ANTI-CHEINESE ATTITUDES IN POST-COMMUNIST MONGOLIA
THE LINGERING NEGATIVE SCHEMAS OF THE PAST

by

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Abstract

This thesis examines “anti” attitudes in general and anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia in particular, to answer the puzzle: Why do anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia still persist after both nations have enjoyed friendly, neighborly state-to-state relations for more than two decades? The argument is made that anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia are persistent because of lingering impacts of artificially-consolidated negative schemas about China, Chinese people, and their culture from the 1960s-1980s. Mongolian political elites at that time institutionalized anti-Chinese attitudes, introducing only negative schemas, while blocking all other sources for positive or neutral schemas about China. Nevertheless, Mongolian political elites’ attitudes toward China became noticeably positive since mid-2000 due to increased interactions, information, and the changing economic reality despite the fact that unfavorable views of China and the anti-Chinese attitudes have still dominated the media, blogosphere, and public discourses. The main reason for the gap between attitudes of the political elites and the public can be explained by a reluctance of the political elites and intellectuals to de-construct the past schemas because of its diacritic purpose to differentiate Mongolian identity in addition to material realities.

This thesis also contends that anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia are a variant of a global anti-Chinese phenomenon. The “anti” attitudes are explained by three main reasons: a power imbalance, a backlash against economic activities, and conflicting identities. In this regard, the Mongolian case study is an excellent entry point to understand the causes and consequences of anti-Chinese attitudes in the small, developing, democratic Chinese neighbors.

This thesis uses analytical approaches for a similar phenomenon, anti-Americanism, and extensively uses the notion of schema, as developed by Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) in their conceptualization of anti-Americanisms.
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My final thanks go to my family for their patience and encouragement as I engaged in this challenging new path of learning and discovery.
Dedication

To my Dad
Chapter 1: Introduction

A few days before the 2009 Mongolian presidential election, news coverage about presidential candidate Elbegdorj’s Chinese ethnic ties stirred strong public reactions. He flew from Ulaanbaatar to his mother in Khovd, a far western province, and asked her to speak on national television about his father’s Mongolian origins. Soon after, another series of debates on major mining and railroad projects surfaced in the domestic politics as parliament debated whether to allow Chinese investment in the Oyu Tolgoi copper mining deposit and to extend domestic railroad links using either Russian or Chinese gauge. On February 22, 2010, almost every Mongolian wore deel, a traditional dress, to convince international heritage experts that deel is a true Mongolian dress and could not be considered as Chinese heritage. The public pressured the government to have other nomadic heritage items registered at UNESCO before China did. Mongolian monks, as usual, argued about whether the Mongolian Lunar New Year occurs on a different day or on the same day as the Chinese Lunar New Year. Also in 2010, three separate small-scale clashes, which could be classified as ethnically-motivated, occurred near two Chinese mines in the south and west, and at a construction site in Ulaanbaatar. Just before the New Year, the Chinese “insidious” policy of controlling Mongolian meat markets was disclosed by the media, prompting government inspection agencies to investigate the Chinese meat business in Mongolia. Interestingly, anyone who questioned the rationality of the anti-Chinese debates was soon attacked with jargons associated with anti-Chinese sentiments.

These examples are typical of the anti-Chinese attitudes in post-communist Mongolia, which have had a direct impact on the policies of the Mongolian government and on Sino-Mongolian relations, particularly on the Mongolian side. Mongolian political elites prefer closer ties with the West and with regional major powers (i.e., Russia, India, and Japan) to avoid Chinese dominance. Although this has raised concerns among the Chinese political and military elites, it is implausible to speculate that anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia have upset ordinary Chinese people in Beijing, considering their diverse neighbors and the Han-dominated multi-ethnic society.

A great deal of contemporary international relations (IR) literature on China touches on the re-emergence of anti-Chinese sentiments around the world and Chinese soft power policy. Moreover, major international opinion surveys have been tracking public views about China. Similarly, IR discourse on Mongolia is concerned with traditional anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia. The literature, public opinion polls, and academic discourse would lead us to believe in the existence of a coherent global phenomenon, anti-Sinicism, and its deep-seated variant in
This thesis has the modest goal of contributing to the scholarly examination of the “anti” attitudes and a variant, the anti-Chinese phenomenon in Mongolia. Mongolia is a reasonable entry point for several reasons. First, all main sources of “anti” attitudes – a power imbalance, a backlash against economic activities, and conflicting identities – are in place. Second, Mongolia and China have coexisted for centuries, allowing researchers to observe the dynamics of anti-Chinese attitudes over a longer period. Finally, Mongolia has many similarities with other Chinese neighbors, in its nomadic traditions (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), ethnic homogeneity (Japan and two Koreas), and its democratic neighbors. Furthermore, Mongolia was an ally with the Soviets, along with Laos and Vietnam, against China during the Cold War, and had experiences of communism similar to the former and current Chinese communist neighbors.

My specific research question is, Why have the anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia persisted, even after both nations have enjoyed friendly, neighborly state-to-state relations for more than two decades? In this thesis, I will provide two answers. First, in general, the Mongolian case is no different than any other “anti” attitude case between small and big neighbors, where three main sources of negative attitudes – a power imbalance, a backlash against Chinese economic activities, and conflicting identities – exist. Anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia are a variant of the global anti-Chinese phenomenon. Second, anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia were institutionalized during the 1960s-1980s through the use of negative ideas, images, and theories (henceforth, schemas), which have never been de-constructed, thus allowing the systematic bias towards China, Chinese people, and their culture to persist in the public domain. In explaining the second answer, I use the notion of schema, as developed by Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) in conceptualization of a similar phenomenon, anti-Americanism.

The thesis is divided into four sections: first, I will construct an analytical framework for the study of anti-Chinese attitudes using research approaches for anti-Americanism; second, I examine the negative attitudes toward China, its people, and culture in post-communist Mongolia, as an empirical case study; third, I locate a Mongolian variant of the anti-Chinese attitudes from the other variants existing among the Chinese neighbors; and finally, I conclude with some ideas about “anti” attitudes in general, and anti-Chinese attitudes, in particular.

This thesis will employ a few specific concepts. A narrower concept ‘political elite’ will refer to people who have power and influence to determine, formulate, and implement state and
government policies. Table 1 depicts the different types of political elites in the communist regime and democracy in Mongolia. In the contemporary Mongolian case, this component includes members of parliament and cabinet as well as leaders of political parties of Mongolia while in previous political system, members of the Political Bureau and Party Central Committee had power and influences on political decisions. In contrast, the concept of public will refer to people, who are not entitled any political powers. The notion of schemas, which are “sets of representations that process information and guide actions” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, p. 230) will used to disaggregate anti-Chinese attitudes into interconnected negative ideas, images, and theories. Lastly, the “diacritic” use of schemas refers to ways in which political elites and intellectuals construct and deploy negative schemas about the people, government, and society of the target nation to consolidate image of their own country. “These processes of negative self-definition invoke anxieties, self-images, and political experience that are quite specific to each country, and that often form part of broader political or social strategies” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, pp. 228-230).

Table 1. Mongolian Political Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Communist Regime (1921-1990)</th>
<th>Democracy (1990-Present)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Political Elites</td>
<td>Dictator (totalitarian regime) Members of the Political Bureau Members of the Party Central Committee</td>
<td>Members of Parliament Members of Government Cabinet President, Policy Advisors Leaders of Political Parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The focus of this thesis is limited to the period after 1990, when Mongolia transitioned to democracy and the Sino-Mongolian relations became normalized. However, reference will also be made to earlier periods, particularly, the post-second world war era.
Figure 1. Map of Asia

Source: Library of the University of Texas (www.lib.utexas.edu/maps)
Chapter 2: Conceptualization of Anti-Chinese Attitudes

2.1 Overview

Anti-Chinese attitudes are not a new phenomenon in international relations. They are comparable to other “anti” phenomena in regards to general causes, processes, and consequences. Therefore, to help in developing an analytical framework, a similar phenomenon, anti-Americanism, will be used to investigate the anti-Chinese attitudes. In this chapter, I use three seminal approaches for understanding anti-Americanism to identify general causes, processes, and consequences of the negative attitudes, and develop an analytical framework based on three main sources of “anti” attitudes and the notion of schema. I argue that political elites in repressive regimes consolidate the negative schemas that often have a lingering impact on the society, even after transitioning to democracy or normalization of relations with the target country. This leads to my main argument, detailed in Chapter two, that anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia were institutionalized between the 1960s and 1980s through the use of negative schemas that still feed today’s systematic bias against China, Chinese people, and their culture.

2.2 Conceptualization of the “Anti” Attitude Phenomenon

Many different terms are used to describe the negative attitudes toward China, Chinese people, and their culture, such as anti-Chinese sentiment, anti-Sinicism, or Sinophobia. Because these terms have been operationalized for different purposes at different times, in this thesis I will use the social psychological term, “attitude.” An attitude can be positive, negative, or neutral, and according to social psychologists, attitudes consist of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors (Atkinson, 1993), making it a broader term than sentiment, less ideological than anti-Sinicism, and less psychological than Sinophobia. Negative attitudes toward any nation are often observed at all levels of international relations and affect international systems and domestic politics. States promote negative attitudes as an ideology against other states, while interest groups or individuals use negative attitudes in domestic politics. Anti-Chinese attitudes, for instance, were institutionalized and systematically used by the Soviets, the Vietnamese, and the Burmese during the Cold War. Today, politicians and interest groups in the US, Japan, and elsewhere advance anti-Chinese attitudes for various reasons.

Although current international relations discourses on China often highlight the widespread existence of anti-Chinese attitudes and Chinese government policy (e.g., soft power, charm diplomacy) to minimize the effects of the negative attitudes, the phenomenon has received scant attention in the scholarly literature. Public opinion about China is becoming of greater interest in major opinion surveys. But comparative, in-depth, and longitudinal studies are rare.
Like the IR academic coverage of China, most of the literature on Mongolia notes the existence of deep-seated anti-Chinese attitudes and the resulting impact on Sino-Mongolian relations, but does not investigate them.

One way to deal with the lack of systematic studies on anti-Chinese attitudes is to look at the approaches that have been used to study different varieties of negative attitudes. For this thesis, I have selected studies of anti-American attitudes, which are mostly referred to as anti-American sentiment or anti-Americanism in the IR literature. First, anti-Americanism is an old, recurring phenomenon, targeting a major power. Second, the phenomenon is global, and expressed everywhere along with the dichotomous Americanization. Third, anti-American attitudes have been extensively studied by academics.

Despite some major differences between anti-American and anti-Chinese attitudes, I will use the following approaches in explaining anti-American attitudes, to develop an analytical framework to explain the causes and effects of the persistent anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia.

Table 2. Approaches of Anti-Americanism Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Titles</th>
<th>Key Themes/Regions/Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Donald E. Smith, et al. (1985) | Anti-Americanism in the Third World                                   | • Implications for US Foreign Policy  
• Africa, Latin America, Middle East, South and Southeast Asia  
• Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia  
• Multinational Corporations  
• Anti-Americanism at the United Nations       |
  o Churches  
  o Higher Education  
  o Mass Media  
• Anti-Americanism Abroad  
  o The Third World  
  o Western Europe  
  o Mexican and Canadian Intellectuals |
| Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane et al. (2007) | Anti-Americanisms in World Politics                                   | • Analytical Framework  
• Public attitudes toward the US  
• Social Movements  
• Political consequences  
• Europe, Middle East  
• France, China, Indonesia |

The works listed in Table 2 examine anti-Americanism in different periods. Rubinstein and Smith (1985) studied anti-Americanism in the 1980s when the international system was dominated by two superpowers that explicitly used “anti” attitudes to discredit their opponents in the Third World nations and to marginalize the dissenting elites from their own domestic politics. Hollander (1992) looked at the phenomenon in 1992 at the end of the superpower
rivalry and the beginning momentum for democratization in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. During this period, anti-Americanism has been used by authoritarian regimes, repressive governments, and religious groups to discourage democratization and globalization tides. Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) investigated anti-Americanism in 2007 following 9/11 and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In Table 2, all of the books, except Hollander’s (1992), are edited volumes, involving several experts on different regions, countries, and specific issues. Rubinstein and Smith (1985) focused on the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa, while Hollander’s (1992) work examined anti-Americanism in American domestic politics, and covered such issues as feminism, communism, peace movements, and culture. Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) presented single country case studies, comparative studies, and an analysis of public attitudes. The study of anti-American attitudes is thus complicated and rich, requiring a multi-perspective approach, to explore the many variants of anti-American attitudes.

2.2.1 Defining “Anti” Attitudes

No single definition is agreed upon. Rubinstein and Smith (1985) defined anti-Americanism as “a post-World War II and post colonial phenomenon that took among elites whose policies and perceptions of regional and international issues differed from those of Washington”. On the other hand, Hollander (1992) and Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) emphasized the psychological or emotional aspects. In Hollander’s (1992) view, anti-Americanism is

a particular mindset, an attitude of distaste, aversion, or intense hostility the roots of which may be found in matters unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society or the foreign policies of the US… In short, anti-Americanism refers to a negative predisposition, a type of bias which is to varying degree unfounded.

He even compared anti-Americanism “to other hostile predispositions such as racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, or various kinds of ethnic prejudice” (p. viii). Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) argued that anti-American views and attitudes are objects of political struggle and accepted the broader definition of anti-Americanism as “a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the US and of American society in general” (p. 12). Here, we see three different views. Rubinstein and Smith (1985) think all opposing attitudes could be counted as anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism is mostly irrational and unfounded in Hollander’s (1992) view, which is often shared by the right in American domestic politics. Although Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) agree about the psychological dimension of an anti-American attitude, they
emphasize the need to differentiate anti-Americanism from opposition or argument-based criticism of US policy. In their words, “If it were anti-American to hold views different from those of the U.S. government, many loyal American would be “anti-American” and the Bill of Rights would be meaningless” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, p. 274).

Table 3. Definitions and Findings of the Anti-Americanism Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Major Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Donald E. Smith et al. (1985) | “Anti-Americanism is a post-World War II and post-colonial phenomenon that took root among elites whose policies and perceptions of regional and international issues differed from those of Washington” (p.9) | - Explanation should look at (1) ethnicity, religion and culture, (2) the values of elites, and (3) the political systems of societies (p. 2)  
- Areas of Disagreement:  
  o Global U.S. policy  
  o Policy toward the Third World  
  o American economic activity in the Third World  
  o Perceptions of U.S. Society  
- Typology  
  o Issue-Oriented  
  o Ideological  
  o Instrumental  
  o Revolutionary  
- Manifestations (attitude, verbal expressions, demonstrations, violence) |
| Paul Hollander (1992) | Anti-Americanism is “a particular mindset, an attitude of distaste, aversion, or intense hostility the roots of which may be found in matters unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society or the foreign policies of the US… In short, anti-Americanism refers to a negative predisposition, a type of bias which is to varying degree unfounded” (p. viii). | - Hostility toward the US abroad and domestic are interdependent  
- Sources of Anti-Americanism:  
  o Human need for scapegoating  
  o Sole superpower status  
  o Identification of the US with modernity and its problems  
  o American foreign policy and society  
- Types of Anti-Americanism abroad:  
  o Nationalism (political and cultural)  
  o Anti-capitalism  
  o Protest against modernity |
| Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane et al. (2007) | Anti-Americanism is “a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general” (p.12). | - Anti-Americanism has cognitive, emotional, and normative components.  
- Need to distinguish opinions, bias, and distrust  
- Sources of Anti-Americanism:  
  o Ephemeral source: “what America does”  
  o Fundamental source: “what America is”  
- Negative schemas (cognitive component) help to structure unfavorable attitudes (Chapter 8 by John Bowen);  
- Typology of Anti-Americanism (identification with the US): Liberal, Social, Sovereign-Nationalist, Radical, Elitist, and Legacy (historical) |
Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) made several important contributions to the study of anti-Americanism as well as to the study of the general “anti” phenomenon. First, they differentiated anti-American attitudes from opinion, distrust, and bias, and introduced “an idea of a continuum between unbiased opinion and systematic bias, with distrust as an intermediate category” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, p. 274). Opinion is always open to new information. If opinion is hardened into distrust or even bias (defined as “the most fundamental form of anti-Americanism, which can be seen as a form of prejudice”), new information will be often interpreted with preconceived bias (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, pp. 12, 19-28; Forsberg, 2009). Second, they argued that people can hold multiple, different attitudes toward the US, its policies, and American people.  

Third, as Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) emphasized, between “what America is” – the fundamental values and attitudes of US society – and “what the United States does” – its policies, particularly, its foreign policies – is the investigation of anti-Americanism (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, p. 10). According to the authors, 

negative views of what the US is are less likely to change, as US policy changes, than are negative views of what the US is doing… People who are negative about the US itself are more likely to be biased than those who are critical only of a set of American policies (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, p. 10).

Finally, the authors suggested disaggregating anti-Americanism into three interconnected components: cognitive, emotional, and normative. In the cognitive component, a schema (a key concept of cognitive processing in social psychology) performs a number of cognitive functions and can become an enduring distrust or systematic bias. The emotional component will be activated with negative assessments that are held, while the normative component “can serve as identity markers or ways to regulate certain behavior” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, pp. 12-15). Katzenstein and Keohane do not analyze the emotional component in their study because it requires “careful psychological analysis, applied to particular individuals and groups” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, p. 15). For a similar reason, I will focus more on cognitive component of the “anti” attitude phenomenon using the notion of schemas.

2.2.2 Causes, Processes, and Consequences

All of the perspectives agree on the multi-causal nature of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, three common sources of anti-Americanism are apparent: a power imbalance, a backlash against economic activities, and conflicting identities (Forsberg, 2009; Katzenstein &
Keohane, 2007, pp. 307-309). Because the US is currently the most powerful state in world politics, it is a cause for concern in all other nations. Some imbalances are in play against others, and the power imbalance causes political elites and intellectuals to perceive the US hegemonic power as an economic, cultural, and military threat, leading others to react to “what America is” or “what the United States does.” Because of its need for markets and resources, the US, as a leading economy, is often perceived as a major driving force behind the global economic system. This generates negative attitudes, which are labeled as a backlash against economic activity (Rubinstein & Smith, 1985), modernity (Hollander, 1992), and globalization (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). Conflicting identities have been major sources for tension and conflicts. “Anti-Americanism is generated by cultural and religious identities that are antithetical to the values being generated and exported by American culture – from Christianity to the commercialization of sex” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, p. 309). Also, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007, pp. 307-316) concur that the power imbalance, a backlash against of globalization, and conflicting identities are useful starting points for examining the anti-American attitude, but caution that these causes will not sufficiently explain the many variants of anti-Americanism, due to the polyvalent nature of America.

“Anti-American individual attitudes and collective beliefs are dynamic” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007), which wax and wane over time and in different locations. Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) contend that anti-Americanism needs top-down organization and bottom-up shifts to have impacts on politics. A certain degree of negative attitudes and sentiments toward American people, governments, and culture, as well as political actors and entrepreneurs are needed with the strategic or tactical goals to activate the existing negative attitudes (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). Once the process starts, it can take in many different forms. Rubinstein and Smith (1985) identified four main forms of manifestation: attitudes, verbal expressions, demonstrations, and violence. “Individuals and elites feel resentment, anger, ill will, and hatred toward the American government and people; and these attitudes can be deeply felt, but remain unexpressed.” Verbal expressions include statements, speeches, writings, and media programs that “criticize, ridicule or denounce the American government and people”. Demonstrations can range from less organized to more organized assemblies of people “to denounce the US through marches, speeches, and shouting slogans”. Lastly, the most serious form of manifestation is any violence against US embassies, consulates, overseas facilities, and American people (Rubinstein & Smith, 1985).
Two types of consequences could be expected from any of the negative attitudes towards any nation: direct (short-term) and indirect (long-term) impacts at local, regional, transnational, and global levels. “Political entrepreneurs and political organizations are very attuned to different types of anti-Americanism, as they seek to mobilize people to whatever cause they are pursuing” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, p. 35). The direct consequences of negative attitudes toward any nation vary depending on the institutionalization and degree of intensity. The foremost impacts will be on bilateral relations, and on the citizens and businesses of each nation. According to Noam Chomsky, any government, including democratic ones, are prone to use this negative attitude phenomenon against their domestic opposition (Martin J., 2002). If public opinion is hardened into systematic distrust and bias, as a result of state-led institutionalization of the negative attitudes, the negative attitudes would have impacts on domestic and world politics.

The analysis of the political elites’ discourses, a genealogy of “anti” attitudes (Bowen, 2007, p. 229), and public opinion surveys will enable researchers to explain the sources, processes, and consequences of the negative attitude phenomenon. The formation and use of negative schemas, which will be discussed in the next section, are connected to a genealogical study.

2.3 Formation and Use of Negative Schemas

To study the causes and consequences of negative attitudes toward a nation, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) made important contributions by introducing the notion of schema. The social psychological term refers to cognitive structures stored in memory that are abstract representations of events, objects, and relationships in the real world (Atkinson, 1993). Bowen (2007) simplified the notion of schemas as the ideas, images, and theories in his chapter on anti-Americanism in France and Indonesia in Katzenstein and Keohane (2007). According to his line of reasoning, people hold a set of ideas about the US. These ideas “may be in tension with, or even contradict, one another” (Bowen, 2007, pp. 227-232). They can be negative, positive, or relatively neutral; salient or silent, depending on circumstances; and confirmed by past events or new information.6

Schemas are constructed in the forms of narratives. Actors and people share and transmit the narratives
to constitute a community of narration, within which people can tell each other stories of and expect to have their narratives ratified… Together, actors reinforce each other’s
sense that they have a good grasp of the world… Narratives are thus both individual and collective (Bowen, 2007, p. 232).

Political actors and people deploy especially negative schemas “in strategic fashion to justify their own policies, to formulate a sense of their national identity vis-à-vis features of the [target nation], or to criticize more general features of today’s world” (Bowen, 2007, p. 227). For example, “actions, values, or institutions imagined as characteristics of the United States can become a convenient or psychologically satisfying object against which public leaders or intellectuals can fashion ideas of how their society ought to look.” Bowen called this process the “diacritic” use of schemas (Bowen, 2007, p. 228; 230). Anti-Americanism, as Bowen explained, can consist of two or more different types of schemas: some schemas about types of persons and others about systems, with the former being relatively easy to conceptualize, compared to schemas about systems (Bowen, 2007, p. 232).

Studying any negative attitude phenomenon towards a nation, using the notion of schemas, permits us “to disaggregate “attitudes” into multiple ideas whose relative salience shifts over time” and “corrects a tendency to think of these attitudes as irrational” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, p. 231).

2.4 Analytical Framework for Anti-Chinese Attitudes

Because this thesis aims to explain the “anti” phenomenon in general, and anti-Chinese attitudes in particular, I will employ a broader definition of “anti” attitudes, which includes negative opinions, feelings, and behavior that emerge in different contexts.

While accepting the multicausal nature of the anti phenomenon, I will identify a power imbalance, a backlash against economic activities, and conflicting identities as the main sources of negative attitudes toward a nation. Colonial and imperial domination; however, is another known cause for negative attitudes toward major powers, though it might only apply to visible minorities in Chinese autonomous regions, rather than to its neighbors. Also, the power imbalance may be the major difference between anti-Americanism and anti-Chinese attitudes. Although the political elites of the Chinese neighbors and other states see the rising China as an economic, cultural, demographic, and military threat, and may react to “what China is” or “what China does,” they appear to be more concerned with “what China might do” as it becomes a great power.
Table 4. Main Sources of Anti-Chinese Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Imbalances</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A backlash against Economic Activities</td>
<td>Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicting Identities</td>
<td>Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The notion of schema will serve as a key concept in this thesis to explain the particularity of anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia. Negative schemas of the past have lingering impacts on any society, even after it transitions to democracy or after its relations with the target nation improve.

In totalitarian states, negative schemas about a target nation, its people, and culture have been systematically consolidated by the provision of one-sided information and the complete closure of all other sources of information and views. North Korea, for instance, uses education, media, literature, and rumors to consolidate negative schemas about the US and South Korea, while exerting repressive measures against any dissemination or spread of positive or neutral schemas.

In authoritarian states, political elites still employ power and state instruments to marginalize or control positive or neutral schemas about a target nation. Russia and China, for example, use past negative schemas about the West and Japan to consolidate systematic bias and stereotypes in the minds of new generations and often use “anti” attitudes as foreign policy leverage.

In contrast, in democratic states all types of schemas (positive, negative, or neutral) are available for both political elites and the public in democratic states; therefore, negative attitudes toward any nation are not easily institutionalized by the ruling elites and intellectuals. Although interest groups and politicians in democratic societies often seek opportunities to invoke previous negative schemas, their overall impact is shallow unless it is supported by the ruling government.

Nevertheless, the impacts of artificially-consolidated past schemas will linger in a democratic society until the past negative images, ideas, and theories about the country are deconstructed through entertainment, media, education, literature by political elites and
intellectuals. This explains the increasing gap in the attitudes between the Mongolian political elites and public with China. Mongolia consolidated only positive schemas about Russia for 70 years, and negative schemas about China for 30 years in the past century. These lopsided schemas have not been fully de-constructed since 1990.

The framework used in the following two chapters is based on three main causes of the “anti” attitudes and the notion of schema. It explains the nature of anti-Chinese attitudes in post-communist Mongolia and locates the Mongolian variant of anti-Chinese attitudes in relation to those of its immediate neighbors.
Chapter 3: Anti-Chinese Attitudes in Post-Communist Mongolia

3.1 Overview

In this chapter, I examine the anti-Chinese attitudes in post-communist Mongolia within the context of the analytical framework laid out in the previous chapter. Two arguments are advanced. First, attitudes of the Mongolian political elites toward China have changed noticeably from mid-2000 due to increased interactions and the economic benefits. Second, public attitudes have not changed because of lingering impacts of negative schemas of the past and the unwillingness of the political elites to deconstruct the overly negative schemas.

To substantiate these arguments, I first present a quick historical background, and then discuss the attitudes of the political elites and the public toward China and Chinese people. Finally, I analyze the impacts and use of negative schemas that were consolidated during the Cold War.

3.2 Historical Background

Sino-Mongolian relations date back to the third century, when nomadic tribes were interacting agrarian people living in the territory of China. Eventually, the Great Wall was created to keep nomads out and peasants in (Lattimore, 1937). The Mongolian Empire (1206-1271) and the Mongol-ruled Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) were the main sources of anti-nomadic barbarian attitudes in China and Russia. Following the demise of the Yuan Dynasty, Mongols were fragmented and more vulnerable to the rising Chinese Ming (1368-1644) and Manchu-ruled Qing (1644-1911) Dynasties. The Qing Dynasty took over Inner Mongolia in 1636, Outer Mongolia in 1691, and Western Mongolia in 1755 (Perdue, 2005; Baabar, 1999). Manchu rulers maintained specific restrictions on the interactions between Chinese and Mongolian subjects to prevent Chinese settlements (assimilation) in Mongolia (Friters, 1949) and divided Mongolia into multiple administrative units to prevent any unified uprisings against the colonial rulers (Lan, 1999, p. 39).

As ethnic-Chinese bureaucrats dominated in the waning Manchu-ruled Qing Dynasty, at the beginning of 1900s, the Qing Dynasty lifted its earlier restrictions on Chinese settlements and economic activities (agriculture, mining, and trade) in Mongolia and adopted a “New Administration Reform” policy aimed at integrating Mongolia, East Turkestan, and Manchuria politically, economically, and culturally with China (Lan, 1999; Baabar, 1999). For Chinese and Manchu rulers, the policy was to stop Russian expansion in Inner Asia, but the Mongols and Uyghurs perceived it as a clear colonial policy of assimilation. Nonetheless, the “New Administration Reform” policy partially succeeded in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, but failed
in Outer Mongolia, because the Mongolian political elites contested the policy and elicited support from Russia to gain their independence (Lan, 1999; Friters, 1949; Kao, 1980; Baabar, 1999). To suppress the nationalist movements in Inner and Outer Mongolia, the newly-established Chinese government dispatched military expeditionary forces and increased Chinese settlements in Outer Mongolia in 1919 (Lan, 1999; Friters, 1949; Baabar, 1999). The following year, Japan supported the fleeing Imperial Russian military commanders and their attempt to liberate Mongolia from Chinese while also helping it advance its plan to establish a Pan-Mongolian state and to expand its colony into Siberia. But Soviet Russia expanded its military operations into Mongolia to defeat the rebel Russian military units and established the first satellite communist state in 1921. From 1921 to 1989, Mongolia allied with the Soviet Union and became a hostage of the Sino-Soviet tension, which lasted for about three decades since the 1960s (Choudhury, 1982; Molomjamts, 2008).

The dynamics of the Mongolian official attitudes toward China since 1911 have fluctuated between two extremes: hostile and friendly (Table 5). Under the Manchu-ruled Qing Dynasty, Mongolians and Chinese together opposed Manchu rule since both had similar feelings as colonial subjects. As the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911, Outer Mongolia was neither hostile nor friendly to the Chinese provincial government until Russia and China covertly jeopardized Mongolia’s independence by recognizing Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia in 1915. Anti-Chinese attitudes were inflamed as China occupied Mongolia militarily and expanded Chinese settlements in Mongolia between 1915 and 1921 (Baabar, 1999; Bulag, 1998).

When China was weakened by internal turmoil and external interventions, Mongolian official attitudes toward China were neutral at key junctures, especially in 1911 and between 1921 and 1945. Mongolia’s political elites even attempted to re-unite Inner Mongolia during this period. As a result of positive Sino-Soviet relations, Mongolian relations with China became closer and broader from 1945 to 1963. Then, between 1963 and the mid-1980s Sino-Mongolian relations turned hostile due to the Sino-Soviet conflict. Following the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in 1986, Sino-Mongolian relations again entered into a neutral and friendly period. Although the pattern reveals the importance of external factors on the attitudes of a buffer state toward its neighbors, domestic factors, especially the actions of the political elites, were often the drivers of opinion in the late communist period and during the democratic transition.
Table 5. Dynamics of Mongolian State Attitude towards China

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>hostile</td>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>friendly</td>
<td>hostile</td>
<td>neutral→ friendly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Persistence of the Anti-Chinese Attitudes

When Sino-Mongolian relations were normalized in 1989, Mongolian political elites were uncertain about Chinese intentions. Their responses were constrained by Mongolia’s geography and the demise of the Soviet Union. Major political statements at the time often contained policies directed at restricting the Chinese influence in Mongolia. In the middle of this decade, especially from 2004 and 2005, noticeable changes emerged in the attitudes of political elites. The political leaders pledged to develop bilateral relations in all areas and declared a strategic partnership, unthinkable even a decade earlier. Still today, the negative attitudes toward China remain consistent as seen in major public opinion polls and the public discourses (e.g., media, blogosphere) in both Ulaanbaatar and countryside. Why does the observable discrepancy in the attitudes of the political elites and the public toward China persist?

3.3.1 Attitudes of the Political Elites

For the first time in more than 20 years, the Chinese and Mongolian foreign ministers met during the UN General Assembly in New York in 1984 (Batbayar, 2002, p. 124). The meeting was followed by a series of visits and the resumption of normal relations by 1991 (Batbayar T., 2005). In contrast, relations between Mongolia and Russia were strained at the beginning of the 1990s: Russia withdrew its military and technical advisors, ceased all types of assistance, and imposed market prices for its fuel and other imports. Consequently, the Mongolian political elites had to deal with China without Soviet backing or guidance.

The attitudes of the political elites can be divided into two periods – from 1990 to mid-2000, and from mid-2000 onwards – based on observable changes in the government policies toward China. The earlier period is characterized as being cautious, and the later period was seen as having changing or diverging attitudes.

Mongolian political elites, especially members of the executive and legislative bodies along with leaders of key political parties, formulated and implemented most of fundamental state policies in the first period (1990 to mid-2000). Uncertainties about Mongolia’s two neighbors and their intentions dominated their thinking. Most of the political elites had been educated in the Soviet Union and since they had had almost no interactions with Chinese for the previous three decades, more explicit concerns were present, especially about their southern
neighbor. Measures to prevent a massive influx of Chinese immigrants were reflected in the 1992 Constitution (prohibition of land ownership by foreigners) and the 1993 Immigration Law (imposing restrictions on the number of permanent foreign residents and immigrants) (Batbayar, 2002). The 1994 National Security Concept officially securitized the “Mongolian culture and way of life” and “protection of genetic pools of the population,” a foreseeing the increase of Chinese influence. While the foreign policy concept emphasized keeping equidistance relations with both neighbors, a “third neighbor” policy, aiming to court support from the developed democracies to help strike a balance with Mongolia’s neighbors, was adopted by the state. The political elites were continuously struggling to develop political, economic, and security ties with Russia, the US, Germany, Japan, and India, while securing Chinese official reaffirmation of Mongolian sovereignty and access to Chinese markets and infrastructure. Even though China concluded a bilateral treaty of friendly relations and cooperation in 1994, endorsed Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free zone in 1995, and provided access to its market and foreign assistance after 1990, caution and fear of Chinese influence dominated the political discourses in Ulaanbaatar.

In the second period (mid-2000 and onwards), the attitudes of political elites towards China became more diverse for a couple of reasons. First, a generational cohort of 1950s and 1960’s dominated most of leadership posts at the parliament and government. For instance, generations of 1950s (36%), 1960s (47%), and 1970s (14%) constitute body of lawmakers in the 2008 parliament. These generations’ experiences during the political and economic transitions in 1990s made them realize the importance of Chinese investment, labor and the size of its export market for Mongolian livestock and mineral resources. Second, the declaration of “good neighborly partnership” by President Hu Jintao and President Bagabandi during their reciprocal visits in 2003 and 2004 respectively had major impact on attitudes of political elites in both nations, especially in Mongolian case. President Hu assured that “a stronger China was not a threat to the rest of Asia” in Ulaanbaatar and intentionally selected Mongolia as his first foreign trip (Sutter, 2005, p. 255; Rossabi, 2005, p. 244). Following these visits, political statements and the content of regular, high-level exchanges indicated an attitudinal shift from caution to neutrality and even amity. China became the largest investor and trading partner and bilateral relations expanded in all areas, including the military. Mongolia became an active participant in Chinese-backed multinational forums; as a participant in the Boao Forum for Asia and as an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Both sides agreed to increase economic, cultural, and educational cooperation within the strategic partnership agreement,
which was concluded in June 2011. The number of Mongolian students in China reached 6,200 in 2010, compared to 170 Mongolian students a decade before. Even in the Mongolian parliament, the Mongolian-Chinese Parliamentary Group became the largest.

But still debates among politicians on several key issues, such as foreign direct investments in mining, infrastructure, often highlight concerns about China and Russia. But these did not translate into a consistent and vociferous opposition among the politicians against developing closer relations with China. Economic reality of Chinese trade and investment along with sustained interactions with China could explain the shift towards an increasingly neutral and friendly attitude among elites. Today 80 percent of Mongolian exports, mostly copper, coal, and other natural resources, go into Chinese market while about 30 percent of Mongolia’s import and over half of the foreign investments come from China. Nevertheless, the fundamental national security goals of developing traditional ties with Russia and “third neighbors” in political, economic, and security areas seemed to be intact.

3.3.2 Public Attitudes

Anti-Chinese attitudes among the public appear to persist in Mongolia, despite changes in the attitudes of the political elites from cautiousness to supporters of strategic partnership with China. Immediately after the democratic transition, anti-Soviet attitudes were prevalent, in part because of the disclosure and discussion of facts about Stalinist purges of Mongolians, trade imbalances, suppression of Mongolian nationalism, and environmental degradation caused by the Soviet military. This negativity involved words but not deeds and was not long-lived. In contrast, the anti-Chinese attitudes have persisted in the public domain. The negativity centers on Chinese business and construction workers in Mongolia, suppression and assimilation of Inner Mongolians by Han Chinese, and the low quality of Chinese goods (Bulag, 1998; Shurkhuu, 2005; Bruun, 2006; Rossabi, 2005). In the 1990s, politicians and business people often criticized the government’s inability to control the export of raw materials that weakened domestic industries. There was vocal opposition to allowing Chinese labor and businesses to enter Mongolia. Nevertheless, negative comments by elites remained rare after the middle of the decade even as discourse in the media, blogosphere, and public arena continued to be dominated by anti-Chinese sentiments.

Public opinion polls in Mongolia rarely included views about the neighboring states in the 1990s. But after 2005 several barometer studies began including questions about public perceptions with regards to the other key nations. According to a 2008 opinion survey by the Research Center of the independent, non-profit, Sant Maral Foundation, respondents indicated
that Mongolians were better in communication and cooperation with Russia (40.8%), with South Korea (9.2%), and with China (8.2%). In answering a question about which country would be the best partner for Mongolia, the respondents chose Russia as their first choice (47.8%), the US (13.1%), and China (3.3%). The survey results from 2011 showed slight changes: respondents indicated Mongolians were in better communication with Russia (35.5%), and with China (10.9%). Respondents also indicated that Russia (51.9%) would be the best partner for Mongolia, while only 2% indicated that China would be the best partner. The same survey also revealed a slight improvement in communication and cooperation with Chinese, but the people’s views on partnership with China did not improve and actually became more negative (Appendix C). There was an observable change in positive attitudes of residents of Ulaanbaatar, a capital city, to Chinese people from 21% (2008) to 39% (2011) while views in the countryside remains stable around 28%. But there were no significant correlations in terms of geographic locations (urban and rural) and gender in the Japanese AsiaBarometer (2005) and Asian Barometer (2006) surveys. However, Asian Barometer survey (2006) suggests a statistically significant mean difference between educational levels. Higher the level of education is lesser negative views of China (Table 6). Indeed, it is difficult to conclude on the basis of opinion polls, which are susceptible to significant events (eg high-level visits, media, and even sporting events), experience and knowledge of respondents, and even locations. A person, who lives or works near Chinese-run mines or construction sites operated by Chinese, answers differently than people, who received medical treatment in Beijing or Inner Mongolia, traveled to China, or who have never interacted with Chinese people.

Table 6. Mean Differences between Educational Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>4.9964</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>2.29588</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary/Vocational</td>
<td>5.5501</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>2.36048</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>5.8906</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>2.30988</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (total)</td>
<td>5.5162</td>
<td>1172</td>
<td>2.35142</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: df=2, F=11.114, Sig=.000

In the Asian Barometer’s 2009 poll, 64.5% of the Mongolian respondents indicated that China would be the most influential country in Asia in the next ten years; 85.2% saw China as having influence over Mongolia; and 48.7% saw the Chinese influence over Mongolia to be negative, while 25.2% saw it to be positive. Also 71.2% of the respondents acknowledged Russia’s influence on Mongolia, but 79.5% thought that the influence was positive. How to explain public views that were strongly more positive toward Russia than China? In the last two
decades, interactions between Mongolians and Russians have been reduced to minimal levels and the people-to-people exchanges have been further complicated by Russia’s abolition of its visa waiver policies for Mongolians in 1995.

3.4 Causes of the Persistent Anti-Chinese Attitudes

A noticeable gap exists between the attitudes of the political elites and the general public with regards to China and Chinese people. On one hand, the attitudes of the Mongolian political elites have become more diverse as a result of the growing trade and Chinese, the increased interactions with Chinese counterparts, and the growing knowledge about China. On the other hand, cautiousness and uncertainty about rising China is clearly a part of the equation, since the elites are knowledgeable about the risks of being too dependent on one major power. Political elites prefer having a neutral and amicable stance towards China, while also exploring the opportunities for diversifying Mongolia’s options. The public seems does not share the same view about China. At the same time, political elites and intellectuals avoid de-constructing the artificially-consolidated negative schemas that underpin Mongolian identity.

By exploring the three main sources of negative attitudes, the causes for the political elites’ cautious and neutral stance towards China, as opposed to the public’s anti-Chinese attitude, may be better understood. In addition to examining the sources of negative attitudes, the notion of schemas can also be used to clarify the Mongolian case of anti-Chinese attitudes.

A power imbalance has been the main source for anti-Chinese attitudes among the political elites in Mongolia. As a nation state, Mongolia is vulnerable. China is territorially larger, demographically more populous, and economically and militarily more powerful. This can explain the cautious and neutral stance of the Mongolian political elites towards China and has always prompted them to take all necessary measures to counter China’s potential dominance. Currently, the fundamental question for the Mongolian political elites is, “what China might do” rather than “what China is” or “what China does.”

A backlash against Chinese economic activity is one of the main sources for the anti-Chinese attitudes among the Mongolian public and some of the business community, whose business interests may have impacted by Chinese economic activity, according to Mongolian and Western scholars (Bruun, 2006; Campi, 2010; Rossabi 2005; Shurkhuu, 2010). Although the lack of water-borne transportation routes and a poor climate for agriculture discouraged Chinese settlers in Mongolia, traditionally Chinese have been interested in mining, animal products, and trade in Mongolia. Since 1990, the number of permanent Chinese residents has not increased, but their presence in Mongolia has become more seasonal. There are three major groups of
Chinese residents in Mongolia. First is construction workers have been either invited by a Mongolian company or sent by the Chinese government to work on Chinese assistance projects. Second is a group of business entrepreneurs who collect animal raw materials (hides, wool, cashmere), especially in the spring and fall. Third are Chinese investors involved in various economic projects, predominantly, medium and small-sized mining companies. Some anecdotal evidence also suggests that Mongolia is considered to be a safe haven away from an authoritarian and crowded China, or may serve as a transit point to other destinations for some Chinese and Inner Mongolian nationals. According to Mongolian official statistics, the number of Chinese travelers in Mongolia leads foreign tourists from other countries; however, these statistics need further examination to identify trends of Chinese travelers in Mongolia (Table 7). Traditionally, the Mongolian public is vociferous about the potential for Sinicization if an all-male Chinese labor force is allowed into Mongolia. Moreover, the public is concerned about possible environmental degradation by the Chinese mining companies (though other foreign and domestic companies are also involved), and the potential threat to local businesses and employment.

Table 7. Number of Arrivals by Top Four Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>57,546</td>
<td>196,832</td>
<td>229,451</td>
<td>193,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>49,456</td>
<td>109,975</td>
<td>108,105</td>
<td>121,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>8,039</td>
<td>43,396</td>
<td>38,273</td>
<td>42,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>11,392</td>
<td>14,939</td>
<td>11,401</td>
<td>7,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Statistical Bulletins of National Statistical Office of Mongolia (www.nso.mn)

Conflicting identities is another apparent cause of the public’s anti-Chinese attitudes and the political elites’ reluctance to de-construct past negative schemas about China and Chinese people. During his field studies, Ole Buruun observed,

The conventional themes include relations with the Chinese, who still function as the antithesis to everything worth striving for. China is considered authoritarian and communitarian, Mongolia free and independent, with an individualist, self-reliant population. One would suspect that members of the elite have a particular interest in continuing old prejudices from prerevolutionary society: anything threatening the social order – internal strife, illegal immigration, corruption, illicit land use, fake foodstuffs and consumer goods, illegal border trade, unfair competition, and a host of other issues – may be seen as having Chinese roots. Chinese nationals become the usual suspects (Buruun, 2006, p. 228).
Anti-Chinese sentiments have been for centuries the identity-makers that distinguish the pastoral nomads in Mongolia from the sedentary agrarians in China for centuries. The anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia tend to become inflamed whenever China claims the Mongolian identity to be part of the Chinese identity, or claims Mongolia as a “lost territory”.

All three sources of the “anti” attitudes are present in the Mongolian case. The power imbalance causes consternation among the political elites, a backlash against Chinese economic activities causes public outrages, and conflicting identities trigger anti-Chinese attitudes among the public and the political elites. Still, the sources do not explain the apparent institutionalized and systematic anti-Chinese attitudes that persist in the public domain. There are four possible explanations for the persistence of the anti-Chinese attitudes in post-communist Mongolia.

First, China is building its justifications for re-uniting Mongolia with the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Regions, and is intentionally advocating the anti-Chinese sentiments in Mongolia to encourage Mongolians to attack Chinese people and businesses in Mongolia. This provides justification for Chinese military intervention. As Alan Wachman states, “The sense of menace that Mongolia associates with the PRC is unmatched by evidence of a concerted intention by Beijing to subordinate Mongolia to its will” (Wachman, 2010, p. 598).

Second, Russia may be behind these events. Historically, the anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia provided opportunities for Russians to justify their political and military presence in Mongolia and to dominate Mongolian politics and economy. Although Russia has enormous natural resources, its state and business entities are striving to re-assert their influence in Mongolia as a way to reach Chinese and East Asian markets.

Third, Mongolian business groups and some populist politicians are activating anti-Chinese attitudes among the public to serve their narrow economic interests. Ole Buruun observed that,

the most remarkable improvement in the herders’ general conditions came from increasing competition in the cashmere market (induced by China), which brought vastly higher prices to the producers [herders] but threatened Ulaanbaatar’s languishing cashmere industry, in which political and native business interests are strong (Bruun, 2006, p. 228).

Similarly, in 2010, when Chinese meat imports increased, Mongolian meat companies and retailers pressured the government to restrict the Chinese meat business in Mongolia. Although this is one of the plausible explanations for the anti-Chinese attitudes, its impact may be limited
because Mongolian herders want to sell their products at higher prices and many Mongolian companies are willing to take advantage of the insatiable Chinese market.

Fourth, the Mongolian nationalists are promoting anti-Chinese attitudes to consolidate Mongolian national and cultural identity and to possibly instigate pan-Mongolianism among the Mongolian ethnic groups in China and Russia. Ideas for Pan-the creation of a Mongolian or Greater Mongolian (даяар монгол) state have been around for many years among Mongolians but have very little political influence in Russia or China. Russia and China are now relaxing their concerns about cultural and sports exchanges with the Mongolian-ethnic minorities and the Mongolians. While these four explanations have some validity, my argument is that anti-Chinese attitudes are persistent in the public because of lingering negative schemas of the past and an unwillingness of the political elites to de-construct schemas that are being used strategically and culturally to consolidate Mongolian identity.

3.5 Lingering Impacts from Negative Schemas of the Past

Following its independence in 1921, Mongolian society was strictly controlled by its communist party closely allied with the Soviet Union. With Soviet support, Marshall Choibalsan, one of the revolutionary leaders, consolidated his power from 1929 until his death in 1952, exercising total control over the society. The totalitarian regimes in Moscow and Ulaanbaatar conducted systematic massacres of 30,000 people, mostly intellectuals and monks, to keep the society in a state of fear until 1952 (Kaplonski, Prelude to violence, 2008; Baabar, 1999, pp. 315-317; 361-365). According to Rupen (1979), when the “fatherly leader” Choibalsan died in 1952, “Mongolia went from a cult of personality to control by bureaucracy” (p. 73). A Soviet-educated economist Tsedenbal became the Prime Minister and implemented massive economic reforms to change the agrarian nomadic existence into a centrally-planned Soviet-style economy. Both leaders took advantage of the anti-Chinese attitudes: (1) to consolidate their powers, (2) control the society, and (3) depict the Mongolian communist party and the Soviets in a positive light to the public. In doing so, they introduced only negative schemas about China and positive schemas about the Soviets and communists.

While the Mongolian leaders of the earlier periods used negative schemas about China for strategic and cultural purposes, they differed by not simultaneously blocking out all sources of positive or neutral schemas about China and Chinese people.

3.5.1 The Negative Schemas Consolidation Process

Despite the Chinese leaders’ irredentist statements, Mongolia’s de-jure independence was recognized by the Chinese Nationalist Government in 1945 and by the communists in 1949
with explicit Soviet backing. The Mongolian military joined with the Soviet army to liberate the northern part of China from the Japanese in 1945\(^{18}\) and the three nations entered into a symbolic friendship under their respective communist parties in 1950. China and Mongolia further established a non-militarized border in the 1950s. In 1956, Mongolia de-commissioned its border troops and drastically reduced its military forces, which had been built up during the war with Japan.\(^{19}\) China provided grant aids and loans, which were used to construct factories, apartment complexes, roads, and bridges, and 18,000 Chinese laborers with their families worked on the construction projects until 1964 (Batabayar, 2006, p. 218; Green, 1986). By 1966, the friendly relationship had disappeared, as a visiting foreigner noticed the huge Soviet presence, the disappearance of Chinese participants in the annual *Naadam* parade, guarded encampments of Chinese laborers, which was in stark contrast to the earlier visible Chinese presence, small numbers of Soviet advisors, and the participation of Chinese workers in the *Naadam* parade in 1959 (Salisury, 1967, pp. 107-121). Numerous explanations can be given for the sudden shift of mood toward China in 1960s.

First, Mongolia, unlike North Korea, was caught in the middle of the Sino-Soviet tension, because of its geography. Second, ties between the Mongolian leadership and the Soviets were stronger than those between the Chinese and most of the Mongolian leaders, who had been mostly educated in the Soviet Union. Third, the political elites were fearful of Chinese assimilation and were uncertain about Chinese intentions. Most importantly, the political leaders’ calculations to maintain a repressive controlled regime likely had a crucial effect on the changes in attitude. Tsedenbal, who served as President and Prime Minister from 1952 to 1984, personally hated the Han Chinese (Milivojevic, 1991, pp. 19-20). He had studied in Russia for nine years and married a Russian woman. At the outset, the young, 36-year old prime minister needed to consolidate his political clout by eliminating his opponents and critics. At the time, his pro-Soviet stand was criticized by the senior party leaders and intellectuals, especially during the Mongolian version of the de-Stalinization process, which involved eliminating the cult following of Choibalsan’s personality and the rise of nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, Tsedenbal needed a strong Soviet backing and assistance for transforming Mongolia from an agrarian society to a Soviet-style society. At the same time, the Soviets desired to eliminate the spreading Chinese influence in Mongolia (and other developing nations) and use Mongolia as a geo-strategic buffer for its military operations against China. Not for the first time, Mongolian and Soviet communist leaders collaborated to form the pro-Soviet government in Mongolia. The Soviets backed the Mongolian communists to eliminate their religious and feudal opponents in
1921-1939, who were alleged to be in a conspiracy with the Chinese and Japanese. The party machines were experienced with controlling the consolidation process, using negative schemas about the target nations and political groups.

Tsedenbal and his followers could easily use all of the available assets of propaganda, education, and repressions to frame the negative schemas about China and Chinese people. By the 1960s, the Soviet-style education and propaganda organizations, along with other controlling organizations had been fully established and equipped with new instruments and manned with specialists, who were educated and trained in the Soviet Union (Rupen, 1979). For example, a section at the Ministry of Internal Affairs was tasked to censure media and literature, becoming a special Department of Control for Media and Literature. The personnel worked directly under the party leaders and the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Central Committee in 1953. The department was responsible for censuring all publications, newspaper materials, and radio broadcasts (from 1934) and television transcripts (from 1967) prior to public dissemination; controlling the content of foreign publications, pre-screening films, documentaries, and plays; and confiscating anti-regime publications or other restricted materials. The secret police was also fully institutionalized for its control over the population.

Several sources of new information were available for Mongolians at the time: education, works of organized propaganda, newspapers, radio and television (with one Mongolian channel, and later, a Soviet channel), and rumors. From the mid-1960s and 1970s, most of the history textbooks were re-written to highlight the sacrifices made by Mongolian communists and Soviets, in protecting Mongolia’s independence and to transform the Mongolian backward agrarian society into a socialist one. Obviously, China, as the main target for the propaganda, was depicted as a nation with historic intentions to colonize Mongolia and to assimilate the Mongolian population, as had been the case for Inner Mongolians and Tibetans. Organized propaganda and the news media played major role in portraying the evil intentions of the Chinese and the need for Soviet military protection (Rupen, 1979, 92-100). The Sino-Indian war in 1962, the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, Mao’s statements and claims about Mongolia, the Chinese Cultural Revolution (particularly in Inner Mongolia), the Ussuri River Armed Conflict in 1969, and later, the Sino-Vietnam conflict in 1979 were cited as proof for China’s threat. The Mongolian communist party leaders made statements to criticize the Chinese government and to express Mongolia’s support of the Soviet Union’s policy toward China. Whether the statements were made because of pressure from the Soviets or from Mongolians to appease their colleagues in Moscow is, hard to know. At the same time, the communist party classified any news that
could be used in the enemy’s propaganda, such as accidents, failures, or mistakes that involved Mongolians and Soviets. Negative rumors about a Chinese conspiracy for coup d’état, Chinese spy rings, or possible sabotage were widespread. The other main sources of rumor were the students and people who studied or visited the communist bloc countries, though most went to the Soviet Union.

Besides these sources of new information, the national films, drama, and literature was used to introduce negative images of China and Chinese people. A Mongolian national film studio was established in 1954 and its production increased in the 1960s, as Mongolian producers were graduating from the Soviet Union. Only one movie, Ardiin Elch (People’s Envoy), depicted a positive image of the Chinese settlers in Mongolia. The movie was produced at the height of friendly Sino-Mongolian relations, in 1959. The movies, documentary films, dramas, literature, and patriotic songs all painted an evil image of Chinese people. Chinese citizens, mostly laborer and their families, were also controlled (guarded) until their departure in 1964. Moreover, Chinese settlers, their children, people who were believed to have Chinese ethnic links, and experts on China (linguists, historians, and others with experience in China) were marginalized from the society by having their access to privileges (party membership, higher education, and government works) limited and they were kept under control of the secret police (Bulag, 1998, Baabar, 2011). Tsedenbal and his colleagues eliminated some of their opposition, who had alleged connections with Chinese ethnic ties or who even had false connections with the Chinese government. The acts of repression and control systematically created a fearful population, to the point that the people avoided talking about China and Chinese people; interacting with Chinese settlers, their children and the purged people; or talking negatively about the Soviets. People with Chinese ethnic connections hid their true ethnicity and most registered themselves as Khalkh, the dominant ethnic group in Mongolia.

The objective of the institutionalized efforts was to prove that theories of “Chinese takeover” and “Chinese assimilation” were plausible, to justify the Soviet political and military presence in Mongolia from 1966-1992 and, for Tsedenbal and his cult, to strengthen their political base by marginalizing any dissenting views and covering up the negative side of his policies. Some Mongolians maintain that Tsedenbal managed to stop Chinese expansions in the 1960s and 1980s by expelling Chinese workers and settlers, and thus, his negative attitudes toward China were similar to many of the previous Mongolian political and religious leaders. Although this point deserves more careful analysis, and even though the traditional diacritic use
of negative schemas about China was apparent, the period was more strictly institutionalized as an ideology.

3.5.2 Diacritic Use of Negative Schemas

As Bowen argued, “we ‘know’ things about the world because we read, or hear, or experience something that in most cases already has been mediated and framed by producers of knowledge [therefore] knowledge is ’socially-mediated and iterative’” (Bowen, 2007, pp. 232-233). Knowledge about China, Chinese people, and their culture was certainly “socially-mediated and iterative” for the Mongolian people, who were systematically exposed to the communist, party-run, propaganda from the mid-1960s.

Historically, the Mongolian political and religious leaders and intellectuals used negative narratives to create negative schemas about China and to consolidate Mongolian nomadic identities and values. Unlike the Cold War period, however, sources and information of both positive and neutral schemas were available for Mongolian nomads. Mongolians were interacting with Chinese merchants and business entrepreneurs in Mongolia and in their travels to China in earlier periods (Murphy 1966, 44-46; Lattimore, 1955, 6-21; Lan 1999; Rupen, 1979, 73-83).

According to the Mongolian Foreign Minister’s report in 1925, 51,207 foreigners, including 23,919 Chinese, were in Mongolia. In 1929, the government forcibly expelled all foreigners (Batbayar, 2002, p. 143). Perhaps, this was because of pressure from the Soviets, who wanted to increase their political and economic influence in Mongolia. In the following years, until 1945, Mongolian political leaders and the Soviets conducted massive purges and repressions against individuals and groups who were “anti-regime,” including intellectuals, monks, and feudals. Then, in the 1950s, Mongolia received over 18,000 Chinese construction workers along with their families, to build construction projects funded by the Chinese government. The Mongolian political leaders and the Soviets organized another round of “softer” purges and expelled foreigners and Chinese citizens, as the Sino-Soviet relations worsened. From these parallel events, we can conclude that the Mongolian political leaders built on anti-foreign (anti-Chinese) sentiments to justify their acts of repression and the purges, to consolidate their political clout and to allow the Russian leaders to reassert their influence in Mongolia. For Mongolians; however, the acts were perceived as the government’s effort to protect the Mongolian genetic pool and their nomadic culture from sinicization.

The diacritic use of anti-Chinese sentiments in Mongolia is historic. The political elites and intellectuals use “negative schemas” and “narratives” to differentiate Mongolian ethnic
identity from the Han Chinese in the attempt to spread nationalistic and anti-colonial ideology, and to distinguish Mongolian culture, lifestyle, and values from sedentary society. The communist leaders, along with the Soviets, have systematically eliminated sources of positive or neutral narratives and schemas and institutionalized the use of only negative narratives and schemas about China, Chinese people, and their culture.

This diacritic use of anti-Chinese sentiments has continued even beyond after the normalization of Sino-Mongolian relations in the 1990s for several reasons. First, the political elites and intellectuals, who have endured extreme anti-Chinese propaganda for more than two decades and who are unfamiliar with the new China, have been unwilling to deconstruct the intentionally-framed negative schemas about China since the Cold War. Possibly, a nation needs an ‘enemy’ or ‘uncertainties’ to justify its national security policy. Second, films and literature have been inundated with the nationalistic and patriotic genre, which uses anti-Chinese sentiments. Third, Mongolia succeeded in making its political transition, while the Chinese democratization process stalled, which has led to further conflicts in identity: democracy vs. communism. Finally, the media’s coverage has mainly been focused on negative events and incidents involving Chinese people and the low quality goods in Mongolia. Moreover, Western negative media coverage on China began to be welcomed into the Mongolian media, as was the case during the Cold War. Because ‘love’ and ‘hate’ relations between neighbors have been viewed in extreme darkness for 24 years, only a few intellectuals have made positive comments about China, while most politicians have been afraid to make such a “suicidal” move. Consequently, the negative schemas continue being used by Mongolians to highlight their key differences: pastoral nomadic society vs. agrarian society, Buddhism and Shamanism vs. Confucianism, Mongolian language vs. Chinese language, and democracy vs. authoritarian governance.

3.5.3 Examples of Negative Schemas, Stereotypes, and Types of Manifestations

All of the negative ideas and images of China and Chinese seem to support the oft-recited “China takeover theory”. Mongolians use any informal irredentist claim by Chinese politicians (i.e., inclusion of Mongolia on Chinese maps, or narratives in Chinese literary work and textbooks) as a proof for the China takeover theory. In the following section, I will discuss a few examples of the negative schemas and stereotypes.

Chinese Assimilation – Mongolians have always been afraid of assimilation by Han Chinese because of the increased presence of Chinese. During the Qing Dynasty, only Chinese male traders and government officials were allowed to work in Mongolia. This was intended to
assure their return and remittance to China. Later, in 1919, the Chinese military entered Mongolia to consolidate its influence. Mongolians explained the policy with the idea that China was trying to assimilate the Mongolian population. In the 1950s, the Chinese government allowed Chinese workers to bring their families to Mongolia, likely because of the Mongolians’ earlier concerns. Today, most companies hire Chinese construction workers, who are mostly males on a temporary basis. As a result, the public still interprets the Chinese nationals in terms of their pre-existing understandings about Chinese assimilation.

Pro-Chinese Coup d’état – This was often used by the communist leaders during the Cold War. Эрлний or hурлний Mongolians, who have ethnic ties to Chinese, were believed to be connected to the Chinese communist government, Chinese settlers, and workers in Mongolia. Although the government expelled most of the Chinese citizens from Mongolia in 1964, many remained in Mongolia, because of the better living conditions and the higher level of internal turmoil in China (e.g., Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution). The Mongolian perspective; however, was that the Chinese government was intentionally keeping Chinese settlers in Mongolia to advance the Chinese ethnic ties to higher posts in the party and government, and to organize a pro-China coup d’état in Mongolia. Even today, people look at Chinese labor as organized para-military units, and continue using labels such as эрлний, хурылний, or Chinese тагнуул (spy, collaborator) for politicians and others, who might have links with China or have a favorable view of China. The Chinese government’s call for overseas Chinese to maintain their language and culture may have contributed to the Mongolians’ suspicions.

Poisoning of Mongolians Through Food – According to Kaplonski (2004), numerous stories were recorded about poisoned food supplies from China, but only one story described bad food from Russia. Although this may have been connected to the government’s attempts in the early-1920s or even the 1960s to discourage consumption of Chinese products by the public, while increasing consumption of Russian products, the notion of Chinese planning to poison Mongolians has remained popular even since the 1990s. Prior to the 1920s, Mongolians were consumers of Chinese products and Chinese merchants were the only traders in Mongolia. This was interrupted from the 1930s to the 1950s, because of the Chinese internal turmoil (and Soviet policy). Chinese consumer goods re-appeared in Mongolia after the 1950s, though bilateral trade ceased in the mid-1960s. When Mongolia’s trade with the Soviet Union and communist bloc countries ended in 1990, Mongolian peddlers imported food products from China. Because of the low income of most Mongolians, the small-scale traders tended to buy low quality and large quantity products in the absence of the state’s ability to enforce food import standards. The
rumors and media coverage on low quality Chinese food products, along with other goods, was mostly interpreted as the traditional Chinese method of poisoning and deteriorating the Mongolians’ health and minds. Even today, it is not surprising to hear rumors about the death of high-level politicians, in connection with Chinese food and drink. It is not difficult to learn about complaints about low quality of Chinese machinery, consumer goods, and food in Mongolia. For instance, most products, either machinery, goods, or even food items, at the market are labeled as “made in China and others” and priced differently. These negative schemas will not disappear, but they wane and wax over time depending on numerous interconnected factors, which outlined in Table 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Schemas</th>
<th>Current Dynamics</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Facts (Past Narratives) to Substantiate Negative Schemas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic (wax)</td>
<td>Reduced Trade Non-Chinese investments Limitation of Chinese labor Protectionist Measures against Chinese companies</td>
<td>Investment Dependence on Chinese markets Chinese dominance in Mongolian market (cashmere, meat, consumer goods, service) Presence of Chinese laborers, companies illegal trade (corruption)</td>
<td>Chinese merchants (debts) in early 1900s Chinese exploitation of Mongolian minerals (low standards, low control of pollutants) Bribery political and administrative authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup d’état (wane)</td>
<td>Marginalized/Controlled Chinese Diaspora</td>
<td>Increased Chinese Settlements Chinese Government’s Appeal for overseas Chinese</td>
<td>Various anecdotal evidences, literary works, fabricated lies about Chinese attempt to intervene in Mongolian domestic affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic (wax)</td>
<td>Reduced presence of Chinese nationals in Mongolia</td>
<td>Presence of Chinese Diaspora Increased Legal and Illegal Chinese MigrantsSinicization of Chinese minorities</td>
<td>Chinese expansion in early 1900s Chinese labor settlers in 1950s Chinese expansions to Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang Global increase of Chinese diasporas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural (wax)</td>
<td>Spread of non-Chinese cultural elements Buddhism Soviet lifestyles Western lifestyles Languages (Russian earlier, English, German now) Nomadic Heritage</td>
<td>Claim of nomadic heritage items by China and Inner Mongolia Spread of Chinese cultural elements Chinese language Sporting events Increased educational and cultural scholarships from China</td>
<td>Chinese cultural expansion in Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery (wax)</td>
<td>Limited Imports</td>
<td>Increased imports of low quality machinery Limited domestic maintenance capabilities</td>
<td>Crashes of Chinese aircrafts, machinery (e.g., Yu-12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods (wax)</td>
<td>Limited Imports</td>
<td>Increased imports of large quantity and low quality goods</td>
<td>Less durable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food (wax)</td>
<td>Limited Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deaths of alleged poisoned foods and drinks Diseases, alleged from Chinese foods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Use of Derogatory Terms** - The terms *huaqiao* (overseas Chinese, in Mongolian ‘Hujaa’ or ‘хужаа’), *danjaad* and *luhaan* (nicknames for Chinese), and *Hyatadiin erliiz* (“Хятадын эрлийз”) were used as derogatory terms during the Cold War. Although they were used prior to the 1920s, their uses became more widespread by the public to belittle others and to criticize anyone who was connected with China or Chinese people. Today, the terms are more often encountered in the blogosphere or in daily public conversation. On a simple Google search, there were 317,000 hit as ‘hujaa' and 396,000 ‘хужаа,’ and 121,000 on ‘Хятадын эрлийз.’ Also, a Mongolian anti-Chinese hip-hop song, *Hujaa*, and its version with lyrics, by Gee group were
received 80,649 viewers on the YouTube sites. Interestingly, no derogatory terms about Russians are in common use.

These ideas, images, and theories were intentionally framed and transmitted to the public in an institutionalized manner from 1964 until 1990 through the use of the education and information media which systematically created biases about China, Chinese people, and their culture. Even though positive and relatively neutral ideas and images became more available after the 1990s, Mongolians have continued using the biases and stereotypes. Socialist-style film, drama, and literature, developed in the 1970s and 1980s have created lasting negative images of Chinese people in Mongolian-controlled society.

Anti-Chinese attitudes have been manifested in several different forms in the past twenty years. The most hostile forms are harassment of Chinese people and businesses in Mongolia by xenophobic and racist groups, but these cases are rare and not broadly supported as foreign media and reports suggest. As reported by the US Embassy Investment Climate Statements (2007),

There has been a gradual and perceptible level of rising hostility to Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Russian nationals in Mongolia. This hostility has led to some instances of improper seizure of Chinese-invested property; and in more limited cases acts of physical violence against the persons and property of Chinese nationals resident in Mongolia.

Both Western and Mongolian media may have exaggerated these sporadic events as being nation-wide hostile manifestations against Chinese people and businesses in Mongolia. Also, ethnically-motivated clashes were likely the result of misunderstandings between Mongolians and Chinese, since they do not speak the same language, and then exacerbated by the media and xenophobic racist groups. However, frequency and scale of such hostility have been very low in comparison to large scale cases in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines. However, elder people often recall the Mongolian-Chinese clash in 1956, when a small fight between youth turned into two-day a rock-throwing fight in Ulaanbaatar.

Most of the anti-Chinese attitudes have been manifested verbally in the media or in the form of peaceful demonstrations outside of the Chinese Embassy in Ulaanbaatar. For instance, the demonstrations near the Chinese Embassy in Ulaanbaatar tend to be noticeable, but rare in occurrence and relatively small in scale. The most significant demonstration was held in October 1991 by Mongolian students demanding “the release of political prisoners and a halt to ethnic
assimilation in Inner Mongolia” (Batbayar 2002, p. 151). Similar demonstrations were organized in 1996, 1999 (Rossabi, 2005, p. 241) and 2011. Other issues, like the Chinese assimilation policy in Inner Mongolia, Chinese claims about Mongolian nomadic heritage and history, and irredentist calls for Mongolia as a lost territory, have always caused a range of verbal reactions in Ulaanbaatar.

These negative ideas, images, and theories seem to have been constructed and transmitted since the early interactions between Mongolians and Chinese. Mongolian political elites used their powers to consolidate only negative images, ideas, and theories about China, Chinese people and their culture in the 1960s to 1980s, and the impact has been lingering for several generations. Although an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis, I will advance a few thoughts on generational imprinting.

3.6 Generational Imprinting

Karl Mannheim (1952) defined a generation as a social creation and argued that each generation receives imprints from the social and political events during their formative age. Schuman and Scott (1989) argued that “different cohorts recall different events or changes, and these memories come especially from adolescence and early adulthood… generational effects are the result of the intersection of personal and national history.” The authors highlighted that “generational imprinting can thus be regarded as a consequence of normal individual development, just as differences in generational perspectives on the ‘same’ event can be seen to be a consequence of varying locations in historical time” (Schuman & Scott, 1989). Therefore, the study of generational aspects could lead to more insightful examination of anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia instead of over-emphasizing its persistence among general public.

Logically, all generations talk differently about China, Chinese people, and their culture, because they have collective memories of significant events based on their first-hand or second-hand learning experience. Without rigorous interviews and analysis, it is impossible to prove generational aspects. Nevertheless, I will advance the following speculations to dis-entangle overall claim of persistent anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia a little further. Table 9 correlates seven generations, their sources of foreign education and orientation, experience (either first or second hand) of events, and political status to speculate potential attitudinal outcome in regards with China, Chinese people, and culture. If a generation received all sources of schemas, their attitude toward China may be neutral. In opposite, if a generation is only exposed to negative schemas during their formative age and has limited interactions with China, their attitude towards China could be mistrusted. And, even if they are exposed to positive and neutral
schemas after their formative ages, their attitude to China may be cautious. At the same time, attitudes of generational cohorts also may alter significantly over time due to dramatic changes such as start and end of Cold War and democratization.

**Table 9. Perceptions of Different Generations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Foreign Education</th>
<th>1945-1963 (Friendly Period)</th>
<th>1964-1989 (Hostile Period)</th>
<th>1989 – now (Friendly Period)</th>
<th>Attitudes to China/Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>First-hand Experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>Out of power</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>First-hand Experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>First-hand Experience</td>
<td>Neutral Cautious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Not applicable Second-hand Experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>Cautious Mistrusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Not applicable Second-hand Experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>Cautious Mistrusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Western States Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, China</td>
<td>Not applicable Second-hand Experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>Cautious Mistrusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>No applicable Second-hand Experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>No applicable Second-hand Experience</td>
<td>No applicable Second-hand Experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>No applicable Second-hand Experience</td>
<td>No applicable Second-hand Experience</td>
<td>First-hand experience</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Not applicable means that cohort either was not born yet or not in their formative years; therefore, they relied on second-hand experience about past periods.

A cohort born in 1930 would have seen high-level exchanges of Sino-Mongolian leaders, a visible presence of Chinese workers and their families in Ulaanbaatar, unique Chinese goods (e.g., silk, fruits, and tea), and culture (e.g., song and table tennis), and heard about Mongolian participation in the Liberation War in northern China during their formative years (17-25 years). Many of those who were educated in the Soviet Union would have interacted with Chinese students in Moscow and a few might have had opportunities to study in Beijing. The generation would have also lived through a period of three decades, when all these interactions would have ceased. They would have seen a good China (providing assistance to Mongolia) and a bad China (cultural revolutions, political struggles, and the Tiananmen incident). This group of people might have played a crucial role in resuming normal relations with China at the end of the
1980s, since most members of the Political Bureau of the Mongolian Communist Party had been born in the 1930s.

The second cohort, born in the 1940s, witnessed some friendly Sino-Mongolia relations. But the students abroad in the Soviet Union would have had few interactions with Chinese people in Mongolia, because the Chinese workers in Mongolia were strictly guarded and influenced by the extensive propaganda and anti-Chinese attitudes. They would have been mostly aware of the images of bad China, and would have interacted closely with Russians in Mongolia and abroad, from their formative years, starting from the 1960s. As Mongolia transitioned into a democracy in 1990, the political elites from this cohort would have dominated most of the leadership posts.

The third cohort, born in the 1950s, would have had first-hand experience with anti-Chinese attitudes, but would not have interacted with Chinese until the 1990s. They were brought up under the “China threat” atmosphere and would have fulfilled their extensive military and civil defense obligations. Although they would have had first-hand experience of the Soviet-Mongolian brotherly relations, and been knowledgeable about the Soviets and the communist world, their views on China would be one-sided, since they would have lacked any exposure to neutral or positive views about China. This group has been a driving force for the democratic movements, and abhorred the Chinese and Romanian repressions of democratic movements.

The 1960s generation had experiences that were similar to those of their previous generations, though Sino-Soviet tensions had been reduced and the cohort began questioning the need to have military and civil defense obligations. During their study in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the members of this generation would have had first-hand experience with the negative images of the Soviets in Eastern and Central Europe, and been exposed to liberal ideas and anti-communist discourses. They would be attracted to the ideas of democracy, market economy, and developments in the capitalist world. Their knowledge about China would have been influenced by the negative views; they would have disliked the Chinese repressions of 1989. On the other hand, this generation enjoyed free access to Chinese markets and infrastructure. This cohort is becoming the most influential group in Mongolian politics today.

The 1970s generation has mixed views about both China and Russia. They would have first-hand experience of the anti-Chinese propaganda, strained relations with Russia (withdrawal of Russian military and the anti-Soviet attitudes), and increasing interactions with China. They would likely have similar feelings about the Tiananmen incident and the growing Chinese economy, as would earlier cohorts. Nevertheless, Russia would no longer be the window through
which to see the world, as it was for earlier generations. Cohorts from the 1940s and the 1960s were more familiar with Russia, its people, and culture, since 32,000 Soviet civilian workers with their large numbers of dependents, and 80,000 Soviet troops were in Mongolia in the 1970s and 1980s. The Russian language was a mandatory second language for thousands of Mongolians who were studying in the Soviet Union, from the time of their elementary school. This was not the case for generations, from the mid-1970s and afterwards.

Logically, generations of people, who were born in the 1980s and 1990s, will likely have the most neutral view of China and be rather cautious and mistrusting of Russia. They have not experienced the anti-Chinese (pro-Soviet) propaganda, and are able to have multiple views on most issues, links with the West, and access to vast amounts of information (from the Internet, cable TV, and newspapers). The most significant events they are likely to recall are the winning of two gold medals by Mongolians at the Beijing Olympic game, rather than second-hand knowledge about the Tiananmen incident and bad images of China from the 1960s. The increasing number of Mongolian students in China and China’s sustained projection of its soft power policy (e.g., visa waiver, granting access to Chinese infrastructure and medical facilities, developmental aid, and assistance) for Mongolia will certainly affect the attitudes of future generations in Mongolia. However, the results from AsiaBarometer (2005) and Asian Barometer (2006) yield interesting outcomes. First, all generations tend to hold neutral and negative views of China in both polls. Although there was no significant deviation between generations of 1930-40s and 1950-70s, younger generations (1980-90s) have slight positive impression of China in the Asian Barometer study. But younger generations in both polls were overly polarized while other generations have more neutral views (about 28-36%). Second, there are noticeable correlations between view of China and gender along with educational level of younger generations. Male participants and people with low educational levels hold more unfavorable view of China. The question will remain why views of younger generations are polarized and holding similar negative views as older generations.

These barometer studies are not likely reveal attitudinal shifts of generations. First, number of the sample, questions, conducting organizations, and timeframe of two barometers were different. For instance, when AsiaBaromenter (2005) asks about Chinese influence, Mongolians responded in more negative while more positive as Asian Barometer (2006) asks about impressions about China. Second, each poll had a single question on China and one possible response. More insightful examination of anti-Chinese attitudes would need a specific set of questions. For instance, questions whether a person allow his children marry to Chinese,
live next to a Chinese neighbor, or work in Chinese-Mongolian run business may help us to understand emotional components of anti-Chinese attitudes. Moreover, degree of awareness of Chinese culture (e.g., language, literature, religion, customs, and traditions), history, contemporary Chinese politics and socio-economic situation as well as Sino-Mongolian relations need to be examined by a carefully-designed questionnaire will contribute to our understanding of anti-Chinese attitudes. In addition to variables like age, gender, geographic location, it might be possible that other variables such as personal income, social status, and degree of interactions with Chinese people could correlate person’s attitude to China.

Without further study, it would be difficult to make firm conclusions about the anti-Chinese attitudes of different generations and their key generational imprints. Nevertheless, it is fair to speculate about the existence of lingering impacts from the artificially-consolidated past schemas on the younger generations, since the past schemas have not been de-constructed in historical textbooks, the literature, entertainment, or the political leaders’ discourses in post-communist Mongolia. A handful of empirical studies suggest that Mongolians generally hold unfavorable views about China, and the intensity of the anti-Chinese discourses in the media, blogosphere, and public domain is apparent.

Above all, three sources of “anti” attitudes are clearly present in Mongolia: the power imbalance, a backlash against economic activities, and conflicting identities. In the next chapter, I examine a Mongolian variant of the anti-Chinese attitudes, present in the immediate Chinese neighbors.
Chapter 4: Locating a Mongolian Variant among Chinese Neighbors

4.1 Chapter Overview

Like anti-Americanism, many variants of anti-Sinicism exist. The variants wax and wane across regions and time. The first wave of anti-Sinicism was mostly directed against Chinese immigrants, who were seen as an economic and demographic threat. Anti-Chinese attitudes were institutionalized in Australia, North America, and Africa, in the 1800s and early-1900s, even though Chinese laborers were needed for major infrastructure projects (Daniels, 1978; Chan, 2006; Craib, 1996). As Harris explains, “this apparent economically founded antagonism went beyond merely bordering on racism” during the 19th century (Harris, 2010, p. 219). The second wave of anti-Sinicism was instigated by Japanese in Asia, during the Second World War, resulting in the massacre of Chinese people. The third wave began in the 1960s, in East Asia, mostly motivated by the Soviet Union and other regional major powers, such as India. In the case of Southeast Asia,

since the 1960s anti-Sinicism has flared on and off, with varying degrees of intensity – including, in some places, much violence – as a significant aspect of nationalism in Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam (Chirot & Reid, 1997, p. 16).

The fourth wave of anti-Chinese attitudes was manifested differently across regions and countries from the 1990s, to create challenges in defining the merging or diverging patterns. Besides the Western criticism of human rights issues in China,

The majority of experts tend to advance both pro- and anti-Chinese arguments, a two-fold argumentative structure that can be explained by the variety of issues involved. China is more highly rated in relation to geopolitical and economic issues, for example, than it is in relation to questions of identity and culture (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2009).

This could apply to at least two cases of Chinese neighbours. In this chapter, I will attempt to locate a Mongolian variant of the anti-Chinese attitudes present in the immediate Chinese neighbors.

4.2 Negative Attitudes in China’s Neighbors – Locating a Mongolian Variant

China has 14 land neighbors and 4 immediate maritime neighbors, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Three main causes for anti-Chinese attitudes appear to be common to all. Because of its population size, size of territory, and economic and military strength, China has a power imbalance with some of its neighbors. Being the largest trading partners, China is
projecting itself to be a hub for regional and global economic power, and is investing into infrastructures for resources and markets (e.g., rail, ports, roads, and pipes in Laos to form links with Southeast Asia, in Nepal and Myanmar to link with South Asia, in Kazakhstan to link with Central Asia, and in Russia to link with Eurasia). Each of the neighbors has similarities and differences in terms of their identities and values. Like the case in Mongolia, negative schemas of the past are still lingering in the minds of people in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, Vietnam, Laos, as well as in other states like Myanmar and North Korea, which has had a troubled history with China.

4.2.1 The Power Imbalance

Mongolia, sharing the longest land border with China, is the most vulnerable of China’s neighbors. Except for Bhutan, Mongolia has the smallest population (2.8 million), while other smaller states, Kyrgyzstan (5.4 million), Laos (6.2 million), and Tajikistan (6.8 million), have slightly larger populations than Mongolia. Although all of China’s neighbors have their ethnic diasporas within Chinese territory, sizes of diasporas are smaller than their co-ethnic nationalities in Chinese neighbors. Still, more ethnic Mongolians (approximately 3.5 million) live in China than in Mongolia. Mongolia, like Bhutan, Nepal, Laos, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is one of the low-income, landlocked neighbors of China. Adding to the power imbalance, Mongolia has not had any security backing from other major powers since 1990, as it has attempted to maintain equidistance from its neighbors. In contrast, most of China’s other neighbors rely heavily on their political links and security ties with other major powers: Japan, Philippine, South Korea, and Taiwan are linked with the US (Chung, 2010); Bhutan and Nepal are linked with India; and the Central Asian states are linked with Russia. Finally, China has claimed Mongolia formally (prior to 1949) and informally, though to a lesser degree than their claim of Taiwan.

At the same time, Mongolia is also considered one of the most vulnerable points to China’s security and stability. As Wachman observed,

historically, successful invasions of China have come often from the north… [w]hile Chinese strategists have observed how there are natural sources of protection in the east, south, and west (the seas, jungles, and mountains), there is none in the north (Wachman, 2009, p. 14).

Therefore, Mongolia’s collaboration with Chinese adversaries – Russia, the US, and India – touches a nerve of the military strategists in China. Moreover, instability and a rise in the
Mongolian nationalistic movements in Mongolia could contribute to further instability in China’s autonomous regions. China has received Mongolian political elites in Beijing to advance bilateral relations and to offer more benefits to Mongolia during the aftermaths of turbulent events. For instance, President Ochirbat and Prime Minister Byambasuren paid official visits in 1991 and 1992 respectively after Tiananmen Incident while Prime Minister Batbold concluded a strategic partnership agreement in 2011 amidst of instability in Inner Mongolia. China has had similar concerns about the Central Asian states, with regards to Xinjiang, and concerns about Nepal, in the case of Tibet.

It would be plausible to argue that the Mongolian political elites feel extremely vulnerable amid all of the imbalances in demographics, economics, and security. The precarious circumstances in Mongolia are also shared by the political elites in China’s smaller neighbors.

4.2.2 A Backlash against Chinese Economic Activities

Since the economic capacity of China’s neighbors varies dramatically, their reactions to Chinese economic activities also vary greatly, though some consistency would be found among the stronger economies and among the low-income economies. Japan, India, South Korea, and Taiwan look at China as a market, and for resources, while China’s low-income neighbors seek Chinese investments for their infrastructure development, and Chinese markets for their exports. In the larger economies, Chinese economic activities could cause tensions in the bilateral trade policies, rather than negative sentiments from the public. Chinese economic migrants could also cause concern in the local communities in the extremely homogenous nations like Japan or South Korea.

In some cases, Chinese economic activities could also trigger traditional negative attitudes toward Chinese businesses and labor forces. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has pursued two noticeable policies with respect to its mid- and low-income neighbors. First, China provides economic aid, preferential loans, and assistance for its neighbors: (1) to alleviate anti-Chinese sentiments in its former hostile neighbors; (2) to secure their assurance not to support ‘separatist elements,’ including Xinjiang and Tibet; (3) to endorse a one-China policy; and (4) to gain access into natural resources or infrastructure (sea and land transportation). Second, China, especially since 2000, has explicitly explored opportunities to link its backward provinces with markets and resources of neighboring countries (e.g., the ‘economic belt’ initiative with Vietnam and North Korea, and Mekong Development Projects). Economic cooperation has increased between China’s southern provinces and Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar (Nanjing, 2000); between China’s western provinces and the Central Asian states,
and between its northwestern provinces with Mongolia, North Korea, and Russia. The policies have led to a growing presence of Chinese traders, economic entrepreneurs, and labor forces in the previously hostile neighbors. Despite challenges for some Mongolian companies, who compete with Chinese counterparts for market and resources (e.g., livestock exports, cashmere, textile, and coal mining), Chinese market, infrastructure, and skilled labor (esp., for construction companies) are practically attractive to most Mongolian companies. Moreover, China also serves as a shorter, convenient bridge for Mongolia to connect with the global economy.

In repressive regimes, such as North Korea, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos, the political elites control the “anti” [foreign nation] attitudes, which has made it difficult to know the real dynamics involving local populations and the increasing Chinese presence. Nevertheless, in free societies like Mongolia, Philippines, and to a certain degree in Kyrgyzstan, the tensions form a steady undercurrent erupting into sporadic hostile protests against Chinese nationals and their businesses. Nepal or Bhutan, which are considered to be inaccessible to Chinese, may not face these challenges in the near future. Thus, the backlash against Chinese economic activities may still be a source of the political elites’ negative attitudes towards China, who suspect that the Chinese economic activities are a means to increase Chinese leverage in their domestic politics. At the same time, the political elites are concerned about the tensions between economically-disadvantaged local populations and Chinese nationals and settlers. In China’s smaller neighbors, the political elites seek closer economic cooperation and offer access to their infrastructure in exchange for Chinese investment and support in regional and international politics.

4.2.3 Conflicting Identities and Values

The Mongolian political elites and intellectuals have often used negative schemas to differentiate the Mongolian identity from Chinese identity. In contrast, China has attempted to claim similarities between Mongolia and China, based on history and Inner Mongolia. China has made similar claims about the Central Asian states, Nepal, Bhutan, and Indian Buddhists. Culturally and linguistically, China is similar to North Korea and South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar, compared to its similarity with the South and Central Asian states, which has influenced Chinese expansion. Owen Lattimore’s observation as below is still valid today:

Chinese expansion was limited by the ability to absorb non-Chinese populations.
Throughout their history, the Chinese have been willing to accept as Chinese any barbarian who would drop his language and learn Chinese, wear Chinese clothes, farm
like a Chinese and accept the other conventions of being a Chinese. Toward the south, the Chinese were able to expand to an almost indefinite depth because they found in their southern territories tribes which, in agriculture and the evolution of their social systems, were still in phases through which the Chinese themselves had already passed (Lattimore, 1953, pp. 22-23).

The Inner Asian nomadic states, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and to some extent Afghanistan and Tajikistan, were targets of Soviet intervening and consolidated into the Soviet-style identity and values, over a 70-80-year history in the 20th century. These states have all been used by the Soviets as political, economic, and demographic buffer zones against Chinese expansion. Bhutan and Nepal remained under Indian political and cultural influence and has mostly remained less connected to Chinese culture, because of the natural barriers (inaccessible Himalayan Mountains) and Tibet. On the other hand, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Philippine were heavily influenced by Chinese culture and have sizeable ethnic Chinese minorities, that have retained their culture and language. Except for Taiwan, China’s three eastern neighbors, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea, have cultural and linguistic similarities with China, but are ethnically homogenous. Although ethnic Chinese populations were introduced into these states during the world wars, any increase in the percentage of the Chinese minority over 0.5 of the total population was avoided. Nevertheless, the public attitudes in those states that are culturally, ethnically, and linguistically similar to China tend to be positive toward Chinese people and their culture.

Distinct from other Central Asian states, Mongolia has remained ethnically homogenous, as has Japan, North Korea, and South Korea, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have a substantial number of ethnic Russians and other ethnic groups from the former Soviet republics. Like North Korea, Mongolia expelled Chinese immigrants in 1960s, and prohibited local and foreign Chinese to gain party membership, serve in the military or government, or obtain citizenship status during the Cold War. Although Myanmar and Vietnam have had closer cultural and linguistic ties with China, they have also maintained similar policies with regards to Chinese immigrants and minorities, to prevent assimilation.

In addition to the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic dimensions, the political systems and values of China’s neighbors vary greatly. Both the political elites and the public, in free societies, can express critical views of the Chinese government and its policies toward its population. The list of these free states includes Japan, India, South Korea, Mongolia, Philippine,
and Taiwan, and may also include new, turbulent democracies, such as Nepal and Kyrgyzstan. To gain public support in local politics and elections, the political elites in these societies cannot explicitly support the Chinese government. In contrast, the political elites in the totalitarian regimes, like Bhutan, Myanmar, North Korea, and Tajikistan, and in the authoritarian regimes (including Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Laos, and Vietnam), can explicitly support the Chinese government, as they need Chinese political support on the international stage and in their economic cooperation with China. In these states, the negative attitudes of the public toward China seem to be under the control of the regimes.

Here, Mongolia represents the key features of China’s neighbors. First, Mongolia is a traditionally nomadic society like the Central Asian states. Second, it is ethnically homogenous, like China’s eastern neighbors (Japan, North Korea, and South Korea). Third, Mongolia’s current political orientation and system is similar to that of China’s democratic neighbors.

4.2.4 Negative Schemas

Similar to the case of Mongolia, negative schemas of the past have also contributed to the persistence of anti-Chinese attitudes in some of China’s neighbors. Negative schemas of China, and Chinese people and their culture have been intentionally consolidated in the Central Asian states, Far Eastern Russia, Vietnam, and Laos, during the Cold War (Okabe, 1997; Rigg, 2003; Nanjing, 2000; Lukin, The Image of China in Russian Border Regions, 1998). Since these societies were fully controlled by repressive governments, negative ideas, images, and theories were introduced to the public through different kinds of education and propaganda. The local Chinese population was controlled or expelled, and all sources of positive schemas about China and Chinese people were repressed by the security institutions.

The ruling elites used negative schemas about China to consolidate their national identities and support the Soviet values, to strengthen their political and economic base by repressing and marginalizing their domestic political opponents. Like in Mongolia, in the Central Asian states, Vietnam, and Laos, theories of “China Takeover” and “Chinese Assimilation” were used to justify the Soviet political and military presence, that coincided with extensive defense spending and alliances with the Soviets during the Cold War. In the 1990s, these nations developed closer and broader economic connections with China, which resulted in Chinese economic migrants, labor, and business entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and the Russian Far East receiving extensive negative media coverage and public attention with harassments and attacks (Kulsharova, 2010; Marat, 2008). Although Chinese investment in mining and infrastructure in Vietnam, and in railroad projects in northern Laos, were also
interpreted by the local populations as a form of Chinese takeover, the authoritarian governments in Vietnam and Laos were repressing sources of negative attitudes toward China (Crispin, 2009; Overland, 2009; Pham, 2008). Similar tensions likely existed in other repressive states, like Tajikistan, Myanmar, and North Korea, where hatred and anti-Chinese sentiments have existed traditionally.

The negative schemas about China was consolidated similarly in India, Nepal, and Bhutan, during the Sino-Indian conflicts of 1962, and in Philippines from the US take-over in 1898 and afterwards. The major difference in the use of negative schemas in these states, in contrast to its use in the communist or repressive states, was that the political elites did not completely close the sources of positive (or neutral) schemas about China, as was the case in the communist regimes.

Still, no studies suggest that the political elites in these nations attempted to de-construct the negative schemas (about China), which had been consolidated during the Cold War. Thus, the political elites in these nations may have used negative schemas of the past to differentiate their identity from the Chinese. Ultimately, the gap in attitudes between the political elites and the public continues to linger, especially in states with a communist legacy.

4.3 Public Attitudes in Comparative Surveys

No single survey includes all of China’s neighbors, and for a number of reasons, the results of different public attitudinal surveys cannot be compared. First, the surveys covered different time-frames, and major events tend to have an impact on public opinion polls. Second, all of the surveys have a different theoretical and methodological basis. Third, the survey results always depend on how the surveys were executed in the field (based on the experience of researchers), even though they were based on good methodologies. These factors complicate the location of Mongolian public attitudes among China’s neighbors. Nevertheless, the public attitudinal surveys can reveal the general attitudes toward a target nation.

Several surveys are relevant to this study. First, the Pew Global Attitudes Project and the BBC World Service Poll included public attitudes toward China (in India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and South Korea). Second, the 2005 Asia Barometer (Japan) and the 2006 Asian Barometer Survey (Taiwan) included Mongolia in both surveys. Third, several surveys were conducted by institutions in Russia and by some other Chinese neighbors, though their methodologies are unfamiliar and their survey data is inaccessible. In the case of the Russian surveys, the results differ greatly due to locations: people in the Russian Far East often hold negative attitudes toward China because of increasing Chinese migration and because they were
at the frontline during Sino-Soviet tensions (Lukin, Russian Perceptions of China Threat, 2002), while people in other regions, especially Moscow, tend to hold different opinions regarding China. Inevitably, it is difficult to learn the true public opinions in repressive states, especially in Myanmar, North Korea, Bhutan, Vietnam, and Laos. Some generalized views about the public attitudes in these countries are described later.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project first included attitudes towards China in 2002 and then annually since 2005. In Pakistan, public attitudes towards China have been constantly positive, while Russian attitudes were 60%, Indians were 40-50%, South Koreans were around 50%, and Japanese were the lowest. South Korean attitudes fluctuated, possibly because of North Korean issues, while Japanese attitudes toward China may have been influenced by both historic issues and current events. The BBC poll, conducted by GlobeScan and the PIPA (University of Maryland), revealed a similar trend. Public attitudes toward China were similar in South Korea and Philippines, who have free societies, are US allies, and are maritime neighbors of China, though Philippines has a sizable ethnic Chinese community. As Pew highlighted in its 2010 survey,

the public in this survey were worried about China’s growing military might… consistent with their overall views of China. Japan and South Korea remain among the most likely to evaluate China’s growing military might as a bad thing for their countries (88% and 86%, respectively).

In the 2005 AsiaBarometer survey, the participants from Pakistan (89.8%), Afghanistan (87.7%), Nepal (86.7%), Tajikistan (71.2%), and India (60.5%) responded that China has a good influence (responses for ‘good’ and ‘rather good’ were combined) (Figure 2). On the other hand, participants from Mongolia (59.7%), Kyrgyzstan (31.7%), Kazakhstan (27.7%), and Bhutan (27.8%) answered that China had a bad influence (responses for ‘rather bad’ and ‘bad’ were combined), while over a third of participants from Kazakhstan (37.4%), Bhutan (39.2%), and Kyrgyzstan (32.2%) held a neutral view about Chinese influence. Thus, while the people of Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan had been indoctrinated by anti-Chinese propaganda during the Cold War, the negative attitudes towards China decreased significantly from Mongolia to Tajikistan. Several points may help to explain this trend: first, Kyrgyzstan has a sizeable ethnic Chinese minority (Dungans) and the public interactions between China and Kyrgyzstan are closer than those between Mongolia and Kazakhstan. Second, public attitudes toward China in Tajikistan are beginning to resemble those in other Muslim-dominated neighbors (i.e., Pakistan and Afghanistan). Third, in comparing the Nepalese with the Bhutanese,
both countries were used as buffers by India against China. Since Bhutan is often threatened by Chinese incursions along their disputed borders, and the number of interactions with Chinese are fewer, the public attitudes in Bhutan are mostly neutral or negative. In contrast, because China has increased its aid to Nepal significantly to receive Nepalese support on Chinese Tibet policies (i.e., exiled governments and Tibetan refugee), and Nepal has sought China to help balance itself against Indian influences, the Nepalese attitudes toward China are surprisingly high (Magnier, 2011). Finally, public attitudes toward Russia were extremely high and similar in the Central Asian states and in Mongolia. Survey participants from Tajikistan (95.4%), Kyrgyzstan (91.8%), Mongolia (82.9%), and Kazakhstan (82.8%) responded that Russia has a positive influence in their countries.

**Figure 2. China Influence in 2005**

Source: AsiaBarometer (2005) ([www.asiabarometer.org](http://www.asiabarometer.org))

The 2006 Asian Barometer (Taiwan) presented results from the East Asian countries, including Mongolia, Philippines and Taiwan (Figure 3). They are all small and democratic neighbors of China. The participants from Taiwan (46.1%), Mongolia (35%), and Philippines (23.7%) held unfavorable views toward China. Although three nations had similar values in terms of democracy, and relied on China’s economy, they revealed major differences between them. Taiwan and Philippine are China’s maritime neighbors, and both have closer ethnic ties with China than Mongolia’s ties with China. The strong negative feelings that are present in Taiwan and Mongolia could be explained by a shared vulnerability felt by both nations, as China claims its suzerainty for Taiwan, formally, and for Mongolia, informally.
Figure 3. View of China in 2006


Reliable surveys on public attitudes in controlled societies rarely exist, which creates difficulties in comparing Mongolian anti-Chinese attitudes with other variants that exist in controlled societies. Substantial gaps would be expected between the attitudes of the political elites and the public in North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. Western media reported numerous accounts of anti-Chinese sentiments in Vietnam (Crispin, 2009; Overland, 2009), Laos (Pham, 2008), and Myanmar (Cropley, 2008; Than, 1997), though the accounts were not systematically analyzed. Both Vietnam and Myanmar have experienced consolidated negative schemas about China and Chinese people, in the 1970s and the 1960s to 1980s, respectively. The ruling political elites marginalized their political and economic opponents, with regards to their Chinese links; expelled massive numbers of local and foreign Chinese nationals; and maintained repressive control over the remaining Chinese-ethnic population. Currently, both regimes have developed closer cooperation with China, but the moves may not have been supported by the local populations, who are fearful about a Chinese economic take-over and assimilation. The situation in Laos seems to be less complicated than those in Vietnam and Myanmar, since the Laotian Chinese are well-integrated with Laotian society. Nevertheless, fear of assimilation and economic take-over by Chinese seems to exist, especially in the northern part of Laos, which is sparsely populated and now hosts Chinese laborers and economic entrepreneurs. Although North Korea is depicted as a brotherly ally of China, anti-Chinese sentiments are high in the closed society. Facts about the Minsaengdan incident of the 1930s, Chinese occupation in the 1950s, the expulsion of Chinese nationals during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese claims for the Koguryo Kingdom (in 2004), and the marginalization of Chinese nationals in North Korea easily
portray a troubled partnership between the two. North Korean elites have never highlighted the Chinese influence in their domestic media, and the public has remained suspicious about a Chinese economic take-over. The regime in Pyongyang, like the Mongolian communist government in the past, is in full control of the formation, consolidation, and use of negative schemata of target nations. Apparently, the regime pursues a neutral position about China, while framing, transmitting, and consolidating negative schemas about the US and the South Korean governments. The negative schemas about the US and South Korea will likely linger even after relations between the nations can be normalized. The ruling elites in Myanmar and Vietnam, on the other hand, appear to be implementing measures to crush the anti-Chinese attitudes and the provocation. It would be interesting to see whether the ruling elites in these nations can deconstruct the intentionally-consolidated negative schemas of the past, or just use it to marginalize anti-government elements and democratic activists.

Some of the new measures from the Chinese government are easing the anti-Chinese attitudes and protecting Chinese nationals abroad. First, the Chinese government is pressuring its counterparts in Vietnam and Myanmar to protect the rights of Chinese nationals in their territory. Second, because of situations in Afghanistan and Africa, the Chinese government has improved its protection measures for overseas Chinese laborers by introducing insurance, security elements, and training. Finally, China is currently deploying its military assets to evacuate Chinese nationals from crisis zones (recent examples include Kyrgyzstan and Libya). In 2005, China discussed with Kyrgyzstan the deployment of military force in Kyrgyzstan to protect Chinese nationals during the turmoil. This topic could be further explored to understand changes in China’s reaction to hostile forms of anti-Chinese attitudes in developing nations. Historically, Chinese nationals and merchants were empowered in 1919 when China deployed its military forces to Outer Mongolia to collect debts and increase China’s economic activities; however, the action instigated more hostile attitudes toward Chinese from the local population and the elites.

A number of general conclusions can be drawn about anti-Chinese attitudes, in general, and the case of Mongolia, in particular. First, three common causes of “anti” attitudes are present in most countries, with the exception of China’s traditional ally, Pakistan, and the more distantly located nations like Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bhutan. The resulting impacts are different, depending on the population size, stage of economic development, military and security capabilities and alliances, and cultural dimensions.

Second, the negative schemas about China, Chinese people, and their culture have been used differently by China’s neighbors. Repressive regimes, especially with a Soviet legacy,
appear to share Mongolia’s past use of only negative schemas to consolidate political and
economic power by the ruling political elites.

Third, gaps can be noticed between the attitudes of the political elites and the public in
Mongolia, the Central Asian states, Russia, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea, and Vietnam. The
gaps are the result of the intentional consolidation of negative schemas during the nations’
adversary periods with China. The gaps will likely continue even after a nation transitions into
democracy, or after its relations with China become normalized, as the political elites would be
reluctant to de-construct the past negative schemas, for the sake of differentiating their nation’s
identity from China’s.

Fourth, generational imprinting continues to be important in each of China’s neighbors.
As in the case of Mongolia, all cohorts have experienced various historic events domestically
and internationally in the past several decades, and the events, interactions, and sources of
information will affect their views and actions towards China and Chinese people.

Finally, the Mongolian case is an excellent entry point to understand the general trends
for the anti-Chinese attitudes in China’s small, developing, and democratic (transitioning)
neighbors. Understanding the case of Mongolia sheds light on temporary, repressive regimes like
North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam, and on their use of anti attitudes towards target nations.
Mongolia, after all, seems to be the most vulnerable of China’s neighbors, in terms of its
population size, economy, military, and geographic proximity.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

Negative, neutral, or positive attitudes toward neighboring nations have existed for centuries, and political elites have manipulated public attitudes for a variety of reasons. Negative attitudes, when institutionalized by the political elites, can affect the people’s daily lives and leave lingering effects that may last for centuries.

Different research approaches examining anti-Americanism have reached the same conclusion: “anti” attitudes are multi-causal phenomena that need to be studied from a multidisciplinary perspective, same apply to anti-Chinese attitudes. The analytical framework used in this thesis considers three main causes of the “anti” attitudes: a power imbalance, a backlash against economic activities, and conflicting identities, in conjunction with the social-psychological notion of schema. These attitudes are manifested in different forms and have consequences on the daily lives of people and politics depending on its contexts and the level of institutionalization.

The “anti” attitude is mostly prevalent in smaller nations and it targets major or regional powers. Anti-attitudes to neighbors or past colonial powers have deep-historical roots and well-developed negative schemas by political elites and intellectuals of smaller nations to distinguish their values, actions, and institutions to contrast of target nations. Therefore, these negative schemas are more about themselves rather than the target nations. For instance, anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia, anti-Americanism in Canada, anti-Nigerian attitudes in Ghana, and anti-Brazilian sentiment in Paraguay have a repertoire of well-constructed negative schemas and institutionalized through political process. These schemas resonate easily among public because they are closely linked their daily lives, accepted as proven facts, and political elites know how deploy them strategically.

A few points need a more theoretical and empirical treatment. First, the “anti” attitudes used in repressive states, either totalitarian or authoritarian, are always institutionalized and therefore, have a more direct impact on domestic and international politics. The conclusion in Katzenstein and Keohane (2007), that anti-Americanism has no direct impact on politics, may only apply to democracies or nations that are geographically distant or that have had no past experience with Americans obviously the study does not include repressive states, excluding China. However, anti-American attitudes are more systematically institutionalized in repressive regimes.

Second, although public opinion polls suggest the persistence of the “anti” attitudes in any nation, more studies are needed to validate such a claim. Public attitudes are dynamic. Even
people appear to demonstrate coherent unfavorable attitudes; they hold a multiple attitudes depending on the issue. Their attitudes are subject to alter due to personal factors (cultural and religious orientation, education, experience, and age), political and socio-economic factors, as well as geographic factors.

Third, through generational memories and imprinting, each generation has a collective memory of global, regional, and national events. The attitudes may change because of first- or second-hand knowledge about those events. Therefore, studies that consider generational imprinting may further our understanding of how anti attitudes can change over time. Or, how much impact do these well-developed negative schemas and narratives that are used to transmit “we know” views have on cognitive development of younger generations?

The main purpose of this thesis is to find plausible explanations for the question: Why have anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia persisted, even after both nations have enjoyed friendly relations for more than two decades? To answer the question, I propose two explanations. First, the anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia are not different from any other cases of ‘anti’ sentiments expressed between small and big neighbors. Second, the anti-Chinese attitudes have persisted because of the lingering impact of the government’s indoctrination and propaganda that was anti-Chinese during the 1960s and 1980s and the reluctance of the Mongolian political elites’ to de-construct the artificially-consolidated negative schemas (idea, images, and theories) about China, Chinese people, and their culture.

From examining the available studies and results of public opinion polls dealing with the attitudes toward China, the anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia are not different from other variants of anti-Chinese attitudes, despite differences in their intensity, and other factors related to time and location. The anti-Chinese attitudes are multi-causal, as are the sentiments of anti-Americanism. In almost every case, three main causes are involved, manifested differently, and have med and long-term consequences.

The negative schemas about China, Chinese people, and their culture were intentionally consolidated by the Mongolian ruling elites with a strong backing from the Soviets, during the 1960s to 1980s. Although the Mongolian political elites and intellectuals traditionally used negative schemas of China to differentiate Mongolian identities from Chinese for centuries, they never completely closed the sources of positive (or relatively neutral) schemas about China, as the communists had done. The communists used all available propaganda and coercive instruments to systematically create biases about China and Chinese people, and marginalized all dissenting views to justify “the Soviet political and military presence in Mongolia.”  

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Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the political elites did not attempt to de-construct the negative schemas of the past. Instead, both the elites and the media enriched the anti-Chinese attitudes with new negative information about rising China and its hideous intentions to engulf Mongolia economically. Obvious changes were occurring in the attitudes of the Mongolian political elites toward China, since middle of the first decade of 2000, because of the increased interactions with Chinese counterparts, more information about China, and the economic reality. Nevertheless, negative attitudes toward China and Chinese people persisted in the media, and public surveys and discourses. The explanation for the persistence of negative attitudes in the public domain stems from the political elites’ and the media’s reluctance to de-construct the negative schemas of the past. The increased presence of Chinese labor, economic entrepreneurs, and low quality goods are now being interpreted in connection with past stereotypes and the systematically created bias. Political and business interest groups, and nationalist, xenophobic, and racist groups continue to target Chinese nationals and their businesses in Mongolia. Although anti-Chinese attitudes are not being institutionalized today, at the state level, the phenomenon from the past has been sufficiently intense to complicate current Sino-Mongolian relations and Mongolia’s foreign and domestic politics.

“Anti” attitudes, in general, and anti-Chinese attitudes, in particular, need to be further studied. “Anti” attitudes (or “pro” attitudes) have been used by major powers to expand their influence in small, developing nations, and by political elites and various interest groups in developing nations to construct, consolidate, and manipulate the attitudes for different purposes. As a focus for future research, generational dimensions may also help to shed light on the issue, by understanding how generations respond to political, economic, and cultural manipulations of the attitudes toward a nation.

Recently, the anti-Chinese attitudes have begun to pick up some qualities of the anti-imperial attitudes. All of China’s small, developing neighbors are watching for Chinese intentions for the future. China’s treatment of ethnic minorities, which has been historically, ethnically, and culturally tied with China’s neighbors, and with its dealings with smaller neighbors like Taiwan, Mongolia, Laos, and many others, will have an impact on the global attitudes toward China. Any threatening Chinese behaviors will invite responses from other major powers in China’s periphery and inflame the anti-Chinese attitudes of the political elites and public in China’s neighbors.

Negative attitudes towards a nation are more easily institutionalized in repressive and controlled societies, creating long-lasting impacts. The intriguing question is: How can the
artificially-consolidated negative schemas be de-constructed, as international relations become normalized and the repressive regimes transition to democracy?

Like anti-Americanism or anti-Semitism, anti-Chinese attitudes deserve further investigation, as they are re-emerging as a global phenomenon, and challenge the policy options of most governments at international, regional, and domestic levels. Anti-Chinese attitudes are not only a global problem, or a problem for China’s neighbors, but they are a problem for China, which must construct its own domestic and international policies.

Negative attitudes, as suggested by Katzenstein and Keohane (2007), are the objects of political struggle, making the phenomenon attractive and complicated. In the case of Mongolia, the difficult question to ask is: How will these anti-Chinese attitudes evolve?

Three key factors will likely play significant roles. First, in terms of Sino-Russian relations, historically, the Sino-Russian honeymoon never lasted longer, and attempts by either to gain an advantage in their peripheries were only made when one were weak. If a rift comes, Mongolia will likely attempt to stay neutral or take a side until circumstances evolve precariously. Second, the future behavior of the Chinese government towards its small neighbors and ethnic minorities would be crucial. If China moves to unify Taiwan militarily, or intensifies the Sinicization of Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, anti-Chinese attitudes of the political elites and public would likely become inflamed. Third, if the Mongolian political elites implement policies to de-construct the past, artificially-consolidated negative schemas about China, its people, and culture, and to regulate the interactions between Mongolians and Chinese in more transparent (and legal) ways, the biases and stereotypes that Mongolians have about China and Chinese people may eventually wane. In opposite, political elites and intellectuals could avoid de-constructing a repertoire of well-developed negative schemas in order to consolidate Mongolian identity (Mongolness) and to constrain Chinese growing influence and presence in Mongolia. Today it is the case in Mongolia. Finally, the level of anti-Chinese attitudes will also change as new generations of Mongolian political leaders take bolder steps to strengthen bilateral relations with China as the cohort of 1960s pushed for a strategic partnership with China in economic, cultural and educational cooperation. As a result of increased cooperation and Chinese ‘charm diplomacy,’ we might observe noticeable attitudinal shifts in the Mongolian public in coming decades. Whichever path future leads, it is important to de-construct the lopsided views about Mongolia’s neighbors during the Cold War in historical textbooks, literature and media. The biased view may do more harm than good for people and politics.
Five days before the Presidential Election, journalist D. Ariуunaa’s coverage about Chinese origins of Elbegdorj aired by TV5 channel, a Mongolian commercial news channel, on May 19, 2010. According to her sources, Elbegdorj’s father was believed a Chinese migrant.


The majority of prime time news and newspapers reported that China is trying to register Mongolian heritages in the UNESCO and international experts coming on February 22 to investigate if deel is true Mongolian heritage. Therefore, encouraged all wear the national dress.


Katzenstein and Keohane presented four main types of anti-Americanism in accordance with the level of identification with the US and the degree of fear as highlighted by Tuomas Forsberg in his review (Forsberg, 2009, p. 446). Liberal anti-Americanism is closely identified with the US, but with fears of American political hypocrisy. Social anti-Americanism, which is found in social democratic welfare states, resents the market-driven nature of American politics, though “social anti-Americans share broadly democratic values.” Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism emphasizes nationalism, sovereignty, and aspirations to become a great power; therefore, sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism avoids being identified with America. Radical anti-Americanism “is built around the belief that America’s identity is hostile to the furtherance of good values, practices, and institutions elsewhere in the world” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007, pp. 28-34).

Rubinstein and Smith also proposed four specific types of anti-Americanism: issue-oriented, ideological, instrumental, and revolutionary. Issue-oriented anti-Americanism is triggered in connection with the U.S. policy measures while ideological anti-Americanism is a “rationally argued antagonism” towards US government as politically, economically imperialist and values of the US society. Instrumental anti-Americanism is employed by governments to elicit mass support by playing on nationalism, marginalize domestic opposition, to use as a scapegoat for government failures, to justify its alignment with the major powers. Revolutionary anti-Americanism characterizes “groups seeking to overthrow a regime closely identified with the US” (Rubinstein & Smith, 1985, pp. 20-28).

“Schemas are set of representations that process information and guide action. They contain both relatively fixed ideas and ideas that depend on contextual cue” (Bowen, 2007).

Bowen argued that “[other schemas] would have to do with systems, such as the image of the United States as hedonistic or overly multiculturalist, or with theories about the workings of an imperialistic economy…These schemas might exhibit distinct degree of malleability, and they would not to be consistent with one another” (Bowen, 2007, p. 232).

Professor Alan Wachman suggested that “however, in the study of anti-Chinese attitudes, it is all about ‘What China might do’ and lines between ‘what China is’ and ‘what China does’ are seem blurred” e-mail correspondence on 17 January 2011.

Mongolia hosted the annual SCO Business Council Meeting in November 2009 and conducted bilateral military exercise with China in the same year.


Interview of Chinese Ambassador to Mongolia, Uls Turin Toim (Political Digest Newspaper), (March 25, 2011), accessed at http://economy.news.mn/content/59951.shtml.


The Academy of Management, the Social Science Academy, and independent think tanks such as Political Education Academy and Sant Maral Foundation began to include queries regarding views of Mongolians about major partner nations and also the regional barometer studies began to include Mongolia.


A data was generously provided by Dr. D. Ganbat, Director of Political Education Academy of Mongolia.

Chinese settlements in Mongolia have begun in 1700s, when Qing emperors used Chinese nationals to provide food for their military campaign in Western Mongolia and Central Asia. Most of Chinese nationals, believed around 100000, fled during the Mongolian revolution in 1921. The official statistics counted 23,919 Chinese nationals in 1925 and the majority of Chinese nationals were expelled in 1929 by the Soviet instructions. In 1950s, around
18,000 Chinese construction workers along their families were living in Mongolia, but most of them left in 1964 and remaining expelled in 1980 (Batbayar T., 2006; Rupen, 1973; Green, 1986).

Out of 30,000 people, who were executed in 1930s, 17,000 were monks in addition to 20-25 thousand monks were persecuted in 1920s. And, 20-30 thousand Mongolian refugees entered Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang escaping from the regime brutality (Sandag & Kendall, 2000, p. 63; Baabar, 1999, p. 309). The total number of Mongolian population at that time was debatable between 647,000-800,000. And, 85,677 monks were in the early 1930s (Murphy, 1966, p. 180; Liu, 2006, p. 23).

In 1945, 16,000 Mongolian military personnel joined with the Soviet military forces to liberate the northern part of China and penetrated 400-450 km deep in contemporary Chinese territory (Bold R., 1996, p. 95)

A year later, Chinese government accepted Mongolia’s request to demarcate its 4673 km border and Protocol for Border Demarcation was signed by the foreign ministers (Sanders A., Mongolia: Looking to the Sea, 1997, p. 147). Mongolian scholars interpreted Chinese decision to demarcate its border with Mongolia in many ways, but most scholars tend to connect to Chinese efforts to demonstrate that its ability to settle border issues in peaceful way while India was causing armed conflict over border dispute in 1962 (Bold R., 1996, pp. 90-107; Molomjamts, 2008).

The Department was also responsible for re-calling published materials, directing and controlling the correction process. For instance, if high-level individuals were purged, the department would recall materials published by them or included their names, images, and statements.

Although Sino-Mongolian Border Treaty was an historic gesture of the Chinese Communist Party toward Mongolia, it was not highlighted in Mongolian press. Chinese Foreign Minister’s positive statement on the Mongolian boundary (29 September 1965) did not informed and recorded in any publications. He recognized Mongolia’s independence in his statement and acknowledged that “there are Han chauvinists in China, who have always refused to recognize the Mongolian People’s Republic. We are opposed to such Han chauvinism. Since its founding, New China has provided the Mongolian People’s Republic with large amounts of aid. In recent years, the leading group in Mongolia has been following Khrushchev revisionists in opposing China. But we do not cancel our aid to it on this account….It is for the Mongolian people themselves to decide whether co-operation with China is more in their interests. We do not oppose our will on them” (Lawrance, 1975, p. 146).

Crimes or accidents involved the Soviet military and citizens in Mongolia, various types of technical accidents, and Soviet facilities in Mongolia were not reported in domestic news. However, many of these were disclosed in early 1990s.

Tsendenbal also expelled 1700 Chinese settlers in 1980.

Erliiz, a concept of ‘half-breed’ or ‘hybrid,’ and hurliiz, one born of an erliiz, according to anthropologist Bulag, “conceived not only as biological category but also as a cultural one (Bulag, 1998, 1, 140).

He noted that “it was a fairly common experience in 1993 to hear of people taking ill thorough Chinese food or drink (such talk seemed absent in 1997 and later). Children ended up in the hospital, comatose, because of Chinese sugar; a man went blind from Chinese alcohol; Chinese grain was infested with insects. The stuff the Chinese were selling as salt wasn’t really salt, either. The list seemed to go on and on” (Kaplonski, 2004, 43).

Data was collected on July 4, 2011. Gee, hip hop group, is one of the most famous by 2011 among youths born after 1980s. Somehow, this song reflected all negative insights about China and Chinese people.


For more on Mongolian elites’ education in the Soviet Union, see Tom Ginsburg (Ginsburg, 1999).

It is important to note that this simplified wave division did not reflect rise and fall of anti-Chinese sentiments of Chinese neighbors because anti [a big neighbor] attitude must have been around for centuries and its changes may be better explained in their particular circumstances. Also, China was a major source of immigration throughout its history due to civil wars, foreign invasions, and repressive regimes.

Websites of the National Statistical Office of Mongolia (www.nco.mn), National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan (www.stat.kg), and Lao Statistics Bureau (www.nsc.gov.la).

Chung observed Mongolia’s acute security concern regarding China while South Korea has relatively positive views of China. One of the reasons, in his words, was that “South Korea takes its alliance with the US for granted while Mongolia has been struggling hard for solid security ties with the US as a strategic counterweight against China” (Chung, 2010, pp. 672-673).

Although both Koreas acknowledge cultural and linguistic similarities with China, both Koreas outraged when China claimed the ancient Kingdom of Koguryo (37 BC – AD 668) as a part of Chinese heritage in 2004 (Gries, 2005). In contrast, Yoo argued that South Korea’s emotional attachment for China based on historical and geopolitical factors (Yoo, 2005).
Sino-Pakistan relationship is particularly interesting, at certain point, it could be considered as similar to Israel-US ties. Both political elites and public in Pakistan have the most positive attitudes toward China and Chinese people. The following Kulsharova’s observation about anti-Chinese sentiment in Kazakhstan applies to Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, and Russian Far East.

“Conversely, Chinese migrants are culturally disconnected from the locals. This cultural disconnect, coupled with the involvement of Chinese businesses in the acquisition of important economic and infrastructural niches in the Kazakhstani economy, earns the Chinese migrants a negative image. Furthermore, limited participation in the management of resource based industries leaves the local population feeling like bystanders or outsiders. Ignorance of the real economic benefits and the actual extent of foreign involvement (corporations and companies) in strategically important spheres breed resentment among the local population and this fuels anti-Chinese sentiment” (Kulsharova, 2010).

All four nations are apparently worried about Chinese economic migrants. Chinese migrants seek citizenships in these nations, which enable them to travel to other nations, and also gain land and other economic privileges. For instances, Kyrgyzstan’s citizens are entitled visa-free travel to Turkey and Russia (Marat, 2008) while Mongolia’s citizens to travel several countries in Southeast Asia.

Chinese communities in Phillipines are better integrated than other Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand since Phillipines located closer to China and their interactions with China and Chinese began earlier (Wickberg 1997; Kuhn, 2006).


During my interactions with North Korean military, diplomats, and scholars in two occasions in Pyongyang and several other events in Ulaanbaatar in 2008-2009. It was clear that their feelings toward China and Chinese people are not similar as depicted in the Western or Chinese media.

Munkh-Ochir called the need for “demythization” of sinophobia that persistent in Mongolia and “hindering the nation’s more thorough identification and interest affiliation with East Asia” (Munkh-Ochir, 2003).
References


Appendices

Appendix A  AsiaBarometer 2005 (Japan)

Table 10. Question 26
Do you think the following countries have a good influence or a bad influence on your country?  A. China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Bhutan</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good influence</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Good</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good influence</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither good</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nor bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather bad</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Count %        | 737       | 1105   | 979      | 840        | 623    | 741      | 717   | 776        | 769        |

Do you think the following countries have a good influence or a bad influence on your country?  F. Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Bhutan</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good influence</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Good</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither good</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nor bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather bad</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad influence</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Count %        | 773       | 1019   | 886      | 840        | 439    | 737      | 534   | 795        | 789        |


Table 11. Mean Differences between Countries on Question 26 A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Code</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>2.3131</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>1.13980</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>3.0193</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>1.16884</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>3.0676</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>1.21433</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>3.0882</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>1.04079</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.5928</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>1.10530</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>3.8853</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>1.01014</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>4.0349</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>.68312</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>4.3500</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>.71515</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4.4474</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>.73061</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>4.1272</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>.80624</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4.1959</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>.78775</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>3.6710</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>1.28391</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>4.2794</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>.78792</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>3.3113</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>1.14123</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.6783</td>
<td>10634</td>
<td>1.16213</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: 1. df =13, F=302.349, Sig=.000; 2. Only highlighted countries are Chinese immediate neighbors.
Appendix B  Asian Barometer 2006 (Taiwan)

Table 12. China Impression Crosstabulation (Question 166)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Rather Bad</th>
<th>Neither Good Nor Bad</th>
<th>Rather Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Total Count</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>1.174</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1486</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note:</td>
<td>For the purpose of this thesis, I have modified the 10-point Asian Barometer scale, being 1 very bad and 10 very good, into a 5-category scale, in which 1-2 represents ‘bad,’ 3-4 ‘rather bad,’ 5-6 ‘neither good nor bad,’ 7-8 ‘rather good,’ and 9-10 ‘good.’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. Mean Differences between Countries on Question 166

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Code</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>4.4287</td>
<td>1486</td>
<td>1.97560</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>5.5179</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>2.35204</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>5.6884</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>2.20981</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>5.6565</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1.59051</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>6.2036</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>2.16936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.4245</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>2.16936</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note:</td>
<td>1. df= 4, F=132.316, Sig=.000 2. Only Taiwan, Mongolia, and Philippines are included in the thesis as Chinese immediate neighbors.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14. Mean Differences between Age Groups (Mongolian Respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-49</td>
<td>5.4539</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>2.08698</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>4.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-79</td>
<td>5.4005</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>2.32202</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-99</td>
<td>5.9234</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>2.55430</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>6.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.5179</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>2.35204</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note:</td>
<td>df=2, F=4.735, Sig=.009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. China Impression: Generations (Mongolian Respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>“Bad”</th>
<th>“Rather bad”</th>
<th>“Neither good nor bad”</th>
<th>“Rather good”</th>
<th>“Good”</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-1949</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1979</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1999</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note:</td>
<td>df=2, F=4.735, Sig=.009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16. China Impression: UB vs. Rural (Mongolian Respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Bad”</th>
<th>“Rather bad”</th>
<th>“Neither good nor bad”</th>
<th>“Rather good”</th>
<th>“Good”</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note:</td>
<td>df=4, F=.175, sig=.016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C  Comparison of Results of “SANT MARAL” Foundation Surveys

Table 17. Best Partner Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>October, 2008</th>
<th>May, 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union*</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Don’t know)</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No answer)</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18. Urban and Rural Differences on Best Partner Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Countryside</th>
<th>Ulaanbaatar</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
<th>Countryside</th>
<th>Ulaanbaatar</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union*</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19. Communication and Cooperation Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>October, 2008</th>
<th>May, 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union*</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No answer)</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Don’t know)</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20. Urban and Rural Differences on Communication and Cooperation Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Countryside</th>
<th>October, 2008</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
<th>Countryside</th>
<th>Ulaanbaatar</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union*</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sant Maral Foundation of Mongolia (http://www.santmaral.mn/en/publications)