

FROM THE INTERNAL TO THE EXTERNAL:
A SELECTED TRANSLATION AND STUDY OF FOUR ARCHAEOLOGICAL
TEXTS AND THEIR ACCOUNT OF HUMAN NATURE

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis covers four of the Confucian bamboo strip manuscripts discovered in the Guodian archaeological site: *Liude*, *Xing zi ming chu*, *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi*. Much of the scholarship to date on the Guodian manuscripts has treated all of the Confucian texts as a unit, or has examined each text in isolation, ignoring the potential differences and similarities between individual texts or groups of texts within this corpus. This thesis is intended to address this problem by investigating the conceptual themes that connect these four texts into a single, coherent philosophy. Because the four texts addressed in this thesis appear to have been originally bound together into a single bundle of bamboo strips, they present an ideal starting point for this investigation.

Chapter One examines the distinction made between the biological relationships of the family and the non-biological relationships of the social and political world, and how this affects people's innate emotional dispositions. Chapter Two considers the question of human nature as it was understood at the time, and the possibility that these texts were written as a response to the concept of human nature that had been recently proposed by rival philosophers. Chapter Three examines how these fundamental questions of biology, society and human nature form the foundation of a political philosophy, and how later thinkers would adopt the rhetoric of this philosophy, but would do away with the fundamentally Confucian beliefs that underlie the political vision of these four specific texts.

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1 Introduction

With the development in mid-Warring States China of a set of philosophical concepts that rooted morality within a coherent definition of the innate dispositions of human nature, Confucian thinkers were compelled to provide their own account of human nature that justified their ethical and political vision. Until recently, the major example from Confucianism of an ethical system that specifically responded to this new concept of human nature was Mencius, who claimed that human nature contained the necessary resources to allow a person to become morally accomplished. Now, with the discovery of the Guodian archaeological texts, we have a new example of a system of Confucian thought that responded to this new concept in a novel way, attempting to justify Confucian ethics by asserting that humans are unique among living beings in their capacity to exceed their nature through the power of culture and education. This view is further predicated on a key distinction between the moral feelings that people are spontaneously capable of feeling toward family members and the moral feelings directed towards non-kin relationships that can only be developed through moral training. Although these texts arguably share much in common with the later thinker Xunzi, they remain unique in their emphasis on the fundamental difference between these two kinds of feelings. They use this account of human nature to justify their political philosophy – a view of government that relies on an understanding of and adherence to human nature and people's inherent emotional dispositions; thus, they ultimately attempt to reconcile the distinctively Confucian beliefs in the ineluctable structure of human society and the primacy of biological family within that society, as well as the important role of the political world, with the innate nature of the individual. It is my intention in this paper to explore how these themes connect four specific Guodian texts together into a coherent moral philosophy. Although each of these texts focuses on its own particular concern, each of them is also fundamentally engaged with the overall moral vision that they share. Because of the difficulties

involved in dealing with archaeological texts, exploring these themes also requires addressing issues of translation and philology. As such, this paper is a work of both philology and philosophy.

1.1 The Guodian Manuscripts

In October 1993, in the city of Guodian 郭店 in Hubei 湖北 province, China, a tomb was excavated whose contents included 804 bamboo strips of text.¹ Unlike the majority of archaeologically excavated bamboo texts that have been discovered so far, these were all philosophical writings. Consequently, and not surprisingly, the texts were of immediate interest to scholars of Chinese religious and intellectual history. From practically the moment the strips were made publicly available in 1998, after the Jingmen city museum 荊門市博物館 staff had finished restoring and organising the strips, they became the subject of prodigious scholarly writing. The tomb itself, designated by archaeologists as “Guodian Chu tomb number one” 郭店一號楚墓 was located near the Warring States city of Ying 郢 which was then capital of the state of Chu 楚. Although there is no specific textual evidence in the tomb to indicate a precise date, the style of the tomb and its contents bear similarities to other, nearby Chu tombs that can be accurately dated. The tomb almost certainly does not date later than 278 BCE, the year that the Qin 秦 army occupied Ying. After 278 BCE, local burials near Ying show a clear Qin cultural influence not seen in the Guodian tomb. Based on the tomb typology, it most likely dates to slightly earlier than 300 BCE. It can thus be considered to be a late fourth century BCE tomb (Allan & Williams 2000: 119).

In early 1994, a collection of more than 1,200 further bamboo texts from the state of Chu appeared on the Hong Kong antiques market and were purchased by the Shanghai Museum 上海博物

¹ For a general history of this tomb and the bamboo texts found inside it, see Allen & Williams 2000, as well as Shaughnessy 2006. Both of these works also deal with the methodological issues involved in interpreting these texts.

館。These again were philosophical texts, and the Shanghai Museum began to publish them in volumes starting in 2001. To date there are seven volumes available, with more yet to come. These texts were collected by grave robbers, and as a result we have no archaeological information on the tomb(s) in which they were originally sealed. In this paper, I do not deal directly with the Shanghai corpus, but because a parallel version of the Guodian text *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出 was also discovered among the Shanghai Museum strips, this second corpus is also of use to this paper.

Included among the texts that make up the Guodian corpus was a version of the *Daodejing* 道德經 in a form that is substantially different from the received version². It is to date the earliest known version of the text, and it has received by far the greatest academic attention. In addition to the *Daodejing*, a version of *Ziyi* 緇衣, a well-known chapter of the received *Liji* 禮記, was also discovered; but beyond these two texts, the majority of the remaining manuscripts are comprised of previously unknown content. The obvious exception is the text *Wuxing* 五行 which did not survive into the received tradition, but had been previously discovered on a silk sheet alongside the *Daodejing* in the famous Mawangdui 馬王堆 archaeological site, excavated in the early 1970s and dating to the Western Han dynasty.

The unknown texts have been slower to receive attention, due largely to the fact that the *Daodejing* is one of the most popular and important texts in the received tradition. In addition, the added difficulty of interpreting a previously unknown text, written in an ancient Chu script that is not well understood, is considerable. If there is an exception to this relative lack of attention, it is the opening lines of *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出, which discuss human nature (*xing* 性), that has captured the interest of the scholarly community.

2 In fact, in the Guodian corpus there are three bundles of strips made up of passages that are now considered to belong to the single text called *Daodejing*, or *Laozi*, suggesting that these passages were not considered at the time to belong to a single work.

Understanding the meaning and significance of each text, its place in history and its connection to specific philosophical schools of the time requires dealing with a number of complex, interrelated issues. First, there are the two most fundamental issues of textual integrity and strip order. Textual integrity involves determining which strips were originally collected into one bound roll, and then dividing each roll of strips into individual texts. Strip order refers to the specific order of strips within an individual text.

The original binding straps that connected the strips together and in their correct order had long ago disintegrated, leaving the remaining manuscripts in a disordered pile of disconnected strips. Determining which strips were originally bound together relies primarily on physical evidence. When the original editors of the Guodian manuscripts were presented with these hundreds of bamboo strips, their first task was to physically restore the more than two thousand-year-old bamboo and render the actual characters as legible as possible. After this, they had to deal with the particularly difficult task of putting the strips together into individual bundles. The length of complete strips and the distance between the marks left on them by the original binding straps indicates which were originally bound together into a single bundle. Further dividing each bundle into individual texts then requires taking into account the philosophical content, character style and calligraphic hand.

Once these issues of textual integrity are made reasonably clear, it then becomes necessary to place the strips in the correct order within each text. Because many of the strips are damaged, and entire sections of text have been lost, it is frequently impossible to connect all of a single text's strips together into one continuous and unbroken chain. As a result, we are often left with a number of discrete sections of internally connected strips; it often remains unclear in what order these sections should be in respect to each other.

After these questions of textual integrity and strip order have been addressed, one can begin to deal with questions of palaeography. The Guodian manuscripts were written in the state of Chu before

the unification of China under the First Emperor in 221 BCE. Consequently, it pre-dates the standardisation of writing that begin in the Qin dynasty. This ancient Chu script is still not entirely understood even by the best of palaeographers, although a remarkable amount of excellent scholarship has already been done³. When dealing with particularly unclear characters, determining their meaning frequently relies on context and guesswork. Finally, when palaeographic questions have been largely dealt with, one can begin the study of the texts' philosophical content.

This simplified story of how one goes about studying these texts is essentially true, but has so far neglected the complex degree of interaction between each step. Determining textual integrity requires not only an examination of physical data but also of the philosophical content. Deciding how to read damaged sections of text or unclear Chu script characters relies on philological interpretation but also needs to be grounded in a thorough understanding of the intellectual content and purpose of each text that is being translated.

Understanding the intellectual content requires, in turn, understanding the specific content of each individual text on its own, understanding the connection between each text within the Guodian corpus and placing these texts individually and as a collection within the context of the development of Warring States intellectual history more broadly. This last point presents the intellectual environment in which these texts were produced and the philosophical concepts, questions and debates to which they were addressed. To appreciate the full relevance of these texts requires that none of these elements is neglected. Despite the considerable attention the Guodian corpus has received, there remains considerable work to be done on each of these points, from the specific details of palaeography to the broad picture of Warring States thought.

Obviously it is not my intention to fully address all of these points in one paper, nor to deal with the Guodian corpus in its entirety; rather, it is my intention to begin connecting these points together by

³ Much of my translation relies on work done by Qiu Xigui (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998), Li Ling (Li 2007a) and Ding Yuanzhi (Ding 2004).

addressing them in union on a small scale. My focus is on four specific Guodian texts that appear to have been originally bound together into one scroll: *Liude* 六德, *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出, *Zun deyi* 尊德義 and *Cheng zhi wen zhi* 成之聞之.⁴ Much of the scholarship to date on the Guodian corpus has focused on readings of individual texts in isolation, or on selective readings of specific passages, which are chosen to elucidate broad themes in Confucianism generally. Limiting textual comparisons to the larger, accepted schools of the received canon implicates these texts with much broader systems of thought than may be warranted, and draws attention away from the underlying philosophical thread that they may share in common. Limiting my examination to four specific texts allows me to highlight the ways in which these texts differ from other texts of the received canon, and place their philosophical concerns within the more specific context of the time in which they were written. Because of the intimate connection between these four texts that is suggested by their belonging to a single scroll, these manuscripts in particular are an ideal starting point for this kind of study.

The intention of this paper is two-fold. First, I hope to address the intellectual concerns discussed above and the ways in which these four texts can be meaningfully considered as a unit. Second, I hope to unite the philosophical with the philological in order to create a more meaningful translation of major sections of these texts. Resolving the difficult philological issues of palaeography and strip order remains of primary importance to the interpretation of philosophical concepts inherent within these works; at the same time, philosophical analysis remains a vital tool in resolving these same textual problems. It is only through the mutual application of philology and philosophy together that the texts can be reliably understood. The first section of this paper will address the conceptual themes shared by these four texts, while the second section will present a philological translation of the major sections of these manuscripts, establishing the philological justification for the translations that I use in

⁴ The manuscripts themselves bear no titles. These were the titles given the texts by the original editors. Throughout the paper, I refer to the texts by these names in order to avoid confusion. In the translations proper at the end of this paper, I present a title at the head of each text that I feel is more descriptive.

discerning these conceptual themes, while simultaneously applying these conceptual themes, where sufficiently clear, to passages that are particularly troublesome in the hopes of offering solutions to these issues that are rooted in a firm understanding of their philosophical context.

I will not be directly addressing the question of authorship. Although a veritable cottage industry has developed in the field of Warring States philosophy regarding the questions of the authorship and lineage of these texts, there is little evidence connecting these texts to any particular individual. The majority of scholars continue to argue that the Guodian texts represent part of a Simeng 思孟 school of thought, referring to Zisi 子思⁵ and Mencius, while others have argued that they belong to a school of Gaozi 告子, the philosopher who famously debates with Mencius on the question of human nature in *Mengzi* 6A1-5. Gaozi does famously argue that *ren* is internal and *yi* is external, a view that is mirrored in *Liude*, as we shall see below. Thus, there is some reason to consider Gaozi in examining these Guodian texts. However, to ascribe these texts to a “school of Gaozi” is not helpful, because almost nothing is actually known about Gaozi as a person or a thinker. It is unlikely that Mencius gives a very accurate representation of his system of thought in *Mengzi* 6A. My purpose in this paper is to examine the conceptual themes of the Guodian texts themselves. As a direction for future research, I believe the conceptual themes I attempt to illustrate here may help us to better understand the precise nature of Mencius' and Gaozi's disagreement.

1.2 Textual Integrity

The bamboo strips that were divided by the original editors of the Guodian manuscripts into the four texts *Xing zi ming chu*, *Liude*, *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi*, appear to have originally been bound together into one bundle. Of the 195 strips that make up these texts, they are all of the same

⁵ See Csikszentmihalyi 2004: 86-100 and Goldin 2005 for summaries of the argument that these texts are connected to Zisi.

approximate length of 32.5cm and share the same approximate distance between the markings left by the original bindings of 17.5cm. The content of the texts are also clearly of a similar Confucian theme, and the decision to divide them into these four separate texts was made based on specific details of character form and context (Cook 2006: 155). Although this particular textual division is not universally agreed upon, the majority of scholars continue to accept the division into these four texts, while also suggesting revisions to the specific sequence of the strips within them.

As Scott Cook (2006: 157-8) notes, certain character forms peculiar to specific texts strongly indicate that this division is warranted, citing Qiu Xigui's 裘錫圭 opinion that the character forms of *Xing zi ming chu* and *Liude* are the most similar, while *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi* each bear notably different character forms. Specifically, he notes *Cheng zhi wen zhi*'s particular way of writing *zhe* 者, *er* 而 and *ze* 則, adding that – minus one or two instances of 者 – there are no exceptions in the forms of these characters within each text. There is a degree of self-fulfilling logic to this argument: given that the textual divisions suggested by the original editors of these strips were presumably made based on precisely this sort of evidence, we certainly should not expect exceptions. It is also problematic to base a textual division on the consistent use of specific characters while ignoring occasional exceptions to this usage. In addition, if we do not take for granted that the forms of characters within a single text necessarily need to be consistent, or even written a single scribe, then the issue becomes immediately more complex. Early work by Matthias Richter (2004) on the question of individual hands in the Guodian Manuscripts suggests that questions of a material nature, including types, styles and hands of writing as well as usage of orthography remain uncertain and largely unexplored. He also notes that even if questions of textual integrity and strip order were resolved, “we could still not be certain whether one manuscript, in the sense of a codicological unit, comprised several such textual units or only one (or perhaps even less)” (2004: 133).

If the division into these four texts is accepted, there are certain thematic overlaps: for example in *Cheng zhi wen zhi* strips 31-32, there is a passage that speaks very specifically on the topic of the same “six social positions” (六位) that are central to the theme of *Liude*. If content is used as the primary means of determining textual divisions, then logically this passage should belong with *Liude*. However, as Cook (2006: 158) notes, we can also find references to Heaven's Constancy and the six social positions in *Cheng zhi wen zhi* strips 37-38, where we also find the distinct forms of the characters 而 and 者 that are considered to belong exclusively to *Cheng zhi wen zhi*. All of this is to say that the issue of textual integrity is not completely resolved: although the material evidence of specific character forms provides strong evidence that the textual divisions made by the original editors are correct, we should not assume that this evidence is final. However, in addition to direct material evidence, there is also the matter of strip sequence and textual integrity. The current textual division provides four coherent texts that are each made up of often large sections of meaningfully connected strips. Removing strips from these meaningful passages disrupts an otherwise compelling sequence. Thus, breaking up the texts and reorganising them causes substantially more problems in terms of material evidence, strip order and scribal integrity than it resolves. It is predominantly in the case of individual strips or short sections of text that reconsidering strip order is more plausible, but in such cases the overall integrity of these four texts is not put into question. Simply in terms of conceptual themes and style, it also appears the division into these four specific texts is sound. *Liude* deals very specifically with the six social positions and its content is generally limited to this, particularly in the passages I have selected for translation. *Xing zi ming chu* in its first half deals very clearly with issues of human nature, genuine emotions and the development of ritual by the sages of antiquity; its second half is less clear, but is concerned for the most part with praising the value of genuine emotions in political endeavours. *Zun deyi* and *Cheng zhi wen zhi* both deal primarily with politics.

1.3 Conceptual Themes

In understanding the ways in which these four texts relate to each other, it may be of use to use the common Confucian metaphor of roots and branches. Although the ultimate end for these works is establishing a successful system of government, the political concerns act as the branches of this philosophy. Political success is the ultimate conclusion of a moral theory that begins with moral roots of family, human nature and self-cultivation. Only if these aspects are correctly addressed can the final, political concepts be understood.

My discussion of these concepts will consequently begin with the roots by discussing the understanding of the family that these texts present, and the ways in which the basic social divisions are established. This view of social division is based on a fundamental difference between biological and non-biological relationships. This difference, in turn, acts as a core moral dilemma: because it is more difficult to correctly establish moral feelings toward non-biological relationships, a system of self-cultivation is required to do so. This system of self-cultivation is based on a specific conception of human nature and the role that the genuine emotions play in ethically transforming oneself internally. These two concepts, social division and self-cultivation, are the emphases of *Liude* and *Xing zi ming chu* respectively.

The political branches of this philosophy are emphasised in *Zun deyi* and *Cheng zhi wen zhi*. They present a political system that is based on the idea of “following the hearts of the people,” and which requires an understanding of human nature and people's emotional dispositions. They argue that only a morally self-cultivated ruler can successfully manage the kind of moral leadership that is needed to produce a genuine ethical effect on the common people, and thus the beginning of proper government lies in the moral self-cultivation of the ruler.

1.4 Note on Translation

There is as of yet no published translation of these Guodian texts in whole. However, there are a number of publications that include partial translations, and in making use of these publications I am significantly indebted to these English renditions. This includes Perkins 2009, Brindley 2006a and 2006b, Slingerland 2008, Cheng 2002, Goldin 2005 and Puett 2004. In addition, I am indebted to the renditions of these works in their full into modern Chinese by Ding 2004 and Tu 2001, and to Li Tianhong's modern Chinese rendition of *Xing zi ming chu* (Li 2002). Although I often depart in ways both significant and minor from these translations, they have always helped elucidate the meaning of the texts overall, and at times the particular choice of wording or phrasing simply cannot, in my opinion, be improved upon.

2 Biology and Society

Operating at the very base of these texts' moral and political philosophy is a specific understanding of the human relations (人倫) and the social positions (位) into which people are naturally divided. The texts, and *Liude* in particular, attempt to define and account for the natural diversity of human society while simultaneously establishing a theory that fits each of the distinct social roles into a single cosmological unity. *Cheng zhi wen zhi* describes this unity as the “Great Constancy,” which it explains is manifested in three specific and distinct kinds of relationships:

天降大常，以理人倫。制為君臣之義，作為父子之親，分為夫婦之辨。是故小人亂天常以逆大道，君子治人倫以順天德

Heaven sends down the Great Constancy, and by means of this it orders the human relations. It is (deliberately) regulated in the form of the *yi* between Ruler and Minister, it is (naturally) expressed in the form of intimacy between father and son, and it is (clearly) differentiated in the form of the distinction between husband and wife. Therefore, the Petty Man brings chaos to Heaven's Constancy by opposing the Great *Dao* (while) the Gentleman orders the human relations by following Heaven's Virtue.

Liude also emphasises the fact that these six basic social positions are an inherent feature of human society: “As long as people have existed, there have necessarily been husbands and wives, fathers and sons, rulers and ministers” (生民斯必有夫婦、父子、君臣). Each of these six positions has its own specific function in society and it is necessary for these functions to be fulfilled in order to maintain social stability. It is part of the natural diversity of human society that:

有率人者，有從人者，有使人者，有事人[者，有教]者，有[學]者。此六職也。

There are those who lead others and those who follow others, those who employ others and those who serve others, those who [instruct] and those who [learn]. These are the six duties.

For these four texts, the six social roles serve as the most fundamental truth of the human condition and represent human society as, so it is argued, nature intended. To fail to maintain this social paradigm is to work against the natural structure of the human world, as determined by Heaven. For these texts, this specific structure of human society is cosmologically significant.

At the same time, while the social structure is perceived to exist as a single, natural whole, the six roles can be divided into three distinct pairs: husband and wife, father and son, and ruler and minister. Each pair forms a hierarchical relationship: the husband commands the wife, the father rules the son, and the ruler commands the minister. The idea of a social hierarchy is one of the essential points distinguishing Confucianism from rival schools of philosophy. While Mohism accepted the absolute authority of rulers and a social hierarchy, they did not adhere to the precise social vision of the Confucians or the precedence given to one's own biological family. The so-called proto-Daoists, primitivists and individualists rejected any notion of social hierarchy at all.⁶

The three pairs of social positions are considered equally important and necessary to create a healthy and stable society, but, as is typical of these texts, they are not all equally fundamental. Throughout these four texts, human nature, society and moral self-cultivation are shown as a series of progressive steps that begins with the most fundamental truths and builds up towards the more complex. Thus, just as the political system is ultimately rooted in the view of human society that is shown in *Liude*, human society itself is based on a progression of steps building up gradually from what the original writers considered to be the most fundamental and clear distinction between human beings (biological sex) up to the more tenuous and murky political roles. It is this progressive hierarchy of human social distinctions that ultimately connects these three pairs of social relationships into the single cosmological unity of Heaven's Great Constancy.

The first and most fundamental aspect of human society is the distinction between male and female. Once this distinction is made, then intimacy can arise between husband and wife. Once this intimacy arises, then the proper sense of *yi* can develop between ruler and minister:

男女別 生焉，父子親生焉，君臣義生焉。

(Once) the proper distinction between male and female is made, then affection will arise between

6 See Graham 1985 for a discussion of the respective views on family and society held by the Confucians, Mohists and individualists.

father and son; (once affection has arisen between father and son), *yi* will arise between ruler and minister.

If one fails to correctly adhere to the more fundamental aspects of human society, then the less fundamental aspects will fail to materialise. Thus, it is necessary for a ruler to understand how these three distinct social relationships form together into a cohesive whole:

君子不啻明乎民微而已，又以知其一矣。男女不別，父子不親；父子不親，君臣無義。The gentleman is not content to understand only the details (of each social role) and cease there, but rather also seeks to understand their unity. If male and female are not distinguished, then father and son will not be intimate. If father and son are not intimate, then there will be no *yi* between ruler and minister.

One's biological sex was considered to be the most fundamental and intrinsic distinction between human beings. In the social world this sexual difference is defined by its clear distinction (辨) and demonstrated by the relationship between husband and wife. Once this basic sexual distinction is made, and the differences between the sexes, as they were understood at the time, were established, then father and son could develop a sense of intimacy appropriate to and developed by virtue of their shared maleness.⁷ The father-son relationship is less physically intrinsic and fundamental than one's physical sex, but it is still defined by a biological connection. Thus, it is more difficult to achieve the proper relationship between father and son than it is to properly distinguish male from female; it is also more easily and naturally developed than the relationship between ruler and minister which has no biological connection whatsoever.

As Edward Slingerland (2008: 241) and Wang Bo (2001: 163) both point out, one of the main differences between the natural father-son relationship and the ruler-minister relationship is that the former is given while the latter is chosen. In a situation where a minister disagrees with a ruler, he can sever his relationship, but in a situation where a son disagrees with a father, he cannot do so. The

⁷ Although the sexual distinction is treated as fundamental, it also receives the least attention and explanation in these texts. Because women were barred from the political world and from the Confucian moral system, the entire social vision of the texts is of a male world.

intimacy between a father and a son arises (作) spontaneously while the ruler-minister relationship requires deliberate regulation (制). In the progressive stages involved in developing the proper (male) human relationships, it is necessary to first develop the feeling of intimacy between father and son before one can hope to develop the proper feeling of *yi* between ruler and minister. This is due to the fact that the ruler-minister relationship is the least physically intrinsic of all the relationships. The fact that it is chosen rather than biologically determined makes it the most fragile of all the social relationships. Developing this feeling of *yi* consequently requires the most effort. Bridging this gap between the spontaneously developed feelings of family members and the deliberately established feelings of the wider social world is the purpose of the system of moral self-cultivation that these texts propose.

The way that these texts explain the difference between these two kinds of feelings is by describing the spontaneous feelings of family as “internal” and the deliberate feelings of the social world as “external.” These feelings are represented by *ren* and *yi* respectively:

仁，内也。義，外也。禮樂，共也。内位父子 夫也，外位君臣婦也。

Ren is internal, *yi* is external. Ritual and music are both (internal and external). The internal positions are: father, son and husband. The external positions are ruler, minister and wife⁸.

The means of bridging the gap between the internal and external involves ritual and music, as they occupy a unique position that will be explained in the following chapter and that is central to the thesis of *Xing zi ming chu*. As Wang Bo (2001) notes, when the text refers to *yi*, there appears to be two distinct but related concepts: the general *yi* of moral appropriateness in society, and the specific *yi* appropriate to the relationship between ruler and minister. *Xing zi ming chu* deals particularly with the former, while *Liude* is concerned especially with the latter. In addition to ritual and music, and more specifically important to developing the *yi* specific to the ruler-minister relationship, is filial piety (孝).

⁸ It is unclear why the texts place husband among the internal positions and wife among the external positions. Throughout the text, the distinction between internal and external seems to apply most fittingly to the father-son and ruler-minister relationships specifically.

Liude proposes a metaphorical extension of the relationship between father and son on to the relationship between ruler and minister. Because the ruler-minister relationship builds naturally upon the foundation of the father-son relationship, it is absolutely vital that the correct relationship between father and son first be developed before the proper ruler-minister relationship can occur. As a result, in the moral system of *Liude*, the son occupies the most important position, and filial piety the most important virtue; it is, in fact, the “root” (孝，本也).

This emphasis on filial piety and respect for elders (literally “obedience to an elder brother” 弟) is demonstrated as well in Analects 1.2:

有子曰：“其為人也孝弟，而好犯上者，鮮矣；不好犯上，而好作亂者，未之有也。君子務本，本立而道生。孝弟也者，其為仁之本與！”

Master You said, “A young person who is filial and respectful of his [elder brothers]⁹ rarely becomes the kind of person who is inclined to defy his superiors, and there has never been a case of one who is disinclined to defy his superiors stirring up rebellion. The gentleman applies himself to the roots. ‘Once the roots are firmly established, the Way will grow.’ Might we not say that filial piety and respect for [one’s elder brothers] constitute the root of Goodness?” (Slingerland 2003a: 1).

For *Liude*, however, the central importance of filial piety and brotherly respect derives from this perceived emotional gap between the internal feelings felt toward biologically related kin and the external feelings that need to be developed toward the wider social world. One creates the external feeling by building on the foundation of the internal feeling. By first learning the correct sense of respect toward one’s biological kin, one establishes the necessary foundation upon which the more tenuous form of respect toward a political superior can develop. Thus, the ruler-minister relationship is, in essence, an adaptation of the father-son relationship:

非我血氣之親，畜我如其子弟，故曰：苟淒夫人之善施勞其藏腑之力弗敢憚也，危其死弗敢愛也，謂之【臣】以忠事人多。忠者，臣德也。

(Although) the ruler is not my biological¹⁰ kin, he cares for me like one of his own children. Thus it is said: if you are (helping to) complete your lord’s goodness, then even if you are worked to

9 Slingerland translates 弟 as “respect for elders.” The term does carry this more general sense, but in light of the particular context in discussion here it seems prudent to emphasise the more literal sense of the respect felt by a younger brother 弟 toward his elder brother 兄.

10 Literally: my blood-qi kin.

exhaustion¹¹, you do not dare complain; even if your very life is put in danger, you do not dare begrudge it: one such as this can be called a [minister]. He places the highest value upon serving his ruler with dutifulness. Dutifulness is the virtue of a minister.

If one has not already properly developed a feeling of filial respect within the family, they lack the resources to develop the next stage of moral self-cultivation within the political world. Because these relationship pairs also exist as hierarchies, it is incumbent upon the father to produce *ren* within his son, and for a ruler to produce dutifulness within his ministers:

聖生仁，智率信，義使忠。

Sageliness engenders benevolence, wisdom marshals trustworthiness, rightness employs loyalty.

The ruler-minister relationship is an adaptation of the father-son relationship, and the more general sense of socially moral appropriateness (the “general” *yi* mentioned by Wang Bo) develops out of the spontaneous feelings that arise within a family, but the external feeling of *yi* is not the same as the internal sense of *ren*. The practice of *yi* in the official world is not simply an expanded *ren*, but must follow its own rules. This is demonstrated firstly by the ritual precedence shown toward kin over non-kin. Although a ruler is like a father, and a friend is like a brother, in situations where they come into conflict, biological relations come first:

為父絕君，不為君絕父。為昆弟絕妻，不為妻絕昆弟。為宗族攢失朋友，不為朋友失宗族。One can reject one’s lord for the sake of one’s father, but would never reject one’s father for the sake of one’s lord; one can reject one’s wife for the sake of one’s brothers, but would never reject one’s brothers for the sake of one’s wife; one can, for the sake of one’s fellow clansmen, become estranged from one’s friends, but one would never become estranged from one’s clansmen for the sake of one’s friends.

The feeling of intimacy within a family must arise (作) naturally, while the feelings of the public world must be deliberately regulated (制). Thus, social order relies on these three kinds of relationships being properly cultivated: when dealing with the most fundamental relationship between the sexes, and especially between husband and wife, one must focus on the clear distinction between them; when dealing with the biological relationship between father and son, one must ensure the

¹¹ Literally: exhaust the strength of your viscera.

feeling of intimacy arises naturally; and when dealing with the non-biological relationships of the social world, one must ensure that care is taken to keep the relationship deliberate and regulated by the rules of moral appropriateness.

3 Human Nature

Liude establishes the emotional gap between the spontaneous feeling of intimacy felt between father and son and the more difficult to acquire emotion of *yi* felt between ruler and minister. These are not directly equivalent emotions but it is necessary in *Liude's* moral epistemology to develop first the internal feeling of *ren* within the family and then use that feeling as a model in order to develop the more tenuous feeling of *yi* in the official world. They are distinct in that *ren* is the more fundamentally intrinsic and genuinely emotional. In *Liude*, because the ruler-minister relationship is modelled on the father-son relationship, the position of son and its encompassing moral virtue of filial piety is the root of ethical self-cultivation and key to developing the same kind of hierarchical but loyal and trustworthy relationship of ruler and minister.

However, there appears to be a more general sense of *yi* at work in the moral system of these texts: a social morality based on, but distinct from, this spontaneous family virtue of *ren*. Thus, in terms of its development, this general *yi* is similar to the more specific *yi* between ruler and minister. It differs in that it refers to an overall ethical correctness that applies to people not members of one's immediate family. In direct contrast to Mencius, *yi* is deemed to be “external” and consequently requires a system of moral self-cultivation to inculcate; this system is presented in *Xing zi ming chu*. The internal-external tension underlies this system of self-cultivation and informs its moral epistemology.

While *Liude* centres itself on the human relations specifically, *Xing zi ming chu's* discussion commences with the difficult Warring States concept of *xing* 性 – generally translated as “human nature.” A focus on the idea of *xing* marked a shift in Warring States thought and changed the way that thinkers addressed the question of human nature (Graham 2002). The term is related etymologically to *sheng* 生 (life), although the exact nature of that etymological relationship remains uncertain. It is also

not clear when it became standard to graphically distinguish them with the addition of a radical to *xing*, but the Guodian texts, where *xing* is written as 性, suggest they were graphically distinct by at least the mid- to late- Warring States period. A.C. Graham suggests that in its philosophical usage, particularly outside of mainstream Confucian discourses, the *xing* of a particular thing (e.g. the *xing* of human beings 人性, or the *xing* of water 水性) refers to “its proper course of development during its process of *sheng*” (Graham 2000: 4). Thus, it connotes a telos that can be, but ought not to be, interrupted. In its pre-philosophical usage, the term likely referred to “the health and longevity of men in general,” and consequently it was a concern not to damage or lose one's *xing*. If Graham is correct, it is easy to see why Yang Zhu and other advocates of the “Nurture of Life” 養生 philosophy – what Graham refers to as individualism – would focus on this term. Graham believes that it was these individualists who first established the philosophical conceptualisation of *xing* as “nature.” Because their philosophy insisted that people not sacrifice the natural course of their lives for the empty purposes of politics, *xing* took on a normative quality, and the positive value inherent in not preventing this natural course suggested that the Confucian project of moral self-cultivation was self-defeating; as Graham puts it, “Since Heaven is the highest authority, on what grounds are we to prefer morality to the nature with which Heaven has endowed us?” (Graham 2000: 13). Moral self-cultivation, in this light, is in essence a mutilation of one's natural moral telos and the only viable solution to this problem would be for the Confucians to successfully demonstrate that:

it is when he is acting morally, not when he is pursuing his own longevity, that man fulfils his nature. Mencius was the first to offer this solution, but it seemed so opposed to common experience that it was not until its incorporation into the Neo-Confucian system of [Zhu Xi] 朱熹 (A.D. 1130-1200) that it finally prevailed (Graham 2000: 13).

John Emerson gives a slightly different account, arguing that Yang Zhu's key innovation was the “discovery of the body,” and he portrays this discovery as particularly threatening to Confucian moral theory:

By providing a physical definition of human nature, Yang [Zhu] freed the Chinese elite from the public ritual roles (and, to a lesser extent, from the clan identifications and traditional obligations to the spirits) that had up to that time dominated and defined them. By treating public honors, court ceremonial, and feudal relationships as external conditions, he struck at the heart of the traditional ritual order defended by the Confucians. Simultaneously, he made possible new, nonpublic, nonritual forms of individual self-awareness and self-cultivation that were sharply different from the Confucian and traditional forms (Emerson 1996: 533).

Thus, according to Emerson, the individualists radically re-interpreted the meaning of selfhood by arguing against the socially and ritually defined aspects of personhood that the Confucians argued were an intrinsic aspect of one's own being. The social aspects of a person became, in effect, external to one's own nature.

There is likely a measure of truth to both of these accounts. Emerson's account of the “discovery” of the body seems exaggerated, but if we set aside for the moment the more dramatic aspect of his claim that the individualists literally discovered the body, he makes an important point. The Confucians very consciously identified one's selfhood with the social and political system, and were clearly threatened by the idea that literate, educated persons should drop out of society and, as the Confucians saw it, neglect their social duties¹². Graham may also be correct that the concept of a normative teleology intrinsic to *xing* was a threatening idea to certain Confucians who believed that moral self-cultivation was a necessary and life-long process of self-improvement. Graham's further claim that Mencius provided the only viable “solution” to this concept of *xing*, and that it required nearly one and a half millenia for Confucian thought to catch up to Mencius' claim, is rather more problematic¹³, but it does make an important comparison between Mencius' view of the goodness of human nature and the individualists' view of the normative telos of one's *xing*, and their mutual concern that this not be interfered with. Mencius' view can only be considered a “solution” if it is acknowledged that the individualists' view of *xing* was undeniably correct. As I hope to show below,

12 As seen, for example, in Analects 18.5-8.

13 It is well beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the motivations of Zhu Xi in establishing Mencius' particular version of Confucianism as orthodox, but the influence of Buddhism on Chinese thought after its introduction to China certainly cannot be ignored. See Ivanhoe 2000a: 43-58.

the solution offered by the Guodian texts was to argue that the natural course of one's *xing*, if allowed to develop entirely on its own, was morally insufficient; education was required to make one fully human.

Whether or not the individualists and Yang Zhu originated this philosophical conception of *xing*, it is apparent that the concept had developed sufficiently by the late third century BCE to prompt the author(s) of *Xing zi ming chu* as well as Mencius to specifically address it; however, while Mencius would pursue a definition of *xing* that centred on its incipient qualities¹⁴ and the course of its natural, uninterrupted¹⁵ development, these Guodian texts would focus on the firm distinction between the qualities of *xing* itself and the process of education that allows human beings to become more than their *xing* in of itself can make possible.

In Confucian moral philosophy, a specific definition of *xing* sets the parameters of people's inborn moral capabilities and established the source of moral knowledge and the means of acquiring it. It can refer to the qualities that a person possesses naturally, and can denote either the qualities universally possessed by all humans – and thus what distinguished people from other animals – or the qualities a single person possesses, and thus distinguishes that individual from the rest of humanity. In the case of *Mencius*, *Xunzi* and the *Xing zi ming chu*, the view of human nature is what Bloom (2002) would call essentially “egalitarian,” meaning that they all people all endowed with a human nature that carries the potential for moral transformation. However, the precise definition of *xing* was not agreed upon by all Confucians, as demonstrated most famously in Xunzi's “*Xing'e*” 性惡 (“Human Nature is Bad”) chapter, where he argues specifically against Mencius' view of *xing*.

14 Irene Bloom (1985) argues that Mencius' account of human nature takes into account both the biological aspects of human nature and the effects of culture, in effect accounting for both “nature” and “nurture”. Roger Ames (1985) offers a unique description of Mencius' view of human nature as a “process,” rather than a telos -- a concept that he claims, if I understand him correctly, avoids an ontology that is mired in subject-object distinctions, but rather views the development of the individual as part of the process of being in a community.

15 Mencius did believe, however, that one needs to reflect (思) on these incipient qualities in order to cultivate and extend them.

Xing zi ming chu begins with an explanation of *xing* and its relation to moral epistemology and moral motivation:

凡人雖有性，心亡定志，待物而後作，待悅而後行，待習而後定。喜怒哀悲之氣，性也。及其見於外，則物取之也。性自命出，命自天降。道始於情，情生於性。始者近情，終者近義。知【情者能】出之，知義者能內（納）之。

Although people (each) have a *xing*, their heart lacks a fixed intention. It awaits (external) things before it stirs, awaits pleasure before it (is compelled to) act, and awaits habitual practise before it becomes fixed. The *qi* of happiness, anger, grief and sorrow are the features of *xing*. When (one of these emotions) becomes apparent in one's exterior, it is because (some external) thing has taken hold of it. *Xing* arises out of *ming* 命; *ming* descends from Heaven. *Dao* begins with *qing*; *qing* is born from *xing*. At its beginning, it is close to *qing*; at its end, it is close to *yi*. (Thus,) one who understands *qing* is able to express it and one who understands *yi* is able to internalise it.

The text does not argue for a moral epistemology that would deny human nature any sense of morality or goodness, but establishes the problem of moral development as a lack of a stable moral will or disposition. Human nature refers here to the qualities that are inherent to people at birth – the qualities conferred by Heaven's mandate. *Xing* itself derives from Heaven, but the specific actions of a given person must be distinguished from the basic material of *xing* with which one is born. A person's basic nature is stimulated by the external world and drawn towards those kinds of stimulus that please a person. It is only through the habits acquired through the experiences of life and moral training that a stable moral will becomes established.

Xing zi ming chu emphasises this distinction between *xing* as an inherent quality of humans at birth from the actual situations one encounters in life:

好惡，眚（性）也。所好所惡，勿（物）也。善不[善，性也]所善所不善，執（勢）也。凡眚（性）為主，物取之也。金石之有聲，[弗扣不鳴。人]雖有性，心弗取不出。凡心有志也，亡与不[行。心之不可]獨行，猶口之不可獨言也。

(The ability) to like or dislike (derives from) *xing*; that which is liked and that which is disliked are external things. (The ability) to deem as good or [not good (derives from) *xing*]; that which is deemed as good and that which is deemed as not good are circumstances. *Xing* is the basic material that external things draw out. While metal and stone (instruments each) have a tone, [if they are not struck (the tone) will not ring out]. (In the same way), although people (each) have a *xing*, if the heart does not take hold of it, (the *xing*'s qualities) will not issue out. (And) while the heart has a will, without its “companion,” the heart will not act. The inability of the heart to act on its own can be likened to the mouth's inability to speak on its own (without the assistance of the tongue).

Although *xing* is responsible for one's innate ability to judge external things or situations, it only does so when stimulated by the occurrence of these things or situations. The innate capabilities of *xing* are like the innate sounds that metal or stone instruments are capable of producing, but which are only produced when acted upon. Thus, a latent capability is distinct from the dynamic process of that actual capability being realised. The realisation of this capability is *qing* 情 – the dynamic interaction between the latent *qi* 氣 of the emotions and real world events.

Xing zi ming chu is consistently careful not to attribute to *xing* itself any kind of dynamism. Human *xing* refers only to the basic capabilities of human beings, but the actual process of life involves encountering situations and external stimuli and responding to these stimuli in, initially, a predictable fashion: one is stirred by stimuli (物) and moved to action based on what is pleasurable (悅). As *Xing zi ming chu* explains, the *dao* begins with *qing*, not with *xing*, and as one begins to undergo the process of education, they move gradually away from the passive responses of *qing* and toward *yi* – socially moral appropriateness. As Michael Puett puts it, in his discussion of the meaning and evolution of the term *qing*:

Qing, in this text, is how one would spontaneously respond to a situation, while *yi* is how one ought to respond. One of the central issues for the text, therefore, is to explain how humans can move from *qing* to *yi* (Puett 2004: 46).

Qing refers here to more than simply the spontaneous and passive (and therefore morally inappropriate) reactions to events, and *yi* “does not result from overcoming or even controlling one's *qing*. It is rather an internalization, and... a refinement, of the *qing*” (Puett 2004: 46-47).¹⁶ In the end, moral development becomes a matter of properly expressing one's *qing* while also internalising the rules of

16 Puett goes on to say that “value judgements themselves properly come out of *qing*,” but this appears to be based on what is now considered an incorrect reading of the text, which, based on the Shanghai Museum text, has now been emended to say, “善不[善，性也]” ((The ability) to deem as good or [not good (derives from) *xing*]), but which Puett, without the benefit of the Shanghai Museum text, emended as “善不[善，情也],” which he translates as “Deeming things good [and deeming things bad are *qing*]” (Puett 2004: 47).

socially moral propriety; in essence, mooring the *xing*'s otherwise unfixed (or at least inconsistent) moral qualities to the correct ethical standards.

Qing occupies the central role in the process of self-cultivation primarily for two reasons. First, the importance of *qing* is due to its connection to genuine¹⁷ moral transformation. As Edward Slingerland has noted, “intellectual assent to the Confucian Way is insufficient – one must sincerely love the Way and strive to embody it in one's person” (2008: 7). Consequently, an authentic emotional change must be the source of and final goal of moral self-cultivation, due to a common human intuition that

emotions are in some ways less fungible than beliefs or merely intellectual convictions—that emotions possess a great deal of phenomenological inertia, as it were. Intellectual argumentation can shift easily-moved beliefs around, but genuine emotional commitment seems harder to budge (Slingerland 2008: 242).

Second, this reliance on *qing* is a natural extension of the underlying distinction between the internal and the external expressed in *Liude*. The spontaneous feeling of *ren* is already internally accessible because it is an internal emotion; but, because it is more difficult to develop the proper feelings within non-biological relationships, the entire system of moral self-cultivation exists for the purpose of extending the more spontaneous emotions felt toward kin on to these public, social relationships. *Qing* and *yi* are intimately connected because *qing* represents the doorway into one's interior moral resources; that is, *qing*, unlike *yi*, derives from *xing* but is accessible from the outside because it represents the dynamic interaction between one's innate qualities and the external world. While *Liude* lays out a hierarchy of the fundamental social relationships, from sexual distinctions, to biological love, and finally to political/social propriety, *Xing zi ming chu* establishes a hierarchy that works up from the interior to the exterior: from *xing* (which derives from Heaven) to *yi*. Connecting the moral system of *Liude* to *Xing zi ming chu*, we can see that the development of dutifulness 忠, the

¹⁷ As we will see below, this connection between *qing* and authenticity (信) is also central to the political philosophy that these texts espouse.

feeling that a minister should have toward his ruler, out of filial piety 孝, the feeling a son should feel toward his father, follows this same pattern. By accessing the emotion of intimacy between father and son, one can internalize the socially appropriate feelings of dutifulness and respect. Thus, the power of *qing* in moral self-cultivation lies in the fact that it is both genuine and accessible.

Xing zi ming chu further argues that ritual and music are uniquely capable of effecting moral transformation specifically because they allow one to efficiently access *qing*. We might say that while *qing* represents the doorway to one's interior, ritual and music represent the key to that door. The unique power of ritual and music is due to their inherently emotional qualities. As Erica Brindley notes, *Xing zi ming chu* posits:

a direct correlation between a musician's inner feelings and a listener's emotional response. The key to such direct and authentic communication of feeling is the manner in which one's inner world is expressed outwardly: through sincerity. Sincere expression of one's *qing*, or feelings and emotions, brings about a powerful response in the listener---one that is similar in kind to the original expression of emotion (laughter produces freshness, which is happiness; singing and chanting produces joviality, which is excitement, etc.) (Brindley 2006a: 251-2).

There is a natural responsiveness on the part of human beings to authentic expressions of emotion, and in particular to the emotional expression of music. The sages of antiquity, realising this, deliberately retooled the already existing cultural forms of poetry, ritual and music into powerful tools for affecting the *qing* in a morally appropriate fashion. Thus, *qing* also forms the link between the natural expressions of emotions and the deliberate actions of education¹⁸:

詩、書、禮、樂，其始出皆生於人。詩，有為為之也。書，有為言之也。禮、樂，有為舉之也。聖人比其類而綸會之，觀其之先後而逆順之，體其義而節文之，理其情而出入之，然後復以教。教，所以生德于中者也。禮作於情，又興之也，當事因方而制之。

The odes, the histories, the rites and music all have their origins in human beings. The odes were deliberately crafted, the histories were deliberately expressed, ritual and music were deliberately devised. The sages compared the categories (of the Odes) and then divided them and collected them together (where appropriate); they examined the sequences (of the Histories) and then rejected and accepted them (where appropriate); they embodied the propriety (of the rites) and then restrained and elaborated upon them (where appropriate); they regulated the *qing* (of the music) and then discarded and retained them (where appropriate). Once (the sages) had (done all this), these (cultural

18 See Cook 2004.

forms) were brought back for (the purpose of) education. Education is the means by which virtue is engendered within. The rites were crafted out of *qing*, (and in turn) they also give rise to *qing*; and (by virtue of) this bi-directionality, (the rites are able to) govern (*qing*).

As Puett notes, “the traditions are defined as that which allows for a refinement of, but never a loss of, the basic qualities of humanity” (Puett 2004: 51).

Xing zi ming chu presents *xing* as the basic material of human nature, but denies that *xing* itself contains the dynamic properties necessary to explain specific human behaviour or the necessary impetus to form one into a fully cultivated human being. It is made clear that humans are distinct from animals in their capacity to be shaped not only by their own *xing* but also by the power of education:

牛生而長，鴈生而伸，其性[使然。人]而學或使之也。凡物亡不異也者。剛之楛也，剛取之也。柔之約，柔取之也。四海之內其性一也。其用心各異，教使然也。

When an ox is born and (in due time) grows large, or a goose is born and (in due time) develops a long (neck), it is their *xing* that makes this so. However, with people, education also shapes them. Among (all the various kinds of) things of the world, there are no (two kinds) that are alike. When a hard (thing) stands upright, this is the hard thing drawing on (its own intrinsic quality of hardness). When a soft (thing) bends pliantly, this is the soft thing (itself) drawing on (its own intrinsic quality of softness). Between the four seas, all (human beings) share the same *xing* (and yet) they each differ in the use of their hearts. It is education that makes this so.

This education takes the form of the cultural tools that the sages perfected, and which derive their power to morally transform people from their ability to affect the genuine emotions. As such, human nature is defined as morally neutral¹⁹; it contains the necessary capacity to form moral human beings, but requires external guidance to do so. This stands in stark contrast to the view of *xing* that the individualists appear to have espoused, which emphasised the self-contained sufficiency of *xing* and rejection of any external influences upon it. These Guodian texts do allow that *xing* contains a basic internal capacity to love one's own family, but argues that this is not enough. Part of the cosmologically determined social order is the political world, yet to construct an adequately peaceful and moral political structure requires something more than simply allowing one's *xing* to fulfil the

¹⁹ Morally neutral, but containing moral impulses. These impulses are simply insufficient to produce a wholly moral person without external guidance.

natural course of its telos – education and moral self-cultivation are required.

This view differs importantly from Mencius, who, as Graham pointed out, attempted to address the concept of *xing* by arguing that it inherently contains the incipient moral qualities necessary to become moral, and thus moral self-cultivation is in of itself fulfilling the natural course of one's life. Although, as Slingerland (2008: 252) notes, there are some important disanalogies with Xunzi's philosophy, Paul Goldin (2005) has argued that the Guodian texts may represent an antecedent to Xunzi's thought. Both Xunzi and these texts argue that *xing* is morally insufficient and they both use this as a justification for Confucian social ethics²⁰ and ritual. The precise nature of the difference between Xunzi's and Mencius' respective views on human nature has provided a rich source of debate in Confucian ethics, but perhaps many of these differences can be explained in part by the fact that Mencius and Xunzi were writing in very different times. If Slingerland is correct in arguing that the position of the Guodian texts lies somewhere between the opposite extremes of Mencius' internalist position and Xunzi's externalist position (Slingerland 2008: 252), and are thus, as Goldin argues, Xunzian in many of their essential concerns, but still having much in common with Mencius, this may be partially explained by the fact that the Guodian texts are roughly contemporaneous with Mencius and thus addressing the same intellectual milieu.

Both Mencius and the Guodian texts were likely attempting to establish an understanding of *xing* that defended the Confucian moral project. The Guodian texts' emphasis on the human capacity to become more than their *xing* also serves as an alternative solution to the individualists' conception of a normatively proper course of life that must not be interrupted by external forces. According to Graham, the individualists established a dichotomy between the “self” (我 or 己) and external “things” (物), and used their concept of a normative telos to justify a rejection of politics and society. Because

²⁰ Graham notes that one of the key aspects distinguishing Confucianism from Mohism 墨家 and the individualists is its view that behaviour is “prescribed according to social categories, and [yi], 'duty' or 'righteousness'... in the sense of an act appropriate to one's station as ruler or minister, father or son, husband or wife' (Graham 1985: 77).

for the individualists, “the welfare of his own body” was of greater importance than “the things which are mere means of its support,” (Graham 1985: 77) the broader social and political world becomes a potential inference to the natural course of one's life. What the Guodian texts establish is a contrary view of both *xing* and the social world. While they acknowledge that one's *xing* will not, if left to its own devices, allow for any feelings toward the social and political world, they argue that establishing a connection with this social world is a necessary part of being human. Thus, they create a distinction between “human nature,” which is limited in what it can produce, and what might be called, for lack of a better term, the “human condition”, which requires education to fully realise. Thus, the proper, normative course of one's existence requires external influence. This turns the individualists' notion entirely on its head and may help to explain why *Xing zi ming chu* goes to such great lengths to define the power of external things to influence the *xing*.

As we shall see below, the Guodian texts also attempt to provide an account of politics that makes use of this concept of human nature by arguing that successful government must understand the human nature and people's emotional dispositions. This political vision also argues that Confucian moral self-cultivation is required to achieve a peaceful state. The underlying justification for this is the belief that non-biological relationships, which includes political relationships, need self-cultivation to be correctly established.

4 The Role of Human Nature in Government

The central theme binding *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi* together is the idea of “following the *dao* of the people” (順民道), a concept whose ultimate political ends cannot be meaningfully disconnected from questions of a moral or psychological nature. At its core, the concept refers to a political philosophy that does not rely on coercive government, based on punishments and rewards, but rather a more refined knowledge of the intrinsic tendencies and dispositions of the common people. Thus, the implications on a political scale accord with the political views found elsewhere in Mid- to Late-Warring States texts, such as the *Lüshi Chunqiu* 呂氏春秋 and certain chapters of the *Guanzi* 管子. However, in the case of these two Guodian texts, there is an unmistakably Confucian foundation underlying its political objectives: the moral cultivation of the ruler (君) and the efficacious value of ritual and music in achieving a peaceful and morally upright state. The means of achieving this relies on an understanding of the inherent moral capabilities of human nature (性), and the invariable social and family roles of individuals (人倫). In the broad moral vision of these Confucian texts, these elements are all inextricably linked.

The texts lay out a hierarchical progression of moral and political stages that need to be accomplished in order to achieve a peaceful state, and they repeatedly emphasise the need to gradually follow this progression in the correct order. Although it is the duty of the ruler to educate the people, any attempt to do so without first improving himself will result in failure:

君子之於教也，其導民也不浸，則其淳也弗深矣。是故亡乎其身而存乎其治，雖厚其命，民弗從之矣。

This is the Gentleman's approach to education: when guiding the people, if you fail to be gradual (and constant), then (your teachings) will not penetrate (them) deeply. Thus, if you are lacking something in yourself, but attempt to apply this to your governing (of the people), then regardless of the force of your orders, the people will not obey them.

This entails more than the ruler simply practising what he preaches. He must genuinely understand

himself before he can hope to understand others:

察諸出所以知己，知己所以知人，知人所以知命，知命而後知道，知道而後知行。

By examining your own conduct you can come to understand yourself. By understanding yourself you can come to understand others. By understanding others you can come to understand *ming* (命). Once you understand *ming*, you can come to understand *dao*, and once you understand *dao*, you can come to understand how to act.

Thus, instructing the people begins with self-examination and self-cultivation. Self-knowledge is a necessary tool for understanding others, and an understanding of others is also a necessary tool for understanding Heaven's mandate, *ming* (命). Because each stage of accomplishment is itself necessary in order to accomplish the next, neglecting the fundamental steps will inevitably result in failure. The first step in proper government lies in the ruler's own moral development, yet moral development itself is also comprised of a progression of stages:

由禮知樂，由樂知哀。有知己而不知命者，亡知命而不知己者。有知禮而不知樂者，亡知樂而不知禮者。

Understand music through ritual, and understand sorrow through music. There is such a thing as understanding oneself but not understanding *ming*, but there is not such a thing as understanding *ming* but not understanding oneself. There is such a thing as understanding ritual but not understanding music, but there is not such a thing as understanding music but not understanding ritual.

It is this central thesis of requisite stages of accomplishment that provides the common thread that runs throughout these four texts and ultimately connects them. The encompassing Confucian ethical and political project begins with the personal self-cultivation of the ruler – the necessary first act in a series of acts that, if followed correctly, will lead to an ordered and successful state. Yet, as shown, the act of self-cultivation itself must follow its own correctly-ordered progression beginning with the principles of first ritual and then music. Because the entire project of these four texts is built upon a foundation of self-cultivation and, perhaps more importantly, because its political thesis is that effective government only functions when the rulers adhere to the natural dispositions of the people, the political system that is espoused in these manuscripts is necessarily predicated upon the view of human nature

that they assume.

Xing ziming chu's discussion of *xing* also places emphasis on hierarchical relationships and ordered progressions: *dao* begins in *qing*, *qing* is born out of *xing*, *xing* comes out of Heaven's mandate. Thus, moral cultivation begins with human psychology, which is shown to have its own hierarchy. The fundamental origin of human psychology is ultimately Heaven, which manifests itself in the form of *xing*, the inborn qualities that make one human. Because of the influence of Mencius on our understanding of *xing*, it is easy to miss the fact that in these Guodian texts, for the purposes of self-cultivation, the starting point is not *xing*, but rather *qing*. *Qing* serves as the point of interaction between a person's *xing* and the external world: the “*dao* begins with *qing*,” In the end, moral development becomes a matter of properly expressing one's *qing* while also internalising the rules of moral correctness, *yi*.

The second half of *Xing zi ming chu* focuses on the issue of political rulership, and argues that *qing* is also the key factor in eliciting trust and respect from others:

凡人情為可悅也。苟以其情，雖過不惡；不以其情，雖難不貴。苟有其情，雖未之為，斯人信之矣。未言而信，有美情者也。

A person's *qing* is something that can be considered joyful. If (you) act by means of your *qing*, then even if you err, you will not be despised. If you do not act by means of your *qing*, then even if you trouble yourself greatly, you will not be valued. If your conduct contains your (genuine) *qing*, then even if you have not yet acted, people will (already) trust your actions. One who is trusted (even) before he speaks can be said to have a beautiful *qing*.

Just as music has the power to appeal directly to one's emotions, and consequently to effect a genuine change in one's moral bearing, it is the “authenticity” of the *qing*, of genuine emotions, that allows a ruler to gain the trust and respect of the people. Any attempt on the part of the ruler to circumvent the need to transform himself before attempting to educate or control the people will inevitably fail, because any sort of conscious effort reeks of inauthenticity and is incapable of moving others in a genuine fashion.

All of this provides an attempt to thoroughly explain and justify a very old Confucian idea – one that can be found as early as the *Analects*: that punitive and legal measures will ultimately fail to change the common people or create a stable society:

子曰：“道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。”

The Master said, “If you try to guide the common people with coercive regulations (政) and keep them in line with punishments, the common people will become evasive and will have no sense of shame. If, however, you guide them with Virtue, and keep them in line by means of ritual, the people will have a sense of shame and will rectify themselves.” (Slingerland 2003: 8).

Xing zi ming chu grounds this argument on the psychological and physiological vocabulary that had become requisite in the Mid to Late Warring States discussions of morality, and demonstrates the counter-productive nature of punishments as a motivating force for moral transformation. If the common people are resistant to the state's directives – if they become “evasive” and have no sense of shame – then regardless of the force of the ruler's decrees, they will not be obeyed. The only choice is to “follow the hearts of the common people” – an argument that is not presented as a question of morality, mercy or justice, but as a pragmatic response to the reality of human nature. *Shun* (順) must be understood as “following” in the sense of working in a fashion that takes into account the dispositions and nature of the common people. Working against their nature is not only immoral, but bound to fail.

Zun deyi commences by explaining that government relies on two factors: moral guidance (as opposed to punishments) and an understanding of unvarying social roles in human society:

尊德義，明乎民倫，可以為君。沮忿戾，改碁勝，為人上者之務也。

One who is respectful of the Virtues and *yi*, and is fully enlightened regarding the human relations can be considered a ruler. Putting an end to grudges and quarrelsome behaviour, and reforming feelings of acrimony and rivalry: these are what the superior man devotes himself to accomplishing.

Moral training and instruction must adhere to the *dao* of human beings, and must not stray from the nature of human society:

教非改道也，教之也。學非改倫也，學己也。

If a (method of) education is not contrary to the *dao*, (one may) apply this instruction to others. If a (method of) learning is not contrary to the social relations, (one may) apply this learning to oneself.

These are all key concepts expanded in *Xing zi ming chu* and *Liu de*. By following these truths about the natural dispositions of human nature, the enlightened ruler Yu brought order to the world in antiquity – and it was by opposing them that the tyrant Jie brought the world to chaos. Thus, the *dao* of the people remains a constant, unchanging fixture in the human world:

禹以人道治其民，桀以人道亂其民。桀不易禹民而後亂之，湯不易桀民而後治之。聖人之治民，民之道也。

It was by means of their *dao* that Yu brought order to the people, and it was by means their *dao* that Jie brought disorder to the people. It was not that Jie (first had to) change Yu's people before bringing disorder to them, nor that Tang (first had to) change Jie's people before bringing order to them.

Understanding the *dao* of the common people is a necessary part of governing them, as is case in any major task:

禹之行水，水之道也。父之御馬，馬也之道也。后稷之藝地，地之道也。莫不有道焉，人道為近。是以君子，人道之取先。

It was by means of the *dao* of water that Yu (was able to) redirect the waters. It was by means of the *dao* of horses that Zao Fu could ride his chariot (so well). It was by means of the way of the earth that Hou Ji was able to cultivate the land. There is nothing that does not have a *dao* within it, and the *dao* of human beings is of the most immediate importance. Therefore, the Gentleman is the one who takes the *dao* of human beings as his first principle.

Although this idea is inextricably connected to questions of a moral and personal nature, on the political level it is presented in a more mundane fashion: just as water, horses and earth have their own properties, so do people; just as it would be counter-productive to approach an engineering project such as the redirection of rivers without considering the natural tendencies and properties of water, it would be ineffective to approach the management of human beings without considering their natural tendencies. Divested of any larger questions of the moral responsibilities of the ruler, the argument becomes more forceful by virtue of its pragmatism: punishments simply do not work; people simply do not respond to them. What they do respond to is a genuine emotional connection to the ruler through

the media of empathy and personal example. This is the argument presented by *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi*, and it relies on the understanding of *xing* and human society shown in *Xing zi ming chu* and *Liu de* respectively. As will be seen below, what distinguishes the coherent vision of these four texts from later writings is its focus on the personal, moral connections between people as represented in the concepts of *qing* and the six social positions.

Attempting to place the Guodian texts within a larger context, Scott Cook (2006) argues that they may represent an early example of a political ideology that stood against the use of punishments and fear to control the state, and which was devoted to the concept of “following the heart-minds of the common people” (順民心). The three Guodian texts, *Ziyi* 緇衣, *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi* all appear to represent this specific strain of thought, and share in common a set of ideas and terms also found in sections of *Guanzi*, particularly the opening chapter, “*Mu min*” 牧民 (“Shepherding the People”). Cook traces the history of the “following the heart-minds of the common people” ideology towards the end of the Warring States period, where its influence can still be seen in the *Lüshi Chunqiu* 呂氏春秋 (*The Annals of Lü Buwei*) and where it is criticised in the *Han feizi* 韓非子, and eventually into the early Han, where similar ideas are found again in the *Huainanzi* 淮南子.

Because *Guanzi* is a discursive composite of works on various themes, and because its writings cannot be easily dated with accuracy or clearly associated with specific authors or schools of thought, it does not provide any definitive evidence to assist in locating the Guodian manuscripts within the wider corpus of Warring States philosophy. The text is associated with the seventh-century BCE minister of the state of Qi 齊, Guan Zhong 管仲 (d. 645 BCE), a figure about whom relatively little is known but who eventually became a legendary figure within the state of Qi, cited for his exemplary and moral political leadership.²¹ The *Guanzi* text itself, however, is likely comprised of works dated from as

21 The Confucian opinion on Guan Zhong was mixed at best, although he is mentioned by Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi. Confucius appears to have admired his skills as a minister and credits him with making Qi a powerful and secure state,

early as the Mid- to Late-Warring States period and as late as the early Han. There is a general consensus that the text has connections to the famous Jixia 稷下 Academy which was formed in the state of Qi under the auspices of King Xuan 宣. W. Allyn Rickett (1985: 18) notes that in “the writing of political propaganda the name of Guan Zhong carried considerable weight in his home state of Qi. Thus the Jixia Academy would have been a likely place for the development of a body of literature centred around his name.” Consequently, it is possible that a range of loosely connected political ideals may have formed in Qi, connected to the historical personage of Guan Zhong and based on what were presumed to have been his views. This set of ideals may have continued to develop among scholars connected to the Jixia Academy, and may have eventually had an influence on the development of Xunzi's philosophy as well.

The “*Mu min*” chapter discussed here is, in Rickett's opinion, “certainly one of earliest chapters of the *Guanzi*,” and “its emphasis on practical economic concerns in the pursuit of good government makes it perhaps as close to the original ideas of Guan Zhong as any chapter in the *Guanzi*” (1985: 51). He dates the chapter itself to somewhere from the early or middle part of the fourth century BCE (Rickett 1985: 51), but as Scott Cook (2006: 50) notes, the no longer extant commentary, “牧民注,” may have been in part incorporated into the text proper, making it difficult to assign a clear date of composition. In any case, the date of composition for the majority of the chapter, along with its major themes, is likely relatively early, and probably dates roughly to the same time as the Guodian manuscripts. It employs a vocabulary similar to *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi*:

but he also criticises him for his ritual and moral failings (see Analects 3.22, 14.16, 14.17 and 14.19). This is presumably the reason, in Confucius' mind, that Duke Huan, whom Guan Zhong served, would merely become the first recognised “hegemon” 霸 in 680 BCE rather than a true “King” 王. A similar distinction would be made between these two sets of skills when Xunzi later criticised the state of Qin 秦 for being admirably strong and well-ordered but still lacking a certain, vital *je ne sais quoi*: “Why is that? It is that it is dangerously lacking in Ru [儒] scholars. Thus it is said: Those who possess the pure form are True Kings; those who have the mixed form are lords-protector [霸]; those who lack any at all are annihilated” (Knoblock 1990 v.3: 247). (是何也？則其殆無儒邪！故曰粹而王，駁而霸，無一焉而亡).

政之所興，在順民心。政之所廢，在逆民心。

Success in government lies in following the hearts of the people. Failure lies in opposing them (Rickett 1985: 54).

The need to effect a genuine change in the heart-minds of the people, a thesis central to *Zun deyi* and *Cheng zhi wen zhi*, is also apparent in “*Mu min*,” but the pragmatic tenor of its argument is more forceful in the latter. Government will not simply be ineffective; the very political position of the sovereign will be in danger:

故刑罰不足以畏其意，殺戮不足以服其心。故刑罰繁而意不恐(畏)，則令不行矣。殺戮眾而心不服，則上位危矣。

Therefore punishment alone is not enough to *instil a sense of reverential awe* in the minds of [the people], nor is killing sufficient to make their hearts submissive. Thus, if punishments are numerous yet the minds of the people are not *in awe*, orders will not be carried out. If killing abounds, yet the hearts of the people are not submissive, the position of the sovereign will be endangered (Rickett 1985: 54)²²

Finally, the behaviour and values of the ruler are shown, as in *Zun deyi* and *Cheng zhi wen zhi* but particularly in *Ziyi*, to directly affect the behaviour of the common people. The ruler's own behaviour and preferences act as the “reins that direct the people:”

御民之轡，在上之所貴。道民之門，在上之所先

The reins that direct the people consist of those things the sovereign honors. The gate through which they are led consists of those things the sovereign puts first (Rickett 1985: 56).

The Guodian *Ziyi* appears to be a more discursive text than *Cheng zhi wen zhi* or *Zun deyi*.

Essentially a selection of quotations, each prefaced with “The Master said” (子曰), and then concluded with a quote from an authoritative text, such as the Book of Odes (詩經), it lacks the degree of philosophical coherence found in *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi*.²³ The text centres primarily around

22 The received *Guanzi* reads “故刑罰不足以畏其意” and “故刑罰繁而意不恐.” Rickett (1985: 54) emends “畏” to “恐” in accordance with the *Qunshu zhiyao*, and to make the parallel consistent. In the first instance, I have retained “畏” and in the second, I have emended “恐” to “畏” in light of usage in the excavated Guodian and Shanghai Museum strips. I suspect the original may have read as “畏” with the “心” signfic. I have altered Rickett's translation accordingly, and my emendations there are in italics.

23 It is of interest, then, that *Ziyi* appears to have been the more popular text, appearing again in the bamboo strips of the Shanghai Museum and eventually surviving, with some differences, until the present day as a chapter of the *Liji* 禮記.

the idea of the direct correlation between the ruler's behaviour and the common people, and is so much in line with *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi* that it actually repeats *ad verbim* [verbatim?] a line from *Zun deyi*²⁴:

子曰：下之事上也，不從其所命，而從其所行。上好此物也，下必有甚焉者矣 (Guodian *Ziyi* strip 4).

While these earlier examples of this strain of thought demonstrate a relatively unambivalent criticism of the use of coercive political measures, Cook contends that as the idea developed over time and was borrowed by later thinkers, the arguments against punishments softened. Towards the end of the Warring States period, the debate was no longer one between two mutually contradictory political tools, severity and moral guidance; it had evolved into a question of degrees. In his view, both punishments and moral guidance were viewed as necessary tools to manage the people, but the question of which of these two should act as the “foundation” (孰為本) of a political system became an important point of contention (Cook 2006: 60). As will eventually be shown below, however, it is not at all clear that the Legalist thinkers considered moral guidance to be of any value.

The *Lüshi Chunqiu*, like *Guanzi*, is essentially an anthology, covering a wide breadth of topics and written by a variety of (now anonymous) scholars. Unlike *Guanzi*, *Lüshi Chunqiu* appears to have been written under firm editorial guidance and with a clear vision in mind of a single, all-encompassing tome of knowledge. It was compiled under the patronage of Lü Buwei²⁵ (d. 235 BCE), a man who began life in the merchant class before eventually becoming a powerful political figure in the state of Qin 秦 – an unprecedented example of social mobility which marks Lü himself as a symbol of the changing face of early Chinese society toward the end of the Warring States period. It is not currently

24 This repetition may be due to the fact that *Ziyi* is a collection of quotations, possibly from a variety of locations. It is also possible that both *Ziyi* and *Zun deyi* borrowed this line from the same source, possibly a well known expression. There is another line in *Ziyi* that is also found, almost word for word, in the Shanghai Museum text *Cong zheng* 從政, also a collection of quotations.

25 See Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 1-55 for their biography of Lü Buwei and introduction to the *Lüshi Chunqiu*.

known to what extent Lü was himself involved in the composition of the text, but given its relatively consistent political tendencies, it seems reasonable to assume that it reflects at the very least his basic ideals. The text is syncretic in the sense that it borrows readily from a variety of philosophical concepts and terms, but I believe that Knoblock and Riegel are correct in saying that it nevertheless “resembles no one of them exactly” (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 43).

The text ostensibly espouses the Confucian preference of *yi* over coercive government, as seen in this passage from “Employing the Masses” (用民):

凡用民，太上以義，其次以賞罰。

As a general principle, it is of supreme importance to use morality when employing the people, and of secondary importance to use rewards and punishments (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 488).

It also employs a vocabulary similar to *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi*, as seen in this passage from “Being in Accord with the People” (順民):

先王先順民心，故功名成。夫以德得民心以立大功名者，上世多有之矣。失民心而立功名者，未之曾有也。

The Former Kings took being in accord with the people's hearts as their first principle, and thus their accomplishments and fame were realized. In high antiquity there were many who won the people's hearts and thereby established great achievements and reputations. There has never been a case where someone, having lost the people's hearts, nonetheless managed to establish achievements and a reputation (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 209).

It also would appear to hold a strong position on the importance of grounding its political ideals in the reality of human nature and the natural dispositions of the people themselves. This more than anything puts it very much in line with the “following the heart-minds of the people” ideology of the Guodian manuscripts as this particularly eloquent passage against severity in government from the “Moderating Severity” (適威) chapter demonstrates:

故亂國之使其民，不論人之性，不反人之情，煩為教而過不識，數為令而非不從，巨為危而罪不敢，重為任而罰不勝。民進則欲其賞，退則畏其罪。知其能力之不足也，則以為繼矣。以為繼知，則上又從而罪之，是以罪召罪，上下之相讎也由是起矣。故禮煩則不莊，業煩則無功，令苛則不聽，禁多則不行。桀、紂之禁，不可勝數，故民因而身為戮，極也，不能

用威適。子陽極也好 嚴，有過而折弓者，恐必死，遂應獬狗而弑子陽，極也。周鼎有竊，曲狀甚長，上下皆曲，以見極之敗也。

The way anarchic states treat their people does not take human nature into account, nor does it consider natural human predispositions: it irritates them with complicated instructions and faults the people for not knowing them, increases the number of orders and condemns the people for not following them, makes restrictions more severe but condemns the people for not being daring, burdens the people with heavier responsibilities and punishes them for not being able to bear them. The people go forward only because they want the reward, and they retreat only because they fear the punishment. Knowing that their strength is insufficient, they pretend to continue in their efforts. When their pretense is discovered, their superiors follow through by condemning them. In this way, condemnation brings about more condemnation. And it is in this way that the mutual animosity between superior and inferior is created (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 495).

Yet, as Cook notes, *Lüshi Chunqiu* does not share the Guodian texts' unambivalent criticisms on the value of punishments and rewards. In one passage from "Employing the Masses," it tells the story of a (typically foolish) man from Song whose treatment of his horses was ludicrously severe:

雖造父之所以威馬，不過此矣。不得造父之道，而徒得其威，無益於 御。人主之不肖者，有似於此。不得其道，而徒多其威。威愈多，民愈不用。

Even the famed charioteer Zaofu was never this severe. The man from Song did not have Zaofu's Dao. He merely grasped its severity, but this was of no advantage to driving horses. Incompetent rulers resemble the man from Song. They lack the proper Dao and have merely multiplied severity, and the more severe they become, the less their people can be employed (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 492).

This gives the initial impression of a critical view of the value of punishments, but the passage goes on to explain that:

故威不可無有，而不足專恃。譬之若鹽之於味，凡鹽之 用，有所託也，不適則敗託而不可食。威亦然，必有所託，然後可行。惡乎託？託於愛利。愛利之心諭，威乃可行。

Therefore, while it is true that one cannot do without severity, severity itself is insufficient if it is the sole technique on which one relies. The situation is analogous to using salt to enhance flavor. Generally speaking when you use salt, you add it to some other thing. If the amount you use is not suitable, you ruin the other thing and the result is inedible. It is the same with severity. You can only use it when there are other things to which you add it. What are these other things? You add it to love and benefit. Only when your commitment to living and benefiting the people is understood can you practice severity (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 492).

The passage does not criticise punishments altogether, but rather urges for a degree of moderation in their application. More importantly, it argues that punishments are only effectual when used in conjunction with a wider set of political techniques, most importantly a palpable desire to benefit the

common people; that is, making it apparent to them that one has their best interests at heart even when in the midst of applying punishments.

If Cook is correct in arguing that the history of this ideology shows a gradual acceptance of punitive measures, then this may have been due to the changing political landscape of Warring States China. The undeniable success of the state of Qin and its inexorable rise to one of the most powerful states in China would have been impossible to ignore and may have lended credibility to the Legalist 法家 philosophy that, it is believed, had been prominent there since Shang Yang 商鞅 (d. 338) instituted his reforms to Qin's political system. In light of this, it would have been difficult for any political philosopher of the time to have made a compelling argument that governmental severity led inevitably to political decline; in fact, quite the opposite appeared to be true. It might appear, then, that the philosophy found in *Lüshi Chunqiu* represents the continuation of the “following the heart-mind of the people” concept, revised to suit the political and intellectual *milieu* of the time.

Cook is likely correct that a philosophy of “following the heart-mind of the people” was developed initially by a school of Confucian thought and probably took the form seen in the Guodian manuscripts. How exactly this idea proceeded to develop over the course of the remaining Warring States period is not entirely clear, but it would appear that in the syncretic environments of first the Jixia academy and later the monumental undertaking of the *Lüshi Chunqiu*, the premise of this idea may have become fused with systems of thoughts that were not always entirely in line with the Confucian doctrine that initially developed the concept. The shifting emphasis that these texts showed on the question of punishments as a tool of statecraft was presumably a sign of the changing political and social landscape of Warring States China. However, to only superficially consider how these various political philosophies viewed the value of severity as a tool of statecraft without understanding the deeper context of each respective thinker's political objectives and views on human nature risks

missing the wider implications of their philosophical differences.

Thus, the shared vocabulary and general ideology of “Following the heart-minds of the people” found throughout these texts does not indicate a clear development of a single school of thought, shifting in a predictable fashion in response to changing political times. What they do represent is a collection of conceptually linked ideas and terms that a range of individual thinkers and schools of thought felt free to borrow and employ to their own ends. It then represents the ongoing evolution of a discourse, not a single concept, in which differing views on punishments specifically only played a part. With respect to this context, it is necessary to keep in mind that these writings simultaneously represent both the views of the specific thinkers who wrote them and the social reality to which they were addressed.

Returning to the “Moderating Severity” chapter in the *Lüshi Chunqiu*, from which the eloquent argument against severity was quoted above, we find a charioteering metaphor reminiscent of the references to Zao Fu in *Zun deyi* and to the charioteering metaphors in *Cheng zhi wen zhi*:

先王之使其民，若御良馬，輕任新節，欲走不得，故致千里。善用其民者亦然。
The Former Kings employed their people the way a charioteer does fine horses. A light load, a new whip, and not allowing the horses to run at will are the reasons the horse covers a thousand li. The same is also true of those who are skillful at using the people.

While these two Guodian texts focus on the need to understand the basic nature of human psychology and to achieve a direct, emotional connection with the common people, in *Lüshi chunqiu*, the point is simply not to overwork the people. The story that follows later on in the same chapter tells of Duke Zhuang 莊 being impressed by a skilful demonstration of charioteering, only to be told by a wiser figure that the horses would collapse, which they do. When asked to explain how he knew this would happen, he explains:

夫進退中繩，左右旋中規，造父之御，無以過焉。鄉臣遇之，猶求其馬，臣是以知其敗也。
He made them go forward and backward in a perfectly straight line and made them turn left and right in a perfect arc. Even the charioteering of a Zaofu would be no better than that. Yet when I

later encountered him, he was still demanding more of his horses – this is how I knew they would collapse (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 439).²⁶

Even when the text directly espouses the need to follow and acquire the heart-minds of the people, as it does in the passage from “Being in Accord with the People” (順民) above, the details of the concept bear little similarity to *Cheng zhi wen zhi* or *Zun deyi*. What follows the passage quoted is a series of historical stories of rulers who were able to win over the people's *affection* (which is indeed precisely how Knoblock and Riegel translate “心” in these passages) in what reads more like a modern public relations manual than it does a Confucian text. The force of the argument is that a ruler cannot successfully employ the people unless they feel that he is on their side. While the Confucian texts continue to argue for the morally transformative effect of virtuous leadership upon the common people, *Lüshi chunqiu* argues that a subtler understanding of human nature allows a leader to have more political weapons in his arsenal than continually increasing severity. An understanding of human psychology allows one to know how to apply punishments so that they are effectual. Thus, while the “Employing the Masses” chapter begins with the statement that rightness 義 is of paramount importance to employing the people with punishments and rewards being secondary, as the chapter continues it tells a different story. The key to controlling the people lies in understanding their desires and aversions:

何欲何惡？欲榮利，惡辱害。辱害所以為罰充也，榮利所以為賞實也。賞罰皆有充實，則民無不用矣。

What are the people's desires and aversions? They desire honor and profit, and they hate disgrace and harm. Disgrace and harm are how you make your punishments material; honor and profit are how you make your rewards concrete. If rewards and punishments are material and concrete, all people may be used (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 490).

Throughout the text, punishments and rewards are only useful if used as part of a more

²⁶ A similar story appears in the “Duke Ai” (哀公) chapter of *Xunzi*, but with different characters. In this instance, the horses do not “collapse” (敗), but rather “bolt out of control” (失) (Knoblock 1994: 263). I suspect this chapter was not originally written by Xunzi himself.

comprehensive system of government. In the text's words, it is the salt that is added to an already well-formed dish. In applying punishments and rewards, the important point is not the degree of its severity but the elegance of its application:

莫邪不為勇者興懼者變，勇者以工，懼者以拙，能與不能也。

The sword Moya does not change its character depending on whether a brave man or a coward uses it. That the brave man uses it skilfully and the coward clumsily is because the one is capable and the other not (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 490-1).

Throughout *Lüshi chunqiu*, the purpose of acquiring the people's affection and of employing them successfully is always for military purposes: winning their hearts means they will die for you; when the common people are properly employed, a state with a small army can defeat a state with a large army. Thus, while *Lüshi chunqiu* conveys the pragmatic tone, vocabulary and terminology of *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi*, utterly gone is their Confucian foundation. Even when morality is rhetorically prominent, it serves as little more than a convenient catchall, encompassing any sort of political action that is not defined by its harshness or cruelty. In this, it stands in stark contrast to the Confucian texts that likely originally formulated these concepts; yet it also stands in contrast to the Legalist writings of the time which were likely the target of the text's exhortations against severity. The philosophy, as found in such works as the *Book of Lord Shang* 商君書, associated with the Qin reformer Shang Yang (but likely written after his death) and most famously in the writings of Han Feizi, argued for supremacy of *fa* 法, "laws" or "standards," a political system based on the ideas of an impartial legal machinery, a meritocratic government that allowed for social mobility, and the supreme importance of the military. It also pitted itself against the very core of Confucian doctrine by rejecting the notions of antiquity, personal morality, ritual and family.

The Legalist reforms represented not simply an increase in severity, but a radically new vision for society and a move away from a feudal morality based on personal and family connections where the individual, moral bearing of the ruler was of central importance to one of the impersonal: fixed,

unchanging legal standards. It is likely this notion of fixed standards that *Lüshi chunqiu* was criticising when it claimed in “Employing the Masses,” that “there are no constant principles in employing the people... only those who have attained the *dao* can do it” (Knoblock & Riegel 2000: 489). It is also the same view of fixed and severe standards that *Lüshi chunqiu* employs an ostensibly Confucian vocabulary to attack when it says that anarchic states do not “take human nature into account” but rather irritate the people “with complicated instructions and faults the people for not knowing them.” *Lüshi chunqiu* does not, except superficially, espouse the Confucian's personal, feudal moral system, but attacks what it sees in Legalism as a counter-productive degree of severity, and a complete lack of understanding of human nature.

Although Legalist philosophy purported to represent a government that is intrinsically impartial and amoral in the mechanics of its workings, it can also appear at times to be based on a cruel and pessimistic view of human nature, such as when extolling the power of punishments and the need to set aside personal feelings in the application of law. In “Discussing the Common People” (說民), the *Book of Lord Shang* claims that a King “applies punishments in nine cases (out of ten), (while) rewards arise in one case (out of ten)”²⁷ (王者刑於九，而賞出一). This is because:

罰重，爵尊；賞輕，刑威。爵尊，上愛民；刑威，民死上。
(When) punishments are heavy, then there is respect for the nobility. (When) rewards are light, then punishments are held in awe. If the nobility is respected, then those of high rank will take care of the common people. If the punishments are held in awe, then the people will (willingly) die for their superiors.

It is this particular emphasis on punishments with which *Lüshi chunqiu* disagrees.

What ultimately distinguishes the Guodian texts in question from both *Lüshi chunqiu* and the Legalist writings discussed here is their focus on the personal and the moral. The vision of the relationship between the ruler and the common people that emerges from these texts is emotion and ethical, but above all what might be called “personal” or “intimate”. While *Lüshi chunqiu* speaks of

²⁷ All translations from *The Book of Lord Shang* are my own.

“employing” the common people (用民), and the *Book of Lord Shang* speaks of the government “overcoming” the people (政勝其民), *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi* speak of “instructing,” (教) and “guiding” (導) them. This instruction and guidance is conducted in a gradual and sincere fashion, is founded on a genuine emotional connection between the ruler and his people, and is grounded in the ruler's own self-awareness and moral cultivation. This vision is uniquely Confucian,²⁸ and its final vision is of a society where the common people have a sense of personal shame (恥): a self-motivated, internal *ensor morum* that is instilled in them by the ruler's own personal example and maintained through the restraining power of ritual. The need to resort to punitive measures indicates a flaw on the part of the ruler. When the people commit crimes, it is the direct result of the ruler's own moral failings, and consequently to blame and punish the people themselves can accomplish nothing of value.

This emphasis on the personal pervades Confucianism but is most apparent in the *Analects*, the most intimate of the Warring States philosophical works. Its very existence is inherently intimate, as a record of the remembrances of Confucius' disciples and of their individual interactions with him. The contrast between the *Analects*, a record of personal interactions, and *Lüshi chunqiu*, a tome of reference intended to encompass the knowledge needed to rule an empire, and set down once and for all, is due in part to the development of a culture of writing and the long, gradual movement away from a purely oral tradition; yet it is also more than this. The particularly intimate nature of the *Analects* is not accidental. Confucius clearly felt that moral instruction was necessarily personal, as indicated by his need to shape the moral lessons he imparted to his students according to their individual strengths and weaknesses²⁹. This need for personal correctness in moral instruction extends into government as well, in the need to find worthy ministers. The quest to discover the truly worthy, and the risk of being fooled by

28 It should not be assumed that the Legalists attacked only the Confucians, however. In the *Han feizi*, the Confucians and Mohists are often grouped together as a common enemy. In Han Feizi's eyes, they were much the same: groups of scholars who apparently contributed nothing to the functioning of government, and wasted time with empty rhetoric and debates on human nature and morality.

29 E.g. *Analects* 11.22.

hypocrites who demonstrate only the veneer of worthiness but lack a genuine goodness was a central concern for Confucians. It was believed that a person's true value could only be judged through personal interaction and careful observation of their behaviour. This is a common theme in the *Analects*, although it is perhaps most clearly expressed in *Analects* 2.10:

子曰：“視其所以，觀其所由，察其所安。人焉廋哉？人焉廋哉？”

The Master said, “Look at the means a man employs, observe the basis from which he acts, and discover where it is that he feels at ease. Where can he hide? Where can he hide?”

In *Lüshi chunqiu*, this focus on the intimate is merely absent. The very core of Legalism was diametrically opposed to it. The Legalist reforms represented a break away from the intimate and the personal, and an end to the idea of personal morality as the primary force of just government. In the *Book of Lord Shang*, only the supremacy of government and law can bring the people together. The old, feudal notion of employing the morally “good” (善) leads to a fractured, nepotistic society where individual concerns override the law:

用善，則民親其親；任姦，則民親其制

If you employ the “good”, then the people will be fond of (personal) intimacy. If you employ the “wicked”, then the people will be fond of (fixed) regulations.

The Legalists believed that allowing personal connections to take precedence over the law inevitably leads to disorder, and prevents the ruler from exerting his authority.

Han Feizi believed that it was ultimately impossible to run a government based on the ideal of employing the morally upright because there is no way to determine a person's interior qualities. Only the objective observation of their performance in a governmental position allows a ruler to determine their worth:

發齒吻形容，伯樂不能以必馬；授車就駕而觀其末塗，則臧獲不疑駑良。觀容服，聽辭言，仲尼不能以必士；試之官職，課其功伐，則庸人不疑於愚智。

If one were only to look at a horse's teeth and examine its shape, then even the famous judge of horses, Bo Luo, could not guarantee the quality of the horse. But if one hitches it to a carriage and observes how it covers a certain distance of ground, then even the stupid slave can tell whether the horse is good or not. Similarly, if one were only to observe a man's features and dress and listen to

his speech, then even Confucius could not be certain what kind of person he is. But if one tries him out in government office and examines his achievements, then even a man of mediocre judgement can tell whether he is stupid or wise” (Watson 2003: 125).

A system run according to practical, objective and fixed standards also has the advantage that it does not have to rely on exemplary figures. As Han Feizi notes, even a man of mediocre judgement can determine if a minister is skilled if he has the opportunity to watch him in action. Thus it was his view that government ministers should be judged on a bureaucratic scale rather than a moral one. In this grand, bureaucratic vision of the Legalists, there was no room for the personal. Theirs was a system of government designed for a centralised, absolute control – a prerequisite for the efficient mobilisation of the common people for war – the primary end for any government at the time.

Although morally reprehensible in the eyes of both the Confucians and the Mohists, this single-minded focus on war was perhaps understandable in the midst of the aptly-named Warring States period, and particularly in the time of Han Feizi, where only a few independent states remained vying the absolute authority over all of China. Although the authors of *Lüshi chunqiu* sought to establish a more ecumenical style of government than the Legalists, they clearly shared the view that the personal, intimate ideals of the Confucians were no longer tenable.

This fundamental difference between the political philosophy of *Lüshi chunqiu* and the Confucian Guodian texts makes clear the philosophical core of these Confucian works. Although the basic vocabulary of their political philosophy could be borrowed, without the conceptual roots of the social order (Heaven's Constancy), the primacy of family, the specific concept of human nature and the connection between the genuine emotions and political relationships, the purpose of that vocabulary is entirely different. The source of this difference is a shift of emphasis away from the personal and the intimate and toward the bureaucratic and legally standardised. What *Lüshi chunqiu* and Confucianism share in common is a concern that Legalism at its most extreme resulted in a harsh, immoral and ultimately ineffectual system of government. Where they differ is in their solution: for *Lüshi chunqiu*

this problem could be resolved by injecting a degree of finesse into the application of the law by means of a more thorough understanding of human psychology; for the Confucians, the solution was to effect a genuine emotional connection with the common people, achieved by means of personal moral self-cultivation.

More specifically, for the four Guodian texts considered here, establishing a politically stable society is the precise goal of moral self-cultivation. Human beings are innately capable of developing the appropriate moral feelings of love and intimacy toward their own biological kin, but the non-biological relationships that form society and define the political world can only be properly established if people are educated and morally trained by means of the rites and music. Thus, matters of government cannot be separated from matters of self-cultivation because they are ultimately one and the same.

5 Conclusion

What binds these four texts together is their overall vision of a political system that is rooted in the reality of human nature. Together, they form a coherent theory in which the questions of social roles, family, the emotions and government are all inextricably connected. The political philosophy that is espoused in *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi* argues that government can only be successful when based on a firm understanding of people's innate dispositions. In order to understand these dispositions, a ruler must turn inwards, investigating his own nature and cultivating his own morality. Only once he has done this, can he begin to instruct his people. As *Xing zi ming chu* informs us, the ruler's genuine emotions, *qing*, serve as the means of both his own self-cultivation and the moral instruction of his people. Because a person's *qing* is both accessible and authentic, it occupies a unique role in the process of self-cultivation. One can make use of ritual and music to affect their *qing* and thus undergo a genuine, internal moral transformation. This, in turn, allows a political ruler to serve as an ethical role-model to his people, who spontaneously respond to the authenticity of his cultivated *qing*. The need for self-cultivation derives from the claim in *Liude* and *Xing zi ming chu* that human nature only contains the innate qualities necessary to spontaneously develop the proper moral feelings toward one's own biological kin. It is only through the external application of education that these spontaneous moral feelings can be built upon, in order to create the socially proper relationships between people who are not biologically related.

It is this focus on education as a solution to this moral dilemma that marks these texts as unique for their period. Although Xunzi, writing much later, would place a similar emphasis on the need for education in order to reshape a morally deficient human nature, he was writing in a different intellectual environment and addressing different concerns. These texts were likely written at

approximately the same time as Mencius, and it is likely that their emphasis on *xing* was a response to the same concerns that caused Mencius to propose his own definition of human nature. Compelled to respond to a new set of philosophical concepts that argued that the answers to ethical questions must be based on the internal truths of individual human nature alone, Mencius and the Guodian authors offered differing justifications for the Confucian ethical system. While Mencius would argue that moral development in the Confucian sense was a necessary part of the natural course of one's *xing*, the Guodian texts responded by giving an account of individual human nature that also made the external factors of education and culture necessary to the fulfilment of human existence. By arguing that the political world, although external to *xing*, was a necessary component of a cosmologically determined (and thus religiously significant) human social order, these texts countered the individualist claims that anything not intrinsic to human nature was morally corrupt.

In order to defend the cultural institutions of the ancients, the texts offer a unique account of the origin and power of the cultural innovations of ancient times. The Guodian texts claim that these cultural forms were devised by the sages of antiquity to shape and regulate the natural expressions of the genuine emotions. Because these cultural tools were able to both express and reshape people's emotional dispositions, they allowed one to transcend their inborn nature and become fully moral. Their moral project is thus an extension from the internal to the external, making use of the innate moral capacities of human nature to create the kind of ethical society that they argue could not exist without the aid of moral guidance and the cultural legacy of the past.

6 Annotated Translations

6.1 Introduction to Translations

This section includes annotated translations of the four texts discussed in this paper: *Liude*, *Xing zi ming chu*, *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi*. These are the titles that were originally given to them by the editors who first published these texts in Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998. However, at the head of each translation, I provide my own title for these texts: *Liude*, I have retitled, “The Six Social Positions” (*Liuwei* 六位); *Xing zi ming chu*, I have retitled, “Treatise on Human Nature and the Genuine Emotions” (*Xing qing lun* 性情論); *Cheng zhi wen zhi*, I have retitled, “On the Gentleman's Approach to Moral Training” (*Junzi yu jiao* 君子於教). I have retained the title, *Zun deyi*.

The format of the translation is as follows. Each passage begins with the Chinese text, followed by my English translation, and finally my textual annotations in smaller text. In the Chinese text, a numeral within square brackets (e.g. [01]) indicates a non-standard Chinese character. A list of these characters, with reference to this numeral, can be found after the translations on table 1.1. Numerals not inside square brackets indicates the strip number of the previous text. Although I have not always followed the original strip order given in Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998, for ease of reference I have retained the strip numbers that are assigned to each strip in this volume. A Chinese character in parantheses (e.g. (如)) indicates the reading of the previous character. A Chinese character in thick brackets (e.g. 【不】) indicates my emendation of a textual gap. A Chinese character in pointed brackets (e.g. <臣>) indicates an emendation of a presumed scribal error. A roman letter in parantheses (e.g. (A)) indicates a textual annotation.

Except where otherwise noted, my punctuation in the Chinese text is the same as suggested by the original editors in Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998. I have attempted to avoid any particularly

controversial re-ordering of the strips. In terms of my strip order, for *Liude* I have tended to follow Scott Cook (2004), for *Xing zi ming chu* I have tended to follow the original editors' strip order, and for *Cheng zhi wen zhi* and *Zun deyi* I have tended to follow Chen Wei (2001).

6.2 六位

The Six Social Positions

Formerly “六德” (“*Liude*”)

Chapter One

君子女(如)谷(欲)求人[06](道)……06【不】(A)[31](由)其[06](道)，唯(雖)堯求之弗得也。生民07【斯必又(有)夫婦、父子、君臣此】(B)六立(位)也。又(有)率人者，又(有)從人者；08又(有)[09](使)人者，又(有)事人【者；又(有)】(C)教(D)者，又(有)[30](學)(E)者；此六戩(職)也。既又(有)09夫六立(位)也，以剝(任)此【六戩(職)也】(F)，六戩(職)既分，以依(F)六 [20](德)。

If the Gentleman wishes to seek for the *dao* of human beings... [If one's management of the people does not abide by] this *dao*, then even Yao were to try and seek it, he would not acquire it. As long as there have been human beings, there have necessarily been husbands and wives, fathers and sons, rulers and ministers. These are the six positions. There are those who lead others and those who follow others; there are those who employ others and those who [serve] others; there are those who [instruct] and those who [learn]. These are the six duties. By means of these six positions being present, distribute the six duties; By means of these six duties having been distinguished, rely upon the six virtues.

(A) The top half of strip 7 is missing. The insertion of “不” here is based on context.

(B) The top half of strip 8 is missing. This emendation is based on a passage on strip 42 that seems to parallel this.

(C) There is a textual gap of approximately three characters here. This emendation is based on context.

(D) Only the bottom half of this character can be seen, showing the “子” signific. Most likely, this is “教.”

(E) The original editors found this character to be unclear and did not transcribe it, however it does appear most likely to be a scribal error for “學.”

(F) Strip 10 is damaged, leaving a textual gap of approximately three characters. This emendation is following Qiu Xigui's reading (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 189, note 10).

[……]可(何)胃(謂)六[20](德)?聖、智也，[27](仁)、宜(義)也，忠、信也。聖與智[32](就)壹(矣)，01[27](仁)與宜(義)[32](就)壹(矣)，忠與信[32](就)【壹(矣)】(A)。

What do we call the six virtues? Sageliness and wisdom, *ren* and *yi*, dutifulness and trustworthiness. Sageliness and wisdom are indeed close, *ren* and *yi* are indeed close, dutifulness and trustworthiness are indeed close.

(A) There is no “矣” here, but this is most most likely due to scribal error.

乍(作)豐(禮)樂，折(制)胃(刑)[33](法)，[08](教)此民尔(黎)(A)[09](使)02之又(有)向也，非聖智者莫之能也。新(親)父子，和大臣，歸四鄰03之帝(抵)[34](牾)，非[27](仁)宜(義)者莫之能也。聚人民，任[35]= (土地)(B)，足此民尔

(黎) 04 生死之甬(用)，非忠信者莫之能也。……5

To establish the rites and music, to regulate the punishments and laws, to instruct the people and give them direction – one who lacks sageliness and wisdom cannot do this. To generate affection between fathers and sons, to create harmony amongst the great ministers, to put an end to conflict with neighbouring states – one who lacks *ren* and *yi* cannot do this. To gather the people, distribute and make proper use of the land, to give the people enough both to live on and to mourn properly – one who lacks dutifulness and trustworthiness cannot do this.

(A) There is a general scholarly consensus on reading “尔” as “黎” based on their similar pronunciation. This reading is not certain, but based on context it does seem likely.

(B) Qiu Xigui believes that the repetition symbol (=) here does not indicate the repetition of a single character, but rather that this should be read as the two character expression “土地” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 189, note 4). This does appear to be most likely the case.

[……]大材執(藝)者大官，少(小)材執(藝)者少(小)官，因而它(施)祿安(焉)，[09](使)之足以生，足以死，胃(謂)14之君，以宜(義)[09](使)人多(A)。宜(義)者，君[20](德)也。

A great official is one who is of great talent and ability; a petty official is one who is of petty talent and ability. Thus one who gives out titles and emoluments in accordance to (his officials' abilities), and ensures they have enough to live on and enough to mourn properly can be called a ruler. He places the highest value upon employing others with *yi*. *Yi* is the virtue of a ruler.

(A) Following Ding Yuanzhi (2004: 218) in reading “多” in the sense found in Wang Bi *Laozi* chapter 44: “名與身孰親？身與貨孰多？” (“Your name or your body, which do you hold more dear?” (Ivanhoe 2002: 47).

非我血[05](氣)之新(親)，畜我女(如)其15子弟，古(故)曰：句(苟)淒(A)夫人之善它(施)纈(勞)其[36](藏)[37](腑)(B)之力弗敢單(憚)也，16危其死弗敢愛也，胃(謂)之【臣】(C)以忠[09](事)人多。忠者，臣[20](德)也。

(Although) the ruler is not my biological³⁰ kin, he cares for me like one of his own children. Thus it is said: if you are (helping to) complete your lord's goodness, then even if you are worked to exhaustion³¹, you do not dare complain; even if your very life is put in danger, you do not dare begrudge it: one such as this can be called a [minister]. He places the highest value upon serving his ruler with dutifulness. Dutifulness is the virtue of a minister.

(A) Following Ding Yuanzhi in reading this as “濟,” which he notes can be read with the sense of “成” or “盈” (Ding 2004: 220).

(C) “臣” is not present here, most likely due to scribal error.

智(知)可17為者，智(知)不可為者，智(知)行者，智(知)不行者，胃(謂)之夫，以

30 Literally: my blood-*qi* kin.

31 Literally: exhaust the strength of your viscera.

智率人多。18 智也者，夫[20]（德）也。

Knowing what can be done and what cannot be done; knowing what should be done and what should not be done: one such as this can be called a husband. He places the highest value upon leading others with wisdom. Wisdom is the virtue of a husband.

能與之齊，終身弗改之壹（矣）。是古（故）夫死又（有）[38]，終19身不變，胃（謂）之婦，以信從人多也。信也者，婦[20]（德）也。

Able to be in union (with your husband), and to the end of your life to never depart from his (ways); and thus, even after your husband dies, to be in possession of his memorial tablet, and to the end of your life to not change (from this): one such as this can be called a wife. She places the highest value upon following her husband with trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is the virtue of a wife.

既生畜之 20 或(又)從而[08]（教）癢（誨）(A)之，胃（謂）之聖(A)。聖也者，父[20]（德）也。

Having given birth to a son and having raised him, to then also to follow this by instructing him: one such as this can be called sagely. The virtue of a father is sageliness.

子也者，會[39](?)長材(A)21 以事上，胃（謂）之宜（義），上共(恭)下之宜（義）(B)，以[40]（？）[41](?)，胃（謂）之孝，古（故）人則為 22 【□□□□】(C)[27]（仁）。[27]（仁）者，子[20]（德）也。

Now, as for a son: if he brings together all of his strengths and talents in order to serve a superior, this is called *yi*; respectful towards superiors and *yi* towards inferiors... (?) this is called filial piety. Therefore, a person who is... *ren*. *Ren* is the virtue of a son.

(A) This section of text is unclear, and it is possible that strip 22 does not actually belong here. If we do accept this strip order, it would seem that this section of text is describing the similarities between the *yi* of serving one's superiors and the *ren* of filial piety. They both involve respect, but are distinct in that one is related to the family and the other is related to the social world. Unfortunately, this entire section of text is simply too unclear to be able to offer any kind of reading with confidence, but is worth looking at due to the fact that it possible presents an argument that *yi* and *ren* are somehow connected within the social position of the son.

(B) This is also unclear. Some have argued that the “之” is excrescent, or that it carries the sense of “向” here (Ding 2004: 225).

(C) There are approximately four characters missing here. There is a general consensus that this should read “故人則為[人也，之謂]仁,” based on *Mengzi* 7B16: “孟子曰：‘仁也者，人也。合而言之，道也’” (“Mengzi said, “Benevolence is simply being human. The Way is simply to harmonize with benevolence and put it into words” (Van Norden 2008: 188)). However, this makes little sense in this context. For the moment, it remains unclear how to render this passage.

古（故）夫夫，婦婦，父父，子子，君君，臣臣，六者客（各）23 行其戡（職），而歲（讒）闕（諂）(A)亡[31]（由）迄（作）也。

Thus, when husbands behave as husbands, wives as wives, fathers as fathers, sons as sons, lords as lords and ministers as ministers – each of these six comporting themselves in accordance to their appropriate duties – then false words will have no place from which to arise.

Chapter Two

[27] (仁)，內也。宜(義)，外也。豐(禮)樂，共也。內立父、子、26夫也，外立君、臣、婦也。

Ren is internal. *Yi* is external. Ritual and music are both internal and external. The internal positions are father, son and husband. The external positions are ruler, minister and wife.

為父[42] (絕) 君，不為君[42] (絕) 父。為昆弟[42] (絕) 妻，不為妻[42] (絕) 昆弟。為29宗族失朋友，不為朋友失宗族。

One can reject one's lord for the sake of one's father, but would never reject one's father for the sake of one's lord; one can reject one's wife for the sake of one's brothers, but would never reject one's brothers for the sake of one's wife; one can, for the sake of one's fellow clansmen, become estranged from one's friends, but one would never become estranged from one's clansmen for the sake of one's friends.³²

Chapter Three

男女33卡(辨)生言(焉)，父子新(親)生言(焉)，君臣宜(義)生言(焉)。父聖，子[27] (仁)，夫智，婦信，君宜(義)，34臣宜(忠)。聖生[27] (仁)，智率信，宜(義)[09] (使)忠。古(故)夫夫，婦婦，父父，子子，君君，臣臣，此六者客(各)35行其馘(職)而蔽闕蔑[31] (由)亡(乍)也。

Once the proper distinction between male and female is made, then affection will arise between father and son; (once affection has arisen between father and son), *yi* will arise between ruler and minister. The virtue of a father is to be sagely, of a son to be benevolent, of a husband to be wise, of a wife to be trustworthy, of a ruler to be *yi* and of a minister to be loyal. Sageliness engenders *ren*, wisdom marshals trustworthiness, *yi* employs dutifulness. Thus, if fathers behave as fathers, wives behave as wives, sons behave as sons, rulers behave as rulers and ministers behave as ministers – each of these six comporting themselves in accordance to their appropriate duties – then falsehoods will have no place from which to arise.

君子不帝(畜)明(乎)民微而已，或(又)以智(知)38其[43] (一) 壹(矣)。男女不卡(辨)，父子不新(親)。父子不新(親)，君臣亡宜(義)。

The gentleman is not content to understand only the details (of each relation) and cease there; he also seeks to understand their unity. If male and female are not distinguished, then there will not be affection between father and son. If there is not affection between father and son, then rulers and

32 Translation based on Slingerland 2008: 242.

ministers will not have *yi*.

是古（故）先王之 39[08]（教）民也，司（始）於孝弟。……孝，[44]（本）也。

Therefore, when the kings of antiquity were instructing the people, they began with filial piety and brotherly respect... Filial Piety is the root.

6.3

性情論

Treatise on Human Nature and the Genuine Emotions

Formerly “性自命出” (“*Xing zi ming chu*”)

Chapter One

凡人唯（雖）又（有）眚（性），心亡奠志，[01]（待）勿（物）而句（後）[02]（作），
[01]（待）兌（悅）而句（後）行，[01]（待）習而句（後）奠。喜[03]（怒）[04]（哀）
悲之[05]（氣），眚（性）也。及其見於外，則勿（物）取之也。

Although people (each) have a *xing*, their hearts lack a fixed will: it awaits (external) objects before it stirs, it awaits pleasure before it sets into action, and it awaits training before it becomes fixed. The *qi* of happiness, anger, grief and sorrow are (qualities of) *xing*. When (these emotions) are manifested in the outer world, it is because (external) objects have drawn them out.

眚（性）自命出，命 02 自天降。[06]（道）司（始）於青（情），青（情）生於眚（性）。
司（始）者近青（情），終者近義。智（知）【情者能】(A)03 出之，智（知）宜（義）者能
內之。

Xing comes out of *ming* and *ming* descends from Heaven; *dao* begins in *qing* and *qing* is born out of *xing*. At the beginning, it is closest to *qing*, at the end, it is close to *yi*. (Thus,) one who understands *qing* is able to express it (appropriately) and one who understands *yi* is able to internalise it.

(A) Strip 3 is broken at the bottom, leaving a textual gap of approximately three characters. Based on context and the Shanghai Museum text, this gap can be confidently emended.

好亞（惡），眚（性）也。所好所亞（惡），勿（物）也。善不【善，性也】(A)04 所善所不
善，執（勢）也。凡眚（性）為[07]（主）(B)，勿（物）取之也。金石之又（有）聖（聲），
【弗扣不 05 鳴。人】唯（雖）又（有）眚（性），心弗取不出(C)。凡心又（有）志也，亡与
不【行。心之不可】(D)06 蜀（獨）行，猷（猶）口之不可蜀（獨）言也。

(The ability) to like or dislike (derives from) *xing*; that which is liked and that which is disliked are external things. (The ability) to deem as good or [not good derives from *xing*]; that which is deemed as good and that which is deemed as not good are circumstances. *Xing* is the basic material that external things draw out. (Although) metal and stone (instruments each) have a tone, [if they are not struck (the tone) will not ring out]. (In the same way), although people (each) have a *xing*, if the heart does not take hold of it, (the *xing*'s qualities) will not issue out. (Although) the heart has a will, without its “companion,”³³ the heart will not act. The inability of the heart to act on its own can be likened to the

33 It is not clear if this refers to “external things” (物) needing to act upon the heart in order to spur it into action, or if it refers to the *xing* needing to be acted upon in order for the heart to act.

mouth's inability to speak on its own (without the assistance of the tongue).

(A) Strip 4 is broken at the bottom, leaving a gap of approximately 3 characters. This can be emended based on the Shanghai Museum text.

(B) Chen Wei (2000a) understands “主” to refer to the initial and original qualities (“先行存在”) that external objects (物) act upon.

(C) There are five characters missing from this passage: the bottom of strip 5 is broken, leaving a gap of three characters, while the top of strip 6 is also broken, leaving a gap of an additional two characters. The general meaning of the first half of the passage is relatively uncontroversial, and several parallels exist in received texts, each with slightly different wording. E.g., in the “Heaven and Earth” (天地) chapter of *Zhuangzi* 莊子, it appears as, “故金石有聲，不考不鳴。” Li Ling (2007a: 136) renders the passage as “【弗扣不鳴。人之】雖有性心，弗取不出。” The particular wording I have chosen follows Li, except that I have removed the “之” after “人。” The textual gap only appears to allow for five characters, and “之” is unnecessary.

The second half of the passage is more controversial. It is unclear how to parse the grammar in the line “[人]雖有性心弗取不出”. Some have interpreted the passage as “[人]雖有性，心弗取不出” and others as “[人]雖有性心，弗取不出,” which would give the respective meanings of either, “Although people (each) have *xing*, if (their) heart does not take hold of it, it does not issue out” or “Although people (each) have a *xing* and a heart, if (something) does not act upon them, they will not issue out.” Alternatively, Zhao Jianwei 趙建偉 (1999) has argued that “心” is an excrescent character (衍文), added due to scribal error.

There is no way to be completely certain how to punctuate the passage, and given that the theme of *Xingzimingchu* is largely on the relationship between *xing* and the heart, the interpretation of this line greatly influences the reading of the text as a whole. Franklin Perkins (2009: 123-4) reads the passage as, “Although [human beings] have *xing*, if the heart does not take/stimulate it, it does not issue out” ([人]雖有性心弗取不出), arguing that in the broader context of Warring States thought, it would be more likely for the text to ascribe to the heart “a primary role in decision making”. Although Perkins is correct in noting that the line reads more naturally if one assumes a break between 性 and 心, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the text explicitly states that *xing* (性) is the basic stuff that is drawn out by external things (物), not the heart. Ultimately, the text simply seems to read better, as Perkins notes, with a break between 性 and 心, and so this is the most likely parsing.

(D) Strip 6 is broken at the bottom, leaving a presumed gap of five characters. Unfortunately, this section of text does not appear in the Shanghai Museum version. As with the missing text discussed in note (C) above, each interpreter's emendation of the lacuna drastically affects their reading of the text as a whole. It is generally presumed that the passage should read “亡與不[可。(?)之不可]獨行，猶口之不可蜀(獨)言也。” However, what should fill the question mark in that passage is not clear. Li Ling (2007a: 136) fills the gap with “人,” Guo Yi with “志” (Li 2002: 141), and Liao Mingchun (2001:) with “心.” Chen Wei (2000a) emends the text differently: “亡與不奠。性(或志)之不可獨行...” As for the other character in question, any of “性,” “心,” or “志” would be appropriate in this context. In the narrower context of this sentence alone “心,” and “志” are particularly relevant. Li Ling's choice of “人” seems less likely to be correct. The context here seems to be a discussion of the heart's will, and so reading this character as “心” seems most likely.

牛生而偃(長)，見(鴈)生而轡(伸)，其聿(性)【使然。人】(A)07而學或[08](使)之也。凡勿(物)亡不異也者。剛之楨(B)也，剛取之也。柔之08約，柔取之也。四海之內其聿(性)縈(一)也。其甬(用)心各異，[08](教)[09](使)然也。

When an ox is born and (in due time) grows large, or a goose is born and (in due time) develops a long (neck), it is their *xing* that makes this so. However, with people, education also shapes them. Among

(all the various kinds of) things of the world, there are no (two kinds) that are alike. When a hard (thing) stands upright, this is the hard thing drawing on (its own intrinsic quality of hardness). When a soft (thing) bends pliantly, this is the soft thing (itself) drawing on (its own intrinsic quality of softness). Between the four seas, all (human beings) share the same *xing* (and yet) they each differ in the use of their hearts. It is education that makes this so.

(A) Strip 7 is broken on the bottom, leaving an estimated gap of three characters after “性”. The original editors transcribed “性” without comment, but in fact only a tiny fraction of a character can be seen. In light of the context and the fact that what little can be seen of the character does correspond with the appearance of “性”, it seems a reasonable assumption.

Li Ling (2007a) emends the text as “牛生而長，鴈生而伸，其性【使然。人】07而學或使之也”.

Chen Wei (2000a) emends it as “牛生而張，鴈生而伸，其性[也。人生]7而學，有使之也”.

Tu (2001) takes an entirely different tack: “牛生而長，鴈生而伸，其性天之就也。而學或使之也”，

where he reads “或” with the sense “疑”. “人生而學” retains a parallel style with the preceding “牛生而長” and “鴈生而伸”，

making it the most straightforward emendation. It is not entirely clear how to read this

passage, however the purpose of the text so far has been to argue that in the case of human beings, there is a distinction between the inherent qualities of their nature and the reality of their experiences; one's moral character is shaped by these experiences, but built on the foundation of their innate nature.

(B) As Qiu Xigui notes, this line is similar to one found in Guodian *Yu cong* 3 strip 46: “彊之討也，彊取之也” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 183, note 5). Zhao Jianwei (1999: 36) reads the character as “祝，”

with the sense of “to break,” noting that “[11]” and “祝” are of similar pronunciation. Zhao notes that in Guodian

Laozi A strip 2, the character “豆” is read as “屬，” which is how it appears in chapter 19 of the Wang Bi

Laozi. Following Zhao, the meaning of the passage would presumably be that while “hard” objects can be

used to break other objects, soft objects can be used to bind other objects together, or alternatively that hard objects are themselves wont to break, while soft objects are pliable and thus superior. Li Tianhong believes

this reading may have been influenced by the Qing dynasty Wang Xianqian's 王先謙 (1842-1917)

commentary on Xunzi, “荀子集解 (*Xunzi jijie*).” Wang's comment on the line “強自取柱，柔自取束” is

that “柱” should be read as “祝” with the sense of “to break,” thus giving it the meaning that when an object

is hard, it can break. In fact, Wang's reading does accord with the received texts *Da Dai liji* and *Huainanzi*

where in place of “柱，” the character “折” is used in similar passages, where the meaning “to break” is

explicit (Li 2002: 143). Despite the *Da Dai li ji* and *Huainanzi*'s uses of “折，” I believe Li is correct. In light

of the parallel in *Yu cong* 3 and the general context of this specific passage, the reading of “樹” with the sense of “upright” is more likely.

凡聿（性）09或[14]（動）之，或[15]（逢？）（A）之，或交之，或萬（厲）之，或出之，或
養（養）（B）之，或長之。凡觀（動）聿（性）10者，勿（物）也；置（逢？）聿（性）者，
兌（悅）也；交聿（性）者，古（故）也；萬（厲）聿（性）者，宜（義）也；出聿（性）者，
執（勢）也；養（養）聿（性）11者，習也；長聿（性）者，[06]（道）也。

It is the case with *xing* that there is something that moves it, something that lures it, something that engages with it, something that encourages it, something that causes it to come out, something that nourishes it and something that makes it grow. That which moves it is external things; that which lures it is pleasure; that which engages with it is purpose; that which hones it is *yi*; that which draws it out is circumstances; that which nourishes it is practise; that which extends it is the *dao*.

(A) There is no scholarly consensus on the reading of this character. The most plausible reading of this

character follows the reading of a similar character on strip 32 of *Cheng zhi wen zhi* in the line “是故小人亂天常以逆大道” which is read as “逆.” The appearance of this character on strip 32 *Cheng zhi wen zhi* is almost the same as here. This is the best palaeographic answer, and it fits contextually if 逆 is read with the sense to move or draw toward (迎接). Earlier in the text, pleasure 悅 is cited as the primary motivating factor on the heart, and so it would make sense to read it 悅 here as the element that lures the *xing* and motivates it.

(B) This character could alternatively be read as “永.” Chen Wei (2000a: 8) does read it as “永” in order to maintain consistency with the opening passage, where it states “待習而後奠.” Reading it in this sense, the line might be read “there is something that makes it constant,” carrying the same sense of “fixed” (奠) above. Chen raises an important question: does this entire section parallel the opening passage and its description of the heart (or *xing*?) awaiting external things before it stirs, pleasure before it moves and practise before it becomes stable? If so, then this section might be considered an elaboration of the basic idea presented at the beginning of *Xing zi ming chu*. The fact that the passage states that it is “practice” (習) that has this effect (either 養 or 永) on *xing* makes Chen's argument compelling. One problem with Chen's reading is that it assumes the opening passage is referring to *xing* 性 rather than the heart 心, but this does not appear to be the case. Chen (2000a: 8) also notes that the following line, “或長之” (there is something that makes it grow), is repetitive if we read this line as “或養之” (“there is something that nourishes it”). This is potentially true; however, if we read “長” with a sense other than “to grow,” perhaps more generally as “to extend,” the line would not be as repetitious as Chen argues. Ultimately, the reading of this character is, unfortunately, unclear. I have read this character consistently as “養” in *Zun deyi* strips 21 and 39, and because it is not entirely clear if this line must directly parallel the opening passage, I have decided to tentatively read this as “養” here as well.

凡見者之胃（謂）勿（物），快於己者之胃（謂）兌（悅），勿（物）12之執（勢）者之胃（謂）執（勢），又（有）為也者之胃（謂）古（故）。義也者，群善之藹也。習也13者，又（有）以習其眚（性）也。[06]（道）者，群勿（物）之[06]（道）。

That which causes (the *xing*) to be manifested is “(external) things,” that which causes one to feel satisfaction within oneself is “pleasure,” the (particular) occurrence³⁴ of a thing is “circumstances”, that which is deliberate is “purpose.” “*Yi*” refers to the collection of the various (kinds of) goodness. “Practise” refers to that which is created within one's *xing* through habit. The “*dao*” is the Way³⁵ of the various things.

時（詩）、箸（書）、豐（禮）、樂，其司（始）出皆生15於人。時（詩），又（有）為為之也。箸（書），又（有）為言之也。豐（禮）、樂，又（有）為[17]（舉）之也。聖人比其16類而論（論）(A)會之，觀其之（先）[18]（後）(B)而[15]（逆）(C)訓（順）之，體其宜（義）而即（節）[19]（文）(C)之，里（理）17其青（情）而出內（入）之，[10]（然）句（後）復以[08]（教）。[08]（教），所以生[20]（德）于[21]（中）者也。豐（禮）[02]（作）於青（情），18或（又）(D)[22]（興）之也，堂（當）事因方而折（制）之。

34 What I have translated as “occurrence” here and as “circumstances” later in the sentence is “勢” in both cases in the original Chinese. The passage uses the word in its general sense in order to define the word in its technical sense. I have given them slightly different translations in English in order to distinguish these two uses.

35 See note 1 above. Although I have generally tried to avoid translating technical vocabulary into English in order to retain their semantic range, I have translated *dao* as “Way” here in order to distinguish the term in its general sense from the particular technical sense that this line is defining.

The Odes, the Histories, the Rites and Music all have their origins in human beings. The Odes were deliberately crafted, the Histories were deliberately expressed, the Rites and Music were deliberately devised. The sages compared the categories (of the Odes) and then divided them and collected them together (where appropriate); they examined the sequences (of the Histories) and then rejected and accepted them (where appropriate); they embodied the propriety (of the rites) and then restrained and elaborated upon them (where appropriate); they regulated the *qing* (of the music) and then discarded and retained them (where appropriate). Once (the sages) had (done all this), (these cultural forms) were brought back for (the purpose of) education. Education is the means by which virtue is engendered within. The rites were crafted out of *qing*, (and in turn) they also give rise to *qing*; and (by virtue of) this bi-directionality, (the rites are able to) regulate (*qing*).

(A) Most scholars have read this character as “論.” Chen Wei (2000a: 9), however, reads it as “綸.” He cites Zhu Xi's commentary on Zhongyong 中庸 where “綸” is explained as having the sense of organising and classifying. If the character is read as “論” then the meaning would presumably be “elucidate” or “explicate.” In this context, “綸” makes more sense, as it fits with “會.”

(B) Qiu Xigui believes that these characters “之[18]” are a scribal error and should say “先後” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 182, note 9). This is likely: the upper signific of “先” is “之.”

(C) Qiu Xiugui believes “即[19]” should be read as either “次序,” “次度” or “節度.” He argues that “[19]” uses “且” as its pronunciation signific, and believes it may be an alternative version of “[23].” “且” is similar in pronunciation to “序” and “度” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 182, note 10). Li Ling reads this as “節文” (Li 2007a: 140). “[19]” appears again on XZ strips 20 and 22, where Qiu consistently reads it as being most likely “序” (see Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 182, notes 13 and 14). Li Tianhong believes the character should be read “文” in all of these occurrences (Li 2002: 150).

(D) This could also be read as “或” or “有.” If read as “有,” Guo Yi believes it should be read with the sense that “there was someone who” (有的人), referring to “聖人” (Li 2002: 151). I have read it as “又.”

Note:

If 聖人 is taken to mean the sages of antiquity, then I believe the passage should be read more generally, as a matter of taking the cultural works of the past and producing meaningful tools of moral cultivation out of them. If 聖人 is taken instead to refer to Confucius specifically, then it is possible that it is referring to the commentaries and specific arrangements of the classical texts that Confucius was believed to have personally undertaken. I suspect that the passage is not referring to Confucius specifically.

This passage refers to four kinds of cultural works: Odes, Histories, the Rites and Music. It is common to group ritual and music together as one, as they are in the line “禮、樂，有為舉之也.” Consequently it is not entirely clear if the section of this passage that describes the actions of the sages (or Confucius), which is broken into four parts, should read generally about all four kinds of cultural works, or should be read as referring to each kind of work in the respective order that they are listed. The nature of the each description does seem to imply that the latter case is true. In the first two cases, presumably speaking of the Odes and the Histories it discusses first categorising and ordering, and then arranging in order. For ritual and music, it speaks of first regulating cultural forms and then regulating the emotions.

Chapter Two

凡學者[24](求)其心為難，從其所為，近得之壹(矣)，不女(如)以樂之速也。36唯(雖)能其事，不能其心，不貴。求其心又(有)為也，弗得之壹(矣)。人之不能以為也，37可智

(知)也。

It is the case with studying that seeking the (proper) motivation is difficult. By following (a method that) exerts effort, one can come close to attaining it; (but) this is not as good as the speed of (using) music. If one is able to conduct an affair but does not have the proper motivation, then this is not of any value. If one's (effort) to seek out the heart is uses conscious effort, then they will not attain it. The (fact that) people cannot use conscious effort is something that can be (easily) understood.

【其】(A)過十舉，其心必才(在)安(焉)，[17](察)其見者，青(情)安 [25](失)才(哉)？

(If) a man commits the same excesses a more than ten times, his heart must be behind it. If you examine the manifestation (of these excesses), then how can you lose (sight of) his *qing*?

(A) Li Ling (2007a: 142) fills this gap with “不.” The majority of scholars fill this with “其.”

凡人青(情)為可兌(悅)也。句(苟)以其青(情)，唯(雖)過不亞(惡)；不以其青(情)，唯(雖)難不貴。50句(苟)又(有)其青(情)，唯(雖)未之為，斯人信之豈(矣)。

A person's *qing* is something that can be considered pleasing. If one conducts his actions by means of his *qing*, although he commits excess, (people) will not revile (what they have done); if one does not act by means of his *qing*, although they trouble themselves greatly, (people) will not value (what they have done). If one is in possession of their *qing*, then even before they have begun to do anything, the people will already trust them.

未言而信，又(有)美青(情)者也。未[08](教)51而民互(恆)，眚(性)善者也。未賞而民懼(勸)，含福者也。未型(刑)而民懼(畏)，又(有)52心懼(畏)者也。蔑(賤)而民貴之，又(有)[20](德)者也。

One who has not yet spoken, yet who is trusted [can be said to] have beautiful *qing*. One who has not yet trained the people, and yet the people are constant [can be said to have] a good nature. One who has not yet bestowed awards and yet the people are encouraged [can be said to] be in possession of great fortune. One who has not yet conducted punishments, and whom the people respect [can be said to] have a heart-mind that commands respect. One who is of lowly status, and yet is treated as noble by the people [can be said to] have virtue.

6.4 君子於教

On the Gentleman's Approach to Moral Training

Formerly “成之聞之” (“*Cheng zhi wen zhi*”)

君子之於[08]（教）也，其道（導）民也不[45]（浸），則其淳也弗深矣。是古（故）亡乎其身而4[46]（含）(A)乎其[47]（治）(B)，唯（雖）[48]（厚）其命，民弗從之矣。

This is the Gentleman's approach to education: when guiding the people, if you fail to be gradual (and constant), then (your teachings) will not penetrate (them) deeply. Thus, if you are lacking something in yourself, but attempt to apply this to your governing (of the people), although you pile on the orders, the people will not obey them.

(A) This character appears again on CZ strip 9. Qiu Xigui explains that the upper part of the character is similar to “鹿”. The ancient version of [49] had the same pronunciation as “薦”. Because in this context it appears in contrast to “亡”, Qiu reads it as “存”(Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 168, note 4). Ding cites Feng Shi 馮時 as arguing that the character is made up of the “木” and [51] signifiсs, where [51] is the phonetic component; thus, Feng reads the character as [51] which can be used with the meaning of “含”. Zhang Guangyu 張光裕 suspects the character is a scribal error for “民”, read as “泯”(Ding 2004: 133). However, as the form of the character here, and on CZ strip 9 do noticeably differ from “民,” and given that “存” and “含” make more sense contextually, I have chosen to follow Feng Shi.

(B) This character is generally taken to be “詞”. However, Chou Feng-wu 周鳳五 notes that this character is seen again on strip 23 where it is taken as “治”(Ding 2004: 134). Guodian *Laozi A* 老子甲 contains two similar characters: [50] (*LZA* strip 11), which in a parallel passage in the Wang Bi *Laozi* chapter 2 is transcribed as “辭”; and [47] which in the Wang Bi *Laozi* is transcribed as “治”. In addition, [47] is transcribed as “治,” and fits contextually as such, in several other places in the Guodian corpus, including CZ strip 23 and ZDY strip 6 (Ding 2004: 133-5). Despite the immediate temptation to read the line as a statement on general hypocrisy by contrasting the ruler's actions with his words, in fact it makes more sense contextually to interpret it as a comment on ruling by means of virtue. I have chosen to follow Chou Feng-wu.

是古（故）畏(A)備（服）(B)型（刑）罰之婁（屢）行也，5[31]（由）[52]（上）之弗身也。昔者君子<?>(C)有言曰：戰與型（刑）人，君子之墜[20]（德）也。是古（故）6[52]（上）句（苟）身備（服）之，則民必有甚安（焉）者。……7

Therefore, frequent recourse to intimidation, violent punishments and fines derives from the failure of those of higher station to set a personal (example). In ancient times, the Gentleman had a saying: “Wars and violent punishments (are signs) that the people's ruler has abandoned his Virtue.” Thus, if their superiors obey a principle themselves, then the common people cannot but have an even greater spirit of obedience within themselves.

(A) Qiu Xigui notes that the upper signifiс of this character differs from other places in the text where it has been transcribed as “畏.” Here, the upper signifiс appears as [53] whereas elsewhere it appears as [54]. Due to this difference, Qiu transcribes it as “威”(Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 169, note 5). As Ding notes, “威”

makes sense within the context of punitive measures (刑罰) (Ding 2004: 135). It is also possible that this character, though stylistically different from other occurrences, should nevertheless be read as “畏.” In this case, the lack of a “心” radical should also be noted. In either case, whether the character is “威” (as opposed to “畏”) or “畏” as opposed to [55] it seems clear that the difference is that in this case it should be understood as a negative form of fear, rather than the positive feeling of “reverential awe.” Thus, it might be said that while a tyrant can use laws and punishments to inspire fear, a virtuous leader inspires awe simply by means of his virtuous character. See Pang Pu 庞朴 2006 for a discussion of the Warring States usage of the “心” radical.

(C) Qiu Xigui reads this passage as “君子有言曰：戰與型（刑），人君之墜德也”(Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 169, note 6). This assumes that the insertion of “子” in “人君子” is a scribal error.

……上不以其道，民之從之也難。是以民可 15 敬道（導）也，而不可弇也；可御也，而不可（牽）也。

If those of higher station do not act in accordance with (the people's) *dao*, then it will be difficult to make them obedient. Thus, the people can be guided in a respectful manner, but they cannot be deceived. They can be steered (in the right direction), but they cannot be dragged (there).³⁶

智（知）(A)而比即（次），則民谷（欲）其智（知）之述（遂）也。福(富)而貧(分)賤，則民谷（欲）其 17 福(富)之大也。貴而能讓（讓），則民谷（欲）其貴之上也。反此道也，民必因此厚也 18 以復之，可不[56]（慎）乎？

If you are knowledgeable, yet (willing to to apply that knowledge) when appropriate, then the people will wish for you to attain (even more) knowledge. If you are wealthy, yet (willing to) share your wealth with the unfortunate, then the people will wish for your wealth to be (even) greater. If you are of high status, yet capable of deference, then the people will wish for your status to be (even) higher. If you turn away from this *dao*, then in response the people will become more drastic in their disobedience. How could you fail to be cautious (of this)?

(A) This character is written as “智”, and this is how many scholars, including the original Guodian editors, have read it (with the sense of “知”). Li Ling, however, reads the character as a sound-loan for “秩” (Li Ling 2007: 160). He notes that in its ancient pronunciation “秩” has an initial from the “定” group, and a final from the “質” group, while “智” has an initial from the “端” group and a final from the “支” group, giving them a similar pronunciation (Li 2007: 160). I have continued to read the character as “知.”

古（故）君子所復之不多，所求之不[57]<遠>(A)，[58](察)(B)反者（諸）己而可以 19 智（知）人。是古（故）谷（欲）人之愛己也，則必先愛人；谷（欲）人之敬己也，則必先敬人。
20

That which the Gentleman (need) investigate is not numerous, that which he (need) find is not far. (How is this so?) He (need only) turn his investigation toward himself and thereby come to understand others. Thus, if he wishes to have others love him, he must first love others. If he wishes to have others respect him, then he must first respect others.

³⁶ Literally, “they can be steered (like the horses of a chariot), but they cannot be pulled (like cattle by a ring in the nose).”

(A) Qiu Xigui believes that this character is a miswritten version of “遠”(Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 169, note 21).

(B) This character also appears on *ZDY* strip 8. Li Ling argues that in this instance this character is a variant of “察”, but should be read as “竊” based on their similar pronunciations.

天[59](證)(A)大[60](常),以里(理)人倫(倫)。折為君臣之義,[61](作)(B)為父子之新(親),分 31 為夫婦之[62](辨)。是古(故)小人[63](亂)天[60](常)以逆大道,君子[47](治)人倫(倫)以川(順)32天[20](德)。

Heaven sends down the Great Constancy, and by means of this it orders the human relations. It is (deliberately) regulated in the form of the *yi* between Ruler and Minister, it is (naturally) expressed in the form of intimacy between father and son, and it is (clearly) differentiated in the form of the distinction between husband and wife.

(A) The original editors transcribed this character as “ ”, but Li Ling (2007: 160) argues it should be transcribed as “59”, which he reads as “登”. Guo Yi agrees with the transcription of the original editors, and reads the character as “降” (1998: 62). I have followed Guo.

(B) Li Ling (2007: 160) reads this character as “作”. The character is comprised of the “心” and “著” significs. Li argues that because “著” is made up of a “精” initial and a “鐸” rhyme, and “作” is made up of a “端” initial and a “魚” rhyme, they are close in pronunciation. Tu (2001: 100) reads this as “著”, with the sense “明白規定”(clearly prescribed/stipulated). Ding (2004: 178) reads the character as “著” with the sense of “顯示”(to show/illustrate/display/demonstrate). This passage is demonstrating the distinct ways in which these three kinds of relationships are manifestations of Heaven's Great Constancy. The relationship between ruler and minister is defined by its being regulated, and the relationship between husband and wife is defined by its being distinguished. Based on the description of these three social positions found in *Liude*, what defines the father-son relationship is an intimacy that, because it is “internal,” arises naturally between them. Based on this, 作 seems to be the most appropriate reading.

6.5 尊德義 Respecting Virtue and Righteousness

[64] (尊) 尊 (德) 義，明乎民倫 (倫)，可以為君。[65](沮)(A)忿[66] (戾) (B)，改 [67] (慕)(C)勝，為人上者之[68] (務) 也。 1

One who is respectful of the Virtues and *yi*, and is fully enlightened regarding the human relations can be considered a ruler. Putting an end to grudges and quarrelsome behaviour, and reforming feelings of acrimony and rivalry: these are what the superior man devotes himself to accomplishing.

(A) This character was transcribed by the original editors as [65]. Li Ling (2007: 183-4) takes it as an alternative character for “濩”, which he reads as “去”. Chen Wei (2001: 109) reads the character as “沮”, arguing that this was a common variant in the state of Chu for [69]. The essential meaning remains the same with either of these two readings.

(B) This character was transcribed by the original editors as [67]. Li Ling (2007: 184) notes that the same character appears in *Zhongxin zhi dao* strip 8 and *Xing zi ming chu* strips 30 and 67, where it is read as “戀”. In this case, however, Li reads the character as “戾”. Chen Wei (2001: 109) agrees with Li, arguing that “忿戾” was a common expression in classical texts, and cites *Analects* 17.16: “古之矜也廉，今之矜也忿戾” (“In ancient times, those who were proud were at least principled; nowadays, they are simply belligerent and easily provoked.” Slingerland 2003: 207). I have chosen to tentatively follow Li.

(C) This character was transcribed by the original editors as [67]. Li Ling (2007: 184) takes it as a variant of “慕.”

.....[08] (教) 非改道也，[08] (教) 之也。 4 [30](學)非改倫 (倫) 也，[30](學)己也。

If a (method of) education is not contrary to the *dao*, (one may) apply this instruction to others. If a (method of) learning is not contrary to the social relations, (one may) apply this learning to oneself.

禹以人道[47] (治) 其民，桀以人道亂其民。桀不易 5 禹民而句 (後) 亂之，湯不易桀民而句 (後) [47] (治) 之。

It was by means of the human *dao* that Yu brought order to the people, and it was by means of the human *dao* that Jie brought disorder to the people. It was not that Jie (first had to) change Yu's people before bringing disorder to them, nor that Tang (first had to) change Jie's people before bringing order to them.

聖人之[47] (治) 民，民之道也。禹 6 之行水，水之道也。戚 (造) 父之御馬，馬也之道也。句 (后) 稷之執 (藝) [35] (地)，[35] (地) 之道也。莫 7 不又 (有) 道安 (焉)，人道為近。是以君子，人道之取先。

It was by means of the *dao* of people that the sages were able to bring order to them. It was by means of the *dao* of water that Yu (was able to) redirect the waters. It was by means of the *dao* of horses that Zao Fu could ride his chariot (so well). It was by means of the *dao* of the earth that Hou Ji was able to cultivate the land. There is nothing that does not have a *dao* within it, and the *dao* of human beings is

of the most immediate importance. Therefore, the Gentleman is the one who takes the *dao* of human beings as his first priority.

[58] (察) (A) 諸(B) 出，所以智(知) 8 己，智(知) 己所以智(知) 人，智(知) 人所以智(知) 命，智(知) 命而句(後) 智(知) 道，智(知) 道而句(後) 智(知) 行。

By examining your own conduct you can come to understand yourself. By understanding yourself you can come to understand others. By understanding others you can come to understand *ming* (命). Once you understand *ming*, you can come to understand *dao*, and once you understand *dao*, you can come to understand how to act.

Note:

Due to the repetitive nature of this passage, the scribe(s) made use of the “repetition symbol.” The passage actually reads as follows, where “=” indicates repetition: “.....所以智=8 己=所以智=人=所以智=命=而後智=道=而智行”.

(A) See *Chengzhi* strip 19 above.

(B) Li Ling reads this character as “者” in this instance, but as “諸” on *Chengzhi* strip 19. Chen Wei (2001: 112) argues that “察者” can be understood in this case to have the meaning “復於己者”. Ding Yuanzhi (2004: 288) reads this as “諸”, and takes “出” to indicate the external manifestation of one's conduct (行為的表現). Presumably, this would mean that the text is saying that the means to understanding oneself is to examine their own actions. The exact meaning of this passage is unclear, but Ding's reading seems most likely.

[31] (由) 豐(禮) 智(知) 9 樂，[31] (由) 樂智(知) [70] (哀)。又(有) 智(知) 己而不智(知) 命者，亡智(知) 命而不智(知) 己者。又(有) 10 智(知) 豐(禮) 而不智(知) 樂者，亡智(知) 樂而不智(知) 豐(禮) 者。……11

Understand music through ritual, and understand sorrow through music. There is such a thing as understanding oneself but not understanding *ming*, but there is not such a thing as understanding *ming* but not understanding oneself. There is such a thing as understanding ritual but not understanding music, but there is not such a thing as understanding music but not understanding ritual.

[08] (教) 以豐(禮)，則民果以至(勁)(A)。[08] (教) 以樂，則民[71] (淑?) (B)[20] (德) 清(C) 將(藏)(D)。

Instruct by means of ritual, and the people will be (morally) resolute and upstanding. Instruct by means of music, and the people will cultivate their virtue and clarify their goodness.

(A) Li Ling reads this as “勁” (Li Ling 2007: 185), which seems to fit the context.

(B) The original editors did not transcribe this character into a modern form. Li Ling (2007: 185) reads it as “弗.” Liu argues that the character contains the [72] signific and should be transcribed [73], with the reading “淑” (Liu 2003: 133). Contextually, Liu's reading seems most appropriate.

(C) The original editors transcribed this as “清.” The character has been variously rendered as “爭,” “靜,” and “清.” I have chosen to read the character as “清,” as it appears in the original text.

(D) Ding Yuanzhi cites a usage of “將” in the Book of Poetry 詩經, Odes of Bin 邶風, Po Fu 破斧: “哀我人

斯、亦孔之將。” According to the Qing Dynasty scholars Wang Yinzhi 王引之 and Wang Niansun 王念孫, “將” is close in pronunciation to “藏”, and they render the passage “哀我人斯、亦孔之藏”(His sympathy for us, oh! It is indeed of such profuse goodness!)³⁷ (Ding 322). I am tentatively following Ding.

[08] (教) 13 以辯兌 (說) , 則民執(A)[74](隄)(B)[75](長)(C)貴(D)以忘(E) 。

Instruct the people by means of logical disputation, and the people will disrespect their elders and superiors, and will not be mindful of their responsibilities.

(A) The form of this character is the same as in the following passage, “教以執”, but the context would appear to be different. Chen Wei (2001: 114) reads the character as “褻” in this specific passage, noting that in *Ziyi* strip 28 the expression “執型” occurs, which appears as “褻型” in the received version of the same text. Li Ling (2007: 183) reads it as “藝.” Although hesitant to assume that this occurrence of “執” should be read differently than the occurrence directly below, I have read it as “褻” here and as “藝” in the following passage.

(B) Li Ling (2007: 185) tentatively suggests 修. Chen Wei (2001: 114) reads it as “陵”. Tu (2001: 112) considers the character to be made up of the “阜” and the “定” signifiers. The *Yu pian* 玉篇 says that this can have the sense of “限,” which Tu presumably reads as an extension of its literal meaning of a dike. This is a compelling palaeographic argument, and so I have decided to tentatively follow Tu.

(C) Li Ling (2007: 185) reads this as “長.” Chen Wei (2001: 114) reads this as “俚.” Ding (2004: 322) reads this as “悵.” The most straightforward reading of this character would be 長 in the sense of “elders,” which also fits with the most straightforward reading of the following character as “貴,” people of high rank.

(D) Chen Wei (2001: 114) reads this as [76], which Guo Pu 郭璞, in his commentary on *Fang yan* 方言 lists as having the same meaning as “詐.” Ding (2004: 323) reads this as “憤.” In connection with the previous character, the most obvious reading would appear to be “貴.” See note (C) above.

(E) Chen Wei (2001: 114) suggests this should be read as [77] with the sense of “exaggerative” or “boastful”. Chen Wei also notes that the character could be interpreted as [78] which is how the majority of interpreters have taken it; however, I suspect the character might be best read as is: “忘,” with sense of being neglectful (or forgetful) of one's responsibilities.

不 32 愛則不新 (親) , 不□(A)則弗懷(B) , 不釐則亡悵 , 不忠則不信 , 弗憇 (通) 則 33 亡復 。

If you do not show solicitude for the people, then they will not care for you. If you do not... then the people will not cherish you. If you fail to be orderly, they will lack a feeling of reverential awe for you. If you fail to be dutiful, then the people will not trust you. If you are not willing to (personally) interact with others then people will not be responsive (to you).

(A) This character is unclear.

(B) Chen Wei (2001: 117) reads this as “通,” which I have followed.

[79](咎?)(A)則民[80](恨)(B) , 正則民不[81](吝)(C) , [82](恭)(D)則民不[83](怨)(E) 。

If you are too quick to blame, the people will hold a grudge. If you are upright, then the people will not be mean-spirited. If you are respectful, then the people will not be resentful.

37 Translation my own.

(A) The original editors did not transcribe this character. Li Ling reads the character as “咎”, and suggests that it carries the meaning of “to blame” (怪罪) (Li Ling 2007: 184). Ding Yuanzhi adds that the character can also carry the meaning of “to hate/abhor” (惡). Chen Wei (2001: 115) reads this character as “縱.” Because the passage as a whole is unclear, it is difficult to use context to determine the meaning of this character. If we read this character as well as the character in note (B) below as negative qualities, then this line is not directly parallel with the following two parts of the passage. It is likely for this reason that Chen Wei (2001: 115) suggests this line belongs with the paragraph above. I have tentatively followed Li's suggestion that the character carry the sense of “to blame.”

(B) Chen Wei (2001: 115) reads this character as “輕.” Ding notes that the *Shuowen Jiezi* defines this character as “恨”. In Duan Yucai's 段玉裁 commentary, he defines “恨” as having the meaning of “悻” in *Mengzi* 2B12 (Ding 2004: 300): “How could I be like one of those petty fellows who criticizes his ruler, and when it is not accepted becomes angry? With a scowl on his face he leaves and does not rest until he has exhausted a whole day's effort” (Van Norden 2008: 61) (予豈若是小丈夫然哉? 諫於其君而不受, 則怒, 悻悻然見於其面。去則窮日之力而後宿哉?). In this context, it conveys a sense of bitter or spiteful anger.

(C) The original editors transcribed this character as “吝.”

(D) Qiu Xigui takes this as a scribal error for [92], which he reads as “恭” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 175, note 21).

(E) This character appears on *Ziyi* strip 10, where it is transcribed as “怒.” See Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 133, note 32.

均(A)不足以坪(平)正(政), [84]緩 (B)34 不足以安民, [85] (勇) 不足以沒 (C)眾, 專 (博) 不足以智(知)善, 快(決) 不足以智(知) 倫(綸) (D), 殺 35 不足以夯(勝) (E) 民。

Evenly distributing (the wealth among people) is not sufficient to make governing equitable. Leniency are not sufficient to pacify the people. A demonstration of courage is not sufficient to quell the masses. Broad learning is not sufficient to understand goodness. Decisiveness is not sufficient to understand statecraft. Executions are not sufficient to overawe the people.

(A) As Ding notes, “均” and “平政” together can refer specifically to equitable land taxes. He cites the *Zhouli* 周禮 (Rites of Zhou) chapter *Diguan situ* 地官司徒 (Offices of Earth: Minister of Education): “(Make) equitable government by means of (equitable) land taxes” (以土均平政). It's entirely possible that the text here is meant to be this specific, in which case the line would be rendered along the lines of “making use of taxation laws is not enough (alone) to make governing equitable” (Ding 301). However, I have translated the passage with a more general meaning of “均,” “equal distribution”

(B) The original editors transcribed the character as being made up of the “心” and “家” significs. According to Li Ling, this character is made up originally of the “心”, [86] and [87] significs, and he reads it as “埒”, with the sense of “相等” (equal) (Li Ling 2007: 184). Ding takes the meaning of “埒” as borders, channels or walls in a more extended sense: relying on legal restrictions in order to pacify the people (301). Chen Wei (2001: 118) reads this character as “緩,” with the sense of “寬緩” (lenient). Ultimately, the meaning is unclear, but I have tentatively followed Chen.

(C) The original editors transcribed this character as “沫”. Li Ling reads it as “蔑,” arguing that in the ancient pronunciation, both characters had the “明” initial category and the “月” final category (Li Ling 2007: 184). Liu (2003: 129) reads the character as “沒.” I have followed Liu.

(D) Although “倫” is generally taken to mean “倫” in the *Guodian* texts, in this particular passage it does not appear to fit the context. I have followed Ding's suggestion to read the character as “綸” with the sense of

“經綸” (Ding 2004: 301).

(E) The original editors transcribed this character as [88]. Qiu Xigui argues that it should be read as “勝” (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 174, note 23).

下之事上也，不從其所命，而從其所行。上好是勿（物）也 36 下必又（有）甚安（焉）者。
(A) 夫唯是，古（故） [20]（德）可易而施可 [89]（轉）(B) 也。又（有）是施少（小） 37 又
（有）利，[89]（轉）而大又（有）裒（害）者，又（有）之。又（有）是施少（小）又
（有）裒（害），[89]（轉）而大又（有）利者，又（有）之。38

When those of lower station serve those of higher station, it is not the content of their superiors' orders that they follow, but rather the content of their actions. When a person of high station demonstrates a fondness for certain things, those of lower station are certain to have this feeling to a great deal within themselves (as well). Therefore, if one can effect a change in (the quality) of one's (own) virtue, they can also have a (practical) effect on the practice (of government). In some cases there are practices that are initially of small benefit, but with a change of direction they become practices of great detriment – such practices exist. In some cases, there are practices that are initially of small detriment, but with a change of direction they become practices of great benefit – such practices (also) exist.

(A) There is a parallel version of this passage in the *Guodian Ziyi* strips 14-15. Also note *Chengzhi* strip 7 above.

(B) Qiu Xigui reads this as 轉 (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998: 174, note 24). Chen Wei (2001) reads this as “遭.” In either case, the meaning is essentially the same.

凡 [90]（動）(A) 民必訓（順）民心，民心又（有）恆，求其秉 (B) …… 39

In order to mobilise the people, you must follow the (dispositions of their) hearts. The hearts of the people have consistent (qualities), and you must seek the way to nourish these (qualities).

(A) Chen Wei (2001: 118) reads this as 極, but 動 is more straightforward.

(B) The majority of scholars read this character as 永. I read it as 養 (see also Chen Wei 2001: 119). This character also appears on *Zundeyi* strip 21, where I also read it as 養.

[64] 尊 [27]（仁）、新（親）忠、敬壯(莊)(A)、歸(B)豐（禮），20 行矣而亡 [91] (違)(C)，
秉（養）心於子(慈)佞（諒）忠信日益而不自智（知）也。

Revere *ren*, be intimate with dutifulness, respect dignity and return to the rights. If you act (in accordance with these precepts) without faltering, and nourish your heart with kindness and mercy, then you will grow more dutiful and trustworthy each day without (even) being aware of it.

(A) Li Ling (2007: 183) reads this as 莊. Chen Wei (2001: 119) reads this character as 長, in which case it would read “respect elders.” Either reading is possible, but Li's is more consistent with the rest of the passage.

(B) Li Ling (2007: 183) reads this as 違.

民可 [09]（使）道 21 之，而不可 [09]（使）智（知）之。民可道(導)也，而不可強也。桀不

胃（謂）其民必亂，而民又（有）²² 為亂矣。爰<受>(A)不若也，可從也而不可及也。

The people can be made to follow a thing, but cannot be made to understand it. The people can be guided, but they cannot be forced. (Thus) Jie did not explicitly tell the people they had to be chaotic, yet they were chaotic (nonetheless). If one does not accept this fact, he (will be able to make the people) go along (with him), but not for a long time.

(A) The original editors tentatively transcribed this character as “爰”. Li Ling considers the character to be a scribal error for “受”.

Table 1.1: Reference of Non-standard Chinese Characters

| | | |
|--------|--------|--------|
| [01] 是 | [32] 豪 | [63] 纒 |
| [02] 友 | [33] 癩 | [64] 齏 |
| [03] 惹 | [34] 虐 | [65] 灘 |
| [04] 惹 | [35] 陞 | [66] 纏 |
| [05] 熨 | [36] 馳 | [67] 愜 |
| [06] 行 | [37] 蚩 | [68] 灸 |
| [07] 室 | [38] 室 | [69] 沮 |
| [08] 善 | [39] 璋 | [70] 悵 |
| [09] 貞 | [40] 莢 | [71] 冏 |
| [10] 狀 | [41] 豎 | [72] 勇 |
| [11] 桓 | [42] 絲 | [73] 甬 |
| [12] 一 | [43] 弋 | [74] 阮 |
| [13] 一 | [44] 杏 | [75] 很 |
| [14] 敷 | [45] 憲 | [76] 讀 |
| [15] 連 | [46] 崇 | [77] 誌 |
| [16] 昌 | [47] 討 | [78] 壹 |
| [17] 盒 | [48] 毫 | [79] 久 |
| [18] 途 | [49] 鷹 | [80] 煙 |
| [19] 鷹 | [50] 炯 | [81] 誼 |
| [20] 惡 | [51] 弓 | [82] 罌 |
| [21] 申 | [52] 走 | [83] 慚 |
| [22] 戩 | [53] 冫 | [84] 悵 |
| [23] 鷹 | [54] 友 | [85] 山 |
| [24] 束 | [55] 悵 | [86] 冫 |
| [25] 避 | [56] 斬 | [87] 戮 |
| [26] 誦 | [57] 煨 | [88] 勇 |
| [27] 惡 | [58] 戮 | [89] 迫 |
| [28] 評 | [59] 釜 | [90] 撞 |
| [29] 牛 | [60] 棠 | [91] 懲 |
| [30] 留 | [61] 悵 | [92] 齏 |
| [31] 纒 | [62] 友 | [93] 一 |

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