILA)

As Xiaotao juxtaposes her work environment against CILA and labels the former’s distinctiveness, such as discreet workplace behaviours, as “the Japanese way,” and the latter as not a “typical Japanese university,” participants live across imagined communities that they label “Japanese” and “not Japanese.” Moreover, as I will present in the rest of this chapter, their stories illustrate different imagined communities in addition to their institution as an international community and off-campus Japanese society as the Japanese community. For example, even within their international institution community, they have different communities, such as Chinese students as a single community, Chinese student communities representing different regions of origin, and a Japanese student community. Their sense of identity is expressed in how they position themselves in relation to each imagined community. In other words, their self-positioning in relation to the imagined communities represents their transculturation in their
institutions and in Japanese society as contact zones (Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Pratt, 1998). In following sections, I will illustrate how these communities and students’ sense of identity are expressed in students’ stories.

**A Japanese-speaking community versus an English-speaking “fantasyland.”**

One of the major factors that makes participants see their institutional settings as not “real Japan” is the use of English in their institutions. In participants’ accounts, Japanese society is portrayed as a Japanese-speaking community in contrast with their institutions, which adopt English as a language of instruction. Students at both institutions repeatedly describe the language gap that they experience as soon as they step outside their institutional environments. Jie succinctly refers to HGU as a “fantasyland” to articulate how HGU’s language setting differs from the rest of Japanese society:

> If you want to travel or whatever you want to do in this country, you know that you have to speak Japanese. I mean, HGU is fine, because you can still survive in this university. You can still be normal taking English classes. It's like a fantasyland. I mean . . . if you can imagine yourself in any other Japanese university, you know, it's not possible for you to even survive there if you don't speak Japanese. And, Japanese people speak Japanese. They don't speak English. Accept the fact. This is the fact. (Jie, female, HGU)

As Jie asserts that Japanese people speak Japanese, participants’ comments also suggest that they view Japan as a monolingual community, or as Other in contrast to their institutional settings that have adopted English.

> The dominance of the Japanese language in the broader Japanese society is undeniable. Even at CILA, which is located in a metropolitan city that attracts a lot of international tourists, expatriates, and immigrants, CILA participants keep describing the dominance of Japanese
language in their lives outside CILA. Despite the English environment at CILA, one-third of CILA participants lament that their English skills had either deteriorated or had not improved as much as they had hoped, and they attribute it to their limited opportunities to use English in Japan. For example, one of them, Yongling, expresses her disappointment at the lack of opportunities to improve her English, in contrast to the abundance of opportunities to learn Japanese in her life environment:

[English-medium education] is . . . one of the reasons why I chose CILA because I wanted to improve my English in Japan. But [pause] I just can't learn English from my classes or lectures or seminars . . . , but I can learn Japanese everywhere. When you are, for example, watching TV, traveling, also doing a part-time job, anywhere I can learn a lot of Japanese. English, . . . how can I learn it? I just can't [just by] reading a book or something or writing essays. (Yongling, female, CILA)

This comment addresses a challenge of implementing an English-medium program in a non-English-speaking country by pointing to the fact that students’ use of English tends to be limited within classroom or their institutional settings.

*Questions of Englishization.*

As discussed in Chapter 6, faculty and staff participants justify the Englishization of their university education with the idea that English is the most important international language, primarily in the global market. However, a few student participants’ stories suggest that English is not always the most useful language. Qiang, who has been seeking a job in international financial industries in Japan, describes his puzzling job-hunting experience as follows:

[The companies] do have recruitment activities in Japan, and their official language is English, and they use English for everything within the company, but the [recruitment]
process is always carried out in Japanese. . . . I need to compete with Japanese people using Japanese and then after getting into the company, everything is changed to English. I feel there isn't a point of testing people only in Japanese. (Qiang, male, CILA)

Si Jing shares a similar account on her job-hunting experience, about which she says, “I felt inequality there”lvii (Si Jing, female, CILA). She explains:

It’s unfair, for example, to require of us to take SPI44 in writing. . . . The content of those tests is too hard for us, international students, who have been here only for four years, and it’s actually in our third year when we do job-hunting. It’s absurd to impose the same requirements upon us with Japanese university students. lviii (Si Jing, female, CILA)

In my interviews with student participants who have experienced job-hunting in Japan, I did not ask them in detail about their job-hunting process with each company. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent these two participants’ stories above represent hiring practices in Japan. Nonetheless, participants’ comments on the lack of the need or chance to use English not only in job-hunting but also in their daily lives in Japan raise a question: to what extent is the institutions’ sense that they need to align themselves with English imagined or reflective of reality?

Students’ stories illustrate that Englishization is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, Englishization has opened a door to the majority of the participants who did not have Japanese language skills when they went to Japan to study. On the other hand, once in Japan, they hit the reality that English does not take them too far. Being located in the English-speaking institutional environments that lack relevance to their external linguistic environments, they seem to see Japanese society from a particular vantage point: They view Japanese society as a

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44 Synthetic Personality Inventory. A vocational aptitude test invented and administered by a Japanese human resource company Recruit. The new version SPI2 replaced SPI, but the test is widely known as SPI in Japan. [http://www.spi.recruit.co.jp/service/spi2/](http://www.spi.recruit.co.jp/service/spi2/)
Japanese-speaking Other, as distinct from their institutions as English-speaking “fantasylands.” As a result, Jie, who refers to HGU as a “fantasyland,” expresses a strong feeling of being lost in the gap between HGU’s English-speaking environment and the rest of Japanese society. Asked how she thinks her experiences in Japan have influenced the way she looks at herself, she responds, “It makes me feel less confident.” She continues:

Jie: I kind of feel like, if I were a native speaker of . . . not Chinese but English, then perhaps I would be looked like in different ways. But I'm neither a native speaker of Japanese nor English. That makes me be in another position to be looked at.

Hanae: What position?

Jie: Like a totally different, like a third position. I'm neither this nor that. (Jie, female, HGU)

This comment by Jie can lead one to wonder why she does not seek to improve her Japanese in order to integrate herself more fully into Japanese society, or to seek to join an English-speaking community based on her English fluency. It is true that those participants who have successfully improved their Japanese language skills report a high level of social integration in Japan. However, it is uncertain to what extent Jie’s Japanese skills are inferior to those participants who feel satisfied with their Japanese skills and their level of social integration in Japan. Jie has been successfully accepted into numerous on-campus student positions and into a competitive career development program for international students by the Japanese government, both of which require demonstrated Japanese language skills. What deserves more attention is that regardless of participants’ attitudes towards or actual command of the languages, Jie feels that she has to be a native speaker of either language. In other words, the subtext of her comments above is that in her view, a native English speaker who has little command of Japanese can attain some sense of
inclusion in Japan, whereas a native speaker of neither Japanese nor English, such as a native Chinese speaker, cannot have such a sense of inclusion.

Kubota and McKay (2009) conclude that Japanese people’s idea of internationalization is strongly associated with their imagination of English-speaking White middle-class people, and as I will demonstrate later in this chapter, participants are aware of Japanese society’s adoration of Westerners. The English-or-Japanese dichotomy in which Jie feels trapped suggests that her sense of isolation is embedded in the dichotomy of the Japanese-Self and Western-Other that has been constructed in the discourse of kokusaika with Japan’s desire to “catch up” with the West (Kubota, 1998, 2002; Mochizuki, 2004; Rappleye & Kariya, 2011; Yoshino, 1997). A CILA participant, Si Jing, supports the point. She argues that her institutional setting, which adopts English as the main language, is a manifestation of Westernization and limits, rather than enhances, international students’ learning potential in Japan, as she explains below:

Si Jing: CILA, well, in terms of innovation, I think they are one step ahead Japanese universities, but I feel it’s such a shame that Japanese universities are moving toward European and American countries. [pause] I say this because . . . many of my friends from my cohort cannot speak Japanese much after four years. There are many students who don’t know much about Japan after studying in Japan for four years. So from this point of view, I think that CILA should find its own way instead of going toward a European or American way, yeah.

Hanae: So you mean, you think that CILA is going toward a European or American way?
Si Jing: Yes. [CILA goes for] international, international for whatever. I think being international is fine, but I feel that they are Westernized rather than internationalized now, yeah.

Hanae: What makes you think that way?

Si Jing: Umm, [silence] for example, I think it’s strange that all the classes and reports must be in English, even though some students can choose [the language] for their graduation theses depending on their professors.\textsuperscript{ix} (Si Jing, female, CILA)

As seen here, Si Jing’s critique of Englishization, Jie’s struggles with not fitting in with either English or Japanese speakers, and other students’ stories that point to the lack of usefulness or relevance of English to their lives in Japan illuminate a paradoxical space that Englishization has opened up for international students at Japanese universities. Despite the notion of inclusivity that internationalization appears to promote, these students’ accounts show an unintended consequence of the English language environment created in the name of internationalization in Japan.

While being paradoxical, however, the space can be a place for critical dialogues and learning as well. An HGU participant, Ming, shares a story of one of her course assignments consisting of a team debate on the hegemonic power of the English language in the world. She explains her team’s standpoint, which she also supports personally, as follows:

You cannot avoid [English hegemony] because you know that globalization is going and going, and you want to be globalized. You have to speak one language . . . . Right now, English is mostly used so English is the language. So, of course, English hegemony happens, but I just don’t think it's bad. I think it's necessary. (Ming, female, HGU)
This view of prioritizing system efficiency may not completely satisfy the questions about Englishization that have been raised in this section. Because Ming is the only participant who shared a story about a debate on English, it is unknown how widely and deeply students engage in such conversations at the two institutions, and if they do, what they learn from it. However, these divergent student voices on Englishization suggest that their institutions can be rich learning sites where students can discuss the opportunities and challenges brought by Englishization based on their own direct experiences with it.

Life with/in Chinese communities: “Yappari chūgokujin (Of course, Chinese).”

Besides the use of English, what makes participants see their institutional environments as a special place is their large international student populations. As an HGU participant states, “HGU is special. HGU has a lot of international students” (Peiyao, female, HGU). As discussed in Chapter 6, one of the major rationales for the institutions to recruit many international students is to create multicultural learning environments on their Japanese campuses. Nonetheless, contrary to the institutions’ intentions, participants repeatedly describe the lack of interaction among students from different countries and that students tend to mingle within their own nationality group. Participants testify:

We all are from different cultural backgrounds. Sometimes, it's just simply, you know, hard to mix one with each other. But I did make some Japanese friends. But having said that, I think, still, I feel like interactions between the majority of the Japanese and the majority of the international students here at least in HGU are kind of weak. (Xiao Ming, male, HGU)

I see a lot of students from different countries here, but they are not necessarily well integrated. Chinese students stick together with Chinese students. I think this is the same
everywhere in the world, but I think it would be better if we were mixed.\textsuperscript{ixi} (Si Jing, female, CILA)

Likewise, the majority of participants at both institutions are closely associated with Chinese student communities on campus. The vast majority of participants agree that it is not ideal that students are separated by nationality. Nonetheless, the most common response to a question about their closest friends in Japan is, “Of course, Chinese” (Ming, female, HGU) or “\textit{Yappari chūgokujin}”\textsuperscript{45} in Japanese.

As a participant states, “In CILA, there are many Chinese students. You just come across them, and you talk to them, [just] like that” (Yongling, female, CILA), participants at both institutions emphasize how easy it is for them to find friends from China. An HGU participant, Wang, echoes the strong presence of the Chinese student population at HGU by framing it as a “little Chinese society,” and adds how easily Chinese students can live within that society as he recalls his first year living in the dormitory at HGU:

[The dormitory] seems like a little Chinese society because they have more than 200 [Chinese] people. So you can lead a happy life there even if you can’t communicate with Japanese people. I always hanged out with my Chinese peers every day.\textsuperscript{xii} (Wang, male, HGU)

These students’ accounts show an unintended consequence of having a large international student body, through which the institutions have intended to provide students with cross-cultural and international learning opportunities. Contrary to the institutions’ intention, students

\textsuperscript{45} The term “\textit{yappari}” carries multiple nuances, such as “after all,” “as you may expect,” and “of course.” Five participants who were interviewed in Japanese used exactly the same term or “\textit{yahari}” (the synonym of “\textit{yappari}”) to respond to a question asking who their closest friends in Japan are.
can easily find many friends from China and lead self-sufficient and comfortable lives without having substantial interactions with students from other parts of the world.

**Institutional mechanism for the formation of a national group identity.**

Overall, at both institutions, students tend to stay with their Chinese peers, but HGU participants tend to express stronger connections with their Chinese peers than CILA participants. When asked who their closest friends in Japan are, all except one HGU participant include their Chinese peers in their list of their closest friends in Japan, and two-thirds of them list only their Chinese peers as their closest friends. In contrast, three-quarters of CILA participants include their Chinese peers as their closest friends among others, and approximately a half of them list only their Chinese peers as their closest friends. This gap, albeit small, suggests that there are implications of the different institutional contexts for how students identify themselves. Pratt (1992) concludes that identities in a contact zone are constructed in a reciprocal exchange of influences, and representations of Self and Other are in constant negotiation. As I will present below, students’ stories suggest that their identity as Chinese is developed reciprocally with how their institutions set up social interaction opportunities for them.

HGU students’ close relationship with their Chinese peers can be explained in that, compared to CILA, there are more organized occasions at HGU, such as the dormitory and school events, where Chinese students meet and establish friendships. In particular, the World Culture Week plays a significant role not only in uniting Chinese students but also in influencing how they imagine their social existence in relation to others at the institution. Even though any student can participate in planning and performing on any culture for a World Culture Week event, HGU participants’ stories indicate that Chinese events for the series serve as a major
opportunity for many Chinese students to meet, work, and socialize with each other. HGU participants repeatedly offer their stories of the joy and challenges of working with their Chinese peers to present Chinese culture at the event. For example, Fei describes the swelling sense of pride he felt in presenting his Chinese culture: “I could present my pride as Chinese and traditional Chinese culture to the Japanese and other foreigners. I felt honored [chuckle] and proud as a Chinese” (Fei, male, HGU). In contrast, Tao, describes his struggles in working with his Chinese peers for the event:

I was a little embarrassed that Chinese people could not unite and work together. In this kind of international setting, in a situation where everyone needed to unite, everyone was doing different things. I was kind of disappointed. I saw students from other countries singing and dancing together, and I really envied them. (Tao, male, HGU)

For Tao, the event worked as a medium through which he identified himself as part of a group of Chinese students and sought a sense of unity among them. The above comments by both Fei and Tao illustrate that, despite their contrasting experiences, they juxtapose Chinese culture or Chinese students against other nationality groups and express a Self-Other dichotomy in their imagination. Fei felt a sense of pride presenting his Chinese culture to others, which he describes as, “the Japanese and other foreigners.” Tao was also embarrassed and disappointed by a lack of solidarity among his Chinese peers in contrast to “students from other countries.” It is possible that these students had held such a dichotomous imagination even before coming to HGU, but in their accounts, we can observe HGU’s environment working to sustain or reinforce, if not to initiate, such imagination. The World Culture Week is a prime example of the “creation of cultural diversity and a containment of cultural difference” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 208) in an internationalized institution as a contact zone. The event communicates the institution’s
expectation of students to perform their cultural difference and to celebrate cultural diversity by nationality or world region. The event evokes China as a bounded imagined community and nationalistic sentiment vis-à-vis other national imagined communities.

At CILA, participants describe boundaries between students’ nationality groups or their Chinese identity less clearly than do their HGU counterparts. Compared to HGU participants, whose life experiences tend to be confined within the small and centralized university context, CILA participants’ stories tend to cover more diverse social spaces, such as student clubs at Kasuga University and off-campus activities for students from different universities in the city. While one CILA participant is actively involved in a CILA Chinese student group, few other CILA participants mention their active involvement in the group or any other groups or events for or by Chinese students. Even though CILA participants are surrounded by many Chinese peers and tend to mingle amongst themselves, there are not many organized occasions at CILA when they feel they are being labeled as Chinese or articulate themselves as such. For example, Xiao Han, who responds, “Of course, Chinese,”\textsuperscript{lxv} to a question about her best friends in Japan, provides the following statement in a discussion on her sense of self as Chinese: “About me as Chinese, I have never thought of such a thing because there are many Chinese\textsuperscript{lxvi} (Xiao Han, female, CILA). Similarly, when asked if and how she thinks about herself as Chinese, Mao Mao responds, “No, actually,” and expresses her sense of anonymity in her multicultural city environment as follows: “In [the name of the city where CILA is located], there are quite a lot of immigrants so I'm not the only Chinese here so I cannot feel so much special [laugh]” (Mao Mao, female, CILA). These CILA students’ comments suggest that they may be as deeply immersed in their Chinese community as their HGU counterparts are, but they may not have as
many occasions as HGU students to perform or celebrate their difference in contrast to other nationality groups.

In addition, nationality is not necessarily the most helpful student identifier at CILA where the presence of students with transnational backgrounds is strong. During my participant recruitment at CILA, there were occasions when students said they would introduce their Chinese friends to me, but then, they were not sure if the friends could be categorized as Chinese international students because, for example, the friends were born outside China or had parents of different nationalities. In such a transcultural environment of CILA and the surrounding multicultural city environment, students seem to see themselves more as individuals than as a member belonging to a certain community with a specific label, even if they most closely associate themselves with their peers from China.

*The imagination and specificity of “the same background.”*

Whether or not HGU and CILA participants describe their Chinese peers as their community members, their most common explanation for their strong connections with their Chinese peers is that they share a common language and culture, which they often describe as “the same background.” The idea that Chinese friends share the same background signifies that participants imagine a homogeneous Chinese student community and that they associate themselves with the community based on the imagined sameness. The Chinese community thus represents participants’ sense of Self, or “us,” that distinguishes them from other students as Other, or “them.” For example, Wei, who responds, “Of course, Chinese,”[lxvii] to the question of who her closest friends are, justifies the response as follows: “It’s not that I don’t want to make friends with [students from other countries]. But almost like, we talk more with the people who have the same language, background, right?” (Wei, female, CILA). Ruo at HGU also expresses
the idea of the same background in her explanation for why she mostly hangs out with her Chinese peers:


Maybe we both talk in Chinese, and we have the same background so we can get closer easier. And sometimes, I . . . cannot talk as fluently in English . . . so it's easier to hang out with Chinese people. (Ruo, female, HGU)

Students can thus easily find peers from China and comfortably locate themselves within the community by imagining its homogeneity. However, the idea of the same background is not completely imaginary and can be as specific as the same high school. As a result of the Japanese institutions’ focused recruiting strategies in particular areas and high schools in China, their large Chinese student populations allow Chinese students to find friends not only from China but also from the same region, city, or even the same high school in China. An HGU participant and a CILA participant state that their high schools in China annually send as many as 30 and 15 students, respectively, to their Japanese institutions. A participant explains how students gravitate towards those who have more commonalities in their backgrounds:

We help each other, and maybe we can feel close when you go outside of our own county. You can see that . . . here, you are all international students, and among the international students, you are all from China, even you are from the same city, you are from the same [high] school. Yeah, it is kind of [pause] a good feeling [chuckle]. . . . This is the most important reason which bonds us together. (Mao Mao, female, CILA)

However, while these sub-communities by region or high school provide students with a greater sense of belonging, comfort, and solidarity amongst themselves, students describe cultural divides between the sub-communities, mostly between those who are from Northern China and
from Southern China. Mana explains the divide within the Chinese student community at HGU as follows:

    I have friends from different cities and . . . you know, China is big. . . . Maybe sometimes we have different cultures, you know, within China. We also have different cultures, yeah. Since I come from . . . the, umm [pause], south part so we have, you know, difficulties in, not difficulties but a little bit difficult to talk to, not talk to but to stay with people from the north part, but it’s okay with me because I don't like to stay too close with my friends. You know, we just keep some space from each other, so yeah. (Mana, female, HGU)

Thus, students’ desire to spend time with those with whom they share the same background drives them to segregate themselves from peers not only from other countries but even from peers from other regions in China. The existence of these sub-communities demonstrates that the homogeneity of Chinese students as a singular community is imagined. However, what participants refer to as the same background does have more specificity when they are in fact referring to their sub-community.

**Detached sense of self from Chinese students or China.**

The imagination of Chinese students across the board sharing the same background becomes further complicated when the following students’ views are taken into consideration. Four participants express their sense of detachment from Chinese students as a student group or from China as a nation. Two of them detach themselves from China or Chinese students as Other in a critical sense, while the other two simply see their connections with such a community as non-existent or weakening. For example, a CILA participant, Si Jing, belongs to the latter type. She identifies herself as culturally closer to the Japanese than to the Chinese because of her
upbringing in Japan. Her friendships are based on shared hobbies or being in similar walks of life rather than on the place of origin.

CILA participants Jiao and Chengyi represent the former type. In their stories, their Chinese peers are placed in the position of Other due to their opposing disposition. Jiao describes that it is difficult for him to relate to his Chinese peers at CILA because they seem to him to be aimless. He elaborates:

To be frank, from my point of view, I think that [Chinese students at CILA] do not have a sound objective to come to Kasuga. I’m not talking about all of them, and to be sure, it is just my personal and generalized observation. However, for many of them, graduating from Kasuga means no more than getting a title, a “graduate from an internationally prestigious university” that is better than graduating from a prestigious university in China. They simply think that becoming able to speak Chinese, English, and Japanese would be a good addition. They therefore tend to focus on taking internationally transferrable and practical economics and finance courses. It is not because they are good at or interested in these subjects but just because everyone else is taking these. That can’t be a reason for me [to choose my study subject]. I just cannot believe that they are satisfied with just learning Japanese after coming all the way to Kasuga. They are wasting a great opportunity. \(^{lxxviii}\) (Jiao, male, CILA, email correspondence after the interview)

For Chengyi, the majority of his Chinese peers at CILA are Other because their political orientation is different from his. Interestingly, however, Chengyi’s closest friends in Japan are Chinese students. According to him, what bonds them together is their unpatriotic political orientation nurtured through their transnational upbringing, as well as the shared mother tongue.
He explains why he is not involved in the other Chinese student communities, which he labels as “the real mainland Chinese”:

My way of thinking is different from the real mainland Chinese. I don’t think I will be able to talk with them well. Even if I join, it would be a waste of time, yeah. I think I don’t want to join them. . . . You know, many Chinese people are quite patriotic. On TV, I have seen many people raising their hands when asked, “Are there Chinese people who don’t like the Japanese?” I personally don’t like those people because they are like brainwashed. . . . They are taught a lot of patriotism, but I didn’t have such education at all. . . . Simply put, you know, patriotic people control everything for their country. Personally, I would argue why I would control myself for China when China hasn’t done anything for me.\textsuperscript{lxix} (Chengyi, male, CILA)

Chengyi, who grew up in different Asian countries and was educated in the International Baccalaureate program in China, might have never seen himself as “the real mainland Chinese.” However, a multicultural learning environment such as HGU or CILA can be a site where those who Chengyi would label as “the real mainland Chinese” are exposed to different ideas and transform their sense of self as Chinese. In the following conversation, Xiao Ming articulates his personal and political transformation through his experiences at HGU.

Xiao Ming: As I said, I had never been abroad before. So my perspective could have been quite limited, just to see my own country. And, you know, China is . . . nationalistic ideologies sometimes . . . [come] to play. So I kind of had, you know, looked at myself, my surroundings, and my culture. Here, you come [across] so many different factors and really open up your mind, and you experience so many different things. . . . For one single incident, there
are different interpretations provided by different cultures of different nationality groups, and you need to be open, and you need to tolerate diversity of opinions.

Hanac: So you are more open to different ideas. OK. Has it affected your sense of self?

Xiao Ming: Yeah, certainly, I think, [silence] I think . . . you've got detachment . . . [from] yourself or . . . your own country. I realize that the world is converging in a certain way, maybe, perhaps. There is a big, big world out there, and what happens around yourself and what happens around your own country may not be so significant, and there are certainly many different ways to see things. So, you've got to be all ears up and listen to different things. (Xiao Ming, male, HGU)

Even though the students presented in this section do not represent the majority of the participants, their self-positioning outside or against their Chinese peers or China illustrates the heterogeneity of Chinese students. On the one hand, the majority of participants tend to stay with their Chinese peers with the imagination that their Chinese peers constitute a homogeneous community where everyone shares the same background. On the other hand, their stories reveal the heterogeneity of the community in which Chinese students hold a different sense of identity. The heterogeneity of Chinese students further complicates the internationalized institutions as contact zones by adding not only international diversity but also diversity within a nationality group. In the contact zones, Chinese students with different geographical, biographical, and political trajectories meet and negotiate ways to position themselves in relation to each other.
Self-positioning with Japanese peers as Other.

Outside their Chinese communities, international students are often participants’ close friends. Participants provide several explanations for this. One is that they have had more constant contact with their international peers than with their Japanese peers through their required Japanese language courses. In addition, Taiwanese students are often included in their friendship circles because of the shared mother tongue. Also, the shared experience of having lived abroad is another bonding factor for international students. What this trend suggests is that Japanese students tend to be outside their friendship circles. However, interestingly, with or without substantial stories of their direct experiences with Japanese peers, participants tend to express their sense of self in relation to their Japanese peers rather than to their international peers. Just as Pratt (1992) describes that transculturation in a contact zone is reciprocal rather than one-directional, participants’ stories show that they “other” Japanese students as much as they feel they are being “othered” by Japanese students.

Japanese peers as Other: “The Japanese don’t care about education.”

A common observation participants make about their Japanese peers is that the latter are preoccupied with non-academic activities, such as student clubs, part-time jobs, and socializing. Approximately half the participants at both institutions express their disapproval of or detachment from Japanese students who prioritize non-academic activities over academic work. For example, a participant explains that she will not choose a graduate school in Japan because, “The Japanese don’t care about education” (Ming, female, HGU). She explains:

[Japanese students] only think that college life is just [for] social. . . . During my life [in Japan], I right now see a few Japanese students who are really working hard in education.
. . . Others, they just do part-time [jobs]. They just play. They don't care about their scores, even don't attend courses. (Ming, female, HGU)

In particular, participants express their disapproval of or detachment from their Japanese peers’ deep involvement in student clubs, which are called *bukatsu or săcuru*.\(^{46}\) Student clubs in Japanese universities usually entail a lot of social activities among the members, such as partying and hanging out. In some cases, activities that relate to the official objective of a club could actually have secondary importance to socializing. As an extreme example, a participant recounts the *săcuru* that she joined at Kasuga University as follows: “Just every day, [Japanese student members] have a *nomi kai* (drinking party). . . . For example, I joined a tennis *săcuru*. I never did anything about tennis” (Yongling, female, CILA).

The majority of participants view the extent to which Japanese students devote themselves to those non-academic activities as excessive or pointless. The following participant’s comment represents participants’ view of their Japanese peers:

[In] my *săcuru*, [Japanese students] focus on the *săcuru* life more than study. Yeah, they hang out. . . . They're *too too* focused on the *săcuru* life. . . . Chinese students, we think like . . . you should put your studying first and then maybe school life or *săcuru* life. (Nan Nan, female, CILA)

As Nan Nan draws a line between Chinese students as “us” and Japanese students as “them,” participants differentiate themselves from Japanese students by holding on to their own principle to prioritize education, instead of aligning themselves to the dominant university student culture in Japan.

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\(^{46}\) *Bukatsu*, which is a shortened form of *bukatsudō*, usually refers to student clubs certified by the school with which it is affiliated. *Săcuru* usually refers to student clubs organized and run by students. The term *săcuru* derives from “circle” in English.
Marginalization by Japanese peers: “We are not the same as them, they think.”

Thus far, we have seen how participants see Japanese students as Other. However, their stories also tell their experiences of being marginalized by their Japanese peers to various degrees and for various reasons, such as differences in language and culture, and political tensions between China and Japan. Compared to HGU participants, CILA participants are more explicit about their marginal position in relation to Japanese students based on their participation in or observation of Kasuga University-wide student clubs where there are many Japanese students. Four CILA participants did not join a student club due to a cultural as well as language gap that they felt existed between them and Japanese students, and three CILA participants joined and then quit due to their marginalizing experiences with their Japanese counterparts.

In addition to the language barrier - from either their lack of Japanese skills or their Japanese counterparts’ lack of English skills - a cultural barrier is another common reason participants give for their sense of marginalization in relation to their Japanese peers. Participants offer numerous stories on how they feel Japanese cultural norms and practices are imposed on them by their Japanese counterparts. What participants particularly find challenging is junior/senior (sempai/ kōhai) student relations in student clubs. For participants, on top of having to communicate in Japanese, they must also use Japanese’s honorific language in Japanese, which is an additional challenge. Japanese students’ demand that their international peers speak in a culturally appropriate way makes participants feel inadequate and marginalized. For example, Peiyao at HGU recollects her marginal experience in a student club:

I often couldn’t make myself understood in Japanese so the members of my cohort group were like, “We don’t get what Peiyao is saying.” I felt that a distance between us became wider. [chuckle] The sācuru . . . had a very strong influence by Japanese culture, like the
hierarchical relationship between junior and senior members. I often couldn’t act properly and made senior members mad at me. [chuckle] (Peiyao, female, HGU)

As a result, she quit the club after six months. She describes her feelings at that time: “I really felt down. I lost my confidence. I joined the sācuru because I wanted to improve my Japanese, but in contrary, I felt like I couldn’t open my mouth even more” (Peiyao, female, HGU).

Besides language and cultural barriers, participants also sense that their Japanese peers view international students as Other. For example, Nan Nan at CILA describes how she felt she was treated as Other by her Japanese peers in a chorus club at Kasuga University:

Nan Nan: I found like [Japanese students] just think we are ryūgakusei (international students); like foreign students. Actually, . . . we think we are one of the students in Kasuga University, Kasuga University students, but . . . they think we are ryūgakusei. . . . We are not the same as them, they think.

Hanae: Um-hum. How does it make you feel?

Nan Nan: I feel like, “Oh, we are not the same in Kasuga University,” because when I was in that . . . [chorus] sācuru, some senpai (senior students), they . . . asked me, . . . “How do you practice your Japanese?” But for me, I really want to be one . . . of them, I really want to . . . sing with them . . . not just to speak Japanese with them. (Nan Nan, female, CILA)

As Nan Nan sensed her Japanese peers were seeing her as an international student or a non-Japanese speaker, Xiao Han also describes her frustration with her Japanese peers who assume that international students would want to return home or should return home after graduation:
When Japanese students hear that I’m job-hunting [in Japan] now, they would ask, “Why don’t you go back to China?” “Why do you want to work in Japan?” I find it a bit offensive. I wanted to say to them, “Why can’t I stay in Japan?” or something like that. I’m not sure if they would understand, though, even if I explain. But I really wondered if Japanese students had a problem with us staying here.\textsuperscript{lxii} (Xiao Han, female, CILA)

Those who have experienced marginalization by Japanese peers express disappointment and a sense of hopelessness about the possibility of becoming an equal to Japanese students. As a result, their imagined “us-and-them” dichotomy between themselves and Japanese students is sustained and reinforced. For example, Jie concludes that she can stay with her Japanese peers, who impose their cultural protocol, only by “behaving like the Japanese”:

How can you feel easier? You can only achieve this goal by behaving like the Japanese, accepting their values, treating ourselves as one of them, right? If you keep on being myself, then there's no way you could feel any easier. . . . You can't say, “OK, I'm going to change you guys.” No way. (Jie, female, HGU)

Nonetheless, as Nan Nan states, participants, including Jie, find it impossible to think and behave like “the Japanese” after all and detach themselves from their Japanese peers: “[Behaving like Japanese students is] kind of difficult so now I just [try to] be like myself, like not do as what they do anymore” (Nan Nan, female, CILA).

Thus, either due to their experience of having been marginalized by Japanese students or their critical view of Japanese students as Other, participants’ stories show how the “us-and-them” dichotomy between participants and Japanese peers is created and sustained. On the one hand, they see themselves being placed in the position of Other by their Japanese peers, and as seen in this section, they express a sense of powerlessness in the position given to them. On the
other hand, they also choose to separate themselves from Japanese students and comfortably position themselves within other communities, such as with their Chinese or international peers. This self-positioning practice can be interpreted not only as a strategy for coping with their marginal experiences in Japan but also as an identity statement asserting that they are not like “them,” a reference to the Japanese students they see as aimless or lacking the ability to accommodate differences. They position themselves outside the Japanese student community by drawing an us-and-them line in between, rather than passively putting themselves in a position of marginalized victims.

Self-positioning with socio-political tensions in Japan.

Xiao Han, who was offended by her Japanese peers’ assumption that international students would return to their home countries after graduation, concludes: “I think Japanese people are, . . . after all, they don’t really have welcoming attitudes toward foreigners, especially toward the Chinese and Asians” (Xiao Han, female, CILA). As she makes sense of her Japanese peers’ attitudes as a manifestation of socially pervasive racial discrimination especially toward Asians in Japan, participants’ self-positioning processes with their Japanese counterparts are embedded in a broader socio-political context of Japanese society.

Students’ stories about their experiences in the socio-political sphere of Japanese society address two issues that are not mutually exclusive: racial relations in Japan and current and historical political tensions between China and Japan. Two HGU participants and five CILA participants describe their own experiences or perceptions of racial discrimination in Japan. In addition, three HGU participants and two CILA participants express their unsettling feelings or concerns about living in a country - Japan - that has been in a troubled political relationship with China.
In Chapter 4, I discussed that prior studies consistently demonstrate Asian international students’ experiences with implicit or explicit racial discrimination in Japan. Compared to the literature, the proportion of those participants who offered stories on socio-political tensions in Japan is relatively small. Nonetheless, the significance of their stories should not be underestimated. As I will describe later, although there are a few exceptions, participants tend to discuss socio-political issues only with their Chinese peers or with their international student friends in order to avoid political complications in their friendships with Japanese or their life in Japan in general. In fact, more participants were willing to offer stories that they heard from their friends when I asked them to describe their experiences in the socio-political context of Japan. It can be inferred that some participants might have been too uncomfortable to share their personal stories on socially contentious issues with a Japanese interviewer like myself who was a virtual stranger to them. It is thus all the more important to attend to the available participants’ stories because they offer valuable insight into how they, and possibly also some of those participants who did not offer their personal accounts, experience and make sense of the socio-political context in Japan.

Moreover, while it remains unknown how many participants might have chosen not to share their firsthand accounts of the inhospitable socio-political climate in Japan, a lack of stories on socio-political issues, as well as the difficulties I had in having such conversations with them, suggest not only the limitations of the study but are also a finding on learning opportunities that might have been missed in the international institutions. I leave further discussions on the grey area of the findings to the end of the chapter where I present students’ stories that I believe indicate missed and emerging learning opportunities in their international institutions. Below, I present students’ accounts of socio-political tensions in Japan.
Experience of being “other Asians”: “Japanese people really like Western people.”

Consistent with the existing literature on Asian international students in Japan (Asano, 1997; Duan, 2003; Iwao & Hagiwara, 1988), participants experience Japanese people’s implicit and explicit racial discrimination, which their white Western counterparts seldom encounter. This is a manifestation of what Creighton (1997) calls “sociological categories of race, conforming to the white, yellow, black continuum” for foreigners in Japan (p. 212). With this categorization, non-Japanese Asians are placed in the status of “inferior Other,” whereas white Westerners are placed in the status of “superior Other.” Japan’s post-war successes in the international economic and political arena provide a backdrop to this racial hierarchy in Japan. According to Creighton, as a result of Japan’s economic success, mainstream Japanese imagine living in a “symbolic space of ‘white’” characterized by privilege, economic and political power, and cultural dominance (p. 228).

Nan Nan articulates her keen awareness of her position in the racial hierarchy in Japan: “Japanese people really like Western people. Among foreigners, they like seiyōjin (Westerners) more than other people, other Asian people” (Nan Nan, female, CILA). Her following comment illustrates a series of occasions when she saw herself positioned by Japanese people in an inferior position to her Western counterparts. She starts with her involvement in a music club in Kasuga University:

American guys have . . . a lot of people asking him to join the band, but not me. And, when I had to participate in events . . . [offered by Kasuga International House], we had Japanese students and some exchange students from like Europe or America and Asia. . . . I found Japanese people . . . like to talk to people from Europe or America. . . . And, last time, . . . I was interviewed by two senior or junior high [school] students from [another
city in Japan], and . . . when [the staff who organized the interview] introduced me [to the students], they said, “Oh, she's from China.” And then, they said, “Oh, we have another guest . . . America kara no dansei dayo (Here is a guy from America).” The two kids were like, [making a gasping sound]. (Nan Nan, female, CILA)

She interpreted that the Japanese students’ gasping reaction, which they did not have for her, was a reflection of their excitement or their thrill of meeting an American whom they idolize. As such, how Japanese people treat Westerners serves as a counter point reference for some participants to understand where they are positioned in the racial hierarchy in Japan.

Moreover, according to Peiyao, it is not rare for her to receive overtly discriminatory remarks especially from old Japanese customers when she works at a store for her part-time job:

Peiyao: Old men like in their 70’s would see my name tag . . . and say, “You are Chinese, aren’t you?” . . . They often say, “Are you stupid?”

Hanae: They say that to you?

Peiyao: Yes, especially when they ask me something in Japanese . . . and I don’t get it, . . . I say, “Would you please wait for a moment? I will ask someone who is responsible for this.” They wouldn’t calm down and say, “Are you stupid?” (Peiyao, female, HGU)

Out of those who offered their own accounts of unfavourable or discriminatory treatment by Japanese people, Peiyao is the only participant who offered her own experience of being a target of overt and direct discrimination. Nonetheless, with or without having an experience of being a target of explicit insult or discrimination, participants perceive some Japanese people’s attitudes toward them as discriminatory or unfavourable. They combine what they observe and what they have heard from others. For example, Xiang Hong describes why she thinks Japanese people do
not like Chinese people: “When you are talking in Chinese in the densha (train), some [Japanese] people always look at you like in that kind of way [making an annoyed or unpleasant facial expression] and just don’t look straight at you” (Xiang Hong, female, CILA). Xiang Hong then confirms her accounts above by stating, “My Korean friends have had a similar experience, but . . . people from American, European [countries], they don’t find that because the Japanese seem like they love Americans. [chuckle]” (Xiang Hong, female, CILA).

Moreover, participants link the discrimination they experience in Japan to Japanese people’s stereotype of China as a poor and underdeveloped country. Peiyao describes her dismay of how her country is represented in the classroom as follows:

The videos about China that many teachers used in class showed images of China ten years ago, showing images of bicycles all over the city. . . . [I feel that Japanese people hold] an image of a poor country [about China]. (Peiyao, female, HGU)

Xiang Hong also perceives that the fact that she is from a major Chinese city makes Japanese people’s attitude towards her more favourable than their attitudes towards those who are from rural areas of China:

Even . . . after [Japanese people] know that I speak Chinese and I am from China, I think the Japanese are kinder to Shanghainese because maybe they know about Shanghai. They know it is not so poor like their traditional image of Chinese cities. Because it is kind of a well-known city so you feel like they are kinder to you. (Xiang Hong, female, CILA)

Yet, what underpins this comment is her perception that the socio-economic status of her place of origin dictates how Japanese people would treat her. These participants’ accounts demonstrate that racial relations in Japan are intertwined with how Japanese society imagines its superior position to other Asian countries and peoples based on its economic prosperity.
Life in political tensions.

Participants also raise a number of recent political incidents between China and Japan as a source of their discomfort and sense of marginality in Japan. Those incidents include anti-China sentiments during the Beijing Olympics in 2008, cases of food poisoning from dumplings imported from China in 2008, and the aforementioned territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in September 2010. Participants witness anti-China protests on the street, watch Japanese news coverage that is critical of China, or hear about anti-China activities that their Chinese friends came across in Japan. For example, by referring to the territorial conflict between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Mao Mao, describes how the incident was portrayed in the Japanese media and how it made her feel uncomfortable and vulnerable in Japan:

At that time [when the dispute occurred], you see the Japanese television, and then, you can see . . . programs [in which] they show the video or some so-called professors or experts on the Chinese-Japanese relationship. . . . And they say some bad things about China. As Chinese, I feel *really really* uncomfortable, but in Japan, you can do nothing. *If* you do something, maybe you will be arrested by the police, and you'll be sent back to China. (Mao Mao, female, CILA)

Similar to Mao Mao, Fei expresses his concerns about living under political tensions between China and Japan. By referring to the territorial dispute, which is a topic that he often discusses with his Chinese friends, he states, “[Chinese students in Japan] are worried about the China-

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Japan relationship gets worse. . . . What are we going to do if a war begins? (Fei, male, HGU).

Most of the participants who describe political affairs between China and Japan note their effort to detach themselves from those political incidents stating that those affairs are between the two governments, not individuals. Nonetheless, in their stories, it is clear that they as individuals are not completely separate from the bilateral relationship between China and Japan. For example, Jiao describes that Japanese people’s negative stereotypes about China rooted in political affairs between the countries do not affect him personally; however, he is relieved about his Chinese identity being not visually recognizable. He states, “Asians, we are all yellow and have black hair. No one knows who is Chinese unless told, right? I’m a little relieved about that” (Jiao, male, CILA). His “relief” about the invisibility of his Chinese origin expresses his vulnerability to the political tensions. Similarly, Xiazhi sees that the China-Japan political relationship does not affect his current life at HGU. However, when asked about his concerns about the future, he responds, “I don’t have a concern, but I have a wish. . . . I want the China-Japan relationship to be improved” (Xiazhi, male, HGU). He explains:

Once I’m out to Japanese society in the future, I’m sure I will meet many people, and I think that if I meet those who do not like China, they may bully me. . . . Now, I’m a student at a university so I have no problem. There are many international students, and I’m not the only one, but I think that there are not so many foreigners once I’m out to the society. (Xiazhi, male, HGU)

He thus anticipates his vulnerable minority status in Japanese society where there is anti-China sentiment.
Acceptance of socio-political tensions in Japan: “It doesn’t trouble me.”

These participants’ experiences in Japan’s socio-political environment can be perceived as disheartening, worrisome, humiliating, or uncomfortable to say the least. However, whether or not they have a direct experience with xenophobia, racism, or anti-China sentiment in Japan, the majority of those participants who discuss socio-political issues in Japan tend to express their indifferent or accepting, rather than anguished or critical, stance toward the issues.

What is most puzzling or disconcerting is that those who have actually experienced xenophobia, racism, or anti-China sentiment see the inhospitable socio-political climate in Japan as normal or acceptable, even if they were offended or disappointed by it. For example, Xiang Hong perceives Japanese people’s discriminatory attitude towards Chinese people as expected and understandable given the historical and current political tensions between the two countries. While mentioning that experiencing discrimination is unpleasant, she states, “It doesn’t trouble me,” and then explains why:

Xiang Hong: [Receiving discriminatory treatment from Japanese people] is not a big deal because I imagined that before I came here to Japan, so . . . [I am] already getting used to it. . . . It doesn’t trouble me.

Hanae: Really? Why?

Xiang Hong: It is understandable because we have so many political problems between the two countries, and, yeah, it is understandable that . . . they don’t like the Chinese because, I mean, in China there are millions of people who don’t like the Japanese, too. So it is understandable, and yeah, it is like OK as long as they don’t come and, you know, say something bad to me.

(Xiang Hong, female, CILA)
She thus accepts discrimination as mutual, based on the hostile bilateral relationship, unless she becomes subject to a personal attack. Similarly, while Meng feels that her Japanese peers look down on her because she is Chinese, she accepts it as “human nature” because Chinese people also look down upon Vietnamese people. She explains:

Maybe it's human nature, but really we look down on Vietnamese people. . . . Maybe [some people] do not admit that, but it's true that I think, in our heart, we have different levels of countries and people from [different] countries. (Meng, female, HGU)

Likewise, those participants who have experienced socio-political tensions in Japan express their accepting and unaffected stance toward the experience. Nan Nan at CILA is the only participant who was completely turned off by the inhospitable climate in Japan. Her experiences of Japanese people’s discriminatory attitudes toward her contributed to her decision not to stay in Japan after graduation contrary to her original plan.

Perhaps participants’ accepting stance toward the difficult socio-political environment in Japan can be explained, to some extent, with what Japan means to them in the future. As discussed in the previous chapter, many participants view Japan as a temporary place to stay. Xinmei accepts Japanese people’s exclusionary attitudes toward non-Japanese people as normal and explicitly states that she does not have an expectation to be accepted as part of Japanese society because she will leave Japan anyway:

It would be difficult to be admitted by other Japanese people that you are just like the same as them. They will still have the idea that you are different; [you are] from a different country or different race or something. . . . If I try to be part of the society, it will be way [more] difficult than I just try to live here. Because I don't have a plan to work . . . or live in Japan ever after, [and] because, you know, Japan is not an immigrant
country, so it's kind of impossible for me to live here [forever]. . . . So I don't have a motivation to try to be part of this society. (Xinmei, female, CILA)

Xinmei is the only participant who articulates her sense of detachment from Japanese society based on her view of Japan as a temporary place to stay. However, this comment provides valuable insight into how participants’ temporary sense of affiliation with Japan can be translated into their distanced and accepting stance toward the problematic socio-political climate in Japan.

**Missed and emerging learning opportunities for socio-political engagement.**

Participants’ indifferent and accepting stance toward socio-political issues in Japan points to missed learning opportunities for them to critically engage in challenging social complexities surrounding them in the internationalized institutions and overall Japanese society as contact zones. At the same time, a few participants’ stories also suggest transformative learning through their engagement in the socio-political aspect of the contact zones. In this section, I will illustrate some of the missed and emerging learning opportunities addressed in students’ stories because they suggest the opportunities and challenges that the internationalization of Japanese higher education brings to Japanese universities and society at large.

**Missed opportunities in international-student-friendly institutional settings.**

Students’ stories reveal that their multicultural institutional settings are not necessarily working fully as a site for the students to discuss and tackle socially contentious issues arising from diversity in their campus community or in the surrounding Japanese society. Firstly, participants’ stories show that their lives tend to be encapsulated within their international-student-friendly institutional environments, which are distant from the rest of Japanese society. When asked about difficult or uncomfortable experiences with their peers or with Japanese people, participants repeat that they are fine as long as they are in their institutions because the
institutions are friendlier to international students than the rest of Japanese society. For example, Xiaotao attributes her lack of negative experiences in Japan to her hospitable CILA environment, which is not always the case with the rest of Kasuga University:

I think that Japanese people are quite nice especially to us, international students, but maybe because that is I’m getting friends with CILA students. They have already gotten used to . . . international students so they don’t really think like we are strange or we are foreigners. But actually, I heard that from my friend, . . . sometimes [students] from other departments, . . . they think that foreigners are strange. When . . . my Taiwanese friends, they were talking in Chinese, and I think they were on the campus, a Japanese guy heard that they were using Chinese, and he said, “Gaijin kowai (foreigners are scary).”

(Xiaotao, female, CILA)

Likewise, Zhongyang at HGU describes that xenophobia in the off-campus Japanese society is not applicable to her HGU environment:

There are some old people in Japan who really have some negative images about China. But I think that most of the people, especially young people [in Japan], they are very friendly, and they treat international students very well. . . . Especially students at HGU, they meet international students every day. They know us, and so. [trailing off]

(Zhongyang, female, HGU)

These comments show that, fortunately in one sense, their international-student-friendly institution environments shield students from harsh socio-political tensions in Japan. However, the gap which participants see separating their institutional environments from the external Japanese society points to a distance participants feel between Japanese society and themselves.
The distance suggests disengagement as well as protection from the socio-political reality of Japanese society.

Secondly, even within their welcoming institutional settings, when they do interact with other student communities, they can keep their interactions at a superficial level. For example, five HGU participants and a CILA participant state that they avoid discussing or dealing with differences in political views or cultures. One of them, Fei, asserts his unwillingness to discuss international politics with his non-Chinese peers: “Rather than that I find it hard to talk about it with them, I just don’t want to talk about it” (Fei, male, HGU). He explains:

If I talk about political issues with other friends, I think our friendship will be affected. If I talk about politics with my Japanese friends, for example, I think I really have to think about what they would think about it. . . . I think they would think, “Ah, you are Chinese after all,” or “The Chinese are always self-centered.” I think everyone thinks that way.

When we have a problem with another country, the blame is always on the other country, like, “My country hasn’t done anything wrong.” (Fei, male, HGU).

Likewise, due to the difficulties of communicating different political views with students from different countries, Mana concludes, “So I just try to ignore [politics] and just talk to them, like, ‘Oh, let's hang out for other things, but just ignore . . . the difficult part or different part,’ yeah” (Mana, female, HGU).

Much like Fei expresses his concerns about the repercussions of discussing a political issue with his non-Chinese friends, participants’ discretion on political matters can be understood as a self-protection strategy. It would be unrealistic and unreasonable to expect individual students, particularly those who are placed in a vulnerable position in the current volatile political climate in Japan, to jeopardize their friendships to initiate conversations on socially
contentious issues. Nonetheless, their isolation from Japanese society and from their peers from other countries makes one wonder about the meaning of the international education institutions that were created to allow students from different countries to interact and learn with and from one another.

*Emerging learning opportunities in on-campus and off-campus contact zones.*

The participants’ stories above illustrate missed learning opportunities in their internationalized university settings, suggesting how challenging it is to let socio-political learning emerge from such settings. However, some other stories, albeit few in number, also show that their interactions with their international peers and local Japanese people, such as in classroom discussions and through their off-campus part-time jobs, have turned into transformative learning experiences. Their stories resonate with what Pratt (1998) calls the “joys of the contact zone” (p. 184). Pratt describes the joys as well as the challenges of engaging her diverse students in discussions on the Americas and the multiple cultural histories at a university in the United States:

All the students in the class had the experience, for example, of hearing their culture discussed and objectified in ways that horrified them; all the students saw their roots traced back to legacies of both glory and shame; all the students experienced face-to-face the ignorance and incomprehension, and occasionally the hostility, of others. . . . Virtually every student was having the experience of seeing the world described with him or her in it. Along with rage, incomprehension, and pain, there were exhilarating moments of wonder and revelation, mutual understanding, and new wisdom – the joys of the contact zone. (p. 183-184)
The following stories by student participants point to various degrees of joy (or potential joy) as well as to the challenges of internationalized university settings and the surrounding Japanese society as contact zones.

For example, three HGU participants describe their humanized view of Japanese people whom they used to see as a cruel Other due to Japan’s wartime aggressions in other Asian countries. One of the participants, Zing, describes how her view of Japanese people has changed through the trusting relationship she has developed with her Japanese colleagues at her part-time restaurant job:

The owner and other staff [of the restaurant] were really nice to me, and I had such a fantastic time there. . . . The history between China and Japan hasn’t been really good, right? . . . [But] I thought that I shouldn’t judge [people] only by history. (Zing, female, HGU)

While the above account points to Zing’s transformation of a stereotype of Japanese people that had been constructed by her historical knowledge, the following story by Xiang Hong illustrates her learning about the political construction of historical knowledge of the China-Japan relationship. In a discussion on a meaningful experience in Japan, she shares a story from her interactions with her Japanese friend who is studying history education at Kasuga University. She describes:

We talk a lot about Chinese history, and something is kind of a totally different story in their Japanese [text] book and a Chinese [text] book. But we just don’t feel embarrassed when we talk about, you know, those differences. We just feel that it is interesting. The two education systems, they just make totally different stories, you know? It is not important which one is true. It’s important why [the two education systems] are doing
this. It’s a kind of political thing. . . . Because I haven’t had a chance to talk about those . . . touchy subjects with the Japanese before, it is kind of interesting for me. (Xiang Hong, female, CILA)

As Xiang Hong enjoys unpacking “touchy subjects” with her Japanese friend, such as the history of the China-Japan relationship, Ting also appreciates an opportunity to discuss political issues with her Taiwanese friend as follows:

Because . . . the Taiwan and the mainland China have political problems, so sometimes we just talk about this kind of problem. [chuckle] Like, she has her own opinion, and I have my own opinion. . . . Even though . . . [there are] political problems, we see some news, and we just discuss together so that's very nice, really. (Ting, female, HGU)

These stories demonstrate that internationalized universities as contact zones, where students of diverse historical, political, cultural, and geographical trajectories meet, have great potential to be able to offer students transformative learning opportunities. Students can be engaged not only in international friendships but also in discussions on challenging socio-political issues surrounding them at both the local and global levels.

These students’ accounts above illustrate that their engagement in socio-political issues with their international peers organically transpired from friendships and led them to meaningful learning experiences. However, it is challenging not only to let such learning happen but also to carry out a learning process that evokes a lot of emotion and discomfort, what Pratt (1998) refers to as the “pedagogical arts of the contact zone” (p. 184). For example, Mao Mao reflects on her uncomfortable feelings with her Taiwanese classmates in her international relations class:

In the mainland of China, people always try to say that Taiwan is a part of China. But the Taiwanese, maybe they don't think that [way]. Yeah, and the teacher asks the Taiwanese
students, and it’s uncomfortable when you hear that your country or your province is part of China. Some [Taiwanese] students say, “No.” Uncomfortable. Really really uncomfortable. And, Chinese students would [wonder], “Why [do] you say that?” . . . We all speak Chinese, and we all have the same appearance. Why [do] you say that? (Mao Mao, female, CILA)

However, to conclude her stories on uncomfortable classroom discussions on China’s relationships with Taiwan and Japan, she expresses her effort to stay open-minded to different ideas presented by her international peers:

I think that in CILA especially, the international environment is really strong, and it is a kind of mainstream culture, the international culture. So if we can't accept other people's ideas . . . and whether or not we accept and really agree with it is our own problem. (Mao Mao, female, CILA)

As such, in an internationalized university as a contact zone, a challenge and an opportunity to let transformative learning happen are two sides of the same coin.

**Summary.**

In this chapter, I have explored how participants see themselves positioned or work to position themselves in relation to others in their institutional settings and the broader Japanese society. Overall, participants’ stories demonstrate that they tend to see Japanese society as Other from a distance. In their view, their institutional settings with the English language and a large international student body represent what is international, that is, what is not Japanese. In this way, they imagine a homogeneous and monolingual Japanese community as Other, in contrast to their institutional environments.
Within the institutions, participants tend to socialize primarily with their Chinese peers based on the imagined sameness they share. However, at the same time, their stories show the complexity of the actual Chinese student community. Firstly, their stories reveal the heterogeneity of the Chinese community, such as different regional cultures and political views. Secondly, their stories suggest that their institutional settings and practices have implications for how they imagine and relate to different communities among their peers. HGU participants’ friendships tend to be more confined to their Chinese peers on campus compared to their CILA counterparts. While CILA participants also tend to live their lives primarily with their Chinese peers, their alignment to the group identity as Chinese is not as clearly pronounced as in HGU. To explain the subtle gap between the two student groups, I explored different institutional settings. As represented in HGU’s hallmark event, the World Culture Week, HGU organizes a campus space where diversity among the students is framed and celebrated according to nationality. In contrast, CILA has a space where neither students nor campus events are organized according to students’ nationality or national culture.

Even though participants’ interactions with Japanese students and the overall Japanese society tend to be limited, Japanese students or Japanese society often still serve as a counterpoint of reference for them to describe their social existence in Japan. Their stories show the reciprocal ways they see and label their Japanese counterparts as Other while feeling that they are othered by their Japanese counterparts. For example, while on campus they feel as though they are being marginalized by their Japanese peers who view them as Other or impose on them Japanese cultural norms and practices. They also detach themselves from Japanese students whom they critically see as aimless.
In addition, their on-campus and off-campus experiences are embedded in a socio-political climate in Japan that marginalizes non-Japanese people, especially other Asians. While some participants experience or observe racism, xenophobia, or anti-China sentiment due to the intensifying bilateral relationship between China and Japan, they tend to present an indifferent attitude toward the troubling socio-political climate surrounding them. Their indifferent stance resonates with their view of Japanese society as a temporary place to stay and as Other, imagined from the distant vantage point of their institutional settings whose linguistic, demographic, and cultural environments are detached from the surrounding Japanese society. As a result, the Self-Other boundaries that participants imagine between themselves and their Japanese counterparts are sustained, rather than challenged, in the institutional settings that offer a hospitable environment for international students.

Participants’ lack of engagement in Japanese society, on the one hand, points to missed learning opportunities for them to critically engage in the challenging social complexities surrounding them in both the internationalized institutions and in the overall Japanese society as contact zones. On the other hand, a few participants’ stories point to transformative learning emerging from their engagement in the socio-political aspect of the contact zones.
Chapter 9: Discussion of Findings and Conclusion

One of the main research questions of this study was “How do Japanese universities see their social existence and translate it into their internationalization discourses and practices?” In Chapter 6, based on interviews with faculty and staff participants, I showed that both of the institutions’ creation of English-medium programs and diverse student bodies manifest their sense of social existence as international institutions located in Japan. They see themselves located in a homogeneous, non-English-speaking, and non-Western country in the competitive and uneven global fields of higher education and economy. At the same time, the two institutions see different futures for themselves from the different positions they occupy within the hierarchical Japanese higher education system. As a large elite institution, CILA, together with Kasuga, sees itself as well positioned to take advantage of government funds for internationalization, and to become a leading academic institution on the global stage. In contrast, as a small and less prestigious institution, HGU sees itself in a disadvantaged position to exploit the government’s competitive funding and yet seeks to enhance its competitiveness in the economic arena by preparing students to become global human resources.

The other research question was “How do international students see their identities and future possibilities in and through their international education in Japan?” I divided my investigation for this question into two parts: students’ identity formation through their global mobility and through their experiences in Japan. In Chapter 7, I addressed the former and highlighted students’ classed identity formation process and Japanese institutions’ involvement in the process. Even though the majority of the student participants grew up with the idea of studying overseas as a common, possible, and ideal life option, Japan was not originally a desirable destination country for them. However, international student recruitment efforts by the
Japanese institutions effectively appealed to students’ different needs and desires. For the majority of HGU students, going there was a convenient and strategic solution to the extremely competitive university entrance exam and job market in China. They were attracted by HGU’s timely and relatively easy admissions and generous financial support, as well as by an international education opportunity that they envisaged would help them stand out in the future job market. In contrast, for the vast majority of CILA students, going there was a choice rather than a solution. They were consistently driven to affiliate themselves with CILA’s prestige. These contrasting motivations of the two student groups elucidated the two Japanese universities’ role in sorting and reproducing students’ socio-economic class.

Most of the participants at both institutions did not go to Japan with clear future plans, and their post-graduation plans still contain a lot of uncertainties and various possibilities. However, their stories illustrate that their experiences in Japan are giving rise to a transnational life path as a possibility in their future imaginations.

In Chapter 8, I addressed students’ identity formation in Japan and illustrated various ways they imagine communities around them and position themselves in relation to those communities. Their stories show that, overall, students tend to socialize primarily with their Chinese peers based on an imagined sense of sameness among them. Their identities are often described in relation to their Japanese counterparts and Japanese society as Other. For them, their Japanese peers are Other not only as a result of having been marginalized by them but also as a way to resist affiliating themselves with Japanese students who lack academic focus. In addition, their stories indicate that they see Japanese society as homogeneous Other by positioning themselves in their institutions, which they see unrepresentative of Japan based on the presence of English language and international students.
Yet, there were some subtle differences between HGU and CILA participants, reflecting their different institutional settings. Firstly, HGU students tend to identify with the Chinese student community more consistently and explicitly than do their CILA counterparts, suggesting the implications of HGU’s practices, represented by its hallmark campus event, World Culture Week, for students’ imagination of their communities bounded by national borders. Secondly, compared to HGU participants, CILA participants tend to more strongly express their marginal position in relation to their Japanese peers, based on their contacts with Japanese students in Kasuga-University-wide student clubs.

In this chapter, I explore the intersections between international students’ identities and the internationalization of Japanese higher education by synthesizing the findings from my findings chapters with the relevant literature. In analyzing the intersections, I intend to achieve this study’s main purpose, which is to identify some of the challenges and potential of the internationalization of Japanese universities. I discuss three themes that have emerged from the intersections. Firstly, I address the imagined communities that were expressed in students’ stories on their global mobility and the institutions’ involvement in students’ imagination. Secondly, I articulate alignments between how the institutions imagine their future possibilities through internationalization and how students imagine their own futures through their participation in international education in Japan. Thirdly, I discuss theoretical and practical problems involved in the creation of cultural diversity on the two Japanese university campuses by juxtaposing the institutions’ intentions and students’ engagement and disengagement in the cultural diversity. Following the conclusion of the study, I describe its implications for internationalization policy and practice, as well as its contributions and limitations. I then provide suggestions for future research and close the dissertation with my personal reflections.
Emerging imagined communities in global student mobility.

Borrowing Anderson’s (1991) concept of imagined communities, this study has sought to discover what types of communities Chinese international students seek to join through their international education in Japan. In line with prior studies on globally mobile individuals (Baas, 2010; Fong, 2011; Ong, 1999; Rizvi, 2005; Waters, 2006a, 2009a), my findings have documented students’ strategic ways of enhancing flexible and transnational life options and of positioning themselves better in the labour market. However, what I found in my study was that whatever community participants envision joining is less clearly articulated than in other studies. My analysis of my student interview data was stalled when my focus was on identifying the community (or communities) that students were trying to join through participating in international education in Japan. Yet, I later came to realize that the conceptual usefulness of imagined communities is limited when students are in the process of developing their imagination for their future possibilities. For the majority of my student participants, there was barely such a thing as an image of community they aspired to join from the beginning of their international education endeavour.

The subtle difference between my study’s findings and those from prior studies can be elaborated when my findings are compared with Baas’ (2010) study of Indian international graduate students in Australia and Fong’s (2011) study of transnational Chinese students in developed countries. When compared with Baas’ (2010), my study highlights the emergence, rather than the preexistence, of international students’ future imaginations to live as transnationals. On the one hand, in both my and Baas’ studies, students aspire to attain lives as transnationals, even if transnationals do not represent “observable end-states” but rather “imaginary arrival points that are constantly rewritten under changing circumstances” (Baas,
For Baas’ participants, joining a globally mobile community, in which the members possess flexible transnational life options, has been a consistent goal from the very beginning. When they first came to Australia, they already had the idea of gaining better access to global mobility through obtaining Australian permanent residency, and thereby to “a full transnational life” (Baas, 2010, p. 180). In Australia, they worked toward the goal although they encountered numerous barriers to achieving it. In contrast, for most of my student participants, the imagination of living as transnationals did not exist from the very beginning but rather emerged and grew as a possible life option through their encounters with and experiences in their Japanese universities.

This subtle difference between my findings and Baas’ (2010) highlights these studies’ different contributions to the literature on international students’ identities. Baas claims that one of the major contributions of his study is that it has articulated the process of transnationalization based on his critique of previous studies on transnationalism. As Baas puts it, “If the study of transnationalism is most of all about labeling groups that either are or aren’t transnational, then we run the risk of forgetting about the actual process which triggers and facilitates this in the first place” (Baas, 2010, p. 11-12). My study has added a subtle layer to the knowledge of the process of transnationalization developed by Baas. My findings articulate how individuals, who did not necessarily have a clear imagination of a transnational future, start seeing the possibility of joining a community of transnationals.

In particular, my findings elucidate the key role that the Japanese universities have played in initiating, enabling, and developing students’ future imagination. For example, in Baas’ (2010) study, students were primarily attracted to Australia because it is a sponsor of permanent residency. In Fong’s study, students were driven to gain access to the “developed world” as a
single imagined community that encompasses diverse developed countries throughout the world. My study also shows that students had imagined that their experiences in Japan as a developed country or as a global economic power would lead them to prosperous career opportunities in Japan, China, or elsewhere. Therefore, it is possible to say that my student participants were driven to associate themselves with the imagined developed world community, however explicit or implicit the intention might have been for them. Yet, it is important to note that for the majority of my participants, the choice of a destination country was secondary to their choice of institution. In my study, students’ stories elucidate how effectively the two Japanese institutions met the needs and desires of the students. Rather than the specific desire to belong to the imagined developed world or transnational community, what really drove the majority of my student participants to decide to go to Japan were the specific opportunities that the Japanese institutions offered for their immediate futures, be it a biographical solution of systemic contradictions in China or a chance to study at an internationally prestigious university.

Thus, while the concept of imagined communities has served my study as a helpful entry point to explore students’ imagined futures, the exploration has led me to a more complex and fine-grained picture than a fixed and broad picture of a community students work to join through participating in international education in Japan. The study has highlighted the intersections between Japanese universities’ internationalization activities and the development of international students’ future imagination to join a transnational community in the developed world.

**Actors’ aligned self-positioning within global and domestic systems.**

Students’ stories show that how they construct their life paths and new identities are not always linear and rational. Along with encounters with the Japanese universities, which were
happenstances for many students, many other factors were involved in the development of their future imaginations. The factors include students’ consumerist desire for a tourist life, an admiration of the West as an imagined community, concerns about the gao kao university entrance exam, and the desire to stand out in the job market.

Yet, while the way students imagine their future possibilities is not always linearly directed toward a certain goal or destination, neither is it totally random or serendipitous. When the findings from faculty/staff participants and student participants are combined, we see alignments between how the institutions imagine their future possibilities through internationalization and how students imagine their future possibilities through their participation in international education in Japan. The alignments illustrate how the internationalization of Japanese higher education serves as a site of social reproduction in which the actors – the Japanese government, the universities, and international students – work to position themselves within the existing configurations of power at both the global and local levels and social imaginaries of globalization.

In Chapter 2, I discussed the relationship between the internationalization of higher education and globalization, which has historical roots in Western imperialism and colonialism (Forstorp, 2008; Luke, 2006; Spring, 1998). Today, internationalization in Japan and elsewhere is embedded in a neoliberal imaginary of globalization (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010) while simultaneously continuing to be located within a Western imaginary of globalization, a sense of global interconnectivity in which the West is central and dominant (Deem et al., 2008; Mok, 2007; Spring, 1998). In Chapter 3, I have shown that within this global context, the internationalization of education has historically been a way for Japan to assert its position and
identity in the world, more specifically in relation to the West (Kariya & Rappleye, 2010; Mochizuki, 2004).

The two institutions’ internationalization practices signify their self-positioning strategies, which reflect their socially situated imagination of their social existence and future possibilities based on their understanding of Japan’s position in the world. Their relentless drive toward the integration of English into their education settings is a prime manifestation of their constrained imagination of “what is normal” and “what is possible,” seen from a vantage point of institutions located in Japan, a non-English-speaking, non-Western country. Yet, at the same time, they take advantage of their affiliation with Japan, a non-English-speaking country with a mature economy, for their competitive edge in the international student recruitment market. Thus, the institutions are not passively subjugated to the hegemonic power of English or the West.

In addition to a Western imaginary of globalization, the institutions’ imaginations are espoused in a neoliberal imaginary of globalization. Faculty/staff participants’ justifications for their use of English show that their primary concern is about system efficiency and the requirements of the global market, rather than by cultural or educational concerns. They are also driven to establish their positions as international institutions by adopting English. With English, they can attract more international students and enhance their international profiles, thereby enhancing their access to positional goods (Marginson, 2006).

While seeing their social existence in the world from the vantage point of Japan, which is situated within the Western and neoliberal imaginaries of globalization, the two institutions also see themselves and future possibilities in a more locally specific way at a domestic level. The different types of competitiveness that they pursue through internationalization are informed
largely by their different positions in the hierarchical Japanese higher education system. Yokota et al. (2006) predicted that the competitive funding allocation system that was introduced in the Japanese government’s recent internationalization policies would reinforce the existing stratification of Japan’s higher education system by privileging large and prestigious universities. My study has demonstrated a finding consistent with this prediction while also facilitating a close exploration of how the two institutions of different academic prestige work to enhance different types of competitive advantage. HGU, for its part, sees inequality in funding distribution by the Japanese government. Nonetheless, they aim to establish their institutional competitiveness in an economic domain by meeting the Japanese economy’s perceived needs for global human resources. In contrast, Kasuga, including CILA, seeks to advance its established prestigious position in the Japanese higher education system to an international academic community. Unlike HGU, which seeks to establish its status by serving Japan’s economic needs, Kasuga independently seeks to fulfill its own competitive needs by exploiting increased government funding opportunities. Thus, how the institutions see their social existence and future possibilities and act on their self-positioning through internationalization is located within existing global and domestic power structures entrenched in Western and neoliberal imaginaries of globalization. Put differently, their internationalization strategies represent the institutions’ biographical solutions to systemic contradictions within and outside Japan’s national borders. The institutions incorporate challenges and opportunities in highly competitive fields of higher education in Japan and beyond into their internationalization strategies in order to better position themselves.

How international students view their social existence and future possibilities and how they work to position themselves in the world fit within this picture of internationalization, both
hierarchically and ideologically. As discussed in Chapter 7, student participants have grown up with a certain level of class privilege as manifested in their access to English education and global mobility. Yet, combined with their family backgrounds, their stories about why they chose the particular Japanese institutions show their classed life strategies aligned with the hierarchical self-positioning strategies of the institutions. CILA students could ultimately be choosers who could afford the most prestigious university education possible with few financial constraints. In contrast, HGU students’ decisions represent their solutions to their life circumstances in China. These contrasting ways these two student groups work to position themselves in the world mirror the institutions’ different positions in the international student recruitment market. CILA’s privileged position in the Japanese higher education system allows them to attract international students without offering as much financial support for international students as HGU does. In contrast, HGU attracts international students with financial aid and career support. This alignment between students with different class backgrounds and the institutions of different academic prestige show that the internationalization of Japanese higher education not only takes place within the existing configurations of power but also sustains, rather than disrupts or alters, the configurations.

The data from HGU faculty/staff and student interviews also suggest another type of alignment: their ideological alignment to neoliberalism. As described in Chapter 7, HGU student participants tend to explicitly express their strategic ways of commodifying their international education experiences for their employability, which reminds us of what Apple (2001) calls “enterprising individuals” (p. 414). Their self-capitalizing narratives overlap with HGU’s investment in enhancing its competitiveness as a supplier of global human resources. In contrast,
such neoliberalist narratives were not as consistently and strongly expressed by CILA faculty/staff and student participants. This study does not have sufficient empirical evidence to allow me to make definitive statements on the extent to which HGU is implicated in the students’ identity construction as neoliberal subjects. It should be remembered that HGU students had the desire to attain a competitive edge in the future labour market even before coming to HGU. Nevertheless, suffice it say that HGU’s zealous investment in the production of global human resources has encouraged or at least maintained, rather than challenged or shifted, students’ preexisting neoliberal thinking. This suggests ideological implication of institutions’ discourses and practices to students’ sense of identity, consistent with prior empirical studies (Demerath & Lynch, 2008; O’Flynn & Petersen, 2007).

In sum, this study has demonstrated that the internationalization of Japanese higher education has been a medium through which Japan as a nation, the Japanese institutions, and international students all work to position themselves within the existing global and domestic power structures that are entrenched in Western and neoliberal imaginaries of globalization. How students with different socio-economic classes and the institutions with contrasting academic prestige position themselves in the international student recruitment market fits within this picture of internationalization. A limitation of the internationalization of Japanese higher education emerges from this picture of internationalization. Specifically, the coordinated imaginations and self-positioning actions of the actors – the Japanese government, the universities, and international students alike – are confined within, rather than transcending or transforming, the existing power structures and the dominant Western and neoliberal imaginaries of globalization. In other words, as far as the cases in this study are concerned, the
internationalization of Japanese higher education is not a game-changer but rather a self-positioning game in itself. The actors participate in the game with their imaginative capacity to see their current social existence and future possibilities shaped within the existing power structures embedded in the dominant social imaginaries. This finding illuminates the socially situated nature of the actors’ imaginations and the challenges to overcoming the given material and ideological conditions.

Creation of cultural diversity and students’ dis/engagement.

As described in Chapter 6, both institutions’ campuses represent a future community in which they imagine their students will live: An internationally diverse English-speaking community. Faculty and staff participants at both institutions express their sincere sense of mission to prepare their students for the imagined future community. Some students’ stories suggest that the campus environments created with such a vision have the potential to be sites where students engage in transformative learning, thereby transcending national and cultural boundaries. However, the creation of such campus environments has both theoretical and empirical problems. The problems manifest in the construction of the imagined pristine and neutral multicultural community – a community in which the institution and students locate themselves, but do so while also disengaging from its complexity, and from the complexity of Japanese society.

At a theoretical level, as discussed in Chapter 6, the campus environments at HGU and CILA represent Bhabha’s (1990) notion of the “creation of cultural diversity” (p. 208) underpinned by the assumption that Japan is a culturally and ethnically homogeneous society; therefore, diversity needs to be brought from overseas. In addition to recruiting many international students to diversify the student body, the creation of the English-medium programs
on the Japanese campuses is an integral part of the creation of cultural diversity. This particular way of creating cultural diversity is problematic because it fails to attend to various forms of diversity in Japanese society and creates imagined Self/Other boundaries between Japanese society and international students, and between the institutions and Japanese society.

This theoretical problem needs to be understood in a nuanced way. Firstly, as Matus (2006) problematizes, as much as the idea of international students as a symbol of cultural diversity conveys an idealistic sense of inclusivity of differences, the idea puts international students in a homogeneous subject position of Other being different from the host society as homogeneous Self. Yet, in my study, the boundary between international student community as Other and the Japanese community as Self is not completely fixed on the two campuses. Some faculty/staff participants at both institutions resist the notion of international students as different or special based on their institutional identity as international institutions. Secondly, in the discourse of kokusaika in Japan, English represents the language of civilized Other and the language of an imagined international community (Kubota, 1998, 2002). It can be interpreted that the institutions’ intention of adopting English as a language of instruction is to participate in the imagined international community rather than to engage in the existing diversity in Japan. Nonetheless, faculty/staff participants’ preoccupation with English needs to be understood as an expression of their imagination being constrained by their social position as a non-English-speaking country, rather than a sign that their imaginative capacity is flawed.

Even so, the theoretical problems of creating cultural diversity on the Japanese campuses empirically manifest when participants’ stories are taken into account. As described in Chapter 8, students’ detachment from Japanese communities appears to run parallel to their institutions’ visions. In essence, instead of engaging in existing ethnic, cultural, or linguistic diversity in
Japan, both the institutions and students seem to imagine their current and future positions somewhere outside Japanese society. Just as an HGU student refers to her campus environment as a “fantasyland” (Jie, female, HGU), HGU and CILA have created campus environments that in fact diverge from Japanese society by bringing in English and many international students. From such a particular campus environment, which participants describe as “international,” “special,” and “atypical” in Japan, they tend to see Japanese society as Other, a homogeneous country closed to the world.

Students’ lack of interactions with Japanese society is embedded in this particular imagination of Japan as Other. Despite the cultural diversity created on their campuses, students tend to lead an encapsulated life within their Chinese student communities, and their Japanese counterparts constitute an imagined community of Other against which they describe their sense of identity in Japan. For me in particular, one of the most puzzling and concerning findings was how rare it was for student participants to offer their accounts of their marginal experiences in Japan. This does not mean that I think that they should feel marginalized or discriminated against in Japan. Moreover, I am aware that some of them might have withheld their honest accounts from me for various reasons, including my subject position as a Japanese. Nonetheless, their lack of stories about their engagement in Japan’s socio-political context seems to signify how detached they are from Japanese society, and this lack of engagement demands a critical reflection on what it means to create cultural diversity on Japanese campuses.

Based on my prior knowledge of the experiences of social minorities, including international students, in Japan, I visited each institution with an expectation to hear about student participants’ marginal experiences in Japan’s socio-political climate. However, to my surprise, to a large extent my findings did not align with this expectation. If I had repeatedly
heard stories from student participants about racism among their peers at their institutions, for example, I might have asked faculty/staff participants about how their institutions are working on the problem, but this did not happen. In addition, none of the faculty/staff participants mentioned political or racial tensions in Japan in any segment of the interview, including when I asked them about the current or future challenges for their institutions. Eventually, I came to wonder if I was holding on to a negative bias that is in fact irrelevant to these institutions.

Yet, some students did offer candid accounts of racism and political hostility against China based on their own experiences with their Japanese peers and with Japanese society. Some also talked about their relief that their non-Japanese status was not visible by their appearance or their fear of experiencing racism when they work in a Japanese company in the future. These students’ accounts are not groundless, but are informed by their daily interactions with their Japanese counterparts and their observation of Japanese society and media. Their poignant accounts offer sufficient, if not abundant, evidence that is consistent with my knowledge about the harsh socio-political climate for minorities in Japan.

What makes the creation of cultural diversity at the institutions even more questionable is that even those who have experienced or witnessed discrimination and political hostility in Japan are uncritical about it. In addition, many participants seemed to be almost unaware of the problematic issues in Japan or to see the issues as irrelevant to them. This troubling finding seems to be related to how students describe their institutional settings. They often describe their institutions as benign and welcoming spaces compared to the wider Japanese society, and they attribute the difference to their international institutional culture. Although it is a positive finding that there are few outstanding racial and political tensions within their institutions, their almost
total lack of awareness of and indifference to social problems in Japan suggest that they imagine their institutions as pristine multicultural communities divorced from Japanese society.

Their pristine accounts of the institutions are an imagined construct, for any internationalized university setting is a contact zone and can never be neutral (Doherty & Singh, 2005b; Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Pratt, 1998). In fact, some student participants’ accounts illustrate Japan’s racial hierarchy, which favours Westerners over Asians, and tensions among students in a classroom discussion on topics like China-Taiwan relations. Students’ lack of articulation about the social power relations is, to some degree, a result of the institutions’ conscious or unconscious “acts of purification or sanitization in contact zones” (Doherty & Singh, 2005b, p. 55). Students are too easily persuaded by the pristine image of their institutional space that represents a “creation of cultural diversity and a containment of cultural difference” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 208) to recognize, let alone critically describe or act upon, the asymmetrical relations of power within it.

In fairness to the institutions profiled here, this study does not document how and to what extent the institutions themselves engage or do not engage students in the political, cultural, and historical complexity in Japanese society and in their institutions. Also, as shown in Chapter 8, some student participants’ stories indicate transformative learning emerging from their interactions with their Japanese and international student peers both in and outside the classroom. Such learning was made possible by the very creation of cultural diversity on the campuses. Therefore, existing and potential learning opportunities at the institutions should not be dismissed, but rather be acknowledged and nurtured.

Nonetheless, it remains questionable to what extent internationalization through the creation of cultural diversity has gone beyond the production of student tourists who experience
the “so-called authentic ‘other’ cultures” and commodify their experience as their “cross-cultural awareness” for their careers in the global knowledge economy (Kenway & Fahey, 2007, p. 169). According to faculty/staff participants, their multicultural education settings were created in order to prepare students for their anticipated future in the world. Some students indeed boast that their cross-cultural awareness has been nurtured in their multicultural campus environment in Japan, and that this is an advantage to them in the future job market, regardless of the extent to which they have been involved in communities outside their Chinese student communities. They may in fact be able to have successful careers in the global economy with their international profiles. However, questions still remain: when students are left almost completely unaware or uncritical of the social, political, cultural, and historical complexity around them, how could they possibly become active members of the future international community in a political and moral sense? When they are disengaged from their local community in Japan as Other, how is it possible for them to develop a sense of attachment to or responsibility for any community that they are going to meet in Japan, China, or anywhere else in the future?

Conclusion.

In this study, I have explored the intersections between the internationalization of the Japanese higher education institutions, specifically HGU and CILA, and Chinese international students’ identity construction, and have done so with the aim of addressing some of the challenges and potential of the internationalization of Japanese higher education. This study has articulated the closely aligned ways the Japanese institutions and international students work to position themselves in the world. In particular, the close link between how the Japanese institutions with contrasting levels of academic prestige and international students with different socio-economic backgrounds seek to position themselves in the competitive world was
outstanding. A challenge of internationalization that has emerged from this picture is that, as far as the two cases in this study are concerned, the internationalization of Japanese higher education is a game of self-positioning within existing material and ideological conditions, rather than transforming or transcending them. The institutions and students participate in the game with the imagination of their current social existence and future possibilities, both of which are shaped by the existing global and domestic power structures and entrenched in Western and neoliberal imaginaries of globalization.

For both institutions, their large international student bodies and their English-medium programs represent their identity as international institutions and the international community in which they imagine their students will live in the future. As the institutions intended, some student participants’ stories indicate transformative learning opportunities emerging from their interactions with their Japanese and international student peers both in and outside the classroom. However, more often, they tend to be disengaged from the social, cultural, and political complexity of both Japanese society and the multicultural institutional settings, pointing to a problematic aspect of the internationalization of the Japanese institutions. With Bhabha’s (1990) critical concept of a “creation of cultural diversity and a containment of cultural difference” (p. 208), I have analyzed that the creation of cultural diversity on the Japanese campuses has contributed to constructing an imagined pristine multicultural community that is free from political power struggles. It is suggested that the institutions and students comfortably see themselves in the imagined community and fail to engage in social power relations surrounding themselves, thereby missing learning opportunities that their local environment could possibly offer.
Implications.

HGU and CILA have created institutional environments featuring the use of English language and the presence of many international students with a view to preparing their students for futures in the globalized world. The Japanese government aims to promote this particular practice of internationalization further through the national internationalization policies. Yet, this study has demonstrated internationalization serving as a site of self-positioning for the Japanese institutions and international students confined within existing configurations of power at the local and global levels and within the dominant social imaginaries of globalization.

If “imagination, especially when collective, can become the fuel for action,” as Appadurai (1996, p. 7) contends, the current picture of internationalization depicted in this study is a product of the collective imagination and actions of the actors. Then, changing the picture in both a material and ideological sense takes the actors’ collective and intentional effort to imagine and act differently upon their futures. Rizvi (2007) maintains that, while there is no turning back from the contemporary processes of globalization, education can engage students in open and critical dialogues across cultures and nations so that students can begin to imagine how globalization could take other forms. To that end, he argues, it is essential to make students see how their problems are inextricably related to others at both the local and global levels. Stier (2004) echoes the significant social as well as educational responsibilities of those who work on internationalization, such as policy-makers, educators, and university administrators, as follows:

As international educators our job extends far beyond education in a narrow sense – It is a vocation and a path to development, for us, our students, and the world as a whole. It is up to us whether the internationalization of higher education merely becomes a
consequence of globalization, or rather a powerful tool to grasp and debate its effects – positive and negative. (p. 96)

Below, based on the findings from this study, I discuss how we may be able to start imagining future possibilities of the internationalization policies and practices in Japan that are not determined by Western standards or market logics alone.

**Implications for practice.**

The two Japanese institutions have played a pioneering role in the internationalization of the Japanese higher education system by offering English-medium education and by creating a large international student body, both of which are still rare in Japan. These particular internationalization practices have brought challenges and opportunities to the institutions and students. For example, Englishization has brought numerous educational opportunities for international students, domestic students, and Japanese universities. By adopting the ubiquitous English language as a common language, the Japanese institutions have attracted many international students who would not have otherwise come to Japan to study. Also, the English-medium programs help students who have English skills but not Japanese skills make an easier transition to a Japanese-speaking environment while still taking their major courses in English. Moreover, Japanese students benefit from Englishization because it gives them increased opportunities to meet and interact with students from around the world without having to leave Japan. However, student participants’ stories reveal that the usefulness of English tends to be limited to within their institutions for academic purposes, or to communicate with their peers who do not speak Chinese. As a result, the English-speaking environment at their institutions has contributed to their view of their institutions as “special” and of Japanese society as the monolingual Japanese-speaking Other.
This unintended consequence of Englishization calls for critical reflection by universities and students on their participation in Englishization. To be clear, my intention is neither to deny the usefulness of English nor to advocate a monolingual campus environment of Japanese language only. Rather, my point is that, as Kubota (1998, 1999) argues, English as a dominant language should be taught with critical consciousness, rather than for the mere acquisition of the language per se, in order to create a more equal and pluralistic society. According to Kubota’s (1999) critique, the applied linguistic literature on teaching English as a Second Language has produced and legitimized a fixed and essentialized cultural dichotomy between the East and the West without addressing unequal power relations underpinning this dichotomy. As an alternative approach, she advocates English teaching and learning for critical literacy as follows:

In critical literacy, the teacher and students need to read, write, and discuss with critical consciousness how the existing knowledge of cultural differences is formed and what kind of meanings are attached to dominant and subordinate forms of culture and language. (Kubota, 1999, p. 28)

For Kubota (1998, 1999), teaching and learning English is necessary to understand the cultural and linguistic codes of the dominant group (i.e., the Western Anglophone); otherwise, students cannot deconstruct the dominant codes and effectively participate in power struggles.

As such, the Japanese universities practicing Englishization have the potential to be sites of social transformation where educators and students from across the world discuss what their participation in Englishization means and how they can become agents for social change at both the local and global levels. For example, they may question how the English environment in their institutions shapes their on- and off-campus experiences in Japan. In addition, they could question why they participate in Englishization in Japan, who benefits from Englishization, who
is left out by Englishization, and how they could engage in inequitable practices that are sustained and exacerbated by Englishization in Japan and beyond. Moreover, it would require Japanese universities to attend to the existing linguistic diversity in Japan and to explore whether and how a language other than English could possibly be a vehicle for their internationalization, rather than teaching the language just as one of their foreign language offerings. Without these critical debates, universities practicing Englishization will only perpetuate an internationalization that is preoccupied with Westernization, and will therefore remain “fantasylands” divorced from the surrounding local and global realities.

In addition, the Japanese institutions have succeeded in creating an internationally diverse student body on their campuses based on the belief or hope that a large international student population will bring about multicultural learning among the students. However, an unintended consequence of having a large international student body, as this study has found, is that students can easily find many peers from the same country and lead self-sufficient lives within their home country community with little substantial contact with other student groups. This phenomenon is not necessarily new or surprising. Knight (2011) argues that the expectation that international students will be internationalization agents is a “myth,” and empirical studies contextualized in different countries support the argument that a diverse student body does not automatically get translated into meaningful interactions among students (J. C. Brown & Daly, 2004; Deardorff, 2009; Trice, 2003). However, this aspect of the findings is relatively new among studies about international students in Japan because international students have been minorities, in both a demographic and a social sense (Asano, 1997; J. Chen & Takataya, 2008; Duan, 2003; Iwao & Hagiwara, 1988). As Japanese universities work to increase their number of international
students as part of their internationalization endeavour, facilitating more interaction among different student groups will become an inevitable challenge.

To tackle this challenge, it is essential to acknowledge that internationalized university settings and their host societies are contact zones where students of diverse historical, cultural, political, social, and geographical trajectories meet (Doherty & Singh, 2005b; Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Pratt, 1998). Rather than just celebrating cultural differences or constructing a neutral and pristine image of the contact zones, internationalized university settings need to become spaces where both domestic and international students engage in the political and historical complexities of their relationships at the local and global levels. For example, they could learn about how the racial hierarchy in Japanese society has been constructed in Japan’s process of positioning itself in the world, more specifically in relation to the West, dating all the way back to the Meiji era. They could also reflect on how their daily interactions with their peers are embedded in the process and product of that history. For that, as Suhara (1996) argues, Japan’s historically rooted desire to detach itself from other Asian countries in order to join the West also needs to be challenged. Moreover, in the context of Japan’s intensifying political relationships with neighbouring Asian countries, developing a shared understanding of the history between the Japanese and Asian international students in Japan has never been more important. As student participants’ stories illustrate, discussions on socio-political issues are challenging, but at the same time, their active engagement in such conversations with their international peers could bring about invaluable transformative learning experiences.

**Implications for policy.**

The 300,000 International Student Plan advocates the “globalization (grōbaruka)” of Japanese universities and society by recruiting more international students to Japanese
universities and by retaining them after graduation (MEXT et al., 2008). The primary focus of the policy and the supporting programs, such as the Global 30 Program, is on establishing infrastructure in the Japanese higher education system and in Japanese society, including the immigration and labour systems, to accommodate a large number of international students. This study of the two Japanese institutions, both of which preceded the policy and established institutional conditions on their own initiative, provides us with valuable insight into what lays ahead for the infrastructure development stage.

Based on his research on the JET Program, which the Japanese government initiated in 1987 as part of its internationalization endeavour, McConnell (2000) critiques internationalization in Japan as follows:

What the Japanese have done is to meet the guests at the door with a great display of hospitality. Assured that they are only short-term guests, the hosts then focus not on whether the foreigners are integrated into Japanese society but on whether they are treated hospitably and enjoy their stay. (p. 272)

In addition, Horie (2002) critiques the internationalization of Japanese higher education in the 1990s for its scant attention to the rights of foreign nationals and ethnic minority students living in the country. Although faculty/staff participants at both institutions in this study are critical of viewing and treating international students as short-term “guests,” these scholarly critiques of internationalization from over a decade ago still seem to be valid. As far as the current internationalization policies that emulate the two institutions profiled in this study are concerned, fully integrating international students into Japanese society is a significant challenge to the internationalization of Japanese higher education.
For one, this study has found numerous challenges of engaging international students in Japanese communities in a substantial way. If Japan really intends to retain many international students as an integral part of Japanese society and its economy, the country’s internationalization policies need to reconsider its preoccupation with enhancing the country’s international competitiveness in research and human resources and attend to more educational and social concerns. Observing the current policy focus on international competitiveness, Yonezawa et al. (2009) urge:

- The value of international exchange, mutual understanding, and mutual respect should be widely shared by the efforts of the entire academic community. If not, only the superficial provision of “strategic planning” documents and data for participation in a domestic budgeting game will emerge. (p. 141)

On the one hand, the two Japanese universities in this study have created harmonious multicultural learning environments that embrace the sentiment of international understanding and mutual respect that Yonezawa and colleagues advocate above. On the other hand, this study has also found numerous challenges in facilitating more substantial and meaningful interactions among students of diverse backgrounds. In particular, student participants’ unawareness of or indifference toward social injustices in Japan, such as racism and political hatred, signals a need for education that cultivates students’ political subjectivity. Regardless of how temporary or permanent international students’ presence in Japan may be, internationalization policies need to encourage and support Japanese universities in developing curricula and extracurricular programs that prepare both international and domestic students to become not only productive global human resources but also equal and active members of Japanese society in a moral and political sense.
In addition, even if Japan succeeds in establishing the infrastructure to accommodate more international students in Japanese universities, as the current policy envisages, it is questionable if and to what extent the Japanese government is serious about retaining international students for the long term. Unrealistically high qualification requirements, such as the requirement for Japanese language skills and proof of income, for highly-skilled foreign residents to immigrate to Japan have been debated but have yet to be resolved (Arudou, 2012; Iwasaki, 2013). Until the Japanese government creates a social system that enables international students to imagine their long-term futures in Japan in a concrete sense, it is undeniable that internationalization in Japan is merely a shortsighted and self-serving national strategy (Rivers, 2010), in which international students are disposable labour.

Following the popular discourse of kokusaika (internationalization), new discourses such as tabunka (multicultural) and kyōsei (co-living) have begun to emerge since the 1990s in local and national policy debates concerning foreign residents in Japan (Burgess, 2004; Chapman, 2006; Tai, 2006). In contrast to the discourse of kokusaika, which assumes Japan’s homogeneity and necessitates the possession of Other from outside the national borders, the new discourses seem to indicate an “ideological shift from an ideology of homogeneity to an ideology of difference” by suggesting the idea of placing foreign residents on equal footing with the Japanese, and eradicating discrimination and prejudice for harmonious co-living (Burgess, 2004).

However, these seemingly more progressive discourses still deserve critical examinations. For example, Burgess (2004) asserts that the new discourses, as well as kokusaika, are ultimately a “process of ‘Othering’ not by exclusion but by inclusion.” He continues:
Discourses such as *kokusaika* can act as powerful signifiers which “include” foreigners by locking them into a particular category of difference. With stereotypical forms of difference as the basis for inclusion, subjects are sometimes marginalized and denied access to mainstream sites of power and full participation in the community.

Chapman (2006) and Tai (2006) argue that this very dual mechanism of inclusion and exclusion in the discourse of *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural co-living) has masked the political and cultural struggles of “old-comer” *zainichi* Koreans, who were forcibly brought to Japan from Korea during the war, and the struggles of their offspring. Tai therefore concludes that the discourse “is not very different from the assimilationist discourse of the multiethnic Japanese empire, which deprived colonized Koreans of their culture and language while at the same time propagating the idea of co-prosperity in East Asia.” Then, it may not be overly pessimistic to be concerned about the policies’ future direction overlapping with Japan’s colonial past, especially since internationalization policies emphasize the need to “globalize” Japanese society and the higher education system with international students while still neglecting to offer educational and legislative strategies to integrate them into the Japanese social and political fabric.

Despite these unresolved concerns against the backdrop of Japan’s colonial past and ongoing political tensions with its neighbouring countries, Japan is beginning to develop a cooperative higher education network in Asia. Japan, China, and Korea signed a trilateral agreement for the Campus Asia project in 2010 with the goal of promoting student exchanges between the countries by developing systems for credit transfers, exchange programs, and quality control (McNeill, 2010; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, n.d.-d).

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48 They are categorized as Special Permanent Resident under Alien Registration Law. The San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 recognized the independence of Japan’s former colonies. From that day, all former colonial subjects of the Japanese empire living in Japan became disenfranchised resident aliens.
The outcome of this trilateral cooperation, as well as its implications for the broader global higher education space, have yet to be seen. As is the case with the Bologna Process in Europe (Ferlie et al., 2008; Rizvi, 2006b), it is undeniable that Campus Asia is regional cooperation for the sake of global competition embedded in a neoliberal imaginary of globalization. Nonetheless, the cooperation holds potential for the three countries to develop a new paradigm that resists neocolonialism in the global field of the internationalization policies and practices where Anglo-Saxon countries currently dominate (Altbach, 2004; Deem et al., 2008; Mok, 2007). Moreover, what is not only possible but also necessary for this higher education network in Asia is to engage more students in unpacking their unsettling historical and current political relations and in developing mutually respectful and equitable relationships within and beyond the region. Then, internationalization will finally be able to begin to move past a mere self-positioning strategy and contribute to social transformation.

Contributions.

This study makes several contributions to research on the internationalization of higher education and international students in Japan. Firstly, it is the first of its kind to combine the internationalization of Japanese universities and international students’ experiences in Japan and has allowed a close look at the intersections between the two. By exploring the interactions, the study has illustrated the coordinated ways universities and international students work to position themselves in local and global contexts and the roles of their imaginations in this process.

Secondly, with the two universities that are “exemplary” cases of internationalization in Japan, this study has provided valuable insights into the future challenges and opportunities of the internationalization of Japanese higher education. Particularly, by combining international student participants’ accounts with faculty/staff participants’ accounts, this study reveals the
unintended consequences, as well as the potential, of the form of internationalization that the Japanese government and universities aim to promote. Moreover, although it looked at only two cases, contrasting institutional profiles of the exemplary cases have shown the breadth of the internationalization of Japanese higher education.

Thirdly, this study has added a perspective of power to the body of literature on the internationalization of Japanese higher education, a body of literature which so far has been largely descriptive. By utilizing the concepts of social imaginaries of globalization (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010), a socially situated notion of imagined communities (Appadurai, 1996), and internationalized universities as contact zones (Doherty & Singh, 2005b; Kenway & Bullen, 2003; Pratt, 1998), the study has located Japan, the Japanese universities, and Chinese international students in the webs of global and local power relations. By articulating how these actors’ imaginations of their social existence and future possibilities are shaped by the global and local power configurations and dominant social imaginaries, the study has added a new layer to a descriptive understanding of the internationalization of Japanese higher education as a value-neutral response to empirical changes that globalization has brought to the field of education.

Limitations.

This study has several limitations. As discussed earlier, I need to reiterate that the data I was able to collect for this study and my analysis are limited due to my subject positions, such as being Japanese, being an outsider to the case institutions, and being a non-Chinese speaker lacking a deep understanding of China’s social, political, and cultural complexities. In addition, a lack of opportunities to immerse myself in each institutional setting, both inside and outside classroom, constitutes another limitation of this study. For example, my lack of immersion in various aspects of students’ experiences at each institution limited my ability to gain a nuanced
understanding of institutional discourses permeating throughout the campus and how students adopt and incorporate the discourses into their sense of self and their imagination of their futures. In addition, the absence of an investigation of teaching and learning at both institutions constitutes a major limitation of the scope of this study. What is presented in this dissertation is a partial understanding of the case institutions and their participants.

In addition, there is some question concerning to what extent the group label “Chinese international students,” which I posed to student participants, might have restricted their ability to speak about who they think they really are. For example, three CILA student participants had a transnational upbringing, and some of their stories were informed by their experiences of moving from one place to another. The three students’ stories were not only divergent from the rest of the participants in many ways but also different from each other. Yet, in this dissertation, I had to locate their stories as part of all the international student participants rather than singling them out for the sake of thematic analysis. In addition, it was only after I visited the two institutions that I learned about the institutions’ dilemma over labeling international students as such due to their institutional identity as international institutions. I wonder why I did not think of asking student participants what they thought about being labeled “international students” or “Chinese international students.” Only in hindsight did I realize that I might have been able to obtain valuable insights from posing such a question to them. Thus, my limited understanding of and thoughts on the complexity of students’ identities constitute a limitation of the data that I was able to collect and my subsequent analysis of it.

While I wish I could go back to the institutions and participants to investigate further the limitations arising from my limited understanding and insights during my data collection, it is
logistically difficult to obtain a consistent set of data from the same group of participants. I therefore would like to integrate these reflections into my suggestions for future research.

**Suggestions for future research.**

This study about the construction of Chinese international students’ identities in new and unique institutional settings in Japan has been a new attempt with few prior examples to follow, and it has generated more questions than answers. In addition, as discussed above, my reflections on the limitations of the study point to areas for further exploration.

Firstly, this study has provided a snapshot of limited aspects of international students’ experiences and imaginations at a very particular point in their lives. It is my interest to pursue a more holistic understanding of their experiences in Japan and the implications of these experiences for their future lives. A longitudinal study following their lives after graduation would provide valuable insight into what this particular form of internationalization in Japan has meant to their lives. In addition, future research may deploy participant observation strategies to gain a broader and deeper understanding of students’ on- and off-campus lives, including their involvement in classroom activities, student clubs, part-time jobs, and social activities.

Secondly, using the concept of contact zones, I have examined how international student participants feel they are positioned by and work to position themselves in relation to others. However, how domestic students view and position themselves in relation to their international student counterparts is an unexplored area in this study as well as in the broader literature. In this study, Japanese students often served as a point of reference against which student participants described themselves. This finding leads me to wonder about Japanese students’ views of and experiences with their Chinese, or more broadly international, counterparts. For example, how are their views of their Chinese counterparts shaped by the racial hierarchy in Japan, their
knowledge about the historical relationship between China and Japan, and recent political conflicts between the two countries? How do they integrate these views into their interactions with their Chinese peers? How do they feel they are seen by their Chinese peers, and how do they, in turn, represent themselves to their Chinese peers? When Japanese students’ experiences and identities are articulated, we will be able to attain a more comprehensive understanding of internationalized university settings as contact zones.

Thirdly, what internationalization means to teaching and learning in Japan is another important area of future research. Even though I looked at the overall curriculum (i.e., distributions of required course credits) of each institution, I did not investigate specifically the areas of teaching and learning. There is a great range of possible exploration in this area. For example, how is each institution’s notion of internationalization reflected in how and what instructors teach in their classrooms? How do instructors integrate international and intercultural issues into how and what they teach? What do they think about Englishization, and how has Englishization impacted their teaching practice? What are their experiences with diverse students in their classroom? How do instructors and diverse students interact with one another in a classroom as a contact zone, and how do the issues of power manifest in their classroom interactions and self-representations? How do international students integrate their classroom experiences into their sense of self in Japan and the world and their imagination of their futures?

In particular, more research specifically on how socio-political issues are taught and discussed in internationalized university settings has special significance under the current political climate in Japan. As I write this dissertation, Japan’s domestic political climate as well as its international relations with China and other neighbouring Asian countries has gone through tumultuous times. For example, while Japan’s relationships with China and Korea continue to
deteriorate over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the Takeshima/Dokdo islands disputes, respectively, the conservative LDP regained leadership of the government\textsuperscript{49} and ultra-right-wing politician Shinzō Abe became Japan’s Prime Minister once again in December 2012.\textsuperscript{50} Abe is a strong advocate for revising the history regarding Japan’s wartime aggression towards neighbouring Asian countries (G. Evans, 2013; Guttentag & Sturman, 2013; “Turning the page on history books,” 2013). Moreover, especially after Japan’s territorial disputes with China and Korea, xenophobic hate speeches against permanent residents of foreign descent, particularly of Korean descent, have been escalating in both cyberspace and public spaces in Japan (Ishibashi, 2013; Mie, 2013; Yasuda, 2012). I wonder if and how the news has been discussed inside and outside classrooms at the two Japanese institutions and other Japanese universities that advocate internationalization and host many international students. Understanding how students and educators engage (or do not engage) in the current troubling socio-political climate in Japan will provide researchers and educators in Japan with valuable insight into what internationalization is supposed to mean.

\textbf{Reflection.}

There are not only geographical but also cultural, social, and political differences between the location of this study, Japan, and my current location, Canada. In addition, while I come from Japan, my student participants come from China, a country that I have never even visited. As I described, many of the limitations of my data and analyses stem from these oceans of difference between my study subjects and me. Despite the acknowledgement of the limitations, there have been lingering questions in my mind throughout the processes of analysis.

\textsuperscript{49} The LDP has been in power since 1955, with short exceptions between 1993 and 1994, and again between 2009 and 2012.

\textsuperscript{50} Abe served as Prime Minister from September 2006 to September 2007.
and writing: “Who am I to say this? How do I know this?” The questions were especially magnified when I was generating critical analyses. Yet, this study’s analytical process has given me the opportunity to critically and humbly reflect on my own journey as an international student, an educator, and a researcher. The process has allowed me to see both myself and my participants in the big picture of the internationalization of higher education.

As I discussed, one of the most puzzling moments in this research was how rarely student participants volunteered their stories of racial discrimination in Japan even though I took into account the possibility that some of them might have withheld these accounts from me. However, this puzzlement has revived my own memory of how comfortably uncritical and unaware I used to be of social power relations. It is only relatively recently that I have finally come to identify and describe my experiences of marginalization in the United States and Canada. After I came to Canada, I came across Bannerji’s (2000) argument that in Canada, the discourse of diversity in its politics of multiculturalism has reduced, in an essentialized manner, power relations among social groups of various categories, such as race, gender, and class, into issues of cultural diversity, such as traditions and religions, and that this discourse has also masked unequal social power relations in favour of the status quo. With this critical analytical lens, I have slowly started to see that similar social engineering is at work in the field of international education. My marginal sense of social existence in Canada, despite the country’s image of being a harmonious cultural mosaic, and the voicelessness I felt in the field of international education in the United States, despite my colleagues’ good intentions, were both due to the fact that in both situations I was locked in the dominant paradigm of a “creation of cultural diversity and a containment of cultural difference” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 208). I was blinded and silenced by the benign discourse of cultural diversity, which celebrates differences among
people while masking the different levels of power attached to the differences. By reflecting on my own learning process, I have come to see that many student participants’ unawareness of and indifference to troubling aspects of Japanese society, something I initially struggled to understand, is to a large extent a product of the nature of the international education they received.

When I wonder about my participants’ futures in Japan or elsewhere, my imagination evokes the memory of my struggle with understanding and negotiating with the power relations surrounding me. This may be only a vain imagination on my part. Regardless, I still believe that if education does not equip students with a language to identify, unpack, and resist oppression, they could remain voiceless, unable to see, let alone speak critically of or fight against, oppression in their own lives and in the broader society at the local and global levels.

In addition, during my analytical process, I had to face the reality that I was a student tourist at the same time that I was critiquing the overlap between student participants and the image of student tourists, who travel to experience different education systems while consuming the cultures of the Other (Kenway & Fahey, 2007). I have recently had the opportunity to work on a project that investigates the history of education of Aboriginal students at UBC against the backdrop of the national, provincial, and institutional historical contexts. Through the project, I came to realize how much I have seen Canadian society as Other, both as a place that has marginalized me and as a place of transit in my life. The project has taught me the historical underpinnings of both my marginality in Canada and my privilege. While I am affected by the colonial legacy of white supremacy in Canada (Stanley, 2009), my affiliation with UBC as an English-speaking Western academic institution standing on the unceded territory of the

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51 Education for Aboriginal Students at UBC: Historical Timeline (work in progress as of July 2013): [http://aboriginaltimeline.sites.olt.ubc.ca/](http://aboriginaltimeline.sites.olt.ubc.ca/)
Musqueam people puts me in a privileged position in Canada, Japan, and elsewhere. With the awareness that I share a particular time and place with others occupying various social positions shaped by history, I can now see myself as part of Canadian history and society today.

The fact that this realization occurred to me as late as my fifth year in Canada speaks to how oppressive social relations are perpetuated by people like myself, people who are unaware of their own complicity. However temporary my life in Canada may be, by working with others for social transformation within my local setting, I feel that I can finally begin to transform my sense of marginality into solidarity with others. This shift has been facilitated not by seeing myself in a rosy picture of multicultural Canada or in an innocent subject position, but by engaging in the complexity of both the host society and my existence in it. This is why, despite numerous challenges, I am hopeful about the educational and social potential of an internationalized education setting as a contact zone. Also for this reason I insist on the responsibility of educational institutions and educators to engage students in socio-political dimensions of their local societies while also addressing the interconnectivity and interdependence between the local and global contexts. Otherwise, the internationalization of higher education, despite its potential for bringing about new learning and social change, will only continue to sustain, rather than to transform, the existing social order.

These personal reflections on my own learning process make me realize how temporal and partial my understandings and imaginations were and inevitably continue to be. At the same time, this realization reminds me that the imaginations and understandings that my participants shared with me for this study are also temporal and partial, implying continuous evolution and transformation. This gives me hope for the role of education in the future.
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that push students from China to Japan and other countries: Prediction based on the IDP analysis approach]. Tokyo, Japan: Meiji University.


Dear [Name],

Thank you very much for indicating your willingness to cooperate with me on my data collection at [name of the university] for my doctoral research project, “The construction of Chinese undergraduate international students’ identities and the internationalization of Japanese universities.” The study is outlined in the sections below; once you read these, I hope you can confirm your intention to assist me in making initial contact with potential participants for the study. Should you agree to help me, I have outlined next steps at the end of this letter.

The Study
As seen in the “300,000 International Student Plan,” the recent internationalization policies of Japanese higher education aim to increase the number of international students and retain them as a highly skilled labor force in Japan. However, there is a lack of understanding as to what kinds of new identities and futures international students aspire to realize through studying in Japan. This study therefore aims to examine how Chinese undergraduate international students’ identities are constructed through their experiences at Japanese private universities that take progressive approaches to internationalization.

To achieve the goal of the study, I would like to facilitate face-to-face interviews with two groups of individuals at [the name of institution]: (1) international students and (2) faculty/staff members. As I describe in the participant selection criteria in the following sections, I would like you to help me identify and contact the potential participants.

Target Participants 1: International Students
The first group I would like to recruit is Chinese undergraduate international students. I would like interview 15 students from the group. The sample selection criteria for this group are:

- an international student from the mainland China,
- a full-time degree-seeking student, humanities or social science major at [the name of university],
- in the 3rd or 4th year of the undergraduate program, and
- a self-funded student

The purpose of the interviews with this group of participants is to understand the ways in which they think about their identities and futures through exploring their motivation to come to Japan to study, their experiences in Japan, and their future plans.

Because I do not have access to student communication systems (e.g., student email list, bulletin board) or students’ personal data (e.g., name, contact information) at your institution, I will rely
on you to identify an appropriate and effective way to contact this group of international students and to distribute my interview invitation message to them.

**Target Participants 2: Faculty/Staff Members**
The second group I would like to interview is 5-10 staff and/or faculty members who hold or have held a leadership position in the policy formation and/or implementation in the following area(s) at the institution:
- The internationalization of the institution and/or a particular program
- International student services, career support, and/or recruitment

The purpose of the interviews with this group of participants is to understand how the internationalization policies of Japanese higher education are interpreted and practiced at your institution as a context of international students’ identity construction. The interview will ask the participants about the institution’s engagement with internationalization and international students.

I would like you to identify 5-10 faculty or staff members for the interviews and send them my interview invitation message.

**Other Information**
I will conduct all the interviews during my visit at [the name of institution]. I am currently scheduling the visit. The interviews will be either in Japanese or English, whichever the participant prefers. To all participants, I will provide a summary of the research results when the study is completed. In addition, each international student participant will receive a gift card (value amount 1,000 yen). There is no monetary incentive for faculty/staff participants. All the participants’ decision whether or not to participate in the study is voluntary.

**Next Steps**
If you agree to cooperate with the recruitment of research participants, please kindly send me a letter as an email attachment addressing that you agree to support my research at your institution, including the recruitment of participants. The letter is needed for my study to be reviewed and approved by the Behavioural Research Ethics Board (BREB) of the University of British Colombia. Due to the requirement by the BREB, the letter needs to be on your institution’s letterhead.

Once the study is approved by the BREB, I will electronically send you invitation letters and consent forms, which explain the study to potential participants, including the participant criteria, and the interview procedures. I would like to ask you to forward those documents to the two groups of potential participants. Those who are interested in participating will directly contact me.

If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me and/or my thesis co-supervisors listed below. Thank you very much for your time and kind consideration.
Regards,

Hanae Tsukada
PhD Candidate
Department of Educational Studies
University of British Columbia, Canada

Thesis Co-Supervisors:
Professor Donald Fisher
Department of Educational Studies
University of British Columbia, Canada

Professor Ryuko Kubota
Department of Language and Literacy Education
University of British Columbia, Canada
Appendix B: Third party recruitment request (Japanese)

Printed on official Department of Educational Studies letterhead

教授、学長殿

研究調査参加者募集のお願い

拝啓 いよいよご清栄のこととお詫び申し上げます。この度は私の博士論文研究「中国大学部留学生のアイデンティティ形成と日本の大学教育の国際化」にあたり、＜大学名もしくはプログラム名＞におけるデータ収集中にご協力下さる旨、心より感謝致します。本日は、本研究の聞き取り調査への参加者募集に関して、ご協力をお願いするためのお手紙を送らせて頂きました。

以下に本研究の趣旨、参加対象者のご説明をさせて頂きます。もしこのような研究調査参加者の募集にご協力頂けるようでしたら、その後に申しますような手順で参加者募集にご協力をお願い致しました。学期中でお忙しいところ大変しつこいお願いではございますが、ご一読の上、ご協力をお願い申し上げますよう、どうぞよろしくお願い致します。

研究の趣旨
「留学生30万人計画」をはじめとする近年の日本の大学教育の国際化政策は、多くの留学生を受け入れ、彼らを卒業後、高度人材として日本経済に組み入れていくことを提唱しています。しかし、留学生自身が日本留学を通じて培う自己意識や抱負についてはあまり知られていません。よって、本研究は、国際化に前進的な取り組みをしている私立大学に在校する中国大学部留学生たちのアイデンティティ形成を調査することを目的としています。

つきますまして、以下の二つのグループの研究調査参加者募集にご協力お願い申し上げます。

研究調査参加対象者 1：留学生
本研究調査の対象となる一つ目のグループは、留学生です。このグループから以下の条件すべてを満たす留学生を１５人募集し、インタビューを行いたいと考えております。

- 中国本土からの留学生
- ＜大学名もしくはプログラム名＞在籍の人文、社会科学系専攻のフルタイム正規学生
- 学部３、４年生
- 私費留学生

このグループの留学生の皆さんとのインタビューの目的は、彼らの日本への留学動機、日本での経験、そして将来の展望などを聞き取ることにあります。

私は貴大学の留学生の皆さんへの連絡ルート（例えば、メールリスト、掲示板など）にアクセスもなく、また学生氏名、住所といった個人情報にアクセスすることもできないため、＜教授、学長名＞様にこのグループの留学生の皆さんへインタビュー協力をお願いするメッセージを送って下さいますようお願い致したいと存じます。
研究調査参加対象者 2：教職員
本研究調査の対象となる二つのグループは、＜大学名および／もしくはプログラム名＞の国際化政策の立案、推進においてリーダーシップを取る役職にいらっしゃる、もしくはそのような役職にいらっしゃることのある教職員の方々です。このグループから５人から１０人の参加者を募集し、インタビューを行いたいと考えております。

・＜大学名および／もしくはプログラム名＞の国際化
・留学生サービス、リクルート、進路サポート
このグループの教職員の方々とのインタビューの目的は、留学生のアイデンティティー形成の背景にある大学の国際化を理解するために、貴大学が日本政府の推進する国際化政策をどのように解釈し、国際化や留学生支援に取り組んでいらっしゃるかをお尋ねします。＜教授、学長名＞様には上に挙げた条件に該当する教職員の方々を５から１０名を特定し、それらの方々に私からのインタビュー協力のお願いのメッセージを送っておりますようお願い致したいと存じます。

その他
すべてのインタビューは私の貴大学への訪問時に行なう予定です。現在、訪問の日程を検討中です。すべてのインタビューは一対一で、英語か日本語どちらか、参加者の希望する言語で行ないます。インタビューに参加して下さった方全員には、本研究完了後、研究結果の要旨を差し上げます。また、留学生の参加者にはそれぞれ１０００円分のギフトカードを差し上げる予定です。大変恐縮ですが、教職員の参加者への金銭的報酬はございません。また、本研究に参加するか否かの決断は参加者の任意によります。

調査研究参加者募集の手順
本研究は、研究参加者を保護するためのプリティッシュ・コロンビア大学の研究審査機関の審査を受けなければなりません。そして、その審査申請には、本研究調査にご協力下さる大学の方の同意のお手紙が必要です。つきましては、もしそ本研究調査参加者募集にご協力頂けるようでしたら、お手数をおかけし大変恐縮ですが、＜教授、学長名＞様に参加者募集を含め、本研究調査にご協力下さる旨を記したお手紙をお書き頂き、私宛に電子メールの添付書類として送って頂けないでしょうか。なお、お手紙は、その研究審査機関の規定により、貴大学の便箋にお書き下さいますよう、お願い致します。

一旦、その研究審査を通過しましたら、本研究調査参加者の方々宛に本研究の趣旨、参加資格、そして参加に興味がある場合の連絡方法などを説明したインタビュー協力お願いのお手紙と同意書を私より＜教授、学長名＞様宛に電子メールにてお送り致します。その後、＜教授、学長名＞様の方から先に申しました二つのグループの方々にそれらのお手紙、同意書を電子メールにてご転送頂きたく存じます。その後はインタビュー参加に興味のある方から直接私の方へ連絡を頂くように致したいと思います。

もしも質問や懸念事項などございましたら、以下の連絡先をご確認の上、もしくは私の指導教官（フィッシャー教授、もしくは久保田教授）にお問い合わせ下さい。ご多忙中のところお手数をおかけして誠に恐縮ですが、本研究の趣旨をご理解頂き、ご協力下さいますよう、どうぞよろしくお願い申し上げます。

敬具
塚田英恵
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学
教育学部 博士課程

指導教官
ドナルド・フィッシャー教授
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学
教育学部

久保田竜子教授
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学
言語教育学部
Appendix C: Invitation letter for faculty/staff members (English)

Printed on official Department of Educational Studies letterhead

Letter of Request to Participate in Research

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Hanae Tsukada, and I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Educational Studies at the University of British Columbia, Canada. I am writing to ask you to participate in my doctoral dissertation research, “The construction of Chinese undergraduate international students’ identities and the internationalization of Japanese universities.” You are being invited to take part in this study because you hold or have held a key position in the policy formation and/or implementation in internationalization or in international student services, recruitment, or career support at [the name of institution].

You were recommended as an appropriate potential participant for this study by [the name of the contact person] at [the name of the department or division], who has agreed to assist me to conduct this study at your institution. I would greatly appreciate it if you would kindly consider my request.

As seen in the “300,000 International Student Plan,” the recent internationalization policies of Japanese universities aim to increase the number of international students and integrate them as a highly skilled labor force into Japanese economy. However, there is a lack of understanding as to what kinds of new sense of self and future plans international students aspire to realize through studying in Japan. This study therefore aims to examine how Chinese undergraduate international students’ identities are constructed through their experiences at Japanese private universities, like yours, that take progressive approaches to internationalization. Learning about how the Japanese government’s internationalization policies are interpreted and practiced at your institution is a crucial step to achieve the goal of the study. I therefore would like to interview you about your institution’s engagement with internationalization and international students.

The interview will take place at your convenience during my visit at [the name of university] between [date-date]. The interview will be either in Japanese or English and last about 60 minutes. Please review the attached consent form for more information about the study and the interview process. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me and/or my thesis co-supervisors at the email addresses and phone numbers listed below.

If you are willing to participate in an interview, please contact me via email either in English or Japanese. In your email, please indicate your preferred date and time of the interview between [dates of my visit at the institution].

Thank you for your time and consideration in this research.
Regards,

Hanae Tsukada
PhD Candidate
Department of Educational Studies
University of British Columbia, Canada

Thesis Co-Supervisors
Professor Donald Fisher
Department of Educational Studies
University of British Columbia, Canada
Professor Ryuko Kubota
Department of Language and Literacy Education
University of British Columbia, Canada
Appendix D: Invitation letter for faculty/staff members (Japanese)

博士論文研究聴取調査へのご協力のお願い

拝啓 いよいよ清栄のこととお喜び申し上げます。カナダのブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学教育学部博士課程在籍の塚田英恵と申します。現在「中国人学部留学生のアイデンティティー形成と日本の大学教育の国際化」と題した博士論文研究に取り組んでおります。つきましては、＜大学名もしくはプログラム名＞の国際化政策の立案、推進をなさっている、またはなさったことのある教職員の方々を対象に聞き取り調査を行いたく存じます。特に、国際化政策担当者、及び留学生サービス、リクルート、進路サポート担当者の方々にご協力をお願いできないでしょうか。

この度は、貴大学＜学部または部署名＞の＜教授名＞教授より、本研究の聞き取り調査対象者としてご推薦を頂き、大変お世話いただきますが、ご連絡を差し上げております。

「留学生30万人計画」をはじめとする近年の日本の大学教育の国際化政策は、多くの留学生を受け入れ、彼らを卒業後、高度人材として日本経済に組み入れていくことを提唱しています。しかし、留学生自身が日本留学を通して培う自己意識や抱負についてはあまり知られていません。よって、本研究は、国際化に前進的な取り組みをしている私立大学に在籍する中国人学部留学生たちのアイデンティティー形成を調査することを目的としています。そのためには大学の方針も理解することが不可欠です。今回お願いする聞き取り調査では、貴大学が政府の推進する国際化政策をどのように解釈し、国際化や留学生支援に取り組んでいるうえがお尋ねします。

本聞き取り調査は、私が貴大学に滞在させて頂く＜何月何日から何月何日＞の間で、貴方のご都合のよい日時に行いたいと思います。時間は６０分程度を予定しております。なお、本研究の概要及び聞き取り調査の詳細につきまして、添付の同意書をご覧下さい。ご協力頂けるようでしたら、お手数ですが、電子メールにてご回答をお願い致します。その際には、＜何月何日から何月何日＞の間でインタビューに応じて頂ける日時をご指定くださいますよう、お願い致します。また本研究についてご質問等ございましたら、以下の調査者連絡先までご連絡ください。

学期中でお忙しいところ大変恐縮ですが、本研究の趣旨をご理解頂き、聞き取り調査へのご協力をご検討頂けますよう、どうぞよろしくお願い申し上げます。

敬具

調査者：塚田英恵

調査者指導教官：ドナルド・フィッシャー教授（教育学部）
久保田真子教授（言語教育学部）
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学
Appendix E: Consent form for faculty/staff members (English)

Printed on official Department of Educational Studies letterhead

Consent Form (For Faculty/Staff Members)

**Research Project Title:** The Construction of Chinese Undergraduate International Students’ Identities and the Internationalization of Japanese Universities

This consent form explains the research project and requests your participation. Please read this form to consider your participation in the study, and if you have any questions, please contact the researcher and/or the researcher’s supervisors at the email addresses and phone numbers listed below.

**Researcher:** Hanae Tsukada  
PhD Candidate  
Department of Educational Studies  
University of British Columbia, Canada

**Co-Supervisors:** Professor Donald Fisher (Department of Educational Studies)  
Professor Ryuko Kubota (Department of Language and Literacy Education)  
University of British Columbia, Canada

**Purpose**  
The purpose of this study is to examine the construction of Chinese undergraduate international students’ identities through their international education experiences in Japanese universities. The purpose of the interview is to understand how the Japanese government’s internationalization policies are interpreted and practiced at your institution. The interview will ask you about your institution’s engagement with internationalization and international students.

You are being invited to take part in this study because you hold or have held a key position in the policy formation and/or implementation in internationalization or in international student services, recruitment, or career support at [the name of institution].

**Research Procedures**  
If you volunteer to participate in the face-to-face interview, you will be contacted by Hanae Tsukada to schedule the interview at your convenience, during her visit at [the name of university] between [date-date]. The interview will be either in Japanese or English (whichever you prefer) and last about 60 minutes. With your permission, the interview will be digitally recorded and transcribed to help with the data analysis process. If you consent to participate in the interview but do not wish to have the interview audio recorded, your request will be accommodated. You may also be contacted either for a brief follow-up conversation over the phone or Skype* or via email (whichever you prefer) for additional information or clarification. The correspondence will require you about 30 minutes. You will receive a copy of the transcript
and a summary of the interview conversation and have the opportunity to change, delete or add anything you wish.

* Skype is a software application that allows users to make voice calls over the Internet. For more information, please go: [http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/home](http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/home)

**Benefits and Potential Risks**
There is no monetary incentive for participating in this study. When this study is completed, you will receive a summary of the research results. There are no known risks associated with participating in the interviews. The interview will take place only after you are made fully aware of the study, and after informed consent is obtained. You are under no obligation to participate, and you may end the interview and/or withdraw at any time and without giving any reasons for your decision and without any consequences. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions.

**Confidentiality**
All of the information that you share with me will be kept strictly confidential. No names or identifying information whatsoever will be used on copies of individual files and recordings, and you and your institution will not be identified by name in any reports in the completed study. The files will be kept for five years, as per UBC policy, in a locked filing cabinet as well as in computer files protected by passwords known only to the researcher.

**Contact for concerns about the rights of research subjects**
If you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research participant, you may contact the Research Subject Information Line in the UBC Office of Research Services at (604) 822-8598 or at RSIL@ors.ubc.ca.

**Consent**
Your consent is required before you may participate in this study; however, your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Please select from the statements below and sign under the one that indicates how you would like to participate in this study.

Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records and that you consent to participate in this study and to have your interview audio-taped.

____________________  _____________________  ________________
Participant’s Signature  Printed name  Date

Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records and that you consent to participate in this study but do not want your interview audio-taped.

____________________  _____________________  ________________
Participant’s Signature  Printed name  Date
Appendix F: Consent form for faculty/staff members (Japanese)

Printed on official Department of Educational Studies letterhead

同意書（教職員用）

中国人学部留学生のアイデンティティー形成と日本の大学教育の国際化

本同意書は、本研究「中国人学部留学生のアイデンティティー形成と日本の大学教育の国際化」について説明し、貴方の聞き取り調査への参加をお願いするものです。ご一読の上、ご質問等ございましたら、下記の調査者もしくは調査者の指導教官までお問い合わせ下さいますよう、宜しくお願い致します。

調査者：塩田英恵
教育学部 博士課程
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学

調査者指導教官：ドナルド・フィッシャー教授 （教育学部）
久保田他子教授 （言語教育学部）
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学

本研究調査の目的
本研究の目的は、中国人留学生たちが、日本の大学での留学経験を通して、どのように新しい自己意識や抱負を培っているのかを考察することにあります。本聞き取り調査においては、留学生のアイデンティティー形成の背景にある大学の国際化の方針を理解するために、貴大学が日本政府の推進する国際化政策をどのように解釈し、国際化や留学生支援に取り組んでいらっしゃるかをお尋ねいたします。

貴方には＜大学名もしくはプログラム名＞の国際化政策の立案、推進をなさっている、またはなさったことのある教職員、特に国際化政策担当者、及び留学生サービス、リクルート、進路サポート担当者として聞き取り調査にご協力をお願い致します。

調査手順
本聞き取り調査は、調査者が貴大学に滞在する＜何月何日から何月何日＞の間で、参加者の指定する日時に行なわれます。時間は60分程度を予定しております。調査者と参加者の対面のインタビュー形式で、使用言語は日本語か英語のどちらかを参加者に指定して頂きます。インタビューは、参加者の承諾の上、データ分析のためにデジタル録音され、文字に起こされます。参加者がインタビューの録音を望まない場合は、録音はいたしません。また、参加者の承諾の上、インタビュー終了後、内容を再度確認、追加質問等をさせて頂くために、調査者から電話、スカイプ（注）、または電子メールにより連絡をさせて頂くことがありますが申し訳ありません。その所要時間は30分程度と予想されます。また、インタビューを文字に起こした後で、その原稿と要約をお送り致しますので、内容をご確認の上、修正点ございましたら調査者へご連絡をお願い致します。
本調査に参加することの利点およびリスク

本聞き取り調査参加者への金銭的報酬はありませんが、研究終了後、研究結果の要旨をお送りします。また、本聞き取り調査参加に伴って起こると考えられるリスクはありません。聞き取り調査は、参加者が本研究調査を理解し、参加に同意してからのみ始められます。参加者は、答えたくない質問への回答を拒否したり、インタビュー終了後でも参加を取り消すことができます。その場合は、理由を説明する必要はありませんし、その決断によって参加者に何か不利なことが生じることもありません。

秘密保持・匿名性に関して

参加者が調査者に提供した情報は個人情報として扱われ、公開されることはありません。本研究調査の記録及び報告書の中では、参加者と貴大学の名前が使われることはありません。また、調査の結果は、ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学の規定により、調査者のみがアクセス出来るパスワードや鍵で管理されたファイルに5年間保管されます。

研究参加者の権利に関する問い合わせ先

研究参加者としての扱われ方や権利に関してご質問がある場合は、ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学の研究サービスオフィスの研究対象者情報ライン（電話：604–822–8598、電子メール：RSIL@ors.ubc.ca）に連絡して下さい。

同意

本研究への参加には参加者の同意を求められますが、参加は任意で行われるものとします。どのように本研究に参加したいか、以下のどちらか希望する方を選んでご署名願います。

以下の署名は、参加者が記録としてこの同意書のコピーを受け取ったこと、本研究に参加すること、およびインタビュー録音に同意することを示します。

参加者署名                  参加者氏名                  日付

以下の署名は、参加者が記録としてこの同意書のコピーを受け取ったこと、および、インタビュー録音せずに本研究に参加することに同意することを示します。

参加者署名                  参加者氏名                  日付

注：スカイプは、インターネットを通じて通話ができるコンピューターソフトウェアです。詳しくはこちらのウェブサイトをご覧下さい（http://www.skype.com/intl/ja/home/）。
Appendix G: Invitation letter for international students (English)

Printed on official Department of Educational Studies letterhead

Share your stories about your experience in Japan and receive ¥1,000!

Are you…?
- an international student from the mainland China,
- a full-time degree-seeking student, humanities or social science major at [the name of university] (not an exchange student),
- in the 3rd or 4th year of your undergraduate degree program,
- a self-funded student, and
- willing to be interviewed

If you fulfill all of the categories above, you are invited to participate in an interview for a research project, “The construction of Chinese undergraduate international students’ identities and the internationalization of Japanese universities.” The interview will be conducted by Hanae Tsukada for her doctoral dissertation research.

What
At the interview, you will be asked about:
- Your motivation to come to Japan
- Your experiences in Japan
- Your future plans

When & How
- Date/Time: At your convenience between [date-date]
- Duration: 60-90 minutes
- Language: English or Japanese

Benefits
Participants will receive 1,000 yen in cash.

How to participate
If you are willing to participate in an interview, please contact me via email, either in English or Japanese. In your email, please include the following information:
  a) Name
  b) Phone number
  c) Year in your current program (Example: 3rd year undergraduate student)
  d) Length of your stay in Japan so far
  e) Major
  f) Place of origin (Where in China are you from?)
  g) Male or female
  h) Age
If I hear from more than 15 potential participants at once, I will choose 15 participants by taking the balance of participants’ demography (e.g., male/female, age, place of origin) into consideration. However, I will respond either via email or phone to all those who contact me. I will offer a summary of the research results to anyone who is interested.

Please see the attached consent form for more information about the study and the interview. If you have any questions, please contact me or my co-supervisors at the email addresses and phone numbers listed below.

Thank you for your consideration in this research. I am looking forward to hearing from you soon.

Hanae Tsukada
PhD Candidate
Department of Educational Studies
University of British Columbia, Canada

**Thesis Co-Supervisors:**
Professor Donald Fisher
Department of Educational Studies
University of British Columbia, Canada

Professor Ryuko Kubota
Department of Language and Literacy Education
University of British Columbia, Canada
Appendix H: Invitation letter for international students (Japanese)

Printed on official Department of Educational Studies letterhead

日本での留学経験を話してみませんか？1000円差し上げます！

あなたは・・・？
- 中国本土からの留学生
- ＜大学名もしくはプログラム名＞在籍中の人文、社会科学系専攻の留学生（交換留学生ではない）
- 学部３、４年生
- 私費留学生
- インタビュー参加に興味がある

この条件すべてに当てはまるなら、塚田英恵の博士論文「中国人学部留学生のアイデンティティ形成と日本の大学教育の国際化」の研究調査インタビューに参加しませんか。

インタビューの内容
- あなたの留学動機
- 日本での経験
- 将来の予定

インタビューの予定
- 日時：＜何月何日から何月何日＞の間のあなたの都合のよい時
- 所要時間：60分から90分
- 言語：日本語か英語

特典
インタビュー参加者には、1000円差し上げます。

連絡方法
興味がある場合は、日本語か英語で電子メールでご連絡下さい。メールには以下のことを書いて下さい。

a) 名前
b) 電話番号
c) 学年（例：学部３年生）
d) 日本滞在年数
e) 専攻
f) 出身地（中国の出身地域または都市名）
g) 男女
h) 年齢
15人以上からインタビュー参加希望の連絡があった場合は、性別、年齢、出身地などのバランスを考えて参加者を選びますが、連絡を下さったすべての方には電話か電子メールでお返事をします。また、ご希望であれば、どなたにも調査結果の要約を後日お送りします。

この研究やインタビューについての詳しいことは、添付の同意書をご覧下さい。また、質問がありましたら、下記の連絡先までお問い合わせ下さい。

インタビューへのご協力、どうぞよろしくお願いします。ご連絡お待ちしています。

塚田英恵
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学
教育学部 博士課程

調査者指導教官
ドナルド・フィッシャー教授
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学
教育学部
久保田竜子教授
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学
言語教育学部
Appendix I: Invitation letter for international students (Mandarin)

Printed on official Department of Educational Studies letterhead

诚邀分享您在日本的学习经历并获得1000日元

如果您是：
- 来自中国大陆的国际学生，
- 在[name of university]学习人文或社会科学的全日制学位在读学生 (非交换学生)，
- 目前就读本科三年级或四年级，
- 自费留学生，
- 愿意接受我们的采访

您将被邀请参加关于“日本的中国本科留学生的身份结构和日本大学的国际化”研究课题的采访。访谈将由塚田英惠(Hanae Tsukada)主持，这是她博士论文课题研究的一部分。

访谈内容
在回答访谈时，您将被问及以下相关内容：
- 您来日本学习的动机
- 您在日本学习的经历
- 您未来发展的计划

访谈时间和方式
- 日期/时间: [X年Y月Z日-X年Y月Z日]期间您方便的时间
- 时长: 60-90分钟
- 语言: 英语或日语

好处
参与者将获得1000日元现金。

如何参与
如果您愿意接受我的访谈，请通过邮件联系我。在您的邮件中，请包含如下信息（用英文或日文均可）:
  a) 姓名
  b) 电话号码
  c) 您目前所在的年级（比如：三年级本科生）
  d) 迄今为止在日本的时间
  e) 专业
  f) 出生地（在中国的哪个省份/城市）
  g) 性别
  h) 年龄
如果可以收到15个以上访谈候选人报名，我将基于人口平均分布（如：性别、年龄、出生地等）最终确定15名访谈对象。无论是否成为正式的被访谈对象，我都会通过邮件或电话的方式回复所有参与者。任何对本研究感兴趣者，都可以向我索取研究报告的概要。

请参考附件的同意书，以了解更多关于本研究和访谈的情况。如果您有任何问题，请通过如下邮件或电话方式联系我或我的合作导师。

我期待尽快收到您的回复，感谢您的参与！

塚田英恵(Hanae Tsukada)
博士候选人
教育研究系
不列颠哥伦比亚大学，加拿大

论文合作导师：
Donald Fisher教授
教育研究系
不列颠哥伦比亚大学，加拿大

久保田竜子(Ryuko Kubota)教授
语言与文学教育系
不列颠哥伦比亚大学，加拿大
Consent Form (For International Students)

Research Project Title: The Construction of Chinese Undergraduate International Students’ Identities and the Internationalization of Japanese Universities

This consent form explains the research project and requests your participation. Please read this form to consider your participation in the study, and if you have any questions, please contact the researcher and/or the researcher’s supervisors at the email addresses and phone numbers listed below.

Researcher: Hanae Tsukada
PhD Candidate
Department of Educational Studies
University of British Columbia, Canada

Co-Supervisors: Professor Donald Fisher (Department of Educational Studies)
Professor Ryuko Kubota (Department of Language and Literacy Education)
University of British Columbia, Canada

Purpose
This study aims to understand how Chinese undergraduate international students’ sense of self changes through their international education experiences in Japan. The purpose of the interview is to understand your motivation to come to Japan to study, your experiences in Japan, and your future plans.

You are being invited to take part in this research because you are:
- an international student from the mainland China,
- a full-time degree-seeking student, humanities or social science major at [the name of university/program],
- in the 3rd or 4th year of your undergraduate degree program,
- a self-funded student, and
- willing to be interviewed

Research Procedures
The interview will take place during my visit at [the name of university] between [date-date], at your convenience. The interview will be either in Japanese or English (whichever you prefer) and last 60-90 minutes. With your permission, the interview will be digitally recorded and transcribed to help with the data analysis process. If you consent to participate in the interview but do not wish to have the interview recorded, your request will be accommodated. You may also be contacted either for a brief follow-up conversation over the phone or Skype* or via email (whichever you prefer) for additional information or clarification. The correspondence will
require you about 30 minutes. You will receive a copy of the transcript and a summary of your interview and have the opportunity to change, delete or add anything you wish.

* Skype is a software application that allows users to make voice calls over the Internet. For more information, please go: http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/home

**Benefits to Participation**
When you participate in the interview, you will receive 1,000 yen in cash. In addition, when this study is completed, you will receive a summary of the research results.

**Potential Risks**
There are no known risks associated with participating in the interview. The interview will take place only after you understand the study, and after informed consent is obtained. You are under no obligation to participate. You may end the interview and/or withdraw at any time and without giving any reasons for your decision and without any consequences. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions.

**Confidentiality**
All of the information that you share with me will be kept strictly confidential. No names or identifying information whatsoever will be used on copies of individual files and recordings, and you and your institution will not be identified by name in any reports in the completed study. The files will be kept for five years, as per UBC policy, in a locked filing cabinet as well as in computer files protected by passwords known only to the researcher.

**Contact for concerns about the rights of research subjects**
If you have any concerns about your treatment or rights as a research participant, you may contact the Research Subject Information Line in the UBC Office of Research Services at (604) 822-8598 or at RSIL@ors.ubc.ca.

**Consent**
Your consent is required before you may participate in this study; however, your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Please select from the statements below and sign under the one that indicates how you would like to participate in this study.

Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records and that you consent to participate in this study and to have your interview audio-taped.

Participant’s Signature  Printed name  Date

Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records and that you consent to participate in this study but do not want your interview audio-taped.

Participant’s Signature  Printed name  Date
Appendix K: Consent form for international students (Japanese)

Printed on official Department of Educational Studies letterhead

同意書（留学生用）

中国人学部留学生のアイデンティティ形成と日本の大学教育の国際化

この同意書は、この研究（「中国人学部留学生のアイデンティティ形成と日本の大学教育の国際化」）について説明し、あなたのインタビュー参加をお願いするものです。この研究やインタビューについて質問などがある場合は、下記の調査者または調査者の指導教官にお問い合わせ下さい。

調査者：
塚田英恵
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学
教育学部 博士課程

調査者指導教官：
ドナルド・フィッシャー教授（教育学部）
久保田達雄教授（言語教育学部）
ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学

研究の目的
この研究は、日本の大学に在籍する中国人留学生たちが日本での経験を通じてどのように変化するのかについて調べます。このインタビューは、カナダのブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学教育学部博士課程在籍中の塚田英恵が博士論文研究として行なうものです。インタビューではあなたの留学動機、日本での経験と将来の予定について質問します。

この研究では、以下の条件すべてを満たす留学生にインタビューをお願いします。
- 本国本土からの留学生
- ＜大学名もしくはプログラム名＞在籍中の人文、社会科学系専攻のフルタイム正規学生（交換留学生は除く）
- 現在、学部3年、4年生
- 私費留学生
- インタビュー参加に興味がある

調査手順
インタビューは調査者（塚田英恵）が＜大学名＞に滞在する間＜何月何日から何月何日＞、参加者の希望の日時に、日本語か英語のどちらか希望の言語で行なわれ、60分から90分かかります。インタビューは、データ分析のためにデジタル録音され、さらに文字に起こされます。もしも参加者がインタビュー参加の意思があっても、録音を望まない場合は、録音しません。また、インタビューの後、インタビューの内容を確認したり、追加の質問をするために、調査者から参加者に連絡することがあるかもしれません。その場合は、調査者から電話、スカイプ*、または電子メールのうち参加者が希望する方法で連絡を取り、30分くらいで終了します
この研究調査に参加する利点
インタビュー参加者には1000円差し上げます。また、研究終了後、研究結果の要旨を送ります。

この研究調査に参加するリスク
このインタビューに参加することによって起こると考えられるリスクはありません。インタビューは、参加者がこの研究調査を理解し、参加に同意してからのみ始められます。参加者は、答えたくない質問への回答を拒否したり、インタビュー終了後でも参加を取り消すことができます。その場合は、理由を説明する必要はありませんし、その決断によって参加者に何か不利なことが生じることもありません。

プライバシーの保護
参加者から提出された情報が、参加者が誰か分かるかたちで公開されることはありません。この研究調査での記録や報告書の中では、参加者や参加者の大学名が使われることはありません。この研究の記録は、ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学のままにより、調査者しかアクセスできないパスワードや鍵で管理されたファイルに5年間保管されます。

研究参加者の権利に関する問い合わせ先
参加者としての扱われ方や権利について質問がある場合は、ブリティッシュ・コロンビア大学の研究サービスオフィスの研究対象者情報ライン（電話：604-822-8598、電子メール：RSIL@ors.ubc.ca）に連絡して下さい。

同意
この研究調査に参加するには、まず参加者の同意が必要ですが、参加するかどうかは参加者次第です。どのようにこの研究に参加したいか、以下のどちらか希望する方を選んで署名して下さい。

以下の署名は、参加者が記録としてこの同意書のコピーを受け取ったこと、この研究に参加すること、そしてインタビュー録音に同意することを示します。

参加者署名 ____________________ 参加者氏名 ____________________ 日付 ________________

以下の署名は、参加者が記録としてこの同意書のコピーを受け取ったこと、そして、インタビュー録音せずにこの研究に参加することに同意することを示します。

参加者署名 ____________________ 参加者氏名 ____________________ 日付 ________________
Appendix L: Interview protocol for faculty/staff members (English)

- Check the interviewee’s preferred language (English or Japanese)
- Thank-you for participating in study
- Introduce myself (interviewer)
- Re-introduce study (Purpose of the study and what I hope to learn from the interviewee)
- Discuss confidentiality
- Ask for permission to record
- Ask if participant has any questions or concerns
- Request participant’s signature on consent form
- Provide a copy of the consent form to the participant

Date of interview: ____________________________

Time of interview: (start) ___________ - (end) ___________

Location of interview: ____________________________

A: Questions to leaders in the internationalization of the entire university [Kasuga University and the Hokuto Global University (HGU)]

1. How have you been involved in the decision-making about internationalization at your university in what capacity?

2. Let me ask you about your university’s goals and strategies in internationalization.
   a. What are the main goals of internationalization?
   b. What kinds of strategies does your university take to achieve the goals of internationalization?
   c. What are the rationale for the goals and strategies?
   d. What do you think do international students mean to your university’s internationalization goals or strategies?

3. Let me ask you about the implication of the internationalization policies by the Japanese government to the internationalization of your university.
   a. How are the Japanese national policies reflected to internationalization at your university? Please provide examples.
   b. What, if anything, are the aspects of the Japanese national policies that do not align with the goals, needs, or circumstances of internationalization at your university?
   c. What do you think the Japanese national policies mean to your university?

4. Let me ask you about your university’s internationalization practices.
   a. How does your university implement the internationalization strategies? Please provide examples.
b. What are some of the barriers or challenging factors for internationalization at your university?
c. What are some of the supporting or advantageous factors for internationalization at your university?

5. Is there anything else you could share with me to help me understand the internationalization of your university better?

B: Questions to leaders in internationalization at the College of International Liberal Arts (CILA) at Kasuga University

1. Can you tell me about your responsibilities in CILA?

2. Let me ask you about internationalization at Kasuga University and CILA.
   a. What are the roles of CILA in the internationalization of Kasuga University?
   b. What do you think internationalization mean to CILA?
   c. What do you think do international students mean to internationalization at CILA?

3. Let me ask you about the implication of the internationalization policies by the Japanese government to the internationalization of your university.
   a. Can you provide examples that show how the Japanese national policies are reflected to internationalization at CILA?
   b. What are the aspects of the Japanese national policies that do not align with the goals, needs, or circumstances of internationalization at CILA?
   c. What do the Japanese national policies mean to CILA?

4. Let me ask you about internationalization practices at CILA.
   a. How does CILA implement internationalization? Please provide examples.
   b. What do you think are the rationales for the internationalization practices at CILA?
   c. What are barriers or challenging factors in internationalization at CILA?
   d. What are the supporting or advantageous factors in internationalization at CILA?

5. Is there anything else you could share with me to help me understand internationalization at CILA better?

C: Questions to leaders in international student services, support, or recruitment [at CILA and HGU]

1. Can you tell me about your responsibilities at [CILA or HGU]?

2. Let me ask you about your office’s work with international students.
   a. How does your office work with or for international students?
   b. How is your office’s work related to the internationalization of your university?
c. What are some of the challenges or problems for your office in [supporting or recruiting] international students?

d. What are the supporting or advantageous factors for your office in [supporting or recruiting] international students?

e. What do you think international students mean to [CILA or HGU]?

f. What do you think are the responsibilities of [CILA or HGU] for international students?

3. Let me ask you about the implication of the internationalization policies by the Japanese government to the work your office does with international students at [CILA or HGU].
   a. Can you provide examples that show how the Japanese national policies are reflected to the work your office does with international students at [CILA or HGU]?
   b. What are the aspects of the Japanese national policies that do not align with the goals, needs, or circumstances of your office’s work with international students at [CILA or HGU]?
   c. What do you think the Japanese national policies mean to the work your office does with international students at [CILA or HGU]?

4. Is there anything else you could share with me to help me understand your institution’s engagement in internationalization or international students better?

- Ask the interviewee if s/he would be willing to be contacted for follow-up inquiries, noting that s/he can change her/his mind at any point.
- Explain the following research process:
  - I will email the transcript of the interview and the interviewee’s story so that s/he can review and make changes as s/he wishes.
  - I will provide a summary of the research results.
- Thank the interviewee.
Appendix M: Interview protocol for faculty/staff members (Japanese)

- 使用言語を確認（英語か日本語）
- インタビュー協力へのお礼
- 自己紹介
- リサーチ／インタビューの目的
- インタビューで話したことは外には漏れないことを説明
- 録音の許可の確認
- 質問や心配なことがあるか聞く
- 同意書の説明とサイン
- 同意書のコピーを渡す

日付：____________________

時間：（開始）_____________ - （終了）_____________

場所：____________________

A: 大学全体の国際化のリーダーへの質問（春日大学とHGU）

1. 貴校の国際化の目標と戦略について決定するにあたり、貴方はどのような役職でどのようにかかわってこられましたか？

2. 貴校の国際化の目標と戦略についてお聞かせ下さい。
   a. 貴校の国際化の主な目標は何ですか？
   b. 貴校の国際化の目標を達成するための戦略についてお話し下さい。
   c. 貴校が今お話し下さったような国際化の目標や戦略を立てた背景にある理由や考え方は何だと思われますか？
   d. 貴校の国際化の目標や戦略にとって留学生はどのような意味を持つものと思われますか？

3. 日本政府の国際化政策と貴校の国際化についてお聞かせ下さい。
   a. 貴校の国際化は日本政府の国際化政策をどのように反映していますか？例を挙げてお話し下さい。
   b. 日本政府の国際化政策のうち、貴校の国際化の目標、ニーズ、もしくは状況に合わない点があるとしたら、それはどんな点ですか？
   c. 貴方は貴校の国際化にとって日本政府の国際化政策がどのような意味をもつとお考えですか？

4. 貴校の国際化の実施の仕方についてお聞かせ下さい。
   a. 先ほど貴校の国際化戦略についてお話し頂きましたが、貴校はその国際化戦略に対し、どのように取り組んでおられますか？具体的な実施例を挙げてお話し下さい。
b. 国際化を実施するにあたり、貴校ではどのようなことが障害もしくは課題となっていますか？
c. 貴校にとって国際化を実施するにおいて、有利な点はどんなことですか？

5. 私が伺わなかったことで、貴校の国際化をよりよく理解するために何かお話し頂けることがありましたら、お願いします。

B: 春日大学インターナショナル教養学部（CILA）の国際化のリーダーへの質問

1. CILAでの貴方の役割をお話し下さい。

2. 春日大学とCILAでの国際化についてお聞かせ下さい。
   a. 春日大学の国際化の中で、CILAはどのような役割をもっていますか？
   b. CILAにとって国際化はどのような意味をもっていると思われますか？
   c. CILAの国際化において留学生はどのような意味をもっていると思われますか？

3. 日本政府の国際化政策とCILAの国際化についてお聞かせ下さい。
   a. CILAの国際化は日本政府の国際化政策をどのように反映していますか？例を挙げてお話し下さい。
   b. 日本政府の国際化政策のうち、CILAの国際化の目標、ニーズ、もしくは状況に合わせた点があるとしたら、それはどんな点ですか？
   c. 貴方はCILAの国際化にとって日本政府の国際化政策がどのような意味をもつとお考えですか？

4. CILAの国際化の実施の仕方についてお聞かせ下さい。
   a. CILAでは国際化にどのように取り組んでおられますか？具体的な実施例を挙げてお話し下さい。
   b. CILAがそのような国際化の仕方をする背景にある理由や考え方は何だと思われますか？
   c. 国際化を実施するためにあたり、CILAではどのようなことが障害もしくは課題となっていますか？
   d. CILAにとって国際化を実施しやすくしていること、もしくはCILAが国際化をするにあたり有利に働いている点はどんなことですか？

5. 私が伺わなかったことで、CILAの国際化をよりよく理解するために何かお話し頂けることがありましたら、お願いします。

C: 留学生サービス、支援、リクルートのリーダーへの質問（春日大学CILAとHGU）

1. ＜CILAまたはHGU＞での貴方の役割をお話し下さい。

2. 貴方のオフィスの留学生への取り組みについてお聞かせ下さい。
   a. 貴方のオフィスでは留学生に対してどのような仕事をしていますか？
   b. 貴方のオフィスで留学生に対して行なわれる仕事は、貴校の国際化にどのように関連していますか？
c. 貴方のオフィスで留学生を＜支援もしくはリクルート＞するにあたり、どんなことが障害もしくは課題になっていますか？

d. 貴方のオフィスで留学生を＜支援もしくはリクルート＞をしやすくしていること、もしくは有利に働いている点はどんなことですか？

e. ＜CILAまたはHGU＞にとって留学生はどのような意味をもつと思われますか？

3. 日本政府の国際化政策と貴方のオフィスにおいての留学生への取り組みについてお聞かせ下さい。

a. 日本政府の国際化政策は貴方のオフィスが留学生に対して行なう仕事にどのように反映されていますか？例を挙げてお話し下さい。

b. 日本政府の国際化政策のうち、貴方のオフィスが留学生に対して行なう仕事における目標、ニーズ、もしくは状況に合わせない点があるとしたら、それはどんな点ですか？

c. 貴方のオフィスにとって、日本政府の国際化政策はどのような意味をもつと思われますか？

4. 私が伺わなかったことで、＜CILAまたはHGU＞の国際化や留学生への取り組みをよりよく理解するために何かお話し頂きることがありましたら、お願いします。

- 後日フォローアップの質問などに応じて頂けるか確認する。後で意向を変更しても構わないことも説明する。
- 今後のリサーチの手順
  - インタビューを文字起こしたもの、インタビューの会話の要旨をメールで送り、協力者が手を加えることができる。
  - リサーチが終了したら、リサーチ結果の要約を送る。
- インタビュー協力へのお礼
Appendix N: Interview protocol for international students (English)

- Check the interviewee’s preferred language (English or Japanese)
- Thank-you for participating in study
- Introduce myself (interviewer)
- Re-introduce study (Purpose of the study and what I hope to learn from the interviewee)
- Referring to that I am Japanese, explain that I would like to learn the interviewee’s negative as well as positive experiences in Japan.
- Discuss confidentiality
- Ask for permission to record
- Ask if participant has any questions or concerns
- Request participant’s signature on consent form
- Provide a copy of the consent form to the participant

Date of interview: ______________________________

Time of interview: (start)_____________ - (end)_____________

Location of interview: ______________________________

1. Let me first briefly go through your background based on the information you gave me:
   a. Place of origin
   b. Year of degree program
   c. Length of stay in Japan so far
   d. Major
   e. Self-funded student (Sources of funds? - family, scholarship, job, etc)
   f. Age

2. Why did you decide to come to study in Japan? Please walk me through your decision-making process.
   a. What made you start thinking about studying outside of China?
   b. What was the major reason why you chose Japan, instead of another country, as your destination?
   c. Why did you choose [name of university]?

3. Please let me ask about your experiences in your studies in Japan.
   a. What have been some of the most challenging issues in your studies (in and/or outside classroom)?
   b. What have been some of the most interesting or meaningful experiences in your studies (in or outside classroom)?
   c. What do you do when you have difficulties in your studies?
   d. What do you think about the learning support provided by your university?
4. Please let me ask you about your experiences in Japan other than studying.
   a. Are you part of any student clubs or organizations on campus? If so, can you tell me what you do with the group?
   b. Can you tell me about school events, in which you had memorable experiences, if any?
   c. What do you think about the support that your university provides for international students? Is there any area of support that you think as either helpful or insufficient? If so, what is it?
   d. Do you think your university perceives you in a certain way? If so, how do you think they perceive you? Can you give me some examples? What do you think about it?
   e. Do you have a job in Japan? If so, what do you do? How many hours a week do you work? On what do you spend your salary?
   f. Are you part of any groups of people off-campus and outside your job (e.g., a community of Chinese immigrants in the region, religious group, volunteer activities, etc)? If so, can you tell me what you do with the group?

5. Let me ask you about your experiences with people in Japan, including both Japanese people and non-Japanese people living in Japan.
   a. Who have been your best friends on- and off-campus in Japan? Why do you think you get along well with them?
   b. In your experiences with people in Japan, what have been some of the things that you struggle with or feel uncomfortable or negative about? Can you tell me one or two stories about them?
   c. Through your personal relationships and daily encounters with people in Japan, do you think people in Japan perceive you in a certain way? If so, how do you think they perceive you? Can you give me some examples? What do you think about it?
   d. Do you think your personal relationships and daily encounters with people in Japan have influenced the way you see yourself? If so, how? If not, why?

6. Reflecting on your whole experiences in Japan so far;
   a. What have been some of the most important or meaningful experiences for you in Japan? Can you tell me one or two stories about them?
   b. What have been some of the most challenging experiences for you in Japan? Can you tell me one or two stories about them? What do you think need to change to improve the challenging situation?
   c. How, if at all, do you think you or the way you think about things have changed through your experiences in Japan? Can you give me some examples? If you don’t think there has been any changes, why?

7. Let me ask you about your future plans.
   a. What do you plan to do after your graduate? Why do you want to do that?
   b. Do you have any concerns about your life after graduation? What are they?
   c. Do you use career support offered by your university? How do you use it? If you don’t use it, why?
d. Can you tell me about your long-term future plans or goals, if you have any?
e. Have there been any changes in your future plans or the way you think about your future since you came to Japan? If so, how have they changed?
f. What do you think do your experiences in Japan mean to your future?

8. Is there anything else you would like to share with me?

- Ask the interviewee if s/he would be willing to be contacted for follow-up inquiries, noting that s/he can change her/his mind at any point.
- Explain the following research process:
  o I will email the transcript of the interview and the interviewee’s story so that s/he can review and make changes as s/he wishes.
  o I will provide a summary of the research results.
- Ask the interviewee to select his/her pseudonym.
- Thank the interviewee.
- Provide the gift card.
Appendix O: Interview protocol for international students (Japanese)

- 希望の言語を確認（英語/日本語）
- インタビュー協力へのお礼
- 自己紹介
- リサーチ/インタビューの目的
- 私が日本人であることに触れ、留学生の日本でのいい経験の話だけでなく、そうでない話も聞きたいことを説明する
- インタビューで話したことは外には漏れないことを説明
- 録音の許可の確認
- 質間があるか聞く
- 同意書の説明とサイン
- 同意書のコピーを渡す

日付: ______________________

時間: （開始）______________ - （終了）______________

場所: ______________________

1. あなたのバックグラウンドについて簡単に確認させて下さい（事前にもらった情報をもとに）。
   a. 出身地
   b. 学年
   c. 日本で何年目
   d. 専攻
   e. 私費学生（主な財源は？家族から仕送り、奨学金、アルバイト等）
   f. 年齢

2. 日本に留学しようと決めたのはなぜですか？どのようにして日本への留学を決めたのか話してもらえますか？
   a. 海外で勉強をしようと思うようになったきっかけは何ですか？
   b. 他の国ではなく、日本に留学しようと決めたのはなぜですか？
   c. ＜大学名＞を選んだのはなぜですか？

3. ＜大学名＞での勉強のことについて聞かせて下さい。
   a. 勉強で大変なことはどんなことですか？（授業、授業以外）
   b. 勉強で面白いと思うこと、いい経験になっていると思うのはどんなことですか？（授業、授業以外）
   c. 勉強で何か困ったことがある時、どうしていますか？
   d. ＜大学名＞の学習面のサポートについてどう思いますか？

4. 勉強以外の経験について聞かせて下さい。
   a. 学校で部活やサークルなど、何か参加しているグループや活動はありますか？もしあれば、どんなことをしているか話してもらえますか？
b. これまで参加した学校のイベントで何か特に印象に残っていることがあったら話してもらえますか？

c. ＜大学名＞の留学生のためのサポートについてどう思いますか？ 役に立っている、もしくはサポートが不十分だと思うことがあるとしたら、それはどんなことですか？

d. 自分が＜大学名＞にどのように見られていると感じていると感じますか？ そして、例をあげて話してもらえますか？ それについてどう思いますか？

e. アルバイトはしていますか？ どんな仕事ですか？ 週に何時間働いていますか？ お給料はどんなことに使っていますか？

f. 学校やアルバイト以外で何か参加しているグループや活動がありますか？（例：地域の中国人コミュニティー、宗教や趣味のグループ、ボランティア活動など）もしあれば、どんなことをしているか話してもらえますか？

5. 日本での人間関係について聞かせて下さい。

a. 日本で一番親しくしているのはどんな人たちですか（学校で、学校外で）？ 彼らと仲がいいのはなぜだと思いますか？

b. 日本でのいろいろな人とつきあう中で苦労すること、付き合いにくいと感じること、もしくは嫌な思いをするのはどんなことですか（学校で、学校外で）？ 例をあげて話してもらえますか？

c. 日本でいろいろな人たちと付き合ったり接したりする中で、自分が人にどのように見られていると感じることはありますか？ そして、例をあげて話してもらえますか？ それについてどう思いますか？

d. 日本でいろいろな人たちと付き合ったり接したりすることで、あなたは自分の見方が変わったと思うことはありますか？ どんなふうに変わりましたか？ 変わった点がないとしたら、それはなぜだと思いますか？

6. これまでの日本での経験をまとめて振り返って。

a. 日本で一番良い経験になっていると思うこと、日本に来てよかったと思うのはどんなことですか？ 例をあげて話してもらえますか？

b. 日本で一番苦労することはどんなことですか？ 例をあげて話してもらえますか？ どんなことが変わればよいと思いますか？

c. 日本に留学してものの考え方や自分自身が変わったと思うことはありますか？ あるとしたら、どのように変わったか例をあげて話してもらえますか？ そして変わった点がないとしたら、それはなぜだと思いますか？ それ（変わったこと、変わってないこと）についてどう思いますか？

7. 将来の予定について聞かせて下さい。

a. 卒業後はどうする予定ですか？ なぜですか？

b. 卒業後のことでおか不安なことはありますか？ どんなことですか？

c. ＜大学名＞のキャリアサポートは利用していますか？ 利用しているとしたら、どのように役立っていますか？ 利用していないとしたら、それはなぜですか？

d. 5年後、10年後などもっと先の将来の予定や目標があったら話してもらえますか？

e. 日本に来てから将来の予定や考え方が変わったことはありますか？ あるとしたら、どのように変わりましたか？
f. 日本での留学経験はあなたの将来にどんな意味をもつと思いますか？

8. 私が聞かなかったことで何か話しておきたいことはありますか？

- 後日質問などに応じてもらえるか確認する。後で意向を変更しても構わないことも説明。電話、メール、スカイプの希望を聞く。
- 今後のリサーチの手順
  - インタビューを文字起こしたもの、インタビューの会話の要旨をメールで送り、協力者が手を加えることができる。
  - リサーチが終了したら、リサーチ結果の要約を送る。
- 仮名を選ぶかどう
- インタビュー協力へのお礼
- ギフトカードを差し上げる
Appendix P: Original Japanese quotes

Chapter 6

i 私たちが考えている国際化の最も象徴的なもの

ii 必要悪

iii 例えば、春日においてもこく端的ななすけど、今まで我々だけで頑張っていた時はいろんな意味で反対されることが多かったんですね。「それはもうこの学部だけのことなんだから、その学部だけでやってよ」とか、例えば、「英語の表示もして下さい」と言って、「この学部だけなんだから、そこだけやってればいいでしょう？」っていう感じだったのが、Ｇ３０になった途端にみんなやらなきゃいけない。...一部の特別な対応と思われてたことが、みんなやらなきゃいけないんだ、っていうふうになってきた。

iv 最近の政策の状況って意外と良くてですね、つまり、国立大学にオートマティックに行っていただ金っていうのが段々減っているわけですよね。それで、それを競争資金にしてくれて、手を挙げて、とにかく一生懸命プロポーザル書いて取って来るということが可能になっているので、当然、働かされる大学の先生たちは、全体的には嫌だと思っている人は多いと思うんですけれど（笑）、春日のような、まあ、そういうミッションというか、あとバリッションもある（笑）大学としては、そういう競争資金でも何でも、手を挙げることができるということは有難いと思っています。

v たまたま日本にある国際大学

vi 日本の中にありながら、いわゆる、世界に関われている

vii 留学生いなかったら、ただの大学ですから（笑）。

viii 国際化のシンボル的な存在だったり、国際交流のcounterpart、お客様

ix やはり留学生として本来は捉えるべきでないと、思っています。日本にあるけれども、やはり国際大学と銘打っている限りは、日本人も中国人も韓国人も、なんでよう、ロシア人も関係なくて、多分、学生だっていうふうに本当は受け止めてるべきだと思うんです。

x 小さな世界

xi 彼らが住む世界って、要はHGUみたいな世界だと思うんですね。

xii たまたまこういった環境が、学習環境、多文化学習環境があるというところで、日々が異文化間コミュニケーションだし、日々が異文化学習があるというところがHGUの強さなんだと思います。うん、だから毎日どこか海外にいるようなもんなんでよね。だから、うちの学生が家に帰ると、「日本人しかいなくて気持ちが悪いんですけど」（笑）みたいな（笑）。...けして中国人のコミュニティと日本人のコミュニティがこう、コミュニティ別に分かれずに一緒に何かやってるってわけではないんですけど、だた、まあ、それがとにかくある。例えば、ニューヨークの街に行って歩いているみたいな感
じなわけですよ。あちこちからいろんな言語が聞こえて、っていうのがこのキャンパスで３６５日
あるっていうのがポイントなんだと思います。

xiii それは春日の場合には、メインキャンパスの中にレベルアルーツの外国人とかなんかが、他の日本の
大学と比べてくれたらすぐに分かりだと思わんだけだ、飛び交っている言葉が日本語だけじゃないって
いうのがはっきりしてますよね。そういう場を提供するっていうのは大学として重要なんだよね。そっ
いう場を提供して、そこで考えなさい、と。何をせーということじゃなくて、そういう場の中で自分た
たちがこれから大学卒業して３０年、４０年働いて、社会の中で活躍していくために必要なものは何かっ
ているのは、いれば考えるわけですよね。

xiv Walking dictionaryじゃないですけど、walking material、teaching materialがそこにゴロゴロい
るっていうのが、まず意義があるとは思います。... ここ方がこう、授業で教えている時に、日本人にだけ
教えていれば、日本人の意見しか出てこないけど、他の国から来た学生が来ることによって、どんなる
世界が広がっていくというか、意見が広がっていくし、枠が取れていくことがあったりとかあるので、そっ
いった意味での、特に方向的な授業をしている先生のところであれば、さらにだと思うんですけど、学生に対してその学びの機会を大きく与えていることが実際にあるとは思います。

 xv 「多文化共生できていると思いますか？」「イエス」「どうしてですか？」「留学生がたくさんいて、
みんないろんな言語で喋っているわけですか。」

 xvi 今年は日本全体がもう国際化の波というんですか、非常に押されていて、企業自体がグローバル
化しなければいけないという話になってて、で、しかも、学生たちが、まあ、非常に内向き志向と言われ
していて、日本人の子たちがなかなか外に行かない。で、しかも日本の企業も今まであまり出ても行かなか
かったはずなんですねけど、... 一番でこんなに変わるかな、と思うんですけど、一昨年のレベルは、日本人
で国際的な経験を持っている人に是非来て欲しい。なぜならば日本語が通じるから（笑）。日本のカ
ルチャーある程度通じるから、っていうのが多分本音だったと思います。でも今年は、もう、「留学
生でいい」。変な話ですけど、「留学生の方がいい」くらいなんかで。

 xvii 学力、働くモチベーション、言語運用能力、この三つの面では日本人はかなわない、ということなん
ですかよね。そういう意味での国際競争力に日本の学生が勝てるかと言ったら、勝てない。日本人よ
リ優れた社員を供給、供給源としてHGUはね、留学生であろうが日本人であろうがなっている、
と。特に留学生はどうか。

 xviii 留学生っていうのは、母国も分かる。でも、全然飛び出して、日本でマイナーで頑張ってる。やっぱり
そのへんのとがかったその感覚いうんですかね、それが抜き出てるんじゃないのかな、っていう
ふうに思いますね。

 xix その地域の持続的な発展に貢献できるような人材を育成しようとして

  x  日本をよく知ってもらって、日本文化も日本の歴史とか関心、理解してもらって、こう、日本のファ
ンになってそのまま、ま、残る人もいれば、本国に帰り、日本と本国の架け橋になるとか、そういった
 役割を持たずに育成していくのが本学の勤めであろう。留学生に対しては、っていうような考え方を
 持っていると思います。

 xli 国際的な人材を作るということはね、留学生のためじゃなくて、一緒に学ぶ日本人のためでもあった
り、地域のためでもあった、すごい広い効用がありますから、単にその、留学生を育てて、日本とそ
の母国の架け橋にするよ、という、そこだけじゃない。もっと広い、日本が将来にわたって、世界の中で位置を占めていく上でのおっかな意味がありますから。

xxii ブリッジ人材

xxiii 新しい価値観を経済的に生み出すという意味でのイノベーション人材

xxiv それが日本社会への、あるいは大きく言えば国際的経済社会への大きなメリットになるのではないか。

xxv 責任ではないんですけど、やっぱり日本を大好きになってもらって、やっぱり日本企業に入って欲しいな、っていうのが願いですね。

xxvi それでやはりメディアで取り上げられるじゃないですか。「HGUの就職率が高いです」。いいのは、国際生はいいので、そこで平均値を上げていくんですね、やっぱり。で、それにこう、追従したかたちで日本人の方も上がっていこう、ちょっと不思議な、ウン、なので、国際生が落ちると日本人も落ちるんですね。

xxvii 経営的判断

xxviii 企業さんから見るとね、グローバル人材が欲しい、と。海外で働ける人材が欲しい、というふうに見た時にですね、HGUは宝庫なんですよ。

xxix アジアの中、日本の中核なる大学という自負は当然あるわけですねけど、それを広げてアジアの中核なる大学にしているということです。

xxx アジア太平洋地域における知の共創

xxxi この共創という言葉は当然...若干のcompetitionの部分も当然あるわけです。と言えますか、competitivenessとふるいに言った方がいいかもしれませんけれど、つまり、競争力のある大学、もしくは、競争力のある人材を国際的にですね、グローバル社会において、もしくはアジア太平洋地域において競争力のある人材を、大学を作っていきたいということが当然あるわけで、で、それをする方法として「共創」といいますか、つまり、competitionではなくて、partnershipもしくはcooperationというようななかたちで、他の大学との協力をしながらそういう人材を育てていきたい。

xxxi 国際化の拠点

xxxn 私はよく言うんですけども、あのウィンブルドンと同じになっても構わない、と。つまり、あのウィンブルドンのテニスっていうのは、あそこに出ても選手、イギリス人、もういなくっちゃったよね。けど、あのウィンブルドンというあの大会は世界でトップだよね。春日大学も別段、教員も学生も日本人である必要はない。春日大学っていう名前があって、そこでいい教育と研究がされていれば、教えている人も、授業を受けている人も何人も構わない。

xxvii 春日大学は１０数パーセントの国からのお金あるけれども、別段、じゃないというふうに言えば、１０数パーセントの日本人さえいりいいよ、や。それはもう割り切っちゃったの。...要するに、世界の中で競争していく大学になっちゃえ、と。
Chapter 7

第二故郷ですから。

日本に対するその感情っていうのがすごい強いんですよね。

例えば、中国で一緒に、海外で日本人を見かけたら、「あ、喋りたいな」とか、そういう感じですね。

米国とヨーロッパすごく混んでいるから（以後英語）

ただ、もうあの時は多分そこに逃げたいかな、と思っててしまう。
まず、入りやすいというか（沈黙）。20分の面接で、すぐ、ま（笑）、入学したから、なんか、不思議だな（笑）思っとけど、たしかに、中国の大学に入るよりリスクがずっと低いですよ。

日本という国は日本語使っていますよね。日本語というのは、英語とかフランス語とかスペイン語じゃないで、いろんな国で使っている言語じゃないで、...この言語を使ってる国は少ないということです。私はもし日本に行ったら、日本語勉強できるし、日本語の能力を身に付ければ、多分、中国でも、多分、なんていうの、他のところでは多分トップのレベルの大学で勉強している人たちに負けるんでしょうけど、言語力を加えると多分勝てるかな、と。勿論みんな英語喋れますけど、日本が喋れる人はなかなかいないです。

有名だから。

private universityに入れるだけど、でも、一番いいの大学は入らない。これは難しいですよ。私の両親は私にいい大学に入る方が良いと、ずっとそんな理念を持っている。で、私もいい大学に入りたい、と思います。でも、中国はいい大学には、トップ5と、本当に難しいです。私は、自分はレベルはトップ20の方ですよね。だから、これ、中国にいい、よく教育を受けないから、留学の方が、他のいい大学に入ってよく教育を受けるのが、これはいいチャンス、機会から、日本へ来ました。

以後、なんか就職する時、どっかで働くと言われますと、まあ、有名、有名、ブランク名が高い方がですね、だから大学が入った方が、なんか、将来、就職活動に有利かなと思いまして。それで春田大学選んだですね。もし中国に戻ったら場合も、春田大学っていう名前ぐらいは聞いたことあるっていう人は結構いると思いますね。

中国にいたら多分このまま大学院に入っていて、そして、分からないけれども、でも、中国にいたら、どうだろうね、多分、多国籍企業に入るかどうかは分からないけど、でも、今の自分だと、選考も結構進んでいるので、希望が見えるようになっていますので、日本に来て、多国籍企業にも入るし、日本語能力も身につけるし、それが一番よかったかな、と思います。自分のキャリアとしては、自分の人生も変わったかな、と思います。

自由の土地に一度立ったら、もう二度とそんな場所に戻れないって感じ。...もともと共産党が嫌いだし。...中国に戻って、Googleすら使えない、そういう国に戻ってどうやって生きられるかわからないです。

Chapter 8

HGUに来られたいろんな国の方から、いろんな国のイベントとかパフォーマンスとか、そういうものを沢山見て、中国で絶対に見られない風景がたくさん見れて、なんか、ほとんと、世界中旅したような感覚でしたね。

HGUは本当の日本じゃない。

不平等性を感じましたね。

不平等。例えば筆記試験でSPIでしたり、...、そういう内容は、われわれ留学生では、まだ日本に来て4年間しか経ってないじゃないですか。就職[活動]しているときは3年間。その中で、日本の同じ大学生と同じようなベースは、お払いんじゃないかと思ってるんですね。
Si Jing: 国際教養学部、そうですね、日本の大学でも、イノベーションっていう観点からすれば、第一歩を踏み出しているなと思いますけれども、ただ、その、日本の大学が、全て欧米に向かっているっていうのは、なんか、もったいない気がして（小休止）、というのは、…同様でも、4年間たって日本語がそんなしゃべれない子もたくさんいますし、4年間日本に留学して、結果的に、そうですね、そんなに日本についてもあまり知らない、という子もたくさんいるんですので、そういう意味からすれば、欧米路線に行くより、自分独特の路線を見つけたほうがいいんじゃないかと思います。うん。

Hanae: っていうのは、じゃあ、CILAは欧米に向かっている気がする、ということ？

Si Jing: そうですね。何でもインターナショナル、インターナショナルはいいと思うんですけど、インターナショナルというよりも、なんか、今はWesternizeされているような気がして、そうですね。

Hanae: それ、どういうところで感じるの？

Si Jing: うーん（沈黙）。例えば、すべての授業とレポート、まあ、卒業論文は選択できるんですけれども、教授によっては、英語だというのはおかしいんじゃないかなるんでしょうかね。

HGUは特別なので、HGUは留学生が多いので、

本当にたくさん、他の各国から来る学生たち見かけますけれども、その学生たちが全部インテグレーションしているとは限らず、中国人は中国人で固まって、ま、世界どこも同じだとは思うんですけど、そういうのはなんかミックスでなければ。

It seems like a little Chinese society because they have more than 200 people. だから、日本人とコミュニケーションしなくてもハッピーなライフをできます。毎日中国人ばかり遊んでいた。

自分の中の諷りとか、伝統文化をよく日本人と外国人にちゃんと伝えています。自分も一人の中国人としてなかなか光栄（くすぐる笑）ですか、なんか、諷りを持ってます。

中国人が団結できないっていうことが、なんか、ちょっと恥ずかしく思いました。やっぱ、このような国際的な環境で、ほんとに団結すべきところでみんなばらばらで、ほんとに情けないというか。他の国の人が、みんな集まって、踊ったり歌ったりって風景を見た時はすごく羨ましいと思ったんですね。

やはり中国人ですね。

中国人としてのことだと、やはり中国人が多いので、そんなに考えたことがない。

やっぱり中国人ですねよ。

だから見た彼らは、どうもここ春日来る意味が甘すぎるというのは正直な感想です。もちろん全員がそうだというわけではありません、あくまで私的な一般論ですが、彼らの多くにとって、春日から卒業することは、「国際的名門卒」という国内の名門卒に勝る層書きをもたらす以上の意味がなく、もしその上中英、日三ヵ国語を話せるようにもならばそれはただの良いおまけだということです。だから彼らは自分たちが別に上手でも好きでもない、ただ「他の人も取ってるから」という、私としては理由に含まれない理由で、万国共通というか実務的というかの経済、金融関係の授業ばかり取るようになっています。はるばるここ春日来って日本語の勉強さえできたからもうそれでいい、というもっといなさ過ぎる話は私には思いませんでした。
 lxix 本物の大陸出身の中国人と私の考え方方が違うんですよ。入ってもそこまで上手く話せると思わないし、
で、入っても時間の無駄かな、はい、入りたくない、そんな感じもありまして、入りたくない、という
気分です。... 中国人って結構愛国主義な人が多いじゃないですか。結構テレビで見たことありますけど、
なんか、「日本人の方で嫌な中国人いますか？」って言うと結構人手にしてている人が多いですけ
ど、個人的にそういう人はですね、洗脳されみたいない、個人的に、それ嫌なんでしょ。... いっぱいの愛
国精神とか詰め込まれて、ですから、個人的に一切こういう授業はなかったんですから。... 簡単でいえ
ますと、愛国主義っていう人は国のために何でも規制するじゃないですか。個人的には、中国は私に何も
やってないので何で私は中国のために規制するのかって話になっちゃうわけです。

 lxx ははり自分があまり日本語で通じられないこともいっぱいありますから、同期の人は、「Peiyaoさん
は何言ってるか分からないな」。そういう、ずっとそういう感じでみんなも私ちょっと遠くなったー
（くすぐる笑）みたいな感じがありまして、その... [サークルの名前] は日本の文化のサークルが非常に
滲んでいるサークルとして、先輩後輩の段階的な、そういうイメージが非常に強いですね。そういう
イメージの下で、私があまり守れないから、先輩から怒られることも（くすぐる笑）ありましたし、

 lxxi 非常に、えー、気が落としたみたい（笑）な感じ。自信もなくなったりし、実は最初はサークルを通し
て自分の日本語を高めたいと思ってんんですけど、なぜ入ったのかは、口がもっと開けられない（笑）み
たい感じがありました。

 lxxii 他の日本人が、私が今就活する時は、聞いてるなら、「なんで中国に戻らないの？」「なんで日本に
就職したいの？」すごく。なんか、ちょっと皮肉な感じがあるので、本当に「なんで日本でダメです
か？」とか、そういうふうに言いったかったですが、でも、ちゃんと説明して、相手が理解、理解しても
もらえるかどうかは分からないけど。本当に日本人学生にとって私たちは邪魔かなると思っていまし
ました。

 lxxiii やはり日本人はなんか、外国人に対して... 特に中国人とかアジア人に対してそんなに友好的な態
度ではないかなと思います。

 lxxiv Peiyao: 70才くらいのおじいさんとか、いつも私の名札を見ると、...「中国人じゃない？」。
Hanae: いつも「お前は馬鹿じゃないか」ということよく聞かれますよね。
Hanae: そういうこと言われるんですか？
Peiyao: はい。特に日本語、何か聞かれて、... 私、分からない。...「ちょっと待って下さい
。ちょっと責任者に関きたいんですが」[と私が言っても]... 落ち着かないで、「お
前は馬鹿でないですか？」って。

 lxxv 授業で、たくさんの先生が見せたビデオとか、そのビデオの中の中国は全部10年前の中国のビデオ
なので、自転車が、街中に自転車ばかりというイメージで、... 貧しい国（笑）というイメージ [を持た
れていると思いました]。

 lxxvi 中日の国際関係が悪化したら私たちも不安です。... 戦争があったらどうしますか？

 lxxvii アジア人、みんな黄色だし黒髪だし。別になんか言わなくちゃ誰も中国人だと知らないじゃないで
すか。それはちょっとほっとしてるっていうか。

 lxxviii 心配はしないですね。願いはあります。... 日中関係をよくしてほしいです。
lxxix 未来に、日本の社会に出てると、必ずいっぱいの人と会うことがありますので、もし中国嫌だと思う人に会ったら、私たち、私にいじめがあるかもしれない。... 今は学生ですので、大学にいるから問題ないです。勿論、留学生は私一人じゃなくて、いっぱいいますよね。で、社会に出たら外国人はそんなに多くないと思います。

lxxx 話しにくいというか、話したくないですね。

lxxxi 他の友達と話すと、きっと関係が悪くなるでしょう、と思いますね。国際問題なんかを話したら。例えば、私と日本人とその問題話したら、日本人の友達はどう考えているかよく考えないといけないと思いますね。... やっぱり他の友達は、「あー、やっぱりお前は中国人ですね。」「中国人はやっぱり勝手なやり方しますね。」ま、みんなそうでしょう。私たち、他の国の問題あったら、やっぱり、その問題あったら絶対他の国のせいですね。自分の国、何も悪くない。

lxxxii その店長さんとかみんないろいろほんとに私には相当優しくしてくれまして、もうその時は本当に楽しかった。... 日本と中国の歴史とかあまりよくないじゃないですか？... それは歴史だけで判断するわけではないと思いました。