

State-building in Afghanistan: A Gendered Human Security Perspective

by
Christina Leanne Black

B.A, the University of British Columbia, 2010

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF**

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Interdisciplinary Studies)

**THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
(Okanagan)**

August 2013

©Christina Leanne Black, 2013

Abstract

With the transition to Afghan national control underway in Afghanistan, questions of legitimacy and security continue to surround the last decade of international military involvement in the country. The initial bombing campaign and subsequent military operations following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 proclaimed the goal of providing humanitarian relief to Afghans as one of the primary motives behind military action. In order to achieve the stated objectives in Afghanistan, the cooperating states implemented a 'comprehensive approach' to state-building, whereby the military intervention was combined with diplomatic and development initiatives. This project critically examines the progressive Canadian involvement and international state-building techniques currently employed in Afghanistan. In conjunction with a historically contextualized consideration of the issues facing Afghans, the 'comprehensive approach' is critiqued through a feminist international relations (IR) lens regarding the humanitarian concerns and overarching legacy of the Afghan conflict.

Preface

This research and resulting thesis required the approval of UBC's Behavioural Research Ethics Board, under certificate number H12-00231.

Table of Contents

Abstract	ii
Preface	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Theoretical Framework	3
Fundamentals of State-building	6
Chapter Two: Historical Overview	12
The Current Conflict	19
Culturally Divided	22
Chapter Three: Challenges of State-Building in Afghanistan, 2001-2012	24
International Security Assistance Force	26
Humanitarian Issues	30
Aid Discrepancies	35
Corruption and 'Warlordism'	36
Justice	43
Canada in Afghanistan	46
Evolution of the Canadian Engagement	48
Specific Initiatives	52
Community Involvement	61
Chapter Four: State-building in Afghanistan: A Feminist Perspective.....	67
Background	70
Human and Women's Rights as Justification for Afghan Intervention	71
Humanitarian Liberation?	71
'Humanitarian' Military Intervention	76
Intervention, Human Security, and Gender	77
Human Security and Women's Rights	83
Key Issues	87
Indirect Consequences	91
Direct Consequences	93
Threats	93
Legal Justice	98
Post-Conflict	99
Canada's Post-Conflict Involvement	100
Chapter Five: Conclusion	108
Legacy for Afghans	110
Legacy for Canada	119
Bibliography	126

Introduction

The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 anticipated the elimination of the Taliban and al Qaeda members and supporters. The initial military successes dissolved into the quagmire still evident in Afghanistan over a decade later. The extended hostilities on the ground have destroyed agriculture and basic infrastructure, causing food and employment shortages in addition to health concerns, inflation and price increases (Plümper and Neumayer, 2006; Ghufraan, 2006). Structural violence and inequality, worsened by the economic breakdown and drug culture pervasive in Afghanistan today, require consideration in any militarized search for peace and solutions (Daulatzai, 2008). In a society where basic infrastructure and social welfare institutions have been destroyed, where American and international aid and security forces are held in deep distrust by the general population, and where corruption and mismanagement permeate the Kabul government, this thesis asks whether the withdrawal of international actors will be a benefit or a detriment to peace efforts in Afghanistan? (Bhadrakumar, 2010; Rubin, 2008)

The removal of international advisors, troops and private security companies, relied upon by government officials and civilians for years, leaves the Afghan government, police and military alone to maintain the peace (Bhadrakumar, 2010). The struggles hampering the Afghan National Forces (ANF) will be considered below, but their shortcomings have left room for rival warlords, religious divisions, and regional tensions to once again surface and demand domestic attention¹ (Biddle, 2010). If the Karzai government could establish stability and demonstrate steps toward establishing effective legal, social and economic policies, it could earn the respect

¹ As well as the attention of those international forces/governments still involved in the Afghan conflict.

and consent of the people – limiting the influence of the Taliban (Biddle, 2010). Through a critical examination of the state-building techniques currently employed in Afghanistan under the tutelage of Canadian military, government and civilian authorities, and in conjunction with a historically contextualized consideration of the issues facing Afghans, this project explores the legacy of the Afghan conflict.

The state-building policies presented in this thesis can be analyzed through many different prisms. The initial bombing campaign and subsequent military operations after 9/11 proclaimed the goal of providing "humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions under the Taliban regime" as one of the primary motives behind military action.² In order to achieve the stated objectives in Afghanistan, the cooperating states implemented a 'comprehensive approach' to state-building, in which military intervention was combined with diplomatic and development initiatives. The political, humanitarian, and women's rights limitations behind the application of state-building aid – and therefore the effectiveness of the development side of initiatives in Afghanistan – have been well researched (see Abu-Lughod, 2002; Fluri, 2011; Kandiyoti, 2007; MacNeil, 2011; Naylor, 2011; Rippenburg, 2004; Ritter, 2009). Likewise, the military and security challenges of state-building have received great attention from within the security discourse (see Berman, 2010; Biddle, Christia & Their, 2010; Chaudhuri & Farrell, 2011; Griffin, 2011; Marten, 2010; Whitty & Nixon, 2009; Williams, 2011). This paper adds to the growing literature on the state-building situation in Afghanistan by confronting it from a modified 'comprehensive approach' of its own, considering

² As stated on 7 October 2001 by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld "about two hours after the United States started bombing Afghanistan". Kurt Mills, "Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict," *Global Governance* 11 (2005): 161.

a discussion on humanitarian and human security concerns in tandem with the security elements with a desire to bridge the gap between the (often opposing) schools of thought.

Due to the scope of the topic addressed, this thesis drew on a range of methodologies and developed through a widespread survey of secondary literature, with a focus on creating a mainstream, policy-driven analysis. While a critical element of this analysis – appearing primarily in the gendered discussion of chapter four – utilized a feminist international relations lens, this thesis was not fundamentally shaped or driven by a critical-feminist framing. Seeking instead to create a constructive and policy-relevant synthesis of the state-building mission in Afghanistan alongside thoughts on the future viability of "humanitarian" interventions, the incorporation of a limited feminist critique and interview component were beneficial in expanding the analysis outside the confines of a primarily security based discussion. Limiting its critique within the boundaries stated, and not wanting to distance the security audience by fixating completely on the humanitarian side of the argument, it is the opinion of the author that any discussion on the Western involvement in Afghanistan must include recognition of the humanitarian concerns as equally important.

Theoretical Framework

In "Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan", Michael Ignatieff analyzes the ostensibly humanitarian trend of international involvement and development initiatives undertaken by Western governments³ and organizations in conflict-ridden or developing nations. With an eye on the imperial interests expressed through choices made and contracts granted, this "new form of colonial tutelage", combined with Western countries'

³ The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Scandinavian states were all involved in Afghanistan and are herein classified as the "Western governments".

desire to extricate themselves from long-term and costly endeavors ('temporary imperialism'), often results in policies that are hastily developed and implemented with minimal involvement or consideration of local needs (Ignatieff, 2003, 122, 22, 79, 106). While acknowledging that it was American-led "military power which made nation-building possible in the first place", Ignatieff claimed that the imperial ambitions of state-building – which he lists as the US desire to "consolidate its global hegemony, to assert and maintain its leadership and to ensure stability" in insecure zones key to itself or its allies – must recognize certain limitations (2). The deployment of "overwhelming military superiority does not translate into security" (3), and has failed to generate the regional stability hoped for by the US (9). Recognizing the problematic application of such foreign ambitions, M. J. Williams defined 'Empire Lite' as combining

...the use of diplomacy, development and shortterm military intervention to shape international affairs. It does not involve conquest, colonialism or direct governance as in the age of empire. Unsurprisingly, the term is controversial. Nonetheless the conflict in Afghanistan (and the subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq) resulted in an application of the thesis through what would become known as the 'comprehensive approach' – the use of national resources from across national government. Joint civil–military units, the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), would implement the comprehensive approach (Williams, 2011, 65).

However, in practice, this 'comprehensive approach', meant to approach state-building initiatives from a concerted and multi-faceted position, has consistently ignored or limited local involvement – weakening the overall effectiveness of the projects and funding involved. Instead of imposing Western-dictated terms and conditions on Afghans, Ignatieff argues that Afghans themselves "should be the ones who decide what kinds of democracy, rule of law and stability of property can be successfully absorbed in their culture and context" (2003, 21). The logic behind the comprehensive approach relied on the understanding that focusing solely on security and the insurgency problem in Afghanistan while ignoring civil responsibilities and

development would not build a stable state – one able to withstand regional and ethnic divisions into the future.

This project considers the challenges and complexities facing the state-building initiatives in Afghanistan, and within that the overall legacies of the conflict itself, through a four-tiered approach. The history behind the current conflict (chapter two), focusing on cultural and political applications, forms the basic foundation of the analysis. In chapter three, the progression of the military operation and Canadian participation, under the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), are examined as illustrative examples of the state-building challenges and 'comprehensive' lessons learned. A discussion based on four key interviews conducted by the author concludes chapter three. As a limited study, the findings are not intended as a critique of the development projects themselves, nor as a comprehensive assessment of Canadian aid decisions. Instead, the study is intended to offset the military/security-heavy focus of the chapter by including a civilian voice from the development side of the comprehensive approach discussion. Chapter four builds on the discussion of the weaknesses demonstrated by the application of the comprehensive approach in Afghanistan and considers human security and aid initiatives (through a feminist international relations lens) as imperative post-conflict state-building elements. The final chapter utilizes the above discussions in questioning the state-building legacy for both Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Canada. The narrative that develops through this research speaks to the theoretical wisdom of applying a comprehensive (versus a purely military) approach to post-conflict situations like Afghanistan, yet highlights the weaknesses and shortcomings demonstrated in the Afghan conflict that must be accounted for if future state-building operations are to secure better

results.

Fundamentals of State-building

The classic literature on state-building considered economic motivations (under the Marxist analysis of the means of production and creation of wealth in the progression of society), the process of the centralization of power (with Durkheim's theories on the structures created and power generated in state-building), and the Weberian understanding of the state as "the institution with the monopoly of the use of legitimate force and statebuilding as the rationalisation of the uses of that force" (Carver, 2011, 71). Fukuyama suggests that state-building, "always begins with the creation of military and police forces or the conversion of the former regime's coercive agencies into new ones" (2005, 87). Democracy promotion often follows closely behind, as constraints are instituted against "that very power [granted to the military or police forces] so that it is dispersed to localities, limited by the rule of law, and ultimately subject to public accountability and popular consent" (87). While acknowledging the role these two elements play in the state-building discussion, I will distance myself from both the 'democracy promotion *as* state-building' and nation-building debates.⁴ The following analysis focuses on state-building as the development of "official governmental institutions and structures" in an effort to address the 'three core functions' of the state – "providing security, representation and welfare (through providing and/or redistributing wealth)" (Adeney, 2008, 536; Lister, 2009, 991; Fukuyama, 2004, 17; Carver, 2011). A state needs to be able to "keep order, to build roads, [and] to deliver basic services", yet given the historically decentralized

⁴ Nation building is a process to develop a shared national identity, Katharine Adeney, "Constitutional Design and the Political Salience of "Community" Identity in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era," *Asian Survey* 48, no.4 (July - August 2008): 536.

nature of Afghanistan, state-building strategies must move beyond the narrow confines of the centralized democratic push (Berman, 2010, 3; Lister, 2009; Senate Committee Reports, 2008).

Along with good governance, legitimacy, a crucial element in the makeup of the modern nation-state, is only achievable – whether in the eyes of the international community or in the domestic sphere – once the state has reached some level of stability.⁵ Legitimacy in this case is realized once the state has a critical mass of generally content people, with solid state revenues, bureaucratic efficiency, a communications apparatus in place, and capable public health system, police services, and legal courts (Rubin, 2006, 178; Fukuyama, 2004). The state must be able to focus simultaneously on domestic issues and international responsibilities.

Ethnic tensions and territorial regionalism add to the precarious nature of any state-building endeavour, and such concerns are especially relevant in the case of Afghanistan, with its ongoing security challenges and concerns (Adeney, 2008; Berman, 2010). Afghanistan is a classic 'post-modern' case of conflict, in which Clausewitzian national armies facing off along recognizable lines have been replaced by what Umberto Eco refers to as "a multiplicity of powers [placed] into competition with one another" (1997, 10). Factors now include governing powers fighting against "their own internal, rival political parties and religious factions; the media, embedded and reporting from behind 'enemy lines;' Wall Street and the financial sector, heavily invested in hope of profit, but with no clear strategic goal or financial objective", all influencing military, government and public opinion (Lucas Jr. Post-Modern War, 2010, 290).

⁵ 'Legitimacy', as utilized throughout this thesis, relies on the above understanding of state-building and considers the ability of the nation-state (in this case, Afghanistan) to provide the security, legal structure, and basic well-being required of its populace. The author frequently designates concepts/people/situations as 'legitimate' in contrast to being 'illegitimate' or corrupt. 'Legitimate stability', therefore, rests on the implementation of a recognized set of rules/norms that are accepted by the majority of Afghans and adhered to at the corporate level consistently and comprehensively. See the discussion on corruption below (pages 36-43).

The Clausewitzian consideration of war not as "merely an act of policy but [as] a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means" (Clausewitz, 87, 605-607) – with the end goal of total victory – requires modification. Eco states that if the Clausewitzian understanding still stood, "war would end when the situation reached a state of equilibrium sufficient to permit a return to politics" (Eco, 14). Yet,

In our century it is the politics of the postwar period that will always be the continuation (by any means) of the premises established by war. No matter how the war goes, by causing a general redistribution of weights that cannot correspond fully with the will of the contending parties, it will drag on in the form of a dramatic political, economic, and psychological instability for decades to come, something that can lead only to a politics "waged" as if it were warfare (Eco, 14).

Ever-advancing technological innovations, asymmetrical warfare⁶, and the changing character of warfare – with new concepts of security, military targets, tactics and threats – also understood as the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), factored into the Afghan conflict and affected the state-building operations (Krepinevich, 1993). In a country still involved in conflict, recognizing and applying the changing elements of warfare in an effective manner was a crucial element in the security side of the 'comprehensive' state-building approach (Sidky, 2007; Smith, 2003; Major, 2009; Arquilla, 2001). According to the Afghanistan Compact⁷, "genuine security remains a fundamental prerequisite for achieving stability and development

⁶ Asymmetric warfare is a means for non-state actors to disrupt and weaken a "nominally superior opponent to the point of strategic exhaustion" by "circumvent[ing] conventional military strengths and tak[ing] advantage of weaknesses. Asymmetric threats and asymmetric techniques in warfare can include the use of conventional weapons in unexpected ways, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors and rogue nations, the exploitation of non-military technologies and platforms in a manner incongruent with the original design, and the regular use of deception and surprise against military and civil targets. Asymmetric threats can also be of the low-tech variety, such as improvised explosive devices, assassination, ambushes, and the use of graffiti to pass messages." The Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment: 2008-2030* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, January 2009): 101, see also 81, available at http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/documents/CFD%20FSE/Signed_Eng_FSE_10Jul09_eng.pdf

⁷ Signed in 2006 by the Afghan government and 50 other participating countries (including Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and Russia) involved in the London Conference on Afghanistan, as well as 10 participating organizations (including NATO, the UN, Islamic Development Bank, World Bank, and the IMF) and 14 observer-status nations.

in Afghanistan. Security cannot be provided by military means alone. It requires good governance, justice, and the rule of law, reinforced by reconstruction and development" (Afghanistan Compact 2006, 3).

The gendered human security discussion of chapter four interrogates the 'humanitarian'⁸ reasoning used to generate support for the military intervention in Afghanistan. By employing a feminist IR perspective on the conflict and macro-level reconstruction (Ismael, 2011; Abu-Lughod, 2002; Blanchard, 2003; Caiazza, 2001), this project addresses the micro-level development gap regarding policy usefulness and durability for the average Afghan. That women faced hardships in the patriarchal and conflict-ravaged country was certain, yet the utilization of ostensibly feminist concerns to justify military actions that would result in greater hardships remains a contentious issue more than a decade into the conflict. Such a framing promotes attention to 'human security' as opposed to typical realist definitions of security. Realists consider nation-states to be the primary actors in a self-interested and anarchic world order; order is maintained through balancing interests or dominance by a global hegemon (such as the United States). Security is understood as a corporate notion. The human security approach "equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms" and advocates "the centrality of the security of individuals rather than that of states" (MacNeil, 2011, 6). Over the past twenty years, the human security agenda "has been widely adopted, particularly by middle powers such as Canada, as the main theoretical framework for development in conflict and post-conflict zones" (6).

⁸ The term 'humanitarian' is used throughout this thesis "in the broadest sense to encompass both disaster and development assistance". See Róisín Shannon, "Playing with Principles in an Era of Securitized Aid: Negotiating Humanitarian Space in Post-9/11 Afghanistan," *Progress in Development Studies* 9, no.1 (2009): 19.

Human security involves the "freedom from fear and freedom from want", "protection from physical violence... [and] chronic threats like hunger, disease, severe economic deprivation, or political repression" (Ferreira, 2009, 502). Peterson (2003) found that the traditional "national security" question focused on by nation-states actually imposes structural insecurities on certain portions of society, particularly women. Lara Coleman (2007) likewise argued that widespread gender discrimination negatively affects economic, political, social and cultural outcomes. Questioning the human security side of the state-building effort, therefore, is necessary in the development of an inclusive picture of the military intervention legacy.

Tackling the notion of gender-neutral problems and concepts in political study, feminists raise questions of gendered security, equality and culturally defined roles (Caprioli, 2004; Tickner, 1997; Carpenter, 2002; Maira, 2009). Feminist international relations scholars also question the traditional role of the nation-state as the primary actor in international relations, focusing instead on individuals "in their social, political, and economic settings, rather than on decontextualized and unitary states and anarchical international structures" (Tickner, 1997, 616, 623). Instead of the broad security and power questions typical in international relations studies, feminists seek to understand how international policies affect women on a personal level (Steans, 2007; Carpenter, 2002). According to V. Spike Peterson, "Politics is about different access to resources – both material and symbolic – and how such power relations and structures are created, sustained, and reconfigured [...] politics operate at all levels, ranging from the family and community to the state and the international sphere" (Peterson and Runyon, *Global Gender Issues*, 1993, 32). Proposing policies or striving toward state-building goals, whether formed in North America or Afghanistan, without first basing those ideas on the

realities of life (including gendered realities) for the Afghans concerned results in questionable outcomes.

Building a school to educate children is beneficial, but who will teach at the school must be taken into account. Hospitals are critical to improving the life expectancy of women and children, but if the roads are unsafe for travel the hospital is of little benefit. Interviews with international development advisers illustrated that NATO militaries and the wider development community in Washington and the allied capitals often simply embraced the idea of 'development as security' without considering the wider ramifications of an action. The result is not just wasted funds, but a dangerous conflation of security and development (Williams, 2011, 75).

As state-building projects in Afghanistan continue past the international troop withdrawal, the militarized influence over security issues (within the 'comprehensive approach') has decreased as the focus on human security elements of development increased. The examination of the progression of international state-building initiatives in Afghanistan and discussion of the humanitarian concerns regarding the overarching legacy of the Afghan conflict considered in this thesis must be placed within the historical context of Afghanistan itself. The following chapter highlights the importance that Afghan traditions and cultural norms play in the ongoing security concerns and corresponding reconstruction effort.

Chapter Two: Historical Overview

Afghanistan is a landlocked country in southwest Asia at a crossroads of "three major cultural and geographic regions: the Indian subcontinent to the southeast, central Asia to the North, and the Iranian subcontinent in the west".⁹ Strategically important, the area has been "part of many different empires ruled by outsiders and the center of a couple of its own".¹⁰ The current conflict in Afghanistan is not an isolated crisis; it has historical roots and far-reaching cultural and regional dimensions. To propose criticisms or recommendations regarding state-building without first considering the historical background is shortsighted and dangerous. Thomas Barfield, in *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, traces cultural and military trends back over 1000 years. To support his framing, Barfield claims, "in Afghanistan (where centuries merge as fluidly as decades do in other countries) the past isn't even past yet", and that dissecting the intricacies of contemporary Afghanistan is only possible once current trends and possibilities are viewed in the light of history.¹¹

Examples abound of the fragmented nature of Afghan society and the tendency to resist imposed restructuring. Afghanistan faced two radical reform attempts and corresponding backlashes in the twentieth century.¹² The disconnected nature of the tribal system, despite the attempts to centralize rule under British colonialism, has kept Afghan society fragmented, with

⁹ Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2010): 1.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid, 15. Regarding ethnic ties and the proximity of history for Afghans, Barfield cites a similar ideology as exemplified in a statement by "the activist politician Abdul Wali Khan in the 1970s ... [who was] questioned about his loyalty to Pakistan. He scornfully declared, "I have been Pakistani for thirty years, a Muslim for fourteen hundred years, and a Pashtun for five thousand years"." Barfield, 20.

¹² "The first during the reign of King Amanullah between 1924 and 1928, the second under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) between 1978 and 1979." Deniz Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas or New Challenges? The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan," *Development & Change* 38 (March 2007): 171, 173, 174; see also Carol J. Riphpenburg, "Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Changed Outlook for Women?" *Asian Survey* 44, no. 3 (2004): 410, 411.

resistance to each attempt by the ruling elites to enforce national reforms. The consent of local tribes dictated the limits of statehood imposed on rulers. The defense of local autonomy and cultural norms against centralized, foreign, and 'modern' attack would be a habit often repeated in Afghanistan. It is a stance that would resurface with far-reaching ramifications under the Taliban.¹³

Afghanistan has a long history of rulers and elites governing more or less as they chose. Amir Abdur Rahman, who ruled Afghanistan from 1880 – 1901, implemented a governance structure based on the belief that "rulers should resist sharing power and that the Afghan population had no role in government" – a belief still popular among Afghan elites today.¹⁴ The fact that Rahman managed to unite and autocratically rule the fragmented state of Afghanistan often overshadows the violence required for such centralization, however. Following his lead, so long as successive governments left the rural regions to their own devices, the rural/tribal leaders remained detached from both foreign and domestic concerns. Nominal sovereignty over the marginal regions served to keep relative peace, with "carrots (alliances or subsidies) and sticks (punitive campaigns or trade embargoes) to keep them in line".¹⁵ Up to the time of the communist coup of 1978, the right to rule had been characterized by a "lack of involvement (militarily or politically) by the subject population".¹⁶ With the decimation of the traditional

¹³ Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas", 172, 173; Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia, and F. Alexander Their, "Defining Success in Afghanistan – What can the United States Accept," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no.4 (2010): 49, 51; Seth G. Jones, "It takes the villages: Bringing change from below in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, 89, no.3 (2010): 123; Sheri Berman, "From the Sun King to Karzai: Lessons for State Building in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no.2 (2010): 2; Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Ethnicising Afghanistan?: Inclusion and Exclusion in Post-Bonn Institution Building," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no.4 (2004): 708.

¹⁴ Barfield, 12, see also 164; Frederic Carver, "Are The Reasons for the Failure of Statebuilding in Afghanistan Specific to the Country or Characteristic of South Asia More Generally?" *Asian Affairs* 42 (March 2011): 80.

¹⁵ Barfield, 68, see also 70, 146-155, 159, 160, 161, 338.

¹⁶ Ibid, 4, see also 217.

dynastic rule during the Communist/Soviet era, however, the problem of political legitimacy rose to haunt potential Afghan rulers.

The communist coup and consequent Soviet invasion in 1979 began a long period of conflict. The coup leader, Nur Mohammad Taraki, imposed socialist reforms via violence "including mass arrests, torture and summary executions", causing many "well-educated Afghans, landed elites and religious leaders, the primary targets of the regime's violence," to flee the country.¹⁷ A rival leader soon overthrew Taraki, and a guerrilla movement mounted by frustrated Islamic groups, known collectively as the *mujahedin*, brought the Soviet Union into the conflict.¹⁸

Among the imposed reforms of this period, the Soviet-backed Communist Party planned to build on the freedoms Afghan women had been enjoying since the progressive 1964 Afghan Constitution.¹⁹ Prior to the Soviet invasion, Afghan women "had the right to vote, to serve in government posts, to send their children, both male and female, to school, and to marry the person of their choosing".²⁰ The Soviet reforms "moved to prohibit traditional practices which were deemed feudal in nature, including banning bride price and forced marriage. The

¹⁷ Ashley Jackson, "The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009," Oxfam report (17 November 2009): 7.

¹⁸ H. Sidky, "War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001," *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no.4 (July, 2007): 849, 861-862.

¹⁹ Moderate reforms had also been building since the 1920s, but the 1964 Constitution, instituted by King Mohammed Zahir Shah, "guaranteed equality to men and women while simultaneously emphasizing the country's Islamic roots. This recognition of women's rights in Afghanistan was reflected by the sharp rise in literacy rates both for women and for men and the growing participation of women in the political process", Caroline B. Fleming, "'Even in Dreams, They are Coming': Islamic Fundamentalism and the Education of Women in Afghanistan", *William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law* 11, no. 3 (2005): 598. See also Amnesty International, "Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in Men's Power Struggles" (Nov. 1, 1999), available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA11/011/1999/en/c80434b3-e035-11dd-865a-d728958ca30a/asa110111999en.pdf>; and Arline Lederman, "The Zan of Afghanistan: A 35 Year Perspective on Women," in *Women for Afghan Women: Shattering Myth and Claiming the Future* ed. by Sunita Metha, Palgrave Macmillan (2002): 46-58.

²⁰ Fleming, 598.

minimum age for marriage was also raised. Education was stressed for both men and women and widespread literacy programmes were set up".²¹ In their desire to "ensure equality in Afghanistan" and expand Afghan women's rights, however, the Communists underestimated the fuel this added to the fire already burning against them within the conservative Muslim community.²²

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, "more than 870,000 Afghans were killed, three million were maimed or wounded, a million were internally displaced and over five million were forced to flee the country".²³ The American and Pakistani support for the various factions of mujahedin fighters served to further fragment Afghan society, decentralize authority, and exacerbate the ethnic and regional problems that would haunt the country for years to come.²⁴ "By the time the Soviet army was overthrown in 1989, the country was in economic and social shambles. Rights for women, challenged during the years of the Soviet war, disappeared entirely when the mujahadeen took control of the country in 1989".²⁵ The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 ended the attention paid to Afghanistan in a Cold War context, and left a volatile political vacuum that led to civil war.

Afghanistan fought off foreign interventions by the British and Soviets by becoming an ungovernable land. With tribal leaders and mujahedin fighters undermining conventional warfare techniques and the jihad mindset of expelling foreigners overcoming regional and ethnic divisions, Afghans fighters were able to unite and win. The problem, however, came with

²¹ Amnesty International, "Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in Men's Power Struggles", 2.

²² Fleming, 599.

²³ Jackson, 3, 8; see also Deniz Kandiyoti, "Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Islam and Women's Rights," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no.3 (2007): 511.

²⁴ Barnett R. Rubin, "Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy Wars," *International Affairs* 73, no. 2 (1997): 285; Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 508.

²⁵ Fleming, 599.

handling the nation post-conflict. Afghans had succeeded by "employing rural militias in rebellions over which the dynastic elite had no control. This set up a contradictory dynamic in which the Afghan rulers encouraged armed resistance to expel foreign invaders, but they refused to share power when the war was over".²⁶ With each round of intervention and repulsion, "the restoration of state authority became harder and disputes over who had the right to rule the state became fiercer".²⁷

The civil war period of 1992 -1996 was arguably the "bloodiest and most destructive period in Afghan history".²⁸ According to a report by Oxfam,

Human rights violations, including executions, abduction, imprisonment, sexual violence and other forms of torture, were committed by all factions. The death toll is difficult to determine but by one estimate, 10,000 individuals were killed in 1993 alone...the abduction of women, sexual violence and forced marriages markedly increased. Rape of women and girls appears to have been condoned by militia leaders as a weapon of war, to further terrorize civilian populations, as well as a way of "rewarding" fighters.²⁹

Organized crime and the repression of women characterized this period, with basic services destroyed, personal security threatened, and women often prohibited from working outside the home and girls from attending school.³⁰ "The [mujahedin], seen by many Afghans as heroes during the Soviet occupation, became reviled and feared for the chaos they wrought".³¹

The Taliban originated at this time among the Afghan exile community in neighboring Pakistan. The Pakistan government, in a move meant to unite the ethnic Pashtuns on either side of the Afghan/Pakistan border and provide a stable zone conducive to oil extraction,

²⁶ Barfield, 5, see also 235, 255, 348.

²⁷ Ibid, 5.

²⁸ Chesmak Farhounand-Sims, "Unfulfilled promises: women and peace in post-Taliban Afghanistan," *International Journal* 62 (Summer 2007): 644.

²⁹ Jackson, 10.

³⁰ Lila Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others," *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (2002): 787.

³¹ Jackson, 10; see also Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas," 175; and Sidky, 865.

supported the Taliban (or Islamic student) movement.³² The training "galvanized the resentment of Pashtun tribes against the corruption of the former mujahedin leaders and the domination of the government by non-Pashtuns".³³ The Taliban quickly rose to power in Afghanistan, taking over regions "with the promise to restore law and order" to a war-weary nation, "albeit through a particularly harsh application of shar'ia".³⁴ At the outset, the

Movement's extreme ideology provided a much-needed sense of discipline and purpose in [Afghans'] disrupted lives and supplied an outlet for the pervasive generational and gender conflicts that Afghanistan's social disruption had caused... And, by exerting strict control over women, it reasserted the honour of Pashtun men and legitimated their power with an Islamic symbol, even if it was one not accepted by the vast majority of the world's Muslims.³⁵

Taliban rule (from 1996-2001) was characterized by the extreme repression of women and girls with regard to education and work. They were standardly relegated to the confines of the family home unless escorted by a male relative and wearing a full-length *burqa*.³⁶ Widows, who were numerous following the years of conflict, were held to the same regulations. The Taliban required men also to fit their mold – with full beards, turbans and mandatory mosque attendance. Music, many sports, card games, kite flying, nail polish, statues, photography and chess were all forbidden.³⁷ The repressive policies stifled the economy and led to widespread poverty and dislocation as people fled en masse to neighboring countries. Ethnic persecution

³² Rubin, 286; Jackson, 10; Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas," 178; Simonsen, 710; Sidky, 874-876; see Sidky, page 855 for historical tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding the Pashtun regions; for more on the on-going role of Pakistan and their support of the Taliban see Rubin, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain - Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan." *Foreign Affairs* 87, no.6 (2008): 30-44.

³³ Rubin (1997), 286.

³⁴ Kandiyoti, "Hammer," 511; see also Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas," 175, 178; Jackson, 10; Farhoumand-Sims, 644; and Simonsen, 710.

³⁵ Rubin (1997), 290.

³⁶ Jackson, 11.

³⁷ Ibid; Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas", 175; Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 512; the Taliban also "forbade music, kite flying and chess," Rubin (1997), 289, 295; Amy Caiazza, "Why Gender Matters in Understanding September 11: Women, Militarism, and Violence" Briefing Paper, Washington, DC: Institute for Women's Policy Research (November, 2001): 1, 2; Rippenburg, 408.

and human rights abuses flourished at the hands of the Ministry for the Enforcement of Islamic Virtue and the Prevention of Vice – the group charged with the religious protection of Afghans.³⁸ Domestic support for the regime and much-needed international aid faded as reports of Taliban abuses circulated.³⁹

From the overthrow of the Musahiban monarchy to the era of Taliban rule, the Afghan use of force and ability to conquer was one thing, but "providing effective administration was another".⁴⁰ Rulers bent on achieving victory over their rivals acted without consideration of the wishes of the Afghan people. Social change and reform were constant hot-button issues that none of the incoming rulers handled well. In keeping with Karl Marx's maxim that "a society is a product of its economic base", "reformers or revolutionaries could never hope to change Afghan society without first changing its economy".⁴¹ Even in the mid-twentieth century, when education became a focus for the Musahiban rulers, there were no job opportunities available outside government positions in the major cities, resulting in a sizable class of educated but unemployed Afghans.⁴² Therefore, due to shortsighted policies, rulers who lacked the education and training to establish order and implement infrastructural reforms, or heavy-

³⁸ Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas", 175; Rachel Reid, "The "Ten-Dollar Talib" and Women's Rights: Afghan Women and the Risks of Reintegration and Reconciliation," *Human Rights Watch* (July 13, 2010): 16, 17; Referred to elsewhere as The Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice. "The religious police not only beat women publicly for, among other things, wearing socks that were not opaque enough, showing their wrists, hands, or ankles, or not being accompanied by a close male relative, but also for educating girls in home-based schools, working, and begging. Beatings by the religious police were harsh, unpredictable and arbitrary, with no defense, and no appeal." Reid, 17. Health care for women was almost non-existent and the UN estimated that "only 3 percent of girls received some kind of primary education," Reid, 18. According to an Oxfam report, non-Pashtun ethnic groups "particularly the Hazara, were persecuted, subject to ethnic cleansing and massacred. An estimated 300 Hazara men, women and children were deliberately killed while seeking shelter in a mosque in Yakaolang in January 2001 while an estimated 2,000 Afghans, including many Hazara, were massacred in an attack on Mazar-e-Sharif in November 1998," Jackson, 11.

³⁹ Jackson, 3, 12; Mohammed Haneef Atmar, "Politicization of Humanitarian Aid and its Consequences for Afghans," *Disasters* 25, no.4 (2001): 323.

⁴⁰ Barfield, 88, see also 169-172.

⁴¹ Ibid, 172, see also 242.

⁴² Barfield, 212.

handed foreign involvement, legitimacy and support from the Afghan masses eluded a succession of rulers.

The Current Conflict

The US-led 'coalition of the willing' declared war on al Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, and sought to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban in order to prevent the state from serving as a 'safe haven for terrorists'.⁴³ By the winter of 2001, news agencies were showing footage of liberated Afghans celebrating their freedom in the streets, and by May of 2003, the Americans had declared major combat operations complete. The speedy collapse of the Taliban was met with local optimism, and foreign troops "were welcomed, against all expectations, because the Afghans saw them as a bulwark of protection against the very Afghan forces that had driven the country into ruin".⁴⁴ Yet the misconceived state-building methods employed at the outset, along with the forced democratic transition, have opened space for Taliban and anti-government forces to reorganize and wage renewed war against international troops.

With the overthrow of the Taliban, the international community expressed concern that Afghanistan would break up like the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ However, the ethnically diverse and decentralized nature of Afghanistan differed greatly from Yugoslavia. Afghanistan had "ethnicity without nationalism and a pragmatic politics that was largely immune to ideology".⁴⁶ Diplomatic initiatives, such as the instatement of Hamid Karzai as the provisional leader of

⁴³ Jackson, 12. The Afghan ruling authorities, the Taliban, had allowed radical Islamic organizations, such as al Qaeda, to operate from within the Afghan borders, even allegedly 'assisting, supporting and using the terrorist organization'. Antonio Cassese, *International Law, Second Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 474.

⁴⁴ Barfield, 7.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 8, 278, 280.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 8; see also Carver, 76-77.

Afghanistan following the Bonn Agreement of 2001, were meant to ease the transition to democratic politics and help to hold the country together.⁴⁷ Legitimacy, though, again proved problematic. With the fall of the Taliban and installation of the new government, most Afghans clearly yearned for security, stability, and a chance to better their lives. In short, Afghanistan seemed open and ready for effective government. If Karzai could respond effectively, the legitimacy of his leadership could be expected to grow in tandem with the governability of Afghanistan.

Hamid Karzai appears to be following the example of strong, centralized Afghan rulers of the past, without himself being strong or particularly representative of the desires of the Afghan people. Barfield argues that the inability of the current Afghan government to adequately address and represent the desires of the people (thus the problem of governmental *illegitimacy*) undermines peace, stability and economic progress in the country. Additionally, the ongoing reliance on foreign aid and military support continues to weaken the legitimacy of Karzai's leadership. These problems resonated throughout the literature on post-conflict Afghanistan, most pronounced from the mouths of Afghans themselves, as demonstrated by a female participant (who remains anonymous for security reasons) of the Oxfam study examined below:

The current conflict has caused lots of tension and concern among people. People are very concerned about their future. At the beginning, people had hope but the ineffectiveness of the current government and bombardments of civilians by international forces made people hate the government and created more opportunities for the anti-government forces.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Jackson, 13.

⁴⁸ Female interview participant from Herat province, Ibid. Refer to p.31 and Footnote 93 for study details.

James Piscatori noted that the perceived 'new imperialism' of globalization accompanying the spread of western/American economic influence across the Muslim world⁴⁹ has compounded the standing vehemence toward the American "policies of support for Israel and its opposition to Palestinian rights, sanctions against Iraq, and assistance to narrowly based regimes in Egypt, the Maghreb, the Gulf, and elsewhere", which many believe "are all designed to insure [US] hegemony over the Muslim world".⁵⁰ This underlying resentment toward the US in turn casts resentment on Karzai, as "association with the world's superpower taints all".⁵¹ The Afghan public was surprisingly welcoming toward the foreign troops at the outbreak of the current conflict; their desire for peace seemed to overrule their dislike of foreigners. As the war dragged on, however, Afghans came to feel less positive toward the outside 'help'.⁵²

Mistakes made during President George W. Bush's time in office, especially regarding the willingness to shortchange the Afghan mission in favour of the Iraq invasion, resulted in a resurgence of Taliban guerrilla fighters and continuing security problems through the latter half of the past decade. The Obama administration's renewed troop 'surge' in 2010 seemed to reinvigorate pro-government domestic and foreign troops; yet civilian frustrations over perceived American occupation and the rule of the Karzai government itself contribute to the ongoing unrest. With the staged removal of international forces, the current transition period is

⁴⁹ Whereby the "new 'liberal' order of privatization and free trade is promoted" to the detriment of Muslim societies, as the "world capitalist system [is] controlled from the imperial centres of the West" and consistently "does not treat all as equals". James Piscatori, "Order, Justice, and Global Islam," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, edited by Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 271.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 271,272. "Although most Muslims would dissociate themselves from the violent means used to counter the purported Western interventionism, particularly the targeting of civilians, they would subscribe to the general complaint" – especially when questioning how the "encompassing liberal international economic order can ever respond to Muslim needs, or how a state system dominated by the US and the UN can ever be sympathetic to Muslim claims to justice". Piscatori, 281, 282.

⁵¹ Ibid, 281.

⁵² Farhoumand-Sims, 647; Barfield, 273-277, 312, 316, 318.

crucial in preventing a return to open civil war.⁵³ For long-term peace in the region, security problems certainly need to be dealt with, but societal and diplomatic problems associated with the highly centralized yet disconnected Afghan government must also be addressed.

Ordinary Afghans have taken a backseat in the ongoing dialogue surrounding state-building efforts in their supposedly 'ungovernable' and 'backward' country. A more appropriate approach is that of Barfield, who focuses instead on "the Afghans themselves as the main players to understand the country and its political dynamics, examining the question of how rulers in Afghanistan obtained political legitimacy over the centuries and brought order to the land".⁵⁴ Afghanistan has a specific and rich traditional culture and history, one that needs to be acknowledged if effective mechanisms of state-building and governance are to be promoted.⁵⁵

Culturally Divided?

Afghanistan, largely rural, places tribal and ethnic ties above individual concerns – an idea even more foreign to urbanized westerners than it is to urbanized Afghans.⁵⁶ The urban/rural divide in Afghanistan is historically quite severe, as rural communities/tribes traditionally had little contact with city dwellers. Thus, education and religious codes of conduct were not exposed to modernizing influences.⁵⁷ As the years of conflict wore on (through the Soviet occupation and civil war) and rural people were forced off their ancestral lands, the contempt and fear with which city dwellers viewed nomads and villagers paralleled the disdain that rural villagers evinced toward urbanites. Indeed, when the Taliban came to power and

⁵³ See Rod Nordland's New York Times article, "Troop 'Surge' in Afghanistan Ends With Mixed Results" available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/world/asia/us-troop-surge-in-afghanistan-ends.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

⁵⁴ Barfield, 2.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 2, 40-42, 54, 200.

⁵⁶ Carver, 70; see a more thorough discussion on this notion in Barfield, 40-42.

⁵⁷ Farhoumand-Sims, 657.

imposed their harsh version of Islam, it was partly as a puritanical punishment for the 'sinful' lifestyle rampant in the cities.⁵⁸

The individual nature of the market economy, whereby individuals work/produce in order to earn money and better themselves, stands in stark contrast to the importance of social and ethnic ties, so central to rural Afghan lifestyles. The mass influx of Afghans returning after 2001, most of whom headed to the relative safety of the major cities, has urbanized traditional social connections and overwhelmed an already saturated workforce.⁵⁹ "Identification by residence (not kinship) and hierarchical divisions based on class" characterize city life, in a "world of strangers who are economically dependent on one another... but have no reason to interact socially".⁶⁰ In a state where imposed transformative institutions – whether extremist rules or westernized democracy – have a long history of failure, how these changes will affect the social structure and cultural norms of Afghanistan remains to be seen.

⁵⁸ Barfield, 65, 201, 217-220, 261-262.

⁵⁹ Carver, 73; Barfield, 281.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 61.

Chapter Three: Challenges of State-building in Afghanistan, 2001-2012

Canadian troops were first deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 in accordance with the country's commitments as a NATO member, in support of its American neighbours, and under the authority of the United Nations in the international effort to counter terrorism.⁶¹ With the fall of the Taliban, the international military focus shifted toward a secondary mission of state-building in an attempt to create a government and state structure capable of maintaining order, "to help the Afghan people rebuild their country and to prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a haven for terrorists".⁶² In order to achieve the stated objectives in Afghanistan, the cooperating states implemented a 'comprehensive approach' to state-building, in which military intervention was combined with diplomatic⁶³ and development initiatives.

The multiple reconfigurations of the military engagement, as well as the prolonged failure to address fundamental stabilization and reconstruction efforts in favour of the militarized drive to root out Taliban members (long after al Qaeda was effectively chased from Afghanistan), severely undermined the security of the country and continue to consume foreign troops and resources. The misconceived acts of persuasion and coercion in the attempt to win over the 'hearts and minds' of the Afghan people failed to take hold, and the ongoing backing of

⁶¹ See Cassese, 473-475 for a detailed look at the dramatic international legal changes and UN resolutions resulting from the 11 September attacks.

⁶² Transcript of Speech given by Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon to University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs, "Governing Global Security: The Role of Summit Diplomacy," Toronto, Ontario (June 18, 2010); see also Barnett R. Rubin, "Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Security?" *Third World Quarterly* 27, no.1 (2006): 184; and Biddle, 48.

⁶³ While diplomatic agents and foreign government advisors have been mentoring Afghan governmental actors throughout the democratic transition period in Afghanistan, the diplomatic dance that has characterized the relationship between Karzai and his foreign advisors requires greater debate than space would allow within the scope of this thesis. Aside from brief mentions of the Bonn Agreement and other international diplomatic conferences -- as well as governing, justice, and legal court diplomatic efforts later on in this thesis -- the 'diplomacy' aspect of the comprehensive approach has been limited herein to allow for greater discussion of the security and development initiatives.

the Karzai government created "an Afghan security apparatus whose existence and employment is connected to a US life-support line" that appears unsupportable with the removal of US financing.⁶⁴ Pervasive corruption, as well as the disconnect between the flow of international aid into actual grassroots improvements, created space for a resurgent Taliban to undermine government initiatives through provision of basic justice and social programs, expanding the movement's local support. Through a descriptive assessment, this chapter will demonstrate that the initial state-building methods and forcible democratic transition, along with misguided outside interference, have opened space for Taliban and anti-government forces to reorganize and continue waging war against international troops. This has limited the effectiveness of the military intervention, and called into question the overall legacy of international involvement.

Questions of security are at the forefront of the ongoing Afghan conflict. In Afghanistan, the shift from combat to reconstruction has required a new plan of action and utilization of military, governmental and civilian personnel in the quest for a 'comprehensive approach' to peace and stability.⁶⁵ A decade into the conflict, former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for a more flexible military role in Afghanistan under increased American congressional oversight, with a focus on long-term instead of short-term achievements.⁶⁶ This was to be accomplished by providing support to Afghanistan in its quest to provide its own security. An

⁶⁴ Hy Rothstein, "America's Longest War", in *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*, eds Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012): 78.

⁶⁵ Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no.3 (2010): 3, 4; Aaron Major, "Which Revolution in Military Affairs? Political Discourse and the Defense Industrial Base," *Armed Forces & Society* 35, no.2 (2009): 334.

⁶⁶ Gates, 6.

effort has been made by the American forces⁶⁷ to transform military thinking from "idealized, techno-centric, scientific formulas—such as “network-centric warfare” (NCW) or “effects-based operations” (EBO)—to more complex, ambiguous, and human-centered visions of war”.⁶⁸ The comprehensive approach that characterizes the Canadian involvement likewise sought to invest systematically in long-term outcomes. Throughout the conflict the expression of such missions changed in appearance, varied in effectiveness, and is evolving anew in the context of the transitional operation. This chapter will consider the state-building challenges facing the international military and humanitarian actors, before concluding with an analysis of Canada's role and specifically Canadian initiatives that represent the development side of the comprehensive approach.

International Security Assistance Force

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in 2002, in accordance with the Bonn Agreement, to facilitate international assistance for the various wings of the Afghan National Security Forces. Under NATO command from 2003 on, ISAF operations were disjointed and the ever-changing leadership was disorganized.⁶⁹ This disunity and the prevalence of conflicting missions are a key characteristic of the Afghan conflict. The

⁶⁷ Specifically within the Army and Marine Corps. See Brian McAllister Linn, "The U.S. Armed Forces' View of War," *Daedalus* 140, no. 3 (2011): 38-41.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 33.

⁶⁹ See Marten, "From Kabul to Kandahar: The Canadian Forces and Change", for greater discussion of this situation. Canadian senior officers at this time "were unhappy that both the ultimate strategic purpose and the rules of engagement of the ISAF mission were muddy and that its separation from the OEF detracted from unified command in Afghanistan". Marten, 217.

intervention in Afghanistan was distinguished "by its duality, relating on the one hand to the global-level war on terror and on the other to conflict at the local Afghan level".⁷⁰

Under ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal, the various arms and command structures of the international operations in Afghanistan were organized and united under one overarching campaign plan for the first time.⁷¹ From 2009 onward, ISAF's main concern became the "will and ability to provide for the needs of the population "by, with and through" the Afghan government".⁷² Prioritizing the need to protect the Afghan population and "accelerate the development and ownership of Afghan security by Afghan national security forces through 'embedded partnership' of ISAF with ANSF", McChrystal hoped to build Afghan capacity toward the transitional phase of the engagement.⁷³ Unfortunately, the rules of engagement (ROE) that McChrystal implemented, meant to limit Afghan civilian deaths, resulted in greater risk for ISAF troops and greater freedom for insurgent forces. The restraint McChrystal's policies placed on ISAF troops "resulted in mild-to-severe frustration on the part of the coalition leaders and troops", and actually undermined the authority of ISAF in the eyes of Afghans.⁷⁴

General David Petraeus took over leadership of the US Afghan mission – following McChrystal's ill-advised comments against top American administrators – and quickly shifted the focus toward "the very real need to relentlessly pursue the enemy, take away his safe

⁷⁰ Yuka Hasegawa, "Is a human security approach possible? Compatibility between the strategies of protection and empowerment," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 2007): 6; see also Brendan Whitty and Hamish Nixon, "The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Objectives on Democratization and Statebuilding in Afghanistan," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 5, No.1 (July 2009): 188.

⁷¹ Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell, "Campaign disconnect: operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011," *International Affairs* 87, no.2 (2011): 274-275.

⁷² Ibid, 273.

⁷³ Ibid, 273, 274.

⁷⁴ Rothstein, "America's Longest War", 66, 67.

havens, degrade his ability to plan, and ultimately cause him to run or reconcile".⁷⁵ Petraeus built on McChrystal's consolidation of an encompassing mission and created unified goals to reengage the insurgents and weaken their influence over the Afghan people. "The more robust military campaign carries greater risk of civilian casualties, and potentially is in tension with the 'protect the population' mission", but the need to regain military control in areas overrun by insurgent forces took priority under Petraeus.⁷⁶

The Afghan National Army (ANA), one of the cornerstones of Afghan readiness to function without international oversight, has faced harsh judgment and criticism since its inception. The training of ANSF forces has been ongoing over the course of the Afghan conflict, but has found new importance as the core of the transitory mission. Yet anecdotal evidence casts into doubt the readiness of Afghan soldiers to take control of their territory. Corruption, insubordination, unreliability, widespread drug addictions and poor discipline are all problems requiring resolution before effective Afghan state control can be expected.⁷⁷

The Afghan National Police have likewise faced a torrent of criticism, even surpassing that of the ANA. Corruption and insubordination run rampant⁷⁸, yet the ANP face additional challenges:

Their lot is not an enviable one. Police in any country are going to have trouble performing well if they have substandard equipment, low salaries and inconsistent training. Nor is it morale

⁷⁵ Ibid, 70.

⁷⁶ Chaudhuri, 282.

⁷⁷ A major issue with the ANA is the tendency for troops to go AWOL (Absent Without Official Leave). Part cultural and part financial, the problems facing Afghan troops are deeper than plain 'insubordination'. While serving long stints away from home with limited means to get desperately needed money back to family members, many troops simply leave to deliver the funds with every intention of returning to the field. Standing Senate Committee, 15; Jones, 122. See also the article by Paul Wood, "US Troops Show Concern over Readiness of Afghan Army," *BBC News* (16 October 2010), available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11557781>; See Human Rights Watch, "'Killing You is A Very Easy Thing For Us': Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan", *Human Rights Watch* 15, no.5 (2003), available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/07/28/killing-you-very-easy-thing-us-0>

⁷⁸ Standing Senate Committee, 30.

boosting to be the primary targets for Taliban insurgents, who continue to ambush them at their flimsy posts in remote areas.⁷⁹

Illiteracy and a widespread lack of working knowledge of the new Afghan laws further limit the effectiveness of the ANP.⁸⁰ With financial concerns and local power politics, "often, the police are little more than a militia of the local power [broker]; they commonly prey on the population, and through their extortion and violent abuse of civilians can turn local people towards insurgency".⁸¹ With the transition to Afghan-led security well under way, police training reform is necessary to transform the ANP from a disorganized group concerned with fighting the Taliban into a capable civilian police force.⁸² The ANP "need to be trained and mentored in civilian policing duties such as investigating crimes, protecting local people from land mines, arresting suspects, as well as upholding and enforcing the law".⁸³

Nonetheless, both the ANP and ANA have developed codes of conduct and value statements which stress accountability and define proper conduct as ANSF representatives. Coupled with increasing legislation and the creation of departments to provide "credible, independent investigation and prosecution" into complaints against military and police, the legitimacy and professionalism of the national troops may gradually increase.⁸⁴ The efficient and honest working of the ANSF is necessary to create lasting ties between the Afghan people and the new government, for "if the Afghan people do not feel that they can rely on the police,

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 31.

⁸¹ Chaudhuri, 278.

⁸² Standing Senate Committee, 34; Point 8, NATO, "Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan".

⁸³ "The RCMP has ministerial authorization to send 50 of its officers to Afghanistan. It also has the funding to send 150 municipal and provincial police officers from across Canada on overseas deployments." Standing Senate Committee, 95.

⁸⁴ Oxfam, "No Time to Lose: Promoting the Accountability of the Afghan National Security Forces," (May 2011): 25, available at <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/afghanistan-no-time-to-lose-20110510-en.pdf>

this is bound to undermine their faith in the effectiveness of the Government of Afghanistan".⁸⁵ Improvements should not be expected immediately.⁸⁶ NATO allies and ISAF partners have pledged to continue their support beyond the 2014 transition deadline on the understanding that the Afghan government will assume, "no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces".⁸⁷

Humanitarian Issues

Many sources agree that the extended hostilities in Afghanistan have destroyed agriculture and basic infrastructure, causing food and employment shortages in addition to inflation and price increases.⁸⁸ Citizens face unreliable electricity, disconnected communication lines, lack of clean water and sanitation concerns.⁸⁹ Prime issues facing Afghans include health care, hygiene, economic options and funding opportunities in light of displacement, as well as "poverty, malnutrition, unremitting mourning stemming from multiple deaths of children or spouse or other family, repeated displacements [and] war-related [disabilities]".⁹⁰ Structural

⁸⁵ Standing Senate Committee, 88.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 46.

⁸⁷ As stated at the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn on 5 December 2011 and reemphasized at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, Points 18, 10 and 16.

⁸⁸ Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer, "The Unequal Burden of War: The Effect of Armed Conflict on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy," *International Organization* 60, no. 3 (Summer, 2006): 730; "Price increases are most severe for goods for which demand reacts least elastically on price increases—in other words: goods that are most desperately needed: clean water, food, electric power, and medication." In 2005, the Afghan budget was almost 90% composed of foreign funding, demonstrating the lack of domestic infrastructure and productive capabilities after years of conflict. The drug economy, on the other hand, was booming, with "60% of the economy in 2004-05 derived from the output of the opium sector, over \$2.8 billion in value", Nasreen Ghufuran, "Afghanistan in 2005: The Challenges of Reconstruction," *Asian Survey* 46, no. 1 (2006): 90.

⁸⁹ Plümper and Neumayer, 729; Using current statistics, only "27 percent of Afghans have access to safe drinking water and 5 percent have access to improved sanitation," Oxfam Report, "Promises, promises: A Briefing Paper for the Kabul Conference on Afghanistan," (19 July 2010): 4, available at <http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/promises-promises>; Standing Senate Committee, 70.

⁹⁰ Anila Daulatzai, "The Discursive Occupation of Afghanistan," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 35 (December 2008): 425; see also Cheryl Benard, "Caution Nation-Builders: Gender Assumptions Ahead," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 32 (Winter 2008): 26; Plümper and Neumayer, 729-730; Rubin (1997), 295; Jackson, 4, 24-

violence and inequality, worsened by the economic reality and drug culture pervasive in Afghanistan today, need consideration in any search for peace and solutions.⁹¹

Data on the current situation in Afghanistan remains slightly limited, as the ongoing conflict has restricted the ability of the government and outside sources to accumulate information.⁹² A report produced by Oxfam International, with the cooperation of other established organizations inside Afghanistan,⁹³ interviewed over 700 Afghans from 14 provinces on their experiences of the past thirty years of conflict in order to create an accurate portrayal of Afghan perceptions and recommendations.⁹⁴ The often silenced voice of Afghan women has found an outlet within this work (and similar studies by Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, and other cooperating humanitarian agencies – the limitations of which can be found in the body of the specific articles referenced), and have helped shape the issues addressed throughout this thesis.

After the fall of the Taliban, limited progress was made in the areas of health and education. The Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), managed by the Ministry of Public Health, has been slowly dealing with the health issues as security allows.⁹⁵ Channeling work through local and international NGOs, a 'mixed delivery model' has "expanded the reach of

25; and Standing Senate Committee, 70. Using current statistics, only "27 percent of Afghans have access to safe drinking water and 5 percent have access to improved sanitation," Oxfam, "Promises, promises," 4.

⁹¹ Daulatzai, 429, 430, 434-435.

⁹² Benard, 32; Rippenburg, 402; Daulatzai, 423.

⁹³ This research was jointly designed and/or carried out by the following organizations: Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF), Afghan Peace and Democracy Act (APDA), Association for the Defence of Women's Rights (ADWR), Cooperation Centre for Afghanistan (CCA), Education Training Center for Poor Women and Girls of Afghanistan (ECW), Oxfam GB, Organization for Human Welfare (OHW), Sanayee Development Organization (SDO) and The Liaison Office (TLO).

⁹⁴ Jackson, 3, 16, 34.

⁹⁵ Oxfam Report, "Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan," (26 January 2010): 4, available at <http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/quick-impact-quick-collapse>; Rani D. Mullen, "Afghanistan in 2008: State Building at the Precipice," *Asian Survey* 49, no.1 (January - February, 2009): 37.

public services significantly", with access to primary health care and rural development projects cited as main improvements.⁹⁶ Schools have indeed been built and enrollment has increased, but insecurity and continued risk for females has hindered the impact of international funding and attention.⁹⁷ As Afghans continue to wait for real improvements to their welfare, many are questioning the promises they received in the early years of the engagement. A female member of parliament went on record with Human Rights Watch to express her frustration:

After the fall of the Taliban everyone wanted to come and work for women's rights, they were proud to say they were here to help Afghan women. Slowly, slowly this disappeared. Maybe the international community saw that we had two or three women in the cabinet, and thought, it's ok, now they have their rights. But we have lost everything, from those cabinet positions to the donor attention. Women are not a priority for our own government or the international community. We've been forgotten.⁹⁸

The conflict has destroyed hospitals and pharmacies and either killed or chased away many doctors and nurses. Underfunding has meant cuts to immunization and preventative medicines, while emergency medical care is overstretched.⁹⁹ According to Oxfam, "currently, one in five children dies before the age of five, one in eight women dies from pregnancy-related complications and two million children, two-thirds of whom are girls, do not attend primary school".¹⁰⁰ A female participant of the Oxfam study highlighted the problems facing children, stating, "They have suffered a lot, and they were mentally impacted because they had witnessed killings and torture. Sometimes they were hungry for days and had to walk long

⁹⁶ Whitty, 197.

⁹⁷ Oxfam, "Promises", 4; Jackson, 14; Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, "We Have the Promises of the World: Women's Rights in Afghanistan", (December 6, 2009): 2, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/12/03/we-have-promises-world-0>

⁹⁸ Shinkai Karokhail, member of parliament, Kabul (interviewed June 4, 2009), "Promises of the World", HRW, 2.

⁹⁹ Plümper and Neumayer, 729; Rippenburg, 412, 415.

¹⁰⁰ Jackson, 14; see also Rippenburg, 414; "Poor women don't have the money to travel to health treatment centers. Twelve percent of women overall have access to health care, while internally displaced women have almost no access. Most women postpone seeking treatment for themselves and their children until the situation becomes urgent," Rippenburg, 413.

distances during displacement".¹⁰¹ Lacking a specific assessment of the impact of the conflict on children, it is estimated that mental illness, post-traumatic stress disorder and depression affect as many as two-thirds of the greater Afghan population.¹⁰² Regarding large-scale infrastructure projects, the reliance on international donors has resulted in some progress on the "main ring road linking the country's major urban centers, but deficits remain in power, linking roads, and irrigation. Since these projects often have been at least initiated outside the government budget, the long-term fiscal and administrative basis for their operation, expansion, and maintenance is still an issue".¹⁰³ As international donor priorities shift and troop presence is minimized, the long-term feasibility of the delivery of basic health care and public services is uncertain.

Adding to the challenge of providing basic services is the overwhelming problem of displacement. Either internally or outside of Afghanistan, displacement is disruptive socially and economically.

Many refugees are young, have never known Afghanistan to be at peace, have spent most of their lives outside of their country and have not been able to develop the skills that would enable them to integrate into life in Afghanistan. According to a recent survey of refugees living in Pakistan, 71% reported having no formal education, 89% having no skills and 71% no monthly income.¹⁰⁴

In the large Oxfam survey, three quarters of those interviewed had been "forced to leave their homes at some point during the conflict".¹⁰⁵ Numerous examples were cited of people being "displaced multiple times, moving from one place to another in search of security, only to be

¹⁰¹ Female interview participant from Bamiyan province, Jackson, 21.

¹⁰² Jackson, 15; Rippenburg, 416.

¹⁰³ Whitty, 197.

¹⁰⁴ Jackson, 14.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 4.

forced to flee once again months or years later or after having returned home again".¹⁰⁶ Forced displacement and habitation in refugee camps also has a deleterious effect on health, as infectious diseases spread quickly through overcrowded camps and weakened individuals.¹⁰⁷

The repercussions of conflict continue to affect daily life for many Afghans, as articulated repeatedly by participants of the above-mentioned studies. As one female participant of the Oxfam study claimed, "Conflict not only killed people and destroyed their houses. It also destroyed their whole lives and their sense of trust. Children who have lost their fathers and grown up in the conflict do not trust anyone. We are scared of everything, because we fear the conflict might start again".¹⁰⁸ Another participant spoke of the increased domestic violence and prevalence of Afghan youth addicted to drugs in light of the "poor economic conditions and increased unemployment" post-conflict.¹⁰⁹ One participant referred directly to her reality as a woman, asking

Who suffers first from the war? It is the Afghan women. It is the Afghan women who lose their houses, who lose their husbands who bring the food home. That's why women don't oppose reintegration and reconciliation, because if that will bring peace then why not? But if the government is going to do reintegration and reconciliation overnight... then of course things will get worse for Afghan women.¹¹⁰

The range of ongoing conflict and post-conflict situations throughout Afghanistan create more challenges in the provision of basic welfare and need to be addressed with the goal of easing daily hardships for women.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 4, see also 18-20; "Although more than five million Afghan refugees returned between 2002 and 2008, more than two million registered refugees remain in Pakistan and 900,000 in Iran", Jackson, 14.

¹⁰⁷ Plümper and Neumayer, 731.

¹⁰⁸ Female interview participant from Faryab province, Jackson, 29.

¹⁰⁹ Female interview participant from Parwan province, Ibid, 14.

¹¹⁰ Samira Hamidi, Executive Director, Afghan Women's Network, Kabul (interviewed February 14, 2010), Reid, 4.

Aid Discrepancies

The purpose of humanitarian work and aid is to save lives. According to Mohammed Haneef Atmar, an Afghan aid worker and citizen,

When donors try to shape humanitarian assistance to achieve other objectives, they are twisting humanitarian principles and the likely result is loss of life. Blaming abusive authorities for the consequences may be justifiable but it is not sufficient reason for abdicating humanitarian responsibility at a time when most donor states claim to uphold human rights as a key principle of their foreign policy.¹¹¹

The domestic repression rampant during the Taliban-ruled years isolated the country, as international aid donors halted funding in protest of human rights abuses and had their attention drawn to international crises elsewhere, which resulted in the most vulnerable Afghans failing to receive greatly needed aid.¹¹² This is the lesson to draw from the pre-9/11 Afghan-conflict era – the losers of the conditionalities/sanction game are average Afghan citizens, not the perpetrators. The focus should be on helping those that need help.¹¹³ Western powers, instead of creating a comprehensive plan to address the "multi-layered conflict of Afghanistan, which is part of a regional conflict system that threatens the peace and stability of the whole", left the UN to deal with the Taliban problem, and only became involved when the issue became "securitized" following the attacks of 11 September 2001.¹¹⁴

With the ongoing conflict and few job opportunities, the Afghan economy is heavily reliant on international aid, creating a 'state-building paradox',

whereby the enormous dependency of the Afghan state on international resources and expertise to improve its performance may also be undermining its own long-term development

¹¹¹ Haneef Atmar, 324.

¹¹² Ibid, 324-328.

¹¹³ Ibid, 328.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 322. As has been discussed throughout this thesis, conflict in Afghanistan – both during the Taliban-era and to date – is itself a multi-layered situation of which economic, cultural, historical, and sectarian considerations play a role.

and sustainability. In 2004-2005, international assistance constituted more than 40 percent of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while domestic government revenues were only 5 percent of GDP-a very low ratio internationally. In other words, the Afghan state received eight times more resources from international donors than from its own economy. The need to channel enormous resources through or around structures that have little capacity has generated a range of parallel mechanisms, an external budget that undermines policy setting, and conflicting short- and long-term imperatives, such as the mix of counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics, and sustainable public administration reform.¹¹⁵

Improper management of funds and corruption within the aid hierarchy are thus crucially important issues to the average citizen.¹¹⁶ Many international donors attach individualized requirements to aid, undermining the involvement of the Afghan government in the management of its own state and further disconnecting the donor community.¹¹⁷

Corruption and 'Warlordism'

Corruption throughout the Afghan government and ANSFs is widespread. According to Amartya Sen, corruption "involves the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit", and should be managed by the creation of "clear systems of rules and penalties, along with rigorous enforcement," to alter behavior patterns.¹¹⁸ Applied to the discussion herein, corruption may be understood as the intentional mismanagement or misallocation of funds and/or resources away from their intended recipients, often due to skimming or bribes. It is problematic not only politically, but for security and development as well. The Taliban government may have been ruthless, but it was relatively devoid of corruption, certainly compared with the regime installed after 2001.¹¹⁹ With President Karzai "proclaiming the

¹¹⁵ Whitty, 198.

¹¹⁶ Standing Senate Committee, 26.

¹¹⁷ The US maintains, "Separate spending mechanisms and procedures that are accountable to its own political authority. In the 2005 budget presented by the Afghan authorities, for instance, less than 30% of all expenditures were [channeled] through the Afghan government's budget. What former Afghan finance minister Ashraf Ghani has called the 'dual public sector' operates according to its own rules". Rubin (2006), 182.

¹¹⁸ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, New York: Anchor Books, 2000, 275.

¹¹⁹ Standing Senate Committee, 28.

benefits of the foreign aid his government is attracting to the country", and average Afghans witnessing no physical results or improvements, "they conclude the worst: it has disappeared into the pockets of every level of civil servant and policeman between them and the President".¹²⁰ Not only is there great inequality within the major cities, with many Afghans malnourished in Kandahar city while "the mansions of warlords loom over them", but poverty has increased in rural regions.¹²¹

A report released in 2008 found that low salaries in the public sector, the generally low standard of living, the lack of government control and accountability, and ineffective law enforcement were important factors contributing to the rise in corruption. This report also found that the average Afghan household paid \$100 in bribes every year, this in a country where over 70% of the population survives on less than \$1 a day.¹²²

Corruption in Afghanistan extends to top officials, including Parliamentarians and governors.¹²³

In the pursuit of establishing centralized rule in the historically decentralized state of Afghanistan, initial expenditures of arms or resources and training of leaders outside of Kabul focused on groups or people of significant standing who opposed the Taliban insurgency. Histories and transgressions of individual warlords were ignored when such local elites were deemed useful.¹²⁴

Commanders from the North and West, working together under the umbrella United Front (known as the Northern Alliance), fought with the US-led coalition forces against the Taliban in 2001, subsequently gaining formal political positions in the interim administration. President Karzai then confirmed this power by appointing them to the transitional administration, after the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002. In the South and East, strongmen linked to tribal

¹²⁰ Ibid, 28, see also 26; "We get billions of dollars of foreign aid. It goes into the pocket of the person with the big belly and thick neck who is a minister." Quoted in Wood's article, "Nato battle insurgency and fight for Afghan support".

¹²¹ Standing Senate Committee, 29.

¹²² Mullen, 35.

¹²³ Standing Senate Committee, 29.

¹²⁴ Katia Papagianni, "Transitional Politics in Afghanistan and Iraq: Inclusion, Consultation, and Public Participation," *Development in Practice* 15, no.6 (November, 2005): 749.

structures continued to exert political control both locally and nationally, and continued to dominate the local political economy.¹²⁵

The authority and power held by these former warlords was a powerful incentive for their inclusion in the Bonn Agreement of 2001, which led to the founding of the interim Afghan government and laid the groundwork for the new constitution.¹²⁶ Along with the UN backed rehabilitation program (DDR), "Bonn further legitimized these warlords by granting them prominent positions and power within the interim government".¹²⁷ The Afghan government and ISAF, "facing a conflict with no end in sight, an Afghan public increasingly disaffected by thousands of civilian casualties, and pressure for an exit strategy from troop-contributing countries," are pressing for a negotiated settlement and reincorporation of Afghan fighters into society.¹²⁸ Seeking to avoid messy confrontations, Karzai tends to favour accommodating local power holders by granting them "important positions in central and provincial government".¹²⁹

Granting amnesty to war criminals and incorporating warlords into the government, however, is detrimental "to reconstruction in Afghanistan because it furthers a culture of corruption and general lawlessness".¹³⁰ An unfortunate (and probably foreseeable) consequence of such a compromise has been the persistent utilization of crime and illegal trade by the warlords to maintain networks of dominance and community compliance.¹³¹ Many

¹²⁵ Sarah Lister, "Changing the Rules? State-building and Local Government in Afghanistan," *Journal of Development Studies* 45, no. 6 (July 2009): 993.

¹²⁶ Jones, 121; Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 506, 510; Ghufraan, 89.

¹²⁷ Jackson, 13; Rubin (2006), 180; Lister, 1003-1004.

¹²⁸ Reid, 5, see also 7; Lister, 1004; See "The Afghanistan London Conference", available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/27707151/Afghanistan-London-Conference-Documents-28-Jan-2010>

¹²⁹ Lister, 994.

¹³⁰ Benard, 27; see also Jackson, 15; Reid, 7, 38; Ghufraan, 89, 90; and Wood, "Can Afghan forces bring security when Nato leaves?" *BBC News* (19 November 2010).

¹³¹ Activities may involve "robbery and violence, illegal taxation, forced recruitment or forced marriage. Commanders are directly involved in ethnic conflict-mongering, as a means of legitimising their activities." Simonsen, 723; Lister, 994.

forward-thinking warlords have "learnt to say the right things before an international audience; some of them have even themselves spoken out against warlordism... A culture of impunity is establishing itself, where he who is powerful enough will go unpunished for violence and abuses, corruption or drug production".¹³²

The drug trade is an element of a corrupt system that generates immense profits in Afghanistan.¹³³ As the influx of secret CIA aid transformed the Afghan drug trade during the Soviet-Afghan war era, so the illegal trade continues to be "a reliable source of big money for covert warfare".¹³⁴ The CIA had hoped to draw out the Afghan War into a Vietnam-like scenario for the Soviet Union, with the objective of tying down Soviet attention and spending on a protracted and costly war and thus "bleeding the Soviet Union white".¹³⁵ The CIA took advantage of the anti-Soviet stance of Afghanistan's drug lords, whom they "counted on... as readily available and dependable allies", granting them sweeping power and influence and creating a network of deadly warlords in the process.¹³⁶ The end of the Cold War and the loss of international aid meant that illicit drugs took even higher priority as a "primary source of funding for warlords".¹³⁷ The rampant "political instability, gangsterism and... illegitimate exercise of power" generated by the trade were eliminated under Taliban rule.¹³⁸ Following the fall of the Taliban, however, "opium came back in a big way" and now is used in some measure

¹³² Simonsen, 723.

¹³³ Mullen, 37.

¹³⁴ Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Three Leaves Press, 2004): 141. See Mamdani's full account of the CIA involvement in the Afghan jihad in chapter three of *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*, especially pages 140-163.

¹³⁵ Ibid, 146.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 141, 144-145.

¹³⁷ Carver, 80; see also Jade I. Rodriguez and Rebecca Lorentz, "Civil and uncivil society", in *Afghan Endgames*, 196.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 80, 81.

by the Taliban to fund their insurgency.¹³⁹ Supporters and war material are bought, poppy fields are defended and officials are paid off.¹⁴⁰

According to UN statistics, Afghanistan has produced over 90 percent of the world's supply of illegal opiates for the past six years in a row. In 2008 and 2009, 98 percent of Afghanistan's opium was produced in seven provinces in southwestern Afghanistan, all of which are areas under contested control or under the influence of the Taliban or warlord organizations.¹⁴¹

Drug money has "corrupted the whole system from top to bottom, almost everyone is linked to it. The President is weak and the government has no credibility where narcotics are concerned".¹⁴² Unless the drug situation is addressed and the Taliban revenue source is stopped, the insurgency will continue to undermine development initiatives within Afghanistan.¹⁴³

Corruption in the form of the patronage networks and favoritism exhibited by President Karzai and his top commanders is a major stumbling block in the quest for transparency and oversight in military and governmental matters. As aid and development contracts are constantly "funneled through patronage networks to corrupt officials and illegitimate actors", the reality of the situation challenges state-builders to "redefine [their] notions about corruption and who can legitimately participate, or not, in governance and stabilization efforts in countries like Afghanistan".¹⁴⁴

Serious attempts to confront corruption have proved fruitless. The Major Crimes Task Force Afghanistan (MCTF-A) was developed under McChrystal to "coordinate international

¹³⁹ Ibid, 81; see also Standing Senate Committee, 4, 17.

¹⁴⁰ Standing Senate Committee, 36.

¹⁴¹ Rodriguez, 196.

¹⁴² UN informant, as quoted by Shannon, 23.

¹⁴³ Rodriguez, 196; Rubin (2006), 181.

¹⁴⁴ Rodriguez, 196.

mentoring of Afghan efforts to combat corruption and organized crime".¹⁴⁵ Created by "international law enforcement agencies" but positioned under the authority of the Afghan government, the MCTF-A served to further "irritate the already tense relationship between the international community and Karzai".¹⁴⁶ Chaudhuri demonstrated the severity of the problem with an account of the arrest of Mohammad Zia Saleh in July 2010 on bribery charges:

The investigation was prompted by the MCTF-A. Saleh's internment exposed the deeply entrenched strains between Karzai and the ISAF anti-corruption drive. Almost immediately, Karzai launched a campaign to rein in the MCTF-A and subordinate it to Afghan government structures, effectively robbing it of its independent status. Significantly, Saleh was later released on the orders of the Afghan attorney general's office. Hence, notwithstanding Karzai's pledge 'to clean the government of corruption', he has come to be viewed on the contrary as the chief stumbling block to meaningful reform.¹⁴⁷

The international community has struggled to understand the nature of the patronage networks and create meaningful policies to limit or utilize their existence. "That such networks have a role to play is an established mantra in the Regional Commands. Senior officers accept that 'functional corruption' is a 'norm in Afghanistan'".¹⁴⁸ That corruption exists in government and hinders the development process is a given, but instead of ineffective attempts to flush out corruption or end the deeply ingrained patronage system, some state-building analysts are starting to ask whether a certain level of corruption is unavoidable, and how they might best work with it.¹⁴⁹

Corruption has been built into the state-system in Afghanistan. As the layers of government and societal organizations developed, so the informal, "personal and patronage-

¹⁴⁵ Chaudhuri, 284.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 284-285.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 285.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid; Lister, 1001; Jones, 127.

based" interests of power-holders intertwined into the reality of today.¹⁵⁰ The interests of the Taliban, insurgent forces, warlords, and corrupt officials are all served by "ensuring that stability and peace are not established since it would mean an end to a profitable war funded by aid money, contracts, and drugs".¹⁵¹ Rodriquez and Lorentz argue that the 'unofficial channels' through which development and aid flow have confused any easy definition of corruption in Afghanistan. For "those benefiting from the patronage networks, corruption is not a problem", and that the Karzai administration relies on such networks for "influence and effectiveness".¹⁵² Whether we then classify Afghanistan as "warlordism beneath a veneer of democracy" or as "democracy in Kabul and warlordism in the countryside"¹⁵³, the reality is that the situation exists and will continue unless steps are made to transform it at a systemic level. Likewise, it is debatable whether removing the warlords and dismantling the patronage system would be beneficial, if such a scenario would destabilize the limited governing capabilities that currently exist:

The absence of democratic governance in Afghanistan has not meant that there is an absence of governance altogether. Some warlords have delivered governing dividends and proved to be valuable assets in the absence of unlimited central resources, troops, and political will. The state does not grow strong as a result of their inclusion, but a period of hybrid governance "at the edges" may represent an inevitable stage in the project of state (re)formation in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁴

The "essential economic and social benefits" provided by the corrupt system cannot be suspended while a new system is created; the new system must meet the needs of the Afghan people to such an extent that the corrupt system is no longer required.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ Lister, 995.

¹⁵¹ Rodriquez and Lorentz, 196.

¹⁵² Ibid, 196-197.

¹⁵³ Carver, 74.

¹⁵⁴ Rodriquez and Lorentz, 200.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 197, see also 198-204.

A problem throughout Afghanistan – and not limited to just the former warlords, or even the Taliban members who have been reintegrated into society – is the ability to manipulate western funding or resources to further one's individual agenda. Endemic corruption belies any movement toward transparency within government, aid or power structures. Former Taliban fighters who 'reintegrated' into the community during the harsh winter months, may "rediscover their commitment to the Taliban come spring".¹⁵⁶

Factors are in play that undermines a ready transition to peace and legitimacy. The Taliban's presence on Afghan soil will outlast the international engagement and, understanding the conflict, Afghans "will calibrate their options almost exclusively based on an accurate assessment of their interests or long-term behavior".¹⁵⁷ Fragile power relationships reinforce structural corruption and individualist decisions. The negative environment of conflict allows space for Taliban and insurgent fighters to siphon funds and support meant for Afghan civilians, stalling the development and support necessary to build legitimate stability into the Afghan state. Self-preservation is a powerful motivator to a people plagued by decades-long conflict. Unless the western influencers and Kabul government can create a compelling and realistic picture of life post-conflict, Afghans will continue to hedge their bets on which side to support, and therefore continue to undermine the development initiatives.

Justice

"We should remember that the repeated experience of peace without justice and human rights in Afghanistan has led to further conflict and grave human rights violations over the past three decades. Peace without justice or human rights is not real peace. The route to real and lasting security can only come through the promotion of human rights and rule of law".¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Kagan, "A Case for Staying the Course", in *Afghan Endgames*, 113.

¹⁵⁷ Rothstein, 64, see also 66.

¹⁵⁸ Sam Zarifi, Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific Director, as quoted in a news report by Amnesty International, "Afghanistan conference raises fears of sacrificing rights for short-term peace," (18 July 2010), available at

The Afghan government has been busily passing laws and updating judicial practices, yet issues regarding justice continue to plague Afghanistan.¹⁵⁹ The western-directed push for democracy created superficial institutions with vague responsibilities and roles, often limited capabilities and "appointments to them subject to obscure influences and motivations".¹⁶⁰ Corruption within government and security institutions, as well as elite privilege and the prevalence of an informal justice system limit the effectiveness of attempted legal reform. "In a largely illiterate country with little central government presence, who knows about these laws? And in a country with entrenched customs, in which local leaders have traditionally settled disputes, who cares?"¹⁶¹ The Afghan constitution

commits the country to universal human rights instruments, guarantees equal rights between men and women, and establishes the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). However, it also recognizes a range of sources of informal, legitimate authority in Afghan life. Articles 1-3 establish Islam as the foundation of the republic, noting that no law shall contravene the tenets of the "holy religion of Islam" (art. 3). By incorporating a range of the sources of Afghanistan's law and political organization, the constitution therefore reflects reality but it does not provide clear direction when these sources-whether Islamic, traditional, statutory, or international-contradict each other. More recently, the lack of clarity in the constitution on the relative powers of the executive, legislature, and judiciary has contributed to confusion and delay over issues including ministerial appointments and vital preparations for elections. The result has been a large gap between aspects of the constitution and practice.¹⁶²

Canadians witnessed a severe lack of legal personnel in Kandahar, with 2008 statistics listing "only eight practicing private defence lawyers and 12 legal aid defence lawyers... [as well as only] six judges in the province [when] there should be 86".¹⁶³ The traditional reliance on informal dispute resolution continues to defy international state-builders. Afghan communities

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/afghanistan-conference-raises-fears-sacrificing-rights-short-term-peace-2010-07-19>

¹⁵⁹ Standing Senate Committee, 35.

¹⁶⁰ Whitty, 189.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Whitty, 190.

¹⁶³ Standing Senate Committee, 89.

rely on tribal leaders or local assemblies to "find solutions to problems that will end a dispute, be seen as fair by the local community, and maintain communal peace".¹⁶⁴ The traditional local or community councils, known as *jirgas* and *shuras*, fill legal voids as a "place to solve problems and negotiate over common goods and burdens, with its more prominent members serving as liaisons to the central government".¹⁶⁵ The state would only be called on in the case of a failure to reach consensus. The overlapping and sometimes incompatible levels of governance challenge the capacity of state-led governing.¹⁶⁶ Instead of fighting against the traditional form of legal justice, Barfield and Nojumi argue that the state should actually strengthen "these highly effective informal institutions [to] reduce the traffic jam within the Afghan state court system and also offer a positive competing alternative while offering the needed space for the Afghan government to clean house and develop professional cadres inspired by the Afghan constitution".¹⁶⁷ In supporting such a crucial element of civil society, Barfield and Nojumi warn state-builders to understand the importance of 'retaining the flexible ad hoc character' of the councils and refrain from creating permanent versions, imposing government appointed leaders or placing members on payroll. "Provincial and district councils are no substitute for them; these formal bodies are service-driven innovations" that fail to replace the grassroots community feel of the *jirgas*.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ Thomas Barfield and Neamatollah Nojumi, "Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability," *Middle East Policy* 17, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 47.

¹⁶⁵ Biddle, 50; see also Jones, 123. "*Shura* and *Jirga* denote communal decision-making bodies consisting of elders or other almost exclusively male notables. *Shura* generally refers to a body that functions and handles issues on an ongoing basis, whereas a *jirga* is typically convened to deal with a specific issue". Whitty, Footnote 9, p191.

¹⁶⁶ See Whitty and Nixon, "The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Objectives on Democratization and Statebuilding in Afghanistan," for greater examination of the multi-faceted layers of governing in Afghanistan and how they interact.

¹⁶⁷ Barfield and Nojumi, 47.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 48; see also Oxfam, "No Time to Lose", 16.

Taking advantage of the lack of local support granted to government and foreign forces, the Taliban has assumed the role of judge in community affairs. "Despite the rough justice of the Taliban's literal version of shari'a rulings, Afghans often find it better than no justice at all, and preferable to the slow and corrupt court system of the government".¹⁶⁹ Showing no favoritism and accepting no bribes, the courts have effectively fostered support for the Taliban in regions devoid of justice (sometimes artificially devoid, as the Taliban has removed competition via the assassination of government appointed judges).¹⁷⁰

Problematic questions about the corruption and justice issues in Afghanistan demonstrate the challenges of state-building in Afghanistan. Easy answers elude domestic and international state-builders, yet initiatives have been making an impact – including Canadian ones, a subject to which we now turn.

Canada in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, Canada faced a unique opportunity to promote positive transformation. The Canadian state-building endeavor rested on a desire to assist Afghans in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, utilizing military, governmental and civilian sources and expertise. Canadian strategic goals in 2008 (the first year such specific goals were listed) focused on security, governance, and development. The Senate Committee Report of the same year called for effective Afghan military and police forces that are "strong enough to maintain the Government's control of the nation's territories" and provide "citizens and communities with protection under the rule of law"; a central government that is sensitive to (and able to provide

¹⁶⁹ Robert Reilly, "Shaping Strategic Communication", In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*, 180; see also Whitty, 190; and Chaudhuri, 287.

¹⁷⁰ Reilly, 180.

for) "the needs of the people"; and widespread access to "basic essentials - food, water, sanitation and shelter, and opportunities... to improve their economic conditions and encourage free enterprise".¹⁷¹ In addition, Canada announced six priorities in 2008 to guide the Afghan undertaking. Focus in this case revolved around the Kandahar mission, with the training of Afghan National Security Forces; support for democratic governance, "Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation", and the "institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth"; humanitarian assistance for "extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons"; and the enhancement of border security, with the "facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani authorities".¹⁷²

Following the May 2012 NATO Chicago Summit, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) called for the government in Afghanistan to:

deliver on its commitment to a democratic society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption, where the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, including the equality of men and women and the active participation of both in Afghan society, are respected.¹⁷³

In turn, NATO countries committed to continue supporting Afghanistan militarily through the transition period (July 2011 -2014) and in the future as deemed feasible. As security duties are transferred from ISAF to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), "NATO will have made the shift from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission, which will be of

¹⁷¹ Senate Committee Reports, *Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. How Are We Doing in Afghanistan? Canadians Need to Know*, (Senate Committee: Ottawa, 2008): 69.

¹⁷² Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan – Setting a Course to 2011: Report to Parliament" (June 2008): 7, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/Afghrep_en.pdf

¹⁷³ NATO Official Texts, "Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan" (21 May 2012), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm?

a different nature to the current ISAF mission".¹⁷⁴ As such, Canadian objectives have changed slightly in the current transition period to emphasize development and civilian issues over strict security provisions. Since mid-2011, the main goals for the transition period have included:

- investing in the future of Afghan children and youth through development programming in education and health, and improving the lives of Afghans, especially women and children;
- advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, including the provision of up to 950 military trainers, their support personnel and approximately 45 Canadian civilian police to support and train Afghan National Security Forces;
- promoting regional diplomacy; and
- helping to deliver humanitarian assistance.¹⁷⁵

Evolution of the Canadian Engagement

The Taliban initially spread through Afghanistan from within Kandahar province, the heart of the Pashtun region, meaning that the area Canada has been most involved in was ground zero for the Taliban. Additionally, Kandahar's "strategic location along the Pakistani border and at the bottom of the major highway to Kabul has made it a flashpoint for combat".¹⁷⁶ Many Kandaharis supported the Taliban – due to "family connections, religious connections, and even ideological connections" – while most Afghans outside of Kandahar did not.¹⁷⁷ Canadian troops, while attempting to include local Afghans in decision-making and development projects, were constantly aware of the possibility that those participating might have links to the Taliban or be Taliban members themselves.

¹⁷⁴ NATO, "Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan".

¹⁷⁵ Government of Canada, "Canada's Approach in Afghanistan" (24 August 2011), available at: <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/approach-proche/index.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>

¹⁷⁶ Kimberly Marten, "From Kabul to Kandahar: The Canadian Forces and Change", *American Review of Canadian Studies* 40, no.2 (June 2010): 215.

¹⁷⁷ Standing Senate Committee, 4, see also 17; Simonsen, 710; and Jones, 124.

The Canadian/Afghan mission evolved through three stages. *Operation APOLLO* placed the first Canadian task force in Kandahar for six months of combat starting in January 2002.¹⁷⁸ From mid-2002 through early-2003, Canada pulled back from Afghanistan in order to restructure and retrain its forces to more adequately contribute to the Afghan mission. The ensuing *Operation ATHENA* (with Canada taking command of ISAF), followed the 'comprehensive' approach and included "a substantial combat force as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), first in Kabul (August 2003–December 2005) and later in Kandahar Province (August 2005–July 2011)".¹⁷⁹ *Operation ATTENTION*, meanwhile, launched in July 2011, "delivers training and professional development services to the national security forces of Afghanistan, especially the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)".¹⁸⁰ Paralleling the wrapping up of security missions undertaken by other NATO member states, the Canadian Task Force Kandahar (TFK) concluded operations "and moved its assets back to Canada or to other deployed task forces".¹⁸¹ From December 2011, Canadian troops have focused on providing support and training throughout the transition period scheduled to terminate in 2014.

In Kandahar (from 2006-2011), Canadian troops were involved in a mentorship training process known as Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OLMT or "omelette").¹⁸² Canadian soldiers were embedded within Afghan military units and operations were jointly conducted.

¹⁷⁸ National Defence and the Canadian Forces, "Operation ATTENTION: Mission Context," <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/attention/index-eng.asp> (accessed June 2011)

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. See the Department of National Defence's summarization of the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan via timeline at <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/progress-progres/timeline-chrono.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>

¹⁸² Standing Senate Committee, 16.

Meant to improve the battle-readiness and fighting abilities of the ANA, OMLT consisted of "approximately 200 CF [Canadian forces] personnel who [were] training approximately 3,000 Afghan soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 205th Corps, broken down into Kandaks (battalions) of about 350 soldiers each".¹⁸³ Under US leadership in the *NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan* operation, the ANA focused not only on 'clearing the Taliban', but also on building loyalty within local communities for the Afghan national forces.

While at work with the international and Afghan police and army forces in Kandahar, the primary Canadian goal was to attain a reasonable level of military security, with a focus on human security needs such as development, government, and basic necessities destined to follow. Basic necessities included food, water, shelter, and healthcare. Education, transparent and competent government institutions, economic opportunities, human rights, and judicial concerns were considered secondary issues. Acceptable levels of security were defined as "a decline in violent deaths resulting from armed conflict or criminal activity to a level that enables central government and its provincial subsidiaries to provide basic services to the populace and allows Afghans to begin making individual efforts to improve their lives".¹⁸⁴ Military and government planners worked with Afghan officials to build government ministries; Canadian Forces' civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) teams assisted with development work in unsafe areas; and Canadian troops mentored Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers and provided financial support and training for the Afghan National Police (ANP) within Kandahar.¹⁸⁵ While

¹⁸³ Ibid, 16, see also 33.

¹⁸⁴ Standing Senate Committee, 71.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 39, 41, 46, 59, "Since November 2007 the Canadian military has been paying the salaries of police in Kandahar directly since it became obvious that the police were not receiving money owed by the Government of Afghanistan. As Brigadier General Guy LaRoche told the *Globe and Mail*: "The money did not get to these guys.

militarily seeking to "hold the Taliban at bay and give the Government of Afghanistan all the assistance it can to serve Afghans in a way that will win their support", Canada also focused on three 'signature projects'.¹⁸⁶ Meant to address some of the "social, cultural and economic causes of [the] conflict", ¹⁸⁷ aid was directed toward

- the rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam¹⁸⁸ and its irrigation and canal system, generating Afghan jobs and fostering agriculture;
- the construction, expansion, or repair of 50 schools in key districts of Kandahar; and
- the expanded support for polio immunization in Kandahar with a view to eradicating the debilitating disease in Afghanistan.¹⁸⁹

Without delving into a more detailed discussion of the military weaknesses and successes of the various stages and configurations of involvement in Afghanistan, it is worth remembering that amid the political maneuverings and reconfigurations of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan,

the CF were still deployed in the same foreign country, with the same overall strategic mission of contributing to state-building and providing security for the Afghan population, and as part of the same international coalitions: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) under US command, responsible for combat operations; and NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. But both the operational conditions that the CF faced on the ground and the political conditions they faced in Ottawa shifted dramatically over time.¹⁹⁰

Mirroring the desire to demonstrate mission longevity, as the military forces drawdown in the current period of transition, contracts have been granted to Canadian health, community planning and education professionals to develop effective policies alongside their Afghan counterparts. As understanding and insight into the Afghan social, cultural, and education

Somebody is taking 10 percent here, 10 percent there, and in the end, the poor guys are left with nothing", "Ibid, 60; Rubin (2006), 181.

¹⁸⁶ Standing Senate Committee, 61.

¹⁸⁷ Biddle, 59.

¹⁸⁸ See the "Dahla Dam: Fit it, Share it, Use it" discussion for more details -- Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of April 1 to June 30, 2010", 6, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r06_10-eng.pdf

¹⁸⁹ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan – Fourteenth and Final Report to Parliament" (March 2012): 5, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/r06_12/index.aspx?lang=eng&view=d

¹⁹⁰ Marten, 215.

norms progresses, the focus has shifted from enforcing or implementing policies to supporting and assisting Afghan initiatives.

Specific Initiatives

The Canadian government considered development aid an important element in the Afghan engagement, making substantial commitments to funding development projects alongside the military/security provisions for mentorship and training. As the governmental branch responsible for such aid decisions, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had been providing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan prior to the 9/11 attacks, "ranging between \$10 and \$ 20 million per year", but increased its funding substantially as calls for international development aid progressed.¹⁹¹ "Between 2002 and 2007, Canada committed approximately \$100 million in aid annually for basic services, infrastructure, education, rural development, and the support of community development councils".¹⁹² The "drastic restructuring of Canadian foreign aid allocation" following 9/11, "made Afghanistan the top recipient of Canadian aid", a move criticized by some analysts as a demonstration of the "re-politicization of Canadian aid as countries in need are turned away in the name of fighting global terror".¹⁹³ The political manipulation of the human security concept will be discussed in the following chapter, with language and initiatives analyzed through a feminist IR lens, but for the purpose of this section the author has chosen to focus on the initiatives solely from a state-building perspective.

¹⁹¹ In 2002, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the subsequent defeat of the Taliban regime, Canada responded to Afghanistan's appeal for long-term development investments.

¹⁹² CIDA, "Afghanistan: Overview".

¹⁹³ Leah MacNeil, "Securing the Afghan People? Canadian Foreign Aid Policy and the Perils of Human Security," *Undercurrent* 8, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 9.

Following the Manley report in 2008, CIDA refocused its aid distribution primarily on Kandahar province¹⁹⁴, supporting Canadian priorities there, with "CIDA's work focused on supporting basic services, providing humanitarian assistance, and advancing democratic governance".¹⁹⁵ As the mission progressed into the current transitional stage, the objective of CIDA's funding became the need to "meet the basic needs and reduce the vulnerability of the Afghan people, especially of the women, girls and boys, in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan, Afghan civil society, and other donors".¹⁹⁶ This shift of focus will continue to be examined in the chapters to follow.

CIDA has worked closely with the World Bank's *Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund* – a committee designed to coordinate with Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance in shaping and implementing the strategic application of aid in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁷ CIDA has been involved in the eradication of polio, tuberculosis control, and the provision of essential medicines and basic health care services. Funding, training and support have contributed to:

(1) improving provision of quality medicines and supplies, (2) improving national coordination of pharmaceutical donations, with an emphasis on the equitable accessibility of medicines and supplies for women and children, (3) strengthening national capacity at the Ministry of Public Health to manage the logistics supply chain of quality medicines; (4) improving efficiency and effectiveness of national drug quality control procedures and systems to ensure that medicines

¹⁹⁴ Known as the 'Manley Report' due to the leadership of John Manley (the former Liberal minister of Foreign Affairs under Chretien), the independent commission analyzed the Canadian role in Afghanistan to date (2008) with the mandate to advise Parliament if Canada should extend its mission in Afghanistan past 2009. The commission saw merit in continuing the mission and proposed key change recommendations to the Harper government for moving forward. See the "Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan," (Minister of Public Works and Government Services: Ottawa, 2008). See also Kimberly Marten's critique and discussion of the importance of the report within the Canadian political climate -- Marten, pp225-228.

¹⁹⁵ CIDA, "Afghanistan: Overview".

¹⁹⁶ Ibid; Canada's Four Themes for Afghanistan: 2011-2014.

¹⁹⁷ CIDA, "Afghanistan: Progress on Aid Effectiveness", (Last modified 8 August 2012). Available at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/JUD-129153625-S6T>

of high quality are available to the population and (5) enhancing opportunities for pharmaceutical manufacturing industry development in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁸

In an attempt to focus on development initiatives within the overarching discussion of security in the Canadian comprehensive approach, interviews were conducted with a multi-disciplinary panel of four experts (Canadian academics and social development professionals) possessing first-hand post-conflict experiences in Afghanistan. These interviews were not designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of the development projects in Afghanistan, nor a critique on CIDA's funding decisions, but were intended to supply a glimpse into the development world through conversations with those who had spent time working in Afghanistan. Recruited through purposive sampling, the four key participants represent the areas of health care, education, city planning, and women's welfare. One interview was conducted in person, while the other three, for logistical reasons, were conducted via email correspondence. All participants were presented with the project objectives prior to the interview session, and each signaled their desire to be identified alongside their responses. While the sample size for this study was small – with secondary sources and policy statements incorporated in the analysis – the personal, anecdotal responses provided by the participants allowed for the inclusion of first-hand civilian accounts of the non-military Canadian involvement in Afghanistan.

Justine Turner is the Program Manager for War Child Canada (WCC) and responded to the interview questions on behalf of the War Child program underway in Afghanistan. Headquartered in Toronto, WCC has been supporting a local partner organization – the

¹⁹⁸ CIDA, "Project profile for Capacity Building and Access to Medicines", a project funded for \$10.5m in partnership with Health Partners International of Canada. Further information available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/projEn/A034247001>

Afghanistan Women's Council – for close to a decade. With the goal of "improving overall wellbeing and economic independence of vulnerable women, their families and their communities", the Afghan Women's Community Support Project (AWCSP) implements education and livelihood programs.¹⁹⁹ "Livelihoods programming focuses on skill development through small business and finance training, business development support services, and training in simple marketable skills such as tailoring and banking".²⁰⁰ Due to widespread illiteracy problems, "educational programming includes basic education (literacy, numeracy, civics and geography), lifeskills training (human rights, peacebuilding) and teacher training". Engagement with the local community is paramount, with "project and partner staff conduct[ing] outreach and awareness raising [targeting male and female community members] about the importance and right to education, especially for girls and young women, and liaise with local leaders and authorities to ensure support for the program". Additionally, "in order to facilitate programming activities, child care support, basic education and nutrition is provided to pre-school children of female participants". This focused implementation of a women's economic and social empowerment program was based primarily in Kabul, before being expanded to Jalalabad.

Pamela Thompson, President of Global Village Consulting (a Canadian company), works as a Technical Advisor to the Afghan Ministry of Public Health. Thompson was in Afghanistan on contract from October 2010 to November 2011 and continues to support her Afghan colleagues

¹⁹⁹ Justine Turner, interview with author, 10 August 2012.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

virtually. Funded until November 2011 by CANADEM²⁰¹ and CIDA, Thompson facilitated the creation of the *Strategic Plan for the Ministry of Public Health (2011-2015); Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*. Working with approximately eighty people – from various NGOs to Afghan ministers and officials – the multi-layered participatory process focused on creating sustainable systems and objectives, rather than relying on western-dictated 'expert' prescriptions. In-depth interviews with high level officials concerning health plans in place were followed by small group and workshop sessions to develop strategic objectives. Space was created throughout the process for feedback and group cohesion. Thompson said she approached her role as facilitator understanding that high/senior level Afghan officials needed to be involved with the project from the beginning to ensure understanding and implementation along the chain of command. Roles and responsibilities were therefore built into the process, both *for* and *with* the people concerned. Training and mentorship periods for designated teams of Afghan ministerial workers coincided with *Strategic Plan for the Ministry of Public Health* drafting and operational planning sessions. Current and projected health goals were assessed and measurable plans created with reviews and checklists built into the system framework.²⁰²

Athena Elton has a background in city planning and international development work and is currently working with the United Nations International Training and Research (UNITAR)

²⁰¹ Established in 1996, CANADEM "is a non-profit agency dedicated to advancing international peace and security through the rostering, rapid mobilization, and mission management of experts committed to international service". CANADEM "maintains a roster of over 15,000 experienced Canadian and international experts. Our end-users include the United Nations, the Canadian Government, inter-governmental organizations, other governments, and non-governmental entities of all kinds." See <http://www.canadem.ca/home/> for more information.

²⁰² Afghan planners are thus able to assess periodic results, see if progress has happened, and analyze data. There was recognition of a gender element in the data whereby sex specific data and goals were developed.

program. Elton volunteers as a mentor to 6 Afghan "Fellows" who work at the Ministry of Finance Aid Management Directorate (AMD). The Fellows were chosen by UNITAR to receive specialized training in development methods and policies, which also focuses on team-building and leadership training.²⁰³ Under UNITAR's direction, the Fellows engaged in a series of workshops, prepared a comprehensive Needs Assessment, and then drafted a full Proposal. Elton met with the Fellows in Japan in October 2012 for another series of seminars.

Dr. Tim Goddard is the project director of the Teacher Certification and Accreditation of Teacher Training Institutions in Afghanistan Project (TCAP-Afghanistan), funded by CIDA, with WUSC, UPEI, and the Ministry of Education Teacher Education Directorate (TED). The one year design phase of the program has just concluded (2011-2012), with the full project implementation scheduled to begin in October 2012 and run until 2016. Through multiple trips to Afghanistan, Goddard has built significant working relationships with the academic board in Afghanistan and his current project was actually initiated in response to a clear statement of need from the government of Afghanistan. While many international development programs are supply driven ("a country or group has skills it wishes to share, and which it believes are needed, so seeks money to deliver [them]"), TCAP-Afghanistan is a demand-driven project designed through consultation with the Afghan academic board.²⁰⁴ The project utilizes Afghan training and mentorship throughout and consists of 5 components.

1. The **accreditation** of teacher training colleges (TTCs) – there are 42 TTCs in Afghanistan, plus another 80+ "satellite TTCs" which serve rural and remote areas mainly by offering in-service teacher education to un/under-qualified teachers. There are currently no accepted standards as to what constitutes a quality teacher education program – what sort of facility is required, staff, resources, student intake, program of studies, etc. TCAP will work with TED to develop an appropriate legislative and regulatory policy framework.

²⁰³ Athena Elton, interview with author, 12 October 2012.

²⁰⁴ Dr. Tim Goddard, interview with author, 16 September 2012.

2. The **certification** of pre-service (high school graduates coming into program and graduating after 2 year diploma, grade 14 equivalency) and in-service (teachers receiving training when not working) candidates – right now, teachers are only ‘registered’ when they get a job. No professional identity or career ladder exists, and professional development courses taken are not helpful in assisting teachers to progress through the salary scales. TCAP will work with TED to develop an appropriate legislative and regulatory policy framework.

3. **Capacity development** – at multiple levels and group sizes – directors, assistants, administrators, academics, large groups/smaller seminars/one-on-one – this project is (and must be) ‘made in Afghanistan’. The CIDA component is only for 5 years, therefore it is critical that there is both the individual and institutional capacity to continue to implement, review, renew and manage the policy frameworks after TCAP has finished.

4. **Curriculum** development (considering pedagogy) – working on answering the question of how to teach teachers. The government of Afghanistan has invested a lot of money in a new national Teacher Training College curriculum but recognizes that the instructors (most of whom have a university degree but little or no actual classroom (K-12) teaching experience) need assistance in developing their teaching methods.

5. **Distance education** – there is a very real problem of reaching rural areas and working around technology challenges. A feasibility study was conducted during the Design Phase of the project and Dr. Goddard concluded that a distance education (DE) delivery of teacher education curriculum was an exciting possibility making use of accessible and affordable technologies. As distance education was not part of the implementation budget however (just the feasibility study was), Goddard continues to seek alternate funding sources for the realization of this element of the project.²⁰⁵

From the myriad experiences and interactions shared by each interview participant, the following themes were isolated using qualitative analysis coding.

1. Longevity of involvement is crucial

Whether regarding health care or education, the investment of time and training by both the Afghans and Canadians involved is undermined without follow-up. Professional support and capacity development within governmental ministries will continue to be needed in Afghanistan after international troops depart.²⁰⁶ For NGOs reliant on annual funding, the uncertainty surrounding the 2014 pullout means that many donors "have not finalized their strategies for funding post 2014", making it "unclear who will continue/ increase/ reduce their

²⁰⁵ Based on the interview with Dr. Goddard.

²⁰⁶ Elton interview.

funding levels for Afghan programs over the next two years".²⁰⁷ Yet the time provided by the years of strong Canadian investment (2008-2011 especially) allowed for the development of trust and professional relationships that should be considered as strategic assets in the attempt to achieve Canada's stated transitional goals.²⁰⁸ Thompson strongly believes that "capacity development is not a short-term commitment", and that Canadians need to stay connected to the Afghans they were working with.²⁰⁹ The CIDA projects undertaken should not be considered "one-off trainings", but rather as foundations of effective future support. Virtual support and communication are worthwhile assets, if the necessary mechanisms are available, and offer an alternative for remaining connected once back on Canadian soil.

2. Successes at the macro level rely on micro-level initiatives

Utilizing the CIDA-funded initiatives mentioned above as examples, development projects aim to produce measurable, attainable "successes". While benchmarks vary depending on the projects, CIDA uses "a comprehensive 'logic model framework' approach, where intermediate outcomes (to be achieved by the project) are measured by our success in achieving immediate outcomes. These are based on outputs, which are things we achieve from our activities, which in turn require us to show what the inputs will be".²¹⁰ Goddard explained that,

in order to achieve (for example) better teacher education in TTCs by the end of the project (immediate output), one way will be to have better teacher educator instructors (immediate outcome) through the design and implementation of a law specifying instructor skills (output). This is developed through collaborative writing, delivery of seminars and workshops, exposure to other models of teacher education (each is a separate activity) and so we need to plan what resources we need (inputs) in order to make that activity work. So we start with big picture,

²⁰⁷ Turner interview.

²⁰⁸ See overview of goals above, p25 of the "Canada in Afghanistan" section of Chapter Three.

²⁰⁹ Pamela Thompson, interview with author, 10 August 2012.

²¹⁰ Goddard interview.

design down to detail, and then do the work from the bottom up. Each project has its own set of outcomes (also called indicators) and the key thing is that these must be measurable.²¹¹

Donors, investors, and the governments involved are all seeking proof that their money has been wisely used. Therefore, the provision of verifiable results has been built into the framework of development projects. The TCAP-Afghanistan project has a Monitoring and Evaluation consultant as part of their team, "to help each of the component domain experts to make sure they are collecting the appropriate data for analysis and reporting".²¹²

WCC likewise considers the short-term 'immediate output' level and longer-term 'impact' level when crafting its development goals. Detailed micro-level output goals measure the success of specific actions, which are then evaluated against longer-term effect assessments. Under such a framework, the ability of WCC directors to verify that a planned training session did take place (a micro-level output) leads to questions like whether women "actually have increased knowledge as a result of the training? And more importantly, has this resulted in changed behavior as a result? Are they now actively using these skills?" (impact-level goals).²¹³ Turner highlighted a few of the 'impact-level' successes measured by WCC in Afghanistan: the percentage of female participants who are engaged in alternative means of securing livelihoods; and the number of women who report an increased level of involvement in decision-taking related to household management. Unintended successes are also considered, such as the desire of

a number of female participants to become mentors to other vulnerable women in their community". This is leading us to explore the potential of setting up a mentorship program where unskilled, illiterate women can be mentored by our previous beneficiaries in basic income generating skills, and business development skills. Our previous beneficiaries, having once been

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Turner interview.

in a similar situation, have a great deal to share about their experiences and challenges that would be extremely beneficial to young mentees.²¹⁴

Through the informal sharing of knowledge with family members, the Afghan women who have gone through WCC training are themselves, in some cases, addressing macro outcome issues. WCC found that the noticeably positive impact of the program on women – evident in participants' increased confidence, self-awareness and peacebuilding skills – has helped women to exert greater influence over household decisions, and has actually encouraged men to support sending their children to school.²¹⁵

3. Given the chance, involvement would be repeated

This statement applies to the study participants and their collectively emphatic assertion that the work they have done has been fulfilling, the Afghans they have worked with have enriched their lives, and they learned as much (if not more) from the Afghans they were meant to be teaching. Canadian political and military analysts might approach the decision to send troops to Afghanistan with greater hesitation if given the opportunity to undertake the operation anew, but the civilian actors interviewed here were encouraged by the progress they witnessed, and felt strongly that the projects they were involved in deserved attention and support.

Community Involvement

Physical safety and other concerns associated with working in a conflict-zone notwithstanding, Justine Turner stated her conviction that the comprehensive approach was "key to ensuring sustainable impact in the lives of women and their families." Yet, according to

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

Turner, the WCC wishes they knew at the outset of their commitment in Afghanistan how important outreach programs would be in fostering support for the WCC projects. WCC maintained "a low profile in Afghanistan as an INGO and as much as possible [sought] to engage and include Afghans at all stages and to ensure Afghans [were] at the forefront of program implementation".²¹⁶ The WCC Kabul office was run by Afghans and an expat Country Director (and sometimes an expat Senior Manager) and worked closely with the Afghanistan Women Council, a local NGO that was staffed entirely by Afghans. The Afghanistan program was designed to "foster community engagement at all stages of implementation" and included "extensive consultations with potential participants (vulnerable women²¹⁷), their male family members and community leaders and religious leaders".²¹⁸

One of the major lessons we have learned over recent years is that change at the individual level will not be sustainable without change in and support from the communities in which the women live. Initially, we found that low levels of support for women led to difficulty enrolling women in the program, or some withdrawal of women from the program. However, we have increased our focus on increased engagement through multiple community outreach initiatives, including with religious leaders and direct engagement with male family members. This engagement moves beyond merely raising awareness about the program but also uses the opportunity to provide educational sessions for men in a variety of life skills including women's rights, effective parenting and health and hygiene. In this way, men in the community have felt increasingly engaged and are developing new knowledge. This has the longer term result of creating a protective environment for women and children.

Many of the women in our program are now business owners, hiring other women from the community to work for them... Religious leaders have become spokesmen for the work we do,

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ The War Child Canada website gives greater detail as to what constitutes a "vulnerable woman" in the eyes of WCC: "Years of conflict and oppression have left thousands of Afghan women destitute with few economic options. Many of these women have been widowed by the conflict and left to care for their children. Without education and marketable skills, their income-generation capacities are extremely limited. Escalating insecurity and the challenges associated with redevelopment have also restricted government-provided services and support. This unfortunate reality locks many Afghan women into a cycle of perpetual poverty with their lack of power in society making it extremely difficult to change their situation. Since 2003, War Child has been working with the Afghanistan Women's Council to improve the lives of these vulnerable women and their children." See <http://www.warchild.ca/whatwedo/afghanistan/> (last accessed June 20, 2013) for more details on WCC's CIDA-funded Afghanistan mission.

²¹⁸ Turner interview.

and as community opinion leaders, this has led to increased support not only for our program, but for the promotion of education for girls, and for increased understanding of the rights of women. Cultural norms cannot be changed overnight, but initiatives like this get the process started. It is absolutely essential that programs have legitimacy in the eyes of the community and are conducted in a transparent manner.²¹⁹

The impact of community-wide involvement in the region has caused WCC representatives to ponder the effect that greater engagement could have had if it had been implemented effectively from the outset of the organization's involvement in Afghanistan.

Also utilizing the impact of community involvement, Development Works, a Canadian company, used CIDA funding to implement a community-based approach in Kandahar.²²⁰ The Development Works project involved local Afghans in irrigation, sanitation and building projects, established Women's Vocational Centres, and developed both a community-based bakery and marketplace in one community under the Kandahar Rapid Development Plan.²²¹ The project directors and managers spent months in Afghanistan meeting with local leaders and Afghans from within the proposed location, including the Afghanistan Ministry of Education in decision-making and funding for teachers as well.²²² Despite threats from the Taliban, locals showed up for work and defended their projects, apparently taking pride in their accomplishments and the benefit to their community and families.²²³

Community Development Councils (CDC) in Kandahar, consisting of locally elected representatives to deliberate "with community members on the disposition of development

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ See Development Works, <http://devworksco.com/>

²²¹ Senate Committee Reports, 54.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid, 55.

grants", were a major focus for the Government of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program (NSP) funding and project opportunities.²²⁴ The NSP was designed to

strengthen communities through elected community development councils, which work to identify local development priorities and projects. The program, supported by Canada, has increased villager access to basic services, delivered positive change in village-level governance and increased community acceptance of women engaged in economic activity—examples of the manner in which the livelihoods of Afghans are changing and improving at the community level.²²⁵

Launched in 2003, the NSP had, by 2010, "supported the creation of 22,500 community development councils in 316 districts across Afghanistan, and had financed some 50,000 development projects".²²⁶ In the *Governance and Development Support Program*, funded by CIDA (just over \$22 million) in partnership with the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, democratic governance and basic health care services in Kandahar City were greatly increased. 85 CDCs were created, "88 CDC-led initiatives have been completed and a further 21 are underway". These projects include "constructing culverts, building concrete sidewalks, connecting or extending electricity service, and surfacing roads with gravel. A land registry program has been developed" that led to the "registration of more than 26,000 plots in the city, which prevents the eviction of homeowners" and provides revenue for the city.²²⁷

²²⁴ Whitty, 194. "The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is the Afghan Government's primary program for community development. It aims to reduce poverty by empowering communities to take initiative, improving local governance and increasing social, human and economic capital." Standing Senate Committee, 53.

²²⁵ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of July 1 to September 20, 2010", 9, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r09_10-eng.pdf

²²⁶ Chaudhuri, 280. See CARE's Project Information on their ongoing NSP involvement at <http://www.care.org/careswork/projects/AFG021.asp>

²²⁷ CIDA, "Project profile for Governance and Development Support Program", available at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/projEn/A033789001>

The security component of the Canadian state-building operation in Afghanistan has been the focus of extensive study in Canada.²²⁸ With the troop withdrawal, however, the comprehensive nature of the mission has shifted to focus heavily on human security issues, women's rights and involvement in the development process, training and mentorship. Planning and implementation challenges, especially in consideration of the conflicting perspectives and ideologies involved, continue to permeate the transition stage of the Afghan operation. While the interviews included (and CIDA programs mentioned) cast a favourable light on the development and humanitarian programs underway in Afghanistan, the limitations and biases of the interview subjects must be acknowledged. The interview participants supported their projects and felt their contributions were warranted and useful to the Afghans involved, a sentiment clearly displayed in their statements. Indeed, Canadian aid has contributed to immunizations, family planning, maternal and child health programs, extending health services to the rural poor, and water, sanitation and hygiene projects. City planning, vocational and teacher training, and marketplace restorations compliment the local governance and private sector initiatives.²²⁹ Support arrangements developed through "local governance structures, in order to increase the local legitimacy and hence effectiveness of aid projects" remain key features through the transition period.²³⁰ Improving governance outside of Kabul, while difficult for a number of reasons, is understandably crucial in establishing the justice and

²²⁸ See the numerous Canadian Parliamentary reports (as will be discussed below) and Department of National Defence findings.

²²⁹ See the CIDA Map of funded projects in Afghanistan for more information on individual projects currently receiving funding, available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/CAR-101192930-HU2> (Last Modified: 13 July 2012) and the CIDA "Afghanistan" overview for a list of project achievements to 2011, available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/JUD-129153625-S6T> (Last Modified: 8 August 2012).

²³⁰ Chaudhuri, 280.

accountability necessary in the post-conflict period.²³¹ While there are many laudable elements to the humanitarian-focused initiatives Canadians have been involved in, they also require greater analysis. The following chapter will critically evaluate the application of humanitarian and human security rationale within the context of the military intervention in Afghanistan, examined through the lens of a feminist International Relations analysis.

²³¹ Reid, 7.

Chapter Four: State-building in Afghanistan: A Feminist Perspective

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 decisively transformed global policies on security and warfare. The idea that civilians were no longer safe in their own countries, an attitude historically understood by most of the Global South, was earth-shattering for the previously little-affected North. Attention and anger, aimed immediately at al-Qaeda as the group responsible for the attacks, festered and grew as the ruling Taliban government in Afghanistan was accused of enabling the anti-American faction to operate.

The resulting 'war on terror' has held military and political sway over American foreign policy dealings for the past decade. Much as with the selective attention to Afghan women, (as will be examined below) the Bush administration in particular employed moral and humanitarian arguments only to the extent that they aligned with other national interests.²³²

In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush made reference, in quite graphic detail, to atrocities committed by the Hussein regime. And, as with Afghanistan, Secretary Rumsfeld identified humanitarian reasons as one of a number of reasons for the war. Again, looking at the history of the conflict, it is fairly clear that humanitarianism is not what impelled the administration to war with Iraq—particularly given the fact that President Bush said during the 2000 presidential campaign that he would not have intervened in the Rwandan genocide.²³³

The ongoing operation of Guantanamo Bay and claims of torture and unlawful imprisonment also undermine the American declarations of support in humanitarian cases.²³⁴ But such rhetoric was useful in generating multilateral support for US policies in the United Nations, as

²³² S. Neil MacFarlane, Carolin J. Thielking and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?" *Third World Quarterly* 25 (2004): 983, 984; Thomas G. Weiss, "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era", *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (2004): 149.

²³³ Mills, 176.

²³⁴ Ibid, 177.

well as bolstering the administration's credibility domestically.²³⁵ The human rights abuses and repression of women central to Sharia law under Taliban rule were particularly useful in generating public support for regime change: the abuses fit neatly with a stereotypical image of Islamic tyranny.²³⁶ In subsequent years, as the bombs fell, infrastructures crumbled, everyday life continued to worsen, and the Afghan government moved toward peace talks with the insurgents, questions regarding the claimed "liberation" of the Afghan women continued to arise.²³⁷

This chapter takes a critical approach to the study of state-building, gender, and humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan, utilizing theories of international relations and gender to better engage with issues that are too often constrained by standard theoretical frameworks. Current studies on women in Afghanistan, from a western perspective, generally center on traditional gender roles and the repression of the Taliban regime. By casting all Afghan women in the same mold – as that of the burqa-clad, submissive and oppressed woman yearning for the liberation and opportunities open to their American sisters – we relegate Afghans firmly to the role of victim. Rejecting the typical realist understanding of international relations and instead utilizing a feminist lens allows attention to be focused on the gendered politics enmeshed within the traditional role of the nation-state as the primary actor in international relations. The emphasis here is on how international policies, security and power questions affect ordinary individuals, especially women and girls.

²³⁵ Ibid, 148.

²³⁶ Jill Steans, "Telling Stories about Women and Gender in the War on Terror," *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations* 22 (January 2008): 160, 161; Gretchen Ritter, "Domestic Containment or Equal Standing? Gender, Nationalism, and the War on Terror," *Journal of Policy History* 21 (October 2009):443.

²³⁷ Reid, 5; See also Tobi Cohen's article in the Vancouver Sun, November 15, 2010, "Women's rights are possible focus of extended role: but critics say Canada and its allies haven't lived up to promises so far".

The chapter first discusses how the maltreatment of women under the Taliban was used as a justification for the militarized intervention. The direct and indirect consequences of the conflict and the current issues facing women are then considered, before an examination of the post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts underway in the country. In keeping with the 'Canadian legacy' question of the state-building chapter, the focus in the final stage will be on Canadian projects. This chapter seeks to build on the state-building discussion by highlighting the need to consider the development initiatives that are most likely to succeed: those incorporating local needs and considerations and giving them equal weight to government/state interests in building sustainable initiatives to earn the Afghan government legitimacy and support.

Considering the role of women in conflict and post-conflict scenarios through a feminist-IR lens helps to address the intrinsic limitations of conventional western mindsets,²³⁸ opening new avenues for effective development initiatives that incorporate Afghan women and address their needs in the post-conflict period. Asking whose security the state is protecting, feminists build on the leftist arguments from the modern era to address the structural implementation and epistemological underpinning of power. Modernity constructed 'proper' gender roles. Men existed in the public and political realm, while women contented themselves inside the domestic, private sphere.²³⁹ Female subordination and the 'protection' allegedly provided by their husbands meant that male-centered interests and concerns guided understandings of security issues and policies. The security of women inside the home became a non-issue,

²³⁸ As discussed in the Introduction, p10.

²³⁹ V. Spike Peterson, *A Critical rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies* (New York: Routledge, 2003): 33, 34, 36, 37, 42.

especially among those most responsible for state security – military men. The perceived weakness of feminine personality traits and the supposed inability of women to manage political affairs have consistently underpinned their ostracism from public life, and now threatens to taint state-building efforts.

Background

As mentioned in chapter two, the oppression of Afghan women did not originate with the political takeover of the Taliban. Afghanistan faced reform attempts and foreign interventions throughout the twentieth century, all the while maintaining a fragmented state structure that served to preserve the traditional norms. Hardships for women have been a consistent feature of the diverse conflicts over the last three decades. Afghanistan is a patriarchal society, with public authority a male near-monopoly. It is also patrilineal – "inheritance of property and status is through the male line", and patrilocal – whereby "women move to the husband's place of residence."²⁴⁰ Afghan women, therefore, are culturally and legally subservient to their male relatives, a status that is not easily changed no matter how well-intentioned western reformers may be.²⁴¹ Understanding the historical progression of conflict and women's rights in Afghanistan is a crucial step in addressing the current troubles and possible solutions. To examine the plight of Afghan women outside of the context of Afghan history, or to propose changes incommensurate with Afghan cultures and traditions, is to disregard the complexity of the issue. For a case in point, we turn now to the flawed application of the 'Taliban oppression of women' claim by the western governments as justification for the military intervention in Afghanistan.

²⁴⁰ Riphenburg, 405; see also Benard, 26.

²⁴¹ Farhoumand-Sims, 655.

Human and Women's Rights as Justification for Afghan Intervention

The initial bombing campaign in 2001, and subsequent military operations, proclaimed as a primary motivator the provision of "humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions under the Taliban regime".²⁴² In particular, the United States government utilized the harsh treatment of women at the hands of the Taliban to generate popular public support for the destruction of a nation that, until the attacks, had been well off the international radar.²⁴³

Humanitarian Liberation?

Deploying an idealized version of American women's emancipation, the Bush administration set the image of the modern, liberated western woman against that of the oppressed and silenced, burqa-clad Afghan woman.²⁴⁴ Women throughout North America and Europe came to champion 'missionary feminism' and call for the overthrow of the Taliban government.²⁴⁵ The Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), a liberal and secular group already in existence in Afghanistan, perfectly suited the image of modern women sought after by the Bush administration in sculpting the justification for war.²⁴⁶ Invitations to appear on Oprah, media attention and glowing praise for their efforts in speeches by Washington power players did not translate into actual assistance or a genuinely receptive ear

²⁴² As stated on 7 October 2001 by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld "about two hours after the United States started bombing Afghanistan". Mills, 161.

²⁴³ Farhoumand-Sims, 450; Jackson, 12; Martha Thompson, "Women, Gender, and Conflict: Making the Connections," *Development in Practice* 16, no. 3/4 (June 2006): 345; Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas," 175.

²⁴⁴ Ritter, 439; A speech given by Laura Bush on National radio on 17 November 2001 was referenced repeatedly by feminist scholars as a vulgar call to support the American intervention, Abu-Lughod, 784; Riphenburg, 401.

²⁴⁵ Sunaina Maira, " "Good" and "Bad" Muslim Citizens: Feminists, Terrorists, and U.S. Orientalisms," *Feminist Studies* 35 (Fall 2009): 631.

²⁴⁶ Steans, 164.

in Washington.²⁴⁷ It seems that the Bush administration preferred a docile group (in line with the western stereotype of Muslim women) to pose for pictures and silently support the American mission of liberation, not demand aid over military intervention or expose American ties to fundamentalist groups.²⁴⁸ Considered by some feminists as "heirs to colonial feminism", the actions of the Bush administration mirrored "the ploy of colonial officers to champion the rights of women, not as a sincere cause, but as a rhetorical vehicle to promote the imperial power's colonial objectives and to denigrate the local culture as an obstacle to development".²⁴⁹

RAWA, in keeping with Muslim opinion globally, strongly opposed the Western intervention in Afghanistan, claiming, "It would breed resentment of US imperialism and create the conditions in which fundamentalist and terrorists groups would flourish".²⁵⁰ They did not see American bombing as bringing about "Afghan women's salvation but increased hardship and loss".²⁵¹ Calling for disarmament and multi-national peacekeeping forces, "They consistently remind audiences to take a close look at the ways policies are being organized around oil interests, the arms industry, and the international drug trade".²⁵² Moreover, to truly challenge the made-in-Washington model, RAWA were "not obsessed with the veil, even though they are the most radical feminists working for a secular democratic Afghanistan".²⁵³

²⁴⁷ "At a State Department reception Colin Powell paid tribute to the courage of RAWA women who had been beaten, imprisoned and forced into exile, while US Under-Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky called the women "pioneers of hope". Steans, 164; RAWA was also awarded as the Glamour Magazine Women of the Year, Abu-Lughod, 787.

²⁴⁸ Steans, 170.

²⁴⁹ Jacqueline Ismael, Shereen Ismael, and Chris Langille, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Women in the Muslim World," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 35.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Abu-Lughod, 789.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

RAWA remained defiant in the face of American pressure, thereby demonstrating that while "Afghan women [were] rhetorically useful in prosecuting the War on Terror... they were most useful to the Bush administration when banished to the private sphere and covered with the veil".²⁵⁴

Melding references to the Taliban and women's rights with more generic references to terrorists and Islam, Afghanistan became a gendered battlefield infused with an Orientalist 'othering' of the enemy.²⁵⁵ In keeping with Arturo Escobar's claim that "the Third World and its peoples exist 'out there,' to be known through theories and intervened upon from the outside", the developed and modern Western powers took the role of hero or liberator, and Afghanistan became the victim or weaker party requiring liberation.²⁵⁶ Afghan women were discursively cast in the role of victim at the mercy of the evil enemy – the Taliban or insurgent forces who collectively were represented by the generic 'Afghan male' and blamed "for all that was unfortunate in Afghan society".²⁵⁷ Problematic for both Afghan men and women,

Afghan women, targeted (by the USA) as (sub)sovereign sacred subjects are placed into the zone of indistinction through their victimized distinction. Afghan women identified by the USA as victims in need of a geopolitical savior are (dis)placed in various ways that attempt to discursively separate them from Afghan men by diminishing the diversity of women into a narrowly categorized and conceptualized "Afghan woman". Similarly, Afghan male diversity is reduced into a dichotomized representation of violent agency as either enemy combatants or potential allies—without victim status.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁴ Steans, 165, see also 170.

²⁵⁵ Ritter, 443, 444; According to Edward Said, Orientalism is "a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience." Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979): 1.

²⁵⁶ Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 8.

²⁵⁷ Daulatzai, 421; see also Maira, 641.

²⁵⁸ Jennifer Fluri, "Capitalizing on Bare Life: Sovereignty, Exception, and Gender Politics," *Antipode* (Inaugural issue): 8.

Another gender framework seamlessly entered the rhetoric: that of the West as "just, fair, righteous, wise, strong, and heroic, hence real men (i.e. masculine)...the victims, on the other hand, are weak, helpless, peaceful, and powerless, hence not real men (i.e. feminine)".²⁵⁹ By simplifying the categorization of men and women and focusing "on the abusive or 'dark side' of Afghan traditions or family life, incoming troops and development workers discursively forgot (or ignored) "other aspects such as social reproduction and interactions, humor and the fulfillment of (women's and men's) lives within their families".²⁶⁰ These 'gender/savior mythologies' may be effective media and propaganda tools, but their utility in bringing about positive changes for the women in question is doubtful.²⁶¹

Naylor develops the 'victim' categorization further by questioning the international development discourse as a 'Politics of Pity'. Humanitarian actors in this case "perpetuate a hierarchical, coconstituted structural relation", which classifies the "identities and abilities of actors".²⁶² Naylor considers Hannah Arendt's dialogue on the difference between compassion and pity as symbolic of the intrinsic problems within the humanitarian debate:

The sentiment of compassion is "to be stricken with the suffering of someone else as though it were contagious." It only exists between two individuals in direct, specific relation to one another, and it is thus wholly unable to deal with generality. Compassion is necessarily genuine, and it is a sentiment that derives from passion, not from reason. Compassion is more than just sympathy; it responds to suffering as an immediate and particular "co-suffering". Pity, on the other hand, is indirect and general. It is "to be sorry without being touched in the flesh". It is a depersonalized response to the suffering of depersonalized, abstracted others. Pity is not a sentiment of immediate relations. There is distance—temporal, geographic, and/or social—between the pitied object(s) and he/she who observes the suffering.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Momani et al. claim that in situations of war, "gender metaphors are intentionally used to emasculate and degrade the opponent", Kawakib Momani, Muhammad A. Badarneh and Fathi Migdadi, "Gender metaphors in Middle Eastern politics and the Arab receiver," *Social Semiotics* 19 (September 2009): 294, see also 308.

²⁶⁰ Fluri, "Capitalizing on Bare Life", 17.

²⁶¹ Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas", 170; Abu-Lughod, 788. See also Cockburn 2001 and Enloe 1989, 2000.

²⁶² Tristen Naylor, "Deconstructing Development: The Use of Power and Pity in the International Development Discourse," *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 178, see also 194.

²⁶³ Ibid, 185.

Pity, in the discourse of saving non-western women, creates and reinforces "a sense of superiority by Westerners, a form of arrogance that deserves to be challenged".²⁶⁴ Pity removes itself sentimentally from compassion and is able to consider suffering from an intentional, outside position. As pity cannot "exist 'without the presence of misfortune,' [it] has a vested interest in the existence of those who suffer, as the spectacle of their suffering is necessary for pity to be evoked as a means to justify action".²⁶⁵ Pity, therefore, as generated in the formation of the victim/liberator discourse, is an undesirable sentiment as it creates a hierarchical power relationship between the "fortunate and the unfortunate" that permeates and shapes all interactions between the two.²⁶⁶

The Afghan variant of the 'Politics of Pity' employed "emotions to make an unknown world, and the lives of subjects in that world, intelligible. Actors with the power to do so use the sentiment of pity to translate the 'distant suffering' of unknown others so that it is recognizable and comprehensible".²⁶⁷ As the victimized character in the discourse, Afghan women are understood and defined primarily in terms of their vulnerability. The outsider's role is not as an equal in this scenario, nor even as a supporter. Instead, the image is of a victimized Afghan pleading for the assistance of the empowered Western actor. This perpetuates "paternalistic norms and categories of understanding, [and] also serves to structurally reinforce Afghan actors—both the state and individuals—as submissive recipients of Western aid".²⁶⁸ The thinking reinforced here is that 'we', as the powerful Western liberators, must save the

²⁶⁴ Abu-Lughod, 789.

²⁶⁵ Naylor, 184.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Ibid, 185; see also Abu-Lughod, 787; For an interesting visual representation of this point, see the Time.com photojournalism presentation "Portraits of the Women of Afghanistan", by Jodi Bieber, available at http://www.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,308943282001_2007270,00.html

²⁶⁸ Naylor, 188.

disempowered from poverty and violence by any means necessary. The poverty and violence generated by our own hands is excusable in such a noble mission.

'Humanitarian' Military Intervention

Beyond the flawed utilization of the 'oppressed Afghan' discourse, many feminists question how "the bombing of Afghanistan would liberate Afghan women".²⁶⁹ This question of using military force for humanitarian reasons is itself a controversial idea. The propaganda value of violence against women was crucial in earning Western support for the intervention and continued to be used in the quest to keep troops in Afghanistan. TIME magazine in particular was criticized for "presenting a falsely dichotomous dilemma" whereby women were safe so long as the international troops remained, but faced a certain future of horror and mutilation if the troops withdrew, as forcefully demonstrated by TIME's iconic cover image of Aesha, the Afghan adolescent girl whose nose was amputated by the Taliban.²⁷⁰

Yet feminism has long been tied to "pacifism in rejecting the masculinist impulse to resort to arms in the face of conflict".²⁷¹ Military interventions "entail the deployment of armed force capable of causing great destruction, injuring civilians, and devastating societies. Doing so in the name of humanitarianism or even in the defence of women does not negate the harm caused to civilians who become collateral damage or are violently displaced".²⁷² Van Schaak

²⁶⁹ Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 505; see also Steans, 171.

²⁷⁰ Beth Van Schaack, "The Crime of Aggression and Humanitarian Intervention on Behalf of Women," *International Criminal Law Review* 11 (July 2011): Fn 39, 489; See also Derrick Crow, 'TIME's Epic Distortion of the Plight of Women in Afghanistan', *Rethinking Afghanistan*, 31 July 2010, rethinkafghanistan.com/blog/2010/07/times-epic-distortion-of-the-plight-of-women-in-afghanistan/. Image by Jodi Bieber. For the original Time cover story, see <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2007407,00.html>; and for the CNN interactive site – Saving Aesha - <http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/05/world/saving.aesha/>

²⁷¹ Van Schaack, 490.

²⁷² Ibid.

argues that interventions launched in the name of women's rights tend to fall short of actually benefitting women:

Women in Afghanistan have not necessarily fared better following the partial ouster of the Taliban. Nor were the women of Kuwait liberated along with their country by Operation Desert Storm. Even in Kosovo, where NATO's intervention halted an ethnic cleansing, the introduction of foreign troops occasioned a dramatic increase in sex trafficking and forced prostitution.²⁷³

Yet the claims were made, and the intervention into Afghanistan was launched. As the military intervention transpired concurrently with the development of the *Responsibility to Protect* (RtoP, ICISS) doctrine, the intervention found greater legitimacy by connecting itself to the RtoP humanitarian language.²⁷⁴ The international community was already engaged in the debate over what should be done, and by whom, in support of vulnerable or disempowered persons in situations where the state itself is imposing (or allowing) hardships or violence on its own citizens. The 'plight of women in Afghanistan', therefore, served to augment the call for military intervention, for better or for worse for the women involved.

Intervention, Human Security, and Gender

The *Responsibility to Protect* was in its infancy when the 2001 terrorist attacks occurred. But it encapsulated the thriving dialogue surrounding international actors' responsibility to respond to human rights catastrophes (motivated by indelible images such as those of the 1994 Rwandan genocide). Arguing that in our interconnected world, conflict outbreaks may spill over to any number of nations, the ICISS declared that when a state "nominally in charge is unable or

²⁷³ Ibid, 489.

²⁷⁴ MacNeil, 9.

unwilling to stop [the abuses]" against its own people, the international community is compelled to act.²⁷⁵

The responsibility to ensure the safety of civilians by a range of means, from sanctions to military intervention, challenged the traditional 'peacekeeping' mindset of the United Nations. The need for the organization to take the lead in such cases led to an understanding that the UN "should bear the ultimate international responsibility for protecting civilians," and this "increased international focus on people's security, both in terms of their physical safety and their livelihood, is now encapsulated in the concept of human security".²⁷⁶

The RtoP itself blurs the lines between politics, war, and state sovereignty by calling for states to seek a political and military consensus on the enforcement of preventative actions or military interventions.²⁷⁷ Under the core principles of *The Responsibility to Protect*, the 'responsibility' in question is primarily applied alongside the concept of state sovereignty. Domestically, the state itself holds the principal responsibility "for the protection of its people". An international 'responsibility' emerges "where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it", thus warranting the suspension of the principle of non-intervention.²⁷⁸ International responsibility is further defined as the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild. With the competing geopolitical interests represented in the United Nations Security Council however – as the organization

²⁷⁵ Kofi Annan, "Two concepts of sovereignty", *The Economist* (18 Sept. 1999): 51; see also Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko, "Partners in Preventative Action: The United States and International Institutions", *Council on Foreign Relations Special Report* no. 62 (September 2011): 3.

²⁷⁶ Hasegawa, 2.

²⁷⁷ Thomas G. Weiss, "RtoP Alive and Well After Libya," *Ethics & International Affairs* 25, no. 3 (2011): 291.

²⁷⁸ *Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)*, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001): XI; see also Annan, 51.

deemed 'most appropriate' to decide on such international cases – debate, indecision, and tardiness have limited the application and effectiveness of the RtoP humanitarian agenda.²⁷⁹

As these humanitarian claims did accompany the military intervention into Afghanistan, the question remains – did the overthrow of the Taliban ease the human security situation for Afghans? And how will the handling of the post-conflict period address the human security issue? Critics, such as MacNeil, claim that "the human security of Afghans is 'set aside' in the interests of the 'higher goals of peace [and] security'. Development aid has been 'captured by the global security agenda', leading human security to take a back seat to statecentric security practices, which clearly predominate".²⁸⁰

Human security, as mentioned in the literature review, differs from the realist security understanding in that it focuses on individual over corporate interests. Instead of considering security as a zero-sum game of power and chaos between sovereign nation-states (as the realists posit), human security considers how economic, social, and political factors affect individual actors in a given state. Human security includes the "freedom from fear and freedom from want", "protection from physical violence... [and] chronic threats like hunger, disease, severe economic deprivation, or political repression".²⁸¹

Humanitarian principles claim the need to be "neutral, apolitical and non-profit making"²⁸², yet the embedding of humanitarianism within the military intervention and state-

²⁷⁹ ICISS, XII.

²⁸⁰ MacNeil, 9.

²⁸¹ Rialize Ferreira, "Operationalizing Human Security in South Africa," *Armed Forces and Society* 35 (April 2009): 502.

²⁸² Katarina West, *Agents of Altruism: The Expansion of Humanitarian NGOs in Rwanda and Afghanistan*, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001): 14.

building in Afghanistan threaten to undermine those founding statements.²⁸³ Some scholars claim we are now in an age of neo-humanitarianism, which is "distinguished by the explicit manipulation of humanitarianism for political or military gain on the ground in a conflict or as a substitute for political and military action".²⁸⁴ The founding doctrine of the humanitarian desire to ease human security issues is losing its centrality, as "humanitarianism, which is now as much about public relations as it is about helping people, is often used in the service—either directly or indirectly—of foreign policy goals and wartime objectives".²⁸⁵

Following the overthrow of the Taliban, the Afghan state-building mission occupied a murky junction that demonstrated the problematic differences between security and humanitarian concerns. Hasegawa characterized the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan as a conflicting duality, "relating on the one hand to the global-level war on terror and on the other to conflict at the local Afghan level".²⁸⁶ The US-led insurgency operation (later headed by ISAF) dealt with army, police, and defense duties, while a hodgepodge of NGOs, UN and international development workers sought to address the human security needs. Progressing from a war culture "in a way that did not worsen human security in the short term and which created a structure which ensured transformation of the conflict in the long term" was the primary challenge early in the conflict and faced greater uncertainty as the insurgency war continued through the decade.²⁸⁷ As the 'comprehensive' or whole-of-government approach evolved to

²⁸³ MacNeil, 11.

²⁸⁴ Mills, 162, see also 167, 168.

²⁸⁵ Ibid, 166. For greater examination of this debate, see Kurt Mills, "Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict."

²⁸⁶ Hasegawa, 6.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

manage the situation, the military and humanitarian elements underwent greater integration, with mixed results.

The problematic reality of development initiatives within the militarized environment of Afghanistan raised the "issue of compatibility between the strategies of protection and empowerment".²⁸⁸ Hasegawa claimed that "the overarching aim [in Afghanistan] was to begin the process of conflict transformation by eliminating the elements of war culture", which meant that the international forces and organizations involved had to "run in parallel strategies for strengthening the state structure for the protection of human security, empowering indigenous entities in order to address human insecurity and directly filling the gaps in protection in the short term".²⁸⁹ As the state-building programs – examined in the previous chapter – developed, humanitarian workers and human rights activists fought for the inclusion of the human security discussion in the development process.²⁹⁰ The ongoing security concerns frustrated the humanitarian work, as "protection implied the use of advocacy and the protection of rights in pursuing justice and equality, as well as the creation of a structure conducive to peace, empowerment emphasized that the process should be owned by the local actors".²⁹¹ The need for international workers to have armed escorts outside secure compounds limited their "ability to understand and subsequently address the 'real needs' of Afghan civilians in various locations", thereby restricting the reach of the programs they were creating.²⁹² With the 'comprehensive' understanding that human security operations should

²⁸⁸ Hasegawa, 2.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, 17.

²⁹⁰ See Shannon's article "Playing with Principles in an era of Securitized Aid: Negotiating Humanitarian Space in Post-9/11 Afghanistan".

²⁹¹ Ibid; see also Shannon, 21.

²⁹² Fluri, "Bodies, bombs and barricades," 289; see also Shannon, 24.

complement state security measures, the international workers were to address "a variety of human security issues including the (re)construction of infrastructure and state structure, the reintegration of displaced populations, the rebuilding of communities affected by conflicts, addressing violence both by state and non-state actors and providing humanitarian and development assistance", all from a safe distance.²⁹³

Side-stepping this problem led to a greater militarization of aid, whereby (for example) CIDA funding went directly to Canadian Forces for the creation and implementation of development projects in Kandahar, thus "threaten[ing] to undermine the efficacy of development in Afghanistan, and, consequently, human security".²⁹⁴ Militarizing aid has restricted the "ability of humanitarian agencies to operate effectively in Afghanistan, serving to limit people-centered aid focused on poverty reduction, women's empowerment and socioeconomic development, while instead acting to serve military priorities".²⁹⁵ Funds are being provided for "development activities but not humanitarian activities, when clearly there is an ongoing and worsening humanitarian situation in large swaths of the country".²⁹⁶ MacNeil accuses Canadian policy-makers specifically of "abus[ing] the human security model, particularly in the case of Afghanistan, in order to securitize development and justify strategic geopolitical action".²⁹⁷

²⁹³ Hasegawa, 3.

²⁹⁴ MacNeil, 10.

²⁹⁵ Ibid, 11.

²⁹⁶ Shannon, 29. The distinction between development and humanitarian activities was crucial to Shannon's study, as those involved in development work tended to define their activities "not as the long-term sustainable, process-oriented endeavour understood by NGOs[,] but as anything that positively impacts the community. This allows them to blur the lines between humanitarian and military actors and at the same time, present themselves as doing something constructive, positive and helpful for the poor people of Afghanistan because that is what development is perceived as by wider audiences". Shannon, 31.

²⁹⁷ MacNeil, 7.

As addressed by MacNeil et al., with the UN focus on human security over realist security, greater emphasis should rest "on the importance of the UN's role in addressing such issues as violence by non-state actors and post-conflict reconstruction, especially in post-conflict situations where the agenda of state-building has to be tackled".²⁹⁸ By moving human security issues and "women's empowerment out of normal politics and into the discourse of security", human security issues face the real risk of being sub-categorized under 'state-centric security priorities' and therefore not receiving the attention and precedence due them as primary concerns.²⁹⁹

Human Security and Women's Rights

As shown above, the exclusion of women from Afghan political life is a deeply ingrained cultural norm that is not easily changed. Hasegawa claims that human security, at the implementation level, "provides a common reference point in addressing such operational and policy issues as the crowded humanitarian space, the linkages between humanitarian and development assistance and the civil-military relationships".³⁰⁰ Indeed, one of the most direct consequences of the human-security emphasis is substantially increased rhetorical commitments to protect women from harm. "The concept of human security in such a context is considered to embody human rights and humanitarian concerns and to imply meeting the need for the protection of human worth, minimum physical safety, human rights and minimum standards of living".³⁰¹ The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 recognized that "civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by

²⁹⁸ Hasegawa, 2.

²⁹⁹ MacNeil, 12.

³⁰⁰ Hasegawa, 2.

³⁰¹ Ibid, 3.

armed conflict" and called for the "equal participation and full involvement [of women] in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making".³⁰² Alongside Resolution 1820 (2008), which considers the prevention and prosecution of sexual violence in armed conflict situations, the UN stressed the need to "integrate women and women's groups into decision-making about the propriety and execution of humanitarian intervention".³⁰³ Resolutions 1888 and 1889 (2009) built on the framework of the previous two resolutions and provide greater clarification and direction for the incorporation of female-specific considerations, including "physical security, health services including reproductive and mental health, ways to ensure their livelihoods, land and property rights, employment, as well as their participation at the early stages of post-conflict peacebuilding".³⁰⁴

Reflecting the new prominence of a discourse of women's rights, in Afghanistan quotas for the inclusion of women in parliament and decision-making forums were established following the fall of the Taliban, and many NGOs and aid organizations sought explicitly to include local Afghans, especially women, in their projects. Yet the restrictive nature of gender relations in Afghanistan, cultural and family reservations, and the underlying 'victim/savior' complex discussed above all limited women's effectiveness.³⁰⁵ "Women in relative positions of power within the government and judiciary... expressed their dismay at several

³⁰² U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325) p. 1 (31 October 2000).

³⁰³ Van Schaack, 492.

³⁰⁴ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1889 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889) p. 2 (5 October 2009).

³⁰⁵ Reid, 6, 21, 40, 41; Ghufuran, 91; Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 508, 509, 514; Mona Lena Krook, Diana O'Brien and Krista Swip, "Military Invasion and Women's Political Representation," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 12 (March 2010): 68, 69; HRW, "Promises of the World," 26; Sari Kouvo and Corey Levine, "Calling a Spade a Spade: Tackling the 'Women and Peace' Orthodoxy," *Feminist Legal Studies* 16, no.3 (2008): 366, 367; Jackson, 5, 26; Benard, 30.

aid/development organizations working on 'women's issues', while not listening to their suggestions or ideas for projects".³⁰⁶ Organizations "actively seek to have Afghan women on staff either as part of the organization's goals and initiatives, or (more commonly) to increase its funding opportunities".³⁰⁷ This may result in increased welfare for the women and their families due to the wages involved, but it may also lead to other gendered problems.

The priorities of the international aid community to help Afghan women have created circumstances under which it is much more difficult for men than for women to find paid work. As a consequence, many families are now provided for by women. Men are not only left unemployed, a condition that has serious psychological consequences anywhere in the world, but they have to live in an environment that is controlled by foreign agents who consider Afghan men to be inherently misogynistic and anachronistic.³⁰⁸

The 'liberation' of Afghan women by means of providing work outside the home may in reality be more limiting than liberating when considered alongside the detrimental welfare side-effects possible. Equally problematic, these same women are often used to propagate the 'victim' discourse:

Trauma, war stories, and tales of abuse, forced marriage, and traditionalism are another unit of capital exchange. Several "best selling" books about Afghan women, written by internationals, exemplify the capital value placed on exchanging Afghan female suffering by way of international interlocutors' (non)fictional narratives. Afghan women (and some men) are also solicited to exchange their memories of suffering to secure jobs, educational scholarships abroad, and other forms of capital solicitation.³⁰⁹

Women who do not fit the victim mould may be excluded from development opportunities or even vilified for their urban/educated identities, both by the international community and local actors. The empowerment inherent in promoting one woman over another, or funding one group over a rival, has the capacity to be divisive in the post-conflict development process, which again emphasizes the humanitarian principle of finding "an impartial footing in the

³⁰⁶ Fluri, "Capitalizing on Bare Life", 15.

³⁰⁷ Ibid, 15, see also 9.

³⁰⁸ Daulatzai, 432.

³⁰⁹ Fluri, "Capitalizing on Bare Life", 16.

delivery of this strategy and the need for an overall strategy, taking into consideration the impact on the transformation of the conflict".³¹⁰ The strategy behind empowerment is valid and important, as it has the potential to link the lofty desires of the women's rights and human security proponents to practical actions on the ground. The decisions made in such an understanding can help in "the creation of a state structure conducive to human security, supporting local constituencies for peace, creating local capacity including that of government and encouraging bottom-up pressure for peace through assistance".³¹¹ But the decision of one 'expert' to fund an organization with ties to a powerful warlord or one less corrupted could drastically change the fortune and welfare of a given community. Granting a project to a traditionally disadvantaged ethnic or religious group could alter the social composition in a rural town. A weighty power and danger rests on decisions made "based on a superficial understanding of local relations" and "lacking an understanding of the impact of a wider structural change" that foreshadows the potential for long-lasting consequences.³¹²

To move beyond the limitations imposed by Western stereotypes of Afghan women, it is vital to recognize that military engagements alone cannot bring about the liberation of women. The feminist IR perspective described above questions the effectiveness of the traditional humanitarian discourse to respond to human security issues, especially those affecting women and girls. The militarized 'war on terror' (which utilizes humanitarian language when necessary, as demonstrated above) contradicts the humanitarian claims by essentially positioning "'home-land' populations at the centre of security discourse and practice rather than prioritizing the

³¹⁰ Hasegawa, 16.

³¹¹ Ibid, 5.

³¹² Ibid, 5-6.

security of humans living in states embroiled in political conflict".³¹³ Support for the intervention into Afghanistan was thus generated through the amplification of feminist calls for Afghan women's freedom and security – which were then categorically ignored in the military solution that was subsequently applied. While perhaps strategically important in America for gaining domestic support during the commencement of the mission, the shift from purely military objectives to the less easily attained or measurable humanitarian considerations complicated the entire operation considerably. The interconnection between "governments, private contractors, logistics and private military companies" and the "privatization of both security and aid/development" in support of the humanitarian 'comprehensive approach' in Afghanistan have "created inextricable links between the networks that support war making and those that historically characterize peace".³¹⁴ The "contemporary international aid and development projects in Afghanistan are further politicized by security-driven aid agendas and militarized reconstruction efforts", which compound the 'limitations and ineffectiveness' of the policies for women.³¹⁵ Exploiting feminist arguments to generate support for military intervention has also served to partially limit the feminist influence. The military apparatus can deflect feminist criticisms of *their* treatment of Afghan women and the hardships caused by the conflict as excusable collateral damage in the humanitarian fight for liberation.

Key Issues

Historically ingrained cultural inequalities cannot be magically erased by western powers, nor are the injustices horrific to the Western audience those that most appall

³¹³ Fluri, "Bodies, bombs and barricades," 283.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Fluri, "Capitalizing on Bare Life", 5-6.

Afghans.³¹⁶ The humanitarian concern for the plight of Afghan women – a key feature to elicit sympathy and justify the militarized intervention – the quest to 'liberate' the repressed Afghan women has simplified and stereotyped the everyday experiences and concerns of Afghans collectively.

The burqa has been a key element in the 'repressed women' image. Illustratively, in 2002, the international medical humanitarian network Médecins du Monde/Doctors of the World (MdM) was honored in a cocktail reception (sponsored by the French Ambassador to the United States, the Head of the delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations, and a member of the European Parliament) that featured a photography exhibition titled "Afghan Women: Behind the Veil". The exhibition included the following text:

For 20 years MdM has been ceaselessly struggling to help those who are most vulnerable. But increasingly, thick veils cover the victims of the war. When the Taliban came to power in 1996, Afghan Women became faceless. To un-veil one's face while receiving medical care was to achieve a sort of intimacy, find a brief space for secret freedom and recover a little of one's dignity. In a country where women had no access to basic medical care because they did not have the right to appear in public, where women had no right to practice medicine, MdM's program stood as a stubborn reminder of human rights... Please join us in helping to lift the veil.³¹⁷

Fighting the restrictive labels enforced on them from outside, though, not all Afghan women wish to be free of the burqa. It was not, after all, an invention of the Taliban designed to silence

³¹⁶ Abu-Lughod, 787; Maira, 641; "Fatima Gailani, a U.S.-based advisor to one of the delegations, is quoted as saying, "If I go to Afghanistan today and ask women for votes on the promise to bring them secularism, they are going to tell me to go to hell." Instead, according to one report, most of these women looked for inspiration on how to fight for equality to a place that might seem surprising. They looked to Iran as a country in which they saw women making significant gains within an Islamic framework-in part through an Islamically oriented feminist movement that is challenging injustices and reinterpreting the religious tradition", Abu-Lughod, 788; Focusing on the abuses imposed on women at the hands of the Taliban, most "imperial feminists show little sympathy for the Afghan (and now Pakistani) women and children bombed by the United States and U.S.-backed forces, for girls who were raped and murdered by U.S. soldiers in Iraq, or for Palestinian women who live under an illegal occupation funded and supported by the United States," Maira, 642.

³¹⁷ As quoted by Abu-Lughod, 789.

women. It was a traditional Pashtun piece of clothing that symbolized women's modesty and respectability.

Twenty years ago the anthropologist Hanna Papanek (1982), who worked in Pakistan, described the burqa as "portable seclusion." She noted that many saw it as a liberating invention because it enabled women to move out of segregated living spaces while still observing the basic moral requirements of separating and protecting women from unrelated men. Ever since I came across her phrase "portable seclusion," I have thought of these enveloping robes as "mobile homes." Everywhere, such veiling signifies belonging to a particular community and participating in a moral way of life in which families are paramount in the organization of communities and the home is associated with the sanctity of women.³¹⁸

Veiling is viewed by much of the Muslim world as a means of honoring God and promoting virtuous living. It can represent "security and respectability in public space", and should be respected as a cultural choice.³¹⁹ The Taliban imposed the Pashtun form of dress on the wider population, along with the other strict religious codes, and it was this imposition on women that the West took to represent oppression.³²⁰ In freeing the Afghan women from the hold of the Taliban, however, the West must accept that some of the women who are "liberated" might choose to continue wearing that which they are most comfortable in – the burqa. Likewise, many women would prefer an Iranian model for change and modernization over the secularized western version. Many look "to Iran as a country in which they saw women making significant gains within an Islamic framework - in part through an Islamically oriented feminist movement that is challenging injustices and reinterpreting the religious tradition".³²¹

Deniz Kandiyoti, in discussion of the "gendered legacies of conflict", argues that the focus on gender relations and women's rights as an issue separated from the social and economic reality of living in a wartime environment has undermined the depth of the problem

³¹⁸ Abu-Lughod, 785.

³¹⁹ Fluri, "Bodies, bombs and barricades," 285.

³²⁰ Abu-Lughod, 785, 786.

³²¹ Ibid, 788.

and misrepresented the issue. Daulatzai likewise argues that gender mobility and education issues should not eclipse the "larger and perhaps more consequential modalities of suffering experienced by Afghan women as a result of more than two decades of armed conflict, war, and natural disasters".³²² Ismael contends that reconstruction projects are generally economic in nature and thus fall under the "domain of international financial interests, mediated by international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF". "Social reconstruction programs", however, "focus on relief and rehabilitation programs for women and children," falling under the jurisdiction of "humanitarian non-governmental organizations mediated by international agencies such as UNICEF".³²³ The destructive impact of war affects "households, neighborhoods, and communities[,] breaks down the social fabric of life in Muslim societies and intensifies social polarization".³²⁴ Social reconstruction should be prioritized equally with economic reconstruction to address the indirect and direct consequences of conflict for women.

How the problems facing Afghan women are framed can be detrimental in itself. Focusing on the perceived gender or religious inequalities and oppressive practices of the Afghan women, and ignoring their opinions on the problems facing their country, has not stopped the conflict or made life in Afghanistan much easier for the female half of the population.³²⁵ As we turn in the next section to the Afghan articulated concerns, it is beneficial to remember that these points represent individual people and their lived realities.

³²² Daulatzai, 425.

³²³ Ismael, 23.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ "Though life has improved for some Afghans, still nearly half of the population lives below the poverty line, more than a quarter of a million individuals remain displaced inside the country due to the conflict and nearly three million remain in Pakistan and Iran. A whole generation has grown up never having experienced peace and

Indirect Consequences

Deniz Kandiyoti, in discussion of the "gendered legacies of conflict", argues that the constant focus on gender relations and women's rights as an issue fully separate from the social and economic reality of the broader conflict has evaded core problems and misrepresented key issues:

The differences in the tone and content of writings on the political economy of conflict in Afghanistan and those dealing with gender relations and the status of women are quite revealing. The former demonstrate that the war economy has brought about a profound transformation in social relations, changing a country with a predominantly rural economy based on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism into the world's largest producer of opium, and a centre of arms dealing and smuggling whose criminalized economy funded local warlords, including the Taliban. In discussions of women's rights, however, we often revert to a world of unchanging tradition and cultural stasis. Unexamined assumptions concerning the role of Islam further reinforce a timeless conception of gender relations.³²⁶

Kandiyoti contends that "dynamics of gendered disadvantage, the erosion of local livelihoods [and] the criminalization of the economy and insecurity at the hands of armed groups and factions" have together made women more vulnerable in an already precarious traditional situation.³²⁷

A popular focus among western audiences has been the push to educate Afghan girls and provide training to increase the employability of women. Among the wider movement toward educating girls across all developing nations, such as the *Because I am a Girl* campaign,³²⁸ the various Afghan-specific projects are supported by such established

many Afghans are struggling to cope with the psychological, economic, social and physical ramifications of the conflicts, past and present." Jackson, 3-4; Daulatzai, 419, 420, 423, 425, 428.

³²⁶ Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 510, 511; see also Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas", 176.

³²⁷ Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 511.

³²⁸ See <http://planacanada.ca/BecauseIAmAGirlOverview> and the 10x10 movement at <http://10x10act.org/> -- "10x10 is a feature film, *Girl Rising*, and a social action campaign, created and launched by an award-winning team of former ABC News journalists in association with *The Documentary Group* and Paul Allen's *Vulcan Productions*. We use the power of storytelling and the leverage of strategic partnerships to deliver a single message: educating girls in developing nations will change the world".

organizations as CARE, UNICEF, and World Vision.³²⁹ Obviously important for the people involved, illiteracy also has numerous ramifications for women. State-building initiatives that emphasize the development of new legal and doctrinal regulations, for example, are pointless if the judges, police and community leaders outside the capital are unable to read the documents.

Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) recognized the different roles men and women play in conflict situations, and called for greater acknowledgment and incorporation of women's concerns into peace-building and peace-keeping scenarios. Reflecting the range of issues confronting women, and a belief in the "key role women can play in re-establishing the fabric of recovering society", Resolution 1889 called for the inclusion of women in "all stages of the peace process".³³⁰ The vast economic, health, and education problems of Afghanistan, discussed in Chapter Three, fall into this 'indirect consequences of conflict' category, and need to be considered along with a gendered understanding that women are often affected most, and to a greater extent than men, by these indirect consequences of war. In fact, "there are good reasons to presume that the indirect consequences of conflict are much more important in many cases than the direct casualties".³³¹ Carefully considered reconstruction and welfare initiatives, as outlined in Resolution 1889, thus need active implementation through the post-conflict period.³³²

³²⁹ The CARE *Help Her Learn* campaign: <http://www.care.org/campaigns/powerwithin/index.asp>; UNICEF: <http://www.unicef.ca/en/discover/education>; and World Vision: <http://www.worldvision.ca/ContentArchives/content-stories/Pages/fact-sheet-world-visions-work-in-afghanistan.aspx>

³³⁰ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1889 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889): 1.

³³¹ Plümper and Neumayer, 723, see also 731.

³³² U.N. Security Council Resolution 1889 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889): 3-5.

Direct Consequences

The impact of direct conflict and violence on the wellbeing of Afghans colours the post-conflict period. The establishment of lasting and genuine peace relies strongly on mechanisms of justice and reconciliation. As argued in the previous chapter, the legitimacy of the Karzai government and the spread of the Taliban are both tied to the question of justice. The government needs to implement measures to deal with the injustices, land disputes, theft, and displacement concerns rampant throughout the country or the Taliban will continue to undermine the governmental influence through their own resolution system. In the previous chapter we examined the justice issue from the perspective of government institutions, local court systems, and community involvement. Here we examine the direct and personal consequences of war for women, their distinct needs for justice, and the distinct challenges they confront in securing it.

Threats

Illiteracy and safety are monumental problems facing women. In areas with strong Taliban influence, female teachers and students face continuing security risks in their desire to attend school while women face threats if they attempt to work outside the home.³³³ Female parliamentarians face daily threats, with one claiming "every day when I leave home to go to parliament, I fear that they might blow me up, so I say goodbye to my daughters, and give them advice, and leave them some money just in case I don't come back".³³⁴ Another woman told a Human Rights Watch interviewer, "They have said that they will kill my children. This is what keeps me awake at night. My life does not matter, I am used to the threats. But I cannot allow

³³³ Reid, 30.

³³⁴ "Promises of the World", HRW, 28.

threats against my children".³³⁵ Night letters – threatening notes delivered to houses, schools and mosques – bearing signatures or symbols of the Taliban have terrorized countless women into compliance.³³⁶ Attacks on schools "increased 200 percent in 2010 on the previous year," with physical attacks such as bombings, poisonings and arson reported.³³⁷ The abuses perpetrated under the Taliban have been widely documented, with scathing reports issued by international organizations as attacks on schools continue, as well as physical abuses such as bombing, poisonings and arson.³³⁸ The idea of reconciling with and politically including the Taliban has many in the aid community concerned about human rights abuses, especially regarding women's rights.³³⁹

Direct victimization in conflict such as torture, imprisonment or personal injury over the last three decades of conflict have affected one in five Afghans. The majority of the torture cases occurred "either during the Taliban (38%) or the civil war periods (29%). On average, 37% of those who reported that they had been tortured were female. However, this fluctuated over time, with women comprising 24% of those tortured during the communist period but 44% during the civil war and 42% during the Taliban period".³⁴⁰ Imprisonment and torture are often presented together in survey results, with injuries over the first three conflict periods likewise

³³⁵ Ibid, 26.

³³⁶ Ibid, 8-13, 25-27, 29, 30.

³³⁷ Oxfam, "Promises, promises", 6; see also Reid, 31. See "Mass sickness hits Afghan schools," The Guardian, April 26, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/afghanistan>; and "90 Afghan Schoolgirls Poisoned in 'Taliban Gas Attack'," Reuters, May 13 2009, http://www.alternet.org/rights/139996/90_afghan_schoolgirls_poisoned_in_taliban_gas_attack

³³⁸ See Amnesty International, "Afghan couple stoned to death by Taleban," News (15 August 2010), available at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/afghan-couple-stoned-death-taleban-2010-08-16>; see also Human Rights Watch, "Afghanistan - Humanity Denied", vol. 13, no 5, October 2001, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/10/29/humanity-denied>; or <http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org/warcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity19782001.pdf>

³³⁹ Amnesty International. "Afghanistan conference raises fears of sacrificing rights for short-term peace." News (18 July 2010).

³⁴⁰ Jackson, 16.

linked. Conflict-induced injuries were relatively few in the current conflict, but national statistics found that "unexploded ordinance from the past three decades of conflict cause an estimated 50 to 55 deaths per month and 2.7% of the population lives with a disability, many of them war-related".³⁴¹

Recent writings on the subject of violence examine systemic violence against women as a reflection of a greater societal bent toward violence in general. "Economic instability, combined with patriarchal views of women's roles, breeds conditions that lead to violence against women and undermine their capacity to build peaceful societies".³⁴² The power struggles in Afghanistan throughout the decades of conflict have resulted in a kind of validation of violence. "Where violence of any sort is an acceptable strategy for achieving power, societal instability only encourages its further use".³⁴³ Therefore, private attacks on women such as rape or domestic violence mirror public attacks which may take the form of legal, economic and political exclusion.

Estrada found that the violence experienced by women, whether domestic, public, economic, sexual, political or emotional, has been culturally structured in society to minimize the importance and public voice of the victims. The "cultural devices by means of which subjectivities prescribed in the matrix of relations between the sexes are produced and reproduced [and] within the framework of power relations that delimit the exercise and subordinate the status of the roles of each gender," legitimate the "forms of subordination,

³⁴¹ Ibid, 18.

³⁴² Amy Caiazza, "Why gender matters in understanding September 11: women, militarism, and violence," Briefing Paper (Washington, DC: Institute for Women's Policy Research, November, 2001): 1.

³⁴³ Caiazza, 1, see also 2; Thompson, 345.

discrimination and the exercise of control of subjectivity that include acts of physical and emotional violence".³⁴⁴

Under Taliban rule, women and girls faced forced marriages and early marriages (girls as young as 10 years old), as well as kidnapping by Taliban fighters.³⁴⁵ While violence (physical, sexual and emotional) and inequality are important issues of concern for Afghan women, the breakdown of existing societal structures "and the ensuing brutalization fuels male aggression against women, who suffer from sexual violence both within and outside their domestic household".³⁴⁶

The Taliban employed violence in different measures and for different purposes, rooting violence in various aspects of social and private life:

The 'privatised' violence exercised by kin groups and families in the service of honour and reputation must be distinguished from sexual violence (against women, girls and boys) used as a systematic tool of war to intimidate, despoil and establish positional superiority, and from the public performances of Islamic retribution (featuring spectacular events such as lashings and executions) deployed by the Taliban as a means of social control. The Taliban were not merely affirming their piety or their implementation of Islamic law, but 'were engaged in "staged publicity" that ritually affirmed their power and legitimacy'.³⁴⁷

The insecurity still raging in many areas has even motivated "liberal, educated, urban middle-class families to impose stringent limitations on their female members, often out of fear rather

³⁴⁴ Angela María Estrada, "Regulation and Control of Subjectivity and Private Life in the Context of Armed Conflict in Colombia," *Community, Work & Family* 10, no.3 (August 2007): 259.

³⁴⁵ Rippenburg, 406-407; HRW "Promises of the World", 51, 52; "Fifty-seven percent of all marriages that take place in Afghanistan are classified as child marriages by UNIFEM (under the legal age of 16), and 70 to 80 percent as forced marriages. These practices underlie many of the problems faced by women and girls, with a correlation between domestic violence and child/forced marriage." HRW "Promises of the World", 7. "Forced marriage includes situations in which women and girls must marry without their consent, face threats or violence, are kidnapped, or are traded through informal dispute mechanisms, such as to settle a rape case, and when they are 15 or younger", HRW "Promises of the World", 49.

³⁴⁶ Plümper and Neumayer, 724. "A study by the International Organisation for Migration confirms that there is a growing human trafficking problem in Afghanistan, with victims drawn from among the destitute, the displaced and the indebted. Young rural women (and children) are subjected to forced prostitution, forced labour and practices akin to slavery (abduction and forced marriage, exchange of women to settle disputes, or marriage in exchange for debt repayment)," Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 513.

³⁴⁷ Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 512; see also Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas", 179.

than social conservatism".³⁴⁸ In this situation, it is inaccurate to blame an average Afghan male for the repression of women. The deeper meanings of violence and its position in society need to be considered in order to help heal the deeply rooted fissures of inequality and repression encouraged by the Taliban.³⁴⁹

From a feminist perspective, it is equally problematic that western outrage tends to focus on the abuses imposed on women at the hands of the Taliban, while ignoring those inflicted by Western actors. A female participant in the Oxfam study recounted a story rarely heard by western audiences – when a report claiming that Taliban members were present in her home reached international forces, the force responded by attacking at night. They "killed my father, my sister and my mother and they took my brother away. They claimed my family was Taliban and Al Qaeda. When the people demonstrated and told them that we are innocent people, all they said was that it was an accident. My niece still has nightmares and calls for her mother".³⁵⁰ Furthering this sentiment, Maira claims "Imperial feminists show little sympathy for the Afghan (and now Pakistani) women and children bombed by the United States and U.S.-backed forces, [or] for girls who were raped and murdered by U.S. soldiers in Iraq".³⁵¹ Instead of the thoughtless regurgitation of imposed stereotypes or sensationalist news coverage, the physical threats facing Afghan women need to be addressed rigorously, and from the perspective of the women involved.

³⁴⁸ Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 513.

³⁴⁹ Caiazza, 1; Thompson, 350; HRW "Promises of the World", 9.

³⁵⁰ Female interview participant from Nangarhar province, Jackson, 32.

³⁵¹ Maira, 642.

Legal Justice

The UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888 and 1889 all address the injustices facing women during times of conflict and propose recommendations for peace and reconciliation processes. Calls for "all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians", and "to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse," form the backdrop for a variety of legal measures supporting women's rights.³⁵²

Yet "violence against women in Afghanistan is endemic".³⁵³ Human Rights Watch reported in a 2008 nation-wide survey that 87.2 percent of women had "experienced at least one form of physical, sexual, or psychological violence or forced marriage in their lifetimes".³⁵⁴

There are so many disputes between families and tribes, and too often they take personal revenge using the easiest victim— a child, a woman. It's easy access, and there is usually no punishment from the government. The first thing we need is equality before the law. Whether it is a minister or a farmer who rapes a woman they must receive equal treatment by the law.³⁵⁵

The Elimination of Violence Against Women law has many women hopeful, as rape has finally been listed as a crime.³⁵⁶ "The deteriorating security situation has severely negatively affected women's ability to enjoy the rights and opportunities promised them by the international community".³⁵⁷ Despite certain constructive initiatives, the "Afghan government has failed to take proactive measures to prevent gender-based violence, investigate crimes, prosecute

³⁵² UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000), 3; see also Farhoumand-Sims, 652, 653.

³⁵³ HRW "Promises of the World", 5.

³⁵⁴ "The forms of violence include rape, physical violence, forced marriage, and "honor killings", Ibid, 6.

³⁵⁵ Fauwzia Kufi, member of parliament, Kabul (interviewed June 7, 2009), Ibid, 32.

³⁵⁶ Ibid, 6.

³⁵⁷ Farhoumand-Sims, 654.

perpetrators, and ensure victims' safety and access to services".³⁵⁸ Problems surrounding female access to legal representation, knowledge of rights under the law, cultural prejudices and lack of gender based training for police and judicial staff all hinder the implementation of women's legal rights.³⁵⁹

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) is "trying to ensure human rights in a challenging environment".³⁶⁰ With heavy corruption, the decision to include former warlords and human rights abusers in government, and the failure of the Afghan government "to take attacks and threats against women seriously[,] greatly increases the threat that women face, by creating a permissive culture for those who seek to silence and sideline women".³⁶¹ With each high-profile killing of a female public figure that goes unpunished, Afghan women lose more of their recently-won political space.³⁶²

Post-Conflict

By relegating Afghan women to the sidelines – as the Bush administration tried to do – or removing women from all facets of public life – as the Taliban attempted – the foundation has been laid for women to take a backseat in Afghanistan's struggle for peace and reconciliation. The recent Human Rights Watch report found a broad consensus among the Afghan women interviewed, calling for a negotiated end to the conflict. Yet these women felt that negative consequences would accompany incorporating the Taliban into positions of

³⁵⁸ HRW "Promises of the World", 32.

³⁵⁹ Ibid, 8; Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas", 187, 188; Riphenburg, 405; Benard 28-29.

³⁶⁰ Ghufuran, 91.

³⁶¹ Reid, 34; see also Ghufuran, 91; and HRW "Promises of the World", 22.

³⁶² Benard, 28-29; HRW "Promises of the World", 5, 10, 21, see pages 17- 20 for stories of influential female public figures targeted by the Taliban. "Women who are active in political life—including parliamentarians and provincial councilors— face attacks and intimidation. This has profound ramifications not only for the safety of women who continue political work, but for their ability to continue to defend the rights of all Afghan women and girls. It can also deter the next generation of women leaders," Reid, 33.

power.³⁶³ As women often are left out of discussions of conflict, or referred to only in terms of their status as victims or refugees, the incorporation of such opinions in the post-conflict dialogue is necessary if the initial humanitarian rationale for intervention is to be upheld. The mainstream analysis of the conflict in Afghanistan has led to constructed limitations on gender that are difficult to escape. Nevertheless, women play a role in conflict situations, and their experiences need to be made visible and policy-relevant.³⁶⁴

Canada's Post-Conflict Involvement

With the ongoing backing of CIDA for Afghan projects, not to mention civilian/non-governmental support for NGO initiatives, Canadians remain poised to participate in the mentorship and support of Afghan women in coming years. At the Canadian governmental level, the tone of official reports has gradually changed as the prominence (and implied importance) of women's rights issues increased substantially through the last five years of the Afghanistan engagement. As demonstrated by the recommitment to Resolution 1325 at the recent NATO summit in Chicago, women's rights in Afghanistan also remain on the political agenda internationally. As signatories to the declaration, Canada supported the third General Principle of the document, which emphasized "the importance of full participation of all Afghan women in the reconstruction, political, peace and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan and the need to respect the institutional arrangements protecting their rights".³⁶⁵

Domestically, however, the tone and substance of government documents were far removed from such internationalist declarations. The Canadian government may have lauded

³⁶³ Reid, 6.

³⁶⁴ Thompson, 343, 348; Oxfam "Promises", 9; Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 504, 509; Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas", 192; Caiazza, 4, 5; Daulatzai, 432, 434-435.

³⁶⁵ NATO Official Texts, "Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan" (21 May 2012). Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm?

the military intervention in support of women's issues internationally, but their actions and spending focused on more tangible projects, such as training and supporting Afghan troops, rebuilding the Dahla Dam, and constructing schools. Aside from brief outlier moments in the Parliamentary reports, official Canadian objectives scarcely referred to women. The first Parliamentary report (2008) made no reference to female-specific funding outside of a brief mention of women in the context of widespread illiteracy and the need to assist with the drive to get Afghan girls into school.³⁶⁶ This report set the format for the following thirteen official Parliamentary documents. The six main priorities were discussed [see p25 of the "Canada in Afghanistan" section of Chapter Three], benchmarks developed, and progress presented.

Given such a framework, it is unsurprising that Afghan women appeared late in the second report, and only as a secondary sub-point for improving the access of "vulnerable populations" to essential health services.³⁶⁷ The December 2008 report featured greater attention to humanitarian concerns – with threats, physical attacks, and health problems joining illiteracy in women-focused initiatives.³⁶⁸ The March 2009 report to Parliament was released following the controversial passage in Afghanistan of the Sharia-friendly law that undermined the rights of women. As such, the "urgency of rule-of-law reform" and strong entreaties for the Afghan government to "honour its international treaty obligations, including obligations to respect the equality of women before the law" appeared in the Foreword of the

³⁶⁶ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan – Setting a Course to 2011: Report to Parliament" (June 2008): 6, 11, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/Afghrep_en.pdf

³⁶⁷ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament" (September 2008):20, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/rep-rap09_08_e.pdf

³⁶⁸ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament" (December 2008): 3-4, 7, 9, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r02_09_e.pdf

report.³⁶⁹ Also noticeable was the increased number of pictures selected for the document featuring female Canadian soldiers and Afghan women and girls. Prime Minister Harper is quoted as saying, "We cannot state strongly enough our concern for the rights of women in Afghanistan".³⁷⁰ Priority 3 of this same report, calling for the provision of "humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons", specifically mentioned malnutrition suffered by women and girls as a result of "persisting high food prices and drought in the north and northwest of the country", which led to a third of all Afghans being classified as "chronically food insecure".³⁷¹ The next report, apparently issued after Canadian public outrage over the Afghan law had subsided, failed to build on the momentum of the March report, reverting to the prior practice of mentioning women only in reference to education and illiteracy benchmarks.³⁷² The sole noticeable adjustment was the designation of women and children as the primary "vulnerable populations" considered in the progress indicator for increased access to health services.³⁷³

The September 2009 report featured an encouraging amount of female-specific information and goals. From the participation of women in the 2009 election, with "Two female candidates contest[ing] the presidential race and 326 women contest[ing] seats in their respective provincial councils", to the increased security measures for Afghan school girls and female teachers, projects and funding aimed specifically at women were notably more

³⁶⁹ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament" (March 2009): Foreword, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r03_09_eng.pdf

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament" (March 2009): 8.

³⁷² Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament" (June 2009): 6, 19, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r06_09_e.pdf

³⁷³ Ibid, 23.

abundant.³⁷⁴ The December 2009 quarterly report mentioned the (now defunct) Afghanistan Challenge, which had raised over \$280,000 toward "vocational training, microfinance and scholarships for women in Afghanistan". The Government of Canada matched the contributions of Canadians "dollar for dollar, doubling the investment made by Canadians to development in Afghanistan".³⁷⁵

Reports from this point on shifted to feature an increasing number of Afghan women-focused concerns and initiatives beyond the aforementioned 'signature projects'.³⁷⁶ Security benchmarks were addressed in the context of the larger issues facing the Afghan people, with community and development concerns supplanting the military-heavy focus of the previous reports. With the "Afghan government's ability to deliver basic services to Afghans" now considered a high priority, the June 2010 report reiterated that "a government that is unable to provide its citizens with access to clean water, education, health services and economic opportunity cannot engender confidence or foster long-term peace".³⁷⁷

New projects included the Emergency Micronutrient Initiative, which aimed to "reduce nutritional deficiencies and health complications among pregnant women and children under the age of five", with "140,000 children receiv[ing] packets of multiple micronutrient powders

³⁷⁴ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of July 1 to September 30, 2009", 3, 7, 9, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r09_09_e.pdf

³⁷⁵ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of October 1 to December 21, 2009", 7, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r12_09_eng.pdf

³⁷⁶ For more information on the three signature projects the Canadian government focused funding on, see p29, *Evolution of the Canadian Engagement* in Chapter Three.

³⁷⁷ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of April 1 to June 30, 2010", 2, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r06_10-eng.pdf

[and] 78,000 pregnant or lactating women receiv[ing] iron and folic acid supplements".³⁷⁸

Canadians became involved in business development for Afghan women "through training, skills development and access to small loans".³⁷⁹

The Afghan-led Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan has, since 2003, provided microfinance services to some 430,000 clients, 60 percent of whom are women. Access to credit in turn enables low-income households to purchase basic goods like food and clothing or the necessary start-up capital for a micro-enterprise. Women borrowers in particular greatly benefit from microfinance loans, as this assistance enables their participation in the local economy through activities such as selling poultry or dairy products, making crafts to sell at markets or operating tailor shops.³⁸⁰

The excitement evoked by female participation in the electoral process in turn generated programs aimed at supporting "voter education and female candidates".³⁸¹ Canada "provided electoral support materials and funded training for 251 female candidates running for office in the parliamentary elections, representing 60 percent of all female candidates", and helped create a hotline for "women in politics that fielded hundreds of calls".³⁸² Food security initiatives, undertaken by the World Food Programme (WFP) and supported by Canadian aid, include the "Purchase for Progress program that buys wheat from smallholder farmers for distribution in other regions of the country, thereby strengthening those farmers' access to Afghan grain markets".³⁸³

³⁷⁸ Ibid, 1, 8.

³⁷⁹ Ibid, 7.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of July 1 to September 20, 2010", 12, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r09_10-eng.pdf

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of October 1 to December 31, 2010", 8, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r12_10-eng.pdf

The June 2011 Parliamentary report chronicled the end of Canada's engagement in Kandahar and the new role Canada would undertake through the transition operation. As the Canadian Forces and civilian personnel returned home, focus shifted to:

the delivery of development programming in education and health, in particular for women and children; the advancement of security, the rule of law and human rights, including the provision of up to 950 CF trainers and support personnel for Afghan security forces, and approximately 45 civilian police trainers; the promotion of regional diplomacy; and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.³⁸⁴

The Fourteenth and Final Report will be examined in depth in Chapter Five, but the gradual evolution of the humanitarian dimension – and specifically the focus on Afghan women – illustrated by this brief survey of official Canadian government reports speaks to the overall shift in the greater Afghan mission. As the grassroots involvement of women in decision-making and community planning increased,³⁸⁵ aid was gradually demilitarized, and international funding and governmental cooperation began to focus more closely on gendered issues.³⁸⁶ Non-traditional and traditional opportunities for women continue to be developed and supported, especially considering the ongoing return of refugees to devastated areas and seeking work.³⁸⁷ Education aid remains a key Canadian priority, with CIDA investment in education projects through Global Partnership for Education,³⁸⁸ and CARE.³⁸⁹ Additionally,

³⁸⁴ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of April 1 to June 30, 2011", Foreword, available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r06_11-eng.pdf

³⁸⁵ Lara Coleman, "The Gendered Violence of Development: Imaginative Geographies of Exclusion in the Imposition of Neo-liberal Capitalism," *BJPIR* 9 (2007): 215; Oxfam, "Quick Impact," 1, 2, 4-5; Oxfam "Promises", 4, 6-7; Kandiyoti, "Hammer", 514; Benard, 29; Plümper and Neumayer, 748; Reid, 62.

³⁸⁶ HRW "Promises of the World", 3; Oxfam "Promises", 5, 9-10; Kandiyoti, "Old Dilemmas", 188, 189, 190; Benard, 27; Caiazza, 5.

³⁸⁷ Benard, 29, 30, 31, 35; Ghufuran, 91-92; Rippenburg, 416; See a short video on Canadian specific investment -- <http://www.unicef.ca/en/video/education-in-afghanistan-the-building-blocks-for-the-countrys-future>

³⁸⁸ See <http://www.globalpartnership.org/afghanistan>

³⁸⁹ The CARE project is composed of three main elements: 1. Partnership Advancing Community-based Education in Afghanistan (PACE-A), which "aims to reach over 90,000 Afghan children, youth and adults, focusing on women and girls, in approximately 1,000 remote communities. This project primarily supports communities that do not

humanitarian assistance for widows and vocational training for Afghan women in general will continue to receive funding through the transition period.³⁹⁰

While the overall trend toward greater inclusion of women and women's rights in aid spending is laudable, such interventions should surely be considered a primary and fundamental, rather than secondary, element of the state-building process. Granted, the Canadian government repeatedly stressed the importance of the comprehensive approach and the need for the various wings of the engagement (including military, government and civilian actors) to work in tandem toward the betterment of the Afghan people.³⁹¹ Yet government funding went first and foremost toward security and infrastructure projects rather than humanitarian needs.

The Canadian involvement in Afghanistan exemplifies the challenges of moving from justifying military intervention to emphasizing women's rights and humanitarian issues, and the

have any access to formal schools by providing primary grade education to Afghan children (60% of them girls) but also offering accelerated learning, literacy and early childhood development activities to youth, adults and preschool-aged children where these are identified as needs through consultations with the community." 2. Community-Organized Primary Education (COPE), which "promotes local accountability and sustainability through the training of Community Education Committees (CECs), teachers and employees from the Education Department and Ministry of Education. COPE assists with the establishment of community-based classes, provides material support to teachers and students and offers training and in-class room support to community-based teachers." 3. Secondary Schools for Girls, which focuses on "rural areas where there are fewer schools and resources, and more conservative attitudes may limit the ability of girls to further their education. In an attempt to fill the gap, CARE piloted community-based education project with private funding to provide specialized classes in grades seven through nine for girls". For more information on these projects, please see <http://www.care.org/careswork/projects/AFG023.asp>

³⁹⁰ See CARE projects: Kabul Widows Humanitarian Assistance (KWHV) at <http://www.care.org/careswork/projects/AFG018.asp>; Poultry Development for Women / WIGLD at <http://www.care.org/careswork/projects/AFG020.asp>; and Vocational Training for Afghan Women (VTAWP) at <http://www.care.org/careswork/projects/AFG046.asp>

³⁹¹ See *Canada First Defence Strategy*, Department of National Defence (2008), page 9: "Today's deployments are far more dangerous, complex and challenging than in the past, and they require more than a purely military solution. In Afghanistan, for example, the Canadian Forces' contribution [was] only one component, albeit an essential one, of a 'whole-of-government' approach. Only by drawing upon a wide range of governmental expertise and resources will Canada be successful in its efforts to confront today's threats." Document available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf

reality of actual military operations. As stated by Shannon, "In the post-9/11 era, Afghanistan has become a testing ground for changes in development theory, humanitarian policy, aid modalities, global governance and responses to the 'war on terror'".³⁹² Well-intentioned or not, the intervention was a military endeavor, reliant on military might and focused on military targets or operational benchmarks, at least at the outset. With the withdrawal of Canadian forces, the Canadian government has addressed the question of continued involvement in post-combat Afghanistan with a focus on humanitarian concerns and development aid initiatives. Regardless of the course the intervention has taken, with the withdrawal of the international forces and gradual transition to full Afghan leadership, the legacy of the measures proposed now will affect Afghan women, and the Afghan population as a whole, for years to come.

³⁹² Shannon, 18.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

As a goal or end state, winning hearts and minds provides the wrong focus of operations... [it should be] giving the people faith they are going to a better future, that things will continue to improve, that we... will not leave prematurely... and the situation will not revert to the chaos of the 1990s. (Former commander 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division)³⁹³

The Afghan situation is extraordinarily complex. Despite the many twists and turns in the evolution of the state-building mission, international forces, including Canada, have played a vital role in Afghanistan. There are no easy answers for disengagement, development, or reconstruction in the post-conflict period. As a consequence, the initially optimistic nation-building hopes – following the initial overthrow of the Taliban government by the coalition – have undergone a pragmatic reassessment.

The comprehensive approach discussed in chapter three was a military-friendly attempt to integrate RMA and humanitarian requirements into a changing global intervention model. The effectiveness of the humanitarian discourse in responding to core security issues in Afghanistan remains questionable when viewed from a feminist and human-security perspective, however. The blurring of boundaries between the various humanitarian and security actors produced strategic problems for legitimacy, neutrality and 'success' of key operations.³⁹⁴ Considering the development aspect of the approach, the CIDA-funded initiatives have come under attack for being pro-politico-military in nature, with a focus on "marketable military and aid achievements rather than progress towards human security and development".³⁹⁵ Shrouding projects in humanitarian language and placing greater importance

³⁹³ Former commander 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, as quoted by Scott Sigmund Gartner and Leo Blanken, "Beyond Victory and Defeat", in *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*, 127.

³⁹⁴ Shannon, 16.

³⁹⁵ MacNeil, 10.

on domestic opinion in Canada over impact in Afghanistan, the structural imbalance between the military and development personnel served to empower "traditional security actors in the aid regime".³⁹⁶ Tangible concerns facing Afghan women need to be addressed, specifically those areas contributing to the fear and vulnerability still undermining the safety and security of Afghan women. "When women have more rights and equality, national standards of living also rise – life expectancy is higher, incomes and education levels are higher, and birthrates and lower. As countries more fully include women in political, economic, and social rights, standards of living improve as well".³⁹⁷ Effective aid, justice, governmental representation and personal safety provisions require a renewed focus on Afghan needs and the demilitarization of aid.

Hasegawa claims that "the concept of human security in such a context is considered to embody human rights and humanitarian concerns and to imply meeting the need for the protection of human worth, minimum physical safety, human rights and minimum standards of living".³⁹⁸ Whether these goals have been achieved is debatable, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The state-building operations under the comprehensive approach tied macro issues at the state level with micro projects to address community concerns at the individual level, with varying (but so far not decisive) degrees of success. This thesis has considered the Afghan engagement with an eye to the country's history, and to the legacy of the western-imposed state-building methods.

³⁹⁶ Ibid, 11.

³⁹⁷ Caiazza, 2.

³⁹⁸ Hasegawa, 3.

Legacy for Afghans?

The military intervention did "have a role to play in providing assistance to save lives and alleviate suffering in situations where no civilian actor [was] able to do so".³⁹⁹ But the legacy of the intervention for Afghans, whether they are civilians or members of the military, government, or insurgent forces, will depend on how the transitional phase progresses. Will Karzai and the centralized government remain in 'control'? Will decentralized power and local leadership bring peace to Afghanistan, or spur renewed civil war? Will the international community again turn its collective back on the region? And what happens when the channels of aid run dry? With a turbulent recent history still etched in their memories, it is likely that the majority of Afghans will back whichever force appears likely to control their valley or village in five years' time. As they attempt to generate legitimacy for a widely-distrusted government while fighting an ongoing counter-insurgency war, Afghan and coalition leaders confront significant continuing challenges.

Stemming from the decades of war and general international disregard, the sudden influx of news about Afghanistan in the western media has focused primarily on the 'ungovernability' of the 'backward' country, with the concerns of the average Afghan citizen taking a backseat. Generalizing among various poor Muslim countries to generate information and create policies for Afghanistan was an easy (and dangerous) method for 'understanding' a distant conflict. Afghanistan is a unique land, and must be addressed in unique and specific

³⁹⁹ Oxfam, "Quick Impact," 2.

ways.⁴⁰⁰ Afghanistan consequently has a particular and rich culture and history. Afghans deserve to have their testimonies and concerns recognized.⁴⁰¹

Afghanistan is also an extraordinarily diverse state, with regional and ethnic differences as well as a historic distaste for centralized authority. Instead of continuing the fight for centralized democracy, the Afghan government and ISAF officials should consider hybrid governing options that are more appropriate for the Afghan political system. Recent Afghan history demonstrates that a succession of rulers have failed to create respectful policies, capitalize on local governing strengths, or implement productive economic and infrastructural reform. They have thus failed to generate legitimacy and support among the Afghan people. The Taliban rose to power following the civil war because they brought stability and governance, however vicious in many respects. Today the Taliban are utilizing similar policies, and "capitalizing on grievances" felt toward the government to recruit supporters.⁴⁰² Despite all the time, money, and lives invested in the military campaign against the Taliban and insurgent organizations in the region, international and Afghan officials must consider non-military solutions as equally important in this fight.

Concerns regarding Karzai's reluctance to undertake any agenda that would decrease his power or increase the authority of those outside his immediate circle are valid, and have led some analysts to hint at regime change. Arquilla and Rothstein recommend that state-builders "identify and nurture young Afghan leaders who are committed to Afghanistan," and that they should "assist in pushing out the "old guard" (even by means of a civil/military coup if

⁴⁰⁰ Barfield, 54.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid, 2.

⁴⁰² Jones, "It takes the villages," 125.

necessary)".⁴⁰³ Rejecting such extremes, Barfield claims that granting autonomous regions in Afghanistan greater levels of involvement in local matters would result in a more favourable attitude toward a central government handling the 'higher-level responsibilities' of international and security policy.

Furthering the discussion on justice and legitimacy, Rodriquez and Lorentz offer an interesting suggestion regarding power-holders in Afghanistan, and possibly game-changing steps that should be considered. They challenge state-builders and the Afghan government to take youth into account as a means of disrupting the ingrained power dynamics. Pointing to the success insurgency forces have had in indoctrinating disenfranchised and frustrated youth with jihadist ideologies, Rodriquez and Lorentz call for a rejuvenated focus on civil society. While the state-building prerogatives have shifted under the transition operation, throughout much of the engagement civil society was largely ignored by state-builders.⁴⁰⁴ The Taliban benefited greatly from such tendencies, gaining support at the local level by working through informal channels – "mosques, family ties, tribal ties" – and by collaborating "with conservative clerical networks, and recruit[ing] the marginal, petty criminals and young unemployed" in remote (that is, ignored) regions.⁴⁰⁵ By investing in youth and backing the non-state actors and social structures that consistently supported local communities throughout the years of conflict, the government would undermine the appeal of the Taliban and generate good will for itself. Recognizing that corruption may accompany any investment in local communities, certain

⁴⁰³ John Arquilla and Hy Rothstein, "Assessing the Strategic Alternatives", in *Afghan Endgames*, 217.

⁴⁰⁴ Whitty, 215; Carver, 72.

⁴⁰⁵ Rodriquez and Lorentz, 201, see also 200.

material losses may be acceptable if they help to build a relationship between the government and civil society.⁴⁰⁶

The Taliban has demonstrated a strategic strength in its ability to adapt to the changing political climate of Afghanistan. Finding niches of influence to destabilize Kabul's reach has allowed it to rebuild from the almost total destruction inflicted upon it early in the latest Afghan war. Western attempts to suppress the Taliban must likewise move beyond a 'security' mindset if they are to succeed. Robert Reilly points to American awareness of and responsiveness in the 'information war', and the creation of pro-government media programs, as positive contributions to the propaganda battle. Further methods proposed as strategic communication tools are debating Taliban theology and highlighting ideological lacunae to challenge the religiosity central to the Taliban's message, and to undermine Taliban claims of moderation with regard to past extremist behavior (for example, by disseminating decrees and religious teachings to remind Afghans of the reality of Taliban rule). As Stephen Biddle recommends, "create a political narrative that puts the Taliban on the outside, killing innocent Afghans, and ourselves on the inside, defending them".⁴⁰⁷

Gartner and Blanken argue that a cyclical pattern of stability and instability should be expected in Afghanistan, and that "rather than being focused on static victory and fixed goals, the focus [should be] more fluid, seeking to create an Afghanistan resilient enough to resist extreme spikes in violence".⁴⁰⁸ Rothstein likewise contends that long-lasting 'outcomes' of policies should carry greater weight and emphasis than short-term effects right from the initial

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid, 201, 203.

⁴⁰⁷ As quoted by Reilly, "Shaping Strategic Communication", 186.

⁴⁰⁸ Gartner and Blanken, 132.

stages of strategic planning. Mirroring the admonitions of multiple authors, Gartner and

Blanken propose a policy along a modified understanding of a progressive strategic reality:

1. *Go Small*. Deploy small units within a thin web of air and logistical support.
2. *Go Local*. Focus on working with local forces to improve local security.
3. *Go Long*. Recognize that transforming a nation like Afghanistan takes decades.
4. *Use Anticipatory Indicators of Success*. Capture civilian expectations of security.⁴⁰⁹

International troops experimented with localized security forces periodically throughout the Afghan engagement, with marginal success. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and joint civil-military units were a principal focus of the Canadian involvement in Kandahar, and American forces developed multiple mutations of the same model before their latest attempt – the Village Stability Operations (VSO). The top-down organization and training models that had proved problematic in previous variations were addressed under the VSO creation, with village-specific security structures and leadership by those "recognized by the local population as the legitimate representatives of their communities" holding decision making powers.⁴¹⁰

Undercutting Karzai's desire for centralized rule, yet addressing the security needs outside of Kabul, VSO's are useful as a short-term stepping stone while the training and operational abilities of ANSF troops improve. With appropriate international support and backing from the Afghan government, such community-level involvement could produce a long-term solution to the problem of rural insecurity.

The 'government in a box' prototype⁴¹¹ implemented in Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban privileged the western idea of government over locally necessary

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Rothstein, 74; see also Kagan, 112.

⁴¹¹ The term refers to General McChrystal's claim that he had a "government in a box, ready to move in" once the shooting stopped in Marja (the largest Taliban stronghold in Helmand province in 2010). "For the first time, NATO and Afghan officials have assembled a large team of Afghan administrators and an Afghan governor that will move

strategies of governance. While government can be understood as "the act of ruling, the continuous exercise of state authority over the population it governs," the concept of governance is far broader, referring to "the manner in which communities regulate themselves to preserve social order and maintain their security" – something that can be accomplished even "in the absence of state authority".⁴¹² Lister points out that rules and institutions were already entrenched in regions that are currently being guided along a path of western democratic state-building. Even through the years of conflict, locally dictated customs and institutions served to bring order amidst the chaos.

With the formation of the Afghan government following the Bonn Conference of 2001, the job of governing was delegated to the central government. But in the process, a confusing 'institutional multiplicity' was created. Lister claims that "it may be more helpful to think of 'state-building' initiatives as attempting to replace one type of rules with another, so that formal bureaucratic rules of a Weberian type take precedence over informal rules rooted in patronage and clientalism".⁴¹³ State-builders failed to acknowledge the importance of subnational governance structures until 2005, by which time the "local powerholders have had the time, space and resources (through trading opium poppy and other illegal activities) to

into Marja... More than 1,900 police are standing by". Dexter Filkins, "Afghan Offensive is New War Model", *The New York Times* (12 Feb 2010) available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/world/asia/13kabul.html>. References to McChrystal's ill-advised statement abound, with notables from Reilly ("Shaping Strategic Communication", 181), Barfield and Nojumi ("Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability", 45), Peter Charles Coharis and James A. Gavrilis ("Counterinsurgency 3.0." *Parameters: US Army War College* 40, no.1 (2010), 42), and Noah Shachtman ("Marjah's 'Government in a Box' Flops as McChrystal Fumes", *Wired* (25 May 2010), available at <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/marjahs-government-in-a-box-flops-as-mcchrystal-fumes/>).

⁴¹² Thomas Barfield, "Afghan Paradoxes," in *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*, 54.

⁴¹³ Lister, 992.

adapt the old 'rules of the game' to the new circumstances".⁴¹⁴ Demonstrable improvements in certain districts, and the success of particular programs, should encourage state-builders and the Afghan government to continue developing initiatives in a region-specific manner to fit community characteristics and requirements.⁴¹⁵

In Canada, the Manley Report (2008) recommended "blending familiar international procedures with the best of traditional Afghan approaches to the peaceful settlement of community disputes and private differences".⁴¹⁶ Civil society has played a key role in maintaining some measure of continuity in parts of Afghanistan, and policymakers need to gain a more nuanced understanding of local government as part of a range of mechanisms necessary to generate effective policies.⁴¹⁷

Internationally backed aid and state-building measures, necessary during conflict and post-conflict periods when national resources are lacking, must include local actors if the projects are to have long-term validity and legitimacy.⁴¹⁸ 'Community-driven development' enables aid recipients to determine the needs and benefits of policies and ensure the effective implementation of donor funds, thus granting Afghans ownership over their own reconstruction effort.⁴¹⁹ Locally directed or generated development initiatives that strive to be socially and economically responsible have found greater acceptance and success at the local level, influencing current trends in state-building strategies in Afghanistan.⁴²⁰ While the

⁴¹⁴ Ibid, 1002.

⁴¹⁵ See Lister for critique of public administration initiatives in Afghanistan, 996-997.

⁴¹⁶ "Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan," 16.

⁴¹⁷ Lister, 1005; See Barfield and Nojumi for an extensive list of decentralized governing recommendations.

⁴¹⁸ Francis Fukuyama, "'Stateness' First," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005): 85.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid, 86.

⁴²⁰ Senate Committee Reports, 52; Andrew Kurt, "Afghanistan's Current Situation and the Outlook for the Future: An Interview with Thomas Gouttierre", *Digest of Middle East Studies* (Fall 2010): 222-223, 225.

governing powers in Kabul focus on macro issues, concerns at the local level (micro) also require attention and funding if true reconstruction is to take hold. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts tend to "marginalize non-sectarian community capacity building in favor of formal political institutions, privileging elite classes" and excluding "the specializations and expertise of those in the informal sector, women particularly".⁴²¹ Discussions on 'community involvement' focus on creating space for such minorities to be recognized as influential in the "informal processes of local peace-making and peace-keeping roles" instead of being overlooked "in favor of centralized conflict resolution and settlement models".⁴²² Such models elevate "the importance of elites and armed groups, [and minimize] the significance of those 'on the ground,' who have developed practical and every-day mechanisms for peace-building".⁴²³ Additionally, decentralized community inclusion should incorporate ethnic, political and religious minorities in a more 'inclusive and flexible political arrangement'.⁴²⁴ The grassroots involvement of Afghans at all stages of the development process – considering community concerns, localized rule and judicial matters aligned within national parameters – could better address the issues important to Afghans than the volatility that currently exists.⁴²⁵

The humanitarian proclamations issued after 9/11 eased the path to military intervention in Afghanistan for the western actors. The human security discourse in turn bridged the gap between military intervention and civilian humanitarian issues. The treatment and effective inclusion of women in the reconstruction stage of the conflict will bring the dialogue full circle in addressing the initial humanitarian justification for intervention.

⁴²¹ Ismael, 32.

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ Ibid; see also Jones 125, 127.

⁴²⁴ Biddle, 51; see also Lister, 993.

⁴²⁵ Adeney, 543, 544; Biddle, 54; Mullen, 28.

The long-term consequences of continuous war and militarization must be addressed with great care and understanding. Human security and women's rights need to be addressed at the political and legal levels to create space for women to become visible in the public realm.⁴²⁶ The international community cannot arbitrarily impose judicial and societal modifications and expect them to work. Framing the Afghan engagement in basic cultural and religious terms ignored the "roots and nature of human suffering in this part of the world".⁴²⁷ Instead of examining "questions that might lead to the exploration of global interconnections, we were offered ones that worked to artificially divide the world into separate spheres – recreating an imaginative geography of West versus East, us versus Muslims".⁴²⁸ Focusing on the historical, economic and political reality of women in Afghanistan creates a clearer picture of the complexities of life and possibilities moving forward. The lessons to be learned from the critical approach to the problems surrounding Afghanistan can only materialize once the historical and root causes of the issues are effectively considered.⁴²⁹ The legacy of the state-building and development initiatives implemented in Afghanistan under western guidance will determine whether the humanitarian concerns and human security issues deployed to justify military intervention were more than rhetoric.

⁴²⁶ Reid, 6, 14, 51, 53; Benard, 34-35. "In February 2009, Parliament passed the Shia Personal Status Law, which the president signed. The law regulates the personal affairs of Shia Muslims, including divorce, inheritance, and minimum age of marriage. A number of provisions severely restrict women's basic freedoms, for instance, those preventing women from leaving their homes without permission from their husbands, or granting custody rights to fathers and grandfathers in the event of separation. The law was passed ahead of the 2009 presidential election, when Karzai was seeking the voting blocs of powerful hardline Shia leaders." Reid, 22. See "Afghanistan: Repeal Amnesty Law," Human Rights Watch news release (March 20, 2010), available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/03/10/afghanistan-repeal-amnesty-law>

⁴²⁷ Abu-Lughod, 784.

⁴²⁸ Ibid, 784, see also 786; Maira, 633.

⁴²⁹ Afghan women must be "given an opportunity to come to terms with their past, [or] there is little prospect for sustainable peace", Jackson, 6; Reid, 60; Daulatzai, 434-435.

Legacy for Canada

The Afghan engagement has been a key feature of Canadian foreign policy for over a decade. As argued by Kimberly Marten, the influence of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) on Canadian involvement in international affairs, and DFAIT's tendency to utilize civil-military relationships to address diplomatic and foreign policy concerns, means that the lessons learned from the Afghanistan situation need to be assimilated into Canadian foreign policy debates of the future.⁴³⁰ Marten claims that the two primary foreign policy goals of DFAIT – to "increase Canada's international visibility as a state separate from its powerful neighbor to the south, while simultaneously placating the United States on security issues so that trade relations between the two countries remain stable and profitable" – while often at odds in application, may sometimes be effectively combined.⁴³¹ Marten's article goes on to say that the "mutual distrust and competitiveness" plaguing relations between CF and "Canadian politicians and bureaucrats, especially those in DFAIT, when it comes to foreign deployments", can be overcome when "the mission is clearly defined and resources are adequate to support both its military and civilian dimensions", such as with the Kandahar PRT cooperation of 2009-2010.⁴³² Marten cautioned, however, that

⁴³⁰ Marten considers the power of DFAIT in Cabinet decisions on Canadian Force (CF) deployment and the tendency of DFAIT to "view the CF as a tool to be used in its overall foreign policy and diplomatic strategies" (p 214) in her article "From Kabul to Kandahar: The Canadian Forces and Change".

⁴³¹ Ibid, 214.

⁴³² The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) combined DFAIT, "CIDA, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), local police forces from Toronto and other large Canadian cities, and Canadian Forces". Ibid. Amid the political maneuverings and reconfigurations of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, "the CF were still deployed in the same foreign country, with the same overall strategic mission of contributing to state-building and providing security for the Afghan population, and as part of the same international coalitions: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) under US command, responsible for combat operations; and NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. But both the operational conditions that the CF faced on the ground and the political conditions they faced in Ottawa shifted dramatically over time". Marten, 215.

The increased level of civil-military cooperation that has emerged in Canada under the whole-of-government approach in Kandahar will be sustained [only] as long as the *individuals* who have experienced it are given positions of influence within their individual agencies. However, the cross-agency *institutions* that were created for the Kandahar mission...are unlikely to be resurrected after the current mission ends – unless, once again, there is a crisis in a failing state that galvanizes across-the-spectrum political support, this time with the budgetary focus and government attention that such institutions require. While the examples of these institutions may be remembered by many people, the complex lessons learned about their design and effectiveness are likely to be lost unless government resources are dedicated to retaining them.⁴³³

If the comprehensive approach is to remain a key tool in Canadian foreign policy, the struggles endured and relationships forged between the civilian and military arms of the Afghan operation must not be discarded following the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In the "Fourteenth and Final" parliamentary report on *Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan*, the conclusion of the Canadian military involvement is clearly emphasized. In the report's foreword, Prime Minister Stephen Harper acknowledged that Afghanistan "continues to be one of the most impoverished and dangerous countries in the world"; the "challenges that the Afghan people continue to face today are formidable"; and "the country will require years to recover from the violence, underdevelopment and poor governance that 30 years of war, turmoil, and oppression from the Taliban have caused".⁴³⁴ Harper commended the legacy of "our soldiers and civilian professionals in Afghanistan" and mirrored the report itself in highlighting the achievements made during the period of engagement.⁴³⁵

The report is more concerned with bookending the 2008 operational objectives (the first year of the engagement that a comprehensive report was prepared) than considering the

⁴³³ Marten, 230.

⁴³⁴ Government of Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan – Fourteenth and Final Report to Parliament." (March 2012) available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/r06_12/index.aspx?lang=eng&view=d

⁴³⁵ Foreword, "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan – Fourteenth and Final Report to Parliament."

legacy of the conflict for Canada domestically. The key elements of the initial participation in the Afghan conflict – supporting our US allies and NATO responsibilities in overthrowing the Taliban, and helping to create a "more stable, self-sustaining, prosperous country that will never again serve as a haven for terrorists" – maintain their prominent place, prioritized over the humanitarian concerns of "bringing security, stability and development to the people of Afghanistan".⁴³⁶ Looking forward, however, Prime Minister Harper's statements reflect the adjustment of foreign policy strategies as the Afghan engagement winds up. Early military motivations have been replaced with objectives such as

making investments in the future of Afghan children and youth through ongoing development programming in education and health; and advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, including through the provision of military and police trainers; promoting regional diplomacy; and helping to deliver humanitarian assistance to those in need.⁴³⁷

Looking past Afghanistan, Canada seems likely to continue to emphasize its UN and NATO commitments, as "membership in these institutions continues to serve Canadian interests".⁴³⁸ The Department of National Defence asserted that multilateral cooperation "is, and will continue to be, the foundation of a stable and peaceful international system. The nature and complexity of today's threats, ranging from failed states to terrorism, require a coordinated approach and an investment in resources that could never be achieved by governments acting on their own".⁴³⁹ Interoperability with 'coalitions of the willing' in situations outside the capacity of the UN, especially in support of our neighbour to the south, will remain a high priority for the Canadian Forces.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, 8, see also 45, 79.

⁴³⁹ Ibid, 45.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid, 7, 47.

After Afghanistan, Canadian policy-makers will likely approach international security concerns from a framework other than an exclusively military one.

Humanitarian crises, human security needs, and counterinsurgency operations in the future will require harnessing all the instruments of Canada's national power: governance, diplomacy, development, defence and security forces, legal institutions and law enforcement, trade and commerce, economic development, education, health, social services, negotiation skills, reconciliation processes, and institution building. This will have to be applied in a comprehensive and coordinated fashion in order to achieve the desired effects – the resolution of dissatisfaction, the elimination of conflict, and the restoration of peace.⁴⁴¹

As non-state actors are expected to continue to influence conflicts and crises worldwide, the state-building strategies developed in response to circumstances in Afghanistan may prove useful for the Canadian forces in the future. Just as it was difficult to differentiate between civilian and insurgent Afghans, non-state actors may include various forces and groupings, such as:

militias, warlords, local defence groups, rebel groups, radical ecological and religious organizations, terrorist groups, criminal organizations and private military firms. These non-state actors are expected to play a larger role in the future security environment, and their presence will further complicate traditional military operations, primarily because they operate outside the international laws and norms governing the use of force by which state militaries are bound.⁴⁴²

Engaging in military operations in civilian areas will require the continued presence of humanitarian actors and assistance, and the debate over initiating and implementing 'humanitarian military interventions' will continue to draw criticism from human-security and feminist perspectives.

It is this author's conviction that there was merit in employing a comprehensive approach in the Afghan situation, but that the limitations and challenges woven into such an engagement called for a greater inclusion of humanitarian considerations throughout the

⁴⁴¹ Ibid, 90.

⁴⁴² Ibid, 79-80.

conflict/engagement period. Utilizing the humanitarian lexicon in defence of the military intervention while disregarding humanitarian issues, harmed the development aspect of the engagement and caused greater problems for the post-conflict period. As demonstrated by international involvement in past conflicts, individual nation-states characteristically depart from post-conflict situations as soon as possible and the newly vacated and war-ravaged nation concerned soon is left to rely on the limited funds and resources of the few individual/humanitarian organizations who do continue on. If the United Nations and NGOs are expected to 'clean up the mess' left behind by military interventions, there exists a dangerous possibility that "rather than enmeshing and constraining the United States and other actors, humanitarianism might lose all meaning and become just one more foreign policy tool that has nothing at all to do with the people who are supposedly being helped".⁴⁴³ The comprehensive approach to international operations therefore may fail to satisfy conflicting demands and expectations, both domestic and global. Yet it is the method this researcher deems best able to encompass the intertwined humanitarian and security concerns evident in Afghanistan. Moving forward, the overarching policy recommendation this paper endorses is a two-fold need for longevity of focus. As made apparent within the interviews of chapter three, the first area longevity applies to is in consideration of aid funding. Whether funding new initiatives in Afghanistan or deciding to continue funding established programs, planners must consider the long term impact and benefit of the proposed spending as *more important* than short term gains. Building the trust and respect needed for effective mentorship relationships is time-consuming, yet the promise of sustained support between local and international actors helps

⁴⁴³ Mills, 178.

create an environment of stability compatible with ground-level improvements. Within that, sub-categorizing humanitarian initiatives below military spending undermines the viability of said programs and hinders the long term benefit of the initiatives themselves. As stressed throughout this thesis, humanitarian concerns must receive equal footing with security objectives in the drive toward improving welfare for the average Afghan (both male *and* female. This thesis focused on voicing the concerns of Afghan women, but the complex state of affairs for Afghan males deserves a full study of its own). Secondly, the years of trial and error spent in the pursuit of an effective mix within the Canadian civil-military units should not be abandoned following the close of the Afghan engagement. Focus again must be on future engagements, with the cooperation forged among individuals from the opposing humanitarian and security sectors fostered and their shared knowledge supported and retained.

Considering the 'legacy' in this case is not reliant on the 'success' or failure of the Afghan engagement. These are multi-layered concepts, and they are not easily defined. It is merely to inquire about the impact of the conflict on Afghanistan, as well as in the international sphere and in Canada specifically. In this country, the legacy of the Afghan involvement politically will continue to be debated. The military impact can be considered in terms of innovations implemented, hardships suffered, counterinsurgency operational lessons learned, or command recommendations made. Future military endeavors, regarding both the initial decision to join military coalitions and the form that counterinsurgency and state-building operations will take, will certainly seek to draw on the lessons of the Afghan operations. The impact that the Afghan engagement will have on future public perceptions of war, and hence on domestic support for the Canadian Forces, remains uncertain. Moreover, it is likely that future assessments of the

Afghan conflict and foreign involvement will reflect the perspectives and attitudes of the commentators as much as it does the ground-level realities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abu-Lughod, Lila. "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others." *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (2002): 783-790.
- Adeney, Katharine. "Constitutional Design and the Political Salience of "Community" Identity in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era." *Asian Survey* 48, no.4 (July - August, 2008): 535-557.
- 'Afghanistan Compact', The. The London Conference on Afghanistan, 31 Jan. to 1 Feb. 2006. Available at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf
- Amnesty International. "Afghanistan conference raises fears of sacrificing rights for short-term peace." News (18 July 2010). Available at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/afghanistan-conference-raises-fears-sacrificing-rights-short-term-peace-2010-07-19>
- . "Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in Men's Power Struggles" (1 November 1999). Available at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA11/011/1999/en/c80434b3-e035-11dd-865-d728958ca30a/asa110111999en.pdf>
- Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. "Osama bin Laden and the Advent of Netwar." *New Perspectives Quarterly* 18, no.4 (Fall 2001): 22-33.
- Arquilla, John and Hy Rothstein. "Assessing the Strategic Alternatives." In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*. Eds Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. 211-218.
- Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2010.
- . "Afghan Paradoxes." In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*. Eds Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. 39-57.
- and Neamatollah Nojumi. "Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability." *Middle East Policy* 17, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 40-52.
- Benard, Cheryl. "Caution nation-builders: gender assumptions ahead." *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 32 (Winter 2008): 25-37.
- Berman, Sheri. "From the Sun King to Karzai: Lessons for State Building in Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs* 89, no.2 (2010): 2-9.

- Bhadrakumar, M K. "Karzai Wagers on Obama's Audacity." *Asia Times Online* (August 28, 2010). Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LH28Df01.html
- Biddle, Stephen, Fotini Christia, and F. Alexander Their. "Defining Success in Afghanistan – What can the United States Accept." *Foreign Affairs* 89, no.4 (2010): 49-60.
- Blanchard, Eric M. "Gender, International relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory." *Signs* 28, no.4 (2003): 1289-1312.
- Caiazza, Amy. "Why gender matters in understanding September 11: women, militarism, and violence." Briefing Paper, Washington, DC: Institute for Women's Policy Research (November, 2001) 6 p.
- Cannon, Lawrence. Transcript of Speech given by Minister of Foreign Affairs to University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs, "Governing Global Security: The Role of Summit Diplomacy," Toronto, Ontario (June 18, 2010).
- Caprioli, Mary. "Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis." *International Studies Review* 6 (June 2004): 253-269.
- Carpenter, R. Charli. "Review: Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a Nonfeminist Standpoint?" *International Studies Review* 4, no.3 (2002): 153-165.
- Carver, Frederic. "Are The Reasons for the Failure of Statebuilding in Afghanistan Specific to the Country or Characteristic of South Asia More Generally?" *Asian Affairs* 42 (March 2011): 70-82.
- Cassese, Antonio. *International Law, Second Edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Chaudhuri, Rudra and Theo Farrell. "Campaign disconnect: operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011." *International Affairs* 87, no.2 (2011): 271–296.
- Coleman, Lara. "The Gendered Violence of Development: Imaginative Geographies of Exclusion in the Imposition of Neo-liberal Capitalism." *BJPIR* 9 (2007): 204–219.
- Daulatzai, Anila. "The Discursive Occupation of Afghanistan." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 35 (December 2008): 419-435.
- Department of National Defence. *The Future Security Environment: 2008-2030*. Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, January 2009. Available at http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/documents/CFD%20FSE/Signed_Eng_FSE_10Jul09_eng.pdf
- Eco, Umberto. "Reflections on War, La Rivista dei libri (1 April 1991)"; reprinted in U. Eco, *Five Moral Pieces*, trans. A. McEwen (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1997): 1-17.

Escobar, Arturo. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Estrada, Angela María. "Regulation and Control of Subjectivity and Private Life in the Context of Armed Conflict in Colombia." *Community, Work & Family* 10, no.3 (August 2007): 257-281.

Farhounand-Sims, Chesmak. "Unfulfilled promises: women and peace in post-Taliban Afghanistan." *International Journal* 62 (Summer 2007): 643-663.

Ferreira, Rialize. "Operationalizing Human Security in South Africa." *Armed Forces and Society* 35 (April 2009): 501-525.

Fleming, Caroline B. "'Even in Dreams, They are Coming': Islamic Fundamentalism and the Education of Women in Afghanistan". *William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law* 11, no. 3 (2005): 597- 617.

Fluri, Jennifer. "Bodies, bombs and barricades: geographies of conflict and civilian (in)security." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 36, no.2 (2011): 280-296.

----- . "Capitalizing on Bare Life: Sovereignty, Exception, and Gender Politics." *Antipode* (Inaugural issue):1-23.

Fukuyama, Francis. "'Stateness' First." *Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005): 84-88.

----- . "The Imperative of State-Building." *Journal of Democracy* 15 (April 2004): 17-31.

Gartner, Scott Sigmund and Leo Blanken. "Beyond Victory and Defeat". In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*. Eds Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. 127-149.

Gates, Robert M. "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance." *Foreign Affairs* 89, no.3 (2010): 2-5.

Ghufran, Nasreen. "Afghanistan in 2005: The Challenges of Reconstruction." *Asian Survey* 46, no. 1 (2006): 85-94.

Government of Canada. "Canada's Approach in Afghanistan." (24 August 2011). Available at <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/approach-approche/index.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>

----- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan – Setting a Course to 2011: Report to Parliament." (June 2008). Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/Afghrep_en.pdf

- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament." (September 2008). Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/rep-rap09_08_e.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament." (December 2008). Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r02_09_e.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament." (March 2009). Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r03_09_eng.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament." (June 2009). Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r06_09_e.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of July 1 to September 30, 2009." Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r09_09_e.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of October 1 to December 21, 2009." Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r12_09_eng.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of January 1 to March 31, 2010." Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r01_10-eng.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of April 1 to June 30, 2010." Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r06_10-eng.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of July 1 to September 20, 2010." Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r09_10-eng.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of October 1 to December 31, 2010." Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r12_10-eng.pdf
- . "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of January 1 to March 31, 2011." Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r03_11-eng.pdf

-----. "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of April 1 to June 30, 2011." Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r06_11-eng.pdf

-----. "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan – Fourteenth and Final Report to Parliament." (March 2012) Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/r06_12/index.aspx?lang=eng&view=d

-----. "Canada's Four Themes for Afghanistan: 2011-2014." (November 16, 2010). Available at http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/news-nouvelles/2010/2010_11_16b.aspx?lang=eng

Haneef Atmar, Mohammed. "Politicization of humanitarian aid and its consequences for Afghans." *Disasters* 25, no.4 (2001): 321-30.

Hasegawa, Yuka. "Is a human security approach possible? Compatibility between the strategies of protection and empowerment." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 2007): 1-20.

Human Rights Watch. "We Have the Promises of the World: Women's Rights in Afghanistan." December 6, 2009. Report available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/12/03/we-have-promises-world-0>

Ignatieff, Michael. *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*. Toronto: Penguin, 2003.

"Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan." Minister of Public Works and Government Services: Ottawa, 2008.

Ismael, Jacqueline; Ismael, Shereen; Langille, Chris. "Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Women in the Muslim World." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 23-43.

Jackson, Ashley. "The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009." Oxfam report. 17 November 2009. Available at <http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/cost-war-afghanistan-experiences>

Jones, Seth G. "It takes the villages: Bringing change from below in Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs*, 89, no.3 (2010): 120-127.

Kagan, Frederick W. "A Case for Staying the Course". In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*. Eds Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. 97-114.

Kandiyoti, Deniz. "Between the hammer and the anvil: post-conflict reconstruction, Islam and women's rights." *Third World Quarterly* 28, no.3 (2007): 503-517.

- . "Old Dilemmas or New Challenges? The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan." *Development & Change* 38 (March 2007): 169-199.
- Khan, Feisal. "Why Borrow Trouble for Yourself and Lend It to Neighbors? Understanding the Historical Roots of Pakistan's Afghan Policy." *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 37 (2010): 171-189.
- Kouvo, Sari and Levine, Corey. "Calling a Spade a Spade: Tackling the 'Women and Peace' Orthodoxy." *Feminist Legal Studies* 16, no.3 (2008): 363-367.
- Krepinevich, Andrew. "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions." *National Interest* (Fall 1993/1994): 1-4.
- Kurt, Andrew. "Afghanistan's Current Situation and the Outlook for the Future: An Interview with Thomas Gouttierre." *Digest of Middle East Studies* (Fall 2010): 213-227.
- Linn, Brian McAllister. "The U.S. Armed Forces' View of War." *Daedalus* 140, no. 3 (2011): 33-44.
- Lister, Sarah. "Changing the Rules? State-building and Local Government in Afghanistan." *Journal of Development Studies* 45 (July 2009): 990-1009.
- Lucas Jr., George R. "Postmodern War." *Journal of military ethics* 9, no. 4 (2010): 289-298.
- MacFarlane, S. Neil, Carolin J. Thielking and Thomas G. Weiss. "The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?" *Third World Quarterly* 25 (2004): 977-992.
- MacNeil, Leah. "Securing the Afghan People? Canadian Foreign Aid Policy and the Perils of Human Security." *Undercurrent* 8, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 6-16.
- Maira, Sunaina. "'Good' and 'Bad' Muslim Citizens: Feminists, Terrorists, and U.S. Orientalisms." *Feminist Studies* 35 (Fall 2009): 631-656.
- Major, Aaron. "Which Revolution in Military Affairs? Political Discourse and the Defense Industrial Base." *Armed Forces & Society* 35, no.2 (2009): 333-361.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. New York: Three Leaves Press, 2004.
- Marten, Kimberly. "From Kabul to Kandahar: The Canadian Forces and Change". *American Review of Canadian Studies* 40, no.2 (June 2010): 214-236.

- Mills, Kurt. "Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict." *Global Governance* 11 (2005): 161–183.
- Momani, Kawakib, Muhammad A. Badarneh and Fathi Migdadi. "Gender metaphors in Middle Eastern politics and the Arab receiver." *Social Semiotics* 19 (September 2009): 293-310.
- Mullen, Rani D. "Afghanistan in 2008: State Building at the Precipice." *Asian Survey* 49, no.1 (January - February, 2009): 28-38.
- National Defence and the Canadian Forces. "Operation ATTENTION: Mission Context." Available at <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/attention/index-eng.asp> (accessed 2011)
- Naylor, Tristen. "Deconstructing Development: The Use of Power and Pity in the International Development Discourse." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 177–197.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Official Texts. "Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan." 21 May 2012. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm?
- Oxfam report. "No Time to Lose: Promoting the Accountability of the Afghan National Security Forces." May 2011. Available at <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/afghanistan-no-time-to-lose-20110510-en.pdf>
- . "Promises, promises: A Briefing Paper for the Kabul Conference on Afghanistan." 19 July 2010. Available at <http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/promises-promises>
- . "Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan." 26 January 2010. Available at <http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/quick-impact-quick-collapse>
- Papagianni, Katia. "Transitional Politics in Afghanistan and Iraq: Inclusion, Consultation, and Public Participation." *Development in Practice* 15, no.6 (November, 2005): 747-759.
- Peterson, V. Spike. *A Critical rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies*. New York: Routledge, 2003.
- . and Anne Sisson Runyon. *Global Gender Issues*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
- Piscatori, James. "Order, Justice, and Global Islam." In *Order and Justice in International Relations*. Eds Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 262-292.

- Plümper, Thomas and Eric Neumayer. "The Unequal Burden of War: The Effect of Armed Conflict on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy." *International Organization* 60, no. 3 (Summer, 2006): 723-754.
- Reid, Rachel. "The "Ten-Dollar Talib" and Women's Rights: Afghan Women and the Risks of Reintegration and Reconciliation." *Human Rights Watch*, July 13, 2010. Report available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/07/13/ten-dollar-talib-and-women-s-rights-0>
- Reilly, Robert. "Shaping Strategic Communication". In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*. Eds Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. 169-191.
- Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.
- Riphenburg, Carol J. "Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Changed Outlook for Women?" *Asian Survey* 44, no. 3 (2004): 401-421.
- Ritter, Gretchen. "Domestic Containment or Equal Standing? Gender, Nationalism, and the War on Terror." *Journal of Policy History* 21 (October 2009): 439-447.
- Rodriguez, Jade I. and Rebecca Lorentz. "Civil and uncivil society". In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*. Eds Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. 193-207.
- Rothstein, Hy. "America's Longest War". In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*. Eds Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. 59-81.
- and John Arquilla. "Understanding the Afghan Challenge." In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*. Eds Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. 3-16.
- Rubin, Barnett R. "Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Security?" *Third World Quarterly* 27, no.1 (2006): 175-185.
- "Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy Wars." *International Affairs* 73, no. 2 (1997): 283-296.
- and Ahmed Rashid. "From Great Game to Grand Bargain - Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan." *Foreign Affairs* 87, no.6 (2008): 30-44.
- Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

- Sen, Amartya. *Development as Freedom*. New York, Anchor Books, 2000.
- Senate Committee Reports. *Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. How Are We Doing in Afghanistan? Canadians Need to Know*. Senate Committee: Ottawa, 2008.
- Shannon, Róisín. "Playing with Principles in an Era of Securitized Aid: Negotiating Humanitarian Space in Post-9/11 Afghanistan." *Progress in Development Studies* 9, no.1 (2009): 15-36.
- Sidky, H. "War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001." *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no.4 (July, 2007): 849-888.
- Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. "Ethnicising Afghanistan?: Inclusion and Exclusion in Post-Bonn Institution Building." *Third World Quarterly* 25, no.4 (2004): 707-729.
- Simpson, John. "Afghan army key to Nato withdrawal." *BBC News* (13 July 2010) Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10624783>
- Smith, Eugene B. "The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications." *Parameters* 32, no.4 (Winter 2002-2003): 104-119.
- Stares, Paul B. and Micah Zenko. "Partners in Preventative Action: The United States and International Institutions". *Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 62*, September 2011. 44p.
- Steans, Jill. "Negotiating the Politics of Difference in the Project of Feminist Solidarity." *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007): 729-743.
- Thompson, Martha. "Women, Gender, and Conflict: Making the Connections." *Development in Practice* 16, no. 3/4 (June, 2006): 342-353.
- Tickner, J. Anne. "You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists". *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (December 1997): 611-632.
- U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325). 31 October 2000. 4p.
- U.N. Security Council Resolution 1829 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1829). 19 June 2008. 7p.
- U.N. Security Council Resolution 1888 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888). 30 September 2009. 7p.
- U.N. Security Council Resolution 1829 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889). 5 October 2009. 5p.
- Van Schaack, Beth. "The Crime of Aggression and Humanitarian Intervention on Behalf of Women." *International Criminal Law Review* 11 (July 2011): 477-493.

Weiss, Thomas G. "RtoP Alive and Well After Libya." *Ethics & International Affairs* 25, no. 3 (2011): 287-292.

----- "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era". *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (2004): 135–153.

West, Katarina. *Agents of Altruism: The Expansion of Humanitarian NGOs in Rwanda and Afghanistan*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001.

Whitty, Brendan and Hamish Nixon. "The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Objectives on Democratization and Statebuilding in Afghanistan." *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 5, No.1 (July 2009): 187-218.

Williams, M. J. "Empire Lite Revisited: NATO, the Comprehensive Approach and State-building in Afghanistan". *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 1 (Feb 2011): 64-78.

Wood, Paul. "Can Afghan forces bring security when Nato leaves?" *BBC News* (19 November 2010). Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11795446>

----- "Nato battle insurgency and fight for Afghan support." *BBC News* (6 December 2010). Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11928249>