ACCESS TO POWER: HEGEMONIC PARTY RULE IN SINGAPORE AND TAIWAN

by

Netina Clara Tan

M.A., The University of Regina, 2004
M.A., The National University of Singapore, 2000
B.A., The National University of Singapore, 1992

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

The Faculty Of Graduate Studies

(Political Science)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
(Vancouver)

December 2010

© Netina Clara Tan, 2010
ABSTRACT

My dissertation investigates the sources of hegemonic party resilience. I ask why do some hegemonic party regimes persist, while others concede to multipartism? Building on party politics and electoral authoritarianism literature, I develop a mid-range theory based on the concepts of strategic coordination and institutionalization to explain why elites unite and oppositions fail to pose a credible threat. To demonstrate the utility of my explanation, I compare two similar hegemonic parties of different outcomes: the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore and the Kuomintang Party (KMT) in Taiwan.

I posit three factors to account for hegemonic party resilience. First, I contend that a hegemonic party that is adept in strategic coordination – by providing public goods and withdrawing political, civil liberties and media freedom – is more likely to win mass support and deter opposition coordination. Both the PAP and early KMT were high performing, strategic regimes that enjoyed growth and forestalled democratization. While the PAP remained the ruling party in Singapore, the KMT controlled the pace of liberalization during its long decade of transition, losing power after a party split. Second, I argue that the PAP is better than the KMT in keeping the ruling elites united because of its institutionalized leadership succession system. I develop a model to explain how a centralized, oligarchic and exclusionary leadership selection method fosters elite unity. My findings based on elite interviews, party publications and survey data support the counter-intuitive theory that the more intra-party democracy, the less party cohesion.

Finally, in hegemonic party regimes, survival means increasing the certainty of winning. Through electoral engineering, the incumbent is able to institutionalize an uneven playing field that systematically disadvantages the opposition. By analyzing the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral reforms, I offer new empirical evidence to show how the PAP “manufactured” its legislative supermajority to rescue its declining popular votes. The contrasting study of the KMT highlights how a former hegemonic party transforms and adapts as a dominant party to survive the uncertainty of elections.
PREFACE

The UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board (BREB) approved the elite interviews involving human subjects conducted for my dissertation. The Certificate of Approval, Ethics Certificate Number (H06-03753) to conduct research in Singapore and Taiwan is enclosed in Appendix Q: UBC BREB Certificate of Approval.

Parts of Chapter 3 and 6 will appear as a book chapter entitled “Institutionalized Hegemonic Party Rule in Singapore” for *Party and Party System Institutionalization in Asia*, edited by Allen Hicken and Erik Kuhonta, supported by the Institute for the Study of International Development, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Singapore’s Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan and the Department of Political Science at McGill University.

Parts of Chapter 7 will be revised as a book chapter entitled “Hegemonic Party Stability and Opposition Party Failure In Singapore” in *Party Stability and Party Performance in Southeast Asia* edited by Wolfgang Sachsenroeder, funded by Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ ii
Preface ........................................................................................................................................ iii
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... vii
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. ix
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... x
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... xii
Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... xiv

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 15
   Implications ............................................................................................................................... 18
   Case Selection ......................................................................................................................... 21
   Plan of the Dissertation .......................................................................................................... 23

2 Strategic Coordination, Institutionalization and Electoral Engineering .............................. 25
   A Typology of Single-Party Regimes ...................................................................................... 25
   Theories of Authoritarian Durability ...................................................................................... 29
   Problems and Gaps .................................................................................................................. 32
   Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................... 35

Part I: Origins, Organization and Coordination ........................................................................ 52

3 The PAP: Organization Transformation and Strategic Coordination ................................ 53
   Origins of the PAP .................................................................................................................... 55
   Organizational Changes in 1958 ............................................................................................ 63
   Party Adaptation After 1963 .................................................................................................. 65
   Strategic Coordination: Dismantling Cleavages .................................................................. 67

4 The KMT: Organizational Adaptation and Coordination Dilemmas .................................. 82
   Origins of the KMT .................................................................................................................. 83
   Party Membership, Taiwanization and Co-optation ............................................................. 97
   Implications of Taiwanization ............................................................................................... 102
   Coordination Dilemmas ......................................................................................................... 105
   Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 111
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part II: Leadership selection and party cohesion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The PAP: Institutionalized Charisma and Party Cohesion</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Westminster Parliamentary System and Party Cohesion</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rules of the Game in Singapore</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutionalization, Leadership Selection and Party Cohesion</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key Features of the PAP’s Candidate Selection</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implications and Potential Problems</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part III: Elections, electoral engineering and party system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The KMT: Un-Institutionalized Charisma and Factionalism</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection of Chiang Ching-kuo as Party Chairman and President</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intra-Party Democratization</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rules of the Game in Taiwan</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implications for Party Cohesion</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Re-Centralizing Leadership Selection</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Singapore: Electoral Engineering and Institutionalizing Certainty</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role of Elections in Hegemonic Party Regimes</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Why Elections in Singapore?</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral Engineering in Singapore</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanical and Psychological Effects</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutionalized Hegemonic Party System in Singapore</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Taiwan: Elections, Electoral Reforms and Institutionalizing Uncertainty</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Why Local Elections?</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When Do Elections Matter?</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination Dilemmas and De-Institutionalization</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Origins of Electoral Reforms and Institutionalizing Uncertainty</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-2005 Electoral Reforms</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral Reforms and Unintended Consequences</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implications</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gaps and Lessons Learnt</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td></td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td></td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A: List of Interviewees and Archival Sites in Singapore And Taiwan .............. 273
Appendix B: BTI Democracy Status and Key Indicators of Singapore and Taiwan, 2010 .. 275
Appendix C: Organization Structure of the PAP, 1958 and present ......................... 276
Appendix D: Significant Events During the PAP’s early rule, 1960s ......................... 277
Appendix E: Party Organization Structures of the KMT, 1952 and present ................. 278
Appendix F: Ethnic Breakdown of the KMT Membership (1952-2005) .................. 279
Appendix G: World Bank Governance Indicators for Singapore & Taiwan (1998-2008) ... 280
Appendix H: List of Registered Political Parties in Singapore ............................. 281
Appendix J: TI Corruption Index for Taiwan and Singapore (1995-2009) ............... 283
Appendix K: Old and New Electoral Systems in Taiwan ................................. 284
Appendix L: Electoral Systems of Singapore and Taiwan ............................... 285
Appendix M: List of Active Parties in Singapore .......................................... 286
Appendix N: Voter Turnout in Singapore (1968-2001) ..................................... 287
Appendix O: Taiwan's Constitutional Reforms in the 1990s ............................... 288
Appendix P: Comparative Freedom House Scores of Singapore and Taiwan (1973-2009) 289
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1-1: Dissertation Structure Based on Three-Level Analytical Framework ...................... 21
Table 2-1: A Typology of Single-Party Regimes ........................................................................ 29
Table 3-1: Singapore’s Population by Ethnicity, 1957 .............................................................. 59
Table 3-2: PAP Membership Size and Residential Population in Singapore (1958-2006) ....... 60
Table 3-3: Trade Unions, Disputes and Strikes in Singapore, 1960s-70s ................................. 66
Table 3-4: Ethnic Composition and Education of the PAP Members, the 1960s .................... 67
Table 3-5: List of Para-Political Institutions under the PA in Singapore ................................. 70
Table 3-6: Number of Para-Political Organizations Under the PA (1996-6) ........................... 71
Table 4-1: Evolution of the KMT Regime (1945-2000) ............................................................ 85
Table 4-2: Ethnic Composition of Total Population in Taiwan (1952-64) ............................... 87
Table 4-3: Taiwanese-Mainlanders Composition in the Military, 1950-1987 ........................... 88
Table 4-4: Rural-Urban Geographical Distribution in Taiwan (1952-64) .............................. 89
Table 4-5: KMT Party Branches and Cells (1952 and 2010) .................................................... 94
Table 4-6: Growth of KMT Service Stations (1951-2) ............................................................. 95
Table 4-7: Demographic Trends of the KMT Recruitment (1952-1997) ................................. 99
Table 4-8: Ethnic Composition of Executive Yuan (1950-95) ................................................ 101
Table 4-9: Ethnic Composition of CSC and CC (1952-1994) ................................................. 101
Table 4-10: Timeline of Significant Events Under the KMT (1960s-80s) ............................. 107
Table 4-11: Indicators of Taiwan's Economic Growth (1953-87) ........................................... 108
Table 4-12: Public Protests in Taiwan (1983-1988) ................................................................. 108
Table 4-13: Press Censorship in Taiwan (1980-1986) ............................................................. 109
Table 4-14: Major Reforms Initiated During Last Years of Chiang Ching-kuo's rule ......... 110
Table 4-15: Breakdown of KMT Party Membership, Recruits and Staff (1952-present) .... 111
Table 5-1: Voting Behavior in Singapore Parliament (2007-9) .............................................. 116
Table 5-2: Deposit Amount for Legislative Candidates in Singapore .................................... 120
Table 5-3: Occupational Background of MPs (1963-2006) ...................................................... 121
Table 5-4: Comparative Salaries of MPs and Ministers, 2006 .................................................. 123
Table 5-5: List of PMs in Singapore ......................................................................................... 129
Table 5-6: Rate of Turnover in Parliament (1980-2006) ....................................................... 131
Table 5-7: Occupational Profiles of Cabinet Ministers (2001-9) ........................................... 134
Table 5-8: Female Representation in Singapore Parliament (1980-2006) ............................. 137
Table 5-9: PAP Membership and Total Singapore Population ............................................. 140
Table 6-1: Violation of Party Discipline (1952-1995) ............................................................. 149
Table 6-2: Selection Methods for the CC and CSC (1952-2005) ........................................ 154
Table 6-3: Social Composition of the CSC and CC (1952-1994) ........................................ 155
Table 6-4: Occupation Background of KMT’s CSC (1950-1992) .......................................... 156
Table 6-5: Female Representation in Legislative Yuan (1995-2008) .................................... 157
Table 6-6: Education Qualifications of the CSC ................................................................. 158
Table 6-7: Candidacy Requirements for Legislative Elections for Taiwan and Singapore .......... 159
Table 6-8: Legislative Yuan Elections (1969-2001) ............................................................. 160
Table 6-9: Breakdown of Candidates and Elected Officials for LE (1989-2001) ....................... 161
Table 6-10: Total Spending of Parties on Advertisements in LE and PE ................................. 165
Table 6-11: Comparative Electoral Campaigning Laws for Taiwan and Singapore ................. 166
Table 6-12: KMT’s Presidential Nomination Methods (1996-2008) ...................................... 170
Table 6-13: Direct Presidential Candidates and Results (1996-2008) .................................... 173
Table 6-14: Party Splits in the KMT ..................................................................................... 175
Table 6-15: Selection Methods of Party Chairman (1949-present) ......................................... 178
Table 7-1: Key Electoral Changes in Singapore ...................................................................... 180
Table 7-2: Effective Number of Parties Based on Vote and Seat Shares in Singapore ............. 200
Table 7-3: Electoral Disproportionality Based on Vote and Seat Shares (1968-2006) .......... 202
Table 7-4: Number of Contesting Candidates and Parties (1968-2006) .............................. 204
Table 7-5: Credibility of Political Parties in Singapore, 2006 ............................................... 211
Table 8-1: Breakdown of Vote and Seat Shares of Local Elections (1965-1993) ....................... 221
Table 8-2: Vote and Seat Shares in National Assembly and Legislative Yuan ....................... 231
Table 8-3: Effective Number of Parties Based on Vote and Seat shares ................................. 232
Table 8-4: Electoral Disproportionality of LEs (1986-2008) ............................................... 233
Table 8-5: Characteristics of Political Parties in Taiwan ...................................................... 237
Table 8-6: Level of Political Trust in Taiwan and Singapore, 2006 ........................................ 241
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1: Strategic Coordination of Hegemonic Party Regimes (HPRs) .................................. 37
Figure 2-2: Candidacy, Selectorate and Selection Method ......................................................... 44
Figure 2-3: Model of Leadership Succession and Institutionalization ...................................... 45
Figure 4-1: Ethnic Breakdown of the KMT Membership ......................................................... 100
Figure 5-1: The PAP’s Model of Leadership Succession and Party Cohesion ......................... 126
Figure 6-1: The KMT’s Model of Leadership Succession and Party Cohesion ....................... 146
Figure 6-2: The KMT's Seat and Vote Shares in the Legislative Yuan (1969-2008) ............. 166
Figure 7-2: Minority MPs in Parliament .................................................................................... 194
Figure 7-3: Uncontested Seats in Singapore (1968-2006) ...................................................... 206
Figure 7-4: Electoral Volatility of Singapore GEs (1968-2006) ............................................. 210
Figure 8-2: Electoral Volatility Based on LEs and PEs in Taiwan ........................................ 236
Figure 8-3: Breakdown of Candidates and Independents in LEs (1989-2008) ................. 240
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Angkatan Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Alliance Party Singapura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Barisan Socialis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Bertelsmann Transformation Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCs</td>
<td>Citizens' Consultative Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMCs</td>
<td>Community Club Management Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCs</td>
<td>Community Centre/Clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDAC</td>
<td>Chinese Development Assistance Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCs</td>
<td>Community Development Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRA</td>
<td>Chinese Democratic Reformers Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Central Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Consumer price index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Central Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYC</td>
<td>China Youth Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAB</td>
<td>East Asian Barometer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIP</td>
<td>Ethnic Integrated Housing Policy (EIP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First past the post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>General Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPWD</td>
<td>General Political Warfare Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Group Representative Constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDB</td>
<td>Housing Development Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISD</td>
<td>Internal Security Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang Party (Nationalist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakas NUCD</td>
<td>National Union of Christian Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>Malayan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Minister Mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Multi-member district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Miscellaneous Offences Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRHA</td>
<td>Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCMPs</td>
<td>Non-Constituency Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCs</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMP</td>
<td>Nominated Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>New KMT Alliance/Chinese New Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>National Party of Singapore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NSP National Solidarity Party
PA People’s Association
PAP People’s Action Party
PAYM People’s Association Youth Movement
PCF PAP Community Foundation
PE Presidential Election
PEA Parliamentary Elections Act
PEMA Public Entertainments Meeting Act
PF The People’s Front
PFP Peoples First Party
PKMS Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura
PLDP People’s Liberal Democratic Party
PM Prime Minister
PP Progressive Party
PPF PAP Policy Forum
PR Partai Rakyat
PR Proportionate Representation
PRI Institutional Revolutionary Party
PRP People’s Republican Party
PSC Public Service Commission
RCs Residents’ Committees
RP Reform Party
RSAF Republic of Singapore Air Force
SAF Singapore Armed Forces
SCC Secretariat of the Central Committee
SCMSSU Chinese Middle School Students Union
SCP Singapore Chinese Party
SCS Singapore Civil Service
SDA Singapore Democratic Alliance
SDP Singapore Democratic Party
SIDA Singapore Indian Development Agency
SJP Singapore Justice Party
SM Senior Minister
SMC Single member constituency
SMD Single member district
SMP Single member plurality
SNF Singapore National Front
SNTV Single Non-Transferable vote
SPF Singapore Police Force
SPP Singapore People’s Party
TSU Taiwan Solidarity Union
UDP Parti Kesatuan Ra’ayat/United Democratic Party
UNF United National Front
UPF United People’s Front
UPP United People’s Party
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WP The Workers’ Party
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people to thank for the completion of this dissertation. First and foremost, I want to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Max Cameron, who has stood by me from my first year of doctoral studies and offered me valuable advice and support throughout various “critical junctures”. Perhaps unbeknown to him, the advice that he gave has had enormous “path-dependent” effects. His positive feedback, encouragement, confidence and belief in my work have helped me stay on task, push myself and achieve beyond my expectations. I am also very fortunate and perhaps at the envy of my colleagues to have Yves Tiberghien and Ben Nyblade as my committee members. Yves is a mentor and a model teacher who has taught me the rules of the game and “nuts and bolts” of survival in the academic world. I am forever grateful to the encouraging emails that he has written to lift my spirits and many words of wisdom to navigate through difficult times. Ben has offered me the best and the most intellectually stimulating conversations on my research. His bountiful energy and insightful comments have always challenged me to think more comparatively, strategically and broadly. I cannot ask for a more supportive committee.

Besides my committee, I have also benefitted immensely from the close mentoring of Paul Evans – who has been there from the beginning to offer support, encouragement and help to broaden my network of academic connections in Vancouver and beyond. I also want to thank Ken Foster, who “adopted” me after my comps and went through countless drafts of my prospectus. This dissertation has also drawn from many sources, conversations over meals and advice of scholars with similar research interests and expertise. Specifically, I am grateful to Angela O’Mahony, Diane Mauzy, Brian Job, Chris Kam, Mark Warren, Katia Coleman, Alison Bailey, Timothy Cheek and Michael Leaf who have taken time to talk to me about my work and ensure that I stay on course.

At UBC, I have been blessed with many intelligent, fun and loyal friends who have helped me keep my head above water. I am especially thankful for the companionship and many dinner meals with Hyunji Lee, David Seekings, Erin Williams, Nathan Allen and Kate Hecht. Outside of UBC, I am grateful to have had the opportunity to work and engage with Joseph Wong, Allen Hicken, Erik Kuhonta, Cheng Tun-jen, Craig Townsend and Wolfgang Sachsenroeder - outstanding scholars on East and Southeast Asia - on book projects that I look forward to seeing them in fruition soon.

My dissertation would not have been possible without financial support from many sources. Firstly, I want to thank the Faculty of Graduate Studies of UBC for four years of Ph.D Tuition Award and travel awards from both FOGS and Political Science Department that allowed me to present my work in conferences.

Secondly, I am also very grateful to the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for a Dissertation Fellowship that supported my 11 months of fieldwork in Taiwan, 2007. My interviews and data collection would not have been as successful without the help, warm hospitality and camaraderie of Kiel Downey, Bo Tedards, Russell, Mei Chen, Amy, Weichi, Grace, Angel and Lydia Tsai of the TFD. Additionally, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Robert Chu Wen-Ching for his friendship and help in setting up interviews;
inviting me to KMT events and taking time to explain the internal KMT party politics to me over many lunches. I am glad to have connected with Kharis Templeman, who has taught me much about the mechanisms of electoral politics from the “dark green side”.

In Taiwan, I am grateful to all the following interviewees and people who have taken time to speak to me on the KMT: Chang Yu-Tzung; Chen Peng-Jen; Cheng Tun-Jen; Cheng Su-Feng; Chu Yun-han; Michael Hsiao Hsin-Huang; Huang Min-Hua; Huang Su-Feng; Ho, Szu-Yin; David Hamilton; Ron MacIntosh; Shaui Hua-Min; Shelley Rigger; Shih Cheng-feng, Wang Fu-Chang; Wu Nai-tek; Lin Jih-Wen; Shao Ming-Huang; Yu Ching-Hsing and Xu Xin-Sheng. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the help of Marina Hu Hai-Ming, an exceptional librarian at the Kuomintang Archives Library for hunting down historical documents and recommending reading materials at crucial times.

I am indebted to my adopted Taiwanese family, Jenny Hsia and Alan Tan who have looked after me during my stay and socialized me to live like a local in Taipei. We have spent endless hours debating thorny issues till late in the night. Without them, my time in Taiwan would not have been as colourful, meaningful and enjoyable.

Third, I want to acknowledge the support of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University for hosting me as a Visiting Research Associate during my 3 months of fieldwork in Singapore. I want to thank Amitav Archarya, Mely Anthony, Ralf Emmers, Harish, Luanne, Sue Chia and Sofiah for making me feel welcome and providing an excellent office support. For Singapore’s interviews, I am indebted to the following people who have enriched me with their views on the PAP government: Alex Au, Chee Siok Chin, Chee Soon Juan, Chua Beng Huat, Russell Heng, Lee Koon Choy, Catherine Lim, Sylvia Lim, Michael Palmer, Garry Rodan, Kenneth Paul Tan, Simon Tay, Perry Tong and Benjamin Wong.

And for completing my dissertation, I want to acknowledge the financial support of the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office for awarding me a Graduate Fellowship in Taiwan Studies, which freed me from teaching and allowed me to focus on writing.

Last but not least, my family - Richard, Elizabeth, Victoria and Alexander - who have been through so much to support my seemingly endless years of grad school and put up with moving around the world. I would not have completed this dissertation without their patience, love and selflessness. My three wonderful children have learnt to survive with long periods of their mom’s absence and always brought home outstanding report cards that would make any parent proud. Their maturity, independence and many achievements have kept me going. I thank them for making me a stronger and better person.

And to Rich, my pillar of strength, who has been my most faithful, dutiful and loyal supporter. I thank you for keeping me grounded, positive and happy.
To Rich, Lisa, Vicky and Alex
1 Introduction

Following decades of democratization since the Third Wave, the spread of democracy has come to a halt (Freedom House 2009). Scholars observe that the decline of freedom in Asia and the rise of China and Russia are pointing to a growing “pushback” against democracy (Puddington 2007; Kagan 2007). With the recurrence of coups in Thailand and Fiji, suppression of protests in Burma, Pakistan and Malaysia, parts of Asia are showing signs of authoritarian reversion. In an era of liberal democracy, why are some authoritarian regimes stubbornly persistent while others breakdown?

Current studies show that authoritarian regimes ruled by a single party are more durable than military or personalistic ones (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007). In particular, electoral authoritarian or hegemonic party regimes that combine democratic and authoritarian traits to govern are especially persistent. Indeed, since 1987, this single-party subtype has grown in strength and numbers and has become a modal authoritarian regime type (Roessler and Howard 2009, 103).

My dissertation investigates the sources of hegemonic party resilience by comparing two exceptionally resilient hegemonic party regimes in East Asia, namely Singapore under the PAP (1959-present) and Taiwan under the KMT (1949-2000). The PAP has ruled Singapore since 1959 and remains in power today. On the other hand, the KMT, once the wealthiest party in the world, lost ruling power after 5 decades of rule. What explains their divergent political trajectories? What can be learnt from their successes and failures?

Scholars have warned that apart from exogenous shocks that undermine the resilience of all authoritarian regimes, internal splits and leadership succession are the most likely

---

1 According to FH, 2008 was a setback for global freedom as the countries considered “Free” has stagnated for a decade. In 2008, the EIU found 51 autocracies and 36 hybrid regimes out of 167 countries.

2 Geddes found single-party regimes to have an average life span of 34 years, 16 years longer than personalist and 24 years more military regimes (2003, 79).

3 Following Sartori, a hegemonic party regime is defined as a polity where a party dominates policy, controls access to political office, even though other parties may exist and compete for power. It refers to a semi-competitive party system where a hegemonic party exercises tight control over the players; rules of the game in the electoral arena and leaves little room for opposition and contestation (1976, 230).

4 Schedler classifies electoral authoritarianism as regimes that hold multi-party elections to select the chief executive as well as a legislative assembly and earn average FH ratings between 4 and 6. In 2001, he identified 58 electoral autocracies; 32 electoral democracies and 25 closed autocracies (2002, 47).
causes of authoritarian breakdown. To explain why hegemonic party regimes, such as Singapore’s PAP, are successful in staying cohesive and winning elections, I ask the following: what builds party cohesion? And if hegemonic party regimes hold elections, when do these elections matter and bring about democratizing outcomes?

To answer these questions, I move away from large-scale theories of regime change and focus on investigating the sources of hegemonic party resilience. Drawing from electoral authoritarianism and party politics literature, I develop a mid-range theory to explain what behavioural incentives keep elites united, maintain mass support and deter opposition challenge, and how they do so. Using the concepts of strategic coordination and institutionalization, I posit three explanatory factors. First, I argue that a hegemonic party regime with an institutionalized incentive distribution system that ensures the long-term security of its ruling elites is more likely to stay cohesive. My dissertation offers a leadership succession theory to explain how a centralized, oligarchic and exclusionary leadership selection model fosters elite unity; a decentralized, democratic and inclusionary model leads to disunity. Second, I contend that a successful hegemonic party that is adept in strategic coordination – by providing public goods and withdrawing political and civil liberties and media freedom – is more likely to win mass support and deter opposition coordination. Finally, when faced with declining vote shares, I show how a hegemonic party can turn to electoral engineering to institutionalize a semi-competitive party system to “manufacture” its legislative supermajority and systematically repress the opposition.

I demonstrate the utility of my explanation through a “structured and focused” comparative study of Singapore’s PAP and Taiwan’s KMT over the last 4 decades (George and Bennett 2004, 67). Through careful process tracing, I examine how a selected aspect of

---

6 This dissertation builds on the emerging scholarship on electoral authoritarianism to examine the hybrid nature of single-party regimes (Schedler 2003; Levitsky and Way Lindberg 2009; Carothers 2002).
7 The method is “structured” as I pose the same questions for each case and these questions guide my data collection. It is “focused” as I only address a particular aspect of the two cases.
8 Process-tracing refers to the method of within-case analysis to evaluate causal processes. It investigates the decision-making processes by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes (George and McKeown 1985; Falleti 2006).
institutional structure in the two cases, drives change (or not) and investigate how the choices made at critical junctures affect the final regime outcome.

Based on qualitative analysis, in-depth elite interviews, and electoral and public opinion data, I study the strategies hegemonic parties use to stay in power and the conditions under which they give it up. My evidence is drawn from 60 elite interviews with party members, politicians, subject experts and archival sources collated over 12 months of fieldwork in Singapore and Taiwan during 2007-8. See Appendix A for the list of interviewees and archival sites in Singapore and Taiwan.

Key Arguments

In an age of democracy, the resilience of hegemonic party regimes depends more on institutions than coercion, charisma or ideological commitment. Unlike a military or personalistic authoritarian regime, a successful hegemonic party regime is characterized by its selective use of coercion9 and relies on the party as the key organizational tool to co-opt dissidents and mobilize mass support through semi-competitive elections. In this dissertation, I argue that a modern, successful hegemonic party is one that is effective in its strategic coordination – responsive in public good provision to earn mass support and selective in the withdrawal of coordination mechanisms to prevent the opposition from becoming a credible threat. When basic public goods such as healthcare, primary education, housing, national security and basic infrastructure are provided to a large proportion of its population, the hegemonic party is likely to be viewed as competent and legitimate.10 However, the withdrawal of coordination mechanisms such as freedom of speech, assembly and media freedom prevent the opposition parties from coordination and mobilization.

Leadership succession is one of the gravest threats to hegemonic party stability. I argue that a key strategy for the hegemonic party to counter this threat is to “institutionalize charisma”, that is, to ensure that the charismatic leadership that pulls the party together is replaced by an institutionalized incentive structure that is centralized, autonomous and

---

9 In hegemonic party regimes, force is usually not manifested, as it is rarely necessary to maintain the capitalist organization of society (Przeworski 1986, 137). Calibrated coercion works better than brute force as the latter damages international image.

10 Legitimacy is defined as “the belief in the rightness of a state…so that commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest [but] because subjects believe that they ought to be obey” (Barker 1990, 11).
routinized. Based on candidate selection literature, I develop a leadership selection model to explain how the PAP’s elitist and oligarchic leadership selection system asserts centripetal forces to encourage the party elites to rally around party goals, display loyalty and step down without protest. In comparison, I show how the KMT’s leadership selection model of “un-institutionalized charisma” during Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule (1975-1988) was unstable as the lack of routine, procedures and criteria opened up space for speculations, factionalism and party splits after the strongman’s passing.

Unlike single-party states, hegemonic party regimes permit multi-party elections and claim political legitimacy through elections. In electoral democracies, democratization involves institutionalizing uncertainty – subjecting all interests to uncertainty (Przeworski 1986, 58). But in hegemonic party regimes, regime consolidation involves institutionalizing certainty – to increase the incumbent’s certainty of winning. When faced with declining electoral support, a strategic hegemonic party will tend to fall back on electoral engineering as its last line of defence to ensure that it ultimately prevails.¹¹

Implications

My dissertation explains a number of theoretical and empirical puzzles in post-Third-Wave studies. These range from institutional sources of hegemonic party resilience to the importance of leadership selection and the failure of institutionalization to ensure democratization

First, my strategic coordination theory explains why high performing hegemonic party regimes are more resilient. Based on the comparative study of the PAP and the KMT, I show how hegemonic parties that invest in institutions and are strategic in their coordination of incentive distribution system that secures benefits to its ruling elites, supporters and voters are more stable and persistent. Both the PAP and KMT built a strong bureaucracy, powerful military, and a robust export-oriented economy. The mass legitimacy earned from providing public goods and selective restriction of civil and political liberties helped to insulate them

¹¹ Confronted with new electoral realities, former hegemonic party needs to adapt, accept “institutionalized uncertainty” and “learn to lose” (Cheng and Lin 2008; Wong and Friedman 2008). While for others, survival means turning to electoral engineering and institutional manipulation as its “last line of defence” to institutionalize the certainty of winning (Schedler 2010).
from the social pressures for democratization that modernization brings. While Singapore remained resistant to liberal democracy, Taiwan took more than a decade to fully democratize. Both cases show that high-performing authoritarian regimes are better in controlling the pace of political liberalization and shaping the institutional design of electoral arrangements to their benefits than low performing ones.

Second, my study on the origins of the PAP and the KMT lend support to the hypothesis that early formative years have an indelible impact on the party organization and chances of survival (Smith 2005; Huntington 1970). Likewise for the PAP and the KMT, their early electoral participation gave them a distinctive advantage. Both parties built mass-base organizations to grow a wide network of para-political institutions to penetrate into the grassroots levels to police public discourse. Both capitalized on their incumbency and drew on state resources to develop their organizational and mobilizational capacities.

My study also finds that early socio-economic structural pre-conditions are not deterministic. Contrary to Lipset and Rokkan’s thesis, the socio-ethnic cleavage structures in Singapore are not as immutable and did not “freeze” the party system (1967). Unlike the KMT, the PAP put in place a series of measures to dismantle and depoliticize socio-ethnic cleavages after coming to power. Through strategic coordination, the PAP prevented partisan alignment or mobilization based on ethnic or religious consciousness. On the other hand, the KMT exacerbated the sub-ethnic cleavage between the majority Taiwanese and minority Chinese from Mainland China. The KMT’s discriminatory policy that prevented Taiwanese from assuming key party and political positions reified the ethnic cleavage and provided the basis for its party system formation. The diametrically different approaches, which the PAP and the KMT took to address the socio-ethnic cleavages in their countries, are what I found to be one of the key factors that explained their divergent political trajectories.

Third, my theory of leadership selection explains how certain hegemonic party regimes avoid the perils of leadership succession. How the PAP stays united and renews itself through an institutionalized leadership selection system is significant as it could become a model for other authoritarian regimes such as China, Vietnam or Burma to emulate. Unlike the KMT, which suffered factionalism and party splits after the passing of its strongman, the PAP defied all odds by engineering two smooth national leadership
transitions. In Chapters 3 and 4, I show how the oligopolistic PAP with centralized and exclusive selection methods is more cohesive than the KMT that experimented with inclusive and democratic selection methods in early 1990s. The PAP leaders put in place many institutional incentives and constraints at the systemic and party organization levels to ensure elite loyalty and cohesion. Through a complex elite recruitment and candidate selection process based notionally on meritocracy, the PAP institutionalized a process by which the Party as an organization incorporated the founder’s values. If the KMT had institutionalized similar leadership selection process in the 1980s, then its political fate may be quite different today.

Fourth, current democratization and party politics literature often assumes that party system institutionalization leads to democratic consolidation. But in this dissertation I argue that the concept of institutionalization ought to be distinct from democratic consolidation. My study of the PAP shows that party and party system institutionalization can occur in electoral authoritarian regimes. In Chapter 7, I argue that institutional manipulation and electoral engineering helped to institutionalise a semi-competitive party system that systematically disadvantaged the opposition in Singapore. Faced with declining vote shares, the PAP “manufactured” its legislative supermajority through a series of electoral reforms that fundamentally altered inter-party competition and voting behavior. The notion that a hegemonic party regime may be institutionalized is significant as it highlights the teleological bias in transitology paradigm and demonstrates how hegemonic party regime may be more persistent despite regular elections.

Fifth, my study contributes to the emerging studies on electoral authoritarianism to show when elections might bring about democratization (Lindberg 2009). My theory of strategic coordination shows that when the coordination mechanisms (freedom of press and assembly) increase to level the playing field, more competitive elections are likely to bring

---

12 For example, Mainwaring and Scully have argued that an institutionalized party system is necessary for democratic consolidation (1995, 1). Likewise, Dix also assesses the prospects of democratic consolidation in Latin America based on the institutionalization of its party system (1992).

13 Besides Singapore, Brazil (1967-1969) and Chile (1980) also show that military regimes may be institutionalized as new constitutions were adopted and formal rules were established to regulate the power structure within the regime and government functions were assigned to the armed forces (Aguero 2000).
about democratizing outcomes, as in Taiwan during the late 1990s. If high-performing regimes such as Singapore are able to maintain mass support and selectively withdraw coordination mechanisms to prevent opposition mobilization then the opposition will remain small, inferior, and incapable of posing a credible threat. Under these conditions elections are unexpected to bring about party alternation.

Finally, my dissertation offers a three-level analytical framework to integrate agency and structure by showing how incentive structures shape behaviour at the party organization, party system and regime level. Building on existing theories, I identify the key processes and mechanisms that encourage elite unity, opposition party failures and mass support of the hegemonic party – conditions necessary for the survival of the hegemonic party. Unlike most studies that theorize on the individual level or too broadly at the regime level, my analytical framework highlights the incentive structures within party organization and the party system to show how they affect the calculations of key actors. My dissertation shows how disaggregating the broad processes may help us understand how the incentive structures shape the preferences and behaviour of actors. See Table 1-1 for a summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1-1: Dissertation Structure Based on Three-Level Analytical Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focal point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions between party elites; elites and members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case Selection

My case selection has strong methodological and theoretical rationale. Based on JS Mill’s method of difference, I have chosen to compare Singapore with Taiwan as they share many similarities but have different regime outcomes. For example, both regimes share
similar Sinic roots, Confucian ethos and formidable militaries. Ethnically, they have a large population of migrant Chinese from China such as Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi. Economically, the two capitalist, export-oriented economies were also leading Tigers in the region that grew under authoritarian rule. These similarities allow for some qualitative control over cultural, socio-economic and ethnic factors. However, Taiwan abandoned the yoke of authoritarianism in the 1980s; Singapore remains a hegemonic party regime. My focus on the varied incentive structures of the two regimes helps to explain why this is so.

Singapore and Taiwan represent the failure and success of the Third wave. Singapore is the world’s wealthiest non-oil producing country that is not a democracy. Its refusal to embrace competitive multipartyism defies democratization theories. Indeed, the story of how the PAP maintains elite cohesion and wins elections again and again after 5 decades is an exceptional one that deserves explanation. On the other hand the KMT was one of the wealthiest and most durable hegemonic parties in the world. After 51 years a combination of leadership struggles, rising middle-class consciousness and international pressures led to the regime’s electoral opening and lost of government power in 2000. The KMT’s adaptation from a hegemonic party to a dominant party provides an excellent counter-case to test my institutionalist theory of hegemonic party resilience.

Studies indicate that the trend of democratization is weak in Asia (Croissant 2002, 1; FH 2008). Yet, no studies have satisfactorily explained why this is so. One reason could be because Euro-centric party politics theories do not neatly apply to the developments in Asia (Blondel 2006). Based on the comparative study of Singapore and Taiwan, my dissertation hopes to offer more refined hypotheses and generalizable mid-range theories that can be further tested in a larger sample and explain the persistence of hegemonic parties in Asia and other regions in Latin America and Africa (see Lijphart 1975, 685).

Presently, no work has been done to compare the party organization and electoral strategies of the PAP and the KMT in a systematic way. My comparative study addresses this gap and contributes to the democratization literature by moving away from the single-
case study method, more commonly used in the study of democratization in Asia. The divergent political trajectories of Singapore and Taiwan hope to address the teleological bias in the transitology scholarship and help expose the selectivity problem in the “Asian values” cultural thesis.

**Plan of the Dissertation**

My dissertation contains 9 chapters and the research chapters are divided into 3 parts. I begin with an Introduction and Theoretical Chapter that lay out the key questions, gaps in the literature, rationale behind the case selection and offers a three-level theoretical framework on strategic coordination to explain hegemonic party resilience.

In Part I, I trace the sources of institutionalization by examining how party origins and organizational models of the PAP and the KMT affect strategic coordination of the party elites. In Chapters 3 and 4, I show how socio-ethnic cleavages affect party system formation in Taiwan, but not in Singapore. The empirical evidence is drawn from party publications, archival data and elite-interviews.

In Part II, I consider the effects of intra-party mechanisms and processes and compare how different leadership selection models in the PAP and the KMT affect party cohesion. In Chapters 5 and 6, I examine how elite recruitment and candidate selection methods for top party and political positions become tools for distributing patronage, settling disputes and reinforcing elite unity; and the conditions under which these processes fail to bind behaviour, leading to elite defections and party splits. Empirical data on factionalism, party defections and party discipline will be used to support my analysis.

In Part III, I examine the role of elections and electoral institutions on party system formation in Singapore and Taiwan. I study the conditions under which the electoral institutions are manipulated or de-institutionalized, bringing about unintended regime outcomes. In Chapter 7, I demonstrate how the PAP institutionalized an uneven playing field and “manufactured” its legislative supermajority despite its declining vote shares. In Chapter 8, I examine the role of local elections and study how recent electoral reforms concentrate the party system and reward the larger parties in Taiwan. Measures of electoral proportionality, volatility, fragmentation and electoral legitimacy are used to assess the mechanical and
psychological effects on parties and voters. I end by comparing the degree of party system institutionalization in Singapore and Taiwan and prospects for regime consolidation. In the concluding chapter I summarise the key findings of the dissertation and review the lessons learnt from Taiwan’s evolutionary party system change and implications for Singapore’s prospects for more competitive, multi-party system.
2 Strategic Coordination, Institutionalization and Electoral Engineering

Apart from exogenous shocks that destabilize all authoritarian regimes, internal splits and leadership succession are the two biggest threats to hegemonic party stability (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Huntington 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). To explain how some hegemonic parties are better equipped to avoid these threats, this chapter introduces a three-level theoretical framework to show how strategic coordination and institutionalization of leadership selection maintain elite unity and mass support. As hegemonic parties claim their legitimacy to rule through elections, my explanatory framework considers the conditions under which institutional manipulation might disadvantage the opposition and increase the incumbent’s chances of winning.

This chapter begins by introducing a typology of single-party regimes that allows us to study how hegemonic parties evolve from one sub-type to another. Then, I review existing theories and problems of authoritarian durability before presenting my theoretical framework that will be used to explain the subsequent chapters on Singapore and Taiwan.

A Typology of Single-Party Regimes

Single-party regimes vary in party competitiveness and electoral certainty. Here, I propose a typology that includes 3 sub-types of varied competitiveness and pluralism: 1) dominant party, 2) hegemonic party and 3) one-party state. The point of this tripartite typology is to merge competitive and non-competitive regimes into one framework. The focus is on the regime¹ rather than the party system because the ‘one-party system’ is a misnomer (Sartori 1976, 44). It is important to distinguish the different single-party sub-types as varied electoral competitiveness could lead to different liberalizing outcomes (Howard and Roessler 2006; Norris 2009). My typology, designed based on the following 4 dimensions: 1) political participation; 2) contestation; 3) legislature dominance and 4) party alternation would allow us to compare the various single-party regime sub-types in a meaningful way.

¹ My analysis is on the regime-level so to highlight a system of governance that determines the methods of access to the political offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the rules of the game for access (Schmitter and Karl 1996, 50; Munck 1996, 6).
Regimes are not static. They adapt and evolve. My typology allows us to assess the transformation or adaptation from one sub-type to another.²

Political participation refers to the right to vote. This dimension refers to: fairness of the electoral process, access of parties to public funding and the extent of suffrage - the proportion of the population and entitlement to participate in the contestation for government office (Dahl 1971; Munck 2002). The way the regime impinges on the procedures affect the opposition’s access to public offices. In a dominant party regime, voters enjoy universal suffrage and the opposition candidates can participate freely in elections. In a hegemonic party regime, voters enjoy universal suffrage but the opposition candidates face formal, legal barriers to entry such as the lack of independent electoral commission or legal restrictions. On the other hand, in a one party state, opposition parties are banned or excluded.

The second dimension, contestation, refers to the degree to which the regime permits opposition. This includes the right to compete, the freedom to form parties, freedom of the press and access to alternative information (Dahl 1971; Munck 2002). Electoral rules matter and may be categorized into three types: autocratic, cartel and egalitarian (Norris 2009, 152-3). While autocratic regulations are those that are explicitly skewed towards the ruling party and restrict the opposition to prop up the one-party state, cartel regulations limit party competition through a variety of practices designed to benefit established parties such as ballot access; allocation of public funding, access to campaign subsidies or high minimal vote thresholds to achieve elected office. Egalitarian rules are more permeable and open, facilitate pluralism, and competition among contenders enabled their access to resources.

In a dominant party regime, opposition parties are free to contest in an open and fair environment. Parties and candidates can nominate and campaign freely with minimal restriction on civil rights and freedom. As for hegemonic party regimes, elections are free but unfair. Free elections induce opposition actors to form parties and compete for votes. However, elections are unfair as there are biases in partisan competition that tilt the playing field which means the opposition parties are unlikely to win. Opposition parties are disadvantaged and antagonistic contestation is not permitted through legal means or else

² See Tien (1989, 7-12) for an excellent discussion of the various types of single-party rule.
deprived of rights of expression and organization (Sartori 1976). Skewed playing fields enable the incumbents to retain power without resorting to blatant electoral fraud, which would undermine their international reputation (Levitsky and Way 2010). A hegemonic party sustains power through asymmetric access to state resources and selective restrictions in civil and political freedoms which impair the opposition’s ability to organize and compete. In one-party state, contestation is minimal or non-existent as opposition parties are disallowed and independents have slim chance of winning seats.

The third dimension measures the legislative dominance of the party. If a major party receives a plurality of votes and manages to win a majority or more than 50% of seats (not necessarily of votes) in Parliament, then it qualifies as a dominant party. If a party receives a majority of votes and occupies more than 70% of seats (or two-thirds majority) in Parliament and enjoys a dominant bargaining position, then it ought to be viewed as a hegemonic party. Unlike the dominant party, a hegemonic party strives for a supermajority (more than 70%) in legislature so as to control institutional changes to their advantage. As opposition parties are formally banned in a one party state, the incumbent is expected to gain more than 90% of the votes and nearly all the seats in the legislature.

The ability of citizens to change their government is the hallmark of democracy. The prospects of party alternation may be used to distinguish the different single-party sub-types. While turnover is expected in a dominant party regime, in hegemonic party regimes alternation can occur but does not (Sartori 1976, 230). Constraints in civil-political liberties and media freedom prevent the possibility. While there is an avenue for party alternation, it seldom occurs as a semi-competitive party system suppresses the rise of a credible replacement. In a one-party state, alternation through elections cannot occur.

Based on these 4 dimensions, a one-party state refers to a closed, non-competitive autocracy where national elections are not permitted and outcomes are certain. Examples include former Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and Laos. On the other hand, a dominant party regime refers to a competitive, electoral party system where a party regularly wins multiple

---

3 Any threshold of quantitative support is inevitably arbitrary. I use the percentages of seat shares that are widely used in the literature. See Sartori (1976, 195); Pempel (1990, 3) and Magaloni (2006, 15).

4 For simplicity, I retain the use of “dominant” rather than “predominant” as Sartori suggests.
or successive elections which are relatively free and fair and is supported by a winning majority (absolute majority of seats). Minor opposition parties are legal, legitimate and independent antagonists of the dominant party, as in TJ Pempel’s *Uncommon democracies*. Sometimes, the dominant party has to form coalitions to maintain legislative majority. Examples include Japan under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule and Italy under the Christian Democratic Party (CD).

Finally, the term hegemonic party regime refers to a polity where a party exercises tight control over the electoral arena, rules and players, leaving little room for contestation. Opposition parties serve as second-class, licensed parties that are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic or equal terms. The ruling elite puts up the appearance of competitive elections, but in reality do not tolerate open contestation. Harmless opposition candidates are allowed to run but party alternation is not viable because of an asymmetry of power between the hegemonic and satellite opposition parties. The hegemonic party system functions as a two level system in which one party tolerates and allocates a fraction of its power to subordinate political groups (Sartori 1976). In short, a hegemonic party regime is a “diminished” form of authoritarianism rather than a “diminished” democracy (Carothers 2002). Examples include Taiwan under the KMT (1949-1991), Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, 1929-1997) and Singapore under the PAP (1968-present). See Table 2-1 for a summary.

---

5 The quality of democracy in dominant party regimes is controversial. See Sartori (1976, 48-51), Scheiner (2006, 7-30) and Ware (1996, 245-254).

6 The PRI won every presidential election from 1929 to 2000, held the majority in Congress until 1997, won every governorship until 1989 and controlled the vast majority of municipalities. For excellent studies on the PRI rule, see Magaloni (2006) and Greene (2007).
Table 2-1: A Typology of Single-Party Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of Inter-Party Competitiveness</th>
<th>Non-competitive</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions</td>
<td>One-Party Hegemonic Party</td>
<td>Dominant Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>No suffrage</td>
<td>Universal suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contestation</td>
<td>Autocratic or no elections</td>
<td>Relatively free but unfair elections under cartel regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative dominance</td>
<td>Absolute control (90 -100% of seats)</td>
<td>Supermajority (more than 70% of seats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party alternation</td>
<td>Cannot occur</td>
<td>Can but does not occur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theories of Authoritarian Durability

Explanations of authoritarian durability and breakdown are two sides of the same coin. Within the democratization literature, theories of regime breakdown often fall within three camps: 1) structuralist, 2) institutionalist and 3) culturalist. To begin with, structuralists usually build on Marxist or Weberian tradition to focus on large-scale phenomena such as: socio-economic conditions (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1971); rise of a robust middle class (Moore 1966); class relations (Rueschemeyer 1980; Stephens 1989); revolutions (Skocpol 1979) or stateness (Linz and Stepan 1996) to explain regime change. Amongst these, Lipset’s (1959) modernization thesis is most widely cited to link economic growth to single-party breakdown in post-Communist states in East Europe (Przeworski 1991).

Like regime studies, party politics literature often turns to structuralist approaches to explain how social cleavage structure affects party system stability and change (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Based on Western European party formation experiences class structure, religious or ethnic differences are considered as causal factors for ideological, strategic or electoral shifts in the party system (Mair 1997). Institutional factors such as type of electoral system, size of district magnitude and type of electoral engineering strategy are used to explain party system change and stability (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997).

Dissatisfied with the over-determinism in structural analysis, scholars have merged elite-based explanations with structural analysis to show how regime transitions may be
“crafted” or negotiated between hard and soft-liners in the form of “pacts” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). From this perspective, authoritarian stability and transition depends on the bargaining power or short-term calculations of negotiating elites. For example, building on O’Donnell’s (1988) seminal work on bureaucratic authoritarianism, later structural-institutionalists such as Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Remmer (1990), Liberthal and Oksenberg (1988) and Wallerstein (1980) highlight the institutional conditions of authoritarian regimes that shape elites’ preferences and capacity to deal with economic and legitimacy crises in single-party regimes.

Besides structuralist analyses, institutionalist explanations have also dominated the literature. Generally, institutions refer to the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity (Hall and Taylor 1996). Broadly, institutionalists focus on the organizational and institutional features such as the decision-making authority in the executive (Geddes 1999); role of party organization (Panebianco 1988); degree of party system institutionalization (Huntington 1968; Levitsky 1998; Mainwaring and Scully 1995); inter-institutional relations in presidential or parliamentary systems (Linz 1994); separation of coercive and political resources (Haggard and Kaufman 1995); use of legal barriers to prevent opposition challenge (Molinar 1991) or technocratic or bureaucratic agencies that equipped elites to co-opt social groups during crisis to explain the resilience. Within this tradition, Perlmutter’s work is perhaps most representative to explain how the institutional structures, instruments of control secure mass support and legitimacy in authoritarian regimes (1981).

Apart from structural and institutional analyses, coercion and tyrannical leadership are also used to explain authoritarian resilience (Alagappa 2001; Bellin 2005; Wintrobe 1998, 2007). In this school, scholars focus on systematic state repression, violations of human rights, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, restrictions of civil liberties and freedom of speech as explanatory factors for authoritarian persistence. But not all authoritarian regimes are equally repressive. For example, Davenport’s (2007) study of 137 regimes shows that one-party regimes are less repressive than other authoritarian regimes. Besides, Smith’s (2005, 427)

---

7 See Thelen and Steinmo (1992), Skocpol and Somers (1980) and Pierson and Theda (2002).
8 For an excellent quantitative study on repression and human rights violation, see Davenport (2007).
study on repression based on Polity III scores found no systematic relation between the level of political violence and regime viability. In fact, hegemonic-party autocracies are a comparatively more benign form of authoritarianism (Magaloni 2006, 10). The decision to use coercion is often a question of agency and strategic interactions between power brokers such as the military and the opposition elites. The focus on coercion alone is thus insufficient, as it needs to explain the timing and selective use of coercion to govern.

Drawing from anthropology, culturalists posit that a common set of shared meanings, values and belief systems, embodied in a society’s institutions and organizations, shape the way of life and worldview in a regime (Almond and Verba 1989; Diamond 1993). Culturalists contend that a collection of attitudes or values, such as Confucianist-inspired Asian values or democratic culture, are important tools for legitimacy or mass mobilization. For example, Ottaway’s (2003) work on semi-authoritarianism shows how racial, cultural and religious differences explain authoritarian persistence in the era of neo-liberal democratization. In East Asia, scholars and political leaders have argued that East Asian countries with similar group consciousness and political culture are unlikely bedfellows of liberal democracy (Harrison and Huntington 2000; Kausikan 1993). For example, Pye claimed that East Asian countries are more likely to exhibit certain group consciousness in their political culture that is distinct from the kind of individualism found in Western culture, the source of liberal democracy. Advocates of Asian values stressed that the existence of a shared identity and values among East Asians are different from the West. The inference is that democratization is antithetical to East Asians as they have different view of human rights.

---

9 Polity III score is a composite measure of different kinds of repressive or coercive government action. Smith’s study on the impact of fiscal and political constraints on regime durability found no relationship between economic performance and regime survival (2005).

10 Pye asserted that: “There do seem to be some features of Asian civilizations that have set them apart from western civilization. Probably the most significant of these is the Asian tendency to place more value on the collectivity and to be less sensitive than the West to the values of individualism” (1985, 26).

11 Asian values are based on Confucianism that include: an emphasis on the community; a strong state; deference toward authority; diligence; strong work ethic; focus on harmony and consensus.

12 A more extreme strand of culturalist approach suggests that authoritarianism is necessary for the growth and stability as liberal democracy is disorderly, confrontational and inefficient. The IMF has cited negative Asian values such as nepotism, cronyism and patrimonialism as causes of the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997. See Pye (2000, 244-255) and IMF Finance & Development, June 1998.
The controversy over the compatibility between Confucian societies and liberal democracy, otherwise known as the Asian Values debate, has pitted proponents justifying the exigency of authoritarian governance based on cultural relativism against critics arguing for the universality of democracy (Kausikan 1993; Mahbubani 1995; Sen 1997). There are flaws with the cultural argument. Apart from the selective reading of Confucianism and oversimplification of the cultures deriving from Islam, Buddhism and Christianity, there are no quintessential values that apply to a large and heterogeneous Asia (Diamond 1988, Tay 1997). The fact that South Korea and Taiwan have embraced liberal democracy shows that it can thrive in East Asian Confucian societies.

Problems and Gaps

In an age of democracy, the resilience of Singapore’s hegemonic party rule is a puzzle (Haas 1999). A small island with a population of less than 4.6 million, Singapore is the wealthiest non-oil producing country in the world that is not a democracy. Despite its affluence and ideal socio-economic preconditions for democracy, the PAP has ruled the country uninterrupted since 1959. No substantial opposition party has existed since and electoral competition is weak. Contrary to expectations, the large middle-class in Singapore does not agitate for change but remains “passive, deferential, acquiescent, and lacking political mobilization” (Sinnott 2006, 45). Singapore’s refusal to embrace competitive party politics confounds democratization theorists, leaving some to exclude it as a deviant case that permits no meaningful comparison (Neher 2002, 174). As Huntington said, “the anomaly remains Singapore” (1993, 38).

The case of Singapore shows that social pressures arising from development are necessary but insufficient for democratization. As Bueno De Mesquita and Brown caution, modernization theorists underestimate the ability of oppressive governments to thwart

---

13 To critics, cultural argument based on Asian values is an “illusion concealing the iron grip of petty despots”, a defence for authoritarianism (Lingle 1995, 193; Kessler 1999, 7).
14 There is no authoritative study to demonstrate that Asian values are hostile to liberal democracy. The literature is replete with contradictory public opinion data. See Dalton and Ong (2003) and Blondel (2006).
15 The rejection of the Asian values discourse by former leaders of South Korea and Taiwan, Kim Dae Jung and Lee Teng-hui also points to the intra-regional differences within Asia (Kim 1997).
17 See World Values Survey 2008 that found Singaporeans to have no strong demand for more democracy.
demands for social and political change (2005). The idea that autocrats could embrace economic growth while postponing democracy through strategic coordination and suppressing coordination mechanisms such as political rights, human rights and media freedom is important and will be further developed in the next section.

Current literature has overlooked how effective authoritarian regimes turn democratic institutions to their advantage and manipulate the rules of the game through constitutional and electoral engineering to suit their interests. With a supermajority of seats in the legislature, autocrats enjoy a marked advantage over the average citizen and opposition in their ability to shape institutions and politics. Without turning to electoral fraud and ballot rigging, autocracies can institutionalize a semi-competitive electoral arena and deny the opposition the ability to coordinate. Consequently, voters are constrained by a series of dilemmas that compel them to vote for autocracy, as in Mexico from 1940 to 1980\(^\text{18}\) (Magaloni 2006, 19).

The ability of hegemonic-party regimes to survive exogenous shocks such as economic crisis also depends on the capacity of rulers to retain the loyalty of elites who have control over the coercive, administrative and political resources (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 64). Indeed, in response to the global credit crisis in 2008, Singapore’s PAP was quick to dip into its national reserves, an estimated amount of US $170 billion to fund a US$13.74 billion “Resilience Package” to stabilize its economy.\(^\text{19}\) The decision to use the national savings was made for the first time in the country’s history and the initiative was passed without much debate. As Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence, says, “The use of reserves to stabilise the net capital flows is the most important domestically controlled circuit breaker” (Straits Times 31 Oct 2009). With the PAP government’s direct control over the national resources, it is clearly in a better position to ward off economic shocks.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{18}\) Also see Greene (2007) who contends that opposition coordination failure contributed to PRI’s dominance in its final decade and PRI’s dominance was unsettled by economic conditions beginning in 1982.

\(^{19}\) By April 2009, estimates show Singapore’s economy have shrunk by 11.5% compared to 2008. The “resilience package” was designed to save jobs and keep local companies afloat. “Singapore Taps Reserves for S$20.5b Economic Stimulus Plan,” Channel NewsAsia, 20 Jan 2009.

\(^{20}\) Some argue that mass support in times of crisis reflect Singaporeans’ trust the government’s ability to lead them out of recession (Straits Times 31 Mar 2009). While others contend that the 1998 economic crisis was not as bad as others such as the one that Mexico experienced in the 1982 and 1997 fiscal crises under the PRI’s rule. Bratton and Van de Walle demonstrated that mass support for some authoritarian African regimes doubled
Institutionalist explanations have been used to highlight how institutions and strategic control over economic, political and coercive institutions explain hegemonic party resilience. For example, theorizing at the individual-level, rationalist-institutionalists focus on the behaviour of party elites and show how incentive structures, incumbency advantage and opposition coordination dilemmas explain the survival of hegemonic parties (Geddes 1999; Greene 2007, Magaloni 2006). In this approach, structural factors such as ethnic cleavage, class relations or historical factors become secondary contextual conditions that affect the cost-benefit calculations of actors. For example, Geddes’ study shows how single party regimes are equipped with the incentive structures to prevent elite defection. Based on game-theoretical logic, intra-party struggles are modelled as a stag-hunt game. Party elites are expected to co-operate as they have little incentives to defect and have no barracks to return to, unlike military leaders (Geddes 2003).

My dissertation builds on the institutionalist approach to highlight the importance of behavioral incentives. However, it goes beyond Geddes’ game-theoretical approach that takes the origins of party and electoral institutions as given. As Smith notes, “treating party institutions as prior variables makes it nearly impossible to figure out the incentives within such regimes might come or not come, to look very much like the Stag Hunt game” (2005, 427). An account linking party institutions to regime outcome is missing in rationalist-institutionalist story. Existing institutionalist explanations tend to overlook the origins of party organization foster elite unity and show how electoral institutions could dampen inter-party competitiveness – preconditions for hegemonic party durability.

I build on institutionalist explanations by showing how strategic coordination and institutionalization of a self-reinforcing incentive distribution system that ensure the long-

---

21 In Geddes’ explanation, leadership struggles do not affect the party cadres’ desire to defect. As long as benefits of cooperation are sufficient to ensure co-operation, single-party regimes will endure. See Elster’s (1989) critique of rational choice theory and assumption of methodological individualism that fail to explain motivation and behavior. He argues that behaviours such as wishful thinking, sour grapes and lack of foresight may defy rationality and result in non-cooperative behavior.

22 Institutionalization is a process by which rules or patterns become routinized, stabilized or entrenched (Levitsky 1998; North 1990).
term benefits of ruling elites, supporters and voters build regime resilience. Institutions23 matter because they serve as the rules of the game that shape interaction and “reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life” (North 1990, 3). They provide stability and predictability in hegemonic party regimes. The mechanisms and processes that bring about elite unity are different from those that enable a party to win elections. A complete institutionalist argument needs to identify the organizational structure in which actors operate, the rewards and punishments that motivate elite co-operation or defection, and the rules and regulations that shape the parties’ chances in the electoral market.

In any study of single-party rule, scholars have to decide on the level of analysis, to theorize on the party organization, party system or regime level. But to focus on one and not another risks oversimplification and misses the link between institution and regime outcome. To address this, my dissertation offers a three-level theoretical framework that integrates analysis at the party organizational, party system and regime level (Barnea and Rahat 2007). This framework focuses on how behavioural incentives shape the preferences of the party elites, parties and voters. It highlights how the interactions of the political processes and control mechanisms24 at three levels that bring about the final outcome – regime resilience.25 This framework is useful as it allows one to 1) identify and study the underlying political processes and mechanisms at each level; 2) examine the utility of existing explanations and propose hypotheses that contribute to broader, complex theories; 3) compare the effects of specific process or mechanism in the two selected cases in a structured and focused way.

**Theoretical Framework**

Why are some hegemonic parties better in maintaining cohesion and winning elections? I argue that an institutionalized hegemonic party regime with an effective strategic coordination of incentive distribution system is more likely to keep elites united, maintain

23 Institutions are formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organization structure of the polity or political economy (Hall and Taylor 1996, 398).

24 I treat mechanisms as “intervening variables” that link the independent and dependent variables together in a causal inference. They are intermediate between laws and descriptions, which allow us to explain but not to predict (Elster 1989, 45).

25 Resilience refers to the ability of the regime to recover quickly to its original institutional arrangement when challenged; durability refers to the ability of the hegemonic party to withstand challenges and remain in government, measured by its longevity in government. I use the two terms interchangeably.
mass support and deter opposition challenge. Strategic coordination refers to a set of activities that the ruling elite actively engages in to maintain political power (Bueno De Mesquita and Brown 2005). Hegemony is never complete but rests on the ruling party’s ability to improve the material life of the governed (Gramsci 1971; Weber 1958). Strategic coordination is necessary to ensure that material incentives, socio-legal and electoral constraints are in place to appease the ruling elites, supporters and voters.

For its long-term survival, the hegemonic party needs to selectively suppress opposition activity without undermining economic growth or the provision of public goods. If it is able to maintain performance legitimacy and limit the opposition mobilization by restricting the availability of coordination mechanisms\(^{26}\), then, it can reduce its chances of being replaced. To assess the regime’s provision of public goods, indicators from the World Bank Governance data on “Government effectiveness” may be used. For example, a regime with 60% and above rating may be considered effective in public good provision; rating below 60% may be classified as ineffective that lowers its legitimacy and mass support.

Coordination mechanisms refer to a system of rules, laws and processes that govern civil, political liberties and media freedom. Coordinating mechanisms benefit the opposition parties as greater civil and political liberties increase their ability to recruit, communicate with and mobilize their supporters. However, restrictions over campaign rules, state control media and biased reporting impair the opposition’s publicity, fund raising and recruitment capabilities. As a measure of the availability of coordination mechanisms in the regime, FH’s scoring of political rights and civil liberty may be used.\(^{27}\) While the scores of 3 and below mean a freer electoral environment with fairer inter-party competition, regimes with scores of 4 and above imply a more repressive environment that stifles opposition.

Hegemonic party regimes differ in their provision of public goods and restriction of coordination mechanisms. The different capacities to provide and repress, and the consequent effects on regime outcomes are presented in a two by two matrix in Figure 2-1. This strategic

\(^{26}\) This is similar to the Dahlian calculus of the cost of repression as compared to the cost of toleration (1971). The withdrawal of coordination mechanisms are less costly than brute force as it is difficult to isolate its effects and do not directly threaten economic activities.

\(^{27}\) Also see Howard and Rossler (2009) and Hadenius and Teorell (2007) who use both FH and Polity data to measure the degree of civil and political liberties in electoral authoritarian regimes.
coordination matrix is designed to explain the conditions under which: 1) hegemonic party regimes are most stable and likely to persist; and 2) opposition parties are likely to coordinate and increase the competitiveness of elections to bring about democratizing outcomes. For example, the upper left column in Figure 2-1 shows that hegemonic party regimes are stable when there is an adequate supply of public goods to earn mass support and where restriction of political and civil liberties prevent the opposition mobilization such that they remain small, weak in organization and ephemeral (Rakner and Van de Walle 2009). A regime is stable when there is an absence of preferable alternatives (Przeworski 1986, 51-2). Under this condition, the opposition that is systematically disadvantaged is prevented from becoming a credible replacement. Singapore under the PAP (1968-present) and Taiwan under the KMT (1975-1988) are prime examples of this regime type.

**Figure 2-1: Strategic Coordination of Hegemonic Party Regimes (HPRs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Goods Provision (PG)</th>
<th>Availability of Coordination Mechanisms (CM) for Opposition</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Hi PG, Lo CM</td>
<td>Hi PG, Hi CM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPRs enjoy mass support; selective repression results in opposition failure</td>
<td></td>
<td>HPRs enjoy mass support; more competitive elections may lead to liberalizing outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore PAP (1968-present)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan KMT (1990s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan KMT (1972-1989)</td>
<td></td>
<td>S Korea (1961-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia UMNO (1959-present)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable and Uncompetitive</td>
<td>Low PG, Low CM</td>
<td>Low PG, Hi CM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unresponsive and repressive HPR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unresponsive HPR and effective opposition, most likely to lead to regime change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (1990s)</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Philippines’ KBL (1980s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico PRI (1990s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If high performing hegemonic party regimes are able to provide public goods but coordinating mechanisms are also available the opposition are in better position to mobilize support and compete effectively in a more level playing field. See upper right column in
Figure 2-1 for effects of elections in competitive hegemonic party regimes. With increased space and mechanisms for opposition coordination, competitive elections in hegemonic party regimes are likely to bring about non-violent, liberalizing outcomes as in the case of Taiwan in the 1990s after electoral opening. As transitology studies show, single-party and hegemonic party autocracies are more likely to negotiate its withdrawal from authoritarian rule (Geddes 1999). Under this condition, the opening of the electoral market may result in the incumbent’s gradual loss of power through electoral means. Regime transitions may occur in the form of elite “pact negotiations” to abolish old institutions and to erect new ones.

Given that voters are utility maximizers, they cannot simply “throw the rascals out” as their choices are constrained by a series of dilemmas that compel them to support the hegemonic party (Magaloni 2006, 20). For high performing hegemonic party regimes, voters may continue to vote for the incumbent because of fears of being made worse off with an untested contender and preference for predictability. Having been ruled by the same party over a long time, voters may not have any prior knowledge or experience to mitigate their fear of the unknown. They may avoid voting for opposition out of fear of instability, reprisals or negative impact on the economy. Even as they acknowledge compromise in their civil liberties, voters vote for the hegemonic party as it is the “known evil” that has a record of delivering goods. Without fair media coverage, voters may not have all the necessary information to assess the credibility of the opposition. The availability of coordination mechanisms is thus one key factor that tilts the level playing field between the incumbent and the opposition.

In the lower left column, hegemonic party regimes are unstable and uncompetitive as the incumbent party fails to deliver public goods and resorts to more repression to prevent opposition mobilization from challenging the ruling party. These low performing and repressive regimes are usually stuck in the “grey zone” and conduct façade elections to pay lip service to democratic norms. Examples of this regime type are found in post-communist regimes and electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Burkina Faso.

---

28 For studies on the liberalizing effects of regular elections in authoritarian regimes, see Lindberg (2009).
29 In Singapore, there is a popular, colloquial Hokkien phrase - “kiasu” which means “afraid to lose” that captures the essence of the voter’s dilemma in a hegemonic party autocracy.
30 In economic crisis, voters usually rally behind the “known evil” with the past record of delivering (Geddes 2003; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Magaloni 2006).
Angola, Zimbabwe and Congo (Lindberg 2009; Schedler 2009). The incumbent party remains in power despite its low legitimacy. Voters are constrained, as there is a lack of viable alternatives and repression causes opposition coordination failure. Under this condition, the hegemonic parties are more likely to breakdown as a result of internal splits and struggles over spoils; rather than through electoral means.

Finally, low performing hegemonic parties that are unable to deter the opposition challenge are likely to be replaced. As lower right column of Figure 2-1 shows, in unstable and more competitive hegemonic party regimes, the opposition are likely to cooperate as their prospects of winning are increased. The availability of coordination mechanisms enables the opposition to mobilize and boosts their public image as a credible alternative. Presented with a viable replacement, voters may vote for the opposition if the hegemonic party fails to deliver. Under this condition, party alternation is likely to result if the incumbent chooses not to repress, as in the case of Mexico under PRI – which gave up power through elections. And if the hegemonic party represses and fails, then, the low performing hegemonic party may be ousted through mass uprising as in the case of the Golkar Party in Indonesia during Surharto’s rule or the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in the Philippines during Marco’s rule. The next section will now consider the incentive structures within the party organization that foster elite unity and party cohesion.

**Party and Party System Institutionalization**

Institutions matter. I argue that the underlying strength of hegemonic party regime depends largely on the degree to which the ruling party is institutionalized or moved through the phases of transformation, adaptation and consolidation. Party institutionalization refers to the process by which a party acquires stability and values, and becomes established in organizational terms as well as in patterns of behavior and attitudes. An institutionalized hegemonic party regime is one with an entrenched two-tier party system whereby the

---

31 Panebianco defines party institutionalization as a process where a party ceases to be a means to certain ends; the preservation and survival of the party becomes a goal and is “valuable in and of itself” (1988, 53).
opposition parties are systematically disadvantaged and unable to compete with the incumbent on antagonistic or equal terms.  

Scholars use the terms institution and institutionalization differently. While Huntington defines institutionalization as the “process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” and measures institutionalization by its “adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures” (1965, 394); Mainwaring and Scully identify stability; stable roots in society; legitimacy and party organization as 4 criteria for the institutionalization of democratic party systems (1995). To complicate matters, the same dimension is sometimes analyzed under different labels. For example, Huntington’s “complexity” is similar to Mainwaring and Scully’s “party organization”. Apart from definitional ambiguity, the concept has been criticized for tautology and failing to separate the explanation from its outcome (Levitsky 1998).

Despite the debates, there is a general consensus that the concept retains its utility, as long as its definition, unit of analysis and dimensions are laid out. The challenge is to “unpack” the concept and demonstrates that the outcome to be explained is not treated as an aspect of institutionalization (Levitsky 1998). Instead of treating institutions as “sticky” and electoral institutions as “very stable and resistant to change” (Pierson 2004; Lijphart 1994), I view institutions as stable because of the power of the current supporters and not because of the binding constraints of the original agreement (Moe 2005).

An institutionalized party must have an incentive distribution system that builds organizational interests, loyalty and cohesion, without which it will be prone to power struggles and internal splits. To build cohesion, the party must distribute selective incentives (prestigious positions, career opportunities) to its ambitious members and collective incentives (sense of belonging) to its activists and supporters (Panebianco 1988). Without the consolidation of this incentive structure party institutionalization cannot take place and

---

32 As Panebianco said: “All parties must institutionalize to a certain extent in order to survive” (1988, 54).
33 Some view institutions as "rules of the game" while others see them as formal organizations; patterned behaviour or as "myths" and ideational structures. See Hall and Taylor (1996).
34 Pierson has argued that institutions "are typically not plastic. They do not adapt swiftly and effortlessly. They are subject to change, but the multiple sources of resilience suggest that in many circumstances they will exhibit very substantial inertia. It is this inertial quality that makes them important contributors to an understanding of long-term process of institutional development" (2004, 157).
organization survival is at stake. In this study, party cohesion refers to “the extent to which, in a given situation, group members can be observed to work together for the group’s goals in one and the same way” (Ozbudun 1970, 305). It embraces the degree to which elites co-operate (unity), and the compliance of members with party goals or leader’s preferences (loyalty). Cohesion is different from party discipline as the latter refers to a special cohesion achieved through enforcement or sanctions by which enforced cohesion is attained.

According to Mainwaring and Scully, an institutionalized party system must have: 1) regular and stable inter-party competition, 2) rootedness 3) party organizations that matter and 4) electoral legitimacy (1995). It is through time that a party as an organization becomes institutionalized (Randall and Svasand 2002, 14). The longer the party is in existence, the more likely it will be rooted and institutionalized. The age of the party may be measured: 1) chronologically, 2) generationally - replacement of party founding leaders and 3) functionally – its participation in national elections. A party is likely to be institutionalized if it has contested at the first national competitive elections and fought in more than three national elections (Rose and Mackie 1988; Huntington 1968). The party origins, age and rootedness of the PAP and the KMT are important sources of its organizational resilience and will be examined in Chapters 3 and 4. I will compare the degree of party system institutionalization in Singapore and Taiwan based on the 4 dimensions in Chapters 7 and 8.

Institutionalization does not progress in a neat, linear fashion (Randall and Svasand 2002, 15). While institutionalization increases a regime’s stability and resilience, there is no guarantee against regression, manipulation or de-institutionalization. As Mainwaring and Scully remind us “evaluations of party system institutionalization are not “static”, “unilinear nor irreversible” (1995, 21). While institutions have the capacity to shape behaviour, they are also partially endogenous and subject to change as a result of strategic calculations by political actors (Magaloni 2006, 12). When self-interested elites set out to redesign electoral institutions or constitutional framework, we need to recognize the embedded cultural, socio-political constraints that led to the final choices (Grofman et al. 1999, xi). A key contribution

---

35 De-institutionalization refers to the loss of autonomy and systemness in response to sudden, exogenous change in the external environment such as economic shock or electoral loss (Panebianco 1982). Mainwaring and Scully argue that for hegemonic party regimes (such as Mexico and Paraguay) to democratize; de-institutionalization has to first occur (1995, 20).

36 For more on the endogeniety problem, see Greif and Laitin (2004).
of my dissertation is to highlight the sources of institutionalization (Chapters 3 and 4) and the conditions under which these institutions are manipulated or de-institutionalized bringing about un-intended consequences (Chapter 7 and 8) (Pierson 2004).

**Leadership Selection and Party Cohesion**

The rules governing leadership selection have a direct impact on party cohesion (Katz and Mair 2002; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Panebianco 1988; Przeworski1986). Leadership selection is important as it highlights the interests of power brokers. As Schattschneider reminds us, “The nature of nominating process determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party. This is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party” (1942, 64).

Parties have different rules and selection criteria on who can or cannot join the party, gain access to top party leadership positions. Leadership selection consists of elite recruitment and candidate selection. Elite recruitment refers to the process by which individuals are inducted into active, high profile political roles within the party or at the national level; candidate selection is part of elite recruitment where parties nominate and select their candidates before the general elections (Hazan and Rahat 2006, 109). On the party system level, the rules and procedures guiding candidacy directly affect the composition and representativeness of the national legislature.

I posit that a hegemonic party with an institutionalized leadership selection system is less vulnerable to power struggles and defections. In highly institutionalized parties, elite recruitment has a centripetal movement or a strong “centre” that monopolizes incentive distribution. To make one’s career in the party is to allow oneself to be co-opted by the centre. Centralized incentive structures governed by a clear set of rules are more predictable and stable. In weakly institutionalized parties, elite recruitment has a centrifugal movement. To succeed, the candidate has to define himself against others, which fuels intraparty competition and factionalism while undermining cohesion.

37 As Przeworski also notes, when the problem of succession appears and mechanisms of succession are not institutionalized, a conflict is imminent (1986, 55).

38 Candidate selection is “the process by which a political party decides which of the person legally eligible to hold an elective office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates” (Ranney 1981, 75).
I propose to measure the degree of hegemonic party institutionalization based on its leadership succession system. If the party selectorate\textsuperscript{39} enjoys high decisional autonomy and the process displays high systemness\textsuperscript{40} then, its leadership selection system is institutionalized. Autonomy is high when the selectorate can set its own requirements for candidacy, exclude external intruders who do not meet its admission requirements and nominate or appoint its candidates without external interference from outside organizations such as the unions or the church (Lovenduski and Norris 1993, 321). Exclusiveness means that the party selectorate has the rights and jurisdiction over the recruitment eligibility and criteria. Parties with candidates selected by the party leader or a small group of elites through methods such as closed nominations and party conventions, are more likely to produce loyalists and foster cohesion (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008, 15).

In institutionalized hegemonic parties, leadership selection has a centripetal movement – towards whoever has the monopoly to nominate, select candidates and distribute incentives. To climb the party ladder, careerists will need to show loyalty, unite and rally around party goals. Conversely, if the selectorate is too inclusive\textsuperscript{41} with permeable borders, or has little control over the quality of candidates, then its autonomy will be low. For example, if the candidates are selected through an election that involves a large selectorate, the candidates are likely to respond to various interests and less inclined to comply with the party directives (Rahat 2007, 159). For example, in open primaries, party leaders have little control over the candidates and candidates have little incentives to be loyal or unite. See Figure 2.2 for a summary of the inclusiveness of the candidate selection method.

\textsuperscript{39} Party selectorate refers to the body that selects the candidates. It composes of one person or many people (including the whole nation) (Harzan and Rahat, 2006, 110).
\textsuperscript{40} Systemness refers to the “increasingly scope, density, and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure” (Randall and Svasand 2002, 13).
\textsuperscript{41} Canadian parties are an exception as their candidate selection methods are highly decentralized and inclusive (less than the US parties), but Canadian MPs show high levels of discipline (Carty 2004, 5-24).
Figure 2-2: Candidacy, Selectorate and Selection Method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusiveness</th>
<th>Exclusiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Selectorate</td>
<td>General Electorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidacy</td>
<td>All citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Method</td>
<td>Voting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Harzam and Rahat (2006)

Systemness is another dimension of party leadership succession. Systemness refers to the routinization of charisma or regularization of patterns of social interaction, or the entrenchment of the formal and informal rules of the game (Levitsky 1998, 88; Panebianco 1988, 53). If there are formal party charters or informal rules (patronage network), established guidelines (education qualification) governing candidate selection for top party and national positions and these rules are accepted without contest, then, leadership selection displays high systemness. Conversely, if these rules are circumvented or manipulated to suit the short term needs of one person or a group; or is challenged by a majority of members, then, systemness is low. A party may be unevenly institutionalized, displaying high autonomy and low systemness, or vice-versa. Uneven autonomy and systemness signifies uneven institutionalization of leadership selection that could lead to leadership struggles. See Figure 2-3 for the combinations in a four-cell matrix.
### Figure 2-3: Model of Leadership Succession and Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Systemness (S)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Autonomy (A)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Institutionalized Charisma</strong></th>
<th><strong>Un-institutionalized Charisma</strong></th>
<th><strong>Institutionalized Conflict</strong></th>
<th><strong>Un-institutionalized Conflict</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>High S &amp; High A</strong></td>
<td>Regular successions based on clear rules of the game, and facilitated by a small, exclusive selectorate</td>
<td>Low S &amp; High A</td>
<td>Irregular successions based on a small incumbent selectorate</td>
<td>Low S &amp; Low A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High S &amp; Low A</td>
<td>Singapore’s PAP (1990s- present)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low S &amp; Low A</td>
<td>American parties</td>
<td>British Labour party</td>
<td>Most Nordic parties</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia’s Funcinpec Party (1980s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The upper left quadrant refers to parties with leadership selection that display high systemness and high autonomy. In these parties, successions are institutionalized and routinized and a small selectorate retains the exclusive right to decide the admission criteria and quality of candidates into the top party or national political positions, without external interferences. A clear set of rules regulates the expectations and the party’s opportunity structure. Careerists who want to be elected will rally around the selectorate or party goals, demonstrate loyalty, cohesion and discipline. Intra-party competition takes a centripetal pattern and manifests itself in the form of “procedural battles”. Charisma is institutionalized as it is objectified and access to power is not tied to the idiosyncrasies of any individual. Rather, the party organization becomes a bureaucracy for facilitating leadership renewal. Parties with “institutionalized charisma” model are typically unified and cohesive.

---

42 Rules become instruments of control and represent a source of guarantee for other careerists who can appeal to the rule to defend themselves from the whims and fancy of the ruler (Panebianco 1988).
Leadership successions are less prone to power struggles as the outcome is predictable. Singapore’s PAP is a prime example.

On the upper right quadrant, parties display high systemness as leadership selection is routinized and governed by clear selection rules and admission criteria. However, the parties suffer from low autonomy as the selectorate can include all the party members or the voting electorate. Inclusive methods are likely to encourage politics of personality and cooperative behavior. For example, in the U.S. open primaries, voters may select congressional nominees without deferring to the preferences of the party organizations. This increases the value of cultivating constituent loyalties and fosters personality-based politics (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). Parties become platforms for the candidates, who are responsive to their electorates rather than to their parties. Candidate centered politics are prone to dissension and infighting. For example, the U.S. Democratic or Republican parties that facilitate open primary elections typically lack cohesion. Likewise, the British Labour Party also falls within this quadrant as it has weak autonomy and the organizational stability depends on its links to the trade unions. The unions can assert influence over the party selectorate as they have veto powers over unwanted parliamentary candidates through proposing their own nomination lists via the National Executive Committee (where the unions are a majority). Consequently, the Labour party is factionalized by various power centres and competing interests (Panebianco 1988, 93-4). Leadership selection based on “institutionalized conflict” leads to low party cohesion and is open to contention with uncertain outcomes.43

On the bottom left quadrant, parties are characterized by low systemness and high autonomy, as successions are dependent on a single-ruler or a small, exclusive group of selectorate. While most parties have charismatic leaders, this model is concerned with parties with leaders who impose themselves as “the undisputed founder, conceiver and interpreter of a set of political symbols” (Panebianco 1988, 52). This characterization typifies most charismatic or leaderist parties where succession is based on personal ties to the incumbent leader, with an absence of rules or internal career patterns. Unlike the “institutionalized charisma” model, this opportunity structure relies on informal networks. To climb the party

43 This label “institutionalized contention” draws from Przeworski’s view that democracy is a process of institutionalizing uncertainty - where all groups subject their interests to uncertainty. In democracy, no group is able to intervene when outcomes of conflicts violate their self-perceived interests (1986, 58).
ranks, party careerists will need to mobilize around the leader and compete continuously for his attention or favour. In this model, centripetal competition between “tendencies” may get intense; it will not involve the leader and takes place at the level below him. Careerists compete amongst themselves to get into the inner power hierarchy. Publicly, they display high levels of unity and loyalty as no one expects to openly challenge the leader and win.

“Uninstitutionalized charisma” is inherently unstable. In the event of the sudden death of the leader, the “tendencies” could turn into factionalism and result in intense leadership infightings. As Huntington says, “The institutional strength of a party is measured in the first instance by its ability to survive its founder or the charismatic leader who first brings it to power” (1968, 409). Un-institutionalized charismatic parties are vulnerable to the death of the leader and violent overthrow. Leadership successions could lead ugly contentious politics with uncertain outcomes. Examples of this model include the KMT during Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule in Taiwan and the Golkar Party under Suharto’s era in Indonesia.

Finally, on the bottom right quadrant, parties lack both autonomy and systemness in its leadership succession system. In this model, successions are irregular and the opportunity structure is based on informal networks, patronage or clientelism. Rules governing candidacy are arbitrary or inconsistently applied based on network ties. Both the party selectorate and admission criteria vary depending on the relations with the party elite, resources or candidate popularity. Examples of this model include Thailand’s Chart Thai or Thai Nation Party (“Generals’ Party”). Thai Nation Party was described as a “family” rather than an institution. It has no real candidate election by the party members as it believed that conflict would ensue, if, candidates were determined by the branches (Thornton 2003). Other examples include the Funcinpec Party, led by Prince Sihanouk and later Prince Ranariddh. The Party lacked autonomy as it had depended on foreign and American aid, funnelled through ASEAN. Without strong leadership and clear rules governing successions, these parties are unstable, un-cohesive and organizationally weak. In these parties, irregular successions are prone to internal conflicts with uncertain outcomes. In the next section, I will explain how varied

---

44 Tendencies refer to loosely organized groups or aggregations at the top without organized rank and file. Factions on the other hand are organized groups that may be cut either vertically (from the top to rank and file) or geographically, organized at periphery (sub-coalitions) (Panebianco 1988).
electoral systems assert mechanical and psychological effects to shape the degree of competitiveness in hegemonic party systems.

**Electoral Engineering and Institutionalizing Certainty**

Earlier, party institutionalization was assessed based on party origins, autonomy and systemness of leadership succession. On the party system level, the unit of analysis is on the electoral system, the key incentive structure that regulates inter-party competition.\(^{45}\) As Sartori reminds us, the electoral system is “the most specific manipulative instrument of politics” (1968, 273). The electoral system serves as “redistributive” institution while electoral rules are distributive institutions to improve the share of one group at the direct expense of another (Tsebelis 1990; Benoit 2004). In hegemonic party regime, the incumbent will seek to increase electoral certainty through electoral engineering as its “last defence of authoritarianism” (Schedler 2010, 69). Electoral engineering is marked by a flexible electoral system that is strategically altered and tweaked in small parts, but not overhauled by the incumbent party. The aim is to institutionalize the semi-competitive party system such that the opposition parties are systematically disadvantaged.

As North suggests, “institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather, they are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules” (1990, 360-1). Hence, electoral rules tend to be written by strong parties or “winners”.\(^{46}\) Changes in the electoral rules tend to reflect the self-interest of dominant parties in the face of rising electoral uncertainty (Remmer 2008, 9). As long as the electoral system serves the incumbent well, there is no incentive to change. If the partisan competition heats up, the stronger party will modify its electoral system to maintain its

---

\(^{45}\) I view parties as self-interested actors with the primary aim of maximizing their overall vote and seat shares in the legislature (Remmer 2008). Voters are strategic actors who will avoid voting for candidates who will do badly in the election, even if it means supporting the second-ranked candidate in their preference orderings. Parties will avoid wasting votes or resources on hopeless candidates (Boix 1999).

\(^{46}\) Electoral rules are formal institutions that encourage the strategic behavior of both elites and voters and hence force their coordination around a set of viable candidates (Boix 1999, 609).
advantage.\textsuperscript{47} Electoral engineering is likely to occur when the hegemonic party supports an arrangement that brings it more seats than the status quo electoral system (Benoit 2004, 374).

Electoral institutions can shape party systems by asserting mechanical and psychological pressures on parties and voters (Duverger 1951).\textsuperscript{48} Mechanical effects concern how electoral rules constrain the seats from the distribution of votes; psychological effect deals with the shaping of party and voter strategies in anticipation of the electoral function’s mechanical constraints (Benoit 2004, 364). Broadly, the electoral system may be divided into 3 parts: 1) the ballot structure that may or may not allow voters to split their votes between parties; 2) district magnitude (average number of legislators elected per district) that constrains factor in the translation of votes to seats, and 3) electoral formulae (plurality or PR systems) for translating votes to seats (Rae 1967; Lijphart 1990). Electoral engineering occurs when the incumbent party seeks to manufacture its electoral dominance by altering specific aspects of the constitution or electoral system to institutionalize an un-level playing field. For example, Mexico held 5 congressional elections between 1985 and 1997, each under different electoral formulae to prop up the PRI. In Singapore, its single-member plurality (SMP) system was changed to include an additional block voting in Group Representative Constituencies (GRC) in 1988, which had disastrous effects on the opposition. Taiwan, on the other hand, has had 7 constitutional revisions since 1991, making its electoral system one of the most complicated in the world.

Electoral systems are subject to partisan manipulation because they have non-neutral effects: larger parties tend to do better with SMP electoral formulas, while smaller parties do better under the PR system. Electoral engineering shapes the incentives facing parties and actors and alters inter-party competitiveness. Parties hold or derive preferences for alternative institutions based on expectations of the payoffs of the electoral institutions. Hence, parties fight over the rules and practices that govern the electoral process in a complex “nested

\textsuperscript{47} Boix argues that the impetus to change from plurality to PR system is contingent on 2 conditions: 1) strength of the new challenging parties and 2) coordinating capacity of the ruling parties (1999, 609). There will be no change to PR if new parties are weak.
\textsuperscript{48} Mechanical effects show the electoral system’s systematic underrepresentation of “third parties”, while psychological effects shows the tendency of voters to rally what they consider the least unacceptable of the two major parties as they realize the votes for minor parties are not translated to votes. See Blais and Carty (1991) for attempts to measure the psychological effects of electoral laws.
games” (Tsebelis 1990). By altering the electoral system, the incumbent parties seek to maximize their electoral “bang for the buck” to win more seats with the same number of votes (McElwain 2008, 32). In hegemonic party autocracies, survival hinges on the incumbent’s ability to win supermajority so to control institutional change to their advantage and project an image of invincibility to deter opposition (Magaloni 2006).

With legislative supermajority, the constitutional order and judicial independence tend to be weak in hegemonic party regimes. The opposition movement is systematically disadvantaged with little protection from the rule of law. The hegemonic party with the monopoly over rulemaking will thus shape the rules of the game to its advantage. Given access to state resources, infrastructure, personnel and information, the hegemonic party can calibrate its electoral strategies to cripple but not eliminate the opposition, so that it does not become a credible replacement. The position of the hegemonic party is maintained as the challengers are better off playing by the rules set by the incumbent rather than defect and be completely excluded. The opposition thus face a dilemma in an electoral autocracy: to be an inferior party and play by the rules or boycott the election altogether (Schedler 2009, 200-1). To boycott the election comes with a high cost. The withdrawal of opposition or failure to co-ordinate will often strengthen the status quo - a desired outcome for the incumbent.

The view that electoral institutions may be manipulated is important as it: 1) highlights the structure of unequal power relations between the incumbent and opposition parties that constrained their ability to compete (Moe 2005); 2) allows us to move beyond static, structural explanations that focus on historical “founding moments” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967); 3) avoids tautological propositions that link ex ante shifts in electoral outcomes to reforms (Remmer 2008), and 4) shows the adaptability of hegemonic parties in response to rising opposition threats (Benoit 2004). Repression is costly and electoral fraud requires substantial resources that may result in unintended outcome (Lehoucq 2003). Electoral engineering is less costly and safer that allows the incumbents to retain power without undermining their international reputation (Levitsky and Way 2010).

The hegemonic party does not have full control over the electoral outcome as electoral strategies is only one of the institutional constraints that shape the behaviour of party leaders, candidates and their followers. Regular elections offer feedbacks to the
incumbents on the effectiveness of its strategies. Despite the extensive literature and studies on the expected effects of electoral rules on party system, “electoral design remains more an art than science” (Norris 2004, 23). Indeed, elections and electoral engineering may bring about unintended consequences and end up enlarging the spaces of interparty competition by “default” (Way 2006; Case 2005; Hicken 2008). In Chapter 7 and 8, I will compare the effects of electoral engineering in Taiwan and Singapore. Measures such as party system fragmentation, party polarization and electoral volatility will be used as indicators of mechanical and psychological effects on party system.

49 Schedler argues that electoral engineering may be ineffective and fail to persuade voters as 1) the incumbent party may lack personnel or resources to put their strategies into effective practice, and 2) opposition parties may employ more sophisticated means to demand for more accountability (2009).

50 Case argues that the persistence of electoral autocracies is a function of artful manipulation as opposed to “unskilful” manipulation that result in regime replacement (2005).
PART I: ORIGINS, ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION
3 The PAP: Organization Transformation and Strategic Coordination

Origins of strong parties are often to be found in the struggles that brought them to power (Lapalombara and Weiner 1966). This is especially true for one-party regimes, which are “the product of the efforts of a political elite to organize and to legitimate rule by one social force over another in another bifurcated group” (Huntington, 1970, 11). Early political experiences and societal cleavages have important implications for a party’s organizational model and long-term survival (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Smith 2005). In Asia, the period between World War II and the onset of authoritarian regime was a critical juncture for the formation of states, regimes and parties (Slater 2005).

To understand how socio-economic cleavages and historical legacies affect the hegemonic party systems in Singapore and Taiwan, Chapter 3 and 4 will highlight the conditions under which the PAP and the KMT arose. This is not a historical study of the two parties as it has been done elsewhere in more depth. Rather, my aim is to build on established insights on party system formation and trace how historical experiences and early development of the two parties laid critical foundations for its institutionalization and resilience (Rose and Mackie 1988).

Within the study on Western European party systems, Lipset and Rokkan’s “freezing hypothesis” is most widely cited to explain how socio-economic cleavages, industrialization and national suffrage affect the formation and stability of party system (1967). Socio-ethnic cleavages such as class, culture, religion and ethnicity are usually viewed as contributing factors that lead to sharply differentiated groups within society and also determinants of the social bases of political conflict, institutionalizing a pattern of politics that was more or less immutable (Lijphart 1999; Rose and Urwin 1969).

---

1 For the PAP’s early history, see Pang (1971); Chan (1976); Fong (1979); and Drysdale (1984). For the history of the KMT after 1949, see Dickson (1997); Taylor (2000) and Tien (1989).

2 As Lipset and Rokkan say, “The decisive sequence of party formation took place at the early stage of competitive politics, in some cases well before the extension of the franchise, in other cases on the eve of the very rush to mobilization of the finally enfranchised masses” (1967, 34). Cleavages are issues, policy differences or identifications related to conflicts in a society; associated with demographic attributes such as race, religion and occupation. See Bartolini and Mair (1990); Mair (1990); and Kitschelt (1995).
In contrary to Lipset and Rokkan’s thesis, I argue that socio-ethnic cleavage structures are not deterministic or immutable. Based on my study of the PAP and KMT, I argue that socio-ethnic cleavages have varying impacts on party system formation. In Singapore, the PAP leaders were able to put in place a series of measures to dismantle and depoliticise socio-ethnic cleavages. The PAP’s strategic coordination prevented the rise of partisan alignment based on ethnic or religious consciousness. But in Taiwan, the KMT exacerbated the sub-ethnic cleavage between the majority local Taiwanese and minority Chinese from Mainland China by adopting discriminatory policy to prevent Taiwanese to assume key party and political positions since 1945. In Chapter 4, I show that while the KMT attempted to address this sub-ethnic cleavage through Taiwanization policy - recruiting more local Taiwanese to key party and official positions in the 1970s and 80s, the policy reversal came too little, too late and had dire consequences on party cohesion. Emboldened by Taiwanization, the “Dangwai” or opposition movement formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 against the legal ban. Capitalizing on the sub-ethnic cleavage, the DPP was able to mobilize the disenfranchised Taiwanese based on ethnic justice.

Unlike the KMT model that allowed the sub-ethnic cleavage to translate into partisan alignment, the PAP repressed socio-ethnic tensions through strategic coordination – the provision of public goods and selective withdrawal of civil-political liberties. After the PAP government came to power, it systematically de-politicized ethnic cleavages, fostered a national identity and built a “catch-all” party platform to appeal to a wide-sector of Singaporeans. The PAP was intrusive and deliberate in its public policies and use of state resources to build a network of para-political institutions to maintain ideological and racial harmony. As Chua argued, the “depoliticization” effect was an ideological achievement of the PAP (1997, 127). In Chapter 5, I contend that the PAP’s ability to set the political agenda and dictate the parameters for public discourse gave it a distinct advantage over its challengers.

Pre-democratic parties formed during Lipset and Rokkan’s “early period” are more likely to persist (1967). In Singapore and Taiwan, the early establishment of the PAP and

---

3 This is based on the view that ethnic identities are pragmatic or opportunistic constructions by political entrepreneurs and need to be understood within its social, cultural contexts (Laitin 1998).
KMT gave them a distinctive advantage. In both cases, the parties have had a critical role in fighting for the country’s independence and international recognition. In the 1950s, both parties experienced working with, and later fought against, the communist parties. These early experiences left an indelible mark as seen in the KMT’s mass-based, quasi-Leninist-style organization and democratic centralism as its decision-making model. Likewise for the PAP, its left-wing experiences led to its transformation from a mass party to a cadre one - a critical juncture in its party development that removed intra-party democracy from its leadership selection. As Chapters 3 and 4 posit, the PAP and KMT’s quasi-Leninist party organization based on cadre system and penetration into the grassroots levels through para-political organizations were common traits that foster party discipline and elite cohesion – institutional sources that explain their resilience in the 1960s and 70s.

The arguments in this chapter are organized as follows. The first section considers the origins of the PAP and demonstrates how Singapore early socio-economic cleavages affect the PAP’s organization. It focuses on the PAP’s early party formation experiences and impact of the party splits on its cadre-party organizational model on cohesion. Based on the idea of strategic coordination, I argue that the provision of public goods such as housing and social services via the para-political institutions helped to build ideological consensus and performance legitimacy of the PAP. By constraining civil liberties through a myriad of legal rules, the PAP was able to turn the negative ground swell around in the 1960s and lay the institutional foundation for its hegemonic rule.

**Origins of the PAP**

Singapore was returned to its British colonial master after 3 years and 8 months of Japanese occupation (Feb 1942- Sep 1945). After the end of Second World War, the British resumed control of Singapore, first as a British Military Administration (Sep 1945-Apr 1946) to restore law and order and later, as a separate crown colony. However, the inability of the British to defend Singapore had severely damaged its credibility as the ruler of Singapore. Post-war Singapore saw an increasing political awakening amongst its local population and rising anti-colonialist and nationalist sentiments (Fong 1979).
Meanwhile in London, a group of English-speaking, middle-class men\(^4\) from Singapore and Malaya came together to form the Malayan Forum to discuss the ideas of forming an independent Malaya. Upon their return from Britain after completing their studies the young men, imbued with Fabian Socialist idealism, decided to form an anti-colonial left-wing party to fight for equal treatment, social justice and local representation.

Lee Kuan Yew, the PAP’s founding leader, was a trained lawyer with double-first class honour from Cambridge University\(^5\). As automatic registration of voters under the Rendel constitution\(^6\) enabled more Chinese-speaking voters into the Singapore rolls, Lee knew his middle-class background and limited Chinese language knowledge would hinder his reach to the Chinese supporters (Lee 1998). To capture the Chinese and dialect-speaking voters for the Legislative Elections in 1955\(^7\), he decided to “ride the tiger” and invite left-wing Chinese-speaking, communist leaders from the trade unions to join the PAP.

In a ceremony attended by 1,500 members, supporters and observers, the PAP was inaugurated on 21 November 1954 (Lee 1998). This ceremony marked the beginning of what Duverger termed an “externally-created party”\(^8\) that rejected colonialism, imperialism, the Rendel Constitution, the Emergency Regulations and Malayanization of the civil service. The PAP had sought recognition of Chinese, Tamil, Malay and English as official languages and equal citizenship regardless of race, religion or language to all who were prepared to pledge loyalty to Malaya\(^9\) (Pang 1971).

Ideologically, the PAP projected itself as a radical, left-winged party with the support of the trade unions and student movement. While the founding leaders were from a middle-class background, the PAP distinguished itself from the other more established, right-winged

\(^{4}\) The PAP’s founding leaders were Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye, Goh Keng Swee; members of the Malayan Forum - a group formed in London. Goh later recruited two more “lieutenants”, Joe Pillay and Chua Sian Chin (Lee 1998, 231). These pioneers held key government positions in Singapore’s early government.

\(^{5}\) A legal advisor to trade unions, Lee was self-described as a “golf-playing, beer-swilling bourgeois”, brought up in a family who thought “everything English was the acme of perfection” (Lee 1998, 138).

\(^{6}\) The Rendel Constitution was introduced in 1953 to allow Singapore more self-governance.

\(^{7}\) There were two previous elections to the Legislative Council (1948 with 6 elected seats and 1951 with 9 elections) with small electorates (Fong 1979, 27).

\(^{8}\) “Externally created parties” refer to those that emerge outside the legislature and involve some challenge to the ruling group and a demand for representation. They are expected to be more centralized than “internally created” parties and more ideologically coherent and disciplined, less willing to ascribe importance to be deferential toward the Parliament (Duverger 1954, xxiii).

\(^{9}\) The PAP considered Singapore to be part of Malaya from its inception (Pang 1971, 3).
parties such as the Progressive Party (PP) - Singapore’s first political party led by English educated professionals and Englishmen - and the wealthy Democratic Party (DP) which consisted of Mandarin-speaking bourgeois from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. To legitimize itself as a multi-racial, multi-lingual mass party, the first PAP Central Executive Committee (CEC) - the highest executive body in the Party - had 11 members of different ethnicities and backgrounds who were a “consciously radical and anti-colonial coalition of moderate socialists and left-wing communist forces” (Chan 1989, 71). Then, the CEC composed of 7 Chinese, 2 Malays and 2 Indians; young men in their 20s and 30s of varied education levels (3 with university degrees, 5 secondary and 3 primary school education) (Pang 1971, 38).

From the onset, it was clear to outsiders that the Party had two factions: the moderates and the communists. 3 out of the 11 CEC members were known communists or communist sympathizers. While the moderates led by Lee needed the communists for mass support; the communists led by Lim Chin Siong needed the PAP to pursue the cause of their illegal Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Lim was a prominent leader of the militant Middle Road Group of Unions and Chinese Middle School Students Union – training grounds and channels of recruitment for the underground Malayan Communist Party (Clutterbuck 1985). Despite the ideological and language differences between the factions, the Party was united in the common goal to represent the working-class and end colonial rule.

Singapore’s early electoral politics was vibrant, competitive and rambunctious. As a result of the Rendel Constitution, the island was divided into 25 constituencies and automatic registration of voters in 1955 increased the limited electorate from 48,000 in 1951 to 300,000 voters. Then, 60% of the voters were Chinese-speaking. The 1955 Legislative Assembly

---

10 Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye, Goh Keng Swee were considered the moderates, while Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and Devan Nair were said to be leaders of the communist faction (Pang 1971, 3).
11 Lim has never publicly admitted to being a communist. See Clutterbuck’s interview with Douglas Hyde, Lim’s prison cellmate from 1964-8 (1985, 99).
12 The “Middle-Road” Group was a group of unions that included Singapore Factory and Shop Worker’s Union (SFSWU) under Lim Chin Siong and Singapore Bus Workers’ Union (SBWU) under Fong Swee Suan.
13 See Lee (1998, 184) and Yeo (1973, 252-4) for Singapore’s early electoral framework.
election was the PAP’s first election and marked the Party’s foray into Singapore politics as an opposition force.\(^\text{14}\)

**Fight for Independence and Cleavages, 1950s**

From 1955 to 1959, Singapore was a self-governing entity and in a state of flux. The Labour Front government, under its first Chief Minister David Marshall and then later under Lim Yew Hock, pushed for independence. However, their efforts were met with resistance as Singapore was deemed a vital British commercial interest and strategic naval base in the region. Besides, the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947 and the defeat of the Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT government in China in 1949 also raised fears that Chinese chauvinism and wave of nationalist sentiments could turn Singapore into a hotbed for communism in Southeast Asia.

Pre-independence Singapore had all the elements of value dissension (Chiew 1990, 46). The small island’s struggle to independence was plagued by anti-colonial agitation, communist subversion and racial unrests. The Rendel Constitution that extended the franchise of Singaporeans changed the electoral techniques, composition and organization of parties such as the PAP (Yeo 1973, 253). Elite-based politics dominated by English-speaking locals and British elites were quickly replaced by mass politics that altered the pattern of electoral contests. In the 1950s, Singapore was filled with immigrants from impoverished rural South China, South India and Malaysia as a result of an unrestricted immigration policy.\(^\text{15}\) Problems of overpopulation, poverty, unemployment and inadequate housing fuelled discontent amongst the population of 1.4 million. Low literacy rate, poverty and lack of job opportunities pushed the immigrants to lowly paid menial work such as hawkers, rickshaw pullers and domestic servants (Huff 1994, 277).\(^\text{16}\) In the 1950s and 60s, the majority of Chinese population (75.4%) was comparatively, the least literate (46.2%). See Table 3-1.

---

\(^{14}\) In the 1955’s hotly contested Legislative Elections, a total of 79 candidates competed: 69 nominated by parties, while 10 stood as independents. The PAP fielded 4 candidates and won 3 out of the 25 seats.

\(^{15}\) After 1965, Singapore's government imposed strict controls on immigration, granting temporary residence permits only to those whose labor or skills were considered essential to the economy.

\(^{16}\) In 1957, unemployment stood at 4.9%. 38.5% of the total employed population were in the production, transport and manual work occupation. Only 5.2% were in the professional sector (Huff 1994, 91 and 291).
Table 3-1: Singapore’s Population by Ethnicity, 1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Malays</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-70 (Growth rates)</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 (Literacy rates)</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>94.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rising Chinese nationalism polarized the multi-racial Singapore society. Dissatisfied with the income disparity between the minority English speaking colonial subordinates and the rest of the population, many working-class Chinese joined unions, parties and student movements to agitate for change. The earliest record shows that in the mid-1960s, Singapore’s personal income distribution or Gini coefficient\(^{17}\) was 0.50, improving to 0.44 only in 1975 (Huff 1994, 351). However, the orientation and loyalty of the Chinese students and unionists were to China and not Singapore (Chiew 1990, 55). The Chinese textbooks used in the Singapore Chinese schools were mostly from China and Taipei.\(^{18}\) As a result, unions and student groups were prime recruit grounds and infiltrated by communists to further their agenda (Clutterbuck 1985, 75-98). The Chinese working-class was dispossessed as they were excluded in the official life of the colony, which employed only English-educated Caucasians, Indians and others as subordinates (Lee 1998, 167). As anti-colonial sentiments grew, the gap between the English middle-class and the poor, Chinese-speaking working class widened.

Low wages and unfair welfare treatment of labourers also led to a series of labour union strikes, civil unrests, student “sit-ins” and anti-colonial demonstrations, many instigated and led by the unions and the PAP’s left faction. The riots and grievances of the Chinese movement highlighted the problem of nation building in a plural society (Chiew 1985, 55). Some of the strikes and protests that turned bloody include Maria Hertogh\(^{19}\) riot in 1950; National Conscription riot on 13 May 1954; Hock Lee Bus Riot on 12 May 1955 and Chinese middle-school riots in 1956.\(^{20}\) It was estimated that 275 strikes were called and 162

\(^{17}\) There was no income distribution index or statistics available for 1950s.

\(^{18}\) After China turned communist in 1949, Chinese nationalism in Singapore was split into the left and right. The left was led by the Communist Party of Malaya, and right, by the Kuomintang Party in Taiwan. Both competed for the allegiance of the Chinese students in Singapore (Chiew 1990, 55).

\(^{19}\) Maria Hertogh riots was sparked by a custody battle over a Dutch Catholic girl allegedly informally adopted by a Muslim Malay woman which resulted in 18 deaths and 173 injured (IBA Report 2008, 62).

\(^{20}\) See Clutterbuck (1985) for causes of the riots in the 1950s and Vasil (1989, Chapter 7) on the role and development of trade union movement in Singapore.
of them in the 5 months from Apr to Sep 1955 were attributed to the “Middle-Road” Group under Lim Chin Siong – the PAP’s communist faction leader (Clutterbuck 1985, 100).

The PAP Membership and Organization

As Duverger posits, the mass party model usually emerges in a highly polarized society with key objectives of large-scale recruitment and socialization of individual members (1964, 60-71). The PAP was initially organized as a mass party with a broad and inclusive recruitment policy that emphasized quantity rather than quality. As early sources show, the party membership was only a few hundred and grew to 4,860 after 1959 (Pang 1971, 6). See Table 3-2. The PAP membership in the early 1960s consisted mostly of lowly educated, working-class Chinese, between 20 to 29 years old. While there were other ethnic-minority representatives in the PAP, the percentages were low, compared to the ethnic minority groups of the total Singapore population in 1961.

Table 3-2: PAP Membership Size and Residential Population in Singapore (1958-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total membership</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4,860</td>
<td>2,183</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>14,830</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no of residents / no. of citizens (’000)</td>
<td>1.445</td>
<td>1.646</td>
<td>1.795</td>
<td>1.886</td>
<td>1.874</td>
<td>2.623*</td>
<td>3.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated % of total residents/citizens</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PAP Membership and Singapore’s Population by ethnicity (%), 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Malays</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAP’s membership (before 1961)</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore’s total population (1961)</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PAP Membership by Age and Education, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Before 1961</th>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>College or University</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>Vocational and Classics</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculated based on data from Pang (1971), Petir and Singapore Statistics, various years.

PAP’s recruitment has declined since its heydays in 1960s and not kept with the country’s population growth. In fact, the proportion of PAP members to the total population has dropped from 0.8% to 0.5% as the population grew from 1.9 mil in 1971 to 3.1 mil in 2009. See Table 3-2. Presently, the party membership is 15,000, approximately 0.1% of total
number of Singapore citizens\(^{21}\) (3.2 mil, 2009). There are insufficient new recruits to replace the aging party members. In 2006, more than 50% of its party members were above 40 years old. As one PAP member observed, “By 2030, 15 years from now, 25 per cent of the population will be more than 65 years old. The situation will be the same in our party membership and in each branch. Without a focused, sustained influx of young activists in the next five years, we will have a weak party” (Petir, Sep/Oct 2006).\(^ {22}\) With an increase in the total population of Singaporeans, the PAP has attempted to recruit more aggressively to keep up with the changes in demography (Petir, Sep/Oct 2006). In 2009, the PAP Youth Wing reported a surge of over 1,000 new, young members - an increase from previous years of 600 to 700 recruits annually (Straits Times, 4 Feb 2010).

The PAP was understaffed and underfunded in its early years.\(^ {23}\) As Lee Kuan Yew said in his autobiography: “The PAP organization was weak, almost nonexistent: no paid staff, branches or grassroots leaders. For canvassing and help at election rallies, we would call upon the unions and Chinese middle school students”. To expand membership, the party welcomed all members and volunteers that included “young people, mostly workers, trade union officials and students” (Lee 1998, 182). The PAP’s open and inclusive recruitment policy meant that the party was vulnerable to communist infiltration (Fong 1979, 32). In 1961, it was estimated that 677 (29.1%) of total PAP members were trade unionists. After 1961, the total number of unionists began to decline to 570 (23.5%) (Pang 1971, 67).

Between 1954 and 1957, the PAP had a simple party structure with direct communication channels between the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and cadre members (Shee 1971, 85). In 1955, the PAP organization consisted only of a CEC and 6 branches (Fong 1979, 33). A headquarter (HQ) Committee was only set up to re-organize and streamline the various branches after 1958. See Appendix C for the organizational structure of the PAP in 1958. In the PAP, the CEC is the main decision-making body and the branches are instrumental in implementing the policy.

\(^{21}\) According to Article III of the PAP’s Party constitution, only citizen of Singapore above 17 years old is eligible to be a member. Refer to the PAP’s Constitution at http://www.pap.org.sg/ourconstitution.php.

\(^{22}\) See “Speech by Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, Chairman,” YP 20th Anniversary YP, 15 Apr 2006.

\(^{23}\) For party finance, see Fong (1971, 288) and Pang (1971, 29).
The party organization has grown in complexity since the 1960s. With the CEC holding the key executive power, there is now a highly organized Executive Committee at the Headquarters that is tasked with 12 core functions, namely: Constituency Relations, Information and Feedback, Malay Affairs, Membership Recruitment and Cadre Selection; New Media, PAP Awards, Political Education, Publicity and Publications, Social and Recreation, Women’s Wing (set up in 1989), Young PAP (Youth wing, set up in 1986) and External Relations. Aside from running these 12 functions, the HQ Executive Committee also oversees the organization of the PAP policy Forum and five Districts. Unlike wealthy parties such as the KMT, the PAP operates out of a modest headquarters in Upper Changi, on the outskirts of the city centre. And from just 10 party branches in 1950s, there are now a total of 84 party branches, strategically located in various parts of Singapore. The expansion of party branches indicates a high degree of party rootedness and institutionalization.

**Intra-party Leadership Struggles and Implications**

Before 1957, the PAP constitution provided that the CEC was to be elected annually in the Party Conference by all party cadres and members. While the communist faction leaders stood aside in the Party’s first CEC election in June 1955, the tension between the moderates and communist factions grew. By the 3rd Party Conference in July 1956, the Communist faction looked set to wrestle control from the moderates, as it won 5 out of 12 CEC seats during the CEC election (Pang 1971, 4).

As the two factions headed for a showdown for the 4th Party Conference in Aug 1957 to elect the next CEC, the rift between the factions became irreconcilable. Inclusive party membership and open, electoral policy meant that the communists could stack the assembly hall with their supporters, many whom were registered as party members at the last minute. As a result, 6 left-leaning members were elected into the 12 men CEC with 4,858 votes. The moderate faction led by Lee only received 5,380 votes. As the moderates realized that they have lost majority control of the CEC, they refused to take leadership. As Lee said, it was a

---

24 There were conflicting reports to why Lim and his comrades decided not to contest (Pang 1971, 4).
25 In response, Lee recruited Ong Pang Boon, an educated bi-lingual man, who could converse in English, Mandarin and dialects to help Lee connect with the Chinese speaking mass-base (Lee 1998, 242).
26 The control of the CEC was critical as the communist faction was against the moderate’s call for independence through merger with the Federation of Malaya and the Internal Security Council (Pang 1971, 4).
tactic to leave the pro-communist in charge, so that they will be left without a front (1998, 270). But the victory of the pro-communist faction was short-lived. Ten days after the 4th Party election, 5 PAP CEC members were among the 35 people arrested under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance – which gave the ruling Labour Front government powers to detain without trial. The purge was a “welcome respite to the moderates who resumed control of the Party” (Pang 1971, 4).

The near capture of the CEC by the communist faction was a turning point in the history of the PAP as the moderates learnt that inclusiveness and intra-party democracy could severely weaken internal cohesion and control. As Lee said, “the folly of adopting a democratic constitution that had left it open to capture through the penetration of its own party branches. We discussed several possible changes to ensure that it could never happen again” (Lee 1998, 271). Indeed, the PAP learned a hard lesson from this incident and has not opened up the election of the CEC to the party members since. As shall be discussed in Chapter 5, the near take-over by the pro-communist faction was a critical juncture that led to the permanent removal of a democratic and inclusive leadership selection method – a significant organizational change that fostered party cohesion.

Organizational Changes in 1958

After the failed communist takeover attempt in 1957, Lee instituted a cadre system and introduced a bloc-voting system for the CEC selection and maintained regular re-registering of party membership to prevent outsiders from takeover (Pang 1971, 35). Reminded of the resilience of the Catholic Church after a visit to Rome in 1958, Lee overhauled the PAP’s CEC election system and applied the Pope selection method to the selection of the party’s CEC. In addition to this, an Ordinary Party Conference was introduced where cadre members meet every two years to elect the CEC. Significantly, the

---

27 The 35 people were detained because of their communist subversive activities and instigation of strikes. Lee Kuan Yew claims that the arrests were an attempt by the Lim’s government to prevent the communist in capturing the Singapore Trade Union Council (Lim’s support base) (1998, 271).

28 As Lee recounts in his autobiography: “The Church must have got many things right to have survived for nearly two thousand years... Soon after I returned from Rome, I proposed that PAP elections to the central executive committee be modeled on the system for electing the Pope...Only cadres who had been chosen by the CEC could in turn vote for candidates to the CEC, just as only cardinals nominated by a Pope could elect another Pope. This closed the circuit, and since the CEC controlled the core of the party, the party could not now be captured” (1998, 287).
PAP leaders altered the party constitution to remove intra-party democracy. The new party constitution: 1) allowed only full cadres to vote in the election of the CEC; 2) became more stringent in its membership recruitment policy; and 3) introduced four categories of membership to distinguish between the cadre and ordinary members (probationary, ordinary, probationary cadre and cadre) (Chan 1989, 73). 1958 marked the end of 4 years of intra-party democracy where party members came together annually to elect the CEC. The implications of the PAP’s leadership selection will be discussed in Chapter 5.

**Party Splits in 1960 and 1961**

Unlike the present day leadership, the PAP in the 1960s was factionalized. In fact, leadership and factional struggles led to two party splits. While the first split was the result of a personality clash between Ong Eng Guan and Lee Kuan Yew, the second was driven by ideological differences between the moderate and pro-communist factions. Perceiving attempts by Lee to curtail his power, and out of a general dissatisfaction with the leadership, then Minister for National Development, Ong Eng Guan tabled “Sixteen Resolutions” in the Legislature and challenged Lee’s leadership. Ong was later suspended as a Minister and expelled for “attempts to disrupt party unity and destroy collective party leadership” (Pang 1971, 8). Ong’s expulsion triggered the PAP’s first split and the formation of the United People’s Party (UPP). Consequently, a by-election was held in Hong Lim constituency and a PAP candidate, Jek Yuen Thong, lost to Ong by a large majority. Ong’s expulsion and the loss of the Hong Lim Branch marked the beginning of the PAP’s unravelling as the party leaders were losing control over the CEC and coordination among the branches (Shee 1971, 87).

In 1961, disagreements over the terms towards independence through merger with Malaya and the abolishment of the Internal Security Council between the pro-communists and moderates led to the second historic party split. On July 1961, 13 PAP Assemblymen left the PAP and formed the Barisan Socialis (BS) party, fronted by Dr. Lim Siew Choh. This

---

29 Ong was the Party Treasurer and Mayor of the City Council who stood in the Hong Lim constituency in 1959 elections. Ong’s fiery and anti-imperialist speeches in Hokkien were a crowd puller (Pang 1971).
30 The “Sixteen Resolutions” accused the Party of moving to the right and lack of intra-party democracy. Ong gathered 10,000 supporters in a stadium to support the Resolution on 12 Jul 1960 (Pang 1971).
31 See Pang (1998, 12-4); Vasil (2000, 25-7); Fong (1970, 98-9) and Mutalib (2004, 78-84) for the events leading to the split and formation of the BS.
defection resulted in the mass exodus of PAP members, including one of Lee’s parliamentary secretary Chan Sun Wing, who was in charge of the People’s Association (PA). The PA was created as a national grassroots organization to promote racial harmony, social cohesion and nation building\(^{32}\) through community recreation and activities. After the split, the PA and the Work Brigade\(^{33}\) went on strike (Bloodworth 1986, 243).

The second split nearly decimated the Party. As Chan observed, the split was a “major watershed in party organizational and ideological development, leading to a creative phase in political leadership. The moderates, who overnight had lost the existing mass base to the new party, were forced to develop new organizational resources” (Chan 1989, 72). Reportedly, 20 out of 25 party branch organizing secretaries and their committees defected and as much as 35 out of 51 party branches went to BS. The damage to the Party extended beyond membership numbers as branch property such as typewriters, sewing machines and furniture were looted and many properties were vandalised and sabotaged (Fong 1979, 105).

**Party Adaptation After 1963**

As Huntington reminds us, “the strength of one-party systems usually depends upon the duration and intensity of the struggle to acquire power or to consolidate power after taking over the government” (1970, 14). For the PAP, the intra-party leadership fights and struggle towards independence through merger with the Malaysia Federation in early 1960s were intense and long drawn. After it assumed government, pressures mounted from within and without. Parties from the left, such as the BS, campaigned against the PAP’s proposal for merger. Union strikes and student protests were staged to undermine the government. As Table 3-3 shows, in 1961 and 62, the number of trade disputes reached its highest levels of 1, 225 and 1064 respectively. Pressures were mounting. Besides the party splits, the PAP also lost its second by-election in Anson constituency to David Marshall.

---

\(^{32}\) See Fong (1979, 108-9) on the formation of the PA on July 1960 and role of party branches.

\(^{33}\) Lee later appointed Ahmed Ibrahim, a hardliner, to deregister the Trade Unions Congress and put down a mutiny by the pro-communist operators in the Works Brigade (1998, 388).
According to Pang’s estimates, the 1961 party split caused the PAP to lose as much as 80.4% of its members. In 1961, a total of 565 had either resigned or were expelled from the party. Many left for ideological reasons; dissatisfaction with the PAP’s leadership or a loss of faith in a non-communist PAP (Pang 1971, 388-9). The PAP had to face the formidable task of rebuilding the embattled Party that was left with only 26 members in a 51 member Legislative Assembly (Lee 1998, 385-6; Fong 1970, 105). See Appendix D for the significant events during the PAP’s early rule.

The 1961 split altered the size and composition of the party membership. Prior to the split, the PAP consisted mainly of young, Chinese working class members. By mid 1966, the PAP became more heterogeneous with more Malays and Indians. There was also a noticeable downgrading of mass party expansion, as the Party moved towards a more balanced social profile that reflected the socio-ethnic demography of Singapore’s population. By the mid 1960s, party recruitments show that the PAP was attracting older and better educated, English speaking members from other minority groups. See Table 3-4.

Table 3-3: Trade Unions, Disputes and Strikes in Singapore, 1960s-70s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Trade Unions</th>
<th>Union Members</th>
<th>Industrial stoppage/strikes</th>
<th>Trade disputes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953-4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>144,770</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>164,462</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>1,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>189,032</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>142,936</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>157,050</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>154,052</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>141,925</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>130,053</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>125,518</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120,053</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>112,488</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data for 1953-55 from Clutterbuck (1985, 100); 1955-7 from Fong (1979, 143) and Singapore Statistics (1983, 40-1).
Table 3-4: Ethnic Composition and Education of the PAP Members, the 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Composition of PAP members (%)</th>
<th>Before 1961</th>
<th>Joined after 1961</th>
<th>Mid 1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malays</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium of Education of the PAP members (%)</th>
<th>Before 1961</th>
<th>Joined after 1961</th>
<th>Mid 1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others/Unknown</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes In The Education Level Of The PAP Members (%)</th>
<th>Before 1961</th>
<th>Mid 1966</th>
<th>Mid 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary or Secondary</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College or University</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and Classics</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shee (1971, 166) and Pang (1971, 61-2).

**Strategic Coordination: Dismantling Cleavages**

How did the PAP recover from the bloodbath from the 1960s splits? How did the frail party manage the volatile social-ethnic relations in a polarized society? I argue that through strategic coordination - provision of public goods and selective withdrawal of coordination mechanisms - the PAP was able to rebuild the Party and regain the mass support of Singaporeans. Here, party building refers to the extent to which the Party was able to penetrate from the centre to the periphery (territorially and organizationally) (Randall and Svasand 2002, 17). Ideologically, the PAP moved towards the centre and projected itself as a centrist “catch-all” party to appeal to wider spectrum of Singaporeans.34

Organizationally, the PAP’s reforms after 1963 to change from mass party to cadre-party model helped to tighten party cohesion after the mass exodus of members.35 As Chan

---

34 According to Kirchheimer, “catchallism” meant a reduction of the party’s ideological baggage; b) strengthening of the top leadership groups, whose actions are judged based on their contribution to the entire social system; c) downgrading of the role of the individual member; d) in favour of recruiting voters among the population and e) securing access to interest groups for financial and electoral reasons (1966, 190).

35 See Lee’s account of how the moderates regained grounds after the communists left (1998,174).
notes, the PAP is “a cadre party in a mass party guise” (1985, 159). Party building includes the use of para-political institutions for integrative functions. As Panebianco says, territorial penetration occurs when the “centre” controls, stimulates or directs the development of the “periphery” (1988, 50). The greater the degree of penetration to the ground, the more institutionalized a party is likely to become. The following sections will examine how the PAP’s strategic coordination laid the foundation for its institutionalization.

**Propaganda Campaigns.** To begin with, a Special Committee headed by Dr. Goh Keng Swee was formed in July 1961 to find ways to improve party morale. The Party’s special committee was asked to weed out career-seekers and disloyal elements by holding more meetings between party leaders and branch officials and increased political indoctrination (Shee 1971, 92). Besides, Lee and his colleagues also went on massive constituency tours in 1962 to 1963 to visit all 51 constituencies to rally grassroots support and boost morale (Fong 1979, 107). As a result of the early partnership with the pro-communists, Lee learnt that the communist styled mass psychology and adroit manipulation of stage management were critical in winning the hearts and minds of the people. Propaganda campaigns were one of the mobilizing strategies that the PAP used to build civic consciousness. As Lee said: “We mounted a series of well-publicized campaigns to clean the streets of the city, clear the beaches of debris and cut the weeds of unkempt vacant land. It was a copycat exercise borrowed from the communists” (1998, 322). Lee gave 12 broadcasts over the radio in English, Malay and Mandarin to explain the reasons behind the infightings, the events leading to split between the two factions and rationale behind the PAP’s proposal for the merger (Lee 1998, 398-9). In an era without TV, Lee’s broadcasts had a far-reaching public relations impact and changed the mass perception of the PAP. Besides, the party’s bilingual organizing secretary, Ong Pang Boon also started a recruitment drive.

**Building Para-Political Institutions.** To rebuild the party branches, the party leaders appointed the loyal 26 Assemblymen as Party branch chairmen in their respective constituencies (Pang 1971, 15). The tradition of appointing a PAP MP as a chairman of the party branches remained till date. Under their guidance, the branches regrouped the cadres,

---

36 As Lee said, “It took me two years from 1954 to 1956 to fathom their methods, to get glimpses of their intrigues and deviousness and to understand the dynamics of the communist united front (CUF) (1998, 174).
supporters and re-established networks (Fong 1979, 106). Interestingly, the PAP did not expand or invest more resources at the branch level. Instead, the PAP decentralized and left the branches to be financially self-sufficient, autonomous in recruitment and solving local constituency problems (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 43). The PAP leaders learnt that they could not rely on mass-party organizational techniques and the concentration of activities in one single organization would leave the PAP vulnerable to one blow (Chan 1985, 161).

With the impending referendum in 1962 and Assembly Elections in 1963, the PAP used the People’s Association (PA) to re-establish links with the clan associations, civil and cultural groups, the Community Centres and the Works Brigade (Bellows 1968). Established as a statutory board\(^\text{37}\), the PA then draw on state resources to build a sprawling network of Community Centres (CCs); Citizens' Consultative Committees (CCCs); Community Club Management Committees (CCMCs), Residents' Committees (RCs) in public housing estates and Neighbourhood Committees (NCs) in private estates for political communication and political participation purposes\(^\text{38}\) (Bellows 1968, 36-7; Seah 1985, 174-6). See Table 3.5.

These para-political institutions are critical to PAP’s consolidation of power and building of mass support.\(^\text{39}\) Indeed, the CCs provided a wide range of recreational, social and sports courses, activities, programmes and facilities in the local constituencies, while the CCMS ran the CCs. On the other hand, the CCCs were created as institutionalized feedback mechanisms for the masses to relay messages from the ground to the government.

---

\(^{37}\) The PA is anchored in the government structure. The Chairman of its board of management is the Prime Minister and the Deputy Chairman is a Cabinet minister.

\(^{38}\) See Tan (2003) for a critique of the CDCs as tools to mute the antagonistic tendencies of civil society.

\(^{39}\) As Seah notes: “the government realized that it could afford not wait for the party to regain its former organizational and mobilizational capabilities. The parapolitical organization was to perform this vital task of consolidating the ruling government...institutionalized channels where the norms of the new political community envisaged by the PAP leaders would be fostered” (1985, 177).
### Table 3-5: List of Para-Political Institutions under the PA in Singapore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Para-Political Institutions</th>
<th>Aims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>People’s Association (PA)</td>
<td>Established as a statutory board, chaired by the Prime Minister to promote closer ethnic ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Community Centre/Clubs (CCs)</td>
<td>To provide recreational, social and sports courses, activities, programmes, facilities and kindergartens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Community Centre Management Committees (CCMCs)</td>
<td>To manage the CCs. Local leaders appointed to newly established CCMCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Citizens' Consultative Committees (CCCs)</td>
<td>Committees led by the MPs. CCCs members are selected by the MPs to provide feedback.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>PA Youth Movement (PAYM)</td>
<td>To encourage youths to participate in local, communal activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Residents' Committees (RCs)</td>
<td>Created to improve the living environment, safety and security of their estates; run by volunteers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>PA Indian Cultural Groups Coordination Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>PA Malay Activity Groups Coordination Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>CCs upgraded and renamed Community clubs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>CCCs and RCs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Community Development Councils (CDCs)</td>
<td>9 CDCs were first set up, later regrouped into 5 districts that administer programs to promote community bonding and cohesion. 5 appointed mayors lead the CDCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Committees (NCs)</td>
<td>Part of CDCs, set up to improve the social and physical environment in private estates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Full time mayors appointed to lead 5 CDCs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To counter the opposition BS’s provision of pre-school education in the 1960s, the PAP also operated a chain of low-cost kindergartens, ran directly by the branches until 1986, where a charitable arm of the PAP (PAP Community Foundation) took over. Organized similarly to the PA, the PCF is a large organization with 84 branches, over 300 centres and 3,000 employees. Together, the para-political institutions played a “vital role in political communication and brokerage between the masses and the government” and helped foster a sense of community and well-being (Seah 1985, 174). For example, in 1969, the CCs were mobilized to make house visits to calm fears and soothe tempers to avert violence resulting from riots between Malays and Chinese in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Clutterbuck 1985, 324). CCs were set up in all 51 constituencies by 1961. Starting with only 28 CCs, the PA has expanded to 105 CCs, 550 RCs and 100 NC centres. As of this writing the PA has over 1,800 grassroots organisations with more than 25,000 volunteers or grassroots leaders.
The establishment of the PA was the most effective strategy of controlled mobilization that served the critical functions of co-opting the local talents and directing them to the government’s socio-political development programs (Seah 1985, 174). Besides, the CCCs act as brokers between the MPs, the PAP government and the people and replaced some of the traditional party functions by connecting the Party with the masses.\(^{40}\) They provide outlets for the people to express their interests and avenues to be socialized and abandon their sub-group nationalism and anti-system beliefs. In sum, the CCCs and CCMCs are channels where people can participate in local politics and provide feedback to the MPs. They are tools used to rationalize government policies so that they are more palatable and acceptable to the people. For example, in the 1960s, the CCs facilitated the acceptance of national conscription among the Singaporeans. It was also through the CCs that the PAP launched campaigns such as “Keep Singapore Clean and Pollution Free” and exhibitions to rationalize the significance of a citizen soldier for the defence of Singapore (Chan 1991, 165).

For the growth of para-political grassroots organizations under the PA, see Table 3-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens’ Consultative Committees (CCCs)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Centre/Club Management Committees (CCs/CMCs)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents’ Committee (RCs)</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No. GR Organizations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens’ Consultative Committees (CCCs)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,034</td>
<td>3,054</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>3,223</td>
<td>3,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Centre/Club Management Committees (CCs/CMCs)</td>
<td>2,418</td>
<td>2,786</td>
<td>2,858</td>
<td>2,879</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>3,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents’ Committee (RCs)</td>
<td>10,869</td>
<td>11,439</td>
<td>11,281</td>
<td>11,343</td>
<td>11,453</td>
<td>11,643</td>
<td>11,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Membership</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17,173</td>
<td>17,276</td>
<td>17,479</td>
<td>17,830</td>
<td>18,136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Instead of building party branches, the PAP scaled down branch activities. Organizationally, the PAP has only 8-9 paid full-time staff to run a small party headquarters located in an isolated location in Changi. With the PA created as a statutory board, the PAP

\(^{40}\) As Chan notes: “The Government had nurtured a viable local leadership whose contribution in the implementation and feedback process enhanced the capacity of the political leaders to govern” (1991, 165).
was able to draw government resources and free its party branches of the burden of organizing educational, sports and welfare activities at the grassroots level. Doing so meant that the line between the party and state becomes unclear. While the para-political organizations under the PA are quasi-governmental organizations, the opposition is excluded and prevented from using the bases to mobilize support (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 95; Seah 1985, 177 and 191). Opposition WP leader, Sylvia Lim complains that:

Under the Town Councils Act, the incumbent MP of a constituency will be in charge of the Town Council which controls the use of common space. As for the Community Clubs, these are in the hands of the People’s Association. It is next to impossible for an opposing candidate to be allowed to use a space to organize activities or dialogues. We have applied for permission to use spaces in PAP wards, and received expected rejections. (Constitutional Amendment Bill, 27 Apr 2010).

Some scholars suggest that the PAP’s strategy of building para-political institutions has undermined the PAP’s organizational capability (Chan 1985, 160; Lam 1999, 266; Mauzy and Milne 2002, 49). However, I argue that these institutions are extensions of the PAP as they propagate its party policies. The para-political institutions also have indirect partisan linkages as they are headed by PAP MPs. Under the PA’s Act, the PM is the Chairman. A senior minister would typically be appointed as Deputy Chairman. Having celebrated its 50th anniversary recently, the PA’s network of organizations is like the PAP’s penetrative tentacles that connect the state, party and society. It is unclear whether the PAP will give up control over the PA should party alternation occur. As E. Tan concurs, voters have grown to perceive the CDCs, Town Councils and the GRCs as PAP related entities. The PA’s successes in delivering social and recreational services are claimed as the Party’s achievements (2005, 419).

To appreciate the extent of the PAP’s penetration to the grassroots level, I suggest looking beyond the party’s formal, lean party structure to consider how these quasi-political institutions touch the people’s daily lives in concrete ways. As extensions of the Party’s formal organization, the PA has blurred the line between the government and party - reinforcing the PAP as a party-state. Like Seah, I contend that “unless the opposition is in a position to duplicate a similar set of parapolitical institutions, it will be extremely difficult for

---

41 Milne and Mauzy contend that while the BS gained control of the secondary associations, they lacked the PAP’s astute leadership (1990, 58). Also see Mutalib (2004, 96-111) for an explanation of the BS’s decline.
these parties to make any significant headway in the political process, especially if continued economic and social development is assured by the ruling party” (1985, 179).

**“Broker Institutions”**. Once in power, the PAP took active steps in “de-pluralization” – breaking down ethnic boundaries and exclusiveness of social and political organizations to foster a common Singaporean national identity. De-pluralization refers to the twin process of decreasing the significance of “parallel institutions” (an institution not shared among the ethnic groups) and increasing the significance of “broker institutions” (an institution shared by members of different ethnic groups) that bridge two or more ethnic groups such as family, education, government and parties. The PAP inaugurated 7 broker institutions to serve integrative functions and broke down socio-economic cleavages to foster national identity. For example: 1) integrated schools of different ethnicities; 2) inter-ethnic participation was actively promoted in schools; 3) school textbooks were Singaporeanized; 4) state symbols such as Singapore Flag, National Day Parade and National Anthem were designed to foster national identity; 5) bilingualism schools were made compulsory in 1966; 6) Housing Development Board was set up in 1960 and integrated public housing estates that consisted of all ethnicities; 7) technical and secular subjects were introduced to build a new Singaporean culture that is shared by all members of ethnic groups (Chiew 1990, 55).

All these nation-building efforts helped to develop cross-cutting ties, break down negative stereotypes and neutralize ethnic strife. With the help of organizations under the PA, the PAP was able to dismantle ethnic barriers and encourage communal, integrative activities for peoples of different ethnicities. As Brown argued, since the 1980s, the PAP has employed inclusionary corporatism that encouraged co-operative relations between state and private enterprises (1994, 76). Besides, the PAP government has also imposed corporatist controls on its workers and placated the workers through the redistribution of the surpluses earned (Case 2002, 87). Corporatist techniques were extended to the realm of ethnic identities which included reinforcing ethnic identities and engaging the Chinese community through the creation of Chinese Development Assistance Councils (CDAC); the dispensing of benefits to

42 According to Brown, the PAP’s corporatist strategy involves the state’s attempt to structure political around three facets: loyalty, value and interest. He contends that the state’s corporatist tendency has developed to such an extent that the ruling elites seeks to depict and organize every party of Singapore society along ethnic lines; even economic, political and social areas unrelated to ethnicity (1994, 76-7).
the Malays through the Mendaki program and the Indian community through the Singapore Indian Development Agency (SIDA). But critics such as NMP Viswa Sadasivan argue that these self-help groups reinforce race-consciousness and racial segregation.43

**Legal Constraints.** To quell union strikes, social and ethnic unrests, the PAP put in place a range of legal and social control mechanisms to maintain social order. The nationalist movement, backed by the trade unions and Chinese students that first propelled the PAP into the political scene, was later systematically dismantled by the PAP. As most scholars observed, Singapore labour-capital relations were channelled, institutionalized and regulated by a tight framework of labour laws and regulations (Luther 1978, 221). To begin with the PAP introduced the Trade Unions (Amendment) Bill and the Trade Union Bill in 1960 to empower the Registrar of Trade Unions to refuse registration or deregister unions in 1959. Between 1959 and 1960, a total of 106 unions lost their registration because of demands for high wages or were considered “infiltrated by communists” (Luther 1978, 225). By 1965, union movement and strikes were brought under control (Vasil 1989, 149). In 1970, the number of strikes and union disputes were contained at 5 and 486 respectively, a far cry from a high of 116 strikes and 1,225 disputes in 1961. See Table 3-3. The transformation of the Singapore labour movement, its reorganization by the state was arguably one of the “most important single factor(s) in the shaping of contemporary Singapore” (Luther 1978, 229).

Presently, Singapore’s industrial labour relations are characterized by a tripartite structure with joint decisions by representatives of labour, employers and government; issues such as wages are resolved through the tripartite National Wages Council.44 The scope of collective bargaining is restricted by legislation, and bargaining over transfers, promotions, layoffs and job assignments is disallowed. As Surin observes: “The Singapore labour system is a greatly oppressive one in which highly regulated trade unions appear to be engaged in collective bargaining. However it is a bargaining process that is strictly controlled by the state. In addition, union activity such as striking is closely regulated, union leadership is scrutinized by the ruling party, and wage increases are capped by government policy” (1996, 145).

43 See “NMP as the harbinger of controversial and divisive issues,” *New Asia Republic*, 1 Jan 2010.
44 For a critique of the top-down corporatist model of the Singapore’s industrial relations, see Barr (2000) and Leggett (1993). For a legal interpretation, see Surin (1996).
Singapore’s last racial riot was in 13 May 1969 when the election results in Malaysia led to clashes between the Chinese and Malay communities in Singapore.\textsuperscript{45} To prevent a replay of the ethnic or religious riots, the PAP government introduced a range of legislations that include the Public Entertainments Meeting Act (PEMA)\textsuperscript{46}, the Miscellaneous Offences Act (MOA), the Newspaper and Printing Presses (Amendment) Bill\textsuperscript{47}, the Singapore Societies Act, the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA, 1992), and the Seditious Act (1985) to ensure ethno-religious harmony and control over public gatherings.\textsuperscript{48} In 1970, the Presidential Council (later renamed Presidential Council for Minority Rights) was provided for in the Constitution to scrutinize the Bills passed by the House to ensure that the proposed law does not discriminate against any race, religion or community.\textsuperscript{49} The Sedition Act was also introduced in 1985 to curtail any attempt that might “promote ill-will or hostility between the different races or classes” (Subsection 3 of Sedition Act, 1985).\textsuperscript{50} See the list of legislations that prevent the politicization of ethno-religious cleavages in Singapore below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Legislations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Trade Union Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Public Entertainments Meeting Act (PEMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Seditious Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore Societies Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Newspaper and Printing Presses (Amendment) Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Public Order Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by author.

\textsuperscript{45} See Pang, Tan and Cheng (1989, 128-143) and Vasil (1989, 144-170) on how the PAP tamed the labour movement and unions in Singapore.

\textsuperscript{46} Outdoor protests and marches are required to obtain a permit under the PEMA. The only outdoor place that does not require a permit to demonstrate is at the Speaker’s Corner, venue for outdoor political speeches. See Public Entertainments and Meetings Act, Chapter 257 of Singapore Statutes Online at: http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.

\textsuperscript{47} This bill, passed on 1 Aug 1986 prevents foreign interference in Singapore politics. It forbade newspapers from receiving foreign funds and allows the PAP government to restrict the sale of publications deemed to have interfered in domestic affairs. Magazines such as Time, Asiaweek and Far Eastern Economic Review have had their circulations restricted in 1986 and 7. See Chronicle of Singapore (2009, 128 and 210).


\textsuperscript{49} See Tan (1989, 24) and Chapter 167A in the Singapore Constitution.

\textsuperscript{50} See all the legislations on Singapore Statutes Online at: http://statutes.agc.gov.sg
Amongst all the legislations, the MRHA is the most unique and powerful invention that gives the government an exceptional jurisdiction to restrain leaders and members of religious groups from carrying out activities, "exciting disaffection against" the government, creating "ill will" between religious groups, or carrying out subversive activities. In 2009, prior to the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation meeting in Singapore, the Government passed a Public Order Act\(^1\) to bar all public assembly without prior police permit.

Most of the legislations have been designed to empower the government to police race and religion in the public arena.\(^2\) With the advent of information technology, the PAP has introduced a range of legislations to regulate political discussions on chatrooms, blogging and social network websites on the Internet. Unlike the Chinese government, the PAP government engages in minimal Internet filtering, blocking only a small set of pornographic web sites. Instead, Singapore employs a combination of licensing controls and legal pressures to regulate internet access and limit the presence of objectionable content and conduct online (\textit{OpenNet Initiative Report} Jun 2009; Hachigian 2002). In Sep 2005, the Sedition Act was first used when 3 men were charged for making inflammatory racist comments on the Internet. In 2006, a young man received a police warning under the same Act for putting up offensive cartoons of Jesus Christ on his blog while 3 teenagers were arrested over racially insensitive remarks on Facebook.\(^3\) More recently, an evangelical Pastor was called up by Internal Security Department for disparaging Buddhism and Taoism during a sermon that was posted on \textit{YouTube}.\(^4\) See list of charges made under Sedition Act.


\(^{3}\) The PAP has been successful in curbing dissenting voices amongst traditional print and broadcast media, it is less so with regulating personal blogs, vodcasts and podcasts. See \textit{Channel NewsAsia}, 5 May 2006.

\(^{4}\) “Online joke turn nasty,” and “Pastor called up by ISD,” \textit{Straits Times} 5 Feb and 8 Feb 2010.
Charges made under Sedition Act in Singapore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2005</td>
<td>Sedition act first used on 2 men for making seditious and inflammatory racist comment on internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Young man received police warning for putting offensive cartoons of Jesus Christ on his blog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2008</td>
<td>A middle-aged Christian couple charged for distributing seditious publications to two Muslim women in 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2009</td>
<td>3 teenagers charged over racially sensitive remarks on Facebook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2010</td>
<td>A pastor called up by ISD for disparaging remarks about Buddhism and Taoism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2010</td>
<td>A man jailed for casting aspersions on Prophet Mohammad⁵⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled based on various media and newspaper sources.

Presently, ethnic and religious politics are banned in Singapore and ethnic parties are nearly non-existent. Subsumed under a nation-building rationale, strict rules regulating public and political discourse have deprived the potential opposition challengers of any space for social or political mobilization. Opposition parties with representation in Parliament such as the Workers’ Party⁵⁶ (WP) and the Singapore People’s Party (SPP) are led by Chinese leaders. The Singapore Malay National Organisation, or Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura⁵⁷ (PKMS) is the only Malay-based political party representative of Malay interests that is plagued by power struggles and a spent force. The newly formed Reform party (RP), led by JB Jeyaratam’s son, Kenneth Jeyaretnam, an ethnic-minority leader of mixed Indian and English descent is inclusive and open to members of all ethnicity and religions.

Public Goods. The PAP relies heavily on bureaucratic expertise⁵⁸ for policy formulation and execution to improve its performance legitimacy (Chan 1989, 75-6). To boost economic growth, Lee called on former civil servant Dr. Goh Keng Swee to restructure the economy and tourism sector in the 1960s. To provide affordable housing, Lim Kim San was tasked to set up Housing Development Board (HDB) – a crucial project that launched two 5-year plans for urban renewal and provided subsidized housing to replace squatters.

---

⁵⁵ This is the first case in Singapore’s history where a man was jailed under the Sedition Act. See “Jailed for religious insults.” Straits Times, 6 Aug 2010.

⁵⁶ The WP is the longest surviving party and was first led and David Marshall and JB Jeyarettnam, an Indian lawyer. JBJ was an MP from 1981-6 and again as a Non-Constituency MP from 1997-2001.

⁵⁷ PKMS started as a branch of Malaysia’s UMNO party in Singapore in 1951. Then it made efforts to help provide affordable housing for Malays. Yet, none of the PKMS candidates who contested in past general elections has ever won a seat. Since 2001, the PKMS has contested as part of the SDA coalition. See “Party once had a part in helping Malays” and “Is this $10m site the reason behind the PKMS fracas? Straits Times 13 Sep 2009 and “PKMS factions to meet,” Straits Times 7 Aug 2010.

⁵⁸ A political study centre was set up to train and socialize civil servants about the social and economic threats to Singapore. It was later known as Civil Service College.
50,000 units in high-rise blocks were built by 1965. Within 5 years, another 60,000 were completed. By 1972, 42% of the population were living in HDB housing and by 1981, 70%. Since 1988, 16 town councils\textsuperscript{59} were formed to manage the 900,000 HDB flats – 14 town councils by PAP members of parliament (MPs), while the other 2 are by opposition MPs. The New Towns housed around 600 to 1000 (25000 to 50000 inhabitants) units with its CCs, swimming pools, social and recreational amenities.

If the PAP had not been able to deliver results and build houses in prominent and strategic locations, Lee Kuan Yew may not have been re-elected in 1963 GE (Lee 1998, 344). The provision of affordable public housing was a visible, public good that earned the PAP extensive legitimacy and ground support (Quah 1985, 247; Chua 1997, 129). Singapore’s success in public housing has won the country much international acclaim.\textsuperscript{60} It is a public good that the PAP is wont to remind the electorate of in order to make political capital out of it. A lot has been written on the national housing policy and the PAP’s electoral successes and will not be repeated here.\textsuperscript{61} It suffices to say that the PAP’s provision of public good such as housing reinforced the Party’s governing capability and legitimacy.

Besides generating legitimacy, the HDB public housing programme was also a critical nation-building tool. As a result of early British colonial town planning, various immigrant ethnic groups were separated spatially in Singapore (L.L. Sim et al. 2003). To prevent the growth of ethnic enclaves, the PAP introduced an Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) in the 1960s to integrate Singapore’s multi-racial population.\textsuperscript{62} Under the policy, maximum proportions are set for all races - Chinese, Malays, Indians in each HDB block and neighbourhood. Once the limit for an ethnic group is reached, no further sale of HDB flats to

\textsuperscript{59} In 1988, A Town Council Bill was passed such that the town council will take over the management of HDB estate from the HDB. There were considerable debate regarding the role of the Town Council – whether it should serve as an estate management corporation or meant as a form of local authority with wider residential participation. See “Missing Link Between Town Councils And Residents,” Straits Times, 27 Jun 2009.

\textsuperscript{60} In 2009, Singapore was ranked first, amongst 215 cities, to having the best city infrastructure by Mercer’s 2009 Quality of Living Survey.

\textsuperscript{61} See Chua (1995, 124-146) and Quah (1985, 233-258).

\textsuperscript{62} The EIP is applicable to the purchase of new flats, resale flats, replacement flats, as well as the allocation of rental flats in all HDB estates. “PRs may be subjected to ethnic integration policy in buying flats,” Channel NewsAsia, 29 Jan 2010.
that ethnic group is allowed. For example, when Chinese quotas are binding, non-Chinese sellers cannot sell to Chinese buyers because the transaction increases the Chinese proportion above the quota. Research shows that the EIP is effective in reducing the intensity of the ethnic enclaves while increasing social integration (L.L. Sim et al. 2003). With more than 80% of Singaporeans in public housing, issues concerning the prices and governance of the housing estates have the potential of being politicized. The PAP government has introduced legal restrictions to prevent the opposition claiming credit for housing or from politicizing it to gain leverage with the electorate. Chapter 7 will consider the effects of these strategies on the opposition from setting political agenda.

**Racism and Implications.** While the PAP government has gone to significant lengths to foster racial harmony and to discourage intolerance, this does not mean that racism or discriminatory policies do not exist. For example, the Malays, the largest ethnic minority community constituting around 14% of Singapore’s total population, are known to be excluded from top, sensitive military positions. From 1969 to 1973, no Malays were conscripted into the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and regular Malay soldiers were removed from combat posts. Early retirement was encouraged and promotional prospects curtailed. Malay loyalty is of question as they are expected to fight against Muslim brothers in Malaysia and Indonesia. Limited conscription of Malays into the SAF only recommenced in 1973 but restrictions remained on their placement in critical positions (Huxley 2000, 102-4).

Critics argue that the some of the PAP’s policies are counter-productive and have an effect of reifying racial stereotypes and categories of the ethnic minority groups. Official procedures such as form-filling, government data collection and Singapore identity cards required the filling of one’s “Race” are inconsistent with the “regardless of race” tenet

---

63 As a result of the increased influx of immigrants, the government has also imposed similar EIP scheme on immigrants to prevent the congregation of permanent residents. See Channel NewsAsia, 29 Jan 2010.
64 In 1981 Anson by-election, the PAP lost a seat to J.B. Jeyaratnam of the WP as a result of voters unhappiness with increases in the HDB flat prices and housing plans (Quah 1985, 248).
65 For the PAP government’s position, see “Responding to the Observations of the MPs,” Petir, Apr 1987 and “This is a Singapore problem. We will solve it ourselves,” Straits Times, 18 Mar 1987.
66 All eligible Malays were only called for to serve National service in 1985. More Malays are allowed to participate in the SAF. But very few Malays are admitted to the Air Force. For a critical study of the restriction of Malay recruitment in the SAF, see Walsh (2007).
enshrined in the national pledge. Recently, a fact finding mission conducted by the UN in April 2010 found that ethnic marginalisation, entrenchment of minority status through ethnic categorisations, the minority political representation dimension to the GRC system, the academic under-performance of Malay students and under-representation of minorities in the SAF, Police, intelligence services and the Judiciary are pervasive, even today. The UN Report is important as it highlights how strict controls over political debates on ethnic, racial and religious issues have had the effect of stifling the understanding of the social issues facing Singapore. However, the PAP was swift to dismiss calls for greater openness in the discussion of ethnic, religious issues and defend its right to police ethnicity and religion. Defending its right and “responsibility” to police ethnicity and religion, the statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the UN report says:

“Race, language and religion will always be sensitive issues in Singapore. This does not mean that they cannot be discussed, but a balance must always be struck between free expression and preservation of racial and religious harmony. This balance is only for the Singapore Government to determine because only the Singapore Government bears the responsibility should things go wrong. The UN bears no such responsibility and we see no reason to take risks for the sake of an abstract principle. We believe most Singaporeans agree with the Government's approach” (Straits Times, Apr 29, 2010).

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to show how early political experiences and societal cleavages have important implications for a party’s organizational model and long-term survival. In Singapore, early struggles toward independence and painful party formation experiences were critical junctures that led to the PAP’s adoption of the exclusionary, cadre system that tightens party discipline and rewards loyalty. To voters and supporters, the PAP has projected itself as an inclusive, pragmatic “catch-all” party, representative of peoples of all ethnicities, religions and social class. I have argued that one of the PAP’s strengths lies in its wide network of para-political institutions and the introduction of a myriad of legal rules and legislations to maintain social order and racial harmony. The para-political institutions

67 See “Certain ethnic groups marginalised by government policies,” Online Citizen, 28 Apr 2010 and “SFD written submission to UN Special Rapporteur,” Singaporeans for Democracy, 22 Apr 2010.
68 For the Singapore’s government full response to the UN report, see “UN expert's comments draw swift Government reply,” and “Foreign Ministry responds to UN expert's comments,” Straits Times, Apr 29, 2010.
69 For the Singapore’s government full response to the UN report, see “UN expert's comments draw swift Government reply” and “Foreign Ministry responds to UN expert's comments,” Straits Times, Apr 29, 2010.
are now part of the regime’s strategy that polices public discourse and prevents partisan mobilization based on socio-ethnic tensions or consciousness.

In Singapore, Lipset and Rokkan’s “freezing thesis” is limited in explaining how socio-ethnic cleavages affect party system formation. Based on the ethnic fractionalization index score by Fearon, Singapore has higher respective ethnic and cultural fractionalization scores (0.388 and 0.388) than Taiwan (0.274 and 0.169) (2003). One would consequently expect a higher party system fragmentation and polarization in Singapore than in Taiwan. This was the case in pre-independent Singapore where ethno-linguistic and class cleavages mobilized citizens into various parties and voter alignment that fostered a competitive party system. However, after the PAP came into power, the predicted pattern of socio-ethnic cleavages shows severe limitations when it tries to explain the rise and persistence of the PAP. Presently, ethnic politics are disallowed and ethnic parties are nearly non-existent in Singapore. The early ethnic-linguistic cleavage structures did not “freeze” but were “thawed” and deliberately reconfigured to foster a common Singapore national identity.

As Huntington says, “Party systems originate in the patterns of cleavage and alignment among social forces. Different relationships among social forces and different sequences in the development of cleavages among them give rise to different types of party systems. Once the system takes root, however, they develop a life of their own” (1970, 10). The PAP’s successful turn-around from near decimation to hegemony hinged on its strategic coordination - supply of public goods such as para-political grassroots organizations and public housing to fulfil the needs of the electorate. The restriction of coordination mechanisms through rules and legislations prevented the opposition from politicization based on ethnic or religious grounds. Institutional building was key in constraining dissent.

In the next chapter, I compare the experiences of the KMT and the PAP and examine how its early civil war experiences affect its party organization and early exclusionary policy widened Taiwanese society’s sub-ethnic cleavage. Specifically, I examine the KMT’s policy reversal to adopt inclusionary “Taiwanization” policy to address the sub-ethnic tensions heightened intra-party tensions and triggered regime “de-institutionalization” in the 1980s.

---

70 Singapore is ranked 10th while Taiwan is ranked 15th in the region for cultural diversity (Fearon 2003).
4 The KMT: Organizational Adaptation and Coordination Dilemmas

The last chapter demonstrated how early historical experiences and organizational development lay critical foundation for the PAP’s institutionalization in Singapore. In this chapter, I examine how the KMT’s organizational reforms in the early 1950s transformed the revolutionary and exclusionary one-party state to a pragmatic and inclusionary hegemonic party regime. It is argued that historical and socio-ethnic cleavages are not deterministic but contextual factors that shape the strategic calculations of the ruling elite.

In response to the changing socio-economic developments, Chiang Ching-kuo initiated inclusionary policy and triggered the regime’s de-institutionalization – a dismantling of authoritarian institutions that facilitated the economic and political liberalization of the 1980s. De-institutionalization was de-stabilizing. The implementation of Taiwanization that reversed the discriminatory policy against Taiwanese posed new challenges to the KMT. As Chapter 6 will show, after Chiang’s passing, the KMT under Lee Teng-hui’s leadership experienced the worst factionalism. Torn apart by irreconcilable visions of national identity and sub-ethnic cleavage, intense leadership struggles led to the KMT’s first split in 1993.

Huntington has hypothesized that as a result of socio-economic changes, the revolutionary and exclusionary party may transform itself into an established and inclusionary party. He divided the evolution of a revolutionary one-party system into three periods: 1) transformation, characterized by strong ideological commitments and an autocratic leader; 2) consolidation, characterization by pragmatism and institutionalization; and 3) adaptation, characterized by reliance on technocrats, with more room given to interest groups, intelligentsia and popular participation.¹

The evolution of the KMT appears to follow Huntington’s model of party change (Jian and Wu 1992; Meaney 1992). For example, the KMT under Chiang Kai-shek (1949-1975) signified a time of organizational transformation and consolidation as a one-party, quasi-Leninist monolithic state. But under Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule (1975-1988), the KMT’s adapted as a pragmatic hegemonic party and initiated liberalization. Significantly, the lifting

¹ Huntington’s classification is similar to Sartori’s, who divided single-party systems into three types: 1) totalitarian, 2) authoritarian and 3) pragmatic (1970, 32-40).
of martial law and the ban on formation of political organizations under Junior Chiang’s rule signified a gradual transition from “hard to soft authoritarianism” (Winckler 1984). As a result, the KMT regime was able to fend off international and domestic pressures to fully democratize and prolong its rule through capitalizing on its incumbency advantage and relative strength to the opposition (Cheng 1989; Cheng and Lin 1999; Tan 2002).

The analysis of the KMT’s organizational adaptation and strategic coordination proceeds as follows. The first section highlights the KMT’s origins and party building experiences after its move from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. Specifically, I focus on the effects of expanding party membership and exclusionary discriminatory policy that exacerbated Taiwan’s sub-ethnic cleavage and partisan alignment. The second section outlines the series of external and internal pressures that presented a coordination dilemma to the regime. Chiang’s decision to liberalize rather than repress at the critical juncture triggered the process of “de-institutionalization”, signified by the reversal of ethnic policy or Taiwanization, constitutional reforms and negotiations with the opposition. Instead of repression to starve off opposition, Taiwanization and negotiation with the opposition also meant that the KMT was able to co-opt and control the pace of transition. The unintended effects of “de-institutionalization” are presented in the final section.

Origins of the KMT

Like the PAP, the KMT party was an “externally created party” with origins dating back to the last century (Duverger 1954). Founded by Sun-Yat Sen and a group of Chinese in-exile in opposition to the Manchu monarchy during the Qing dynasty, the KMT began as a dissident force against the Yuan Shi-kai’s government in 1912. Embattled by civil war against warlords, the battle fatigued KMT was offered a lifeline after the Communist government of the USSR extended military and economic aid and training2 to the KMT in the early 1920s. Then, the Soviets provided 300,000 roubles, 40 Soviet officers as instructors, political indoctrination as well as military training (Long 1991, 41-5). Soviet aid permitted Sun to establish a KMT army and a military academy at Whampoa in 1924 and Chiang Kai-

______________________________

2 Chiang kai-shek was one of the generals sent to Moscow to study Soviet military and political organization. Chiang was the director of the academy and trained 2,000 cadets in 3 years. These officers were known as the Whampoa Clique, the core of the KMT army and Chiang's political base (Dickson 1997, 59).
shek was appointed as its first commandant. The massive aid that the KMT received facilitated the party re-organization and transformation into a quasi-Leninist-style party.

The KMT was formed as a revolutionary party that struggled against the Manchu dynasty and later against the Chinese Communist Party. As Tai notes, “the fact that the KMT was conceived as a revolutionary organization dominated by the military created an inevitable trend toward the personalization of power” (1970, 408). As a result of its revolutionary aims, power was concentrated in the hands of the man who held the highest command and security apparatus was used to ensure compliance while the Party usurped state functions. The strong personalistic rule of Chiang Kai-shek, and later his son Chiang Ching-kuo, led many to describe the KMT rule as “leaderist” or even a “one-party dictatorship” (Winckler 1988; Moody 1992; Meaney 1992).

On a regime level, the KMT’s rule during the Chiangs’ era was closest to being personalistic, as major decisions concerning access to office and fruits of office depended largely on the discretion of an individual leader. As Huang notes, “Neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Chiang Ching-kuo permitted challenges to their authority within the KMT, and although both were known to consult with close advisers, both made almost all important decisions within the party alone” (1996, 122). Tien shares this view as he says: “to ensure the regime’s political stability, the ruling political elite, particularly the Mainlanders, have relied heavily on the charisma of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo to provide legitimacy” (1989, 75). While Chiang Kai-shek ran the KMT in a dictatorial way, he paid lip service to the 1946 Constitution and upheld fa-tong or constitutional legitimacy.

My study characterizes Chiang’s leadership as “situational charismatic”, or one in which there is a total symbiosis between the leader and organizational identity (Panebianco 1988). Organizationally, the early KMT under Chiang Kai-shek’s rule behaved as one-party

---

3 See Tai (1970, 406-411) for the party structure and functions of the KMT back in the mainland.
4 Meaney argues that leaderist quality of the KMT makes it more comparable to a Leninist party than to PRI in Mexico that does not permit or allow dominant figure (1992, 98).
5 A personalist regime may be defined as one, which the leader, himself maintains near monopoly over policy and personnel decisions despite the existence of a support party (Geddes 2003, 53).
6 The significance of Chiang’s “situational charisma” on leadership succession and elite cohesion will be discussed in Chapter 6.
state as opposition parties\(^7\) are not tolerated and viewed as traitors to its revolutionary or nationalist cause (Tien 1989, 10). Since national elections were banned till 1969\(^8\), party alternation could not occur. However, local elections were permitted as a means of maintaining legitimacy and keeping tabs on the local population (Huang 1995). And by the late 1960s, the one-party state was transiting to a hegemonic party\(^9\) regime; subsequently, the Party allowed elections of the Legislative Yuan. Refer to Table 4-1 for a summary of the evolution of the KMT regime based on the typology introduced in the Theoretical chapter. The following sections will now focus on the KMT’s early organizational changes and implications on sub-ethnic cleavage in Taiwan.

### Table 4-1: Evolution of the KMT Regime (1945-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>One-Party</th>
<th>Hegemonic Party</th>
<th>Dominant Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>No suffrage</td>
<td>Universal suffrage</td>
<td>Universal suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contestation</td>
<td>No national election till 1969</td>
<td>Relatively free but unfair elections under cartel regulations</td>
<td>Free and fair elections under egalitarian regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative dominance</td>
<td>Absolute control (90-100% of seats)</td>
<td>Supermajority (more than 70% of seats)</td>
<td>Absolute majority (50% or more seats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party alternation</td>
<td>Cannot occur</td>
<td>Can but does not occur</td>
<td>Can and may occur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The KMT’s Early Rule in Taiwan (1945-1949)

Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule for fifty years (1895-1945). After the end of World War II, Taiwan was transferred to China and ruled under the authority of a military governor, General Chen Yi, a corrupt and incompetent administrator. While Taiwan was decolonized, the political order in the postwar period resembled a colonial one under the KMT (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 3). As an outside power, the KMT imposed political control over domestic politics where the local Taiwanese population was largely excluded. The KMT denied local Taiwanese from holding key party, military and political positions

\(^7\) Two other parties, Young China Party and the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party were allowed to exist as they posed no threat to the regime and were internally split (Huang 1995, 954).

\(^8\) While local elections were allowed since 1954, limited national elections were held only in 1969 for the limited number of seats in the Legislative Yuan.

\(^9\) LaPalombara and Weiner describe the KMT as a “one-party pluralistic system” - quasi-authoritarian regime dominated by a single party is pluralist in organization, pragmatic rather than rigidly ideological in outlook, absorptive, rather, than ruthlessly destructive in its relation with other groups (1966, 38).
because of an on-going civil war with Communist China. The political atmosphere was tense and highly-charged as the KMT was suspicious of anyone with loyalty problems or socialist inclinations. The Party’s discriminatory practice and brutal treatment of the local Taiwanese soon gave rise to the “228 Incident” – a series of bloody riots that left thousands dead on 28 Feb 1947. This incident marked the beginning of the “White Terror” era where thousands of Taiwanese and Chinese, suspected of being dissidents or communist sympathizers, were jailed, tortured and killed. To date, the “228 incident” remains controversial and symbolizes the cruelty and injustice of the KMT towards the local Taiwanese population.

During the first four years of rule in Taiwan, the KMT had little party activity. After its civil war experiences against the warlords and its humiliating loss of the mainland to the Chinese Communists, the KMT government under Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in 1949. After Chiang’s arrival, the KMT was committed to liberating the Chinese mainland from Communist control.11 In 1948, the KMT government passed the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion” and imposed martial law in May 1949. These laws put the country in the state of emergency and exempted the President and Vice President from the two-term limit as provided in the Article 47 of the Constitution.12 Chiang also eliminated national and intra-party factionalism, which he thought led to the defeat of the KMT. Factional strife petered out after 1965, not to resurface again until mid-1980s (Cheng and Chou 2000, 42-66). To maintain civilian control over the military, the warlord or province-based military units were disbanded; rotation and fixed tenure for command was established (Dickson 1997, 60).

Sub-Ethnic Cleavage in Taiwan

From 1948 to 1950, an estimated half a million Chinese Mainlanders followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan after the civil war. According to 1948 census, there were 316, 642 aborigines, 5,523,912 permanent Chinese settlers, 46, 190 Mainland Chinese in Taiwan (Hu 1989, 2). By 1952, the Mainlanders constituted less than 10% of total population while

---

10 For more on the “228 incident”, see Formosa Betrayed (Kerr 1965).
11 Also see Roy (2002) for more on the political history of the KMT.
12 The extra-constitutional arrangements were expanded over 1950s and 1960s which suspended the re-election of the three national representative bodies – the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan – extended the tenure of the incumbent members for life and deterred the election of the provincial and municipal heads indefinitely (Chu and Lin 2001, 114).
the Taiwanese consisted a majority of 90% of the total population in Taiwan. See Table 4.2.

As a minority group, the Mainlanders dominated the key political, military and central government positions and enjoyed special privileges. Since 1949, the KMT government laid a wide, social network as well as numerous rules to discriminate against Taiwanese and ensure better social status for Mainlanders. Financial subsidies and unfair screening rules in schools as well as in government reified the sub-ethnic cleavage between the two groups.\(^{13}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1963-4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese (%)</td>
<td>7,478 (92)</td>
<td>8,943 (89.1)</td>
<td>10,349 (87.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainlanders (%)</td>
<td>650 (8.0)</td>
<td>1,096 (10.9)</td>
<td>1,535 (12.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>8,128,374</td>
<td>10,039,435</td>
<td>11,883,523</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The label “Mainlanders”\(^{14}\) refer to Chinese from China and those Taiwan born, native Taiwanese who speak the Fukien dialect and whose parents came from China after the civil war (Tien 1989, 36). On the other hand, Taiwanese refer to the permanent settlers in Taiwan that include aborigines and Chinese who speak Hoklo/Hakka. These two categories are affected but not determined by their political or economic status. Broadly, Mainlanders harbour anti-Japanese sentiments as a result of experiences through the Second Japanese-Sino War and tend to view Taiwanese, educated and brought up under the Japanese as traitors and with suspicion. On the other hand, Taiwanese tend to view the Mainlanders as poor, backward and corrupt.\(^{15}\) Despite the stereotypes and ambiguities in the sub-ethnic classification of Mainlanders and Taiwanese, the two categories persist.

Like the PAP that initiated a series of economic development projects in Singapore, the KMT launched a series of social welfare programs in the 1950s. For example, the KMT government constructed public financed national housing units, mobilized the Armed Forces to develop social communities, created a cabinet commission to provide job retraining and employment, and extended free education from six to nine years (Tai 1970, 428). These social welfare programs were well-received and generated performance legitimacy for the mainlander-dominated KMT regime. However, during the course of economic development,

\(^{13}\) For more on ethnic politics in Taiwan, see Wang (2004) and Wu (1995).

\(^{14}\) Mainlanders also include those with Taiwanese wives and children (Hu 1989, 255).

\(^{15}\) I found similar negative stereotypes and mutual suspicions to persist between the DPP and the KMT supporters during my fieldwork in Taiwan in 2007.
Mainlanders with official or party connections used government prerogatives for personal gains, which the local Taiwanese detested (Huntington and Moore 1970, 29).

**Comparing the KMT and the PAP’s Ethnic policy**

Comparatively, the KMT government’s early discriminatory policy was more extensive and systematically applied than the PAP’s. In Singapore, the most evident and clear discriminatory policy against ethnic minority is the exclusion of Malays from sensitive and high ranking positions in the Singapore Armed Forces. For fear of split loyalty in times of war against neighbouring Muslim neighbours like Indonesia or Malaysia, Malays were excluded from national conscription in early years (Huxley 2000, 102). However, since this discriminatory policy began to be phased out in the 1970s, the proportion of Malays doubled over the course of 7 years. In 1985, all eligible Malays were called up for national service and more assumed higher-ranking military positions, with two Malay fighter pilots in the Air Force (Interview with RSAF Officer, 15 Jan 2010).

In contrast, the KMT kept local Taiwanese away from sensitive postings in the military, the central government and also the party bureaucracies from 1950s to 80s. To prevent coups, the Taiwanese military only enlisted Taiwanese as soldiers and Mainlanders as officer corps. See Table 4-3 that shows Mainlanders occupying more than 90% of leadership positions, while more than 50% Taiwanese were foot soldiers from 1950-1965.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generals</th>
<th>Colonels</th>
<th>Lieutenants</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-65</td>
<td>M  97.7</td>
<td>T  1.3</td>
<td>M  90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-78</td>
<td>M  92.6</td>
<td>T  7.4</td>
<td>M  81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-87</td>
<td>M  84.2</td>
<td>T  15.8</td>
<td>M  67.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As mentioned, in Singapore, the PAP has suppressed ethnic tensions in Singapore through the use of “parallel” and “broker institutions” and a range of socio-legal constraints.

---

16 See Walsh (2007, 265-285) who argues that the SAF’s exclusion of Malay minority and women from the military has reduced its effectiveness and professionalism.

17 Critics of the PAP argued that the SAF is likewise discriminatory as ethnic Malays are excluded from high-level positions or sensitive postings such as fighter pilots. For more see Walsh (2007) and Huxley (2000).

18 A 1967 survey showed that Mainlanders held 82% of the positions in the military, police and national security agencies while 34% in public administration and the professions (Long 1991, 63).
to breakdown ethnic barriers. But the KMT did not employ any of these measures. Within the state bureaucracy, discriminatory policy meant that Taiwanese only accounted for 56.5 % of the overall civil service and 37.3 % of the central government in 1959. The proportion of Taiwanese in the civil service and central government only increased to 71 and 66.2% respectively by the end 1991 (Chu and Lin 2001, 119).

One of the key differences between Singapore and Taiwan in terms of ethnic policy lies in the distribution of public goods such as housing. As discussed in Chapter 3, the PAP instituted Ethnic Integrated Housing Policy (EIP) to enforce inter-ethnic interaction in the housing estates to prevent the rise of ethnic enclaves or local partisan alignment. The enforced assimilation of different ethnicities in the same housing estate increased social integration and understanding between the different ethnic groups.

In Taiwan, Mainlanders with occupations in the central government resided largely in the urban areas in eastern and parts of northern Taiwan, while Taiwanese are predominantly rural folks with positions at the provincial, county and municipal levels were located in the southern parts of Taiwan. See Table 4-4 for the rural-urban geographical distribution in Taiwan. As Chapter 8 will show, the two sub-ethnic groups that are geographical differentiated are to contribute to regional variation of partisan alignment and voting behaviour in the 1980s (Lay, Yap and Chen 2008).

| Table 4-4: Rural-Urban Geographical Distribution in Taiwan (1952-64) |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| (in thousands) | 1952            | 1958            | 1963 and 4      |
| Urban (%)      | -               | 2, 800 (31)     | 4, 300 (35)     |
| Rural (%)      | -               | 6, 200 (68)     | 8, 000 (65)     |
| Literacy (%)   | 3, 694, 000 (57.9%) | 5, 404, 000 (69.1) | 7, 653, 000 (77.6) |

Source: Tai (1970, 416)

In terms of economic achievement and legitimacy, the KMT regime has done remarkably well and provides a good case of exceptional growth under authoritarian regime. As Tien noted, 3 major policies namely, land reform, price stabilization and import substitution policy pursued in early 1950s were critical in propelling Taiwan’s economy (1989, 19). To pursue economic development, the KMT launched a major land reform.
program (1949-1953) that benefitted tenant farmers. Essentially, the land reforms boosted the KMT’s legitimacy as it brought “a great of rural good will and developed among the farmers a vested interest in the government’s agricultural program” (Tai 1970, 428).

However, reform programs have also stirred up strong resentments amongst the elite, largely Taiwanese landlords against the KMT as the reforms redistributed income; increased the status of small-owner families and undermined the status of landlords. On the whole, the land reforms laid a solid foundation for Taiwan’s agricultural growth throughout the 1950s, improved the lifestyles of small farmers, resolved land tenure problem and forestalled potential rural unrests (Tien 1989, 22-4). As White observes: the land reforms “allowed the KMT to give traditionally prestigious Taiwanese political families political leadership in nonstate enterprises, delaying their political leadership in government” (2009, 69). He argues that the equalization effects of land reforms and the redirection of indigenous Taiwanese from landowners to small and medium size firm entrepreneurs contributed to the Taiwanese economic boom in the 1980s.

To fend off competition from local factions and conglomerates to maintain their oligopolistic status, the KMT had also built alliances with conglomerates and left Taiwanese to run small and medium enterprises. For many decades, the political economy of Taiwan also reflected the sub-ethnic division. While Mainlanders were largely in charge of national politics and large-scale corporations, Taiwanese remained as foreign exchange earners, entrepreneurs and businessmen from industrial production and exporting industries. The political and socio-economic elite thus overlapped the sub-ethnic cleavage between mainlander and Taiwanese. Taiwan’s ethnic division was not a zero-sum as economic opportunities were still available to the Taiwanese (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 9-10).

**The KMT’s Wealth and Party Assets**

As a quasi Leninist party state, there was overlapping character of party, state and military political authority in Taiwan under the KMT’s hegemonic rule (1949-1988). As a result of long-term incumbency and assuming national assets from the Japanese colonial

---

19 There were three aspects to the land reform: 1) rent reduction; 2) sale of public farmland to tenant farmers; 3) land to the tiller program which requires each landlord family to sell to the government any land that it owned in excess of 2.9 hectares of paddy field (Tien 1989, 23).
government after 1945, the KMT is now one of the world’s richest parties. The KMT is said to have illegally seized land and property worth millions of pounds when the Japanese left Taiwan, which they ruled as a colony from 1895-1945. However, “the extent of the KMT empire is Taiwan’s best kept secret” (Economist 27 Aug 1993). News reports in 2001 estimated the party assets to be between US$7 billion and US$16 billion (Schafferer 2004, 47). During Chiang’s rule, the amount of party assets was large enough to finance a huge party apparatus to prop up a strong central leadership (Kuo 2000, 94). Recent report by the Ministry of the Interior shows that in 2006, the KMT has 100 times more asset value, or roughly NT$25.5 bil (Taipei Times 18 July 2007). To support the huge party machinery for political control, the KMT relied on government resources and privileges to build a colossal business empire.

Essentially, the KMT is funded by revenue generated by party enterprises rather than membership dues. In 1992, the income from membership was NT$70 million, which could only cover 1.4% of the party’s expenditure (Xu 1997, 410). As Chu describes it, the KMT is an “oversized, richly endowed, and autocratically run political machine” with a business empire estimated at about US$9 billion with yearly dividends exceeding US $140 mil (1996, 76). A large part of the KMT businesses concentrated in highly regulated sectors such as insurance, leasing, banking, brokerage, investment trust, mass media, public utilities and real estate (Chu 1996, 76). In the 1980s, the KMT government had owned or controlled most of the island’s media that include three television stations, four national daily newspapers (the government owned 2, and the military 5). Besides, privately owned newspapers also enjoyed close corporate ties with the KMT. For example, the owners of the two newspapers with the highest circulation, China Times and United Daily News were members of the KMT’s CSC (Rawnsley 2006, 137).

---

20 The KMT was reported to have taken TW$11 billion worth of private property and 860 Japanese owned or joint ventures from Mar 1947 to Dec 1950 from the Japanese (Xu 1997, 401). For more critical reports of the KMT’s party enterprises, see “Wealth probe for 'world's richest' party,” BBC, 26 Oct 2001 and “Kiss your assets goodbye,” Time, 7 Oct 2002 and “KMT assets’ magical vanishing act,” Taipei Times, 5 May 2010.

21 In Feb 1993, it was reported that the KMT party enterprise management committee has 7 major holding companies with total assets of NT $20 billion (Xu 1997, 404).
The KMT’s Organizational Changes, 1951-2

As Dickson notes, it “was the lessons learnt in its defeat in the civil war and the steps taken from in the early 1950s to overcome its failure that allowed the KMT to endure” (1997, 63). Obsessed with unifying China under the KMT’s rule, the KMT underwent a critical party re-organization from 1950 to 1952.22 To address the party’s failings and loss of China, Chiang launched a “Reconstruction Campaign” to re-organize the KMT (gai-zhao-yun-dong). A Central Party Reconstruction Committee was established on 5 August 1950 to transform the organizational structure and the political socialization of party members.23 The aim was to revive the esprit de corps of the cadres and rebuild the KMT’s revolutionary spirit. Like the PAP, the KMT adopted communist organizational and mobilization methods. As Chiang Kai-shek said: “If we want to beat the communist bandits, we must understand their methods and use their techniques to overcome them” (cited in Tsang 1999, 2). During these two years, the KMT strengthened its party organization, eliminated all divisive factions, created a network of party organizations in the military and government, a cadre system, a cadre school and made the party cell the basic working and training unit of the KMT.24

The KMT’s re-organization reflected Leninist features as: 1) party membership was only open to those who pledged that they would carry out party decisions; 2) a pyramidal party structure that parallels government hierarchy with the National Congress as the supreme organ and small cell groups act as base; 3) the formation of party groups in social organizations that asserted party policies, and finally, 4) the establishment of Control Committees in all the rank and file of the party organs to enforce discipline (Tai 1970, 409). These Leninist organizational25 features were key in fostering party cohesion during the KMT’s early rule in Taiwan.

The KMT has a pyramidal party structure, parallel to the government hierarchy. At the top of the party, an elected National Congress serves as the supreme organ, which

23 For more on the aims and course of actions to be taken by the Central Committee for Party Reform Commission, see 7th Plenum of the KMT Central Executive Committee Party Report, 1952.
24 Also see Cheng and Haggard (1992, 4-8) on the implications of party reforms.
25 The KMT’s party organization exhibited many Leninist features because of early Soviet aid and training in the 1920s (Tai 1970, 409).
discharges its functions between sessions through the Central Standing Committee (CSC) - the most powerful decision making body of the party. The National Congress meets once every 2 years and the delegates are selected to serve 4-year terms. Essentially, the Congress amends the party charter, determines the party platform and policies, elects the party chairman and the Central Committee members, and approves candidates nominated by the chairman to serve as vice chairmen and members of the Central Advisory Council. In 1952, the 7th National Congress was held (first time on the island) and renewed Chiang Kai-shek’s term as party leader. Besides, the Congress also elected a Central Committee (32 members) and a Central Advisory Committee (48 members). See Appendix E for the party organization structures of the KMT, 1952 and present.

The Central Standing Committee (CSC) is the most influential organization in the KMT. It represents the CC when that body is not in session and meets every week to discuss and approve important policies and nominate candidates. Currently, the CSC consists of 39 members with a one-year term. Among these, 32 members are directly elected by the party delegates while 7 members are designated by the KMT chairman (including one for the Youth League and the other for Youth Affairs).

As a “revolutionary democratic party”, the KMT adopted democratic centralism as a party orthodoxy where the party leaders held the lion’s share of decision-making power (Hood 1997, 26-8). Democratic centralism meant that tactical and ideological decisions were made with internal democracy and centralization. Once the top party leaders make a decision, all members must support and actively promote it. Decisions flowed from one central leader from the Central Committee downwards, all the way down to the party cell (Dickson 1996, 45). Along with these organizational changes, Chiang also upheld Sun Yat Sen’s Three Principles of the People (San-Min-Zhu-Yi) as the party’s official ideology that promoted a set of national values to build party loyalty.

In the early years, power was highly centralized and anchored on the paramount leader. The 1950 re-organization created a structure based on a stable, homogenous and non-

---

26 The delegates were elected from all levels of the Party. See Article 23 of the KMT’s Party Constitution.
27 This consists of 3 lectures which deals: 1) Principle of Nationalism; 2) Principle of Democracy; and 3) Principle of People’s Livelihood - the most important as it proposed a planned, mixed economy with the public controlling the major share, resembling British Fabianism (Tai 1970, 410).
competitive elite recruitment process that institutionalized the hegemonic rule of the KMT in society (Chu and Lin 2001, 114). Structurally, a hierarchy of party apparatus are dispersed throughout the state structures and grass roots organizations based on network of cells. The party cell\(^{28}\) functions as the basic, training unit of the party and penetrates into all state institutions and organized social groups such as schools, labour unions\(^{29}\), youth groups, religious groups, professional associations, business associations, famer’s associations, schools and mass media.

Similar to the PAP’s “corporatist” strategy, the KMT built mass support by creating social organizations, subsidizing and inserting party cadres to represent their interests (Wang 2006, 110). As Cheng and Haggard note, the “pre-emptive corporatism” reduced the possibility for working-class politics to emerge (1992, 5). With the growth of sub-leaders, cadres and small party cells, the KMT became more organizationally complex and hierarchical. By the end of the 1952, there were a total of 34, 476 party cells, 6, 542 party sub-branches, 1,405 party branches and 56 party bureaus throughout the 23 counties and cities of Taiwan (Lin 1998, 75). Presently, the party cell remains the workhorse of the party. My interview with a KMT party staff reveals that there are an average of 50,000 party cells throughout Taiwan now (Interview with R. Chu, 11 Apr 2010). See Table 4-5.

### Table 4-5: KMT Party Branches and Cells (1952 and 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party sub-bureaus</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party branches</td>
<td>1,405</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party sub-branches</td>
<td>6,542</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party cells</td>
<td>34,476</td>
<td>14,498</td>
<td>48,877</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party members</td>
<td>281,947</td>
<td>1,039,752</td>
<td>1,040,000 (Est.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General population</td>
<td>8,128,000</td>
<td>23,127,845</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of members to population</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Building Para-Political Institutions

The creation of para-political organizations helped the party to boost the morale of a defeated party after the civil war. While the KMT was organized as a mass party, it became

---

\(^{28}\) Each party cell consists of about 3-11 people. All party members were required to attend cell meetings every other week and pay their membership fees regularly (Lin 1998, 75).

\(^{29}\) For the myriad of political and legal strategies to control labour movement, see Wang (1998, 250-74).
“a cadre party design to facilitate the exercise of power” (Tai 1970, 409). The creation of para-political organizations was what Winckler calls “institutional leadership” where leaders build institutions, assigns tasks and cultivate their own policies and personnel through them – an authoritarian form of social control to expand the KMT power base (1993, 113). Like the PAP, the KMT treated the mass organizations as “transmission belt of the party-state and remains an “overarching institution of interest aggregation” (Tien 1989, 14-5).

In an effort to increase party membership, the KMT established a network of para-political organizations. In 1951, the KMT built “people’s service stations” (Min zhong fu wu zhan) throughout the island. Within a year, 234 stations were set up in every city and township under the provincial party office to provide social services to the public which include mandarin classes, reading classes and travelling advice (Wu 1987, 54). Organized under the Special Sector Party Office, party organs mushroomed all over the military, state-owned and public enterprises such as the aviation and shipping industry, railway and highway industries. See Table 4-6 for the degree of the KMT penetration into the public and grassroots organizations in 1951-2. By 1952, there were a total of 1,839 service station party cells installed in the various public enterprises, unified in 1954 (Wu 1987, 56).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party service stations at city and county level</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-party service stations at city and county level</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service station party cells</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>1,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of party members</td>
<td>12,097</td>
<td>15,007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Like the Soviet Communist Party, the KMT formed two “organizational weapons”31: the China Youth Corp32 (CYC) and the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) to concentrate power in the hands of a small ruling elite and cultivate party loyalty. Then, Chiang Kai-shek tasked his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to head the CYC and the GPWD to

---

30 These figures are sum total of service stations from the aviation, shipping; railway and highway industries from 1951-2.
31 Selznick (1960) calls “organizational weapon” - institutions for national integration and political socialization. Some subversive tactics include divide and rule, propaganda and agitation (Bullard 1997, 4-11).
32 The CYC was also known as China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps. The CYC began with 15 detachment units in the various universities and youth organizations in the early 1950s (Li 2005, 133). Structurally, the CYC became independent of the GPWD after 1969.
recruit and transform the mentality of youths and soldiers – 2 most important social groups in Taiwan. Both the CYC and the GPWD were auxiliary organizations to expand party membership, improve political socialization, training and mobilization of youths. Under Chiang’s supervision, the CYC and GPWD combined the Leninist revolutionary method and neo-Confucian traditional ethics to rear a group of followers who pledge their loyalty to the Party. And 2 of the pioneer CYC and GPWD members such as Li Huan and Wang Sheng were Chiang’s close aides and became influential leaders in the KMT in the 1970-80s.

Established in 1952, the CYC provided military training to youths before they were drafted into the Nationalist Armed Forces. Taiwan has an average total of 150,000 youths conscripted each year. It was a captive audience to undergo political socialization (Bullard 1997, 81). The CYC offers a range of recreational and social activities such as summer field trips that became important channels for the KMT to recruit and co-opt talented and bright students to join the Party. Around 300 students were selected from the summer programs of the CYC to receive one year of military-based training annually. Under Chiang’s leadership, he introduced the harsh discipline that he’d experienced in Russia (Hsu 1993, 8). The stringent selection and the prestige in joining the CYC and military training helped to instil party loyalty (Interview with Chang, 26 Sep 2007).

The GPWD, in coordination with the Ministry of National Defence and Education was responsible of training programs, the selection and training of political instructors for the military, civilian schools and colleges (Bullard 1997). The GPWD’s role was to instil in the military personnel an appropriate ideology and loyalty in times of conflict with China (Chang 1984, 434). Through the GPWD, Chiang monitored the reliability of all military officers, gathered covert information of corrupt or unethical practices and maintained control over the

---

33 Taiwan has an estimated average total of 150,000 youths conscripted each year. It was clearly a captive audience to undergo political socialization (Bullard 1997, 81).
34 Wang Sheng was one of Chiang Ching kuo’s possible successors. See Chang (1984, 434).
35 Chiang went through considerable hardship during his twelve years in Russia. His training as a former graduate of Soviet Central Tolmatchev Military and Political Institute and life in Soviet Union had an impact on his populist leadership style and his organization of the CYC and the GPWD. See DVDs on Finding Chiang Ching-kuo, 2006; President Chiang Ching-kuo 2006; Chiang Ching-kuo and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, 2007.
36 For more on the China Youth Corp, see Bullard (1997, 143).
37 The responsibility for training was transferred to the Ministry of Education in 1 July 1960. Structurally, the CYC became independent of the GPWD after 1969.
38 Officially, Chiang had no operational authority over the military commanders. But through the GPWD, Chiang was able to supervise the intelligence and paramilitary activities against the mainland.
military. As GPWD was not an operational combat unit, its intrusion into the different military services brought Chiang in direct conflict with career commanders (Interview with Shuai, 22 Nov 2007).

Since Chiang’s passing in 1988, the youths’ interest in the CYC has declined drastically. As the country democratized, the government’s spending is more closely scrutinized and funding for the CYC is harder to come by. While the CYC remains active today, youths are showing less interest in the CYC as compared to the 1960s. Reports indicate that an estimated number of 130,000 young people participated in the CYC programs in 2006, a dismal performance compared to an average of one million registrations per year two decades ago (Chou, 2007). Since Ma Ying-Jeou became chairman in 2005, he had tried to revive the KMT youth corps and created “Young KMT” – an umbrella of non-partisan youth organizations in high schools and universities to provide recreational and social activities to re-ignite the youths’ interest in the Party. However, party reports and interviews with party officials indicate that the interests in “Young KMT” remained lacklustre (Interview with R. Chu, 13 Apr 2009).

**Party Membership, Taiwanization and Co-optation**

There are no reliable figures on KMT’s membership in 1949. Early estimates show that the KMT had around 34,382 members when it first moved to Taiwan in 1949 (Wu 1987, 367). To address the problems of factionalism and leftist sympathizers, the KMT Reorganization Commission imposed stringent recruitment guidelines for cadres and party members. Like the PAP, the creation of the KMT’s cadre system in 1950 was a major achievement in the KMT’s reorganization. Selected from party activists, cadres are those who demonstrate leadership abilities and loyalty in non-party organizations. All cadres, regardless of their background had to be inspected.41

40 For a critique of Ma’s efforts, see “Ma Youth corps set to produce dictators,” *Taipei Times*, 4 Feb 2006.
41 Inspections cover moral character, academic history, administrative accomplishments and family background. Some have to undergo examinations and appointed cadres have to demonstrate competence in skills appropriate to the posts (Dickson 1997, 56).
In 1951, 5,491 political cadres were inspected (Dickson 1997, 56). Regular inspection\(^{42}\) fosters cohesion as it filters out undesirable members of split loyalties. Party membership is open only to those who pledge to carry out party decisions, participate in party activities and pay regular dues. To qualify, one has to be endorsed by two party members and undergo two-months of training. In the early years, the KMT recruited almost exclusively from urban elites and overseas Chinese. Party members were mostly blue-collar workers and young males below forty years of age from the military, government sector or education backgrounds (Jiang and Wu 1992, 81).

By early 1970s, the KMT had begun to put more emphasis on professionalism and expertise, as opposed to mobilization skills formerly valued by revolutionary movement. This was reflected in the recruitment policies. By 1969 to 1976, over 57% of all new recruits were students. Another 6% were from among public servants and teachers. This means that nearly two-thirds of new recruits were intellectuals. The largest occupational groups are government, party officials, soldiers and workers (Dickson 1996, 56-7). See Table 4-7. By 1970s, the efforts to recruit youths and intellectuals had resulted in a marked improvement in the educational levels of the party members. The number of recruits with high school and tertiary education has increased in the 1980s. Party reports show that by 1997, more than 85% of recruits were below the age of forty.

\(^{42}\) Article 10 of the Party Constitution stipulates that party membership rectification has to be conducted every 2 years and a membership inspection, every 4 years.
Table 4-7: Demographic Trends of the KMT Recruitment (1952-1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40,097</td>
<td>707,020</td>
<td>104,614</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80.26</td>
<td>75.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,514</td>
<td>277,242</td>
<td>42,528</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.74</td>
<td>24.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Recruits</td>
<td>42,611</td>
<td>984,262</td>
<td>147,142</td>
<td>95,710</td>
<td>75,973</td>
<td>53,693</td>
<td>615,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>36,614</td>
<td>915,977</td>
<td>142,377</td>
<td>96.76</td>
<td>82.93</td>
<td>90.02</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
<td>5,997</td>
<td>68,285</td>
<td>4,765</td>
<td>17.07</td>
<td>9.98</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer/Fishermen</td>
<td>6,533</td>
<td>42,345</td>
<td>2,742</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>18.22</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>9,980</td>
<td>4,407</td>
<td>6,742</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry &amp; Commerce</td>
<td>2,427</td>
<td>30,529</td>
<td>4,558</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians/C.servants</td>
<td>3,164</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>3,061</td>
<td>562,850</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>57.78</td>
<td>22.17</td>
<td>25.47</td>
<td>29.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers/Educators</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>58,850</td>
<td>8146</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>47.04*</td>
<td>56.34</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>5,824</td>
<td>181,622</td>
<td>34,561</td>
<td>23.49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Soldiers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,690</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>4895</td>
<td>7,163</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,545</td>
<td>1,865</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3806</td>
<td>19,441</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>13.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the 1950s, the KMT was viewed as an “outsiders” party or émigré regime as more than 70% of its members were Mainlanders. From 1950-2, the total membership in KMT increased eight fold to 282,959 members. However, out of this total population, only 26% (73,852) were Taiwanese. See Appendix F for the ethnic breakdown of the KMT party membership (1952-2005). To address the internal inequalities, the KMT began Taiwanization - the deliberate strategy of placing more Taiwanese elites and local factions into the local party officers and central decision making bodies of the party. From 1952 to 1963, the proportion of Taiwanese was raised to 30%. After 1972, there was a significant jump in the number of Taiwanese, hitting 553,215, nearly half of the total membership of 1,448,106. See Figure 4.1 for the surge of Taiwanese after 1963. By 1975, Taiwanese already constituted 53% of the total KMT membership. The total number of Taiwanese increased another 10% and exceeded 65% of total membership by 1986. Also see Appendix F. Taiwanization was Chiang’s strategy to reshape Taiwan’s political culture and control dissent by co-opting Taiwanese elites and local factions into the party (Dickson 1996). As Geddes says: “Factions

43 Co-optation refers to the “process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability of existence” (Gamson 1968, 135).
form in single-party regimes around policy differences and competition for leadership positions, as they do in other kinds of regimes, but everyone is better off if all factions remain united and in office. This is why co-optation rather than exclusion characterizes established single-party regimes” (2003, 59).

**Figure 4-1: Ethnic Breakdown of the KMT Membership**

At the local level, the KMT created a new position of vice-chairman in every city and county party committee and required that it to be filled by a “good local” party member, that is, a Taiwanese. Even though the vice-chairman was without significant power, the move showed that the KMT was trying to mollify the Taiwanese’ bad feelings by recruiting more Taiwanese into the party’s leadership stratum (Wu 1988, 67).

At the highest level, Chiang surprised many conservative members when he nominated Lee Teng-hui, a low profile Taiwanese as Vice-President on 15 Feb 1984. The nomination of Lee as Chiang’s VP running mate was a critical juncture that gave Lee his political opportunity to reshape the KMT (Jacobs and Liu 2007, 380-2). Lee became President when Chiang passed away in 1988. After Lee assumed presidency, Taiwanization escalated, raising the total proportion to 69% by 1992. In the Executive Yuan (cabinet), under Lee’s presidency, the proportion of Taiwanese increased to 44%. See Table 4.8.

---

44 The Executive Yuan (Cabinet) is headed by a premier (appointed by the President) and consists of a vice premier; a number of ministers and chairpersons of commissions; and five to seven ministers.
Table 4-8: Ethnic Composition of Executive Yuan (1950-95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Premiers</th>
<th>Taiwanese (%)</th>
<th>Mainlanders (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-54</td>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek</td>
<td>Chen Cheng</td>
<td>1 (50)</td>
<td>19 (95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-8</td>
<td>Chen Cheng</td>
<td>Yu Hung-chun</td>
<td>1 (5.3)</td>
<td>18 (94.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-63</td>
<td>Chen Cheng</td>
<td>2 (7.7)</td>
<td>24 (92.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-72</td>
<td>Yen Chia-kan</td>
<td>4 (11.1)</td>
<td>32 (88.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-8</td>
<td>Chiang Ching-kuo</td>
<td>Sun Yun-hsuan</td>
<td>8 (27.6)</td>
<td>21 (72.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-84</td>
<td>Yu Ku-hua</td>
<td>12 (34.3)</td>
<td>23 (65.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-90</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui</td>
<td>16 (47.6)</td>
<td>16 (52.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-3</td>
<td>Hau-Pei-ysun</td>
<td>28 (43.7)</td>
<td>20 (56.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-7</td>
<td>Lien Chan</td>
<td>31 (44)</td>
<td>14 (56)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>Xiao Wan-zhang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Soong argues that the KMT demonstrated its willingness to bring about changes to accommodate diverse views (1992, 65). But critics contend that the composition of the staff of the Party HQ and the CCs still reflected the discrimination and Taiwanization only occurred in the lower levels (Huang 1995, 102; Wu 1987, 68). But the KMT did recruit more Taiwanese into the higher party organizational levels. While there were no Taiwanese in the CSC from 1950 to 1952, from 1972 to 1981, the number of Taiwanese in CSC doubled from 14.3% to 33%. See Table 4.9. By July 1988, Lee Teng-hui had named 16 Taiwanese out of 31 members CSC. Under Lee, Taiwanization accelerated and more Taiwanese were appointed to CSC. For the CC, the proportion of Taiwanese was raised to 25% for the same period. See Table 4.9.

Table 4-9: Ethnic Composition of CSC and CC (1952-1994)45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Chiangs’ Era</th>
<th>Lee’s Era</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


45 The KMT stopped the practice of keeping official records of the members’ background after 1992.
Implications of Taiwanization

As the KMT 15th party congress reports: “da y da de nan chu”, which roughly translates to “big parties come with their own big problems”. While the 1952 re-organization increased the party’s organizational complexity, hierarchical structure, the membership expansion had strained the relationship between the old and new members. As Panebianco reminds us, a principal cause of intra-party conflicts lies in the party’s internal system of inequalities (1988, 4 and 43). It is argued that the KMT’s early discriminatory policy has led to: 1) the antagonism between the two sub-ethnic groups that translated into polarizing partisan alignment, 2) contradictory and destabilizing internal tensions which undermined the KMT’s internal cohesion, and finally 3) the pushing through of political and economic liberalization as a result of the appointment of Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui as chairman. This in turn opened up new incentive structures that encouraged political corruption and eroded the KMT’s legitimacy.

Partisanship. Unlike Singapore, Taiwanese sub-ethnic cleavage has a direct impact on partisan formation (Liu and Ho 1999). Most scholars agree that Taiwan’s partisanship is a product of social cleavages and identities that cross-cut each other in the following ways: 1) Taiwanese versus Chinese national identities, 2) democratic versus authoritarian ideologies and 3) Taiwanese ethnic consciousness versus Chinese “Mainlanders” ethnic consciousness (Wu 1995, 101-30; Lay, Yap and Chen 2008, 785). In Taiwan, ethnic and national identities were highly politicized as seen from the “Dangwai” (outside the party) movement that was born out of an anti-KMT sentiment, mobilized along ethnic lines.46 Dissatisfaction with the KMT’s discriminatory policy and pro-democratization sentiments galvanized Taiwanese consciousness and led to the illegal formation of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on 28 Sep 1986 under national law (Rigger 1999, 116-130). Broadly, the DPP is viewed as the rising force that champions Taiwanese interests, Taiwan’s independence and opposes the KMT’s authoritarian ways (Hsieh 2000). From 1976 to 1992, the DPP top party leadership was composed of more than 94.5 % Taiwanese, while Mainlanders only made up 5.5 % (Hung 1992, 65).

46 Ethnicity and national identity are closely intertwined in Taiwan but are not identical. While ethnicity mobilized support for opposition in the early days, recently, it is more national identity that mobilizes opposition, see Hsieh (2000) and Wong (2001) for a study of ethnic and civic nationalism in Taiwan.
**Factionalism and Split.** After the 1952 party re-organization, the creation of cadre system and subjugation of local Taiwanese elites allowed the KMT to control factions. However, the rapid co-optation of Taiwanese in late 1980s heightened party tensions. This internal tension was most evident after Lee Teng-hui assumed Chairmanship, as the KMT experienced the most intense intra-party infightings and opposition to Lee’s leadership. The socialization differences between old members (Mainlanders) and newcomers (Taiwanese) threatened the Party’s collective identity. As Blondel suggests, changes in party size affect power distribution between central and local party organs (1978, 148). Taiwanization divided the KMT along the sub-ethnic line and led to the rise of factions.

Unlike Chiang who was against factionalism, Lee encouraged it. Soon, the tensions between the Taiwanese and conservative Mainlanders gave rise to “mainstream” (led by Lee) and “non-mainstream” (led by conservative Mainlanders) factions and was further divided into the Wisdom Club, the New KMT Alliance/Chinese New Party (NP) and the Chinese Democratic Reformers Alliance (CDRA). Dissatisfied with Lee's leadership, old guards and young urban professionals rebelled. The formation of the New KMT Alliance eventually led to the KMT’s first party split and the formation of the New Party (NP), which represented the interests of the “non-mainstream” faction and restoration of Mainlanders’ privileges (Hood 1996, 477). But, unlike the PAP’s split, the NP did not trigger a mass exodus of members from the KMT. As Cheng and Chou argue: “The huge resources commanded by the KMT (including government positions, lucrative party owned enterprises and name recognition) kept nearly all the factions from “exit” (2000, 58). Within the party, clashes between the

---

47 The KMT was traditionally viewed as a party advocating reunification between Taiwan and China. This changed under Lee’s leadership as the KMT began to downplay pro-unification as he promoted national identity and Taiwanese nationalism to garner support from Taiwanese community (Hsieh 2002, 117; Lin 2003, 68).

48 Factions were forbidden to vertical and horizontal alliances during Chiang’s rule. Factional leaders promoted to central government had to cut off their ties with followers or prevented to use their positions to distribute favours. Horizontally, faction leaders were not allowed to build cross-country or cross-city alliance. If they did, the KMT would provide financial support to the opposing faction (Kuo 1995 and 2000). For more on the KMT factionalism, see Lu (2002), Hood (1996) and Cheng and Chou (2000)

49 The Wisdom Club was formed in 1989, embraced a “Taiwan first” agenda and supported the mainstream faction. Members believed that Taiwan should be an independent and opposed the KMT’s claim to rule all of China. See Hood (1996, 475); Wu (1995, 98) and Lin and Tedards (27-30).

50 The NP was aided by former Finance Minister Wang Chien-shien and former Environmental Protection Director Jaw Shaw-kong, with charismatic and clean images. Projecting itself as a “purifier party”, the NP attacked the Lee’s KMT for betraying party orthodoxy. For more on the NP, see Fell (2005, 223-4).
factions centred around irreconcilable claims about Taiwan’s statehood and national identity, for independence or reunification with China (Chu 1996, 77).

Political Corruption and “Heijin”. To boost his flagging support, Lee turned to business tycoons, local factions and underground “black society” (heidao) connections to break up the non-mainstream faction of the KMT. In contrast to Chiang’s distaste for large capitalists, Lee embraced the capitalists to get electoral funding and support from the conglomerates. In return, the conglomerates were able to reap “usury rents from various protected sectors” (Kuo 2000, 97). In the Legislature Yuan, members begin to coalesce into factions to enhance individual interests. Unlike the past, where national and local factions were contained and balanced through “divide and rule”, under Lee’s leadership local factional leaders with gangster links were co-opted into central government and party central positions which led to rent-seeking and pork-barrel politics51 (Kuo 2000, 95). As will be discussed in Chapter 8, candidate selection and electoral system methods based on the single non-transferable vote (SNTV), multi-member system contributed to the KMT candidates’ competitive, self-seeking behaviour and political corruption (Cheng and Chou 2000, 59; Rigger 1993, 16-21).52 Declining control from the HQ over money and nominations also forced candidates to behave in a self-interested manner.

Political stakes were raised at the local levels as rival factions, some having underworld or “black society” connections, had to compete directly with candidates from the same party (Moody 2002, 36). Factional disputes undermined cohesion and contributed to the KMT’s dismal electoral performance in the National Assembly and Legislature Elections (Rigger 1999, 127).53 Chapter 6 will argue that Lee’s lax attitude towards party discipline and his nurturing of “black gold”54 (heijin) money politics involving gangsters exacerbated factionalism (Dickson and Chao 2002, 17; Lu 2002, 53-72). Candidates with gangster links

51 Easy access to government procurement and construction allow factional leaders to make profits and borrow easy loans from state-controlled banks (Cheng and Haggard 1996).
52 Hsieh argues that the SNTV system is in fact responsible for “black gold” politics (2002, 124-5).
53 On the electoral front, attitudes toward national identity can by represented by three major forces: 1) the DPP – supported by native Taiwanese which insists that Taiwan should become independent; 2) the NP and conservative KMT faction with strong mainlander presence and 3) the KMT with mixed ethnic composition and vague in national identity issue (Lin 2003, 67).
54 “Black” means underworld and “gold” means money or business. “Black gold” politics refers to the underworld gang activities, vote buying, political violence, bid rigging and political corruption. See Chin (2003) for an in-depth study of how “black gold” politics that contributed to the fall of the KMT party in 2000.
would offer bribes to win seats in the legislative Yuan and once in power, would seek to influence the Legislative Yuan’s Judicial Committee’s police affairs. In 1988, it was reported that among 3,600 plus council representatives at the town level, about one quarter had gang connections. At the county/city level, among the 865 representatives elected in 1994, 286 representatives (33%) were gangsters. Local factional leaders were also known to employ gangsters to intimidate local political rivals or to threaten government officials (Kuo 2000, 97). The introduction of “Heijing” politics also encouraged criminal activities; according to one report, there were 780 cases of criminal activities involving 8000 people, of whom only 800 were actually prosecuted and brought to justice (Myers et al 2002, 82).

Coordination Dilemmas

When the hegemonic party faces a protracted legitimacy crisis, the declining advantages are expected to alter the power asymmetry between the ruling party and opposition (Greene 2007). When faced with a coordination dilemma in 1970s, Chiang chose to concede to the increasing demands for political participation rather than repress. While no one will know precisely the motivation behind Chiang’s decision to liberalize, scholarly information does indicate that he played an important role at those critical junctures.

Two key factors influenced his calculations. First, a series of diplomatic setbacks and the de-recognition of Taiwan by the United Nations were snowballing into a legitimacy crisis. Taiwan’s national status was at stake as more countries recognized the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (Fan and Feigert 1988, 447-8). Taiwan’s changing geopolitics shaped Chiang’s view on Taiwan’s democratic future (Hu 2005; Winckler 1984). Second, the cleavage between Mainlanders and Taiwanese was increasingly played out as a struggle for redistribution of power against the discriminatory power structure maintained by  

---

55 For statistics on the number of congressmen and city/county councillors who joined gangs or were charged with criminal records, see Kuo Cheng-Lian’s doctoral dissertation (1995, 176).
56 For similar approach see Tien (1992) and Chao and Myers (1994).
57 As Lu said: “Admittedly, Chiang made his momentous decision not only out of conviction in the intrinsic superiority of the democratic system, but rather due to shrewd calculation that in the face of growing discontent with the KMT party-state on the part of the emerging middle class as well as the international isolation of Taiwan after its expulsion from the United Nations in 1972, the decision was necessary to ensure the survival of the regime” (2002, 55).
58 Most scholars agree that Taiwan’s international isolation and difficult diplomatic situation was an important factor in Chiang’s calculations. For his foreign policy, see Clough (1993) and Tien (1989, 216-248).
the KMT. As Chiang’s former close aide, Lee Huan agrees, Chiang’s decision to Taiwanize was influenced by external and internal factors.\(^{59}\) These two problems culminated into a national identity problem and a legitimacy crisis for the KMT (Chu and Lin 1996, 82; Huang 1995, 97).\(^{60}\)

Domestically, the KMT was stressed by allegations of abuse and use of repression tactics against critics of the regime. In 1977, ballot irregularities in a local election led to violent clashes that resulted in the burning of a police station and deaths, in what is now known as the Chungli incident. This sparked an anti-KMT militant opposition movement (Tien 1989, 9). Besides this, the infamous Kaohsiung Incident that began as an anti-government demonstration organized by Formosa Magazine on 10 Dec 1979 also ended in a violent confrontation between the crowd and police and the arrests of eight opposition leaders. In 1984, the murder of Henry Liu, an American citizen, implicated Taiwan’s military intelligence and strained the relationship between Taiwan and the US. On the economic front, a series of loan scandals or “Tenth Credit Cooperative Scandals” brought down two successive economic ministers and damaged the KMT’s credibility (Wu 1995, 38-9). And from 1980-5, the KMT under Chiang continued to suppress freedom of speech and arrested many of the “Dangwai” leaders connected with the Formosa Magazine Incident. See Table 4.10 for a timeline of key events that damaged the KMT’s legitimacy from 1960s-1980s in the next page.

Taiwanization was an attempt by the KMT to address the Party’s internal inequalities and ethnic tensions. It was Chiang’s strategy to appease demands for greater political participation and adopt a “damage-control” mechanism to co-opt Taiwanese dissidents into participants for the KMT cause (Wu 1995, 44). As Winckler observed, Chiang’s Taiwanization efforts were initially effective in forestalling pressures for more political participation (1999, 60). But the co-optation of Taiwanese could only dampen dissent temporarily. As Nathan and Ho observed, Chiang had tried to co-opt the emerging Taiwanese political elite into the KMT in the early 1970s. However, people such as Chang Chun-hun, Hsu Hsin-Liang and Su Nan-cheng who first began as promising KMT members broke away

\(^{59}\) For similar arguments on Chiang’s decision, see Nathan and Ho (1993), Wu (1995) and Hu (2005).

\(^{60}\) For alternative view, see Yang who argued that Taiwan’s liberalization was not driven by legitimacy crisis but “facilitated by the relatively high level of legitimacy enjoyed by the regime” (2005, 107).
from the party (1993, 40). Disenfranchised Taiwanese were emboldened by Taiwanization and rallied behind the “Dangwai” movement based on ethnic justice (Rigger 1999, 122).

**Table 4-10: Timeline of Significant Events Under the KMT (1960s-80s)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Lei-Chen Free China Fortnightly Affair</td>
<td>Lei Chen was sentenced by a military court to 10 years and had his magazine banned after it offered Chiang Kai-shek constructive criticisms and for attempting to organize a political party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Failed assassination of CCK</td>
<td>Failed assassination of Chiang Ching-Kuo by Taiwanese graduate student from Cornell, Wang Wen-Shiung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Lost UN seat</td>
<td>Taiwan lost the UN Seat because of cold war politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Chun-Li incident</td>
<td>“Dangwai” movement made impressive gains in provincial elections. In Chung-li province, protests against irregularities in vote counting sparked off a serious clash with the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-9</td>
<td>U.S.’s recognition of the PRC</td>
<td>President Carter recognized China in Dec and severed ties Taiwan the US signed Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which allows for the sale of defense equipment and provide arbitrary guarantees for Taiwan’s security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Formosa Magazine incident</td>
<td>A rally Kaohsiung city developed into a riot. After the incident, the “Dangwai” was split into moderate and radical wings, 1983.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Lin’s family massacre</td>
<td>While one of the Dangwai leaders, Lin Yi Hsiung was in prison, his mother and twin daughters were brutally murdered at home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Political imprisonments</td>
<td>A series of public arrests, trials and jailing of Taiwan’s prominent “Dangwai” leaders and intellectuals such as Shih Meng-the, Kao Chun-ming and Annette Lu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Death of Chen Wen-cheng</td>
<td>Chinese scholar at the Carnegie-Mellon Institute in Pittsburgh found dead in Taipei after an interrogation by security police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Removal of General Wang Sheng</td>
<td>A long time Chiang Ching-kuo aide and potential successor, Gen Wang Sheng was “kicked-upstairs” to Paraguay as an ambassador.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Murder of Henry Liu</td>
<td>A Chinese American who wrote a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo was murdered in his Californian home. The investigations found the head of Taiwan’s military Intelligence Bureau and organized crime ring (Bamboo Union) responsible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Loan scandals</td>
<td>Tenth Credit Co-operative financial crisis, fraudulent activities by Tsai Chen-Chou, a well-known KMT legislator sparked the worst financial crisis and worst non-political demonstrations. Two economic ministers forced to resign as a result.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various news and media sources

Economically, Taiwan experienced outstanding growth during the period from 1951-1984. It achieved an average 8.9 % economic growth rate from 1951-1984, slowing to 5 % in 1985 because of an economic recession; however, it reverted to 11.2 % by 1987 (Tien 1989, 17). Refer to Table 4-11. The KMT’s performance legitimacy was bolstered by Taiwan’s economic growth, but the rise in the middle-class, literacy, mass communications and living standards also altered political consciousness and demands (Huang 1995, 97).
Table 4-11: Indicators of Taiwan's Economic Growth (1953-87)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Growth rate</th>
<th>Real GNP</th>
<th>Per capita GNP</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953-62</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-72</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-87</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Growth rate calculated based on *U Penn World Tables* (Version 6.3) and the rest from Hsu (1993, 22).

As Table 4-12 shows, the number of protests against a variety of issues increased in quantity and ferocity by mid-1980s reaching a peak of 1,172 protests by 1988.

Table 4-12: Public Protests in Taiwan (1983-1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic/Livelihood</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour dispute</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>1172</td>
<td>2685</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Social movements related to student’s rights; women’s rights; consumer rights and ecology became more vocal and found their way into street protests (Interview with Hsiao, 28 Sep 2007). By 1989, at least 18 social movements had emerged to make claims on the state (Hsiao 1992, 59). Alongside with growing protests, civic organizations also increased exponentially from 2, 560 in 1952 to 10, 482 by 1985 (Hsu 1993, 22). In the 1980s, opposition journalism flourished. The media broke several taboos by making increasingly frequent attacks on the personal lives of the KMT leaders, cross-strait relations and self-determination in the media itself. This strained the KMT’s official tolerance of dissent.

In response, the KMT suspended publication, banned issues or confiscated copies for circulation. As shown in Table 4-13, censorship escalated during 1984-6 as a reflection of the regime’s vigilance and “desperate efforts to enforce existing rules that were rapidly becoming outdated” (Tien 1992, 46). From 1982-6, Taiwan was rated “Partly Free” by FH and had “5” for both political and civil liberties scores. See Appendix P for FH scores. The KMT’s domination over the media channel enabled it to manufacture a public image as the only party that could ensure a stable future for Taiwan. Opposition leaders, on the other hand, were portrayed as radical, violent and irresponsible (Wu 1995, 78).

---

61 See Hsiao (1992, 57-72) for the rise and impact of social movements and civil protests in the 1980s.
Faced with the greater socio-economic pressures and changing geo-strategic developments, Chiang was forced to respond. As he said “times are changing; the environment is changing and the tide is also changing” (Cited in Taylor 2000, 406). To survive, the KMT must increase political space or repress. Chiang was said to have told an aide: “It is easy to use power, but it is hard to know when not to use it” (see Taylor 2000, 407). It is difficult to ascertain the reasons behind Chiang’s decision-making, but my reading of the archives and academic accounts of timeline of events indicate that Chiang was in a dilemma, but he chose not to use force.

In hegemonic party regimes, de-institutionalization had to first occur before democratic transition (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In Taiwan, “de-institutionalization” was triggered during Chiang’s later rule when the KMT was in distress. As the transitivity literature tells us, single-party regimes are more likely to negotiate their withdrawal and take the form of elite pact negotiations to abolish old institutions and erect new institutions (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 37-47). In Taiwan, elite negotiations took place to change institutional arrangements. In 1986, when the Dangwai announced its intention to form a political party or the DPP against national law, Chiang did not clamp down, against the advice of party hardliners. See Table 4-14 for the major reforms initiated by Chiang.

Chiang began “de-institutionalization” that laid the grounds for transition and electoral reforms. Yet, selective repression was also used as the opposition faced intimidation and alleged political killings in 1980-4. By Oct 1986, Chiang appointed a 12-member group of the KMT’s CSC to study political reform measures. On 15 July 1987, Chiang lifted martial law as well as the ban on establishing political parties and newspapers. In October the same year, he allowed Taiwanese to visit their relatives in Mainland China and relaxed restrictions.

---

Table 4-13: Press Censorship in Taiwan (1980-1986)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total no of actions</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confiscations/Bans</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspensions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

62 Unlike Lee Kuan Yew, Chiang Ching-Kuo did not leave an autobiography. It is difficult to assess the motivations behind his decision to reform. Most scholarly accounts agree that his decision to liberalize was critical to Taiwan’s democratization. For arguments supporting the elite-led process, see Cheng and Lin (2008, 172); Chu (1992, 51-3); Chou and Nathan (1987, 283) and Wu (1995).
on newspaper publications (Hsu 1994). By 1990, FH has upgraded Taiwan’s civil and political liberties to 3 with “Partly Free” status. See Appendix P for the Comparative FH scores for Singapore and Taiwan.

### Table 4-14: Major Reforms Initiated During Last Years of Chiang Ching-kuo's rule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Feb 1984</td>
<td>Nomination of Lee Teng-hui, a low profile Taiwanese as Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1984</td>
<td>Allowed formation of a Quasi Opposition party (PPRA) and mediated talks with the KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Dec 1985</td>
<td>CCK publicly declared that he had become a Taiwanese and no family member of his would run for presidency⁶³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May 1986</td>
<td>Appointed The KMT CSC to study major reforms. Declared that the martial law was to be lifted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July 1987</td>
<td>Formally lifted emergency decree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Nov 1987</td>
<td>Allowed Taiwanese to visit Mainland China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-Jun 1987</td>
<td>Enacted the National Security Law and amended the Law on Civic Organizations to protect the people’s freedom to form associations, parties and organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 1988</td>
<td>Law on Assembly and Parade was passed to allow indoor gatherings and conduct parade activities; protects the people’s freedom of assembly and association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jan 1988</td>
<td>Chiang Ching-kuo passed away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1989</td>
<td>Law on Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians in early 1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Hsu (1994) and Jiang and Wu (1992).

### Post-2000 Party Reforms

The shock of electoral defeat was one of the most important factors that led to KMT’s party change (Harmel and Janda 1994). Since the KMT’s disastrous defeat in the 2000 PE, the KMT has undergone a few more re-organizations after the 16th Party Congress to streamline the Party (Tan 2002, 158-9). Despite the changes, the foundational pyramidal party structure based on the cadre system and network of party cells remains the same. After Lien Chan assumed chairmanship in 2000, he formed a Party Affairs reform committee to take drastic measures to professionalize the party so to become a more competitive, “electoral machinery”. The KMT has since cut down the number of party committees from 12 to 6 and reduced the number of party units from 55 to 26. See Table 4-15. One of the party’s key units, the Business Management Committee in-charge of party assets was eliminated as the KMT faced public pressures to be accountable of party assets amassed over

---

⁶³ In a National Assembly speech in Dec 1985, Chiang said that his successor would be produced according to the constitution and “could not and would not” (pu-neng ye pu-hui) be a member of his family. He also declared that the ROC “could not and would not” have military rule (Taylor 2000, 399).
its 50 years of hegemonic rule. The KMT also announced that it would stop operating profit-seeking businesses and focus on electoral machines.

Table 4-15: Breakdown of KMT Party Membership, Recruits and Staff (1952-present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Congress reports</th>
<th>7th</th>
<th>15th</th>
<th>16th</th>
<th>17th</th>
<th>18th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party members</td>
<td>282,959</td>
<td>261,761</td>
<td>952,835</td>
<td>1,056,709</td>
<td>1,040,000 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New recruits</td>
<td>42,611</td>
<td>615,539</td>
<td>100,080</td>
<td>24,000 est.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16,957</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total party paid staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,601</td>
<td>1,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party HQ staff</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party HQ volunteers</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party branch staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Retirees</td>
<td></td>
<td>404</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To increase efficiency, the total number of party staff has been whittled from a high of 3,000 to 1,395. Within the Party HQ, the number of party staff has shrunk by half from 288 in 2001 to 100 in 2010. To keep the Party young, the average age of staff retirement has been reduced from 65 to 60 and a total number of 400 party staff were asked to retire in 2005. Accordingly, party expenses were cut to around to NT$5.2 bil a year (Taipei Times 18 Jul 2007). The recent re-organization efforts and dwindling resources are expected to have a negative impact on the morale of the party staff (Interview with R. Chu, 21 Apr 2010). But, after the belt-tightening and party streamlining measures, the KMT is still comparatively richer than its competitors and can be expected to emerge as more efficient party. We will only be able to properly gauge the effects of the recent organization changes after a few more elections.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that the KMT’s party origins - its civil war experiences and revolutionary goal to reclaim the mainland - have an impact on its party organization and transition from one-party state to a hegemonic party system. As Smith says, “the kinds of organizations that the parties build will directly influence their ability to withstand political crisis” (2005, 422). The humiliating defeat in mainland and party reorganizations in 1950 were critical junctures that led to the KMT’s adoption of cadre system to tighten party discipline and improve the quality of party membership. The Party’s quasi-Leninist party
organization based on democratic centralism and building of para-political institutions also became part of its corporatist strategy to maintain party cohesion in the early years.

The KMT built on its incumbency; extensive network structures to establish its organizational and mobilization capacity. For example, the KMT’s use of “organizational weapons” such as the CYC and GPWD were pivotal institutional innovations that centralized the Party’s power. The network of party cells and stations in public enterprises and social organizations signified the extent of the KMT’s penetration to the grassroots level in the 1960s and 70s. Building its means for co-optation also bolstered its performance legitimacy. The KMT’s party building experiences demonstrated how strong leadership reinforced party discipline and constitution, without which the Party may have been factionalized.

Lipset and Rokkan’s “freezing thesis” has more explanatory leverage in Taiwan than in Singapore. The KMT’s discriminatory policy and use of coercion to repress and exclude local Taiwanese from key political and party positions reified the sub-ethnic cleavage in society. The unequal social and political structures were potential grounds for conflict and a key factor in the rise of an opposition party based on ethnic justice. Indeed, the Taiwanese consciousness and the Dangwai movement in the late 1970s set the stage for the formation of a multi-party system after the lifting of the ban on political parties. Taiwan’s party system formation followed the pattern of older democracies where sub-ethnic cleavage transformed into party alignments. As Cheng and Hsu contend that: “The hot issue of Taiwan’s national identity and statehood essentially shapes the structure of partisan conflict and heats up the cold issues of public policies” (1996, 169).

Finally, this chapter traced the significant events that led to the electoral “opening” and regime’s liberalization. The protracted legitimacy crisis, the rising opposition movement and external pressures altered the power asymmetry between the KMT and opposition. When faced with a coordination dilemma, Chiang conceded through the selective repression and negotiation with opposition leaders that allowed the KMT to control the pace of liberalization. In the late 1980s, the passing of a Party leader, rapid Taiwanization and party expansion altered party membership and the power relations between the old and new members. As Chapter 6 argues, the lack of institutionalization in the KMT’s leadership succession would eventually lead to the Party’s electoral decline in 1990s.
PART II: LEADERSHIP SELECTION AND PARTY COHESION
5 The PAP: Institutionalized Charisma and Party Cohesion

Leadership succession is one of the gravest threats to hegemonic party stability (Huntington 1970, 30; Lapalombara and Weiner 1966, 411; Przeworski 1986, 55). Leadership struggles are often sources of conflict that reduce party cohesion. Unlike the KMT that was split by internal conflicts after the passing of its strongman, the PAP has survived 2 national leadership transitions: the first in 1992 when the party’s founding leader Lee Kuan Yew handed his prime ministerial position to Goh Chok Tong, and the second in 2004, when Lee Hsien Loong, Senior Lee’s son took over as Goh’s successor. How did the PAP facilitate leadership succession without power struggles or party splits?

This chapter examines Singapore’s institutional structures at the systemic and party organizational levels that affect party cohesion. Specifically, I consider the PAP’s model of leadership selection and implications for its cohesion and stability in the last four decades. I argue that the PAP’s transformation from a democratic and inclusive mass-base party to a cadre party based on democratic centralism in 1961 was a critical organizational development that prevented factionalism and personalism.

Based on the theoretical framework of leadership selection as discussed in Chapter 2, I argue that the PAP’s elitist model of leadership selection under the Westminster Parliamentary system asserts a strong centripetal that pulls party careerists toward the strong centre - a small selectorate who has the monopoly to nominate and select candidates. Within the party, the system of elite recruitment and candidate selection is institutionalized - the process is centralized, routinized and based notionally on the concept of meritocracy. Despite its horizontal integration of elites into the party that could undermine the leader-member relations, the maintenance of the PAP’s parliamentary voting unity has helped to stabilize its oligarchic government and prolong its hegemonic rule.

There are many institutional sources of party cohesion such as systemic factors (legal, constitutional, electoral and political system), organizational and other contextual factors (resources, motivations of gatekeepers and leaders). In this chapter, I focus on the rules and regulations governing leadership selection (elite recruitment and candidate selection) for the national and party levels as they directly affect intra-party competition and cohesion. The aim
is to highlight how the incentive structures and mechanisms at the systemic and party organizational levels operate to affect the calculations of key actors.

My arguments are organized as follows: First, I highlight the incentives and constraints of Singapore’s Westminster parliamentary system that affect voting unity and legislative candidacy. Second, I revisit the theoretical connections between institutionalization, party leadership selection and elite cohesion. Then, I examine the PAP’s leadership selection model for top party and national leadership positions. Specifically, I consider how the PAP’s exclusive and centralized leadership selection model alters legislators’ calculations for re-election, accountability and representation in the Parliament. Finally, I assess the strengths and weaknesses of the PAP’s elitist leadership selection model, the possibility of de-institutionalization and implications for regime durability.

**Westminster Parliamentary System and Party Cohesion**

Singapore inherited a Westminster, unicameral parliamentary system from its British colonial masters. Its electoral system is a mixture of single-member constituency (SMC) and “party block vote” or Group Representative Constituencies (GRCs) of five to six candidates based on a one-man-one-vote system and simple plurality. The current 11th Parliament is represented by 23 electoral constituencies: 9 single seats and 14 GRCs consisting of 5 or 6 seats (Total = 84 seats). In addition, the House also includes non-elected seats: 9 for nominated MPs¹ (NMPs) and up to 3 seats for Non-constituency MPs² (NCMPs).

**Party Whip and Voting Unity**

Like British parliamentary parties, the PAP displays high cohesion (Epstein 1956). Party cohesion refers to the extent to which, in a given situation, group members can be observed to work together for the group’s goals in one and the same way. It embraces the degree to which elites unite, and the compliance of members with party leader’s preferences.

---

¹ The NMPs are non-partisan, citizens appointed by the President of Singapore for two and a half years on the recommendation of a Special Select Committee of Parliament chaired by the Speaker. Unlike the NCMPs who are opposition members, the NCMPs are independent, non-partisan and “distinguished” persons who have special knowledge, expertise or practical experience in society.

² A NCMP is a non-elected MP or the “best opposition loser”. To qualify, an opposition candidate is expected to obtain at least 15% of the constituency's votes, and if the opposition manages to win three or more seats, the NCMP practice would cease (Mutalib 2002, 661-2; Quah 1985, 223).
Cohesion is distinct from discipline, as the latter refers to the use of enforcement or sanctions such as the party whip or expulsion to achieve cohesion (Ozbudun 1970, 305).

Conventionally, the study of party cohesion in pluralistic regimes is based on party vote or roll call analysis of the legislature. However, such approach is not useful for understanding the PAP’s cohesion as its MPs are obliged to vote along party lines and the small number of opposition MPs pose little threat. To prove the futility of roll-call analysis in Singapore’s parliament, a random selection of the recent bills show that the PAP MPs display strong voting unity and always vote in unison. See Table 5-1.

Table 5-1: Voting Behavior in Singapore Parliament (2007-9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Recent Bills introduced</th>
<th>Votes breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Amendment) Bill On Legal Service Commission (Judicial independence)</td>
<td>Against: 2 (Opp. MPs) For: 75 (PAP MPs) Abstain: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Penal Code (Amendment) Bill</td>
<td>Against: 1 (NMP) For: 76 (PAP MPs) Abstain: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Parliamentary Election: Motion to debate on By-election</td>
<td>Against: 62 (PAP MPs) For: 5 (NMPs) Abstain: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(Amendment) Bill on Article 5(2) of the Constitution</td>
<td>Against: 0 For: 75 (PAP MPs) Abstain: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Public Order Bill</td>
<td>Against: 2 (Opp. MP) 1(NMP) For: 74 (PAP MPs) Abstain: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Human Organ Transplant Bill</td>
<td>Against: 1 (PAP MP) For: 72 (PAP MPs) 1 (Opp MP) 1 (Opp NCMP) 1 (PAP MP) Abstain: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(Amendment) Bill on Article 5(2) of the Constitution</td>
<td>Against: 2 (Opp MPs) For: 75 (PAP MPs) Abstain: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MP= Member of parliament; NMP=Nominated member of parliament; NCMP=Non-constituency member of parliament; Opp MP=Opposition member of parliament
Source: Extracted from Singapore Parliament Reports.

As Table 5-1 shows, out of the 7 Bills that were voted on, only on one occasion when the Party Whip was lifted (Human Organ Transplant Bill, 24 Mar 2009) did a PAP MP vote against the Party’s position while two PAP MPs abstained, possibly on religious grounds. For the PAP, the party whip ensures party discipline. Unless the party whip is lifted, very few PAP MPs will vote against the party line. With more than two-thirds supermajority in the

---

3 Quantitative methods of measuring party cohesion include “party vote”; “index of cohesion” or “index of party loyalty”. See Owens (2003), Carey (2009) and Kam (2009).
4 In 1969, 10 PAP MPs abstained from voting for the abortion Bill when the Whip was lifted, thus signalling their opposition to the Bill.
Parliament, the PAP can control parliamentary agenda, pass unpopular policies quickly without much debate or need to forge coalitions with opposition. As Tan notes, in Singapore “…given that the institution of the party whip and the culture of obedience to one’s party leaders that constrains parliamentarians means that the cabinet controls parliament rather than vice versa” (1989, 165).

Besides the use of the party whip to ensure voting unity, Singapore’s Westminster parliamentary system also asserts strong institutional centripetal forces that encourage party cohesion. As Kam argues, the Westminster parliamentary government that is built around a double-monopoly of power 1) concentrates office perks and policy influence in a single body, the cabinet, and 2) provides one set of party leaders with exclusive control of cabinet and the recruitment channels that lead to the cabinet. And it is “This double-monopoly of power fuses professional and advancement and policy influence into a single indivisible good that is controlled by the party leadership (Kam 2006, 563). Likewise for the PAP careerists, access to power depends on their good relations with their party leaders, which involve support in vote and voice. Departing from the party line would mean loss of favor, re-election or promotion. To illustrate the incentives and constraints of Singapore’s Parliamentary system, I will examine the rules governing legislative candidacy next.

Rules of the Game in Singapore

Singapore’s legal restrictions on candidate eligibility are fairly universal with three key legislations governing Singapore Parliamentary Elections.5 Significantly, candidates must comply by Article 45 of the Constitution6 - which states that anyone sentenced by a court of law in Singapore or Malaysia and imprisoned for more than a year, or a fine of more than S$2,000 will be ineligible for candidacy or disqualified from Parliament.

5 The 3 legislations are: 1) The Constitution of Singapore (The Legislature - Part VI); 2) The Parliamentary Elections Act (Chapter 218); 3) The Political Donations Act (Chapter 236) and Subsidiary Legislations. A person is qualified to stand as a candidate if he is a citizen above 21 years; in residence for more than 10 years; possess language proficiency in one of the 4 national languages: English, Malay, Mandarin or Tamil and not incapacitated by physical causes.

6Article 45 states that a potential candidate convicted of defamation; imprisoned for one year or fined with at least S$2000 or liable to pay damages in a civil suit that results in bankruptcy is ineligible to stand for elections for 5 years.
Rule of Law or Rule by Law?

Despite the universality of Singapore’s legal rules governing candidacy, critics argue that the existing laws have been used by the PAP to prevent the opposition to stand in Parliament for long periods of time (IBA Human Rights Report 2008, 28-9). For example, the first opposition MP, J.B. Jeyaretnam of the Worker’s Party (WP) was disqualified in 1984 for mis-stating party funds and again, as an Non-Constituency MP in 1997 because of bankruptcy lawsuits brought by PAP leaders. Unlike the brawling scenes that we see in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, Singapore MPs have to abide by a strict code of conduct or face stiff penalty. Thus far, only opposition MPs, such as JBJ, have been fined for their conduct in Parliament (Straits Times 6 Jun 2009). Besides JBJ, other opposition candidates who have been disqualified to contest as a result of lawsuits were WP members Wong Hong Toy, Tang Liang Hong, R. Murugason and SDP Secretary General Chee Soon Juan. In contrast, Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam, a former Administrative Service Officer and Director in the Monetary Authority of Singapore who was charged and found guilty of breaching Official Secrets Act in June 1992, was fined only S$1,500 - an amount that allow him to contest in elections as a PAP candidate.

The strings of libel and defamation suits that have been brought to cripple dissidents and opposition leaders have been discussed in depth elsewhere and will not be repeated here. What is important to highlight is the inconsistent application of the rule of law and the exclusion of dissenting opinions from the House. This inconsistency raises questions about the country’s judicial independence and surrounding civil and political freedoms that deter potential independent or opposition candidates from standing in election. While Singapore

7 See Mauzy and Milne (2002, 134-6) for a summary of the key lawsuits. For the lawsuits against JBJ and his party members, see the Worker’s Party (WP) website at http://www.wp.org.sg/party/history/1981_1986.htm
8 The Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act spells out a list of 17 different offences MPs can be taken to task for. The penalties include imprisonment, suspension or a fine of up to $50,000 (Straits Times 6 Jun 2009).
9 In the 1980s, JBJ was referred to the House's Privileges Committee 4 times - once in 1982 and thrice in 1986. The 1986 cases involved alleging executive interference in the judiciary and abuse of police powers, and failing to declare a pecuniary interest in a question raised. The committee fined him $1,000 on each count.
10 See Worthington (2003, 155-163) for the “accidental prosecution” of T Shanmugaratnam.
11 See Gomez (2006); Worthington (2001); IBA Report (Jul 2008) and Rodan (2009).
12 See Worthington (2001) on the judicial and executive relations in Singapore. Worthington argues that Singapore’s judicial system has been hegemonized by a number of political bureaucratic strategies and interprets its role in terms of the goals of the political executive. For more critical perspective, see Seow (1999, 107-124) and IBA Report (Jul 2008, 49-68).
has often been lauded by some international organizations such as the World Bank (WB) for its strong rule of law (93.8 percentile), expert based surveys such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index’s (BTI) show Singapore’s rule of law to be weak (6.3/10); especially in “Separation of powers” (4/10) and “Independent judiciary” (5/10). See Appendix G for the WB Governance Indicators for both Singapore and Taiwan and Appendix B for the BTI Democracy status and key indicators of Singapore and Taiwan (2010).

Critics such as Catherine Lim13 have argued that fear of legal harassment and lawsuits have fostered a “climate of fear” in Singapore. However, government officials have consistently rejected such characterization. For example, in a live televised forum, Lee Kuan Yew defended the political freedom in Singapore by challenging a young journalist to prove that “a climate of fear” exists. In defence of his tough public reproach, Lee said: “I allow my grandchildren to speak back to me. But from time to time when they're out of bounds, I put them down.” After being publicly chastised by Lee, the Cambridge-trained journalist resigned from his job.14 This episode perhaps best encapsulates how the PAP leaders would browbeat dissenters to protect its “image of invincibility”.

**High Election Deposit**

Like most countries, Singapore requires candidates to place a monetary deposit to stand for legislative election (Massicotte et al. 2004). Since its first Legislative Council Election in 1948, a deposit amount of $500 was required of each candidate. However, by 2006 GE, the deposit amount has increased twenty-seven fold to S$13,500. Constitutionally, the deposit amount is calculated based on 8 percent of the total allowance payable to MPs in the preceding year. With the dramatic increase in ministerial and civil servant’s salary15 in the last two decades, the deposit amount has skyrocketed. The official rationale to impose monetary deposit is to screen out farcical candidates. However, the large sum of deposit clearly privileges resource rich, incumbent PAP candidates and deters poorer candidates and

---

13 Catherine Lim is a famous local writer who was chastised by former PM Goh Chok Tong for her critical views of Singapore’s PAP government. See “Climate of fear hurts Singapore.” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 Dec 2007. For a great study of Lim’s views, see K.Tan’s “Who’s afraid of Catherine Lim” (2009).


15 See Press Release by the Prime Minister’s Office, 13 Dec 2007.
parties from contesting in elections (See Table 5-2). In the last 2006 GE, the election deposit for a single candidate was S$13,500 (US$9,910) and $54,000 (US$39,643) for a team of 4 candidates to contest in a GRC. Thus far, only independent candidates or opposition candidates have forfeited deposits. This precedence may discourage qualified opposition candidates to contest in elections and exacerbate the rise in uncontested seats (see Chapter 7).

### Table 5-2: Deposit Amount for Legislative Candidates in Singapore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Deposit Amount</th>
<th>Candidates Who Forfeited Deposit</th>
<th>Names of Parties (No. of candidates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>WP (1); Ind (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>BS (1); UNF (19); WP (1); Ind (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>$1,200</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>UPF (2); Ind (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>UF (2); UPF (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>AI (1); UPF (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>AI (1); PKMS (2); UPF (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PKMS (1); IND (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>DPP(1); SPP (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>DPP(1); IND (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$13,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data extracted from Singapore Elections website.

“Dual Mandate” and Horizontal Integration of Elites

In liberal and pluralist regimes, the political elites usually emerge from a competitive electoral process and independent social groups. To reiterate Schumpeter, elites are competitively chosen to make choices for the electorate. And elites are usually vertically integrated where people enter organizations at the low levels and work themselves up to the top. Usually, a society characterized by high levels of elites vertical integration is likely to be more institutionalized and developed than one that is not (Birnbaum 1978, 107; Panebianco 1988, 62). In contrast, the political elites in authoritarian regimes emerge mainly, if not exclusively, from the political structure (Perlmutter 1981, 26). Likewise in Singapore, political elites are horizontally integrated or co-opted from parallel state institutions.

---

16 A candidate's election deposit will be forfeited if he or she garners less than one-eighth or 12.5% of the votes cast in the constituency he or she contests. See Singapore Elections.
17 See Appendix C for the list of political parties in Singapore.
18 See Birnbaum (1978, 107-113) for a comparative study of the implications of vertical integration in the British political system, the US, France and West Germany.
19 Horizontal integration refers to elites passing from a position of power in one institution to another of equivalent power in another institution (Birnbaum 1978, 107). Also see Panebianco (1988, 62).
In most legislatures, there are prohibitions of dual mandates. Likewise, under Singapore law, public servants are not allowed to assume political office. Legally, senior categories of officers from the Public Service (SAF, Singapore Civil Service (CSC), Singapore Legal Services and the Singapore Police Force (SPF)) are prohibited to hold public office and be an MP at the same time). However, this prohibition does not prevent the PAP from recruiting its candidates from the Public Service. In fact, the Civil Service, Statutory Boards and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are prime recruiting grounds for the PAP. Hand-picked candidates are fast-tracked into ministerial positions (Rodan 2005, 116).

Table 5-3: Occupational Background of MPs (1963-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrats</td>
<td>14 (16.9)</td>
<td>11 (13.1)</td>
<td>13 (15.7)</td>
<td>13 (16)</td>
<td>14 (17.3)</td>
<td>23 (23.9)</td>
<td>8 (19.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Linked Companies (GLCs)</td>
<td>4 (4.8)</td>
<td>4 (4.8)</td>
<td>3 (3.6)</td>
<td>4 (4.9)</td>
<td>4 (4.9)</td>
<td>1 (1.04)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>6 (7.2)</td>
<td>6 (7.1)</td>
<td>6 (7.2)</td>
<td>5 (6.2)</td>
<td>3 (3.7)</td>
<td>2 (2.1)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>9 (10.8)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10 (11.9)</td>
<td>16 (19.3)</td>
<td>20 (24.7)</td>
<td>21 (25.9)</td>
<td>22 (22.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>22 (26.5)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26 (31)</td>
<td>14 (16.9)</td>
<td>11 (13.6)</td>
<td>10 (12.3)</td>
<td>14 (14.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical doctors</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 (4.8)</td>
<td>5 (6)</td>
<td>3 (3.6)</td>
<td>5 (6.2)</td>
<td>12 (12.5)</td>
<td>11 (26.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 (4.8)</td>
<td>5 (6)</td>
<td>3 (3.6)</td>
<td>5 (6.2)</td>
<td>7 (8.6)</td>
<td>12 (12.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union links</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 (4.8)</td>
<td>5 (6)</td>
<td>3 (3.6)</td>
<td>5 (6.2)</td>
<td>7 (8.6)</td>
<td>12 (12.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Managers</td>
<td>17 (20.5)</td>
<td>14 (16.7)</td>
<td>18 (21.7)</td>
<td>18 (22.2)</td>
<td>14 (17.3)</td>
<td>14 (14.6)</td>
<td>3 (7.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Staff</td>
<td>2 (2.4)</td>
<td>1 (1.2)</td>
<td>1 (1.2)</td>
<td>1 (1.2)</td>
<td>3 (3.7)</td>
<td>2 (2.1)</td>
<td>9 (21.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others /Unknowns</td>
<td>1 (1.2)</td>
<td>1 (1.2)</td>
<td>3 (3.6)</td>
<td>3 (3.7)</td>
<td>4 (4.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of MPs</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Data for 1963 to 1984 from Iwasaki (2003, 352); the rest compiled by author based on official Singapore Parliament and Singapore Election websites.

As Table 5-3 shows, the bulk of Singapore’s Ministers and the PAP MPs were former career civil servants, university professors and military officers. An average of 49% of the PAP MPs – nearly half of the Parliament - were drawn from the Government Ministries, government-linked corporations and statutory boards. The politicization of the civil service is a key feature of Singapore’s political system that is distinctively un-Westminster style.

---

20 A study by Massicotte et al. (2004, 59) shows that except in France and Germany, 46 countries do not allow public servants to serve simultaneously as elective officers at the national levels.

21 The Singapore Public Service employs some 110,000 public officers working in 15 Ministries, more than 50 Statutory Boards and 9 Organs of State.
(Vennewald 1994; Worthington 2003, Iwasaki 2003). Since the PAP’s split in 1961, the locus of power has shifted from the Party to the bureaucracy. The PAP government is perhaps best described as an “administrative state”\(^22\) that fuses party and state and facilitates horizontal integration of government elites into the PAP (Chan 1975).

\[\text{Why Become a Candidate?}\]

As in most countries, Singapore candidates are motivated by ideological, personal or material incentives to stand in elections (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 182-4). For example, opposition WP chairman Sylvia Lim indicated that she had decided to stand in election as she believes in democracy and wants to address the problem of uncontested seats and persistent lack of opposition voices in the House (Interview with Lim, 6 Feb 2007). On the other hand, PAP MP Michael Palmer indicates that he has had no prior party experience and decided to join the PAP and stand in 2006 GE because he was “invited” to do so (Interview with Palmer, 2 Aug 2007).

The PAP candidates, also known as “Men in White”, often don white uniforms during election campaigns in an attempt to reinforce the image of the Party as being clean and incorruptible. The Party prides itself for its anti-corruption, clean governance that does not condone gift giving or patron-client relations. See Appendix G: WB governance data (1998-2008), which shows Singapore scoring 99.5 percentile for its control of corruption. Besides, the Party website also states that “party membership does not offer any special privileges or material benefits”.\(^23\) Indeed, the PAP government has a record of disciplining its own cadres and even Ministers who have been found to engage in corruption. For example, in 1966, then Minister for National Development Tan Kia Gan was investigated for helping his close businessman and his son to clinch the sale of Boeing aircraft to Malaysian Airways. Tan was later stripped of all his public appointments by the Government. Additionally when Wee Toon Boon, then Minister of State for the Environment, was convicted for corruption in 1975 he was sentenced to 4 1/2 years' imprisonment and ordered to pay a penalty of $7,023.\(^24\)

\[^{22}\text{Singapore’s “administrative state” entails 1) a de-politicization of the citizenry; and 2) a significant power of bureaucrats which blurs the distinction between the civil service and the executive (Chan 1975, 510).}\]

\[^{23}\text{See the PAP recruitment website at http://www.pap.org.sg/joinpap.php.}\]

\[^{24}\text{Another high-profile case was Teh Cheang Wan (ex-Minister for National Development) who was investigated in 1986 for accepting 2 bribes totalling $1 mil. Teh committed suicide before he was formally}\]

122
prosecution of these high profile cases continues to serve as a deterrent to anyone who may want to profit from their public office. In line with its party image, the PAP members are not expected to benefit materially, to be nominated as candidate or gain favours as a result of party membership.

However, it is also a well-known fact that there are plenty of financial incentives to be gained if one gets “spotted” or groomed for political office. In Singapore, the financial incentives available to politicians are far more attractive than in other countries. The country is known to pay its MPs and Ministers far better than other Westminster parliamentary systems. As Table 5-4 shows, Singapore Ministers and the Prime Minister earned disproportionately more than their counterparts in Hong Kong, Canada and the UK. Singapore’s PM is now the highest paid political leader in the world. He is paid more than 40 times the city-state’s GDP per person. The Government’s justification of the Ministers’ high salary are: 1) to attract “good, competent people” to join politics; 2) to deter corruption; 2) to demonstrate the government’s belief in meritocracy and 3) an important retention strategy to prevent the outflow of talent from the civil service to the private sector.

### Table 5-4: Comparative Salaries of MPs and Ministers, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
<td>HK$652,680</td>
<td>SG$142,8005</td>
<td>CAN$147,700</td>
<td>£59,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Minister</td>
<td>HK$3,219,660</td>
<td>SG$1,458,040</td>
<td>CAN$218,500</td>
<td>£133,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister or Head of government</td>
<td>HK$2,934,780</td>
<td>SG$2,700,000</td>
<td>CAN$295,400</td>
<td>£187,932</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Annual Salary of Major Office-holders in Selected Overseas Legislatures and Governments” (May 2006), the Legislative Council, Research and Library Services Division, Hong Kong.

Hence, despite the PAP’s public rhetoric to stay clean, it also relies on material inducements and not ideological commitments to attract candidates to join its Party and stand in election. Aside from the prospects of high ministerial salary, candidates can look to holding multiple company directorships as a lucrative sideline once they become MPs. In charged in court. See Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) website at http://app.cpib.gov.sg/cpib_new/user/default.aspx?pgID=237.

25 Lee’s annual salary was S$2.7 mil (2007), which he justifies is a fraction of what top managers in investment firms earn. “S’pore cannot afford “revolving door” style of government.” Straits Times, 4 Apr 2007.


27 See “PAP MP pays $6.5 million for unit at luxury condo Marina Bay Suites,” SG Forums, 9 Dec 2009.
one report, some PAP MPs\(^{28}\) were said to be sitting on as many as 11 boards and receiving fees of up to S$70,000 (US$ 51,364) from each company (Financial Times 1 May 2004). The phenomenon of the PAP MPs holding multiple directorships has fuelled suggestions that private companies have sought the MPs as board members to gain influence within the PAP. To counter the bad press, the PAP devised a “Code of Conduct for PAP MPs” rulebook with new demands from their MPs to abide by the “rules of prudence” and to submit a list of their directorships and the total fees and stock options they receive to the Party annually.\(^{29}\)

Singapore citizens know that it makes good financial sense to stand as a PAP rather than as an opposition candidate, and they will also have a better shot at ministerial positions. Domestically, the high ministerial salary and multiple directorships enjoyed by PAP leaders are controversial. Critics argue that the disproportionately high ministerial salaries have become a form of political corruption or abuse of state funds to keep the PAP in power (Tarling 2005, 159). Besides, the high ministerial salary may also exacerbate the income gap in the country and create the “politics of envy” between the rulers and the ruled\(^{30}\) (Tan 2008).

**Institutionalization, Leadership Selection and Party Cohesion**

Thus far, I have outlined the institutional incentives and constraints of legislative candidacy in Singapore. Next, I will turn to the party organization and examine the institutional structures within the PAP that govern elite recruitment and candidate selection (leadership selection). The focus on the PAP’s internal politics is to show how institutionalization can occur in hegemonic parties and demonstrate that party institutionalization need not necessarily lead to democratic consolidation. A party with an institutionalized succession system is expected to be more stable as it has a predictable incentive structure that could attenuate the uncertainties of power struggles.

\(^{28}\) Reportedly, former MPs Dr. Wang Kai Yuen, Ong Kian, Dr John Chen and Chew Heng Ching were notorious for holding 8-11 directorships. MP Chew Heng Ching was even said to call himself a “professional company director”. Also see “Singapore issues rules to prevent ‘crony capitalism’. Financial Times 1 May, 04.

\(^{29}\) See “Code of conduct for PAP MPs” on PAP website at http://www.pap.org.sg/articleview.php?id=1008&mode=&cid=23

\(^{30}\) The median salary of an average Singapore worker is only $2,400 monthly compared to a junior minister who can expect to take home more than $160,000 in the same period of time. For more criticisms, see Au’s “Singapore's 'fat cat' ministers to get fatter,” AsiaTimes, 5 Apr 2007.
There are two competing theories on the effects of candidate selection on party cohesion. The first approach suggests that the democratization of candidate-selection method and inclusive selectorate leads to a decrease in party cohesion (Baum and Robinson 1999; Hazan and Rahat 2001). That is, more centrally controlled nomination and candidate selection should lead to greater party cohesion than locally controlled processes (Bowler, Farrrell and Katz 1999; Katz 2001; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). If a candidate’s nomination and ranking is determined by party leaders, then, he is more likely to toe the party line and show loyalty. If his ranking is determined by local constituency support, the plurality of pressures will result in ambitious party member acting in self-interest rather than as a team player. However, the second approach argues that an inclusive selectorate increases the power of party elites and help preserves party cohesion (Carty 2004; Mair 1994). Based on the logic of cartel party model, the latter theory posits that the less stable, atomized or unorganized the party base, the more likely it is for party members to take the lead from high-profile party leaders resulting in cohesion.

My study of the PAP’s leadership selection supports the first theory that more democratic and inclusive methods decrease party cohesion. Leadership selection constitutes the party’s incentive system. For a party to survive, it must distribute incentives such as powerful positions, career opportunities to supporters to build loyalty. If the center loses autonomy over incentive distribution, then centrifugal tendencies will result in intra-party competition and party disunity.

In Singapore’s Parliamentary system, the PAP’s intra-party elite recruitment and candidate selection are important as they: 1) are part of the Party’s patronage or incentive distribution system that decide who become a Member of Parliament (MP) and has a shot at the Cabinet and the PM’s office; 2) determine the composition and representativeness of the Parliament, and 3) are critical mechanisms in building party loyalty and elite cohesion.

Based on the two by two matrix that was introduced in the Introduction, I argue that the PAP’s leadership succession system is institutionalized as the selectorate has exclusive rights and jurisdiction over the recruitment eligibility and criteria for candidacy. The PAP selectorate or the CEC is highly autonomous as it is able to set its own requirements for candidacy and exclude any invasions by intruders who do not meet its own admission
requirements. The PAP can nominate or appoint its candidates without external interference (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). See Figure 5-1.

**Figure 5-1: The PAP’s Model of Leadership Succession and Party Cohesion**

Autonomy (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systemness (S)</th>
<th>High S &amp; High A</th>
<th>High S &amp; Low A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Institutionalized charisma”</td>
<td>“Institutionalized conflict”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Regular successions based on clear rules of the game, and facilitated by a small, exclusive selectorate</td>
<td>- Regular successions based on clear rules of the game and facilitated by all party members or an inclusive electorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP (1961- present)</td>
<td>PAP (1945-1961)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systemness (S)</th>
<th>Low S &amp; High A</th>
<th>Low S &amp; Low A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Un-institutionalized charisma”</td>
<td>“Un-institutionalized conflict”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Irregular successions based on a small incumbent selectorate</td>
<td>- Irregular successions based on patronage or informal clientelistic network with no clear rules; ad-hoc selectorate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on elite interviews, party publications and media reports, the next section will explain how the PAP’s elite recruitment and candidate selection affect its elite cohesion.

**The PAP’s Secretive Cadre Selection**

As discussed in Chapter 3, the PAP originated as a left-winged mass party, and co-opted pro-communist unionists to expand its support base. Then, 3 key events altered the organizational development of the PAP: a failed takeover attempt by the Communist faction in 1957 and two party splits that resulted from personality and ideological differences in 1960 and 1961. The close capture of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) by the Communist faction was a critical juncture in the PAP’s history as the moderate faction learnt that inclusiveness and intra-party democracy could weaken party cohesion. It was after the near takeover that Lee re-organized the mass-based PAP into a cadre one.

Since 1957, four categories of membership (probationary, ordinary, probationary cadre and cadre) and regular re-registering of party membership were introduced to prevent
takeovers (Pang 1971, 35). To ensure that only members with substantial contribution to the party could become cadres, measures such as selection board and cadre-training classes were introduced (Lee 1998, 280). While the exact number of the cadres was never disclosed, it was estimated to be around 1000, 6.7 percent of the total party membership of 15,000 in 2007. Usually, a cadre is a loyal, trusted party activist, nominated by his MP from among the outstanding branch activists. To be considered as a cadre, a selected member must undergo three interview panels of 4 or 5 Ministers and MPs (Straits Times 4 April 1998). Annually, around 100 candidates are selected for interviews.

The PAP’s CEC Selection

From 1954 to 1957, the PAP has direct elections by all the party members to elect the CEC. 1958 marked the end of PAP’s experiment with intra-party democracy and the CEC was formed only through election by a few hundreds of selected cadres. A bloc voting system was instituted so that only full cadres were allowed to vote in the bi-annual election of CEC (Chan 1989, 73). A selection committee was set up to ensure that only members with substantial contribution to the party could become cadres. Besides this, the Party also began cadre-training classes to “talent-spot idealistic Chinese speakers with political convictions that were not left-wing” (Lee 1998, 280). It was during this time the PAP switched from mass recruitment to “talent-hunting” strategy to recruit the best and ablest to join the party’s top-echelon.

The CEC is the pinnacle of the PAP’s decision-making body and dominated by the party secretary who selects the cadre, who, in turn endorses the CEC at a biannual party conference. As Pang describes, the CEC voting is a "closed system" in which "the cardinals appoint the pope and the pope appoints the cardinals" (Pang 1971, 36). Consisting of 18 members, the CEC is the party’s selectorate of legislative candidates, who are mostly Cabinet members. In the latest CEC formed in Dec 2008, 15 out of 18 CEC members were in the Cabinet. Instead of discussing policy direction within the party, the PAP uses the Cabinet meetings to develop policies.

31 As a pragmatic party that seeks an ideological middle-ground, the PAP cadre selection seeks representation from diverse backgrounds and educational qualifications (Straits Times 4 April 1998).
32 Also see Shee (1971) for the selection and composition of cadres in the 1960s-70s.
Behaving like a “catch-all party”, party leaders also began to co-opt new members into the CEC or higher level leadership groups based on the basis of their technical or managerial abilities rather than ideological orientation or class origin (see Krouwel 2006, 257). As Chan notes, “The second echelon leadership, characteristically younger men with ability and attributes approved by the cabinet, are co-opted into politics. They usually have no previous party links and are thrust into the political arena. Promotion within the political hierarchy for these select few is rapid” (Chan 1985, 162).

The secretive and exclusive cadre recruitment and CEC selection procedures foster elite cohesion as it filters like-minded members into the inner-circle and excludes those with extreme views. While being a cadre comes with no extra incentives or privileges, the sense of exclusivity on being the select few serves as a “collective incentive” and a sense of belonging (Panebianco 1998, 54). As Wong Kan Seng, the PAP’s first Assistant Secretary General said: "You know you are among the elite, the trusted few. People are quite happy when told they have become cadres" (Straits Times 4 April 1998). My interviews with PAP cadres also confirm that the prestige and honour of being a PAP “insider” rather than rather than material incentives were sufficient to generate loyalty and a sense of belonging.

**Formalizing Leadership Selection**

The Secretary General of the PAP, who is the party’s supreme leader, is usually also the country’s prime minister. Over the last five decades, the PAP has engineered two party leadership successions without public infighting or power struggles. In 1959, Lee Kuan Yew became the country’s first PM when it attained self-government as he was the Party’s Secretary General. In 1990, he relinquished his PM position and endorsed Goh Chok Tong as PM in a carefully managed leadership transition. While Goh was not Lee Kuan Yew’s preferred successor\(^3\), he deferred the choice to the Cabinet and Goh was popularly selected by his cabinet colleagues (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 115-6). The first leadership transition was completed when Lee gave up his Party’s Secretary General position 2 years later. While PM Goh was widely seen as a “seat-warmer” for Lee’s son, Lee Hsien Loong, he held on to his position for 12 years and earned respect for his consensus-based, leadership style (*Asiaweek*

\(^3\) Lee had preferred Tony Tan as his successor as he was doubtful of Goh’s public-speaking skills and lack of toughness. Eventually, he endorsed Goh after some “mutual adaptation” (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 118).
3 Dec 1999). Meanwhile, young Lee waited at the helm and supported Goh as Deputy PM. See Table 5-5 for the list of the past and present PAP PMs.

### Table 5-5: List of PMs in Singapore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Yrs as Sec-Gen</th>
<th>Age as PM</th>
<th>Former Profession</th>
<th>Selection Method</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Reason for giving up</th>
<th>Post-PM position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Lee Hsien Loong</td>
<td>2004-present</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Army Brigadier General</td>
<td>Nominated by PM &amp; endorsed by cabinet &amp; ministers and elected PAP MPs</td>
<td>2004 - present</td>
<td>In office</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author.

During the second leadership transition, former PM Goh formalized a 3-step selection procedure for the PM in May 2004 that begins with: 1) a meeting of all the Cabinet Ministers to nominate a leader based on consensus; followed 2) by a meeting by all the PAP MPs to show their support of the PM candidate in a separate venue. At this stage, the PAP MPs are permitted to nominate other names and their nomination will be considered separately by the CEC. 3) And finally, the CEC would meet to mediate and endorse the final decision. Based on this new formal procedure, Lee Hsieng Loong was selected and appointed as the country’s third PM in Aug 2004.

This formalization of PM selection method is significant as it provides a mechanism to mediate potential power struggle. This new procedure offers a means for selected cadres such as the PAP MPs to nominate an alternative PM candidate and mitigate any arbitrariness. In the event of a disagreement, a mechanism is in placed to close ranks. While no primary election is instituted, this formality is expected to build elite cohesion, as former PM Goh said: “the next prime minister will be chosen by his or her own peers. Having chosen the leader, the team would then be obliged to support him or her fully” (Petir Jul/Aug

---

34 Lee’s diagnosis of lymphoma in 1992 was another reason why Goh stayed longer as PM.
35 As Goh says, “The confidence of MPs is important. I want to put in place a process so that, in future, if there is a contest for the position, there’s a process to follow” (Petir May/Jun 2004).
36 It is assumed that all PAP MPs were made cadres of the party.
2008). In Singapore’s short history under the PAP, two PMs have stepped aside for a younger successor. While the fourth PM successor has not been identified, the precedence of PMs stepping down for younger successor is expected to continue.

**Who Becomes a PAP Candidate?**

There is no primary election for the PAP’s selection of legislative candidates. Like its exclusive cadre selection method, the search of a PAP candidate to stand in GE is conducted through an elaborate nomination and appointment process. While candidate selection was ad-hoc in the past, since 1976, it has become more systematic and formalized. As the PAP’s organizing secretary for recruitment Dr. Ng Eng Hen says, the Party’s recruitment committee relies on its “network of contacts...the net is cast wide, covering the civil service, the corporate sector, and professions such as law, banking and medicine.” Generally, the PAP selection comprise of the following 6 stages:

**Stage 1:** Candidates are “talent spotted” and recommended by PAP activists, corporate leaders, MPs and senior civil servants to PAP recruitment committee (*Straits Times* 15 Apr 2006). Recommendation is informal and drawn from a network of contacts. Candidates are usually professionals, top of their cohort from the Civil Service, the private sector, and professions such as law, banking and medicine. In 1984 GE, more than 2000 names of potential candidates were compiled from lists of local government scholars, returned scholars and registers of professionals as well as those in the party ranks (Ooi 1998, 371).

**Stage 2:** Groups of six to eight candidates are invited to meet with one of three ministers in tea discussions, which lasts around 60 to 150 minutes. During the tea session, the minister will ask questions to ascertain the ideas, motivation and political inclinations of the potential candidates on issues and ability to be a “team player” (*Straits Times* 18 Apr 1996). Around 100 candidates get invited for the tea sessions a year (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 48). Due to the large number of “talents” studying or working abroad, tea sessions are now conducted overseas (*Straits Times* 15 Apr 2006).

**Stage 3:** Shortlisted candidates undergo two formal interviews by a high level panel at the party headquarters. Successful candidates who passed the second formal interview are invited to meet the Cabinet ministers. Party activists or grassroots members who are familiar with the key office holders may skip the first three stages.

**Stage 4:** The CEC, the party selectorate, reserves the final authority to endorse the selected candidates. In 1997 GE, 24 PAP candidates were fielded out of 300 interviewed (Ooi 1998, 372). Each prospective candidate has an 8% chance of being fielded.

**Stage 5:** Months before an election, the selected candidates are deployed to the different constituencies to learn the ropes of running party branch work by studying under a senior MP. This training period may range from a few months to 4 years. Before the election, prospective
candidates are sent for courses on public speaking and communications skills to learn ways to handle the press and to field questions during hustings.\(^{37}\)

**Stage 6:** Selected candidates who have been deemed to have ministerial quality will be asked to go through an additional stage of psychological tests of over one thousand questions that lasts around one-and-a-half days (Neo and Chen 2007, 351). At this stage, the PAP adopts the potential appraisal system developed by Shell Oil Company to assess the personality and disposition of its candidates. In each election, 5 to 6 candidates are identified to have ministerial qualities and carefully groomed for higher office.

A typical PAP candidate is one who is a professional or technocrat, a former government-scholar from a prestigious overseas university, married, male in his 30s and 40s with a few children to lend support to the government’s population and pro-family policies.\(^{38}\) Language abilities are also prized assets. While the first batch of PAP leaders were mostly English speakers, but with the rise of China and globalization, knowledge in information technology and bilingualism are also key qualities for aspiring office holders.

**Key Features of the PAP’s Candidate Selection**

**Regular Turnover.** In Singapore, elections are conducted every 4 to 5 years. In the last 3 elections, the average turnover rate is around 20 to 24 MPs, or a third of each cohort. In 2006 GE, 25 MPs relinquish their parliamentary positions. 4 out of the 25 MPs had only served one term and no reasons were given for their removal from office. According to ex-PAP MPs, the decision to step down is always communicated directly to about one-quarter of each cohort of MPs, around 6 months before polling day. Usually the PM, who is the Party’s Sec-Gen, meets the selected MPs over lunch, in groups of 2-3, to ask them to step down (New Paper 29 Oct 2005). See Table 5-6 for the rate of turnover in Parliament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Total Elected MPs</th>
<th>No of New PAP candidates</th>
<th>MPs retired/gave up position (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11 (14.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20 (25.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14 (22.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9 (11.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18 (21.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23 (27.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24 (28.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from Singapore Elections and Singapore Parliament websites.

---

\(^{37}\) MP Ong Kian Min revealed that the training focuses on TV appearances where they learnt to avoid shifty eyes or gesticulating when speaking in front of camera (Straits Times 4 Feb 2006)

\(^{38}\) The recent batch of new PAP candidates has 3 single women (Indranee Rajah; Penny Low and Fatimah Lateef – breaking the PAP’s convention of fielding only married candidates.
The PAP’s regular turnover is significant because: 1) It reminds MPs of the party hierarchy and more specifically that the Party selectorate retains the rights to nominate and select its candidates; 2) it emphasises the continued need for loyalty and performance in order to ensure re-election; 3) it ties MP positions to the Party and not local constituency support. My interview with former PAP CEC member Lee Koon Choy also indicated that many old guards such as Toh Chin Chye, Ong Pang Boon and himself were dissatisfied with the speed of the party’s renewal (Interview with Lee Koon Choy, 8 Feb 08). However, apart from Toh Chin Chye who was quite public about being forced into retirement, these dissatisfactions were usually privately expressed and not publicly played out. The regular and routinized process increases systemness as the PAP MPs learn to accept that it is part and parcel of party renewal.

Unlike the popular KMT legislators in Taiwan who would defect or stand as an independent if un-nominated, the PAP MPs often comply with party decisions without public protests. In Singapore, the number of independents who stand in elections has decreased substantially from a high of 39 in 1959 GE to nil in the 2006 GE. The dwindling number of independent suggests that the PAP has retained its autonomy with regard to candidate selection. In Singapore, the practice of party switching has been eradicated as a result of former PM Lee’s constitutional reform initiation. The practice of party switching was endemic in the 1950s where dissenting PAP legislators would cross the floor to form opposition parties such as United People’s Party (UPP) and Barisan Socialis (BS) to challenge the PAP in the House. The last known PAP expulsion of rogue MPs was in 1959, when flamboyant National Development Minister Ong Eng Guan challenged Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership and was expelled. Then, the former PM Lee had “restored the law so that if any MP resigns or is expelled from his party, he has to re-contest his seat” (Straits Times 28 Aug 2008). Since the 1960s traumatic party splits, the PAP has put in place many institutional measures and amended the Constitution in 1963 to enforce party discipline and

39 Ong’s expulsion was not the first. In Nov 1959, Tan Gak Eng, was also expelled for anti-party activities (Pang 1971, 8). Another two PAP Assemblymen (S.V. Lingam and Ng Teng Kian) were later expelled for their support of Ong. See Fong (1979, 83-8) for an account of events leading to Ong’s expulsion.
40 Now, the tenure of the MP is governed by Part VI, 46 (2b) of Singapore Constitution states that: “The seat of a Member of Parliament shall become vacant if he ceases to be a member of, or is expelled or resigns from, the political party for which he stood in the election”.

132
prevent rogue MPs from defection. The PAP’s practice of electoral engineering to foster party cohesion and legislative stability will be further elaborated in Chapter 7.

“Talent Spotting”. Conventionally, a person interested in political office would register with a party, work up the ranks and file and cozy up to the leaders in the hopes of being spotted and nominated as a candidate. But this is not the case for the PAP. The PAP is odd\textsuperscript{41} as it avoids vertical integration of its cadres and does not overtly reward party loyalists. As senior Lee said: “We have resisted the temptation, and the pressure, to fill up the Parliament with party loyalists. We have to field the best that Singapore has” (Petir 1984, 22).

Since 1984, the PAP has adopted the process that the Government uses in the recruitment of its top civil servants, specifically the officers for the Administrative Service – the apex of the Civil Service hierarchy and the military.\textsuperscript{42} The PAP’s access to state institutions, such as the Public Service Commission (PSC) that administers 13 prestigious government and military scholarships, helps to channel highly qualified scholars into its party (Neo and Chen 2007; Barr 2006). The myriad of government scholarships administered by the PSC is one of the PAP’s main “talent spotting” mechanisms that identifies and “fast tracks” outstanding returning scholars who serve their scholarship bonds\textsuperscript{43} in the military, government ministries or statutory boards. Before elections, the cultivated scholars would be invited to have tea sessions with the Ministers and join the PAP. Within the military, the Singapore Armed Forces has also established a “Project Wrangler” scheme in 1974 to groom an elite corps of young officers with leadership potential to take over key staff and command positions. The SAF Wrangler scheme affects about 10% of army and navy officers below the rank of lieutenant colonels, and scholar officers are included in the scheme. Outstanding “wranglers” may later join the elite Administrative Service and become a civil servant if they find themselves unsuited for military career (Chan 1985, 147).

Singapore’s bureaucracy is the largest employer in the country, with a total of 110,000 employees – with 60,000 in 15 ministries with its component departments, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} See Mauzy for characterization of the PAP as an “odd” party (2002, 246-7).
\item \textsuperscript{42} Since 1984, Lee Hsien Loong has adapted the psychological tests by Shell Oil company to assess the PSC Administrative Service officers and PAP candidates. See Chen and Neo (2007, Chapter 7).
\item \textsuperscript{43} Scholarships awarded by the Singapore government usually come with a bond period of 3 to 10 years. See Public Service Commission (PSC) website: \url{http://www.pscscholarships.gov.sg/}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
50,000 in 55 statutory boards (Ho 2000, 164). As the party-government, the PAP has the advantage over the opposition to have exclusive access to an extensive pool of high quality, potential candidates. By virtue of the fact that the PAP government is the largest employer in Singapore, it plays a significant role in influencing the career advancement and trajectories of a significant number of people. For the sake of job security, it makes good sense for the government employees to be “induced quietly to acquiesce to the prevailing status quo rather be disruptive in any way” (Tarling 2005, 159).

In the present 11th Parliament, there are now a total of 23 former government scholars, or “scholar MPs”, sponsored for higher education in prestigious foreign universities by the PSC. These “scholar MPs” are part of the power elite and groomed for higher leadership roles. In the latest Cabinet that consists of 21 Ministers, 71.4% were former government scholars. Out of this cohort, six ministers (28.6%) were former military officers and SAF military scholars. As Table 5-7 shows, most Cabinet ministers were former scholars, civil servants from the elite Administrative Service or the military.

### Table 5-7: Occupational Profiles of Cabinet Ministers (2001-9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009 (%)</th>
<th>2008 (%)</th>
<th>2006 (%)</th>
<th>2004 (%)</th>
<th>2003 (%)</th>
<th>2001 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Service</td>
<td>5 (23.8)</td>
<td>4 (20)</td>
<td>3 (16.7)</td>
<td>3 (15.8)</td>
<td>3 (16.7)</td>
<td>3 (17.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Scholars</td>
<td>15 (71.4)</td>
<td>13 (65)</td>
<td>12 (66.7)</td>
<td>13 (68.4)</td>
<td>13 (72.2)</td>
<td>14 (82.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service/Stat. Board</td>
<td>7 (33.1)</td>
<td>10 (50)</td>
<td>10 (55.6)</td>
<td>11 (57.9)</td>
<td>11 (61.1)</td>
<td>10 (58.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIC/GLC</td>
<td>3 (14.3)</td>
<td>3 (15)</td>
<td>3 (16.7)</td>
<td>3 (15.8)</td>
<td>2 (11.1)</td>
<td>2 (11.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>6 (28.6)</td>
<td>4 (20)</td>
<td>4 (22.2)</td>
<td>4 (21.1)</td>
<td>4 (22.2)</td>
<td>4 (23.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>5 (23.8)</td>
<td>3 (15)</td>
<td>1 (5.6)</td>
<td>1 (5.3)</td>
<td>1 (5.6)</td>
<td>1 (5.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ministers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated based on data from official *Singapore Cabinet* website and PAP publications.

Between 2001 to 2009, only an average of 10 percent of Ministers were from the private sector. As discussed, the PAP “talent spots” from within the state structures and integrates them horizontally into the Party. The fact that the PAP is able to preserve the composition of its elites and exclude any invaders that do not meet its criteria suggests that

---

44 Out of 83 elected MPs, there are 6 President Scholars; 8 Colombo Plan Scholars; 2 EDB-Glaxo Scholars; 2 Singapore Police Force Scholar; 1 Commonwealth Scholar and 5 SAF Overseas Scholars.

45 Grace Fu, Lee Yi Shyan, Masagos Zulkifli and Lui Tuck Yew were earmarked for higher office in 2006 GE (*Channel NewsAsia*, 3 May 2006).

46 Both the PM Lee and Deputy PM Teo Chee Hean and Foreign Affairs Minister George Yeo were holders of President and SAF Overseas scholarship – two most prestigious scholarships in Singapore.

47 They are PM Lee; Lim Hng Kiang; Lim Swee Say; Lui Tuck Yew; Teo Chee Hean and George Yeo.
the party is highly autonomous and institutionalized. Viewed this way, the PAP cadre party structure is evolving into a party-state, cartel model where the “colluding parties become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state to ensure their own collective survival” (Katz and Mair 1995, 5). As Senior Lee explains:

Our problem was not to find loyal cadres who can do the rank and file work and running of the party, even to be MPs…and the only way we could overcome that was by going out recruiting, talent spotting…A person who has done well in Singapore’s scholarship system will eventually be “spotted” and “headhunters” from the party will look for him. That is the system that has evolved (Petir PAP 45th Anniversary 1999).

Incumbency advantage and access to state resources and unloading of traditional party functions to the para-political organizations such as the People’s Association (PA), the Community Development Centres (CDCs) and Community centres (CCs) have also bolstered the PAP’s policy formulation capacity and penetration into grassroots level (Tan 2003). As Worthington puts it: “In Singapore, hegemonic rule is achieved not through democratization but through oligarchic means... Because of the high degree of penetration of the state into the market and society, the party selected elite also penetrates these sectors thus perpetuating oligarchic control” (2003, 10).

**Meritocracy or Elitism?** The PAP prides itself on having developed a leadership recruitment system that is based on the concept of meritocracy and elite-led government. As PM Lee says, it is a “uniquely Singapore approach”, comparable to the Communist party in China (Lee’s speech, 6 May 2008). As he says: “Singapore adheres to the philosophy of government by elite. We must pick elites from different industries and trades to participate in the running of the country. The prerequisite is that these elites must have a sense of social responsibility and they must be willing to serve the people” (Straits Times 8 July 2008). In contrast to other parties, political ambition within the PAP is not considered to be a virtue. Candidates or members who publicly evidence political ambitions will in fact be viewed with suspicion by the party leaders (Interview with Palmer, 2 Aug 2007). Besides academic brilliance, the candidates must have a proven record of outstanding career achievements and qualities such as “ability, integrity and commitment” and “character, motivation, judgment, stability, temperament, ability to connect with people” (Petir 1984, 22).

---

48 For an insightful study debunking the myth of meritocracy in Singapore, see K Tan (2008).
The PAP leaders are wont to remind Singaporeans that the basic values underlying Singapore’s success are “ensuring leaders of high integrity; meritocracy; a level playing field for all citizens; and English as the working language”. As Lee Kuan Yew said: "People get to where they are on merit - not nepotism, not corruption. Hence, all are capable and competent. No policy is skewed as a result of personal benefit or profits. We have been rated the cleanest government in Asia, and amongst the first three cleanest in the world. (Channel NewAsia 15 Aug 2010). But such self-congratulatory public messages may have had the effect of reinforcing existing class structures and excluding the under-privileged from mainstream society, economy and politics because of their race, gender and class (Tan 2008, 10).

Critics argue that the PAP’s “concept of meritocracy contains inherent contradictions that may, in practice, lead to the unravelling of Singapore’s political society” (Tan 2008, 7). Indeed, the way meritocracy is practiced so extremely has reduced social mobility and increased the inequality between the “in-group” winners co-opted by the ruling minority and the “out-group” losers (Straits Times 4 Jul 2008). Thus far, the PAP Government has not come up with any sustainable strategy to address the growing income gap as the country becomes more embedded in globalization. In fact the gini-coefficient, a common measure of income inequality, has risen from 0.436 in 1990 to 0.481 in 2009\(^{49}\) - one of the highest in Asia. In response, the PAP leaders have argued that the income gap is inevitable and that Singaporeans should be more concerned with whether those at the top are helping the poor.\(^{50}\)

Meritocracy as an ideology obscures how success in Singapore often depends on inheritance, marriage ties, and social connections as opposed to academic merit. For example, it is well known among locals that Singapore’s highly competitive education system is an elitist one that entrenches the privileged and disadvantages the poor. Admissions to the top schools favour those with right networks, residential addresses and access to expensive extra-curricular tuition. Early privileged education provides a self-select group of people with a head start in the Singapore’s scholarship system. Reportedly, 53% of government PSC

scholars live in private property, while 80% of Singaporeans live in HDB flats.\textsuperscript{51} And it is within this pool of PSC scholars that the PAP selects its candidates – a group from privileged backgrounds who have enjoyed unfair advantages from the beginning.\textsuperscript{52} The idea that the Singapore’s education and leadership selection system is based on meritocracy and equality of opportunity is therefore a myth. And as the economic and political elites are rewarded with larger prizes, a visible inequality of outcomes will replace the incentive effect with a sense of resentment, helplessness and social disengagement – perpetuating the politics of envy amongst those who have been systematically excluded (\textit{Straits Times} 15 Aug 2008; Tan 2008).

\textbf{Gender Imbalance.} In Singapore, females are fairly well-represented in the medical, legal, bureaucratic and other professional sectors. However, in politics, they remain under-represented. Unlike the KMT, the PAP does not impose a gender quota on its candidate selection. While the PAP Government introduced the GRC scheme to address ethnic imbalance in Parliament, they have not advocated any affirmative action to address the gender imbalance in the House.\textsuperscript{53} In 1959, the Parliament had 5 female MPs. After female MP Chan Choy Siong, the only female MP at the time, retired in 1970 parliament was left without any female MP for 14 years. It was only in 1984 GE that the PAP fielded 3 female candidates\textsuperscript{54} increasing that number to 4 by 1988. However, a narrow loss of an acting female minister, Dr. Seet Ai Mee in 1991GE, prevented the PAP from fielding female candidates in SMCs. See Table 5-8.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Female PAP MPs & 17 & 10 & 4 & 2 & 4 & 3 & 0 \\
Female Opposition MPs & 1 (NCMP) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
Elected Female MPs (%) & 17 (20.5) & 10 (11.9) & 4 (4.8) & 2 (2.4) & 4 (4.9) & 3 (3.8) & 0 \\
Total & 83 & 84 & 83 & 81 & 81 & 79 & 75 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Female Representation in Singapore Parliament (1980-2006)}
\end{table}

Source: Data from \textit{Singapore Parliament} website.

\textsuperscript{52} During election, the PAP candidates often downplay their privilege backgrounds and portray themselves as poor children who were “saved” by Singapore’s meritocratic education system.
\textsuperscript{53} For the PAP Minister’s response to my letter to the press on the double standards in gender and ethnic representation see, “Gender quota versus GRC scheme” \textit{Straits Times} 6 Jun 2009 and “No double standard: says Lim Hwee Hua”, \textit{Straits Times} 18 Jun 2009.
\textsuperscript{54} The first 3 female PAP candidates were: Dr. Aline Wong; Dr. Dixie Tan and Mrs. Yu-Foo Yu Shoon.
Since 1997, the PAP has attempted to field more female candidates, but only in GRCs, increasing from 10 in 2001 to 17 in 2006. In Apr 2009, a former Administrative Service officer and director of the government’s investment arm, Temesek Holdings, Mrs Lim Hwee Hua became the first female Minister in Cabinet. Presently, there are 17 female elected MPs (20.5%) in the 11th Parliament and the PAP hopes to increase the percentage to 30% “gradually”. The PAP has a strong Women’s Wing set up in 1989 to groom women politicians. To recruit more local female candidates, the three national universities have also been roped in to nominate outstanding female undergraduates to participate in PAP’s political and networking activities and mentoring by female politicians (Petir Jul/Aug 2009). Clearly, the reliance on state and academic institutions for elite recruitment is thus another institutional advantage the PAP has over the opposition.

**Implications and Potential Problems**

In most autocracies, the question of leadership succession is perilous as it raises expectations and changes that could de-stabilize the balance of power. For example, when Taiwan was under the KMT’s rule in the 1980s, speculations or publications on the prospective successors of ailing strongman Chiang Ching-kuo were banned (Chang 1984, 425). Usually, strong leaders strive to hold on to power for as long as possible or show little interest in developing a means of providing a successor. However, this is not a case in Singapore. Singapore’s leadership succession is exceptional as its leaders make leadership succession a priority and PMs retire voluntarily – not an easy feat, considering how often coups and protests are the main mechanisms for leadership change. As former PM Goh said: “In the PAP, we have institutionalized a planned and orderly system of political succession. The old generation systematically identifies and prepares the next generation to take over. It steps aside when the successor generation is ready” (*PAP 50th Anniversary*, 2004).

Another feature of Singapore’s leadership succession system is that retired PMs and senior Cabinet Ministers do not leave the political scene, but remain in office to lend expertise as Senior Ministers (SM) or Minister Mentor (MM). This practice of creating new posts is a sign of oligarchic, cartel phenomenon, as Michels described decades ago: “As the

---

56 See the PAP’s Women’s Wing website at [http://womenswing.pap.org.sg/](http://womenswing.pap.org.sg/)
chiefs become detached from the mass, they show themselves more and more inclined, when
gaps in their own ranks have to be filled, to effect this, not by way of popular election, but by
coopitation and also to increase their own effectives wherever possible, by creating new posts
upon their own initiatives” (1915, 111). Currently, the Cabinet has two SMs and one MM.
The expansion of the Cabinet is an ingenious innovation as it mitigates the potential of power
struggles and uncertainties that come with leadership transition. The creation of new cabinet
positions encourages elite cohesion and stability as it: 1) compensates the outgoing leader
with a prestigious position and high salary, and 2) allows the new leader to tap his
predecessors for knowledge and expertise. While the specific job scopes are unclear, the
current MM and SMs act as consultants and ambassadors by travelling overseas to improve
Singapore’s international standing. Domestically, they grace governmental functions and
support government policies.

Three decades ago, Chan Heng Chee has described the PAP’s leadership selection
system as weak as it has “no strength other than the adoption by the party leadership” (1975,
301). Chan predicted that the PAP will suffer from leadership struggles as “party discipline
that is the very strength of the party will become its major weakness in future because when
the present leadership leaves the scene, there would be a whole generation of politicians who
are short on manipulatory (oratory) skills because manipulation within the party has been
discouraged and the ability of such politicians to stick together must surely be questioned”.
Chan’s prediction has not come to pass. Even if there were internal rivalries and power
struggles within PAP, they are not evident to outsiders.

Despite the PAP’s institutionalized leadership succession system, the survival of the
PAP as a party organization may be “de-institutionalize” for the following reasons. First, the
horizontal integration elites promotes elite unity but does not foster vertical ties between
leaders and members. The PAP struggles with its image as an elitist party. Its party
membership has failed to increase in the last 35 years despite increases in the total population
from 2.1 mil in 1971 to 4.4 mil in 2006. The percentage of PAP membership relative to the
population has in fact reduced, from 0.71% in 1971 to 0.34% in 2006. See Table 5-9.
The PAP leadership is aware of its image problem and has launched aggressive recruitment drive to appeal to younger Singaporeans. Its attempts to address the gap between party leaders and members includes initiating a PAP Policy Forum (PPF) in 2004 as a feedback mechanism and reaching out to the internet savvy youngsters through Facebook, podcasts and blogs.  

Like most parties, the PAP is moving towards more intra-party democratization by allowing direct elections and voting to take place for party committees such as the Youth Wing, Women’s Wing and district branches. As these initiatives are still new, it is too early to tell the effects of inclusiveness on party cohesion.

Second, unlike most parties that prize party loyalty and grassroots experience, the PAP recruits widely from different sectors and “parachutes” candidates without strong party ties or grassroots experience to stand in elections. Overtime, this could undermine the relevance of the PAP as a political organization as it is no longer the primary supplier for candidates. PAP’s “talent spotting” and recruitment from outside the Party may also frustrate ambitious cadres. Party careerists who were leapfrogged and excluded from the elitist “parachuting” scheme may choose to “exit” rather than “voice” (Hirschman 1970).

Third, as a result of five decades of hegemonic rule, the PAP now behaves more like a party-state where the line distinguishing the party and state is blurred. The fusion between two is compounded by the fact that the CEC membership overlaps with the Cabinet. The Party exercises little influence on the government and the “CEC is only a rubber stamp for government decisions, and that the party has lost is role in giving direction to society” (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 49). The PAP organization is lean with less than 9 salaried positions.

---

57 One of the PPF’s roles is to organize regular policy forums such that younger party members can meet with party leaders and participating in party affairs and policy formulation. See “PAP Policy Forum - A Vibrant Singapore” and “PAP policy Forum – PAP Giving Voice to the Rank and File,” Petir Jul/Aug 2006.

58 30 positions in Young PAP were up for grabs in its first elections in 2004 (Straits Times, 6 Mar 2004).

59 The positions on the previously exclusive executive positions are slowly opened to the rank and file members. Now, two district elected members can have two seats in the HQ executive committee.

60 For the debate on inclusiveness and cohesion see Carty (2004); Rahat and Harzan (2001).
administrative staff in a humble headquarters located far away from the city centre. Instead, the Party relies on state resources to develop a sprawling network of para-political organizations to serve the constituencies. As Chapter 3 has shown, the grassroots organizations are slowly replacing the traditional roles of the PAP. Without more party-building efforts, the PAP may risk losing its organizational strength, coherence and relevance as a Party.

Finally, the PAP’s meritocratic-based recruitment and candidate selection process is viewed as “ruthless winnowing process” that promotes elitism and “politics of envy” (Barr 2006; Tan 2008). Singapore PM, cabinet ministers, MPs and civil servants are one of the highest paid in the world. As the political elites are rewarded with larger prizes, the growing income inequality between the elites and masses may evoke a sense of resentment, social disengagement, and envy among those excluded from this elite-based system. PAP’s elite-selection process may result in the ruling class renewing itself with the people of same mindset, promoting in-breeding of ideas. PAP candidate selection can degenerate into nepotism or a “grave oligarchic phenomenon” (Michels 1915, 112). As this study shows, the Parliament is filled with technocrats, experts and professionals. With fewer MPs with party links, trade unions and grassroots experience, the Parliament may lack empathy for the problems of the ordinary people and become disconnected from the ground.

**Conclusion**

Current party politics literature tends to equate party institutionalization with party democratization. My study of the PAP in Singapore challenges this assumption by showing how party institutionalization could foster hegemonic party cohesion and stability. The PAP has an exclusive and autonomous selectorate that retains the power to nominate and appoint

---

61 In contrary, Mauzy and Milne observe that despite the complaints of elitism, Singapore voters will rarely vote for a person who is not well educated or qualified professionally (2002, 346).


63 As Michels warned: “There arises in the leaders a tendency to isolate themselves, to form a sort of cartel, and to surround themselves, as it were, with a wall, within which they will admit those only who are of their own way of thinking. Instead of allowing their successors to be appointed by the choice of the rank and file, the leaders do all in their power to choose these successors for themselves, and to fill up gaps in their own ranks directly or indirectly by the exercise of their own volition” (1915, 111).

64 As senior civil servant, Ngiam Tong Dow warned, elites may lack empathy as younger Cabinet ministers hail from upper-middle class backgrounds (Interview with Ngiam, Straits Times 22 May 2008).
candidates based on its selection criteria. Access to state resource sand incumbency advantage have freed the PAP from external interferences. The PAP shows high systemness as rules, regulations and selection process are in placed and routinized. With time, the party members and electorate have come to view interviews and psychological tests as acceptable means to produce an elite-based government. Selection criteria based on meritocracy and technocracy also appear to have mitigated factionalism, personality and money politics.

Today, the PAP government is one of the world’s least corrupt in the world today (Global Corruption Barometer 2009). 5 decades of rule with two leadership transitions have bolstered its claim to generate good quality leadership. Public opinion data shows that 91.4% of Singaporeans are satisfied with leaders in office and have high levels of trust for political institutions (EA Barometer Survey 2006). The PAP’s leadership selection model constrains personalism and factionalism as anyone interested in climbing the party ladder will need to be co-opted into the inner power circle. The opportunity structure is such that ambitious members interested in making a political career in Singapore will need to be part of the “elite” circle, be loyal and take policy directions from the Cabinet, also members of the PAP CEC. There is a strong centripetal movement and concentration of power in this inner, elite circle that exercises power through the “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1915). As in Parliamentary politics, the PAP MPs who are interested in promotion have to concentrate on obtaining its ministerial position at the disposal of the party leadership. Aside from institutional incentives, the PAP’s strong party discipline, use of party whip ensures voting unity and can push through unfavourable policies (see Chapter 7).

Observers contend that the PAP’s cohesion over 50 years owed much to Lee Kuan Yew's forceful personality. Yet, it is more than charisma or ideological commitments that sustain the PAP. Lee and his successors have put in place institutional incentives and constraints at the regime and party organization levels to ensure the PAP elites remain cohesive. Through a complex elite recruitment and candidate selection process, Lee and his successors have institutionalized a process by which the PAP as an organization incorporates the founder’s values. In pluralist regimes, the electorate decides on the merit and composition of the legislature. In Singapore, the PAP decides on the merit of the candidates and stacks the Parliament with MPs of its own choosing. The institutionalization of leadership selection system suggests that the PAP is better prepared than most to face the uncertainties of
leadership succession. But as Huntington said: “The institutional strength of a party is measured in the first instance by its ability to survive its founder or the charismatic leader who first brings it to power” (1968, 409). Only the passing of strongman Lee Kuan Yew would perhaps be the best test of the PAP’s true mettle.
The KMT: Un-Institutionalized Charisma and Factionalism

How does the KMT’s leadership selection model differ from the PAP and to what effect? How do the incentive structures that govern the access to power shape intra-party competition and elite cohesion? This chapter argues that the KMT’s leadership selection model during its authoritarian rule (1949-1988) differs from the PAP’s as succession was based on personal networks and ties to the Party Chairman. While the Chairman enjoys high decisional autonomy in elite recruitment and candidate selection, the process lacks systemness and predictability.

As Panebianco reminds us, “Party institutionalization entails a ‘routinization of charisma’ and very few charismatic parties can survive the transfer” (1988, 53). The lack of institutionalization in the KMT’s leadership succession was a key factor that led to its internal conflicts after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo. Unlike the PAP that instituted exclusive and elitist leadership-selection method after the threats of communist takeover in 1961; the KMT’s experiments with intra-party democracy and loose party discipline after Chiang’s passing contributed to its party splits in 1993 and 2000.

In this chapter, I examine the effects of the KMT’s leadership selection for the top party and legislative positions in the pre and post-liberalized Taiwan. Specifically, I compare the changes in leadership selection methods in the KMT under the chairmanship of: Chiang Ching-Kuo (1975-1988) and Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000). I argue that greater intra-party democracy in the KMT’s nomination and candidate selection methods for top party and national leadership positions in the 1990s increased intra-party competition, power struggles and overall regime instability. While this chapter focuses on Taiwan, comparisons with Singapore’s PAP will be made to highlight how two similar hegemonic party regimes differ in leadership selection methods. Data on the KMT’s party discipline, defections and party splits will be used to measure the degree of party cohesion.

Selection of Chiang Ching-kuo as Party Chairman and President

The President holds the most powerful office in Taiwan. When Taiwan was ruled under the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of the Communist Rebellion in 1948” (1948-1991), the Constitution was suspended and the presidential powers were greatly
expanded. The Temporary Provisions allowed the President and the Vice-President to be re-elected indefinitely despite the two-term restriction prescribed in the Constitution. When the President was concurrently the chairman of the KMT1, there was no check on his power, as in the case during Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule. Whoever is Party Chairman will naturally earned the presidential nomination. Neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Chiang Ching-kuo permitted challenges to their authority. Although both were known to consult with advisers, both made almost all the important decisions within the party alone (Huang 1996).

Chiang Ching-Kuo was Chiang Kai-shek’s anointed successor and it was signalled to the Party from an early stage. For example, Chiang Ching-kuo was placed in many important positions in the defence and security department and became a CSC member by 1957. However, Chiang Ching-Kuo’s political rise was not smooth. As KMT legislator and former Army General Shuai Hua-min says, “In 1949, Chiang Ching-Kuo was only 39 years and a nobody. He had to build his own power base from scratch” (Interview with Shuai, 20 Nov 2007). Chiang Ching-kuo was selected as a successor not only because he was Chiang Kai-shek’s son but also because of his quiet determination and willingness to be under his father’s shadow:2 The transition of power3 from Chiang Kai-shek to Chiang Ching-kuo was gradual and accepted as a natural state of affairs by party cadres. By the 1960s, junior Chiang had begun to handle more daily administrative affairs (Hsu 1993, 13). And after Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975, Chiang Ching-Kuo’s appointment as Chairman came as no surprise.

The KMT during both Chiang’s era was closed to being personalistic4 as major decisions concerning access to office and fruits of the office depended their discretion. The KMT during Chiang’s rule may be best described as “institutional leadership” where personal leadership is institutionalized through constitutional provisions, ministries; extra constitutional enactments and agencies, informal political alliance and personal networks

---

1 However, when the president does not hold concurrent KMT Chairmanship, the power of the presidency diminishes, as it was during Yen Chia-kan’s presidency (1975-8).
2 There were other contenders to succeed CKS. For example, General Chiang Wei-kuo. Both Chiang Ching-kuo and Chiang Wei-kuo were put through a series of tests. Eventually Chiang Wei-kuo’s alleged involvement in a coup disqualified his candidacy (Winckler 1988, 159).
3 To avoid accusations of nepotism, Chiang junior did not assume presidency immediately after Chiang Kai-shek’s death. Instead, Yen Chia-kan was appointed as a president for 3 years from 1975 to 1978.
4 A personalist regime is defined as one which the leader himself maintains near monopoly over policy and personnel decisions despite the existence of a support party (Geddes 2003, 53).
As the Party Chairman, Chiang had supreme authority over most policy matters and personnel appointments, including the selection of members into the Central Standing Committee (CSC) and Central Committee (CC). Technically, the delegates of National Congress approve the nomination list by electing the candidates through block vote. But in reality, the delegates could only choose the CC members from a list provided by the Chairman and rubberstamp the leader’s decision. In terms of the power of appointment, the power of the KMT chairman was at its pinnacle during the Chiangs’ rule (1949-1988). From 7th to 13th Party congress, the Chairman has the ultimate say on who gets on the appointment list into the CSC and CC. See Figure 5-1’s bottom left quadrant where the KMT’s leadership selection was characterized by low systemness and high autonomy.

Figure 6-1: The KMT’s Model of Leadership Succession and Party Cohesion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systemness (S)</th>
<th>Autonomy (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High S &amp; High A</td>
<td>“Institutionalized charisma”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular successions based on clear rules of the game, and facilitated by a small, exclusive selectorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT (2000-present)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low S &amp; High A</td>
<td>“Uninstitutionalized charisma”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular successions based on a small incumbent selectorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT (1949-1988)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High S &amp; Low A</td>
<td>“Institutionalized conflict”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular successions based on clear rules of the game and facilitated by all party members or an inclusive electorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT (1989-2000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low S &amp; Low A</td>
<td>“Uninstitutionalized conflict”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular successions based on patronage or informal clientelistic network with no clear rules; ad-hoc selectorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this model of “uninstitutionalized charisma”, Chiang Ching-kuo imposed himself as “the undisputed founder, conceiver and interpreter of a set of political symbols” (Panebianco 1988, 52). Leadership selection is based on personal ties and criteria set by the

---

5 Organizational, the KMT National Congress is the party’s highest authority as it has the power to amend the party charter representative body. The delegates meet once every two years and approve the appointment of vice chairmen, members of the Central Advisory Council and Central Committee, all of whom nominated by the party chairman. But the party’s decision-making power lies with the CSC.
leader. In my interview with Cheng Peng-Jen, a former close aide of Chiang Ching-Kuo revealed that Chiang had three important criteria for selecting the right people to his team: “character, ability and loyalty to Chiang Ching-Kuo”. Interestingly, unlike the PAP’s focus on meritocracy, Cheng said: “Chiang Ching-Kuo never used people who are more capable than him” (Interview with Cheng, 28 Sep 2007).

Besides, Yu Ching-Hsing also noted that Chiang’s criteria of promoting or demoting people depended a lot on “integrity” and “loyalty”. It was critical that the candidate displays no personal ambition or interests for power (Interview with Yu, 28 Nov 2007). For example, it was General Wang Shang’s arrogance and display of personal ambition that resulted in his removal, despite having been the secret guardian of Chiang’s illegitimate twins, John Chiang Hsiao-yen and Winston Chiang Hsiao-tzu. Wang’s purge shows that Chiang was suspicious of people with personal ambition. Hence, Lee Teng-hui’s loyalty, Taiwanese background and low political profile may explain why Chiang appointed him as Minister without portfolio in May 1972 and a member of the KMT’s CC in 1976, only after 4 years in Cabinet. Lee was made a member of the CSC in Dec 1979 and nominated as Chiang’s vice-president in 1984. According to Lee’s biography, he was only told of Chiang’s decision to nominate him as VP moments before the announcement at the 12th Party Congress meeting on 15 Feb 1984.

The secrecy and lack of transparency or formality in leadership succession during Chiang’s rule suggests that the process lacks systemness and was weakly institutionalized. Indeed, any speculations on the potential successors of Chiang were prohibited and articles such as “Who will be Chiang Ching-kuo’s successor?” were banned in 1982. Unlike Singapore’s “institutionalized charisma” model, the opportunity structure during Chiang’s rule relied on informal networks and relations to him. Cohesion was assured by the fact that

---

6 Wang Sheng was Chiang’s ally and a Security Specialist groomed during his posting to Jiang-xi.
7 See “Chang to start using surname of late president,” Taiwan News, 8 Aug 2005.
8 See Tien (1989); Dickson and Chao (2002); Jacobs and Liu (2007) and Wu (2008).
9 Lee was not Chiang’s first Taiwanese VP. Hsieh Tung-min (1978-84) was Chiang’s fist Taiwanese VP. Chiang elevated Lee as the governor of Taiwan to VP despite the fact that Lee has never run for elected office and has relatively short KMT membership. However, it was said that his expertise in agricultural economics, image as an incorruptible public figure, diligence and ethnicity have earned him support and respect. His Taiwanese background was said to help alleviate factionalism from 1984-7 (Tien 1989, 115-7)
10 See Lee’s autobiography in Chinese, “Witness For Taiwan: President Chiang Ching-kuo and I” (2004, 3-11) for accounts of Lee’s 156 meetings with Chiang through his 3 years and 8 months of vice-presidency.
11 The magazine, Tsung Heng (The Encounter) was later suspended from publication by the government for broaching on issues of leadership succession (Chang 1984, 425).
only those who benefit from the leader’s support and faith have authorized access to the “inner circle” (Panebianco 1988, 66). To climb the party ranks, careerists will mobilize around the leader and compete continuously for his attention. Leadership selection assumes a centripetal movement - careerists compete amongst themselves to get into the inner circle. While centripetal competition between “tendencies” may get intense, the competition does not involve the leader and takes place at the level below him.

During Chiang’s rule, the KMT was able to maintain cohesive for two key reasons. One, factionalism had limited space to play itself out. Chiang was averse to any form of factionalism or cliques (Interviews with Shuai, 20 Nov 2007 and Yu, 28 Nov 2007). Party discipline was strictly enforced. A study of disciplinary cases in the KMT from 1952 to 1995 indicates that party discipline was strictly enforced during Chiang’s Chairmanship. As Ozbudun reminds us, parties that do not adopt disciplinary measures are the least cohesive (1970, 331). The high number of disciplinary cases during from 1977 to 1986 shows that party loyalty and cohesion were highly regarded. As Table 6-1: Violation of party discipline (1952-95) shows, the disciplinary cases were high during Chiang’s chairmanship as the average number of cases over ten years stood at 713, while the number of expulsion was 84.

Like most Leninist parties, the threat of expulsion is a potent weapon of party discipline. Disloyal or overly ambitious cadres were swiftly removed as in the case of Lei Chen or posted to ambassadorial positions like General Wang Sheng. With the threat of sanction, careerists will display loyalty and not challenge the leader openly. Charisma substituted institutions to constraint rogue behaviour. Like his father, Chiang Ching-kuo was a strongman and the centre of Taiwan’s stability, who acted as the cement that eliminated

---

12 Throughout Chiang’s life, he had gathered around himself a good number of allies and recruited groups of followers to work with him, “the graduates of the Youth Corps School, however, remained his most trusted ones” (Hsu 1993, 8). Li Huan was tasked to head the China Youth Corp from (1948-1977) and appointed the 12th Premier of the Executive Yuan (1989-1990). Besides, General Yi was also placed as the Head of Cadre Control Party (1966) and Chang Pao-shu, was Party Secretary General (1968).

13 For more on factionalism, see Tien (1989) and Kuo (1995).

14 Political parties have formal rules and ideology tinted platforms; factions are informal, personal, opaque. Factions are ideology-free, interest-centered, and power motivated (Cheng and Chou 2000, 43).

15 For example, when he knew of the formation of “Liu Shao-Kang Office” in 1979 – code name for an ad-hoc leadership led by Wang Sheng and other key leaders; Chiang ordered it to be disbanded in May 1983. Wang was removed as the Director of the General Political Warfare Department (Tien 1989, 81).
factionalism and intra-party conflicts (Chang 1984, 424). But, this was not the case during Lee’s chairmanship.

Table 6-1: Violation of Party Discipline (1952-1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Chairman</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expulsions</th>
<th>Total cases*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>N.a.</td>
<td>1040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Ching-kuo</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>713.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Teng-hui</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>305.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Comparatively, the disciplinary cases dropped by more than 50% during Lee’s rule (1988-1995). For 7 years, the average number of disciplinary cases declined to 305 while the number of expulsion was only 16. The low disciplinary cases during Lee’s era shows that he was unable to discipline rogue members and forge party cohesion. Studies on factionalism and subgroups in the Legislative Yuan show that 7 out of 8 subgroups in the Legislative Yuan were formed by the KMT members for the period between 1989 to 1992 – who challenge the Party’s role as a “revolutionary democratic party” and doctrine of democratic centralism (Huang 1995, 113). Chiang would not have been tolerated this.

As a quasi-Leninist party, the members of the Legislative Yuan were required to declare their loyalty to the party leadership. The KMT under Chiang enjoyed a total

---

16 The party disciplinary cases were not available on the Party Congress Report after 1995.
symbiosis between the leader and organizational identity. The vertical political structure of
the party organization and principle of democratic centralism allows Chiang to wield
enormous power with few institutional constraints (Tien 1989, 73). Chiang was the
authorized interpreter of the party’s policy and ensures him control over the KMT as an
organization. But Lee was unable to do likewise. As a result of rapid Taiwanization and
changing socio-economic conditions, Lee had to face a series of coordination dilemmas that
compelled him to concede to opposition pressures and undertake intra-party democratization
that escalated intra-party competition and leadership infightings.

**Lee Teng-hui as Party Chairman**

“Un-institutionalized charisma” is inherently unstable. In the event of the death of the
party leader, the “tendencies” could turn into factionalism and result in intense power
struggles. This was the case after Lee assumed Chairmanship. For the first 3 years of Lee’s
rule, the party witnessed the most intense intra-party infightings, factionalism and opposition
to his leadership (Tien 1989). Despite the fact the KMT nominally controlled around three-fifths of the seats, the party discipline was weak throughout the whole of the second
Legislative Yuan (Tien and Chu 1996). Lee had difficulty-forging consensus between the old
and young; and the Mainlanders and Taiwanese, as he lacked seniority and experience in the
party establishment (Wu 1995). 17

Lee Teng-hui was handpicked by Chiang Ching-Kuo to succeed him as he was viewed as a compliant and “harmless” technocrat (Interview with Chang, 26 Sep 2007). However, a small number of old guard party members of Mainlander descent who nevertheless wielded considerable influence were reluctant to embrace the leadership of a
party chairman and president of Taiwanese background. Within the Party, Lee was viewed as
a seat warmer without tangible power base. The fact that he was only nominated as Party
Chairman six months after Chiang’s death, on 8 Jul 1988 – reflected the CSC’s resistance to
his leadership. 18 Lee’s appointment as Chairman was controversial as there were other
challengers such as Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Wei-guo to the position (Domes

17 Also see The Journalist, 15 -18 Aug 1993, 33-39 for an in-depth analysis of the various factions (under
party, political, military and intelligence labels) in the KMT from 1990-3.
But after much internal infighting, the CSC supported Lee’s nomination and rejected calls to elect a Mainlander as Vice-Chairman or to elect the Chairman based on secret ballot. Like previous procedures, the delegates of the National Congress endorsed Lee’s chairmanship by standing and applauding in open acclamation during 13th Party Congress. However, some members protested by sitting down (China Times, 8 July 1988).

**Factionalism and Power Struggles (1989-1993)**

After Chiang’s passing, the KMT top echelon publicly split along factional lines. Broadly, the Party was divided between the non-mainstream and mainstream factions. The mainstream faction supported Lee while a non-mainstream faction led mostly by Mainlanders and old guards wanted to sideline him. Without the prestige and personal power base of Chiang, Lee’s power was constrained by the old cadres such as Secretary General Lee Huan, Chief of Staff Hau Po-tsun, Premier Yu Guo-hwa and President of Judicial Yuan Lin Yang-kang, and National Security Council Chiang Wei-guo (Chiang Kai-shek’s adopted son) and Madame Chiang Kai-shek – a group known as the nonmainstream faction (Chao and Myers 1994).

The two broad factions fought over the redistribution of power and the future direction of Taiwan. Lee’s strong foreign policy positions also startled many old cadres when he began to take positions that amounted to the de-recognition of the People’s Republic of China (Chu and Lin 1996, 84). As Hood noted: “The rise of factions is a reflection of the difficulty the party has had in confronting two related issues-the mainland-Taiwanese rift in the KMT and the problem of Taiwan's political identity” (1996, 481). The two factions fought openly and bitterly over policy decisions. Notable examples include the intense debates over the direct election of party chairman, nomination of presidency and vice-presidency in Feb 1990 (The Journalist 1993). When the non-mainstream faction lost their bid to hold a secret ballot, two old guards, Lin Yang-kang and Chiang Wei-guo decided to

---

19 See Domes (1989) for an analysis of the politics behind Madame Chiang’s intervention and call for collective leadership after Chiang’s death. According to Wu Nai-teh, Lee had called many committee members not to support secret ballot; demonstrating Lee’s undemocratic streak as when “democracy becomes a personal inconvenience it can be discarded” (2008, 9).

There were 3 main factions: Mainstream faction led by Lee Teng-hui; Nonmainstream led by the old guards or the new KMT Alliance (Chinese New party) and Wisdom Coalition faction led by legislators who supported the mainstream faction. See Lin and Tedards (2003, 27-30) for more.
challenge Lee by announcing their candidacy for presidency and vice presidency.\textsuperscript{21} Their public rebellion led to the stock exchange index tumbling more than 6,000 points in Feb and Mar (Wu 1995). Eventually, the leadership struggle was mediated by Taiwanese party elders, who forced Lin (a Taiwanese) to withdraw so as not to be used by the Mainlander elites in their attack against the first Taiwanese President (Chao and Myers 1994). Lee eventually won and was formally elected President by the National Assembly in Apr 1990 – the final time a president was elected by the National Assembly (Hood 1997). See Appendix I for the significant events under Lee Teng-hui’s early rule (1988-9).

Power struggles continued to persist over the method, process, and criteria for selecting the chairman and vice-chairman, as well as the premier and cabinet members of the Executive Yuan. Other disagreements revolved around constitutional reform, party restructuring and mainland policy as the two factions disagree whether Taiwan should speed up cultural and economic exchanges with China and allow pro-independence exiles to return to Taiwan or not. Lee resisted many of the non-mainstream’s recommendations such as establishing direct sea and air links with the Mainland. Eventually, he removed Chiang’s former loyal aide, Lee Huan and appointed General Hau Po-tsun as Premier. Hau’s appointment as Premier was controversial as it meant stripping him of his military power – a risky strategy that paid off which undermined the non-mainstream’s influence.\textsuperscript{22} In Jan 1993, Hau finally resigned as Premier after being humiliated in the Legislative Yuan - completing Lee’s marginalization of the non-mainstream faction.

**Intra-Party Democratization**

The leadership selection model during Lee’s early rule is described as “un-institutionalized conflict” as the Party lacked autonomy over elite recruitment and candidate selection. During Chiang’s era, the Chairman was the sole person who nominated and recruited members into the CSC and CC. But this was changed after 1988, when the selection systems of the CC and CSC were gradually democratized. The idea to democratize originated

\textsuperscript{21} On Feb 1990, Lee nominated Lee Yuan-tsu as his vice-president, but elders from the non-mainstream such as Lee Huan opposed. The old guards wanted to nominate Taiwanese Lin Yang-kang and mainlander Chiang Wei-guo for presidency and vice-presidency (Chao and Myers 1994, 223).

\textsuperscript{22} See Wu (2008, 11) and *Taiwan Communiqué* (Feb 1993, 2-4) on the politics behind Hau’s resignation.
from Dr. John Kuan, who, for most of his party career, advocated for party primaries and favoured the CSC to vote in secret rather than stand to select party leaders.

There were other reasons for the KMT to initiate intra-party democracy, such as: 1) to create party loyalty; 2) improve party image; 3) strengthen ability to compete and 4) enhance party unity (Wu and Fell 2001, 26). However, scholars suggested that the true intention of primaries was to reduce the influence of local factions in the nomination process (Hadley and Wu 1997). As Baum and Robinson note, the party elections diminish the effects of traditional bargaining practices used to placate powerful patrons and factions (1999). Whether intra-party democracy fosters party cohesion remains an open question. Here, I argue that the more inclusive and less autonomous the candidate selection methods, the more the party is susceptible to intra-party conflicts.

After the Party Chairman, the CSC is the top of the Party’s hierarchy and is the most prestigious and powerful body that makes all the major decisions. The CSC represents the CC23 of 210 members when that body is not in session. From the 7th to 12th Party Congress (1952-1981), all the candidates for the CC were nominated by the party leader and elected by bloc vote. However, this changed in 1988 during the KMT’s 13th Party Congress. For the first time in 43 years, the delegates were allowed to elect members of the CC through secret ballot. See Table 6.2. The Chairman retained the right to nominate twice as many seats (180 candidates) in the CC; the delegates of the Party Congress also recommended their own list of candidates (180 candidates) as along as each nomination had the joint signatures of two other members. On the basis of this double list of candidates, the delegates of the Party Congress elected the CC by block vote (Domes 1989).

As mentioned, the mainstream and non-mainstream factions were engaged in procedural battles over the candidate selection methods. By the 14th Party Congress in 1993, negotiations led to the election of the CC by limited vote. It was during the 14th Congress that Lee approved changes such as: 1) the addition four vice-chairmen24, nominated by Lee and approved by the Congress, to the CC; 2) allowing Congress to elect the Party Chairman

23 The CSC is a small body with membership number that rose from 10 in 1952 to 39 in 2009.
24 The non-mainstream wanted to elect Hau Po-tsun, Li Huan and Lin Yang Kang to check the power of the Lee. The heated exchange between the two factions led to fist fights (Hood 1997, 123).
through secret ballot; 3) empowering the Chairman to appoint 10 to 15 of the 31 members of the CSC, with the remaining members elected by the CC; 4) increasing the frequency of the National Congress to every two years instead of four. Comparatively, the methods for selecting the CSC were less democratic as members were still appointed by the leader or elected by block vote. By 1998, half of the seats in CSC were nominated by the leader, while the other half nominated by the joint signatures of the delegates (Huang 1995, 108-9). See Table 6.2.

Table 6-2: Selection Methods for the CC and CSC (1952-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress (Yr)</th>
<th>Central Standing Committee</th>
<th>Central Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th (1952)</td>
<td>Same number of candidates as seats, all nominated by leader and approved unanimously by delegates</td>
<td>Twice as many candidates as seats, all nominated by leader and elected by block vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th (1957)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th (1963)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th (1969)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th (1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th (1981)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Post-Lee Party reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress (Yr)</th>
<th>Central Standing Committee</th>
<th>Central Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13th (1988)</td>
<td>Twice as many candidates as seats, nominated by leader and elected by block vote</td>
<td>Twice as many candidates as seats, half nominated by leaders and half nominated by joint signature of delegates. Elected by block vote. As above, but elected by limited vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th (1993)</td>
<td>17 members were elected by CC to the enlarged CSC and 16 delegates appointed by the Chairman.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th (1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Post-2000 Party reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress (Yr)</th>
<th>Central Standing Committee</th>
<th>Central Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th (2000)</td>
<td>Elected by CC members based on open nomination. 40% of seats to be reserved for representatives from ethnic minorities, youth, fisheries, labor and women. The Charter barred those convicted of criminal or sexual offences from seeking nomination for public offices. Party members who were seriously disciplined or expelled cannot stand for election.</td>
<td>Directly elected by party delegates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th (2009)</td>
<td>Among 39 CSC members: 32 are directly elected by the party delegates, while 7 are designated by the Chairman (2 seats reserved for Youth Wing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data for 7th to 13th Party Congress from Huang (1995, 108). The rest from KMT News and media reports, various years.

Implications of the KMT’s intra-party democracy

Taiwanization. One of the most immediate effects of the KMT’s intra-party democratization in 1990s was Taiwanization – the closing of the gap between Mainlanders
and Taiwanese, improving the Party’s image and appeal to a wider electorate. In 1952, there were no Taiwanese in the CSC and only one Taiwanese in the CC. Since Chiang’s initiation to Taiwanize, the number of Taiwanese increased from 5 in the CSC in 1976 to 12 in 1984. Taiwanization accelerated during Lee’s Chairmanship, as the number of Taiwanese doubled, jumping to 21 members (60%) of the CSC in 1994. See Table 6.3.

Taiwanization was a clear and irreversible trend - a function of generation change and democratization. As Taiwan democratized, the forces identifying with the Taiwanese identity increased. Surveys show that by the 1990s, the shift from Chinese identity to double identity (both Taiwanese and Chinese) has increased (Ho and Liu 2003, 153-69; Cheng 2006, 377). The identity shift correlates with the pattern of change in the public affinity with particular parties. Taiwanization reflects the Party’s attempt to recast itself as an indigenous force to retain its hegemonic position.

Table 6-3: Social Composition of the CSC and CC (1952-1994)

| Year | CSC | | |
|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
|      | Chiang’s Era | Lee’s Era | |
| Total No. | 10 | 16 | 16 | 19 | 21 | 22 | 27 | 31 | 31 | 35 | 35 |
| Taiwanese | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 12 | 16 | 20 | 21 |
| Military | 3 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| CC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total No. | 32 | 50 | 74 | 74 | 99 | 130 | 150 | 180 | 210 |
| Taiwanese | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 19 | 25 | 62 | 112 |
| Percentage | 3.1 | 6.0 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 14.6 | 19.3 | 34.4 | 53.3 |

Source: Data extracted from Huang (1995, 105).

As Dickson notes, the increased Taiwanese among the KMT elites was an indicator of the KMT’s commitment to respond to the changing status as the ruling party and a move away from its early goal to re-unify China under the KMT’s flagship (1997, 114). However, the rapid increase in the number of Taiwanese also worsened the “tendencies” within the

---

25 As Tien notes, the proportion of Taiwan’s population born on the mainland after 1950 has dwindled to 15% in 1950 to 5.7% in 1985. For the younger generation, even those with mainlander parents, identification with the China is becoming an abstract notion (1992, 43).

26 There has been a shift away from Chinese identity toward Taiwanese identity in the public consciousness. The number of people identifying themselves as “Chinese” has dropped, while those calling themselves “Taiwanese” has risen. Those with double identity category stayed around 50% (Cheng 2006, 378).
Party as the non-mainstream faction, dominated by Mainlanders felt threatened by the encroachment and had to fight to preserve their status.

**Change in Elite-Composition.** Intra-party democratization had a substantial impact on the social composition of the KMT ruling elites. Traditionally, the CSC and the CC were filled with military officers, cabinet members, party veterans and heads of intelligence services. For example, as Table 6.4 shows, the CSC from 1976-1992 were mostly former civil servants (56%), followed by elected legislative members (17.8%) and officers with military background (10.3%). The Civil Service was heavily politicised under the KMT rule (Chu 2001, 268). Party reforms implemented since 2000 further altered the elite composition. For the first term of the 39 CSC members elected in 2009, more than half were elected legislators and city councillors (53.8%), followed by businessmen (20.5%), Cabinet ministers (15.3%), Youths (5.12%) and Others (5.12%). See Table 6.4.

**Table 6-4: Occupation Background of KMT’s CSC (1950-1992)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party activists</td>
<td>22 (46.8)</td>
<td>25 (49)</td>
<td>60 (56.01)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected members</td>
<td>12 (25.5)</td>
<td>15(29.4)</td>
<td>19(17.8)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21(53.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet ministers</td>
<td>7 (14.9)</td>
<td>3(5.9)</td>
<td>5 (4.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>7(10.6)</td>
<td>7(13.7)</td>
<td>11(10.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
<td>3 (2.8)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial/Business</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1(2.0)</td>
<td>2 (1.9)</td>
<td>8 (20.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1 (2.1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>5 (4.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youths</td>
<td>2 (5.12)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>5 (4.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Indigenous minority &amp; handicapped)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (1.9)</td>
<td>2 (5.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>(0.9)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9 (28.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Gender Parity.** Traditionally, women were almost totally excluded from the highest positions of KMT and the Government. Prior to 1980s, not a single woman held a post in the Executive Yuan or the CSC. It was only in 1988 that Shirley Kuo became the sole female

---

27 For a detailed analysis of the CC elected in the 13th Party Congress, see Domes (1989)
28 As Asia Times reports: “Taiwan’s civil service is supposed to be politically neutral…Indeed the boundaries between the civil service and the KMT party organization were so hazy that official would regularly and repeatedly hop between the two.” See “Taiwan opposition shoots itself in the foot,” 29 Jun 2002.
Cabinet Minister of Finance and a member of the CSC\(^{30}\). And in 2000, Lin Chen-Chi became one of the KMT’s first female Vice-Chairmen. Since 2000, 1 of the 7 Party Vice-Chairman seats has been reserved for a woman. Out of present 39 CSC members constituted in Nov 2009, 9 are female (28.13%). Comparatively, the PAP’s 18-member CEC elected on Nov 2008 only has only 2 (11.1%) female. As Chapter 5 shows, Singapore’s current Parliament only has 20.5% of elected women MPs (2006-2010). Despite similar economic development status, Singapore is behind Taiwan in promoting female political representation. In Taiwan, gender quota\(^{31}\) introduced in 1997 has helped to push the percentage of female legislators from 14% in 1995 to 30% in 2008 – one of the highest in Asia.\(^{32}\) See Table 6.5.

### Table 6-5: Female Representation in Legislative Yuan (1995-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
<th>Total Candidates</th>
<th>Female Candidates</th>
<th>Females appointed/elected</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schafferer (2003, 62-6) and Yang (2009, 2)

**Academic Qualifications.** Like the PAP, the KMT’s ruling elites are known to have excellent education credentials. To climb the party ladder, one must not only have had the party experience and right connections but also academic qualifications. For example, out of the CSC elected in the 1976-1992, 20 (18.7%) have PhDs. See Table 6-6. Since the 1970s, the KMT has had the practice of hand picking foreign trained students, co-opting them into the CC and fast tracking for leadership positions. Some of these scholars include Lien Chan, Frederick Chien, Chen Li-an and Lee Teng Hui (Tsang 1999, 11).

---

\(^{30}\) See (Tien 1989, 80) for a full list of CSC from 13\(^{th}\) Party Congress and their background in 1988.

\(^{31}\) Constitutional change in 2005 also revised the gender quota -17 of the 3 seats from the party lists (15% of 113 seats) reserved for women. See *Taiwan Yearbook 2009*.

Table 6-6: Education Qualifications of the CSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>3 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>3 (6.4)</td>
<td>2 (3.9)</td>
<td>2 (1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>35 (74.5)</td>
<td>37 (72.5)</td>
<td>64 (59.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>6 (12.8)</td>
<td>8 (15.7)</td>
<td>18 (16.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhDs</td>
<td>3 (6.4)</td>
<td>4 (7.8)</td>
<td>20 (18.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dickson (1997, 114) and Hung Shi-yiu (1992, 77).

**Post-2009 Party Reforms**

Since 16th Party Congress in 2000, party re-organization and revisions to the Party Charter have attempted to institutionalize the selection of the CC and CSC. Presently the 210 member CC is directly elected by the party delegates, while the selection of the CSC has oscillated between nomination by Chairman and election by the Party delegates.\(^{33}\) To keep up with the DPP\(^{34}\) and the Constitutional reforms since 2005, the KMT has revised its Party Charter to ensure 40% of the CSC seats are reserved for representatives from special interest groups such as women, ethnic minority groups, youths, fisheries, labour and handicapped members. For example, for the CSC members elected by the 18th Party Congress in 2009, 56.3% of seats were representatives of special interests groups.

**Recentralization.** But since 2009, after 3 years of direct election of the CSC by the Congress the KMT has reverted to the CSC (39 members of one year term), with 32 members directly elected by the party delegates while 7 are appointed by the Chairman (including 2 reserved for the Youth Wing). The reservation of 7 seats to be directly appointed by the chairman shows that the Party is trying to retain its autonomy to select and wrestle control back from the local cadres. In the last CSC elected in Nov 2009, 5 out of 6 Cabinet Ministers were appointed to the reserved seats. As the ruling party, the close party-government relation reflects a recentralization of power in policy-making.

The CSC remains an important party body that has the final authority over all significant candidate nominations (County Magistrates, City, National Assembly, Legislative

---

\(^{33}\) In 2009, 13 out of the 39 (40%) CSC members are incumbent legislators. The 1st term of the 18th Party Congress CSC members were elected by 1,529 party delegates with 96 percent voter turnout. “KMT Elects New Central Standing Committee,” *KMT News*, 12 Oct 2009.

\(^{34}\) Unlike the KMT, the DPP has been more proactive in promoting gender parity and minority rights. During the DPP government, Chen had ensured that a quarter of his Cabinet were women and had appointed Annette Lu, a woman to be the VP (Yang 2009).
Yuan, Provincial Assembly and Municipal Councils). Critics argue that since the KMT instituted a one-year term for the CSC, it has lost much of its previous power (as fewer candidates are running for the CSC). However in Oct 2009, a vote-buying scandal that resulted in the mass resignation and re-election of the entire CSC shows that it is still an important body. Careerists are still willing to spend money on vote-buying and risk expulsion, just to be elected into CSC.\(^{35}\) Since the KMT’s return to power, the CSC has regained its influence as CSC members can increase their political profile and network with Cabinet Ministers and elected Legislators – who make up around 50 to 60% of the CSC.

The next section will examine the rules governing legislative candidacy in Taiwan and highlight key features of the KMT’s selection for the Legislative Yuan Elections (LE). Comparison will be made to Singapore to show how differences in incentive structures governing candidate selection and electoral campaign shape behaviour. As the decisive power lies with the national government, the focus will be on the national rather than local elections\(^ {36}\) as they are politically more significant.

**Rules of the Game in Taiwan**

Like Singapore, Taiwanese legal laws governing candidacy are quite universal.\(^ {37}\) Taiwanese nationals aged 23 or older can register as candidates in legislative elections, candidates in local election must be 35 years or older. And like most countries, Taiwan has citizenship rules governing public office holders.\(^ {38}\) According to the Nationality Act, dual citizenship is strictly forbidden for Taiwanese public office-holders, who are required to renounce their foreign citizenship before assuming public office and to obtain a certificate testifying to the loss of citizenship within one year of their inauguration. In 2008, KMT legislator Lee Ching-an was sentenced to 2 years in prison for possession of dual citizenship while being a legislator from 1999 to 2008.

---

\(^{35}\) See “KMT CSC to have by-election in mid-November,” *People’s Daily*, 27 Oct 2009.

\(^{36}\) For more on local elections, see Rigger (1999). And for a comprehensive study of candidate selection method at the provincial, mayoral and county level, see Wu (2001).

\(^{37}\) See cross-country comparative requirements for LE in Massicotte, Blais and Yoshinaka (2004, 42-9).

\(^{38}\) She was also asked to repay roughly NT$80.9 mil (US$2,530,497) for the 3 terms she served as a legislator. “Legislator Lee Ching-an given an ultimatum on nationality,” *China Post*, 27 Dec 2008 and “Ex-lawmaker handed 2 years for fraud,” *United Daily News*, 5 Feb 2010.
In both Taiwan and Singapore, candidates have to pay election deposits to stand in elections. While candidates have to fork out S$13,500 (US$9,800) for election deposit in Singapore, Taiwanese candidates need to part with NT$200,000 (US$6,200) of deposit; the deposit is returned if the candidate polls at least 10% of the quotient obtained by dividing the number of voters by the district magnitude (Schafferer 2004, 42).\(^{39}\) See Table 6-7. In 1992 LE, 144 candidates lost their deposits, which showed that despite the legal filter, there is still a strong incentive for candidates of small electoral bases to run for a seat (Nathan 1993, 428).

<p>| Table 6-7: Candidacy Requirements for Legislative Elections for Taiwan and Singapore |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Citizenship and residence</th>
<th>Monetary deposit</th>
<th>Ineligibility with other mandates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Citizenship for 10 years</td>
<td>Candidate deposit, reimbursed if candidate obtains at least 10% of valid votes; in the case of overseas candidates and from nationwide electoral district, reimbursed if elected</td>
<td>Public service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Residence in electoral district for 4 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Citizenship required; no residence requirement in electoral district</td>
<td>Candidate deposit, reimbursed if candidate garners more than one-eighth or 12.5% of the votes cast in the constituency he or she contests.</td>
<td>Public service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author.

**Why Become a Candidate in Taiwan?**

Why do candidates run against the KMT when the rewards associated with the ruling party is greater? Why are candidates willing to stand as non-party affiliates or as “Dangwai” (outside the party) candidates in the early years? In Singapore, observers argue electoral engineering and a “climate of fear” have contributed to a shortage of candidates and a high level of uncontested seats and “walkovers” in the 1990s. See Chapter 7. But in Taiwan, there is an over-supply. Even before opposition parties were legalized in 1988, independents or “Dangwai” candidates often stood in local and supplementary elections. For the number of independents in Taiwan LE, see Chapter 8.

Standing for national elections in Taiwan is costly and dangerous, especially in the 1990s where elections can become violent as some legislators were tied to “underground politics” (Chin 2003, 143). Besides, as Chapter 3 explains, the fusion between party and state during the KMT rule also meant that all civil servants, teachers and military officers are

\(^{39}\) For the rules governing candidacy, see Article 31-8 of the Public Officials Election and Recall Law.
under the KMT’s payroll. Resource asymmetry\(^{40}\) and incumbency advantage also meant
unlevel playing field that gave challenges very little chance of winning. So, why do
Taiwanese run as non-party candidates and risk being denied promotion or positions of
power in the government?

Despite Taiwanese lack of democratic experience, Taiwanese like to participate in
elections, either as voters or as candidates. As Table 6-8 shows, the average number of
candidates is usually twice the number of seats contested, sometimes much higher when the
contested office is important. In most elections, the polling rate is usually around 65% - very
high for a country without compulsory voting legislation like Singapore. While there is no
definite answer to the motivations of candidates, it seems that in Taiwan, most non-party or
independent candidates stand in early elections to protest against the KMT’s hegemonic rule
membership does not provide supporters with any material benefit, only activists, and the
political committed are keen to join” (1999, 73). While some are motivated by ideological
reasons, a large number of candidates, especially in the 1990s are also induced by the
privileges and connections the political positions could bring.

Comparatively, Taiwanese legislators earn less than Singaporean MPs. And unofficial
report estimates the annual salary of a Taiwanese legislator to be NT$2,423,520 (US$75,600),
excluding reimbursements, about US$30,000 less than a Singapore MP. For comparative
salary figures for Taiwanese and Singaporean politicians, see Table 5-4. Aside from salary,
being a politician in Taiwan promises involvement in construction projects, buying and
selling of land, opportunities for money embezzling and operating vice-businesses - common
alternative ways for elected officials to make money. The closed connection between politics
and money enhances the appeal of politics as the path to money (Moody 2002, 36). The
conviction of President Chen Shui-bian and his family on graft charges perhaps best
exemplifies the pervasiveness of corruption at the highest level.\(^{41}\)

\(^{40}\) See Chu (2001) and Solinger (2001) for the KMT’s huge control of financial empire estimated at around
US$6.7 bil in 2000 and later dropped to US$2.6 by 2001. The KMT’s tremendous financial, organizational and
ideological resources allowed it to outspent its competitors.

\(^{41}\) Chen was charged with embezzling $3.15 mil during his presidency, receiving bribes worth at least $9
million in connection with a government land deal, money laundering and forging documents. He was
Finally, Taiwan’s SNTV electoral system creates incentives for anyone with a voter base of 20,000 or more to stand in election and leads to an over-supply of candidates (Wu and Fell 2001, 28; Nathan 1993, 428). As Hsieh argues, large parties like the KMT tend to over-nominate candidates under the SNTV system, leading to party candidates competing against their fellow party candidates rather than against those from the other parties (1996, 207). The over-nomination and supply of candidates intensifies intra and inter-party competition - exacerbating inner party conflicts and dissent. The implications of Taiwan’s electoral system will be discussed in Chapter 8. The following section will examine the KMT’s candidate selection method for the Legislative Yuan and implications for party cohesion.

**The KMT’s Candidate Selection for Legislative Yuan**

When the KMT government moved to Taiwan in 1949, they brought along the members of the elective bodies, the Constitution and its government structure. From 1949 to 1969, elections for national bodies were prohibited. The KMT claims to be the legitimate government of all China and the terms of the original elected members in 1947 in the Mainland were extended for the duration of "Election and Recall Law”. But, local elections were allowed for executive and council positions at county, township and village level.

**Supplementary Elections.** By 1980s, as more elected members from the Mainland began to age and die, the KMT was compelled to hold supplementary elections to fill the vacant seats at the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan. Gradually, the Government had to open up seats\(^{42}\) for elections based on two types of electoral systems: a single-vote, single-member plurality system (SMD) for the election of mayors and magistrates and a single-vote, multimember system (SNTV-MMD) for the election of national legislators, provincial assemblymen, and city and county councilmen (Tien 1989). In Apr 1991, Lee Teng-hui ended the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion”, sentenced to life in prison in Sep 2009. “Chen Shui-bian,” *New York Times* 11 Sep 2009. Also see Chin (2003, 144-152) for politician’s involvement in pork-barrelling, rent-seeking and land speculation.

\(^{42}\) In 1969 and 1972, the Legislative Yuan has 51 additional members of three-year term. Subsequently, more seats were opened. For more, see Chao and Myers (2000) and Cheng (1989).
leading to the state of civil war across the Strait.\textsuperscript{43} By Dec 1991, all veteran members in the Legislative Yuan elected in 1948 were retired.

For the supplementary legislative elections (1969-1986), the CSC relied on the opinions of party members and cadres to generate a list of potential candidates.\textsuperscript{44} See Table 6-8. The nomination was guided by the following criteria: party loyalty as well as the results of the cadre reviews and the closed caucuses; age, sex, education, and financial resources of potential candidates; factional rivalry\textsuperscript{45}, social base of the candidate, public image, the odds of winning, and matters of vote distribution among KMT hopefuls. For this period, a typical KMT candidate would be: 1) a long term KMT party activist; 2) a co-opted candidate such as a famous athlete, scholar or social notable; 3) a career politician who has been invited to run for public mobility; or 4) an entrepreneur who sees the instrumental value of public office to promote his industrial or business interests (Tien 1989, 171-4). The selection of a KMT candidate is thus different from the PAP, who avoids fielding party activists and focuses on horizontal co-optation of scholars and technocrats from the Civil Service or the Military.

Table 6-8: Legislative Yuan Elections (1969-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>KMT Nomination method</th>
<th>Seats Open</th>
<th>Total Candidates</th>
<th>Polling Rate (%)</th>
<th>KMT wins</th>
<th>Non-KMT wins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seats Won</td>
<td>Seats (%)</td>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>Seats won</td>
<td>Seats (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Party cell opinion</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Party member opinion</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>68.18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>75.97</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Party member opinion &amp; cadres' evaluation</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>66.36</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>63.17</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>65.38</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Closed primary</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>75.17</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Revised primary</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>72.02</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Opinion consultation</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>67.65</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>68.09</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Revised primary</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>66.31</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lui (1992, 168); Wu and Fell (2001, 36) and Schafferer (2003, 66).

\textsuperscript{43} This enabled cross-strait negotiations on a “state to state” basis (Lin and Tedards 2003, 36).

\textsuperscript{44} Three types of cadres are involved in the initial selection process: (1) political cadres; (2) social cadres; and (3) party functionaries who are full-time party officials (Tien 1989).

\textsuperscript{45} For the KMT’s candidate nomination based on local factionalism, see Chen (1996 174-192).
**Party Primaries.** During Chiang’s rule, the Party Chairman and the CSC (a small selectorate) retained the ultimate decisional autonomy to select the final slate of candidates. However, since Lee assumed Chairmanship in 1988, he acceded to pressure to democratize the party and hold primaries to field candidates for the national elections. The decision to hold primaries was also to better reflect the party’s distribution of power and improve the party’s image. Besides, the KMT was also compelled to democratize to reduce the influence of local factions and respond to the electoral challenge from the DPP and the rising expectations of the electorate (Schafferer 2003, 115; Huang 1996, 125).

**1989 Supplementary LE.** Eventually, the CSC approved an elaborate set of qualifications such as endorsement and at least 0.2 % of signatures from party members to hold closed primary elections for the 1989 LE for the first time in KMT’s history. Despite all the excitement with intra-party democracy, the nomination rules regarded the primary results as advisory and not binding in the final selection (Baum and Robinson 2000). At the 1989 supplementary LE, the KMT performed worse than expected with its vote shares declining by 7% from 69.9% in 1986 LE to 60.1%. The loss of 11% seat shares from 80.8% to 71.3% shares was viewed as a defeat for the hegemonic party. See Table 6.8.

The KMT’s experience with primaries persuaded party elites that primaries were divisive and counter productive. Besides, the nonmainstream faction appeared to have benefitted as more Mainlanders won the nomination (Baum and Robinson 2000). The Party’s dismal performance at the polls resulted in Dr. Kuan’s resignation, as many blamed his initiation of primaries as the key reason for the party’s dismal performance. However, the purging of Kuan fuelled the tension between Lee Teng-hui (non-mainstream) and Li Huan (mainstream), which cumulated to the open factional conflict and party split in 1993.

**First Competitive 1992 LE.** In Dec 1992, all the 161 seats in the Legislative Yuan were up for grabs for the first time in Taiwan’s history. The electoral system was based on the SNTV system while the proportional representation (PR) system was instituted in a few

---

46 The nonmainstream faction led by old guards Mainlanders and Party Organizational Department Chief Dr. John Kuan were pushing for party primaries. However, 8 out of 31 CSC members objected to the primaries because of fears of vote buying, factionalism and un-representativeness of candidates.

47 The DPP also held primary. However, the DPP rules regarded the results as binding.

48 Party leaders Lee Teng-hui and James Soong had to publicly apologize for not achieving the customary 70% of vote shares (Ling and Myers 1990, 377).
districts (Hsieh 1996, 204). This election was significant, as it was first full election of the Legislative Yuan – where the opposition could unseat the KMT. For this LE, the KMT revised its nomination method: while the members still had a choice in the selection, their votes only counted for 50% of the final decision. The KMT returned to a more centralized nomination method to allow the local party branches to cancel primaries and make recommendations directly to the party headquarters. Despite the revised nomination method and low voter turnout for 1992 LE primaries, there was still an explosion of candidates as the KMT ended up nominating 158 candidates and 122 candidates ran without endorsement. In addition, more than 40 KMT and DPP members left their parties to run as independents (Nathan 1993, 712). The jump in the number of independents from 80 (1989 LE) to 122 (1992 LE) suggests that the major parties were losing their monopoly over the nomination process, as candidates did not see parties as the only channel to political power. See Table 6.9.

**Table 6-9: Breakdown of Candidates and Elected Officials for LE (1989-2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LE</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Turn-out (%)</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total KMT</td>
<td>DPP NP Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>75.16</td>
<td>302 140 82</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>72.02</td>
<td>403 158 78</td>
<td>- 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>67.65</td>
<td>397 139 93</td>
<td>45 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>68.09</td>
<td>498 161 112</td>
<td>51 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>66.31</td>
<td>434 97 83</td>
<td>32 111 132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Poor Electoral Performance.** In this 1992 competitive LE, the KMT continued to perform poorly - earning only 53% of total votes and 57% of total seat shares. Both vote and seat shares declined significantly, compared to 1989 LE. Only 60% of the fielded KMT candidates won, while 64% of the nominated DPP candidates were elected. This was the KMT’s worst election since 1969 and many considered it another defeat. See Figure 6.2. After experimenting with primaries for the 1989 and 1992 LE, the KMT terminated primaries for the following 2 elections and reverted to a more centralized candidate selection method.
From 1992-2001, the KMT amended its nomination method to opinion consultation whereby the party branches could select from one of the following methods: member opinions, primaries and cadre evaluation. The KMT only returned to party primaries after 2001. Unfortunately, the reversion to centralized candidate nomination methods failed to abate the KMT’s declining votes. By 1995, the KMT had lost its dominance. After the KMT reintroduced primaries again in 2001 LE, it suffered its worst electoral defeat ever and became a minority party for the first time, with 36.6% of seat shares.

**Implications for Party Cohesion**

There were a few reasons for the KMT’s weak performance in 1989 and 1992 LE after introducing primaries. First, candidates who failed to win the primary obstructed the nominated candidate during the election and unsuccessful aspirants complained of the lack of fairness that led to power struggles. The primaries divided the Party and pitted the mainstream and nonmainstream factions against each other over the effects of candidate selection and distribution of power within the party (Baum and Robinson 2000, 13). Critics of the primaries saw the process benefitting the non-mainstream faction as more Mainlanders won in 1992 LE, lending credibility to the view that primaries were unfair (Nathan 1993, 76).

Second, some of the party careerists who did not receive nominations continued to run without party endorsement or defied the party and left (Wu 2001, 113-6). As Table 6-1: Violation of party discipline (1952-1966) shows, party discipline was weak under Lee’s rule. One of the worst demonstrations of the KMT’s rebellion was in the candidates’ fierce criticisms of their own party’s campaign strategy, which led to lost votes (Wu 1995, 99). As
Ling and Myers observed when discussing the primary election in Jul 1989: “A new spirit of activism swept the rank and file and they supported their candidates even when the KMT upper echelon refused to endorse them” (1990, 365). The animosity and mudslinging between candidates that resulted from intense campaigning carried over after the elections and left the Party disunited.

The surge in the number of mavericks who decided to run as independents or candidates without party endorsements when they failed to secure party nominations provides yet another indicator of the lack of party cohesion (Wu and Fell 2001, 29). Reports show that in 1989 LE, a total of 48 KMT candidates ran without party endorsement and a KMT candidate, Chen Yuan-chi, joined the China Democratic Party when he failed to receive the party’s endorsement in Tainan (Wu and Fell 2001, 33; Ling and Myers 1990, 370). For the 1992 LE, the KMT had a total of 43 candidates running without endorsement. A key reason for this was the factionalism between the Mainstream and Non-mainstream. Significantly, when two KMT high officials Zhao Shao-kang and Wang Chien-hsuan of the Nonmainstream faction failed to get nominated in 1992 primary, they resigned and ran against the Party as non-party affiliates (Nathan 1993, 3). Subsequently, Lee’s attempt to discipline them led to their defection and an exodus of 6 KMT legislators, causing the party’s first split in Aug 1993. The defectors soon formed the New Party and challenge the KMT. Zhao and Wang became the two highest vote-getters for 1992 LE. Their candidacy shaved off the overall vote shares of the KMT and partly explained the KMT’s poor performance (Nathan 1993, 3). Most observers attribute Zhao and Wang’s defection to party factionalism and lack of systemness and fairness in the nomination process during Lee’s rule. As Tien and Chu note, despite the fact that KMT nominally controlled three fifths of the seats, the KMT’s party discipline also suffered when renegade KMT legislators joined the DPP and NP to pass a sweeping Financial Disclosure law that requires all elected officials officers and high

---

49 For the sensationalist and violent electoral campaigns during the 1989 LE, see Ling and Myers (1990).
50 Out of the 43 insurgents, only 7 were successful (Nathan 1993, 433).
51 Zhao advocated strong business ties with China and opposed an independent Taiwan. As a Legislator, he publicly voted against KMT bills on high speed railway, nuclear water plant, and Sunshine law (A bill requiring public officials to disclose their financial records Supporters of the NP were dissatisfied with Lee’s autocratic tendencies, reliance on business links and pro-independence position (Hood 1996, 477).
ranking officials to declare their income (1996, 1165).\(^{52}\)

Third, Taiwan’s electoral system that combines multi-member district (MMD) with single-non-transferable vote (SNTV) system had an effect of encouraging candidate-centred rather than party-centred campaigning (Hsieh 1999; Carey and Shugart 1995). In SNTV system, there is no fixed number for candidate nomination.\(^{53}\) The more candidates, the fewer the votes needed to win. Under the SNTV system, intraparty competition can become stiffer than interparty competition. District voters care little about party label. Candidates have to be resourceful to distinguish themselves from their fellow nominees to gain votes. In Taiwan, candidates needed to be weary of fellow candidates who might steal votes or uproot their “Tiau-a-ka”\(^{54}\) (vote brokers). Conflict of interests intensified local factionalism and undermined party unity.

Taiwan’s SNTV system creates incentives for anyone with a voter base of 20,000 or more to stand in election. This has may lead to over-supply of candidates\(^{55}\) (Wu and Fell 2001, 28; Nathan 1993, 428). Small winning quotas mean that candidates pay little regard with aggregating large number of voters and would rather focus only smaller groups of voters. This encourages candidates to take extreme positions on sensationalist issues to capture specific constituencies rather than policy-based campaigning. As a result, SNTV systems tend to encourage local factionalism, complicated interpersonal networks and vote-buying as a way to win elections (Stockton 2009, 6; Wang 1996, 96).

Fourth, the KMT’s primary elections were inefficient and wasteful as candidates had to spend their money and energy twice. As studies show: “The more inclusive the party procedure is in selecting its candidates, the more costly the campaigns of contestants” (Hofnung 2008, 739). Party primaries involve significant amount of money. This is made worst under the SNTV system, which is known for raising campaign costs as voters in each

\(^{52}\) See Tien and Chu (1996, 1167) for the roll-call in the Legislative Yuan over four important bills.

\(^{53}\) For the nomination strategies under the SNTV system, see Wang (1996, 95-6) and Tan et al (1996, 487).

\(^{54}\) Tiau-a-ka are local vote brokers who co-ordinate and act as mediators between faction leaders and voters. During elections, the tiau-a-ka mobilizes support and votes for the candidate. Tiau-a-ka help local politicians win elections because they receive both material and emotional incentives (Rigger 1999, 87-93).

\(^{55}\) Given that voters cast a single-vote in MMD, as the number of districts increased, the % of votes to win decreased. In large districts, the % of votes to win a seat could be as low as 5-10% (Stockton 2009, 6).
district can play politicians off each other in demanding constituency service. Primaries also raised cost for party central committees since they have to maximize efficiency by fielding an optimum number of nominees require them to convince weaker politicians not to run, by typically offering side payments (Greene 2007, 266).

In Taiwan, primaries and elections are notoriously expensive. Reports estimate that a candidate for the Legislative Yuan in the 1990s had to spend as much as NT$60 to NT$120 mil (US$2-4 mil) on elections (Fell 2005, 232; Ling and Myers 1990, 370). Comparatively, in Singapore’s 1988 GE, the PAP only spent a total S$675,000 (US$498,000) or an average of S$8,333 (US$6,100) per candidate; while opposition Worker’s Party spent a total of S$105,000 (Quah 1991, 390).

Presently, there is a lack of data on the KMT’s expenditure on the primaries. It is difficult to estimate exactly how much a candidate has to spend for both primary and election. But based on the candidate’s expenditure for an election, it is logical to assume that a candidate would find it expensive and inefficient to raise funds twice, even when public and party funding available to subsidize the election expenditure. Reportedly, the public subsidies of the KMT are NT$217 mil (US$6.8 mil), while the DPP get NT$157 million (US$4.9 mil) (Kovick 2003, 332). In terms of party funding, the resource-rich KMT was said to have offered NT$1.5 billion in subsidies to its candidates, although estimates put the figure nearer NT$5 billion (US$156 mil). The DPP on the other hand, provided a more modest subsidy of NT$100 mil (US$3.2 mil) to its candidates. However, even these astronomical amounts of party and public subsidies are insufficient for the candidates.

Electoral Campaign and Money Politics

With increased inter and intra-party competition, candidates have to find ways to distinguish themselves from the other candidates in their electoral campaigns. Despite the electoral laws to limit the candidate spending at NT $7 mil (US$218,000) for LE parties and

56 For the effects of the SNTV systems on party system and voting behavior, see Grofman et al (1999). For the KMT’s electoral strategies and tactic of “vote-distribution” under the SNTV system, see Liu (1999).
57 The lack of data is because candidates are not required to declare campaigning expenses and there are no laws on the conduct of the primaries in Taiwan.
58 Parties are subsidized based on the national performance of their candidates. Parties that surpass the threshold of 5 percent of the national votes receive NT$50 per vote. See Taiwan Central Election Commission.
59 Also see Schafferer (2004) and Fell (2005) for electoral campaign strategies and use of media.
candidates often spend more than the limit. As in American elections, increasing professionalism in electoral campaigns require parties to spend money on public opinion surveys and public relations experts in order to gauge the popularity of their candidates and identify key areas in which to mobilize their campaigns. To select attractive candidates, party strategists are relying more on surveys, public opinion data, electoral data and marketing specialists (Dickson 1996, 62). Usually, candidates and parties spend huge amounts on newspaper, television ads, campaign rallies, posters and leaflets. For 1998 LE, the total spending of parties on advertisements alone was estimated at NT$266 mil (US$8.3 mil). And for 2001 LE, it shot up to NT $826 (US$25.8 mil). See Table 6-10.

Table 6-10: Total Spending of Parties on Advertisements in LE and PE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998 LE</th>
<th>2000 PE</th>
<th>2001 LE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>3,127</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (NT$ mil)</td>
<td>266 (US$8.3 mil)</td>
<td>3,602</td>
<td>826 (US$25.8 mil)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schafferer (2004, 45)

“Heijin” Aside from advertisements and publicity, candidates have to host lavish banquets, lobby, and buy votes (Ling and Myers 1990, 369). The price of a vote in the 1990s was between US$10 and $30 dollars (Wu 1995, 87; Fields 2002, 135). In 1992 LE, each vote was to cost between NT $500 (US$15) to NT $2000 (US$60) (Nathan 1993, 429). Reports show that vote buying and factionalism were rampant during the primaries for the LEs. Candidates of the 1989 LE accepted money from businessmen to pay for their costly campaigning. Some ex-legislators, known as “golden ox” candidates admitted that it was donations from businessmen that made it possible for them to recover their campaign.

---

60 The limit is NT $26 mil (US$811,000) for local elections. The KMT election campaigning shows that candidates mapped their campaigns like battlefield manoeuvres; mobilizing forces, devising tactics, and attacked their enemies to snatch the spoils of war. For more, see Chao and Myers (1998) and Rawnsley (2006).
61 See Kuo (1995) and Chin (2003) on “black gold” politics or underground organized crime and the connections between gangsters, tycoons and politicians in Taiwan.
62 Taiwan elections are characterized by vote-buying. Buying a vote is not a way to get rich but to solidify a connection, to return a favour (money) for a favour (vote). But the payment turns the public act of voting into a private deal. There is no guarantee in vote-buying, most voters sell their votes to more than one candidate which weakens effectiveness and increased campaign expenditure. For more see Bosco (1994) and Wu (1995, 87-8).
63 See Shiau (1996, 221-2) for elections as political business and the necessity of business support in Taiwan’s elections. For an interesting study of the KMT’s business enterprises, see Fields (2002).
64 “Golden ox” refer privileged candidates who have unlimited funds to spend on lavish banquets, expensive advertisements, fireworks display and other gimmicks. (Fell 2005, 63)
expenses. As Chin says: “Money is frantically sought after by politicians, not only to reimburse themselves for the past election, but also to cover their heavy daily expenses while serving as elected officials and to finance their next campaign. Corruption and financial fraud involving elected officials have become other aspects of “black-gold” (heijin) politics” (2003, 143).

The KMT’s power struggle also fuelled electoral corruption by spurring the different factions to bring in new allies from outside. As Chu notes: “as Taiwanization of the party-state accelerated, the old institutional insulation between the party-state’s central leadership and the business sector began to melt away” (1996, 76). The fact that the candidates have to rely on external sources for funding meant that they are more likely to behave independently and less inclined to take Party directives. Party’s declining autonomy over money and nomination thus forced candidates to raise money and political stakes at the local level, worsen illegal criminal activities, vote buying and corruption. Candidates without party endorsement turn to businessmen for funding or resort to violence to compete more aggressively (Ling and Myers 1990, 367-8; Copper 1992, 73).

**Corruption.** Mafia politics and corruption, which undermined public trust in political institutions, were especially prevalent in the 1990s. Based on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), corruption in Taiwan is more rampant than Singapore. Indeed, Taiwan’s corruption was at its worst in 1996 (the year of Taiwan’s direct PE) with a score of 4.98. With more countries polled through the years, Taiwan’s CPI ranking has slipped from 25 in 1995 to 37 in 2009. Singapore, on the other hand, has improved its CPI score since 1995 and maintained its ranking at 3rd to 5th place from 2002-9. Besides the TI index, WB Governance indicators for Taiwan and Singapore also show similar results to the “Control of Corruption”, indicating an improvement in ranking for Singapore but a drop in ranking for Taiwan from 1998 to 2008. See Appendix G for WB Governance Indicators. Taiwan’s rankings were on a downtrend as corruption under Chen’s administration worsened.

---

65 There were reports of assassinations and intimidations during the campaign period. Some candidates had to borrow bullet-proof vests to prevent assassination attempts (Nathan 1993, 72).

66 See Chu (1996, 76-7) on how money politics undermined the public trust in democratic institutions.

67 Oehler argues that surveys conducted by TI and PERC contain biases that expose only the parasitic and predatory corrupt behaviour. Singapore’s ranking may belie its unique form of political corruption – formal and informal inducements and incentives that secure the acquiescence of the population (2005, 149).
The Taiwanese public were appalled by the acts of extortion, crimes committed by politicians with gangster background and scandals that exposed shady deals and corruption. At present, increased public awareness has meant that corruption is now an important mobilization platform or tool for candidates to rally voters in recent elections.

**Campaign Laws.** Taiwan has not enacted a political party law to govern the finances or operations of political parties. Once subsidies are given to the parties, parties do not need to account for or report how the subsidy is being spent. See Table 6-11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6-11: Comparative Electoral Campaigning Laws for Taiwan and Singapore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finance law</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disclosure of reporting by candidates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaign period</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions for reporting violations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign donations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Free TV ads</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opinion polls</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public funding campaigns</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spending limits</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public funding of parties</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign funding</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Taiwan Public Officials Election and Recall Law; Hofnung 2008 (736) & Singapore (in-progress).*

Singapore, on the other hand, has strict rules governing candidacy and does not offer public funding to parties or candidates. As Chapter 5 on Singapore’s legislative candidacy shows, the stringent regulations governing candidacy and elections are rigorously enforced, especially those on party donations and expenditure. However strict enforcement of rules have an effect of squeezing out resource-poor opposition parties out of contest and deter

---

68 3 cases of foreign meddling were reported in 1959, 1976 and 1988. See Wong, Kan Seng. 2nd Reading Speech on Political Donations Bill. *Singapore Parliamentary speech, 22 May 2000.*
69 A limited amount of time is available for free TV campaign broadcasts (Ferdinand 2003, 60).
70 See “Elections Expenses Limit” stipulated on *Singapore Elections* website.
71 The 1992 amendment prohibits campaign funding from foreign groups (Schafferer 2003, 120).
candidates from elections, driving up un-contested seats. Singapore’s stringent measures underscore the country’s intolerance for money politics but also reflect the repression of a healthy and competitive electoral climate. The next section will examine how the KMT’s battle over the Presidential nomination split the Party - leading to its Presidential loss in 2000.

**Battle over Presidential Nominations and Electoral Defeat**

Amendments to the constitution approved in 1994 allowed for the direct election of the President and Vice President. In 1995, the President and Vice Presidential Election and Recall law was finally passed and approved by Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. This established the Central Election Commission (CEC) to direct and supervise elections at all levels throughout Taiwan. Under this law, the president would be elected for a four-year term by popular vote and be able to serve two terms. Potential candidates could be nominated by parties, provided they received at least 5% in the most recent elections. Independent candidates could also stand, provided they submitted petitions of endorsement signed by at least 1.5% of eligible voters and paid a deposit of NT $15 mil (US$473,000).^73

At the 14^th^ Party Congress in 1994, Lee Teng-hui was re-elected to a new four-year term as KMT chairman through secret ballot for the first time in party history. Lee won 83% of the votes and was re-elected Chairman – which also earned him a presidential nomination for 1996 PE. There were calls from the nonmainstream faction for a primary election to select the presidential candidates, however the request fell on deaf ears (Robinson and Baum 2000). As the popular president, Lee discouraged other leaders from seeking nominations for the first PE. This time round, the lack of intra-party contest led to the defection of two mavericks: Lin Yan-kang and Hau Po-tsun, who decided to run as independents to challenge Lee. Compared to the DPP, the KMT’s nomination method was less democratic. See Table 6-12 for the nomination methods of presidential candidates.

---

^72 Campaign expenditure limit at S$3 a voter; expenses of S$10 and more to be accompanied by a receipt. Permanent residents are not allowed to donate. See “Political Donations Act” enacted on 15 Feb 2001.
^73 For the rules governing presidential candidacy & campaign expenditure, see Rawnsley (1997).
^74 Lin and Hau campaigned on the New Party’s (NP) ticket. Both were not expelled for their defiance; rather, their memberships were only suspended.
Table 6-12: KMT's Presidential Nomination Methods (1996-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Presidential Nomination Method</th>
<th>Vice-presidential Nomination Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Closed primary election by 1,900 party congress delegates</td>
<td>Decided by president without debate or secret ballot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Closed primary election by 2,000 party congress delegates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>No primary, elite arrangement between KMT-PFP coalition (^{75})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>No primary, nomination based on 2005 election for Party Chairman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1996 PE. In the run up to the 1996 PE, the electoral campaign was focused on two main issues: 1) national identity (Taiwan independence versus unification with China, and Chinese versus Taiwanese identity) and 2) political corruption. Lee’s pro-independence\(^{76}\) and democracy rhetoric sparked the most intense, third Cross-Strait crisis. China conducted a series of ballistic missile exercises near Taiwan waters and hurled verbal threats to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate from voting for Lee. China’s aggression backfired. The Taiwanese electorate rallied around their leaders. Lee and Lien won 54% of popular votes, while the DPP trailed behind with 21%. See Table 6-13.

Table 6-13: Direct Presidential Candidates and Results (1996-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes earned</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996 PE</td>
<td>KMT: Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan</td>
<td>581,369,9</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP: Peng Ming-min and Frank Hsieh</td>
<td>227,458,6</td>
<td>21.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent: Chen Lu-an and Wang Ching-feng</td>
<td>107,404,4</td>
<td>9.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 PE</td>
<td>KMT: Lien Chan and Vincent Siew</td>
<td>2925513</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP: Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu</td>
<td>4977697</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP: Li Ao and Elmer Fung</td>
<td>16782</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent: James Soong &amp; Chang Chao-hsiung (ex-KMT)</td>
<td>4664972</td>
<td>36.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent: Hsu Hsin-liang (DPP) and Josephine Chu (NP)</td>
<td>79429</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 PE</td>
<td>KMT: Lien Chan and James Soong</td>
<td>6442452</td>
<td>49.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP: Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu</td>
<td>6471970</td>
<td>50.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 PE</td>
<td>KMT: Ma Ying-Jeou and Vincent Siew</td>
<td>7659014</td>
<td>58.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP: Frank Hsieh and Su Cheng-chang</td>
<td>5444949</td>
<td>41.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Election Commission.

The electoral results reflected the nation’s sentiments toward national identity and preference for Lee’s pragmatic policy, rather than the DPP’s pro-independence platform. Despite the unprecedented number of independents and contestants, Lee managed to win because of: 1) Beijing’s aggressive cross-strait crisis, 2) incumbency effect that allowed Lee

---

\(^{75}\) KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP Chairman James Soong declared a KMT-PFP alliance on 14 Feb 2003 - formalizing a “pan-blue” coalition. “Thanks for the nuts, but…the bolts?” Taipei Times, 16 Feb 2003.

\(^{76}\) The crisis was sparked by Lee’s visit to Cornell university in 1995 and his state-to-state theory.
and his campaign strategists to use the media to his advantage, 3) Lee’s public image, and 4) Lien’s rally of voters to support the government in time of crisis (Rawnsley 1997, 51-2). The electorate was also more concerned with national security than democracy during the crisis. The intense campaigning by all the parties was largely overlooked and overshadowed by the cross-strait developments. Instead of being damaged by the missile threat, the KMT’s popularity was boosted by the electorate’s widespread anger against China’s bullying tactics. The crisis officially ended when the U.S. government sent two aircraft carriers near Taiwan waters. 77

2000 PE. In the run-up to the 2000 PE, nomination battles in 1999 once again led to the KMT’s split. As Lee designated Lien Chan as his heir, James Soong, a charismatic, former protégé of Lee defected. 78 Soong’s decision to stand as an independent was a critical juncture that led to split votes between the KMT supporters. The KMT was dealt a humiliating defeat as defector Soong earned a close second place of 36.8%, losing a mere 2.5% to DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian with 39.3%. The KMT candidate, Lien Chan only finished third, with 23% of the vote. After Soong’s defection, he formed the NP, which became a formidable third party that undermined the KMT in the early 2000s. See Table 6-14 for a summary of the KMT’s splits.

Table 6-14: Party Splits in the KMT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>KMT splits</th>
<th>New Parties</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1993</td>
<td>First split</td>
<td>The new KMT Alliance faction led by Chao Shao-kang and 7 legislators formed the New Party (NP)</td>
<td>Dissatisfaction with Lee’s leadership, close ties to businesses and unfair nomination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2000</td>
<td>Second split</td>
<td>James Soong defected and ran as an independent after failing to win nomination to run as candidate in 2000 PE. Soong formed the People’s First Party (PFP) in 2000.</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui campaigned for Lien Chan instead of popular Soong divided the Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001</td>
<td>Third split</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui expelled from the KMT for supporting the formation and spiritual leader of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).</td>
<td>Lee resigned as party chairman on 24 Mar 2000, two months after the KMT lost 2000 PE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by author.

The KMT would have stood a better chance of winning if they had buried the hatchet and put up a Soong-Lien ticket – a strategy that the KMT eventually did attempt in the 2004

77 For more to Lee’s victory for 1996 PE, see Cheng (1997). For the voting behaviour and perceptions of the candidates, see Hsieh, Lacy and Niou (1998).

78 Soong was once Lee’s “god-son” and groomed by Lee. How the rift between Lee-Soong grew so wide was a mystery to many. See Diamond (2001, 56-8) for an analysis of Lee-Soong relationship.

79 For the electoral fate of these new parties, see Fell (2005).
As Wu said, “The structure of the three-way election favored Chen, who otherwise stood no chance to win if there had been a united KMT front” (2001, 41). If the KMT elites had reconciled their differences, the results of the 2000PE and 2001 LE would have been very different. What was significant was that Soong had challenged the KMT to hold a democratic open primary election of all party members to determine the presidential nominee. Had the KMT agreed to this reform, he would have been committed to respecting the outcome and supporting the victor (Diamond 2002, 66). Being the more popular candidate in the KMT, he would have won the primary easily. However, Lee and Lien Chan insisted the Party used an indirect selection by the 2000 delegates during the 15th Party Congress.

The KMT underwent another split when Lee and his other protégé Lien Chan had a falling out. In the last few weeks of the presidential campaign, a few of Lee’s close friends endorsed DPP Chen Shui-bian, leading many to believe that Lee had dumped Lien to prevent the Soong’s election. The leadership struggle between Lee, Soong and Lien in 2000 epitomized how a Party’s lack of centralization of candidate nomination could lead to elite disunity. After Soong’s failed presidential bid, he left the KMT to form a new party, the People’s First Party (PFP), which attracted many KMT cadres to defect. In Sep 2001, Lee Teng-hui himself was later expelled from the KMT for splitting the party and backing the formation of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) party. By the 2001 LE, the KMT had hit rock bottom as it was relegated to a third-party position, as its seat share was reduced to 28.6% – the lowest in the KMT’s history.

Back to Closed-door, Elite-Arrangement. The KMT’s experience with primaries to elect Presidential candidates is not a linear development from a closed to an open and inclusive selection process. After the failed 2000 PE, the KMT reverted to a closed, elite arrangement by forming a deal with the former KMT defector, James Soong of the PFP, to make him the VP candidate for the 2004 PE. Likewise, for the 2008 PE, there was no

80 Diamond (2002, 60) explains that a Lien-Soong ticket did not materialize because of: 1) fear of Lee Teng-hui extending his presidential term and 2) Lien’s fear of defying Lee.
81 There were rumours that Lee had intentionally sabotage the KMT by nominating Lien and obstructing Soong’s candidacy. See Diamond (2002) for a more objective assessment.
primary election. Ma Ying-jeou was nominated as candidate by virtue of being the Party Chairman.

The KMT’s more inclusive and closed method of selecting presidential candidates suggests that the Party was learning and adapting after 2000 PE shock defeat. While the KMT pushed on cautiously with democratic candidate selection and mechanisms for the party and other national leadership posts, it has drawn the line for the contention of the top-prize - the Presidential nomination – to be decided by elites, alone. Clearly, the KMT has learnt that the open, intra-party democratic methods have unintended consequences that undermine the Party’s autonomy and cohesion. To prevent future three-way fights that split votes, the Party had since kept the horse-trading and elite struggles behind closed doors, so to maintain the public image of party integrity and unity.

Re-Centralizing Leadership Selection

To mend deep rifts after its humiliating defeat in 2000, the KMT underwent a massive party re-organization and made several revisions to the Party Charter to institutionalize intra-party democracy and allow a direct election of party chairman for a 2-year term. The KMT created a policy research wing, imposed party discipline and rejuvenated party membership. To boost the party's image, the Party also included Article 43 in the Charter to bar those convicted of criminal or sexual offenses from seeking nomination for public offices. Party members who were seriously disciplined or expelled are also ineligible to stand for election. To ensure representation from all social groups, the Party Charter also reserves 40% of seats for representatives from ethnic minorities, youth, fisheries, labour and women. In Mar 2001, Lien Chan, the sole candidate, became the first popularly

83 For an excellent analysis of the KMT’s recovery after 2000 PE defeat, see Cheng (2006, 374-5).
84 The way Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jing-ping was edged out of the 2008 Presidential candidacy by Ma Ying-jeou best exemplifies the behind-the-door elite power struggle. Wang’s refusal to run as Ma’s VP was widely viewed as a sign of his disapproval of Ma’s candidacy. Despite overtures from Lee Teng-hui to join TSU, Wang has remained in the KMT and publicly supportive of Ma.
85 Article 43 was said to be included to prevent Soong from returning to the KMT to challenge Lien Chan’s Chairmanship. Article 43 was later revised in 2007 to allow party members to run for public offices on party tickets until they are convicted on final appeal. “KMT adopts revision to Party Charter,” KMT News, 25 Jun 2007 and “Ma contested after being acquitted of all charges,” KMT News Apr 2008.
elected party chairman, winning 97% of votes cast by 530,000 party members. See Table 6.15 Lien resigned in 2005 after losing its second presidential bid in 2004.

In 2005, the KMT eventually held its first competitive election for party chairmanship and Ma Ying-Jeou won with 72.4 per cent of vote, defeating his opponent, Wang Jin-ping, Speaker of Legislative Yuan by a large 72% to 28% margin. This primary election was significant as it showed that the KMT was attempting to move towards a fairer and less arbitrary leadership selection process. The fact that the Party chairmanship is up for election every 2 years suggests a degree of routinization to succession. After Ma’s resignation as Chairman after being indicted for corruption and misuse of funds in 2007, Wu Po-Hsiung was elected through a landslide win against a female contender through another election.

Table 6-15: Selection Methods of Party Chairman (1949-present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yr</th>
<th>Selection method</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Home Province</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Reason for giving up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Elected by the party congress in a one-man race</td>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek</td>
<td>Mainlander</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>(candidate the incumbent or designated successor).</td>
<td>Chiang Ching-kuo</td>
<td>Mainlander</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Appointed by the CC Secret ballot</td>
<td>Lee Teng hui (Ph.D)</td>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Resigned and expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Secret ballot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>The Party Charter revised and allowed direct election</td>
<td>Lien Chan</td>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Resigned, given the title of Honorary Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of party chairmen by all party members.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Direct election</td>
<td>Lien Chan</td>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>Resigned because of corruption charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>First competitive direct election</td>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou (Ph.D)</td>
<td>Mainlander</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2nd competitive direct election</td>
<td>Wu Po-Hsiung</td>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>86.79</td>
<td>Resigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Direct election</td>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou (Ph.D)</td>
<td>Mainlander</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by author.

Wu’s Chairmanship did not last. After much internal jostling, Wu had to step aside for Ma - the sole candidate who won 93.87% of votes in Jul 2009. While a mechanism was in place for the direct election of Chairmanship, the fact that Ma was elected without contest raised concerns on the KMT’s sincerity in pursuing intra-party democracy. Ma’s decision to

---

86 The 16th National Congress was convened in September 2003, at which, a new 210 CC was elected, and in turn, elected the 31 members of the CSC. The KMT 16th Party Congress Report, 2001, 20.
hold both presidency and chairmanship showed the Party’s reluctance to separate party-state relations. The lack of transparency also raised doubts regarding the KMT’s promises for party reforms.\(^89\) Ma’s sole candidacy suggests that the KMT is trying to retain autonomy and reverse the devolution of power to local cadres. The fact that the Party revised Article 43 to allow Ma to become Party Chairman suggests that institutionalization is weak – as the rules of the game were selectively tweaked to suit the interests of a particular person or group. Based on my interviews with KMT staff, it appeared that the KMT is resisting intra-party democracy or opening the Chairman position for contest for fear of repeating the internal power struggles as in the past (Interview with R. Chu, Dec 2009).

**Conclusion**

Leadership selection is a major source of party conflicts. This chapter has argued that the decentralization of candidate selection methods has a negative effective on party cohesion. From 1989-2001, the KMT’s leadership selection system showed high systemness and low autonomy that gave way to “institutionalized conflict”. Decentralized candidate nomination and selection methods based on primary elections have devolved power to local cadres and encouraged internal conflicts. Instead of unifying the Party and guaranteeing candidate selection, primaries produced self-seeking candidates who were more concerned with personal or factional success than party effectiveness. Unlike Singapore’s party-centered campaigns, Taiwan’s candidate-centred campaigns undermined party cohesion.

In the first 3 years of Lee’s rule, the KMT faced a series of coordination dilemmas and had to respond to pressures from within and outside the Party. Factionalist pressures between the mainstream and nonmainstream contributed to power struggles over leadership selection, which severely undermined the Party’s cohesion. Under Lee’s leadership, the KMT suffered three public party splits in 1993, 2000 and 2001.

The KMT’s experiments with inclusive and decentralized democratic methods (closed primaries for legislative candidates) have eroded the party’s autonomy to nominate and control. Weak party discipline and inability to sanction mavericks also intensified centrifugal tendencies, leading to power struggles, factional disputes and electoral decline in

the 1990s. As Baum and Robinson argue, “If the leaders cannot expect to compel compliance with party policy positions, the voters have difficulty in rewarding those who serve them in punishing those who neglect them. Hence, theory holds that democratic government be party government and that effective parties be undemocratic” (2000, 22). The case of the KMT provides ample evidence to support the counter-intuitive and elitist logic that exclusive and centralized leadership selection method is better for party cohesion.

The KMT will perhaps never be able to revert to the closed and centralized leadership selection method as practiced by the PAP after 1961. However, the recent changes in the KMT’s nomination method for the CSC and Party Chairman indicate that the Party is learning. It is perhaps on its way to institutionalize a more regular and centralized mechanism for leadership selection, which may discourage careerists to defect and “exit” in future.
PART III: ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL ENGINEERING AND PARTY SYSTEM
This chapter examines how elections and electoral engineering\(^1\) “manufacture” the legislative dominance of the PAP in Singapore. The PAP’s popular vote share experienced a more or less steady decline since full GEs began in 1968 until the 1991 GE. The 3 elections following the relatively successful 1980 GE were each successively lower than each other and were collectively the 3 lowest percentages of the vote share recorded to date. Even so, the PAP has been able to maintain more than 90% of seat shares in Parliament for those 3 elections. How did the PAP maintain its legislative supermajority despite its declining vote shares? I argue that electoral engineering or strategic tweaking of electoral rules and regulations since 1988 has helped to boost the PAP’s legislative presence.

Singapore’s electoral system, based on simple plurality, has produced an effective one-party government with a parliamentary majority while simultaneously penalizing minor parties. The majoritarian formula it has adopted tends to concentrate legislative power in the hands of the single-party government and under-represent minority views. In its “winner-takes-all” elections, the ethos of majority rule determined by the plurality system means that the strongest party stands to gain (Duverger 1951). As SM Goh Chok Tong said, “Singapore is, therefore, like one big constituency. Hence, in a first-past-the-post Westminster system of democracy, it must be that any party that wins, wins big” (Straits Times 26 Jul 2008).

The electoral system is the most specific manipulative instrument of politics (Sartori 1968, 273). As the literature on institutional change tells us, changes in the electoral rules of the game tend to reflect the political interests of the dominant parties in the face of rising electoral uncertainty (Remmer 2008, 5). Through electoral engineering, the largest party is inclined to preserve its position by tweaking the electoral system to improve its seat shares at the expense of another. Indeed, as North reminds us: “institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules are created to serve the interests of those with bargaining power to device new rules” (1990, 16).

\(^1\) See Norris (2004), Reilly (2006) and Remmer (2008) on how the electoral system is used to refashion the party system. Also see the literature on electoral authoritarianism that highlights the “menus of manipulation” that authoritarian rulers have to reduce the uncertainty of elections (Schedler 2002; 2010).
In Singapore, electoral engineering is part of the PAP’s coordination strategy to improve its position vis-à-vis the challengers. Besides the withdrawal of coordination mechanisms such as accessibility to media, freedom of expression and assembly, the PAP had also introduced a series of electoral reforms in the late 1980s to build an unlevel playing field to prevent the opposition from becoming a credible threat. By institutionalizing the semi-competitive arena, the PAP has been able to reduce the uncertainty of electoral politics and repress party competition in a two-tier system where the minor parties are accorded an inferior, second-class status (see Schedler 2010, 73).

According to Duverger, party systems are shaped by electoral institutions that exert both mechanical and psychological pressures on voters and parties (1951). To demonstrate how electoral engineering extends the lifespan of the PAP in Singapore, this chapter will assess the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral reforms on parties and voters. While the mechanical effects of the electoral system describe how electoral rules constrain seat shares based on the distribution of votes, the psychological effects pertain to how parties and voters change their strategies in response to the mechanical effects of the rules.

My arguments are organized as follows. First, I examine the role of elections in Singapore and trace the series of electoral reforms initiated since 1980s. Second, I compare the changes in 1) electoral proportionality, 2) effective number of parties, and 3) distribution of vote shares of the hegemonic and opposition parties before and after the introduction of electoral reforms. I offer my analysis of the degree of hegemonic party system institutionalization in the conclusion.

Role of Elections in Hegemonic Party Regimes

In transitology literature, multi-party competitive elections are expected to have liberalizing effects as they provide a set of institutions, rights and processes that stack up costs and incentives that further democratization (Rigger 1999, 12-5; Lindberg 2009, 9). This explains why “founding elections” are often treated as the hallmark of democratic transition, usually when the old regime is disposed of. Consequently, a minimalist definition of

----

2 While we know more about the mechanical effects of electoral rules such as legal electoral thresholds that exclude minor parties from parliamentary representation, less is know of the psychological effects. See Blais and Carty (1991) for an attempt to measure the psychological impact of electoral laws.
democracy views the “two-turnover tests” or two alternations in power after the completion of the first election as an indicator of democratic consolidation (Huntington 1991).

Elections do not mean the death of authoritarianism (Levistky and Way 2002; Karl 2006; Schedler 2006). Those who argue that Singapore qualifies as an electoral democracy because it conducts regular elections and permits opposition parties may be committing what Karl calls the “fallacy of electoralism”\(^3\). For example, FH has consistently rated Singapore as only “Partly Free” with scores of “5” and “4” from 1972-2009, signifying constraints in political freedom and civil liberties. See Appendix P for FH Scores for Singapore. In Singapore, a combination of restrictions on the freedom of expression\(^4\), the organization of public rallies and the use of libel suits to intimidate opposition leaders during Lee Kuan Yew (1965-1990) and Goh Chok Tong’s (1990-2004) rule exclude it as a liberal democracy.\(^5\)

Studies on the role of elections in 135 autocracies show that authoritarianism is not hindered by multipartyism (Brownlee 2007, 29-32). Rather, the nature of rule and the type of governing institutions shape regime longevity regardless of whether elections are held (Lindberg 2009; Norris 2009). As Geddes reminds us, the phenomenon of electoral authoritarianism is not new but simply “successful, well-institutionalized authoritarian regimes” (2006, 3). Indeed, not all the elections are the same. For electoral autocracies such as Singapore, institutions of rule matter more than the conduct of elections.

**Why Elections in Singapore?**

Since its independence in 1965, Singapore has facilitated 11 General Elections (GE) and 3 Presidential Elections (PE). Unlike a one-party state that bans political parties, Singapore has 23 registered political parties and an average of 1.96 electoral parties, based on vote shares. Over the years, elections have performed important functions in Singapore such as leadership renewal, interest aggregation, political socialization and participation as in

\(^3\) This refers to a flawed conception of democracy that privileges elections over other dimensions of democracy and ignores the degree to which multi-party elections exclude significant portions of population from contestation and decision-making is beyond the control of elected officials (Karl 1995)

\(^4\) All news dailies in Singapore are owned by the Singapore Press Holdings, which is in turned controlled by the Ministry of Information and the Arts (Ooi 1998, 392). The compliance of editors and reporters are encouraged informally by “OB” (out-of-bounds) markers (Case 2004, 116-7).

\(^5\) Even minimalist conception of democracy requires a minimum level of freedom (speech, press, organization and assembly) in order for elections to be meaningful (Diamond 1999, 9).
electoral democracies. Elections were competitive in the 1950s and 60s, but by 1968 the PAP emerged as a hegemonic party, winning every seat in every election until 1981, where a by-election broke the monopoly. Yet, the representation of opposition members in the House has not exceeded 4.

In Singapore, elections are not a channel of party alternation. Rather, they serve legitimizing and stabilizing functions for the ruling regime. As Sartori says, elections are the most crucial means of providing the ruling elite with a flow of information that any party is able to put together (1976, 232). Elections provide a regular feedback mechanism for the incumbent; they also serve as an incentive distribution system to renew party leadership, settle power struggles and ease societal tensions by offering the opposition a controlled channel for the articulation of criticism. The PAP facilitates elections because they act as a psychological outlet and safety valve designed to placate opposition. Through elections, the PAP can gather feedback and then respond by calibrating its electoral strategies to cripple or co-opt dissent.

As Chapter 5 shows, elections are regularized mechanisms and opportunities for selecting leadership, distributing patronage and settling disputes. Election allows the PAP leaders to regularly reward loyal supporters and remove disgruntled party members from the “inside” power structure, re-enforcing elite unity (Magaloni 2006, 8). Like the PRI in Mexico, the PAP uses elections as an incentive distribution system to regularize payments to its supporters and punish challengers. Through elections, the voters and elites can learn to have a vested interest in the survival of the ruling regime.

The PAP enjoys incumbency advantages and can access state resources to build para-political institutions for partisan gains. It can also rely on the technocratic expertise from the bureaucracy to attract talented and quality candidates to stand for election. Given these institutional advantages, elections are more for political legitimization and self-affirmation rather than a chance for party alternation (Croissant 2002, 3). Indeed, more evidence is emerging to show that autocracies that hold elections remain in power longer than those that fail to hold them (Gandhi and Przeworski 2001; Hadenius and Toerell 2005).

For Singapore, elections are an important but uneventful rite of passage that symbolize the country’s nominal commitment to democratic procedures and institutions.
Elections help to legitimize the established patterns of control, especially when the regime is reliant on the financial or political support of foreign democratic actors (Croissant 2002, 7). Like Taiwan, Singapore is an export-dependent economy that relies heavily on foreign directed investments in the country. The PAP leaders find it imperative to protect Singapore’s image as an economically open, orderly and efficient society to instil investor confidence. Being procedurally democratic helps to insulate the regime from international criticisms and soften its authoritarian image.

**Electoral System in Singapore**

As a legacy of colonial rule, Singapore inherited a Westminster, unicameral parliamentary system. When Singapore attained self-rule in 1959, it instituted a compulsory voting system, held its first full Legislative assembly election and set the minimum voting age at 21. From 1959 to 1987, Singapore’s electoral system was based on first-past-the-post system in single-member constituencies (SMCs). Beginning with 51 constituencies in 1968, the number of constituencies was raised to 79 by 1984. In 1991, a constitutional amendment also transformed the presidential office into an elected one, with a term office of 6 years. From 1965 to 1991, Singapore had a non-executive president with limited powers.

In its post-independence constitutional development, the PAP initiated a series of constitutional amendments to its original electoral system, introducing schemes such as Group Representative Constituencies (GRC), Non-constituency Members of Parliament (NCMP), Nominated Members of Parliament (NMP) and an Elected Presidency, which ought to be regarded as a unique system of its own (Rodan 2005, 114; Tsun 2008, 611). As legal scholar Eugene Tan says, the electoral “changes have transformed Singapore’s Parliament into one of the most unique in the world” (2009, 304).

Since 1988, Singapore’s electoral system is a mixture of SMC and multi-member constituency or Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) based on simple plurality.

---

6 FDIs in Singapore stood at $437 billion as at end 2007. UK ($63 bil) and Netherlands ($51 bil) were the top two investors, while others include the U.S. ($49 bil) and Japan ($46 bil). Singapore Statistics 2008.

7 For example, see IBA Report 2008 for the lack of electoral rights and freedom in Singapore.

8 The nomination process and the exact power of the Singapore’s President are controversial. The incumbent President S.R. Nathan was declared unopposed and has held office from 1999 till date. For more on the elected presidency, see Tan and Lam (1997) and Tsun (2008, 623-7).

9 Also see Thio (1997), Mauzy (2002) and Mutalib (2002).
While voters vote for one candidate in the SMC, in the GRCs, the voters cast their votes for the entire team of 5 or 6 candidates (block vote). Presently, the 11th Parliament is represented by 84 seats distributed among 23 electoral constituencies: 9 single seats and 14 GRCs consisting of 5 or 6 seats (75 seats). In addition to these 84 elected seats, The Singapore Parliament now has a number of non-elected MPs: currently up to 9 seats reserved for NMPs and up to 9 seats for NCMPs. 10 See Appendix L for the electoral systems in Singapore and Taiwan.

**Electoral Engineering in Singapore**

In hegemonic party autocracies, regime survival hinges on the incumbent’s ability to win a supermajority so that it can control constitutional changes unilaterally without having the need to form coalitions and negotiate with the opposition (Magaloni 2006, 15). With a more than two-thirds majority of seats and a flexible constitution, the PAP has been able to unilaterally change the electoral system with ease. Despite with the presence of opposition MPs in the House, opposition policy-making roles are limited due to their minority position. The bills proposed by the opposition are seldom taken seriously nor seconded. As Figure 7-1 11 shows, as a result of declining vote shares, Singapore has turned to electoral engineering – selective manipulation and changes to the formal electoral rules – to shape the behaviour of political actors, parties and voters to disadvantage opposition and manufacture legitimacy (Case 2005; Reilly 2001; Schedler 2002 and 2006).

*Figure 7-1: PAP Vote Shares*

---

10 The total number of non-elected MPs is expected to increase from 14 to at least 18 when the new Bill is passed to change the electoral system in March 2010 (*Straits Times*, 28 May 2009).
11 Data from *Singapore Elections* website.
As Figure 7-1 shows, the significant constitutional amendments to the original electoral system were made in the late 1980s – the period where the PAP’s popularity vote reached its lowest ebb, finally hitting 61% in 1991GE. I argue that the series of electoral reforms introduced in the late 1980s (NCMP in 1984; GRC in 1988 and NMP in 1990) reflected the concerted effort by the PAP to maintain a supermajority in the Parliament in order to rescue its declining vote shares.

In Singapore, electoral engineering has begun as far back as 1963, when the constitution was amended to prevent party switching – a practice endemic in the early 1960s where dissenting PAP legislators would cross the floor to form opposition parties such as United People’s Party (UPP) and Barisan Socialis (BS) to challenge the PAP. According to PM Lee Hsien Loong, after 1965 the Constitution was amended to prevent “spectator blood sport”. As a result, party switching was effectively eradicated.

To address the inter-party struggles and instability before independence, Singapore had developed a very “responsive and flexible constitution” (Tan, 2009, 55). Then, the Amendment Act No. 8 of 1965 Constitution of Singapore was introduced to change the amendment process for the 1963 State Constitution that allows the governing party to pass legislation with a simple majority. Although the Act was again amended in 1979 (Act 10 of 1979) to restore the amendment requirement back to the two-thirds majority, the fact that the amendment process was eased had set the precedence for and facilitated a very flexible constitution that expedites the passing of legislations to change policies in the country (Tan 2009, 55). For a summary of the key electoral changes, see Table 7-1 in the next page.

The NCMP, GRC and the NMP schemes were the 3 most significant constitutional amendments that changed the way that the legislators were selected and represented in Singapore. The following sections will examine the significance of these electoral reforms and their mechanical and psychological effects on parties and voters.

____________________

12 Then, former PM Lee had “restored the law so that if any MP resigns or is expelled from his party, he has to re-contest his seat” (Straits Times 28 Aug 2008). The term of the MP is governed by Part VI, 46 (2b) of Singapore Constitution which states that: “The seat of a Member of Parliament shall become vacant if he ceases to be a member of, or is expelled or resigns from, the political party for which he stood in the election”.

13 The 1965 amendment was initiated because of the PAP’s concern that it will not be able to secure two-thirds majority in Parliament in the upcoming 1968 election.
Table 7-1: Key Electoral Changes in Singapore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Constitutional changes</th>
<th>Stated Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>The Constitution is amended so that an MP loses his seat when resigns or is expelled from his party</td>
<td>To prevent party switching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>NCMP scheme to ensure a minimum representation of opposition members in the Parliament. Constitution allows up to six NCMP.</td>
<td>To allow the “best loser” opposition a seat in the House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>GRC scheme introduced to ensure a minimum representation of minority ethnic groups in the Parliament. Size of GRCs gradually increased from 3-4 to 5-6 in 1991, 1997 and 2001.</td>
<td>To ensure a minimum ethnic minority presence in the House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>NMP scheme created to provide more alternative views and constructive dissent in parliament.</td>
<td>To co-opt a wider spectrum of non-partisan voices in the House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Elected presidency, rather than appointed. First elected presidency election on 1991.</td>
<td>To have custodial power over the national reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Speakers’ Corner created.</td>
<td>To allow citizens to speak freely without the need to seek police approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Overseas voting allowed (suspended during 2001 GE)</td>
<td>To allow the rising number of overseas citizens to vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Rules governing Speakers’ Corner loosen. Indoor political activities permitted. Societies Act amended to allow automatic registration of non-specifed societies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Rules governing overseas voting relaxed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Outdoor political demonstrations allowed at Speakers’ Corner. No police permit for indoor political demonstrations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>New Public Order Bill 14</td>
<td>Tightens regulations and gives police more powers for outdoor political events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Films Act amended</td>
<td>To allow political party films, manifestos and documentaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No. of NCMP increased from 6 to 9 No. of SMCs increased from 9 to 12</td>
<td>To institutionalize alternative voices in the House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Size of GRC reduced from 6 to 5 or 5 to 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>NMP scheme institutionalized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Ban campaigning on the eve of Polling Day 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from government and media publications.

Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP)

In May 1984, former PM Goh Chok Tong introduced the NCMP scheme to allow more opposition voice in the House. Then, the Singapore Constitution and the Parliamentary Elections Act (PEA) were amended to permit the three highest-scoring losing

---

14 See parliamentary speech on Public Order Bill by WP NCMP Sylvia Lim on 13 April 2009.
15 Three laws amended to allow more opposition representation in the House; a cooling-off day to ban campaigning on the eve of Polling Day and online election advertising. See “Constitution changes tabled,” Straits Times, 11 Mar 2010. Also see “TOC Editorial: Cooling off-day may lead to heated confusion,” Online Citizen, 16 Mar 2010 that raised the lack of clarity on what is permissible on the Internet for discussion.
16 According to the former PM Goh, there were 3 reasons for the NCMP scheme: (1) to educate younger voters about the myths about the opposition's role in Parliament; (2) to sharpen the debating skills of the younger ministers and MPs; and (3) to provide a means of giving "vent to any allegation of malfeasance or corruption or nepotism" to "dispel suspicions of cover-ups of alleged wrongdoings," Straits Times, 25 Jul 1984.
opposition candidates to get non-constituency seats in Parliament. As a result, an NCMP is a non-elected MP and the “best opposition loser”. To qualify as an NCMP, the opposition candidate is expected to obtain at least 15% of the constituency's votes, and if the opposition manages to win 3 or more seats, the NCMP practice is required to cease (Mutalib 2002, 661-2; Quah 1985, 223).

Since the launch of the scheme in 1984, only 4 opposition members have served as NCMPs: 1) Dr. Lee Siew Choh, a former PAP politician who defected and formed the Barisan Socialis party to challenge the PAP in the 1960s; 2) JB Jeyaratnam, a long-term opposition leader who was later dismissed from Parliament for his inability to discharge his bankruptcy brought about by defamation suits by the PAP MPs; 3) Steve Chia, a remisier, who was charged for taking nude pictures of his domestic maid, and later resigned from politics; 4) Sylvia Lim, a female law lecturer from the WP.

The response to the NCMP scheme has been lukewarm and not well received by the opposition members, the alleged beneficiaries of the scheme. In the 1984 GE, 2 opposition party candidates - the WP's M. P. D. Nair and SUF's Tan Chee Kien - even rejected the offer of NCMP seats. Besides, WP Secretary General Low Thia Kiang has also publicly stated that he does not support the scheme (Asiaone, 10 May 2006). Critics argue that the NCMP scheme masks the reality of an uneven playing field in the electoral arena and is a ploy by the PAP to boosts its own legitimacy. Even NCMP Sylvia Lim argues that the scheme should not be institutionalized as the NCMPs lack official capacity to represent the people from any constituency and write letters on their behalf.

\[17\] Tang Liang Hong was one of the WP candidates who campaigned with JBJ at Cheng San GRC in 1997 GE and accused of being anti-Christian and a Chinese chauvinist. Tang was later sued for defamation by 10 PAP MPs. JBJ was legally entangled in the defamation suit. On July 1997, JBJ was expelled from Parliament for being a bankrupt. See “JB Jeyaretnam-the use of defamation suits for political purposes.” Amnesty International Report, 15 Oct 1997.

\[18\] WP MP Low Thia Kiang is against the NCMP concept because he believes the person holding this post does not represent any constituency. Yet, he did not object to his party member, Sylvia Lim from accepting the offer. See “Workers’ Party chairman Sylvia Lim accepts NCMP offer,” AsiaOne, 10 May 2006.

\[19\] Se As Lim says: “I have been doing house visits in Aljunied GRC for several years. The residents have raised certain concerns to me which I have highlighted in Parliament as issues. However, I have no official capacity to write letters on their behalf regarding their specific cases, though I would very much want to. In addition, an NCMP has no physical base”. Lim’s parliamentary speech on Constitutional Amendment Bill, 27 Apr 2010.
The NCMP scheme reinforces the image of the opposition members as “second-class” MPs as the NCMPs: 1) cannot vote on important issues such as budgetary and supply bills, constitutional amendments or cast a “no confidence” vote against the government\(^{20}\); 2) lack representativeness as they do not represent or are accountable to any constituency; 3) may give the voters the false impression that they need not vote for the opposition as the scheme assures the Parliament of the opposition voice, regardless of their vote; and 4) risk being co-opted by the ruling party and obliged to play by its rules.

The NCMP scheme was first designed to allow up to 3 appointed seats from the opposition. However, a new bill was tabled in 2010 by PM Lee Hsien Loong to increase the number of appointed seats to at least 9 opposition voices - whether elected or NCMPs - in Parliament.\(^{21}\) The new provision states that no more than 2 NCMPs were allowed from each GRC to be appointed in the House (\textit{Straits Times}, 28 May 2009). It is unclear how many more NCMPs will be appointed in the next election as it depends on the overall performance of the opposition parties in getting opposition MPs elected. For example in the 1991 GE, no NCMP was appointed as 4 opposition members were elected into Parliament.

It is difficult to assess the psychological effects of the NCMP scheme as only 4 NCMPs have served in the House. However, a poll conducted by a Singapore political website shows that 60% of pollsters did not think that more NCMP seats would augur well for the opposition.\(^{22}\) The PAP government may seem magnanimous to propose the NCMP to institutionalize opposition presence. However, the scheme may also be viewed as an ingenious strategy to “keep your enemies close” as well as boost the credibility of the policy making function of the Parliament.\(^{23}\)

The presence of the NCMPs may stimulate debate in the House and act as a “safety valve” for the opposition to vent their frustrations. Keeping the opposition members occupied

\(^{20}\) The NCMPs can only vote on changes to legislation and raise motions to pass new Bills. See \textit{Singapore Constitution} Part VI, Article 39 (2).
\(^{22}\) For a more positive view, see “Should opposition parties reject the enhanced NCMP scheme?” \textit{Yawningbread}, 3 Jun 2009.
\(^{23}\) For example, In 1996, PM Goh admitted publicly that the NMP “would indeed benefit the PAP” and an “attempt to foster an artificial and eminently controllable Opposition…in the hope that Singaporeans will be satisfied with than, in place of the real thing” (Cited in Mutablib 2002, 664).
may also deter them from civil disobedience, as in the case of SDP leader Chee Soon Juan, who has been repeatedly jailed for illegal public assembly, defamation, contempt of court and speaking in public without a permit. By keeping their enemies close, the PAP can better position themselves, pre-empt their challengers and incorporate some of their ideas as their own. Finally, the PAP’s proposal to institutionalize opposition presence in the House is also a sign of its responsiveness to growing discontent, especially amongst the younger voters who want more opposition and robust discussion in the House.

As an NCMP, an opposition candidate is allowed the rare opportunity to increase his/her publicity, gain political experience and be financially rewarded in the process. For example, NCMP Sylvia Lim has spoken 220 times since her appointment to the House from 2006 to 2010. Her attempt to speak has outperformed another female PAP MP, Jessica Tan, who has only spoken 57 times for the same period of time. The fact that the opposition party members have not wholly rejected the NCMP scheme shows that they are more pragmatic than ideological. Short of being elected, the NCMP may be the safest bet for the opposition to formally engage the hegemonic party and build its public credibility, even if it means risking co-optation or being viewed as “second-class” opposition party in the process.

**Group Representative Constituencies (GRCs)**

The introduction of the Group Representative Constituencies (GRC) Bill was another significant electoral reform that changed Singapore’s political landscape. The rationale for the GRC was to ensure fair multiracial representation in the House to reflect the country’s social-ethnic composition. On 8 May 1988, the GRC Bill was passed in Parliament, months prior to the 1988 GE to include at least one ethnic minority candidate in a GRC - a single block of MPs. In the past, Singapore was spatially divided into single member constituencies (SMCs) based on simple plurality. Under the GRC scheme, three SMCs are merged into one

---

25 The NCMP receives the same remuneration as an elected MP, around S$13,500 per month in 2009.
27 Also see Fetzer (2008); Tey (2008, 616-620) and Thio (1997) for an in-depth analysis of the legal implications surrounding the introduction of the GRC.
single-block. The voter then casts his or her vote for the entire team. Each party contesting in the GRC will need to field a multi-member team that consists of one minority ethnicity.\(^{28}\)

The GRCs first began at a size of 3 but the size has grown bigger to groups of 5 and 6 by 2001. The composition and size of the GRCs are expected to change again in April 2010. See table for the distribution of SMCs and GRCs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of GE</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
<th>Total SMCs (%)</th>
<th>Total GRCs (%)</th>
<th>Make up of GRCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Sep 1988</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>42 (51.9)</td>
<td>39 (48.1)</td>
<td>13 x 3 member GRCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 1991</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>21 (25.9)</td>
<td>60 (74.1)</td>
<td>15 x 4 member GRCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jan 1997</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>9 (10.8)</td>
<td>74 (89.2)</td>
<td>15 GRCs: (5 x 4 member; 6 x 5 member and 4 x 6 member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 2001</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>9 (10.7)</td>
<td>75 (89.3)</td>
<td>14 GRCs: (9 x 5 member; 5 x 6 members)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author.

As Thio (1997, 39) argues, the GRC complicates the spatial basis of representation and marks the demise of the “one person one vote” system. With a large Chinese majority in Singapore, the PAP leaders were concerned that Singaporeans were voting along ethnic lines, and not returning ethnic minority MPs in the Parliament. Yet, the overall minority parliamentary representation was not severely imbalanced to begin. As Figure 7-2 shows, the minority representation (Malays, Indians and non-Chinese) of MPs before the GRCs was between 27.6% and 19%, approximating the national ethnic composition. After GRC was introduced, the percentage of the minority MPs in fact dipped to 16.1% for the 7th Parliament. Overall, the effect of the GRC began to kick in after the 8th Parliament in 1991, pushing the minority MPs up to 27.7% in the 11th Parliament. Now, the minority MP representation is not significantly different from the pre-GRC system.

\(^{28}\) To ensure adequate Malay parliamentary representation, three-fifths of the total number of GRCs are designated constituencies where at least one of the candidates in every group has to be a Malay.
Despite the PAP’s government good intention to ensure multiracialism in the Parliament, the GRC scheme has been heavily criticized for the following reasons:

- the lack of evidence that Singaporeans are voting along racial lines\(^{29}\);
- exacerbating the unlevel playing field with arbitrary increase in the size of the GRC;
- increasing the sum of electoral deposit makes it difficult for the resource-strapped opposition parties to recruit minority candidates to compete in big GRCs;
- excluding independents from contesting in more than three-quarters of the constituencies;
- adulteration to the “one-man-one-vote system” - as the lack of parity between the weight of the vote cast by a GRC voter and a SMC voter may constitute a breach of the equal protection clause entrenched in Article 12 of the Constitution;
- gerrymandering\(^{30}\) that allows hotly contested SMCs to be swallowed up into a GRC;
- diluting representative link between the government and the voter;
- being too closely tied to para-political institutions such as the CDCs\(^{31}\);

---

\(^{29}\) See the letter by the SDP to the Parliamentary Select Committee that opposed the GRC amendment Bill because “there is no evidence that Singaporeans are voting by race,” 15 Feb 1988.

\(^{30}\) The PAP has been charged by the opposition for arbitrary redrawing of constituency boundaries announced shortly before elections. Also see complaints by WP in “PMO- Electoral Boundaries Review Committee Report,” by WP NCMP, Sylvia Lim, *Budget 2010 Parliamentary Speech*, 5 Mar 2010.

\(^{31}\) As argued in Chapter 2, voters see the parapolitical institutions as linked to the PAP. The close link between the GRC and these institutions may deter voters from voting for opposition constituencies for fear of losing social and material incentives provided by the institutions.

Out of all these problems, gerrymandering is perhaps the most damaging to the opposition parties as they do not know whether the constituencies they have been working on will be around in the next election. Changes in the size of GRCs and addition of single member seat wards do not require changes to the law as they can be specified in the terms of reference of the Electoral Boundaries Committee that redraws the boundaries before a general election (Straits Times, 24 Apr 2010). Opposition leaders have complained that the lack of transparency in the electoral redrawing process and short notice given prior to elections put the opposition at a disadvantage as it gives them insufficient time to campaign. As WP leader, Sylvia Lim said in Parliament:

The other twin pillar of the double whammy is gerrymandering. The entire electoral boundary re-drawing process is completely shrouded in secrecy, chaired by the Secretary to the Cabinet. There are no public hearings, no minutes of meeting published. The revised boundaries are released weeks or even days before Nomination Day. The report makes no attempt to explain why certain single seats are retained while others are dissolved, nor why new GRCs are created or old ones re-shaped. (Constitutional Amendment Bill, 27 Apr 2010).

Since the introduction of the GRC in 1988, all minority MPs have been elected through the GRC scheme. No minority candidate has contested in SMC since 1997 and no opposition party has been able to win a GRC since then. Indeed, the GRC scheme has fundamentally changed electoral strategies of the parties in fielding the candidates and in party competition. This chapter will examine the effects and demonstrate the mechanical and psychological effects of the GRC on party system in more depth later.

Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP)

Following the GRC scheme, the PAP government introduced another controversial electoral reform that allowed the appointment at the time of up to 6 Nominated MPs in the Parliament in 1989. The rationale for the NMP scheme was to ensure a wider representation

---

32 The Bill was passed on 29 Mar 1990. Then, Dep. PM Goh Chok Tong said that the purpose of the NMP was “to further strengthened our political system by offering Singaporeans more opportunity for political participation and to evolve into a more consensual style of government where alternative views are heard and constructive dissent accommodated.” See Tey (2008, 621) and Parliamentary Debates vol 54, cols. 695 for the rationale of the NMP scheme.
of community views in Parliament and to improve the quality of debate as the opposition MPs were considered weak. Unlike the NCMP, the NMPs are non-partisan citizens appointed by the President of Singapore for two and a half years on the recommendation of a Special Select Committee of Parliament chaired by the Speaker. Unlike the NCMPs who participated in elections, the NCMPs are independent, non-partisan and “distinguished” persons who have special knowledge, expertise or practical experience in society.

The nomination and selection process of the NMPs is still vague. The NMP scheme allows interested individuals to self-nominate or be nominated by the six functional groups that represent the various business, social, media and labour organizations in Singapore. Like the NCMPs, the NMPs have limited voting powers and are allowed to vote on all issues except those pertaining to public funds, amendment of constitution, votes of no confidence in the government and removal of President from office. As expected, the NMP scheme has been heavily criticised, not only from the opposition but also from the PAP backbenchers, such as Dr. Tan Cheng Bock and Chandra Das (Mutalib 2002, 663).

Essentially, the NMP scheme is seen to have eroded the democratic principles of representation and accountability and undermined the presence of the opposition leaders in the House. Allowing non-elected dissenting voice in the House, it is argued, sends a signal that opposition presence is unnecessary (Mutalib 2002, 663). Critics also contend that the NMP scheme is another PAP ploy to co-opt and moderate dissenters and discourage Singaporeans from joining opposition parties (Chua 1997, 175; Tremewan 1994, 172; Rodan 1996, 74). The NMP scheme also smacks of elitism as only “distinguished” persons can participate in political process and they are technically, accountable to no one. By not representing any constituency, the NMP may be detached from grassroots sentiment and

33 “Reforming the NMP Scheme,” The Online Citizen, 11 Dec 2009.
34 NMP nominees have to write an essay on issues they will address in the House, be interviewed by a selection committee made up of 8 MPs, led by the Speaker, before the candidates are approved. However, the nomination and selection of the NMPs have been criticized for lack of transparency. See “NMP hopefuls from all walks of life,” Straits Times, 10 June 209 and “Lift veil over NMP selection,” Straits Times, 28 Jul 2009.
35 The nominations are solicited from 6 functional groups: 1) business and industry; 2) the professions; 3) labour movement; 4) social and community service organization; 5) tertiary educational institutions and 6) media, arts and sport organizations. See “Nominated Members of Parliament: Invitation for submission of names,” Press Release by the Parliament of Singapore, 5 Apr 2009.
present only “ivory tower” views in the House (Thio 1997, 46). There is also no guarantee against potential abuse by an NMP who might use his position to pursue a private agenda.\(^{37}\)

Most NMP candidates are recommended by social and professional groups. However, the public can also self-nominate as in the case of Associate Professor Ong Soh Kim, who was later appointed as an NMP. Since 1990, parties are no longer the exclusive channels for candidate nomination as individuals can now get into the House via self-nomination or nomination from interest groups. This implies that the NMP scheme may reduce the autonomy and role of the opposition parties to nominate candidates. In 2006, there were 36 applications from the general public and other fields to be NMPs; in 2009, the number of applications increased to 46 (*Straits Times*, 7 July 2009). The institutionalization of the NMP scheme in 2009 was expected to neutralize the opposition parties’ ability to nominate candidates, as dissenters who would otherwise join the opposition are now “co-opted” into the House with limited voting rights.\(^{38}\)

Supporters of the NMP scheme contend that the NMPs have improved the quality of the debate and some form of check is better than no check on the ruling party. Notably, former NMP Walter Woon, a law professor, made constitutional history when he tabled a private member’s bill - the *Maintenance of Parents Bill* - and the bill was passed. Other NMPs such as Law professor Thio Li-ann, Lawyer Siew Kum Hong and orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Kanwaljit Soin have raised important issues and intensified debates on women and gay rights issues in Parliament. In this respect, the NMPs appear to have fulfilled an important informative function. The NMP scheme has had 6 batches of NMPs since its inception in 1990. In 1997, the number was increased from 6 to 9. The applications for the NMP have risen from 11 in 1996 to 46 in 2009.\(^{39}\) Despite widespread criticisms, the PAP government is set to institutionalize the scheme in 2010 (*Straits Times* 27 May 2009).

---

\(^{37}\) Siew Kum Hong was criticised for abusing his power as a NMP to promote gay rights in the House as he submitted a petition to Parliament in 2007 on Section 377A of the Penal Code, which makes it illegal to have sex with other men. See “NMP overstepped role in championing gay cause” and “NMP in no way overstepped his role,” *Straits Times* 18 Oct 2007. His application for a second term as a NMP was consequently rejected. See “Siew: Disappointed, but I stand by what I did,” *Straits Times*, 7 Jul 2009.

\(^{38}\) Like the NCMPs, the NMPs have limited voting powers and are allowed to vote on all issues.

In Singapore, the introduction of the NCMP, the GRC and the NMP scheme in the 1980s were the 3 most significant electoral reforms that transformed the way parties compete and voters elect their representatives in the Legislature. The following sections will assess the mechanical and psychological effects of the electoral reforms in Singapore. This aim is to move beyond the descriptive and investigate whether the PAP has initiated reforms to entrench its hegemonic party rule.

**Mechanical and Psychological Effects**

Classic Duvergian law predicts that a plurality rule electoral system tends to favor a two-party system and conversely, a PR or two-ballot system encourages multipartyism (1964, 217-226). The reason for this is that the mechanical pressure of the plurality rule would lead to all but the two strongest parties to being underrepresented as they tend to lose in each constituency. The psychological effect reinforces the mechanical one as voters realize that their votes will be wasted on small parties and would rather transfer their votes to the two strongest parties. The psychological pressures also work on the elites as they do not want to waste their resources on running as a small party. They will tend to form alliances or merge with larger parties to improve their electoral chances (Croissant 2002, 333).

Majority governments are created in two ways: by a majority of voters supporting a party, or by the electoral system transforming an electoral minority into a parliamentary majority (Blais and Carty 1987, 213). While there are many variables that could increase the likelihood of a one-party majority government, it has been argued that district magnitude is the most critical compared to others such as size of legislature or presence of direct elections (Blais and Carty 1987, 213; Taagepera, 1985, 1985). For example, Blais and Carty found that “Multi-member majority systems are four times more likely to produce majority governments than are single-member majority systems, and one and a half times as likely as single-member plurality systems” (1987, 216). The expectation that multi-member majority systems are more likely to produce majority governments may explain why the PAP government has moved towards the adoption of the GRC – the multi-member constituency based on block vote and plurality rule. And it may also explain why the district magnitude has increased from 3 in 1988 to 6 in 2001.
To assess the mechanical effects of Singapore’s new electoral reforms that have moved from purely SMC-plurality system to a mixture of SMC and GRCs-plurality systems, I will use two different measures and provide averages for each electoral phase. First I will measure the reductive effects of the electoral system by comparing the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties in the pre and post reform period. While the number of effective electoral parties indicates the degree of party competitiveness, the number of parliamentary parties will show the extent of parliamentary fragmentation and tendency of the electoral system to produce a one-party government (Sartori 1976, 122-3).

Second I compare the changes in electoral disproportionality that indicates the disparity between parties’ votes and seat shares of the pre and post reform electoral systems (Lijphart 1994, 57-77; Blais and Maiscotte 1996, 67-72). The measure of electoral disproportionality shows how the electoral system translates vote shares to seat shares. It demonstrates how the electoral system awards “bonus seats” to the largest party and penalizes the smaller parties (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 65). The degree to which each party’s seat share corresponds to its share of votes is an indicator of the representativeness of the parties and the degree to which the electoral system promotes democratic representativeness (Croissant 2002, 329-332; Norris 2004, 88-9).

To evaluate the psychological effects of the electoral reforms on the party elites and voters, I will compare the: 1) number of contesting parties and candidates; 2) number of uncontested seats and “walkovers”; 3) changes in the vote shares for the opposition parties in the pre and post reforms elections (Blais and Carty 1991, 83-4). If the new electoral system asserts a strong psychological effect, then the number of contesting parties and candidates is expected to decline. Consequently, changes in the number of “uncontested seats” will be used as an indicator of the willingness of the party elites to compete in elections. Finally, voters are not expected to waste their votes on minor parties who are unlikely to gain any seat shares in the House. If Singapore’s new electoral reforms assert a strong psychological effect on the voters, we ought to expect the vote shares of the minor parties to decline after reforms.
Effective Number of Electoral and Parliamentary parties

A comparison of the effective number of parties (based on vote shares) and the effective number of parties in parliament (based on seats shares) shows the degree of electoral fractionalization or how the electoral system concentrates the party system (Croissant 2002, 333). The effective number of parties index shows the number of effective parties present, not on the basis of a specific and predetermined threshold, but on the basis of relative size and relevance of each party (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 34). The higher the effective number of parliamentary parties, the higher the degree of fragmentation. Conversely, the lower the effective number of parliamentary parties, the lower the fragmentation.

Based on Laakso and Taagepera’s formula, the effective number of parties in Singapore is calculated based on following formula: \( N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2} \), where \( n \) is the number of all parties and \( p_i^2 \) the square of each parties proportion of all votes (or seats) (1979). As Table 7.2 shows, before the electoral reforms, the effective number of electoral parties was 1.68. After the NCMP, GRC and NMP schemes were introduced, the number of electoral parties was raised to 2.16. This meant that the opposition parties gained in electoral strength and the party system became more competitive. However, the increase in the electoral strength of the opposition did not translate into seat shares. The new electoral reforms after 1984 continued to under-represent opposition parties and repressed parliamentary parties at 1.05.

| Table 7.2: Effective Number of Parties Based on Vote and Seat Shares in Singapore |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| GE                             | Effective no. of electoral parties (based on vote shares) | Effective no. of parliamentary parties (based on seat shares) | Difference between electoral and parliamentary parties |
| 1968                           | 1.33            | 1               | 0.33            |
| 1972                           | 1.96            | 1               | 0.96            |
| 1976                           | 1.78            | 1               | 0.78            |
| 1980                           | 1.65            | 1               | 0.65            |
| Average (1968-1980)            | 1.68            | 1               | 0.68            |
| Post-electoral reforms         |                 |                 |                 |
| 1984                           | 2.29            | 1.05            | 1.24            |
| 1988                           | 2.27            | 1.02            | 1.25            |
| 1991                           | 2.46            | 1.1             | 1.36            |
| 1997                           | 2.2             | 1.05            | 1.15            |
| 2001                           | 1.7             | 1.05            | 0.65            |
| 2006                           | 2.05            | 1.05            | 1               |
| Average (1984-2010)            | 2.16            | 1.05            | 1.11            |
| Average (1968-2010)            | 1.96            | 1.03            | 0.93            |

Source: Data from Singapore elections.com.
With the increase in the legislature size through the years from 53 in 1968 to 84 in 2006 in Singapore, the number of parliamentary parties in Singapore ought to have increased proportionately. Yet, this has not been the case. Singapore’s new electoral system is more effective in “manufacturing” the majority government by producing a smaller effective number of parliamentary parties than its effective number of electoral parties. See Table 7-2. The difference between the electoral and parliamentary parties before reforms (1969-1980) and after reforms (1984-2006) has risen from 0.68 to 1.11 - suggests that the electoral system has a strong reductive effect on the number of parliamentary parties.

It is a known fact that the simple plurality or the FPTP system has a reductive impact on the number of effective parliamentary parties. Yet, the reductive effect in Singapore is stronger than in other FPTP systems. For example, among the Anglo American countries with a FPTP system, the mean number of effective parties is 2.0 in the U.S., 2.1 in the U.K. and 3.0 in Canada (Norris 2004, 86). As for other Asian countries that adopt the plurality rule for its single-member seats, the effective number of parliamentary parties is 2.8 in Taiwan (1992-2004), 5.03 in Thailand (1992-2005) and 2.83 in Korea (1988-2005). Despite the PAP’s efforts to institutionalize opposition presence in the House, Singapore’s electoral formula maintains the PAP’s supermajority in the Parliament.

Electoral Disproportionality

Another measure of the mechanical effect of electoral systems is to consider how proportionately the electoral system converts votes to seat shares. Perfect proportionality is the situation in which each party receives exactly the same share of seats as the share of votes it receives (Croissant 2002, 329; Lijphart 1994, 57-77). There are different ways to measure disproportionality. Here, I used the Lijphart’s index (1994) that is most commonly used to assess the deviation of the party’s seat shares from their vote shares in pre and post electoral reform in Singapore. The degree of disproportionality is derived by the absolute difference between the total percentage of votes ($V_i$) for the most over-represented party and the total percentage of seats ($S_i$) obtained by the most over-represented party. The index of disproportionality is the average vote-seat share deviation of the two largest parties in each election. The difference between vote and seat shares ($V_i - S_i$) is an indicator of the “bonus

---

40 For more on the effective number of parties in Asia, see Reilly (2008).
seats” earned. It is a useful indicator to show the extent to which the electoral system rewards the largest party or penalizes the minor parties.

It is often said that the majoritarian system tends to generate higher disproportionality for the leading party, and penalizes the minor parties more, than in the PR system (Norris 2004, 88-9). This is also the case in Singapore. From Table 6.3, it is clear that Singapore’s electoral system produces an exceptionally high level of disproportionality. In fact, the introduction of the electoral reforms after 1984 worsened the index of disproportionality from an average of 15.6% pre-reforms to 22.3% post-reforms! The higher degree of electoral disproportionality shows that Singapore’s new electoral system has a poor record of representativeness with stronger majoritarian effects as the largest party or the PAP is over-represented in the House.

Table 6.3 shows that despite the declining vote shares of the PAP or the largest party from 77.2 to 66%, the PAP has enjoyed a boost in its “bonus seats” from 22.8% to 31.4% after reforms. Comparatively, the second largest opposition party has been penalized as its “bonus” seats was reduced from -8.4% to -11.9%. While the popularity votes for the second largest party increased from 8.4% to 14.4%, this did not translate to seat shares.

### Table 7-3: Electoral Disproportionality Based on Vote and Seat Shares (1968-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V₁%</td>
<td>S₁%</td>
<td>Bonus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ave.</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ave.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average (1968-2006) 19.6

Source: Data from Singapore elections.com. V₁ = Vote shares; S₁ = Seat shares

Singapore’s higher disproportionality shows that the new electoral system asserts a stronger majoritarian effect and is less representative than before. The PAP’s supermajority in Parliament is not a good indicator of the “political will” of the people. Although the PAP’s
supermajority encourages governability, it also means that the Party is able to control policy changes without much debate. With only two-elected opposition MPs in the current 11th Parliament and a strong party whip, the House serves more as a rubberstamp to endorse the Bills proposed by the PAP MPs and works to exaggerate the PAP’s “image of invincibility”.

**Psychological Effects**

While it may be easy to show the mechanical effects of electoral system, it is less easy to demonstrate the psychological effects of the electoral formulae. But as Blais and Carty suggest, one way to assess the “illusive” psychological effects is to investigate the polarization of the vote itself (1991, 83). Instead of looking at vote-seat share relationships, we can consider how the reforms affect the party elites by comparing the 1) number of contesting parties and candidates, and 2) the effect on voters by the distribution of vote shares for the opposition parties in the pre and post reforms elections. While the number of contesting parties and candidates reflect the changing strategies of the party elites, the distribution of vote shares will tell us whether voters are shying away from minor, opposition parties.

**Decrease in Contesting Parties and Opposition Candidates**

Based on Table 7-4, it appears that the introduction of electoral reforms did not deter the opposition party elites from participating in elections as the average number of contesting parties and candidates have remained largely the same, at 5 and 45, pre and post reforms. However, if we consider the impact of reforms on the opposition party elites and independents in the post-reform period, we see a more interesting variation. In the post-reform period, the total number of opposition parties contesting in elections has in fact declined, from a high of 8 in 1984 to only 3 in the last 2006 GE. See Table 7-4.

The declining number of participating parties may be a psychological effect of the new electoral system as the opposition parties learnt to adjust to the PAP’s electoral strategies by pooling resources and co-operating as an alliance (see Blais and Carty 1991, 83). For example, a few months prior to 2001 GE, the former SDP party leader Chiam See Tong
brought together 3 opposition parties together in an alliance\textsuperscript{41} (the Singapore Democratic Alliance) to field 13 candidates in the 2001 election. The motivation for the opposition parties to co-operate may stem from the party elites’ anticipation of mechanical effects or the avoidance of voters from small parties. The opposition’s strategy to build an alliance may be a response to mitigate the possibility of split votes or “wasted vote” syndrome – an effect of the Duvergian plurality rule at work (Blais and Carty 1991, 80).

Table 7-4: Number of Contesting Candidates and Parties (1968-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of GE</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
<th>Parties contested</th>
<th>Opp. Can contested</th>
<th>PAP CAN</th>
<th>PAP Can. (% of total sts)</th>
<th>Opp. CA</th>
<th>Opp. Can (% of total sts)</th>
<th>Ind</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ave. (1968-2006)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from Singapore Elections. Can. = candidates; Opp. = Opposition; Ind. = Independents

Table 7-4 shows the percentage of opposition candidates fielded declined from 44 (65%) pre reforms to 45 (54.8%). With an increased number of parliamentary seats from 79 to 84 in the post reform period, the number of opposition candidates did not rise proportionally. In comparison, the ruling PAP party fielded 100% of seats available. The decline in the total percentage of opposition candidates show that the reforms have a psychological effect, deterring the opposition from standing in elections. Arbitrary enlargement of GRCs may be one reason for the decline. Based on my interviews with opposition party leaders, one of the common complaints was with the GRC scheme and the

\textsuperscript{41} The last time opposition parties came together was in 1976 when five opposition parties (BS, SJP, PKMS, UF and WP) formed a Joint Opposition Council to cooperate at the polls. Despite the co-operation, the opposition did not manage to win any seats in the House.
size of the district magnitude. Opposition parties feel disadvantaged by the GRC scheme as they find it difficult to recruit high-quality minority candidates to stand in election. For example, NCMP Sylvia Lim said that the WP had problems recruiting Malay candidates to contest in the GRCs (Interview with Lim, 6 Feb 2007).

The high electoral deposit of S$67,500 for a 5-member GRC (S$13,500 per candidate) may also deter smaller financially-strapped parties from contesting in the GRCs. The arbitrary redrawing of the GRC district boundary and enlargement of the size of GRCs from 3 to 6 members have also made it difficult for the smaller parties to recruit candidates and identify the constituency to build its support base (Straits Times, 2 August 2008).

In Singapore, as a result of the Ethnic Integrated Policy (EIP) scheme, ethnic minority groups (Malays, Indians or others) are not allowed to exceed 20% in one constituency (Tey 2008, 617). As Tremewan says, “the government took steps to undermine any growing sense of neighbourhood identity and security arising from minority ethnic affiliation which might be translated into an opposition bloc vote. It achieved these aims by imposing racial quotas, by extending state community organisations and by furthering militarizing the housing estates” (1995, 65). In the FPTP system based on territorial constituencies, the geographical distribution of votes is critical to the outcome of votes. The “winner takes all” elections create a high vote threshold for minor opposition parties with support that is spatially dispersed across many constituencies (Norris 2004, 44).

With ethnic minority groups spatially dispersed across 23 constituencies in Singapore as a result of EIP, it is difficult for opposition parties to mobilize mass support for its

42 The district magnitude refers to the number of legislative seats assigned to a district. District magnitude is the primary determinant of an electoral system’s ability to translate votes cast into seats won proportionally. See Ace Electoral Knowledge Network.
43 Chiam See Tong, leader of the SDP also argued that the GRCs need to be abolished or have the size reduced to better reflect the demography of the constituencies. “Abolish GRC,” Straits Times, 27 May 2009.
44 The GRC began in 1988 with a 3-members per team, however the number was increased gradually to 4 in 1991 and 5 to 6 members in 1997.
45 In GE 2001, the revised boundaries were released 1 week before Nomination Day. In 2006, they were announced about 7 weeks before. See “PMO-Electoral boundaries review Committee Report.” Parliamentary speech by Sylvia Lim, NCMP, 5 Mar 2010.
46 EIP was introduced in 1989 that sets a representative quota of homes for proportional quota of Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians in a housing block or neighbourhood.
47 For example, in SMD, the minor party candidates are often placed 2nd or 3rd place, even though these parties may obtain substantial support across the whole country, they will fail to win any seat in the House that reflects their national vote.
candidate based on ethnic votes. Unlike Taiwan, where partisan alignment is linked to geographical distribution of voters, Singapore’s minorities are unable to do likewise. As Tan notes: “Minorities, even when acting in concert, would be unable to constitute an effective swing-vote bloc…Consequently, the EIP reduces the ethnically conciliatory features of the GRC scheme, as the minorities possess significantly reduced collective power to ensure the dominant majority remains sensitive to them” (2005, 421).

**Increase in Uncontested Seats and “Walkovers”**

The introduction of electoral reforms has reduced the number of opposing candidates fielded. Indeed, the number of uncontested seats has risen dramatically in the post reform period, from 13.6% in 1988 to 65.5% in 2001, then easing to 44% in 2006 GE. In comparison, the ethnic minority representation in the House has only increased marginally and reverting back to 1968 figure of 27.4% in 2006GE. See Figure 7-3. 48 From 1991 to 2001, more than 50% of seats were uncontested.

![Figure 7-3: Uncontested Seats in Singapore (1968-2006)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malays</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority MPs</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-Contested Sts</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>44.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data drawn from Singapore Parliament and Singapore Elections.

48 The reason for the high number of uncontested seats in 1968GE was a result of opposition parties such as the BS boycotting the elections.
The arbitrary enlargement of GRCs reinforced the view that GRCs were created to enable rookie candidates to ride on the coattails of heavyweight PAP candidates without the need to undergo the “baptism of fire.” In the present Cabinet, young ministers such as Lim Swee Say, Dr. Ng Eng Hen, Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan and Rear Admiral (NS) Lui Tuck Yew were all inducted into politics without having to face opposition challenge. All these ministers assumed political office through “walkovers” in the GRCs – a PAP strategy that ensures promising new candidates a place in government. Even Deputy Prime Minister Wong Kan Seng, who has been in office for 6 terms, has only faced opposition contested once in his career.

As explained in Chapter 5, the low opportunity cost, high salary and high probability of winning under the GRC scheme are key incentives for political careerists to contest as PAP candidates. Even former PM Goh admits that the introduction of the GRC: “allows the PAP to recruit younger and capable candidates with the potential to become ministers…Without some assurance of a good chance of winning at least their first election, many able and successful young Singaporeans may not risk their careers to join politics” (Straits Times 24 Apr 2006). This indicates that the PAP knew the mechanical effect of the GRC and used it as a form of “reserved seats” that allowed the PAP to “appoint” rookie PAP MPs into the House.

The high number of uncontested seats meant that in the 1997 and 2001GEs more than half of the electorate did not get the chance to exercise their right to vote. As Appendix N on the Total Voter Turnout in Singapore shows, the number of “walkover” voters increased substantially from 219,175 (13.1%) in the 1988 GE to a high of 1,316,617 (66.85%) in the 2001 GE. Although the phenomenon was improved in the 2006 GE, the high number of “walkover voters” is still a concern and raises a question regarding the representativeness of the MPs.

---

49 Singaporeans are clearly unhappy, one of the forum letters to the press says: “Although we boast a high voter turnout in every election, the underlying picture tells only half the story. It is not very surprising if a citizen does not get to vote in his lifetime in democratic Singapore. This basic human right to choose one's leaders is denied to some because of the GRC system,” Straits Times, 23 Mar 2010.
Institutionalized Hegemonic Party System in Singapore

Current democratization and party politics literature often assume that party system institutionalization leads to democratic consolidation. Regularized and institutionalized parties are important as they provide a framework for stable patterns of inter-party competition. However, I argue that the concept of institutionalization ought to be distinct from democratic consolidation as party institutionalization can occur in authoritarian regimes. As Chapter 5 has shown, a hegemonic party can minimize power struggles and remain cohesive through institutionalizing its leadership selection and building a party organization that matters. As studies on electoral authoritarianism remind us, party system institutionalization can arise in authoritarian regimes that conduct regular, multi-party elections under semi-competitive conditions (Schedler 2003; Levitsky and Way 2010).

In Singapore, the resilience of hegemonic party regimes such as Singapore is not a new phenomenon but rather an example of a “successful, well-institutionalized” authoritarian regime (Geddes 2006, 3). How institutionalized is Singapore’s hegemonic party system and what are its prospects for authoritarian consolidation? According to Mainwaring and Scully, an institutionalized party system must have 1) regular and stable inter-party competition, 2) rootedness in society, 3) party organizations that matter and 4) electoral legitimacy (1996, 4). While the first two criteria refer more to interactions between parties as a system, the latter two criteria are more party organization specific issues that concern party-voter relations. In the following sections, I will examine the degree to which the hegemonic party system is institutionalized in Singapore based on the above 4 dimensions.

Low Electoral Volatility

In the study of party system institutionalization, electoral volatility is commonly used to measure the stability of inter-party competition and that parties have accepted the electoral mechanisms as the only game in town and parties have maintained their social bases. Here, I use Pedersen index to calculate the volatility by taking the sum of the net change in the percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, divided by two \( (\sum |v_{it} - v_{it+1}|) / 2 \). A score of 100 signifies that the set of parties winning votes is completely different from one election to the next. A score of 0 means the same parties receive exactly
the same percentage of votes across two different elections. The higher the volatility score, the less institutionalized the party system.

As Figure 7-4 shows, Singapore has a low electoral volatility of 12.1% based on the last 10 elections (1968-2006). The two small spikes in 1984 (17.8%) and 2001GE (18.1%) were a result of voters’ “protest votes” against the ruling PAP and effect of electoral engineering strategies. For example in 1984 GE, the PAP’s popular votes suffered a big dip as voters were unhappy with the PAP’s eugenics-inspired “Graduate mother’s scheme”\textsuperscript{50} that enticed graduate mothers to give birth, while encouraging lowly-educated women to be voluntarily sterilized. But, in 2001GE, the PAP enjoyed a boost in its popular vote shares (+10.3%) largely because of the increase in district size of the GRCs. Even as Singapore was saddled with one of the worst economic crisis since independence, the overall vote shares for the PAP improved. This was the election where 4 opposition parties competed as an alliance. However, a combination of opposition party blunder\textsuperscript{51} and ineffective candidate fielding strategy resulted in only a third of all the seats being contested by the opposition - the largest number of “walkovers” in Singapore’s electoral history.

Singapore’s low electoral volatility shows that a large proportion of voters have stuck to their parties since the 1960s. Compared to the regional volatility average of 24.1% based on 14 Asian party systems (Kuhonta and Hicken forthcoming), Singapore’s party system is stabilizing or enjoying high degree of party system institutionalization.

\textsuperscript{50} To encourage more graduate mothers to have children, this scheme was to provide direct financial benefits and special school enrolment privileges for graduate mothers who have more than 2 children; and financial benefits to women with little education to undergo voluntary sterilization. See Milne and Mauzy (2002, 60); Palen (1986) and Lee (1998) for more on Singapore’s interventionist, fertility policies.

\textsuperscript{51} For example, one WP GRC team was disqualified for filing incomplete papers in Aljunied GRC.
Figure 7-4: Electoral Volatility of Singapore GEs (1968-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Number of elections** 10 (1968-2006)

- Volatility of 1st and 2nd elections: 24.4
- Volatility of last elections: 13.5
- Average volatility (1983-2008): 12.1

**Weak Organization and Rootedness of Opposition Parties**

Most opposition parties in Singapore lack stable roots and have short life spans. Apart from the WP, PKMS and the PAP, none of the parties that were formed before independence period are in existence today. Besides from the WP - the oldest surviving party in Singapore - most opposition parties do not have sufficient resources to build party organizations. For example, out of the 7 active political parties today, only the WP and the NSP have functioning committees and town councils. In comparison, the PAP has 84 party branches sprawled across the island. In terms of party newsletters, only the PAP and the WP have regular printed party publications in circulation or for fund-raising. See Appendix M for a breakdown of total party membership, party branches and years in electoral competition for the key political parties in Singapore.

Opposition parties in Singapore are also often inflicted with leadership struggles. Primarily, un-institutionalized processes over party leadership succession have led to personality clashes or party splits. For example, both the SPP and the RP are splinter parties, formed as a result of leadership clashes within the SDP and the WP. More recently, the SPP leader and long-time opposition MP Chiam See Tong has appointed his wife, Lina Chiam as Secretary General of the SPP. The lack of fair and institutionalized process for leadership
succession has driven a wedge between Chiam and his former protégé, Desmond Lim (current Secretary General of SDA).\textsuperscript{52}

On the other hand, the only ethnic-based party, the PKMS is in a shambles after street fights over the ownership of S$10 mil headquarters building. It is unclear whether it will be able to field candidates in time for the upcoming GE.\textsuperscript{53} The opposition party alliance or SDA that was formed in 2001 has also waned in influence as a result of leadership disagreements. In May 2010, the RP tried to join the SDA Alliance but was unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{54} The public spats between opposition leaders are often given extensive media coverage, which undermines the public’s confidence and trust in the opposition.

**Electoral Legitimacy and Trust**

Aside from the WP – the longest surviving political party in Singapore, most of the opposition parties would not fare well in terms of electoral legitimacy. In general, opposition parties do not enjoy as much legitimacy or mass support as the PAP. If public opinion surveys were used as an indicator of Singaporeans’ attitude toward parties, then the 2006 East Asia Barometer (AB) survey results would show that 83% of Singaporeans thought favourably of the PAP, while the other main opposition parties (WP, SDA and SDP) only received between 48% to 16%. See Table 7-5 below for the opinion of the four key parties in Singapore based on the question: “Do you think the following is a credible party?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Don’t understand/Can’t choose/Decline to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *EA Barometer Survey 2006.*

---

\textsuperscript{52} See “SPP wrecked by infighting between Desmond Lim and Lina Ng,” *Temenek Review*, 27 Jul 2010.

\textsuperscript{53} See “PKMS faction fails to seize bank accounts,” *Straits Times*, 12 Sep 2009 and “Opposition group has to get its house in order,” *Straits Times*, 12 Sep 2009.

In another post-2006 GE study, a telephone interview survey conducted by the Singapore Institute of Policy Studies\(^5\) (IPS) based on a sample size of 985 respondents also show similar results with 87% of respondents agreeing that the PAP was a credible party while the scores for the oppositions stood at 61% for the WP, 49% for the SDA, and 18% for SDP.

The PAP may have generated high level of political trust because of its performance legitimacy, clean and effective governance that has been able to deliver economic goods for the last 4 decades. For example, in the EA barometer survey (2006), 92.6% of Singaporeans evaluated the PAP highly in terms of political efficacy, while 66.8% considered the PAP government responsiveness and more than 85% viewed the current form of government the best for them. Also see Table 7-8: Trust in political institutions, Taiwan and Singapore (2006) which showed that Singaporeans have high level of trust in political institutions such as: 1) Prime Minister (92.4%); 2) the Courts (91.6%) and 3) the Military (90.8%). Comparatively, political parties in Singapore score the lowest with only 72.5% of positive evaluation from Singaporeans.

In sum, Singapore’s hegemonic party system is well-institutionalized because: 1) opposition parties are “second class, licensed parties” which cannot compete with the PAP on equal terms; 2) the PAP outdistances the other parties with more than two-thirds majority of legislative seats; and 2) alternation of power is not envisaged (Magaloni 2006; Sartori 1976). Opposition parties are personality driven and under-institutionalized – conditions that foster the PAP’s “image of invincibility” and prospects of hegemonic rule.

**Conclusion**

Electoral engineering is one of the institutional constraints that shape the behaviour of party leaders, candidates and their followers. This chapter has argued that the hegemonic party with the monopoly over electoral rulemaking tends to shape the electoral rules to its advantage. The PAP’s popular vote share has declined since the 1980s. Yet, it has been able to maintain more than 90% seat shares in Parliament. I have attempted to show how electoral

\(^5\) The polling day for GE 2006 was on 6 May and the IPS conducted a survey via the telephone interview with 985 Singapore citizens who are aged 21 and above, from 8-20 May 2006. For a full report of the study, see Koh (3 Jun 2006) and IPS Report (Koh, Tan and Conceicao, 2006).
engineering is one of the PAP’s coordination strategies that helped to boost the party’s legislative dominance despite its electoral decline.

Since the late 1980s, the PAP has introduced three key electoral reforms; the NMP, GRC and NCMP schemes that fundamentally altered the electoral competition and voting behavior of Singaporeans. The comparative study of the mechanical and psychological effects of pre and post electoral reforms show that the reforms have benefitted the ruling PAP by 1) reducing the number of effective parties in Parliament and concentrating the party system, and 2) increasing electoral disproportionality and reducing the representativeness of the House. In the post-reform period, the electoral system has reduced the number of parliamentary parties to 1.05, despite having 2.16 electoral parties. The GRCs increased electoral disproportionality and do not translate vote shares proportionately to seat shares.

The reforms have also been a source of psychological effects on the parties and voters as the number of contesting parties has declined, suggesting that the parties have anticipated the “wasted vote” syndrome and formed alliances to counter the effect. However, the opposition’s strategy has not worked out as well due to coordination problems which exacerbated the number of uncontested seats. The rise in uncontested seats in the 1990s meant that more than 50% of the electorate were unable to exercise their rights to vote in the 1991, 1997 and 2001 GEs – which raised questions on the PAP’s electoral legitimacy.

The PAP leaders made no apologies for the tendency of its new electoral system to institutionalize its rule because they equate multi-partyism with bad governance. As SM Lee warns, “Singapore cannot afford a revolving door style of government where leaders change every five years” (Straits Times 4 Apr 2007). Clearly, the electoral reforms introduced in the 1980s were not meant to improve electoral competitiveness but to increase the PAP’s certainty of winning and ensure legislative supermajority in the House.

Singapore’s hegemonic party system is well-institutionalized. First, low electoral volatility shows stable inter-party competition and consistent party-voter relations overtime, with no big swings in vote shares between parties. Second, aside from the PAP and the opposition WP, most of the parties have weak party organizations and rootedness. The PAP’s incumbency, asymmetrical organizational advantages, access to resources and sprawling network of grassroots organizations dwarf the opposition. The coordination failures of the
opposition as a result of personality differences, leadership struggles or internal party conflicts also undermine their ability to pose a credible threat. Finally, the PAP’s high political legitimacy and low public trust of opposition parties reify the two-tier hegemonic party system where the opposition parties are accorded inferior, second-class status.

Based on earlier calculations of effective parties and ideological pluralism, Singapore has 1.03 relevant parliamentary parties (1968-2006), a moderate level of party pluralism and low party fragmentation. With an institutionalized semi-competitive party system, elections alone are insufficient to break the virtuous cycle of dominance. Without exogenous shocks or unusual circumstances that dramatically reduce the legitimacy and incentive distribution capacity of the PAP, it is unlikely that it will lose power through electoral means alone.
8 Taiwan: Elections, Electoral Reforms and Institutionalizing Uncertainty

In Chapter 7, I examined how the PAP institutionalized an uneven playing field and maintained its legislative supermajority. In this chapter, I trace the events leading to Taiwan’s electoral reforms and compare the effects of the KMT’s electoral strategies under the Single-Non Transferable Vote (SNTV) system and the new “mixed system” that was introduced after 2005. I argue that the post-2005 electoral framework benefit larger parties such as the KMT and the DPP and signal the institutionalization of a stable two-party system. Strong parties and winners write the “rules of the game” and changes in the electoral rules tend to reflect the self-interest of dominant parties in the face of rising electoral uncertainty (Remmer 2008, 5-6). As the 2008 LE results show, this was the case in Taiwan.

My arguments will proceed as follows. First, I examine how the local elections during the KMT’s authoritarian rule laid the foundation for its transition to a competitive party system in the 1990s. Second, I trace the origins of electoral reforms and the KMT’s strategic coordination dilemmas that led to an elite-led, “pacted transition”. Finally, I assess the effects of reforms by comparing the changes in 1) electoral proportionality, 2) effective number of parties and 3) distribution of vote shares of the KMT and opposition parties in pre and post electoral reforms.

Why Local Elections?

Why do authoritarian regimes spend money on elections and facilitate elections? Why didn’t the KMT suspend elections completely as in a one-party state? From 1949 to 1989, national elections were disallowed and opposition parties were legally banned in Taiwan. Yet, local elections at the township, county and provincial assembly levels were organized since 1946. Then, Taiwan had 16 counties and five provincial municipalities: county governments headed by magistrates and city governments by mayors. However, key positions then such as the provincial governor and mayors of Taipei and Kaoshiung were still appointed positions and not elected nor accountable to the legislature.

---

1 “Pact transitions” involve a pact between the regime moderates and the opposition moderates, who are both able to “use” and “contain” their respective hard-liners (Linz and Stepan 1996, 61). Also see Cheng (1989); Higley, Huang and Lin (1998) and Lin (2003) who forward similar arguments.

2 However, key positions then such as the provincial governor and mayors of Taipei and Kaoshiung were still appointed positions and not elected nor accountable to the legislature.
positions were allowed to be directly elected for a 4 year term and may be re-elected to serve a second term.\(^3\)

Like most electoral authoritarian regimes, the KMT facilitated local elections because they helped to legitimize and stabilize the political system. Before democratization, local elections were a democratic façade to secure the U.S. support, especially during the Cold War (Cheng and Lin 200, 30). It was also a way for a émigré hegemonic party to govern and learn about the unfamiliar society. Similar to Singapore, elections were a crucial means of providing the ruling elite with feedback and a flow of information. Besides, regular elections also allowed the KMT to build sophisticated organizations vis-à-vis the masses and a variety of social groups by providing the illusion of quasi-democratic political participation (Huang 199, 107). In response, the ruling elites could then recalibrate and devise their strategies to manage dissent. For example, after the 1947’s bloody “228 Incident” in Taiwan, the KMT held local elections to restore legitimacy.

Elections were also a way to channel discontent into institutions and to keep dissidents away from the streets (Wu 1987, 197). They were psychological outlets that helped to placate the opposition. In Taiwan, local elections attract a high level of participation. Unlike Singapore’s low electoral participation, there is always a ready supply of candidates and voters in Taiwan. Early electoral data show that the candidate to seat ratio was 2:1 for the county councillor and the provincial assembly elections, and even higher at 3.5:1 for country magistrates and city mayoral elections (Cheng and Lin 2008, 164). Local elections were competitive and usually attract over 70% turnout. Except for Taiwan Provincial Assembly elections, the KMT’s share in the local elections generally exceed 80% of the vote (Huang 1996, 107). From 1951 to1985, KMT candidates would often win between 80 to 100% of local government posts, 70 to 85% seat shares in the provincial assembly and 75 to 92% for the Taipei city council seats (Tan et al 1996, 486).

Generally, the SNTV system is expected to benefit small parties when the district magnitude increases.\(^4\) But in reality, due to the KMT’s strong organizations and effective

---

\(^3\) In June 2009, the Executive Yuan approved Taipei County’s application to upgrade to a special municipality and the requests of Taichung, Kaohsiung and Tainan’s cities and counties to merge and form three special municipalities. After 20 Dec 2010, there will be five municipalities and 17 counties.
mobilization that can assign a targeted vote to each candidate in each district (*pei-piao* or vote allocation), the KMT was more efficient than its competitors in candidate nomination\(^5\), allocating votes and maximizing seat shares. While the local elections were competitive, scholars observed that the SNTV electoral system in fact contributed to the KMT’s dominance (Wang 1996; Chu 2001; Bosco 1994; Rigger 1999). In Taiwan’s SNTV system, optimal nomination, as well as even distribution of votes among its candidates were crucial for maximizing seats. The KMT’s easy access to state resources, control over the media and large resource base gave it an upper hand in vote distribution and nominating the right number of candidates. Through the strategy of “divide and rule”, the KMT was able to dominate early local elections, balance the power of county and country councils.\(^6\)

Like the opposition in Singapore, challengers to the KMT’s hegemony face a plethora of restrictions in their political coordination and mobilization. The non-KMT candidates, usually independents had to struggle to overcome the KMT’s incumbency advantage, asymmetrical financial strength and strong base for local organization. There were few options for the opposition as dissent and debates took place within the KMT’s rules of the game (Jacobs 1974, 28). As in Singapore, the KMT’s tight control over coordination mechanisms such as freedom of press and constraints in civil, political liberties deprived the opposition of a fair level playing field. For example, under the 1980 Election and Recall Law, the opposition were denied access to the mainstream mass media (but permitted the use of party-owned media). This law clearly benefited the KMT because, as the Party in government, it owned and controlled most of the island’s media (including all 3 TV stations).\(^7\) Moreover, privately owned newspapers enjoyed close corporate ties with the KMT. For example, the owners of the 2 newspapers with the highest circulation, *China Times* and *United Daily News* were members of the KMT CSC (Rawnsley 2006, 137). Restrictions on the publications of daily newspapers were suspended until 1988 and the transmission and reception of cable television broadcasts were illegal until 1993 (Rawnsley 1997, 49).

\(^4\) The winners are the top M vote-getters, where M is the district magnitude usually lying between two and six (Cox and Niou 1994, 222). See Hsieh and Niemi (1999) for an in-depth analysis of how M+1 rule applies to Taiwan’s LE (1986, 95).

\(^5\) For candidate nomination under the SNTV system, see Wang (1996, 95-6) and Tan et al (1996, 487).

\(^6\) For the ways which the KMT controlled local politicians through traditional values, electoral clientelism as party of the regime patronage system and other strategies. See Wu (1987) and Cheng and Chou (2000).

\(^7\) As a hegemonic party regime, there was little separation of ownership due to the overlapping character of party/state/military political authority. Then the KMT owned 4 national daily newspapers and the government owned 2, and the Military, 5.
Electoral results showed that the KMT would tolerate up to 40% of opposition vote shares (around 30% of seat shares under the SNTV system). If the opposition exceeds the 40% threshold then, “rules would be altered and coercion might even be used to prevent the further advance of the opposition” (Cheng and Lin 2008, 168). For example, the opposition was suppressed twice when their popular votes exceeded 40%. First during the 1960 Free China Journal affair and second during 1979 mass mobilization of the opposition. Refer to Table 4-10, timeline of significant events under Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule.

Local elections offered a channel for the KMT to recruit indigenous elites willing to co-operate with the Party (Lin 1998; Cheng and Haggard 1992). Similar to the PAP’s tactic of institutionalizing the NMP scheme to co-opt dissenters into the Singapore Parliament; the recruitment of local elites was a stated function in the KMT’s Reconstruction Committee guideline. Based on Lin’s study in 1952, 18.1% of non-KMT candidates joined the KMT after the Township Council elections and 6.6% joined the Party after the County/City Council elections. In 1955, 9% of non-KMT candidates joined the KMT after the Township Council elections, while 5.8% joined after the County/City Council elections (1998, 142). Although these are not staggering figures, they are good indicators to show how local elections helped the KMT to co-opt local elites.

Local elections allowed the KMT to penetrate into Taiwanese society and mobilize the local population (Cheng and Lin 2008, 164; Huang 1996, 107; Kuo 1995). Indeed, the local politicians who were willing to work with or be co-opted by the KMT were rewarded with political positions, status or financial incentives. In return, these local politicians extended the KMT’s reach to the grassroots level by building local factions and mobilizing on behalf of the KMT. Usually, local factions relied on vote brokers (tiau-a-ka) to co-ordinate and mediate between faction leaders and voters. During elections, the tiau-a-kas

---

8 A guideline from the KMT’s Central Reconstruction Committee (CRC) stated: “In areas where a local non-KMT person has the general trust of the local people to whom our party candidate cannot reach, if such person can identify with out party’s ideology and policies, then we should support this person and ask him to join the party” (quoted in Lin 1998, 141).

9 Local factions are based on the exchange of political support and co-operation for political and material benefits (Rigger 1996, 84-7, 304). In earlier years, the KMT was able to control the rise of local leaders and preventing them to become opponents. But as local leaders became richer, the KMT was then trapped in the expanding corrupt networks and ended up being penetrated and transformed instead. For more on the local politics in Taiwan, see Kuo (1995) and Bosco (1994).
would mobilize support and votes for the candidates. Besides drumming support for the candidates, *tiau-a-ka* also engage in vote-buying as part of their factional mobilization. For important elections (county level where the KMT is most threatened), the money for vote-buying would come from the central KMT. But at the township level, the candidates would have to raise their own funds (Bosco 1994, 40).

Finally, local elections served as a safety valve that released the frustrations of the local factions (usually Taiwanese) who were excluded from national politics because of the KMT’s early discriminatory policy. The political energies that might otherwise be directed at the KMT regime are now directed against local political rivals instead (Rigger 1996, 305). Local elections were a mechanism for the KMT to suppress a possible source of opposition. More importantly, it allowed the Party to coordinate among rival factions to facilitate the rise of factional leaders to gain access to power. As long as the local factions supported the KMT regime, they were powerful barriers against the expansion of the opposition (Tien 1989, 167).

**When Do Elections Matter?**

As Huang observed: “as long as elections do not pose a serious threat to their [KMT] continued rule, authoritarian regimes usually use elections to consolidate their legitimacy” (1996, 134). However by providing the opposition the opportunity to mobilize and organize, elections could accelerate the breakdown of authoritarian rule. Cumulative elections could have unintended consequences and “entrapped the KMT in a protracted process of organizational change that eventually prepared it for the full-blown electoral competition” (Cheng and Lin 2008, 164). The strategy of a partial integration of the opposition in elections may backfire and become “windows of opportunity” to accelerate democratization (Croissant 2002, 16). So, when do elections matter and bring about democratic outcomes?

Emerging studies on electoral authoritarianism contend that elections are likely to have democratizing effects when they share power-sharing principles: regular, multi-party competition, electoral integrity and power sharing rules (defined as contests using proportional representation electoral system and/or positive mechanisms for minorities) (Norris 2009, 149; Brownlee 2009, 78; Teorell and Hadenius 2009, 80). Yet there is no consensus whether a single-shot election or a series of elections is necessary for democratization to occur. Neither is there agreement on the number of preconditions such as
a functioning state, prior regime type or the rule of law (Carothers 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Schmitter and Karl 1991). Indeed as Munck and Syn have observed, election alone is insufficient to explain why autonomous groups turn against a ruler. Electoral competition may galvanize defections by disgruntled elites, but it does not explain why a pool of disaffected actors emerged in the first place (2004, 21).

In Taiwan, there is a general consensus that the 34 years of local elections since 1946 laid the necessary institutional foundation for party system change. However, they are not the only factor that account for the rise of competitive elections and transformation of the hegemonic party system. As Chapter 4 shows, Taiwan national identity issues and sub-ethnic cleavages were also salient in shaping party politics (Hsieh and Niou 1996). Additionally, exogenous factors also played a critical role in changing the strategic calculations of the KMT leadership to open the electoral market in the 1970s. As mentioned, a series of diplomatic setbacks such as the loss of the UN seat to the PRC and the de-recognition by major allies in the 1970s had severely undermined the KMT’s legitimacy and claim to rule. In 1971-73, a total of 27 nations switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China (Tien 1996, 9). In addition, the fall of Marcos in the Philippines and the militancy of the opposition party in South Korea had a “snowballing effect” that emboldened the Dangwai movement in Taiwan (Huntington 1991, 101). Without these exogenous pressures and diplomatic isolation, the KMT regime may not have acceded so quickly to domestic demands for change (Schafferer 2003, 14-22).

In Taiwan, there was no significant “founding election” but rather a series of elections. Most scholars agree that the cumulative local elections created a “trickling-up” effect for the hegemonic party to increase electoral competition (Cheng and Lin 2008; Rigger 1999; Chao and Myers 2001). Local elections offered opportunities for the socialization of democratic norms and behaviour, and facilitated recruitment of the political staff on a sub-national level. They provide an arena where an organized opposition could challenge the KMT through electoral means. This development is best shown by the Dangwai movement’s considerable gains in the 1977 local election which tested the KMT’s limits (Chou and Nathan 1987, 281). See Table 8-1. In 1977, opposition candidates won 2 out of 4 mayoral posts and 29 out of 78 provincial assembly and municipality council seats.
Table 8-1: Breakdown of Vote and Seat Shares of Local Elections (1965-1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yr</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>Dang-wai/DPP</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>% of seats (N)</td>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>% of seats (N)</td>
<td>% of vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>90.5(19)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>95.2(20)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>90.5(19)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>81.0(17)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>85.1(17)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>100.0(20)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>80.0(16)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>78.9(15)</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>15.8(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>81.0(17)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>4.8(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>66.7(14)</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>28.6(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>56.7(14)</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>28.6(6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Provincial Assembly and Municipal Councils in Taiwan, 1954-94

- 1954: 57
- 1957: 66
- 1960: 73
- 1963: 74
- 1968: 119
- 1972: 122
- 1977: 128
- 1981: 170
- 1985: 170
- 1989: 171
- 1994: 175

Source: Huang and Yu (1999, 88-91) *voting statistics do not include aboriginal constituencies

In addition, the declining KMT’s vote shares posed a coordination dilemma to the ruling elites. To maintain its hegemony, the KMT had to either repress, change the rules or concede defeat. Each of these options comes with inherent risks.

**Coordination Dilemmas and De-Institutionalization**

For Taiwan, the explanations for its electoral opening and transition from a semi-competitive, hegemonic party to a competitive, multi-party system overlapped with theories of democratic transition in the country. Broadly, the explanations fall within three camps.

The first emphasizes the interactions of the internal and external pressures that threatened the KMT’s legitimacy, representativeness and claim to rule over Taiwan (Chao and Myers 1994; Yeh 2002). The second usually highlights the short-term interests and calculations of elites. Institutional changes were a result of under-the-table “pacts” and negotiations between the KMT and the DPP elites over the terms of democratization and power-sharing rules (Cheng 1989; Higley, Huang, and Lin 1998). Finally, the third approach usually adopts a historical-
structuralist view to explain how conditions such as socio-ethnic cleavages, declining resource base\textsuperscript{10} of the KMT; rising political activism; electoral defeats or environmental “shocks”\textsuperscript{11} led to party system change (Greene 2007; Solinger 2001; Tan 2002).

As my dissertation attempts to show, these three approaches are complementary. The sources, choices and effects of institutional change cannot be understood in isolation. Both agency and structure matter. In Taiwan, a series of historical events and critical choices to apply a combination of selective repression and negotiations with the rising opposition led to the opening of the hegemonic party system. What is distinctive about Taiwan’s party system change is that both the ruling and opposition elites were involved in the intensely negotiated long-drawn process (Higley, Huang and Lin 1998).

As Norris reminds us: “…electoral systems are rarely designed, they are born kicking and screaming into the world out of a messy, incremental compromise between contending factions battling for survival, determined by power politics. We lack a theoretical framework to understand how political systems reform basic constitutional principles” (1995, 4). For Taiwan, the choice of electoral institution or institutional arrangement was dependent on the contextual factors and constraints. The evolution of Taiwan’s electoral framework and party system is perhaps best viewed as a product of power relations and negotiations between self-interested elites, emerging from and embedded in concrete temporal processes.\textsuperscript{12}

Above all, institutions are partially endogenous (Magaloni 2006, 12). Even when self-interested elites set out to redesign electoral institutions or constitutional framework, we ought to recognize the embedded cultural, socio-political constraints that lead to the final choices (Grofman et al. 1999, 4). As Lin observed: “The unusual evolution of Taiwan’s constitutional structure owes much to the rules governing constitutional reforms as to some peculiar historical contingencies” (2003, 85). Chapters 3 and 6 had discussed the conditions

\textsuperscript{10} Greene argues that the KMT’s declining resource base constrained its ability to dispense patronage and its SNTV system made it more vulnerable to defections in the late 1990s. Resource vulnerability, elite rivalries and electoral system that promoted politicians with independent resources caused a split (between Lee and Soong) in the KMT (2007). But the electoral system for the PE is based on plurality system and not SNTV.

\textsuperscript{11} This is largely based on Harmel and Janda’s theory that posits that party change occurs from internal factors such as changes in leadership, factional changes and electoral performance (1994). Also see Tan (2002).

\textsuperscript{12} This view is drawn from Thelen (1999) and Pierson (1996) historical-institutionalist explanation of institutional change.
that allowed the KMT to sustain its control in the early years. The following sections will now highlight the factors that led to the KMT giving up the control.

**Coordination Dilemmas.** In the course of Taiwan’s liberalization, the KMT regime had experimented with different options such as vote rigging, repression and electoral engineering to maintain its hegemonic position. For example, in 1977, the KMT attempted to tamper with votes at the Chungli city, which ignited a huge protest. The protests escalated into a full-scale riot whereby 10,000 people stormed and burnt a Chungli police station and 12 police riot control wagons (Fan and Feigert 1988, 457). And in 1979, the decision to repress and jail 8 leaders of *Formosa Magazine* protest ended in a violent confrontation that galvanized widespread public support for the anti-KMT, Dangwai movement. Then, the use of repression was counterproductive and damaged the KMT’s legitimacy. Besides repression, the KMT had experimented with changing the electoral rules of the game. As Hsieh noted, before the 1989 LE and 1991 NA election in Taiwan, the KMT tried to change the district magnitude\(^\text{13}\) and succeeded in doing so, despite the DPP’s protest (1999, 67).

**Elite-Decisions.** As Chapter 4 argued, Chiang’s role in opening up the electoral system in the 1980s was a key factor to understand why the hegemonic party began “de-institutionalization”. Even as early as 1978, Chiang had directed the KMT officials to meet with Dangwai figures under the auspices of a newspaper publisher to find out the opposition’s demands. But such contacts stopped after the opposition’s poor performance in the 1983 elections. This meant that the rising electoral support for the Dangwai had featured into the KMT’s elites’ calculations. With increased support for the Dangwai by Apr 1986, the KMT’s further conceded concession to the opposition. was more evident in Apr 1986, when For example, Chiang appointed a 12-member group made up of party leaders and government officials to study political reform measures such as the: conduct of large-scale supplementary elections; feasibility of local self government; termination of martial law; ending of the ban on civic associations and parties, and also strengthening of public order. These were critical steps that began the “de-institutionalization” of hegemonic party regime.

\(^{13}\) As studies show, the relatively lower district magnitude (2-6 seats) that predominated in Taiwanese districts would give the KMT, the largest party a “mechanical advantage” (Cox and Niou 1994).
As Chapter 6 explained, Chiang made an important decision to initiate Taiwanization by co-opting and appointing more local Taiwanese leaders to political and party positions. Perhaps unbeknown to Chiang at that time, his decision to appoint Lee Teng-hui (an indigenous Taiwanese) as VP was one of the most critical junctures that altered Taiwan’s political history. Lee’s appointment demonstrated the KMT’s resolve to adapt to the changing socio-economic context by refashioning its party image and electoral strategy to improve its legitimacy and attract indigenous voters. And by May 1986, the KMT had reopened talks with the Dangwai over the illegal formation of the Dangwai-Research Association on Public Policy (TRAPP) a quasi-political party. While the TRAPP was illegal then, the KMT government chose not to clamp down. More significantly, when 132 Dangwai politicians formed the DPP on 28 Sep 1986 despite the legal ban, Chiang ordered his government not to take any repressive actions (Chou and Nathan 1987, 283-9). Instead, Chiang chose to open the electoral arena and held a series of meetings with the DPP to set out the terms of reforms. The dismantling of the old structures was not easy as Chiang had to face stiff resistance from the security bureaucracy and Party hardliners. As a result of unstable civilian-military relations, Chiang had to also persuade the security apparatus to go along with the political reforms (Tien and Cheng 1999, 25). Taiwan’s electoral opening may not have been as smooth if he had taken the advice of the hardliners.

Declining Electoral Support. As Table 8.1 shows, the local election results from 1985 to 1994 (except for 1991 NA elections) indicate a downward trend for the KMT. Declining support for KMT candidates had made the regime realized that it had to learn to win votes to stay in power and maintain mass support (Chao and Myers 2001, 45). Rising economic development and increased literacy by the 1980s have increased voters’ consciousness to use elections as a means to improve governance and solve problems. As Chu explained, elections became the institution “upon which the entire local power structure came to rest, increasingly the national ruling elite found out not only that they could do

\[14\] As Schafferer notes, one of the consequences of the talks was the sidelining of the hardliners (from the security and military apparatus) in the KMT, as the moderates took active role in pushing for negotiations and political change (2003, 108). The tension between control and liberalization is what Rigger describes as a “calculus of decompression” - liberalization that rests on the authoritarian regime’s calculation that it can control the pace and direction of political reform (1999).
without elections, but also they had to deal with the rising pressure from both within and without the party for electoral opening at higher level” (1992, 50).

**Rising Political Activism.** A combination of the external and internal pressures, and the KMT’s own organization capacity were probably featured into Chiang’s calculation to open up the electoral arena to face the uncertainties of competitive elections. As Figure 8-1 indicates, there was an increasing number of mass protests organized on the streets from the mid-1980s onwards. On 15 Jul 1987, Chiang eventually lifted martial law and the ban on political parties. Consequently, this led to an exponential number of registered political parties: from 38 in 1989 to 148 in 2009. Besides, there was a flux of socio-political activities, daily newspapers (from 31 in 1986 to 246 in mid-1992), and magazines (from 3354 before 1986 to 4356 by mid-1992) (Soong 1992, 76; Taiwan Yearbook 2009). All these increased the supply of coordination mechanisms that encouraged the electoral mobilization and support for the opposition parties. The next section will now turn to examine the origins and effects of electoral reforms on the party system after the electoral opening.

**Origins of Electoral Reforms and Institutionalizing Uncertainty**

After Chiang’s passing, Lee Teng-hui became the first native Taiwanese President elected by the National Assembly on 1990. As Chapter 6 had discussed, Lee’s early rule was marked by an intense power struggle between the mainstream and the non-mainstream factions over the pace and terms of electoral reforms. Policy disagreements revolved around constitutional reform, presidential election by the National Assembly and cross-strait
relations. Outside the Party, Lee was confronted by the rising demands for democracy. In March 1990, an estimated 22,000 students protested against the lack of democracy and called for popular elections. Lee appeased the protestors by going on national television and promised a series of constitutional reforms such as direct presidential election and National Assembly reforms within 3 years. Lee’s public announcement gave him the leverage he needed over the KMT old guards and put Taiwan on the path to democracy (Lin and Tedards 2003, 29). As a result of Lee’s weak party base within the KMT, he turned to pro-reform forces and the opposition by holding a cross-party conference to get support for the electoral reforms. His decision to work with pro-democracy opposition furthered Taiwan’s elite based “pacted transition”.

**National Affairs Conference, 1990**

During Lee’s rule, he made two important decisions that accelerated electoral reforms and institutionalized the rules of the game for a competitive party system. First Lee convened the National Affairs Convention (NAC) to develop a common agenda for political reforms in early 1990. From 28 June and 4 July 1990, the NAC brought 140 opposition party leaders, returning exiles, former political prisoners and elites from the overseas Taiwanese community together to discuss the terms of constitutional amendments at the Grand Hotel in Taipei over a few meetings (Tien and Cheng 1999, 26-8; Wu 2000, 12). The NAC marked the onset of Taiwan’s democratization as the Constitution was redefined to institutionalize a process for the direct election of President in 1996 and allowed the issues of ethnic cleavage, national identity and social distribution to be discussed publicly (Cheng and Lin 1999, 240).

The NAC was also symbolic as it showed the KMT’s public concession and willingness to negotiate with the opposition, something unimaginable a few years ago. The KMT responded to the mounting opposition movement with a combination of incremental political change and intimidation. It also intensified the schisms between the soft-liner and

---

15 There is no data available on the number of mass protests in the 1990s.
16 For an in-depth study of the politics behind the 1990 student protests, see Wright (2001).
17 Lee enjoyed wide popularity amongst the opposition and appealed to Taiwanese voters As Tien observed, “Lee was one of the few Taiwanese leaders in the KMT to enjoy opposition’s respect – a status that became Lee’s biggest asset” (1989, 115).
18 There were 2 rounds of constitutional amendments: first was in April 1999, and the second between 1992 and 1994 (Tien and Cheng 1999, 27).
hard-liner groups within the KMT. While the KMT top leadership backed the softliners to balance the hard-liners, they also avoided confrontation with the opposition (Cheng and Lin 1999, 234-5). Ultimately, the NAC resulted in proposals to change the political system from a semi-parliamentary to a semi-presidential one and to hold direct presidential elections, rather than the indirect ones through an electoral college, as suggested by the non-mainstream faction.19

By 1990, the Council of Grand Justice had demanded the resignation of all senior legislators. On 31 Dec 1991, all veteran members in the Legislative Yuan elected in 1948 were finally retired. The legislative power was eventually taken over by 130 additional members elected in 1989 (Hsieh 2002, 34). This landmark decision thus paved the way for the elections of the entire National Assembly20 and Legislative Yuan in 1991 and 1992. In Apr 1991, Lee Teng-hui ended the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” officially declaring an end to the state of civil war across the Straits. In 1991, the National Assembly ended the “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion” and laid the path for the creation of a new Taiwanese constitution (Lin and Tedards 2003, 36).

**National Development Conference, 1996**

The second key decision was Lee’s initiation to hold the National Development Conference (NDC) on 23 Dec 1996 for solutions to revitalize the economy, improve government efficiency and seek agreement on constitutional reforms. It was during this NDC that Lee proposed to increase Presidential power and change the SNTV system to a “mixed one”. Reportedly, Lee asked Tien Hung-Mao and Tsia Cheng-wen (two political advisers) to sketch the outlines and benefits of the “mixed system”.21 Then, the “mixed system” was supported by the DPP, who preferred the more proportionate version.

---

19 For more on the politics behind the NAC, see Higley et al (1998) and Tien and Cheng (1999).
20 The National Assembly was suspended in 2000 and finally abolished in 2005.
21 Cognizant that his proposal face stiff resistance, Lee had asked his advisors to package and “sell” the political reform in the NDC agenda (Chao, Myers and Robinson 1997).
Under the new system, Taiwan would adopt a new central government along the lines of the French Fifth Republic\(^\text{22}\) where the President will be elected by more than 50% of the people, be able to appoint a premier without Legislative Yuan approval and dissolve the Legislative Yuan. Besides, the Legislative Yuan can also check the Premier and Cabinet by a no-confidence vote (Chao, Myers and Robinson 1997, 63). It was also during the NDC that Lee proposed to abolish the Taiwan provincial government – a position held by Lee’s protégé, James Soong.\(^\text{23}\)

Lee’s proposal to strengthen the Presidency came under heavy fire and the delegates in the convention failed to agree on the constitutional amendments.\(^\text{24}\) However, the idea to abandon the SNTV system was planted in the minds of people and was later revived by the DPP. The NDC proposals languished until 2004, when the idea of legislative reforms became an expedient campaign issue for the DPP before the 2004 PE (Stockton 2009, 12). For the major outcomes of the proposals that were submitted to the National Assembly for deliberations, see Appendix O for Taiwan’s Constitutional Reforms in the 1990s.

### Post-2005 Electoral Reforms

Taiwan has had seven constitutional revisions since 1986, making its electoral system one of the most complicated in the world. Electoral reforms were introduced incrementally over the years, never a comprehensive revision of the Constitution. As a result, Taiwan’s constitutional framework now remains elusive, ill-defined and confusing (Cheng 2003, 19). In 2002, DPP President Chen Shui-bian advanced Lee’s earlier reform ideas from the NDC, but with a proposal closer to that of Japan with two-thirds of Legislative Yuan elected by plurality rules and the remainder from a national list. Electors have a separate vote for the district and list ballots (previously, list seats were simply allocated to parties polling more than 5% in proportion to their vote share at the district level). For the differences between the old and new electoral system, see Appendix K.

\(^{22}\) For differences between Taiwan’s semi-presidential system and French Fifth Republic, see Chu (2001).

\(^{23}\) Soong saw this as the beginning of Lee’s efforts to sideline him and submitted his resignation Governor, but it was refused. For an analysis of the politics behind the NDC, see Chao, Myers and Robinson (1997).

\(^{24}\) See “Taiwan ponders constitutional reform,” *BBC*, 30 Jun 2005. Article raised the concern that the constitutional reforms will make it easier for activists to promote independence and provoke war.
Under the new electoral model approved in 2005, the size of the Legislative Yuan was reduced to 113 seats. From the two-thirds of the seats elected in single-member districts, 34 seats will be selected from a national PR list while 6 seats will be reserved for aboriginal voters. Significantly, the district magnitude was also reduced from 5.8 to 1 per district. Taiwan’s move to the “mixed system” is not new but falls in line with other East Asian democracies, such as Japan and South Korea that had also abandoned the SNTV system (Reilly 2007, 189). In 2004, the Legislative Yuan passed the constitutional amendment proposals to endorse the reforms. And in 2008LE, the new electoral system was used for the first time.

**Electoral Reforms and Unintended Consequences**

Under the former SNTV system, a multi-party system ought to have emerged in Taiwan. Based on Duverger’s law, the PR system is expected to benefit small parties and lead to multi-party system (Riker 1982). Theoretically, a small party ought to do better in the SNTV system (that behaves like a PR system when district magnitude increases) than the SMD system. That is, the larger the district magnitude, the greater the advantage for the smaller parties (Hsieh 1999, 71). However, this was not the case in Taiwan.

From late 1980s to early 1990s, the KMT was able to retain its dominant position as it consistently won the local elections by two-to-one majority. Then, the contestation between the KMT and an emerging DPP remained semi-competitive. The KMT clearly enjoyed asymmetrical organizational advantages, access to resources and mobilization capacity at the local level, especially in the early years (Tan, Yu and Chen 1996). Similar to Singapore, the opposition votes were fractionalized as a result of opposition coordination failure. The Dangwai candidates were unable to effectively challenge the KMT. It took the Dangwai candidates many elections before realizing that to do well in the SNTV system, vote coordination and mass mobilization mattered. And partly driven out of pragmatism, the Dangwai movement decided to form the DPP despite the legal ban so to have a party organization to improve vote-allocation and better candidate nomination strategy to prevent split votes.

25 Also see Liu (1999) on the KMT’s mechanism of campaigning and the creation of the Responsibility Zone System (Zoning system) that contributed to the KMT’s dominance at the local levels.
To explain the non-Duvergerian outcome in Taiwan, scholars such as Cox (1997) and Hsieh (1999) posit that the SNTV system favours the governing parties rather than the smaller parties because of better coordination capability and access to pork and money, as in Japan. Besides, the non-concurrent timings of the LE and PE (conducted under the SMD plurality system) may have also moderated and capped the number of parties in Taiwan (Hsieh 2002, 36). There were also other drawbacks of the SNTV system such as propensity for vote-buying, candidate-centered campaigns that fuelled intra-party conflicts and coordination failures that could have inflicted all parties, regardless of size.

Within electoral studies, there is no-consensus on the effects and the causal direction of electoral system on the party system – endogeneity of electoral institution as a cause or effect (Benoit 2002). As the electoral system shapes party system by constraining voters’ choices, changes in voters’ choices may also affect parties to change the electoral system (Lin 2010). At the end of the day, all parties, regardless of size, face the possibility of error in non-optimal nomination and unequal distribution of votes (Wang 1996; Liu 1999; Cox and Niou 1999). As Chapter 6 indicated, even large parties such as the KMT may over-nominate candidates, as in the 1992 LE, which could lead to too many candidates competing against their own party candidates and undermining cohesion and performance. Aside from gerrymandering or altering the size of the district magnitude, whichever party can alleviate the problems of coordination will best enjoy the party seat bonuses under the SNTV system.

**Party System Change, mid-1990s**

By mid-1990s, Taiwan’s hegemonic party system changed decisively as the political system moved towards a semi-presidential system with an unicameral legislature. Amendments to the constitution approved in 1994 allowed for the direct election of the President and Vice President. In 1995, the President and Vice Presidential Election and Recall law was passed and approved by the Legislative Yuan. On 23 Mar 1996, direct PE was held for the first time. With 76% turnout rate, KMT’s Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan had a landslide win of 54% vote shares in a four-way race under the worst cross-strait crisis since 1958. Most observers viewed the KMT’s victory as unrepresentative of its electoral support, as it was already losing majority and dominance over the national bodies.
Greater press freedom and civil liberties also intensified inter-party competitiveness under more level playing field. Indeed in 1996, FH upgraded Taiwan’s civil and political rights from 2 to 3 and ranking from “partly free” to “free”. See Appendix P for the Comparative FH Scores of Singapore and Taiwan. Aside from fending off challenges from the DPP, the KMT votes were also chipped away by the NP - a significant third party, formed by the KMT defectors in 1993. In 1995 and 1996 national elections, the NP was already winning approximately 13% of votes and seat shares. As Table 8-2 shows, in 1995LE, the KMT was holding on to razor thin majority of 51.8% majority in the Legislative Yuan and 54.8% seat shares after the 1996 NA elections.

Table 8-2: Vote and Seat Shares in National Assembly and Legislative Yuan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Assembly</th>
<th>Legislative Yuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Dang-wai/DPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972*</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980*</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986*</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991*</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996**</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The declining KMT’s presence in the national bodies show that the KMT was losing electoral monopoly. And the party system had begun to show fragmentation by the 1998LE.

**Higher Party Fragmentation**

If Taiwan’s party system were exemplified by the distribution of seats in the Legislative Yuan, then Taiwan would have moved from a one-party to two-plus system by mid-1990s. Based on Laakso and Taagepera’s formula used in Chapter 7, the effective number of electoral and legislative parties in Taiwan may be calculated based on following
formula, \( N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2} \), where \( n \) is the number of all parties and the square of each parties proportion of all votes (or seats) (1979). The 1992 LE marked Taiwan’s transition from hegemonic party system to a two-plus system as the effective number of legislative parties rose from 1.5 to 2.3 (1992-2004). After lifting the ban on political parties, the number of registered parties skyrocketed. In the 1992 LE, there were 72 registered parties with a total of 14 parties that fielded candidates. In total, 403 candidates registered in the country’s first competitive full LE (Copper 1992, 72). See Table 8-3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LE</th>
<th>Effective no. of electoral parties (vote shares)</th>
<th>Effective no. of legislative parties (seat shares)</th>
<th>Difference between electoral &amp; legislative parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (1983-9)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (1992-2004)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (1992-2008)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by author based on data from CEC.

Even when Taiwan was under the KMT’s hegemonic party rule (1983-9), the effective number of legislative parties (1.5) was still more than Singapore’s (1.03) for the period from 1968 to 2010. However, in general, Taiwan’s party system fragmentation has been still under control, as the effective number of legislative parties rarely exceeds 3. Except for the volatile period of 2001-4, Taiwan behaved more like a multi-party system for a short period with nearly 4 electoral parties (KMT, DPP, PFP and TSU). The volatility shown during the period of 2001-4 was largely a result of the country’s first historic party alternation in 2000. Besides, the KMT’s party split and the defection of James Soong to form the People’s Front Party (PFP) had replaced the NP as the third party. In addition, the Taiwan
Solidarity Union\(^{26}\) (TSU) formed after Lee Teng-hui’s departure from the KMT, was another challenger that emerged in 2001 that also split the KMT’s votes. Yet, both the new parties were unable to maintain their momentum and supporters like the more established KMT and the DPP. Despite the expectations that these new parties would increase their legislative presence by the 2004 LE, the seat and vote shares of the PFP and TSU declined.\(^{27}\)

**Electoral Disproportionality**

Another way to measure the mechanical effect of the electoral system is to consider how proportionately the new electoral system converts votes to seats shares or how the electoral system penalizes the minor parties. Based on Lijphart’s index (1994), the average electoral disproportionality prior to democratization from 1986-1989 was a high of 8.4. After the Legislative Yuan was subject to full and competitive elections after 1992, the electoral system based on the SNTV became more proportionate with an average score of 4 (1992-2004). See Table 8-4. This implies that the party system is more representative. But after reforms in 2005, the disproportionality jumped to 16.5 – highest in the democratic history of Taiwan after 2008 LE. The mechanical effect of the Taiwan’s new electoral system supports Duverger’s law, that is, electoral systems with SMD are more conducive for a two party system while the MMD system makes it easier for third and minor parties to be successful.

**Table 8-4: Electoral Disproportionality of LEs (1986-2008)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LE</th>
<th>Largest Party (KMT)</th>
<th>Second Party (DPP)</th>
<th>Average disproportionality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vi</td>
<td>Si</td>
<td>Si-Vi Bonus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (1986-9)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>62.70</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>46.07</td>
<td>51.83</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>46.43</td>
<td>54.67</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>30.22</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>32.83</td>
<td>35.11</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (1992-2004)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>71.68</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (1986-2008)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: calculated by author based on CEC data.

\(^{26}\) Lee Teng-hui is the spiritual leader behind the TSU. The majority of the TSU leaders are Lee supporters from the KMT. The TSU is now part of “pan-green” coalition and supports the DPP.

\(^{27}\) Fell’s research on the successes and failures of new parties show that small parties like the PFP and the TSU generally lack organizational resources; clear party platform; ability to nominate correctly under the SNTV system and take advantage of the opportunity structure (2005).
Taiwan’s move to “SMD-two vote system” favours the largest party as it removed the benefits for the smaller, third parties who could have benefitted from the lower vote quota under the MMD system. Indeed, since the new electoral system was applied in the 2008 LE, all the small parties including the PFP have been decimated.

The new system asserted psychological effects on the parties, as the smaller parties had begun to form coalitions with the two larger parties KMT and the DPP prior the 2008 LE. For example, the KMT and its main “pan-blue” coalition partners (PFP and MPSU) signalled their awareness of the consequences of the systemic change by coming together to adjust candidate nomination and campaigning strategies. As Chapter 6 discussed, since the KMT’s efforts in improving party discipline and autonomy in candidate selection, the KMT has been more effective in reconciling elite differences and managing coalitions with the “pan-blue” partners. On the other hand, the DPP and its “pan green” ally (TSU) also discussed cooperative nominations. However, no agreement was reached, which may explain their weak performance in the 2008 LE.

**Institutionalized Two-Party System?**

What are the prospects of Taiwan’s emerging two-party system for democratic consolidation? The KMT lost its status as a hegemonic party in 1990s. But within a decade, it re-emerged as winning dominant party in 2008 PE and LE. After nearly two decades and seven constitutional reforms, how institutionalized is Taiwan’s party system? As discussed in the Theoretical Chapter, an institutionalized party system must have 1) a regular and stable inter-party competition, 2) enjoy electoral legitimacy, 3) have party rootedness in society and 4) also party organizations that matter (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 4). An institutionalized party system demands stability in the rules governing inter-party competition whereby elections are “the only game in town”, the only mechanism for settling social conflicts and distributing power between parties. Losers need to learn how to lose and concede defeat, without turning to violence or other non-constitutional means to overturn the results. This means that the parties not only have to follow the rules of the game but maintain the stable social base over time.

Based on these 4 dimensions, the emerging two-party system dominated by the KMT and the DPP may be considered institutionalized and stable after having experienced a
decade of tumultuous emotional confrontation and divisive power struggles.\textsuperscript{28} Aside from the controversial 2004 PE results\textsuperscript{29}, political parties in Taiwan have accepted electoral mechanisms as the only game in town. Since the 1990s, the two largest parties, the KMT and the DPP have shown resilience and survived many party splits, party switching and leadership struggles. With strong party bases and rootedness in society, these two parties have emerged as the two most formidable party machineries with strong mass mobilization capacities. However, the introduction of “mixed system” since 2005 had sidelined smaller parties such as the TSU, PFP and the NP. The following analysis will further consider the degree of Taiwan’s party system institutionalization and implications for its democratic consolidation based on the Central Election Commission and public opinion survey data.

**Low Electoral Volatility**

One of the ways to assess the stability of inter-party system competition is by measuring the electoral volatility of the lower chamber seats based on Pedersen’s index (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). As in Chapter 7, electoral volatility is calculated by taking the sum of the net change in the percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, divided by two \[\left(\sum |v_{it} - v_{i, t+1}| / 2\right)\]. Based on Figure 8-2, the electoral volatility of LE vote shares were relatively low (5) from the 1986 to 1998 LEs. There were only 2 exceptional spikes after 1998 LE. The first was in 2001 LE when the KMT lost legislative majority and was relegated to third-party position because of party split and the emergence of the PFP and the TSU that splintered the KMT’s vote shares.

The second spike was in the 2008 LE after the electoral reforms and adoption of the SMD-plurality based “mixed system” that exerted strong reductive effect to squeeze out smaller parties. As Clark argues, the high volatility experienced in 2008LE was largely because of the contradictory forces that pushed Taiwan’s party system in different directions, especially in terms of national identity and political corruption issues (2003, 97).

\textsuperscript{28} See Chu (2005) for a critique of Taiwan’s semi-presidential system and makeshift constitution that has produced political gridlocks and a divided, immobilized government, incapable of governance.

\textsuperscript{29} The DPP won by a narrow margin of 0.22 percent in the 2004 PE. Many saw the mysterious shootings of the DPP candidates Chen and Lu during their campaign as staged to earn the DPP sympathy votes. KMT candidates Lien and Soong refused to concede and unsuccessfully challenged the results.
On the whole, Taiwan’s average volatility of 9.9 (based on the 9 LEs) show that its party system is quite stable and that the large proportion of voters have stuck with their parties. Compared to the average regional volatility of 24.1%, Taiwan is doing well (Kuhonta and Hicken, forthcoming).

Figure 8-2: Electoral Volatility Based on LEs and PEs in Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LE and PE</th>
<th>1983-2008 (LE)</th>
<th>1996-2008 (PE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of elections</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility of 1st and 2nd elections</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>24.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility of last elections</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>8.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average volatility (1983-2008)</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>14.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by author based on CEC data.

And if we consider the distribution of vote shares based on the last 4 PEs, the average volatility is also similarly low at 8.56. Aside from the spike in the 2000 PE which resulted in party alternation for the first time in Taiwan’s political history, the electoral volatility of the 4 PEs is not very significant and continued to show a downward trend. One of the reasons for this maybe because of the plurality rule of the PE which could have encouraged the electorates, politicians and interest groups to converge into two main electoral blocs. As there have only been 4 PEs, it is still too early to make any definitive judgment of the party-voter relations based on PE results alone.

**Varied Party Rootedness**

Weak party roots are often associated with high electoral volatility (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Compared to 14 other Asian party systems, Taiwan’s parties are enjoying stronger party-voter links than its regional counterparts. As mentioned in the Theoretical
Chapter, the longer the party is in existence, the more likely it is will be institutionalized. The longevity of the parties shows that parties have been able to capture the long-term voters and loyalties of key social groups (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 13). Based on age, the KMT is likely to be the most institutionalized party as it is the longest surviving party in Taiwan and has been active electorally for 61 years. In contrast, the DPP has only been around for 24 years. See Table 8-5. Electorally, only the KMT and the DPP have competed in all LEs since 1992 and developed more sophisticated electoral machinery than the smaller parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8-5: Characteristics of Political Parties in Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of Formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since founding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced founding leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of LE contested since 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share in 2008 LE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total party membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social base</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by author (in-progress)

As Chapter 6 shows, the KMT has had a tough learning curve in institutionalizing leadership selection after the passing of the party’s strongmen. However, after experiencing a series of party splits and electoral splits, it has begun to learn and build more systematic mechanisms to facilitate elite recruitment and candidate selection processes. Comparatively, the two dominant parties, the KMT and the DPP are well embedded and rooted than the other two smaller parties. See Table 8-5 for a summary of 4 parties that have had more than 10% seat shares in the Legislative Yuan.

Based on EA Barometer surveys carried out in 2001 and 2006 in Taiwan, the findings show that voters have developed a stronger closeness to the KMT and the DPP. In fact, both the KMT and the DPP ratings have improved significantly since 2001 as 58.5% and 33.3%

---

30 For an in-depth study of the success and failures of small parties in Taiwan, see Fell (2005).
feel close to the KMT and DPP – a significant 41.8 and 10.3 points improvement. See the survey party-voter closeness below.

**Party-Voter Closeness in Taiwan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party that you feel closest to</th>
<th>2001 (%)</th>
<th>2006 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t feel close to any party</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Party Organization and Autonomy**

As Table 8-5 shows, the KMT and the DPP are currently the two largest parties in Taiwan with estimated party membership of 1.04 mil and 544,515 respectively. Both the KMT and DPP have established party organizations with strong grass roots or local connections. Scholars argue that the KMT’s declining resource advantage as a result of the privatization of state-operating enterprises in the late 1990s have undermined its ability to distribute incentives (Fields 1998, 5-7; Greene 2007, 265). Indeed, since losing governing power in 2000, the KMT has downsized considerably with hundreds of party workers pensioned off and the colossal headquarters at the Zhongshan Road sold to cut expenses. Besides, the KMT has also streamlined its party organization, improved its structural coherence and disassociated itself from the *heijin* image. Despite the belt-tightening measures, the KMT is still far richer than other parties. For example, a report by the Ministry of the Interior shows that in 2006, the KMT is nearly 80 times richer - in total asset than the DPP. In terms of net assets, the KMT has 100 times more asset value, or roughly NT$25.5 bil to the DPP's NT$253 mil. See political finances of parties below.

**Political Finances of Parties in Taiwan, 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Liability</th>
<th>Net Worth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>5,207</td>
<td>27,043</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>25,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>-134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Taipei Times*, 18 July 2007 (Figures are in NT$’000,000).

---

31 The data may show a closer party-voter link in 2006 as the option of “Don’t feel close to any party” was not available in 2006 survey question. Overall, there is still an improvement in positions for the parties.

32 Mostly older workers were pensioned-off (Interview with Chu, Nov 2007).
Based on net assets, the KMT has more than NT$27 bil (US$821 mil) while the DPP's assets only amount to NT$339 mil. In contrary, the TSU has net worth of NT$14 mil while the PFP is penniless and running a deficit.\(^{33}\) Hence, even when the KMT leader complained that the Party is in financial crisis it still has a comparative advantage over the others. Besides, a smaller party organization also meant that it has to be efficient, to do more with less (Interview with R. Chu, Nov 2007).

Aside from party finances, the autonomy of the parties to recruit candidates is another principal function of parties and an indicator of its organization capacity. A high number of independents would imply that the parties lack autonomy and not viewed as a channel to power.\(^{34}\) If the number of independents is a measure of party system autonomy, then, the autonomy would be at its weakest in 1989 and 1992 as the percentage of independents and non-party affiliates (without party endorsement) to the total candidates were at their highest in 1989LE (47.8%) and 1992 LE (36.9%).

As Figure 8-3 shows, parties only began to regain the autonomy to nominate candidates after 2004 LE, as the percentage of independents fielded dropped from 23.6% in 2004LE to 9.7% by 2008 LE. The declining participation of independents and drop in the number of elected independents show that the Taiwan party system is being institutionalized as it shows that party organization matter for electoral success and politicians who ran on a party ticket stood a better chance of winning.

\(^{33}\) While posting the figures was a requirement, there were no legal consequences for non-compliance. In total, only 19 out of 170 parties and political organizations submitted data. See *Taipei Times*, 18 July 2007.

\(^{34}\) For an early study of the independents from “outside-the-party”, see Fan and Feigert (1988).
Figure 8-3: Breakdown of Candidates and Independents in LEs (1989-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total candidates</th>
<th>Independents</th>
<th>Independents (%)</th>
<th>Independents Elected</th>
<th>Independents Elected (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ave.</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from Taiwan CEC, various years.

Low Political Legitimacy and Trust

Finally, political legitimacy is the fourth indicator of party system institutionalization. In an institutionalized party system, the major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to parties. Elites behave and play by the electoral rules of the game and see elections as the primary route to governing (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 5). Here, I use survey data from East Asia (EA) Barometer in 2006 on the public trust in political institutions as a measure of the legitimacy of Taiwan’s party system, which shows that Taiwan’s political institutions suffer from legitimacy or trust deficit. In fact, the 3 institutions that suffer the worst trust deficits are: 1) political parties (82.5%); 2), the Parliament (78.3%); and 3) the President (68%), the highest political office holder in the country. Comparatively,

---

35 Political trust refers to the people’s faith in the government. When the people have faith in the legitimacy of party, they believe that the government will abide by the law and offer better social welfare.

36 According to most public opinion polls, mid-way through Chen Shui-bian’s administration, the DPP had become more corrupt than the KMT in the public mind. See Copper (2009) on a summary of the corruption charges against Chen officials and his family members.
the political institutions in Singapore enjoy a high level of legitimacy and trust on all counts, despite being a hegemonic party authoritarian regime.\(^{37}\) See Table 8-6.

### Table 8-6: Level of Political Trust in Taiwan and Singapore, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregated Evaluations</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Prime Minister or president</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Courts</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the national government</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in political parties</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Parliament</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Civil Service</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the military</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the police</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in local government</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in newspaper</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the election commission (Singapore: International TV)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *EA Barometer Survey*, 2006

The reasons for Taiwan’s low legitimacy in political institutions are due to the parties and politicians’ association with political corruption\(^{38}\), vote-buying\(^{39}\), criminal activities and links with *Heidao* (gangsters), which had received a lot of media attention and prosecuted rigorously under criminal law (Copper 2009, 477; Schafferer 2003, 165).\(^{40}\) Besides, the view that the cabinet members and politicians enjoy immunity also tainted the image of politicians.

\(^{37}\) The same survey also shows that political institutions in China enjoy high legitimacy. Scholars suggest that economic performance and control of information may explain the connection between regime type and legitimacy. See Nathan (2007) and Huang, Chu and Chang (2007).

\(^{38}\) From Jan to Nov 2006, 1,487 persons were indicted on corruption charges; 1252 had been convicted. Of those, 77 were high government officials, 244 were mid-level, 394 were low level, and 58 were elected. See Copper (2009, 475) on corruption and devolution of democracy during Chen’s administration.

\(^{39}\) The general consensus is that vote buying has declined because parties consider it ineffective and voters are less likely to participate as a result of rising democratic culture (Rigger 1999).

\(^{40}\) See Gobel (2004) on organized crime and political corruption and Schafferer (2003) on the public dissatisfaction on the lack of public safety as a result of the collusion between politicians and gangster rings.
and confidence in Taiwan’s judicial independence. This is clearly shown in the low trust score as more than 65% evaluated “the Courts” negatively. See Table 8-6. The results also reflected the public’s frustration with the government inefficiency and legislative deadlock. This was especially evident during the mid-2000s as the KMT and the DPP’s postured and jockeyed for short-term electoral gains during the DPP’s minority government (Chu 2005, 44). Additionally, the public legislative brawls and violence, where the legislators engage in punching, kicking, spitting and food fights to get media attention also do not boost the public’s confidence in the Legislative Yuan.

Taiwan’s problems with political corruption, legislative gridlock and policy immobilization during Chen’s administration are in direct contrast to Singapore’s image of clean and efficient government. Indeed, the Taiwanese’ frustration and disillusionment in politicians’ poor performance have raised concerns that the “devolution of democracy” may have triggered a wave of “authoritarian nostalgia” as a surprising large number (23.2%) of EA Barometer felt that “under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one”.41

The way parties and leaders play by the rules of the game and accept the electoral result also reflect the party system legitimacy. If the electoral results are often contested, or, if parties turn to violence or use of the military coup to intimidate or block their rivals’ access to power, then the party system is clearly unstable and un-institutionalized, as in the case of post-Thaksin Thailand. In Taiwan, the close connection between the military and the KMT during the authoritarian era has been weak since the democratic transition in the 1990s and cut when the DPP took over in 2000. As Table 8-6 shows, more than 59% of Taiwanese evaluate the military institution positively. Also based on separate BTI42 report, Taiwan also enjoys an effective monopoly on the use of force. The implementation of the National Defense Act in 2002 strengthened the effective democratic control over the security sector. There has been no active military involvement in Taiwan’s domestic politics since Lee Teng-hui’s removal of Gen Hau Po-Tsun in 1993.

42 The BTI Status Index ranks the countries according to their state of democracy and market economy as of Spring 2009. The scores of 1(lowest) and 10 (highest) are assigned each category. The mean value of all the scores given the 5 criteria make up the Democracy Status score.
Based on a BTI report which uses five criteria (stateness; political participation; rule of law; stability of democratic institutions and political and social integration) to rank the Status Index of democracy in 128 countries; Taiwan has scored favourably with a high democracy status of 9.5 and a ranking of 3rd place out of 128 countries in 2010. Comparatively, Singapore is only ranked 28th place with a democracy status of 5.4 out of 10, scoring lowly on “political participation” (3.3) and stability of democratic institutions (2).

In Taiwan, the most controversial event that tested the consolidation of democratic institutions was the shooting of President Chen Shui-bian and Vice-President Annette Lu and their razor-thin victory of the DPP candidates in the 2004 PE. A serious scuffle broke out between the DPP and KMT members after an argument over vote recounts and the PE result was hotly contested by the KMT candidates for many weeks after the elections. The controversial shooting event led to emotional disputes between the two parties and divided the nation. As Cheng and Liao say: “The consent of electoral losers is the litmus test of electoral democracy” (2006, 96). Despite the acute polarization and vitriolic exchanges between the two parties, the dispute was eventually settled by the judiciary a third party. The acceptance of the outcome by the KMT candidates in the very closely and bitterly fought PE showed that the losers are learning to lose.43

Based on the 2010 BTI Index, Taiwan has a stable, moderate and socially anchored party system which enjoys broad popular consent. Refer to the BTI’s “Political and Social Integration scores” in Appendix B. Taiwan party system is still highly polarized as the two opposing party alliances (the “blue camp” consisting of the KMT and PFP, NP); and (the “green camp” of the DPP and the TSU) are uncompromising on the issues of national identity, unification or independence and cross-strait policy.44 On the other hand, Singapore is showing moderately stable, hegemonic party system where opposition parties are experiencing great difficulty to engage constructively in the political process or find qualified candidates to stand in elections.

44 See Chu (2005) on the nasty, endless paralyzing political battles between the DPP government and the KMT during Chen’s administration that led to legislative deadlocks and inefficiency government.
In Taiwan, the two larger parties, the KMT and the DPP have emerged as key stabilizers of the party system as they are more rooted in society, have strong party organizations with resources and retained autonomy in candidate selection. Unlike the smaller parties, both the larger parties enjoy close voter-party ties and could rely on sophisticated electoral machinery for issue-framing and effective mass mobilization. Despite the severe test of its democratic norm and commitment in the 2004 PE, the parties appear to have embraced elections as the mechanism for access to power and generally abide by the rules of the game.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the transformation and adaptation of the KMT as a hegemonic to a dominant party over the last two decades. As a result of internal and external pressures that challenged the legitimacy and claim to rule, the KMT has “learnt to lose” and win again under “institutionalized uncertainty” in a competitive party system (Cheng and Lin 2008, 161; Wong and Friedman 2008). Early electoral opening was marked by open, procedural battles between ruling and opposition elites that dismantled and “de-institutionalized” the former political structures, apparatus and rules that once preserved the privileged position of the hegemonic party. Unlike other emerging democracies, the transformation of the KMT and the evolutionary trajectory of Taiwan’s party system change has been largely a result of an elite-led, intensely, negotiated “pacted transition”.

Many factors have contributed to the smooth party system change in Taiwan. First, the local elections during the KMT’s authoritarian rule in the 1950s have laid important foundations for the socialization of democratic norms and behaviour that encourage grassroots political participation. The avenue for limited electoral contest had also enabled the Dangwai movement to form the DPP, develop sophisticated electoral machinery and formulate electoral strategies to challenge the hegemonic party.

Second, structural conditions such as socio-ethnic cleavages, national identity, political corruption and cross-strait security issues have provided the necessary ideological basis for party formation, realignment and mobilization. Two major issues dominated the opposition’s agenda: government system and national identity (Lin 2003). For example, the rise of splinter parties such as the NP, PFP and the TSU all arose out of the KMT’s internal
party conflicts and dissatisfaction with pro-independence rhetoric under Lee’s leadership or insufficient focus on Taiwanese nationalism and sovereignty. However, the fate of these small parties currently look bleak.

Taiwan’s party system may be considered institutionalized after two party alternations or “two turnover test”.\textsuperscript{45} However, the Taiwanese party system also show signs of weakness, as voters show disillusionment with how democracy is practiced in the country. The signs of concerns are 1) the declining voter turnout for LE from 1972.02\% in 1992 to 58.5\% in the last 2008LE, 2) the severe trust deficits in democratic political institutions and finally 3) the uncompromising, party polarization over issues of national identity, unification versus independence and cross-strait policy that continue to divide the nation. Government inefficiency, legislative gridlock and political corruption have also undermined the public’s confidence and may pose problems for further democratic consolidation. The recent electoral reforms are expected to moderate the party polarization in Taiwan. But it would take a few more elections to better assess the effects of the institutional change on the party system.

Under the new electoral framework that took effect in the last 2008LE – Taiwan is likely to move away from a multi-party system as the electoral institutions exert strong mechanical effect that reduced party fragmentation. Taiwan has had 7 constitutional revisions since 1986 and its current electoral system based on a mixed system of proportional and plurality representation appears to be more conducive for an institutionalization of a stable, two-party system.

\textsuperscript{45} “Two turnover test” is usually used as an indicator of democratic consolidation where a party that takes power in the initial election, loses a subsequent election and turns power over to election winners, and election winners then peacefully turnover power to the winners of the next election (Huntington 1991, 267).
Conclusion

My dissertation has focused on the sources of hegemonic party resilience. Based on the concept of strategic coordination and institutionalization, I have attempted to explain how hegemonic parties such as the PAP and the KMT managed to stay in power for more than 5 decades, and the conditions under which the KMT gave it up. Strategic coordination requires a combination of material incentives, socio-legal, institutional and electoral constraints. The concept is particularly useful to explain how high-performing hegemonic party regimes have greater longevity, more effectiveness in postponing demands for democracy, and are more able to control the pace of political liberalization.

I have also argued that the hegemonic party resilience depends on the degree to which the ruling party is institutionalized or moved through the different phases of transformation, adaptation and consolidation. My comparative study of the PAP and the KMT shows that party organization and institution building matters. The unprecedented resilience of the PAP and the KMT depended on their wide network of para-political institutions and the myriad of legal rules to police public discourse and repress partisan mobilization. The parties’ early formation and participation in the struggle for statehood gave them a distinct advantage as they were able get in on the ground floor of the electoral market, establish mass organizations, entrench themselves in government and narrow the space for partisan mobilization. Through strategic coordination, both parties were able to capitalize on their incumbency, rely on their access to state resources and control over media channels to develop their organizational and mobilization capacity.

Institutionalization matters because it stabilizes authoritarian regimes and provides a set of institutional arrangements to regularly co-opt and transform dissenters into participants. My dissertation has argued that a hegemonic party regime with an institutionalized incentive distribution system is more resistant to the problems of leadership succession and internal splits. To illustrate the utility of institutionalization, I offered a theory of leadership selection to explain how a centralized, routinized and exclusionary leadership selection model fosters elite unity. My findings based on the PAP and the KMT leadership selection methods lend support to the counter-intuitive theory that the less the intra-party democracy, the higher the party cohesion. Indeed, the PAP has successfully engineered two national and several party
leadership transitions since its formation in 1954. Its oligarchic, “institutionalized charisma” selection model is likely to survive the passing of party strongmen and continue to inject likeminded elites to ensure that the preservation of the PAP government becomes a desirable goal in and of itself.

On the other hand, the KMT’s “un-institutionalized charisma” model during Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule was unstable and vulnerable to power struggles. The Party’s experiments with inclusive and democratic methods (such as party primaries to select legislative candidates and party chairmen) ultimately caused more internal conflicts and poor electoral performance. Weak party discipline and an inability to sanction mavericks intensified centrifugal tendencies, led to factional disputes and caused party splits. The KMT’s experience demonstrates that democratic and inclusive selection methods have a negative effect on elite unity. The PAP and KMT’s experiences support the counter-intuitive, elitist logic that exclusive and centralized leadership selection methods are better for party cohesion.

Hegemonic party regimes hold elections. In my study, I use strategic coordination to explain why voters vote for the hegemonic party while the opposition fails to become a credible threat in Singapore and Taiwan in the 1970s and 80s. First, I argue that high performing regimes with an adequate level of public good provision can get away with restricting coordination mechanisms that prevent opposition mobilization. A series of dilemmas (fear of the untested contender, biased media coverage, lack of viable alternatives and preference for predictability) explain why voters continue to vote for the incumbent. Unless exogenous shocks or a chronic fall in public goods provision dramatically alter the status quo, elections taking place on unlevel playing fields are unlikely to bring about party alternation. Ultimately, when faced with declining electoral support, the hegemonic party can turn to electoral engineering as its last line of defence to “manufacture” its legislative majority and boost its image of “invincibility” – as in the case of the PAP in the late 1980s.

Second, high performing hegemonic regimes are in a much better position to negotiate their withdrawal from power. As a result of internal and external pressures, the KMT faced a series of coordination dilemmas to either repress or concede to demands for democratization. For Taiwan, the moderate KMT leaders initiated a “pacted transition” with the opposition elites, which led to the regime’s “de-institutionalization” and a long decade of
transition. In the 2000 PE, the first party alternation occurred because of an internal split that divided the KMT votes. If the KMT elites had united and put up a single ticket to contest in the 2000 PE, the KMT could have defeated the opposition DPP and extended its own life span.

**Implications**

My dissertation has found interesting empirical evidence to support some of the key tenets in the party politics literature and counter the teleological assumptions in the Third Wave studies. First, I found Lipset and Rokkan’s thesis to have varying explanatory power. The case of Singapore shows that socio-economic structural pre-conditions did not have a deterministic impact on its hegemonic party system. However, Taiwan’s polarizing party system reflects its long-standing sub-ethnic cleavage between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. My cases show that structural conditions are secondary, contextual factors that shape the calculations of party elites and voters. Elite choices and strategic coordination play a more critical role in shaping the party system.

Second, my study challenged the prevailing assumption that party system institutionalization leads to democratic consolidation. Through careful use of the term “institutionalization”, I have attempted to show how Singapore’s hegemonic party system may be institutionalized and consolidated. For example, at the party level, I show how the PAP’s institutionalized leadership selection system helped the Party avoid the perils of leadership succession and subsequent power struggles. At the party system level, I demonstrate how electoral engineering institutionalized a two-tier party system where the opposition parties remained inferior and systematically repressed.

The possibility that a hegemonic party system can be institutionalized has important theoretical and empirical implications. Above all, it shows that institutionalization stabilizes authoritarian regime. It also lends support to one of Mainwaring and Scully’s key observations that hegemonic party regimes have to be “de-institutionalized” first before democratic transition (1995). My study also contributes to the rationalist-institutionalist explanations that take party and electoral institutions as given. Instead, my theoretical framework specifies *what* party and electoral institutions alter calculations and *how* they shape regime outcomes. My three-level analytical framework is more nuanced than a game-
theoretical explanation as it provides a finer-grained explanation to show how institutions shape the final outcome.

Third, in a perverse way, my theory of strategic coordination is also a recipe for authoritarian success as it provides the ingredients needed to extend hegemonic party rule. Being “strategic” is perhaps the most difficult part of the recipe to replicate as it depends on the quality of leadership, access to resources and other social conditions that affect elite calculations and coordination choices. That being said, the case of Singapore’s PAP success could still generate a “snow-ball” effect and encourage a wave of electoral authoritarianism should other one-party regimes such as China and Vietnam choose to develop economically and hold uncompetitive elections to gain international legitimacy. Singapore’s strategic coordination model is appealing because it gives the hope that a free market does not require a free society to thrive in. And China is especially interested to learn how. Since Deng Xiao Ping’s visit to Singapore in 1978, the China Communist Party (CCP) had sent over 400 government delegations to observe and investigate the reasons for Singapore's success. Selected by the Chinese provincial governments, the brightest Chinese officials and academics were sent to learn Singapore’s way of co-ordinating economic openness and political regulation. In the first 8 months of 2008 alone, Guangdong province sent more than 3,000 officials on study trips to Singapore.46

In Southeast Asia, Singapore’s close relations with Burma has also raised concerns. Burma held elections for the first time after 2 decades in Nov 2010. The plethora of rules governing media regulations, reserved seats for military officers and finally the exclusion of minority parties and opposition leaders (such as Aung San Suu Kyi) from political participation meant that the electoral outcome was never in doubt. Clearly, Burma has more draconian rules than Singapore; however, after the Burmese generals shed their military uniforms and learn to stage their “sure win” election, they may look to Singapore to adopt some of its “soft” authoritarian strategies to extend their political rule.

46 Since 1990s, more than 2 dozen books on Singapore have been published in China. In China, funding for research projects on Singapore are easier to come by than projects involving other country. In Shenzhen university, a Centre for Singapore studies has also been set up. See “The Dragon eyes the Lion City,” Straits Times, 8 Nov 2008 and “Singapore shows the way,” Petir, Jul/Aug 2009.
My dissertation shows that elections are necessary but not sufficient for democratization. The notion that electoral authoritarian regimes may be institutionalized is significant as it challenges the teleological bias in the transitology paradigm and explains how electoral authoritarianism may be more resilient than expected (Schmitter and Karl 1991). Not all elections are the same. More competitive elections are expected to bring about liberalizing outcomes. The degree of competitiveness is contingent on the availability of coordination mechanisms. In hegemonic party regimes, elections serve to legitimize, stabilize and renew the ruling regime rather than as a channel for party alternation. Singapore shows that authoritarian regimes that hold elections remain in power longer than those that fail to hold them (Brownlee 2009). In Taiwan, regular elections did not “cause” democratization. Rather, democratization occurred as a result of changing power relations and negotiations between self-interested elites. Limited local elections created a “trickle-up” effect that increased electoral competition. It took a long time for the socialization of democratic norms and behaviour before an organized opposition could effectively emerge as a credible threat to challenge the KMT.

Finally, the transformation of the KMT from a hegemonic to a dominant party to compete in an uncertain electoral market is another remarkable story of organizational resilience and adaptation. Recently in Singapore, the PAP government has taken steps to liberalize: lifting the ban on political films, relaxing internet rules on posting political videos and campaign materials, allowing protests within the confines of Speaker’s Corner. Will Singapore follow Taiwan’s footsteps to embrace liberal democracy? In Singapore, public opinion surveys show an increased demand for greater political participation.47 Younger and more educated voters want to play a bigger role in policy-making and see more robust debate in the Parliament. So far, there is no indication the PAP government wishes to introduce full, participatory, competitive elections that might allow the incumbent Party to lose power. Rather, the conciliatory moves were initiated because the PAP leaders want “to create a kinder, gentler, more secure and stable authoritarianism without altering fundamentally the nature of the system” (Huntington 1991, 129).

Diffusing opposition and dissent without resorting to full democratization is a common feature of liberalization. Singapore’s recent steps to liberalize have not increased the coordination mechanisms that allow the opposition to mobilize or co-ordinate. In line with its pragmatic and calculated approach, the PAP has opened the political space strategically and cautiously.\(^48\) In the short term, the political and media reforms are unlikely to level the playing field. There are still many concrete steps that would need to be taken before free and fair elections could occur. Examples include the setting up of an independent Electoral Commission and an independent body to make electoral boundary decisions,\(^49\) a more proportionate electoral system, more rights for peaceful organization and demonstration and freedom of expression in the mainstream and new media that allow greater political activism.\(^50\) Singapore’s managed liberalization is a long process. Experiences of other hegemonic party regimes such as Mexico and Taiwan show that liberalization could stretch over decades without immediate transition to fully competitive and open electoral politics.

**Gaps and Lessons Learnt**

My dissertation does not directly study the relationship between the military and the hegemonic party or the bureaucracy. As a result of the long-term incumbency of the hegemonic party, the line between the party and the state has become blurred. I consider the military and the bureaucracy\(^51\) two key state institutions that provide coercive and technocratic expertise to the ruling party. The military and bureaucracy are two parallel state institutions that protect the party’s hegemony even when its role at times conflicts with its self-image and institutional autonomy. In Singapore and Taiwan, the military has a strong presence in society as a result of its national conscription program. The military is a coercive apparatus and a major ally of the party that ensures the national security and ideological

---

\(^48\) After the announcement to ease political rules, a new Public Order Act, was later passed without much debate in parliament to empower the police to prevent civil disobedience and mass protest in specific arena. Presently, any public gathering of 5 or more people is illegal in Singapore without a police permit.

\(^49\) The Prime Minister’s office controls both the Elections Department and the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee that publishes updated electoral boundaries only weeks before an election.

\(^50\) For more media freedom, the: 1) Newspaper and Printing Presses Act; 2) Broadcasting Act; 3) Films Act need to be repealed or relaxed. To foster political participation, 1) an independent body for the selection of judges; 2) repealing of the Public Order Act; and 3).

\(^51\) See Ho (2000, 162-5) for the more on politics of bureaucratic policy making in Singapore.
heritage of the country. In Taiwan, the military was brought under strict KMT’s control through a network of party cells and party organ directed by the political commissars in all military units. Besides, the KMT also met the corporate interest of the military. The party’s control over the military as well as the security forces is one of the key factors that stabilized hegemonic party rule, and it is a subject that deserves further study.

Both Singapore and Taiwan boast of a strong bureaucracy that provides technocratic expertise and administrative know-how to the ruling elites. In the two cases, the hegemonic parties have a high degree of penetration into the respective military and bureaucratic institutions. This is reflected in the number of high-ranking, retired military officers in the party committees, cabinet and the parliament. The high level of horizontal integration of party and state elites show that the party and state institutions share an organic and symbiotic relationship. I leave it for further research how the hegemonic parties built, penetrated and controlled the military and bureaucracy to extend the parties’ life spans. My theory of strategic coordination had subsumed institutional building of these two state institutions under provision of public goods.

Leadership selection through elections is the heart of democracy. Democracy is real only if the rulers are willing to give up power as a result of elections (Huntington 1991, 267). Without the test of party alternation in Singapore, we will know whether the PAP will give up power peacefully. What we know now is that the PAP believes that party alternation as experienced in Taiwan is not right for Singapore, and equates multipartyism with bad governance. As PM Lee Hsien Loong insists: “Change has to take place in Singapore but change must take place not (between parties) but within the PAP… As long as the PAP changes itself, and continues to provide clean and good government, and the lives of Singaporeans improve, the country is much better off with one dominant, strong, clean, good

52 Singapore’s 2009 military budget is $11.4 billion, or 5% of GDP, while Taiwan’s military budget is US$9.3 billion for 2009. See “S’pore defence budget up 6%.” Straits Times, 22 Jan 2009 and “Taiwan Defense Budget 6.9% Below 2009 Figure.” Defence News 14 Jan 2010.

53 The organizational relations between the party and military reduced, if not, eliminated the threat of a military intervention (Cheng and Haggard 1992).

54 For party-military relations in Singapore, see Tan (2001) and for Taiwan, see Lo (2001).

55 MM Lee once commented that” Without the elected president and if there is a freak election, within two or three years, the army have to come and stop it”, suggesting that a coup may be necessary to restore PAP’s power in the event of freak election when the PAP is booted out. See “Lee Kuan Yew defends PAP’s political dominance” Reuters, 16 Sep 2006 and “Sir, would you send in the army?” Straits Times, 3 Sep 2009.
party” (*Straits Times* 16 Nov 2008). Party systems are competitive when outcomes are uncertain and uncertainty matters. In Singapore, the PAP has done all in its power to institutionalize its certainty of winning.

Good governance instead of democracy is a point often emphasized by the PAP leaders. They are wont to make capital out of the trust deficits suffered by Taiwan, who has embraced liberal democracy. To the PAP, a clean, high-performing albeit interventionist government that is able to provide socio-economic goods to its people is a better option than a corrupt, inefficient, policy-gridlock government that offers unbridle civil and political liberties, freedom of speech and assembly to its people.\(^{56}\) As PM Lee reminded the PAP members of the ills of multipartyism in a Party Conference and said, “in Asia, it very seldom works because having two or more parties has not guaranteed good governance or progress,” he added, citing Taiwan as an example that “In the last decade, its unhappy voters had swung from the Kuomintang [KMT], to the Democratic Progressive Party, and back to KMT again. By Western definitions of democracy, Taiwan qualifies because it's got two changes of government - in, out, in. But it is not a political system which is working properly. And I don't think you want that kind of political system in Singapore (*Straits Times* 16 Nov 2008). Despite the electoral reforms introduced since 1980s, the PAP is preventing the emergence of a competitive, multi-party system where it may be subjected to the uncertainties of losing.

In Taiwan, *EA Barometer survey* shows signs of authoritarian nostalgia as voters grew frustrated and disillusioned with inefficient government, political corruption scandals and ugly party polarization that paralyzes the Legislative Yuan. However, as Huntington reminds us, authoritarian nostalgia is an essential first step to democratic consolidation:

> Democracy does not mean that problems will be solved; it does mean that rulers can be removed; and the essence of democratic behavior is doing the latter because it is impossible to do the former. Disillusionment and lowered expectations it produces are the foundation of democratic stability. Democracies become consolidated when people learn that democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily to anything else (1991, 263).

Taiwanese may be learning that democracy rest on the premise that governments will fail and democracy provides an institutionalized, electoral mechanism to “throw the rascal”

\(^{56}\) See “Goh Chok Tong on level of trust in government,” *Straits Times* 16 Apr 2010.
out. And that what was Taiwan it did in 2008 PE and LE where President Chen Shui-bian was booted from power and the DPP saw its legislative seat shares plummet from 39% to 23%. With the KMT back in power under the new electoral framework and stronger public demand for effective, transparent, clean government, we might see less party polarization and more party system stability in future.

The possibility of party alternation, degree of competitiveness and certainty of electoral outcomes distinguish authoritarian regimes from democracies. In Singapore, the possibility of alternation appears remote as institutionalized unlevel playing field has systematically disadvantage the opposition. Unlike Taiwan, there is no national identity crisis or socio-ethnic cleavage to mobilize the electorate. Through strategic coordination, the PAP has narrowed the electoral bases for mobilization and set the rules of the game for permissible electoral competition. Public opinion shows Singaporeans are dissatisfied with the way democracy is practiced in the country and there is growing demand for greater political participation. However, we can only have a better gauge how this demand translates to vote shares over the next few elections.

This dissertation has been largely driven by my puzzle with the exceptional resilience of the PAP government in Singapore and dissatisfaction with existing theories to explain why this is so. To understand how another similar hegemonic party regime fails to persist, I have selected the KMT regime in Taiwan for a comparative study. With extra time and resources, it would have been more ideal to include Mexico’s PRI and Malaysia’s UMNO – 2 other hegemonic party regimes as additional cases to test the strategic coordination theory and stretch the utility of the three-level theoretical framework. The additions of two paired comparisons across regions with varied socio-ethnic and cultural backgrounds would increase the richness of observations and inferences on how strategic coordination alters opposition mobilization and protects against failures. There is clearly more to be learned. I hope my dissertation has contributed and enriched our understanding on the sources of hegemonic party resilience and conditions under which they unravel.
REFERENCES


———. 1975. Politics in an administrative state: Where has the politics gone? University of Singapore, Department of Political Science.


———. 2009. The devolution of Taiwan's democracy during the Chen Shui-bian era. Journal of Contemporary China 18 (60): 463-78.


Cox, G. W. 1997. Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems. UK: Cambridge Univ Pr.


Taiwan Government Information Office. *Taiwan Yearbook 2009*. Republic of China (Taiwan), Taipei.

Taiwan Government Information Office. *Taiwan Yearbook 2008*. Republic of China (Taiwan), Taipei.

Taiwan Government Information Office. *Taiwan Yearbook 2007*. Republic of China (Taiwan), Taipei.


Wu, J. J. 1995. Taiwan's democratization: Forces behind the new momentum. HK: Oxford Univ Pr.


Publications and Documents in Chinese


Chen, Ming-Tong. 1990. Local factions and Taiwan’s political change. Taipei, Yueh Tan press.


——. Ed. 1976. The KMT’s 11th Party Affairs Progress Record.


——. Ed. 2010. The KMT’s 18th National Congress Report.


Newspapers, magazines and online-sites


*Penn World Table.* http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php [accessed Jan-Dec2009]


Documentary Videos


*Chiang Kai-shek and Ching-kuo in Taiwan.* 2007. DVD. Hi-Yu International Co. Ltd.


*President Chiang Ching-kuo: Presidential Anecdotes and Artifacts.* 2006. DVD. Academia Historica, National Taiwan University Press.

*Success Stories: Lee Kuan Yew.* 2001. DVD. Hong Kong: Innoform media.
Appendix A: List of Interviewees and Archival Sites in Singapore And Taiwan

**Singapore: List of interviews (2007-8)**

Anthony, Mely. 2007. Associate Professor, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Conversation, unrecorded, 1 Feb.
Chee, Soon Juan. 2008. Secretary General, Singapore Democratic Party. Interview by author. 15 Aug.
Chua, Beng Huat. 2007. Professor, Sociology, National University of Singapore. Interview by author. 6 Feb.
Heng, Russell. 2008. Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ISEAS. Interview by author. 20 Aug.
Lee, Koon Choy. 2007. Former PAP MP and Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Singapore Ambassador and High Commissioner to eight countries. Interview by author. 5 Dec.
Lim, Sylvia. 2007. WP NCMP, Chairman, Workers’ Party. Interview by author. 6 Feb.
Palmer, Michael. 2007. PAP MP of Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC, Partner, Harry Elias Partnership. Interview by author. 2 Aug.
Rodan, Garry. 2008. Professor, Politics and International Studies Programme of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities and Director of the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Conversation, unrecorded, 12 June 2008.
Tan, Kenneth P. 2008. Associate Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. Interview by author. 21 Aug.
Tay, Simon. 2008. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. Conversation, unrecorded, 17 Apr.
Tong, Perry. 2007. President of Youth Wing, Workers’ Party. Interview by author. 7 Feb.
Wong, Benjamin. 2007. Associate Professor, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University. Conversation, unrecorded, 5 Feb.

**Research and archival sites in Singapore**

- Singapore National Library
- SAFTI Military Institute Library
- National University of Singapore Library
- Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Library

**Taiwan: Lists of interviews (2007)**

Chang, Yu-Tzung. 2007. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. Project Manager, Asian Barometer. Interview by author. 26 Sep.
Chen, Peng-Jen. 2007. Professor and Head of Department, Japanese Language and Literature, Chinese Culture University. Former Director of the KMT Party History Institute and Central Committee of the KMT Party. Interview by author. 28 Sep.
Cheng, Su-Feng. 2007. Assistant Research Fellow, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. Conversations. 30 Apr.
Cheng, Tun-Jen. 2007. Professor, Political Science Department, College of William and Mary. Interview by author. 26 Nov.

Chu, Yun-Han. 2007. Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. President, Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation For International Scholarly Exchange. Interview by author. 13 Nov.


Ho, Szu-Yin. 2007. Professor, Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University. Director, Department of Overseas Affairs, Central Committee Member, the Kuomintang Party. Unrecorded conversation. 2007.


Huang, Min-Hua. 2007. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. Interview by author. 11 Oct.


Lin, Jih-Wen. 2007. Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University. Interview by author. 3 Oct.

MacIntosh, Ron. 2007. Executive Director, Canadian Trade Office in Taipei. Unrecorded conversations. 4 Oct.

Rigger, Shelley. 2007. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Davidson College. Unrecorded conversations. 3 July.

Shao, Hua-Min. 2007. Interview by author. 13 Nov and 20 Nov.

Shao, Ming-Huang. 2007. Director of Party Archives Library, Culture and Communications Affairs Committee, Central Committee Member, the KMT Party. Interview by author. 26 Sep.

Shih, Cheng-Feng. 2007. Professor, Political Science Department, Tamkang University. Chairman, Institute for National Development. Interview by author. 12 Sep.


Xu, Xin-Sheng. 2007. Director of the KMT Party Mainland Affairs Department and Member of the Policy Coordination Department. Interview by author. 2 Oct.

Yu, Ching-Hsin. 2007. Professor and Research Director of Election Study Center. National Chengchi University. Interview by author. 28 Nov.

**Research and archival sites in Taiwan**

Academia Sinica Library
Academia Historica
Kuomintang Party Archives Library
Taiwan National Library
Taiwan National University Library
### Appendix B: BTI Democracy Status and Key Indicators of Singapore and Taiwan, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>4.6 mil</td>
<td>22.9 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth</td>
<td>4.2 %</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>0.94 (2010)</td>
<td>0.902 (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Education Index</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>50,295</td>
<td>30,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy status</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking status</td>
<td>28/128</td>
<td>3/128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Stateness</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly on the use of force</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State identity</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No interference of religious dogmas</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic administration</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Political Participation</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and fair elections</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective power to govern</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association/assembly rights</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Rule of Law</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of powers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent judiciary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecution of office abuse</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Stability of democratic institutions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance of democratic institutions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to democratic institutions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Political and Social integration</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent to democratic norms</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational activities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *BTI* and country reports, 2010.
Appendix C: Organization Structure of the PAP, 1958 and present

a. PAP Organization, 1958


b. PAP Organization, present
Appendix D: Significant Events During the PAP’s early rule, 1960s

29 Apr 1961: Hong Lim By-election – Expulsion of Ong Eng Guan and dissolution of City Council led to re-contestation of Hong Lim seat. PAP candidate Jek Yuen Thong lost to Ong by 4,927 votes (46.6%).

15 Jul 1961: Anson By-election - The death of PAP Assemblyman triggered a 5-corner fight. PAP candidate lost again and David Marshall won by a plurality of 3, 598 votes (43.3%) under the WP flag. This election marked the end of independents in the Legislature.

Nov-Dec 1961: Examination Boycott

2 Feb 1963: Operation Cold Store – 111 communists, including key members from the BS were arrested and detained by the Internal Security Council. The arrest diminished the BS chances for the 1963 GE. Trade unions were brought under control and Singapore Association of Trade Union (SATU) was deregistered (Fong 1971, 128-9).

1 Sep 1962: Merger Referendum - The first and only referendum in Singapore to be held to vote on merger with Malaysia. BS boycotted the referendum as merger meant that the suppression of BS. 26% of votes were left blank. A majority voted for merger, 72% and gave the PAP the mandate to proceed.

16 Sep 1963: Malaysia Day - Singapore officially became a component part of Malaysia, along with Sabah and Sarawak. PAP registered itself in on Peninsular soil and contested in a Malaysian GE in 1964, which led to frictions with Malaysia's UMNO-led ruling Alliance coalition.

21 Sep 1963: 1963 GE - The fiercest and most severely fought election in the history of Singapore. 210 candidates nominated for 51 constituencies; the BS fielded 46 and the PAP, 51 candidates. The results returned PAP as the government with 47.4% votes and 37 seats. To end defections, the PAP passed a law to disqualify legislators from office if they had resigned or expelled from the party they stood for elections.

Sep-Dec 1963: Konfrontasi campaign - Indonesia under Sukarno severed relations with Malaysia, steps up border patrols and carried out Konfrontasi campaign three days after the elections. 7 bombs went off in different parts of Singapore over three months. Vigilante Corps formed in Sep 1964.

21 Jul 1964: Kallang racial riots – A procession to celebrate the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday along Kallang bridge broke into a fight and developed into the worst racial riots that Singapore had seen. A curfew was imposed for 2 weeks, a total of 23 people were killed and 454 injured.

Jul 1965: Hong Lim By-Election – Sole UPP MP Ong Eng Guan resigned his seat. Both PAP and BS contested. PAP’s candidate Lee Koon Choy won the seat by 2,052 votes (19.0%).

Sept 1965: Geyland Serai racial riots – A mysterious murder of a Malay trishaw-rider in Changi Road triggered another senseless and bloody riot. 12 people were killed and 109 injured. Curfew was imposed the second time.

10 Mar 1965: Terrorist Bomb – Bomb at Macdonald House killed 3 people and injured 33 others.


Source: Clutterbuck (1985); Fong (1971); Lee (1998); Pang (1971) and PBS On-line.
Appendix E: Party Organization Structures of the KMT, 1952 and present

a. KMT Organization, 1952

```
National Party Congress
  Party Chairman
  President's Office, Executive, Judicial and Examination Yuans
    Central Standing Committee
    Central Committee
    Work Committees
      Organization, Culture, Society, Youth, Mainland Affairs,
      Overseas Chinese, Women's Affairs, Training,
      General Secretary Office, Party Policy Committee
  Legislatives Yuan
  National Assembly
  Provincial and Special Municipality Organizations
    Country/City Organizations
      District Organs
      Branch Organs
      Cell Units
```


b. KMT Organization, present

```
National Party Congress
  Party Chairman
  Central Standing Committee
    Central Committee
    Secretary General
      Deputy Secretary General
  Central Steering Committee for Women
    Young KMT
    6 Work Committees
      Policy Committee
      Culture and Communication Committee
      National Development Institute
      Organizational Development
      Administrative Committee
      Organizational Development
  Provincial and Special Municipality Organizations
    Country/City Organizations
      District Organs
      Branch Organs
      Cell Units
```
### Appendix F: Ethnic Breakdown of the KMT Membership (1952-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KMT Chairman</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>KMT members (% of Total Popn.)</th>
<th>Total Membership</th>
<th>Taiwanese Membership</th>
<th>% of Taiwanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>34,382</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>50,147</td>
<td>38,317</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>232,000</td>
<td>64,854</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>282,959</td>
<td>73,852</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>403,260</td>
<td>106,459</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>509,864</td>
<td>152,464</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>564,784</td>
<td>166,046</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>950,993</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1,448,106</td>
<td>553,215</td>
<td>46.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,284,063</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Ching-Kuo</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>13.81</td>
<td>1,488,106</td>
<td>764,961</td>
<td>52.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>15.13</td>
<td>1,884,766</td>
<td>954,145</td>
<td>56.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>15.62</td>
<td>1,934,011</td>
<td>1,033,779</td>
<td>57.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>15.79</td>
<td>1,997,646</td>
<td>1,124,561</td>
<td>59.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>15.95</td>
<td>2,070,683</td>
<td>1,180,352</td>
<td>61.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>16.06</td>
<td>2,120,979</td>
<td>1,236,534</td>
<td>61.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>2,187,973</td>
<td>1,300,772</td>
<td>62.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>16.31</td>
<td>2,268,974</td>
<td>1,346,014</td>
<td>63.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>16.44</td>
<td>2,356,042</td>
<td>1,408,980</td>
<td>64.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>16.69</td>
<td>2,398,155</td>
<td>1,480,032</td>
<td>65.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>17.01</td>
<td>2,422,195</td>
<td>1,552,025</td>
<td>65.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>16.98</td>
<td>2,535,530</td>
<td>1,586,264</td>
<td>66.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Teng-hui</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>16.85</td>
<td>2,546,429</td>
<td>1,619,538</td>
<td>66.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>17.35</td>
<td>2,570,904</td>
<td>1,713,377</td>
<td>67.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>2,617,651</td>
<td>1,810,392</td>
<td>69.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>16.94</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>16.95</td>
<td>2,617,651</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lien Chan</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>952,835</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>1,061,959</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Ying-Jeou</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>1,040,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix G: World Bank Governance Indicators for Singapore & Taiwan (1998-2008)

SINGAPORE
Comparison between 2006,2003,1998 (top-bottom order)

Voice and Accountability
Political Stability
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption

Country's Percentile Rank (0-100)

TAIWAN
Comparison between 2006,2003,1998 (top-bottom order)

Voice and Accountability
Political Stability
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption

Country's Percentile Rank (0-100)

Appendix H: List of Registered Political Parties in Singapore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Current status/participation in elections</th>
<th>Date of Registration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Alliance Party Singapura</td>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Never contested</td>
<td>17 February 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Angkatan Islam</td>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Dormant</td>
<td>6 August 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Barisan Socialis</td>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Dormant</td>
<td>15 August 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Democratic Progressive Party</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Dormant</td>
<td>16 March 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 National Party of Singapore</td>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Defunct</td>
<td>26 February 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 National Solidarity Party</td>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>6 March 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Partai Rakyat, Singapore State Division</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Defunct</td>
<td>3 December 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Parti Kesatuan Ra’ayat (United Democratic Party)</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>18 June 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 People’s Action Party</td>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>18 February 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 People’s Republican Party</td>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Dormant</td>
<td>30 August 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 People’s Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>PLDP</td>
<td>Dormant</td>
<td>2 May 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Persatuan Melayu Singapura</td>
<td></td>
<td>Never contested</td>
<td>2 February 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (Singapore National Malay Organization)</td>
<td>PKMS/SMNO</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>20 February 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Reform Party</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Never Contested</td>
<td>3 July 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Singapore Chinese Party</td>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Dormant</td>
<td>26 September 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Singapore Democratic Alliance*</td>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>2 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Singapore Democratic Party</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>8 September 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Singapore Indian Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td>Never Contested</td>
<td>7 August 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Singapore Justice Party*</td>
<td>SJP</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>10 August 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Singapore National Front</td>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Never Contested</td>
<td>15 August 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Singapore People’s Party</td>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>21 November 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 The People’s Front</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Defunct</td>
<td>21 May 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 The Workers’ Party</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>30 January 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 United National Front</td>
<td>UNF</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>6 March 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 United People’s Front</td>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>20 March 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 United People’s Party</td>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>Dissolved</td>
<td>14 July 1961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Singapore Yearbook 2008 and Singapore Elections website.

---

1 4 parties joined an umbrella alliance and were registered as Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA) on 3 July 2001 in preparation for 2001 GE. SDA, led by Chiam See Tong, consisted of four parties including SPP, NSP, SJP and PKMS. NSP left the alliance after GE2006.

**1988**

1. **Jan. 13**  
   CCK died at the age of 78. Vice President Lee Teng-hui succeeded CCK as the president of the ROC.

2. **Jan. 20**  
   The KMT CSC meeting originally scheduled for the purpose of electing LTH as the acting party chairman was cancelled because KMT conservatives led by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, preferred a collective leadership instead of an acting chairman.

3. **Jan. 27**  
   After intra-party struggles, Lee Teng-hui was elected acting chairman of the KMT.

4. **Feb. 3**  
   The KMT CSC passed a resolution, promising to increase the number of additional members in the national representative bodies to call for the voluntary retirement of senior First National Representatives.

5. **Feb. 22**  
   In his first press conference, Lee said that he would handle the Taiwan-Mainland relations with a new approach, but within the framework of the “three Nos policy” and adopt a flexible strategy to improve Taiwan’s foreign relations. He also mentioned Taiwan independence was an illegal activity that would severely jeopardize Taiwan’s stability.

6. **Jul. 8**  
   Lee Teng-hui elected Party Chairman in the KMT’s 13th Party Congress.

7. **Jul. 14**  
   The First Plenum of KMT’s 13th Party Congress passed the accounted for more than half of the CSC members, with 16 of 31 newly elected CSC members in Taiwanese (KMT secretary-general Lee Huan, prime Minister Yu Kuo-hua, and the Secretary-General of the Presidential Office Shen Chang-huan all remained in office).

8. **Oct. 17**  
   Lee replaced Shen Chan-huan, the Secretary-General of the Presidential Office and a hard-liner, with Lee Yuan-tsu, a soft-liner.

9. **Dec. 25**  
   Lee announced that due to Taiwan’s special circumstances, it was necessary that the Temporary Provisions continued to be practiced and that the ROC Constitution remained unchanged. He stressed that political reform should follow the framework of the ROC Constitution and the Temporary Provisions.

**1989**

1. **Jan. 26**  
   The Legislative Yuan passed a bill giving each senior representatives who agreed to a voluntary retirement a monetary compensation of approximately US $300,000.

2. **Mar. 9**  
   Lee returned from his 4-day visit to Singapore. When asked by reporters what he thought about being addressed by the Singaporean press as “the President from Taiwan”, he said he found it “not satisfactory but acceptable”.

3. **May 22**  
   Lee nominated Lee Huan to replace Yu Kuo-buan as the prime minister and later promoted James Soong to KMT secretary-general. Sung had been a strong supporter of LTH during the KMT’s intra-party struggles.
Appendix J: TI Corruption Index for Taiwan and Singapore (1995-2009)²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwan CPI</th>
<th>World Ranking</th>
<th>Singapore CPI</th>
<th>World Ranking</th>
<th>Total countries polled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transparency International.

² CPI ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians through surveys of businessmen, political analysts and the general public; a perfect 10.00 score would be a totally corruption-free country. See Transparency International, CPI.
## Appendix K: Old and New Electoral Systems in Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Old Multi-Member Districts, Vote</th>
<th>New Single-Member Districts, Two Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Seats in the Legislature</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Districts</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Seats</td>
<td>166 (avg. 5.8 per district)</td>
<td>73 (1 per district)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats for Indigenous Peoples</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Highland/Lowland Constituencies)</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>3/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total At-large Seats</td>
<td>49 (22% of 225 seats)</td>
<td>34 (30% of 113 seats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC-based/Expatriate Legislators</td>
<td>41/8</td>
<td>No quota for residents or expatriates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes per Voter</td>
<td>One vote, cast for a single district or indigenous-constituency candidate (though a district or constituency may have several seats)</td>
<td>Two ballots, one cast for a district or indigenous-constituency candidate; the other (at-large ballot) for a political party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of At-large Seats</td>
<td>Divided proportionally among parties receiving over 5 percent of the total vote</td>
<td>Divided proportionally among parties receiving over 5 percent of the total at-large vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Legislators</td>
<td>If a party wins between 5 and 10 seats in a given district or indigenous-constituency, or in the ROC-based or expatriate division of at-large seats, then the party's list of winning candidates in that category must include one woman. For every 10 additional winners in a given district or in the ROC-based division, the party's list must include one more woman.</td>
<td>At least 50 percent of a party's at-large legislators must be women. There is no minimum for district and indigenous-constituency seats.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Taiwan Yearbook*, 2009.
### Appendix L: Electoral Systems of Singapore and Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>Unicameral System: The Parliament</td>
<td>Unicameral System: Legislative Yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System</td>
<td>A mixture of first-past-the-post system in single-member (SMCs) and group representation constituencies (GRCs) (1988-present)</td>
<td>Two-vote mixed parallel member proportional (MMM, mixed member majoritarian or mixed superposition) (2007-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Electoral System</td>
<td>First-past-the-post system in SMCs (1968-1988)</td>
<td>SNTV and additional national list (plurality and 5% of total valid votes; Hare-Niemeyer) (1968-1988) 2 under parallel voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Individual Votes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 under parallel voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Legislature</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>113 seats (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Constituencies</td>
<td>23 constituencies (9 SMCs, 5 GRCs with 6 seats and 9 GRCs with 5 seats each)</td>
<td>73 constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(73 SMD-plurality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34 seats (party-list PR system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 seats (reserved for Taiwanese aborigines under SNTV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold (Party List)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5% threshold for party lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Party List</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quota</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, 6 seats reserved for Taiwanese aborigines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Quota</td>
<td>Yes (at least 1 ethnic minority per GRC)</td>
<td>Closed party-list, PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen requirement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Voting</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum voting age</td>
<td>21 months</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum period of residence in the electoral district</td>
<td>Allowed in SMCs</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Candidates</td>
<td>Allowed</td>
<td>Allowed in SMDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of the Elections</td>
<td>Elections administered by civil servants in the Elections Department, under the PM’s Office. No independent election commission.</td>
<td>Administered by Central Election Commission, under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan. The CEC consists of 11-19 party representatives and non-partisan nominees, appointed by the Premier and confirmed by the Legislature. 4 No independent Election Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

3 Taiwan does not permit absentee or overseas voting. All votes must be cast inside the country. In 2008 PE, an estimated 250,000 Taiwanese expatriates returned to Taiwan to vote. “Overseas Taiwanese Return Home to Vote.” ABC online, 24 March 2008.

Appendix M: List of Active Parties in Singapore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>CEC</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>Newsletter</th>
<th>Date of Registration</th>
<th>Yrs</th>
<th>Succession</th>
<th>Electoral Participation</th>
<th>Parliamentary Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s Action Party (PAP)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Petir</td>
<td>18 Feb 1961</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Workers’ Party (WP)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,557</td>
<td>4 Committees</td>
<td>Hammer</td>
<td>30 Jan 1961</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Yes (JBJ; LTK; SL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pertanohana Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS)</td>
<td>Un-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 HQ</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20 Feb 1961</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>In-fighting</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore People’s Party (SPP) (offshoot of SDP)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 HQ</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>21 Nov 1994</td>
<td>29/15</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Yes (CST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>1 HQ</td>
<td>New Democrat</td>
<td>8 Sep 1980 – 1993; 1993 - 29</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Yes (CST)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Solidarity Party (NSP)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2 Committees 1 Town Council</td>
<td>North Star News</td>
<td>6 Mar 1987</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Yes (SC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Party (offshoot of WP)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30 - 60</td>
<td>1 HQ</td>
<td>New Dawn</td>
<td>3 Jul 2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Never Contested</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA)</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2 Jul 2001</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Yes (CST)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

467 JBJ-JB Jeyaretnam; LTK-Low Thia Khiang; SL-Sylvia Lim; CST-Chiam See Tong; SC-Steve Chia.
Appendix N: Voter Turnout in Singapore (1968-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GE</th>
<th>Eligible</th>
<th>Total voters</th>
<th>Voters (%)</th>
<th>“Walkover Voters”</th>
<th>“Walkover” voters (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>759,367</td>
<td>84,883</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>674,484</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>908,382</td>
<td>812,926</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>95,456</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,095,817</td>
<td>857,297</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>238,520</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,290,426</td>
<td>685,141</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>605,285</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,495,389</td>
<td>944,624</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>550,765</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,669,013</td>
<td>1,449,838</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>219,175</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,692,384</td>
<td>847,716</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>844,668</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,881,011</td>
<td>765,332</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>1,115,679</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,036,923</td>
<td>675,306</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>1,361,617</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,159,721</td>
<td>1,223,442</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>936,279.0</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Singapore Elections website.
### Appendix O: Taiwan's Constitutional Reforms in the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
<td>Direct gubernatorial election</td>
<td>Suspend elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>Extending seats; add overseas delegates</td>
<td>Approves nomination of members of Control, Judicial &amp; Examination Yuans; yearly meeting</td>
<td>Chair instituted referendum needed to impeach president</td>
<td>Term extended; PR system based on LE results*</td>
<td>Powers transferred to the Legislative Yuan. Assembly election suspended.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Yuan</td>
<td>Extending seats; overseas delegates</td>
<td>President nominates, Assembly approves; lose affirmation power of presidential appointments</td>
<td>Cannot impeach or review president</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination Yuan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Yuan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election of president</td>
<td>Electorates defined</td>
<td>Direct election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>Extending seats; overseas delegates</td>
<td>Can initiate impeachment of president; membership increased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President-Executive relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential powers</td>
<td>Emergency order</td>
<td>Nominate members of Control, Judicial, Examination Yuans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Established by President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>Introduced PR seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive-legislative relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Override threshold decreased; vote of no confidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President-legislative relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Can remove premier</td>
<td>Reactive dissolution of Legislative Yuan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix P: Comparative Freedom House Scores of Singapore and Taiwan (1973-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th></th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Freedom House
PR: Political rights score
CL: Civil Liberties score
NF: Not Free
PF: Partly Free
F: Free