A STUDY OF MOVEMENT AND ORDER:

THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN CANADA AND FRANCE

by

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Dissertation Abstract

This dissertation is about the movement of people and the system of order underpinning the movement. In undertaking a comparative study of Canada and France between 1989 and 2005, the study explores a widespread phenomenon that security studies and migration scholars would have considered an anomaly only two decades ago: understanding the movement of people as an existential security threat.

How is it that nation-states around the globe are cracking down on migration for security reasons? How do we know if migration has been securitized – and which criteria should we employed to guide our analysis? What are the social mechanisms at play in the interaction between movement and order? Does a variation in levels of securitized migration exist – and if so, what are the key determinants of the variation? These questions are at the heart of the present study.

My argument is twofold. First, I contend that a constructivist perspective is useful in gaining a better understanding of the social mechanisms involved in the securitization of migration as it highlights discursive power, ideational factors, and cultural/contextual elements. Second, I argue that securitization theory – the current benchmark in securitization research – remains silent on the issue of variation in levels of securitized migration. As such, securitization theory, as currently applied and organized, cannot explain empirical findings of my study – a weak securitization in Canada versus a strong securitization in France. Underscoring the necessity to amend securitization theory, I investigate the impact of cultural factors – and especially the role of domestic audience – to account for the variation.
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Chapter 1
1.1 A study of movement and order

This dissertation is about the movement of people and the system of order underpinning the movement. In undertaking a comparative study of Canada and France between 1989 and 2005, the study problematizes the relationship between migration and security. It explores a widespread phenomenon that security studies and migration scholars would have considered an anomaly only two decades ago: understanding the movement of people as an existential security threat.

Indeed, the movement of people is now provoking worldwide anxiety and apprehension. It casts long-established patterns of cultural identity, belonging, and security into doubt. In this troubled context, abrasive rhetoric about migration is gaining popularity; nation-states around the globe, especially Western ones, are cracking down on migration for security reasons. Multilateral and bilateral agreements have been signed, international and domestic institutions have been created, extradition and deportation agreements between receiving and sending states have been signed, and conventions and protocols have been ratified with, at its core, the linkage between migration and security. A sharp increase in border control is also noticed: by the end of the 1990s (i.e. before 9/11), the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had more employees authorized to carry guns than any other federal law enforcement force (US Department of Justice 2000).

In short, the movement of people has been discursively and institutionally integrated into security frameworks that emphasize policing and defence—what is here referred to as the securitization process. Scholars have referred to this current state of affairs as
securitized migration or as the securitization of migration (Huysmans 2006; Wæver et al. 1993).

To be sure, migration has been controlled through national policies and bilateral and/or multilateral agreements for a long time. As well, the notion that certain individuals could pose security threats has been the case for many years. It is: (a) the notion of migration in a collective sense posing an existential threat to the security of the state and/or the society; (b) the prominence given to immigration as a security threat; and (c) its attendant effects in political practice which have undergone significant and even startling change in various places that is different.

Two interrelated questions drive this study. First, what are the social mechanisms involved in the process of securitizing migration? As securitizing an issue is a complex process, fundamental questions abound such as the question of the relationship between material and ideational factors, the agents’ capacity (or not) to navigate freely toward a successful securitization, and the role of contextual factors and domestic audiences in the securitization process. The second question seeks to answer an empirical puzzle: Does a variation in levels of securitized migration exist – and if so, what are the key determinants of the variation?

Providing some answers to these questions is timely and relevant for several reasons. First, we do not have a profound understanding of the mechanisms at play in the securitization process. To be sure, the 1990s have seen several pushes for widening and broadening the notion of security as new issues have entered the realm of security studies shortly after the end of the Cold War. However, contributions trying to gain a better
understanding of the social mechanisms involved in the securitization process have
remained of little number and unequal in their internal coherence and success. This is
particularly true in the case of securitized migration.

Secondly, what makes a comparison of the securitizing process in Canada and France
particularly relevant is that they occupy distant positions on the migration-security
continuum. As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, Canada displays a low level of securitization
of migration, whereas France has a high level of securitization. Since my study involves
comparing a considerable range of variation on the phenomenon to be explained, it could
act as a matrix for further research about the social mechanisms involved in the process of
securitizing migration.

Last, though not least, especially for security studies literature, the importance of this
study resides in the fact that it is among the first studies to systematically operationalize –
across securitizing agents, across time, and across cases – the current theoretical
benchmark in the securitization process, i.e. securitization theory. Despite the fact that
securitization theory has attracted the attention of numerous scholars in recent years, a
limited number of studies have tried to “apply” the theory. The vast majority of scholars
have focused on the theoretical aspects of securitization theory – sometimes highlighting
its values, sometimes underscoring its shortcomings. Few studies have aimed at presenting
a set of theoretical criticisms and an assessment of securitization theory’s contributions to
securitization research through a detailed, systematic, and rich empirical research.

At this point, two important notes need to be mentioned. My emphasis in this
dissertation is on the securitization of migration and not on the politicization of migration.
Politicization of migration refers here to the process of taking the issue of migration out of restricted networks and/or bureaucracies and bringing it into the public arena (Guiraudon 1998; Huysmans 2006).\textsuperscript{2} The politicization of migration encompasses both the positive and the negative point of views on the issue even though anti-immigration political actors have been keen to voice their message in a particularly strong way in recent years. Therefore, politicization, as it encompasses both positive and negative overtones concerning migrants and immigration, is analytically separate. As the distinction between a politicization of migration and a securitization of migration is important in the present context, I will discuss the issue throughout my study.

As well, one has to distinguish between securitization and desecuritization. Following the prevailing treatment of desecuritization in security studies (Huysmans 2006; Waever 1995), I refer to desecuritization as the process of unmaking the securitization of an issue. In other words, desecuritization is the process of excluding an issue from security frameworks emphasizing policing and defence. The distinction will prove to be essential in my analysis of the process of securitizing migration, as the next chapters will demonstrate.

1.2 The argument

In this dissertation, I make two contributions to the security literature. First, I argue that a constructivist perspective is useful in gaining a better understanding of the social mechanisms involved in the securitization of migration as it highlights discursive power, ideational factors, and cultural/contextual elements. Second, I develop a conceptualization of security as a continuum rather than as a binary notion. As such, my analytical
framework will permit both an empirical measurement of levels of securitized migration and the deduction of hypotheses to account for the variation.

This constructivist study of the securitization of migration addresses silences and corrects weaknesses of other approaches. The alarmist argument, which assumes that migration is by definition a security concern, eschews the complexity of the phenomenon. The grand strategy approach, proposing that the “international threat environment” is the primary explanatory factor, fails to take into account that the securitization of migration is not simply an objective reaction to material factors and events. As well, a constructivist perspective underscores that securitization theory, which argues that labelling something as a security issue permeates it with a sense of importance that legitimizes the use of emergency measures, is incomplete and under-specified.

Security is neither a fact of nature nor merely a question of material factors. It requires to be “written and talked into existence” (Huysmans 2006). As such, I demonstrate the role of several agents’ securitizing moves – i.e. speech acts intended to present migration as an existential threat requiring exceptional measures – in ‘talking into existence’ the securitization of migration. However, a security speech act does not constitute a securitization, but only an attempt to securitize an issue. Securitizing moves made by agents have to be analyzed within the multifaceted contexts in which they have been made. Proceeding within a constructivist perspective allows me to show that when students of the securitization process take into consideration agential and contextual factors, they gain a better understanding of the securitization process. To situate agents’
moves in their historical, cultural, and sociological contexts engenders a fertile dialogue between ideas, findings, and generalizations.

My second argument concerns the question of levels of securitized migration. I argue that securitization theory – the current benchmark in securitization research – remains silent on the issue of variation in levels of securitized migration. Indeed, the prevailing treatment of security is to understand security in a binary way: either an issue is securitized or it is not. There is no theoretical space to incorporate the possibility of levels of securitized migration, let alone to propose an explanation for the variation. This is problematic because securitization theory, as currently applied and organized, cannot explain empirical findings of my study – a weak securitization in Canada versus a strong securitization in France. Against this standpoint, I will develop a more nuanced conceptualization by understanding security as a continuum. My analytical framework will permit both an empirical measurement of levels of securitized migration and the deduction of hypotheses to account for the variation.

On a broader level, these two contributions are closely connected with Martin Heisler's (2006) remark that a coherent and comprehensive theoretical framework making sense of the link between migration and security has yet to be produced. In the following pages, I take steps in proposing an analytical framework for studying the process of securitization that includes sequence, agential factors, and cultural factors.

1.3 Methods of inquiry

Although this dissertation employs a traditional content analysis as the primary method of investigation, I use the logic of triangulation of methodological approaches as research
method. Indeed, I have tried throughout the study to check findings obtained with one research method against findings deriving from another type. Thus, I use statistical analysis to depict the role of each securitizing actor in the securitization of migration (results are presented in form of graphs) and to provide an overview of how migration and security are co-related in the complete set of speeches of each securitizing agent (using simple correlation coefficients). Then, I employ interviews and content analysis to further understand and explain tipping points and plateaus observed in these graphs. I use survey and poll research as well as historical and contextual analysis to capture the role of public opinion and audiences in the securitization of migration.

To answer the two questions driving this study, I explore the role of two securitizing agents (political, media) and of two contextual factors (exogenous shocks, domestic audiences) in the securitization process.

For the purpose of this study, political agents are elected politicians and members of the government—those who are in power. I have focused my analysis on the leaders of the governing political party as well as the ministers in charge of foreign affairs and immigration portfolios; therefore, I have not included leaders of the opposition in my study. In Canada, my political agents are Prime ministers, Ministers of Foreign affairs, and Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration. In France, I have chosen Presidents, Prime ministers, Ministers of Foreign affairs, and Ministers of Interior. For each agent, I examined the complete set of speeches made between 1989 and 2005; in total, I have retrieved, collected, and quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed approximately 3,500 speeches.
In this study, media agents are editorialists of major national newspapers. In Canada, my media agents are editorialists of *The Globe and Mail* and *La Presse*. The former is generally regarded as something like Canada’s national newspaper and the latter as the most important French-speaking newspaper. Taken together, they have a daily circulation of more than 500,000 copies (weekdays). In France, I have selected editorialists of *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*; the daily circulation is substantial as well with on average 850,000 copies (weekdays). These two newspapers are largely considered the two most important newspapers in France. While *Le Monde* is regarded to be on the centre-left of the political spectrum, *Le Figaro* is the main centre-right newspaper. For each media agent, I examined the complete set of editorials written between 1989 and 2005 in which the issue of the movement of people was discussed; in total I have systematically retrieved, collected, and quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed 900 editorials.

On top of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of politicians’ speeches and editorialists’ editorials, I conducted a limited but well-targeted number of interviews in each country case using multiple choice questionnaire, semi-structured questions, and open-ended questions. In Canada, I interviewed eight senior bureaucrats from five departments; in France, I interviewed eight individuals from three departments. Without revealing their individual identities, among the interviewees were national security advisers, executive directors, an assistant deputy minister, a vice-president of an enforcement branch, and immigration policy advisers.

As well, I have filed requests under the *Access to Information Act* in Canada for all briefing notes between 1989 and 2005 regarding Chinese immigration to Prime Minister,
Minister of Foreign affairs, Minister of National defence, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, as well as to the Canada Border Services Agency between 2003 and 2005 (for details, see Annexes).

An exogenous shock refers to an event or a group of events that induce points of departure from established sociological, cultural, and political patterns. The so-called “refugee crisis of the 1990s” and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are particularly relevant exogenous shocks in the present context. This is not to say that Canadian and French larger historical contexts, the “geographic” location of each country, the bombing of Air-India Flight 182 in 1985 in the case of Canada, or key judicial landmarks (for instance, the Singh case for Canada) were not important in the securitization process. In fact, I briefly discuss these contextual factors are in Chapter 2. However, I argue that the “refugee crisis of the early 1990s” and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are the most important exogenous shocks in the years that this study covers, i.e., between 1989 and 2005.

In regards to domestic factors, I investigate the role of audiences for reasons that will be established in the theoretical discussion that follows. I draw on three principal sources to track down how audiences shape the securitization process. First, I have collected the political manifestos of the main federal political parties in Canada as well as the most important presidential candidates in France. In total, I have analyzed more than 70 political manifestos. Second, I examined the extent to which Parliament has allowed or constrained securitizing actors’ moves by analyzing whether the most important immigration laws regarding the securitization of migration were passed, narrowly passed,
or defeated in each country case. I have examined five pieces of legislation in Canada and three in France. Third, I have examined public opinion on questions related to the migration-security relationship. In total, I have collected and analyzed more than 120 public opinion polls – as Table 1.1 summarizes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political agents</th>
<th>Media agents</th>
<th>Contextual Factors</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>Manifestos</td>
<td>Bills / Laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1067</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1.4 Definitions

For my purpose, migration is the movement of people crossing international borders, i.e. it includes the United Nations’ largely accepted definition of migrants as persons living outside their country of birth or citizenship for 12 months or more but it also includes refugees, foreign migrant workers, student migrants, border workers, denizens, and legal and “extra”-legal migrants. Since the focus of the study is on the international aspect of the movement, I have excluded internally displaced persons (IDP) from the analysis.8

Employing this rather broad definition makes sense for several reasons. First, the aim of the study is to examine how the international movement of people has been socially constructed as a security concern in Canada and France. As such, the focus is on the deeply intertwined relationship between international movement and the international
system of order underpinning the movement. Second, precise distinctions between, for example, legal and illegal migrants or between migrants and refugees would limit more than they would reveal – this despite the fact that these distinctions render a better understanding of the term “migration”. Indeed, I contend that a security framework is not applied only to refugees but rather to the entire category of the movement of people.

Critics might contend here that the object of securitization is not the movement of people in its totality but the more circumscribed aspects of the phenomenon of migration (e.g. illegal/irregular migration, refugee); therefore, calling for a more narrowed definitional positioning. They eschew two fundamental elements. First, states’ authorities define what constitutes an irregular/illega migrant. There is no multilateral coordination between countries on what is an illegal migrant. An illegal migrant in France could well be a legal migrant in Canada. Neither theoretically nor empirically does our understanding of the illegal vs. legal migrants dichotomy necessarily have to be that of a particular state. As Morice and Rodier (2005) argue, to sort out migrants and refugees is a harmful distinction in the context of state’s attempt to control migratory movement under national security concerns; the classification process is not neutral.

Second, it is the malleability of the concepts “migration” and “security” that make them especially useful in politics (Edelman 2001; Heisler 2006). As the following chapters demonstrate, the state’s security apparatus purposively provokes an elision and confusion of migration categories. Overdrawing an analytical distinction between several categories of migration would indeed miss the “flexibility” quality that politicians have been particularly eager to exploit. Indeed, a research focusing merely on “illegal”
migration would miss important features of the phenomenon of securitized migration such as that legal would-be immigrants have been detainees for several days before being granted with the permission to stay in France, or that legal tourists have been "strongly" invited to board a plane bringing them back to their country of origin the day after their plane landed in Vancouver.

1.5 Précis of the study

The program of work contains six chapters. Before getting into the heart of the study, Chapter 2 presents the indicators that I have developed to understand whether migration has been securitized or not, and the rationale for the selection of cases.

Chapter 3 presents the merits of adopting a constructivist perspective in the particular context of this study. It reviews the relevant literature trying to make sense of the linkage between migration and security; thereby, it identifies weaknesses and limits of these models. The last section of the chapter details my own approach.

I examine the agential components of the social mechanisms of the securitization process in the following two chapters. Chapter 4 studies the role of political agents within and across my two country cases in analyzing the complete set of speeches made by forty-four political agents over the 1989-2005 period. Chapter 5 re-directs the focus by studying a different set of agents - media agents. I examine editorials of four nation-wide newspapers over the same period.

I consider the contextual factors in Chapter 6 in which I present, document, and discuss the role of exogenous shocks and of domestic audiences in the securitization of migration.
As the dissertation unfolds across chapters, I engage several debates and hypotheses. Among them are whether migration and security were linked simply because immigrants are more involved in criminal activities than “local” people; whether international events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 drive the securitization in some objective way; whether material and ideational factors are mutually exclusive; and whether there is a difference between politicization and securitization of migration.

These are exciting and timely debates in international relations and security studies literature. The first step in tackling them starts with defining and describing the phenomenon of securitized migration, a task I undertake in the next chapter.
Part I – Developing an analytical framework
Chapter 2 – Securitized Migration
"[I would rather] die in Nigeria for a reason than waste away in [detention in Canada] when I had done nothing wrong." Few days after having written these words to immigration officials, Michael Akhimien, a 39-year-old Nigerian who claimed refugee status in Canada on October 28, 1995, died on December 18, 1995 while in a detention centre. During his detainment, Akhimien made two applications to withdraw his refugee application. He did not want to be in Canada anymore; yet, that is where he died.9

In France, two undocumented migrants died in Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport during their deportation in December 2002 and January 2003. Ricardo Barrientos, a 52-year-old Argentine, and Mariam Getu Hagos, a 24-year-old Somali, both died in the airplane when French border police officers who where accompanying them forced their upper body on their legs and their heads between their knees while the plane was taxiing for take-off. They had come to France to seek asylum.

These idiosyncratic events are a manifestation of a larger phenomenon that is taking place in world politics, i.e. the securitization of migration. Canada and France are no exception.

The puzzle driving this study is twofold. First, I want to make sense of a very interesting phenomenon that has been happening in world politics in the past decades: changes in the way the movement of people is viewed from a solution to economic and demographic problems to an existential security threat to the state and/or the society. To be sure, migrations have been controlled through national policies and multi/bilateral agreements for a long time. As well, the notion that certain individuals could pose security
threats has been the case for many years. It is the notion of migration in a collective sense posing an existential threat to the security of the state that is different.

Surprisingly, the application of a security framework to the movement of people—what is referred to here as securitized migration—can be observed in both "classic countries of immigration" such as Canada and "reluctant countries of immigration" such as France (Cornelius et al. 2004). The similarity in behaviour across cases brings to the forefront the question of social mechanisms involved in the securitization process. How does migration become securitized? What is the relative importance of material factors and ideational factors in the process? What category of agents has been particularly efficient at becoming securitizing agents in the context of migration? Are media agents undoubtedly securitizing agents? Do cultural factors have any role in the securitizing process? Trying to provide an answer to these questions is at the heart of my study.

Second, while migration has been securitized in Canada and France there is a considerable variation in levels of securitization. As the next pages will demonstrate, migration is weakly securitized in Canada whereas it is strongly securitized in France. In tackling this puzzle, I explore the idea that security is best conceptualized as a continuum rather than as a binary notion.

The next pages are important in setting up the dynamic "story" of the securitization process. In the first two sections of this chapter, I discuss my selection of cases and develop a set of indicators to measure the phenomenon under study (the dependent variable). To do so is fundamental for three reasons. First and contrary to one of the Canadian officials I interviewed who saw "no evidence" that migration is securitized in
Canada, I demonstrate that migration is securitized in Canada; migration is also securitized in France. Second, I demonstrate that there is considerable difference in terms of levels of securitization. As such, comparing Canada and France is in fact comparing cases that present a significant range of variation on the phenomenon to be explained. Third, I construct a timeline of securitized migration for both countries. The timeline allows me to underscore when the securitization process was initiated within the time range of my study (1989-2005). The timeline also allows me to highlight the pattern of engagement – and its evolution over time – of each securitizing agents with the phenomenon of securitized migration; thereby, identifying elements of rupture and continuity throughout the years that my study covers. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will intertwine analysis of the role of several agents in the securitization process with the result obtained here.

The last section of this chapter presents a brief description of the agents and the contextual factors studied as well as a summary of my research strategy for both. This step is of central importance, as the core of my study (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) highlights the securitizing attempts made by agents as well as the relevance of contextual factors in the process of securitizing migration.

2.1 Case selection

Immigration is a central question in Canadian history. Indeed, scholarly works published on the question of immigration divide Canadian immigration policy of the past century or so in several phases: each phase has as its heart the theme of nation building. “From confederation in 1867 until today, nation building has been a theme underlying
Canadian immigration. Historically, immigration to Canada was sought to expand the population, boost the economy, and develop society. This is still true” (Reitz 2004:100)\textsuperscript{11}. Immigration has always been – and continues to be – socially constructed as an integral part of what defines Canada. Several factors have sometimes fostered the social construction; others have sometimes constrained it. For instance, the geographic particularities of Canada have long been seen as a crucial factor facilitating the social construction of Canada as a self-defined country of immigration. Other events have put to test Canadian welcoming mat. On June 23, 1985 a Boeing 747 en-route from Canada to India via London exploded as it entered Irish airspace: the plane crashed into the sea killing all 329 people on board, of whom 280 were Canadian citizens (the vast majority of them from Indian origins). The bombing of Air-India Flight 182 – which led to investigation and prosecution that took almost 20 years and was the most expensive trial in Canadian history – undoubteldy did set the stage for the process of securitizing migration in the years that my study covers. As well, key judicial landmarks that occurred prior 1989 have also been important in setting the stage of the process. Perhaps the most important key landmark is the so-called Singh decision of April 4, 1985. In Singh \textit{v. Canada}, the Supreme Court of Canada held that refugee claimants are entitled to claim the protection of section 7 of the Charter, which provides that everyone should enjoy security of the person. It ruled that the human rights entrenched in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights applied to refugee claimants; thereby, the Singh decision extended Charter rights to noncitizens on Canadian soil.
In France, the “story” of immigration policies is characterized by more ambiguity than in Canada. For many years, the “place” of immigration was not highlighted in the history of France. For instance, scholars have suggested that a “collective memory” of immigration had not yet been forged in France. Scholars have underlined that while official rhetoric was eschewing migratory particularity and history of France the reality was different; consequently, scholars have been part of an effort to document the migratory nature of the French nation-state. Just as in Canada, the geographical particularities of France are an important factor in the social mechanisms leading to the securitization process. The “closeness” of North African countries has undoubtedly helped to establish the perception of waves and un-stoppable movements of people was under way – and will remain so. Other pre-1989 factors have as well been important in setting the stage for the process of securitizing migration to unfold. For instance, the larger historical trend of de-colonisation (especially in the northern African regions) has certainly influenced the process. As well, when in 1984 the extreme-right Front National won municipal elections in Dreux, an industrial town just west of Paris, on a platform calling for a complete halt to immigration as well as the deportation of several hundreds thousands of African immigrants, a electoral breakthrough was made that was significant years later as the securitization of migration unfold.

I recognise the general relevance of Canadian and French larger historical contexts, the impact of “geography”, the enduring legacy of significant historical events such as The bombing of Air-India Flight 182 in 1985, and the importance of key judicial landmarks. However, I have not considered these contextual factors in my study as some of them fall
outside of the years that my study covers (1989-2005) and that I had to limit the range of material under investigation.

With respect to the study of securitization process, Canada and France exhibit similar features allowing for a high degree of comparative control. Both Canada and France are representative democracies characterized by highly developed, industrial, and capitalist economies. In demographic terms, both societies are under heavy pressure: because they both have a relatively low fertility rate\textsuperscript{14} (Canada has the lowest rate with 1.6, followed by France with 1.8), they would have declining populations if it were not for international immigration. A similar inverted diamond shape of the age structure is found in both cases: 18 per cent of people fall within the 0-14 years category; 65 to 69 per cent in the 15-64 years; and 13 to 16 per cent in the 65 years and over category.

Passionate debates about immigration are also taking place in each case, albeit in different forms; thereby, they signify the importance of migration issues on the national public agenda. In Canada, the debate currently focuses on the consequences of border control for Canada's sovereignty and its relationship with the US in a post 9/11 world. In France, the most salient issue is the increasing popularity of the right wing and anti-immigration Front National lead by Jean-Marie Le Pen. Revisions of respective immigration laws have been accompanied by numerous public consultations and public demonstrations, particularly in France.\textsuperscript{15}

In immigration terms, both have a positive net migration rate. While Canada is a country founded and populated by immigrants, France has been an immigration country since the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century. Leaving aside official rhetoric, which eschews regional and
migratory particularities, scholarly literature on immigration in France has long recognized and documented the migratory nature of the French nation-state. For instance, Gérard Noiriel, the leading historian of France immigration, has been engaged in the past decades in an enterprise of debunking the "France unitary myth" (Noiriel 2006). Although the annual intake of immigrants significantly varies as seen in Figure 2.1, the total refugee population of Canada and France is very similar (respectively, 132,500 and 139,000) as well as relatively constant between 1995 and 2004. Furthermore, France and Canada rank respectively third and fourth among OECD countries regarding the total number of asylum seekers for the period 1980-1999. When the percentage of total of asylum seekers to total population is calculated, their rank is also very similar: i.e. eighth for Canada and tenth for France.

Figure 2.1 Annual intake of immigrants, Canada and France, 1989-2005

Source: CIC, DPM, CICI, Coleman, 1997. Thierry, 2000, 2004. Note: For Canada and France, data include only “Entrées à caractère permanent” – or “Permanent entry”. Thus, it excludes “Temporary entry” such as
seasonal workers and students. However, in France for the years 1994 to 1996 Thierry includes students in his statistics (there is no uniformity on the number of students admitted per year among various French institutions providing statistics. Depending on sources, the number of students admitted in these years range from 11,000 to 27,000). To include or not students is a matter of debates between demographers, compare Coleman, 1997 and Thierry 2000, 2004.

2.1.1 Dissimilarities between Canada and France

One of the main challenges of a comparative study is to identify elements of uniqueness intrinsic in each case as well as key differences that could influence our research question. Of course, a key dissimilarity between my two cases is the migration flow. The annual intake is higher in Canada than in France throughout the time period of this study, as Figure 2.1 illustrates. On average, the annual intake of immigrants in Canada between 1989 and 2005 is 224,817 immigrants, whereas the annual intake in France between 1990 and 2005 is 114,484. Nonetheless, this dissimilarity has to be qualified. France’s official immigration policy since 1974 of “immigration zero”—i.e. to stop all immigration and reduce the number of asylum seekers to a minimum—particularly amplified the dissimilarity. Despite this rather draconian goal, France’s annual intake has not fallen much below 100,000 since the early 1950s according to Hollifield (2004). For Lynch and Simon (2003), France’s annual intake of immigrants is about 130,000 immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s and at about 175,000 immigrants in the 1980s. Still, and even when these estimates are taken into account, the annual intake of immigrants is far greater in Canada than in France. However, the annual intake merely represents an indication of the success of controlling measures. The annual intake does not explain why France displays a stronger securitization of migration; it only indicates that France’s
immigration policy is less open than Canada's. In other words, the annual intake of immigrants is a consequence and not a cause of the securitization of migration.

A second and related difference that somewhat complicates the comparison process concerns the immigration system. While both Canada’s and France’s immigration policies admit permanent immigrants in three categories—独立, family reunification, and refugees—differences exist in the proportion that each of these classes have of the total annual immigrant intake. Canada’s point-based system, introduced in 1967 under the Immigration Act of 1952, gives preference to the highly skilled and independent immigrants, especially since the end of the 1980s. In 2005, the category “independent immigrants” represents about 60 per cent of the total immigrants intake while the category “family” about 25 per cent. In France, for the year 2004, the class “workers” account for 5 per cent and the “family” class for 73 per cent.

Although the difference in terms of immigration system has important socio-political consequences, its impact on national security is less clear. A fragile hypothesis is that because France admits more immigrants under the family reunification class than Canada does the securitization of migration is stronger in France. In fact, this would be arguing that by definition a family class immigrant is more a security threat than an economic immigrant, which is an uncertain foundation to theorize about.

As well, the dissimilarity, especially when looking at the “refugee class”, appears to be overstated. When compared with other OECD countries, the stock of refugee population of Canada and France is very similar and the similarity is relatively constant. The average stock of refugee population between 1995 and 2004 is 139,000 in France, while it is
133,000 in Canada. Again, these numbers are significantly different from the one for Germany (1,013,000), the United States (524,000) and the United Kingdom (181,000) – as Table 2.1 summarizes. Furthermore, Table 2.2 shows that France and Canada rank respectively third and fourth among OECD countries regarding the total number of asylum seekers for the period 1980-1999. When Canada and France are compared with other OECD countries, the percentage of asylum seekers in the total population is also similar (see Figure 2.2 shows). For the period 1980-1999, the percentage of asylum seekers in total population is 1.36 in Canada while it is 0.96 in France; these numbers are far from results for other countries such as Switzerland (5.09), Germany (3.14), Australia (0.46) or the United States (0.43).

Table 2.1 Stock of refugee population by country of asylum, 1995-2004

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<td>976</td>
<td>906</td>
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<td>179</td>
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<td>147</td>
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<td>112</td>
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<td>155</td>
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<tr>
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<td>155</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>130</td>
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<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>125</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>123</td>
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<td>129</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>133</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>65</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in thousands. Source: UNHCR
Table 2.2  Total number of asylum seekers, OECD countries, 1980-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected OECD countries</th>
<th>Total number of asylum seekers, 1980-1999*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,584,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1,296,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>581,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>451,4</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>418,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>384,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>382,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>376,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* in thousands; Source: OECD

Figure 2.2  Percentage of asylum seekers in total population, selected countries

Another dissimilarity relevant to this study is the criminality of immigrants. As two specialists point out, "there is a fairly common belief in the community that the migrant population is more likely than the native population to both engage in criminal activity and persist in such activity over time" (Borowski and Thomas 1994:633). Furthermore, migration scholars have argued, with caution and reserve, that migration and security were linked for an obvious reason: immigrants are more involved in criminal activities than
“local” people (Guiraudon and Joppke 2001). Pursuant to this argument, the “crime” hypothesis contends that a society with a high level of criminal involvement of immigrants would opt for a high level of securitized migration to counter the crime-immigrant linkage. At first sight, the “crime” hypothesis seems conclusive. In the case of France, the criminal involvement rate of immigrants is roughly 2.5 times that of the native-born population. In Canada, numbers show the opposite: immigrants have a lower rate of criminality than the native-born population (Lynch and Simon 2003). The “crime” hypothesis varies in the same way as securitized migration does across my two cases.

Despite their attractiveness, a careful examination of these statistics is required in the present context for four reasons. First, the concept of criminality fluctuates across my two country cases; thereby, it makes cross-national comparisons of crime involving immigrants difficult. As Lynch and Simon (1999) underscore, differences in the legal definition of criminal acts complicate significantly cross-national comparisons.

Second, statistics on criminal involvement of immigrants are a function of immigration policies. Restrictive immigration policies coupled with the numerous restrictions on immigrants could induce the detection of criminal activities; thereby, it introduces a negative bias in statistics. Even more, particular policy despite applying to everybody induces higher records of criminality. For instance, it is required to carry an identity card on you at all times in France; and the police have the right to ask you to officially identify yourself whenever they encounter you. In contrast, Canadians do not have to carry an ID card with them and policemen cannot take repressive measures if you do not show an ID card when asked. If we add the documented and well-known tendency of French police
forces to systematically control the identity of “coloured” (read North-African) people but seldom the identity of “white” people, it is thus logical that France’s statistics are higher in this regard.

Third, since only immigrants are subject to the intense processing for immigration, infraction measures of criminal involvements are intrinsically inflated. This is especially the case in France where the official position since 1974 is that of “zero immigration” – a position obviously disconnected from reality but nonetheless reiterated throughout the time period of this study (Weil 2005).\(^\text{17}\)

Fourth, the migration-crime linkage is also, if not principally, a matter of perception and construction rather than an objective reality driving the securitization of migration. When the official rhetoric constantly stresses the negative aspects of migration and points to problems and dangers associated with the movement of people (as in France), the perception of the migration-crime linkage is obviously more predominant than in a society where immigration is often seen as positive and where difficulties are presented in terms of challenges instead of threats (as in Canada). Indeed, a recent survey indicates that the perception of the criminality associated with migrants is strikingly different; a significant larger proportion of French respondents agree that immigrants increase crime rates than Canadian (see Table 2.3). The important point in the present context is that the migration-crime linkage is largely a question of social construction and, as such, not a social law or reality determining the relationship between movement and order.
Table 2.3  
**Immigration and Crime in Canada and France**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>44%</td>
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Source: (Jedwab 2006)

In sum, these differences—the migration flow, the immigration system, and the crime rate—between Canada and France can largely be neutralized for the purpose of my study. That is, even though a comparison of Canada and France cannot fully control for all aspects of a country’s uniqueness, my comparative project aiming to suggest factors explaining variation in levels of securitized migration can hold constant these dissimilarities, as they do not account for the variation.

2.2 Securitized Migration

How to define and measure security is a subject of much contention and intense debate among international relations scholars. Some scholars contend that security is an “essentially contested concept”; other scholars argue that security should be defined solely in material/military terms; while still other scholars are in favour of widening and broadening the definition of security. The present study clearly opts for the third line of argument. In the particular context of this study, the fact that I adopt a rather broad definition of security means two things. First, my study needs to establish whether migration is securitized in each country case. Second, my study, based on the assumption that security should not be understood as a binary notion but rather as a continuum
involving various degrees of intensity or strength, has to explore whether there is such a variation in the level of securitized migration between Canada and France. Accordingly, I have to rely on indicators allowing me to answer these two questions. Therefore, I have used a combination of indicators offering a nominal measurement (presence or absence of the phenomenon), a degree measurement (providing a rank ordering of my two country cases), and within-case analyses.

While debates surrounding security's definition have proliferated in security studies, the situation is strikingly different in the literature on the migration-security nexus. In fact, very few studies do present measurement devices or indicators of securitized migration. Some almost take it for granted; others strive to demonstrate the linkage without aiming to isolate indicators of a securitized migration. One major exception is the recent work of Jef Huysmans who, without directly distilling a list of criteria, has provided some guiding principles for further research. For Huysmans (2006:4) migration's “security modulation can emerge from the context within which it is embedded. [...]Migration] can be rendered as a security question by being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy frameworks that emphasize policing and defence.” Accordingly, I chose to place these themes – institutions, frameworks, policing, and defence – at the heart of my indicators of a securitized migration. I use two categories of indicators.

The first category is the institutional indicator (indicator I). This set of indicators offers both a binary measurement and a degree measurement. First, I have included a “legal” component to the institutional indicator (indicator I-I), I have registered the most important immigration Acts as well as provisions relating the linkage between migration.
and security. I have then briefly highlighted their content along the migration-security nexus.

Second, I have explored whether immigration/migration is listed as a security concern in policy statements that relate to security, foreign affairs, and immigration (indicator I-2). Furthermore, I have codified the existence (or not) of a particular department or departmental division in charge of border control and national security in which immigration is seen as a key element. I have then placed the results on a timeline in order to pinpoint critical historical junctures in the context of my study, that is, when migration entered the list of security concerns in Canada's and France's policy statements.

Third, I have measured the saliency of the link between migration and security within these policy statements (indicator I-3). The following questions have oriented a careful reading of how the migration-security nexus was conceptualized in these statements: Is the migration-security nexus at the core (or not) of the document? Is the movement of people discussed under a distinct subheading or is it only mentioned alongside other existential threats? Is migration referred to as one of the most important existential threats?

The second category of indicators of securitized migration concerns the security practices relating to the migration-security nexus (indicator P). Two policies/practices are relevant: interdiction (P-I) and detention of immigrants (P-2). I contend that these instruments are part of a framework that emphasizes policing and defence as Huysmans has pointed out. Thereby, they constitute valuable indicators in the context of this study.
Interdiction offers a binary measurement, while detention of immigrants permits an ordinal measurement.

The United Nations (2000) defines interdiction as an activity directed towards preventing the movement of people at the source. Working within the footsteps of the rather broad UN's definition, migration scholars have provided a more comprehensive understanding of interdiction policy. That is, a set of practices that seek to stop the flow of immigrants by prohibiting, intercepting, and/or deflecting them while they are in movement or before movement is initiated (Davidson 2003; Dench 2001; Dench and Crépeau 2003; Morris 2003; Pratt 2005; Rodier 2006). Interdiction includes the imposition of sanctions on carrier companies that transport illegal or irregular travelers; the requirement that travelers acquire a visa; placing immigration officers in foreign airports for detection purposes; the interception of marine vessels in international or territorial waters; and the return of refugee claimants to countries of transit through use of the concepts of “safe-third country” or “country of first asylum”. As a multifaceted tool, interdiction (P-1) constitutes a powerful instrument to measure the phenomenon of securitized migration.

My second indicator is the magnitude of the detention of immigrants (P-2) as a security practice both in terms of absolute number and of proportion of detained immigrants vs. the immigration intake. Detention of immigrants by completely merging the movement of people with security measures constitutes a central piece of a framework that emphasizes police and repression. Procedures, codes of conduct, and the apparatus of these detention centres strikingly resemble carceral facilities. To be sure, some immigrants are not
detained for national security considerations. The breakdown of detention statistics to highlight the security aspect is a difficult, if not hazardous, task. Nevertheless, detention operates a strong symbol by which immigrants-in-detention equal dangerous immigrants; and as such, it relates directly to this study.

2.2.1 Canada

The Canadian government has revised its immigration laws several times within the time period that my study covers, as the left hand column in Figure 2.3 shows. In January 1989, Bills C-55 and C-84 came into effect, introducing many changes to immigration law and the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). In 1992, Bill C-86 came into effect, introducing revisions, mostly restrictive, to the refugee determination system. The provision “danger to the public” enters the Immigration Act with Bill C-44 in 1995, by which a person loses the right to appeal the removal order if the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration is of the opinion that a person is a “danger to the public” (Dent 2002; Waldman 2005). In June 2002, Canada passed the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which has re-enforced security certificates and detention provisions, and expanded the inadmissibility categories to permit refusal of entry on the basis of security.
Figure 2.3  Timeline, Institutional Indicators, Canada, 1989-2005

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<td>Foreign Policies Themes and Priorities</td>
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<td>Creation of the Canadian Border Services Agency</td>
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In terms of whether immigration/migration is listed as a security concern in the priorities of departments in charge of security, foreign affairs, and immigration portfolios (indicator I-2), one of the most important dates in the case of Canada is 1991. Whereas the previous official document *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations*, published in 1985, was silent on the issue of migration, the document *Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities*, issued in 1991, lists migration as a security concern. To be sure, the initial inclusion of migration in the realm of security was made with caution and mostly in terms of the need for the international community to develop cooperative security. “We need to address transnational security threats such as proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, and irregular migration”, the document declares (DEA 1991:91). Furthermore, “problems facing the international community that ignore national boundaries [are] growing in length and gravity. Global environmental threats, population and migratory pressures, and proliferation of weaponry can only be addressed on a multilateral basis” (DEA 1991:90). A position reiterated in the *White Paper on Defence* (1994) and particularly in *Canada in the World* published in 1995: “the threats to security now are more complex than before ... whole range of issues that transcend borders—including mass migration, etc. – have peace and security implication” (DFAIT 1995:ii).

In 1996, Citizenship and Immigration Canada issued a new policy statement, *Detention Policy*, which was revised and re-issued in 1998. The new policy sought to instruct immigration officials to use detention as a last resort, justified only in cases where there was a real possibility that the individual would endanger the Canadian public (Pratt 2005). The 1998 detention policy adds that immigration officers exercise “sensible risk
management practices”. Most sections of the related CIC immigration manual highlight the importance of the security aspect of immigration officials’ work. For instance, the section on inadmissibility instructs immigration officials that the first objective of the Canadian immigration legislation relative to the inadmissibility provisions is “to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society” (CIC 2002b:3). As well, the section on detention informs immigration officers to exercise sound judgement: “sound judgement not only requires individual assessment of the case, but also an assessment of the impact of release on the safety of Canadian society. Additionally, it requires a risk management approach to make decisions within the context of the following priorities: (1) where safety and security concerns are identified ...; (2) where identity issues must be resolved before security or safety concerns are eliminated or confirmed; (3) to support removal where removal is imminent and where a flight risk has been identified; (4) where there are significant concerns regarding a person’s identity” (CIC 2002a:6).

Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, issued in 2004, is more precise in declaring the security concern that the movement of people represents for Canada. It applauds the progress made to date “to improve the screening of immigrants, refugee claimants and visitors and to enhance the capacity to detain and remove anyone posing a risk to Canada” (PCO 2004:41). Securing an Open Society also praises Parliament for passing the new “Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which provides more tools to address security threats” (PCO 2004:42).
Finally, the Canadian government has presented its *Canada International Policy Statement* in 2005. The *Statement* contains four booklets: Diplomacy; Defence; Development; and Commerce. While the Diplomacy booklet focuses on the smuggling and trafficking of immigrants, the Defence booklet argues that “to support more effectively the Government’s essential role in providing for the safety and security of Canadians ... the Canadian Forces will focus their efforts in the following areas ...: monitoring illegal drugs and immigration activity” (DND 2005:18-19).

In terms of the existence of a particular departmental division relating to the migration-security nexus, two departmental re-organizations are worth mentioning. First, the new Citizenship and Immigration Canada Intelligence Branch, created after the September 11 attacks, brought together existing intelligence resources in CIC and provided a focal point for sharing information with partners in the intelligence community. Intelligence activities of the CIC concentrate on three main areas: building capacity; improving screening; and managing security within Canada. New funds from the December 2001 budget allowed CIC to place more officers at ports of entry to improve the front-end security screening of refugee claimants and to work with the United States on innovative strategies and policies to address continental migration concerns.

Second, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) was created in December 2003. The CBSA amalgams several sections (or departmental divisions) in charge of enforcement of border security, including the Customs program from the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), the Intelligence, Interdiction, and Enforcement program from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and the Import Inspection at Ports of
Entry program from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). Building its mandate from the Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration (signed in December 2001), the CBSA is said to be an “integral component in enhancing Canada’s national security”. Accordingly, the CBSA wants to bring “together all the major players involved in facilitating legitimate cross-border traffic and supporting economic development while stopping people and goods that pose a potential risk to Canada.” In turn, the Smart Border Declaration is committed to “identify security threats before they arrive in North America through collaborative approaches to reviewing crew and passenger manifests, managing refugees, and visa policy coordination”.

With regards to the level of saliency of the link between migration and security in these policy statements (indicator I-3) Canada presents a low level in the context of securitized migration. Despite being listed as a security concern, the movement of people is not at the heart of the Foreign Affairs’ Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities. Likewise, Canada in the World acknowledges the new international context in which “threats to security” include mass migration, without making the movement of people a conspicuous and prominent issue. In sum, the saliency of the migration-security linkage is relatively low. The same conclusion applies to Canada International Policy Statement. Furthermore, this is a conclusion shared by all my Canadian interviewees, i.e. they all acknowledged, with tangible discomfort for some, that migration is in fact securitized in Canada only to add hastily that it is a “mild”, “low”, or “weak” securitization.

As for the first security practices indicator (interdiction—P-I), Canada has developed over the years a powerful interdiction apparatus. Indeed, several scholars have aptly
demonstrated that Canada has put in place a strong visa regime and carrier sanctions, for example (Crépeau and Nakache 2006; Davidson 2003; Dench 2001; Dench and Crépeau 2003; Pratt 2005).

Finally, Canada also employs detention for security purposes. There are three reasons that immigration officers may order the detention of an immigrant, namely, the foreign national (including a permanent resident) is (1) deemed a security threat; (2) unlikely to appear for examination; and (3) presenting identification documents that do not satisfy the officer. Most Canadian detention centres—and certainly the three principal ones—present carceral features: immigration detainees are held together (co-mingled) with persons held under criminal law, immigration detainees are handcuffed and leg-ironed during transport to and from centres, and detention centres are equipped with solitary confinement rooms for troubled detainees.

Detention of immigrants is fast increasing in Canada. While 6,400 people were detained in 1996, the number of immigrant detainees was over 13,000 in 2003, an increase of 100 per cent. Despite this worrying surge in detention, the ratio of immigrants who have been detained vs. the total number of immigrants accepted in Canada remains relatively low, especially in comparison with France. As Figure 2.4 shows, the ratio of immigrants who were detained versus the total number of accepted immigrants is, on average, around four percent.
2.2.2 France

In the case of France, the European Union official documents, protocols, and treaties must be taken into account, identified in Figure 2.5 on the left side of the timeline. Of course, the first ones are the Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985, and the subsequent convention implementing its provisions (Dublin Convention, 1990). Both the Agreement and the Convention are well known; thus, suffice it here to mention that they both institutionalize the securitization of migration. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) changed the nature of cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs by defining the area of freedom, security, and justice in more ambitious and more precise terms. Immigration
policy became a full community responsibility with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. One of the objectives of the Amsterdam Treaty is to “maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security, and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration, and the prevention and combating of crime.” Moreover, in December 2003, Javier Solana, the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, released *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, which sets out the main priorities and identifies the main threats to the security of the EU. The fifth threat identified in the document is organized crime, under which the *Strategy* mentions that illegal migration accounts for a part of the activities of criminal gangs and it could also have links with terrorism (EU High Representative CFSP 2003).

France also displays positive measurement on the “legal” indicator (indicator *I-I*) of securitized migration. The Pasqua law of 1993 reinforces repressive measures to impede access to the French territory, and limits the entry and residence of many categories of migrants. The Debré law (1997) hardens detention provisions and expands police powers. The Sarkozy law (2003) aims at reinforcing measures against illegal migration, and criminal phenomena tied to illegal migration.
Figure 2.5  Timeline, Institutional Indicators, France, 1985-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Documents</th>
<th>EU-France Policy Statements</th>
<th>France Legislations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Schengen Agreement</td>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>Dublin Convention</td>
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<td>Maastricht Treaty</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Pasqua law</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>White Paper on Defence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Debré law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty of Amsterdam</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>Tampere Council</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Sarkozy law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interdepartmental Committee on the Control of Immigration</td>
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</table>
In terms of official documents (indicator I-2), France’s White Paper on Defence issued in 1994 discusses the link between migration and security in terms of the threat that mass movement of people poses to France’s security interests.20 “Disorganized movements of people” are caused by miserable economic conditions, according to the White Paper, and if nothing is done to improve the living conditions of people in developing countries it could provoke mass migratory movements and ultimately crisis and armed conflicts (Ministère de la Défense 1994:11).

In regards to the internal re-organization of France’s security-related department, the Interdepartmental Committee on the Control of Immigration (CICI) is of major importance in the present context. The CICI was created in 2005 and is presided over either by the Prime Minister or the Minister of the Interior. Its mandates are to reinforce the coherence of government’s action in the context of the fight against illegal immigration and to determine the general orientations of the government regarding the control of migratory flux.21 Another institution worth mentioning is the Security Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Under the Direction of strategic, security, and disarmament affairs, the Security Division is in charge of “new threats” including “terrorism, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking and illegal immigration”.22

In terms of saliency of the link between migration and security in official documents (indicator I-3), France displays a strong level. While the free movement of persons is inscribed in no more than two articles of the Dublin Convention, the vast majority of the Convention’s articles elaborate and develop a strong security system to compensate the
"security lost" of the free movement of persons. Article 5 of the Dublin Convention states that "for stays not exceeding three months, aliens fulfilling the following conditions may be granted entry into the territories: ... (e) that the aliens shall not be considered to be a threat to public policy, national security or the international relations of any of the contracting parties" (Dublin Convention 1990). One should note here that the focus is not on immigrants as defined by the United Nations, but rather on the movement of people for which the stay is not exceeding 90 days. The security system involves police cooperation, extradition procedures, a joint information system that assembles all security alerts on persons and disseminates the list among states members, etc. In sum, the Convention locking together migration and security throughout the document scores high in terms of the saliency of the linkage between migration and security.

Regarding security practices indicators, France scores high. As in Canada, several scholars have documented the use of interdiction (indicator $P-I$) by the French government for security purposes\textsuperscript{33}. They all concluded that interdiction is a major component of security practices relating to the movement of people. For instance, Claire Rodier, tracing back the use of carrier sanctions for having on board passengers without proper identity papers to the Dublin Convention of 1990, highlights that the rules have been "hardened" in the spring of 2001 with the intention of inducing as much control as possible before migrants leave their place of origin. Rodier also underscores the creation of Immigration Liaison Officers (ILO) in 2004, which are national bureaucrats dispatched abroad with the task of "preventing illegal immigration", as evidence of the intensification of interdiction measures (Rodier 2006:12).
Finally, in terms of detaining immigrants (indicator $P-2$), there are two categories of detention facilities in France. The waiting zones are the first category. A person is placed in waiting zones if he has been refused entry to the country because he does not satisfy the conditions set down in the Foreigner Code; if he is a foreigner in transit who has been prohibited from boarding a plane, boat or train; or if he is an asylum-seeker at the border. There are 120 “waiting zones” in airports, ports, and other locations open to international movement of people.

The administrative holding centres are the second category. A person is detained in an administrative holding centre if he is a foreigner subject to a judicial removal measure (removal to the border) or an administrative one (deportation order); if he has been banned by a court from remaining on French territory; or if he is under an enforceable removal measure taken by one of the European Union member countries. There are 22 administrative holding centres in France.

The number of immigrant detainees is considerable in France. More than 47,000 immigrants were detained in 2004. Waiting zones and administrative holding centres have carceral features such as solitary confinement rooms for troubled detainees, handcuffing detainees during their transport, etc (Welch and Schuster 2005). As well, the sanitary and general conditions of these centres are troubling, provoking a fierce rapport from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in 2005 (Commissioner for Human Rights 2006).

Comparing the security practices of detaining immigrants highlights a sharp contrast between Canada and France. In Canada, the average of immigrant detainees between 1996
and 2003 is about 9,000 persons; a number that represent less than four percent of the total number of accepted immigrants. In France, the average of immigrant detainees between 2000 and 2004 is just under 43,000 persons, representing 28 percent of the total number of accepted immigrants (as previously shown in Figure 2.3). Detention of immigrants is, thus, significantly higher in France than in Canada.

As Table 2.4 summarizes, the movement of people is securitized today in both Canada and France. I have demonstrated in the previous pages that both Canada and France score on all indicators of securitized migration. Legal instruments and key policy statements listing migration as a security threat have been developed in Canada and France. My third indicator, the saliency of the linkage between migration and security in policy statements, reveals an important difference in levels of securitized migration between Canada and France. I underscored that the saliency is relatively low in Canada and relatively much higher in France. In terms of security practices, I have shown that interdiction policy is used in Canada and France to crack down on migration for security reasons. Finally, the issue of detention of immigrants reveals a considerable difference in the level of securitized migration. Although detention practices are fast increasing in Canada, this country case displays a relatively low level of detention of immigrants. In France, detention of immigrants as security practices is well established. France also displays a high level of detention of immigrants.
Clearly then, significant variations exist between the two country cases on the level of the securitization. The outcome for Canada, with low results in terms of saliency and of detention, is a weak level of securitization, whereas the outcome in France, with high saliency and high level of immigrant detainees, is a strong level of securitization. Furthermore, as Figure 2.3 and 2.5 illustrate, it is fair to say that the early 1990s represents a fundamental critical juncture for the study of securitized migration in Canada and France. In Canada, the publication of *Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities* marked the first time migration was listed as a security concern; in France, the Dublin convention establishes how the movement of people is to be viewed as for years to come.

### 2.3 Looking ahead

In this chapter, I have first presented a rationale of why comparing Canada and France was feasible in the context of this study as well as of why that particular comparison was instructive. I have then described the indicators that I used in order to measure (1) whether migration was securitized in my two country cases; and (2) whether there was any variation in the level of securitization between the two cases. Results obtained here are
particularly relevant for the following chapters. Although migration is securitized in both Canada and France, there is a meaningful variation in how securitized it is in each country. This renders a comparative study of social mechanisms involved in the securitization process particularly relevant. As well, comparing Canada and France in the context of migration is in fact comparing cases that present a considerable range of variation on the phenomenon to be explained.

The next chapter takes a more theoretical turn. In reviewing the existing models proposed to understand the linkage between migration and security, I present the merits of adopting a constructivist perspective in the particular context of this study. The critique of these models (and especially of securitization theory) furnishes the basis for an alternative framework, which is detailed in the last section of this chapter.
Chapter 3 – Constructivism, Security, and the Movement of people
This study problematizes the relationship between the movement of people and the system of order underpinning the movement. It explores a widespread phenomenon that security studies scholars would have considered an anomaly only two decades ago, i.e. perceiving the movement of people as an existential security threat. Indeed, the movement of people has been integrated, discursively and institutionally, into security frameworks that emphasize policing and defence – what is here referred to as the securitization process. As such, migration is presented as an existential security threat to a chosen referent object (state, society, regional security, etc.). Scholars have referred to this current state of affairs as securitized migration or as the securitization of migration (Huysmans 2006; Wæver et al. 1993).

As indicated in the previous chapter, migration is securitized in Canada and in France: both countries have developed over time a series of instruments for the securitization of migration. The previous chapter also shows that considerable differences exist in the level of securitized migration and that migration is weakly securitized in Canada whereas it is strongly securitized in France. The present chapter sets up the theoretical framework from which my empirical investigation will proceed.

The interesting questions regarding the emergence of securitized migration are twofold: (1) What are the mechanisms involved in the securitization process? and (2) how do we account for the variation in the level of securitized migration across cases?

To understand the social mechanisms involved in the securitization of migration, as well as to suggest an explanation for the variation in levels of securitized migration, we must shift from current theoretical models to a constructivist perspective focused on the
importance of ideational and material structures as well as on the role of identities and cultural factors. Realists and state-centred theorists, in underscoring structural security environments, military considerations, and static determinants of the linkage migration-security, have presented a deterministic and alarmist viewpoint on the question (Kaplan 1994; Miller 1998; Weiner 1993). As well, scholars hesitating to embrace fully constructivists’ premises have either proposed static and structural accounts in which ideational factors are at best treated as intervening variables, as in Buzan’s and Rudolph’s model, or have focused on agential power largely to the detriment of contextual factors (Buzan 1983; Rudolph 2006; Wæver 1995). Constructivist scholars, by contrast, focus on the power of identities and ideas, on the durability as well as dynamism of social norms, and on the importance of the multifaceted contexts in which agents are embedded.

Despite the increasing number of scholarly works touching on the issue, Heisler’s remark that a coherent and comprehensive theoretical framework making sense of the link between migration and security has yet to be produced remains valid (Adamson 2006; Andreas 2000; Bigo 2002; Castro Henriques and Khachani 2006; Doty 1998; Friedman and Randeria 2004; Heisler 2006; Huysmans 1998; Rudolph 2006; Vernez 1996; Wæver et al. 1993). Therefore, I take few steps in this study to propose a new analytical framework for studying the process of securitizing migration.

This chapter starts by locating the study within a constructivist approach to world politics. Over the past decades, a community of scholars has been central to the emergence and the establishment of a social constructivist approach in international relations. Their achievements have been instrumental in shifting the focus of analysis of
world politics away from merely material factors to include social as well as ideational
factors. In the present context, a constructivist study argues that the securitization process
is not merely objective reactions to material factors. Rather, the securitization of migration
is a social construction in which the interpretation of material and ideational factors by
agents plays a key role.

Then I assess competing theories trying to make sense of the phenomenon of
securitized migration. I consider securitization theory with special attention. Since
securitization theory as currently understood and applied is useful in answering my first
question (what are the social mechanisms of the securitization of migration?) but fails to
provide adequate guidance for my second question (what explains the variation levels of
securitization between Canada and France?), I develop an alternative approach in the last
section of this chapter.

3.1 Theoretical habitat

The achievement of constructivism in international relations is of remarkable
significance. In the past two decades, scholars have successfully employed a constructivist
approach to describe and explain the vectors of national security, chemical weapons
taboo, the formation of national identity, security communities, new forms of diplomacy,
national interest, and the creation of international norms, to name just a few.25

Despite the upswing of constructivist research – theoretically and empirically – it is
difficult to fully encapsulate the basic assumptions and foundations of constructivism.
Critics of constructivism were fast in portraying this as a significant weakness. As a
friendly critic puts it, "social constructivism is more united on what is being rejected [i.e.
mainstream approaches] than on what is being proposed” (Smith 1999:690). Advocates of constructivism, on the other hand, tend to see such flexibility as one of its main strengths and a noteworthy contribution to the international relations discipline.

Constructivists themselves differ, in varying degrees, on what the assumptions of constructivism are (see Table 3.1). Adler (2002), following Guzzini (2000), posits that there are two common grounds shared by the vast majority of constructivists – the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality. On the other hand, Ruggie (1998b), focusing heavily on the material/ideational divide, identifies four main features of constructivism: the international reality is made of both material and ideational factors; ideational factors possess a normative and an instrumental dimensions; ideational factors express both individual and collective intentions; and time and place are crucial determinants of the meaning and significance of ideational factors. In their article on the rationalism-constructivism debate, Fearon and Wendt (2002) argue that four characteristics of constructivism can be identified: a fundamental concern with the role of ideas in the construction of social life; agents are socially constructed; methodological holism, as opposed to methodological individualism; and a central concern with constitutive explanations rather than uniquely causal explanations.

Acknowledging that the boundaries set by these scholars are not exclusive and that there is actually a lot of crossover among them, the present study adopts Price and Reus-Smit’s standpoint. In their seminal article, serving as a bridge between constructivism and critical theory, they state that constructivism emphasizes three core ontological propositions: “the importance of normative or ideational structures as well as material
structures; identities constitute interests and actions; agents and structures are mutually constituted” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998:266).

### Table 3.1  Core features of constructivism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Features</th>
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<tr>
<td>Adler; Guzzini</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Social construction of knowledge;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Construction of social reality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ruggie</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. International reality is made of material and ideational factors;</td>
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<td>2. Ideational factors have a normative and an instrumental dimension;</td>
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<td>3. Ideational factors express both individual and collective intentions;</td>
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<td>4. Time and place are crucial determinants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fearon &amp; Wendt</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Fundamental concern with the role of ideas;</td>
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<td>2. Agents are socially constructed;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Methodological holism;</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Central concern with constitutive explanations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price &amp; Reus-Smit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Importance of ideational as well as material structures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Identities constitute interests and actions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Agents and structures are mutually constituted</td>
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3.1.1 Locating the state

The issue of whether the state is an agent or not is of central importance in the present context. The state is indeed at the heart of both concepts underlying the study, i.e. notions of movement and of order. What we call migrants in the present world-time is conceptually dependent on the territorially defined entities called states as well as on the system of order that sustains them. As well, positioning the state is important because of the current propensities of migration studies to treat, wrongly I will argue, the state as an autonomous agent. Finally, locating the state will prove a necessary step in order to analyze the current literature on the securitization of migration (next section).
Migration scholars have advanced a "traditional" set of arguments to support their option of treating the state as an agent. Influential scholars have argued that research of the determinants of immigration policy "must centre on the state as an international actor" (Zolberg 1992:316) or that "bringing the state back in" constitutes one of the key contributions of political science to migration studies—that is, to conceptualize states as unitary and autonomous actors (Hollifield 2000). Furthermore, Rudolph (2003:606) in his study of national security and immigration argues that "closer scrutiny reveals a central role of the state not only in shaping forces at other levels, but also as an agent in its own right. [Sometimes] the state functions as the sole political determinant of policy." In his recent book, Rudolph devotes a large section of its concluding chapter in defending a statist approach to study migration. One of his arguments in favour of a state-as-an-agent perspective is that "the state plays a crucial role in determining national interest .... Whereas domestic interest groups ... tend to be single-issue oriented and define preferences accordingly, the state instead tends to forward a 'national interest' that represents an aggregation of these domestic interests" (Rudolph 2006:203).

In international relations literature, the emergence of the agent-structure debate has not only provoked a re-evaluation of the place of the state in the scholarship, but also forced scholars to thoroughly articulate their claims of state-agential powers. As such, and despite the fact that studies conceptualizing the state as a unitary agent are less frequent than in the past, students of world politics have suggested a rather unusual set of arguments for treating states as agents. This strand of literature is closely associated with Wendt's claim that "states are persons too" (and therefore agents). Since "states can be
considered goal-directed units of action”, he contends, “they can be considered agents by this definition” (Wendt 1987:359). In Social Theory of International Politics, his argument was refined: the state is a singular kind of structure that has emerged into a corporate agent. And as such not only are states agents but “states are persons too” (Wendt 1999:215). For Wendt, problematizing the notion of state personhood is timely because “giving up the concept of state personhood would result in a substantial loss of extant scientific knowledge about world politics” (Wendt 2004:316).

I argue that to understand the state as a unified agent limits more than it reveals in the context of my study for two reasons. First, these studies are “black-boxing” the state. In bracketing the domestic sources of state identity, they are not capable of tackling the issue of change. Without opening the concept of state in order to unravel who the agents “behind it” are, these studies cannot account for variation across cases and across time. Sources of change and continuity are treated exogenously. Indeed, as Cederman and Daase (2003) have recently demonstrated, scholars, in anthropomorphizing collective actors, leave corporate identities un-problematized. As Adler argues in his criticism of Wendt’s position, “he offers a theory and a portrait of agency and the state that locks in politics as the study of inter-state relations and ultimately gives up on bringing into the theory the ultimate constructor of worlds—by which I mean the thinking, often reasonable, sometimes surprising, and even at times creative human individual” (Adler 2002:108, emphasis in original).

Second, these studies reify the state; they postulate its ever-presence and enduring nature. Yet, the usefulness of reifying the state remains unclear (Cederman 1997;
Koslowski 1999; Wight 1999). Furthermore, migration scholars Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) have underscored the tendency of studies that conceptualize the state as an agent to fall into the danger of methodological nationalism, i.e., “the naturalization of the nation-state by the social sciences”.

3.2 The securitization of migration: the state of the art

Although an increasingly popular topic among students of world politics, few scholarly works attempt to make sense in both theoretical and empirical terms of the phenomenon of securitized migration. Two large categories of studies are relevant in the present context: migration studies and international relations studies.

3.2.1 Migration studies

Broadly defined, numerous scholarly works tackling the interconnection of migration and world politics have been published in the past two decades. Most studies consist of either an ad hoc list of migration (and diaspora) influences on foreign policy, or observations that migration is a significant factor influencing world politics (Hall 1990; Loescher and Monahan 1989; Newman and Selm 2003; Ong and Nonini 1996; Shain 1995; Shain and Barth 2003; Sheffer 1986).

In the specialized literature on migration policy, scholars have advanced four predominant arguments regarding the link between migration and security. First, scholars have demonstrated the effects (usually negative) of the securitization of migration on migrants themselves (Beare 1997; Caloz-Tschopp 2004; Freedman 2004). Second, others have argued for the near impossibility of constructing cogent theories making sense of the
phenomenon given that both migration and security are complex and multi-layered concepts (Heisler 2006). Still others have shown that the movement of people has an effect on regional security and on the balance of power (Adamson 2006; Collyer 2006; Loescher 1992). Finally, others have highlighted the interconnections of security practices and human rights considerations (Crépeau and Nakache 2006; Devetak 2004).

In general, the aim of these studies is to gain a better understanding of various aspects of the securitization of migration. Certainly, these studies are significant contributions to the question of securitized migration. However, the aim of these studies is not to construct an analytical framework for understanding the securitization process or to offer guiding principles to account for the variation in the level of securitization.

3.2.2 International relations studies

Most cogent and interesting models for understanding the process by which migration becomes a subject of security concern come from works published mainly in international relations literature rather than in migration studies journals. Three traditions in international relations scholarship have given rise to five models for understanding and explaining the securitization of migration.

The first two models have their roots in the realist tradition of international relations. There is no consensus, however, among advocates of the realist school on the applicability of a realist perspective on the securitization of migration. Indeed, one of the leading advocates of the realist school has circumscribed the focus of security studies to “the phenomenon of war” and, incidentally, defined security as “the study of the threat, use and control of military force”. Thereby, he is closing off any possibilities of applying a realist
perspective on the securitization of migration (Walt 2002; 1991:212). Notwithstanding Walt's reticence, scholars have applied the realist model in two ways. First, scholars attuned to notions of structural anarchy and material interest have chosen to present an alarmist picture of the security consequences of the movement of people, i.e. the disorder produced by migration. For some, Western states should fear the "coming anarchy" associated with mass migration (Huntington 2004; Kaplan 1994). Others view the world as divided into two camps, the rich and the poor, and predict that the poor will either fight the rich or simply overwhelm them (Connelly and Kennedy 1994). Some focus on negative images: "advanced industrial countries can protect their borders from invading armies but not from hordes of individuals who slip into harbours, crawl under barbed-wire fence, and wade across rivers" (Weiner 1995:9). Still, albeit in a more gentle way, scholars have argued that by definition migration is a security concern: "migration always is security-sensitive because migration often changes societies and societies often change migrants" (Miller 1998:25).

The second way scholars have applied a realist perspective to the securitization of migration is to explain the securitization of migration in terms of its potential to induce international crisis and war. Scholars have argued that migration should be incorporated into security concerns only when it induces or provokes international conflicts (Weiner 1993).

Applying the realist model to the securitization of migration presents important limits. The structurally deterministic scholarship that underlines the alarmist point of view constitutes an uncertain foundation for theorizing about the migration-security nexus,
despite the fact that some politicians have found the alarmist statements attractive. As well, migration has been securitized in Canada and France without any clear evidence that it would induce conflicts, let alone conflicts that Canada or France should fear will affect their respective national security interests. Furthermore, perhaps with the exception of a few references in French President Mitterand's speeches, the “story” of the securitization of migration according to the empirical evidences amassed in this study does not support these two lines of argument. That is, neither the concern of structural anarchy nor the concern regarding the inducement of international-regional conflicts arose in Canada’s and France’s securitization process.

The third model is the sectoral security model (Buzan 1983). Attuned to realist’s premises, Buzan has however distinguished himself from realist scholars by making a key move, which is to broaden the security agenda to five sectors rather than the realist traditional focus on military security. The five sectors are military, political, economic, societal, and environment. The sectoral model was subsequently refined with the aim of offering a middle-ground analytical framework between realist and critical theory perspectives. As such, the focus on the state is considerably reduced. According to Buzan et al. (1998a:8), they have “modified [their] statement to move away from its implicit (and sometimes explicit) placement of the state as the central referent object in all sectors.”

Nevertheless, scholars have raised some concerns about postulates of sectoral security. The feasibility of exercising a clear distinction between external (the military and political sector) and internal (societal) security (Bigo 2001), and between state and societal security (Ceyhan 1998), has been challenged. Indeed, as Dauvergne (2003; 2006) has convincingly
shown, the movement of people is regarded as challenging the very foundation of the state—that is, national sovereignty—and not only society as sectoral security posits. As well, the approach is not useful in examining the “nuts and bolts” by which migration comes to be seen and perceived as a security issue (which is one of the fundamental questions of the present study).

A fourth stream of theorizing has its root in the international relations neoliberal literature. The work of Christopher Rudolph (2006; 2003) is especially worth mentioning. In his study of national security and immigration in Western states, Rudolph (2006:22) attempts to build a “truly comprehensive theory applicable to more than one state” by revisiting the concept of state grand strategy. This grand strategy perspective is coupled with a three-dimensional security framework (economic production, military, and societal dimensions) in which ideational factors are considered intervening variables.

In the context of my study, Rudolph’s approach is flawed in two important ways. Firstly, one of Rudolph’s central hypotheses is inconclusive in the particular context of this study. He postulates that the “structural threat environment” is the primary explanatory factor of migration/security policies. The general causal pathway starts from “external” geopolitical threat, to state response, and then finally to policy output. Ideas are here treated as intervening variables. However, a constructivist perspective sees ideational factors as having tremendously more power than being merely an intervening variable. Indeed, for constructivists ideas are at the core of how structural/external threats come to have any meaning. Instead of treating the relationship between structural threats and ideas as, respectively, explanatory and intervening variables, a constructivist study postulates
that neither structural threats can exist without the ideational factors that brought them meaning and significance, nor are ideas formulated and created in a structural vacuum. In fact, Rudolph’s claim to bring constructivism into his framework through the inclusion of ideas as intervening variable sits awkwardly with large sections of constructivist scholarships.29

As well, Rudolph attempts to do something that I precisely try to avoid: treating the state as a unitary agent. His goal of offering a theory that bridges domestic and international factors while at the same time acknowledging that domestic political processes have been “black boxed” (2006:204) does not fit well with the overall objectives of the present study. Without opening the concept of state in order to unravel who the agents “behind it” are, it is difficult to identify the social mechanisms at play in the securitization process across time within a case. For instance, “the” Canadian position on the migration-security nexus significantly varied depending on who was the Minister of Foreign affairs even when Ministers came from the same political party.

The fifth model, i.e. securitization theory, is theoretically very interesting. On one hand, securitization theory is influenced by Buzan’s inclination toward assumptions of the realist school; on the other hand, securitization theory is also influenced by the critical theory-informed work of Ole Waever. As securitization theory constitutes the current benchmark of securitization research, and given the fact that I borrow important elements of securitization theory to develop my own alternative approach (described in the last section of this chapter), it receives special attention in the next pages.
3.2.3 Securitization theory

Securitization is an intersubjective and socially constructed process, according to securitization theory. Bringing speech act theory into security studies, securitization theory posits that labelling something as a security issue permeates it with a sense of importance that legitimizes the use of emergency measures outside of the usual political processes to deal with it. For securitization theory, “the process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)” (Buzan et al. 1998b:26). In other words, “it is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one” (Wæver 2004:13). Since security is a function of existential threat and about survival, a securitizing speech act attempts to take an issue “beyond the established rules of the game and [frame] the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998b:23). Securitization theory seeks to gain an understanding of how, when, and by whom an issue is presented as a security one. According to securitization theory’s architects, the process of securitizing an issue involves, on one hand, agents making speech act-securitizing moves and, on the other hand, conditions for a successful speech act. The theory distinguishes two types of actors: a securitizing actor securitizing issues by declaring something existentially threatened, and a functional actor affecting the dynamics of a sector. Conditions refer to facilitating conditions and the role of audience (to be discussed in more detail below).
To be sure, securitization theory offers at first sight a creative theoretical foundation for understanding the linkage between security and migration. Indeed, as one of securitization theory's friendly critics observes, one of securitization theory's greatest strengths is that it underscores the importance of labelization as a form of symbolic power in security studies (Bigo 1998); thus, it shifts the focus of analysis away from merely material factors to include as well social-cultural ones. The theory also acknowledges the subjective dimension of securitized migration. Dealing effectively with the notion that territorial boundaries are producing the social artefact called migrants, the theory postulates the social construction of threats and referent objects. Finally, the theory offers some guiding principles regarding who are the agents involved in the securitization of migration.

Securitization theory has attracted the attention of numerous scholars in recent years. Scholars have generally focused on theoretical dimensions of securitization theory and a very limited number of studies have tried to "apply" the theory.\textsuperscript{31} Scholars have attacked the question of identity (McSweeney 1996) and the responsibility of the analyst (Eriksson 1999) while others have tackled, with greater insights, its normative implications (Huysmans 1993; 1998). Other scholars have attacked the coupling of speech act theory with securitization theory from a gender perspective (Curley 2004; Hansen 2000; Kennedy-Pipe 2004). Some scholars have focused their criticisms on the speech act theory. For instance, Michael C. Williams (2003) contends that by insisting on speech act alone, securitization theory explanatory power is limited because it underestimates other powerful practices such as gesture, the production of image (photos, television, the Internet), and the use of symbols.\textsuperscript{32} Others have focused their criticisms on the lack of
universal and trans-cultural understanding of “the established rules of the game” (Curley and Wong forthcoming). Scholars have also questioned securitization theory’s understanding of security (as an existential threat) while advancing an understanding in terms of emancipation (Booth 2005; 1991). Similarly, scholars have criticized the desecuritization strategy implicitly present in securitization theory. Claudia Aradau’s article has indeed spurred an enriching dialogue on this question (Alker 2006; Aradau 2004; Behnke 2006; Taureck 2006).

Stimulated by these important contributions, the present study aims to raise the stakes by underscoring a set of new criticisms that have to do with contextual factors and variation in levels of securitization.

First, I want to argue that a central element that securitization theory leaves ill-defined is the contextual factors that enable and constrain the securitization process. Instead of talking in terms of contextual factors, securitization theorists present two categories of conditions: facilitating conditions and audience approval.

Concerning the conditions “making a successful securitization more likely”, i.e., facilitating conditions – the theory postulates that

“conditions for a successful speech act [are]: (1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security; (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor ...; and (3) features of the alleged threats” (Buzan et al. 1998a:32-33).

Concerning the second category of conditions enabling a successful securitization, – i.e., the question of audience, securitization theory asserts that
"a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such ... Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act" (Buzan et al. 1998a:25-31, emphasis added).

Obviously, securitization theory is right in pointing to the importance of audience. Indeed, many studies have demonstrated that the impact of public opinion and domestic structures on security issues (Knopf 1998; Mueller 1994; 1973; Risse-Kappen 1991). However, the wording used by securitization theory raises some concerns. One could ask who precisely comprises the audience? Securitization theory's response, which is to add an adjective here and there to the word audience, confuses things. For instance, Buzan et al. (1998a) refer to the “significant” audience (p.27), to the “sufficient” audience (p.204), and to “those the securitizing act attempts to convince” (p.41). In another contribution, Waever (2000:251) talks about the “relevant” audience. In turn, this list of adjectives leads to important and interrelated questions. For example, who constitutes an “audience” and for whom? What is a “sufficient” audience? How do we measure a “significant” audience in order to affirm if a securitizing move has been elevated to a securitization? What is the “relevant” audience in the case of migration? If migration is a societal security concern (whether in terms of a threat to social cohesion or national identity), then should the “relevant” audience be the society under threat? In a liberal democracy, can the ultimate audience be something other than the general population? In order to justify exceptional measures to protect the society from a societal-security threat (as migration is often categorized), should not the society as a whole be the audience. In other words, if a
securitizing actor argues that migration is threatening Canadian society, then should not Canadian society be the audience that policymakers need to convince in order to implement and impose exceptional measures susceptible of eradicating the threat that they are facing?

Scholars who have worked on the audience aspect of securitization theory also present an unconvincing standpoint on the issue. In a important article, Balzacq argues that the units of analysis of securitization theory “negates the audience” and that an effective securitization should be “audience-centred” (Balzacq 2005). Rather than discussing directly the nature, definition, and attributes of the “audience”, Balzacq contends that “a securitizing actor is sensitive to two kinds of support, moral and formal” (2005:184). Whereas he does not define the vectors and nature of moral support, Balzacq stresses that formal support can be equated with a formal decision by an institution, e.g. a vote by the Security Council or Parliament.

While his argument constitutes a significant contribution to securitization theory, it offers little guidance in the present context for two reasons. Firstly, Balzacq’s claim that securitization theory “negates the audience” does not sit well with securitization theory’s claim that “successful securitization is ... decided ... by the audience of the security speech-act” (Buzan et al. 1998a:25). To be sure, securitization theory leaves un-specified what is meant by “audience”, but it clearly does not negate its existence or its role. Secondly, Balzacq’s distinction between moral and formal support does not constitute an effort to disaggregate the “audience”. According to Balzacq, the same social entity can give both formal and moral support; and as well, both the “public” and an “institutional
body” can provide moral support. There is also a sense of incompleteness on what constitutes “moral” support in Balzacq’s article. He provides no definition and he remains evasive on what he means by “moral” support.

My second criticism of securitization theory is that the theory remains silent on the issue of variation in levels of securitization. Securitization theory does not differentiate the intensity within the securitization process: either an issue is securitized or it is not. The only difference that securitization theory recognizes is along the politicization/securitization spectrum. That is, for securitization theory any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized, to securitized. Once an issue falls into the ‘securitized’ camp, securitization theory does not distinguish whether the issue is strongly securitized or weakly securitized; it treats security as a binary notion. As such, securitization theory does not deductively offer guiding principles to account for variation in levels of securitization either within case across time or across cases.

There are two interrelated problems associated with this. Firstly, one observes a disconnection between theory and empirical evidence since my previous chapter has demonstrated that a considerable difference exists in the level of securitized migration between Canada and France. Secondly, securitization theory, by treating security in a binary way, eschews variation within and across cases thus failing to provide adequate guidance for suggesting hypotheses to account for the variation in levels of securitization.

In the next few pages, I look to offer remedies to these two criticisms. As securitization theory’s conditions for a successful securitization are inconclusive and largely
unspecified, I contend that a departure from the conceptual devices of “conditions” to a constructivist approach stressing socio-historical, ideational, and contextual factors is necessary. Against securitization theory’s treatment of security as a binary notion, I develop a more nuanced conceptualization – one in which security is understood as a continuum.

3.3 The argument

This study advances three sets of propositions in order to answer my first question, i.e. what are the social mechanisms involved in process of securitization? The first set of propositions aims to distinguish between politicization and securitization; the second set of propositions relates to the issue of sequence; and the third set of propositions is to identify agential and contextual factors as social constituents of the securitization process.

Following the prevailing treatment of the relationship between politicization and securitization processes, I argue that migration can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized, to securitized. Non-politicized refers to the stage where migration is not dealt with publicly. Politicization refers to “expanding the participation ... beyond clientelistic networks and bureaucratic politics to larger constituencies” in which a wide range of agents enter the debate (Huysmans 2006:119-120). It is important to understand that politicization can have both positive and negative overtones concerning the movement of people. When an agent is underscoring the positive contribution of immigrants to a country’s history or culture, he is making a positive politicization. When an agent is criticizing the efficiency – and the rapidity – of the refugee recognition process; she is making a negative politicization. Yet, a negative
politicization does not equate with a securitization of migration. It is one thing to question the adequacy of settlement services and the failure to recognize overseas professional credentials. It is an altogether different one to declare that migration is a national security threat. Securitization refers to the process of integrating, discursively and institutionally, migration into security frameworks that emphasize policing and defence. Finally, desecuritization refers to the process of unmaking the securitization of an issue; the process of excluding an issue from security frameworks.

Regarding the issue of sequence, I contend that the process of securitizing an issue involves three interrelated phases: discourse elaboration; discourse production; and discourse relation (see Figure 3.1). Discourse elaboration refers to the complex and multifaceted process of decision-making before an official position is taken, since a research project on the discourse elaboration phase would involve collecting and analyzing briefing notes, internal communication, reports, and so on. Discourse production refers to the actual speech acts intended to present an issue (here migration) as an existential threat requiring exceptional measures, i.e. securitizing moves by securitizing agents. Discourse relation refers to how securitizing agents’ moves relate to cultural and socio-historical contexts in which they are made. Exogenous shocks and domestic audiences play a fundamental role in this phase.
None of these phases can alone successfully securitize an issue, i.e. a securitizing speech act is contingent on both discourse elaboration and discourse relation. A security speech act does not constitute a securitization; it only represents the "discourse production" phase. While this study focuses on the last two phases, it is important to remember that multi-directionality and feedbacks apply here. Agents in charge of discourse elaboration do not work in a vacuum; both the production phase and the relation phase influence them. How discourses relate to the multifaceted context as well as how the agent making securitizing move envisages how his move relates with the context strongly condition discourse elaboration and discourse production.

The third proposition is to identify agential and contextual factors as necessary social constituents of the securitization process. As Huysmans (2006:7) reminds us, “insecurity is not a fact of nature but always requires that it is written and talked into existence.” The mention of migration as a security issue by an agent constitutes a securitizing attempt or
securitizing move, i.e. speech acts intended to present migration as an existential security threat requiring exceptional measures. A securitizing agent must follow the grammar of security, i.e. accepted social procedures that are both contextual and temporally dependent. A securitizing agent ought also to possess social power and social recognition. Social recognition could be institutionalized (e.g. a politician in power), but it could also be an emergent recognition. That is, while a social agent may have little social power and recognition at the beginning of the securitization process, its social recognition and thus social power could increase precisely because of the questions he is raising and the way he is doing so.

An agent’s securitizing move falls into the discourse production phase. This in turn brings the question of private securitization. I argue that the possibility that an agent makes a securitizing move “unofficially” and away from public awareness definitely exists. It falls into the discourse elaboration phase of the three interrelated phases of the securitization process proposed in my study. These “private” securitizing moves will most likely aim at first to measure in what ways these moves would relate with domestic audiences. The goal would be to evaluate whether domestic audiences would facilitate or constrain these moves before making an official speech. In a liberal democracy, the discourse production phase is likely to be indispensable. At some point in time, migration will be discursively and “officially” presented as a security threat for security practices to be justified in the medium-long term. Securitizing agents precisely intend to do just that in the discourse production phase of the securitization process.
In this study, I explore the role of two agents on the process of securitizing migration: political agents and media agents. This selection of agents is not a theoretical statement on who constitutes a securitizing agent; in designing the study, I had to limit the range of agents under investigation. Nonetheless, I argue that assessing the value of these two agential hypotheses is fundamental in the context of the securitization of migration.

To be sure, the relationship between political agents and media agents is a complex and multifaceted one that the present study only slightly explores. Yet, for the purpose of my study, I contend that the relationship is one of continuous interaction. Rather than seeing political agents as automatically the initiators of the securitization process, I contend that political agents can, in some cases, be the initiators of a particular security policy and, in other cases, transmitting players (e.g. by giving its institutional support to media’s and/or audiences’ security demands).

Similarly, media agents can be, in some cases, initiators of the securitizing process (e.g. by making securitizing moves before political agents formulate one, thereby pressing both the government and the audiences to adopt a particular security policy). In other cases, media agents can be transmitting players in the securitization process (e.g. by supporting political agents’ securitizing moves or by voicing and articulating audiences’ security demands).

This is not to say that political and media agents’ security speech acts can alone successfully securitize migration. They are merely securitizing moves in an attempt to securitize migration.
In fact, proceeding within a constructivist perspective allows me to restore a better relationship between securitizing actors and the context in which their speech acts are made, that is, discourse relation. Indeed, a constructivist perspective highlights both the constraining and enabling power of settings, or contexts, on agents. Securitizing moves both percolate from the environment in which they are made and are constrained by the same environment. Agents’ securitizing moves have to be analyzed within the context in which they have been made. To be sure, multifaceted contexts in which agents operate cannot “impose” a securitization without agential powers. Contextual factors do not simply drive securitization in some objective way; they do not speak for themselves. Rather, agents have to “interpret” the context in which they planned to formulate securitizing moves; agents have to give a particular meaning to a particular events occurring at a particular point in time. This study, in fully incorporating these factors into the theoretical framework, is conducive to restoring a contextual dimension to securitization theory.

In this study, I examine the role of two exogenous shocks, the so-called “refugee crisis” of the early 1990s and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the role of domestic audiences in the process of securitizing migration in Canada and France.

I further propose distinguishing between elite audience and mass audience. Elite audience refers to major political parties’ establishment, members of the executive power of a state, and elected members of Parliament. To be sure, some members of the elite audience can also be a securitizing agent. However, elite audience refers to the notion of a highly influential group of individuals in a collective sense. Because the elite audience
will allow the point of view of an individual to be presented as the official position of the political party's or as the official position of the government (the cabinet collective responsibility sealing the unity of the caucus around the policy), it can be conceptualized in a collective sense. To be sure, a political party’s (or a caucus’) position on an issue is rarely obtained through unanimity, involving in fact debates and faction struggles. However, in an electoral campaign (or during a mandate), the unity of the party (or the government) will become paramount and the dominant position within the party (or government) will be presented as the official position in a collective sense.

Elite audience can shape the securitization process in two ways. First, it can impede or limit the securitization process by constraining the scope, the nature, and the strength of an agent’s anticipated securitizing attempts (given the tradition, history, and political orientations of a political party). And, second, it can also facilitate the securitization process by enabling and inducing agents to make securitizing moves (e.g. the elite audience of a political party known to have far-right inclinations will enable agents in making securitizing attempts in the context of migration).

Mass audience refers to “the people” that politicians aim to represent, i.e. the general population. Mass audience can shape the securitization process in two ways: (1) it can impede or limit the securitization process by constraining the scope, the nature, and the strength of an agent’s securitizing attempts; and (2) it can facilitate the securitization process by enabling and inducing agents to make securitizing moves.

While the involvement of one type of audience is required for a successful securitization, elite audience needs not to be congruent with mass audience. As such, the
involvement of elite audience may be sufficient for successful securitization, especially in non-democratic political regime. However, this would put a great deal of pressure on the legitimacy of the government in a representative democracy; it is hard to imagine that in the medium-term a successful securitization would last without a relative involvement of mass audience.

In order to answer the second question driving this study – to explain the variation in the level of securitization between Canada and France – I propose to focus on the role of the mass audience. I suggest that when the mass audience represents a constraining and limiting force on agents' securitizing moves, the outcome is a weak securitization. When the mass audience represents an enabling and facilitating force on agents' securitizing moves, the outcome is a strong securitization. To be sure, exogenous shocks are important components of the social mechanisms leading to the securitization of migration, but they offer little guidance in explaining the variation in the level of securitized migration – as the next chapters will underscore.

3.4 Looking ahead

The theoretical discussion presented here consisted of three parts. It began with a presentation of a constructivist approach to my study of movement and order. This theoretical standpoint offers me useful devices from which to "locate" the state and opens the discussion of existing models tackling the process of securitizing migration. After reviewing criticisms of securitization theory, I propose a set of new and interrelated criticisms. In turn, these criticisms render necessary the formulation of an alternative
approach for studying the securitization of migration in which sequence, contexts, and the possibility of levels of securitized migration are fully incorporated.

While this chapter had a clear theoretical outlook, the following chapters will focus on empirical findings. In order to facilitate comparison across my two country cases, I have structured the next two chapters along the two securitizing agents explored in the study. Chapter 4 examines the role of political agents; Chapter 5 analyzes the role of media agents. I explore the role of exogenous shocks and audiences in Chapter 6.
Part II – The Securitization of Migration in Canada and France
In the next three chapters, I explore the role of two types of agents—political agents (Chapter 4) and media agents (Chapter 5)—as well as the role of exogenous shocks and audiences (Chapter 6) in the process of securitizing migration.

Political agents

For the purpose of this study, political agents are elected politicians and members of the government – those who are in power. I have focused my analysis on the leaders of the governing political party as well as the ministers in charge of the foreign affairs and immigration portfolios; therefore, I have not included leaders of the opposition in my study. Of course, several other agents could be said to be political and contribute to securitization of migration. For purposes of feasibility, I am confining my exhaustive analysis to a particular set of securitizing agents that are undeniably powerful without discounting that others play roles as well. In Canada, my selected political agents are Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign affairs, and Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration. In France, I chose Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign affairs, and Ministers of Interior. To allow for within and across case comparisons, I have systematically retrieved, collected, and quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed the complete set of speeches made by each agent between 1989 and 2005: a total of about 3,500 speeches.

Collecting and analyzing the complete set of speeches, although putting important pressures on research effort, reduces considerably several biases rightfully associated with discourse analysis (Milliken 1999). First, this study largely avoids the media-
interpretation bias by which a scholar, instead of retrieving the original speech, uses portions of the speech reported in a newspaper article. Analysing sections of a speech that have been quoted in a newspaper article provides, by definition, a sense of incompleteness to the analysis. The present study has taken great care in steering away from such a bias. And, second, this study also avoids the partial-research bias by which a scholar, instead of retrieving the complete set of primary sources, focuses only on a partial set of primary sources or on speeches surrounding an isolated crisis in time. Inevitably, the scholar enters a fragile zone in which he/she must justify the selection procedures allowing him to collect one speech and not another. Such a research strategy leaves some room for uncertainty. Because I aim to conduct a systematic investigation, reducing as much as possible uncertainty associated with the research material is imperative.

A note is required at this point. I have been able to retrieve and collect the complete set of speeches made by all political agents with one exception: the Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration Canada. I have worked with several archivists and librarians of Library and Archives Canada to collect as many speeches as possible. However, the entire collection of speeches by Ministers Bernard Valcourt, Sergio Marchi, and Lucienne Robillard are closed to the public. Some speeches from Minister Barbara McDougall are closed to the general public until 2017. I have also made a request under the Access to Information Act for all speeches by all Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration of Canada between 1989 and 2004. I have received an incomplete set of speeches: for example, I received 17 speeches in 1999 (for comparison, the Minister of Foreign affairs on average make 30 speeches per year), seven speeches for 1992, but none for 2004.
Hence, my conclusions concerning the role of Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration will not be as robust as with all the other Canadian and French political agents.

Media agents

"The media play a key role in the organization of the society; they are powerful actors in the political and social structure" argues a major figure in the field of communication studies (Siegel 1996:18). In the context of this study, numerous people indeed assume that media are influential actors in the securitization of migration. Several interviewees both in Canada and France ranked media as a highly significant actor in the process of securitizing migration. As well, some scholars impute at least partially the securitization of migration and the production of a "migration crisis" to mass media (Berman 2003; Hier and Greenberg 2002; Ibrahim 2005). Thus, rather than assuming that national newspapers function solely as transmitting belts of information, this study problematizes the role of editorialists of national newspapers in the social construction of the link between migration and security.

I selected two major national newspapers per country allowing for within and across case comparisons. In Canada, I chose The Globe and Mail and La Presse. Taken together, they have a daily circulation of more than 500,000 copies (weekdays). In France, I selected Le Monde and Le Figaro. The daily circulation is substantial as well with on average 850,000 copies (weekdays). I have limited my analysis to the editorials, i.e. the article expressing the opinion of a newspaper's editors or publishers. Like speeches constitute the loci of political claims by securitizing political agents, editorials are
newspapers' explicit own voice in public debates. Because newspapers' editorials possess a detailed argumentative structure, an investigation of editorials permits an analysis of interpretive frames behind the newspapers' official position, proposals, and demands regarding the migration-security nexus. In total, I have systematically retrieved, collected, and quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed nearly 900 editorials.

Collecting the complete set of editorials that discuss migration issues largely avoid potential bias. The most important bias that this study avoids is the "rebound" one. As editorialist usually write its editorial only few hours after an event took place, focusing solely on editorials published shortly after a crisis (e.g. the summer 1999's Chinese refugee crisis in Canada or the 2001's East Sea crisis in France) could significantly bias the analysis in one way or the other. Providing an analysis of the evolution of a newspaper's official position that is not biased by events isolated in time is crucial to fully understand the role played by editorialists in the process of securitization over the relatively long time-period that this study covers (1989-2005). This is a research effort that will prove to be important in the particular context of this study; especially in case of The Globe and Mail's and La Presse's reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as we shall see.

I have selected political and media agents in an inductive way with the aim of gaining a better understanding of social agents involved in the securitization process. As such, this selection of agents is not meant to be a theoretical statement on who constitutes a securitizing agent. Likewise, while this research investigates actors involved in the
securitization of migration, the emphasis is not on the authors of the securitization – if such a role exists. As Hannah Arendt (1958:184-185) underscores superbly,

“the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is not an author or producer. ... The perplexity is that in any series of events that together form a story with a unique meaning we can at best isolate the agent who set the whole process into motion ... we never can point unequivocally to him as the author of its eventual outcome.”

Hence, my intention is to highlight the role—sometimes decisive, sometimes negligible—of securitizing actors under study. This is not a "study in search of an author". Nor do I look to identify and analyse all possible securitizing agents.

Contextual factors

I distinguish two contextual factors that have a considerable influence on the process of securitizing migration: exogenous shocks and domestic audiences. Exogenous shocks refer to an event or groups of events that induce points of departure from established sociological, cultural, and political patterns. Exogenous shocks often offer a "window of actions" to agents for the transformation of social structures. None of these events objectively produces a significant change in world politics. Rather, they constitute resources that are interpreted by and potentially acted upon (or not) by agents. I explore two exogenous shocks particularly relevant in the context of this study, i.e. the refugee "crisis" of the early 1990s and the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

I disaggregate domestic audiences into elite audience and mass audience. I draw on three principal sources to track down how elite and mass audiences have shaped the
securitization process. In regards to elite audience, I have collected, coded, and analyzed along the migration-security nexus the manifestos from the main federal political parties in Canada, as well as most important presidential candidates in France. Political parties’ manifestos are a valuable source of information on elite audience’s involvement mainly because the elite audience will allow the point of view of an individual to be presented as the official position of the political party’s, and because parties’ manifestos set out their strategic direction as well as outlines of prospective legislation should they win the election. Furthermore, I have examined manifestos over a relatively long time period (in Canada from 1945 to 2005; in France from 1974 to 2005); thus, rendering possible an analysis in terms of rupture and continuity.

A second option to track down elite audience’s role in the securitization process is the extent to which the legislative branch of government has allowed or constrained securitizing actors’ moves. I have analyzed whether the most important immigration laws sailed through Parliament, whether they were narrowly passed, or whether they were defeated. Legislative outcomes are a particularly good measure of elite audience’s role in the securitization process because they constitute a final decision in which the dominant view is expressed; furthermore, they are a package of administrative powers and procedures setting the framework for practices related to national security.

Concerning mass audience’s involvement in the securitization process, I have examined public opinion on questions related to the migration-security relationship. I have collected results of public opinion for all years that my study covers, and have put into historical context all measurements of public opinion. Doing so renders possible (a) an
analysis of the evolution of public opinion between 1989 and 2005, and (b) an analysis of how public opinion relates to the specific pattern of securitized migration in Canada and France (detailed in Chapter 2). As well, I have relied directly on primary data from pollsters instead of distilling the information from media sources.
Chapter 4 – Political Agents and their Security Speech Acts
"Closing the door is not the answer"
—Lucienne Robillard, 1998

“A strong immigration is an investment in our future. Immigration, in short, is a successful economic, social, and cultural strategy”
—Elinor Caplan, 1999

“We are strengthening inadmissibility criteria so that criminals, security risks, and violators of human rights will not be given access to Canada”
—Elinor Caplan, 2000

“Uncontrolled migratory movement would be a threat against our fundamental national interests”
—Philippe Marchand, 1991

“France does not want to be an immigration country anymore. The objective is now ‘immigration zero’”
—Charles Pasqua, 1993

“You take a father with three or four wives and 20 children who gets 50,000 francs in welfare payments—naturally without working. Add the noise and the smell; the French worker on the same corridor goes crazy”
—Jacques Chirac, 1991

Whereas questions of identity, social construction, and discourse were barely touched on by international scholars theorists twenty years ago, these issues are now at the forefront of the discipline. Since the mid-1980s scholars have started to widen the concept of security and to offer new perspectives on issues such as national security, taboos, norms, collective identity, and ideational factors. In the particular context of the present study, this opening had fundamental consequences. As we have seen in Chapter 3, a pertinent theoretical framework in understanding and explaining the phenomenon of securitized migration is securitization theory: a theory that gives a prominent place to discourse.
In exploring the role (or lack thereof) of these political agents in the process of securitizing migration my aim is twofold. First, I want to conduct a temporal analysis, i.e. contrasting when the securitization of migration was initiated with when political agents of each country case made their securitizing moves. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 2, the early 1990s represent a fundamental critical juncture in my study of securitized migration in Canada and France, with the publication of *Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities* (1991) in Canada and the signing of the Dublin Convention (1990) in the case of France. Thus, I will highlight the pattern of engagement of each political agent with these respective critical junctures.

Second, I want to underscore each political agent’s securitizing moves (or lack thereof) in regards to migration between 1989 and 2005, i.e. investigating how each agent relates with the phenomenon of securitized migration. Overall, I seek to gain a better understanding of the social mechanisms involved in the securitization process within and across cases.

It is important to remember at this point that agents’ securitizing attempts do not by themselves create successful securitization. Securitizing attempts made by securitizing agents are central components of the social mechanisms of the securitization process but they are not the only ones.

For each speech, I have counted the number of times the word “migration” or its derivatives appeared and describe in which context it was used. I also have counted the number of times the word “security” appeared, followed by an analysis of the context. Finally, I have counted the number of times the two notions were connected. That is, the
number of times migration was said to be a security concern for the country under study.\textsuperscript{39} I also took note of the context in which the securitizing move was made and the rationale behind the move. Although these research methods render possible statistical analysis to map out the evolution of the wording for each agent, a traditional content analysis constitutes the primary method of investigation.\textsuperscript{40}

This chapter contains two sections. The first section examines the case of Canada; the second focuses on France. A concluding section summarizes the key findings and introduces the next chapter.

4.1 Canada

4.1.1 Prime Ministers

In Canada, each new parliamentary session is marked by the Governor General's Speech from the Throne in the Chamber of the Senate outlining the government's legislative agenda. It is widely acknowledged that the Prime Minister is, in fact, the principal architect of the text; thus, it constitutes a reliable source to indicate the general orientation and position of the government as well as the Prime Minister's political agenda.\textsuperscript{41}

What is fascinating is that the first such securitizing move in the period under investigation was made in October 1999—that is, the Speech from the Throne opening the second session of the thirty-sixth Parliament of Canada, as shown in Figure 4.1. As we have seen in Chapter 2, one of the key dates in the case of Canada is 1991, with the publication of the policy document \textit{Foreign Policies Themes and Priorities}. Therefore,
there is a temporal gap of eight years between the securitization of migration and the first securitizing attempt made by the Prime Minister through the Speech from the Throne.

**Figure 4.1  Speeches from the Throne, Canada, 1989-2005**

Note: The dashed line represents the number of times “migration” was mentioned in a speech; the solid line represents the number of times migration was said to be a security concern for Canada, i.e. securitizing moves; the vertical filled column refers to one of the key year in the securitization process; “Chinese Summer” refers to the arrival of four boats Chinese would-be immigrants to British Columbia’s shores; IRPA stands for Immigration and Refugee Protection Act; CIPS stands for Canada International Policy Statement; the grey horizontal line indicates which political party was in power.

Two notes are important here. First, there were only two Speeches from the Throne in the early 1990s – on May 31, 1991 with Brian Mulroney as Prime Minister, and on January 17, 1994 with Jean Chrétien as Prime Minister. One of the reasons explaining the gap of eight years mentioned above might be that during Prime Minister Kim Campbell’s government (in office from June 13, 1993 to October 25, 1993) there was not a Speech
from the Throne – for reasons that will be become clearer in my discussion of Prime Ministers’ speeches. Had she and her political party won the federal elections of November 1993, we might have seen securitizing moves in a Speech from the Throne. Second, one should note the increasing number of securitizing moves in the past six years (from 1999 to 2005). When these securitizing moves are juxtaposed with the use of migration in the Speeches from the Throne, it indicates an increasing interest in issues of migration as well as its security implications in Canada.

An investigation of Prime Ministers’ speeches (527 speeches) is more revealing. Kim Campbell made the very first securitizing moves in the summer of 1993, as shown in Figure 4.2. Her swearing-in speech of June 1993 is noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, it was the first time a Prime Minister officially linked migration and security. Prime Minister Campbell told her audience that the new Public Security portfolio “consolidates the responsibilities for policing, border protection, customs, processing of immigrants’ applications and the enforcement of immigration laws” in order to ensure that Canadian society was not at risk (Campbell 1993). Secondly, the speech came nearly two years after the publication of the official Canadian document initiating the securitization of migration (1991). As in our study of the Speeches from the Throne, a time gap exists between the initiation of the securitization process and the first securitizing move made the Prime Minister. However, the time gap (two years) is considerably smaller than the one with the Speeches from the Throne (eight years).

As well, Campbell’s securitizing moves were idiosyncratic attempts. They were all made within a very short period of time and they were made in a particular historical
context in Canada. Replacing Brian Mulroney, who left after two mandates in power, as the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, Campbell's Progressive Conservative Party suffered its biggest defeat in history in the 1993 federal election, going from a majority government (169 seats) to losing its status of a recognized political party by Elections Canada (only two seats).

**Figure 4.2  Speeches, Prime Ministers, Canada, 1989-2005**

Note: The dashed line represents the number of times "migration" was mentioned in a speech; the solid line represents the number of times migration was said to be a security concern for Canada, i.e. securitizing moves; the vertical filled column refers to one of the key years in the securitization process; "Chinese Summer" refers to the arrival of four boats Chinese would-be immigrants to British Columbia's shores; IRPA stands for Immigration and Refugee Protection Act; CIPS stands for Canada International Policy Statement; the grey horizontal line indicates which political party was in power.

Between Campbell's securitizing move made in 1993 and the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the Prime Minister of Canada did not make a single speech-act
securitizing migration. It is not, however, as though the opportunity did not exist. The arrival of 599 would-be Chinese immigrants near Vancouver during the summer of 1999—the so-called “Chinese Summer of 1999”—resulted in a groundswell of emotion across Canada, and could have easily resulted in a bold statement to the effect that the movement of people was disturbing Canada’s security. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister made no declaration to that effect.

Of course, Jean Chrétien repeatedly mentioned the movement of people in 1999 as Figure 4.2 illustrates; yet, it is important to note that it was a politicization with positive overtones. As well, the “Chinese Summer of 1999” did not simply drive securitization in some objective way—although I will discuss this issue in detail in Chapter 6. Indeed, the Prime Minister had to interpret the exogenous shock in one way or another along the migration-security nexus; he also had to put forward his understanding of the implications for Canada of that event. Contextual factors—such as the “Chinese Summer of 1999” constitutes resources upon which securitizing agents can make security speech acts or not.

Obviously, the attacks of 9/11 did have a huge impact on the linkage between migration and security. In his address during a special House of Commons debate in response to the terrorist attacks in the United States, Prime Minister Chrétien did not hesitate to establish the linkage. However, and perhaps in indication of the long-term Canadian position, Chrétien also noted that Canada would not give in to the temptation of creating a security curtain, and declared that his government would not be “stampeded in the hope—vain and ultimately self-defeating—that we can make Canada a fortress against the world” (Chrétien 2001). Furthermore, one should also notice the sharp decrease, as
early as 2002, in the linkage between migration and security in the Prime Minister’s speeches.

Overall, one finding stands out clearly from the analysis of Prime Ministers’ speeches from 1989 to 2005 in the particular context of this study: the Prime Minister of Canada has not been the key securitizing actor in the process of securitizing migration. Indeed, an investigation of Speech from the Throne as well as an analysis of Prime Ministers’ speeches reveals that the Prime Minister has not been a key actor in the initiation of the securitization process. Semi-structured interviews conducted in the fall of 2005 corroborate this conclusion. Every senior analyst/bureaucrat interviewed (from four departments: the Privy Council Office, Foreign Affairs, Citizenship and Immigration, and Transport) have indicated that the Prime Minister has not been a key player in the process of securitizing migration.

This is not to say that the Prime Minister was not involved in the general process. “Every cabinet document that has something to do with immigration would go through the [respective] Secretary of PCO and there would be analysts within that [section] who would be specialists in immigration. If a major document was going through ... they would be looking at whether there was some money to be spent, whether all government’s departments that were involved were on side, and so on” explained one of my interviewees. “But I do not think it would be right”, he continues, “to see PCO as the driver in most circumstances [that touch on migration issues].”42
Furthermore, the relationship between migration and security in the Prime Ministers’
speeches displays no systematic and consistent direction. Simple correlation coefficients
calculated for each year indicate that two variables are uncorrelated (see Annexes).

4.1.2 Ministers of Foreign Affairs

A thorough examination of the speeches of Canada’s Ministers Foreign affairs (384
speeches) reveals that the Ministers appear to have been the key player in the process, as
Figure 4.3 shows. Indeed, a temporal connection emerges between a security speech-act
and the initiation of the securitizing process.

Barbara McDougall, in the second Progressive-Conservative majority government, was
the first Foreign Affairs Minister in the period under investigation to declare that
migration was a national security concern for Canada. In a speech she gave on December
10, 1991 to the conference commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Statute of
Westminster, she declared that “in adopting [a] wider concept of security, Canada will be
more aggressive and active in tackling transnational threats to security such as weapons
proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, and irregular migration” (McDougall 1991). In
an address given in January 1992 to the Council of Ministers of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, she identified cooperative security as a fundamental
factor “apt to reduce the threat of mass migrations.” A few months later, in another
international address (to the ASEAN post ministerial conference), McDougall reinforced
the idea that a security dialogue between countries to deal with the movement of people
was needed. The securitization of migration was later reaffirmed in a domestic address. At
the official opening of the Canadian Foreign Service Institute in Ottawa, the Minister told
the audience “the challenges of our foreign services are increasingly complex and diverse. Mass movements of populations ... have changed forever the way our immigration officers work. The work they do is crucial to the well-being and long-term security of all Canadians” (McDougall 1992a; b).

We observed a relative continuity in the way migration is seen with the change of government (from a Progressive-Conservative majority to a Liberal majority) in 1993. André Ouellet, the new Liberal Minister, told the audience of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, in September 1994, that if we would ask Canadians what development outside of Canadians borders is threatening Canadian security the answers would likely to be global in nature. “Unchecked movements of peoples across frontiers” is found alongside international crime, drugs, disease, and nuclear proliferation in Ouellet’s answer to this hypothetical question (Ouellet 1994).
The rationale behind the securitization of migration in these years is rather simple for some. One of my interviewees, who was directly involved in the writing of 1995s Canada Foreign policy statement Canada in the World, told me, quite candidly, that Canada had included migration in its security concerns partly because “every other governments were doing it, so we made the link.”

The arrival of Lloyd Axworthy in the Lester B. Pearson building marks a sharp decrease in the securitization of migration. Axworthy, despite being a heavy consumer of words like “security” and “threat”, rarely spoke of the movement of people in terms of a
security issue for Canada. During one of the longest terms as Minister of Foreign affairs in Canadian history (January 25, 1996—October 16, 2000), Axworthy securitized migration on only two occasions.

In fact, the angle of analysis preferred by Axworthy was brought onto the scene in the summer of 1999 with the arrival of four boats of Chinese would-be-immigrants to British Columbia’s shores. Instead of mounting a charge to the effect that immigration was bringing all sorts of security problems to Canada, Axworthy cast the whole incident under the human security agenda. That is, the arrival of the boats “brought home to Canadians the ugly reality of another human security threat of global proportions—the smuggling and trafficking of human beings” (Axworthy 1999). Or, as this passage illustrates nicely: “millions of vulnerable people have been forced from their homes; been driven to borders which are open one minute and closed the next; forced into hiding; separated from their families; made to act as human shields; stripped of their identities; sexually abused; and callously killed. The need to combat these threats has become the basis of the Canadian approach to foreign policy” (Axworthy 2000).

Undoubtedly, the linkage between migration and security is established under Axworthy; however, the link is constructed with a rather different angle than the one previously made. Securitized migration in this context is about the security of the migrants; migration is not conceived as a “threat” to Canada. Rather, the linkage is made in terms of security for the migrants; an unsurprising finding given Axworthy’s record of accomplishment as one of the most well known public figures to have put human security in the international arena.
Axworthy's successor, John Manley, had a different understanding of how the movement of people should be interpreted. In his very first speech as Minister of Foreign affairs, and in front of a Canadian audience, Manley made it clear that under his leadership the department would see migration as a salient security issue. "We are facing new and complex security threats: including illegal migration, crime, terrorism, disease, illegal drug trafficking, and computer-based crime" he argued at a forum on Canada's foreign policy agenda and priorities in October 2000 (Manley 2000).

As expected, the linkage between migration and security became especially acute after 9/11. Immigration, security, terrorism, border controls, and security screening are fused into the same conceptual category both in domestic speeches, such as the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and in international speeches such as at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, the idea of the Smart Border Declaration, a key document signed by the US and Canada in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, is built around securitized migration. The first pillar of the Declaration's action plan, entitled "The secure flow of people", undoubtedly links migration and security in a formal and perhaps enduring way:

"We will implement systems to collaborate in identifying security risks while expediting the flow of low risk travelers;
We will identify security threats before they arrive in North America through collaborative approaches to reviewing crew and passenger manifests, managing refugees, and visa policy coordination;
We will establish a secure system to allow low risk frequent travelers between our countries to move efficiently across the border."
A major change is brought, albeit in a subtle manner, to the general way the movement across borders is perceived. Indeed, the spectrum of security has significantly shrunk: either someone is a security “risk” or a “low risk” migrant. Tellingly, the category “not a risk” is totally absent from the document—as well as any conceptualization of the movement of people that is not from a “risk” or a “threat” perspective. From the very beginning, the migrant (and even the frequent traveler) is a security concern. In addition, it is important here to point out that since its signature in 2001, all Foreign Affairs’ Ministers have praised the success, the coherence, and the structure of the Smart Border Declaration.

Hence, in the particular context of the securitization of migration, a content analysis of speeches made by Ministers of Foreign affairs is tremendously informative. First, securitizing moves made by Minister Barbara McDougall are temporally connected in a systematic way with the initiation of the securitizing process; thereby, conferring to McDougall a particularly important role in the context of migration. Second, several Ministers of Foreign affairs have played a crucial role in the process throughout the years that this study covers. In recent years, John Manley (both pre and after 9/11) and Bill Graham pushed hard to securitize migration. Third, the analysis underscores the necessity of distinguishing the different individuals who have held the position of Minister of Foreign affairs. For example, Lloyd Axworthy has been more a de-securitizing force than a securitizing force.
4.1.3 Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration

My analysis of speeches made by Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration between 1989 and 2005 underscores the important role of this particular agent in the process of securitizing migration. It also highlights two critical junctures: the arrival of four boats of Chinese would-be-immigrants to British Columbia’s shores and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The role of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in initiating the securitization process is harder to evaluate as the entire collection of speeches by Minister Bernard Valcourt (Minister from April 1991 to November 1993) are closed to public. Notwithstanding, I was able to collect seven speeches in 1992 and two speeches in 1993 with the help of several archivists of Library and Archives Canada and a request under the Canadian Access to Information Act. Valcourt made no securitizing attempts either in 1992 or 1993, except to mention once the need to protect Canadian society from abusers of the immigration program. This gives us the following picture: Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration made almost no securitizing moves between 1989 and 1998. Therefore, it would be surprising to find strong, systematic, and repeated securitizing attempts by Valcourt in 1991 when his speeches will be fully open to public.

While there is no systematic securitizing move in the early years that the study covers, there have been increasing securitizing moves of late by the Ministers, as Figure 4.4 illustrates. To understand this rupture, it is important to trace back the evolution of Ministers’ speeches. Indeed, one of the most telling examples of the increasing securitization of migration is the way those who abuse the immigration system were
discursively presented throughout the years that this study covers. To be sure, the "abusers" of the immigration system have always been a key concern for Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration; however, a change occurred in 1999. In the early 1990s, the rationale was a matter of control: it was important to focus on those who tried to abuse the Canadian system in order to justify the argument that a large intake of immigrants to the Canadian society would not jeopardize Canada's social cohesion. "The Canadian public", argued Bernard Valcourt in 1992, "will support open and generous immigration and refugee programs as long as they feel those programs are under control" (Valcourt 1992).

A few years later, the same logic was re-stated. Lucienne Robillard, who is often described as one the best Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration of the recent past, told the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, "to protect the integrity of our program, we cannot turn a blind eye to the minority that do not honour their commitments ... we are targeting the problem area: we are focusing on the small number of people who default" (Robillard 1998).

Up to this point, the focus on the "abusers" had no particular security lenses attached to it. Indeed, Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration had made almost no securitizing moves up until the summer of 1999. The cabinet shuffle of the summer of 1999 (naming Elinor Caplan as the new Minister) and two particular international events changed the dynamic.

While the Prime Minister made no securitizing moves on or shortly after the "Chinese Summer of 1999" – as we have seen in the previous section, Minister Caplan decided to interpret differently this exogenous shock. In one of her first speeches following the event,
Caplan kept the focus of Citizenship and Immigration Canada on the “abusers” while adding something new: a security component through the issue of detention.

“We know that if an accelerated process is part of the solution, so is an enhanced detention policy. ... We have already announced proposals to increase detention if a person is undocumented and uncooperative. ... We will take every action necessary to deal with the abuse of immigration and refugee processes” (Caplan 1999b).

**Figure 4.4  Speeches, Ministers of CIC, Canada, 1989-2005**

Note: The line represents the number of times migration was said to be a security concern for Canada, i.e. securitizing moves; the vertical filled column refers to one of the key year in the securitization process; “Chinese Summer” refers to the arrival of four boats Chinese would-be immigrants to British Columbia’s shores; IRPA stands for Immigration and Refugee Protection Act; CIPS stands for Canada International Policy Statement; the grey horizontal line indicates which political party was in power. Even though it is breaking to overall structure of how graphs of speeches are presented, I did not include “migration” in this particular graph because the Minister uses, evidently, the word so often that it would “hide” results for securitizing moves.
This official position was re-stated on several occasions in the following months (Caplan 2001b; 1999a; 2000a; b; 2001c; 1999c). Sometimes, the targeted group was clear: “Foreign nationals convicted of serious crimes. War criminals, terrorists, those posing risks to national security. I want them out of here. They are strictly inadmissible, and unwelcome.” Sometimes, the target was more diffuse: “how do we maintain a proper balance between our humanitarian objectives regarding newcomers and the need to maintain security in the face of global migration” (Caplan 2000c; d).

As well, a twist to the general argument was sometimes brought up. The Minister argued, occasionally, that the experience of the summer 1999 have lead her to consider detention as a human security—that is, in cases where the persons may themselves be at risk from the smugglers and the organized crime behind their journey (Caplan 2000b; 1999b).

While the arrivals of four boats in the summer of 1999 did initiate the linkage between migration and security, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 undoubtedly hardened both the linkage and the discourse associated with it. In one of the first speeches following the terrorist attacks, Caplan opts to send a strong message by powerfully linking migration and security:

“Canadians are looking to us for reassurance that we can protect their health and safety, and the security of our society. ... These begin with the welcome we offer to immigrants and the haven we provide for refugees from around the world. I am proud to say that this is very tough legislation for those who pose a threat to public security, and for those who do not respect our laws. ... We will crack down on criminals and security threats, and those who would abuse our laws” (Caplan 2001d).
Throughout the months following 9/11, the Minister kept pushing for the securitization of migration. "In my own portfolio—immigration—we have acted quickly and firmly to deal with threats against the safety and security of Canada and its neighbours", Caplan declared in November 2001. The Minister also applauds the introduction of a new permanent resident card, the enhancement of Canada’s security screening of refugee claimants, the increase capacity to detain and deport “those who pose a risk”, as well as the passing of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA). These measures “will allow us to protect our values and pursue the Canadian way together, in security and freedom from fear”, according to the Minister (Caplan 2001a).

The tone of securitizing moves considerably hardened with the arrival of Denis Coderre as the new Minister. Coderre told his audience in March 2003 that as the Minister responsible for one aspect of Canada’s security, he made sure his department has taken a number of measures to enhance security. Pointing out that “CIC have been operating within an intensified security framework since 9/11”, he adds that the “Canadian government is vigilantly assessing threats to national security. ... Canadians can be sure that we will do our utmost to ensure the nation’s security” (Coderre 2003d). Applauding measures such as the introduction of immediate and in-depth security checks for refugee claimants, the denial of access to the Canadian refugee determination process to those who would abuse it, and the systematic fingerprinting and photographing of all refugee claimants, Coderre pushes securitizing moves into two perceptible directions.

The first is to situate Citizenship and Immigration within a bigger, nearly global, process. “Canada today is entering a new world order”, according to Coderre, adding that
this “new world order” demands that all levels of government adopt new approaches to protecting the safety and security of all Canadians at home and abroad (Coderre 2003a). As such, Coderre insists that Citizenship and Immigration Canada “continues to find new ways to work cooperatively with other federal agencies, provincial and municipal governments and police forces. ... We are fully committed to protecting the safety and security of Canadians” (Coderre 2003c).

Second, Coderre places a strong emphasis on surveillance and monitoring through the use of biometrics and particularly the potentiality of an ID card. For Coderre, the introduction of a Canadian identity card is not a matter of “reacting to the US’, but rather an issue of “international security.” “Yes, it will prevent terrorism” further argued the Minister. For Coderre, biometrics will enhance border security and keep out security risks. In October 2003, he further contended that “document integrity is a fundamental way to help improve our personal and national security in an uncertain world. I know that improved document integrity is just one important component of our security strategies. It fits with our commitment to border protection, intelligence services, and screening by immigration officers at ports of entry into Canada and internationally” (Coderre 2003b).

In conclusion, a content analysis of speeches made by Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration highlights that several Ministers have made numerous securitizing moves. Elinor Caplan and Denis Coderre hold a particularly important role in the securitization of migration. While the arrivals of four boats in the summer of 1999 triggered these securitizing moves, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 undoubtedly hardened the discourse. However, one should note that the increasing frequency of securitizing moves—both in
number and intensity—happen before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In fact, 70 per cent of the securitizing moves made by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in 2001 were made before 9/11. Notwithstanding, the terrorist attacks dramatically altered the position of all Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration from Elinor Caplan onwards.
4.2 France

4.2.1 Presidents

In the particular context of this study, one of the first securitizing moves made by the President of the Republic was made in a discourse of June 18, 1994 on French foreign aid of the last thirty years, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. Francois Mitterand, toward the very end of his second mandate, advised Western countries’ leaders not to ignore tumultuous events unfolding in Africa because, with such a policy, we could observe “the proliferation of several types of disorder against which the atomic bomb would be useless: drugs, epidemic, erratic migratory movements, environmental problems” (Mitterand 1994b). We must convince ourselves, he adds, that “these dangers will not be limited to their countries of origin”. Nearly three months after the end of the Rwanda genocide, as well as the terrorist attacks in Paris in the summer of 1994, Mitterand reiterates his position in a speech on Africa’s democratization. “What a risk it is”, he told his audience, “to observe, with extreme poverty as background, the birth of plagues against which even the most hermetic border will never protect us: drugs, epidemics, erratic migratory movements, terrorism, and environment problems” (Mitterand 1994a)

Jacques Chirac, the newly elected President in May 1995, largely on the theme of the French insecurity and the need to remedy the situation, formulated a similar policy in the first year of his first mandate. In a speech before the US congress in January 1996, he warned his audience that massive immigration from poor countries was a risk for future generations. Neither accumulating arms nor creating useless barriers would ensure a
successful protection. Rather, "the best security today is solidarity" (Chirac 1996). Later the same year, Chirac argued that France had to understand the consequences of a new era in world politics. France's Department of Defence, he contends, was leading the path out of the woods by identifying novel, more diffused, and unpredictable threats to France; of which migration was listed along side the renewal of ethnic hatred and fanaticism.

**Figure 4.5  Speeches, Presidents, France, 1989-2005**

Note: The dashed line represents the number of times "migration" was mentioned in a speech; the solid line represents the number of times migration was said to be a security concern for France, i.e. securitizing moves; the vertical filled column refers to one of the key year in the securitization process; the first grey horizontal line indicates who was the President at a particular point in time; the second grey horizontal line indicates which political party was controlling the government; RPR stands for Rally for the Republic; UMP stands for Union for Popular Movement.
Contrary to a widespread perception, more than 85 per cent of the discursive linkages between migration and security made in 2001 were actually made *before* the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, two months after 9/11, Chirac was stressing the elements of continuity in the assessment of France’s national security. While the fight against terrorism certainly calls for an adaptation of France’s security system, declared Chirac, it did not provoke a profound revision of that system. “The main threats to the security of France remain the same. They did not change” (Chirac 2001b).

Furthermore, in an exchange with a journalist about the relationship between Europe’s and France’s security interests, Chirac insisted that France is fully aware of the existence of a number of dangers (expressed in terms of instability, migrations, and conflicts) at its borders. “Our interest is to neutralize these dangers that can carry many difficulties for France. In other words, Europe, in enlarging, is actually reinforcing its zone of security” (Chirac 2001a).

We observe a decrease in the link between migration and security immediately after the presidential election of April 2002, which Chirac won by a landslide against the controversial right-wing anti-immigrant Jean-Marie Le Pen. Moreover, Chirac re-affirmed his strong stance on the issue toward the end of his second mandate. Speaking to the French-German chamber of commerce in April 2005, he declared: “there are some domains in which Europe needs to give member states the opportunity to join forces.” One of these domains is “security, to fight illegal immigration networks, international terrorism, and organized crime” (Chirac 2005).
In sum, this analysis of Presidents' speeches since 1989 (449 speeches) invites two conclusions. The President appears to have had a relatively low influence on the process of securitizing migration; and the terrorist attacks on the United States were not a trigger effect in the particular context of this study. This finding suggests that the exogenous shock of 9/11 did not operate as an objective factor; rather, the President had to interpret the exogenous shock in one way or another along the migration-security nexus. He had to talk into existence his particular understanding of the implications of 9/11; the securitization of migration appears to have not been one of them.

4.2.2 Prime Ministers

Michel Rocard, Prime Minister from May 1988 to May 1991, holds a significant place in the story of securitizing migration attempts in France. Indeed, an analysis of the Prime Minister's speeches (801 speeches) reveals that the linkage between migration and security was first established in 1989, as Figure 4.6 shows. "Internal security of our country has its European dimension," he declared in Strasbourg on June 15, 1989, in relation with the Schengen Agreement. The transfer of some aspect of France's internal security to the European level is the trade-off of the free movement of people within country, members the audience were told. The objective is to provide "guarantee for both security and human rights" in this regard. "What would be the point of being rigorous in our foreign policy if European frontiers were open all the way down and if the free movement of people would be merged with the free movement of terrorists?" (Rocard 1989).
However, it is probably for his strong politicizing moves that Rocard is best remembered. In a speech where migratory pressures, especially labour migration, were presented as a fundamental problem requiring urgent measures, Rocard declared, “France is no longer an immigration country. I have said it and I am reaffirming here: We cannot welcome all the misery of the world” (Rocard 1990). This particularly strong standpoint was reiterated few months later, albeit with slightly different wording.

**Figure 4.6 Speeches, Prime Ministers, France, 1989-2005**

Note: The dashed line represents the number of times “migration” was mentioned in a speech; the solid line represents the number of times migration was said to be a security concern for France, i.e. securitizing moves; the vertical filled column refers to one of the key year in the securitization process; the first grey horizontal line indicates who was the President at a particular point in time; the second grey horizontal line indicates which political party was controlling the government; RPR stands for Rally for the Republic; UMP stands for Union for Popular Movement.
Rocard's successor as Socialist Prime Minister, Édith Cresson, made it clear that she intended to pursue a policy of continuity. In her first speech as Prime Minister, she argued that the central mission of the state is to guarantee the security of its citizens. She further contended, "it is true that a feeling of insecurity, individual and collective, is strong. These security expectations logically indicated the objectives [of the government]: the defence of our national interests, the fight against drugs, the full control of migratory flux, a neighbourhood-oriented police service" (Cresson 1991). In September 1991, she proposed to the surprise of many Socialists to organize charter flights to ensure (and speed up) the deportation of unwanted immigrants.

The Rally for the Republic (RPR--centre-right) won the legislative election of early 1993, producing what has been called the "cohabitation" (i.e. a Socialist President, François Mitterand, working with a centre-right parliament, headed by Édouard Balladur). This represents a fundamental turning point for the study of the securitization of migration in France. The Declaration of the general policy of Balladur's government was indeed unequivocal. "A coherent immigration policy firstly requires that irregular situations must be ended and that decisions of expulsion must be carried out with strength. ... However, applying the law is not enough; the law must be changed when it is no longer in line with the needs. Condition of entry of foreigners in France must be defined more strictly. France is an old nation which intends to remain itself" (Balladur 1993).

Such a strong stance on this issue was reiterated in different settings, which indicated the depth and strength of the position. For example, at the inauguration of the new headquarters of Paris' police forces, Balladur stated that the new headquarters constituted
a symbol of the political willingness to ensure the security of the French in a world filled with difficulties. Indeed, the new headquarters reflect the image of the security policy pursued by his government—that is, a sharp increase in identity control and in the control of immigration. In fact, Balladur's government was involved in a broader enterprise of recovery, of which a tougher stance on migration was a central aspect. The linkage between migration-security was in fact cast in an emergency, worst-case scenario type of reasoning. "We should be very careful. If we do not implement the necessary measures to fight clandestine immigration, then what is happening elsewhere would happen in France: the reactions of opinion would put principles to which we are profoundly attached in serious peril." Furthermore, according to the then-Prime Minister, the period was a matter of such grave concern, in fact "the most difficult period since the war", that the left and right divisions should be bridged.

The return of a Socialist government, under a new leadership, in the National Assembly in June 1997 did change the political-security agenda in the particular context of this study. In contrast with the harsh rhetoric of the previous centre-right government as well as the leftwing government of the early 1990s, Lionel Jospin, in its first Declaration of general policy, made it clear that his government was seeing migration from a rather different point of view. In fact, Jospin made no securitizing moves in his entire mandate as Prime Minister (five years), as Figure 4.6 shows.

One could argue that Jospin did not have to make a securitizing move since the previous government had already securitized migration. However, three elements indicate that such a conclusion appears to be erroneous.
First, Jospin’s government did indeed try to create a rupture in migration policy. “We will abrogate the Pasqua and Debré laws,”* mentions the Socialist party electoral platform. An intense debate about the reformulation of an immigration law was engaged, of which the Chevènement law, adopted on May 11, 1998, was the legislative outcome. The Chevènement law did not reject all the repressive dispositions included in the Pasqua and Debré laws, but certainly did bring some significant changes. According to Weil, the anti-immigrant discourses became so costly politically at that time that even the leader of the right and Jospin’s predecessor as Prime Minister, Alain Juppé, was starting to acknowledge that a consensus on immigration was in the making. “I admit that [Jospin’s government] has somewhat loosened things up on immigration issues”, said Juppé (quoted in Weil 2005:302).

Secondly, and more importantly in the context of this study, one observes a refusal to frame migration in a security setting. The new thinking is not just about legislative reformulations (and ‘old wine in new bottles’); rather it is about a profound change in the way migration issues are dealt with. Indeed, for Jospin, “those who preach the intolerance and the hatred of the Other exploit realities, such as misery, unemployment, personal and social insecurity, and manipulate representations such as the foreigner” (Jospin 1998). In consequences, they must be combated. Furthermore, at the very beginning of its mandate, Jospin asked Patrick Weil, one of the leading specialists on migration issues in France, to lead a team of thinkers and intellectuals to report on the current situation and to “propose simple, realistic, and human rules for the entry and the sojourn of foreigners” (Weil
2005:297). The report came out in July 1997 with 140 propositions touching on the right of asylum, family reunification, student migration, and so on (Weil 1997).

Thirdly, despite one of the most powerful opportunities to formulate securitizing, i.e. the terrorist attack of 9/11, Lionel Jospin made no speeches to that effect. In his speech that follows the attacks, Jospin does not mention once the word “migration” or its derivatives.

In fact, we have to wait until July 2003 (and the return of a centre-right government) to note a strong securitizing move. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, appointed Prime Minister by Chirac after the May 2002 legislative election, made a clear link between migration and security on the basis of criminality. In his speech in the National Assembly, Raffarin told the parliamentarians that since their first day in power, his government undertook to regain French confidence in the Republic by “insisting on what constitutes the core of the Republic: security for all. Security ... is the first liberty” (Raffarin 2003a). Praising his government for its tough stance on criminality, he then announced that his government would continue to work on this path when discussing two important texts: one on immigration and the other on the right of asylum. Two months later, Raffarin made an even clearer linkage. “[Others’] insecurities bring different difficulties. I am thinking of course here of important topics such as the European enlargement. We are asking ourselves: ‘How we will manage the migratory flux?’” (Raffarin 2003b).

Overall, the Prime Minister has played a strong role at the beginning of the securitization of migration, but a subtler role from the Jospin mandate onward. Tellingly, an analysis of Prime Minister Dominic de Villepin’s speeches during the civil unrest in
the fall of 2005 is enlightening. In these very intense four weeks—when three persons lost their lives, thousands of vehicles were burned, a state of emergency was declared, more than two hundred cities were affected, and the monetary damage was estimated at 200 million Euros—de Villepin was extremely careful, unlike the Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, not to merge and fuse together ethnicity, integration, poverty, youth, migration and security. No securitizing speech act was pronounced; most, if not all, of his declarations were on themes such as calmness and complexity (and the danger of reducing the crisis to one factor).

4.2.3 Ministers of Foreign Affairs

As my discourse analysis of Ministers of Foreign affairs’ speeches (738 speeches) reveals, migration has not been of a particular interest for successive Ministers since 1989. Except for the year 2003, Ministers of Foreign affairs have barely touched on the issue of migration, as Figure 4.7 illustrates. For the first ten years that this detailed analysis covers, migration has only been mentioned on average a little more than once a year. Unsurprisingly, given this clear lack of interest, securitizing moves have not been numerous. From 1989 to 2003, securitizing moves have been made only in 1995 and 1997; furthermore, the moves uttered in these two years have been relatively weak.
The strongest and clearest linkage between migration and security was made in June 2003 by then-Minister of Foreign affairs, Dominique de Villepin. Revisiting a few dispositions of the “Chevènement” law regarding asylum and refugee issues, de Villepin argued for the necessity of giving the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Person the entire responsibility of verifying that “asylum seekers did not constitute a threat to public order, public security or state security.”

He further argued: “it would not be responsible to ignore the security of our citizens when dealing with the
issue of asylum. We all know that international displacements could bring risks in terms of traffic and violence” (de Villepin 2003).

More recently, Philippe Douste-Blazy, in a speech on France’s foreign policy priorities and diplomatic action, has used terrorist attacks in Madrid and London to link migration and security, albeit indirectly. “And now security:” he declared, “our citizens need to know that Europe is capable of protecting them from the threat that is assailing us. More than ever we have to focus our efforts to reinforce our control at the frontiers, through biometric visas” (Douste-Blazy 2005).

A relative lack of securitizing moves does not forbid rather bleak rhetoric on the question, however. For instance, in an intervention in the French National Assembly, Hervé de Charette, Foreign affairs' Minister from May 1995 to May 1997, argued that it was up to France to take the particular dispositions and practices to make the Schengen Agreement ‘work’. “The Schengen Agreement should not be held responsible when our [the French] services do not conduct appropriate controls. In other words, it is up to us to start sweeping in front of our doors” (de Charette 1995).

In light of this detailed discourse analysis from 1989 to 2005, we can conclude that France’s Minister of Foreign affairs has not been a central securitizing actor in the context of migration. As one of our interviewees confirms: “the Department of Foreign Affairs, despite being involved at some point, has not been and remains a minor player in the process”. Indeed, every senior analyst/bureaucrat interviewed (from three departments: Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defence) have indicated that the Quai d’Orsay had played almost no role in the process of securitizing migration.
4.2.4 Ministers of the Interior

The Department of the Interior and Regional Development has five central missions: one of them is to “protect the population against risks and calamities of all kinds and against the consequences of an eventual conflict”. It is therefore not surprising to find several powerful securitizing speech acts in relation to migration made by numerous Ministers, as Figure 4.8 shows.

Three points stand out from an analysis of Ministers of the Interior’s speeches. First, security speech acts made by Ministers of the Interior are temporally connected with the beginning of the securitization process; thereby, rendering the minister a particularly influential securitizing agent in the context of this study. Whereas the Presidents and the Ministers of Foreign affairs made no securitizing moves in the early 1990s, the Ministers of the Interior made several securitizing moves, thereby, establishing a clear and important temporal connection between securitizing moves and the initiation of the securitization of migration in France.

As early as 1991 the Minister of the Interior Philippe Marchand made an important securitizing move. One of the four priorities of the national police, according to Marchand, is the control of migratory flux. “If immigration is not controlled”, he declared on 20 November, 1991, “it will become a destabilizing factor for our security. ... Uncontrolled migratory movement would be a threat against our fundamental national interests” (Marchand 1991). Marchand’s successor, Paul Quilès, further established the linkage between migration and security, as Figure 4.8 shows. Among members of the centre-left governments in power between 1989 and 2005, Quilès represents one of the
securitizing agents who made the most powerful and repeated securitizing moves in the context of migration. Furthermore, Charles Pasqua, the Minister of the Interior under the newly elected centre-right government of Édouard Balladur in 1993, solidified the role of the Minister of the Interior as the initiator of the process of securitizing migration, in making the themes of migration and security a central concern of its mandate.

Figure 4.8  Speeches, Ministers of the Interior, France, 1989-2005

Note: The line represents the number of times migration was said to be a security concern for France, i.e. securitizing moves; the vertical filled column refers to one of the key year in the securitization process; the upper grey horizontal line indicates who was the President at a particular point in time; the lower grey horizontal line indicates which political party was controlling the government; RPR stands for Rally for the Republic; UMP stands for Union for Popular Movement. Even though it is breaking to overall structure of how graphs of speeches are presented, I did not include “migration” in this particular graph because the Minister uses, evidently, the word so often that it would “hide” results for securitizing moves.
The second important element that stands out from an analysis of Ministers of the Interior’s speeches is the rationale behind securitizing moves: the initial and basic justification for making a securitizing move is the danger to France’s social cohesion that an uncontrolled movement of people represents. Indeed, from 1989 to 2002, the fundamental rationale behind the numerous securitizing moves is the notion of social cohesion. That is, the movement of people, if not controlled, would certainly lead to the explosion of France’s national cohesion.

While Philippe Marchand first elaborated this standpoint, Paul Quilès, Minister of the Interior from January 1992 to March 1993, established on firmer ground the rationale behind the securitization. “The strength of a country is also its social and territorial cohesion which are provided by its security.” Giving this, the Schengen Agreement must be applied, according to Quilès, in order to compensate the loss of security caused by the free movement of people.

Many ministers did reiterate this standpoint between 1991 and early 2002, incidentally, making the social cohesion the fundamental reason invoked by various ministers to try to legitimize the securitization of the movement of people. For instance, Charles Pasqua undoubtedly hardened the tone and the message; however, the rationale for the securitization is still cast in terms of social cohesion. In its first speech as minister, Pasqua declared, “clandestine immigration is a new phenomenon that we urgently need to combat if we do not want to see our national cohesion explode” (Pasqua 1994). Pasqua reiterated his position in several subsequent speeches; sometimes speaking in terms of loss of France’s identity, sometimes highlighting the necessity of protecting the “national
Charles Pasqua. In this speech in front of senior police officers (France's commissaires) on migration as a justification for the securitization of migration was undoubtedly period of 2002 onwards. One of the strongest advocates of the linkage between criminality introduced as early as 1993, Pasqua further contended in introducing his immigration law that the law constitutes the "last chance to save France's integration model", a law that had at its core the linkage between migration and security. Pasqua further contended in introducing his immigration law that the law constitutes the "last chance to save France's integration model", a law that had at its core the linkage between migration and security. Pasqua further contended in introducing his immigration law that the law constitutes the "last chance to save France's integration model", a law that had at its core the linkage between migration and security. Pasqua further contended in introducing his immigration law that the law constitutes the "last chance to save France's integration model", a law that had at its core the linkage between migration and security. Pasqua further contended in introducing his immigration law that the law constitutes the "last chance to save France's integration model", a law that had at its core the linkage between migration and security. Finally, the third crucial point that this study highlights is that elements of a profound insularity and potential problems. It outlines exclusion" (Vallet 2001).
May 10, 1993, Pasqua told them that “your priority will be to fight against two phenomena increasingly interconnected: drugs and clandestine immigration ... Clandestine immigration is a natural pond for delinquency” (Pasqua 1993a).

This strong and powerful linkage between criminality and migration finds an echo almost a decade later, with the nomination of Nicolas Sarkozy as Minister of the Interior. “The time of taboos is over” Sarkozy told his audience on September 2, 2002, “delinquency has taken new forms that we cannot ignored ... Aggressive mendacity and clandestine immigration ought to be dealt by giving the police a strong capability to act. ... We cannot fight against these plagues, which are the gangrene of everyday life of the French, by closing our eyes on their international dimension” (Sarkozy 2002). In another speech he made on the same day, Sarkozy made an even more powerful securitizing move in declaring that the success of a internal security policy was conditioned by the fight against clandestine immigration, organized crime, and terrorism. Sarkozy’s successor, Dominique de Villepin, has pursued a similar set of arguments, albeit in a less provocative way. “To reduce insecurity in a enduring way, we must tackle the core of the problem. That is the direction that I chose in fighting against drug trafficking, cyber criminality, and irregular immigration” (de Villepin 2004).

In fact, from 2002 onwards (that is from the so-called Sangatte crisis and the Saint-Denis’s church crisis in which immigrant families and sans-papiers had taken refuge onwards) clandestine or irregular immigration, delinquency, criminality, and drug trafficking are fused into the same conceptual category: as fundamental vectors of insecurity that need to be vigorously fought. By linking discursively these themes in such
a consistent way, Sarkozy and de Villepin have undoubtedly made powerful securitizing moves in the context of migration.

4.3 Conclusion

Summing up the evidence amassed in the previous pages allows me to explore how each political agent relates with the phenomenon of securitized migration described in Chapter 2. Drawing together the pattern of engagement of political agents under study is important because it provides a better understanding of the social mechanisms involved in the securitization of migration.

4.3.1 Temporal analysis

The first answer provided by drawing together the pattern of engagement of political agents is a temporal analysis, i.e. contrasting when the securitization of migration was initiated in the period under investigation with the result obtained for each political agent under study.

In Canada, the pattern is clear. Among the actors I examined, the role of the Minister of Foreign affairs is paramount in initiating the securitization process. Whereas Joe Clark (Minister of Foreign affairs from September 1984 to April 1991) made no securitizing moves in the last two years and a half of its mandate that this study covers, his successor Barbara McDougall (April 1991 to June 1993) made numerous and repeated securitizing moves in the crucial year of 1991, as well as in 1992 and 1993. McDougall has been very influential in initiating the process of securitizing migration in Canada.
While the securitization of migration could hardly have occurred without the Prime Minister engagement or tacit accord (given Canada's political system), my findings suggest that the Prime Minister has not been the key securitizing agent initiating the securitization process. Brian Mulroney made no securitizing attempt throughout the last four years of his mandate that this study covers. The first securitizing attempts were made by Prime Minister Kim Campbell during the fall 1993 federal election.

The role of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in initiating the securitization process is harder to evaluate as the entire collection of speeches by Minister Bernard Valcourt (Minister from April 1991 to November 1993) are closed to public. Yet, results, based on collected material, indicate that Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration made almost no securitizing moves between 1989 and 1998.

The temporal pattern is less clear in the case of France. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior are significant players in the early stage of the securitization process. Already in 1989, Prime Minister Michel Rocard was making securitizing moves; thereby he was setting the securitization process in motion. Of all the years that this study covers, the year 1990 contains the second most numerous securitizing attempts made by the Prime Minister; only 1993 saw more securitizing moves. Rocard's successor, Edith Cresson (Prime Minister from May 1991 to April 1992), pursued a policy of continuity in this regard, thereby, re-enforcing the role of the Prime Minister in initiating the securitization process.

1991-April 1992) and Paul Quilès (April 1992-March 1993) became strong and influential proponents early in the process. In terms of total securitizing moves made on a yearly basis, 1991 and 1992 are both within the top five of all the years that this study covers.

Whereas Rocard, Marchand, and Quilès had important roles early in the securitization process, Minister of Foreign affairs Roland Dumas and President François Mitterand were not key agents in initiating the process. Dumas made no securitizing moves throughout his mandate that this study covers (1989 to 1995); Mitterand made its first securitizing attempt only in 1994.

4.3.2 Comprehensive understanding

The second answer provided by drawing together the pattern of engagement of political agents is a comprehensive understanding of the role of each political agent throughout the years of this study (1989-2005). Here, the pattern in Canada is less clear than in France.

In Canada, neither Jean Chrétien nor Paul Martin (who together were in power for 13 of the 17 years that this study covers) made repeated and systematic securitizing moves in the context of migration. Figure 4.9 presents the evolution of securitizing moves across political agents between 1989 and 2005. To be sure, we observe a rise in the number of securitizing moves shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: more than 80 percent of all securitizing moves made in 2001 were actually made after 9/11. However, these securitizing attempts were not made on a systematic and repeated over time basis. As early as 2002, the number of securitizing attempts by the Prime Minister drops significantly. It has remained relatively low since.
Several Ministers of Foreign affairs have had an important role in the securitizing process. Ministers Barbara McDougall, John Manley (October 2000 to February 2002) and Bill Graham (February 2002 to July 2004) repeatedly and with fervour made securitizing moves in the context of migration. It important to note that there was a significant rise in the number of securitizing attempts by the Minister of Foreign affairs before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

However, the Department of Foreign Affairs has not spoken in a unified voice during the time period of my study. While Ministers McDougall, Manley and Graham have all been influential proponents of the securitization of migration, Lloyd Axworthy, during one of the longest terms as Minister of Foreign affairs in Canada’s history (from January
1996 to October 2000), has not supported the securitization of migration. In fact, Axworthy has been a de-securitizing agent in the context of migration, although a full narrative of his de-securitizing actions was not the purpose of this study.

Finally, ministers of Citizenship and Immigration Elinor Caplan and Denis Coderre were also key securitizing agents. The first Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to introduce a security component into how the movement of people should now be seen in Canada has been Elinor Caplan (Minister from August 1999 to January 2002). From Caplan's initial securitizing move onward, Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration have all been important agents in the securitization process. Denis Coderre (Minister from January 2002 to December 2003) undoubtedly hardened the tone and the message; thus, he is one of the Ministers mostly involved in the securitization process.

Furthermore, Figure 4.10 shows that “migration” and “security” are, perhaps unsurprisingly, the discursive turf of respectively Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration and Ministers of Foreign affairs. Indeed, Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration have talked about migration far more than the two other political agents (85 percent of the total results); similarly, Ministers of Foreign affairs have discussed issues of security considerably more often than Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration and Prime Ministers (70 percent of the total results). In addition, a distribution of all securitizing moves across political agents indicates a near equal distribution between Ministers of Foreign affairs and Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration. The former have made 40 percent of all securitizing moves; the latter, 41 percent.
In France, the pattern of engagement of each political agent with the phenomenon of securitized migration is clearer than in Canada. Ministers of the Interior are without a doubt central players in the securitization of migration, as Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 illustrate nicely. Ministers of the Interior have made sixty percent of all securitizing moves in the context of migration. Ministers Philippe Marchand (January 1991 to March 1992), Charles Pasqua (March 1993 to May 1995), Jean-Louis Debré (May 1995 to June 1997), and Nicolas Sarkozy (May 2002 to March 2004) have been the most influential Ministers in the securitization process. As Figure 4.11 also shows, the theme of security is a central concern for Ministers of the Interior.
Figure 4.11 Relative use of the words ‘migration’ and ‘security’ by political agents as well as distribution of all securitizing moves across political agents, France, 1989-2005

Prime Minister Édouard Balladur (March 1993 to May 1995) has also been an important securitizing agent in the context of migration. As Figure 4.12 shows, Balladur noticeably pushed for the securitization of migration in 1993: in fact, in the 26 months that he was Prime Minister, Balladur made 41 percent of all securitizing moves made by Prime Ministers between 1989 and 2005. However, the Prime Minister’s office has not spoken in a unified voice throughout the years that this study covers. Indeed, Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (June 1997 to May 2002) made it clear, in his first Declaration of general policy (1997), that his government was seeing migration from a rather different point of view. Not only did Jospin make no securitizing attempt throughout his government’s mandate, but he also pushed for the desecuritization of migration in many regards.
Presidents François Mitterand (1981-1995) and Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) have both made several securitizing attempts in the context of migration. Mitterand made his securitizing moves at the very end of its second mandate whereas Chirac made numerous securitizing attempts in the first two years of his first presidential mandate and shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However, their direct role in the securitization of migration appears to be relatively low.

Finally, no Minister of Foreign affairs has been an important agent in the securitization of migration. In fact, the total of securitizing moves made by all Ministers of Foreign
affairs represents only eight percent of all securitizing moves made by all political agents: a small figure when compared with Ministers of the Interior (60 percent).

Overall, the pattern of engagement of agents’ securitizing moves with the phenomenon of securitized migration has been relatively different in my two country cases, as Table 4.1 summarizes. In Canada, political agents from both Departments of Foreign Affairs and Citizenship and Immigration Canada have been at the heart of the securitizing process. In France, influential political agents have all been Ministers of the Interior, with the exception of one Prime Minister.

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<th>Table 4.1 Role of political agents in the securitization process</th>
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<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
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---: not applicable; important individual in brackets

Security is neither a fact of nature nor merely a question of material factors. In this Chapter, I have underscored that several securitizing agents have pushed for the securitization of migration. As well, I have described which political agents have attempted to present migration as a national security concern. I have also traced when and how political agents have made their securitizing moves. This is not to say that security
speech acts can alone successfully securitize migration. They are securitizing moves and as such, they are part of the "discourse production" phase of the securitization process.

My findings also point to an interesting question about securitizing moves and the three sequences of the securitization process—that is, discourse elaboration, discourse production, and discourse relation. Could a securitizing move be made "privately"? In other words, could a political agent make a securitizing move "unofficially" and away from public awareness? Such a possibility definitely exists. I would argue, however, that it falls into the discourse elaboration phase. I want to highlight two points in this context. First, these "private" securitizing moves will most likely aim at first to measure in what ways these moves would relate with elite audience. The goal would be to evaluate whether elite audience would facilitate or constrain these moves before making an official declaration or speech. I give special attention to this question in Chapter 6. Second, in a liberal democracy the discourse production phase is likely to be indispensable. At some point in time, migration will be discursively and "officially" presented as a security threat for security practices to be justified in the medium-long term. Securitizing agents precisely intend to do just that in the discourse production phase of the securitization process.

The next two chapters will further explore social constituents of the securitization process by analyzing the role of another agent (written media) and the role of exogenous shocks as well as domestic audiences.
Chapter 5 – Media, Migration, and Security:

An obvious link?
"[The press] may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about."
—Cohen, 1963

"Media are highly significant vectors of the link between migration and security"
—Interviewee 14; Department of Foreign Affairs, France, 2006

"Media are significant agents of the securitization of migration"
—Interviewee 1; Privy Council Office, Canada, 2005

This chapter further explores the social mechanisms involved in the securitization process started in the previous chapter by examining the role of a second category of agents: media agents. To do so, I investigate editorials, i.e. the “voice of the newspaper”, of two newspapers in each country case.

Similar to the objectives of the previous chapter on political agents, my aim in this chapter on media agents is threefold. First, I want to do a temporal analysis, i.e. to contrast when the securitization of migration was initiated in each respective country case in the period under investigation with when media agents of each country case made their securitizing. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 2, the early 1990s represent a fundamental critical juncture in my study of securitized migration in Canada and France, with the publication of Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities (1991) in Canada and the signing of the Dublin Convention (1990) in the case of France. Thus, I will highlight the pattern of engagement of each media agent with these respective critical junctures.

Second, I want to underline each media agent’s attempt (or lack thereof) to securitize migration between 1989 and 2005, i.e. to investigate how each editorial relates to the phenomenon of securitized migration.
Third, I want to examine a set of arguments often invoked but rarely unpacked, i.e. that media are influential actors in the securitization of migration. The argument is that media often if not always portray the movement of people as negative fostering a sense of threat and insecurity, thereby, arguing that the media bear a special responsibility in the securitization of migration. Several interviewees in both Canada and France ranked the media as a highly significant actor in the process of securitizing migration, as the aforementioned quotes illustrate.\(^9\) As well, some scholars impute at least partially the securitization of migration and the production of a "migration crisis" to mass media (Berman 2003; Hier and Greenberg 2002; Ibrahim 2005). Thus, rather than assuming that national newspapers function solely as transmitting belts of information, this study problematizes the role of editorialists of national newspapers in the social construction of the link between migration and security.

The chapter contains three sections. The first part focuses on the case of Canada, in which I analyze editorials of *The Globe and Mail* and *La Presse*. *The Globe and Mail* is a broadsheet English-language nationally distributed daily newspaper. With a weekly circulation of two million, it is Canada’s largest-circulation national newspaper (it calls itself "Canada’s National Newspaper"). The readership of *The Globe and Mail* includes intellectuals, policy makers, bureaucrats, politicians, and the general public. The newspaper has been generally supportive of the Liberal Party of Canada in the 1990s and early 2000s. *The Globe and Mail* is considered the winner of what has been called the "national newspaper war"; a war that has started with the launch of another English-
language national newspaper in 1998, the National Post. Since the National Post does not cover the entire time span of the present study, I have not included it in the study.

La Presse is a broadsheet French-language daily newspaper published in Montreal. Although La Presse is mostly distributed within the province of Quebec, the newspaper is distributed across Canada. La Presse is the largest-circulation newspaper in Quebec with a weekly circulation of a million and a half. The aimed-readership of La Presse is the general public, policy makers, bureaucrats, politicians. I opt for La Presse over Le Devoir, which aims for a more intellectual readership, because the weekly circulation of Le Devoir is significantly smaller (180,000) as well as minimaly distributed across Canada.

The second section concentrates on the case of France where I examine editorials of Le Monde and Le Figaro. Le Monde is one of France’s leading broadsheet daily newspapers with a weekly circulation of 2,400,000 copies. Le Monde is distributed throughout France, with a readership that includes intellectuals, policy makers, politicians, and the general public. Le Monde is often described as a centre-left newspaper and has generally been supportive of the Socialist Party.

Le Figaro is also a broadsheet French-language daily newspaper. With a weekly circulation of two million, Le Figaro is one of the largest newspapers in France. Le Figaro is considered a conservative newspaper and has generally been supportive of Jacques Chirac’s and Nicolas Sarkozy’s political parties.

For each of these newspapers, I counted on a yearly basis the number of editorials in which migration was the main topic. For example, when a new cabinet shuffle was discussed and the new minister in charge of the immigration portfolio was simply named,
I have not considered this as an editorial in which migration was the main topic. Then, I counted the number of securitizing moves—the number of times migration was said to be a security concern for the country under study. I also took note of the context in which the securitizing move was made and the rationale behind the move. Although these codifying procedures render feasible a statistical analysis to map out the evolution of migration interests and securitizing moves of each newspaper, a content analysis constitutes the primary method of investigation.

The concluding section of this chapter discusses the implication of my findings for the emergent field of research of studying the relationship between media, war, and security.

5.1 Canada

5.1.1 The Globe and Mail

"If there is anxiety to be suffered on account of the cultural changes immigration produces, it is the first-generation immigrants who have the greatest claim to it rather than Canadian society" —Editorial, The Globe and Mail, 1997

An analysis of editorials of The Globe and Mail establishes three points regarding the phenomenon of securitized migration. First, editorialists of The Globe and Mail have not been important securitizing agents at the beginning of the securitization process. Second, from 1989 until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, editorialists did not understand migration as a threat to Canada’s national identity. Third, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 constitute the source of a profound rupture in the way editorialists see the movement of people. In the next pages, I discuss these three points.
5.1.1.1 An agent involved at the beginning of the securitizing process?

One of the most important findings of an analysis of *The Globe and Mail*’s editorials from 1989 to 2005 is that editorialists appear to have not been key securitizing actors in initiating the process of securitizing migration. Indeed, a temporal disconnection is present between editorialists’ securitizing moves and the initiation of the securitizing process. While migration was put alongside weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation as security threats to Canada in 1991, *The Globe and Mail*’s editorialists made no systematic securitizing move in that period as Figure 5.1 illustrates.

In fact, one could argue that editorialists of *The Globe and Mail* worked more as de-securing agents than securitizing ones at the early stage of the securitization process. For example, in February 1989 Radio-Canada (Francophone national public television) aired a documentary called “Disparaître: The inevitable fate of North America’s French-speaking nation”\(^1\). The documentary argued that an increasing number of immigrants who do not speak either French or English would bring racial disharmony and, more importantly, would threaten the province of Quebec’s fundamental character. “Quebeckers”, the host of the show Lise Payette said, were “living dangerously.”
The Globe and Mail's editorial, entitled "The panic button", published in the following days was noticeably critical of the documentary. The editorial firstly contended that the documentary was not an isolated gesture; rather, it was part of general trend in Quebec (as an element of proof, the editorial brings in a quote from then-Premier Robert Bourassa, saying that a "deep feeling of insecurity" exists among francophones). The editorial then rejects both moves: "The danger with such tracts as Disparaître and the apocalyptic musings of politicians is that they promote a bunker mentality, marketing the unwarranted belief that the language and culture of French-speaking Quebeckers is seriously
threatened." "Insecurity on that scale" the editorials persists, would create a scare that "is not justified by the facts" (The Globe and Mail 1989).

Furthermore, while editorialists of The Globe and Mail made no systematic and repeated securitizing moves in the early 1990s, they also stayed away from perceiving immigration as a threat to Canada’s cultural identity. "If there is anxiety to be suffered on account of the cultural changes immigration produces, it is the first-generation immigrants who have the greatest claim to it rather than Canadian society." “It is their children”, the editorial continues, “who will be palpably different from them” (The Globe and Mail 1997).

Along the same lines, an editorial of 1998 notes, “the news that Toronto will in a few short months become a majority non-white city has been anticipated all decade long. ... The fear was that such a radical shift would spell social dislocation, ethnic tension and crime. Nothing of the sort happened. ... The big news story is how little of a news story this revolution is” (The Globe and Mail 1998). This pro-immigration stance was reiterated more recently. “This country is being transformed by waves of immigrants from the Far East, Africa and other distant points. Yet, there is scant evidence of the fear or anxiety that often accompanies rapid change. Canadians like what is happening to their country” (The Globe and Mail 2004a).

The recurrent praise of the Canadian immigration system also illustrates the continual refusal to conceptualize migrants as existential threats to Canadian society. “Canada’s immigration and refugee policy is among the world’s most liberal” contends a 1993 editorial (The Globe and Mail 1993). Several editorials mention the generosity of
Canada’s immigration system—“one of the most generous in the world”—as well as the idea that immigration enriches Canada, thereby making Canada a much more vibrant nation as a result.\textsuperscript{32}

In 2000, the editorial board of \textit{The Globe and Mail} went even a step further in rejecting a securitization of migration. The editorial of 31 January 2000 is worth quoting at some length.

"Fear of drugs, migrants and terrorists slipping into the U.S. from Canada has many Americans so twitchy that they are pressuring the Clinton administration to impose security measures on their neighbour to the north akin to those used along the border with Mexico. ... The prospect is daunting ... Since that degree of security [the high degree of security of the U.S.-Mexico border] has not stopped the flow of illegal migrants from Mexico into the U.S., it seems only reasonable to ask whether it is even possible to secure the Canadian border ... Even if it were possible, is it worth it? ... [F]utile attempts to inspect and track everybody and everything that crosses the border creates a problem instead of a solution" (\textit{The Globe and Mail} 2000).

In sum, editorialists of \textit{The Globe and Mail} made almost no securitizing moves in the context of migration between 1989 and 2001. It is not as though the opportunity to make securitizing moves did not exist. Following the considerable windows that constitute the so-called “1999 Chinese summer crisis”, editorials do promote repressive measures against migrants, but not under a security agenda. To be sure, the editorial of \textit{The Globe and Mail} “applaud[s] holding the migrants in detention until their cases can be decided” following the arrival of 599 would-be Chinese immigrants near Vancouver during the summer of 1999. However, they did not applaud the detention because Chinese would-be immigrants represent a serious national security threat. Rather, the detention of
immigrants was welcomed on the basis that “releasing the first group of them has been disastrous from a public-relations perspective” since it is widely assumed that they went underground in the United States to work off their debts to snakeheads in sweatshops or prostitution rings (The Globe and Mail 1999). Clearly, polishing the Canada-US relationship was a greater concern than the logic of securitization.

In fact, The Globe and Mail’s editorial position regarding the “Chinese Summer of 1999” nicely illustrates that this exogenous event did not drive securitization in an objective way. In order to become security concern, the “Chinese Summer” incident had to be read and interpreted as such. Evidence amassed in my analysis of The Globe and Mail’s editorials shows that editorialists have not interpreted this particular event as having national security implications.

Moreover, a refusal to securitize migration (at least in the pre-9/11 period) does not mean a refusal to politicize the issue – i.e. the process of taking an issue out of restricted networks and/or bureaucracies and bringing the issue into the public arena (Guiraudon 1998; Huysmans 2006). Migration is indeed a recurrent theme in The Globe and Mail’s editorials from 1989 to 2005, as Figure 5.1 shows. Migration constitutes the main topic of 11 editorials per year on average. Among the recurrent themes that The Globe and Mail’s editorials politicize, but do not securitize, are the category of immigrants, the discretionary power of the Minister, the refugee determination system, the economic contribution of immigrants, and so on. In many instances, the politicization has positive overtones. This does not mean that no harsh words were written or that no inconsiderate positions were
taken. For instance, one of the editorials urges, on economic grounds, that the Minister exclude prospective immigrants carrying the AIDS virus.\footnote{This example highlights the economic implications of immigration policies.}

Overall, pre-9/11 editorials not only reject, unequivocally, the securitization of migration, but they also constantly highlight the overwhelming contributions of migration to Canada. This is not to say that no editorials of *The Globe and Mail* argued for the securitization of migration between 1989 and 2005. The gist is that these securitizing moves were made after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

5.1.1.2 A profound rupture

We have to wait until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to see a clear rupture in *The Globe and Mail*’s editorials. In fact, we have to wait until the week after the terrorist attacks because the anti-securitization stance is even stronger than before in one of the editorials written shortly after the terrorist attacks. The editorial of September 19, 2001 argues that rewriting Canada’s immigration laws to keep any possible terrorist or agent far from Canadian shores is an unnecessary, unworkable, and undesirable reaction to 9/11. Changing immigration laws in order to try to block every possible terrorist agent is undesirable, according to the editorial, not only because such policies would be a fundamental redefinition of Canada’s values, but also because “any attempts to build a foolproof immigration system would only lead to a false sense of security.” In sum, it would be a “panicked reaction” to change hastily “an essential characteristic of Canadian society” (*The Globe and Mail* 2001b).

A first element of rupture appears three days later, i.e. on September 22, 2001. The editorial, while applauding the Canadian government’s effort to tighten border security
and “clamp down on loopholes in our immigration policy so that we don’t play an
unwitting role in a future disaster”, criticizes Canadian authorities for not going far
enough (The Globe and Mail 2001c). The editorial of September 29, 2001 pushes the
demand higher: “Canada faces the greatest threat to its security since the Second World
War”. Accordingly, “bringing our defences up to scratch will require more than the sort of
tinkering—locked cockpit doors, new security passes for some airport workers—that we
have seen from Ottawa so far. What is needed is wholesale rethinking of our security
policy, from defence to law enforcement to immigration. It must be sweeping and it must
be fast” (The Globe and Mail 2001d).

Further and more considerable elements of rupture came into sight in December 2001
and January 2002. The editorial of December 4, 2001 contends that few Canadians would
disagree with the announcement made in early December 2001 that Canada and the US
will cooperate to improve border and immigration security (the Smart Border
Declaration). “It is logical, even reassuring” the editorial argues, that both governments
will expand the use of police, customs and immigration enforcement teams. “Increased
security will benefit Canada as much as the United States. Not only will it detect
suspected terrorists, but it should find more criminals of every sort”. For the editorialist,
the only troubling aspect to the security plan “is the unilateral deployment of military
personnel to patrol the border” (The Globe and Mail 2001e). The editorial of January 12,
2002 discusses a possible federal cabinet shuffle. Elinor Caplan, then Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, has earned, according to the editorial, a one-way ticket to
the backbenches because “she is an ‘open door’ kind of liberal who appeared
philosophically uncomfortable with the law-and-order toughness Canadians were seeking after Sept. 11. She resisted amending Canada’s immigration legislation for too long this fall” (The Globe and Mail 2002).

All this represents a profound turnaround—if not a complete contradiction—of The Globe and Mail’s editorials regarding the migration-security nexus. Whereas securitizing the border was previously seen as unreasonable, unworthy, and creating a problem instead of offering a solution, the securitization of immigration was now “logical” and “reassuring”. Whereas rewriting Canada’s immigration laws were deemed an undesirable reaction to 9/11, a “sweeping” and a “wholesale rethinking” was now needed...and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration should loose her cabinet membership because she resisted rewriting Canada’s immigration laws. Whereas the prospect of security measures at the US-Canada border was previously “daunting”, it was now beneficial for both countries to increase security at the border. Whereas attempts to track everybody crossing the border were previously seen as “futile”, it was now assumed that the same attempts would be successful in detecting suspected terrorists and criminals. Whereas policies that intend to block every possible terrorist agent were previously characterized as a “panicked reaction” that would alter a fundamental aspect of Canadian society, it was now thought that being philosophically uncomfortable with the law-and-order toughness approach to immigration made you an “open door” minister.

Undoubtedly, the 9/11 effect explains much of the rupture. However, it does not explain everything, since editorialists wrote an important “anti-securitization” editorial the
week after the attacks. It might be that the significance of the terrorist attacks took some time to percolate or that the newspaper made a policy decision to change its stance.\textsuperscript{54}

However, the overall important conclusions of my investigation of \textit{The Globe and Mail}'s editorials are (1) that editorialists have not been important securitizing agents at the beginning of the securitizing process; (2) that editorialists have categorically refused to securitize migration between 1989 and early 2001; (3) and that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 created a profound rupture – if not a contradiction – in the editorial line of \textit{The Globe and Mail}.

5.1.2 \textit{La Presse}

“There are many people who swindle social security programs, others who defraud employment insurance: this is not a reason to place all welfare recipients or all workers under the responsibilities of the public security department. Why would we do that in the case of immigrants?”

—Editorial, \textit{La Presse}, 1993

An investigation of \textit{La Presse}'s editorials draws attention to three features of their stance regarding the migration-security nexus. First, editorialists have not been important securitizing agents at the beginning of the securitizing process (i.e. in the early 1990s). Second, editorialists have overall rejected the securitization of migration between 1989 and 2005. Third, while the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have shaken the established “anti-securitization” position of \textit{La Presse}'s editorialists, the attacks have not been the watershed event after which everything is built anew.
5.1.2.1 A securitizing actor?

In one of his last editorials before retiring from the editorial board of *La Presse*, Pierre Vennat wrote the only editorial associating immigrants with a lost of Quebec’s cultural identity, in the years that the study covers. “Those [immigrants] who will refuse to accept that in Quebec ‘it is in French that things are done’ will have to be redirected somewhere else” the editorialist contends in October 1989. The editorial entitled “Immigration and the survival of a francophone Quebec” argues that francophones’ anxiety toward immigration is fully legitimate because “it is provoked by the real threat that immigration, in the actual period, poses to the survival of a francophone Quebec” (Vennat 1989). Undoubtedly, this constitutes a strong securitizing move in the context of my study.

However, instead of representing *La Presse*’s editorial line over time this securitizing move turned out to be an idiosyncratic editorial, as Figure 5.2 illustrates. In fact, several editorials of *La Presse* written between 1989 and 2005 have rebutted, in a systematic way, the logic behind Vennat’s securitizing move.
For instance, the editorial of August 19, 1993 contends that Kim Campbell’s cabinet reshuffle and the transfer of many immigration responsibilities to a newly created department – the short-lived Department of Public Security – runs the risk to “exacerbate xenophobia and intolerance.” Since the sole purpose of the Department of Public Security is to track criminals of all sorts, Campbell’s move to associate migrants with criminals gives a false sentiment of control and order when the real target is a very thin portion of all migrants. “There are many people who swindle social security programs, others who defraud employment insurance: this is not a reason to place all welfare recipients or all
workers under the responsibilities of the public security department. Why would we do that in the case of immigrants?” (Gruda 1993b).

In December 1993, editorialist Agnès Gruda also argued, based on a study produced by the Conseil Supérieur de la Langue Française, that the new reality of Quebec negates the immigrant stereotype as a “cultural stealer”. “The study”, the editorialist notes approvingly, “actively refuses to comply with those who think that the best way to fight for the survival of French is to cultivate the fear of the Other” (Gruda 1993a).

Between 1996 and early 2001 (i.e. before 9/11), several editorials narrate case studies of the government’s decision to treat an immigrant as a dangerous criminal or refugee who, after having been deported, was tortured, and of situations where human rights considerations were not applied. These editorials argue that the government was clearly “paranoiac” with its security concerns, that it “cultivates a cult of hostility”, and that creating a security fortress is pointless from the beginning (Gruda 1996; 1999). Furthermore, in two editorials written a few months before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 Agnès Gruda contends that Canada holds a dual responsibility concerning refugees. Canadian authorities, by making it harder and harder for a refugee to be recognized as such, have created a system that invites internal abuses. Still, Canadian authorities, by closing its doors to refugees, are also partially responsible for the terrible travel conditions that many would-be immigrants are willing to accept. The more a rich country tries to build a fortress against the movement of people, the more it will induce organizations to go “illegal” and to organize less and less safe travel “arrangements” (Gruda 2001a; b).
Yet, one of the best illustrations that arguments going against Vennat’s point of view have become the established position on the issue is an editorial published ten years after Vennat’s. In October 1999, the Parti Québécois held its National Congress. The radical wing of the Party put forward propositions to the effect that immigration was largely responsible for the “decline” of the francophone, who would become a minority in Montreal within fifteen years; thereby, making immigrants a threat to “Québécois de souche”. To add to the controversy, the Party’s leader and Premier, Lucien Bouchard, somewhat concurred with the radicals’ position. Such a position brought a vitriolic reaction from *La Presse*’s editorialist, Alain Dubuc. To play the “Québécois de souche” against the others is “odious because it recreates ethnic cleavages. It is also stupid because the thirty percent of allophones do not constitute a homogenous group but a mosaic that includes several cultures and languages.” The editorialist went on to attack the minister in charge, accusing her of managing the linguistic file with fundamentalist inclinations “that do not correspond to the values of Francophones from Quebec”. Indeed, on this issue the minister is, “to use a French analogy, much closer to the Front National [of Jean Marie Le Pen] than to the Socialist Party”. In sum, the initiative of the Parti Québécois is “despicable” and “constitutes a twenty-five year step backward” (Dubuc 1999).

While an idiosyncratic editorial published in 1989 argued that francophones’ anxiety was legitimate because immigrants were a “real threat” to the survival of a francophone Quebec, several subsequent editorials have precisely attacked such sets of arguments by describing them as “odious” and “despicable”.
Similar to that of editorialist at *The Globe and Mail*, editorialists of *La Presse*’s refusal to securitize migration does not equate with the non-politicization of the issue – politicization of migration refers here to the process of taking an issue *out* of restricted networks and/or bureaucracies and bringing the issue *into* the public arena (Guiraudon 1998; Huysmans 2006). Migration is a recurrent theme in *La Presse*’s editorials from 1989 to 2005. As shown in Figure 5.2, migration is the main topic of more than nine editorials per year on average. The politicization of migration reaches a peak in with 1991, i.e. when the Quebec-Canada Accord on immigration was signed and at a time where the Mohammed Al-Mashat affair was making the headlines56.

Unlike *The Globe and Mail*, however, several editorialists of *La Presse*, between 1992 and 1994, have directly questioned the contributions of immigrants (Dubuc 1994a; b; 1993). *La Presse*’s editorialists politicize several topics such as the category of immigrants, the Quebec-Canada relationships concerning migration issues, and immigrants’ economic impact.

Among these politicized topics, the question of the refugee determination system is particularly revealing of politicization that did not lead to securitization. In a vitriolic and controversial editorial published in March 1992, *La Presse*’s editor-in-chief, Alain Dubuc, contends that refugee advocacy groups are responsible for portraying Canada as a closed and unjust country. Perhaps out of guilt, media have become “accomplice of that propaganda” by never denouncing the untruth and biased messages portrayed by these pressures groups. The focus of attention is more on idiosyncratic cases of rejection and arbitrary expulsion, which “by definition will [make people] cry”, than on giving due
recognition to Canadians and Quebeckers who are making efforts to open their doors to refugees by paying taxes and by adapting themselves to the cultural shock. For Dubuc, Canada "is too generous." The only winners of Canada’s strategy of "opening its arms and closing its eyes" are the swindlers. Hence, rethinking Canada’s position is crucial. To do so, a good starting point would be, according to the editorialist, to ask the following questions:

"Is it normal that the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ is applied even when the applicant’s narrative makes no sense? Is it normal that refugees waiting for their application to be processed have the right to obtain legal counselling, which constitutes an invitation to delay due process and to multiply claims? Is it normal that social security be automatically granted to refugees and that a refugee with a dubious claim can rent an apartment and work? Is it normal that an accepted refugee become automatically an immigrant when the right of asylum is temporary and should stop when the situation in the home country goes back to normal?" (Dubuc 1992a).

Obviously, the editorial provoked strong reactions especially from targeted advocacy groups. In his rejoinder to the “letters to the editor” that he received, the editorialist even goes a step further. "It is impossible to propose critical thinking on important issues such as refugees”, the editorialist insists, “without provoking mafias’ thunderous reaction, who seize the monopoly of truth.” The society needs to be able to count on an objective point of view regarding important topics argues the editorialist. However, non-governmental organizations such as refugee advocacy groups, are not objective because they are militant organizations and “the exigencies of [their] struggles has priority over the search for the truth.” Media are the only providers of objectivity. However, the media, in this particular case, have not been able to play their noble role, according to the editorialist, partly
because of the strength of the pressure from these non-governmental organizations. Hence, refugee advocacy groups “are largely responsible for the imperfections of the system” (Dubuc 1992b).

This is politicization at its highest level. Yet, no securitizing moves were made. *La Presse*’s editorialist, in his editorial as well as in its rejoinder, never casts the discussion in terms of security concerns for Canada or Quebec. The editorialist never brought the argument that migration constitutes an existential threat necessitating and justifying emergency measures, nor did he argue that migrants were vectors of fundamental loss to Canada’s identity. Rather, in the midst of the controversy are matters of principle and perceptions of reality. Certainly, one can easily debate the editorialist’s standpoint, notably his understanding of humanitarian concerns and the media’s objectivity. The point remains, however, that *La Presse*’s editorialist made no securitizing moves.

5.1.2.2 A partial fracture

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 will fracture the continuous rejection of the securitization of the movement of people. Indeed, 9/11 has hardened *La Presse*’s editorial point of view on the migration-security nexus. The terrorist attacks have made the balance between security and migration harder to assess, thus bringing its fair share of contradictions among editorials.

In one of the first editorials written after 9/11, the editorialist contends that it would be too easy, but wrong, to hold the Canadian refugee system partially accountable for the tragedy. However, the editorialist, while acknowledging that none of the terrorists who carried out the attacks were a refugee, also applauds the adoption of hardened refugee
admission measures (i.e. security checks imposed on all refugee claimants). In the face of the new reality provoked by 9/11, Katia Gagnon (2001a; 2001b) argues that these repressive measures against refugees answer “the legitimized demand of security by North-Americans” by establishing a “dense security net” ... as if refugees have been conducting the attacks.

Yet, one of the best illustrations of the blurring effect of 9/11 on the point of view of La Presse’s editorials is how editorialists have come to see the role of bureaucrats in managing the migration-security nexus. In April 2003, an editorial strongly criticized Canadian bureaucrats in charge of immigration and refugee issues for showing “a strong tendency to forget the poignant human tragedies behind their books of norms.” Bureaucrats ought not to focus solely on their role of security providers; they “should also let themselves be moved by the tragedies they are managing” (Gagnon 2003a). Four months later, the same editorialist took the opposite position. In the summer of 2003, six families who refused to go back to their countries of origin, arguing they would be persecuted and/or tortured if sent back, were in sanctuary in Canadian churches in a last resort move to stay in Canada. The ensuing editorial, published on August 9, 2003 was unequivocally hard. “To give the benefit of the doubt to every refugee who sought sanctuary in a church and who pretended to be victim of an injustice is unbearable”, the editorialist contends. “Canada has given itself rules to evaluate the veracity of each of 50,000 refugees claimants who knock on our door every year. These rules are clear and they are generous” (Gagnon 2003b). Hence, bureaucrats should simply apply these “clear and generous” rules that make their book of norms. While the previous editorial criticized
bureaucrats for opting for the security component of the relationship between migration and security, another editorial expressed disapproval of bureaucrats' decision of opting for the migration component.

In conclusion, my investigation of *La Presse*’s editorialists reveals: (1) that editorialists have not been important securitizing agents at the beginning of the securitizing process (in the early 1990s); (2) that editorialists have overall rejected the securitization of migration between 1989 and 2005; and (3) that while 9/11 has shaken the position of *La Presse*’s editorialists, the terrorist attacks have not been as influential on editorialists’ point of view as many would have presumed.
5.2 France

5.2.1 Le Monde

"France has a deep problem of relation with the Other, with the stranger"
—Editorial, Le Monde, 1997

My analysis of Le Monde’s editorials touching on the issue of migration between 1989 and 2005 establishes three points. First, editorialists of Le Monde have not been important securitizing agents in initiating the securitization of migration. Second, editorialists have not understood migration as an existential threat to France’s security for the entire period under study. In fact, Le Monde’s editorialists have repeatedly argued against the securitization of migration throughout the years that this study covers, as the next pages will demonstrate. Third, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a relatively small impact on editorialists’ position.

5.2.1.1 A securitizing actor?

One of the most important findings of my analysis of Le Monde’s editorials from 1989 to 2005 is that editorialists have not been key securitizing actors in initiating the securitization process. Indeed, Le Monde’s editorialists made no securitizing attempts in the early 1990s, which as we have seen in Chapter 2 constitutes a critical juncture in the study of securitized migration in France. While the vast majority of articles of the Dublin Convention (1990) elaborate and develop a strong security system to compensate the
“security lost” of the free movement of persons, editorialists made no securitizing moves at the particular point in time.

In fact and except for a rather ambiguous editorial published in 2002, Le Monde’s editorialists made no securitizing moves throughout the years that the study covers, as Figure 5.3 illustrates.

**Figure 5.3** Editorials, *Le Monde*, France, 1989-2005

Note: The dashed line represents the number of editorials in which migration was the main topic; the solid line represents the securitizing moves; the vertical filled column refers to one of the key year in the securitization process; the upper grey horizontal line indicates who was the President at a particular point in time; the lower grey horizontal line indicates which political party was controlling the government; RPR stands for Rally for the Republic; UMP stands for Union for Popular Movement; for comparison purposes, I have kept the same scale on the y-axis for all figures.
It is not, however, as though the opportunity did not exist. For example, the arrival, on February 17, 2001, of the freighter "East Sea" which deliberately run aground on a French Mediterranean beach carrying 900 Kurdish refugees resulted in a groundswell of emotion across France and could have easily induced a bold editorial to the effect that "uncontrolled" migration was jeopardizing France's security. Equally, the entry into force of the Pasqua law of 1993, the Debré law of 1996, or the Sarkozy law of 2003, have all created a good deal of political attention, as the Figure 5.3 illustrates. Nevertheless, editorialists of *Le Monde* wrote no securitizing moves. As such, one should note here that the "East Sea" crisis of 2001, for example, did not simply drive securitization in some objective, deterministic way. *Le Monde'*s editorialists had to interpret the crisis along the migration-security nexus; they opted not to understand this event in terms of a security concern for France.

In fact, my investigation of *Le Monde'*s editorials underscores a larger message: editorialists repeatedly aim at reorienting the ways in which the movement of people is seen in France. For instance, the editorial of November 8, 2003 argues that instead of perceiving the movement of people and the arrival of immigrants as a existential threat to its cultural identity, France should see migration as a "chance for plurality" (Le Monde 2003). An editorial published during the 1995 presidential election campaign opposing Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin wishes that both candidates "would not succumb to the temptation of opportunistic political discourse on clandestine immigration and security" (Le Monde 1995). Moreover, the general debate surrounding the Debré law of 1996 confirms, according to the editorial of December 21, 1996, that "the obsession of the
migratory risk nourishes a repressive spiral that has devastating effects for the nation-state". In the year that saw the unexpected appearance of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the runoff election against the incumbent Chirac, several editorials vigorously denounces the apparently winning combination of islam-immigration-insecurity. Equally, editorialists decry the “discourse of order” on the basis that it is producing a “social stigmatization” and that “police responses are short-sighted” (Le Monde 2001a; 2002a; b; c).

While editorialists clearly refuse to make a securitizing move in the context of migration, they also push for the desecuritization of migration on several occasions. Instead of accepting the “simple answers” provided by the culture of insecurity, one should understand and acknowledge the complexity of migration, argues Le Monde. Instead of limiting its response merely to the repressive aspect, the government should systematically give the preference to building a more balanced “social model”. Instead of seeing migration through “accountant lens” in which only “useful” migrants are looked for, France should open wider their perspectives (Le Monde 2001b; 1996; 1993a; b; 2004; 2005). “The heart has its arguments that reason must listen to”, the editorial of February 22, 2001 reminds its readership.

5.2.1.2 The effect of September 11, 2001?

The direct and immediate effects of the terrorist attacks are hard to identify in Le Monde’s editorials. While debates surrounding the Pasqua law (1993) and the Debré law (1996) constitute the main explanation for the rise in editorials that have migration as its main topic, the attacks of September 11 are not the central event with which migration is anchored in 2001 or 2002. Indeed, Le Monde’s editorialists rarely discuss the terrorist
attacks in conjunction with the migration in the weeks/months following the attacks. The presidential election and the European Summit held in Seville, Spain, in June 2002 are the two key issues associated with the rise of *Le Monde*’s number of editorials that have migration as the main topic.

Thus, the trigger effect of 9/11 appears to be considerably less significant on *Le Monde*’s editorialists than on editorialists of *The Globe and Mail* as we have seen in the previous section. The terrorist attacks have induced no significant change in *Le Monde*’s editorials.

In conclusion, my investigation of *Le Monde*’s editorials have demonstrated: (1) that *Le Monde*’s editorialists have not been important securitizing agents at the beginning of the securitizing process; (2) that editorialists have made no securitizing moves throughout the years that this study covers; (3) and that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a very limited impact on the editorial line of *Le Monde*.

5.2.2 *Le Figaro*

“In some areas, the number of immigrants is one-third more than citizens who really come from here; the integration in these areas could work in reverse. Our good Republic cannot resign itself to such permanent drifting.”


A thorough examination of the editorials published by *Le Figaro* is enlightening in three regards. First, *Le Figaro*’s editorialists have been important securitizing agents at the beginning of the securitization process. Second, editorialists made several securitizing moves throughout the years that this study covers, establishing themselves as important
securitizing agents. Third, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had almost no effect on editorialists’ position.

One of the most important findings of my investigation of Le Figaro’s editorials from 1989 to 2005 is that Le Figaro’s editorialists have been key securitizing agents in initiating the process of securitizing migration. Indeed, a temporal connection is present between editorialists’ securitizing moves and the beginning of the securitization process. As Figure 5.4 illustrates, Le Figaro’s editorialists made several securitizing moves in the early 1990s, which as we have seen in Chapter 2 constitutes a critical juncture in the study of securitized migration in France.

Indeed, as early as 1990 Le Figaro’s editorialists argued that “the phenomenon of immigration is currently de-structuralizing French society.” “We must suspend immigration”, warns an editor, “otherwise everything is possible: the country is one the verge of burning fiercely” In 1991, an editor was arguing that in France “11 per cent of the population were strangers. How can we be surprised that cities are sometimes burning?” In 1992, an editor contended that in the face of the immigration pressure French people were wondering about their identity and whether they had a future as a nation. (Giesbert 1990a; b; 1991a; Lambroschini 1992).
As well, *Le Figaro*’s editorialists have made several securitizing moves throughout the years that this study covers. Editorialists put forward two rationales for the securitization of migration. The first and most important argument is the fear of social explosion, which we found throughout the years covered by this study. In 1994, an editorialist was arguing that the “unity of the society” was seriously at risk of “social explosion.” Another editorial urges the governments to see the “problem” as “a new form of war”; then, praising the 1996 Pasqua laws as “un-attackable in its principles.” “We must urgently control the
migration flow – both legal and clandestine”, wrote an editorialist in 2005, “otherwise in fifteen years from now it is the children of the newly arrived immigrants who will put the suburb on fire.” If the migratory pressure is not controlled, it will imperatively become a “source of tensions threatening France’s social cohesion” argued another editorialist in January 2005 (Brézet 2005; Giesbert 1990a; b; 1991a; Lambroschini 1992; Marchetti 1995; Rebois 1996; Thréard 2005).

Another vector of the securitization of the movement of people for Le Figaro’s editorialists is the issue of numbers. The idea that France is facing a tremendously high level of migratory pressure has indeed been at the centre of many editorials. On several occasions, editorials raise the issue of mass movements of people, which they often deem as “un-stoppable” and bound to grow significantly in the near future, as a security concern for France. France is confronted with massive immigration in such a way that firmness will not be enough to control it: “the wave will never stop to grow”. In May 1990 the editorialist Franz-Olivier Giesbert, while recognizing that the proportion of foreign population in France at the beginning of the 1990s decade was the same as in 1926, argued “it is still too much, especially when we know that new waves of immigration are under way.” A year later, Giesbert was considering the same statistic dubious: “official statistics are telling us that the number of foreigners in France has been constant since 1982 and that the number is very similar to the 1931’s number. Bizarre. We should look into that more closely”, warned the editorialist as if these numbers were a manipulation. Similarly, not only should Western governments realize that the “demographic explosion of the Third World” is currently posing a threat to developed countries, but also this threat
requires “out of the ordinary measures” (Giesbert 1990a; 1991b; Rebois 1991; 1993; Rioufol 1996; Thréard 2005).

Sometimes the issue of numbers is not taken in absolute terms but rather in relative terms: “In some areas”, Georges Suffert wrote in 1997, “the number of immigrants is one-third more than the number of citizens who really come from here; the integration in these areas could work in reverse. Our good Republic cannot resign itself to such permanent drifting” (Suffert 1997). The same theme had an echo in 1990. “In areas where the immigrants are becoming a majority, it is the French people who are feeling excluded.” This is an unacceptable state of affairs requiring drastic measures (most notably stopping definitely some aspects of immigration), according to the editorialist (Marchetti 1990a).

A related finding concerns the sequential connection. As I hypothesized in Chapter 3, two roles are particularly important for media agents in the securitization of migration. Media agents can be initiators of the securitizing process (e.g. by making securitizing moves before political agents’ ones; thereby pressing elite audience to adopt a particular security policy and/or to prepare the ground for policy reforms) or they can be transmitting players in the securitization process (e.g. by cuing in on political agents’ securitizing moves after the fact).

In the context of this study, evidences suggest that Le Figaro’s editorialists have been active initiators in the securitization process. To be sure, editorialists often aimed at influencing the mass public. Notwithstanding, several editorials were prescribing to an elite audience what they ought to do in the context of the movement of people, as well as which position they should adopt. In fact, the particular role of Le Figaro’s editorialists is
best illustrated when their securitizing moves are juxtaposed with Ministers of the Interior’s securitizing moves at two critical points in the securitization of migration: the Pasqua law of 1993 and the Debré law of 1997.

In both cases, as Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show, editorialists formulated their securitizing moves shortly before Ministers of the Interior did. While the Pasqua law was introduced in August 1993 in the National Assembly, *Le Figaro’s* editorialists were making securitizing moves as early as April 1993 – a few days after Pasqua (and the new Balladur government) were sworn into power in March 1993. In May 1993, Xavier Marchetti was arguing that “the France’s national identity is at risk ... The government must start to tackle [immigration]; the mood of the nation is at stake” (Marchetti 1993). As Figure 5.5 illustrates, editorialists formulated almost all their securitizing moves before the Minister of the Interior started to make strong securitizing moves. The 1997 episode saw the unfolding of the same sequential connection. In August 1996 editorialists’ securitizing moves were made before the Debré law was introduced in the National Assembly and before Debré made his securitizing moves. As such, evidence suggests that editorialists’ securitizing moves were setting the tone for the Pasqua’s and Debré’s securitizing moves in the following months.
Figure 5.5  Securitizing Moves, *Le Figaro* and Minister of Interior, 1993

Figure 5.6  Securitizing Moves, *Le Figaro* and Minister of Interior, 1996-97
Le Figaro's securitizing moves also come with a high level of politicization of migration, politicization of migration refers here to the process of taking an issue out of restricted networks and/or bureaucracies and bringing the issue into the public arena (Guiraudon 1998; Huysmans 2006). Surely, the number of editorials with migration as the main topic is particularly important in the case of Le Figaro, as Figure 5.4 shows. Editorialists of Le Figaro have devoted on average more than six editorials per year; almost twice as many editorials than did Le Monde's editorialists.

However, what is the most surprising in this intense “interest” in migration from editorialists of Le Figaro is the near total absence of positive dispositions toward the issue of immigration. I have encountered a tiny portion of editorials where immigration or immigrants were discussed in positive terms. When the topic managed to reach the top of an editorialist’s agenda it was for its negative, dangerous, and threatening aspects. A clear sense of bitterness and aggressiveness towards the phenomenon of the movement of people is hard to miss. Negative stereotypes are often postulated as pure facts. In two editorials published on July 14 – France’s national holiday celebrating the storming of the Bastille in 1789 during the French Revolution – the editorialist Gérard Nirascou was particularly harsh. The two editorials, one published in 1997 the other in 2000, used almost the same formulation. Immigrants should realize that “to be French, it is not only receiving family allowances or unemployment indemnities, it is perhaps, one day, fulfilling one’s duty to give his life [for France]” … and that “to be French, it is not only to benefit from social programs, but it is also to participate in the history of a great nation” (Nirascou 1997; 2000). It is important to re-affirm this, according to Nirascou, because the
immigration “problem” is, at the dawn of the 21st century, of a particular acuity rarely seen in the history of France.

Furthermore, the word “problem” precedes immigration in most, if not all, editorials. For example, Georges Suffert in an editorial published in December 1997 argued that “immigration is a problem that touches every single French citizen”. In 1990 Xavier Marchetti was telling its readers that “we have to acknowledge that the problem of immigration, which is felt deeply in the people’s soul and which is a carrier of risks of all kinds, has been tossed away for too long.” The reiteration of the “problem of immigration” in Le Figaro’s editorials reached an apogee in November 2001 to explain the lack of national identity in youth immigrants. “Experts in falsification and apostles of repentance have not stopped in the last fifteen years to qualify France as a racist nation and to present colonization as an abject enterprise”, argued editorialist Alexis Brézet. “How, then, could youth living in suburbs”, he continued “wish to claim the French identity if France is shameful of her own identity? Why would they love a nation that does not love herself?” (Brézet 2001; Marchetti 1990b; Suffert 1997).

5.2.2.1 A 9/11 effect?

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have had almost no effect on Le Figaro’s editorialists, as Figure 5.4 underlines. None of the securitizing moves made in 2001 and 2002 has as its rationale the terrorist attacks. Some of these editorials discuss a disruptive event in a sport competition where immigrants had booed La Marseillaise (France’s national anthem); others discuss the European asylum policies or the results of Jean-Marie
Le Pen in the first round of the 2002 presidential election. Nevertheless, none of the securitizing moves by *Le Figaro*’s editorialists has a link with 9/11.

5.3 Conclusion

Five main conclusions stem from an analysis of the role of editorialists of four national newspapers in the securitization of migration. First, there is a clear temporal disconnection between the initiation of the securitization process and editorialists’ securitizing moves in three of the four newspaper sets of editorials studied. None of the editorials published by *The Globe and Mail*, by *La Presse*, and by *Le Monde* is temporally connected with the initiation of securitizing process, i.e. the early 1990s. Only the editorialists of *Le Figaro* made securitizing moves at a crucial time period.

Second, my analysis reveals that *La Presse*’s and *Le Monde*’s editorialists were not key securitizing actors in the particular context of this study; they made almost no securitizing moves in the context of migration. *The Globe and Mail*’s editorialists made repeated securitizing moves only after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. My analysis also shows that this is an altogether different picture in the case of *Le Figaro*. Editorialists of *Le Figaro* have made, systematically and repeatedly, several securitizing moves throughout the years that my study covers. Overall, the stance of *Le Figaro* is tied to its overall political and ideational inclinations. As such, *Le Figaro*’s editorialists have been securitizing agents that have looked to securitize migration. Interestingly, the interplay between *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* in the context of migration appears to constitute a securitizing-desecuritizing dynamic.
Third, I hypothesized in Chapter 3 that media agents could have two roles in the securitization process: initiators or transmitting players. In the case of *Le Figaro*’s editorialists, evidence suggests that they were initiators in two of the most important periods of the securitization process (the Pasqua and Debré laws). Results for *The Globe and Mail*, *La Presse*, and *Le Monde* lead to an interesting element in the present context. They have pushed for the desecuritization of migration on several occasions and throughout the years that my study covers; thereby, evidence suggest that they may have been initiators of the *desecuritization* process.

Fourth, the level of attention paid to migration has been significantly intense in Canada and France. As Table 5.1 shows, *The Globe and Mail* has published on average 11 editorials per year with migration as the main topic, whereas *La Presse* has published nine editorials. In France, *Le Figaro* has published six editorials per year, while *Le Monde* comes last with about four editorials per year with migration as the main topic.

Finally, the effects of 9/11 have been more important on *The Globe and Mail*’s editorialists than on the editorialists of the other three newspapers. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have created a profound rupture—if not a contradiction—in the editorial line of *The Globe and Mail*. While 9/11 has shaken the position of *La Presse*’s editorialists, the terrorist attacks have not been as influential on editorialists’ point of view as many would have presumed. In the case of France, the terrorist attacks have had almost no impact on the securitization of migration either on *Le Monde*’s or *Le Figaro*’s editorial line.
Table 5.1  Number of editorials with migration as the main topic, 1989-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>The Globe and Mail</th>
<th>La Presse</th>
<th>Le Monde</th>
<th>Le Figaro</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td><strong>11.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The broad category “media” is often deemed as being powerful actors in the securitization of migration. Some scholars argue that media bear a special responsibility in producing a “migration crisis” and in the securitization of migration in Western countries. As indicated by the epigraphs to this chapter, several senior analysts in Canada and in France have also ranked media as a highly significant actor in the process of securitizing migration. The argument is often presented with a high level of ubiquitousness. The argument is, however, rarely unpacked.

Yet, evidence amassed in this chapter suggests that the role of editorialists of two major newspapers in each case country case varies considerably within and across cases. Canada’s biggest national newspaper made securitization moves only following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; Canada's biggest francophone newspaper made almost no securitizing moves in the period under investigation. Similarly, editorialists of one of the biggest newspapers in France have not argued for the securitization of migration for the entire period that this study covers. Editorialists of Le Figaro are the only media agents that have made several securitizing moves in a forceful and repeated way.

A vast literature exists on the interplay of media, politics, and society that this study, although influenced by it, does not engage directly. Equally, my purpose was neither to problematize a specific aspect of media agenda-setting nor to demonstrate the existence of a Canadian or a French media agenda. Rather, the goals were to examine how two important national newspapers in each country situate themselves on the migration-security nexus through an analysis of the "voice of the newspaper", i.e. the editorial, and to assess their respective strength as securitizing actors. As such, I do not claim that my conclusions are equally valid for all sections of the same newspapers (front-page, photos, inside articles, columnists, etc.) or for all forms of media (radio, TV, Internet, etc.).

This chapter completes my investigation of social agents involved in the securitization of migration. As I argued in Chapter 3, agents make securitizing moves. These securitizing moves percolate and are constrained by the multifaceted contexts in which the agents interact. In the next chapter, I will turn my attention to these factors.
Chapter 6 – Contextual Factors
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, I seek to examine contextual factors involved in the securitization of migration. I want to describe the most important contextual factors enabling as well as constraining securitizing agents in their attempts to securitize migration in Canada and France. The general objective is to gain a better understanding of the social mechanisms involved in the securitization process. The second aim is to examine the role of these factors in explaining the variation in the level of securitized migration, i.e. between a weak securitization (Canada) and a strong securitization (France). As such, I assess for each factor whether it has any role in the securitization process and whether it provides guidance in explaining the variation in levels of securitization.

As I have detailed it in Chapter 3, I contend that the process of securitizing an issue involves three interrelated phases: discourse elaboration, discourse production, and discourse relation. Whereas I have empirically assessed the discourse production phase in Chapters 4 and 5, I focus on the discourse relation phase in this chapter.

Agents’ securitizing moves do not by themselves create successful securitization; they are merely attempts to securitize migration. In fact, securitizing moves percolate from the environment in which they are made; they are also constrained by the same factors.
Incidentally, agents' securitizing moves are to be analyzed within the context in which they have been made.\textsuperscript{60}

I analyze the role of two contextual factors in the securitization of migration: exogenous shocks and domestic audiences. The first exogenous shock that I study is the so-called the "refugee crisis of the 1990s". I consider the "refugee crisis" to be an enabling and facilitating force when a sudden and significant rise in the number of worldwide refugees is observed and, more importantly, when an important surge in the proportion of worldwide refugees accepted by my two country cases is seen.

In relation to the question of variation in the levels of securitization, I consider the "refugee crisis" to be a preponderant explanatory factor of the variation between a weak and a strong securitization of migration when the refugee pressure is significantly higher in the country case showing a strong securitization of migration. In turn, I consider the "refugee crisis" to have relatively no explanatory power on the question of variation when the refugee pressure is similar or when it points to the opposite direction of what my indicators of securitized migration have found (e.g. a higher refugee pressure in the country case that presents a weak securitized migration).

The second exogenous shock that I study is the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. I consider the terrorist attacks to be an enabling and facilitating factor if legislative branch of respective governments have passed laws specifically targeting the movement of people after the attacks. The terrorist attacks need to be at the heart of the rationale and justification for the adoption of the pieces of legislation.
Regarding the issue of variation in levels of securitized migration, I consider the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to be a preponderant explanatory factor when the effects of 9/11 are significantly higher in the country case showing a strong securitization of migration than in the country case displaying a weak securitization.

The last section of this chapter concentrates on domestic audiences. Distinguishing between elite audience and mass audience, I consider elite audience to be a constraining and limiting force when no major political parties’ manifestos have presented migration as a security concern and when pieces of legislation related to the securitization of migration were passed with difficulty or were almost defeated. In contrast, I consider elite audience to be an enabling and facilitating force when major political parties’ manifestos have presented migration as a security concern and when bills and laws concerning the securitization of migration sailed through Parliament. I consider mass audience to be a constraining and limiting force when several public opinion polls display respondents’ reserve and caution to see the movement of people as a security concern. In contrast, I consider mass audience to be an enabling and facilitating force when public opinion shows, in a systematic and repeated way over time, that the mass audience does see migration as a security concern.

The focus on the “refugee crisis of the early 1990s", the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and domestic audiences does not mean that they are the only contextual factors involved in the securitization process. The Canadian and French larger historical contexts, the “geographic” location of each country, the bombing of Air-India Flight 182 in 1985 in the case of Canada, and key judicial landmarks (for instance, the Singh case for Canada in
1985) are relevant contextual factors. However, these contextual factors were not considered as some of them fall outside of the years that my study covers (198-2005) and that I had to limit the range of material under investigation.

6.1 Exogenous shocks

Exogenous shocks refer to an event or a group of events that induce points of departure from established sociological, cultural, and political patterns. These contingent events offer to agents “windows of actions” for the transformation of social structures. To be sure, exogenous shocks do not function as an invisible hand provoking change in world politics. While some events possess considerably more power to provoke change than others do, the same event could induce change in one country and not in another one. None of these events objectively produce significant change in world politics. Rather, they constitute resources that are interpreted by and potentially acted upon (or not) by agents.

6.1.1 The “refugee crisis” of the early 1990s

A first exogenous shock that had a significant impact on the securitization of migration is the so-called “refugee crisis” of the early 1990s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, regional and civil wars resurfaced around the globe, inducing important migratory movements. The refugee streams resulted from the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan, as well as from the first Gulf war, ethnic strife in Rwanda, and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. In addition, the fall of the Berlin wall induced mass movements of people within Europe. While the number of refugees worldwide was nine million in 1984, it reaches a peak in 1992 with more than 18 million; i.e. an increase
of 100 percent in less than a decade (see Figure 6.1). It thus gave rise to all sorts of projections, scenarios, and arguments, such as the image of a wave of refugees, uncontrollable and unstoppable movement of people.

Figure 6.1  Number of refugees worldwide, 1980-2004

![Bar chart showing number of refugees worldwide from 1980 to 2004.]

Source: UNHCR

In the literature on the linkage between migration and security, rising numbers of refugees gave strength to Kaplan’s (1994) notion of “coming anarchy”, but also, and more importantly, to studies seeking to raise the profile of international migration in the eyes of security studies. Two of the most important works were Myron Weiner’s edited volume *International Migration and Security* (1993) and Gil Loescher’s Adelphi paper *Refugee Movements and International Security* (1992). The primary objective of both studies was to raise the issue of international migration as both potential cause and consequence of insecurity. The gist of their argument was that mass migrations and refugee movements could create domestic instability and threaten regional and international security; hence, security studies should pay close attention to the phenomenon.
While the surge in the total number of refugees worldwide reveals an important pattern, breaking down receiving states in categories is more enlightening in the present study. Indeed, it is not merely the increase in the absolute number of refugees per se that prompted governments to regard the movement of people with suspicion, but also the rising proportion of refugees attempting to enter developed countries at that particular point in time.

The estimated proportion of refugees in developed countries vs. worldwide refugees has significantly increased in recent years, going from about 15 percent in the late 1980s to 30 percent in 1996 (see Figure 6.2). Furthermore, while the total number of refugees has declined since the peak of 1992, the proportion of refugees accepted by the more developed countries has continued to increase. Since 1995, it has never gone below 25 per cent of worldwide refugees.

**Figure 6.2** Proportion of refugees in developed countries vs. worldwide refugees, 1980-2004

![Proportion of refugees in developed countries vs. worldwide refugees, 1980-2004](image_url)

Source: UNHCR
This trend in the movement of people had particularly important implications on the securitization of migration. Indeed, for many scholars the rise in numbers of refugees worldwide as well as the increasing refugee pressure on industrialized countries brought about a security-oriented understanding of the movement of people, which came to be interpreted as a national security issue. That is, mass migrations became not only a regional security concern in war torn areas but they were also socially constructed as a national security concern for Western states.

Studies have indeed argued that rising numbers of refugee movements in the early 1990s were at the heart of why Western countries started to see the movement of people through a security lens. As well, scholars have highlighted the repeated elision and confusion of migration categories – between refugees and migrants. A rising number of worldwide refugees, the increase in “refugee pressure” on developed countries, large-scale movements of people, were often fused together into one broader category, viz. the mass movements of people.

For instance, Georges Vernez (1996:2), Director of the Centre for Research on Immigration Policy at RAND, highlights that the perception that the movement of people poses a security threat to Western nations was “fuelled by steady increases in migration flows to Western countries.” Reg Whitaker (1998:414-415, emphasis in original) also points out that in the early 1990s the refugee has been “reconstructed in the dominant state discourses as an object of fear .... At worst, the refugee is criminalized or politicized as a threat to order .... Images are invoked of tidal waves of refugee movements threatening to engulf and overwhelm the host country, if not checked.” Several rationales were advanced
to sustain the linkage between migration and security in the early 1990s but one of the most important, as Whitaker notes (1998:422), was the image of “apocalyptic threat of desperate, hungry human tidal wave washing relentlessly westward.” While Whitaker was writing mainly about the Canadian context, Boswell finds similar conclusions in the European context. She notes that rising numbers of asylum seekers “have fed alarmist tendencies [which] reinforce the notion that Europe is being flooded with migrants from poorer regions” (Boswell 2006:98). Similarly, van Selm (2000; 2003) argues that fear of massive movements of people – notably but not limited to the images of hundreds of thousands of East Germans heading through Hungary and Czechoslovakia towards Western European countries – fuelled fears of yet more massive displacements which in turn have set in motion concerns about insecurity. Miller (1997) as well as Keely and Russell (1994) also argue that the perception of “large-scale immigration, including refugees” was provoking major security concerns for European governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. “All in all”, concludes Robinson (1998:84-85), “the 1990s have seen migration and the threats which are perceived to be associated with it take on a much higher profile.” For Robinson, not only are many countries in the West practising “exclusion and discouragement based on the fear of inundation”, but the fact that refugees were perceived to threaten national security led to the implementation and/or the reinforcement of repatriation policies. In turn, “repatriation (either organized or spontaneous) was undoubtedly seen as one of the main solutions to the refugee crisis of the early 1990s.”
My analysis of agents’ speeches does point in the same direction. In Canada, mass movements of people have indeed been a key concern for political agents under study. Barbara McDougall, then-Minister of Foreign affairs, spoke of the threat of “mass migration” on a number of occasions. In an address given in January 1992 to the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, she identified cooperative security as a fundamental factor “apt to reduce the threat of mass migrations.” A few months later, McDougall reinforced that a security dialogue between countries to deal with the movement of people was needed. The securitization of migration was later reaffirmed in a domestic address. At the official opening of the Canadian Foreign Service Institute in Ottawa, the Minister told the audience “the challenges of our foreign services are increasingly complex and diverse. Mass movements of populations ... have changed forever the way our immigration officers work. The work they do is crucial to the well-being and long-term security of all Canadians” (McDougall 1992a; b). Prime Minister Kim Campbell also spoke about the “inescapable” connections between “population flows” and “fundamental sources of insecurity” (Campbell 1993).

In France, the effects were if anything more intense and more direct on agents’ speeches. Indeed, key political agents jumped on this issue to push their agenda. In June 1991, Jacques Chirac, then Mayor of Paris, complained about the smell and the noise of immigrants, as the epigraph of Chapter 4 illustrates. Few weeks later, Prime Minister Edith Cresson publicly introduced the idea of organizing charter flights to ensure (and speed up) the deportation of unwanted immigrants; an idea that did not sit well with her fellow Socialists. In September 1991, former President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing warned
the French of the “invasion” of immigrants. As Alec Hargreaves (2001:29) puts it in a piece written before the 2002 presidential election, “shortly after this series of highly publicized statements, support for Le Pen’s ideas hit an all-time high, despite the fact that the FN leader has been largely out of the limelight during the preceding months”.

As well, we saw in Chapter 4 that controlling the migration flux was the focus of numerous securitizing moves made by Interior Ministers. “If immigration is not controlled”, Socialist Interior Minister Philippe Marchand declared in 1991, “it will become a destabilizing factor for our security. ... Uncontrolled migratory movement would be a threat against our fundamental national interests” (Marchand 1991). Marchand also stated that more considerable migration flux might come posing greater security challenges and, as such, these flux had to be controlled.

The impact is perhaps best illustrated with *Le Figaro*'s editorialists. The idea that France is facing a tremendously high level of migratory pressure has indeed been at the centre of many editorials. On several occasions in the early 1990s, editorialists raise the issue of mass movements of people as a security concern for France; migratory flux are often deemed as “un-stoppable” and bounded to grow significantly in the near future. “The migration pressure won’t stop overnight”, concluded an editorialist. In May 1990, an editorialist, while recognizing that the proportion of foreign population in France at the beginning of the 1990s decade was the same as in 1926, argued “it is still too much, especially when we know that new waves of immigration are under way.” The perception of waves and un-stoppable movements of people was strongly established (Giesbert 1990a; 1991a; Rebois 1991; 1993).
In sum, mass movements of people and the increasing "refugee pressure" on industrialized countries have been socially constructed as having security implications for Western states in general and for Canada and France in the particular context of my study. This is not to say that numbers about refugee movements were not accurate. Rather, the point is that numbers are only numbers; they do not operate in an objective way on the securitization of migration. Refugee movements had to be read and interpreted as having national security implications for them to have some. A constructivist perspective postulates that an exogenous shock only acquires security meaning if it is interpreted as such. Evidence amassed here suggests that the "refugee crisis" of the early 1990s was constructed as having security implications; as such, this exogenous shock appears to be a component of the social mechanisms involved in the securitization process.

As regards the second question driving this study – the variation in levels of securitized migration, the "refugee crisis" of the 1990s offers little guidance to explain the variation between a weak securitization of migration (Canada) and a strong securitization of migration (France).

Yet, the hypothesis that rising numbers of asylum seekers explains much of the variation in levels of securitized migration seems, at first, convincing. Indeed, when the numbers of asylum seekers is compared on an annual basis, the "refugee pressure" is quite stronger in France than in Canada, especially between 1989 and 1991 as Figure 6.3 illustrates. It would then be logical to observe a stronger securitization of migration in the country where the "refugee pressure" is the higher. This would indeed provide a simple and convincing explanation to the question of variation in levels of securitized migration.
However, the reality is more complex. First, the inflow of asylum seekers is, in some years, higher in Canada than in France. Second, when the ratio of the total number of asylum seekers is calculated on total population of each country, results point in the opposite direction. Indeed, Figure 6.4 shows that the percentage of asylum seekers in total population is significantly higher in the case of Canada than in France. For all the years that my study covers, the average percentage of asylum seekers in relation to total population in Canada (with 0.103 per cent) is more than 50 per cent higher than in France (with 0.067). Moreover, the lowest point in the percentage of asylum seekers in total population in Canada (in 2005) is more than 100 per cent higher than the lowest point in France (in 1996), and the highest point in Canada (in 1989) is about 25 per cent higher than the highest point in France (in 1989).
Furthermore, an important trend is discernible when the number of worldwide refugees is juxtaposed with the percentage of asylum seekers in total population, as shown by comparing Figures 6.1 and 6.4. While the number of worldwide refugees is increasing at a rapid pace between 1989 and 1992, reaching a record high of 18 million in 1992, the percentage of asylum seekers in total population is fast decreasing in France. From 0.107 per cent in 1989, the percentage of asylum seekers in total population in France decreases to reach 0.051 per cent in 1992, a more than 50 per cent decrease in only four years. Numbers for Canada show a small decline in 1991, but a marked rise in 1992 to reach one of the highest percentages of the years studied. Actually, the 1991’s point in the case of Canada is 10 per cent higher than the highest point in the case of France (in 1989). The most important difference is found in 1992 when the percentage of asylum seekers in total population is 150 per cent higher in Canada than in France.
In sum, the "refugee pressure" appears to be an incomplete hypothesis in order to answer the second question driving this study, i.e. how to account for the variation in the level of securitization of migration found between Canada and France.

6.1.2 The terrorist attacks of 9/11

Another exogenous shock relevant in the context of this study is the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Several scholars have highlighted the impact of 9/11 on the migration-security nexus; studies underline an increase in security practices such as detention, fingerprinting, interdiction, and an increase in the use of biometric technology to identify potential threats in a post-9/11 world (Alexseev 2005; Andreas and Biersteker 2003; Faist 2004; Kruger et al. 2004; Rudolph 2006; Tirman 2004).

To be sure, the view that the movement of people might have implications for security was established long before the events of 11 September. Indeed, several enforcement measures structuring the migration-security nexus were actually developed and implemented before the attacks. For example, deportations and removals for security reasons existed before both in Canada and in France; speech acts securitizing migration were made before the terrorist attacks; and migration was listed as a national security concern in key official documents of the department in charge of foreign affairs and/or immigration before 9/11. In Canada, Bill C-11: The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act contains clauses related to the securitization of migration, such as provisions for condensing the security certificate protection procedure. These clauses were drafted before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 though the bill received Royal Assent on 1 November 2001 (Adelman 2002; Crépeau and Nakache 2006; Lyon 2006).
Yet, the attacks of 9/11 appear to have had a significant impact on the securitization of migration in Canada. In December 2001, Canada and the US signed an agreement to tighten asylum procedures. Under the new procedures, foreigners will have to seek asylum in the first country they reach, thus ending the current pattern, in which 60 percent of asylum seekers in Canada arrive from the US. If a refugee claim is denied in the US, Canada will also deny asylum. The agreement is credited with reducing the number of asylum seekers who cross the US-Canadian border and file a refugee claim by 55 percent in 2005, according to a review of the Safe Third Country Agreement (Migration Dialogue 2002; 2005; 2007). The terrorist attacks brought about, for instance, the creation of a new security agency, the Canadian Border Service Agency, of the Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration, and of the Canadian Passenger Analysis Units – an advance passengers information system to predetermine whether anyone on an air flight is cause for concern. Although several clauses of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act were written before 9/11, the attacks undoubtedly gave an opportunity to harden the tone (Adelman 2004; Reitz 2004). The legislation “expedites the removal of people who are deemed to be security threats, imposes harsher penalties for migrant smuggling, and limits access to the Canadian refugee determination process” (Kruger et al. 2004:77).

As well, my evidence suggests that the linkage between migration and security became especially acute after 9/11 in several agents’ discourses. As we have seen in Chapter 4, immigration, security, terrorism, border controls, and security screening are fused into the same conceptual category in the Canadian Minister of Foreign affairs, John Manley. We also have seen that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 undoubtedly hardened
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Elinor Caplan’s securitizing moves. In one of the first speeches following the terrorist attacks, Caplan indeed argued that Canadians are looking to their government for reassurance that it can protect Canadian society. This begins “with the welcome we offer to immigrants and the haven we provide for refugees from around the world. ... We will crack down on criminals and security threats, and those who would abuse our laws” (Caplan 2001d). Throughout the months following 9/11, the Minister kept pushing for the securitization of migration. Caplan’s successor, Denis Coderre, also used the terrorist attacks as a rational for the securitization of migration. He applauds security measures such as the introduction of immediate and in-depth security checks for refugee claimants, and the systematic fingerprinting and photographing of all refugee claimants.

I have also demonstrated the considerable impact of 9/11 on The Globe and Mail’s editorial line; in fact, a profound turnaround in their position regarding the securitization of migration. I have shown that, pre-9/11, editorialists saw the securitization of migration as unreasonable, unworthy, and creating a problem instead of offering a solution. In contrast, editorials post-9/11 were arguing that the securitization of migration was logical, reassuring, and that a sweep and wholesale rethinking of Canada’s immigration laws was needed. In the case of La Presse’s editorialists, I have highlighted that the terrorist attacks have shaken editorialists’ position on the migration-security nexus.

In France, my results suggest that the “9/11 effect” has had a more limited impact. To be sure, an increase in restrictionist and repressive measures is observed: additional officers (about 750) were deployed to patrol France’s borders, increased ID checks and
forcible deportation were observed, and weekly charter flights were started in March 2003 to return illegal migrants. Similarly, the Sarkozy law, which increases the number of days migrants can be held in detention from 12 to 32 days, was passed in 2003. The law is also requiring applicants for three-month tourist visas to be fingerprinted – a measure that aims at stopping the practice of destroying documents after arrival, which makes removal difficult because the identity of the migrant cannot be proven (Migration Dialogue 2003).

However, the impact appears to be less significant in France than in Canada. Detailed analyses of France immigration policy of the past decades reveal that no sign of major reversing policies were observed after 2001 and that no fundamental transformation has been undergone (Hollifield 2004; Rudolph 2006). As well, the terrorist attacks have had a limited impact on all political agents’ speeches studied in my research. President Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and Interior Minister Sarkozy did not employ the terrorist attacks to push for the securitization of migration. Indeed, two months after 9/11, Chirac was stressing the elements of continuity in the assessment of France’s national security as we saw in Chapter 4. Likewise, even though Sarkozy made securitizing moves after 9/11, he did not justify his moves on the basis the terrorist attacks, but rather in terms of domestic politics.

A comparative look at speeches made by Canada’s Prime Ministers and France’s Presidents is very instructive in this regard, as Figure 6.5 illustrates. Whereas the terrorist attacks had a clear influence on securitizing moves made by the Prime Minister of Canada, the impact was significantly less important on securitizing moves made by the
President of the French Republic. The gap is even wider when the Prime Minister of France is included as he made no securitizing moves in 2001.

Figure 6.5 Securitizing moves, Prime Ministers and President, 1997-2005

Regarding the impact of 9/11 on editorialists of *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, I have shown that the attacks of September 11 are not the central event with which migration is anchored in 2001 or 2002 in respective editorials. Indeed, *Le Monde*’s editorialists rarely discuss the terrorist attacks in conjunction with the migration in the weeks/months following the attacks. Similarly, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have had almost no effect on *Le Figaro*’s editorialists: none of the securitizing moves made in 2001 and 2002 has as its rationale the terrorist attacks.

A comparison of the attacks’ impact on editorialists’ position of respective newspapers is equally informative. Figure 6.6 shows that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have brought several securitizing moves by *The Globe and Mail*. In France, the terrorist
attacks have had almost no impact on the securitization of migration either on *Le Monde’s* or *Le Figaro’s* editorial line.

The important conclusion that these results suggest is that the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the migration-security nexus have been interpreted in a substantively different way in Canada than in France. The terrorist attacks have not operated in an objective, deterministic way on the securitization of migration; the securitization of migration is not simply an objective reaction to major external events. Rather, the securitization of migration is a project under construction in which exogenous shocks such as 9/11 have to be read and interpreted as having security implications for them to have some. Exogenous shocks only acquire security meaning in the context of migration if agents interpret these attacks accordingly. Evidence amassed in my study suggests that there was some variation in the interpretation. On one hand, the attacks have...
modulated several aspects of the securitization of migration and have served as a justification for many security practices touching migrants in Canada. On the other hand, the attacks have not been a shattering, trigger event transforming established practices in the context of migration in France.

Regarding the second central question of my study – variation between a weak securitization (Canada) and a strong securitization (France), the terrorist attacks of 9/11 appear to offer little guidance. To be sure, the effects of the attacks have been unequal: evidence suggests that they had a bigger impact in Canada than in France. As such, if 9/11 was a crucial factor explaining the variation of securitized migration, then we should observe a stronger securitized migration in Canada than in France. Yet, we observe the opposite: a weak securitized migration in Canada and a strong securitized migration in France.

6.2 Domestic audiences

As described in Chapter 3, I propose to disaggregate domestic audiences and to distinguish between mass audience and elite audience. Mass audience refers to “the people” that politicians aim to represent, i.e. the general population. Elite audience refers to major political parties’ establishment, members of the executive power of a state, and elected members of Parliament.

Even when the audience is subdivided into more circumscribed elements, there is still significant obstacles to operationalize a disaggregated audience. I draw on three principal sources to track down how audiences shape the securitization process. In regards to elite audience, I analyze along the migration-security nexus: (1) the manifestos from the main
federal political parties in Canada as well as the most important presidential candidates in France; and (2) the legislative record in each country case. Thirdly, to track down mass audience's role in the securitization process, I analyze public opinion. Ideally, public opinion on immigration should be put in some historic context to counter the volatility of an analysis based on idiosyncratic measurement. Without situating public opinion in time we have no reference through which to determine whether a profound change happens or continuity is what drives the thinking about a given issue. As well, it is crucial to look at this issue *over time* because the nature of mass audience’s involvement is not static. A mass audience could have been a constraining force in the past while it constitutes a facilitating force in a more recent period, or vice-versa. In order to evaluate whether there has been rupture or continuity in mass audience’s involvement, my analysis needs to be carried out over a relatively long period of time. As such, when it was possible, I have situated all measurements of public opinion in historical context, and I have also relied directly on primary data from pollsters instead of distilling the information from media sources.²

To be sure, none of these proxies—electoral platforms, Parliament’s decisions, and public opinion—can alone assess and measure the role of audiences. Nevertheless, I argue that when they are grouped together to form an aggregate these proxies constitute powerful tools for understanding how audiences shape the securitization process.
6.2.1 Electoral platforms

6.2.1.1 Canada

In Canada, there are no prominent anti-immigration political parties like Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National in France, the List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands or Pauline Hanson's One Nation in Australia. Since 1945, all parties have presented themselves to the electorate as supporting a selective immigration policy, largely based on the capacity – indeed the necessity – of the country to integrate immigrants without injury to a well-balanced economy. However, a significant change happens in early 1990s as major parties have started to see migration through security lenses.

The Liberal Party of Canada has governed the country for 43 of the last 60 years. Since 1945, the Liberals have been a major driving force in the pro-immigration camp of Canada's increasingly passionate debate about immigration. Despite this somewhat positive record on immigration, the party's establishment opted to prohibit "admission of people who pose a threat to public health, safety, order or national security" in their 1984 manifesto—an election which resulted in a debacle for the Liberals (their seat count fell from 135 to 40—a 95 seat loss, the worst performance in their history). This particular position on immigration was somehow left out of the 1988 electoral platforms—a federal election that resulted in a second Progressive-Conservative majority government. In the red book *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal plan of Canada* of 1993, the Liberal Party promises to pursue "strict enforcement of border controls to prevent false claimants from arriving in Canada."
The electoral platforms of the Progressive-Conservative Party have remained silent on immigration issues for most of the second half of the twentieth century. Not once in all federal elections since 1945 have the Conservatives linked migration and security in their manifests. The only two electoral campaigns in which immigration was mentioned in the electoral platforms were in 1945 and 1957. In both, the party’s position was cast in economic terms, i.e. the selection of immigrants should be made in order “to assure development of Canada’s natural resources and to create employment”.

The establishment of the Reform Party, a “spin off” of the gradual collapse of the Progressive-Conservative Party in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has worked toward the securitization of migration in the party electoral platform of 1993. While maintaining the Conservatives’ focus on economic benefit for Canada as the primary criteria for the selection of immigrants, the Reform Party introduced new wording, however. For instance, the Reform Party would welcome “genuine” refugees—that is, refugees who qualify under the strict requirements of the UN Convention. Furthermore, the Reform Party wants to proceed to the “immediate deportation of bogus refugees and other illegal entrants.” It adds that the Constitution may have to be amended to ensure that the government can ultimately control entry into Canada; meanwhile, the “notwithstanding” provision of the Charter of Rights should be used to ensure such control. Reform Party made a major breakthrough in 1993, inheriting nearly all of the Tories’s support in the West (the party won all but four seats in Alberta and dominated British Columbia as well). In total, the Reform Party won 52 seats and came second across Canada with 18 per cent of the popular vote. Its political power increased in the 1997 federal election in which it
won 60 seats and became the official opposition with nearly 20 per cent of the popular vote.

Reform’s successor, the Canadian Alliance, kept most of the Reform Party’s positions in the 2000 election, calling for immediate deportation of “bogus refugees and other illegal entrants” and promising to “severely penalize those who organize abuse of the system.”

Finally, the New Democratic Party, like its predecessor the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, never made the linkage between migration and security. The NDP has endorsed, over the years, a “planned” immigration policy that would take into account several factors, such as employment opportunities, language training sessions, housing availability, and social services.

6.2.1.2 France

In a sharp contrast with the case of Canada, immigration has been a central issue in several French presidential elections. In the 1974 presidential election, candidates from the major political parties—Valéry Giscard d’Estaing from the Independent Republicans-UFD and François Mitterand from the Socialist Party—touched on the question of immigration whereas Jean Marie Le Pen was silent on the subject. In the next electoral campaign for the presidency (1981), the platform of the Socialist Party leader did mention immigration in three of its 110 propositions: proposition 79 concerned the fight against discrimination; proposition 80 discussed the rights of immigrants and foreign workers; proposition 81 stated that the fight against clandestine traffic of immigrants would be strengthened (Weil 2005).
In the 1988 presidential election, the manifestos of all major candidates tackled the link between migration and security. The manifesto of the First Secretary of the Socialist Party and incumbent President, François Mitterand, addressed the issue of immigrants mostly through a discussion of the Nationality Code. “We would honour ourselves by rendering the procedures [that a would-be immigrant has to fulfill] less humiliating: interminable waiting, rebuffs, excessive delays. I regret that the new citizen is welcomed in such a grimy way. I would prefer if they would be welcomed like a celebration, joyfully and solemnly, by the mayor where they live. We would breathe better in France” (Mitterand 1988). In contrast, the manifesto of the leader of the Rally for the Republic, Jacques Chirac, put the themes of security, criminality, and clandestine immigration at the forefront (Brechon 2002). In fact, the security-immigration nexus constituted one of the central points of the televised electoral debate between Mitterand and Chirac and certainly one of the central attacks of Chirac on Mitterand. “Concerning the question of immigration,” Chirac strongly asserted, “we must stop it. Concerning clandestine immigration, we must fiercely fight against it. ... Clandestine immigrants are by definition the natural pond of delinquents and even criminals; hence, we must expel them.”

Finally, the manifesto of the National Front’s candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, adopted harsh and security rhetoric on immigration.

In the first round of the 1995 presidential elections, the manifesto Jean-Marie Le Pen unsurprisingly promises to stop immigration, to take seriously the “danger” threatening the nation and the people of France, and to expel a total of three million immigrants. The second presidential candidate who talks about immigration in his platform is Édouard
Balladur. As Prime Minister, Balladur insists he has restored a sense of security of French's day-to-day activities. "We have controlled, with strength and humanity, an immigration which was excessive and disorganized". The manifesto of the leader of the RPR, Jacques Chirac, and of the Socialist Party, Lionel Jospin, did not mention the question of immigration in either the first and second rounds. However, the theme of security, while absent in their respective platforms during the first round, was touched on by both candidates, but especially by Chirac in the second round.

Of course, the first round of the 2002 election came as a shock to many observers, almost all of whom had expected the second ballot to be between the incumbent President Chirac and the Socialist Jospin. However, Le Pen's unexpected appearance in the runoff election against Chirac did put the migration-security nexus at the forefront of this presidential campaign. The political platform of the National Front for the 2002 presidential election, Pour un avenir français, continues to put forward the overall ideology adopted in past decades, which in the context of this study relates to the "expulsion of delinquent immigrants" and stopping the "immigration invasion". Furthermore, in the words of the general secretary of the National Front, Carl Lang, "integration [of immigrants] leads to national disintegration—that is, a multicultural, mosaicked, balkanized, and tribal France" (quoted in Brechon 2005:37).

6.2.2 Pieces of legislation

A second option to track down elite audience's role in the securitization process is the extent to which the legislative branch of government has enabled or constrained securitizing actors' moves. Because pieces of legislation constitute a final decision in
which the dominant view is expressed and represent as well a package of administrative powers and procedures setting the framework for practices related to national security, they represent valuable markers of elite audience’s role in the process.

In Canada, five pieces of legislation have considerable significance in the present context: Bills C-55, C-84, C-86, C-44, and the IRPA. Bill C-55, which came into effect in 1989, officially amends the Immigration Act of 1976. It provides a new structure and procedures for processing refugee claims; it also creates an independent Immigration and Refugee Board. Also in 1989, Bill C-84 came into effect: it aimed at imposing tougher immigration control measures, primarily directed at smugglers and illegal trafficking). Bill C-84, entitled Refugee Deterrents and Detention Bill, introduced new detention measures, among them tougher criminal penalties on those who “smuggled” or aided the undocumented. The results of the vote in Parliament for both Bills are telling in the context of this study. These Bills were debated and passed through House of Commons in 1986-1988: Bill C-55 passed on the third reading with 155 votes for and 48 against; Bill C-84 also passed on the third reading with 92 votes for and 52 against. However, the Senate amended them and they were both referred back to the House. In turn, the House of Commons did not accept all amendments and the Bills died when the Parliament was dissolved in 1988. The two Bills were reintroduced in the subsequent parliament as Bill C-77. It was introduced, passed through all stages, and passed through the House of Commons in one day, June 14, 1990, without debate. It passed through the Senate without delay, and received Royal Assent June 27, 1990. There were no recorded divisions for Bill C-77.
In 1992, the passage of Bill C-86 established tougher criteria for asylum, resettlement, and detention, including an expanded list of criteria by which an applicant might be determined inadmissible. The bill proposed revisions to the refugee determination system, mostly restrictive. The first level screening process with the credible basis test was abandoned and "eligibility" determinations transferred in part to immigration officers. Other measures proposed were fingerprinting, harsher detention provisions and making refugee hearings open to the public (these were amended as the bill passed through Parliament). New grounds of inadmissibility were added. The bill also included a provision requiring Convention Refugees applying for landing in Canada to have a passport, valid travel document or "other satisfactory identity document". Bill C-86, which "fundamentally altered the shape of immigration law" (Galloway 1997:20), aimed at filling the perceived gaps in the existing legislation regarding migrants who threaten the security of Canada (Pratt 2005). The final vote in Parliament is a clear indication that elite audience has facilitated the securitization of migration in Canada: the Bill passed on third reading with 115 in favour and 89 against.

Bill C-44, which was enacted in 1995, is clearly sensitive to concerns of national security. CIC's news release accompanying the legislation lists changes that the Bill effected. One of them is that the Bill "cancels the right of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division by non permanent residents certified... to be a security risk" (quoted in Galloway 1997:21). Bill C-44 sailed through the Parliament with 152 votes for versus 84 votes against.
The last though not least piece of legislation is the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA), which came into effect in June 2002. At the origins of the IRPA there are two Bills. Bill C-31, tabled by then Minister Elinor Caplan on 6 April 2000, was intended to replace the 1976 Immigration Act but the bill died when the November 2000 federal election was called. In February 2001, a slightly revised bill (Bill C-11) was introduced. This means that the core of what would become the IRPA as well as most of the provisions were in fact prepared and embedded in pieces of legislation well before the September 11th attacks. The IRPA presents a notable emphasis on security measures and illustrates the preoccupation with security, criminality and enforcement measures (Kruger *et al.* 2004; Pratt 2005). Like Bills C-55, C-84, C-86, and C-44, the IRPA was passed with a comfortable majority: 135 in favour and 84 against.

France

The repressive nature of the 1993 Pasqua law is well documented (Hollifield 2004). The Pasqua law sought, in the words of its architect, to “zero immigration” by seeing immigration primarily as a police matter and rolling back the rights of foreigners. As one of the leading specialists on France’s immigration policy underscores, “equal protection and due process were denied to foreigners by cutting off possibilities of appeal for asylum seekers and by giving the police greater powers to detain and deport foreigners” (Hollifield 2004:200). As Figure 6.8 shows, the Senate has largely endorsed the law voting with a proportion of 72 percent in favour. The National Assembly finally adopted the Pasqua law with a large majority: 480 votes for and 88 votes against. This means that
85 percent of the parliamentarians who took part in the votes were in favour of the Pasqua law.

On March 26, 1997, the new French immigration law, the Debré law, was approved by Parliament. The Debré law, designed to resolve the ambiguous status of some sans-papiers, proposes further draconian measures to limit the rights of foreigners in France as well as to crack down on illegal immigration. One of the provisions that received much attention concerns the requirement “of all private citizens to notify local authorities whenever they received a non-European Union foreigner in their homes”. Because of its Vichy-era similarity, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning the Debré law. As for the Pasqua law, the Senate adopted the Debré law with a large majority (70 percent). National Assembly finally approved the Debré law with a majority (65 per cent) but with significant modifications (most notably that foreigners themselves have to report their whereabouts to the authorities).

The most recent law of February 2003—the Sarkozy law—has focused mostly on security issues and aims at reinforcing measures against illegal migration, and criminal phenomena tied to illegal migration. Among the most important provisions are the requirement for applicants for three-month tourist visas to be fingerprinted and the increased of the number of days foreigners can be held in detention from 12 to 32 days. The Sarkozy law was met with strong outcries and denouncements mostly from civil society groups and associations. However, the Senate adopted the law with nearly a 65 percent majority; and the National Assembly adopted the law with a show of hands.
One of the important points in this context is that elite audience has been a facilitating factor in the securitization of migration in both countries. Yet, results on how pieces of legislations were passed suggest that no considerable difference can be found between Canada and France – this is of course mostly due to the political Parliamentary system. Still, elite audience appears to provide little guidance in explaining variation in levels of securitized migration between Canada and France.

6.2.3 Public opinion

Does mass audience constrain or enable the securitization of migration? How do securitizing agents' moves relate with Canadian and French mass audience? A final proxy that I use to answer these questions is public opinion. In the next pages, I present several polls and surveys that have tried to understand respective mass audiences' position on issues related to the securitization of migration.

Unfortunately, no poll has been conducted in Canada or France precisely on the question of the process of securitizing migration. In Canada, one way to tackle the question is to look at how Canadians perceive the number of immigrants accepted yearly. A Gallup poll has been asking the following question to Canadians since 1975:

"If it were your job to plan an immigration policy for Canada at this time, would you be inclined to increase immigration, decrease immigration, or keep the number of immigrants at about the current level?"

I assume that if Canadians think migration is a security threat, they will want to decrease it. However, as the Figure 6.9 shows, nothing indicates that the Canadian mass audience does perceive migration as security concern. The only time that those who
answered "decrease of immigration" pass the threshold of 50 per cent is in 1982—indicating that the key concern was more about the economy and the job market than about national security as Canada was going through period of both recession and slow growth. One should note, however, the rise in the number wishing to decrease immigration in 1991, a crucial year in the particular context of this study as we have seen in Chapter 2. The publication of *Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities* in 1991 marked the first time migration was listed as a security concern for Canada in a foreign policy statement. There is an increase of 13 percent in those choosing "decrease of immigration" in less than eight months (from 32 percent in September 1990 to 45 percent in June 1991). This surge certainly indicates a lessening in the constraining role of mass audience in the securitization process. From 1991 to 1996, the level stays around 45 percent; after 1996, it falls down to 40 percent of Canadian respondents wishing to decrease immigration.

One finding of this graph that is particularly worth emphasizing is the Canadian answer after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Indeed, the lowest point in the proportion of Canadian respondents supporting a decrease in the number of immigrants in the last 30 years is after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, in 2005, with 27 per cent. This result suggests that the securitization of migration is not merely a function of objective reactions to material factors and events such as 9/11. Even one of the most shattering events in the last 10 years did not operate in some objective way; the event had to be interpreted and rendered meaningful along the migration-security nexus in order for the social construction of the securitization of migration to take form.
Even when the question is framed in a more negative way, Canadian respondents remain hesitant to see migration as an existential threat. In the past decades, several pollsters have asked Canadians whether the government of Canada was letting in “too many immigrants”. The results are consistent with previous findings on whether Canadians would increase or decrease the level of immigrants accepted yearly. The only time a majority of Canadian respondents have answered that Canada was letting in “too many immigrants” was in 1994 with 53 per cent, as Figure 6.10 shows. The second lowest
point between 1989 and 2002 is after the so-called “Chinese Summer of 1999”, with 33 percent.

Figure 6.10  Percentage of Canadians agreeing that Canada is letting in “too many immigrants”, 1989-2002

Note: The solid line represents the percentage of Canadians agreeing that Canada is letting in “too many immigrants”; the vertical filled column refers to one of the key year in the securitization process; “Chinese Summer” refers to the arrival of four boats Chinese would-be immigrants to British Columbia’s shores; IRPA stands for Immigration and Refugee Protection Act; the grey horizontal line indicates which political party was in power. Source: Angus Reid/Southam News, Longwoods International Inc, Ekos, Léger Marketing, CIC, Environics, Angus Reid.

The limiting and constraining role of mass audience on agents’ securitizing moves is also illustrated when the two are directly juxtaposed, as in Figure 6.11. Mass audience appears to have been a limiting factor between 1989 and 2005 – with a proportion of Canadian respondents well below the threshold of 50 per cent agreeing that Canada was
letting in "too many immigrants". To be sure, the rise in Canadian respondents agreeing that Canada is letting in "too many immigrants" in the early 1990s may have facilitated the initiation of the securitization process. Notwithstanding, mass audience has been a particularly important limiting factor in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002 in which several and affirmed securitizing moves were made. The proportion of those agreeing that Canada is letting in "too many immigrants" drops to 30 per cent in these years.

Figure 6.11 Political agents' securitizing moves and percentage of Canadians agreeing that Canada is letting in "too many immigrants", 1989-2002

Note: The black column represents the securitizing moves made by Prime Ministers; the grey column refers to the securitizing moves made by Ministers of Foreign affairs; the empty-square line represents the percentage of Canadians agreeing that Canada is letting in "too many immigrants"; IRPA stands for Immigration and Refugee Protection Act; the grey horizontal lines indicate which political party was in power.
In France, the situation is strikingly different. Since 1984, the highly regarded polling company TNS-Sofres has asked French people the following question:

“Do you agree with the following statement: There are too many immigrants in France”.

Already in 1984, 58 percent of respondent answered that there were “too many immigrants” in France, as Figure 6.12 shows. The anti-immigrant tendency reaches a record high of 78 percent answering that there were too many immigrants in France in 1993. Furthermore, for the time period that this study covers the percentage of French respondents answering that they were too many immigrants has never dropped below 58 percent. The results are also valid across political parties as Duhamel and Jaffre (1991) have pointed out.
The sharp difference between Canada and France is made even clearer when securitizing moves made by French’s political agents are juxtaposed with the proportion of French agreeing that there are “too many immigrants” in France, as Figure 6.13 shows. When the number of securitizing moves made by a political agent reaches a record high of 30 (in 1993), the anti-immigrant feeling reaches a record high of 78 percent answering that there were too many immigrants in France.
At this point, two major differences between Canada and France appear to have played a significant role in the context of the securitization of migration. First, although Canadians respondents were more numerous than in previous years to wish for a decrease in immigration in 1991, they still represent a minority. In France, nearly four out of five French agreed that there were too many immigrants in 1993. In sum, the results suggest that the mass audience in Canada has been a constraining force in the securitization of
migration while France’s mass audience has been a facilitating force in the securitization process.

The second important difference refers to the enduring continuity in Canadians and French attitudes towards immigration. While an average of 39 per cent of Canadian respondents have answered that they wanted to decrease immigration between 1975 and 2005, an average of 64 per cent of French respondents have answered that there were too many immigrants in France between 1984 and 2005.

As these three polls have been asking the same questions over the last two decades, they represent robust evidence. It not only permits us to control for the effect of idiosyncratic events on public opinion, such as the arrival of refugee boats in 1999 in Canada or the terrorist attacks in Paris in 1994, but it also gives a clear indication of the evolution of Canadian and French public opinion on the issue.

Even more, this strong cultural factor finds an echo in other vectors of public opinion in Canada and France. A series of polls conducted in 1989 showed that most Canadians feel that immigrants make a positive contribution to Canada's economy and culture (Malarek 1990). By the end of the decade, the positive sentiment toward immigrants was even stronger. When Canadians were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement “Immigrants make an important contribution to this country”, a clear majority of respondents agree with the statement. While more than 65 per cent of respondents agree with the statement in 1997, that number gained more than 10 per cent three years later to reach 77 per cent of respondents agreeing that immigrants make an important contribution to Canada, as Table 6.1 shows. Furthermore, this additional 12 per cent were added to the
vast majority in the category “strongly agree”, at the same time reducing the percentage of respondents who “strongly disagree” to less than four per cent in 2000. In 2006, an international Ipsos MORI study confirmed Canadians’ positive attitudes toward immigration. To the question, “Overall, would you say immigrants are having a good or bad influence on the way things are going in [Canada]?”, a solid 75 percent answered that immigrants have overall a positive influence on the country (Adams 2007).

Table 6.1  Canadians and the contribution of immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration has a positive impact on Canada (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As well, Canadians remain strikingly consistent in their views of immigration’s impact on Canadian culture. While 63 per cent of Canadian respondents said the fact that there are people from different races in Canada adds to what is good about Canada in 1991, the majority of Canadians feel that the presence of immigrants from several cultures in Canada serves to strengthen Canadian culture in 2004 and 2005, as Table 6.2 illustrates (The Globe and Mail 1991).

Table 6.2  Impact of immigration on strength of culture, Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does the fact that we accept immigrants from many different cultures make our culture stronger or weaker? (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much stronger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In France, a public-opinion poll commissioned in 1990 as part of an investigation launched by Prime Minister Michel Rocard's office concluded that the French are becoming increasingly intolerant of ethnic minorities. According to the poll, 76 per cent of French people think there are too many Arabs living in France. Thirty-nine per cent of those surveyed openly said they do not like the Arab immigrants; twenty-four per cent of those surveyed think there are too many Jews as well (Reuter 1990). On April 7, 1990, a journalist in Paris was reporting in *The Globe and Mail* that a new opinion survey shows that an overwhelming majority of the French (85 per cent) think the country has reached what President Mitterand once called "le seuil de tolérance" – the saturation point – beyond which more immigrants are not acceptable (Morier 1990).

Another poll by Sofres conducted in August 1991 and published in the September edition of *Le Figaro-Magazine* shows that Jean-Marie Le Pen came first with 22 per cent of respondents among the politicians "who proposes [a] satisfactory solution to the problem of immigration"; an increase of seven per cent from 1985 numbers (*Le Monde* 1991). Similarly, Le Pen's ideas on immigration also hit a record high of approval in 1991. To the question, "Do you approve or disapprove Jean-Marie Le Pen's positions on immigrants", 38 per cent of French respondents approved Le Pen's ideas. As Figure 6.14 shows, this represented a gain of 14 percent from 1988.

Figure 6.14  Percentage of French approving Le Pen's ideas on immigrants
A poll conducted in 1992 to assess Mitterand’s Presidency, which was celebrating its 10th anniversary, confirmed French opinion on the topic. To the question “According to you, what was its biggest failures?”, the “rise in the number of immigrants” came second with 41 percent, after the rise of unemployment (49 per cent). 67

Tellingly, the French concerns about the movement of people are not a function of fear of unemployment or the loss of a job for a “Frenchman”. Rather, concerns are framed as fear of the loss of a national identity and safety, as the Table 6.3 shows. In 1993, two out
of three French citizens fear that France will lose its national identity if immigration is not limited; three quarters of French respondents did not feel safe in areas where there are many immigrants. Furthermore, almost half of French respondents agreed in 2005 with the statement, “We don’t feel at home anymore in France”, an increase of four percent from 2003 (Sofres 1998; 1996; TNS-Sofres 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.3 French attitudes toward national identity and safety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If something isn't done to limit the number of immigrants, France risks losing its national identity (in %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In areas where they are many immigrants, one doesn't feel safe (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is then unsurprising to see that when the French Parliament passed a tough immigration law, which restricts foreigners’ rights to marry or bring their families to France and gives police extra power to carry out expulsions, the support was strong. The Pasqua law has been the subject of furious debates and attacks by liberal lawyers and civil-rights groups. Yet, the measures have proved popular. In an opinion poll carried out immediately after a police operation (in 1996) in which immigrant families and sans-papiers were forcefully expelled from the Saint Bernard church in which they had taken refuge (that is, when a human dimension was put on these harsh measures), 67 percent of
respondents said they wanted to maintain the Pasqua laws and were in favour of deporting the immigrant families (Brehier 1996).

Finally, crucial differences between Canada and France are also observable when the two countries are directly compared (that is, when a public opinion poll has been asking the same question across countries). First, as shown in Table 6.4, Canadians see immigrants’ impact on their society and culture in a more much positive footing than their French counterparts. Perhaps the most striking finding is the low percentage of Canadians who disagree with the statement that immigrants improve Canada’s society, especially in comparison with the percentage of French who disagree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.4</th>
<th>Immigration’s impact on society and culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do immigrants improve your society by bringing new ideas and cultures? (%)</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Carleton University Survey in Jedwab (2006)

Second, when the crime vector is factored in the difference between Canada and France is striking; in fact, revealing that Canadians reject, relatively to the French, to see immigrants through negative stereotypes. Table 6.5 underscores that Canada comes first among several countries in rejecting the statement that immigrants increase crime rates. While almost half of French respondents agree that immigrants increase crime rates, only 27 per cent of Canadian respondents concur with the link between crime and migration.
Table 6.5  Perception of the link crime-migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do immigrants increase crime rates?</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generally, do you think immigrants are more likely to be involved in criminal activity than people born here, less likely, or isn’t there much difference?</th>
<th>% More likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thirdly, a poll of nine Western countries published in May 2004 by Ipsos-Public Affairs (for The Associated Press) also underscores the difference in attitudes towards immigration, as Table 6.6 shows. In six of the other countries polled, more people felt immigrants were a bad influence than felt they were a good one. This was true in France, Great Britain, Germany, Mexico, Italy, Spain, and the United States. Of the nine countries polled, only the Canadians had a positive view of the influence of immigrants. Seventy-three per cent felt that immigrants were a very good or somewhat good influence. Just twenty-one per cent of Canadian respondents said they were a bad influence.
Table 6.6 Influence of immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bad influence (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Associated Press-Ipsos-Reid. (The Associated Press-Ipsos-Reid 2004)

Does mass audience constrain or induce the securitization of migration? My findings suggest that mass audience in Canada has been a constraining force in the securitization process whereas the mass audience in France has been a facilitating force in the process of securitizing migration. Detailed process-tracing of the deliberations of politicians would be necessary to attempt to prove more definitively the role public opinion on immigration played in discouraging or encouraging securitizing attempts, but the results here certainly suggest that the public audience has been more a limiting factor for securitization of immigration in Canada than in France.

Indeed, as Figures 6.9 and 6.10 highlight, the Canadian mass audience, in systematically and repeatedly not seeing migration as an existential threat throughout the years that my study covers, appears to have been a constraining force in the process of securitizing migration. At the same time, the figures illustrate a build-up in negative attitudes toward immigration that occurred in the early 1990s concerning the movement of people, thereby, conferring a relative legitimization to the securitization of migration. Furthermore, others vectors of public opinion corroborate this finding. As Table 6.4
shows, the Canadian mass audience feels that the presence of immigrants from different cultural backgrounds in Canada serves to strengthen Canadian culture rather than representing an existential threat to Canadian cultural identity.

In the case of France, as Figures 6.12 and 6.13 underscore, evidence suggests that the French mass audience has been a facilitating force in the process of securitizing migration. As well, other vectors of public opinion also point in the same direction. For example, Table 6.3 shows that two out of three French citizens fear that France will lose its national identity if immigration is not limited. Another poll reveals that almost half of French respondents agreed in 2005 with the statement, “We don’t feel at home anymore in France.”

6.3 Conclusion

In looking for answers to questions driving this study — (1) what are the social mechanisms involved in the securitization of migration and (2) what explains the variation between a weak securitization and a strong securitization of migration — I have explored in this chapter several contextual factors: the “refugee crisis” of the early 1990s, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and domestic audiences.

The magnitude of the so-called “refugee crisis” in the early 1990s as well as the powerful image of “massive flow” and “potential spill over” that it carries, was a vector of anxiety and apprehension in the particular context of this study. Yet, my investigation shows that the “refugee crisis” remains inconclusive in explaining the variation between a weak securitization of migration as in Canada and a strong securitization as in France.
While the attacks of 9/11 appear to have had a significant impact on the securitization of migration in Canada, my results suggest that the “9/11 effect” has had a more limited impact in France. However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 remain inconclusive in explaining the variation between a weak and a strong securitization of migration. Indeed, if 9/11 was a crucial determinant in the process of securitizing migration, then we should observe a strong securitized migration in Canada and a weak securitized migration in France. Yet, we observe the opposite: a weak securitized migration in Canada and a strong securitized migration in France.

Finally, my analysis of domestic audiences appears to be useful in answering my two questions. My analysis of electoral platforms as a site of elite audience’s involvement in the process of securitizing migration suggests that elite audience constitutes a social constituent of the securitization process in both Canada and in France. While no Canadian political parties have made immigration their leitmotif in an electoral campaign, the early 1990s saw, nevertheless, a rupture. In France, while the Socialist Party under the leadership of Mitterand has mostly refrained itself from perceiving migration as a security threat, from the 1988 election onward, Chirac’s political party tapped into the linkage between migration and security as one of its electoral leitmotifs.

An analysis of important pieces of legislature also suggests that elite audiences in both Canada and France have enabled and facilitated the securitization of migration. In Canada, some pieces of legislation were passed without debate while others obtained an overwhelming Parliamentary majority. None came close to being defeated. The situation
is quite similar in France. All three important pieces of legislation for this study sailed through Parliament.

As well, mass audience appears to have been a constraining and a facilitating force in the securitization process in both Canada and France. A host of public opinion polls show that Canada’s mass audience has been reluctant to see the movement of people predominantly as a security concern; it also demonstrates that the mass audience has done so in a consistent way throughout the years that this study covers. On the contrary, several public opinion measures show that France’s mass audience has seen migration through security lenses; polls also show that mass audience has done so continually between 1989 and 2005.

As such, the involvement of mass audience in the securitizing process offers useful guiding principles in answering the question of variation between levels of securitized migration. Indeed, evidence amassed in this study suggests that when the mass audience represents a constraining and limiting force on agents’ securitizing moves as in Canada, the outcome is a weak securitization. When the mass audience represents an enabling and facilitating force on agents’ securitizing moves as in France, the outcome is a strong securitization.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion
This dissertation is about the securitization process, i.e. the process of integrating, discursively and institutionally, an issue into security frameworks that emphasize policing and defence. As the Cold War began to wane, new issues have entered the realm of security studies bringing the literature to re-evaluate established parameters of the process of securitizing an issue. However, contributions trying to gain a better understanding of the social mechanisms involved in the securitization process have remained of little number and unequal in their internal coherence and success. This is particularly true in the case of international migration. Despite the increasing number of scholarly works touching on the issue, Martin Heisler’s remark that a coherent and comprehensive theoretical framework making sense of the link between migration-security has yet to be produced remains valid (Adamson 2006; Andreas 2000; Bigo 2002; Castro Henriques and Khachani 2006; Doty 1998; Friedman and Randeria 2004; Heisler 2006; Huysmans 1998; Rudolph 2006; Vernez 1996; Wæver et al. 1993). One of the objectives of the study is to take steps in proposing a new analytical framework for studying the process of securitizing migration.

The study asks two interrelated questions: (1) what are the social mechanisms involved in the securitization of migration; and (2) what are the key determinants of the variation in the level of securitization between a weak and a strong securitization of migration. To answer these two questions, I have proceeded within a constructivist perspective highlighting ideational factors, discursive power, and cultural factors. Empirically, I have investigated the role of political agents (Chapter 4), media agents (Chapter 5), as well as of exogenous shocks and domestic audiences (Chapter 6) in the securitization process.
In this concluding chapter, I first want to examine the politicization—securitization of migration debate. In the second section, I underline the main theoretical conclusions that my study provides. The final section opens the discussion to questions and hypothesis that my study brings.

7.1 Politicization versus securitization of migration

My emphasis in this dissertation is on the securitization of migration and not on the politicization of migration. Politicization of migration refers here to the process of taking an issue out of restricted networks and/or bureaucracies and bringing the issue into the public arena (Guiraudon 1998; Huysmans 2006). Defined as such, the politicization of migration is a neutral process. It encompasses both the positive and the negative point of views on the issue even though anti-immigration political actors have been keen to voice their message in a particularly strong way in recent years.

In the context of this study, the distinction between the politicization and the securitization of migration is an important one for several reasons. First, the current benchmark in securitization research, i.e. securitization theory, calls for such a distinction. As Chapter 3 made it clear, securitization theory contends that the process of securitizing an issue implies that security-related measures that are "beyond normal politics" ought to be taken in order to deal with the phenomenon because it is believed to be an existential security threat. Following the prevailing treatment, I argue that migration can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized, to securitized. An unpolticized issue is a question that is not included in public debate. A politicized question is discussed within the standard political system and is part of the public policy domain; a
politicization can have positive or negative overtones concerning the movement of people. Working within the footsteps of securitization theory to develop my alternative approach, I had to be able to operationalize the distinction.

Second, a politicization of migration does not necessarily equate with a securitization of migration; an agent can politicize an issue without securitizing it. When the Prime Minister of Canada stresses the benefits of multiculturalism as an umbrella policy for immigration, he is making a politicizing move albeit with positive overtones. As well, when the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada highlights the contribution of immigrants to the Canadian history and cultural identity, she is positively politicizing migration. Along the same lines, it is one thing to question the efficiency of the refugee recognition process, the over-concentration of migrants in large urban agglomerations, refugee adjudication, the adequacy of settlement services, and the failure to recognize overseas professional credentials. It is an altogether different one to declare that migration is a national security threat. In short, distinguishing between “politicizing moves” and “securitizing moves” is very important in a study about the securitization process.

Nonetheless, critics might indeed argue that my indicators of a securitized migration developed in Chapter 2 leave out the fact that immigrants have increasingly become the subjects of harsh political discourses and are singled out as convenient scapegoats for political parties wanting to offer an image of robustness and control.

Still, I argue that the evidence amassed here underscores the validity and necessity of distinguishing between politicization and securitization. My quantitative results demonstrate, for example, that Canada’s Prime Ministers have markedly politicized the
issue of migration for the period that my study covers (Chapter 4). Among the migratory questions touched on by Prime Minister Chrétien are the category of immigrants accepted, multiculturalism, and the positive contribution of immigrants to Canadian society – to name just a few. The key point, however, is that Canadian Prime Ministers’ focus on migration does not always translate into securitizing moves. A telling example is Prime Minister Chrétien’s series of speeches following the arrival of almost 600 would-be Chinese immigrants near Vancouver in 1999. The arrival, and the media coverage that it produced, could have easily induced bold statements to the effect that mass migratory was disturbing Canada’s security. Notwithstanding, Chrétien made no declaration of that nature.

In addition, a detailed content analysis of the complete set of political agents’ speeches underlines the benefit of distinguishing between politicization and securitization. There were a limited number of powerful speeches using immigrants as scapegoats for social problems. These speeches are especially rare in the case of Canada, and are almost limited to Charles Pasqua and Jean-Louis Debré in France. In fact, harsh rhetoric about immigration seems to be the political turf of leaders of opposition in Canada (e.g. Reform Party), and in the case of France, of leaders of far-right political parties (e.g. Jean-Marie Le Pen and Philippe de Villiers). Actually, this might be a logical consequence of the politicization of migration. As Guiraudon (1998) and Huysmans (2006) highlight, bringing an issue into the public arena, i.e. politicizing an issue, allows participation of political agents, especially leaders of far-right political parties.
Furthermore, my study of media agents (Chapter 5) is helpful in looking at politicization/securitization debate. Between 1989 and 2005, *The Globe and Mail* has published on average more than 10 editorials per year with migration as the main topic. Among the migratory issues discussed in these editorials are the discretionary power of the Minister, immigration and refugee selection, the economic contribution of immigrants, and the “Chinese Summer”. Yet, *The Globe and Mail* made no securitizing moves in these crucial years.

Juxtaposing results obtained from my analysis of political agents with those obtained from my investigation of media agents also contributes to the debate. If we assume that a good indication of the level of the political intensity of the movement of people at a given time is obtained by comparing (a) political agents’ use of the word “migration” (and its derivatives) and (b) the number of times migration is the main topic of an editorial, important conclusions stand out, as Figure 7.1 shows. Both the Prime Minister of Canada and editorialists of *The Globe and Mail* have politically discussed the issue of migration on several occasions throughout the years that this study covers. Yet, as we have seen in previous chapters, these two agents made a limited number of securitizing moves.
As I have detailed in Chapter 3, the securitization process refers to the discursive and institutional integration of an issue into security frameworks emphasizing policing and defence. As such, securitized migration is the incorporation of the movement of people into security frameworks on the basis that migration is an existential security threat to a chosen referent object.

Proceeding within a constructivist perspective offers many advantages in the present context. Indeed, a constructivist perspective addresses silences and corrects the
weaknesses of other approaches. There are currently four models for understanding and explaining the securitization of migration. First, scholars attuned to the notion of structural anarchy and fearing the "coming anarchy" associated with mass migration have warned Western states of the security consequences of migration; (Huntington 2004; Kaplan 1994). Obviously, the deterministic point of view underlying the alarmist model constitutes an uncertain foundation for theorizing about the securitization process, insofar as it is apparent that not all states have reacted the same in response to the alleged environmental imperative of immigration. The second model is the sectoral security model (Buzan 1983) that divides the security agenda into five sectors (military, political, economic, societal, and environment), in which migration is associated with societal security. A constructivist perspective argues that distinguishing between sectors of security, as the sectoral security model invites us to do, is a daunting challenge mired in difficulties that cast some doubt on its usefulness (Bigo 2001; Ceyhan 1998). A third model is Rudolph's (2006) grand strategy perspective in which on one hand the "international threat environment" is the primary explanatory factor and, on the other hand, ideas only are incorporated in the framework as intervening variables. However, a constructivist perspective sees ideational factors as having tremendously more power than the grand-state strategy model. For constructivists, ideational factors are at the heart of how structural threats come to have any meaning. The fourth model is securitization theory (Balzacq 2005; Wæver 1995). For securitization theory, security is best understood as a discursive act, as a speech act. Labelling something as a security issue permeates it
with a sense of importance that legitimizes the use of emergency measures outside of the usual political process to deal with it.

While acknowledging the noteworthy contribution of securitization theory, a constructivist perspective underscores its sense of incompleteness as well as its underspecificity. My study, one of the first to systematically operationalize securitization theory across securitizing agents, across time, and across cases, has indeed shown securitization theory's limits. My empirical investigation presents two results particularly puzzling for securitization theory.

The first result concerns the issue of variation in levels of securitized migration. While the securitization of migration can be observed in both Canada and France, a considerable variation in the level of securitization exists. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 2, migration is weakly securitized in Canada whereas it is strongly securitized in France.

The problem is that securitization theory does not differentiate the intensity within the securitization process: either an issue is securitized or it is not. The only difference that securitization theory recognizes is along the politicization/securitization spectrum discussed above. That is, for securitization theory any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized, to securitized. Once an issue falls into the “securitized” camp, securitization theory does not distinguish whether the issue is strongly securitized or weakly securitized. By remaining silent on the issue of variation in levels of security, securitization theory treats security as a binary notion. As such, securitization theory does not offer guiding principles to account for variation in levels of securitization either within a case but across time, or across cases.
The second result concerns the audience’s role in the securitization process. While my indicators demonstrate that migration is securitized in Canada, my measurement of Canadian mass audience indicates that it does not largely support a securitization of migration. The problem is that for securitization theory a successful securitization “is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience” (Buzan et al. 1998a:31). If anything, my result points to the necessity of better specifying what the theory understands by audience and how to empirically investigate and demonstrate the role of audience. Indeed, a set of questions stems from the juxtaposition of securitization theory’s formulation with my empirical findings: Who comprises the audience? Does audience can be circumscribed and subdivided? How do we go about measuring the role of audience in a parliamentary democracy? What proxies should a scholar use to operationalize a logic in which audience has such a fundamental role?

Taken together, these two empirical results point to (a) the necessity of integrating the question of levels of securitized migration into the analytical framework; and (b) the need to specify better the logic of the securitization process as well as the social constituents of the securitization process (e.g. the question of audiences). The need to develop a new analytical framework for studying the process of securitizing migration became obvious.

7.2.1 Toward a novel framework

In this study, I put forward (a) three propositions in order to identify the social mechanisms involved in process of securitization, and (b) one proposition to account for the variation in levels of securitized migration.
Proposition One concerns the relationship between politicization and securitization as discussed in the first section of this concluding chapter. Following the prevailing treatment of the relationship, I argue that migration can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized, to securitized. Non-politicized refers to the stage where migration is not dealt with publicly. Politicization refers to “expanding the participation ... beyond clientelistic networks and bureaucratic politics to larger constituencies” in which a wide range of agents enter the debate (Huysmans 2006:119-120). Obviously, media agents (but also political agents) play a fundamental role in the politicization of migration. Securitization refers to the process of integrating, discursively and institutionally, migration into security frameworks that emphasize policing and defence.

Proposition Two relates to the issue of sequence. I contend that the process of securitizing an issue involves three interrelated phases: discourse elaboration; discourse production’ and discourse relation. Discourse elaboration refers to the complex and multifaceted process of decision-making before an official position is taken. My study has not focused on this particular phase. The mention of migration as a security issue by an agent constitutes a securitizing attempt or securitizing move. However, an agent’s securitizing move does not constitute a successful securitization; it only represents the discourse production phase. Scholars need to analyze how securitizing agents’ moves relate to cultural and socio-historical contexts in which they are made – the discourse relation phase. Factors such as exogenous shocks and domestic audiences play a fundamental role in the discourse relation phase.
Proposition Three is to identify agential and contextual factors as social constituents of the securitization process. The mention of migration as a security issue by an agent constitutes a securitizing attempt or securitizing move, i.e. speech acts intended to present migration as an existential security threat requiring exceptional measures. A securitizing agent must follow the grammar of security, i.e. accepted social procedures that are both contextual and temporally dependent. A securitizing agent ought also to possess social power and social recognition. Social recognition could be institutionalized, but it could also be an emergent recognition.

Yet, agents’ securitizing moves have to be analyzed within the context in which they have been made. Proceeding within a constructivist perspective is useful here to restore a better relationship between securitizing actors and the context in which their speech acts are made. Indeed, a constructivist perspective highlights both the constraining and enabling power of settings or contexts on agents. Securitizing moves both percolate from the environment in which they are made and are constrained by the same environment. To be sure, multifaceted contexts in which agents operate cannot “impose” a securitization without agential powers. Contextual factors do not simply drive securitization in some objective way; they do not speak for themselves. Rather, agents have to interpret the context in which they planned to formulate securitizing moves; agents have to give a particular meaning to particular events occurring at a particular point in time. This study, in fully incorporating these factors into the theoretical framework, is conducive to restoring a contextual dimension to securitization theory.
Proposition Four refers to the second question driving this study – to explain the variation in levels of securitized migration – in which I propose to focus on the role of mass audience. In other words, when the mass audience represents a constraining and limiting force on agents’ securitizing moves, the outcome is a weak securitization. When the mass audience represents an enabling and facilitating force on agents’ securitizing moves, the outcome is a strong securitization. The four propositions are summarized in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Central Questions and Propositions of this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question One: What are the social mechanisms involved in the securitization process?</th>
<th>Question Two: What explain the variation in levels of securitization?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposition One: Migration can be located on a spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized, to securitized</td>
<td>Proposition Four: Mass audience offers useful guiding principles to account for the variation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition Two: Securitizing an issue involves three interrelated phases: discourse elaboration; discourse production; and discourse relation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition Three: Identify agential and contextual factors as social constituents of the securitization of migration</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The analytical framework developed in my study generates specific securitizing combinations. Summing up the evidence amassed in the previous chapters allows me to draw together the pattern of engagement of agential and contextual factors with the phenomenon of securitized migration as well as to highlight the usefulness of my four propositions.

In Canada, the role of the Minister of Foreign affairs has been paramount in initiating the securitization process, as Figure 7.2 illustrates. Barbara McDougall made numerous
and repeated securitizing moves in the crucial year of 1991, as well as in 1992 and 1993. Several years later, John Manley and Bill Graham have repeatedly and with fervour made several securitizing moves in the context of migration. While the securitization of migration could hardly have occurred without the Prime Minister’s engagement or tacit accord (given Canada’s political system), my findings suggest that the Prime Minister has only participated in an active way, and for a short period of time, in the securitization process after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Finally, the first Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to introduce a security component into how the movement of people should be seen in Canada has been Elinor Caplan. From Caplan’s initial securitizing move onward, Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration have all been important agents in the securitization process, with Denis Coderre undoubtedly hardened the tone and the message.
Figure 7.2  Securitized migration and role of principal political agents, Canada, 1989-2005

- Bill C-55
- Bill C-84

1989

- Foreign Policies Themes and Priorities
  Bill C-86

1991

- White Paper on Defence

1994

- Bill C-44
  Canada in the World

1995

1999

- Immigration and Refugee Protection Act

2002

- Canadian Border Services Agency

2003

- Securing an Open Society

2004

2005

Barbara McDougall
Minister of Foreign affairs

Elinor Caplan
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration

John Manley
Minister of Foreign affairs

Jean Chrétien
Prime Minister

Denis Coderre
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration

Bill Graham
Minister of Foreign affairs
In the case of France, Ministers of the Interior are without a doubt central players in the securitization of migration, as Figure 7.3 shows. Ministers of the Interior have made 60 percent of all securitizing moves in the context of migration. Ministers Philippe Marchand, Charles Pasqua, Jean-Louis Debré, and Nicolas Sarkozy have been the most influential Ministers in the securitization process. Prime Minister Michel Rocard was making securitizing moves already in 1989, thereby setting in motion the securitization process. As well, Prime Minister Édouard Balladur appears to have been an important securitizing agent in the context of migration. While he has not actively and directly participated in the process, President Jacques Chirac made several securitizing attempts in the context of migration in the first two years of his first presidential mandate, and shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which give him a role in the context of this study. Finally, no French Minister of Foreign affairs has been an important agent in the securitization of migration.
Figure 7.3  Securitized migration and role of principal political agents, France, 1985-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schengen Agreement</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Michel Rocard (Prime Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin Convention</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Philippe Marchand (Minister of Interior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Maastricht</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Édouard Balladur (Prime Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasqua law</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Charles Pasqua (Minister of Interior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Paper on Defence</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debré law</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Jean-Louis Debré (Minister of Interior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Amsterdam</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampere Council</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Jacques Chirac (President)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy (Minister of Interior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarkozy law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdepartmental Committee on Control of Immigration</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The role of editorialists is in many ways easier to assess. My analysis reveals that neither *The Globe and Mail*'s editorialists nor *La Presse*'s editorialists were key securitizing actors in the particular context of this study. Editorial of *The Globe and Mail* have made securitizing moves only a few months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Securitizing moves of *La Presse*'s editorialists are even rarer.

In France, my analysis of *Le Monde*'s editorials demonstrates that this particular media agent has not been a significant securitizing agent in the context of migration. Not only is migration not understood for the entire period under study as an existential threat to France's cultural identity, but also the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have provoked no significant change in the position of editorialists of *Le Monde*. My analysis also shows that this is an all-together different picture in the case of *Le Figaro*. Editorialists of *Le Figaro* have made, systematically and repeatedly, several securitizing moves throughout the years that my study covers.

Exogenous factors equally hold a central role in the securitization of migration. I have highlighted that the rise in the proportion of refugees accepted by Western countries, with the image of “massive flow” and “potential spill over” that it carried, has been a factor inducing the securitization of migration. Although the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were an element of considerable importance, I have also demonstrated that it did not constitute a watershed event after which everything was created anew in the context of securitizing migration. As well, I have suggested why neither the “refugee crisis” nor the terrorist attacks of 9/11 offer guidance in explaining the variation in the levels of securitized migration.
Finally, my analysis of electoral platforms and pieces of legislation as sites of elite audience’s involvement in the process of securitizing migration suggests that elite audience constitutes a social constituent of the securitization process in both Canada and in France. While no Canadian political parties have made immigration their leitmotif in an electoral campaign, the early 1990s saw, nevertheless, a rupture. The two biggest political parties have started to link migration and security in their manifestos. In France, while the Socialist Party under the leadership of Mitterand has mostly refrained itself from perceiving migration as a security threat, Chirac’s political party, from the 1988 election onward, tapped into the linkage between migration and security as part of its electoral leitmotif.

My study of important pieces of legislation also suggests that elite audiences in both Canada and France have enabled and facilitated the securitization of migration. In Canada, five pieces of legislation have had considerable impact in the present context: Bills C-55, C-84, C-86, C-44, and the IRPA. Some pieces of legislation were passed without debate while others obtained an overwhelming Parliamentary majority. None came close to being defeated. The situation is quite similar in France. All three important pieces of legislations for this study, i.e., the Pasqua law of 1993, the Debré law of 1997, and the Sarkozy law of 2003, sailed through Parliament, thus, indicating that France’s elite audience has been a facilitating and enabling factor in the securitization of migration. Yet, results on how pieces of legislations were passed suggest that no considerable difference can be found between Canada and France. Therefore, elite audience appears to provide little guidance in explaining variation in levels of securitized migration between Canada and France.
In regards to mass audience, my findings suggest that mass audience in Canada has been a constraining force in the securitization process whereas the mass audience in France has been a facilitating force in the process of securitizing migration. A host of public opinion polls show that Canada's mass audience has been reluctant to see the movement of people predominantly as a security concern. These polls also demonstrate that the mass audience has done so in a consistent way throughout the years that this study covers. On the contrary, several public opinion polls show that France's mass audience has largely facilitated the securitization process; and as well, polls show that mass audience has done so continually between 1989 and 2005.

In other words, evidence amassed in my study suggests that when the mass audience represents a constraining and limiting force on agents' securitizing moves as in Canada, the outcome is a weak securitization. When the mass audience represents an enabling and facilitating force on agents' securitizing moves as in France, the outcome is a strong securitization.

Although the purpose of my study is to gain a better understanding of the process of securitizing the movement of people as well as to propose guiding principles for explaining the variation in levels of securitized migration between Canada and France, the findings presented do suggest important conclusions that go beyond the focus of the study.

Migrants and refugees are often the first victims of insecurity. It is therefore important to keep in mind that a securitized migration is conceptually open. That is, the linkage between the movement of people and the system of order underpinning the movement is not given and unquestionable. Against the determinism ascribed to the migration-security
nexus by some scholars, my constructivist study understands the phenomenon of securitized migration as a socially, historically, and discursively constructed phenomenon. Taking a sociological turn and treating security interests as dynamic realities opened to change allows us to critically examine the nature, the origin, and the durability of the relationship between the movement of people and security considerations.

As well, my study highlights that the undifferentiated quality to the national security interests associated with some models trying to explain the securitization process is unwarranted. States are not unitary and autonomous actors. Treating states as autonomous actors having objectively known security interests limits more than it reveals in the context of a study about the social mechanisms of the securitization process. For instance, “the” Canadian position on the migration-security nexus significantly varied depending on who was the Minister of Foreign affairs even when Ministers came from the same political party. Indeed, the Department of Foreign affairs has not spoken in a unified voice during the time period of my study. It is equally true for Prime Ministers of France. The securitization of migration has not only brought to the forefront notions of national security interests (in a traditional way), it has also brought along several elements of alternative understanding of security interests, such as the human security considerations and elements of desecuritization.

Against the idea that everything is built anew after an exogenous shock such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, my study suggests that time and history are significant in the securitization of migration. The attitude of mass audience toward immigration – my study suggests that mass audience is one of the key factors explaining
levels of securitized migration – has not been created overnight. Of course, the attitude of mass audience is influenced by idiosyncratic event that are marking collective memory. However, one should also take into account the power of time and legacy on mass audience’s inclination toward the movement of people and the system of order underpinning the movement. The social construction of the securitization of migration brings to the forefront fundamental issues such as path-dependence, self-reinforcing dynamic, resilience to change, enduring consequences of history and legacy, and the importance of imprints left by institutions and social norms.

7.3 Avenues for future research

My study leads to several avenues for further research. First, an interesting project would be to investigate the discourse elaboration phase of the securitization process in both country cases. For feasibility reasons, my study has focused on the dominant discourse stemming out of that phase. However, a closer examination of the decision-making process in the context of the securitization of migration could point to discontinuities and continuities in the securitization process. It could also highlight how alternative discourses were silenced. Furthermore, an investigation of the discourse elaboration phase could examine whether “private” securitization has occurred or not. Such an analysis would also improve our understanding of the rationale behind political agents’ securitizing moves as well as our overall understanding of the social mechanisms involved in the securitization process.

Of course, another project would be to expand the securitizing agents under study. The category “political agents” could be expanded to include for instance leaders of all major
political parties and not only those which were in power as I did in the present study. Mayors of both small and large cities could also be included. The category “media agents” could also be expanded to include key columnists to provide a better understanding of the relationship between media and the securitization process, not to mention other media sources such as television, talk radio, and the Internet. Finally, other categories of agents could also be included, such as the judiciary, leaders of interests groups, and academics.

Another project concerns the relationship between securitizing moves and de-securitizing moves. Indeed, my analysis of political agents and media agents involved in the securitization process has highlighted the de-securitizing role of several agents. In Canada, we have seen that Lloyd Axworthy has been a de-securitizing agent in the context of migration. As well, several editorialists of The Globe and Mail (prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11) and of La Presse have also had a de-securitizing role. In France, I have demonstrated that Prime Minister Lionel Jospin not only made no securitizing attempt throughout its tenure, but he also pushed for the desecuritization of migration in many regards. While editorialists of Le Monde have clearly refused to make a securitizing move in the context of migration, they have also pushed for the desecuritization of migration on several occasions and throughout the years that my study covers. Integrating conceptually these de-securitizing moves into the analytical framework proposed here would certainly be both a stimulating challenge and a valuable way to improve our understanding of the securitization process.

The securitization-desecuritization question brings an important question to the forefront, whether a within-case variation in the levels of securitization exists. To be sure,
I have presented in this study an analytical framework for explaining the variation in the level of securitization of migration across cases. However, further research is needed to examine more carefully the issue of time (and history broadly conceived) within a case. How has the process evolved over a large period of time in one country? Is the process of securitizing migration that I have identified for the post-Cold war era in Canada valid across time (particularly if we go backward)? Do we observe periods of desecuritization followed by periods of securitization over time? Is it the reverse: securitization moments leading to desecuritization moments?

Last, though not least, another project would be to step outside the case of migration to examine how – and to what extent – the securitization process is different for other issues, such as the environment. Undeniably, migration is an analytically useful phenomenon for an investigation of the process of securitizing an issue because a profound rupture in the perception of the movement of people occurred in the late 1980s, early 1990s. The perception shifted from an essentially political economy view, in which immigrants represented workers readily available and necessary for national economic growth, to a security-oriented point of view, in which immigrants became existential threats upon which security practices had to be applied. Consequently, theorizing about the migration-security relationship provides new insights into our study of the social mechanisms of the securitization process in a post-Cold war era. Evaluating the usefulness of the analytical framework developed in this dissertation to other questions would be a valuable avenue of research.
As of June 2000, the INS has 17,674 agents authorized to carry firearms and make arrests, followed by 13,557 officers of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 11,523 FBI agents, and 10,522 Customs Services agents.

In sharp contrast with the idea that "the term 'politicization' is nearly always applied to actions of which one disapproves." Baldwin, 1985. See also Ransom, 1987.

Obviously numerous other agents could be said to be political and contribute to securitization of migration. I am simply confining my analysis for purposes of feasibility to exhaustive analysis of a particular set of agents that are undeniably powerful and indeed, I contend, the most powerful set of political agents involved in these processes, without discounting that others play roles as well. Since these agents I focus upon display the kinds of differences that are at the heart of this study they serve the analytical purposes well of explaining variation.

For purposes of feasibility, I have not included Canadian Ministers of National Defence and Heads of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in my study. I expect that neither made many if any public speech on migration. An interesting follow-up project would be to investigate the role (or lack thereof) of these two agents in the securitization process.

As there were no Department of Immigration per se in France between 1989 and 2005, the Department of the Interior is largely in charge of the immigration portfolio.

The initial research design was to focus on a particular highly relevant case group, i.e. Chinese immigrants in Canada and France; thereby, explaining why I asked for briefing notes regarding Chinese immigrants. However, as my research unfolds I came to the realization that refocusing the study was in order for two reasons. First, there was a lack of systematic and comparable evidences across cases. Second, and more importantly, the evidence shows that it was the movement of people, broadly defined, that was securitized and not merely a particular group.

Foreign migrant workers are foreigners admitted by the receiving state for the specific purpose of exercising an economic activity remunerated from within the receiving country. Their length of stay is usually restricted as is the type of employment they can hold. Long-term migrants are persons who move to a country other than their usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes their country of usual residence. Hammar (1990) coined the term denizens to refer to non-national migrants that were granted legal rights and welfare state membership. Border workers are persons commuting between their country of usual residence (which is usually their country of citizenship as well) and their place of employment abroad. Short-term migrants are persons who move to a country other than their usual residence for a period of at least three months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business, medical treatment or religious image. Skilled transients are highly skilled persons who move to a country other than their usual residence for a period less than a year (12 months). Most common examples are accountants, computer experts, lawyers, construction engineers and business consultants. Internally displaced people (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. Refugees are foreign persons granted refugee status either at the time of admission or before admission. This category therefore includes foreign persons granted refugee status while abroad and entering to be resettled in the receiving country as well as persons granted refugee status on a group basis upon arrival in the country. The refugee status refers to any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside of the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it. Source: Migration Information Source-MIS, United Nations Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol.

9 For more details, see the heartbreaking account narrated by Pratt, 2005 as well as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2000, Amnesty International, 1997.

10 Interviewee #3, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada, 02.11.2005.

11 See also Adelman, 2004; Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield, 1994; Dauvergne, 2006; Dirks, 1995; Hawkins, 1988; Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998; Lynch and Simon, 2003

12 See also Feldblum, 1999; Noiriel, 2006; Wahnich, 1997; Weil, 2005; Wihtol de Wenden, 1987


14 Children born/woman, 2003 estimate.


16 See also Feldblum, 1999; Wahnich, 1997; Weil, 2005; Wihtol de Wenden, 1987

17 With perhaps the notable exception of Nicolas Sarkozy when he was the Minister of the Interior.

18 See Baldwin, 1997; Booth, 2005; Booth, 1991; Campbell, 1992; Dalby, 1992; Dillon, 1996; Eisenhower Institute, 2004; Enloe, 1989; Homer Dixon, 1991; Katzenstein, 1996; Klein, 1998; Krause and Williams, 1997; Mack, 2002; Matthews, 1989; Mutimer, 1997; Tickner, 1992; Tickner, 1995; Ullman, 1983.

19 Until December 2003 the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was responsible for immigration detention. Since then this responsibility has been assigned to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), an agency created in 2002 within the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The decision to order immigration detention accordingly now lies with CBSA officers.

20 The previous White Paper on Defence was published in 1972.

21 And as one of my interviewee told me in the Spring 2006, the CICI might be in fact the precursor of the soon-to-be created Department of Immigration in France. The recent headlines in French politics did confirmed that the creation of such a Department is being planned as well as the importance of the CICI in the government organization.


24 The Foreigner Code, officially known as “Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile”, lists all legislative dispositions relating to foreigner/immigrants rights.


28 See also Badie and Wihtol de Wenden, 1994; Beare, 1997; Dupont, 2001; Grayson, 2003; Liotta, 2002; Lowry, 2002.

29 Acharya, 2004; Adler, 1997; Finnemore, 1996; Laffey and Weldes, 1997; Reus-Smit, 2002; Ruggie, 1998a; Wendt, 1992.

30 For the sake of clarity, one should note here that securitization theory is not a political statement, but is instead an analytical framework striving to understand the securitization process. As such, securitization theory’s advocates are not arguing in favour of securitizing many issues. On the contrary, they contend that “security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics” (Buzan, 1998: 29).
Waever (1995), in particular, favours a desecuritization strategy to several issues that have been securitized in the past decades. See among many others Taureck, 2006.

31 See also Abrahamsen, 2005; Curley and Wong, forthcoming; Elbe, 2005; Emmers, 2003; Higashino, 2004; Jackson, 2005; Roe, 2004; Sasse, 2005.

32 Kaufman, 2001 has also convincingly demonstrate the power of symbols and images in every phases of an ethnic conflict—which ultimately requires a process of securitization.

33 I acknowledge that the actual name of the department in charge of foreign affairs has changed overtime in Canada; however, for the sake of simplicity, I have used the most recent denomination.

34 I acknowledge that the actual name of the department in charge of immigration portfolio has changed overtime in Canada; however, for the sake of simplicity, I have used the most recent denomination.

35 The question is asking, “How would you rank the following list regarding their involvement in the process of securitizing migration?” The list includes media, right-wing lobby groups, left-wing lobby groups, refugee advocates, public opinion, intellectual, diaspora communities. Respondents had to indicate whether they are highly insignificant, insignificant, significant, or highly significant in the securitization process.

36 The National Post, founded in 1998, will not be studied as it does not cover the entire time-span of the present study.

37 I have searched and collected all editorials (between 1989 and 2005) in which the word “migration” and its derivatives were used.

38 As such, editorialists are not detached from population’s concern at a given time. For example, concern about Canada’s immigration policy has subsided in November 1999 after shooting upward in September 1999, when polling showed that 20 per cent of respondents cited it as the most important issue (compared with 34 per cent for health care), i.e. after the “Chinese crisis” of the 1999 summer. In November 1999, concern over the issue had fallen back to normal levels, with 7 per cent of Canadians citing it as the country’s most pressing issue.

39 I have done so regardless of whether migration was said to be a security threat to the state or the society. I have focus on the distinction in my content analysis.

40 These research procedures also allow me to counter what could be identified as the simplicity of language. As Buzan and Waever correctly argue, it is important to note that a security speech act is not defined by the use of the word security. In that sense, codifying agents’ use of “migration” to see whether it was presented as a threat assure me a sufficient large fish net to capture the nature of agents’ securitizing moves.

41 Since only ten Speeches from the Throne were made within the time range of my study (1989-2005), I have also investigated all Speeches from the Throne (57 speeches) since the end of the Second World War. The analysis reveals that no securitizing moves were made in regards to migration between 1945 and 1989.


43 Despite the fact that until 1993 the post was known as Secretary of State for External Affairs, I use the title of Minister of Foreign affairs for the sake of simplicity.

44 Interview, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada, 03.11.2005.

45 Unless otherwise indicated all translation are mine.

46 To be sure, migration was not the only aspect of the center-right enterprise of “redressement” (Balladur takes good care of including Jacques Chirac within the movement just 2 years before the presidential election), but it certainly holds a prominent place. Indeed, three of the eight elements justifying such an enterprise of “redressement” concern migration (the others being for example budget deficit and the justice crisis).

47 The “Debré” law, adopted on April 24, 1997 (i.e. two months before the legislative election) increases the repressive measures on migration (for example confiscation of passports of foreigners found in irregular situations).

48 That responsibility was transferred in 1998 (with the Chevènement law) to the Department of the Interior.

49 Interview 37, Department of Interior, 13.06.2006.

50 The question was asking, “How would you rank the following list regarding their involvement in the process of securitizing migration?” The list includes media, right-wing lobby groups, left-wing lobby groups, refugee advocates, public opinion, intellectual, diaspora communities. Respondents had to indicate
whether they are highly insignificant, insignificant, significant, or highly significant in the securitization process.

51 In French “Disparaître : Le sort inévitable de la nation française d’Amérique.” The documentary is a co-production Radio-Canada and the National Film Board of Canada.


54 A set of interviews with the editorial board of The Globe and Mail would be required to explore this particular question in details.

55 Contrary to Dubuc’s description we do not have to go back twenty-five years.

56 When the Canadian government granted immigrant status to the former Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, Mohammad al-Mashat, in an unusually short processing period, it sparked intense media and public debate. Stories about al-Mashat dominated the news for days and weeks.

57 See Berman, 2003; Hier and Greenberg, 2002; Ibrahim, 2005; Nyiri, 2005; Pickering, 2005; Silverstone and Georgiou, 2005

58 See Burn and Parker, 2003; Fairclough, 1995; Iyengar, 1994.


60 As I have argued in Chapter 3, securitization theory understanding of “conditions” enabling a successful securitization is inconclusive, at best unspecified and incomplete. Thus, I contend that a departure from the conceptual devices of “conditions” is necessary.

61 Many scholars have follow Weiner and Loescher path, see Kenyon Lischer, 2005; Lohrmann, 2000; Newman and Selm, 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006. One could argue that they have been heard. As Roberts highlights, the UN Security Council, which has a long record of involvement in refugee issues, has been far more preoccupied with them in the 1990’s than in any previous period. He points out that, in resolutions concerning at least five major crises, the Security Council has identified the fear of refugee flows and the actual flow as constituting threats to international security; Roberts, 1998.

62 On the importance of doing so, see the analysis of Lynch and Simon, 2003.

63 I have broken with the general structure of the study (1989 to 2005) to include political parties’ manifestos since the end of the Second World War for two reasons: (1) it gives a better overview of each political party’s position on the migration-security nexus; (2) and it permits and strengthens my analysis of rupture and continuity in how the movement of people is seen by political party.

64 What this means is that most Indo-Chinese refugees would not have been allowed into Canada in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. They did not in fact fit the definition of the 1951 UN Convention and had to enter Canada under the ‘designated class’ provisions of the 1976’s Act.

65 Despite being an individual election (as president), candidates are usually supported by a political party. Indeed, the candidate is generally seen as the leader or the representative of a political party’s or a coalition of political parties. In that sense, even though the manifestos take an individual form presenting the policy program of the presidential candidate, one should be reduce and underestimate the influence of the organization behind each candidate. Furthermore, presidential candidates usually have to go through an investiture process in order to be nominated as the political party’s presidential candidate. This process contextualize the power of the candidate on one hand, and underline the influence of the political party on the other hand.

66 Complete transcript of the debate can be found at http://www.leboucher.com/pdf/president/xdebat.pdf

67 As respondents could indicate more than one answer, the round up does not totalize 100 per cent.

68 Some aspects of French general attitudes toward immigration have crystallized over the years. The proportion of French respondents that did not know whether France’s national identity was at risk is down from an already low five percent in 1985 to a stunning one percent in 1993. Similarly, 13 percent did not know what to answer in 1985 when asked if immigrants were luck in France; down to only six percent in 1993, see.
In sharp contrast with the idea that "the term ' politicization' is nearly always applied to actions of which one disapproves." Baldwin, 1985. See also Ransom, 1987.
References
References

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CROP (2000). Political Surveys. CROP Inc.


McDougall, B. (1992b). Notes for an Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the official opening of the Canadian Foreign Service Institute. Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs, October 1.
Ouellet, A. (1994). Notes for an Address by the Honourable André Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs, September 8.


Valcourt, B. (1992). Notes for an Address by Bernard Valcourt, Minister of Employment and Immigration to the Legislative Committee Studying Bill C-86. Ottawa, Department of Employment and Immigration, July 27.


## Appendices

### Appendix A—Correlation coefficients and Contingency tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A.1</th>
<th>Correlation coefficients, migration and security, Canada, 1989-2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign affairs</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A.2</th>
<th>Correlation coefficients, migration and security, France, 1989-2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign affairs</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B—Summary of research

Table B.1  Corpus of research, Total number of speeches, Canada and France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Speech from the Trone</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Minister of Foreign affairs</th>
<th>Minister of the Interior</th>
<th>Minister of Citizenship and Immigration</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n/a means not applicable

Table B.2  Corpus of research, Interviews, Canada and France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and Citizenship</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Border Service Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (16)</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n/a means not applicable
Table B.3  Corpus of research, Total number of editorials, Canada and France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The Globe and Mail</em></td>
<td>341</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>La Presse</em></td>
<td>246</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Le Monde</em></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Le Figaro</em></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>587</strong></td>
<td><strong>312</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>899</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n/a means not applicable
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request to Access to Information Act</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All documentation, correspondence, letters, manuals, ministerial directives regarding Chinese migration, include strategic assessment files, trends in Chinese migration, internal security-immigration.</td>
<td>National Defence</td>
<td>No record could be located within the Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All briefing notes concerning: key words: Chinese immigration from the January, 1 1989 to August 30 2005</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>No records related to my request exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All briefing notes to Prime Ministers, between January 1, 1989 to July 11, 2005, regarding Chinese immigration</td>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
<td>I have received about 20 pages of briefing notes. However, simply reading the briefing notes is a daunting challenge as massive amount of information has been withheld pursuant to various sections of the Access to Information Act. Of these sections, the section 15(1), which contains information of which the disclosure could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct of international affairs or the defence of Canada is the most common one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing notes relating to immigration of all types: security issues but not including terrorists but particularly interested in notes pertaining to the Chinese</td>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration</td>
<td>I have received more than 500 pages of documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing notes on Chinese immigration from December 12, 2003 to June 21, 2005 in the Pacific region only</td>
<td>Canada Border Service Agency</td>
<td>No records of written correspondence and documentation were found in the Strategy, Coordination, and Enforcement Branches in reference to my request.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>