THIRD PARTIES’ MORALLY-MOTIVATED RESPONSES TO MISTREATMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS

by

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Abstract

Why do third parties, individuals who are not the direct target of an act of mistreatment, attempt to either punish the perpetrator or help the victim? Starting with the basic proposition that third parties intervene when they perceive an act of mistreatment as morally wrong and that intervening is the morally right thing to do, I construct a model of third parties’ morally-motivated responses to others’ mistreatment. I draw from theories of deontic justice, moral intuitions, moral identity and moral emotions to explain why some third parties will be motivated to respond while others will not. I incorporate third party power, in the form of personal resources and hierarchical position, to provide a more nuanced explanation of how third parties will respond once motivated to do so in an actual workplace setting. In Studies 1 to 3, I test the basic propositions of my model. Study 1 finds that moral anger mediates the relationship between third parties’ moral identity and injustice cognitions. Study 2 finds that moral anger mediates the relationship between third parties’ moral identity and punishment. Study 3 finds that resource power is associated with helping the victim and indirect punishment and that relative position power is associated with direct and indirect punishment. In Studies 4 to 6, I extend my research to consider whether third parties react differently depending on the type of justice violation. I test the proposition that third parties’ moral reactions are stronger in response to interpersonal injustice than the other types of injustice commonly studied in the organizational sciences. I find evidence for the stronger impact of interpersonal injustice in comparison to distributive injustice (Studies 4 and 5) and procedural injustice (Study 6). I conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of this dissertation.
Preface

Portions of this dissertation are based on collaborative work. Chapter 2 is based on work developed with Dr. Karl Aquino. This research is published: O’Reilly, J., & Aquino, K. (2011). A model of third parties' morally-motivated responses to mistreatment in organizations. *Academy of Management Review, 36*, 526-543 (doi: 10.5465/AMR.2011.61031810). The ideas and propositions put forth in this article were developed through a collaborative process. As first author, I was responsible for writing the first draft, incorporating co-author and reviewer feedback, and managing the review process.

Chapter 4 is based on collaborative work with Dr. Karl Aquino and Dr. Daniel Skarlicki. This research is currently going through the peer review process: O’Reilly, J., Aquino, K., & Skarlicki, D. (2011). *The lives of others: The role of moral identity in third parties’ emotional, cognitive, and behavioural reactions to injustice* (unpublished manuscript). The studies included in this dissertation are the ones that I was responsible for data collection, analysis and write up. As first author I took a managerial role in putting together the manuscript and writing up the theoretical content and arguments with the help, and guidance of the other two authors.

The research presented in this dissertation was approved by the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board, under certificate numbers H09-0083, H12-00690, AND H11-00174. This research was supported in part by a Doctoral Fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
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1 Introduction

Alex Juani, a former employee of the City of Mississauga’s Works and Transportation Department, became perturbed by the mistreatment he witnessed on a continual basis by his supervisor towards some of his colleagues. In an attempt to relieve the situation he reported the incidents to upper management on several occasions. When management failed to properly address the situation, Juani covertly video recorded his supervisor’s abusive behaviour and released the tape to the public media (CBC News, 2010). Juani’s decision to appeal to the public for help may seem extreme, but it highlights an important and relatively understudied organizational phenomenon; namely, individuals can become troubled by and react towards the mistreatment of others in organizations.

Individuals who are neither the direct target of an act of mistreatment nor the perpetrator of that act have been labeled third parties (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). Third parties can be customers, employees, colleagues, supervisors or anyone who witnesses or learns about mistreatment directed towards another individual or group. While considerable scholarly attention has focused on understanding victims’ reactions to mistreatment in an organizational environment, comparatively less attention has been devoted to understanding third parties’ experiences. Of the research that has, much of this has concluded that people can become distressed and fearful that similar mistreatment might befall them, and thus, others’ mistreatment can have a negative effect on third parties’ work-related attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Ferguson & Barry, 2011; Low, Radhakrishnan, Schneider, & Rounds, 2007; Miner-Rubino & Cortina, 2004; Porath & Erez, 2009). This research is no doubt important, as it highlights the cost of mistreatment that can extend beyond the direct or intended target; however, it does not capture the full picture of third parties’ reactions. As Juani’s story highlights, people can also become
incensed over others’ mistreatment and attempt to rectify the situation by seeking punishment for the perpetrator. Furthermore, in a recent survey by the Workplace Bullying Institute, 36.3% of respondents who had been mistreated at work indicated that their coworkers tried to help them in some way, predominately by providing comfort and/or advice (WBI, 2008).

Indeed, not all third parties react benevolently to others’ mistreatment. In the same study conducted by the Workplace Bullying Institute, 28.9% of respondents indicated that their colleagues ignored the situation or avoided them following their mistreatment. Even more disconcerting, 32% of mistreated individuals reported that third parties supported the perpetrator(s) of their mistreatment and in some cases even turned into perpetrators themselves (WBI, 2008). Despite this harsh reality of life, third parties may have an important and relatively understudied role to play in helping the victims of mistreatment in organizations and preventing future mistreatment (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). For example, managers can often engage in “invisible remedies” to benefit their employees who they feel have been treated unfairly by the organization (Nadisic, 2008). Furthermore, Bowes-Sperry and O’Leary-Kelly (2005) have pointed out that the victims of workplace sexual harassment are often too vulnerable to rectify their own mistreatment, and third parties tend to be in a better social position to demand justice on a victim’s behalf. Research in other areas of social life has also begun to recognize the important role third parties can play in addressing mistreatment. For example, recent research on preventing sexual assault on college campuses stresses the effectiveness of third party intervention (Banyard, 2008; Burn, 2009). Educational programs targeted towards promoting the responsibility of third parties, have been successful at preventing sexual violence on college campuses (Banyard, Moynihan, & Plante, 2007). Finally, elementary and secondary-school based programs aimed at promoting third party intervention in schoolyard bullying can reduce
bullying incidences in schools (e.g., Baldry & Farrington, 2007).

Given the prevalence and detrimental costs of workplace mistreatment, developing organizational third party intervention programs is a worthwhile and potentially highly effective strategy for reducing workplace mistreatment and alleviating some of its detrimental impact. However, such programs are not possible until we begin to understand the motivations and impetuses that underlie third parties’ constructive reactions towards others’ mistreatment. A significant amount of research exists that can help answer the question of why people can react negatively, by either derogating the victim, and sometimes even victimizing the target further (Bennett & Dunkel-Schetter, 1992; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983), or by ignoring the situation entirely (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley, 1968; Latané & Nida, 1981). However, we know comparatively less on why people would choose to do the opposite; to become personally involved in a situation in which another person or group is mistreated and attempt to help. Thus, the overarching purpose of this dissertation research is to answer the question: *Why are third parties motivated to react constructively to the mistreatment of others?* I define a *constructive response* as one in which a third party attempts to intervene into the situation by either ensuring that a perpetrator of mistreatment is punished, by providing comfort, instrumental or social support, and advice to a target of mistreatment, or by engaging in both courses of action.

To answer this question I focus on the moral agency of third parties. I explore the possibility that third parties react when they recognize mistreatment as *morally wrong* and believe that reacting, by either punishing the perpetrator or helping the victim, is the *morally right* thing for them to do. Focusing on the moral motivations that drive third party reactions does not preclude the possibility that third parties are driven to help victims of mistreatment for other reasons as well. As examples, it is possible that third parties can be driven to help due to
affiliation motives, when a mistreated colleague is a close friend; or by political reasons, when the perpetrator is an organizational adversary of theirs. Focusing on the moral motivations, however, has particular beneficial implications for promoting constructive third party reactions in the workplace. Research in moral psychology indicates that, at least to a certain extent, the underlying factors that promote moral motivations can sometimes be persuaded (e.g., Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2001; Grusec, 2006; Hart, Atkins, & Donnelly, 2006; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). Furthermore, the moral motivations that underlie some third parties’ reactions can explain why people can be moved to react when others are mistreated, even when they have no established relationship with the victim and no stake in the situation. Thus, an understanding of the moral factors that motivate constructive third party responses garnered through this research not only allows us to build a greater understanding of third party reactions but can also help tailor organizational programs to appeal to third parties’ moral character and promote beneficial third party intervention.

I start my dissertation with a review of theory and empirical research that has explored the nature of third party reactions based on a moral imperative. Specifically, I start with a discussion of the concept of deontic justice, the idea that organizational mistreatment can be understood by its morally prescriptive properties (Cropanzano, Goldman & Folger, 2003; Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005). In this section, I build a model of the moral motivations that underlie third parties’ constructive reactions to others’ mistreatment. I extend the deontic justice literature by drawing from the moral psychology literature, integrating theory on moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001), moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984) and moral anger (Haidt, 2003). The empirical portion of my dissertation thesis tests some of the basic propositions of this model, which is depicted in Figure 1.
2 Literature Review and a Model of Third Party Responses towards Others’ Mistreatment

An employee of an environmental management firm witnesses his new colleague’s team leader berate and insult her for making a calculation mistake on a consulting report. While he understands that the mistake may have caused problems for the firm had it not been noticed, he also believes that the team leader’s behaviour is “over-the-top,” and “uncalled for.” He is incensed over the team leader’s actions and talks to his own manager about it. Furthermore, he approaches his rebuked colleague to let her know that regardless of the mistake she is still doing a good job and offers her advice on how to get switched to a different team.1 Another employee witnesses this event but does not become incensed and does not get involved in the situation. Instead, he chalks it up to the ‘normal,’ ‘harsh realities’ that exist in a competitive consulting environment. Why does one employee become enraged when he witnesses his colleague be berated by her team leader and intervene in the situation, while the other employee is both unmoved and unconcerned? I contend that the first employee in the scenario is incensed by the team leader’s behaviour because he perceives such mistreatment represents a moral violation; a violation of how people should or ought to treat one another. A model in the organizational sciences that formally links such mistreatment to morality is Folger and colleagues’ deontic justice model (Cropanzano, et al., 2003; Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger, et al., 2005) and thus, I begin my discussion of third parties’ morally-motivated reactions to mistreatment by drawing from this model.

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1 Based on an actual account told in an interview as part of a final project in COMM 623: Qualitative Research Methods.
2.1 Organizational Mistreatment as a Moral Violation: Introduction to the Deontic Perspective of Justice

Folger (2001) coined the term *deontic justice* to refer to a psychological state yielding emotionally charged reactions to events perceived as violating moral norms of proper social conduct. Deontic emotions derive from individuals’ moral assumptions regarding how human beings *should* be treated and *should* treat others. Importantly, people can be motivated toward fairness because it is the “right thing to do”—as an end in itself, and can be moved by violations of moral norms, regardless of the consequences of that unfairness (Folger, 2001). When people infringe upon moral standards it can provoke a reaction because of their apparent disrespect towards the implicit social rules that others have tried to uphold (Folger, 2001; Montada, 1998b). One’s reaction to a moral violation motivates individuals to reaffirm the sacredness of moral rules by punishing the person or organization that is deemed responsible for the violation (Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger, et al., 2005).

The deontic model of justice is relevant to third party responses towards others’ mistreatment because it focuses individuals’ reactions upon their understanding of a breached moral standard rather than the personal consequences one suffers as a result of an unfair act. Admittedly, deontic justice is not the only perspective that describes a justice motive that can explain individuals’ reactions towards others’ experiences of unfairness. Like the deontic justice model, just-world theory (Lerner, 1965, 1980, 1998; Lerner & Miller, 1978) for example, recognizes the prescriptive elements of the psychology of justice. According to this theory, individuals are motivated to preserve their belief that the world is a just place, where people ultimately get what they ‘deserve.’ This sense of deservingness is developed through one’s experiences as a child and continues into adulthood (Lerner, 1977, 1998). Lerner proposed that
people need to believe in a just world to satisfy a personal contract, and concomitantly, that this personal contract is valid only to the extent that the world is perceived as just (Lerner, 1980). A prominent feature of this theory is that third parties can apply cognitive strategies to make sense of a situation that might threaten this belief.

Although just-world theory recognizes that observers to injustice can also react by attempting to help those who are suffering (e.g., Miller, 1977; Zuckerman, 1975), much of the empirical research on belief in a just world has emphasized the phenomenon of victim derogation, in which bystanders blame sufferers for their own misfortunes and perceive victims of injustice in a negative light (see Hafer & Bègue, 2005, for a review). In this sense, one’s belief in a just world can be understood as a personal motive; third parties are motivated to derogate victims of mistreatment because it provides psychological comfort in the face of a threat to their belief. Derogating a victim offers a means of coping with injustice, particularly if no other means of understanding perceived unfairness are readily available (Furnham, 2003; Montada, 1998a). In line with this, empirical research has shown that third parties are less likely to derogate a victim to the extent that a situation is less threatening to their sense of deservingness (e.g., because one’s suffering is relatively trivial) or when they have options to help someone who is suffering (Lerner, 1980).

While both perspectives recognize that people can be disturbed by others’ experienced unfairness, just-world theory has covered decidedly different conceptual ground than the deontic perspective. The deontic model describes why people will seek to restore their sense of injustice by punishing those who violate significant moral standards. As such, the deontic perspective is

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2 My use of the term “restore” does not capture the final utility of a third party reaction, but rather his or her psychological desire to create a sense of moral balance (Homans, 1961). In other words, acting upon a desire to restore justice can be psychologically satisfying even when one’s actions do not actually remedy the situation. Indeed, empirical research on the deontic motive has shown that people are willing to punish even if the perpetrators
directly applicable to understanding third parties’ motives for constructive responses towards others’ experiences of injustice - even if such motives are not antithetical to the just-world perspective. Empirical research that has tested the deontic model has shown that third parties will seek to punish someone who violates (or even merely intends to violate) a significant moral standard, even if the victim does not feel offended (Umphress, Simmons, Folger, Ren, & Bobocel, 2013). Furthermore, while not directly embedded in a deontic perspective, Lutgen-Sandvik (2005) found that at least some witnesses (and victims) of workplace bullying felt passionate that the bullies’ behaviours represent a strict moral violation. Even witnesses were willing to accept a personal cost in terms of quitting their jobs in protest of the bully’s behaviour. These actions are not inconsistent with the just-world hypothesis. However, rather than derogating the victim or rationalizing-away injustice, in these examples third parties were willing to recognize a moral violation and were even willing to accept a personal cost by responding. An important question to answer then, is why do some third parties exhibit moral reactions that appear to go against their self-interest? As I discuss in the next section, the foundations of the deontic motive are rooted in adaptionist perspectives of reactions to mistreatment (e.g., Darwin, 1871; Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002; Folger & Skarlicki, 2008; Haidt, 2007; Kesebir, 2012; Trivers, 1971). Adaptionist perspectives of third parties’ moral reactions describe individuals’ psychological responses to unfairness as evolved mechanisms used to solve ancestral problems (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987).

2.2 The Relationship between Deontic Punishment and Human Cooperation

The nature of deontic punishment it theoretically related to altruistic punishment, defined as punishment that is both costly for the punisher and yields no personal or direct material gains of injustice will have no knowledge that they have been socially reprimanded for their misdeeds (Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002).
Both theoretical perspectives indicate that individuals’ motivations to punish norm violators can seemingly violate assumptions of self-interested, rational decision making, because individuals either get involved when they themselves have not been personally or directly harmed or are willing to accept a personal cost in order to enact punishment.

Altruistic punishment is often studied in the context of public goods and social dilemma game experiments (e.g., Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gächter & Herrmann, 2009; Walker & Halloran, 2004; Yamagishi, 1986) and has also been verified in a third party context (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).

The distinction between deontic punishment and altruistic punishment stems from the different theoretical focus taken by each perspective. While deontic justice theory has been concerned with identifying the psychological processes that motivate seemingly irrational reactions towards injustice, altruistic punishment research has been more concerned with situating the phenomenon within broader theory that explains the evolution of human cooperation. Early understandings of cooperation recognized the importance of reciprocity, a tendency to respond in kind to another’s actions (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971). Perhaps the most famous study of reciprocity is Axelrod’s (1984) simulation in which artificial players competed in a series of dilemma games. Axelrod identified the “tit-for-tat” strategy, in which a player cooperates on the first move and then copies its partner’s move in the previous round, as the most optimal strategy. In essence, the principle of reciprocity makes engaging in free-riding or self-interested behaviours costly, and individuals cooperate in order to avoid the cost of punishment. Experimental studies of altruistic punishment indicate that cooperation can flourish when individuals are willing to accept a cost in order to punish, and is impeded when

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3 Cooperation to avoid punishment need not be a conscious act. Evolutionary models of cooperation indicate that those who cooperate with cooperative others tend to be better off in the long run. From an evolutionary perspective, these individuals are then also more likely to achieve reproductive success (Trivers, 1971).
individuals do not punish norm violators (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Altruistic punishment can be regarded as a stronger test of the reciprocity hypothesis, indicating that it is not only fortuitous to punish when there is an immediate payoff to doing so, but also because it will build cooperation in the long run. This research also highlights the extent to which individuals tend to have a strong desire to punish wrongdoers even when doing so is not personally beneficial.

Organizational research has identified several phenomena that can be understood using either a deontic or altruistic punishment framework (Adams & Mullen, 2012). For example, whistle-blowing occurs when an organizational member discloses illegal activity within the organization (e.g., Near & Miceli, 1995). In my opening example, Alex Juani’s actions could be construed as whistle-blowing. Consistent with the deontic perspective, whistle-blowing is often (although not always) motivated by a need to punish those who engage in ethically questionable behaviour (Near & Miceli, 1995). Consistent with altruistic punishment, whistle-blowing tends to have more external benefits for society at large, by helping to enforce cooperative norms, than personal benefit for the whistle-blowers themselves (Near & Miceli, 1995). Whistle-blowers often pay a cost for their actions in the form of social retaliation and sanctioning, such as being ostracized in one’s organization, receiving unfair negative performance appraisals, and even being fired from one’s job (Near & Miceli, 1995; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999).

Importantly, despite individuals’ willingness to sometimes engage in costly punishment to reproach norm violators and defectors, punishment need not always be costly (Barclay, 2012). Whistle-blowing is a vivid example of the extent to which individuals are occasionally willing to accept a personal cost to punish wrongdoers. But such sacrifices are the exception, not the norm. Generally, most people are not so ready to accept severe personal consequences to punish norm violators (Guala, 2012). Third party punishment in groups can be conceptualized as a “second
order” free-riding problem because some people in a group can benefit (via increased cooperation or the deterrence of future unethical behaviours) from the actions of those who are willing to bear the costs of punishing non-cooperators. As a result, in a social setting, individuals can sometimes engage in collective punishment to diffuse the potential personal cost (Feinberg, Cheng, & Willer, 2012).

One organizational activity that diffuses the cost of punishment is gossiping. Research has indicated that ‘gossip’ is often motivated by the same negative reactions that underlie altruistic punishment (Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 2012). Furthermore, gossip can promote cooperative behaviour by damaging one’s reputation and communicating to group members that engaging in positive social exchange with a particular person should be avoided or that a person should even be ostracized by the entire group (Beersma & van Kleef, 2012; Willer, Feinberg, Irwin, Schultz, & Simpson, 2010). While gossiping can be costly (e.g., Atwater, Waldman, Carey, & Cartier, 2001) this cost is generally not as severe as reactions towards other forms of punishment in organizations, such as the costs associated with whistle-blowing. Recent research on punishment has also indicated that in addition to the potential costs associated with punishment, punishers also reap personal benefits. For example, in a series of dilemma game experiments, Barclay (2006) showed that third parties will bestow monetary benefits to those who punish free-riders.

Both the deontic justice and altruistic punishment frameworks focus solely on punishment as a third party reaction to injustice, however, when third parties decide to intervene in a situation, punishment is not their only potential course of action. Third parties can also choose to help a victim by providing either instrumental or social support, direct compensation, or helping in some way as an alternative intervention (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Gromet,
Okimoto, Wenzel, & Darley, 2012; Leliveld, Vandijk, & Vanbeest, 2012; Lotz, Baumert, Schlösser, Gresser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). In the next section I discuss helping as an alternative or additional third party intervention strategy, and explain why such reactions fit with and extend the deontic justice paradigm.

2.3 Helping the Victim as a Deontic Motivated Response

The underlying psychological desire of deontic punishment is to either explicitly or implicitly restore a sense of justice after fairness norms have been violated. In this sense, deontic punishment can be considered a form of just desert, punishment motivated by a retrospective need to make perpetrators pay for their violation to a degree that is perceived as being proportionate with the offense (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002).4 Recently, scholars have noted that the broader literature on punishment has ignored its complementary relationship with helping the victims of mistreatment (c.f., Leliveld, et al., 2012; Lotz, et al., 2011; van Prooijen, 2009). Both punishment and helping the victims of mistreatment can be considered a deontic response because each can restore the sense of justice threatened by a moral violation. However, helping the victim takes a victim-centered rather than perpetrator-centered approach to achieve this (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Gromet, et al., 2012). In the legal-sphere, victim compensation generally refers to formal, court-imposed sanctions that attempt to return victims to a state equivalent to that which they had before they were wronged. In the social-sphere, I argue that victim compensation can take the form of social support. As a victim-centered approach, social support can be offered as an attempt to restore a victim’s threatened sense of self, perceived

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4 Just desert, or retributive, motives for punishment are in contrast to utilitarian motives, which describe punishment as motivated by its potential functionality. Research has shown that even when individuals can rationalize their support for punishment in terms of its utility, their support is more strongly driven by a retributive motive (Carlsmith et al., 2002). However, Barclay (2012) has noted that one’s motivations for punishment and the actual outcomes of punishment can often differ. Thus, even when punishment is driven by a retributive motive, it can sometimes still serve a deterring function.
standing in a social group, and their feeling of living in a safe, secure world.

Social support can come in multiple forms (House, 1981), the two most recognized of which are emotional and instrumental (Beehr, 1985). Instrumental support captures actions that offer tangible outcomes, such as directly helping someone finish a work task, or providing someone with additional resources such as time or information. Emotional support is characterized by caring actions, such as providing comfort or a listening ear to someone who is in the midst of a personal problem, and showing sympathy to the needs of others. Helping the victims of injustice can help restore their sense that the world is just as well as restoring them to the psychological and emotional state they were in before they experienced the injustice.

For example, in line with instrumental support, research has documented that managers will sometimes offer employees special perks and resources when they have been unfairly treated by either other organizational members or the organization itself (Nadisic, 2008). When managers cannot rectify an organizational injustice directly, they can use their control over alternative fringe benefits to offer some form of compensation, such as offering a slighted employee a position on a sought-after project, or giving an employee requested time off work even during busy times. Furthermore, emotional support can help buffer the negative effects of being mistreated by restoring a victim’s diminished self-esteem and damaged social standing in a group (Cohen & Wills, 1985).

Emerging empirical research shows that third parties are often willing to help a victim in lieu of or in addition to punishing a perpetrator of injustice. Some scholars have supported a view of ‘punishment primacy’ – that is, third parties will punish rather than help a victim if this course of action is available (Hogan & Emler, 1981). For example, van Prooijen (2009) found that when a third party is more socially distant from a victim, s/he prefers to punish a perpetrator
as indicated by third parties willingness to support higher fines on perpetrators compared to their support for the amount given to a victim as compensation. However, other studies have found that third parties are more likely to take a mixed strategy approach if both options are available (Leviveld et al., 2011; Lotz et al., 2011). For example, using an ‘investment game’ paradigm, Charness and colleagues (Charness, Cobo-Reyes, & Jiménez, 2008) showed that when participants were able to compensate a slighted player, the amount they devoted to punishing the perpetrator decreased. However, third parties spent more on compensation and punishment combined when this option was available than the amount spent on punishment in the ‘punishment-only’ condition. Thus, both punishing the perpetrator and providing help to a victim can be consider a ‘deontic’ response driven by a desire to restore justice. With this research in mind, in the next section I turn my attention to the psychological process that follows when a third party witnesses or learns about injustice, and how this reaction leads to either compensating the victim, punishing the perpetrator, or both.

2.4 A Model of Third Parties’ Morally-Motivated Reactions

Folger and Skarlicki (2008) argued that deontic reactions are the product of evolved psychological foundations. This position is consistent with Haidt and colleagues’ work on Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). According to these views, moral reactions are based on evolved psychological systems that have promoted adaptive behaviours and group functioning. Internalized moral standards that can be seen as being violated by one’s own and others’ actions are based upon these evolutionary foundations and are also associated with an emotional element. Such reactions form the basis of “intuitive ethics” which characterize moral reasoning as ‘intuition’ rather than a deliberate judgment. A moral 

intuition is, “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective
valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence or inferring a conclusion” (818; Haidt, 2001). Moral intuitions are part of a broader set of non-conscious thought processes that can influence individuals’ attitudes, judgments and behaviours (Dane & Pratt, 2009). The theoretical basis for linking intuitions to social cognition and behaviour are dual-process models of information processing. Dual-processing models describe two distinct processes through which individuals form judgments: one involves automatic and relatively effortless processing, the other a more deliberate and conscious thought process (Bargh, 1996; Epstein, 1990, 1994, 2002; Sloman, 1996). The concept of intuitions and intuitive thinking is related to the first system (Epstein, 2002; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008). Colloquially, intuitions are ‘heart’ instead of ‘head’ decisions (Shirley & Langan-Fox, 1996: 564).

Recent theoretical and empirical advances in moral and ethical reasoning have begun to recognize the importance of the non-conscious, reflexive system in moral thought processing (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; Zhong, 2011). Traditional models of moral reasoning had tended to focus on the extent to which ethical judgments are the product of deliberative cognitive processes in which relevant information is knowingly weighed and evaluated (Kohlberg, 1963; Rest, 1986; Gardine & Throne, 2001). Perhaps the most well-known traditional model of moral reasoning is Kohlberg’s model of moral development (Kohlberg, 1963; Walker, 1996). Kohlberg recognized that people can often articulate their moral reasoning for solving particular ethical dilemmas. Influenced by Piaget’s work on development (Piaget 1970, 1985), he described six developmental stages that represent degrees of moral maturity.

Emerging evidence, however, suggests that non-conscious thought processing in the form of intuitions is not only important in understanding moral reasoning but also precedes conscious
moral judgment and behaviour (Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Zhong, 2011). Studies have shown that people often have instantaneous and implicit reactions to moral violations, without having to initially reason through why they feel a particular event was wrong (Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000). This phenomenon has been labeled *moral dumbfounding*. Cognitive neuroscience research has shown that making attributional inferences about others’ misbehaviour is often a rapid process (Lieberman, 2007; Greene & Haidt, 2002).

In addition, the affective nature of these reactions is usually a good predictor of subsequent reasoning and behaviour, particularly compared to the predictive capabilities of more deliberate forms of reasoning (Hoffman, 1982). Proper judgments of right and wrong do not predict moral behaviour in the absence of moral emotions (Damasio, 1994). Work by Zhong (2011) shows that engaging in rational ethical decision making can lead to more unethical behaviours, such as lying (Studies 1 and 2), and less prosocial behaviours such as charitable donations (Study 3) compared to engaging in intuitive thought-processes. Furthermore, work by Skarlicki and Rupp (2010) suggests that generating quick moral judgments about others’ mistreatment can be more effective at provoking a response compared to using a more rational thought-process particularly in those who are not predisposed to care about moral infractions.

Taken together, these findings support the notion that evaluative reactions to others’ behaviour are often driven by rapid, non-conscious processes and that these reflexive conclusions are important in promoting further moral functioning. Based on this research, I propose that such an intuitive recognition that a moral violation has occurred will promote further thought processes that can ultimately lead to constructive third party responses. However, just as one person can come to a different conclusion following deep deliberation about something, third parties can also experience different intuitions of right and wrong. Where one
third party reflexively intuits that mistreatment represents a moral violation, another third party might be unmoved by the injustice. Indeed, as the opening example of the employees in the environmental consulting firm suggests, some third parties react more fervently to seeing someone else being mistreated than others. To explain why, I draw from the literature on moral identity.

2.5 Moral Identity and Moral Intuitions of Others’ Mistreatment

*Moral identity* is defined as the extent to which an individual sees being moral as a central characteristic that defines his or her “self” (Blasi, 1984). For my dissertation, I adopt the socio-cognitive conceptualization of moral identity, proposed by Aquino and colleagues, which describes moral identity as one of many possible self-schemas a person can adopt (e.g., Aquino, et al., 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). A person’s moral identity is stored in their memory as a complex knowledge structure consisting of related moral values, traits, goals and behavioural scripts (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This conceptualization recognizes that people can define themselves in many ways, but that some identities are more central (or ‘important’) to their overall sense of self than others. Furthermore, people vary in the degree to which a particular identity occupies a central role, meaning that this particular schema is more readily available for processing and acting upon social information, sometimes referred to as having a moral identity that is ‘chronically activated’ in one’s working-self (Aquino et al., 2009). Identities can also be temporarily activated in the working-self by situational cues and social roles (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino, et al., 2009).

Having a more central moral identity is associated with engaging in more moral behaviours (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1993; Weaver, 2006). Blasi (1984) argued that a felt obligation to engage in moral behaviours is associated with a need to be consistent with oneself
and to act in accordance with one’s identity. This proposition is consistent with broader theories of the self and the need for self-consistency (Carver & Sheier, 1998; Lord & Brown, 2004; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). In other words, people whose moral identity has high centrality within their overall self-concept feel a sense of responsibility to act in ways that are consistent with their understanding of what it means to be a moral person. If they do not do so, they can experience dissonance and self-condemnation. The desire to maintain consistency between one’s moral identity and one’s actions in the world has been used to explain why moral identity should influence behaviour. Furthermore, if moral identity serves a self-defining function, it should also affect peoples’ emotional and cognitive responses to social stimuli (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). In line with this reasoning, moral identity is positively associated with engaging in behaviours generally considered as moral such as donating money to charity and negatively associated with engaging in behaviours generally considered as immoral, such as cheating and lying (see Shao et al., 2008 for a review).

Reed and Aquino (2003) argued that a mechanism through which moral identity can affect responses to social experiences is by partly determining the extent to which a person feels a moral obligation to show responsiveness to the needs of socially distant others. Drawing from Singer (1981), Reed and Aquino (2003) called this felt obligation a person’s “circle of moral regard.” The circle of moral regard is rooted in the idea that people do not interact with others as external in some objective sense but, rather, in terms of how they are comparatively oriented in one’s psychological space (Lewin, 1951). Applying this principle to the moral realm leads to the prediction that certain people occupy a position in one’s psychological space that makes them seem more deserving of moral concern. The larger the number of people or social groups occupying this moral psychological space, the more expansive one’s circle of moral regard.
Other theorists have used a similar conception to explain justice reasoning. For example, Opotow (1996) used the term *scope of justice* to delineate the psychological boundaries that people use to incorporate those persons toward whom they feel obligated to show concerns about rights, justice, and fair treatment. People with strong moral identities tend to apply ethical standards to a broader portion of humanity compared to those with comparatively weaker moral identities (Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Younis & Yates, 1999).

The socio-cognitive perspective of moral identity and the concept of an expanded circle of moral regard not only helps explain why moral identity should be theoretically linked to intuitions of moral wrong, it also suggests that moral identity might be more robust and reliable predictor of third party responses than other individual moral characteristics that could be investigated. It is possible that other individual moral characteristics, such as moral development (Kohlberg, 1968; Rest, 1986), moral personality (Walker & Frimer, 2007), moral foundations (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and the like will also influence a third party’s morally motivated responses to others’ mistreatment. However, while these characteristics might explain what actions a third party is likely to view as morally right versus wrong, unless these attributes are incorporated into one’s sense of self, they do not readily explain why a third party will attend to and react towards morally relevant social information. According to the socio-cognitive perspective of identity, peoples’ identity schemas can affect their interpretation of social information (e.g., Fiske, 1992; James, 1983/1890; Schneider, 1973; Smith & Semin, 2007).

Recall that an intuition that another’s behaviour violated significant moral norms is a quick and sudden judgment. The more central a particular identity, the greater its *activation potential*, defined as the degree to which a knowledge structure is readily accessible to influence information processing (Higgins, 1996; Higgins & Brendl, 1995). The self acts as a filter for
social information, guiding a person to either pay attention to or ignore certain information about
the world (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Schneider, 1973). For example, research has shown that
people will attend to and remember more information about another person that is relevant to
them in terms of their accessible self-identity, and what information they attend to naturally
affects the favorability of their attitudes towards that person (Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982).
Importantly, an accessible self-schema allows one to rapidly process any social information that
is relevant for an activated self-domain (Markus, 1977) and people will interpret ambiguous
information in a way that is consistent with their expectations (Cantor & Mischel, 1979).

As the moral self is a schema organized around a set of associated moral traits, values,
and behavioural scripts, any social information that is relevant to this network of variables will
be readily recognizable and attended to by a third party with an activated moral identity.
According to the socio-cognitive perspective of moral identity, while the centrality of one’s
moral identity can differ, the mental representation of the traits and goals that characterize a
moral person is a social construction (Aquino & Reed, 2002). That is, there is a general
consensus regarding what traits and behaviours represent moral characteristics, even if only at an
abstract level (Walker & Pitts, 1998). Other’s behaviours that violate the mental representation
of how a moral person “should” act are likely to be attended to by those with an activated moral
identity and as a result, the stronger one’s moral identity, the more likely they will experience a
moral intuition of wrong.

Finally, beyond the link between moral identity and social attention towards moral
violations, moral identity can also explain why, once a third party with an activated moral
identity recognizes a moral wrong, they can more easily resist an urge to derogate a victim as a
means of psychologically coping with injustice compared to those with a relatively weak moral
identity. If it is true that those with a stronger moral identity show an expanded sense of care and concern towards the welfare of others, it is conceivable that derogating an innocent victim of mistreatment is relatively inconsistent with their sense of self. A response such as derogating a victim is less likely to be readily accessible in the minds of those with a strong moral identity, compared to those with a weak moral identity. In line with this argument, Skarlicki and Turner (2013) found that priming moral identity can attenuate victim derogation in a performance evaluation context. In addition, research has also shown that when people are reminded that it is right to respond with sympathy to those who are suffering through no fault of their own there is a remarkable reduction in the extent to which they derogate innocent victims (Simons, 1968, reported in Lerner, 1998). In a sense, reminding people of the moral virtues of empathy can evoke a moral identity which can change how they process information about unfairness.

Thus, for reasons stated above, those with a stronger\(^5\) moral identity will be more likely to experience a moral intuition that a moral standard has been violated as a result of others’ mistreatment. Furthermore, because of their more expansive sphere of moral concern, third parties with a strong moral identity will view a larger set of people or groups in society as deserving just treatment. Based on the preceding I propose the following:

**Proposition 1:** The intuition that an act of mistreatment is a moral violation is more readily elicited among people whose moral identity is strong rather than weak within their overall self-concept.

How does an intuition that a moral violation has occurred turn into moral action? One argument against relying solely on intuitions to explain moral behaviour is that it oversimplifies the complex interplay between intuition and reason (Narvaez, 2008, 2010). My model adopts a

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\(^5\) I use the terms “strong” and “weak” to capture the level of activation of one’s moral identity within their working self-concept. Based on the socio-cognitive model, a person’s moral identity can be chronically or temporarily activated.
similar view by assuming that intuitions alone cannot fully account for the behavioural responses
of third parties to what they may reflexively recognize as a moral violation. I propose that when
third parties experience a moral violation but that moral intuition is not accompanied by an
intense emotional response, third parties are likely to ignore the situation. Furthermore, when
third parties intuit that a moral violation has occurred but are unable to generate good reasons to
support their intuition (e.g., moral dumbfounding), I propose that their motivation to intervene in
the situation will also be relatively weak. In other words, for intervention to occur further
cognitive processing must take place and one’s intuitions must be accompanied with an intense
emotional reaction (Narvaez, 2008).

2.6 Moral Intuitions into Moral Action

I expect third parties, after experiencing an initial gut feeling that something unjust has
happened, to almost simultaneously experience an emotional response to the situation and to
attempt to make sense of it. However, the intensity of which one may experience this emotion
can vary across third parties. For theoretical simplicity I refer to this emotional response as moral
anger. Moral anger refers to a temporary state that can include several discrete but related
emotions (i.e., anger, hostility, contempt, etc.). The deonance model directly links the experience
of anger with perceived injustice and describes it as an intense emotional reaction elicited by a
moral violation (Folger, 2001). However, anger is not the only emotion that can be elicited by
witnessing injustice. For example, Haidt (2003) situates moral anger within a broader “family”
of moral emotions, labeled other-condemning emotions, including contempt and disgust, which
can be elicited in response to being harmed or seeing others harmed unjustly. Following Haidt
(2003), I conceptualize moral anger as consisting of a set of discrete emotional reactions that are
related because they can lead people to think negatively about the perpetrators of injustice and
want to see them punished.

Regardless of the specific set of emotions that make up the broader construct of moral anger, I contend that this response is triggered by the initial moral intuition that some sort of wrong has occurred. The intensity of moral anger will vary across persons, but based on my previous discussion of moral identity, I propose that moral anger is heightened in those with stronger moral identities compared to those with relatively weak moral identities. The reason for this is that an expansion of the circle of moral regard leads a third party to be more emotionally disturbed by witnessing injustices experienced by others when he or she intuits that a wrong has occurred.

*Proposition 2: When a person experiences an intuition that a moral violation has occurred it produces an emotional response of moral anger, which varies in intensity such that it will be stronger for people with a stronger moral identity as compared to those with a relatively weaker moral identity.*

Once moral anger has been elicited, I expect third parties to execute a more elaborate form of cognitive processing to make sense of the event. I base this argument on theory (Elsbach & Barr, 1999) and empirical research (e.g., Schwartz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991; Bless, Bohner, Schwartz, & Strack, 1990) suggesting that negative events lead to more effortful sensemaking processes because they elicit negative affect, mood, and emotions. Negative affect, mood, and emotions, in turn, elicit more elaborate forms of information processing because being in such a state signals to an individual that something is amiss and that the situation merits further cognitive attention (Elsbach & Barr, 1999).

The movement from a reflexive, non-conscious response (i.e., moral intuition) to a comparatively more elaborate form of processing parallels a distinction made in the intuition
literature between intuition and insight (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke, Claxton, & Sparrow, 2009). Whereas an intuition is a gut feeling, a sense of knowing but without knowing “why,” an insight is a distinct and sometimes sudden understanding of the situation or problem (Hodgkinson et al., 2008). Intuition can often precede insight, and insight generally involves more recognition and reasoning than intuition. However, insight need not necessarily originate through an explicitly deliberate thought process (Hogarth, 2001). To a certain extent, the sensemaking process that follows an intuition is similar, but not identical, to insight. By adopting this view, the model presented here retains an intuitionist flavor while acknowledging that intuitions are often only the first step toward gaining a more complete understanding about the situation.

According to the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001), people engage in thoughtful processes that lead to moral judgments when their moral intuitions are challenged. Similarly, my model proposes that third parties interpret the situation to determine whether they should respond after they have intuited some kind of moral violation. This process is systematic, but it can still be relatively fast. Once the initial recognition of wrong-doing driven by intuition has occurred and moral anger is elicited, I posit that third parties will also make three critical cognitive appraisals, including: the severity of harm, the attribution of blame, and the victim’s deservingness of harm.

My selection of which cognitive appraisals a third party is likely to make during the sensemaking process is guided by fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), which states that people’s reactions to an event instigated by an authority depend on three counterfactuals that compare present circumstances to imagined alternatives. Counterfactuals are mental representations of past events that consider what might have been. In fairness theory the would
counterfactual compares a person’s current state of well-being to other potential states, the *could* counterfactual assesses whether other feasible options were available to the authority, and the *should* counterfactual assesses whether the event violated moral or ethical standards. These counterfactual assessments of authorities can be logically extended to the evaluation of actions performed by peers and subordinates. I propose that the would, could, and should counterfactuals yield judgments about the severity of harm, blame attribution, and victim deservingness, respectively, that can motivate third parties to respond. Importantly, these counterfactuals capture a perpetrator’s degree of accountability – in other words, whether the perpetrator can be held responsible for their actions (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001).

The judgment of severity is based on an assessment of the ‘would’ counterfactual because it relies on a comparison between a victim’s present state and an alternative state. To the extent that third parties generate counterfactuals that depict the victim’s present state as worse than alternative states, they are likely to evaluate the severity of harm to the victim as being greater. The greater degree of harm third parties perceive, the more likely they will judge the situation as an act of injustice and the more motivated they will be to respond (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999).

Third parties will also assess whether the perpetrator should be blamed for his or her actions. This assessment directly results from an evaluation of the ‘could’ counterfactual. Assessments of blame tend to be dependent upon one’s assessments of intentionality and justifiability (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). If third parties believe that a perpetrator could have acted differently toward the victim and in a way that would not have caused harm, they are likely to assign greater blame to the perpetrator for causing harm.

Finally, third parties will assess whether the victim deserved the harm that was inflicted.
Deservingness refers to the alignment between an individual’s outcomes and his or her attributes, prior behaviour, or general disposition (Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002; Feather, 1999). When applying fairness theory, this judgment arises from an assessment of the ‘should’ counterfactual. The ‘should’ counterfactual refers to whether third parties believe that the victim is entitled to better treatment than he or she received by virtue of his or her personal characteristics, status, or role within the social context.

To summarize, if third parties perceive that (1) severe harm occurred, (2) the perpetrator was responsible for this harm, and (3) the victim did not deserve the harm, they will arrive at a reasoned judgment that the situation is one in which an injustice has occurred. The result of these three appraisals is that moral anger elicited by the intuition that a moral foundation has been violated will either be intensified or dissipated. Moral anger will be intensified when third parties’ justice cognitions are in accord with their experience of a moral violation and will be dissipated if their cognitive appraisals conflict with this experience. This process of deliberate reasoning interacting with moral anger is depicted by the feedback loop in the model showing a connection between cognitive appraisals and moral anger.

Proposition 3: Moral anger will lead to a systematic appraisal of justice-based cognitions concerning the severity of harm, the attribution of blame, and the victim’s deservingness of harm.

Proposition 4: If a third party concludes, as a result of these appraisals, that an injustice has occurred, the third party’s moral anger will be intensified. However, if a third party concludes that injustice has not occurred, the third party’s moral anger will dissipate.
2.7 Justice Judgments, Moral Anger, and Third Party Motivation

When cognitions based on counterfactual assessments reinforce moral anger, third parties will construe the event as a justice violation and will be highly motivated to respond. Emotion theorists recognize that certain emotions are attached to specific “action tendencies” (Frijda, 1987). When moral anger is reinforced by the results of cognitive appraisal, third parties can be described as being in a state of emotion-cognition concordance. In other words, they are angry about a moral violation and also conclude that there are good reasons for believing that the act was wrong and unprovoked. According to self-regulatory theory, people are motivated to act when they are energized to achieve a particular positive goal (Carver & Scheier, 1999; Higgins, 1997, 1998). When they experience emotion-cognition concordance, third parties should experience a discrepancy in their current state (i.e., understanding that a “wrong” has occurred) and desired state (i.e., a world in which people are not treated badly for no reason) that will motivate them to adopt an approach-focused goal orientation to reduce the discrepancy. Reducing the discrepancy in this case can take various forms, including punishing the perpetrator, supporting the victim, or both.

However, when third parties cannot conclude that a justice violation has occurred, I propose that they will be unmotivated to act, even if their initial emotional response to the situation was one of moral anger. In this case the sensemaking process results in non-concordance between thoughts and emotion, which I expect will inhibit further action. Further action will also be inhibited if the act produces little or no moral anger. In this case no additional sensemaking will be attempted. In the absence of strong moral emotions, a third party will not be sufficiently energized to risk the security and comfort of being a passive bystander.
Proposition 5: When a third party’s cognitions and moral emotions are in a state of concordance, the third party will be motivated to respond to injustice.

Proposition 6: When a third party’s cognitions and moral emotions are in a state of non-concordance, or when a third party’s level of moral anger is low, the third party will not be motivated to respond to injustice.

2.8 The Moderating Role of Power

The preceding theory explains why a third party can be motivated to respond towards others’ mistreatment. To summarize, third parties will be motivated to intervene when they feel that an act of mistreatment violates a significant moral standard of how people ought to be treated; their intuition is accompanied with an intense experience of moral anger; and their cognitive appraisals of harm, blame and deservingness support their initial intuitions. Furthermore, those with a strong moral identity are more likely than those with a relatively weaker moral identity to intuit moral violations directed at others and to experience moral anger as a result. But, given that both punishment and helping the victim can be a potential deontic response, how will a third party intervene once motivated to do so, particularly within a workplace context?

I argue that the constructive response a third party decides to take once motivated will ultimately depend upon what personal and social resources s/he has at his or her disposal. While a multitude of moderating factors exists, I propose that a third party’s source of power will have a significant impact on his or her ability and willingness to respond. By incorporating power into my model, I recognize that third party responses can often be associated with personal costs (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005) and that the context offers particular opportunities and constraints that will influence a third party’s final intervention action.
My model recognizes four broad types of possible reactions a third party can have in response to another’s mistreatment. First, a third party can attempt to punish the perpetrator of mistreatment directly. *Direct punishment* refers to actions taken by a third party to personally and visibly respond to the perpetrator. An example would be if a third party in a position of authority fired an employee who mistreated another. Second, a third party can punish a perpetrator indirectly. *Indirect punishment* occurs when a third party tries to influence others with power to exact punishment. In my opening example, Alex Juani tries to indirectly punish his boss by using public ridicule and contempt to persuade officials in the Ministry of Work and Transportation to fire the perpetrator. Third, third parties might attempt to use *covert social sanctioning*, which captures any insidious behaviour, concealed from the perpetrator, aimed at enacting a social cost on a perpetrator. An important difference between indirect and covert punishment is that with the latter a third party is not particularly trying to rally more direct punishment through another individual or group, and perpetrators are often unaware of the social cost they are incurring because of their mistreatment of others. Finally, third parties can also attempt to *aid the victim* by providing comfort, solace and support or offering advice to those who are mistreated directly. Importantly, the degree and nature of the potential costs associated with each of these courses of actions vary.

Power is a broad construct and it is beyond the scope of my model to discuss all of the possible sources of power in organizations. Instead, I focus on two abstract ways of thinking about power. Power has been defined as the extent to which one can control another’s outcomes (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). Control can be in the form of offering valued rewards, administering punishments, or controlling material or social resources that another is dependent upon. The ability to control another’s outcomes in a
workplace can result from one’s position within a social system or because one possesses resources that can be used to affect others’ outcomes (Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1992). I refer to the first form of power as *position power* and to the second as *resource power*.

I develop a series of propositions to explain how a third party will respond constructively, depending on the combination of power he or she posses. I argue that in the case of position power it is not the absolute level of power that third parties possess that will influence their assessment of how to appropriately respond to observed injustice but, rather, how much of this form of power they possess relative to the perpetrator. Position power as it is defined above is based on the formal structure of a social system, so being in a higher position carries certain legitimated and formalized capabilities that are denied to those who occupy a lower position. These capabilities can be used as mechanisms for punishing the undesired behaviour of those occupying lower positions in the social system. In contrast, resource power is not necessarily determined by the formal structure of the organization, because it can include social resources like reputation and access to networks, as well as more personal resources like political skill, perspective-taking ability, or even having time to devote to various activities. The use of the term resource power in my model refers to the absolute amount of resources third parties possess rather than to the amount they possess relative to the perpetrator.

Logically, third parties who perceive themselves as being high in both position and resource power are more likely to believe that they have a greater capability to act on their approach goal orientation and are also more likely to view themselves as having more options for intervening to achieve justice compared to third parties who perceive themselves as being low in these powers. Hence, I posit that third parties who possess this combination of powers are most likely to pursue actions that punish the perpetrator and provide aid to the victim.
At the other extreme, third parties who perceive themselves as being low in both forms of power are likely to conclude that intervening in a situation in which another individual is being mistreated is potentially too personally costly. Such individuals are more susceptible to social threats and potential counter-retaliations from a perpetrator of mistreatment (Fiske, 1993; Heider, 1958; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Furthermore, people with low power generally avoid situations in which they are likely to get hurt or reprimanded, and are thus less likely to get directly involved in a potential costly situation (Keltner, et al., 2003). As a result, a third party with low power is unlikely to directly or indirectly punish a perpetrator. I also argue that they are likely to avoid providing comfort or aid to a victim out of fear of similar mistreatment befalling them if they are seen as similar or affiliated with the victim. However, this desire to avoid the situation will also be at odds with third parties’ understanding that something morally wrong has occurred and the feeling that they have some type of moral responsibility to act. As such, a third party who is low in both forms of power will choose to engage in covert social sanctioning. In a workplace setting, such sanctioning is likely to emerge in the form of gossip. Gossiping has been conceptualized as a powerful tool for the un-powerful to reign in others’ abusive uses of power (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008) and as a warning system to expose others’ counter-normative behaviour (Beersma & van Kleef, 2012). In line with this research, third parties with low power are likely to use covert social sanctioning as a means of circumventing their low power position and enact some social cost on a perpetrator of injustice, even if such punishment is perhaps less palpable than direct or indirect punishment.

It is possible, of course, for people to be high in one form of power and low in the other, and so a complete analysis of the role of power requires a consideration of these combinations. I propose that when third parties’ position power is high but their resource power is low, they are
more likely to punish the perpetrator rather than do nothing, but they will not necessarily be motivated to also provide aid to the victim. Furthermore, I theorize that if punishment does occur, it is likely to take a direct rather than indirect form. My argument is based on an understanding of the nature and influences of position or legitimate forms of power. First, those who have higher formal status in a social system are generally entrusted and concerned with maintaining social and moral order (Blau, 1964). Furthermore, maintaining social order is generally achieved through direct and overt forms of punishment for those who violate social norms (Blau, 1964). Second, those who have higher position power are less susceptible to subsequent threats and retaliation by those they punish (Heider, 1958). So even though their resource power may be low, third parties with relatively higher position power than the perpetrator are well positioned by virtue of their role in the social structure to execute some form of direct punishment and may also feel duty bound by their role requirements to do so.

Finally, I propose that the specific response of third parties who perceive that they have a combination of high resource power but low position power will depend on the source and nature of the resources they have available (Hardy & Clegg, 1996). It is beyond the scope of my theory to document the various resources that might facilitate a certain response. Instead, I offer a more general proposition that third parties who are high in resource power but low in position power are more likely to provide aid and support to the victim than they are to punish the offender. This is because these third parties have at least some sense of power and thus less susceptible to reprisal from perpetrators of injustice, but are not in a formal position of power to completely ignore this threat. However, if third parties perceive that the resources they possess afford some opportunity to punish the perpetrator, they are most likely to do so indirectly rather than directly.

Figure 2 summarizes how the various combinations of power relate to different third-
party responses. Within each cell I identify the *most likely* strategy a third party will use to intervene once an approach goal orientation has been activated based on that party’s sources of power.

**Proposition 7:** When third parties are motivated to respond to another’s mistreatment, the perception that they are high in position power relative to the perpetrator and also high in resource power will increase the likelihood that they will attempt to both punish the perpetrator and provide aid to the victim.

**Proposition 8:** When third parties are motivated to respond to another’s mistreatment, the perception that they are low in position power relative to the perpetrator and also low in resource power will increase the likelihood that they will use covert social sanctioning to punish the perpetrator, and decrease the likelihood that will respond by directly and indirectly punishing the perpetrator and helping the victim.

**Proposition 9:** When third parties are motivated to respond to another’s mistreatment, the perception that they are high in position power relative to the perpetrator but low in resource power will increase the likelihood that they will respond by directly rather than indirectly punishing the perpetrator.

**Proposition 10:** When third parties are motivated to respond to another’s mistreatment, the perception that they are low in position power relative to the perpetrator but high in resource power will increase the likelihood that they will help the victim and/or indirectly punish the perpetrator. However, this combination of powers will decrease the likelihood that they will directly punish the perpetrator.
2.9 Chapter 2 Summary and Discussion

Why do people intervene when they witness or hear about another being treated unfairly in their organization? In the preceding theory I propose that people will intervene when they perceive unfair treatment violates significant moral standards and feel that intervening is the morally right thing to do in response. This assumption is grounded in Folger and colleagues’ model of deontic justice, which states that people can be incensed by injustice because it violates significant moral norms, as an end in and of itself, regardless of the harm that injustice might cause to oneself. However, my model brings theoretical precision to and extends beyond the deontic model. First, by drawing from intuitive theories of moral reasoning, I provide a more nuanced explanation of why third parties can be moved by injustice. My model suggests that third parties’ morally-driven motivation to respond to another’s injustice begins when they intuit that a moral norm has been violated. These moral intuitions can arise reflexively, in the absence of complex cognitive processing. I also explain that this intuition coincides with the experience of moral anger and draw from fairness theory, to explain why the potency of these moral intuitions in motivating third party behaviour still depends on at least some other cognitive processing. By incorporating these cognitions into my model I imply that third parties will not be motivated to react if there is any uncertainty surrounding the incident of third party injustice. In other words, third parties must have at least an elementary understanding of why the act was wrong and needs reproach. This understanding also contributes to one’s experience of moral anger, as indicated in my model by the feedback loop connecting moral anger to justice cognitions and justice cognitions to moral anger.

Secondly, my model also explains why some third parties will intuit that a moral violation has occurred, and thus potentially move through the rest of the process and be
motivated to intervene, while others do not. By incorporating moral identity into my model I introduce the Self as a predictor of third parties’ moral responses to others’ mistreatment. There are other morally-relevant individual variables that could also predict why some people respond to moral violations while others do not. I chose to focus on moral identity because identity-based approaches suggest that one’s identity is a strong and relevant motivator behind behaviour (e.g., Bergman, 2004; Blasi, 1984; Haslam, 2001). Also, moral identity has direct theoretical relevance in a model that describes reactions to others’ injustice based on a moral imperative, rather than instrumental or affiliative ones. Focusing on moral identity can also help future research derive practical implications for management that may have been more difficult to implement than focusing upon stable individual characteristics. Finally, I explain how helping a victim of mistreatment can also be conceptualized as a deontic reaction towards others’ mistreatment and explain how people will respond, as a function of their relevant positional power and resource power.

In the next section, I conduct a set of empirical studies that test the basic propositions of this model. In Chapter 4, I extend upon this theory to consider whether different types of justice violations will spark more potent third party reactions. I embed this set of studies into the organizational literature by comparing third parties’ responses to the three types of injustice typically studied in the organizational sciences: distributive, procedural, and interpersonal.
3 Testing the Basic Propositions

In this section, I test the basic propositions of the model I proposed in Chapter 2. Study 1 investigates the relationships between moral identity, moral anger, and injustice cognitions. Study 2 investigates the relationships between moral identity, moral anger, and punishment. Finally, Study 3 investigates the impact of relative position power and social resource power on third parties’ behavioural reactions in an actual workplace setting.

3.1 Study 1 Introduction

In Study 1, I test the relationship between moral identity, moral anger, and injustice cognitions. According to the model I presented, once angered, a third party will engage in some form of sensemaking in order to internally conclude that what occurred was indeed morally wrong so that their emotional reaction is justified. I noted three important cognitions a third party will assess: the severity of the mistreatment in terms of the harm caused; the extent to which a perpetrator can be blamed for his or her actions; and the extent to which a victim’s treatment was underserved. Furthermore, those with a more central moral identity are more likely to experience moral anger in response to another’s mistreatment. Based on the preceding theory, I test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Moral identity will be positively related with moral anger in response to another’s mistreatment.

Hypothesis 2: Moral anger mediates the positive relationship between moral identity and injustice cognitions.

In Study 1, I also tested whether a belief in a just world had similar effects on moral anger and justice cognitions as moral identity. If my suppositions are correct, moral identity should be a more relevant predictor of moral anger and justice cognitions than belief in a just
world, because moral identity can attenuate a bystander’s otherwise quick reaction to derogate a victim, and instead focus a third party’s attention on the moral violation itself. This will lead to moral anger rather than victim blaming. Individual differences in a belief in a just world is often associated with a stronger need to psychologically cope with injustice, however, it does not necessarily predict how a person will cope with others’ injustice specifically (Furnham, 2003).

3.1.1 Study 1 Procedures and Sample

Data were collected from Qualtrics, an online subject pool that provides access to a representative sample of United States citizens. In order to participate in the study, respondents had to be at least 19 years of age, be currently employed and have worked in the same organization for at least the past 6 months. This study applied recent adaptations to the Critical Incident Technique to capture third parties’ reactions to mistreatment in an organizational setting (see Flanagan, 1954, for original; e.g., Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Boswell & Olson-Buchanan, 2004). This technique involves asking participants to recall an actual experience they have encountered in the past, and to then answer a series of quantitative questions regarding their reactions to this experience. Participants were asked: Think back over the last 6 months. Has there been a time where you witnessed a colleague at your current workplace be mistreated by another individual in your organization? A six-month timeframe was chosen because it strikes a balance between allowing enough time for a third party to have experienced an incident of mistreatment in the past, as well as being able to remember the details of the incident clearly (Aquino et al., 2001; Boswell & Olsen-Buchanan, 2004). Respondents who answered affirmatively were then asked to describe the situation and respond to a series of questions regarding their emotional and cognitive reactions. Participants then answered a series of demographics-related questions and responded to measures of moral identity and belief in a just
world. I also collected demographic information, moral identity, and belief in a just world from those who responded “No” to the opening question.

I set several a priori measures to ensure that the quality of the data was not compromised through the online recruitment. First, I included two test questions that asked participants to answer a specific response on Likert-type scale. Those who responded incorrectly were presumably not paying attention to the survey questions and were thus removed from the sample. Second, I coded the incidents participants described to ensure that they reported an appropriate third party situation (i.e., they were not personally affected by the injustice). I removed those who reported an incident in which they were the victim, and those who indicated that the victim was a close relative or romantic partner because third parties in these situations are likely heavily influenced by relational motivations to respond to injustice. Finally, I removed participants who provided fraudulent or unclear responses to the open-ended questions (i.e., responded with gibberish, or did not respond to the question at all). The final sample, including both participants who responded affirmatively to the opening question and those who responded ‘no,’ was 282 participants (47% men; 84% Caucasian; $M_{age} = 38.84$, $SD_{age} = 12.15$; $M_{work\ years} = 19.96$, $SD_{work\ years} = 12.67$). Of those 123 described an incident in which someone at work had been mistreated (44% of those who responded), of which 44% were men; 84% were Caucasian. The subsample had a mean age of 37.79 ($SD = 11.56$) and had an average of 19.31 ($SD = 12.00$) years of work experience.

3.1.2 Study 1 Measures

A full list of items not reported in the main text is provided in Appendix A.
**Moral identity.** Moral identity was measured using five items from the internalization dimension of Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity instrument. I used the internalization subscale because, according to Aquino and Reed (2002), the internalization subscale of their instrument best captures the degree to which people's moral trait associations are experienced as being central to one’s self-definition. This measurement tool asks people to identify the degree to which they define themselves in terms of a subset of moral traits (e.g., compassionate, kind, honest, fair, etc.) that represent lay construals of moral character. Their measurement approach relies on the phenomenon of spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975) among clustered self-relevant traits (moral in this case) in memory (cf. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Aquino and Reed’s (2002) instrument exposes participants to moral trait stimuli and asks them first to reflect on the stimuli and then to answer several questions about how those trait stimuli relate to the private and public aspects of their self-concepts. Aquino and Reed (2002) referred to the private aspect of the moral self as *internalization*, which is the mental representation that resides in memory; and they defined its public aspect as *symbolization*, or the degree to which the moral self-schema is projected through the person’s actions in the world. Aquino and Reed (2002) provided considerable evidence that the internalization subscale validly measures the chronic activation potential of the moral self schema, which is one indicator of its centrality to the self. Sample Internalization items are: “It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics,” and “Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.” The five items measuring internalization will be answered on a 7-pt Likert-type scale ranging from ‘Completely Disagree’ (1) to ‘Completely Agree’ (7) and had indicated strong reliability (\(\alpha = .85\)).

**Moral Anger.** I measured moral anger by asking participants to respond to four items:
extent to which they felt, angry, outraged, mad, and offended in response to what had occurred. This approach is consistent with past measures of moral anger which have asked participants to report the extent to which the feel a series of anger-related emotions (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011) and is also consistent with my definition of moral anger as a series of discrete but related emotions. The items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘Not at All’ (1) to ‘Extremely’ (5) and averaged ($\alpha = .87$).

**Injustice Cognitions.** I measured respondents’ injustice cognitions using four items written for the purpose of this study. These items included: In your opinion, how severe was the mistreatment (1 = ‘Not very severe,’ 10 = ‘Very severe’); How much harm was caused by the mistreatment (1 = ‘Little to no harm,’ 10 = ‘A lot of harm’; To what extent did the harmed party deserve such treatment (1 = ‘DID NOT deserve to be treated that way at all,’ 10 = ‘DID DESERVE to be treated that way A LOT,’ reverse coded); and, To what extent can you blame the perpetrator for his/her actions (1 = ‘Not at all,’ 10 = ‘A lot’). Items were standardized and averaged together to create an index of injustice cognitions, with higher numbers indicating stronger perceptions of injustice ($\alpha = .66$).

**Belief in a Just World.** Belief in a just world was measured using the 20-item Rubin and Peplau (1973) belief in a just world scale. Example items include, “By and large, people deserve what they get,” and, “People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves.” Items were coded such that higher numbers indicated a greater strength in one’s need to believe in a just world. Items were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (7) ($\alpha = .66$).

**Control Variables.** I controlled for a number of factors that could influence the moral motivations of third parties’ reactions in this study. First, I controlled for how long ago the
incident had occurred because third parties’ recollection could be weaker for violations that had occurred in the distant past and could affect how they responded to the questions in the survey. Also, third parties who recalled a more recent incident could still harbor strong emotions that would affect their responding. Participants were asked to indicate whether the incident occurred within the past week, month, 3 months, or 6 months.

Given that the extent to which a perpetrator has mistreated the third party in the past could influence how a third party chooses to respond, I controlled for the extent to which the third party had also been mistreated by the perpetrator. I used a single item that asked participants, “On a scale of 1 to 10 please indicate the extent to which the perpetrator has also treated you unfairly.” The scale ranged from ‘Never’ (1) to ‘Always’ (10). I also controlled for the relationship between a third party and the victim to address potential relational affects of a third party’s response. This was measured by averaging two items. The stem question asked, “How would you describe your relationship with the harmed party?” The responses to the first item ranged from 1 ‘I do not like this person at all’ (1) to ‘I like this person a lot’ (10) and the second item ranged from ‘We do not have a friendly relationship’ (1) to ‘We have a very friendly relationship’ (10) (α = .93).

Finally, past research has shown that from a first-person perspective, people sometimes respond differently to personal (e.g., verbal abuse; ostracism; rudeness; berating and humiliating treatment, etc.) versus policy-related (e.g., being looked over for a deserved promotion; employment unfairly terminated, etc.) offenses (Boswell & Olsen-Buchanan, 2004). Thus, I coded the open-ended descriptions participants provided of the incidents and controlled for potential differences. Examples of policy-related violations include a colleague who was: being falsely accused of wrongdoing; singled out for punishment of inappropriate behaviour; and
unjustly fired after sickness or a family emergency. Personal related violations included excluding or ostracizing a colleague, berating, yelling at, and demeaning employees, sexual harassment, making racist and inappropriate comments to colleagues, and sabotaging a coworker. This variable is coded such that ‘personal offense’ is 1 and ‘policy-related offense’ is 0 (83% of incidents were coded as personal offenses).

3.1.3 Study 1 Results and Discussion

Before testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, I first conducted an ANOVA to assess whether those who had reported witnessing mistreatment at work reported a stronger moral identity than those who did not. The results indicated that the mean scores of those who reported an incident of third party mistreatment ($M = 6.20, SD = 1.04$) and those who did not report witnessing mistreatment ($M = 6.22, SD = 1.00$) did not statistically differ ($M_{\text{diff}} = .02, F_{1, 280} = .04, ns$).\(^6\)

The means, standard deviations, and first-order correlations between the focal variables are provided in Table 1, based on the subsample of only those who reported an incident of third party mistreatment. I used hierarchical linear regression (Aiken & West, 1991) to test Hypothesis 1, which predicted that moral identity would be positively related to moral anger in incidences of third party mistreatment. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 2.\(^7\) The results supported this hypothesis. Moral identity was positively related to moral anger ($\beta = .19, p < .05$). Furthermore, belief in a just world did not predict moral anger ($\beta = -.13, ns$).

To test Hypothesis 2, that moral anger mediates the positive relationship between moral identity and injustice cognitions, I used the bootstrapped estimation of conditional indirect effects (see Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). This approach offers several advantages over the

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\(^6\) Likewise, the mean scores on participants’ reports of belief in a just world also did not differ as a function of whether a participant reported an incident of third party mistreatment ($M_{\text{diff}} = .09, F_{1, 280} = 2.03, ns$).

\(^7\) I assessed whether gender, ethnicity or age affected the pattern of results reported here. There were no main effects or moderated effects of these demographic variables; therefore, they were not included in the reported analyses.
conventional procedures for assessing mediation detailed by Baron and Kenny (1986). Among these are that it directly estimates the size of the indirect effects, provides confidence intervals (CIs) for the estimated effects, demonstrates higher power and greater control over Type I error rates, and relies on fewer assumptions about the sampling distribution (see Bollen & Stine, 1990; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). This approach maintains the required observations of a significant relationship between the independent variable and the mediator variable in a model, as well as between the mediator and the dependent variable. However, the observation of a significant, direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is not required (see Collins, Graham, & Flaherty, 1998; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Since belief in a just world did not predict moral anger, it violates the first criterion.

The results of this analysis are also provided in Table 2. The positive relationship found between moral identity and moral anger offers support for the first criterion of a mediation model. In support for the second criterion, the results indicated that moral anger predicted injustice cognitions ($\beta = .53, p < .01$). Furthermore, the bootstrapped bias corrected 95% CIs were estimated to assess the indirect effect of moral identity and injustice cognitions using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012). PROCESS generates ordinary least squares and maximum-likelihood based CIs for the indirect effects of an independent variable on continuous and dichotomous variables respectively. The estimation of each CI involved generating 5000 re-samples of the data (with replacement) to derive empirical distributions for assessing statistical significance, indicated by an interval that does not include zero (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). The resulting Bias Corrected 95% CI for the indirect effect ranged from .01 to .40. Given that the
lower bound is above 0, I can conclude that moral anger mediates the relationship between moral identity and injustice cognitions. Since the relationship between moral identity and injustice cognitions remains significant even once moral anger is included in the model ($\beta = .27, p < .01$), the results support partial mediation. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 2, again belief in a just world was not a significant predictor of injustice cognitions ($\beta = .07, ns$).

The results of Study 1 provide initial support for my model proposed in Figure 1. Those with a more central moral identity reported feeling a stronger sense of moral anger in response to others’ mistreatment, and in turn these third parties interpreted the situation as more unjust. The results revealed no difference in the average strength of moral identity of those who reported an incident of mistreatment, compared to those who did not. This result indicates that both those whose moral identity is a central aspect of their sense of self, and those for which moral identity is comparatively less central can acknowledge others’ mistreatment. However, their responses to this mistreatment are decidedly different. Those with a stronger moral identity reported feeling more moral anger and this moral anger in turn influenced their sensemaking conclusions of the situation. Furthermore, individual differences in belief in a just world did not influence third parties’ moral anger in response to others’ mistreatment. While the fundamental principles of just world theory can help explain why third parties are moved by others’ injustice, this finding suggests that belief in a just world as an individual difference characteristic is not relevant in understanding third parties’ moral reactions. As proposed, moral identity was a better predictor of third parties’ moral reactions to others’ mistreatment.

A particular strength of this study is it provides insight into how actual employees respond to mistreatment within their organizations. However, a limitation of this study is that moral identity could have influenced the nature of the mistreatment participants recalled. To
address this concern, as well as test an additional portion of the model proposed in Figure 1, I
cconduct a quasi-experiment in Study 2 in which I ask participants to respond to the same
mistreatment stimuli.

3.2 Study 2 Introduction

In Study 2, I test the importance of moral identity and moral anger in motivating third
party punishment. I test my hypotheses in Study 2 by observing participants’ reactions to a video
in which an instructor mistreats a student. As will be explained below, third party punishment in
this study was measured via participants’ recommendation for the instructor’s supposed salary
increase. In addition to testing Hypothesis 1 stated above, I also test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Moral anger mediates the negative relationship between moral
identity and participants’ salary recommendations (as a form of third party
punishment).

3.2.1 Study 2 Procedures and Sample

Participants were undergraduate business students, drawn from a business school in the
Mid-Atlantic area of the United States. Thirty-eight students participated in this study, of which
45% were male and 87% were Caucasian, with an average age of 20.21 (SD = .99) and 3.96 (SD
= 2.13) average years of work experience.

To enhance mundane realism, participants were informed that as part of a joint initiative,
researchers at their business school were participating alongside researchers from the Sauder
School of Business to improve instructor evaluation forms. The purpose of these ‘new’
evaluation forms was ostensibly to give the students greater voice in administrative decision-
making regarding rehiring and salary increases for adjunct and temporary faculty members. They
were told that they would watch a video of an actual instructor teaching a class and asked to give
their impressions of the instructor’s teaching effectiveness. They were instructed to respond accurately, as their responses would be compiled with those of students at the Sauder School of Business, and could potentially be used to make administrative decisions. This context created a third party situation in which the participants had no immediate stake in the situation (e.g., participants did not need to worry about potentially having to take a course with the instructor in the future) but also enhanced their motivation to pay attention and respond truthfully.

In actuality, the video was created for the purposes of this study. The 8-minute video was directed and produced by a professional videographer with an educational background in Psychology and used professional hired actors. In the video, the instructor notes that because of a personal conflict he has changed the class start time to a later start, and that a mandatory make-up class will be necessary to recover the lost time. He schedules the make-up class for the end of the semester. A female student in the class, who speaks with an Arabic accent and wears a hijab, informs the instructor that she would need to miss the make-up class because she has already scheduled a flight home to celebrate a Muslim holiday with her family. The instructor then indicates that instead of the make-up class she can complete a lengthy assignment. When she questions why she must do the assignment, the instructor says, “You are the only one who has a problem with this. It seems like every year there is some sort of problem with you people. Why can’t you assimilate into Canadian culture? Unfortunately the assignment is mandatory and the issue is not open for discussion.” Thus, the instructor violates norms of common decency and respectful treatment (Bies & Moag, 1986).

After watching the video, participants were first asked to fill out a short general impressions questionnaire which included a measure of moral anger. They then filled out the ostensibly new evaluation form. This evaluation form included questions generally found on an
evaluation form as well as the dependent variable of interest, salary recommendation. Once participants had finished completing the evaluation form, they were told that they would be participating in an unrelated study. They were given a packet of individual difference measures which included a measure of moral identity, as well as demographics questions.

3.2.2 Study 2 Measures

*Moral identity.* Moral identity was measured using the same instrument by Aquino and Reed (2002) described in Study 1 ($\alpha = .70$).

*Moral Anger.* Moral anger was measured with three items: “The instructor did things that made me angry”;” The instructor’s behavior made me upset”; and, “I am outraged by this instructor’s actions.” The items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (5) and averaged ($\alpha = .91$).

*Third Party Punishment - Salary Recommendation.* Participants were informed that the business school could offer up to a 5% increase in salary for high teaching performance. They were then asked “Do you recommend that [the business school] offer this instructor an increase of salary of 5% if [the school of business] extends this instructor’s contract?” Participants’ response options included either Yes or No. Answering “Yes” was equivalent to giving a 5% raise. For participants who answered “No,” they were also asked to recommend an alternative amount ranging from 0-5%. Scores on this measure could therefore range from 0 – 5. Thus, smaller responses indicated more punishment.

*Control Variables.* Aside from moral motivations, third parties can also react to others’ mistreatment because of relational motives. Brockner and Greenberg (1990), for example, found that third parties react more strongly to violations directed toward others with whom they identify. To rule out identification motives as an alternative explanation, I controlled for the
degree to which the participants identified with the victim’s situation. I averaged two items written for the purpose of this study to capture students’ past experiences with instructors: “I have been treated unfairly by instructors in the past”; and, “I have had similar experiences with instructors in the past.” Responses ranged from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (5) ($\alpha = .72$).

3.2.3 Study 2 Results and Discussion

Table 3 provides the means, standard deviations and first-order correlations for the focal variables. I used the same statistical approach applied in Study 1 to test the hypotheses in Study 2. Hypothesis 1 predicted that moral identity will be positively related to moral anger in response to another’s mistreatment. The results indicated a positive relationship between moral identity and moral anger ($\beta = .32$, $p < .05$), thus supporting Hypothesis 1. These results are presented in Table 4. Hypothesis 3 predicted that moral anger mediates the negative relationship between moral identity and participants’ salary recommendations. I used the bootstrapped estimation of the conditional indirect effects detailed in Study 1 to test this hypothesis. The results of these analyses are provided in Table 4 and support Hypothesis 3. There was a negative and statistically significant relationship between moral anger and salary recommendations ($\beta = -.50$, $p < .01$) when moral identity was controlled for, indicating that the more third parties were angered by the instructor’s actions, the more they punished the instructor by recommending a reduced salary. The relationships between moral identity and moral anger, and moral anger and salary recommendation satisfy the two criteria for mediation based on the Preacher et al.’s (2007) approach. Furthermore, there was a significant indirect effect of moral identity predicting salary recommendation. The resulting Bias Corrected 95% CI for the indirect effect ranged from -1.14

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8 I assessed whether gender, ethnicity or age affected the pattern of results reported here. There were no main effects or moderated effects of these demographic variables; therefore they were not included in the reported analyses.
to -.07. Given that the upper bound is less than 0, I can conclude that the overall indirect relationship between moral identity and salary recommendation is negative and significant. This result indicates that those with a stronger moral identity recommended a lower salary. The results support full mediation.

The results of Study 2 again provide support for the model proposed in Figure 1. After watching a video of another person being mistreated, those with a comparatively more central moral identity were more angered by the instructor’s actions. The mistreatment stimulus used in this study is noteworthy. In the video, the instructor makes unambiguously disparaging remarks. Even with such a strong manipulation, moral identity was a significant predictor of the moral anger third parties felt in response. Finally, moral anger was found to be an important motivating ingredient in producing third party punishment. The more anger third parties felt in response to the instructor’s actions, the smaller the salary increase they recommended.

Studies 1 and 2 indicate that those with a more central moral identity are more angered by others’ mistreatment, perceive others’ mistreatment as unjust, and are more motivated to punish those who mistreat others. As I discussed above however, once motivated to respond to others’ mistreatment, third parties’ sources of power can affect the available courses of action they can take. In Study 3, I test the latter part of my model by exploring third parties’ responses as a function of their power in an actual workplace environment.

3.3 Study 3 Introduction

Study 3 takes into account the fact that even when individuals are motivated to respond to another’s mistreatment, the costs associated with their reactions in a workplace environment will likely have an effect on how they ultimately decide to respond. Above, I discussed how third parties’ sources of power (i.e., relative hierarchical power, and resource power) influences the
costs and responsibilities associated with their reactions to others’ mistreatment in a workplace setting. In Study 3, I test this portion of the model.

Recall that having power can help protect third parties from potential reprisal from a perpetrator should they intervene in the situation (Blau, 1964). Third parties who are afforded the most protection are those of higher hierarchical status compared to the perpetrator. Furthermore, it is often expected of members of a social system with hierarchical power to punish those who violate social norms of the group (Heider, 1958). Thus, third parties with higher hierarchical power compared to a perpetrator will be more likely to punish that perpetrator directly than third parties with less hierarchical power. Second, resource power is likely to be related to providing help to a victim and indirect punishment. This is because these third parties have at least some source of power, and are thus less susceptible to reprisal from perpetrators than third parties with no power. However, their lack of position power means that they are not completely immune to a perpetrator’s retaliatory efforts. Finally, those with neither position power nor resource power will likely engage in covert social sanctioning, which in this study I capture via social gossiping (Beersma & van Kleef, 2012; Keltner, et al., 2008). Third parties with no power are the most susceptible to retaliation from a perpetrator and have little instrumental means to punish a perpetrator either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, third parties with no power are also not likely to help a victim because they have no access to resources to do so (Lerner, 1980). Covert social sanctioning, such as gossiping provide the un-powerful with a tool to enact a social cost on a perpetrator without incurring a stark social cost upon themselves.

Based on the aforementioned theory, I test the following Hypotheses in Study 3.

*Hypothesis 4: Third parties’ relative position power will be positively related to direct punishment.*
Hypothesis 5: Third parties’ resource power will be positively related to (a) indirect punishment and (b) helping the victim.

Hypothesis 6: Third parties’ relative position power will be negatively related to gossiping about the incident.

Hypothesis 7: Third parties’ resource power will be negatively related to gossiping about the incident.

Resource power is a broad construct and thus for the purpose of this research, I will limit the study of resource power in the form of social resources, including one’s social ties to others, reputation, and extent of social support. These resources are considered ‘social’ because they depend upon and originate from a third party’s relationships with others. These social resources contribute to one’s social capital, interpersonal relationships that create value (Coleman, 1990; Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). According to social resource theory, individuals with credible social capital can draw upon the resources of those with whom they have relational ties and mobilize these resources for their own gain (Lin, 1990).

Johnson and colleagues (2013) discuss three facets of social capital: ties to others, social standing and prestige, and personal relationships and affiliations. ‘Ties to others’ refer to the relational ties a third party has in his or her network. Social ties refers to developing relationships with others who could potentially be depended on for help with a career or social related problem, attending and participating in social functions and developing friendships with senior managers (Forret & Dougherty, 2004). One has access to important tangible resources through these social ties, such as favors and information. While social ties are a two-way street in that individuals are expected to exchange similar social resources back to their social ties, social capital is generally associated with career success and status (Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001;
Standing and prestige captures a third parties favorable reputation. *Reputation* is defined as salient characteristics and accomplishments that one is known for (Ferris, Blass, Douglas, Kolodinsky, & Treadway, 2003). It is often demonstrated through one’s behaviours, and interactions with others. Having an auspicious reputation can grant someone legitimacy in an organization (Gioia & Sims, 1983). Furthermore, those with more favorable reputations are perceived to be more competent and trustworthy (Gioia & Sims, 1983; Ostrom, 2003) and reputation is related to status and success (Gamson, 1966). A favorable reputation can contribute to one’s social capital because when one is competent and credible others are more likely to create social ties with that person as they trust their social ties can be mutually beneficial.

Finally, ‘personal relationships and affiliations’ refer to the loyalty and support one receives from others in their network. Social support is generally defined as positive behaviours and interactions with the purpose of fostering quality relationships (Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002; Rook, 1984). Social support can come in different forms, such as emotional support, expressed through sympathetic and caring behaviours, and instrumental support, expressed through help with work related tasks (Beehr, 1985). Social support is similar to general social ties, but generally afforded to one through “strong” ties with others (Burt, 1992) and is focused more upon the content of social exchanges (i.e., emotional or instrumental) than the number of ties one has. As such, social support is a specific form of social capital. Social support has been conceptualized as a psychological resource and individuals can draw upon these resources when they face stressful situations or depleting circumstances (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Hobfoll, 2002). Social support can also have direct effects on one’s well-being by contributing to the
fundamental need to belong and feel valued by others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Together, these elements of social capital can contribute to one’s social resource power.

3.3.1 Study 3 Procedure and Sample

In Study 3, I again applied recent adaptations of the Critical Incident Technique, similar to that of Study 1 (see Flanagan, 1954, for original; Aquino et al., 2001; Boswell & Olson-Buchanan, 2004) to capture third parties’ behavioural reactions to others’ mistreatment in an organizational setting.

Data was collected via two online subject pool companies: Clearvoice and Qualtrics. Both companies provide access to a representative sample of United States citizens and steps were taken to ensure that no same participant was recruited through by each company. In order to participate, participants were told that they had to be a resident of the United States, and at least 19 years of age. Importantly, they also had to have experienced an incident in which a colleague of theirs was mistreated by another organizational member at work within the past 6 months of responding to the situation and this incident angered them at least to a minor degree. I used the same *a priori* measures described in Study 1 to ensure that the quality of the data was not compromised because of illegitimate responding. The final sample included 178 participants: 70 drawn from Clearvoice and 108 drawn from Qualtrics. Men comprised 43% of the sample and 75% of participants were Caucasian. The sample had a mean age of 41.84 (SD = 11.26) years, and an average tenure of 9.49 (SD = 8.27) years at their current job.9

In Study 3, I was interested in understanding how people respond to others’ mistreatment in a workplace setting as a function of their social and position power. As

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9 Via Clearvoice, 431 individuals opened the link to the survey, and 136 of these indicated that they met the study criteria (32%). Via Qualtrics, 268 individuals opened the link to the survey and 137 of these indicated that they met the inclusion criteria (51%).
such I reframed the critical incident question to capture participants who were already emotionally and cognitively motivated to respond to others’ mistreatment. In this study, participants were asked to recall a time in which they were *angered by unfair treatment* directed towards another individual in their workplace. Specifically, they were asked:

*Think back over the last 6 months. Has there been a time where you witnessed or heard about a colleague at your current workplace being treated by another individual in your organization unfairly and it made you angry?*

If a participant responded affirmatively, they were asked to describe the situation in detail, explaining what happened and their role in the event. Those who responded ‘No’ were thanked for their interest and informed that they did not meet the criteria of the study. If a participant responded ‘Yes’ they were then asked a series of questions about how they responded in the situation, followed by a series of demographic questions, followed by a number of measures that captured participants individual differences and workplace relationships. Included in this final section were my measures of moral identity and resource power. These items were included at the end so as not to bias participants’ initial recall of the incident.

### 3.3.2 Study 3 Measures

All items not reported here are provided in Appendix A.

*Position Power.* Consistent with others’ research (Aquino et al., 2001), position power was measured by asking participants whether they are of lower, equal or higher hierarchical status compared to the perpetrator in the incident. This variable was coded from 1 (the perpetrator is of higher status compared to the participant) to 3 (the perpetrator is of lower status compared to the participant), with a response of 2 indicating that the perpetrator and he
participant were of equal hierarchical status. Thus higher numbers indicated more relative
position power for the participant.

Resource Power. Resource power was captured via participants’ social capital. Guided
by Johnson and colleagues (2013) three facets of social capital, I created a composite index using
three measures that relate to each facet. Social ties in one’s workplace was measured using 6-
items from the Political Skills Inventory (Ferris, Treadway, Kolodinsky, Hochwarter, Kacmar,
Douglas, & Frink, 2005) (α = .93) which captures the extent to which an individual actively
builds network ties with other individuals in his or her workplace. Social standing was measured
using Hochwarter, Ferris, Zinko, Arnell and James’ (2007) 12-item reputation scale (α = .96).
Finally, social affiliation was captured via social support, using the eight items drawn from the
emotional-instrumental subscale of the abbreviated Social Support Survey (Gjesfjeld, Greeno, &
Kim, 2007) (α = .93). All items were measured on a on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (5). These three scales were significantly correlated
(ranging from .32 to .50, p < .001). These scales were standardized and averaged to create a
composite index of social resources such that each component was equally weighted in the final
scale (α = .95).10

Third Party Reactions. All items used to measure third party reactions were measured on
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (7). I drew from
a number of scales to create measures of helping the victim, indirect and direct punishment, and

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10 Composite Index Variables are created by combining multiple indicators of a particular construct of interest into
one overarching measure. In this study, the use of a composite index was theoretically derived, since social capital is
made up of three separate factors. To assess the validity of this scale, I conducted a criterion validity test to ensure
that each individual component of the derived composite measure was positively related to each other, and related
similarly to the outcome variables (OECD, 2008). The results of this test are provided in Table 5. The results
suggest that each component of the social capital composite measure were positively related. Furthermore, each
component was positively related to indirect punishment and helping the victim, and were not significantly related to
direct punishment. There was only one anomaly – a small positive correlation between social support and gossiping.
Given the overall pattern of relationships, the correlations support the aggregation of these three separate factors into
one overarching composite index of social capital.
gossiping. These scales included items from measures of voice and social-coping (e.g., Boswell & Olson-Buchanan, 2004; Wasti & Cortina, 2002), social support (e.g., Gjesfjeld et al., 2007), advocacy-seeking and reprimanding (Wasti & Cortina, 2002), and gossip (drawn from measures of mistreatment: e.g., Glomb, 1998). The original scales included 5 items each. I conducted confirmatory factor analysis to assess the dimensionality and distinction between the different types of reactions. CFA was conducted using AMOS 16. The sample covariance matrix of the reported frequency of experiencing each behaviour was used as input for the CFA. Following Bollen’s (1989) recommendation, I examined several fit statistics: the chi-square test, normed-fit index (NFI), goodness-of-fit index (GFI), comparative-fit index (CFI), and root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA). The CFA showed that the four-factor model fit the data reasonably well, $\chi^2 (df = 164) = 462.26, p < .01$, GFI = .77, CFI = .88, NFI = .82, RMSEA = .11. Several of the fit statistics fell within the recommended ranges, and all of the parameter estimates for the items were significant. However, inspection of the modification indices and standardized residuals indicated that fit could be improved by deleting two items that had loadings on multiple factors. I deleted these items and performed a CFA on the remaining items (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). The fit statistics improved, $\chi^2 (df = 122) = 335.62, p < .01$, GFI = .81, CFI = .91, NFI = .87, RMSEA = .09. I also compared the 18 item four-factor model to a single factor model. The fit statistics for the single factor model indicated a poorer fit to the data, $\chi^2 (df = 135) = 1673.85, p < .01$, GFI = .43, CFI = .35, NFI = .33, RMSEA = .26. Furthermore, a chi-square difference test indicated that the four-factor model fit the data significantly better than the single factor model, $\Delta \chi^2 (\Delta df = 13) = 1318.23, p < .01$. I therefore concluded that the four-factor model provided better fit to the data. The standardized parameter estimates for each item are shown in Table 6. Direct punishment was measured using 5 items ($\alpha = .94$). Indirect punishment was
measured using 4 items ($\alpha = .91$). Helping the victim was measured with 5 items ($\alpha = .89$). Finally, covert social sanctioning was measured with 4 items that captured gossiping about the situation and perpetrator ($\alpha = .91$).

**Control Variables.** I controlled for a number of factors that could influence the moral motivations of third parties’ reactions in this study. As in Study 1, I controlled for how long ago the incident had occurred, the participants’ relationship with the victim ($\alpha = .86$), and the extent to which the perpetrator had also treated the participant unfairly in the past. These variables were measured the same way as reported in Study 1.

Second, while the instructions asked participants to recall a time in which a colleague was mistreated and they were *angered* by the situation, participants’ amount of angered could range. Thus, I controlled for moral anger by asking participants to report the extent to which they were angered by the incident on a single item that ranged from 1 ‘Somewhat Angered’ to 10 ‘Extremely Angered.’ I also again controlled for the nature of the violation, after coding whether the incident described represented a personal (1) or policy-related (0) act of mistreatment (66% of violations were personal).

I controlled for the extent to which the participants tend to be empathetic towards others. Feeling empathy suggests that third parties might react because they internalize the pain or hurt caused by others’ mistreatment rather than feel morally motivated to respond because an ethical standard has been violated. To measure empathy I used the 7 items of the empathetic concern subscale of the interpersonal reactivity index ($\alpha = .82$) (Davis, 1983).

**3.3.3 Study 3 Results and Discussion**

The means, standard deviations, and correlations of the study variables are included in Table 7. I tested Hypotheses 4 to 7 using hierarchical regression (Aiken & West, 1991). In each
model, the control variables were entered in the first step, and relative position power and social resources were entered in the second step. The results of these analyses to test Hypotheses 4 to 8 are provided in Table 8. Hypothesis 4 predicted that relative position power will be positively related to direct punishment. The results supported Hypothesis 4, relative position power was positively related to direct punishment ($\beta = .39, p < .01$). In addition, relative position power was also positively related to indirect punishment ($\beta = .19, p < .05$) but was not related to helping the victim ($\beta = .08, ns$). In support of Hypothesis 5, third parties’ social resource power was positively associated with indirect punishment ($\beta = .29, p < .01$) and helping the victim ($\beta = .25, p < .01$). Hypotheses 6 and 7 predicted that both relative position power and social resource power will be negatively related to gossiping. In other words, gossiping is a strategy those with less power use to socially sanction perpetrators of mistreatment. The results did not support these hypotheses (relative position power: $\beta = -.13, ns$; social resource power: $\beta = .08, ns$).

The purpose of Study 3 was to investigate how third parties will respond to others’ mistreatment once they are motivated to do so in the workplace. Drawing from theories of power, I hypothesized that third parties with higher organizational status, relative a perpetrator of mistreatment, would be more likely to punish the perpetrator. The results supported this general proposition as relative position power was positively related to direct punishment, which captures responses in which a third party personally and openly reprimands a perpetrator. Relative position power was also positively related to indirect punishment in which a third party uses their connections with others or formal organizational mechanisms to ensure that the organization addresses a perpetrator’s misdeed. Furthermore, third parties with social resource power were more likely to help the victim of mistreatment and punish the perpetrators indirectly.

11 I tested for potential interactive effects of relative position power x social resource power. There were no significant effects.
Importantly, this research suggests that even when third parties are angered by mistreatment towards others, they do not react unless they have some source of power that can protect them against subsequent retaliation. Finally, I had predicted that each source of power would be negatively related to gossiping about the situation since workplace gossip as been conceptualized as a means for the un-powerful to covertly and safely sanction those who violate social norms. It is possible that given that gossiping is potentially available to any third party, even though those with little power might rely upon it more heavily, those with more power are also likely to engage in at least some gossiping. At this point, this conclusion is only speculative based on the present data and requires further future investigation.

3.4 Chapter 3 Summary and Discussion

The purpose of Studies 1 to 3 was to test the basic propositions of the model I developed in Chapter 2. Studies 1 and 2 highlight the important role of moral identity in producing moral anger, and an understanding that an act was morally wrong or unjust (Study 1), and third party punishment (Study 2). According to the deontic model of justice, people can be angered by others’ mistreatment because mistreating others violates prescriptive norms of how we ought to treat one another. However, as experience and past empirical research tells us, not everyone experiences moral indignation and contempt in response to others’ experiences of injustice. The socio-cognitive perspective of moral identity begins to shed light on this question. Those with a more central sense of a moral self are more likely to reflexively recognize when moral standards of fair treatment have been violated. Furthermore, because those with a more central moral identity have an expanded circle of moral regard towards the welfare of others, they are also likely to extend this to the victims of mistreatment. In line with this theorizing, in Study 1, I find that moral identity does not predict whether or not a third party can recall a time in which
another person was mistreated in their workplace. However, moral identity was an important factor in explaining how people responded to others’ mistreatment. Those with a stronger moral identity felt more moral anger in response to others’ mistreatment. Furthermore, moral identity, in part via moral anger, predicted whether a third party would conclude that an act of mistreatment violated significant norms of fair treatment. Moral identity was related to cognitions of injustice. Using a quasi-experimental design in Study 2, in which all participants responded to the same act of mistreatment, I find that again those with a stronger moral identity are more likely to be angered by another’s mistreatment. In this study, the participants had no instrumental stake in the situation and their anger translated into punishing a perpetrator for his mistreatment of another.

In Study 3, I test the latter part of my model. I focus on the role of power and theorize about how people will respond once they are motivated, via feelings of moral anger and an understanding that an act violated norms of fair treatment. Past perspectives of deontic reactions to injustice tend to implicitly and explicitly focus on the primacy of punishment as a reaction. Recently however, scholars have begun to recognize the complementary nature of punishing a perpetrator and helping a victim; namely, that both can help implicitly restore one’s sense of justice. In an organizational environment, the costs to responding to another’s mistreatment can be great. Those who are in a better position to defend themselves against the potential backlash or retaliation associated with punishing others are more likely to do so. In line with this broad proposition, those who have either relative position power and social resource power were more likely to intervene in a situation in which another is treated unfairly. Furthermore, these different sources of power were associated with different responses. Those who have social resource power were more likely to rely on their network of others to provide indirect punishment and to
help a victim of mistreatment. Those with relative position power were more likely to punish, either directly or indirectly.

These three studies provide initial support for the model I proposed in Chapter 2. Up to this point, I have not considered whether third parties will react differently to different types of injustice. It is reasonable to assume that from a third parties’ vantage point, some norm violations are more easily discernible than others. In the next section, I conduct a series of studies with the purpose of constructive replication. I again explore the important role of moral identity and moral anger in producing third parties’ constructive responses to others’ mistreatment. However, I also take into account that the intensity of third parties’ moral anger can be a function of the type of violated standard.
The preceding theory is based on the assumption that all types of moral violations can readily be ascertained from a third party’s perspective and thus can elicit an intuition that a moral violation has occurred. However, it is very possible that certain types of mistreatment elicit stronger third party reactions than others because they violate more overt and universal moral standards of social conduct. In this chapter, I extend the theory I offer in Chapter 2 by considering the effects of different types of justice violations. I investigate whether the moral anger third parties experience in response to others’ injustice depends on the nature of the violation. I test two hypotheses drawn directly from the preceding theory in Chapter 2:

Hypothesis 8: Moral identity moderates the impact of justice violations on third parties’ moral anger such that the positive effect of justice violations on moral anger is amplified for third parties with a strong rather than weak moral identity.

Hypothesis 9: Moral anger mediates the effects of the moral identity x justice violation interactions on third party’s punishment of the perpetrator of injustice.

4.1 The Impact of Interpersonal, Distributive and Procedural Injustice on Third Parties’ Reactions

The organizational justice literature has identified several types of mistreatment (Colquitt, 2001). *Distributive justice* is concerned with individuals’ right to receive what is fairly owed to them (Adams, 1965; Leventhal, 1976). Standards for judging fairness are comparative and based on the relative contributions that people make in an exchange relationship. *Procedural justice* is concerned with having a voice in the decision-making process and the fair application of allocation and process related rules (Leventhal, 1980; Thibault & Walker, 1975). *Interactional justice* concerns the fairness of the interpersonal interaction that occurs when administering the
outcome or procedure and has two related aspects: *interpersonal justice*, which refers to the extent that the individual was treated politely and respectfully and *informational justice*, which refers to whether the individual received an adequate explanation for the outcome or procedure (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993). These aspects are related because providing information and an explanation (informational justice) can also signal that the recipient is worthy of dignity and respect (interpersonal justice).

In this first set of empirical studies, I test the possibility that third parties react more strongly to interpersonal injustice, than both distributive and procedural injustice. This proposition takes into account the logical possibility that certain moral violations are more (or less) likely to be reflexively recognizable as unambiguously *morally wrong* from a third party’s vantage point of the situation. I focus on interpersonal injustice specifically because it is generally understood that there is some level of respect and sensitivity that all people in organizations are entitled to receive regardless of how much they contribute to an exchange relationship, more so than the other types of justice, assumes (Greenberg, 1990). In formulating the theoretical rationale for this argument, I draw from two previously separate streams of research. First, in the organizational sciences, interpersonal injustice is generally associated with greater discretion (Folger, 2001; Scott, Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009). Second, evidence from neuropsychology has demonstrated that discretionary, or intentional, moral violations stimulate a more automatic response of moral anger (Young, Scholz, & Saxe, 2011; Young & Waytz, 2013).

*Discretion* refers to the extent to which an organizational actor has the latitude and freedom to act in pursuit of their own goals or objectives (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Williamson, 1963). Organizational policies and procedures, formalized protocols, and role requirements can constrain an organizational actor’s discretionary power. In the context of
organizational justice, discretion captures the extent to which an organizational actor has control over treating employees in ways that are consistent with distributive, procedural, and interpersonal justice normative standards. Organizational scholars have recognized, however, that because of the inherently different characteristics of each type of justice, each is associated with more or less actor discretion (Scott, et al., 2009). To varying degrees, both procedural and distributive injustices are described as “structural” phenomena, whereas interpersonal injustice is described as relational (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg & Lind, 2000). Formalized systems can remove much of an organizational actor’s flexibility in determining how a decision is made or offering specific rewards (Schminke, Ambrose, & Cropanzano, 2000). In comparison to the other two types of justice, interpersonal injustice is less mediated by such institutional procedures and role requirements and treating employees with a basic degree of dignity and respect is a relatively cost-free form of justice (Scott, et al., 2009).

From an actor’s perspective, discretion affords the freedom and flexibility to act in ways consistent with one’s own objectives, from a third party perspective, an actor’s discretion is associated with blame and accountability when the actor violates norms of moral conduct. Folger (2001) makes this connection. He proposed that while violations of each type of justice can produce deontic reactions in third parties, they are more likely triggered by interpersonal violations because it is easier for third parties to make attributions of responsibility in this case compared to others. According to Folger (2001), justice violations in which it is clear that the violator should be held accountable are more likely to produce a moral reaction because the assignment of blame is less equivocal.

Importantly, while social and organizational psychologists have recognized a link between perpetrator intent and deontic responses (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Folger, 2001;
recent neuroscience evidence suggests that when a third party is given unambiguous evidence that a moral violation was intentional, they are more likely to experience immediate anger in response to the violation (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Young et al., 2011). Extrapolating from this evidence, it is logical to predict that third parties will respond with more moral anger in response to interpersonal injustice, compared to distributive and procedural injustice.

There is some existing empirical research to support different third party reactions to mistreatment as a function of interpersonal, procedural and distributive injustice. Leung and colleagues (Leung, Chiu, & Au, 1993) found that third parties are more willing to support and sympathize with unionized employees’ industrial actions when grievances were caused by interpersonally unfair actions compared to both procedural and distributive unfairness. Also, support for procedural based grievances was stronger than that of distributive grievances. I extend this research by exploring both the moral motivations that underlie third parties reactions, and their willingness to punish a violator. To be clear, I am not claiming that distributive and procedural justice violations will produce no deontic reactions, only that their relative magnitude will be lower compared to interpersonal justice violations. Indeed, the results I found in Studies 1 and 3 also provide some evidence of the different reactions to the different types of justice violations. Across both studies “personal” injustices, which best reflect interpersonal injustice, were the most widely discussed violations from a third party’s perspective (83% in Study 1 and 66% in Study 3 represented interpersonal injustice). Thus, while third parties do not ignore procedural and distributive justice violations entirely, it is possible that third parties are more reactive towards interpersonal violations. Based on the above theory, I offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 10: The moderating effect of moral identity is stronger for interpersonal than distributive (Studies 4 and 5) and procedural (Study 6) injustice.

4.2 Study 4 Introduction

In Studies 4 and 5, I investigated the comparative effects of interpersonal justice violations and distributive justice violations on moral anger as a function of a third party’s moral identity and the mediating effect of anger on one’s tendency to punish an (un)fair organization. In both studies I presented participants with a scenario describing a fictional sweatshop factory; however, participants were led to believe that the factory is a real factory and the information in the scenario was based on real-life stories of life working in a sweatshop. Participants were presented with a scenario in which the factory either treats its employees respectfully or disrespectfully (interpersonal injustice) and pays them either at or below industry standards (distributive injustice). Participants were then asked to report the emotions they feel towards the organization in the scenario, to report their intentions to be a customer of the organization (Study 4 & 5), and to indicate whether they would like to be directed to a website of an organization devoted to protesting unfair sweatshop labor factories (Study 5). Studying third party responses in the context of potential customers of a fictional company assured that participants truly fit the definition of third parties. Furthermore, customer reactions to sweatshop mistreatment of employees is practically important and presently relevant (e.g., Teather, 2005). Given recent high profile cases of employee mistreatment in factories, most, if not all, participants will have heard similar news reports and cases before. Importantly, because most companies view customers as a lifeline for survival (e.g., Schneider & Bowen, 1995), the responses of potential customers to the organization can have non-trivial economic consequences. Thus, similar to other scholars, I interpret choosing to boycott (vs. support) an unfair organization provides a relevant indicator of
customers’ fairness reactions (for a discussion, see Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). I also investigate participants’ willingness to become a member of non-profit organization that seeks to protest unfair labor practices as an additional measure of punishment in Study 5.

4.2.1 Study 4 Procedure and Sample

Participants consisted of 164 undergraduate and MBA students enrolled at the University of British Columbia (55 MBAs). The average age of these participants was 25.0 (sd. = 6.21, 10 participants did not report their age), 50% were male (7 participants did not report their gender), and 66% of the participants identified as Asian (8 participants did not report their ethnicity).

The study was a 2 (interpersonal injustice high vs. low) x 2 (distributive injustice high vs. low) between subjects factorial design. The manipulation involved a story about ‘Western Garment Manufacturers’ (WGM). Participants were told that this organization was one of the Mexican maquiladoras, a group of factories operating in Mexico. Participants were informed that WGM either paid its employees the average wage compared to similar factories (comparatively low distributive injustice) or a wage that was 50% less than the average hourly wage (comparatively high distributive injustice). In addition, participants were informed that WGM treated its employees either with “dignity and respect” (low interpersonal injustice) or treating them with “harshly and disrespectfully” (high interpersonal injustice). The story was fictional, but was based on real accounts of sweatshop conditions. Participants were told that the story was based on a real-life organization to heighten mundane realism. See Appendix B for the entire manipulation materials.

4.2.2 Study 4 Measures

A full list of items can be found in Appendix A.

*Manipulation checks.* The distributive justice manipulation check consisted of one item
based on Leventhal’s (1976) distributive justice scale, “The workers at WGM receive a fair amount of pay.” The interpersonal injustice manipulation check consisted of two items drawn from Bies and Moag (1986): “The workers are treated with dignity,” and “The workers are treated with respect.” These items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (5).

**Moral identity.** Moral identity was measured using the same five items from the internalization dimension of Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity instrument used in Studies 1 and 2 ($\alpha = .86$).

**Moral Anger.** I measured this construct by asking participants to respond to three items: the extent to which they felt, angry, upset, and hostile in response to what had occurred in the scenario. The items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘Not at all’ (1) to ‘Extremely’ (5) and averaged ($\alpha = .85$).

**Customer intentions.** Customer intentions was measured using five items from Skarlicki, Ellard and Kelln’s (1998) measure to assess customer intentions and measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (5). In order to conceptually capture ‘punishment,’ these items were averaged then reverse coded so that higher numbers indicated a stronger intention to avoid, or boycott, the target organization.

### 4.2.3 Study 4 Results and Discussion

Manipulation check results indicated that the manipulations were effective and in the intended direction. An ANOVA revealed that participants in the low distributive injustice condition perceived significantly more distributive justice ($M = 1.98$) than those in the high distributive injustice condition ($M = 1.67$, $F_{1,161} = 7.05$, $p < .01$) and that participants in the low interpersonal injustice condition perceived significantly more interpersonal justice ($M = 3.06$)
than those in the high interpersonal injustice condition ($M = 1.27, F_{1, 161} = 149.59, p < .01$).

Furthermore, the interpersonal injustice manipulation had no impact on participants’ responses to the distributive injustice manipulation check and the distributive injustice manipulation had no impact on participants’ responses to the interpersonal manipulation check and there was no significant interaction. Finally, given that moral identity can be primed and my measurement of moral identity was administered after participants had read the study materials, I checked to ensure the study condition did not influence participants’ moral identity. These results indicated no direct effects of each type of justice violation on moral identity (distributive injustice: $F_{1, 157} = 1.29, ns$; interpersonal injustice: $F_{1, 157} = .00, ns$) and no moderated effects ($F_{1, 157} = 1.87, ns$).

Table 9 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the study variables. I conducted hierarchical linear regression to test Hypotheses 8, which states that moral identity will moderate the impact of a justice violation on third parties’ moral anger. All independent and dependent variables were standardized prior to the analysis. Moral identity, the distributive injustice manipulation and the interpersonal injustice violation variables were included in the first step of the regression analyses whereas the interaction terms of moral identity x interpersonal injustice violation and moral identity x distributive injustice violation were included in the second step.\(^\text{12}\) The results supported a significant interaction between moral identity and interpersonal injustice ($\beta = .19, p < .05$) but not a significant interaction between moral identity and distributive injustice ($\beta = -.01, p = .86$).\(^\text{13}\) Thus I found partial support for Hypothesis 8. Furthermore, these results support Hypothesis 10. Recall that Hypothesis 10 predicted that moral identity would have a stronger moderating effect on interpersonal injustice,\(^\text{12}\) I assessed whether gender, age and ethnicity influenced the nature of the results reported in this study. There were no direct effects or moderated effects of these variables. As a result, they are not discussed further.\(^\text{13}\) While it is conventional to present unstandardized regression coefficients with moderated regression, I chose to present the standardized beta coefficients because of the presence of a comparative hypothesis (Hypothesis 11). I provide a full breakdown of the nature of the significant interaction effects in Studies 4 to 6.
compared to distributive injustice. Given the null results for the moral identity x distributive injustice condition interaction term, this hypothesis was supported. The full results of these analyses are reported in Table 10.

In order to explore the interaction between moral identity and interpersonal injustice further I re-analyzed the data removing the non-significant moral identity x distributive injustice interaction term from the analysis and followed procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1992) to investigate the nature of the relationship between interpersonal injustice and moral anger at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) moral identity. The results of this analysis are depicted in Figure 3. The results indicated that the relationship between interpersonal injustice and moral anger was positive and significant at high moral identity ($\beta = .56, p < .01$) but not significant at low moral identity ($\beta = .18, ns$).

Hypothesis 9 predicted that moral anger mediates the effects of moral identity and injustice on participants’ willingness to be a customer of the described organization. I used the same bootstrapped estimation of conditional indirect effects described in Study 1 (see Preacher, et al., 2007) to test this hypothesis. Following the recommendations of Preacher et al. (2007), I specified a mediation model and a dependent variable model and found: (1) that moral identity interacted with interpersonal injustice to predict moral anger and (2) that moral anger was negatively related to customer intentions after controlling for the control variables and main effects of the independent and moderator variables. It also involved a formal assessment of the indirect effect of interpersonal injustice among participants with high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) moral identity. Table 11 reports the results, controlling for distributive injustice condition.

The results indicated that both of the conditions for demonstrating an indirect effect were satisfied. Moral identity interacted with interpersonal injustice to predict moral anger ($\beta = .19, p$
Moral anger predicted customer intentions when moral identity and interpersonal injustice were controlled for ($\beta = .52, p < .01$). The bootstrapped bias corrected 95% CIs were estimated to assess the indirect effect of interpersonal justice for those high in moral identity (+1 SD) and low in moral identity (-1 SD) using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012). The resulting Bias Corrected 95% CI for the indirect effect of interpersonal injustice predicting customer intentions among participants with high moral identity ranged from .17 to .44. Given that the lower bound of the CI is above zero and that the direction of the effect is positive when moral identity is high I conclude that moral anger mediates the relationship between interpersonal injustice and customer intentions for individuals with a high moral identity. For participants with low moral identities, the Bias Corrected 95% CI for the effect ranged from -.01 to .20. Given that the confidence interval includes 0, I conclude that moral anger does not mediate the relationship between interpersonal injustice and customer intentions for individuals with low moral identity. Based on these results, I find support for Hypothesis 9.

To summarize, in Study 4 I find that those with a strong moral identity are more angered by an interpersonal injustice against others, compared to those with a weak moral identity. Furthermore, in general, individuals were not overly disturbed by distributive injustice directed against socially distant others as they were in response to interpersonal injustice. Furthermore, moral anger motivated participants’ willingness to boycott or avoid doing business with an organization that treats its employees interpersonally unfair. This study provides initial support for Hypotheses 9 to 11. In Study 5, I prime moral identity to see whether the pattern observed in Study 4 is replicated using an alternative measure of moral identity and to rule out the possibility that results in Study 4 were driven by Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measurement instrument. I also added a behavioural dependent variable to provide a more conservative test of Hypothesis 9.
4.3 Study 5 Introduction

In Study 5, I manipulate moral identity. According to the social cognitive view of moral identity, people can vary in the degree to which their moral identity can be both chronically and temporarily activated (Aquino, et al., 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Shao et al., 2008). Moral identity centrality is presumed to capture the chronic activation of moral identity, but Aquino, Reed, and their colleagues (Aquino, et al., 2009; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007) have shown that the salience of moral identity within the working self can also be temporarily primed and that doing so can produce similar effects as when moral identity is more chronically activated.

4.3.1 Study 5 Procedure and Sample

Data were collected via two online participant pools: Study Response, an online research service that provides access to general population research participants, and Mechanical Turk, an online marketplace that allows researchers to post surveys. I sampled adult American citizens. A total of 229 participants completed the survey via Study Response and 161 completed the survey via Mechanical Turk.14 Of the total 390 participants, 49% were men, 70% were Caucasian, the sample had an average age of 35.6 (SD = 11.6) years and an average of 14.9 (SD = 11.4) years of work experience. Since the data were collected on-line and participants completed the study at their convenience, I used several a priori guidelines to improve the quality of my sample. Doing so was particularly important because the effectiveness of the moral priming procedure depended on participants following the instructions and conscientiously completing the survey items in one sitting. Pre-testing of the on-line survey showed that the survey could be completed by most people in 10 minutes. Thus, I did not include the data of participants who took longer than 15 minutes. 

14 I used participants’ IP addresses to ensure that no participant completed the survey twice. As per ethics approval requirements, IP addresses were not saved once data was downloaded to ensure participant anonymity.
minutes to complete the survey to eliminate respondents who might not have completed the survey in a single sitting. I also eliminated participants who took less than 5 minutes as taking less than 5 minutes indicated that participants were not adequately paying attention to the survey questions. I also eliminated participants who did not adequately respond to the moral and neutral prime conditions (details described below) as well as participants’ whose answers indicated that they did not pay attention to the question or who failed to answer the priming question legitimately. Finally, I eliminated participants whose IP Addresses indicated that they were either not in the United States at the time of responding or indicated that they had completed the survey twice. The final sample consisted of 204 participants (52% of those who completed the survey, 51% of sample from Study Response), 49% of whom were men, 79% were Caucasian, and they had an average age of 35.4 (SD = 11.5) years and an average of 15.1 (SD = 11.4) years of work experience. I conducted follow-up analyses to ensure that the deletion of questionable participants did not result in a sampling bias. I found no differences in the gender (t_{373} = .09, ns), ethnicity (t_{379} = 1.50), mean age (t_{371} = .33, ns), and years of work experience (t_{371} = .66, ns) of the eliminated versus retained participants.

Study 5 consisted of a 2 (moral identity prime vs. neutral prime) x 2 (low vs. high distributive injustice) x 2 (low vs. high interpersonal injustice) between-subjects factorial design, with participants randomly assigned to conditions. In the moral identity condition, participants were asked to think of the type of person they are and to list five reasons why they might consider themselves to be a moral person. In the neutral condition participants were asked to think of a ‘square’ and to list five reasons why a square is a useful shape. Illegitimate responses included responding “n/a,” “no answer,” giving a vague, extremely short or thoughtless answer, or answering the alternative condition question (indicating that the participant had read the first
part of the survey and then re-started). The manipulation was similar to that in Study 4.

4.3.2 Study 5 Measures

Manipulation Checks. The distributive injustice manipulation check consisted of one item based on Leventhal’s (1976) distributive justice scale, “The workers at WGM receive a fair amount of pay.” The interpersonal injustice manipulation check consisted of the average of two items drawn from Bies and Moag (1986). These items were, “The workers are treated with dignity,” and “The workers are treated with respect” (α = .98). Participants responded on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (5). Higher scores indicated that participants perceived less injustice. I also included a manipulation check for the moral/neutral prime condition by asking participants on a 7-pt Likert-type scale the extent to which the writing exercise made them think about how moral they are.

Moral Anger. I measured moral anger by asking participants to respond to four items: the extent to which they felt angry, offended, outraged, and hostile in response to what had occurred in the scenario. The items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘Not at All’ (1) to ‘Extremely’ (5), and were averaged (α = .93).

Customer Intentions. Customer intentions were measured using the same items from Skarlicki et al.’s (1998) measure as in Study 4. Again, higher scores signified higher customer intentions to avoid buying products from the target organization (α = .90).

Support for a Non-Profit Activist Organization. After responding to the aforementioned measures, participants were informed about “Behind the Label,” a non-profit activist news organization that covers stories of unfair labor practices within the garment industry in developing nations with the intention of fighting against harmful practices. Participants were informed that they could become a member of this organization to show their support for the
fight against sweatshop labor and to remain informed, ostensibly about the actions of the organization described in the study manipulation, as well as similar organizations. Participants were asked to indicate whether they wished to be redirected after the study to sign up as a member of Behind the Label (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Participants who indicated their interest in signing up as a member were redirected to the organization’s website after they completed answering questions about their demographic details and reading a debrief form.

4.3.3 Study 5 Results and Discussion

The results indicated that the manipulations were effective and in the intended direction. Participants in the moral identity condition reported that the writing exercise made them think about how moral of a person they are ($M = 6.14$, $SD = 1.01$) more than those in the neutral condition ($M = 4.32$, $SD = 2.35$, $F_{1,202} = 51.17$, $p < .01$). Furthermore, participants in the low distributive injustice condition thought workers in the scenario were treated more fairly in terms of distributive justice ($M = 2.03$, $SD = 1.21$) than workers in the high distributive injustice condition ($M = 1.59$, $SD = .99$, $F_{1,201} = 8.02$, $p < .01$). Participants in the low interpersonal injustice condition thought workers in the scenario were treated more interpersonally fairly ($M = 3.35$, $SD = 1.20$) than participants who read the high interpersonal injustice scenario ($M = 1.65$, $SD = 1.00$, $F_{1,200} = 121.04$, $p < .01$). Furthermore, the interpersonal injustice manipulation had no impact on participants’ responses to the distributive injustice manipulation check and the distributive injustice manipulation had no impact on participants’ responses to the interpersonal manipulation check and there were no significant interactions.

The means, standard deviations, correlations and reliabilities are given in Table 12. Consistent with Study 4, I used hierarchal regression to test Hypothesis 8, which predicted that moral identity would moderate the relationship between the justice violations and participants’
moral anger. All variables were standardized prior to analysis. Step 1 included the main effects of the moral identity prime, distributive injustice, and interpersonal injustice conditions.\(^{15}\) Again, the interpersonal injustice x moral identity interaction was significant (\(\beta = .14, p < .05\)), but the distributive injustice x moral identity interaction was not (\(\beta = .05, ns\)). These results are reported in Table 13. Furthermore, the form of the interaction, shown in Figure 4, indicated that interpersonal injustice had a stronger effect on moral anger in the moral identity primed (\(\beta = .45, p < .01\)) versus neutral condition (\(\beta = .19, p < .05\)). The positive relationship between interpersonal injustice and moral anger in the neutral condition likely reflects the fact that some people in this condition had chronically accessible strong moral identities. Importantly, there was a significant difference between those who had been primed with moral identity, versus those who had not been primed with moral identity in the high interpersonal injustice condition (\(\beta = .16, p < .05\)), but not in low (or no) interpersonal injustice condition (\(\beta = -.10, ns\)). These results fully support Hypothesis 8 for interpersonal justice. Furthermore, since the moral identity prime x distributive injustice interaction did not impact participants’ moral anger, again I find support for Hypothesis 10, that moral identity has a stronger impact on interpersonal injustice, than it does for distributive injustice.

Hypothesis 9 predicted that moral anger mediates the effects of moral identity and injustice on (a) customer intentions and (b) willingness to become a member of a non-profit activist organization. I again used the bootstrapped estimation of conditional indirect effects using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (see Preacher et al., 2007) to test this hypothesis and the results are reported in Table 14. The PROCESS macro for SPSS is conducive for testing hypotheses with a dichotomous dependent variable and uses maximum likelihood logistic

\(^{15}\) I assessed whether gender, age and ethnicity influenced the nature of the results reported in this study. There were no direct effects or moderated effects of these variables. As a result, they are not discussed further.
regression for estimating coefficients when the dependent variable is dichotomous. The results indicated that both of the conditions for demonstrating an indirect effect were satisfied. Moral identity prime interacted with interpersonal injustice to predict moral anger ($\beta = .15, p < .05$). Moral anger predicted customer intentions when moral identity and interpersonal injustice were controlled for ($\beta = .57, p < .01$). I conducted logistic regression to assess the relationship between moral anger and willingness to support an activist organization given that this was a dichotomous variable. Results indicated a positive relationship between moral anger and participants’ willingness to support a non-profit activist organization ($\beta_{\text{log odds}} = .28, p < .05$).

Furthermore, the resulting Bias Corrected 95% CI for the indirect effect of interpersonal injustice predicting customer intentions among participants whose moral identities were primed ranged from .15 to .42. For participants in the neutral prime condition, the Bias Corrected 95% CI for the effect ranged from .01 to .22. Given that the lower bound of the CI is above zero and that the direction of the effect is positive when both moral identity is primed and when it is not, I conclude that moral anger mediates the relationship between interpersonal injustice and customer intentions when moral identity was primed and in the neutral condition. The overall indirect effect was stronger when moral identity was primed ($a*b = .27$) than when it was not primed ($a*b = .11$). The results were also consistent with participants’ willingness to become a member of a non-profit activist organization. The resulting Bias Corrected 95% CI for the indirect effect of interpersonal injustice predicting membership among participants whose moral identities were primed ranged from .02 to .42. For participants in the neutral prime condition, the Bias Corrected 95% CI for the effect ranged from .00 to .20. Furthermore, the overall indirect effect was stronger when moral identity was primed ($a*b = .16$) then when it was not primed ($a*b = .06$). Again, I can conclude that moral anger mediates the relationship between interpersonal injustice
and membership when moral identity was primed and when it is not.

Study 5 replicated the results found in Study 4. Specifically, those with a strong moral identity reacted with more moral anger in response to interpersonal injustice against others, compared to those with a weak moral identity. Again, distributive injustice did not seem to arouse moral anger. These results provide stronger support for the proposition that a moral motive underlies individuals’ reactions to others’ unfair treatment by highlighting the importance of moral identity and moral anger in producing a third party constructive response.

4.4. Study 6 Introduction

In Study 6, I sought to replicate these results by comparing third parties’ reactions to interpersonal injustice to their reactions of procedural injustice. To enhance the external validity of this set of studies, I changed the experimental context to look at how students respond in a situation in which another student is unfairly treated by a University instructor, using some of the same materials described in Study 2.

4.4.1 Study 6 Procedure and Sample

One hundred and fifty participants were recruited via the participant pool at a west-coast Canadian business school. This participant pool consists of both student and non-student members. Participants received monetary compensation (approximately $5 US) in exchange for their participation. Two participants were removed for illegitimate responding (e.g., took less than 8 minutes to complete the study) and 6 were removed due to incomplete responding (e.g., did not fill out one side of two-sided survey). The final sample was 142 participants (95%; 67% Female; average age of 23 years; 76% Asian; 73% Undergraduate students; average years of work experience 3.70).

The design consisted of a 2 (low vs. high interpersonal injustice) x 2 (low vs. high
procedural injustice) between-subjects factorial design with random assignment. Participants were led to believe that the study was part of a departmental effort to create a new and improved evaluation form for the business school instructors, and to involve students in decisions related to instructor retention and promotion. In the instructions leading up to the study, participants were told that the business school was seeking specific and direct feedback regarding instructor performance in order to make more appropriate administrative decisions and that the form contained both typical and a-typical (i.e., salary recommendations) evaluation questions. Participants were informed that they would watch an eight-minute video of an instructor teaching a class. This video was created for the purposes of this research and contained the study manipulations. There were thus four versions of the video. After watching the video, participants completed the “new” evaluation form.

In the video, the instructor notes that because of a personal conflict he has changed the class start time to a later start, and that a mandatory make-up class will be necessary to recover the lost time. He schedules the make-up class for the end of the semester. A female student in the class, who speaks with an Arabic accent and wears a hijab, informs the instructor that she would need to miss the make-up class because she has already scheduled a flight home to celebrate a Muslim holiday with her family. The instructor then indicates, instead of the make-up class, she can complete a lengthy assignment. When she questions why she must do the assignment, the instructor responds in several ways depending on the experimental conditions.

In the low interpersonal injustice condition the instructor states in a kind but not overly empathetic tone, “You are the only one who seems to have a conflict with this make up class date. I hear your concerns and understand that this is a frustrating situation for you.” In the high interpersonal injustice condition the instructor says, “You are the only one who has a problem
with this. It seems like every year there is some sort of problem with you people. Why can’t you assimilate into Canadian culture?” This manipulation was purposefully strong to provide a conservative test of my hypothesis. That is to see if moral identity would still be an important moderator of the interpersonal justice violation and moral anger relationship even when the interpersonal justice violation fairly unambiguous to all participants.

The procedural injustice manipulation directly followed the interpersonal injustice manipulation. In the low procedural injustice condition the instructor says, “Well in this case why don’t we meet to discuss the assignment? You will still have to do the assignment but we can discuss the details of it outside of class to work something out.” In the high procedural injustice condition the instructor says, “Unfortunately the assignment is mandatory and the issue is not open for discussion.” Given that there are several criteria for procedural injustice, it is difficult to manipulate multiple criteria in one laboratory study. Thus, to make the experiment manageable and facilitate interpretation of the results, I varied only whether the student is allowed to express voice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). In all conditions, the outcome (i.e., the requirement to do the assignment) was held constant.

Once participants had finished viewing the video, and completed the evaluation form, the experimenter then handed them a survey packet that was ostensibly for a different study. This survey contained, among a variety of personality questionnaires, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity instrument.

4.4.2 Study 6 Measures

Moral Identity. I measured the strength of moral identity using the internalization subscale of Aquino and Reed’s (2002) instrument described in Study 1 ($\alpha = .84$).

Moral Anger. Moral anger was measured with one item, “The instructor did things that
made me angry.” This item was measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). I used only one item to measure moral anger in Study 6 to reduce potential suspicion that the evaluation form was assessing something other than student perceptions of the course and instructor.16

**Salary Recommendations.** Participants were informed that the business school could offer up to a 5% increase in salary for high teaching performance. They were then asked “Do you recommend that [the business school] offer this instructor an increase of salary of 5% if [the school of business] extends this instructor’s contract?” Participants’ response options included either Yes or No. Answering “Yes” was equivalent to giving a 5% raise. For participants who answered “No,” they were also asked to recommend an alternative amount ranging from 0-5%. Scores on this measure could therefore range from 0 – 5% (same as in Study 2).

**Control Variables.** Participants were drawn from a subject pool that included University community members at large. Thus, I controlled for whether a participant was an undergraduate student (undergraduate student = 1, non-undergraduate student = 0) to account for the possibility that undergraduate students would have different expectations of what constitutes appropriate behaviour in the classroom compared to their non-student counterparts, which could influence how the former interpreted the video. As well, students have more of a vested interest in ensuring that the university reprimands poor instructors, which could affect their motivation to punish an unfair instructor.

4.4.3 Study 6 Results and Discussion

**Pilot Study.** In order to enhance the realistic nature of Study 6, I assessed the effectiveness of the interpersonal and procedural injustice manipulations in a separate sample.

16 While a one item measure of moral anger is not ideal, “angry” captured most of the variance in the measurement of moral anger in both Studies 1 and 2 and offered the single best indicator of moral anger. Thus, I reasoned that this item provides an acceptably valid measurement of the construct of moral anger.
Sixty-four undergraduate business students from a State University in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States participated in the pilot study. The sample was comparable to the main study (47% women; average age 20.38 years; average years of work experience was 3.78) however it did contain a higher percentage of Caucasian participants (89%). One item assessed the effectiveness of the procedural injustice manipulation (“The instructor was willing to meet with students outside of class time to discuss any conflicts”) and two items to assess the effectiveness of the interpersonal injustice manipulation (“The instructor treated students with dignity,” and, “The instructor treated students with respect”) ($\alpha = .97$). Items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The results supported the effectiveness of the manipulations in this study. Participants in the high procedural injustice condition viewed less justice ($M = 1.47, SD = .80$) than participants in the low procedural injustice condition ($M = 3.65, SD = 2.06, M_{diff} = 1.02, F_{1, 61} = 85.74, p < .01$). Furthermore, participants in the high interpersonal injustice condition viewed less justice ($M = 1.40, SD = .81$) than participants in the low interpersonal injustice condition ($M = 1.95, SD = .91, M_{diff} = .56, F_{1, 61} = 6.43, p < .05$). Finally, the procedural injustice manipulation had no impact on participants’ responses to the procedural injustice manipulation check and the procedural injustice manipulation had no impact on participants’ responses to the interpersonal manipulation check and there was no significant interaction.

**Main Analyses.** As in Study 4, I first ensured that the manipulations did not prime participants’ moral identity. These results indicated no direct effects of each type of justice violation on moral identity (procedural injustice: $F_{1, 141} = .14, ns$; interpersonal injustice: $F_{1, 141} = 1.78, ns$) and no moderated effects ($F_{1, 141} = 1.60, ns$).

Table 15 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the study variables.
Hypothesis 8 predicted that moral identity moderates the impact of justice on third parties’ experience of moral anger such that the positive relationship between justice violations and moral anger is stronger when moral identity is strong compared to weak. Hypothesis 10 predicted that the moderating effect of moral identity would be stronger for interpersonal than for procedural justice violations. I used hierarchical regression to test these hypotheses. Table 16 presents the results of this analysis.

Table 16 shows a significant interaction between moral identity and interpersonal injustice in the model predicting moral anger ($\beta = .20, p < .05$), however the interaction between moral identity and procedural justice predicting moral anger was not significant ($\beta = -.12, ns$). The interaction is presented in Figure 5. The nature of the interaction was such that for those with a strong moral identity (+1 $SD$) the relationship between interpersonal injustice and moral anger was significant and positive ($\beta = .53, p < .01$). For those with a weak moral identity (-1 $SD$) the relationship between interpersonal injustice and moral anger was not significant ($\beta = .09, ns$). Thus, Hypothesis 8 was supported for interpersonal injustice but not procedural injustice and Hypothesis 10 was supported.

Hypothesis 9 predicted that moral anger mediates the effects of the moral identity x justice violations interactions on third parties’ recommendations for a justice violator’s salary. I used the bootstrapped estimation of the conditional indirect effects detailed in Study 1 to test this hypothesis. The moral identity x procedural justice was not significant thus I did not investigate it further. I controlled for student status (i.e., student versus non-student) and procedural injustice in the test of the indirect effects.

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17 I assessed whether gender, age and ethnicity influenced the nature of the results reported in this study. There were no direct effects or moderated effects of these variables. As a result, they are not discussed further. Furthermore, there were no interactive effects between participants’ status as an undergraduate student and the different experimental conditions on moral anger or third party punishment.
Moral identity interacted with interpersonal injustice to predict moral anger ($\beta = .22, p < .05$) and moral anger predicted salary recommendations ($\beta = -.24, p < .01$). The results of these analyses are provided in Table 17. The bootstrapped bias corrected 95% CIs were estimated to assess the indirect effect of interpersonal injustice at high and low moral identity. The estimation of each CI involved generating 5000 resamples of the data (with replacement) to derive empirical distributions for assessing statistical significance, indicated by an interval that does not include zero. The resulting Bias Corrected 95% CI for the indirect effect of interpersonal injustice among participants with a strong moral identity (+1 $SD$) ranged from -.24 to -.06. This result indicated that there is an indirect effect of interpersonal injustice on salary recommendation for those with strong moral identities. For those with a weak moral identity (-1 $SD$), the Bias Corrected 95% CI for the effect ranged from -.11 to .03. Since this interval included zero, I concluded that there was no indirect effect of interpersonal injustice on salary recommendation among people with weak moral identities. Study 6 replicated the general pattern of results found in the first two studies and did so in a realistic context where the dependent variable was behavioural (i.e., making a salary recommendation). The study provides further evidence for the robustness of these effects and the internal validity of my theory.

4.5 Chapter 4 Summary and Discussion

The second set of empirical studies provided a constructive replication of the first set. Once again, moral identity was an important factor in producing moral anger as a response to others’ mistreatment. Furthermore, moral anger provoked third party punishment towards an unfair organization (Studies 4 and 5), and individual (Study 6). An important extension of this research however, is that it highlights the more potent impact of interpersonal injustice, compared to distributive and procedural injustice. This research recognizes that from a third
party’s vantage point, some moral violations can be more or less obvious. Interpersonal injustice was theorized to be more obvious to third parties because it based upon comparatively more universal norms of how we should treat one another, and does not rely on more abstract standards that incorporate the relative treatment of others. Furthermore, because interpersonal justice is unmediated by organizational factors, it is easier from a third party perspective to intuit intention and assign blame. In other words, we have clearer expectations that people ought to treat one another with at least a basic level of dignity and respect. In contrast, whether an act violates norms of distributive or procedural justice to a certain extent depends on more contextualized norms, including how others in the same environment are treated, and localized rules that guide the fair distribution of resources and decision-making procedures. In line with this, in Studies 4 and 5, I found that those with either a chronically activated (Study 4) or primed (Study 5) moral identity are angered when others are exposed to interpersonal mistreatment but did not seem moved by distributive injustice. The pattern of results was similar in Study 6 in response to interpersonal versus procedural injustice.

A particular strength of this research is that I replicate a fairly consistent pattern of effects across three separate studies using both adult and student samples. However, it is worthwhile to note that comparative hypotheses are always subject to potential limitations (Cooper & Richardson, 1986). Cooper and Richardson (1986) caution against creating an unfair comparison through a research design that inadvertently ‘stacks the deck’ in favour of one hypothesis versus the other. They suggest ensuring that experimental manipulations are as ‘objectively equal’ as possible. A particular complication with the present research, however, is that injustice is naturally a subjective phenomenon. Indeed, the specific purpose of this set of studies was to show that interpersonal injustice is a more potent provocation of third party moral anger in
general. These effects are also consistent with the stories reported in Studies 1 and 3. When asked to report an incident of third party mistreatment, the majority of participants recalled examples of interpersonal injustice. In addition, very few participants recalled incidents of distributive injustice. A potential explanation for this is that third parties are more reactive towards interpersonal injustice, and thus it is easier to remember these injustices against others in comparison to the other types of injustice. This does not mean that third parties will never be angered by distributive or procedural injustice against others, only that all things being equal these violations need to be more salient. Cooper and Richardson (1986) point out that it is nearly impossible to ensure objective equivalence in social research, but replicating an effect across multiple samples and using different experimental stimuli is particularly important when testing comparative hypotheses.
Conclusion

Why do third parties, individuals who are not the direct target of an act of mistreatment, attempt to either punish the perpetrator or help the victim? Starting with the basic proposition that third parties intervene when they perceive an act of mistreatment as morally wrong and that intervening is the morally right thing to do, I constructed a model of third parties’ morally-motivated responses to others’ mistreatment. The deontic model of justice provided a theoretical starting point for this research (Cropanzano et al., 2003; Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger, et al., 2005). According to the deontic model of justice, people can be disturbed by injustice, even when they are not personally affected by it, because it violates significant moral norms of how people ought to treat one another. In this sense, justice can be understood by its prescriptive elements, and when norms of fair treatment are violated it can incite emotions of anger, indignation, outrage, contempt, and the like, and the perception that an act is morally wrong. As explained by the deontic model, when people violate norms of fair treatment it is as though they have put themselves above the needs and concerns of others, and as such they deserve to be punished. By extending upon the deontic model of justice, I make several contributions to the literature on third party reactions.

First, I incorporate theories of the self into our understanding of third party reactions. The need to punish those who violate significant norms can be so powerful at times that empirical research has found that people are willing to punish even when an injustice causes no personal harm and when doing so is personally costly (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Turillo et al., 2002). However, experience tells us that not every third party is moved by others’ experiences of injustice and indeed some third parties might even respond by derogating or shaming a victim of mistreatment instead. Thus, an important missing theoretical piece in the deontic justice puzzle
was an understanding of who is more likely to react in line with the deontic model. I focus upon moral identity to answer this question. Specifically, the socio-cognitive perspective of the self recognizes that the self acts as a filter for social information. The self can determine what social information a person pays attention to and also how that information is subsequently processed and interpreted. I argued that because moral identity is linked to a self-schema of related moral traits, values, goals and behaviours, those with an activated moral self will more quickly and readily recognize a moral wrong when others are mistreated. I studied this relationship by looking at the relationship between moral identity and moral anger across several studies. Moral anger is the affective component of a moral intuition of wrong and is nearly instantaneously provoked along with an intuition (Haidt, 2001). Across several studies, the link between moral identity and moral anger in response to others’ mistreatment is robustly supported. Third parties’ moral identity was positively related to moral anger in response to actual workplace mistreatment directed towards colleagues (Study 1), unfair instructor behaviour (Studies 2 and 6), and an organization’s mistreatment of its employees even when the third party is an organizational outsider (Studies 4 and 5).

In line with the socio-cognitive perspective of moral identity, moral identity does not necessarily influence whether a third party recognizes mistreatment, only whether a third party views it as morally wrong and is thus angered by it. This is reflected in Study 1, in which participants were asked to recall a time at work in which a colleague was mistreated. Both those with a strong and weak moral identity could recall instances of others’ mistreatment. Given that it is widely understood that justice is an important factor in people’s lives, and that individuals have a socialized need to understand the world is fair, this is not surprising (Lerner, 1980). The important role of moral identity is reflected in how it influences third parties’ reactions to these
situations. Third parties with a strong moral identity are more likely to be angered when others are mistreated, than to rationalize the situation, ignore the victim’s plight, or derogate the victim further.

Importantly, moral identity was shown to be a critical factor in producing moral anger even in situations in which a moral violation is fairly unambiguous and salient. More specifically, in Studies 1 and 6, third parties were presented with a situation in which an instructor very clearly and harshly treats a student with a complete lack of respect. Despite the intensity of this manipulation, those with a stronger moral identity were more outraged by the instructor’s actions, and engaged in more punishment as a result (Study 6), than those with a comparatively weaker moral identity.

In addition to highlighting the important role of moral identity, this research also integrates theories and empirical evidence from both psychology and management. This research extends the intuitionist model of moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001) in an organizational context and incorporates a sense-making process grounded in fairness theory. By doing so, this research acknowledges the role that conscious reasoning plays in guiding moral action. My research therefore attempts to reconcile intuitionist and rationalistic theories to explain a specific type of morally-driven response to injustice. A key insight of this research is to suggest that in the absence of some cognitive processing, the potency of moral intuitions is limited in the context of explaining third party reactions to injustice. By definition, third parties are not the direct targets of harm, so I presume that the internal mechanisms that lead from gut-level reactions that a wrong has occurred to actual behaviour must be stronger than what would typically be needed to motivate behaviour when a person is personally impacted by injustice.

This model and empirical research also acknowledges that third parties are often more
limited in their information about situations of mistreatment than first person victims. For this reason, more ubiquitous and apparent violations to moral standards are likely to spark an initial intuition of wrong. As a result, third parties tend to more easily conclude that an injustice occurred when they are confronted with interpersonal as opposed to distributive or procedural violations. The rationale for this is that it is much easier from the third party’s perspective to intuit intention, an important factor in individuals’ understanding of what is wrong behaviour (Young et al., 2011; Young & Watz, 2013). This insight advances theory by recognizing that some justice violations are more likely to elicit rapid emotional responses than others.

Cumulatively, this research also highlights the important role of emotions (i.e., moral anger) in producing a third party response. My research implies that third parties are likely to respond when they are emotionally disturbed by acts of mistreatment. Other studies have similarly noted that emotions can trigger third party punishment. For example, Skarlicki and Rupp (2010) showed that third parties who were cued to respond emotionally as opposed to rationally demonstrated significantly greater punishing tendencies in response to an injustice. Indeed, moral anger is specifically tied to an action tendency of punishing a norm violator. However, not all third parties are in the position of punishing a perpetrator. When motivated to respond but unable to punish a perpetrator or prevent future mistreatment, a third party will offer support or comfort to a victim. To capture this insight, power is incorporated into my model and empirically supported in Study 3.

5.1 Limitations and Future Directions

A particular strength of this research is that it uses different study designs (including field survey, quasi-experimental, and experimental) and replicates the effects across a diverse set of samples (including undergraduate and graduate students, and working adults). Together, these
features enhance the internal and external validity of this research program. Despite these strengths, there are limitations of note that can help drive future research on this topic. First, admittedly, I focused more predominately on the motivating role of moral anger in this set of studies than on the role of sensemaking cognitions. Theoretically, third parties are only likely to respond when their moral anger is congruent with their sensemaking conclusions and when moral violations are relatively unambiguous these two motivational ingredients should be highly consistent. Indeed, in Study 1 there was a high correlation between moral anger and the extent to which a third party perceived mistreatment as severe, undeserving, and blameworthy.

Furthermore, moral anger and the role of emotions in sparking reactions to injustice have received comparatively less attention in the organizational sciences than the role of cognitions. In this sense, by focusing more predominately on the role of moral anger my research begins to fill in this gap. However, the nature of the relationship between moral anger and third parties’ sensemaking remains an empirical question worth exploring further.18

The study design of Study 1 does not allow me to tease apart the causal order between third parties’ moral intuition or wrong, moral anger and sensemaking cognitions. At this point, evidence for the pattern of third party reactions as stemming from intuition, which in turn produces moral anger, and the interactive relationship between anger and cognitions is based on general psychological theory of emotion as well as neuroscience evidence of individuals’ assessments of moral stimuli. One accepted view of emotion is that it is first elicited by relatively elementary forms of (cognitive) appraisal (Frijda, 1993). These elementary forms of appraisal are described as rapid, relatively simple, and are not well-captured through self-reported measures.

18 I am currently involved in a research project that includes formally testing the pattern of relationships between moral identity, moral anger, cognitions, and third parties’ reactions (Smith, O’Reilly, Aquino, & Freeman, 2013). This research has replicated the pattern of results found in Study 1 and also highlights the impact of cognitions in mediating the relationship between moral anger and third party reactions.
This description is consistent with the notion of a moral intuition – a generalized gut feeling that something is morally wrong. An elaboration process then produces more concentrated emotions and specific cognitive attributions (Frijda, 1993) and negative emotions can spark a more elaborate process than positive emotions (Elsbach & Barr, 1999; Schwartz et al., 1991; Bless et al., Strack, 1990). In line with this description, neuroscience evidence using fMRI imaging has established that our assessments of moral stimuli stem from the activation of brain regions associated with rapid, emotional reactions (including activation in the orbitofrontal/ventromedial frontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobe, and amygdale) (Greene & Haidt, 2002). However, research also suggests that these quick reactions to moral stimuli also depend on particular contextual features. For example, rapid moral reactions occur more readily when a violation is unambiguously intentional (Young et al., 2011; Young & Waytz, 2013) and when individuals are asked to consider personal rather than impersonal moral actions (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Providing more empirical evidence to establish the process described in my model would not only provide a more nuanced understanding of third party reactions but might also shed further light on the different reactions observed in Studies 4 to 6 in response to interpersonal versus procedural and distributive injustices.

Another noteworthy limitation of this research that warrants further theoretical and empirical attention is the cross-cultural generalizability of these findings. Given that all data were collected from North American samples I cannot verifiably extend these findings to other populations. Importantly, the cross-cultural replication (or non-replication) of these findings would provide additional insight into the evolutionary foundation of this research. On the one hand, immediate and retributive tendencies towards unfairness and uncooperative others have
been found across a wide-range of cultures (Henrich et al., 2006). On the other hand, wide variations exist across these cultures in the extent to which individuals are willing to punish and the relationship between the degree of unfairness and punishment (Henrich et al., 2006). Based on this evidence, scholars have suggested that cultural learning processes play a crucial role in the development of prosocial behavior, and that reactions to unfairness are associated with norms of altruistic behavior (Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006) (in contrast to a pure genetic-evolution explanation for unfairness reactions). According to the cultural evolution perspective, the types of infractions third parties respond to and how third parties respond is dependent on group culture. Understanding the cultural bounds of third party reactions introduces an additional variable to the model – the extent to which a third party reacts to another’s mistreatment might dependent on both their moral identity and a third parties’ culturally influenced views of unfairness.

Finally, while I focus on the role of moral identity in producing constructive third party reactions, it is possible that other activated selves can also influence how a third party will react. For example, according to the accessible identity model of justice reasoning, what individuals’ determine is fair and unfair can be influenced by a number of justice-related selves (Skitka, 2003). It is logical to assume that these different identities can also influence third parties’ reactions towards others’ mistreatment. It is also possible that some of these alternative justice-related selves could potentially spark third parties’ reactions to distributive and procedural injustice. Future research could explore this possibility. Along a similar vein, while I focus exclusively on moral identity as it relates to moral motives behind third parties’ reactions, third parties’ responses can also be driven by self-interested and relational motives (see Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005, for a review). In an organizational context, these moral motives likely do not exist
on their own, and future research should explore how these different motives interact to produce third party responses.

5.2 Practical Implications

Third parties are important from a practical perspective because for every victim of injustice, there are several third parties who can potentially react to the mistreatment. Third party responses can be extremely important for protecting victims of injustice from further harm. When third parties are willing to intervene directly to prevent injustice, they can deter harm-doers from continuing their activities while providing social support to victims of mistreatment. For example, it is often only through the courageous efforts of third parties that workplace bullies are punished for their behaviour (Lutgen-Sandvik, 2005). Furthermore, by virtue of their position and resource power, third parties are sometimes in a better position to fight for justice than the victims (Bowes-Sperry & O’Leary-Kelly, 2005). It would therefore seem unwise for managers to discourage third parties from acting when they see wrongs being committed. One way managers can facilitate third party action is by providing them with sufficient power in the form of resources that they can marshal when they are motivated to act against injustice. These resources can be psychological, such as providing employees with ethics, assertiveness training, or support so that they will be able to recognize injustice and then confront harm-doers more confidently. They can also be institutional, such as providing employees with communication channels through which they can report the actions of those who mistreat others without placing themselves at risk.

An important practical question that must be addressed given the psychological nature of this model is whether managers are in any position to influence the elicitation of intuitions that a moral wrong has occurred. Recall that moral identity was presumed to act as a psychological
mechanism that makes some third parties more likely than others to intuit that a moral violation has occurred. If so, then it raises the possibility that one way for managers to increase the likelihood that peoples’ intuitions about right and wrong will be more readily elicited by seeing others harmed is to make employees’ moral identities more salient. Aquino and his colleagues have argued and shown empirically (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Aquino, et al., 2009) that the salience of moral identity within the working self can be influenced by situational cues like role models and incentive structures which, in turn, can influence behaviour. Similarly, Weaver (2006) suggested that employees’ moral identities can be reinforced by providing them with opportunities for expressing virtue at work. The dynamic model of identity (Aquino, et al., 2009; Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994) posits that the importance of the different identities that make up the self can wax and wane depending on environmental cues and contingencies. Thus, managers may be in a position to influence the elements of self-knowledge that employees attend to.

5.3 Summary

In summary, this research provides insight into why and how third parties can be angered by others’ mistreatment and seek to restore their sense of justice, either by punishing a perpetrator or helping those who have been mistreated. Across six studies, I highlight the importance of moral identity in producing the necessary emotional and cognitive reactions needed to motivate a constructive response. I also implicitly test the role of moral intuitions of wrong in sparking moral anger. Finally, by highlighting the role of social power, I illustrate why some third parties appear to ignore the situation even though they may experience moral anger and perceive another’s mistreatment as morally wrong.
### Tables

#### Table 1  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Study 1)

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<thead>
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<td>8. Injustice Cognitions</td>
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<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: $N = 123$. *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$. Justice violation coded such that 0 = Policy Related, 1 = Personal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Model $R^2$          | .15**   | .48** |

Note: $N = 123$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. Justice violation coded such that 0 = Policy Related, 1 = Personal. Numbers represent standardized beta coefficients.
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<td>4. Salary Recommendations</td>
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<td>1.73</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.35*</td>
<td>-.56**</td>
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Note: N = 123. * p < .05, ** p < .01.
Table 4  Hierarchical Regression Results (Study 2)

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<th>Predicting Salary Recommendations (Third Party Punishment)</th>
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<td>Moral Anger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model R²</td>
<td>.10*</td>
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</table>

Note: N = 38. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Numbers represent standardized regression coefficients.
Table 5 *Supporting Social Capital as a Composite Index Measure (Study 3)*

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<td>3. Networking Skills</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>.83**</td>
<td>.42**</td>
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<td>4. Social Support</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct Punishment</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indirect Punishment</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.18*</td>
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<td>.27**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helping the Victim</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gossiping</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 178. *p < .05, **p < .01. Composite Index created by averaging the standardized variables of reputation, networking skills, and social support.
Table 6  Standardized Parameter Estimates for Third Party Reactions (Study 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct Punishment</th>
<th>Indirect Punishment</th>
<th>Helping the Victim</th>
<th>Gossiping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>I reprimanded the perpetrator</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>I disciplined the perpetrator directly</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>I spoke to the perpetrator directly and filed a warning in his/her file</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>I initiated proceedings to have the perpetrator fired</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>I initiated proceedings to have the perpetrator moved to a different department</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>I spoke to someone in my organization who is in a more powerful position than myself to deal with the incident</td>
<td></td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>I reported the situation to management/Human Resources/ or my union</td>
<td></td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>I sought assistance from someone who could help address the situation</td>
<td></td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>I talked with my supervisor or someone in management about the incident</td>
<td></td>
<td>.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>I provided the harmed party with a listening ear</td>
<td></td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>I provided comfort to the harmed party</td>
<td></td>
<td>.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>I provided social support to the harmed party</td>
<td></td>
<td>.69</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>I let the harmed party know that I was there for him/her</td>
<td></td>
<td>.91</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>I tried to be extra nice to the harmed party</td>
<td></td>
<td>.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>I gossiped about the incident with others at work</td>
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<td>.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>I spoke critically of the incident with other colleagues</td>
<td></td>
<td>.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>I talked about the incident with other colleagues</td>
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<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>I warned other colleagues about the perpetrator’s actions</td>
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### Table 7: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Study 3)

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<td>-.01</td>
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<td>1.59</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Indirect Punishment</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Helping the victim</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Gossiping</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( N = 178 \). Justice Violation coded such that interpersonal injustice (1), procedural or distributive justice violation (0). Relative Position Power coded such that higher positional power compared to perpetrator (2), equal positional power compared to perpetrator (1), lower positional power compared to perpetrator (0).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct Punishment</th>
<th>Indirect Punishment</th>
<th>Helping the Victim</th>
<th>Gossiping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length of Time</strong></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anger</strong></td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice Violation</strong></td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similar Mistreatment</strong></td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim Relationship</strong></td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third Party Empathy</strong></td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moral Identity (MI)</strong></td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position Power (PP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Resources (SR)</strong></td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| $R^2$                    | .06               | .30**               | .11*              | .22**      | .29**     | .35**     | .07        | .09        |
| $\Delta R^2$             |                   | .24**               | .11**             | .06**      | .02       |            |            |            |

**Notes:** $N = 178$. Numbers represent standardized beta coefficients. Moral Identity, Position Power and Social Resources have been mean centered.
Table 9  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Study 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Interpersonal Injustice</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Distributive Injustice</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Moral Identity</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Moral Anger</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Customer Intentions</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.56**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N =164. *p < .05, **p < .01. The Distributive and Interpersonal Injustice conditions are coded such that low (0) (i.e. no injustice) and high (1) (i.e. justice violation).
Table 10  Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Third Parties’ Moral Anger  
(Study 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variables</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Injustice (IJ)</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>5.00**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive Injustice (DJ)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Identity (MI)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI x IJ</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>2.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI x DJ</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model R²</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Model R²</td>
<td>.04*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔR² MI x DJ</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔR² MI x IJ</td>
<td>.04*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 164. * p < .05, ** p < .01. All variables were standardized prior to analysis.
Table 11  Hierarchical Regression Results Testing the Mediation Effect of Moral Anger (Study 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Customer Intentions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Identity (MI)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive Injustice (DJ)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Injustice (IJ)</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI x IJ</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Anger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.52**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model R²</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 164. * p < .05, ** p < .01. All variables were standardized prior to analysis.
Table 12  Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations (Study 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Moral Identity (Prime)</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Distributive Injustice</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interpersonal Injustice</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Moral Anger</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Customer Intentions</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Willingness to be Member</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N = 204. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Moral Identity prime is coded such that neutral (0) and moral (1). The Distributive and Interpersonal Injustice conditions are coded such that low (0) (i.e. no injustice) and high (1) (i.e. justice violation).
Table 13  Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Third Parties’ Moral Anger
(Study 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>( t )</td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>( t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Identity Prime (MI)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive Injustice (DJ)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Injustice (IJ)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>4.76**</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>4.90**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI x DJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI x IJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>2.16*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model \( R^2 \)  

| \( \Delta R^2 \) MI x DJ | .00 |
| \( \Delta R^2 \) MI x IJ | .02* |

Note: \( N = 204 \). * \( p < .05 \), ** \( p < .01 \). All variables standardized prior to analyses.
Table 14  Hierarchical Regression Results Testing the Mediation Effect of Moral Anger for Customer Intentions (Study 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Customer Intentions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Identity Prime (MI)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive Injustice (DJ)</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Injustice (IJ)</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI x IJ</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Anger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.57**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model R²</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 204. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Moral Identity prime is coded such that neutral (0) and moral (1). The Distributive and Interpersonal Injustice conditions are coded such that low (0) (i.e. no injustice) and high (1) (i.e. justice violation).
### Table 15  Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations (Study 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Undergraduate Student</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Procedural Injustice</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interpersonal Injustice</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Moral Identity</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Salary Recommendation</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Moral Anger</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 142. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Undergraduate coded such that non-undergraduate student (0), undergraduate student (1). The Procedural and Interpersonal Injustice conditions are coded such that low (0) (i.e. no injustice) and high (1) (i.e. justice violation).
Table 16   Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Third Parties’ Moral Anger  
(Study 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate Student</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td></td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Identity (MI)</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td></td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice (PJ)</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Justice (IJ)</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>4.02**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>4.04**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI x PJ</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI x IJ</td>
<td></td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.27*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model R²</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Model R²</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔR² MI x PJ</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔR² MI x IJ</td>
<td>.04*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 142. * p < .05, ** p < .01. All variables standardized prior to analysis.
Table 17  Hierarchical Regression Results Testing the Mediation Effect of Moral Anger (Study 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Salary Recommend</td>
<td>Undergraduate Student</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Moral Anger</td>
<td>Moral Identity (MI)</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procedural Justice (PJ)</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interpersonal Justice (IJ)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI x IJ</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Anger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model R²</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01. All variables standardized prior to analyses.
Figures

Figure 1  Theoretical Model

Awareness of Mistreatment → Intuition of moral violation → Moral Anger → Justice cognitions (severity of harm, deservingness, blame attribution) → Constructive Response

- Direct Punishment
- Indirect Punishment
- Covert Social Sanctioning
- Providing Support or Comfort to the Victim

Strength of Moral Identity → Power
Figure 2  The Predicted Most Likely Third Party Intervention as a Function of Position and Resource Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third party’s resource power (absolute amount)</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Covert social sanctioning</td>
<td>Directly punish perpetrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Help victim</td>
<td>Directly punish perpetrator and help victim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third party’s position power (relative to perpetrator)
Figure 3 Interaction between Moral Identity and Interpersonal Injustice Predicting Moral Anger (Study 4)
Figure 4 Interaction between Moral Identity Prime and Interpersonal Injustice

Predicting Moral Anger (Study 5)
Figure 5 Interaction between Moral Identity and Interpersonal Injustice Predicting Moral Anger (Study 6)
References


instigated bullying still works for city*. Retrieved from


*Psychological Bulletin, 98*, 310-357.


71*, 179-184.


Appendices

Appendix A: List of Measures

Listed in the order they appear in dissertation.

1. Moral Identity (Used in Studies 1, 2, 4, and 6) (Aquino & Reed, 2002)

INSTRUCTIONS:

Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person:

**CARING, COMPASSIONATE, FAIR, FRIENDLY, GENEROUS, HELPFUL, HARDWORKING, HONEST, KIND**

The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Completely Disagree</th>
<th>Mostly Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Mostly Agree</th>
<th>Completel y Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2. Belief in a Just World (Used in Study 1) (Rubin & Peplau, 1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation s/he has.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Basically, the world is a just place.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. People who get &quot;lucky breaks&quot; have usually earned their good fortune.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as careless ones.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free in American courts.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. People who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a heart attack.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The political candidate who sticks up for his/her principles rarely gets elected.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by the referee.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. By and large, people deserve what they get.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. When parents punish their children, it is almost always for good reasons.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. In almost any business or profession, people who do their job well rise to the top.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. American parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired in their children.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in the USA.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Crime doesn't pay.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Resource Power (Social Capital) (Used in Study 3)

1) Reputation Scale (Hochwarter et al., 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I am regarded highly by others in my workplace.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I have a good reputation at work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I have the respect of my colleagues and associates.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. My colleagues see me as a person of integrity.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Others regard me as someone who gets things done.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I have a reputation for producing results.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. People expect me to consistently demonstrate good performance.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. People know that I will produce only high quality results.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I have a reputation of producing highest quality performance.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. If people want things done right, they ask me to do it.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. People count on me to consistently produce the highest quality performance.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. My colleagues trust me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Political Skills Inventory (Ferris et al., 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I spend a lot of time and effort networking with others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I am good at building relationships with influential people at work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. At work, I know a lot of important people and am well connected.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I spend a lot of time at work developing connections with others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I am good at using my connections and network to make things happen at work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates whom I can call on for support when I really need to get things done.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3) Social Support Survey (Gjesfjeld et al., 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. There is someone at work that I can count on to listen to me when I need to talk.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. There is someone at work who gives me good advice when I need it.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. There is someone at work that gives me information to help me understand situations at work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. There is someone at work I can confide in or talk to about myself or my problems.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. There is someone at work whose advice I really count on.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. There is someone at work I can share my most private worries and fears with.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. There is someone at work I can turn to for suggestions about how to deal with a personal problem.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. There is someone at work who understands my problems.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Third Party Reactions (Used in Study 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>I reprimanded the perpetrator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>I disciplined the perpetrator directly</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>I spoke to the perpetrator directly and filed a warning in his/her file</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>I initiated proceedings to have the perpetrator fired</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>I initiated proceedings to have the perpetrator moved to a different department</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>I spoke to someone in my organization who is in a more powerful position than myself to deal with the incident</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>I reported the situation to management/Human Resources/ or my union</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>I sought assistance from someone who could help address the situation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>I talked with my supervisor or someone in management about the incident</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>I provided the harmed party with a listening ear</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>I provided comfort to the harmed party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>I provided social support to the harmed party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>I let the harmed party know that I was there for him/her</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>I tried to be extra nice to the harmed party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>I gossiped about the incident with others at work</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>I spoke critically of the incident with other colleagues</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>I talked about the incident with other colleagues</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>I warned other colleagues about the perpetrator’s actions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Empathy Subscale (Used in Study 3) (Davis, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for them.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Customer Intentions (Used in Studies 4 and 5) (Skarlicki et al., 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. If I knew that a piece of clothing was made at the Western Garment Manufacturers, I would not buy it for myself.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I would feel terrible buying clothes manufactured by Western Garment Manufacturers.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. If I knew that a piece of clothing was made at the Western Garment Manufacturers factory, I would not buy it as a gift for someone else.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I would not hesitate doing business with Western Garment Manufacturers.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. If I had a choice to do business with Western Garment Manufacturers or another organization that pays its employees better wages, I would choose to do my business elsewhere.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. If asked, I would discourage my colleagues and friends from doing business with Western Garment Manufacturers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Study Materials (Used in Studies 4 and 5)

A large part of the Mexican economy is driven by the *maquiladoras*, factories that receive duty-free status for export to the US and Canadian markets. Nearly half a million Mexicans are employed in these factories, which are considered by some Western activists to be equivalent to sweatshop labor as the average wage in these factories (about $1.65 (US) an hour) is often not enough to provide workers with the basic necessities of life.

**Low Distributive Injustice Manipulation**
Western Garment Manufacturers is one of these factories operating in Mexico. Western Garment Manufacturers pays its workers $1.65 (US) an hour. This wage is the same as the average wage of similar factories in the area.

**High Distributive Injustice Manipulation**
Western Garment Manufacturers is one of these factories operating in Mexico. Western Garment Manufacturers pays its workers $0.83 (US) an hour. This wage is 50% less than the average wage of similar factories in the area.

**Low Interpersonal Injustice Manipulation**
In addition, Western Garment Manufacturers is well known in the area for treating its employees with respect and dignity.

**High Interpersonal Injustice Manipulation**
In addition, Western Garment Manufacturers is known for treating its employees *harshly and disrespectfully.*”
Appendix C: Evaluation Form (Used in Study 6; Modified Version Used in Study 1)

1. Do you recommend that Sauder extend the instructor’s contract for another 5 years? (Circle your response)
   - Yes
   - No

2. How would you feel if the Sauder School of Business renewed the instructor’s contract? (Check your response)
   - Very Upset
   - Somewhat Upset
   - Neutral
   - Somewhat Pleased
   - Very Pleased

3. Upon contract renewal at Sauder, instructors can receive up to a 5% salary increase. Do you recommend that Sauder offer this instructor an increased salary of 5% if Sauder extends the instructor’s contract?
   - Yes
   - No - IF NO, please type in an alternative salary increase ranging from 0-5% ____________

Please provide feedback regarding your thoughts about the instructor. What did the instructor do well? What did the instructor do poorly? Please provide as much feedback as possible.

For certain contract renewal decisions, the Dean would like to meet one-on-one with students to discuss their thoughts about an instructor’s teaching abilities and interpersonal skills. Would you be willing to meet with the Dean regarding this instructor’s behavior?

   - No
   - Yes (If yes, please provide your email address: ____________________________)

*By providing your email address you are giving your consent to be contacted by the Dean’s Office, you may or may not be contacted. Your comments and identity will not be directly provided to your instructor.*