National and Colonial Language Discourses
in Japan and its Colonies, 1868-1945

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

The Faculty of Graduate Studies

(Asian Studies)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

(Vancouver)

October 2011

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the colonialist discourse in Japanese linguistics in the period from 1868 to 1945, the time when Japan changed from a semi-feudal isolated country to a modernized nation and a colonizer. To address the complexity caused by such rapid development, and namely, to show how modernization and colonialism shaped Japanese language studies during this period, I present my analysis in two parts: the first part explores multiple facets of Japanese language education in the colonial period, both on Japanese territory and in Japanese colonies, particularly on the Korean Peninsula; the second part is a study of language manuals for Japanese soldiers. Although I examine some multilingual manuals, my main focus is on Korean language manuals because their number far exceeds that of other languages and also because Korea is my primary research area.

My claim is that a careful examination of language manuals as well as of Japanese language education both in Japan and its colonies reveals one of the characteristic features of Japanese colonial linguistics: a situation when a standard-in-the-making was simultaneously being exported to colonial sites with variable success rates. Before the Japanese language went abroad, and more importantly, after its export, the struggle over what kind of Japanese language to teach continued to be a matter of controversy and was never settled until the U.S. occupied Japan and implemented educational reforms. But superimposed on all the debates was always the conflicting concept of kokugo (national language), which was so over-politicized that it precluded the possibility of any academic reforms or structural refinements in tandem with its political expansion overseas. As my study shows, one of the reasons for this complexity was that not only nationalism but also
pan-Asianist discourse played a significant role in the Japanese colonial enterprise in East Asia. The language manuals for Japanese soldiers that I examine were published between 1882 and 1935. As the publication years grow more recent, we can see, in the prefaces and the contents, shifts in the forms of nationalism and pan-Asianist rhetoric occurring simultaneously with the rise of colonialist discourse.
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1. Introduction

If you were an American fluent in English and, say, in Persian or Arabic, and were asked to publish a language manual for American soldiers dispatched to the areas where those languages are spoken, which kind of manual would you write? First, you might want to state your reasons to author a manual in your preface, explaining the significance of military enterprise in the region along the lines of peace-keeping and democracy building to secure the welfare of the people as well as the stability of the surrounding regions – something perhaps only the U.S. can do – and that all this will lead to future benefits in business, a better quality of life, peace on earth, etc. Second, depending on the amount of time you would expect your readers to spend on your manual, you would decide if you would include transcriptions in the Arabic alphabet or stick to the English alphabet. Third and most importantly, you would decide on your content. Because your target readers are soldiers, the content should stay more practical and conversational rather than literary and packed with grammatical explanations. You would imagine which kinds of phrases soldiers would need to use, privately or officially, and write them down. *How much is it? Where do you come from? Did you see any armed soldiers here recently? Please don’t be scared; we are here to protect you from the bad guys...*

What I will examine in this thesis are not language manuals written for American soldiers in the twenty-first century, but those intended for Japanese soldiers about a century ago. Like today in North America, a variety of language manuals were sold at bookstores in Japan in the late nineteenth century. The popular languages were English, French, and German – the all-important languages of Western knowledge at that
time – but there was also a demand for Korean, Chinese, and Russian languages as well, albeit for different reasons.

Writing language manuals for soldiers cannot be simply language instruction, due to the time constraints on soldier training, nor can it be free from social/political ramifications due to the strategic value of the enterprise. In this thesis, I examine language manuals for Japanese soldiers to show how language was used in colonialist discourse. By the word “discourse” I mean not just the ideological coloring of phraseology found in the texts, but rather how those various forms of language intertwined with the deeds of soldiers and educators in colonial sites along with the types of reactions the colonized peoples had to those forms of language. Importantly, it is the differences that matters the most – the differences found throughout the colonial period’s various experiments with the language standards in Japan.

Regarding colonial linguistics, there is a substantial amount of scholarship about the relationship between language and colonialism in the former colonies of the European powers in Africa and India, but research on the impact of Japanese colonial rule on the formation of Korean linguistics has been overlooked. What is special about the Japanese colonial enterprise vis-à-vis other colonial powers is that the formation of the nation-state ideology and imperial expansion took place almost simultaneously, that language was a key tool in both projects. Japan launched its colonial enterprise without waiting for domestic standardization of the language, a fact that often caused chaos in Japan’s language policies.

I also examine the kinds of theoretical frameworks prevalent in language policies, which can be observed in the contents and prefaces of language manuals. First I
introduce the *four-pattern theory* of national thinking presented by Erica Benner (2006) and examine how the military conscription system functioned in Japan’s nation building. Unliberated farmer soldiers learned the modern apparatus of Western lifestyle in the military and experienced encounters internal and external to Japan through the journey to the war front, which facilitated a shift in identity from a local/provincial type to a national identity. Moreover, pan-Asianism was the favorite rhetoric and pet theory of the language manual authors. The problem with analyzing the historical phenomenon of pan-Asianism is the fact that many of its protagonists were Japanese, who often asserted Japanese leadership in a pan-Asian regional order, a trend related to Japanese colonialism. As a result, ideals such as Asian solidarity and equality favored by early pan-Asianists were pushed into the background. Nonetheless, pan-Asianism and nationalism emerged as two major modern ideologies in Korea when Korea began to face Western challenges, and the triumph of nationalism over pan-regionalism was historically contingent, following Japan’s annexation of Korea that remodeled the concept of pan-Asianism from an equal alliance against the West into an alliance with the Japanese as an “enlightened leader” burdened with a “civilizing mission.”

Although my primary interest is on Korea, these wartime language manuals frequently cover not only Japanese and Korean, but also other languages including English, Mandarin, and Russian, thus instantiating a multilayered discourse on the target languages as well as on the Japanese language itself. These language guides are particularly important because

(1) soldiers’ speech is based on strictly colloquial language, which helps us acquire a close reading of levels of polite speech and the language discourse
behind them. Koyama (2003:505, 539) posits that the military was one of the sites whence the discourse on modern Japanese honorifics derives; (2) soldiers’ speech has an extensive, lingering effect on the target locales due to the contemporary social pervasiveness of the military as well as the authority behind it. For example, in postwar Japan, some soldiers’ expressions and manners of speech became ubiquitous and were adopted by lay people with or without their original connotations (Kida:106); (3) the Japanese colonial gaze that is so often identifiable in the manuals is far-reaching – the Japanese absorbed the framework of hegemonic Western models (Sung:17) together with their “Orientalist mindset” (Said, 1993:394). After opening to the West in 1868, Japan adopted en masse Western knowledge and the military apparatus from the European imperialist powers: England, France, and Germany (Kida: 94, 98).

The most significant published works on the language manuals to date are Minami (1999), Yamada (2004), and Sung (2010). While the focus of Minami and Yamada is primarily on language manuals and language journals that promoted the Korean Language Encouragement Policy of the Japanese Government-General during Japanese colonial rule over the Korean peninsula (1910-1945), Sung examines manuals published in the Meiji era (1868-1912) in order to examine the formation of modern Japanese linguistics in a rather technical manner. Although both Yamada and Sung provide comprehensive philological research in their work, their critical studies remain shallow with respect to the impact of colonialism on linguistic discourse. For instance,
even though Yamada and Sung include the multilingual language guides in their lists, they do not take English, Mandarin, Russian, etc. into consideration, which could have added much diversity to their studies. Also, even though his focus is not on languages, the work by Ichinose (2004) examines a number of how-to manuals for Japanese soldiers packed with canned phrases for greetings, speeches and letters as well as military knowledge and on-the-field survival hints. This type of manual enjoyed wide circulation, starting with the launch of the compulsory military system in Japan in 1873 and lasting until the end of WWII. According to Ichinose, the authors of the manuals covered in his book were little known (as were the authors of the language manuals), which shows a bottom-up vector for the production of such manuals. This in turn is a clear example of how power operates at the micro-levels, expanding from the grassroots upward, and not as the previously accepted top-to-bottom model of colonialist discourse, focused on the decisions of the ruling elite, would otherwise suggest.

The sections below are as follows:

In Chapter 2, I describe the formation of the Japanese national language, mainly relying on the work of Lee Yeounsuk (2009);

Chapter 3 examines what happened when the Japanese language went overseas;

In Chapter 4, I first introduce the *four-pattern theory* of national thinking presented in Erica Benner (2006) as the basic framework for my analysis to observe the developments in colonial discourse in the language manuals for Japanese soldiers. Then I

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1 According to Ichinose (2004), there was no official guide or textbook issued by the military for soldiers until the outbreak of WWII, notwithstanding the amount of knowledge that soldiers were obliged to memorize. Drill instructors taught soldiers how to address one’s superiors, and how to pronounce formulations, strategies, regulations, etc., verbally; in the meanwhile, many manuals were authored privately by military officers or retired officers (20).
contextualize the background against which the language manuals were written and cover the history of pan-Asianist frameworks, discursive features of which figured prominently in the prefaces and contents of the language manuals.
2. *Kokugo* (national language) and *nihongo* (Japanese)

Let me begin the discussion by posing the following question: what is the difference between *kokugo* (national language) and *nihongo* (Japanese)? One might say that the term *kokugo* is used when *nihongo* is learned or spoken by Japanese nationals. Thus, the term *kokugo* is burdened with nation-state ideology while *nihongo* is not. Nonetheless, *nihongo* is not free from the implications of modernity. Indeed, collective speech varieties spoken within the archipelago only became *nihongo* or a language called “Japanese” at a certain point in recent history.

Perhaps the most well-known example of language ideology in the world is French. From the time of the French Revolution to the present, people who respect “liberty, equality and fraternity” and speak French are allegedly accepted into France. In the case of the French language, an entity “called ‘national language’ appeared during the French Revolution in order to support the modern nation-state: the French language, as *la langue nationale*, became the symbol of the nation’s spiritual unity. Nonetheless, even before the revolution, the sense of linguistic identity already existed as a truisim, which had been manipulated by the Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts or Académie Française. The revolutionaries were but the successors to this ready-made linguistic tradition.” (Lee: 2). Such was not the case with the Japanese language. In modern Japan, *nihongo* never provided the solid foundation for the construction of *kokugo*, the national language; it was rather, “only after the showy tower of *kokugo* was constructed that the foundation, the identity of the Japanese language, was hurriedly made up” (ibid.).
2.1 Construction of *kokugo*: Ueda Kazutoshi’s two frameworks

An entrepreneur of the “showy tower”, Ueda Kazutoshi (1867-1937) was given a professorial position in the department of linguistics at the Imperial University in 1894 on his return from Europe. During Ueda’s stay in Europe, his encounter with the Neogrammarians and the Allgemeiner Deutscher Sprachverein (All-German Language Association) had had a great impact on Ueda (Lee: 85). “The two organizations were distinct in their character: the former was an academic movement mainly among universities, while the latter was initiated by an association that also involved public membership” (ibid.: 85). Ueda’s later work also exhibits two different vectors – academic and political – both rooted in his experience with Prussian-German nationalism. “Academic research into language and pragmatic policy-making about language were two indispensable leading characters on the same stage, called the nation-state” (ibid.: 86).

Ueda’s lecture *Kokugo to kokka to* (The National Language and the Nation-State) (1894) was quite daring because nobody before him had so directly connected the concept of *kokugo* to the nation-state and justified, in scholarly terms, the internal and organic connection between the two (ibid.: 87). “Ueda’s view of language reminds us of Humboldt’s: a language forms the worldview of the people who speak it. After Humboldt, the stress on the organic and spiritual relation between a people and their language became one of the traditional German views about language.” (ibid.: 89) Ueda characterizes the ideology of *kokugo* as follows: “A language for the people who speak it is the symbol of the spirit of the brethren, just like the blood shared by their bodies. Therefore, the language of the Japanese nation is the spiritual blood of the Japanese
people. The *kokutai* (national polity) of Japan is maintained by this spiritual blood, and the Japanese race is unified by this most strong and long-preserved tie.” (ibid.: 89-90)

This is the political significance of Ueda’s *kokugo* idea. I will describe his academic endeavors, such as the construction of a uniform Japanese language through language standardization, in the following section.

### 2.2 Standardization of Japanese I: the beginning

Before the Meiji period, the distance between the spoken and written language in Japan was extraordinary. It was only when the social order, which had supported and allowed these two language varieties to coexist without conflict, started to collapse that people became aware of the distance. *Kanbun* (Classical Chinese)-style language was used for cultural and administrative matters among intellectuals and the samurai class throughout the Edo era (1603-1867). Some Meiji intellectuals attempted to bridge the gap between the spoken and written language in a movement that came to be called *genbun itchi* (unification of the written and spoken language).

It is peculiar that *genbun itchi* – in essence a kind of vernacularization – was believed to be the key to future success as a modern nation-state as well as a linguistic weapon to compete with Western powers. The Japanese situation was similar to that of China and Korea, where the distance between the written and spoken languages was just as far as that in premodern Japan. The Petition for Actions towards *Genbun itchi* (*Genbun itchi no jikkō ni tsuite no seigan*) submitted by the Imperial Board of Education in February 1901 (Meiji 34) says: “European countries liberated themselves three hundred years ago from the domination of the Latin language, and their exercise of
genbun itchi since then advanced their civilization and enlightenment and enabled them to become wealthy nations with a strong military; by contrast, the Koreans, Jurchens, Khitans, Manchus, and Mongols failed to realize genbun itchi, and consequently these nations were doomed to wither; currently in Japan, the difficulty in learning Japanese language, script, and styles has been distracting people’s tremendous energy from ‘gaining other necessary and useful knowledge’; this was ‘an extreme waste for Japan, which is now in a race with the world,’ and ‘genbun itchi must come first and foremost in educational reform.’” (ibid.: 53)

In 1902, following the approval of the petition, the Imperial Board of Education in February created the Kokugo Chōsa Iinkai (National Language Investigative Committee), an official governmental committee, with Ueda Kazutoshi as director. The ultimate goal of the committee was to establish the hyōjungo (standard language) – a linguistic norm premised on the spoken language as its base. Ueda was an advocate of rōmaji (Latin script) and the abolition of Chinese characters since he firmly believed that sound was the essence of language and that the “ideographic” Chinese characters, which did not represent sounds, defied this purpose. He set as “the ‘ultimate goal’ of kokugogaku (studies of the national language) the realization of ‘correct speaking, reading and writing’ among the people. This clearly indicated that the research goal of kokugogaku was not the language itself, but to make real the ideal of kokugo… Therefore, it could not exist without practicing the education and policies of kokugo.” (ibid.: 105)
2.3 Standardization of Japanese II: reformists vs. conservatives

Ueda set up the overall schema of kokugo, and, after his retirement, his student, Hoshina Kōichi, upholding his determination to carry on Ueda’s work in language policy and education, combated the ultranationalistic conservative scholars and literati who firmly believed in a “sacred tradition” of kokugo protected under the kokutai (national polity).

Beginning with his appointment by the Ministry of Education in 1898, Hoshina persistently advocated “the adoption of the phonetic way of writing kana (Japanese vernacular), the reduction of Chinese characters with a view toward their ultimate abolition, and the use of colloquial language in public sectors.” (Lee: 119) In reality, however, none of his efforts and plans came to fruition at that time. It was only after the war ended and his rivals – ultranationalistic scholars – were swept away that his kokugo reforms started to move forward (ibid.). The postwar kokugo reform was not forced by the occupation army, but was “rather a realization of the plans that the reformists among the bureaucrats had already drawn up before the war” (ibid: 120). “The reformists in the government, represented and led by Hoshina, almost all survived in spite of the military defeat.” (ibid.:121)

In the field of language before 1945, the conservatives and the reformists were in constant confrontation regarding the problems and policies of kokugo. The conservatives identified kokugo with kokutai (the national polity) and opposed kokugo reform as antinational. Both domestically and in the colonies the conservatives did not see any need for kokugo reforms. On the other hand, in view of domestic language issues, Hoshina, the front man of the reformists, was anxiously seeking approval for a language
policy in the overseas colonies. “He aimed to expand the domination of the Japanese language by assimilating different ethnic groups in the colonies. His argument for this was a typical representation of linguistic colonialism. For Hoshina, domestic kokugo reform and language politics overseas were inseparable, or rather, ultimately complementary as prerequisite to each other.” (ibid.: 121)
3. **Japanese as the “common language” in East Asia**

Between the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), as the mix of formal and informal Japanese imperial possessions had formed rapidly, “the Japanese flag could be found flying over a vast expanse in East Asia and the western Pacific: the colonies of Taiwan, Korea, and Sakhalin; the island mandates in the Pacific; the satellite regime of Manchukuo in Northeast China, and a network of treaty port settlements in China” (Duus: ix). In these areas – the so-called “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”\(^2\) – the Japanese language was taught to the locals as the “common language (kyōtsūgo).” Why was it Japanese that was to be the common language in the sphere? According to Hoshina, “it is a general principle in the history of language that when uncivilized people have contact with civilized people, the former adopt a great part of the latter’s language” (Lee: 196). Also, Hoshina argued for the necessity of a common language because different languages were spoken not only between different ethnic groups, but even among the same group. Indeed, others who learned from Ueda, such as Ogura Shinpei, more or less shared this similar idea, and in the case of the latter, applied this view to the situation in Korea (Yasuda: 116). This view, to be sure, had nothing to do with opinions held by colonial subjects.

However, although Japanese language education and subjugation policies were always enforced on the locals, the relations between the colonizer and the colonized were not always simple and should not be reduced to a simple dichotomy of coercion and

\(^2\) The term and the concept came into usage during Konoe Fumimaro’s cabinet in 1938, a year after the second Sino-Japanese War broke out (Tani: 2). Konoe Atsumaro (1863-1904), the father of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, after experiencing Western racism toward Asians in Europe, founded the *Nankin Dōbun Shoin* – the precursor of the *Tōa Dōbun Shoin* (East Asia Common Culture Academy) – in 1900 to promote future harmony and cooperation between Chinese and Japanese youths (Reynolds, 1998: 76). Many of its graduates were later recruited to Manchukuo and other parts of China (Reynolds, 1989: 246, 262). For further details on the *Tōa Dōbun Shoin*, please refer to Reynolds (1989; 1998) and Kurita (1998).
resistance. Tani argues that such a simplistic understanding of Japanese education has been a virtually unquestioned dogma among scholars in the field, but it is gradually losing its persuasiveness (Tani, 2006: 253). She presents the examples of Indonesia and Burma, the former Dutch and British colonies, where the locals received school education in Japanese and eventually rebelled against the Japanese as well as against the former colonizers and achieved independence (ibid.: 253). Furthermore, in his book about Japanese colonial “kokugo” education in Taiwan, Chen (2001) calls this relation between colonizer and colonized “Dōka’ no dōshō imu (sleeping in the same bed of ‘assimilation’ while dreaming different dreams).” Different intentions lay behind “assimilation” policies and these intentions changed over time and affected policies differently. The Japanese, pushing kokugo education under the aegis of their “assimilation” policy, attempted to limit the amount of “modern knowledge” in education, whereas Taiwanese, absorbing the “modern knowledge” through education, claimed their rights and aimed for resistance (Chen, 2001: 19). The significance of the works by Tani and Chen is in their careful examination of the local responses against the policy and education. Mitsui (2010) also employs a similar stance in his work which focuses on the language movements in colonial Korea vis-à-vis the Government-General’s approach to Korean orthography issues. I will cover their arguments in detail in the following sections.

Although Japanese language education was always enforced on the locals, the name of the subject and the level of priority accorded it varied depending on the region, as shown in the table below (Tani, 2000: ii)³:

³ The table is quoted from Tani (2000: iii) but its contents are simplified.
Table 1: Japanese language education in the occupied regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Occupation period</th>
<th>Name of the subject (Japanese)</th>
<th>Years of learning</th>
<th>Mandatory or optional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1895-1945</td>
<td>Kokugo</td>
<td>4 or 6 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sakhalin</td>
<td>1905-1945</td>
<td>Kokugo</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangtung province in China</td>
<td>1905-1945</td>
<td>Nihongo</td>
<td>4 or 6 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1910-1945</td>
<td>Kokugo</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island mandates in the Pacific (Micronesia)</td>
<td>1914-1945</td>
<td>Kokugo</td>
<td>3 or 4 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo</td>
<td>1932-1945</td>
<td>Nihongo</td>
<td>2 or 4 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied areas in North/Central China</td>
<td>1938-1945</td>
<td>Nihongo</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1942-1945</td>
<td>Nihongo</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya and Singapore</td>
<td>1942-1945</td>
<td>Nihongo</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1942-1945</td>
<td>Nihongo</td>
<td>3 or 6 years</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1942-1945</td>
<td>Nihongo</td>
<td>4 or 5 years</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prior to the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), education policy in overseas territories was implemented separately by local institutions such as the Korean Government-General, the Taiwanese Government-General, the Karafutochō 樺太廳 in

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4 The table excludes the regions that fell under the control of Japan between the Meiji Restoration (1868) and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), i.e. the Ryūkyūs, Hokkaido, and the Kurile Islands. Also, after France fell under the control of Germany in 1940, Vietnam was occupied by Japan from 1940 to 1945 with the permission of Vichy France government, yet Tani does not seem to have taken this into account.
Southern Sakhalin, the Kantōchō 関東廰 in Kwangtung province, the Nan'yōchō 南洋廰 in the Island mandates in the Pacific, the Manchurian Railway Company in its surrounding areas, and so forth. The Japanese central government, i.e., the Ministry of Education, could not openly interfere with the decisions made by the local governments. However, as of 1938, when the Kōa-in (East Asia Development Board, 興亜院⁵), the institution in charge of the occupied areas in China, was established, the Ministry of Education as well as the Kōa-in began to take part in Japanese language education policy in the area (Tani: 3). Later in 1941, they established the Nihongo kyōiku shinkōkai (Japanese Language Promotion Institute), which started to influence the language policies of the other overseas territories and fostered interaction with Japanese domestic language policies (ibid.).

Despite these attempts to spread the Japanese language throughout the Co-Prosperity Sphere as its common language, Ueda’s students like Hoshina and Ogura shared pessimistic views about the policy. Both were aware that obstacles to the overseas advancement of Japanese were inherent in the language itself (Lee: 206; Yasuda: 104-5). “There was no clear model language, no standard for vocabulary or pronunciation; there was a flood of difficult kanji and kokugo; the kana usage was inconsistent with the pronunciation; there was extreme disparity between the spoken and written languages. Hoshina contended that unless these problems were solved, promotion of Japanese overseas would be impossible.” (Lee: 207) “The moment that Japan tried to make

⁵ In 1942, as the war went on, Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki expanded the Kōa-in into a new Daiōa-shō (大東亜省, Ministry of Great East Asia), which was established to supervise the policies in regions outside of the Japanese archipelago, Korea, Taiwan, and Southern Sakhalin (Tani, 2006: 142).
Japanese the language of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, the mass of unsolved problems in *kokugo* and its orthography resurfaced and became of pressing importance” (ibid.).

The unexpected move toward language reforms was actually prompted by the Japanese army after the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) broke out. “As a result of the large increase in mobilization, the average literacy of the soldiers declined to a degree that hindered the operation of weapons. Because of this, the army decided to simplify the armament terms, in a series of reforms: the Regulations concerning Simplification of Armament Names and Technical Terms in February 1940 limited the number of *kanji* to 1,235 so that the soldiers who had finished normal elementary schools could read and write them. […] The Guidelines for *Kana* Usage for Armaments in March 1941 adopted complete phonetic usage. These reforms, though confined to the army, were in accord with what Hoshina had been hoping for…” (ibid.) Hoshina must have felt that the time had finally come to enact *kokugo* reform, his dream of many years: the plans that had been frustrated by “the tradition” at home would no longer be obstructed overseas. He hoped that the reform overseas would reciprocally influence the homeland’s language. Nevertheless, here again, his plan incurred criticism from the conservative camp, which branded the idea of reform of Japanese for foreigners as “blasphemy against the sacred tradition of *kokugo*” (ibid.: 208).

### 3.1 *Kokugo* in Korea and Taiwan

Compared to the case of modern-day Korea, where people are preoccupied with erasing the colonial past and highlighting the Korean independence movement or Korean cultural uniqueness, the situation in today’s Taiwan is quite different. The colonial
legacy, such as old Japanese-style buildings, is still visible and the older generation who received education in Japanese like to show off their ability to speak Japanese, all of which draws a vivid contrast to today’s Korea (Son: 12). What can account for this difference? Taiwan was under Japanese control fifteen years longer than Korea, yet this fact alone cannot explain this contrast in attitudes toward Japan and Japanese. As far as language policy was concerned, there were no great differences between the two colonies. Some attribute it to the difference in cultural “maturity” between pre-colonial Korea and Taiwan (Tani, 2006: 97). Korea had been an independent country with a distinct culture for many centuries while Taiwan had not (Tani, 2006: 97; Kim: 172-3). I will suggest the following reasons to answer the question: 1) most of the Korean peninsula was a monolingual environment, which facilitated the formation of nationalist movements based on language and script, while Taiwan was largely multilingual, which made it difficult for the locals to prepare a linguistic platform for independence movements, 2) prior to the annexation, there had been many missionary schools in Korea, which provided Koreans with another route whereby to access modern civilization, while Taiwan had only a few missionary schools, most of which supported Japanese education.

Many have argued that colonialism was a primary factor in the rise of nationalism throughout the world, and particularly outside the West. With the arrival of colonial forces, native people launched cultural and political movements to counter the unfortunate fate colonialism had dealt them (Shin: 41). Taiwan and Korea were no exception. Establishing a national identity and solidarity, unique racial origins and language, and especially a vernacular language, played a significant role in their anti-Japanese movements. An important point is that in both Taiwan and in Korea there
existed parallel (and often overlapping) stances to absorb modern knowledge through Japanese language education alongside a nationalist movements. However, due to the above-mentioned reasons, the former was more conspicuous in Taiwan, while the latter predominated in Korea, backed by the existence of a native vernacular script, han’gŭl.

3.1.1 Korea (1910-1945)

*Han’gŭl*, the word designating native Korean script, is a neologism coined by Chu Sigyŏng sometime between 1910 and 1913 (King, 1997: 111). The language entrepreneurs including Chu “argued eloquently and systematically for the connection between language and nation and between national script and independence” (King, 1998: 63). Shin Gi-Wook argues that Japan’s efforts to subjugate Korea using the discourses of colonial racism played a significant role in shaping the nature and development of Korean nationalism (Shin: 42). The Government-General in Korea specifically attempted to investigate Korean customs, cultures, traditions, rituals, religions, and institutions, with the explicit purpose of providing a “scientific basis” for colonial racism by searching for elements in Korean history and culture that could be used for its assimilation policy (Shin: 44). “On its face the new Japanese policy appeared to appreciate Korean tradition and culture, but its underlying goal was to demonstrate that Korea was one part of the larger East Asian sphere in which Japan was dominant (Shin: 45).”

In 1920s Korea, a cosmopolitan outlook with little appreciation of Korea’s past was prevalent. People “did not generally appreciate their traditions and culture, but rather criticized their own historical heritage, especially the Confucian heritage, as backward
and sought to reconstruct Korean nationality largely based on modern liberal Western thought. The best-known example was Yi Kwangsu’s ‘Minjok kaejoron’ (A Theory of National Reconstruction). Yi acquired a ‘modern’ education in Japan and returned to Korea right after the March First movement. He became one of the most prolific writers and influential intellectuals of the colonial period.” (ibid.: 46) Nevertheless, in the late 1920s this tendency began to change. As the Japanese stepped up their efforts to assimilate all things Korean into a Japanese context, Korean nationalists began to defend their heritage, reevaluating it in a more positive light, by defining the nation in racial and collectivistic terms. “Efforts to preserve ancient remains and historical monuments grew into a broader movement to invigorate studies on Korea” (ibid.: 50). Amid such booming interest in Korean heritage, “han’gŭl befit a broader nationalist movement whose main intention was to restore Korean national identity and culture” (ibid.: 52). Traditionalists’ efforts, however, were confined by and large to cultural, historical, or rhetorical arenas, without any political power to lead Koreans to national independence. Through the glorification of their past, Koreans were perhaps able to enhance their psychological pride but they still fell short of altering their colonial condition.

Korean nationalists racialized the notion of the Korean nation, stressing the ideas of shared blood and ancestry and the uniqueness and purity of the Korean nation. “While Koreans contested the contents and meanings of colonial racism, they could not escape from using the very logic and language of their colonizers” (ibid.: 55). First, nationalists confronted certain inherent limits in subverting colonialist discourse. As Schmid (2002) shows, “the Japanese influenced Korean nationalist thinking by producing knowledge of

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6 Tikhonov (2010) argues in detail how Social Darwinist thinking was introduced and became prevalent among Korean intellectuals via Japan, the most well-known example being from Fukuzawa to Yi Gwangsu.
and about Korea as well as by providing the conceptual vocabulary of modernity – ideas such as munmyŏng kaehwa (‘civilization and enlightenment’ – bunmei kaika in Japanese), social Darwinism, minjok (race, nation), and tongyang (the East).” Also, in denouncing colonial racism and Japanese assimilation policy, Korean nationalists employed the same logic and language that Japanese colonialists used (Shin: 55; Kim: 170). Kwŏnjŏng Kim states that the famous passage of Ch’oe Hyŏnbae (1894-1970), a successor of Chu Sigyŏng, in which he argues that “a language is a spiritual product of one ethnic group,” greatly resembles Ueda Kazutoshi’s “Japanese language is the spiritual blood of the Japanese” (169). Besides, the genbun itchī (unification of the spoken and written language) movement in Japan influenced contemporary Koreans in shifting their writing from Chinese characters to the phonetic alphabet han’gŭl, in order to narrow the gap between the written and spoken language, which was considered to be a prerequisite to joining the circle of world powers by advocates of the movement (Mitsui: 79-80).

After the March First Independence Movement in 1919, the Government-General’s office kept a close watch over such language reform movements. In order to bring them under control, they established a committee to fix the official Korean orthography, let Korean activists join the committee, and adopted their ideas (ibid.: 66). Although it was not an ideal setting for the Korean linguists, it was an important opportunity to decide what orthography should be taught in schools in Korea (ibid.: 185). Thus, they could not but take part in the committee to reflect their opinions on the official orthography. From the standpoint of the Government-General, this roundtable for Korean orthography was a part of the assimilation policy – Korean language to become
part of Japanese. Taking advantage of Korean language nationalism, the Government-General mobilized Korean researchers to the roundtable and appealed to Korean public sentiment (ibid.: 187-8). Although Mitsui disagrees that these language activists can be called “colonial collaborators,” he also criticizes that in today’s Korea, the Korean Language Society (today’s Han’gŭl Society) has come to monopolize the history of the language movement during the colonial period. This view ignores the existence of other groups which rivaled the Korean Language Society and turns a blind eye to the fact that the Korean linguists who joined the orthography committee of the Government-General were all from the Korean Language Society. Their eventual hegemony over the other groups was only guaranteed by taking advantage of the Government-General’s Korean education infrastructure (ibid.: 231). This relationship in which both the colonizer and colonized took advantage of each other for different purposes can be also observed in the case of Taiwan.

3.1.2 Taiwan (1895-1945)

The linguistic situation in Taiwan was different from that in Korea, and one of the most conspicuous differences was its linguistic diversity in pre-colonial times. Before discussing language issues, let me touch briefly on the history of Taiwan. Originally, residents in Taiwan before the seventeenth century were Malayo-Polynesian ethnic groups. From 1624 to 1661, Taiwan was occupied by the East Indian Company of the Netherlands, which had its headquarters in Java. In the meantime, the Spanish were settled in the north for a short period of time but were soon driven out by the Dutch in 1642. From 1661 to 1683, a group led by Zheng Chenggong ruled the island, claiming
the revival of the Ming dynasty. In 1683, Taiwan came under the control of Qing China, first as a part of Fujian province and later as a separate province from the late nineteenth century onward. After defeating Qing China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japan annexed Taiwan. Upon Japan’s defeat in WWII in 1945, although Taiwan was again included into Mainland China, the conflict between the Communist Party and Nationalist Party soon resumed and in 1949, when the Communist Party declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Nationalist Party retreated to Taiwan. Then, the Korean War broke out and as Communist China became preoccupied with supporting North Korea, the United States began to protect Taiwan from the mainland as a part of its anti-communist strategy (Wakabayashi, 2006: 18-9).

According to a recent sociolinguistic survey\(^7\), Taiwan consists of natives (1.7%), immigrants from the southern part of Fujian province (73.3%), immigrants from the northern part of Canton province (12%), and those who came from the mainland after 1945 (13%) (ibid.: 20). Prior to the Japanese annexation in 1895, the gap between spoken and written languages was similar to that in Japan – only cultural elites used Classical Chinese writing and the elite bureaucratic speech style called guanhua (ibid.: 21). Under colonial rule, the eagerness to absorb “modernity” or “modern civilization” among Taiwanese facilitated the spread of the Japanese language, which came to function as a common language between different ethnic groups (ibid.: 23). Until Japan radicalized its assimilation policy in the 1930s, there were three kinds of language reform movements\(^8\) in Taiwan: 1) the Chinese vernacular writing (baihua) movement, which

\(^7\) The result cited in Wakabayashi’s article is from 1995, but the latest survey shows no significant change to date.

\(^8\) For details, Wakabayashi suggests referring to Matsunaga Masayoshi’s article “Kyōdo bungaku ronsō (1930-32) ni tsuite [Concerning the disputes on vernacular literature]” (1989) and Chen Peifeng’s book
followed the contemporary trend in Mainland China, 2) the Taiwanese vernacular writing movement, which, as a result of the difficulties in adapting *baihua* writing to Fukienese and Cantonese, advocated inventing a vernacular writing system that would embrace all the Chinese speech varieties in Taiwan, and 3) the Latin script movement, which promoted the use of Latin script in transcribing vernacular speech, following the Bible translation by Western missionaries, similar to the precedent in Vietnam (ibid.: 25; Son: 32).

Just as in Korea, Taiwan also had a Confucian tradition which emphasized the importance of education. In addition, with rich natural resources, Taiwan had a relatively wealthy society which could afford to pay the tuition for schooling (Chen, 2001: 13). Although mutual communication between the colonizer and the colonized is crucial for the sake of sound governance of the colony, setting up and running a comprehensive educational infrastructure for the colonized required a great amount of effort and money and was not always believed to be necessary. For instance, in the case of India, only selected locals were allowed to receive education to work for the colonizer (ibid.: 13). When Japan occupied Taiwan, the Japanese government was having financial difficulties and dismissed Izawa Shūji, known as the first entrepreneur of the education system in colonial Taiwan, who requested an increase in the education budget in order to install a comprehensive *kokugo* education infrastructure for assimilating Taiwanese into “Japanese” (ibid.: 61).

Following the standpoint presented by Mark R. Peattie, Chen argues that the Japanese “assimilation” policy through *kokugo* education had two directions; one was

“assimilation” into the Japanese national polity (*kokutai*), and the other was “assimilation” into civilization and modernity in general. These two must be separated and carefully analyzed within their contexts (ibid.: 24). While Izawa aimed for both directions, Gotō Shinpei, the Taiwanese governor-general, and Mochiji Rokusaburō, a director of the educational bureau under Gotō, only focused on the latter, using the former as mere rhetoric (ibid.: 64). Unlike Izawa, a professional educator and enthusiastic nationalist, Gotō, who had been a medical doctor, was a cool-headed, pragmatic person (ibid.: 67). He was against ideological egalitarianism under the emperor and denied the possibility of ethnic “assimilation.” Instead of spending a great amount of budget on educating the locals, he planned to build vocational schools in Taiwan to benefit from colonial enterprise (ibid.: 77-8). After he left Taiwan, Mochiji, the director of the educational bureau, took over and continued this framework, promising the Taiwanese equal rights when they became as “civilized” as the Japanese. By trying to reduce the number of public schools, he attempted to improve the fiscal situation (ibid.: 97).

What was the reaction of the Taiwanese to these policies? From the beginning, the Taiwanese had a strong enthusiasm toward school education and even sent their daughters to school, disguising them as males (ibid.: 103). At one point, when the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) broke out, they strongly resisted the education provided by the Japanese, but after that, no matter how the Government-General changed its policies, their basic stance of welcoming public education never changed (ibid.: 103). Taiwanese anti-Japanese activists requested the Government-General to include Mandarin in school curricula, but they also requested the construction of more public schools and never
mentioned abolishing Japanese language education (ibid.: 235). Also, unlike Korea, which had been a relatively independent country for about a millennium, Taiwan had never been an independent region, which resulted in their rather reluctant adherence to their own traditions and independence, as compared to their obsession for new knowledge (ibid.: 248).

Mochiji, however, felt threatened by Taiwanese’ strong motivation for learning, which drove him to restrict access to education (ibid.: 105). During the Meiji period, the schools for Japanese and Taiwanese were separated; the Japanese children studied at shōgakkō (小学校) fully run by public funding, whereas the Taiwanese studied at kōgakkō (公学校). Nonetheless, owing to this divided school system, the wealthy families in Taiwan donated a lot of money to the latter, thinking the latter were their schools (ibid.: 111). Regardless of the background of such donations, some biographical writings of the Taiwanese intellectuals show their ambivalent feelings between pride for the traditional Confucian schools (書房) and longing for the modern-style education at kōgakkō (ibid.: 118).

Many Taiwanese had chosen kōgakkō as a place where they could absorb modern knowledge and some also sent their children to Japan to learn more; on the other hand, many Koreans had chosen missionary schools for the same purpose since some regarded it a shame to send their children to schools built by the Japanese (ibid.: 119). At the time of the annexation, there were many missionary schools in Korea, and the Japanese schools were neither the only nor the best option for receiving a modern education, which was not the case in Taiwan (ibid.: 119). When Taiwan was annexed, there were only five Christian schools in all of Taiwan, all of which focused on religious learning and
accepted only Christians (ibid.: 119-20). Besides, unlike in Korea, where American missionaries were the dominant force and had also played a political role against Japanese occupation, missionaries in Taiwan were supportive of Japanese public education and even recommended that their followers go to study in Japan (ibid.: 120).

Although Mochiji attempted to restrict access to education among the Taiwanese, eventually the requests from the Taiwanese to build more schools as well as to receive higher education grew in intensity and became hard to ignore. Moreover, the Qing dynasty collapsed and a democratic government of the Han Chinese ethnic group was established in Mainland China in 1912 (ibid.: 146, 151). Kumamoto Shigekichi, the successor of Mochiji, was alarmed by the situation and feared the influence of the mainland activists over the Taiwanese. At that point, the Taiwanese Government-General began to advocate the necessity of “assimilating” Taiwanese into the Japanese national polity (ibid.: 152). In order to stop the locals from going to study in schools in Mainland China, they could not but enrich the educational infrastructure in Taiwan and began to strengthen Taiwanese “assimilation” into the Japanese national polity (ibid.: 169, 172).

At primary school (kōgakkō), the students who had a good grasp of Japanese got their compositions published by a well-known publisher with a preface written by a famous writer such as Satō Haruo; on the other hand, the students who could not pronounce Japanese words properly were severely scolded in class (Kawamura: 60). For the Takasago ethnic group (高砂族) in Taiwan, the Japanese language functioned as a common language as well as written medium between different tribes, which motivated them to learn Japanese even more actively than the Han ethnic group (ibid.: 70). Despite
the Musha Incident (霧社事件) in 1930, where 134 Japanese were killed by 200 Takasago ethnics, the effect of kokugo education was revealed in the work of Takasago giyūtai (高砂義勇隊), a volunteer corps formed of Takasago youths during WWII (ibid.: 72).

3.2 Teaching nihongo, not kokugo

In September 1931, the Japanese Kwantung army occupied the northeastern part of China and hastily created a new nation, Manchukuo, in the following year. “To justify this fabricated nation, the authorities manipulated various strategies including the hollow slogans such as gozoku kyōwa (the five races – Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Manchu, and Mongol – live in harmony) and ‘create a utopian paradise’” (Lee: 182). Unlike the case in Korea and Taiwan, the ethnic diversity initially found a positive meaning in Manchukuo and later in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Following their utopian slogan, Japanese had to teach nihongo, not kokugo to the locals in the Manchukuo multiethnic and multilingual sphere. In such a situation, what status should be given to the languages spoken in different areas and which language would be used in government offices, courts, schools, and other public spheres? Although the Japanese authorities produced “harmonizing” slogans, they were either unaware of these questions or unwilling to answer them and consequently never legislated an official language or status of other languages in the overseas territories.
3.2.1 *Tōa Dōbun Shoin* (East Asia Common Culture Academy)

Even prior to Manchukuo, Japanese language had been taught in Mainland China since the late nineteenth century. While most foreign schools, including missionary schools and Buddhist schools, derived from religious institutions, *Nankin Dōbun Shoin* (Nanjing Common Culture Academy) – later renamed as *Tōa Dōbun Shoin* (East Asia Common Culture Academy) – was a rare example unrelated to any religion (Reynolds, 1998: 77). The school was established in 1900 with Konoe Atsumaro (1863-1904) as its head under the slogan of bringing together Chinese and Japanese youths through language exchange (ibid.: 76). Nevertheless, right after the opening of the school, teachers and students needed to be evacuated to Shanghai due to the influence of the Boxer Rebellion, and when they reopened their school in Shanghai as the *Tōa Dōbun Shoin*, they no longer accepted Chinese students due to financial difficulties in school management (ibid.: 77).

An interesting aspect of the *Tōa Dōbun Shoin* can be found in its origins: the founding entrepreneurs of the school were military men. Arao Sei (1858-1896), called “*shina rōnin* (China adventurer),” was a member of the fifth class at Japan’s elite *Shikan Gakkō* (Military Academy) and, several years later, he joined the China Section of the army’s General Staff (Reynolds, 1989: 215). In a speech delivered in 1889, he said, “while there, I had carefully calculated the cost of Japan’s defense needed over the next ten years. Japan was too weak, I had felt, to take the profits of her trade with the West out of Western hands; but China was closer to Japan, resembled her in many ways, and therefore seemed a likelier source of profits” (ibid.: 215). Munakata Kotarō (1864-1923), another founding member of *Tōa Dōbunkai* (East Asia Common Culture Association) –
the Tōa Dōbun Shoin’s sponsoring parent organization – worked for more than thirty years as a China-based spy for the Japanese Navy (ibid.: 216). Later, Arao resigned from the military to “devote himself completely to planning and promoting his trading company and its auxiliary, Nisshin Bōeki Kenkyūjo (Japan-China Trade Research Institute)” (ibid.: 217). His commitment to this field “derived from the demonstrated incompetence of Japanese merchants in their trading encounters with China” (ibid.: 217).

Machida Jitsu’ichi (1842-1916), from the Navy, then a foreign service officer, was the first Japanese consul at Hankow. He also shared the same opinion. Because of financial difficulties at the institute, the Vice-Chief of Staff Kawakami sent support funding from the General Staff (ibid.: 220).

In June 1893, after three years of training, eighty-nine students graduated from Nisshin Bōeki Kenkyūjo, many of whom served as army interpreters and spies during the Sino-Japanese War in the following year (ibid.: 221). Reynolds argues that this success is “directly relevant to the subject of the Tōa Dōbun Shoin, because the institute served as the direct model and inspiration of the latter, Japan’s second research and training institution on China” (ibid.: 221). Whatever the original goal of the school, the institute was heavily driven by military interests. Indeed, many graduates of the Tōa Dōbun Shoin got jobs in Manchukuo and other parts of the Japanese informal empire in China (ibid.: 262-4). After Arao died in Taipei of bubonic plague in 1896, Arao’s right-hand man, Nezu Hajime (1860-1927), a former Army Staff General, served as director of the Tōa Dōbun Shoin from 1900 to 1923 (ibid.: 222-3). The school was founded in 1900 under the initiative of Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863-1904), the head of the House of Peers and the Peers School, and the Tōa Dōbunkai (East Asia Common Culture Association), the
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*Tōa Dōbun Shoin*’s sponsoring parent organization, had similarly been established by Konoe in 1898 in Tokyo (ibid.: 224).

### 3.3 Japanese language education in the occupied regions

In most cases, *kokugo* had been taught entirely in Japanese under the propaganda slogan that “the Japanese national spirit” is only understood and transmitted through “the national language,” and even the use of other languages or speech varieties was strictly prohibited in classrooms. On the other hand, *nihongo* was sometimes taught in the languages spoken locally, depending on the region. For example, in Kwangtung province in China, the region occupied by Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), the local authorities invited Japanese language instructors from Taiwan and Korea and adapted their pedagogy for the teaching of Japanese (Tani: 21). In Manchukuo (1932-1945), the language of instruction was officially Japanese but remained controversial due to the popularity and efficiency of adopting Japanese textbooks with Chinese parallel translations (ibid.: 22). In the occupied areas in North China, due to the lack of Japanese instructors with a good grasp of Mandarin, the Japanese textbooks with Chinese translations were considered an effective tool; however, the textbook compiled in 1941 for use in China presupposed the language of instruction to be Japanese and did not meet the needs of the local situations (ibid.: 33). Here again, the *kokugo* dogma that “the Japanese spirit” is only understood through Japanese language hindered efficient classroom instruction even in the case of *nihongo*.

After attacking Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941, the Japanese forces advanced to the south, occupying Hong Kong and the Philippines in the following January,
Singapore in February, and Java and Burma in March, and established a military
government in the occupied territories. They soon started Japanese language education,
which lasted for about three and a half years (ibid.: 124). Unlike the Ministry of
Education, the Army and Navy, depending on the strategic importance and the amount of
natural resources in the regions, determined whether these regions would have
independence in the future, and set the levels of Japanese language education accordingly
(ibid.: 126-7). Nevertheless, “[a]s Hatano Sumio in his work on Japan’s Asian policy
during the Asia-Pacific War has pointed out, the declaration of independence for Burma
and the Philippines in 1943 was above all an attempt to prepare ‘Japan’s case’ for the
postwar era – at a time when defeat was already certain” (Saaler: 14).

From 1943 to 1944, in order to educate intermediates between the locals and the
military authority, the Japanese military dispatched a group of local students to Japan
from Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Burma, the Philippines, Sulawesi (Celebes), Borneo
(Kalimantan), and Seram (Ceram), who were the first state scholarship students of the
Japanese government – 193 students in total (Tani, 2006: 151-3). Moreover, the Japanese
military formed a “propaganda team (sendenhan 宣伝班),” which imitated the
propaganda department under Nazi Germany. Famous writers, critics, scholars, poets,
painters, actors, etc., were mobilized to Malaya, the Philippines, Java, Burma, etc.; for
instance, Jinbo Kōtarō and Ibuse Masaji were sent to Malaya and Singapore, and Miki
Kiyoshi was sent to the Philippines (ibid.: 151). In 1942, upon the request of the Army
and Navy, the Ministry of Education planned to build a training centre for Japanese
language instructors for the Southern regions. They opened the institution, called the
Nanpō haken nihongo kyōiku yōin yōseijo (南方派遣日本語教育要員養成所; Training
centre for Japanese language instructors for the Southern regions), and the *Nihongo Kyōiku Shinkō-kai* (日本語教育振興会; Association for the Promotion of Japanese language Education)\(^9\) was in charge of the training and selection of the candidates (Kawamura: 117).

### 3.3.1 Southern Sakhalin (1905-1945)

In accordance with the treaty after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), the Southern half of Sakhalin Island was annexed by Japan, and in 1906 the administrative ministry for Sakhalin, *Karafutochō* (樺太廰), was established (Tani, 2006: 95). Ainu residents were not only forced to change their lifestyle to adopt Japanese manners, but they were also displaced from their original homes to locations allotted by *Karafutochō*, similarly to the case of aboriginals in the U.S. and Canada (ibid.: 95; Kawamura: 212). As for their children, *Karafutochō* set up small schools (*kyōikujo* 教育所) in relatively large “camps” near the west coast, where all the expenses for their education, including stationery supplies, etc., were paid (Tani: 95). In 1921, as *Karafutochō* met financial difficulties in school management, the government employed all the instructors in the *kyōikujo* as public employees and in 1930, they established a special school in Shisuka for non-Ainu indigenous residents (ibid.: 96). In 1933, following the amendment of the law on familial registry, the indigenous residents of Sakhalin also became “Japanese” and were forced to change their names to Japanese names (ibid.: 96). As they became

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\(^9\) *Nihongo Kyōiku Shinkō-kai* was a semi-governmental organization established in 1941 by the *Kōa-in* and the Ministry of Education, and all the board members were from these two organs. The goals of the organization were promotion of Japanese language education, compilation of Japanese textbooks and manuals, training of Japanese language instructors, publication of journals, hosting of meetings and sponsoring of conferences to promote Japanese language education, etc. (Kawamura: 228-30).
“Japanese,” they began to study with Japanese children at primary schools and all the kyōikujo were closed except for the one in Shisuka (ibid.: 96).

Similar to the administrative ministry for Hokkaidō, Hokkaidōchō (北海道廰), the Karafutochō enforced “assimilation policy” and Japanese language education on Ainu, Uilta (Orok), and Nivkh (Gilyak) people (Kawamura: 216). Except for a few Western missionaries in Hokkaidō, there was no one who paid respect to the indigenous language and culture, and the researchers who studied their religion, language, and culture were merely concerned with preserving them as museum artifacts (ibid.: 216). Kindaichi Kyōsuke studied Ainu culture to “discover” the genealogical origins of kokugo (Yasuda, 2008: 54). Yasuda remarked that, without the epic poetry yukar, the Ainu culture as well as its language had no value to Kindaichi Kyōsuke and the department of linguistics at Tokyo Imperial University. Thus, Kindaichi commented that mastering the language by imitating what Ainu spoke today was not only boring but also useless (ibid.: 65).

3.3.2 Kwangtung province and the surrounding areas of the Manchurian Railway Company (1905-1945)

When Japanese first began to educate locals in China in Kwangtung province, they used a Russian-Chinese school (露清学校) building to open the Kinshū Nankin Shoin (金州南京書院; Jinzhou Nanjing Academy) in 1904. The director of the school was Iwama Tokuya, and upon the opening of the school, all curriculum design, etc., was in his hands. Iwama was a graduate of the Tōa Dōbun Shoin, and after his graduation he made great efforts in the education of the Chinese. He put emphasis on Chinese language
education, rather than on Japanese, thus gaining respect from the locals (Tani, 2006: 169-70). Since the Kwangtung province was a leased territory, the administrative ministry for the Kwangtung province, the Kantōchō (関東庁), could not enforce Japanese school education on the locals and therefore the number of students enrolled in their schools remained small. Their curriculum set the hours of Japanese language classes at half that of Chinese language classes. And the language of instruction was Mandarin except for the Japanese language class (ibid.: 170-1). Control over the school system was strict in Kwangtung, whereas in the surrounding areas of the Manchurian Railway Company it was relatively lax and the Chinese side ran most of the schools in the region (ibid.: 171).

3.3.3 The island mandates in the Pacific (Micronesia) (1914-1945)

The Micronesian islands in the Pacific, such as the Northern Mariana Islands, the Chuuk Islands (Truk Islands), Palau, Pohnpei, Yap, Jaluit, etc., were formerly under Spanish and later German control, but during WWI, the Japanese army occupied these Micronesian islands as of 1914; they subsequently became territories under the mandate of Japan following a decision of the League of Nations (LON) in 1920. Even after Japan’s withdrawal from the LON in 1933 following the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan remained in the area, and Japanese language education – called “kokugo education” just like in other colonies – continued for about thirty years until 1945 (Tani, 2000: 88). Generally speaking, owing to their long history of hostile colonization by Spain and Germany, the residents of the islands did not show much resistance toward Japanese occupation or language education, unlike the cases in Taiwan and Korea (ibid.: 121).
The Japanese education system of the region was broadly amended three times. From 1914 to 1918, the military was in charge of education; although they tried to recruit Japanese teachers from Japan, due to the lack of applicants, Japanese Navy officers taught local children at school. From 1918 to 1922, there were enough teachers from Japan to avoid Navy officers teaching in schools. In 1922, the Nan’yōchō was established and they began to organize the school system (Tani, 2006: 131). Upon the Nan’yōchō’s request, Ashida Enosuke (1873-1951) compiled a textbook in 1925, which adopted phonetic writing with katakana and only a few Chinese characters as well as colloquial speech style. Ashida explains that the reason for going beyond what was taking place inside Japan in terms of language reform was that a pioneer enterprise was a very risky one; what made him take such a risk was not for the sake of kokugo or himself, but for the convenience of the learners (ibid.: 134-5).

When the Japanese first arrived on the islands, Matsuoka Shizuo (1878-1936), an elite naval officer and younger brother of Yanagida Kunio, came to the islands as a colonizer and did research on the Micronesian languages (Kawamura: 28). As a researcher of Micronesian languages, which had no writing system, he put an emphasis on spoken language in the case of Japanese language education. This phonetic understanding of language was shared with his older brother, Yanagida Kunio (1875-1962), who also played an important role in Japan’s Micronesian occupation (ibid.: 31). He was an elite bureaucrat and, at that time, was assigned as a committee member of the League of Nations mandate, with a recommendation by Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933), No. 2 at the LON at the time. In a report to the LON, Yanagida criticized the assimilation policy of the Nan’yōchō, saying, “the common language must be chosen from the local
languages, and forcing the locals to memorize all the names of emperors is simply nonsense” (ibid.: 33-4). Nonetheless, this report was made in English outside Japan, whereas he never gave such opinions toward a domestic audience and kept talking about *kokugo* ideology (ibid.: 35)\(^{10}\). Matsuoka, in his book about the Micronesian languages, clearly states, “this book in no way intends to contribute to the spread or development of the Micronesian languages,” which signifies his intention for assimilation and colonization. Only people with such intentions devoted themselves to studying the languages of the colonized, which had a negative impact on Japan’s colonial rule overall (Kawamura: 46).

\subsection*{3.3.4 Manchukuo (1932-1945)}

The number of “national languages” in Manchukuo seems uncertain because the law never defined which languages were to be spoken under what circumstances. Depending on whom you asked, some said that the national languages were Japanese, “Manchu” (here it practically means Mandarin rather than Manchu), and Mongolian, while others said only Japanese and “Manchu” (Kawamura: 77). Moreover, depending on the regions inside Manchukuo, the languages to be taught at high school (*kokumin*...)

\(^{10}\) After his retirement, he started conducting folklore research. His folklore studies took shape as a critique of modernity as well as of governmental policies. He shed light on the daily life of “lay people” and on negative aspects of capitalist society. Nevertheless, Lee argues that the reason why Yanagida criticized modern Japan, including the establishment of “standard Japanese,” was that modernity meant the destruction of “Japanese tradition” inherited from generation to generation among “lay people” (Lee, 2009: 82). His view resembles that of Ogura Shinpei in colonial Korea – what language to speak must be chosen voluntarily by the speaker. In Ogura’s case (Yasuda, 1999), it meant that Koreans living in the countryside and having no need to communicate in Japanese need not learn to speak in Japanese; on the other hand, in Yanagida’s case, the opposition was between dialects and metropolitan standards. He believed that the standardization process of the language would occur naturally without any policies. In his opinion, the Japanese language originally had one speech style in the centre where the Japanese emperor was, but as people spread in all the directions, regional variety resulted; thus, if people moved to the centre and learn the language, the opposite phenomenon would eventually take place (ibid.: 116-7). His severe anti-governmental criticism concerning the standardization of *kokugo* was supported by one variety of *kokugo* ideology and *kokutai* (national polity) nationalism (ibid.: 119).
$kōtō$ gakkō 国民高等学校) varied; under the regulations of the school law, in prefecture-administrative districts ($kensei$ shikō chiiki 県制施行地域), it was Japanese and “Manchu,” in banner-administrative districts ($kisei$ shikō chiiki 旗制施行地域), Japanese and Mongolian, in the Russian residential district, Japanese and Russian, and so forth (ibid.: 79). The Japanese were encouraged to learn “Manchu,” whereas the “Manchus” were encouraged to study Japanese. Starting from 1936, the government sponsored language proficiency exams and gave bonuses to those who passed the exams (ibid.: 79). Although the system looked like that of a multiethnic and multilingual empire, it was supported by the strong intention of the Japanese authorities to spread Japanese in the region. Also, Manshū-gana (Manchu kana, slightly modified katakana) was established as a national script by the Manchukuo authority to transcribe all the languages of the region. This was greatly encouraging for the advocates of katakana as a national script in Japan, where the mixed style of Chinese characters and hiragana was dominant; however, their hopes soon disappeared together with Manchukuo (ibid.: 86).

Manchukuo was also a land of opportunity for many Koreans. Korean newspapers in the 1930s wrote of Manchukuo as an escape valve from a crowded Korea, and the number of immigrants between 1932 and 1940 was estimated to be approximately 720,000 (Han: 179). Some Koreans became low-ranking policemen. Due to the historical background that Korea had been a vassal state of China for long, Koreans received unpleasant treatment at the hands of Chinese; hence, some immigrants asked the Korean Government-General for permission to present themselves with Japanese names in Manchukuo (Tani, 2006: 123). Many who later became leaders in many fields of South and North Korea spent their youths there, such as Park Chung Hee, who was an
officer in the Manchukuo Army, Ch’oe Kyuha, who had a temporary position in the Manchukuo government, Chun Doo Hwan, who also crossed the border with his family for a better life, and Kim Il Sung, who was a cadre of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army; interestingly, Park was on the opposite Japanese side in Manchukuo (ibid.: 179-8). Han argues that Manchukuo became a model for the Korean states after liberation, as Korean officers of the Manchukuo Army later formed the core of the South Korean Army and supported Park’s coup in 1961. They had witnessed the revolt of the Kwangtung Army against Tokyo (the Manchurian Incident), state-led industrialization, bandit suppression, and mass mobilization, all of which became hallmarks of Park’s regime (ibid.: 180).

3.3.5 Occupied areas in North and Central China (1938-1945)

With regard to Japanese language education in China, the Twenty-One Demands in 1915 – a set of demands made by Japan on the Republic of China – caused a temporary decline; however, in the early 1920s, rivaling the U.S. and Britain, both of which founded universities near Beijing and started to recruit promising students to their universities as well as to their home countries, Japan launched a new education program for Chinese students (Tani, 2006: 177). With financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Tōa Dōbunkai established three schools in China between 1920 and 1922. Nonetheless, due to the frequent clashes between the Japanese and Chinese armies, the schools were emptied as many students participated in the anti-Japanese demonstrations and soon closed when the Manchurian Incident broke out in 1932 (ibid.: 177-9).
After the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, Japan occupied major cities in North and Central China by the end of the year. From 1938, the Kōa-in (East Asia Development Board, 興亜院) in cooperation with the Ministry of Education dealt with Japanese language education policy, and from 1941 it was succeeded by the Nihongo Kyōiku Shinkō-kai (Association for the Promotion of Japanese Language Education) (ibid.: 179). According to the investigation report compiled by the Kōa-in in 1941, people were obliged to learn Japanese not only at schools but also at companies and factories. The report categorized the prefectures into four levels of Japanese language proficiency; 1) prefectures which had teachers and schools of good quality, often related to Buddhist sects such as Honganji (本願寺), Tenrikyō (天理教), and Nichirenshū (日蓮宗)11, 2) prefectures where interpreters, if not school teachers, taught Japanese, and teachers themselves were not fluent in the language, with only three-to-six-months of Japanese language training, 3) prefectures where police guards taught at school when they were off duty, 4) prefectures with no Japanese education. Since those who had good command of Japanese were employed in the government or at railroad companies, the quality of the teachers remained poor, which resulted in low quality in education in general (ibid.: 180-1).

In Central China, even though in 1940 Japan and the Wang Jingwei government concluded an anti-communist treaty which featured further bilateral cooperation in military and economic matters, training schools for Japanese language instructors for primary schools were shut down; in addition, the hours of Japanese instruction were cut

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in school curricula, whereas hours of English instruction increased (ibid.: 184). Possible reasons for this were the lack of Japanese population in the region, the uncertainty of Japan’s further development in the region, and the high cultural level of the region due to the existence of many foreign interests. Besides, compared to Japanese, the cultural capital of English language learning was enormous, and the quality of textbooks as well as instructors was far better than those for Japanese (ibid.: 184). Although the Kōa-in and the Ministry of Education made efforts to propagate Japanese in the region, Japanese language education in the occupied territories in China remained unsuccessful.

In the regions around Inner Mongolia, the quest for independence among Mongol residents grew after the establishment of Manchukuo. In 1936, they established the Mengjiang United Autonomous Government (1936-1945), backed by the Kwangtung Army (ibid.: 185). Similar to Manchukuo, the Japanese advisors as well as the army and Kōa-in controlled this new puppet government (ibid.: 185). There were around 1600 schools in the region with very few female students. Japanese language education in the region seems to have been implemented smoothly; nonetheless, obstacles were the lack of Japanese instructors and textbooks as well as the strong anti-Japanese campaign by the Chinese Communist Party (ibid.:185-6). Tani cites Shi Gang (1993)’s opinion that because Mongolia is located between Russia and China, Japan took advantage of its unstable position in the region as well as of the people’s desire for independence (ibid.: 186-7).
3.3.6 The Philippines (1942-1945)

Before the arrival of Japan, the Philippines were a colony of Spain for about three hundred years from the sixteenth century and of the U.S. from 1898. Unlike Spain, which provided limited access to education among the locals, the U.S. made great efforts to provide education for Filipinos (Tani, 2000: 175). Despite the deterioration of public security amid the takeover, Japan resumed the local school system and made Japanese a mandatory subject (ibid.: 178). Although both Japanese and Tagalog were set to be the official languages, the use of English was also allowed “for the time being;” upon the strong request of the Spanish government to make Spanish an official language, Spanish was allowed in public, too (ibid.: 178).

Before the Japanese occupation took place, Japanese language education was conducted on a limited scale by Japanese religious groups such as Honganji (本願寺) in Manila and by Japanese Protestant churches (ibid.: 177). In 1942, considering the large population of Catholics in Philippines, Japan sent Japanese Catholic abbesses and their followers, as well as licensed English teachers, to the Philippines to teach Japanese to Filipinos (ibid.: 182-3). After Japan started the war against Britain and the U.S., Japanese engaged in English-related business such as film importing companies and interpreting were discriminated against within local Japanese society (ibid.: 183-4). Hence, those people who came to the Philippines not only from the Japanese archipelago, but also from Korea and Manchuria, were motivated to teach Filipinos. As social subalterns of the time, these Japanese held a strong anti-Japanese government sentiment and showed no enthusiasm to promote Japan’s assimilation policy. In the Philippines, English was often used in the classrooms not only to teach Japanese but also to teach other subjects (ibid.:
Japanese instructors in the Philippines maintained a tight teaching network and often held workshops or study groups to learn and improve their pedagogical skills – something that never occurred in the other overseas territories (ibid.: 190).

Thanks to the pedagogical enthusiasm of both the instructors and the students, as well as owing to the well-established educational infrastructure previously set up by the U.S., Japanese language education in Philippines had the best quality among the areas occupied by the Japanese after 1941 (ibid.: 195). Nevertheless, since the U.S. had promised the Filipinos independence by 1946, the Japanese were thought of as unwelcome intruders, a fact that strengthened the locals’ emotional dependency on the U.S. (ibid.: 193, 195). With no motivation to learn Japanese among Filipinos, Japanese language education, despite its high quality, proved to be a failure in the long run (ibid.: 195).

### 3.3.7 Malaya and Singapore (1942-1945)

In Malaya, the population consisted of Chinese ethnicities (45%), Malays (40%), and Indians (10%), while in Singapore, Chinese comprised 80% and Malays 10% (ibid.: 130-1). Anti-Japanese sentiment was strong among the ethnic Chinese groups in these regions. After the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, many of the Chinese supported their home country financially. As the Japanese forces were aware of this fact, they massacred thousands of locals after the beginning of the occupation (Tani, 2000: 131). They prohibited the use of Mandarin and English and made an order to switch all street signs and notices into Japanese. Nevertheless, the Japanese mayor of
Singapore regarded this request from the military as unrealistic and postponed the implementation of the order indefinitely (ibid.: 132).

After public security had been restored, the military government resumed the school system; in Malaya and Singapore, the primary schools were divided into four kinds – Malay schools, Chinese schools, Indian schools, and Japanese schools (remodeled English schools) (ibid.: 134). The languages that were allowed inside the schools were limited to Japanese, Malay, and Tamil (ibid.: 135; Watanabe: 78). However, English and Mandarin were deeply rooted in society and in addition, the schools lacked both Japanese teaching materials and Japanese instructors. Therefore, the military government soon loosened the prohibition and permitted the use of Mandarin temporarily (Tani: 150; Watanabe: 81, 106).

Jinbo Kōtarō, a poet, Ibuse Masuji, a writer, and Nakajima Kenzō, a scholar of French literature, were sent to Singapore as members of the military propaganda team (senden-han 宣伝班) (Kawamura: 79). According to Jinbo, Nakajima worked enthusiastically for the promotion of Japanese language education, and Jinbo himself remarked, “loving Japanese language is not only equal to loving Japan but also to becoming a Japanese citizen” (ibid.: 86, 97). This logic interrelating language, culture, and ethnicity was nonsense to people living in multiethnic and multilingual areas like Singapore, and such a stance made Japanese language education appear self-righteous and distorted (ibid.: 97-8).

Generally speaking, the school system in Malaya and Singapore remained unchanged, except for the switch from English to Japanese (Watanabe: 108-9). The textbooks as well as instructors in the Chinese schools came mostly from Mainland China
and regardless of whether the subject was history, geography, or Mandarin, the class materials contained a great deal of patriotic statements and anti-foreign spirit (ibid.: 113).

3.3.8 Indonesia (1942-1945)

When Japan occupied Indonesia, its main focus was to obtain abundant natural resources. On the other hand, Indonesians regarded the Japanese invasion as a great opportunity to achieve independence from the 350-year-old Dutch colonial rule (Tani, 2000: 152). In political and military aspects, Indonesians were oppressed by the Dutch, whereas in the sphere of business, they were oppressed by the ethnic Chinese groups (ibid.: 153). In 1942, when Japan occupied Java, the Japanese released political offenders such as Sukarno (1901-1970) and Mohammad Hatta (1902-1980), who had been imprisoned under Dutch rule, and appointed them to military positions (Tani, 2006: 195). Although Japan originally did not intend to give the Indonesians independence, with the worsening of the war situation, they had decided to help Indonesians with preparing for future independence through such steps as the formation of an Indonesian volunteer army (PETA; later the Indonesian national army) which motivated locals to learn Japanese and to work for the Japanese (Tani, 2000: 153).

Unlike the Netherlands, which limited locals’ access to education and physical training, Japan obliged Indonesians to go to school (the tuition was usually free or very inexpensive) and to learn Japanese (ibid.: 158, 171). The literacy rate in the region was 4% in 1930, one of the lowest in Southeast Asia at that time (Tani, 2006: 197). The military propaganda team was tasked with promoting local education. Ōe Kenji (1905-1987), a famous writer, said that on the day of the opening of his school, so many
applicants flooded to the reception desk that the fence fell under the pressure and some got injured (Tani, 2006: 196).

Writing journalist reports and teaching Japanese at school, Ōe had conceived an idea of a pidgin language to be the language of the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (Kawamura: 122). Amongst the intellectuals who served in the military propaganda team and became involved with the local education of the Japanese language, there were two types: one was like that of Hino Ashihei (1907-1960), who lamented the situation of “disordered Japanese,” while the other was like that of Ōe, who saw the efficacy of mixed languages and conceived a formation of the language of the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” by mixing Japanese and the local languages, like a creole language or pidgin language (ibid.: 123). Satō Haruo (1892-1964), a famous writer who traveled to Southerneast Asia to observe Japanese language education among the locals, commented that “since the Meiji era, Japanese has absorbed many foreign terms and its structure has also become very confusing. If this current Japanese was well-organized and well-structured, it would be disturbing, but as it has been quite unstable, we should let it absorb some new elements until it naturally stabilizes itself” (ibid.: 128). Needless to say, his conception as well as Ōe’s were not accepted by the official kokugo discourse, in which kokugo should never be confused or mixed with other languages but always remain “pure and just” (ibid.: 129).

In the low literacy areas, government propaganda through movies and radio was found effective: the radio tower was called the “Talking Tree” by the locals and attracted a large audience (Tani, 2000: 163). The data shows that the number of applicants for Japanese language schools was far beyond their maximum capacity. The number of
schools was estimated to be about 2,211 and the number of students about 122,198 (Tani, 2006: 200). This implies that learning Japanese enabled locals to find jobs or get promotions in their workplace (Tani, 2000: 172). In Indonesia, although there were eventual plans for monolingual Japanese education, the local authorities temporarily allowed schools to teach Japanese in Malay and other local languages. Nonetheless, in reality, as instructors from Japan knew only the basics of the Malay language, they ended up teaching entirely in Japanese from the outset (ibid.: 22-3).

Due to the assimilation policy, Japanese education produced an increase in the number of Indonesians volunteering for suicide attacks (ibid.: 172). Modeling their actions upon the suicide attacks of the Japanese forces, not only men but also women in Indonesia aroused patriotic sentiments for their nation, which later led to suicide bombings against the Dutch during the independence war against the Netherlands (ibid.: 173). In Burma, where Japanese language education was also accepted smoothly by the locals, the number of Japanese language learners decreased as Japan started to show signs of defeat in WWII, but in Indonesia (perhaps owing to the fact that their land did not become a battlefield), except for Chinese ethnic groups and Eurasian residents, the eagerness to absorb knowledge and techniques through Japanese language in preparation for future independence never declined (ibid.: 173).

3.3.9 Burma (1942-1945)

Lastly, in Burma, unlike the other overseas territories of Japan, the Japanese language was not a mandatory subject in local schools. Instead, Japan separately established Japanese language schools to promote Japanese in Burma (ibid.: 204). Be it
officially or otherwise, the use of English was also allowed temporarily. Moreover, one intriguing feature salient during the occupation of Burma was that Buddhist monks, who held special prestige in Burmese society, played a significant role in promoting Japanese language education. With a strong anti-British sentiment, monks were motivated to eliminate English education by replacing it with Japanese. The difference in religious customs triggered antipathy for the Japanese in Malaya and Indonesia because the Japanese were ignorant about the Muslim lifestyle. But religious troubles were much less frequent in Burma, where people shared a common Buddhist culture with Japan (ibid.: 208).

Among the military occupied areas, Japanese language education in Burma was often considered to be relatively successful, owing to the strong anti-British sentiment before the arrival of Japan (ibid.: 207). Unlike in the Philippines, whose future independence had been promised as early as 1934, Burma had been absorbed into a part of India under British control. In a situation like this, the Japanese troops, who did not regard Burma as strategically important and promised the Burmese future independence, were temporarily welcomed as a “liberation army.” The Japanese put an emphasis on liberation from British colonialism in order to elicit cooperation from the locals to advance the war cause (Tani, 2006: 204). It is well known that the thirty-six soldiers headed by Aung San (1915-1947) were associated with the Japanese military in hopes of achieving early independence. In 1943, Burma became an independent nation with Ba Maw (1893-1977), who had been imprisoned as a nationalist under British rule, as its head and Aung San became the head of the Burmese military (ibid.: 205). As in Indonesia, inspired by Japanese kamikaze attacks, Burmese youths followed the same
example (ibid.: 210). However, such thoughts triggered an unexpected backlash against the Japanese. On March 27, 1945, the Burmese army led by Aung San revolted. As Japan started to show signs of defeat in WWII, whether they had noticed Japan’s intention to stay in power in Burma or not, they had contacted the British army, which they had previously expelled with Japanese help, and rose up in an “anti-Japanese, anti-Fascist” strike (Kawamura: 121).

3.4 Summary – status of nihongo and other languages in the sphere

In summary, the local response to Japanese language education in the military occupied areas varied greatly depending on the local governments’ policy-making and on the relationship between the locals and the former colonizers. In Indonesia and Burma, the education and ethnic identity acquired through the Japanese language during the occupation helped Indonesians and Burmese to later achieve independence from their colonizers. On the other hand, in the Philippines, Malaya, and Singapore, people harbored anti-Japanese sentiments and wished for the temporary return of their former colonizers. Prior to the Japanese occupation, such local languages as Tagalog and Malay tended to be ignored, compared to the languages of the colonizers and Mandarin. Even for a short period of time, giving those languages the status of official language set the stage for a unified national language movement as well as for the construction of ethnic and national identities.

Official languages and languages of school instruction were decided arbitrarily by the local governments and restrictions were often loosened “for the time being” owing to the urgent demands of warfare. After all, the Japanese occupation in the above areas
lasted only three and a half years. Nonetheless, if it had lasted longer, the multilingual situation would eventually have created a serious problem for “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Hoshina Kōichi, a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Education, was greatly alarmed by this multilingual situation because he was well aware of the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire had disintegrated in part due to its multiplicity of ethnicities and languages (Lee: 183). As a solution to prevent the multilingual empire from disintegrating, he proposed the concept of kokka-go, “state language” (Staatssprache12).

“State language” was a legal concept. The state language controlled language usage in the following four areas – government services, education, the courts, and the military – and under the state language, local languages (Landessprache) used in each province and ethnic languages (Volkssprache/Stammsprache) spoken in each ethnic group were positioned in a vertical hierarchy. According to Hoshina, the state language was to be superior to local or ethnic languages, while local languages could still be official languages used in provincial services and provincial schools (Lee: 184).

While the concept was proposed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in order to solve the newly-surfaced political language problems there, Hoshina proposed this concept in order to prevent such problems from surfacing, by giving legal status to nihongo to secure its position on top of the other languages spoken in the fully multilingual empire. From observing the Austro-Hungarian case, he predicted that as long as a nation contained different ethnic groups, people would eventually claim their own language rights in order to gain higher status in the society, and the resistance of the ruled could cause dreadful

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12 The term was first used in a speech in the Austrian Congress of 1848 and again in 1880 by a congressman of the Austro-Hungarian Imperial Congress (Lee: 185).
results for the ruling system (ibid.: 191). Nonetheless, the concept of kokugo, which itself was overly politicized, hindered this new political concept – the state language – from entering into play. At that time, not only the ultranationalistic conservatives but also Hoshina’s old friend, Andō Masatsugu, who had also studied under Ueda, opposed the idea of the state language. Andō was afraid that confining Japanese to the political field alone would endanger the authority of kokugo, saying that “authorizing the status of kokugo by the nation would rather demarcate the influence of kokugo…” (ibid.: 190).

Neither the Great Japanese Empire nor the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere lasted long enough for such political language problems to surface. Perceiving rivalry from the former Western colonizers, the Japanese local governments in Southeast Asia tried to appeal to the locals by allowing indigenous languages to enjoy official status. Yet even under the disguise of nihongo, which was supposed to co-exist with other languages, it was always the concept of kokugo that hindered any attempts at political legislation reforms.

3.5 Conclusions

One of the characteristic features of modern Japanese is that the formation of kokugo – a canonical tool of nation-state ideology – and Japanese expansion in Asia took place almost simultaneously (Oguma: 57). The formation of Japanese linguistic unity advanced side-by-side with colonial expansion in Asia. Ueda Kazutoshi connected the concepts of nation and national language in 1894, and set up a committee to standardize the language in 1902, seven years after Japan had occupied Taiwan (Miura: 11). Thus, Japan began its colonial enterprise without waiting for a “standardized kokugo” and
*kokugo* was exported and enforced on Asia without any academic or political preparation. The brutality that attended such a disordered assimilation policy was one of the characteristics of Japanese colonial rule, as exemplified in the assimilation policy of *kōminka* (the making of imperial subjects) and *sōshi kaimei* (Japanese renamings) (Miura: 11). Although *kokugo* language proficiency was the scale used to measure colonial subjects’ degree of “civilization” as well as their loyalty to the Japanese nation, the colonized people in the overseas colonies and military occupied areas in Asia, as well Ryūkyūans and Ainus who spoke Japanese “dialects,” could never become a part of the closed concept of *kokugo* ideology with regard to imperial bloodline (Miura: 12; Oguma 61). The “Japanese spirit” was only conveyed through *kokugo* – the nation’s “blood” – and any modification to this national language was considered to be a breach of the national polity (*kokutai*), which made it extremely difficult to carry out language reforms and policies. After all, it was the concept of *kokugo* itself that rejected any academic reforms or structural refinements along with its political expansion into the pan-Asian sphere.
4. Nationalism and pan-Asianism in linguistic discourse

As I have examined the macro-level cases under the Japanese colonial enterprise in the previous chapters, I shall now turn to my study of the language manuals for Japanese. Though my main focus is on Korean language manuals, the wartime language manuals frequently cover not only Japanese and Korean, but also other languages including English, Mandarin, and Russian. Thus, I will sometimes refer to the other languages in addition to Korean in order to observe a multilayered discourse on the target languages as well as on the Japanese language itself.

The language manuals exemplify what I have shown in the previous chapters – national and colonial linguistics discourse formation in tandem with the linguistic standardization process. Although my primary interest is to examine the bottom-up national / colonial discourse from the perspective of soldiers, the target readers of language manuals often overlap, e.g., one manual could be written for soldiers as well as global businessmen or settlers in Korea as well as public servants engaged in bureaucratic work in Korea. Thus, I have given priority in my examination to those manuals which contain a chapter containing terms like “military” or “warfare.” As Japan at that time had a military conscription system, every man – whether he was a business person or public servant – was supposed to enter the military and go to war if such occurred; thus, “military” and “warfare” were rather ubiquitous subjects, much more so than they are presently, and they were indeed included in many language manuals. It is in this climate that we can observe the creation of language manuals for Japanese soldiers and concentrate on the material found in the manual prefaces and contents. A further development of my hypothesis is that as we proceed chronologically in our examination
of the manuals we see on the one hand a consolidation of the Japanese language toward a standardized form at the turn of the twentieth century, and on the other hand, shifts in the paradigmatic view of the colonial others, ranging from “cautious engagement” to “enlightened leadership” and finally toward a radicalized stance, applying Benner’s framework.

In this chapter, I first introduce the four-pattern theory of national thinking presented in Erica Benner (2006) as the basic framework for my analysis of developments in colonial discourse in the language manuals. Then I contextualize the background against which the language manuals were written and cover the history of pan-Asianist frameworks, discursive features of which figured prominently in the language manuals.

4.1 Methodology: Erica Benner’s four patterns of national thinking

Japanese nation-builders of the late nineteenth century strove to adopt the measures taken in modernizing Europe in order to create a nation, namely – mass military conscription and mass education. Such steps would help to forge a national unity across regions and social strata unattainable by pre-modern models of sovereignty. With the abolition of feudal fiefs and the caste system it became possible to attain a territorial unity upon which the new legal system and biopolitics could be implemented, and in which a national language could be distilled. Nation-building never occurs in isolation: it needs an outsider to position oneself against, i.e., Japan as a new nation had to look at its neighbors to delineate its own borders and cultural uniqueness. Language manuals are a
rich site for examination of both the standardization of language and its positioning vis-à-vis the Other’s, i.e., the enemy nations’ languages, took place.

To observe the developments of colonial discourse in language manuals for Japanese soldiers, I propose to use the four-pattern theory of national thinking presented in Erica Benner (2006) as the basic framework for my analysis. The four patterns are:

1. Defensive Consolidation
2. Cautious Engagement
3. Enlightened International Leadership
4. Radicalization

The first pattern gives mainly defensive reasons for strengthening national boundaries and identities… Seeing the international environment as hostile and beyond their direct control, authors wrote on behalf of their countries that vulnerable polities could only hope to defend themselves through radical cultural reform… The second pattern of national thinking, instead of trying to compensate for weakness by cultivating ethnic national identities, advocates cautious engagement with the dominant powers. Arguments of this type are made on behalf of countries which, in the judgment of a given author, had fair chances of becoming major players if they undertook forms aimed at meeting the standards of Great Power membership – “modernization” or “civilization.” In contrast to the first two patterns, the third perceives the dominant international norms and practices as unthreatening and subject to rational control… Authors advocate a benign, self-assured nationalism based on a just internal constitution on the one hand, and enlightened international leadership on the other… The fourth pattern of national thinking develops with the radicalization of any of the first three. Radical national doctrines can take many forms, but all involve perceptions of extreme and imminent threats to a nation’s survival
or standing… In the late nineteenth century, the birth of radical nationalism was fuelled by the popular idea that nations corresponded to biological “races,” which in turn formed a natural hierarchy of populations more and less fit to lead the others… Far from being simply a radicalized version of defensive ethnocentrism or authoritarianism, racial thinking and radical national assertion could grow just as easily out of the enlightened leadership pattern if its proponents perceived international changes as threatening their status… [I]n any country, shifting perceptions of international pressures may lead previously dominant strands of national doctrine to give way to very different forms. Most of a country’s national thinkers might express a sense of vulnerability and call for defensive “closure” in one period, then move toward cautious engagement or enlightened leadership at a later phase, as perceptions of international pressures become less fraught. (Benner: 14-17)

Although there cannot be a clear-cut periodization based on the above four patterns of national thinking, we can nonetheless identify the broad-spectrum temporal correspondences as to when a particular pattern gains mediatic and political prominence in the late nineteenth through early twentieth centuries in Japan. Thus the “defensive period” would span from 1868 to 1874 (Taiwan Expedition 台湾出兵). The “cautious engagement period” would follow: 1874-1905. Defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) brought on an overall sentiment among most Japanese that Japan was now a fully civilized nation state capable of international leadership. Hence, the third period: 1905-1931. The subsequent encroachment on China in 1931 initiated by the Japanese military without parliamentary approval opened the “radicalization period” that lasted until Japan’s defeat in WWII.
In my treatment of language manuals for Japanese soldiers I shall seek the correspondences between the proposed periodization and the contents of prefaces and vocabulary, thus hypothesizing that it will be possible to see both the historical trends reflected in the manuals under examination as well as individual nationalistic inclinations of the authors.

4.2 Japan’s nation-building and soldiers’ encounters with the ‘Other’

Before going into the language manuals, let me briefly summarize a major shift in the linguistic situation in Japan from the Edo (1603-1868) to the Meiji era (1868-1912). “From the time that Tokugawa Ieyasu became shogun around 1600 until the Tokugawa shogunate collapsed in the middle of the nineteenth century, each of [Japan’s feudal] political divisions drifted in a different linguistic direction. Domain boundaries became linguistic boundaries” (Ramsey: 87) due to the difficulty of travel beyond the domains under strict control of the central authority in Edo. “In the early nineteenth century, the differences separating Japanese ‘dialects’ more closely resembled the linguistic differences separating Chinese dialects” (ibid.). With the coming of the Meiji Restoration (1867-8) this issue became crucial to the policies of the nation-builders. Accounts of that period contain stories of confusion, incomprehension, misunderstanding, and chaos. Here is a well-known (though probably apocryphal) anecdote often repeated in the historical literature to illustrate the kind of frustration that arose:

In 1868, in the turmoil of the Boshin civil war, troops from Yamaguchi and Kagoshima in the southwest were dispatched in an expeditionary force to Tohoku. When these soldiers reached their destination and tried to talk to the people of the
area, they discovered that communication was impossible. Not one among them knew how to speak the local language. The situation became desperate. The army needed to be supplied, directions needed to be worked out, and for both purposes the units needed local help. Finally after many things had been tried, one especially well educated soldier tried reciting lines from the repertory of Noh drama, from which he knew expressions such as: “We are in need of rice, can you be of service?”; “Would you show us the way?”, and the like. As it happened, there was a man in the area who had studied Noh drama and he was able to act as an intermediary for the soldiers. (ibid.: 87-88)

Regardless of whether the story is actually true, the unification of language was a primary building block for modernizing the army and the country’s infrastructure. Yutaka Yoshida argues that the army had more social pervasiveness than the navy, as the former was much bigger than the latter, in addition to the fact that the navy depended heavily on the volunteer system (Yoshida: 18). Regarding the relationship between the military and society, what one should remember is the historical fact that the military played a significant role in modernizing social orders (ibid.: 19). Military training fostered the discipline of time (i.e., the spread of watch wearing), body (e.g., the habit of wearing shoes, marching, as well as Field Day practices), speech (language standardization), clothing (military uniforms with hats on short hair), food (meat and bread), and lifestyle (sitting on chairs and sleeping in beds) among the masses, especially those living in the countryside.
Yōko Katō, in her book on the history of the conscription system in Japan, states that observing the military under conscription system reveals a whole picture of one country, and that soldiers serve as indices of a country. Canadian diplomat and historian, E. H. Norman, who was born in Japan in a missionary family, wondered why the polite Japanese he knew could massacre thousands of people in Nanjing. His answer was that slaves could become the cruelest agents to force the same burden upon others (Katō: 6). Since the Meiji Restoration was an absolutist revolution, the “liberated farmers” of a bourgeois revolution did not exist; nonetheless, the Meiji government adopted a conscription system similar to that brought into existence after the French Revolution because recruiting professional soldiers with lifetime employment (as seen in the samurai class) would have been too costly for Japan at that time (ibid.: 7). Hence, the government had to rely heavily on “unliberated farmers.” This was a great contradiction that the Meiji government had to deal with – arming a social class whose enemy class would be a monarchist government and leaving national defense in their hands; therefore, the government enforced strict military discipline to prevent a revolt within the military. In short, miserable farmer soldiers under a strict military code were forced into armed aggression overseas (ibid.: 7). Nonetheless, the army appealed to the farmers with an ideology of “egalitarianism” inside the military (i.e., peasant soldiers had the same opportunities as the former samurai), which helped secure public support (ibid.: 10).

As for language standardization, Yoshida argues that although the exact time when “army language” (heigo 兵語) was formed remains uncertain, it was certainly absorbed into the speech of the general populace across various social strata. The phenomenon was witnessed as early as in 1899, as cited in the book, Kokumin hikkei.
rikugun ippan (国民必携 陸軍一班, 1899). The “army language” contributed to the formation of the common language through military experience (Yoshida: 28). Interestingly enough, the military authorities were also well aware of the impact of army language within society more broadly (ibid.: 29). The Japanese Army Language Dictionary (大日本兵語辞典), authored by a lieutenant in 1921, proudly explains in the section for the term “common language” (tsūyōgo, 通用語) that back in earlier days people from different regions communicated with phrases from famous Noh dramas but now the army language plays that role as common language. Indeed, one might be surprised by the amount of familiar vocabulary that we use today to be found in this army language dictionary (ibid.: 29). Yet the standardization process was never smooth; for instance, Yoshida gives an anecdote of a new conscript from Osaka who was having a hard time under a team leader from the northern part of Japan (ibid.: 30).

In the army and elsewhere, the search for a language standard had begun. Ueda Kazutoshi, an official in the Ministry of Education in the mid-Meiji period, is credited with the establishment of the National Language Research Committee (now known as the Council on the National Language), which was at the helm of the national language policies. Since the beginning of Meiji, the “National Language” (Kokugo 国語) had been a standard course in the school curriculum, but it was primarily geared toward reading and writing instruction. Hence, the classroom language was the local dialect and not standardized speech (Ramsey: 96). The term hyōjungo (標準語), “the standard language,” appeared around 1890, and the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War were turning points in the government’s attitude toward the national language. The government came to consider dialects an impediment to be eradicated (ibid.). “The
concept of a uniform *langue national* went back to the French Revolution, when social radicals introduced the idea that equality before the law could only be obtained by eliminating the prejudices and inequities that resulted from differences in speech. It was a strange kind of irony, in which social and ethnic minorities were given legal rights by ruthlessly extirpating their individual languages and dialects.” (ibid.: 97) “The most potent stimulus for learning, we are told, is the creation of situations where communication is only possible through the standard language. The experience of the military was in this sense very important to young men from the provinces.” (ibid.: 103)

In the developments of the Meiji military system we find confirmation of the observations above. According to Naoko Shimazu (2006), the Russo-Japanese War was the defining event in consolidating the identity of the ordinary Japanese as national subjects (*kokumin* 国民). Examining soldier diaries of that period, Shimazu argues that there were two kinds of factors that contributed to raising soldiers’ national consciousness: (1) Japan-internal, i.e., the travels of conscripts across Japan to the war-dispatching ports, and while doing so, their contacts with local patriotic associations all over the country, and above all, participation in emotionally-engaged slogan proclamations, and (2) Japan-external, i.e., the striking contrasts of poverty, infrastructural malfunction, non-sanitary conditions, and low level of education of locals (*dojin* 土人) on the continent. Both factors were of crucial influence on the soldiers who thus underwent a shift in identity from a local/provincial type to a national identity. And it is this contact with the grassroots on the inside and the foreign locals on the outside that
shapes the bottom-up national identity discourse I am interested in. As the soldiers expressed in their diaries, this inter-locale bonding inside Japan, contrasted with the repulsiveness of “the Other” on the war front, was by far a better reason for them to sacrifice their lives than that of symbolic loyalty to the Japanese empire. “In this crucial transformation [from a local identity into that of a national subject], not one soldier ever mentioned the emperor” (ibid.: 52). Indeed, only a few of the language manuals examined here mention the name of the emperor in the text.

Once on the continent, soldiers often took to comparisons. One soldier, who had been a school teacher back in Japan before the war, mentioned in his diary how dirty the Chinese children were. He lamented their inability to benefit from education “like the Japanese children.” Another soldier was appalled with the ignorance of Koreans as to “why the Japanese troops were in their country.” Many soldiers shared the sentiment expressed earlier by Fukuzawa Yukichi in his *Escape Asia* (*Datsu-A*, 1885): “No wonder Korea was in the state it was in.” They saw the cause of the country’s failure to raise itself to the international standard in locals’ inability to do things the way Japanese do. It is hardly surprising that the soldiers did not follow the same line of discourse addressing the Russians, as the latter were considered to be as civilized as the Japanese. “Distancing of oneself from the colonial ‘Other’ by denigrating the ‘Other’ as being ‘dirty’ or ‘filthy’ was common in colonial discourse. In some sense, the Japanese soldiers were simply reflecting the received wisdom of a colonial power in the age of imperialism.

As the oft-rehearsed Japanese official discourse went, the Russo-Japanese War was a

13 According to Ichinose (2004), a number of manuals for canned phrases were available at a cheap price and they were particularly popular during wartime; people read the manuals and adopted the “appropriate” phrases to practice as a soldier or a well-wisher, through which they somewhat convinced themselves of the “appropriateness” of the war. Such discourse continued to be reproduced through such “subjective” grassroots voices. (9-10)
‘civilized war between civilized peoples’ and the soldiers had subconsciously taken up the official mantra.” (Shimazu: 61)

Thus, it is in this climate that we examine the proliferation of language manuals for Japanese soldiers with the issues observed above reflected in the manuals’ prefaces and contents. The further development of my hypothesis is that as we proceed chronologically in our examination of the manuals we shall see on the one hand a consolidation of the Japanese language toward a standardized form at the turn of the twentieth century, and on the other hand, shifts of paradigmatic outlook upon the colonial others ranging from “cautious engagement” to “enlightened leadership” and finally toward a radicalized stance.

4.3 Colonial discourse in the prefaces and contents of language manuals

In this section, I examine the language manuals published between 1882 and 1935, particularly those targeted at Japanese soldiers. Due to the compulsory conscription system, the army became a “conduit of modernity” for the general public in many spheres, and language was no exception. Besides, army language manuals are valuable sources for colloquial language and help us acquire a close reading of the levels of polite speech and language discourse behind them. Their examination affords us the tools needed to conduct a careful study of the discursive forces behind their production. Even though my main focus is on Korean, these language manuals frequently cover not only Japanese and Korean, but also other languages including English, Mandarin, and Russian, instantiating a multilayered discourse on the target languages as well as on the Japanese language itself. Thus, from time to time, I will refer to other languages in
addition to Korean. Due to restrictions of space and time, I have given priority in my analysis to manuals which contain a chapter entitled “military” or “warfare.” The language manuals studied in the thesis are all included in the table at the end.

The following section focuses on the manual prefaces to examine the reasons for their production and how they appealed to their contemporary audience, together with an examination of the manuals’ formats and structures. Then in the following section, I look into manual contents to examine the phraseology that the authors thought their contemporary readers would need to use in the target languages.

4.3.1 Analysis of the prefaces

In this section, I have divided the exposition into three sub-sections: ca. the Sino-Japanese War (1880-1899), ca. the Russo-Japanese War (1900-1910), and post-annexation of Korea (1911-1945) to examine the shifts in the national thinking pattern.

4.3.1.1 Early Meiji period: 1880-1899 – the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5)

The shift [from the “old patriotism” of reactionary ethnic self-assertion to the new patriotism of “Enlightenment” times] involved both negative and positive assessments of international pressures. On the negative side, like the Federalists and Hegel, Japanese authors saw engagement with foreign intruders as a matter of regrettable necessity. A weak country like Japan simply had no choice but to learn the rules of the Western international game, or face complete humiliation. More positively, once the necessity of engagement had been embraced, Japan would be able to benefit from Western borrowings, especially from norms of national statehood and civilization. The liberal thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi [in his writing]
underscored the symbiotic relationship between these negative and positive aspects of
nation-building. (Benner: 23)

According to Sung (2010), until the early Meiji 20s (1887-1897), the purpose of
the publication of Korean language manuals remained geared toward diplomatic relations
and trade. In Meiji 27 (1894), the year the Sino-Japanese War broke out, many manuals
(seventeen on her list) written specifically for soldiers were published (ibid.: 14). Some
manuals included the Declaration of War.

The author of Nichi kan ei sangoku taiwa (日韓英三國對話, 1892) says in the
book’s preface that “the structures and sentences of previously published manuals are
old-fashioned and too simple for commercial use; thus I have borrowed the structures
from Western conversational manuals as well as Kōrinsuchi (交隣須知)” (ibid.: 17).

Kōrinsuchi (交隣須知) was a truly epoch-making Korean language manual compiled by
Amenomori Hōshū (雨森芳洲, 1668-1755), a Confucian interpreter from Tsushima, and
had been reprinted throughout the Edo period. Even after the Meiji period, it had been
continuously revised and republished by different authors with some minor changes in
contents. Kōrinsuchi contains chapters for conversations on politics, weapons, and wars,
yet what differs from the manuals written after the Meiji period is the absence of
nationness. The absence of terms such as Japan, Japanese spirit, Westerners, or
China/Russia makes for a striking contrast with the other texts dealt with here.

Moreover, one of the most popular Korean language manuals widely used until
late Meiji, Nikkan tsūwa (日韓通話, 1893), adopted structures and sample phrases from
Kōrinsuchi, yet, as mentioned in the author’s preface, it also imitates the structure and
orders of Western conversational manuals which introduced the compound words for
daily use together with exercises so that readers could practice for themselves,
anticipating real situations of various kinds, while Kōrinsuchi is simply a voluminous phrase book.

The language manuals for the Sino-Japanese War often contained three languages: Japanese, Mandarin, and Korean. Generally speaking, the characteristics of language manuals published in the Sino-Japanese War period can be summarized as follows:

1) pocket-size

2) no Korean script (or Russian script, but some manuals give Chinese phrases in Chinese characters with kana pronunciations attached); written in katakana pronunciation only

3) limited to short simple phrases mainly in imperative, confirmation, threatening, prohibition, permission, or interrogative forms

The topics in these manuals include not only the conventional ones from Kōrinsuchi (e.g., astronomy, geography, diseases, valuables, body, personality), but also newly added topics such as letters, numbers, names of places, weapons, and battles, which met soldiers’ immediate needs for food, help, and survival on the battlefield. They also contain sentences to cheer up soldiers’ spirits, to talk about the current warfare situation, how Japanese soldiers are supposed to behave, etc. No polite expressions or honorifics were used. (ibid.: 20-23)
Furthermore, although most of the language manuals for soldiers in the Sino-Japanese War do not include original script from the target languages, Kōrinsuchi and Nikkan kaiwa (日韓會話, 1894) have Korean writing. Nikkan kaiwa, a massive 206-page-long pocketsize manual compiled by the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office, is also one of the most significant and influential manuals, which many later manuals take as their model. The final forms in this manual are relatively polite (-desu / -masu form) and its structure follows that of Western conversational manuals.

4.3.1.1.1 Noteworthy phrases with respect to language and colonial discourse

What you find in the quotations that follow in this and following sections is that the ideas expressed by the authors, by and large, correspond to the above-proposed four patterns of national thinking and colonialism discourse as well as to pan-Asianism. As for the pan-Asianist trend, which was the favorite rhetoric and pet theory of the language manual authors, I examine it in detail in the next section. I shall thus let the authors speak for themselves and insert my own comments and remarks on each preface only briefly so as not to interrupt the flow of the presentation. The numbers in front of the manual titles are given in chronological order to facilitate reference.

1. Nikkan tsūwa 日韓通話 (1893)

1.1. “Once upon a time, people said there were treasure lands in the East. They are Paekche, Silla, and Koguryŏ, which are today’s Chosŏn. What made them say so? The country has gold and silver in the mountains, various kinds of farm produce in its fields, beauty in nature, and numerous kinds of precious products and medicinal herbs. As the
country is located in the center of the East, transportation is convenient. The state of
affairs is stable and the country is wealthy owing to trade. Our country must follow the
way Korea does and acquire wealth and prosperity. The treasure that people need for
living is what springs abundantly from nature. Otherwise, the term ‘treasure’ sounds empty… If people engaged in shipping trades do not have this book, they are like people
who are empty-handed in a treasure mountain.” (From the preface contributed by
Kinoshita Masayuki 木下真弘)

This type of rhetoric is often found in writings of Western explorers who referred
to the East as a fertile land of opportunity, i.e., a typical Orientalist/colonialist utopian
view is expressed here, but in Japanese. It signals the successful importation of
colonialist discourse.

1.2. “Two hundred years after the diplomatic relationship started, the Treaty of Amity (修
好條規 Shūkōjōki) and Trade Agreement (通商規約 Tsūshōjōki) were signed in 1876,
and thereafter the relationship has been much strengthened and trade business is growing
year by year. Nonetheless, because of the language barrier, people cannot build a good
relationship, and lose profit.” (From the preface written by the author, Kokubun Kunio 国
分国夫)

In the early years, as I mentioned in the previous section, authors wrote language
manuals that address businessed needs more than anything else. In fact, not only
language manual authors but also their elite contemporaries in the army and navy were
also concerned with the constant financial shortages of the Japanese government, to the
extent that one group of elite officers, who were greatly alarmed by Japan’s financial
situation, quit the army and founded a language school in China to educate Japanese youths capable of learning trade (from the stories about the Tōa Dōbun Shoin, covered in the previous section). Japan was indeed in the “cautious engagement” stage.

2. *Chōsen gogaku hitori annai* 朝鮮語學獨案内 (1894)

2.1. “The ethnic groups and their languages in Northern Asia, Japan, Korea, and Turkey highly resemble each other. Ŭnmun in Korea is *kana* in Japan. Scholars should look into Hebrew and so on to find their origins and the truth behind them, which will later contribute to the formation of a great alliance.” (From the preface contributed by Taguchi Ukichi 田口卯吉)

Though some claimed a closer relationship than others, speculations about shared language genealogy repeatedly appear in the prefaces of Korean language manuals published around the turn of the century, in order to call for unity based on a shared cultural heritage, a hallmark phrase of pan-Asianists, together with the claim of linguistic similarity, especially in the syntax and the use of *kana* and Ŭnmun (today’s *han’gul*).

3. *Shinsen chōsen kaiwa* 新撰朝鮮會話 (1894)

3.1. “[The recommendation letter] says “look at the intelligence he has got; it is hard to find among Koreans… The intention of the author is to make Japanese master Korean, or to make Koreans master Japanese, or both? Anyway, for the sake of ‘knowing others is knowing oneself,’ there should be some benefit… The author should have a determination to endeavor for the sake of his country using all the knowledge and
experience he got from Japan.” (From the preface contributed by Tokutomi Sohō 徳富蘇峰)

The author of this language manual was a Korean, Hong Sŏkhyŏn. The recommendation letter mentioned in the text suggests a reference letter written for Hong when he paid a visit to Tokutomi Sohō (徳富蘇峰, 1863-1957), a well-known critic of the time, to ask him to write a preface for Hong’s language manual. As the referee’s words show, he regards Hong’s intelligence as an unusual feature for a Korean – according to a common stereotype among the Japanese, Koreans were supposedly “backward” so there was no need for the Japanese to learn Korean.

4. Nichigo shōkei 日語捷徑 (1895)

4.1. “What is most needed for people to know civilization and get enlightened is nothing but an understanding of Japanese… [T]here is no doubt that [learning Japanese through this book] will open the door for Koreans to new knowledge.” (From the preface contributed by Shizan 紫山生)

Here, an early example of “enlightened leadership” is observed, i.e., Koreans are considered to be as yet “uncivilized” people who need the help of the Japanese to get “enlightened.”

5. Nichiwa chōshun: tango rengo 日話朝雋 單語連語 (1895)

5.1. “[I]f men and women of all ages read this book, they will have a good grasp of both languages and contribute to making the countries prosperous. Thus, we have decided to
author the book.” (From the preface written by the authors, Yi Pong’un 李鳳雲 and Sakai Masutarō 境益太郎)

The preface assumes that the audience speaks neither Japanese nor Korean “properly,” judging by the phrase, “if men and women of all ages...have a good grasp of both languages.”

6. *Jitchi ōyō chōsengo dokugakusho* 實地應用 朝鮮語獨學書 (1896)

6.1. “To keep Korea’s independence and encourage its people, domestic administrative reform is crucial, and in order to carry it out, Koreans should never lower themselves, but they should foster their national pride. Korea is now on the decline because Koreans had been lowering themselves, whereas China is on the decline today because Chinese have lost their national pride.” (From the preface contributed by Sakuraura 櫻浦生)

After the victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), this preface contributor offers his analysis of the reasons for the “failure” of remodeling of Korea and China, as if to give them guidance for the future.

6.2. “What has driven Japan into the war against China is [the desire] to maintain peace in the East and the independence of declining Korea… Then, after the war ends, we must keep the independence of Korea and protect Korea, which is our purpose in this war. For that sake, land development, financial reform, and promotion of industries are crucial. This great task can never be fulfilled by Koreans; they need Japan’s help, and in order to lend a hand to Koreans, learning Korean is essential for Japanese.” (From the preface written by the authors, Yumiba Jūei 弓場重英 and Naitō Ken 内藤建)
This is a good example of early “enlightened leadership,” whereby the complete colonization of Korea is not considered, but instead, Japan’s leadership in the development of the Korean Peninsula is assumed.

**4.3.1.2 Late Meiji period: 1900-1910 – the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5)**

Japan was doubly disadvantaged as a late-comer to the club of Great Power aspirants, and a non-European one at that. Even such stout supporters of Japan’s nation-building efforts as the British sociologist Herbert Spencer, Theodore Roosevelt, and European constitutional advisers warned Japanese leaders against trying to reach an “advanced” stage of development in a short period of time. Sympathetic foreigners repeatedly expressed doubts about whether any non-European people could establish a stable constitutional government of its own accord. Surrounded by all these doubts, it is little wonder that many Japanese felt anxious about their prospects of acceptance into even the secondary ranks of international leadership – unless they agreed to play the role of regional front-man for a Western power…

The writings of Fukuzawa, an independent scholar whose books sold in the millions, indicate how widespread such doubts were. (Benner: 29)

According to Sung (2010), the language manuals in the late Meiji were written for a variety of purposes, such as the Russo-Japanese War, modernization/industrial enterprises in Korea, international trade, smooth communication in daily conversations, and public enterprise and official duty; their contents varied depending on the purposes. The authors of these manuals were much more skilled than those in the early Meiji, as reflected in the quality of structures, sample phrases, and the descriptions of the books. Sung writes, “Japanese intended to grow manpower and the economy in Korea through
active investments in various kinds of industries and education. They opened markets and built infrastructure including railroads. Such a state of affairs is pronounced in detail in the prefaces of these manuals” (Sung: 34). The preface from *Dokugaku kango taisei* (獨學 韓語大成, 1905) says: “Learning Korean and Japanese is the urgent priority today. If people of both countries cooperate together and develop the great natural resources of Korea, they will share the peace and prosperity of the East by means of enhancing national prosperity and defense” (ibid.: 35). It is uncertain in what kind of form the author expected the two countries to “develop the great natural resources of Korea” and to “share the peace and prosperity of the East,” but it is highly likely that the author expected Japanese’ leadership in such a bilateral relationship. Sung concludes that it was the modernization of Korea, its industrial development, and bilateral trade, that led directly to further development of the Japanese economy and military power. And in order to achieve this goal, Japanese were required to master the Korean language from basic daily conversation to expressions of warm hospitality (ibid.). Until the Meiji 20s (1887-1897), most Korean language manuals were designed only to teach Korean language to Japanese readers; nevertheless, starting from *ca. Meiji 30s* (1897-1907) they also began to add another function to the manuals; teaching Japanese to Koreans. By the Meiji 40s (1907-1912), it became fairly common for one and the same manual to have both functions, i.e., instructing Japanese as well as Korean. After the annexation of Korea, due to assimilation policy, the number of Korean language manuals published decreased drastically while the number of Japanese language manuals increased. (ibid.: 36) This is a significant observation because it is indicative of a certain radicalization of the “enlightened leadership” from the outset of the colonization period.
While the language manuals for the Sino-Japanese War contained up to four languages (Japanese, Mandarin, Korean, and English), the manuals for the Russo-Japanese War often included up to five languages, adding Russian. The contents resemble those from the previous war. Nonetheless, the level of politeness in speech increased considerably (ibid.: 38). During the Sino-Japanese War, the speech forms in the manuals were mostly limited to casual speech, yet in the late Meiji, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the number of language manuals which adopted relatively polite speech levels, such as “de arimasu” “desu / masu” and “o-nasai” grew considerably (ibid.). This is indicative of the successful policy of the consolidation of the national language and the purge of dialects; it also implies that the Russo-Japanese War was seen as a war between two “civilized” nations, insofar as the concern was about how the “civilized” should behave while fighting against a “civilized” Western enemy. The changes from the previous war to the Russo-Japanese War are not limited to the speech forms in conversations but extend into the contents as well. Striking contrasts in contents are especially conspicuous in the multilingual manuals. In Russian, as if to demonstrate how “civilized” Japanese are to Russians, the speech levels are much more polite than the corresponding Korean sentences. The contents are also much more moderate than those in the Chinese and Korean sections. It is intriguing to see that in one manual, Nichiroshinkan kaiwa jizaihō (日露淸韓會話自在法, 1904), sentences in Russian inquire about a new book release with a beautiful front cover, while those in Chinese are about looking for a missing newspaper, and those in Korean are about how great Japan and the Japanese soldiers are.
Sung, in her conclusions, draws comparisons between the early Meiji manuals and the late Meiji ones, maintaining that many language manuals in the early Meiji show vocabulary and conversational samples without the explanation of *han’gŭl*, whereas those in the late Meiji often explain writing, spelling, and pronunciations in detail and show more sophistication in forms (ibid.: 42). Besides, in the early Meiji, most manuals had separate sections for vocabulary and conversations, while those in the late Meiji had these two combined, showing vocabulary first and conversational examples for practice next (ibid.). Furthermore, they employ diverse forms both in categorization and structure to derive the best effect in learning (ibid.: 42-43). The manuals in the late Meiji period grew in page size and in page numbers, and this tendency paralleled their linguistic consolidation (ibid.: 44).

A possible explanation for these tendencies would be the change in the demand from the Japanese audience as well as an improvement in the language skills of Japanese alongside the results of linguistic research (ibid.). Also, the authors of the early Meiji manuals are mostly Japanese, yet in the late Meiji, co-authored manuals by Japanese and Koreans or those proofread by Koreans increased in number (ibid.: 45). Even though biographical information about the Japanese authors remains largely uncertain, most of them sojourned in Korea for extended periods of time and learned the language through communication with Koreans. Some authors, such as Shimai Hiro, Matsuoka Kaoru, Kanashima Taisui, Hirono Kanzan, Maema Kyōsaku, etc. published language manuals with similar contents in numerous editions. (ibid.) Their language skills were very high and their Korean translations quite accurate. Also, not only their Japanese but also their Korean speech etiquette followed those of cultured norms. This is because they stayed for
long periods in Seoul, Pusan, or Incheon, while being associated with people of high social status, and directly acquired their speech, a fact which is reflected in their work. (ibid.: 46)

The places of publication, which were widely scattered in the early Meiji (Tokyo, Osaka, Yamaguchi, Nagasaki, Kanazawa, Kumamoto, Sendai, Kagawa), become concentrated in three locations: Tokyo, Osaka, and Seoul; there are some differences in endings depending on the place of publication (ibid.). Besides, the early Meiji manuals cover mostly the vocabulary and phrases needed for particular situations which met the purposes of publication and expressed one’s subjective intentions. Conversely, those from the late Meiji put more focus on smooth communications, paying great attention to the proper use of cordial expressions. (ibid.: 48) This again is indicative of the consolidation of Japanese national language norms.

Sung argues throughout her dissertation that the improvement in linguistic studies on the Japanese side (sophistication in grammatical descriptions, in the structure of the manuals, accuracy in translations, etc.) should be taken into consideration and indeed, many authors or preface-contributors mention the names of Western missionary linguists, which shows their sophistication in the field of language studies.\(^\text{14}\) However, I tend to

\(^{14}\) For instance, Junpei Shinobu in his preface to \textit{Bunpō chūshaku kango kenkyūhō} (文法註釋 韓語研究法, 1909) says: “I myself have a great interest in research methods of foreign languages. According to my shallow understanding in this field, the Frenchman François Gouin (1831-?)’s research method is impressive. In summary, Gouin’s method employs the way babies naturally learn the languages their mothers speak. The same method should be applied to Korean; the natural acquisition by ear is the best.” Also, Yasuo Iguchi mentions Gale’s massive Korean-English dictionary in the preface to his book \textit{Jitsuyō hon’i nissen jiten} (實用本位 日鮮辭典, 1920), saying: “Although it has been many years since Korea was annexed, I have never heard that any Japanese-Korean or Korean-Japanese dictionaries were published. Even though there are not many residents from the U.S. and England in Korea, they have a great dictionary written by Dr. Gale, and despite the difference in syntax, most of them speak good Korean. On the other hand, there are few Japanese who are able to say greetings in Korean. What makes such a difference?” Yakushiji in his \textit{Bunpō chūshaku kango kenkyūhō} (文法註釋 韓語研究法) (1909) says: “…many language manuals only list words and conversational phrases and none of them have yet explained Korean
attribute this state of affairs not only to the growth of Western linguistic knowledge in Japan, but more fundamentally to the consolidation of the Japanese national language around the Kantō dialect as a standard and the development of new standards of politeness, as contrasted to earlier Edo forms in formal writing *sōrōbun* (候文) and dialectal diversity in the provinces. In Foucauldian terms, the subjection of others starts from disciplining oneself: to begin a colonial discourse, Japan itself needed to be solidified along the lines of an “enlightened nation.”

### 4.3.1.2.1 Noteworthy phrases with respect to language and colonial discourse

7. *Nisshinkan sangoku senjimon* 日淸韓三國千字文 (1900)

7.1. “Back in the days of the time of Emperor Ōjin (應神天皇, 201-310), books such as the *Analects of Confucius* (論語 Rongo) and the *Thousand Character Classic* (千字文 *Senjimon*) were introduced to our country from Paekche, and thereafter our culture and institutions began developing and reached today’s prosperity. Now translating the *Thousand Character Classic* is a principle of Heaven.” (From the preface contributed by Kametani Seken 龜谷省軒)

As we shall observe more and more from here on, the rhetoric of Japan as an “enlightened leader” to bring Korea modern knowledge and civilization is equated with “returning the debt of gratitude for the ancient civilization.” The *Analects of Confucius* and the *Thousand Character Classic* stand out as typical examples of cultural debt, and in phonemics and grammar systematically. There are some works done by Westerners, yet these are not appropriate for Japanese learners. Thus, intending to fill the blank here, I have made efforts to explain about the phonetics and grammar in this book.”
the core of this manual, the *Thousand Character Classic* is the title of the book and forms the core of its contents.

7.2. “One poem says: although brothers fight against each other at home, if they suffer an insult outside their home, they fight back together. The people of the three countries must think about this carefully.” (From the preface contributed by Gamō Keitei 蒲生褧亭)

This is another example calling for pan-Asian unity between Japan, Korea and China against the West.

7.3. Observing Korean politics and customs, the author writes, “lay people share the same systems with us and their culture and institutions are not so different from ours. It is natural to cooperate with each other in order to tide over the situation… Our literature came from Korea in ancient times and Koreans brought the *Thousand Character Classic* to us. This is the origin of the *Thousand Character Classic* in Japan. Revitalizing the relationship between the two countries based on the *Thousand Character Classic* – this is one of the ways to repay a debt of gratitude… In the 16th year of Emperor Ōjin, an erudite envoy from Paekche brought us the *Analects of Confucius* and the *Thousand Character Classic*, from which our literature is derived. Since the time Empress-consort Jingū conquered the Korean Three Kingdoms and established an outside government in Mimana (任那), the interaction between our two countries has never ceased and meantime all the culture, institutions, arts, and crafts came from Korea. Thus, when we
see the relationship literally, Korea and Japan are friendly neighbors, yet when we see it in terms of duty and loyalty, Korea and Japan are sworn brothers.

In the time of Emperor Tenji, the Tang dynasty at last defeated Paekche and tried to annex Koguryŏ. Although the courts of Paekche and Koguryŏ still had the power to rescue their people, a great number of emigrants of the two countries ended up in our land. This is clearly written in the *Kokuten* (國典 State Code) and Koreans are well aware of this, too.

The *Book of Songs* (詩經) says ‘Why would you not think about your ancestors? In order to praise your ancestors’ virtuous conduct, you must first undertake virtuous conduct for yourself. By doing so, you will inherit your ancestors’ virtues…’ Today Korea and Japan keep independence in the East and one can see the reason for it through the history of the two countries and through archeological studies. However, the reason for the current vicissitudes can be understood not only through country-internal processes, but also through the power game between world powers.’ (From the preface contributed by Shakusui Kusaka 勺水日下)

At the very beginning of this excerpt, the preface contributor refers to the resemblance in politics and customs between Japan and Korea, but he claims that it is not courtiers but “lay people” who share the same culture and institutions with the Japanese. And he calls for cooperation based on this cultural resemblance, reaffirming his pan-Asianist outlook. Then he proceeds to another example of “repaying a debt of gratitude,” referring to the *Thousand Character Classic*. Furthermore, by referring to the story (or rather, myth) of Empress-consort Jingū’s occupation of Korea and her mission in Mimana (任那) as well as the episode of the emigrants from Paekche and Koguryŏ, he seeks the
grounds for bilateral harmony (under Japan’s leadership) and calls for future pan-Asian solidarity.

7.4. “People of old said: ‘what one has obtained by means of weapons can never be controlled and pacified by means of weapons.’ This is an important saying which should be applied to the political scene. Last year, the emperor, being concerned with the independence of Korea, sent troops to war. Now, when the troops have been completely withdrawn, is the time to rely on the means of letters… ‘A thousand-mile journey starts from one step.’ This is a principle which can be applied to any language, and it is not only of benefit to Koreans. When we look back to the past, a large part of our civilization came from the Korean Three Kingdoms (三韓), and everything was brought by Koreans; this is an enormous debt of gratitude. Now the author, a person from our country, has compiled a language manual and has been contributing to education in Korea; this is ‘repaying a debt of gratitude.’ How can one not be touched by this?” (From the preface contributed by Akizuki Tanetatsu 秋月種樹)

This is yet another example of “repaying a debt of gratitude,” a moderate Confucian rhetoric for asserting influence over Korea and justifying Japan’s intervention into Korea’s cultural reforms and internal affairs.

7.5. “From the beginning, the three countries share the same race, script, and thoughts, but the languages differ in sounds. In order to learn the languages, people must pay attention to their similarities and differences.” (From the preface contributed by Yōlsu kōsa 洩水居士)
This Korean preface contributor also puts an emphasis on the shared cultural heritage, such as script, race, and thoughts among Chinese, Korean, and Japanese.

7.6. “If the harmonious relationship between the three is broken off, the enemies [i.e., Western powers] will bring the East misfortune and calamity. Thus, peoples of the three countries must cooperate together to strengthen the trilateral friendship. Amongst many options, literature serves best for this purpose. From the beginning, the literatures of the three countries are related like fathers and sons, but they have developed differently due to the differences in land and customs. However, if we study hard, we will find a way to facilitate communication between the three.” (From the preface contributed by Ijūin Hikokichi 伊集院彦吉)

This preface contributor even alarms the audience that the West might intrude into the East if China, Korea, and Japan do not cooperate together. And according to him, in order to strengthen the trilateral relationship, the shared cultural heritage, namely literature, will be the best bond among the three countries, saying that the literatures of the three nations were originally one and were simply different variations sharing the same roots.

7.7. “…The Eastern civilization has been developed owing to the presence and power of Chinese characters. However, some people argue that Chinese characters are too difficult and hard to deal with. Yet it is impossible to abolish something which has been in use already for several thousand years in Asia. Therefore, in the future, people should learn Chinese characters only briefly and look for the way to facilitate their use in practical
aspects. I have always been thinking about this… Although Japan is a country with a spiritual tradition and the Japanese have a spirit called ‘yamato damashii (大和魂)’ which attaches importance to cleanliness and chivalry, they did not have their own letters in ancient times… When we look at the situations of China and Korea, apparently peace and stability of the East are at risk. It is urgent to let them understand the world situation by means of educational reforms. The conventional education is merely memorization of texts and poetry and is not practical at all; this is exactly the reason for the decline of the East… It is obvious that today’s cultural maturity of our country is derived from the scholarship which came from ancient Korea, China, and India. Thus, if Japan helps Korea and China whose race, scholarship, and customs resemble ours, Japan will be repaying the old debt of gratitude. These days, due to the convenient transportation links between the East and the West, the Western powers have been watching us for a chance to intrude upon us. Hence, what is most needed now is to remedy the vicious old practices, clarify the situations of the world, keep the power balance of each country, and stabilize the regional situation. Even a small mistake might bring a great misfortune; we must learn from the overthrow of India…” (From the preface written by the author, Aranami Heijirō 荒波平治郎)

The author of this book called the “Thousand Character Classic of Japan, China, and Korea” apparently advocates the use of Chinese characters, to which, he claims, “the Eastern civilization” owes its existence. Nonetheless, he also argues that studying Chinese characters has to be more concise and reconsidered from the perspective of practical ease. Then he uses the same logic of “Japan repaying the old debt of gratitude,” saying Japan owes Chinese characters and its ancient civilization to China and Korea, but
now in return, China and Korea can learn modern civilization from Japan instead of 
learning how to recite poetry. By referring to the case of India, he reminds his readers of 
the importance of trilateral cooperation and regional stability in order to prevent the West 
from intruding upon Asia.

8. *Nichigo dokushūsho* 日語獨習書 (1903)

8.1. “Marine transportation and commerce are today’s world trend, and following the 
trend, people of foresight set their priority on having a good knowledge of Western 
styles… As travel becomes more frequent and the relationship between the two countries 
more important, drawing comparisons between the two countries becomes vital… The 
distinguished Japanese scholar Mr. Murakami is a great person with a scholarly passion. 
He has established the *Kinryō tōbungakudo* (金陵東文學堂, a Japanese language school 
in China founded by Higashi-honganji 東本願寺) and taught youths in China for four 
years, contributing to local civilizational development and ideological improvement.” 
(From the preface written by the Chinese authors, Guo Zupei 郭祖培 and Xiong Jinshou 
熊金壽)

The authors were graduates of the *Kinryō tōbungakudo* showing their respect for 
their teacher at the school who also proofread the manuscript of the manual. As I 
mentioned previously, in Japan, instead of Christian missionaries, it was Buddhist sects 
that were active in language education abroad.

9.1. “When we think about today’s East Asian situation, we should be aware that we are responsible for its future. Suffering from the large indemnity, can the post-war Chinese empire recover from the damage? Yes. Although its land and wealth have withered, its presence and potential are still far-reaching.

A tragedy occurred in China as the world powers invaded its territory. This brought on a crisis in East Asia and today we live in a world where the strong prey upon the weak. In the past, Ferdinand Cortes from Spain conquered Mexico and Francisco Pizarro subjugated Peru. Today, likewise, they are rushing to East Asia. This is what they always do.” (From the preface written by the author, Kawabe Shiseki 川邊紫石)

The author of this multilingual manual (Japanese, English, Chinese, and Korean), who is concerned with China’s misery and the encroachment of imperial powers around the world, seems to take a more “defensive”/“cautious engagement” stance rather than “enlightened leadership,” likely because the book was written around the time when the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) broke out.

10. *Shussei hikkei nichiroshinkan kaiwa* 出征必携日露清韓會話 (1904)

10.1. “The Japanese Empire tries to keep a good relationship with the world superpowers, and by doing so, we keep the regional security without harming the profits of each country, thus securing a long-lasting future of the Empire… Korea’s security problem is very important to us, not only because of the long close relationship between the two countries but also because of the possible regional security crisis which will affect the Empire… Manchuria became a part of Russia, and the security of Korea will be
vulnerable, causing regional instability… Korea’s security is in peril and the national interests of the Empire face imminent danger.” (From the Declaration of War on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, quoted on the book cover.)

As shown in the title of the book (a “must-have item when you go to war – Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Korean language manual”), this manual is written specifically for Japanese soldiers going to the Russo-Japanese War. The manual includes the Declaration of War, which states Japan’s reasons for fighting against Russia, i.e., to protect Asia from a regional security crisis.

11. *Dokugaku kango taisei* 獨學韓語大成 (1905)

11.1. “Located only a stream away from each other, Korea and Japan have been in a close relationship, which is already no different from people in the same village drinking water from the same well.” (From the preface contributed by Cho Minhŭi 趙民熙)

The preface contributor, Cho Minhŭi (趙民熙, 1859-?), was the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Korea to Japan. Along the lines of stressing a close relationship between Korea and Japan, he emphasizes the geographical proximity between the two countries by using an idiomatic expression, *ichii taisui* (一衣帯水; literally, located only a stream away from each other), a popular expression used by many language manual authors, together with “*dōbun dōshu* (same script, same race),” which I discuss in the next section.

11.2. “The entanglement between Japan and Korea has been complex for hundreds of years and has not yet been solved. Nonetheless, today, fortunately, the way of all things
has been clarified and the direction to be taken has been decided. Thus, people of both countries should trust each other and care about each other, striving for the happiness of each other. To achieve these goals, mutual understanding is crucial.” (From the preface contributed by Ebara Soroku 江原素六)

Japan practically made Korea its protectorate after the victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) and this preface implies that fact and suggests that people of both countries learn each other’s languages to foster “mutual” benefits.

11.3. “Hideyoshi said: ‘Make them speak in our language, why do you need interpreters?’ Although his words sound vigorous, it was his ignorance of the situation that made him say so.” (From the preface contributed by Kuga Minoru 陸實)

Some prefaces compare Hideyoshi’s expedition to the Korean Peninsula in the sixteenth century to the current situation and suggest their readers learn a lesson from past failures and study Korean.

11.4. “After the Russo-Japanese War, the world has changed greatly and it goes without saying that Japanese must learn Korean. The relationship between Koreans and Japanese has become so close to the extent that they share good days and bad days and rely on each other. How could Japanese and Koreans possibly, without learning each other’s languages, still rely on interpreters? This book perfectly meets the demands of the changing world today.” (From the preface contributed by Kamei Eizaburō 龜井英三郎)

This preface also suggests that Japan technically made Korea its protectorate after the Russo-Japanese War and suggests that Japanese readers learn Korean, which can be
interpreted as a sign of “cautious engagement” as well as of “enlightened leadership.”

Judging from the overall tone of the sentences, this preface contributor seems to be
alarmed by the current situation in Japan and feels a pressing need to catch up with
changing world standards.

11.5. “With gold mines in the mountains and rich crops in its fields, Korea, located in a
strategically good place, keeps the land wealthy enough to grow strong as a military
power. However, depending on the era and people in charge, this great potential has not
always been fulfilled. It is good that, luckily, today’s politicians are aiming at reforms
and development of the country… At the turn of the century, Japan’s victory in the
Russo-Japanese War brought peace to the East and happiness to the people. Korea had
better follow this good model case, which sees the flow of the times, and start reforms,
regulate bureaucrats’ behavior and injustice, and give rise to business in the private
sector… Learning Korean and Japanese is the urgent priority today. If people of both
countries cooperate together and develop the great natural resources of Korea, they will
share in the peace and prosperity of the East by means of enhancing national prosperity
and defense.

Written on the day when I heard the good news that Japan had occupied Port Arthur.”

(From the preface written by the author, Itō Ikichi 伊藤伊吉)

Another Orientalist/colonialist perspective on Korea’s fertile land and
strategically important location is observed, and the author is concerned with the fact that
the great potential has not always been fulfilled due to the incapability of Koreans.

Although the author values that Korean politicians of the time are aiming at reforms and
development of their country, he presupposes Japanese guidance in such reforms. Examplifying the “enlightened leadership” pattern, the assertion of the author proceeds to the shared “peace and prosperity of the East” under a regional security guaranteed by Japan.

12. *Kango dokushūshi* 韓語獨習誌 (1905)

“[N]ow learning Korean is an urgent task for courageous expansionists. Hence, without inquiring whether it is sufficient or not, I have decided to publish this book mainly for the practical purposes of those who have an ambition in the management of the peninsula and have no schools around where they live or no time for schooling.” (From the preface written by the author, Fujito Keita 藤戸計太)

After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), the overall tone of language manual prefaces shifted from “cautious engagement” to “enlightened leadership,” as seen in this preface.

13. *Nikkan shinkaiwa* 日韓新會話 (1905)

13.1. “...the Meiji government has done lots of favors for Korea, including helping with their financial difficulties in investments, educating their students with new Western knowledge, fighting against China and Russia to protect them… [F]rom top to grassroots, Japanese ignorance about Korea and Koreans should be attributed to their ignorance of the language… In order to develop Koreans’ intelligence and reform their country, we should never neglect the importance of learning Korean. In order to make Korea a protectorate of Japan, there is no other way except for sending our Korean
experts to Korea, where they will transplant Japanese culture… I hope this book will help Japanese both in Japan and in Korea to learn Korean so that they will not make the same mistakes that Hideyoshi did.”

Throughout his preface, the author, Kanashima Taisui (金島苔水) compares the current situation with that of the Hideyoshi invasions, putting emphasis on the importance of learning Korean and Korean culture. Although the author does not seem to expect Korea to be completely annexed by Japan, he suggests assimilating Korea into Japanese culture by sending Japanese experts on Korea there.

14. **Chōsengo hitorigeiko** 朝鮮語獨稽古 (1907)

14.1. “Needless to say, if one has a setup but doesn’t know what to do with it, it is impossible to benefit from it. The series of political events between Japan and Korea after the Russo-Japanese War corresponds to the setup. In order to have the two countries cooperate and blend in various fields of business, learning languages is the crucial means to establishing these goals.” (From the preface contributed by Itō Yūkan 伊東祐侃)

The colonialist mindset is conspicuous in this preface. In order to benefit from colonial enterprise, the preface suggests readers learn the language.

15. **Nikkan iroha jiten** 日韓いろは辭典 (1907)

15.1. “To have a very close relationship with our country is a natural result for Korea, which is located only 10 hours away from Shimonoseki… Now Korea’s ten million people, its thirteen thousand square miles of land, and its future happiness are all upon
our shoulders... [L]earning the language is the single fundamental means for a mutual understanding in all affairs and building a harmonious blend of the minds of the people... Thus, having Japanese learn Korean and Koreans learn Japanese is the best way to meet the needs of both sides fundamentally.” (From the preface contributed by Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信)

The preface contributor, Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838-1922) was a Meiji entrepreneur. As he was not only a politician (two-time prime minister) but also an educator who founded Waseda University, he was a frequent preface contributor. In this preface, he puts an emphasis on the geographical proximity of Japan and Korea and on assimilation policy, stating that harmony between the two countries is mutually beneficial. Also, by saying, “[n]ow Korea’s ten million people, its thirteen thousand square miles of land, and its future happiness are all upon our shoulders,” he implies that Japan is now an “enlightened leader” burdened with a “civilizing mission.”

15.2. “According to my theory, languages which share a common writing system should in fact be the same language... This book will remove the barrier between the languages with the same writing system and help to build a good relationship between neighboring countries, by which the people of both sides will benefit greatly. Besides, thanks to the book, my theory has advanced one step and I am very grateful for the author’s effort.” (From the preface contributed by Tokuhisa Tsunenori 徳久恒範)

Although it is not clear whether “a common writing system” signifies writing with Chinese characters or writing in the same syntactical order, the “theory” of this preface
contributor sounds extreme. Either way, his main argument in this preface is that removing the language barrier between Japan and Korea is mutually beneficial.

16. *Bunpō chūshaku kango kenkyūhō* 文法註釋 韓語研究法 (1909)

16.1. “A businessman without the knowledge of local languages is equal to a soldier without weapons on the battlefield: it leads to inevitable failure… Now Korea has completely become our protectorate, and we are responsible for its development in order to share the civilizational merits together… I hope the thousands of Japanese businessmen will study Korean hard with this book and succeed in their business.” (From the preface contributed by Amano Kinosuke 天野喜之助)

The main target readers of this language manual are assumed to be Japanese engaged in global business, but intriguingly, this preface contributor draws a comparison between businessmen and soldiers, which attracts readers’ attention and is metaphorically effective.

16.2. “Observing the fact that Western missionaries, addressing a nation with a different script and race (or culture and race; *ibun ishu*, 異文異種), speak fluent Korean with good understanding of the culture and are winning the confidence of Koreans, Japanese who share the same script and race (or culture and race; *dōbin dōshū*, 同文同種) should feel ashamed… Besides, because of the language barrier, Japanese get in trouble and cause serious losses in our administration of the peninsula, which should never be overlooked… Thus, I have been always suggesting to Japanese, especially those who have close contacts with Koreans, to learn Korean and make use of it in their daily duties with good
indices of human feelings, by which they should contribute to private/public administration in various aspects. This is the reason why I have decided to publish this book called *Kango kenkyūhō.*” (From the preface written by the author, Yakushiji Chirō 薬師寺知曨)

This is a clear example of “*dōbun dōshu*” (interpreted as either “same script and race” or “same culture and race” because the Chinese character “*bun* 文” signifies both culture and script), in other words, pan-Asianist theory. As this preface was written in 1909 right before Korea’s annexation, instead of Asian unity against the West, this author suggests making use of such a pan-Asian base for the sake of successful colonial enterprise. I discuss on pan-Asianism in detail in a later section.

17. *Daisokusei nikagetsu nichigo dokushūsho* 大速成 二個月日語獨習書 (1909)

17.1. “Jumping over East-West boundaries in a split second, world-wide competition and invasion are natural results… While idling for days and years, if people do not intend to spread Japanese language, fools will be all over the peninsula… Alas! Our twenty million compatriots should be engaged in study and industry. Raising nations and increasing state power will lead to the enhancement of national glory with the national flag secured. I believe this is not only my wish but also that of all national subjects from top to bottom.” (From the preface written by the author, Yuk Jongmyŏn 陸種冕)

While accepting Japanese rule, the Korean author encourages his “compatriots” to learn Japanese and acquire some academic or industrial skills to protect national pride and independence. Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910; thus, when this book was published in 1909, Korea was still a protectorate of Japan.
18. *Kango bunten* 韓語文典 (1909)

18.1. “Today, the political strategy against Korea requires not only governmental involvement but also that of national subjects. We must cooperate with Koreans and lead them to enlightenment... People quote Hideyoshi out of the blue in order to avoid the trouble of learning a new language... Nonetheless, I am uncertain if we should remove the language barrier by the annexation of the country. For this, I will await the opinions of my superiors.” (From the preface written by the author, Takahashi Tōru 高橋亨)

The author, Takahashi Tōru (高橋亨, 1878-1967), was later a professor of Korean language and literature at Keijō Imperial University. In this preface, he clearly shows an “enlightened leadership” attitude, saying that every Japanese is responsible for “enlightening” Koreans and suggesting not avoiding learning Korean like Hideyoshi. Takahashi wonders if the annexation of Korea will be positive – this manual was published in 1909 just prior to the annexation in 1910.

19. *Kangotsū* 韓語通 (1909)

19.1. “In linguistic genealogy, there is no doubt that Korean belongs to the agglutinative language family. Nonetheless, its relationship with other agglutinative languages such as Manchu, Mongol, and Turkish needs further inquiries, and likewise, the relationship between Korean and Japanese remains unclear. Nevertheless, observing their numerous similarities in grammar, if we are to make groups within the agglutinative language family, no doubt Korean and Japanese fall into the same group.” (From the preface written by the author, Maema Kyōsaku 前間恭作)
The author, Maema Kyōsaku (前間恭作, 1868-1941), was originally from Tsushima and served as a Korean interpreter for the Korean Government-General. In the preface, he talks about the genealogical relationship between Korean and Japanese, which was a popular topic at that time, and shows his modest disagreement with linking the two languages without further examination. I will mention the popularity of such genealogical discourse *ca.* 1910 in the next section.

20. *Seisen nikkan genbun jitsu* 精選日韓言文自通 (1909)

20.1. “In the world now where thousands of countries are interacting with each other, if one is smarter or stronger than the other, the former may rule over the latter. If one is not fluent in languages, how could he or she sense the intentions of the other? On the level of individuals, if a dimwit confronts a smart one, the result is obvious. If one who is deaf confronts one who has a good ear, or if one who is blind confronts one who has a good eye, the result is even more obvious.” (From the preface written by the author, Song Hŏnso̖k 宋憲奭)

In a world where the imperialist powers confronted each other, the Korean author, in question-and-answer form, suggests readers equip themselves with the least armament, i.e., language skills, because according to him the lack of language skills is more dangerous than the lack of intelligence.
21. *Seisen nichigo taikai* 精選日語大海 (1909)

21.1. “[T]he majority of scholarship in Japan is based on Western civilization. If one had no knowledge of languages, he or she could not pursue scholarship further.” (From the preface written by the author, Pak Chunghwa 朴重華)

The author, Pak Chunghwa, was not only an independent activist and laborers’ rights activist but also an educator who authored many Japanese language manuals. The first edition of this language manual was published in 1909 and reprinted numerous times with revisions. The kind of meritocratic attitude observed in this preface is often found in the writings of other contemporary Korean intellectuals as well as those of “collaborators” with Japanese authorities during the colonial period, as seen in Tikhonov’s work (2010).

22. *Nikkan kannichi gengoshū* 日韓日言語集 (1910)

22.1. “The origin of the important definition that Japan and Korea are one house or one family is deep and far-reaching. Many of those who look for the origins in ancient history refer to mythology as the reason. Probably historical documents or remains are included in their references, too. By now, this has been dealt with mainly among historians, yet lately linguists have also agreed on this. Their theory is the so-called ‘Common Origin of the Japanese and Korean Languages (*nikkango dōitsukeisetsu*, 日韓語同一系説).’ Although I am neither a historian nor a linguist, considering the geographical relation and the historical background, I think this theory is convincing. Thus, comparative studies between the Japanese and the Korean languages are the key to discovering the origins of the bilateral relationship. On top of that, the significance for
Japanese to learn Korean and for Koreans to learn Japanese has been highlighted by recent events. What is most called for in the efforts of the people of both countries at this particular time is to cultivate mutual friendship between Japan and Korea… Nichigo gengoshū (日韓語集) authored by Ida Kin’ei (井田勤衛) focuses primarily on real communication and should be regarded as a work which will not only contribute to the studies of language learners, but will also bridge the spiritual gap between both countries. In that sense, I should say the significance of this book reaches further than that of a mere language manual.” (From the preface contributed by Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信)

This is another example of language genealogy as a popular topic at the time. As mentioned here, in Japan the argument on the genealogical origins of Japan and Korea was launched in the field of anthropological history and then spread to the field of linguistics. In this preface, Ōkuma Shigenobu agrees with the “Common Origin of the Japanese and Korean Languages (nikkango dōitsukeisetsu, 日韓語同一系説)” a.k.a. Kanazawa Shōzaburō’s nissen dōsoron, which I mention in the next section.

22.2. “Countries vary in size and strength, yet they have their own traditions and keep independence. If countries covet like a wolf, glare fiercely like a tiger, and override other countries, who could possibly call this a respectful attitude toward public laws? Now Japan and Korea depend on each other and the people of both countries are learning each other’s languages while seeking the best solutions cooperatively. By doing so, both countries can earn respect from the world and show their good relationship. Nonetheless, even though people have a sense of public justice, this can easily be inclined to be egocentric and bound by power, which makes it impossible for them to acquire the
essence of studies. In such cases, even if they become fluent in the languages, I am afraid that they will never obtain true confidence or concord and never earn any respect from the public… Now, as ground and marine transportations have developed, countries around the world have become closer and Korean and Japan are like a family.” (From the preface contributed by Cho Minhŭi 趙民熙)

The preface contributor, Cho Minhŭi (趙民熙, 1859-?), was the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Korea to Japan. Judging from the overall tone of his writing, he seems to be afraid that Japan might turn into a “wolf” or a “tiger.” Thus, he repeatedly tells the audience (Japan) to respect public laws and keep a respectful manner in global society, seeking appropriate distance between Korea and Japan “like a family.”

22.3. “As found in old documents, in ancient times Korea was founded by Susanoo-no-Mikoto (素盞雄命). With a close look at Korean grammar, the syntax is the same as that of Japanese. Besides, Koreans use Japan’s jindai-moji (神代文字; letters of the Divine Age), calling them ŏnmun. Scholars have conducted comparative research on it and proved it. They resemble each other very much. I have attached the chart of jindai-moji written by Hirata Nobutane (平田延胤) to the top of this book for readers’ reference. […] The Sino-Japanese War has awakened Korea from its long delusion by China and as a result, China is no longer able to intervene in the internal affairs of Korea. Now Korea is our closest neighbor which needs the utmost care of our country. Thus, learning its language is the most urgent task and a perfect grammatical guide is crucial for that sake.” (From the preface written by the author, Ida Kin’ei 井田勤衛)
Just as Ōkuma Shigenobu mentioned in his preface that seeking the genealogical origins of Japan and Korea is “deep and far-reaching” and “many of those who look for the origins in ancient history refer to mythology”, the author of the manual connects Japan’s jindai-moji to Korean ŏnmun (invented in the fifteenth century), referring to ancient myth. He also states that Japan’s “utmost care” is needed for Korea in a rather condescending tone.

4.3.1.3 Post-annexation period: from 1911 to 1945

The international game of power in the early twentieth century capitalist expansion required more than a modernized nation. The most powerful ones had their colonies administered under the slogans of “enlightened leadership,” draining colonial resources for their own benefit. Defeating Russia was Japan’s ticket to qualifying for the game. Korea then became less “a dagger pointing at the heart of the young empire,” and more a possibility of resource expansion under a slogan similar to Western “enlightened leadership,” yet with a Confucian tone: “returning the debt of gratitude for ancient civilization.”

Already in the mid-nineteenth century, European liberals had begun to see the possession and control of overseas colonies as an essential component of national greatness and their arguments illustrate how anxieties about imperial-national standing tended to radicalize even liberal national thinking in top-ranking states… The decades leading up to the First World War also witnessed the spread of racialist thinking in political, military, and academic circles in these countries, reflecting anxieties about their ability to maintain top international status against newcomers like Germany and Japan… It is important to keep
this comparative ideological history in mind when examining radical Japanese nationalism in the 1930s [and even earlier.] Some aspects of this nationalism had roots in indigenous myths, …the 1889 Constitution, …nationalistic education policies, …self-congratulatory militaristic and racialist thinking during the wars with China and Russia. But radical national thinking in Japan was also nourished by wider intellectual and political developments that fostered radical nationalism in most front-ranking Western countries. (Benner: 33-37)

4.3.1.3.1 Noteworthy phrases with respect to language and colonial discourse

23. *Rokujūnichi nissen kaiwa dokushū* 六十日日鮮會話獨修 (1912)

23.1. The preface written by the author Takagi Tsunejirō (高木常次郎) is heavily ridden with colonializing discourse, positing “the pressing need to learn Korean for Japanese… almost to say that Japan is Korea and Korea is Japan, where Japanese are burdened with the responsibility to lead Koreans to civilization and enlightenment.” And in order to fulfill the responsibility or “mission accorded by Heaven,” in the author’s words, “Japanese need to master Korean and learn the actual condition of the country and the people.” The topic of the last lesson is marriage. At the end of the conversation, the character says: “after getting a wife, I’d like to go to China to conduct business.”

24. *Kanada kokugo taiten* 가나다國語大典 (1914)

24.1. “Since the current situation is pushing Koreans to import civilization from Japan and absorb new knowledge, more and more Koreans are trying to study the national
language (Japanese) both in the cities and in the countryside.” (From the preface contributed by Oka Motosuke 岡元輔)

The preface contributor claims that even Koreans living in the countryside will be civilized by absorbing new knowledge through Japanese, now the “national language” to them.

25. *Chōsen jukugo kaishaku* 朝鮮熟語解釋 (1915)

25.1. “Public servants like myself should always be aware of the efficiency of clerical work. However, just as they favor decorative clothes and ornaments, Koreans often use too many embellishing expressions in official documents to the extent that it rather looks cheap, and due to the fact that we are not accustomed to those idiomatic expressions in Korean, it not only interrupts the efficient flow of clerical work but also often causes serious problems in central/regional governance owing to mutual misunderstandings.”

(From the preface written by the author, Yamanoi Rinji 山之井麟治)

Working as a part of the Japanese colonial enterprise, the author regards the decorum found in Koreans as a hallmark of “backwardness” in comparison to the pragmatic efficiency of “modernity” and “civilization.”

26. *Jitsuyō hon’i nissen jiten* 實用本位 日鮮辭典 (1920)

26.1. “Japan and Korea, being in a close relationship, should share good days and bad days. Nonetheless, the language barrier hinders their assimilation into civilization, which greatly harms the relationship between the Japanese and Koreans.” (From the preface contributed by an unknown Korean with family name Han)
Ten years after the annexation of Korea, this Korean author is concerned with the language barrier which keeps Koreans from assimilating into civilization and thus from harmonizing with Japanese.

27. *Nissen kaiwa dokushū* 日鮮會話獨習 (1925)

Both prefaces open with the same story. This seems to be the widely shared view of the situation at the time: “After the annexation of Korea, thanks to the joint efforts of the government and the general public, the development achieved in Korea is outstanding; however, we all have to admit that the industry and economy of the peninsula are still far behind those of the archipelago (*naichi*, 内地).”

The tone in the following two prefaces reveals anxiety about and frustration with the management of the colonial enterprise and regards the lack of language skills as the major cause.

27.1. “The development of the Korean peninsula is a key factor in the further prosperity of the empire, and it is such a shame to see unnecessary quarrels between Japanese and Koreans which are often caused by mutual misunderstandings due to the language barrier. [U]ltimately I believe this book will help Japan and Korea to become one in harmony.”

(From the preface contributed by Shimizu Shigeo 清水重夫)

27.2. “Development of Korea is not only a concern for public officials in Korea but also for all Japanese, who should be aware of how urgent and important the development is for the further progress of the empire. We should do our best to assimilate Koreans into
Japanese… I believe this book will be of benefit not only to beginner learners of Korean but also to the assimilation of the Japanese and Koreans.” (From the preface contributed by Imae Yonetarō 今江米太郎)

28. *Nissen kaiwa jiten* 日鮮解話辭典 (1926)

28.1. “The harmonization of Koreans and the Japanese is the biggest issue to be resolved for the sake of the welfare of seventy million compatriots… In order to avoid unnecessary quarrels, people must study the Korean language. People study foreign languages while putting Korean aside, which is just unreasonable. I hope this language manual will help Koreans and Japanese to harmonize.” (From the preface written by the author, U Yonggūn 禹鎔根)

It is rare to find a Korean author suggesting that Japanese study Korean as directly as this. It is perhaps because the author was a member of the welfare society mentioned below which consisted of both Japanese and Koreans.

28.2. As the author was a vice-president of the *Kyōsai-kai* (共濟會 Benefit Society) in Nagano, the objectives of the *Kyōsai-kai* are also included.

“Like the sun shining over beautiful spring fields, the peace that we enjoyed has gone. Having lost the race for survival over the centuries, the compatriots sought for a breakthrough in China and Russia, which ended in vain. Then the drifters yearned after the city shining under justice and peace in the eastern sky. Like insects flocking to light, they came across to Mainland Japan (*naichi*, 内地) leaving their home behind; their
numbers exceed 300,000. Nevertheless, how is the current situation of those people after they came over to Japan?

The country with a flourishing culture, which they yearned after when they left their loving home, provides them neither the stable life which they imagined nor the education they expected. There is no place to live or food to eat, which puts them in despair. In addition, the differences in custom and language cause misunderstanding and inhospitality, which drives them to curse the society as well as their lives. Without reflection on morality and justice, their minds get twisted, which eventually has a negative impact on society. How could we overlook the situation with respect to the ethnic viewpoint? It is clearly essential that the officials in charge should rescue them by political means, whereas we should rescue them in a humanitarian manner. Both in the public and private sectors, the lack of institutions to support them is what we feel the most regret about, and the happiness and prosperity of the humans should never be divided by borders. Thus, we humans who share the feelings of joy and anger should help each other by means of love without ethnic divisions. There is no life without love, and life is always accompanied by love. Setting the coexistence and co-prosperity of mankind as our motto, we have established the Kyōsai-kai in order to rescue Korean workers from despair.”

29. *Seisen kokugo taihan* 精選國語大範 (1933)

29.1. “Today, the larger the Japanese Empire expands, the more widely the national language will be spoken. As for Korea, although it has been long since the public and private sectors started promoting its use, the number of people who are fluent in the
[Japanese] language remains small.” (From the preface written by the author, Pak Chunghwa 朴重華)

This manual was published after the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932. This manual is a reprint of his manual previously published in 1909 (Seisen nichigo taikai; Preface No. 21), but the change in its title from “nichigo (Japanese)” into “kokugo (national language)” is symbolic.

4.3.2 Analysis of the contents

Lastly, in this section, I will look into the contents of the language manuals to see what kinds of phrases the authors wanted their contemporary readers to use and understand in the areas where the target languages – mostly Korean, and sometimes Chinese and Russian – were spoken. I have divided the section into sub-sections by specific themes that are relevant to the discussions in the previous sections.

4.3.2.1 About enemies – China and Russia vs. Japan

“The Chinese soldiers all surrendered without fighting.”

“Do you think the Japanese soldiers are going to beat the Chinese? – Of course. Chinese soldiers are not disciplined while Japanese soldiers are under rigorous discipline and self-restrained. – That means the Japanese soldiers have a true martial spirit.”

“We are soldiers from Japan, so there is no need for the elderly and ladies to either get scared or run away. – People were so annoyed by the Russian soldiers’ violence. – Don’t

15 Nichi shin kan sangoku kaiwa (日清韓三國會話, 1894) p.76, Nisshinkango hitorigeiko (日清韓語獨稽古, 1895) p.8.
16 Nichi shin kan sangoku kaiwa (日清韓三國會話, 1894) pp.77-8, Nichiroshinkan kaiwa jizaihō (日露清韓會話自在法, 1904) p.28.
worry! We Japanese soldiers are under rigorous discipline and never do any harm to civilians.”\(^{17}\)

“How did the war between Japan and Russia go? – Japan won. – That’s great. The Japanese soldiers are really strong. – Japan fought this war entirely for the sake of Korea and China. The Japanese troops are simply magnificent.”\(^{18}\)

“The Russian soldiers ran away. The Russian troops are very exhausted.”\(^{19}\)

“Since the military code is not strict, the soldiers are not disciplined.”\(^{20}\)

“Russians are arrogant and violent.”\(^{21}\)

“The military code of Russia is very loose.”\(^{22}\)

“Russia invades other countries as it wishes; hence, Japan cannot help but fight against Russia with all the might of its loyal national subjects. By doing so, Japan will show the Japanese spirit to the world. When the peace of the East is at risk, Japan must fight.”\(^{23}\)

“If a country loses a war which it fought for egoistic reasons, it will be required to pay a lot of compensation.”\(^{24}\)

“Judged by our merits, we receive medals and bonuses.”\(^{25}\)

“Since Japan defeated Russia, we are expecting to receive treasures from Russia.”\(^{26}\)

“Since Russian soldiers are all uneducated, there is no doubt that the Japanese, not only educated but also patriots, will defeat the Russians.”\(^{27}\)

\(^{17}\) Mankandogo annai (満韓上語案内, 1904) p.46-7, p.100, Nikkan kaiwa sanjā’nichikan sokusei (日韓會話三十日間速成, 1904) p.172.

\(^{18}\) Jicchi ōyō nikkan kaiwa dokushū (實地應用日韓會話獨習, 1904) pp.72-3.

\(^{19}\) Iroha hiki chōsengo annai (いろは引朝鮮語案内, 1904) p.42.


\(^{21}\) Ibid. p.121.

\(^{22}\) Dokugaku kango taisei (獨學韓語大成, 1905) p.345.

\(^{23}\) Ibid. p.352.

\(^{24}\) Ibid. p.353.

\(^{25}\) Ibid. p.258.

\(^{26}\) Nikkan gengo gōheki (日韓言語合璧, 1906) p.348.
In preparation for war, phrases that evoke a feeling of hostility toward the enemy are often found in the language manuals, including a large number of derogatory terms and offensive expressions. The target shifted from China to Russia in the second war. It might be noteworthy, though, that as early as 1894, one language manual has a sentence asking if anybody has seen Russian soldiers in the area. Another remarkable sentence is in Dokugaku kango taisei (1905), which uses the logic of “Japan fights in order to keep the peace and stability of the East.” Although this kind of logic had already appeared in the Declaration of the War in the Sino-Japanese War, it was not seen in the language manual phrases until then.

There are also some sentences which reveal the fact that the Japanese might have had an inferiority complex toward the Chinese, such as “Don’t think that I use the language of a country bumpkin.”28, “You’ve got some nerve.”29 These sentences only appear in Chinese phrase examples, not in Korean or Russian contexts.

Although the term “Emperor” appears in the vocabulary sections, it is never included in conversations in the manuals until 1909, which implies that the authors felt no need to include such sentences in their manuals because the topic of the Emperor at that time still had little currency among the general populace. Indeed, the language manuals often say “fight for the sake of the country” or “for the sake of the nation”, but never “under the name of the Emperor”. Also, as argued above, soldiers themselves never expressed their emotions toward the emperor. Rather, and more reasonably, Ichinose argues that medals and bonuses were used as a means to encourage soldiers to work hard (37-8), as briefly seen in the above phrases.

28 Nichi shin kan sangoku taishō kaiwa hen (日清韓三國對照會話篇, 1894) p.78.
29 Ibid. p.64.
The term “banzai,” as well as the phrases which contain the term, is everywhere, to the extent that there is no manual without the term; here is one example in the context of Korea – “Banzai, banzai! Korean Emperor banzai! Korean citizens banzai! Prince Ùihwa of Korea banzai! Empress banzai! Nation banzai! It is a great victory of the East! The most favorable incident ever to happen since Korea was founded!”

4.3.2.2 Self-esteem as high as Mt. Fuji

“Which country is the strongest in the world? – Japan. – But Japan is a small country. – Though the land is small, the people are endowed with a special Japanese spirit.”

“The Japanese soldiers are under rigorous discipline and self-restraint. – That means the Japanese soldiers have a true martial spirit.”

“The Japanese swords are the best in the world.”

“Mt. Fuji is higher than heaven.”

“Britain has the best navy, Germany has the best army, and Japan has the best military code.”

32 Nichi shin kan sangoku kaiwa (日清韓三國會話, 1894) pp.77-8, Nichiroshinkan kaiwa jizaihō (日露清韓會話自在法, 1904) p.28.
34 Taiyaku nikkan kaiwa shōkei (對譯日韓會話捷徑, 1905) p.92.
“Japan is well-known for its strong military, Britain is well-known for its powerful commerce, and France is well-known for its sophisticated beauty.”

“Although Japan is a small country, it has the best landscape in the world.”

Ichinose argues that at the time of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, even though talk about the characteristic “Japanese spirit (yamato damashii)” seems pervasive (e.g., Nisshinkan sangoku senjimon; Preface No.7.7), it was the victory in the two wars that gave true supporting reasons to secure and strengthen this spiritualism (113). In fact, Japan barely won the two wars, yet the reason for the victory was attributed to the special Japanese spirit; in other words, the number of soldiers or power of the country was not decisive for the results of the wars; what mattered was the military code, discipline, and Japanese spirit. This discourse gradually strengthens and becomes more radicalized toward WWII.

4.3.2.3 Healthy degree of skepticism or obsessive doubt?

“If you tell me a lie, I’ll shoot you. – No, I’m not telling you a lie. – Tell me the truth, quickly!”

“Hey, you! Where did the enemy soldiers go? – I don’t know. – Stop talking nonsense and tell me quickly!”

“Tell me the truth.” “That must be a lie.” “Don’t try to trick me.” “Can’t trust you.”

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36 Kango kyōkasho (韓語教科書, 1905) p.197.
37 Nikkan gengo gōheki (日韓言語合璧, 1906) p.177.
38 Chōsen gogaku hitori annai (朝鮮語學獨案內, 1894) pp.149-50.
39 Nichiroshinkan kaiwa jizaihō (日露清韓會話自在法, 1904) p.30.
40 Jicchi ōyō nikkan kaiwa dokushū (實地應用日韓會話獨習, 1904) p.76, 78, 80.
The Korean language manuals contain overwhelming numbers of phrases concerning lies. These go beyond a healthy degree of skepticism, revealing the obsessive doubts that the Japanese harbored against Koreans. Ichinose also points out that one how-to manual for soldiers contained a sample letter format to use in case Japanese soldiers are killed by Koreans during the two wars (73-4).

4.3.2.4 How to make diehard patriots

“What do Japanese soldiers study? – They study war strategies, geography, gymnastics, international relations, arithmetic, and history. – They study like scholars!”

“Everyone, including scholars and students, would go to war in times of state crisis.”

“Soldiers should always be loyal patriots and serve their country to the death.”

“You must do some exercise.”

“You can do anything if you bring up your spirit.”

“Men without endurance are helpless.”

“Though the face looks well-fed, his body is weak.”

“Though it has been only a couple months since they started schooling, our children have shown much improvement in their behavior.”

“Scholarship must be done with patriotism!”

“Merchants like us, too, should work with loyalty and patriotism!”

41 Shinsen chōsen kaiwa (新撰朝鮮會話, 1894) p.140.
43 Kango kyōkasho (韓語教科書, 1905) p.288.
44 Kango kyōkasho (韓語教科書, 1905) p.94.
46 Taiyaku nikkan kaiwa shōkei (對譯日韓會話捷徑, 1905) pp.121.
48 Nikkan gengo gōheki (日韓言語合璧, 1906) p.318.
It is noteworthy that rationalistic attitudes were illustrated in the manuals from the early 1890s as well as in Kōrinsuchi, e.g., “Don’t die meaninglessly where you don’t have to” or “as it seems difficult to win, let’s surrender.” Nonetheless, as soon as the Sino-Japanese War broke out, such sentences were no longer included. Instead, the attitude of “Forsake your life to serve the nation” prevailed. This mental attitude becomes radicalized later, especially during WWII, to the extent that not only soldiers but also civilians in Japan committed suicide (or were forced to commit suicide) in order to avoid becoming prisoners of war. According to Ichinose, this social discourse regarding the stigma of becoming a prisoner of war as the most despicable deed was first formulated due to “unequal” warfare situations where Japan was fighting against big countries like China and the Western enemy, Russia, equipped with the latest weapons (Ichinose: 96). Later the idea was connected to Bushido and the Japanese spirit (Yamato damashii), forming a powerful social discourse which led not only to the society’s cold treatment of returned war prisoners but also to the Japanese soldiers’ abuse of WWII POWs.

4.3.2.5 Civilization talk

“Could you please show me a new release, if any? I am particularly interested in the genre of poetry and history. – Yes, sir. – What about the small book with a beautiful front cover? – This is a collection of poems.”

“The Railroad is the symbol of civilization.”

“From now on, people who study practical genres of scholarship will be regarded as great men. – Then, I will learn painting. – Rather than painting, study commerce.”

50 Ibid. p.263.
51 Nichiroshinkan kaiwa jizaihō (日露淸韓會話自在法, 1904) p.10.
52 Kango kyōkasho (韓語教科書, 1905) p.194.
“Without the knowledge of Japanese, you will fall behind the times.”\(^{54}\)

“After the country becomes civilized, naturally you will be able to have a good relationship with other countries.”\(^{55}\)

“Learning foreign languages is essential in order to absorb new knowledge of civilization from world scholarship.”\(^{56}\)

“Invite foreigners as advisors to each department and learn the systems of civilized countries.”\(^{57}\)

“There is no enemy under heaven if you have humanitarian ethics on the one hand and the core doctrine of civilization on the other.”\(^{58}\)

“Would you like to have your name embroidered on your suit? – Yes, please. Write it in English.”\(^{59}\)

“Do you have any interesting novels? – Which ones would you prefer, historical or detective novels? – Which publishers are these from, British or American?”\(^{60}\)

These sentences start to find their way into the language manuals around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, when the concern was about how the “civilized” should behave while fighting against a “civilized” Western enemy. Striking contrasts in contents are especially conspicuous in the multilingual manuals. In Russian, as if to demonstrate how “civilized” Japanese are to Russians, the speech levels are much more polite than the

\(^{53}\) Ibid. pp.245-6.
\(^{54}\) Ibid.
\(^{55}\) Taiyaku nikkan kaiwa shōkei (對譯日韓會話捷徑, 1905) p.108.
\(^{56}\) Dokugaku kango taisei (獨學韓語大成, 1905) pp.146-7.
\(^{57}\) Ibid. p.253.
\(^{58}\) Ibid. p.353.
\(^{59}\) Kan nichi ei shinkaiwa (韓日英新會話, 1909) p. 402.
\(^{60}\) Ibid.
corresponding Korean sentences. The contents are also much more moderate than those in the Chinese and Korean sections. It is intriguing to see that in one manual, *Nichiroshinkan kaiwa jizaihō* (1904), sentences in Russian inquire about a new book release with a beautiful front cover, while those in Chinese are about looking for a missing newspaper, and those in Korean are about how great Japan and the Japanese soldiers are. Intriguingly, but predictably, this “civilization jargon” can also be observed in *Kan nichi ei shinkaiwa* (1909), the multilingual language manual for Korean, Japanese, and English written by Korean authors, where similar conversations are staged at a bookstore and at a tailor’s.

### 4.3.2.6 Filth vs. cleanliness – savagery and colonial discourse

“[At an inn] *This is dirty; go change it with a clean one.*”61

“You should keep sanitary.”62

“You haven’t cleaned it yet? – Sorry about that. – *What a dirty place!*”63

“Don’t spit on the ground!”64

“Clean the kitchen! The washroom is dirty!”65

“This dish tastes bad; it smells like rotten fish.”66

“Though the house is dirty, there is a space to sleep, so please come in.”67

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62 *Sensen chokugo iri nichi shin kan taiwa benran* (宣戰勅語入日清韓對話便覧, 1894) p.20.
63 *Jicchi ōyō nikkan kaiwa dokushū* (實地應用日韓會話獨習, 1904) p.19.
64 *Kango kyōkasho* (韓語教科書, 1905) p.79.
67 *Dokugaku kango taisei* (獨學 韓語大成, 1905) p.91.
As for savagery, the phrase “Display chopped heads in public!” appears in Kōrinsuchi published in 1883 and 1904, but Dokugaku kango taisei (1905) criticizes this as a savage practice of the Koreans, saying “such savage practices remain only in an underdeveloped country like Korea (259)”, as if the Japanese never had such a practice before. Moreover, in Kan nichi ei shin kaiwa (1909), the multilingual manual for Korean, Japanese and English written in 1909 by Korean authors, a conversation in a barbershop sounds pertinent: “My head is full of filth, so brush my hair well, please. – Yes, sir. After brushing your hair, let’s wash your head. Which one would you prefer, with soap or with egg? – Wash it with egg, please.” (324)

4.3.2.7 Eyes on Korea – critiques of its “backwardness” and Japan’s leadership

“The King of Korea is always righteous and loves civilization.”68

“The Emperor of Korea is intelligent and strives in his official duties.”69

“Is there a doctor? – There is no doctor in this town. We’ll go to a pharmacy instead. – A pharmacist is knowledgeable in medicine? – Not quite.”70

“Some doctors kill their patients.”71

“Is there an ordinance? – Yes, but no one knows how to use it.”72

“The discipline at that haktang [school] is apparently no good, so I will go to public middle school.”73

“Are you planning to study in the U.S.? – No, I am going to Tokyo.”74

68 Nichi kan ei sangoku taiwa (日韓英三國對話, 1892) p.133.
69 Kango kyōkasho (韓語教科書, 1905) p.233.
71 Kango kyōkasho (韓語教科書, 1905) p.236.
72 Nikkan kaiwa (日韓會話, 1894) pp.142-3, Chōsen gogaku hitori annai (朝鮮語學獨案內, 1894) p.165.
73 Kango kyōkasho (韓語教科書, 1905) p.82.
“Local governors have control over the judiciary as well as the administration, which gives them enormous authority. Only after they stop accepting bribes, will administrative reforms be carried out.”

“Korean craftsmen are often lazy.”

“No matter how beautiful the clothing is, if it does not suit a man who puts it on, it looks ugly.”

“It is difficult to command Korean military forces because they do not maintain discipline.”

“Although the palace guards in Seoul are equipped with new Western guns, the others are still using matchlocks.”

“Do you know the trick to fix stiff shoulders? If you know, could you teach me? – No, I don’t know. Go see a doctor!”

“Pyongyang is well-known for flies and Anju is well-known for mosquitoes.”

“Intending for civilizational improvement, we have invited Japanese as advisors and employed them in each department, depending on their specialty.”

“As bribery is prevalent in underdeveloped countries, misdeeds and injustices occur frequently.”

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74 Ibid. p.198.
76 Ibid. p.237.
77 Ibid. p.247.
78 Ibid. p.288.
79 Ibid.
81 Taiyaku nikkan kaiwa shōkei (對譯日韓會話捷徑, 1905) p.194.
82 Dokugaku kango taisei (獨學 韓語大成, 1905) p.255.
83 Ibid. p.262.
“Korea has invited Japanese advisors to reform its police system. It is very intriguing to see the effectiveness of one captain / chief inspector who pacified the revolt.”\textsuperscript{84}

“Although he killed a person, his fault was pardoned by bribing a local governor.”\textsuperscript{85}

“The Japanese have established a lighthouse on the Korean Straits where there was none before.”\textsuperscript{86}

“A Japanese doctor came to this town and he is doing a great job in curing patients.”\textsuperscript{87}

“Weapons in Korea are all imported from other countries while Japan produces weapons and even warships.”\textsuperscript{88}

“Today, people must actively learn foreign languages. – Language teachers are all foreigners. – Yet as for Koreans, Japanese teach better than our Korean teachers.”\textsuperscript{89}

“I am planning to learn Chinese and English. – What about German? – You would never use it even if you learn it. – What do you study these days? – I study Japanese. – You should study diligently with all your heart. – Of course.”\textsuperscript{90}

The conspicuous emphasis on “backwardness” is found within the descriptive sentences about Korea. “Decorum” and “laziness” are opposed to efficiency and diligence – the hallmarks of “civilization” – as the signature characteristics of Korean “backwardness,” which can be also seen in the prefaces (e.g., Chōsen jukugo kaishaku; Preface No. 25). Also, there are numerous conversations on medicine and hygiene, which end up being yet another means of criticizing Korean “backwardness.”

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. pp.266-7.
\textsuperscript{85} Nikkan gengo gōheki (日韓言語合璧, 1906) p. 327.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. p.178.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid. p.219.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. pp.285-6.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid. pp.168-9.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid. pp.169-70.
4.3.2.8 Racialist discourse – Westerners as descendants of monkeys

“Why are the skin and hair color of Westerners different from ours? – That’s because they are descendents of monkeys.”\(^91\)

“They are very hairy and have big mouths and noses.”\(^92\)

“The people of the West and people of the East are different races.”\(^93\)

“Europeans have brown eyes and bright hair, whereas most Asians have yellow faces with black eyes.”\(^94\)

“Westerners are all tall.”\(^95\)

“As the color of the skin and beard are different from ours, Russians look ugly. Westerners are descendents of monkeys.”\(^96\)

“Westerners have big noses and yellow eyes.”\(^97\)

Much emphasis here is put on differences in appearance and race. Some remain simply descriptive, while others are rather pejorative. Also, a clear flashback of Western racial discourse can be seen in expressions like “yellow faces” and the use of term “monkeys”, which is reversed. Frank Dikötter argues that “racial discourse, which has sometimes been more about imagined cultural inclusions than about real social encounters, has shaped the identity of millions of people in East Asia: although it is a historically contingent object which is constantly rearticulated in adaptations to changing

\(^91\) Nikkan kaiwa (日韓會話, 1894) p.61.
\(^92\) Ibid. p.93.
\(^93\) Kango kyōkasho (韓語教科書, 1905) p.157.
\(^96\) Taiyaku nikkan kaiwa shōkei (對譯日韓會話捷徑, 1905) pp.107.
\(^97\) Ibid. p.136.
environments, its fundamental role in creating both Self and Other has given it a particular kind of resilience so that it often survives social, economic and political changes” (10).

4.3.3 Summary

The various examples cited above from language manuals produced for the Japanese from the late 1800s to the early 1900s confirm the usefulness of the *four-pattern theory* of national thinking proposed by Erica Benner in that the application of the patterns to the analysis of the manuals helps us to explain better the complexities of discourse formations in nation-building and colonialism. By contrast, historical periods are too vast and inclusive to allow for more specific instantiation. Overall, the emphasis should be placed on the periods when “cautious engagement” gradually culminates in “enlightened leadership,” i.e., roughly between 1895 through the 1920s, to afford a closer examination of how colonialist discourse, from both above and below, shaped the target language (in this case, Korean) through its “articulation” in Japanese.

4.4 Pan-Asianism in the sinographic cultural sphere

Pan-Asianism was the favorite rhetoric and pet theory of the language manual authors. Today, “sinosphere,” “East Asian cultural sphere,” “Chinese cultural sphere,” and “Chinese-character cultural sphere” are all different terms used to refer to the shared cultural elements in a group of East Asian countries, namely: China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam. Amongst various common denominators are geographic proximity, shared political and religious models, historical interactions, and perhaps more basically,
adaptation of Chinese characters or sinographs as the writing medium. Following Sheldon Pollock’s term for Sanskrit-based cultures – the Sanskrit Cosmopolis\(^{98}\) – we might also call it the Sinographic Cosmopolis.

Lately, trans-regional research projects are attempting to reveal facets of a greater picture emerging from the combination of shared cultural elements in this sphere. For instance, in the field of Classical Chinese literature, Judy Wakabayashi (2005), Sasahara Hiroyuki (2008), and Kin Bunkyō (2010) compare the translation techniques and practices of composition in Classical Chinese in China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Jean-Noel Robert (2001) also strongly argues for the importance of studying Classical Chinese as the underlying fabric of common East Asian culture even today.

Observing current trans-regionalist and pan-Asianist trends in East Asia, one might notice that the majority of scholars who adhere to such frameworks are from Japan and/or are in Japanese Studies. About a century ago, pan-Asianism based on sinographs (dōbun dōshu) was a “pet theory” used by the Japanese to propagate “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” According to Lee Sungsi (2000), the term *higashi ajia bunkaken* (East Asian cultural sphere), from which today’s East Asianism trend derives, was coined by Japanese scholar Nishijima Sadao (1919-1998). In the 1960s, he and his teacher, Uehara Senroku (1899-1975), intended to change the Western-centered paradigm by offering a new paradigm in historiography. Lee argues that such a stance is produced by re-interpretations of the past and a rebuilding of historical frameworks, and that it is dangerous to subscribe to such frames of reference without knowing the historical background that gave birth to such concepts.

The main goal of the following sub-sections is to explain how this pan-Asianist trend developed in Japan about a century ago. I will examine the idea of pan-Asianism as it appeared during the Meiji era (1868-1912) and how it spread to Korea and beyond, transforming into the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Pan-Asianism had wide implications, ranging from the fields of historiography to folklore studies and politics. Indeed, Nishijima, the initiator of today’s pan-Asianism trend, originally proposed the concept in the context of ancient and premodern history, from which it later spread to other fields. In this section, I shall limit my focus to language studies.

4.4.1 Pan-Asianism in Japan vis-à-vis shifts in Japanese nationalism

“Identification with Asia was not always an affirmative experience, …but Asia, as Oguma Eiji points out, always functioned as a mirror for Japanese efforts at defining Japanese identity.” (Saaler: 3)

The history of modernity for Japan started with the country’s rejection of “Asian ties,” primarily those with China. Japan had been under heavy cultural influence from China since ancient times, adopting religions, governmental institutions, and Chinese script. With the encroachment of the Western imperialist powers, Japan after the Meiji Restoration (1867-8) rushed to modernize itself under the slogan of bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment), ranging from the Westernization of its military to the industrialization of its economy. For this new departure as a modern nation, detachment from and decentering of China, the old model, was deemed essential by the new Japanese government and by progressivist thinkers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), who proclaimed this view in a title that says it all: Escape Asia (Datsu-A ron 脫亜論, 1885)—
a book that sold millions of copies (Benner: 29). With the rise of nationalism in Japan in the late 1880s, pan-Asianism found itself in an extremely unfriendly environment. Japanese were eager to distance themselves from Asian traditions and to seek an independent identity (Sato: 126-7). “The nation was conceived as an extended family, with the Emperor as semi-divine father of the nation and the head of state… Japanese ideologues borrowed theories of national discourse from Western nationalists and accordingly manipulated indigenous myths” (Weiner: 101). “The diffusion of social Darwinism, in particular, would provide scientific legitimacy for both the market laws and the notion that social and political development was a manifestation of the aggressive interplay of natural forces” (ibid.: 102).

A similar phenomenon occurred in the sphere of language studies, which was also soon reached by the wave of Westernization and nationalization. At the epicenter was Ueda Kazutoshi (1867-1937) in the Department of Linguistics at Tokyo Imperial University (today’s University of Tokyo), the first chief professor of the department. In June 1894, upon his return from three and a half years of studying philology in Europe, Ueda was appointed professor of linguistics at the Imperial University, where he transplanted what he had learned from abroad (Lee: 78). This took place only two months before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) (ibid.: 87). Besides, the linguistic turbulence in the Meiji era (1868-1911) was closely tied to consciousness of the “nation-state” and the “empire,” triggered by the Sino-Japanese War (ibid.: 54). Ueda, in his Kokugo to Kokka to (The National Language and The Nation-State 国語と国家と, 1894), emphasized that “the Japanese polity had been, and would continue to be, sustained by the Japanese ‘race,’ and argued that the Japanese language itself was the
manifestation of the inherited qualities of its people” (Weiner: 103). This was yet another aspect of what he had learned in Germany. I have covered this in detail already in Chapter 2.

Under the direction of Ueda, one of the common goals of researchers in the department of linguistics was to contextualize the Japanese language on the world map. Where did it come from? Are there any languages that share the same roots? While studying different languages, the researchers were interested to discover their relatedness to Japanese. For example, Fujioka Katsuji was in charge of the Manchu and Mongol languages, Iha Fuyū, Ryūkyūan, Kindaichi Kyōsuke, Ainu, Gotō Asatarō, Chinese, and Ogura Shinpei, Korean (Yasuda: 45). Ueda’s colleague and Ogura’s teacher, Kanazawa Shōzaburō, was also in the department. His well-known theory, called nissen dōsoron, claimed that Japanese and Korean language shared the same roots.99

During the Meiji era, pan-Asianism had been a vague romantic and idealistic feeling of Asian solidarity; for instance, Okakura Tenshin (Kakuzō) (1862-1913), who is today regarded as a representative figure of pan-Asianism, coined the famous phrase “Asia is one” in 1903 in English, and also some activists tried to strengthen contacts with their counterparts in Asia, such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Sun Yat-sen, Kim Ok-kyun, and so forth (Saaler: 6-7). Pan-Asianism on a broader scale surfaced as a result of “the growing consciousness of Japanese national strength and the rise of Japan as a leading regional power” (ibid.: 7). Because the spread of pan-Asianist thought in Japan was a consequence of growing its national strength, it was being observed with increasing suspicion in other Asian countries; consequently, inter-Asian dialogues on pan-Asianism

practically ended in the late 1920s (ibid.: 8-9). On the other hand, as the pan-Asian movement was becoming more influential in political circles in Japan, its ideology became more concrete and better defined with clear concepts of regional integration, such as “sameness of culture and script, racial sameness” (dōbun dōshu), “alliance of the yellow races,” Confucian tradition, geographical proximity (often represented in an idiomatic expression, ichii taisui 一衣帯水; literally, located only a stream away from each other), historical legacy of the Sinocentric order (rhetoric like “Japan was paying a debt of gratitude to Korea and China”), etc. (ibid.: 9-10)

After Japan’s victory in the two wars – the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), in which Japan beat its old model, and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), in which Japan defeated a Western imperialist power – Japan presented itself as a new imperialist player in the game of power in Asia, taking Taiwan as its colony and making Korea its protectorate. In search of handy theories to rationalize Japan’s entry into Asia and its right to exercise control over the internal affairs of other Asian nations, concepts like nissen dōsoron and dōbun dōshu (same script, same race) were welcomed, but often used only in their superficial meanings. Moreover, although neither the public’s perception of China nor the country’s educational policies toward Chinese characters were unified, advocates of kanbun (Classical Chinese writing) saw the time as a perfect moment to stress the immutable differences between “East” and “West.” They increasingly racialized different identities into an opposition between the “white” and the “yellow” (Sato: 128-134).

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100 For example, according to Takashi Mitsui (1999), Kanazawa’s nissen dōsoron originally argues that Korean and Japanese share the same roots and compares their relationship to that of older and younger brother. Nonetheless, it was modified to suit the political agenda of the time and the positions of older and younger brother were reversed in his later works. Kanazawa’s successor, Ogura Shinpei, who was interested in ascertaining the genealogy of both languages through old Korean poetry and dialectology research, showed modest disagreement with Kanazawa’s nissen dōsoron (Yasuda: 1999).
9). Indeed, the vision of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” was already in the making with the calls for expulsion of Western powers from Asia and establishment of Japanese hegemony (ibid.: 135).

“Pan-Asianism, above all, was an activist ideology, and the rationale underlying the ideology was adjusted over time in quite opportunistic ways” (Saaler: 10-11).

The problem with analyzing the historical phenomenon of Pan-Asianism is the fact that many of its protagonists were Japanese, who often asserted Japanese leadership in a pan-Asian regional order, a trend related to Japanese colonialism (ibid.: 11). “As a result, ideals such as Asian solidarity and equality favored by early pan-Asianists, were pushed into the background” (ibid.: 11-12). “However, even claims for Japanese leadership have to be seen in the context of anti-colonialism directed against Western influence in Asia. To be sure, Japanese leadership and a Japanese role model at times also were acknowledged in parts of Asia, particularly after Japan’s victory over Russia in 1904-5. But such appraisals of a Japanese model soon disappeared, particularly after pan-Asian rhetoric was drawn upon to legitimize Japanese colonial rule.” (ibid.: 11-12)

“Hegemonic Pan-Asianism in Japanese foreign policy had its climax in November 1943, when the representatives of six Asian governments – Japan, Manchukuo, China, Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines – met in Tokyo at the Greater East Asian Conference (Daitō-A kaigi) or the ‘Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations’ and discussed the future of Asia. After the lengthy address by Japan’s Prime Minister, Tōjō Hideki, and speeches by the representatives of the other participating nations as well as the Indian observer, Chandra Bose, the summit issued a Joint Declaration, the Daitō-A Sengen.” (ibid.: 13) “This declaration later served to mobilize support, such as natural
resources, from fellow nations. The pan-Asianism at the Tokyo Conference was above all inspired by economic autarky for warfare against the world’s superpowers, Great Britain and the United States” (ibid.: 13-14). Many Japanese soldiers in Southeast Asia were indoctrinated to believe that they were fighting for the liberation of Asian peoples, and the language manuals edited for them are also full of such Pan-Asian rhetoric.

### 4.4.2 Korea before 1905 – nationalism vs. pan-Asianism

In today’s Korea, the form of pan-Asianism prevalent during the early twentieth century in Korea is commonly considered to be the ideology of “Korean collaborators” under colonial rule. Nevertheless, Shin Gi-Wook argues that pan-Asianism and nationalism emerged as two major modern ideologies in Korea when Korea began to face Western challenges. “Both shared a sense of crisis and urgency in creating a new identity that could offer a conceptual framework for defending and strengthening Korea in its increasingly precarious situation… Ultimately, nation triumphed over region as a defining source of Korean identity. Yet this outcome was not inevitable or predetermined. Indeed, its triumph was historically contingent: it was Japan’s colonization that stripped legitimacy of pan-Asianism as a course of a new Korea.” (Shin: 39-40)

In the early years, pan-Asianism in Japan contained an element of idealism (ibid.: 33). Korean pan-Asianists positioned themselves as part of the yellow race, rather than as a distinctive race within East Asia. Underscoring the shared cultural heritage, they called for regional solidarity and cooperation against the threat of Western white imperialism. Using a traditional metaphor, Korea, Japan, and China were depicted as
“lips and teeth” (sunch’i chi kuk 脣齒之國), indicating that, based on geographical proximity, “East Asian nations could survive the white onslaught only if the three acted together” (ibid.: 31). Among Western imperialist powers, Russia was regarded as the common threat to them. For instance, Yun Ch’iho, a progressive leader of the Independence Association (Tongnip Hyŏphoe), maintained that there was a “common bond among East Asians and called for their unity against the ‘arrogant’ white race, particularly the Russians” (ibid.: 32).

After Japan made Korea its protectorate, Korean advocates of pan-Asianism expressed a bitter sense of betrayal and anxiety having come face-to-face with Japanese imperialists. Editorials in Hwangsŏng Sinmun, an early supporter of pan-Asianism, “charged that Japan would protect and promote only its own interests without regard to its neighboring nations and thus would cooperate only to ensure its own national interests. In their view, Japan was an uncertain partner with the West and could be so in the East as well” (ibid.: 34). They contended that “the treaty not only jeopardized the security of Korea but also put the whole East Asian region into peril by creating division and tension among neighbor nations” (ibid.: 35).

4.4.3 Summary: limitations of pan-Asianism – the perspective of kokugo

With the annexation of Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910, Japan emerged as a colonial power in the East, and its concepts of pan-Asianism were remodeled into

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101 Similar expressions (“lips and teeth” relationship, etc.) repeatedly appear in the prefaces of Korean language manuals published around the turn of the century, in order to call for unity based on a shared cultural heritage and geographical proximity, together with “same script, same race (dōbun dōshu)” logic. One language manual author even suggested researching the relationship between Japanese and other languages as far afield as Hebrew in order to seek the basis for a greater alliance in the future (Chōsen gogaku hitori annai; Preface No.2).
ideologies of colonial racism. The discourse directed at the locals was no longer about an equal alliance against the West, but about an alliance with the Japanese as an “enlightened leader” burdened with a “civilizing mission.” Japan was thus to become the center of “civilization” and the Japanese language was to become its medium. As part of this trend, the Japanese domestic educational system was extended to the new territories overseas with minor modifications. Primary importance was placed on teaching Japanese – or kokugo (the “national language”).

One intriguing feature of the Korean language manuals written for the Japanese is that in the prefatory matter many Japanese authors pushed for the idea of East Asian unity based on the shared cultural heritage as in dōbun dōshu, whereas in the contents of the manuals, they rather emphasized the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese culture and race as well as its leadership in East Asia.
5. Conclusions

In order to examine colonialist discourse in Japanese linguistics in the period from 1868 to 1945, this thesis is divided into two parts: an examination of Japanese language education both in Japan itself and in Japanese colonies, and a study of language manuals for Japanese.

What is special about the Japanese colonial enterprise vis-à-vis other colonial powers is that the formation of the nation-state ideology and imperial expansion took place practically simultaneously, and that language was a key tool in both projects. Japan launched its colonial enterprise without first conducting domestic standardization of the Japanese language, which often resulted in discursive violence in the form of inconsistent assimilation policies. Although *kokugo* language proficiency was used as the scale to measure colonial subjects’ degree of “civilization” as well as their loyalty to the Japanese nation, the colonized people in the overseas colonies and military occupied areas in Asia, as well as Ryūkyūans and Ainus who spoke Japanese “dialects,” could never blend into the closed concept of *kokugo* ideology because the “Japanese spirit” was only conveyed through *kokugo* – the nation’s “blood.” Thus, any modification to this national language was considered a breach of the national polity (*kokutai*), which made it extremely difficult to carry out language reforms and policies. The concept of *kokugo* was so over-politicized as to preclude the possibility of any academic reforms or structural refinements in tandem with its political expansion overseas.

I have also examined the theoretical frameworks prevalent in language policies, through an analysis of the contents and prefaces of language manuals. First I introduced the *four-pattern theory* of national thinking presented by Erica Benner (2006) and
examine how the military conscription system functioned in Japan’s nation building. Pan-Asianism was one of the favorite rhetoric devices and pet theory of the language manual authors. The problem with analyzing the historical phenomenon of pan-Asianism is that many of its protagonists were Japanese, who often asserted Japanese leadership in a pan-Asian regional order – a trend related to Japanese colonialism. As a result, ideals such as Asian solidarity and equality favored by early pan-Asianists were soon pushed into the background.

The language manuals for Japanese soldiers that I examined were published between 1882 and 1935. As the publication years grow more recent, we see in the prefaces and manual contents, shifts in the forms of nationalism and pan-Asianist rhetoric occurring in tandem with the rise of colonialist discourse. Although my primary interest is in Korea, these wartime language manuals frequently cover not only Japanese and Korean, but also other languages including English, Mandarin, and Russian, thus instantiating a multilayered discourse on the target languages as well as on the Japanese language itself. The various examples cited from the language manuals produced for the Japanese from the period exemplify the complexities of discourse formations in nation-building and colonialism.

All the previous scholarship on the soldier manuals in Japan relies on historiography rather than on nationalist discourse analysis and is therefore somewhat too arbitrary and premeditated when one deals with the particularities of language-related discourse in Japan in the periods dealt with here. Still, much remains to be done. In my later work I plan to address in greater detail the issue of the formation of the national language in Japan, and how this impacted Korean linguistics by looking more closely at
the Korean sentence structures provided in the manuals. An even larger project is possible if one is to incorporate the analysis of Chinese and Russian equivalents of the sentences analyzed in this thesis. These tasks remain for the future.
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