ENGAGING THE STATE

Urban Citizenship Practices at the Frontier of Urban Renewal and *Nagar Raj* in Suburban Mumbai

by

Benita Maria Menezes

Bachelor of Architecture, The University of Mumbai, 2001

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Abstract

What are the political practices of engaging the state at the intersection of urban renewal and decentralization of governance (*Nagar Raj)* in millennial Mumbai? At stake in this question is the need to intervene in existing scholarship, which, until now, has been framed predominantly through macro-narratives of the structural dimensions of urban change. With regard to urban renewal, it has framed debates through the tropes of gentrification and dispossession and, with regard to urban governmentality, through binary constructs of civil and political society, or the overarching notion of civic governmentality. Although these conceptualizations have been useful, what is missing is a grounded reading of the micro-politics of everyday citizen practices that point to a dynamic and contentious public sphere.

This thesis explores the micro-politics of spatial and institutional restructuring in a suburban neighborhood in Mumbai. Drawing on research across the themes of urban decentralization, renewal and citizenship, the research renders more complex the binary constructs of civil/political society as well as the homogeneous categories of urban poor and community by focusing on a case study of neighborhood-led micro-urban renewal. The research locates the evolving political consciousness and agency of neighborhood actors through their actual practices that overlap with and transgress siloed conceptualizations. In developing this argument on the new politics of neighborhoods, four ways of engaging the state in suburban Mumbai are identified: a politics of (1) difference, (2) silence, (3) civility, and (4) compensation.

Preface

This research study required the approval of University of British Columbia's Behavioral Research and Ethics Board, Certificate Number H10-00832.

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List of Acronyms

ALM   Advanced Locality Management
AGNI   Action for Governance and Networking in India
ASR   Area Sabha Representative
BMC   Bombay Municipal Corporation
BRIMSTOWAD   *Brihan* Mumbai Storm Water and Drainage
CAG   Citizens Action Group
CSO   Civil Society Organization
CPL   Community Participation Law
CPF   Community Participation Fund
CRZ   Coastal Regulation Zone
CMZ   Coastal Management Zone
DCR   Development Control Regulation
FSI   Floor Space Index
GR   Government Resolution
GoI   Government of India
GoM   Government of Maharashtra
IMF   International Monetary Fund
JCWG   Juhu Citizen's Welfare Group
JNNURM   Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
MCGM   Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai
MHADA   Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority
MMCMCA   Maharashtra Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils
                   Amendments Act
MPLADS   Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme
MMRDA   Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority
MP   Member of Parliament
MLA   Member of Legislative Assembly
MoUD   Ministry of Urban Development
MTSU   Mumbai Transformation Support Unit
MUTP   Mumbai Urban Transportation Project
MUIP   Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project
NGO   Non Governmental Organization
NDZ   No-Development Zone
PAP   Project Affected Persons
RTI   Right to Information
R&R   Resettlement and Rehabilitation
SRA   Slum Rehabilitation Authority
TAG   Technical Advisory Group
TDR   Transfer of Development Rights
URIF   Urban Reform Initiatives Fund
ULCRA   Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act

Glossary

Advanced locality management (ALM): It is a scheme initiated by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. It entails extensive interaction of the ward-office with local neighborhood groups at the Municipal ward level. These groups form ALM street committees and coordinate with the respective ward officer for better management of civic issues especially garbage management.

Area *Sabha*:
– Defined in relation to an area, the body of all persons registered in the electoral rolls pertaining to every polling booth in the area, in a Municipality or if the Government so decides two or more contiguous polling booths (2200-5000 voters, not exceeding five polling booths) in such territory are ordinarily resident. (Model *Nagara Raj* Bill, GoI: 2005)
– Called *Shetra Sabhas* in Maharashtra, they are the smallest unit of governance at the sub-municipal ward level envisaged by the Maharashtra *Nagar Raj* Bill or Maharashtra Act no XXI of 2009 (MMCMCA) comprising elected members who are residents registered within two-five contiguous electoral polling booths. (Maharashtra Act no XXI of 2009)

Area *Sabha* Representative (ASR):
- Any registered voter in an Area (municipal ward) may file his nomination for the office of Area Sabha Representative. The election is to be conducted by the state government, state election commission, or any state agency, or ward councilor. (Model *Nagara Raj* Bill, GoI: 2005)
- The ward councilor is nominated as the Chairperson of the area sabha in the electoral ward. Secretary of Area Sabha will be an official of the Corporation. (Maharashtra Act no XXI of 2009)

Bombay First: is an industrialist philanthropic organization based in Mumbai. It was conceptualized in 1994 from a seminar "Mumbai: The Emerging Global Financial Centre", conducted by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) in association with the British Council. Bombay First assumed the role of facilitating the restructuring of Mumbai through various Public Private Partnership initiatives. Comprising major industries, business houses from Mumbai and supported by financial institutions it was modelled on the lines of London First. It accesses the Government of Maharashtra to share opinions and exchange views through the Citizens Action Group (CAG) chaired by the Chief Minister, the Empowered Committee chaired by the Chief Secretary and the recent Chief Minister's War Room (CMWR).

BRIMSTOWAD: The BRIMSTOWAD was implemented in Juhu as the *Irla Nallah* Widening Project under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). It was the last major study commissioned by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) in 1993 that recommended the augmentation of the drainage network along with pumping measures at the major outfalls across Mumbai.

Civil Society Organization (CSO): defined in the context of this study as an umbrella organization comprising of two or more organized groups as non-government organizations, advanced locality management groups, community based organizations functioning at the City, municipal ward, electoral ward, neighborhood and street level.

Corporator: In Mumbai, the Municipal Councilor is known as a Corporator. Each municipal ward has at least ten or more subdivisions called electoral wards. Each electoral ward elects one corporator for a term of five years through Municipal elections.

Citizen's Consensus Councilor (CCC): Citizen's Consensus Councilor was a Juhu-based ALM leader who was supported by the membership of ALM groups to contest the 2007 Municipal elections as their chosen candidate. He was shortlisted based on a process that evaluated his articulation of issues in public debates, screening by a panel of eminent personalities from elite civil society organizations at the city-level, his overall track record of civic activism that benefited the neighborhood and being a responsible, well-respected resident of Juhu. This process was based on the Model *Nagar Raj* concept. For the first time in India a Citizen's Consensus Councilor was nominated and elected to office for five years in Juhu or electoral ward 63.

Cut-off-date logic: Under the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, 1 January 1995 is known as the cut-off date to verify the eligibility of "slums" and "slum" structures in Greater Mumbai. In the case of an individual who moved into a "slum" structure pre 1 January 1995, both individual and structure are protected and eligible for the free rehabilitation scheme under the slum redevelopment project. An individual who moved into a "slum" structure, (registered pre-1995) after the cut-off date of 1 January 1995, is not eligible for the free rehabilitation scheme under the slum redevelopment project. But under the Development Control Regulations, laid out by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, an occupier of a rented property gets free housing when the building is redeveloped. More recently (as of 3 January 2012) the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, under the guidance of the State government has decided to sort out this anomaly by "recognizing all slum dwellers up to 2000 as eligible for the free rehabilitation scheme under the slum redevelopment project, by paying a nominal transfer fee.

Collector: is the chief administrative and revenue officer of an administrative district. The administrative district is the basic unit of urban administration. The Collector is also referred to as the District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner. The Collector, is a trained personnel from the Indian Amdinistrative Services (IAS) and is appointed by the State government. The general responsibilities of the Collector involve collection of land revenue, land assessment, land acquisition, collection of income tax dues, excise duties etc.

East Indians: The East Indian community is recognized as an indigenous group, who engaged in agricultural practices before colonial contact. They were converted to Christianity by Portuguese-Christian missionaries since the 17th century. Their cultural practices of rituals, dress, language, food, and ceremonies can be described as hybridized forms accommodating Christian and Hindu influences.

FSI: Called Floor Space Index, it refers to the permissible buildable area on a plot of land. It is a planning instrument adopted by the local and subnational state to guide development and growth in metropolitan Mumbai. FSI for Mumbai suburbs is 1 but another FSI of 1 could be loaded by buying Transfer of Development Rights. In 2011 the state government decided to provide builders 33% extra FSI for a premium fee for suburban developments. Part of this premium would go to the local state, the MCGM, to augment city-level infrastructure projects.

*Gaothan***:** is a former agrarian village characterized by low-rise, high-density housing typologies. The East-Indian communities primarily lived in *gaothans*.

*Inam***:** A feudal title (*Inamdar*) bestowed upon a person who received lands in grant or as gift (*Inam*) for extra-ordinary service rendered to the ruler (British *Raj*) or the kingdom (*Peshwa*).

*Khoti***:** Land held upon a privileged tenure was called *Khoti* (leased) land, and the *Khot* (lessee) exercised certain seignorial rights on it.

*Koliwada***:** a fishing village characterized by low-rise, high density housing typologies typically on the coastal edge with a fish drying yard close to it. The village of the *kolis*, mostly a fishing community is called a *koliwada*.

*Kolis***:** The particular *koli* sub-caste identified in this study is a fishing community whose origins can be traced to coastal villages in southern Gujarat. They are mainly distributed in sixty villages from *Survoda* village in *Valsad* district to *Colaba* in Greater Bombay in Maharashtra. The sub-caste name is derived from *meg* which means fishing net. They speak a regional dialect that has influences from *Gujarathi, Hindi* and *Marathi*. Traditionally this *koli* sub-caste worked as labor on the boats of the *Mahadev kolis* who were powerful, elite in the traditional *koli* hierarchy. Classified as a tribe by colonial governmentaility, they were re-designated as a low Hindu caste in the Constitution of modern India. In Juhu, I met with this *koli* sub-caste group who have been resident in an urban village since the mid-twentieth century. According to local folklore, their ancestors migrated from the forested hills in present day *Vidharba* then part of the Hyderabad princely province, to villages in southern *Gujarat* and Colaba in Bombay. This particular sub-caste of *kolis* has strong linkages with their source village.

*Nagarpalika***:** a term in Hindi used to describe an Urban Local Body (ULB) such as a Municipality or Municipal Corporation that governs an urban area.

Nagar Raj **or Community Participation Law (CPL):** Drawing from the *Panchayati* system of grassroots village governance, national level civil society organizations suggested the concept of urban area *sabhas* (that mimic *gram sabhas* in village governance). *Janaagraha* and *Loksatta* advised the National Advisory Council and Second Administrative reforms Committee in 2005, on whose recommendations the Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India, undertook these second-generation reforms as a constitutional obligation for the decentralization of urban governance. This led to the emergence of the Community Participation Law (CPL) commonly referred to as the *Nagar Raj* Bill in 2008. There are multiple versions of the *Nagar Raj* Bill being contested across civil society organizations

[*Janaagraha* (2005)] *Loksatta* (2005) and *Lokraj Andolan (*2009*)]* and the national and subnational state [the Ministry of Urban Development (GoI) (2005), Government of Maharashtra's *Shetra Sabha* Act (2009)].

Nallah: Referred to as *nullah, nallah or nala* could be described as an open sewer. Most present day *nallahs*, are former fresh water systems. The *Irla Nallah* used to be a creek until the reclamation in the 1960s.

National Advisory Council: was set up by the GoI in 2004-2006, to monitor the implementation of their coalition government, the United Progressive Alliance's (UPA) Common Minimum Programme. It was a platform to institutionalize expert advice from organized civil society to the government appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the head of their political party. The functions of the NAC include formation of government policy and assistance in the legislative business of the state. Being an advisory body none of their suggestions were mandatory. In elite policy circles, it is informally known as the UPA's "Planning Commission with a social agenda" that brings a humane and welfarist face to the developmentalist trajectory of the Planning Commission.

Planning Commission: established in 1950 by the postcolonial Indian state as a rational, technical domain, outside of politics, to neutrally determine economic programmes on behalf of the nation. Since the late 1980's, the economic and governance reforms proposed by the Planning Commission for urban areas has sustained the "developmentalist" ideology of the postcolonial state in urban areas as opposed to the rural areas which was the focus since independence. The Planning Commission is not a constitutional authority. It, however, advises the national government and plays a powerful role in shaping policy-level decisions.

Panchayat: The grassroots system of village governance that comprised of a *panch* (five members) and a *sarpanch* (village head) is called the *panchayat*. Their role consisted of village management, arbitration and decision-making at the village level. It is the basic unit of rural governance.

Photo-pass: an official document issued by the Collector, (Maharashtra State) to "slum" dwellers squatting on government lands. It acts as a proof of residing on the land, and has details of the date of residence, structure (size, physical features), family size, the rent payments and ownership /transfer details.

Ration card: An official document card issued by the Government of India, as part of the national Public Distribution System of subsidized grains and commodities for the poor. It acts as a primary piece of identity and domicile for all resident citizens in India.

Sarpanch: The headman in a village is called a *sarpanch*.

Slum Redevelopment: Colloquially it is referred to as *Zhopadpatti Punarvasan Prakalp* in Marathi. Officially, it is called the *Shivshahi Punarvasan Prakalp* or Slum Redevelopment Scheme under the SRA (Slum Rehabilitation Authority). This project can be undertaken on

lands that are under the ownership of private or public entities such as the state government or state housing development authority. It cannot be undertaken on Central (national) government lands. As per the cut-off date logic of 1995 any person who is resident in a *vasti* and has a registered structure in the electoral rolls is eligible for a house in the slum redevelopment scheme. This project requires a 70% consensus from the *vasti* residents living in the *vasti* at the time the project is to be undertaken. There are three critical documents in this process. The first called Annexure 1 is a No-Objection Certificate that has to be obtained in writing from the respective landowner by the project implementing agency. The foundation of the project is a document called Annexure 2. It is a survey list of physical structures and dwellers on the land at the time of slum redevelopment is undertaken. The structures listed have to be either in the Census survey (documentary proof showing existence before the cut-off date of 1995) or has to be a structure notified by state-level authorities such as the Deputy Collector/Collector. The project developer could be a private developer, the land owner, an NGO or a "slum" dweller co-operative housing society, has to issue a financial capacity document which has details of the financial aspects of the project that determine its viability called Annexure 3. These documents have to be submitted to the concerned departments of the state housing development authority. This office scrutinizes the documents, verifies eligibility of residents and declares a list of eligible *vasti* residents for rehabilitation. Once the consensus of *vasti* residents is obtained, then *vasti* residents have to come together and form a registered society (*Samiti*) and nominate a chief promoter. The role of the chief promoter is to represent and protect the interest of *vasti* residents in the development procedures besides handholding the role of coordination, supervision and managing the project processes across various partners such as the developer, elected representative and government agencies. In reality private developer's create and manage the *Samiti*.

TAG: The Technical Advisory Group comprises non-officials who advise the National Steering group chaired by the Prime Minister, the Central Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee, the State level Steering Committees, the Mission Directorates and the Urban Local Bodies (Municipal Government), ensuring transparency and accountability, mobilizing support of civil society and elected representatives for reforms in urban governance and to help enlist involvement of citizens at grassroots level. Their actual role has involved developing city-level technical advisory groups and voluntary groups and the preparation of guidelines for preparing and processing schemes under the Community Participation Fund (CPF).

ULCRA: The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 sought to control land speculation and to achieve a more equitable distribution of land by putting a ceiling of 500 sq. m. on vacant urban land in Mumbai that could be held in private ownership. All the land in excess of this ceiling was supposed to be returned to the government, to be used for housing the poor. Optionally, the owners could seek exemption, mainly under Section 20 or 21 of the Act, for the excess vacant land on the condition that the said land would be used to build one-room tenements for the weaker sections (as per the GR of 1986).

Ward Office: There are 24 administrative wards in Mumbai. Each municipal ward has a ward office. The branches of various departments are brought together at the ward office, placed in-charge of a ward officer. The role of the ward office is to collect taxes and other fees or dues,

register births and deaths and issue relevant certificates and attend to complaints in respect of civic services. The administration of licensing, factories, shops and establishments divisions have been amalgamated in the functions of the ward office so that citizens could conveniently approach the ward officer. For supervision, these offices are placed under the Deputy Municipal Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation.

Ward Committee: Formulated due to the provisions of the 74th CAA, the ward committees comprised of the councilors elected from each electoral ward within a particular administrative municipal ward, the ward officer and three non-voting and non-political co-opted members such as technical experts or NGO representatives. The role of the Ward Committee was to initiate meaningful interaction between the civic administration, councilors and citizens. The MCGM formulated 16 ward committees across 24 wards in Mumbai.

74th CAA: The Statement of Objectives and reasons in the 74 CAA (1992, 11) highlights "In many States, local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered necessary that provisions relating to Urban Local Bodies are incorporated in the Constitution particularly for—(i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the State Government and the Urban Local Bodies with respect to— (a) the functions and taxation powers, and (b) arrangements for revenue sharing. (ii) ensuring regular conduct of elections; (iii) ensuing timely elections in the case of supersession; and (iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women". One of the significant recommendations was the creation of "Municipal Ward Committees" for each administrative ward that would comprise a combination of local elected-representatives (councilors), bureaucrats from ward level offices and non-government organizations/experts. The inclusion of the third group is significant in this legislation, moving towards political decentralization at the local level.

Public Disclosure Law or Right to Information (RTI): was an urban governance reform mandated by the JNNURM in 2005. The JNNURM primer on Public Disclosure Law suggests "the goal of public disclosure is to institute transparency and accountability in the functioning of municipalities through publication of information pertaining to various facets of municipal governance, namely personnel, particulars of administrative structure, finances and operations".

Case-Study Specific Terminology

Neighborhood Actors: this phrase refers to the major resident groups identified through fieldwork in Juhu - the *vasti* residents, *koliwada* and *gaothan* residents and elite, upper-middle-class and middle-class groups. The term *vasti* and *gaothan* residents describes the type of settlements these residents live in. The term *koli* refers to a culturally-specific ethnic group. The phrase elite and middle-class group is an income-based and culturally constructed category in the context of economic liberalization.

Elite/Middle-Class Groups: To conceptualize the urban elite and middle-class groups in Juhu, I draw on class-based formations characterized by income but more recently defined in terms of a cultural construct i.e., the new middle-class (Fernandes: 2006). This segment describes a professional segment of the middle-class associated with new economy jobs such as the service sector, information technology and the financial sector. In the context of India, post-independence, Chatterjee (2004) locates the wealthy classes as traditional landed elite and merchant communities who benefited from the monopolistic license-*raj* and an import-substitution regime. He suggests the emergence of a thrifty middle-class was rooted in the economic regimes marked by state-led industrialization. This social class could be seen to include small traders, shopkeepers and public and private sector employees. Since the 1990s, however, urban economic restructuring embedded in the liberalization- privatization-globalization era, has led to a shift from the industrial manufacturing base to the service economy in metropolitan cities like Mumbai. Fernandes (2006, 2415) locates the phenomenon of the "new middle-class as a cultural formation in this shift, characterized by attitudes, lifestyles and consumption practices associated with the liberalizing economy". Chatterjee (2004, 143) locates the rise of a "managerial and technocratic class" with the information technology sector, to create a "new urban elite" and "urban middle-class" in India characterized by "high-spending capacities".

Across the five neighborhoods in Juhu, we observe the presence of both traditional and new elites in the elite JVPD town planning scheme and Old Juhu, living in the multi-storied luxury apartments, beach facing bungalows and the bungalow schemes. Their economic activities are characterized by big businesses, celebrities in Mumbai's film industry and professional elites from advertising, accounting, legal services, architects, bankers etc. In the Gulmohar town planning scheme and parts of Old Juhu we observe the old and new forms of the upper-middle and middle-class comprising shopkeepers, small to medium traders, public sector employees the English-speaking professional segments that are characterized specifically by their consumption in upmarket restaurants, shopping malls and multiplex theatres, consumption of household commodities and appliances and the car as a symbol of social status. The *koli, gaothan* and *vasti* households living in Juhu reveal a wide range of socio-economic consolidation embedded in the so-called informal sector, working class and sometimes reveal even middle-class capacities. This renders the blanket term "urban poor" insufficient to describe this wide range of incremental socio-economic consolidations.

Acknowledgements

Chapter 1: The Struggles to Belong

The Expansion and Erosion of Urban Citizenship Claims in Suburban Mumbai

1.1   The Frontier of Urban Renewal and Governmentality in a Suburban Mumbai Neighborhood

Dhuno[1] *koli*[2] was born and raised in the *koliwada* sandwiched between Juhu Beach and the *Irla* Creek. It is one of the oldest settlements in Juhu built since the 1940's. To make way for a public garden in 2005, the state government demolished his home and so Dhuno, a public sector employee currently lives in a joint family of fourteen. As I sit with Dhuno*ji* in the Juhu *Machimaar Samiti* office, a ten by twelve feet room made of brick walls and an asbestos roof, children playing cricket outside catch my eye. He looks at the only *koli*[3] courtyard left in his fishing village, lamenting, "slum dwellers who came later on, took over the other village courtyard with help from local politicians". He points to the transformations in the surroundings of the urban village from the allocated land use of the City Development Plan (1981) on a large Google map. This loss has triggered a strong sense of territoriality. Resulting in heaps of paperwork accrued through a seventeen-year struggle to prevent dispossession of the *kolis*. Intrigued by this, I asked, how it all began.

> In 1993, a private developer organized a village meeting to announce the state government's slum redevelopment project to develop the village. A conversation about that meeting with my professor at the government Law College made me aware of Mumbai's revised Development Control Regulations and redevelopment policies. I realized that these policies perceived my village as a *slum* and the *kolis* as *slum dwellers*. There was an enormous difference in the developer's redevelopment promises to the *kolis* and what the "rehabilitation" regulation allowed for. This knowledge compelled me, the first graduate *koli*, to fight the *dispossession of our lands* by the private developer and government. In 1996, I founded the *koli Samiti* to

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[1] For purposes of anonymity, I have used pseudonyms for the people who participated in this study.

[2] Interview, *koli* resident 23 September and 31 October 2011.

[3] The *kolis* are a culturally distinct ethnic people living along the coastal belts and certain inland water systems in India. Their primary occupation has been fishing and fish vending. The *koli samaj* (society) has its specific community structures, notions of hierarchy, and distinct rituals and ceremonies, language and collective living habits. Post-independence, a sub-caste of *kolis* were notified as a low Hindu caste i.e., from a scheduled tribe's status in the colonial era to the social status of other backward class, (OBC) under the Constitution of India. By 2003, this sub-caste was categorized as a Special Backward Class (SBC) a sub-group of the OBC category created in 1995 from recommendations of the infamous Mandal Commission. In addition to this, urbanization processes emerging from a state-led development paradigm have resulted in pressures on these former indigenous communities, their gradual evolution and struggle to assimilate themselves in "modern" urban society.

represent our interest in the public domain around issues of self-redevelopment of housing and livelihood. It has provided some recognition as "original inhabitants" amongst few ALM groups in Juhu, mobilizing building residents to participate in voting for their candidate. National government agencies have engaged with the *Samiti's* recommendations to formulate policy for traditional fisherfolk rights. But I still wonder, how could governments allow "slum" redevelopment, reclamation of no-development zone as real estate and organize demolition of *koli* housing along the *Irla Nallah*, when the lands are reserved for *koli* housing and fishing infrastructure in the Development Plan (1981)? (Interview, *koli* resident A, 23 September 2011).

Hari Vishwas[4] was raised in the *vasti*[5] settled on state government lands upstream the *Irla Nallah* since the 1960's. A small businessman he lives in a joint family of eight members that includes a "home-office". Recently this *vasti* has been threatened by eviction for a "public-purpose" infrastructure project. At one of our evening meetings, we walk through an internal street, doubling as a cricket pitch, past a college, snack stall, photocopy centre and *balwadi* (school)that opens into a licensed stationary shop. The storeowner greets us and offers us a set of keys. Walking up a steep metal ladder, we reach a ten by six feet air-conditioned mezzanine office space. This is the *Vikas Samiti*[6] founded in 2010 to resist eviction by the *Irla Nallah* widening project. When I enquired why they did not approach a local politician to stall demolitions, Hari replied:

The "slum" demolition drive along the *Irla Nallah* since 2008, resettlement of families at the municipal limits of the City, and the politician-builder *raj*, made me realize that new winds of change had swept Juhu. No longer could we fall back naively on *shakha pramukhs* (grassroots leaders) of political parties to sustain our settlements and tenure of public lands. To collectively address our housing concerns and threats of eviction

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[4] Interview, *Vasti* 1 resident A, 8 November 2011.

[5] Throughout this study I use the term *vasti* residents to refer to resident groups in Mumbai that are usually referred to as "slum" dwellers or the urban poor. "Slum" is a colloquial term used to lump together individuals living in self-built habitats, often as a result of in-migration to the city. The national state defines "slum" or "slum areas" as a compact settlement with a collection of poorly built tenements, mostly of temporary nature, crowded together, with inadequate sanitary and drinking water facilities in unhygienic conditions, which may be on Government land or on Private Land. The Mumbai Municipal Corporation defines "slum" as "*zopadpatti*" (regional variant in *Marathi* to suggest squalor) as "poor neighborhood areas or blights". Most of the families and individuals I met through this research referred to their self-built habitats as *vasti*. A term in the Marathi language related to *vasahat* which means "place of dwelling or settlement". Hence in this study I use the phrase *vasti* to refer to self-built habitats as neighborhoods as opposed to "slums"/blighted neighborhoods. The *vasti* households reveal a wide range of socio-economic consolidation. These emerge from stability of residence across at least two generations and livelihood activities embedded in the so-called informal sector, working class sector and self-employment. A few *vasti* households reveal consumer capacities of the "middle-class", through access to electronic goods, household appliances, two wheeler ownership and accessing new spaces of consumption such as multiplexes and malls. This renders the blanket term "urban poor" insufficient to describe a diverse range of socio-economic consolidations in the *vastis*. The *vastis* also house tenants and single-male laborers who live precariously since their socio-economic consolidation is relatively recent or dependent on the owner of the structure they sub-lease from.

[6] A *Vikas Samiti* is a development association. This community-based association is located in a *vasti*-based and organizes *vasti* households towards political activity.

we formed a *Samiti*, and I was appointed its chairperson. This make-shift office space was borne from a working partnership with local enterprises. What is different is that we maintain correspondence with the municipal and state bureaucracies on the *Samiti* letterhead, access the Public Disclosure Law on a regular basis to remain updated and network with resident organizations. Our mandate is to envision *vasti* development on this land, to advocate on behalf of *vasti* households with municipal and state bureaucracies, politicians and other groups. However, the poor man's home is still demolished and he is thrown to *Mankhurd*. As if the poor were garbage to be disposed, off. As of today, we do not have a secure space in Juhu that we can call our home. Where should the poor go? Do they not have the right to live in Juhu? (Interview, *Vasti* 1 resident A, 8 November 2011).

Dhuno and Hari, residents of the urban village[7] and *vasti* in an elite suburban neighborhood of Mumbai, are aware that they do not own the land. However, they recollect specifically how cumulative efforts of two-three generations, made socio-economic consolidation possible for themselves in the city. More recently, the struggles around land in Mumbai, at the frontier of urban renewal, has created conflicts amongst diverse societal groups and the singular "world-class" telos advocated by the state. It is within such a politics of land and uncertain, contested futures that Dhuno and Hari struggle to belong as urban citizens in a suburban Mumbai neighborhood. This claim to urban citizenship through land is embedded in a sense of belonging to a particular territorial area that has been developed and consolidated from scratch. They seek recognition of the fact that consolidation of neighborhood space and its sense of place was made possible through their contributions as voters, taxpayers, consumers and home owners. Rooted in his studies of citizenship practices in the self-built peripheries of Sao Paolo, Holston defines such an imagination of urban citizenship as:

> ….where urban residence is the basis for mobilization, rights claims addressing the urban experience, compose their agenda.The city is the primary community of reference for these developments, and residents legitimate this agenda of rights and participatory practices on the basis of their contributions to the city (Holston: 2008, 23)

Claims to urban citizenship in Mumbai at the turn of this century have simultaneously expanded and eroded through a series of events. These events have critically affected the lives and futures

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[7] I use the term urban village to describe the former *koli* village or *koliwada* and the two *vasti* settlements surrounding it. Urban village is a broad term that hopes to capture the contemporary cosmopolitan nature of the settlement that has experienced different waves of in-migration since the early twentieth century. The major residents are *kolis* and *vasti* residents with multi-ethnic, caste, religious and language sub-groups. These families cluster together on the basis of source area, date of in-migration and ethnicity. The families and individuals I met through this research referred to the settlement as *gaon*. The term *koliwada* specifically means a *koli* village based on kinship networks and ties amongst the *koli* society. Referring to the "*gaon*" (village) as *koliwada* in 2011 would exclude the presence of *vasti* residents or non-*kolis* that have consolidated their lives and livelihoods on these lands since thirty years. I adopt their use of the term and henceforth refer to the settlement as an urban village to include a broad group of residents and activities in a suburban setting.

of residents like Dhuno and Hari in Mumbai's suburban neighborhoods. On the one hand, demands for institutionalization of citizen participation in municipal governance via municipal ward committees (2000)[8], and a people's campaign for systemic and electoral reforms in municipal governance by a coalition of elite civil society organizations (2004)[9] promised an expansion of citizenship rights. On the other hand, the initiation of the Mumbai transformation project for a "world-class" city by the Maharashtra state government (2003)[10] resulted in a massive demolition drive to clear public lands of encroachments, through participation of elite and middle-class groups. This caused the eviction of hundreds of urban poor families without rehabilitation or compensation (2005).[11] Roy (2009, 159-161) underscores this moment in the twenty-first century metropolis as:

> ..a paradoxical space. On the one hand it is shaped by *grassroots citizenship* powered by civil society energies and social mobilization. […] On the other hand the contemporary city is marked by deepening forms of inequality, the speeding up of displacements and entrenchment of segregations and separations that territorialize urban identities in enclave geographies. […]The politics of the bourgeois city, is one of *civic governmentality* mobilized by grassroots energies in creating and managing a civic realm; where the urban subject is simultaneously empowered and self-disciplined, civil and mobilized, displaced and compensated (in the developmentalist violence of urban renewal through the promise of inclusion to citizenship) (Roy: 2009, 159-161, brackets added).

My research is located at the juncture of this paradoxical space of governance and urban renewal in millennial Mumbai. Roy (2009) conceptually articulates how the convergence of the frontier of urban renewal and participatory governance in Mumbai shapes the expansion and erosion of urban citizenship claims. Existing scholarship has insufficiently explored this convergence. Predominantly, it tends to study citizenship in conjunction with either governance or urban renewal. What is missing is a grounded reading of everyday practices and experiments that engage the state at this intersection, revealing the interplay of agency with structural dimensions of change. In this thesis, I attempt to tease out the complexities of the politics of citizenship practices at the intersection of urban renewal and governance drawing on the experiences of a suburban Mumbai neighborhood.

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[8] Baud et al: 2008.
[9] Loksatta: 2004.
[10] McKinsey: 2003.
[11] Mahadevia: 2008.

1.2 A Historical Overview of Decentralization of Urban Governance and Urban Renewal in India

In this section, I provide a brief historical overview to reveal the intersection of decentralization of urban governance and urban renewal in Mumbai.

"Rescaling" Urban Governance[12]: The recognition, during the late 1980s, of the importance of cities to the national economy compelled the Centre[13] to focus on the governance and modernization of urban areas. A National Commission on Urbanization instituted in 1988, led to the formation of an independent Ministry of Urban Development and recommendations for decentralization of urban governance. For the first time in forty years, comprehensive governance was legislated for urban areas. Beard et al. (2008) have argued that since the early-1990s, international development organizations mainstreamed the need for political decentralization to urban local government and a concurrent modernization of cities as "engines of economic growth" in the Global South as part of the Structural Adjustments Programme. The economic and governance reforms in urban India since the 1990s were influenced by this ideology.[14] Kohli (2006) suggests that an economic crisis, huge national debt, and pressures from a small group of technocratic elite and the corporate capitalist sector compelled the Centre to seek loans from international donor agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to keep the economy afloat. The Structural Adjustments Programme was a critical conditionality of such loans received from donor agencies.

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[12] Refer Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2

[13] The national government of India is usually referred to as the Centre in policy circles.

[14] It is important to note that the origin of the decentralization of governance in India is not located in the economic liberalization of the 1990s, but as a part of the postcolonial national state's focus on decentralization of rural governance. This period under the regime of a one-party dominance form of political system and a central command economy was marked by tensions in national and subnational state relations that delayed the rural decentralization process. Neoliberal re-structuring in the 1990s, led to a shift in the logic of decentralization of governance. This logic pointed to the inefficiencies of wasteful government bureaucracies as the root problem of state legitimacy and suggested neo-liberal economic policies as a solution. Thus the eve of liberalization in the 1990s provided constitutional recognition to the decentralization of urban and rural governance in India in the form of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts (CAA).

Legislative ● Executive ○ Judiciary ◉

		Legislative	Executive	Judiciary
National State • Government of India	Central Government/ Centre	Prime Minister ●	Cabinet Secretary ○ • Ministry of Urban Development • Ministry of Environment & Forests	Supreme Court ◉
Subnational State • Government of Maharashtra	State Government	Chief Minister ● *Elected by the State Assembly*	Chief Secretary ○ • Urban Development Department • Housing Development Authority	Bombay High Court ◉
4 Divisions • Konkan	Division		Division Commissioner ○	
Local State • Corporation of Mumbai	Municipal Government	Mayor *Elected by the Councilors*	Municipal Commissioner ○	
Island City and Suburban District • Suburban Sub-District: Andheri	District	* Member of Parliament (MP) ● Constituency: 36 electoral wards	Collector ○	
24 Wards • K West Ward	Ward	* Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) ● Constituency: 6 electoral wards	Ward Officer ○	
227 Electoral Wards • Juhu or Electoral Ward 63	Electoral Ward	* Councilor/Corporator ● Constituency: One electoral ward		

* *Elected through direct elections*

Data Source: http://india.gov.in/my-government/whos-who.
Figure Source: Author

Figure 1-1 Schematic Urban Governance Structure (India)

Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM)

Mayor
227 Councilors

Statutory Committees

Standing | Improvement | Wards | Education | B.E.S.T

Special Committees

Public Works (City) | Public Works (Suburbs) | Public Health | Markets & Gardens | Law, Revenue

Deliberative Wing

Commissioner

4 Additional Municipal Commissioners

2 Joint Municipal Commissioners

19 Deputy Municipal Commissioners

24 Assistant Commissioners

Departments Water, Sanitation, Construction, Health, Sewerage, Education, Shops and Establishments, Security, Pest control, Markets, Gardens, Revenue, Transport, Disaster Management)

Executive Wing

Figure 1-2 Mumbai's Municipal Governance Structure

Data Source: http://www.mcgm.gov.in/
Figure Source: Author

Parallel to these events, the Centre deliberated on its own processes for decentralization of governance in urban and rural areas. Eventually, a historical legislation for urban areas called the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 (74th CAA) was passed. Considered as a crucial moment in India's urban governance, the 74th CAA recognized urban local bodies as a third tier of government. The Maharashtra Social Watch Report (2010) underscores the significance of the 74th CAA:

> Municipal governments were accorded a constitutional status to initiate a process of democratic decentralization of functions, functionaries and finance for greater accountability, responsiveness and transparency. It also provided a framework that enables citizen participation in local governance. The overall purpose was to ensure the functioning of municipalities as democratic units and lead to greater participation of the people at the grassroots in decision-making (Maharashtra Social Watch Report: 2010, 7-11)

Pinto (2008) stresses that:

> by empowering the local self-government as the third tier in India's federation (the 74th CAA) seeks to do away with the arbitrariness of and ad hocism that plagued state-locality functional and fiscal relationships.(Pinto, 2008, 56 brackets added)

In Maharashtra, the 74th CAA was legislated as the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils (Amendment) Act, 1994, called the Maharashtra Act No 41 of 1994. In the case of Mumbai, the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, (MMC Act) was amended as the Maharashtra Act No 41 of 1994 to implement the provisions of the 74th CAA. One of the outcomes was the rapid growth of neighborhood level organized Advanced Locality Management (ALM) groups in suburban areas.[15] The municipal body institutionalized these groups through the ALM Programme. It involved extensive interaction between the ward-office, local neighborhood groups and elected representatives at the Municipal ward level for locality management and governance. The membership of ALM groups came from private housing societies and buildings organized along neighborhood streets. Despite this beginning, not a single Ward Committee was formed in Maharashtra until 2000.[16] In response to a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by a Mumbai-based nongovernment organization, the Bombay High Court

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[15] The MCGM website lists 648 registered ALM groups since 2001 in Mumbai, mostly located in the western suburbs.

[16] The Shiv-Sena BJP combine in power at the municipal level in Mumbai and at the state level in Maharashtra from 1995-1999, did not implement the provision of creation of Ward Committees. A primary reason was that the new institutional structures such as Ward Committees, envisioned by the 74th CAA, replicated their party organization structures of grassroots units called *shakhas* thereby threatening their power and authority at the ward/sub-ward level.

directed the state government to expedite the process of Ward Committee creation in urban Maharashtra.[17] Because of this advocacy-based activism, Mumbai witnessed the creation of 16 ward committees for 24 municipal wards by 2000.

To discipline the inertia of state governments in settling urban governance reforms, the Centre announced the Urban Reforms Incentive Fund (URIF) in 2003.[18] Projected as a form of reform-linked financial assistance, it hoped to accelerate and incentivize reforms. Through this programme, the state government would enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) with the Centre's Ministry of Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation (MoUD&PA) accepting to undertake the reform measures as the conditionality to access funds. The seven reforms included repealing the Urban Land Ceiling Act, rationalizing Stamp Duty, Rent Control reforms, Property Tax reforms, introduction of computerized processes of document registration, introducing reasonable user charges for specific services and adopting a double entry accounting system.[19] Disciplined by its political party at the Centre, the Maharashtra government signed the MoA in 2003 and agreed to all seven reform conditions at once.

To entrench this governance reform process further the Centre initiated a flagship programme of urban renewal called the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) in 2005. Its focus was development of urban infrastructure, poverty alleviation, creating an investor-friendly environment and accountability of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs)/ para-statal agencies towards citizens.[20] Conditionalities of the JNNURM applied to state governments, ULBs and para-statal agencies. In addition to the URIF reforms, critical mandatory conditionalities included introducing e-governance, provision of basic services for the poor and implementation of decentralization measures as envisaged in the 74th CAA. At the time, elite

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[17] It was only with the Congress government in power in Maharashtra in 1999 that the High Court's verdict was acted upon. See, Writ Petition No. 2549 of 1999, *YUVA vs State of Maharashtra and Others* and Sivaramakrishnan (2006).

[18] "Centre to Set Norms For URIF Disbursals Soon", *Business Standard*, 8 January 2003.

[19] See www.niua.org/Publications/newsletter/urb_fin_dec04.pdf

[20] See http://jnnurm.nic.in/

civil society organizations such as *Janaagraha* and *Loksatta*[21] mainstreamed the idea of the *Nagar Raj* Bill or Community Participation Law (CPL)[22] and the Public Disclosure Law (or Right To Informaton)[23] to the National Advisory Council and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission. By 2008, both these national laws became a mandatory conditionality for state governments accessing JNNURM funds. State governments had to create conformity legislation of these two laws at the state-level. In Maharashtra, the Public Disclosure Law was enacted by the Government of Maharashtra (GoM) as the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils (Amendment) Act, 2007 and was implemented by 2008. The Maharashtra *Nagar Raj* Bill was presented thrice in the state legislative assembly from 2007-2009. It was only in 2009, to expedite the release of JNNURM funds, that it was passed and published as the Maharashtra Act No XXI or the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils (Amendment) Act, 2009. Thus, urban governance reforms initiated by the Centre were unevenly settled across urban areas in Maharashtra. However, the case of Mumbai was unique being the state administrative capital and the financial hub of India. The presence of an active organized civil society ensured that urban governance reforms were quickly settled in Mumbai, so that it could act as a model for other cities.

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[21] *Janaagraha* is a non-government organization based in Bangalore, Karnataka, founded in 2001, as a movement to enable citizen's participation in public governance. Its primary aim is to improve the quality of life in urban India defined as the quality of urban infrastructure, services and quality of citizenship that is defined by the role of urban residents in civic issues. See http://www.janaagraha.org/

Loksatta was founded as a non-partisan movement for democratic reforms in Andhra Pradesh in 1996. In 2004, *Loksatta* established an office in Mumbai. To implement their suggestions of administrative reforms on the ground, they actively mobilized civil society organizations, NGO's and ALM groups working across Mumbai. They collaborated with various organized civil society groups to evolve the Vote-Mumbai Campaign in 2005. It raised awareness for systemic reforms in delivery of urban services and an overhaul of municipal policies and legislations rooted in archaic administrative structures from the colonial era that required modernization to address the issues and concerns of 21st century Indian cities. As it aimed to transform the culture of urban Indian politics it emerged as a political party by 2007, see http://www.loksatta.org/.

[22] The CPL hoped to institutionalize citizen's participation and introduce the concept of the Area *Sabha* in urban areas.

[23] The RTI hoped to institute transparency and accountability in the functioning of municipalities and municipal governance through periodic publication of relevant information.

Figure 1-3 The Evolution of New State-Society Relations

Figure 1-4: Mumbai's Local Governance Structure (Pre 1990s)

Figure 1-5: Mumbai's Local Governance Structure: Municipal Ward Committees (Post 74th CAA,

Figure 1-6: Mumbai's Local Governance Structure: Area Sabhas at the Electoral Ward Level (Post *Nagar Raj* Bill 2008)   **Figure Source:** Author

"Settling" Urban Renewal: Concurrent to settling urban governance reforms in principle, the subnational state of Maharashtra initiated a process of modernizing urban space based on national land policy goals since the 1990s. Urban land perceived as a resource for accumulation had to be planned.[24] Influenced by economic liberalization policies, cities such as Mumbai, once considered "overgrown, unmanageable, sick urban entities" were repositioned as "generators of national wealth".[25] Regional planners projected Mumbai as a strategic site for the consolidation of the tertiary and quaternary sector economies. They hoped Mumbai would transform itself into an "international city" integrating the national economy to the advanced global economy. Central to the idea of the "international city" was the development of land and infrastructure to make Mumbai attractive to foreign and domestic investments in addition to improving the quality of citizen's lives.

To transform Mumbai into an "international city", the subnational state had to address two constraints: land and finances. To address the problem of cash-strapped state coffers, the subnational state targeted tight regulatory frameworks on land, its use and development. The new planning paradigm focused on incentivizing private sector participation through the public-private partnership (PPP) model.[26] The development thrust focused on private sector investments, re-structuring the metropolitan economy and creation of land use policies that were market-friendly. To consolidate these new ideas in re-imagining the use of urban lands and the potential private sector investments in it, the subnational state worked with the Urban Local Body on the revisions to the Development Plan (DP) and the Development Control Regulation (DCR) for Mumbai, both statutory obligations of the ULB.[27] Thus, by the early 1990s, amendments to the DP and DCRs reflected a new entrepreneurial city-building ideology. These efforts resulted in the creation of New Planning Instruments - Transfer of Development Rights (TDR), Additional Development Rights (ADR) and increased Floor Space Index (FSI) for redevelopment of land through urban renewal. These instruments involved incentives for private

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[24] Prior to the 1990s, socialist ideas had led the national/subnational state to prevent concentration of land ownership in private hands through land ceiling rules and controls such as the ULCRA. For a detailed analysis of the politics of land and ULCRA in Mumbai see Narayanan (2005).
[25] MMRDA (1999, i)
[26] *Ibid*
[27] These are stated in the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act (MRTP).

developers, compensation for land owners at market rates, increased development rights on the land and transfer of development rights to another land within the municipal regulatory framework. Thus, urban renewal emerged as the primary vehicle to create the necessary conditions for settling the "international city" through regulatory and spatial restructuring of land and generating revenue through new planning tools. Such a regime focused on housing, land and infrastructure as the sites for urban renewal in Mumbai. Some target projects identified were:

a. **Redevelopment of Housing Stock:** comprising old building stock in the inner-City areas of Mumbai that had deteriorated due to archaic rent control rules. These rules froze house rents at rates prevailing in the 1940s. Self-built housing by the urban poor that had mushroomed on public and private lands in the city was the other focus of urban renewal projects.

b. **Redevelopment of Industrial Lands:** comprising large tracts of public and private lands such as the textile mill lands that were up for redevelopment after the closure of the mills and revisions to the DCR. The surplus docklands were another source of land available due to shifting of port operations to Navi Mumbai and the decision of national state agencies to sell surplus lands to generate revenues.

c. **Augmenting Infrastructures:** included expanding road and railway corridors for efficient traffic dispersal, improving water, storm water drainage and sewerage systems built during colonial rule, tapping new dedicated sources for water supply from the region and settling in new information technologies and telecommunications.

To initiate urban renewal projects, the state government appointed many committees to study the existing condition of infrastructures, ground realities and develop recommendations for implementation. Many long-term solutions based on incremental improvements or issue/sector-based problem solving emerged from these processes within the subnational and local bureaucratic state. These ideas were translated into dispersed, piecemeal and fragmented efforts at urban renewal formulated by technocratic elites in the subnational state in partnership with the private sector. However, for the private sector not much implementation was visible on the ground. Threatened by deregulation and spatial restructuring, however, many city residents felt that the planners' dreams of the "international city" threatened their public amenities, open

spaces, housing and livelihoods. These became the grounds for new contestations for advocacy-based activism comprising NGOs of environmentalists, heritage activists, and housing rights movements. They hoped to mobilize the judiciary or bureaucratic state to stall what they saw as corporatist political excesses.

This situation was perceived quite differently by the corporate sector elite. Non-implementation of urban renewal projects on the ground was interpreted as inertia of the state government embedded in conventional attitudes towards incremental efforts and crisis management. To address this fragmented thinking that focused on "incremental improvements and de-bottlenecking", [28] the resistance of NGO-based activism and to transform bureaucratic and political attitudes to "comprehensive, bold and big-picture thinking", corporate elites called upon McKinsey consultants in 2003, to develop a blueprint for "transforming Mumbai into a world-class city". Called Vision Mumbai it was mainstreamed across policy elites and state/national governments as a comprehensive vision with a development blueprint. Inspired by this report, the GoM appointed a Task Force and Citizen's Action Group (CAG) in 2004, including corporate, policy and civil society elites. These interactions reinforced the discourse of a "slum-free-world-class" telos for Mumbai.[29]

With the Vision Mumbai report in place, the subnational state busied itself with a strategic plan for implementation. The first targets of Vision Mumbai were "slums". A massive demolition drive, dubbed "Operation Shanghai" was carried out in the winter of 2004. The subnational state evicted 94,000 families across 44 sites and cleared 288 acres of government lands through an intensive demolition programme spanning two months.[30] Criticism from the opposition parties, pro-poor NGOs, human rights-based organizations and ruling party bosses at the national level, compelled the subnational state to withdraw to maintain its political legitimacy. However, the unprecedented Mumbai floods in 2005, brought to the forefront issues of city management, proliferation of slums, environmental degradation and governance. Corporate and civil society

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[28] Bombay First-McKinsey (2003)
[29] *Ibid*
[30] Mahadevia (2008)

elite, the middle-class and poor voiced their anger against the subnational state and inept municipal administrations. To address their concerns, and maintain its legitimacy, the subnational state created a technocratic forum, the Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU). Established as a joint initiative of the World Bank, Cities Alliance, USAID, All India Institute of Local Self-Government and Government of Maharashtra, the MTSU was to facilitate the process of Mumbai's transformation into a "world-class" city. As the ideology of the "world-class" city was mainstreamed by Mumbai's corporate and civil society elites through the subnational state, the Centre, sought to create a vehicle to settle urban infrastructures and unsettle poverty in target cities through a new discourse of "community participation" influenced by civil society elite and international development agencies.[31] With a strategy of developing urban infrastructure, "alleviating" poverty, creating investor-friendly urban environments and ensuring accountability of ULBs/para-statal agencies towards citizens the national state embarked on an ambitious project for urban areas. Thus, the JNNURM was born.

The GoM became a signatory to the JNNURM project and appointed an Empowered Committee in 2006 to streamline and develop the proposals of the "official" Vision Mumbai blueprint. To re-initiate the process of Mumbai's Transformation, large-scale urban renewal projects modeled on the PPP paradigm were on the drawing board. These included the Dharavi slum redevelopment, cluster approach to redevelop inner-city areas, a rental housing project to increase rental stock in the region, the MUTP-MUIP to augment city and regional transportation infrastructure, the Mithi River Redevelopment project to augment storm water and sewerage infrastructure and the redevelopment of the heritage Crawford market to transform municipal markets across Mumbai. The MTSU initiated a grassroots planning initiative that involved local elected-representatives in developing municipal ward-level planning proposals. Municipal politics was the domain of the opposition party so not many corporators chose to participate in

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[31] Roy (2010) refers to this paradigm shift as the "post-Washington" consensus that considers the social costs towards fulfilling its political and economic agenda, in the Global South. This shift in the Indian case is evident in the creation of quasi-governmental bodies that created a platform for the participation or inclusion of civil society elites in decision-making. The National Advisory Council that focused on bringing a humane and welfarist face to developmentalism and refered to as a "Planning Commission with a social agenda" is one such example.

this process. However, the ruling class in municipal politics co-opted Vision Mumbai in its own ways, sometimes drawing the scrutiny of the subnational state.[32]

The GoM, further organized interactions with representatives of six state government agencies, corporate and civil society elite, international urban planning consultants, and international development agencies to develop a Concept Plan for Mumbai. This think-tank was formulated on the advice of the corporate elite and the CAG. Deliberations in this elitist, technocratic forum resulted in the expansion of the task of Concept Planning for the entire metropolitan region.[33] In addition, suggestions were made to undertake comprehensive development planning at the ward and sub-ward levels, scrap the provision of free public housing and include lands occupied by slums as developable land to prevent land shortage.[34] Taking this advice in its stride the subnational state appointed a Singapore-based planning consultant for transforming Mumbai from a "slum-free world-class to a global city by 2052".[35] Simultaneously, the ULB identified an international planning consultant, an Indian subsidiary of a French firm, to review and develop Mumbai's Development Plan (2014- 2034).

These efforts of the subnational state in collaboration with corporate and civil society elites to make Mumbai "global" through controlling urban development decisions via exclusive, elitist, citizen participation processes are being challenged. Two forms of resistance can be identified to this "top-down" statist-corporatist city-building process.

1. The first form of pressure bloc comprised of advocacy-based activism through NGOs that emerged since the late 1980s. More recently with the institutionalization of citizen-participation these are increasingly morphing into loose, broad-brushed coalitions, not limited to the non-profit sector but tactically including the private sector as well. Examples are coalitions of city-based NGOs, national-elite civil society organizations, academic

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[32] "BMC gears up to tap the markets", *The Times of India*, 13 October 2006; "BMC officials accuse state of ignoring Mumbai," *The Times of India*, 21 August, 2006; "BMC ropes in O&M to do a Mumbai shining," *The Times of India*, 14 December 2006; "Maharashtra CM to review revamp of 12 markets and role of private players", *Economic Times*, 4 October 2007.
[33] Minutes of the Meeting for Concept Plan of Mumbai, Government of Maharashtra 1 September 2008.
[34] *Ibid*
[35] "India's Singapore? MMRDA to commission Concept Plan", *Indian Express*, 2 September 2008.

institutions with a range of technical expertise, community-based organizations, local associations, religious institutions, local business interests, petty and big developers and international donor agencies. Such coalitions primarily oppose the "non-participatory" processes of specific public-private partnership projects in housing, infrastructure, amenities, city planning and governance. Identifying themselves as "stakeholders outside" the official development planning process, they have assumed leadership roles to "intervene" on behalf of an "entire cross-section of the city" or "marginalized groups" or "affected groups". These coalitions access and engage the local and subnational (legislative, bureaucratic and judicial) state with the intention of evolving "public participatory processes" to ensure a platform from which they could air their concerns, needs and potential solutions. Examples are the city-level coalitions that intervened in the Dharavi Redevelopment Project, the "Remaking of Mumbai Federation" that created a counter model for the cluster approach to development, the Mumbai Development Plan group and Vote Mumbai Campaign that hope to inform the local and subnational state decision-making processes by influencing a city-wide audience. These coalitions are led by NGO groups headed by elite and middle-class activists who structure, mobilize and sustain collective action on "behalf of" those excluded or marginalized. Benjamin (2007) suggests that increasignly the corporatist forces have come to capture and co-opt the progressive language of these advocacy groups towards their own ends. Additionally, a sub-advocacy bloc that emerged within this comprises rights-based, confrontationist groups. Led by middle-class and elite activists focusing on issues of subordinated groups (women, ethnic minorities, poor, caste-based groups) they have mobilized grassroots energies to influence thinking on citizen rights to housing, livelihoods and difference in Mumbai by directly engaging the state government in its responsibility as the "provider" for Mumbai's citizens.

2. Since the 1990s, however, another pressure bloc in the form of locality-specific grassroots forms of mobilization can be observed in the City and suburbs. The institutionalization of "citizen participation" in urban governance has resulted in a neighborhood politics that emerges in the residential and recreational domain as opposed to

the workplace.[36] The dominant actors are primarily elite and upper-middle / middle-class residents. Identifying themselves as "citizens," they have assumed leadership roles to "self-govern" and protect the physical environments of their residential neighborhoods, thus exhibiting a strong sense of territoriality. They access and engage the local bureaucratic and subnational judicial state, with intentions of gaining inclusion into decision-making that affects their quality of life. This grassroots residence-based politics intervenes to check political populist excesses that support slums, manipulations of private-developer coalitions and macro state-led urban renewal projects in their neighborhoods. Examples of this form of resistance, accompanied by direct interventions, can be seen in the resident associations that have emerged across the City, western and eastern suburbs. They suggest "grassroots planning models" for micro-urban renewal, beautification, street improvements, through neighborhood plans, which adopt planning tools to envision a particular aesthetic in neighborhood space and the right to local self-governance. A fine-grained study of this domain reveals the presence of a multiplicity of neighborhood-specific actors who are not limited to elite and middle-class resident groups.

Grassroots Rescaling and Unsettling of a "World-Class" Telos: Three forms of resistance can be identified to statist-corporatist city-building processes. The first form of resistance comprises advocacy NGO groups that engage the bureaucratic state through "civilized" modes to include "public" participation in decision-making. The second form of resistance comprises rights - based NGOs who deploy confrontationist modes of engaging the legislative and bureaucratic state for the cause of those excluded as citizens i.e., the working class and urban poor. The third form of resistance includes suburban grassroots neighborhood actors that undertake experiments in "self-governance" and "community-led" micro- urban renewal projects. They engage the bureaucratic and legislative arms of the local state and seek redressal with the judiciary, when nothing else works. The possibility for the third group to adopt a vocal politics of dissent to state-led urban renewal emerges specifically from the conditionalities of good governance tied to "community-driven" urban renewal embedded in the JNNURM. Therefore, it is the national

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[36] Harriss (2007)

JNNURM that consciously integrates spatial restructuring through urban modernization and good governance via rescaling and democratization to trigger selective economic growth in Indian cities.

The governance conditionalities of the JNNURM have simultaneously led to the expansion and contraction of local democracy, a central argument that is detailed in chapter three of this thesis. In short, on the one hand, the millennial developmental state promises to democratize urban governance. It does so through rescaling urban governance to the municipal level to involve "citizens" through new spaces of political inclusion. In involving citizen's participation, it promises new forms of local democracy that would create citizens of subjects. On the other hand, the state's modernization project hopes to propel cities such as Mumbai into the global economic order. This imported vision for modernization has primarily been shaped by exclusive, elitist and technocratic forums. Additionally, this elitist modernization project threatens to displace and relocate so-called slum dwellers but promises to compensate them financially as part of an overall urban redevelopment program and to improve their quality of life, thus shoring up its political legitimacy. It is therefore, in the JNNURM, that urban renewal is propagated through governance conditionalities that create a third space of uncertainty and anxious participation across a variety of state and non-state actors. These overlapping processes of envisioning regulatory, institutional and spatial change in Mumbai and its metropolitan region through the elitist discourse of "participatory planning and governance" would be perceived differently by those governed and those who govern.

1.3   The Planning Puzzle

To understand this intersection of participatory planning and governance and its ensuing conflicts from various standpoints, I have attempted to write a brief historical overview of Mumbai's urban renewal and decentralization of urban governance since the 1990s. This narrative offers my understanding of how the discursive and organizational practices of the subnational state, corporate and civil society elites advance their hegemonic project of a "world-class" city. It also reveals the exclusion from this project of an entire cross-section of citizens outside the formal planning process. My intellectual project is therefore to understand urban

restructuring from the standpoint of this excluded or tactically included cross-section of the city's population. To unravel the notions of these local actors, I turn to a suburban Mumbai neighborhood, Juhu, to examine the complexity of grassroots claim-making practices for a toehold in suburban millennial Mumbai. To address this line of inquiry, I therefore ask the following over-arching question:

What are the political practices of engaging the state at the intersection of urban renewal and decentralization of governance (*Nagar Raj)* in millennial Mumbai?

To capture the complexities of urban citizenship practices that emerge at the intersection of urban governmentality and renewal, I further ask two interrelated sub-questions:

(a) How have locality-based efforts at participatory approaches to micro-urban renewal via neighborhood planning and governance changed community power structures in Juhu (Mumbai)? Specifically, how have they shaped state-society relations?

(b) How do groups of the urban poor in Juhu, residing in the urban village and *vastis*, respond to the evolving state-society relations in order to gain access to the new spaces of decision-making?

To address these questions, my research adopts an ethnographic case-study approach that traces the complex locality-based history of state mobilization taking place at the intersection of micro-urban renewal and decentralized local governance in Juhu, Mumbai.

1.4   Defining Key Concepts in the Thesis

Through the major events in Mumbai, identified earlier on in this chapter, the implications of the intersection of urban renewal and decentralized local governance in suburban Mumbai neighborhoods is palpable. The resistances to these reveal a cleavage in the project of governance and spatial restructuring emerging from the neighborhood. Located in this contextual backdrop, my primary interest is to understand the transforming ideology of the state in urban development and governance and how people engage this emergent statist ideology in the case of metropolitan Mumbai to claim their right to urban citizenship. To understand this process, I draw on Abu Lughod's (1996) and Holston's (2008) suggestion to historically and contextually locate specific events, actors and processes to understand why certain forms of development,

regulations and rules are settled in a particular way or tend to be persistent and entrenched within a specific context.

A Window on the Roots of State Mobilization in Mumbai: Historians have noted that in colonial cities such as Mumbai, educated business, professional elite and traditional merchant communities devised ways to engage colonial city-building projects and administrations as "citizens" rather than "colonial subjects". This engagement eventually led to the creation of tiny social and cultural infrastructures to enhance the life of Mumbai's residents.[37] Post-independence, colonial administrative systems were embraced to run a postcolonial civic administration that in Banerjee-Guha's (1995, 103) terms served the interests of the dominant elites to the exclusion of the majority of Mumbai's inhabitants. The engagement of ordinary city residents in urban affairs was relegated to a "suggestion/objection" window in the development planning process, which they barely knew how to access. Urban development decision-making considered an elite, technocratic domain often left the working classes to negotiate their priorities through the local elected representatives. The only political power in the hands of a majority of the city's inhabitants rested in the right to vote.

With economic liberalization also came a change in attitudes towards cities by the 1990s, through efforts to increase the proximity of those who govern with the governed. This decade saw the phenomenal rise of residents in urban neighborhoods comprising elite and middle-class groups, who had traditionally distanced themselves from electoral democracy or decision-making procedures of the bureaucratic state. However, through policies such as the JNNURM, one notices the convergence of rescaling governance with macro-urban renewal through governance reforms. If citizen engagement has varied and evolved in the course of transforming decision-making cultures, how then have state ideologies evolved since independence?

The Formation of the "Millennial Developmental" State in India: Chatterjee outlines the characteristic features of the postcolonial state in India as:

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[37] Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001), Dossal (2010).

The developmental state of the passive revolution after independence was the dominant formation claiming the moral high ground of modernity, national interest, equity, justice and efficiency. The big bourgeoisie, mired in the parochial ethos of traditional merchant communities, unwilling to break out of its protected monopolistic shell, was socially weak. Primitive accumulation was carried out with the full legal, fiscal, and coercive powers of the state-unapologetically, since the rational neutrality of decision-making organs such as the Planning Commission was supposed to ensure that such decisions of the state were always equitable and in the overall national interest…when (the state) took up populist welfare projects such as *garibi hatao* (poverty removal) it did so by proclaiming (its) role in independent and equitable national development, as steps in the transition to some sort of socialism (Chatterjee 2008, 91, brackets added).

Chatterjee further explains the shift in urban societal structures since the 1990s that deeply influenced statist ideology:

The composition of the capitalist class has transformed from landed elites who used electoral mobilization as a source of political power to the corporate capitalist class who have emerged due to the dismantling of the monopolistic license and import-substitution regime and the rise of the information technology industry in India. This class exercises control over central and state governments not through electoral mobilization of political parties or movements, but through the judiciary, bureaucratic-managerial class and independent regulatory bodies. A new field of competition has been generated where state governments woo domestic and foreign investments considering their interests primarily. Although the state continues to be a mediating apparatus for conflicting class interests, the urban middle-class [civil society] increasingly dismisses the state apparatus as corrupt and populist and accepts the professional and efficient commitment to growth and development of the corporate capitalist sector (Chatterjee 2008, 55-57).

Thus, Chatterjee (2008, 57-58) argues that in twenty-first century urban India, the "corporate capitalist class has risen to dominance within the state structure inferred from the virtual consensus among all major political parties about the priorities of rapid economic growth led by private investment". Chatterjee concurs that although the significance of exclusive capitalist growth is the dominant paradigm of economic growth and urbanization, ameliorative measures are planned for the dispossessed, to address the severity of urban change on the poor. Thus, he succinctly locates the decade of the 1990s as a significant turning point in the post-independence trajectory of India through revealing a transforming statist ideology. John and Deshpande (2008, 84) analyze this turning point as tokenistic attempts towards "structural adjustment with a human face" and Roy (2010, 89) conceptualizes it as a hegemonic paradigm of "millennial development". Roy's critical reading of *this paradigm* is the

"formation of a new political economy, a reworking of neo-liberalism to manage the social costs of neo-liberalism, or even as a strengthened configuration of market ideologies and practices that opens up untapped frontiers of dispossession and accumulation"(Roy: 2010, 88-89)

Roy therefore rejects the populist projection of millennial development or the post-Washington consensus, as a benevolent approach that is aimed at enhancing redistribution.

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In the specific case of India, the modern state reveals ambivalence in how it engages and mobilizes "citizens" and "populations" through the JNNURM hoping thereby to modernize cities and create citizens through good governance. Scholars have conceptualized this shift on the one hand as the "hegemonic moral sway of the corporate capitalist class over the urban-middle-class" (Chatterjee: 2008, 58), "empowerment of consumer-citizens" (Harriss: 2007, 2717) and "institutionalization of participatory citizenship through civic governmentality" (Roy: 2009, 159). On the other hand, the harsh implications of this shift for the urban working class and the poor compel the state to respond for reasons of political expediency. These are framed as a "re-assurance through palliative schemes" (John and Deshpande: 2008, 84), "community-led resettlement governed by the idea that displacement is inescapable to improve infrastructure and services in cities" (Roy: 2009, 177) and the inevitability of "accumulation by dispossession" (Banerjee-Guha: 2010, 198). These readings reveal the struggles of the national/subnational "millennial developmental" state to maintain its political legitimacy across the urban middle-classes and working class poor who increasingly perceive party politics as corrupt, and morally bankrupt.

Engaging the "Millennial Developmental state" in Mumbai: For a nuanced reading of the millennial developmental state and the responses of ordinary people, I adopt the suburban neighborhood as a unit of analysis. I will attempt a detailed re-interpretation of the popular perception of urban middle-classes as "active agents" and the working class poor as "passive recipients or beneficiaries" of the millennial developmental state. To do so, I re-locate the political agency across actors in contemporary suburban territorial space. The central arguments of this thesis are to understand: (1) how city residents or non-state actors respond to the promises/excesses of the millennial developmentalist state, (2) what are their strategies and tactics and (3) what are their practices and politics.

The conceptualization of the state in this thesis is anything but a monolithic entity. Drawing on the work of political theorists such as Chatterjee (1997, 2004, 2008), Brenner (2004) and Chiriyankandath (2008), the state is being read across its scalar dimensions of government (local, subnational and national), its structural dimensions (executive, judiciary and legislative) and the

nature of its formation rooted in heterogeneous time (colonial, postcolonial, neoliberal). Such a reading of "state-space" overlapped with the interactions of shifting standpoints of residents from a single suburban neighborhood in Mumbai reveals a multiplicity of ways that city residents have responded. This grounded understanding of a diversity of people's responses cannot be neatly or easily categorized in existing registers of "civil" and "political" society or the confrontationist modes of engaging the state such as: "civil society mobilizes against the state", whereas "the poor are left to politics"

The ethnographic case study in chapter three of this thesis details the shifting standpoints of residents, their modes of engaging and accessing the state and their micro-practices and politics. However what I wish to reiterate here is that rather than dwell on the celebratory rhetoric of the heroic "civil society" confronting the state, or mobilizing against it, my inquiry is located in exploring how millennial developmental statist ambivalence opens up new avenues for city residents also urban citizens to "engage the state" for their own ends. I locate my analytical inquiry in studying such a tactical and strategic mobilization of the state across its scalar, structural and temporal dimensions that embody shifting power, hierarchy and authority. Emerging from the contextual situatedness of my inquiry, I argue that city-resident actors, so-called civil and political society, reveal hybrid practices in the context of an ambivalent millennial developmental state that assumes the varied roles of facilitator, entrepreneur and provider. To tease this hybridism, I draw on Osborne and Rose's (1999) reading of the emergent logics of advanced liberal government that adopts market logic and re-conceptualizes an active role for citizens in their own governance. Osborne and Rose tease out the nature of this liberalized mode of government as:

> …new forms of government through freedom multiply the points at which the citizen has to play his or her part in the games that govern them. But, inescapably, they also multiply the junctures where these games are opened up to uncertainty and risk, and to contestation and redirection. The multiple projects of contemporary urban government work with presuppositions about urban citizenship in terms of activity and obligation, entrepreneurship and allegiance, in which rights in the city are as much about duties as they are about entitlements. Each tries to govern through a certain kind of citizenship game. Each, by virtue of its dependence on an active practice of citizenship, opens the possibilities for certain agonism. […] Strategies of governing through citizenship are inescapably open and modifiable because what they demand of citizens may be refused, or reversed and redirected as a demand from citizens for a modification of the games that govern them, and through which they are supposed to govern themselves (Osborne and Rose 1999, 752).

I locate my inquiry in Osborne and Rose's readings to tease out the ambivalence in urban governance mechanisms in millennial Mumbai from the standpoint of those who are governed. Twenty-first century suburban governance in Mumbai reveals a multiplicity of active citizens and new modes of engaging the state as a "facilitator" and "entrepreneur" as opposed to falling back only on older forms of mobilizing *against* the state as "provider". My line of inquiry is thus located in the emergent relationships that connect a multiplicity of city residents and the 21st century millennial developmental state in new notions of urban citizenship. The literature on India's urban governance suggests that the new conceptualizations around citizenship are embedded in a neoliberal market logic (consumer-citizen, new middle-class) and a reformist state (Baviskar: 2003, Fernandes: 2006, Harriss: 2007, Baud et. al: 2008, Chatterjee: 2004, 2008, John and Deshpande: 2008, Roy: 2009, Coelho et. al: 2010). A small subset of scholarship reveals challenges to such conceptualizations of urban citizenship through locating differentiated subaltern agency and its role in politicizing urban governmentality through diverse citizenship practices (Appadurai: 2001, Chatterjee: 2004, Benjamin: 2007, Coelho and Venkat: 2009). I attempt to locate the struggles of a diversity of entrepreneurial agents with complex collaborations and networks in Mumbai working within, in-between and outside such conceptualizations of urban citizenship. How these active citizens appropriate the market logic of citizenship in ambiguous ways reveal differentiated levels of submission to market logics through self-regulation and acceptance of the duties of citizenship on one hand, and re-visiting the need for stronger role for government in city-building processes on the other. Thus, adopting Chatterjee's (2004) seminal reading on the "politicization of governmentality embedded in the politics of the governed", I focus on the social and politicized practices of city residents as increasingly active, entrepreneurial agents working towards engaging the state at the intersection of urban renewal and decentralization in suburban millennial Mumbai.

1.5   Rationale for Selecting Juhu as the Case Study Area

To develop a fine-grained reading of this state mobilization at the intersection of urban renewal and decentralization in 21st century Mumbai, I now turn to the case-study area. Juhu[38] is an elite

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[38] The K west ward and electoral ward level details of Juhu are provided in the next section.

suburban Mumbai neighborhood with approximately 20% of its residents living in self-built housing and urban villages. Administratively defined as an electoral ward, this neighborhood becomes the primary unit of analysis in my study. Although located in suburban Mumbai's administrative ward K (West), Juhu, has been at the forefront of resident-led civic activism efforts since the mid-1990s.[39] In the 2007 municipal election, a tiny political experiment called Vote Juhu[40] got the first-ever "Citizens-Consensus Corporator" elected to municipal office in India. This marked a new wave of residence-based activism as neighborhood actors stepped into the domain of electoral democracy as political players (Zerah: 2007).[41] The mainstream media has celebrated this moment and the vociferous efforts of Juhu's elite and middle-class residents as "reclaimers".[42]

Concurrent with this celebratory rhetoric of "citizen power", Juhu has witnessed demolition drives along the *Irla Nallah*, prompted by what I argue is a form of "neighborhood actor-driven" micro-urban renewal. Since 2008, the *Irla Nallah* lands, densely settled with self-built housing or *vastis* and urban villages developed respectively by in-migrants and original settlers, are being steadily "reclaimed" for elite and middle-class recreational use, high-income housing or commercial uses. My interest in engaging with Juhu emerges from a convergence of two redevelopment processes, one that emerges from city-based processes and another that is locality-driven. The ongoing local state-led *Irla Nallah* redevelopment project is framed in terms

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[39] As of 2006, a study conducted by the S.P. Jain Institute of Management studies reveals that K West ward has the highest concentration of ALMs (63) in Mumbai. See http://www.karmayog.com/cleanliness/almreport.htm See "Burb thrives on people power", *The Times of India*, 24 March 2012, details the intensive use of Public Interest litigation by elite and middle-class resident groups against the use of Transfer of Development Rights in the suburbs, standard rent provision in the Rent Control Act, the Juhu Beach restoration, attempts by private developer-led coalitions to usurp public lands earmarked for recreation and the elevated Metro-Rail Project that threatens to disrupt the planned nature of Juhu.

[40] Modeled on the Model *Nagar Raj* concept this experiment emerged from the Vote Mumbai campaign– a campaign for systemic reforms in local governance– initiated by *Loksatta* and *Janaagraha* that eventually led to the creation of a Maharashtra *Nagar Raj* Bill (2009). It translated into the Vote Juhu Campaign, in the 2007 Mumbai municipal elections where existing Advanced Locality Management groups formed Area *Sabhas* as recommended in the Model *Nagar Raj* Bill and shortlisted a candidate to contest the municipal elections against political parties.

[41] See, "People waiting for clean politics", *The Hindu*, 8 February, 2007.

[42] "Residents unite to save Juhu", *The Times of India*, 6 February 2005; "Reclaiming Beaches and Open Spaces", *The Times of India*, 21 August 2010; "Winning back Juhu but battle to save beach never ends", *The Times of India*, 24 March 2012; "You can take a walk in Juhu woods soon", *The Times of India*, 2 July 2012.

of augmenting storm-water infrastructure. "Neighborhood actor-driven" micro-urban renewal expanded its scope to include ecological restoration of the water system. Cumulatively these efforts have led to displacements and dispossession of citizens from the lands they consolidated over a period of thirty years. The implications of these processes of spatial and institutional restructuring for the urban poor were reinforced during my preliminary field visits to Juhu following the demolition drives in 2008-2009 and continuing field visits in the summers of 2010 and 2011.

The most recent visits included meetings with the leaders from *vastis* and the urban village who invited me to understand closely their efforts to negotiate both state-led and neighborhood-driven processes of urban spatial change and governance. These conversations signaled "other" stories of survival and patience that the mainstream media and locality-based civic activist groups failed to acknowledge. Their efforts since the mid-1990s to survive dispossession from prime neighborhood lands and displacement to the eastern City limits point to specific discursive and organizational practices embedded in Juhu's *vastis* and urban village. This study has therefore become an effort to sketch a "view from the ground" across the standpoints of major resident groups in Juhu living in self-owned private apartments and bungalows, *vastis* and the urban village. This study focuses on the practices of the "invisible" citizens of Mumbai and residents of Juhu, living in five *vastis* and an urban village, identified in this study, whose stories of struggling to belong in Juhu need to be recognized and voiced.

Thus, Juhu becomes a significant case study to understand the implications of the intersection of experiments in local democracy and "community-driven urban renewal from the standpoint of those traditionally excluded or only tactically included citizens living in *vastis* and the urban village. Being the only neighborhood to "successfully" adopt and implement the *Nagar Raj* concept in 2007 and simultaneously witnessing demolition drives of self-built habitats since 2008, Juhu provides a glimpse of suburban change in millennial Mumbai. The celebratory and populist rhetoric around "participatory governance and planning" driven by elite and middle-class groups and civil society elites attempts to regulate the domain of urban citizenship. However, the contradictions and conflicts emerging on the ground in the case of Juhu signal the

need for a fine-grained reading of these experiments and their implications to understand the politics of urban citizenship as viewed from the *vastis* and urban village in Juhu.

1.6   Situating Juhu in K West, Mumbai

In this section, I locate the suburban neighborhood of Juhu in Greater Mumbai. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) administers the city of Greater Mumbai (**refer Figure 1-7**). Its jurisdiction includes the island city and the suburban district of Mumbai. Administratively, Mumbai comprises 24 municipal wards and 227 electoral wards. Each Municipal ward comprises one or more electoral wards.

Mumbai	
Area	437.71 sq.km
Population	12 million
Density	27000 per sq. km..

K West Ward	
Area	23.28 sq.km
Population	637,042
Electoral Wards	13 nos.

Juhu	Electoral Ward 63
Area	2 sq.km
Population	50, 982
Neighborhoods	5

Figure 1-7: Locating K West Ward and Juhu in Greater Mumbai

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Juhu is located in the relatively large K West Ward (**refer Figure 1-8**) in the suburban district of Greater Mumbai. Spread across an area of 23.28 sq.kms, K West has an approximate population of 637,042.[43] Geographically, it is bounded by the Arabian Sea to the west, the *Malad* Creek and *Oshiwara* River to the north, the western railway line to the east and the *Milan* subway to the south. Historically, this ward was characterized by *koliwada*[44] settlements (old fishing villages) namely *Taragaon*, Juhu (*Gundaoli*), *Vesave* and *Madh* as well as *gaothans*[45] (agrarian villages) such as *Irla*, *Parle, Bamanwada, Sahar*, *Marol, Chakala, Oshiware* and *Ambivali*. Currently the ward includes the localities of Juhu, Vile Parle, Andheri, Jogeshwari, Versova, Madh and Marol. It has four major *nallahs* running through its area namely *Rasraj, Irla, Mogra* and Indian Oil *Nagar Nallah*. In 1964, the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC)[46] developed a broad land use plan for Greater Bombay, including the K West Ward. In the city gazetteer, Chaudhari (1987) suggests that the north consisted of old fishing settlements, town planning schemes[47], squatter colonies near the archaeological ruins of *Jogeshwari* caves and private residential apartments. The eastern areas comprised industrial clusters of mixed-use developments with industries and few office buildings while the southern areas included mixed-use areas, middle-class residential areas, public amenities and commercial activities. The western areas had middle- and high-income residential developments, bungalows, hotels and institutional buildings. Presently, it comprises thirteen electoral wards (nos. 53-65) (**Figure 1-9**) including Juhu, called electoral ward 63.

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[43] Population figures are sourced from the state and municipal electoral census website (2012) http://mahasec.com/marathi/html/result_council.asp, and http://www.mcgmelection.org/prabhag_rachana_details.asp?70.

[44]*Koliwada* is a fishing village characterized by low-rise, high density housing on the coastal edge.

[45] A *gaothan* is a former agrarian village characterized by low-rise, high density housing.

[46] The Bombay Municipal Corporation established under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, of 1888, is responsible for the civic infrastructure and administration of the city and suburbs of Bombay. Since 1995 it is referred to as the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, after the *Shiv Sena* political party changed the name of Bombay to Mumbai. .

[47] The concept of Town Planning Scheme owes its genesis to planning legislation arising out of the Improvement Trust Model of development in British colonial cities during the early 20th century. The concerns of public health arising from the outbreak of fires and epidemics such as the plague led to the need for opening up congested areas in Indian cities, improving drainage and sanitation facilities, providing open spaces, and opening up communications. Improvement Trusts were created in several United Provinces in India. The Presidencies of Bombay and Calcutta Provinces were the first to adopt this model.

Figure 1-8 Localities in K West Ward (1964)   **Figure 1-9 Electoral Wards in K West (2007)**

Located in the western part of K West Ward, electoral Ward 63 or Juhu is spread over an area of 2 sq.kms with a population of 50,982 people.[48] Contemporary Juhu is a suburb characterized by predominantly affluent resident groups (approximately 80% demographic of elite and middle-class residents) living in bungalows, town planning schemes, private co-operative housing societies, and luxury multi-storied apartments.[49] The remaining population (approximately 20%), includes former indigenous communities living in *gaothans* and *koliwadas* (referred to as urban villages) and migrant communities living in incrementally settled *vastis* along the *Irla Nallah*.[50] This demographic ratio is unusual compared to other electoral wards in K West where the opposite is true.[51] The physical fabric of Juhu comprises five significant and very different neighborhood areas (**refer Figure 1-10**):

(a) Old Juhu, comprising *gaothans* or two urban villages*,* the *bazaar,* church and school complex, Hindu and Jain temples, waterfront resort /hotels and private beachfront bungalow developments,

(b) *Ruia* Park*,* comprising one urban village, hotels, military lands and private beachfront bungalows,

(c) Two town planning schemes *Gulmohar* and the Juhu -Vile Parle Development Scheme, and three *vastis* along the *Irla nallah*,

(d) *Irla* village, a former agrarian village, comprised of a local popular market area, educational institutions, slum redevelopment schemes, private housing societies, a public-sector housing complex and the highest density of *vastis* and *chawls* in Juhu.*[52]*

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[48]Juhu or ward 63 constituency is referred to as *Bhakti Vedanta Mandir-* Cooper Hospital by the state election commission. Population figures are sourced from the state and municipal electoral census website (2012) http://mahasec.com/marathi/html/result_council.asp, and http://www.mcgmelection.org/prabhag_rachana_details.asp?70.

[49] Interview, Elected representative D, 22 August 2011.

[50]*Ibid*

[51] Zerah (2007, 66) suggests that "redrawing the (electoral) ward boundary prior to the 2007 municipal elections effectively reduced slum territories to only 20% in ward 63, as against the average figure of more than 50% of Mumbai's population living in slums.

[52]A *chawl* is a type of building constructed in the early 20th century to house in-migrants to Mumbai who sought employment in the textile mill economy. It comprised of four to five stories high with 10 to 20 tenements (*kholis***)**, on each floor. A tenement consisted of one all purpose room that functioned both as a living and sleeping space, and a kitchen that served as a dining area and offered some degree of privacy.

Figure 1-10 Juhu's Neighborhoods and the *Irla Nallah*

Figure 1-11 Multi-Storied Luxury Apartments (JVPD)

Figure 1-12 Transit Camp Housing along the *Irla Nallah*

Figure 1-13 Adopted Recreational Space, Old Juhu

Figure 1-14 Slum Redevelopment for Project-Affected Families from the *Irla Nallah*

Figure 1-15 Club Millennium Transect *Irla Nallah* **Cutting Across Gulmohar Scheme.**

Figure 1-16 Ruia Park Transect: *Irla Nallah* **Meets the Arabian Sea**

Figure Source: All photographs taken by the Author during fieldwork.

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In addition to these neighborhoods, Juhu has a beach strip, the *Irla Nallah*- a creek transformed into an open drain, mangroves, and central government owned military land. *Irla Nallah* (open drain) located partially in Juhu derives its name from the agrarian *gaothans* that were located on its path. Transformed through reclamation and re-alignment from 1960 to the present, it flows from the east (in Andheri) and splits into a southward stream before meeting the Arabian Sea at Juhu. The *nallah* measures 4.35 km in length and its width varies from 6-10 meters. The lands abutting the *Irla Nallah* are under the ownership of the Collector, Maharashtra state government and are maintained by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. Land use along the *nallah* is composed of dense *vastis* tucked away behind commercial and institutional buildings that conceal them. The narrow, tight strip of land adjacent to the *Irla Nallah*, approximately ten meters wide on either side, includes several incrementally consolidated *vastis* along its length. I have broadly identified three transects along the length of the *Irla Nallah* based on how its physical course intersects the neighborhoods in Juhu:

(a) the *Irla* transect, comprises four *vastis*, *chawls* from *Irla* village, private apartment buildings, educational and government institutions;

(b) the Club Millennium transect, sandwiched between the *Gulmohar* and JVPD developments, including three *vastis* (**refer Figure 1- 15**) and

(c) the *Ruia* Park transect flanked by military lands along one edge comprises - one urban village, migrant self-built habitats, open recreational plots and residential and educational developments of electoral ward 59 (*Versova*) (**refer Figure 1-16**). I focus on five *vastis* and an urban village along the *Irla Nallah* that faced demolition of self-built housing and displacement of families to the municipal limits of the City, as a result of the *Irla Nallah* widening project (2008) undertaken by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. To understand the processes that led to demolition for the economically weaker groups in Juhu, I trace its locality-based histories of urban development since the late nineteenth century.

In the next chapter, I revisit the scholarship on urban governance and urban renewal in addition to outlining the analytical framework and methods for this study.

Chapter 2: Research Design
Situating the Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks

2.1   Summarizing the Existing Literature on Urban Governance and Urban Renewal

Since the early-1990's, international development organizations have mainstreamed the need for political decentralization to urban local government and a concurrent modernization of cities as "engines of economic growth" in the "Global South".[53] The economic and governance reforms in urban India since the 1990's have largely been influenced by this ideology.

2.1.1   Millennial Development through Decentralization in the Global South.

In the context of liberalization of economic and governance reforms in the "Global South", there is a growing debate on the:

> …reducing role of the state and the increasing importance of the market in providing goods and services to citizens…the shifting importance of different levels of government, with the role of the national government being reduced vs-a-vs that of local government on the one hand and international governing institutions on the other (Baud and Post: 2002; Pierre and Peters: 2000) [Baud and de Wit: 2008, 3].

Drawing from Brenner and Theodore (2002), Banerjee-Guha locates the emergence of the new global order and describes its economic system:

> "Post the 1970's the world capitalist system became increasingly neoliberalized...taking a dominant form impacting socio-economic spaces and developmental systems of the Global South....a multi-scalar and multi-faceted framework, characterized by universal backtracking of the welfare state, dismantling of institutional constraints upon marketization, increased commodifcation, shrinking of jobs, hyper-exploitation of workers, downgrading of democratic rights earned through long drawn struggles and a tremendous economic uncertainty…a new kind of state intervention with a larger entrepreneurial capacity was brought in to roll (out) new forms of governance that suited a market-driven globalizing economy"(Banerjee-Guha: 2010, 1).

Baud and de Wit (2008, 11) highlight the ensuing partnership debate borne from the "shift of the government's role as the direct provider of public services to its role as the enabler of other parties in providing services". Some scholars suggest that despite problems with capacities at lower levels of government and the question of funds the interest in promoting decentralization of urban governance by national government is connected to globalization that provides opportunities for decision-making beyond the state through consolidation of local identities and

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[53] Beard et al. (2008).

rescaling of governance to lower levels of government (Brenner: 2004). Swyngedouw (2005) cautions us with regard to "governance beyond the state" that advocates lean bureaucracies through inclusion of non-state actors in partnerships and multi-stakeholder arrangements. He suggests although such forms of governance are discursively inclusive, transparent and accountable, in practice they could become contested and narrow due to context dependent power structures.[54] Scholars suggest two forms of decentralization, administrative and political. [55] Through empirical evidence Beard et al. (2008, 7) suggest that "political decentralization that involves devolution or democratic decentralization makes possible the inclusion of a variety of non-state actors such as organized civil society groups, grassroots activism and women, who use a combination of invited and invented spaces to transform their role into something significant than providing cheap labor to predetermined projects that pretend to be participatory". Democratic decentralization has also been described as a highly "contested world of politics and power that involves the process of transfer of tasks and funds that is power" (Eaton: 2001 quoted in Baud and de Wit: 2008, 10).

2.1.2   Urban India's 21st Century Millennial Development Paradigm.

In the case of urban governance reforms in India[56] since the late 1980s, we observe national government efforts at rescaling governance towards localization (Brenner: 2004) involving recognition of municipal governance as a third tier of government, the efforts at administrative and fiscal decentralization to local government (Baud and de Wit: 2008), and institutionalization of citizen participation via new invited and invented spaces (Baud and de Wit: 2008; Beard et al:

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[54] *Ibid*

[55] Beard et al. define "administrative decentralization as the hierarchy and functional distribution of powers and function between central and non-central government units (Cohen and Peterson 1999: 23). It can entail either deconcentration, which moves the central government offices and administrative units to more localized government bodies (e.g. regional, provincial and/or municipal bodies) (Cohen and Peterson 1996). It can entail devolution which is a more extensive transfer of authority and responsibility to local government bodies. Political decentralization attempts to build a democratic culture with a given polity-it is the transfer of political power to local government bodies and civil society organizations, and the inclusion of popular participation in governance and planning" (Beard et al.: 2008, 3-4).

[56] The Indian state is described as a liberal-democratic nation-state which governs its people through representative form of government. The sovereignty of the postcolonial state is exercised through its executive, legislature and judiciary across various scales of governance i.e., national, state and municipal. In this study my conceptualization of the state is that of a heterogeneous entity.

2008). The late 20th century project of decentralization of urban governance in India marks an important milestone in (urban) state-society relations. Tracing the implication of economic and governance re-structuring processes since the 1990's, in the context of India's political economy of reform, political theorist Partha Chatterjee hints at a shift in the nature of governmental technologies for "looking after" populations and the transformation of societal structures from a class-coalition-based dominance post-independence. Thus Chatterjee argues that in India the

> Corporate capitalist class has risen to dominance within the state structure inferred from the virtual consensus among all major political parties about the priorities of rapid economic growth led by private investment, both domestic and foreign. It has also achieved moral-political hegemony over the urban middle-classes (Chatterjee: 2008, 57).

Banerjee-Guha (2010) suggests that Indian cities are being pushed into the fray of becoming "world-class" to function as nodes of global capital. This telos is being settled by "a unified vision of modernization of cities, accompanied with large-scale gentrification of the urban space, form and recasting of the structures of urban governance" (Banerjee-Guha: 2010, 12).

2.2 Decentralization of Urban Governance in Indian Cities

The existing literature on decentralization of governance in Indian cities reveals two distinct strands of thought. One strand of this literature focuses on the unintended consequences of decentralization of governance suggesting the empowerment of middle-class actors and civic activism, while the other strand focuses on illuminating the agency and appropriation of those socially marginalized or excluded in the process of decentralizing urban governance.

2.2.1 Emergence of "Middle-Class" Actors

The first line of inquiry suggests that national governance reform policies[57] recognized a need for pluralist approaches in governance to create "new invited spaces"[58] (Beard et al.: 2008; Baud et al.: 2008). According to this scholarship a neoliberal regime redefines the citizen as a consumer-

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[57] The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (74th CAA), 1993, Public Disclosure Law, 2005, and Community Participation Law (CPL) or *Nagar Raj* Bill, 2008.

[58] These spaces were institutionalized in Mumbai through the formation of Advanced Locality Management (ALM) Groups and Municipal Ward Committees. The *Nagar Raj* Bill, 2008, envisioned further political decentralization by "institutionalizing citizen participation" in certain municipal functions and the creation of Area Committees (*Shetra Sabhas*) creating 'new spaces of political inclusion' at the neighborhood level.

citizen whose well-being is measured through the "quality of life" enjoyed. (Beard et al.: 2008; Baud et al.: 2008; Harriss: 2007).) Through multi-stakeholder arrangements these spaces include non-state actors (civil society organizations such as NGOs, ALM groups, corporate sector organizations, technocratic experts, private service providers) to play a role in municipal governance and development planning with the aim of improving the quality of life for cities and citizens. India's elite civil society organization leaders supported these shifts by suggesting that democracy has to ripple out of its citizens not trickle down to them.

Critical studies on democratization of governance processes in urban India (e.g. urban neighborhood politics and empowerment) suggest that envisioned political decentralization through "invited spaces" has led to many unintended outcomes. The literature on urban governance has documented these outcomes as, "the rise of middle-class activism in urban neighborhoods excluding the urban poor" (Chakrabarti: 2007) and a "new politics of empowerment for urban middle-class groups that forge new relationships between the urban middle-class, private capital and the post-liberalizing state that exclude the poor" (Harriss: 2007). Few scholars read this moment as an opportunity for middle-class residents to become political actors and create elitist forms of local democracy" (Zerah: 2007) and a critique of the "limits to middle-class collective action in furthering local democracy" (Kamat and Venkat: 2008). Other suggest "the creation of invited spaces by the state for the participation of middle-class households and private service providers in multi-actor arrangements manifesting double standards in basic urban service delivery for middle and high-income groups versus low- income groups" (Baud et al. : 2008) and the "limits of the politics of inclusion of the urban poor, practiced by elite civil society organizations in the face of urban re-structuring processes fuelled by bourgeois aspirations for the city" (Roy: 2009). In short, these studies speak to the middle-class dominance of the new spaces of political inclusion, formation of elitist forms of local democracy, inherent contradictions in the celebratory rhetoric of inclusion and participation, limitations of participatory governance reforms and the exclusion of socio-economically marginalized social groups from these spaces and processes of decision making. Such broad brushed renderings of the latter group render them as "passive recipients" of ensuing power struggles and policy outcomes.

These analytical readings are useful to understand the new politics of empowerment as it plays out in urban neighborhoods. However they reveal only one protagonist in the story i.e., the middle-class. Suburban neighborhoods are anything but homogeneous entities. They contain heterogeneous social groups. Since the new politics emerges from the residential and recreational domain it is critical to understand the multiplicity and heterogeneity of locality-specific social groups who are involved in or engaged in negotiating this new politics. An understanding of the actors, micro-processes and social/political practices are critical to understand the expansion and erosion of urban citizenship practices that are fuelled by this new politics. Such an ethnographic, grounded and comparative approach to study neighborhood actors, their political consciousness and agency would provide nuanced readings of the terrain of the new urban neighborhood politics. However these explorations would remain discursive unless overlapped on to physical urban space in heterogeneous time, which is the ground zero of claim-making practices in suburban neighborhood. This requires understanding the entanglement of institutional and socio-spatial re-structuring in a context-specific case.

2.2.2   Itineraries of Recognition

The second line of inquiry develops "itineraries of recognition that seek to confer visibility and voice to the subaltern subject" (Roy: 2011, 311). Such scholarship reveals subaltern agency of socio-economically marginalized groups by illuminating "their appropriation of the discourses of the elite to create forms of counter-governmentality" via coalitions with civil society organizations that counter the corrupt political / bureaucratic machinery of the state (Appadurai: 2001), suggest "the growth of paralegal arrangements that benefit populations whose habitation or livelihood exists on the other side of legality and their politicization of governmentality (Chatterjee: 2004) and "occupancy urbanism that unevenly subverts the politics of the elite and the politics of the bureaucratic system in negotiating their claims to the city through linkages in local government" (Benjamin: 2000, 2007). More recent research, critical of binary distinctions between civil and political society, suggests that there exists an overlap between these in the contests for urban citizenship (Holston: 2008; Coelho and Venkat: 2009). Coelho and Venkat (2009) suggest that overlaps between civil and political society exist in the ways they engage

both the political sphere (of electoral democracy) and civic associational forms (of organized civil society) to claim citizenship. Very little scholarship focuses empirically on the actors comprising heterogeneous and multiple social groups in urban/suburban neighborhoods and the modes through which they respond, challenge, support or resist the new neighborhood politics and the neoliberal entrepreneurial/disciplinary state. My research intends to address these cleavages that emerge at the intersection of the socio-spatial and institutional re-structuring processes in millennial suburban Mumbai.

2.3   Urban Socio-Spatial Re-Structuring in Indian Cities

A second body of literature focuses on the shift in the programs and policies of the national and subnational state in modernizing urban space since the 1990s through planned urban renewal. Existing scholarship on urban renewal characterizes the shift in India's urban development paradigm as a thrust towards privatization, deregulation of land use and competitive strategies that involved state withdrawal from social welfare measures resulting in displacement, dispossession, impoverishment and increasing marginalization of low-income urban groups (Das: 1995; Baviskar: 2003; Banerjee-Guha: 2002, 2010; Zerah: 2007; Benjamin: 2000; Roy: 2009).

Banerjee-Guha's (2010) political economy perspective of twenty-first century economic restructuring in Indian cities focuses on the investments in the built environment (as opposed to production) to create a "new urbanism" that drives speculation and the growth of the real estate sector. She argues in the case of Mumbai that "corporatization of city space" (Banerjee-Guha: 2010, 211) for a "modern, homogenized urban society" (Banerjee-Guha: 2010, 205) has led to the production of urban space characterized by "control of socially privileged groups and intense conflict leading to contradictory/ competitive urban landscapes" (Banerjee-Guha: 2010, 205). She emphatically suggests that planning is implicated in fuelling indiscriminate "market-oriented economic growth and settling elitist spaces of consumption" (Banerjee-Guha: 2010, 205) in the production of "revanchist urbanism" in Mumbai.[59] Chatterjee conceptualizes the urban modernization process since the 1990s as the "new global bourgeois vision of twenty-first

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[59] (Banerjee-Guha: 2010, 221).

century modernity for Indian cities" (Chatterjee: 2004, 144). He suggests that although the nationalist elite "produced little fundamental thinking about the desired Indian city of the future" (*Ibid*, 140) the subsequent crisis of the industrialization process that led to deterioration of urban environments created the necessary preconditions for a different urban imaginary.   The circulation of images of the "post-industrial global metropolis" (*Ibid*, 143) dominated by "finance and a host of producer services" (*Ibid*, 142) has deeply influenced ideas of how the city ought to be amongst the urban middle-classes in India. Chatterjee describes this process of urban spatial restructuring as:

> Manufacturing industries are being moved out beyond the city limits, squatters and encroachers are being evicted, property and tenancy laws are being rewritten to enable market forces to rapidly convert [..] sections of the old city into high value commercial and residential districts (Chatterjee: 2004, 144).

In short Chatterjee (2004) and Baviskar (2003) locate the clamour of "urban bourgeois citizen" groups right to healthy and planned urban environments through reinforcing the "rule of law". Roy complicates the narrative on urban change through conceptualizing the contradictory politics of the twenty-first century bourgeois Indian city "as a paradoxical space that is shaped simultaneously by *grassroots citizenship* powered by civil society energies and deepening forms of inequality through displacements and entrenchment of segregations that territorialize urban identities" (Roy: 2009, 159). She describes the processes of producing urban space in the twenty-first century bourgeois city as a "violent frontier of urban renewal and redevelopment" that enables capitalist accumulation (*Ibid*, 162).

The ongoing urban renewal in Indian cities is conceptualized as a rational conscious planning regime rooted in a neo-liberal state. Urban renewal and redevelopment processes have been read through the lens of "gentrification" (Banerjee-Guha: 2002), "bourgeois environmentalism" (Baviskar: 2003), and "new global bourgeois visions of twenty-first century modernity" (Chatterjee: 2004). These processes have led to "unequal trade-offs between differing objectives" (Zerah: 2007), the "corporatization of decision-making circuits producing urban space that excludes pro-poor economic activity" (Benjamin: 2000) and the "violence of community-led resettlement at the frontier of urban redevelopment and grassroots activism" (Roy: 2009). Banerjee-Guha (2010) argues that multiple complex processes of urban renewal embody the logic of "accumulation by dispossession". These processes, however, bring forth the issue of

institutional reforms as a form of resistance that might enable the urban poor address social justice in gaining a right to the city. Benjamin (2010), however, suggests that an "opaque politics and a messy political process" have the possibility to subvert the voices of powerful and vocal elite groups that push forth institutional reforms through a language of transparency.

In the specific case of urban renewal processes in Mumbai, since the 1990's, scholars and activists identify the instrumental role of international development agencies and financial institutions such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, USAID and the International Monetary Fund in mainstreaming privatization-based policies that have shaped multiple national and state government level policies and programs. In policy circles, these are termed as the LPG reforms, i.e., Liberalization-Privatization and Globalization reforms.[60] Bhagat and Sita (2010) trace Mumbai's spatial transformations emerging out of economic restructuring processes such as de-industrialization in the 1980's and economic liberalization:

> Mumbai experienced significant changes in its economic and spatial structure since the 1990's. Having evolved as a colonial port city, by 1931, it had become established as an industrial centre with the textile industry dominating its economy. Migration induced by employment opportunities played an important role in the growth of the city. Since the population was concentrated in the core area that was characterized by multifunctional uses, place of work and residence were in close proximity for a majority of the workers. This was probably necessitated due to intra-urban transport not being developed. By 1961, a tremendous growth in population necessitated the incorporation of the suburbs, so that the suburbanization process gained momentum. On the other hand, Mumbai's position as a major industrial centre got strengthened. There was diversification of the industrial base and chemical, mechanical and other industries gained importance. By the 1990's the economic base of Mumbai changed; services had emerged as a major economic activity in addition to industry and trade. Among the industries, textiles had declined in importance (Bhagat and Sita: 2010, 237).

The re-conceptualization of the role of cities in the national economy led to the evolution of a revised Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Plan (1996-2011) by elite para-statal agencies. The thrust of the plan hinged on new growth management strategies that suggested key cities could be retro-fitted to serve a new role in the global economic order through specific investments in infrastructures. In the case of Mumbai, the Regional Plan envisioned:

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[60] Revisions to the Development Control Regulations (DCR) by Mumbai's Municipal government were developed in coordination with the state government policies. Mumbai saw unprecedented redevelopment projects unfold through DCR (58) Redevelopment of Textile Mill Lands in the inner city, DCR 33 (7) and (10) Redevelopment and reconstruction of Cessed buildings in the inner city and DCR 33 (9) Redevelopment of Slums. In addition the legislation of a heritage policy in 1995 hoped to beautify, protect and preserve colonial architectural and cultural heritage in the island City as tourist attractions.

With its premier position as the country's financial capital, its leadership in the country's international trade, its strategic location with respect to the global market centers, and its ability to provide wide range of technical, professional and business services; Greater Mumbai has the potential to emerge as an international city, fostering growth of financial and business services, and hi-tech, export-oriented industries. Basic to such development is the provision of high quality infrastructure - telecommunication and transport, office complexes, housing, and good living environment. This cannot be achieved through sole reliance on public investment, regulations, and controls. It calls for an approach that would facilitate increased investment by private sector in infrastructure and other developments; enable appropriate structural changes in the Regional economy; and permit adoption of land use policies that respond to market potential (GoM, Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Plan: 1996, i).

Das (1995) suggests how revisions to the Development Control Regulation (DCR) was another move by the state government to release large swathes of industrial land that cotton textile mills and working-class housing occupied in the inner City. These lands were being opened out for redevelopment into residential, commercial and recreational purposes that directly affected the lives and livelihoods of thousands of textile mill workers. The subaltern historian Gyan Prakash marks the closure of the textile mills and deindustrialization processes in Mumbai as a dismantling of working-class politics in Mumbai. He writes:

Where once the city hummed to the rhythm of cotton mills and docks now there was the cacophony of the post-industrial megalopolis. State government policies and urban government pushed Mumbai under siege of imperiled spatial mutations and occupations by the uncivil masses, a wasteland of broken modernist dreams (Prakash: 2010, 11).

The intense process of spatial re-structuring through privatization of the housing policy,[61] creation of new mixed-use enclaves of affluence and exclusion, redevelopment of "slum" settlements, inner-city and suburban housing and mega-infrastructure projects[62] have resulted in ad-hoc displacement of the working class and urban poor to the margins, deepening inequalities in urban society and fragmenting urban space into territorial units. In short, this literature emphasizes the nature of urban socio-spatial re-structuring as a top-down hegemonic process.

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[61] Housing activists suggest that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were instrumental in the privatization thrust that influenced and shaped multiple policies and programs at the national and state government level. This trajectory coincides in Mumbai with private sector efforts to scrap the Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act (ULCRA 1976), the creation of Slum Redevelopment as opposed to Slum upgradation, relaxation of FSI (Floor Space Index) and initiation of TDR (Transfer of Development Rights) norms. In 2007, the Maharashtra state government scrapped ULCRA, to implement land reforms under the National urban renewal mission (2005).

[62] The Maharashtra government, Government of India and World Bank funded MUTP-MUIP (2004) project is the first mega-infrastructure project initiated to augment transportation infrastructure as part of Mumbai's transformation. It involved a massive demolition drive in 2004 that was dubbed Operation Shanghai by the media.

Driven by a proactive neoliberal state in partnership with corporate elite and international development organizations, a singular "world-class" telos was sketched for Mumbai. Such a "world-class" status would improve Mumbai's status in the global economic order. While these narratives render the "urban poor" as "passive recipients" of planning policy outcomes, a number of Indian scholars (Benjamin: 2007, 2010; Appadurai: 2001; Chatterjee: 2004; Coelho and Venkat: 2009; Roy: 2009) throw light on the specific practices and politics of traditionally disadvantaged actors in engaging the local state as they make claims to urban land for housing and livelihoods.

2.4   Research Design and "Methods of Inquiry"

To develop the nuances of these practices and politics I adopt an ethnographic case-study approach shaped by qualitative methods in human and social inquiry. I have attempted to synergize three analytical approaches to approach the case-study in Juhu. The first is a phronetic (pragmatic) approach to planning (Flyvbjerg: 2004, 2011) that focuses on concrete examples and detailed narratives to discover the ways in which power and values work in planning and the second approach is institutional ethnography that examines social relations and power from the standpoint of marginalized groups (Smith: 2005). These are complemented by Abu-Lughod's (1996) and Holston's (2008) proposition to investigate long term perspectives of contemporary development processes that has helped me situate the evolving politics of a locality within the larger history of Mumbai. McAdam et al's (1996) approach of analyzing the factors that shape the process of collective action such as, political opportunities and constraints, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. These provide a useful analytical strategy to comprehend state mobilization processes across various groups. And finally I approach the issue of the agency of neighborhood actors drawing on Bhabha's (2004) conceptualization that *appropriation* to create *mimesis* (replication) produces a difference rather than sameness, revealing the differentiated and uneven agency of grassroots social forces. In drawing on these analytical and methodological approaches I trace the complex locality-based histories of state mobilization that take place at the intersection of micro-urban renewal and decentralized local governance in Juhu, an electoral ward in suburban Mumbai.

Researcher Positionality: Born and raised in suburban Mumbai, I am a native and a citizen of Mumbai. My interest in the neighborhood politics of Juhu has evolved over a decade, through my position as an urbanist researcher in non-profit and academic institutions in Juhu between 2001-2003, 2007-2009 and as a Graduate student from 2009-2011. The grounded "insider" readings in this thesis are informed by this engagement. I have come to discover the associational activity of *vastis,* urban villages and private apartment/bungalow residents in Juhu over time. What started out as clearly defined "objects" of study to be examined gradually blurred into enmeshed, entangled complex systems that I was part of as I immersed myself in the everyday life of Juhu and its residents. Over a decade, I have observed Juhu transform. From the initial efforts of expert-driven local-area development planning, community-based planning to enable nascent grassroots planning practices, witnessing demolition and eviction drives along the *Irla Nallah* and contemporary struggles of residents to be recognized as urban citizens, has helped me "see" Juhu from multiple standpoints, ideologies and rationalities. I retell some stories that emerged through a "polyphony of diverse voices" that revealed the lived reality, aspirations, needs, despair and hope of Juhu's residents. This narrative is thus a "view from" as opposed to a "view of" Juhu, from its multiple, heterogeneous neighborhoods, peoples and their aspirations. This account involves a cross-section, comprising both vertical and horizontal networks of people sometimes beyond the territorial space of the neighborhood. I have attempted to locate myself within both the dominant and subordinated discourses of several neighborhood groups, city-based advocacy groups, para-statal agencies and the professional/ academic space to evolve a critical, experiential view from Juhu, positioning myself as both "native" ethnographer and critical informant.

As a native ethnographer I have realized that I do not neatly fit into existing registers of outsider or insider. Depending on my political and analytical project, my position can be best described as in-between, as an outsider-insider.[63] I hoped to understand the practices of planning and

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[63] Although I am a native of Mumbai the *vasti* and urban village residents, differ from me in terms of socio-economic class, religion, ethnicity, education and language. In these terms I could be perceived as an outsider who has not experienced their everyday struggles and their efforts to initiate grounded change. On the other hand, my engagement with various resident groups in Juhu, over a period of time has provided me a grounded view of suburban change. This provides an insider reading that has evolved over a decade.

governance that shape a particular view of the *vasti* and urban village in Juhu that problematize their existence. Explorations of the discursive practices of the academic, professional, and technocratic sphere from within which certain ideas, knowledge and rationalities emerge are critical to understand the common sense mainstreamed as participatory planning and good governance. On the other hand, exploring a range of futures envisioned from the lived realities, struggles and claim-making practices of *vasti* and urban village residents could help generate a new body of knowledge as it is experienced from the margins of the *vasti* and urban village. The role of the native ethnographer in developing a grounded body of knowledge founded on such experiences transforms her position as a critical informant who is willing to interrogate such conceptualizations within the discipline of planning. In addressing the struggles, logics, priorities and aspirations, of those on the margins, the critical informant makes possible new ways of seeing from the grassroots that could problematize the perception of people, built environments and difference by hegemonic planning practice. Roy (2007, 626) problematizes Euro-American-centric planning practice by drawing on South African urban practices to suggest that they "speak to the very core of (Euro-American) planning practice, to the truths of planning – that there is a future for which one can plan and a place at which such planning can be located". Taking inspiration from this argument, the critical informant could turn Trojan Horse in attempting to question the ignorance of Indian technocratic elite, planning agencies and professional planning of grassroots planning practices. In doing so, the critical informant could attempt to interrogate her own locations of practice. To locate my practice and positionality, I now turn towards specific events, to help the reader understand why and how I was interested and became involved with this study.

My engagement with people and places in Juhu began in 2001, when I worked as a team member with a nonprofit organization that hoped to generate a local area development plan.[64] At the time, neighborhood-based activism was relatively nascent. Efforts to engage civic administrators at the

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[64] This group comprised of Juhu's professional and business elite who had turned advocates for "their" neighborhood. Their intent was to transform Juhu through the creation of a "citizens" plan through interdisciplinary research. The need to mobilize grassroots energies was relegated to organizing festivals and neighborhood –based cultural events. These elites imagined their role as an "expert-advocacy" group that represented Juhu.

ward-level to influence local area planning decisions, was mostly unheard of. During this period, various street-specific ALM groups mushroomed. Membership was based on residence along specific streets in Juhu. These ad-hoc groups worked to control neighborhood governance and locality management seeking support for their activities. Often ALM groups witnessed overlapping agendas and in some cases conflict of interests in the plans proposed across middle-class/upper-middle-class and elite organized groups. The middle-class organized groups, however, focused on expanding a mass volunteer base through building coalitions of the like-minded creating a "pressure" group that would mobilize against the state to demand their rights. By 2003, the "expert-advocacy" gradually disbanded and the emerging "pressure" ALM coalition gained strength in Juhu. Their mobilization dependent on creating a mass base revealed potential political ambitions by the winter of 2006. The locality-based coalition tapped networks of city-level NGOs to build a sizeable volunteer base and public presence in Juhu. They primarily worked towards suggesting specific models for locality governance and neighborhood planning.

By 2008, I was invited to a sub-ward level-planning meeting organized by a government agency in Mumbai.[65] Within this meeting, the elected representative from Juhu shared a "Citizen's-Consensus" vision, which was appreciated as a comprehensive document. This vision outlined a set of projects across Juhu with the redevelopment of the *Irla Nallah* and its transformation into a public open space as the central highlight of the vision. The silence on low-income groups as residents of Juhu and erasure of their consolidated settlements into open spaces begged the question of how this "Citizen's-Consensus" vision for Juhu was developed.[66] Who was involved in its creation? What processes were identified for outreach and awareness generation across diverse vertical and horizontal social strata? What caused the exclusions/inclusions of some groups, their aspirations needs and contributions?

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[65] The organizers of this meeting hoped to understand need-based projects and programs from municipal elected representatives that could be facilitated in each electoral ward and the nature of funds required in furthering the goals of Mumbai's transformation into a "world-class" city.

[66] Although the land base occupied by *vastis* in Juhu was small and they were mostly tucked away behind private buildings, the densities within them accounted for a sizeable population even in an affluent neighborhood like Juhu until the delimitation of the ward boundary before the 2007 municipal election.

By 2008, a public presentation was organized to share a Juhu master plan with its residents comprising a mix of elite, upper-middle-class, middle-class and low-income groups. A resident architect in collaboration with a local academic institution developed the physical master plan for Juhu. This was another attempt at developing a comprehensive people's plan for Juhu. Because the focus of the project was around the possible futures for public open space in Juhu, few low-income residents representing the *vastis* and urban village asked questions around how they could be kept informed about the process and participate in decisions taken. Although the plan-makers had attempted to include the needs of low-income, middle- to upper-class communities, the former left the public presentation, unsure of their role in or benefits from this grand expert commentary. The latter were happy with the plan and "expert" suggestions from professionals in helping shape "their" future. In six months, a series of demolitions along the *Irla Nallah* in Juhu evicted and displaced hundreds of families to the City limits or rendered them homeless. It was this moment of vulnerability and loss of Juhu's residents in self-built settlements that compelled me to seek people in the *vastis* and urban village.

Two years later a meeting with the local councilor at his office in the summer of 2010 revealed new relationships of organized ALM groups with those previously excluded such as the "slum" dwellers. The councilor introduced me to grassroots leaders with whom he had built relationships with to mobilize "people's participation from all walks of life" in Juhu. I was invited by both the leaders of the *vasti* and urban village to visit their homes and hear their stories of struggle. These preliminary meetings and subsequent ethnographic fieldwork have led me to the following questions:

- How did the rhetoric on democratization of governance and planning transform locality-specific power structures in Juhu? How did this shape the visions for twenty-first century Juhu?
- How could demolition of *vasti* and urban village residents be authorized at a moment when the mainstream media, suburban Mumbai's public forums and the state legislative assembly were saturated with participatory discourses that were citizen-centric?

- How did new the state-society relations that created a "Citizens-Consensus" councilor marginalize *vasti* and urban village residents in the same neighborhood especially in decision-making processes that concerned their lives, livelihood and housing?

- How could a deeper, heterogeneous reading of emergent locality-specific power structures in Mumbai, located in an era of new state-society relations enable planning practitioners to rethink planning practice?

2.5   Synergizing Analytical Frameworks

To generate a contextually-rooted narrative, I re-visited critical reflections on approaches and methods as suggested by planning and social science theorists. Drawing on the recent works of Friedmann [1976 (2011)], Flyvbjerg (2004, 2011) and Smith (2005), I situated this research study as an effort at *learning* and *discovering* something as opposed to proving a single theory or falsifying a given hypothesis. To do so, I adopted a "commonsensical" (Flyvbjerg: 2011, 320) approach to case-study research that focuses on "what is to be studied as opposed to making a methodological choice" (Flyvbjerg: 2011, 301). My focus is on a specific neighborhood as a unit of analysis, its contextual detail, a historicist overview that provides details of interrelation of events and the relation of this unit with larger structural factors that govern, transform or sustain it. The case-study approach to this study not only provides me with a complex view and experience of real-time events, actors and their practices, but also with a nuanced knowledge that would critically inform my imaginary of planning practices within Mumbai. Engaging real-time complexity in a textual format made my attempts to develop a summarized narrative difficult. I take recourse in Lisa Peattie's warning against doing so. Peattie suggests that "the very value of the case-study, the contextual and interpenetrating nature of its forces, is lost when one tries to sum up in large and mutually exclusive concepts" [(Peattie: 2001, 260) cited in Flyvbjerg: 2011, 311]. Drawing on Flyvbjerg's advice, I chose to "keep (the narrative) open" (Flyvbjerg: 2011, 311). In developing the narrative I have chosen to tell the conflicting-stories across time and space as I experienced them in my fieldwork and my earlier engagements with the case-study area. In addition, by drawing on scholarship from diverse sets of disciplinary fields such as political theory, sociology, social anthropology, planning and revisionist historiographies, I hope to allow the "study to be different things to different people" (Flyvbjerg: 2011, 312).

To allow an open-ended approach to planning, John Friedmann suggests the need to re-imagine planning praxis as a "societal and political activity with a transformative potential" [Friedmann :(1976) 2011, 1]. In his critical reflective essay "The Transactive Style of Planning", Friedmann argues that transactive planning by its nature is an open experiment whose actual course is constantly subject to transformation through a reflective process of social learning. He suggests:

> In mutual learning, planner and client each learn from the other- the planner from the client's personal knowledge and the client from the planner's technical expertise. In such a process the knowledge of both undergoes a major change. A common image of the situation evolves through dialogue; a new understanding of the possibilities for change is discovered [Friedmann: 1976 (2011), 23].

In "The Epistemology of Social Practice", Friedmann identifies both mutual learning and social practice could become the basis for producing a grounded theory of reality.

> Social practice begins with a problem of human (social) existence that matters to someone and engages his attention. Two things follow from this beginning: first social practice can arise anywhere within a given social formation, that is to say, it can arise at multiple locations simultaneously; second, social practice is directed at specific problems that arise from the dominant system of social relations: it is by nature a conflictive process [Friedmann: 1976 (2011), 51].

Friedmann suggests that the epistemology of social practice emerges from the actions of various agents in the public realm, and so "the integral exploration would be to locate the actors". In short he recognizes the open-ended, deliberative and dynamic nature of social practice embedded in the everyday lived-experiences of people. Such an approach focuses on the everyday practices of various agents in a hope to democratize and re-conceptualize planning praxis. In a recent stocktaking article on planning research, Friedmann identified that one of the things he would do differently today in thinking about the epistemology of social practice would be to explicitly introduce the "*question of power*" (Friedmann: 1998).

Taking this call to introduce and explore the question of power in planning further, Flyvbjerg elaborates an approach called phronetic-planning research. He suggests:

> The principal objective in a phronetic approach is to clarify values, interests, and power relations in planning as a basis for praxis. The point of departure can be summarized in the following value-rational questions: (1) Where are we going? (2) Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? (3) Is this development desirable? (4) What, if anything, should we do about it? The 'we' referred to in questions (1) and (4) consists of those planning researchers asking the questions and those who share the concerns of the researchers, including people in the community or planning organizations under study. Thus the 'we' will always be situated in relation to a specific context. Furthermore, when there is a 'we' there is also usually a 'they', especially when issues get constructed in adversarial terms, which often happens in the planning conflicts, planning researchers examine (Flyvbjerg: 2004, 289-290).

The second question focusing on power is what sets apart phronesis from other research planning approaches. It helps create a contemporary reading of phronesis through questions on power and outcomes. The central inquiry is *how* power is exercised and not merely *who* has power and *why* they have it. This creates a focus on process in addition to structure. Flyvbjerg suggests that phronetic planning research is an analytical project, but not a theoretical or methodological one. He suggests:

> By focusing on planning practice, phronetic planning researchers problematize the taken-for-granted 'truths' about the progressive and rational promise of planning; phronetic planning researchers re-evaluate these contestable truths in the context of power in order to understand who gains and who loses by the telling of such truths, and how things can be done differently.[..] A central task of phronetic planning research is to provide concrete examples and detailed narratives of the ways in which power and values work in planning and with what consequences to whom, and to suggest how relations of power and values could be changed to work with other consequences. Insofar as planning situations become clear, they are clarified by detailed stories of who is doing what to whom. Such clarification is a principal concern for phronetic planning research and provides the main link to praxis (Flyvbjerg: 2004, 302).

The phronetic approach to planning research finds resonance in an approach called "Institutional Ethnography" that emerged out of feminist standpoint theory. Pioneered by Canadian sociologist Dorothy Smith (1987) a proponent of what she terms "engaged sociologies", Smith explored strategies for investigating institutions from the standpoint of disempowered groups with a view to develop a nuanced understanding of social reality from a "people's standpoint" (Smith: 2005, 1). Calling it a "method of inquiry" as opposed to a methodology, she has outlined a dual intention of institutional ethnography as a way to produce for people maps of the ruling relations and the institutional complexes they participate in and to build knowledge and methods to discover institutions and the ruling relations (Smith: *op.cit.*).

Smith defines "ruling relations" as structural procedures, organizational and professional texts, the generation of social relations that emerge from these texts and documents and their role in ignoring and invalidating difference" (Smith: *op.cit.*). O'Neill (1998) interprets social relations as defined by Smith as:

> the concept (of) social relations, to refer to the processes by which people's lives are shaped to conform to dominant ideologies. She argues that texts shape social relations, including the delivery of services, to be consistent with dominant ideologies, thereby excluding issues related to race, economic status, gender, sexual orientation and other differences from discourse (Griffith & Smith: 1991). This lack of recognition of diversity forces individuals to conform to abstract definitions of reality contained in institutional texts. The result is that members of marginalized groups experience contradictions between their own lives and the version of reality upon which service delivery is predicated (O'Neill:1998, 132).

Within Smith's analytical framework, researchers often study a mix of data sources including observations, interviews, and written texts. Practitioners drawing on institutional ethnographic approaches to research suggest

> members of marginalized groups live within the dominant culture as well as their minority culture; they may have knowledge not available to members of the powerful groups in society (Riger: 1992). Thus, standpoint research can add to understanding not only a specific minority group but the larger society as well (O'Neill: 1998, 131).

Drawing on the critical-reflexive works of Friedmann [(1996), 2011], Flyvbjerg (2004, 2011) and Smith (2005), I hope to capture the complexities of urban citizenship practices in the case-study area that emerge at the intersection of urban governmentality and urban renewal through two interrelated sub-questions:

(a) How have locality-based efforts at participatory approaches to micro-urban renewal via neighborhood planning and governance changed community power structures in Juhu (Mumbai)? Specifically, how have they shaped state-society relations?

(b) How do groups of the "urban poor" in Juhu, residing in urban villages and *vastis* respond to the evolving state-society relations in order to gain access to the new spaces of decision-making?

This study attempts to unpack *how* and *why* participatory discourses in planning and governance result in ensuing power struggle amongst heterogeneous neighborhood actors involved. The central inquiry in this study is *how* power is exercised in decision-making, and not merely *who* has power and *why* they have it. The focus is primarily on actors, structure, processes and practices. By recognizing and unpacking power relations embedded within the ongoing processes from the standpoint of diverse residents of *vastis*, the urban village, private apartment buildings and bungalows this study hopes to explore their perceptions and lived-experience of participatory governance and planning. Linking these experiences of micro-urban renewal projects and self-governance to larger discourses of "worlding" Mumbai through good governance and urban renewal reveals the real-time impact on the everyday lives and livelihoods of suburban neighborhood residents. In addition, there is an effort to trace the agency of the local in ongoing collaborative efforts to identify possible strategies and alternative futures for their communities within emerging development scenarios. This study has carefully attempted to chart out a course,

which does not begin with a theory or single methodology to address the questions emerging from this specific context and case. Instead, drawing from a pragmatic approach of locating the micro practices within a larger socio-historical context, this study hopes to suggest the critical need for alternative approaches to knowledge production, which could inform planning praxis.

The primary focus of such a synergized approach is discovering the relationship between structures, actors, processes and agency.

> Phronetic planning research focuses on both actors and structures, and on the relationship between the two. Planning's actors and their practices are analyzed in relation to the structures of the organizations, institutions, and societies of which they are a part. Structures are analyzed in terms of agency, not for the two to stand in a dualistic, external relationship, but so structures may be seen as part of and internalized in actors, and actors as part of and internalized in structures. Understanding from 'within' planning and from 'without' are both accorded emphasis (Flyvbjerg: 2004, 299).

Addressing the two interrelated sub-questions of this study, my intention is primarily to trace the evolution, consolidation and fragmentation of suburban neighborhood politics through actors, institutions, policy texts and processes that have helped consolidate it or destabilize it. To locate this I develop a thick description of actor's perceptions, interests and practices in an age of "worlding" Mumbai. As a pragmatic and locally rooted co-learner in this study asking the four central questions developed by Flyvbjerg, I am conscious of evolving only partial insights of the phenomenon at hand. My readings of the neighborhood politics located specifically in the heterogeneous social and politicized practices of neighborhood residents becomes a contribution to the ongoing dialogues and debates on urban citizenship claims in the development planning process in Mumbai that "planning, planners and those planned face" (Flyvbjerg: 2004, 302).

2.6   Ethnographic Methods

To develop these readings I drew on ethnographic methods of conceptual and physical mapping exercises, participant observation, focus group discussions, semi-structured and open-ended interviews. In case of physical mapping exercises, I walked along the *Irla Nallah* through different times of the day, along different parts of its length and across the months that I was in the field. I visited the *vasti* along the *Irla Nallah* and urban village alternately every week from September to December through mutually convenient appointments. The visits provided different reference points during festivals, formal meetings, informal meetings and consultation

processes. In short, I spent my working weekdays and weekends in Juhu throughout these months. This considerably helped me re-immerse myself in the physical environment but also in terms of locality-specific events, actors and discussions. In addition, I requested the respective leadership permissions to attend and witness planning-related local consultative processes with their allies and partners, study their self-built archives comprising documentary films, newspaper clippings, RTI applications, correspondence with various agencies and organizations and community based organization meetings. The interviews and focus group discussions were critical in helping me develop "voices from below" as people perceived planning and governance from their unique standpoints. The interviews were mostly open-ended conversations. These conversations continued through multiple meetings, brainstorming sessions to address specific problems and concerns, writing reports for a policymaker audience and presentations for activist conferences that form their solidarity networks. Through conversations I explored possibilities with youth and women, who were mostly absent at the forefront in associational activity, despite having the skills and knowledge to strengthen ongoing efforts. Focus group discussions became a method to engage groups who had time constraints or had mobilized through specific ideas. It made possible a space for dialogue and debate especially in a situation where individuals were suspicious of the intention of the other resident groups or anxious of an individual conversation.

2.7 Generating the Narrative

The primary themes that have emerged from my fieldwork are neighborhood governance, community-led urban renewal, community power structures and everyday practices/experiments as sites of ongoing negotiations by neighborhood actors. To develop this narrative I focused on descriptions, interpretations and textual or visual perceptions of both participants and myself to trace ongoing processes of Juhu's urban change. Generating thick descriptions through observations and verbatim quotations I have included a "polyphony of voices" (Flyvbjerg: 2004, 300) dissenting, supporting, critiquing, arguing, and appealing all together to map the politics of democratization of urban governance and community-led planning. The narrative also reveals the implications of this change on local community power structures for Juhu's residents living in private apartments, bungalows, *vastis,* the urban village, and their agency in seeking alternative futures   to   the   singular   telos   of   "world-class"   Mumbai.   .

Chapter 3: "No Man's Lands"?

The Micro-Politics of *Nagar Raj*[67] and Local Area Development Planning in Juhu

3.1 Introduction

Juhu scheme, as I said, was nicely designed with bungalow schemes, plotting was proper, roads were proper, everything was well planned. However, the *Irla Nallah* lands are 'no man's land' because no one takes responsibility for what happens there. The apathy and nonchalance of civic staff is quite problematic. The slum dwellers and hawkers had encroached the *nallah* and other open spaces. The slums were haphazard and the fact that these people were expanding over the nallah reducing its width was a dangerous thing. It was essential to have some kind of authority to tell those who are not abiding by the rules. Those who are staying in Juhu scheme have selected this area because of a particular quality of life, otherwise one can stay anywhere. (Interview, Middle-Class Representative A, 9 September 2011).

A poor person cannot go to any land and setup their home. There are *dadas* (slum agents) who exist before the *vasti*. These people identify vacant spots of land, occupy them and sell space to migrant families in need of shelter. A *vasti* would not be possible without an interaction between the *vasti dada*, police, municipal bureaucrats within the system and elected representatives. So the *vasti dada* creates the possibility to setup, rent or buy a home. However thirty five years later I cannot call the house I live in 'my own' because society and the government call it a "slum". Our home can be demolished and we could be displaced. (Interview, *Irla Nallah vasti* 1 resident A, 29 October 2011).

The basic mistake we made was to provide rental housing to non-*kolis*. Initially we thought it was a good source of income but they ended up building houses on the seaward side with support from elected representatives and private developers. In the 1980's our community elders believed the municipal councilor who suggested that they hand over the inward village lands to the state government. So we lost lands along the coastal edge and the main source of livelihood the inward fishing pond as well. The government shows no willingness to recognize the wrongdoing on our community and the toll it has taken on us and our means of livelihood. (Interview, Urban village *koli* resident A 8 November 2011).

These quotes reveal some diverse views and distinct standpoints of the major resident groups of Juhu. For the elite and middle-class residents the "unorganized and undisciplined slums" had to be disciplined by the "rule of law". This would require specific actions on the ground. For *vasti* residents who eked out a basic existence as migrants to the city, self-built housing emerged from the

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[67] Rooted in the spirit of the 74th CAA, 1992, and drawing from the *Panchayati* system in the villages, national level civil society organizations, suggested the concept of area *sabhas* (that mimic *gram sabhas* in village governance), for the participation of "urban citizens" and the formation of area *sabhas* within polling stations in each urban electoral ward. Bangalore-based *Janaagraha* advised the National Advisory Council and Second administrative reforms Committee in 2005, on whose recommendations the Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India, undertook these second-generation reforms as a constitutional obligation for the decentralization of urban governance. This led to the emergence of the Community Participation Law (CPL) commonly referred to as the *Nagar Raj* Bill in 2008. Many civil society groups believed that the *Nagar Raj* Bill was a mechanism to implement the promise of "institutionalization of citizen participation" in the 74th CAA, 1992. Considering the subject of state autonomy, state governments have the discretion to adapt and customize the CPL, its legislation was a conditionality to access funds from the national urban renewal programme for creating what Roy (2009) terms millennial cities.

lack of land ownership and affordable housing options. Accessing existing networks of slum agent, municipal bureaucracy and elected representatives, they have created a life-chance for themselves and their families. For former indigenous communities (*kolis*), categorized as "slum" dwellers by municipal and state government bureaucracies, the future of lands reserved for their housing and livelihood seem uncertain. These contrasting views overlap and intersect in the case of the *Irla Nallah* in Juhu on the question of land as a resource, referred to as "no-man's land" by local elites, and create contestations for urban space for a disparate set of needs - recreation, housing, and livelihoods in Juhu.

This chapter explores the tension arising out of these contestations i.e., the micro-politics of spatial (urban renewal) and institutional (decentralization of governance) re-structuring in Juhu through the specific case of the *Irla Nallah* redevelopment project. To unpack the micro-politics of these intermeshed processes, I ask three questions: How have urban development processes historically shaped the socio-spatial re-structuring of Juhu? How have locality-based efforts to frame participatory approaches to local area planning and governance impacted community power structures in Juhu, and more specifically, how have they shaped state-society relations? How have the evolving state-society relations, in turn affected the capacity of urban village and *vasti* residents along the *Irla Nallah* gain inclusion to the "new spaces of decision-making" i.e., Area *Sabhas*[68] in Juhu?

In addressing these questions, I advance three arguments. Following Abu-Lughod's (1996) and Holston's (2008) propositions to investigate long term perspectives of development processes, a historical overview of Juhu's urban development since the early 20th century, reveals that successive developmental planning regimes have grafted new legalities on former agrarian lands, creating entrenched socio-spatial divides amongst new settler and resident groups. Neighborhood ALM

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[68] There are multiple versions of the *Nagar Raj* Bill being contested across civil society organizations [*Janaagraha* (2005)] *Loksatta* (2005) and *Lokraj Andolan (*2009*)]* and the state [the Ministry of Urban Development (GoI) (2005), Government of Maharashtra's *Shetra Sabha* Act (2009)]. Juhu's ALM groups adopted *Janaagraha's* concept of the Area *Sabha* defined as the footprint of one or two polling stations of 1200 to 2400 voters within an electoral ward (sub-municipal ward level). This varies drastically from the state government version legislated in 2009. See "*Nagar Raj* Bill faces citizen's ire", *DNA*, 26 May 2009 and "State plans to clip people's power", *DNA*, 26 May 2009.

coalitions revived a century old bourgeois vision of Juhu as "Oriental Venice", today via participatory planning, revealing tendencies of what Baviskar (2003) terms "bourgeois environmentalism". Second, I draw on the McAdam et al. (1996) approach to analyze factors that are central to collective action such as political opportunities and constraints, mobilizing structures, and framing processes[69] to understand forms of mobilization of the state. Ongoing efforts in Juhu to frame participatory approaches to neighborhood planning and governance reveal the evolution of organized strategies of "elitist forms of local democracy" (Zerah: 2007) that aim to create new nodes of power in the hands of Area *Sabha* representatives and the "Citizens Consensus" Councilor. These propositions of neighborhood governance duplicate the organizational structure of political parties firmly entrenched at the grassroots. Through processes of deliberative democracy political parties, have countered such attempts of duplicating power, by weakening selective provisions of the (Model) *Nagara Raj* Bill to legislate the Maharashtra *Nagar Raj* Act (2009). Third, *vasti* residents along the *Irla Nallah* have been agile at "social learning" (Friedmann: 1976) and have negotiated the new urban neighborhood politics through a range of complex practices that engage the state to further their citizenship claims. These practices of resistance frame diverse, and sometimes overlapping, modes of engagement against the backdrop of making a "world-class" Mumbai. My study identifies four practices comprising a politics of difference, silence, civility, and compensation.

This chapter is structured in four parts. Following this introduction, the second section presents a brief introduction to the case-study area across two levels: the municipal ward and the electoral ward (sub-municipal ward level). The third section historically traces the urban development of Juhu and the unfolding micro-politics of socio-spatial and institutional restructuring for socially marginalized groups via the *Irla nallah* redevelopment project. The final section reiterates the arguments emerging from this case study.

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[69]McAdam et al define political opportunities as 'created from changes in the organizational structure or informal power relations of a given national political system which create the possibility for the emergence of social movements'. Mobilizing structures entail the collective vehicles, informal as well as formal through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. Framing processes are the conscious strategic efforts of groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action. (Mc Adam et al: 1996)

3.2   Tracing Histories of Urban Development: The Micro Politics of *Nagar Raj* and Local Area Development Planning in Juhu

In this section, I trace the historical roots of contemporary urban development in Juhu. Following this, I explore the emerging micro- politics at the intersection of *Nagar Raj* and local area development planning in Juhu. Identifying the governance tools used to rationalize and legitimize certain forms of urban development and the actors involved in these processes, I unpack the various ways that rational planning approaches have affected the lives of *vasti* residents. I have structured Juhu's socio-spatial evolution in three distinct phases, which capture its transition from an elite suburban getaway in colonial times to its residents present aspirations of a middle-class "green" neighborhood. This history is based on a combination of the following sources: imperial and postcolonial gazetteers, survey maps of Bombay (1930-1969), recent documented histories of the city, contemporary research on Juhu, biographic accounts, oral histories through ethnographic fieldwork, newspaper archives, and records of legal cases.[70]

In the first two phases of Juhu's historical evolution, I provide a glimpse of urban development drawing on secondary archival materials. The third phase of the historical evolution from late 20th to early 21st century combines both secondary archival and empirical ethnographic materials[71] to re-construct the locality-specific micro-politics of the intersection of *Nagar Raj* and local area development planning in Juhu. In order to analyze the complex micro-politics, identified through the third phase of Juhu's socio-spatial evolution, I draw on McAdam et al.'s (1996) approach to identify the factors that shape collective action namely framing processes, mobilizing structures, and political opportunities and constraints whose interrelationships results in context-specific dynamics of collective action.[72]

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[70]Gazetteers include Campbell (1882), Edwardes (1902), and GoM (1987). Histories of Mumbai city include Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001). Contemporary urban research on Juhu includes Das et al (2008). Biographic accounts include Harris (1958) and Lala (2004).

[71] Oral and locality specific histories collated through semi-structured/open-ended participant interviews during my fieldwork in Juhu from August to December 2011.

[72]McAdam et al. (1996, 3-4) define "framing processes as the conscious strategic efforts of groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action. Mobilizing structures entail the collective vehicles, informal as well as formal through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. Political opportunities as created from changes in the organizational structure or

3.2.1 Late 19th – Mid 20th Century: Juhu as 'Oriental Venice' of a Colonial Industrial City:

By the late 19th century, Bombay had been transformed from a mercantile town to an industrial and manufacturing centre.[73] Dwivedi and Mehrotra suggest the island city was comprised of the "well planned" colonial core proudly called the "*urbs primis indis*" by the British and the "native" towns to the north. "Native" ethnic enclaves experienced severe congestion from an influx of migrants who came to work in the docks, the textile mills, trade and industry and new building projects.[74] Due to overcrowding, civic services such as water supply and sanitary facilities suffered, making the "native" town a breeding ground for the dreaded bubonic plague in 1896:

> The city's populace was crowded in the narrowest part of the island (Indian quarter) due to the employment opportunities (colonial quarter). Workers who could not afford train and tram fares chose to live in close proximity to their work place-resulting in overcrowding and unsanitary slums. Bombay had become a quagmire of congested slums that harbored pestilence. Alarmed by the plagued deaths and devastation that gripped the town, the Bombay government considered development of a comprehensive scheme of improvement. Primary consideration was to be given to the ventilation of densely inhabited areas, better means of sanitation and prevention of overcrowding. The Bombay City Improvement Trust was constituted in 1898. It was set to dramatically alter and improve Bombay's physical state. **(**Dwivedi and Mehrotra: 2001, 165-166, brackets added).

It was during the plague that Juhu was "discovered" by Indian industrialist interests in the early 20th century, including Jamsetji Tata.[75] Harris (1925) for instance writes:

> The severity of the plague (1896) drew attention to the overcrowding of Bombay and the urgent need for developing its suburbs. On the island within eight miles of the city, acres of land lay waste. A few lean kinds picked their sustenance from the herbage; the remainder was covered with scrub and swamps breeding ground of a virulent mosquito which spread the germ of malarial fever. The inhabitants of these undesirable tracts were mostly peasants and fisherfolk who dwelt in extremely poor and insignificant villages. During the plague the populations and their dwellings increased near the stations along the railway lines of Salsette Island. These were referred to as the suburbs. Mr. Tata had predicted their "becoming so" **(**Harris: 1925, 76. Emphasis added**)**.

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informal power relations of a given national political system which create the possibility for the emergence of social movements". This approach was earlier used in studying the politics of implementing Special Economic Zones on Mumbai's periphery; see Mujumdar and Menezes (forthcoming).

[73]Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001, 88).

[74] Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001, 204) suggest that the influx of new immigrants from the 1880's considerably altered the character of the city not only in its physical form, but also its social, cultural patterns and political framework.

[75] Harris (1925, 89) writes, "Mr Tata proposed to convert the hamlet of Juhu Tara into a fashionable seaside resort. He was much in love with the place, and had there built a small bungalow, where he frequently entertained his friends. Juhu Tara is one of the healthiest sites in the vicinity of Bombay. A beach of fine white sand, four miles in length, provides a splendid gallop for anyone who loves a horse, and during recent years has become a favorite resort for mixed bathing. Covered with comely houses, such a suburb could hardly have failed to attract a number of wealthy residents. The Collector of the district accepted his plan as a government proposal, but nothing was done, and Mr Tata's idea was left as a legacy for future generations".

In the early 1890's, the noted Parsee industrialist-philanthropist Jamsetji Tata invested in property purchases in Juhu confident of Bombay's future growth and advancement.[76] The Times of India, the leading English daily, reported:

> Up to a decade ago even the name of Juhu was unknown or very little known beyond the boundaries of the obscure village bearing that name and the credit of first discovering its unique value as a watering place goes to that great captain of Indian industries, the late Jamsetji Tata. (Times of India, 9 April 1926, quoted in Lala: 2004, 62).

The locals referred to Juhu as *Juvem (Juhu) Tarra* in the early nineteenth century.[77] A *Khoti* village, it was awarded to the master ship builders of Gujarat, the *Wadias,* as an *inam* (gift) by the East India Company for building their ships.[78] Jamsetji argued that Bombay's suburbs lacked any "systematic and aesthetic development" (Harris: 1925, 80). Along with the provision of road and railway infrastructures, he envisioned the suburban areas to the north as an alternative source for creating new land banks to be settled with housing scheme typologies of development, modeled on the aesthetic and functional garden city concept that was becoming popular in Europe.[79] During his travels, he had visited Venice, and being impressed, was tempted to reconstruct it in Bombay. His land agent, Saklatvala, penned his grand ideas in great detail:

> (Jamsetji) had a scheme for a small Venice in Juhu. It was virtually a virgin area with mudflats washed by tides on its shorelines. Jamsetji formulated a scheme for an Oriental Venice. Some twelve hundred acres of low-lying marshlands of Juhu Tara intersected by shallow creeks could be converted into such a development. This would be accomplished by sluices that would control the creeks at either end of Juhu Island and building plots reclaimed from the marshy land with waterways running between. This area was to be served by two large and wide openings at both ends northwards and south letting in the sea at high tides and flooding the area above to a height of three feet. By reclaiming one acre plots about five hundred in number having no roads but trenches or canals dug deep all round each of the reclaimed one-acre plots and establishing communication by boats. The tides would help to bring in water and regulate the height within the area by self-acting sluice gates at both ends. These villages and bungalows that would have been built thereon would have obtained access by boats through 30-40 feet wide canals. It was on account of such a novel idea that this was called the Venetian scheme. These plans remained unrealized due to a reluctance of the Wadias to sell parts of their *inam* lands. The Suburban District Collector of Thana, however, appreciated the scheme and adopted it as a government proposal. The Collector pursued the matter with the Wadias and on their refusal he filed a suit against the Juhu Inamdar's Privy Council in the Court. (Harris: 1925, 88-89, brackets added).

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[76]Jamsetji Tata was actively engaged in procuring leasehold lands from the Bombay Port Trust, the City Improvement Trust and the Bombay City Government. His foray in property development initiated by developing homes for his family, extended to constructing apartments for 'Englishmen of modest means' in the city, developing the city's first big hotel, and then focusing on land reclamation schemes across the western coast of the Salsette Islands (Harris: 1925, 70).

[77] See Albuquerque (1981, 199).

[78]Harris (1925, 69) suggests that land held upon a privileged tenure was called *Khoti*, and the *Khot* (lessee) exercised certain seignorial rights on it.

[79] See, Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001, 177-178) and Harris (1925, 77).

The survey map of Salsette Island from 1930, shows the Juhu Tara Island separated from the mainland by the Irla Creek and tidal marshlands. It shows the demarcation for the reclamation of land for an airport and infrastructure railway corridors laid by the colonial rulers. It reveals the concentration of populations along the railway corridor because of the bubonic plague that struck the native towns in the inner city in the late nineteenth century.

Tidal Marshlands and mudflats flooded by Irla creek and its streams

Densely wooded areas   ▪▪▪▪ Juvem Tarra (Juhu Tara) Island

Cultivated Lands

Settlements

1930

Data Source: Surveyor General of India, 1930, 47 A/16, Bombay City, Bombay Suburban and Thana Districts. Second edition. Surveyor of India office, Calcutta.and Fieldwork.

Figure Source: Author.

Figure 3-1 Juhu Tara Island in 1930: Jamsetji Tata's Oriental Venice

This collusion of private capital and Indian industrialist elites, to engage and mobilize the colonial city government could be seen as early efforts in settling suburban development in Juhu. The repressive regimes of superior colonial governments, other business forays, and the untimely death of Jamsetji Tata meant that this grand land reclamation scheme had to be shelved. And in due course, the rapid expansion of the suburban areas resulted in the need for local government:

> By the 1930's the areas around Juhu Tara developed substantially creating the need for urban local government to administer the territory. These were institutionalized through the creation of Municipal Councils outside of Vile Parle Municipality but which were part of the larger Bombay Suburban District. By the early 1940's the municipality of Vile Parle had absorbed the small municipal councils governing the coastal island of Juhu around it. With the formation of Greater Bombay in 1945 these areas came directly under the supervision of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. **(**Dwivedi and Mehrotra: 2001, 288**).**

Simultaneously, the Airport Authority of India acquired large tracts of land for its wireless station (the district level Government won from the Juhu *Inamdar's* Privy Council, free of cost, 400 acres of land and 125 acres of the Juhu seashore as part of Jamsetji Tata's reclamation scheme) and delineated it for a civil airport. This is how the Juhu airport came to be located at its present site. At the time, it was called the Bombay Flying Club.[80] The "virgin" beaches at Juhu gradually emerged as a weekend getaway for the wealthier Indian classes and the colonial elite who used these environs for sports, motoring and bathing. [81] No longer an Oriental Venice, it earned the nickname, the "Brighton of the East".[82] Private elite weekend getaway cottages and bungalows constructed by Indian property developers sat cheek by jowl with existing indigenous hamlets. The existence of "original inhabitant" ethnic groups such as the *Kolis, Agris, Bhandaris, Prabhus* and *Pachkalsis,* who had lived in Bombay since the 13th century, has been detailed in colonial ethnographic studies.[83] Detailed survey maps of the Salsette Island from the mid-20th century provide clues to how land in Juhu was consolidated over time.[84] During this period, the *kolis* settled on Juhu-*Tara* island in two settlements: *Gundaoli*, present-day urban village in the north, and *Taragaon*, present-day Juhu *Koliwada* in the south.[85] It was covered with dense coconut plantations and linked to the mainland through a road connection. Agricultural settlers' cultivated small patches of these fertile lands and lived in *gaothans.* The urban village was flanked by the Arabian Sea and the *Irla* Creek,

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[80]Lala (2004, 62-63)
[81]See Albuquerque (1981, 199).
[82] *Ibid*
[83]Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001, 31)
[84] See for instance, Survey Maps of Bombay City, Bombay Suburban and Thana Districts 1930.
[85]Interview, Urban village *koli* resident A, 23 August 2011

its tributaries, tidal marshlands, mud flats and mangroves. The local economies included fishing in the inland creek waters, limited paddy cultivation and coconut/banana *wadis* (plantations).[86] Settlement clusters were organized by several ethnic groups (*Kolis, Agris, Bhandaris, Kunbis* and East Indians) and caste/occupation groups (cultivators, fisherfolk, toddy tappers, salt makers).

The early 20th century processes of suburbanization show that the existence of local populations (that had consolidated their land, activities and living spaces prior to colonial rule) were ignored by the colonial state as well as Indian elite industrialists who envisioned Juhu as a *tabula rasa* and "struggled to impose their visions on urban space".[87] Their main concern was decongesting the "slum-like" unsanitary conditions of the "native" town in the inner city areas of the colonial industrial city. Both suggested master planned land banks and physical infrastructures as a way to create serviced urban lands, bungalow developments for Indian and colonial elites and grand reclamation schemes for weekend getaways in Juhu (Salsette Island). In doing so, these planning approaches effectively re-organized land, property ownership, land records, and activities for new settlers and users. In these processes, planning played the role of grafting new legalities on the land claims of the existing local populace.

3.2.2 Mid 20th- Late 20th Century: Juhu as Planned Suburb of an Emerging Metropolitan City

The first decade after independence (1947) saw the post-colonial national-state involved in complex aspects of the nation-building exercise - one such issue was the reorganization of the provincial states along linguistic differences. Until 1960, Bombay was part of the Bombay Presidency that comprised the combined entity of *Maharashtra* and *Gujarat*. In 1960, the independent state of *Maharashtra* was carved out, with Bombay as its capital city.[88] Masselos (2003) explains how the City boundary was created:

> "by the end of the (British) raj, the Bombay Municipal Corporation covered the area of Bombay island with the adjoining suburbs of Salsette Island covered by a separate administration. In the first decades after independence, following the post-war population explosion and the need for administrative reform, further expansion of the city limits were gazetted to incorporate increasingly dense and extended settlements in and beyond what had been the Bombay suburbs on Salsette Island. The new limits also defined the area in which development was to take place.

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[86]*Ibid*
[87] See, Parpiani (2012, 8)
[88] See, Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001, 296).

The Bombay municipal limits were expanded in 1950, 1957 and 1965 to incorporate both Bombay and Salsette Island." (Patel and Masselos: 2003, 34)

The expansion of city limits was inevitable.[89] Planners hoped to decongest the city by moving industries from the island city and creating middle and elite housing projects, new developments in the suburbs, new townships in Bassein and a new city across the eastern harbor of Greater Bombay.[90] Bombay was transforming from an industrial into a service economy, with the city expanding into a larger city-region.[91] Suburban areas like Juhu, *Madh, Marve* and *Versova* quickly became the holiday resorts for the city's population with facilities such as motoring, sea bathing and recreation that were developed during the colonial era as weekend getaway spots for European and Indian elite who accessed beach fronts for recreation purposes.

The Bombay Municipal Corporation's decision to develop Juhu, as a recreational district gained prominence with the first development plan for Greater Bombay (1964).[92] Exploiting their scenic location, these sites saw the quick development of hotels and private beach bungalows. In addition, the state housing authority, Maharashtra Housing Area Development Authority, conceptualized twin town planning schemes targeted at elite and middle-class households in Juhu. In due course, the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC) and Bombay Housing Area Development Authority generated contiguous land banks along the *Irla* Creek in preparation for a major redevelopment scheme. The entire stretch of the creek and its watershed which flowed through the marshy lands and mangroves was being transformed by reducing the width of the creek and realigning its course.

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[89] Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001, 296) explain, "The Bombay City and Suburbs Post-War Development Committee, delineated the entity of Greater Bombay to include the town and islands of Bombay, the port, and boroughs of Bandra, *Parle-Andheri* and *Kurla*, municipal districts of *Ghatkopar*, *Kirol*, Juhu and 42 villages of the suburban district." Also Masselos (2003, 35) suggests that the post-colonial state was " driven by a dominant philosophy of planning, far more proactive than it had been under the *raj* which had responded to change rather than planned for it. City limits thus incorporated land that was not in the least urban; land with villages and farms but located in places where it was determined that growth would occur or where there would be an impact from and close links with, the city."
[90] Albert Mayer (New York consultant) and N. V. Modak (Member of post-war development committee) prepared yet another set of suggestions through an Outline Master Plan for Greater Bombay, 1947.
[91] Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001, 296).
[92] Bombay Municipal Corporation (1964, 65). The Town Planning Act of 1954 was published as the Draft Development Plan for Greater Bombay. The concept of Floor Space Index (FSI) was introduced for the first time. Dwivedi and Mehrotra (2001, 345)

Figure 3-2 Reclamation of the *Irla* Creek in 1969: Planned Suburban Development

This map shows the reclamation of the *Irla* Creek by 1969, to create urban developable land. The reclaimed lands housed two town planning schemes- the Juhu-Vile-Parle Development Scheme commonly referred to as Juhu Scheme or JVPD and the Gulmohar Town Planning Scheme. It also housed the Juhu Flying Club or Civil Aerodrome. This map clearly shows the majorly reclaimed and constricted *Irla* Creek and its new course.

From the 1970's onwards, on the Juhu reclamations emerged single bungalow residential areas for the elite and private 3-4 storey apartment buildings for the middle-income groups.[93] Those who could afford commuting costs and the initial investment opted for housing in these healthier and attractive suburbs. These new developments and recreation facilities for the elite drove up the land values in Juhu. During the settling-in of the two town planning schemes, Juhu experienced in-migration as well. In search of livelihood options, migrant settlers formed a labour pool to support existing construction sites for developments in Juhu and elsewhere in the city. In Juhu they provided services to tourists and camping sites along the beach through mobile, make-shift street vending. As one resident recollects:

> I migrated to Mumbai in 1970 from Kerala. People started settling here since the 1960's. Initially there were a few Malayalee families who settled close to the kolis who lived near the beach. They didn't have many job options so they used to collect coconuts from the wadis nearby and sell them on the beach and earn some money. Over a period of time they brought their families and settled here. Gradually many initial owners sold these structures to people like us and moved on. (Interview, Urban village, *vasti* 1 resident A, 15 November 2011).

Others worked on construction sites in the ongoing developments and some serviced the new housing populations that moved into the area as drivers, security staff, maids, caretakers and cooks. [94] Many were recruited by the new hotels, educational, cultural, religious and medical institutions as blue collar labour.[95] Some migrants set up small-scale automobile repair shops, food vending carts, temporal vegetable and fruit markets, tea stalls, shoe repairing, recycling units, etc.[96] They settled along available open lands primarily along the beach extremities where the *Koliwadas* were located, along the single tributary of the re-aligned and constricted *Irla* Creek, the edges of the civil airport lands and vacant private lands. The *kolis* and East-Indians whose livelihood sources were affected by reclamation of the *Irla* creek turned to provide rental housing for these in-migrants in the *koliwadas* and *gaothans*. The presence of in-migrants became a source of income for the local inhabitants:

> By the 1960s, there were fewer than 30 houses in the village. People stayed only in two clusters - *Koli* and one small migrant cluster. By late 1970's people migrated from other places and started settling in the fishing village. Until then

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[93] Interview, Middle-Class Representative B, 28 September 2011 (The bungalow developments were located in Juhu-Vile Parle Development Scheme and apartments were located in *Gulmohar* scheme).
[94] Interviews with Urban village *vasti* 1 resident A, 15 November 2011; *Vasti* 1 resident A, 8 November 2011 and *Vasti* 2 Displaced resident B, 10 August 2011.
[95] Interviews with *Vasti* 1 resident B, 21 November 2011; Displaced resident B, 10 August 2011 and *Vasti* 4 Displaced resident D, 15 September 2011.
[96] Interviews with Urban village *vasti* 1 resident A, 15 November 2011; *Vasti* 1 resident A, 9 December 2011; *Vasti* 5 resident E, 14 September 2011 and *Vasti* 1 Focus Group Discussion Women's Group, 13 November 2011.

they had lived in temporary structures. In the 1990's, they started building concrete houses and gradually extended their structures to the second floor. By mid 1990's, they started renting rooms to other migrants. Their community started growing (Interview, Urban village *koli* resident B, 2 November 2011).

In short, along with the settling-in of formal privately owned properties and their residents in the town-planning schemes, *vastis* emerged providing services to various communities. The master plan, a tool of the developmental state, did not provide affordable, low-income housing options in Juhu. In-migrants responded by consolidating their lifespace in *vastis* along the narrow, publicly owned lands to sustain their vital social and economic linkages to elite and middle-class groups in Juhu. A *vasti* resident of Juhu recalls this process:

> Our *vasti* evolved since the 1960's on the off-shoot of the *Irla Nallah*. At that time *Irla Nallah* was not an open drain, it was a natural creek that connected to the Arabian Sea. By the 1970's, there were many families coming in. The collector provided these households photo passes in 1976. This became some proof of the right to live on the lands by paying a monthly rent to the collector of 5 Rs per tenement. People did not feel angry about this fee. The receipt issued per month gave them security and some physical proof of their right to living there. The photopass had details of the room size; the name of the person under whose name the structure was registered, family size and other details. In 1978, the government wanted to widen the *nallah* and informed households that they had to vacate the site during the work and could return after its completion. At the time, houses were constructed out of recycled or temporary materials so people's lives were not well consolidated. They moved out from the area and returned after the work was done. No one's homes were demolished. (Interview with *Vasti* 1, resident A, 29 October 2011)

To secure their lifespaces along open spaces and the *Irla Nallah, vasti* residents drew on their relationships with *vasti dadas* and local political parties who provided funds for cultural activities through *vasti* festival committees (*sanskritik mandals*). Another set of important allies were field officers from the lower levels of the ward office and bureaucracy of the urban local body (MCGM) who were responsible for the maintenance of the public lands and deeply aware of the ground reality of the "slums" through local "slum" contacts. Officers from municipal agencies, ward office and collector's office, provided documents of recognition (such as the photopass, ration cards, monthly rent receipts and registration of family names in the electoral rolls) which reinforced by pressure from elected representatives ensured that eviction of these households from public lands could not be effected unless demanded by the state government.[97]

As new settlers were moving into Juhu, the local indigenous residents had yet to fathom the degree of change that was taking place on "their" agrarian island. A *koli* resident laments how, "a high

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[97] Interviews with *Vasti* 1 resident A, 9 December 2011, *Vasti* 2 Displaced resident B, 10 August 2011 and *Vasti* 4 Displaced resident D, 15 September 2011.

illiteracy rate, lack of community-based organization and leadership were some of the factors responsible for a steady deterioration" of their habitats and livelihoods as they struggled to integrate themselves within urbanizing Juhu. First, the *kolis* who had lived on coastal public lands were clamoring for tenure rights to restore their livelihoods. However, the lands promised to them by the state government were now housing new migrant populations that were protected by arrangements with municipal and state level elected representatives, *vasti dadas* and the municipal ward office. Gradually this led to conflict between the *kolis* and migrants. Migrants were seen as an alternative source of income by *kolis* in the village. The refusal of the state government to allow *koli* housing on the seaward side, changed their perceptions of migrants located on these lands as a threat. Second, the elite and middle-class groups perceived the presence of "slums" settled by migrants in Juhu as a "nuisance, filthy, unorganized and ruining the well-planned environs of their town planning schemes."

Rapid increase in population densities, adhoc proliferation of small-scale "informal" activities, lack of space for horizontal expansion and unorganized delivery of urban services through the civic administration, especially in waste management, created discontent amongst the resident elite in Juhu. Elite residents saw the presence of *"slums"* as a catalyst for illegal activities, crime, chaotic growth and a drain on the taxpayer.[98] By the late 1980's, a nascent elite civil society, eager to be involved in how their locality was being managed, started voicing their discontent to the ward office and the urban local body (MCGM) for improved urban services and management of their neighborhoods. Given the steady transformation of the habitats and livelihood resources of local indigenous communities, toehold for survival in the city seemed increasingly uncertain. This emergent clamoring was to create fears for *vasti* residents along the *Irla Nallah*.

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[98] Interview with Middle-Class Representative A, 9 September 2011.

3.2.3 Late 20th Century Onwards: Revisiting Visions for 'Oriental Venice' in an Aspiring World-Class City

3.2.3.1 Nascent Evolution of New Community Based Organizations in Juhu: Solid Waste Management as a Framing Device for Advanced Locality Management

By the early 1990's, economic liberalization in India led to the central government asserting the role of metropolitan cities as 'engines of economic growth'.[99] Armed with this ideology, Mumbai's corporate elite mainstreamed visions of 'transforming Mumbai into a "world-class" city through a decade of intense mobilization of the central and state governments.[100] In this context of economic liberalization, governance reforms such as the 74th CAA, 1992 were meant to initiate political decentralization to lower levels of government via re-scaling of urban governance and institutionalizing citizen participation to usher new forms of state-society relations.[101] Drawing from the 74th CAA, 1992, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) experimented with institutionalizing "citizen participation" through an Advanced Locality Management (ALM) programme that focused on solid waste management at the street level in specific neighborhoods. The success of ALM groups in solid waste management led the Corporation to entrust garden plots, beautification of roads and locality maintenance under their supervision.[102] ALM groups networked

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[99]MMRDA: 1999, 5.

[100]In the late 1990's Bombay First, (industrialist philanthropic organization) called upon McKinsey consultants to diagnose the cause for Mumbai's sluggish economic growth and develop a blueprint for Mumbai's development. This document was called Vision Mumbai (2003-2013). The website of McKinsey & Company proudly states, "The report, *Vision Mumbai*, played an important role in influencing policy makers both at the central and state levels to recognize and address the immediate need for urban renewal in the city. Taking off from the recommendations, the government of Maharashtra has established an Empowered Committee chaired by the Chief Secretary and Citizen Action Group to drive key projects like the Mumbai Metro and the Mumbai Trans Harbor Link. The recommendations made by Vision Mumbai also served as a useful basis to seek funding of over US \$1 billion from the government of India for the transformation of Mumbai under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission". (http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/india/communityservice/visionmumbai/)

[101] Pinto (2008, 55-56) explains that, "the 74th CAA, 1992, recognized the autonomy of state governments in certain sectors of decision-making (status and classification of urban settlements) and the role of municipal administrations as local self-government, the third tier in India's federation". She suggests that the 74th CAA, "attempted to build, institutional capabilities by identifying functions and taxation powers in the third tier of urban local governance, thereby, introducing multi-level governance in urban local bodies and developing a new relationship with the State government."
Also see, The Statement of Objectives of the 74th CAA, (GoI: 1993), Sivaramakrishnan (2000, 206-207) and Beard et al (2008, 55-57).

[102]Resident middle and upper class groups, local rotary organizations and clubs in Juhu engaged with the MCGM in these processes. This led to the creation of ALMs in Juhu which manned specific streets across neighborhoods, primarily *Gulmohar*, JVPD scheme and Old Juhu. Through this programme, housing societies from the same street,

with city-level NGO's such as AGNI[103], corporate philanthropic organizations and the private sector. The MCGM simultaneously initiated a "slum" adoption scheme for sanitation in *vastis*.[104] There exist differences in how the local state envisioned citizen-participation across these programmes:

1. The organized elite and middle-class groups, **perceived as a partner** with the municipal government, were given responsibilities to manage neighborhood streets. They responded by demanding active engagement with the ward office. They expanded their portfolios to include the supervision of urban services beyond neighborhood streets. In addition, they mobilized other partnerships (NGOs and corporate sector) to sustain support and the funding required for their activities. With guidance from city-based NGOs, they organized into umbrella organizations such as the Juhu Citizen's Welfare Group (JCWG).[105] Through this initiative, sixteen registered ALMs evolved across Juhu with many smaller ad-hoc groups. Acting as the voice of elite and middle-class residents, they engaged the municipal

came together to form an ALM. Their mandate included supervising effective segregation of waste and collection by civic personnel. They looked after maintenance of storm water drains and beautification along "their" streets. Gradually they demanded periodic meetings with the ward office and heads of department to discuss urban service delivery in their areas. This formalized the interface between resident middle and upper class groups and local government (MCGM).

[103] See http://www.agnimumbai.org. "Action for Good Governance and Networking in India (AGNI) is a voluntary, non-political, non-sectarian movement. It networks citizen groups to create the democratic "numbers" that political systems cannot easily ignore. It works with government agencies for transparency and accountability in them. The basic field unit of AGNI is its JAAG (Joint Area Action Group) functioning in almost every Municipal Ward. It comprises one or more Ward Coordinators and volunteers representing different areas or activities. JAAGs identify local priorities and help tackle them through interaction among the citizens, administrative set ups and elected representatives. Each JAAG may have activities different from other JAAGs. However, some activities are decided centrally and are implemented by all the JAAGs".

[104] The MCGM and *vasti* community based organizations (CBO) entered a partnership for three years to manage sanitation and hygiene in *vastis*. The CBO represented the people and implemented primary municipal services such as collection and segregation of waste and maintaining toilet blocks in *vastis*. Towards provision of equipment and salary for youth involved as personnel, the Corporation provided an annual contribution and the *vasti* households contributed Rs 10/-. The idea was that by the end of the third year the *vasti* would be self-sufficient in managing services related to waste management and sanitation. This was called the *Datak Vasti Yojana* (Slum Adoption Programme). However, this programme did not include unrecognized "slums" and pavement households. (Redkar: 2008, 221)

[105] See www.juhucitizen.org, "This umbrella organization came into being, when AGNI convened a meeting of ALM organizations and residential societies of Old Juhu in 2001, to raise awareness around electoral issues and procedures before the parliamentary elections. During this discussion it was felt that citizens should involve themselves in planning a holistic development agenda for the Juhu precinct. This created the Juhu Citizens Welfare Group (JCWG). Similarly other neighborhoods like Juhu Vile-Parle Scheme development, *Gulmohar* and *Irla* evolved resident associations that were modeled on JCWG".

government, media, the corporate sector and NGOs on civic issues concerning their neighborhood environs.

2. The organized groups of *vasti* residents, **perceived as beneficiaries**, were involved in the provision of fundamental services such as sanitation and solid waste management in their self-built habitats. Registered CBOs emerged in Juhu *vastis*, who worked through the councilor to evolve this scheme. [106] The lack of consistent funding from external sources, of periodic engagement between the Corporation and CBOs and the formalization of financial contributions from *vasti* households, plagued this initiative (Redkar: 2008, 222). Proper mechanisms for the sustenance, monitoring, evaluation and expansion of this programme were lacking. Since the youth wing of political parties under the supervision of the Councilor in power, gradually came to control these programmes in *vastis*, the *vasti* CBOs lacked the capacity and knowledge to network effectively at the electoral ward level or create umbrella factions amongst themselves to demand and sustain these service provisions.

3.2.3.2 Coalitions of New Community Based Organizations in Juhu: From Ad-Hoc Collective Action Towards Mobilizing Effectively for Representational Democracy via the Vote Juhu Campaign:

Since the inception of the ALM programme in 1997, elite and middle-class groups in Juhu were engaged in identifying factors that were gradually transforming their "once planned neighborhood".[107] They identified two key factors: the proliferation of "slums" along the *Irla*

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[106] For instance, interviews with *Vasti* 1 resident A, 9 December 2011, *Vasti* 2 Displaced resident B, 10 August 2011 and *Vasti* 4 Displaced resident D, 15 September 2011, reveal adoption of the *Datak vasti yojana* since the late 1990's. (Fieldwork August to December 2011). Redkar (2008, 221-22) suggests that "to participate in the *Datak vasti yojana* programme, "slum" CBOs had to be registered with the Charity Commissioner and required a recommendation from the Ward Councilor. This led to the dependence of the CBOs on the Councilor, Registrar and "slum" households. The CBOs emerged as 'agents of service delivery to "slum" households' and earned respect from the community. With the benefits accruing from this programme (financial and social), the Councilors prompted the youth groups within their political parties to handhold this programme. This resulted in the control and decision-making power around solid waste and sanitation in the hands of the Councilors and not with the "slum" CBOs.

[107] For instance, in an interview with a Middle-class ALM Representative, a strong perception for the need of a planned Juhu gets amplified: "Juhu scheme, as I said, was nicely designed with bungalow schemes, plotting was proper, roads were proper, everything was well planned." (Interview with Middle-Class Representative A, 9 September 2011). This tends to be the case in most, if not all, interviews across elite and middle-class ALM representatives, their quotes in the media and their organizational websites.

Nallah and the concept of unloading Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) in Juhu.[108] According to these groups, while the *"slums"* choked the flow of the *Irla Nallah* and reduced its width, unloading TDR resulted in a construction boom and a transformation of single-storey housing into multistoried buildings. Such transformations alerted ALM groups to develop street level surveillance mechanisms, to ensure the protection of open space from encroachments, the effective delivery of services by the urban local body to the so-called "tax-paying" citizens, and creation of "clean and green" streets in Juhu. Once organized under the JCWG coalition, elite and middle-class groups made a foray into local governance and area development planning in Juhu, of which at least two examples are important to be cited here.

1. First, to strengthen local governance, *Jaagran*[109] strategized to shortlist and select the "best candidate" from political parties for the municipal elections through a screening and public

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[108] The Transfer of Development Right (TDR) Policy was launched in 1991 by the MCGM, through revising the Development Control Regulations (DCR) to control growth in the island city (south) and plan suburban growth (north) in Greater Bombay. Owners whose plots were marked for public utilities or whose land was required for public purpose projects could surrender their land and get an equal amount of space in the suburbs (Western and Eastern).

The concept of Slum TDR was introduced in 1997. In this case builders redeveloping slums at no cost to the state government or slum dwellers could received slum TDR which could be used north of the scheme. By 2011, the state government decided to provide builders 33% extra FSI for a premium fee in suburban developments to augment infrastructure projects.

See "Civic Planners, Builders praise TDR", *The Times of India*, 4 April 2002, "Suburban builders can buy 33% more FSI from state" *The Times of India*, 21 October 2011; "Secret cartel inflates slum TDR rates", *The Times of India,* 10 August 2007, and "Builders' gain is city's loss", *The Times of India*, 2 March 2002. Also, Interview, Middle-class Representative B, 28 September 2011: "Private developer's indulged in unloading development rights from the island city into new private developments of Oshiwara and Lokhandwala Complex to the north of Juhu and some of the surplus found its way into the two town planning schemes (*Gulmohar* and JVPD Scheme). These plots utilized very low Floor Space Index (FSI) compared to what was permissible at the time. Both plot owners and builders reaped profits from incoming TDR in Juhu. Due to these factors, Juhu witnessed a construction boom from absorbing the incoming TDR".

[109] Interviews with ALM groups in Juhu revealed that, AGNI has been at the forefront of creating awareness, advocating and mobilizing ALM groups, NGO's and civic activists in pursuing "good governance" with the civic administration and identifying "independent, non-partisan" or "honest political" candidates for municipal elections in Mumbai and western suburban neighborhoods like Juhu since 2001. Juhu ALM groups embraced this approach, by organizing under the banner of *Jaagran,* a non-profit society, activated through the local Church. Its members were associated with AGNI. A public notice issued by *Jaagran*, before the 2002 municipal election states, "In order to move closer to our dream of a well-managed city, *Jaagran* and K-West Citizens Association (KCA) propose to help elect a good representative through a "Citizens' Consensus Candidate" plan. Come join us in ushering change. Together we can make a difference!" (*Jaagran's* Letter to All Concerned Citizens: 2001).

Interview, Elected representative, D, 25 June 2010- "*Jaagran* got the candidates amongst the local political parties and rated the candidates based on their future plans for the area through a Q&A session. At that time we chose the Congress candidate. However once he got elected, in 2002 municipal election as councilor, we were let down. He did not show any concern to the issues we raised and mostly avoided us. We attempted working with him for at least six months to a year. When there was no response from him we collaborated with the MP to realize some

debate process with the creation of a Municipal Ward Committee in K West, according to the 74th CAA, 1992,[110] after the elections. They sought to tap into the possibilities that representative democracy had to offer through electing an ALM member as the citizen's consensus candidate. In addition the new space of political inclusion promised by *Nagar Raj* was critical to consolidate and formalize the Area *Sabha* programme uniformly across Juhu. Once "inside" these invited spaces, the hope to advise the elected representatives on expenditure priorities in the ward budget, and negotiate developmental projects within Juhu. In short, the need of the hour, according to elite and middle-class groups, was an alternative governance model, inspired by a possible culture of "good governance" through representative democracy and decentralization, which "linked the ALM citizen representatives to the City Management Committee through the Municipal Ward Committee and the MLA Constituency Committee". [111] Thus, new avenues for the priorities, demands and suggestions of the "tax-paying citizen" to be heard in the City were being conceptualized via the new space of political inclusion, i.e., the Municipal Ward Committee and the Citizen's Consensus Candidate.

2. Second, in thinking about area development planning in Juhu, a model beautification project was essential to draw citywide attention. Juhu beach was a public resource that could deliver on this front. To tackle contesting claims of livelihood by beach vendors, a rebuff from the civic administration and local political processes over the issue of planning for public lands, elite and middle-class groups took recourse in the judiciary. They filed a Public Interest

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of the projects and improvements we had in mind for Juhu. People's power is strong. Civic activism is making a difference. The local ward administration and the MCGM realize that they can't ignore us anymore. The British did a nice thing they planned the city, whereas we are living in anarchy. We need to flatten everything and start from scratch. How can you plan? You have to clean the whole slate so that we can make a difference".

[110] Pinto (2008, 54-57), suggests that the key provision in the 74th CAA, was to ensure proximity of the governed to those who governed through the creation of Ward Committees (WC). Meant for grievance redressal and good governance at the local level, the WC was to be comprised of the councilors (elected from each electoral ward within an administrative municipal ward), the ward officer, and three non-voting and non-political co-opted members such as technical experts or NGO representatives. The role of the Ward Committees was to initiate meaningful interaction between civic administration, councilors and citizens. The idea was to ensure periodical elections to municipal bodies with tenure for a period of five years, devolution of functions, planning responsibilities, fiscal transfers and increasing representation for weaker sections like Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Women".

[111] Public presentation by Juhu Citizens Welfare Group, titled "Citizens Participation Through Ward Committees", October 2004, see www.juhucitizen.org

Litigation (PIL) in the Bombay High Court in 2002.[112] With a favorable Supreme Court verdict by 2004 and funds from the Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS) they were able to implement the project without any obstacles to their plans.[113]

Despite these forays into Advanced Locality Management, until 2005, JCWG achieved modest success in their own neighborhood in protecting a few recreational plots and cleaning the environs of the Juhu beach from existing "encroachments". Their efforts, however, found synergies with Mumbai's corporate elite, the state government, and "eminent citizens" through the "Vision Mumbai" document. [114] The global blueprint makers suggested that, historically, cities played a critical role in driving national economic growth in countries like China. For Mumbai to secure a space within the 21st century circuit of the global economy it would require a "world-class" city status. The promise of the global city blueprint makers was - rapid economic growth and an improved quality of life for all its citizens. (Bombay First and McKinsey: 2003). They identified "proliferation of slums" and "poor governance" as key factors amongst others that undermined Mumbai's transformation and called upon the state and central governments to act. [115] That is exactly what the state government did. By the winter of 2004, drawing on Vision Mumbai's recommendations, the state government ordered demolition drives in Mumbai. According to Mahadevia (2008) "they hoped to bypass the local elected representatives in initiating demolition action, but, invited citizen participation in the demolition drives". [116] This signaled an entry point for

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[112]Vishwanath Mada & Ors Vs State of Maharashtra& Ors; Writ Petition No 3000 of 2002, in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

[113] See www.juhucitizen.org The Juhu Citizen (Changing the Cityscape), monthly newsletter from JCWG, reported in August 2004, "In a stinging verdict, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the *Khadye Peye Vikreta* Association (Vendors Association) and the *Shivaji Smarak Mandal* against the orders passed by the Mumbai High Court on the Juhu Beach Redevelopment Plan. After hearing the arguments for almost an hour, the judges summarily dismissed their appeal and upheld the verdict of the High Court in toto. With this, the legal battle has finally ended. With the judicial endorsement of the plan, Juhu Beach is on its way to a new look".
Also see 'Rs 2 crore makeover for Juhu Beach', 11 February 2001. *Mid-day*, Mumbai

[114] Also see "Mumbai Inc to lobby for slum demolition", *Indo-Asian News Service*, 17 February 2005.

[115] Bombay First and McKinsey (2003, 1-5).

[116] Mahadevia (2008, 563-565) identifies the areas which were targeted in the 2004-2005 demolition-drives (Operation Shanghai) that rocked Mumbai. Slums were cleared from the east-west corridor of Greater Mumbai. From the western suburbs of *Malvani, Marve, Goregaon* to *Govandi, Deonar, Chembur, Ghatkopar* and *Mankhurd* in the eastern suburbs, demolition was carried out on 44 sites, clearing 288 acres of land displacing 450,000 slum dwellers (7.8% of the slum population in Mumbai, as per the Municipal census figures). For an alternative view see "Present slum area not more than eight per cent of total land? Whose city is it anyway? *The Telegraph*, 27 February 2005. Also see, Demolitions Hit Slum Dwellers like the Tsunami, *Inter Press Service*, 30 January 2005;

"eminent citizens", civic activists, NGOs and ALM groups, who supported the leadership of the state government in its decision to enforce the "rule of law".

By January 2005, the "rule of law" was enforced in Juhu, when 165 homes in the urban village along the mouth of the *Irla Nallah* were demolished.[117] The self-built housing identified as "slums", by the civic administration housed both *koli* and migrant families. Despite having documentary proof of residence, none of the evicted families were provided resettlement or rehabilitation on the contention that the lands were reserved for a public garden (*Nakshatra Udyaan*) to be developed by the Municipal Corporation under the DP reservations (1981). Most families moved into the urban village and others shifted to "slum" pockets in and around Juhu. According to the *koli* residents who lost their houses in this demolition drive:

> There were 165 houses constructed on plot no 30 along the *Irla Nallah* till 2005. A corporator complained to the collector and K West ward office that "the land reserved for the '*Nakshatra* gardens' had been engulfed by unauthorized *slum* encroachments". A nearby elite housing federation complained that the *slums* were an environmental threat since they destroyed mangroves part of a fragile marine ecosystem; illegally tapped electricity and water causing colossal losses to the municipal administration and were a burden on the taxpayer. *Slum* structures were sold off for huge amounts of money and had become a profitable business for some. Therefore demolishing the *slums* along the *nallah* was imperative to remove unauthorized settlements, restore the environmental features and develop open spaces. Using these complaints they initiated demolition action on our homes. The administration moved at a swift pace. Houses were demolished despite residents showing documents to prove their legal status. [118] Based on the Municipal Corporation's open spaces policy the cleared land was to be taken up by a locality-based organization on a caretaker or adopted basis.[119] We realized that the local politician planned to access that land as a caretaker to convert it into a club house and the elite housing federation vied to convert the land into an open public garden. We learnt this only through the RTI procedure and approached the Maharashtra Human Rights Commission for justice. (Interview with urban village *Koli* resident A, 10 November 2011).

"BMC wants evicted slum dwellers delisted", *The Times of India*, 21 January 2005. "Demolition to continue as per manifesto, says Maha CM", *Tribune News Service*, 17 February 2005.

[117] "Kolis cry foul over demolition drive", *NDTV News*, 18 February 2005. Also see "Bulldozing Rights: report on the Forced Evictions and Housing Policies for the poor in Mumbai", *Indian People's Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights*, 2005, 13.

[118] Documentary proof for tenure security include a ration card, photo pass issued by the Municipal Corporation, voters id with the name of household members in the local electoral roll, children's birth certificate issued by local hospitals, electricity bill, etc.

[119] According to the caretaker policy, initiated in 2004 by the Municipal Corporation an open plot reserved for recreational purposes could be taken over by private institutions for 33 years and they could use 33% of land for construction of ancillary structures. The adoption policy however consisted of an organization adopting the open space for a period of five-years with no provision of construction on the land. Media reports over the years have revealed a nexus between the local state and developers to convert these grounds into privatized club houses. See, "Open spaces: environmentalists to press for adoption policy", *The Indian Express*, 5 July 2009; "MLA offers club under caretaker policy", *The Indian Express*, 21 September 2007

Between 2003 to 2005 *vasti* residents along the *Irla Nallah* were approached by a coalition of developers through the volunteers or elected representatives of various political parties and junior officers (ward and municipal government), to initiate slum redevelopment projects on the lands they had occupied. Despite the demolition drives in the city, *vasti* households along the *Irla Nallah* had been assured home ownership through slum redevelopment projects. Their eviction from the *Irla Nallah,* however, became possible only in late 2008.[120]

To understand the set of events and actors that caused demolition drives in Juhu, in the winter of 2008, I need to revisit an event in the monsoon of 2005, the flash floods that brought *Mumbai* to a standstill.[121] The devastation of lives and property caused by the floods, initiated public debates through the print and electronic media on the causes of flooding. Mumbai's corporate, technocratic and resident elites suggested that the civic administration was ill-prepared for a "natural disaster".[122] Environmental activists, however, suggested that it was a "man-made disaster", in that the reclamation of the marshlands and mangroves along the *Mithi* River, by the *Mumbai* Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), was a critical factor that had caused flooding.[123] This devastation caused a public outcry. The elite and middle-class groups accessed the media, to voice their anger against the municipal and state government. [124] In response, to this targeted ire from specific segments of society, the GoM appointed the *Chitale* Committee in 2006, to analyze "the

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[120] "Residents fear scrap dealers will become permanent settlers along Irla nallah", *The Times of India,* 5 November 2008.

[121] The flash floods were caused by a combination of unprecedented rainfall, 944 mm of rainfall on 26 July 2005, coupled with a high tide sea level. For detailed coverage on the devastation, the ensuing blame game and recommendations see, "Mumbai trains cancelled, flights grounded", *The Hindu,* 2 August 2005. "Heavy rains lash Mumbai", *The Hindu,* 1 August 2005, "Complete breakdown in Mumbai, 108 dead", *The Times of India*, 28 July 2005. "Mumbai under water, city at a standstill", *The Times of India*, 27 July 2005.

[122] "City as Hero No 1", *The Indian Express*, 2 August 2005 suggested: "After last week's unprecedented deluge, which submerged parts of Mumbai, a post-mortem is in order. No natural calamity should be allowed to cripple India's financial centre". "Floods dash Mumbai's bid to become a new Shanghai", *Sunday Business,* 7 August 2005; "Citizens' panel to probe Mumbai floods", *The Hindu,* 3 September 2005; "Lessons from the Mumbai Deluge", *The Hindu,* 28 August 2005; "Citizens' report on Mumbai floods likely by October 31", *The Hindu* 26 September 2005; "Mumbai after the rain: Piecemeal policies", *The Hindu,* 9 September 2005.

[123] "Give Mithi 150 acres say experts", *DNA*, 13 October 2005; "Torrential rains unearth a city's frailties: hasty development weakened Mumbai", Third edition, *International Herald Tribune,* 4 August 2005.

[124] "PILs seek to put City back on Track", *The Times of India*, 15 August 2005 read: "We have lost faith in the government. Our only hope is the judiciary".
"Make Mumbai a city-state', *Mumbai Mirror*, 5 August 2005 said: "Mumbai needs an alternative administration and should be treated as a city-state, because the politicians do not want to do anything for the city but only for their constituencies".

causative factors of flooding, the existing situation of the storm water and sewerage disposal systems and developing guiding principles for development of these systems".[125] Drawing from the BRIMSTOWAD Report, 1993, prepared by international technical consultants, the *Chitale* Committee suggested the removal of "encroachment structures in or above the *nalla*" and "preparation of plans at the Ward level with citizen participation through creation of ALM's".[126]

Corporate elites and technocrats, environmentalists, NGOs and locality-based ALM groups drew on the *Chitale* Committee Report and McKinsey's Vision Mumbai Report to frame the problem of the floods as a crisis of governance, environmental and city management. They suggested a "need for systemic reforms in municipal governance" that had led to the encroachment of the city's environmental assets, poor solid waste management and storm water and sewerage infrastructure, lack of a disaster management plan for the city and outdated weather forecasting equipment.[127] The coalition of ALMs in Juhu, could now rationalize their framing of "slums" around the *Irla Nallah* as a nuisance in two ways. First, they framed "slums" as a form of "environmental degradation and a health hazard" due to direct waste disposal into the *nallah*, and as an environmental hazard due to "encroachment over the *nallah*". Second, they framed "slums" as a land use question. They argued that the proliferation of *"slums"* was a result of poor enforcement of laws, and therefore, called for a stronger enforcement strategy to reclaim the *Irla nallah* as an environmental resource.

In June 2006, *Loksatta* launched its "Vote *Mumbai*" Campaign.[128] This grand coalition of forty NGOs, ALMs and smaller ad-hoc groups, based itself against the backdrop of the overburdened infrastructure and its failure during the *Mumbai* floods. It claimed to represent the voice of the

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[125]GoM (2006, 6).
[126]GoM (2006, 260-261).
[127] For the opinions of *Loksatta* see *Loksatta* Manifesto, "An introduction to the New Mumbai, Defining systemic reforms for the governance of Mumbai city and Mumbai Metropolitan Region". Also see, "Make Mumbai a special administrative area", *The Times of India*, 14 September 2005; "Make Mumbai a city-state", *Mumbai Mirror*, 5 August 2005; "Directly elected Mumbai mayor demanded", *The Hindu,* 29 September 2005.
[128] See www.loksatta.org. Vote Mumbai campaign focused on systemic reforms to empower urban local governance - through the implementation of the Metropolitan Planning Committee, creation of Area *Sabhas*, directly elected Mayor in the Municipal Corporation and formulation of other instruments and systems of accountability in Mumbai.

"informed public of *Mumbai*" who demanded *Mumbai's* transformation from a "decaying city into a *global*, *world class* city".[129]

With support from civil society organizations such as *Loksatta* and *Janaagraha,* Juhu's ALM groups jointly developed mechanisms to implement a *Nagar Raj*-based political experiment in Juhu. In short, elite and middle-class groups found "new" ways to mobilize direct action. The idea was to contest the 2007 municipal elections to access political power, democratize neighborhood level decision-making, and create new forms of accountability in Juhu's local governance. In short, ALM groups in Juhu had hoped to compel the municipal state and its agencies to implement the frameworks of decentralized governance at the sub-ward and ward level that would help citizens influence local area decision-making, through suggesting priorities and needs from a locality-based perspective. An Area *Sabha* representative recounts the need for the experiment:

> To manage and govern parts of the City there are ward offices with a ward officer and department heads. The ward office acts as a basic unit of governance for the administrative ward and reports to the Municipal Corporation. Councilors are the link between citizens, the ward office and the Municipal Corporation. The Municipal Ward Committee appointed by the state government, comprised of the ward officer, Councilors (as an advisor with voting rights), and members of non-profit agencies such as NGOs (without voting rights). Until 2007, the Municipal Ward Committee avoided making any connections with the ALMs. It was essential to create links with the ward office. If the Councilor was a local person he would be aware of the ground realities of that area and could suitably inform civic staff and the Corporation. Area Sabhas in their present form are not part of the Corporation or the ward. The area sabha concept came with the *Nagar Raj* Bill, earlier this concept did not exist. *Nagar Raj* is effective because it provides rights and power to each resident of the polling booth area to vote the area sabha representative and Councilor. Area Sabha representatives are volunteers, citizens of the local area and act as a link between the Councilor and residents of the neighborhoods. It gives power in the hands of people because if he underperforms, he will have to face local people, who will demand accountability and transparency from him. That was the idea. (Interview, Middle-Class Representative, B, 28 September 2011)

In the buzz created by the Vote *Mumbai* Campaign, was a lesson for Juhu's ALM groups. Until the 2007 municipal elections, it is crucial to note that the residents of the *gaothan* and *koliwada* settlements were perceived as "slum" dwellers within Juhu's civic activism circles. I draw on Roy's (2009) formulation of the "politics of inclusion" to explain how former indigenous groups became key allies of the ALM groups by identifying two common threats - the migrant "slum" dwellers and private developer lobbies.[130] This *Nagar Raj*-based political experiment saw the nascent evolution of

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[129] Shende (2006).

[130] Roy (2009, 161) suggests that "civic regimes produce a governmentalization of the state, recreating the terms of rule and citizenship. There is also a "civilizing" of political society, such that grassroots governmentality comes to turn on formations of civic identity and a broader civic commitment to the idea of a unified city. [...] within

Nagriksatta Ward 63 Association in 2007.[131] Modeled as an umbrella organization, it represented four major local blocs[132] - Juhu Citizen's Welfare Group (JCWG), the Gulmohar Area Society Welfare Group (GASWG), the 14 society Juhu Scheme Residents Association (JSRA) and the *Gaothans* Active Residents Association of Juhu (GARAJ) representing two *gaothans*. They enjoyed informal "outside" support from the *koli* community based organization of the urban village representing one *koliwada*.[133] A core group member of *Nagriksatta* describes the process of the Vote Juhu Campaign:

> The state government never wanted *Nagar Raj* and it was kept on the backburner. *Loksatta* and *Janaagraha* advocated for it and they were wondering which area in *Mumbai* would experiment with this idea. So they scouted for neighborhoods which had some civic activism in place. Juhu was a good candidate because of the elite people and the fact that they would not go in for only short term gain but opt for a long term vision. Then few active residents from ALMs were involved as a core team in the "Vote Juhu" process to create a model on the ground. Juhu was subdivided into five zones (Old Juhu, JVPD, *Gulmohar*, *Irla* and *Ruia* Park) with one person as a member on the core committee. The people chose their ASR through the existing ALMs. Twenty-seven polling booths exist in Juhu and so we created 27 area sabhas. But we didn't have 27 ASRs due to lack of enthusiasm or time issues. In case of slums they were excluded because of being involved with corrupt political parties. Our monthly newsletter, regular public meetings and core group meetings were organized to mainstream these ideas across Juhu. The volunteers were professionals, business people, housewives, retired people and students. The critical difference between the Citizen's Consensus Councilor and any other independent non-partisan candidate was that the people supported him through voting and backed his claim to contest the elections. It involved people's participation. This process was based on *Nagar Raj* concept. This is the first time in India that a Citizen's Consensus Councilor was nominated and elected to office for five years in Juhu. (Interview, Middle-class Representative A, 9 September 2011).

In short, middle-class groups replicated mainstream electoral processes in evolving an alternative grassroots model of governance, through Vote Juhu. They imagined it as a democratic process, without corrupt politics, money and muscle power.[134] As Zerah (2007) suggests,

> political mobilization of ALMs and their constituencies, by civil society organizations, created elitist visions of local democracy that contradicted the democratization and empowerment aimed at by the 74th CAA, 1992. On the one hand rallying voters can be interpreted as relegitimizing representative democracy by enhancing people's

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regimes of civic governmentality the urban subject is simultaneously empowered and self-disciplined, civil and mobilized, displaced and compensated. Such contradictions constitute the politics of inclusion [...] how subjects and spaces come to be inside the project of citizenship". Interviews with Middle-Class Representative, A, 9 September 2011 and Elected representative, D, 22 August, 2011.

[131] The Association was a registered public trust established to receive funds for the voluntary works that ASR's were doing besides re-organizing groups for the Vote Juhu process. After the elections this organization was used to raise funds to cover costs of communication materials, core group meeting expenses, office rental and part-time staff salaries, equipment, electricity and utility expenses etc. This set-up was to aid the Citizens Consensus Councilor who didn't have any political party support or funds for functioning (Interview, Middle-Class Representative, A, 9 September 2011).

[132] See www.nagriksatta.org

[133] Interview, Urban village *Koli* resident A, 10 October 2011.

[134] Interview, Elected representative, D, 22 August 2011.

participation at election time, on the other hand the councilor had to be educated, efficient and good. Hence local democracy (according to middle-class actors) is above all about efficiency in governance and well-spirited citizens are better equipped to hold local responsibilities (Zerah: 2007, 65).

Juhu's demographic composition[135], delimitation of the electoral ward boundary[136], non-reservation of the electoral seat[137] and selective inclusion of *gaothan* and "slum" dwellers (actually *koliwada* residents)* were factors significant to the success of the *Nagar Raj* experiment, mobilized and implemented by ALM groups. *Nagar Raj* provided elite and middle-class organized collectives an entry point into political space to engage the local state through the successful people's candidate. It was the victory of the Citizens Consensus Councilor that brought about changes in local community power structures in Juhu. A stronghold of the Congress party since the 1960's, Juhu was mostly governed by Congress councilors, MLAs and the MPs except for a brief period when the Shiv Sena was in power at the state level (1995-2000). Because of the *Nagar Raj* experiment, for the first time in sixty years there was a non-Congress councilor in Juhu, an independent candidate from an organized civil society organization. This was perceived as a threat by *vasti* dwellers whose existence on public lands in Juhu and access to local government (the ward office and Municipal Corporation) was consolidated from ties with the local and state-level elected representatives. Besides the *vasti* residents, how did residents from *gaothans* and the *koliwada* gain from the Vote Juhu process of perceived empowerment? The *Gaothans* Active Residents Association of Juhu (GARAJ) tried to revive the *panchayat* system in Juhu's *gaothans*. [138] The *panchayat* (rural governance system) initiated in Juhu's *gaothans* was not recognized in the urban jurisdiction of the

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[135] The general perception of Juhu is of an elite neighborhood known for its beach, hotels, film stars and entertainment activities. My fieldwork however, has traced the presence of *vasti* neighborhoods, *chawls*, and urban villages such as *gaothans* and a *koliwada* comprising former indigenous communities and *vasti* residents.

[136] Zerah (2007, 66), suggests that "redrawing the (electoral) ward boundary prior to the 2007 municipal elections effectively reduced slum territories to only 20% in ward 63 and their political power through votebank politics, as against the average figure of more than 50% of Mumbai's population living in slums". Benjamin (2010, 122) suggests that "this delimitation exercise was one of several other factors that resulted in the success of the Vote Juhu Campaign. Key amongst these factors were the mobilization of the elite and middle-class vote by Juhu's celebrity community and the presence of Muslim candidates who 'split' the vote reducing the chances of the Congress I to succeed in this constituency".

[137] In keeping with the provisions of the 74th CAA, 1992, seats in the municipal elections are reserved for women, SC/ST or OBC candidates on a rotation basis, decided by the State Election Commission. The Juhu seat was not reserved in the 2007 municipal election.

[138] "Juhu gaothan gets new sarpanch", *The Times of India*, 27 July 2009 -"The election was an attempt to revive the old panchayat system of the villages in a modern avatar so that the Gaothans get better civic amenities said Gleason Baretto of GARAJ, an NGO working for the *Gaothans*. The *Gaothan* movement is getting management inputs from the NM Institute of Management which is involved in the project".

Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. The Citizen's Consensus Councilor, however, supported it as an experiment under the *Nagar Raj* model of urban governance.[139] The *kolis* did not implement *panchayat* elections in their urban village due to -lack of education, poor communication skills, lack of time and fear of standing up against state elected representatives whose informants existed in the *koli* community.[140] After 2007, the exclusion of *vasti* residents from the Vote Juhu Campaign, because of their perceived relations with "corrupt" political parties, was to have severe implications.

3.2.3.3 Popularizing Bourgeois Environmentalism through Master Planning Juhu: Revisiting Visions of 'Oriental Venice'

With the success of the Vote Juhu Campaign, the elite and middle-class groups, worked under the guidance of *Janaagraha* (Bangalore) to implement their visions for Juhu via local area development planning focusing on "slum" redevelopment and protecting open spaces.[141] By January 2008, the Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU)[142] under the aegis of the JNNURM, organized a meeting to initiate redevelopment at the electoral ward level via "community-driven" pilot projects. Retired bureaucrats, NGOs, architects, academic institutions involved in planning studies, World Bank officials and 227 elected representatives across the 24 Municipal Wards in Mumbai were invited for discussions. Of the eleven councilors who responded, Juhu was represented by the Citizen's Consensus Councilor who shared "Juhu Vision" under the banner of the Juhu Area *Sabha* Representatives coalition.[143] This vision focused on the transformation of Juhu into a model

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[139] "This Sunday Juhu gaothan will elect a new sarpanch", *The Times of India*, 25 July 2009 : "Under the *Nagar Raj* Bill, as conceptualized by the Union government, citizens of an area, which is one polling booth (800-1,200 voters), must elect an area *sabha* representative. The representative is part of the Councilor's ward committee and helps in its administration. The Juhu gaothan has around 800 voters. The area *sabha* representative will help the corporator undertake civic work in his area and provide a better quality of life to citizens of the area".
[140] Interview, Urban village *koli* resident A, 23 September 2011
[141] "Vision Juhu is now on top of their agenda", *The Times of India*, 12 February 2007.
[142] See http://www.visionmumbai.org/ "It was a joint initiative of the World Bank, Cities Alliance, USAID, All India Institute of Local Self-Government and Government of Maharashtra setup in 2005, to facilitate the process of Mumbai's transformation into a world-class city. Conversations with researchers revealed the need for community driven projects emerged from studies of slum pockets and cessed buildings in Mumbai that showed distinct peculiarities that could not be easily re-organized through universalized planning norms".
[143] See Juhu Vision Report (2008) prepared by *Nagriksatta* for Mumbai Transformation Support Unit and "Juhu residents move HC regarding Irla slum demolition", *The Times of India*, 16 July 2007.

neighborhood through key projects including conversion of the *Irla Nallah*.[144] With "slum" clearance, de-silting and solid waste removal a transformation of the *Irla Nallah* was believed to be possible. The vision spoke for about 30% of Juhu's population living in *vastis* who would have to be re-housed but whom, of course, had not been consulted nor would they have benefited from this scheme. In a few months, the state government initiated the idea of developing a "Concept Plan for Mumbai" and its metropolitan region to fulfill the requirements of the JNNURM project.[145] MTSU was chosen as the project coordinator. The MTSU's effort at steering community-driven pilot projects was never heard of again. By late 2008, Juhu's ALM groups accessed exclusive "public consultations" organized by the state government in collaboration with the elite corporate sector, for Mumbai's transformation via the Citizen's Consensus Councilor.[146] These meetings gave them a heads-up on new infrastructural projects such as (the Metro rail project, the coastal road project and expansion of Juhu Flying club into the Arabian Sea) that were being implemented through the JNNURM. The coalition of ASR and ALM groups in Juhu perceived these projects as ill-planned

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[144] Interview, Middle-class Representative, 9 September 2011: "There is a huge *nallah* that runs through Juhu. It was in a sad state- open and a place for breeding mosquitoes. Earlier there were slums overlooking the *nallah* their waste was thrown in it and was never cleaned for 10-15 years. The slums were the main problem - haphazard and expanding over the *nallah* reducing its width. This was dangerous as highlighted by the Mumbai floods in 2005. We had made a planning proposal that we convert *Irla nallah* into a beautiful water body like Venetian canals with gondolas sailing through it and develop the area around as public space. We hope to ecologically restore the *Irla nallah*, develop a green buffer along its length, create walking and cycling tracks, introduce cultural spaces –amphitheatre, exhibition centre, children's play area and gardens. The slums should be rehabilitated, but somewhere else. "

[145] See www.visionmumbai.org, for the project vision which suggests "The Concept Plan for Mumbai Metropolitan region was developed on the behest of Bombay First. On the advice of the GoM, Mumbai Transformation Support Unit has taken up the task of the preparation of the plan for the horizon year 2052. The objective is to prepare a plan with a view to integrating towns and cities to promote balanced development of the region. It is conceived as a plan that will optimize distribution of economic activities and housing with transport infrastructure. MTSU has appointed Surbana International, Singapore as consultants. The GoM has setup a steering committee under the Metropolitan Commissioner, MMRDA to oversee and guide the process of concept plan".

[146] Coelho et al. (2011, 7) identify the emergent trend of exclusive public consultations as part of the JNNURM project process- "When exclusive enclaves in hotel ballrooms or corporate conference halls are termed public consultations, there is a suggestion of new kind of public being addressed. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that these enclaves sport an increasingly familiar parade of participants, from select academic institutions, consultant firms, think tanks, NGOs and professional agencies, along with the occasional representative of a particularly prominent Resident Welfare Association. This familiarity appears to operate not only within but across cities in the country: a noteworthy feature of these new sites of consultation and collaboration is what is emerging as small but tight national networks of persons associated in various consultant capacities with urban infrastructure investment projects, carrying out tasks ranging from community mobilization to preparation of policy toolkits and detailed project reports. The unexpected (and usually uninvited) entry of members of the urban poor into these enclaves is a palpably uncomfortable intrusion, especially since organizers of these events carefully refrain from announcing them too widely in the popular press".

and detrimental to the planned nature of Juhu. [147] The appointment of professional experts (also Juhu residents) to the Concept Plan of Mumbai, working Committee, created a possibility for ALM groups to influence the re-routing of JNNURM infrastructural projects.[148] The professional experts mostly architects and urban designers, collaborated with an architecture school in Juhu, to create a blueprint for master planning public lands - open spaces, JNNURM infrastructure corridors, "slum" redevelopment and public utilities. These ideas and the physical blueprint, called "Vision Juhu" was modeled along the lines of the "Vision Mumbai" document identifying problems, quick-fix and long-term solutions. Vision Juhu promoted "neighborhood planning" as a way forward to address the dilemmas that faced development planning in Mumbai. Mainstreamed across the press, local ALM groups, advocacy NGO networks in the western suburbs, state and municipal government agencies, and the corporate elite, Vision Juhu aspired to inform the development planning process for Mumbai.[149] The ALM groups organized public protests outside the offices of para-statal

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[147] Interview, Elected representative D, 22 August 2011, "Most of these projects have not consulted local citizens. Who propagates these projects? Why are foreign consultants involved who do not understand the ground reality? The citizens are against these ridiculous projects. In a democracy can the bureaucratic administration take a decision on what has to be done without consulting the executive (MP, MLA, councilor) or the people themselves? The state government is mostly sanctioning big projects which we may not require. Participation is the only way to make this change, participation can be ensured through organizing people."
These comments highlight that civil society is not necessarily neatly in line with corporate elite or state government visions for the "world-class" city. Elite and middle-class groups and *gaothan* residents have contesting visions for Juhu's future focused on their territorial needs and aspirations. In 2007 *vasti* residents were excluded while *koli* residents were tactically included (as "slum dweller" support) by ALM groups in creating the impression of a uniform mobilized front against political parties. During my fieldwork in 2011, I found that there were new cleavages within the coalition of ALM groups based on those whose property was being affected by the state government led Metro-rail project and the efforts of the Citizen Consensus councilor to mainstream the idea of the People's candidate via *Nagar Raj* across Mumbai. In December 2011 the united ALM coalition in Juhu seems to be weakened by fragmentation caused by conflicting sense of locality problems, alternate political resources, new collaborators and access to decision-making circuits and complaints of politicization of key leaders. This complicates the popular narrative of a homogeneous, united and "civilized" middle-class actor.
[148] The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) is a flagship project of the GoI. It envisages fast track growth and development in 63 selective cities in the country. (www.jnnurm.gov.nic.in)
[149] See "Planning For Mumbai the Neighborhood Way- Case Study Vision Juhu", February 2011. "Vision Juhu is a pragmatic proposal in consultation with many resident groups, elected representatives, government officials and eminent citizens. It has been prepared professionally and scientifically, to devise a strategy to make Juhu a congenial location to live in. It includes conserving reserved open spaces and creating new ones, pedestrianization, significant solutions to flooding in Juhu, development of the *Irla nallah*, improvement in transport infrastructure by skillfully integrating the proposed Metro rail and re-planning traffic flow, opening up of several accesses to the beach, appraisal of social amenities like educational and health facilities and making them accessible to all, improvement in the standard of living in slums and gaothans, provision of space and security to hawkers and including them in mainstream development plans and networking this public realm"(Vision Juhu: 2008, 62)

agencies to voice their opposition, while resident professional experts, business and celebrity elite met with bureaucrats, political party bosses and the Chief Minister.[150] They reiterated the need to re-route the metro rail project that affected their homes in Juhu, stall the extension of the Flying Club lands and re-consider the route of the coastal road project. Instead, they asked for the implementation of the BRIMSTOWAD project along the *Irla Nallah* to prevent flooding in Juhu.[151]

For elite and middle-class groups in Juhu, the locality-specific problems were not road or railway infrastructure as envisioned by the state government, corporate elites and international planning consultants. Their problems were "slums" that "illegally occupied" public lands reserved for open spaces in the development plan 1981, ad-hoc developer driven development, poor delivery of urban services, local governance and locality-management. Instead, the state government planned to initiate infrastructure projects that would disturb the planned housing schemes in the heart of Juhu. Implementing the BRIMSTOWAD project on the other hand, would initiate the implementation of the "neighborhood plan" in the production of "community-envisioned" public space in Juhu through the removal of "slums" and widening the *Irla Nallah*. Elite and middle-class groups suggested that nothing less than an ecological restoration of the *Irla Nallah* to its former condition was the solution, in the "public interest". Thus in 2008, a century after Jamsetji Tata had proposed transforming Juhu into an "Oriental Venice" elite and middle-class ALM groups drew inspirations from archaic bourgeois perceptions of the planned suburb and what planned neighborhood development "should" look like.[152] They popularized and ensured implementation of their ideas through "Vision Juhu" a comprehensive physical blueprint by professional experts from Juhu modeled on the rationale of the "Vision Mumbai".[153]

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[150] "Juhu homes will not be damaged says MMRDA", *The Times of India*, 1 September 2010.
[151] "There may be no flooding at JVPD next monsoon: BMC", *The Times of India*, 17 December 2008 and 'Reclaiming beaches and open spaces', *The Times of India*, 21 August 2010.
[152] "Tata dreamed of Venice in Juhu", October 2005, *The Juhu Citizen*. See, www.juhucitizen.org
[153] "Finally 18 acre Juhu city forest project to take-off", *The Times of India* 12 August 2011.

3.2.3.4 Place-Breaking Tendencies Along the *Irla Nallah* Enabled by *Nagar Raj*, Bourgeois Environmentalism and Micro-Urban Renewal

Vision Mumbai and the Mumbai floods, created pressures on the state government from Mumbai's corporate elite, and the Centre to implement infrastructure projects under JNNURM. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai faced pressure from ALM groups, NGOs and the judiciary to implement the BRIMSTOWAD project. [154] This resulted in ad-hoc implementation of the BRIMSTOWAD project across the city and the widening of the *Irla Nallah* in Juhu. In addition to the funds from the JNNURM that the state and municipal government received, resident groups could access the Community Participation Fund (CPF) via the Citizens Consensus Councilor by 2008.[155] *Vasti*s along the banks of the *Irla Nallah* witnessed forced evictions of families, demolition of their self-built habitats, displacement of people to the municipal limits of the City and erasure of their socio-economic structures.[156] The eviction of *vastis* and demands from elite and middle-class resident groups for neighborhood planning created a political opportunity for local developers. The developer-led coalition moved in to develop slum redevelopment schemes for non-affected locality based "slum" dwellers on the cleared lands of the *Irla Nallah*. This allowed the coalitions an opportunity to exploit the real estate values of the land through the sale component of the slum redevelopment project. The hectic pace of slum redevelopment on the cleared lands provided incentives of slum TDRs to the coalitions but acted as a spoiler to the plans of transforming Juhu into the "garden suburb" with its own "Venetian scheme" that the ALM coalition had envisioned for these lands.[157] For the developer-led coalitions, the *Irla Nallah* widening project became a political

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[154] "Juhu residents move HC regarding Irla slum demolition", *The Times of India*, 16 July 2007.

[155] Sivaramakrishnan (2011, 154) explains, "in addition to existing resources the JNNURM's Community Participation fund (CPF) instituted by 2005, promised a boost to ward/sub-ward level neighborhood projects. The CPF was available for small scale projects which cost up to 1-2 million Indian Rupees. These projects were to be designed and executed by community organizations. The projects funded could include solid waste management, sanitation, minor roads, drainage works, community centers, crèches, citizen information centres, renovation to municipal markets and provision of planned hawker zones. The community organizations had to work closely with municipal government since this collaboration was a requisite for funding. In short, the fund allows community based organizations to formulate and undertake a project catering to specific needs of a community using central financial help.

[156] "City body to raze 250 unauthorized hutments", *The Times of India*, 11 December 2008.

[157] Interview, Middle-Class Representative, 9 September 2011, "It was decided in the area *sabha* meetings that one plot of land along the *Irla Nallah*, cleared of slums should be developed and converted into a garden. The civil work had begun with the Citizens Consensus Councilor's fund and support from resident private donors. When the work was nearing completion, the additional Municipal Commissioner's team came and demolished the garden. This was done without any prior notice or information. When questioned about this action he said that

opportunity to access contiguous strips of vacant land that could be reassembled as land banks for slum redevelopment projects and attract slum TDR on prime real estate in Juhu with tremendous potential for profits.[158]

The demolition of *vastis* along the *Irla Nallah* and attempts of converting the lands in the urban village along the *nallah* for private club houses compelled the *kolis* to make "one of the last remaining patches of open land in *their* region their own".[159] Organized through the urban village community-based organization, they planned to develop and maintain the open space through applying for the JNNURM Community Participation Fund (CPF). The initiation of the *Irla Nallah* widening under the BRIMSTOWAD project, however, foresaw the provision of a pumping station complex on the open land near the urban village.[160] This abruptly ended any hopes of the *kolis* to stake a claim to what they perceived as "their lands" either for home ownership or recreational facilities for their community. The *vastis* along the *nallah* faced the threat of displacement with the

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the land was meant for a road as per the 1981 Development plan. The Citizens Consensus Councilor appealed this decision with the Corporation. The money had been spent and the work of creating a public amenity was nearing completion when it was demolished by the Corporation. We suggested that till the road was constructed the garden could have remained, or alternatively another existing road could have been widened and this patch converted into a garden so that the locality residents could have enjoyed the garden. With this response from the Corporation the residents have lost interest in pursuing civic activism". For details of this story see "Civic body bulldozes part of Juhu garden", *The Times of India*, 20 May 2009.

[158] Interview, Middle-Class Representative, 9 September 2011, "A plot of land along the *Irla Nallah* meant for open spaces was converted by a builder into a slum redevelopment project. Through RTI applications we realized that the builder had changed the land use; exceeded the height restriction and that wealthy people had booked flats in the redevelopment buildings meant for slum dwellers. When this came to light through the media the work was stalled by the Corporation. Also see "Millionaire slumdogs: The high and mighty turn poor to grab free flats meant for the destitute", *Mail Online India*, 6 April 2012, and "BMC stops controversial slum rehab project", *The Times of India*, Mumbai, 13 November 2011 for examples of adhoc implementation of slum redevelopment in Juhu.

[159] See "Landless *kolis* pitch for open space: Fishermen seek Central government aid to adopt a playground", *The Times of India*, 10 December 2007.

[160] See *Chitale Committee Report* (2006 83, 88), "The *Natu* Committee initiated a new direction for handling the flooding situation with modern technologies – like gates, barrages and pumping stations. BRIMSTOWAD was an excellent next step that introduced the catchment management approach for the storm water issues in Mumbai. [...]it is clear that the storm water related issues are gradually getting better defined on the technical side. [....] The whole problem of flooding has arisen as the storm water drains are discharging rain water directly by gravity in the sea through outfalls. If balancing reservoirs are constructed with adequate sluice gates to receive storm water from low lying areas and the same is discharged in the sea during low tide the severity of the problem will be much reduced. At times storm water will have to be discharged through pumping stations. However this will involve establishment of huge pumps to be used for brief periods and on rare occasions. Its necessity, location and capacity will be an area of study for the MCGM". Also see, "There may be no flooding at JVPD next monsoon: BMC", *The Times of India*, 17 December 2008.

Irla Nallah widening project. This table summarizes the quick-paced place-breaking tendencies of the local state and its allies along the *Irla Nallah* from 2007-2010 in the implementation of the *Irla Nallah* widening project (BRIMSTOWAD).[161]

Year of Eviction	Demolished *vasti*s	No of housing units	Resettlement	
			ineligible	eligible
2005	Urban Village extension area adjacent to *Irla Nallah*	165	165	0
2007	*Vasti* One	207	150	57
2008	*Vasti* Two	120	50	70
2008	*Vasti* Three	100	156	94
2008	*Vasti* Four	150		
2010	*Vasti* Five	140	70	70

Table 3-1 "Place-breaking" tendencies of JNNURM-funded *Irla Nallah* redevelopment project.

How did *vasti* residents of Juhu mobilize and frame responses to place breaking tendencies, i.e., demolition notices and displacement from the *Irla Nallah* lands to involuntary resettlement sites at the edge of the City limits? How did they represent their claims to the lands that had been "home" and a form of social security to them since the 1960's, but were now being envisioned by elite and middle-class residents as recreational "public space", and by local coalitions of developer-elected representative and bureaucrats as prime real estate? By 2008, *vasti* residents received eviction notices from the Collector's office and the Municipal Corporation. The widening of the *Irla Nallah*

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[161] When I conducted fieldwork from August to December, 2011, I met individuals who were displaced from these six identified *vastis* along the *Irla Nallah*. Figures have been sourced from interviews with displaced residents who have been pursuing this issue ever since.

was announced as a major public purpose project by the municipal council with the promise that those affected (*vasti* residents) would be resettled.[162]

In this study I focused on six *vastis* along the *Irla Nallah* and recorded oral histories of key displaced residents.[163] Most of these residents were found ineligible for resettlement, few were resettled at the municipal limits of Greater Mumbai at Rawalpada, Dahisar (East), residents of two *vastis* lived in in-situ transit camps and a few residents of one *vasti* had home ownership in a slum redevelopment scheme in Juhu.[164] Recognizing the adhoc process of eviction a *vasti* resident articulates the politics of eviction in Juhu that reveals the work of the local coalitions of developer-bureaucracy and elected representative:

> There are two reasons why serving us demolition notices doesn't make sense. First we are located on an offshoot of the major *Irla Nallah*. Second with the diversion of the southern tributary of the *Irla Nallah* (implemented as per the Chitale Committee's recommendations) the load on the *Irla Nallah* has been reduced. The Corporation plan however shows our *vasti* as being located on the *Irla Nallah*. When we asked municipal officers (Storm Water Drainage, Planning cell, BRIMSTOWAD) of the MCGM they say these orders come "from above". Till date we have never figured out "who is above"? Municipal ward committee members and the top Corporation officials are clueless of the ground reality; they refer to reports created by their junior staff. What we have found out through the right to information procedure is that to provide an access road to a builder for a slum redevelopment project the Corporation wants to provide a right of way through our *vasti* lands- so we are being evicted. In addition the *Irla Nallah* has been re-aligned in a way to provide more land on the developer's side and reduce the lands on which our *vasti* stands. The only beneficiary for this road alignment and *nallah* widening project is the developer whose land values will increase. For us we will lose everything we consolidated since thirty-five years! (Interview, *Vasti* 1, resident A, 23 November 2011)[165]

Discussions with displaced residents reveal a four stage eviction process: serving eviction notices to *vasti* residents by the municipal administration, verifying eligibility of each family based on

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[162] The state and municipal government agencies have adopted the definitions of project affected persons, resettlement and rehabilitation for development induced displacement from the World Bank funded MUTP-MUIP project of 2007. Refer Glossary for details.

[163] My fieldwork revealed that demolished *vastis* broadly had two types of residents on the basis of ownership of a structure and therefore rights to rehabilitation or compensation through resettlement. The first are those who had some recognized forms of ownership of the housing unit (through transaction with a previous owner or self-built) and others who had no-recognized forms of ownership (tenants). The tenants rented the upper storey of a housing unit, comprising informal labour (single male migrants and in some cases relatives or friends).These residents lacked any voice within the *vasti* as their occupancy is based on informal arrangements emerging from mutual trust. These tenant residents were mostly ineligible for rehabilitation or resettlement even if they fell within the cut-off-date logic (residing in the *vasti* before 1 January 1995) for redevelopment. This discrimination is embedded in the eligibility criteria of the slum redevelopment regulations. So these groups tend to be the most disadvantaged often having no recourse either to home ownership through rehabilitation, or resettlement or compensation.

[164] "City body to raze 250 unauthorized hutments", *The Times of India*, 11 December, 2008.

[165] "Land plan altered in Juhu for SRA project", *The Times of India*, 27 October, 2011.

documents relating to duration of residence in the *vasti*, announcing the names of eligible residents and distribution of keys to rehabilitation homes and finally demolition of the housing units of the *vasti* on the banks of the *Irla Nallah*.[166] *Vasti* residents recollect the eviction process:

> We were given an eviction notice in the week when the Mumbai terror attacks took place in November 2008. It was the time of children's exams, the city was in a state of curfew and we had not made any provisions to re-house our families. We requested a week's extension. They came a week later and demolished our houses in the winter of December. (Interview, *Vasti* 2, Displaced resident B, 10 August 2011).

> In August, 2008 the deputy collector, encroachment division issued an eviction notice to us. The notice suggested that since we did not participate or co-operate with the civic administration in their efforts to clear the *nallah* lands, they invoked section 34-38 for direct eviction. After this notice we desperately started visiting the offices of the collector and the Municipal Corporation to avoid eviction. However the deputy collector informed us that the notice could not be taken back. He passed the eviction notice which had a seven day period for families to move out of the *Vasti* before the Corporation bulldozers would come.(Interview, *Vasti* 4, Displaced resident D, 15 September 2011).

They turned to the representatives of their community-based organizations such as *Samitis* (people elected from amongst the *vasti* households, who formed the lowest rung of political party workers / volunteers). They requested help from field junior civic officials and senior elected representatives such as the Member of Legislative Assembly and Member of Parliament, to put a stay on the evictions and even offered to reduce the length of their rooms to create direct access to the *nallah.* Alternatively, they requested resettlement within a 3 km distance at the least.[167]

> *Nallah* widening was the only reason given to us for being evicted. When we heard about this project we informed the authorities that we were willing to reduce the depth of our rooms by at least 2-3 feet if they needed access to clean the *nallah*. But they refused our suggestion. The local *vasti Samiti* members, social welfare organizations, elected representatives did not help us. Each household contributed 2000 Rs to save their homes or be rehabilitated locally within 3 kms by organizing an advocate to plead on our behalf with the Konkan Commissioner but we didn't get any response to that either. The MLA informed the *Samiti* that nothing was possible; the decisions had been taken at the higher levels. People's vulnerability was being manipulated. (Interview, *Vasti* 3, Displaced resident C, 21 August 2011).

The eviction and displacement of *vasti* residents from the *Irla Nallah* created three groups. An eligible group comprising new home owners resettled at the edge of the City limits, an ineligible group of people with documentary proof of ownership who nevertheless were declared ineligible

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[166] Interviews with displaced *vasti* residents revealed, that high end retail, club houses and private building extensions along the *Irla Nallah* have managed to avoid evictions. The logic for the protection of these forms of property by the local state representatives and elite and middle-class actors are that they are clearly defined and delineated and since one side of the banks of the *Irla Nallah* have been cleared for accessing the *nallah* there is no immediate need. However where there existed *vastis* on either side, there eviction notices have been issued for clearance on both banks of the *Irla Nallah*. Even in the case of a *vasti* that is located along the off-shoot of the *Irla Nallah*, eviction notices have been issued.
[167] See "Juhu residents move to HC regarding Irla slum demolition", *The Times of India*, 16 July 2007.

due to "insufficient" proof and the tenants without ownership rights within the *vasti*.[168] The displaced *vasti* residents considered "eligible", were involuntarily "resettled" at the northern edge of City limits in a transition area poorly serviced by the Municipal government.[169] At the time of my research, many families had locked these units and returned to places like Juhu, Vile Parle and Andheri where they resided on a rental basis. Others have moved further north to *Nalasopara* and *Virar* to either rent space or buy a one room unit, and still others had moved elsewhere within the city.[170] The displaced residents suggested that many eligible families were declared ineligible for rehabilitation by the complicated and ad-hoc processes of the municipal and state government agencies. Among these displaced residents, a vulnerable sub-set of residents affected by the process of eviction and displacement were (a) the existing population of tenants in the *vasti* (mostly renters) and (b) the "new tenants" ineligible for resettlement. Displacement prevents these floating families/ individuals from consolidating socio-economic ties and housing to a place and a lack of sense of belonging to a locality. Their tenuous status results from their "borrowed" ownership (as a tenant) on already "borrowed land tenure" (housing unit constructed on public land supported by specific government documents).

The first type of displaced vulnerable families such as recent migrants, were rendered invisible within the processes of "compensation", since they could not make claims either on the land or on

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[168] Although the work of the coalition around slum redevelopment seems to be hectic, *vasti* residents suggest only few have managed to access resettlement options through the slum redevelopment scheme depending on their networks and contacts with the *Samiti* members, state elected representatives or middle rungs of the municipal bureaucracy. Gross manipulations in the processes of eligibility verification are cited as a major reason. One of the main factors for this has been re-issuing of the photopass for a single household in 1995, 2000, 2010 since it was first issued in 1978. Although the government cut-off date for eligibility has been 1995, the re-issued photopass creates ambiguity in terms of eligibility depending on which photopass is valid at the time of eviction and the details on the newly issued photpass. Most families do not have their paperwork in order (proof of registered structure in the electoral rolls in addition to other documentary proof required to show eligibility). This politics of the photopass has rendered many families ineligible for resettlement making them homeless. Some residents are currently re-housed in transit camps poorly serviced by the private developers. Few households "hope to be rehabilitated" in-situ through slum redevelopment schemes. The reality of slum redevelopment projects in Mumbai according to *vasti* residents and ALM groups is that most of these are sold often to the upper middle-class or middle-class first time home owners who could afford the costs of housing.
[169] Each eligible family head was called to the Municipal Corporation office and handed over the keys to their new resettlement house. Few people with contacts in the junior bureaucracy and *karyakartas*(political party volunteers), managed to convert the status of their residential unit into a commercial unit, which meant that in the resettlement building they would get a commercial unit in addition to a housing unit.
[170] Interviews with *Vasti* 2 displaced resident B, 10 August 2011, *Vasti* 3 displaced resident C, 21 August 2011, *Vasti* 4 Displaced resident D, 15 September 2011, *Vasti* 5 resident E, 14 September 2011.

the structure which they rented. Their displacement meant socio-economic marginalization and in some cases re-migration, i.e., sending family members (women, children, seniors and unmarried siblings) back to the village, with the male/women bread winners staying behind in the city. [171] This severely affected their monthly household incomes. It also rendered women and seniors working in locality-based jobs unemployed. Children and youth in such families were pulled out of school and college, uncertain if they could continue their education in the future. The second type of displaced vulnerable family, defined as "ineligible" for resettlement despite documentary proof of residence in the *vasti* before the cut-off date of 1995, were compelled to "become tenants" elsewhere. This has resulted in an increase in the number of families who joined the floating population that is becoming homeless or with unstable sub-tenancies. Finally, for the eligible families, all is not well as it may seem. Often families (in a joint family system comprising 6-12 members) were provided a single unit of 270 sq.ft, when previously they may have had a two storey unit in the *vasti*. Although as international development agencies suggest, they achieved their new home ownership through displacement, it has decreased their capacities to survive urban life.[172] In the end many families returned to *vastis* in Juhu, Vile-Parle and Andheri in the hope of maintaining their social and economic linkages in Juhu. A *vasti* leader explains the reasons that lead to this "moving back" process:

> No official *Samiti* is appointed to ask us what we have to say or for our suggestions and objections on the form of the rehabilitation project, its location and the practical problems of displacement for "slum" dwellers. Officials accuse poor people of '*moving out of their newly provided homes to create slums elsewhere*,' but why do people behave like this? Unfortunately the government has defined a better quality of life for a slum dweller a 270 sq.ft *pucca*, concrete house for a family of 8-12 people, without any thought of the socio-economic and cultural impacts. Mere provision of the 'new *pucca* house' at great distances from their livelihood and education sources deteriorates the condition of the adults and children as opposed to improving it. (a)**First is the question of livelihood.** In a posh area like Juhu women get jobs as cooks, maids, cleaners, and caretakers. This allows flexibility to manage their household chores with a job. It ensures supplementary income to the household and provides children with basic education in locality based municipal schools. Due to displacement women lose their livelihoods and sense of contributing towards the household. This reduces the household income by 30-35%. A cut in the household income caused by loss of women's livelihood affects the monthly family budget. Who will travel for four hours everyday by public transit to reach a job and then travel back home to the resettlement site? The costs of transport, the time and energy required make sustaining a job in Juhu for a resettled individual impossible. If you say they can take jobs locally in Rawalpada or Mankhurd (resettlement sites) then you have to understand

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[171]The average size of a household in this case study comprised joint families between 6-12 people.

[172]Many participants spoke of how pooling monthly incomes, division of labour across gender and age roles, helped sustain the joint family system through co-operative sharing of resources (human, economic, social). This ensured optimized use of these finite but joint resources at the household level. In the case of single male migrant labor once again a sharing/pooling model ensured a "roof on their heads, a home-cooked meal at night and savings to send back home". (Based on Field Interviews)

the nature of the resettlement areas. These areas don't have posh and sophisticated neighborhoods, middle-class or high-income people who will need household help nor institutional and office buildings. (b)**Second the question of escalated monthly expenses due to new home ownership.** The increase in monthly maintenance expenditure (in the resettlement building is 600-700 Rs, when we pay Rs 25 in the *vasti*)- is 10% of your monthly income; increase in expenses for children's education (Rs 1000 per child), escalated travel costs for family members due to increased distances to work and education, besides health, food expenses. This means that although you got a *pucca* house, survival gets endangered. (Interview, *Vasti* 1resident A, 9 December 2011.)

Drawing lessons from demolition drives and displaced families, residents of *vastis* and the urban village in Juhu, re-shaped their efforts to avoid eviction through "community-driven" micro-urban renewal. It is within a broad range of micro-practices, organizational and discursive[173], broadly characterized as "civilized" that once can locate their evolving political consciousness and agency in mobilizing the state.

3.3   Key Observations

In this chapter, I have attempted to unpack the micro-politics of planning in Juhu at the intersection of urban renewal and decentralization of governance through an ethnographic case study. Citizenship claims in this micro-politics are situated against the macro backdrop of making Mumbai a "world-class" city. In addressing the three interrelated questions in this chapter, my analysis highlights three arguments.

1. **Entrenched Socio-Spatial Divides: Re-Imagining Juhu as "Oriental Venice"**

Juhu's evolution from the early 20th century up to the present reveals multiple developmental actors, logics of master planning and complex arrangements in settling urbanization in Juhu. In the early twentieth century, Indian industrial elites, in collusion with colonial bureaucrats, envisioned Juhu as an "Oriental Venice of the East" through reclamation schemes settled with

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[173] The leadership from the *vasti* and urban village (*koli*) suggested that the mainstream media was uninterested in the stories that they had to tell of struggle to maintain a toehold in Juhu, of marginalization of their livelihood resources or their aspiration for an improved quality of life. In our conversations *kolis* revealed how they went ahead and created a film around their struggles, hopes and aspirations that they hope to mainstream to create awareness. They hoped that the film could be screened at various NGO-based workshops and national government public consultations to showcase their needs. Thus the film became a tool to create a discourse of difference rooted in ethnic, caste and occupational identities that the "Other non-*koli*" group did not possess or experience. In conversations with the *vasti* group leadership, we explored possible alternatives of media platforms which could become a medium of communication (but also a discursive space) and their suggestions moved towards the internet (a dedicated website and social media linkages) as new spaces for possible political inclusion and similar to how ALM groups had created a public presence. (Menezes: 2011)

weekend getaway bungalows for the European and Indian elites. This logic of master planning did not take into account the agrarian and fishing communities that had consolidated their living and workspaces long before this envisioned development. Post independence, the developmental state implemented a number of town planning schemes as healthy suburban developments in Juhu and the city. Land reclamation converted the livelihood-related environmental resources of the former inhabitants into developed land banks. This provided elite and middle-class groups access to affordable and healthy housing, but it marginalized agrarian and fishing communities economically and did not provide affordable housing for economically weaker in-migrant groups. In the final decades of the twentieth century, new state-society relations revealed three tendencies of the emerging urbanism in Juhu: redensification of low-density housing, mega-infrastructure projects, and bourgeois environmentalism. Private developer lobbies have fed micro-urban renewal processes by unloading TDRs and slum-redevelopment. The state government and corporate elite ideology of "worlding" Mumbai has facilitated mega-infrastructure projects. In addition, the "bourgeois environmentalism" of ALM groups has emerged as a response to counter the excesses of the first two tendencies and to discipline "slums" through "the rule of law." Their master plans for micro-urban renewal co-opted Vision Mumbai's strategic planning to envision Juhu as "world-class" neighborhood. However, they draw inspiration from century-old visions of Juhu as an Oriental Venice.

The new state-society relations and tendencies of urbanism in twenty-first century Juhu reveal distinct actors such as private developer-led coalitions, the local and subnational state and neighborhood residents at loggerheads in the production of "slum-free-world-class" city-space. The efforts of these actors in claiming suburban neighborhood lands to settle diverse projects, so-called "public-purpose", "public-private welfarist" schemes or "community-driven" projects are unfolding against the backdrop of creating millennial Mumbai. These territorial contestations reveal four major cleavages across neighborhood actors in Juhu.

1. The first cleavage has emerged between the "new" settlers i.e., economically weaker migrants in *vastis* versus propertied, elite and middle-class groups.

2. The second cleavage has emerged between "old" and "new" settlers i.e., *kolis* versus *vasti* residents over the tenure rights on prime coastal lands, reserved for *koli* housing and livelihood infrastructure.

3. The third cleavage emerges between elite/middle-class groups against the developer-led coalition that transforms the planned environment of Juhu throgh adhoc redevelopment projects. On the other hand and *koli* groups battle adhoc slum redevelopment projects on urban village lands.

4. The fourth cleavage emerges between elite/middle-class groups against state-led mega-infrastructure projects that plan to settle mass-transit corridors or beautification projects on prime neighborhood lands.

Thus, macro-restructuring processes at the City-level have direct implications for territorial contestations and micro-urban renewal in Juhu. Thus tracing the historical processes of urbanization in Juhu from a "wasteland north of the colonial industrial city" to a projected "world-class" neighborhood reveals how planning as a technology of ordering urban space has grafted new legalities on land, leading to entrenched socio-spatial divides and deepening inequality in Juhu.

2. **Shifting Power Structures in Juhu**

If master planning emerged as a tool to legitimize new spatial orders, *Nagar Raj* emerged as a tool to create new state-society relationships in governing Juhu. Elite and middle-class groups in Juhu felt neither represented by political parties, nor by the "new invited spaces" promised by decentralization. Thus, they adopted the *Nagar Raj* concept of sub-municipal governance. Delimitation of the Juhu electoral ward boundary[174] that significantly reduced *vasti* populations

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[174] Zerah (2007, 66), suggests that "redrawing the (electoral) ward boundary prior to the 2007 municipal elections effectively reduced slum territories to only 20% in ward 63 and their political power through votebank politics, as against the average figure of more than 50% of Mumbai's population living in slums. Benjamin (2010, 122) suggests that this delimitation exercise was one of several other factors that resulted in the success of the Vote Juhu Campaign. Key amongst these factors were the mobilization of the elite and middle-class vote by Juhu's celebrity community and the presence of 'Muslim' candidates who 'split' the vote reducing the chances of the Congress I to succeed in this constituency.

in it, resultant demographic composition[175], non-reservation of the electoral seat[176] and selective inclusion of *gaothan* and *kolis* to form a locality-based bloc were significant factors that led to a shift in community power structures. With the success of the *Nagar Raj* experiment, Juhu now for the first time in sixty years had an independent candidate as councilor. From the standpoint of *vasti* residents, such a councilor weakened their claims to land and housing, due to inexperience and lack of linkages with political party and municipal bureaucratic networks. The neighborhood governance regime revealed tendencies of "elitist forms of local democracy" (Zerah: 2007) that aimed to create new nodes of power concentrated in the hands of Area *Sabha* representatives and the Citizens Consensus Councilor. Mobilization of ALMs and former indigenous groups as "constituencies" was engineered through a sub-municipal level institutional space, i.e., the Area *Sabha* (a mimetic of the organizational structure of political parties with a deep grassroots base). However, the elected representatives from political parties have countered attempts of power mimesis at the electoral ward level by ALM groups by weakening selective provisions of the (Model) *Nagara Raj* Bill to legislate the Maharashtra *Nagar Raj* Act (2009) through the processes of deliberative democracy. This Act has strengthened the municipal elected representative's political legitimacy to counter the practices of non-state actors, i.e., Area Sabha representatives, ALM groups and NGOs.

ALM groups in Juhu have engaged and negotiated "community-driven" micro urban renewal, votebank politics, and "world-class" aspirations - through a range of complex practices and politics embedded in "participatory governance and planning discourses" to engage the state in furthering their rights to land, governance and planning as urban citizens. My study identified two practices of elite and middle-class groups that frame overlapping modes of engagement against the backdrop of making Mumbai a "world-class". These are a politics of inclusion and a politics of co-optation. The formulation of the Area *Sabha* Representatives Coalition, the local bloc, in Juhu reveals a politics of inclusion (Roy: 2009). *Gaothan* residents and *kolis* were

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[175] The general perception of Juhu is that of an elite neighborhood famous for its beach, hotels, film stars and corporate elite residents. However my fieldwork has traced the presence of *vasti* neighborhoods, *chawls*, *gaothans* and an urban village comprising former indigenous communities and *vasti* residents.
[176] In keeping with the provisions of the 74th CAA, 1992, seats in the municipal elections are reserved for women, SC/ST or OBC candidates on a rotation basis, decided by the State Election Commission. The Juhu seat was not reserved in the 2007 municipal election.

projected as "original inhabitants" and therefore as "rights-bearing citizens" at least till the "Vote Juhu campaign" was being mobilized, while excluding *vasti* residents perceived as "beneficiaries" of vote bank politics. For the former indigenous groups their provisional inclusion as "citizens" to "participate" in decision-making processes was an opportunity to access political power to survive ad-hoc redevelopment of their urban village lands. The perception of *kolis* by ALM groups as "beneficiaries", "illiterate" and "backward", as opposed to *gaothan* residents who were perceived as "partners", resulted in a marginal position for *kolis* in the bloc almost similar to that of "slum" dwellers. For *kolis* the promise of continuous "citizen participation" has been elusive.

As Juhu's ASR bloc shows tendencies of fragmentation and marginalization on the basis of traditional class and ethnic divides, another split amongst actors of the "same but not quite similar" class divide seem to surface. The recent emergence of a tiny faction comprising architects and urban designers with linkages to existing policy networks, elite residents and political parties, signals a cleavage within the elite and middle-class faction of the ASR bloc. Although they supported "community participation" in governance through mass-mobilization processes earlier, on the issue of neighborhood planning they recommend an "expert-oriented" and "scientific-basis" for a comprehensive physical plan. Such suggestions are perceived as retrogressive by the Citizens Consensus Councilor, who had hoped "participatory governance would enable participatory planning" to challenge the tokenistic "suggestions and objections" procedures of state-led development plan making. This sub-faction sees expert intervention as critical, to rein in the climate of 'micro-urban renewal' in the neighborhood, via technical recommendations of neighborhood management. In Juhu, these tendencies of expert-control are visible with efforts to by-pass the Citizens Consensus Councilor in the planning processes of the neighborhood plan. The elite professional group has appropriated the "world-class" city imagery and created its mimetic through "community-driven" neighborhood planning along lines that are perceived to be comprehensive, rational and scientific. They seek to implement it, however, by working the system (Benjamin: 2008), organizing confrontational protests at para-statal agency offices to voice their concerns over "irrational" and "ad-hoc" state-led project implementation. In doing so, this elite faction reveals a politics of co-opting both "participatory governance" and

"world-class" city ideals to assert a form of neighborhood planning that endeavors to control "community-driven" micro-urban renewal in a way that will improve the speculative real estate values of land in Juhu.

3. Claims to Urban Citizenship via Multiple Practices and Politics

Roy (2009) describes "Mumbai's [metropolitan] land [as] the frontier of urban renewal and redevelopment". One could ask how *vasti* residents in Juhu have negotiated this "frontier". The micro-practices of *vasti* residents in Juhu have to be understood in relation to larger city-level processes including the urban politics of organized civil society groups via participatory governance, private developers and experts in ALM groups promoting micro "community-driven" urban renewal and corporate/bureaucratic elites aspiring to Mumbai's "worlding" through accelerated economic growth.

Various actors diversely perceived *vasti* residents. *Vastis* were perceived as *illegal encroachers* on lands claimed by the elite and middle-class, as *outsiders* by the *kolis* and east-Indians, as *beneficiaries* of governmental welfare by the municipal state and as an *anomaly* in a "world-class" future by corporate interests. These perceptions weakened the claims of *vasti* residents to neighborhood lands, participatory governance and redevelopment within a regime of "community-driven" urban renewal and "participatory" governance. Their exclusion by the Juhu ASR coalition from the *Nagar Raj* political experiment was based on the popular perception that they had already benefitted from linkages with political parties that had nurtured them as vote banks. The reality on the ground was that no single political party could claim to represent diverse factions in Juhu's *vastis*. Cleavages along class, caste, ethnicity, religion, place of origin, language, date of in-migration and tenure security create fragmented sub-groups in the *vasti/ urban village* that owe diverse allegiances thus complicating the notion of homogenous vote banks.[177] Although "community participation" (via *Nagar Raj*) was a conditionality for

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[177]Participants suggested that lack of single coherent leadership, small numbers of households (50-165 in each of the five *vastis*) and lack of linkages to the municipal administration via the elected representative post 2007, resulted in demolition of their *vastis* along the *Irla nallah*.

local area development planning under the JNNURM (2005), participatory planning processes in Juhu excluded "project-affected" *vasti* residents.

Prior to the project there was no deliberative processes of decision-making regarding project details, location and impacts, suggestions and objections from *vasti* groups or mechanisms for grievance redressal, in the *Irla Nallah* redevelopment project. The framing of *vastis* as "slums" by locality-specific ALM groups that led to environmental degradation, led to their being perceived as "encroachments". Such perceptions helped ALM groups pressurize the state government and bureaucratic elite to implement the BRIMSTOWAD project. On the other hand, lack of access to municipal government and bureaucrats, due to the vacuum created by elitist forms of local democracy and the intense activity of developer-led coalitions to access contiguous land banks along the *Irla Nallah* were key factors that led to their displacement from Juhu. It is thus readily apparent that *vasti* residents are socio-economically marginalized groups across these multiple fronts and spaces (the neighborhood and the city) despite participatory governance and planning discourses.

This atmosphere of uncertainty and socio-economic marginalization caused by displacement for some has resulted in "social learning"[178] for others. Former indigenous and *vasti* leaders engage and negotiate the new urban neighborhood politics, "community-driven" micro urban renewal and "world-class" aspirations - through a range of complex practices and politics that engage the state to further their claims as urban citizens to land, governance and planning. My study has identified four practices of resistance of traditionally disadvantaged groups that frame diverse and sometimes overlapping modes of engagement against the backdrop of making Mumbai a

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[178] Friedmann suggests that transactive planning was by its very nature a one-off experiment, whose actual course would constantly be subject to correction through a reflective process of social learning. "In mutual learning, planner and client each learn from the other- the planner from the client's personal knowledge and the client from the planner's technical expertise. In such a process, the knowledge of both undergoes a major change. A common image of the situation evolves through dialogue; a new understanding of the possibilities for change is discovered" [Friedmann: 1976 (2011), 23].

"world-class" metropolis. These are a politics of difference, of silence, of civility, and of compensation.

The former indigenous group deploys a distinctive *politics of difference* rooted in ethnic identity when mobilizing the local and national state to claim urban citizenship rights to land for housing and livelihood. Existing *vasti* resident groups in the urban village that have strategically accepted the slum redevelopment scheme, respond with a *politics of silence* to the participatory planning discourse of residential neighborhood politics, maintaining strong ties with state-level elected representatives and private developer lobbies. Existing *vasti* residents along the *Irla Nallah* faced with the threat of demolition demonstrate strategic *"civility"* via networks with organized civil society to confront private developers through negotiating with the municipal state in considering alternatives for in-situ redevelopment. Displaced *vasti* families rendered homeless despite proof of eligibility for resettlement, hope to confront the bureaucratic state and private developers via the judiciary engaging in a calculated *politics of compensation*. These practices and politics across different actors in Juhu seek to engage the millennial developmental state while working to be included as urban citizens in millennial Mumbai.

I will focus on these multiple social and political practices of engaging the state at the intersection of "community-driven" urban renewal and "participatory" governance in the following chapter.

Chapter 4: Engaging the State

The Ensuing Politics of Urban Citizenship Practices

4.1 The Expansion and Erosion of Urban Citizenship Claims in Suburban Mumbai

The struggles over land in Mumbai have been recorded in various accounts of the city. Struggles since the 1990s, however, bring to light a new politics of urbanization and governance. For instance, the claims by the residents of the urban village, *vasti* and private apartments/ bungalows in Juhu, documented in the previous chapter, are few archetypal moments in a historical, diverse, and contested terrain of governance and socio-spatial change in a suburban Mumbai neighborhood. The existing literature on urban change provides sparse analytical attention on the form and nature of these struggles. To generate such an understanding I ask the question:

How do groups of the "urban poor" in Juhu, residing in the urban village and *vastis*, respond to the evolving state-society relations in order to gain access to the new spaces of decision-making?

To tease out the complexities of this emergent urban frontier at the intersection of "community-driven"/state-led urban renewal and "participatory" urban governance, to explore the processes of claim-making practices across neighborhood actors in suburban Mumbai I further adopt the lens of urban citizenship.

"Citizenship and Social Class", T.H. Marshall's (1964) seminal essay was the first to situate the issue of rights as central to citizenship to establish the meaning of full political membership in society. He identified three principal elements of citizenship charting their development across several historical periods - civil rights (the bundle of rights necessary for individual freedom), political rights (the exercise of political power as a voter) and social rights (that made possible forms of economic welfare and security). In highlighting social rights, Marshall revealed the actual practices and contested nature of citizenship. In exploring the trajectory of citizenship in the context of India, Chatterjee problematizes Marshall's reading that the modern welfare state created possibilities of equal citizenship and expanding citizenship rights. Chatterjee suggests that the attitudes of welfarist measures by the postcolonial independent Indian state were rooted in the colonial "ethnographic state's" technologies of governmentality over its subjects.

Classification, description and enumeration of population groups as the objects of policy [..] has a history in the colonial ethnographic state. [..] Ideas of republican citizenship accompanied the politics of national liberation…..the postcolonial developmental state promised to end poverty and backwardness by adopting appropriate policies of economic and social reform…and deployed the latest governmental technologies to promote the well-being of their populations, often prompted and aided by international and nongovernmental organizations (Chatterjee: 2004, 36-37).

Thus, Chatterjee (2004, 37) argues that such developmental governmentality results in a differentiated citizenship in India, one founded on "popular sovereignty and granting equal rights to citizens" and the other "connecting populations to governmental agencies pursuing multiple policies of security and welfare". This differentiation he has termed as civil and political society respectively. Historically, the postcolonial Indian state achieved political legitimacy through formulating a developmental ideology on behalf of the nation that included populist welfare programmes directed towards specific populations. However, the state did not have the means to deliver these benefits to the entire population. With the Structural Adjustments Programme of the early 1990s, this social welfare dimension was being reversed in the face of liberalization policies. At the turn of this century, however scholars drew our attention to the post-Washington consensus, which recommended governments to address "the social costs of neoliberalism" (John and Deshpande: 2008; Chatterjee: 2008; Roy: 2010). Since the 1990s such a policy regime reveals tendencies of offloading the social welfare burden from the state to a multiplicity of non-state actors and changing the terms and forms of governmental policy directed towards the poor.[179]

Problematizing the universal and popular notion of citizenship in the nation that promises egalitarian inclusion, both formally and substantively to all its citizens, Holston and Appadurai (1999, 4) suggest, "formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship." Holston (2008, 22) further suggests that although the modernist project of nation building attempted to "dismantle the classical primacy of urban citizenship and replace it with the national. [..] cities remain strategic arenas for the development of citizenship". The social anthropologist Li Zhang reiterates the entrenched relationship between

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[179] Prior to the 1990s, access of the urban poor to government schemes was contingent on the ability of these groups to mobilize support for implementation of policy towards their needs. Where *vasti* residents could previously access some forms of tenure security on land, in-situ up gradation or subsidized housing through governmental schemes, today they certainly risk being dispossessed through meagre compensation in resettlement projects at the City limits or being rendered homeless.

citizenship and spatiality, arguing "citizenship is a contested figuration and that the site of its contestation at the local level is to be found in spatial claims and practices" (Zhang 2002, 329).

The major debates reviewed on the processes involving the formation of policy regimes and grassroots consciousness and agency, highlight how they have simultaneously shaped, expanded and eroded urban citizenship rights. This scholarship attempts to map the politics of the urban poor, in the context of a differentiated urban citizenship regime. Holston interprets such a politics in the autoperipeheries of Sao Paolo as forms of "insurgent citizenship" that comprise practices of claim-making and new forms of knowledge from below that seek to recognize the contributor-rights of the poor towards urban citizenship (Holston: 2008). Appadurai interprets the politics of the urban poor in Mumbai, through the globalized discursive and material practices of community-based organizations, embedded in emergent horizontal and vertical scalar networks, both locally and globally. He suggests these practices create moments of "deep democracy" and forms of self-regulation through knowledge production from below as a form of "counter-governmentality" to the corrupt state apparatus (Appadurai: 2001). The postcolonial theorist, Partha Chatterjee, interprets the politics of the urban poor in Calcutta as a politicization of developmental governmentality, as an open and tactical site of negotiation and contestation (Chatterjee: 2004). The urban theorist, Ananya Roy, interprets this politics through the mode of "civic governmentality" that makes possible spaces for rights-based confrontation mobilized by grassroots energies or even a political subjectivity that is alternatively concerned with compensation (Roy: 2009). These debates focus on diverse practices and experiments of specific organized groups of the urban poor to open out a range of claim-making practices towards inclusion in the project of urban citizenship.

Located within this approach, I explore the discursive and organizational practices and politics of neighborhood residents in suburban Mumbai that reveal a mix of diverse claim-making practices. These practices do not neatly fall into the existing registers of "political/civil" society, rights-based advocacy groups handholding the urban poor, or governmentality from above/below. These practices reveal the entanglements and new relationships emerging from associational activity across neighborhood residents that transgress and move beyond siloed conceptualizations. These heterogeneous practices reveal a cacophony of claim-making practices towards urban citizenship in

millennial Mumbai. Through the specific case of Juhu, I explore the practices and politics of four suburban neighborhood actors who frame diverse and sometimes overlapping modes of engagement against the backdrop of making a "slum-free−world-class" Mumbai. These are a politics of difference, silence, civility and compensation.

4.2   How Neighborhood Actors Engage the State in Millennial Mumbai
4.2.1   Citizenship Practices at the Juncture of "Community-Driven"/ State-Led Urban Renewal and "Participatory" Governance in the Urban Village

But what is the perceived physical, social and spatial composition of this urban village in Juhu?

The Urban Village: I use the term urban village to describe the former *koli* village or *koliwada* and the two *vastis* surrounding it. Urban village is a broad term that captures the contemporary cosmopolitan nature of a settlement that has experienced different waves of in-migration since a century. The major residents are *kolis* and *vasti* residents divided into multi-ethnic, caste, religious and language sub-groups. The families cluster together based on source areas date of in-migration and ethnicity. The families and individuals I met through this research referred to the settlement as *gaon,* which literally translated means village. The term *koliwada* specifically means a *koli* village based on an ethnic identity and kinship. Referring to the *gaon* only as *koliwada* in 2011 would exclude the presence of *vasti* residents or non-*kolis* that have consolidated their lives and livelihoods on these lands since thirty years and continue to do so now. I therefore adopt a broader use of the term *gaon* to refer to the self-built settlements to include a diverse group of residents and activities in a suburban village setting.

Looking at the Urban Village: The *koliwada* is one of the oldest settlements in suburban Juhu with its fishing hamlets established since the 1940s. The urban village land is presently under the ownership of the Collector, Government of Maharashtra. Flanked by elite beach bungalows, private apartment buildings, educational institutions, defense lands owned by the national government and private recreation spaces, it is comprised of two parcels of land with a population of approximately 5000 people living in 1200 two-storey housing units on an area of 22,330 sq.mts of prime waterfront land. The urban village has two access roads separated by defence lands.

Based on *koli* and *vasti* resident's oral histories, I learnt that the *kolis* migrated to the urban village through kinship contacts since the 1940s. Since the late 1960s, the land along the seaward side and southern edge of the *koli* cluster came to be occupied by *vasti* settlements. The demographic composition of the urban village consists of families of diverse *koli* sub-caste groups and a cosmopolitan mix of ethnic migrants including *Marathi*, *Malayalee*, *Gujarathi*, Christian, *Marwari* communities from Maharashtra, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal. Each of these ethnic groups reveal different levels of socio-economic consolidation, forms of ownership to a built unit and membership in local community-based organizations (cultural, political, civic and development related). Both the *koli* and *vasti* leaders reported that the population roughly comprised of two-thirds of *vasti* residents and a third of *kolis*.

Vasti households employed in the so-called informal sector are self-employed or have part-time / full-time jobs in the formal economy. Livelihood sources for households ranged from being rickshaw and taxi drivers, mechanics, maids, daily-wage laborers on construction sites, in small manufacturing units, or on *koli* fishing boats. Others were employed as janitors, waiters, drivers, cooks, nannies, accountants, clerks, peons and private security staff. A few individuals are self-employed as produce vendors, tuition teachers, sports coaches, tailors, and electricians, owners of local convenience stores, tea stalls or as suppliers of food items to convenience shops/ businesses. A few *kolis* are also engaged in traditional fishing practice that is mostly manual or with small boats. Some *kolis* work as daily - wage labor on private fishing boats or trawlers; others work part-time jobs. More recently with access to national government schemes, a handful of *kolis* are in the process of obtaining loan approval for the purchase of large boats. *Koli* women are primarily engaged in selling fish.

A View from the Territorial Clusters in the Urban Village:

Koli **Resident***:* In the 1980s our community elders believed the local elected representative and requested the government to reclaim the lands in the village *(gaon)*. With this reclamation, we lost the main source of fishing - the village pond (*kadda*) that protected our families with food and basic income. With the gradual degradation of the *Irla* Creek to an open drain, destruction of mangroves and reclamation of tidal marshlands, our occupation of fishing and small fishermen have been dealt a serious blow. The private bungalow owners have encroached our drying yards to create sea-facing gardens. In addition, the proliferation of "slums" along the beach is a cause for concern. The government however shows no willingness to recognize the wrongdoing on our community and the toll these decisions have taken. They support "slumwallahs" through elaborate slum redevelopment housing schemes on coastal lands once promised to our *koli* communities. Worse still they consider us as "slumwallahs"

and suggest we can be eligible for free housing! But we are indigenous *koli* communities like the East Indians, how can the cut-off date logic be applicable to us? (Interview, *Koli* resident A, 23 August 2011).

Vasti **Resident One**: I came to the *gaon* forty years ago in the 1970s. The lands were owned by the government but have been leased by the Airport Authority of India on a 99 year lease. The village comprised few *koli* houses and migrant houses clustered separately. One had to use boats to come to the village from the mainland because of the tidal influx that flooded the *Irla* creek and mudflats, as it was not yet reclaimed then. Initially houses in the *vasti* were temporary made of bamboo and plastic sheets. Because of the *Maharashtra* Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment Act, 1978), those who lived in *vastis* (on public lands) were recognized as having some tenure rights on the land through redevelopment even though they were neither the original squatters nor landowners. In 1993, a developer proposed a slum redevelopment scheme for our *vasti*. Many households agreed to the project and signed agreements. However, until 2011 no housing project has been implemented. It seems the developer has no intention to complete our project. Now we see attempts by the *kolis* to stake claim to our lands by parking their boats on our plot along the beach although their traditional location for boat storage has been the *Irla* creek side. How can *kolis* interfere in our matters when they do not live here? (Interview, *Vasti* 1 resident A, 15 November 2011)

Vasti **Resident Two**: The *kolis* are like an extended family from *Gujarat*. They occupy the northern part of the village land and we occupy the southern part. We are not involved with each other. We have identified an area that includes the *sabhagriha*, (village assembly hall) *balwadi*, (school) public toilet and edge of the village bounded by the military ground as "our" land. When the *Shiv Sena* government announced a slum redevelopment scheme in 1998, we approached the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) and proposed a Co-operative housing society to initiate the slum redevelopment scheme. We are interested in the government scheme because without charging a single coin to the poor residents housing will be made available to them. For this it was essential to select a developer who would be contracted to do all the jobs such as surveying the structures and the land, developing the plan, and constructing the housing project. Committee members of the Co-operative housing society selected and recommended a developer for the project to the SRA. Both the *vasti* located on the upper side of the village and the *koli* areas have got nothing to do with us (southern part). So there is no question of joining any of them in their slum redevelopment or other housing schemes (*Vasti* 2: Focus Group Discussion, 25 November 2011).

These three distinct standpoints on declining livelihoods, urban village renewal through self-redevelopment, and the opportunity to propose slum redevelopment projects as a means of upward social mobility in the urban village, reveal the heterogeneous struggles to survive suburban change at the intersection of community-driven or developer-led (micro)/state-led (macro) urban renewal and decentralized governance in Juhu. These contesting claims to urban village lands provide an entry point to comprehend the practices and politics of urban citizenship in suburban Mumbai.

The *kolis* living north of the urban village claim seven plots of coastal lands based on the reservations of the City Development Plan (1981), state government resolutions of 1980-1983, the provisions of the coastal regulation zone (CRZ 1991) laid out by the national government as well as local histories that point to earliest in-migration of *kolis* to these lands. *Koli's* genealogical and ethnic claims have complicated the linear narrative of community-driven urban village renewal. The *koli* leadership has worked almost two decades to stall efforts of the private developer-led coalition

to transform the beach facing urban village lands into profitable but cramped slum redevelopment schemes.

The first group of *vasti* residents includes a cosmopolitan mix of migrants as well as a tiny number of *koli* households supporting the slum redevelopment scheme. They have consolidated the upper areas of the urban village, towards the west, as their territorial space separated from the lower areas of the urban village consisting of the *koli* cluster. Their claim to this parcel of land is based on the consolidation of their housing needs in the last twenty years. The formal declaration of their *vasti* as a "slum" as stipulated by the slum rehabilitation authority, preparation of a slum redevelopment project by a private developer, consensus of the *vasti* residents and multiple clearances of the proposed project by the housing authority form the basis of their claims to these lands. As of today, and despite the official green signal for the implementation of the housing project, an actual redevelopment project has not yet begun. This non-implementation is being blamed on the interference of *kolis*, who "do not live on their side of the village".[180] The interference of the *kolis* is perceived as a problem especially since the state-led slum redevelopment offers home ownership through a formal institutionalized process compared to the ad-hoc informal *koli* plans for self-redevelopment of the urban village. Aspirations of home ownership in Juhu or suitable compensation packages have led this faction to revive the "stalled" slum redevelopment project after a seventeen year pause.

The second group of *vasti* residents lives in the lower village area adjacent to the *kolis*. It is predominantly comprised of migrant households from the Marathwada region of Maharashtra, categorized as a backward region in the state with a high percentage of subordinate castes. A tiny number of *koli* households exist in this part of the urban village as well. The formation of this cluster of households is based on kinship ties that emerge from the villages of origin, caste affiliations and religious beliefs. Their claims on approximately one-third of the lower village lands are based on the tenuous recognition by the state government of their socio-economic consolidation

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[180] Participants commonly referred to the seaward facing plot housing the *vasti* settlement on it as the "upper side" (*upar*) as it is on elevated land. The *Irla Nallah* facing lands in the interior housing the *koli* settlement and one *vasti* settlement was referred to as the "lower side" (*neeche*).

over the past forty odd years. This recognition by the state government since the mid-1990s has created a belief in the possibility for "free" housing schemes for "slum" dwellers. This group has taken recourse in procedures, documents and projects that recognize the possibility of their in-situ rehabilitation through slum redevelopment. Through this possibility they aspire towards home ownership in Juhu.

4.2.1.1 Claim-Making Practices of *Kolis*: A Politics of Difference

The *koli* struggle to survive in the urban village began in 1993 with the entry of private developers who planned to initiate slum redevelopment schemes. *Koli* efforts to reach out to elected representatives with a "nativist" ideology, to secure their development rights, augmentation of livelihood-related infrastructure and housing failed consistently.[181] The *kolis* were deeply aware that their small and inconsequential numbers become a grave threat to their survival in the urban village. More so at a time when development decisions in Mumbai were dictated on the sheer strength of numbers involved. This led the *koli* leadership to explore other modes of accessing the state to engage it towards their ends. With the rise of elite and middle-class activism in Juhu against the "misrule of law" and let down by political parties the *koli* leadership sought to adopt techniques of ALM groups to access political power to maintain a toehold in the urban village.

When 165 *koli* homes in the urban village along the *Irla Nallah* were demolished to make space for a public garden earmarked in the City Development Plan (1981), *kolis* devised an informal arrangement with elite and middle-class neighborhood groups to engage the bureaucratic and judicial state. However, as we have seen in chapter three, the tactical and brief inclusion by ALM groups of *kolis* resulted in an elusive promise to be recognized as urban citizens. This frustration in accessing and engaging the local/ subnational bureaucratic state has compelled them to frame a

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[181] Until the 1990s the city-level *koli* leadership supported the *Shiv Sena*, a regional "Hindu-chauvinist" party that practiced a violent, nativist, anti-migrant politics on "outsiders" mostly in-migrants from other states and non-Hindus. However, when this party came to power in Maharashtra (1995-2000) they co-opted the World-Bank aided slum-redevelopment projects aimed at "affordable" housing, to float the populist *Shivshahi Punarvasan Prakalp,* promising "free" housing for the urban poor comprising migrants. According to the *kolis* in Juhu the slum redevelopment project led to rapid transformations of fishing villages to be surrounded by "slums". This has led to a two fold increase in "slumwallahs" marginalizing the original *koli* population. This according to the *kolis* is a common phenomenon across Mumbai's *koliwadas.* Presently the state, private sector and civil society actors perceive *kolis* as "slum" dwellers.

politics of difference based on an argument of ethnic discrimination (**Refer Figure 4-1**). The ambiguity of being simultaneously recognized as "original inhabitants" in popular/historic consciousness and as "slum" dwellers in contemporary policy, planning and governance circles has reinforced the need for accessing social rights towards substantive citizenship. In doing so, they have unevenly deployed an identity politics located in being *koli* that is constitutionally recognized as a special backward class (SBC) that recognizes them as a vulnerable group. This politics has been deployed as a rights-based approach to "working the system" that hopes to claim a right to urban citizenship through demands couched in having an exceptional status.

The efforts to "work the system" dominated by fickle logics of numbers through specific cut-off dates, a mandatory percentage of resident's consent for redevelopment, and other requirements have been the catalyst for *kolis* to mobilize the few non-*koli*[182] households in their territorial area in the urban village. This form of organizing across sub-castes, ethnic and language groups, date of in-migration and home ownership, has resulted in the formation of a grassroots urban *koli* organization called the *Juhu Machimaar Samiti*.[183] Through affiliations across international/ national/state-level fisher-folk trade unions and city-level socio-cultural organizations, the *Samiti* has attempted to negotiate urban *koli* claims to national livelihood-related welfare and housing schemes. Over a period of time, they have strategically diversified their associational activity to include participation in neighborhood-level civic activism with elite and middle-class ALM groups in Juhu and city-level NGOs working to create forms of self-regulated, local democracy that could counter the populist excesses of political parties supporting slum redevelopment housing projects for migrant groups.

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[182] Families from Bihar (a northern state with a high percentile of in-migrants into Mumbai) are located south of the *koli* quarter in the lower area of the urban village. This non-*koli* cluster is sandwiched between the *koli* quarter and second *vasti* located along the main entrance to the urban village.

[183] The *kolis* have certain traditional community structures that guide, protect and conserve relationships amongst people within their *samaj* (society). There are six *Samitis* or organizations within the *koli* community that govern life within the *samaj*. These are the *Nyaya* (Justice) *Samiti* which focuses on conflict resolution, the *Utsav* (Festival) *Samiti* that manages cultural and religious events, the *Mrityu* (Death) fund *Samiti* that manages the rituals, ceremonies and logistics in case of the demise of a *koli* individual, the *Vikas* (Development) *Samiti* which focuses on village redevelopment plans, governance and management of urban services, the *Yuvak Mandal* (Youth group) which focuses on youth related issues and needs and the Juhu *Machimaar Samiti,* a registered body with the Government of Maharashtra. All five *Samitis* function under the leadership of the *Machimaar Samiti.* The membership of the *Machimaar Samiti* comprises primarily of *koli* and few non-*koli* households. The non-*koli* membership does not have voting rights in *Samiti* matters, their membership has been mostly symbolic.

They have appealed for tenure-security or ownership of specific coastal lands reserved for *kolis/ fisher-folk* in the Development Plan. Access to a Member of Parliament (MP) sensitive to their demands has created the possibility for *kolis* to provide recommendations to a national-level policy think-tank institution. In addition to these efforts, networks with state-level fishing trade union leaders and identifying kin-based contacts across government departments provide tiny supports in "working the system".

In addition to working the system from "inside", they have developed complex arrangements at creating a "pressure- based" solidarity group that hopes to inform the ongoing "official" process of revising the Development Plan of Mumbai from the "outside". Networking with academic institutions (architecture and public policy-oriented), pro-poor NGO groups, civic activists trained as environmentalists and lawyers, national-level housing and land rights organizations and state-level human rights organizations have created possibilities for *kolis* to negotiate alternative futures of urban village redevelopment with a focus on livelihood, housing and income-generating activities. In its ongoing efforts at engaging the state both from "inside" the system and "outside", the *koli* leadership has deployed the "*koli* card" in four political opportunities that have emerged in its struggles this far.

1. ***Kolis* Unsuccessful Attempts to Access the Subnational Judicial State for Tenure Rights to Coastal Lands:** The first opportunity emerged when the Juhu Citizens Welfare Group (JCWG) filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Bombay High Court (2002) to address coastal land-use violations that affected the Juhu beach redevelopment. By engaging Juhu's ALM groups, the *koli* leadership managed to gain an entry point in negotiating a right to the coastal lands for fish drying yards by filing an appeal with the Monitoring Committee. The *koli* organization petitioned the High Court via JCWG's organized civil society network by framing their unique right on specific coastal lands, based on their ethnic origin, i.e., *koli,* reserved in the City Development Plan and state government resolutions for drying yards and fishing-related activities specifically for *kolis*. However, although organized civil society groups were successful in dealing a blow to the street vendors associations who had to adhere to the Juhu beach redevelopment plan, the *kolis* did not manage to free lands reserved

for their housing and livelihood from bungalow owners who had violated the law by transforming these lands into private gardens.

2. ***Kolis* as Tenuously Rights-Bearing Citizens within Organized Neighborhood Civil Society Mobilizations:** The next opportunity emerged when Juhu's elite and middle-class groups fed up with the apathy of political parties, the proliferation of "slums" and ad-hoc development by private developers, experimented with becoming political players themselves. The momentary inclusion into the Area *Sabha* Representatives Coalition, the local bloc in Juhu in the municipal elections of 2007, was an important milestone for the *kolis*. According to Roy (2009) such a politics of inclusion is inherently contradictory in terms of what it promises and what it delivers. Such forms of urban inclusion are not a genuine expression of substantive citizenship for those at the margins. In the case of Juhu, *gaothan* residents and *kolis,* were identified as "original inhabitants" and thus as tenuously rights-bearing citizens while excluding *vasti* residents, perceived as beneficiaries of vote bank politics and the "misrule of law". *Kolis* saw the provisional inclusion in ALM-driven neighborhood politics as an opportunity to directly access political power and so to survive the ad-hoc redevelopment of their urban village lands at the hands of petty private developer-led coalitions. On the other hand the reciprocal perception of *kolis* by ALM groups as "beneficiaries", "illiterate" and "backward", marginalized *kolis* in the bloc. Their hopes for citizen participation inside the project of citizenship thus remained elusive.

3. ***Kolis* Engage the National Bureaucratic State**: The third attempt by *kolis* to consolidate their rights on the coastal lands came with their participation in the national-level public consultative process for the coastal management zone legislation (2008). Environmentalists and fish-workers trade unions were suspicious of the national state's neoliberal ideologies in the World-Bank assisted Coastal Management Zone (CMZ 2009) Notification. This was seen as a mechanism to dismantle the stringent Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ 1991)

Notification that would adversely affect fisher communities and marine ecosystems.[184] Networking with national and state-level fisher-worker's trade unions, city-level *koli* organizations, international organizations for fisher-worker's rights and city-level environmentalists, the Juhu *koli* leadership focused on preventing ad-hoc slum redevelopment projects that were intended to create a slum-free "world-class" city. The working group report called Final Frontier states:

The hardship faced by the fishing communities living in Juhu were brought to the notice of the Committee.[..] in the name of slum redevelopment State Government gives away the land of the fishermen community to the builders with an assurance that the fishermen community would get a decent dwelling unit, but this has not happened. The fishermen communities who occupy the prime land in Mumbai are displaced and their land sold at premium price to the developers. They also showed pictures of illegally constructed building in the fishing village in Versova against which they are fighting a legal battle for several years. They requested the Committee to address the issues of the fishing community and to provide them the rights and ensure that their livelihood is not affected. They also informed that if permitted they would construct their own houses but would require a higher Floor Space Index to meet for the growing family needs (sic) (Final Frontier: 2009, 47).

Committed participation as representatives of the Maharashtra fisher-worker's trade union in the national-level CMZ consultative process brought the *kolis* from Juhu, a seat at the CRZ 2010 Notification, public consultation process initiated by the national state with assistance from international development agencies.[185] The *koli* leadership managed to insert a special clause for coastal lands of Mumbai and *koliwadas* that would directly influence the future of Juhu's urban village and its inhabitants. The CRZ Notification suggests:

Koliwada namely, fishing settlement areas as identified in the Development Plan of 1981 or relevant records of the Government of Maharashtra, shall be mapped and declared as CRZ-III so that any development, including construction and reconstruction of dwelling units within these settlements shall be undertaken in accordance with and applicable as per the local Town and Country Planning Regulations. Reconstruction and repair works of the dwelling units, belonging to fisher communities and other local communities

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[184] The agenda of consultations by the Expert Committee on the draft Coastal Management Zone Notification (2008) constituted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF, GoI) was to protect the ecosystem and habitat of India's coast for conservation and livelihood security. Titled the *Final Frontier* it argued that having "studied the views expressed by a wide range of stakeholders all over the country, discussions with Central, state government, Mumbai Metropolitan Representatives and representatives of fishermen and women- we urge that the Coastal Management Zone Notification of 2008 may be allowed to lapse. Keeping the CRZ Notification, 1991 as the basic framework, suitable additions/amendments may be made taking into account the new challenges likely to arise from climate change-induced sea level rise, and the growing pressure of population on coastal resources and biodiversity. The lives and livelihoods of nearly 25 per cent of our population living within 50 km of the shoreline, as well of the nearly 10 million fisherfolk, will depend upon the decisions we take now to develop enforceable regulations for integrated attention to both ecological and livelihood security" (Final Frontier 2009, 1).
[185] GoI: 2010; Discussion paper on Coastal Regulation Zone.

identified by the State Government, shall be considered and granted permission by the Competent Authorities on a priority basis, in accordance with the applicable Town and Country Planning Regulations (CRZ: 2011, 15).

- *Kolis* **as Self-Advocacy Planners:** The relentless, repetitive and daunting process of gathering knowledge around government schemes and policies, through the Public Disclosure Law provided the *koli* leadership with clues of a slew of state-led modernization projects to be settled in and around the urban village. This "insider" knowledge about the potential displacement of *kolis* through a variety of urban renewal projects, created an opportunity for action. *Kolis* now identified allies and mobilized their support to create a supportive network that would produce a public front for an otherwise "invisible" *koli* community. This helped them amplify their demands to power centers through participating in public consultation forums or appealing the judicial state via these same networks.

An alternative village redevelopment plan is being drawn up in concert with architects, urban designers and policy analysts from academic institutions. This vision counters the modernist, culturally ill-conceived slum redevelopment project of the subnational state. With help from pro-poor and environmental NGOs, the *kolis* hope to assert their socio-economic rights to consolidate the coastal lands in the urban village. They also hope to envision alternative futures that will enable *kolis* to further their community's needs on urban village lands in Juhu. Their project is intended as an experiment in self-redevelopment. However, the dominant *koli*-focus on housing and livelihood projects, has led the non-*koli* support to dwindle. How have *vasti* residents residing around the *koli* cluster, responded to this seventeen-year long effort by the *koli* leadership to prevent slum redevelopment in the urban village? I will turn to address this question in the following section.

**Figure 4-1: Politics of Difference (*Kolis* in the Urban Village)**

Figure 4-2: Politics of Silence (*Vasti* Residents in the Urban Village)

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4.2.1.2   Claim-Making Practices of *Vasti* Residents I: A Politics of Silence

The two *vasti* factions have conflicting views with the *kolis* on the question of land tenure rights, territorial boundaries and visions for urban village renewal. For seventeen years *vasti* residents have been "working the system" through private developer-led coalitions to implement two slum redevelopment projects in what they have identified as their territories in the urban village. The primary reason for their lack of interest in self-redevelopment arose with the possibility of "free" in-situ home ownership through the *Shiv Sena's* populist slum redevelopment project that drew the interests of developers and *vasti* resdients across Mumbai. Developers were interested in transforming lands occupied by "slums" into planned real estate through the open-market component of the slum redevelopment project. This interest created a political opportunity for enterprising *vasti* residents.

Subaltern Agents and Their Critical Consciousness: *Vasti* residents took on varied roles as leaders, brokers or volunteers to negotiate slum redevelopment for their *vastis*. In the urban village, the two factional groups identified households under their leadership through recognizing volunteers from sub-groups based on caste, religion and ethnicity. They organized and mobilized households based on their location within the territorial delinetaions in the urban village since the mid 1990s. Documentary proof of home ownership of a structure, date of migration and continuous residence has been an important aspect of inclusion in the faction. These eligibility criteria have resulted in the exclusion of recent in-migrants who live on the outer edge of the urban village, tenants within their territorial boundaries who lived in upper storey units on a rental basis, single-male migrant workers who live collectively in groups without families and the *koli* and non-Marathi speaking migrant groups. Thus, the two factional grassroots groups represent another subset of people within the urban village who are interested in slum redevelopment. The project for these groups is a promise of gaining urban citizenship through formal home ownership in an aspiring "world-class" Juhu.

Contrary to the literature on urban renewal that focuses on "bourgeois environmentalism", "gentrification", "corporatization of city space" and "violent community-led resettlement" as the modes of the "world-class" city imagination that excludes *vasti* residents and involuntarily

displaces them, everyday practices of *vasti* residents to access urban citizenship suggests otherwise. In this particular case of the urban village, *vasti* residents do not resist the "slum-free–world-class" city future. They support its projects of slum redevelopment as an opportunity for home ownership and an improved quality of life for their children that would lead to upward social mobility. They negotiate claims to in-situ redevelopment rights on urban village lands through the slum redevelopment projects that can no longer be viewed only as "specific governmental schemes targeted towards marginalized populations" in the city. Networking with elected representatives and grassroots volunteers in political parties, petty private developers and "working the bureaucratic and political system" through contacts in the lower rungs, they hope to engage the bureaucratic state at the local and subnational levels in implementing slum redevelopment schemes in their urban village.

Challenges to Urban Citizenship Claims of *Vasti* Residents: The hope for *vasti* residents inclusion as urban citizens remained unfulfilled by 2011. A range of factors were responsible for this delay:

- the change of the state-level ruling party in Maharashtra.[186]
- a massive demolition drive of slums by the Congress-led coalition government to clear public lands of encroachments through Operation Shanghai,
- enforcement of the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ 1991) at the state level that problematized "slums" along the urban coastal edge,
- rise in elite and middle-class activism in Juhu to evict "slums" and ensure the conversion of occupied lands as recreational spaces,
- the *koli* efforts to claim development rights to the coastal lands promised to them for housing and livelihood purposes,
- ALM groups and environmentalists efforts to stall ad-hoc reclamation and redevelopment along the Juhu Beach,

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[186] The Shiv-Sena government (1995-1999) was voted out of power by 1999, when a Congress-Nationalist Congress Party coalition came into power in Maharashtra. Many policy-decisions taken by the previous ruling party were being scrutinized minutely at the turn of this century.

- new height restrictions recommended by the defence authorities in Juhu for developments located along the coastal edge to counter infiltration threats from the sea after the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008,
- inconsistencies in the developer's implementation process after the collapse of transit camp constructions onsite and
- a wait and watch game adopted by the developer in lieu of skyrocketing real estate prices in Juhu.

Specifically in Juhu, efforts of *vasti* residents to gain urban citizenship are threatened by elitist neighborhood politics that focus on efficient locality management, governance and micro-urban renewal. These elitist efforts to enforce the rule of law, threaten the *vasti* resident's plans for in-situ home ownership. Through pressuring the local and subnational state and appealing the judiciary, elite and middle-class groups attempt to clear public lands of "slums" and settle recreation spaces earmarked in the City Development Plan. On the other hand, the *koli* resistance to slum redevelopment and implementation of the amended CRZ (2011) notification has increased. The private developer for the faction on the upper area of the urban village has not implemented the project despite receiving multiple clearances for the project. Fearing subversion by these competing local development agents of their opportunity to gain inclusion as urban citizens through home ownership, *vasti* residents deploy a tactical politics of silence (**Refer Figure 4-2**).

The two *vasti* factions carefully guard their constituent households against external interferences from elite/middle-class groups, *kolis* and their allies, and the private developers who have delayed their housing projects. To negotiate the new urban neighborhood politics that has caused eviction and displacement due to "community-driven" or private-developer driven urban renewal along the *Irla Nallah*, *vasti* leaders respond by remaining silent about their project plans, being opaque in their interactions with those whom they considered outsiders or trouble makers and working the municipal system. Benjamin (2007) describes this form of locality politics as an appropriation of political space by the margins, through their linkages to the local or state-elected representatives in mainstream politics. These linkages of the poor with specific power nodes create the possibility for official administrative orders that project a particular situation as an exception to the norm. The politics involved in the creation of such an exception at specific moments comes to occupy the

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space of policy in what is popularly perceived as patron-client relations that are feudalistic, corrupt and opaque. Benjamin suggests that the exclusion of the poor from the formal planning process generates this opaque politics of the margins that strikes fear in the technocratic and property owning elite.

The need for this politics of silence was reinforced in the face of factional disintegration due to the difficulties in maintaining unity across multiple sub-interest groups, especially when the expected housing projects failed to materialize. At the same time, new factions have replicated the processes of the mother group to create new agreements with rival political parties, or other elected representatives within the same party, private developers and another set of contacts in the bureaucratic system. Thus, although the three larger factions and members of the older disintegrated groups maintain superficially cordial relations, they practice a strategic politics of silence that blocks any knowledge of their plans in the urban village. And yet behind the scenes, they actively and energetically work the system to become urban citizens through home ownership in Juhu. As shown below, there are two new factions of *vasti* residents that bring the total number of sub-factions in the urban village to five.

1. The first sub-faction emerged from the upper area of the urban village as a challenge to the private developer when the transit camps[187] that were being constructed to shift *vasti* residents collapsed mid-way. When the developer did not take any action to restart the work, this group comprising men and women, engaged the judiciary to mobilize its support through filing a writ petition demanding a change in the project Committee overseeing the slum redevelopment project. With help from the Bombay High Court, fresh elections were conducted and a new project Committee comprising *vasti* resdients was put in charge of the project. Currently the committee members are accessing the RTI, consulting legal experts and pro-poor NGOs to get advice on how to implement their project that has received multiple clearances. The private developer-led coalition through the old project committee

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[187] Transit camps are temporary in-situ single room accommodation with common toilets and water taps, provided to *vasti* residents when the slum redevelopment project is in progress on the site. Once the project is completed the residents move into the vertical building units allotted to them.

however continues to interfere in their work, creating challenges through their entrenched networks and contacts in the system.

2. The second sub-faction emerged from the lower area of the urban village due to a cleavage between *kolis* and Non-Marathi migrants. [188] The latter had strategically supported the *koli*-led urban village renewal since they had been excluded by the culturally close-knit group of migrants from Marathwada that supported anti-outsider regional chauvinist parties. However, when they found out the new provisions of the CRZ (2011) that protected *koli* rights and problematized the presence of slums along the coast, they lost faith in the *kolis* intentions to be inclusive. In addition, their lack of membership in the *koli Samiti* to represent their voice and the increasing uncertainty concerning land tenure rights in the urban village, all contributed to a splintering of this group from the *koli* faction. Since then this group has organized a sub-faction based on the common areas of origin of the non-Marathi speaking households united by virtue of source area and language. This sub-faction has now entered into agreements with a rival developer-coalition and has promised its break-away constituency a "slum redevelopment" scheme of their own.

The residents of the urban village thus struggle with a plethora of urban village renewal plans. This includes internal conflicts and contestations amongst urban village residents and external forces of elite and middle-class driven micro-urban renewal, private-developer driven redevelopment and state-led macro-urban renewal. This reveals a disjuncture not only between state-led futures and "community-driven" futures as the literature suggests. My empirical study reveals multiple disjunctures between sub-factions in the urban village and external actors that complexify the binary notion of state-led vs. community driven futures envisioned in urban development.

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[188] Migrants from the northern states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, mostly non-Marathi speaking, have traditionally been targets of a violent, anti-migrant and Hindu-chauvinist politics in Mumbai.

4.2.2 Citizenship Practices at the Juncture of "Community-Driven"/ State-Led Urban Renewal and "Participatory" Governance in the *Vasti*:

4.2.2.1 Claim-Making Practices of *Vasti*[189] Residents II: A Politics of Civility

As we have seen so far, residents of the urban village struggle to belong in Juhu through multiple and conflicting claims to urban citizenship. Forty minutes away from the urban village *vasti* households along the *Irla Nallah,* struggle to claim their redevelopment rights on the lands they consolidated over a period of forty years. The uncertainty, socio-economic marginalization and dispossession of *vasti* residents along the *nallah* created by the new urban neighborhood politics and its agents has resulted in agile "social learning"[190] by those who are resisting eviction and displacement. A young *vasti* leader who demonstrates agile learning says:

> *Vasti* **One:** There are two reasons why serving us demolition notices doesn't make sense. First our *vasti* is located on an offshoot of the major *Irla Nallah.* Second with the diversion of the southern tributary of the *Irla Nallah* (implemented as per the Chitale Committee's recommendations) the load on the *Irla Nallah* has been reduced, so the BRIMSTOWAD project cannot be made applicable to us. The Corporation plan however shows our *vasti* as being located on the *Irla Nallah.* When we asked municipal officers (Storm Water Drainage, Planning cell, BRIMSTOWAD) of the MCGM they say these orders come "from above". Until now we have never figured out "who is above". Municipal ward committee members and the top Corporation officials are clueless of the grounded reality; they refer to reports created by their junior staff. What we have found out through the right to information procedure is that to provide an access road to a builder for a slum redevelopment project the Corporation wants to provide a right of way through our *vasti* lands, so we are being evicted. In addition the *Irla Nallah* has been re-aligned in a way to provide more land on the developer's side and reduce the lands on which our *vasti* stands. The only beneficiary for this road alignment and *nallah* widening project is the developer whose land values will increase. For us, we will lose everything we have consolidated for thirty-five years! (Interview, *Vasti* 1 resident A, 23 November 2011).

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[189] The first *vasti* along the *Irla Nallah* is located on land that belongs to the Collector, Government of Maharashtra with a compact area of 2508.40 sq.m occupied by 813 residents. In addition to the resident household population there are renters, migrant labour, and small-medium business enterprises. Every housing unit has an upper storey level, which is predominantly rented out. 67% of housing units are one-room units, 1% mixed-use units with single-male migrant labour housing and 32% commercial units (small and medium sized businesses, shops, *godowns)*. Settled since the 1960's by in-migrants who were involved in local construction projects, it was recognized as a "slum" in 1976 when the state Government issued photopass documents. The average family size is approximately 5-10 members. The ethnic mix comprises *Marathi*, *Telugu*, people from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, Muslim, Christian, and *Marwari* families. Approximately 70% of the population has a social status of Other backward class commonly referred to as OBC

[190] Friedmann suggests that transactive planning was by its very nature a one-off experiment, whose actual course was subject to correction through a reflective process of social learning. "In mutual learning, planner and client each learn from the other- the planner from the client's personal knowledge and the client from the planner's technical expertise. In such a process the knowledge of both undergoes a major change. A common image of the situation evolves through dialogue; a new understanding of the possibilities for change is discovered" [Friedmann: 1976 (2011), 23].

To further their claims to land, counter threats of eviction and ensure in-situ redevelopment, the *vasti* leadership has utilized two political opportunities to deploy a strategic politics of "civilized" engagement in engaging the local and subnational bureaucratic state in advancing their claim to urban citizenship (**Refer Figure 4-3**). The *vasti* leadership has negotiated the tactical politics of inclusion by ALM groups since 2011. The *vasti* residents seek two objectives:

1. Appeal for development rights on *nallah* lands from the subnational state for self-redevelopment or alternatively state-funded in-situ rehabilitation in light of the local state-led *Irla Nallah* widening project. This opportunity to access the bureaucratic state has emerged from their recent affiliations with Juhu's ASR Coalition and identifying contacts across government departments in their efforts to "work the system".

2. Draw on neighborhood-level civic activism through volunteerism. In doing so, they hope to create forms of self-regulated local governance and *vasti*-led micro-urban renewal that could counter the excesses of developer-led coalitions in settling new projects in the guise of slum redevelopment projects on lands cleared of *vastis* along the *nallah*.

Vasti **Residents Deploying New Modes of Civility to Access the Local State**: The first opportunity for *vasti* residents to intervene in neighborhood- level urban renewal arose in the run-up to the 2012 municipal elections when the Juhu seat was reserved for an OBC candidate. [191] To continue the *Nagar Raj* experiment in Juhu, it was crucial that an OBC Citizens Consensus Councilor be shortlisted to run for the municipal post. A sub-faction from Juhu's ASR coalition reached out to specific *vasti* leaders in Juhu to indicate their willingness to support an "eligible" OBC candidate from the *vasti*. Individuals they sought out were mostly middle-aged males, who were not office-holders in a political party, had basic proficiency in English, held regular jobs, had no criminal background and had a track record of social work in the *vasti*. They approached both the urban village and *vasti* leaderships. With no favorable response from the former, the *vasti* leader had the opportunity to collaborate with them. Through this process he learned the techniques of Juhu's

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[191] The OBC stands for Other Backward Class. Popular perception associates this social status with low-income groups. This meant that most of the active, core members of elite and middle-class were ineligible. If few people within them were eligible, that is if they were elite OBC individuals, they did not reveal their caste status since this usually attracts social stigma. Eventually an OBC upper middle-class candidate was shortlisted to contest the 2012 municipal elections.

organized civil society groups to access, engage and mobilize support from the bureaucratic state. He came to negotiate the new neighborhood politics in a way that provided tacit support of *vasti*-residents claims for in-situ redevelopment instead of eviction. He would formulate the *Vasti Vikas Samiti,* a grassroots organization with a mandate to plan, organize and implement the *vasti* redevelopment process and negotiate on behalf of *vasti* households with the local state as well as other non-state actors.

Armed with an official *Samiti* letterhead, he has begun a comprehensive communication process. Through letters in English and Marathi, he is creating a trail of documents to establish an official record of a process that had been rendered invisible due to merely verbal assurances by elected representatives. He has scheduled appointments with mid-level and senior officials, often also with an NGO representative or a friend with technical knowledge to discuss *vasti* residents concerns and grievances in regard to in-situ redevelopment threatened by the augmentation of city-level storm water and sewerage infrastructure. He has kept updated about state, municipal, and ward-level decisions by accessing information through the Public Disclosure Law, created a network of allies, and hired professional expertise of small-scale legal and architectural experts to assist with their claims to land.

Vasti **Residents as Grassroots City-Builders**: The second opportunity for *vasti* residents has emerged from the evasive responses of a cash-strapped subnational state in terms of project funding and feasibility. The *vasti* leadership has developed a creative project funding mechanism from the surpluses of local economies. Replicating the public-private paradigm of the slum redevelopment scheme, *vasti* residents created a symbiotic relationship with local enterprises interested in the redevelopment project that would create benefits for all partners in the process. In doing so, the *vasti* leadership appropriates the model of slum redevelopment to create its difference. In this new version of *vasti* redevelopment the partners involved would be *vasti* residents, local enterprises and the local state. *Vasti* residents would offer for redevelopment, the lands they have occupied. Surpluses from local enterprises would provide the capital. The local state in partnership with these two agents could create the mechanisms for the implementation of the project. In this way, each partner involved in the redevelopment project could benefit. Residents could be rehabilitated in-situ with

permanent home ownership. Local enterprises could receive prime serviced land for commercial use. The local state could be offered land to create access routes for cleaning the *Irla nallah* that would help its efforts at improving storm water and sewerage infrastructure. These alliances coupled with the critical consciousness of the *vasti* leadership sustain the associational activity of *vasti* residents and help them negotiate the excesses of the new urban neighborhood politics and state-led public purpose projects. Creating collaborations with locality- and city-specific actors the *vasti* leadership hopes to engage the municipal bureaucratic state and simultaneously also the local elected representative to consider alternatives to demolition, through in-situ redevelopment. This model co-opts the logic of the slum redevelopment by furthering the concept of no financial burden to the local state. In doing so, existing *vasti* residents along the *Irla Nallah* faced with the threat of demolition reveal a strategic politics of "civility" that simultaneously appropriates a "slum"-free, "world –class" city but resists the singular approach of slum clearance to arrive at it.

These practices problematize the conceptualization of the so-called political society as merely "target populations for governmental schemes". Drawing on Chatterjee's (2004, 60) notion of the politics of the governed, this group "appeals to the moral rhetoric of a community striving to build a decent social life under extreme, harsh conditions and at the same time, affirming the duties of citizenship" (*Ibid*). The *vasti* residents thus make political claims but in a way that is somewhat different from Chatterjee's idea. My empirical work locates this difference as a politics of civility that is hybrid in nature. The claim of *vasti* residents for their in-situ redevelopment project seeks, to benefit based on grounds of an exceptional status[192] by appealing the local bureaucratic state. Although political, the demand for such a claim is couched in formal, rational and discursive terms through detailed letters and verbal presentations to the local state. This signals an attempt by few *vasti* residents to make their claims through an administrative procedure by citing the exceptions to the rule created by the local state itself in the case of relaxation of setback space from the *Irla*

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[192] In this case exceptional status was being requested based on three aspects. First, the location of the *vasti* was a critical aspect, since it was not directly located along the *Irla nallah.* This meant that the logic of slum demolition for the *Irla Nallah* widening public purpose project could be challenged. Second, the relaxations of setback space from the *Irla nallah* for slum redevelopment projects granted by the local state to private developers in the recent past served as a precedent of particular exceptions. Third, the extensions of a temple and play area along the *Irla Nallah* by private apartment buildings, regularized by the local state suggested another form of particular exception.

Nallah for private developer-led slum redevelopment projects and regularization of "illegal" extensions by private residential users on lands reserved for public open spaces along the *Irla Nallah*. These claim-making practices through an administrative procedure are being mobilized through partnerships with organized civil society groups as opposed to solely tapping into patron-client relationships with mainstream political parties.


Figure 4-3: Politics of Civilty (*Vasti* along the *Irla Nallah*)   **Figure Source:** Author

4.2.2.2   Claim-Making Practices of *Vasti*[193] Residents III: A Politics of Compensation

> *Vasti* **Two**: Since 2002 private developers who promised slum redevelopment projects along the *Irla Nallah* frequented the *vasti*. Many non-*vasti* occupied lands along the *Irla Nallah,* although reserved for public gardens in the Development Plan have private clubhouses or luxury mixed-use complexes on them. To ensure road access for slum redevelopment projects and improving project viability the developer focused on reconstituting irregular strips of land on which our *vastis* stood. So he decided to group eleven lands occupied by *vastis* and chawls that were narrow but contiguous. Of these, five lands were private and the state government owned six lands. As per the rules, the slum redevelopment project is allotted to a registered Society of *vasti* residents. In this case, the developer formed a society and the project was allotted to him. The families living on this land were assured by the developer and *karykartas* (volunteers in political parties and residents in the *vasti*) of rehabilitation in a slum redevelopment project. In 2008, the *vastis* were demolished. The manipulation of the list of eligible families led to only 94 of the 252 families to gain home ownership by 2011. The developer showed the land parcels, potential rehabilitation sites, additional loading of project-affected persons from adjacent *vastis,* project details, and sale components of the slum redevelopment project on paper. In reality, 156 of the 252 families have either been accommodated in temporary transit camps for the past four years or rendered homeless. The slum *dadas*, *karyakartas* and developer discriminated between sub-groups in the *vasti* based on religion and ethnicity to divide communities in the allotment process. This resulted in infighting amongst families, increasing insecurities amongst them. (Interview, *Vasti* 1, resident A, 23 November 2011).

Vasti **Residents Appropriate the "Moral Rhetoric of Community"**: The *vasti* residents had hoped to stall hasty eviction by the local state because they did not have clarity of where they would go once evicted. To buy time they filed an appeal with the District Commissioner's Office to stay eviction until they received clarifications on their post-eviction status. Besides a meager four months delay, their appeal did not yield much. The District Commissioner's office confirmed the demolition date as prescribed by the municipal authorities. In the demolition order, however, the Commissioner had considered the fears of the residents and suggested that the developer and municipal authorities should proactively look into provision of alternative accommodation for evicted families and grievance redressal through public hearings for project-affected-persons. However, the developer-led coalition did not follow most of these suggestions before and after the demolition and eviction process. This has led to eligible *vasti* families being displaced, rendered homeless or "rotting"[194] in

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[193] The second and third *vasti*s along the *Irla Nallah* were located on land that belonged to the Collector, Government of Maharashtra, with an area of 3,300 sq.m occupied by 252 families approximately 1250 residents. These *vastis* were demolished in 2008, as part of the BRIMSTOWAD *Irla Nallah* widening project.

[194] "When the demolition took place most families were on the footpath for three to four months because we had nowhere else to go. Our children studying in local schools had to bear the shame of living on the footpath as their classmates lived in the same area. Their exams were affected so we had to get special permission on humanitarian grounds to enable them to re-give their exams at school. We were not provided any alternative accommodation. The developer has not initiated the redevelopment project since 2008; meanwhile the land value escalates and will provide him good return in the future. In the meantime, we live in conditions worst than animals, rotting in vertically stacked temporary transit camps since 2008. Each floor of the transit camp has ten small rooms. There are three public toilets and four water taps in all, at the ground level. Mentally disturbed by poor living conditions people are moving out after four years, selling their rights to the developer for tiny

transit camp facilities. When *vasti* residents grew frustrated with their inhuman living conditions they looked for other ways to change their situation. The Public Disclosure Law became a useful tool to initiate change. Through the information collected from the concerned government departments under the RTI, they became aware of the criteria for project approval and basis of eligibility lists for in-situ rehabilitation. This "insider" knowledge has created a tiny opportunity for displaced *vasti* residents to challenge the haste of demolition undertaken as a "public-purpose" project without the requisite "community-participation and consultation process" recommended by the JNNURM. They hope to target the non-compliance and negligence on the part of the developer-led coalition in following proper procedure laid out by "public-purpose" project agencies and the District Commissioner's suggestions. This has yielded a politics of compensation (**Refer Figure 4-4**).

Since the demolition proceeded as "officially planned", the residents converted their judicial appeal filed in 2008, from a stay on demolition to requesting the High Court to scrutinize the procedural process involved in defining eligibility and the list of project-affected-persons prepared by the developer. In case of gross negligence, they have requested the Court to provide them some relief through compensation from the concerned government department or private developer for the "loss of their roof, livelihood, social linkages and access to good education for their children". *Vasti* residents are well aware that they do not own the lands along the *Irla Nallah* which their families occupied four decades ago. However, they base their claims to the land for the efforts invested by two generations of their households in consolidating the lands along the *Irla Nallah*. The efforts of *vasti* residents at consolidating lands through creation of housing, the provision of urban services and micro-economies that support transient populations visiting Juhu, have created value on these now serviced suburban lands. It is this value that developer-led coalitions seek to exploit through slum redevelopment projects. *Vasti* residents realize this. Having experienced eviction, demolition and displacement due to the BRIMSTOWAD *Irla Nallah* widening project, and frustration of a four

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compensation and settling elsewhere. Most people are losing hope of ever having their own permanent home in Juhu. The transit camp was used as a carrot to keep people's hopes but the reality is that the land they have been kept on now has been approved for housing so-called project-affected persons. This means that our families will not have anything in the end. If the local elected representative loses the next election, there will be no memory of our misery, injustice and struggle to live in Juhu". (Interview, *Vasti* 2 Displaced resident B, 10 August 2011).

- year wait for resettlement and formal home ownership in Juhu, they deploy a strategic politics of compensation to mobilize the support of the judiciary to compensate them for their loss. Located in these practices of negotiating compensation is a claim to urban citizenship that appropriates the "moral rhetoric of a community" (Chatterjee: 2004, 60) that has suffered an injustice.

The *vasti* residents seek to negotiate a compensation for displacement–either monetary or a resettlement unit within a particular radius of their previous *vasti* within Juhu – as project-affected persons of a public-purpose project initiated by the local state and funded by the national urban renewal programme partnered by the subnational state. Roy describes this moment as a "political subjectivity concerned with the calculus of compensation"

> The politics of compensation cannot be simply dismissed as co-opted or compromised forms of insurgent citizenship. It must be taken seriously as a modality of inclusion, one that makes possible rehabilitation, resettlement and dialogue. It can also be concluded that such forms of participation and inclusion produce a distinct political subjectivity. This governed subject is one that seeks to be compensated (Roy: 2009, 173)

Vasti resident's consciousness around the "calculus of compensation" has emerged in light of the growth of the new neighborhood politics that accesses the judicial state to mobilize its support towards their visions for Juhu. In addition, the nation-wide support for Anna Hazare's anti-corruption campaign since 2011 has strengthened the resolve of these residents to participate in claiming a right to continue living in Juhu.


Figure 4-4: Politics of Compensation (*Vasti* along the *Irla Nallah*)   **Figure Source:** Author

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4.2.2.3   Observations on the Social and Political Practices of Neighborhood Actors

In briefly summing up the multiple politics of urban citizenship practices and the hybrid outcomes they suggest, I offer three readings:

1. First, my experiences and observation of grassroots political practices in the case-study area reveal the fallacy of universalist notions of "community-driven" and "participatory" planning. Mainstreamed by international development agencies, the state, and corporate/ civil society elites, these perceptions are based on a homogeneous view of what constitutes "community", "slum" and "urban poor". Such neat formulations however, do not exist on the ground. Real-time planning processes reveal three disjunctures within and across community groups, within the heterogeneous state, and between the state and societal groups. The first disjuncture within neighborhood resident groups, lies in how they choose to implement neighborhood planning processes. These range from "citizen-led", "comprehensive master planning through scientific studies", "people-led self-development" and "state-led" rehabilitation programmes. The second disjuncture was how different levels of the bureaucratic state and government, envision the exercise of planning as "community-driven", "international consultancy-based" or as "public-private partnerships". The third disjuncture was between state vs. "community-driven" envisioned futures. This created debates around the priority for public-private mega-infrastructure projects vs. neighborhood greenways and housing projects.

2. Second, the pressures of "worlding" Mumbai's suburban neighborhoods through mega-infrastructure projects and strategic planning exercises are being countered by grassroots residence-based organizations. These resistances to a singular future have to be read in an open-ended way that involves appropriation, mimesis, support and discursive challenges from the grassroots. These agents hope to access and engage the state to enable multiple hybrid mutations of the singular telos. These hybrid versions explicitly address the priorities, needs and aspirations of diverse citizen groups. These readings suggest that the fractures and cleavages across and between actors in both society and state in settling "slum-free−world-class" neighborhood space troubles the dominance of the elitist project of the "world-class" city as hegemonic. It opens out the struggles and inconsistencies that

the global blueprint makers face from entrepreneurial grassroots actors. More critically, neighborhood actors appropriate practices, discourses and tools "to reconfigure the dominant through the act of mimesis". Such mimetic practices become a powerful tool to engage the "ambiguity and ambivalence" of a millennial developmental state. Grassroots resistance, fragmentation and conflict emerging in the paradoxical spcae of the twenty first century metropolis need to be viewed positively rather than being probelmatized. Precisely because they hope to democratize planning processes by multiplying the challenges to the singular logic of the "slum-free world-class" city.

3. Third, neighborhood actors reveal hybrid forms of associational activity that open out possibilities for claim-making practices to urban citizenship. These practices reveal a diversity of entrepreneurial subjectivities across the social divide that negotiate the uncertainty and anxiety unfolding at the "frontier of urban renewal" and decentralization of urban governance in suburban Mumbai. A key moment was the victory of the 2007 municipal election that came from the support of *gaothan* and *koli* residence-based organizations as supporters "inside" and "outside" the official formal process of mobilization. In the 2012 municipal elections *vasti* residence-based organizations supported the incumbent corporator's campaign and efforts to mainstream "citizen-consensus" candidate models of grassroots governance in the western suburban neighborhoods. This possibility emerged due to split between how civil society elites and middle-class grassroots leaders imagined self - governance in the neighborhood. These interactions and negotiations have led to social learning and new nascent relationships amongst groups across the social divide.

The rise of middle-class activism, the elusive and sly nature of votebank politics deployed for redevelopment, the demolition and displacement of self-built settlements and the grassroots struggles for accountability from those who govern increasingly circulated through the mainstream media have unevenly heightened political and critical consciousness in urban society. Few individuals become agents of change within their communities, working as advocates, negotiators and facilitators. Thus, claim-making practices from the *vasti* and urban village hope to negotiate substantive urban citizenship rights in recognition of their valuable contribution as residents of Juhu.

They see themselves as "contributing urban citizens as voters, taxpayers, home builders and consumers" (Holston: 2008). It is their struggles over two-three generations that has enabled consolidation of land, livelihood, housing and life-chances for themselves within Juhu and Mumbai.

Chapter 5: Concluding Thoughts

This thesis has attempted to tease out the new state-society relations, at the intersection of decentralized governance and urban renewal, through the social and political practices of neighborhood citizens in millennial Mumbai. It attempts to reveal how diverse citizen groups engage the state towards addressing their priorities, aspirations, exceptional status, and contributor/consumer - citizen rights. The study was structured in four parts.

The first chapter briefly introduces the claim-making practices of the residents of two neighborhoods to make a case for the need to study claims to urban citizenship that have emerged at the intersection of urban renewal and decentralized urban governance in millennial Mumbai. In the second chapter, I review the existing literature on urban governance and urban renewal in India. This literature primarily frames macro narratives of the structural dimensions of urban change in millennial Indian cities. Although these theorizations are extremely valuable to understand the larger picture of structural change through restructuring processes, this literature speaks in terms of macro-processes of gentrification and dispossession, through binary conceptualizations of "civil" and "political" society or imagining governmentality from above or below. Recent critiques of such macro readings suggest concepts of "civic governmentality", a fine-grained analysis on the associational activity of the urban poor and the politics of stealth of the urban poor in asserting and furthering their claims to urban space and resources. These critical responses to the readings on new state-society relations, unfolding at the intersection of urban renewal and decentralized governance, however, have some limitations. They do not identify the diverse and contradictory practices and politics of grassroots actors in a specific contextual setting, the distinct forms of micro-urban renewal aimed at settling bourgeois neighborhood space or unsettling it and the complex nuances of resistance that no longer resemble only direct confrontation. My research intends to address these concerns through a case study approach.

To move beyond the macro and binary conceptualizations, the third chapter adopts a case study approach to explore everyday micro-practices across a diversity of neighborhood actors in Juhu that engage the state towards achieving their own ends through a range of complex and often provisional

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arrangements. Three arguments have emerged through the case-study. First, the case study shows how "the past leaks into the present" through claim-making practices from a differentiated urban citizenship that suggests the simultaneous expansion and erosion of citizenship claims in millennial Mumbai. Second, in line with the literature on urban governance, my observations in Juhu reveal "elitist forms of democracy" that aim to create new nodes of power in the hands of ALM groups. My study however, goes beyond such a reading through exploring the practices and politics of *vasti* and *koli* residents in addition to elite and middle-class residents. This has revealed how *vasti* and *koli* residents along the *Irla Nallah* have been agile at "social learning" and have negotiated the new urban neighborhood politics through a range of complex social and political practices that engage the state to further their urban citizenship claims.

In the fourth chapter, finally, I attempt to conceptualize four social and political practices of neighborhood residents in engaging the state at the intersection of decentralized urban governance and urban renewal. These practices reveal an entrepreneurial politics of *difference* rooted in ethnic identity that challenges and appropriates the "world-class" future imaginary to address livelihood and housing concerns; of *silence* rooted in aspirations for social mobility through acceptance and support of in-situ slum redevelopment recommended for a "slum-free world-class" city; of *civility* rooted in prevention of dispossession by seeking an exception through local administrative procedure based on the exceptions to the rule created by the local state; and of *compensation* rooted in a calculus of compensation that seeks justice for dispossession and displacement from suburban lands despite promises for rehabilitation.

I make three arguments based on the practices of neighborhood actors. First, drawing on a diversity of social/political networks, historically produced power relations, struggles to consolidate land and development rights, and evolving political consciousness, neighborhood actors engage the state to mobilize its support for multiple "future-oriented and place-centered enterprises" in Juhu that are integrally linked to the politics of land. This politics of land unfolds in complex ways at the frontier of urban renewal and governmentality through a diversity of urban citizenship practices that cannot be described by any one grand politics. These practices transgress the conceptual boundaries of civil and political society based on how they engage the state to further their claims to neighborhood land

through politicized grassroots planning practices. Second, community-led micro-urban renewal in Juhu has been implicated as much as state-led macro urban renewal, in dispossession of the urban poor and gentrification of neighborhood space. This problematizes the celebratory and progressive notions around participatory planning and governance, as a route to democratization of decision-making and egalitarian inclusion in the project of citizenship. Third, the forms of resistance to a singular envisioned future for Juhu are complex, ambivalent and ambiguous as much as they are direct or confrontationist. Thus, it is insufficient to read resistance only as a confrontationist mode such as of a heroic civil society standing up against the state. Resistance should be re-conceptualized as contradictory, open-ended, tactical, conforming and strategic politics that co-opts, appropriates challenges and supports the singular telos of a "world-class" city. Thus, the politics of *difference*, *silence*, *civility* and *compensation* cannot be read only as complicity of or a complete opposition to the world-class future. These are to be read as distinct political, mimetic and entrepreneurial subjectivities that seek a place in the world-class future, but through a vision fashioned by their needs, priorities and aspirations. In doing so they "speak to the truths of planning… that there is a future for which one can plan and a place at which such planning can be located" (Roy: 2007, 626). Thus, challenging and transforming the singular envisioned "world-class" future with multiple hybrid futures they have envisioned.

Having explored in-depth the politics of urban citizenship practices I now want to briefly reflect on Flyvbjerg's (2004) value rational question, *what, if anything, can we as planners do about it*? The *it* in this case refers to the need for recognition and representation of grassroots claim-making practices, both social and political in nature, across a differentiated urban citizenship in suburban Mumbai neighborhoods. To answer this question partially I turn to planning theorists who are generating critical readings around planning theory and practice in the global South. Watson (2009) suggests a need to interrogate the assumptions in planning theory, especially the "borrowed" ideas of normative communicative theory within planning to address concerns specifically rooted in diverse conditions of the global South. Watson (2003) has argued that planning praxis in cities of the global South has not considered the extent of "conflicting rationalities" what she calls "deep difference" on the ground based on context specificity. She makes two suggestions for planners to explore. Firstly, to situate themselves ethically, planners should take cognizance of "fundamentally

differing worldviews and value systems" (Watson: 2003, 396). Secondly, to inform planning praxis, case study research provides one alternative to grasp deep differences, through engaging grounded realities first-hand in a given contextual setting (*Ibid*). The turn to normative participatory approaches in community-led planning or comprehensive master plan or blueprint approaches, do not even begin to address Watson's concern of the reality of "conflicting rationalities", let alone identify the specific actors, their standpoints, their concerns, their rights and needs. The existing literature on urban renewal summarized in this thesis, has rightly highlighted how such rational comprehensive approaches envision and seek to produce homogenized spaces for a particular urbane body based on social class, aesthetic appreciation and particular use. In doing so, borrowed ideas of best practices from other emerging Asian or European contexts fail to address entrenched socio-spatial injustices and divides in the twenty-first century metropolis.

There remains the question of my reflection on my fieldwork experience in Juhu. My analytical and political interest through this case study has been to understand social injustice and deepening inequality from the standpoint of those who experience it in their everyday struggles to belong in millennial Mumbai, called the *city of dreams*. During my research in the field, I increasingly became aware of the conflicts and contestation both among and within groups, as I engaged them in many conversations. Few differences, however, were not etched in stone and were fluid in nature dependant on the situation, the interlocutor, particular issues and the perceived threats at the time. Two things emerged as critical to the process of attempting to understand and engage deep difference. The first was the fragmented and diverse nature of what we often broadly refer to as society, public or community. In recognizing cleavages across opposing values and rationalities, I have come to realize that actors involved in these processes already dapple in negotiation and facilitation in diverse ways. These however, do not necessarily create consensus. It is therefore critical that planners identify just how deeply divided groups may be. It is essential to recognize that conflicting value systems could mean fear and mistrust of the other. It could also mean contestation for similar aspirations. Thus, instead of viewing such fragmentation, heterogeneity and conflict as a problem, we have to recognize that it opens up spaces and possibilities for "different imagined communities, so many modes of governance, so many civic realms" (Roy: 2007, 627). These in turn create possibilities for the entrepreneurial subject through creation of space to mobilize action in real

time. At other times, it could also create a deadlock. It is these grey zones of ambivalence and contradiction that trouble the "world-class" vision and its planners, through the surprises and challenges that ripple from the grassroots. Second, the exercise of collecting stories and mapping practices across a diversity of actors with differing political consciousness, struggles, resources, and rationalities, across socio-economic class, ethnicity, language, gender and age have helped me discover a diverse set of social practices that attempt to control, pause, accelerate or drive suburban change in contemporary Juhu. Such a grounded, multilayered, complex, and heterogeneous set of readings troubles the "truth" of planning, of a singular, unified plan to be located in a specific place and time.

This complexity compelled me to recognize and reconcile the need to "align" my values, and rationalities with the value systems of neighborhood actors and organizations that irregularly resonated with mine. In doing so, I did not exclude what would be perceived as "opposing" sets of value systems. I engaged them in many conversations to discover, why things happened the way they did, to understand conflicting standpoints and perceptions. This aligning of the self, ideas and actions greatly transformed my learning process in the field as it troubled my assumptions of conflicting groups. No longer, was I looking at the *vastis* and urban village from the academic space; I was looking outwards from within. This greatly shifted my position in the process and offered me invaluable insight in how processes worked on the ground and how dynamic the situation can be. This value-rational approach to planning created revisionist understandings of ground realities for me. It has helped generate new knowledge of urban citizenship practices, as they are experienced from the *vasti* and urban village. These practices problematized by formal planning practice, as an anomaly needs to be seen afresh. Developing a grounded body of knowledge founded on these real-time experiences, could transform the role of the phronetic practitioner as someone who is willing to interrogate stereotype conceptualizations, biases and prejudices from within the discipline of planning. In addressing the re-conceptualizations of those marginalized by formal planning practice, the phronetic practitioner, makes possible new ways of "seeing from the grassroots".

Responding to these new ways of seeing from the grassroots and acknowledging the deep differences at play, multiple possibilities for action could emerge. Depending on how the phronetic practitioner locates herself within an existing web of social relations, the interest groups she chooses to work with, the value systems and rationalities that she hopes to align with and the scale of the process could create different possibilities, opportunities and entry points for change. One possibility emerges from lessons of Juhu's grassroots mimetic practices. The phronetic practitioner could choose to align and collaborate with groups that have weak claims to neighborhood land and resources. Understanding the needs, priorities and aspirations of these groups, the phronetic practitioner could help co-generate a set of discursive and material practices that would strengthen existing efforts of weak neighborhood groups in mobilizing the support of non-state actors in engaging the state to make a difference. Such an approach opens out many possible directions for future research. A critical direction to explore would be the "spaces of praxis" that "professional" planners and "progressive" academicians have opened out in the last few decades by recognizing and engaging the grassroots politics and practices of neighborhood groups. The critical question will be "Are these alternative or radical spaces of praxis silent on the claims that remain weakly addressed?"

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Figures

The Author has generated all tables and figures, including maps, diagrams and photographs in this thesis.

Appendix

Appendix A

List of interviews and focus groups conducted during fieldwork in Juhu (July-December 2011).

1. <u>ALM Groups/ Area *sabha* representatives</u>
   a. Middle-Class Representative A, 9 September 2011.
   b. Middle-Class Representative B, 28 September 2011.
   c. Elected representative D, 25 June 2010 and 22 August 2011.
2. <u>*Vastis* along the *Irla Nallah*</u>
   a. *Vasti* 1, resident A, 29 October, 8 November and 9 December 2011.
   b. *Vasti* 1, Focus Group Discussion Women's Group, 13 November 2011
   c. *Vasti* 2, Displaced resident B, 10 August 2011
   d. *Vasti* 3, Displaced resident C, 21 August 2011
   e. *Vasti* 4, Displaced resident D, 15 September 2011
   f. *Vasti* 5, resident E, 14 September 2011
3. <u>Urban Village</u>
   a. *Koli* resident A , 23 August, 14, 15, 23 September, 31 October, and 2, 5, 8, 10, 23, 26, 27 November and 3, 4, 6, 8, 14 December 2011.
   b. *Koli* resident B, 2 November 2011.
   c. *Koli* resident C, 9 November 2011.
   d. *Vasti* 1 resident A, 15 November 2011.
   e. *Vasti* 1 resident B, 21 November 2011.
   f. *Vasti* 2: Focus Group Discussion, 25 November 2011.