THE ROLE OF URBAN REAL ESTATE IN JESUIT FINANCES AND NETWORKS BETWEEN EUROPE AND CHINA, 1612-1778

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

The Faculty of Graduate Studies

(History)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
(Vancouver)

January 2013

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the role of urban real estate in the finances and networks of the Jesuit missions in China. Starting in 1612, when Jesuit missionaries working in China envisioned for the first time a strategy for making the missions financially independent from Europe, I will investigate how and why it took until the second half of the eighteenth century for the Christian communities in China to become financially self-sustaining. The procurators and their subordinate treasurers, the Jesuits primarily in charge of the financial management of the missions, are the subject of this dissertation. How did they combine the resources and personnel extracted from Europe, India, and China to establish an autonomous financial foundation for the missions in China? This dissertation argues that their most reliable source of income was revenue from investments in urban real estate.

The arc of this dissertation spans both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries examining the Portuguese and the French Jesuit missions in China. Through a close analysis of Jesuit procurators' activities and personal networks this dissertation will assert that while they realized the necessity of economic integration in the global missions early on, procurators encountered great problems in realizing this goal. As such, this dissertation recognizes the limitations of global networks by exploring the role of global contact and the circulation of missionaries, money, and mail and by looking at the Jesuit search for financial opportunities in the local and regional economy to become self-sustaining communities. Only by studying the Jesuit finances in China over a time-span of 166 years does the relationship between Longobardo’s strategic planning for financial independence in 1612 and the French Jesuits’ budget for their missions in Beijing in 1778 become fully clear. This dissertation’s most important contribution is in charting the growing importance of revenue from investments in urban real estate. Ironically, just as the missions in China had begun to galvanize local resource networks largely independent of the central organization of the Society, European monarchs expelled the Jesuits from their realms and Rome finally dissolved the Jesuits as a Society.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>Archivio della Santa Congregazione per l’Evangelizzazione dei Populi, Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Informazioni Pro Missione Sinensi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCG</td>
<td>Scritture Originali riferite nelle Congregazioni Generali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSI</td>
<td>Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Fondo Gesuitico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JapSin</td>
<td>Japonica-Sinica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASV</td>
<td>Archivio Secreto Vaticano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAV</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BorgCin</td>
<td>Borgia Cinesi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNC</td>
<td>Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele II, Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Fondo Gesuitico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>Bibliothèque Nationale de France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanves</td>
<td>Archives of the Jesuits in Vanves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgments

As I lay the final touches to six years of doctoral studies, I think back to who helped me from the beginning to the end. I thank Danny Vickers for his support to have me transferred from the Masters program at the University of British Columbia to the doctoral program. Danny helped me navigate through the first two years of the program with advice on classes, comprehensive examinations, historiography, and career development.

I am grateful to Tim Brook and Luke Clossey for their patient and empathetic supervision. It was a wonderful experience to work with two scholars I greatly admire. At key moments they each invested much time and energy in my work, and they were enthusiastic about my project while at the same time helping me along with many great ideas and suggestions. Both Tim Brook and Luke Clossey strengthened my argument in many different ways, and their stylistic corrections – punctuation, grammar, and the traps of using the conjunctive too often – have incurred such contributions to this dissertation that I will never be able to pay back.

Richard Unger took time out of his retirement to provide sharp and effective comments on earlier drafts of chapters. Christopher Friedrichs’ teaching methods and views on world history set an example that will influence my own courses in that field significantly. I thank Leo Shin for supervising me during the first two years in the history department.

There are more reasons to thank my fellow graduate students at UBC than I have room to do so here. I would like to express my thanks first to Desmond Cheung and Tim Sedo. Desmond’s editorial advice, both at the early stages of my dissertation and the chaotic gallop towards the finish, gave me hope and courage. Craig Smith, Noa Grass, Nick Simon, Heidi Kong, Kelly Cairns, Patrick Slaney, and Douglas Ober commented on my work, and with each of them I had many fruitful discussions about academic and life goals. I thank David Luesink, Malcolm Thompson, Anna Belogurova, Tom Woodsworth, Alex Ong, David Meola, Laura Madakoro, Kynhoon Cho, Matt Galway, Jason Young, and Zhang Dewei for all I learned from them while taking classes together or working side by side at C.K. Choi building. I thank Tim Cheek, Jessica Main, Alison Bailey, Tsering Shakya, Karen Jew, and Marietta Lau for graciously giving me a place to work at the Institute of Asian Research.

I am grateful for the award of grants throughout my program: the Chinese Railroad Workers Commemorative Scholarship in History, History departmental research funding that partially paid for my research in Belgium, France, and Italy, travel awards, a Faculty of Arts Graduate award, and PhD tuition fee awards. I would like to thank Ronnie Hsia for inviting me to Penn State University for a six-week workshop on contacts between missionaries and converts subsidized by the Andrew Mellon Foundation. Apart from helping me with my research this workshop brought me in contact with many other young scholars such as Brandon Bayne, Paolo Aranha, Adina Riu, Chris Wisniewski, Veronica Gutierrez, Jared Staller, Daniel Wasserman, Leon Garcia, Qinghua Liu, and Jeff Horton. The nurturing environment Ronnie Hsia created at Penn State was the start of enduring friendships with all my
workshop colleagues. We met at conferences and in the archives. They are an essential part of my expanding interdisciplinary, and international network of people interested in the early modern world. I am grateful for the Andrew Mellon Foundation providing me with a second scholarship that allowed me to visit the Knights of Columbus, Vatican Film Library at Saint Louis University in combination with a short visit to the Lilly Library in Bloomington. Towards the end of my program, Father Antoni Ücerler and Wu Xiaoxin were responsible for a great archival experience at the Ricci Institute of the University of San Francisco. Thanks to a travel grant I was able to finish the last chapter of my dissertation while meeting and discussing my project with Mark Mir, Ken Kopp, Eugenio Menegon, and many others at the Ricci Institute.

I thank Richard von Glahn, Tonio Andrade, John Wills, Noel Golvers, Nicolas Standaert, Ad Dudink, Brigit Tremml, Daphon Ho for their helpful comments and feedback on my developing scholarly ideas. Bernard Deprez time and again guided and helped me in accessing the resources of the Catholic University of Leuven. His mailing list on new Jesuit-related material was of substantial use to me. I also thank the staff at the Jesuit archives and especially Mauro Brunello for their instructions that made my research such a pleasant episode within my overall graduate studies.

I found many friends in North America and Vancouver specifically. I thank St. John’s College for introducing me to a fair share of them. I thank Deepika Mittra, Genevieve Gagne-Hawes, Carly Teillet, Phil Dunlop, Stephen Bridenstine, Olivia Freeman, Stefan Lambrecht, Nathan Adams, Wendy Strangman Bassett, Simon Vickers, Alex Westbye, Suzanne Rigden, Bieke Gils, Tom Morley, Vishaal Kapoor, Brent Calis, Mel Garipoglu, Tom Peotto, Debbie Wong, David Newberry, Soma Banerjee, David Freeman, Stephanie Shames, Matt Sedo, Rui Hua, Nicole Ong, Teilhard Paradela, Nianhua Feng, Anouk De Weerdt, Kaspar Russ, Kristen Mackey-Russ, Brandon Marriott, Weiting Guo, Martin Nouaille, Alexey Golubev, Sasha Johnson, Adam Scalena, and Karl Smith. I thank Bruno Vantomme for his friendship and for the advice and help he gave me with several Latin translations.

I thank Andrew Hill for his support with data programs, data entry, and data analysis. He introduced me to the many professors and students at the department of economics of UBC. The lounge for graduate students enrolled in economics became a second home: Dave Freeman, Lori Timmins, Angela Redish, Lanny Zrill, Donna Feir, Evan Calford, Jeanne Tschopp, and many others were a willing audience for all my experiments in economic history. It was a very valuable hands-on experience in interdisciplinary training to explain historical concepts such as global micro-history – re-labeled by the economics students as micro macro history – and test their validity on an audience who were not historians or religious studies scholars. It was particularly encouraging when economics students became excited about the historical data on Jesuit travel I had collected.

I thank most of all my family. I have moved to four continents with the purpose of broadening my mind and studying other cultures and peoples. My wife’s family – Guy, Megan, John, Matthew, Alice, Ruby, Sam, Jennifer, Jack, Sarah, Jan, and Dave – welcomed me into their midst with an enthusiasm I rarely came across. I will never forget meeting Jan and Dave in their house in Canmore: they were genuinely
interested in me and my work as a Jesuit-China-world historian. They still are. I thank them for their support, which enabled me to focus solely on my research.

My sister and brothers – Stefanie, Wouter, and Simon – are my closest friends. They have never questioned the academic reasons for which I traveled so far. I think of them often. Wouter’s wife and sons – Aaron and Sam – awakened the desire to have my own family. I thank Johan, Mieke, and Toby. My mother and father have set high standards for me to emulate. Living far away and raising my own family I miss them every day. No one spent more time on editing and formatting than my wife Gemma. She also never tired of listening to my research ideas and she improved them continually. Gemma and my daughter, Stella, reminded me to strive to be a better person, a better scholar, a better father, and a better husband. A kind word, a warm embrace, a smile from them is what drove me most to finish this dissertation.
Dedication

To my mother and father
Simon, Wouter, and Stefanie
Gemma and Stella
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Economic History of Jesuits in China

This introduction will outline how, until the 1990s, within the field of Jesuit history, the study of the economic and material integration of the Society of Jesus in China took second place to the study of cultural and religious accommodation between European Jesuits and Chinese scholars and broader society. The few scholars who have investigated the finances of Jesuits in China focused almost entirely on the missions in the seventeenth century, and they concluded that the source material for this topic is incomplete and scattered. Secondly, this introduction acknowledges the problem of scarce and incomplete source material, and, after outlining how previous scholars have worked around this issue, this introduction describes the source collections I use to build upon previous research of Jesuit finances in China. I agree that information on Jesuit finances in the collections most used by Jesuit scholars who work on China – the Japonica-Sinica collection at the Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu – is sporadic at best. Thirdly, this introduction discusses how Jesuit history has studied the issue of national affinity and how each chapter of this dissertation will develop its focus on Jesuit groups with different national affinities. In the following chapters I will investigate a collection of letters of a French procurator between 1691 and 1706, a guidebook for procurators written in 1747, and a collection of reports detailing the French possessions, investments, and missionaries in Beijing from the eighteenth century to support this dissertation's main historical contribution regarding the importance of Asian real estate in financing Jesuit missions in China.

Beginning in 1612, when Jesuit missionaries working in China first envisioned a strategy for making the missions financially independent from Europe, this dissertation will chart the changes in Jesuit finances until the second half of the eighteenth century in the Christian communities in China. The subjects of this dissertation are the Jesuits primarily in charge of the financial management of the missions, from Nicolas Trigault (1577-1628) who was the first visitor-procurator to
travel from China to Europe in 1612 and who was the first to try and collect enough resources for the China mission to become financially self-sustaining, until François Bourgeois (1723-1792) who was the last procurator of the French Jesuit missions in 1778. Chapter two analyzes in-depth the capacities of Trigault as a procurator and his successors during the seventeenth century, whereas chapter three examines procurators working both in China and Europe and their networks during the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Chapters four, five, and six broaden the scope to procurators and their subordinate treasurers, and the importance of the interaction between European communities and their investments in Asian economies during the eighteenth century. How did procurators and treasurers combine the resources extracted from Europe, India, and China to organize sufficient finances and personnel for the missions in China?

As the argument develops in chapters two and three, this dissertation will illustrate how social, economic, and political changes in both China and Europe affected the degree to which the Jesuits were able to implement the financial strategy envisioned in 1612. Aside from changes in Europe and China, the ability to transport money, missionaries, and mail on a global scale determined the methods for and success of procurators gathering start-up capital and personnel with the aim of financial self-sustainability. Chapter three focuses on the increased commitment of both the French and Portuguese rulers and how this influenced the resource networks set up by procurators. The dissertation’s final three chapters examine the financial consequences of these developments inspected in chapter three and the ensuing increased importance of urban real estate. Only by studying Jesuit finances and networks from this dissertation’s scope – from 1612 until the late eighteenth century – is it possible to gauge the importance of revenue from urban real estate and fully understand how this goal of financial self-sustainability had been in the making – yet unreachable – since the beginning of the Jesuit missions in China. As such, this dissertation provides the first complete history and analysis of the Jesuit finances and networks in China.
1.2 Jesuit Historiography: The Predominance of a Missiological Perspective in Primary and Secondary Literature

The primary subjects of this dissertation are the Jesuit fathers and brothers responsible for the financial management of the Jesuit affairs in China. These men were often operating in the shadows of their fellow missionaries who pursued the religious ambitions of the Society. Both Jesuits themselves – the authors of the primary source material – and Jesuit historians – the secondary Jesuit literature – have neglected to place procurators and especially treasurers in the spotlight. Instead, Jesuits engaged in religious conversion of Chinese people and more specifically Jesuits who were engaged in missionary work at the Chinese court or that were in collaboration with Chinese mandarins, have been the center of reports and histories written by Jesuits during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The first people to write Jesuit history were the Jesuits themselves.1 They molded the narrative of their missionary exploits as it served their interests best, and then presented it to a European audience. Jesuit finances were not discussed, perhaps to avoid affirming the widespread notion that Jesuits were canny with their finances. This culminated in a “saying in Portuguese Asia [that] advised you to ‘guard your wife from the friars, but watch your wallet with the Jesuits.’”2 In the case

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of China, it was Nicolas Trigault who wrote the first (hi)story of the Jesuit missions in this empire entitled, *De Christiana Expeditione apud Sinas suscepta ab Societate Iesu* (1615).³ His journey figures prominently in chapter two. During his voyage to Europe he edited and re-wrote Matteo Ricci’s diaries and manuscripts, and published the resulting work as *De Christiana Expeditione*. It became a runaway bestseller throughout Europe, and was re-published and translated into French, German, Spanish, Italian, and English (partially) within a decade.⁴ This was the auspicious beginning of publications on Jesuit history in China.⁵ Jesuit Fathers continued to write their own history well into the twentieth century. At no point did their finances feature prominently. Today, the written documentation on the Society of Jesus fills many archives and libraries, however, the sources on the finances of the Jesuit missions are incomplete and fragmentary. The difficulty of collecting the scattered relevant documents partially explains why few scholars have tried to examine this topic systematically. The finances of Jesuit missions were most often overlooked in both primary and secondary Jesuit literature.

In his historiographic article (1997) Standaert called the entire economic situation of Christianity in China an almost completely undiscovered field.⁶ Four years later Noël Golvers repeated the same assessment in the *Handbook for Christianity in China* (2001).⁷ “The available material – so far not collected or studied systematically – is fragmentary and incomplete.”⁸ In the most complete bibliographic work on Christianity in China (964 pages in total) only three pages were dedicated to the financial situation of the missions, concluding that it was a

³ More on this in chapter two.
⁴ See Florence C. Hsia, *Sojourners in a Strange Land: Jesuits & their Scientific Missions in Late Imperial China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 30. See also chapter two.
⁸ Golvers in Standaert, *Handbook of Christianity in China*. 
theme still deserving more investigation. Since then several other scholars have argued similarly, illustrating that the call has not gone completely unanswered. Before discussing how these scholars have worked around the issue of incomplete and scattered sources, and with what sources this dissertation hopes to contribute to the research on Jesuit finances in China, this introduction first answers the question of why scholars should study religious actors from an economic perspective.

Luke Clossey has asserted that only during the late eighteenth century was the economy perceived as a distinct entity, and that until then, the profane and the sacred were more mixed up than they are today.\(^9\) This important insight indicates that the fields of early modern world economics and Jesuit studies cannot be entirely separated during this period. The China missions were not simply constructed out of human resources and missionary zeal, but also out of material conditions. The fundamental financial resources and the position of the Society of Jesus in the world economy as it evolved from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, as well as the material culture of the China missions, all deserve more attention.

It is evident from the following statement that the finances of the Jesuits in China should be understood as both separated from, and imbedded into, Chinese society:

...though the missionaries themselves remained exponents of European culture and ultimately dependent on material support from ecclesiastical institutions and from the colonial administration, due to the Ming and Qing administration they were largely separated from the trader and colonist and as such were able to establish a unique relationship with different layers of Chinese society.\(^{10}\)

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As a case in point, Noël Golvers declares that the expenses of François de Rougemont, the European missionary who is the focus of his study, were “very closely linked to the Christian community.”11 Adding incentive to the economic approach was the slow change of focus from isolated “giants” (as Jesuit fathers were described by George Dunne in 1962) to the missionary as an “overburdened manager” of a Chinese Christian community of more than 200,000 (as Jesuits were described by Liam Brockey in 2007).12

Recent scholarship has investigated lesser-known Jesuits in combination with scholarly curiosity for the Chinese Christian communities. Contrary to earlier scholarship that perhaps overemphasized Matteo Ricci’s role in establishing the Jesuit’s “uneasy foothold” in China, Brockey began his overview of Jesuit history by crediting the redirection and forceful new policymaking of Jesuits such as Alessandro Valignano (1539-1606) and Niccolò Longobardo (1565-1655).13 The latter’s policy-making with regards to the Jesuit finances features prominently in chapter two.14 At the same time, the Jesuits were no longer seen as uniquely talented men who were handpicked by their superiors in Europe to confront the challenges of China.15 Instead, their talents were recast as the result of a rigid program that was not specifically geared towards the difficulties of learning

12 Since Dunne’s Generation of Giants (1962), Jesuit history has evolved through several different paradigms. Jesuit scholars have increasingly connected Jesuit history in China with other historical fields.
13 The phrase “uneasy foothold” is borrowed from Liam Brockey. See also Jonathan Spence, “The Dream of Catholic China.” This dissertation also confirms the importance of Niccolò Longobardo and his policies concerning financial management of the Jesuit missions in China.
14 Other scholars are returning their gaze from the top-down conversion schemes that went hand in hand with writing hagiographic accounts on the most prominent Jesuits, to examining Jesuits who did not have direct contact with the Chinese emperor but worked in the provinces and converted the majority of China’s Christian converts. A fine example of this was Noël Golvers’ study on François de Rougemont, a Flemish missionary in Jiangnan province. Noël Golvers, François de Rougemont.
15 Brockey, Journey to the East, 209.
Chinese. Some succeeded in establishing more than that (like Ricci), but others could barely write Chinese by the end of the seventeenth century. Brockey suggests this might be a consequence of their expanding flocks and intensifying pastoral burdens.

The sheer scale of this type of community, though dwarfed by Chinese non-Christian society and economy, must have nonetheless generated an economic and financial system that combined Asian and European resources and benefactors. The European Jesuits became “overburdened managers,” while Chinese converts and leaders of parishes replaced the European fathers and kept the Christian communities running every time persecution occurred. This happened for the first time during the Nanjing affair in 1617, but especially after 1663, when Christianity in China had become a family religion, its importance increased exponentially. The Chinese Christian communities were not an amalgamation of randomly converted mandarins (that operated at the Chinese court), but a mature, dynamic community with, at its center, devout Christian confraternities that were lead by Chinese converts (and European Jesuits). Those Jesuits traveled extensively and were not always fluent in Chinese, so it was no surprise that towards the end of Brockey’s

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16 The key skills that the novice Jesuits learned during their basic training were threefold, says Brockey: the ability to analyze linguistic structures, skill in "logical argumentation," and "techniques for dealing with abstract philosophical and theological concepts.” Spence, “The Dream of Catholic China.”
17 Brockey, Journey to the East. Each time European Jesuits were singled out and banished (temporarily), while the Chinese Christian community leaders bore significantly heavier punishments. Very few Jesuit scholars focus on Chinese Jesuit priests. Even before the 1980s Father Francis Rouleau lamented this lacuna in Jesuit scholarship, and he researched the Chinese clergy throughout his life. See Francis Rouleau, “The First Chinese Priest of the Society of Jesus, Emmanuel de Siqueira, 1633-1673,” Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu 28 (1959): 3-50. Based upon the material preserved in the Francis Rouleau archives in the Ricci Institute at the University of San Francisco, Father Rouleau collected more material on this topic than his few publications would suggest. Michael Shen was another example of Chinese Christians whom Father Rouleau was studying. See also Barry Martinson, Celestial Dragon: A Life and Selected Writings of Fr. Francis Rouleau (Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute, 1998).
18 Brockey, Journey to the East, introduction.
Jesuit history, it was the Chinese converts who took the main stage.\(^\text{19}\) By the end of the seventeenth century, the Jesuits were well aware that the Chinese Christians themselves were the driving force behind Chinese Christianity.\(^\text{20}\)

An integral part of this dissertation’s attention to Jesuit procurators and treasurers is the ways in which the Chinese Christian communities supported the European Jesuits materially and financially. My work has been influenced by a change of focus from individual European missionaries to the communities they were a part of, and which defined them. This did not just take place in the way they culturally accommodated European Christianity for an Asian audience, but also in the way Chinese communities contributed to the economic and material foundations of each Jesuit mission. I argue that this was especially important because of the limits early modern travel from Europe to China imposed on the transport of people, goods, and money.

This dissertation proposes that the Jesuits were ultimately not able to rely fully on material support from Europe and it was precisely the successful economic initiatives within Asia and the blending of local and global resources that allowed the Jesuits to survive financially in China even after the Society of Jesus was suppressed in 1773. The Jesuit China vice-province was, just like the Jesuit Japan province, in constant need of money. Whereas their contemporaries, enemies, and later Jesuit scholars agreed that the Jesuits were economically prosperous on a

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\(^{19}\) Tim Brook holds that Jesuit history can still be directed further from a missiological and Europe-centered to a China-centered approach. Timothy Brook, “The Early Jesuits and the Late Ming Border: the Chinese Search for Accommodation,” in *Encounters and Dialogues: Changing Perspectives on Chinese-Western Exchanges from the sixteenth to eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Xiaoxin Wu (San Francisco: Monumenta Serica Institute, 2005), 37. This rethinking requires shifting from a frontier study (the Jesuits being on Europe’s frontier) to a border orientation. The Jesuits’ arrival was not an overpoweringly important moment in late imperial Chinese history, so its place should definitely not be overemphasized (hence, a border orientation). The different contexts and range of interactions between Chinese and Jesuits were aptly illustrated in Jami, Engelfriet, and Blue’s edited volume on Xu Guangqi. Xu was reinvented several times by both Westerners and Chinese. However, Xu Guangqi was in a way a “Chinese Ricci.” He did not and cannot represent the diversity and the changing role of the Chinese Christian communities.

global scale, it is clear to Jesuit scholars now that the Asian missions were not in perfect agreement with this global stereotype.\textsuperscript{21} I will now briefly discuss the literature on the material and economic culture of the Society of Jesus in China.

1.3 Jesuit Historiography: The Material and Economic History of Jesuit Missions in China

The first scholar to bring into focus the Jesuit finances in China was Fortunato Margiotti (1913-1990). Until recently, the most complete sketch of Jesuit economics in China was chapter seventeen in his \textit{Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738}, published in 1958.\textsuperscript{22} Even the overview in the \textit{Handbook of Christianity in China} acknowledged that it based itself mainly on Margiotti’s groundbreaking compilation and organization of financial data. Margiotti compiled most of his sources on Jesuit finances from the Japonica Sinica and Fondo Gesuitico collections held in the Jesuit archives (Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu, ARSI), and, for his discussion of non-Jesuit orders active in China, he relied on sources found in the Propaganda Fide archives.\textsuperscript{23} Margiotti’s ability to find isolated references in many volumes is especially clear in his use of the Japonica Sinica collection.\textsuperscript{24} Margiotti narrowed his description to the finances of the Portuguese Jesuits during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries (the French had just the same approach but implemented it later\textsuperscript{25}), and he recognized five categories of financial resources: commerce, regional pensions, help from Japan, alms, and

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} See Golvers’ assessment of the Christian missions in China, \textit{François de Rougemont}, 630.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Fortunato Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738} (Roma: Edizioni ‘Sinica Franciscana,’ 1958), 367-417.
\item \textsuperscript{23} There are over forty references to both the Japonica Sinica and Fondo Gesuitico collections, especially in the first half of the chapter.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Margiotti uses at least fourteen different volumes and he makes reference to many diverse sections within these large volumes.
\item \textsuperscript{25} I disagree with Margiotti’s point of view that the French implemented the same approach as the Portuguese and will expand on this in chapter six.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushleft}
stipends given to the missionaries.\textsuperscript{26} His categorical organization stresses the difficulties of creating a chronological overview of Jesuit finances without accounting for many gaps. After discussing these means of income in the first thirty pages of the chapter, Margiotti then turned his attention to the Spanish religious living in China and their financial assets. His exhaustive record included the Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians, Propaganda Fide missionaries, Paris Foreign Missions, Lazarists, etc. Though Margiotti did not pay much attention to the French Jesuit missions in China, two other (French) scholars, Paul Bornet and Joseph Dehergne, each wrote an article on the goods of the French mission.\textsuperscript{27} Bornet’s and Dehergne’s articles similarly illustrate a dependence on incomplete and sporadic sources. Add to this three more articles, and that was all there was written on Jesuit finances in China until the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{28}

The first monograph on the material and economic culture of Jesuit missions in China is Noël Golvers’ \textit{François de Rougemont, S.J., Missionary in Ch’ang-shu (Chiang-nan)}, which translates the account book and eulogium of the Flemish missionary working in the Christian missions in Changshu, a municipality close to Suzhou.\textsuperscript{29} Golvers returns to Western sources that were previously ignored – just like Liam Brokey would in 2007 – but the focus is no longer on a few great missionaries. Instead Golvers studies an unknown missionary who worked in the Chinese provinces. Though de Rougemont was a busy editor of Jesuit Christian books in Chinese, he did not entirely fit the previous stereotype of the Jesuit-scholar whose main activity was studying at the Chinese court and producing literary

\textsuperscript{26} More on this in chapter six.
\textsuperscript{29} Golvers, \textit{François de Rougemont}. 
bestsellers for a European audience.\(^{30}\) Golvers’ main source is the draft of a Jesuit account book that revealed his personal finances for the period between 1674 and 1676. This draft should have been destroyed once copied into the big ledger of the Changshu mission, which covered the finances from the start of the mission in that province until the end.\(^{31}\) Just like almost all other Jesuit account books, the big ledger was destroyed to avoid it falling into the hands of the Society’s enemies. However, by sheer luck, the draft of the account book was picked up by de Rougemont’s friend and colleague, Philippe Couplet (1623-1693). Couplet and de Rougemont both studied in Leuven from 1643 to 1645 (where they befriended Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688) as well, who completed the Belgian triumvirate that would later on work as missionaries in China).\(^{32}\) Couplet and de Rougemont left Flanders together and would eventually both work in Jiangnan province, China, at less than a day’s travel from each other. Couplet collected his old friend’s account book when he died in 1676, and, thinking it might be useful for aspiring missionaries back home, he took it with him when he was elected as procurator to tour Europe in the 1680s. Thanks to this series of haphazard connections, we have today the richest source on Jesuits microeconomics, and, thanks to Golvers’ dedicated research, the most complete (and only) monograph on Jesuit material culture and day-to-day accounting.

Golvers’ work not only discussed the missionary’s finances, but also drew attention to the Chinese (Christian) community in which de Rougemont was embedded. Jesuit scholars inspired by the China-centered or Chinese-centered turn were frustrated regarding the invisibility of the Chinese (and the Chinese Christian converts) and how the Chinese perceived, supported, or rejected the religious and material integration of these European missionaries.\(^{33}\) The first obvious proliferation of a renewed mission history that accounted for the Chinese was

30 Such as Nicolas Trigault, see chapter two for more on the literary production of procurators and the missionary-scholar stereotype.
31 See chapters two and six.
33 See below.
Gernet’s work, which examined the anti-Christian texts written by Chinese critics.\(^{34}\) The difficulties of reconstructing the Chinese perspective and the struggle of the birth of an “ethnographic China mission history” (as Paul Rule called it) was successfully navigated by Golvers, who used the account book to reassemble the ties between European missionaries and the surrounding Chinese community.\(^{35}\) An account book of more than 800 entries proved a true goldmine for the social structure and daily life of the Chinese Christian population of that specific region.

This dissertation uses and reinterprets this account book in chapters two and six. In chapter two, I maintain that de Rougemont’s account book further illustrates how procurators working in the Portuguese missions in China did not accumulate enough capital to invest in Chinese real estate, nor did a Chinese clergy replace European missionaries by 1700. In combination with an analysis of the other surviving account books of the China Jesuit missions, this dissertation reaffirms and expands upon Golvers’ study and view that the Jesuit mission’s “financial situation is that of a heavily charged budget, with a particularly fickle and vulnerable basis.”\(^{36}\) My dissertation will argue that it was mostly investments into local and eventually regional Asian real estate, which changed Jesuit budgets such as that of de Rougemont. Chapters four and six discuss the importance of real estate further and assert that since de Rougemont’s mission in the 1670s was financed by irregular gifts from local benefactors, these gifts and donations were not reliable enough to ensure unceasing self-sufficiency of the mission as a whole.

This dissertation incorporates Margiotti’s, Bornet’s, Dehergne’s, and Golvers’ source material on Jesuit finances. I reinterpret the sources that deal with Jesuit finances during the seventeenth century (Margiotti and Golvers) in light of the sources that discuss Jesuit finances during the eighteenth century (Bornet and Dehergne). More specifically, in combining the dispersed sources discussed by previous scholarship, I am able to link the way Jesuits during the 1610s envisioned

\(^{34}\) See below.


\(^{36}\) Golvers, *François de Rougemont*, 630.
making the Portuguese Jesuit missions financially self-sustaining with source material demonstrating how French Jesuits in Beijing reached this goal at the end of the eighteenth century. Even though the scarcity of the sources make it difficult to construct a chronological step-by-step investigation of the finances of Jesuits in China (and how and when they evolved), this dissertation intends to study the fragmentary sources on Jesuit finances systematically and provide a more complete picture by bridging the divide between the well-studied Jesuit missions during the seventeenth century with the less-studied Jesuit missions of the eighteenth century. When examined together, the sources confirm that the goal of seeking financial self-sufficiency over this extended period of time did not change (in fact, it intensified).

1.4 Jesuit Historiography: World History and Jesuit History

Including relevant material from lesser-studied collections, such as the compiled letters of a French procurator working in Paris but responsible for the French Jesuit Asia missions (in chapter three) or a guidebook for procurators and treasurers (in chapter four), is a technique used in response to the scarce and fragmentary source material. Before elaborating on these sources, I will briefly discuss how this approach to primary source material replicates in some way the secondary scholarship that combines world and Jesuit history.

When narrowing one’s gaze to academic works on the economic history of the Jesuits in China, it is difficult to find more than ten relevant works. However, contributions to the economic history of Jesuits who worked in regions other than China can inspire new approaches and adaptations for scholars working on Jesuits in Asia, or, more narrowly, on Jesuits in China. In the following section, I will first

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37 For a discussion on the problems that accompany a regional approach to a topic that had a global coverage, see below. Some of the studies that have influenced the financial and economic approach to the Jesuits in this dissertation are: Nicholas Cushner, Lords of the land: sugar, wine, and Jesuit estates of coastal Peru, 1600-1767 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980); Steven Harris, “Long-Distance Corporations, Big Sciences, and the Geography of Knowledge,” Configurations, 6 (1998): 269-304; Ronnie Hsia, Noble Patronage and Jesuit Missions: Maria Theresia
discuss the scholarly works on Jesuit economic history beyond China with which this dissertation interacts most. I also define in what ways this dissertation builds upon this previous scholarship and how this dissertation will further contribute to the field. Second, I investigate the link between economic history, Jesuit history, and world history, and I specify how this dissertation benefits from these fields in studying a topic and people who are both globally and locally defined.

The first study that encompasses the fields of Jesuit, economic, and world history and on which this dissertation builds is Dauril Alden’s *The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond, 1540-1750.*

Alden researches why, how, and to what extent, the Society of Jesus became involved with the imperial Portuguese economy. Puzzled by the multiple ways in which the Jesuits supported themselves, Alden decided to research the missionaries and reconstruct the economic basis of their enterprise. His study covers all continents, but despite this global geographic span and the cultural diversity it accompanies, Alden himself warned that the paper trail was thickest in Portugal, Brazil, and India (which is where most Jesuits under the Portuguese Assistancy worked) and as such these lands received more emphasis than others such as China.

Despite this limitation when it comes to primary sources, Alden did include information on the economic ties of the Jesuits in China and Japan and the

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Portuguese empire. His broad world historical approach emphasized the horizontal connections of a network between different regions.

This dissertation develops a few specific issues that Alden’s work, though exhaustive, did not. If money or people were not connected to the Portuguese empire, then they were not in the focus of Alden’s study. As there were both Portuguese and French Jesuit missions in China (with separate finances, as chapters three, five, and six will explain), this dissertation will investigate the French missionaries and their economic connections to the French empire in Asia and beyond, and I will compare the French Jesuits’ sources of support with those of the Portuguese Jesuits.\textsuperscript{40} Sources left by a French procurator are relevant to the ways French Jesuits in China financed their missions, and therefore relevant to an overall picture of the Jesuits in China. A comparison and analysis of non-Portuguese patronage (German, Italian, etc), Portuguese state patronage, and French patronage will add to Alden’s \textit{The Making of an Enterprise} and further explore the diverse and ever changing ways in which the Jesuits in China supported themselves financially. It also adds another layer to the networks that Alden depicted, an important one because there were linkages created outside the official alliances that reveal a more realistic portrayal of how different Jesuit networks transported missionaries, mail, and money between Europe and China.

Half a century after Margiotti’s pioneering chapter, a new outline of the Jesuit financial network was published in Luke Clossey’s \textit{Salvation and Globalization in the Early Jesuit Missions} (2008), chapter eight.\textsuperscript{41} Fifty years of Jesuit historiography influenced the perspective from which Clossey approaches the subject. It was shaped by a desire to break through a regionalized approach to Jesuit history, and therefore Clossey studied the Jesuits’ “global efforts to sustain themselves in Germany, Mexico, and China.”\textsuperscript{42} Just as was the case with Alden, Clossey combined findings on Jesuit finances across several regions. Both scholars have a world historical approach and investigate the global operations of the Society, and more

\textsuperscript{40} See chapter six.
\textsuperscript{41} Clossey, \textit{Salvation and Globalization}, 162-193.
\textsuperscript{42} Clossey, \textit{Salvation and Globalization}, 163.
specifically the perceived centrality of the Society.\textsuperscript{43} Alden focused on the pivotal role of Brazil, in order to balance the continuing lack of “clarity, comprehensiveness, and accuracy” of the sources on the China missions’ accounts. This approach steps away from portraying Lisbon as the pivot of a European network. Clossey tries to “correct the traditional view of connections only running between Rome and a set of independent mission regions, regions as discrete as the chapters in historical studies of the Jesuits.”\textsuperscript{44} In order to accomplish this, Clossey studies the global financial network between Germany and China, Germany and Mexico, and Mexico and China. More so than Alden’s study, Clossey’s work recognizes the overlapping and competing layers within the multi-national overall Jesuit network. Ideally, there should be equal attention paid to the different regions and cross-regional ties, but Clossey focuses most on the China region, and he discusses the German-China patronage network extensively.\textsuperscript{45} Clossey argues that Bavarian financial support “was still unmatched by the generosity of the papacy or of the Portuguese crown.”\textsuperscript{46}

This dissertation adds to Clossey’s sources on Bavarian financial support by linking them to different copies of the same document held at the Propaganda Fide archives and the national library in Rome.\textsuperscript{47} At the same time, I connect these documents with the collection of Antoine Verjus’ letters, in which the French procurator rerouted Bavarian financial support during the 1690s.

This dissertation interprets Clossey’s statement as an indication that there existed financially significant and diverse patron networks that supported the traditional state patronage by supplementing the Jesuits’ finances in China with temporary yet remarkable contributions.\textsuperscript{48} I hope to build upon Clossey’s scholarship and study the different ways in which individual Jesuit procurators for the vice-province of China gathered financial support by optimally using existing

\textsuperscript{44} Clossey, \textit{Salvation and Globalization}, 192.
\textsuperscript{45} See also chapter three.
\textsuperscript{46} Clossey, \textit{Salvation and Globalization}, 179.
\textsuperscript{47} See chapter three.
\textsuperscript{48} Chapter three will investigate further the continual or continuous character of the French state patronage.
patrons or by creating new patronage networks, thus submitting a new and dynamic layer of economic activity to the study of global networks.

This approach is somewhat similar to that of one last scholar of patronage and Jesuit missions. Ronnie Hsia recognized the Jesuits’ multifarious and textured network when it came to patronage as well.\(^{49}\) In his *Noble Patronage and Jesuit Missions: Maria Theresia Von Fugger-Wellenburg (1690-1762) and Jesuit Missionaries in China and Vietnam* Hsia investigated the nature and evolution of the private patronage of Maria Theresia to several generations of German/Austrian descent. Hsia examined the “world systems” that were used by the Society of Jesus and the uneven speeds of communication that linked them.\(^{50}\) The main focus of his study, an Austrian benefactress, made use of the Portuguese network at first, switched to the French East India Company after that, and finally replaced the French with the Prussian East India Company in combination with the reliable Dutch sailing ships. In line with Hsia’s findings, this dissertation will pry more deeply into the fickle character of political and economic networks used by Jesuits to transport money from Europe to China, and, in chapter three, I will argue that relationships of trust forged between individuals is what explains their temporary and ever-changing nature.

A final collection of sources that is aimed towards clarifying the finances of the Jesuit missions in Asia is the small collection of Philippine manuscripts archived in the Lilly Library at Indiana University, Bloomington.\(^{51}\) Catalogued by Charles Boxer in 1968, the sources contain numerous references to material and financial connections between China and Manila as well as a guidebook for procurators and treasurers from 1747.\(^{52}\) Chapter four will examine these documents in detail and


\(^{50}\) He does this shortly in *Noble Patronage and Jesuit Missions*, 89-99.


\(^{52}\) For example, Boxer’s description of Lot 511, volume 2: “...innumerable references to their dependence on supplies of chocolate and silver money from Manila, the latter in the form of pesos...”, “...numerous references to the dissensions between French and Portuguese Jesuits and to the claims of the Portuguese Padroado...” See
assert that the trend towards the importance of revenue from investments in Asian real estate during the eighteenth century was evident in the Jesuit finances in both China and the Philippines.

This dissertation studies these collections of sources from a world-historical perspective in line with Tonio Andrade’s and Sugata Bose’s model of a global micro-history. Tonio Andrade’s concept of a global micro-history is based upon the need to restore balance in the way world history has been written.\textsuperscript{53} He states that “we’ve made great strides building powerful models of global historical structures and processes: global silver flows, strange parallels, divergences great and small.”\textsuperscript{54} This type of world history, comparative and connective, has developed great social scientific models, but it has also ignored personal stories and real people. Andrade believes that, since “human dramas ... make history come alive,” we “should adopt microhistorical and biographical approaches to help populate our models and theories.”\textsuperscript{55} This is what he calls a global micro-history.

Sugata Bose is another scholar who defines the concept of global micro-histories.\textsuperscript{56} Bose’s approach aims “... to avoid the high degree of abstraction that characterizes so much of global, oceanic, interregional, and comparative histories in which real human beings and their agency vanish from view.”\textsuperscript{57} “The weaving of broad patterns of interregional networks is matched ... by the unraveling of individual tales of proconsuls and pirates, capitalists and laborers, soldiers and

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\textsuperscript{54} Andrade, “A Chinese Farmer, Two African Boys, and a Warlord,” 574.

\textsuperscript{55} Andrade does acknowledge “the most effective precedents” of scholars “who haven’t been associated with the world history movement” such as Jonathan Spence (\textit{A Question of Hu}), Linda Colley (\textit{The Ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh}), Nathalie Zemon Davis (\textit{Trickster Travels}), and Leonard Blussé (\textit{Bitter Bonds}). Andrade, “A Chinese Farmer, Two African Boys, and a Warlord,” 574.

\textsuperscript{56} Sugata Bose, \textit{A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

\textsuperscript{57} Bose, \textit{A Hundred Horizons}, 22-23.
sailors, patriots and expatriates, pilgrims and poets.” Bose continues that his “series of micro-histories ... have to strike a balance: they must avoid an exclusive obsession with the particular that leaves the whole out of view as well as sidestep an all-encompassing meta-narrative on networks of capital and labor that is insensitive to actual life experiences.”

In addition to Andrade’s and Bose’s rationalizations for a global micro-history approach, I use the concept of global micro-histories because it incorporates and defines both sides of global contact during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: its limits and its extent. This dissertation examines these two aspects of global contact, and how this affected not just networks and systems, but also people. How were the Jesuits and their global network both made possible and restricted by global travel during the early modern world?

Measuring the range and limitations of this contact and writing a “connected history” of these global interactions is not an easy task. The interaction and reciprocal definition of the global and the local has been analyzed most succinctly by scholars such as Sanjay Subrahmanyam who proposes a connected history based upon Joseph Fletcher’s concept of an “integrative history.” Subrahmanyam seeks an answer to the question of how the local and specific interacted with the “supra-

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58 Bose, A Hundred Horizons, 23.
59 Bose, A Hundred Horizons, 78-79.
60 I hope to develop Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s concept of ‘connected histories’ in describing the geopolitical strategies the Jesuits used to connect networks from Europe to Asia. See Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Explorations in Connected History (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).
local.” The supra-local connections are not limited to material phenomena such as world bullion flows and their disputed impact, but also contain the flow of ideas and mental constructs that allow for interesting connections such as religious millenarianism across Eurasia. Subrahmanyam’s approach does not attempt to “measure” globalization, since, whether done explicitly by economic historians (for example the measurement of importance of trade by Jan De Vries) or conceptually, by creating centers and perimeters (for example Immanuel Wallerstein’s and Janet Abu-Lughod’s approach), it cannot be applied when one studies the influences of the local and the global in a specific region. In order to illustrate the entanglement of both these influences and forces, a different approach is needed – so asserts Subrahmanyam –, an approach that highlights the outward connections without

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63 Subrahmanyam makes this point most clearly in the Akbar-Montserrate connection, where he points to the (conspicuous) role of European Catholic missionary orders such as the Jesuits. The message and accompanying the-end-of-the-world-is-near-notion/idea of the Jesuits made sense to Akbar and, as he no doubt reconfigured this through his own understanding, a connection was made, based upon a dialogue of (mis)understanding. This millenarianism and material connections such as the silver-flow, allow us to approach a problem of global dimensions, but with quite different local manifestations. Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories,” 750.
dimming the importance of local context and how this changes outward ideas, goods, people.66

From an economic point of view, the type of global contact or the interaction between the global and the local is often framed as a form of early ‘globalization’ in the sense that there was a development toward increasing “integration of international commodity markets.”67 From a world history perspective, different schools of world historians argue that globalization was a phenomenon that became significant after 1500 (Jerry Bentley), during the sixteenth century (Immanuel Wallerstein), somewhat before 1500 (Janet Abu-Lughod), or a long time before 1500 (Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills).68 By using the concept of global micro-histories this dissertation provides an alternative way of interpreting the shape and changes in global contact from 1612 until 1778.

Global micro-histories are a history of connections and a history of disconnections. This type of world history is not either connective history or comparative history (Patrick O’Brien splits the world history field in these two categories), but it combines both approaches to write a history of global links (made by either networks or people) while simultaneously writing a history with a focus on those instances where the global did not connect or integrate people and networks.69 World historians do not react well to connections that do not bring integration of two different cultures, peoples, or civilizations.70 The framework that deals with these seemingly loose ends is set in terms of success or failure. However,

66 Subrahmanyam contextualizes this relationship together with David Armitage as a “thickening [of] interregional connections” which will eventually lead to a global age of revolutions. See David Armitage & Sanjay Subrahmanyam, (eds.), The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840 (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2010), xxii. Fletcher also wishes to “measure the thickness of globalization” in his “Integrative History,” 2-3.
69 In line with Fletcher’s approach in “Integrative History,” 5-6.
70 This idea – connections but no integration – was brought to light by Desmond Cheung who acted as a discussant for a panel at the annual Association of Asian Studies conference, Toronto 2012.
even if a connection across the world does not bring cultural, economic, or religious integration, this does not mean that there was no “creative moment,” or no new understanding built from mutual misunderstandings. My approach to a global micro-history functions best at precisely this intersection: I do not attempt to tidy up the mess of ‘successful’ or ‘failed’ connections, but instead I recognize that this is where the local or the micro aspect of a history would come to the foreground and overshadow its global counterpart. A clear example of this changing interaction between the global and the local is the dependence on intra-Asian trade of both European trading companies and the Jesuit missions discussed in chapter five. Another example is the way this dissertation interprets the accumulated data on the extent and limits of global contact when it comes to Jesuit global maritime systems: 127 out of 249 Jesuits sent from Europe to China between 1581 and 1712 survived the passage. The number does not say where and how people died or what alternative solutions Jesuits in China came up with to maintain and safeguard their resources on a local level. My global micro-history interprets this number as a series of connections, a series of disconnections or dropped links, and, when resources and

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71 Timothy Brook argued in favor of this term at the Jesuits in Asia panel, Association of Asian Studies conference, Toronto 2012.
72 To be interpreted as described by Subrahmanyam above. See Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories,” 750. It can also be understood the way Nicolas Standaert analyzes funeral rituals from an interaction-and-communication-network or, as he describes it metaphorically, an “interweaving of rituals.” See Nicolas Standaert, The Interweaving of Rituals: Funerals in the Cultural Exchange between China and Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 212-213. Cultural creativity arises from the existence and creation of an interstitial space between transmitter and receiver, between subject and object, between self and other. “The starting question of the interaction framework is whether the Chinese, in the construction of the new ritual, have adopted the gestures and meanings offered by the Europeans and vice versa. Instead of considering the new creation a misunderstanding, it explains the various ways of understanding by revealing their coherence. By “coherence” is meant that in the eyes of the authors, the new creation fits internally together, makes sense, and is considered effective, as was the case with different funerary rituals for local Christian communities. By presupposing interaction, the framework allows for the human capacity to disengage from cultural determinism.”
73 See chapter five, section 5.4.4.
74 See George Pray, Historia Controversiarum de Ritibus Sinicis (Budapest), 1789, 250.
people were not safely transported on a global scale, a series of instances where the employment of local resources and people complemented the global connection and strengthened the China Jesuit networks.

This dissertation unravels the local and global finances of Jesuit missionaries working in China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the one hand I will examine networks and global systems: I will study the way Jesuits interacted with “global silver flows” (see chapter five) and compare financial categories of Portuguese and French patronage (see chapter four) or discuss the dynamics of Jesuit networks and how they affected the flow of Jesuit finances and resources (see chapter three). On the other hand I search for Andrade’s and Bose’s balance. I focus on the people who spent silver (and copper) in Europe, India, and China. The personal story of a European procurator or an Asian treasurer is woven into the larger analysis of each chapter.

Having addressed the source-related problems and the world history perspective of this dissertation, I will continue by discussing two more aspects of the China Jesuit missions’ financial self-sufficiency: one of national affinity – the distinction between the Portuguese Jesuit and French Jesuit missions in China – and, mirroring this, the difference between the study of the Jesuit missions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As mentioned at the outset, the arc of this dissertation spans both the Portuguese and the French Jesuit missions in China from the 1610s until the 1780s. I will now address the approach to Jesuit national affinity and the importance of examining Jesuit finances in this dissertation’s specific time span (1610s – 1780s). At the same time, I will provide a description of how this dissertation connects to previous paradigms within Jesuit studies.

1.5 Jesuit Historiography: National Affinity, and the China Jesuits in the Eighteenth Century

If Jesuit procurators and treasurers, and the finances of Jesuit missions in China, were not at the center of scholarly attention, then which Jesuits and what Jesuit topics were written about by Jesuit historians? Father George Dunne wrote a
general modern history of the Jesuits in 1962, entitled *Generation of Giants; the Story of the Jesuits in China in the last Decade of the Ming Dynasty*. The change in policy that resulted in the final resolution of the controversy over the Chinese Rites in 1939, combined with increasingly global concerns of the Catholic Church in the 1950s and 1960s, sparked Dunne's re-evaluations of the China Jesuits. *Generation of Giants* discusses the interaction between the missionaries and Chinese around concepts such as “accommodation” and “adaptation.” Accommodation, and not simply conquest, was the theoretical approach, since China had a high culture that required reviving the method of cultural adaptation. The missionaries rose to the challenge, and, in Brockey’s description, were presented as “cutting-edge natural philosophers” with remarkable linguistic capacities. They were used as “standard-bearers of superior technological skills that were eagerly received by indigenous intellectuals.” The Jesuits deserved a chapter in the greater tale on the scientific and technological transmission between the West and the East. Dunne ended his prologue with the statement that “they [the missionaries] wrote a splendid page in the history of the cultural relations of East and West.”

Dunne’s history of the Jesuits zoomed in on those Jesuits whose intellectual accomplishments were so remarkable that the Jesuits were seen as “forerunners of modern and tolerant attitudes,” and established the first link in the Sino-Western relations. However, not all Jesuits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were written about in the Jesuit histories, and this explains why Dunne could portray those few who did feature in his study as giants. The Jesuits who left a lot of writings were the ones that generally stood in the Jesuit historians’ spotlights. Thanks to the latest prosopographical analyses we know that “an exceedingly small proportion of individuals was responsible for the Society's collective legacy in both script and

print.” Out of the more than 400 Jesuits who lived and worked in China, no more than a handful at a time published works or engaged themselves in scientific research at the Chinese court. Nonetheless, the stereotype of the Jesuit-scholar-scientist was widely accepted.

The most famous Jesuit scholar-scientists were the “Big Three:” Matteo Ricci, Johann Adam Schall von Bell, and Ferdinand Verbiest. Each of them worked at the Chinese court or had personally known the Chinese emperor. As Standaert pointed out, each of these Big Three was primarily, but not exclusively, studied by fellow countrymen. Italian scholars such as Pasquale d’Elia (Fonti Ricciane: Documenti Originali concernenti Matteo Ricci e la Storia delle Prime Relazioni tra l’Europa e la Cina (1579-1615)) and Father Pietro Tacchi Venturi (Opere Storiche del P.M. Ricci) edited and published Italian Jesuits’ works (Ricci), German scholars such as A. Väth investigated the importance of German Jesuits (Johann Adam Schall von Bell and others), and Belgian scholars such as Henri Bosmans, Henri Josson, and Léopold Willaert published on the correspondence and scientific contributions of the Belgian Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest.

Despite the fairly recent paradigm shift towards the importance of globalization and the Jesuits' new-found relevance that supersedes the binary Sino-Western framework of the 1960s to 1980s, the national divisions amongst contemporary scholars who focus in their studies on Jesuits of their specific nationality persist.\textsuperscript{85} Take, for example, the study of Portuguese missionaries in the China missions. The Portuguese were the nationality that supported most missionaries in the China missions but, since none of the Big Three was Portuguese, their fathers originally did not receive a comparable share of attention from later historians.\textsuperscript{86} A reason for this was that they proportionally published fewer works per missionary in comparison with their Italian or Belgian counterparts.\textsuperscript{87} To reaffirm the significance of the Portuguese padroado and the country's missionaries, the latest historical overview of the Jesuit missions to China, Liam Brockey's \textit{Journey to the East} (2007), returned to previously ignored Western sources or sources that were "hidden in the proverbial broad daylight."\textsuperscript{88} The sources he focused on were primarily Portuguese ones, and Brockey reminds other Jesuit historians that the importance of this nation within the history of Catholic Europe and the European expansion to Asia and the Americas cannot be ignored. The China missions were part of the Portuguese Assistancy, and the lingua franca of the Jesuits (and European merchants in Asia) was Portuguese.

The issue of renowned Jesuits and national affinity within Jesuit scholarship is related to the division of Jesuit missions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

\textsuperscript{85} Not many Jesuit scholars address the issue of nationality or state of origin: is it possible to talk about national or proto-national feelings that caused tensions amongst the diverse groups of Jesuits? An examination of the relevance of nationalistic or proto-nationalistic feelings during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries will be incorporated into chapter three. See also Luke Sean Clossey, “Distant Souls: Global Religion and the Jesuit Missions of Germany, Mexico, and China, 1595-1705” (PhD diss., Berkeley, 2004), 249. Clossey refers to John Bossy, “Catholicity and Nationality in the Northern Counter-Reformation,” in \textit{Religion and National Identity}, ed. Stuart Mews, Studies in Church History 18 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 287-89, 294.

\textsuperscript{86} Brockey, \textit{Journey to the East}, 17.

\textsuperscript{87} See Nicolas Standaert, “The Jesuit Presence in China (1580-1773).”

\textsuperscript{88} Brockey, \textit{Journey to the East}, 17. Dauril Alden similarly reconnects the Society of Jesus with the Portuguese Empire. See Dauril Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}. 
centuries. Brockey’s historical overview of the Jesuits runs from 1579 to 1724, and this way he preserves the gap between seventeenth and eighteenth century mission history in China. The popularity of the seventeenth century in Jesuit history outshines the eighteenth century by far. John O’Malley states that the Society’s “golden age” was the seventeenth century. Eugenio Menegon uses almost the exact same wording to describe this period in the China missions, and refers to the period from 1645 to 1723 as “the Golden Age of Opportunity.”\(^{89}\) Contributors to O’Malley’s volume explore the richness and complexity of the Society’s activities during the eighteenth century to restore the uneven balance of scholarship. Most works on the eighteenth century, however, were and are written by French historians who focus on the importance of the French Jesuit missions in China and their relationship to French imperial ambitions. This is another dimension in China Jesuit studies that, to a certain extent, displays a concurrent national division: French historians examine French Jesuits in the eighteenth century in contrast to Portuguese historians (or other historians who use mostly Portuguese sources) who study Portuguese Jesuits in the seventeenth century.

All these nationalistic divisions are of course far from absolute. An excellent example of this is the continued interest of scholars from all over the globe in Matteo Ricci. Ricci may have been the only missionary of the Big Three that throughout the past century has never left the limelight. During the first half of the twentieth century he was the center of attention for two Italian historians. In the 1950s, Louis Gallagher translated Trigault’s edition of the journals of Matthew Ricci, and later in the 1980s Spence wrote his The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci, digging deep into Ricci’s original Italian and Chinese writings. Recently, in 2010 and 2011, two more scholarly works complete the collection: Ronnie Hsia’s Jesuit in the

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This dissertation does not focus on any of the Big Three, nor does it revolve around exclusively Portuguese, Belgian, French, or Italian Jesuits. The Jesuits I study are a semi-separate group: the procurators and treasurers. However, I do not wish to view this class of people responsible for the local and global finances of the Jesuits as a group with no national affinity. When looking at individual French, Italian, or Portuguese procurators, I hope to unpack the so-called international character of the Society of Jesus. Over the time span of both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, I examine how national affinity was a part of each individual Jesuit’s identity and position within the Society, and how national affinity similarly affected the finances of both the Portuguese and French Jesuit missions in China. For example, French procurators competed with their Portuguese brothers for money coming from other European benefactors (German patrons for example, see chapter three). Dutch sailors severely damaged financial interests of the Jesuits because the Jesuits had aligned themselves with the rival Portuguese maritime empire. However, sometimes, Dutch merchants did help Belgian Jesuits, and the English East India Company transported money, people, and goods for the French Jesuit mission in China. These examples will illustrate that nationality was not an absolute division within or outside of the Society of Jesus.

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91 Chapter three provides many examples analyzing the nationalistic feelings or national affinities during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
A way to understand this complex issue most clearly is to avoid perceiving the Jesuits as a single organism, for, “despite the international composition of the order and its professed nonsecular orientation, in times of crisis its members were as unable to resist nationalistic impulses as were ordinary citizens.”92 One such crisis occurred at the end of the seventeenth century when both Portugal and France intensified the number of Jesuits sent to China. Nationalism amongst Jesuits (but also beyond the Society) was a contributing factor to another crisis, the Rites Controversy, as well.93 The result was that Jesuits sent to China were either part of the French Jesuit China missions or the Portuguese Jesuit China missions. This period is the focus of chapter three. The original founders of the Society operated at “a time of incipient nationalism,”94 and the national affinities and concurrent rivalries only grew stronger during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, the transport and communication networks of individual Jesuits were able to transcend some of the nationalistic divisions in their Society, which helps to explain why, even during the 1690s, several French Jesuits were still sent to the Portuguese China missions (see chapter six).

Contrary to most historians, who either focus on the Portuguese (or fairly international) Jesuit missions in China during the seventeenth century or the French Jesuit missions and the accompanying French colonial background during the eighteenth century, this dissertation seeks to displace nationalistic paradigms in favor of an integrated perspective on individual Jesuits and their operational networks. Both Jesuit organizations had to find a way to supply their missions financially and with adequate personnel. My narrative includes the Jesuit missions

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93 This was arguably the most damaging crisis Jesuits in China ever faced and an important reason for their ultimate expulsion from China. See James Sylvester Cummins, *The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navarrete, 1618-1686* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), vol. 1, l. Paul Rule is working on a book that discusses the China rites controversy. A fair share of his research took place at the Matteo Ricci Institute of the University of San Francisco, and, if Rule uses the notes compiled by Father Francis Rouleau and Father Edward Malatesta, then he will surely include the French-Portuguese strife as a factor in the overall China rites controversy.
during the eighteenth century, and it does not couch this period in terms of “slow decline” after the “golden age.” Rather, it was a time when the Society as a whole was forced to adapt and reframe its resource networks when it came to safeguarding continuous maritime support for their global enterprise in Asia. European maritime networks were in a state of constant flux because of fierce competition for Asia’s trade. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, the struggle for Asian resources was between the Portuguese and the Dutch empires. Towards the end of that same century, the competitors multiplied and included powerful new players such as the French and, most importantly, the English. During this time, it was essential for not just individuals, but the entire Society to steer clear of possible devastation of their enterprise if they decided to remain loyal to only one nationality and openly hostile to all others.  

The Jesuits who were affected most by this issue were the ones in charge of sending money, people, goods, and letters from one continent to the next, the subjects of this dissertation. Procurators and treasurers displayed a great creativity in building their own multi-layered networks both within and outside the Society. New connections were made to avoid local or global conflict, thanks to a personal connection, or thanks to a strategically placed correspondent. The issue of national affinity was successfully superseded when, for example, an Italian missionary in the Portuguese vice-province was proud to have an associate in London who would forward his letters or annual pension from a German benefactress.  

My dissertation is a Jesuit history that examines the national divisions of the Society of Jesus in depth within their international arena, without regarding them as absolute. I do not limit myself to the study of one national group within the Jesuit enterprise.  

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95 See chapter three.  
96 See chapter three.  
97 This corresponds with Clossey’s argument against the prejudice that all Europeans were the same. My dissertation will clarify that the French Jesuits’ approach to financing was different the Portuguese Jesuits’ approach. The personal networks of an Italian missionary were different from those of a Portuguese, German, or French Jesuit. Clossey, Salvation and Globalization, 6.
1.6 Dissertation Overview

Chapter two examines the procurators and Jesuit superiors responsible for both the local and global finances of the China Jesuit missions. How did they cope with the limitations of early modern travel from Europe to China and the transport of goods and money on such a scale? The chapter begins with an introduction to the responsibilities of procurators and treasurers, in the way the constitutions and the administrative center of the Society conceived them in the sixteenth century, and the financial strategies they instructed their members to bring into practice. In this chapter I also provide an overview of the limitations of the European approach to financing the China missions, and in the process demonstrate how the procurators working in the missions and responsible for the economic survival of their fellow missionaries adjusted their superior’s original financial plans.

The chapter employs the case study of the first (unofficial) procurator for the Jesuit vice-province of China, Nicolas Trigault (1577-1628) and his superior Niccolò Longobardo (1565-1655). This case study is used to assert that the China Jesuits set in motion initiatives from the periphery (China) to the center (Europe) that were not authorized by their Jesuit superiors, with the goal of establishing a two-way global flow of people and resources between China and Europe. After less than thirty years of China missions, they sought to make the China missions financially independent from Rome and Lisbon. Longobardo and Trigault desired a Chinese clergy because the human costs of transporting Jesuits from Europe to China were too high. They also wanted enough start-up capital to make investments in Chinese real estate, which would allow the China Jesuits to become financially self-sustained. Previously, Edmond Lamalle wrote the history of Nicolas Trigault’s mission from the perspective of Trigault’s literary achievements, and, as such, Lamalle concluded that Trigault’s mission was a success. In contrast, this chapter addresses Trigault’s ability as a procurator to collect people and funding from Europe and use these resources to build self-sustaining China missions. Seen from this perspective, it is less clear that Trigault’s mission was a success. Procurators after Trigault continually requested capital to invest. However, evidence found in Jesuit reports on their
possessions after the Qing dynasty take-over and a close up investigation of the
global funding of a Flemish missionary working in Changshu during the 1670s,
François de Rougemont (1624-1676), suggest that procurators working in the
Portuguese missions in China did not accumulate enough capital to invest in Chinese
real estate, nor did a Chinese clergy replace European missionaries by 1700.

Whereas chapter two revised the efforts of procurators sent from China to
Europe between the 1610s and the 1670s, chapter three focuses on the efforts of
procurators responsible for China who remained in Europe. The primary sources
central to this chapter are the seventy-eight letters of the French procurator,
Antoine Verjus (1632-1706). Written between 1691 and 1706, Verjus reported
specifically on his efforts to establish a safer and more reliable connection between
Europe and China. Verjus’ manifold attempts to expand his personal network in
order to transport people, goods, and money across continents are contextualized
by the endeavors of earlier and later Jesuits to build relationships of trust with the
Muscovite empire, the Portuguese and French states, and English and Dutch
merchant networks. Procurators needed to trust the people responsible for carrying
their letters, money, and fellow missionaries from Europe to China, and ensure that
letters were not lost or made public, that money was not appropriated for other
purposes, and that missionaries were not redirected to other missions. This
definition of trust within the procurator’s personal network is supported by
statistical data that provides the percentage of redirected Jesuits between Europe
and China. To analyze the internal structure of the networks between individual
Jesuit procurators and their superiors, European states, benefactors, and merchants
I propose that relationships of trust geared towards the successful transport of mail,
money, and people were needed and came to define the dynamic and personal
character of these Jesuit networks. Verjus’ correspondence at precisely the turn of
the seventeenth to eighteenth century illustrates his pivotal role in reshaping Jesuit
transport and communication networks. At the end of the chapter statistical data
further substantiates that neither the attempts of procurators working in China such
as Trigault nor the efforts of procurators remaining in Europe (but responsible for
the China missions) were able to overcome the limitations early modern global travel imposed on people and money.

Chapters two and three focus on the procurators, both in Europe and in China, who operated on a global scale. Chapter four examines the Jesuit administrator responsible for the management of people, money, and material resources on a local scale, the treasurer. Since the procurators experienced such difficulties in overcoming the dangers of early modern world travel (avoiding the redirection of mail, money, and people), they required the expertise and knowledge of the local treasurer, a subordinate who was either locally recruited or had been stationed for a longer period in the local mission. Based upon the evidence embedded in a guidebook for procurators and administrators written in 1747, this chapter argues that it is this cooperation between procurator and treasurer that fully exploited the opportunities for financing the Jesuit missions locally. François de Rougemont’s mission in the 1670s was financed by irregular gifts from local benefactors, but gifts and donations were not reliable enough to ensure unceasing self-sufficiency of the mission as a whole. By the eighteenth century, the guidebook for procurators suggests that it was management of local real estate investments that was the main occupation of the Jesuits responsible for the economic management of the Society of Jesus in Asia. The person with the knowledge to make these local real-estate investments was the treasurer, who was in most cases a local Asian convert with the status of Jesuit brother. Locally, a procurator relied almost completely on the treasurer’s knowledge. The treasurer was his most trusted liaison with the local social and financial network, while also providing a continuity of knowledge and people.

The focus of attention on urban real estate continues in chapter five with a shift from real estate management in the Jesuit missions of Manila in the 1740s to the revenue generated by Beijing real estate overseen by French Jesuits in the 1770s and 1780s. The source material changes from guidebooks for procurators to the surviving accounting sources of both the Portuguese and French Jesuit missions in China. In total, four such sources survived. I investigate the historical context of each account book in relation to the accounting information on French real estate in
Beijing to improve our understanding of the relationship between local financial integration and global sources of funding.

These account books are magnifying lenses that allow for close analysis of the dense web of material, financial, and personal interactions that shaped the Chinese Christian communities. The French Jesuits in Beijing relied significantly on income from local and regional investments rather than global financial funding. I argue that the shift from being dependent on global funding to missions that were largely financially self-sustaining was similar to the way European merchant companies financed their trade operations in Asia during the eighteenth century. As shown in chapter four, this evolution started at the beginning of the eighteenth century and was a trend that persisted in both the Philippines and China. In both cases, the local financial integration increased and changed character in comparison with the Jesuit dependence on Asian economies during the seventeenth century.

Chapter six maintains the focus on the importance of urban real estate to the overall finances of Jesuit missions during the eighteenth century. The main source material for chapter six is the collection of French Jesuit and French governmental reports on the “goods” [biens] of the French missions in China. Building upon the earlier sources that account for the same real estate, this chapter explores the perspective of the French state on real estate across the world, worth over half a million French livres. How did state patrons envision the mutual obligations brought forth by their patronage, and how did state patrons plan to extend ownership over the wealth produced by their patronage?

This chapter further examines and compares the state patronage of both France and Portugal. I analyze the differences and similarities between the patronage of both states according to four categories: pensions, properties (and the sense of ownership over them), scientific materials, and commerce. The first category, pensions, is directly controlled by the state, and I argue that the numerical differences between the French and the Portuguese state pensions are relatively small. The second category, properties, is partly an investment of the funds provided by the first category and partly the result of new separate funding. It is not entirely within the control of the French or Portuguese state, since developments
that occurred within Qing or Ming China affected Jesuit property values, and since the Chinese state contributed to these properties as well. The third category, the materials needed for the Jesuit scientific project at the Chinese court, is not as significant financially to the overall Jesuit finances in China as the first two categories. The fourth category, commerce, is more a consequence of lacking state patronage.

Chapter six argues that the French Jesuit missions were financed differently than the Portuguese Jesuit missions in China in two aspects. Firstly, the French state and Jesuits had a strong sense of national ownership over their properties in China, which manifested itself most prominently at the beginning and the end of the French Jesuit missions in China (1685 to 1700 and 1773 to 1785). Secondly, the French Jesuit missions did not engage in the Nagasaki-Macao related commerce controlled by the Portuguese (and later the Dutch), but rather turned to the English to help them transport profits made in other Asian markets. This second point was not the result of a different approach in state patronage, but was due to changing papal policies regarding missionary trade in East Asia and changing commercial opportunities for Europeans in Asia from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. These conclusions correspond to and expand upon my analysis in chapters four and five of the increased role of revenue invested in Asian urban real estate managed by the Jesuit communities during the eighteenth century.
Chapter 2: The Forgotten Accountants of the Society of Jesus

Chapter two is the first research chapter and examines the procurators and Jesuit superiors responsible for both the local and global finances of the China Jesuit missions. Procurators operated on every level within the hierarchy of the Society of Jesus, but very little is known about the way they did their job. How did they cope with the limitations of early modern travel from Europe to China and the transport of goods and money on such a scale? First, I introduce the responsibilities of procurators and treasurers, in the way the constitutions and the administrative center of the Society conceived them in the sixteenth century. Second, I examine the case study of the procurator Nicolas Trigault who was sent from China to Europe during the 1610s. I reinterpret the existing literature on Trigault’s mission, and I bring his two goals to the forefront. Trigault wanted to make the China missions financially self-sustaining and, since it was so difficult to transport missionaries from Europe to China, he wanted to develop a Chinese clergy. Even though the sources for calculating the precise financial benefits of Trigault’s mission did not survive, this chapter will use data in combination with later procurator reports and a China Jesuit’s account book to show that from 1612 until 1693 Trigault’s goals were not realized.

2.1 Introduction: Fabulous Riches?

One of the most apparent developments in the material realm of the Society of Jesus was its seemingly instant economic success, both in Europe as well as in its missions across the globe. This remarkable financial prosperity would have been a surprise to the Society’s founder. In 1537, Ignatius of Loyola and his companions lived on meager alms and confined themselves to an ascetic life.\footnote{The financial underpinnings of the Jesuit Society were laid out in \textit{The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus}, which was “a collection of statutes and ordinances composed by Ignatius for the inspiration and government of the religious institute he} Loyola further
envisioned that the Society should own no houses and accept no rents. However, by the founder’s death in 1556, the Society already possessed over one hundred endowed houses. Early on, it became clear that a contradiction between personal and institutional poverty, or more precisely personal poverty and institutional wealth, was arising. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, certain Jesuit missions managed very large acquisitions of land and property that well exceeded their personal maintenance requirements.Later, when the Society was abolished in 1773, the papers of its fiscal administration and all accounts of local procurators were being pursued in an attempt to grab and take over any of its former possessions or capital.

The Jesuits’ riches, impressive in terms of both financial records and assets as well as geographical reach, cause scholars such as Charles Boxer to point out that the Jesuits’ economic activities were:

... far greater in scope than those of either the Dutch or the English East India Companies, which are sometimes termed the first multinationals. Moreover, whereas the directors of both Jan Compagnie and John Company were nationals of their respective nations, the Jesuit Generals at Rome, and the Provincials, superiors, and heads of missions abroad were truly international.

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99 Thomas Cohen, “The Social Origins of the Jesuits 1540-1600” (PhD diss., Harvard, 1974), 53. The Jesuits differed from the mendicants in their refusal to accept any fees for performing sacraments. Mendicant orders were for example the Franciscans, Dominicans, Carmelites, Augustinians etc. These religious orders depended directly on the charity of the people for their livelihood.


101 Certain Jesuit historians such as Serafin Leite argued that institutional wealth and personal poverty were not incompatible. Nicholas P. Cushner, Lords of the land: sugar, wine, and Jesuit estates of coastal Peru, 1600-1767 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 6. Cushner finds this argument unconvincing.

102 Cushner, Lords of the land.

Boxer also states that the Society was the first multinational corporation. Yet, Boxer's assertions were not true academic investigations, nor did they claim to be. Dauril Alden, a specialist on Jesuit finances, politely disagrees with Boxer and insists that, when closely examined, the operations, organizational structure, and decision-making character of the Society of Jesus bore no discernible resemblance to those of the modern multinational corporation. Alden's seven-hundred-page study, *The Making of the Jesuit Enterprise*, illustrates the differences and similarities (real and apparent) between a multinational corporation and the financial administration of Society of Jesus. Despite Alden's significant contribution, the economic and financial administration of the Jesuit riches in the Far East were, and still are, shrouded in mystery.

The secondary literature on Jesuit procurators and real estate is remarkably sparse. Apart from chapter twelve in Alden's *The Making of an Enterprise*, exactly two articles have been written on Jesuit procurators: Felix Zubillaga's “El Procurador de la Compania de Jesus en la Corte de Espana” published in 1947-1948 and Josef Wicki’s “Die Anfänge der Missionsprokur der Jesuiten in Lissabon bis 1580,” which was published in 1971. In his 20-page chapter, Alden introduces the

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104 Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, 668. *Times of India*, 24 Dec. 1978. Lawrence J. Sakarai wrote the article, entitled Trading in Souls and Slaves: “Prof. Charles R. Boxer, 74, an eminent authority on Portuguese history, was recently in India to attend a seminar on Indo-Portuguese history and deliver the prestigious Heras lectures in Bombay.” Boxer’s quote was the end of a long answer to Sakarai’s question (What was the role played by the church?). This was the second question of the interview, a follow-up question to the first, namely “For more than four centuries the Portuguese ruled an empire stretching from Sofala (on the east coast of Africa) to Macao. How did they manage such a vast empire since they were chronically plagued by shortages of ships, men and money?”


106 For more on Alden’s work, see introduction, chapter 4, and chapter 5. Alden's work makes great use of the source material available for the Jesuit missions in Brazil. He acknowledges that the sources regarding the economic situation of the Jesuits in the Far East are less organized and incomplete.

tasks and responsibilities of mission procurators, provincial procurators, college procurators, and estate managers. Zubillaga’s article has a narrower scope and he investigates the position of the court procurator, while Wicki pays special attention to how the function of mission procurator for the Portuguese missions in Asia evolved before and after 1574. Alden comments that it was the procurator’s “labors [that] made economically possible many of the Society’s celebrated spiritual achievements,” thus exposing the link between the Society of Jesus’ overall finances and the role of the procurator. No single monograph has studied the people managing the Society’s wealth.

I will first lay out the strategies and structures that were established to support the Jesuit economic enterprise in Europe, and discuss how the procurator’s functions were originally framed. I will describe the weaknesses in how the center of the Society of Jesus envisioned the financial foundations of future global missions. In the second part, I use the case study of Nicolas Trigault (1577-1628) to look at how certain Jesuit procurator positions sought to establish a two-way interaction between the center and the periphery with the goal of reminding the center to ensure either continuous material and human resources or to raise enough start-up capital to allow missions in the periphery to be self-sustaining.

I argue that, while the world was slowly becoming a more connected place thanks to increased global contact (or “globalization”), ad-hoc solutions initiated by fathers in the periphery, such as Trigault’s, illustrate that the periphery sought to improve the global Jesuit network connectivity and to overcame the limitations of economic management directed from the center of the Jesuit missions. This problem was important enough for Trigault to travel back to Europe without the Jesuit provincial government’s approval. However, not even Trigault could overcome the limitations of early modern world global travel, and the costs of shipping people and


108 Alden, _The Making of an Enterprise_, 298.
resources from Europe to Asia only reinforced the importance of Jesuit economic accommodation within the East Asia missions.  

2.1.1 The Center: Initial Financial Structure of the Society of Jesus

At the heart of the conflict between personal poverty and institutional wealth (or Loyola’s initial perception of the Society and the actual reality of running a nearly global enterprise) was the procurator. He was responsible for all temporal Jesuit affairs. At the top stood the procurator general, then the provincial procurators that worked in the different courts in Europe, followed by the mission procurators, the college procurators, and finally, the estate managers. Most often, each of these posts had several brothers or temporal coadjutors that helped them with their tasks and provided more practical experience with the non-spiritual and financial aspects of the job. These brothers were called treasurers. Chapter four examines treasurers and their role in Jesuit finances. Sometimes brothers would fill the job of procurator as well, instead of the fathers. The treasurer was always a brother (in Asia, this would most often be an Asian Jesuit convert).

The mix of both fathers and brothers was fairly confusing, even to members of the Society. In 1584, Father Aquaviva wanted Father Gomes Vaz to be relieved from his duty as a provincial procurator because he had already taken his fourth vow. However, technically Aquaviva was wrong since the specific ordinance said the only position that fathers who had taken their fourth vow could not fill was the job

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109 Liam Brockey reaches a similar conclusion in his “Largos Caminhos E Vastos Mares: Jesuit Missionaries and the Journey to China in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies, Vol 1 (2000): 45-72. Another scholar that described the limitations of this phenomenon was Alfred Plattner in the second chapter of his Jesuits go East (Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds, 1950), 62-118. See also his introduction, 18: “And the purpose of this book is to give a survey of this heroic and tragic struggle, a struggle to discover and maintain lines of communication with Asiatic missionlands, a struggle against sea, mountains and desert.” See also the statistics of the appendix on early modern world globalization.  
110 See chapter four.
of procurator general.\textsuperscript{111} All other rungs in the procurator-hierarchy could be filled by either brothers or fathers. In theory, the procurator general could only be a brother (working as a coadjutor). This chapter examines the procurators, whereas chapter four will further investigate the relationship between procurators and treasurers and the role of treasurers in linking the global and local finances of the Jesuit missions in Asia.

2.2 Global Responsibilities of the Procurator: The Case of Nicolas Trigault

The more global counterpart of a local procurator was the visitor-procurator, referred to by some scholars as “mission procurator.”\textsuperscript{112} Both Dehergne and Lamalle allude to these visitor-procurators as procurators as well. The visitor-procurator was not to be confused with the treasurer or procurator of a province despite sharing the exact same title and some interesting overlap in functions.\textsuperscript{113} The tasks of this appointment sounded very similar to what a college or estate procurator did in a far off mission, except that rather than communicating via letters and sending off the account information to the procurator general in Rome, the visitor-procurator traveled physically back to Europe and acted as “part ambassador, part fund-raiser, and part recruiter” for whatever province he represented.\textsuperscript{114} This apt description of the visitor-procurator’s tasks and responsibilities explains the difference between regular procurators and a “visitor-procurator,” which is why I will refer to him this way and not as a mission procurator. By doing this I hope to avoid confusion. Nicolas Standaert has pointed out that most, and sometimes all, of this type of procurator’s tasks are unrelated to financial matters.\textsuperscript{115} In the case of China, I do believe the visitor-procurator reported on all (material) matters

\textsuperscript{111} Ganss, \textit{The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus}, paragraph 793.
\textsuperscript{112} For example Joseph Dehergne.
\textsuperscript{113} In sources they are sometimes referred to as procurators or mission procurators. See also Standaert, “New Trends,” 356.
\textsuperscript{114} Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 248.
\textsuperscript{115} Personal correspondence. I hope to do further research that might bring to light any changes in the professional duties of the procurator both over time and, perhaps, depending on which region.
concerning the mission, and he was responsible for securing the two most valuable resources: money and missionaries. As we will see below, the visitor-procurators' demands followed a strategy whereby the China missions attempted to become self-sustaining with regards to both money and missionaries. Within the larger hierarchy of procurator- and treasurer-related functions, this specific position deserves extra attention: no other person knew better how much energy, time, and costs went into ferrying and managing resources back and forth.

2.2.1 The Unique Position of the Visitor-Procurator

The visitor-procurator was one of the few elective posts within the Society, one on which every senior colleague of the relevant province had a say in, and as such it was different from the financial and legal officer known as procurator. Each category of procurator required its own skills, and, since the background and training of the professed and the coadjutors was entirely unlike, the visitor-procurator did not need the local knowledge and business savvy that a treasurer or brother generally provided.

Table 2.1 List of Visitor-Procurators from China to Europe

In the case of the visitor-procurators of the province of the China mission (before and after 1628 when the China mission was a vice-province to Japan), all the visitor-procurators listed by Dehergne were professed fathers.

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116 I do not disagree with Standaert's description of the procurator's tasks. I do think that certain financial or economic tasks could be the responsibility, even the main responsibility of the procurator. If most financial duties were assigned to the treasurer, then the procurator still supervised the way the treasurer carried out the Society's business.


118 However it was not unlikely for the visitor-procurator to have his own helpers/brothers. Trigault for example appointed his older brother Elie (who was a brother coadjutor and had five years of experience in 'commerce').

Portuguese Jesuit missions in China
Michele Ruggieri (1588-stayed in Italy)
Nicolas Trigault (1613 until 1619)
Alvaro de Semedo (1636-1644)
Martino Martini (1650-1659)
Michael Boym (1651-1658; sent by the Southern Ming emperors)
Johann Gruéber (1661-stayed in Europe)
Prospero Intorcetta (1666-1674)
Baltasar da Rocha (1673-1683)
Philippe Couplet (1681-1693; died at sea on his return)
Alessandro Cicero (1685-1691)
Filippo Grimaldi (1686-1694)
Miguel do Amaral (1694-1699)
François Noël (1702-1707)
Diogo Vidal (1702-1704; died at sea)
Kaspar Castner (1702-1707)
José Ramon Arxo (1708- stayed in Spain)
Miguel do Amaral (1722- stayed in Portugal)
Francisco de Cordes (1735- stayed in Europe)
José Simoes (1751- ...)
Onofrio Villiani (1768?- ...)

And those sent by the French mission in China
Louis Le Comte (1691- stayed in France)
Jean de Fontaney (1699-1701) and (1702- stayed in France)
Armand Nyel (1715- stayed in Europe, died in Spain)
Pierre de Goville (1724- stayed in France)
Cyr Contancin (1731-1732; died at sea)
Louis-Marie Du Gad (1770- return impossible)

Most of these visitor-procurators were on one-time missions. Only a few of them continued in the same line of business after their election as visitor-procurator and did become procurator of the China vice-province or were sent on further diplomatic missions. Their missionary experience ranged from two to thirty years in various mission houses and provinces, revealing little to build a uniform profile.120 Since each of these visitor-procurators was a professed father, members of the

120 Castelnau and Maldavsky make a very rough profile of the two procurators they focus on: both are in their fifties, born in Europe, they know the geography of the province well, and they have held similar posts of responsibility within the Society. None of these characteristics fit each member of the group of visitor-procurators I look at. See Castelnau and Maldavsky, “Entre l’Europe et l’Amérique,” 125-126.
Society with higher status held this position in comparison to those who served as treasurers or even performed certain other procurator functions. As for the Portuguese Jesuit missions in China, twenty visitor-procurators were sent in total: five stayed in Europe and never returned to China (Ruggieri, Grueber, Arxo, Amaral, and Cordes), three died at sea or upon arrival in China (Boym, Couplet, and Vidal), the fate of two fathers (Simoes and Villiani) is unknown, leaving only ten to travel back to China with new resources and missionaries. This rate of successful return voyages was below the rate of successful travel from Europe to China for all Jesuits (see statistical data below). The last successful visitor-procurator for the Portuguese Jesuit missions was Kaspar Castner, who returned to China in 1707. However, the Portuguese Jesuit missions continued to exist in China until the second half of the eighteenth century. Was this an indication that Jesuits both in China and Europe realized that the strategy to send Jesuits back to Europe to look for capital to invest in Asia and new missionaries was not the most efficient way to use their already limited resources? Of the six visitor-procurators sent by the French Jesuit missions from 1691 onwards none returned to China. Five left China before 1731, leaving a gap of thirty-nine years between the second last and last visitor-procurator. Just like the Portuguese Jesuits, the French turned to other strategies during the beginning of the eighteenth century. Chapters five and six will explain in depth how the French financed their missions differently.

This chapter analyzes the case of Nicolas Trigault in detail to illustrate the different aspects and skills of his assignment as visitor-procurator. Trigault was the first visitor-procurator to return to China with new resources and missionaries. His 1613 to 1619 propaganda tour passed through many European courts before returning to China with books, money, luxury gifts for the emperor and other Chinese officials, and twenty more missionaries, eager to work in the China mission. According to Lamalle’s assessment this made him one of the most

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121 1700 is also the year when the Paraguayan Jesuit missions sent its final procurators. See Mörner, The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the La Plata Region, 226-227.
122 Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault.”
successful visitor-procurators to have ever spoken on behalf of the China Jesuit missions. Edmond Lamalle’s article was the first to discuss the details of the mission of a visitor-procurator. Both primary and secondary literature on Trigault is considerable thanks partly to Trigault’s own publications and letters. However, sources demonstrating Trigault’s success in gathering financial support are missing, and no one has examined Trigault’s most important goals as a visitor-procurator - the collection of money and missionaries – nor has anyone studied Trigault in relation with other visitor-procurators systematically. Lamalle repositions Trigault’s voyage as a visitor-procurator in light of Trigault’s literary accomplishments, and Lamalle assesses Trigault’s success based upon the works Trigault published. Similarly, other scholars have studied the role of Trigault as the editor (or writer) of Matteo Ricci’s biography (see below). This chapter, however, addresses Trigault’s ability as a procurator to collect people and funding from Europe and use these resources to build self-sustaining China missions, a plan already envisioned by Trigault’s superior Niccolò Longobardo. Seen from this perspective Trigault’s mission was not an undivided success, as he did not provide a continuous solution that would end the resource scarcity experienced by the missions in the East. After analyzing the different aspects of Trigault’s mission, this chapter will work around the lost sources on Trigault’s mission’s financial contributions by investigating the sources left by later visitor-procurators that mention the goal for financial self-sustaining missions. Additionally I will analyze

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123 See for example Claudia von Collani’s biography and bibliography of Nicolas Trigault, compiled for http://encyclopedia.stochastikon.com, and available online. She lists thirty-nine of Trigault’s published books or letters, and her bibliography contains forty-eight works.

124 This dissertation is a first step towards such study.


126 This Jesuit stood in Matteo Ricci’s shadow for a long time. Ronnie Hsia’s latest work on Matteo Ricci *A Jesuit in the Forbidden City* (2010) reappraises Longobardo’s role regarding the policies made to map the path of Jesuit missions in China.
evidence found in Jesuit reports on their possessions after the Qing dynasty take-over and a close up investigation of the global funding of a Flemish missionary working in Changshu during the 1670s, François de Rougemont (1624-1676), to further determine whether visitor-procurators succeeded in accumulating enough capital to make the Portuguese Jesuit missions financially independent from Rome and Lisbon.

2.2.2 Trigault’s Background and the China Missions’ State of Affairs in 1612

Trigault was born in a family of merchants, in the town of Douai, in northern France. In 1577, Douai, a flourishing textile market centre, still fell under the jurisdiction of the Count of Flanders. Though his business background and an apparent “temperament of a man of business” would have set him up for the financial tasks of a procurator, Trigault had a literary mind, taught Latin, and was more of a writer than an accountant.127

When he arrived in China in 1610, the China missions had just lost its founder Matteo Ricci (1552-1610). Their financial means were in a very precarious state, and there was no easy way to acquire more money and resources. The newly appointed superior Niccolò Longobardo felt stifled by his superiors of the Japan mission (of which China was officially a part, and dependent upon). At that time, after almost thirty years of proselytizing the Christian faith in China, only 5,000 Chinese had converted.128 Because of these meager results, Longobardo’s superiors did not agree with his plans to increase the evangelization efforts in a seemingly unstable and barren vineyard (especially compared to the Jesuit missions in Japan which yielded around 300,000 converts).129 However, missionaries working in

127 Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault,” 53. It was not usual for a Jesuit to teach Latin, so this did not really matter as to whether Trigault was leaning more towards spiritual or temporal talents.
128 Standaert, “New Trends,” 382. There were twelve Jesuits working in five different mission houses within China.
China remembered that Francis Xavier had traveled from Japan to China. Even before entering the country, Xavier understood that the vastness of China held great apostolic potential. In 1610 that potential was not yet realized, but the hope for mass Chinese conversion was still very alive amongst the missionaries working in China.

To succeed they needed more money and resources. It was up to Trigault to enact these hopes with his grand propaganda tour that would ask for more missionaries, more money, more books, and other institutional changes such as Rome’s permission to detach the China missions from the Japanese province and become a vice-province. This was a make-it-or-break-it moment for the China Jesuit missions.

2.2.3 Unofficial Status and Initiative from the Periphery

Late February 1613 Trigault wanted to catch the annual passage for India, and neglected to ask the approval of the superiors of the Japan province to make his travel.130 In all likelihood, it would never have been granted since visitor-procurators had to be elected by the superiors of the province and Longobardo was not the superior of the Japan province. As Trigault tried to obtain all the goals on his list, the real Japan superior sent letters to Europe to obstruct and point out the inconsistencies of his (Longobardo’s) plans. This conflict of authority is perhaps best understood in context with the visitor-procurators conflict with the regulations pressed upon them and their missions by for example the Portuguese padroado (see below). It was not unusual for a visitor-procurator to ignore the limitations of royal patronages.131 Trigault’s authority issue within the Jesuit hierarchy was eventually resolved. The exact list of Longobardo’s instructions to Trigault has been lost as a

but his objectives were several: institutional changes such as the nomination of a bishop for the interior of China, obtaining financial help from European benefactors and securing precious curiosities that could be used to appeal to Chinese literati and mandarins, recruiting new missionaries, and propagating the China missions by writing books and promoting them at every European court. Within months of arriving in Rome at the end of 1614, Trigault obtained some of the institutional changes he desired. He also attended the general congregation as a procurator “ad negotia” (since technically he was not appointed by the superior of a province but just by a superior of a mission), and presented his needs to the delegates from Jesuit provinces around the world.

Right from the start of his six-year propaganda mission throughout Europe, Trigault was in a great position to negotiate all of Longobardo’s goals. He had overcome his unofficial appointment and what the superiors of his province (of Japan) would deem a rogue status partly thanks to the support of the Jesuit superior general Muzio Vitelleschi (1563-1645, superior general since 1615). He also had the ear of the entire congregation of his officially appointed peer visitor-procurators, who were impressed by his enthusiasm for the China missions.

2.2.4 Financial Goals

Longobardo had stressed to Trigault that since the China missions were in such dire straits, financial help was at the top of his list of priorities. Longobardo had given him exact numbers and calculations, though the Japan mission superiors contested these numbers, and wrote to the superior general that Longobardo’s plan was simply not realistic. The Province of Japan was already heavily burdened with

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132 Perhaps it was a vocal agreement in the first place as Lamalle suspected.
133 He was given the permission to celebrate the mass in China (in Chinese), translate certain holy books, and use a Chinese liturgy. Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault,” 61.
134 The previous Jesuit general superior Claudio Acquaviva (1543-1615) conceded the creation of a Chinese Vice-Province, independent from the Province of Japan on the 28th of January 1615, three days before his death.
all sorts of costs, and it neither could nor would sustain rather unpromising missions in China. So far, Trigault’s personality and his networking skills outweighed any critique written in his superior’s letters. Apart from Trigault’s personality and the way that he presented Longobardo’s propositions, it was also the rationale of his superior’s plans that convinced Rome: Longobardo’s requests revealed that he wanted a sustainable solution. If the center had the means to make the periphery self-sufficient financially, then this was one less thing to worry about. I believe that this was also the ultimate goal of missionaries operating in the periphery such as Longobardo or many other Jesuits worried about the inconsistency with which Europe sent new missionaries, money, and other material supplies to the missions in the Far East.

The missionaries within China felt restrained because of the lack of funds: they could not order new Chinese books let alone print and translate their ideas into Chinese and present them to Chinese literati and mandarins. Meanwhile, the limited amount of money and material the Jesuits in China were receiving came from Macao, which caused the Chinese to be suspicious of the Jesuits’ actual intentions and connections to the Portuguese state. Longobardo wanted the residences to be as independent as they could from Macao, and to do this he envisioned each residence would need an endowment of 2,000 ecus, which would yield a yearly rent of 200 ecus. The endowment would be invested in real estate and the resulting rental profits would sustain the Jesuits in China forever, independent of the Portuguese


137 It also meant that the center might lose part of its control over the periphery.

138 The Chinese understood that not all missionaries in China were Portuguese, and were aware of all the different nationalities of Westerners there were in Macao and China. They also understood that missionaries of all Western nations somehow relied on Portuguese patronage. How could they not be suspicious of this hard-to-define liaison?

umbilical cord. This also meant independence from the center – Rome –, and an unbroken way of financing Jesuits in mainland China outside of the Portuguese Empire’s control.\textsuperscript{140}

For the five existing residences and another five prospective new missions, Longobardo calculated they needed 20,000 ecus. Longobardo also stated that if Trigault managed to gather 40,000 ecus, “the infidels of China would provide for the Jesuits’ mission costs forever.”\textsuperscript{141} Part of the reason why the superiors of the Japan mission may have doubted Longobardo’s figures was his lack of expressing a specific currency: in different letters Longobardo referred to 20,000 taels (China), pardoes (Portugal), cruzados (Portugal) and ecus (Italy). Longobardo’s estimates were also beyond the reach of the Japan province if they were invested in Chinese real estate and not in sea loans, which were the prevalent way of funding the missions of the Indies at that time.\textsuperscript{142} It would have been impossible to keep the gains of sea loans out of the hands of the Japan province (whose headquarters were in Macao, the trading port that was crucial to all interactions with Japan). In a sense Longobardo was a visionary since half a century later it was finally understood that

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{140}] Portuguese officials all over its empire tended to turn to the Jesuits when they needed loans (sometimes without leaving the Jesuits the option of not extending said loans). See Alden, \textit{The Making of An Enterprise}, part four (especially chapter twenty two).
\item[\textsuperscript{141}] Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault,” 67.
\item[\textsuperscript{142}] Sea loans were the prevalent way of funding the Far East Jesuit missions until 1670. The Society would invest a certain amount of piculs of silk in the Portuguese trade between Nagasaki and Macao. Chapter four and six describe similar types of commercial investments. Clossey describes this type as “probably the most risky investment… where the principal was not guaranteed if the goods were lost in shipping.” See Clossey, \textit{Salvation and Globalization}, 168. Alden describes them as follows: “In Macao, one distinctive source of such income was sea loans (\textit{respondência, respondêntia}) made upon the cargoes of third parties… high-risk ventures, since lenders were not assured of the payment of either their principal or a premium if the voyage failed...Between December 1661 and June 1667, sea loans provided just over 51 percent of the reported income of the vice-province of China.” “As Portugal’s political and economic position in the East deteriorated, the making of this type of loan appears to have declined as well sometime before the end of the century.” See Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 563. For specific numbers, see also ARSI, FG 721 II/6, ff. 23-24, “\textit{Recetra do cabedal da v. prov.a da China...18 de dezembro de 1661 ate o fim de junho de 1667}.”
\end{itemize}
sea loans were a high-risk investment that was constantly contested by the Jesuit enemies. At the same time the role of Macao and the Portuguese in the trade between Japan and China would peter out completely by the mid-seventeenth century. Sea loans were simply not a sustainable solution. Real estate was. Before evaluating Trigault’s and Longobardo’s main goals, I will briefly discuss the other aspects of Trigault’s voyage (which have been brought to the center of attention by other scholars such as Lamalle).

2.2.5 Material Resources’ Goals: Books and Presents

Money to pay for the Jesuit missions could be made both in Asia and in Europe. Certain other resources such as books and presents were also the responsibility of the visitor-procurator, and some of these items could not be bought in Asia.

As noted before, Trigault did keep track of the value of every present or curiosity he collected, and these long lists would matter greatly in the finances of the mission to determine who deserved what present and how the guanxi relational network with Chinese literati was best maintained by balancing the value of interchanged gifts. Trigault’s collection of books was the start of a scientific library that was further enlarged by Schall and successors. It was again Longobardo’s idea. He orchestrated and understood the importance of a library that

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143 The French Jesuits who arrived at the end of the seventeenth century invested straight away in Chinese real estate, especially since they could not use the Macao/Portuguese empire connection that was so central in sea loans anyway.
144 See chapters four, five, and six.
146 Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault,” 75. This was before the Chinese Christian community had become a family religion.
could compete with the best libraries in Europe. Ironically Chinese scholars would still consider the Jesuit library as a fairly small one in comparison with Chinese contemporary libraries, but at least Longobardo realized the importance of having a library in the first place.

Besides Trigault, another Jesuit, Johann Schreck (1576-1630), was responsible for collecting books. Schreck’s background as a medic and very promising scientist explained the significant amount (and high quality) of scientific works included, apart from ecclesiastical works. The pope himself gave 500 volumes of books and donated another 1,000 ducats to complete his collection, whereas Vitelleschi contributed as well. The China missions would obviously benefit from this library for a long time, but the same was true for the presents and curiosities Trigault collected. Not all presents by Italian and German benefactors were given to Chinese mandarins and official bureaucrats; some were sold which in turn helped the overall finances of the China missions, while others gathered dust in warehouses in Macao until they were finally useful twenty years after Trigault had brought them back to China.

The local procurator and visitor-procurator are each connected to material property such as a library or the storage of precious items: the local procurator would own the key to the storage rooms and would decide on the budget available for any costs regarding the library. Trigault as a visitor-procurator operated on a different level. He physically traveled to Europe and collected and transported the materials that later Asian procurators would manage. These were different tasks that similarly required different skills. In this case I argue that it was Longobardo's

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147 Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault,” 75. Standaert asserted that contemporary sources exaggerated the number of books (7,000 volumes) Trigault and Schreck collected. Standaert, Handbook of Christianity, 209-210. The real number was 757 books in 629 different volumes. Hubert Verhaeren, Catalogue de la Bibliothèque du Pé-t’ang (Pékin: Imprimerie des Lazaristes, 1949) 9-12. Of this number around 457 volumes (or 534 books) could be traced back to the papal gift mentioned earlier. Two other significant additions were 200 works in 143 volumes, obtained during Trigault’s last trip to German lands in 1617, and Father Jan de Saint-Laurent’ (23 works in 29 volumes) library.

vision in combination with Trigault’s persuasion that explained a long-term success. The combined response from these two individuals annoyed many other fathers within the Society, and this kind of animosity was very similar to the one a local procurator could feel whenever he managed (limited) resources.

2.2.6 Propaganda Goals

Whereas the previous responsibilities are credited to both Trigault and Longobardo, propaganda was all to Trigault’s credit. Trigault’s propaganda embodied a crucial skill for a high-profile visitor-procurator. At the same time it also signals the most eye-catching difference between a visitor-procurator and a treasurer or procurator. As much as Trigault’s tasks and skills overlapped with those of a local (treasurer) procurator, he was no temporal coadjutor (see chapter four) who kept his head down and crunched numbers. In the way he performed the propaganda section of his job, it showed that he fully exploited his literary expertise and talent as a writer while fulfilling his other responsibilities as a visitor-procurator.

Other visitor-procurators after Trigault such as Martino Martini (procurator in Europe from 1650-1659) and Philippe Couplet (1681-1693) wrote and published books as well, but within two years of arriving in Europe, Trigault published three works (as author or editor) of which one would become a bestseller: *De Christiana Expeditione apud Sinas Suscepta ab Societate Iesu*.149

This work was based upon the diary and jottings of Matteo Ricci, whose close to 30-year experience in China dwarfed Trigault’s and any other Jesuit’s up to that point. Ricci had never intended his diary to be used as a propaganda tool for an entire European audience, but rather kept his diary to help the next generation of missionaries in China. He only started writing down everything that could be helpful in 1608, two years before his death, and because he feared he would not be able to

finish the manuscript, he skipped entire sections, to be filled in later or already discussed by other authors or sources such as annual Jesuit letters. Trigault rewrote and reorganized Ricci’s incomplete manuscript, and changed Ricci’s writing style completely. Joseph Shih states that Trigault’s literary qualities improved Ricci’s work considerably. Ricci had been gone from Italy for exactly thirty years in 1608 and complained about his abilities of writing in his mother tongue. In 1595 he wrote to his superior that he had no more courage for the Italian language; it felt more estranged than the barbaric language (Chinese) he spoke and wrote every day. Meanwhile Trigault was a teacher of Latin, and had left Europe less than five years prior to being asked to rewrite Ricci’s diary. After early medieval manuscripts by travelers such as Marco Polo and William of Rubruck, Trigault’s edited work on Ricci’s lifelong experiences in China once again captured the attention of nobles and academics across Europe. It was the first Jesuit work among many to bridge China and Europe. Within ten years of its original publication in Latin in 1615, it had been republished nine times into six European languages: Latin, French, German, Spanish, Italian, and English.

It is hard to estimate the reach of this work alone in Europe during the first half of the seventeenth century, but it triggered a long-lasting interest in China and the Jesuit missions in China. During the seventeenth century, “the iterative mechanisms that produced a Jesuit ‘Apostle to China’ were set in motion with the publication of that mission’s first synthetic history in 1615.” Hsia continues that

152 According to Felix Alfred Plattner Martino Martini’s De Bello Tartarico Historia “had an even greater success than Trigault’s De Christiana Expeditione.” Plattner, 107. He continues that “yet we must consider Father Martini’s chief work to be not ‘The Tartar War’ but the Novus Atlas Sinensis, published by Blaen in 1655.” Martini’s De Bello Tartarico Historia was translated into Dutch and French (2 reprints), and it had Latin editions in Antwerp, Cologne, and Vienna. It was also translated into German, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish, and, in 1706, even in Danish.
153 Hsia, Sojourners in a Strange Land, 21.
Trigault’s “reworking of Matteo Ricci’s journal was a spectacular success.” "Most telling indication of the work’s influence, however, came in the form of the mission histories that followed in its wake.” Trigault’s De Christiana Expeditione set the tone for Athanasius Kircher’s China Illustrata (1667), Adam Schall’s Historica narratio (1665), and Ferdinand Verbiest’ Astronomia Europaea (1687) to name a few.\(^{154}\) Even in the twentieth century whether or not Trigault took credit as author (instead of editor or translator) after tinkering with Ricci’s diaries was the source of an academic debate that saw publications in multiple European languages, and Trigault’s work itself was re-published and introduced to yet again a new audience in English and French.

As a visitor-procurator Trigault was not an exception when it came to literary production while on tour. Other China visitor-procurators such as Alvaro de Semedo (on tour from 1636 to 1644: published at least four or five works in this time period), Martino Martini (1650-1659: six to eight works), Michael Boym (1651-1658: four or five works or letters), Philippe Couplet (1681-1693: five works and more letters), François Noël (1702-1707: four during his tour, several just after) and Jean de Fontaney (1699-1701 and 1701-stayed in France) equaled or toppled Trigault’s productive “push-for-publication-while-on-tour-efforts.”\(^{155}\) This systematic high literary productivity illustrated the importance of books as propaganda materials and a way to disseminate knowledge of China.

A negative consequence was that it provided the Jesuit critics with equally valuable information on Jesuit missionary approaches. So almost a decade after Trigault had left for China again and done his fair share of bookish work, Vitelleschi

\(^{154}\) Hsia, Sojourners in a Strange Land, chapter three.

\(^{155}\) These numbers are based upon Dehergne’s list of procurator/visitor/mission procurator sent from China to Europe, and matched to Pfister and Sommervogel’s bibliographical information on each of these Jesuits. The following Jesuits have more than 10 entries (of which in most cases a specific amount can be tracked to the period in which they were on tour as procurator): Nicolas Trigault (20 in total), Martino Martini (13), Michael Boym (12), Philippe Couplet (21), François Noël (23), Jean de Fontaney (22). In some cases it is not clear whether the published works (books, letters or any other type of report) were published during the author’s tour as procurator.
wrote to the Provincial of the Gallo-Belgian province, Jean Herennius, that he did not know what was going to happen. “Now that Trigault’s book has been re-published several times and translated into several languages, all one could do was pray to God, that the beautiful possibilities of that mission [the China mission] were not endangered by this imprudence [the bestseller *De Christiana Expeditione]*.”

The critique and negative feedback that a visitor-procurator faced was then remarkably more damaging than what a local procurator or treasurer had to deal with. The number of people and amount of resources Trigault could access was great and had a global scale: it is no surprise that in the aftermath of his propaganda tour his fellow Jesuits must have experienced a great deal of worry as they too understood that heavy was the head of the visitor-procurator and the crown he wore.

### 2.3 Trigault and Longobardo: Success or Failure?

#### 2.3.1 Financial Success of a Visitor-Procurator

Previous literature has rightly emphasized Trigault’s importance as a forerunner when it came to propaganda. Trigault’s literary productions were not unusual when compared to his peers and successors, and set the tone for most of the seventeenth century. Propaganda is a dangerous tool, and it is no surprise that the China Jesuits moved away from the way Trigault wrote Jesuit history by the end of the seventeenth century. A sole focus on Trigault as a propagandist, however, ignores his most important role, that of a procurator responsible for Jesuit finances, material sources, and personnel.

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157 See Hsia, *Sojourners in a Strange Land*, for a closer examination of the different (China) Jesuit textual traditions and the way they evolved during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

158 See Hsia, *Sojourners of a Strange Land*. 
With Trigault as his spokesman, Longobardo was the first to spell out a new method for managing resources by seeking for capital to invest in Asian real estate. Longobardo’s numbers may not have been very realistic (see above), but his financial plan was as visionary and significant as Trigault’s capacities as a propagandist; a century and a half later both the Portuguese and French Jesuit missions in China were largely funded by real estate investments.\footnote{See chapters four, five, and six.} Was Trigault successful in obtaining Longobardo’s financial strategy by 1620? Lamalle estimated that Trigault most likely amassed sufficient funds for the existing mission residences, and, possibly for several or all of the planned residences.\footnote{Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault,” 67-71. I assume some of these planned residences were real estate investments.} Lamalle acknowledges, however, that the exact amount of money Trigault took back with him to China is unknown and may remain that way due to the lack of an exact accounting book. Just like other treasurers and procurators, Trigault kept track of the value of every present or curiosity he collected, but he left no formal record (or it was lost) of actual and promised financial help he acquired. Midway during his travels through Europe, Trigault unofficially appointed his younger brother Elie Trigault (1575-1618) as treasurer (he was a coadjutor at the time) and sent him to Lisbon to deal with the financial and organizational tasks of embarking all missionaries for China.\footnote{Alden describes some of these tasks based upon evidence he found visitor-procurators (Alden refers to them as mission procurators) working in Portugal and Brazil. See Alden, The Making of an Enterprise, 303-305.} Elie Trigault died on his way to China. Without sources on the financial achievements of Trigault’s mission, it is difficult to calculate if enough start-up capital was collected. Lamalle worked around this issue by tracing some of the financial gifts such as 3,000 pardoes from the Portuguese king, 500 florins from the Bavarian dukes, and an unsuccessful “monte” from Naples.\footnote{Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault,” 68.} Based upon my own search for circumstantial evidence, there are multiple reasons why I suspect that the financial gifts Trigault managed to secure did not allow the Jesuits to fully implement Longobardo’s strategy.
For each of the promised financial gifts, there is little paper trail to prove that this promised money was actually paid in full and subsequently reached the Jesuits in China safely. One source that does allow for a close up investigation of local and global funding of Jesuit missions during the seventeenth century is the account book of a Flemish missionary working in Changshu during the 1670s, François de Rougemont (1624-1676).

Jesuit account books of their missions in China are a rarity. The bibliographical section on Western primary sources of the Handbook of Christianity in China includes only three, two in Western languages and one in Chinese. Most Jesuit account books were destroyed upon the author’s death because enemies of the Society could use this type of document to critique the Jesuits’ management of their financial affairs, which was a very delicate issue. The three that survive seem to have been preserved almost by accident (discussed further in chapter five). Each of the sources in Western languages is a draft version of a more complete account book or “major ledger” that has been lost. The reason François de Rougemont’s account book survived was that, after his death, his friend Philippe Couplet, who was a missionary in the nearby Shanghai missions, decided to take it with him when he visited Europe in the capacity of visitor-procurator five years later. Couplet most likely wanted to use it as a propaganda tool to re-emphasize that the missions in China still needed money from rich European benefactors. De Rougemont’s account book is without doubt the most complete and extensive of its kind, consisting of

163 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity, 193-194. For more on these different account books, see below. A fourth source on accounting also survived, namely Jean-François Fouquet’s seven folios of daily expenses. For more info, see below, 5.5.1.
164 See also Noël Golvers, François de Rougemont, S.J., Mission in Ch'ang-Shu (Chiang-Nan): A Study of the Account Book (1674-1676) and the Elogium (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), 69. For the first source, de Rougemont’s account book, it covered only two years since it was supposed to be copied into a “major ledger,” or Ta ki puen (this is Golvers’ transliteration or Dajiben), which covered the budget of the entire mission. In the second case, Jean François Fouquet’s Cahier de comptes de dépenses, etc., was again a series of annotations written down so hastily that a fair amount of them are indecipherable. See Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana (BAV), BorgCin 376. Contrary to FdR’s (François de Rougemont) account book, Fouquet’s entries are very concise, and do not indicate any currency or weight/number of goods bought or sold, just goods and numbers.
nearly 150 pages of text with over 800 entries that cover his daily expenses and other financial transactions.\textsuperscript{165}

A source on finances as coherent as de Rougemont’s should include references to European funding from the Portuguese king or Bavarian dukes. De Rougemont would receive money from the Portuguese king in the form of an annual salary.\textsuperscript{166} Missionaries who lived on their own and were the sole missionary of a single Christian community would receive a yearly grant of 60 taels\textsuperscript{167} offered by their Jesuit superiors in the Japanese province. This money was either of Japanese or ‘European’ origin and was deposited in Macao.\textsuperscript{168} This would have been the first indication of de Rougemont’s global finances. However, there was not a single reference to this grant in de Rougemont’s account book. This may be due to the incomplete nature of the account book, but I suspect that this money never arrived during the 1670s. While the Jesuit missionaries and their possessions had been subject to turmoil around the Indian Ocean and the southeast Asian region at the end of the 1650s, they were facing more conflict in the 1670s. This time the chaos

\textsuperscript{165} Golvers, \textit{François de Rougemont}, 71. Golvers translated and edited the account book after stumbling upon it in the Royal Library of Brussels. Apart from providing an annotated translation, he also analyzed the topographical setting of de Rougemont’s mission, his social life, priestly life, the means of propagation, the material culture of the mission, and the finances of the mission. My study builds upon Golvers’ very thorough research, and expands and contextualizes the finances of the mission a little further.

\textsuperscript{166} See chapter six for more information on the different categories of Jesuit funding.

\textsuperscript{167} The tael consisted of 37.3 grams of silver, with a ranging fineness. See Hans U. Vogel, “Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800,” \textit{Late Imperial China} 8:2 (1987): 5. The tael was the Portuguese equivalent of the Chinese liang 两. Wilkinson states that by the late Qing, there were more than 170 different kinds of taels current in China. See Endymion P. Wilkinson, \textit{Studies in Chinese Price History} (New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1980), 250. The differences were in both weight (Wilkinson’s very rough indication was: 40 grams of silver = 1 tael) and fineness. FdR never indicated the exact weight of the taels that he was using, only the fineness (the carats were ranging from 8.5 (p. 30) to 9.9 (p. 46). Quite often FdR’s silver would be of good quality but occasionally he also received or spent silver of rather common quality (p. 18). See Golvers, \textit{François de Rougemont}, 557-560.

\textsuperscript{168} The money was paid in silver. If this silver came from Europe, it was most likely mined in Bolivia or Mexico, and then shipped across the Atlantic. It entered and exited European circulation, and was finally sent to Asia.
that surrounded them was even more disruptive in the sense that it disconnected nearly all missionaries north of Macao from any communication or financial help that came through southern China. The main reason for this was the eruption of the War of the Three Feudatories in 1673.169

Even before, in 1662, Couplet wrote that he had not received Macao’s financial support for the past three years.170 If Macao was not able to send money northwards into China during times of relative peace, what were the odds of successfully transporting money and other resources across southern China during the next two decades, when the bloodiest war in the history of the Qing was raging?171 A decade later, in 1674, Le Faure (working in Shanghai) referred to Macao as the only place from which any support was expected, but that the road was closed and missionaries like himself and de Rougemont were unable to receive their ‘financial remedies.’172

The account book similarly does not contain any reference to any income related to financial gifts from other European nobles or benefactors. Instead, de Rougemont relied on gifts from Chinese benefactors. Chinese converts donated mostly small amounts of silver to de Rougemont.173 These donations were geared towards the Jesuit’s immediate needs and they did not allow him to invest in real estate. Like so many other missionaries during the 1670s, de Rougemont was disconnected from Portuguese state patronage and all other Jesuit financial sources that came from outside the Chinese domestic economy, leaving him with a “heavily

169 This suspicion is put forward by Noël Golvers.
170 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 587.
171 The bloodiest war before the Taiping rebellion. Nicola Di Cosmo, The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth-Century China: ‘My Service in the Army’ by Dzengseo (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), 2. This peace was very relative: 1662 was also the year in which the Manchus had pushed their battle with the last defenders of the Southern Ming to the Western borders of Yunnan, into Burma even. In late May of that year the last claimant to the Ming throne and his son were captured, brought back to Yunnan County and executed. See Struve, The Southern Ming, 1644-1662, 178.
172 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 587.
173 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 591.
charged budget” and a “particularly fickle and vulnerable [financial] basis.” This was not the sort of mission one would expect to be the result of Longobardo’s strategy for financial self-sufficiency.

It is of course possible that over the period from when Trigault returned to China (1619) until the 1660s and 1670s, the Jesuits had successfully invested in real estate but had lost most of their income due to the dynastic struggle between the Ming and the Qing, a conflict that was highly disruptive for several decades during the mid seventeenth century. Many Jesuit reports recounted the impact of this violent transition. An account that pays specific attention to the consequences for Jesuit real estate was the report Gabriel de Magelhães (1610-1677) written in 1649 to the Jesuit visitor Manuel de Azevedo (1581-1650). Magelhães reported on the destruction and persecutions endured in the Jesuit missions in Sichuan during the 1640s. First, Magelhães repeats the great potential both in the countryside and the city, and how this peaceful society slipped into chaos, with increasing numbers of bandits attacking even the cities and executing the official mandarins. Magelhães decided to leave the city with his companion Lodovico (Luigi) Buglio (1606-1682), and they left a Christian student, Antonio, behind in their house to watch over their possessions. Five days before the city was invaded, Magelhães and Buglio “sent precise orders” to Antonio to “leave everything.” Antonio refused, “saying that many soldiers were entering the city anew led by the official [Qing or Ming?] from the mountains and neighboring barbarian soldiers.” Messages may have been mixed up. Perhaps Antonio thought he was safer in the Jesuit house inside the city walls. Days later, “many of the King’s relatives armed with hand weapons entered [the Jesuit] house and began stealing [the] possessions.” It turns out that the leader of

174 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 630.
175 ARSI, JapSin 127, ff. 1-35. Gabriel de Magelhães was born in the village of Pedrogão, close to Coimbra, and was related to the family of the famous navigator Magellan (1470-1521). See Dehergne, Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine, 161-162. An unpublished (?) translation of this document by Father Joseph M. Costa is kept at the Ricci Institute, Francis Rouleau Archives, File Cabinet A.
176 ARSI, JapSin 127, f. 2r. This was most likely because European priests stood out more than Asian Christians.
177 ARSI, JapSin 127, f. 2r.
the looters had been baptized, but he was described by Magelhães as “a Christian in name only.” The leader of the looters died within days, but most Christians (including Antonio) survived (Magelhães claimed that this occurred thanks to the Lord’s protection). All of Magelhães’ possessions were stolen or destroyed. Zhang Xianzhong (1601-1647), a powerful rebel leader whose base of control was in Sichuan, promised the Jesuits new furniture and also a new church. Zhang declared himself “King of the West,” and the Jesuits were initially impressed with “his extraordinary intelligence.”

Zhang was also convinced that Heaven wanted to punish the people of the province of Sichuan (he himself was a Shaanxi province native), so he ordered mass killings, disarmed and butchered one of his own armies that had failed to conquer a city, and finally exterminated all the 60,000 inhabitants of Chengdu (Sichuan’s capital) before setting the entire city on fire. In Sichuan, Magelhães reported that they had to start anew (all properties were lost, most Christians were killed).

In 1666, Francesco Brancati’s (1607-1671) report similarly elucidates the precarious situation of Jesuit properties. Brancati informed his superior that Xu Guangqi had donated 3,000 “pieces of gold” (= taels?) towards buying, building, and decorating a church in Shanghai. However, Brancati was banished to Canton in 1665, and he died there in 1671. Brancati worried that “the churches and houses would be divided up by the mandarins.” He further explained that in the name of some noblemen he could buy these properties again for 4,000 or 5,000 gold pieces, a sum he assured his superior he could “raise without great difficulty from the sixty thousand Christians” in his parish. But Brancati never returned to Shanghai. What happened to these properties?

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179 Zürcher, “In the Yellow Tiger’s Den,” 357.
180 ARSI, JapSin 162, f. 135. Is this an example of yet another conflict that seriously hampered the Jesuit ability to manage their real estate during the seventeenth century?
181 ARSI, JapSin 162, f. 135.
Visitor-procurator Martino Martini’s *De Bello Tartarico* (1654) similarly described the ravage of the Manchu conquest.\(^{182}\) Time and time again rovers pillaged cities. Soldiers defeated the rovers, and, in turn, pillaged or looted. Urban real estate took a particularly devastating hit in Kaifeng. After a six-month siege, which caused a famine so terrible that “a pound of rice was worth a pound of silver, and a pound of any old rotten skin was sold at ten crowns” and “dead mens flesh was sold publicly in the shambles as hog flesh,” the Manchu armies flooded the city.\(^{183}\) The result was that “the houses of the town were not overrun with water, but also beaten down.”\(^{184}\) Many more reports like Magelhães,’ Brancati’s, and Martini’s illustrate that Longobardo’s visionary financial plan to invest in local real estate rested on the assumption that a safe environment would make real estate a continually growing and self-supporting source of income. From the 1620s to the 1680s, many regions within China were not at peace.

Finally, there is little evidence to suggest that Jesuit finances shifted away from investments in sea loans and the Macao-Nagasaki trade to real estate before the 1670s.\(^{185}\) Based upon this circumstantial evidence and by carefully contextualizing the financial outcome of Trigault’s mission and Longobardo’s

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\(^{182}\) See Martino Martini, *De Bello Tartarico* (Antwerp: Moretus, 1654). This dissertation has also used the English (partial) translation *Bellum Tartaricum, or the Conquest of the Great and Most Renowned Empire of China, by the Invasion of the Tartars, who in these last Seven Years have wholly Subdued that Vast Empire. Together with a Map of the Provinces, and Chief Cities of the Countries, for the Better Understanding of the Story. Written Originally in Latin by Martin Martinus, present in the Country at most of the Passages herein related, and now faithfully translated into English* (London: John Crook, 1654), and a French translation of both Martini’s and Álvaro Semedo’s (1585-1658) *Relação da Propagação da Fé no Reyno da China e Outros Adjacentes* (Madrid, 1641), namely Hierosme Prost’s *Histoire Universelle de la Chine Par le P. Alvarez Semedo, Portugais. Avec l’Histoire de la Guerre des Tartares, contenant les revolutions arrivaes en ce grand Royaume, depuis quarante ans: Par le P. Martin Martini* (Lyon, 1667).


\(^{184}\) *Bellum Tartaricum, or the Conquest of the Great and Most Renowned Empire of China*, 72. The Latin original reads: “domus omnes undarum si non modo tectae, sed & omnino dirutae sunt.” Martini, *De Bello Tartarico*, 62.

\(^{185}\) See chapter six for a more inclusive discussion of Jesuit trade and sea loans.
strategy with the other sporadic source material on Jesuit finances during the seventeenth century, I contend that Trigault, at best, only partially succeeded in accumulating enough capital to make the Jesuit missions self-sustaining. As China’s economy was affected by the dynastic transition and the following Kangxi depression from the 1660s until the 1690s, so were the finances of the Jesuit missions in disarray.\footnote{During the second Qing reign, that of the Kangxi emperor (1661-1721), prices for grain, cash crops like cotton, arable land and finished cloth declined dramatically. For the next 30 years, until 1690, the Chinese economy experienced a prolonged depression. Although the scarcity of quantitative data inhibits a thorough analysis of the economic causes of this deflation, Kishimoto attributes the Kangxi depression to monetary factors. See also Kishimoto. Richard von Glahn is willing to concede that scarcity of silver partly explained the Kangxi depression, but by no means was this the main causal factor. Instead he emphasizes declining aggregate demand for goods resulting from the substantial population decline of roughly 20-25% between 1600 and 1660. See Mio Kishimoto, “The Kangxi Depression and Early Qing Local Markets,” Modern China 10.2 (1984). See also Richard von Glahn, Fountains of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), and private correspondence June 2010. See chapters three and five.}

The treasurer, procurator, and visitor-procurator were all responsible for collecting money, books, and presents, but only the visitor-procurator was also recruiting new missionaries and taking them across oceans and continents to keep the missions going. This would turn out to be the most strenuous task. The transport of missionaries was related to the financial affairs of the Society, as missionaries, were the most expensive asset of the Jesuit missions in China. As seen above, resources such as money and books were challenging to secure and transport. New missionaries as a resource were even more difficult to gather and move around safely. Before analyzing hurdles Trigault had to overcome to transport new missionaries to China, I will elaborate on the costs of missionary personnel.

\footnote{Philippe Couplet was a Jesuit missionary working in Shanghai during the 1660s and 1670s. Noël Golvers, François de Rougemont, 587.}
2.3.2 Finances and Personnel: Costs of Personnel

Transporting new missionaries from Europe to Asia was expensive. Before the arrival of steam ships, there was no maritime transportation revolution before the nineteenth century. This meant that the caravan trade remained cost beneficial for a long time. Similarly, travel logs of the late seventeenth century such as that of Philippe Avril argue passionately that, even with perfect winds, overland travel is much shorter and safer than the Europe-Asia sea voyage. By sea it took often more than 2 years to arrive in China, whereas one could travel overland from France to China in six months. Avril asserted his authority was based upon his life-long experience traveling in Asia. Ironically, seven years after publishing on his

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187 It is hard to calculate the precise costs, because the Portuguese state subsidized the travel of Jesuits aboard Portuguese ships. The French state did the same for French Jesuits on French ships. However, the French procurator Antoine Verjus pointed out that German Jesuits aboard Portuguese ships would still pay 125 rijksdalers per person. ARSI Galliae 112, f. 121v. Was this a partial contribution that non-Portuguese Jesuits had to pay to embark on Portuguese ships? Was it a misrepresentation of a disgruntled French procurator? In 1702, the Italian cardinal Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon recorded the cost of 9,915.60 pieces of eight (?) for the China journey. B. Cas. 1626, collected in the Francis Rouleau archives, folder kept in chronologically classified file cabinet A (not yet digitalized). For more “lists with private travel costs of a particular missionary,” see Lilly Library, Philippine manuscripts, 21524 (also classified as Phillipps 8293 + 8469, or Lot 511, vol. 1), f. 482. See also Handbook of Christianity in China, 199. 188 The travel time required or the assurance of safe arrival did not improve significantly before the nineteenth century. See chapter five and Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973. 189 Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution. 190 See Philippe Avril, Divers voyages en divers Etats d’Europe et d’Asie, 1692, 90. “Cela etant, comme il est aise à un chacun de s’en convaincre, il ne faut pas douter que la route par terre à la Chine ne soit soit beaucoup plus sure & plus courte que celle de Mer, où quelque diligence qu’on sasse, & quelque Bonheur qu’on puisse voir dans sa Navigation, on n’employe guere moins de deux ans pour s’y rendre.” Before arriving in India, Avril also stated that caravan travel was the safest mode of travel to cross from the Mediterranean to Bukhara and Samarkand. See Avril, Divers voyages, 60. See also below as to the reasons why Avril favored the overland passage so much.
extensive travels, he did board an English ship from Surat to China, and died in a shipwreck off the coast of Formosa (present day Taiwan).

Before leaving on an expensive and dangerous passage, the Society had already invested time and money in each Jesuit’s training and education. This comes out most clearly in the second part of Liam Brokey’s history of the Jesuit mission in China Journey to the East (chapters six through 10), in which he focuses on Jesuit academic training. Every Jesuit sent to Asia went through a nine-year program: “two years of humanities, three years in the arts course, which focused on Greek philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy, and four years of advanced theology studies.” Besides scholarly skills, they also learned the mundane practicalities of how to keep up a residence, teaching skills, and had a passive exposure to the pastoral techniques used by missionaries in Europe. Whether or not each Jesuit was a highly trained scientist, each missionary sent was an investment worth a lot of time and money even before the costs of shipping from Lisbon or Port Louis to China were incurred.

Though it is difficult to calculate the precise costs of the Jesuit training in Europe and the absolute costs per missionary aboard each ship, the third part, maintaining Jesuit personnel once they arrived safely in Asia, was probably the most expensive. The average stay of a Jesuit father (or brother) in Asia, including his travel to Macao and life in China, was twenty-two years. The average cost per

191 Liam Brokey, Journey to the East: the Jesuit mission to China, 1579-1724 (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). Brokey analyses the diverse set of mental and linguistic tools they received without adding to the myth that the Jesuits were “a uniquely talented set of men who had been handpicked by their superiors in Europe to confront the challenges of China.” Brokey, Journey to the East, 209. He points out that, even though the China mission was unique – since in no other mission was the distance between erudition and conversion so close – there was no systematic plan in the European academic schooling for the specific conversion of the Chinese.

192 See Jonathan Spence, “The Dream of Catholic China,” Review of Journey to the East. For a more precise study of the socio-economic background of each Jesuit and his individual education, see Jean-Pierre Duteil, Le mandat du ciel, 28-34.

193 See Brokey, Journey to the East, 223.

194 The basis of my dataset is the information collected by Joseph Dehergne, Aloys Pfister, and Josef Wicki. See Joseph Dehergne, Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine
year for a Jesuit living in China in 1675 amounted to 231 taels.\textsuperscript{195} 1675 was almost the midpoint of the Jesuit missions in China (1582 to 1773). Twenty-two times 231 taels equals 5,110 taels.\textsuperscript{196} According to this calculation, the extrapolated maintenance costs of Jesuits such as Martin Correa (1699-1786) or Niccolò Longobardo (1565-1655) who stayed nearly or just over sixty years in Asia, was well over 15,000 taels.\textsuperscript{197} From an economic point of view, keeping alive the human investment was of course the end goal of all costs incurred during training and transport. Having clarified the financial repercussions of loosing missionaries in via, I will now return to Trigault’s mission and investigate to what degree Trigault was successful in fulfilling his target of missionary transport as a visitor-procurator. There were two major obstacles to transport missionaries from Europe to China. The first difficulty that cut into each regiment of new Jesuits was in-house politics. For this the visitor-procurator, just like a treasurer or mission procurator, had to negotiate carefully and fight for every resource he could get hold of, over and over again.\textsuperscript{198} The second barrier was the deadly sea passage.

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\textsuperscript{195} 22 \times 231.5949 = 5,110.33392. This number is calculated by Noel Golvers for the Jesuit father François de Rougemont. Golvers, Noël. \textit{François de Rougemont, S.J., Missionary in Ch’ang-Shu (Chiang-nan): A Study of the Account Book (1674-1676) and the Elogium}. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999, 596. See also chapter five.

\textsuperscript{196} The tael consisted of 37.3 grams of silver, with a range of fineness. See footnote 167 for bibliographical references on the value of a tael in the seventeenth century.

\textsuperscript{197} See Dehergne, \textit{Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine}, 61, 153.

\textsuperscript{198} See below and see chapter four.
2.3.3 The Portuguese Padroado

The goals set by Longobardo were as follows: ideally Trigault was looking for a third missionary in each of the existing five mission stations, with enough manpower for another five future missions if possible and some missionaries with specialist knowledge that would be of use in Beijing. This amounted to more than twenty new missionaries for the China missions alone. On top of that, both Longobardo and Trigault were of the opinion that every three years a half dozen missionaries should be sent to China. If possible, Trigault had to bring back with him fifty new missionaries. In hindsight this number may sound slightly unrealistic when placed in its historical context (and compared to the statistical data I compiled – see below). When Trigault left China, there were twelve Jesuit missionaries (not including six brothers) working in China, who took care of fewer than 2,500 Chinese converts. There would be forty Jesuits in China at the end of the seventeenth century, and the highest number of Western Jesuit fathers working at one time in China was eighty two, in 1701.

Besides the number, Longobardo’s further specifications only added to the degree of difficulty recruiting said missionaries. Half of the new Jesuits should be non-Portuguese, with a special contingent of fathers from the Northern Provinces

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199 After the Treaty of Tordesillas (1493, 1494), Portugal obtained papal authorization to conduct trade and establish colonies in the Far East in combination with the duty to support the proselytizing of the Catholic faith in its colonies as an official patron (which initiated the Portuguese padroado). For more information on the Portuguese padroado, see Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, 24. See also Standaert, *Handbook of Christianity*, 309. See also Clossey, *Salvation and Globalization in the Early Jesuit Missions*, 154, 156, 158. For an analysis of the changing role of the Portuguese padroado, see chapters three and six, sections 3.5 and 6.3.6.


201 This number is based upon Dehergne, *Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine*, 346-347. See also Standaert, *Handbook of Christianity*, 307.

202 Standaert, *Handbook of Christianity*, 305, 307. In 1701 there was the highest number of new arrivals, thirty European Jesuits. This was still well below Trigault’s desired number. For more information on numbers, please see appendixes.
such as the Netherlands, the Southern Low Countries, and Germany. Since at that time the Spanish and Portuguese Crown were united, more attention was paid to avoid mixing subjects. The Belgian Jesuits, who were officially Spanish subjects, should go to missions under Spanish patronage rather than to missions under Portuguese patronage. French Jesuits did not stand a chance to get Madrid's approval to sail to China on their ships. In Germany and the Southern Low Countries Trigault could take his pick among the many volunteers because of the huge interest, which also allowed him to draft only those versed in mathematics or engineering. Other criteria were that the candidates had to be young and good humanists. Did Trigault realize that he most likely could not get all those candidates on to Portuguese ships? He did negotiate this issue with the court procurator for Portugal in Madrid, but maybe neither Trigault, nor Longobardo, realized that this issue had very little room for barter. On the other hand it may have been a good technique to aim high and ask for more than could be given. Did Longobardo realize that he had set Trigault on a course towards an unavoidable conflict with other procurators among whom, eventually, was the procurator at court in Spain?

The main issue was that these plans flagrantly ignored the Portuguese padroado. Lamalle argues that the visitor-procurator that Japan sent did point out that the province could not even bear the costs of the existing residences and that therefore new recruits had to be limited and split between the China and Japan missions. This actual visitor-procurator, Father Gabriel de Matos (1572-1634), in contrast to Trigault as a “rogue” visitor-procurator, also emphasized that Spain would simply not allow a great cohort of mostly foreign missionaries in its Portuguese missions. As mentioned above, the conflict between a visitor-procurator, Trigault, and royal patronage was almost unavoidable. The visitor-

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204 More on the problems with and violations of the Portuguese padroado in chapter three. According to Castelnau and Maldavsky it was not unusual for a procurator to ignore the limitations of royal patronages. “Dans le cadre espagnol, ce voyage et les tâches qui incombent au voyageur révèlent aussi l’ambiguïté des jésuites vis-à-vis du Patronage royal, dont ils respectent les règles tout en les détournant.” Castelnau and Maldavsky, “Entre l’Europe et l’Amérique,” 130.
procurator traveled within and beyond the limits of the royal sphere, and he expected to so with a group of missionaries from all over Europe (with many different national affinities). As Trigault was colliding with the real visitor-procurator and the procurator at court and other Jesuits, he finally lost the support of the Jesuit general, Vitelleschi. Vitelleschi let him know that the royal council decided that he could leave with ten non-Portuguese missionaries. When Trigault reached Lisbon, the royal court seemed to have changed this to two foreign missionaries, and only Belgians were allowed. Again Trigault had to use all his negotiating power and an intervention of the vice-king to change this number. In the end he left with four Belgians, three Germans, one Austrian, three Italians, and ten Portuguese Jesuits. This was not the result Longobardo or Trigault had in mind when he left for Europe, but it was much better than it looked before Trigault called upon the vice-king.

2.3.4 The Deadly Toll of Sea-Passage

Of Trigault’s cohort, only eight worked in China as missionaries after five died at sea. While this seems daunting, it was not unusual. Thirty-six percent of the Jesuits arrived in China, or eight out of twenty two, which was a high percentage in comparison to later batches of reinforcements brought by visitor-procurators. Boym landed with three out of eight (38%) missionaries to China in 1656. Martini managed to bring five out of seventeen (29%) in 1657. Father Prospero Intorcetta’s (1625-1696) battalion was decimated worse than any other: only one out of twelve (8%) made it to China in 1673 (fifteen out of twenty seven arrived in Goa). On the 9th of September 1673, Intorcetta wrote a letter from Goa to the Jesuit general reporting on the nine Jesuit fathers he had recruited in Europe. Of those nine new

208 Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault,” 86. Is this an instance in which Trigault as a “seducer” managed to turn around a terrible outcome into a slightly less bad result? Castelnau and Maldavsky, “Entre l’Europe et l’Amérique,” 134.
209 ARSI JapSin 162, ff. 358r-v.
missionaries intended to work in China, one reached Goa alive.\textsuperscript{210} Intorcetta ended his letter with a list of details on the deceased fathers. All but one died in April while crossing the equator.\textsuperscript{211} One of the last visitor-procurators for the Portuguese missions during the seventeenth century to return with new missionaries, Philippe Couplet (1623-1693) in 1692, traveled with fifteen fellow missionaries of which four (26\%) companions made it to China (he himself died somewhere between Madagascar and Goa when luggage fell on top of him).\textsuperscript{212} This brings the average rate for Jesuits who would end up working in China and were brought by a visitor-procurator in the seventeenth century to 27\%.\textsuperscript{213} If Trigault wanted to add fifty Jesuits to the China missions, he should have recruited at least 182 missionaries, and hoped that the sea and all its dangers did not take more than it usually did. What was additionally unfortunate and compounded the challenge before him, was that after Trigault’s intense haggling, Portugal was even less likely to allow a small percentage of non-Portuguese Jesuits to travel in the future.

The statistical data from the 1610s until the 1690s depicts an equally grim picture. The table below (table 2.2) charts the total number of Jesuits sent from Europe to China, and then table 2.3 places these numbers in context within the overall number of missionaries sent to Asia.


\textsuperscript{211} April 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 23, 24. ARSI JapSin 162, f. 358v.


\textsuperscript{213} This number is based upon Standaert’s data analysis. As mentioned before, my data set is not identical to his. The number of Jesuits who died \textit{in via} is, as Standaert notes, not a straightforward issue. Appendix A includes a comprehensive discussion, analysis, and comparison of primary source- and secondary source-based data sets.
Table 2.2 Number of Jesuits Sent to China (Based upon Dehergne’s Bibliographic Work)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number of Jesuits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1540s</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1560s</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580s</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600s</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1620s</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1640s</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1660s</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1680s</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700s</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720s</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740s</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760s</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2 illustrates that towards the end of the seventeenth century a great number of Jesuits was sent following a low-point during the 1670s. However, not all 111 Jesuits sent in the 1690s arrived in China. Chapter three will examine in detail the networks and flows of Jesuit missionary personnel from the 1690s onwards. For the period discussed in this chapter, it is remarkable to note that the unrest within China coincided with fewer Jesuits sent from Europe during the mid seventeenth century. During the 1660s and 1670s as well, few Jesuits were sent. Of those who were sent, most traveled with visitor-procurator Intorcetta, and only 8% reached China. Keeping in mind the high numbers of Jesuits who did not make it to China, Jesuit groups guided by visitor-procursors such as Nicolas Trigault (1618), Michael Boym (1656), and Martino Martini (1657) explain sub peaks in the data in table 2.2. The combined efforts of Boym and Martini procured twenty-nine Jesuits out of the fifty-four that were sent during the 1650s. This shows most clearly that the relationship between the efforts of procurators to return to China with new
missionaries and the total number of missionaries sent to China is rather limited. In combination with later tables on the survival rates of Jesuits sent to China and Standaert's data on the Jesuit presence in China (whose data do not show a peak in Jesuit China presence during the 1650s, rather the opposite), it shows that efforts in sending Jesuits, whether they were coordinated by procurators or not, did not overcome the dangers of the sea voyage.

Table 2.3 Number of Jesuits Sent to Asia (Based upon Wicki's List)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number of Jesuits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1540s</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550s</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1560s</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1570s</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580s</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590s</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600s</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1610s</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1620s</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630s</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1640s</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650s</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1660s</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670s</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1680s</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td>1690s</td>
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<td>1700s</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710s</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720s</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3 shows the number of Jesuits sent to all of Asia from Lisbon, based upon Joseph Wicki’s list.\(^{214}\) I included this table to provide extra context to table 2.2, which shows the number of Jesuits sent to just China. For example, the 1690s peak shown in table 2.2 is not as explicit in table 2.3. However, thanks to two different data sets I can calculate the percentage of the number of Jesuits sent to China over the number of Jesuits sent to Asia. As Wicki’s data only includes the Jesuits who

\(^{214}\) See appendix A for more information on Wicki’s data and my parameters.
departed from Lisbon whereas Dehergne included those who were sent via France, overland, and Mexico, I have subtracted the biggest group – French Jesuits via France – from Dehergne’s data to calculate that during the 1690s, 55% of all Jesuits sent to Asia via Lisbon were assigned to working in China.

Table 2.4 below shows the rates of Jesuits who reached China during the seventeenth and eighteenth century.

Table 2.4 Percentage of Jesuits who Reached China

Table 2.4 calculates per decade the percentages of Jesuits who survived and reached their destination of China. Percentages give a distorted view because in the 1540s only six Jesuits were sent to China, of which two were redirected and one died. The survival and non-redirection rate is thus 50%. In the 1680s, forty Jesuits embarked: four died and sixteen were redirected. Even though the survival and non-redirection rate is the same for both decades, the number of Jesuits sent during the
1680s was more than six times as large as during the 1540s, which means that the actual loss in human lives was significantly higher in the 1680s.

The survival rates similarly show that the large groups of missionaries accompanied by visitor-procurators more than often overlapped with periods of particularly low survival rates. Apart from random bad luck, the only way to match the remarkable low percentages of visitor-procurator missions mentioned earlier (Trigault – 36%, Boym – 38%, Martini – 29%, Intorcetta – 8%, Couple – 26%) with the percentages in table 2.4 (which are not that low) is that Jesuit superiors of missions on the way to China were more likely to pick off members of larger groups of missionaries destined for China than when smaller groups or individual Jesuits passed on their way to China. Trigault’s mission during the late 1610s led to the low-point in table 2.4, as most of the missionaries sent to China during that decade were part of his mission. Semedo was the next visitor-procurator who returned with a group of new missionaries during the 1640s (1644), closely followed by visitor-procurators Martini (1659) and Boym (1658) who returned during the 1650s. For both decades the rates go down to 56%. The voyages of the next visitor-procurators Intorcetta (1673), da Rocha (1683), and Couple (1693) concur with the lowest point in the table (47% to 50% during the 1670s, 1680s, and start of the 1690s). These data illustrate the limitations of Trigault’s and Longobardo’s goals to recruit and transport new missionaries from Europe to China. Chapter three further examines the precise circumstances in which new missionaries were lost or died in via, whereas this chapter continues to focus on the efforts of visitor-procurators in China during the seventeenth century to collect money and missionaries.

2.4 The Visitor-Procurator Evaluated, 1612 – 1693

I suspect that the second-last visitor-procurator who returned with a large cohort of missionaries in 1692, Philippe Couple, felt the limitations of his own efforts and the plans laid out by Longobardo and Trigault.215 Regarding finances, it

215 There were two other visitor-procurators for the Portuguese Jesuit missions during the 1690s: Filippo Grimaldi and Miguel do Amaral. Grimaldi returned
was Couplet who brought de Rougemont's account book back to Europe. This was very unusual. There are no other surviving account books that match the extent and detail of this source. Most, if not all, were lost or destroyed by the Jesuits themselves. Why would Couplet take this source? Was it perhaps because as a visitor-procurator he analyzed de Rougemont's source the same way I have done? Based upon the account book the following conclusions could be reached regarding Jesuit finances:

1) Even at the best of times, little European funding actually reached the Jesuit missions, and no funding came through if any region between Europe and China was in serious disorder.

2) Integration into the local economy was what allowed de Rougemont to balance his finances in a very precarious way.

3) Longobardo’s plan for financially self-sustaining missions thanks to annual (or monthly) revenue from real estate investments was not realized. China missions during the 1670s and 1680s, such as de Rougemont’s, were financially as insecure as they were during the 1610s.

As for personnel, Couplet compiled a catalogue of Jesuits who had been sent to China up until the 1680s, entitled Catalogus Patrum Societatis Iesu, qui post obitum S. Francisci Xaverii ab Anno 1581, usque ad Annum 1681, In Imperio Sinarum Jesu Christi Fidem propugnârunt, ubi singularum nomina, ingressus, predicatio, mors, Sepultura, libri Sinicè editi recensentur.\textsuperscript{216} Couplet published this catalogue as a second work following Ferdinand Verbiest’s Astronomia Europaea sub imperatore Tartaro Sinico Cám Hy appellato ex umbra in lucem revocata (1687).\textsuperscript{217} Couplet’s text

\textsuperscript{216} Philippe Couplet, Catalogus Patrum Societatis Iesu, qui post obitum S. Francisci Xaverii ab Anno 1581, usque ad Annum 1681, In Imperio Sinarum Jesu Christi Fidem propugnârunt, ubi singularum nomina, ingressus, predicatio, mors, Sepultura, libri Sinicè editi recensentur.

\textsuperscript{217} See Ferdinand Verbiest, Astronomia Europaea sub imperatore Tartaro Sinico Cám Hy appellato ex umbra in lucem revocata (Dillingae: Joannis Caspari Bencard per Joannem Federle, 1687).
starts on page 100, ends on page 126, and provides brief information on 105 Jesuits who entered China between 1581 and 1681 (with the exception of Francis Xavier who was number one). Couplet’s list includes each missionary’s name, country of origin, date admitted into the Society, short biography, and works published. Couplet’s 105 entries are not limited to those who survived the passage (he lists Ignatius Lobo and Joannes Monteiro, for example). A fellow Jesuit who researched the safety of different routes to China, Philippe Avril (1654-1698), based his estimate of the survival rate on that given to him by Couplet in a letter. His assessment of the reliability of transporting missionaries, money, and other resources on Portuguese ships was bleak. Only 100-200 Jesuits out of every 600 survived. Avril’s original French text re-cites Philippe Couplet’s number:

J’ay sceu du Pere Couplet illustre Missionnaire, que tout Paris vit avec tant de plaisir après son retour de la Chine, où il a demeuré plus de trente ans, qu’il s’étroit étudié à faire une supputation exacte du nombre des Jesuites qui étoient parties de différents endroits de l’Europe pour se rendre à la Mission qu’il venoit de quitter, & qu’il avoir trouvé que de six cent qui s’étoient embarquez pour y aller depuis que l’entrée en est ouverte à nôtre Compagnie, il n’y en étoit arrive qu’une centaine, tout le reste ayant consommé son sacrifice en chemin par les maladies ou par le naufrage.

The caption to the right of the main text (in the original publication of 1692) repeated that nearly 500 Jesuits perished on their way to China. The English translation, which was published only one year later, noted (in a text box next to the main text) that “near four hunder’d Jesuits perish’d going to China.” I compared

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218 See Philippe Avril, Divers voyages en divers Etats d’Europe et d’Asie (Paris, 1692), 3-4. So far I have not this letter. I suspect that Couplet refered to the number of Jesuits who made it to China and not to the number of Jesuits who died in via. Perhaps Avril interpreted this to be the latter in line with his argument regarding the unsafety of sea travel in his own work.

219 See Philippe Avril, Travels into divers Parts of Europe and Asia, Undertaken by the French King’s Order to discover a new Way by Land into China, Containing many curious Remarks in Natural Philosophy, Geography, Hydrography, and History. Together with a Description of Great Tartary, and of the different People who inhabit there, To which is added, A supplement extracted from Hakluyt and Purchas, giving an account of several Journeys overland from Russia, Persia, and the Moguls Country to

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this calculation to Couplet’s catalogue. Couplet’s catalogue did not mention any of the 400-500 Jesuits who did not survive. It did mention some missionaries who died during travel in China, such as Emmanuel de Sequeira, but omitted this information for others like Michael Boym. This leads me to conclude that while Couplet, being a visitor-procurator, no doubt possessed specialist knowledge as a bibliographer and a manager of material and human resources, his estimate was most likely part of Verbiest’s larger plea to European patrons and heads of state to send more missionaries and more money to the Jesuit missions in China. Others, such as Avril, picked up Couplet’s assessment (accepting his authority as a visitor-procurator responsible for the Jesuit resources in China), and this confirmed that what Longobardo and Trigault had stipulated the China missions needed during the 1610s continued to be the same seventy years later. Couplet’s estimates had familiar Jesuit propagandistic purposes (all Jesuits who died in via, were considered martyrs equal to those who died in the missions), but they should not be discounted for this. Couplet died before reaching China (1693), so he was unable to see that two developments were about to change this situation. First, Verbiest’s letter requesting more resources and missionaries played a role in shaping France’s desire to send Jesuits to China independently from the Portuguese padroado (the focus of chapter three). Secondly, stability was created by the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors at the end of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth century. This environment would finally permit inroads to be made for the implementation of Longobardo’s visionary financial plan in the eighteenth century.

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221 See Couplet, *Catalogus Patrum*, 119, 125.

222 In addition, perhaps in order not to offend the Portuguese king and patron, Couplet blamed the sea voyage instead of Portuguese superiors in India picking off members of each large cohort of new missionaries traveling to China. See chapter three.
2.5 Conclusion

Longobardo’s confidential assessment of Trigault’s capacities was the following: Trigault was a great negotiator among princes and wealthy magnates of France, Flanders, and Germany whose support was invaluable to the mission. Besides that he was a talented writer, in both Chinese and Western languages, and this would prove his great value as a propagator for the China missions. Finally, judging by the Peter Paul Rubens painting, he personified China and Jesuits in China to many Europeans.\(^{223}\) As visitor-procurator Trigault withstood the intense travels, relentless negotiations, and loosing his older brother Elie Trigault (1575-1618) at sea on their way back to China.\(^{224}\)

Trigault’s case study illustrates both the minor and major obstacles that faced a visitor-procurator. First of all, multiple upper-echelon fellow Jesuits, who argued that Trigault was not a real visitor-procurator, criticized Trigault. They felt that he was ignorant of how his requests for resources (both money and people) could harm the rest of the Society. His demands were perceived as overstepping his boundaries as a visitor-procurator, since he was expected to follow the example of a recognized authority, such as the procurator at court or the superior of a province. Luckily, Trigault was accepted as a “rogue” visitor-procurator thanks to the personal support of the superior general. This, however, did not ensure his success in collecting people and funding from Europe to use as resources to build self-sustaining China missions.

\(^{223}\) Longobardo did also not fail to observe “that he was very choleric, and has moods that are very vehement and furious.” Liam Brockey, “Covering the Shame: The Death and Disappearance of Nicolas Trigault, SJ,” \textit{Colonial and Imperial Histories Colloquium} Princeton University (2002),” 11. Brockey argues that Trigault committed suicide in 1628. This has been covered up since few scenarios could have been more harmful to the Jesuit missions and the overall Catholic Church than the possible suicide of a bestselling, highly educated, European-wide known missionary such as Trigault. According to Brockey this is the reason why the silencing was done so thoroughly that he only found one brief coded reference: official missions inspector Andre Palmeiro concluded his letter to the superior general of the order that Father Trigault had hanged himself. See ARSI, JapSin 15, f. 196r.

\(^{224}\) His older brother was also Trigault’s treasurer.
It was the limitations of global travel that controlled Trigault’s most valuable resource: missionaries. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the cost of transporting people from Europe to Asia was simply too high.\textsuperscript{225} The internal mechanisms of the Jesuit organization were unable to overcome the confines of early modern global travel in the sense that the center could never send enough missionaries and money to the periphery. No one understood the un-sustainable character of visitor-procurator tours better than the Jesuits operating in the periphery. I agree with Martínez-Serna, who states that the transportation of people was “…one of the most complicated tasks that Jesuit procurators faced.”\textsuperscript{226} This is why early on, in 1612, Longobardo intended to deal with the danger of global disconnect with regard to transporting the two most important resources, and asked for enough money for the missions to finance themselves and for a bishop who could ordain Chinese priests. Even though Longobardo’s intentions were visionary, they did not come to fruition from 1612 until 1690, and they were only implemented and fully developed in the eighteenth century (see chapters four, five, and six). During the seventeenth century, procurators after Trigault continually requested capital to invest. However, evidence found in Jesuit reports on their possessions after the Qing dynasty take-over, a close up investigation of the global funding of a Flemish missionary working in Changshu during the 1670s, and statistical data on Jesuit travel between Europe and China, suggest that procurators working in the Portuguese missions in China did not accumulate enough capital to invest in Chinese real estate, nor did a Chinese clergy replace European missionaries by 1700.\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{225} For more on this, please see appendixes.
\textsuperscript{226} See Martínez-Serna, “Procurators and the Making of the Jesuits’ Atlantic Network,” 200.
\textsuperscript{227} I do not know why this was the case. The issue of ordaining non-Western Christians was a very delicate issue. There were different and changing policies in both the Portuguese and Spanish spheres of influence. Ordaining Chinese or Japanese converts as priests was also different from ordaining Indian converts. In the Chinese case, Standaert has pointed out that training – the ability to speak and read Latin - would be one of the factors that played a role. There is no room for a comprehensive discussion of this topic here.
While the world was slowly becoming a more connected place thanks to increased global travel (sometimes referred to as “globalization”), ad-hoc solutions initiated by fathers in the periphery, such as Trigault’s, illustrate that the periphery sought to improve the connectivity of the global Jesuit network to overcome the limitations of centralized economic management. This problem proved important enough for Trigault to travel back to Europe without the Jesuit provincial government’s approval. Trigault’s propaganda tour was successful in the following aspects: he wrote the first bestselling story of the Jesuit missions in China, based on Matteo Ricci’s diaries; he collected a great number of books that became the foundation of a Western library in Beijing; the presents he collected were of use for several decades; and he obtained institutional changes, some of which were however never carried out.228 Lamalle deemed Trigault successful based upon his literary accomplishments.229 However, from the economic perspective of a procurator whose task it was to ensure reliable and continuous human and material support between the center and the periphery, Trigault’s mission was not as successful. While it was clearly his goal as a visitor-procurator, Trigault was unable to collect enough capital to make real estate investments allowing the Jesuit China missions to become financially independent from the Portuguese (and Japan province) support. At the same time no Chinese clergy developed, which contributed to the ever-increasing230 pressure on missionaries. Both these issues only reinforced the Society’s reliance on local knowledge and investments within the East Asia missions, which are further examined in chapters four, five, and six.231

228 For example the translation of the bible in Chinese. See Standaert, *Handbook of Christianity*, 621.
230 See Liam Brockey’s *Journey to the East*, and his ideas on the Jesuits as overburdened managers by the end of the seventeenth century.
231 Liam Brockey reaches a similar conclusion in his “Largos Caminhos E Vastos Mares: Jesuit Missionaries and the Journey to China in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” *Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies*, Vol 1 (2000): 45-72. Another scholar that described the limitations of this phenomenon was Alfred Plattner in the second chapter of his *Jesuits go East* (Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds, 1950), 62-118. See also his introduction, 18: “And the purpose of this book is to give a survey of this heroic and tragic struggle, a struggle to discover and maintain lines
Chapter 3: The Dynamics of Connected Networks between Europe and Asia

3.1 Jesuit Networks during the 1690s

Chapter two analyzed the efforts of procurators sent from China to Europe between the 1610s and the 1690s. Chapter three continues to focus on procurators, but I will include the procurators responsible for China who remained in Europe and whose efforts were not only to raise capital for the missions, but more to seek out and secure reliable networks for transport of money, mail, and missionaries to the Far East. Without these reliable networks providing a continuous supply of people and resources, they would never build the momentum to become self-sustaining.

At the end of the seventeenth century multiple geopolitical changes occurred that would affect the work of Jesuit procurators and the finances of Jesuit missions in China. China’s economic and political environment stabilized as the Kangxi depression ended and the Qing pacified north, central, and south China and even sought expansion towards central Asia. At the same time, the Portuguese maritime empire in Asia was under attack from European competitors and the Muscovite empire had pushed so far east that it negotiated borders with the Qing. These developments opened up new possibilities of both maritime and overland routes to China. In addition, France began sending Jesuits who would eventually build Jesuit missions independent from the existing Portuguese Jesuit missions. This chapter examines the Jesuit networks constructed in this new age.

Starting in the 1690s, at the peak of Jesuit travel to China, this chapter inspects the collection of letters of a French procurator, Antoine Verjus, to analyze his strategies for establishing a safer and more reliable connection between Europe and China. Verjus’ manifold attempts to expand his personal network in order to transport people, goods, and money across continents and oceans are contextualized by the endeavors of earlier and later Jesuits to build relationships of communication with Asiatic missionlands, a struggle against sea, mountains and desert.” See also the statistics of the appendix on early modern world globalization.
trust with providers of overland and maritime connections between Europe and China, such as the Muscovite empire, the Portuguese and French states, and the English and Dutch merchant networks. First, this chapter defines the concept of trust as it was applicable to the procurator’s networks. Statistical evidence (in line with the end of chapter two) and Verjus’ letters will support the chapter’s argument of how and why the French Jesuits used trust, and how the French Jesuits’ efforts to find a more reliable way of communicating and transporting people and money between Europe and China, changed the Jesuit finances of all (French and Portuguese) missions in China. I propose that procurators’ individual networks can be understood as part of a complex web of connected histories in which members of religious, economic, and political networks in Asia interacted with each other in the interest of forming relationships of trust to secure their channels of global communication and transport of goods and people.232

3.1.1 European and Asian Competitors for Global Networks

The fathers of the Jesuit enterprise relied on European political networks, such as the Portuguese empire, to transport people and goods from Europe to Asia. They were thoroughly invested in maintaining strong ties to these networks to better serve their missions. In the beginning, there was but one option: after the Treaty of Tordesillas (1493,1494), Portugal obtained papal authorization to conduct trade and establish colonies in the Far East in combination with the duty to support the proselytizing of the Catholic faith in its colonies as an official patron (which

232 Pedro Machado used a similar approach in his “Cloths of a New Fashion: Indian Ocean Networks of Exchange and Cloth Zones of Contact in Africa and India in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in How India Clothed the World: The World of South Asian Textiles, 1500-1850, ed. Giorgio Riello & Tirthankar Roy (Brill: Leiden, 2009), 53.
initiated the Portuguese padroado). For the first Jesuit who traveled to Asia in 1541, Francis Xavier, the only political network available was the Portuguese one.

Over the course of the seventeenth century, missionaries from other orders, or supported by other European monarchs, established missions in China. Although missionaries of nationalities that were not at peace with the Portuguese crown entered China by avoiding the port of Macao, Macao was the only official and legitimate entry to China from both the Portuguese and the Chinese perspective. After 1680, missionaries sent by the Propaganda Fide in Rome set sail for China, and in 1685 the first French missionaries embarked on a diplomatic and religious mission to the Chinese emperor. Both the Portuguese exclusive rights – the Crown's Padroado – and the close connection between the Portuguese network and the Society of Jesus became increasingly obsolete at the end of the seventeenth century, as competing and more effective European networks in the East multiplied. At this point, Jesuits had more options as to how to bridge the gap between Europe and China. There were different opinions within the Jesuit organization about these choices. This chapter examines how different groups of Jesuits approached the challenge of balancing their relationships with competing networks in the interest of successfully completing their missions. As this chapter will demonstrate, the changing geopolitical entities and these multiple networks made the tasks of the visitor-procurators discussed in chapter two more complex.

Throughout most of the seventeenth century, Europeans such as the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Spanish, and the English were competing with each other for trade and political monopoly in the Asian maritime space. This is not to say that certain political entities had total control over the Asian seas or coasts, since, as Daphon Ho pointed out, “coastal areas in the early modern period were not the

\footnote{For more on the padroado, see footnote 198 and chapters three and six, sections 3.5 and 6.3.6.}

\footnote{Xavier did not travel overland because his group of missionaries, just like the Portuguese, attempted to circumnavigate Islamic powers. See below for a discussion on the overland travel from Europe to China.}

\footnote{Spanish missionaries had entered mainland China before the 1650s. Joachim Bouvet, Journal des Voyages, ed. Claudia von Collani (Taipei: Ricci Institute, 2005), introduction.}
nation-specific territorial waters they are today,” but certain Asian polities were better positioned to police their waters than other European or Asian contestants.236 In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries European powers such as the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and the English attempted to link both the southeast Asian zone and the East Asian zone to ensure monopoly power.237 At this time, none was successful for long in this venture.238 At precisely the same time that the Jesuits had the lowest rates to transport missionaries from Europe to China, during the 1670s and 1680s as discussed in chapter two, European networks were not the strongest networks that linked southeast Asia and southern China, the maritime network of the Zheng family was.239 The Qing consolidated its territories and defeated the Zheng family during the 1680s. The Qing thus pacified a contested frontier, which a record number of French and Portuguese Jesuits crossed during the 1690s.

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237 Ho, “Sealords Live in Vain,” 105. Ho’s definition of a network is “a framework of routes that connect a certain number of locations or nodes via primary ports (hubs) and secondary ports (spokes).”
238 Eventually, Europeans would be successful in Asia, primarily because of “the organization, cohesion and staying power of state and corporate organizations.” See John E. Wills Jr., “Maritime Asia, 1500-1800: The Interactive Emergence of European Domination,” American Historical Review 98.1 (1993): 86.
239 See Tonio Andrade, “The Company’s Chinese Pirates: How the Dutch East India Company tried to lead a Coalition of Pirates to War against China, 1621-1662,” Journal of World History 15.4 (2005): 443-444. Until 1800, “the states of China and Japan were as strong as European states, both in term of centralization and of course in size, but they were not interested in maritime expansion.” When proponents of a political network such as the Zheng family created “a Chinese maritime state that was interested in overseas trade and colonialism,” they “negated” the Dutch East Indian Company’s “state support” advantage, and chased the Dutch, who were then the “greatest privateer organization of Europe and harbinger of the first multinational enterprise,” out of Taiwan. See also Tonio Andrade, Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China’s First Great Victory over the West (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2011). For more info, see appendix D.
3.1.2 Trust and Procurators

My interpretation of relationships of trust is based upon Charles Tilly’s definition: “trust [networks] consist of ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others.” Members of long-distance trade diasporas, well-knit lineages, religious sects, or confraternities will establish relationships of trust with other individuals inside and outside of the original social network. In securing resources or commitments they will sometimes seek to connect to governments or private benefactors and use them as patrons.

In the case of the Jesuit procurator networks this chapter will argue that the relationships of trust established between individual procurators, ministers (representatives of states), benefactors, and captains of merchant ships were what defined the dynamic character of these interwoven Jesuit networks. Trust also defined the limits of these networks. Prange’s notion of interwoven networks, similar to Nicolas Standaert’s presentation of the interwoven texture of Christian

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241 Prange suggests a new network theory that interprets networks as ‘interwoven:’ “Network theory has been increasingly applied to different aspects of historical enquiry and has become extraordinarily prominent in studies of the Indian Ocean world... The study of networks serves as an organizing principle for the multiple levels of material and intellectual connections across the ocean. What is again affirmed is the role of long-distance trade as the facilitator of communication and exchange. Commercial networks were interwoven with kinship, religious, and scholarly networks; Buddhist temples were situated on trade routes; scholarly prestige was established through association with a teacher on the other end of the ocean...” See Sebastian R. Prange, “Scholars and the Sea.” See also Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). Michael N. Pearson, Before Colonialism: Theories on Asian-European Relations, 1500-1750, Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
funerary rituals, is a powerful tool of visualization that captures the complexity of multiple, overlapping networks.\textsuperscript{242} I propose that European procurators like Verjus needed to trust the people responsible for carrying their letters, money, and fellow missionaries from Europe to China, and ensure that letters were not lost or made public, that money was not appropriated for other purposes, and that missionaries were not redirected to other missions. Based upon this definition of trust, I categorize Verjus’ relationships between different groups of people, who operated both within and outside the Jesuit network (which was dominated by the Portuguese state until the 1680s). A detailed description and analysis of prominent individuals and the categorical identity of the people they trusted, make “network” a less vague concept, in the sense that it helps us to understand the changing nature of this web of relationships between people operating within the network.\textsuperscript{243}

\textsuperscript{242} See Standaert, \textit{The Interweaving of Rituals}. Earlier versions of this chapter questioned the usefulness of network theory as a model for networks as dynamic as the Jesuit ones. My doubts are very similar to those expressed by Steven Harris. See Steven Harris, ““Long-Distance Corporations, Big Sciences, and the Geography of Knowledge.” \textit{Configurations}, 6 (1998): 302. See also Hsia, \textit{Sojourners in a Strange Land}, 7. “Agents that make up such networks are hardly agents at all, as the model assumes both their passive participation and their static nature; network theory itself has yet to integrate ‘a mechanism for how group identity and loyalty might be maintained’ into its picture of reliable agents in the field.”

\textsuperscript{243} Such as which parts were closely knit and which parts are constantly changing, and whether weak ties allow the network to be adaptive and responsive to changes – so strong in the long term – and strong ties make for a rigid, but only temporarily well-integrated network. Tim Brook made this valuable suggestion. Another interpretation of “bonds of trust” is David Lux’s and Harold Cook’s: “Despite differences among the social sites for the production of knowledge, and despite differences among the social ranks of the virtuosi and savants, credible information and ideas spread widely throughout Europe. Without the ability to place trust in reports of matters of fact that had not been personally experienced by people like oneself, the new philosophy would have remained fragmented and isolated in local social and geographical spaces.” See David Lux and Harold Cook, “Closed Circles or Open Networks?: Communicating at a Distance during the Scientific Revolution,” \textit{History of Science} 36 (1998): 181. Lux and Cook also discuss the value of weak ties: “Weak ties are more likely to link members of different small groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups.” Lux and Cook, “Closed Circles or Open Networks?,” 181. Lux and Cook develop Mark Granovetter’s notion of strength of weak ties further in arguing that they “seek to explore the workings and possible significance of weak ties in the international exchange of
In my case-study the major players are Jesuit fathers, more specifically the proctors and treasurers that were responsible for moving people and resources throughout both empires and their contested peripheries. In an effort to better connect far situated missions, procurators and treasurers within the Society of Jesus were active agents who wanted to establish relationships of trust within the larger Jesuit framework. Since the Society was no single organism, the procurator networks were in constant competition with each other, and were put under pressure by political predators, other Catholic Orders, and (occasionally) tensions related to national affinities within their own Society.

In this chapter, I will first analyze the Jesuits’ ties to European political networks, and illustrate their uninterrupted search for the most reliable and fastest network at any time. For the Jesuit missions in China specifically, the period from 1685 to 1700 was a crucial phase. Before this decade and a half, written sources on the Jesuit missions in China suggested that they had but one real option: the Portuguese network. After 1685, the French Jesuits no longer accepted the exclusive connection between the Jesuit network and the Portuguese government. They established their own exclusive network with the French government, which resulted in two independent Jesuit missions in China by 1700: the French and the Portuguese missions. Furthermore, in addition to these two networks, Jesuit sources indicate that there were even more alternative networks at their disposal. Missionaries who were not directly invested in the Portuguese-French competition, such as the Italian fathers, wrote on the pros and cons of using English, Dutch, and Danish ships for sending letters and other goods to Europe and back. Though the scientific information during the seventeenth century. Our primary aim is to suggest that weak ties furnished the basis for a communication strategy that addressed the problems created by new ‘matters of fact’ reported by observers of untested credibility. In a sense, communications based on weak ties met one of the problems of communicating with ‘strangers’ by incorporating individuals into personal networks of weak ties maintained by correspondence.” See Lux and Cook, “Closed Circles or Open Networks?,” 182. I agree with Lux’s and Cook’s statement that “Travel, more than any other activity, established the weak ties by which knowledge could be exchanged.” This is particularly relevant in the Jesuit procurators’ networks discussed below. In a future research project I hope to further develop and incorporate a discussion on weak ties within these Jesuit networks.
characterization of the Society of Jesus as a single organism had no basis even before the arrival of the French Jesuits in China.\textsuperscript{244} I argue that the eighteenth century ushered in an era of competing jurisdictions relating to differently formed networks within the Society of Jesus that further fragmented the overall structure of an organization struggling to link Europe and Asia.

Finally, this chapter will also analyze the financial repercussions of these searches for the best Eurasian network. The shifting of these networks affected the structure of communication within the Society and altered the global money flows that sustained the Jesuit missions in China from 1690 to 1708. The re-channeling of the prestigious global funds of the bishop of Münster, Ferdinand von Fürstenberg, at the whim of these shifts, provoked and deepened the strife between the Portuguese and French Jesuits, and helped to reveal the complex personal relationships that accompanied the changing of Eurasian networks necessary for Jesuit global connectivity.\textsuperscript{245}

3.2 Trust and the Limitations of Sea Passage

Verjus was in close contact with the visitor-procurator Philippe Couplet and other Jesuits such as Philippe Avril, both introduced in chapter two. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Verjus had a fairly accurate knowledge of the reliability, limitations, and outright dangers of sending letters, money, and missionaries through the Portuguese maritime network.\textsuperscript{246} Picking up on the analysis in chapter two, I will analyze statistical data to contextualize why Verjus did not trust the

\textsuperscript{244} This was most definitely inaccurate after the French Jesuit missions in China were officially recognized in 1703. Dauril Alden suggests a similar idea – that the Jesuit order was not a single organism – in his \textit{The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond, 1540-1750} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), x.

\textsuperscript{245} My analysis is similar to Harold Cook's in \textit{Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch Golden Age} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 376. "Human agency [my emphasis] was at work on the part of all the participants, not just the European intellectuals."

\textsuperscript{246} Even though there is little direct correspondence, Verjus and Couplet met in Paris in the late 1680s.
Portuguese ships to carry French missionaries from Europe to China. The Portuguese Jesuits and state redirected French Jesuits more than any other nationality of Jesuits. The following paragraphs will briefly explain the difference between survival rates and redirection rates.

Tables 2.2 (Number of Jesuits Sent to China) and 2.4 (Percentage of Jesuits who Reached China) illustrate the lowpoint of Jesuits reaching China during the 1670s and the highest peak during the 1690s (111), when both the French and Portuguese states increased the number of Jesuits sent along their respective networks.247 As previously illustrated in table 2.4, the rate of Jesuits who actually reached China to work as missionaries cut deep into each group of Jesuits sent to China. However, not all of them died. Earlier estimations included in chapter two by Couplet, may have given the impression that close to 70% of the Jesuits died on their way to China, but this was not the case. What requires clarification is that more often than dying at sea, Jesuits destined for China were actually redirected during the voyage. A careful examination of bibliographical information in lists such as Aloys Pfister's *Notices biographiques et bibliographiques sur les Jésuites de l'ancienne mission de Chine 1552-1773* (1932), Joseph Wicki's "Liste der Jesuiten-Indienfahrer 1541-1758 (1967)," and Joseph Dehergne's *Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine de 1552 à 1800* (1973) will illustrate this statement.248 I have entered Dehergne's data (who updated Pfister's data) and Wicki's data into a database to calculate the survival and redirection rates. For the discussion of Jesuit travel during the 1690s and the Jesuit procurator's networks, I will use Dehergne's data since Dehergne cross-examined

247 Standaert calls this the “Golden Period of 1692-1706," and explains how Ferdinand Verbiest' letter to send more Jesuits to China (delivered by visitor-procurator Couplet to the French king) resulted "especially [in] ... opening up ... the mission to more French Jesuits." See Standaert, “The Jesuit Presence in China (1580-1773)," 8,9. Another reason was “the more favorable situation created for Christianity after the Edict of Tolerance in 1692.”

primary sources, catalogs, and secondary lists, so his number is the closest to an actual rate of Jesuits sent from Europe who reached China alive and worked in the China missions for the remainder of their lives.249

The survival rate calculated from Dehergne’s data stands at 86%, and is the most accurate estimate. Compared to Couplet’s or Pray’s estimates, this number seems disproportionally high. However, not all Jesuits who survived ended up working in China as missionaries because an even larger share was redirected: 167 missionaries out of 704, or 24%. Combined with the Jesuits who died, this brings the rate of Jesuits who survived and were not redirected away from China to 63% (or 441 out of 704). Dehergne’s bibliographical work allows me to calculate per decade how many Jesuits were sent to China, how many died, and how many were stopped or redirected along the way to China (and thus never worked in China despite being sent with that purpose by their superior in Europe).

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249 For more information on the perimeters of my database, please see appendix A. The discrepancy between the primary source estimates of the survival rate and that derived from secondary biographic and bibliographic sources is startling. Without adjustments or corrections based upon Dehergne’s data, the survival rate for missionaries was as high as 92.8% (or 1,849 Jesuits out of 1,993) according to Wicki’s list. Even after adjusting this rate with information subtracted from Dehergne, Wicki’s survival rate remains strangely high, 91.3%. This is mostly because Wicki does not consistently enter which Jesuits died during the passage, but rather which Jesuits left Lisbon. The adjustments based upon Dehergne’s data (forty-four Jesuits died in Dehergne’s data, but survived in Wicki’s list) may give the impression that all of them died after reaching the first stop in Asia, India. This is an incorrect impression. Wicki’s list is simply not adequate to calculate a survival rate, because his data are not concerned with this. As Dehergne pointed out, Wicki’s way of using catalogues relied on information given by European Jesuit clerks: Jesuit provincials operated sometimes according to the principles of “out of mind, out of heart.” Dehergne, Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine, xvi-xvii. European bookkeepers would make note of Jesuit personnel leaving for far off missions, and then lose interest, or they were unable to find out whether missionaries survived the passage or not. Keeping Couplet’s catalogue in mind, Chinese primary sources and catalogs are sometimes equally hard to use. Even the best lists were still full of inaccuracies and omissions.
Of all the many ways in which a Jesuit could fail to reach China, none was more prevalent than redirection. Jesuits destined for China had close to a 10% greater chance of being redirected than of dying during the sea voyage. While nearly every Jesuit publication or journal regarding the travels to and from Asia would mention the great diversity of natural and other dangers, almost none made reference to the fact that nearly one in four whose purpose it was to work as a Jesuit missionary in China, was redirected either by his own will or forcibly. There are many reasons why Jesuits were redirected. Interestingly, Dehergne’s data allows me to calculate the rates of Jesuits who reached China and survived, those who died on their way, and those who were redirected according to groups of national affinity.
Table 3.2 verifies that no other nation had a higher redirection rate than France. While it is only three percent higher than the Portuguese rate overall, there is a compelling reason for this. None of the French Jesuits sent during the 1650s were redirected, therefore this number results from French Jesuits who were redirected during the period that the French state became involved and created a state supported maritime network (one that could rival the Portuguese maritime carreira) between 1685 and 1701. That the overall rate was so high as a result of redirections that took place during such a short timeframe is significant, and illustrates the perceived threat of the French Jesuits missions. As stated above, not
all redirections were forced ones, and this accounts for the high rate of Portuguese Jesuits’ redirections. Portuguese Jesuits were quite often stopped by their supervisors in India or Macao and asked to continue working as a missionary instead of going on to mainland China. Quite often these were not cases of forced redirection. The situation was different for French, central European, or Spanish Jesuits. As this chapter will demonstrate, Verjus’ letters continuously lamented that he did not trust French Jesuits to arrive in China when they were sent aboard Portuguese ships. Before discussing in detail how Verjus wanted to improve the maritime passage, this chapter first examines the overland alternative. Especially non-Portuguese Jesuits would try this alternative for fear of not reaching their destination of choice if they embarked from Lisbon.

3.3 The European Jesuit Networks: The Overland Passage

The first and most obvious alternative to the long and dangerous sea-passage from Europe to Asia was the overland crossing through the expanding Muscovite empire. The sable fur trade drove Russia’s eastward expansion. As the numbers of these animals began to dwindle in northeast Russia, Russian pioneers pushed through all the way to Siberia, and by 1655 they were ready to invade the Amur basin and come face to face with the Qing Empire. While this expansion entailed the gradual subjection and colonization of many Eurasian nomadic peoples, it held great promise for the Jesuit missions. After the crumbling of the Mongol empire in the thirteenth century, the Muscovite empire had reconnected Europe and China, and with it re-established an uninterrupted and relatively safe pathway.

The actual consolidation of the passage was all but finished. Even with governmental support and meddling, the colonization encountered quite a few

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250 Even though relatively few Spanish Jesuits applied for the China Jesuit missions, they were usually redirected via the Americas: Duteil asserts that twenty out of the twenty-eight missionaries who reached China via the “new world” were Spanish. Duteil, Le mandat du ciel, 63.

bumps in the road to the East. However, because of the enormous losses in men, time, and energy of the sea journey, the Jesuits had been interested in finding an overland route ever since the beginning of the seventeenth century. All the other possible overland routes, such as that via the Red Sea crossing, the Euphrates route, and the great Persian caravan road were, however, obstructed by powers that favored or were involved to varying degrees with Islam. This allowed the occasional passing of a Jesuit in disguise – for example Trigault in 1614 – but presented no reasonable alternative to the Portuguese carracks. The Russian empire had put up mileposts and measured distances as far as Yakutsk by 1710 and their laws dictated the official width of roads (twenty-one feet in 1712). The tariff of a letter from Moscow to Nervchinsk was forty kopeks, a rate that compared favorably with those of England and France even a century later. The Russian overland passage was everything the Jesuits had been looking for: safe, fast, cheap, and provided by a Christian empire. It was a perfect fit. Unfortunately, it proved impossible for the Jesuits in China to establish a connection between their network and the Muscovite empire: the Jesuits did not trust the Russians and vice versa.

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252 Even earlier the Jesuits had mused about the possibilities. Francis Xavier wrote in 1552 to Loyola, while he was trying to penetrate China from its East coast, that he was interested in knowing the length of the overland trip and the time it takes. Donald Lach, *The Preface to Leibniz “Novissima Sinica”* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1957), 6.

253 Niels Steensgaard regards Cape route transport costs up to 1620 to be, if anything, higher than the costs of the overland caravans that they replaced. After 1620 both Steensgaard and De Vries argue that the transportation costs involved in oceanic voyages did not go down significantly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This would only add to the desirability of overland trade and communication networks. Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 40. See also Jan de Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia: A Quantitative Analysis of the Cape-route Trade, 1497-1795,” in *Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800*, ed. Dennis Flynn, Arturo Giráldez and Richard von Glahn (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 90.


256 For a list of attempts, see Jean Duteil, *Le mandat du Ciel*, 65-69. According to Duteil, twenty-six attempts were made. Duteil does not say how many were successful. In a later research project I hope to study this topic further and link it to
The Jesuits had seen and tried the possibilities of an overland passage as early as the start of the seventeenth century. They failed to explore it thoroughly since the geographical knowledge of regions such as central Asia had regressed rather than progressed.\textsuperscript{257} In 1602 Father Bento de Goes was sent across the Pamirs, and only then were the Jesuits finally able to identify with certainty that Marco Polo’s Cathay was in fact China.\textsuperscript{258} In 1629, Adam Schall wrote a detailed report on the plausibility of the overland passage.\textsuperscript{259} A possible reason for reminding the Jesuit general of the necessity of an alternative route may have been his experiences in Macao in 1622 that fully exposed the fragility of the Portuguese naval empire in Asia.\textsuperscript{260} On June 21 of that year, thirteen Dutch ships carrying one thousand three hundred men attacked the “lightly guarded port” of Macao.\textsuperscript{261} The Hollanders “landed eight hundred troops,” and the invaders “advanced towards the town.”\textsuperscript{262} The Jesuits mounted several cannon upon a hill behind their college, and fired upon the approaching Hollanders. Giacomo Rho “scored a fortunate bull’s-eye,” that exploded “a powder barrel in the midst of the invaders,” and turned the odds to save the Portuguese port from falling into Dutch hands. Boxer marked this “the most decisive [defeat] ever sustained by the Hollanders at the hands of the Portuguese in its maritime counterpart with a combination of information from bibliographic data and travel accounts.

\textsuperscript{257} This was from the time of Marco Polo until the end of the sixteenth century. Sebes, \textit{The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)}, 90.

\textsuperscript{258} Sebes, \textit{The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)}. See also Louis J. Gallagher, \textit{China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matteo Ricci, 1583-1610} (New York: Random House, 1953), 499-521. In that same year, father Diego de Pantoja would already discuss this geographical verification in his letter (written the 9\textsuperscript{th} of March 1602) to Luys de Guzman, provincial of the Toledo province. See Diego de Pantoja, \textit{Relacion de la Entrada de Algunos Padres de la Compañía de Jesus en la China} (Valencia: 1606), 82-83.

\textsuperscript{259} ARSI, JapSin, 143 ff. 2r-7r and 9r-19v. On folio 13, Schall provides the General with a detailed account of travel time: from China to Bacana, 109 days; from Bacana to Alipo, 146 days, and so on. See also Sebes, \textit{The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)}, 90.

\textsuperscript{260} I concede that this possibility may be perceived as farfetched. However, in the context of Jesuits searching for manifold ways in linking Europe to China, it is perhaps slightly less implausible.

\textsuperscript{261} Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 166.

\textsuperscript{262} Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 166.
Perhaps Schall realized that this ‘decisive’ defeat really hinged on a lucky score. Schall may have understood that the Dutch, and later on the English, attacks on the Portuguese empire were not about to decrease, rather the opposite. In 1654 the Jesuit visitor-procurator Martino Martini (1632-1661) repeated the need for opening up the overland route. Martini wrote to the general that fully exploiting this route made sense now that the Portuguese route was blocked (again). Martini was on his way to Rome, and he no doubt personally argued in favor of this idea.

The Jesuits realized that this alternative route would not just be beneficial for their communications with their superiors in Rome. It could make the transfer of money so much more reliable. The Jesuits’ benefactors in Europe were also aware of this. In September 1664, Leopold I wrote a letter to the Jesuit general suggesting that the yearly allowance of 1,000 florins with which Ferdinand III had endowed the Jesuit mission in China should no longer be sent to Lisbon, but should be used for the discovery of an overland route and Jesuits on it would be under imperial protection. This was the first attempt to re-channel Jesuit financial sources from Europe to China. More and more people realized that the Portuguese naval, global network had become ineffective, which meant that other patrons and Jesuits from non-Portuguese national affinities were looking for alternatives. In 1664 it was too early: Rome received a letter from the king of Portugal protesting against Leopold’s plans, and the Jesuits sent an evasive answer to Leopold I stating that “they would not exchange a safe route by sea for an unsafe one by land.”

However, as the pressure on the Portuguese maritime ‘world-system’ grew, whereby many of its Asian ports were seized by or suffered long-term sea-blockades

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264 See ARSI, FG 724, 2nd folder.
265 Martini also repeated the need for a Chinese clergy. See chapter two.
267 It seems likely that earlier attempts were made. Perhaps inspecting the possibilities of the overland route was one of Bento de Goes objectives.
from the Dutch and English, the need to find more reliable passages for communication, goods, and people to China became an imperative for the Society of Jesus. Alden describes in detail the wreckage the two heretical nations, Holland and England, caused the Portuguese empire. While the Dutch only made their first voyage to the East in 1595, their naval position quickly posed a serious threat to the Portuguese and to the Jesuits. Already in 1606, two of the six Jesuits making the passage to China on Portuguese ships close to Malacca were caught and perished in the naval battles between the two powers. When Malacca finally fell to the Dutch in 1640, the Jesuits lost their college, their precious library, and important revenues that until then had supported missionary activities in East Asia.

After taking the city, the Dutch began a policy of discouraging Chinese trade since they wanted Batavia to rise in prominence and assume the position of principal transshipment port in southeast Asia. As a Dutch colony, the Jesuits would almost never be able to make Batavia a trustworthy node in their Asian network. A notable exception to this was the relationship of trust that developed between visitor-procurator Philippe Couplet, established partly thanks to the Dutch Jesuit Ignatius Hartoghvelt (1629-1658), and the Dutch authorities at Bantam and Batavia. Meanwhile Jesuit revenues within China declined due to the change of  

269 Alden, The Making of an Enterprise, 161. The gradual decline of the Portuguese Empire is described in chapters seven, eight and nine, 159-228.  
272 Paul Demaerel studies Couplet’s Dutch connection in detail in “Couplet and the Dutch,” in Philippe Couplet, S.J. (1623-1693): The Man Who Brought China to Europe, ed. Jerome Heyndrickx, Monumenta Serica Series XXII (Nettetel: Steyler Verlag, 1990): 87-120. It is interesting to note that Couplet wrote to the Dutch governor-general in 1682 with the request to come to Batavia to take “a breath of patriotic air.” Demaerel, “Couplet and the Dutch,” 115. Couplet worked as an informer for the Dutch, spoke their language, and tried to extend his relationship of trust to other Jesuits such as visitor-procurator Prosper Intorcetta. Intorcetta did not use the Dutch extensively. See also Harold Cook, Matters of Exchange, 363. “Couplet and Cleyer continued to write one another, with Couplet sending him information and Cleyer returning newspapers, medicines, money, and requests for Chinese medical works, particularly being interested in manuscripts on Chinese “pulse-method.” This
regime from Ming to Qing (1644) and the accompanying disruption. With their system linking India, southeast Asia, and East Asia destroyed for the foreseeable future, the Jesuits needed to find an alternative route as soon as possible.

As the seventeenth century progressed, the signs of impending collapse of the Portuguese network became hard to ignore, and yet the Portuguese themselves continued to fight every breach to its Padroado rights and forced Jesuits from all other nationalities to accept the link with the Portuguese state. The French were the first to replace this partnership. They established their own Jesuit missions in China with an exclusive connection to the French government. They made it exclusive in the sense that no Portuguese Jesuits could use their network.

3.4 The French Start Investigating the Alternative Networks

Before the birth of the French Jesuit missions of China in 1700, France took the initiative to investigate the potential. In 1678 Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-

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273 An interesting work on this is Ernst van Veen’s *Decay or Defeat? An Inquiry into the Portuguese Decline in Asia, 1580-1645* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2000).

274 Would it be too farfetched to think that the French filled some sort of vacuum left by the Zheng family since they arrived in 1685 and the Zheng empire was destroyed at around the same time? For this I would need to improve my understanding of the trade that the Zheng empire controlled, and consider where those trade flows moved after the Zhengs were forced out of the game.

275 They operated in a legal grey zone. Pope Urban VIII issued a bull in 1633 that stated that all orders and congregations had the right to establish missions in China and Japan, and that the missionaries could travel to these regions by whatever way they wanted. See Duteil, *Le Mandat du Ciel*, 16. This bull was contested by Portugal. Pope Urbain issued several more bulls that caused tensions between the papacy and the Portuguese king. It is curious that Dauril Alden’s *The Making of an Enterprise* does not mention this bull or whether it had long-lasting consequences for the Portuguese *padroado*. Perhaps this indicates that, even though it was proclaimed in
1688) had given visitor-procurator Couplet a letter from China with a request for more missionaries skilled in mathematics and sciences to reinforce the missions.²⁷⁶ The Jesuit confessor to the French king, François d’Aix de la Chaise (1624-1709), brought this to the king’s attention, thereby increasing his desire to extend influence in the East and more specifically China.²⁷⁷ However, it was not just Verbiest’s letter that brought the French to China. Louis Pfister states that besides the propagation of the faith and the advancement of the sciences, a third motivation to start up a French Jesuit mission in China was the extension of “the influence of the mother-country.”²⁷⁸ Catherine Jami’s arguments for the three-pronged convergence of interests that resulted in the new mission of the French king’s mathematicians are similar to Pfister’s.²⁷⁹ The establishment of a Jesuit connection enabled the transmission of scientific knowledge to and from China, which in its turn was a means to pursue both diplomatic and commercial interests in that country. The French state was keen to cooperate with the French Jesuits, and, based upon an anonymous memoir written in 1764, the French state still believed in the usefulness of Jesuits aboard French ships.²⁸⁰ They should be transported for free as they could

¹⁶³³, missionaries that wanted to travel through the Portuguese colonies had to wait for the Portuguese empire to crumble, since Portugal did not accept Urbain VIII’s bull.
²⁷⁶ ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 117v. Verjus alluded to the contents of this letter and how it invited Jesuits from all nations to come to China.
²⁷⁹ Jami, “From Louis XIV’s Court to Kangxi’s Court,” 495.
²⁸⁰ ARSI, Galliae 118, f. 17. Anonymous memoir to his eminence, M. Le Cardinal de Bernis, 1764. An example of the Jesuits’ usefulness is their mediation between French merchants and Chinese customs officers. See below.
provide important services on multiple occasions, and they (the Jesuits) were not considered useless to the nation.\textsuperscript{281}

Before the 1680s, several French Jesuits had reached China aboard Portuguese ships.\textsuperscript{282} The presence of French missionaries began to increase after July 1687, when five French Jesuits arrived in Ningbo, and thereby ignored the Portuguese Padroado.\textsuperscript{283} Each of them was equipped with good mathematical training, and was a member of the newly founded Académie royale des sciences.\textsuperscript{284} Of these five, François Gerbillon (1654-1707) and Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730) worked closely with Antoine Thomas (1644-1709, Flemish) and Tomé Pereira (1645-1708, Portuguese) as Kangxi's teachers.\textsuperscript{285} The other three French Jesuits were sent out to the provinces by their Portuguese superiors.\textsuperscript{286} Another twelve French Jesuits arrived in 1697 and ten more in 1703. The increasing number and close interaction between French and Portuguese Jesuits at the Chinese court were no longer mitigated by intermediary, and relatively neutral, fathers such as Verbiest. This Flemish Jesuit's authority would have had a dampening effect on the strife between the two national factions. After his death in 1688, the competing French

\textsuperscript{281} ARSI, Galliae 118, f. 17.

\textsuperscript{282} Father A. de Rhodes was the first to arrive in China in 1623, afterwards Le Fèvre in 1630, and more were to come after 1655, 1686 and 1697. Joseph Dehergne, Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine (Rome: Institutum Historicum, 1973), 316.

\textsuperscript{283} They left from Brest. See Claudia von Collani, P. Joachim Bouvet S.J.: Sein Leben und sein Werk (Nettetel: Steyler Verlag, Monumenta Serica Monograph Series, 1985), 6. Technically they did not have to after 1673, when “Clement X buttressed the papal argument by declaring that padroado rights do not exist estra dominium temporale regni Portugalliae, beyond where the crown enjoys actual control (“temporal dominion”) – thus excluding independent kingdoms in Asia and Africa.” See Clossey, Salvation and Globalization, 157-158. As seen in footnote 275 above and in Clossey’s study, the papacy had been trying “to erode the padroado” for a while.

\textsuperscript{284} Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, 314. See also Claudia von Collani, P. Joachim Bouvet S.J., 11-17. The five Jesuits were: Jean de Fontaney (1643-1710), Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730), Claude de Visdelou (1656-1737), Jean-François Gerbillon (1654-1707) and Louis Le Comte (1665-1728).

\textsuperscript{285} Collani, P. Joachim Bouvet S.J.

\textsuperscript{286} This order ignored the instructions of Louis XIV. However, only in the strictest sense would it count as redirection.
and Portuguese interests resulted in a conflict that led the Jesuit general to create an independent French Jesuit mission in China on November 30, 1700.

The formation of an independent French mission in China did not end the strife between the Portuguese and the French. Between 1660 and 1680, coinciding with the Kangxi depression, Jesuit finances were at a low and the Jesuit network suffered because of war and disruption in both maritime India (due to the Dutch) and maritime China (due to the Zheng family). Another war in south China in the 1670s added to the failing connectivity. Jesuits working in Chinese provinces were financially isolated during this period. As noted above, the Zheng empire was defeated by the Qing in the 1680s causing the geopolitical situation in maritime and south China to change. The Jesuits turned their attention to the various alternative European networks, as the Portuguese state could no longer enforce the exclusivity of their patronage, which stipulated that the state’s *Carreira da India* was the only legitimate option for the Asia-bound Jesuits. Individual Jesuits and groups of non-Portuguese Jesuits tried to establish links between different states. They would combine as many maritime (and overland) networks as needed to reliably ship people and goods across the Asian seas.

3.4.1 Negotiations between the French and Russian Networks

The French-Portuguese dissension occurred at the same time that the Muscovites and the Qing worked out a treaty that would delineate both Russian and Chinese expansion in central Asia. Although neither Russia nor China needed the services from the Jesuits in order to communicate with each other, this occasion

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287 1660-1690. See footnote 186 in chapter two.
288 See for example the situation of François de Rougemont in chapter two.
289 Ernst van Veen describes this slow decline until 1645. He argues that it was not so much a decisive defeat at the hands of the VOC that caused the Portuguese decline. Van Veen incorporates Subrahmanyam’s view that there was an intra-Asian geopolitical dynamic that undermined the Portuguese, and that the decline was also the result of an endogenous development. See Van Veen, *Decay or Defeat?*, 7.
290 Sebes, *The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk* (1689), 78. This opinion was not shared by Omer Degrijse in Madame Yves de Thomaz de Bossierre’s
presented a great opportunity for the Jesuits. If successful negotiation was obtained thanks to Jesuit intermediaries, it could mean a breakthrough in securing a safe, fast, and inexpensive overland passage between Europe and China. This was then a great opportunity to establish a relationship of trust. A French and a Portuguese Jesuit, Gerbillon and Pereira, were involved in the Nerchinsk negotiations.

Tomé Pereira was the vice-provincial and superior of the Portuguese Jesuits working at the Astronomical Bureau.²⁹¹ Pereira’s “nationalistic zeal” made him a key figure in the French-Portuguese conflict, and he remained the most outspoken opponent of the Russian overland route.²⁹² It was Verbiest who had recommended him to Kangxi, and who urged Pereira to offer his services to the Russians. Verbiest had hoped Pereira could gain their trust, and then finally procure the permit for crossing and free travel through their empire. Pereira agreed to mediate between the two powers, and he did everything to ensure a treaty was signed, but he also covered up his failure to ask the Russians for an overland passage in return for his services. Why did Pereira not commit fully? Perhaps Pereira did not think it was possible to have a relationship of trust with two competing states at the same time.

Gerbillon, Pereira’s companion during his 1689 trip to Inner Mongolia, became one of his principal opponents in the Portuguese-French Jesuit dispute. In a report to the Jesuit general, written September 24, 1696, Pereira described the many differences in opinion between himself and the French fathers, and how he found out on January 5, 1692 that Gerbillon had secretly offered his services to

preface to Jean-François Gerbillon’s (1654-1707): Un des cinq mathématiciens envoyés en Chine par Louis XIV (Paris: Les Belles Letres, 1980). Degrijse states that without the help of the Jesuits there is no doubt that the Chinese and the Russians would not have been able to conclude a treaty. Earlier he also emphasizes Gerbillon’s decisive intervention that allowed the treaty to be signed the 6th of September 1689. Pereira, who was his superior and fluent in both Chinese and Manchu, is not mentioned. Because of this partial perspective I have chosen to follow Sebes’ version of the facts.

²⁹¹ He was also the Vice-Visitor. Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, 315; Dehergne, Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine, 200; Sebés, The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689).
Kangxi for an overland trip to the Muscovites. Gerbillon’s secrecy illustrates that there was most certainly no relationship of trust between Pereira and him. It was perhaps no surprise that both a French and a Portuguese Jesuit were sent to Nerchinsk. According to Pereira, he himself chose Gerbillon as a companion. However, the Chinese emperor was well aware of the conflict between the French and Portuguese factions. A mere decade later he sent father Suarez with father Visdelou to Canton in order to check the advantages and possible disadvantages of dealing with the French. He knew that the Portuguese fathers were set on protecting their country’s padroado, whereas the French were set on securing that overland route, a line of action approved by Louis XIV himself.

All these conflicting dynamics between groups with contrasting national affinities aside, the Russians had the last word in whether or not to grant passage over the newly-built land empire. Pereira’s conflict of interest between loyalty to the Portuguese Crown and loyalty to Verbiest did not matter in the end. Despite half-made promises in Nerchinsk by the Russian negotiators Moscow continued to ‘distrust’ all Jesuits. When Moscow saw the terms of the Nerchinsk treaty, the Russians even held the Jesuits responsible for what they conceived as a treaty unfavorable to Russia’s interests. The Qing thought Verbiest was a spy for the Russians. Pereira showed no commitment to develop a relationship of trust with the Russians.

The only Jesuits who continued to investigate the overland passage were the French Jesuits (both in China and in Europe). Twenty-three out of the twenty-six overland Jesuit voyages from Europe to China took place in between 1650 and

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293 ARSI, JapSin 149, ff. 536r-v, the entire report covered ff. 530-547. See also Sebes, *The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)*, 132.
1700.297 French Jesuits were responsible for eleven out of those twenty-three expeditions.298 As Philippe Avril repeatedly argued in his *Divers voyages en divers Etats d’Europe et d’Asie*, despite having the option of sailing aboard French ships such as the famous *Amphitrite* or *l’Oyseau*, he was convinced that the overland route was safer and faster than any maritime network.299 Avril also stated that those sent overland had apostolic experience by the time they arrived in China, whereas those that traveled by sea did not.300 The only prerequisite to overland success was permission from the Muscovite empire to travel through its central Asian peripheries. At the end of the seventeenth century, Patrice Comilh (1686), Antoine de Beauvollier (1688), Claude de Bèze (1691), Jean de Ressin (1692), Louis Archambaud (1693), François-Albert de Soüastre (1694) were all turned back by either the Portuguese in Goa, the Dutch in Siam, or the Muscovites. Philippe Avril was forbidden passage three times: once by the Portuguese in India, and twice by the Muscovite empire. When the Russians did not trust him the first time, Avril traveled back to Poland, where he received passports and letters of recommendation from both the French king and the Polish king. He then finally returned to Moscow with (what he thought were) the required papers. Avril hoped to use these documents to coerce the Muscovites into granting him passage, but, as

298 Portugal and France combined were responsible for 63.63% of the total of Jesuits sent from Europe to China: 127 French Jesuits or 19.568567% and 286 Portuguese Jesuits or 44.067797%. These numbers confirm that a relatively high percentage of French Jesuits tried the overland passage (even though they made up for 19.5% of the total number of Jesuits sent to China, they were responsible for nearly 50% of the overland attempts).
299 See Philippe Avril, *Divers voyages en divers Etats d’Europe et d’Asie*, 1692, 90. “Cela etant, comme il est aisé à un chacun de s’en convaincre, il ne faut pas douter que la route par terre à la Chine ne soit soit beaucoup plus sure & plus courte que celle de Mer, où quelque diligence qu’on sasse, & quelque Bonheur qu’on puisse qvoir dans sa Navigation, on n’employe guere moins de deux ans pour s’y rendre.” Before arriving in India, Avril also stated that caravan travel was the safest mode of travel to cross from the Mediterranean to Bukhara and Samarkand. See Avril, *Divers voyages*, 60. Avril insisted that the route by land was shorter and safer, even if one had perfect winds at sea. See Avril, *Divers voyages*, 84.
Sebes and Clossey point out, the “Russians still wanted proof of good character, i.e. the Russians continued to distrust Avril and his colleague.”301 An example of an attempt several years later, this time launched from Europe, left traces in the correspondence between Leibniz and the procurator Antoine Verjus.

Verjus was a well-connected man, not just as procurator of the missions in India and China (from 1678 to 1702) and later on as procurator of the province of France (1705-1706), but also thanks to his brother Louis Verjus, Count of Crécy.302 Verjus was also a close associate of father de la Chaise, the Jesuit confessor to Louis XIV and a powerful man during that time in France. While there were procurators afield in China, Verjus never left Paris, other than to accompany his brother to Germany. He worked as a European-based procurator who served the mission in the East. One of Verjus’ many correspondents was Gottfried Leibniz. Their correspondence displayed that both men wanted to expand their personal networks.303

Though Leibniz was mostly known as a metaphysician, mathematician, and logician, his writings on China revealed a profound interest in Chinese culture and philosophy. He was in correspondence with a number of Jesuits in China and Europe. Verjus introduced Leibniz to one of his colleagues, Joachim Bouvet, with whom Leibniz would communicate most often. In 1697 Leibniz published his Preface to the Novissima Sinica. He revised it merely two years later by (amongst other changes) adding a translation of Bouvet’s book Portrait Historique de l’Empereur de la Chine, présenté au Roy, par le P.J. Bouvet, missionaire de la Chine.304

301 See Sebes, The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). I thank Clossey for making this suggestion.
303 They wrote each other less than a dozen letters. Leibniz wrote over 15,000 letters to his many correspondents.
In this preface Leibniz reported on the search for an overland passage to China. One of Leibniz’ goals was to seek harmony between competing European groups, and not just between all Europeans and the Russians, but also the Chinese.\textsuperscript{305}

3.4.2 Verjus, Leibniz, and the Overland Passage

Verjus helped Leibniz and introduced him to his contacts in China. In return, Verjus hoped Leibniz would be his mediator and help him establish a relationship of trust between the French Jesuits and the Muscovite state. Verjus knew Leibniz was greatly admired by the Russian czar, but not even a recommendation by Leibniz secured the French Jesuits an overland passage. In the first letter that Verjus sent Leibniz on March 30, 1695, Verjus complained that he had not received a single letter through Moscow from his fellow fathers in Beijing. After Gerbillon had helped the Russians in their dealings with the Qing, the ambassadors of Moscow had promised to pass on letters to Paris. As a result, the French Jesuits entrusted their letters to Russian merchants and diplomats. Verjus himself had repeatedly made a request for something more tangible such as allowing the Jesuits to travel overland to China. He wanted to consolidate the commitment between the Jesuits and Moscow. Unfortunately the Russians had opened the letters that had been sent, and they made copies of them, which completely violated the secrecy code of letters. Verjus was very upset about this and concluded that the Russians could not be trusted.\textsuperscript{306} Even though this was not a good start towards the building of a relationship of trust, Verjus did not give up hope.

When Leibniz wrote back to Verjus, he confirmed Verjus’ fear. Leibniz explained how he had met Father Filippo Grimaldi (1638-1712) in Rome, who had informed him about the letters intercepted by the Muscovites, letters that had been

\textsuperscript{305} Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, \textit{Writings on China}, 5.
\textsuperscript{306} Leibniz Collected Works, Series 1, Vol. 11, 356.
addressed to Father de la Chaise. Leibniz had part of the duplicate of one of the letters, and he suspected that the original was still in Moscow. In his preface, Leibniz wrote about Grimaldi’s struggle to find a way through Russia. Grimaldi was one of the visitor-procurators mentioned in chapter two. In 1686 both his fellow missionaries and the Chinese emperor sent Grimaldi on a mission back to Europe. He was appointed as a procurator and was instructed to find a solution for the conflict between China and Russia, and to look for a travel route across the continent. Grimaldi attained recommendations from Emperor Leopold I and King John III Sobieski to travel from Moscow to Beijing, but he failed to obtain passage from the Muscovites, and would eventually reach China through Persia. He was one of the few Jesuits who sought the overland passage that was not French or German, but Italian. Leibniz must have shared this information to illustrate how hard it would be to create a network with the Muscovite state.

In the Verjus-Leibniz correspondence, Verjus eventually realized that the overland passage was a pipe-dream, but the considerable energy he spent in trying to establish a personal connection despite previous failed attempts attests to the commitment of individual Jesuits to transcend national divisions in the hope of establishing contacts in multiple networks at the same time. Verjus tried the

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308 ARSI, JapSin 134, f. 370r. Grimaldi was not entirely on the French side when it came to finding ways around the Portuguese *padroado*. In a letter written in Goa, May 12, 1706, Grimaldi complained about D. Carlos Thomas’ interference with the “Royal Padroado of the Most Serene Majesty of Portugal.” ARSI, JapSin 169, ff. 129v-130r.
311 This route took him through Muslim territory, which meant that it was not a viable alternative for sending large groups of Jesuits in a systematic way.
312 Grimaldi was born in Piedmont. This complicates his national affinity somewhat.
313 This illustrates what David Lux and Harold Cook argue, namely that “...the question of whose reports to trust could be best resolved by judging the person. But while social rank and educational credentials counted heavily, trust was best built on personal visits – even at second or third hand, as when character references
Russian network only because he tried to circumvent the Portuguese, so he limited his options further by developing a (seemingly personal) dislike of the Russians as well. The following example demonstrates this dislike and the extent to which Verjus did not even trust information to travel securely along the Muscovite network.

Verjus and Leibniz continued to exchange news and various scientific works, and four years later, on January 30, 1699, Leibniz informed Verjus that one of the directors of the East India Company of the Netherlands, mister Nicolaas Witsen (1641-1717), had a correspondence with Moscow and wrote Leibniz about it in a letter from Amsterdam January 22, 1699: Witsen recounted that a caravan from Beijing had arrived in Moscow and brought some big news: the king of China had died and he was succeeded by his son. Apparently much blood had been spilled because somebody was opposed and had entered the province of Beijing with a big army, and declared himself king. The Manchus had crushed and eliminated him. Witsen had been in Moscow together with a Dutch delegation in 1664-1665, and ever since he clearly maintained an interest in the Dutch-Russian connection.

In his answer at the beginning of March 1699, Verjus admitted that the news gave him some unrest but he reassured himself that it came from the Muscovites, “the most infidel and wrong” nation of the world (Verjus’ characterization). The last letters that he had received were over twenty months old, but it seemed likely to him that news of that importance would have made it from the Bengal river and other places within a year, places of which they had letters from January or February 1698. Leibniz responded that he would check the news and send another letter to Holland, where nothing about the possible death of the emperor came from an intermediary who had already been judged worthy.” Lux and Cook, “Closed Circles or Open Networks?,” 188.

314 Leibniz Collected Works, Series 1, vol 16, 520.
316 Johann Adam Schall von Bell, Lettres et Mémoires d’Adam Schall, S.J., 608. At the same time the overland caravan from Beijing to Moscow had taken only eleven and a half months in 1692. English ships however could make the sea passage in merely eight months if they left at the right time and good winds prevailed.
could be confirmed.\textsuperscript{317} Leibniz then confirmed to Verjus that the Muscovites were indeed forgers of the truth. Verjus did not trust the Russians with his letters, and he distrusted news passed through the Russian communication network as well.

Various groups and people were present each with its own agenda. On the one hand several monarchs or rulers who represented a state were involved: the Russian tsar, the French king, and the Chinese emperor were leaders of competing empires. Contrary to the Portuguese state, which was disintegrating in Asia, these states used (but also distrusted) the Jesuits for information and as spokesmen on diplomatic missions. Different Jesuit factions – the French versus the Portuguese – were united in the Jesuit network, but they should be understood as a web of linked and partially overlapping networks. The overall Jesuit network operating between Europe and China transformed partially thanks to the arrival (and commitment) of new members, the French Jesuits. The French Jesuits were an excellent example of a smaller faction that operated within the bigger Jesuit network. Even though from the outside the boundary between Jesuit and non-Jesuit was still greater than the distinction between French and Portuguese Jesuits (the Russians and even the Qing distrusted all Jesuits), the French Jesuits sought their place within the existing transport networks of the Society of Jesus. Verjus sought to expand his personal network to reliably connect Europe to China and the other way around.

When analyzing the complex strategies employed by different Jesuits, the quarrelsome characteristics seemed to create many random cliques. Some Jesuit factions were more opposed than the states, and went to great lengths to thwart the other groups’ efforts to establish their personal network and find an alternative Europe-Asia connection. Within the larger Jesuit network there were peacemakers such as Verbiest, or people who had relationships of trust (for example Leibniz) that they wished to expand their personal networks. The only consistent aspect I have noticed is that although there were a few obvious divisions along nationalistic lines, time and again individual Jesuits attempted to establish relationships of trust and

\textsuperscript{317} Johann Adam Schall von Bell, \textit{Lettres et Mémoires d’Adam Schall, S.J.,} 761.
develop them further into trust networks to overcome these boundaries. So far, the rate of success seems very low. Perhaps since most of these networks were connected so closely to the relationships of trust of individual Jesuits, they failed or disintegrated easily (see below).

These ventures were crucial in signalling that different Jesuit factions and different European states were searching for networks that provided reliable communication and transport between Europe and Asia. The next section can be understood in the context of the web of networks available. Based on Verjus’ correspondence of seventy-eight letters, written between 1691 and 1706, I will now examine in detail the relationships and rivalries between two particular networks – the French and the Portuguese – to continue my examination of the fluidity and dynamics of these networks. The outcome of these interactions is important to this dissertation as it affected the way the Jesuit financial networks between Europe and China were organized.

3.5 France versus Portugal: The Shifting of Patronage Networks

The primary intention of missionaries such as Johann Adam Schall (1592-1666), Filippo Grimaldi (1638-1712), and Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688) was to improve communication networks between Europe and Asia by using every network available without excluding any. None of them – Schall was German, Grimaldi Italian, and Verbiest Flemish – had the option of traveling along their own state’s network, but rather had to rely on international contacts with the Portuguese, Dutch, and English if they wanted to sail to Asia. French Jesuits no longer needed international contacts since they had the option of using their own nationally funded network. The French state was willing to provide capital and commitment to its own citizens. I will now turn to the way Antoine Verjus attempted to nurture a relationship with the French state, and how he positioned

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318 Similarly, John Wills emphasized the importance of personal charm (especially in the case of Zheng Zhilong) at a conference on global maritime Asia, October 2011, at Emory University in Atlanta, GA, USA.
this network with the existing Portuguese network. Thanks to his many letters, I can analyse the links and dynamics between the multiple Jesuit networks. The following diagram represents the nature of the different connections and the fluidity of the various networks.

Figure 3.1 Dynamics of Jesuit Networks

In the diagram the arrows stand for connections or relationships. I distinguish three different kinds of arrows, based upon the density or firmness of the connection or relationship.

1. Unbroken line arrow: relationship within network
2. Broken line arrow: relationship via acceptance of a state’s patronage (the state is not one’s own)
3. Dotted line: relationship that is excluded from a network

A dense web of connections allows for the establishment of a working network. Verjus, as a French Jesuit, was able to nurture a relationship of trust with the French state and the Compagnie des Indes. The third type of connection

(illustrated via a dotted line arrow) illustrates Verjus’ very unstable connection with the Portuguese state, or the connection between the French state and the Portuguese Jesuits (neither were relationships of trust). The second type of connection (illustrated with a broken line arrow) was a relationship that was fairly stable but ambivalent, for example the relationship between the French state and an Italian Jesuit, or the relationship between the Portuguese state and a German Jesuit. While this relationship could sometimes be strong, it could as easily fall apart. Since the Portuguese patronage came under increasing pressure, it was usually a personal connection that could be severed by the degree of exclusivity/inclusivity of the various networks.320 The most tenuous of connections, for example between a Portuguese Jesuit and the French state, was almost always broken because the Portuguese Jesuits did not have a relationship of trust with the French state. Thus, they were excluded from the French Jesuit network.

There are two networks in the diagram: one between the Portuguese state and the Portuguese Jesuits, and one between the French state and the French Jesuits. In between these two networks is what I call ‘the wavering middle.’ The wavering middle is occupied by other European states, companies and their networks, and all other non-Portuguese, non-French Jesuits. Before 1685, these other Jesuits (Italian, German, Belgian etc) were part of the Portuguese network and accepted the Portuguese state as their patron.321 When Verjus set up the French

320 An interesting example of Jesuits with a national/regional affinity who continued to have a good connection with the Portuguese padroado were Jesuits from certain parts of central Europe. The beginning of the eighteenth century reveals a sudden decline in the 1720s, when not a single Jesuit from central Europe embarked for China. However, in the next decade the highest number ever left for China (13). I do not know why no central Europeans were sent from 1717 until 1734. Each year between 1735 and 1739 at least one (and a maximum of five, 1737) Jesuits boarded ships in Lisbon and sailed under the Portuguese padroado to China. This decade illustrates Duteil’s assessment of the central European Jesuits, of whom he states that there existed “a great loyalty to the Portuguese padroado.” Duteil, Le mandat du ciel, 46.

321 They did this in varying degrees. The Portuguese state was suspicious about their obedience at various times, such as in 1685. See oaths of fidelity to the Portuguese padroado, as chronologically classified in Francis Rouleau archives, File Cabinet A, 1665-1691, Ricci Institute at the University of San Francisco.
Jesuit network, however, he wanted to include the wavering middle as well. The networks in the diagram are then not static entities; they are dynamic, capable of expanding (or imploding) over time. In the following section, using examples from Verjus’ correspondence, I will further illustrate the dynamics between the networks in the wavering middle and the more fluid connections that existed between these networks.

In the fifteen years of Verjus’ correspondence, his ideas on how to mediate between the French and Portuguese Jesuits, and the French and Portuguese state changed. He constantly tried to reassess the strengths and weaknesses of the relationships between the two distinct networks. Each relationship between networks was tested in order to see if he could trust the network to transport money, mail, and missionaries. He needed to evaluate the following key issues (each one refers to a relationship mentioned in the graph):

1. How exclusive was the Portuguese network with regards to the French?
   = What was the relationship between the Portuguese state and the French Jesuits? Was it trustworthy?

2. How reliable was the network between the French state (and merchants) and the French Jesuits?
   = How strong was the relationship between the French state and the French Jesuits?

3. To what extent was the Portuguese network still trustworthy and useful?
   = Was the Portuguese *padroado* still intact to transport Jesuit resources and personnel to China?

He also tested and compared both networks and their benefits to the overall Jesuit network:

4. Was a union between the French Jesuits and the French state more beneficial to the overall Society than the one in place now?

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*It made sense to keep testing these boundaries as they changed over time. I believe they were also tied to the way personal networks interacted. I do not think Leibniz would ever have been able to extend his relationship of trust with the Russians to Verjus for example.*
5. Was our network inclusive to all but the Portuguese, and would it transport not only people but also goods and money?

3.5.1 The Connection between the French Jesuits and the French Company

In July 1699, Verjus wrote one of his many letters to Father Jean-Joseph Guibert (1647-1723), superior of the French Jesuit province, working in Rome. He reported that the French establishments and missions in the Indies were flourishing, and that ships full of Eastern riches were returning for France, where they would wait for the next season to sail out again. Two more large ships were bound for the port of Canton in the months of December or January, and would most likely meet up with the *Amphitrite* on their way there.\(^{323}\) Apart from the obvious commercial benefits, Verjus explained that they were merely trying to satisfy the request of the Chinese emperor, who had asked for even more French missionaries. All this suggested that the French network in Asia had risen fast and strong. In Verjus' opinion, the emperor trusted the French Jesuits. Verjus also emphasized that French Jesuits were useful to the merchants of the Compagnie in their endeavours throughout Asia.

However, the interaction between the commercial Company and the Jesuits was not as agreeable as Verjus depicted it. In January 1699, the directors of the French Company were opposed to the gifts Bouvet proposed the company should donate to Chinese officials, saying that they exceeded the 12,000 livres that had been allotted for that purpose.\(^{324}\) According to the Jesuit fathers, the costs for presents and other customs-related transactions would often go well beyond this set amount. Later on, in October of that same year, finances would cause more conflict between the Jesuits and the Company.\(^{325}\) The director in charge urged the Jesuit fathers to stop interfering in the Company's business altogether. The pressure

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\(^{323}\) ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 102recto.


\(^{325}\) Voretzsch, *François Froger*, 111, 121; f. 103verso, 114r.
of dealing with the Chinese empire and its intricate customs agencies, and the inability to engage in trade the way the French were used to with other nations, might have caused some strain in the relationships of trust with, and mutual dependence on, the Society of Jesus. Despite these issues, both the French merchants and Jesuits were committed to their network, and their cooperation would continue until the Compagnie des Indes was abolished in 1769. Increasing competition between the English and the French merchant companies would force the Jesuits to adjust their network before that date (see below).

3.5.2 The Connection between the Portuguese Jesuits and the Portuguese State

Verjus continued to promote a relationship of trust between commerce and religion. He argued that the reliability of the French-Asian network stood in stark contrast to the declining Portuguese network.\textsuperscript{326} French Jesuits, if not all Jesuits, would do well to cooperate with the French merchants and state instead of with the Portuguese merchants and state. News from another of their richly loaded ships, which had arrived in Port Louis from Surate in merely four and a half months, recounted that what was left of the Portuguese and their network was in such a deplorable state and so abandoned that they could not likely survive as a force in Asia much longer.\textsuperscript{327} Verjus wrote that anyone with the right heart would try to save and defend those Portuguese settlements, which could be easily done with a treaty beneficial for the Christian religion, but “those people (the Portuguese) would rather (let it) perish than to pass obligations to anyone else.”\textsuperscript{328} This way Verjus emphasized that the Portuguese government was losing the Jesuits’ trust (to reliably

\textsuperscript{326} Verjus described this in the first part of his July 1699 letter.
\textsuperscript{327} ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 101r. “It was inevitable that all that would fall in a few years into the hands of the infidels, Mores and heretics, if it would not be provided for somehow, because of the extreme negligence of that nation (the Portuguese).” Verjus did not specify when this would happen.
\textsuperscript{328} ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 101r.
transport people and goods) and could no longer commit to the Jesuit network.\footnote{The Portuguese network officially allowed Jesuits to gain passage aboard their ships to Asia for free. Thus, it also financially funded the Jesuit missions. See chapter four. Tilly, Trust and Rule, 20. Tilly uses Margaret Levi’s analysis to explain the changing relationships between governments and trust networks.}

As an outsider, he wanted to convince Portuguese and French Jesuits to no longer “comply.” Verjus wanted to change the structure of the existing network between Portuguese Jesuits (and Jesuits with other national affinities) and the Portuguese state, and he was able to deliver his critiques because the Portuguese state could no longer coerce non-Portuguese Jesuits to accept Portuguese patronage. When enough people were convinced of the terrible state of the Portuguese empire, or of Verjus’ perspective on this matter, then he could replace the existing network with the French alternative. The transition between the declining Portuguese network, which had more and more dropped connections, and the up-and-coming French network was at the core of Verjus’ thesis. Unlike the Dutch, the French were able to take the torch from the Portuguese, and continue “promoting the Catholic banner in the East.”\footnote{Verjus described the Dutch as “known for perfidies, dishonest parleys, and inflicting violent usurpations.” All this accompanied their Protestant nature, which was the true issue according to Verjus. More simply put, Verjus did not trust the Dutch.}

3.5.3 The Connection between the French Jesuits and the Portuguese State

As seen before in figure 3.1, the relationship between the French Jesuits and the Portuguese state was the most tenuous of connections. The Portuguese network as a whole rarely included French Jesuits.\footnote{Quite similar to the relationship between the Spanish Jesuits and the Portuguese state. However, the Spanish and Portuguese state had clearly delineated spheres within which each could extend their patronage. The border between the two was somewhat blurred in the Far East.} Verjus attempted to change this by making propositions to the Portuguese Jesuits and state in the hope of expanding their network to include the French Jesuits. When this did not work, he would argue that a separate French Jesuit network needed to be established (in line with
separate French Jesuit missions in China). Based upon what follows, I doubt that Verjus ever sincerely tried to widen accessibility to the Portuguese network so that it would include more French Jesuits.

Verjus claimed that the French fathers did not enjoy the same protection that the Portuguese Jesuits received from their state. How could French fathers then trust the Portuguese state? Verjus further stated that he would like the Portuguese king to protect French fathers, but he claimed that the king could not and would not do this. Firstly, Verjus was upset about the dropped connections in the Portuguese network in Asia, and wanted to convince others that the Portuguese state could perhaps no longer reverse this decline. Secondly, he argued that the French fathers suffered more from the dilapidating state of the Portuguese network than the Portuguese fathers. Was Verjus aware of the greater number of French Jesuits (sent for China) who were redirected by Portuguese superiors?

Another issue was “the violent and uninterrupted persecution” of French fathers working under Portuguese superiors in China. This problem had gone unnoticed for a while since, according to Verjus, Jesuit superiors in Rome were only informed by the letters of the fathers who did the persecuting. Verjus was eager to send a different report to Rome, based upon a letter from father Fontaney. Verjus received the letter via Holland, which meant that the Portuguese could not censor or

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332 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 2r+v.
333 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 2r+v. The larger context of the decline of the Portuguese network in Asia is discussed in chapter five.
334 Verjus recounted how the French fathers on their way to China were hassled (?) by the Dutch. However the French fathers were traveling on an English ship, which would have operated outside of the Portuguese network. It was not surprising for European competitors to attack each other, unless there was a temporary truce, established far away in Europe, which would sometimes be honored, other times it would be ignored. This is why Verjus’ argument was not as solid as he pretended it was.
335 Verjus does not explain his logic, but it shows how he thought there was no trust between the French fathers and the Portuguese state, whereas this trust did exist between the Portuguese fathers and the Portuguese state. He does not substantiate his claim.
336 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 11r.
337 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 18r. This was extra harsh since the French had gone to serve in the Portuguese missions out of “honest generosity.”
intercept the letter. Routinely Verjus would write his letters in code, because he feared Portuguese Jesuits (or others) would open his letters. This is the first of many reports in which Verjus emphasized the need to release his fellow countrymen from the vexations of the Portuguese and how the infuriating and indiscreet behavior of the Portuguese was especially painful for the French (who were helping them and providing a service to the Portuguese missions). The relationship between French fathers and the Portuguese state needed to change.

3.5.4 Requirements to enlarge the Portuguese Network

In order to establish a relationship of trust with the Portuguese fathers, Verjus put forward the following conditions: firstly, the French fathers would maintain the property the emperor had given them and the right to build a church on this land. This was a subject of great conflict, since the Portuguese fathers held the opinion that this gift from the emperor had been meant to benefit all Jesuit missions, not just the French. It was given after Fontaney and Visdelou, two French Jesuits, had helped “to cure the emperor’s long-lasting fever” in 1693. As a result, the French fathers received a piece of land, within the area of the imperial palace, a deal that was contested by the Portuguese fathers. Secondly, Verjus asked for a division of the residences and missions of the provinces between French and Portuguese fathers, and added that this division would improve the fortification of

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338 Clearly not all French fathers distrusted the Dutch.
339 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 152 is the first partially encoded letter. See also f. 157, 158, 159r+v, 167.
340 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 21r.
341 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 47v. In 1698 he pointed out that, before the end of the century, there would be 50 or 60 French, Flemish, and German Jesuits, transported to China by French vessels. All the more reason to enlarge the exclusivity of the Portuguese trust network sooner rather than later.
342 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, 314.
343 Joachim Bouvet, Journal des Voyages, 20. The same or a very similar condition appeared in an earlier list of items, written down in a letter of December 1697, that the French fathers of Beijing would get an independent house from the Portuguese where they could house a number of subjects that they judged necessary for the good of their missions. ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 49v.
each mission. Thirdly, he wanted free passage in Goa and other ports for French missionaries. The Portuguese king had to agree that the French could travel on Portuguese ships without restrictions. This is where Verjus’ conditions for establishing a relationship of trust most clearly conflicted with the Portuguese padroado. Verjus’s conditions were a mix of trust concerns of a procurator combined with concerns regarding the issue of ownership of French real estate in Beijing.

Verjus sent a copy of these demands to the Portuguese fathers. Sebastian de Magelhaes (1634-1709), confessor of the king of Portugal, responded swiftly. Rather than reacting to the three conditions, Magelhaes recalled the intolerable behavior of unnamed French bishops and apostolic vicars fifteen or twenty years earlier. This behavior had not initiated a stream of complaints from the Portuguese in the French court. The Portuguese fathers had rather decided to maltreat all French missionaries based upon that experience. Magelhaes tried to make Verjus understand that the conflict was between the French and the Portuguese fathers. For the past two decades these two groups did not have a relationship of trust. Perhaps Magelhaes thought that he would convince Verjus that the relationship between French and Portuguese Jesuits could be improved if both sides showed commitment and were willing to admit that they were both guilty of distrust and enmity in the past. However, Magelhaes and Verjus negotiated the possibility of improving the relationship no further, nor did Magelhaes respond to Verjus’ three conditions.

The Portuguese would be forced to accept the second proposition in November 1700 when the Jesuit general Tyrso Gonzalez de Santalla (1624-1705)

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344 Both the French and Portuguese kings should ratify the agreement between the French and Portuguese fathers.
345 See chapter six for more on the issue of ownership of French real estate in Beijing.
346 Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, vol 5, 308-309. Magelhaes was rector of the Lisbon college, superior of the residence and provincial and confessor of Pedro II.
347 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 52v.
separated the French and Portuguese missions in China.\textsuperscript{348} Despite being contested, the first proposition was outside of Portuguese control; the French fathers had been living on the property since 1693 and constructed the \textit{Beitang} church with the mutual support of the Chinese emperor and French king in 1703.\textsuperscript{349} A report dated May 4, 1694 addressed the situation on the French property. Apparently the author (who was most likely not French) was concerned that if the “gentiles” saw that the French fathers refused to cohabit in “their” house with men from other nations, not just excluding the Portuguese but also Italians, Belgians, and Germans, this might severely harm the Jesuit missions in China. This sort of division would cause many scandals. “What if the Germans proposed to have a separate house for themselves, and the Italians another one?”\textsuperscript{350} The author vehemently protested the fact that the French expected to live in a house without cohabitating with missionaries of different national affinity. This indicated that while the ownership of the new property in Beijing was contested, the French effectively built a house there and lived in it, and did so all by themselves. The third condition was never resolved. What happened instead was that Verjus used the tensions (see below) within the Society of Jesus in combination with an attack on the Portuguese state’s ability to maintain their Asian network to argue for a replacement of the existing Portuguese Jesuit network with a secure French one.\textsuperscript{351} The next step would be to re-channel

\textsuperscript{348} According to Standaert Tyrso Gonzalez did so to put an end to “a conflict of national interests as well as competition in scientific influence.” “Though the lines of authority were delineated, the conflict was never fully settled and various attempts to reunite the French mission with the Portuguese Vice-province failed.” Standaert, \textit{Handbook of Christianity in China}, 315. Sommervogel, \textit{Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus}, vol 3, 1591-1602.\textsuperscript{349} Standaert, \textit{Handbook of Christianity in China}, 315. Sommervogel, \textit{Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus}, vol 3, 1591-1602.\textsuperscript{350} ARSI, JapSin 105, f. 264r. I did not find out who wrote this report.\textsuperscript{351} In a letter of July 14, 1698, he even wrote that the efforts of the French missionaries were routinely ignored, whereas the Portuguese missions were talked about frequently. ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 62v. Verjus insisted that the persecution, which was conducted in a violent, unjust and prejudiced way, continued despite the fact that there would be over thirty French fathers in China by the next year. All throughout 1698, 1699 and 1700 Verjus repeated the need for independence, the persecution of the Portuguese fathers and the promises to treat the French with
money and support from other European nations since the French network could be trusted more so than the Portuguese network when it came to sending money from Europe to China.

3.6 Money Flows Rechanneled

The strife between France and Portugal and the reorganizing of Jesuit networks occurred at the same time another important conflict regarding the Jesuits’ China missions gained momentum: the Rites Controversy. The debate on this subject was forbidden until 1939 when the Papacy annulled the condemnation. Not until the 1990s was a conference held that brought together scholars examining the Rites Controversy. The role of national divisions and how they affected this conflict – and with it the problematic nature of Jesuit multi-national identity – deserve more study. As the previous section indicated, the quarrelsome interaction of different networks within the larger Jesuit network betrays tensions between Jesuits with different national affinities as well. It affected even more aspects of the China Jesuit missions. Jami has concentrated on the scientific conflict between the French and Portuguese Jesuits, explaining how, as soon as the French missionaries arrived in Beijing, Portuguese Jesuits attempted to confiscate their scientific instruments, and forbade their use for some time. Similarly, there was a financial side to the quarreling, and Verjus, procurator of the French missions in China and India and fierce proponent of an independent French network, played a crucial role in the re-channeling of funds from Lisbon to Paris.

more equality and humanity (August 2, August 25, September 29, November 24, May 11, 1699, July 12, 1699, December 14, 1699, January 11, 1700, January 18, 1700, March 1, 1700, July 21, 1700). After November 1700, the missions were separated, and Verjus’ letters changed topic.

352 Both Nicolas Standaert and Paul Rule are writing an extensive study on this subject at the moment.

353 Jami, “From Louis XIV’s Court to Kangxi’s Court,” 496.
3.6.1 German Money Re-channeled

One of Verjus’ many connections was Ferdinand von Fürstenberg (1626-1683), prince-bishop of Münster.\(^{354}\) Until 1688, when the Portuguese *padroado* was the single state patronage supporting the Jesuits in China, the Portuguese crown promised a great deal, but the money did not always arrive. If it did, it arrived late or only partially.\(^{355}\) The bishop of Münster was one of the most significant private European benefactors. It is not clear whether Verjus met him in person\(^{356}\) but in 1680, Verjus did publish and dedicate a work of father Michel Nau to the Prince of Fürstenberg.\(^{357}\) In 1682 the latter established a priviledged foundation for missions in East Asia and northern Europe. Fürstenberg’s motivations for doing this included honoring God, promoting “the well-being of his soul and the souls of his family,” rescuing non-believers at home while at the same time spreading the true gospel through missions far away.\(^{358}\) The specifications for his entire endowment consisted of thirty-six missionaries in fifteen missions (generally two missionaries per mission), divided into four categories: missionaries in his own dioceses (Paderborn and Münster), neighboring areas within a 200 kilometer radius, northern German areas, and missionaries in China and Japan.\(^{359}\) This way, Fürstenberg effectively “linked the finances of the domestic and global Jesuit missions,” and financially supported “the ever-expanding range of Jesuit global missions.”\(^{360}\)

His generosity not only encouraged other German bishops to follow suit, but also spurred on the Portuguese King John V (king from 1706-1750) to increase his

\(^{354}\) Since 1661 he was Prince-Bishop of Paderborn, and after 1678 he also held that title for Münster.

\(^{355}\) Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, chapter 13. The crown was also a far more demanding patron than private benefactors.

\(^{356}\) Perhaps when Verjus accompanied his brother on his travels to Germany.

\(^{357}\) Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, vol. 8, 600.


\(^{359}\) Clossey, *Salvation and Globalization*, 182.

\(^{360}\) Clossey, *Salvation and Globalization*, 181. I paraphrase Clossey’s exact quote: “Linking foreign and domestic missions in this way, Fürstenberg also cited the speed and range of the Jesuits’ global expansion.”
support to “his ‘own subjects’ in China, apparently as a point of honor.”\textsuperscript{361} Besides his honor, the king perhaps realized that one of the main conditions of Fürstenberg’s foundation, throughout all the changes that were inflicted upon it, was that the foundation was for the benefit of all nations, except the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{362} Despite his intention, his foundation worked to put pressure on the exclusive relationship between the Portuguese state and the Portuguese Jesuit network. A significant non-Portuguese patron, apart from the Portuguese king, could threaten the whole structure of the network and further weaken the patronage relationship between the wavering middle, meaning non-Portuguese, non-French Jesuits and the Portuguese state.

As the procurator of the French China and India missions, Verjus would be one of the crucial mediators, in his own words, “the one and only responsible for taking these considerable funds” even further away from the Portuguese. He did this by convincing the successors of Ferdinand von Fürstenberg to send money meant for Asia no longer through the Portuguese network, but rather via the safer, faster, and more trustworthy French network.

\textbf{3.6.2 Trust and Secrecy in Networks}

Charles Tilly’s uses the word ‘trust’ not just “to call up an individual attitude toward a person or an institution,” but also as a “relation of trust.”\textsuperscript{363} “Political analysts [...] think of trust as infrastructure, a phenomenon that facilitates or inhibits certain sorts of politics...” A trust relationship only exists between people who are willing to take risks. The risk Verjus took was being the network facilitator responsible for re-routing not just French Jesuits onto French ships – and thus ignoring Portugal’s \textit{padroado} – but also redirecting German funds for the Society as a whole. Verjus was very careful to establish trust relationships and urged his

\textsuperscript{361} Clossey, \textit{Salvation and Globalization}, 158.
\textsuperscript{362} ARSI, Galliae 112, f.121v.
\textsuperscript{363} Tilly, \textit{Trust and Rule}, 11. “Trust consists of placing valued outcomes at risk to others’ malfeasance, mistakes, or failures.”
correspondents multiple times to keep any re-routing of German money secret.\textsuperscript{364} This secrecy was necessary to ensure the success of Verjus’ network. Verjus cared deeply about sending missionaries and money from Europe to China, not just because he was a Jesuit, part of the global Society of Jesus, but also because it was his job as a procurator to transport missionaries and money between these two places. His solution to the problems with the connectivity of the Eurasian Jesuit network was the establishment of a more exclusive French network. By doing this Verjus believed that he ultimately helped the larger Jesuit network.\textsuperscript{365}

Verjus used trust and secrecy to ensure his solution to transporting money and missionaries could get underway. The less people knew about it, the better. In August 1698 Verjus for the first time reported that the prince nephew of the famous Ferdinand von Fürstenberg had agreed to no longer send the money of their foundation through Portugal.\textsuperscript{366} Both missionaries and monies could be more securely and promptly sent through France, and each year the appointed amount of money would be forwarded to Verjus. Verjus requested that Guibert would not mention this new arrangement to anyone, because, according to him, this was what Münster had ordered him to do.\textsuperscript{367} Eventually the Portuguese would start to complain that they had no idea what happened to the money they usually obtained from Germany.\textsuperscript{368} Verjus also pointed out that the Portuguese purportedly used it for all missionaries but still refused to allow German missionaries on their ships, for whom the money was originally meant. If they did allow German fathers, they were subjected to “a thousand dislikes,” and, after having delayed them for a considerable amount of time in Portugal, the Portuguese would send them to different missions (as the one they had applied for in the first place).\textsuperscript{369} This was a most explicit reference to the Portuguese particularly redirecting any non-Portuguese Jesuits.

\textsuperscript{364} ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 71, f. 106.
\textsuperscript{365} Especially towards the end Verjus emphasizes that his solution will benefit the entire Society.
\textsuperscript{366} ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 71.
\textsuperscript{367} ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 71r.
\textsuperscript{368} ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 71r.
\textsuperscript{369} ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 71v.
Again Verjus urged Guibert not to say anything to anyone about the change; the Portuguese would find out themselves as time passed anyway.

From fall 1698 till spring 1699 Verjus tried to finalize the arrangement. In September 1698 Verjus attempted to reach his patron, but failed since his patron was in Holland. At the same time, Verjus continued negotiations with the Portuguese Jesuits and the Portuguese king. September 29 Verjus received a letter from the confessor of the Portuguese king again, a very nice letter that responded to Verjus’ earlier letters and promised to stop any nuisance from their side in order to guard the great union and charity that could exist between the Portuguese and French. Magelhaes also recognized the obligations that the Portuguese missions had towards the French fathers. More promises were made at the end of November. This indicated that the Portuguese did not yet suspect that anything was different concerning the Fürstenberg foundation. Verjus also carried on investigating the conditions aboard French, Dutch, and English ships, and he discussed possible collaborations that would further facilitate communication and transport networks for the French Jesuit missions. In July 1699 Verjus reported that for the second year the money of the foundation had been paid. The prince planned to raise the number of missionaries from eight to twelve, and, to do so legally, he would bestow a new foundation upon the Jesuit fathers in China. The revenues of this foundation would pass through France and Verjus’ hands.

The new endowment included support for twelve missionaries: four German or Flemish Jesuits, four Spanish or Italian fathers and four French. The revenues from the endowment would be equally divided amongst them, consisting of 125 German thalers, which would be converted into French monies. The original endowment, dating March 25, 1682, stated that, for eight missionaries, the return on

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370 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 76. Verjus was confident that the baron would get the contract when he got back to Münster (on his way back from Paderborn).
371 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 80r.
372 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 128. See also Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele II, Rome (BNC), Fondo Gesuitico (FG) 1386, f. 47r.
373 BNC, FG 1386, f. 48v. The currency in the text is daleri, most likely the Italian translation of the German currency thaler. I would like to thank Richard Unger for pointing this out.
the total sum of money per year (20,000 imperial thalers) was 1,000 thalers, which
divided by eight came to an annual pension of 125 thalers per missionary.\textsuperscript{374} In the
documents preserved in the Jesuit and the Propaganda Fide archives, the total sum
of the capital available for the endowment seemed to be 25,000 Imperial thalers: an
extra 5,000 was needed for converting currencies.\textsuperscript{375} In each archival volume, the
1682 document was followed by the revised 1699 document. Both of them stressed
that French ships were safer and faster, and that, thanks to the Parisian procurator
Verjus, the endowment was extended.\textsuperscript{376}

3.6.3 Distrust and Unraveling Networks

Several months after Verjus had received the second payment of the new
endowment, he felt confident enough to spread the re-routing news to his close
connections in France and Germany.\textsuperscript{377} Criticism came from multiple parties, not
only from members of other networks, but also from Jesuits positioned in the
wavering middle (such as German or Italian Jesuits), and even within his personal
(French) network. The recent changes or dynamics between the French Jesuits and
the French state are what set it off.\textsuperscript{378}

\textsuperscript{374} ARSI Galliae 111, f. 8. This document was signed by the Prince-bishop the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of February 1682. See also Archivio della Santa Congregazione per l’Evangelizzazione
dei Populi, Rome (APF), Informazioni Pro Missione Sinensi (INF) 134, f. 558 and
ARSI FG 111, f. 501-505. For the same numbers and a very similar document.

\textsuperscript{375} Clossey, \textit{Salvation and Globalization}, 182. Unfortunately Clossey’s numbers only
mention six missionaries and an endowment of 15,000 thalers, which provided an
annual revenue of 750 thalers, which amounted to one hundred twenty-five for each
of them. Clossey refers to the document held in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek,
Munich (Codd. MSS. latinor 26472, f. 120r). I have not had the chance to compare
the versions I found with the one he found.

\textsuperscript{376} APF, INF 134, f. 562r mentioned both fourteen and twelve missionaries. The first
number could be a scribal error.

\textsuperscript{377} ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 106. This foundation, so said Verjus, “had been made
uniquely on his request and demand which he had forwarded to the Prince of
Münster and Paderborn, Ferdinand von Fürstenberg, my old friend and patron.”

\textsuperscript{378} A first criticism was that the new endowment was harming the colleges in
Germany. A German bishop also thought that a papal agreement on the contract
could make it more “authentic.” Further criticism was that the Portuguese king
In November 1699, Verjus reported that it caused him great pain to see the endowment hindered by the complaints from German courts, and that he felt even more sorrow due to the letters from Father de la Chaise and from other missionaries. Verjus thought he had a relationship of trust with these contacts, and it came as a shock that they were not automatically supportive of his network. Verjus considered them to be the strongest links (next to his connection with his German patron and the French state) within his network. He did not anticipate that they (Father de la Chaise and others) did not see the benefits of his new network. In an effort to save the widened core of his network, he explained his logic to them repeatedly. When he tried to examine where the money had been lost, the Portuguese superiors would state that they had never received the money in China. This is why Verjus had suggested to the bishop to re-direct the money through a channel that was “more certain, more efficient, and more useful to the glory of God and to the missions of China.” The Portuguese could not be trusted to transport French or German funds.

To counter criticism from the wavering middle, Verjus would reason that the endowment was aimed specifically towards German and French Jesuits, but that Italian or Spanish fathers were welcome since they had to deal with worries about extra navigational costs, worries that the Portuguese fathers did not share. It was the “pure truth and honest spirit and only intention of this foundation,” to rectify this inequality. What other choice did Verjus have, when given the chance by the bishop to distribute the pensions? According to Verjus, this matter was not about the Portuguese or about the French, but about the missionaries in China of diverse nations who would benefit from the revenues the endowment provided. If the Spanish channel or the Italian one were better and shorter than the French network to send the revenues, Verjus would use their ships and mediators.

would never accept the change in the new endowment since it did not respect the old endowment. ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 115.

379 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 117.
380 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 117v.
381 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 118r+v.
In the following months Verjus’ correspondence with both the bishop of Münster and other Jesuits intensified. With the former, he finalized the changes and fine print of the new endowment while to the latter he continued to defend the need for the changes in the first place. He promised that the money would be divided accurately, and that it would be transported in a secure manner. France would also take it upon itself to grant the missionaries free passage to China, not simply French Jesuits but including Jesuits from other nations. Verjus hoped to remove all difficulties addressed by the Portuguese and the Germans, and he was convinced that the overall happiness of the missionaries and the beneficial effect for the souls far away in China would consolidate his changes. He asked whoever he included into his new network to trust him and to trust the relationships that he had built with for example the bishop. Again and again Verjus pleaded that what he valued most was the long-term enterprise of organizing the global transport of Jesuit resources. Towards the end, it must have become clear to him the extent and possible consequences of the risks he had taken to improve this system by establishing a network that started from a personal relationship with the bishop of Münster. His patron answered to the very same critics that the changes were necessary and did not alter anything essential in the original endowment.

3.6.4 Final Verdict of Verjus’ Network and Trust

In 1708 the German opposition, through the intervention of Francisco de Fonseca (1668-1738), general procurator for the Indies, restored the funds in their original state. Even after the French Jesuit missions became independent in 1700, the struggle concerning separate or overlapping finances continued. Eight years later, the Portuguese and German critics undid Verjus’ work, and they sent the

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382 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 121v. Did Verjus have the authority to enforce this promise? Was it simply part of his rhetoric and defense?
383 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 127v.
money from the Fürstenberg foundation once again via Lisbon. An Italian synopsis in the Propaganda Fide archives repeated that the original donation of 800 scudi should be sent through Lisbon for the following reasons: the French were not legitimately incorporated in the China Jesuit Province, the new contract was illegal, the missionaries received their alms from the Lisbon province in Goa and Macao, this was donated for all missionaries (who were accommodated by the king of Portugal on his ships and in his colleges), and, finally, the contract went against the directo naturale. Not soon after Verjus had died (in 1706), the link between his personal network, the French state, and a German benefactor dissolved.

Applied to Verjus’ case, Tilly’s idea of trust was effective in describing the characteristics of the relationship that existed within long-distance networks. Verjus went to great lengths to foster a relationship of trust with the French state and his German patron. He secured their capital and manipulated the coercion imposed on his new network to give it an exclusive character. As long as he operated in secrecy and distrusted all other Jesuits, his network operated well. However, as soon as Verjus attempted to include more people into his network, it became clear how difficult it is to have others accept his personal relationships of trust.

When one applies actor-network theory to a group of people, the actors’ passive participation and the static nature of the overall network is the main weakness of such an approach. Tilly’s idea of a relationship of trust is what divides the insiders from the outsiders and it also characterizes the relationships and dynamics within a network. Verjus wanted to trust his contacts in sending

386 Clossey, Salvation and Globalization.
387 After conversion of currencies 1,000 German thalers could have amounted to this sum.
388 APF, INF 134, f. 565. I’m not sure how to interpret this.
389 Or, as Harris puts it, “Trust and reliability, in other words, were no less important in the communication of scientific information than in the communication of administrative intelligence. And as Steven Shapin has convincingly argued, trust and moral order – whether in society or in science – go hand in hand.” See Steven Harris, “Mapping Jesuit Science: The Role of Travel in the Geography of Knowledge,” in The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773, eds. John W. O’Malley, Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven J. Harris, T. Frank Kennedy, 231 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
missionaries, money, and mail over large distances. If the money did not arrive or was spent on something else, he did not trust this connection. If the letters he sent were opened and made public, he did not trust whoever was transporting or receiving his letters. In the case of the Jesuit procurators such as Verjus, Tilly’s allows for the actors involved to be active rather than passive.

Verjus’ case makes me doubt that it was possible to pass on a relationship of trust to a third party. Verjus’s difficulties in widening his personal network built upon relationships of trust to force long-lasting changes in the way the overall Jesuit network transported money, mail, and missionaries from Europe to China illustrates the fluidity of long-distance networks. Even before his death, Verjus seems to have lost control over the network he built, and I wonder whether he would have been able to stop Fürstenberg’s endowment from being sent once again via Lisbon.\footnote{In this sense Tilly’s network theory was still too static to analyze the dynamic character of Jesuit procurator networks between Europe and China.}

3.7 Multiple Networks in the Wavering Middle: The Dutch and English Network

In diagram 3.1 the struggle between Jesuit networks was represented in a binary way: the French Jesuit network against the Portuguese Jesuit network. However, the dynamics of the wavering middle were not just caught between these two poles. I will now examine the role of the two Protestant networks active in the East and Verjus’ relationship to them.

Both Dutch and English merchants had a profound effect on the communication and finances of the Society of Jesus. The Dutch were the first to seriously threaten the Portuguese network. They did this not just by building their own colonies and establishing their own ports to use as nodes in an overarching Eurasian maritime network, but also by attacking and blocking every link, from Lisbon to Nagasaki, of the Portuguese network. Due to the alignment of Portuguese and Jesuit interests, the Dutch were most often perceived as destructive to the Society. As Jesuit interests detached themselves from Portuguese ones and they
began to rely on other networks such as the French, the relationship between the Jesuits and the Dutch (and English) became more and more complex.

3.7.1 The French, the Dutch, and the English

Verjus’ relationship with the Dutch remained one of trust and distrust. Despite his own travels to the Netherlands and his tracking of ships arriving and leaving Dutch ports such as Delft, he maintained a negative view of the Dutch in the East.\(^{391}\) However, he still used their network for sending letters. In 1698 for example, he would acknowledge that the letters sent through the Dutch and English ships arrived earlier than those sent on board any other ships.\(^{392}\) As a result of their effectiveness Verjus sought further agreements and investigated the employment of Dutch and English ships.\(^{393}\) While doing this research and attempting to expand his network, he reported the following interesting story:

In September 1699, François Foucquet (1665-1741) wrote to Verjus about his very enjoyable passage to Beijing. Foucquet, together with four other French fathers and brothers,\(^{394}\) had travelled from Chandernagore to Madras aboard the Joanna, an English vessel that had set sail for Madras, and then changed to the Saragalley in Batavia.\(^{395}\) According to the letter they had relaxed several weeks in Batavia, where the English from Madras took good care of them. The English liked them so much that they insisted on reimbursing half of the one hundred piasters that the two other fathers\(^{396}\) had paid earlier, when the Dutch arrested them in Malacca on their way to Macao. The English even paid the interest of nearly ten years on the amount that had been confiscated. Verjus was probably impressed with the relationship Foucquet had been able to nurture with the English. Favors and

\(^{391}\) ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 57.
\(^{392}\) ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 62. Even faster than the upcoming French network.
\(^{393}\) ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 89.
\(^{394}\) Francois-Xavier Dentrecolles (1664-1741), Jean-François Pélisson (1657-1713), two lay brothers Pierre Fraperie (1664-1703) and Bernard de Rhodes (1646-1715),
\(^{395}\) ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 109. See also Bouvet, Journal des Voyages, 47; Witek, Controversial Ideas in China and Europe, 87.
\(^{396}\) Blanc and Comilh. I was unable to find out more about these two fathers.
money were exchanged, strong indications of trust. The Dutch were not trusted. It was possible to have a relationship of trust with the English, but perhaps Verjus understood that a network would be harder or even impossible to establish (even though he was comfortable using the English from time to time).³⁹⁷

Other French travelers in the East reported in their journals on the same ambiguity that existed among the French, Dutch, and English. Over a decade earlier François-Timoléon de Choisy (1644-1724) had written a journal on his voyage to Siam aboard the French ship *l’oiseau*. The same ship carried France’s first six China Jesuits of which five would eventually offer their services to the Chinese emperor.³⁹⁸ Choisy noticed the same wavering treatment of the Jesuits by the Dutch. In their settlement at the Cape of Good Hope, the Dutch provided the Jesuits with excellent quarters for astronomical observation.³⁹⁹ There was ample room for their largest telescopes and they were served bread, wine, and fruit. When the French arrived in the Dutch East Indies, in Bantam, Dutch treatment was exactly the opposite. The Dutch commander was not cooperative, and sent the French to Batavia for all their needs and provisions.⁴⁰⁰ The commander did not trust the French Jesuits the way he did Couplet, and the commander did not take the time to examine whether these specific Jesuits were trustworthy. Lux’s and Cook’s analysis of meetings during travel and how this affected networks based on trust applies here: “During visits, people of learning not only traded information but sized each other up and decided whether to trust one another as accurate judges of natural events.”⁴⁰¹ In this case, the meeting between the French Jesuits and the Dutch commander did not result in a relationship of trust. As a result, the French were not looking forward to spending time in Batavia, but, just as at the Cape, they were permitted to land their sick, take

³⁹⁷ It is a pity he is not more specific about all the occasions that he did.
³⁹⁸ See earlier. The Jesuits were Fontaney, Bouvet, Le Comte, Gerbillon, Visdelou and Tachard (the last one remained in Siam).
⁴⁰¹ Lux and Cook, “Closed Circles or Open Networks?,” 183. “Just as with the flow of coin, the flow of information needed to be examined carefully before being accepted, for it might be clipped, debased, forged, or otherwise worth less than it appeared.”
on water, wood, and all kinds of provisions without any trouble.\textsuperscript{402} Choisy describes how at least one third of the European inhabitants of Batavia were French and all were Catholics.\textsuperscript{403} Batavia may still not have been the best and safest place for Jesuits though, as can be seen from earlier accounts of Jesuit arrests in Batavia. The trust relationships between the French Jesuits and the English seemed to have been more reliable than their dealings with the Dutch.

Joachim Bouvet reported an extremely friendly encounter between the French and the English when he left Canton in October 1693. Bouvet was sent by the Chinese emperor to France to recruit more French Jesuit mathematicians who could work at the court in Beijing. In his search for a European ship in Canton, he approached an English ship and became acquainted with the officers and crew.\textsuperscript{404} To communicate, both parties spoke Portuguese, drank tea together in the Chinese fashion, and, after exchanging some more news, drank together to the health of the English king. The missionaries got along so well with the English Captain Stewart that they stayed on board until the next day. After handling some customs with the Chinese authorities, the English offered free passage to the Indies for both Joachim Bouvet and Nicolas Charmot (1655-1714).\textsuperscript{405} Bouvet urged the captain to sail up the river to Canton, so that the Jesuit could assist him in settling his affairs with the mandarins, to repay his generosity. While even more English ships arrived, Bouvet’s gifts from the Chinese emperor for Europe arrived in Canton, and on January 10, 1694, he left on the English ship with Charmot. Both dined at Captain Stewart’s table without any payment until they reached the Indies.

Collani argues that a letter by Chavagnac explains this very amicable behavior. In 1702 Chavagnac commented that all English ships would take all

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{402} Choisy, \textit{Journal of a Voyage to Siam}, 95, 119.
\item \textsuperscript{403} Choisy, \textit{Journal of a Voyage to Siam}, 119. This is a strangely high number. In the future I would like to conduct further research into the international character of European early colonial southeast Asian communities and its links to the global Jesuit organization.
\item \textsuperscript{404} Bouvet, \textit{Journal des Voyages}, f. 91.
\item \textsuperscript{405} Bouvet, \textit{Journal des Voyages}, 198.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
missionaries without question of nationality. The Jesuits were often experienced in astronomy, medicinal, and nautical sciences, spoke several languages and could serve as interpreters, had many contacts and were educated companions for conversation with the ship’s officers. They worked as priests and missionaries on the long travels, and they stimulated good morals among the ships’ crews. All these reasons explain the relationships of trust that could be nurtured between Jesuits and English captains.

This was mirrored in Verjus’ approach to the English, as he had noticed towards the end of November 1705 that a father could be certain to be back in his mission in eight months if he boarded an English ship. The dynamics between the Jesuit networks and the available maritime networks remained very fluid and personal. On the other hand, Verjus feared that an excess of Italian and French missionaries on English ships negatively affected the relationship of trust between the Chinese emperor and the French. The recent arrival of Italian Propaganda Fide missionaries on English ships further ignited animosity against Christian priests in general (in China). However, he himself recognized that the French mission could trust the English ships anyhow, more so than they could trust the Portuguese network. Several years later, he warned his correspondents against vexing the Portuguese “moods” by openly using English and Dutch channels. Best to keep it secret. Apart from Verjus’ limited relationships with English and Dutch, he received letters through Copenhagen and the Danish network as well.

3.7.2 Continuing French-English Relationships after 1706

This French-English cooperation continued after the death of Verjus in the beginning of the eighteenth century. Another French Jesuit who looked into the advantages and disadvantages of the French, Dutch, and English networks and how

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408 ARSI, Galliae, f. 171.
409 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 148v.
410 ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 150.
to best employ them for Jesuit communication and transport was Antoine Gaubil (1689-1759). Unlike Verjus, Gaubil spent most of his life in China. Beginning in 1722 he worked as a mathematician at the Chinese court. Whereas Verjus wrote his letters and reports during the 1680s, 1690s, and 1700s, Gaubil wrote 342 letters to European correspondents from 1722 until 1759 (83 in the 1720s, 115 in the 1730s, 36 in the 1740s, and 108 in the 1750s). Taken together, Verjus’ and Gaubil’s correspondence provides a fairly continuous chronological overview from the 1680s until the 1750s of French efforts to link Europe and China (chapters five and six discuss the reports and letters from the 1760s until the 1780s).

Gaubil’s evaluation of the most useful networks to the Society in 1728 was similar to Verjus’ earlier evaluations. In November 1728, Gaubil reported back to France that the Ostend company had been suspended, the passage of French ships was uncertain, and the most trustworthy connection was provided by the English network. He even urged his correspondent in France to use the English channel as a back-up in case he still decided to send anything through the French network. Gaubil strongly implied that the English network was preferable for letters, observations, and “other things” (see next paragraph). One year later, in 1729, Gaubil sought to put into service the same two channels and again emphasized that the English connection was certain and prompt; nothing specific was said about the French network. Time and again, Gaubil sent his letters through two different channels, of which he trusted the English one more.

Later on, in 1751, it became clear what Gaubil specifically meant when he wanted to send “other things” using the English ships. He wrote to his English correspondent, Mortimer, that he had requested from both Canton and Macao money to transfer to the English for a good micrometer. Apparently this instrument could be bought by them in London and then shipped back to China. Because of his scientific mission at court, Gaubil tried to find funding for the construction of a small

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413 I have not been able to find dates for Father Souciet.
observatory and the necessary instruments. The French mission in Beijing could not afford these costs, but Gaubil implored France to donate one hundred taels which was enough for this important contribution to the French Jesuit missions. The English network would not provide this funding directly, but it was crucial in getting the instruments (and also the actual money) secured and delivered. Gaubil developed a relationship of trust with the English, but, based upon the way he used it, it was a personal network rather than a network accessible to all French Jesuits.

Just like Verjus, Gaubil failed to establish a trust relationship with the Russian network. During the first twenty-eight years of his correspondence he never mentioned the Russian network as an option. In 1750 he heard of a Portuguese doctor in St. Petersburg who through his Dutch and English contacts had sent books and instruments to the Portuguese fathers in Beijing. Perhaps this account made Gaubil realize that there might be some possibilities overland after all. At the same time he complained for the first time about the connectivity of the English network, and how he had not heard anything from them since he had used them two years before to send some letters to Paris. Once again the French would look into the possibilities of the overland passage through Moscow. One year later Gaubil repeated almost the exact same findings on the Russian channel. It was untrustworthy as always for the Jesuits, and for the past several years, they had heard nothing from this country; no caravan had reached Beijing for quite a while.

It turned out that Gaubil had used the Russians earlier to send little presents back to France, but more often than not they had been lost, not because of the Chinese but because of the Russians who somehow neglected to pass them on. Gaubil knew of many occasions when this had happened. Goods and letters were lost by the Russians themselves or the caravan was pillaged on its way to Moscow.

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415 Simon, ed., *Le P. Antoine Gaubil S.J.*, p. 247. The tael consisted of 37.3 g. silver, with a range of fineness. Around 1750, one tael was worth 7.1 livres. See Vogel, "Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800," 5. See also chapter two, footnote 167.


At the same time Gaubil had another negative experience with a Russian called Nicétas. In January 1748 this man had borrowed first fifty and then another thirty taela from Gaubil. Nicétas promised to pay the money back within a few months, as soon as the next caravan came into town. This did not happen. Gaubil complained to the archimandrite and finally understood that he had been duped. He addressed letters to Moscow concerning the money but never received news from them. Gaubil could not trust the Russians nor could he trust the overland passage. While waiting in vain for the next caravan, he advised his fellow Jesuits to use Swedish, Danish, or English channels. Their ships did arrive in Canton every year and they could be trusted. Once again the Russian passage turned out to be useless and untrustworthy.

3.7.3 Final Verdict of French-German-English Networks in Asia

“The French menace to the Germanies was [...] waning in the last decade of the seventeenth century,” partly no doubt since France was focusing more and more of its energy on establishing colonies in the Far East. This larger context explained the better understanding and unity between Verjus and Leibniz and other German benefactors. Both the French and the Germans, united against the south-European empires in the East, were hoping for an overland passage to Russia. French and German Catholics were united against the Dutch Protestants who also

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419 Simon, ed., *Le P. Antoine Gaubil S.J.*, p. 635. This equaled 600 livres.
420 This was the head of a large monastery or group of monasteries in the Orthodox Church.
421 He defended himself by saying that he had lent money to Russians before and was always repaid on time. Gaubil did not give up and continued to ask different sponsors for the money, begging France to repay it or send scientific instruments for that amount instead.
423 Quite the opposite of a relationship of trust. In 1758, when France and England were at war, Gaubil would not even consider using the Russians; he simply switched to the Danes and Swedes.
sought to exploit a possible overland passage. When in 1686 a Dutch mission arrived in Beijing, they volunteered to the Chinese emperor to carry overland his letters of protest against Russian encroachment in the Amur region to the Russian tsar.\textsuperscript{425} Verbiest reacted immediately and convinced the emperor to entrust the same letter of protest to Grimaldi. The Dutch beat Grimaldi to Moscow and Grimaldi, despite German and Polish support, never managed to return through Moscow to Beijing. A decade later, on the tsar’s tour of Western Europe in 1697 and 1698, both Leibniz and the Jesuits attempted again to initiate a relationship of trust with Peter the Great and use the overland passage, but all failed.

3.8 Further Personal Networks in the Wavering Middle: An Italian Missionary’s Assessment of the Best European Network at the End of the Seventeenth Century

Despite their advances, the French Jesuits and state constantly struggled to situate their own networks within the existing European maritime powers in Asia. The networking skills of individual French Jesuits (such as Verjus, Bouvet, and Gaubil) depended on the ability to each establish relationships of trust. If they did develop into networks available to other Jesuits, then it was a very short-lived construction (see Verjus’ case). Within the chaos and fluidity of these networks, it was independent missionaries from countries that did not have their own networks who were sometimes best suited to take advantage of all the possible channels.

Take, for example, the Italian priest Giovanni Donato Mezzafalce (1661-1720). Mezzafalce was not a Jesuit but joined the Congregation of St. Philip Neri while in Rome in 1691 and arrived in China in 1700.\textsuperscript{426} Mezzafalce did not stay in China for long. The papal legate Maillard de Tournon named him pro-vicar of Huguang province in 1705, but as early as 1706 he was expelled by Kangxi, and

would eventually serve in Rome.\footnote{Chan, \textit{Chinese Books and Documents}. According to Chan he never took up that position of provicar of Huguang since the vicar apostolic of Zhejiang province died that year so Mezzafalce was appointed to succeed him instead of proceeding to Huguang.} During his first several months Mezzafalce worked in Fujian province, and in December 1700 he wrote a report on the needs of the Propaganda Fide missions in the empire of China.\footnote{Archivio Secreto Vaticano (ASV), Carpegna 63, ff. 71-89.} After discussing the specific costs of buying a house, Mezzafalce addressed the issues of communication and transportation of money, goods, and letters to Europe. Certain goods that were necessary to establish an independent, fully functioning church in China needed to be shipped from Europe. Mezzafalce mentioned the coarse canvas woven from jute or hemp that served for corporal penance (burlap) and the wine for Mass. However, it was impossible to ship wine from Rome every year.\footnote{ASV, Carpegna 63, f. 75v.} It was easiest to acquire it from the Spanish missions in the Philippines, since that was how the Spanish missionaries were supplied in China. When it came to other instruments related to Mass, Mezzafalce preferred to use the French network.\footnote{He was referring to the \textit{Missionnaires étrangères de Paris}.} The only problem was that one delivery could take many years.\footnote{Possibly even less than that: “…faccia una volta puo durare molti anni.”} Mezzafalce favored that same network to send books, images, medals, and other European curiosities missionaries needed when they visited mandarins.\footnote{ASV, Carpegna 63, f. 76.} Just after these preliminary statements on how he used several networks, Mezzafalce reported that he lost a letter. He was quite upset about this missing correspondence, so upset he wrote an entire treatise on which networks were best used for communication with Europe, in the hope that future missionaries would be able to benefit from his knowledge.

3.8.1 Personal Relationships to the Top Four Networks for an Italian in 1700

Despite Mezzafalce’s short stay in China, which amounted to at most nine years, he identified with the pains and hopes a missionary experienced each time a
European ship disembarked in a Chinese port with possible news, letters, or packages from his correspondents. It was crucial to have connections in every network. First, the best thing to have, stated Mezzafalce, was a correspondent in England. This was useful not just for letters, but also for a thousand other things. Mezzafalce advised that every year at least four copies of the same letter should be sent to this correspondent, using different English ships and at different times. These would be sent in October and January to London and pass the fortress of Madraspatnam.

The second-best network was the French one. Every year a ship would set sail for the fortress of Pondicherry, which was slightly further than Madraspatnam. When sending letters from Europe to China, Mezzafalce thought that these two midway stations were crucial in establishing successful communication. He requested that two copies be sent of each letter: one addressed to the Capuchin superior of Madraspatnam, and one directly to him in China. Similarly a letter should also be sent to Pondicherry and for this a friend in Paris was needed. Again, in order to get the letters in time in China, Mezzafalce’s correspondents in Rome should make sure that their letters arrived in France by October and January, which was in time for when the ships for the East would leave.

The third channel was the easiest to use for Mezzafalce’s correspondent in Rome, and this was the Spanish network through the Philippines. This was most likely also the easiest for Mezzafalce himself since he was living in Fujian at that time, the coastal province that had many connections with the Philippines. In his opinion this was the most certain channel for letters, though they came very late. In order to reach Mezzafalce, one could simply pass on a copy of the letter to the assistants of every order (the Augustinians, Dominicans, Jesuits, and Zoccolante). This was apparently also quite cheap, and Mezzafalce was proud to announce that each of these orders in Manila knew him so his letters would definitely arrive. The

433 ASV Carpegna 63, f. 78.
434 ASV Carpegna 63, f. 79. According to his source some left in November and others in March. Portuguese ships would depart Lisbon the second half of March until April 10. See Van Veen, Decay or Defeat, 59.
only downside was that it took over two years for a letter to make the passage from Europe to China via Mexico.\textsuperscript{435}

The fourth channel was the Dutch network. Their settlement at Batavia was situated perfectly for the inner-Asian trade between Java and Southern China, and the multitude of Asian and European ships passing through the port was a guarantee for swift communication. Mezzafalce does not specify to what extent he trusted this network, but he seems to have developed a relationship of trust with the Dutch.

The last network that Mezzafalce mentioned was a Turkish connection, which he did not trust a great deal. He was very concise about this last option, but did not fail to mention that even here he had a reliable connection, Father Pado Moanier, with whom Mezzafalce had established a stable friendship. This network's midway station seemed to have been Surat.\textsuperscript{436} Mezzafalce ended his report on these different communication channels by pointing out that he needed to be this connected because he was Italian. Italy (or Italian merchants) did have a connection to India, which could be used for letters, but this was a very uncertain one. For all communication to the place where Mezzafalce was working as a missionary, he needed to rely on different nations and their networks, and this explained his lengthy and pragmatic report on communication and transport channels.

3.9 Conclusion

As empires in East Asia such as the Qing, the Tokugawa, and the Zheng were consolidating their powers and (maritime and land) borders internally, space was

\textsuperscript{435} ASV Carpegna 63, f. 79v.
\textsuperscript{436} Mezzafalce does not specify where exactly Moanier lived, but I assume he lived in Surat. I thank Adina Riu for pointing out that another Jesuit, Claude Mercier, states that the safest way for money to reach China was by way of Persia and Mongolia, because it would arrive before the Portuguese found out about the news. Additionally the exchange rate was good. See ARSI, Galliae 97 II, ff. 336-337v. Perhaps future research will further elucidate the importance of a Turkish overland connection. Avril included detailed information on this passage in his \textit{Divers voyages en divers Etats d'Europe et d'Asie}. 
created in between for the introduction of inter-national networks. Multiple networks such as the Jesuits, the VOC, the EIC, and Asian non-state organizations made use of the fluidity of frontiers and sought to transport people, money, and letters reliably across maritime Asia. Another contested frontier was between the Muscovite and the Qing empires. In both geographical areas the Society of Jesus sought to establish a relationship of trust with the empires that semi-controlled these peripheries. The Jesuit organization was not a single organism. It operated within both a framework of consolidating empires and the space in between. As such, it could not tie itself to just one network – the Portuguese *estado da India* – to cross empires and peripheries.

The international organization of the Jesuits boasted members from multiple European nationalities. This diversity caused fragmentation within the Society, but it also allowed them to make better use of the fluidity of networks necessary for their missions in East Asia. The Jesuits as an organization had a highly centralized regime.\textsuperscript{437} The Jesuit headquarters in Rome aligned themselves with the Portuguese state, but procurators both in Europe and Asia sought to expand their personal networks based on relationships of trust to improve the global connectivity of the Jesuit network. Frustrated with the high percentage of redirected Jesuits and the limitations of the Portuguese network towards the end of the seventeenth century, French procurators (Verjus) and non-Portuguese Jesuits (Verbiest, for example) took the initiative of finding more reliable routes between Europe and China. In finding a pattern despite the random nature of these interwoven networks, this chapter argues that relationships of trust defined which ways mail, money, and missionaries were crossing continents and oceans. Close analysis of Verjus’ letters and Mezzafalce’s report demonstrated the need for trust and multiple networks. The well-connected missionary in 1700 spoke Portuguese – still the lingua franca of East Asia – had contacts in Paris, London, Manila, and Rome, and knew how to use them strategically.

\textsuperscript{437} Scholars such as Clossey have doubted the effectiveness of the Society’s centrality. See Clossey, “Distant Souls,” chapter five.
Verjus' networking endeavors occurred during the 1690s, when both France and Portugal sent high numbers of missionaries to China. Both chapters two and three have examined the attempts of procurators working in China and Europe to improve the global connection between both places. Table 3.1 illustrated that in no decade was a higher number of Jesuits redirected or did a higher number of Jesuits die. Table 2.4 confirmed a low-point in missionaries reaching China from 1675 (47%) until 1705 (61%). The percentages improve after this date, however, despite the fact that France’s initial commitment during the 1690s to send people and money did not persist throughout the eighteenth century (see table 3.3 below). The peak at the end of the seventeenth century was due to what Duteil calls “political will:” it was built up during the 1680s (12), reached its maximum during the 1690s (32), and was sustained for one more decade (22). Louis XIV and his minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert used the Jesuits as “liaison officers” who would accompany diplomatic missions to the king of Siam and the Chinese emperor. In 1701 the last large group of French Jesuits left (11). During the rest of the 1700s nine more French Jesuits departed along different networks, but only three of them would ever arrive in China. From 1700 onwards, no more than three Jesuits per year (or no more than 8 per decade) would ever set sail or start the journey to China. Portugal continued to send Jesuits despite its decaying network (table 3.4 below).

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438 Duteil, Le mandat du ciel, 42.
439 Duteil, Le mandat du ciel, 42.
440 For a breakdown of Jesuits sent to China according to groups of regional and national affinity, please see appendix C.
Table 3.3 Jesuits Sent by France or the French Jesuit Province
From a global perspective, neither the visitor-procurator strategies described in chapter two, nor the multiple personal networks described in chapter three were able to continuously send missionaries and money to China. Chapters four, five, and six will investigate whether the sudden increase of personnel and resources sent during the 1690s in combination with Qing China’s internal stability made the Jesuit missions in China financially self-sustaining during the rest of the eighteenth century. To do so, the next chapters will investigate the importance of the local treasurers and the role of Asian real estate investments to determine if Longobardo’s visionary strategy was finally implemented.
Chapter 4: Local Treasurers and Real Estate

4.1 Introduction

Chapters two and three focused on the procurators, both in Europe and in China, who operated on a global scale and who were most active during the seventeenth and the start of the eighteenth century. This chapter, chapter five, and chapter six will examine the local and regional dimensions of Jesuits finances in Asia during the remainder of the eighteenth century. The Jesuit administrator responsible for the management of people, money, and material resources within the local missions was called the treasurer. Since the procurators experienced such difficulties in overcoming the dangers of early modern world travel (avoiding the loss or redirection of mail, money, and people), they required the expertise and knowledge of local treasurers, subordinates who was either locally recruited or had been stationed for a longer period in the local missions. Based upon the evidence embedded in a guidebook for procurators and treasurers written in 1747, this chapter argues that it was this cooperation between procurator and treasurer that fully exploited the opportunities for financing the Jesuit missions locally.

The guidebook suggests that by the eighteenth century, the management of local real estate investments was the main occupation of the Jesuits responsible for the economic management of the Society of Jesus in Asia. The person with the knowledge to oversee these local real-estate investments was the treasurer, who was in most cases a local Asian convert with the status of Jesuit brother. Locally, a procurator relied almost completely on the treasurer’s knowledge. This chapter argues that it was this local knowledge and its importance with regards to Asian real estate that started a shift during the eighteenth century away from global funding secured by visitor-procurators. As the following chapters will demonstrate in detail, this was how the local gained in importance in making the Jesuit missions in Asia financially self-sustaining.
4.2 Treasurers within the Society

The Society was divided into four degrees: novice, coadjutor, scholastic, and professed.\textsuperscript{441} Brothers were of the coadjutor degree. As explained in chapter two, the procurator was most often a professed father, and, in the case of visitor-procurators for China (Trigault, Martini, Couplet, etc), they were all professed fathers. Each of these procurators had several brothers or coadjutors who helped with the procurators’ many tasks and provided more practical experience with the non-spiritual and financial aspects of the job. These brothers (or coadjutors) were called treasurers. The coadjutor was “a man of lesser (intellectual) gifts,” who had agreed to never aspire to profession.\textsuperscript{442} The coadjutors could take the first three vows (poverty, chastity, and obedience), but not the fourth (special obedience to the Pope in the area of missions). All professed fathers had taken this fourth vow. The coadjutor’s three vows were simple vows and not solemn vows, which meant that “they would be bound for whatever time the superior general of the aforementioned Society should see fit to employ them in spiritual and temporal services.”\textsuperscript{443} There was one exception in which case their vows could be pronounced as solemn, but this was only possible with the permission of the superior general.\textsuperscript{444} The Constitutions urged the coadjutors to be obedient and modest, not to change once they became coadjutor and to proceed along the same path, which was shown to them “by Him who knows no change and to whom no change is possible.”\textsuperscript{445}

\textsuperscript{441} Novices, scholastics, and those in their tertianship were Jesuits still in training. See Steven Harris, ”Mapping Jesuit Science: The Role of Travel in the Geography of Knowledge,” in The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773, eds. John W. O’Malley, Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven J. Harris, T. Frank Kennedy, 225 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
\textsuperscript{443} Ganss, The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, 65.
\textsuperscript{444} The superior general would do this because of the candidate’s devotion and personal worth. Ganss, The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, 71.
\textsuperscript{445} Ganss, The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, 113 or paragraph 116 of The Constitutions.
Within the coadjutor category there were two groups, the “temporals” (lay brothers) and the “spirituals” (clerics). Treasurers came from both these groups.\textsuperscript{446} The Constitutions stipulated that only the professed (fathers) could say they were “in” the Society of Jesus, whereas the others had to limit themselves to the statement that they were “occupied in experiences.”\textsuperscript{447} The temporal coadjutors alone made up about a quarter of the Society and worked as artisans, laborers, and other low and humble services: cook, steward, buyer, doorkeeper, infirmarian, launderer, gardener, alms-gatherer, barber, and secretary. They were then recruited on the basis of having for example a strong stomach and physical strength.\textsuperscript{448} They should “not be more numerous than needed, ought to be men of good conscience, peaceful, docile, lovers of virtue and perfection, inclined to devotion, edifying for those inside and outside the house, content with the lot of Martha in the Society, well-disposed towards the Institute, and eager to help it for the glory of God.”\textsuperscript{449} Temporal coadjutors were responsible for less than 5\% of the Jesuit scientific publications.\textsuperscript{450}

While these temporal coadjutors may have been deemed to have less religious ambition,\textsuperscript{451} they were the procurator’s assistants without whom he would have great difficulties running his office successfully. They had business experience (another requirement that was desirable when recruiting coadjutors) that included the knowledge of accounting procedures, exchange rates, and market values.\textsuperscript{452} This dependency was even stronger since mission procurators came and went whereas assistants stayed on the job for long periods of time. The reasons for this were that

\textsuperscript{446} Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 311.
\textsuperscript{449} Ganss, \textit{The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus}, paragraph 148.
\textsuperscript{450} See Harris, “Mapping Jesuit Science,” 225. “...it is also important to note that the vast majority of Jesuits scientific publications – perhaps up to 95 per cent of them – were written by priests, about 90 per cent of whom were professed of the Fourth Vow at the time of publication. Of the remaining 5 per cent of publications, most were written by temporal coadjutors serving as apothecaries (many of whom were located in the Spanish and Portuguese overseas provinces) or by spiritual coadjutors...”
\textsuperscript{451} As Tim Brook has suggested, the coadjutor's lesser gifts “had to do with religious ambition, not necessarily mental acuity.”
\textsuperscript{452} Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 303.
the professed “could give aid at some hour to those who hold these burdensome duties,” and this was not considered improper, but “to assume them permanently is more properly the work of the coadjutors, and they could be provided to lighten this burden for those who are studying.”  

Before joining and engaging in the experiences of the Society, coadjutors were explicitly asked if they agreed with this type of services for the rest of their lives. So they became accountants (or material resource managers) for the Jesuits fathers, who needed them and depended on them.

Treasurers working in Asia have not been studied extensively. Dauril Alden describes their duties briefly in his *The Making of an Enterprise*. Nicholas Cushner has examined the ways in which the estate managers or Jesuit administrators in coastal Peru relied on the practical know-how of his assistants. Compared to the mission procurator, the Jesuit estate manager was more involved with the overall coordination of investments such as sugar plantations or vineyards. He was usually a self-trained agronomist who was able to decide what fields were to be rotated and when and how they were to be planted. At the same time he kept financial and production records, whereas his major domo was the one who tended to the day-to-day running of the estate. Yet again the estate managers were rotated every 5 or 6 years. This was done to avoid poor estate management, out of dissatisfaction of the administrator with the work he was assigned to, and “to avoid creating an independent overseer personality who found it difficult to return to the Jesuit

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454 Ganss, *The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus*, paragraph 118. The *Constitutions* furthermore encouraged coadjutors to learn these tasks, “if they do not know them, with all things always being directed to greater glory of God our Creator and Lord.” Paragraph 305.
456 Cushner, *Lords of the land*, 76. Thanks to a thorough investigation of sugar and wine haciendas by Cushner, the complex multitude of tasks of a Jesuit estate manager are no longer confusing. The estate manager’s job was very similar to the treasurer’s. Missions that relied on revenue from large farms had estate managers, whereas treasurers were more prevalent in missions that relied on revenue from urban real estate.
457 Cushner, *Lords of the land*, 76.
communal-type living after enjoying almost absolute rule on a hacienda.”458 The last two reasons confirmed that while the jobs of procurator and treasurer were ones that required many talents, it was not at all an assignment that was sought after even by brothers or coadjutors, and certainly not the professed.

4.2.1 Treasurers in Asia

The data with which Cushner was able to reconstruct the division of tasks and economic and financial operation of the Coastal Peru missions does not exist for the Jesuit missions in East Asia.459 Temporal coadjutors or brothers, even though they made up one quarter of the Society of Jesus and even though they were responsible for many tasks related to the economic situation of the Society, rarely show up in historical sources. Based upon numbers extracted from bibliographical works by Joseph Wicki and Joseph Dehergne, only after twenty-six years, in 1567, Lisbon sent a brother to Asia (Martín Ochoa).460 According to Wicki’s list, out of 2193 missionaries (mostly Jesuits) sent to Asia from 1541 to 1758, eighty-one were brothers. This is only 3%. Dehergne provides statistics for China specifically. In the Chinese case, there were 111 brothers out of 706 missionaries sent to China, or 15%.461 A gap of 9% needed to be filled. If the Society needed 25% brothers or temporal coadjutors to fill all the “temporal” tasks, then who filled those positions?

458 Cushner, Lords of the land, 76.
459 Data on administrators in the Jesuit missions in Mexico allowed Herman Konrad to calculate the average time served by managers (thirteen years). See Konrad, A Jesuit Hacienda in Colonial Mexico, 131.
460 For an in-depth examination of my statistical analysis, see appendix A.
461 The total number of missionaries (706) is lower than my total amount of Dehergne data entries (843) as I excluded those missionaries whose rank was denoted as bishop (Mgr.), scholastic (Scol.), or those that were not yet priest when they embarked (but would eventually take their fourth vow if they did not die before arrival) These three categories total 105 missionaries (706 + 105 = 811). The rank or nationality of the remaining 32 missionaries is missing (811 + 32 = 843).
It is unlikely that Jesuit fathers took up these tasks. This leaves the locally recruited members of the Society.

Table 4.1 Brothers vs Fathers According to Groups of Different National or Regional Affinity (Dehergne)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of origin of Jesuit brothers (B) and fathers (P)</th>
<th>Number of Jesuit brothers and fathers sent to China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central European</td>
<td>3 B, 69 P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern European</td>
<td>5 B, 36 P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>23 B, 43 P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European</td>
<td>22 B, 135 P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>0 B, 2 P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>16 B, 83 P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>5 B, 5 P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>25 B, 37 P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>37 B, 202 P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

462 Alden describes the extreme hesitancy and reluctance of Jesuit fathers and even spiritual coadjutors to take up these tasks. See Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, 312.

463 My data corroborates Alden’s examples in his short description. Alden points out how difficult it was to find outsiders (or anyone for that matter) to work as a Jesuit college procurator or estate manager. See Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, 309.
Both tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that, when comparing the number of brothers versus the number of fathers that were active in China, only Asians had a significantly higher percentage of brothers working in China (close to 32%). At the same time I found job descriptions in Dehergne for 42 of the 116 brothers. There are three categories: artistic (15), medical (13), and financial positions (14). Artistic jobs included painter, sculptor, and enameller etc; medical jobs were mostly doctors or surgeons, and jobs as procurator and treasurer made out all financial occupations. Brothers often had multiple occupations (even across these three categories) at a time. The data regarding brothers’ occupations is meager, but, in combination with the higher percentage of Asian brothers versus every other region of origin, this does suggest that Asian brothers filled a gap (roughly 10%) left by the discrepancy of the Jesuit father-brother rate both in Europe and China. This

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464 Steven Harris states that “medical services were given to temporal coadjutors, “the invisible rank” of ordained lay-brothers typically assigned to the nonpriestly and nonbookish offices of the Order.” See Harris, “Long-Distance Corporations, Big Sciences, and the Geography of Knowledge,” *Configurations, 6* (1998): 289.
corroborates with Duteil’s findings that, by the eighteenth century, only one quarter of the Chinese missionaries were Jesuit fathers. The rest were brother coadjutors or catechists.465 Similarly, the few treasurers working in Asia that Alden used as examples to describe the duties of college procurators and estate managers (the lowest rungs in the procurator hierarchy) were often locally recruited.466 Before the eighteenth century, even more Asian Jesuits were brothers and not fathers. I agree with Dehergne and Duteil that the data on both Asian missionaries and especially Asian brothers is very incomplete, or, as Harris puts it, temporal coadjutors were “the invisible rank of ordained lay-brothers.”467 However, both for Asia and China specifically, the numbers indicate that it was mostly locally recruited temporal coadjutors or brothers who were responsible for all the tasks associated with the running of the financial and economic backbone of the Society of Jesus in Asia.

4.3 Initiatives from the Periphery: The Position of Procurator and Treasurer in Manila

One scholar who has studied the position of the procurator in a local setting (New Spain) is J. Gabriel Martinez-Serna.468 The procurator was constantly juggling economic dependency (on whatever national patronage) and competition with

466 Alden’s examples include Francisco Henriques, “a Persian who entered the Society in 1557 and served for many years as a lay brother.” Henriques became a procurator of “Old St. Paul’s and several other Goan houses.” Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, 309. Not surprisingly, most of Alden’s examples cover the Portuguese Jesuit missions in India (the paper trail was thicker in those places as mentioned in the introduction).
other local economic powers and even local government and institutions.\textsuperscript{469} The economy of the Society was based upon individual endowments (called foundations) for each of its colleges. This included rural estates, \textit{censos} (annuities from investments), rental properties, and donations by wealthy patrons. In northeastern New Spain for example, the Jesuits established themselves in vineyards, and pursued an economic partnership with the Tlaxcaltecan, which then brought them into conflict with Spanish settlers such as the Urdinola.\textsuperscript{470} Other groups such as the Laguneros or nearby \textit{vecinos} also suffered from this arrangement, and since the Jesuits’ help came with powerful legal support, the Jesuit procurators and treasurers shaped the socioeconomic structure of that community in such ways that the Indians with which they were allied were wealthier than local Spanish settlers. At the same time the Tlaxcaltecan were protected from encroachment upon their land and water resources by those Spanish potentates who tried to monopolize the land and resources in their large-scale estates. Martinez-Serna further asserts that since the Jesuit network even overshadowed the flow of regular communication between the Crown and the diocesan Church to the Jesuit representatives in the northern periphery of New Spain – a remarkable feat of long-distance bureaucratic management – the Jesuits were in every way formidable opponents of frontier governors and bishops.\textsuperscript{471} The person who was constantly in the eye of the storm and had to protect and oversee the Jesuit material possessions was the local (and by extension the provincial) procurator.

\textsuperscript{469} Chapters three and six focus specifically on the issue of patronage and the international character and tensions related to national affinity within the Society.  
\textsuperscript{470} Martinez-Serna, “Vineyards in the Desert,” 76. In India, the Jesuit administrators invested in coconut plantations. See Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 315.  
\textsuperscript{471} Until their fall from power in 1773, the Jesuit procurators were the ones who invested energy, resources, and capital every time a greedy frontier matriarch or a jealous bishop attempted to take its lands and water by manipulating the very pliable laws in these frontier regions. Martinez-Serna, “Vineyards in the Desert,” 74.
4.3.1 Guide for Treasurers in Manila

For this important job, which required strategy, power, and influence, Jesuit treasurers, who were most likely locally recruited members, occasionally wrote manuals intended as a useful tool to bring the new procurator up to speed with the economic situation of the local mission. No such manual or guide for brothers serving as procuradores or administrators survived for China. However, a manual for the procurators in Manila is preserved in the Lilly library of the University of Indiana, Bloomington.\(^{472}\) This is a rather rare type of source – Alden asserts that only a handful of biographies of estate managers from the entire Portuguese assistancy survived –, catalogued by Charles Boxer in 1968.\(^{473}\) By my knowledge, only one scholar has written on its significance, namely Donna U. Vogt who wrote a short article on the manual entitled “Economic and Social Structures in Eighteenth-Century Manila: Padre Pedro Núñez and his ‘Manual for the Use of Friars Serving as Procurators in the Convent’” for a seminar she took with Charles Boxer.\(^{474}\) Whereas Vogt’s article studies in depth Núñez’s role within the social hierarchy of the Philippines, this chapter will examine the central position of the manual’s focus on real estate as an investment during the eighteenth century and analyze how this strategy for financing religious missions fitted within the larger context of local and global ways of financing Asian Christian missions from 1600 until 1800.

Brother Pedro Núñez (?-1761), who “wielded a lively pen” when describing the many responsibilities of his fellow brothers (as treasurers) and the European, Mexican, Creole, and Philippine inhabitants of Manila, wrote the manual circa 1747.\(^{475}\) Although the manual was written by a brother (procurator) to instruct

\(^{472}\) Lilly, Lot 522, 214 folios. It is also referred to as manuscript 21533 (2), or Phillipps 8482.


\(^{475}\) Boxer, *Catalogue of Philippine Manuscripts*, 57. It is not entirely clear what Núñez’ rank was, brother (Boxer) or padre (Vogt).
fellow brothers, almost every folio contains a reference or instruction for the cooperation between procurators, treasurers, and their superiors (that dealt with spiritual affairs). Núñez enthusiastically imparted his knowledge on the teamwork required among all these people based upon his sixteen years of experience in the local Manila missions. This source is invaluable for explaining the relationship between the procurator and the treasurer, while also showing the wide range of tasks of both functions, and how they were divided and sometimes delegated from one to another. It also assured that knowledge on all the possible dangers and nuisances a procurator and treasurer could face in a local setting was handed down.

Not much is known about brother Núñez. Based upon the earlier statistical calculations and upon the following numbers, I assumed at first that he was a locally recruited member (of Asian or mixed descent). Of the 143 Jesuits who were admitted to the Society in the Philippines, most, 117 of 143, were admitted as coadjutor brothers and only three as priests. This meant that most local Jesuits of Philippine descent were coadjutor brothers, and this explains the local knowledge exposed and passed on by the brother treasurers. This also suggests a certain racial divide: one was more likely to enter the Society as a coadjutor if one’s origin was non-European or mixed. The divide was not simply racial. Locally recruited members, especially if they were intended to manage the material and economic affairs of the Jesuit missions, came from “lower socioeconomic strata” (in comparison to the strata from which senior priests were recruited), they “lacked solid training in Latin and theology,” and they often joined the Society at a more advanced age. However, Núñez, was born in Salazar, Burgos, Spain. He leaves little trace in the Europe-Asia shipping lists, since he traveled from Spain to Vera

476 See also Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 44.
478 For an interesting study on the socioeconomic background of the Jesuits, see Duteil, Le mandat du ciel, 28-34.
479 Alden, The Making of an Enterprise, 311.
480 Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 44.
Cruz, and then sailed from Acapulco to Manila where he entered the Augustinian convent in 1724.\footnote{Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 44.} Before the end of his life in 1761, Núñez returned to San Pablo.

The first 212 folios of Núñez’s manual contain twenty-six chapters on all the different aspects of running a mission house. Folios 212-214 list a series of convents, which pay boletas to the mission house of San Pablo de Manila in silver money and in rice, and this section was added in 1753.\footnote{Boxer, Catalogue of Philippine Manuscripts, 57. “In the early days, the crown owned the ships, and each citizen of Manila received a certain amount of the lading space aboard. The law regulated and measured this space into allotments, called piezas, which were divided into boletas. Ambitious merchants bought extra boletas from citizens who had no interest or no money to buy merchandise and filled them with trading goods.” Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 46. Did this mean that the religious orders were deriving income from commerce or trading commercial shares in Manila? For more information on the Jesuit commerce, see chapter six.} Of Núñez’s twenty-six chapters, this chapter will examine in particular detail those dealing with building or managing real estate. Núñez describes the construction procedures in the first nine chapters (ff. 1-66). Later chapters explore the details of collecting rents of houses and lands, and, most importantly, in many chapters towards the end (chapters 15, 16, 21-26) Núñez shares his technical knowledge on litigation matters related to overseeing these investments.

4.3.2 Manila in Comparison to China

The first mainland Chinese mission was erected in 1582, while the first three Jesuits who sailed from Mexico to Manila arrived in 1581.\footnote{Horacio De la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 11.} The Jesuit missions in Manila were slightly bigger than the China missions: in 1656 the province consisted of 108 missionaries. There were five colleges, one novitiate, one seminary-college, nine mission residences, and the spiritual administration of 73 towns.

Though the situation in Manila and most of the local specific information included in Pedro’s manual are irrelevant for Jesuit missionaries working in China,
the missions were connected in many ways. Even though the Philippine missions fell under Spanish patronage and the rest of the Asian missions under the Portuguese, missionaries did attempt to bridge this divide in the hopes of converting the great many Chinese souls. A majority of them were Spanish. They were often refused passage on Portuguese ships (even during the union of both countries from 1580 to 1640), and consequently they tried to reach China via Mexico or Peru. French and Belgian missionaries (such as Pieter Thomas Van Hamme) traveled along this route as well in order to reach China. From the Americas, these ships’ first stop was Manila. Bartolomeu de Roboredo (1607-1647) worked in this city as procurator of the China missions. He would eventually move to Macao, and ultimately die in Canton in 1647. Another Jesuit, Diego Luis Sanvitores, wanted the Jesuit province of the Philippines to have a mission in China. Francesco Brancati (1607-1671) suggested in 1661 that the Philippine Jesuit province could help out in China if one or two provinces were transferred to their pastoral territory. Brancati thought this proposal was not unrealistic, since the Province of Japan had taken over Jesuit missions in Guangxi and Guangdong.

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484 I hope to connect and compare the Manila and China missions in a post-dissertation research project.
485 See statistical data in chapter three. This is another topic that provides a future avenue of more research. The human traffic with regards to different Catholic orders suggests that the permeability of the link between Manila and China allowed for an institutional link as well. The Jesuits arrived after the Augustinians and the Franciscans (1577) in 1581, but before the Dominicans (1587). The Jesuits were charged with missionizing the Parian (Tim Brook). According to Standaert, even within this small (?) community, the Jesuits had to tolerate other orders. From 1588, the Dominicans were assigned the pastoral care of Chinese from Fujian at Manila. *Handbook of Christianity*, 322.
486 For more details please see chapter three.
488 Dehergne, 240. Dehergne also mentions the German brother coadjutor Herman Scolt (?-?), who died in Manila but was actually part of the China province (according to the *Historia Societatis* 50, f. 135v). Dehergne states that this was a mistake.
489 ARSI, JapSin 162, ff. 70-71. Jesuit scholars at the Ricci Institute in the University of San Francisco have collected a set of folders labeled “Philippine Jesuits in China.”
year before. Furthermore, an improved connection between the Philippines and southern China would be crucial if the Dutch maritime attacks on Goa and Macao cut off the communication and provision lines between Portugal and the Far East missions. This request was never granted. It went both ways: already in 1638, the maritime Dutch interference caused Portuguese Jesuits in Macao to request the Jesuit General to permit re-routing missionaries traveling under the Portuguese *padroado* to New Spain and the Philippines (and from there to China). This request was similarly “turned down for fear of nationalistic complications.” However, apart from the possibility of a certain number of Jesuit fathers to travel back and forth across this Portuguese-Spanish colonial border (mind you, many Spanish fathers were sent back in Macao), this proposal illustrates that even on an institutional level, certain Jesuits (a minority for sure) wanted more fluid boundaries between China and Manila. In doing this, they were simply replicating the movements of merchant and immigration networks.

4.4 Cooperation between Treasurers and Procurators

Whereas the centrally directed constitutions tried to set out theoretical guidelines for the interactions between fathers and brothers who handled material affairs on the one hand and those who handled spiritual affairs on the other, Rome was unable to send enough people who could manage the material matters to the ________________

490 Five years later, in September 1666, Brancati would beg his superior Antonio de Gouveia, to allow him to escape the Canton internment and get back to administer his large Christian community in Shanghai (60,000 Christians through 67 churches). ARSI, JapSin 162, ff. 135r-139. Perhaps this illustrates that Brancati came up with daring plans from time to time.
491 Several years after Verbiest sent his letters both via Macao and Manila. ARSI, FG 730, 3.
494 The “crippling situation caused by the maritime expansion of the Dutch in the East Indies” from the 1630s until the 1650s resulted in the Portuguese in Macao requesting “the Father General to permit Portuguese *padroado* missionaries to be re-routed to New Spain and the Philippines...” See Sebes, “Philippine Jesuits,” 197.
farthest periphery. Sources from the periphery, the Philippines in this case, reflected upon how to assure all material tasks were looked after. Brother Núñez put forward pragmatic solutions in his guidebook for procurators, and he framed it in a much more day-to-day context.

Although brother Núñez started his advice with the major works and responsibilities of the procurator, namely the supervision of houses and management of rental properties, he immediately asserted that “the [main] worries ...[and] sorrows” were to be found in the house: for example “doing business with the prelate” and knowing “how to understand one another ... inside the house.” “That cross was so heavy that only the grace of God could give you enough power to carry it and to support it.” This warning suggested that Jesuits who dealt with financial affairs first and foremost had to pay attention to their relationships with fathers and brothers who dealt with spiritual affairs. As seen in the earlier statistical data, fathers who dealt with spiritual affairs were more likely to come from Europe and, even though they lived the rest of their lives in the Asian missions if they survived the sea voyage, these fathers were happily concerning themselves with spiritual affairs. They may not have been as familiar with the headaches of material matters as Núñez. Núñez had decades of experience at precisely this job, and, in pointing out that the relationships with these other fathers were his main worries, he was saying that they were not as knowledgeable when in came to economic and financial dealings as he was.

To further illustrate his position, Núñez discussed all the annoying consequences of this conflict of authorities on a daily basis. The main reason for all the in-house trouble was that everyone wanted something specific from the procurator. The procurator, as keeper of the money and other resources (such as wine, chocolate, medicine, brandy...) had to be able to get along with all of them, while treating them equally. The example that was worked out in Núñez's tenth note

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495 This referred to the other Jesuit fathers and specifically the ones higher up in the local hierarchy.

496 My translation of the Spanish original: "... Cruz es esta tan pesada, que solo la gracia de Dios puede dar fuerzas para cargarla y suportarla." Lilly, Lot 522, f. 64v.
of advice was that of wine.\textsuperscript{497} When do you share wine and how do you find the perfect balance between being nice occasionally when someone needs a drink and wasting resources or being accused of wasting resources of the community? According to Núñez this asked for respect from other people in the Convent for the procurator (since they had to understand that he could not pass out brandy every other week) and a very careful use of responsibility on the part of the procurator. Núñez stated that the key was “having no witnesses.” This meant you could give someone a drink on occasion in private, but best not tell anyone about it. “Someone who is refused a drink will take it to the prelate etcetera.”\textsuperscript{498} Both the example and the advice did not reflect very trusting relationships between procurators (or treasurers) and their fellow missionaries.

Besides a lack of respect, secrecy was an important ingredient to keep relations good between fathers and brothers involved in material affairs and fathers and brothers who were not.\textsuperscript{499} All professed fathers and others related somehow to the Jesuits regularly needed money and goods from the procurator in order to carry out their spiritual tasks. On the one hand the procurator should not visit the private cells of the prelates. Other fathers would notice this and then wonder what was wrong. Besides secrecy and respect, Núñez also declared that it was best to stay as far as you could from your superior. If one did have to tie up some business with them, “just be prepared for worries. These would always arise upon entering his cell... If one was prepared for this, it was less likely that they would lose their temper as procurator or show emotions.” The procurator’s seemingly mundane tasks were in fact delicate social interactions.

Another practical solution to smooth the interaction between procurators (and treasurers) and the other Jesuits was creating a physical distance between them. This was why procurators were supposed to live separately (in detached

\textsuperscript{497} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 69.
\textsuperscript{498} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 69.
\textsuperscript{499} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 66. The rest of Pedro’s advice had a similar tone.
However, the microcosm of a Jesuit mission and its limited resources especially in certain missions in the Far East were unable to create that distance. In this case the practical solution as described in The Constitutions did not work. A direct consequence of this lack of distance according to Pedro was rumors. Fellow missionaries appreciated confidentiality. Similarly the procurator should be very clear when talking to people. If they misunderstood him, they might call him a liar afterwards.\footnote{Lilly, Lot 522, f. 66v. “Cobra Buena fama y echate a dormir: cobra la mala, y trabaja hasta morir,” get a good name and you can go to sleep. Get a bad name, and you’ll work to death.} Better not to show emotion, but rather speak your mind in a simple and sincere way.\footnote{Lilly, Lot 522, f. 65v. Ni en burlas, ni en veras, con tu amo partas peras.} The procurator should also not gossip about the prelate to his fathers, or allow them to talk about the prelate or provincial superiors in the procurator’s cell. “There will always be someone who loves to pass on whatever they heard and before long it will come to the ears of the prelate, and then it will come back to the procurator.”\footnote{Lilly, Lot 522, f. 67v. “No la hagas, y no lo remeras.”} It was not just the spread of gossip within the religious community that worried Núñez, but he was well aware that, if gossip traveled amongst the missionaries it would not take long before it reached people outside the convent. To the procurator these outsiders were business associates with whom he had to conduct careful negotiations concerning the rent or sale of lands and houses. Núñez recounts a specific case in which he himself had gossiped with another brother in the convent. This brother (inadvertently?) shared the news with an outside friend who in turn talked to a judge with whom Núñez negotiated real estate business.\footnote{Lilly, Lot 522, f. 147r+v.} Núñez reported that he later paid the price for his loose tongue when the judge decided against the convent in a land sale. The convent lost over eighty pesos.\footnote{Lilly, Lot 522, f. 147v.}

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\footnote{Similar to the housing arrangements of the procurator general mentioned in Ganss, The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, paragraph 806.}
In the end the procurator, keeper of money and resources, was in a pretty isolated position; “the procurator should never share a secret of the heart with a religious of the Convent even when he appears to be a friend...” The only person to trust was his confessor or perhaps a father that had retired from the ministry and was disengaged with the world.\textsuperscript{506} This overly emotional statement should not be taken literally. However, the trust issue and the gossip storm in which the procurator was more than often at the center, are recurring themes throughout the entire manual. Particularly with the Chinese merchants (and the Spanish notaries) living in Manila Núñez emphasized the need to be diplomatic and cautious.\textsuperscript{507} Núñez recognized that the Chinese were hard workers who, as a community, held “tremendous economic power,” as they controlled trade with China.\textsuperscript{508} This is why Núñez urged his successors to proceed carefully in their dealings with the Chinese.

A time to pay special attention to what one said and shared with others was when the ship from Acapulco was expected.\textsuperscript{509} Certain monks would keep asking and probing the procurator for any revelations concerning everyone’s financial investments. This last example made clear how it was not just the fathers that made life hard for their fellow father or brother who took up the position of procurator, but brothers likewise harassed anyone engaged in temporal affairs. Every tip that was shared by brother Pedro hinted at a series of complex relationships – between treasurer and procurator, brother and father, procurator and the prelate, and people responsible for financial matters and spiritual matters – within (and outside) the Jesuit community. To fulfill all tasks related to material affairs and navigate his congregation without offending others, the procurator needed to cooperate with the treasurer. This may have been an uneasy coalition of a brother and a father (or men of peninsular and Filippino origin), but, as they shared the responsibility over money and resources and as the center was never able to send enough trained brothers (or material resources) to the periphery, they had to work together well.

\textsuperscript{506} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 68.
\textsuperscript{507} Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 55.
\textsuperscript{508} Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 53.
\textsuperscript{509} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 70v.
4.4.1 Constructing a New Mission House: Advice in Chapters 1 to 3

Most of the information relates directly to the job of the treasurer who, when building anything, had to make sure that all wooden materials were ordered and that the wood for a house was acquired a year in advance so that it had time to dry. Houses could need rebuilding “every six years due to the corrosive aspects of Manila’s extreme humidity.”⁵¹⁰ This may have been more so for real estate built outside the city (in more exposed landscapes), but, since most houses were in some way or another rental properties (except for the convent itself) Núñez wanted to take no risks in making clear the importance of picking the right building materials. He started off his manual with this very first tip since the danger of moisture and certain insects was just too widespread in the Philippines to ignore, and the results would cut deeply into the revenue subtracted from these houses. In great detail, Núñez discusses where to place the windows in order to get the optimal light and which wood to use for the braces and other crucial parts of the house.⁵¹¹ Brother treasurers were most likely the audience for all these very specific instructions. However, right after the preliminary paragraphs, the interaction between procurator and treasurer and their tight business-relationship becomes clear. This was the first of many direct references to the father procurator. These were mostly important summary points that should be known to a procurator, since putting in an order for the wrong material could cost the Society a lot of money.

The first chapter in the book deals with the different types of wood and discusses which one is cost-beneficial to use in the construction of houses. With the value of real estate investments in mind, he made notes on how each part of the house should be constructed. Toward the end of chapter one, Núñez summarized the chapter on building materials for the (future) father procurator. Even in this summary he included technical information on different types of wood. He

⁵¹⁰ Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 49. Vogt does not provide references for this statement.
⁵¹¹ Lilly, Lot 522, f. 1. In this case “Madera de Betis,” which was a dark-red type of very hard wood, usually used for constructing keels of ships.
explained that *Molave* wood was the best type of wood that one could find on these islands, since it was very water and insect (especially moth) resistant. It was yellow-colored, and used in all types of constructions. *Molave* was however fairly expensive and should not be used for all the different parts of the house. Other types of wood such as *Betis, Banaba,* and *Pasac* would be better suited. *Banaba* was very resistant to inclement weather. Another option for smaller constructed parts was *Tindalo,* which was pink-colored but rarely available and it did not often come in big sizes.\(^{512}\) Núñez clearly believed that the procurator, as the superior of all treasurers and the one ultimately responsible for the material resources, should be aware of these facts concerning local wood. In the same summary, he warned future treasurers that (before ordering all the building material and furniture from the different parts of the Philippines and China) they should report the exact costs to the father procurator and write him a notice as well.\(^{513}\)

After a long discourse on the different types of wood, Núñez then included the costs of bricks, roofing tiles, and the wages of the local blacksmith. The best bricks came from China, since they were the most solid and easy to work with because of the holes in the bottom.\(^{514}\) The best ashlar (dressed stonework) blocks for the foundation of the houses came from Meycauayan, nineteen kilometers north of Manila in the province of Bulacan.\(^{515}\) The stone used was most likely Meycauayan’s adobe (volcanic tuff rocks) reserves which were ideal for building stone houses and fortifications. The majority of Manila’s old walled city (*Intramuros*) was made with adobe rocks from Meycauayan. Núñez discussed the material, construction, and sizes of doors, stairs, tables, etc. and in each case he would explain the assembly and pressure points in a practical way: he even noted the number of supporting points for furniture and larger constructions (such as

\(^{512}\) I was unable to decipher this last wood-type. Lilly, Lot 522, f. 3v.

\(^{513}\) Lilly, Lot 522, f. 8r+v, 11-13. A little further the exact price of *Molave* wood was noted (one table cost about 4 realer), and when discussing the regional trade of wooden furniture, Pedro again included the father procurator.

\(^{514}\) Lilly, Lot 522, f. 18.

\(^{515}\) Lilly, Lot 522, f. 16. Franciscan missionaries founded this city in 1578.
staircases) needed to maximize their longevity.\textsuperscript{516} The costs of each item or building part of the house should be registered. If Philippine workers did the work, the treasurer or procurator should oversee it. If Chinese workers did the construction, Núñez advised no close supervision was needed.\textsuperscript{517} With the later chapters on renters and collecting rent in mind, these houses were clearly constructed as rental properties.

When it came to nails, the weight was most important. This was why Núñez urged that the father procurator had to count and check each nail by hand, to verify if their heads were solid and not broken.\textsuperscript{518} The detail of the information was again astonishing: at least seven different types of nails and their best purposes were described. For example, certain nails were good for the construction of kitchen tables.\textsuperscript{519} Each of them could be bought from the Sangleyes (ethnically Chinese) that lived in the Parian (Chinese neighborhood outside the Intramuros). When it came to all the different choices of material, it was the procurator who in the end made the final decision depending on his taste (and budget at that time).\textsuperscript{520} The procurator also had to supply money for each individual expense of the work, so that money was only given to treasurers and workmen little by little.\textsuperscript{521} Finally, the head carpenters and the procurator signed the contract of the house, sometimes together with a master Indian (indigenous Philippine) stonecutter (and blacksmith), hired by the procurator.\textsuperscript{522} Once again Núñez emphasized the importance of a hands-on approach in which both treasurer and procurator were in constant and close contact with the local craftsmen and construction workers.

\textsuperscript{516} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{517} Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 54.
\textsuperscript{518} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 14v.
\textsuperscript{519} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 14v. The baraquila nail: they were two and a half points long with a good head.
\textsuperscript{520} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 24v.
\textsuperscript{521} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 29.
\textsuperscript{522} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 42.
4.4.2 Accounting Information on a New Mission House

Since building a new mission was a costly investment, the father procurator in turn should have an empty notebook with 200 pages, so that he could jot down all the material received and the expenses made. At this point, the author focused all his attention on how both treasurer and procurator should keep their accounts. First, an exact description of how the account book should be kept was provided. This was a task for the treasurer, but the procurator had to oversee the work. The account book should be in leaf, and with a table of contents; first, one should write the different amount that was to be received from the procurator for said work; the quantity, day, month, and year should be very clear to avoid any confusion. The treasurer also had to leave three or four sheets blank for additions (from the procurator?). The treasurers never straightforwardly asked the procurator for money, but first made an easy-to-register account of the proposed costs so that a project was always registered. The reasons why the expenditures were going to be made was the next point, where again six blank pages were required, one for each material that had to be ordered. Specific cost should be registered and also a receipt of the money that was sent. Then the treasurer registered the costs of each item or building part of the house. Throughout the entire slot of the chapter, one gets the impression that treasurer and procurator were constantly in communication with each other, shuffling documents back and forth on a daily basis. Núñez’s attention to precise bookkeeping made sure the costs of real estate construction could be tracked in the future, and they would no doubt play a role in setting the rent (and, finally, calculating the profits). His insistence that both the treasurer and procurator fill out parts of the account book would make counting mistakes and corruption less likely. It also guaranteed that the procurator or superior with perhaps less experience (compared to the treasurer) would benefit from the treasurer’s local knowledge and quickly learn the accounting methods, the prices of local and

523 Lilly, Lot 522, f. 13r+v.
regional materials, and the approach to dealing with Philippine, Chinese, and Spanish labor.

Towards the end of the house construction chapter, the guidelines illustrate that the procurator was really the one who made the important decisions, such as whether or not a mission needed to build a new house in the first place.\textsuperscript{524} This is also when the wages of every worker were carefully noted, and what immediate tasks the procurator had to perform when someone moved into a new house. However, several very down-to-earth tasks do seem to blur the lines between the procurator as delegator and boss, and the treasurer as local (most often non-European) brother working under him. For example the procurator was supposed to invigilate the workers that push the small carts with construction material for the house, and make sure that the workers start at 6am and accompany them on four trips before 10am, to see if they can do more and if they push the carts in the correct way.\textsuperscript{525} The author provided the exact quantities of each building material that fitted in the small carts mentioned. This sounded more like a task for a brother treasurer unless this function did not come with enough authority to invigilate this task (or unless Philippine laborers were involved who needed extra supervision). Several other tasks similarly showed a remarkable involvement of the procurator.\textsuperscript{526} The procurator was so involved with the construction of new houses because they represented the fundamental investment on which the finances of the Philippine mission were relying.\textsuperscript{527}

\textsuperscript{524} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 29v.
\textsuperscript{525} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 36v.
\textsuperscript{526} The procurator was for example also responsible for stocking the following building materials: 100 bricks from China to make graves, when a religious had to be buried, 4 to 6000 roofing tiles and the same amount of normal bricks. Lilly, Lot 522, f. 47v.
\textsuperscript{527} By the eighteenth century rental properties were an important part of the income of Jesuit missions in Asia. More on this in chapter five and six.
4.4.3 Cooperation between the Procurator and Treasurer with Regards to Renting Properties: Advice in Núñez’s Chapters 4 to 8

Building new mission houses and managing rental properties were the most important obligations of the procurator (and treasurer). According to Núñez, it was first and foremost their job to look after the goods and belongings of the mission.\textsuperscript{528} Again the constant interaction between the two different functions, treasurer and procurator or brother and father,\textsuperscript{529} which were responsible for the financial running of local Jesuit missions, is what stands out on every folio of this document.

Apart from many tips on the different types of renters that the procurator will have to deal with in Manila, the second part of the chapter confirms the direct overlaps as to what the procurator’s tasks were and where the treasurer should or should not help him. Sometimes they worked as a very close team, for example when it came to problematic rental issues. The monthly rent was six to seven pesos, and the yearly rent could go up to 100 pesos depending on the house. Núñez repeated multiple warnings before he introduced how to use the justice department to implement (forcefully) the collection of rent. Numbering reasons on how to rent the house ideally, he went from specific advice to more general descriptions: “it is important that the procurator is armed with loads of patience, because everywhere in the world it is the same way, no one likes the rent collector, but in this city it is excessively so. Some people treat the procurator with lots of courtesy, others with none at all and not even the patience of Job would suffice.”\textsuperscript{530}

When collecting the presence of the procurator was not required at first or in each case, but, based upon the multiple negotiation schemes that were included in the guide, it was not unusual for the treasurer (the local brother) to go first, and,

\textsuperscript{528} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 49v.
\textsuperscript{529} In East Asia I suspect that a fair share of procurator positions were filled by brothers as well, which was in line with the regulations set out in the Constitutions. It is hard to calculate the precise percentages, however, Dehergne does mention several brothers who were procurators.
\textsuperscript{530} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 53. Núñez repeats the procurator’s need for the patience of Job multiple times.
when it did not work out, the procurator would follow. In these cases treasurer and procurator worked as a tandem. The treasurer would explain how he was only the messenger that had been instructed to collect the rent, but at the same time he would refrain from depicting the procurator as the evil boss. The procurator in turn had to understand that most people in Manila had a specific cycle of money and investments that depended upon the arrival of the yearly galleons. Before July, the procurator would offer truces to renters and not hurry them too much, since their investments had not paid off yet. They would be expected to pay the full amount in August and September after the ships from Acapulco had arrived (generally in July), when many suddenly had cash savings of 500 or even 1000 pesos. This is when the Jesuits would be back. If the renters were still reluctant to pay, a second warning from the justice department would arrive. What sometimes happened then, according to Núñez, was that the renters would suddenly become very reproachful and tried to misrepresent the situation to the superior. This way they skipped both the treasurer and procurator, and it added to the general level of stress for which both treasurer and procurator had to be prepared. In the end the procurator was the one who was responsible for receiving the money and supervising that everything was written down in letters and not just in numbers to avoid yet more trouble with people who wanted to see mistakes in official contracts later on.

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531 Lilly, Lot 522, f. 55. This was not just the case for rent on properties. Merchants would borrow money from religious orders (often to be repaid at 40% or 50% interest) to “purchase and store Chinese goods until they acquired enough lading space to ship them. If the galleon returned with Mexican silver pesos and Spanish wine, the merchant had no trouble paying off his debts, but if the galleon failed to return, he was ruined.” 531 Lilly, Lot 522, f. 172v, chapter 18 on Obras Pias. Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 46.
532 Lilly, Lot 522, f. 56.
4.4.4 The Position of Treasurer and Procurator in the Local Community:
Advice in Núñez’s Chapters 6 and 7

Just before addressing himself directly to the procurator in chapter 9, Núñez made known his ideas about the composition of the population of Manila. So before sharing his almost twenty-year experience and opinions on what the procurator should and should not do or be, and thus minimizing the distance between the two functions, he allowed the reader to understand how he, as a local, related to the community around him, before a future procurator, who was most likely new to Manila, had to position himself in a local setting.

The people with Spanish ancestry were the first type of settlers Pedro describes. Sent by their powerful Spanish families, they were not accustomed to poverty or Muslim traders, but they were most logical and comprehensible when engaged in trading. “In 1779, there were only 348 Spaniards in all Manila, and most of these held important positions.” Núñez seemed to be in constant competition with certain sub-groups within the Spanish elite. Núñez distinguished three groups within the *peninsulares*: the genuinely rich and young immigrants, fortune seekers, and “boasters.” They existed and thrived thanks to the galleon trade. It attracted many poor immigrants. Núñez warned future procurators and treasurers that if these people encountered only hardship instead of fortune, they grew desperate (and were difficult to conduct business with). Chinese commercial success drove a fair number of Spanish to become very frustrated and angry. If possible, one should always try to buy from the *Sangleys* since they “will give you a better price than the Spaniards, because they are content with less profit, and they know the

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534 Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 55.
536 Lilly, Lot 522, f. 59.
game of haggling which is something Spanish do not know.” The Spanish will try to keep their price a secret and only share it with the procurator, and when even he is not willing to pay that much, they will say the procurator is stingy. In contrast, Núñez mentioned that the Chinese liked corner lots for business purposes, for which Núñez was able to charge them more. As such, the Chinese merchants were tightly connected to the religious orders’ revenue on urban real estate. The future procurator will have to deal with all these people, and, according to Núñez, the only thing that differentiates them is the degree of eagerness with which they are seeking profit in trade.

4.4.5 Overburdened Managers

The procurator and treasurer needed each other to bring to completion the multitude of tasks that were all part of the job description. Thanks to the swift expansion of the Society of Jesus and in combination with their ever-increasing wealth, the function of procurator could barely keep up. This problem would become most pertinent in those places where the communication and provision lines were particularly thinly stretched: the missions of the Indies. The procurator of a mission (such as the Manila mission) was overburdened and in need of at least two helpers and several treasurers. Procurators active in other rungs of the Jesuit financial hierarchy faced the same problem. However, consider the following numbers: between 1541 and 1580, a total of 26 dispatches of Jesuits, or 216 fathers

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537 Lilly, Lot 522, f. 59.
538 Lilly, Lot 522, f. 38.
539 Steven Harris discusses Kircher’s Ignatian Tree to analyze the rapid administrative growth of the Society. “The Jesuit bush, in other words, spread to about two-thirds of its maximum geographical size within the first sixty years (and to about 90 per cent within the first century) and then maintained a stable configuration of provincial branches for the next 170 years.” See Harris, “Mapping Jesuit Science,” 222.
540 See Josef Wicki, “Die Anfänge der Missionsprokur der Jesuiten in Lissabon bis 1580,” Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu 40 (1971): 247. This is very similar to Pedro’s managerial assessment of 2 or three helpers. See Lilly, Lot 522, f. 73.
to be precise, were sent to the Indies.\textsuperscript{541} The office of provincial procurator for the Indies was instated in 1554, and it was his job to know in time how many missionaries would be on the next ship to the overseas missions, so that he could obtain the necessary funds from the king for all their costs.\textsuperscript{542} Only in 1574 the procurator was appointed one brother (Bernardo dos Reis) to help him with his many tasks.\textsuperscript{543}

Núñez's manual gives the same impression of an overburdened manager with too little time in a day to deal with all his responsibilities.\textsuperscript{544} Between seven and eight in the morning the procurator turned his attention to matters that concerned the lawyer of the Convent.\textsuperscript{545} Before seven he had finished his breakfast chocolate while reading \textit{Combate Espiritual}. Between eight and nine he met with the notary publics or secretaries in either his house or in the town hall; nine to ten was for meetings with the Spanish vice-regal court and governing body. After this he could retire to his Convent again, until eleven, at which time he would write down and list all his business since “one should never trust them to the memory alone.”\textsuperscript{546} At twelve punctually the procurator should relax and take his siesta for one and a half hours. The two boys (sometimes three) would accompany him and be kept inside the cell.\textsuperscript{547} Since the procurator had so many little errands to run, he needed at least two helpers: one big boy for out-of-the-house tasks and a little boy who

\textsuperscript{541} Wicki, “Die Anfänge der Missionsprokur,” 248.
\textsuperscript{542} This process is also outlined in Liam Brockey’s “Largos Caminhos e Vastos Mares: Jesuit Missionaries and the Journey to China in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.” \textit{Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies} (2002): 48.
\textsuperscript{543} Wicki, “Die Anfänge der Missionsprokur.”
\textsuperscript{544} Somewhat similar to Brockey’s assessment in \textit{The Journey to the East}.
\textsuperscript{545} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 76v.
\textsuperscript{546} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 76r.
\textsuperscript{547} The official reason for keeping the boys indoors during the siesta was that they would otherwise engage in “lewd activities.”
stayed indoors. After the siesta the procurator had to continue and finish the morning business. The afternoon was filled with less official tasks.

This was the busy schedule of the procurator in Manila on normal days. During any religious holiday, when special meals and rituals were required, the procurator’s burden became even heavier. He was responsible for all resources of the kitchen, and kept liquor in a locked cabinet in his cell. Furthermore he had to stock up certain goods when they were available in town: in June the ships from Pondicherry and Madras brought wine, in February, March, and April the ships from China came in. These last ones brought the best ham (from Nanjing).

No matter how proficient and organized, the Society had to deal with the element of overextension caused by attempting to connect the local and the global. The central organization in Rome was aware of this danger. For example, *the Constitutions* stated that, when discussing the occasions for holding a general congregation, every three years an assigned person should come from each province, except from the province of the Indies. They only needed to send someone every four years. However, even this would turn out to be very hard to execute. In the sixteenth century, the Japan vice-province (officially established in 1581), which was even more remote than the Province of the Indies, only sent its first procurator, Michele Ruggieri, in 1588.

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548 As for the Jesuit missions in Manila, the best kids for this job came from Laguna since they were humble and obedient. The procurator paid one peso to the big one, and four realer to the little one.

549 Because the notaries who resided and kept office hours in the houses in the city, were only open from eight to eleven am. The judges of the court were also only available for negotiation between nine and eleven in the morning. As Luke Clossey pointed out, the afternoon schedule did not sound particularly busy by modern standards.

550 Lilly, Lot 522, f. 89v. These were just a few examples.

4.5 Conclusion

Chapters two and three examined the difficulties of financing and moving enough personnel to the religious missions in the Far East from a global perspective. Visitor-procurators and procurator networks set up in both China and Europe were unable to make the Jesuit missions in China financially self-sustaining communities during the seventeenth century. This chapter analyzed the responsibilities of procurators working locally in the trade hub of Manila in 1747. By the eighteenth century religious orders in the Far East may still have earned some income from trade (discussed in detail in chapter six), but it was no longer the most important source of financial support. Making profit from commerce was too risky, and, as especially the Jesuits in China would experience, it exposed them to severe criticism globally. Unlike the religious missions in Mexico, Peru, Brazil and India, the religious missions experienced more difficulties investing in latifundias – large landed estates – or haciendas – large farms – in both the Philippines and China. Instead, the orders invested in rental properties located in the city.

Building on the detailed description of Núñez’s manual, I analyzed the methods of financing missions during the eighteenth century. Even though trade was the main source of living for most of the city’s inhabitants, the Augustinian convent that consisted of twenty priests and at least one hundred servants was supported mostly by the income from real estate investments. The size of this community was similar to the French Jesuit community living in Beijing whose means of support and finances are introduced in chapters five and six. The account

552 See Alden, The Making of an Enterprise, part IV (“Financing an Enterprise: Sources of Controversy”) and part V (“An Enterprise Questioned”).
books calculating the budget of the Philippine convent did not survive, but the operating expenses of the convent were largely covered thanks to the income earned from the real estate investments in the city of Manila.\textsuperscript{555} Núñez’s manual clearly outlined that the construction and management of these investments were the foremost responsibility of procurators and treasurers. Throughout the manual, Núñez shared his accumulated knowledge on the local building materials (wood, stone, nails) and how their life span could be maximized. Núñez did not just pay attention to the superstructure of the houses but similarly described how to manufacture the furniture. As for renters, Núñez listed twelve notes of advice based on experience. For example, bachelors tended to live in only one room of an entire house, and, as such, they never cleaned the rest of the property.\textsuperscript{556} Procurators should prefer couples, as the wives tended to clean the entire house.\textsuperscript{557} In addition to sharing his experience and knowledge as a local, Núñez underlined the importance of cooperation between future procurators and local treasurers in every chapter. Outsiders needed to get acquainted with the material, people, and numbers as soon as possible to ensure profits from these investments were not interrupted. Whereas the account books in the Philippines did not survive, the ledgers accounting for the budget of the French Jesuit community in Beijing during the 1770s do. Using these sources, chapters five and six will further investigate the role of urban real estate within the overall finances of religious communities in the Far East.

\textsuperscript{555} Castro, “Historia del insigne convento,” 91.  
\textsuperscript{556} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 50v.  
\textsuperscript{557} Lilly, Lot 522, f. 50v.
Chapter 5: The Role of Asian Real Estate in the French Jesuits’ Finances during the Eighteenth Century

5.1 Introduction

This chapter continues to examine the role of urban real estate and the ways in which rental property revenue contributed to financing religious communities in the Far East. I shift the investigation from the Augustinian missions in Manila during the 1740s to the French Jesuit missions in Beijing during the 1770s. The source material of inquiry in chapter four was Núñez’s manual for procurators and treasurers. The account book that would have allowed historians to analyze the budget of the Augustinian missions did not survive. Despite this, the evidence and emphasis of Núñez’s manual in combination with the assessment of Philippine historians such as Augustine Mariá Castro indicated that the revenue of urban real estate largely paid for the operating costs of the religious community. In China, no manual for procurators survived, but the accounting sheets explaining the budget of the French Jesuit community in Beijing during the 1770s have been preserved. First, this chapter will briefly discuss all other surviving accounting sources (four in total) for both the Portuguese and French Jesuit missions in China. Second, I will calculate the global, regional, and local sources of funding available to the French Jesuit missions. This chapter argues that, in line with the financial picture of the Manila religious missions drawn in chapter four, it was mostly revenue from local real estate that funded the French Jesuit community in Beijing. Based upon close investigation of the regional sources of funding, I also assert that the shift from being dependent on global funding (during the seventeenth century) to missions that were largely financially self-sustaining was similar to the way European merchant companies financed their trade operations in Asia during the eighteenth century. The French Jesuits in Beijing relied significantly on income from local and regional investments rather than global financial funding.
5.2 Accounting Sources

When looking closely at accounting sources, it is tempting to compare the myriad connections presented beneath the historian’s eye to the Buddhist image of Indra’s net.\(^{558}\) It is hard to find a better metaphor or more convincing visualization than a giant web with reflecting nodes at every intersection, a symbol for a world of interconnectedness where interdependent entities and their reciprocal interactions affected everyone and everything. People’s interconnectedness – for example, visitor-procurators discussed in chapter two or Jesuit networks inspected in chapter three – was not as encompassing as its perfect Buddhist analogy. Even if the global organization of the Society of Jesus had any resemblance to Indra’s net, or could be understood as an earthly, imperfect shadow of the idea, the first two chapters of this dissertation question and dispute whether it grew more connected throughout the period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

A religious idea such as Indra’s net might seem an equally unlikely metaphor to explain the density of details in account books. The information it contained was framed within a bifurcated balance of debit and credit. Numbers prevailed and because of their often incomplete and mathematical nature even economists or economic historians have to go through great pains in order to puzzle together their detailed renderings of who owed whom what goods and money. Despite this, historians without a knack for numbers are often amazed at the information penned down in these account books. Perhaps this is because, just like Indra’s net, every entry in an account book was connected to a certain degree. Take, for example, the following entry made by François de Rougemont during a trip to Hangzhou from April until June 1675.\(^{559}\) De Rougemont made note of a cluster of donations. “The lao-yeh (honourable’) Yam --- 0.600t --- The same (gave me) as travel money ---

\(^{558}\) Timothy Brook has made this comparison when he discussed globalization in *Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World* (Toronto: Penguin, 2008), 123

1.000t of 9 carat --- ... Likewise niang niang ('Lady') Yao, her (i.e. Maria's) youngest sister. The same Yam, the great-hsiang kung, sent me 4 ounces of pure silver --- 4.000t. --- which were spent to print and bind books, (both) sacred and profane, as for example (T'ai-hsi) shui-fa.\textsuperscript{560} This entry spurs on many questions: Was it a regular occurrence for Chinese women from the gentry class to sponsor the Chinese Christian missions? What role did they play in these communities? Did the missionaries often use this type of funding for scientific goals (publishing books)? Was the travel money given in silver because this currency was more widely accepted within the regional economy in which de Rougemont operated?\textsuperscript{561} Was the money given in silver (instead of copper) because the printers would rather accept this currency? Who was the audience of the work - (T'ai-hsi) shui-fa – published with this grant? Was Lady Yao thanked for her support in the preface to this work? How would Chinese readers relate to this type of benefactress (was she funding scholars or religious misfits)?

Even the most basic and short account books hinted at a human network (behind the numbers), through which, at the very least, money and goods were exchanging hands. The relationship between two parties was often more entangled than a simple material exchange. Account books are lenses into local communities that constituted the tiniest node in a global network. The information they contain magnifies the degree to which its players were all interacting, to such an extent that the assimilated Jesuits and their global religion were sometimes hard to distinguish for being buried so firmly and deeply into the fertile ground of the local communities.

The high-resolution image presented by de Rougemont's account book is unique. No other sources on Jesuit finances match its detail. As mentioned before in chapter two, de Rougemont's accounting entries illuminated local and regional interactions, and illustrated the degree to which he was disconnected from the global Jesuit financial network during the 1660s and 1670s. Seen within the context

\textsuperscript{560} Noël Golvers, François de Rougemont, S.J., Mission in Ch’ang-Shu (Chiang-Nan): A Study of the Account Book (1674-1676) and the Elogium (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), 237.

\textsuperscript{561} For more on the relation between the two currencies silver and copper, see appendix E.
of the finances of Portuguese Jesuit missions in China during the seventeenth century, analysis of de Rougemont’s financial budget also reveals that de Rougemont was barely able to make ends meet. He depended heavily on irregular gifts from local Chinese benefactors and benefactresses as seen in the above accounting entry, and his budget was not balanced thanks to revenue from real estate investments. This last observation is important when one studies and contextualizes de Rougemont’s source with the body of sources extant on the French Jesuit missions’ finances during the eighteenth century.

The first account book that survived after de Rougemont’s was that of Jean-François Foucquet (1665-1741), who came to Amoy (Xiamen) in 1699. Foucquet was successful in developing missions in Fujian and Jiangxi provinces before he was called to Beijing in 1711 by the Kangxi emperor, who wanted him to assist Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730) in studying the Yijing (Book of Changes). While in Nanchang (Jiangxi province) Foucquet scribbled down a large series of entries, entitled “Journal de la dépense commune a Voutchoufou,” which the French sinologist Paul Pelliot classified as a Cahier de comptes de dépenses, etc. In only seven folios, Foucquet wrote down his daily expenses for food and money he owed other French Jesuits from 1701 until 1706. In a very rough draft, Foucquet explains the expenses he made on certain days (First date: December 28, 1701) and months (January 1702). Each time, he calculates the total of his expenses. December 28, Foucquet bought wine (176), meat (48), chickens (58), 100 oranges (70), and three more items that are illegible (90, 60, 15), totaling 515 (no currency). At first sight, Foucquet’s accounting draft was somewhat similar to (if shorter than) de

562 For more on Foucquet see John W. Witek, Controversial Ideas in China and in Europe: a Biography of Jean-François Foucquet, S.J. (1665-1741) (Roma: Bibliotheca Instituti Historici S.I., 43, 1982).
564 See BAV, BorgCin. 376, ff 1-7. See also Golvers, François de Rougemont, 70; Paul Pelliot, ed. Takata Tokio, Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits et imprimés chinois de la Bibliothèque Vaticane (Kyoto: Instituto Italiano di Cultura Scuola di Studi sull’Asia Orientale, 1995), 40, no 376.
565 See BAV, BorgCin. 376, f.2.
566 See BAV, BorgCin. 376, f.2. The actual total is 517.
Rougemont’s draft of an account book. Unfortunately, Foucquet did not consistently include the quantities of the goods he bought, nor whom he bought them from or for what purpose. Foucquet’s numbers leave the researcher guessing which currency he is working in. The price of certain items such as meat, oranges, wine (of which he bought eight *hou* for 176), and eggs (sixty for 120) can be calculated if there was a clear indication of what currency Foucquet was using.\(^{567}\) For other items such as sugar, vinegar, herbs, oil, and fat, Foucquet did not write down a quantity. Since Foucquet was buying small amounts of groceries, it is reasonable to assume that he was using copper currency (cash).\(^{568}\) Occasionally, Foucquet referred to items he purchased for colleagues, such as Father Joseph de Prémare (1666-1736), but, contrary to de Rougemont, one does not get a sense of the Chinese community with which Foucquet must no doubt have interacted as well.\(^{569}\)

Just like de Rougemont’s account book, Foucquet’s accounting sheets must have been a draft: unfortunately Foucquet only wrote 7 folios, or 11 pages, in contrast to de Rougemont’s 150 plus pages. Foucquet’s disorganized entries are not only barely legible (a strong hint that his draft was only intended for himself and that there was perhaps a larger account book that was lost), I agree that since they lack quantities of whatever he spent/sold, currencies and precise dates in cases, they lose almost all of their documentary value and can hardly be compared to de Rougemont’s account book.\(^{570}\) Since I doubt that Foucquet’s web of social and economic connections can be disentangled to the extent that local, regional, and global funding within his finances can be traced, I will save this source for a later research project, and leave my discussion of his source in this dissertation at that.

\(^{567}\) See BAV, BorgCin. 376, f.2.
\(^{568}\) See appendix E for more on the bi-mettalic Chinese economy during the early Qing.
\(^{569}\) There is more sporadic evidence on Foucquet’s budget in ARSI, FG 526, ff. 258-263. The Italian text includes one receipt.
\(^{570}\) See Golvers, *François de Rougemont*, 70. Golvers states that most documentary value is lost.
The next account book that survived was from the French Jesuit Valentin Chalier (1693-1747). Chalier entered the Society in 1715, traveled to China in 1728 and started working at the court of the Chinese emperor in Beijing with his fellow countryman Dominique Parennin (1665-1741). He was the inventor of the Chinese hour clock, and governor general of the French missions in China from 1745 until his death in 1747. Unlike de Rougemont’s and Foucquet’s account books Chalier’s was not a draft. It was unique in a different way: Chalier, or “Mr. Sha,” wrote his records in Chinese. His Shifeizhang 使費賬 “Account of Expenses” consists of all the expenses he made from October 19, 1739 until December 23, 1739. In total, Chalier wrote down 473 entries, for which 151 (or almost 32%) had a specific quantity. For these goods the price per measurement can thus be calculated and compared to what de Rougemont paid for the same goods sixty-three years earlier in Changshu. Each of Chalier’s entries was an expense, meaning that he did not include any “credit” entries or cases where he received money from others. Though he only wrote down his expenses for just less than three months, he never missed or skipped a day. On average he made 7.39 entries per day; the lowest number of entries was three, the highest fourteen.

All his expenses were written down in the same currency: copper. Just like de Rougemont’s source, Chalier’s was a highly personal account: he simply wrote down his daily shopping or grocery lists. Among his everyday necessities, water,

572 Pfister, * Notices biographiques et bibliographiques*, 718. See also Lettres éd. T. IV, 56.
573 See *Bibliothèque Nationale de France* (BNF), Chinois, 1307. Mr. Sha was Chalier’s Chinese name.
574 BNF, Chinois, f. 2, 27.
575 Since Chalier and de Rougemont operated in different regional economies (Changshu versus Beijing) and due to inflation (De Rougemont’s costs were made during the height of the Kangxi depression), the prize differences between both accounts may render the exercise pointless.
576 This was a bit unusual, since one would expect Chalier to use the money of account, silver, in his account of expenses. Perhaps a reason for this was that this source was never intended to adhere to the rules of account books in the first place. I hope further research will clarify the exact nature of this source.
lard, wood, and several other basic goods came up the most. For the argument of this dissertation and chapter – the analysis of local, regional, and global funding and the methods with which Jesuits financed their missions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – Chalier’s source is not useful. However, it can be used for a future smaller research project on a Jesuit’s diet living in Beijing in 1739, for example.577

The fourth and final surviving account book of the Jesuit missions in China is the primary source underpinning this chapter. This memoir on the goods (“Biens”) of the French missionaries in Beijing from 1776 to 1778 can be used to examine the interaction between local and global finances of the Jesuits in China, and further contextualize and support the argument of the role of real estate investments made in chapter four (that used the information in Núñez’s manual). Thanks to the letters and reports archived in the Brotier collection in the archives of the French Jesuits in Vanves, this chapter further investigates the evolution and importance of revenue from real estate investments from 1612 until 1785.578 Additionally, when studied in comparison to all other combined sporadic evidence on the finances of the Jesuit missions in China (and the Augustine missions in Manila), it clearly elucidates the differences between the methods used by the Portuguese state and Jesuits to finance religious missions in China and the French state and Jesuits’ approach to financing missions. In the section below I introduce the sources contained in the Brotier collection that are the basis for both chapters five and six.

5.3 French Urban Real Estate

Whereas de Rougemont’s account book reflects the embedding of a single Jesuit into the regional Jiangnan economy, the later French accounts of Jesuit properties in Beijing allow us to understand how the French fathers were engaged

577 This could be a great research project for after the dissertation.
578 See Vanves, Brotier 135, ff. 208-213 and others. See also Joseph Dehergne, “Les Biens de la Maison Française de Pékin en 1776-1778” Monumenta Serica XX (1961). I would like to thank the editorial office of Monumenta Serica for sending me a reprinted version of this article free of charge and within two weeks of my request.
in the Beijing regional economy and housing market almost a century later, during the 1770s and 1780s. All three accounting sources discussed earlier were highly personal documents. De Rougemont’s account book was a draft to be copied. He never thought his friend Couplet would take it to Europe. It is not known if de Rougemont’s account book had an audience in Europe (did many Jesuits benefit from de Rougemont’s account book in preparing for financial penury in China?), and only in 1992 Jesuit historians rediscovered de Rougemont’s work.579 Fouquet’s scribbled notes were not intended for anyone to examine, whereas Valentin wrote his daily shopping lists in Chinese, which was perhaps an indication as well that no European audience (interested in Jesuit finances) should read his short “Account of Expenses.” The accounting sheets and reports on the French possessions in Beijing were not personal documents at all. Four different copies survive.580 Even though it was not published in a Jesuit history, its audience was both religious and governmental agents responsible for the Jesuit possessions after the pope had dissolved the Society in 1773. The French king was the patron who had provided the funding to start up the missions in China. This is why the reports and accounting information were kept carefully to inform the king of his properties and the possible dangers when their keepers, the French Jesuits, were no longer able to manage them.

On November 15, 1775, the Jesuits in Beijing discovered that the rumors were true, and the way they had organized their lives was about to change drastically - or was it? It took another ten years until their successors, the French Lazarist fathers (or the Congregation of the Mission, C.M.), arrived to take over and once again administer the missions in the name of the French king. From 1775 to 1785, competing non-French congregations tried to take over the French missions,
and even within the big French community itself quarrels arose about how best to run the missions. French ex-Jesuits were accusing other French ex-Jesuits of not being “French” enough.\textsuperscript{581} Since the entire structure of Jesuit organization was no longer recognized, no one knew who had the authority to guide the community and be in charge of the finances of the entire group of sixty-four people. At the time there were twelve missionaries – nine French and three Chinese fathers – who each had his own domestic help. There were another forty Chinese Christians living within the French missions.\textsuperscript{582} This was by far the largest French ex-Jesuit community, since there were only another four French missionaries and three Chinese fathers working in all the other French missions in the Chinese provinces combined. As mentioned before, both in size and location the Augustine missions in Manila and the French Jesuit missions in Beijing were similar. Based on the Beijing accounting sources which did not survive for Manila, this chapter will further clarify the role of revenue from urban real estate during the eighteenth century, in line with what I argued in chapter four. In 1779, to avoid any disruption of the finances of this community, Father François Bourgeois (1723-1792), (disputed) superior of the Beijing missions, wrote up an overview of the accounts and sent it off to the Secretary of State for the Navy, Antoine de Sartine (1729-1801).\textsuperscript{583}

Bourgeois was not the oldest or most prominent missionary, which perhaps explained why others such as Ventavon and Grammont did not accept him as superior and administrator and fought his authority with both the French king and

\textsuperscript{581} See chapter six.

\textsuperscript{582} The exact list was: three scholars, two catechists, three porters, four collectors of the rent, two suppliers, four city carters, three carters for the Haitian residence, a cook for the missionaries, a cook for the domestics, a cook for the Haitian residence, a buyer for both the city and the Haitian residence, a crédencier (he was in charge of managing the provisions), a sacristan, a driver of the kang, a gardener, a baker, a sweeper, two cemetery guards, a businessman, three proselytes and two extra helps of Mr. Ventavon. See Dehergne, “Les Biens de la Maison Française de Pékin en 1776-1778,” 258.

\textsuperscript{583} Antoine Raymond Jean Gualbert Gabriel de Sartine (1729-1801), comte d’Alby, secretary of state for the Navy from 1774 to 1780, and before that lieutenant general of Police of Paris, an office he bought from Bertin for the sum of 175,000 livres.
the Chinese emperor. Bourgeois arrived in China only in 1767, and traveled from Canton to Beijing in 1768. Less than eight years later, a patent from the French king made him superior and administrator of the entire French missions. Bourgeois took this job seriously and defended the French king’s resources against an opposing French faction that wanted to split them up. It might also be that they simply did not like Bourgeois’ tyrannical approach to managing all this money. In 1781, Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Grammont (1736-1812?) took over as administrator. Before that Bourgeois sent his account book to Louis-Marie Du Gad de Vitré (1707-1786), who presented it together with his own memoirs on the possessions of the French mission in China to the French king.

Bourgeois’ report to Sartine was short and presented as an appendix to the many other reports and letters on the French Jesuit missions in China. In one page Bourgeois introduced the rest of the document, he then listed the personnel starting with the European missionaries, the Chinese missionaries, and after that the scholars, catechists, porters, collectors of rent, and a list of Chinese Christian community leaders. This took up another page (both sides). Bourgeois recorded the French missionaries in other Chinese provinces (seven in total), and in a second chapter he began introducing “Les Biens,” the properties. These were divided in five categories: shops and houses (sixty-nine contracts), good works (twelve contracts), terrains and graveyards (nine contracts), gardens (four contracts),

584 I hope to explore the issue of whose subjects the ex-Jesuits were at this point in a future project. See also chapter six.
586 Abbot Dugad de Vitri was a director of the Carmelites and applied for the job of procurator in Paris with responsibility for the contacts of the French missions in China. See chapter four.
587 Vanves, Brotier 134, ff. 84-86.
588 “Bonnes oeuvres,” were similar to the Obras Pias found in chapter eighteen of Núñez’ manual. As Vogt explained, “religious orders had separate funds called obras pias, drawn from charitable bequests and endowments established for this purpose.” Vogt, “Economic and Social Structures,” 46.
and lands (twenty-five contracts).\textsuperscript{589} Thirdly, Bourgeois discussed the obligations, then the operating costs (chapter four), and finally the accounts (chapter five). Despite the brevity of his detailed report, two entire volumes of documents, organized in the Brotier collection 134 and 135 (276 pages in total), repeat and elaborate on parts of Bourgeois’ original report. The correspondence between the French (ex)-Jesuits and French state makes it possible to carefully analyze the role of French real estate investments in the overall finances of Jesuit missions in China during the eighteenth century.

5.4 Uncertainty in Beijing: Local, Regional, and Global Finances

As shown by the several volumes containing documents and accounting sheets on the French Jesuit missions in the 1770s and 1780s, both in China and in Paris, people were very interested in the Jesuit possessions in Beijing. Letters and official reports sought to explain exactly from which sources the Jesuits in China extracted money. Critics were plenty in late eighteenth century France, and several disapproving ministers were driven to piece together the complicated economic picture of the Jesuit missions in Beijing.\textsuperscript{590} The Jesuits would no doubt conceive all critics as enemies of the Society. Another aspect of this interest was that these critics understood some considerably valuable French assets were allocated in China, of which the Jesuits happened to be the keeper. The value of the Jesuit real estate in Beijing was the French king’s direct property, and, with the French revolution in full swing at the beginning of the 1790s, this property became the French state’s. Interest arose when that Beijing property alone was valued at over half a million French livres (553,930).\textsuperscript{591} Understandably, critics wrote reports to the Secretary of State for the Navy commenting that “the local revenue should

\textsuperscript{589} Vanves, Brotier 134, f 87.
\textsuperscript{590} The harshest criticism I found was presented in a report to Sartine, written in 1778 or 1779. The report is well informed. The author is unknown. See Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 190. More criticism by unnamed commentators was mentioned in Dugad’s memoir to the king, Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 172r.
\textsuperscript{591} Dehergne, “Les Biens de la Maison Française de Pékin en 1776-1778,” 263.
suffice,” and questioning whether the ex-Jesuits as a group were the best people to manage these French assets. They asked questions such as, “was the missionaries’ presence really beneficial for commerce and even sciences? Maybe they were just artists in service of the emperor?” All these worries confirmed that there was interest by others, not just the Jesuits, eyeing the faraway investments.

Unlike de Rougemont’s account book, Bourgeois’ numbers were mostly concerned with the yearly income and expenses of the French missionary houses and the community as a whole. The burgeoning interest by ministers and other bureaucratic functionaries of the French state influenced the way Bourgeois’ accounting information was understood in France. Those commentators who boldly stated that the king should no longer send any money to the Jesuit missions in China (because they were already self-sufficient) had a point. However, unlike in de Rougemont’s case, whose mission was mostly sustained by just local resources and revenue, the Jesuits in Beijing relied on income from local and regional investments. Bourgeois – and Dugad copied this in his reports – was vague about the importance of this regional income. Critics in Europe uncovered the importance of Asian investments to the Beijing missions, and they were correct to assume that, combined with local income, the French missions in China seemed to be quite successful. In order to disentangle the web of resources available to the ex-Jesuits in Beijing and to investigate the importance of regional income – and whether or not it helped to make the Beijing missions self-sustained – I will divide the yearly revenue into three categories based upon their source: local, regional, and global. This will also explain why outside commentators could argue that global patronage was indeed no longer a necessity to sustain the Jesuit missions financially. Finally, I also hope to clarify which larger trends the Jesuit regional investments may have been following in the eighteenth century.

592 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 178v, f.190-193.
593 It is important to note that a fair share of the local and regional investments were to some degree funded by earlier capital from Europe.
Table 5.1 The Goods of the French Missionaries Established in China (Not Dated)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Value of Principal in French livres</th>
<th>Annual revenue in French livres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing: in shops, houses, gardens, land</td>
<td>553,930</td>
<td>46,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton: in the house of Mr. Montigny du Timeur</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India: investments via the English East Indian Company</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>9,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton: in the house of Mr. Vigny</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France: patronage via lotteries thanks to the King</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is an abbreviated version of the overview that Father Dugad made of the goods and revenue from the Beijing French mission. The origins of the investments and its revenue were Beijing, Canton, India, and France. As indicated above, I have categorized these places into: Beijing = Local, Canton and India = Regional, and France = Global. The total annual revenue is 67,814 livres.

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594 “Les Biens des Missionnaires Français Établis en Chine (Non Daté)” The overview of the goods of French missionaries is not dated, but this must be the annual revenue of 1777, 1778, or 1779. Principal: a sum of money lent or invested on which interest is paid. Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 173. See also Dehergne, “Les Biens de la Maison Française de Pékin en 1776-1778,” 263.
However, after analyzing the letters and reports of other commentators I completed and added to Dugad’s overview the regional investments. The total annual revenue is 112,814 livres.

Table 5.2 Complete Overview of the Goods of French Missionaries in Beijing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Value of Principal in French livres</th>
<th>Annual Revenue in French livres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>553,930</td>
<td>46,214</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canton: in the house of Mr. Montigny du Timeur</td>
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<td>30,000</td>
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<td>160,000</td>
<td>9,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton: in the house of Mr. Vigny</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France: patronage via lotteries thanks to the King</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the following sections I will further explain my categorization and the differences between both tables and accompanying charts.

5.4.1 Declining Importance of Global Patronage

In the finances of the French missionaries in Beijing there were several references to Louis XVI’s global patronage. There was the yearly stipend of 16,200 livres,\(^{595}\) of which Du Gad de Vitré received 1,500, Le Fevre 1,500, Bréquigny 4,200, and the actual French missions – first governed by ex-Jesuits, then Lazarists – the remaining 9,000.\(^{596}\) Compared to Portuguese patronage (that most likely did not make it to de Rougemont’s mission during the entire decades of the 1660s and the

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\(^{595}\) 1 ecu = 3 livres = 60 sou Tournois = 720 denier Tournois.

\(^{596}\) In the chart on the previous page, this amount was entered as 12,000 instead of 9,000 livres. This includes Mister Le Fevre and Mister Du Gad’s share (each received 1,500 livres). Dehergne, “Les Biens de la Maison Française de Pékin en 1776-1778,” 262. See also Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 175v. See also Camille de Rochemonteix, *Joseph Amiot et les derniers Survivants de la Mission Française a Pékin (1750-1795)* (Paris: Librairie Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1915). Mister Bréquigny was paid 4,200 livres and Mister Le Fevre 1,500 (4,200 + 1,500 + 1,500 + 9,000 = 16,200).
1670s, see chapter two), the French patronage was reliable. Sources suggest that even during the turmoil of the 1770s when the Jesuit missions were absolved, and during the 1780s, the money arrived with minimal delay every year. Only after 1792, at which time domestic chaos caused by the French revolution left all state-related matters in disarray, are there no more documents to confirm that the French king’s assistance arrived safely in China.

Despite the efficient performance of this global national network, sending money or goods from Europe to China was not yet entirely safe. In 1767, a Jesuit father reported losing over 17,000 livres somewhere on the way from France to Macao. Several other quantities of money (24,000 livres), and an even higher amount that had been invested in another Asian region, were also seemingly “missing.” Though the reason for these financial setbacks was not explicitly stated, a reasonable guess would be the increased pressure and hassling of the English. Even though the personal networks of French Jesuits and Italian missionaries praised the reliability and speed of the English network (see chapter three), this cooperation seems to have deteriorated significantly after 1760. French Jesuits were alarmed when the English took a few of their ships in 1779, and the overall sense in all letters from 1760 onwards was that the English were a powerful presence in Asia not always to be trusted. The business of all settlements in India, more specifically, was almost always decided by English needs and wants.

Losing small fortunes of global patronage at sea due to natural disasters or greedy competitors was never pleasant, but there was one advantage that the French China missions held, compared to the Portuguese China missions a century earlier. The crippling effect of financial misfortune was less devastating for the French in the late eighteenth century, thanks to the significant royal funding during the first half of that century. This had allowed the French Jesuits to invest in real estate in Qing China, which was peaceful and thriving without the political and economic disturbances that plagued seventeenth century China. Even if the English

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597 At least in comparison with the Portuguese patronage.
598 Vanves, Brotier 113, f. 3.
599 Vanves, Brotier 113, f. 72.
had damaged the French colonial maritime network in the manner in which they and the Dutch annihilated the Portuguese network a hundred years earlier, the French missions in China generated enough revenue from local sources.

Based upon Bourgeois’ numbers, global patronage accounted for only 17% of the entire budget available to the Jesuits in Beijing. It may have been even less, since Bourgeois’ budget did not include certain other regional investments from Macao, Manila, and southeast Asia that brought significant revenue to the missions in Beijing as well. If we exclude the two regional sources of revenue from Canton, then the global revenue from France (12,000 livres) accounted for almost 18% of the total income of 67,814 livres. With these two resources included, global revenue was down to 11% of the total of 112,814 livres. Somewhat similar to the importance of the local economy in de Rougemont’s case, global French patronage was dwarfed by income generated in the local economy, which in this case accounts for 68% of the total revenue (with income from Canton money excluded) or 41% (including Canton resources). As the competition between the French and English empires intensified towards the end of the eighteenth century, it endangered the transport of French global patronage. Since local income was so crucial, did it not make sense for Jesuit critics to doubt the necessity of the French king’s patronage?

5.4.2 Local Investments in Bourgeois’ Accounting Report

De Rougemont’s account book made its most interesting revelations about the local economy. Bourgeois’ source tells a similar story, revealing that the local economy provided Jesuits with the largest secure share of annual revenue. If the payments from Canton did not make it to Beijing, then the local economy would deliver the necessary funds for maintaining the mission. However, a comparison with de Rougemont’s keyhole does not hold for much longer. The lack of detail is embedded in Bourgeois’ account book.

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600 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 173. See also Dehergne, “Les Biens de la Maison Française de Pékin en 1776-1778,” 263.
Whereas de Rougemont had received significant economic aid from Chinese benefactors,\textsuperscript{601} the Chinese community was almost entirely absent in Bourgeois’ reports. Individual missionaries were also not at the heart of the spending and collecting of revenue. A few missionaries such as Gaubil and his small personal foundation for research in mathematics (34.56 taels a year), or brother de Rhodes’ gift of 200 taels used to build a pharmacy, were mentioned in passing, but only because these smaller gifts and endowments were added to become part of the annual total revenue. The total income in 1779, 6,521.51 taels, was set against the total costs of that year, 6,310.65 taels, allowing Bourgeois to calculate the profit of all the missions in Beijing that year: 123.48 taels or roughly just under 1,000 French livres.\textsuperscript{602}

It is difficult to ascertain whether this was the actual yearly profit of the missions and whether all other sources of income had been truly considered. The symbolic value of this number, however, is quite clear. Less than 1,000 livres of profit in 1779 and an equally small deficit the year before demonstrate to all critics and accountants in Europe that Jesuit missions were not a profit-driven enterprise. If anything, the modest profit may have seemed appropriate for a religious organization with an austere yet self-sufficient lifestyle, while at the same time it could be interpreted that the missions could support themselves.

\textsuperscript{601} Poor Chinese Christians were the majority of his “benefactors,” rich benefactresses such as Candida were the exception. Golvers, \textit{François de Rougemont}, 591.

\textsuperscript{602} Bourgeois made mention of a deficit of the previous year (97.43 taels), which would mean that the profit of 1779 was 113.43 taels. But he found an extra 10.05 tael worth in copper from somewhere else.
Table 5.3 Monthly Expenses of the Beijing Missions in the Year 1779\textsuperscript{603}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Received in silver</th>
<th>Received in copper</th>
<th>Spent in silver</th>
<th>Spent in copper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st moon</td>
<td>196.2</td>
<td>348,028</td>
<td>191.1</td>
<td>280,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd moon</td>
<td>220.3</td>
<td>368,830</td>
<td>126.6</td>
<td>372,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd moon</td>
<td>229.2</td>
<td>364,160</td>
<td>121.7</td>
<td>362,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th moon</td>
<td>205.2</td>
<td>321,990</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>493,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th moon</td>
<td>202.2</td>
<td>363,070</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>324,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th moon</td>
<td>265.2</td>
<td>424,440</td>
<td>146.6</td>
<td>353,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd 6th moon</td>
<td>212.4</td>
<td>358,600</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>361,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th moon</td>
<td>213.7</td>
<td>360,200</td>
<td>206.4</td>
<td>341,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th moon</td>
<td>226.9</td>
<td>383,640</td>
<td>353.18</td>
<td>574,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th moon</td>
<td>563.2</td>
<td>817,380</td>
<td>282.3</td>
<td>557,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th moon</td>
<td>483.2</td>
<td>429,480</td>
<td>337.33</td>
<td>603,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th moon</td>
<td>229.2</td>
<td>356,380</td>
<td>749.4</td>
<td>527,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th moon</td>
<td>225.7</td>
<td>591,880</td>
<td>196.9</td>
<td>484,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3472.6</td>
<td>5,488,078</td>
<td>3172.51</td>
<td>5,638,716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The records also show that during some months, such as the 11\textsuperscript{th} month, expenses were much higher than monthly income, but it is difficult to assess the reasons behind this. From the 7\textsuperscript{th} to the 11\textsuperscript{th} lunar month, in what would have been the fall season in Beijing, both the expenses and revenue increased. The largest expenses were repairs to houses, wages of the scholars and domestic staff, food, care of the sick, and the stocking of pit coal. Did this mean that these expenditures were occurring in the fall? Unfortunately, there is not enough information to explain the pattern.

\textsuperscript{603} These numbers are copied from Dehergne, “Les Biens de la Maison Française de Pékin en 1776-1778,” 256. After entering the numbers in an excel spreadsheet I noticed that Dehergne’s total of spent copper (5,648,716) was 10,000 copper coins more than mine (5,638,716). I did not have access to the original manuscript on which Dehergne based his numbers, therefore I do not know whether the mistake was made in the manuscripts or in Dehergne’s article. I tried locating the numbers in two different documents that contain the same report: Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 92r and Brotier 135, f. 211v. Both volumes have an almost perfect copy of said document with all details included except for the monthly breakdown. They both mention the totals received and spent in silver and copper. The number they give is 5,648,716 copper coins spent. I assume the total number is correct and the mistake was made somewhere in the monthly numbers.
The sums received and spent in both silver and copper give the impression that a comparison with de Rougemont’s account book and, therefore, a contribution to the understanding of the bi-metallic economy in Beijing at that time is possible. However, there are no indications as to what was purchased in silver and copper. The missionary pensions and funds of those working in the provinces were most likely paid for in silver (1,000 taels, no doubt unequally divided amongst four French ex-Jesuits and three Chinese priests). All other expenses were, as dictated by accounting’s conventions, in silver.

Table 5.4 Expenses in 1778 According to Bourgeois’ Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bourgeois’ categories</th>
<th>Price in taels</th>
<th>% of total budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good Works</td>
<td>706.13</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>579.56</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisions</td>
<td>971.1</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic costs</td>
<td>2781.38</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“One time costs”</td>
<td>1084.18</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Further costs”</td>
<td>215.3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6337.65</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See appendix E.
Ronnie Hsia has commented how European born missionaries were paid more than Chinese fathers.

At the end of the Beijing accounts of 1779, Bourgeois did include some numbers on the specific costs of two fathers – mister Bourgogne and Jules Sié – who worked and managed the missionaries’ affairs in Canton. Bourgogne paid the other missionaries in the southern provinces and bought tobacco from Portugal and wine and spirits. Jules Sié took care of numerous smaller expenses. The differences between the two remind us of the division between the procurator’s and treasurer’s tasks and responsibilities; Bourgogne made the big expenses and had a budget of 1,500 taels whereas Sié’s expenses amounted to just over 400 taels.

See appendix F for a more precise breakdown of the expenses. In the category of Good Works Bourgeois included established and non-established (temporary loans?) good works, outside catechists, church music, servants for the mass, wax for the church, assemblies of Christians and their catechists etc. Foundations: church and sacristy, baptism, schools, library, pharmacy, and mathematics. Provisions: rice, donkey feed, straw, two types of charcoal, sugar, and raisins. Domestic costs: lockers, lamp oil, house doctor, etc. One time costs: house and shop repairs, journey to Canton, curiosities, six big jars, etc. Further costs: visits to emperor, rope, wood for the oven, etc.
Bourgeois’ breakdown of the ex-Jesuit community’s expenses of 1778, as explained in table 5.4, could be compared to Alden’s patterns of expenditure of six Jesuit colleges throughout the Portuguese empire.\textsuperscript{608} Unfortunately, Bourgeois’ categories would need reformatting to make the most of this compatibility. Alden’s broad categories (such as “foodstuffs and clothing”) are spread over several, if not all, of Bourgeois’ categories. For example, in Bourgeois’ “provisions,” one finds basic staples such as rice, donkey feed (beans, straw, and bran), two types of charcoal, whitewash (white lime?), sugar, and raisins. However, the expenses for the kitchens, lamp oil, the clothing and meals of proselytes, tea, and paper are in Bourgeois’ category of “domestic costs.” Moreover, tobacco and apricot oil are in “one time costs,” and Bourgeois classifies rope, wood for the oven, and prepared meals in the house (for special guests?) in “further costs.” If I include all these specific costs under the umbrella of “foodstuffs and clothing” in order to compare it to Alden’s category, then the Beijing community spent 34% of their annual income on these expenses. Comparatively, the nine colleges of the Province of Goa, for which Alden calculated the patterns of expenditure in 1730, spent in between 17% and 60% for foodstuffs and clothing (60, 47, 47, 29, 49, 17, 30, 41, and 54%).\textsuperscript{609} Since Alden does not specify the specific breakdown of expenses within this category, comparing expenses according to category is not as meaningful as comparing individual costs. For example, health care (house doctor, 0.14%) is fairly low in Beijing in comparison to Alden’s examples in Goa (17, 5, 2, 4, 1, and 4%). Other costs, such as visits to the emperor (0.24%), language teachers (1%), house and shop reparations (4%), newspapers (0.12%), honorarium of scholars and wages of servants (7%) are either specific to the China missions or not specified in accounting sheets used by Alden. While interesting, it is not likely that more research on this topic will unearth more data to allow for meaningful comparisons.\textsuperscript{610}

\textsuperscript{608} Alden, The Making of an Enterprise, 626-628.
\textsuperscript{610} The reason for this is the scarcity and incomplete nature of sources on Jesuit finances. See appendix F for the precise percentages.
In sum, the French accounting sources do confirm that the local sources of income were more significant for maintaining balanced expenses than the financial help from global patronage or regional income. The most important difference between the finances of de Rougemont and the French Jesuit missions in Beijing is that the latter were self-sufficient thanks to revenue from local real estate investments, whereas de Rougemont, as mentioned earlier, was barely able to balance his budget and very dependent on donations of local Chinese Christians. In contrast, urban real estate made up 73% of the total value of all French Jesuit properties. Bourgeois noted that the contracts for houses and shops within Beijing cost 54,578 taels and 8 mas, 5 condorins. Lands (in three different locations) cost 10,343.55 taels and accounted for 14%, terrains and graveyards cost 5,669 taels and accounted for 7%, good works cost 2,351 taels and accounted for 3%, and gardens cost 915 taels and accounted for 1% of the total property values. Bourgeois also calculated the monthly and annual revenue of each of these five sources of local income. Revenue from houses and shops made up over 71% of the annual income.

In the context of accounting sources in both China and the Philippines, Bourgeois' source indicates that the local investments and revenue from these properties were the most important source of income by the end of the eighteenth century. The difference in the nature of the China sources of finances prohibits us from making calculations in Bourgeois’ source as precise as de Rougemont’s source allowed, however, there is a clear shift from making one’s budget balance thanks to irregular gifts from local benefactors to the monthly income of local real estate. Bourgeois’ accounting data thus confirms the conclusions reached earlier in chapter four. Similar to Núñez and the Augustine missions in Manila, Bourgeois and the French (ex)-Jesuits in Beijing relied on revenue from urban real estate to pay for the operating costs of large European religious communities in the Far East.

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611 73.9% to be precise. Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 88.
612 Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 88. 1 tael = 10 mas = 100 condorins.
613 14%, 7.7%, 3.2%, and 1.2%.
614 71.9%.
5.4.3 Regional Investments

Based on figures 5.1 and 5.2, the regional sources of income made up 14% or 48% of the total income of the Jesuit mission in Beijing, depending on the reliability of transport of said revenue. Those investigating the Jesuit finances at the time were convinced that the Jesuits in Beijing were benefitting from this revenue, and these critics (or investigators based in France) tracked them carefully so that they would not be lost to the French state. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Jesuits had invested regionally. The Portuguese Jesuits in China had kept their missions afloat in the late sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century thanks to the blossoming Macau-Nagasaki trade. After the 1670s, evidence of Jesuits’ income from equivalent regional investments is more sparse. There is no doubt that this type of investment continued to be important. Incomplete sources do not allow us to measure how important precisely. Initially, Bourgeois’ report is equally vague. However, combined with all other documents available, a more accurate picture can be reconstructed.

Bourgeois reported that the yearly revenue from Indian investments amounted to 9,600 livres, which was equivalent to just over 14% of the total income of the Jesuits in Beijing. This revenue equaled 6% rent on an investment worth 150,000 or 160,000 livres, or 20,000 Indian pagodas. It was inspected closely in at least five different letters and reports dating from 1727, 1776 (2), 1778, and 1781. The Indian investment was shipped to Canton by the EIC, who tried to stop this service in the 1770s when they saw the Jesuit order was dissolved. The English, however, were quickly persuaded to continue their collaboration with the

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615 For more on this, see chapter six and C. R. Boxer’s work.
616 See also chapter six.
618 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 136 (1727), 156r (1776), 168v (1776), 176 (1781), 193 (1778-1779).
619 See chapter six.
French Jesuits out of fear that the Jesuits would manipulate the Chinese emperor, who in turn would cut the English off from all Chinese trade.

In addition to this investment, an even larger regional source of income was one in the name of brother Montigny of Timeur in Canton for about 300,000 livres according to Bourgeois’ documents in Dehergne, but valued at 375,000 livres according to another accounting report on the missions of China and Malabar.\textsuperscript{620} While this sort of regional investment did not require any overseas transport, its tracking was not any easier.\textsuperscript{621} The brother Montigny reported that he had left all his merchandise and investments with some merchants in Canton. The annual revenue from this was 2,000 taels, or close to 15,000 livres. Montigny’s real estate investments collected annual revenue of 7 or 8\%, or close to 30,000 livres. Meanwhile, Montigny had left his post and did not want to return to China. The rent was not being paid, and no one knew what happened to the money that was being managed by unknown merchants in Canton. If both rents (15,000 and 30,000 livres) arrived in Beijing, then the importance of regional investment suddenly became equivalent to 48\%, instead of 14\%, of their total annual revenue. The French critics that were interested in finding out how to manage the real estate worth 553,930 French livres brought to light these investments and inspected them in multiple reports.\textsuperscript{622}

This income was further proof that global patronage was redundant from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards. It is also evidence that Asian

\textsuperscript{620} Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 178v. According to the author, the Jesuits were able to cash only half of that amount. See also f. 249v.
\textsuperscript{621} These investments had been left by brother Montigny and for several years no one was quite sure where they were or how to transfer them to other reliable French managers.
\textsuperscript{622} See for example Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 178, 193, 228-229, 249. This was not the only insecure regional investment. The procurator in China ordered 50 “pain d’or” (golden breads), valued at somewhere between 50,000 and 60,000 livres by abbot Lefebvre, to be sent from India to Manila. This occurred when the Portuguese dissolved the Jesuit order in India, in 1767. The Spanish dissolved the Jesuits at the same time. Perhaps this was the reason behind the China procurator’s decision to secure the funds. In this case, the regional revenue was even higher than 48\% of the total yearly revenue.
investments, local and regional, were critical for European networks such as the Jesuits at this time. This makes sense when we compare it to the way European merchant companies financed their global networks.

5.4.4 The Importance of Intra-Asian Trade to Europe in the Eighteenth Century

As previously stated, these regional investments were nothing new. Even though further research on regional investments from the Portuguese Jesuit missions in China needs to be conducted, it is my understanding that, combined with local sources, regional investments were key to self-sustaining French Jesuit missions. These Asian investments played an equally important role to the way merchant companies funded their business ventures.

The bond between the French merchant company and the French Jesuits had been strong from the time of the independent French Jesuit missions in China at the end of the seventeenth century. The profits of the French Jesuits in Asia were tied to the profits of the French merchant company because of this fixed connection. This is why, after an initial profitable period during the beginning of the eighteenth century, the French Jesuits also made an alliance with the English East India Company, seeing it was more reliable in transporting the Jesuit yearly revenue from India to China from the 1720s onwards. Jesuits in China acknowledged that the English network had become the most reliable way of transporting goods in Asia. Thanks to the ties with French and English merchants, the Jesuits’ economic

623 This research will require a thorough assessment of the information on Jesuit finances in the Lisbon archives.
624 See Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 133-135, entitled “Mission de Chine 1699-1720: Mémoire concernant les services que les Jésuites français missionnaires ont rendus [sic] aux vaisseaux et aux marchands français à la Chine.” See also chapter three.
626 See chapter three. The English East India Company was one of the important factors in the defeat of the French East India Company.
fortunes became even more reliant on these two merchant companies. This is why Jesuit investments were equally affected by the changes that these two companies had to push through in order to stay profitable during the eighteenth century.

According to economic historian Jan de Vries, “conventional wisdom” holds that merchant companies who “conveyed ‘the riches of the Indies’ to Europe” became gradually richer during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, de Vries suspects that this was not entirely correct. Gross profit margins deteriorated after 1660, the manning rates were higher, and transportation costs of goods from Asia to Europe stayed relatively stable, whereas prices of Asian goods in Europe went down. The result was that merchant companies had “two

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Menard then proceeds to classify everyone who investigated whether or not there was a transport revolution or a slight increase from 1400 to 1800 (Adam Smith, Karl Marx, J.H. Parry, Fernand Braudel, Niels Steensgaard, Ralph Davis, Douglas North, etc.). Would it be too simplistic to, rather than trying to calculate the increase of productivity in transport, note that it all comes down to whether or not there was a revolution in the ship used for transport at that time? In this case, Richard Unger’s idea that shipbuilding saw two great inventions/revolutions – one with the emergence of the full-rigged or Atlantic ship in the middle of the fifteenth century and one with the steamship in the nineteenth century – may help us define whether or not there was a transport revolution in the eighteenth century. Richard Unger, The Ship in the Medieval Economy, 600-1600 (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1980), 216. As Menard pointed out, it could also help us to delineate the early modern world period in time (1450 to 1800). Unfortunately, Steensgaard and Menard reject this with convincing arguments. Menard, “Was there a Transport Revolution?,” 249.

629 De Vries, “The Limits of Globalization in the Early Modern World,” 724-726. See also Jan de Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia: A Quantitative Analysis of the Cape-route Trade, 1497-1795,” in Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800,
significant ways to escape this squeeze of profitability.” They could engage in intra-Asian trade and supplement its trading revenue with political revenue.\textsuperscript{630} The idea that intra-Asian trade was crucial to long-distance European networks is not new.\textsuperscript{631} Niels Steensgaard puts it as follows: “The long-term viability of the Portuguese and later the Dutch, English, French, and Danish companies was determined by their ability to engage in intra-Asian trade.”\textsuperscript{632} The most pertinent example of European merchant companies engaging in Asian trade was the opium trade. The English and Dutch companies were successful in combining both escape techniques, whereas the French were not.\textsuperscript{633} This explains why eventually the English East India Company transported the Jesuits’ Indian revenue, and not the French Company.

Smaller companies followed the example set by the Dutch and English. The Ostend Company was dissolved in 1730 due to the combined efforts of the VOC and the EIC. However, the factory in Banquibazar existed for another fifteen years due to the intra-Asian trade that was generated with the efforts of the French governor Dupleix.\textsuperscript{634} Intra-Asian trade helped recoup the high factory costs, and seemed to

\textsuperscript{630} De Vries, “The Limits of Globalization in the Early Modern World,” 726. Political revenue can be obtained through taxes. The English did this after the battle at Plassey, when they started taxing the Bengal province.

\textsuperscript{631} “It may well be that European historiography has overemphasized the role of the Europeans in Asia, but already for many years the historians of trade have recognized the sizeable volume of the native Asian trade, in which the Europeans could only try to gain their share.” Ernst van Veen, \textit{Decay of Defeat? An Inquiry into the Portuguese Decline in Asia, 1580-1645} (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2000), 8.


\textsuperscript{633} De Vries, “The Limits of Globalization in the Early Modern World,” 728. French private traders were successful in the second half of the seventeenth century but by this time the official French \textit{Compagnie des Indes} had already ceased to exist.

have played an increasingly important role in the overall financial well-being of every European merchant company.\footnote{Not surprisingly historians such as C.A. Bayly, S. Subrahmanym and A. Wink have revised earlier views of eighteenth-century India as a period in which both political and economic structures were in rapid decline. See Patrick Manning, “Asia and Europe in the World Economy: Introduction,” The American Historical Review 107:2 (2002): xi.}

It is in this context that we should understand the importance of the Jesuit regional investments. The detailed information provided in Bourgeois’ accounting sheets and the increasing value of the investments suggests that the French Jesuits in Beijing, just like the European merchant companies with which they were in close cooperation, relied on regional revenue.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the surviving Jesuit account books, in particular Bourgeois’. I aimed to analyze the data and untangle the threads that reveal the local, regional, and global sources of their finances. Brought in context with earlier China accounting sources and the manual for procurators and treasurers discussed in chapter four, Bourgeois’ account book demonstrated that the finances of the French Jesuit missions in Beijing were sustained in their operating costs by local and regional investments. The scarcity of sources on religious finances in the Far East may not allow us to chart precisely when the shift from dependence on gifts of local benefactors to financially self-sustaining missions relying on revenue from rental properties occurred, but, by the 1770s, the French Jesuit community in Beijing had achieved the equilibrium envisioned by Niccolò Longobardo in 1612. A stable Chinese economic and political environment in combination with the accumulation of properties over eighty years of mission building resulted in a sizeable community independent from the still persisting challenges of early modern world travel. Again, incomplete sources do not permit historians to determine whether the French Jesuits’ cooperation with the French state from 1690 until 1705 rendered enough start-up capital to make Longobardo’s
strategy successful right from the beginning of the eighteenth century, or, whether the patronage of the Qing emperors and the environment they provided played a bigger role. Unfortunately, I have also not found sources on the Portuguese Jesuit missions that would allow me to compare both the French and Portuguese Jesuit possessions during the 1770s. Chapter six will further examine the different categories of Portuguese and French Jesuit missions’ finances and each state’s perception of the patronage they supplied to their nation’s Jesuit missions in China. This chapter has also analyzed the French Jesuits’ regional investments, and argued that they followed a larger trend of economic behavior amongst Europeans trading in Asia during the eighteenth century. This analysis has helped me to highlight the importance of local history within long-distance connections and to reposition the importance of local and regional elements in the financial networks of the China Jesuits in the early modern world.636

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636 Consonant with the abstract of a research project, entitled Exchanges of Economic and Political ideas since 1750, under the supervision of Emma Rotschild at the Center for History and Economics, Harvard University: “Large-scale or transnational history has at the same time suggested extraordinarily rich sources of evidence for a new history of economic life. One reason is that by increasing the scale of historical investigation, which has liberated historians from the confining classifications of national historiography, transnational histories have impinged on other confining identities, including classifications into social history, economic history, intellectual history, cultural history, and political history. The increase in scale may in turn have freed historians to rediscover biography, prosopography, and the narratives of individual lives; a macro-turn which has made possible a micro-turn, or a new micro-history of long-distance connections.” http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~histecon/exel/objective.html. Accessed March 10, 2011.
Chapter 6: Portuguese Patronage and French Patronage

6.1 Introduction

This chapter maintains the focus on the importance of real estate to the overall finances of Jesuit missions during the eighteenth century, and, in line with chapter five, the central source material is the volumes in the Brotier collection in combination with an examination of Fortunato Margiotti’s groundbreaking chapter seventeen on Jesuit finances in his Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738 published in 1958. Building upon Margiotti’s study and the reports on the goods of the French Jesuit missions used in chapter five, this chapter explores the perspective of the French state on real estate across the world, worth over half a million French livres, and compares the patronage that two European states, Portugal and France, provided to the Society of Jesus. How did state patrons envision the mutual obligations brought forth by their patronage, and how did state patrons plan to extend ownership over the wealth produced by their patronage? What were the financial consequences for the Jesuit missions in China of Louis XIV’s “challenge to the economic and ecclesiastical dominance that Portugal ha[d] so long enjoyed in maritime Asia?”

This chapter analyzes the differences and similarities between the way the French and the Portuguese states financed their Jesuit missions in China using the following four categories: pensions, real estate (and the sense of ownership over them), scientific materials, and commerce. The first two categories display the most significant financial differences between Portuguese patronage and French patronage. The third category indicates the Portuguese and French patrons’ different perceptions of the role of the missionary, whereas a lack of state patronage

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637 Margiotti, Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738, 367-417. See also chapter one.
638 Florence Hsia, Sojourners in a Strange Land: Jesuits & their Scientific Missions in Late Imperial China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 51.
drove both the Jesuits working under Portuguese patronage and French patronage to exploit the commercial opportunities available in Asian economies.639

Chapter six argues that the French Jesuit missions were financed differently than the Portuguese Jesuit missions in China in two aspects. Firstly, the French state and Jesuits had a strong sense of national ownership over their properties in China, which manifested itself most prominently at the beginning and the end of the French Jesuit missions in China (1685 to 1700 and 1773 to 1785). Secondly, the French Jesuit missions did not engage in the Nagasaki-Macao related commerce controlled by the Portuguese (and later the Dutch), but rather turned to the English to help them transport profits made in other Asian markets. This second point was not the result of a different approach in state patronage, but was due to changing papal policies regarding missionary trade in East Asia and changing commercial opportunities for Europeans in Asia from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. These conclusions correspond to and expand upon my analysis in chapters four and five of the increased role of revenue invested in Asian real estate managed by the Jesuit communities during the eighteenth century.

Jesuit scholars have studied the Portuguese and the French states as separate patrons of the Society of Jesus.640 Few scholars have concentrated on the role this patronage played in the overall material assets of the Jesuits in China, and, until now, no specific attention has been paid to a comparison of the different approaches the Portuguese and the French had when it came to their financial patronage of the Society. Part of the reason for this lack of scrutiny is that the available material on the Jesuit finances in China and the connection to the state is held in numerous collections and archives. As Noel Golvers pointed out, the sources themselves are often fragmentary and incomplete as well.641 In addition, scholarship on Jesuits in China has been divided along national lines, as pointed out in the introduction. The only historians who have studied the Portuguese state’s financial support in a

639 See also Clossey, “Distant Souls,” 400.
640 For example, Dauril Alden, Fortunato Margiotti, and, in a way, Jean-Pierre Duteil and Florence Hsia.
641 Golvers in Handbook of Christianity in China, 290.
systematic way are Dauril Alden and Fortunato Margiotti. Historians of science have studied the French state’s patronage from the perspective of the Jesuits as royal scientists, and how this royal support was related to the overall finances and material possessions of the French Jesuits in China.642

6.1.1 Previous Scholarship on the Portuguese Patronage

Alden’s *The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal, its Empire and Beyond, 1540-1750* (1996) argues persuasively that the Society of Jesus was interwoven with the Portuguese imperial economy. This meant that their finances were an inherent part of a worldwide economy that thrived in an early modern world global contact, spanning all continents and seas. Even though Alden is aware of the decline and collapse of Portuguese authority and empire towards the end of the seventeenth century, the people responsible for the economic well-being of the Jesuit enterprise looked for alternatives before 1700.643 Early on, the Jesuits’ reliance on Portuguese patronage, or *padroado*, diversified to more secure financial support systems such as private commerce between the different markets in the East or rent of houses and properties.644 In previous chapters, this dissertation has sought to illustrate more clearly Alden’s premise that there is no basis for the characterization of the Society of Jesus as a single organism: there was a great deal of friction among the large Jesuit groups of different national affinities, between different missionary provinces, and even between individual members of the order.


643 See chapter three for more information on which alternative patrons the Jesuits (partly) replaced the Portuguese with.

644 The work of Charles Boxer (for example his *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the old Japan Trade, 1555-1640*) shows the temporary nature of the Jesuit commercial ventures at an early stage. See also below.
This was especially the case at a time when the increasing European competition for the Asian market forced the Jesuit infrastructure to search for new patrons and safer networks to bind itself to in order to maintain continued financial support for its missions. The most manifest example of a change of state patrons and their patronages was the establishment of the independent French Jesuit missions in China at the beginning of the eighteenth century with the French state as their patron and network provider. Since Alden relied on primary Portuguese sources in general, and mostly secondary sources for the Far East (because financial records for the Portuguese Jesuit missions in China are fairly scattered and incomplete as mentioned above), this is where a more complete picture of Jesuit financial structure in China can be given. Louis XIV's desire to expand France's influence towards the Far East affected the Society's global communication and financial networks.\textsuperscript{645} When studying the Jesuit network in East Asia, a closer investigation of the split of the Portuguese and French China missions and the financial consequences can supplement Alden's study of the Society's global management of human and financial resources.

The other scholar who has paid particular attention to state financial support for the Society of Jesus is Fortunato Margiotti. In 1958 Margiotti published his findings on the financial resources of the Jesuit mission in China in his “Capitolo 17: Finanze” of Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle origine al 1738. The fifty-page long chapter was, according to the Handbook of Christianity in China (2001), considered the most complete synopsis on Jesuit finances. Margiotti described each different religious corporation according to its financial dependency. He divided them into three groups: the Portuguese Jesuits of the vice province of China which were dependent on the Portuguese padroado, the Spanish mendicant orders whose needs were provided for by the Spanish Crown, and the Propaganda Fide missionaries,

\textsuperscript{645} An example of these changing international finances was studied in the previous chapter, namely Verjus' meddling in transferring German patronage from Lisbon to Paris.
which were subject to the Holy Congregation of the Propaganda. After Margiotti outlined three divisions (Portuguese Jesuits, Spanish mendicants, and Propaganda missionaries), he made a short reference to the French Jesuits. He wrote that he could have added to his repertoire the French missionaries who were dependent financially on the French treasury, but, “trattandosi di poca entità” [being of slight importance], he decided to simply add them to their Portuguese fellow Jesuits.

Before the reign of the Kangxi emperor (1661-1722) the French Jesuit missionaries were the fourth-biggest national group. After the establishment of the independent French Jesuit missions in China in 1701, the French Jesuits became the second-biggest group of missionaries working in China. According to the numbers of Jean-Pierre Duteil, France was sending almost twice as many Jesuits as Portugal in the period from 1650 to 1700 (159 vs. 81). All French Jesuits were paid for by the French state. In comparing the finances of the French Jesuits and the Portuguese Jesuits, this chapter develops Alden’s scholarship and expands upon Margiotti’s study to provide a more systematic study of overall Jesuit finances in China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The overall structure of Margiotti’s chapter focused on the different categories of financial Jesuit support. Margiotti’s five categories of Jesuit finances are (1) commerce, (2) regional pensions, (3) interest rates from houses and lands, (4) financial help from the Jesuit province of Japan, (5) and the interest the Jesuits reaped from large foundations established for the benefit of the China missions in

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646 Margiotti, *Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738*, 367. Propaganda Fide was founded in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV with the aim of spreading Christianity and making sure the Christian message was not corrupted by heresy in those places where Christianity had already spread. The Congregation’s task was to organize all missionary activity of the church.


648 Dehergne, *Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine*, 397-403. For the period of 1685 until 1723, the numbers of French and Portuguese Jesuits are almost identical (86 and 89).

Europe.\textsuperscript{650} This type of categorization and Margiotti’s overall structure of Jesuit finances explains why he overlooks the differences between French and Portuguese state patronage. The French missions extracted financial support from the same categories as did the Portuguese Jesuit missions, except for one (they never received financial help from the Jesuit province of Japan). Even within each of Margiotti’s categories though (except for category 4), there are some differences, which become even clearer if one rearranges the categories a little. My chapter will highlight these differences and similarities according to the following four sources of funds: state pensions, properties, scientific materials, and commerce. I have arranged the categories in this order to facilitate my examination of French and Portuguese state patronage of the Jesuit missions.

6.2 Pensions

A regular source of income, paid from state patronage, was regional pensions or yearly stipends.\textsuperscript{651} After the French and Portuguese Jesuit missions were separated in 1701, their finances and the payment of pensions became independent as well.\textsuperscript{652,653}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738}, 368.
\item Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738}, 377-378 and 393-395.
\item In the 1690s the mission procurator Antoine Verjus complained that the Portuguese deliberately did not pay the French fathers their pensions, and that Father Magelhaes, confessor of the king of Portugal, should do something about that (especially since it was French royal money that was withheld from French Jesuits). ARSI, FG 730", f. 382. Before the French and Portuguese Jesuit missions in China became independent, Louis XIV sent a letter to the Portuguese king to reassure him that all French fathers would obey their Portuguese superiors when working in missions in the East. This could explain why the French fathers could not disobey their Portuguese superiors in China, and the French had to hand over their king’s patronage. The Portuguese superiors also had the power to overrule Louis XIV’s stipulation that all five French fathers should work at the Kangxi court. Pereira, the Portuguese superior, picked deliberately the two French fathers with the least scientific skills to stay at the court and sent the others to proselytize in Chinese provinces (French Jesuits state that this was deliberate).
\item However, according to Margiotti the four French Jesuits who were working in the Shanxi province (Le Comte, Visdelou, Tartre and Contançin) were sometimes paid
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
6.2.1 Chronological Overview of the Value of State Pensions

In the beginning of the seventeenth century the Jesuits living in Beijing received seventy-two taels annually, and Jesuits living in other residences in the provinces slightly less.\textsuperscript{654} After the Nanjing persecution, the stipend was reduced to about fifty taels for those living in Beijing and forty-five for the others. This number increased very slowly over the seventeenth century to fifty taels for Jesuits living within a larger residence and sixty taels for Jesuits living independently in the provinces.\textsuperscript{655} The costs of a one-man residence were considered higher. The pensions were initially calculated according to the prices of food and housing during the late Ming.\textsuperscript{656} This was sufficient for missionaries at that time, but both domestic political changes such as the dynastic transition and global economic disruptions such as the changes in the import of silver unsettled the missionary’s daily spending and annual budget.\textsuperscript{657} Added to that were the serious interruptions in the payment of state pensions. In 1644, the vice-provincial of China reported that his enterprise

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\textsuperscript{654} Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738}, 393-394. The information of the following sentences comes from this section as well.

\textsuperscript{655} ARSI, FG 722, int. 3-16.

\textsuperscript{656} For a collection of food and housing prices, see Golvers, \textit{François de Rougemont}. Throughout the Jesuit sources there is abundant anecdotal evidence on prices, however, no historian has yet collected and analyzed this material into a coherent or exhaustive price study.

\textsuperscript{657} Another disruptive event was the banishment of all but four Jesuits to Canton during the 1660s. The devastation (in each province affecting missionaries and their properties) that accompanied the Manchu invasion is described in the annual letters of 1651 and 1652 (composed by Mathias da Maya?). See ARSI, JapSin 117, ff. 76r-104v. Similarly, the 1649 annual letters complained that contact with Macao had been interrupted for three years and the temporal sustenance that came from there. See synopsis Francis Rouleau Archives, ANNUA SJ China, 1649, based on JA, 49-V-13, f. 480r.
had not received any pensions for more than thirty years and that the arrears then stood at 18,000,000 reals, or roughly fifteen times its annual income.⁶⁵⁸ These pressures affected all Jesuits working under the Portuguese patronage.

In 1666 the missionaries settled in Canton requested from their superiors that the budget be raised to one hundred taels, and when Father Prosper Intorcetta visited Rome in 1672, he asked for the pension to be raised to one hundred taels or one hundred Spanish patacoons (which equaled sixty-six taels) for those missionaries that did not need to make excursions to far distant missions.⁶⁵⁹ It is unlikely that the Portuguese state immediately responded to this request. In September 1681 the Flemish Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688) complained that the pension would still only cover one third or one fourth of actual annual expenses.⁶⁶⁰ Noel Golvers confirmed Verbiest’ estimate in his monograph on François de Rougemont’s finances.⁶⁶¹ De Rougemont worked alone in the mission of Changshu, Zhejiang province, and received sixty taels annually, whereas his actual expenses were estimated at 231 taels. Golvers’ estimate illustrates that the annual pensions of the Portuguese vice-province were still lacking considerably. The situation was not about to improve: for the Changshu’s mission specifically, the pension went down to fifty taels a year in 1703. Only in 1719 did the stipend go up to eighty taels for all missionaries working under Portuguese patronage, and in 1729 the missionaries finally received one hundred taels.⁶⁶² This may have been enough for Jesuits working in Canton and Beijing, Margiotti continued, but for missionaries in the interior, who easily had four or five domestic servants to maintain as well, it was still far from enough. It is not clear what happened to these

⁶⁵⁹ Golvers, François de Rougemont, 594. Intorcetta’s division aimed to give Jesuits working on their own in geographically large Christian communities more money than Jesuits working in, for example, Beijing.
⁶⁶⁰ Jossan & Willaert, p. 354. See also Margiotti, Golvers.
⁶⁶¹ Golvers, François de Rougemont, 393-396.
⁶⁶² Margiotti, Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738, 395.
pensions from 1729 onwards until the dissolution of the Society of Jesus in the Portuguese empire in 1759.663

Right from the start the French Jesuits were paid approximately one hundred taels, and, as such, they were the envy of those Jesuits working under the Portuguese padroado.664 However, the differences between Portuguese and French state patronage with regards to annual pensions were not that significant during the first half of the eighteenth century. Whereas the state patronage of the Portuguese Jesuits became increasingly uncertain towards the second half of the eighteenth century due to the disconnect between the Portuguese state and the Portuguese Jesuits, the French Jesuits and ex-Jesuits (French Jesuit missionaries who were still working and living in China after 1773) expected and were given higher pensions.665 Louis Antoine de Poirot (1735-1813) asked for a 500 taels annual pension; 400 taels for the actual pension and another one hundred taels for security.666 This example demonstrates that the differences and state support at the end of the eighteenth century, when the Society of Jesus was dissolved in Portugal (1759), in France (1762), and then globally (1773), indicate that there was a more important difference in annual pensions. The higher French pensions during the 1760s, 1770s,

663 Chinese Jesuits working under the Portuguese padroado were paid significantly less, namely sixty pieces of eight. See Margiotti, Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738, 395. See also APF, SOCG 1722-1723, vol. 16, ff. 951-954. The very same thing happened to Chinese priests that belonged to Propaganda Fide. Based upon the letters of Nic. Simonetti, procurator of Propaganda missions in Canton, every father with a Chinese name was paid significantly less in comparison with a father with a European name (200 or 250 taels versus 85 taels). ASV, Missioni 111, 4th bundle of documents.
664 ARSI, JapSin 171, f.2r. This document describes certain financial transactions between different French Jesuits from October 1707 until April 1708. See also Margiotti, Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738, 396.
666 Rochemonteix, Joseph Amiot, 400. These pensions were considered too high by some unnamed contemporaries, but they compare favorably with the amounts of money the French state paid to the members of the Parisian Royal Academy of Sciences one hundred years earlier, of which the first six French Jesuits sent to China, were members. See Alice Stroup, A Company of Scientists: Botany, Patronage, and Community at the Seventeenth-Century Parisian Royal Academy of Sciences (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1990), table 1.
and the first half of the 1780s are linked with the second category, properties and assets, and the French state’s effort to extend ownership and control over these French Jesuit properties and assets accumulated in China.

6.3 Real Estate: Properties and Assets

Both the French missionaries and their patron state defined the limits to their royal patronage differently than the Portuguese did with their padroado. The Portuguese padroado was “a combination of the rights, privileges, and duties granted by the Papacy to the Crown of Portugal as patron of the Roman Catholic missions and ecclesiastical establishments in vast regions of Africa, of Asia, and in Brazil.” Until 1687 all Jesuits, from every nationality, worked under Portuguese patronage. Though the Portuguese attempted to fill the missionary posts with Portuguese fathers, they were one of the most sparsely populated countries in Europe in the sixteenth century, with a population of 1.3 million inhabitants. They had no other choice but to allow Jesuits from different nations to travel and work in their colonies. The French did not have to provide missionaries for the entirety of Asia. As such, the national diversity of missionaries aboard French ships was very different from Portuguese ships. On the first three French voyages a total of twenty-eight missionaries embarked, all of whom were French apart from one Italian. After the French Jesuits reached the shores of China, their state’s patronage and whether it included non-French Jesuits similarly dictated their views on the French Jesuit properties and assets in China.


668 Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825*, 309. See also Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, 25. At this time the Spanish kingdoms had 7 million inhabitants, France 14 and England 3 million. In 1619 Lisbon was the third ranking metropolis in Europe with 165,000 inhabitants.

669 The Italian missionary was the painter Giovanni Gherardini (1654-1723).
6.3.1 Separation and Protection of State Patronage at the Start of the French Jesuit China Missions

In 1706, Antoine Verjus\textsuperscript{670} insisted that royal patronage should be separated from the finances that were meant for other Jesuits who were not French. Verjus also wanted to separate the funds he had re-channeled from the bishop of Münster, Ferdinand Von Fürstenberg.\textsuperscript{671} His reasoning was that, since there were more French missionaries than Jesuits from all other nationalities combined, the French should receive most of the money. They also needed it more than the others: perhaps Verjus’ reasoning was that the French Jesuits were mathematicians and scientists who required extra money for carrying out these functions and who needed start-up capital unlike the Portuguese who were well established (and taken care of by both the Chinese and Portuguese states). Verjus was afraid that if they shared the funds or pensions, this would “take away from the houses that the French had recently built.”\textsuperscript{672} This way the Portuguese profited from money that was not intended for them. For it was clearly stipulated in the original contract with Ferdinand Von Fürstenberg that Portuguese Jesuits could not use Fürstenberg’s money.\textsuperscript{673} Fathers from Germany, Flanders, and the Lorraine could use any money that the French did not use. While French missionaries and procurators advocated the separation of finances and patronage, the Portuguese missions on the other hand still included members from all other nations, who were able to continue working under Portuguese patronage.

\textsuperscript{670} See chapter three.

\textsuperscript{671} See chapter three. ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 173v.

\textsuperscript{672} ARSI, Galliae 112, f. 173v. The link here between pensions and properties is telling but perhaps premature. I suspect that the buildings the French Jesuits owned during the 1690s were more a consequence of Kangxi’s goodwill (he gave the French Jesuits lands) than they were the result of investments from French state patronage (even though this may have built up fast). See below.

\textsuperscript{673} It would be interesting to know whether Von Fürstenberg or Verjus came up with this stipulation. ARSI, Galliae 112, f.121v.
6.3.2 Properties during the 1690s

In the 1690s the French Jesuits in Beijing were living in the house that they received from the Kangxi emperor in 1693, after curing the emperor from a fever (caused by a malaria attack) with quinine.\(^{674}\) As explained in chapter three, Portuguese Jesuits complained to no avail about the French Jesuits’ sole right to this property.\(^{675}\) An anonymous French visitor who served under the Portuguese ambassador confirmed that only French Jesuits inhabited the house in Beijing.\(^{676}\) He was pleasantly surprised to see eight of his countrymen living together in a beautiful house, constructed by the liberality of the French king. This suggested that the divide was between the French and all the rest. More so than the Portuguese the French Jesuits wanted to separate themselves from all other nationalities right from the start when it came to housing. Additionally, these properties were not just for the French Jesuits to live in, but they were also valuable rental investments. The French wanted their investments to be separate from the Portuguese Jesuit missions.

A feeling of nationalistic animosity or the anxiety to separate Jesuits working under different patronages did not taint all relationships between the French and the Portuguese. When the Portuguese ambassador reached Beijing in 1727, he also paid a visit to the French Jesuit missions and showed them the presents that the French king had given him, and they drank together to the health of both kings.\(^{677}\) Apart from this house, the French also built their own church with funds from both the French king and the Chinese emperor. Foucquet explained that the house in which the French lived was supported considerably and made bigger thanks to the French king. From the beginning, state patronage towards the French Jesuit


\(^{675}\) See chapter three, section 3.5.3.2.

\(^{676}\) This was an anonymous report. See Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 19r+v. No other mission station was exclusively French.

\(^{677}\) Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 19r+v.
missions came then from two different states, much the same as was the case with the Portuguese Jesuit missions. Both Kangxi and Louis XIV financed the French possessions, but perhaps the Portuguese Jesuits regarded possessions such as the house and the piece of land on which eventually the BeiTAG church would be erected as owned by the Chinese state, and, as such, Portuguese Jesuits had as much right to make use of it as Jesuits working under French patronage. The French Jesuits on the other hand considered that gift from the Chinese state as one that made it property of the French state, especially since it had been enhanced significantly thanks to direct funds from Louis XIV. Eighty years later, in the 1770s, this issue of ownership and the way national patronage was understood caused much more trouble when the Society of Jesus was dissolved.

6.3.3 Properties during the 1770s

The discussions and hostility concerning material possessions that accompanied the birth of the French Jesuit missions in China in the beginning of the seventeenth century came back eighty years later, when the Society was dissolved by papal order. The issue of who exactly owned which missions was one that mirrored the earlier fight over possessions. Again there was a clear French-versus-the-rest divide. In the eyes of both French missionaries such as Jean-Joseph-Marie Amiot (1718-1793), François Bourgeois (1723-1792), and the French authorities represented by the minister of state Henri Léonard Jean Baptiste Bertin (1720-1792), all the possessions of the French mission in Beijing were under constant attack by both the Portuguese and the Propaganda Fide missionaries. In order to safeguard them, it was crucial that the French Jesuit missions were taken over by other French subjects who belonged to different Catholic orders.

In 1773 pope Clement XIV suppressed the Society of Jesus with his brief Dominus ac Redemptor, and this dissolution was promulgated in China two years later. Rumors abounded before the news had reached Macao officially. The weight of

678 Rochemonteix, Joseph Amiot et les derniers Survivants de la Mission Française à Pékin (1750-1795), 49.
the impending doom took its toll on the remaining Jesuits. Father Michel Benoist (1715-1774) wrote just before his death that he feared the news from Macao more than the fatigues of travel. When there was finally no more doubt, all Jesuits were devastated by the news. In a letter to Bertin, Joseph Amiot described this loss of identity and immediately revealed that he was saddened and nauseated, and that his “French heart revolted against the thought that the goods of the French mission would be taken over by foreigners.” Similarly, in another letter to the administrator of a porcelain factory in Sévres, Amiot wrote that they may no longer be Jesuits, but they were still French. As soon as the French Jesuits knew that the possibility existed that fathers who were not Jesuits but also not French would take over their French houses, they started writing about this outrage to their correspondents in France. It was crucial to them that all these possessions of the French missions in Beijing were seen as direct possessions of the French king, and as such should be looked after and inhabited by his subjects, whether or not they were (ex) Jesuits. Amiot complained to Bertin that it would be “the last insolence if their church, their library, their observatory [clearly Gaubil’s wishes had been granted by France at some point], their instruments, and their house where everywhere one could see the different symbols of France, would now fall into the hands of the Italian, Portuguese, and German fathers…”

Jesuits such as Amiot convinced powerful political figures such as Henri Bertin that the French king should also care about this and send more money to ensure that ex-Jesuit procurators both in Paris and in China secured his possessions. It was not just a financial issue however. A letter from October 1774 (and an accompanying note from August 1775) reveals that Amiot understood the rumors about the imminent destruction of the Society of Jesus to be true. Amiot also

679 Vanves, Brotier 113, f. 44.
680 Rochemonteix, Joseph Amiot et les derniers Survivants de la Mission Française a Pékin (1750-1795), 153.
681 Rochemonteix, Joseph Amiot et les derniers Survivants de la Mission Française a Pékin (1750-1795), 198. 1st of November 1774, before the news was officially known.
682 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 140.
believed that the bull stated that all Jesuit missions would be transferred to the Propaganda Fide missions. Louis Le Febvre (1706-1783), the superior of the French missions in China who resided in Canton at that time, informed Amiot about these developments. Le Febvre in turn received word from Father Mosac (1704-1784), the superior general of the French Jesuit mission in India. Mosac discussed the same problem of the French missions passing into the hands of a non-French bishop because of the papal bull in India. Both Amiot and Mosac wanted to suggest to Bertin that they would rather hand over their missions to the *Missions étrangères de Paris* than to the Propaganda missions. It would simply be “more natural to associate French with French instead of with Italians.” Since to Amiot’s knowledge the papal bull stated otherwise, the former Jesuits would need the help of the French minister of foreign affairs. Unfortunately for the Jesuits, the political climate in France had been very hostile to them after the 1750s. The Society was suppressed in France in 1762. They would need a powerful political figure that was willing to rally his resources in favour of their cause. And this is where Henri Bertin came in.

Henri Bertin started his official career as a lawyer in Bordeaux before being named lieutenant general of the police in Paris (1757-1759). Bertin became secretary of state from 1762 to 1780, and one of his duties was responsibility over the French East India Company. He was also an honorary member of the Academy of Sciences (1761) and the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (1772). Bertin was fascinated by China and he remained favorable to the Jesuits after 1762. He did not participate in the violent measures taken against them by the duke of Choiseul and other members of the ministry. Bertin continued to lobby with the king in favor of the Jesuits, and he used his influence to carry forward Amiot’s and Mosac’s ideas on what should happen to the ex-Jesuit possessions in China.

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684 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 154v.
685 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 152v.
To illustrate the reality of his fears concerning different nationalities taking over from the French Amiot reported the following story in 1776. The year before a German Carmelite named Father Joseph de Sainte Thérèse, who was a missionary of the Propaganda Fide of about thirty years and at that time residing in Beijing, came to the French house to show them the bull of destruction of the order of the bishop of Nanjing. The latter proposed that the Jesuits sign over their church, house, and everything that was of use to the French Jesuits to the domain of the pope, or, in effect, to him. Bertin’s help was urgently needed. Amiot continued his story saying how the Jesuits had answered Father de Saint Thérèse that they could not do such a thing and part with any of their domains without the consent of the French king and the Chinese emperor, since everything they owned was because of the liberality of these “two great princes” who had given it to them because they were French rather than because they were Jesuits. Amiot also added that they had signed an authentic promise “not to alienate anything” and to conserve the mission (exactly) and how it was to be handed over into the hands of those that were designated their successors. The Carmelite Father seemed satisfied with this answer. The French Jesuits bought some time, but the pressure to find their ideal successors was on. In a note attached to the letter, Bertin expressed that in his own personal opinion, the Jesuits had dealt with the situation in the right way. He on his side would see if minister Sartine (1729-1801), secretary of state of the Navy, could do anything to prevent this sort of conflict with Lisbon and Rome.

The choices for succession were not that numerous. To avoid Portuguese and papal take-over, the successors had to be French. A second very important condition

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687 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 158.
688 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 158v. “Nous répondîmes que n’étant que les administrateurs du temporal de la mission française, il ne nous appartenait pas d’en céder le domaine sans le consentement du roi de France et de l’Empereur de la Chine, parce que tout ce que nous avions ici, nous le tenions de la libéralité de ces deux grands Princes qui nous l’ont donné comme à des français plutôt que comme à des Jésuites. Nous ajoutâmes que nous signerions une promesse authentique de ne rien aliéner, et de conserver la mission tel qu’elle est, pour être remise ensuite entre les mains de ceux qui seraient désignés nos successeurs. Le P. Carme parut satisfait et nous rendit sur le champ, au nom de M. de Nankin les approbations que nous venions de perdre par l’intention du Bref.”
was that whoever took over the missions in Beijing had to demonstrate a deep interest and commitment to the sciences that would carry on the Jesuits’ work for both the French king and the Chinese emperor. This was at least the way Amiot saw it. While looking for these French successors and paying attention to Italian and Portuguese “vultures,” the danger came from within: two competing French factions, one of which wanted to divide up the properties and part ways. According to a memoir of 1782, this division between individual French missionaries was even worse for the overall financial situation of the ex-Jesuit missions than the division between different kingdoms.

6.3.4 Chaos in the Jesuit Hierarchy

As the Society was dissolved, the pope ordered that the authority of all Jesuit superiors came to an end, in both ecclesiastical and temporal matters. The superior of the French mission in China up to 1773 was François Bourgeois (1723-1792), and, though he gave up his position as superior as soon as the Society was dissolved, he continued to administer the goods of the French missions. His functions as superior before the dissolution and his function as “economic” after 1773, appointed by the king, overlapped, which meant that he was in charge continuously until 1781. This situation, and no doubt other matters that had been bubbling beneath the surface before the suppression of the Society of Jesus, was not to the likening of three other French Jesuits, namely Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Grammont

689 On the difference between Portuguese and French scientists-missionaries and the way they envisioned their work, see Florence Hsia, *Sojourners in a Strange Land*.  
690 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 140-145.  
691 Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 107. Memoir of Amiot. The situation must have been bad if he recognized this strife to be more dangerous than the intrusions of other nationalities. Perhaps they had backed off in the 1780s.  
693 Joseph Krah, *China Missions in Crisis*, 263.  
694 Rochemonteix, *Joseph Amiot*, 210. Economic seems to have been the new French term for procurator or treasurer, however, the titles procurator, treasurer, or administrator were still in use as well.
(1736-1812?), Louis Antoine de Poirot (1735-1813), and Jean-Matthieu Tournu Ventavon (1733-1787). The main issue of their dispute revolved around the authority to manage the goods of their mission, and how and when they should be distributed. Bourgeois’ opponents wanted the property to be controlled by a board of administrators instead of one administrator (under whose absolute authority they had been living for years up until the Society’s suppression), and they were keen to divide up the revenue of the mission among the different French missionaries. According to Bertin and Bourgeois these three French ex-Jesuits (Grammont, Poirot, and Ventavon) were too eager to cut up the French possessions, which was against the will of its true owner, the French king. Accusations flew. In 1780 Bertin characterized the three dissident fathers as “priests with anti-French principles.”

At the same time, Ventavon accused the old administrator (Bourgeois) of having set aside up to 5,000 taels a year for his own expenses.

Before any discontinuation of state patronage Louis XVI sent a patent (brevet) to China to re-institute Bourgeois as the administrator of the French missions in Beijing. At the same time a Chinese ex-Jesuit, Etienne Yang Laforest (1733-1798?), was nominated procurator of the French missions by the king. Ventavon’s faction never accepted the patent since it was missing the king’s seal. They wrongly assumed that Bourgeois had forged the document. As pointed out by Krahl and Rochemonteix, the king had technically no right to appoint Bourgeois as ‘superior’ (or administrator) of the mission, because this was a purely ecclesiastical position. The document used both the terms superior and administrator but neither was legal according to the papal brief of 1773. In a way,

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695 Rochemonteix, Joseph Amiot, 250.
696 Rochemonteix, Joseph Amiot, 337.
697 Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 66. See also Krahl, China Missions in Crisis, 269.
698 According to Krahl Yang’s first name was Stephen, according to Dehergne it was Etienne. See Krahl, China Missions in Crisis, 269; Dehergne, Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine, 301.
699 Krahl, China Missions in Crisis, 270.
700 Krahl, China Missions in Crisis, 269. See also Rochemonteix for a transcription of the entire document, Joseph Amiot et les derniers survivants de la mission Française à Pékin (1750-1795), 219-222.
Ventavon was right (but also wrong) to question the authority of the document. The value of the French Jesuit real estate properties and their yearly revenue caused all this strife, with the core of the matter being who exactly owned the former Society’s possessions: Rome, Portugal, the French state, the French missionaries, or China?

Despite the quickly deteriorating opinion the French public held of the Society of Jesus during the 1760s and 1770s, the king continued his support it with an annual contribution of 12,000 livres, an amount that was later raised to 15,000 livres supposedly thanks to the lobbying of the grandson of the king.\textsuperscript{701} None of the other documents confirmed that the raise was indeed thanks to the grandson of the king, and the Jesuit report of the financial good deeds that the French king bestowed upon the ex-Jesuits did not mention it. It started directly with 15,000 livres and was issued the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of October 1775.\textsuperscript{702} According to Rochemonteix, part of the 12,000 livres came from Bertin, and not just from the king.\textsuperscript{703} An extra 1,200 livres were set aside for the previous procurator of the missions in Canton, Le Fevre. Slightly over a year later, in November 1776, the money for the missions was broken down into several categories and assigned to its different beneficiaries. Of the total of 16,200 livres (15,000 + 1,200), 4,200 livres were assigned to the procurators and the many costs regarding communication and transport of letters and goods to and from China. One of these procurators was Le Fevre, who received 1,500 livres for his services in keeping the goods of the French mission together. It was not clear whether he would still be paid this wage after he came back to Paris in the late 1770s. Bourgeois was assigned a wage as well, since he continued to be the economic or administrator after Le Fevre left until 1781, when Ventavon took over his job.\textsuperscript{704} Abbot Dugad de Vitri, director of the Carmelites, applied for the job of procurator in Paris to administer the contacts with the French missions in China. Dugad outlined his precise costs for lodging, his coworkers, and his household.\textsuperscript{705}

\textsuperscript{701} Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 101.
\textsuperscript{702} Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 174.
\textsuperscript{703} Rochemonteix, Joseph Amiot, 108.
\textsuperscript{704} Ventavon succeeded in taking over power thanks to the mediation of the Chinese emperor.
\textsuperscript{705} Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 71.
calculated that he needed in total at least 5,000 livres, an amount he never received. Minister de Sartine set Dugad's state pension at 2,000 livres. If Dugad wanted more, Sartine suggested he could apply for funding to the French missionaries in Beijing who collected over 40,000 livres of annual revenue from their properties.\footnote{Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 72. Dugad continued to ask for 5000 and even 6000 livres but he eventually had to be satisfied with only 2000 livres, money that came out of the total amount of patronage of the French king (the aforementioned 12 000 or 15 000 livres). This was precisely what Dugad reported doing in 1783, when sent off a new missionary to China with 12,000 livres and kept 2,000 for his own spending. Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 115. In a letter from abbot d'Alais Montalet, written in 1786, Montalet divulged that Dugad still pretended that the sum of 4,200 livres was not enough to cover all his expenses and that he was obliged to continuously supplement that amount from his personal resources. Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 126.} This is when, in the 1780s, the money from state pensions was replaced by revenue on Beijing properties. As royal patronage finally petered out from France, the revenue from the Beijing properties would pay to some extent the pensions of the slowly decreasing number of missionaries.

6.3.5 French State Patronage Towards the End of the Eighteenth Century

Bertin convinced the king that he needed to increase his patronage or else his missions would fall into the hands of foreigners, or fathers with anti-French feelings would carve the possessions up. All his financial support was acknowledged in a document that gave a chronological overview of the “Dons faits par le Roi Louis XVI à la mission de Chine.”\footnote{Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 174 and following.} The king continued his support after non-state flows of French patronage had ceased. Before, two prioresses, one from Troyes and the other from Chartres, donated 10,000 livres annually to the missions in India and China.\footnote{Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 58 and following.} Shortly after the suppression of the Society in Portugal, Benedictines in the diocese of Chartres filed a suit against the procurator of the French ex-Jesuit missions in Paris, Father Latour.\footnote{Could this be Father Marc Antoine Laugier (1711-1769)? See Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, volume 4, 1556-1559.} As a result one of the dioceses stopped its donations.\footnote{Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 174 and following.}
Despite French society’s hostile attitude towards the Society after 1762, the French kings continued their patronage with the main motivation being to reassert control over what the king perceived as his possessions.\textsuperscript{711} Louis XVI’s money was a significant enough amount of support to cause internal strife in the French missions. When state patronage stopped, the logic was that state support throughout the eighteenth century had allowed the Jesuits in China and in Beijing to invest in houses and shops, and it was revenue from these properties that now paid for the French religious community.\textsuperscript{712} This only left the issue of who would continue to manage these French possessions.

For anyone to take charge of the French state’s overseas properties there were two conditions. The benefices\textsuperscript{713} had to be French in the first place, and their hearts filled with French feelings, enough to realize the importance of keeping the king’s possessions together. They also needed to continue the Jesuits’ interest and scholarship in sciences and thus carry on the scientific/diplomatic/political link between the French and Chinese Courts.\textsuperscript{714} Since the patronage money was perceived by the ex-Jesuit French fathers as not being enough for the French missionaries and since the money was donated in the first place to make sure they could survive independently from Propaganda Fide and Portuguese fathers, the nationalistic atmosphere in which the money was given and the sense of ownership linked to the French state and not to the overall Jesuit missions can hardly be exaggerated.

\textsuperscript{710} Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 58. Written in 1775. However, out of the 10,000 livres that the China missions received from those prioresses, 7,000 came from different foundations all over the kingdom. The titles of the benefactors were somewhere in the archives of the procurator of the Indies and China, according to the memoir of father Le Febvre to the Minister of Marine affairs. This list of benefactors has yet to be found. The Benedictine cut into Jesuit finances happened earlier. Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 172. Already in 1758 or 1759 the process had started and payment of the revenues was interrupted.

\textsuperscript{711} One could argue that they were as much the Chinese emperor’s properties as they were the French king’s.

\textsuperscript{712} Vanves, Brotier 135, ff. 168-171. See also chapter five.

\textsuperscript{713} A permanent church appointment, typically that of a rector or vicar, for which property and income are provided in respect of pastoral duties.

\textsuperscript{714} Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 93v.
6.3.6 The End of Portuguese Patronage

Meanwhile the Portuguese state was acting differently in supporting its former Jesuits and their possessions in China. Since the Holy Congregation of Propaganda Fide was authorized according to the brief of suppression to take over all Jesuit property, and claim it as possessions of the Holy See, the Portuguese missions in China were in as much danger of foreign (non-Portuguese) take-over as the French. In none of the kingdoms of Europe was the Holy See capable of realizing this goal, which perhaps explained why it tried even harder to put it into practice in the missions.\textsuperscript{715} This is what happened to the Portuguese Jesuits in China.

The Portuguese appointed a new bishop of Macao, Dom Alexandre da Sylva Pedrosa Guimarães (1727-1789?), who was very ambitious and zealous in the defense of royal rights and more specifically the Portuguese padroado in the China missions.\textsuperscript{716} Contrary to the French successors who cooperated with the ex-Jesuit fathers and even gave them plenty support before 1785, Guimarães was not favorable to the Society of Jesus at all. Guimarães accused the Jesuits of a whole slew of crimes and intrigues that should have had them suppressed before 1759. Guimarães worked in close cooperation with the Marquis of Pombal, Sebastião José de Carvelho e Melo (1699-1782), the Portuguese statesman who expelled the Jesuits from Portugal in 1759. Pombal was one of the most fervent enemies of the Society, which he held responsible for blocking an independent, Portuguese-style Enlightenment. Guimarães intended to write and distribute a historical work against the Jesuits in the hopes of convincing the Chinese emperor to expel all Jesuits from China altogether. He wanted to spread this “in the form of a pamphlet” throughout the Qing empire, a crazy and impossible plan that never materialized but shows the

\textsuperscript{715} Krahl, \textit{China Missions in Crisis}, 211. The next paragraph is based upon Krahl’s exposition of Laimbeckhoven’s account on the controversy between Guimaraes and himself. Guimaraes was “born in Bahia, the capital of Brazil, 1727. Most probably he studied at the Jesuit College of his native city. If so, he preserved little affection for his former teachers. Nothing is known about his early career until his nomination to the See of Macao in 1772.”

\textsuperscript{716} Krahl, \textit{China Missions in Crisis}, 213.
extent of Guimarães’ zeal and his lack of knowledge of the position and authority of Europeans in the Qing empire.\textsuperscript{717} Whereas France still paid a pension and even introduced special extra financial help for its ex-Jesuit fathers, Portugal had stopped paying ever since 1759 (and quite possibly even before). The Portuguese fathers received a meager subsidy from their missions’ headquarters in Beijing in the form of 100 taels per man, complemented by alms from local Christians.\textsuperscript{718}

The differences in patronage regarding state pensions and properties between France and Portugal are remarkable during the second half of the eighteenth century. The Portuguese state cut off all funding and attempted to convince the Chinese emperor to expel all former Jesuits. The French Jesuits’ scientific engagement during the first half of the eighteenth century left them with some defenders among the high political echelons. The next section will discuss the relationship between Jesuit engagement with the sciences and state patronage in more detail.

6.4 French and Portuguese State Patronage Towards Scientific Materials

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Rome had been the vanguard of scientific innovation, but by the end of that very same century, Paris had taken its place.\textsuperscript{719} Louis XIV sent his Jesuit missionaries in an official function as “mathematicians of the king,” each of them a member of the newly founded Académie royale des sciences, and each of them meant to work at the Chinese court in this function.\textsuperscript{720} The French Jesuits became known for their preoccupation with scientific matters, an image that was spread all over Europe by, for example, the constant publications of the Lettres édifiantes et curieuses.\textsuperscript{721} As such they were a

\textsuperscript{717} Krahl, China Missions in Crisis, 218.
\textsuperscript{718} Krahl, China Missions in Crisis, 221.
\textsuperscript{719} Von Collani in Handbook of Christianity in China, 313.
\textsuperscript{720} Initially, due to miscommunication (or jealousy and rivalry) with the Portuguese, only two of them would work at Kangxi’s court.
\textsuperscript{721} For the different forms and perceptions of the scientist-missionary, see Florence Hsia, Sojourners in a Strange Land.
new type of missionary, in touch with the age of enlightenment, whereas the Portuguese Jesuits of the earlier seventeenth century, though some of them were also very much engaged with scientific research, did not share that same aura.\footnote{Von Collani in \textit{Handbook of Christianity}, 315. Collani does not specify the characteristics of “the old type missionary” other than it needed to “clear the way... to a new one of the age of enlightenment.” The work of the Jesuits working under Portuguese patronage at the Chinese court was as much of a scientific engagement as that of the French Jesuits. In that case, all missionaries working at the Chinese court, regardless of their state of origin, were missionaries of the age of enlightenment. What did change was the cultural perception of a missionary in Europe – Collani’s age of enlightenment missionary –, in combination with a change in the attitude of the Chinese state towards European missionaries. After the Kangxi emperor’s death, the Jesuits were no longer allowed to convert Chinese people. Officially, they could only work as foreign experts at the Qing court. From a European perspective the French Jesuits may have been more visibly engaged with sciences, since the Portuguese Jesuits and other nationalities that worked under the Portuguese padroado, were taken care of by the Chinese side.}

This new missionary had different needs, obligations, and a slightly different type of state support. Apart from money for their daily essentials and for expanding their missions, French missionaries such as Antoine Gaubil requested extra money for scientific purposes. An example of this was Gaubil’s demand for money to build a small observatory in Beijing, for which 100 taels would cover all costs.\footnote{Renée Simon, \textit{Le P. Antoine Gaubil S.J.: Correspondance de Pékin 1722-1759} (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1970), 247-248, 288-290, 292. See also Rochemonteix, \textit{Joseph Amiot}, 52.} The mission in Beijing could not afford it, since the little money they had was meant to pay for the most pressing (daily) needs. Two years later, in October 1731, Gaubil complained that many scientific instruments had been lost, broken, or misplaced. This would never happen if they had an observatory, for which the cost had risen to 200 or 230 taels. Paris was not entirely convinced that an observatory was necessary.\footnote{See also Hsia, \textit{Sojourners in a Strange Land}, 123.} Gaubil pointed out that an infinity of beautiful and exact observations could be made if only they had some sort of covered place (it did not even need to be a grand observatory such as the one in Paris) in which they could operate certain instruments such as a parallactic machine and a big quadrant with glasses and a
pendulum (cost: no more than 160 to 180 taels).\textsuperscript{725} Gaubil did not get want he wanted.

Another instrument Gaubil longed for was a globe. Alas, the procurators in Paris never sent him one. Meanwhile, the Portuguese ambassador had secured one for the Portuguese fathers from England.\textsuperscript{726} In light of the different types of missionary – the French age of enlightenment missionary versus the Portuguese older type of missionary (defined by the counter reformation and a more combative nature)\textsuperscript{727} – the circumstances regarding the Portuguese globe are a bit puzzling. Was this a very rare occasion in which scientific instruments traveled through a Portuguese – English connection? I have not found more similar transfers of a scientific or financial nature between Portuguese Jesuits and English merchants. Was Gaubil fed up with France’s diminished support (in comparison to the state and academic support lent from 1685 until 1705), and did he hope the French academics’ and state’s apathy would change if he invoked some feeling linked to competing national affinities? Florence Hsia similarly describes Gaubil’s frustration and her careful assessment of the tensions between the French and Portuguese Jesuit missionaries that were “occasionally expressed in terms of scientific rivalries” indicate that there was no simple distinction between the scientific engagement of the missionaries working under French and Portuguese patronage.\textsuperscript{728}

Whereas in the first and second categories of state support (pensions and properties), the French Jesuits received continuous and even increasing support while the Portuguese Jesuits received less and less, the opposite seems to have happened when it came to financial state support regarding scientific materials. The French state support declined significantly already in the 1730s. Jesuits under the Portuguese padroado held the position of directorship over the Astronomical Bureau, for which they were paid a wage by the Chinese emperor. The combined

\textsuperscript{725} Simon, \textit{Le P. Antoine Gaubil S.J.}, 356-357.
\textsuperscript{726} Simon, \textit{Le P. Antoine Gaubil S.J.}, 728.
\textsuperscript{727} See Duteil, \textit{Le mandat du ciel}, 2. Is this what Collani has understood as the old type missionary?
\textsuperscript{728} Hsia, \textit{Sojourners in a Strange Land}, 122.
Portuguese and especially Chinese state support made the Portuguese Jesuits the envy of the French Jesuits when it came to resources for scientific enterprises.

6.5 Commerce

Just like the third category, scientific materials, this last category is only partially linked to state support. It was a lack of state support that drove the Jesuits towards investigating the ways commerce could fund the missions. The differences between the Portuguese Jesuits’ and the French Jesuits’ engagement in commerce were defined by the changing economic environment the Europeans encountered in Asian markets (see also chapter five). First I will briefly recapitulate what previous studies have found regarding Portuguese Jesuit involvement in commerce, then I will discuss the French Jesuits commercial ventures.

6.5.1 Portuguese Jesuits and Commerce

The payments of the Portuguese king were said to arrive late, incomplete, or never. This was an issue that started before the Portuguese empire was under attack from European competitors, which meant that the Jesuits working under the Portuguese padroado had been looking for alternative sources of income since the very start of the missions in the Far East. The first source of income discussed by Margiotti was the limited amount of commerce that the Jesuits in Japan and China engaged in. Besides Margiotti, two other authors have investigated the commercial activities of the Jesuits in the Portuguese empire: Dauril Alden, who included a chapter (chapter twenty-one) on this topic in his *The Making of an Enterprise* and Charles R. Boxer in his *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the old Japan Trade, 1555-1640* and *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650*. Several other Japanese authors such as Iwao Seiichi, Kato Eiichi and Takase Koichiro have written

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729 As mentioned before in Clossey, “Distant Souls,” 400.
important articles investigating Sino-Japanese trade and Jesuit involvement in the silk trade.\textsuperscript{731}

6.5.2 Early Commercial Ventures (Until 1660s)

When discussing the commercial ventures of the province of Japan and the vice-province of China, Margiotti starts off by delineating two periods: one in which the permission for commerce was allowed and retracted several times, and the latter one when several authorities attempted to prohibit any commerce.\textsuperscript{732} However, this attempt to periodize, just like trying to define the start and end date of all Jesuit commerce that took place between the various Asian markets, is a difficult task. Alden acknowledged that scholars are also not in agreement as to precisely when the Jesuits effectively engaged themselves in the silk trade between China and Japan.\textsuperscript{733} It could be in the mid 1550s, towards the end of the 1560s, or somewhere in the 1570s. Golvers provided very specific beginning and end dates to the silk trade of which the Jesuits in China especially benefitted in the \textit{Handbook of Christianity in China}: from 1636 to 1669. For the sake of a comprehensive overview and in order to sum up what previous scholars have written about this subject, the commercial transactions between Japan and China in the second half of the sixteenth century will be the starting point.

One of the key figures in institutionalizing Jesuit commerce was Alessandro Valignano (1539-1606). This Jesuit administrator for the missions of the Indies and Japan was not always an ardent defender of commerce as a source for the missions, but, perhaps after visiting Japan in 1579, he realized that there were no alternatives

\textsuperscript{731} For references, see Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 533, footnotes 22 and 23.
\textsuperscript{732} Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738}, 368.
for adequate funding.\textsuperscript{734} From 1583 the Jesuits were allowed to sell up to fifty \textit{piculs} (according to Alden one hundred \textit{piculs} starting in 1578) of silk to Japan whenever a shipment left from Macao.\textsuperscript{735} Cooper, however, states yet another number of \textit{piculs} that could be traded by the Jesuits. Based upon a “Report Concerning the \textit{Armação} or Corporate Agreement by Which the Citizens of Macao Send their Silk to Japan,” written by Manuel Dias Sr. (1559-1639), the superior of the Jesuit mission at Nanchang, to the general of the order, Claudio Acquaviva (1543-1615), Cooper shows how in 1578 Valignano made the agreement to send 50 \textit{piculs} instead of the ninety \textit{piculs} that were permitted by the king.\textsuperscript{736} 10\% of the profit would go to the transportation costs and 3\% to other costs, which left the Jesuits with about 1,600 ducats per silk shipment.\textsuperscript{737} The Jesuit general Claudio Acquaviva, despite personally being opposed to Jesuit commercial ventures, received papal approval in 1582, which was revoked in 1585 and then reinstated in 1587.\textsuperscript{738} After that the

\textsuperscript{734} Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 534.

\textsuperscript{735} Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738} 369. Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 534. 1 \textit{picul} equaled about 60.48 kilograms and would be bought in China for 90 ducats and resold in Japan for 140.

\textsuperscript{736} Michael Cooper, “The Mechanics of the Macao-Nagasaki Silk Trade,” \textit{Monumenta Nipponica}, 27:4 (1972): 426-428. “Furthermore, it the Japanese did not wish to buy so much and it was impossible to sell in Japan all the silk shipped in the carrack, then they would give the Jesuit procurator there 40 \textit{piculs} at the price these \textit{piculs} over there cost their owners, for otherwise they would have to bring them back to Macao without selling them there. The fathers continued in this way for some years, sometimes having 90 \textit{piculs} in Japan and sometimes no more than 50 when the Japanese bought the whole lot. The latter was the usual case, for there were only a few years in which there was some silk left over to sell and there were those 40 \textit{piculs} to give to the fathers.” English translation of original document in Portuguese, ARSI, JapSin 14 (I Ib), ff. 341-342.

\textsuperscript{737} ARSI, JapSin 14 (I Ib), ff. 341-342. See also Henri Chappoulie, \textit{Aux origins d’une Eglise. Rome et les missions d’Indochine au XVIIe siècle. Tome II} (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1948), 155. See also Cooper, “The Mechanics of the Macao-Nagasaki Silk Trade,” 429-430. It is puzzling how Alden or Boxer got to the number of 1600 ducats. If one does the math for 90 \textit{piculs} the Jesuits made 3915 ducats per shipment (50 ducats profit x 90 \textit{piculs}, 4500 – 450 (10\% transportation costs) – 135 (3\% random costs) = 3915), if they only traded 50 \textit{piculs}, their profit would still be 2175 ducats. Boxer, \textit{The Great Ship from Amacon}, 39.

\textsuperscript{738} Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicismo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738}, 370.
Jesuit silk trade remained legal (on and off) until 1620. Just in this short period, Alden calculated that about fifty Portuguese ships sailed back and forth between Macao and Nagasaki. Fourteen of those failed to reach their destinations and discharge their cargoes because of maritime conflict or adverse weather. The Jesuits and other Macanese merchants were ruined by additional losses when their entire investment was blown up in 1610. All these additional depletions make it hard to calculate the precise profits of Jesuit commerce.

Additionally, besides this legal trade a certain volume of illegal trade was conducted as well. Since even the legal trade was prohibited multiple times and under constant attack, the difference between legal and illegal Jesuit trade was a rather knotty affair. Illegal trade was defined by Takase Koichiro as trade that was conducted personally by individual Jesuit fathers and not under the supervision of their superior or the Jesuit procurator. Scholars are even less certain about this type of trade’s reach and limitations in both time and space. The only evidence available, restatements of its utter illegal nature by mainly Jesuit visitors, can be interpreted in two ways: according to Takase Koichiro these were all indications that this type of illegal trade was going on, continuous or not, whereas Alden argues that this does not necessarily demonstrate even the existence of illegal trade since “it was common for inspectors to renew admonitions on subjects of special importance to the fathers general.” It does indicate that Jesuit commerce was a subject that continually evoked controversy, whether it took place in reality or not. The Jesuits did not trade in silk alone, even though this type of trade seems to have been the most profitable one until the second half of the seventeenth century.

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739 Alden, *The Making of an Empire*, 534.
741 Alden, *The Making of an Empire*, 134. Surrounded by enemies, the Portuguese captain-major André Pessao ignited his ship’s magazine and thus blew up that year’s silk carrack to avoid its falling into the hands of the Japanese shogun.
744 Starting in 1614, the convention of the Nagasaki College wondered whether they could get permission to trade not only 100 *piculs* of silk but a certain amount of gold
Despite increasing pressure from the center in the 1630s and 1640s to stop these activities, Margiotti explained that the superiors in Macao continued to trade year after year with all surrounding Asian markets (Siam, Cambodia, the Philippines etc.).\textsuperscript{745} In 1636 (this is where Golvers placed the beginning date for the direct engagement of the vice province of China in all these kinds of trade) the vice province in China complained about being unable to carry the costs of its missionaries, so it started investing in trade just like the Jesuit province of Japan, and would only abandon it several decades later after great financial losses.\textsuperscript{746}

Papal bans may not have worked, but changes in the economic profitability of trades in which the Jesuits were involved would influence their commercial activities. Portuguese Jesuit commerce was linked to the position of Macao as a hub and \textit{muschio}, moss, as well. They were also interested in extending their commerce with the Portuguese colonies in the Indies. Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicesimo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738}, 372. Both Golvers and Alden discussed Jesuit trade in profitable wares such as spices (clove, cinnamon and pepper), gems and sandalwood. Handbook of Christianity, 291. Alden, \textit{The Making of an Empire}, 536. Another very profitable trade was in bullion. See Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 536-537. The Jesuits were willingly or sometimes forcibly (since refusing to do so would endanger the very existence of their missions in Japan) taking up the role of bullion broker agents between Japanese Christians or daimyos and the Chinese market. The Japanese side would provide silver that then could be sold or exchanged for a higher value of goods in China. This type of trade was both legal and illegal: in the opinion of Koichiro both the procurators of Nagasaki and Macao traded in bullion as well as individual fathers in various parts of Japan who acted as go-between. Koichiro, “Unauthorized Commercial Activities by Jesuit Missionaries in Japan,” 27. Koichiro further stated that in the denunciations of this type of activity of different Jesuit provincials and visitors, general stresses among fathers of different nationalities (Portuguese vs Italian) were reflected as the different ideas concerning the Jesuit vow of poverty continued to clash over this issue. The bullion trade was officially abolished in 1612, but the subject came up repeatedly, causing Koichiro to question whether the Jesuit trade had really come to an end. Another commodity that was very popular and was traded by Macao-based Jesuits was sandalwood. See Alden, \textit{The Making of an Enterprise}, 538-539.

\textsuperscript{745} Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicesimo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738}, 373.

\textsuperscript{746} Margiotti, \textit{Il Cattolicesimo nello Shansi dalle Origini al 1738}, 375. Two different sections of the Jesuit infrastructure met in Macao: the province of Japan and the vice province of China, founded and independent from the Japan province since 1612. The relationships between these two divisions within the global Jesuit missions were not always friendly due to internal disagreements (more on that and how it affected the finances of the province and vice-province: see below).
in the Japan-China trade. Until 1639, Macao was a bustling commercial center in the East Asian trade network that benefitted from the silk trade between China and Japan. While it would make sense for the Chinese traders themselves to sail for Japan and sell their silk, the Ming government in China had prohibited all trade with Japan. These strong anti-Japanese feelings were fed by repeated attacks of the wako pirates along the Chinese coast, pirates that were believed to be Japanese but were quite often simple Chinese fishermen who engaged in piracy outside the fishing season. The Portuguese were thus lucky to fill in the commercial void and reap all the profits from the China-Japan trade. Even the expulsion of the Jesuits from Japan in 1614 did not stop their engagement with the Macao-Japan trade. When the Tokugawa government in Japan banned all dealings with the Portuguese in 1639, this was unfortunate timing for the fathers of the vice province of China since they had only three years earlier officially commenced to trade silk with Japan via Macao. Macao was desperate to plead with the Japanese government for a continuation of trade, but it was to no avail. Both Macao and the Jesuit enterprise had to restructure their business transactions. Since Macao was still an important port for trade with China, it did not wither immediately after being cut off from the Japanese market. The Jesuit province of Japan similarly focused and redirected itself towards other Asian missions. The most important feature of Macao and its wealth was the sea. “There are no more reliable sources of wealth than what the winds and tides bring. If they fail, all else fails. There is no other way for this Province to sustain its missions.”

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747 See Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, and chapter twenty-one in Alden’s The Making of an Enterprise.
748 Other European nations were trying hard to get their fair share of the trade, and would eventually succeed in replacing the Portuguese, despite the lack of a prime strategic location such as Macao.
6.5.3 French Jesuits and Commerce

The French Jesuits in China came too late to make any profits from the Japan trade. After 1669, pope Clement IX forbade any commerce. Since the French were operating in their own national network (and with the French-Portuguese strife discussed in chapter three in mind), they would have difficulties using Macao (part of Portugal’s colonial empire) as a base of operations anyhow. The French could not link up with any commercial activity that was still going on in Macao in the 1690s or the eighteenth century. At the same time the Dutch and English networks had become more reliable communication networks, which made them a more efficient trading vehicle for the Jesuits (see chapter three). The French Jesuits would comment that the Dutch and the English did “everything possible to establish their commerce in the Great Empire,” and that “one thinks they come in full force with money and industry.” The French Jesuits and these newer colonial maritime powers may have been on either side of the Protestant-Catholic divide, but they did use each other’s services. Besides news and people, more material goods and even Jesuit money traveled on board English ships. After the Jesuit order was officially dissolved in 1773, it became clear that the French mission in China had even invested part of its funds in the English East India Company.

6.5.4 French Jesuit Trade with the English

It remains very hard to gauge the intensity and scope of their commercial dealings, since no sources on systematic involvement comparable to the Portuguese Jesuits’ contract of fifty to one hundred *piculs* of merchandise in the China-Japan trade, are available. There was clear evidence that the French Jesuits were very close to merchants in different networks: not just their own French merchants for which they mediated and with whom they exchanged services all the time, but also the English network and the East India Company.

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751 Vanves, Brotier 134, f. 3.
On 5 March 1776 Father Le Febvre, procurator in China, wrote a letter on this topic to minister Bertin. Ever since 1727 the Jesuits had enjoyed rent from a fund of 20,000 pagodas (valued at 160,000 livres) from Madras at 6%, which meant that a yearly sum of 9,600 livres was sent from India to Canton via the English Company. However, when the Jesuits were suppressed, the payments suddenly stopped. The Jesuits filed a request at the English Council in Madras. The English announced that they would pay the rent from 1774. After that, they would no longer pay until they received specific instructions from the directors of the company in London on how to deal with this service to the Jesuits. Meanwhile the Jesuits contemplated withdrawing their investments altogether from Madras, since rumor was that the English Company was about to go bankrupt in three or four years. Le Febvre awaited minister Bertin’s instructions on how to deal with the English. This time the French minister was not the one that saved the day, but rather the Chinese emperor. The Jesuits took their disagreement with the English Company to the Chinese emperor. The English heard of this (maybe that was the ultimate goal and maybe the Jesuits just pretended to complain to the Chinese emperor), and, out of fear for retaliations from the Chinese emperor that would negatively affect their trade operations, decided to pay the Jesuits once more their annual rent.

The example above illustrates that the French Jesuits maintained a powerful mediating position between trade companies and the Chinese court from the 1750s to the 1770s. An earlier report outlined all the services that the French Jesuit missionaries performed for the ships and French merchants in China from 1699 to 1720. For example, Bouvet and Gerbillon made sure that the Amphitrite, the French ship with which Bouvet and Gerbillon returned to China in 1699, did not

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752 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 156r+v.
754 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 156.
755 Vanves, Brotier 135, f. 168v. This time the amount invested in the English Company was 150,000 livres, at 6% rent, which equaled 9,000 livres a year.
756 Vanves, Brotier 135, ff. 133 and following.
have to pay the regular amount of customs (which would have been 4,000 taels, or more than 28,000 livres, judging by its size). When the Amphitrite came back two years later, it was damaged by a storm and had lost its masts and sails. The French Jesuits made sure it was repaired quickly. According to the contemporary international laws of the sea, prevalent in the West that is, it would have been self-evident that they could have relied on Chinese local carpenters to do the repairs. However, in 1741, the English commodore of the Royal Navy, George Anson, experienced some of the many hurdles that Chinese bureaucracy could erect to prevent foreigners from supplying and repairing their ships. Anson was on a two-year voyage around the world and had been instructed to attack Spanish ships in the East. Upon reaching Macao and Canton, he realized that one of his ships had a leak, and that the main mast was sprung in two places. Only after more than a month did he succeed in meeting with a mandarin who could help him with his supplies and repairs. However, for his repairs he was charged outrageous prices, they were carried out very slowly, and when they were finally done, he was urged to leave the Chinese coast as soon as possible. Anson suspected that the French, who had a countryman and fast friend residing in Canton itself and who spoke the language very well (this could refer to the Jesuit procurator in Canton), were delaying the whole process “by means of intrigues.” The French Jesuits were not mediating in Anson’s case, all the more since Anson was a commodore of ships of war and was not of any use to either Jesuit communication or trade.

6.6 Conclusion

Differences in the first category, state pensions, were linked to the economic health of the French and Portuguese states at the time of the Jesuit missions. The

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757 George Anson, *A Voyage around the World, In the Years MDCCXL, I, II, III, IV*, (London: John and Paul Knapton, 1749), 358. In the present condition his ship would be “in the utmost danger of foundering.” First, he failed to contact any Chinese merchant who would address the matter to the viceroy of Canton.

758 See also Jonathan Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1990), 120-121.
significant support France was able to provide to the Jesuits towards the end of the seventeenth century allowed the French Jesuit missions in China to build up investments in real estate, the second category, in combination with the stable environment provided by the Qing dynasty. As seen in chapter two, Jesuits under the Portuguese padroado had argued for a similar strategy, but, even if they were to some extent successful, these property investments were affected by events outside of the Portuguese state’s control, such as the dynastic transition in the mid seventeenth century. From an economic point of view, the two first categories make up the lion’s share of the state’s direct financial backing of the French and Portuguese Jesuit missions in China. The numerical difference of state support when it came to pensions may not have seemed very significant, but, coupled with property investment, it is most likely that the French Jesuit missions obtained a self-sufficient mode of existence far sooner than the Portuguese Jesuit missions. Correspondingly the French state and the French missionaries had a much narrower perception of ownership over these properties. They were built with French state patronage and maintained by French missionaries, and thus perceived as French possessions. Unlike the connection between the Portuguese state and the Portuguese missionaries, the patronage between the Jesuits and the French state was not immediately terminated at the time of the Society’s suppression. The third category, scientific materials, is a by-product of state patronage, and as such not a major asset of state patronage within the overall financial picture of the Jesuit missions in China. French state patronage in this category was significant at first,

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759 It is hard to calculate this precisely without adequate sources. However, the Portuguese Jesuit missions’ finances were highly dependent on outside sources for the first seventy years (1582-1652), whereas the French Jesuit missions were almost completely independent after the same time (1701-1771). See for example the sources mentioned in footnote 20, or other reports on the history of the Catholic missions in China that were published between 1640 and 1680 such as Gabriel de Magalhães’ (1610-1677) account of the Manchu invasion during the 1640s. The impression Magalhães creates is that the Jesuit properties were affected to such an extent that they had to start anew. After the invasion, mandarins promised patronage in the form of a new church, furniture, and presents. See ARSI, JapSin 127, ff. 2r-3v.
but it was not a sustained effort. Unlike the first category, it was impossible for French Jesuits to benefit from long-term investments in scientific materials. The Portuguese Jesuits secured state patronage from the Qing, which allowed them to continue making scientific observations. Both French and Portuguese Jesuits turned to the fourth category, commerce, as a source of income because papal or state patronage was not continuously infused into the Jesuit missions in the Far East. Just like the second category (and to some extent the third category), it was out of state control, but rather dictated by the economic possibilities presented by Asian markets and the role of European traders in intra-Asian goods. For example, the French Jesuits did not benefit from any income of the Nagasaki-Macao related commerce, which was declining in profitability during the seventeenth century. These differences between the French and Portuguese Jesuit missions were not the result of a different approach in state patronage.

Using these four categories, this chapter analyzed and tracked the different financial relationship that existed between the Portuguese and French states and their respective Jesuit missions in China. Apart from the differences in state patronage and perception of ownership over the properties and assets of these religious missions, many other factors influenced the way French and Portuguese Jesuits were financed. An obvious reason was the changing position of Europeans in Asian empires and the way Asian economy as a whole evolved from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries (see chapter five). The importance of missionary properties and their role in the overall Jesuit finances as real estate investments was the larger theme within this dissertation developed especially in chapters four, five, and six.

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760 For an overview of the slow decline, see Hsia, *Sojourners in a Strange Land*, chapters seven and eight.
761 Hsia, *Sojourners in a Strange Land*, chapters seven and eight.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Procurators were responsible for personnel and financial resources to maintain all material possessions for the ongoing missions. This dissertation began with a close-up examination of the many facets of their job, and how they carried out the multitude of tasks entrusted to them. The weaknesses behind how the center of the Society of Jesus in Europe envisioned providing and managing resources for the Jesuit missions in Asia forced the Jesuit procurators in Asia to create strategic solutions for the problem of insufficient funds. One way of doing this was to send a visitor-procurator back to Europe to establish a two-way flow of resources between the European administration and the missions in the periphery (China). If the goal of ensuring a continuous and reliable flow of material and human resources from Europe fell short, then raising enough start-up capital to allow missions in the periphery to be self-sustaining became the focus. This start-up capital allowed the Jesuits to invest in urban real estate, which in turn provided revenue to make the missions financially viable. Despite these ambitious goals, previous literature has emphasized the literary accomplishments of such China visitor-procurators and their role in generating propaganda, rather than examining to what extent they achieved their goal of making the China missions self-sustaining.\textsuperscript{762} While this dissertation acknowledges that generating propaganda was helpful for the China missions in the long run, I have sought to bring to the foreground the strategies for fund-raising and establishing investments in urban real estate that more directly influenced the development and economic survival of the Jesuit China missions. The literary achievements of visitor-procurators such as Nicolas Trigault, Martino Martini, and Philippe Couplet were considerable, but their efforts to construct a connected network of resources and personnel that supplied the China missions every four-year period were not successful. Only eleven visitor-procurators traveled from China to Europe during the seventeenth century, with the

\textsuperscript{762} Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault.”
longest gap being twenty-three years. Chapter two further demonstrated that the rate of missionaries brought back from Europe to China was as low as 27%. The diversity of missionaries sent to Asia, in terms of their national affinities, had already been severely limited by a conflict between the authority of the visitor-procurator and the Portuguese *padroado*. Political restrictions and redirections linked to national identity reduced the number of Jesuits meant to work in China more than the hazardous sea voyage.

The third chapter further analyzed the efforts of procurators, as well as other Jesuits based in China and Europe, who struggled to improve the link between Europe and China. In 1612, when the visitor-procurator Trigault traveled from China to Europe, he boarded a Portuguese ship to Cochin. He was in a hurry, did not want to wait for the next sailing around southern India, and traveled overland to Goa, where he had missed the ships sailing back to Lisbon by circumnavigating Africa. Trigault boarded another ship to Ormuz (it is not known if he boarded a Portuguese or Arabic ship), and, disguised as a merchant, he traveled overland again across the Middle East to the Mediterranean. His early modern world travels illustrate well that, “webs had grown and fused into one, but the velocity within it had grown only a little.” It would have taken Trigault several years to travel from China to Europe on Portuguese ships, so he adjusted his itinerary. In chapter three, I

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765 Dehaisnes, *Vie du père Nicolas Trigault*, chapter four 110 and following.
766 Dehaisnes, *Vie du père Nicolas Trigault*, 112. Both times Trigault traveled from Europe to China he did so aboard Portuguese ships, most likely because it was hard to disguise a group of eighteen Jesuits and transport this new personnel across Islamic empires.
examined the movements of people, their letters, and money within the overall Jesuit network that bridged Eurasia. I searched for patterns of how individuals and groups of Jesuits traveled this space, dependent on ships and roads that were available. My dissertation has attempted to analyze these patterns of Eurasian Jesuit travel, in the process revealing complex and changing networks that defied predictability and coherence. The creativity of Trigault’s travel from China to Europe was not possible when traveling the other direction, from Europe to Asia. The Jesuit network was linked to the Portuguese *padroado*, which meant that both new Jesuit personnel and material (money, goods, letters, etc.) were shipped from Lisbon to Asian ports that were part of the Portuguese overseas empire. Over the course of the seventeenth century, other European states established maritime and overland networks that connected Europe to Asia. At the same time, the connectivity of the Portuguese maritime network came under pressure from rivals, especially Dutch attacks. Jesuit procurators were amongst those most active within the Society to investigate and create alternative networks, despite their official allegiance to the *padroado*. The relationships within these personal networks were ones characterized by trust. Procurators assessed whether they could trust others with the responsibility of transporting fellow Jesuits, money, and letters. These relationships of trust were the basis of individualized networks with the goal of increasing the chances of successfully connecting Europe to Asia through the China missions. Individual Jesuits, such as Antoine Verjus, created diverse relationships of trust by drawing from competing state networks as needed, (such as the French, Portuguese, and English). Verjus succeeded in transporting people, money, and letters along a (temporary) network he established with the French state. Verjus used French ships to send money from a German private benefactor to missionaries in China. These German financial funds were re-routed from the Portuguese network to the French network. To do so, secrecy and a relationship of trust were crucial to establish the link between a French procurator, the French state, and a German patron. The French state and German patron invested commitment and

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768 Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, chapters seven and eight.
capital in Verjus’ network. Verjus’ network was attacked as soon as Verjus attempted to expand his personal relationships of trust to a larger group of Jesuits. The reorganization of the private funding that lay at the core of Verjus’ network was undone two years after Verjus died. Whenever the effectiveness of a state network such as the Portuguese network weakened, Jesuits would investigate the possibilities of other networks to link Europe and Asia. Similarly, whenever the commitment of a state network such as the French network would lessen, French Jesuits explored the alternatives such as the overland network controlled by the Muscovite empire or the English merchant network. The multitude of networks made Jesuits in Asia keep relationships of trust with representatives of more than one network in order to stay connected to European news, contacts, and resources. However, the instability and personal character of these networks – no matter how many different networks individual missionaries had at hand – did not ensure a constant flow of people and European patronage. Once again, both visitor-procurators and targeted Jesuit initiatives orchestrated from Europe were unable to overcome the obstacles of early modern global travel, in the sense that the center could never send enough missionaries and material to the periphery. The inability to supply the Jesuit missions on a regular basis with financial support throughout the seventeenth century increased the importance of setting up investments in Asian urban real estate.

Chapters four, five, and six turned to the local Jesuit administrators (treasurers) and procurators and their role in financing the Jesuit missions in China. This approach revealed that another solution for overcoming the limitations of global travel was the Society’s reliance on treasurers or procurators recruited to connect to local knowledge and access the financial opportunities in real estate or commercial markets in Asia. By 1612, the Jesuits had envisioned making their missions in China self-sustaining through local real estate investments. However, both global and local conflicts frequently interrupted the trickling European patronage during the seventeenth century. An examination of the French Jesuit account books and a manual for procurators demonstrated how the Jesuits were finally able to become financially independent and how, during the eighteenth
century, revenue from urban real estate paid for the operating costs of the Augustinian community in Manila and the French Jesuit community in Beijing.

Chapter four analyzed the responsibilities of those people responsible for the financial and material management of the religious communities in Manila using the manual for future procurators. The most important responsibility was taking care of the urban real estate investments. The manual carefully explained the details of the construction and management of these properties, and emphasized the serious nature of successful cooperation between procurators and treasurers, precisely because these assets paid for the operating costs of the entire religious community. The close cooperation between local Christians and their religious superiors was the key strategy for compensating the lack of success in financing missions in the Far East with constant European patronage. I argue that the manual makes plain that European procurators needed to be acquainted with the material, people, and accounting practices as soon as possible to ensure profits from these investments were not interrupted. Whereas the account books in the Philippines did not survive, ledgers accounting for the budget of the French Jesuit community in Beijing during the 1770s, which was of similar size as the Augustinian community in Manila, do. They are the principal sources for chapter five and six.

To highlight the differences (and demonstrate the evolution) in financing Jesuit missions in China before and after 1700, this dissertation has contextualized the accounting sheets of the French Jesuit community in Beijing with all surviving sources on finances available in China (De Rougemont, Foucquet, and Chalier) and the manual for procurators discussed in chapter four. After untangling the traces of local, regional, and global sources of finances within the surviving account books of the Portuguese and French Jesuit missions in China, chapter five made clear the evolution of long-distance state and private patronage from Europe, in relation to the growing reliance of the Jesuit missionaries on local Chinese and regional Asian financial opportunities. In the seventeenth century, missionaries like de Rougemont were left with a “heavily charged budget” and a “particularly fickle and vulnerable
European patronage did not reach de Rougemont, instead he relied on gifts from local Christians. This was not the financially sustainable solution. One-hundred years later the local and regional sources of income were of similar significance for the entire French ex-Jesuit community in Beijing. Again, European patronage (private or state) covered less than one fourth of the missions’ operating costs. However, thanks to a stable Chinese economic and political environment in combination with the accumulation of properties over eighty years of mission building, the French Jesuits did not rely on isolated gifts from local Christians, mandarins or Chinese gentry, but on revenue from rental properties. As such, by the 1770s the French Jesuit community in Beijing had achieved the equilibrium envisioned by Niccolò Longobardo in 1612.

Chapter six of this dissertation analyzed the links between the Jesuit networks and the state networks from the perspective of the state. As the ability of the Portuguese state to coerce all Jesuits into loyalty to the Portuguese padroado wore down during the seventeenth century, a competitor, Louis XIV, took up the responsibility of patronage. The way both states imagined their funding to the Society of Jesus was very different. Comparing the French and Portuguese annual pensions does not reveal great differences. The French state supported the French missionaries with slightly higher annual pensions. The French Jesuits were able to invest this into properties, which were a safer source of income thanks to the stability the Qing dynasty provided. The French were unable to invest in the Nagasaki-Macao trade, partially because of the changed attitude of the papacy towards missionary engagement in trade, but mostly because by the eighteenth century the trading opportunities for Europeans in Asian markets had changed. For example, the French Jesuits relied on the English East India Company to ship the

769 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 630.
771 In combination with a different scientific status: this aspect is not further developed in the dissertation. See Hsia, Sojourners in a Strange Land.
Revenue from Indian real estate investments to China. Asian empires and economies dictated all these changes. The French and Portuguese states were more distinct when it came to the sense of ownership over their properties in China. Throughout the eighteenth century, the French state and missionaries saw their properties as being owned by the French state, and, as such, these properties were for the benefit of French missionaries alone and would remain so even after the Society was suppressed. Unlike the Portuguese missionaries, the French missionaries had the continued support of the French state in protecting their possessions, which were by the 1770s their most important source of income.

This dissertation’s main contribution highlights the gradual reliance of Jesuit finances on revenue from this type of investment during the eighteenth century. At the same time I emphasize that Jesuits had been pursuing this strategy for accessing opportunities in local economies since 1612 without abandoning efforts to improve their global network between Europe and Asia. This was an example of the global and the local merging and complementing each other, and this dissertation has sought to write its history from a world history and local history perspective: a global micro-history.

French ministers critical of the ex-Jesuit missionaries pointed out that state patronage from Europe was no longer necessary for missionaries to make ends meet. Concurrently, the Society of Jesus was suppressed, and European states began losing their grip on what they had financed for two hundred years. The missionaries lost their identity as Jesuits, but, as a religious community, they had finally become financially “profitable,” or at least self-sustaining. Longobardo’s vision of financial independence through real estate proved successful, however, within the larger context of the developments of European colonialism in Asia (and the chaos it caused) during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European states or missionaries were not able to maintain their control over these Beijing properties.
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Appendix A: Parameters of Data Sets

I have analyzed the data provided by Joseph Dehergne and Joseph Wicki. I did not build a separate database for Louis Pfister’s numbers because his work has been expanded upon by Joseph Dehergne’s prosopography. The difference between Dehergne’s and Wicki’s lists is one of scope: Dehergne limits himself to missionaries sent from Europe to China between 1552 and 1800, whereas Wicki lists all missionaries sent to Asia from 1541 to 1758. Wicki only investigates missionaries who embarked in Lisbon aboard Portuguese ships, whereas Dehergne includes missionaries whom sailed from France or traveled overland via the Russian empire or the Middle East. Filtered through the parameters of my databases, Dehergne’s and Wicki’s lists result in 843 and 2,192 data entries. In Wicki’s case I have included entries of missionaries who traveled multiple times between Lisbon and Asia. Wicki himself did not include these people but rather made a reference to their first entry and then denoted their second voyage with a number followed by a letter. For example, Nicolas Trigault was missionary number 531, who embarked with ten other Jesuits from Lisbon, February 5, 1607.\(^{772}\) The second time Trigault makes the passage, in 1618, Wicki refers to him as number 645a, placed between number 645 (Manuel de Figueiredo) and number 646 (Francisco Furtado).\(^{773}\) In my database, Trigault has two entries, numbers 542 and 659, because I am interested in the absolute number of successful passages from Europe to Asia.

In the case of Dehergne’s list, the parameters of my database made for a shorter list. Dehergne catalogs 920 missionaries. Besides these entries Dehergne also includes extra numbers, which he marks the same way Wicki does (for example 30a, 278a, 278b, 278c).\(^{774}\) Dehergne states that he enters these missionaries with


\(^{774}\) The complete list is: 30a, 54a, 101a, 107a, 119a, 150a, 207a, 223a, 234a, 249a, 278a, 278b, 278c, 297a, 306a, 341a, 376a, 378a, 400a, 401a, 408a, 410a, 431a, 447a, 453a, 469a, 486a, 501a, 515a, 523a, 535a, 538a, 557a, 600a, 604a, 605a, 612a, 612b, 614a, 628a, 639a, 677a, 677b, 699a, 704a, 724a, 737a, 750a, 778a, 779a, 804a, 823a,
this type of number because he could not always identify them. This adds an extra 69 entries to the original 920, and brings the total to 989 entries.

In line with Standaert’s statistical analysis article I have excluded certain categories of Jesuits included in Dehergne’s Répertoire des Jésuites. One such category were Jesuits Dehergne labeled as “macaïste:” brothers or fathers born in Macao of either Japanese (or Asian?) or Portuguese descent. Just like most Chinese, Japanese, and Tonkinese Jesuits, macaïistes rarely traveled between Asia and Europe. Another category of people I have excluded is the unknown entries: in these cases Dehergne himself will note that these missionaries were mistakenly placed in the list by certain primary sources, or that no information on their passage exists. Both my parameters and approach to Dehergne’s data differ from Standaert’s interpretation, which explains why I selected 843 entries and Standaert has 429 entries. Standaert further excludes four categories from his analysis: Jesuits who died on their way to China (=57), Jesuits who traveled to China before 1580 (=21), Jesuits destined for China who ended up working in different parts of Asia, and Jesuits who worked in Macao or “in neighboring missions, though structurally they belonged to the China mission.” I include each of these

826a, 831a, 834a, 834b, 834c, 844a, 844b, 847a, 853a, 854a, 861a, 861b, 861c, 899a, 904a, 904b, 916a.

Dehergne, Répertoire des Jésuites, xii, note 6. This category is not explained in his overview of the data’s conventions on page 2.


There are some exceptions. This is why I have included all Asian Jesuit brothers and fathers.

Examples of these are: entry 119a, 201, 223a, 289, 312, 350, 428, 474, 515a, 523a, 689 (I am not sure what to do with this entry), 699a, 718, 746, 777, 779a, 813, 870.

Different computer databases (Standaert uses Lotus, I use Excel) may explain some additional changes between Standaert’s and my database.

categories because intra Asian connections of Jesuit networks and the changes in transport of scattered material and human resources are central to my study. I am interested in tracing the movements and role of Jesuit brothers such as Herman Scolt (a German coadjutor) who is mistakenly labeled to be part of the China province but who was actually part of the Philippine Jesuit mission. Another example is the Belgian father Pieter Thomas Van Hamme (1651-1727) whose odyssey to China took him through Mexico and Manila. This connection between the Philippines and China is further illustrated by my choice of source material in chapter four.

781 Dehergne, Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine, 243. See also Robrecht Willem Van Der Heyden, Het Leven van Pater Petrus-Thomas van Hamme, missionnaris in Mexico en in China (1651-1727) (Gent: Annoot-Braeckman, 1871).
Appendix B: Date of Embarkation: Jesuit Travel from Europe to Asia

The date of departure in Lisbon was regulated by the Indian Ocean monsoon system. Ideally ships would leave “the second half of March until the first ten days of April.”782 Leaving within this period ensured entrance into the monsoon system between the months of May and July. According to Van Veen July the 20th was the cut-off date for using the Mozambique channel to arrive safely in Goa. April storms along the Portuguese coast decided when exactly to leave Lisbon. Felix Plattner asserts that “the traditional day for departure of the Indian fleet was March 25th, the Feast of Annunciation.”783 However, based upon data extracted from Wicki’s article, the specific day during which most Jesuits left on India bound ships was April 4th. One hundred and thirty five Jesuits left that day between 1541 and 1758. The second most popular day was April 8th, 89 Jesuits left, and only then, in third place, March 25th (88 Jesuits left). In the table below I have organized the 1,445 entries for which I found the precise date of departure (out of 2,192 entries, which represents 66% of the total data).784 Entries before the 1st of March and after the 30th of April have not been included.785

782 See Van Veen, Decay or Defeat, 59.
784 1,445 out of 2,192 is 65.921533 %.
785 Eleven missionaries left before March: Nicolas Trigault and ten others left February 5, 1607. Three missionaries left October 11, 2 missionaries left October 16, and in the case of twenty-one missionaries the precise date of departure was uncertain (they left during the months of February, March, or April).
Table B.1 Numbers of Departures (Weekly)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Departure</th>
<th>Number of Departures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-7 March</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-14 March</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-21 March</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-28 March</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 March-4 April</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-11 April</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
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<td>12-18 April</td>
<td>224</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-25 April</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-April-2 May</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A possible avenue of further research would be to collect the intermittent dates of travel: the date of rounding the Cape of Good Hope, the date of arrival in India, and the date of arrival in Macao or at another port along the Chinese coast (Ningbo, Canton etc). As it stands now, I have a fraction of this data already available (thanks to Dehergne’s and Wicki’s works), but nowhere near enough to calculate the changing speed of voyages during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. In combination with the information provided in travel logs it might be possible to assemble a representative unit that allows for this type of future research.
Appendix C: Tables of Jesuits Sent to China According to Groups of National and Regional Affinity

Table C.1 Jesuits Sent by Portugal or the Portuguese Jesuit Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number of Jesuits sent to China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1540s</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550s</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1560s</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580s</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590s</td>
<td>12</td>
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Table C.2 Jesuits Sent by the Italian States or the Italian Jesuit Province

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Table C.3 Jesuits Sent by France or the French Jesuit Province

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Table C.4 Jesuits Sent by Central European States/Provinces (Germany, Austria, Poland, Tirol, and South Tirol)

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Table C.5 Jesuits Sent by Northern Europe Provinces (The Southern Low Countries, England, Ireland, and the Netherlands)

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Table C.6 Jesuits Sent by the Spanish Empire (Including Mexico)

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Both Standaert and Duteil discuss the trends in sending Jesuits of different nationality. I will briefly compare my results of trends within different national Jesuit groups with Standaert’s and Duteil’s. Standaert is most succinct in discussing peaks and lows for the most important “nationality groupings.” He charts the Portuguese, Italian, French, and Chinese Jesuits. All other Jesuits are classified together in the “Others” category (including Belgian, Bohemian, Korean, German, and Spanish Jesuits). Duteil divides the total number of Jesuits in China up in the following categories: Portugal, Macao, China, France, Italy, Central Europe, and Pays-Bas. Both Standaert’s and Duteil’s analysis of the changing number of Jesuits sent by these different states or regions are very similar to mine.

Duteil calls the Spanish presence discreet: he asserts that after the union of the Portuguese and Spanish kingdom (1580-1640) the Spanish presence became “almost insignificant: overall, the Spanish Jesuits did not account for even 5% of the total.” My numbers confirm that Spain sent only 3% of the overall number of Jesuits sent to China, but, at an early stage of the Jesuit missions in China, Spanish Jesuits were an important group among the Jesuits in Macao and China. Before the seventeenth century, the percentage of Spanish Jesuits in relation to the total fluctuates from as high as 50% (1540s) to 38% (1560s) and finally 21% (1590s). The union of both kingdoms and the accompanying rigidity with which Spanish and Portuguese missionaries were forced to work in respectively Spanish and Portuguese colonies, explain the downward trend. However, during the 1580s and 1590s, Spanish Jesuits comprised almost one in four (24% and 21%), because East Asia only felt this European-enforced rule with a delay. The absolute numbers of Spanish Jesuits sent during the sixteenth century was of course negligible, and even the overall total, twenty-four, shows that Spanish Jesuits working in China were a rarity. More than a few Spanish brothers and fathers tried to circumvent the

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787 Duteil, Le mandat du ciel, 38. “Pendant l’unirion des deux royaumes (1580-1640), la proportion d’Espagnols est un peu plus importante parmi les missionnaires de la Compagnie, puis elle devient Presque insignifiant: dans l’ensemble, on ne relève wue 5 pour cent de Jésuites ‘espagnols’ au sein de la Mission de Chine.”
788 3.7%.
Portuguese *padroado* and traveled from Spain to Mexico or Peru, and from there to Manila: Nicolás Gallardo, a Spanish brother coadjutor, entered China in 1582 this way, and returned to the Philippines and then Mexico.\(^{789}\) Other examples were Francisco Gayoso, who arrived in Manila in 1676, and entered China via Amoy in 1678. He worked in Shanxi for five years, and then returned to Manila in 1686.\(^{790}\) Not all of them were successful: Spanish brother coadjutor Gonzalo de Velmonte and Spanish father Leandro Phelippe tried for eight years to enter China via Macao. Eventually they gave up and went back to Peru.\(^{791}\) The peaks towards the end of the seventeenth century might be explained by the relative chaos of European and Asian networks during that period. Perhaps this allowed for an easier shuttle across the South China Sea from the Philippines, which was a Spanish colony, to the south China coast. During a time that networks in this region were shifting and adapting to new political formations, I agree with Duteil that Manila, as an important hub in east and southeast Asia, was both a place of refuge and contestation.\(^{792}\) Missionaries understood quickly that this city was important to move between empires and peripheries. As chapter three has argued, it was at this time that the Zheng maritime empire pushed back all competitors, including both the Portuguese and the Dutch maritime powers.

The Italian group was over four times as large as the Spanish, and it accounted for 15% of the total number of Jesuits sent.\(^{793}\) According to Standaert, their presence in China remained constant, whereas Duteil speaks of a brilliant debut followed by a progressive decline.\(^{794}\) Individual missionaries such as Matteo Ricci and Martino Martini are responsible for this “brilliant debut,” but, according to the statistical data contained within table C.2, the percentage of Italian Jesuits sent to China did not steadily decline after the 1650s (Martini). From the 1560s until the

\(^{789}\) Dehergne, *Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine*, 105.


\(^{793}\) 15.7%.

1670s Italy provided between 11% and 41% of the total number of Jesuits sent to China. During the 1690s, twenty Jesuits of Italian origin embarked for China, but, in combination with the increase of Portuguese and French Jesuits, this only added up to 18% of the total. The Italian presence diminished during the eighteenth century, since both France and Portugal allowed for less diversity after the increased European competition during the 1690s and 1710s. Even though Italian missionaries such as Giovanni Donato Mezzafalce (who explained which networks were the most reliable for shipping goods, letters, and people between Europe and China) were proud of having many connections tied to multiple transportation networks, Italian missionaries had greater difficulties reaching China after 1710.

Table C.5 traces the number of Jesuits of northern European origin who left for China. Jesuits with a Belgian origin were the biggest group (30), then Dutch (6), English (2), and Irish (1). Standaert states that missionaries from this area “were too small in number to permit any significant conclusion when taken separately.” Duteil wonders if the Jesuits of Flemish origin were a counterweight to Dutch ambitions. While Flemish or Belgian Jesuits on many occasions had negative experiences with Dutch merchants in Asia, there were, however, also exceptions (included in chapter three). The issue of national affinity during the early seventeenth century becomes most evident in the case of Nicolas Trigault. On different occasions, Duteil includes him in both the French and the Belgian (or Flemish) group. Trigault was born in Douai, which at that time fell under Flemish authority. He belonged to the Belgian Jesuit province. Belgian Jesuit historians do not consider Trigault French, whereas French Jesuit historians such as Duteil point out that he spoke French and that others such as Antoine Thomas were totally assimilated with the French Jesuit missions in Beijing. As reasons for the decline in their number during the eighteenth century, Duteil states that Jesuits from these bishoprics were regrouped under the French Jesuit province. Duteil further suspects

795 Dehergne includes 34 “Belgian” Jesuits, but for 4 of them I could not determine a precise shipping date, which means that they were not included in the chart.
796 Standaert, “The Jesuit Presence in China (1580-1773),” 9; Duteil, Le mandat du ciel, 45.
797 Duteil, Le mandat du ciel, 45-46.
that political changes within Europe and a failed connection to the Ostend Company (which was dissolved before the middle of the eighteenth century), can explain this eighteenth century decline in numbers. The golden age of the Belgian Jesuits was during the seventeenth century, both numerically and individually, with more prominent Jesuits such as Philippe Couplet and Ferdinand Verbiest. The overall pattern of the Jesuits of northern European origin is somewhat similar to the ups and downs of the Italian Jesuits.

The trends in Jesuit missionaries of central European origin do not follow the northern European or Italian group. Table C.4 shows a gradual increase of Jesuits sent from this region until the 1700s. During this time, Michael Boym was one of the more famous Polish Jesuits, while Johann Adam Schall von Bell was one of the German states’ more prominent missionaries. The beginning of the eighteenth century reveals a sudden decline in the 1720s, when not a single Jesuit from central Europe embarked for China. However, the next decade the highest number ever left for China (13). I do not know why no central Europeans were sent from 1717 until 1734. Each year between 1735 and 1739 at least one (and a maximum of five, 1737) Jesuits boarded ships in Lisbon and sailed under the Portuguese _padroado_ to China. This trend illustrates Duteil’s assessment of the central European Jesuits, of whom he states that there existed “a great loyalty to the Portuguese _padroado_.” Even though during the 1680s and 1690s several central European Jesuits tried to reach China via the overland route, Dehergne’s data confirms that most of them did use the Portuguese network. Perhaps this loyalty explains why they were allowed throughout both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to sail for China aboard Portuguese ships. It still does not entirely explain the peak during the 1730s.

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798 Duteil, _Le mandat du ciel_, 46.
Appendix D: Missionaries and Pirates: Strange Connections and Networks

At the end of his life, Zheng Zhilong799 wrote several poems to father Francisco Sambiasi while held captive in Beijing. Zheng's and Sambiasi's paths did not cross from the mid 1640s onwards, but Zheng continued to have contact with other Jesuit fathers until his death in 1661. His interaction and the exchange of ideas between Jesuits and the Zheng family were not short-lived, especially when one considers that Zheng ‘converted’ to the Christian faith as a teenager, after having found his way to Macao during the late 1610s. The first remarkable aspect of the relationship between Zheng and the Jesuit fathers is the persistence of their contact, which stretched over a period of nearly fifty years. The fact that it consisted of not just one occurrence -- they met in Macao, Fujian, and Beijing -- suggests that both Zheng and the Jesuits were invested in continuing their relationship.800

Rather than questioning Zheng as an exemplary Christian after his conversion sometime between 1615 and 1620,801 this appendix examines Zheng's long contact with Jesuit (and perhaps other Christian) connections and its businesslike or diplomatic characteristics. While his original conversion to the Christian faith was explicitly questioned by later fathers such as François de Rougemont, the exchange of goods and money in the 1650s between the two suggests that even then, apart from a possibly increased commitment to the Christian faith, Zheng Zhilong and the Beijing Jesuits continued to strengthen their

801 Later Jesuit writers would comment how during the 1630’s Zheng Zhilong prayed to multiple religious faiths, and had images and statues of Christian, Buddhist and other religions on display. Charles Boxer, “The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan,” 428. See also description in François de Rougemont, Relação do Estado político e espiritual do império da China, pelos annos de 1659 ate o de 1666 (Lisbon, 1672), 7, 23, 43. It was not unusual for Chinese ‘converts’ to understand (or perhaps misunderstand) Christianity’s exclusivity and rather continue their Chinese traditions of religious eclecticism.
alliance via material means. As long as the Shunzhi emperor (1644-1661)\textsuperscript{802} still believed in the strategic importance of Zheng Zhilong and his influence as pater familias of the Zheng family on his son Koxinga, Zheng Zhilong lived in luxurious circumstances and shared his wealth with the Jesuit fathers in Beijing on several occasions. Zheng Zhilong erected a house and chapel, and he supplied them with money, servants, and household goods.\textsuperscript{803} After 1654, the roles were reversed, and the Jesuits donated ten golden pieces (more likely ten silver taels) to Zheng Zhilong.\textsuperscript{804} Jesuit fathers recorded that “this gift touched the old man greatly and moved him to tears.” Apparently Zheng Zhilong further reacted by declaring that “…if it was granted to [him] to be restored to [his] former fortunes, [he would] not be ungrateful.”\textsuperscript{805} The Jesuit fathers did not mention an improvement in Zheng Zhilong’s knowledge of their Christian message, but their relationship was nevertheless deepened via financial reciprocity between two struggling parties.

Ten golden pieces does not seem like a great amount of money. The ‘decem circiter aureos’ were probably ten silver taels, or about 400 grams of silver.\textsuperscript{806} However, it was an exchange between Jesuit fathers and a pirate in captivity. Furthermore, this connection was described in a new history on China and Tartary, which was written for a European audience (published as Historia Tartaro-Sinica Nova in 1673). Why would the Jesuits advertise their relationship with the builder

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\textsuperscript{803} De Rougemont, Relaçam do Estado politico e espiritual do imperio da China, 23,43.

\textsuperscript{804} Ho, “Sealords Live in Vain,” 167. See also François de Rougemont, Historia Tartaro-Sinica Nova (Lovani, 1673), 64 or paragraphs 52-53. De Rougemont mentions more or less 10 golden coins. Cited in Donald Keene, The Battles of Coxinga: Chikamatsu’s Puppet Play, Its Background and Importance (London: Taylor’s Foreign Press, 1951), 65. As Tim Brook pointed out, de Rougemont may have mistranslated jin as gold, since the logical currency used by the fathers in Beijing would be silver pesos. This may be possible, even though de Rougemont was very familiar with financial matters and currencies. See chapter five.


\textsuperscript{806} See de Rougemont, Historia Tartaro-Sinica, 64 or paragraphs 52-53. Or more precisely, somewhere in between 370 and 400 grams of silver of unknown quality.
of a maritime empire that disrupted all European networks in East Asia in the seventeenth century by attacking both Macao and Taiwan? The Zheng family was more than a pirate organization. In the 1660s and 1670s when de Rougemont wrote his East Asian history, they were transitioning from a non-state organization to a state with a basis in Fujian and Taiwan, and they disputed the rulership of the Qing over China. This meant that the Jesuits and a European audience could easily perceive them as an ally. If Zheng Zhilong’s fortunes changed, the Qing were in trouble. This explains the importance the fathers gave to a good relationship with Zheng, and why they advertised it as such. The Jesuits expected to have a strong advocate within the Zheng family to help them link the maritime trade routes between southeast and East Asia.

Zheng Zhilong was no longer a member of government, but it is not too far fetched to assume that he could have resumed his position as a patron within a center of power. Before he lost his resources and power when the Qing captured him in the early 1640s, he was on the verge of securing a powerful position within the Qing bureaucratic system. This possibility was important enough to the Jesuits’ network that they returned the favor when he was (perhaps in their opinion temporarily) out of resources and power.

Four hundred grams of silver was not an excessive amount, but it would have been a considerable financial expenditure for the Jesuits in Beijing at that time. With one silver tael, or one tenth of what the Jesuits gave Zheng Zhilong, one could buy over 166 pounds of flour.\textsuperscript{807} All of their real estate investments in China and Beijing were still recovering from the Ming-Qing take-over the previous decade. Meanwhile, any income from sea-loans or Japan-Macao commerce had similarly taken a serious

\textsuperscript{807} See Noël Golvers, François de Rougemont, S.J., Missionary in Ch’ang-Shu (Chiang-nan): A Study of the Account Book (1674-1676) and the Elogium (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), 170. This calculation is based upon what de Rougemont bought in 1676 in Changshu. As such it is only a very rough approximation: the price of flour might differ somewhat from Beijing to Jiangnan, and the fluctuations in the silver/copper conversion would make an even bigger difference. See chapter five.
downturn and would be forbidden indefinitely in the 1660s. Macao was losing its former prominence as a trading center, and, simultaneously, the Portuguese empire in Asia was under attack and losing ports to the Dutch. At this same time China experienced the "Kangxi Depression," which caused great financial trouble for the Jesuits working in Chinese provinces. Already in 1662, Philippe Couplet (1623-1693) wrote that he had not received Macao's financial support for the past three years. A decade later, in 1674, another Jesuit working in Shanghai would similarly complain that no money had been sent up from Macao for years.

If the Jesuits had had better contacts with the Zheng network, they might have been able to obtain a safe crossing of the South China Sea to ship money from southeast Asia to Shanghai, and circumvent other obstacles such as the war of the three feudatories in south China or the Fujian coastal depopulation disruption. Is it plausible that, because of this very slight chance, the Jesuits decided to broadcast their connection to Zheng? Did they ignore that Zheng had been pushed aside for the past twenty years, and did the Jesuits nonetheless hope for one of those more spectacular reversals of fortune that were not unheard of during these turbulent times? From 1660 until 1680 the Jesuits could have realized that the only organization that was able to keep the VOC in check in East Asia was the network built by the Zheng family. Despite their long association with Zheng Zhilong, the Jesuits were unable to put this connection to the service of their global network just when European maritime competitors were chased out of maritime China.

Both the Jesuits and Zheng had multiple political ties, hedging their bets by maintaining simultaneous relationships with the Ming, the Southern Ming, and the Qing. Their luck in political gambling came to an end soon enough. The Shunzhi emperor’s death in 1661 meant the end of the political goodwill that kept Zheng

809 See footnote 186.
810 Philippe Couplet was a Jesuit missionary working in Shanghai during the 1660s and 1670s. Noël Golvers, François de Rougemont, 587. See also chapter five.
811 Golvers, François de Rougemont.
alive. It was also the end of Adam Schall's (1592-1666) personal connection as friend and teacher of a Chinese emperor.\textsuperscript{812} After 1661 Schall was accused of inappropriate planning for the burial of the son of Shunzhi and subsequently imprisoned in 1664.\textsuperscript{813} The four new Manchu regents thought Shunzhi had been too kind, and in 1660 they condemned Zheng to lingchi (death by a thousand cuts), a very painful procedure that was most likely reduced to beheading.\textsuperscript{814} Could Schall have lobbied in favor of Zheng and changed his fortune? Schall or other Beijing Jesuits were unable or unwilling to put the relationship of trust they had with the Qing at risk by aligning their interests with the Zheng family’s interests (which was perhaps fractured in any case or not a useful patron at all in Beijing).

The Jesuits were also unable to create connections with the rest of the Zheng family in Fujian. This was not for lack of Jesuit talent working in Fujian. Chinese scholars in Fujian honored the mission’s founder, Giulio Aleni (1582-1649), with the title “scholar from the West.”\textsuperscript{815} Aleni knew how to use political patronage to build up a network of friendly literati. He published more than twenty works in Chinese, sometimes in cooperation with his Chinese friends.\textsuperscript{816} Why did he not take the opportunity to establish a network between the Jesuits and the Zheng government? Was it too high a risk to the Jesuit overall enterprise to seek a network with the

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\textsuperscript{812} Johan Adam Schall von Bell (1592-1666). Schall’s star had been rising since being appointed as the first European director of the Astronomical Tribunal in 1644, superior of the Jesuit residence in Beijing in 1648, and finally his promotion to mandarin of the first class in 1658.

\textsuperscript{813} Claudia von Collani, Schall’s biography in http://encyclopedia.stochastikon.com.

\textsuperscript{814} Ho, “Sealords Live in Vain,” 168. See also Boxer, “The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan,” 438.

\textsuperscript{815} See also Lippiello, Tiziana & Romam Malek, eds., \textit{Scholar from the West. Giulio Aleni S.J. (1582-1649) and the Dialogue between Christianity and China} (Nettetal: Monumenta Serica Monograph Series XLII, 1997). At the invitation of Ye Xianggao, former grand secretary, Aleni had arrived in Fuzhou in 1625. Thanks to a low public profile and the Jesuits’ strong private connections he managed to coexist peacefully within the Chinese community. See Eugenio Menegon, “Jesuits, Franciscans and Dominicans in Fujian: The Anti-Christian Incidents of 1637-1638,” in \textit{Scholar from the West}, 228.

\textsuperscript{816} Claudia von Collani lists a total of 27 works.
Zheng family? Was the political situation in Fujian and the rest of China too unpredictable to establish a partial integration of the Zheng network and the Jesuit network? If this were the case, then perhaps the Beijing Jesuits were unable to transform the relationship of trust they had with Zheng Zhilong to a network between Fujian Jesuits and the rest of the Zheng family. Additionally there may have been a lack of commitment both in Beijing and Fujian on the side of the Jesuits to bind themselves to the Zheng family.

While the relationship between Zheng Zhilong and the Jesuits was one of trust, the interactions that existed between them never resulted in a network. However, within the context of connective world history, I find it fascinating to imagine the possibilities of a successful partnership between the Jesuits and the Zheng family, and what could have resulted from it during the following decades. Even before the Zheng family controlled the sea, the Jesuits sought other patrons, such as the Muscovite state. This way they avoided the sea altogether.

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817 Since the Jesuits had a relationship of trust with both the southern Ming and the Qing, a network with both the Qing and the Zheng could not have been too exclusive. 818 In my experience students are similarly excited about this during lectures in first year world history courses. The benefits of how to avoid hindsight bias are discussed in Tetlock, Lebow & Parker’s Unmaking the West: “What-if?” Scenarios that rewrite World History (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2006).
Appendix E: François de Rougemont’s Draft of an Account Book and the Use of Silver Versus Copper

During the seventeenth century China’s economy was bi-metallic; both silver and copper were used as monies. Ideally, it would take one sentence to explain the Chinese bi-metallic system of copper coins and silver taels during the late imperial period: one silver tael was worth 1,000 copper coins. Unfortunately it was not so simple.\textsuperscript{819} Inflation was an obvious factor, but not the only explanation. Both silver and copper experienced different inflation rates. As for copper, there were different copper coins minted by the state and by private agents, at different times and with varying metallic substances.\textsuperscript{820} In addition, as Akinobu Kuroda has shown, the same copper coins’ value would even change according to the local market in which the coin was used.\textsuperscript{821}

Silver, on the other hand, was not minted into coins. It was mined domestically at first, and later imported from Japan and South America. Silver would be easier to use, were it not for the fluctuations in global bullion flows, inconsistent domestic mining, and the fact that, originally (before 1435), silver could not be used to pay taxes in China. However, its popularity and pervasiveness in the Chinese economy gradually rose until, in the mid-sixteenth century, it overran the Chinese economy to such an extent that scholars speak of the Chinese ‘silver century.’\textsuperscript{822} The changing relationship between silver taels and different copper coins, and the fluctuations in value and availability, make the study of the Chinese monetary system a complex matter.\textsuperscript{823}

\begin{footnotes}
\item See silver/copper exchange rate charts on the next page.
\item The copper coins consisted of copper and various other metals. There were many different types with different weights. Akinobu Kuroda, “Copper coins Chosen and Silver Differentiated: Another Aspect of the ‘Silver Century’ in East Asia,” \textit{Acta Asiatica} 88 (2005): 65-86.
\item Kuroda, “Copper coins Chosen and Silver Differentiated,” 65-86.
\item Richard Von Glahn coined this term in his \textit{Fountains of Fortune}, chapter four. The ‘silver century’ lasts from 1550 to 1650.
\item The first table is based upon the exchange rates extracted from the Yueshibian 閱世編, chapter 7 (Monetary System 卷七錢法). Ye Mengzhu 葉夢珠. \textit{Yueshi bian}
\end{footnotes}
Table E.1 Silver to Copper Exchange Rates (Lower Yangtze)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (according to Vogel)</th>
<th>Quantity of Copper Coins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr-1674</td>
<td>1667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug-1674</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-1674</td>
<td>3333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-1678</td>
<td>1136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-1678</td>
<td>1149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-1679</td>
<td>1075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-1679</td>
<td>1087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-1681</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-1681</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-1681</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-1682</td>
<td>1111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-1684</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ye Mengzhu discusses “the unevenness of commodity prices” from his earliest memories to the end of the seventeenth century. He introduces his chapter with the following words: “I remember when I just entered primary school, as I went back and was sitting at my grandfather’s knees, that time the general merchandise was considered expensive, my grandfather once sighed deeply and told me about the cheapness of commodity prices during the Longqing (1567-1573) and Wanli (1573-1620) period, people’s customs were uncorrupted (bright and shining white) then, up to now for a little over 50 years, but the commodity prices were completely different, when it comes to such extremes, (how can we be) without worries for the ups and downs of the public morals.” Six different authors have relied on his price descriptions: Endymion P. Wilkinson, Hans U. Vogel, Richard von Glahn, Mi Chü Wiens, Timothy Brook, and Noël Golvers. See Wilkinson, *Studies in Chinese Price History*, 26-28; Hans U. Vogel, “Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800,” 29; Richard von Glahn, *Fountains of Fortune*, 214-215; Noël Golvers, *François de Rougemont*, 564.

The second table is based on the exchange rates de Rougemont provides when he is visiting Hangzhou in April 1675. De Rougemont needed to exchange silver for copper coins that were accepted in this city, and he exchanged money eight times during two weeks.

There are remarkable differences between the exchange rates in Shanghai (first table) and Hangzhou (second table). This is no surprise since the data are so limited and incomplete, and both charts have a very different timeline.
To track the movements of each currency in every different region over a period of time, exhaustive historical records would be needed. Unfortunately, these no longer exist. Once again the study of monetary change over time and place has to be approached through alternative perspectives to get around the confusion concerning the multiple and coexisting currency circuits (that did not reflect a segregation of markets but rather a multiplicity of interfaces\textsuperscript{824}). What we do have is an extensive draft of a two-year account book, François de Rougemont's account book already mentioned and examined in chapters two and four, that allows us to study the fluctuating relationship between silver and copper: this economic document can capture exactly what was going on at one specific time, in one specific place.

Normally an account book would not be useful to describe the differences in expenses or receipts in silver and copper money (depending on whether the ledger is a summary or a running tally). The reason for this was that silver was the money of account (besides being an actual currency), which means that all accounting

information was jotted down in silver taels, even if the actual expense or receipt had been in a different currency (for example gold, cowries, copper). Until the Jurchen Jin dynasty, circa 1200, copper coins were used as money of account. After 1200, silver replaced copper as a money of account (with the exception of a short regression to copper from 1368 to the 1430s). From the fifteenth century onwards silver became the standard currency in both public and private finances as an actual currency, besides being the money of account. By the time of de Rougemont's account book, silver would have been the currency used in every entry of his account book. This is also why the entries in every other Jesuit accounting sheet were written down in silver. But because de Rougemont's account book was only a draft that he planned to copy into the “great ledger” or official account book of the mission (that had been kept by de Rougemont's predecessor since the mission's start in the beginning of the seventeenth century), his entries were sometimes in silver and sometimes in copper. If the complete account book had survived instead of de Rougemont's shorter draft version, we would never have been able to examine the intricate texture of the use of copper and silver in his local economy. Because de Rougemont had no time to systematically convert every expense and receipt of copper money and thus transform his draft into the prevailing (yet less grainy) contemporary accounting documents, this keyhole of a global actor is most valuable for peeking into the local Jiangnan economy and its silver and copper currency use.

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826 Von Glahn noticed that the history of the silver money of account in China thus presented an intriguing contrast to the more common pattern in monetary history in which the money of account is typically a vestige (a “ghost money”) of a defunct circulating currency. See Carlo Cipolla, *Money, Prices, and Civilization in the Mediterranean World, Fifth to Seventeenth Centuries,* (New York: Gordian Press, 1967), 38-51. However, in the Chinese case, the adoption of the silver unit of account preceded rather than followed the emergence of silver as the dominant circulating money. See Von Glahn, *Fountains of Fortune,* 464.
827 However, drafts of account books such as Foucquet’s and Valentin’s used copper instead of silver (or both currencies).
Since de Rougemont was disconnected from his usual global financial patronage (see chapter two), and passed on most of the silver money he obtained from the Beijing fathers to pay for the expenses of certain Chinese converts, his personal finances were even more sustained by and integrated into the local economy. Additional evidence for his integration was that, even if he had received his yearly stipend (but just did not write it down in his private account book), this money would still have covered only part of his expenses to keep the mission operative. In a letter to the Jesuit General Jean Paul Oliva written on 15 September 1681, Verbiest stated that “Surely, the yearly subsidy... does not suffice, so that the missionary could meet for one-third or one-fourth part of the year all these costs with a minimum decorum. Thus the missionaries are often reduced to a condition of extreme poverty.”

This letter could be interpreted as a subtle demand for more money from the higher echelons of the Jesuit organization, but scholars generally agree that the Jesuits working in small-scale China missions were not as rich as their adversaries made them out to be.

In the particular case of de Rougemont, Verbiest’s estimate was fairly accurate. De Rougemont’s annual subsidy from Macao was 60 taels. Golvers has calculated (partly on a hypothetical basis) that de Rougemont’s total expenses for the year 1675 would be 231 taels. Golvers knows that de Rougmont’s silver and copper income of nine months was 173 taels. De Rougemont did not enter anything during three months, and for this Golvers adds a hypothetical one third of the previous 173 taels, or 57 taels, to arrive at an estimate of de Rougemont’s expenses for the entire year. This extrapolation based upon the expenses entered in the account book confirms Verbiest’s estimate. 60 taels is more or less one fourth of 231.

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830 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 596. 60 taels (= the annual subsidy from Macao) was almost exactly one fourth of 231.59 taels.
As mentioned above, Macao paid the annual subsidy. But the communication lines with the south were cut off and no Macao payment was ever mentioned in de Rougemont's account book. Communication through the north was still possible and the account book does contain several references to amounts of silver from the Jesuit fathers stationed in Beijing.\textsuperscript{831} All transactions were in silver currency.\textsuperscript{832} De Rougemont distributed it to other missionaries and Chinese Christians such as U çu min (Franciscus) and Ho kum kia (Petrus).\textsuperscript{833} Whenever de Rougemont gave them money from his own budget, he would immediately note that this sum was later to be reimbursed from the Beijing fathers.

The total amount of silver that de Rougemont received from Beijing and from local sources which are explicitly mentioned in the account book is 149 taels.\textsuperscript{834} Just over 65% of this number had a “Beijing” source: this meant that either Father Buglio, Father Couplelet, or an anonymous member of the “Beijing Fathers” had donated the silver. However, only a fraction of this amount (2.6 taels out of 97.5 taels) was spent by de Rougemont. Most of it was simply handed over to U çu min and Ho kum kia. Both U çu min and Ho kum kia were catechists. As Golvers points out, the silver that came from Beijing was most likely “distributed, via de Rougemont, to native Christians who were directly and personally responsible for the management of the various Christian parishes.”\textsuperscript{835} Does this mean that de Rougemont received similar amounts of silver for his own expenses which he for some reason does not write down? Unlikely. He would have written this down in his draft account book. Golvers further hypothesizes that the Beijing silver could be “a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{831} Account book, pp. 201, 166, 154, 150 and 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{832} For a precise overview of these four transactions, see Golvers, François de Rougemont, 589.
  \item \textsuperscript{833} Golvers, François de Rougemont, 589. Both these persons were living in Changshu.
  \item \textsuperscript{834} He did not receive any copper from Beijing because the value of copper coins was tied the regional circuit in which it circulated. As Timothy Brook suggests, shipping copper strings was also very cumbersome. Silver could be used on across regions (or even on a global scale). See Kuroda, “Copper coins Chosen and Silver Differentiated.”
  \item \textsuperscript{835} Golvers, François de Rougemont, 589.
\end{itemize}
substitute for a possible missed Macao grant.”\footnote{Golvers, François de Rougemont, 589.} We would know if this were the case had de Rougemont included more information on what he personally kept from the Beijing silver (if he kept any at all). What we do know is that over 95% of the silver that de Rougemont spent in his own community and further circulated via expenditures to craftsmen, printers, and other Chinese people came from local donations.

**Table E.3 De Rougemont’s Local and Regional Income in Silver (1674-1676)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Amount of Silver Received</th>
<th>Total Amount of Silver Spent by FdR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Origins</strong></td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Origins</strong></td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the money that de Rougemont was receiving and almost everything he himself spent and circulated came from within the local economy. I do not know why this happened. There is simply not enough information to calculate precisely which silver he used for which purpose. What we do know is that while de Rougemont had traveled extensively to get to his China mission, once he was working in Changshu county, his existence depended on full integration into the local society and economy. Global patronage would pay one fourth of his actual
expenses at best. However, even this money was most likely not delivered during the 1660s and the 1670s. In addition, the silver that he obtained regionally, largely from Beijing, he would pass on to other pastors. This meant that almost all the silver he did spend, he acquired locally. Therefore, de Rougemont’s account book cannot be used to write a history of long-distance connections of Jesuit economics. However, I will use this rich source to offer a new micro-history of China’s entangled regional economies, and their complicated and ever-changing bi-metallic currencies.

De Rougemont penned his income and expenses in silver and in copper. The copper coins he used for his expenditures were only useful in his specific local economy. The silver he used was also part of the local economy. He received this silver from other Chinese Christians or benefactors, and spent it again locally. If he would have received large amounts of silver from outside of the local economy, then his expenses and income would not be as representative of the local use of both currencies. Before going back to de Rougemont’s account book, I would like to explain what happened to China’s bi-metallic economy at precisely the time de Rougemont was keeping his accounts.

De Rougemont’s seventeenth-century account book was not just a snapshot at an arbitrary time or location in Qing China. The time was the heart of the “Kangxi depression,” and the place was China’s most vibrant and booming economic region: the Jiangnan basin consisting of the cities of Hangzhou, Suzhou, Changshu and Shanghai. During this time scholars have always assumed that China’s bi-metallic economy crumbled under the lack of monies: it regressed. I will question this based upon the information from de Rougemont’s source. The next section will first

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837 Josson & Willaert, eds., Correspondance de Ferdinand Verbiest de la Compagnie de Jésus (1623-1688) directeur de l’observatoire de Pékin (Brussels: Palais des académies, 1938), 354. ARSI, JapSin 145, ff. 41-44: letter from Ferdinand Verbiest to Jean Paul Oliva, Beijing September 15, 1681. “...non sufficit ut missionarius haec omnia cum aliquo decore per tertiam aut quartam anni partem sustineat.”
838 That de Rougemont did not hold on to this silver is very clear in the following case: “The 3rd day, the day before Ash Day (= 26.2) I handed over to Uçu min, in the name of the Peking fathers, 74 ounces of silver and 9 mace.” See Golvers, François de Rougemont, 119 (page 201 in the original account book).
839 See below.
explain the steady rise of silver in Chinese society, and then discuss how it eventually tied China's domestic economy to the rest of the world.

Silver from the Song to the Qing

The transition to a silver economy started during the Song dynasty (960-1279) and gradually changed China's society and economy. The monetary policy of the Chinese state was increasingly losing ground to the forces of the Chinese market. This domestic process of commercialization intensified during the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties and sped up even more during the late Ming (1580-1644) when maritime trade, both from other parts of Asia and the rest of the world, reached the Chinese economy and infused the Chinese market with large amounts of foreign silver. This influx of foreign silver reduced sharply during the 1650s due to restrictions imposed on maritime trade by the new ruling Qing dynasty. According to Richard Von Glahn the influx of silver declined only from 1667, whereas deflation set in beginning around 1656. Other scholars such as Mio Kishimoto disagree and argue that the deflation was not pervasive until the late 1660s. Less than ten years later the Chinese economy experienced the 'Kangxi depression,' which lasted until 1690. The scholarly disagreement with regard to

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840 One of the most important scholarly works that outlines the ways in which Chinese society and economy broke free from the heavy hand of the early Ming is Brook's Confusions of Pleasure, 1998. Other influential work was published in Linda Grove and Christian Daniels' State and Society in China: Japanese Perspectives on Ming-Qing Social and Economic History, 1984. At least in the field of Chinese history, a new paradigm was accepted that replaced the assumptions of earlier scholars such as Karl Wittfogel and his Chinese stagnation model as it was expressed in Oriental Despotism, 1957. It took significantly longer for world historians and European historians to accept and integrate this new understanding of the Chinese early modern economy and society.

841 This was not a new process: it was rather an intensification of Asian regional connections that had already been established before the late Ming.

842 See private correspondence with Richard von Glahn, June 2010. I would like to thank Richard von Glahn for his comments on an earlier version of this appendix.


844 See footnote 186.
the precise start date of the depression illustrates that the exact behavior of silver and its relation to the other money, copper, is difficult to determine. De Rougemont's keyhole could not have picked a better moment to shed light onto this issue.

The academic debate concerning the role of silver on a global scale is no less intense. Many scholars have studied the rising importance of silver and its connection to the concurrent booming commercialization of the Chinese (and world) economy. Some have tried to explain this evolution with a rather Eurocentric view of the Chinese economy, and have pointed out that foreign silver transformed the Chinese domestic economy. They contend that this huge influx financed and fueled China's commercial development. Richard von Glahn has argued that the transition to a silver economy started before the influx of foreign silver and that the demand for silver by China's domestic market caused the influx of foreign silver. I agree with the latter regarding the specific position of silver in the Chinese and world economies. Some of the evidence supporting this is provided by a local gazetteer of precisely the county in which de Rougemont was active (Changshu). The 1539 local gazetteer of Changshu described the customs of people regarding copper and silver in the section containing the records of food and commerce as follows:

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846 Von Glahn, Fountains of Fortune, chapter 7.

847 A local gazetteer or local history was compiled by members of the local elite and produced under the sponsorship of local officials. According to Wilkinson, altogether 8000 local gazetteers are extant. They form one of the most important sources for the study of late imperial (Ming and Qing) Chinese history, “since they contain copious materials on local administration, local economies, local cultures, local officials and local dignitaries.” Wilkinson, Studies in Chinese Price History, 154-155.
In past times the inhabitants of Changshu invariably conducted trade in coin. In those days full-bodied coins were minted. The people, in accordance with their means, hoarded coin, just as northerners accumulate coin in order to attain wealth. Now, with counterfeiting flourishing throughout the empire, there is a growing surplus of coin. Any coins that enter the county are strictly used for buying or selling goods. No one accumulates stocks of coin. People are concerned that coin may be abandoned, and thus will not retain its value. As the local gazetteer illustrates, people converted their assets that were previously built up in copper coins to something more stable such as silver or silk. In between the time this gazetteer was describing changes in local customs and the time that de Rougemont wrote his draft account book, copper lost its prominence as the main currency while large quantities of silver mined in Japan and South America made their way to China. An oft cited description was the one the Portuguese merchant Gomes Solis made in the early sixteenth century in his Discourse on Silver: “silver wanders throughout all the world in its peregrinations before flocking to China, where it remains, as if at its natural center.” Gomes’ rendition was eloquent, but to economic historians the reason why China became the sink in which the silver of the world accumulated was fairly simple: the Chinese market valued silver more highly than anywhere else in the world. In the early sixteenth century, the gold/silver ratio hovered around 1:12 in Europe, 1:10 in Persia, 1:8 in India, and

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848 Von Glahn, *Fountains of Fortune*, 103. Kuroda, “Copper Coins Chosen and Silver Differentiated,” 70. *Changshu xianzhi*, (Gazetteer of Changshu County, 1539), 4.15b. This excerpt describes the shift that occurred in the Chinese monetary system. Copper coins became regionally commodified, whereas silver had a consistent value that allowed it to cross regional boundaries. The Changshu gazetteer shows how Southerners and Northerners alike hoarded coins. The regional differences became important when counterfeiting flourished throughout the empire, creating a surplus of copper coin with regionally defined values. This was contributed to by a cacophony of state issued coins. The exchange ratio between coins minted by the state, and counterfeited coins did not depend on the metallic content of the coin alone. According to Kuroda, before silver reached the level of local markets, copper coins had established a regional system that differentiated certain coins for accumulating assets, and others used for daily transactions. This system was developed and maintained through the loose consensus of local traders.

an impressive 1:6 in China. The further the silver ‘migrated’ east, the more valuable it became. Until 1640 China’s gold/silver ratio was well below the “international” rate, which caused both contemporary European merchants and modern historians such as Braudel to state that silver was being ‘sucked’ into China.

Silver’s Fluctuations in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century

Historians, as mentioned earlier, disagree what the impact of this foreign silver was on the Chinese domestic economy and its link to China’s commercialization. The exact estimate of the total quantity of silver imported is also the subject of intense debate: however, even conservative estimates are impressive. Von Glahn suggests that China imported 46,600 kg of silver per year before 1600 (and this would be a minimum level due to lacunae in data and widespread smuggling) or roughly 7,300 metric tons (7.3 million kg) of silver over the period from 1550 to 1645. The estimate of domestic silver mine output was about 1/8 of the foreign influx per year before 1600, and 1/20 during the first half of the seventeenth century.

This newly available silver currency generated a boost in consumerism and sped up the financial transactions in the economy of highly commercialized areas such as the Jiangnan region (and with it Changshu, the county in which de Rougemont’s mission was located). However, the differences between the European and Chinese gold/silver ratio eventually balanced out (in 1640 according to Von Glahn), and the two-decade-long disturbance that accompanied dynastic change in China cut off (or at least severely diminished) the bullion flow into China. The Qing’s conquest was not primarily aimed at fighting all maritime trade. Their goal was to

850 Von Glahn, Fountains of Fortune, 127. This gap in regional ratios closed by the middle of the seventeenth century.
852 See debate between Von Glahn and Atwell.
853 Von Glahn, Fountains of Fortune, 140-141.
conquer China. The Southern Ming pretenders, the Ming loyalist regime of Zheng Chenggong, and the Three Feudatories were among their primary foes in the early years following the capture of the North. Zheng’s base of power was first in Fujian, and then in Taiwan. He turned out to be a very persistent opponent who relied largely on his maritime fleet to fight off the Qing. He even attacked the city of Nanjing. The Qing had no seafaring fleet that could match Zheng’s so they decided to forcefully evacuate the littoral population of Fujian in an attempt to eliminate Zheng’s advantage. The Qing also declared a ban on foreign trade that was not lifted until 1684, though Zheng died in 1662 after conquering Fort Zeelandia and ousting the Dutch from Taiwan.

This brings us to the 1670s when the Kangxi depression hit the Chinese economy. Silver influx had diminished since the 1640s, and no one is quite sure what happened to the role of silver as a currency in any regional Chinese economy at that time. Silver became scarce; food prices were low, so copper gained in popularity when it came to daily economic exchanges. Silver in turn stopped circulating since rich merchants and those who had a reserve of silver (such as the Qing government) started hoarding it. As such, Japanese economic historians’ idea of Chinese economic behavior during this depression (hoarding silver, using copper coins or even bartering) is remarkably similar to an even older paradigm in history that assumed that the Chinese economy was not as advanced as the contemporary European economy in the sense that Chinese people easily regressed...

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854 See also Daphon Ho, “Sealords Live in Vain: Fujian and the Making of a Maritime Frontier in 17th Century China” (PhD diss., University of California, 2011), chapter 4. Daphon Ho agrees that the Qing’s scorched earth policy definitely disrupted the silver trade and the maritime economy, though Kishimoto’s, Atwell’s and Von Glahn’s research has indicated that silver production as a whole was already on the decline in both Japanese and South American mines around that time. See personal correspondence Daphon Ho.

to a pre-monetized socio-economic state. Even late imperial China historians such as Kishimoto and Brook, who have battled and reversed the knowledge of historians that worked under earlier paradigms (with incorrect assumptions such as the one that the Chinese economy was not as monetized or advanced as the Western one) are convinced that silver as a means of exchange left circulation during the 1670s when the depression was most severe. Kishimoto stated that during the years 1667 to 1673, the Qing treasury withdrew “an average of three million taels of silver per annum” from circulation. This was part of the Qing retrenchment policy: between 1660 and 1674 the silver reserves increased rapidly thanks to the resumption of tax collection and a reduction of financial expenditure. It is not clear exactly how much silver was circulating in China at that time, but Kishimoto does argue that the loss of a few million taels a year would have seriously affected the economy. The overall impression is that silver was so scarce that even rich merchants, who had hoarded it in previous years, were slowly losing it and became impoverished.

Based upon the information of de Rougemont’s draft of an account book, it is clear that in the Changshu and wider Jiangnan regional economy, the circulation of silver did not stop. If we peek carefully through the keyhole, it is even possible to argue that silver was more pervasive in this regional economy than historians such as Kishimoto and Golvers have concluded. Before looking at the data I have extracted from the account book to support this, I will explain where the line was between the two currencies and what kind of expenses each currency was used for.

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857 Kishimoto and Brook do not share the exact same opinion on this matter. Brook sees the withdrawal of silver as partial to certain regions, without a serious impact on local economies. He has yet to publish his findings. See personal correspondence March 2012.

858 Kishimoto, “The Kangxi Depression,” 234.
The Use of Silver in Payments Above and Below 1 Shi of Rice

Tang Zhen 唐甄 (1630-1704) kept notes and observations that have provided historians with textual evidence for the assessment of whether or not silver was still in circulation in the early Qing. He noted that the quantity of silver (in circulation) decreased daily and that there was simply not enough silver for daily transactions. Silver was scarce and, as a result, grain and hundreds of other unsold commodities piled up at the market centers in Suzhou.859 Although Tang Zhen and De Rougemont were contemporaries and even bought their goods in the same markets (Suzhou was less than fifty kilometers from Changshu), there is no reason to suppose that they ever met. Through the sources that both left us, it is clear that both used copper and silver in the same regional circuit, and, though Tang Zhen did not leave an accounting sheet through which we could calculate for what goods he used either currency, he did jot down his opinions on the pros and cons of a bimetallic economy.

Tang Zhen further wrote that “though cash [copper] is now used, it is only for transactions in fish, meat, fruit and vegetables. For a shi860 of rice and above, or a roll of cloth and above, silver is always used.”861 The price of a shi of rice refers to the actual price of a certain amount of rice, and it can also be read as a symbolic reference to the pervasiveness of silver in the economy of the Yangtze delta. Based upon this reference, scholars such as Kishimoto, Golvers, and Brook conclude that daily transactions or small-scale purchases were paid for in copper, whereas unminted silver was the medium of larger scale purchases such as purchases in bulk.

859 Kishimoto, “The Kangxi Depression,” 231. This observation matches up with a popular idea amongst economic historians that the size and number of economic transactions within an economy is dependent upon the quantity of money available. If silver was not available, people would use copper or barter, or goods would simply not sell.
860 1 shi = 10 dou = more or less 100 liters. See Perkins, abbreviations and equivalents but also page 314. See also Chuan, Han-sheng & Richard Kraus, Mid-Ch’ing Rice Markets and Trade: an Essay in Price History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 79-99, for a discussion on the shi as measure for rice.
861 Chuan & Kraus, Mid-Ch’ing Rice Markets and Trade, 62.
(above one shi of rice) and luxury products. In the following paragraphs I will show that this generalization is still useful but may need to be modified slightly in specific regions.

The Value of One Shi of Rice

The price for one shi of rice in Suzhou in 1669 was between 0.6 and 0.9 tael. Mi Chü Wiens, who worked with the same data as Kishimoto (the Yue shi bian 開世編 written by Ye Mengzhu 葉夢珠, 1624-?), comes to similar prices, namely between 0.9 and 1.3 tael per shi during the year 1670, 0.63 tael during the fall of 1673, and 0.73 tael in 1678. Wang Yeh-chien includes values of 0.83 tael per shi of rice in 1672 and 0.93 for 1678. Golvers, who calculated the price of rice based upon several entries in the account book, comes to a price of 0.9 to 1 tael per shi of rice. Golvers also calculated the conversion rate between silver and copper between 1674 and 1676: 1 tael was worth 2,500 copper coins, or 1,000 copper coins equaled 0.400 tael. All these scholars conclude that the prices for one shi of rice were somewhere between 0.6 and 1 tael.

Because the depression was draining silver from all layers of society but especially the poor, I decided to investigate de Rougemont’s interactions with the poorest among his parish first, and compare his monetary exchanges with them. Alms or charitable relief to the poor constituted about 5% (more or less 15 taels) of

866 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 610.
867 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 564.
the total amount of expenses noted in the account book.\textsuperscript{868} De Rougemont gave these alms to a broad range of people who were poor, sick, physically disabled, female (widowed), or any combination of these factors. I expected all of these entries to be in copper, since even rich merchants did no longer dare to use their silver.\textsuperscript{869} Of the 60 entries for alms that I encountered, only 19 entries included the alms’ receiver, and only three individuals could be clearly identified as Chinese Christians.\textsuperscript{870} The smallest amounts were given in copper (30, 40 or 50 coins), but silver was also given in relatively small amounts, such as 1/5 of a tael and even 1/20 of a tael (equal to 125 copper coins). Alms were also given in kind, for example in rice or cotton. Food and clothing would be the most logical item to be distributed among the poor. What is surprising is that 34 of the alms were given in silver, and only 26 of them in copper coins (56% of the number of alms in silver, 43% in copper). I expected all entries to be in copper, since no one was willing to use silver for large or small expenses.

However, if we look at the mean amount of alms in silver that de Rougemont gave to the poor (0.361 tael), then we see that it is well below the price of one shi of rice (0.6 to 1 tael). This average even obscures that 28 of the 34 alms given in silver were amounts below 0.5 tael, and 20 of those were even below 0.200 tael. Without the six entries that were above 0.500 tael, the average was 0.260 tael.\textsuperscript{871}

\textsuperscript{868} Golvers, François de Rougemont, 314.
\textsuperscript{869} The rich did not use silver in any of their expenses with local artisans since the value of this currency was fluctuating too much.
\textsuperscript{870} They were identified either because the entry explicitly states that it concerned a ‘catechist’ or because of circumstantial evidence. Golvers, François de Rougemont, 315. Golvers still concludes that, in light of the strict limits of de Rougemont’s financial resources, it would be improbable that his financial aid to poor people was extended in a significant way to non-Christians and heathens. In several cases the alms was indeed given to a Christian convert, who then would distribute it amongst the poor.
\textsuperscript{871} These six high entries were: 0.500, 0.600, 0.980, 1.200, 1.700 and 3.000.
The poor people who received de Rougemont’s silver probably used most of this silver to buy daily necessities, since several of the entries explicitly state that these poor people were in grave need. If de Rougemont gave them silver, this indicates that these poor people could effectively buy something with this silver; it is unlikely that this financial help was similar to handing over a bar of gold to a homeless person. Instead de Rougemont gave them lots and lots of (silver) change. De Rougemont himself was yet another link in the circulation chain: he got the silver he spent from local sources (he was disconnected from Macao and did not spend the silver he received from Beijing himself), and he was not afraid to donate (thus circulate) it to other people as well.

Apart from this category of “very poor people,” de Rougemont had several other categories of expenses that involved specifically lower-class people. In interactions with common people such as bearers, the data of the account book confirm Tang Zhen’s assessment of the use of copper and silver. The majority of
times de Rougemont paid the bearers for their services carrying his sedan chair or luggage (30 of the 36 entries) in copper. This suggests that daily wages were paid in coin. In contrast, work on a seasonal or annual basis was paid in silver. Most of the payments in silver were entered towards the end of the account book. However, it would be too hasty to conclude that a gradual change of currency occurred. Copper may have prevailed as the most popular currency to pay for this specific interaction, but again all the amounts of silver were below 0.250 tael. The silver payments are much lower than what one would expect from Tang Zhen’s remarks.

Another daily expenditure that was entered 55 times in the account book was the distribution of tips (called xam fum, shang feng 賞封) or monetary rewards that were given to a social inferior. One would expect this data to comply with the daily wages of the bearers. Only in 19 entries was the word ‘servant’ (domestic or not), ‘skipper’, ‘clerk’, and ‘workmen’ entered, but several other entries indicate that some sort of service had been performed in order to receive the tip. Slightly more tips were distributed in copper than in silver (30 versus 25), but again over half of the silver tips (16 of the 25) were distributed in amounts less than 0.270 tael, and five of the nine tips that were above this amount (corresponding to the 0.450, 1.325, 0.980, 0.400 and 0.700 tael) were in fact given out for various combined tips, or combined with other services. Including the combo-tips mentioned above, the mean amount of silver given was 0.394 tael.

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872 I would like to thank Richard von Glahn for making this very valuable comment.
873 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 330.
874 Golvers, François de Rougemont, 330. I agree with Golvers that the general picture indicates that the tips constituted a certain relation to activities of lower-level professions.
875 There appears to be a rationale behind the division of copper and silver payments and donations that is connected to the social status of the receiving party (whether they are servants or not). Further research is needed.
876 During the months of April and May 1675 de Rougemont was traveling in Hangzhou and systematically exchanged silver for copper coins to pay all his expenses. Towards the end of the account book de Rougemont paid slightly more often in silver than in copper. Whereas throughout the entire account book both currencies are intermingled, Golvers noted the same two deviations. See Golvers, François de Rougemont, 562. Golver also calculated that of the “818 monetary
A last daily expenditure that exposed the pervasiveness of silver in the regional economy was the distribution of travel money and the fares that de Rougemont paid for his – and other converts’ – many journeys to the different cities and villages of the lower Yangtze area. Most of de Rougemont’s fares were paid in copper (17 copper entries versus 9 silver). In six of the seven times de Rougemont entered the cost of the fare between Changshu and Suzhou it was in copper, with an average cost of 253 copper coins (or converted in silver: 0.101 tael). Only once did de Rougemont pay in silver, an amount of 0.300 tael, which is exactly three times the usual fare. As Golvers suspects, this could represent the fare of three persons. This would indicate that the skipper who received the money of the fare

indications (divided over 806 separate entries), 478 or 58.44% are expressed in silver, and 340 or 41.56% in copper.”

On several occasions de Rougemont entered the price of an article in both silver and copper. As Golvers pointed out, “such unexpected internal proof is found in the price for the fare (“naulum”) for the distance between Changshu and Suzhou, as a rule set at about 250 copper coins or 0.100 tael.” Golvers, François de Rougemont, 565. This also explains why Golvers opted for a silver/copper exchange rate of 1,000 copper coins: 0.400 silver tael.

Golvers, François de Rougemont, 609.
dealt in both currencies and was accustomed to accepting fares in silver and copper. Of the nine fares that de Rougemont paid for in silver, six involved a journey to Hangzhou. Since Hangzhou was outside of de Rougemont’s local circuit, it made sense to pay in silver, as copper coins were tied to their local currency circuits (whereas silver transcended these boundaries more easily).879

In contrast to the fares, the quantity and type of “travel money”880 that de Rougemont distributed to converts and other Chinese for regional travel indicates the pervasiveness of silver in this expense category (19 entries in silver, 5 in copper). On no less than six occasions, travel money for Nanjing or Hangzhou was distributed in silver currency. However, silver was also used for destinations within the regional market in which de Rougemont and his converts were operating (such as Suzhou, Chongde, Taicang and Shanghai). It is also significant that certain silver payments for travel money were in amounts as low as 0.060 tael. All this evidence supports the claim that silver was preferred over copper to pay for fares and donations of travel money within and outside the regional market. Local skippers were able to make transactions and receive payments in both currencies, accepting amounts of silver below one shi of rice (0.6 to 1 tael).

Besides de Rougemont’s draft of an account book there are several Chinese contemporary sources that discuss the Jiangnan regional economy as well.881 From the Ming onwards the socio-economic changes that occurred in Jiangnan have fascinated Chinese, Japanese, and Western scholars, and an entire generation of China historians has used the abundance of sources on the Jiangnan region to refute

879 This meant that whenever de Rougemont traveled to Hangzhou he would exchange silver for local copper coins. See Kuroda, “Copper Coins Chosen and Silver Differentiated.”

880 Small sums were given to people who would use it to cover their travel costs.

881 Timothy Sedo talks of the “Jiangnan model” of Ming (and early Qing) scholarship. Timothy Sedo, “Linzhang County and the Culturally Central Periphery in Mid-Ming China.” (PhD. Diss: University of British Columbia, 2010): 6. Geographically the area called Jiangnan referred to the southern prefectures of Jiangsu and Anhui provinces in combination with the northern parts of Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces, and thus included the most agriculturally, economically, and culturally vibrant region located along the lower reaches of the Yangtze river delta. The area consisted of important cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Ningbo and Yangzhou.
earlier notions of “Chinese stagnation.” Looking at both Chinese sources – such as Tang Zhen’s and Ye Mengzhu’s comments on the changing role of silver in economy – and Western sources – such as de Rougemont’s account book – allows us to view a more diverse picture of the use of copper and silver in that regional economy.

By setting side-by-side information on the role of copper and silver from both sources, it becomes clear that silver could be used on an everyday basis, despite being “a primitive, indeed regressive form of money,” that “constituted a mediocre instrument of exchange.” 882 I agree with Von Glahn that this is a correct assessment at the dawn of the age of silver in the fifteenth and early sixteenth century, but at the time of the early Qing in the regional market of Changshu, the main focus of this appendix, many external factors influenced the use of silver and copper. In an economic crisis, the use of either silver or copper may have been random depending on what type of currency you had at hand. It may not be always true that silver was used for expenses well above one shi of rice. Perhaps the transaction costs involved in using silver currency – it was still uncoined so it had to be cut with special scissors – and the cumbersome measurement of its weight and purity were not as serious an impediment as assumed earlier. 883

Kishimoto acknowledges that Tang Zhen was not just a radical thinker but also a member of an “anti-silverist group.” Tang Zhen was opposed to the accumulation of wealth and actively promoted the abolition of silver as a currency. In his opinion it would be better to use copper since “like a fountain, [it would] never be exhausted.” Out of concern for the well-being of society Tang Zhen tried to help by promoting the interests of the anti-silver lobbying group of which he was a member. Tang’s background and his perceptions of how the Chinese Confucian elite could remedy the disorder caused by upcoming commercialism dictate the way he

882 Von Glahn, Fountains of Fortune, 83.
883 Von Glahn agrees with this assessment. He also commented that later evidence does show that whenever coin was available in sufficiently abundant quantities (bronze coin in the mid eighteenth century and Spanish pesos in the late eighteenth century), there still was a decisive preference for using coin over sycee silver, and this preference was surely related to the transaction cost problem.
thinks people ought to use silver and copper.\textsuperscript{884} De Rougemont’s accounting draft or keyhole does not necessarily adjust our understanding of whether silver was used only for expenses above one shi of rice or not. To do so more account books or other similar sources that comment on monetary affairs during the early Qing are needed, preferably covering multiple regions in combination with an interval of dates that could help understand the development and waves of monetary cycles before, during, and after the Kangxi depression.

However, using de Rougemont’s account book as an example, I do believe that an approach that uses Jesuit sources and seeks ways to contextualize them, can add something to our understanding of the global economy and its many players and to the specific socio-economic interactions of a very local setting. This way world history – and a historical source such as the account book of a missionary who has traveled far and wide – has the ability to engage at a deep level with local history.

\textsuperscript{884} For more information on the Chinese elite’s reaction to the upcoming consumerism during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see Tim Brook, \textit{The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
### Appendix F: Breakdown of Specific Expenses in 1778 According to Bourgeois’ Categories (in Taels and Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price (in taels)</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>% of total budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good Works</td>
<td>Established good works</td>
<td>265.76</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-established good works (temporary use)</td>
<td>150.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outside catechists</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Church music</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Servants for the mass</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wax for the church</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assemblies of Christians and their catechist</td>
<td>61.66</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old domestic helps</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>706.13</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>11.14%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>Church and Sacristy</td>
<td>77.77</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baptism, Images, Religious books</td>
<td>157.15</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To establish missions outside (Beijing?)</td>
<td>169.71</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>77.43</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Library</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>579.56</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9.14%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisions</td>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>174.11</td>
<td>80 bags</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donkey feed (beans)</td>
<td>119.55</td>
<td>70 bags</td>
<td>1.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Straw</td>
<td>54.55</td>
<td>28595 pounds</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bran (for the donkeys)</td>
<td>24.48</td>
<td>30 bags</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charcoal (earth)</td>
<td>246.53</td>
<td>98595 pounds</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charcoal (wood)</td>
<td>60.55</td>
<td>11146 pounds</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whitewash (white lime)</td>
<td>57.08</td>
<td>46405 pounds</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>112.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raisins</td>
<td>121.95</td>
<td>8827 pounds</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>971.1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>15.32%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic costs</td>
<td>Hai Tian Residence</td>
<td>516.66</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kitchens and House for the sick</td>
<td>805.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lockers</td>
<td>555</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lamp oil</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1200 pounds</td>
<td>1.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honorarium of scholars and wages of servants</td>
<td>440.55</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presents (&quot;gratifications de coutume&quot;)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House doctor</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four language teachers</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clothing and meals of</td>
<td>99.57</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proselytes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea for the year</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper (red, writing paper, packing paper)</td>
<td>25.56</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2781.38</strong></td>
<td><strong>43.89%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>One time costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royalties on a piece of land</td>
<td>10.66</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House and shop reparations</td>
<td>264.65</td>
<td>4.18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey to Canton</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, harnesses, carriages</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1.34%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing custom agents</td>
<td>55.96</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presents for three seasons</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curiosities, diplomatic costs</td>
<td>59.49</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unusual alms and needs</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden maintenance</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six big jars</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To search for the holy oils</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of two shops</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest days of workers</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>11 150 bottles</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apricot oil</td>
<td>7.51 59 pounds</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1084.18</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.11%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Further costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refund</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of year (and soldats des rues)</td>
<td>9.81</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to emperor</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten outings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rope (ma tao)</td>
<td>21.29 1560 pounds</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood for the oven</td>
<td>7.62 3295 pounds</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meals in the house</td>
<td>87.58</td>
<td>1.38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>215.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.40%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6337.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>