"THEY RECOGNIZE NO SUPERIOR CHIEF"

POWER, PRACTICE, ANARCHISM AND

WARFARE IN THE COAST SALISH PAST

by

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ABSTRACT

This inquiry focuses on warfare in the Coast Salish past. Located in the Northwest Coast of North America, the Coast Salish practiced warfare as a basic component of their culture, and warfare manifested in two main periods. Archaeologically, fortified defensive sites were constructed from 1600 to 500 BP. According to ethnohistoric documents and oral histories, conflicts also erupted in the decades after Euroamerican contact, about AD 1790. For this study, I incorporate archaeological, ethnographic, ethnohistoric, and oral historical data for an investigation of warfare, including Coast Salish practices, protocols, and ideology. I assess the types of settings in which warfare occurred and evaluate the motivations for conflict. Finally, I examine these practices for insights into Coast Salish sociopolitical organization and how it altered through time.

To evaluate the array of data, I employ a theoretical framework integrating power, practice, and anarchism. For power, I implement Eric Wolf’s modes of power to assess the intensity of conflicts and scales of defensive site construction. For practice, I harness Pierre Bourdieu’s materialist approach to culture, which is focused on historical, human actions, or practices; moreover, Bourdieu’s multiple types of capital provide a rubric for assessing motivations for warfare as individuals pursue and exchange various forms of capital. The theory of anarchism provides principles for evaluating the dynamics of societies without formal governments. These include an emphasis on local autonomy, voluntary association, mutual aid, network organization, and the decentralization of authority (and resistance to concentrations of authority). This framework illuminates how these principles varied throughout the Coast Salish past and highlights significant differences in defensive structures between precontact and colonial periods.
Both periods of warfare appear after phases of increasing entrenchment of elite power and hegemony (2400 - 1600 BP and ca. 500 to 200 BP). Both periods also exhibit a broader expanse of elites, or *nouveau riche*. I conclude that warfare was an anarchic practice implemented by Coast Salish factions to destabilize elite power structures and allow non-elites to gain wealth and prestige. These practices resulted in the decentralization of power—a heterarchy of chiefs, rather than a centralized chiefdom.
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Chapter I: Introduction

There are still many unanswered questions concerning the pre-contact culture of the Coast Salish of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and adjacent waters. Two of the most important of these have to do with authority and conflict.
—Wayne Suttles (1989:251)

In July of 1741, the Russian ship, St. Paul, of the Bering expedition steered within sight of Chicagof Island and sent a boat of ten well-armed men toward shore. After no sign for seven days, they sent another boat. Then, no sign from either. The next day, two Tlingit canoes approached their ship, and apparently with each viewing the other as hostile, they did not make contact. In the ship’s journal, they recorded: “We then became convinced that some misfortune had happened to our men” (Golder 1922:296). The first European encounter with the Northwest Coast seemed to have resulted in a violent fate. In 1792, Spanish explorers also soon became embroiled in conflict. After the sudden killing of one of their officers on the Olympic Peninsula by unknown perpetrators, they fired cannons at the next canoes they encountered, likely Makah, possibly Klallam or Straits Salish (Whitlam 1989). A decade later, the crew of the Boston would be massacred by the Nuu-chah-nulth, leaving only two survivors, captured as slaves (Jewitt 1987 [1815]). Not all early contacts resulted in conflict, as many Northwest Coast groups also were eager to trade for new kinds of goods, especially iron and firearms (e.g., Gormly 1977; Gunther 1972), but these accounts indicate tensions and conflict were commonplace.

Warfare was a ubiquitous part of life for the Northwest Coast peoples for more than a millennium. The evidence for warfare is found in the weapons they made, the armour worn, the villages that were fortified or camps hidden from plain view. Indeed, the evidence for wounds and scars of violent trauma has been documented from bones unearthed in burials. War also served as a path for achieving success and acquiring
status. Through the bounty of war, one could acquire loot and supplies to hold a potlatch ceremony, or, more permanently, to control a productive salmon stream and its bounty thereafter. Warfare was a way to avenge any slights to one’s character as well. In this manner, the cycle of warfare was embedded into cultural practices of the Northwest Coast.

It is unknown how long ago warfare occurred in the region, but defensive sites that are archaeologically visible began to appear throughout the Northwest Coast by about 1600 years ago, and began to proliferate around 1100 to 600 years ago (Moss and Erlandson 1992). Another period of defensive site construction occurs shortly after Euroamerican contact, and I demonstrate that this was no mere coincidence.

In this work, I analyze the archaeological evidence for warfare in the Coast Salish region (Figure 1), which has received less attention about warfare compared with the northern Northwest Coast. In general discussions of Northwest Coast warfare, examples are prone to highlight the warriors of the Haida, Tsimshian, Tlingit, or—perhaps the most renown in historical memory, due to the Fort Langley journals (Maclachlan 1998)—the Kwakwaka’wakw Lekwiltok, who menaced those to the north and south of them from their bases in the Johnstone Strait and Discovery Passage.

In presenting this history, I begin by establishing the theoretical approach I employ to interpret the archaeological evidence. This study is anthropological as well as historical, and so I situate the archaeology of Coast Salish warfare within ethnohistoric, ethnographic, and oral historical knowledge. The historical and ethnographic evidence is better suited to understanding warfare of the late precontact to postcontact periods, however, these sources do provide significant insights into warfare in the more distant period, however, these sources do provide significant insights into one of the two known efflorescences of warfare in the more distant Coast Salish past. An historically and ethnographically informed assessment of the postcontact rise of warfare

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1. Formerly, the Kwakwaka’wakw were known as the Kwakiutl (e.g., Suttles 1990c).
Figure 1: Map of Coast Salish area, including most groups mentioned in the text.
(Locations are approximate [after Suttles 1990a; 1951; Barnett 1955; Haeberlin and Gunther 1930.]}
is used to assess, interpret, and contrast with the archaeological evidence of the
precontact period of warfare, in an application of the direct historical approach (e.g.,
Marcus and Flannery 1994; Wedel 1938). In presenting the archaeological evidence, I
discuss the range of these defensive site types, their associated technologies (both tools
and features), and I make inferences about the strategies and tactics associated with their
construction. I also discuss how warfare and defensive sites provide insights into how
Coast Salish peoples imbued social relations with power; how they conducted, altered,
and shared their practices; and how they handled and arranged their sociopolitical
organization. Before I summarize the overall approach, I discuss why the topic of
warfare provides a useful focus for such a study.

**The Subject of Warfare**

Warfare is a subject that has been studied in many ways and from multiple
vantage points. Conflict, as journalists know, has inherent drama and so they use those
tensions—whether violent, sporting, or political—as the focal points of their stories.
Conflicts help to clarify issues and events, and an audience is often drawn to such
narratives. The catastrophic and eruptive nature of battle and clear opponents are
ready-made for a news story, an advantage over developments that occur at a gradual
pace, although perhaps no less different in result. With the archaeology of warfare, the
specific stories of conflict are largely gone, although its analysis can still highlight the
broader tensions and conflicts in the past.

Much of recent archaeology, since postmodernism, has emphasized agency (e.g.,
Robb and Dobres 2000), and I cannot think of anything more agential than the defense of
one’s community. Often postprocessual archaeologists discuss agency through various
symbolic expressions and rituals—there has even been a discussion of agency as
expressed through postmoulds (e.g., Pauketat and Alt 2005). However, agency is at its
most concrete in its assertion or defense of physical control, the taking and protection of
goods, resources, or territory; in causing the death of others to protect or enhance one’s
own life and status. Here, warfare with its active expressions can be used to interpret the archaeological record in more humanistic terms, not simply as resource gatherers or as markers for a cultural-typological signature, but as those fulfilling lives and having traditions worth fighting for. An analysis of warfare is one way of seeing the past in a more active, dynamic light that is more expressive of the behaviors of past peoples.

Depending on general cultural values, a warrior’s success in battle may be highly valued by his community and his successes glorified, bringing him both status and wealth. However, in some societies—as among some Coast Salish groups—warfare may be regarded negatively, particularly when not carried out in defense. Similarly, many acts initiating warfare in recent history and in the past have rationales for being defensive actions.² These ideological explanations imply an awareness that offensive actions may not be seen as just. For this work, however, warfare is simply another practice engaged in by people. For an archaeology of warfare, it suffices that warfare occurred in the past of the Northwest Coast, despite arguments in favour of or opposed to war. Indeed, the reasons and rationales—pro and con—for warfare were as multifaceted throughout the past as they are today.

Warfare is important for archaeologists because it contributes to structural change through time, highlighting shifts in the parameters of a group’s social and political operation. Settlement patterns of sites expand to include fortified sites or refuges, and residential villages and camps may be moved to less accessible or visible areas. A village burned in an attack might indicate its time of abandonment, or groups may abandon a region during times of increased warfare. Groups also might take over new territory. All of these actions might reveal shifts in a region’s culture history, indicating structural change.

² Examples include the German invasion of Poland that started World War II, which Hitler argued was a defensive act, merely “returning fire” after German agents (acting as Poles) staged an attack on a German radio station in Gleiwitz, Poland (Baker 2008:132-136). Even recently, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was purported to be “preemptive” against Saddam Hussein’s stockpiling of “weapons of mass destruction.”
Nested Levels of Analysis: Power, Practice, and Anarchism

In order to address broader aspects of meaning and rationale in warfare, I will follow Trigger’s (1989, 1991) holistic archaeology, as others have done in the region (e.g., McMillan 1999). To better understand the archaeological record, Trigger (1989:235) advocated the incorporation of ethnography, ethnohistory, linguistics, art history, oral traditions, plus any other relevant sources. He found that Marxism provided a context that “encourages the analysis of behavioral phenomena in as holistic a context as possible” (Trigger 1989:235) because it provides a theoretical framework that integrates economy and sociopolitical organization and allows for the interpretation of the broader sociopolitical context through physical archaeological remains that are largely indicative of economy. While this study will be holistic in Trigger’s sense, it also applies, more specifically, three predominant approaches to warfare in the past through nested levels of analysis involving power, practice, and anarchism.

As Trigger pressed for the utility of Marxism, I draw on Wolf’s (1990) modes of power. Like Trigger, Wolf (1999:14-15) was a proponent of a Marxist-based or Marxian approach, however, his conceptions of power are much more nuanced than Marx and Engels’ version. Wolf’s modes of power provide for understandings of the degree or scale of power, which is useful for a study of warfare. His model goes beyond a simple typology because he assesses the increasing concentrations and applications of power.

Also originally influenced by Marxism, Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) practice theory provides for the interpretation of physical archaeological remains as the patterns of historical and cultural practices, as opposed to functionalist processes (Pauketaut 2001). Accordingly, the detritus and features of the archaeological record result from past traditional practices; the habitual nature of practices structure or pattern the artifacts and features found archaeologically. In so doing, it provides a way to connect specific archaeological manifestations in the archaeological record to cultural traditions that change over time.
For the third part of the framework, I will use the theory of anarchism to interpret social organization. Since most societies throughout human history had no formal government, my premise is that the theory of anarchism provides principles for understanding non-state forms of social organization, such as that of the Coast Salish.

In a study of warfare, understanding the dynamics of past social organization is important—as Malinowski (1936:444) had discussed. For him, warfare was the “use of organized force between two politically independent units.” The emphasis in his definition is on the social organization of combat and how warfare indicates sociopolitical autonomy between competing groups, either groups asserting control or temporary dominance of others, or through pursuing independence, as in revolution or civil war. Accordingly, when warfare is present, there is no overarching entity or polity that controls affairs—the rules of dominance are precisely being worked out through the conflict itself.

To summarize, Wolf’s modes of power theory is used to understand the intensity and application of physical domination (or attempts at such). Practice theory is used to understand the traditional practices of warfare as indicated in the archaeological record that involve assertions of power. Finally, anarchism is used to assess how such practices were organized in societies without formal government. I discuss each of these three approaches in more detail in the next chapter. Below, I summarize the work as a whole.

The Theoretical Approach and Argument

What follows is an inquiry into the role of warfare in the Coast Salish past. Predominantly, this inquiry is archaeological, concerning the establishment of defensive sites. Defensive sites are a fruitful avenue for a perspective on warfare—these are the architecture for warfare. Additionally, I supplement this with other aspects of warfare as well, such as weaponry, strategy, and tactics. I combine this information with the ethnographic and ethnohistoric detail and the oral histories about Coast Salish warfare.

Defensive sites are large-scale constructions that exhibit certain traits unique to
the Coast Salish, yet these also reveal regional variability within the Coast Salish area overall. Of course, there are also changes through time, marking the shifts in the intensity and frequency of warfare. Such large-scale constructions are also indicators of the nature of Coast Salish sociopolitical organization, indicating the cooperative endeavors of households, villages, or regions for protection.

To undertake this inquiry, I conducted investigations at several defensive sites in the Strait of Georgia, both in the northern and southern Gulf Islands, and sites in the lower mainland and Vancouver Island. Most investigations were aimed towards surface mapping of these defensive features and core sampling. To buttress and inform the archaeological data, this investigation also consisted of significant investigation of available ethnographic, ethnohistoric, and oral histories. I have conducted ethnographic interviews relating to warfare, recording stories of the Cowichan warrior Tzouhalem, the Battle at Lamalchi Bay, and the Battle at Maple Bay.

Indeed, one of the main periods of warfare begins in the wake of contact, the

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3. The majority of the reports for the investigations conducted as part of this inquiry are or will soon be part of the library of permit reports managed by the Archaeology Branch of British Columbia, within the Ministry of Tourism, Sports, and the Arts in Victoria. These will include reports for the Indian Fort Site (DgRr-5; Angelbeck 2006) and the sites investigated in the northern Gulf Islands and Desolation Sound which include Smelt Bay (EaSf-2), Manson’s Landing (EaSf-1), and EaSd-3 (Angelbeck 2008a). A report will also be available for the investigations at Cardale Point (DgRv-1), on Valdes Island (Angelbeck 2008b). The investigations at Manor Point (Angelbeck 2008c) will be on file at the library maintained by the Laboratory of Archaeology at the University of British Columbia, as will the aforementioned reports.

4. Several archives were consulted as part of this inquiry. These included the Special Collections at the University of British Columbia, including the papers of Homer Barnett (1930-1940), Charles Borden (1905-1978) and Wilson Duff (1960-1976). I also researched at the British Columbia Archives and Library in Victoria. In Seattle, I accessed the Pacific Northwest Special Collections at the University of Washington, including the papers of Erna Gunther (1871-1981). Special attention was given to Wayne Suttles’ papers (1946-1986), particularly notebooks from fieldwork from 1948 to 1952. Other archives that were consulted included the Cortes Island Museum and Archives in Manson’s Landing and the archives of the Klahoose First Nation in Squirrel Cove, also on Cortes Island. Other archives maintained by First Nations that I was able to consult included the Stó:lō Nation Archives in Sardis, B.C., and the archives of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group in Ladysmith, B.C. I also consulted the library of archaeological permit reports maintained by the Archaeology Branch and searched site forms through their geographical database online.

5. I conducted ethnographic interviews in the Coast Salish area and worked on ethnographic projects in Stó:lō, Upper Skagit, and Hul’qumi’num territories that have proved useful to this study (Angelbeck 2003; Miller and Angelbeck 2006, 2008), particularly, interviews conducted with elders about the battles at Maple Bay and Lamalchi Bay, which were conducted at the
time covered explicitly by ethnohistory, ethnography, and even many of the oral histories of warfare. This postcontact data provides observations and documents useful for interpreting the archaeological data for warfare, which concerns much of the last 1600 years BP. In turn, the archaeological data allows us a perspective to evaluate the changes that occurred in warfare in the postcontact period, as defensive practices evolved to counter changes in the frequency and intensity of warfare and changes in sociopolitical conditions.

Warfare concerns the application of power, not only in the physical acts of the power displays and dances of a great warrior, or one group dominating another, but also through the networks of alliances that are called upon for attack or defense. To assess the various applications of warfare, I employ Wolf’s (1990) treatment of the four modes of power, which involve individual, interpersonal, organizational, and structural forms of power. More than a typology, these categories represent a scale of power of increasing dimensions. These modes allow us to evaluate the intensification of warfare in the past, through increasing scales of organization for both attack and defense.

While the politics and battles of warfare involve the dynamic interplay of power, individuals implement these actions often through an array of traditional means and options available to them. I deploy practice theory, as developed by Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and archaeologically adapted by Pauketat (2001). Traditional cultural practices pattern the physical deposition of artifacts and structure the nature of archaeological features. Moreover, practice theory is useful for understanding the strategies and tactics implemented by individuals in their pursuit of status and the acquisition of various forms of capital. The cultural practices for any group are influenced by how a group organizes to implement those activities.

To assess how cultural practices are organized—more particularly for this study, how Coast Salish organized to conduct their warfare practices and construct defensive

fortifications—I employ a materialist analysis. For many culture areas, Marxist analyses have been quite an effective form of analysis—a frame that was materialist, yet contained a body of theory enabling interpretations of sociopolitical and ideological social structures from the material patterns of largely techno-economic remains (e.g., McGuire 1992, 2008; Spriggs 1984a; Kohl 1984; Patterson 2003; Gilman 1981; Benn 1990). Here, I employ a materialist analysis that also shares a long history: that of anarchism. The premise is that the theory and principles of anarchism can be useful for understanding anarchic societies, or societies without formal governments. While Marxist theory is robust, it has been heavily oriented to state societies—discussions of “pre-capitalist” societies (e.g., Marx 1965 [1857-1858]) imply a teleology for the capitalist state, indicating that these anarchic societies are even defined by their lack of capitalism or statehood. Non-state societies were not a focus for Marx and Engels, which partially explains the need for theoretical reworkings of Marxism for anthropologists (e.g., Meillassoux 1980; Wolf 1982; Bloch 1983).

Anarchism, on the other hand, is about small-scale social organization, societies that form from the bottom-up, rather than those that are directed centrally from above. Local organization, however, can lead to the operation and maintenance of larger projects and even industrial endeavors as groups cooperate and federate into larger scales of organization, albeit the locus the control remains on the local level. Contrary to its common connotations of chaos that are inherent in “anarchy,” anarchism is about a form of social order. Anarchism consists of a body of theory as old, if not older, than Marxism, depending on when one believes it developed (Woodcock 1962; Marshall 1993; Guérin 1970). It similarly shows a long debate and dialogue, both with Marxists and internally amongst anarchist thinkers, that has sharpened its framework and resulted in numerous strains of thought.

The core principles of anarchism include: local and individual autonomy and expression, voluntary association, mutual aid, network forms of social organization, decentralization, antiauthoritarianism, gift economies, and direct democracy. Rather
than providing a model formula for how societies should function, anarchist thinkers emphasize core principles and practices that should be adapted to local settings and historical circumstances. These practices would not be static but would be constantly renegotiated to continue to adapt to the contingencies of new historical situations.

To many anarchists, these principles were not conceived during the 19th century by theorists, but really are reflections of innate tendencies that will surface through interactions of humans as social beings, principles whose options will occur as individuals engage with others, not only as kin but as a part of a community. These basic principles are coordinated in different fashions and in different degrees according to the needs of groups on local scales. These dynamics can link and federate with other social groups to operate and enact goals on larger scales, including urban and industrial societies. This theoretical framework—of power, practice, and anarchism—is erected in the following chapter, Chapter II. Subsequent chapters illustrate how these interlocked theoretical perspectives can be implemented.

In Chapter III, I discuss the anthropology and archaeology of warfare, primarily to illustrate how the theoretical framework of power, practice, and anarchism can effectively buttress as well as address some weaknesses in prior approaches. I argue that the utility of Wolf’s (1990) scales of power provides a method of evaluation that matches and builds upon the work of Otterbein (2004) and Kelly (2000). Another focus in the anthropology of warfare concerns the causes of warfare. I consider how practice theory provides a framework that does not reduce the human complexity in the multiple reasons for warfare to a single cause. Instead, by focusing on the exchangeability of capital, I argue that reasons for warfare can be more readily encompassed with subsequent transactions or exchanges from resources acquired in battle as well as provide responses that coincide with human reasons for warfare. Finally, I argue that anarchism adds to the discussion of the anthropology of warfare by stressing the sociopolitical dynamics of the bottom-up organization in small-scale and anarchic societies, which can implement larger scales of organization through the networks of
alliances. The theory of anarchism emphasizes that there are always forces within social organizations that aim to inhibit the concentration and centralization of power.

The subject of Chapter IV concerns the ethnohistory of warfare in the Coast Salish area since 1790, beginning with the first documents by the Spanish and continuing through the postcontact period, a period wherein warfare intensified until about 1870. I use Wolf’s (1990) scales of power to assess the different types of warring interaction. I demonstrate that the full range of Wolf’s scales of power are represented, from individual to structural power and argue that scales of warfare intensified at various points over the last two millennia. I close with a discussion of how the Euroamerican settlers themselves employed structural power, both in domination of Coast Salish and other Northwest Coast groups.

I provide an ethnographic overview of Coast Salish practices for warfare in Chapter V. I discuss the role of the warrior and the dangerous and unpredictable nature of warrior spirit powers. I show that the temporary authority given to the warrior in times of war indicates a principle for validating or justifying the nature of an individual’s authority among the Coast Salish. From the discussion of the variety of defensive practices, I show that the Coast Salish exhibit distinct practices among the Northwest Coast groups, commonly using tactics that allow for more flexibility, both at individual and at collective scales. I also assess the causes of warfare in the oral histories and apply the perspective of practice theory, with its emphases on improvisation of strategy and tactics within an array of cultural practices or structures. I argue here that the exchangeability of capital reveals how the Coast Salish could employ manifold rationales for warfare. Perspectives that try to reduce these reasons not only limit their applicability but are also not consistent with Coast Salish motives for warfare.

For Chapter VI, I present an overview of the archaeology of warfare on the Northwest Coast through the perspective of the theoretical framework of power, practice, and anarchism. I posit that over the course of millennia the nature of power altered through time, placing additional constraints on the freedom of an individual or
local group. I also consider how this changing nature of power is furthered or inhibited by changes in the human population. I argue that these are not meant as determining human cultural traits, but rather as settings that enabled actors to enhance their power sociopolitically.

In Chapter VII, I assess the array of defensive sites from predominantly archaeological sources, but also types described ethnohistorically and through oral histories. One key point of this chapter is that there were defensive practices that were unique to the Coast Salish. However, there was still a strong sense of local or regional preferences for particular practices. In fact, I show that no one Coast Salish defensive practice was employed by the Coast Salish as a whole. Rather, there were numerous core centers for certain practices with peripheries of influence. I argue that these patterns are reflective of alliance and interaction networks that Suttles (1987 [1960]) and others have documented.

Next, in Chapter VIII, I analyze arguments for whom the defensive sites are meant to defend against. Often the ethnographic and archaeological literature stresses the battles of the Coast Salish against western and northern groups, such as the Nuu-chah-nulth and Kwakwaka’wakw. I argue that this notion needs to be reconsidered and draw upon the oral histories and ethnohistoric accounts of warfare to assess the degree of warfare that was common among the Coast Salish themselves. After considering internal Coast Salish warfare, I also evaluate those battles between the Coast Salish and external groups. I provide an account and analysis of the Battle at Maple Bay to show how Coast Salish groups could freeze local tensions to ally in the face of larger threats, in an example of bottom-up organization through networks of alliances. A main point is that understanding the dynamics of their anarchic sociopolitical organization is critical for assessing internal conflicts among Coast Salish groups and their corresponding ability to unite into larger networks of cooperation and alliance against external groups.

I assess the evolution of defensive sites, in Chapter IX, to consider how some defensive sites are meant for households while others are designed for allied households.
or villages as a whole. Furthermore, I argue that defensive sites need to be considered beyond the context of any particular site. Because of the nature of Coast Salish alliance networks, defensive sites must be situated within regional contexts. Coast Salish areas exhibit a distributed nature of defense that shows a flexibility of response at multiple scales. I argue that Coast Salish defensive sites exhibit a range of possible defenses that operate to the scales of the threats they faced, from attacks on particular houses to villages or regions. Lastly, I demonstrate that the organization of defensive sites over the last 1600 years intensified to match the scale and frequency of warfare through time.

In Chapter X, I compare the two efflorescences of warfare, the Late Period and the postcontact period through a consideration of changes in sociopolitical organization. I argue that both periods exhibit the growth of *nouveau riche*. In both cases, I argue, warfare played a role in enabling commoners to gain wealth and status. Having been blocked or inhibited in their ability to gain wealth and status through productive methods, these individuals turned to warfare, or destructive methods, to make such gains. In both periods, I argue that warfare served to restrict the concentration of power among elites and redistribute it more equitably, if not in egalitarian fashion. Warfare consisted of practices that enabled individuals and households to enhance their power and autonomy. Viewed through the perspective of anarchist theory, the concentration of power among elites came to be seen as entrenched and unjustified. Those blocked from avenues to higher social status sought to disrupt the status quo and decentralize the existing power structure.

In the conclusion, Chapter XI, I provide a summary assessment and revisit a couple of Suttles’ quandaries regarding the role of authority and conflict among the Coast Salish in light of this inquiry into the nature of warfare.
Chapter II: The Theoretical Framework—Power, Practice, and Anarchism

To undertake an analysis of warfare in the Coast Salish region, I use three primary theoretical tools to assess the scale of power, the types of practices employed, and the nature of their heterarchical social organization. For power, Eric Wolf (1990) provides a treatment of four modes of power that increase in scale and effectiveness. For practice, Bourdieu (1977, 1990) developed a theory that integrates structure and agency, where long-standing traditions serve as an array of options for ready practices that individuals can use as they compete with other individuals for various forms of capital. For social organization, a theory is required that can encompass the fluid and heterarchical nature of the Coast Salish, which is neither centrally hierarchical nor egalitarian. While there were chiefs, there were not chiefdoms. There were elites, commoners, and slaves without the centralization of stratified states. The theory of anarchism provides principles for assessing such a society that does not fit general anthropological models of social evolution based teleologically toward the centralization of chiefdoms and states. Moreover, anarchism integrates well with both theories of practice and power. Anarchism also provides a theory of history that incorporates power, a point that anarchist theorists have repeatedly raised as a weakness in Marxism. Anarchism also provides principles of social organization that assess how practices are organized and implemented to ensure that individuals and local groups retain a high degree of autonomy.

Power

Warfare and violence are expressions of power; in fact, these represent the physical exertion of power of one group over another, or one individual over another.
In this sense warfare is a medium of social interaction where social and political power is played out in the lives and histories of both individuals and groups. Eric Wolf (1990) presented a framework for an analysis of power that provides valuable insight into the nature of social relations that manifest in times of warfare and conflict. He conceived of four “modes of power” (Wolf 1990:586-587):

(i) power as an attribute of a person, or *individual power*;

(ii) the ability of one to impose its will on another, or relational or *interpersonal power*;

(iii) the ability to influence or control individuals within social settings, or *organizational power*;

(iv) the ability to establish or demolish the settings themselves, or *structural power*.

His model is scalar in that each mode encapsulates the prior as nested levels or dimensions of power, from the individual (personal) to self/other relationships (interpersonal) to group dynamics (cultural) and structural governing (societal). Violence and warfare can be expressed as physical manifestations of power accordingly, from the individual to higher scales, which involve increasingly complex social relationships. The first mode, *individual power* (i), is the personal power which is drawn upon or displayed for purposes of politics and/or conflict. This is power as “potency or capability, the basic Nietzschean idea of power” (Wolf 1990:586). These are the characteristics or skills that may lead others to call on a particular individual to address a need or resolve a problem. This is power as intrinsic to a person but does not concern how that power is applied to others. The second mode, *interpersonal power* (ii), can be expressed as power enacted between two individuals, as between a leader and supporter, master and slave, or two combatants, as on a battlefield. Wolf (1990:586) described interpersonal power as that “the ability of an ego to impose its will on an alter,

7. Throughout the text, I continue to refer to these four modes of power parenthetically in this manner.
in social action,” which is the interplay of one’s power in contest or conflict with another. This mode describes the specific one-on-one interaction, but does not address “the nature of the arena in which the interactions go forward” (Wolf 1990:586), or what may be termed the social field according to Bourdieu (1977, 1990). The third mode of power, organizational power (iii), can reflect power expressions within a group, as through organization of others for defense or offense, or by factional competition for positions of control. Wolf (1990:586) described this as the ability of one actor to “circumscribe the actions of others within determinate settings,” which he also characterized as a form of “tactical power.” Lastly, the highest form of power, structural power (iv), is the ability to control or alter the social settings themselves, and this power involves more than organizing others within an existing social arena; as Wolf (1990:587) put it: “Structural power shapes the social field of action so as to render some kinds of behavior possible, while making others less possible or impossible” (Wolf 1990:587).

This is the kind of capital to harness and allocate labor power, and it forms the background of Michel Foucault’s notion of power as the ability “to structure the possible field of action of others.” Foucault (1984:428) called this “to govern,” in the 16th-century sense of governance, an exercise of “action upon action” (1984:427-428). Foucault himself was primarily interested in this as the power to govern consciousness, but I want to use it as power that structures the political economy. I will refer to this kind of power as structural power. This term rephrases the older notion of “the social relations of production,” and is intended to emphasize power to deploy and allocate social labor. These governing relations do not come into view when you think of power primarily in interactional terms (Wolf 1990:586-87).

Here Wolf wanted to concretize Foucault’s use of power from governance of consciousness to the more material aspects of economy, after Marx. Marxists had greatly improved understandings of power into realms involving governance and ideology and control of labour and economy. However, just as Wolf wanted to reorient Foucault’s emphasis, I would like to redirect this mode of power (as well as the other modes) to material forces beyond economy, towards physical enactments of power: warfare is the arena in which power unmasks itself for what it really is. Other more hegemonic forms are understood to be backed by physical power, but in warfare, the
interaction is reduced to the fist, club, or cannon. Of the four modes of power, the ability to alter the settings through structural power is the most destructive mode of power. In applying this mode to warfare, it is necessary to conceive of it beyond simply to “alter” or “orchestrate” the settings, as Wolf (1990:586-87) noted, but it also needs to include the ability to destroy the settings themselves. In fact, this applies to all the modes of power that Wolf defined—power indeed is social, economic, and institutional, but it must have recourse to and foundation in its physical expression, as demonstrated in warfare.

The differences between these modes of power and their intrinsic escalation in dimension from one mode to the next can perhaps be readily illustrated by abstracting these principles through chess. Wolf’s first mode of power, as intrinsic to the individual or person (i), can be seen as the property of the piece concerned, whether a bishop that moves diagonally, a rook vertically and horizontally, or the simple one-move advances of a pawn. Those are the powers intrinsic to the individual piece regardless of their relation to others. For the second mode of power, interpersonal power (ii), one piece can take another (or has power over another) by virtue of their individual powers (i). A rook, for instance, can take a pawn on its rank; a bishop can capture a knight along its diagonal. The application of this power to an opponent’s king is noted in the term, “Check,” meaning that power of one’s piece is threatening the opponent’s king. With the third form, organizational power (iii) is applied through the coordinated mobilization of one’s pieces, whether it is the combined attack of a pair of bishops or a cordon of pawns; notably, to mate a king requires this organizational power in order to win, as even the all-powerful queen cannot checkmate another king on her own (that is, if the King is not inhibited in his movement or powers by his own defensive pieces). The final form of power, structural power (iv), occurs when the organizational power of one’s pieces orchestrates a scenario that controls the setting of the game. It is that point when the setting is so structured that the opponent’s king cannot even make a move—in other words: “Checkmate.”
However, as an abstraction, using the game has its limits. It does not illustrate the obverse or destructive aspect of structural power which involves not controlling but destroying the settings themselves, going beyond the boundaries of the board’s limits: changing the rules mid-game—or swiping a backhand, clearing the pieces off the board itself.

Of the four modes of power, structural power (iv) should be of interest to archaeologists in studying warfare because it indicates points at which the conditions can change, and change rather quickly. Warfare does restructure societal settings. When novelists like Philip K. Dick (1962), with *The Man in the High Castle*, imagine a North America in which Germany won World War II—a common type of theme in imaginative fiction—these authors are playing on this aspect of the structural power of warfare which change the social settings and the course of history itself.

I propose that these four modes of power, identified by Wolf, can readily be identified as archaeological correlates in the Northwest Coast. Briefly, the burials of warriors accompanied by their clubs, indicate individual power (i), the power of individual warriors showcased with their weapons—turned from primarily functional weapons into symbols of the warrior. For interpersonal expressions (ii), examples have been well-documented by Cybulski (1992, 1994, 1999), among others, who have documented trauma resulting from interpersonal violence. These include bone fractures that are unlikely to result from falling out of a canoe: parry fractures on one’s forearms, projectile points embedded in bone, beheadings, and fatal club imprints on skulls. Also, the taking of slaves or the conversion of status from elite or commoner to slave is an expression of such power.

Defensive sites such as fortifications or refuges, a focus of this study, mark an example of organizational power (iii), as these sites involve a great amount of labour to

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8. Kenneth Ames (1995:157) has also found Wolf’s (1990) modes of power useful for analyzing Northwest Coast societies, remarking that it is “a framework for understanding the power of coastal elite in the household and beyond the household.”
construct. Moreover, the death of a chief in battle would be a significant event, causing political reorientation and renewed competition for power among and within the household. A chief’s death might lead to a shift in organizational power, although the societal settings and conditions would remain the same.

For structural power (iv), examples could be the demolishing of a village, or a people. This also could be represented in the introduction of a new technology, such as firearms, which might shift the settings and the balance of power advantageously towards one group over another. Coast Salish groups demolished almost to extinction the Chemakum people of the Port Townsend area, ca. 1845 to 1850 (Eells 1985:351; Boyd 1990:136; Elmendorf 1993:143-145). It is this latter level of warfare that causes momentous shifts in the archaeological record, as one group conquers its neighbours and spreads new practices and material symbols throughout the region—sometimes in complete disregard of the subjugated peoples’ traditions or sites. Whereas organizational power (iii) will have a pattern indicative of a sustained tradition of its associated practices, such practices will generally leave a pattern of continuity. Structural power (iv), on the other hand, is more likely to result in significant social and material discontinuities.

As Wolf (1990) indicated, much of the recent interest in power in the social sciences derives from the work of Foucault, who attempted to delineate the many dimensions of power. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault (1972:7) stated that “Traditional history attempts a coherent, continuous narrative, when history is marked by discontinuities and irruptions.” Such discontinuities would result from power exerted in structural ways, altering both settings and practices. Wolf’s discussion of modes of power is useful for an archaeological analysis of warfare, because it provides a scalar framework for understanding the modes of power expressed. Wolf (1990:587) did not intend that these modes of power as typological categories, but rather as explanatory devices for understanding human interaction: “it is the task of anthropology ... to attempt explanation, and not merely description, descriptive integration, or
interpretation.”

Power, according to Flyvbjerg (2001), is not just an aspect that has been less studied in anthropology, as Wolf had stated, or in the social sciences more generally. Rather, Flyvbjerg (2001) considered analyses of power central to analyses in the social sciences. After Foucault, Nietzsche, and Weber, he proposed that power should always be analyzed as internal to all social relations, not as an external “tool” or other, but as the medium of social relations. Moreover, power is not just a dominating, restrictive or negative force, but is also productive and positive. Furthermore, it too often is focused in individuals or centers when it should be analyzed as intrinsic to sets of relations (Flyvbjerg 2001:131-132). The use of Wolf’s modes of power is a way to undertake a phronetic approach to warfare in the past, situating power as a raw medium of interaction. A phronetic approach, in its orientations to specific contexts and action, can be aided archaeologically by a focus on practices, the patterned forms of actions.

His larger aim was to make the social sciences more relevant once again, since these disciplines have declined in societal importance in recent decades relative to the natural sciences. The reason, he argued, is that the social sciences mostly have tried to emulate the natural sciences, with their “physics envy,” producing universal laws, accumulating knowledge, and making predictions. Flyvbjerg (2001) argued that social sciences are an entirely different domain and that any effort towards approximating natural science is flawed. The answer is not to be in reducing social entities to physics or chemistry, rather it is deal with social science concerns through its own properties and dynamics. Part of the problem is that Western civilization emphasizes scientific knowledge and technology to the detriment of practical reason and ethics. Flyvbjerg discussed his three forms of knowledge as originally defined by Aristotle. Episteme is scientific knowledge (“epistemology”), based in analytical reasoning that generates universal principles that are invariable and context-independent. Techne refers to craft or art (“technology” / “technique”) and is pragmatic, variable, and context-dependent, although oriented towards production. The final form of knowledge is phronesis (which has no cognates in English), which refers to practical reason or ethics; it is pragmatic, variable, and context-dependent and is oriented towards action (Flyvbjerg 2001:57). The epitome of social science domain is the case study, which allows not for universals, but for examples of how humans relate. To Aristotle’s formulation, Flyvbjerg (2001) added that a conception of power must be integrated for a truly effective social science.
Practice Theory

All social life is essentially practical. All the mysteries which lead theory towards mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

—Karl Marx (1970a [1845])

To study warfare from a primarily archaeological perspective, and with a focus on the many modes of power associated with it, we must identify the practices of warfare in the archaeological record. Practice theory, as articulated by Bourdieu (1977, 1990), permits an analysis of the basic practices that actively created the archaeological record. In later periods these practices are also noted in ethnohistorical records, ethnographies, and oral histories. For archaeologists, past practices (in Bourdieu’s terms) contribute to the production of the archaeological record. That is, they extend—in a rather simple way—beyond the descriptive nature of the artifact or feature to the social traditions that produced those patterned actions. Almost fifty years ago, processual archaeologists such as Lewis Binford (1962) exhorted archaeologists to do just that as well. Binford criticized the established archaeological practice of building culture histories as a particularistic, descriptive, and typological exercise. He and his students advocated an approach that emphasized understanding the social and economic processes that produced the patterning of archaeological remains. However, as Pauketat (2001) has noted, the processualists were heavily functional in their approach and were actually interpreting functions or adaptations often quite removed from the material evidence. Their interpretations regularly constructed abstract “processes” that invoked ideal systemic laws and causes as befitting a cultural ecology of the archaeological record. Processualists advanced archaeology with their interpretations of site formation processes, for example, but practice theory attempts interpretation on the microscale, closer to the actions that produced the archaeological record. As Pauketat (2001:74) stated, “the practices are the processes, not just consequences of processes.” This puts the locus of change not on external and reified systemic processes but rather upon the
practical actions of individuals and groups themselves. Thus it is important to “locate the processes of culture change in practices rather than explaining those practices as consequences of external factors or mechanisms to which people passively and uniformly respond” (Pauketat andAlt 2005:231). This would include all types of practices, such as the making of a stone tool, the building of a burial cairn, the holding of a feast, the exchange of luxury items, or the construction of a fort.

A concept from practice theory that is useful for the understanding of past human action is the notion of habitus, which Bourdieu (1977:78) described as “history inscribed into nature.” Rather than mere adaptations to ecological changes, habitus recognizes how culture and its traditions are embodied and structured within its practitioners through time. As individuals express the traditions and practices of their culture, the nature of that habitus leaves its patterns throughout the archaeological record. And it does so in a historical sequence.

This concept has been applied on the Northwest Coast by other archaeologists such as Mackie (2003), Grier (2001, 2006), and Mathews (2006). As Mackie (2003:285) noted in his study of site distributions along the West Coast of Vancouver Island, “To elaborate upon Bourdieu, the structured dispositions of the habitus lead to a structured deposition, which itself acts as a structuring deposition” (emphases in original). The structured dispositions of habitus are the constraining or guiding elements of culture in the improvisatory and creative acts of past peoples. Rather than treating past individuals as passive reactors to changes in ecological stimuli, practice theory incorporates tradition and agency into its operations, reflective of both the passing on of traditional knowledge and the bricolage it forms as those agents have to improvise in addressing new conditions. As Grier (2006:104) put it, practice theory offers “overarching structures [that] provide a spatio-temporal continuity to activity performance, turning the repeated everyday happening over time into an archaeological pattern.” That is, practice theory is not just a specific action but is also about how it connects with or is representative of the broader history or tradition of that practice,
which guides that specific action. It is how Bourdieu conceives of history: that which connects the past to the present, or in archaeological terms, predominantly the moment of deposition.

Another concept Bourdieu presented was that of the field. Similar to Wolf’s (1990) use of the term “arena,” as mentioned above, it is the setting in which individuals strategize and implement tactics in the struggle for resources. The field consists of a set of social positions structured by, and structuring, their power relationships to one another. That is, the field is the field of social struggle. Thus, the approach is materialist; in fact, it is ultimately derived from (Marx 1970 [1845]), when he noted that “all social life was essentially practical.”

As Marx is known to have turned Hegel upside-down, Bourdieu, it is argued by Jenkins (1992), flipped the structuralism of Levi-Strauss upside-down, turning his abstract models onto a materialist base; Bourdieu found structure in material practices and within each of us as bodily *habitus*. In this manner, Bourdieu quoted from Marx’s (1970 [1845]) *Theses on Feuerbach* for a frontispiece, which stated that “idealism naturally does not know real concrete activity as such.” Bourdieu’s aims were to provide a method for analyzing real activities or practices, which explored not structural rules but improvised strategies of action. In so doing, he not only countered structuralism but also the solipsistic existentialism of Sartre (1956) by stressing that the nature of *habitus*, while subjectively generated originally, is objectively learned through inculcation within one’s culture and class; thus, both elements of objectivity and subjectivity play a part in a dialectic of structure and structuration. Both Levi-Strauss and Sartre were then classed, by Bourdieu as idealistic whereas his approach is materialistic and practical.

Bourdieu also expanded upon Marx’s materialist orientation, by addressing types of capital beyond economic forms: social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital. Like Wolf’s modes of power, these forms are not simply categories in a typology—rather they interact dynamically. For instance, Bourdieu had emphasized that each form of capital is exchangeable for another form of capital. With these
concepts, Bourdieu provided insight into other forms of domination beyond the economic. Accordingly, class struggle is not just against the positions of the upper class, but also is a struggle against the meanings and significations that are held by the elite, those symbols and cultural codes that help aid their control through hegemonic practices.10

A practice approach necessarily integrates power into its analysis; in fact, it can be combined readily with Wolf’s (1990) modes of power to assess how organizational power (iii) or structural power (iv) can constrain or control the practices of others in certain contexts or social fields. Bourdieu emphasized the improvisatory nature of people furthering their ambitions by enacting practices and options to advance their own capital or power. This can be seen as the freedom of the actor to either choose particular practices or even create new ones—although, *habitus* creates dispositions toward readily available and historically acceptable practices. On the other hand, others’ modes of power in the social field are always at play, constraining the available practices or actions of another.11 The powers of another (ii, iii, or iv) can limit a person’s actions, but also the power of an individual (i) can enable a greater range or freedom to pursue certain practices or options, as one can gather capital or organize with others into higher forms of power (iii & iv), matching or surpassing the organization of the opposition. Similarly, one’s cultural traditions and dispositions in *habitus* provide constraints as to what options are available to pursue. This is the sense in Marx’s (1964 [1852]) statement: “The traditions of the dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the

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10. Jenkins (1992:59) noted that Bourdieu was not the first to emphasize practices, as Erving Goffman (1959; also 1961, 1967) had undertaken such studies of institutions from within (especially in his main study on asylums) experiencing their practices, not just studying the documents of the institution, as Foucault (1988) had done.

11. Trigger (1991) titled his major exposition on holistic archaeology “Constraints and freedoms,” finding that processual archaeology had been quite effective in determining external constraints upon behaviour (environmental, technological), while postprocessualists had been better about internal constraints imposed by cultural traditions. Internal constraints are indicated in the practice theory sense of *habitus* and tradition. However, Trigger (1991:559) also emphasized the improvisatory nature of past peoples by stressing that people are not fully constrained, that there is freedom in their ability to pursue actions to counter both external and internal constraints.
minds of the living.” However, Marx also acknowledged that there was a striving to counter such traditions as well, and it involves pursuing one’s aims as much as possible within existing constraints:

Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted (Marx (1964 [1852]).

Cultural traditions can also be viewed as freeing, if there is a broader range of options available, although the range of options will inevitably vary through time. In the past of the Northwest Coast, such abilities to keep the options that one has earned would have involved constant renegotiation or reproduction of the capital and constant reenaction of the power one has gained. As Bourdieu (1977:183) discussed for societies without government, strategies and tactics used to achieve goals are temporary and must be renewed:

In societies which have no “self-regulating market” (in Karl Polanyi’s sense), no educational system, no juridical apparatus, and no State, relations of domination can be set up and maintained only at the cost of strategies which must be endlessly renewed, because the conditions required for a mediated, lasting appropriation of other agents’ labour, services, or homage have not been brought together.

Bourdieu’s point is that the nature of sociopolitical organization affects how practices are enacted, what practices are available, and the degree of power that can be achieved—particularly in societies with “no State,” as Bourdieu noted, or anarchic societies. Practice theory, like Marxism, provides a basis of interpreting from material evidence readily to broader theorization within social and political structures. Some of Marx’s theories have been readily taken up by archaeologists (e.g., McGuire 1992; Gilman 1981; Spriggs 1984b; Kohl 1981; Childe 1951, 1956), because they allowed interpretations of modes of production and the sociopolitical relations of production. Because many classes of archaeological remains result from subsistence practices and economic activity, Marxist theory provides a rubric that ties economy to sociopolitical structure and ideology. Bourdieu’s practice likewise provides such an overarching
theory that allows interpretations of specific practices as patterned by habitus in the archaeological record to broader interpretations of tradition and the sociopolitical struggles for various forms of capital. Here, I advocate that anarchism likewise provides such a rubric that is also materialist or practical in orientation. And, similar to practice theory, it also does not rely on class struggle for its interpretation, a feature better suited for capitalist state societies, as Marx had intended.

Anarchism

Anarchism involves a movement and philosophy that has been debated and worked over for many decades concerning how societies should interact without overarching forms of government.12 Like Marxism, which similarly had a long history of theorizing how a communist state would come about, many principles of anarchism might also be useful for understanding the nature of societies without government, such as those of the Northwest Coast.

The theory of anarchism, which has been referred to by that label since the time of Bakunin—a main opponent of Marx in the late 1800s, during the early days of the International Workers of the World. Others see its anti-government traits in the American Revolution (e.g., Thomas Paine) or the French Revolution, while some see these antiauthoritarian principles as extending much further back than that, even millennia, back to the ancient Greeks or Taoists (Marshall 1993). Anarchist theory

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12. Theorists of anarchism include numerous proponents, the first of which are predominantly advanced in the mid to late 19th and early 20th century, such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (e.g., 1890, 1972, 1979; Noland 1967, Woodcock 1962); Mikhail Bakunin (e.g., 1916, 1950; Morris 1993; Maximoff 1964; Carr 1937); Peter Kropotkin (e.g., 1902, 1910, 1946, 1996a [1901], 1996b [1910 -1915]; Morris 2004); Elisée Reclus (e.g., 1886; Clark and Martin 2004); and Emma Goldman (1917). In many quarters, other major thinkers are regarded within the scope of anarchism, such as William Godwin (1976 [1796]), Max Stirner (1907), and Leo Tolstoy (1990). Into the later 20th century, the theory of anarchism further developed through Rudolph Rocker (1998), Colin Ward (1973), Noam Chomsky (2005), and Murray Bookchin (1971, 1991), among others. Recently, theorists have also adapted anarchism in light of its affinity or relevance to postmodern and poststructuralist thinkers such as Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan (May 1994, 2001; Newman 2001; Call 2003). In anthropology, anarchism has been discussed by Perry (1978), Clastres (1987, 1994), Barclay (1982, 1997, 2003), Graeber (2002, 2004, 2007), and Morris (2005).
emphasizes principles of network organization (as opposed to centralized hierarchies),
gift economies, local autonomy, and actively opposes the rise of centralized authorities.
Anarchism also provides a theory of history that is an alternative to, if not contrary to, a
Marxist one. In the following, I discuss the core principles of anarchist theory before an
assessing an anarchist theory of history.

Core Principles of Anarchism

Due to long history as well as its acephalous nature, anarchism actually
comprises a broad corpus of ideas with a variety of strains. And, unlike Marxism, which
is tightly associated with primarily one individual (especially in name), no one thinker is
predominant. Just as its theoretical outlook suggests, much of anarchist thought and
practice encourages variation and is oriented to local circumstances. There are
individualist (“egoist”) strains, collectivist, anarcho-syndicalist, neo-primitivist,
ecological anarchist, and more; David Graeber (2004) has noted that these anarchist
strains are named not after philosophers, but after practices or principles.13 True to
anarchist beliefs, no one thinker is dominant. It has been said that one does not even
have to know who Kropotkin, Bakunin, Rocker or Bookchin are to be an anarchist—a
similar statement could not be said for Marxism. Rather than canonical texts, there is

13 “Now consider the different schools of anarchism. There are Anarcho-Syndicalists, Anarcho-
Communists, Insurrectionists, Cooperativists, Individualists, Platformists.... None are named
after some Great Thinker; instead, they are invariably named either after some kind of
practice, or most often, organizational principle. (Significantly, those Marxist tendencies
which are not named after individuals, like Autonomism or Council Communism, are also
the ones closest to anarchism.) Anarchists like to distinguish themselves by what they do,
and how they organize themselves to go about doing it. And indeed this has always been
what anarchists have spent most of their time thinking and arguing about. Anarchists have
never been much interested in the kinds of broad strategic or philosophical questions that
have historically preoccupied Marxists—questions like: Are the peasants a potentially
revolutionary class? (Anarchists consider this something for the peasants to decide.) What is
the nature of the commodity form? Rather, they tend to argue with each other about what is
the truly democratic way to go about a meeting, at what point organization stops being
empowering and starts squelching individual freedom. Or, alternately, about the ethics of
opposing power: What is direct action? Is it necessary (or right) to publicly condemn
someone who assassinates a head of state? Or can assassination, especially if it prevents
something terrible, like a war, be a moral act? When is it okay to break a window? To sum up
then: 1. Marxism has tended to be a theoretical or analytical discourse about revolutionary
strategy. 2. Anarchism has tended to be an ethical discourse about revolutionary practice”
(Graeber 2004:5-6).
instead an adherence to a set of principles that guides much of anarchism and its practices and these provide connections among the various strains. These principles include: individual and local autonomy, voluntary association, mutual aid, network organization, communal decision-making, direct action, justified authority, and decentralized forms of social organization (in addition to resistance to centralized forms, such as that of states). Here I focus on the principles that are most relevant for an archaeological application.

**Individual and local autonomy**

Within anarchic societies, the locus of control is not within any center but rather is distributed more broadly throughout the society. The centers of control are stronger at the scale of the individual, family, and household. According to anarchist theorists, society should be organized from the bottom-up, with groups voluntarily associating with other groups in broader confederations at larger scales. The locus of control remains on the local scale. Proudhon (1890) had argued for “the autonomy of the private reason, originating in the difference in talents and capacities.” While anarchists advocate for autonomy, it does not mean atomism, which implies independent agents concerned for their own affairs. Rather, autonomy conveys personal and local group freedom but with extensions of cooperation through voluntary association.

**Voluntary association**

Anarchism is closely associated with the furtherance and enhancement of individual and local freedom and expression. An emphasis on autonomy fits with a principle of voluntary association. Instead of a state determining the relationships of its constituents, anarchists prefer individuals to voluntary associate with other groups for tasks or shared interests. Even within modern state societies, Kropotkin (1927:66; cited in Morris 2004:69) often pointed to the voluntary societies that are “constituted everyday for the satisfaction of some infinitely varied needs of civilized man,” including trade
unions, professional and scientific societies, or the Red Cross. These societies were formed without decree from a centralized government for their formation or for individuals to necessarily participate; rather, these form from shared social needs and interests. With smaller societal scales, voluntary association is a principle applied when individuals or groups opt to form an alliance or to participate with others for collective endeavors that local groups could not accomplish on their own. Voluntary associations will tend to ensure that tasks or activities conducted meet the needs of those involved. If the interest or need in such an activity wanes or becomes unnecessary, the association will dissipate. Voluntary association with a group or activity also will tend to ensure positive relationships between those involved. If relations turn negative, the association or relationship can simply be severed. Therefore, to maintain relationships and such associations, a principle of mutual aid connects the shared interests of those involved.

**Mutual aid**

In a society developed on these lines, the voluntary associations which already now begin to cover all the fields of human activity would take a still greater extension so as to substitute themselves for the state in all its functions. They would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations of all sizes and degrees, local, regional, national and international—temporary or more or less permanent—for all possible purposes: production, consumption and exchange, communications, sanitary arrangements, education, mutual protection, defence of the territory, and so on.

—Peter Kropotkin (1910)

Mutual aid is a driving principle for connecting individuals and groups in cooperative endeavors. It contributes to a self-organizing, bottom-up form of social interaction. Self-organization refers to the ability of groups to organize organically, without a centralized authority governing the organization of groups. Anarchists believe that no central authority is necessary to accomplish any given endeavor. To Kropotkin, the cultural evolution of humankind attests to this, as humans have survived and proliferated for most of their evolutionary history in societies without government. While, as humans, we may not have always been formally governed, we have always
been social. This was explicitly a focus of Kropotkin in *Mutual Aid* (1902). In the decades after Darwin (1970 [1859]) published *The Origin of Species* there was a proliferation of ideas, influenced by Thomas Malthus’ (1798) economic principles which emphasized competition. Thomas Huxley (1888) called it the “struggle for existence,” while Herbert Spencer (1891) extolled the “survival of the fittest.” Kropotkin viewed such notions as attempts to buttress capitalism, and, while recognizing that struggle and conflict were important factors in evolution, wanted to emphasize that cooperation was also a critical factor.

Stephen Jay Gould (1988:11) stated that “Kropotkin’s basic argument is correct,” noting that he perhaps overemphasized cooperation, but primarily to balance the Social Darwinist tendency that overemphasized competition. Gould (1988:16-17) remarked how Darwin had investigated the tropics, while Kropotkin, soon after reading *The Origin of Species*, conducted seasons of geographical explorations in Siberia. Their experiences led each to separate conclusions. Whereas Darwin saw the fight over resources in the plentiful, tropical environs, Kropotkin witnessed organisms whose primarily struggle was against the environment. From this experience, Kropotkin postulated that there were two types of struggles: one that engaged each organism against another, or competition; the other being individual organisms in coordination against the environment:

Two aspects of animal life impressed me most during the journeys which I made in my youth in Eastern Siberia and Northern Manchuria. One of them was the extreme severity of the struggle for existence which most species of animals have to carry on against an inclement Nature; the enormous destruction of life which periodically results from natural agencies; and the consequent paucity of life over the vast territory which fell under my observation. And the other was, that even in those few spots where animal life teemed in abundance, I failed to find—although I was eagerly looking for it—that bitter struggle for the means of existence, among animals belonging to the same species, which was considered by most Darwinists (though not always by Darwin himself) as the dominant characteristic of struggle for life, and the main factor of evolution (Kropotkin 1902).

This aspect of evolution is repeatedly returned to, especially among anthropologists. For instance, Quigley (1971), Read (2003), and Isaac (1978) have argued
for the importance of cooperation in hominid evolution. In an ethnography of the Kung San, Alan Barnard (1993) attempted to use Kropotkin’s concept of mutual aid as a better depiction of their life-ways, particularly as “an alternative, very much non-Marxist view of primitive communism.” Richard Lee’s (1988) description of San foragers as exemplifying primitive communism or a communal mode of production provided an interesting perspective on the economics of communalism, however, Barnard argued that a foraging ethos extended well beyond the economy. Asserting there was in fact a “foraging mode of thought,” he described communalism as a mode of interaction that determines social relations and is ideologically embedded (Barnard 1993). These social interactions of mutual aid and cooperation form, through repeated engagements with others, networks of organization.

**Network organization**

Network forms of organization do not exhibit centralized or hierarchical forms. Instead of channelling information downward from those in the upper echelons of a pyramidal structure, networks exhibit rich horizontal linkages. This does not mean that all nodes in a network are equal, as placement within a network can engender certain advantages. However, in networks, the flows of information are more open and organizational responses generally occur at a local level. Among many groups, including the Coast Salish, many social networks are created along lines of kinship. As Read (2003) argued, kinship—despite its namesake—is not really about literal kin, nor genealogical ties, but about how cultural groups ascertain who is related. Kinship is a method of extending one’s familial relations beyond those immediately related biologically. Read (2003) viewed kinship as a mode of ready self-organization that promotes cooperative behavior, a point that parallels Mithen’s (1996) argument that emphasizes sociality throughout human evolution, more so than technical or environmental knowledge.

Mutual aid or cooperative endeavors are seen by anarchists as the core dynamic for the self-organization of groups and for the linking of those local corporate groups
into larger community and regional networks. Anarchic organization is not driven by singular leaders, but rather are generated and structured by the needs of the people involved. According to Bookchin (1991), the practical needs of individuals within local groups are the medium of organization, and organizations can respond as immediately as the need arises, which he described as “an ordering and structuring force.” Colin Ward (1973:11) stated that, in part because of this emphasis on self-organization, this revealed that anarchism is not utopian (as many have classed it): “far from being a speculative vision of a future society, it is a description of a mode of human organization, rooted in the experience of everyday life.” He referred to anarchism as a “theory of spontaneous order” (Ward 1973:28). Likewise, Bakunin (1950 [1872]:18) himself, noted that “liberty must establish itself in the world by the spontaneous organisation of labour.”

Network forms of organization, as defined by Podolny and Page (1998:59), are “any collection of actors (N>2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange.” Networks are in opposition to market-based or hierarchical relations. Market relations are short lived, existing only for the period of exchange—the end of the exchange effectively ends the relationship, whereas networks maintain those relationships. Hierarchical relations exhibit a “clearly recognized, legitimate authority [that] exists to resolve disputes,” whereas networks exhibit conditional and situational authorities (Podolny and Page 1998:59). Moreover, they noted that network forms of organization adapt more quickly to changes due to faster lines of communication than those found in centralized forms. Not only does information travel faster, but it also conveys “richer, more complex information” that also is subject to a wider array of offered responses from various nodes in the network, as opposed to the narrow options to be delivered from the managers in centralized forms of organization (Podolny and Page 1998:62-63).

Archaeologists have also analyzed principles of self-organization as important
for understanding the past. For instance, David Braun and Steven Plog (1982) argued, using studies of the U.S. Southwest and Southeast, that “tribal social networks” were adaptive organizations that could respond to environmental resource instabilities. For Bronze Age Europe, Gilman (1981) stated that labour-intensive projects (such as plow agriculture or irrigation canals) would not necessarily have been led by centralized elites, as each of the examples, considering the scale, could have been locally organized and maintained. Through networks, major problems and projects could be effectively addressed in decentralized fashion.

Decentralization and antiauthoritarianism

True progress lies in the direction of decentralization, both territorial and functional, in the development of the spirit of local and personal initiative, and of free federation from the simple to the compound, in lieu of the present hierarchy from the centre to the periphery.

— Peter Kropotkin (1910)

If mutual aid is something anarchists support, authority is something they oppose. Sebastien Faure wrote that “Whoever denies authority and fights against it is an anarchist” (Woodcock 1962:9). Saul Newman (2001:37) observed that “History, for anarchists, is this struggle between humanity and power”—such is anarchism’s focus on antiauthoritarianism, and, in particular, its rejection of state authority. According to Foucault (1980, 1997), all social relations of dominance and coercion embody relations of power. Moreover, power refers not to an abstract entity or essence, but rather refers only to the nature of relationships. He emphasized that power was never total. If power were totalizing, it could no longer be considered as power. Power relations indicate that some degree of freedom is able to be deployed by those actors.14 One could say that

14 “[P]ower relations are thus mobile, reversible, and unstable. It should also be noted that power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free. If one of them were completely at the other’s disposal and became his thing, there wouldn’t be any relations of power. Thus, in order for power relations to come into play, there must be at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides.... But the claim that ‘you see power everywhere, thus there is no freedom’ seems to me absolutely inadequate. The idea that power is a system of domination that controls everything and leaves no room for freedom cannot be attributed to me” (Foucault 1997:291-93).
Foucault presented a social science variant on Newton’s third law, “To every action there is an equal and opposite reaction,” which would be: To every application of authoritarian power there is an opposing resistance.

Much of the anarchist literature on power concerns the state, although in this study, I am particularly concerned with the application of power in non-state societies. A few anarchist theorists extended their notions of power to non-state cases as well. Proudhon, for instance, noted that “All parties without exception, in so far as they seek for power, are varieties of absolutism” (Woodcock 1962:18). Thus, through an anarchist perspective, authoritarian power is something to be challenged. Newman (2001:37) praised the anarchist critique of Marxism for opening the door to wider examinations of noneconomic forms of power. Proudhon and Newman, however, both exhibit a rather shallow conception of power, limiting it to a vertical notion of power, expressed from top to bottom. Anarchists recognize power in solidarity, or what could be called horizontal power, the power of solidarity. Opposition to authority is often described as the lifeblood of anarchist revolutionaries and, accordingly, helps to sustain anarchic communities. As Bakunin (1970 [1916]:35) said, concerning resistance to authority, “This is the sense in which we are really Anarchists.” However, outspoken Bakunin was about authority, he did not reject it entirely. Rather, it is more accurate to state that anarchists maintain an opposition to authoritarianism.

**Justified authorities**

Does it follow that I reject all authority? Far from me such a thought. In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroad, I consult that of the architect or engineer. For such or such special knowledge I apply to such or such a savant. But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor the savant to impose his authority upon me. I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticism censure. I do not content myself with consulting authority in any special branch; I consult several; I compare their opinions, and choose that which seems to me the soundest. But I recognize no infallible authority, even in special questions; consequently, whatever respect I may have for the honesty and the sincerity of such or such an individual, I have no absolute faith in any person. Such a faith would be fatal to my reason, to my liberty,
and even to the success of my undertakings; it would immediately transform me into a stupid slave, an instrument of the will and interests of others.

—Bakunin (1970 [1871]:32)

Anarchists recognize “authorities” about a matter for their knowledge or experience. Bakunin (1970 [1871]:32) stated “I bow before the authority of special men because it is imposed upon me by my own reason.... Therefore there is no fixed and constant authority, but a continual exchange of mutual, temporary, and, above all, voluntary authority and subordination.”

15 This view of authority as being something rooted in specialized knowledge or skills has commonly been noted anthropologically among many cultures. Among the Coast Salish Puyallup-Nisqually, Marian Smith (1940) noted that warriors, or war chiefs, were given specific powers over villages, related to war activities, but only for the duration of hostilities. The designation of such authority must be carefully and situationally justified, lest it become authoritarian.

Noam Chomsky summarized this anti-authoritarian stance as a core expression of the anarchist principles:

Anarchism, in my view, is an expression of the idea that the burden of proof is always on those who argue that authority and domination are necessary. They have to demonstrate, with powerful argument, that that conclusion is correct. If they cannot, then the institutions they defend should be considered illegitimate. How one should react to illegitimate authority depends on circumstances and conditions: there are no formulas (Chomsky 1996).

An Anarchist Theory of History

The conception of history was one of Bakunin’s main points of contention with Marx—while their end-goals for their philosophies might appear similar (aiming for

15 Bakunin (1984:239) also referred to this distinction as between natural and artificial authority. The former is justified as an expression of natural human relationships, whereas artificial authorities are imposed through institutional structures. Newman (2005:172; see also 2001:38-41) considered this distinction a “major theoretical achievement of anarchism.”" No longer could one claim “what replaces the state?” as the anarchists’ conception of power is not tied to the state or the “social contract,” but concerns human relationships (Newman 2001:40).
communism)—their approaches to achieve that solution were widely different, and according to Bakunin, would lead to wildly different outcomes. Whereas Marx advocated a communist state to rule all in an egalitarian fashion, anarchists opposed any imposition of the state. Those like Bakunin criticized the notion that a “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” would rule over others in egalitarian fashion until a “withering away of the state” could occur—they thought it to be simply naive in its conception of power. Once leaders acquire power, Bakunin and other anarchists maintained, they will struggle to hold onto that power, whether or not they were originally members of the proletariat.\textsuperscript{16} Stalin later provided a ready example of Bakunin’s critique of such a drive to maintain power as the head of a communist state. Like Tolkien’s “ring of power,” acquiring sociopolitical power easily leads to corruption and creates a need to do all that one can to maintain that power, even when one might corrupt into something like Golum. This anarchist emphasis on incorporating power into analyses of social systems predates Foucault by well over a century. In fact, some have claimed that Foucault was (or could be called) a postmodern anarchist (e.g., May 1994, Newman 2001, Call 2003), although it is debatable whether he himself made such a claim. Regardless, his work has been useful to anarchist philosophy in many respects, particularly for his microscale explication of the fingers of power through institutions and fields from governmentality, prisons, medicine, science, to individual sexuality. If there is a criticism from the anarchist perspective, it is that the type of power Foucault described is largely restricted to institutional, bureaucratic forms, where knowledge equals power. Instead, as Graeber (2004:71-72) pointed out, the real “brute force” power of the state is always close

\textsuperscript{16} This strident anarchist message, nonetheless, was picked up in later critiques of Marx. Gramsci (1971 [1929-1935]), for instance, while Marxist, added the concept of hegemony to Marxist interpretation, which showed that not only did the ideology, or the “opiate” (as Marx referred to religion) need to be cracked, but that revolution required opposing the material implementation of power that resides throughout culture in hegemonic practices (this is termed by Kurtz [1996, 2001] in an anthropological adaptation as “hegemonic culturation”). To paraphrase simply, ideology is akin to mythology, while hegemony is similar to ritual practice. Ideology can be countered and needs to be if one is to resist it, but the hegemonic practices must also be faced with counter-hegemonic actions.
at hand and ready to reduce any threats to the status quo.17

These differences in understanding power led Alan Carter (1988, 1989, 2000) to detail two varying theories of history. Marx, with his emphasis on economy, described power as arising bottom-up from basal economic forces, whereas Bakunin and other anarchists saw authoritarian power as originating at the top and working its way down through chains of command through sociopolitical forces. They argued that authoritarian power is ultimately centralized and acted upon at sociopolitical apexes, even if that power was acquired through the control of economic capital. Long before later theorists would try to update or reformulate Marxism (e.g., Gramsci 1971 [1929-1935]; Althusser 1969, 1986) to account for its overly economic or vulgar applications, anarchists had already made these criticisms. The problem was not the focus on economic capital—indeed, many anarchists respected Marx’s powerful exposure of capitalist dynamics. Rather, they simply criticized its weak conception of power. The important difference in an anarchist perspective for Kropotkin (1927:150) was that “it attacks not only capital, but also the main sources of the power of capitalism: law, authority, and the state.”

There is another significant difference between Marxist and anarchist theories of history: Marxism is teleological, while anarchism is not. According to early Marxists, an ideal communist state would eventually arise, after the stage of capitalism. Societies existing prior to this stage were labeled “pre-capitalist” (Marx 1965 [1857-1858]). For

17. “Academics love Michel Foucault’s argument that identifies knowledge and power, and insists that brute force is no longer a major factor in social control. They love it because it flatters them: the perfect formula for people who like to think of themselves as political radicals even though all they do is write essays likely to be read by a few dozen other people in an institutional environment. Of course, if any of these academics were to walk into their university library to consult some volume of Foucault without having remembered to bring a valid ID, and decided to enter the stacks anyway, they would soon discover that brute force is really not so far away as they like to imagine—a man with a big stick, trained in exactly how hard to hit people with it, would rapidly appear to eject them. In fact the threat of that man with the stick permeates our world at every moment; most of us have given up even thinking of crossing the innumerable lines and barriers he creates, just so we don’t have to remind ourselves of his existence. If you see a hungry woman standing several yards away from a huge pile of food—a daily occurrence for most of us who live in cities—there is a reason you can’t just take some and give it to her. A man with a big stick will come and very likely hit you. Anarchists, in contrast, have always delighted in reminding us of him” (Graeber 2004:71-72).
anarchists, the term “pre-capitalist” was teleological because it presumes capitalism was inevitable—a position they did not accept, just as they did not accept the communist state as a future utopia. Rather, anarchism was anti-Progress, in the Victorian sense, and it was closer to Darwin’s non-progressive view of evolution than was Marxism.

**Integrating Anarchism, Practice, and Power**

These three theoretical orientations—anarchism, practice, and power—may appear disparate, but these conjoin in a manner that aids the utility of each. The theory of anarchism provides principles of social organization among small-scale, largely autonomous societies without overarching governments. It is these principles, applied to the needs and desires at hand, that organize their economy, sociality, and ritual. These principles, applied in varying local expressions, reflect how anarchic groups organized their daily practices. Practice theory provides a way to understand how these practices are embodied, through history and *habitus*, into long-lasting, structuring traditions. At the same time, practice theory affords understandings of individual agency, of how practices are strategically and tactically selected and implemented in an improvisational manner that advances an individual’s or a group’s pursuit of capital within a social field. Amassed capital contributes to a concentration of power. Finally, Wolf’s (1990) modes of power provide a way to investigate the dynamic dimensions of power from the individual to the level of interacting societies.

Each of these approaches within our framework of power, practice, and anarchism are deserving of more detail, and in the chapters that follow, I examine them with respect of various aspects of Coast Salish warfare as we proceed through the archaeological, ethnohistorical, oral historical, and ethnographic evidence.
Chapter III: The Anthropology and Archaeology of Warfare

Warfare in non-state societies is often portrayed in either Hobbesian or Rousseauian terms: either warfare was a constant presence, due to the lack of a Leviathan to maintain order; or warfare was limited to ritualistic ceremonies of no real material consequence, if it occurred at all. Warfare, according to the latter view, is the bane of states. Anthropologically, theories of the origin of warfare can be placed mostly in one or the other camp, but, as McGuire (2001) pointed out, such either/or theories are of little explanatory use. For one, those are too generalizing as to have limited applicability to local and historical circumstances that condition and shape the decisions to engage in warfare. Instead, theories are needed incorporate local cultural dynamics but also historical and environmental conditions. In this chapter, I consider major anthropological and archaeological treatments of warfare and situate the theoretical framework developed here for an inquiry into Coast Salish warfare—namely power, practice, and anarchism—to show the advantages of such a multitiered and scalar approach. Anthropological theories of warfare centre around the origins of warfare and its causes, so the first two sections discuss those. In the third section, I incorporate the larger discussion of warfare in the broader social science of political philosophy, relevant to this discussion, specifically Marxist and anarchist approaches to warfare.

The Concern with Origins

Otterbein (2004) maintained two separate origins for warfare, involving “two types of military organization”: The first, two million years ago “at the dawn of humankind,” and the second among agricultural peoples that achieved early statehood. The point, here, is that Otterbein stressed “organization,” which matches nicely the development of power (iii) as outlined by Wolf (1990). Individual power (i) is and has
always been present in any individual, although relative and constantly in flux or in need of maintenance. Interpersonal or relational power (ii) is the deployment of one’s power towards another; consequently, it also has always been present among humans, however, physical enactions towards another are not regarded as warfare, but as violence. It is Wolf’s (1990) third mode, organizational power (iii), that is the mark of warfare. It is the recognition that warfare is a cultural practice enacted by groups. 

Wolf’s model is beneficial as it connects warfare with lesser scales of power that reside in and between individuals, however, it also shows how power increases not only in scale, but in dimension. Furthermore, Wolf’s framework also adds another dimension, which is structural power (iv), the point at which organizational power (iii) controls or can alter, even demolish, the settings of interaction. Many anthropological definitions of warfare contain this notion of organization (iii) as a criterion for warfare. The definition of what constitutes war also has a long history.

Harry Turney-High (1949), an early analyst of warfare, maintained a distinction called the “military horizon” which separated “primitive war” from “true war.” Whereas the former required the recruitment of volunteers, the latter had command structures and campaigns; Lawrence Keeley (1996) later critiqued Turney-High for his treatment of warfare and states, which elevated modern warfare and seemed to insinuate that primitive warfare was a sport. In general, definitions of warfare are subject to interpretation. Even today, offensive attacks are often said by the initiators to be defensive actions, or acts of “preemption” against future attacks, carried out under the auspices of a “Department of Defense.” Analytically, some basic terms can be established despite multifarious interpretations of attackers and defenders. Despite his elevation of military warfare, Turney-High (1971 [1949]:5), in Primitive War, recognized matter-of-factly: “War is war.” Perhaps it does not need further definition:

We are not here speaking of anything so complicated as an explanation of polyandry among separated peoples, nor the similarities or dissimilarities in the ceramic complex of the Americas and New Stone Age Europe. The art of war or the artlessness of fighting are so simple throughout time and over the face of the world that the discussion could
be made very monotonous (Turney-High 1971 [1949]:24).

His work being a “primer” on the subject, he did provide a definition of warfare as “a social institution fulfilling a variety of motives, ending in many ways, evoking many emotions. The central fact of military theory is that war is a sociologic device, and weapons are merely tools used to facilitate its practice” (Turney-High 1971 [1949]:5).

This has some congruence with anthropological treatments of warfare, as Malinowski’s (1936:444) definition indicated, referenced earlier (see page 7), regarding it as “use of organized force between two politically independent units.”

From perhaps the first anthropological conference on the anthropology of warfare (Fried, Harris, and Murphy 1968), Margaret Mead (1968:215) offered another definition: “Warfare exists if the conflict is organized, and socially sanctioned and the killing is not regarded as murder.” Mead forefronted the organizational aspect of warfare but also recognized its distinction from “murder,” which would only be interpersonal power (ii); although it should be noted that interpersonal squabbles and murder are often the fires that escalate into full-scale warfare (iii), as it has in the Coast Salish past.

In discussing the results of a later conference on the anthropology of war (Haas 1990), McCauley (1990:1) defined war as a “a subset of human aggression involving the use of organized force between politically independent groups.” Mead’s (1968:215) earlier definition is perhaps more encompassing, highlighting the agential or active nature of warfare as well as emphasizing that such acts of war are socially decreed, although McCauley’s treatment stressed the autonomy of the groups engaged in a conflict, just as Malinowski’s (1936:444) definition. As regarded by analysts of international politics (e.g., Wendt 1992), any scenario of warfare, whether between polities or within a polity (as in civil wars or revolutions) consists of autonomous groups. The presence of conflict itself minimally indicates assertions of autonomy, even as one or both (or more) attempt to dominate the other group(s). To describe international conflicts, they use the term “anarchy,” in that no overarching institution
has control or authority as warfare, by its very enaction, indicates an autonomous action, whether it be the rejection of another’s claim (external to a polity) or the rejection of one’s authority (internal to a polity). The success or failure of the acts of warfare determine the relations of authority, if any, afterwards. For our purposes, warfare consists of violent and coercive practices conducted in organized means (iii) against other autonomous groups.

**Scalar Approach to Power**

There is more to Otterbein’s (2004) argument for the origins of warfare. These moments of militaristic organization occurred in response to specific conditions. He maintained that, two million years ago, warfare proliferated among big-game hunters. Hunter-gatherers, in general, engage in warfare less often than agriculturalists, horticulturalists, or herders, even if they exhibited many episodes of interpersonal violence (ii) (Keeley 1996:186, Table 2.2; Otterbein 1999, 2004:81). Since early hominid days, hunter-gatherers exhibited traits of cooperation, Otterbein (2004:39) maintained. It is what enabled humans to be successful:

Early humans were cooperators. Among early hominids (austrolophilhecines and early members of the genus *Homo*) cooperation was the key to survival. It permitted them to attack other animals and as well as to repel attacks by them.

This aspect of human evolution has been noted often. For instance, Quigley (1971) and Isaac (1978, 1983) have argued for the importance of cooperation in hominid evolution; Kurland and Beckerman (1985) argued that cooperation was more important than labour and tool use, particularly in the savannah environments where cooperative sharing of information about highly distributed resources would have been critical. Read and LeBlanc (2003) argued that cooperative behaviour—or what we could term, after Kropotkin (1902), mutual aid—is a defining trait that allowed for the emergence of *Homo*. In contrast, Old World monkeys and many African ape species (chimpanzees excluded) exhibited more individualistic behavior that required a reversion to smaller
groups, according to Otterbein (2004:39). However, this cooperative behavior arose in conjunction with a new conceptual system of kinship, which allowed a determination of who among others is likely to be cooperative. Kinship, then, overtakes genealogical ties, in advancing reproductive fitness, as cooperation is pursued with those that are determined to be related culturally, whether biologically related or not. Kinship, in Otterbein’s (2004:39) argument, is a mode of ready self-organization that advances cooperative behavior, a notion consistent with Mithen’s (1996) argument that sociality is the most advanced component of early hominid minds, more so than technological or environmental knowledge.

Cooperation is important, as Otterbein (2004:39) noted, that “defense and attack depend upon cooperation.” This hints at a complex conception of interaction intrinsic to warfare, that cooperation and conflict act at once, depending on which scale of analysis is employed: “Conflict and cooperation are the opposite sides of the same coin. When there is conflict between groups, there is cooperation within the groups in conflict” (Otterbein 2004:46). This is a notion first advanced by the sociologist Lewis Coser (1956:87), who proposed that “conflict with out-groups increases internal cohesion.”

Furthermore, cooperation is important in that “Group cooperation led to fraternal interest groups, the first military organization” (Otterbein 2004:39; also Otterbein 1989). Big-game hunters differed from other hunter-gatherers in their formation of fraternal interest groups, where leaders gather followers and form factions of kinsmen. His conception is opposed to egalitarian hunter-gatherers that emphasize smaller game and gathering more prominently. Big game hunting, with its focus on a collective hunting practice, produced a culture that was oriented towards killing large prey, which required cooperation and tightened the bonds of those involved in the hunt. Given their bonds, fraternal interest groups became the “key elements in situations of conflict” (Otterbein 2004:45):

If one individual challenges another, and if kinsmen of the challenged person are in the vicinity, they will come to his aid. If the challenger’s kin are also in the vicinity, they in turn will come to his aid. Conflict has escalated, and now it is not two individuals but two fraternal interest
groups confronting each other (Otterbein 2004:45).

Here, Otterbein showed how violence between individuals (ii) escalates into organized warfare between individuals (iii). His description of fraternal interest groups relates to another major theory about the origin of warfare by Raymond Kelly (2000). He argued that warfare occurs because of “social substitutability,” where an attack on an individual (ii) is perceived as an attack on one’s group (iii); therefore, warfare occurs when societies become segmented, as with fraternal interest groups. Kelly’s (2000) “segmentary societies” is perhaps the more accurate term to use. While “fraternal interest groups” do encapsulate a majority of culture areas, the term would not be accurate for others, such as the Coast Salish, where allies are formed not just with kinsmen but affines that often were not close but distantly located. In any case, both of these theorists highlight the role of organized factions, if they differ on when those formations occur; Otterbein (2004) argued for early hominids and even chimpanzees having fraternal interest groups, while Kelly (2000) argued that this began 20,000 years ago in the Sudan, with archaeological evidence prominent after 10,000 BP, similar to Haas (2003).

In total, Otterbein (2004) viewed a triad of factors involved in the formation of war: fraternal interest groups, weapons, and a focus on hunting. These could be categorized as factional social relations, means, and cultural practice. The latter, he argued, is a cultural practice oriented towards big-game hunting, already a military-like organization focused on game. As Luckert (1990) concluded, it is simply one more step to go after even greater prey than big game: other humans. For those concerned with status, particularly those in segmented groups where leaders compete for followers, attacking the most formidable prey—other humans—is an avenue for such opportunities. Luckert (1990), and others (Kroeber and Fontana 1986; Ehrenreich 1997),

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18. Flannery and Marcus (2003) have put Kelly’s (2000) framework into archaeological practice by determining the segmentation of groups in early Oaxacan states, leading to the formation of Zapotec state.
have argued that in the decline of big-game or hunting as an economic emphasis, individuals turned to the “hunting” of humans to gain status.

There has been an overall scheme related to the prey/hunter dichotomy. Barbara Ehrenreich (1997) argued that the passions for warfare developed in early hominids in response to the threats of great predators. Fighting back against such predators instilled great group unity and cooperation and directed, even sacralized, the act of killing the beast, the other, whether animal or human prey. That is, the ideology develops in fear of attack of injury upon them—the threat of death. This dialectic of life and death has a significant imprint for early religions, and for this reason it often serves as a path for rites of passage, where initiates symbolically are put to death to be reborn into a new social status.

Maurice Bloch (1992) intended to search for “archetypes” of such religious rituals, which he considered to be universal constructs that served to play a part between human mortality and the seeming permanence of the group or societal structures. He viewed rituals as a dialectic between life and death, mortality and eternity; in other ways, a dialectic between eating and being eaten, the dynamics of the food chain.

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19. Ehrenreich (1997) developed her argument concerning the anthropological history of warfare ultimately as a social critique to argue that such segmentary divisions and ritualistic feelings (its powerful ideology and “contagious” fervor and nationalism) and preparations for war continue to influence the actions of politicians in international relations. While many treatments of war turn to concerns with economy, she emphasized its nearly religious appeal in nationalism, which she connects to these early human concerns in bonding through fear or fervor against other groups.

20. Rituals have long been analyzed as having a dialectic structure: van Gennep’s (1960 [1908]) separation, transformation, and reaggregation into society; Turner’s (1969) elaboration and emphasis on the middle stage of liminality where people engage the sacred and participate in antistructural communitas. Following their basic structure, Bloch (1992) added the importance of violence in such rituals, which those theorists had underplayed. Invocations of death and violence present an alternate logic: for mortal life, birth is the event which precipitates life and growth, whereas in ritual life it is death (as in sacrifice) that burgeons immortality or transcendence. Due to this logic, the symbolic participations in death and violence are the result of actors aiming for transcendence in both religion and politics, and so it is not from an innate propensity towards violence as some have argued (e.g., Girard 1986; Burkert 1996).

21. Theorists have also argued that ritual sacrifice has its origins during an early period in which humans were prey to greater-than-human beasts. Luckert (1991) argued that the origin of ritual sacrifice involved the act of a hunter or scavenger, who satisfied predators (or “gods” since they were the predators, greater-than-human realities) by offering a share of their
Among the Jivaro, Elsa Redmond (1994) had noted a similar rite of passage in which children do not become adults, but rather become warriors. In their ritual, the children attack a sloth, treating it symbolically as a human enemy. The hunting practice is used as a substitution for the practice of warfare. Adulthood is no longer just becoming a predator, but a predator of human enemies. In some cases, the emphasis on warriors is connected with cannibalism, as among the Maori (Vayda 1960a, 1960b) and among the Jivaro (Redmond 1994:49).

Bloch (1992) examined a ritual from the Orokaiva in New Guinea that he considered crucial for understanding the importance of the shift from prey to hunter. During the ritual, feathered- and pig-masked adults chase after boys and girls yelling “Bite! Bite! Bite!” They surround and herd the children onto a platform normally used for slaughtering pigs. Then, all the children are draped and hidden, and taken to an isolated hut outside the village; symbolically, the children have been eaten by the spirits. After a long period of ordeals and training, the children emerge shouting “Bite! Bite! Bite!” and, in some cases, actually participate in a pig-hunt. The ritual ends with the children (now adults) on the same platform redistributing the meat of hunted or killed pigs. Through the rite, they have transformed from prey to predator. Furthermore, since the Orokaiva regard pigs as similar to humans, the transformation to predator is akin to the transformation into a warrior. This substitutability of pigs into humans also has intimations for enemies. Moreover, in the close of the ritual, there are also political ramifications involved in the redistribution of the meat to others from the platform. Here, the children become adults by participating in the alliance creation and exchange of adults. The ritual sacralizes organization into hunters (and warriors).

Reading this through Wolf’s (1990) framework, the implication is that initially the children were just prey—insufficient in power (i) to withstand the attacks of predators scavenged or hunted meat. Toss the wolf a leg from the deer kill—sacrifice it—and they could safely take away the rest. Early hunter-gatherer gods in many societies took the form of predators (Luckert 1975).
(ii). Through this ritual they come together and transform into hunters. Victor Turner (1969) conveyed the importance of *communitas* created during the liminal stage of transformation involved in rituals—that mutable interim between their status as children/prey into adults/hunters—bonds between those that experienced the ritual together, tightening that social unit. Such rituals help to strengthen the ties of alliance. These are rituals that maintain organizational power (iii).

The ritual described here seems to follow how ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, whereby children go through a ritual to become adults, just as humans were originally prey to beasts but then became predators themselves. With the concern for the beginning of warfare, humans become prey yet again, but to other humans, which required yet another transformation—this time of hunters into warriors (Ehrenreich 1997).

Otterbein (1989, 2004), as noted above, described the semimilitaristic organization of hunters, their experience with weapons, and the general camaraderie of the fraternal interest group. Big-game hunters would necessarily have to range distantly over the territories of the big game they preyed upon. This practice would make big-game hunters more likely to encounter other big-game hunting groups. This, he argued, is why big-game hunters were the type of early hunter-gatherers that were more prone to engage in warfare.

So, one could imagine a scenario similar to the early hominid practice of sacrifice: a group kills a mammoth but is within sight of another group of hunters, who approach as other predators. They could sacrifice a portion of the mammoth to them as to a predator, or fight them. Given Otterbein’s (2004) arguments for warfare’s early occurrence, perhaps the latter was chosen more often. Sacrificing or sharing a portion of the mammoth would have entailed creation of relationships with those other hunters.

A major point to take from these theorists (Otterbein 2004; Ehrenreich 1997; Luckert 1990) is that there were practices already in place among big-game hunters that facilitated a transformation into warriors. That is, the cultural practices and means, or
traditions, helped to provide conditions for warfare. Secondly, it is important, according to Otterbein (2004) and Kelly (2000), to consider the nature of social organization to understand the conditions for warfare.

For Otterbein (2004), the second period when warfare proliferates is in keeping with Kelly (2000) and Keeley (1996), around 10,000 BP with the onset of sedentism and domestication. It is the creation of surplus that creates conditions of war: “The comparative reliability of agriculture as a mode of subsistence thus transforms the character, frequency, extent, and distribution of warfare within regional systems” (Kelly 2000:135). Similarly, Otterbein (2004: 91) argued that while there would have been inequities among hunter-gatherers, their nomadism prevented elaboration of those differences. Among settled agriculturalists, such differences would begin to also be marked materially, fomenting tensions within and among groups. Chiefdoms and early states also exhibit increasingly elaborate forms of segmentary societies.

The Concern for Causes

In anthropological treatments of warfare, it has been common to find assessments that attribute the causes of warfare among non-state societies to a variety of reasons, predominantly including biology, resources, social status, and territory. According to several researchers (Thorpe 2003; Ferguson 2001; McCauley 1990), these treatments fall into three primary camps: biological, materialist, and cultural. Since Hobbes, many have argued that aggression is simply an innate trait of humans; in the 1960s, Lorenz (1966) and Ardrey (1966) provided a renewed popularization for such views. Chagnon (1968) incorporated their views into a wider sociobiological argument. Chagnon (1977, 1990) argued that there was a “reproductive striving” among Yanomamo warriors who take women from other villages in violent raids. Warfare allowed them to further perpetuate their own offspring in a model of inclusive fitness as these warriors played out the survival of the fittest. In a broader yet complementary manner, Durham (1976) analyzed warfare as collective actions that are adaptive for all
cooperating individuals. Although he was trying to unite cultural and biological modes of explanation, his argument is underlined with a biological and materialist basis, stating that “individuals maximize their survival and reproduction by living in social groups and participating in collective aggression when access to scarce resources is at stake” (Durham 1976:385). Indeed, after studying many texts of warfare for the Northwest Coast, MacDonald (1984) noted that “first and foremost” the reason for war was to acquire surplus food among the Haida, Tsimshian, and Tlingit.

Materialist approaches emphasize ecological conditions as the catalytic setting for warfare. Like Durham’s (1976) “resource competition,” Ferguson (1984) had maintained that war is waged to control resources. Countering Chagnon, Ferguson (2001) argued that much of Yanomamo warfare was conducted over more immediate reasons than some long-range or ultimate desire for reproductive fitness. Rather it was for items of steel and other trade goods that were worthy of war—things that had been introduced two decades before Chagnon arrived. Other theorists emphasized other related aspects of resource competition. For instance, Carneiro (1970) highlighted the importance of environmental circumscription, which then forces competition for resources. Warfare, for Carneiro, was also the primary factor in the formation of cultural complexity, leading to the emergence of states.

Cultural approaches to warfare involve numerous vantage points ranging from prestige and revenge to symbolic and historical treatments. Robarchek (1989:903) argued that most materialist and biological arguments are “ratomorphic,” borrowing the term from Koestler (1967), meaning that their models exhibited a “variety of approaches that continue lopping off human heads by denying relevance, if not reality, to human consciousness, values, purposes, and intentions.” Robarchek (1989:903) provided the Semai as an ethnographic example of how both peace and violence are purposive actions of individuals responding to “culturally constituted” worlds.

In a similar though more cognitive approach, Harrison (1989) argued that violence among the Avatip people of the Sepik River of New Guinea was ritually
controlled and implemented during times of social tension. However, these ritual practices were in contrast to normal social behavior, which was regarded as peaceful sociality. Warfare called for masks and ritual spirit-possession to temporarily transform into warriors from their normal selves. Still, transformations into warriors were necessary, however, this showcased that the normal conditions are commonly pacific, a view that counters any intimations that violence and aggression are biologically innate; they needed masks to transform from human to warrior.

In an account of warfare in northern South America, Elsa Redmond (1994) provided a fascinating discussion of warfare in tribal in comparison to chiefdom societies. She stated that warfare in tribal societies such as the Jivaro and Yanomamo was primarily conducted for revenge and prestige and only secondarily for looting and women as wives (while chiefdoms pursued territory and resources). She stressed that such endeavors were political actions by those leading or composing an offense or defense. For instance, the leader of a raid calls on others and persuades them to participate in the raid:

Those individuals interested in mounting a tribal raid in order to avenge a kinsman’s death face the often long and arduous task of persuading other villagers and allies to participate.... [It] involves door-to-door canvassing, complete with formal declarations of war, rhetorical arm-twisting, and promises of war spoils (Redmond 1994:45).

Though most theories tend to fall into one of these camps of biological, materialist, or cultural, these do not need to be so narrowly reduced. In his assessment of the anthropological and archaeological theories of warfare, Thorpe (2003) challenged any single theory primarily for their implications of uniformity. Rather, any theory should be particular to its local and historical contexts. Others have emphasized an approach that unifies both materialist and cultural in their frameworks in a theory of practice.

Practice theorists like Bourdieu (1977, 1990) focus on the interrelation between human agency and systemic or historical structures, which proceeds in the manner of the dialectic; for Marx (1970 [1945]), this was the focus of his materialist approach, in the
practices of social life not in the inert objects, or materials in themselves. In archaeology, practice theory has been discussed by Brumfiel (1994a), who stressed the agency of methodological individualism as part of an emphasis on factional competition, and by Pauketat (2001), who stressed historical processes in the formation of cultural practices in Mississippian Cahokia.\textsuperscript{22} In summary for our purposes, practice theory at its core emphasizes a situational context that accounts for environmental conditions (field), cultural traditions and dispositions (habitus), and historical factors (structure) that influence human practices (agency). It provides a way to discuss human warfare with its complicated reasons and motivations while also grounding the discussion in a materialist way without being reductionistic. As Maschner (1997) noted about Northwest Coast warfare, “wars were never fought for a single reason.” Similarly, Prince (2004) argued that the causes for warfare should be considered “case dependent.”

Another instance of the manifold rationales for war comes from Swadesh’s (1948) discussion of the motivations of Nuu-chah-nulth (formerly Nootka) warfare. He analyzed nine war narratives collected by Edward Sapir that contained forty-five accounts of wars. He found the motivation to fight for territory to be more important than plunder. One example has the Ucluelet people holding a war council because “The Ucluelet had no river....” After visiting and being feasted at different villages in the greater area, they decided that the Namint controlled a river with the best salmon. “‘All right,...’ they said. ‘Let us kill them off and take away their river.’” Everyone in the tribe consented (Swadesh 1948:84-85). However, Swadesh (1948:85) also noted that in general, “the food supply on Vancouver Island was generally very plentiful, we must not assume that the desire for new territory was typically based on a real shortage of food.” Here, Swadesh indicates that while territory was an aim sought in warfare, it was not for food in and of itself; there were other driving factors. He also found

\textsuperscript{22} Also, McGuire’s (1992:252-47) Marxist archaeological approach contains a theory of praxis that stresses the dialectic not only between agents and structures, but also the dialectic between researchers and their practice.
instances where the motives were for increased rank, for capturing slaves, gaining plunder, and seeking revenge. In fact, Swadesh found it difficult to make clear distinctions among these, not causes, but “motivations”:

Retaliation and hope of gain have to be seen together. In almost every instance, those who propose warfare are able to point to some offense that has been committed against them; on one occasion ... the offense is invented. In some cases, warfare is proposed to the tribe simply and frankly in terms of advantages to be got. Sometimes revenge and gain are mentioned together. In a few instances, the narrative indicates clearly that retaliation is a mere pretext or at least a very secondary consideration. Even in the many passages in which no other motive than retaliation is mentioned, we can only assume that those who sat in council and planned the raids must have been very sensible of the specific material benefits and the prestige that would come to them from a successful conclusion of the project (Swadesh 1948:91).

Instead of trying to reduce the multifaceted reasons for warfare to the procrustean bed of one cause, I find it more effective to use the exchangeability of capital, from practice theory, that can incorporate multiple motivations into its larger frame, as Swadesh had found.

**Anarchist Theories of Warfare**

Yet for all their limitations, they [non-state] societies show that the Hobbesian nightmare of universal war in a “state of nature” is a myth. A society without hierarchy in the form of rulers and leaders is not a utopian dream but an integral part of collective human experience.

—Peter Marshall (1993:13)

Marshall (1993) pointed out that the notion that a society without rulers is often seen as constant war. However, as many anthropologists of war have noted (e.g., Otterbein [2004], Kelly [2000], and Keeley [1996]), warfare is more frequent in later periods of human evolution, when the scale of social organization increases, diversifying into segmentary societies that develop opposed interests. Accordingly, most of human existence since the onset of *Homo sapiens* has been one without warfare (if not without violence), even when these societies had no rulers, or were anarchic. Given this context, it appears as if this Hobbesian notion is itself an ideology of states—that it is in the
interest of rulers to perpetuate a notion that society would erupt in chaotic warfare if
their rule ended. Indeed, it is with state-scale societies that warfare is more common
and manifests in its deepest manners of destruction. As Randolph Bourne (1999 [1918])
had argued, “War is the health of the state.”

Marxists and anarchists do have some agreement in being not so opposed to war,
or at least certain types of war. Marx and Engels tended to favour the importance of
economics, but they did not overlook the effects of warfare in history. In fact, Marx and
Engels considered warfare a major driving force for much of human history, particularly
for early states (Hobsbawm 1964:44-45). Not inclined to pacifism, warfare was
important for them for revolution, to ultimately achieve communism. Lenin, referencing
Clausewitz’s (1911) famous phrase, stated that “War is not only a continuation of
politics, it is the epitome of politics” (Kiernan 1983:522). Marx and Engels also viewed
national armies somewhat positively at first, thinking that these would help train the
proletariat for the time of revolution. However, they came to see wars as ends in
themselves, while Lenin blamed capitalism for war (Kiernan 1983:522-523).

Anarchists have a negative connotation partly through their association with
violent acts in the early 19th century, with several assassinations of many heads of state
(e.g., Tuchman 1966:63-116). Bakunin (1842) was infamous for saying that the “The urge
to destroy is also a creative urge.” But, that is only part of the spectrum, as many strains
of anarchists have been or are stridently pacifist, particularly Tolstoy (1990). A
commonality, however, is that warfare is warranted in countering unjust rule. Even
Kropotkin, a longtime pacifist, was heavily criticized for supporting the efforts against
Germany in World War I, as he thought it ultimately furthered their cause (Miller
1976:225-232). He also supported the Russian Revolution while countering its eventual
direction, ultimately becoming a critic of Lenin. The point is that, for anarchists and
Marxists, warfare has not been seen as something necessarily to be viewed as negative.
In fact, acts of war actually can be a very just practice and are warranted to counter
tyants and bring about greater freedom for individuals.
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1861) wrote a two-volume treatise on warfare, called *La Guerre et la Paix*, or *War and Peace*—which is often maintained as the source for the title of Tolstoy’s novel. Proudhon aimed to counter the common notion among his fellow French philosophers that war was a crime against humanity, a pathological social practice (Noland 1970). Instead, he argued warfare was conducted by those who did not accept the circumstances as given, by those who would not be passive in the face of threats to their freedom. Proudhon (1861) viewed warfare as an enactment of human agency par excellence: “War, in one form or another, is essential to our humanity.... [It] is inherent in humanity.... [It is] the most grandiose manifestation of our individual and social life” (Noland 1970:290). In this sense, it is an agential assertion of autonomy. As Žižek (2003:31) has stated, similar to Proudhon, assertions of autonomy necessarily have to include the option of violence:

... [A]uthentic revolutionary liberation is much more directly identified with violence—it is violence as such (the violent gesture of discarding, of establishing a difference, of drawing a line of separation) which liberates. Freedom is not a blissfully neutral state of harmony and balance, but the very violent act which disturbs this balance.

More than that, war was, Proudhon (1861) argued, “essentially *justicière* and *juridique*,” or related to justice and law. As Noland (1970:290) noted, “it [warfare, according to Proudhon] has been an agency through which justice has found expression and affirmation in the world. For this reason ‘war is legitimate in its essence, saintly and sacred ...heroic and divine ...the summit of human virtue.’” Proudhon viewed war as the “most ancient expression of justice in society,” that it had a “moral and juridical core” (Noland 1970:299).

In Proudhon’s (1861) view, warfare is simply an outgrowth of normal tensions and conflicts within human societies. Societies are not stable in any sense, but dense with oppositions and tensions. A society must be viewed as perpetually within a

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23. All quotes from Proudhon’s (1861) *La Guerre et la Paix*, in this section are drawn from Noland’s (1970) translations summarizing Proudhon’s sociology of war; the full two-volume work is not yet translated into English.
Heraclitean state of becoming in which “everything relates to everything else, is linked up with it; consequently, everything is in mutual opposition, balance, and equilibrium.” This is the “eternal dance,” where the lives of individuals are “une solution d’antinomies sans fins,” or the resolution of antinomies without end, a never-ending dialectic of life. These internal tensions manifest between individuals and their societies at many scales, yet this did not mean there was chaos, the Hobbesian war of each against all:

While man was an animal, he was, Proudhon insisted, following Aristotle, an animal of a particular sort—a “social animal,” whose destiny it was to live in society. On the one hand each individual was “at war” with his fellow men. At the same time he was “moved by an internal attraction to other individuals”—“moved by a secret sympathy” which he could not resist without denying “his own nature,” for man’s “social needs” were “complex and imperative” (Noland 1970:293).

Here is a common point by anarchist theorists that there is tension, even conflict, at all scales of society from the individual, to their families, to broader society, and those beyond. However, this is not an atomistic portrayal of individuals, rather, it is an autonomous one, where individuals also seek commonality and shared interests with others. It should be noted, that this is opposed to those sociobiological portrayals of humans as self-interested “agents,” where every instance of aid, selflessness, or altruism is somehow reduced to pure self-interest. Instead, humans are first “social animals” that desire sociality and to help others in mutual aid, where individuals willingly curtail some of their own freedoms to live and accomplish projects with others.

While praising many instances of warfare, Proudhon (1861) also recognized that warfare, as conducted by states, was usually not in the cause of justice and increased freedoms for those involved. Instead, he posited that the social inequity of states leads to poverty among the majority and a tyranny of the minority as they attempt to maintain their position, manifesting in corruption and violence. Bourne (1918) argued that states pursue war, not only for material interest, but to also settle the internal tensions caused by inequities and direct those angers elsewhere, towards others, achieving the “peacefulness of being at war.”

War is the health of the state. It automatically sets in motion throughout
societies those irresistible forces for uniformity, for passionate cooperation
with the Government in coercing into obedience the minority groups
and individuals which lack the larger herd sense (Bourne 1918).

States, as Jonathan Friedman (1998, 2003) argued, attempt to engender
uniformity through hegemonic actions. Ideologically, political rituals are often effective
in unifying a populace even when there may be great disparities amongst those who
witness the ritual. As Kertzer (1988) well argued, there is a multivocality to political
rituals, when performed well, that allows for popular agreement on the symbol or ritual
despite deep disagreements over what those symbols and acts mean—a powerful device
for politicians to employ. These types of political rituals can be used to tighten support
for a war.

Bourne (1918) noted that in recent history wars are the actions of states, not
societies or nations of peoples—it is always declared by those in power: “There is no
case known in modern times of the people being consulted in the initiation of a war.”
Accordingly, wars are not voted on; they are declared by the leaders of states. While
many states use arguments of defense, Proudhon (1861) found most state wars to be “a
frightful caricature of the forms of justice.” This is consistent with the anarchist theory
of history, described above, wherein those in power aim to maintain their power, which
is a top-down approach to a society. In such scenarios, anarchists have argued, it is
warranted to challenge such authoritarians for their misuse of power.

Kropotkin (1946 [1897]) similarly found this notable difference between wars of
small-scale societies and those of states:

[In communal societies] the struggle was for the conquest and defence of
the liberty of the individual, for the federative principle for the right to
unite and to act; whereas the States’ wars had as their objective the
destruction of these liberties, the submission of the individual, the
annihilation of the free contract, and the uniting of men in a universal
slavery to king, judge and priest—to the State.

The rise of the state, for many anarchists, is the major development in
humanity—not domestication, agriculture, urbanization, nor industrialization. The state
is the great “rupture” (“coupure”) as Pierre Clastres (1987:202) termed it, as it is not a
revolution fomented by a new economic technology, but a political revolution in the
organization and concentration of power in society; in Wolf’s (1990) framework, the
concentration of political power in a state is the institutionalization of structural power
(iv). Clastres’ (1987, 1994) ethnographic work focused on “stateless societies,”
describing those, not as societies in which states have not yet developed, but rather as
ones that have resisted forms of state power and its associated inequality. Gledhill
(1994) argued that Clastres’ perspective consisted of a variant of Sahlins’ original
affluent society in political rather than economic form. Warfare, among small-scale
societies, served to prevent such concentrations of power:

The atomization of the tribal universe is unquestionably an effective
means of preventing the establishment of socio-political groupings that
would incorporate the local groups and, beyond that, a means of
preventing the emergence of the State, which is a unifier by nature
(Clastres 1987:213).

As emphasized by Kropotkin (1946 [1897]), the state is not equivalent to society,
government, nation, or country. Rather, the state is a political formation, which tries to
ideologically mesh its conception with that of nation and country. This distinction
between the two is expressed in the title of Clastres’ (1987) work, Society Against the
State.

**Interrelating Scales through Alliance Formation**

In his summary analysis of theories of warfare, Helbling (2006) emphasized that
the anthropology of warfare could benefit from theorists of international relations and
foreign policy, who use the notion of “anarchy” to describe situations of warfare, as
described above; a few other anthropologists have also started to use the same
terminology, such as Snyder (2002) and Schon (2008). This use of “anarchy” derives
from its connotation of chaos under a lack of rulership and is not associated with the
theory of anarchism, which is about a form of social order. Here, I argue that this use of
anarchy is rather simplistic—it simply means the polities in warfare act autonomously.
Anarchism as a theory includes autonomy but provides a much larger framework
within which to assess such interactions. With this qualification, Helbling’s (2006:213) analysis provided an interesting insight, which is that previous theorists pondering the causes of warfare have failed to account for the formation of alliances:

The phenomenon of alliance has been neglected by anthropology so far, but this must be taken into consideration because whoever has to wage war also needs allies. Alliance formation influences the regional relation of force between warring local groups, and both victory and defeat may depend on the support of allies (Helbling 2006:213).

This is why Helbling considers alliances a “crucial phenomenon” in the context of war. In Wolf’s (1990) categorization, alliances represent an aspect of organizational power (iii), and so, arguably alliances are implied if not overt in the works of Otterbein (2004) and Kelly (2000) which highlight the organizational context of war. Still, Helbling is pointing to an important aspect of organization in warfare, particularly as his description of alliances is not restricted to alliances of kin groups.

There are certain dynamics to alliances that should be considered. For one, the creation of an alliance can drastically alter the nature of power relations in a social field. As Helbling (2006:125) defined, “Alliances are forms of pragmatic co-operation based on (short term) common interests: two groups will do better against an enemy group by forming an alliance.” Thereby, the strongest group can easily lose its position of dominance when two (or more) weaker groups form an alliance.

An important aspect of incorporating alliance theory into a considering of social organization is that it accounts for internal tensions within a society. Antonio Gilman (1984) stressed tensions exist within society alongside expressions of solidarity. He was countering Durkheim’s (1949) conception of social solidarity, which he considered inadequate because it did not account for internal tensions. Gilman argued, using alliance theory, that people form coalitions with subsets of the overall society for security reasons: if resources are stretched too thin for all, not everyone will survive; however, if you limit your social obligations to a subset, with “closed connubia,” you can better ensure security at least within your coalition. He noted that the distinction was minor, but led to an entirely different social dynamic that could involve significant
qualitative changes in the archaeological record. Although Gilman (1984) advocated this as a Marxist approach, it differs from classic Marxism in that it does not focus on class-based tensions, which would be centralized or vertical. Instead, he emphasized allied groups opposed to other groups, which is decentralized or horizontal; that is, his argument has parallels with an anarchist argument.

Alliance theory has also been advanced by the development of factional competition (Brumfiel and Fox 1994). In her introduction, Brumfiel (1994) argued that a factional-competition approach countered the ineffectiveness of the two predominant approaches, cultural ecology and Marxism. Building upon Barth (1959), Bailey (1969), and Giddens (1979), she proposed a practice theory with influences from methodological individualism that emphasized the actions and agency of individuals that have to work within the structures of history and culture. Factions are groups, assembled with self-interested members by resourceful leaders, that compete with other groups for prestige and power. Within the volume, contributors described various mechanisms for creating such coalitions: feasting, warfare, marriage, ethnic identity, and so on. Two main principles involve alliance building and competition, both of which leave archaeological traces. Clark and Blake (1994) referred to these factional leaders as “aggrandizers” and argued for the use of elaborate feasts to cohere allies in the Mazatan region in Chiapas. They noted importantly that indicators of rank appeared prior to the rise in population growth, countering cultural ecological arguments. Redmond (1994) also highlighted the importance of alliance formations, which was critical to the success of chiefs among the constantly feuding Jivaro. These studies of factional competition, argued Brumfiel (1994), countered the emphasis of Marxism on class-based antagonisms. Class-based analyses were insufficient and inappropriate for groups where internal strifes and alliance formations do not work in class-based fashion but rather among factional lines; this of course, can also be seen as having affinities with anarchist critiques of Marxism.

Not only do societies contain multiple internal tensions, but so do alliances. Members strive not only to be in the stronger coalition but also to gain the most within
the coalition itself (Helbling 2006:125). Elsa Redmond (1994) emphasized the importance of the promises of spoils for alliances formed for raids on other Jivaro groups. If the gains from the spoils do not meet their satisfaction, the alliance can dissolve rather quickly.

One criticism I should note about these coalition theories is that these are based upon common economic conceptions of individuals as ego-centered agents where individuals could not convincingly commit an act of altruism if they tried. Anarchism is not based in alliances simply for advancing self-interested goals—although that element is present. Anarchism instead also allows for other reasons that people might want to work together in mutual aid: that allied work on big projects might be easier, that individuals are social beings, and they want to form close bonds with others. As Studs Terkel (2005) has observed:

> And this is my belief, too: that it’s the community in action that accomplishes more than any individual does, no matter how strong he may be.

> Einstein once observed that Westerners have a feeling the individual loses his freedom if he joins, say, a union or any group. Precisely the opposite’s the case. The individual discovers his strength as an individual because he has, along the way, discovered others share his feelings—he is not alone, and thus a community is formed (Terkel 2005).

In his *Theory of Political Coalitions*, Riker (1962, quoted in Wang 2005:1) pointed out, “in the three-or-more-person game, the main activity of the players is to select not only strategies, but partners. Partners, once they become such, then select a strategy.” The implication here is significant: one chooses the practices one will employ, but also one’s allies; the alliance itself subsequently determines the practices that will be used. Moreover, Riker’s formation suggests a level of agency on the part of coalitions, an agency that is still anchored in the willing participation of individuals who compose the alliance—therefore, it is not something to theoretically reify as an actor or agent in its own right, although it is understandable how the effect of such coalitions could be interpreted that way. Coalitions are a gestalt of individual human agency.

Since Riker’s (1962) major study, some have formed typologies of coalitions.
Wang (2005) provided a descriptive and historical typology of coalitions, categorized by the social formation, duration, task, and status. Each type of coalition, he noted, is a political formation: “Since coalescing partners cooperate with only some of the other actors and struggle against the rest of the actors, any coalition is in essence seeking influence directly among actors without mediation of materials and therefore is political” (Wang 2005:1). Social coalitions involve the types of groups that ally because of similar identity or shared topical interest (religious, ethnic, familial, etc.). Duration coalitions are defined by the length of the alliance: short-term, middle-term or long-term. Task-oriented coalitions involve alliances oriented towards single goals; accordingly, these are mostly short-term. Status coalitions involve alliances categorized by combinations of small- and large-scale, high and low position, or strong and weak constituents; status refers to status of one group relative to the other, not status as prestige. While only typology, it is a framework to begin to understand further aspects of how coalitions form, enlarge, strengthen or dissolve.

Amanda Tattersall (2006) provided a study of alliances derived from organizers of unions and activists. She understands that the nature of the coalition will influence its effectiveness, power, and longevity. She classifies coalitions into four primary categories beginning with the simplest and most temporary: ad hoc, support, mutual-support, and deep coalitions (Table 1). The simplest formation involves ad hoc coalitions that may be event-based or task-oriented. Once the task or event is over, the coalition is also over. Typically, these are “fleeting” and may involve minimal amounts of alliance from the heads of the groups, with not much interaction amongst the respective supporters or members. These are tactical alliances only, and not strategic. While there is a common interest, there is no “joint decision making.” Ad hoc coalitions can sow the seeds, however, for more permanent alliances. Support coalitions are short-term, but structured relationships between groups. They allow for “closer organisational connection through joint decision making” (Tattersall 2006:4). The weakness of support coalitions are that, while they are able to rally people quickly (as a “rent-a-crowd”), there is little
organizational power or “buy-in” amongst those involved due to their short-term nature and structure. Instead, stronger coalitions are able to accomplish that. Mutual-support coalitions form around more than one issue or event, tying the bonds of the coalitions into a stronger alliance that can be seen as more than temporary. This broadens the shared interests and creates the need for closer strategy between those allied. Finally, deep coalitions tighten the bonds of a mutual-support coalition into something that is not just coordinated by group leaders but also by the interaction amongst the members of allied groups, facilitating decision-making at a variety of scales. The alliance is no longer mainly by the groups’ leaders and becomes a “decentralized structure” (Tattersall 2006:12) with multiple types of and scales of capacities for mobilization. Through her typology, Tattersall was able to argue that coalitions are more effective through increasing common interests, decision-making abilities, and deepening involvement between allied groups. As she noted, “the power and capacity of a coalition is greatly influenced by its internal practice.” These coalition typologies may have some utility for considering coalitions archaeologically, as Helbling (2006) has done. 

While Helbling (2006) did advance the anthropology of war by emphasizing alliances, his treatment of alliances is limited in one respect. He is accurate to note, for instance, that “no serious wars will break out as long as two adversaries are of about even strength and in a stalemate situation.” However, the context for such claims are limited only to the actions of those two groups. The actual social field of most groups
involves not only one other group, despite how it may dominate their consciousness at any one time, but rather needs to include all possible groups. The nature of opposition between groups may be conditional. Groups are known to ally even with local enemies to face larger external threats. That is the nature of alliance formation—it is not limited to one scale, but needs to incorporate several social scales. Otherwise, Helbling’s (2006) model works well for any particular scale: family, household, household cluster, village, village cluster, tribe, region, nation, and so on. Had Helbling used the theory of anarchism, rather than “anarchy” after political scientists’ use, he may have more readily envisioned this. Anarchists have theorized the development of alliances and their nature from the local group to larger scales of social action.

A model for the creation of anarchist organization from the small-scale or local to larger-scale organizations is seen in late 1930s-era Spain with the FAI, or Federación Anarquista Ibérica. They set up grupos de afinidad or “affinity groups” to help foment the revolutionary spirit to fight Franco and the fascists. Marxist groups were also involved in the revolution, however, they argued over the organizational forms, with the Marxists advocating a centralized structure and the anarchists favouring a decentralized one:

The Marxists argued that their organizational forms gave them greater efficiency and effectiveness, a claim the Anarchists emphatically denied. To the contrary, they insisted that the most efficient and effective organization was ultimately based on voluntarism, not on coercion or formal obedience. A movement that sought to promote a liberatory revolution had to develop liberatory and revolutionary forms. This meant ... that it had to mirror the free society it was trying to achieve, not the repressive one it was trying to overthrow. If a movement sought to achieve a world united by solidarity and mutual aid, it had to be guided by these precepts; if it sought a decentralized, stateless, nonauthoritarian society, it had to be structured in accordance with these goals. With voluntaristic aims in mind, the Anarchists tried to build an organic movement in which individuals were drawn to each other by a sense of “affinity,” by like interests and proclivities, not held together by bureaucratic tendons and ideological abstractions. And just as individual revolutionaries were drawn together into groups freely, by “affinity,” so too the individual groups federated by voluntary agreement, never impairing the exercise of initiative and independence of will (Bookchin 1998:108).

Bookchin (1971:243) commented that these affinity groups “could be regarded as a new type of extended family, in which kinship ties are replaced with by deeply
empathetic human relationships—relationships nourished by common revolutionary ideas and practice.” When they held congresses of these groups, they were titled “assembleas de las tribus,” or assemblies of the tribes (Bookchin 1971:243). While they did confederate into local, regional, or national forms, the emphasis of power remained with the local, affinity group: “The groups proliferate on a molecular level and they have their own ‘Brownian movement.’ Whether they link together or separate is determined by living situations, not by bureaucratic fiat from a distant center” (Bookchin 1971:244). The important point Bookchin is making is that alliances are temporary and conditional. Like the anarchist view of authority, the power alloted to the alliance must be seen as justified by its need, needs that can shift with changes in conditions or historical circumstance. As power is centered at the smallest scale, in the extended family or the affinity group, the need or justification for large-scale alliances would be much weaker than alliances closer to those that affect the daily routines or concerns of local groups. Large-scale alliances would, accordingly, be more temporary and event- or task-oriented than alliances at lesser scales.

Conclusion

Many anthropological treatments of warfare have tried to reduce its occurrence to one primary cause, rather than viewing such interactions as the complex conjunction of multiple factors. Manifold reasons can be employed as causes or justifications for warfare. In chess, one could view his or her next move confronting various needs: to defend a threatened piece, to mobilize another, or to attack an opponent’s piece. But, a move could be chosen that satisfies all three requirements at once. In analysis of it, one could not reduce that action to one causal motive or reason, rather, the single move encapsulates all three needs, and the better player employs such moves. Similarly, in times of war, a leader can deploy actions that have multiple effects at once—for instance, performing one military act that furthers their material gain, builds the strength of one’s defense, and satisfies allies politically or ideologically. In dealing with complex
societies, or other human societies, we should avoid such treatments that are
reductionistic, that do not recognize the multifunctionality of single actions, formations,
or tools, or fail to incorporate the multiscalar context within which these practices are
performed.

While overall studies such as Otterbein (2004), Kelly (2000), and Keeley (1996) are
intriguing, the findings are on a scale that is broad. The generalities rarely match
particular cases, especially when they involve the complex hunter-gatherers of the
Northwest Coast, who often are described as exceptions to general anthropological
categories for foragers. More useful are specific case studies that tackle local conditions
and historical circumstances. Several volumes have followed upon those works
recently, including Rice and Leblanc (2001) for the U.S. Southwest; Chacon and
Mendoza (2007a, 2007b) and Chacon and Dye (2007) for North and South American
studies; and Arkush and Allen (2006) and Otto, Thrane, and Vandkilde (2006) with
worldwide cases and perspectives.

What makes the scale and perspectives of Otterbein’s (2004) and Kelly’s (2000)
works so different from those that advocate single causes for war is that they both argue
for the importance of social organization in the manifestation of warfare. They
emphasize its sociality and do not reduce warfare to factors outside of human culture.
There may be population pressures, climatic changes, or environmental constraints, but
they recognize that the ultimate decision to go to war is a social one. What’s clear is that
warfare is a practice—it is an option that groups can pursue, however, there are others
as well that do not involve violence. Groups can negotiate to share resources; they can
intensify their use of other resources in the face of drought or flooding, or seek aid from
extended family and allies. The point is, warfare is not the direct result of such
“causes”—the use of “cause” is a problematic term here, when discussing warfare
among human groups. Rather, what should be discussed, especially among
anthropologists, are the reasons or rationales for warfare, or as Swadesh (1948)
described, “motivations.” Causes, or causation, has connotations of physics, with
images of unidirectional objects impinging on another on a grand billiards table. Reasons can be interchangeable with causes, however, its origins are from the Latin, *ratio*, which is from the verb *reri*, “to consider.” Instead of the cause-effect impacts of billiard balls, the actions of humans in warfare are considered—just as chess-players consider the movement of pieces on the chessboard, contemplating their options, deliberating over the opponent’s motivations, and responding to the changing conditions of the board for each turn of events in a simulacrum of war.

Rather than reducing warfare to biology or to limits of carrying capacities, an approach is needed that can be explanatory at multiple scales, ranging from the individual to larger societal groupings. Practice theory, with its Baileyan (1969) characterization of the competition by individuals for the spoils, provides a framework for assessing motives that are not reduced to a singular meaning. Indeed, with the exchangeability of capital—where resources or loot acquired in warfare can be traded for enhancing one’s symbolic status, for example—many reasons can be seen to be operational at once. Moreover, with numerous warriors in battle, there can be many various reasons for each individual to participate. At a larger scale, the theory of anarchism provides a scale of analysis with principles of organization for those cultural practices; anarchism emphasizes a social rather than individual scale, involving principles of decentralization and mutual aid through networked alliances. These are principles and practices that link individuals into larger units of action.

I have tried to show how the framework involving anarchism, practice, and power is useful for considering the anthropology and archaeology of warfare. It does not replace other theories discussed above, rather, I argue that it provides a framework to interconnect disparate theories of warfare at a variety of scales. It provides an overarching frame that assesses the power and capacity of warfare—in which organization is seen as a criterion for warfare as opposed to violence according to Otterbein (2004) and Kelly (2000). Wolf’s (1990) modes of power incorporate their emphasis on organization (iii) by also readily including the dimensions of power of
individuals (i) and between individuals (ii), while also making a distinction for a higher dimension of structural power (iv). Indeed, Otterbein’s (2004) classification of two major periods of warfare parallel these: warfare amongst hunter-gatherers as organizational power (iii) formed in fraternal interest groups, which engage in a constant yet not unifying mode that serves ultimately to redistribute power. Early state warfare could be seen as a structural reformulation of warfare, altering the nature of warfare into something that facilitated the concentration of power rather than redistributing it.

Practice theory aids in helping to understand the nature of that organizational formation through alliance building, which is seen as crucial and under-considered by Helbling (2006) for an anthropology of warfare. Individuals and groups do not only improvise among a set of practices tactically and strategically to defeat their enemies in warfare. They also politically act to acquire and maintain allies as partners, knowing that a larger-scale coalition is the most effective offense, particularly when technology and defenses are the same as the opponents’. Practice theory also provides a meta-framework for viewing long-standing debates over the causes of warfare, which too often try to reduce these complex issues to single factors. A perspective of the exchangeability of capital allows more readily for the inclusion of multiple causes, from material to symbolic, as actions can serve more than one need or advance more than one cause at once. Finally, anarchism provides a larger frame that shows how these practices are organized. Anarchism also provides a frame to interconnect other theories of warfare used in archaeology. Factional competition and alliance formations can be viewed within the larger framework of anarchism, which allows for broader integration of those disparate theories.

Now having situated our theoretical framework of power, practice, and anarchism within the anthropology of warfare, we will now situate this inquiry within the ethnohistoric evidence for warfare in the Coast Salish region.
Chapter IV: Histories of Warfare from Documents and Oral Histories

The first glimpses of the Coast Salish by early explorers and traders in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, provide surprisingly useful, if fragmentary, accounts of violence and warfare in the region (Figure 2). Occasionally, these early encounters highlight the ways in which Coast Salish peoples displayed warlike intentions, interactions, and both offensive and defensive preparations in response to the colonial process. It has to be stressed that these documents, while often illuminating, were produced as part of the colonial encounter and should be considered within the postcontact context. The reach of colonial impacts affected Northwest Coast societies in general, and Coast Salish communities in particular, many years before our earliest accounts. While in some cases, there are descriptions from various journals and logs noting that they must have been the first Europeans encountered by many groups, it is clear that their reputations preceded them, along with European trade items like iron, and deadly diseases such as smallpox.

A period of warfare and defensive site construction occurs after contact. While the context has been altered from how the Coast Salish operated before contact, these glimpses of their lifeways still provide indications of how they employed traditional methods or practices and how they co-opted new technologies and situations to their pursuits.

Early Accounts of Warfare

The language of these natives differs much from those on the outer coast. They recognize no superior chief and carry on continual warfare with those on the north side, thus accounting for the fact that the beaches are strewn with the harpooned heads of their enemies. They are affable,
happy, of good stature and well formed, but the different kinds of paint with which they disfigure their countenances make them horrible to behold.

—Manuel Quimper Benítez del Pino (Wagner 1933:131)

In the summer of 1790, the Spanish Quimper Expedition entered the waters they named the Juan de Fuca Strait, encountering Central Coast Salish groups including the Klallam, Sooke, Songhees, and Saanich, as well as numerous groups of people who lived on the San Juan Islands. In one encounter, they sailed past Dungeness Spit on the Olympic Peninsula and made note of the “harpooned heads of their enemies,” quoted

— 70 —
above, that were likely impaled by the Klallam. Quimper also remarked upon the
wearing of hide for an armour, probably of elk (Wagner 1933:131).

The second Spanish Expedition headed by Francisco Eliza entered the Strait the
following summer. Captain Eliza recorded that native canoes always approached and
their occupants had bows and arrows at the ready. In the Haro Strait, Coast Salish
groups surrounded a ship on an exploration led by one of Eliza’s men, José Verdia.
Under threat, he fired his cannons at them and sank one canoe, noting that they had
“killed some natives among those who were striving to attack the long boat from all
sides with some heavy spears having points of bone like harpoons” (Gormly 1977:27).
Suttles (1989) thought these attackers were likely Saanich or Cowichan. Another crew
member named Pantoja also inscribed an account of the expedition. He described the
Coast Salish as more bellicose than the groups on the outer coast:

They seem to me, however, to be more warlike and daring, not only on
account of what happened to the longboat but because from the Puerto
de Quimper [New Dungeness] to the Ensenada de Rojas [Clallam Bay],
some 18 leagues, we saw on all the beaches a number of skeletons
fastened to poles of the shores. Ordinarily they all use some thick hides
dressed like deerskins and in the bows of their canoes they carry long
spears (Wagner 1933:189-90).

In 1792, another Spanish expedition, led by Galiano and Valdés, also remarked
upon an apparent disposition to warfare by the Coast Salish, specifically the Musqueam
of Point Grey:

[The Musqueam] displayed an unequalled affability together with a
warlike disposition. They traveled provided with many good arms such
as iron-pointed spears half a yard long, quivers full of arrows with tips
of the same metal and of flint, bows and clubs, and hold the latter in such
high esteem that it was not possible to get one in exchange for knives of
Monterrey shells\footnote{These “Monterrey shells” refer to abalone shells that were brought up the coast from
California specifically for trade.} (Wagner 1933:260).

In his analysis of these accounts, Suttles (1989:261) pointed out that no
fortifications are mentioned, however, an artist aboard one of the Spanish expeditions
did depict one described as located on the Strait of Juan de Fuca (see Figure 48, pg. 268).
The 1792 Galiano and Valdés Expedition encountered not only the Coast Salish, but also Captain George Vancouver’s Expedition. In Howe Sound, Vancouver described some Coast Salish, likely Squamish, who approached their ship, noting face-paint and arrow materials:

We had seen about seventeen Indians in our travels this day, who were much more painted than any we had hitherto met with. Some of their arrows were pointed with slate, the first I had seen so armed on my present visit to this coast; these they appeared to esteem very highly, and ... took much pains to guard them from injury (Vancouver 1984 [1792]:587).

Like the Spanish before them, the British also noticed the presence of defensive sites. Menzies (1923 [1792]) described a fortified Coast Salish village near Homfrey Channel on the mainland side of the Strait of Georgia, within Desolation sound:

At the farther end of these Islands we come to a small Cove in the bottom of which the picturesque ruins of a deserted Village placed on the summit of an elevated projecting Rock excited our curiosity and induced us to land close to it to view its structure.

This Rock was inaccessible on every side except a narrow pass from the Land by means of steps that admitted only one person to ascend at a time and which seemed to be well guarded in case of an attack....

Sixteen years later, when Simon Fraser undertook his exploratory trip down the Fraser River in 1808, he also encountered frequent indications of warfare. At one point, he described how the “The Indians advised us not to advance any further, as the natives of the coast or Islanders were at war with them, being very malicious, and will destroy us” (Fraser 1960 [1808]:104). By “Islanders” he appears to have heard about the Cowichan, who conducted raids up the Fraser River. At the Fraser’s delta, lived the Musqueam, a group who were reportedly feared by some upriver peoples.

At last we came in sight of a gulph or bay of the sea [the Strait of Georgia]; this the Indians called Pas-hil-roe. It runs in a S.W. & N.E. direction. In this bay are several high and rocky Islands whose summits are covered with snow. On the right shore we noticed a village called by the Natives Misquiam [Musqueam]; we directed our course towards it. Our turbulent passenger conducted us up a small winding river to a small lake to the village.

Here we landed and found a few old men and women, the others fled into the woods upon our approach. The fort is 1500 feet in length and 90 feet in breadth. The houses, which are constructed as those mentioned in places, are in rows; besides some that are detached. One of the natives
conducted us through all the apartments, and then desired us to go away, as otherwise the Indians would attack us (Fraser 1960 [1808]:105-106).

In continuing downriver, Fraser described his wariness regarding the Coast Salish groups in the area:

After [a] skirmish [at Musqueam] we continued until we came opposite the second village [between Musqueam and Point Grey]. Here our curiosity incited us to go ashore; but reflecting upon the reception we experienced at the first, and the character of the Natives, it was thought neither prudent nor necessary to run any risk, particularly as we had no provisions, and saw no prospect of procuring any in that hostile quarter (Fraser 1960 [1808]:106).

Upon returning upriver, Fraser (1960 [1808]:109) commented that some groups said that his party must have experienced “good fortune to escape the cruelty of the Masquiamme.” Fraser did not just see defensive aspects of villages, and warlike threats, but also saw what he described as scalps: “one of the crew had a large belt suspended from his neck garnished with locks of human hair” (Fraser 1960 [1808]:109).

The Fort Langley Journals

Wednesday 19th [March 1828]. Clear frosty morning. Three Indians from the Kutche Camp up Pit’s River informed us that the Cowitchen war party were passed, that they killed 10 of the Penault [Pilalt] tribe and had taken a number of their women & Children Slaves. They must have passed here at night. This tribe lives about a day’s march up. This warfare keeps Indians of this vicinity in Such Continual alarm, that they Can[n]ot turn their attention to any thing but the care of their family and that they do but poorely. While the powerful tribes from Vancouver’s Island harass them in this manner, little hunts Can be expected from them and unless the Company Supports them against those lawless villains little exertions Can be expected from them.
—James McMillan (McMillan and McDonald 1998:57)

These journals are from the first years of the Hudson Bay Company’s (HBC) Fort Langley, established in 1827 on the south bank of the Fraser River about 45 km upstream from the mouth (Maclachlan 1998). Prior accounts were valuable but they were invariably based on brief encounters and the explorers and traders knew and reported little of the cultural context of their interactions. In contrast, the daily logs at Fort
Langley, written by the Company’s proctors represent the first recordings of everyday life, allowing us to see unfolding patterns of interaction from 1827 to 1830. From Fort Langley’s vantage point, the Fraser River was a transportation thoroughfare, a Coast Salish Main Street, with the fort as a major attraction and transportation and trading node for the Coast Salish canoe travelers. People regularly came from Vancouver Island, the upper Fraser, Puget Sound, and elsewhere; many to trade furs (prizing beaver), sturgeon, and salmon at the fort, but more so to reach seasonal camps or to visit for feasts or other gatherings. Men at the fort married local women, which they viewed as advantageous “alliance[s]” (Maclachlan 1998 [e.g., June 23, 1829]). As Wayne Suttles (1998) noted, the journals are “especially valuable,” for their descriptions of conflict, raiding, and warfare.

Carlson (2001), in an analysis of the journals found that there were notations of at least thirty conflicts during those three years. Fights erupted even at the Fort’s gates and they noted constant alarms about the presence of the feared Lekwiltok, the southern Kwakwaka’wakw who often raided southward into Coast Salish areas. The nature and extent of these conflicts range from personal fights escalating into tribal ones, raiding parties to punish individuals for “bad medicine” (April 26, 1828 [McMillan and McDonald 1998:60]), to the scattering of women and children to hide in the woods upon a raiders’ approach, and reports of gathering tribes to conduct retaliatory attacks on enemies such as the Lekwiltok (e.g., around “500 men”; September 21, 1830 [McDonald 1998:159-160]). Undoubtedly, contact had already altered the nature of these groups before the Fort was built, and later the Hudson’s Bay Company men at Fort Langley hoped to change aboriginal culture even further to their economic advantage. The traders even intended to minimize warfare amongst groups to allow for less obstructions to hunting pursuits. They were more willing to sell firearms for use in hunting than for warfare (e.g., McDonald 1998 [1829]:111-112; Angelbeck 2007:271-272). The journal accounts such as James McMillan’s entries from 1828 provide the earliest in-depth descriptions of warfare in the region:
Thursday 13th [March]. This morning a war party of Cawaithens Headed by Lammus passed up. They Say they are going to kill the Chilquiyouks a tribe that lives on a Small river that Come[s] in from Mount Baker. The man that Stood watch last night observed a large Canoe full of Indians Coming on Slily till they were opposite to the Bastion but perceiving they were discovered they about Ship at once. We Suppose it was those vagabonds on the look out if every thing was quiet in the Fort, and take us for Chilqueyoukes. They are 150 men in ten Canoes, and ugly looking Devils they are—painted to their very ears.... A little after the war party left this they met Shientin the Musqueam Chief with his wife and two of his daughters. The war Chief took the eldest from him, menacing if he did not keep very quiet he would kill him & make Slaves of his family—two very fine looking girls.


Accounts from the 1840s and 1850s

After the establishment of Fort Langley, there were several other expeditions with extant accounts that have provided glimpses of Coast Salish warfare. Charles Pickering (1854:15-16), on a global expedition aboard the Vincesses, described his visit to a stockade near Dungeness Spit on the Olympic Peninsula, Klallam territory in 1841:

[In] the vicinity of Discovery Harbour, I was fortunate enough to fall in with one of the permanent stockaded villages. It was built in a concealed situation, on the bank of a small stream of fresh water, that afforded access by canoe; and it was not far from the anchorage at Dungeness. It appeared to be the proper home of all natives we had seen within many miles; amounting, perhaps, to as many as three hundred persons.

In one of the houses I witnessed the remarkable treatment to which the Chinook25 infants are subjected; being confined to a wooden receptacle, with a pad tightly bandaged over the forehead and eyes, so that it is alike impossible for them to see or to move.... Some of the men had their faces blackened, and I thought at first they were not pleased with my visit. However, I was conducted freely about the villages....

On returning to the ship, I observed a skull lying on the beach; a circumstance that surprised me, as I was aware that these tribes take much pains in the disposal of their dead. On pointing it out to my attendant native, he looked sorrowful, and made some gestures which I thought referred to the common lot of mortality. He also showed me the marks of a wound, received by him, as well as I could make out, in an engagement with a Northern tribe (Pickering 1854:15-16).

25. Having just come from the Columbia River area, Pickering appears to have misapplied Chinook as having broader scope.
A few years later, in 1847, Paul Kane, journalist and artist, visited a fortified Klallam village near Port Townsend called *I-eh-nus*. This was not long after the fort had suffered an attack by the Makah. He described the fort as a:

... [D]ouble row of strong pickets, the outer ones about twenty feet high, and the inner row about five feet, enclosing a space of 150 feet square. The whole of this inner space is roofed in, and divided into small compartments, or pens, for the use of each separate family (Kane 1971:251).

While going northward through Puget Sound, Kane also remarked on several defensive locales. Kane and his crew were even fired upon from a stockade with “two stout bastions of logs” on the west side of Whidbey Island (Kane 1859 [1847]:227).

William Ebrington Gordon, while aboard the HMS *Virago*, recorded a visit to a fort in the southern Gulf Islands in 1853:

In passing the [Cowitchin] Gap [Porlier Pass] there is an Indian village prettily situated on the right hand shore with potatoe grounds sloping to the water on either side, where through the Gap the Cowitchin war village may be seen on a low point about 4 miles to the northward [Shingle Point]. It is a stockade built in imitation of Fort Victoria....

The next day we had to contend against a strong breeze and continuing tide, so we shored at the Cowitchin war village, and did not arrive at the Gap till about 3.30 PM. The war village ... at the time of our visit was deserted (Gordon 1853).

It is likely that this was the fort visited by Bishop Demers in the early 1850s. A missionary history described an account, based on his notes of the encounter, which appears to be the location of a fortification on Shingle Point, Valdes Island:

The Bishop saw here for the first time an Indian fort. This one which enclosed all the village cabins, was built as a protection against the incursions of the terrible Yougletas from the lower Fraser. The Bishop describes it as being about two hundred feet by fifty and surrounded by posts twenty feet high. At regular distances, enormous tree trunks were sunk deep in the ground to solidify the encircling posts which were much shorter. On top of the tree trunks there were figures, supposedly human, but in them would be difficult to say whether the grotesque or the ridiculous prevailed. “The best thing for you to do,” says the Bishop in describing them, “if you wish for a better idea than I can convey, is to blend both adjectives. They were ridiculous and grotesque” (Theodore 1939:187).
That fort was taken down by Chief Joe, at the request of Bishop Demers—he wanted to encourage peace with the Lekwiltok, although in this example, the “Yougletas”\textsuperscript{26} are misplaced as hailing from the Lower Fraser.

**The Memoirs of Samuel Hancock**

Initially setting out from Missouri in the 1850s, Samuel Hancock (1860, 1927) prospected for gold in California, but soon turned his attention northwards to seek his fortune in coal in the central Northwest Coast. While most colonists remained close to the colonial forts, Samuel Hancock set out often on his own, hiring natives from local groups as guides and travelling throughout Puget Sound, the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the west coast of Washington and Vancouver Island in the early 1850s. Because he operated on his own, without an entourage of other colonists, expedition or military crew as most previous encounters had been, he was able to experience and describe aspects of Coast Salish, as well as Makah and Nuu-chah-nulth cultures, in a more personal way. Hancock encountered these groups on their terms, not on the deck of a ship, from the shelter of a trading fort, nor encumbered with a large entourage of other colonists or traders. Instead, he engaged them as an individual and stayed as a guest in their villages and homes. Other individuals also must have operated independently among these cultures, but Hancock provided an account with his detailed memoir of his travels and explorations along the Northwest Coast.\textsuperscript{27}

In the early 1850s, when he first set out from Fort Seattle, he hired a crew of seven natives, likely Duwamish, as guides. He handed each of them muskets and

\textsuperscript{26} There are numerous names used for the Southern Kwakwaka’wakw. I use the spelling “Lekwiltok,” after Duff’s (n.d.) manuscript of the group which covers the time period of their conflicts with the Coast Salish. Other common names include Euclataws (Duff n.d.), Ne-culta (Kane 1859 [1847]), yəḵʷiltəx (Elmendorf 1993), Yukletas, Ucultas, among others (Hodge 1913). Today, descendant communities use the spelling of Laich-kwil-tach.

\textsuperscript{27} Hancock’s memoirs (1860, 1927) are rich in ethnohistoric detail, much like Jewitt’s account of his slavery to Maquinna in 1803. In fact, Hancock also was held prisoner by a Nuu-chah-nulth group for many days until his Makah friends interceded on his behalf and he was freed.
described their reaction:

The first night I encamped at the mouth of the Puyallup River where I discovered my Indians were very proud of their muskets with bayonets; it was quite amusing to see their manoevers with these arms, of which they had never seen any before, and they told me they intended having a fight before we returned, and capturing some slaves (Hancock 1860:95).

Not long after that encampment, Hancock and his men, canoeing alongside Whidbey Island, witnessed what appeared to be a battle at a Snoqualmie village:

That day we came in sight of a large party of natives who seemed to be fighting; I enquired of my Indians [guides] what it meant or whether they were really fighting? They replied that they were “Hias Silex” that is very angry. We ventured near enough to be able to see what they were doing without seeming to attract their attention; they continued charging and rushing through the midst of the crowd; apparently fighting, scalping and killing each other; I could see them strike with knives when one would fall as though deadk [sic], when his antagonist would spring upon him knife in hand and go through all the formula of scalping him at the same time cutting off a bunch of hair which he would hold up exultingly representing the scalp of an enemy; then rushing at another in the most furious way, he would perhaps stumble and fall when his adversary would serve him in like manner. This was a mock fight often up for the purpose of preparing themselves for a moment against an enemy and when I understood there was nothing serious in all this I enjoyed it very much. Soon they finished this pantomime and beckoned us to come to shore (Hancock 1860:97-98).

Once at the village, Hancock (1860:98) learned that the mock battle was conducted to ready for a battle to take place the next day. A chief in the village was preparing to attack the Snohomish. They had captured one of his wives, “leaving the poor fellow only two wives in hand.” As Hancock and his crew of seven had muskets, the chief encouraged them to join their party in the morning attack. Hancock did not want to attack the Snohomish and declined to lend his muskets to them as well. He did, however, offer to come along the next day to help broker a peace. Hancock described the war preparations that night:

The old chief then blackened his face, and kneeling down made a most lamentable noise, something like a forced cry, at the same time making all sorts of gyrations with his hands; during this time the rest of them were painting themselves in a way I supposed for war, but as they pledged me their word to a compliance with their own proposition, I did not attach much importance to this, after finishing this painting they all got their clubs, knives and implements of war, and formed themselves in a circle around the chief, jumping, yelling and dancing most furiously for about a half an hour, the chief seeming to participate fully in the
excitement. When they ceased I asked what it meant, they replied “Cultus” (Hancock 1860:100).

The next morning, the war party of about a hundred men advanced on the Snohomish village where the chief’s wife was held, encountering many warriors armed with bows and some guns, ready in the bushes. The Snoqualmie Chief brought tobacco and pipes as a offering for the return of his wife, which the Snohomish Chief appeared willing to accept, perhaps because of the size of the Snoqualmie war party. Ultimately, after much discussion, the Snohomish Chief accepted two blankets and two muskets for her return. Then, they “joined each other seemingly forgetful that they had ever been in opposition” (Hancock 1860:102).

From Hancock’s accounts, it is clear that villages were often friendly, especially when members of his hired crew would know or be related to members of those they encountered or visited. However, it is also certain that tensions abounded throughout Puget Sound and beyond. His guides were always wary of other canoes while on the water and suspicious of people they encountered on trails as they travelled throughout the region. Hancock’s native guides would warn of unfriendly groups, as when they were on the prairies near the trails that the Yakima used, near Snoqualmie Pass (1860:125-128). Upon hearing this, Hancock became upset that they had selected this spot to camp. They decided to move their camp to a spot less open: “bundling up our effects [they] led the way some distances off the trail, when I spread my blankets and slept soundly the Indians watching by turns all night” (Hancock 1927:128).

A Scalar Approach to Accounts of Warfare

Expressions of Increasing Modes of Power

From the above survey of historic accounts, it is apparent that these contain a lode of information germane to this inquiry into Coast Salish warfare. This overview has not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but merely intending to highlight pertinent accounts from the historic records. Wolf’s (1990) conceptualization of modes of power can provide a framework to array the types of conflict documented. Wolf
meant power in both physical and non-physical ways—one has the power to kill or to remove from a position, as from a job in an institution, or from a role in a volunteer organization; however, as we are looking at conflict, the physical applications of power typically will dominate.

(i) Power as an attribute of a person, or individual power

This form of power is intrinsic in the individual and does not involve interaction with others on its surface, although it can manifest in relation to others, particularly in how an individual displays power to others. Nearly all of the accounts record some form of warlike display, symbolism, or disposition, all of which is meant to display spirit power, the power that allows a person to be a great warrior. This type of power is what led the Spanish to describe the Coast Salish in the Juan de Fuca Strait as “warlike.” Even when they did not witness war directly, personal displays of power demonstrated a war-like propensity. Oral histories and ethnographies, document an important connection between a warrior’s success and the vitality of his spirit power; a connection that will be discussed in more detail later. To an early explorer or settler, one likely would not have needed to know about the cultural significance of spirit power to get the message that it was also an expression of an individual’s physical power. Samuel Hancock witnessed such displays of individual power at the warrior dance on Whidbey Island, just as Simon Fraser had seen among the Musqueam. In such accounts, displays of one’s power (i) are intended to show that one has further powers to dominate, injure, or kill another (ii), as follows.

(ii) The ability of one to impose its will on another, or relational or interpersonal power

This type of power is visible primarily in relations between warriors and their captives, or chiefs and their slaves. While chiefs and elites were not able to force members of their households to do things, they could impose their will on their slaves.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{28} Major works on slaves in the Northwest Coast include Mitchell (1984), Donald (1997), Ames
As Ames (2001:1) described, “Slaveholders not only controlled the labour of slaves, but had the power of life and death over them as well.”

Slaveholders’ power over slaves typically originated from their initial capture in warfare, although they could be traded or purchased thereafter. In itself, the act of taking a slave, is the act of one enacting power over another, with the end result of control, wounding, or killing. All historic accounts of warfare and conflict involve, by its very nature, the attempts for the imposition of one’s power over another. Even at its smallest scale, such as with a fight between two individuals, the goal is the imposition of power. The following account of a “row” outside Fort Langley illustrates this point:

Sunday 10th [January 1830]. Another row amongst the Indians of our neighbourhood—this afternoon one of two Quaitlines that Came down upon a Special visit to the Musquam Village right opposite to us, was brought to our wharf lifeless with 7 or 8 arrows Still Stuck in his body & otherwise much mangled with the Knife—this butchering now is in revenge for the death of the old Musquam that was killed by his Son-in-law in the upper Village latter end of Novr.—nor is the difference likely to end here—One of our men with two of the women happened to be in that direction at the time making ashes: The poor wretch on being mortally wounded made an effort to throw himself into their Canoe, but his pursuers were too much bent upon their purpose to be defeated by this Screen. One of our people was present during the affray (McDonald 1998:136).

Events involving just two people or a few can escalate into yet larger scales, or into higher orders of the application of power, as in the case of the above-mentioned event.

(iii) The control of social settings, or organizational power

Monday 11th [January 1830]. A good deal of reconnoitering going on all night between the two villages—In Course of the forenoon the Quaitlines amounting to about 60 men in 12 Canoes came down armed best they Could, and Seemed to muster from 10 to 12 Guns of one Sort or another—They made it a point to Call upon us first & tendered us a large Sturgeon for ammunition, which we refused them for a variety of reasons.... They then wished one of the Gentlm. to accompany them to the Musquam Camp—this was also refused from the Same motive....

Tuesday 12th. The trouble Continued on the other Side till late today—

Ever since the Quaitlins Crossed they fired occasional volies [volleys], which, with other Signs of hostility did not indicate a peaceable disposition—they now tell us that two of the Musquams are Slain—which we doubt much, as with them I find a man is dead when he acknowledges his life in the hands of his enemy! When the Quaitlines Came down yesterday they told us they had already killed 2 Musquams above, which on further inquiry proved to be a death of this mild nature.29

Wednesday 13th. It is ascertained that two Indians were actually killed & one of them very luckily the identical man that took the life of the other on Sunday—here ends the business for the present.


In these entries, a murder by one spiraled into an event that involved scores of Kwantlen men and the whole village of Musqueam on the other. Initially, a murder of a Musqueam man by a Kwantlen, followed by the Musqueam killing a Kwantlen man, escalated to a battle involving 60 men and two further deaths, including “luckily” one of the prior assailants. Here, with this escalation, we have the display and execution of a broader mode of power. The Kwantlens, overnight, organized dozens of men to attack the Musqueam.

As Samuel Hancock (1927 [1860]) had witnessed on Whidbey Island, a Snoqualmie Chief was able to assemble 150 men quickly in order to attack a Snohomish village. The presence of the multitude of war canoes was enough to encourage the Snohomish Chief, who held the wife captive, to negotiate. With the Kwantlen vs. Musqueam account, it is interesting to note that even with 60 men on one side and presumably as many on the other, the battle occurred at a distance, with the majorities of each group on the either side of the Fraser River—and only two individuals died. That is, much of what occurred during those battles concerned the chief’s display of the

29. From McDonald’s (1998 [1830]) account, it is interesting to note from his experience that when one “acknowledges” one is in control of another in battle—that is, submitted to their interpersonal power (ii)—it is regarded, spoken of, as death. This relates to how when a non-elite is captured, it is often considered a social death. Elmendorf (1960:346-347) has stressed the “immutable slave status” imparted a “a slur against their status comparable to ‘slave blood’ in an upper-class kin line.” This often did not occur for elites as they were valued for their price in ransom, whereas a non-elite only had value as a slave commodity; moreover, elites could hold a feast to clear their name, display and reaffirm their status (Elmendorf 1960:347).
organizational power (iii).

Despite a substantial amassing of warriors for the cause, the main impetus was to show that one has power and can implement it—and they might kill one or two people to show that their organizational power is not a bluff. However, at least among those Coast Salish groups, it appears that they did not want the tension to escalate. These accounts suggest that there is a lot at stake if conflict develops further, taxing alliances, intermarriage ties, and disturbing the peace. For such reasons, perhaps many conflicts at this scale involve lots of bluffing displays instead of the actual implementation of that power or violence, a situation that may indicate that bluffing was less used or would have been less effective in interactions with non-Salish groups, with whom such shared interests or ties were much less common.

(iv) The ability to establish or demolish the settings themselves, or structural power.

The next dimension of power demonstrates the ability to organize within a sociopolitical field and to alter the conditions of that field itself. Warfare at this scale might result in the destruction of a village, or its resettlement to a more defensive location—in effect, altering the fundamental nature of how the social setting is constituted. Rozen’s (1985:108) Hul’qumi’num informants reported that “the so-called ‘wars’ with the Southern Kwakiutl only took place on a large scale (i.e. large enough to force abandonment [sic] of exposed villages on the Gulf Islands) from about 1790 to 1850.” Similarly, Cook (1979) described how the Chilliwack people had moved from the Chilliwack River Valley to the Chilliwack Area after the establishment of Fort Langley, which she argued was partly done because the traders afforded them protection from the “more warlike Cowichans and Qwantlens.”

Warfare not only led to resettlement, but also contributed to substantial destruction of existing villages, including both structures and inhabitants. For instance, Duff (1952) learned from one informant that the Nlaka’pamux (formerly Thompson) raided the Chilliwack and burned a long plankhouse—the village was named yukyuke’us.
(Yakweakwioose), or “burnt out.” Furthermore, Duff (1952:96) recorded an account in which a Sumas warrior, KwEl, led a retaliatory raid on the Lekwiltok, breaking into their fortified house and killing all the warriors there.

In 1856, the first European expedition to attempt to cross Vancouver Island to the West Coast, led by Adam Horne, scouted a Haida war party coming down from the north as they were approaching the mouth of the Qualicum River. They hid until the party passed southward, without noticing them. I present this at some length as it provides an eye-witness account of such a devastating attack on a Qualicum village:  

It must have been six o’clock next morning, or a little later, when the Iroquois31 aroused me, and told me in a subdued voice, that we were within one mile of the Qualicum, and that for some time, he had been watching a large fleet of northern canoes approaching the creek. What they intended doing, of course, he did not know, but he anticipated trouble....

We waited patiently to see whether those Indians would return or not. It was fully twelve o’clock before the first of them came into view in the lower reaches of the creek. We were horrified at the antics of these demons in human shape, as they rent the air with their shouts and yells. One or two of those manning each canoe would be standing upright going through strange motions and holding a human head by the hair in either or both hands. The wind at this time was almost blowing a hurricane from the north, and the sea was tipped with angry white caps in every direction. Turning the prows of their canoes to the south, these northern Indians hoisted mats as sails, and fairly flew along before the gale. In an hour’s time they were all out of sight behind a bend in the shore line....

After lying concealed another hour we once more launched our canoe, loaded it up with our supplies and impedimenta, and poled our way along the shallow beach towards what we were now convinced was the mouth of the Qualicum.... In case we met with any natives, who might give us a hostile reception, all of our men had their muskets loaded and lying by the sides. We saw nothing of the rancherie on entering, but

30. This account is by W. Wymond Walkem (1914), who provided quotations for many passages, but oddly remained in first person (in this case, Adam Horne) outside of quotations; He is not clear on its sourcing. The boundary between Adam Horne’s words and his own is also unclear. Despite these qualifications, the expedition is well-documented (e.g., Hayman 1989:32, 48; Akrigg and Akrigg 1997:116); the lake just upriver on the Qualicum is named after Horne. But, more importantly, the descriptions accord with what is known about Northwest Coast warfare.

31. This is a one-armed man, part Iroquois and Chinook named Tomo, who was a participant in several expeditions on the island (Hayman 1989:32). Robert Brown, for his expedition years later, also employed him, noting that “One armed Tomo (his name is ‘Toma Antoine’ or ‘Thomas Anthony’) [is] of mixed Iroquois & Chinook origin but undistinguishable from a half-breed, & noted as a linguist & hunter....” (Hayman 1989:48).
volumes of smoke were still pouring out from one side of the stream beyond a projecting point, covered with heavy timber.

In five minutes we were round this point, and then a most desolate and pitiable condition of things met our view. What had evidently been a rancherie was now a blackened heap of burning timbers. Naked bodies could be seen here and there, but not a living being was in sight. Our interpreter called out several times that if there was any person living to come out—that we were friends, and would do them no harm. He got no answer, except the echoes from the surrounding hills, and he then walked over to where the lifeless bodies were lying. Horror of horrors! Every trunk was headless and fearfully mutilated. We searched the surrounding underbrush for living beings, but without success. Discouraged, we sat down upon a drift log to discuss what we should do. Some of my men were returning at once to Fort Victoria, but this I positively refused to do.... There were no Qualicum Indians from whom I could gain my information, so I must try and find the trail without assistance. If there were any left they must be prisoners in the hands of these northern Indians.

They eventually found a woman, badly injured, who related the attack to Tomo, the interpreter:

They had all been asleep in the large rancherie when the Haidahs crept in with stealthy step, and more than half of those asleep were killed without awakening. The remainder were quickly killed, there being five Haidahs to one of themselves. She was wounded with a spear, but had seized a bow and fled to the side of the creek and had hidden herself beneath the bank. The Haidahs had taken away with them two young women, four little girls, and two small boys. This expedition was in revenge for the killing of one of the Haidahs when attempting to carry off the daughter of one of the principal men who live where the death currents meet (Cape Mudge). Beyond this we could get no more information....

This camp, with its headless bodies, was no place for us, so we returned to our canoes and left the creek as we had entered (Walkem (1914:41-42).

But, not all such enactments of structural power were restricted to intercommunity battles with non-Coast Salish peoples. For instance, one of Jenness’ (1934) informants described how the Comox similarly burned all three houses of a Saanich village. And, McMillan (McMillan and McDonald 1998:57) in 1828 described a devastating attack by Cowichans on upriver groups like the Pilalt, quoted above (see page 73). In these accounts, it is clear that such attacks altered the social setting of the victims, impeding their ability to engage in routine economic activities, often to the dismay of the traders, who relied heavily on the local production of food and trade goods such as furs.
More examples of such destructive power are illustrated in the accounts of the wars with the Lekwiltok. In many of these accounts, the attacks were similar to those that took place between Coast Salish communities. For example, on August 11, 1827, some Skagit people came to trade at Fort Langley, partly to provision for their trip northward to rescue or punish the Lekwiltok for the capturing of two of their women (Barnston 1998:31-32). On May 8, 1828, the Lekwiltok attacked a Cowichan summer village and killed a Musqueam chief. Other Lekwiltok attacks were more destructive: on June 12, 1828 (McMillan and McDonald 1998:65), they attacked a Musqueam village, reportedly killing 3 men and taking or killing 30 women and children, completely altering the nature and composition of the village; and on July 21, 1830, the Lekwiltok attacked a village at Point Roberts, wounding four Cowichans and killing a Snuneymuxw (formerly Nanaimo, Snanaimuq).

Taylor and Duff (1956) documented that the Lekwiltok took over territory in the Northern Gulf, overtaking control of lands as far south as Quadra Island’s southern tip, Cape Mudge. They drove the Comox from their villages and seasonal camps. Boas (1889) documented a Snuneymuxw and Sechelt attack upon a Lekwiltok village as far north as Salmon Bay on Vancouver Island presumably after the Lekwiltok had taken it from the Comox.

There are other accounts of the movement of entire villages. Jenness (1934) described how the Songhees (also Songish) and Saanich moved their settlements because of the regularity and intensity of raids:

It was through fear of both the Comox and the Kwakiutl that the Songish retreated in summer above the gorge at Victoria, and the Saanich sent their women and children to secluded spots during May and June, the usual seasons for raids, while the men maintained a nightly watch on housetops. During the 19th century, indeed, the Saanich abandoned one of their villages near Sidney, on the east side of the peninsula, and moved to Patricia Bay, on the west side where they were less exposed to attack (Jenness 1934).

Similarly, the Klahoose, according to their Chief Julian, maintained village sites deep up Toba River that were less accessible rather than be open to attack in Toba Inlet (Black, Urbanczyk, and Weinstein 2000:32). Many Coast Salish oral histories detail
significant alteration of lifeways resulting from Lekwiltok attacks.

Once the [Cowichan] were at war with the tribes on the American side of the Straits. While they were absent from their villages some of the Kwakiutl bands swooped down upon their settlements, burnt their houses and carried off the women and children into slavery. When the [Cowichan] warriors came back they found their homes destroyed and their families carried off into slavery. Nothing was left to them but the smoking remnants of their dwellings. Not even a dog remained (Hill-Tout 1978:160).

After that event, the Cowichan decided to organize the Coast Salish together in order to put an end to this cycle of warfare. They held a council of war, inviting chiefs from numerous Coast Salish groups from the Nanaimo and Sechelt in the north, Sooke to the west, Klallam, Skagit, and Nisqually and other Puget Sound groups, as well as some from the Fraser River. Setting scouts along the Strait of Georgia, they were going to be prepared for the next time the Lekwiltok returned. Finally, a battle occurred at Maple Bay, between Vancouver Island and Saltspring Island. From the numerous accounts that are available, most if not all the Lekwiltok warriors were killed; I describe the battle in more detail in Chapter VIII.

Although the oral histories may have exaggerated some of the specific outcomes, they are consistent in noting that these battles ended the Lekwiltok raids. The very large-scale organization of Coast Salish groups for the purpose of ending the Lekwiltok raids is a clear example of structural power that permanently altered the nature of Lekwiltok/Coast Salish interaction. For decades prior, evidently since the 1790s through at least the 1830s—the years of the Lekwiltok wars—it could be argued that the environment of constant raiding and counter-raiding was the predominant sociopolitical field. Most attacks during that period, while destructive, could be described as examples of organizational power, whereas, the Battle at Maple Bay, altered the sociopolitical field itself.

A final example of structural power is in the actual extermination of a people. In the Gulf of Georgia, this happened to the Chemakum, said to be a “troublesome” group inhabiting Port Townsend. According to Gibbs (1877:191), the Makah first attacked them fiercely, after which the Chemakum had to battle with the Snohomish. Finally,
Chief Seattle led the Suquamish against them, destroying their fort and nearly killing them all. The Chemakum survivors joined surrounding groups like the Klallam (Curtis 1970 [1913]:142; also Elmendorf 1993:143-145).

These accounts demonstrate that the Coast Salish did not always directly enact the next scale or mode of power; rather, they frequently only signaled their ability to do so. In effect, they were threatening (or bluffing) that the next higher level of engagement would be undertaken if the enemy did not back down. One can be “warlike,” through a show of force and readiness, putting on various “grotesque” faces and engaging in menacing acts, signaling both power and willingness to conduct war. Alternately, as Simon Fraser had seen, one could bear a “belt of scalps.” Such displays demonstrated that warriors had successfully killed others (ii) many times before. Slaves also were symbols of status. That status resulted from a clear demonstration of control of another. Similarly, other dimensions of power will also have their subsequent material residue in some form of symbolism.32

A “Continual State of Fear”: The Power of the Lekwiltok

Based on this frame involving the different modes of power, it appears from historic accounts that the Lekwiltok were more powerful than the Coast Salish. They were formidable and considered a menace to all groups they encountered. They even called themselves by names that could instill fear, as one group’s name meant “unkillable thing,” after a worm that would keep squirming even when split into pieces; other group names included “murderers” or “the angry ones” (Curtis 1970

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32 One can view elite traded items, described at potlatches, as symbols of those relationships, symbols for alliances that one can call upon—that is, organizational power that one has access to. Often, these items are discussed by archaeologists as ceremonial or otherwise non-utilitarian, but these items serve a potent function: to demonstrate the social capital that one can draw upon when necessary—a degree of power that perhaps could be used to alter the social settings itself.
Crosby (1907:68), an early missionary, described how the Lekwiltok attacked all who travelled through the narrows between Quadra Island and Vancouver Island, or what he referred to as the “gauntlet”:

The northerners were not always successful in making the trip home with their booty. The Cowichans would gather at Dodd’s Narrows and Active Pass, or at Cowichan Gap, and set upon the victors, often turning their victory into defeat. If they escaped the Cowichans they still had to run the gauntlet of the Yu-kwul-toes [Lekwiltok], the most to be dreaded of the whole coast tribes, and many a Tsimpshean, Hydah or Kling-get war party has found its death trap at Seymour Narrows or the Yu-kwul-toe Rapids.

In the Fort Langley journals, there are numerous references to the Lekwiltok and the general fear of them. As McMillan (McMillan and McDonald 1998 [1828:65) noted in his journal entry, after the Lekwiltok had attacked the Musqueam, “The Country her[e]abouts is in [a] Continual State of fear by their powerful and Blood thirsty enemies from the Gulf of Georgia and Johnston’s Straits.” Similarly, McDonald (1998:101), on Friday the 13th, March 1829, remarked that “It is impossible to describe their Continual alarm at the very name of this formidable foe.” Yet, as I have discussed in more detail elsewhere (Angelbeck 2007), this fear of the Lekwiltok appears to be justified, for several reasons, each of which involves a Lekwiltok advantage in dimensions of power, primarily in organizational and structural power.

Kwakwaka’wakw peoples such as the Lekwiltok had warrior sodalities, or secret societies, which Mitchell (1989:5-6) stated was a “superior organization for fighting,” and which was distinctive from Coast Salish modes of social organization, which he described as “atomistic.”

The relative autonomy of extended households in all economic and political matters has contributed to the impression many ethnographers convey of the “atomism” of Salish society. Kwakiutl extended households, however, were additionally associated as members of well-

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33 While Mitchell summarized the ethnography of the Coast Salish as conveying a sense of atomism, a term that characterizes the Coast Salish sense of individualism and autonomy. However, the term also connotes the isolation of disparate parts; therefore, the term anarchism, I believe, is more appropriate, as it conveys both the autonomous quality of households and individuals while having principles of organization that provide networks to fulfill certain needs.
defined descent groups—numayms—as important sub-units of the local group. These divisions were linked through the formal ranking system to provide a structure for Kwakiutl society lacking for the Salish (Mitchell 1989:6).

Further, he described how Salish winter dancers also displayed violent behavior, however, these were the “performances of individuals—not members of a sodality.... among the Salish, the warrior was a feared, almost uncontrollable, and decidedly solitary figure—fully in keeping with the mooted Salish atomism” (Mitchell 1989:9). Here, Mitchell makes a strong point. As he noted, Boas (1897:664) himself attributed the origin of secret societies to warfare, noting that those societies were very active during periods of warfare and that the initiator of the ceremonies was a spirit named Winalagilis, “the one who makes war upon the whole world.” While there may have been clear war symbolism associated with these societies, it is not simply a matter of ideological orientation to warfare they may have had, rather, the organizational power was greater. This dimension of organization outside of the household consisted of an institution ready-made for warfare implementation. Contrast that with the Coast Salish practice where a warrior has to cajole others into joining his cause, perhaps by promising participants a portion of the booty. It must have been easier to persuade people to participate in the defense of their own village rather than to join an attack upon some distant community, even if for revenge.

According to Roscoe (1993), practice theory accounts for how a powerful individual can implement practices that eventually lead to an institutionalization of his power. Leaders in many societies used numerous practices to directly and continually create and maintain alliances, all of which are costly—some leaders ending up owing their supporters more than they have credit, resulting in an unstable form of power. Instead, it is better for leaders, when possible, to “institutionalize their dominance” beyond their own charisma or ability to convince others. The secret society is an example of such a practice, as it does not rely upon association with a warrior or an alliance with a chief that may enable some benefit in return. Rather, the secret society is organized under an ideology and set of ritual practices that orients the relationship of
warriors. In the Lekwiltok case, the warriors form part of a ranked institution that extended beyond and existed separate from the organization of households. Consider the difference in effectiveness with organizational power: one can put one’s energy into canvassing individuals to your cause in warfare, appealing to their self-interests or convincing them of its justification—in such cases, the power to join is heavily in the control of the free individual. Or, the secret society of warriors pursuing this attack can demand that its members participate in the attack, or be barred from membership in that institution—the weight is on side of the institution, or the secret society. For the Lekwiltok, their warrior societies were already an institution—already organized and at the ready—whereas Coast Salish war parties were formed after efforts of organizing for each occasion.

In addition to greater effectiveness in mobilization of people, Mitchell (1989:5) also recognized that their population was greater. This point is particularly relevant for the period of the Lekwiltok wars, from 1790 to the 1830s, given that a smallpox epidemic had decimated the Coast Salish beginning about 1782 (Harris 1994; Boyd 1999). Smallpox affected populations at different times and in different intensities throughout the continent (Dobyns 1966, 1983); and the Coast Salish were particularly hard hit during the outbreak of 1782. In a map detailing the population from a census after the smallpox epidemic (Figure 3), it is clear that their numbers were diminished relative to other areas, particularly the Kwakwaka’wakw (Lekwiltok) to the north and Nlaka’pamux (formerly Thompson) in the northeast. This suggests that the disease spread with devastating effect within the Coast Salish interaction network and slowed down in neighbouring regions. This is important here concerning the Lekwiltok, as smallpox is not documented to have affected the Kwakwaka’wakw at the time. The severity of their population decline undoubtedly affected Coast Salish organizational power. This disparity in numbers and resulting social instability conferred an advantage on the Lekwiltok in their conflicts with their southern neighbours.

The effect of technology must also be considered. Vancouver’s expedition in
1792 documented how the Lekwiltok of Johnstone Strait were well armed with muskets, while within the Coast Salish territory they had just crossed, they did not mention the presence of firearms (Cole and Darling 1990:120-121). Prior to contact, all of the Northwest Coast peoples fought with the same types of weapons: knives, slings, clubs, spears, darts, bows and arrows—the same means of destruction were available to all groups. After contact, firearms were introduced, however, it is clear that their distribution was uneven and groups with access to the outer coast had greater access to traders who could provide guns. Sea-based traders regularly coursed up and down the outer coast, and they visited the inner passages such as the Gulf of Georgia much less
frequently.

The Lekwiltok, while not on the outer coast, regularly interacted with other Kwakwaka’wakw groups that were. The Central Coast Salish did not have ready access to fur traders until the establishment of Fort Langley in 1827, and that was a land-based trading fort. Furthermore, prior to the establishment of Fort Langley, the fur traders would not have been as interested in the types of furs the Coast Salish could produce (e.g., beaver pelts), because during the early decades they particularly wanted otter skins for the China trade. Sea otters were rare in the Gulf of Georgia region and this left the Coast Salish communities at a disadvantage concerning trade goods (Kennedy and Bouchard 1983:116; Suttles 1987d [1957]:155). Once Fort Langley was established, and after the serious decline in sea otter populations throughout the Northwest Coast, beaver pelts were the most prized furs, and these the Coast Salish could supply. However, there was a major difference between the amounts paid by sea-based traders and land-based ones at Fort Langley. As McDonald noted in 1829 (1998:111) when some Cowichans wanted to trade furs for rounds of ammunition to attack the Lekwiltok, “the natives of Vancouver’s Island and all along the Coast Can have no difficulty in obtaining elsewhere for their Skins ten times the quantity of amm. we give.” So, even once traders were readily available to the Coast Salish, there was hesitancy to provide them with firearms, partly in concern for their own welfare as they lived among Coast Salish groups while sea-based traders moved on after exchanges (Angelbeck 2007:271-272). European traders wanted to distribute firearms and ammunition to be used for hunting, to bring in furs. These conditions of geography and historical circumstance led to great disparities in access to firearms, resulting in power differences as well, as recounted in oral histories. For example, Curtis (1970 [1913]:20) recorded two accounts of conflicts between the Lekwiltok and Klallam:

One of the earliest wars of which the old men now tell began when a party of the Lekwiltok attacked a Clallum village on Whidbey [I]land. The islanders, about to celebrate a wedding, were expecting the arrival of friends from other Clallum settlements, and seeing the canoes of the Lekwiltok coming ashore, they hurried down to meet their supposed visitors, never dreaming that an enemy would approach by day. The
northerners, armed with guns, of which the Clallum as yet had none, quickly opened fire, killing many and dispersing the rest in the woods, and then pillaged the houses.

He also documented that a retaliatory attack upon the Lekwiltok was also halted by guns: “Again the allies assembled, and this time they found and attacked the Lekwiltok. But the guns of the northerners were too much for them, and they turned and fled” (Curtis 1970 [1913]:21).

The disparity in firearms access, in light of Wolf’s (1990) modes of power, can be seen as altering the dynamic of warfare, which had been previously, with stone and bone and shell weapons, a field of “equal footing” (Mitchell 1989). It can be seen as giving them a power that altered the field within which warfare was conducted. In fact, in reviewing these three primary advantages—rank institutionalized in secret societies, population inequities after smallpox, and the disparities in firearm distributions and access—two are the result of contact. That still leaves an advantage in readiness for organizational power, between the institutional form of secret societies and more autonomous form of the Coast Salish, described here as anarchic. However, that form of organizational power in warrior societies could be matched, as Salish groups could draw upon their networks of alliances when they needed. This is seen in the account of the Battle at Maple Bay, where their organizational power (iii) superseded the Lekwiltok and ultimately altered the setting for subsequent encounters, enacting structural power (iv).

Colist and Coast Salish Conflict

A common way to array the types of conflict, is to examine the increase in conflict from murders and feuds to intra- and inter-community conflict. However, while it is generally true that each of those conflicts is an escalation of the prior, those categories do not encompass the complexity those classes, especially in regards to the scale or degree of damage or the nature of power applied. This is most readily seen in the conflicts between Coast Salish groups and traders or colonists. For the Coast Salish,
most incidents involved rather small-scale conflict with the killing of one or a few settlers. In the following missionary account, Reverend Ronden (1913) described the response of colonists to murders, using a gunboat:

Time and again, whilst the painstaking missionary was variously engaged, the gunboat “Forward” was despatched from Victoria, now to put an end to some bloody affray between Indians of opposing tribes, now to capture and chastise some wild native guilty of slaughtering Whites. It is sad indeed to record that among the Whites that had commenced pouring into the country there were not a few who by their overbearing manners and dissolute conduct often provoked Father Rondeault’s parishioners to retaliate on them in a sanguinary way. However, it is gratifying to know that in these circumstances the Government wisely worked hand in hand with the clergy. Through Bishop Demers and Father Rondealt’s paternal influence, Cowichan was several times saved from being wiped out by bombardment. Upon the missionaries’ advice many a murderer spontaneously delivered himself to the secular arm, and resignedly paid the penalty, which generally was death (Ronden 1913:45; emphasis added).

First, this account reveals that missionaries were able to protect their First Nations’ parishioners in some cases, but it implies that saving the villagers did not always occur. Moreover, “bombardment” by gunboat was the response to a village for the murder of a settler. One informant related to Thom (2005:255), how devastating these gunboats attacks were:

It was the government that came along to this country and he told his whole crew “Take a pot shot. Lamalchi Bay.” Took a pot shot at Kuper Island Indian Reserve, took a pot shot at Leey’qsun tribes [Lyackson]…. Took pot shots, killing the people. Many people died. Old people. Old women. Little newborn babies were slaughtered by the white man from these ships....

You forgot that it’s your people that destroyed our villages. You shot at us, pot shots with those big guns, destroyed all the big houses. Indians had to go hide in the mountains from you people.

At Lamalchi Bay, the British reportedly killed six or seven Lamalcha and wounded many more, however, they “completely destroy[ed] the buildings” (Victoria Daily Chronicle 1863; cited in Arnett 1999:145). Thom (2005:256; emphasis added) commented that the oral histories of the event revealed the “transformative power wielded by the state in seizing Island Hul’qumi’num land”; he is describing the use of gunboats as structural power (iv). It is interesting to note, in viewing Coast Salish/colonist
relations in this Wolfian frame of power, that colonists, when faced with a murder of one
or two settlers (ii) responded with an application of full structural power (iv). They
altered the social settings with “gunboat diplomacy” (Gough 1984), destroying the
village at Lamalchi Bay for instance, or coming in with an overwhelming show of force
with hundreds of militiamen, as at Cowichan Bay in 1856 (Gough 1984:63-67). Perhaps
it is an indication of their awareness of how outnumbered the settlers were prior to
widespread immigration. Perhaps they felt a need to always show their capability for
structural power.34 This structural power primarily resided in the technology of large
well-equipped gunboats, and European militaristic organization, which was even
stronger than the the numayum of the Kwakwaka’wakw, described by Mitchell (1989).

Earlier, for the HBC traders, a fear was present that the Coast Salish would
organize. Above, I mentioned McDonald’s (1998 [1829]:111) account regarding his
hesitancy to provide firearms or ammunition in large amounts to Salish groups that
lived near the Fort. As Roderick Finlayson (1879:68), Chief Trader of the HBC at Victoria
recorded, it was their intention to prevent such organization:

The Policy of the company was honesty,—and also to keep the several
tribes divided and at enmity among themselves. This plan was followed
for purposes of protection to ourselves. —In short to keep up a jealous
feeling between the respective tribes (Finlayson 1879:68).

Conclusion

From the accounts, both historical and native, described above, several points are
evident regarding the effects of warfare in general and the nature of Coast Salish warfare

34. Similarly, to the far north, the Russian encroachment was met with resistance in the Aleut
area. In 1745, Mikhail Nevodchikov lost 32 crew members at what is now known as
Massacre Bay and Murder Point. In 1762, whole crews of ships commanded by Alexi
Drujinin and Stephan Glotov were killed on Unalaska (Coppock 1970:iii). Two years later,
Ivan Soloviev returned to avenge those deaths, and killed about 300 Aleuts. Coppock
(1970:iii) further wrote that the intervillage alliances of the Aleuts were “ineffectual” as “the
Russians pushed across the area village by village and island by island, they eliminated
approximately 80 percent of the Aleut population.” Thus, in response to the Aleut attacks,
the Russians responded overwhelmingly, nearly wiping out the Aleuts in the process.
in particular. First, warfare had substantial effects on indigenous cultures, particularly with respect to what Wolf (1990) termed “structural applications of power.” Other forms of power in warfare may have created fear, alteration of individual lives (through enslavement or wounding), or the reorganization of households due to deaths of individuals, however, warfare had structural effects that altered peoples’ ability to engage in other cultural practices, including where and how they lived. On seasonal or subsistence outings, conflict was part of peoples’ calculus for determining where they decided to camp. For example, Louis Pelkey, one of Suttles’ (1949 [6]:65) East Saanich informants, described how the “old people used to like to camp where fire not seen and would pull canoe up into bush.”

Second, it affected how they conducted daily routines. For example, one of Smith’s (1940:159) Puyallup-Nisqually informants stated: “My grandfather went out in his canoe to get wood. He always had his arms near him.” Suttles (1949[5]:70) noted Julius Charles’ statement that “Lummi didn’t go [for the] month [on a seasonal outing]. Had to build forts to protect the people.” That is, they opted not to conduct routine annual subsistence activities, and lose any potential surplus stores, in order to build these defensive sites. As Collins (1974:122), noted from her work among the Upper Skagit, “the blood feud not only interfered with economic activities but also affected the round of attendance at religious ceremonies and potlatches.” Since warfare structurally affects how and where their lives and cultural practices were carried out, it becomes an important context to consider for any study, archaeological or anthropological, concerning those periods when warfare was conducted.

It is also clear from these accounts that warfare, or at least its increase in intensity, was a by-product of the contact encounter. Even before the Spanish and British expeditions reached the Gulf of Georgia region in the early 1790s, contact had substantially affected the Coast Salish through the spread of smallpox. The introduction of firearms also tipped the balance, leading some like the Lekwiltok to play those events to their full advantage. The introduction of the fur trade established new dynamics into
the economic systems of the Northwest Coast, a matter which we will return to in more
detail in Chapter X.

While these colonial period accounts of warfare are especially valuable, they
cannot be seen as a mirror of warfare prior to contact. As Ferguson and Whitehead
(1992) emphasized, each and every postcontact account of indigenous warfare is, in fact,
an account that is affected by the nature of contact. In a real sense, there are no accounts
of pristine, indigenous warfare unadulterated by contact with Westerners; this is similar
to a point repeatedly stated in the 1990s about the history and conditions of ethnography
in general, all of which were conducted in colonial situations. For this reason, Haas
(1990) argued that an archaeology of warfare is critical to an understanding of
precontact warfare.

Considering the effects of contact, through Wolf’s (1990) modes of power,
perhaps the anthropological discourse of the Coast Salish is inadequate; as Bierwert
(1999:15-18) has summarized, the literature often presents the Coast Salish as a “raided
people rather than raiding people.” This is a by-product also of reliance upon historic
accounts that highlight Lekwiltok superiority. Such narratives do not take into account
that there power imbalances, both organizational and structural, that resulted from
particular historical circumstances with limited duration. Moreover, the circumstances
of that early postcontact window exhibits points of contrast to the evidence for Coast
Salish traditions for warfare, a point returned to in the next chapters. Examples from the
historic accounts above provide evidence to the contrary of this notion of the Coast
Salish as a “raided people.” Accounts of the Battle at Maple Bay provide indications of
how, despite these postcontact disadvantages, Coast Salish groups were able to match
and supersede the organizational power of the Lekwiltok, destroying Lekwiltok villages
in the north, and transforming the nature of the Coast Salish-Lekwiltok cycle of violence.
Chapter V: Welfare and Warfare: Modes of Production and Destruction

While early historic records present a good deal of detail on warfare, ethnographers have sometimes overlooked it. The traders at Fort Langley journals could not avoid it (Maclachlan 1998). They were outnumbered and surrounded by the Coast Salish and so fortified themselves. The Fort was threatened and occasionally attacked (once, according to journals of James Murray Yale, by about 600 Lekwiltok [Waite 1977:15-16; McKelvie 1957]). Coast Salish oral histories are replete with accounts of warfare. Even their cosmological histories concerning the coming of or Xa’:ls (Khaals), or as brothers the Xexá:ls, involved turning warriors into stone, which suggests that warriors existed since the time of transformation (e.g., Jenness 1955:22). Among some ethnographers in the past, however, this aspect has been underplayed, a point which has been emphasized for the Northwest Coast as a whole (e.g., Ferguson 1983) and for the Coast Salish in particular (e.g., Schaepe 2006). For some, like Codere (1950), the presence of warfare in oral histories apparently would be understood as part of a game, as if readily converted into “fighting with property” in the elaborate potlatches of the colonial period. However, as Ferguson (1983:133) pointed out, “Northwest Coast warfare was no game.” Warfare in the region involved “Sneak attacks, pitched battles, ambushes, prolonged attritional campaigns, treacherous massacres, sporadic raiding—these were facts of life from before contact to ‘pacification’ in the 1860s” (Ferguson 1983:133).

Ethnographers first conducted their research decades after this “pacification” that Ferguson refers to, within a colonial context. Moreover, ethnographers collected information on matters that they were interested in, and sometimes they did not collect information about warfare. Even Suttles (1990b:152), who did research warfare (i.e., Suttles 1951:319-324; ), remarked that “warfare, or at least the threat of warfare, may have played a greater role in the development of Northwest Coast institutions than I
was once inclined to believe.” Moreover, when warfare has been studied, it has been
 treated as a separate topic—optional to cover or not—rather than treated as integrally
 related to Coast Salish culture.

In this chapter, I briefly cover the weapons used in the practices of warfare. For
the most part, weapons comprise the tools and material capital used for warfare, or what
could be called the means of destruction—or even further, the means of defense used by
people to preserve their means of production and livelihood. In the next section, I
describe the relations of warfare, the sociopolitical roles involved in warfare, both in
offense and defense, and the nature of organization and authority, or the relations of
production. After discussing the various roles, I discuss the protocols available and the
array of cultural practices that order or structure the nature of conflictual interactions
during the postcontact or ethnographic period. In the last section, I discuss the
motivations for warfare from materials and territory to prestige. In so doing, I continue
the materialist frame and discuss the field of warfare showing how violent practices are
employed to gain various forms of capital.

Before I begin this summary of ethnographic literature in the Coast Salish region,
it is important to keep in mind that the resources available are drawn primarily from
ethnography, historic accounts, and oral histories, each of which has its advantages and
disadvantages. Each of those disciplines has its form and perspective to consider. From
ethnography, we benefit from sustained analysis that brings out insights amidst the
great complexity of cultural experience, but which are distorted by the postcontact
context, as is especially true with warfare (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992). From
ethnohistoric accounts, we gain greatly from the direct (or indirect) observations of
actual events. These often represent a third-party perspective other than that of the
culture under study, however, those events are often described in a way that reveals an
ignorance of cultural practices, while also suffering from the same colonial effect of the
observer upon the observed. From oral histories, we are aided, by the emic perspective
of those informants who have inherited or learned these traditions, and offer a telling
that highlights what is important about that event, the protocols enacted in those events, and even the telling of the tradition itself. Of the three, the sources for oral histories are of greatest antiquity. However, the greatest advantage of oral histories is also a major limitation: by gaining insight into the cultural perspective of what has been highlighted and handed down through generations, we cannot read what is not said, those subjects or details that might relate to our inquiry but simply were not included as part of their telling, perhaps considered unimportant or common knowledge to Coast Salish themselves. Having noted these qualifications, however, the values of each outweigh the disadvantages, and combined these provide a more well-rounded record. These accounts will be integral for undertaking an archaeological exploration of warfare.

**Weapons, or the Means of Destruction**

One class of Coast Salish weaponry included clubs, axes, knives, and spears. These are referred to as “melee” weaponry, because they are used in the melee of hand-to-hand combat. Another class of weaponry includes “projectile” weapons which can be thrown from a distance. These also include spears, but also slings, darts (with atlatls), and the bow and arrow. Increasingly, during the colonial period, iron axes and muskets were used. At the surface, these means of warfare are mostly the same as the means of productive subsistence. For most cases, that is true—these implements are multifunctional; this has always been the case throughout world history, with peasant armies formed armed with scythes, axes, and machetes. However, it is also true that some weapons were distinct from their subsistence form, having different shapes or decorations if used in warfare, as will be discussed below. Smith (1940:163) conveyed the significance of their differences among the Puyallup-Nisqually:

The weapons employed in all forms of manslaughter were strictly identified with the killing of humans and were used for no other purpose. So true was this that if a war club or dagger accidentally fell from a man’s clothing during a social gathering, it was understood that he had intended slaying his host or guest, as the case might be, and feeling against him was as strong as though the deed had been attempted. Warriors were fully equipped with the paraphernalia of war but ordinary men frequently owned neither war club nor dagger so
closely associated with the shedding of human blood.

Much detail on these tools, their material for construction, and so on, is widely available in the regional literature, so in the following there is no need to be exhaustive, however, it is important to lay some groundwork for this discussion.

**Melee Weapons**

Knives would seem to be an item of dual use, however, one of Suttles’ (1949[6]:87) East Saanich informants stated there were two different kinds of knives. Some knives, such as slate fish-cutting knives, would not be suitable for war, although others might. The Twana had double-edged, chipped-stone daggers of “flint” or obsidian with bone or wooden handles; no other materials would be used for such blades (Elmendorf 1960:471; Barnett 1955:268-269). One informant described that a warrior’s knife was of a post-contact trade item, a 10-in, double-edged iron knife with a brass handle (Suttles 1949[6]:87).

Perhaps the most distinctive weapon was the war club. Although some types of clubs were used to dispatch fish like halibut or sturgeon, war clubs had a specific use and term. Duff (1952) noted that war clubs were preferred weapons, and they were often shaped just like sturgeon clubs, although still distinctive. They could be of stone, hardwood, or bone. Some hardwood clubs were the length of baseball bats, albeit carved with sharp edges, while stone clubs could reach two feet in length. One of Duff’s (1952:60) informants related that “these clubs were only brought in at ‘big times,’ and their histories were told.” Among the Klallam, war clubs were predominantly of elk or whale bone, over a foot long and equipped with a wrist strap (Gunther 1927:268). No matter the material, it seems, they might exhibit anthropomorphic faces or zoomorphic imagery. Among the Twana, the “commonest” weapon was the club, often shaped like a paddle. Elmendorf (1960:471) noted that for winter dancing, a smaller paddle-like club might be used as a symbol of a person’s war power.

Somewhat intriguingly, Barnett (1955:269) remarked that the spool-shaped hand
maul was used for close-range combat as a minor extension of the fist. He described the weapon as “embellished with the nipple on the cap at the small end.” This corresponds to the classic description of the hand maul first noted in the Marpole era and is usually associated with woodworking activities, which seems more likely the case.

**Projectile Weapons**

As Elmendorf (1960:470) noted, the spear was a warrior’s weapon—and this makes sense since its use in hunting had probably long since declined with the advent of the atlatl propelled dart and the bow and arrow. Duff’s (1952:60) informants mentioned the use of spears in bear hunting, and how spears were useful as hiking staffs. In warfare, spears were primarily used for thrusting or stabbing, rather than thrown, and were tipped with points of bone, stone, or mountain goat horn. A favoured tactic with spears, when an attacker advanced, was to plant the handle into the ground and impale the on-rusher upon it (Barnett 1955:270). Among the Klallam, shafts of spears were made of yew, and could be “two fathoms long” with a large spearhead at the tip (Gunther 1927:268).

Slings were also used in warfare, made of various animal skins and cords. Using “perfectly round” stones, the slingshot was swung and whipped around the head. According to one of Duff’s (1952:60) informants, “One man from Yale was said to have been able to split enemy canoes with stones up to 4 inches in diameter.”

The bow and arrow was the favoured weapon for long-range combat. Typically, the bow was made of yew wood (“white cedar”) or vine maple and the bowstring was made of deer-sinew, or occasionally, sea lion gut obtained in trade from the Penelakut (Suttles 1948 [1]:84, 1949 [6]:62-63). The bow was held horizontally, rather than upright or vertical. The center of the bow sometimes was constricted with the tips recurved and those were “often decorated” (Duff 1952:59). Some bows were also backed with sinew, attached with a fish-skin glue (Elmendorf 1960:87). Barnett (1955:100) remarked that there was no difference between hunting bows and bows for war.
Arrows had shafts of cedar, with the tail bearing two duck feathers opposite each other (Duff 1952:59). Their length was the distance from shoulder to fingertip and those would be sanded smooth with dogfish skin (Barnett 1955:101). In some areas, as among the Nisqually, arrows had fore-shafts at the end and their arrowheads were often tied on with cherry bark (Smith 1940). Arrowpoints were made from bone, wood, shell, ground stone, or chipped stone, and later iron. One of Duff’s (1952:59) informants stated that the chipped stone point was exclusively for war. Similarly, in Puget Sound, it has been recorded that there were two types of arrows: one type for hunting and another for warfare (Haeberlin and Gunther 1930:26). Eells (1985:149) noted that in the Klallam area arrowpoints were fastened loosely, so that after impact it would be “remaining in the wound” (see also Gunther 1927:268).

Some stone materials were sought for their magical or “poisonous” qualities. For instance, black obsidian among the Twana, was held to be “naturally poisonous” inside the body (Elmendorf 1960:90). Among the Nisqually, quartz points, or “yellow” points, were also thought to be toxic once they penetrated a person, as were points made from human bone (Smith 1940:296). Also, natural poisons were applied to arrowheads as well, as the Snoqualmie used rattlesnake venom caught in the mountains (Tollefson 1996:155). Among the Twana, arrows and spear points were fire-heated to increase their potency (Elmendorf 1960:471). Sometimes poisons were applied for the same reason. Among Stó:lō groups, Duff (1952:59) recorded that “war-points were poisoned by dipping them in human brain,” while Elmendorf (1960:471) found that knowledge of arrow poisons was a closely guarded secret.

Although harpoons are typically associated with sea-mammal hunting, Gunther (1927:268) noted that the Klallam would use them in warfare when necessary. Two-pronged harpoons would be thrown at an enemy: “The points are barbed and attached to a sturdy rope. When the points have pierced the enemy he is dragged toward the attacker by means of rope, then clubbed, and his head cut off.”

This is yet another case for the multifunctional and creative use of tools. The
weapon categories described above are simply the types commonly described, but even their construction and materials exhibited a range of variability, especially as described for clubs, knives, and so on—a variability that seems particular to distinct Coast Salish groups or simply to individuals. There are also other weapons described by some that seem rare or as individualistic as Barnett’s description of the hand maul as a weapon. For instance, Duff (1952:5) recorded a description of a “sort of cross-bow,” which had a trigger and was used backed against the shoulder; Barnett (1955:270) mentioned that a chief of the Sliammon had described “a sort of catapult for discharging spears which was used in attacking a stockade,” made from “a springy sapling of yew.”

Equipment and Appurtenances for Warfare

Armour

In addition to weapons of offense, warriors would also have items for defense, or usually so. Many mentioned “buckskin shirts” from elk or deer (Suttles 1949 [6]:79), although it was just as common for a Coast Salish warrior to report that no physical armour was needed: “Each informant, when asked about armor, immediately replied that a man's power was his protection” (Smith 1940:164). When Frank Allen was asked about buckskin or other armour, he replied:

That’s no good. People who use that (armor) are no real war men. Warrior doesn’t care if he dies or lives! Disgrace for a man to fight with any protection but his power. Skokomish, Klallum have got big heart, don’t need that kind of stuff! (Elmendorf 1960:472).

However, even the buckskin hides as armour would allow some flexibility in movement, as they were sleeveless and hung down to mid-thigh. Rod or slot armour of the northern groups was not used, as “Men preferred to rely on their agility in dodging or running” (Barnett 1955:270).
War Canoes

Besides the weapons used or armour worn (or not), the means of warfare also included larger, structural items, such as canoes, fortifications, and other constructions. The Coast Salish made several types of canoes, predominantly the dug-out cedar canoe. For rivers, they carved shovel-nosed river canoes that were variably long but typically narrow and were poled, rather than paddled (Elmendorf 1960:170-76; Collins 1974:64-65). Another typical type of canoe, the “all-purpose canoe,” was carved from half a cedar log and about 4 to 9 m (15 to 30 ft) long with the ability to handle up to ten people. The hull is flatly curved, cresting slightly to a point at the stern. Duff (1952:52) considered this the base Coast Salish type of canoe with variants in length. But, for war, larger canoes were used, such as the “Nootka type,” a longer canoe with the “wolf’s head” bow that could carry more people and was used, for instance, by the Stó:lō for trips to saltwater (Duff 1952:51). These were painted red on the interior and black on the outside (Collins 1974:65; Haeberlin and Gunther 1930:34). These war canoes could hold from six to fifteen people (Waterman and Coffin 1920). There were lengthy notches from the bow that allowed placement for spears or harpoons, and these notches were filled with shredded cedar bark to prevent loose rattling (Elmendorf 1960:171-72). It is clear from Duff’s (1952:51-53) informants that the canoe—while named the “Nootka type” (or “Chinook” by Waterman and Coffin [1920:13])—was carved by Salish artisans, although it was often purchased; Gunther (1927:212) noted that such a canoe could be traded from the Nuu-chah-nulth for a slave and would be highly valued.

The Coast Salish were familiar with the Northern style of canoe, called “double-enders,” with protrusions on both bow and stern (Duff 1952:53). These were sometimes purchased or otherwise acquired from northerners. Barnston (1998:34), in August of 1827, described the canoes of some Coast Salish groups as they passed Fort Langley to go to their salmon fishing camps. I provide it at length as he detailed the numerous styles of canoes used and it also conveys the ways used to carry an immense amount of goods, a luxury not afforded to most hunter-gatherers travelling across land:
Saturday 25th [August 1827]. All Hands employed as yesterday, sick list the same.... Families from the Sanch Village at Point Roberts have been passing in continued succession during the day all bound for the Salmon fishery. Their Luggage as well as that of the other tribes is transported up and down the River on Rafts, which are formed by laying Boards across two or more Canoes Kept 8, 10, or 12 feet asunder. They have also among them large War canoes procured from Indians to the northward, which are used by them as Luggage Boats, and which contain a great Bulk of Furniture & Baggage. The Size of some of these craft is fully 50 feet in length and 6 to 7 ft. across the middle. On the Top of the Stern which is flattish there is in general carved out the resemblance of the face of a human Being, and the Stern [bow] rises to the height of at least 7 feet from the water. Whether this latter be intended merely for ornament or not is impossible to say, but it gives the Canoe an imposing appearance, and must afford to the crew a tolerable defence against arrows when they are advancing straight against an enemy. The Sides of the Bow and Stern are very fancifully ornamented with circles and other regular figures which are laid on with various coloured Paints or Clay (Barnston 1998:34).

Frank Allen, one of Elmendorf’s (1960) Twana informants, had ridden in a northern-type canoe while on a trip to Fort Rupert, and thought that these did not handle nearly as well as the “Nootka-type” he was familiar with. On a similar note, Barnett (1955:114) described the Kwakwaka’wakw canoe, manka, as having a square-cut hull and a large prow “sometimes eight feet high on which were hornlike projections and a hooked beak representing an eagle; in a high wind it was removed since it offered considerable resistance.” Such an artifice, however, was likely left on for battles, to instill fear and block arrows. This suggests some differences in approach between the two groups.

As with any technology, there are advantages and disadvantages, and the ramifications of these would have played to their tactics in battles. For instance, John Fornsby recounted how his grandfather encountered the Lekwiltok on the open water.

My grandfather, my youngest grandfather, sqáyxe, had gone to see his relatives at Lummi. The yúk’wta [Lekwiltok] tried to catch my grandfather, but he had a fast canoe. They chased my grandfather and his wife, chased them for a long way and tried to catch them. But they never caught them. They gave up. Their canoes were no good, I guess (Collins 1974:116).

According to Arvid Charlie, in his recounting of the Battle at Maple Bay, the
Coast Salish canoes were generally smaller and more maneuverable, as opposed to the larger northern canoe (Angelbeck and McLay 2009). From the descriptions, it appears that the northern canoe style was better for long distance travel and would look imposing as it came to shore for a raid, but for sea battles, as at Maple Bay, this appears to have been a weakness the Coast Salish groups seized upon. Like spirit power (and nakedness) for armour, this again suggests a Coast Salish preference for flexibility, agility, and speed, rather than relying simply on mass or force.

**Defensive Architecture and Head Poles**

The Coast Salish also created an array of defensive sites. The largest involved palisaded fortifications often on bluff-tops or steep-walled spits. In front of the palisade, there were often trenches and embankments. In the Fraser Canyon, some sites were defended with rock-wall fortifications. Other types included refuges, generally in naturally defensive locales, or lookouts at exposed, elevated positions with views of travel corridors. More discussion about these sites occurs in Chapters VII to IX. For now, it is important to note that Coast Salish accoutrements for warfare extended well beyond weaponry and included multi-person devices like canoes as well as construction intended for use by multiple people, and requiring the organization and cooperation of many to build. Besides defensive architecture, there were also other embellishments at many sites that were related to and a by-product of warfare:

> We saw no village nor inhabitants near the place. But on the point of the beach there stood a remarkable High pole, strongly supported by props at the Bottom, and at the top of It was fixed a human skull. What the reason of so curious a thing could be no one could divine. Many such had been seen in different parts of the Inland Navigation and in Mr. Hanson’s late cruise. No less than three of these Poles with skulls on them were seen at one place contiguous to which was a very large burial ground....


Many encounters detail the impaling of enemy heads upon poles outside of the village. Boas (1889:324) described that among the Snuneymuxw, “The heads of the slain
were cut off, taken home, and planted on poles in front of the houses.” Barnett (1955:269) similarly described these heads “unceremoniously stuck on poles which were planted on the beach, usually at some distance from the village.” At the head of Howe Sound, in Squamish territory, it was noted that a place called Whoh-nuck, separate from the village, was where the heads were displayed (Matthews 1955:429-430). Suttles (1990a) remarked that these represented “trophies.” But, these can also be seen as demonstrations of interpersonal power (ii), subsequently used to convey personal power (i).

In the story, the “Myth of the Ghost Lover,” retold by Hill-Tout (1907:338), a raid by the Songhees on the Sechelt was successful in bringing home many severed heads, which they put on poles. A woman walks by and one of the heads is so handsome, she takes it down and caresses it for many days. Eventually, the ghost of the head starts to speak to her and begins to repeatedly visit her the following nights. For the purposes here, the story suggests just how widespread and common the practice was.

**Warriors**

As he was dying he spoke to his people, telling them that he had not become a warrior simply to make himself “big among his own people” but had done so because he had been ashamed that the northern people had taken their children as slaves; he had become a warrior in order to protect his people.

—Wayne Suttles (1951:324)

We change our voice now to talk about warriors.

—Frank Allen (Elmendorf 1993:126)

The Northwest Coast has long been known as unique for its hunter-gatherer societies that exhibit an array of specializations more typically associated with larger-scale societies such as chiefdoms and states. There were shamans, but also carvers, carpenters, orators, and others—some hired for their particular skills on occasion. There were also professional warriors. As Barnett (1955:267) described, warrior status was a “professional one and ran in families. A northern father tried to inculcate the desire to
fight in at least one of his sons.” Each community would have a warrior or two; Suttles (1951:323) stated that the Lummi may have had four, and Frank Allen also mentioned that the Snohomish had four warriors at one point (Elmendorf 1960:467). They could be hired for particular reasons as well, as one Skokomish warrior was hired to come and kill a troublesome bear, “which he did singlehanded, using only a knife and his war power” (Elmendorf 1960:467).

It is not that these were the only fighters to go on attacks or defend the village, rather these warriors were the ones who led such endeavors. And they trained heavily for the ability to do so, in order to acquire spirit powers for the role, just as other professions had their associated powers. Warrior powers, however, required extensive training, much like a shaman did, which would keep them apart from the community for extended periods of time. For this training they might have to submerge deep to the bottom of lakes (Suttles 1948[3]:63), or engage in other difficult travails.

Among the Twana, these powers they acquired were described as “bad” spirit powers, or warrior powers, called sča’laq (Elmendorf 1960:467). Some might attain a wasp power, yellow-jacket power, wolf power, and among the Sliammon, the double-headed snake, sisiutl, was considered quite powerful (Kennedy and Bouchard 1983:90). Another power widely sought was thunder power. A Lummi informant told Suttles (1949[5]:90) that one who got the thunder power “couldn’t live with people. Built house way upon top of hill.... Had to keep eyes shut up[,] opened like lightning[,] like thunder.” Among the Klallam, an informant stated that “Thunder [was] used mostly for war power. When warriors get into canoes ... talk of war, thunder rolls” (Suttles 1952(13):81). Those warrior powers were so great that once acquired, they were supposed to use these powers to help the others. As Julius Charles emphatically told Suttles (1948[3]:64), “What he gets has to protect his people.... You write it down there.”

No doubt partly because of these “bad” powers, there was an ambivalence regarding warriors. As Barnett (1955:267) described, “in every village there were men who were called ‘mean’ .... [and] they were animated by horrendous spirits.” They
sometimes lived away from the village in isolated houses. For the Sechelt, Peterson (1990:38) described this dangerous aspect of warrior, or sky’akth, as one “dwelt apart from the village, with no fixed abode; and children were forbidden to go near him, lest he harm them.” Florence James, a Peneklakut elder, described the Cowichan warrior, Tzouhalem, whom she acknowledged: “Every one knows him as a bad man ... and as a man like a monster. But, to me he was a warrior” (Angelbeck and McLay 2009).

In a way, these warriors are quite similar to shamans; in fact, a form of structural opposite, with one operating by predominantly physical means, the other metaphysically. While shamans, also called “doctors,” are able to heal the wounds or sicknesses of others, restoring a person’s health, warriors inflict wounds and kill others—they were agents of entropy. Shamans could also be or act in a negative mode, conjuring sorcery upon others for ill (a reason to be wary of their dangerous powers as well). One of Suttles’ (1950 [9]:111) informants, Julius Charles, stated that “Long ago only doctors killed each other,” presumably indicating a time before widespread warfare. But warriors also exhibited a positive aspect, as the agents of preservation and defense for the community.

Another duality involved the direction of energy flow: as shamans typically fasted for their powers, warrior powers (at least once acquired) were associated with supernatural abilities of consumption. Smith (1940:74) described how Nisqually warriors consumed more, but did not show it physically, as if their spirit powers consumed it. There were accounts of warriors eating a side of beef or drinking a full barrel of water—this expresses a lack of restraint, as opposed to what chiefs convey. Twana warriors, while they did not behead their enemies, also drank the blood of

35. It has been noted that contemporary veterans among the Stó:lō have been similarly treated with a form of wary ambivalence, leading to a lack of support when returning from war, an effect of the lasting sentiment that they bear strong or dangerous warrior powers (Carlson 1997).

36. “The shaman got money for killing somebody.... These shamans sang their power songs in order to kill somebody. They would help a sick person get better, and they would get money from the sick person. Anybody might be killed by the shaman, and then the shaman was killed” (Snyder 1968:97).
enemies or ate a bit of flesh of the dead enemy, in order to “feed” his power. Elmendorf (1960:469) went on to say: “war powers liked blood or the flesh of enemies. When not on raids warriors drank animal blood from time to time for the purpose of placating this sanguinary appetite of their guardian spirits.” During spirit dances, warriors might cut their own flesh and drink the blood (Elmendorf 1960:467).

Perhaps it is this opposed quality that leads to some shared traits, as warrior spirit powers enabled them to heal their own wounds. Moreover, whereas most individuals’ spirit powers—that of the winter dancers, for instance—were only available in winter, when the spirits came down from the mountains—the shaman’s and the warrior’s spirit powers were the only specializations with access to their powers year round (Collins 1974:118).

To counter Western conceptions of a soldier as purely a physical agent or ground troop, it might be better to conceptualize the Coast Salish warrior as a “warrior shaman,” highlighting the importance of spirit powers in his ability to attack and defend. In one account, by John Fornsby, a Skagit warrior named Old Snatlem used only his strong warrior spirit power to defend his village from attack by the Lekwiltok. He drove the winds and made the waves crash high to prevent the Lekwiltok from coming to shore. Said Fornsby, “Nobody was killed that time.... Old Snatlem was a powerful man. He made it blow hard” (Collins 1949:299). Chief Sampson of the Swinomish recounted one story about a retaliatory attack on a Skagit group at Ut-saladdy, where a warrior used his power and “The Skagit fell dying in their tracks and [the warrior’s] older brothers and father finished them off with war clubs” (Sampson 1972:57-58).

Shamans also could conduct warfare, albeit restricted to battles of sorcery. It was not uncommon for odd deaths to be attributed to the malignant powers of a shaman even from afar. This was referred to as “power shooting” and “soul theft.” Once a person’s spirit was taken from a doctor, they were not fully present anymore; as Frank Allen described the victim in one retelling: “He’s in the ghost land. That λ'pα'xcut has
taken him to the ghost land” [Elmendorf 1993:224]. A battle could take place in the spirit world as two shamans battle over the spirit power of a person. Stories of the “power wars” are told to this day in the Upper Skagit area:

Larry Williams: They used to tell me stories of them old Indian doctors, the wars weren’t just physical, but they were power wars too.

Bill Angelbeck: What do you mean by that?

Larry Williams: Spiritual power. And, that’s why I was saying that, you know, throwing power, and that’s why nobody would come up here because those Indian doctors they would throw things at them if you would.

Sherman Williams: They kill one another that way. No one believes us, but we’ve seen those days, you know.

Larry Williams: So, [the] kind of powers [that] used to reside up here—and that’s why this [area] was protected that way (Miller and Angelbeck 2008b:113).

In another oral history, a shaman by the name of Little Sam killed another shaman by “hanging a rush effigy of this shaman’s spirit on a house post. The following day the people found that the shaman had hung himself” (Haeberlin and Gunther 1930:78). Often, a shaman after healing a victim would be hesitant to announce who had caused the spirit-loss or sickness of a patient; as Henry Allen stated: “he’d get paid for the job, and it might be himself next time!” (Elmendorf 1960:510). A shaman might be hired as well to kill “a warrior that had become dangerous and overbearing” (Haeberlin and Gunther 1930:78). Curiously, while most shamans were healers, “a shaman could not help a person wounded in war” (Haeberlin and Gunther 1930:78). Warriors had spirit powers (or were left) to heal their own wounds.

A shaman not only would attack one person or another shaman, but could also attack whole communities. In one account, a Skokomish shaman sends his otter power in attack upon a Skagit village and their houses are devastated in a storm; “his doctor power killed them” (Elmendorf 1993:163). Elmendorf (1960:510) remarked that these feuds of hostile magic became “a recognized substitute for open hostility in the form of retaliatory raiding.”
Leaders for Defense

While warriors might be considered opposites of shamans for their powers to inflict death or provide defense, or protect life, a warrior might also be considered the obverse of a chief in the political realm. As Edmond Lorenzetto told Wilson Duff (1952:82), a warrior is “almost like the opposite of sie’m.” Among the Coast Salish, the sie’m or chief was a person regarded for peace. One of Collins’ (1974:36-37) informants stated that “the chief told people to stop when they wanted to fight. The chief didn’t lead people in battle, didn’t know how to fight” (emphasis added). Chiefs, in part, often attained their status as a leader through mediating disputes. They respected or were given the authority to help resolve the dispute for those involved. As Miller (2001:149-150) detailed, the powers of chiefs enabled them to settle disputes, and they were often called on, even hired, from abroad to provide their “good talk.” Their power was shown in being able to mediate between distinct domains, such as two parties in conflict. Miller (2001:115-116) emphasized that the power of a chief came not from a title or role that they played, but rather resided in the person. Because of their ability or powers (usually synonymous) and the respect they had earned, they deserve or have the right to be the chief. The chief’s status and power was based in the individual, not in an institution or role.

Collins (1974:114), in the following passage, reveals the contrasting relationship between chiefs and warriors:

...war leader [was] also distrusted. Warriors per se did not have the prestige which they had among the Plains Indians. The same qualities which made a man a good warrior—a hot temper, an indifference to personal risk, willingness to inflict physical injury—were at variance with the image of the ideal man as slow to wrath and hesitant to strike another.

There are also similarities between the actions of chiefs and shamans. While the shaman, as “doctor,” physically restores health to an individual, the chief politically restores stability to disruptions in the community. Warriors can be seen as the negative application of this role, as they attempt to maintain the health of the community through
active and often destructive defense. Professional warriors would actually be given authority during times of war, albeit only for the duration of the battle (Suttles 1951:277). According to Smith (1940:156), chiefs would consult with the warriors about the situation, but “the warriors were not placed in charge until the moment of actual fighting” lest they start the fight because they want to fight—as if unleashed. It is in this sense, that warriors were seen to be, as Smith (1940:51) phrased it, “necessary evils.”

During peaceful times deference to the authority of the warrior was tinged with fear and, because of the general repugnance for open conflict, every effort was made to keep him from displaying force. But during periods when peaceful means no longer served, he was given, in his role as an expert in war, rather complete control of the situation (Smith 1940:50).

The chief, in a sense, needs the warrior. In this complex hunter-gatherer society with surpluses aplenty generated through their productive subsistence and surplus-generating activities, a means to protect those surpluses or their means of production (weirs, reef-nets, clam gardens, etc.) was “necessary.” As Smith (1940:50) noted, “The warrior was important because he protected the interests of those around him from threats of violence, threats which might at any time disrupt economic activity.” Gifts also were often presented to warriors to prevent any violence.

However, the Coast Salish are variable across the region, exhibiting many local differences, and so, for instance, professional warriors sometimes were noted as household leaders as two Skokomish chiefs had been, according to Elmendorf (1960:473), although he remarked it was atypical. Even for “village leaders” Elmendorf (1960:473) commented that this was indeed rare: “A Duckabush warrior was at one time leader of that Twana village, but this is the only instance in my data of any village headman being a warrior.” Chief Seattle, according to oral tradition, rose in power by leading a defense against an attack from the east (Costello 1895). Even so, that is also qualified, as his leadership of the Duwamish and Suquamish was also due to his great skill in oration, as he is often quoted in relation to peace. Another example of an exception to this warrior discussion would be the Northern Coast Salish, such as the
Comox or Sechelt, where Barnett (1955:267-68) described that spirit powers were less needed; among the Sechelt, it was simply a secular form of training, meaning that it did not require warrior spirit powers. While the Comox had warriors as a part of sodalities or secret societies, such as hamatsa, as did their northern neighbors, the Lekwiltok, with whom members would often ally. Among the Quinault, there were no roles for the warrior as a specialization; all able males would just fight (Olson 1936).

**Roles for Defense**

Besides the role of the “warrior” as the organizer of resistance against raiders, there were other roles involved in coordinating defense across the Coast Salish region. These commonly included scouts: “When the Snohomish heard rumors of an enemy’s approach, they sent young men as scouts” (Haeberlin and Gunther 1930:13). When the attack did happen, for instance against the Semiahmoo, a runner from the Semiahmoo would be dispatched to the Lummi (Suttles 1951:322). In other areas, messages of attacks would be conveyed by watchmen at “fire signals.” The Nisqually would have people manned at “fire signal stations at various points. The last of these posts, (tatu’so), was situated near the present Tacoma Hotel” (Haeberlin and Gunther 1930:13). Closer to the villages or defensive refuges, lookout stations would also be manned. Among the Sechelt, a “lookout tree” would be manned near their palisaded fort (Peterson 1990:28). The Quinault, in times of perceived threat, would place sentries along a high platform that rimmed the palisade of their villages; they were known as suxwanaxwame’ana, or “they who watch” (Olson 1936:117).

During periods when tensions were high, as around 1850—when the Klallam were warring with the Cowichan—the village ensured that watchmen near their Port Townsend area village would be vigilant: “Every day and night they watch over on the spit outside Port Townsend, watch for those Cowichan to come,” Frank Allen recounted (Elmendorf 1993:133).

Among the Lummi, the warriors were assisted by young men, or those less
experienced with battle, in the canoes. The warriors would position themselves in front, ready for attack, while younger fighters would paddle behind (Stern 1934:98; Suttles 1949[5]:69). Also, elderly men often would join as well but to sing their powers to aid the warriors (Stern 1934:98).

**Women and Warfare**

While most of those involved in warfare as warriors or fighters were male, there were roles for women in conflict as well. As Suttles (1951:323) noted, “Usually everyone in a community helped defend it….” Able women were likely leading retreats into hidden refuges behind villages or underground houses, protecting the children and aiding the elderly. In one important way, women often gained clairvoyant powers (Hill-Tout 1978 [1907]:162), and these could serve well in defense. The spiritual power of a seeress could alert the villagers of coming raiders, much like a shamanistic scout (Suttles 1951:322). When the warriors left in times of war, whether in raiding or retaliation, the wives of the warriors would sing songs to support their husbands from afar. Among the Nisqually, Smith (1940:165) described the implications of this singing:

> Wives or female relatives of men who were absent, whether on war trips or on hunting, fishing, etc., expeditions, sang a song which brought their men good luck. This song was said to have been very beautiful and, although it could be sung upon social occasions as well, its main purpose was as described. During it the women faced in the direction which the men had taken. When it was finished, if one woman started to cry it was known that her husband or relative had been killed.

Before an attack on a home village was to begin, women beat sticks against their houses to “stimulate possession in those warriors who had spirit power” (Barnett 1955:270). In other ways, women would also use their songs to help stimulate the warriors during battle, standing behind the men. According to Suttles’ (1951:322), one woman was known to sing behind the warriors and use her power to “dull the senses of the enemy.”

A woman’s power might be more than sorcery in battle. Some women, among the Upper Skagit would travel in raiding canoes. Collins (1974:115) remarked that the
“[raiding] party left the few women who accompanied them to watch the canoes” while they attacked. There are also accounts of women as warriors. A woman warrior that led a routing of the Cowichan during one attack. As Frank Allen described, among the Klallam, “A woman is there named səkema’yłl. . . . Nothing can catch her; she runs like a wolf” (Elmendorf 1993:133).

Səkema’yłl, along with a male warrior named xe’tanəxʷ, headed up a bluff in the expectation of a retaliatory attack by the Cowichan. When they spotted the Cowichan approaching, she told her partner “Wait a minute, till they’ve got down under the bluff.” The Cowichan then begin to approach the village below them. She then tells xe’tanəxʷ:

“I’m going to shoot! You holler your tamánawis now!” referring to his spirit power.

Frank Allen then said:

So she shoots and kills one, and xe’tanəxʷ hollers and runs after them. They think lots of Klallam are coming after them and they break and run to the spit where they landed and had a watchman at the spit.

səkema’yłl stops and cuts the head off the man she has killed. That’s her game. She was a great woman. I saw her in my time, a small lady, not big (Elmendorf 1993:133).

Organization of Defense

Most chiefs’ authority, in Coast Salish villages, generally extended to the limits of their household. As Suttles (1951:277) described, while one might be seen as a village chief, he more operated as a “potlatch organizer” for the village as a whole.

Economically, households functioned autonomously for most tasks. But, when it came to the defense of the village, Suttles (1951:277) noted that the villagers generally worked together: “The village usually, though not always, functioned as a unit in defending itself against enemy attack. And the village might function as a unit in potlatching. But there were probably no other functions of a village as a whole.”

When it came to defensive fortifications, the whole village might work on the fort’s construction, as Julius Charles related to Suttles about the fort at Gooseberry Point (1948[2]:83). So, just as the warrior’s authority over the village is temporary, during
times of attack, so is the operation of the community as a whole: it is done for defense, or perhaps for potlatches. However, Barnett (1944) described how underground dwellings for defense would be built by families, especially among the Northern Coast Salish, although while autonomous in construction, there might have been coordination still at larger scales, as Schaepe (2000, 2001, 2006) has argued archaeologically for the rock-wall fortifications in the Fraser Canyon. This kind of coordination is a topic that will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter VII.

**Warriors and Fighters**

In the literature of the Coast Salish, warriors have been discussed in a somewhat conflated manner. Above, I have described how professional warriors were given temporary authority to defend the village, however, these warriors also sought the help of all other capable and willing males to be defenders, or perhaps assembled a team for an attack. As fighters, these are not “warriors,” in the Coast Salish professional or specialized sense. Here, it is useful to keep the categories separate. Maintaining this distinction between warriors and fighters perhaps offers a way to interpret the conflated manner of how “warriors” are occasionally described. For instance, warriors are described as undergoing rites of purification; Barnett (1955:269) mentioned that “the returning warriors of the Klahuse, Sechelt, and Squamish went through a ritual purification,” involving practices such as bathing, bleeding, and enduring sweat baths. Similarly, for the Twana, Elmendorf (1960:470) described that “Before actually entering his home village each member of a returning war party underwent ritual purification paralleling that of a homicide or a corpse handler.” The purification might keep those warriors away from the village for up to four days, bathing and scrubbing with cedar boughs. The intention of this purification ritual was, in the words of Frank Allen (Elmendorf 1960:470), “to take away the blood (of the slain) from their bodies and everything bad.” Rather, when viewed through that distinction—in which informants made between warriors and other male defenders or raiders—fighters who only
temporarily engage in the “dangerous” practices of warfare would need purification to return to the more optimal settings of stable life in the village. Warriors sometimes were even described as solitary, having to live apart, for example, on a mountain top, as an above story recounted, lest the warrior’s power—thunder—strike someone with lightning when he opened his eyes. Warriors drink the blood of their enemies; fighters scrub the blood from battle with rituals akin to that of handling corpses. If a young fighter had aims of becoming a chief, these dangerous and ambivalent aspects of warfare would need to be cleansed from him.

As rituals of purification, this suggests the procedure likely followed the general course of rites of passage. These individuals are temporarily transformed into warriors. As van Gennep (1960; see also Turner 1969) had outlined, rites of passage proceed in three stages: separation, liminality, and reaggregation. Eliade (1959) emphasized that most rites involved the separation from profane world into the sacred. To enter the sacred, the rite creates a separation from the profane world to temporarily enter the sacred, and then a reaggregation into profane or routine life. This moral distinction in the sacred and profane seems not to describe the Coast Salish conception accurately, as warfare involved the profane, or sacrilegious, the dangerous and ambivalent “necessary evils” of preserving one’s lifeway—it is liminality that gives its ambivalent qualities. For such reasons, fighters required rites of purification to return to normal life.37 For the Coast Salish, in any case, the act of battle and killing often was purified from them ritually.

If rites of purification were used for returning fighters, then likely there were rites for entry into the mode of warrior. Perhaps the war dance served this purpose for some Coast Salish groups, as Samuel Hancock (1927) had witnessed a war dance on

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37. This need for temporary separation has similarities to the hunter tradition among the Navajo, wherein the qualities of the hunter are dangerous and predatory, and requires a ceremony for transformation into a predator, and then a purification to return to humanity. Luckert (1975:149) argued that it was the association of guilt with a hunter for killing its prey; thus the rite absolved them of that guilt—it was not even the hunter but the predator they had transformed into (usually a wolf) that had committed that act.
Whidbey Island (see page 79). Smith (1940:165) stated that the Nisqually engaged in such preparations, which she termed not a “war dance” but a “power sing”: “Before a battle or going out from the home village the warriors engaged in a power sing to call their powers to their aid.” Often, before battle, warriors and fighters applied the ornamentation that symbolized warfare. A warrior’s face would be painted black, with a concoction of “soot and grease” (Elmendorf 1960:472).38

**Leaders for Offense**

In the south (Nanaimo, Cowichan, Sanetch, Squamish, Maskwiam [Musqueam]), the origin [of a raid] was very frequently a desire on the part of a novice warrior to try his newly acquired spirit powers. The young man simply constituted himself the leader of a war party and mustered enough men to accompany him. Usually these were relatives and older warriors, but there were always a number of disagreeable and socially worthless individuals who were glad of an approved opportunity to create terror and to kill and loot (Barnett 1955:267-268).

As organizers of attacks, Collins (1974:114) noted that “a warrior could not force another to go with him.” If he had lost warriors before, perhaps others would be hesitant to join their efforts again. But, if successful, there likely would be other raids. To chiefs, associated commonly with peace, they must have considered raids of this sort ambivalently or as dangerous, regardless even of spirit powers, given that it would open up opportunities for reprisal attacks.

To return to Wolf’s (1990) modes of power framework, warriors had innate power (i), acquired from the war-specific spirit power. They also displayed, in their defeats of others, power over another (ii), demonstrated even afterward by taking of heads. However, as leaders for defense and offense, warriors exhibit organizational power (iii) as well, albeit for a different mode than that of household chiefs. Any

38. Chief Frank Malloway, of Yakweakwioose, described the black paint for spirit dancers as made from the charred remains of any prickly or barbed plant: “The black paint—they usually use devil’s club. They dry devil’s club, and use the cinders; they burn it. They don’t let it turn grey, crushing it all the time, and they sift it, and they mix it with deer marrow. For black paint, they also use stinging nettles. Anything with thorns on it, stinging nettles, beehives.... It’s supposed to be your protection, anything with thorns—it protects you, even if it’s burned” (Angelbeck 2003:60).
plunder taken and added to their wealth, would be an expression and verification of the
strength of their spirit power itself.

Protocols of Conflict

Internecine wars are perpetual among the tribes [of southern Vancouver
Island]. There are always some old-standing differences between them
which are liable, on the slightest occasion, to be revived. Grudges are
handed down from father to son for generations, and friendly relations
are never free from the risk of being interrupted. Lives taken in one tribe
can only be compensated by the same number being massacred in
another, and without regard to the guilt of the individuals sacrificed. It
is difficult to perceive how, upon such a principle, the extermination of
the conflicting parties, eventually, can be avoided.

—Matthew Macfie (1973 [1865]:471)

In his classic text, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Barth (1969) maintained that the
symbols of a group’s identity were strongest at its boundaries with other cultures. His
message was an important one, emphasizing that group identification intensifies when
confronted with another culture; the corollary to this is that there is less of a need to
present symbols of group identity to others that share your culture. In the Northwest
Coast, however, a different dynamic appears to be at play. Rather, villages and even
households were autonomous, so the zones of contact—the areas where identity is
strongest—occurred even within villages. Contests of identity happen with each
potlatch, each gathering for winter dancing, each time sticks were thrown in slah’al
games, with each stone carried in athletic competitions, and each time disputes arose.
The autonomy of Coast Salish households and individuals led to a high degree of
interactions at the boundaries within their own village and region. This accounts in part
for the immense concern with individual status and the status of one’s household, as
well as the widespread social complexity albeit in decentralized ways that has always
made the Northwest Coast an exception to existing models of sociopolitical complexity.

The concern for personal image was so central that a blood feud could erupt over
a slight during a potlatch—even when unintentional or simply perceived as a slight by
some. That was reason enough for an attack. In fact, the one who made that slight may
have intended for such an outcome. The slight itself was meant to take another’s prestige down a notch, and there was no better time for such a “stab” than when speaking publicly at a potlatch or other ceremony. As Barnett (1955:253) described, “Whenever a slight, whether intentional or accidental, had been put upon an aristocratic person’s dignity, the response was an immediate reassertion of worth” by a face-saving ceremony, or through warfare as MacFie (1973 [1865]:471) described.

Much of Coast Salish interaction, conflict or dispute resolution revolved around notions of the restoration of relations. As Miller (2001) related, the intent of Coast Salish systems of dispute resolution was to restore relations in the community, not to punish the individual offender. Those relations, however, do not intend to restore some utopian or egalitarian sense of communal balance; instead, it is the restoration of relations, but not necessarily the same relations as before. In some cases, it could be a restoration from feud to friendliness. But, it as well could be a return to relations between two groups in which there became an acknowledgment of one household’s rise in status corresponding to the other’s decline.

Macfie (1973 [1865]:471) had written, quoted above, that the nature of warfare is seemingly chaotic, “internecine” wars as “perpetual.” Snyder (2002) discussed the “anarchy” of “primitive warfare,” using the term in its sense of turmoil. Rather, just as anarchy can also be a reference to social order, these acts of conflict also were actions taken within a common set of practices. In practice theory, those that are offended can turn readily to the available practices within a social field, their cultural sphere of interaction. Accordingly, any individual is Levi-Strauss’ *bricoleur*, or handyman, strategically improvising one’s actions or tactics to reclaim or enhance their own status. These options may involve conflict, or not. Generally, negotiations between the two parties are attempted first.

Clausewitz (1911) said that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. Warfare for Coast Salish individuals can be seen as one of the many options available to them—not just options to fight or take revenge, but also to pursue negotiation. It is
mostly through negotiations of disputes that the restoration of relations are achieved,
resulting in the status quo or with increased power and prestige for some, or even for
the one who resolves the dispute. This type of practice, where the Coast Salish utilize
the options available to them, as Collins (1979) has written, extends deeply into how a
Coast Salish individual identifies himself or herself. Due to the Coast Salish bilateral
reckoning of kinship, one has options to identify oneself primarily through the mother’s
or father’s line, allowing each to become part of the household that will, in their
estimation, provide them the best opportunities for their own advancement in prestige.
Collins (1979) called these options available in multilinage descent a “Coast Salish
strategy.” This flexibility helps to increase their individual power (i), in Wolf’s (1990)
terms—a similar Coast Salish strategy also is employed for the reckoning of how they
relate to others, or interpersonal power (ii).\(^39\)

When someone has had his or her status challenged or diminished by insult, or
by offensive actions involving adultery, rape, fighting or murder, the offended party can
request payment, money to “pay” for the damages and cover the offense, whether a
slight or murder. The amount of payment is commensurate with the degree of damage
to one’s status, or equal to the status holder, whether the killing was accidental or
intentional. If the offended party accepts the terms of the payment, or negotiates for
acceptable terms, then the matter is settled. If a slight, a “name saving” ceremony could
resolve the matter; if a murder, the funeral may serve as the occasion to publicly address
how the matter has been resolved. However, as Elmendorf (1960:476-477) has noted for
the Twana, one of the most common reasons for conflict was the failure to pay blood
money: “If offered by the killer’s family and refused, this was an announcement that the
victim’s relatives desired to seek blood revenge.” These offers and negotiations for

\(^{39}\) McDonald (1998 [1830]:137) commented on this tactical behaviour of the Coast Salish,
explaining why the traders at Fort Langley would not become involved even in attempting to
resolve a Musqueam-Kwantlen dispute: “If we did interfere tis possible the parties for the
present would acquiesce in our decision; but [it] would only be involving us in endless
treaties among them without producing any permanent good—we therefore make it a point
to keep Clear of all Indian broils: for, like the generality of their race, they have a happy
knack of turning every thing Said or done to their own advantage in Cases of this kind.”
blood money were made by a “paid envoy,” that was “not a close relative to either of the negotiating kin groups” (Elmendorf 1960:477). For the Puyallup-Nisqually, Smith (1940:155) noted that the groups would meet to negotiate, with help from other leaders: “If the settlement misfired, however ... it was equivalent to a tacit declaration of war.”

In the case that Hancock (1927) witnessed on Whidbey Island, recounted above where the Snohomish had kidnapped one of his wives, the Snoqualmie chief did not opt to negotiate but wanted to attack directly. Hancock encouraged negotiation, but that was a common course to take. In any case, the chief’s organization of his village and allies produced a show of force that helped to broker a settlement. Finally, a settlement occurred, and warfare was avoided.

John Fornsby, an Upper Skagit elder, related to Collins (1974:121-122) a story about how the Swinomish and Lower Skagit men got into a brawl, ending with a Lower Skagit man being shot to death. Fornsby said,

The Swinomish gave the Lower Skagit blankets and things—guns. Then they got all right. It was a law they made. The fellows who killed a man had to give something to the relatives of the man they killed. They call this oábilik.40

From these examples, a range of responses is apparent, from straight negotiation to conflict, with an array of bravado or show of force in between, which in its nature encourages negotiation through displays of power that indicate the potential or likelihood of physical conflict. And, as Macfie (1973 [1865]) had surmised, a principle such as this, can lead to an unending escalation of conflict. He did not, however, seem to notice how these conflicts could be resolved at various points throughout the back-and-forth turns of escalating conflict.

Earlier, I described the “Myth of the Ghost-Lover,” a story retold by Hill-Tout (1978 [1907]:139-142), where a Songhees woman falls in love with a severed head that is impaled upon the pole from a victory over the Sechelt, although I only described the

40. This is an example of Kelly’s (2004) social substitutability, discussed above, where an attack upon one individual is perceived as an attack on the whole group.
The story continued with the Sechelt head, or ghost lover, encouraging his Songhees maiden to travel to a mountain near Sechelt and visit his brother, who looks much like him. She does, and they find a way to marry, and the story closes, according to Hill-Tout’s informants, as the reason there has been peace between the Songhees and Sechelt ever since, settled by a marriage and alliance.

These options, or cultural practices, are more available to affiliated groups. These groups are more likely to have intermediaries that can act as third-parties. They will also likely have relations on the other side that they will not want to have harmed. Also, they simply have some common interest to draw upon that can lead to negotiated settlements. Conflicts with more distant groups do not have these types of options available to either side. This is why Keeley (1996:131) pointed out that there is more conflict at frontier zones between cultural groups, noting that these interaction zones “necessarily lack the very social and cultural features that prevent disputes from turning violent.” In such frontiers, conflict is more readily the option to choose, which would be the case with distant Coast Salish groups, but even more the case with the Makah, Nuu-chah-nulth, Nlaka’pamux, or the Lekwiltok.

Regarding the latter, Thom (2005) described how, soon after the Battle at Maple Bay, Coast Salish groups established marriages with the Lekwiltok, including a key one between a Cowichan woman and Lekwiltok man from Cape Mudge. As Thom (2005:362) noted, “This important marriage reopened the Cape Mudge area for island Coast Salish people to fish and camp at for generations after the couples were wed.” As Simon Charlie, one of Thom’s informants, related:

But that’s when we stopped. They wanted to stop the wars that we had with the Yuqwulhte’x. So they got two young people together to stop the war. Those elders [were] one of the last ones that got married to a Yuqwulhte’x person. They stopped the war. That is why we got that fishing ground right there in Cape Mudge (Thom 2005:363).

Simon Charlie also discussed mountain goat hunting areas they were able to access in Knight Inlet, even deeper north into Kwakwaka’wakw territory. Thom (2005) described how these relations have continued since those marriages with the exchange
of names and hereditary privileges. These interconnections allowed some Cowichan, Snuneymuxw, and Comox groups, among others, to return to their seasonal camps or hunting grounds in the north, access to which had been closed during the Lekwiltok southern expansion into the northern Gulf of Georgia. The point is that the Coast Salish resolved this seemingly interminable era of warring by bringing the Lekwiltok into affiliation.

Still, while there was an array of protocols for resolving conflict, there still remained the matter of the initial transgression: the unpredictability of slights and offenses. A variety of motives drove the forces of warfare.

The Forces of Destruction

In the development of productive forces there comes a stage when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into being, which, under the existing relationships, only cause mischief, and are no longer forces of production but forces of destruction.

—Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1970b [1845-1846]:94)

The motivations for warfare are numerous. From the accounts discussed above, it often involves retaliatory actions for offenses or even actions perceived as offenses. Gunther (1927:266) found the main reason or rationale for an attack was the refusal to pay blood money, while Barnett (1955:267-68), describing central Coast Salish groups, said that a young warrior simply would just want to “try his newly acquired spirit powers,” and he would then try to recruit others to join him. He also described how individuals would often want to correct a perceived imbalance of suffering:

A common cause of war attacks everywhere was grief over the natural death of a child or other near relative. The psychology was oddly logical. Reasoning that it was unfair for him to suffer so acutely while others were without grief, the bereaved person encouraged a murdering and plundering expedition to relieve his suffering by imposing it on others (Barnett 1955:268).

While these attribute the causes to revenge, grief, or plain desire, other informants described that stores were sought, such as “dried food” (Suttles 1950[10]:38). Rarely was territory the primary motive. As Suttles (1951:321) described, “At least one
informant denied that people ever fought for territory, saying that they fought only ‘to make themselves big.’” However, Suttles did record some fights, extermination, and takeovers of territory. In one account, the Sooke arranged a marriage with the Makah in order to fight the skʷaⁿəⁿəs:

After the whites came, the skʷaⁿəⁿəs were living at Sooke Bay and the Sooke at Sooke Harbor. A Neah Bay chief came to Sooke Harbor and the Sooke chief gave him his daughter in exchange for killing off the skʷaⁿəⁿəs. The Neah Bay chief said he would do so in four days. On the fourth day the Sooke were up early in the morning, listening. They heard the sound of shots coming from Sooke Bay. The Makah had come and cleaned the skʷaⁿəⁿəs out.

After that the Klallam fought the Sooke. Klallam from Port Discovery and possibly elsewhere came over and attacked them. The Sooke chief named waⁿsi escaped and walked through the mountains to the Songhees but the Klallam captured some of the Sooke and took them back as slaves and sold them to the south so that they reached the Columbia River (Suttles 1951:9).

The Klallam ended up gaining territory across the Strait of Juan de Fuca. As one informant put it, “Becher Bay was all Sooke before Kl. [Klallam] came. But all settled here at river. [B]ecause they fought for it” (Suttles 1952[12]:33).

The Lummi, according to one of their oral histories, acquired access to the mainland through warfare as well. A warrior named Skalaxt, to avenge the death of his brother, trained for years at a lake on Orcas Island, and returned to lead an attack on the whole Skalakin village in which the killers of his brother lived. The Lummi killed most of the people there, but were not satisfied, as they were aware that relatives of the Skalakin lived in other villages (Stern 1934:119). He led yet one more damaging attack upon another of their villages, and then a third time, he headed an expedition for a wife among one of their villages on the Old Nooksack (or Red) River. The siem there offered Skalaxt a wife in order to prevent a third such attack, and he accepted the marriage. In Stern’s (1934:120) telling, “The siem told Skalaxt to take his daughter and accept the river as a gift with her. He urged him also to move his relatives to the mainland and to renew friendly relations with this tribe.”

So, in that account, the original or true motivations are multifaceted. Territory was gained by the Lummi, but the initial reason for the attacks was accorded to revenge
for the death of his brother, and gained territory was not the intention at all, but rather was the side-effect of the successful outcome for Skalaxt—the expansion of territory itself was a “gift.” Similarly, the Sooke, whom the Klallam finished off, were attacked for being so warlike, and they moved (or took over) Becher Bay since it was “deserted” (Suttles 1951:9-10) or “unoccupied” (Gunther 1927:179). Curtis (1970 [1913]:22) noted that the Klallam had harassed the Sooke for a long time as they had killed the eldest son of a chief at “Chihwitsun” or Tse-whit-zen, attacking small parties of Sooke people when out fishing or hunting; “In time, it is said, they accumulated on the beach just above high tide a row of more than a hundred heads bleaching into white skulls.” Again, this is another case of territory acquired, but with motivations that could be attributed to revenge—the Sooke deserved the attacks, and the territory gained was a secondary outcome.

These accounts indicate the multifaceted nature of reasons for engaging in warfare. To invoke territorial acquisition or revenge as a single “cause” would not only be simplistically reductionistic, but also inaccurate. A more encompassing way to assess these motivations for gain is through the exchangeability of the various forms of capital.

The Various Forms of Capital

The nature of Coast Salish exchange incorporates various forms of capital (Figure 4). First, there is the natural capital available in Coast Salish territory; these are the berries, salmon, deer, timber, and lithic resources, for example. These natural capital can be converted into economic capital through household production: berries gathered and dried; salmon caught, cut, and smoked or dried; the deer caught or killed, dressed, and its meat smoked; timber cut down and processed into planks or a canoe; and lithic raw material reduced to cores, bifaces, or specific tools. Natural capital is the potential capital in the territory, or physical realm, but it takes productive activities to convert natural capital into economic capital. Moreover, while some may be readily available—as many bushes contain seemingly uncountable amounts of berries or a fishing station may view a seemingly unending stream of fish moving upstream during peak seasons—
it often takes great productive capacity involving a whole household to convert much of that natural capital into economic capital. The point is that a household may have lots of natural capital available to them, in territories that they own or steward, but lack the ability to effectively convert those resources into economic capital, particularly in short-lived seasons when berries soon rot or dry up and salmon runs quickly pass through. Natural capital, from the physical realm, must be converted into economic capital to become part of the human cycles of exchange. Economic capital, here, refers to the goods from production. It also can indicate the means of production; for example, owning a reef-net, bird net, or a harpoon.

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*Figure 4: Model of the exchangeability of various forms of capital for the Coast Salish.*

*Arrows indicate potential flow or direction for capital; modified for this study after Bourdeiu (1977, 1990).*
Also, for some, to be able to access natural capital requires that they know the owners and have established relations with them. Marriages typically establish these protocols, so that each family gains access to the other’s territories; this is social capital. A group may have to expend some of their economic capital produced as a gift, or share, to the owners for being able to access the natural capital in their territories. Cultural capital indicates the knowledge that involves proper execution of any activity or ceremony. Fishing may need to begin with a proper first salmon ceremony, for instance. Or, simply, the activity requires specific knowledge or training for efficiency or success, which could relate to technical skills, ecological knowledge, proper etiquette or language, or magical phrases to be uttered or rituals to be followed. Cultural capital can refer to the rights that a group or chief may have to a territory.

Symbolic capital indicates items are indicative of prestige and status, particularly elite wares or items that have aspects that extend beyond functional or nonutilitarian. Wealth, among the Coast Salish, has been associated with symbolically representing another form of capital: spiritual. As natural capital is available physically, there is a realm of spirits that also are broadly available metaphysically. However, instead of productive activities, spiritual capital is sought through training and questing, or a spirit may impinge upon a person, even unwillingly. Success or wealth, for the Coast Salish, is an indicator of great spiritual capital. To become part of the cycle of exchange, spiritual capital becomes symbolic capital: a longhouse dancer symbolically indicating his spirit power in song; a hunter through a successful hunt; or a warrior through a successful battle. Each of these instances represents a person with great spiritual capital that enabled their success. That is, their spiritual capital is indicated by symbolic capital, just as natural capital must be converted into economic capital to be exchanged with other forms of capital. Natural capital is converted into economic capital through productive activities, whereas spiritual capital is converted into symbolic capital through conductive activities: individuals could attempt to attract spirit powers by conducting themselves in proper manners, seeking solitude, fasting, and “training.”
Once acquired, the spirit power conducts through them, enabling their successes.

This process, wherein items of various forms of capital are exchangeable, for instance, allows food items from household production to be “converted,” into wealth items (Suttles 1987a [1960]:22) which in turn can be, through the potlatch, converted into high status: “the relationship of food, wealth, and high status is complete. They all form a single system.” Suttles further described the importance of affinal groups, or groups allied through marriage:

The system of exchange and potlatching seems to have worked in this fashion. A kin or local group with a temporary surplus of any item of food, say the result of the run of some fish or the ripening of some berry, might take this surplus to an affinally related group in another locality and receive wealth in blankets or other imperishable items in return. Later the recipient in the first exchange might make a return visit with its own extra food and get back wealth for it. Any group that produced more food than its various affinally related neighbors would of course in time come to have more wealth. But any tendency for wealth to accumulate in a few places was controlled by the practice of potlatching, whereby the wealthy group converted its wealth into high status at the same time giving the other groups the means of continuing the process (Suttles 1987e [1960]:31).

Phrased in practice terms, economic capital (food), are exchanged with allied affines (who make up the group’s social capital) or converted for wealth items (the group’s symbolic capital). In a potlatch, these wealth items can be converted, by giving them away, into other forms. Any of these types of capital indicate spiritual capital, proof of the support or ability from their spirit power. Those with more cultural capital and social capital are able to produce more wealth. It is their hereditary rights to productive territories, a form of cultural capital, that allows them to produce more food, the size of their household (also social capital) contribute to more economic capital. An important aspect of this is the exchangeability of these forms of capital. As Bourdieu has stated, “we see that symbolic capital, which in the form of the prestige and renown attached to a family and a name is readily convertible back into economic capital, is perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation in certain societies” (Bourdieu 1977:179; emphasis original).

Bourdieu’s ideas about the exchangeability of capital are important for assessing
motivations in warfare. Warfare may be undertaken for plunder or slaves, but if the aim is to exchange loot for a potlatch in which one gives it all away, the motivation would be for status, or symbolic capital. As Mitchell (1984:39) pointed out, a “close relationship ... existed between predatory warfare for the acquisition of slaves and the maintenance or enhancement of high social status.” He argued that the main engine for raiding on the Northwest Coast was for the “swift road to personal fortune” in slave-trading (Mitchell 1984:46). Combing through hundreds of ethnohistoric documents, Mitchell documented the extent of this predatory warfare for the colonial period. All cultures from the Tlingit to the Chinook engaged in the trade. Slaves were desired for their value as wealth, and as symbols of wealth. Important slaves were worth more as captives that could be ransomed at high prices. Mitchell effectively described a secondary system of redistributive exchange. The potlatch serves as a redistributive exchange among allies and kin, an internal network. Predatory warfare served as an external network, what can be viewed as an exchange with one’s enemies, through force.

Mitchell (1981) reported that these are integrally related, as his account of the Gitxaala (formerly Kitkatla) chief, Sebassa, revealed. From their base in the north coast, he led a raid on the Nawitti on northern Vancouver Island, killing many men and taking twenty women for slaves. These were later traded to Stikine Tlingit chiefs for furs, which they used to buy commodities at Fort Simpson, and which Sebassa used for potlatch gifts. Normally, preparations for a potlatch through productive means could sometimes take years to amass the amount of wealth items. However, capturing slaves through raiding and warfare provided a short-cut, creating immediate wealth. Moreover, slaves were more than commodities, as they could be used to produce wealth with their labor. With the conversion of slaves into potlatch commodities, Mitchell demonstrated that warfare contributed to social capital, and thus was not simply part of a vulgar materialist logic, but rather exhibited a social calculus as well. Since capital is exchangeable from material to social and symbolic forms, even symbolic forms of capital can be materialist in the economic sense.
Among the Coast Salish, similar economic exchanges occurred with the bounties of war. Frank Allen noted that: “Killers like that čuxe’ləm [a Cowichan warrior] used to get rich. They got slaves and goods of all kinds” (Elmendorf 1993:128). He aptly described how warriors could gain capital and exchange it through a recounting of a Klallam-Cowichan war that started near Port Townsend about 1850 (Elmendorf 1993:132-136). It provides not only a good example of exchangeability of economic capital (or what may be better argued as social capital in this story) into other forms. It is also illustrative of the protocols and cultural practices used as conflicts arise and are to be resolved, so I provide some detail on how the conflict begins.

According to Allen, several Cowichan were present at the Klallam village for a night of gambling, the bone-disk game of slaha’l. As the game continued, tensions mounted—a fight erupted whereby several of the Cowichans were killed. Most of the Klallams set about beheading the dead, but Klallam Pete, Xe’tanaxʷ, an “awful bad fighter,” had killed the son of a Cowichan chief. Instead of beheading him, Klallam Pete kept his victim’s body, removing his entrails—he knew how to insert and apply certain plants to keep it from decomposing for a time. By “playing” with it for many days in a lake, he eventually acquired the dead man’s spirit power. The Cowichan made a retaliatory attack, but called it off when the Klallam fired a hidden cannon that they had borrowed from nearby settlers. Fearing what they thought must have indicated the Klallams’ great warrior spirit power, the Cowichan turned their canoes back.

Eventually, the Cowichan chief sent some Skagit negotiators to get the body of his son. Klallam Pete said “I want ten guns and one slave and one big canoe, and then [the chief, c’o’sia] can take the body of his son in good shape” (Elmendorf 1993:135).

So after a while the interpreters come along again. Here comes a big canoe to Port Townsend. A big canoe now, with more people bringing the slave and those ten guns. When they bring that slave and that canoe and those ten guns, the Skagit chief comes along with them. He says, “Now, you Klallam people, that’s done fighting with the Cowichan people!” “Yes, that’s done.” This Skagit chief’s name is kʷalqe’dəb. That’s the Skagit chief telling the Klallam no more fighting with the Cowichan.

Duke York [the Klallam chief] says “All right, you kʷalqe’dəb, no more
fighting....”
So that’s done now; so c’o’ sia gets his son. No more fighting with the Cowichan now.
Now xe’tanaxʷ gets that slave and those guns. He gives the slave to Duke York and divided the ten guns to his people, one gun to each man. The canoe, that is all he kept for himself.
Now, that is done (Frank Allen [Elmendorf 1993:136]).

Most of the fighters during that slaha’l brawl were satisfied with the symbolic capital they gained from beheading their victim. Klallam Pete, having killed a chief’s son, saw a greater opportunity for more capital to be gained. He gained not only spiritual capital—through the macabre machinations needed to wrest the victim’s spirit power from him—but also ransomed the corpse (as perhaps social capital, instead of economic) for economic capital (guns, a slave, and canoe). He then gave away nearly all of the guns, transforming them into prestige, or symbolic capital. All of this was a verification of the power of his warrior spirit, or spiritual capital.

In assessing motivations for warfare, the focus should be on the ultimate exchange of the goods acquired in warfare. If the initial or ostensible aim was for plunder and/or territory, one could argue that the intention was for access to economic or natural capital. However, if the warrior is using these goods gained from the raids, not for their own individual consumption, but to exchange that capital through a potlatch, then the ultimate exchange was for status and prestige, or symbolic capital. In potlatch ceremonies, people gave away the wealth that was gained in exchange for social and/or symbolic capital. In this economy, much of what was exchanged is symbolic, even if the goods needed to acquire that symbolic capital are manifestly material.

The potlatch presents a ceremonial exchange that allows for individual expression of power while also contributing to the broader good. As Suttles (1987a [1960]:23) noted:

Looking now at that most famous institution, the potlatch, I find that within this total socio-economic system, its most important function is to be found neither in the expression of the individual’s drive for high status nor in the fulfillment of the society’s need for solidarity, neither in
competition nor in cooperation, but simply in the redistribution of wealth.

Suttles opted against vying for competition or cooperation in favor of a redistribution-of-wealth argument, but he actually has demonstrated something even broader: this “total institution” in the Northwest Coast serves both competition and cooperation at the same time. It allows for people to gain status (competition) through benefiting the whole (cooperation), with the whole being their household and allied households, and perhaps the village. The exchangeability of various forms of capital is what allows this to happen. Such an economic exchange is not egalitarian because it showcases elaborate expressions of individual status and prestige. On the other hand, it is not hierarchically centralized, not allowing for the rise of uniquely powerful chiefs—they give away their capital, empowering others with economic capital of their own as they exchange it for symbolic capital. As Suttles (1987e [1960]:24) pointed out, this ceremonial exchange only “extend[s] the process farther.” Nor is this social organization class-based, as Marx described, as these are factions of household chiefs and warriors competing against each other for greater capital. A fitting description of this complex social organization is provided, instead, by anarchism. It is a system that encourages individual expression and local autonomy, but also encourages widespread networks of cooperative ties. Moreover, those in such social organizations actively resist the centralization or overly concentrated forms of domination or authority, a role in which Coast Salish warfare appears to play a part. In the next chapter, I discuss how this unique sociopolitical organization came to existence in Northwest Coast prehistory and how the role of warfare changed throughout.
To some, warfare was the predominant state of humanity in the past, before “civilization.” These times are conceived, Snyder (2002) noted, as exhibiting the “Hobbesian dangers of anarchy,” where presumably past lives are “nasty, brutish, and shorte” without the Leviathan of the State to ensure peace. Yet, such descriptions for much of human history as anarchic are correct, although not in the sense of the term anarchy as chaos, with its suggestions of a free-for-all, but rather in the sense that people lived without formal governments.

In the literature on international relations, warfare is described as occurring only in anarchy. By anarchy, the term does not indicate a society without government but a political situation in which an overarching power does not have (or has lost) dominion over other groups (Wendt 1992, Snyder 2002:7). Warfare, accordingly, is a criterion indicating autonomy, which is just as some in anthropology have emphasized (Malinowski 1936:444; McCauley 1990:1). Wars erupt between states or cultural groups that have no rule over another, or, with revolution, between those who challenge the authority of dominant groups, indicating their assertions of autonomy. Warfare also had particular aims that satisfied other needs. It is better seen as a practice, a strategic or tactical opportunity of individuals pursuing power and capital.

The development of warfare on the Northwest Coast has traces that are witnessed nearly back to its earliest periods, but warfare expanded to higher intensities of devastation and increased scales of organization within the last two millennia. In this chapter, I describe the development of Northwest Coast cultures since New World colonization while highlighting the role and evidence of warfare. I will discuss changes in social organization through time, which before contact was largely anarchic, in that there were no formal governments. Instead, the social structures within and between
households consisted of the social arena in which there were assertions of power and autonomy. In the following, I look at the archaeological history of the whole Northwest Coast to provide a broader context for warfare in the Coast Salish region; a general sequence is provided for the region (Table 2). 

Initial Colonialization & Archaic Period (ca. 11,000 to 3500 BP)

People have inhabited the southern coast of British Columbia since the glaciers began to recede during the Quaternary Period over 10,000 years ago, arriving through an ice-free corridor across the Bering Strait of Alaska. The first inhabitants are even thought to have arrived thousands of years ago by water, traveling along the coast line, according to one theory. Archaeologists have evidence for early coastal sites that suggest a pattern of island migration from eastern Asia and down the Alaskan coast into the waters of British Columbia (Fladmark 1979). Glaciers covered most of the landscape on the northern part of the continent, enough to actually lower the mainland coast with their weight, but islands are argued to have provided refuge along the route (Erlandson et al. 2007). Early sites are documented in the north, in the Queen Charlotte Islands and in the islands of Southeastern Alaska (Fedje and Christensen 1999; Dixon 2001, 2008), but in southern British Columbia, the sites are located on the mainland coast and along the lower Fraser River with a subsistence more reliant on terrestrial rather than marine resources. For this reason, the earliest peoples are thought to have arrived by a land route over the Bering Strait and around the Cordilleran ice sheet during the latest years of glaciation, from 13,000 to 11,000 BP. Yet, coastal migrants could have moved upriver as well.

In the Fraser River Canyon, the Milliken site documents the earliest occupation in southern B.C., with a date of 9,000 years BP (Mitchell and Pokotylo 1996). Other

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Table 2: General chronology for the Northwest Coast and Gulf of Georgia.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Millenia BP</th>
<th>General Northwest Coast Chronology</th>
<th>Gulf of Georgia Chronology</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>POSTCONTACT</td>
<td>Postcontact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LATE PACIFIC</td>
<td>Late Period (Gulf of Georgia) (transition) Marpole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MIDDLE PACIFIC</td>
<td>Locarno Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EARLY PACIFIC</td>
<td>St. Mungo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ARCHAIC</td>
<td>Old Cordilleran Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>PALEOINDIAN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

important early sites include Glenrose farther downriver, and Bear Cove, located on northeast Vancouver Island (Matson 1976; Carlson 1979). These early sites contained large leaf-shaped knives and spear points along with large cobble tools. Since the Milliken site was occupied in summer, it appears that fishing for salmon extends back to its earliest inhabitants, even if it may not have been a primary focus (Mitchell and Pokotylo 1996). Their camps were small and they foraged broadly, with extensive range of the landscape, indicating a highly nomadic existence. They are argued to have lived in small egalitarian groups that drew upon a wide range of environments, with resources from land mammals outnumbering those from the sea.

Coast-wide, the archaeological record reveals a broadly similar material culture pattern, with early sites exhibiting chipped stone tools (pebble tools, leaf-shaped bifaces, and scrapers), from Ground Hog Bay (Ackerman 1996) and Namu (Carlson 1996) to Milliken (Mitchell and Pokotylo 1996) and Dalles, Oregon (Cressman et al. 1960). Early sites have also been discovered along the Oregon coast (Hall et al. 2004, 2005). These have been argued to be descendant from the first migration of peoples (likely Amerind) that is exhibited in the Nenana Complex of Alaska, a likely precursor to Clovis peoples (Matson and Coupland 1995:57-58). The only manifestations of Clovis in the Northwest Coast is at Wenatchee, although Wright (1996) argued for a possible fluted point recovered at Coquitlam Lake, northeast of Vancouver. During this early period, there is no evidence of conflict and warfare from burials, settlement patterns, or weaponry to suggest antagonistic relations during the period of initial colonization. If present, the conflicts would have been of such small organizational scale (in Wolf’s [1990] terms) that it is unlikely that such evidence would be encountered.

During the Archaic Period, however, differences occur archaeologically between the north and south. In the north, the North Coast Microblade Tradition (emphasizing microblades, with less of a presence of chipped stone) and the Old Cordilleran Culture (with pebble tools, leaf-shaped bifaces, and other chipped stone tools) in the central and south coasts, as defined by Matson and Coupland (1995:68-81). Both are examples of
nomadic foragers operating in small, likely egalitarian bands. The north coast is almost exclusively coastal in settings, emphasizing both marine and land mammal hunting, while the southern coast exhibits a combination of coastal emphases, as at Bear Cove (Carlson 1979) and more inland-oriented sites such as Glenrose (Matson 1976).

During this period, the atlatl was also used, which increased the effectiveness of the spear by providing greater propulsion. The name for the tool derives from the Nahuatl word for “spear thrower.” It allowed for an extension of the arm during the throw, giving the thrust of the spear greater leverage than the unaided human arm could provide. For use with an atlatl, spears were shortened and projectile points were smaller. The earliest evidence for atlatls in the Northwest Coast comes from the Dalles in Oregon ca. 8,000 to 9,000 BP (Kirk and Daugherty 2007:60) and from Namu, Period 2, about 6500 to 5000 BP (Carlson 1996:100). Borden (1968) discussed an atlatl recovered in Skagit territory, which he argued was likely Locarno Beach Phase in age; however, Fladmark et al. (1987) radiocarbon dated it to ca. 1700 BP, or the Marpole Phase. This atlatl exhibited anthropomorphic art, likely indicating spirit power connections. It extended the thrower’s reach with its 41-cm length. Another main advantage of the spear-thrower is the spear’s ultimate force of impact, the penetration of which can cripple and immobilize game: “The impact of a spear results in either immediate death or sufficient blood loss to weaken the animal relatively quickly. Spears, in other words, impart a knock-down force and open significant wounds” (Hitchcock and Bleed 1997:355; see also Cattelain 1997, Yu 2006).

The first evidence of violence or conflict occurs during the Archaic Period. The most prominent example is Kennewick Man, the contentious burial discovered in south-central Washington that dated to 9400 BP. A portion of a long and fully serrated, willow-shaped Cascade Point was found embedded in his pelvis. Its penetration was so deep, that it was interpreted as having been a dart propelled by an atlatl (Chatters 2000). The wound had mostly healed over, but the projectile point was visible through computed-tomography (CT) scans.
Other examples of conflict in buried human remains, however, are rare, mostly due to their limited number prior to 5000 BP from these areas. Other evidence, such as artifacts, also do not explicitly suggest weaponry, although tools usually associated with subsistence (projectile points associated with spears and darts at this time, as Kennewick Man’s wound reveals) can be used as weapons. Settlement patterns also do not indicate warfare, because of the nomadism of these mobile hunter-gatherers, with sites consisting of camps or processing areas instead of architectural features. Maschner (1997) suggested that warfare was present in this period—Keeley (1996:186) also found that most hunter-gatherers engage in frequent (50%) or continuous (20%) warfare, although this is less than the percentages for chiefdoms and states. Much of this conflict would have involved melee combat, not a specialized industry producing weapons explicitly for warfare or specifically defensive settlements, nor a division of labour allowing warriors as specialized positions.

Warfare may also have been less common for both regions simply due to low population numbers. If people encountered other groups less often, there would be fewer opportunities or need for conflict. If aggressive groups were encountered, there would have been other open territories to move into. Avoiding conflict and aggression would have been a ready option during this time, both externally, between groups, and within groups, as groups could opt to fission, and avoid internal conflict.

Consider such fissioning through the framework of power. The nature of social organization and fluidity gave individuals and families in bands great flexibility. There were options to choose with whom to ally or not. As the territory was sparsely populated, there were always options to leave the group to pursue their lives elsewhere. This can be seen to be a strategic advantage to those wanting to minimize concentrations of power in one or few individuals, which as Blake and Clark (1999) note is “one of the most effective means” for groups wanting to minimize the power of aggrandizers. They portray this as an example of egalitarian ideology, but it also indicates a phenomenon greater than an ideology of equality. I argue that this fissioning practice enacts a
principle of anarchic social organization, which actively resists the power or attempted authority of others, aggrandizers in particular. That is, the action of fissioning is not a statement about how people should relate to each other equally (in fact, as is the case with many hunter-gatherers, they likely did not engage each other on equal terms), but rather fissioning is an act that actually rejects social relations with aggrandizers—an action that rejects another’s claim to authority and attempts to dominate and govern.

It is anarchic social organization, which has a “centrifugal logic,” as Pierre Clastres (1987, 1994) has described. Such a centrifugal practice of dispersion counters “centripetal” attempts to concentrate power in the hands of a few. This helps to “To assure the permanence of dispersion, of the parceling out, of the atomization of groups,” to maintain local autonomy (Clastres 1994:164). It is in this sense that fissioning is an anarchic practice, one that happens to maintain control of an individual’s autonomous power (i) rather than relinquish it to others (ii).

Because of such options, an individual may have great individual power (i), but be severely limited in his or her ability to impose that power over others (ii). This further affects a potential aggrandizer’s ability to attempt greater forms of power, involving the ability of people to organize into larger groups (iii), and, in turn, the ability to control or alter social settings (iv). The environmental conditions, with openness of territory and the nomadic mobility to move to resource rich areas, aided individuals in their personal power (i) by offering a range of possibilities to pursue. These types of options and relations likely would have predominated during the Archaic Period, lasting for over four thousand years (9,000 to 4,500 BP).

**Early Pacific (4500 to 3500 BP)**

Around 4500 BP, the populations of both the north and southern coasts increased. According to a model by Croes and Hackenberger (1988), populations slowly increased at a gradual rate over thousands of years. Matson and Coupland (1995:142) described populations during the Archaic as “settling in,” in which foragers seasonally
ranged within localized regions. Distinct patterns began to emerge during the Charles Period (4500 - 3500 BP) of the central Northwest Coast, with particular archaeological signatures manifesting in various phases: Obsidian Culture in the Queen Charlotte Strait, St. Mungo Phase in the lower Fraser Valley, Mayne Phase in the Gulf Islands, and Eayem Phase in the Fraser Canyon.

In northern areas, the North Coast Microblade Tradition declined, with microblades mostly absent by 4000 BP, with distinctive phases appearing in the Kitselas Canyon, or Gitaus Phase; near Prince Rupert, Period III; and the Queen Charlotte Islands, Graham Tradition (Borden 1975; Coupland 1988a, 1988b). Subsistence patterns similar to the previous period are present though there is an obvious increase in the use of upper tidal zone resources such as bay mussel, which appear as light to moderate lenses throughout these coastal sites. Subsistence likely was still forager-based, though perhaps closer to collector strategies, given the decreased range of mobility and centuries of local ecological knowledge (Matson and Coupland 1995:114).

Warfare, during this period, was likely similar to the prior Archaic Period, although one could argue for its increase due to the greater population and inter-group contact. One measure of intergroup contact is apparent in trade routes, particularly of obsidian. Whereas in prior periods, obsidian was generally found in sites in the local region up to distances of about 160 km, during the Early Pacific—and even from the terminal Archaic (ca. 6000 BP)—obsidian from numerous sources is found throughout the coast. Moreover, the source types, including those from Mt. Edziza and others from Oregon, overlap in their distribution areas at this time (Carlson 1994). Most archaeologists treat exchange as an example of friendly relations, however, Keeley (1996:126) stressed that “The fact that exchange and war can have precisely the same results is often forgotten by archaeologists.” He is correct in that it is difficult to discern whether the exotic goods are those of trade or from the plunder of war. Moreover, as he further pointed out, “Contrary to the usual assumptions, exchange between societies is a context favorable to conflict and is closely associated with it” (Keeley 1996:126; see also --- 144 ---
Burch and Correll 1972). While it may not be possible to determine whether the trade routes in obsidian indicate trade, warfare, or both, it does indicate increased intergroup contact during this time.

It appears that some conflicts also did occur during this period. Cybulski (1994) analyzed 57 burials that dated to this period and found that 21 percent exhibited evidence of trauma likely due to interpersonal violence; for example, one male at Namu, circa 4300 BP, had a bone point in his backbone (Hester 1978; cited in Carlson 1994). In commenting on Cybulski’s analysis, Maschner (1997) noted that conflict appeared to be associated with the central mainland, as sites on the Queen Charlotte Islands, such as Blue Jackets Creek (Murray 1981), exhibited “little evidence” for such violence. Finally, there are also some indications of weapons for war. Despite a lack of evidence of trauma, warfare may be indicated at Blue Jackets Creek with two carved daggers that accompanied a male burial (Severs 1974; cited in Carlson 1994:348).

The absence of microblades on the north coast is striking and does represent a discontinuity in comparison to later periods. Microblades, for instance, have been argued to be associated with Athapaskan groups, as the North Coast Microblade Tradition (8600 to 4500 BP), which is seemingly derived from the second migration of Athapaskan groups into the continent represented by the Denali Complex in Alaska (Matson and Coupland 1995:82-84). Borden (1979:970) noted that “Later intruders, like the Athapascans, greatly disrupted and complicated the distribution of ethnic groups.” However, despite such a discontinuity, arguments have not been made for the decimation of North Coast Microblade groups by others. Given the Athapaskan presence of groups in the northern interior, it seems that their mode of subsistence changed, perhaps more so through the increased interaction of peoples across the coast.42

42. The use of microblades does continue, although in different contexts, as Matson and Magne (2007:142) suggested their association with later Athapaskan groups from 2000 BP. Also, microblades were adopted by Salishan groups during later periods, as recovered from Locarno Beach and Marpole sites, although not in great numbers (Burley 1980:21) and technologically derived from different microblade cores (Matson and Magne 2007:142).
With increasing population, the degree of social circumscription must have added to a narrowing of options for those wanting to emigrate from potential conflict. If people occupied adjacent areas, this scenario likely heightened the number of group encounters and interactions and opportunities for potential conflict, with peoples likely less related or at least less known. Remaining within one’s original territory may have reduced potential conflict, even if it meant accepting or submitting to another’s claim to power. As Blake and Clark (1999) described for Formative Mesoamerica regarding the undermining of reigning egalitarian protocols, social circumscription in the Northwest Coast appears to have allowed avenues for those seeking power to undermine not only the egalitarian ideology but also to capitalize upon the limits of other’s autonomy. That is, the range of options or practices available to those individuals and groups are reduced; thus, their individual power (i) is subsequently reduced.

Having said this, I do not think population increases should be considered the primary cause of warfare. As Keeley (1996:118-19) has observed, there is “some relationship” between population and conflict, but the nature of that relationship is “very complex or very weak or both”; moreover, he stated that: “In the broadest view, the frequency of warfare and violence is simply not a consequence of human density or crowding. However striking the images, human beings are neither rats packed in a cage nor irascible billiard balls jostling on a table.” Moreover, such approaches ascribe the cause to something external to humans, rather than as internal to human relations, actions, and motivations. It is more productive to consider the environmental context as a constraint or limitation that affects the options available to some and increases opportunities for those able to apply their power over others. Changes in the environment become opportunities for those to apply their tactics and strategies to their advantage.43

43. An example from the Mississippian chiefdoms of the Southeast provides an illustration for such an approach. In the Savannah River Valley, Anderson, Stahle, and Cleaveland (1995) acknowledged that the Little Climatic Optimum was a favourable period for agriculture, resulting in surpluses of corn. However, using dendrochronological data, they demonstrated that even during that optimal period, droughts occurred—they were just less frequent than prior or later periods. In combining the chronology of chiefdom phases with the
Middle Pacific (3500 to 1500 BP)

Early Middle Pacific (3500 to 2000 BP)

At 3500 BP, significant changes occurred throughout both regions, which will best be illustrated with examples from the Paul Mason Phase (3200 - 2700 BP) in the north coast and the Locarno Beach Phase (3500 - 2400 BP) in the central coast. It is during this period that significant economic changes are apparent, particularly for the intensification of salmon. Salmon use has been noted in prior periods at sites such as Chuck Lake in the north and Namu and in the central coast of B.C. Intensification indicates a change in the nature of production that emphasizes storage.

Some arguments have been made indicating that the lack of salmon heads indicates storage (e.g., Boehm 1973; Steifel 1985; Matson 1992; Matson and Coupland 1995:166); some have argued that site formation processes may affect the archaeological presence of the frail bones of salmon heads, although at Crescent Beach heads were not found in Locarno Beach Phase layers while they were present in the older St. Mungo layers beneath (Matson, Pratt, and Rankin 1991). Matson (1992) advocated that salmon intensification would also be associated with sedentism (minimally, to have a place for storage) and, thus, houses or village would be present—and at Crescent Beach, a house floor was uncovered.

On the north coast, the oldest known village is the Paul Mason site, located at a prime fishing area in the narrowing of the Skeena River of Kitselas Canyon. Coupland (1988a, 1988b) argued that the establishment of a village indicates a claim to that dendrochronological record, they determined that chiefly elites were likely able to amass surplus stores to last three seasons of drought, although any extended periods would create havoc for their rule. Indeed, droughts in the dendrochronological data correlated with the cyclical rise and fall of chiefly elites in the Savannah River Valley, as indicated by various successions of short phases. Their case study and approach to the data indicates the important factor of environment, but they still locate the impetus for changes within the cultural context. Elite factions used such optimal periods to sustain their leadership and the failure of the economy often led to their downfall.
resource area. However, these claims were those of the group, specifically the "egalitarian corporate group." These groups, Coupland (1988a, 1988b) argued, maintained an egalitarian social structure due to the similar sizes of houses, with a low range of variance (58.6%).

In the central coast, the evidence for social ranking is apparent, in Fried’s (1967) terms. Burials commonly exhibit labret wear, and the presence of elaborate zoomorphic spoons at Musqueam NE and Pender Canal (ostensibly for feasting) indicate symbolic differences within the population (Carlson and Hobler 1993). However, as Burley and Knüsel (1989) argued, these status differences are achieved rather than ascribed. This period exhibits a change in the mode of production to one that emphasizes surplus accumulation. In the central coast, however, inequality is evidently more dramatically emphasized. Such indications of status have occasionally been present in prior periods—for instance, an elaborate grave for a young male at Namu (ca. 4000 BP; Curtin 1984). Regarding the increased sedentism in both areas, this period marks the importance of ownership, as argued by Matson and Coupland (1995:152) for resources that are “dense, predictable, and reliable.”

Ownership involves a claim to resources, claims that may be defended. During periods of generalized foraging, the natural landscape had been open to foragers for their use. With the construction of houses or other features on the landscape at or near particular resource areas, labour had been invested into the landscape. These constructions accomplish more than their functional appearance might indicate—these were for more than subsistence or shelter. The invested labour also indicates a claim, a symbolic mark to the landscape indicating that those who constructed those cultural features occupy that landscape; this notion about the investment of labour as a claim to ownership that can be extended philosophically back to Locke (1689).

Overall, the evidence for warfare remains thin during this period. There are indications of Locarno Beach-like components at Shoemaker Bay and at Little Beach in Ucluelet (McMillan 1982; 1996), which might represent the presence of Gulf of Georgia
Salishan peoples into the central and western coasts of Vancouver Island. Also, Northern Wakashan peoples, about 2400 BP, expanded from the northern tip of Vancouver Island into the Queen Charlotte Strait, and possibly northward, which according to Mitchell (1990:357) possibly accounts for the Bella Coola isolate of the Salishan speaking groups in the north. Such expansions, however, need not have been of a violent nature. While there appears to be no evidence for warfare during this period, the shift in economy to one emphasizing storage and surplus is a setting conducive to warfare.

Earlier in this chapter, I described the development of more complex or unequal forms of social organization with aggrandizers taking advantage of opportunities to achieve dominance over others (ii). Environmental or social circumscription contributes to a limitation of an individual’s power (i) and allows more opportunities for aggrandizers to subvert egalitarian norms and dominate others (ii). However, simply because there were elites, it does not necessarily indicate that others have been dominated; rather, elite authority may have been earned. Chiefly elites can develop their status through their ability to attract supporters and allies to their causes and efforts. Contributing to the chief’s aims will eventually contribute to one’s own chances for enhanced status. Such a logic is readily seen in the nature of how elites apportion surplus to their supporters and household members. Chiefs can be indebted to their supporters and allies, such that their status is purportedly higher, even while their real authority is limited. Individuals may not be able to fission from those assuming power over them (ii) as easily as prior periods due to social circumscription, but their options for aligning with one chief instead of another remains open. Ethnographically, this appears to be more the case for Coast Salish groups than northern groups, as they reckoned kin bilaterally, allowing more options for individuals in their choice of whom to align with, and which household to reside in. As Suttles (1987c [1960]:41-42) noted, among Wakashan to the north, authority was established through the potlatch, creating a series of ranked individuals. Farther to the north, among the Tsimshian, Tlingit, and
Haida, ranking was even more rigidly established through matrilineal descent, “making alternative membership and individual mobility less possible” (Suttles 1987c [1960]:41-42). During the Middle period, there was likely individual fluidity or mobility for most peoples on the coast, at least in comparison to later periods.

With such mobility options still available, an individual’s power (i) and autonomy is still strong, able to counter those attempting to dominate them (ii). Therefore, chiefs would have had to spend more effort attracting potential supporters. The more capital a person diverts (or redistributes) to his underlings and allies, the more status he can retain. Supporters will follow a leader if they benefit from doing so (Clark and Blake 1994:18-19). This status acquisition is a reflection of an individual’s organizational power (iii), not necessarily one’s power over another person or group. The power is also manifested in productive endeavors, such as constructing fish weirs, houses, boats, or other activities.

This should not be equated with the view that elites are “necessary” for the organization of such projects. For instance, some archaeologists have claimed, regarding the Bronze Age in Europe, that leaders were merely managers facilitating the direction of new construction projects such as irrigation canals and dams. Gilman (1981) countered these functionalist notions of leadership, providing a Marxist analysis which better explains inequality than approaches that argue for elites as functional and necessary. Gilman (1981:3) noted “Even if one grants that certain economic situations demand leadership for the common good, it does not follow that the rulers must be recruited from a ruling class. It is not apparent that the best way of choosing efficient managers is by birth.” There were elaborate burials for subadults and women, something that elites-as-functional theories did not effectively explain. Moreover, Gilman (1981) noted that it was not necessary for elites to spearhead large-scale construction projects, as these could also be formed through the cooperation of interested and mostly egalitarian groups, much as anarchists have advocated. However, once these local groups invested their labour into such projects, Gilman pointed out,
they needed to protect their investments in order to continue reaping surplus from their constructions. Neighboring groups might threaten to overtake the area (and use these constructions without having to invest their own labour), or simply raid them to acquire their increased surplus. Thus, a warrior class arose to answer such needs.

Similarly, in the Northwest Coast, the “functional” aspect of elites had been promoted by Ames (1985). Such a model has been critiqued by Croes and Hackenberger 1988) and Coupland 1988b (also Matson and Coupland 1995:244-45), the former arguing that large projects involving salmon intensification do not require hierarchical organization. Instead these could be accomplished through self-organized groups, with people acquiring status for their ability to organize (iii), not especially through a particular function or direction in the project, but could be restricted through their ability to convene others in egalitarian (or nonhierarchical) fashion towards a task, with results to be redistributed accordingly.

I should note here that much of the anarchist literature explicitly concerns the application of power, particularly a resistance to authoritarian power. Through such a view, the Northwest Coast during the Early Middle period does not exhibit evidence for authoritarian elites. Symbols for the identification of status are applied to adult individuals that could have earned that status, rather than inherited it.44 For instance, labrets appear to indicate items that identify Locarno Beach Phase elites, and these are applied to perforations made in the lips. Percy (1974) determined that labrets were worn by adult males; however, Cybulski (1991) noted that female burials with labrets or labret wear were later found. Furthermore, Burley and Knüsel (1989:5) in the Gulf of Georgia found that interment types during Locarno Beach were predominantly midden

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44 Labret wearing generally consists of practice conducted and applied during the later stages of an individual’s life. It is interesting, however, that Duff (1952:80) had remarked that Chief Pierre of Hope, B.C., was said to have been “born with pierced ears and nasal septum”; that is, he was born already with these chiefly symbols, even though those are known by their very nature of the practice (i.e., perforation with cultural artifact) to be applied later in life—but in his case, in utero. Barring an interpretation of a miracle birth, the account appears to be an ideological move to justify a chief’s authority or eliteness backwards in time to make his authority naturalized, or more appropriately, supernaturalized.
burials with nearly 2 in 5 exhibiting grave goods (13/34; 38%), although those items were “almost totally utilitarian,” likely indicating the nature of their skill in hunting, carving, weaving or otherwise. Similarly, in the north coast, the houses of the Paul Mason Phase (3200 - 2700 BP) are generally similar in size and there is a near absence of prestige goods (Coupland 1988a, 1988b). The pattern generally extends to other temporally related components at Haida Gwaii, Prince Rupert, and Southeast Alaska.

Late Middle Pacific (2000 to 1500 BP)

The developments that occurred during the Early Middle period established a foundation for greater exhibitions of power and opportunities to undermine traditions that favoured an equalization of power during the Late Middle Pacific period. Salmon storage intensified, allowing for concentrations of economic capital. Moreover, in some areas, notably the Coast Salish region, the prior centuries of intensified production set in motion opportunities for elites to entrench their power, attempting to concretize the authority they had earned or achieved and maintain it beyond even their lifetime—that is, to make it hereditary. In the north, this period manifested as Period II in Prince Rupert and the Kleanza Phase in Kitselas Canyon (2500/2000 - 1500 BP) and the Marpole Phase (2400 - 1000 BP) in the central coast.

In the north, the McNichol Creek village in Prince Rupert area revealed evidence for substantial inequality with one house exhibiting twice the size of the other houses; it contains a significantly large central hearth, presumably for hosting elaborate feasts (Coupland, Bissell, and King 1993). In a comparison of cache pit sizes between the Paul Mason Phase and this period, Coupland (1998) demonstrated that the storage capacity increased significantly from 38 m$^3$ to 113.6 m$^3$.

David Archer (1992) dated numerous villages in Tsimshian territory and found that there was a common period of abandonment, between AD 1 and 400:

Of the village sites [in Prince Rupert Harbour area] that have consistent, reliable dates, there are 13 that were all abandoned within the first few centuries A.D. To place this in context, only one site was clearly
abandoned before this period. There appear to be two or three that were abandoned in the centuries after A.D. 500 and before the advent of Europeans, but certainly no more than this. The evidence points to a dramatic change in the local settlement pattern (Archer 1992:15; cited in Marsden 2001:100-101).

In an analysis of oral histories, or *adawx* and *at.oow* of the Tsimshian and Tlingit, in comparison to the archaeological record, Marsden (2001) noted that warfare recorded in their traditions corresponded to the village abandonments, reflecting temporary control of the Prince Rupert Harbour by the Tlingit, as Tsimshian groups retreated up the Skeena River. Later, according to the *adawx*, they are led by a warrior named Aksk who reclaims their territory as Tsimshian (Marsden 2001).

In the central Northwest Coast, Croes and Hackenberger (1988) noted that the Marpole Phase indicated perhaps the greatest period of salmon intensification in the region, even when compared to later periods. Inequality at this time is represented in burials by forms of cranial deformation (Mitchell 1971)—labrets cease by 2000 BP—and there are burials with elaborate grave goods, even for women and subadults. Based on this, Burley and Knüsel (1989) argued that substantial inequality and stratification was indicated. During the Locarno Beach Phase—when status appeared achieved by the symbolic use of labrets, for instance—the number of available status positions seemed limited, though open to all. With status markers such as that of cranial deformation, which can only be applied to infants, such markers of status would not be applicable to everyone, suggesting that positions, resources, and the means of production were not available to all. Cranial deformation is not present in the northern Northwest Coast, although arguments for stratification can be made through other lines of evidence, particularly in the form of elaborate graves for subadults. Notably, in this period, a warrior complex appears to have emerged. This is best illustrated in the warrior’s burial cache at Boardwalk dating to approximately 1800 BP, which contains a zoomorphic stone club, a long basalt dagger, a “braining stone,” an orca jawbone club, and copper-lined rods apparently for use as armour (MacDonald and Cybulski 2001:8-9). It is perhaps to this period that the Hagwilget cache of stone war clubs belongs. Found in
1898 in Hagwilget canyon, these clubs exhibited elaborate zoomorphic imagery. Duff (1975) aptly noted that, while these were clearly stone clubs, they were not quite practical and more likely had symbolic functions: “One of the most curious things about the stone clubs is that they are not so much functional weapons as they are images of weapons.” Several of these “death bringers,” as Duff (1975:114) titled them in Images: Stone: B.C., do appear unwieldy.

Beyond weaponry, or the imagery of war, the burial evidence suggests a significant increase in warfare at this time. Cybulski (1994) noted that nearly a third (32%) of adult males exhibited violent trauma in the north, with many burials exhibiting dental fractures, forearm “parry” fractures, and skull indentations (which seem to match the signature of a stone club). There are “trophy skulls” at the Boardwalk site (MacDonald and Cybulski 2001), and three individuals at the Lachane site were decapitated, dating to 1750 ± 40 BP, suggesting prisoners of war (Cybulski 1996).

Coupland (1989) argued that social inequality may have been enforced through coercion, indicating that these examples of trauma may represent internal violence rather than warfare as elites may have sustained their dominance through violent means. However, he also discussed how warrior ideologies may have been directed outward in order to justify their position and minimize internal disputes. Warfare appeared to be a strategy for leaders enforcing power, enabling them to overcome egalitarian ideologies and strategies, which can be otherwise difficult to undermine (Blake and Clark 1999). In the central Northwest Coast, however, the evidence for such trauma is more limited, with only 10% of adult males indicating death by violent trauma (Cybulski 1992). Instead, the social inequality of these cultures seems to have been maintained more so through regional interaction including trade and marriage, establishing networks of alliances participating in a regional ideology as indicated by the prevalent Marpole art style, for instance, in stone bowls and burial patterns. Both Grier (2003) and Brown (1996) argued that the inception of regional interaction networks that Suttles described for the ethnographic period appeared to be
extant during the Marpole Phase.

The iconography in the art seems more representative of spirit powers (e.g., Carlson 1983) than it does for imagery of warfare, although particular spirit powers have been important for warriors among the Coast Salish, as discussed above. Perhaps this regional network of alliances staved off military expansion. Mitchell (1990) argued that during this period (ca. 2400 BP) there was an expansion of Wakashan peoples from the northwest coast of Vancouver Island into the Queen Charlotte Strait. There is a significant discontinuity between the Obsidian Culture type emphasis on chipped stone to the Queen Charlotte Strait type (with the near absence of chipped stone; bone and mussel shell tools); McMillan (1999) and Coupland (1989) both argued similarly for a Wakashan expansion at this time to the Washington coast, as indicated by the presence of Makah populations. However, there is a lack of evidence for warfare in the Gulf of Georgia (e.g., burial remains, artifacts, or settlement styles); while in the north, a “warrior complex” is clearly present. This led Coupland (1989) to argue that warfare rose in tandem with the development of social inequality in the north, but apparently in the south, warfare appears to follow the development of social inequality. It is during the next period, the Gulf of Georgia Phase in the central coast and Period I in the north, that the evidence for warfare is most apparent, particularly in the construction of defensive sites.

**On the development of an elite class**

It has been argued that the power gained from the intensification of storage practices and the accumulation of economic capital led to the establishment of an elite class, particularly in the Gulf of Georgia. Symbols of eliteness are applied to subadults as indicated in the burials. In fact, the symbolism of cranial deformation was applied to infants. As Burley (1989) argued, these indications reveal ascribed status. The symbolic practice that may have been applied during an individual’s lifetime, the labret, is even abandoned. This suggests, à la Fried (1967), that the availability for elite positions had
been narrowed significantly. In an extreme sense, no longer could one earn the status shown by a labret or other elite symbolic items; instead, one had to be born with it. After Mitchell (1971:54), Burley and Knüsel (1989) provided a solid argument for the differences between achieved and ascribed status differences in Locarno Beach and Marpole, one that was supported and advanced by Matson and Coupland (1995:215).

According to Roscoe (1993), who advocated a primary model for practice theory in anthropology, the political concentration of power involves three predominant variables: *Effectiveness*, or the degree of power; *extent*, the range of the applicability of power; and its *institutionalization*, establishing the rules of authority into structures external to the personal characteristics or achievements of the powerful individual into laws or official roles. However, initially aggrandizers for power have to continually create and maintain alliances, which are costly, and some end up owing their supporters more than they have credit for—an unstable form of power. It is more effective, therefore, to augment power by institutionalizing dominance beyond the charisma and authority that one has achieved:

> Practice dictates that leaders will take advantage of whatever opportunities exist to replace direct control of others with control of structures that dominate them, because thereby their dominance becomes more efficient and their interests are advanced (Roscoe 1993:118).

In the Marpole Phase, we have evidence for the development of all three aspects of political concentration: *Effectiveness* is evident in the widespread appearance of elite wares; *extent* is apparent in the networks of elite exchange, which through regional alliances of elites the range of such power expands; and, finally, *institutionalization* is suggested by the establishment of hereditary eliteness in the symbolic practice of cranial modification and subadults with elaborate grave goods. Just as Clark and Blake (1994) argued that elites in coastal Chiapas overturned egalitarian levelling mechanisms to allow for the rise of aggrandizers, Marpole elites undermined the mechanisms that maintained status as achieved, allowing for the stratification of a hereditary elite. In institutionalizing their authority beyond the abilities or charisma of an individual, they
found a less costly way of maintaining control: by hoarding symbolic capital in the nature of the elite wares (e.g., stone bowls) and practices (e.g., cranial modification), enacting hegemonic controls that constrained the participation of non-elites.

Interpreted through Wolf’s (1990) model of power, Locarno Beach Phase elites appeared to have organized their power (iii) through their achievements, their own personal ability (i) and building upon their dominance over others (ii). In such a system, they needed to maintain their personal power (i), their dominance over others (ii), and maintain organization through alliances and gift-giving (iii) feasts, a process that demanded much effort and continual renegotiation, particularly in a society where one gives away his or her economic (i.e., material) capital in exchange for social, cultural, and symbolic forms. During Marpole, accordingly, the networks of exchange must continue, however, the need to display individual power (i) is lessened—it does not need to be achieved through years of experience demonstrating an aggrandizer’s power over others (ii); rather, it has been institutionalized or hegemonically ritualized through the hereditary inheritance of that individual power (i). The elite infant is born with that power. This ideology of ranking maintains that the infant already has some power over others (ii), that is, over non-elites. Marpole elites organized their power (iii) in such a manner as to control the settings for participation in that eliteness—in other words, they applied structural power (iv).

**On storage and its implications**

Much has been made about the onset of storage on the Northwest Coast and its implications that storage allows for higher population numbers (e.g., Croes and Hackenberger 1988) or increased carrying capacity, just as it has been known to have implications worldwide in the past (Kelly 2000, Otterbein 2004), as discussed above. Population numbers, while increasing the episodes for inter-group contact, does suggest that the chances for tensions are increased. However, increased population does not necessarily mean that such contacts will be violent (Keeley 1996:118-19). It is perhaps
more accurate to discuss how storage contributes to the abilities of those aggrandizers aiming for more power, and to view increased population associated with storage as altering the conditions and dynamics of the social field. The importance of storage does represent a key moment, with its implications for the accumulation of capital.

Some archaeologists like Coupland (1988a, 1988b) and Matson (1992) have argued for the significance of the storage of salmon as similar in its effects to the onset of agriculture, in line with Schalk (1977). Accordingly, it is not agriculture *per se* that is important but rather storage of surplus which is critical, providing a basis for social complexity; factors necessary for storage included dense and predictable resources. Consider the introduction of storage through the frame of power and practice. The storage of material foodstuffs is the amassing of economic capital. This is capital, again, that can be converted or exchanged into other forms of capital. One could feast another chief, establishing an ally (social capital) or trade for knowledge or advice (cultural capital). Moreover, the practice or process of feasting and gifting itself—in public display, meaning in view of witnesses—increases an individual’s status (symbolic capital).

Storage allows for greater display, or gifting episodes, something which occurred earlier Mayne Phase/Locarno Beach, for instance, at Pender Canal, where Carlson and Hobler (1993) made a case for the “feast[ing] of the dead,” from the presence of elaborately carved mountain goat-horn spoons. However, most funerals, while ostensibly about the dead, are more accurately for the living. Similarly, these spoons were more likely indicated feastings by and for the living. Storage is a practice that enables the power of an individual to increase, allowing for public displays (which, in themselves, are demonstrations of organizational power [iii]). Among the the Coast Salish, as other Northwest Coast groups, this witnessing concept is critical. It allows one to publicly receive validation for the title one has gained, or rights acquired.

While storage has been important for the increase of social complexity, it also has implications for warfare. Earlier I described warfare in relation to a mode of production
as opposed to a mode of destruction. The latter phrase, used by Ehrenreich (1997), does convey the damaging aspects of warlike activities. However, it is only accurate in a limited sense. To the victim of a successful attack, the results are destructive, however, to the victors, the results are productive, although not in the traditional sense, as the goods were not produced—at least not by the raiders. Instead, the raiders have decided not to pursue a mode of production but a mode of acquisition, in directly acquiring produced foodstuffs, or economic capital.

**Late Pacific (1500 BP to contact)**

The Late Pacific Period, beginning around 1500 BP, is marked by the widespread presence of defensive sites across the Northwest Coast. According to Moss and Erlandson (1992), around 1200 to 1600 BP, forts begin to be constructed in southeast Alaska, for instance, but most were constructed from 600 - 900 BP. These dates match those on the west coast, as documented by McMillan (1992) at T’ukw’aa refuge (870 - 100 BP); a site where the adjacent village predates the refuge use by centuries (1240 - 580 BP), although he noted that the selection of such a site with a nearby refuge seemed to be in their selection criteria. The site of Ozette is adjacent to Cannonball Island, which has the oldest date (2010 BP) for a refuge site on the coast although this date may be related to its function as a whaling lookout instead of warfare at this time (Moss and Erlandson 1992). Keddie (1984, 1995, 1996) dated numerous forts in southern Vancouver Island that ranged 450 to 1160 BP. Undated rock-wall fortifications also likely date to this period in the Fraser Canyon (Schaepe 2000, 2001, 2006). The introduction of the bow and arrow, in conjunction with defensive sites, indicates a new form of warfare, according to Maschner (1997), changing from mostly hand-to-hand combat to more effective long-distance weapons (bow) and siege tactics, as indicated in defensive sites. Throughout the world, the bow and arrow was widely adopted and even displaced the atlatl and dart in many areas. In the Northwest Coast, use of both appears concurrent, but the bow has been widely in use since about 1500 BP. There are many technological
advantages. Although the bow is predominantly used within the same range as the spearthrower (e.g., 20 to 30 m), the bow is a more accurate weapon (Cattelain 1997:230; Yu 2006). The energy needed for propelling the spear or dart momentum is with the throw itself, which requires space for the overhead throw; the process of the throw inhibits concealment and the significant movement can alert prey. Less room is needed to shoot the arrow than to throw a spear. In fact, a bowhunter can remain quite still while releasing the arrow, since most of the propulsion energy is contained within the bow and its string, when drawn. Shooting an arrow can be done much more quietly than throwing a spear. The launch time required is significantly reduced with the bow and arrow, which means that it can be shot with “far more secrecy than darts from an atlatl” (Nassaney and Pyle 1999:259).

The increase in projectile amount arguably is the most important aspect of the atlatl to bow and arrow transition. Arrows are light enough that they sometimes do not alert prey (or scare them off) during the shot, permitting additional shots at the prey. The smaller projectile and higher accuracy significantly expands one’s range of hunting possibilities as well, since a hunter can target much smaller animals.

Wars on the Northwest Coast were fought with many types of weapons in the precontact past: whalebone clubs, spears, knives, and the bow and arrow. Prior to the introduction of the bow and arrow, however, battles generally involved hand-to-hand or melee combat. Though spears were commonplace, they were used predominantly for thrusting and stabbing—that is, in close range. If a warrior threw his spear, he also threw away his primary weapon. According to Gunther (1972:14), the long flint-pointed lances used in warfare on the Northwest Coast were used as spears, but were not thrown. Similarly, Barnett (1955:270) described that “Spears were seldom hurled but were used for thrusting,” while bows and arrows were used when the fighters were not at close range. Slings were also used, and likely knives thrown as well, but predominantly consisted of hand-to-hand combat. With use of the bow and arrow, a dimension of combat would have come into play, as melee weapons sparred with
projectile weapons.

In other parts of the continent, it appears that warfare also increased with the widespread adoption of the bow and arrow. In the Southeast, the Middle Woodland Period ended as the Late Woodland began, marked by small, corner- and side-notched points. According to some studies, there was an increase in mortality rates, particularly among young men, during this time; indeed, many were found with projectiles embedded in their bones at time of burial. It also has been argued that the palisaded villages of the Southeast at that time were a response to the shift from melee combat to projectile-based combat (Dye 2006). In an overview of North American data, Nassaney and Pyle (1999:260) determined that the expansion of the bow and arrow likely indicated a “qualitative reorganization in the scale and practice of warfare and/or hunting game.”

Warfare was also indicated in burial remains during this period. According to Cybulski (1994), after AD 500, over a quarter (27.6%) of burials across the Northwest Coast exhibited trauma in the skeletal remains, the highest percentage in comparison to prior periods, although the sample size was smaller due to the shift to above-ground forms of burial.

Warfare may manifest in more than weaponry and defensive sites. In an analysis of sites in Kuiu Island and Tebenkof Bay in southeast Alaska, Maschner (1997) noted that Early Period sites were located along the central portion of bays, close to the clam beds. Sites during the Late Period, however, were located along spits and extensions along the sides of such bays. These were not defensive sites per se, but their location provided more visibility to the open seas: three times as much in comparison to settlements deep within the bay, although inconveniently located away from main clam areas. In fact, these sites were also more exposed to winds and storm waves. Maschner (1996:187) described these changes in the Pacific III, or Late Period, as a “transition from an economically maximizing settlement pattern to a pattern of political maximization.” No longer were settlements based primarily upon ready access to resources, but on the ability to defend those resources—the new settlement locations were the response to the
sociopolitical as well as the natural environment, or what he referred to as the “politics of settlement choice” (Maschner 1996; also 1997).

In describing the settlement patterns of Gwaii Haanas, Haida Gwaii, Acheson (2005:320) noted that “Personal protection was second only to access to resources in determining settlement location.” Defensive sites, which were generally attributed to the Late Period, occupied “small, precipitous islands, stacks, or headlands,” and these sites were predominantly along exposed coastlines (Acheson 2005:321).

Around the vicinity of Lake Kitwancool, Prince (2004) noted the locations of cache pits in remote and steep locales, which he argued were used for the protection of foodstuffs from raiding during this period. The lake also contained a lookout site with nearly full views of the lake’s perimeter. He noted that the Little Ice Age may have contributed to regional tensions with neoglacial advances occurring in the larger region.

Maschner (1997) also noticed changes in subsistence patterns. In prior periods, open sea-mammal hunting and fishing were emphasized, while in the Late Period, riverine salmon fishing and land mammal hunting were emphasized. These indicated to Maschner (1997) a shift to safer subsistence strategies, emphasizing collective labour in safer riverine areas and in forests—much less riskier than individual or small group activities on the open sea.

In the central coast, Pegg (2000) has argued similarly that warfare affected gathering practices such as cedar-bark gathering. Using a wide database of dendrochronological dates from culturally modified trees (CMTs), he found that there were changes in the pattern and range of their use (which predominantly were postcontact). Initially, he hypothesized that it correlated with disease, although he found this not to be the case. Rather, Pegg (2000) determined that ranges for cedar-bark gathering were more restricted during flare-ups of warfare after contact.

Other routine practices could also be affected by warfare. MacDonald (1979, 1989) conducted the initial excavations at Fort Kitwanga, a protohistoric fort in Tsimshian territory. The fort was located on a high hill-top near the mouth of
Kitwankul River and consisted of at least five houses within a palisade. The team also gathered oral histories and other information through ethnographic interviews from the village of Kitwanga two miles downstream. From these informants, they were able to interpret the use of such features as small sweat lodges and puberty huts. Normally puberty huts would be located at some distance from the village, however, in times of war the Kitwanga elders noted that the huts would be adjacent to the village, as found at Fort Kitwanga. Thus, arguments for warfare during this Late Period can be extended well beyond burial evidence, weaponry, and fortifications.

Territories were also expanded during this period. About 1000 BP, according to Kinkade and Powell (1976), the Wakashan Makah expanded southward from Vancouver Island to the Olympic Peninsula, overtaking Chimakuan areas. They used several lines of evidence, including linguistics and oral histories to document Chimakuan place-names and migrations among ethnographically Salishan Quileute and Wakashan Makah areas. This suggests that whaling practices would also have been brought southward. However, as Wessen (1990) noted, there is a continuity in whaling traditions on the Washington coast for at least 2000 years.

In his prehistory of West Coast, McMillan (1999; also 2003) suggested that the oral histories do tend to support a southward expansion about 1000 years ago or so. This happens to correspond to the early constructions of defensive sites in Barkley Sound (1200 BP) and on steep-walled Tatoosh Island, off the northwestern tip of the Olympic Peninsula, which was inhabited about a thousand years ago (McMillan 1999:151-152). Elmendorf (1990:440) noted that the Makah and Klallam appeared “intrusive” in the region, finding that both groups appeared to come southward from Vancouver Island disrupting an apparent continuous region of Chimakuan peoples.

**Postcontact Period**

By the postcontact period, warfare is noted as a fact of life in the Northwest Coast. Comparable to the introduction of the bow and arrow is the introduction of
firearms to the region in the 1790s. Elsewhere, it is known that firearms caused
significant impacts. In the Gold Coast of Africa, firearms enabled the Asante expansion
to gather slaves for the trade (Wolf 1982). In North America, firearms were differentially
distributed to groups based on their allegiance to, or willingness to trade with, fur
traders or colonist groups (Worcester and Schilz 1984). In the Northwest Coast, the role
of firearms has been played down (e.g., Fisher 1976, 1977; Cole and Darling 1990),
suggesting that a flintlock musket would have been less effective within the damp
climate, noting that the musket was inclined to misfire. Cole and Darling (1990:126)
found that “for speed of fire, accuracy, unobtrusiveness, and dependability, the Indian
bow often had the edge as an offensive weapon.” They noted that on the West Coast of
Vancouver Island, both the Boston, in 1803 and the Tonquin, in 1811, were conquered by
the Nuu-chah-nulth with traditional weapons (Cole and Darling 1990:127).

Undoubtedly, Northwest Coast groups were proficient with weapons such as the
bow and arrow, however, this does not explain the widespread adoption of firearms by
these groups or the hesitancy in selling such weapons by traders, as at Fort Langley
(Angelbeck 2007:269-272). Fisher (1977) noted the disadvantages of the weapons, but
given their quick and widespread adoption, the advantages of muskets to native groups
appear much greater than Fisher allows. Moreover, other researchers have been clear
about the advantages of firearms in the Northwest Coast.

McMillan (1999:192-193) discussed how the early acquisition of firearms gave the
Tla-o-qui-aht an advantage over groups in Barkley Sound that “did not yet have
muskets.” The wars led to a devastating drop in the numbers of Toquaht, who had
“become few,” according to one of Sapir’s informants (McMillan 1999:193). In the Coast
Salish area, Curtis (1970 [1913]:20) described how the Lekwiltok, instead of attacking at
night by surprise, now attacked during daylight. Similarly, Taylor and Duff (1956) also
emphasized the advantage of firearms in the southern expansion of the Lekwiltok.

While the specific reasons for the onset of warfare during the post-contact period,
may relate to numerous reasons, it is clear that firearms significantly altered normal
arenas of interaction. Duff (1964:61) argued that the impact of firearms made intertribal wars “much more lethal affairs,” finding that the mortality rates became much higher.

It is difficult to gain an appreciation of the destructiveness of this warfare without going over, one by one, the traditional histories of each of the tribes. Murders, massacres to avenge them, and more massacres in retaliation form a constantly recurring pattern. Many small tribes were, in effect, exterminated. Some of the more powerful tribes, or alliances of tribes, embarked on contests of mutual annihilation. The wars continued without abatement into the 1860s. In the early journals we find frequent comments about the constant fighting among the Indians, but these somehow fail to convey the extent of the slaughter that was occurring just beyond the gaze of the men in the trading posts (Duff 1964:61).

Duff was acknowledging how firearms affected traditional practices, producing substantial effects in comparison to traditional forms of combat. Perhaps the desire for retribution was just as great in pre-firearm days. However, there were equal types of arms available to attackers and defenders—all groups could make spears, bows and arrows, and knives: the means of destruction were available to all. Technologically, the arena of battle was equal. Hence, there was a need to gain advantage by other means, by surprise, with attacks occurring in the middle of the night or early morning. Even then, many groups deployed watchmen, messengers, and scouts as a caution against such measures.

With the onset of firearms, the distribution—as occurred throughout much of North America since colonization—manifested with certain inequities, and the effects were substantial (Worcester and Schilz 1984). Collins (1950:337) stressed that the “The role played by the introduction of the gun should not be minimized in this new emphasis on warfare.” It increased as northern groups were attracted to trade at the forts, such as Victoria, bringing groups more commonly into interaction than before. Warfare also increased among Coast Salish villages and “Slave-raids became so prevalent that up-river peoples were afraid to make the trips to the salt-water sites [in Puget Sound] which had always been part of their annual subsistence quest” (Collins 1950:337).

Warfare may have been fueled by individuals aiming to increase stores of
surplus, particularly for potlatches (Mitchell 1984). For example, Mitchell’s (1981) account of Sebassa’s slave raiding shows how slaves were acquired and traded to other groups for furs that could be traded at the forts for items to distribute at potlatches. Warfare and slavery seem to go hand in hand, as slaves (noted by Donald 1997) were always acquired through warfare (or traded for with those who did capture them). Furthermore, Donald demonstrated that slaves were not simply symbolic of status, but rather contributed significantly to the labour pool of those warrior elites. Leaders, particularly aggrandizing ones, aimed to maintain their high status and increase power by generating more surplus, which they used for alliance building and rewarding benefactors. However, most chiefs in the Northwest Coast had only their households composed of kin, and kin generally could not be forced to generate surplus at extreme levels, as they have a degree of autonomy (i). However, with slavery, such bounds are removed, and slave-owners could use the labour of slaves to productively increase their surpluses for potlatching (ii). Surely, these are generating material capital for such endeavors, but through gifting, these leaders exchanged material capital for symbolic capital. For instance, Martindale (2003) argued that Legaic of the Tsimshian became the leader of a paramount chiefdom, not through conquest, but through the cultural practice of the potlatch. Through militaristic control of the access to the fur trade, he was able to generate surpluses such that he could sponsor four sequential potlatches that inarguably set him as the highest ranking chief among those groups for a brief time during the colonial period, ca. AD 1825-40. Warfare it seems is used as an external means both to acquire resources to maintain high status, but also to direct internal strife outwards (Coupland 1988a, 1988b); this is an argument similar to that raised by Coser (1956) and Otterbein (2004), mentioned earlier (see page 44), where external tensions increase internal cohesion. With the manufacture of specialized clubs and the construction of defensive sites, such projects also became another avenue for the allocation of labour, opportunities noted for aggrandizers to assert their power (Arnold 1993).

Warfare represents a multitude of practices, tactics and strategies, that leaders
can use—not only for defeating enemies and acquiring loot—but also for maintaining or building power within their societies.

**Conclusion**

As this archaeological history recounts, the range of practices open to individuals changed through time. Of course, individuals could create new cultural practices as well, and these are reflected most readily in the archaeological record through the introduction of new technologies and the range of variability among certain artifact types. But, as always the case, most creativity was not *sui generis*, but rather it was a response, a synthetic resolution of the dialectical interplay between current needs and past traditions. Most innovations are commonly said, to be done “on the shoulders of giants,” a statement that recognizes that such creativity comes from incorporating existing cultural practices or ideas. Besides, one works with what one has access to (economic capital) or what one knows (cultural capital)—societal tradition influences our formation as individuals—what Bourdieu (1977, 1990) referred to as *habitus*.

Bourdieu was emphatic that while everyone has a *habitus*, each still improvises among cultural practices and ideas at hand. This concept comes from his structural influence in Levi-Strauss, who introduced the concept of the *bricoleur*. Although Levi-Strauss (1966:16-17) had primarily used it to discuss the creation of myths, as when he had written that “Mythical thought is therefore a kind of intellectual ‘bricolage’.” Such an innovator is the *bricoleur*, a handyman or craftsman that uses whatever is at his disposal towards the project at hand—in Levi-Strauss’ case, primarily terms and symbols. Bourdieu extended (or returned) the notion of the “handyman” to its materialist basis in practice.
Chapter VII: Lookouts, Refuges, Fortifications, and Stockades

The range of Coast Salish defensive practices

In this discussion of defensive sites in Coast Salish territory I demonstrate that while there are certain commonalities, there are also distinctions and variations, which is similar to the distributions of other Coast Salish traditions and practices that I have previously discussed (see Chapter V). Before I describe these defensive features, I explain how archaeological features reveal defensive aspects, as archaeologists often have questioned whether many sites, interpreted as fortifications, were associated with warfare at all.

The Case for Defensiveness

While the defensive use of many archaeological fortification sites may appear obvious, this interpretation is a matter of perspective. Several archaeologists have recently published works challenging the omission of warfare from archaeological interpretation worldwide. For instance, Guilaine and Zammit (2005) noted that in Europe archaeologists have sometimes interpreted walled fortresses merely as well-fenced farms, with turrets classified as granaries. Keeley (1996) challenged such interpretations as well, considering much of the anthropological discourse to have Rousseauian overtones. In his work, War Before Civilization, Keeley presented evidence for warfare in the past. He found that sometimes archaeologists obscured the evidence of war: weapons interpreted as ceremonial items; warrior graves as merely status symbols; and even Late Neolithic battles axes “considered a form of money.” In one example, he commented that one 5,000-year-old burial “was found with one of these moneys mischievously hafted as an axe. He also had with him a dagger, a bow, and some arrows; presumably these were his small change” (Keeley 1996:19-20). In the
American Southwest, researchers have disputed the popular notion of Pueblan peoples as simply peaceful. Important work by LeBlanc (1999, also Rice and LeBlanc 2001) has determined that much of Anasazi material culture is infused with contexts of warfare, with defensive sites being constructed from ca. 1000 BC to about the time of contact. Even the apparently peaceful period, the zenith of Chaco culture, was maintained, according to Lekson (2002:611, 614), by a “socialization of fear” through violence, the “extreme processing” of corpses, and possibly ritual cannibalism.

In the Northwest Coast as well, it has been necessary to challenge such oddly pacifist interpretations of weapons. As discussed above, Fisher (1976, 1977:16-17) argued that firearms were of little advantage over the bow and arrow and so had to account for why the technology was desired. He offered that, rather than really serving as weapons, these firearms likely contained “emotional value” or served as “phallic symbols.” Archaeologists in the Coast Salish area also have argued against any defensive aspects of trench-embankment sites. For instance, despite providing a fruitful presentation on trench-embankment sites, Buxton (1969) ultimately proclaimed that these were not defensive at all. Instead she argued that these trench-embankment features were used for fish drying or for game drives. She concluded this despite several lines of evidence to the contrary. For these subsistence-based interpretations, several factors are not taken into account: (1) the sites often were located upon landforms that were difficult to access; (2) these sites are not generally associated with prime hunting or fishing areas (in fact, many were situated high above beaches away from fishing or clamming areas) and usually distant from fresh water, which is not good for hunting; (3) these sites often exhibit evidence of palisade walls at their perimeters; (4) their middens have a similar diversity of artifacts and faunal material to residential sites, if less substantial in volume (as opposed to a narrow range associated with a singular subsistence activity); (5) and, lastly, there is a wealth of ethnographic, oral history, and ethnohistoric information about the defensive use of similar features, while there is limited evidence of such massive trench features associated with fish-drying or hunting.
Jonathan Haas (1990) described some settings in which archaeologists can interpret plausible defensive purposes.

Nevertheless ... [concerns of warfare] may be objectified in the construction of defensive features, such as walls or moats, or in the deliberate selection of defensible site locations. “Deliberate” selection of such locations may be inferred when ready access to resources, water or arable land is sacrificed in exchange for elevation, difficult access, unrestricted or strategic vistas, or physical protection from attack (Haas 1990:177-178).

In the following discussion of defensive sites, the case for the defensiveness of these features and practices will be related directly to analogous examples, where possible, of practices documented in ethnographic or ethnohistoric records, indicating their use as defensive features. In other cases, the defensive aspects will relate to traits mentioned by Haas (1990).

**Defensive Aspects of Residential Villages**

The Coast Salish implemented a broad array of defensive practices, many of which leave archaeological remains or imprints. Evidence of these defensive types can also be found in ethnographies, oral histories, and ethnohistoric documents. I discuss regional variation regarding how defensive sites are employed. Defensive practices were not limited to defensive fortifications alone, but were also an integral aspect to residential village construction, house arrangement, and even village settlement choice.

**Plankhouses**

Plankhouses were more than just shelter from the elements. This is particularly true in comparison to mat lodges or lighter structures that were used prior to the shed-roof house, which first appears during the Marpole Period. Plankhouses were fully wooden enclosures (Figure 5). Even the doors, ethnographers have noted, were designed with protection in mind. They were closed and locked with crosspieces at
night (Suttles 1951:259). Stern (1934:99) noted that, among the Lummi, “the entrances to houses [were] made difficult to prevent surreptitious entrance.” Eells (1976:23) described house doors as having a “circular aperture cut through the building.... [One at Sequim] was three and a quarter by three-quarters feet.... It was closed by sliding other boards over the aperture.” Collins (1974:62) also remarked that Upper Skagit doorways were both low and raised:

It was a small round hole cut in a plank so that it was above ground level. Persons entering the house had to step over the bottom edge and also to stoop. The rationale for this was that if enemies entered, they would be awkwardly situated and could be easily dispatched from within.

Suttles (1991:219) described that the intention was in part to force entrants into a “vulnerable” position. Similar entrances were used for stockade walls, according to Grant (1857:301), which further indicates the defensive aspect of these narrow entrances. Moreover, they often placed the door on the narrow side of a house, which would also give those within more latitude in their ability to respond to invaders (Suttles 1951:259). In some cases, doorways would have protective entranceways, as “a door often had plank walls that extended into the house” (Suttles 1951:259).

Plankhouse roof-tops were also employed to advantage. The Songhees used the
rooftops as lookouts. During times of expected raids, “men maintained a nightly watch on housetops” (Jenness 1934). Also, during battle, the Upper Skagit would stand upon the roof-tops and throw down “lighted torches or bowls of heated pitch or seal oil on the attackers” (Collins 1974:115). Inside the plankhouses, defensive features were also constructed. Frank Allen of the Twana noted that a “trap door” was used for escape, mentioning a story where a man exited his house through a tunnel after being was awakened by his dog (Elmendorf 1993:129).45

As Duff (1952:47-48) described, there were two primary types of shed-roof plankhouse construction, involving both detached, single-household entities and extended, end-on-end shed-roof houses, all under one roof. In the sharing of walls, the houses were more economical, requiring fewer planks to compose a household compartment than a solitary plankhouse; however, this later shift also served to aggregate the village population and minimize the avenues of attack for each household.

One such extended house, located in Suquamish territory, was called Daxwklébeal, also called “Old Man House.” Gibbs (1877) described it as about 160 metres (520 ft) long. Warren Snyder (1956) excavated at the house site and determined that at least part of it was constructed by 1845, and noted that Chief Syál or Seattle had lived there. Hill-Tout (1904) similarly described one that was about 100 metres long in Chehalis, while the earliest descriptions are provided by Simon Fraser in 1808, who described one about 210 metres long in Matsqui. Fraser also described a similar structure at Xwméthkwiyem or Musqueam (Schaepe et al. 2001). He described it thusly: “The fort is 1500 feet [over 450 m] in length and 90 feet [nearly 30 m] in breadth” (Fraser 1960 [1808]:105-106). It is unclear from Fraser’s description whether he described a stockade around a shed-roof plankhouse or that the extended plankhouse itself was fort-like. Likely for similar reasons, Schaepe et al. (2001) put Fraser’s characterization of it as

45. As this account indicates, the common presence of dogs in villages also proved useful for warning of possible intruders.
a “fort” in quotes, as it was likely an extended plankhouse. If so, Fraser’s description is suggestive of Suttles’ (1991:219) conception of the “house as fortress.” Suttles (1951:276) acknowledged that these extended houses were “probably built for greater protection from enemies.” Indeed, it has been noted that people often aggregate for protection, forming either larger, concentrated villages, as in the Southwest (LeBlanc 2001; Haas 1990), or in this case, a larger house. Since walls separating households and families were generally mat partitions, any intruders would meet greater numbers than they themselves could bring in through a small doorway.

**Household Arrangement**

There are also sociopolitical aspects of defense, in which people are protected unequally. Higher status individuals, for instance, generally selected the compartment farthest from the door. Hill-Tout (1901, 1902, 1906; cited in Suttles 1991) repeatedly stated that the chief occupied the safest place at the centre of the house, with commoners and slaves near the doorways to take the brunt of an attack. Suttles (1991) commented that this practice, where chiefs occupying the central compartment, was not typical. In fact, with houses with one primary door, the safest location would have been the section most distant from the door, not necessarily a central section. To approach a chief living in a distant compartment, this meant that visitors would have had to walk farther to approach the chief, in a way acknowledging the chief’s high status and serving to make him less prone to attack. Slaves often slept next to the door (Schaepe et al. 2001:43):

The high-class *smelá:lh* (“worthy people”) occupied the warmest and safest portions of the house—most often the middle section farthest removed from the doorways and drafts.... The lower-status *s’téxem* (“worthless people”) and *skw’i’yéth* (slaves) slept nearer the drafty doorways along the smokier back end of the house, serving as the early warning and defence system against intruders.

A similar principle operated for the village as a whole. Lower-class families, among the Klallam, had to move outside the house with the slaves. As Gunther (1927:183) detailed for the Klallam village of *Suxtcikw’iíñ* on Sequim Bay:
To the left of the trail from the bluff and at the beginning of the point of land in front of the lagoon stood a small group of huts in which the lower class of people lived.... The houses were small and poorly constructed. One of the pastimes of the young bloods of the upper class village was to come at night with poles and lift the roof from one of these small houses.

The placement in front of the upper class houses also made them more exposed:

Wherever a village had a lower class group they were always forced to occupy an open position, on a sandspit or an unprotected beach so that they would bear the brunt of an attack in war. While the enemy fought with this group, the people in the upper class village had time to prepare for the attack (Gunther 1927:183-184).

The distinction between the two classes within the above-mentioned Klallam village, was marked by “a row of poles on which were put the enemies taken in war” (Gunther 1927:184). Gunther (1927:183) also noted that the village had a stockade, but it encircled only upper class houses.

**Defensive Sites**

According to ethnographic accounts, the Coast Salish employed an array of defensive site types throughout their territory: lookouts, refuges, trench-embankment fortifications, rock-walled defenses, and stockades. While trench-embankments were palisaded or stockaded, I apply the term stockade primarily to palisaded fortifications without trenches and embankments. Most of these defensive constructions were built after 1600 BP and several types were documented during the postcontact period.

**Lookouts**

In many oral histories and ethnographies, lookouts are a key element in a defensive plan. Lookouts occupy high-elevation spots with broad views of the coast or passageways and several are noted throughout the Coast Salish area (Figure 6). The name for one lookout on a mountain above the Fraser River in Stó:lō territory was *Alámex*, which meant “babysit,” which suggests a metaphor for the time a scout would spend watching from there (McHalsie 2001:141). Another lookout site in Howe Sound,
Figure 6: Lookout sites in the Coast Salish area as noted in ethnographic and archaeological sources.*

*A few rock-wall fortification sites are also in association with other defensive features as well, such as trench-embankment fortifications. Sources for these, and other defensive sites that follow, are listed in Appendix 1.

the Defence Islands are strategically located where Howe Sound begins to narrow as it extends north-northeastward towards Squamish; it is associated with the name *Tsay-ts oh-sum*, meaning “facing outward” (Reimer pers. comm. 2005; Bouchard, Miranda, and Kennedy 1975:3).

Bryan provided one account of the use of a lookout, attributed to Chief Goliah of Penn Cove on Whidbey Island.
The only information I received in answer to interrogations among the older white settlers of the survey area was from Mr. Ed Armstrong, who had questioned “Chief” Goliah about the entrenchment at Penn Cove Manor (Site IS-50). Goliah, host at the last potlatch given at this site, stated that when he was a young man some “northern Indians” were spotted in their canoes from the lookout station at Fort Nugent (Site IS-93). The lookout ran back to the village to give warning (Bryan 1963:76).

Lookouts have been described in the oral histories of the Klahoose, as occupying major heights with views towards northern passages or on a bluff-top near the head of Toba Inlet (Black, Urbanczyk, and Weinstein 2000).

A warrior of Duckabush Twana named Hwahwa’kwsəb, built a lookout on a promontory in Hood Canal about 1810. He “dug a hole down from the top of the bluff on the north side of Duckabush. He dug it down and came out partway down on the face of the bluff” (Elmendorf 1993:126). He then obscured the opening with brush. Frank Allen stated that “hwahwa’kwsəb goes up to his place every day to watch” (Elmendorf 1993:126). One day, some Skagit raiders stopped on the beach below the lookout, and the warrior killed every man in one canoe, while another canoe paddled away. He enslaved four or five of the wounded (Elmendorf 1993:126-127).

After that [the warrior] had to keep a good watch, every day and every night, for the enemy to come again. After a while, canoes land right below his lookout. He hears their language; they talk like Skagit people. It was nighttime. Now [he] had lots of arrows his people had been making, had them up in his lookout. He didn’t say anything, just shot and shot down at the enemy on the beach. They couldn’t tell where the arrows were from. Lots of them were killed, lots wounded. They left one canoe there and paddled away with some of their dead (Elmendorf 1993:127).

Three canoes of Skagit men again returned to retaliate against him, but also failed. His vigilance and the advantages of that lookout position were too great. From such a position, only a bow or musket would be suitable. Notably, the attackers never could place the origin of the arrows—an advantage of the bow over a musket, as the thunder of a musket, while powerful with attendant psychological effect, does often reveal the position of the sniper.

In Stó:lō territory, a lookout was constructed like a “watchtower,” located at
Stítō:s (McHalsie 2001:139, 149):

Most of the people lived at the Vedder Crossing (that’s where the highway bridge crosses the Vedder River.) Right at the point behind where the bridge is now there used to be a watchtower. They were expecting war canoes from other tribes up north, and they watched for them at this tower (Lerman 1952:145).

The informant, elder Bob Joe, told Lerman (1952:144) that he was describing events of “five to six hundred years ago.” The Fraser River actually used to touch the Chilliwack River at Vedder Crossing back then (Rafter 2000), so the watchtower would have been well placed. In another mention of the Vedder Crossing watchtower, it was noted that “In those days there weren’t any trees, and you could see from the Fraser Valley to Vedder Crossing” (Lerman 1952:156). A specially constructed house was located at the crossing as well, called Qoqólaxel, that had an inverted gable roof for collecting water. This trough on the roof that “holds the water up” could be released to make a loud warning signal (McHalsie 2001:137, 139; 145; Malloway pers. comm. 2008).

Another location in Stó:lō territory is at Pópkw’em, both a lookout and signal station. The name is associated with “puff balls,” noted as likely associated with smoke signals (McHalsie 2001:139, 144). Smoke signals as part of a lookout were also noted in Snoqualmie territory, where foot runners would also dispatch (Tollefson 1996:155).

Another form of lookout has been found in the North Cascades Mountains. Robert Mierendorf (1986; 2009 [pers. comm.]) has found two high-elevation pit sites excavated into talus at locations offering lines-of-sight to Cascade Pass (45SK216 and 45CH754). The first of these (identified as FS 20; Mierendorf 1986) consists of eight pits; the second site, recorded in 2008, consists of five pits. He interprets these talus pits as lookouts monitoring travelers through the pass or as hunting blinds, or both. The depressions would have provided some concealment and furnished some protection. The talus pits are likely cultural in origin. They do not match mining or prospecting features in style or setting; moreover, no historical materials are present in either site while there are nearby precontact sites in the pass. Indeed, Cascade Pass has been
known as an important location for a long time.\footnote{Mierendorf (pers. comm. 2009; Mierendorf and Folt 2008) has also documented base camps in the pass with a series of charcoal-rich hearths and pit features dating from 2010 BP to about 9500 cal. yrs. BP. The pass also has been known ethnohistorically and ethnographically as an important trade route. Collins (1974:13) also remarked upon the use of that route as one of the two main passes to the Interior from the Upper Skagit area. Boxberger (1996:49) described how an exploratory expedition in 1877 hired Upper Skagit individuals to lead them through the pass because of their familiarity with the route.}

These types of sites also appear elsewhere on the Northwest Coast and Interior. Prince (2004) determined that he had a lookout site associated with cache pits with broad views of Kitwancool Lake in the Skeena River Valley, north of Fort Kitwanga (GiTa-23). The site was 23 metres above the lake, and he acquired a radiocarbon date from the lookout of $1300 \pm 60$ BP.

This site is atop a very steep, narrow ridge, barely wide enough to stand on.... This extreme topography was purposely altered at great effort to make it habitable. The crest of the ridge was terraced down to make a small platform, $5 \times 5.5$ m, with a hearth in the center.... The position and limited size of this platform are more indicative of a lookout site. It has no easy route of access to the water’s edge below, but it has a 340 degree view-shed of the shoreline, including a clear view of the north part of the lake, and of the channel to the south, through which approaching canoes would have to pass (Prince 2004:49-50).

Lookouts were noted as one type of defensive site in the Aleutian Islands of Alaska to the north (Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998). Also, in an overview of the archaeology of warfare in North America, Lambert (2002) described lookouts as a site type that should be apparent archaeologically. Lookouts have been a part of site inventories from several archaeological surveys as well on the West Coast of Vancouver Island. Brolly and Pegg (1998) noted several unrecorded lookout sites near Ucluth Peninsula in Ucluelet Traditional Territory; Haggerty and Inglis (1984; 1985) recorded at least six lookouts along Long Beach and the Broken Group Islands of Pacific Rim National Park. Lookout sites were discussed by McMillan (1999:151-152), in summarizing his own and other investigations in Nuu-chah-nulth and Ditidaht territories. He also commented that promontory lookouts along the coast may also have served as lookouts for whales.
Archaeological manifestations of such lookouts might be light, although in some cases, features may be present. Also, defensive sites in general contained lookout areas. In Sechelt territory, the site of Kay’kah-lah-kum, a granite dome in Selma Park was a defensive site with a lookout tree (Peterson 1990:28). Similarly, at the defensive site in Desolation Sound, Menzies (1923:66) described an old maple tree used as a lookout. Schaepe (2001; also 2006) described that as a primary aspect of rock-walled defensive sites in the Fraser Canyon was to serve as lookouts. Indeed, the bluff-top settings of many sites are situated to take advantage, not just of steep natural defenses, but also of broad vantage points.

One such site was recorded in the North Cascades of Washington, Upper Skagit territory. At a prominent overlook high above the confluence of Goodell Creek (45WH490) with the Skagit River, a possible rock-wall lookout is present. The archaeologist recording the site, noted its expansive views up Goodell Creek and the Skagit River drainage. Between two large boulders, were two rock alignments built with angular granitic cobbles and small boulders, one to the north, another with two sections to the south (Kennedy 1992). The description appears similar to rock-wall fortifications of the Fraser River.

Lookout sites are often located upon stony prominences with little stratigraphy, except perhaps in niches and cracks. Lithic debris may still be scattered about but those locations are also exposed to winds and storms that can leave them barren, if features like rock alignments or niches are not present. One could surmise that this type of site would be more difficult to locate archaeologically, although evidence of lithic debris, and cache pits might be present. If inhabited for long periods, small hearth features might be present, or perhaps debris from sharpening arrowheads or other weapons might be found. The high and exposed location of these lookouts, especially ones with

47. At the time the site was first recorded, Mierendorf (pers. comm. 2008) thought that one wall was likely intended as a goat-hunting blind. The other did not appear useful as such, however, and he admitted that had they cleared the trees, it likely would have provided an broad vantage point.

48. In a discussion of inland shell middens, McLay (2004) noted that some were located on high
rock surfaces, might lead to higher rates of erosion obscuring evidence of habitation, but it is likely that some sites may still exhibit such features, and ground-truthing surveys based on oral histories or sites identified through traditional use studies may turn up such sites.

Refuges

The most basic form of seeking refuge is to send the women, children, and elderly into the woods behind the village—to a place out of the way that would deter the efforts of raiders. In the Fort Langley Journals, running and hiding was a common reaction to news of Lekwiltok or Cowichan raiders en route upriver (Maclachlan 1998). Refuges were a reasonable response to the threat of enslavement. Although men were usually killed in warfare, women and children were often taken as slaves. If they were away from the battle site, hiding in a refuge, the threat of enslavement was minimized. The Upper Skagit, Snyder (1950-1954) noted, called these hiding places steetathl. They referred to one such refuge as Sti el, located at the head of the Skagit River, consisting of a camping area beneath a huge rock that had slid into the earth, creating a hidden space beneath (Figure 7). In some cases, the areas were lakes located in the woods behind villages. Two such sites were located in the forests east of villages on Puget Sound. One of those was named seešáhLtub, or “calmed down a little,” which is likely associated with its function as a refuge (Thrush 2008:220).

The Squamish had refuges in niches high on cliffs in Howe Sound (Reimer pers. comm. 2008). Some Saanich groups living near present-day Sidney sought refuges behind the village: “Behind them stretched a forest to which the inhabitants could flee for refuge in case of attack” (Jenness 1934). When the British, in a gunboat, attacked the village at Lamalchi Bay, they reported seeing women and children “carrying goods away on their backs into the woods” (British Colonist 1863; cited in Arnett 1999). This was a tactic employed even though there was a defensive structure, or “Block House” at ground and might be the residue associated with “sentinel” or lookout positions.
the village. According to Stern (1934:99), the Lummi had refuges that were “prepared” behind villages; it is unknown if he was referring to simply areas cleared and hidden with stores of supplies or actual architectural features; in any case, these refuges behind villages might be archaeologically detectable.

One type of unusual site may relate to these refuge areas. Inland shell middens have been found located distantly from the coast and in some cases at high altitudes. Over thirty of these sites have been found throughout the Gulf Islands, Vancouver Island, and in the Sechelt area. McLay (1999) has looked at the diversity of shell
middens in the Gulf Islands. In a discussion of these rare inland sites, he noted that a common hypothesis was that “these inland shell midden sites represent defensive sites,” places of refuge deeper in the woods” (McLay 2004). Regarding several inland shell middens adjacent to cliff escarpments on Gabriola Island, Wilson (1988:61) described that they were “relatively small in area and are not particularly deep, suggesting relatively short term occupation”; he also proposed a possible defensive origin. Similarly, Brown (2000:43) remarked upon the unusual aspect of finding whole shells, which would be much heavier for travel in comparison to dried clams; in his case the site was seven kilometres from the coast. He found it “inconsistent with both ethnographic and archaeological information on shellfish harvesting”; he posited that it may been associated with periods of conflict. Although these may be associated with other activities, defense remains a possibility and one could envision that the archaeological signature of such refuge areas might look like an inland shell midden.

This tactic of sending women and children to refuges behind villages was common enough that attackers used this to their advantage in some cases. According to Stern (1934:103), the Cowichan, who were the “greatest foes of the Lummi,” attacked one of their villages at Momli in Lummi Bay, just northwest of Bellingham. The Cowichan sent many warriors behind the villages to capture the fleeing villagers.49 The Lummi also employed this tactic. According to one tradition, a warrior named Skalaxt wanted to avenge his brother’s murder by the Skalakin people. He spent years training for this attack and told his assembled war party that there would be trails behind the village and that he would hide along those when the rest of the party attacked the village: “Give me a little start then follow up quickly and give the war cry....” As he expected, he found the trail and waited the in the darkness and fog, mostly killing those

49. A plan that worked well, had not the Cowichans’ canoes lodged in the sand as the tide withdrew; the Lummi warriors simply caught the warriors at their canoes, regained their relatives, and nearly killed all of those Cowichan on the beach: “There were very few, some say two or three, who managed to get away during this battle by carrying a small canoe from the shore and using it to make their escape. When the tide came in, dog fish came and mutilated the bodies of the dead Cowichan. In referring to this incident the Lummi people say that the dog fish helped them in the battle” (Stern 1934:103).
who were headed along the trail (Stern 1934:119).50

There were strategies to deal with attackers along the trails outside their villages, which indicates that this also must have been a common form of attack. As Sally Snyder (cited in Bryan 1963) documented elders had known that trails outside villages contained “camouflaged pits with upright spikes” to discourage or entrap such would-be attackers.

With traps or not, trails often led to naturally defensive features, such as caves high ledges. In other cases, the refuge area was modified to enhance protection, as the Cowichan warrior, Tzouhalem, had done at a refuge cave (Jenness 1934). But Coast Salish groups also constructed refuges.

**Blockhouses**

In addition to hidden refuges within the villages, some Coast Salish groups in the southern Gulf Islands and northern Puget Sound built small “blockhouses” (see Figure 7, pg. 181).

Built of stout squared timbers, loopholed for muskets and cannon, the blockhouse allowed warriors to mass their firepower from a protected strategic strong point against an exposed, unprotected enemy. In the Saanich village of Tsouwat, each household built a blockhouse with plank walls (Arnett 1999:25).

At Lamalcha village on Kuper Island, there was one “Block House,” as the British called it, in the center of the village. The British attacked the village because they thought the murderer of a colonist was hiding out there, and “This ship was ordered up there to teach those Indians a lesson,” according to elder Eddy Edwards (Arnett

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50. “As they would come groping their way through the fog, he would club their heads and let them fall to the ground. The people seemed to be in a stupor and not notice what was happening to those ahead of them. When the bodies were heaped in a pile in one place, Skalaxt would move down the trail and continue to slaughter the people as they came. Each time he moved he would get a little closer to the houses until finally he came upon the warriors attempting to keep back their enemy while the rest of the people escaped. These men he also killed. The slaughter was so great that it is said very few, if any, escaped from that village.

“Skalaxt and his party returned victorious but he was not satisfied because he knew that the Skalakin tribe lived in many different villages” (Stern 1934:119).

En route, the British “boarded several canoes and searched them” before arriving in Lamalcha Bay at 11:35 where the *Forward* anchored in front of the village. Seven or eight large houses stood along the beach inside a small crescent-shaped bay enclosed on both sides by thickly-forested points of land. At the centre of the village, in front of the lodges, was the Lamalcha fort, a blockhouse with walls eight feet high “strongly constructed of logs, properly morticed and loopholed on three sides for musketry.” Built with “squared timbers,” in imitation of *huuinitum* [settler] blockhouses on the San Juan Islands, the fortification was designed to defend the village against attack by musket-armed *hwulmuw* [other Coast Salish]. Recently, it had been further modified with the addition of anti-artillery bunkers in the shape of “regular rifle-pits constructed inside the Block House, covered over with thick plank.” In addition, the blockhouse was protected “with numerous rifle-pits and trenches sunk around it.”

This “Block House” was much smaller than the numerous surrounding plankhouses—less than half their size (Figure 8). While a refuge, it served a different
purpose than the underground house. The latter is used to hide women, children, and the elderly, while in this instance, they simply resorted to hiding deeper the woods. The blockhouse was used by the warriors who remained at the village. Moreover, its location was front and center in the village. It is another instance of the Coast Salish deploying multiple tactics in defense.

A similar structure was located at a site on a slough of the Stillaguamish River. Like the blockhouse at Lamalchi Bay, it was within a village. Instead of planks, it also was described as “built of big logs set on end, and a roof of heavy cedar slabs” (Bruseth 1972:11). This was called a “stronghouse” and it was the job of Tsalbilh, a warrior, to maintain it. Villagers deposited their valued items and stores to be guarded by Tsalbilh while they were gone on trips. There was also a trench dug around, although there was no embankment, and the trench was hidden:

Around the house was a deep trench with a lot of sharp pointed stakes in the bottom. Over the trench was laid a network of sticks, and over this a layer of turf, with a secret firm path to the house. The idea was that enemy attackers or raiders would fall into the pit—and be impaled. It happened occasionally that Sklalams and King George Indians came in big raiding parties to capture slaves and valuables. Once a party of five strange Indians tried to rob the Stronghouse. Three fell in the pit, and two got away and went wailing down the river in the canoe (Bruseth 1972:12).

**Underground houses**

Underground houses were used by the Coast Salish as a specific type of refuge (Figure 9). Barnett (1944, 1955) first documented these semisubterranean features, also called these “fighting houses[s].” Barnett (1955:49; 1944:267) described these features as about “ten feet deep and rectangular,” with other informants describing these as “six feet deep.” On top, there was a “flat roof of logs and planks laid flush across.” Furthermore:

“Rafters” were laid at the pit edges to this variety of ridgepole. Poles, bark, and brush were placed over the rafters and the whole was covered with earth. There was no entrance from the top; a gangway sloped down to the floor level entry; and, for flight in case of attack, a tunnel led out the back way (Barnett 1944:266).
Figure 9: Underground refuge locations in the Coast Salish area from archaeological and ethnographic sources.

Indeed, one of his informants described an underground house at Scuttle Bay on the Sunshine Coast, as one of these refuges, which were occupied during “troubled periods”:

The informant was certain that this was once a refuge, not in his father’s time, but perhaps during the lifetime of his grandfather; and furthermore, that it was not only a shelter for a day but was lived in over troubled periods. His father told him that the excavation was six feet deep with a flat roof of logs and planks laid flush across the opening and covered with earth. The entrance was near the corner and by an inclined approach. Curiously, the dirt walls were not planked up. Recesses were cut into them for beds and storage space (Barnett 1944:267).
McHalsie (2001:140) recorded the location of “pithouses” particularly built for security in the Yale area of the Fraser Canyon. The name of the place, Skwokwílàlà, translated as “hiding places.” Also, Chief David LaTasse of the Saanich noted that underground refuges were built in preparation for Lekwiltok attacks:

We hear of them that they are coming, and we make ready. First we dig deep pits far up in the forest, deep pits with small openings but large as a lodge inside. That is to hide our women and children. We carry plenty clams and dried fish for them to eat, and all this we hide by bushes and trees, and cover our tracks so no man can find (Lugrin 1932).

Archaeologically, Bryan (1963; Figure 10) was likely the first to have proposed such an interpretation, for “rectangular pits,” encountered on Whidbey Island. Sally Snyder had described to him that the Skagit peoples had “hide-outs [that] were excavated at quite a distance in the back of a village for the women and children. These
pits were quite deep, and were covered by planks and underbrush” (Snyder pers. comm. n.d.; cited in Bryan 1963:79). Bryan (1963:80) argued that the pit at Penn Cove (45IS50) had “corner indentations on the lip of the rectangular pit” that he interpreted as the inclined passageway. There is another semisubterranean pit at Penn Cove, which likely represents another such feature, although given its prominent ramp, Bryan (1963:80) called it a “horseshoe” shape, even though it is largely the same size as the other pit. From his descriptions of the archaeological features and his informant information, I believe Bryan is correct in his interpretations. His account may be the first documentation of such a feature.

During my fieldwork at Smelt Bay (EaSd-2), I determined the presence of two underground houses (UH 1 and UH 2). These meet Barnett’s (1944, 1955:54-56) descriptions of such features in size and depth. Moreover, Barnett’s specific identification of the “southwest corner of Cortes Island” indicates the site of Smelt Bay, a place that also has been alluded to as having these features by other ethnographers (Kennedy and Bouchard 1983:161). The traditional name for the site is Kw’úumáxen for “shelter inside arm,” which Kennedy and Bouchard (1983:161) stated alluded to the gravelly beaches that form a natural breakwater for the site; however, possibly it contained additional meanings such as cultural protection—albeit a hidden one, just as the houses were. A wireframe surface map indicates the deep excavation of the semisubterranean pit (Figure 11). Notice the incline on its northern side towards the adjacent plankhouse floor, which is also shown to indicate the surface level. Barnett (194:268) noted that “Not every Muskwium family owned or had access to an underground dwelling. Its construction was a family enterprise and was costly in labor....” He also noted the Musqueam often used them for the sick or in times of inclement weather, but that these “were decidedly a luxury” (Barnett 1944:268). Barnett (1955:269) thought that these subterranean dwellings were like pithouses and were adapted from Interior groups such as the Lillooet: “If we accept this, we must then be prepared to admit that a dwelling has been modified into a refuge, and that the manner
Figure 11: Wireframe surface map of an underground house (UH 1) at Smelt Bay (EaSf-2) with plankhouse outline to the north (left) to indicate surface level.

of entry into an underground chamber can, and has, been altered from top to side in one borrowing....” While Barnett noted some differences, his overall inference of Interior influence appears to be incorrect. There are simply too many differences between the two house types in form, function, and setting: (1) pithouses predominantly are circular, while underground houses were rectangular; (2) pithouses exhibited conical roofs, while underground houses had flat roofs; (3) pithouse entranceways were located commonly at the top, instead of from the side (as well as hidden); (4) pithouses were primarily residences, while underground houses served as temporary refuges; and (5) pithouses were in prominent locations while underground houses were built behind residences or villages, even sometimes located distantly from residential villages. However, like pithouses, with grassy or other foliage growing on rooftops, one could imagine that by obscuring the entrance, it would be well hidden.
Not always did they flee to the forests behind the houses. Occasionally they took refuge on rocky headlands impregnable on three sides, and protected on the fourth by a ditch and an artificial rampart of earth.

—Diamond Jenness (1934)

Compared to the previous forms discussed, trench-embankment fortifications were of substantial architectural scale. Many were situated upon high bluffs with broad views of the seascape. Steep bluffs, anywhere from 10 to 40 m high above the beaches below, naturally formed a major part of the defensive structure, while a trench and embankment were excavated along the exposed perimeter in flatter areas. Some took advantage of ravines along either or both sides, heightening naturally steep defenses. Others were situated on narrow and steep rocky headlands or high sandy peninsular spits that afford the broadest possible view. These constructions required significant investments of labour and likely were warranted only when warfare was commonplace.

Here I provide a description from Thacker (Smith 1907:385-386), who visited a one trench-embankment fortification at Hunter Bay in the San Juan Islands:

On a recent visit to Lopez Island, I took the opportunity of briefly examining one of the ancient trenches, several of which are located there, and were apparently constructed for the purpose of fortifying certain points. The place I visited is situated on the southwest side of the island ... and consists of a bluff or headland several acres in area, jutting out somewhat into the water, with what appears to have once been a deep trench cut around its base on the land side. This trench commences on the west side of the bluff at the shore-line, on an almost perpendicular bank 7 metres or more above the water-line at high tide, and, running closely around the base for a distance of 100 metres, intersects the perpendicular wall of rock that forms the eastern side of the headland. The earth and rock thrown out were piled along on the outside of the ditch from the bluff, thus adding materially to its sheltering-capacity. The trench now varies from 0.6 of a metre to 1 metre in depth, and is about 2 metres across at the surface. At one place where the bed-rock comes to the surface, bowlders are laid along the line until the trench is resumed.

At a point on the side of the bluff above the trench, and near where it intersects with the cliff on the east, a little nook makes back a short distance into the bluff, where the rocky background rises somewhat abruptly, forming a kind of miniature canyon, across the front of which appears to have been a wall of rock, which is now indicated by a line of small bowlders extending from side to side. This nook or corner would
accommodate a number of persons; and if protected by a covering overhead, such as an awning, they would be completely sheltered from the storms that frequently come in from the Straits of Fuca. This was the only sheltered place on the bluff.

For whatever purpose this trench was cut, it is run exactly where it should be for the purpose of fortifying the bluff by a rifle-pit, and I can conceive of no other purpose for which it could be used or constructed; and no better place could have been selected on that part of the island as a point of defence against a superior force, with so little labor, and at the same time hold so many advantages. The 100 metre trench connecting the perpendicular shore-line on the west with the rock-wall of the bluffs on the east, fortifies the land side, while its precipitous character fronting the water renders the place so nearly inaccessible that a few men could defend it against ten times their number.

I found no evidence of burial inside the trench or in the fortified ground, nor any place indicating a water-supply, though it may have existed,—the one thing lacking to make this point an ideal fort, as the occupants could catch fish from the precipitous rocks on the water-front, and stand an almost unlimited siege, if they had water (Thacker in Smith 1907:385-386).

W. A. Newcombe (n.d.) first categorized fortifications across British Columbia in the mid 1930s from trips taken with C. F. Newcombe and Harlan I. Smith (1927; 1934). W. A. Newcombe described three primary types for the Northwest Coast, including those in island, peninsular, and acclivity or bluff-top settings. He made depictions of the two types found in the Coast Salish area (Figure 12): the bluff-like rocky headland of Figu...
Albert Head and the peninsular site at Cadboro Bay— island-style defensive sites were more common for northern and West Coast groups.

Trench-embankment sites are the most broadly distributed type of defensive structure built by the Coast Salish, although there is a concentration or core area near the southern end of Vancouver Island (Figure 13). Judith Buxton (1969) provided a survey of trench-embankment sites or “earthworks” in the Coast Salish area, many that are not now in existence due to development. She classified these into three main types: Bluff, Ravine, and Peninsular (Figure 14). Bluff-top defensive sites were placed high above the coast, anywhere generally from 10 to 40 m above sea level. The main defense was natural, consisting of the steep bluff which protects the front of the village. The setting generally provided a broad vantage point upon which to view incoming raiders as well. The edge of the bluff, however, only provided protection along the front, so in order to protect the back of the village, a trench was constructed, with the same principle as that of a moat in the Middle ages, although without water. The trench creates a steep defense along the unprotected perimeter along the sides and the back of the site, a cultural defense to complete the natural steep defense. Ravine defensive sites are similarly placed atop bluffs, but exhibit deep ravines to either (or both) sides of the site, generally gullies associated with intermittent creeks. These sites take advantage of natural defensiveness even further, with the front protected by the bluff and the sides by deep ravines. The defendants need only to create a shorter trench-embankment behind the village, a slight arc to connect the ravines. These ravine types are the same (or a subtype) as bluff type, and I prefer simply a bluff-top category.

Her third type consisted of a site generally closer to sea level, on a minor peninsula or spit. The protected area is usually about 5 to 15 m above shoreline, but the naturally steep protection nearly encompasses the perimeter of the site and, in most cases, only a minor trench is needed across the neck of the peninsula. I have found that these really involve two types that are situated upon quite different landforms: rocky headlands as opposed to sandy peninsular spits. Rocky headlands are stony prom-
Figure 13: Locations of trench-embankment fortifications.

Figure 14: Buxton’s (1969:5; Figure 3) depiction of three major types of trench-embankments.
Figure 15: Typology of trench-embankment sites for this investigation.

...inences that are often peninsular, however, can be in locations as high as bluffs and so rocky and exposed as to have little if any midden remaining. Whereas, those on sandy peninsular spits generally were only 5 to 10 m high, and have broader expanses of soil development for midden areas to accrete. Peninsular spits generally are in areas with clam beds and other bay resources, whereas rocky headlands generally are distant from such resources, surrounded by rocky shores.

For the purposes of the present study, trench-embankments are classified into a new tripartite scheme by landform: Bluff-Top, Rocky Headland, and Peninsular Spit (Figure 15). Archaeologically, these trench-embankment defensive sites have received the most attention, and I will assess a couple of examples for each of these types of fortifications. This will indicate the degree of similar principles behind the construction of these sites as well as the variability of form as these were adapted to local settings.
Bluff top fortifications

Indian Fort Site (DgRr-5)

On August 7, 1915, Harlan Smith visited a bluff-top trench-embankment in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, located along what is still called “Indian Fort Drive,” one of which I provide (Figure 16). He wrote in his notes that: “There is an earthwork about 1 mile south of the station at Crescent, B.C. There is some shellheap material inside on north edge and in ridge at east and south. It should be restored by filling in paths made by cattle, and saved in a Dominion or Provincial Park” (Smith n.d. [ca. 1915]). Smith described the size of the embankments at the site to be 12 feet wide at the “ditch top” and 8 feet wide at the “wall base.” In another report, Smith (n.d. [ca. 1915]) described the whole site as a “semi-circular embankment about 4 feet high by 8

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51. Unfortunately, the site was not protected as a park. Due to house construction on the site since the 1960s, the trenches have been flattened in landscaping and are not apparent, although coring investigations indicated that intact midden areas are present in limited areas (Angelbeck 2006). As Buxton (1969) has noted the majority of these trench-embankment sites have been levelled or otherwise developed, and the pace has continued since her study.
feet wide with exterior ditch about 4 feet deep by 12 feet wide, defending the side of a small area on top of a bluff overlooking the sea....” (Smith 1915; cited in Simonsen 1970). Don Welsh has made an interpretive drawing of the site based on his descriptions as well as ethnographic descriptions of other nearby sites, particularly from Suttles field notes (Figure 17); his drawing provides a depiction of light structures as sometimes used at seasonal camps. The bluff is about 40 m high overlooking Boundary and Mud Bays, with clear views across to Point Roberts peninsula. On the beach below, there are several petroglyphs and probable canoe runs.

This site is an example of a bluff-top trench-embankment, and the fort was protected by two steep ravine gullies to its north and south. With ravine settings, there is extent of natural protection, while also minimizing the labour necessary in the excavation of trenches.

Cardale Point (DgRv-1)

Cardale Point is bluff-top trench-embankment on Valdes Island, on the first triangular point north of Porlier Pass (Figure 18). In his study of Shingle Point, the next spit on the same island to the north, Matson (2003:100) noted that the position of Cardale
Point would allow for ready control of Porlier Pass, one of the few passages through the Gulf Islands between the mainland and Vancouver Island. There are two portions of the site, the defensive portion up on the bluff and the older midden below along the beach. Have dated both parts of site, with the lower occupation dating back over 4,000 years (4,130 ± 70 BP), while the fortification area dated to just over 500 years, with three dates ranging from 510 to 540 BP (Grier and McLay 2001; Angelbeck 2009b). A three-dimensional surface map of the site, produced with a total station, indicates its position and the shape of the trenches (see Figure 18); two photographs of the trench-embankment are also provided (Figures 19 and 20).

The site exhibits an oblique, subrectangular trench-embankment that protects approximately 200 degrees or 55 percent of its perimeter, while the rest is along the bluff edge, 15 to 20 m above the spit. In the southern portion of the site, the trench branches in two sets of trenches about 20 m before the southern bluff edge. This might represent
a rebuilding and restaging of the trench, although since both maintain form, I argue that it likely was a doubly protected entrance into the fort.

The trench that lines the back perimeter is also quite deep, taking advantage of the natural prominence. The trench is so deep that it effectively serves as a double protection—the outer embankment of nearly 2 m (at 45 degree slope) would have to be breached, then a half-meter descent into the trench before a 55 to 60 degree slope up 2.5 m towards the top, where the base of the palisade wall would be located (Figure 21).

Core-sampling of the trench profile revealed, similar to other trench-embankment investigations (e.g., Mitchell 1968; Buxton 1969), the slope was steepened by the trench with the excavated matrix mounded in front of the trench (Figure 22). This resulted in the removal of natural surface horizons in the trench area and natural substratums overlying prior surface horizons in the embankment area. During our
Figure 20: View of embankment and trench from the east, Profile Trench 1 (Colin Grier and Eric McLay within fortified area on top).
Figure 21: Profile of eastern portion of trench embankment at Cardale Point as measured with a total station (Profile Trench 1).

Figure 22: Stratigraphic profile of the lower portion of eastern trench-embankment (Trench Profile 1).
exposure of the trench and embankment, we also encountered a clear distinction
between the midden in the interior, which exhibited a hard demarcation that likely
indicated the placement of the palisade wall. It also exhibited a small postmould also at
the top of the trench (Angelbeck 2009b).

Peninsular spits

High sandy peninsular spits are also selected for trench-embankment sites.
Peninsular settings, again, generally provide the greatest amount of natural protection in
a perimeter, requiring only a single trench minimally across the neck of the peninsula.
At Cadboro Bay, however, three trenches were implemented, according to drawings of
Newcombe (n.d.; see Figure 12, see pg. 191) in the early 1900s. Sites on peninsular spits
are in locations that typically have other functions besides defense. Sand spits were
often near dense clam beds and likely were good areas for fishing. Hence the midden
surrounding or near the defensive site there could be quite deep, while the middens
within the actual protected area might still be shallow and spotty. I describe two
examples, both from the Northern Gulf Islands.

Rebecca Spit (EaSh-6)

Rebecca Spit is a defensive site situated at the front of a sand spit on Quadra
Island. The trench embankment is semirectangular, designed to steepen the slopes and
add obstacles along the southern front and western approach. Along the back to the
north, a longer trench extends nearly 50 metres across to the eastern slope, which is
naturally steep. Rebecca Spit is the most extensively excavated defensive site in the
Coast Salish region. Donald Mitchell (1968) conducted those excavations, including a
total of sixteen excavation units covering multiple aspects of the site, such as interior
midden areas, the fortified wall along the perimeter, and several profiles of the trench-
embankment feature. A surface map is provided of the site (Figure 23), which is
reconstructed based on the contour map provided by Mitchell (1968:30, Figure 1).
Mitchell noted that Heriot Bay was the largest village close to Rebecca Spit, located two kilometres (1.3 mi) to the west of Rebecca Spit, while another semicircular trench-embankment (EaSh-9) is located even closer, just 1.6 km (1 mi) to the south.

Within the upper, protected area of the site, Mitchell determined that there were three small house platforms, suggesting less permanent structures than plankhouses at residential villages. He interpreted these structures as “temporary,” however, there was evidence that these were still “fairly substantial dwellings” (Mitchell 1968:44). This indicates a lengthy occupation, if not a primary residence. Mitchell (1968:45) pointed out that the absence of readily accessible fresh water would make it “untenable for great lengths of time”; moreover, the midden areas within the walls of the site were “so shallow that we are led to conclude the [site was] occupied for relatively short periods.” Instead of a blanket of midden across the interior of the fortification, there was a scatter of shallow deposits with most near the “inner lip” of the perimeter. One
hundred and twenty-seven artifacts were recovered. These were interpreted as a single assemblage, and these included a chipped stone point, ground slate point, knife, scrapers, and abrasive stones. Bone artifacts were more numerous, including 56 bone points (or bone point fragments) of various styles (barbed, blunt-based, wedge-based, and spindle-shaped bipoints). While it is known that many of these bone point types can or did serve as points for subsistence—arming harpoons, fish hooks, leisters, or fish rakes—most of these point styles can serve as arrowpoints. Mitchell (1968:37-38) noted that the Comox Coast Salish, who had lived in the area when Rebecca Spit was occupied, used several styles as points for arrows. Given the context of a fortification site, it is more likely that many of these points served defensive rather than subsistence function. Along the perimeter of the site’s high ground, Mitchell’s excavations indicated the presence of stakemolds; he provided a profile of a postmould from the top of the western trench-embankment (Figure 24). In some units, they recovered the remains of cedar stakes. This and other stakes revealed in postmoulds were “clearly pointed” for

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insertion vertically into the ground (Mitchell 1968:40). This line of stakes marked a “vertical break” of the midden area of gravel and shell inside the wall. The pattern of stakemolds along the outer perimeter suggested to Mitchell (1968:33, 44) a “light barricade.” Or, since these were so widely spaced, these may have indicated light posts supporting a wall of horizontal cedar planks, similar to the construction of Coast Salish plankhouse walls. Excavations of the trench-embankment feature indicated that subsequent site formation processes have somewhat obscured the depth of these trenches. For instance, the western portion was 70 cm deeper than the contemporary surface indicated, resulting in a depth of 1.3 m behind the front embankment (Mitchell 1968:33). Making a case for defensiveness, Mitchell (1968:45) concluded “In each case the ditches and walls serve to isolate a habitation area, and the most obvious explanation for their presence is that their construction was primarily for protection.”

Manson’s Landing (EaSf-1)

At Manson’s Landing, there are two trenches (Figure 25). The first trench-embankment was partially filled in by locals decades ago (Taylor pers. comm. 2007), while the second trench-embankment still remains. The distance between the two trenches is about 110 m. The inner area that is protected, between the second embankment and the point of the spit, is actually quite small, only 38 by 23 m, or about 874 m².

Rocky headlands

Trench-embankments constructed upon rocky headlands exhibit a similar strategy as that employed at sandy peninsular spits in that only a narrow neck of land is trenched. Otherwise, the landforms are quite different. While sand spits were often near beaches and clam beds, rocky headlands are surrounded by cliffs or rocky shorelines. In some cases, defensive sites on rocky headlands often exhibit minor midden areas, simply because some have less areas of soil development.
EaSd-3

In the summer of 2005, I was able to conduct some limited investigations in Desolation Sound (Angelbeck 2009a). This consisted of a rock bastion with two small bays on either side. It is a natural fortress, yet there was much evidence of further constructions to make it even more protected (Figure 26). From the beach and midden area below, a narrow path led steeply upward to the flat on the promontory. The path up appeared constructed as a narrow ramp such that only one person at a time could ascend. Steep, straight-sided stone bluffs dropped eight to ten metres to the bay waters on all other sides. The top of the promontory was flat and open in vegetation, with a large old maple tree. In three core tests conducted on top of the site, midden deposits were sporadic and were thicker near the edges. A trench-embankment had been noted for the site, according to an early site record (Archaeology Branch 1977), however, it had either been filled in, or the report writer was referring to earthen embankments.
protecting the ramp to the north.

The site closely matches the description by Menzies (1923 [1792]:66), who recorded seeing an abandoned fortification in Desolation Sound on Vancouver’s expedition in 1792; Vancouver (1984 [1792]:64) also wrote about the site but did not go ashore. It matches the location, within Homfrey Channel, and the landform description—it even has an old maple tree, which Menzies (1923 [1792]:66) described as having a platform that was used as a lookout. Here is his description, in full:

At the farther end of these Islands we come to a small Cove in the bottom of which the picturesque ruins of a deserted Village placed on the summit of an elevated projecting Rock excited our curiosity and induced us to land close to it to view its structure.

This Rock was inaccessible on every side except a narrow pass from the Land by means of steps that admitted only one person to ascend at a time and which seemed to be well guarded in case of an attack, for right over it a large Maple Tree diffused its spreading branches in such an advantageous manner as to afford an easy and ready access from the summit of the Rock to a conceald place amongst its branches, where a small party could watch unobservd and defend the Pass with great ease.

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We found the top of the Rock nearly level and wholly occupied with the skeletons of Houses—irregularly arranged and very crowded; in some places the space was enlarged by strong scaffolds projecting over the Rock and supporting Houses apparently well secured—These also acted as a defence by increasing the natural strength of the place and rendering it still more secure and inaccessible (Menzies 1923:66).

A similar architectural style to the “scaffolds projecting over the Rock” was employed near the mouth Bute Inlet at a likely Homalco village, according to a drawing from the Vancouver Expedition (Figure 27). The drawing shows housefloors overhanging the edges from the top of the slope, representing another instance where plankhouses were situated in defensible locations, while not being fortified. Indeed, Menzies’ description indicates that Site EaSd-3 was not palisaded, likely because the sides were so steep.

**Manor Point (DbRv-13)**

Manor Point is located near the southernmost tip of Vancouver Island, on a stony promontory facing eastward in the general area of Rocky Point; an area associated with the highest concentration of rock cairns in the Coast Salish area (Mathews 2006). In fact,
one rock cairn is located about 30 m to the west of the trenched area. Between the promontory and the mainland where the cairn is located, the landform narrows at the neck of the headland with steep, ten-metre drops to rocky shores along the north and south; a surface map of the site is provided as well as a photograph of the trench from the highest point on the bluff behind the trench (Figures 28 and 29).

The feature is distinguished from other sites of this type in that it is mostly a trench, and does not exhibit an embankment in front of the trench. The trench, however, is more substantial than most, with a depth of nearly a metre along the front, and generally three to four metres wide. This accentuates the height of the rocky wall behind the trench, which is over seven metres at the highest point from the top of the wall to the base of the trench.

The main area behind the trench consists mostly of exposed bedrock, approximately 65 by 40 m, with only spotty and shallow areas of soil situated primarily
in niches between stony outcrops; these contained minor deposits with cultural material such as lithic debitage. For this reason any structures within would likely have been light and would have to be set up on top of the exposed rock. Areas of rock outcroppings could have been used as naturally protective walls near the perimeter.

**Rock-Wall Fortifications**

Another type of defensive site has recently been identified in the Fraser Canyon near Yale, consisting of rock-wall fortifications (Figure 30). Five have been documented from Xelhalh, near Lady Franklin rock, to Lexu'ts'o'kw'em, the narrows above Yale (Schaepe 2000, 2001, 2006).53 These also make full use of natural defensive settings while adding further rock-wall protections along points facing the river.

Most were located in narrow places in the canyon with turbulent currents as “natural barriers” to upriver canoes; these can be from less than a metre to over two metres high and mostly composed of flat or elongated local rocks (Figure 31). These

53. Kisha Supernant (2008a, Supernant and Schaepe 2008) has continued research on these rock-walls in the Fraser Valley. According to preliminary results, the number of rock-wall sites has increased substantially (Supernant pers. comm. 2008b).
sites were also at high places with good vantage of the river and with long line-of-sight communication with other fortification sites. Schaepe (2001:52; also 2006) hypothesized that “these sites were strategically selected as a series of guard stations involved in a coordinated and co-operative multi-village effort aimed primarily at regulating river passage into and through the canyon.”

Schaepe (2006:671) argued that this represented a “defensive network” in the canyon (Figure 32), coordinating the efforts among the individual sites, noting that it challenged “the long-held belief that individual households were the traditional centers
of economy, and by extension, of political authority among the Aboriginal peoples of the Northwest Coast” (Schaepe 2006:671). Still, while it challenged traditional models of Coast Salish sociopolitical organization, Schaepe did not advocate a form of centralized authority. Rather, he advocated a “corporate family group” model of sociopolitical organization in which these defensive sites within the canyon network would operate and coordinate with, notably, “a minimum level of intercommunity governance” (Schaepe 2006:671). What Schaepe described fits well with an anarchic, decentralized network that allows both household autonomy and broader alliances of coordination.

These major rock-wall fortifications were restricted to the Fraser Canyon, however, there were rock-wall structures used in other parts of Coast Salish territory. For instance, Jenness (n.d.) described that the Cowichan warrior, Tzouhalem had constructed a barrier in a cave on a mountain now named after him: “In Mt. Tzuhelem above he had a cave barricaded with rocks in which he could take shelter.” This site may
have taken on a more natural look with the intention of concealment (as a refuge) rather than defense, but perhaps served both needs.

In the North Cascades of Washington state, a site on a high bluff and stony outcrop contains two “rock alignment features” consisting of boulders and angular granitic cobbles “piled between larger boulders and bedrock outcroppings” (Kennedy

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The site is on a promontory that overlooks the Skagit River valley and the mouth of Goodell Creek. While it may be a hunting blind for mountain goats (Mierendorf pers. comm. 2008), these also appear to be well situated as lookouts. In any case, the rock walls are constructed in a similar manner to those described by Schaepe, and are in a location high above the creek confluence with views potentially of those approaching upriver.

Similar rock walls have been documented by Darcy Mathews (2004) on Mary Hill, near the southern tip of Vancouver Island. These are U-shaped blinds that occupy rocky exposures. These are strategically placed for they would have advantages for attacking those coming around the tip from the south. Both rock walls may have been within line-of-sight of each other, dependent primarily on vegetation cover in the past. While more testing would be needed to verify whether these date to the precontact period, there is some similarity of construction and strategic placement.

Rock-wall alignments have also been implemented at some trench-embankment sites, as Carlson (1954:120-121) described for a fortification site on Lopez Island:

Site 215, located on a high cliff above Hunter’s Bay on Lopez Island, consists of a trench 90 feet long, 12 feet wide, and 3.5 feet deep. A 1 foot lip is found on both sides of the trench. Eighty-four feet to the north of the trench is a wall of stone slabs, 51 feet long, and 1.5 feet high. Associated with these features are twenty-two cairns and a shell mound.

While some trench-embankment sites employ two or even three trenches as protection, Hunter’s Bay included a low rock-wall that appears to have been used as an outer defense, in the manner described by Schaepe (2006).

Stockades

Often, in the literature, stockades are treated as if they were the same as trench-embankment fortifications. However, some stockades did not have trenches or embankments associated with them, and they typically are located on different landforms. Whereas trench-embankment sites were located upon bluffs or peninsulas, stockades were usually located on beaches or river banks. More differences between
these two defensive site types in a later chapter are discussed in Chapter IX. Here, I argue that stockades should be regarded as a distinct category of defensive architecture employed by Coast Salish peoples. These are distributed throughout the Coast Salish area, predominantly on or near the coasts (Figure 33).

In the mid-1800s, Grant (1857:301) saw several of these stockades during his travels around Vancouver Island. He described their entrances as having “A few round holes, or sometimes low oblong holes or apertures in the palisades, generally not above three feet high....” In this respect the entrances to stockades were similar to those already described for the shed-roof plankhouse.

Stern (1934:101-102) provided a detailed description of a fort in Lummi territory:

Long logs were grooved along one side and fitted over these wedged points, each top log forming a section which was braced inside by other logs. The sections were so arranged that the stockade was rectangular enclosing the entire village. This required many sections for the village had two large houses ten to twelve sections each, at right angles to each other. Tunnels with rocks over the top were dug at opposite corners of the stockade to points a short way out so that the entire stockade could be guarded by two men at these lookouts. There was a large pole in the center of the enclosure for hoisting a pitchwood torch to give light in case of a night attack. They perfected the light so that they could see a dog from a distance at night. A plank was planted along the trail to the spring water directly in back of the stockade with sharp bone spikes protruding to hamper the enemy during attacks and to catch anyone seeking to poison the water supply. In the daytime, the spikes were fixed so that the villagers would not be hurt, but every night they were set again. The stockade was built by a man named Sneqwaniq. When it was completed bullets were sent to the tribes of the north as a challenge for them to come to battle but those messages were never answered.

Suttles (1951:322) noted three such stockades built in the Puget Sound region. The fort at Blaine, for instance, he described as:

... consist[ing] of a stockade around two plank houses, with tunnels leading from inside to loopholes in the bank in front of the stockade. Inside were two poles upon which baskets of flaming pitch were hoisted to light the surrounding area at night. Similar features were indicated for the Lummi and Samish forts. The Samish fort also had poisoned stakes set around it (Suttles 1951:322).

These stockades also had features, in some cases along the walls, for a lookout.
As Jenness (n.d.) noted, a Cowichan warrior "Tzoxwlets fortified his village at Kenipsim with a palisade, and had a man on watch all the time." In the northern Gulf of Georgia, large rocks were stored near the top of the palisades for throwing down on attackers (Kennedy and Bouchard 1983:69).

**Labour Organization**

One striking aspect of these fortification sites, particularly the trench-embankment sites and the stockades, is the amount of labour required to build them.
Julius Charles told Suttles (1948[2]:83) that, while the man with the carpenter power, Xwle’yukw, led the construction, the “Whole tribe worked on fort.” In another interview, Charles told Suttles (1949[5]:70) that the “Lummi didn’t go month [away]. Had to build forts to protect the people.” That is, the Lummi forewent other activities so that they could invest time in building a fort for a month. During that time, they had to rely on stores of food instead of building up their surpluses. Also, while Xwle’yukw led the people of his own village to build a fort, Charles said that the Lummi did not have a man with such power and had to hire a Samish man, named Syaqwa’naq, to lead the construction (Suttles 1949[5]:70). So, in addition to investing labour for its construction, the Lummi also had to hire a specialist to direct and plan the work.

As fortifications generally had room for a few households, the hiring and construction likely would have been shared by the household chiefs, each expending some capital for such investments. They might also earn some social and symbolic capital through the organization of such efforts, just as elites might earn capital through organizing household activities, as detailed by Grier (2001) for a Dionisio Point household, and others (e.g., Arnold 1993). The construction of fortifications indicates a further extension of controlling or organizing household labour. Indeed, the fear of attack can be ideologically used to garner support for such efforts.

Ames et al. (1992) have provided some insight into the amount of labour required for a single plankhouse for the Meier site in Oregon. They determined that one house required about 40,000 board feet in building and maintenance throughout the duration of its occupation, about four hundred years. Large numbers of planks and posts were used in stockades as well. And, these had to surround not just one house but multiple houses. For refuge sites, boards may have been borrowed from the main village, as was done for some seasonally occupied villages, leaving mainly the framework of posts—these skeletal houses gave early explorers the idea that these villages were abandoned. From Suttles’ (1951) and Stern’s (1934) descriptions, the palisade walls were constructed and do not appear to rely on planks from their houses.
for temporary installation. For defense, it likely was more effective to have walls in place and ready to protect as soon as needed, although interior structures might have reused portable wall planks from their residential villages.

For most stockades, a palisade surrounded the full perimeter of a site, however, Barnett (1955:38) reported that only the “most vulnerable sector” was stockaded. In his excavations at Towner Bay, Mitchell (1968) found, parallel to the trench, a row of five stakes eight cm in diameter that were placed high and inside the trench-embankment, each of which was 25 cm apart. Again, at Rebecca Spit, Mitchell (1968:32) encountered a row of stake remains at the top of the trench. And, as Kane (1971 [1847]) noted, when he visited the fort at I-eh-nus, there were two walls: an inner wall that was only 5 feet high, but the outer one with boards 20 feet high. I-eh-nus also was shown with planks, in contrast to other descriptions of a wall of posts from young trees, which seems similar to what Mitchell (1968) uncovered.

Among the sites in the northern Gulf of Georgia, surrounding Smelt Bay, the inner protected areas of trench-embankment sites (meaning the area within the innermost trench) average 48 m by 24 m, however, from the description of Snatelum Point on Whidbey Island, the wall must have been at least 145 to 285 m long and 35 to 50 m wide to enclose the numerous plankhouses end on end within (Bryan 1963:47-48).

We must keep in mind that more than just stockade walls are involved in construction. If a trench was present, a significant amount of earth movement was conducted to create trenches commonly 2 m deep and 1 to 1.5 m wide and extending up to 140 m in length as they protract in subrectangular fashion from bluff edge to bluff edge, as at Cardale Point. Julius Charles described other constructions for one fort, as Suttles (1949[5]:83) quickly recorded:

Fort—land sloping all around fence. 3 tiers of tunnels with loopholes. Inside [were] 2 houses [with] shed roofs plank walls. Fence has kind of sidewalk around with wall up to climb.

Tunnels for escape or entry require additional excavation and camouflage to obscure. Entranceways would have needed boards for closing and locking, and
stockade walls require supports and cross-beams, and—as Charles described—a high “sidewalk” for defense and a lookout. Lookout towers and areas would require additional construction, as would torchlights. Then, additional efforts were also required, including the making of weapons, assembling large rocks for tossing down from the fort or gathering pitch for torches. Some also added carved elements for intimidation or display of spirit powers, as at the fort at Lyack-son on Shingle Point that Bishop Demers visited (Theodore 1939:187), and these carvings may have required additional hiring of specialists.

What we have considered so far primarily regards construction—there were additional preparations for battle. For such a stay, often away from fresh water or other resource areas, supplies needed to be brought to the fort. For instance, in a Snuneymuxw telling of the Battle at Maple Bay (Shlup-netz), preparations started as soon as the likely day of battle was known:

Five days before the time appointed for the battle, all the women and children are removed from the Nanaimo camp, and carried away to Chase River: where after laying up a plentiful supply of food, they are left to care for themselves, whilst the whole band of warriors, about six hundred in number, with thirty war canoes, started for the scene of the coming battle (Tate n.d.).

Conclusion

The Coast Salish employed numerous types of defensive constructions. These included lookouts, signal stations, hidden refuges, underground houses, blockhouses, trench-embankment fortifications, fortified rocky headlands, and stockades. Some of these types were locally distinctive while others were shared among the Coast Salish peoples.

Like much of the ethnography of the Coast Salish, the range of descriptions for many of these defensive site types do not apply to the whole region. Barnett (1944, 1955:269-270) remarked on the underground refuges as primarily a northern trait, but also practiced by Squamish and Musqueam, while others noted their presence in central
and southern Coast Salish areas (Bryan 1963:80; Lugrin 1932). Rock-wall fortifications were used predominantly in the Fraser Canyon (Schaepe 2000, 2001, 2006), although I have pointed to other limited examples in the North Cascades and San Juan Islands. Trench-embankment sites have the broadest distribution, yet the greatest concentration is along the coast of Southern Vancouver Island. Stockades and other fortifications were described throughout much of Coast Salish territory, yet documentation of such structures in southern Puget Sound is rare—and the Skokomish Twana were said to not have built fortifications or have refuges, although they knew neighbouring groups did (Elmendorf 1960:169).

While none of these defensive types can be said to have been practiced by all Coast Salish peoples, there are certain traits that were distinctive to the Coast Salish. Whereas it is more common with non-Salish groups to the north and west to situate their defensive sites on steep islets, which provided a full natural perimeter of defense, such sites (and settings) are rare in the Coast Salish area. They preferred protected areas on or connected to land—hence the need for trench-embankments. Rock-wall fortifications may also be unique to the Coast Salish area, with such stone construction not yet demonstrated elsewhere in the Northwest Coast, particularly for defense. Furthermore, underground houses are yet another distinctive defensive practice among the Coast Salish.

Mirroring their nature of anarchic social organization, the Coast Salish defensive practices reveal a degree of local and regional autonomy and expression in the architecture of defense. Yet, in their autonomy, these styles are not limited solely to one subgroup of the Coast Salish, but rather reveal a sharing of practices across broader areas, if not the Coast Salish area as a whole (Figure 34). This appears to match distributions of unique stone bowls or burial mound constructions in earlier periods that have been argued to indicate the sharing and alliances of an interaction sphere (Brown 1996; Grier 2003; Blake 2004). The pattern of distribution for these practices seems to match the type of affinal alliance network described by Suttles (1987a [1960]), one that
would have more nodes of alliance close by, but with certain individuals able to ally with those farther away, and share their ideas and practices in turn. The underground refuge represents a ready candidate for this. These were intentionally hidden, sometimes even distantly from the residential village—awareness of these by potential enemies would have critically hindered their effectiveness. Like a family’s bathing area or ritual practice, the Coast Salish would have kept information about the sacred location of a pool or the proper protocols for a ritual close at hand, maintaining its value
as cultural capital. Yet, with allies, knowledge and practices from a household are shared with one another, just as food is shared and wives intermarried. And, this practice—about a hidden feature—appears archaeologically in other regions outside the northern Coast Salish, if less concentrated. This would appear to mirror the social alliances that share these practices, with a core area in the north and a periphery where some elites shared their practices with distant elites.
Chapter VIII: Defending Against Whom?
Interpreting the Purpose and Strategy of Defensive Sites

In the archaeological literature of the Coast Salish region, it is common to assume that defensive sites were evidence of attacks by northern groups. In other words, it is assumed that most conflict was intertribal, indicating it was between the Coast Salish and non-Salishan groups. Coupland (1989:212) described trench-embankment fortifications, for instance, as “probably defenses against northern raiders, who had come south to trade at Fort Victoria, and intended to return home with Salish slaves” (see also Ferguson 1984), although he also discussed a precontact possibility for these fortification sites. Bryan (1963:76) also discussed “northern Indians” as a possible cause for the building of these sites, and he provided an oral account of such an attack as an example. Many rightfully have pointed (e.g., Mitchell 1968; Keddie 1996) to the advance of the Lekwiltok or Southern Kwakwaka’wakw into Comox territory in the postcontact period (Taylor and Duff 1956). Indeed, warfare did begin to proliferate after contact, and many fortifications were constructed at that time. The Fort Langley journals of the late 1820s, for example, reveal the presence and fear of northern attacks, as do many of the oral histories (Maclachlan 1998). The concept that the forts were for protection from non-Salish attackers is a recurring theme.

In this chapter, I evaluate these interpretations to see how they fit the data: not just archaeological analyses, but also ethnohistoric, oral historical, and ethnographic. First, I discuss the archaeological data, primarily looking at the distribution of defensive sites in the Coast Salish area.

Although defensive sites have been known since the mid-1800s, archaeological surveys and excavations were not conducted until the 1950s and ‘60s.54 Bryan (1955, 1963), Mitchell (1968), Buxton (1969), and

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54. These investigations included Bryan (1955, 1963); Mitchell (1968); Buxton (1969), and
1963) presented a map of trench-embankment sites in 1955, highlighting those in Northern Puget Sound—Bryan’s focal area for his survey—and other known examples from predominantly Southern Vancouver Island. Fifteen years later, Buxton (1969) conducted the largest study of trench-embankment sites (Figure 35). Many of the sites she added were in the northern Gulf Islands, such as Rebecca Spit, previously investigated by Mitchell (1968). She pointed to the paucity of defensive sites in the

Central Coast Salish region: “Conspicuous by their absence are earthwork locations in the Halkomelum region” (Buxton 1969:19).

From these assessments, as well as his own, Coupland (1989:212) interpreted that “there is a tendency for some trench embankment sites to cluster near the Coast Salish/Kwaguilth boundary, and near the Coast Salish/Nootka boundary.” Yet, even this map contains several sites in the central region, particularly in the San Juan Islands and Puget Sound. Furthermore, the southern Vancouver Island cluster is not so much at the Nuu-chah-nulth boundary but rather more to the east, closer to the villages in the Victoria region. In fact, one could argue instead these face the Olympic Peninsula and Klallam territory to the south. Spanish expeditions did note such conflicts and tensions between the Klallam and groups across the Juan de Fuca Strait (Wagner 1933:131), not tensions with those on the coast.

I have drawn upon this earlier research and compiled and updated the data on defensive sites, as discussed in the last chapter. The resulting map combines the array of defensive site types (Figure 36). Some types of defensive sites did not leave an archaeological signature, so it is necessary to combine information from multiple sources—ethnography, ethnohistory, oral histories—to assess the range of Coast Salish defensive practices. The map also includes sites in the central region—the Gulf Islands, eastern Vancouver Island, and the mainland. In addition, it includes Schaepe’s (2000, 2001, 2006) recently documented rock-wall fortifications in the Fraser Canyon. The relatively fewer sites recorded in the Halkomelem area may be due to the higher degree of urban growth and development. Buxton (1969), in her survey, documented high rates of destruction at those sites. In fact, their destruction was often a motivating reason for investigations (Mitchell 1968; Keddie 1983, 1987, 1995).

The resulting combined defensive site map shows a more even distribution of sites throughout Coast Salish territory instead of concentrations at the boundaries to the west or north. This is not to say that the boundary areas were not zones of conflict—those most certainly were. Rather, the concept of a borderline front of protection is
somewhat simplistic and, more importantly, does not accord with the nature of Coast Salish sociopolitical organization. The idea of a borderline suggests a front line protecting a centre, such as would be expected for chiefdoms or states. Coast Salish sociopolitical organization had no such pattern of centralization. Defensive sites and strategies were not more necessary at boundaries with neighbouring groups than they were throughout the region. Defensive strategies were a necessary component of political life for any village, or household, throughout the Coast Salish region. The settlement pattern reflects this—in the map, the total array of defensive sites reveals a
widespread distribution throughout the Coast Salish area, with preferences for certain types of features concentrated in different regions.

Conflicts with external groups were not restricted to or focused on border zones. Lekwiltok raids, for example, were not concentrated on the southern boundary of their territory. As was typical with most Northwest Coast warfare, attacks consisted of surprise raids that could be directed at any village, including those deep within Coast Salish territory. Communications networks would convey information about the raiders and warnings (including false alarms) would quickly spread, often preceding their arrival—a practice documented in the Fort Langley journals (Maclachlan 1998).

Moreover, attacks could come from any quarter, and not just Wakashan groups to the north and west, but from Chilcotin (Kennedy and Bouchard 1983; Black, Urbanczyk, and Weinstein 2000), Mid-Fraser groups (Duff 1952; Collins 1974), or the Chinook (Elmendorf 1993); and later in the postcontact period, Haida and Tsimshian as well (Walkem 1914; Curtis 1970 [1913]).

Coast Salish Sociopolitical Organization and Defense

Whereas subsistence and economy were organized at the household scale, the organization of defense among the Coast Salish was conducted at the village scale, involving significant cooperation among related households (Suttles 1951:277). This indicates defense required a higher degree of communal interaction than was typical for most day-to-day practices. Barnett (1944, 1955) found among the Musqueam, Sliammon, Klahoose, and other groups, that preparations for warfare were still conducted at a household scale, with some households owning their own underground house or “fighting house.” Barnett’s description of household-organized defense suggests a more autonomous organization.

Suttles (1951:277) described defense as being one of the few activities conducted by the village as a whole, suggesting that households allied and cooperated with other households in the village for defensive purposes, just as they would cooperate for large
potlatches in their village. As discussed above, authority might be granted to a professional warrior in times of conflict, to whom all household chiefs would listen. His authority only lasted as long as the threat, after which authority would then return to the household chiefs.

Stockaded villages are an example of a village scale of defense. Also, some trench-embankment fortifications are large, such as Cardale Point, where all the households in the village below the bluff could occupy the fort; in fact, the fort area is large enough that it may indicate the cooperation of other nearby villages, indicating a scale of defense beyond the village.

Since the rock-wall fortifications in the Fraser Canyon exhibited lines-of-sight to other fortifications and lookouts, Schaepe (2006) argued that these formed a network of cooperation for defense. The linkages between these sites indicate a scale of cooperation that goes even beyond what Suttles (1951:277) had described, and apparently in contradiction to widespread notions of autonomous nature of households among the Coast Salish.

However, this array of defensive practices—from household-scale to village-scale defenses to inter-village networks—suggests a flexibility and variability that would be in accord with the nature of defense needed for threats faced by Coast Salish. They did not only face large-scale attacks from external groups. While much of the archaeological discussion of defensive sites among the Coast Salish revolves around the attacks of northern raiders or external groups, the ethnohistoric and ethnographic data as well as the oral histories indicates more internal battles or feuds among Coast Salish groups than with external groups.

**Internal versus External Warfare**

In three compendiums with accounts of Coast Salish warfare, the conflicts described were often intercommunal. Various factors at Fort Langley recorded
observations on fur trading and native life from 1827 to 1830 (Maclachlan 1998). Carlson (2001) found that during these years, over 30 conflicts were noted (Figure 37). Of these, the majority (n=15) were between Coast Salish groups, the Cowichan raided up the Fraser, the Klallam battled the Cowichan, the Snuneymuxw attacked the Chilliwack, and so on. Conflicts involving non-Coast Salish groups, which consistently were by or against the Lekwiltok (n=13), were also common, nearly even to the number of intra-Coast Salish conflicts.

Another set of accounts are the oral histories of the *Twana Narratives* (Elmendorf 1993:126-164). Elmendorf was able to record fifteen stories relating to warfare and comprising a significant portion of the overall accounts he acquired from the Allen elders. Of these fifteen, ten accounts consisted of internal Coast Salish battles, while only five related to conflicts with non-Salishan groups. Moreover, the non-Salishan groups included a variety of opponents including Lekwiltok, Chemakum, Nuu-chah-nulth, and Washington colonists. Curtis (1970 [1913]), in his volume on the Coast Salish, provided thirteen accounts of conflicts, with the majority involving battles among Coast Salish
groups. These included Cowichan against the Sooke, Cowichan versus Klallam, and the Klallam against the Sooke. Accounts about conflicts with external groups included the Tsimshian, Chemakum, Lekwiltok, and Washington settlers.

Warfare with external groups likely were of a different nature, particularly without ready protocols for conflict resolution. However, it seems apparent from these compendiums that warfare was common between Coast Salish groups, even more so than conflict with non-Salishan groups.

Occasionally, the Lekwiltok allied with bordering Comox household chiefs to raid southern Coast Salish groups. Typically, this did not involve all household chiefs from a single village, as some oral histories indicate (Duff n.d.; Tate n.d.; Cryer 2007 [1930]). Some Comox chiefs also acted in alliance with other Coast Salish groups against the Lekwiltok (e.g., Jenness 1934). An example of the complexities of autonomy and alliance among the Coast Salish is found in the accounts of the Battle at Maple Bay, the final large battle with the Lekwiltok.

The Battle at Maple Bay

For many, many years, all in the bright summer weather, they have come down upon us, those Ukultahs of the North. They have killed our men and taken away our women to slavery. Every year they come, and nobody knows whose house shall be left desolate with the coming of the summer. For they are many and strong, and their war canoes are upon the sea as the salmon in the spawning season at the river mouth. We cannot stand against them. We are too few. We are not united as they are. Year after year we wail the loss of our champions, the loss of our wives and children.

Then we make up our minds. All the tribes of the South, the Cowichans, the Malahats, the Songhees, the Saanich and the men from Sooke, where the tall white waves come in from the ocean—all of us make up our minds. We shall become one people and join and await the coming of the Ukultahs. They shall not find us until they come upon us all together.

—Chief David LaT esse, Saanich (Lugrin 1932:38).

Having dwelt on the autonomous nature of defense and the frequency of intra-Salish conflict, I would like to stress that there are also examples in the oral histories of
what can be considered moments of large-scale intertribal battle. The clearest example is
the Battle at Maple Bay, which likely occurred in the late 1830s (Angelbeck and McLay
2009). The accounts of this battle indicate many features of Coast Salish sociopolitical
organization, features that come into bold relief in the context of such a large threat. In
addition, the oral histories recount cultural practices and protocols that were followed in
preparation for the battle and its aftermath.

There are numerous accounts of the Battle at Maple Bay recorded by elders and
informants of the Cowichan, Snuneymuxw, Twana, Penelakut, Saanich, and Puget
Sound groups (Angelbeck and McLay 2009). In the full range of these accounts, there
was participation in the coalition from nearly forty Coast Salish groups, ranging from
Burrard, Capilano, and Musqueam in the east to Sooke and Songhees on the west;
Comox and Sechelt in the north to Duwamish and Puyallup in the south. Some accounts
are not as specific, mentioning only “Fraser River,” “Puget Sound,” or “Gulf of Georgia
Salish,” but even those categories in themselves suggest large groupings of Coast Salish
communities. Most accounts ascribe to the Cowichan a central role in calling the council
of war, where chiefs and warriors from various groups convened. Having just had one
of their villages devastated, the Lekwiltok claimed they would return to attack another
Cowichan village (Hill-Tout 1978 [1907]:160-162).

After this [a battle with the Lekwiltok] my people saw that something
must be done. They had been nearly beaten that time, and their enemies
were getting stronger. One day they would come down and finish the
Cowichans. So they called the Indians to a big meeting at Lyack-sun, on
Valdez Island. From Musqueam over to Esquimalt and Saanich, up the
coast to Nanaimo, then down to Chemainus Bay and on to Valdez
Island, they called all the fighters to come and talk about this thing, and
see what could be done to stop those Indians from one day coming and
beating them and taking all their women and children to be slaves.

Well, the day came for that great meeting, and from all parts came the
big canoes filled with the fighting men of the Cowichan tribe. The beach
at Lyack-sun was filled with the canoes, and still there were more to
come—the people from Musqueam and Esquimalt, and Saanich were not
there yet (Cryer 2007 [ca. 1930]:141).

One remarkable aspect of these accounts is the repeated discussion of a “council
of war” that was called, nearly always in those terms—a typical procedure according to
Eells (1985:351). In most of the accounts, the Cowichan sent out messengers to other Coast Salish villages throughout the Gulf of Georgia and Puget Sound announcing the meeting. Most often, the accounts stated that council was held at Cowichan Bay, along Cowichan River, or, in one case, at Lyack-Sun, or Shingle Point on Valdes Island. Another account stated that the Snuneymuxw (Nanaimo) called the council of war, although the meeting is in Shtlup-nets, or Maple Bay:

... Stah-qult, the old Nanaimo chief sent messages to all the Salish tribes along the southeastern coast of V. Isl., and across the Gulf of Georgia to the mouth of the Fraser River, calling their warriors to meet two days before the full moon at Shtlup-nets for a council of war. He has challenged the Laquiltoes (Tate n.d.).

According to Frank Allen of the Twana, there was a council of war for the Puget Sound groups as well; perhaps this is a secondary council, as other chiefs may have offered to gather others more distantly. At this meeting, which occurred on a long beach on southern Whidbey Island across from present-day Port Townsend, the chiefs proceed one by one to answer whether they would participate or not in this battle. First, each made a public statement about their reasons for participating or not. Frank Allen, whose great-uncle, “Big Jim,” had volunteered to participate in this battle, provided a detailed account to Elmendorf (1993: 145-53):

All the Puget Sound war men met with the Nisqually to decide what to do. And they all asked one another, “What do you say now, Nisqually warrior man?’ What do you say, s̓əhe‘wabs? What are you going to say, Snohomish? What do you say, Skagit men? What are you going to say, Swuqw’a’bš (Suquamish)? (Elmendorf 1993:145).

Much discussion followed among the chiefs and warriors, and attention is given to the response of each group to the challenge of facing the Lekwiltok (yəkʷəltx̌ən):

“And then qaba’xad, the Snohomish warrior, said, “I’m going to die or kill yəkʷəltx̌ən, one of the two. All the time they are raiding us Snohomish, and now I’m mad! I’m going to yəkʷəltx̌ən!”

“The big warrior from Skagit, daxwsi’dəxʷ said “I’m made to be a war man, and I’m not afraid of anything! I’m going to yəkʷəltx̌ən!”

“Now the Lummi speak, ča’wicuł, the great Lummi warrior, got up and said, “The yəkʷəltx̌ən have been troubling us too much! I might as well die
as not, so I’m going to kill them!”

“And now kc’a’p, Kitsap, the big famous warrior of the Suquamish, said “I’m going to die or kill yək’iltx” (Elmendorf 1993:145).

And so it continued, with Squaxon, Sawhemish, Skokomish, Gig Harbor, Dungeness, and others. Not all present at the council joined in the alliance, however. Leschi, a Nisqually chief, declined, although other Nisqually did join. A Skokomish leader decided not to join, saying: “The yək’iltx never bother me. And if they come to my country, I’ve got warriors and I’ve got a trap to kill them!” (Elmendorf 1993:146).

There were many reasons for individual groups to decide to join the battle, including events that occurred in the months before the battle. Boas (1889) described how the Snuneymuxw and Sechelt carried out a retaliatory attack the Lekwiltok at Qusan, or Salmon River, on northern Vancouver Island; Tate (n.d.) related the long story of a Snuneymuxw chief’s son taken hostage and sold as a slave to northern groups in the weeks before the battle. Hill-Tout (1978 [1907]:160-162) described how the Cowichan villages were raided while most of the men were away—this was the final straw for them, leading to the council of war. Two accounts also discuss a Lekwiltok council of war and the performance of ritual warrior dances as well, as they were preparing to mount a substantial raid on the Cowichan (Tate n.d.; Pearson 1969).

After the council of war was held, some immediately went into discussion of preparations for battle. In some accounts, the preparations take up to a month (Elmendorf 1993:146; Tate n.d.; Humphreys n.d.). Curtis (1970 [1913]:33) mentioned that preparations occurred on Kuper Island while another account stated that the Puget Sound groups prepared on Whidbey Island. There, they decided that Kitsap would lead the Puget Sound groups in battle (Elmendorf 1993:146). They prepared their weapons, canoes, and provisions of food. A shaman conjured spirit powers and several conducted ritual preparations (Tate n.d.).

One account said that there were 200 canoes with ten men each, just from Puget Sound, while Tate (n.d.) stated there were 4,000 fighters. Chief David LaTesse told how they readied by sending the elderly, women, and children with stores of clams and dried
fish to underground refuges—as noted above, “as large as a lodge inside” (Lugrin 1932).

Tate (n.d.) described the arrival of 30 canoes of Snuneymuxw, 50 canoes of Cowichan, 20 canoes of Chemainus, and 30 canoes of Musqueam and Tsawwassen, totaling over 5,000 warriors. The numbers are likely exaggerated, but there is a consistency throughout the accounts of an extraordinarily high number of participants, especially when most Coast Salish endeavours typically involved only a few allied households. Most expeditions, even for warfare, would have comprised of only a small fraction of the warriors described in these accounts. No other accounts of warfare in the region approach these numbers.

The Salish war leaders’ strategy was to confront the Lekwiltok on their terms. They knew that if the Lekwiltok intended to go to the mouth of the Cowichan River, they would have to pass through Samsun Narrows between Saltspring and Vancouver Islands. Scouts were sent north of the Narrows to spot the advancing Lekwiltok on the southward trek. Boas (1889:325) described how “Posts were continually maintained to keep the tribes informed of the movements of the Lekwiltok and their allies.” According to Arvid Charlie, a Cowichan elder, lookouts were also stationed along the approaches to Maple Bay, both to the north and south (Angelbeck and McLay 2009). Eventually, the Lekwiltok were scouted camped north of Maple Bay, and “‘Hark! Hoo-ahoo-ahoole, the enemy is coming’ rings out along the line of watchmen” (Tate n.d.).

In most accounts, the Lekwiltok were positioned north of Samsun Narrows. To draw them through Samsun Narrows and into Maple Bay, the Coast Salish coalition used a decoy: a canoe or set of canoes with women—a tempting prize of potential slaves to ensure the Lekwiltok entered the bay (these were actually warriors dressed as women). The Lekwiltok took the bait. Chief David LaTesse of Saanich described:

No need to paddle soft, think the Ukultahs [Lekwiltok]. The Southern Indians are afraid. They have fled before them. The noise of the

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55. A couple of accounts have the Lekwiltok camped at Maple Bay and the Coast Salish using the decoy canoe to draw them out onto the water, where they preferred to battle. For further discussions of minor variations, see Angelbeck and McLay (2008).
Ukultahs’ paddles against the sides of the canoes is like thunder, and they shout and laugh and sweep like a cloud into Maple Bay (Lugrin 1932).

Hill-Tout (1978 [1907]:161) recorded that the Salish groups had a set of calls to organize when to strike:

A system of signals was also agreed upon. The sounds were to be those of the owl, the wolf, and the dog. The cry of the owl was to be given by the [Cowichan] as soon as they saw they were perceived by the Kwakiutl, the sound of the wolf when the Kwakiutl swallowed the bait and began to pursue them, and the sound of the dog would be given by those in ambush outside of the harbour to signify that they were ready to dash in and surround the enemy.

According to Humphreys (n.d.), a decoy is not mentioned, but he described that the Lekwiltok entered the bay en route to the Cowichan River unaware of the warrior groups hidden about the bay:

They passed on into Maple Bay, and headed towards the southern Narrows. When they got to about the middle of the bay, the division of war canoes that were left to guard the Southern Narrows came out to meet them. The Youlcatas stopped, and seemed to be considering. Then the party who were left to guard the northern Narrows launched their canoes, and blocked any chance of escape by that passage. When the Youlcatas found both passages disputed, they began to paddle towards the west side of the bay. It was then that the third division came out of hiding, and the Youlcatas found themselves surrounded by an enemy more than twice their own strength (Humphreys n.d.).

As Jenness (n.d.) put it, then “the Kwakiutl were threatened with a surround” (Figure 38). Some accounts stated that, in seeing the Coast Salish alliance, the Lekwiltok tried to be forestall a battle and began to negotiate for peace. In Frank Allen’s account, the Lekwiltok “hoist up a white flag in their leading canoe. They don’t want to fight now, they put up a white flag. But Kitsap puts up a black flag, that means he wants to fight” (Elmendorf 1993:148).

A Cowichan warrior, according to Humphreys (n.d.), replied that “My people will have peace when the Youlcatas are shorn of their power to fight”—then a warrior fired an arrow into the Lekwiltok leader’s chest, who dropped into the water, initiating the battle.
Figure 38: Map of the Battle of Maple Bay, indicating coordination of Coast Salish groups and roles.
During his telling, Chief David LaTesse “brought his hands together, fingers sharply interlocked” (Lugrin 1932). As he described:

Like that the boats meet. We use our ... clubs made from elk bone. Thump. Thump. Thump. Down on the heads of our enemies. Every thump a kill. That noise—the rattle of bone upon bone—scream of the dying! But over all the triumphant war song of Thulpult and Quala Wonthult (Lugrin 1932).

In a Twana account, there is a crossfire of arrows:

And now the yǝḵʷiłtax come on, and when they get almost bow to bow with the Sound Indians they let go with their arrows, both sides shoot now as fast as they can pull their bows. The war man is in the bow of each canoe and the captain is in the stern, steering (Elmendorf 1993:149).

Frank Allen also described in particular how one Cowlitz warrior fired arrow after arrow at the Lekwiltok:

Every time he shot, a yǝḵʷiłtax man would yell, “a . . . !,” and go overboard with an arrow in him! And some of those war men jumped right into the yǝḵʷiłtax canoes with spears or clubs, while the young men in their canoes went on shooting (Elmendorf 1993:149).

Other stories include descriptions of war powers being brought into play. Kitsap told the warriors near him to not be scared of the lice that suddenly began to crawl about since they were his power (Elmendorf 1993:148-149): “Don’t scatter my ammunition now, just let my ammunition alone. That’s from my power now, just let them crawl on you!” In another account by Angus August, a Cowichan, a man used his rock power to lift up rocks near the surface as a reef to hold up or upend enemy canoes (Bob 1980).

Nearly all warriors sang their power songs. The Cowichan sang their song of Stimqua, the great warrior snake that long ago descended from the skies into Maple Bay, linking the battle with the Lekwiltok to a mythic battle in the same locale (Harris 1901). One warrior’s song made his enemies easier to defeat. According to Chief LaTesse: “It is like a spell, that voice high and [ne]ar. To the dip of the paddle he sings, over and over, the same song. All those Ukultahs must listen. They cannot help [it]. It is magic” (Lugrin 1932).
The Lekwiltok fought back however. Curtis (1970 [1913]:34) described that the Lekwiltok were “trusting to the greater size of their canoes to break through the opposing line.” In a Twana account, Frank Allen described how spears were used to put cracks in the Lekwiltok canoes:

Kitsap hollers to his captain, “Go right through between them now!”
And his canoe goes right through between two of the yak’iltax canoes.
And Kitsap grabs up his short spear and stabs it into the yak’iltax canoes, trying to split them. And the young men in his canoes do the shooting now, and Kitsap splits those two canoes and the water comes in and all the yak’iltax go overboard (Elmendorf 1993:149).

This tactic was also described by Arvid Charlie, who related that these spears were especially made for such use, possessing much larger spearheads than the ones used for hunting. He also said that other warriors guarded the spearer’s flanks ensuring that he was able to make the thrust. When the hull cracked, the enemy was concerned with water flooding and sinking their canoes and so could not focus on fighting. Arvid Charlie also noted that the smaller Coast Salish canoes, as mentioned above, were more maneuverable than the larger Lekwiltok canoes, thus giving the Salish an advantage in close quarters (Angelbeck and McLay 2009). Curtis (1970 [1913]:34) described how Salish groups would also heavily lean their canoes as shields, “[throwing] their weight to one side, raising the gunwale toward the enemy and depressing the other almost into the water.”

In an account recounted by Ts’umsitum and Cryer (2007; also Cryer 1930), a contingent of Lekwiltok canoes was driven by a line of Esquimalt and Saanich canoes, pushing them towards bluffs within (or near) Samsun Narrows, where Coast Salish fighters were laying in wait, prepared to attack. According to Louis Pelkey of East Saanich, there were people with large rocks hidden and situated upon the bluffs on both sides of the narrows (Suttles 1949[6]:51-54).

This was the chance the Cowichans up on the rocks had been waiting for. Just as the first canoe got under the bluff those men took great rocks that they had collected and rolled them down right into the canoe, breaking it into pieces. On came the next, and the next canoes! Too late now to stop, and no good trying to turn back, for our canoes were close behind them! Twenty canoes went under that bluff, and only three got
through (Ts’umsitum and Cryer 2007 [1930]).

In other accounts, such as Jenness’ (n.d.), Lekwiltok canoes faced rocks beneath the surface of the water, snagging or wrecking upon rock reefs—again, by one account, raised by one Salish warrior’s rock power (Bob 1980). As Curtis (1970 [1913]:34) detailed, “some of them ran upon submerged rocks, and many were capsized. Those that did not capsize faced a cordon of Coast Salish canoes, and some succeeded in breaking through, but most of those that did so were overturned in the swirls of the swiftly ebbing tide.” This made them ready targets for Coast Salish warriors. Either swamped, split, sunk, or knocked overboard, many Lekwiltok “warriors were killed with spears as they swam in the water” (Humphreys n.d.). In one account, they described how the Lekwiltok were “speared like salmon” (Bazett 1910:6).

According to Florence James, some Lekwiltok canoes also fled to the shores of Maple Bay (Angelbeck and McLay 2009). Curtis (1970 [1913]:34) noted, “Some were run ashore, and their crews leaped out, only to be ruthlessly pursued and brought down.” Not all suffering was by the Lekwiltok, as Puget Sound warriors were said to have died and some canoes ran into trouble after exhausting their projectile ammunition—a Lekwiltok arrow pierced one warrior’s eye (Curtis 1970 [1913]:16; Elmendorf 1993:150).

The battle, it was said, lasted without pause for a full day (Tate n.d.), two days (Harris 1901), three days (McKelvie 1941), or four (Hill-Tout 1907). By its end, the bay was “red with the blood of the slain” (Hill-Tout 1907; also Ronden 1913; McKelvie 1941; Tate n.d.). Some accounts maintained that all the Lekwiltok warriors were killed, while others tell of stragglers who made it ashore and hid in the woods—but eventually being killed when they exposed themselves searching for clams to eat along the shores (Jenness n.d.; Curtis 1970 [1913]:34). Others were killed by Salish groups as they tried to make it back north to home villages. The night the battle was over, the Coast Salish groups built bonfires in celebration around Maple Bay (Tate n.d.), burning as fuel the wreckage of Lekwiltok canoes (Suttles 1949[6]:53-54).

Curtis (1970 [1913]:34) mentioned that when he asked his Lekwiltok informants,
they “refuse to discuss this disastrous affair, frankly admitting, when pressed, that they prefer to talk about their victories.” And, there had been many before. Indeed, in one variant account\textsuperscript{56} by Curtis (1970 [1913]:14-16), even this battle is regarded by some Puget Sound groups as an “ill-fated expedition,” as so many of their warriors had died. This account is important as it highlights how the battle is portrayed somewhat differently by different Coast Salish groups (see Angelbeck and McLay 2009).

Considering the number of different sources, the accounts of the Battle at Maple Bay exhibit remarkable consistency in many respects. For a battle occurring in the early to mid 1800s, the number of participants and the range of sources for the accounts, these traditions exhibit common strains including: the council of war, the decoy canoe(s), surrounding the Lekwiltok on open water, the rock reefs, rocks dropped from bluff edges, and the redness of the bay. The battle is commonly described as the last battle with the Lekwiltok, ending the major cycle of raids.

Moreover, the differences in these accounts stem more from which portions of the battle they reveal: some discuss battle preparations, words or deeds just before battle, or indicate aspects known about catching and killing stragglers. These kinds of differences reveal distinct sources for the story, whether Cowichan, Saanich, or Twana. These groups all participated in the battle, but each experienced it differently, likely because each group participated in distinct theatres of battle, as attested in the more detailed accounts (e.g., Humphreys n.d.; Tate n.d.; Hill-Tout 1907; Elmendorf 1993).

Differing histories of the battle are evident because each group highlights its own leaders and warriors rather than those of other groups. There was Tzouhalem for the Cowichan, Dexwsdíx’ab for the Skagit, Chidaskuid of the Puyallup, Ca’wicut of the Lummi, Frank Allen’s great uncle Big Jim of the Twana, Kitsap for the Nisqually, Quala of the Saanich, Hiloquib of the Duwamish, Stah-qult of the Snanaimuq and Thulpult of

\textsuperscript{56} Curtis’ (1970 [1913]:14-16) second account is considered a variant because it is about the Puget Sound groups against the Cowichan. However, it otherwise is remarkably similar, including the arrow in the eye of a Puget Sound warrior, as in Frank Allen’s telling (Elmendorf 1993:150); in fact, Elmendorf (1993:153) regarded Curtis’ second account as a variant of the Maple Bay battle.
the Cowichan, among many others. When taking these accounts in total, it cannot be said which warriors were the most important, rather, many warriors were important—and particularly important for the villages and groups they represented (Angelbeck and McLay 2009). The variety of leaders and heroes, when viewed in total, appears as a Coast Salish arena of contestation as each group proclaims its warriors’ lead role in the decisive battle. That is, there is no hierarchy of leaders here, but a heterarchy of great warriors. This extended to the council of war, where each group advanced its own unique reasons for participating in the alliance. This was not complete Coast Salish unity—after all, some declined to join the alliance and a few Comox were apparently allied with the Lekwiltok. In the lead up to and during the battle, there was unity of the Coast Salish, but once the external threat of the Lekwiltok had ended, these accounts indicate contests over who was important and even about who was present and participated in the battle. In other words, in true anarchic fashion, they returned to more autonomous forms of interaction, as the need for such large-scale coalitions had passed.57

After quoting Boas’ account of the first expedition against the Lekwiltok and then Curtis’ recounting of the Battle at Maple Bay, Suttles (1954:46) remarked that:

Evidently tribes from the Nanaimo to the Suquamish and the Skagit participated; the degree of cooperation and basis of organization, in what appears to be a rather loosely organized society, presents an interesting problem which has yet to be solved.

Suttles (1954:46) revealed this as a perplexing incident for a “loosely organized society,” operating primarily at a household scale of organization. But had he viewed it as an anarchic one, where networks of alliances can form bonds appropriate to the scale and nature of the threat, such broad scale coalitions could be more readily conceptualized. An anarchic form of organization retains its locus of autonomy at the

57. Some could argue that the gathering of Salish groups throughout Puget Sound for the signing of the Point Elliot Treaty in 1855 was another such moment, where the Coast Salish unified in great numbers, albeit not for war (Harmon 1998:226).
smallest unit—in the Coast Salish case, the household—but enacts and implements alliances readily with other households and groups as it serves their interests, needs, and values. As Carlson (2003:23) recognized, in discussing postcontact Puget Sound groups, “The key” to understanding Coast Salish political affiliations was “to recognize that they were built upon social networks which at certain times, and under certain circumstances, could be operationalized into a formal political unity.”

An intriguing aspect of a Cowichan account of the battle is what happened immediately before: Cowichan warriors had returned to their village to find it burned to the ground with many slaughtered—the women and children were taken as slaves; as Hill-Tout (1978 [1907]:160) put it: “Not even a dog remained.” Most of the Cowichan warriors had been away, raiding and pillaging Coast Salish villages throughout Puget Sound. It was then, on seeing this devastation upon their return, that they called on other groups for a council of war. Among the many groups called to action were groups in Puget Sound—where the Cowichan had just raided. In addition, many other groups cooperated that had been recorded ethnographically to be “enemies.” In spite of these previous enmities, these groups come together to avenge the Lekwiltok predations, both recent and past.

The Contextual Nature of Enmity and Alliance

The oral histories about the battle illustrate a core principle of Coast Salish social organization: groups act largely autonomously, but they organize together into larger networks to meet specific needs or threats that cross-cut many groups. In the absence of such conditions, local autonomy reigns. There is an Arabic saying that expresses this concept: “It is me against my brothers; it is my brothers and me against our cousins; and it is our cousins, my brothers and me against the world” (Barfield 2004:266).

To make this saying fit the Coast Salish situation, we should insert the household as a unit between brothers (or immediate family) and cousins (extended family), and we would need to add affinal allies created through marriage—but the principle is the same:
there is autonomy first, even conflict and tension, at the smallest scale (brother vs. brother), but bottom-up unity to face larger threats. Moreover, it is a temporary unity or alliance, lasting for as long as the conditions that generate it. Just as warriors were given control of a village only for the duration of the battle, broader alliances were disbanded at the close of the hostilities. This is just as Curtis (1970 [1913]:14) noted, “There was constant internal strife ... among the Puget Sound Indians, but on rare occasions there was cooperation for the purpose of checking the warlike northern tribes.”

These scales of alliance are depicted as increasing from the base in the household and incrementally increasing in scale to include larger alliances with other households in the village, regional networks, and distant affinal alliances (Figure 39). Each scale of social organization has a corresponding material manifestation in an archaeologically visible defensive feature: household scale of defense indicated by underground houses, or even in Suttles’ (1991:219) description of the “house as fortress;” allied households or villages cooperate in the construction of fortifications, both trench-embankment forts and stockades; and defensive sites participate in regional networked defenses with lookouts, signal stations, and lines-of-sight communication and access between forts. Affinal alliances, the largest scale, are indicated in the overall distribution of defensive sites throughout the Coast Salish area, representing a broad sharing of practices between distant allies. Oral histories indicate such unity as demonstrated by the broad coalition for the Battle at Maple Bay.

To sum up, while archaeological interpretations often emphasize intertribal warfare, the ethnography, ethnohistory and oral histories suggest a great deal of warfare among Coast Salish groups. The archaeological record shows—with the dense distribution of defensive sites throughout the area, the pairing of defensive sites with nearby villages and village-scale defense, household examples of defense, and networks of defense—indicates multiple scales of defensive coordination. This material record requires an interpretative framework that is consistent with the historical and
Figure 39: Scalar portrayal of social organization and corresponding defensive manifestation.

Our interpretations must be consistent with our understanding of Coast Salish social organization driven by the bottom-up.
Chapter IX: Autonomy and Alliance
Scales of Organization and Scales of Defense

In the prior chapters, I have considered the array of Coast Salish defensive sites primarily in their form and spatial distributions. In this chapter, I expand upon the network formation of defensive sites and examine temporal changes in defensive types. In the last 1600 years there were two periods of warfare. The first occurred during the Late Period, beginning with the transition and decline of the Marpole Period (with defensive sites dating between 1600 to 500 BP) and the second, after Euroamerican contact (ca 200 BP). What makes these periods distinct is the presence of archaeologically visible defensive sites. In this chapter, I evaluate the scale of defensive sites for both periods of warfare: both the scale of organization and the scale of construction. The scale of construction for defensive sites is indicative of the scale of sociopolitical organization. As discussed in the last chapter, Coast Salish political organization allowed for high degrees of local autonomy at the household scale but yet was ready to enable larger scales of social cooperation through networks of alliances, in order to respond to military threats.

The complex sociopolitical organization of Northwest Coast cultures has long confounded their classification within general anthropological models of sociopolitical evolution. The quandary, as Matson and Coupland (1995:29) have formulated it, is that the culture area “exhibit[s] high social complexity, but low political complexity.” For this reason, the cultures of the Northwest Coast, and particularly the Coast Salish, have been presented as exceptions to most evolutionary models of social organization in anthropology (e.g., Fried 1967; Service 1975). These models typically are constructed as trajectories, often teleological ones, that lead to states; that is, these are models based on centralization. As I have discussed throughout the previous chapters, Coast Salish
sociopolitical organization manifested in a decentralized manner, or in an anarchic fashion. Here, I focus on how this anarchic sociopolitical organization is reflected in Coast Salish defensive organization. I will begin with the Marpole/Late Period transition, beginning ca. 1600 BP—a period when we see the initial expansion of defensive sites.

The Distribution of Defensive Sites

Defensive sites, as discussed in the previous chapter, reflect an increasing scale of organization, from household and village defenses to regional networks of sites. This is a reflection of how households were politically autonomous units unto themselves. As Suttles (1951:278) described, in discussing the establishment and construction of a village at Saanichton, “In this case it is clear that the houses which made up the village were built and owned separately.” That is, a village was not a cohesive unit but rather a cluster of households.

Local autonomy of the Coast Salish has also been described by Marian Smith (1940:6-7), who noted that categorical systems from other North American culture areas “proved difficult” to apply to the Northwest Coast. She stated that “The organization of such a people can best be described by stating the various affiliations to which men might give their allegiance at different times and under different circumstances” (Smith 1940:6). She presented a model for scales of identification for southern Puget Sound. It begins foremost with the family group, extends to the household, and then the village group (notably not the village as a whole). Next, identification is associated with the village in particular, and then the extended village drainage and broader watershed

Notably, the “village” may not refer to one specific location, but can sometimes can include several house clusters in proximity, as Collins (1974:15-20, 1980) also detailed for the Skagit River villages. Archaeologically, these would be recognized as separate sites, but these should be considered in a broader association. Snyder (n.d.) related to Bryan (1963:40-41) that two archaeological sites in Penn Cove appeared related as well: one site was for the “middle class” at Penn Cove Park (45SK50); across the cove, at Snatelum Point (45SK13) were the upper class houses. Snyder’s informants stated that S’Golai-a and his family were able to move to Snatelum Point, likely indicating a promotion of status; this movement between classes is a topic for the next chapter, however, the point here is that individual and group identification described by Smith (1940) is not simply conceptual but manifests in spatial
system. It is a model of identification that is bottom-up: it begins with family first and then involves larger scales of identification. However, these villages were not their year-round occupation; while they had main villages, they also had seasonal camps and fishing sites that would be lived at. A group’s sense of identification to place would have been tied to numerous locations.59

Suttles (1951:272) also noted that most social organization was organized on the household scale:

The family was the basic unit in production and in consumption. It kept its own food supply and kept its own fire.... However, the more productive subsistence activities, the exchange of many kinds of possessions, the conducting of ceremonies, and defense from enemy attack required the cooperation of several families.

Suttles also emphasized that such cooperation was carried out through affinal relations, marriages and alliances with other families. It is clear from Suttles that scales of allegiance extend not rigidly up the increasing scale provided by Smith (1940:6-7), but extend more branch-like through webs of allegiances even outside one’s own local area. These connections are generally not linked village to village, but rather the bonds are household to household, just as marriages are arranged. There was also a preference to marry or ally to a family of “a status at least as equal to its own” (Suttles 1951:289). This is a dynamic for elites that in some ways encourages stronger ties to those distantly located than with those lower class people from other households in the village. Over time, without major changes or disruption, these repeated marriages and alliances with others of similar status would perpetuate and accentuate class divisions.

The primary alliances between households and between communities

movement when that identification switches.

59. Florence James, a Penelakut elder, related this principle of identification to numerous places in regards to her great-grandmother who lived at their main village at Lamalchi Bay. During a visit to the site, she described to us how they saw settlers moving in to their camps across the way on Saltspring Island. As she recounted, even though they were residing at Lamalchi Bay at the time, she said: “They lived there [on Saltspring Island]. That’s why it was such an offense. Because they didn’t just live here, they lived there, too” (Angelbeck and McLay 2008). That infringement led to the murder of one of those settlers, and the reprisal attack mentioned above (see pg. 183).
were those established by marriages. A marriage was ordinarily arranged by the families rather than by the couple to be married, and they arranged it with the benefits to be derived from the alliance clearly in mind. The wedding itself was the occasion for the display and transfer of privileges. Throughout its existence the marriage was the basis for an exchange of food and wealth between the two families. If the alliance was a satisfactory one it often continued to exist beyond the lifetime of one of the couple through the operation of the levirate or sororate (Suttles 1951:289).

Further, Suttles (1951:291-292) noted that the “more important” men had several wives, reflecting their alliances with numerous households:

Often the wives were from different communities; in this way a man established alliances with several other communities. The Lummi warrior sa’xwemgen had six or seven wives, one Klallum, one Duwamish, one Samish, one Skagit, one Lummi, one possibly Saanich, and perhaps another whose origin was forgotten (Suttles 1951:291-292).

Much of Suttles’ discussion of marriage alliances concerned the economic advantages and privileges that a household might gain. But, the alliance also implies defense. Family members were intertwined so that a threat to one household was also a threat towards one’s family members in related households, following the principle of social substitutability elaborated by Kelly (2000). Also, as these alliances allow privileges—rights to access certain berry areas or clam gardens, for instance—a threat to one household therefore becomes a threat to their allies’ privileges. Moreover, the attacked household would in all likelihood call upon its allied households for food and labour investment to rebuild. Affinal alliances confer on households the right to call upon related households if their food stores were raided. This reciprocal relationship ensures that related households assisted each others’ security. This mutual-interest relationship meets what Tattersall (2006) described as a “deep coalition.” This is just to point out that an attack on one household affects the potential or accessible capital of their allies as well.

Suttles’ (1951:289) description of Coast Salish alliances is more detailed than Smith’s (1940:6-7). To be fair, Smith’s model is more about regional identification, increasing from a household to the village to the villages that reside in a river valley, for example. The model implies concentric rings of increasing social scale with the implicit
notion that each larger unit of scale (household, drainage, or river valley) has a sociopolitical coherence, when it often does not. Instead, those larger scales of unity are dependent on allied households that may or may not constitute the whole drainage or river valley at all. Suttles’ (1951:289-293) description of marriage alliances implies a different sociopolitical dynamic: one that begins with the household and does not extend simply to the next tier of neighbours up the drainage or inlet, but rather branches out, near and far, to households in other villages. So, the pattern of alliances is in practice rather more web-like with cross-cutting networks. Therefore, the increasing scales of alliance would not necessarily extend out of the village and up the local drainage area, but could extend in multiple directions to islands and other drainages close and even quite distant. In fact, the greater the distance of an ally was usually equated with greater prestige, a form of greater social capital. The more alliances, the greater amount of potential organizational power (iii) one had and the more types of resources (capital) a household would be able to access.

The bottom-up, decentralized sociopolitical organization of the Coast Salish allowed households to be the predominant form of power, anchoring power in the local. At the same time, there were principles that facilitated voluntary association with other households in networks of alliances, after the form of increasing scalar organization offered by Kropotkin (1910; e.g., see pg. 30 above). This dynamic of autonomy and alliance manifests such patterns in the organization of defense as indicated in the defensive sites through Coast Salish territory.

**Archaeological Evidence for Networks of Defense**

The increasing scale of defensive organization shifting from the household to the region exhibits a networked pattern in the types of sites used for defense. First, as discussed in the last chapter, there is a household scale of defense, or what was described as the “house as fortress” (Suttles 1991:219). Also, there were external household refuges employed by much of the Northern and some Central Coast Salish
groups. Barnett (1944, 1955) as discussed above, described these “underground houses,” also called “fighting houses,” as hidden refuges, sometimes distant but also within the village itself. His informants named four specific locales for these types of houses, and one of which indicated Smelt Bay on Cortes Island. For the rest of this chapter, I will focus on the village at Smelt Bay and related Late Period sites in the region as an example of the increasing and networked scales of defense.

On the surface map of the Smelt Bay site, two prominent parallel ridges outline the back for two rows of plankhouses and perpendicular ridges mark the plankhouse side walls (Figure 40). Two of the house outlines, however, do not fit the typical plankhouse pattern: both were not structures built on the ground surface but were excavated up to 1.5 m into the surface, with the floors reaching into the old beach gravels. These match the descriptions by Barnett (1944) regarding their depth and in their rectangular shape. Moreover, only the two subterranean depressions are located at the margins of the plankhouse site area. One underground house (UH 1) is located at the southern extent of one row, while the other (UH 2) is located behind a house on the second row. I interpret that the entrances as hidden ramps from adjacent houses, or as he described them, a “gangway sloped down to the floor level entry” (Barnett 1955:49). These adjacent houses likely controlled access to these hideouts (See Figure 11, for a detailed wireframe view of UH 1).

The ratio of regular plankhouses to underground houses is low, or about eleven houses to two underground houses. Not every household had one of these. Barnett (1944:268) indicated that subterranean houses were built by wealthy households who could afford such investments in labour. In times of attack, households with subterranean houses would be better protected. Contrary to Suttles’ (1951:277)

60. A possible third but much small refuge [UH 3] appears to be located behind another plankhouse to the immediate north of UH 2. It is very small in comparison to Barnett’s descriptions, but it may represent a refuge for hiding stores of food or other valuables.

61. Barnett (1944:268) also described these as “secret passageways leading from the plank house by a concealed opening in the floor.” He also mentioned “tunnels” leading out (Barnett 1955:49).
suggestion that defense was one of the functions coordinated by the “village as a whole,” these two subterranean houses indicate a form of defense coordinated by households. Such an interpretation would be in keeping with the types of threats that households faced, according to oral histories and ethnographies. For instance, attacks were often directed not at whole villages, but aimed at particular houses, as would be consistent with the nature of revenge attacks between feuding families.

Barnett (1955:268-269) noted that attacking parties scouted to “select the house or houses to be attacked,” and “the party got away to their canoes before the village defenders from other houses could counterattack.” Among the Coast Salish, given inter-marriage ties, such assaults presented problems when the attacker’s were related to some households in a village. For instance, Frank Allen described how Dungeness Klallam warriors did not wish to attack all of the Hoodsport groups at a camp, so they warned someone familiar with those at the site: “If there’s anybody over there, in the camp of the Hoodsport people, that is related to you, that you want to save, go and get
them ... when they come across the canal, we won't kill them” (Elmendorf 1993:131).

Also, one household may be in league with the attackers, as occurred in one Lummi account, whereby “the members of one house ... by prearranged signal built a big fire in their house and stayed safely inside while the enemy attacked the rest of the community” (Suttles 1951:323). These examples indicate the autonomous actions of households in both defense and attack. As discussed above, the murder of an individual could readily escalate to retaliation by several of the victim’s household members. Since there were attacks directed at particular houses, the coordination of a household strategy for defense would appear to meet a common form of threat. However, since only two households appear to have controlled these underground houses, there likely would have been different defensive strategies for the other households, and there are other defensive sites in the area surrounding Smelt Bay (Figure 41).

Several fortification sites are located nearby in a perimeter that radiates from Smelt Bay, including other underground houses and several trench-embankment sites.
According to Barnett (1944:267), underground houses were also present at the eastern part of Cortes Island, likely the Cortes Bay area. Trench-embankment sites in the Smelt Bay area include Manson’s Landing to the north (discussed above), two at the northern and southern tips of Marina Island across the bay, and three on Hernando Island to the southeast. Newcombe (n.d.) also noted a defensive site at Gorge Harbour; likely it is the site located at the eastern side of the entrance (EaSg-6), which is located on a high bluff at the entrance and exhibits a “series of dirt terraces....” that appear “man-made” (Archaeology Branch 2008). Moreover, at Whaletown to the northwest, there is a spot named for its association as a lookout; it has a broad view across the Strait of Georgia, whereas the view northwestward from the village of Smelt Bay is largely obscured by Marina Island. It has a view across the channel towards the fort site of Rebecca Spit.

While there are several trench-embankment fortifications near Smelt Bay, the size of each is comparatively small to the size of the village at Smelt Bay, which exhibited a minimum of thirteen houses extending approximately 260 m long and 60 m wide, covering an area of 15,600 m² (Table 3); there were likely even more houses but the archaeological evidence for those has been obscured or destroyed by development in recent decades, which means the overall size of Smelt Bay would have been even larger. The trench-embankment sites in the area, however, are much smaller, averaging 47.8 x 24 m, or 1273.4 m². It is unlikely that any particular fortification site was predominantly for (or could adequately contain) all of the villagers at Smelt Bay, since the trench-embankments are significantly smaller, less than 10% of the total area of Smelt Bay. Since refuges are temporary occupations, a smaller area might have been tolerable for

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62. There is oral history relating to the spotting of Haida warriors there, allowing for a warning before the coming attack (Black, Urbanczyk, and Weinstein 2000); afterwards, it was named T’ik’ln, or “place where you get discovered” (Kennedy and Bouchard 1983:155).

63. This area for the village of Smelt Bay is only restricted to the length and width of high midden berms that outline the houses; many of the berms and house outlines have been obscured by developments within the park and the adjacent private lots. The full midden extends over 800 m and is largely deep (often 1.5 to 2 m) and broad for much of its extent, so the area of 15,600 m² is conservative.
Table 3: Size of Smelt Bay village, its defensive houses, and regional defensive sites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borden No.</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Average Area by Type (m²)</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EaSF-2</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>15,600</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EaSF-2</td>
<td>Smelt Bay UH 1*</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>EaSF-2</td>
<td>Smelt Bay UH 2*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>156</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>203.00</td>
<td>203.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRENCH-EMBANKMENT SITES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EaSF-1</td>
<td>Manson’s Landing*</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>874</td>
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<tr>
<td>EaSG-1</td>
<td>Marina Island S**</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EaSG-2</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>325</td>
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<tr>
<td>DI5F-4</td>
<td>Boulder Pt, Hernando Isl.**</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>DI5F-5</td>
<td>Hernando Island Southeast**</td>
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<td>3116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1273.40</td>
<td>1273.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Measurements from Angelbeck 2009a
**Measurements from Buxton 1969

limited duration. However, the size of these fortifications is more likely associated not with the village as a whole, but with allied households. The underground houses provide an example area that is suggestive for the area of a household scale of defense, as UH 1 and UH 2 at Smelt Bay average 11 x 19 m, or 203 m². The average area of the nearby fortification sites, at 1273.4 m², indicates three or four allied households, with perhaps just two households at EaSG-1 on Marina Island (325 m²) to about four households at Boulder Point on Hernando Island, DI5F-4. The largest trench-embankment site in the area, DI5F-5 on Hernando Island, is only about one-fifth the area of Smelt Bay.

There is a substantial disparity in the size of the Smelt Bay village to the average size of defensive sites in the area (Figure 42). Two interpretations are possible to account for this. Either a whole village could retreat to the confines of a much smaller
refuge, and do so uncomfortably, probably tolerating such conditions only temporarily. Some refuges are small enough, such as EaSg-1 on Marina Island at 325 m², that the total population of Smelt Bay are unlikely to have used it. Alternatively, only a few households used those defensive sites. This latter interpretation, of a distributed defense, is more in keeping with Coast Salish forms of social organization—rarely was anything done on a village scale.

This might be an indication of a lack of village-scale defense, in contrast to Suttles. However, considering Coast Salish traditions of distributed networks of cooperation and alliance, the other sites in the area need to be considered for proper context. Given the number of defensive sites in close proximity to Smelt Bay and their Late Period contemporaneity, these smaller defensive sites more likely form a network of defense for the population at Smelt Bay and surrounds (Figure 43). This
interpretation is similar to Schaepe’s (2006) suggestion for the Fraser Canyon network of defense, albeit tailored to the island environment.

Nearly each one of these defensive sites maintains a line of sight to another, while others are accessible from Smelt Bay site. In area, each is much smaller than Smelt Bay, while Smelt Bay maintains a wide scope of view and a couple of households have organized defenses of their own with hidden underground refuges. With distributed network of defenses, the potential breadth of visibility is magnified. Maschner (1996) has described the shifting politics of village settlement in the Late Pacific Period for the northern Northwest Coast, where residential sites shifted from the central portions of concave bays to the outskirts of bays where they had greater breadth of visibility of the open sea. Here, in the Northern Gulf Islands, as within the Fraser Canyon, a network of sites contemporaneously occupied multiplies the breadth of visibility with numerous vantage points and lines of sight, augmented by lookout spots, fire signal stations, and messengers (e.g., Haeberlin and Gunther 1930:13; Stern 1934:101; Suttles 1951:322).
For such a region, a decentralized type of defense provides many advantages. First, a communication network throughout the area around Smelt Bay would help provide warning of an impending attack from many directions; this allows time for the households to prepare for attack. A regional network of lookouts, signal stations, and messengers indicates a form of coordination and organizational power (iii) on a regional scale. Moreover, the early detection of attackers allows time for the households to prepare for battle, to engage in battle on their own terms, from fortified positions. By controlling the setting of battle, they enact a form of structural power (iv).

Second, a decentralized network of defense proportionately minimizes the threat to each household. Since each household handled its own primary defense—either in an underground house or defensive refuge in conjunction with a few other allied households—they would disperse to their defensive structures, when confronted with an impending attack. Then, the attackers would have to direct their efforts at one defensive fortification, or one node in the defensive network—only a portion of those households from the village would be bearing the brunt of the attack. If the attackers decided to attack two fortifications, they would have to partition their offensive teams into smaller groups, which would decrease the attackers’ organizational power (iii).

While one fortification in the networked defense would be bearing the brunt of attack, this does not mean that they would be sacrificial offerings to attackers. As a group, they occupy a fortified site, plus there are lines of sight to other nearby fortifications. This makes it possible for warriors and fighters from those other nodes to come to their aid, potentially outflanking the attackers from other sides, surrounding them or at least shifting the locus of battle from the fort to the shoreline or the sea. This would further enhance their control of the setting of battle, thereby increasing their structural power (iv).

Such a model of defense not only seems apparent from the settlement pattern and lines of sight between these Late Period sites, but it is also consistent with the anarchic nature of Coast Salish sociopolitical organization, retaining the autonomy of
households, yet enabling cooperation in allied networks. Moreover, there is evidence for the distributed coordination of attacks by the Coast Salish.

**Historic Evidence for Strategies of Defensive Site Distribution and Cooperation**

There are numerous oral histories that describe how Coast Salish groups worked both defensively and offensively in distributed rather than centralized forms of organization. There were many cases where they launched attacks or planned defense from several nodes at once. In the previous section, I mentioned how Coast Salish employed scouts, lookouts, signal stations, and messengers to create a widespread communication network. The Snoqualmie had lookouts along the upper and lower portions of the Snoqualmie River valley, and they used smoke signals and messengers to communicate to the residents further up the valley. Upon hearing warning, able fighters and warriors would head to the fortification at Sand Hill, while women and children would seek refuge in the steep-walled narrows below Snoqualmie Falls (Tollefson 1996:155). Among the Semiahmoo, runners would dispatch to the Lummi when an attack was foreseen (Suttles 1951:322). The Lummi similarly also would dispatch messengers when an attack was impending.

In one account, Stern (1934:100-101) described an attack by the Lekwiltok. In two canoes, they attacked the Klallam, taking one woman as captive. Afterward, the warriors made camp on Lummi island, and made plans to attack the Lummi the next day. When they rested during the day, all of the Lekwiltok fell asleep—so the captive woman managed to escape. She ran across the island to the north side, toward where she knew Lummi people were living. When she got close, she saw that they were trolling for salmon in Hales Pass, and called for help, yelling that the Lekwiltok were coming. They dispatched messengers to other villages. Warriors soon arrived, presumably within hours. By the time the Lekwiltok approached, “the Lummi were prepared to meet them.” One Lummi warrior fired from a small bluff while others shot
at them from the beach. They were able to kill many of the Lekwiltok attackers and drive away the rest.

Another example involves Barnett’s (1944:266) description of the use of underground houses as part of a distributed defensive strategy. He mentioned that the stockaded village at Salmon Bay in Toba Inlet had underground tunnels that led out of the stockade to refuge areas in the woods behind the village, with one informant describing the tunnels leading to an “underground refuge chamber.” This indicates the coordination of two different defensive structures, both stockades and underground refuges.

During his archaeological survey in Northern Puget Sound, Bryan (1963:76) recorded a story about an attack by “northern Indians.” I had mentioned the beginning of the story in describing lookout sites (see page 174), where the lookout spotted the northern warriors from Fort Nugent, a trench-embankment fortification on the west side of Whidbey Island:

The lookout ran back to the village to give warning. The local warriors, including himself, advanced to the center of the island where they met the invaders. A short skirmish ensued, and the defenders retreated rapidly to the enclosed area of the entrenchment. Pointed stakes had been placed upright in the bottom of the trench, which was then camouflaged, leaving only a narrow passageway into the enclosure. The invaders charged into the area, expecting to push the defenders over the cliff, but instead fell through the camouflage and were impaled on the sticks. The defenders then dispatched all of their enemies in proper order (Bryan 1963:76).

The battle occurred at Penn Cove Manor (45IS50), at another defensive fortification, indicating coordination of defensive communication across both sides of the island and between fortifications. This indicates coordination of defensive efforts between fortifications—not just outer lookouts that might be associated with just one fort, but cooperation between two forts. Those in the fortification to the west were not attacked, but they alerted the people at a fort to the east. Since households ally to create fortifications, as Suttles (1951:278) described, the cooperation between fortifications indicates a larger scale of alliance and cooperation between sets of allied households.
For the Battle at Maple Bay, there was coordination of multiple groups, working from various positions on the landscape and seascape in a networked approach to the battle. A similar strategy and pattern of interaction was exhibited at another battle, as recorded by the British Navy in 1863 at Lamalchi Bay on Kuper Island. In Chapter IV, I mentioned the use of structural power (iv) by the British when they used cannons to demolish native villages in an expression of “gunboat diplomacy.” Indeed, it worked most of the time. However, for the Battle at Lamalchi Bay, on April 20, 1863, the British gunboat faced structural power in resistance, with the Lamalcha taking advantage of the landscape of the bay. The British entered the bay with their gunboat and aimed directly for the blockhouse, located in the centre of the village. Based on the logs of the Forward for that day (cited in Arnett 1999:135, 344), they did not expect to be flanked on the side by lookout-sniper stations.

“At the end of the appointed time,” Laschelles reported, “I hauled down the flag and fired into the Village which they deserted immediately.” It was approximately 1 p.m. As soon as the gunboat fired a shell at the village the hidden Lamalcha riflemen, at Squ’acum’s command, “opened a very sharp fire of musketry ...from the two points of land at the entrance of the Bay.” The Lamalcha “fired simultaneously, raking the gunboat and stern”—their shots “ploughing up the deck.” The Forward lay lengthwise along the line of fire, and the crew were unprotected by the rifle plates which were only placed along the sides of the ship (Arnett 1999:135)

Based on the logs of the Forward, Arnett included a map, indicating the arena of battle as detailed by the British (Figure 44). The account and the map reveal the coordination (“fired simultaneously”) of attack from multiple vantage points, with snipers at lookout stations at both points at the entrance to the bay as well as warriors in the central blockhouse, and even one shooting from high up in a tree. These defensive efforts indicate a coordination of attack from multiple vantage points, with a blockhouse in the centre the focus of the British Navy, while snipers occupy the points on both sides of the bay.

There is also an account that indicates dispersal as a method of defense. After
leading Nisqually attacks upon settlers in and around Seattle in 1855, the warrior Leschi expected retaliation. He “counselling the Nisqually to scatter in small bands among the mountains” (Curtis 1970[1913]:18). The method of dispersing into smaller bands minimizing potential chances for the whole group to be attacked. This strategy is likely also a part of networked defenses of several smaller defensive sites, as discussed in the previous section.

These accounts illustrate how a decentralized approach to warfare can be effective against large-scale attacks, especially for communicating warnings of attacks and distributing defenses to various regional fortifications. However, as we know from historic accounts and oral histories, such violent threats were not always substantial attacks upon the whole village—in fact, smaller-scale threats and attacks were even more common. Given the autonomy of households within a village, conflicts that erupted were not always or were not commonly intended for the village as a whole. A
decentralized approach defense allowed the Coast Salish to have defenses that served to protect the household and other closely allied households, while also enabling a regional network of defensive sites that allowed a broader scale of cooperation and protection. These networks of defense likely continued into the colonial period, but with alterations.

Indications for the Increasing Frequency of Attacks

After European contact, there was increased social and political turbulence along with the influx of new trade goods as well as European epidemics that led to social reorganization (e.g., Carlson 2007). The Lekwiltok, for example, took advantage of this turmoil, expanding their raiding activities, beginning around AD 1790. They had structural advantages of organization and technology and were more populous than the Coast Salish as well as having ready access to firearms (Angelbeck 2007). This imbalance created a situation of political and social uncertainty. The Coast Salish required an organization of defense to meet this new threat.

One indication of this new political order is the appearance of new types of defensive practices and structures in the colonial period that were not previously used; the difference in the dating of trench-embankment sites versus stockades is apparent. Trench-embankment sites date between 1580 and 510 BP (Figure 45; Table 4). Stockades after contact date from AD 1792, with the Spanish and documented by Gunther (1927:183-184) to as late as the 1860s or 1880s (Table 5). There is also a significant difference in the scale of these sites. The size of stockades from the visitors and ethnographers indicate a much larger size of defensive structure (Table 6), averaging 90.3 x 47 m in size, or 4611.2 m². In the previous section, I described how the underground houses were much smaller compared to trench-embankment sites in the Smelt Bay area (see Figure 42 and Table 3, pg. 253). This pattern extends to the rest of the Coast Salish area underground houses and trench-embankment sites (Tables 7 and 8). Moreover, the scale to stockades is even greater compared to trench-
Radiocarbon Dates from Trench-Embankment Sites (BP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Borden No.</th>
<th>Date ±</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Lab No.</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
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<td>Cardale Point</td>
<td>DgRv-1</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>Shell*</td>
<td>Beta 153507</td>
<td>Grier and McLay 2001</td>
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<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>SFU-123</td>
<td>Keddie 1983</td>
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<td>580</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
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<td>705</td>
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<td>I-4008</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
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<td>DcRu-23</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>SFU-772</td>
<td>Keddie 1995; CARD</td>
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<td>DcRu-23</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>SFU-773</td>
<td>Keddie 1995; CARD</td>
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<td>1190</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>I-4007</td>
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<td>GaK-1484</td>
<td>Moss and Erlandson 1992; CARD</td>
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*Shell dates are corrected for the marine reservoir effect (Deo, Stone and Stein 2004; Stuiver et al. 1998).

Figure 45: Radiocarbon dates recovered at trench-embankment sites.

Table 4: Radiocarbon dates recovered at trench-embankment sites.
Table 5: Historical and ethnographic records documenting dates for stockades.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stockade</th>
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<th>Source</th>
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<td>Beach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cowichan area</td>
<td>1850s</td>
<td>W.C. Grant (1857:300)</td>
<td>River terrace</td>
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<td>Shingle Point</td>
<td>1853</td>
<td>William Ebrington Gordon</td>
<td>Beach</td>
<td>Site DgRv-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keekullukhun</td>
<td>1850s</td>
<td>Suttles (2004); MacDonald (1990)</td>
<td>Beach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kullukhun</td>
<td>1850s</td>
<td>Suttles (2004); MacDonald (1990)</td>
<td>Beach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swinomish fort</td>
<td>1800-50s</td>
<td>Sampson 1972:27-28</td>
<td>River bank/Slough</td>
<td>General date estimate; Sullivan Slough; trenches with stakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-eh-nus</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>Paul Kane</td>
<td>Beach</td>
<td>See Figure 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadboro Bay</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>Jean-Baptiste Bolduc (Newcombe  n.d.)</td>
<td>Beach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dungeness Spit</td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>Charles Pickering (1854:15-16)</td>
<td>Near stream, close to beach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn Cove</td>
<td>1838-42</td>
<td>Charles Wilkes (1845)</td>
<td>Beach</td>
<td>&quot;400 feet long&quot;; &quot;pickets of thick planks 30 feet high&quot;; Likely Site 45IS50.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocky Point</td>
<td>1838-42</td>
<td>Charles Wilkes (n.d.:90; cited in Bryan 1963:77)</td>
<td>Bluff</td>
<td>Near Penn Cove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaine Fort</td>
<td>1820-58</td>
<td>Suttles (1951:322-323)</td>
<td>Bluff</td>
<td>xʷsíłhas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guemes fort</td>
<td>1820-30</td>
<td>Suttles (1951:43, 322-323)</td>
<td>Beach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gooseberry Point</td>
<td>1820-30</td>
<td>Stern (1934:101-102); Suttles (1951:37-38, 322-323);</td>
<td>Beach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmon Bay</td>
<td>1800-20s</td>
<td>Barnett (1944:266-267)</td>
<td>Beach</td>
<td>Tunnels to refuge or underground houses behind stockade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Vancouver Isl.</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>Galiano &amp; Valdes (Gunther 1927:63)</td>
<td>Shore to Bluff</td>
<td>See Figure 48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Size of stockades from ethnohistoric descriptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stockade</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Width</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lummi Fort</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>&quot;[T]wo large houses ten to twelve sections each, at right angles to each other.&quot; It could be 55 m wide or larger, depending on space between houses and stockade wall.</td>
<td>Stern (1934:101-102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadboro Bay</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2226</td>
<td>&quot;127 people&quot;</td>
<td>Bolduc 1843 (cited in Keddie 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn Cove</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>45**</td>
<td>5400</td>
<td>Palisade &quot;30 feet high&quot;</td>
<td>Wilkes (1845)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-eh-nus</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2116</td>
<td>Double Palisade; Outer wall was &quot;20 feet high&quot;; Inner wall 5 feet high; Estimated 200 people</td>
<td>Kane (1971 [1847])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snatelum Point</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>In 1841, &quot;several hundred&quot; people living there (Wilkes n.d.). Also, &quot;large family 'smokehouses' here, in addition to several smaller houses belonging to the higher class of Skagits,&quot; according to Johnny Fornsby (Collins 1949:300); House outlines are 720 feet long and 200 feet wide. Midden is 1.2 m deep and extends 1200 feet. A zoomorphic whale bone club handle found (Bryan 1963:48).</td>
<td>(Wilkes n.d.; cited in Bryan 1963:47; Collins 1949:300).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tikotas</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45**</td>
<td>3250</td>
<td>&quot;...more than twenty families.&quot;</td>
<td>Curtis 1970 [1913]:175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td><strong>4611.2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Musqueam "fort" visited by Fraser in 1808 is excluded here, but at approximately 450 by 30 m, it would be 13,500 m² and significantly raise the average area (to 5881 m²). During his expedition, Fraser was familiar with both fortified villages and plankhouses, both of which he described, so his description of this as a "fort" should not be dismissed so readily. However, even if just an extended plankhouse, these were likely defensive in some aspects for the large aggregation, as Suttles (1951:332) posited.

**Lengths provided for these descriptions, but not widths, so 45 m was used as a conservative average from the others.

Table 7: Underground house size and depth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Site No.</th>
<th>House</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Width</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Depth (m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smelt Bay</td>
<td>EaSF-2</td>
<td>UH 1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UH 2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn Cove</td>
<td>45IS50</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>119.56</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Bryan 1963)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14.05</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.56</strong></td>
<td><strong>141.01</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All measurements in metres (Angelbeck 2009a; Bryan 1963).
Table 8: Trench-embankment fortification sizes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Site Number</th>
<th>Front to Back</th>
<th>Width</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cardale Point</td>
<td>DgRv-1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2704</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2009b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquilar Point</td>
<td>DfSg 3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeRt 41</td>
<td>DeRt-41</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>Buxton 1969; Cassidy et al. 1974; Wilson 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime Bay</td>
<td>DcRu-123</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3600</td>
<td>Keddie 1983; Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finlayson Point</td>
<td>DcRu-23</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>Keddie 1995; Buxton 1969; Smith 1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mackaye Harbor</td>
<td>45SJ205</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>13,050</td>
<td>Bryan 1963:75; Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenbank</td>
<td>45IS16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>Bryan 1963; Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blower's Bluff</td>
<td>45IS47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>Bryan; 15 Buxton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn Cove Manor</td>
<td>45IS52</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>Bryan 1963; Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manson’s Landing</td>
<td>EaSf-1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2009a; Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desolation Sound fort</td>
<td>EaSd 3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>Menzies; Angelbeck 2009a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hernando Island</td>
<td>DlSf-6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comox Defensive Site</td>
<td>DkSf-6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>McMurdo 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Fort Site</td>
<td>DgRr-5</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2006; Simonsen 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double Bluff</td>
<td>45IS25</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>5104.5</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrona Beach</td>
<td>45IS10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2960</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequim Bay</td>
<td>DiSe-7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3780</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deep Bay</td>
<td>DiSe-13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>Brolly 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmonds Beach</td>
<td>DcRt-14</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>1071</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yacht Club, Cadboro Bay</td>
<td>DcRv-58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3744</td>
<td>Archaeology Branch 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witty’s Lagoon</td>
<td>EaSg-2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Spit</td>
<td>EaSh-6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3040</td>
<td>Mitchell 1968; Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EaSh 9</td>
<td>EaSh 9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulder Point</td>
<td>DiSr-4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weirs Beach</td>
<td>DcRv-12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>4708</td>
<td>Buxton 1969; Mitchell pers. comm. 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manor Point</td>
<td>DbRv-13</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2009c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note on area. Given the variation in data collected, the area is calculated by length from the bluff edge or end of peninsula to the trench or innermost trench if more than one. Given that these are semirectangular or semicircular, the actual area for many sites is somewhat smaller, but this allows for standardization from various sources.
Table 9: Average size of underground houses and trench-embankment sites to postcontact stockades.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defensive Type</th>
<th>Average Length</th>
<th>Average Width</th>
<th>Average Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Underground Houses</td>
<td>14.05</td>
<td>9.56</td>
<td>203.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench-Embankment Fortifications</td>
<td>47.31</td>
<td>52.02</td>
<td>2586.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockades</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4611.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

embankment sites throughout the region (Figure 46, Table 9).

Instead of relying upon small defensive refuges that groups had to retreat to when needed, it apparently became necessary to palisade entire residential villages for constant protection. Not all villages were palisaded—in many historic accounts, the Lekwiltok and Haida were still able to successfully attack open plankhouse villages. However, early Euroamerican accounts show that many villages were palisaded (e.g.,
Grant 1857; Theodore 1939; Kane 1971 [1847]; Wilkes 1845). Often, discussions of trench-embankment sites in the Coast Salish area rely on these ethnohistoric descriptions (e.g., Bryan 1963), however, there are substantial differences between these postcontact stockades and Late Period trench-embankment sites. The main difference is that colonial period fortifications were much larger than those of the Late Period (see Table 9; Figure 46, pg. 266). Accordingly, residential stockades enclose nearly twice the area of trench-embankment fortifications.

On a visit to a stockade described above (see page 75), Pickering (1854:15-16) stated that it was a “permanent stockaded village” with many houses within, potentially holding as many as “three hundred persons.” Trench-embankment fortifications that are known archaeologically were located upon bluff tops, high peninsular spits, and rocky headlands. Those were in inconvenient locations to inhabit, being sometimes 40 m above the beach. However, the bulk of the stockades described since contact were not in such naturally defensive locations (see Table 5). Instead, the vast majority of these fortifications were placed in bays, low spits, or river banks. For instance, the village visited and depicted by Paul Kane in 1847, the Klallam village of I-eh-nus is situated on a beach (Figure 47).64 The fort drawn by the Spanish in 1792 also extended to the water’s edge (Figure 48). Moreover, that fort is large in size, encompassing eight or more frames for houses inside, and the palisade extended from the shore up to the higher ground.

Most of the colonial period stockades—just as the one described and drawn by Kane (1971 [1847])—do not employ trenches as a defense. In the few examples of sites that did have trenches, these ditches were covered and hidden. The intention was for the attackers to fall inside and impale themselves upon poisoned sticks (e.g., Suttles 1951:322; Snyder n.d.; Bryan 1963:76). Late Period fortifications did not deploy trenches as pits; instead, they were combined with embankments that served to block and protect

---
64. Paul Kane painted two versions of the battle at I-eh-nus. One is provided (see Figure 47) while another is in watercolor, called Battle Between Clallam and Makah at I-eh-nus, and is at the Stark Museum of Art in Orange, Texas; a depiction of it is provided in Schaepe (2006).
the position of the fortified area. Given the position of trench-embankment sites upon high promontories, the trenches were excavated at their weakest points: the areas not protected by bluffs or ravines. With such architecture, people intended not to obscure their trenches but rather to showcase high embankments in the full perimeter. The point
is that colonial period stockades, while maintaining some structural similarities with prior defensive structure (i.e., palisades), were organized and constructed quite differently. It is important to consider these two types of defensive structures and their relationship to Coast Salish protocols and practices for conflict resolution.

There were more practices and options available within the Coast Salish region to resolve conflicts. As conflicts escalated from one murder, to the retaliatory gathering of warriors and fighters to avenge it or demand blood money, there were options to avoid conflict: the offending group could offer to pay “blood money” for the transgression, perform a face-saving ceremony, or accept other arrangements suitable to the group offended. When those offers to settle were declined, the conflict could escalate into fuller blown battles involving households and allies, perhaps whole villages, in attacks on others. Negotiations often were attempted, at varying levels of increasing tension in the feuds, to resolve the issue before it escalated into full-blown village versus village, or allied households versus allied households.

With non-Coast Salish groups, such protocols for conflict resolution were not as readily in place. With non-Coast Salish groups, there would have been fewer shared protocols and fewer individuals with cross-cutting ties between the groups that could help negotiate a resolution.65 Moreover, if the attacking party was formed explicitly for the purpose of raiding, there would be little interest in negotiating at all.

These two different protocols of interaction led to distinct defensive responses, resulting in the differences seen here, between defensive refuges and fortified residential villages. Trench-embankment sites were refuges; that is, they were sought only in times of conflict. Stockades, on the other hand, were used for more permanent protection.

The main evidence that trench-embankments were refuges is indicated in the stratigraphy. Most of these sites exhibit very shallow middens—generally 30 cm

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65. Collins (1974:80-81) noted that the Upper Skagit “object[ed] to the Thompson [hunting] incursions into Skagit territory [because] they did not behave in these accepted routines”—the Thompson (or Nlaka’pamux) did not follow protocols of “announcing their presence, their intentions, and to be given tacit permission.”
Table 10: Maximum midden depths within the defended areas of trench-embankment sites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site Name</th>
<th>Site No.</th>
<th>Maximum Depth of Midden*</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian Fort Site</td>
<td>DgRr-5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manor Point</td>
<td>DbRv-13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2009c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardale Point</td>
<td>DgRv-1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2009b; Grier and McLay 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desolation Sound</td>
<td>EaSd-3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2009a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Spit</td>
<td>EaSh-6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Mitchell 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towner Bay</td>
<td>DcRu-6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Mitchell 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ainslie Point</td>
<td>DeRt-41</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquilar Point</td>
<td>DfSg-3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Buxton 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime Bay</td>
<td>DcRu-123</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Keddie 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finlayson Point</td>
<td>DcRu-23</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Keddie 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comox Fort Site</td>
<td>DkSf-6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>McMurdo 1980; Archaeology Branch 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmonds Beach</td>
<td>DiSe-13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Brolly 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidney Spit</td>
<td>DdRt-2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Angelbeck (personal observation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macauley Point II</td>
<td>DcRu-22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Archaeology Branch 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=14 28.71 avg. ± 16.2

*These are maximum depths generally in the most concentrated areas of scattered midden deposits. Also, deeper midden areas may be located near the sites, as opposed to within the embankment; this is true particularly for those on sand spits, when the area is used for many other activities.

The maximum depth (Table 10), as Mitchell (1968) has noted; these may be located adjacent to areas with deep middens, however, the areas within the protected area are typically shallow. Moreover, midden areas are patchy, with little areal extent. Keddie (1996), who has investigated several of these trench-embankments, remarked that these defensive sites have “The sites contain shallow deposits of midden within the trenched off areas.” Lastly, Mitchell (1968:45) has noticed that trench-embankment sites were often located away from fresh water, making them “untenable” for long occupations. He interpreted the trench-embankments he excavated as “occasional refuges rather than fortified village settlements” (Mitchell 1968:29). In summary, the differences between these two defensive types relate to form, size, construction, features, archaeological deposits, and setting (Table 11). These differences result predominantly from their different use, between temporary refuges as opposed to residential villages. This is not
Table 11: Traits of Late Period trench-embankments versus postcontact stockaded villages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Late Period Trench-Embarkment Sites</th>
<th>Postcontact Stockaded Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use</td>
<td>Temporary Refuge</td>
<td>Residential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midden Depth</td>
<td>Thin (ca. 30 cm)</td>
<td>Thick (&gt; 2m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landforms</td>
<td>Bluff-tops, Rocky headlands, High peninsular spits</td>
<td>Beaches, River banks at confluences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Small to Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate to large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House features</td>
<td>Less prominent</td>
<td>More prominent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench features</td>
<td>Single or double trench embankments</td>
<td>Less common</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to say that trench-embankment sites were not still occupied into the historic period; in fact, with such investment in trench-embankment features, reuse would make sense.66 From the discussion of the array of defensive sites, we should expect a variety of practices to be implemented. However, the postcontact stockades mark the adaption of a traditional practice of palisaded forts to a new setting—not just a new type of landform, but a different sociopolitical field. Mitchell (1968:45) provided an insight to the trench-embankment strategy, commenting that such a defensive structure would have served well given the nature of warfare practices in the region:

... [T]he aboriginal fighting pattern rarely involved siege, being, instead, dependent almost entirely upon surprise as a tactic. With sufficient forewarning during a period of considerable conflict, villagers who feared attack could retreat to the refuge and behind its ditches and walls be reasonably secure from surprise attack (Mitchell 1968:45; emphasis added).

The strategy for stockades is not for such a scenario, as the village is already protected. Postcontact stockades were not refuges. There are two main lines of evidence that indicate that stockades were not meant for temporary occupation. First, stockades surrounded residential households, comprising the perimeter of the village. Stockades generally circumscribed all (or most) households in a village, while trench-embankment

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66. Keddie (1983) encountered postcontact materials during his investigations at Lime Bay, for instance, while the date he acquired placed it to 540 ± 80 BP.
fortifications and underground chambers were likely organized by a few households in a village. Since stockades surrounded residential villages, the middens at these sites are often several metres deep and are not patchy—the middens extend thickly across the landform, often leaving 2-m high ridges that demarcate the walls of houses, as do the midden features at Smelt Bay. At Snatelum Point, an example of an excavated stockade, Bryan (1963:47-50) recorded thick middens, up to 2.4 m deep. In total, the length of the midden is over 585 m, with most of it 1.2 m deep. This is in stark contrast to the protected areas of trench-embankment sites (see Table 10, pg. 270) which have deposits indicating short-term use.

For these reasons, I argue that the defensive refuges of the Late Period, such as trench-embankments, are predominantly indicative of conflict among Coast Salish groups. As refuges occupied for short durations, these sites indicate that a group resorted to them because a threat was known beforehand. That is, tensions escalated and attempts to resolve peaceably—through blood money, speeches, face-saving ceremonies—had failed; or they expected that negotiation would not occur. Perhaps, those who had a fortified refuge retreated to it because they had just attacked another group, and they expected a reprisal attack. The archaeological remains indicate that these were retreats for temporary occupation, while Coast Salish practices suggest the avenues that were readily available for conflict resolution as tensions mounted between parties.

Stockaded villages, on the other hand, indicate a different sociopolitical field, one that exhibits the unpredictability of group relations. When residential villages are stockaded, it indicates a threat that is ever present. I argue that these also indicate that conflict with non-Coast Salish groups increased. Given the documented expansion of northern groups after contact, and a general absence of political protocols or options to

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67. At Smelt Bay (EaSf-2), house midden berms reached 1.2 m in excavations at the base of one berm nearly a metre high from the surface. Also, core-tests revealed deposits up to 1.4 m deep extending over 40 metres back from the edge of the beach (Angelbeck 2008a). The midden also extends over 800 m long.
implement peaceful resolution—let alone with raiders, concerned primarily with plunder—stockades seem to be an effective strategic response that was undertaken by many groups. As Ferguson (1984:299) remarked, based on Collins (1950), the raids of northern groups “add[ed] an element of insecurity for the Salish that was not present before contact.”

In addition to the threat of external attacks, the Coast Salish also had reason to build stockades against attacks from other Coast Salish groups. However, these intra-Coast Salish conflicts were likely amplified by the colonial process: the introduction of firearms, epidemic disease, and economic destabilization due to the fur trade. Traditional models of behavior and interaction had been disrupted. Interactions had become less predictable and warfare became more common. In this context, the investment in stockades at residential villages was reasonable and worthwhile.

Architecturally, there are trade-offs in shifting from trench-embankment refuges to stockades. Trench-embankment fortifications typically were in inconvenient locations, particularly with high bluff or rocky headland settings. The landforms, however, contributed to a much stronger fortification, given their naturally defensive advantages. However, their strength in defense is countered by their inconvenience, their distance from clam beds or fresh water—higher costs and more energy were required to operate from them. For these reasons, they were mostly likely used temporarily as refuges. On the other hand, stockaded residential villages have the advantage of being in convenient locations and full-time protection but had weaker defenses than trench-embankment sites.

The larger size of stockades, encompassing residential villages, indicates that these were predominantly organized by all or most households in a village, in contrast to the smaller size of Late Period refuges which likely involved only a few allied households. From this, one might surmise that the village households must have been more sociopolitically centralized to direct the construction of one primary defensive structure, as opposed to a distribution of smaller fortifications. However, ethnographic
descriptions indicate that stockades were part of regional networks of defense (e.g., Stern 1934:100-101). Moreover, Coast Salish groups coordinated the construction of stockades in a decentralized manner.

Suttles (1951:278) provided an account of stockade construction at Saanichton. At one time, the plankhouse village did not have a palisade. Each household cleared its own space, with nearly all villagers helping each household with the setting of house-posts. That village later was burned down by West Saanich people.

Then they built the houses again. This time they said, “Let’s build a fence, like a fort.” So each household built a fence outside its own house. It had doors with locks and loopholes. It was 20 feet high in front but lower in back, about the height of a man’s reach (Suttles 1951:278; emphasis added).

Suttles (1951:278) observed that the construction of the stockade—while a village decision—still relied on the contribution of each household to construct its own portion of the stockade nearest its own house. This provides another example of how the Coast Salish balanced autonomy and alliance: autonomous households joined in their labours with allied households for defense. While stockades may have given the outward appearance of centralized authority in construction, leaders may have been only temporary, or even hired, and the labour and maintenance for the palisade was the result of the cooperation of several households.

Likely for this reason, stockades sometimes enclosed only some households within a community: those that were able to contribute the requisite labour for constructing their portion of the stockade wall. In most cases, it was only upper class households that could afford the labour. In fact, in some villages, the lower class houses were located outside and in front of the stockade, leaving them exposed to attack.

... the principal Skagit village at Snakelum Point [Snatelum Point] consisted of a great stockade enclosing a long house divided into three segments, each with its own named group of high-class people; outside the stockade were “camps” of low-class people who served as “scouts” and were not allowed inside the stockade. Haeberlin and Gunther (1930:15, 58) report a separate lower-class village, also unprotected, for the Snohomish (Suttles 1987c [1958]:5).
The lower class families at Snatelum Point still participated in the defensive network with those inside the stockade, by acting as “scouts.” Despite these class divisions—even despite not being included in the protection of the stockade wall—they worked with those inside the stockade. It is also possible that other stockaded villages did allow the lower class families inside the stockade during attacks, however, their houses remained unprotected and subject to plundering and burning. This was not a case of class against class, but rather an expression of factions of individuals and households who were enacting their allied interests.

Finally, there is yet another architectural development during the postcontact period that is also indicative of an increase in tensions: the extended plankhouse. Instead of isolated plankhouses, Coast Salish households began to aggregate into one long plankhouse. Suttles (1951:276) determined that these were a “recent development” with one of his informants claiming that they only occurred within the last few generations. Suttles (1951:276) argued that “They were probably built for greater protection from enemies,” because otherwise, he noted, households functioned as before, “probably no different when it was part of an extended house from when it was housed in a building standing alone.” That is, the dynamics between the houses of that village had not changed—these single huge buildings (some as much as 180 m [600 ft] long) did not indicate a form of centralization. Instead, these structures show how households responded to heightened social tensions and regional conflicts, requiring better forms of protection.

Conclusion

From the Late Period to the colonial era, Coast Salish defensive sites exhibit a pattern reflective of their sociopolitical organization, one that was not centralized but rather one that fostered local household autonomy and allowed for interaction and cooperation of allied households and villages in larger networks, providing reliable defensive measures to respond to conflicts and attacks.
Chapter X: Elites, Hereditary Tradition, and Limitations to Social Mobility

Enter the *Nouveau Riche*

In this chapter, I consider the developments that occurred from Marpole to the colonial period in more depth, weaving together the arguments from earlier chapters. Specifically, I evaluate warfare in relation to the changing dynamics of sociopolitical organization. In archaeology, there is often a tendency to assume a long period of continuity since the beginning of the Marpole Phase. The present study challenges such notions of continuity, based on the material evidence of changing patterns of warfare. These results suggest it might be useful to further explore changes that took place during the last 2500 years. These notions of continuity underplay and in some cases obfuscate the evidence for changes in the archaeological record. Perhaps this indicates a retention of some aspects of cultural-historical thinking, that merely traits of artifact types have changed or additional features are constructed and added to the repertoire. Viewed from a historical-processual or practice-based perspective, those changes indicate not just changes in tools but also changes in social and political practices as well as broader shifts in overall power dynamics. The two periods of warfare, in the Late Period and colonial period, indicate striking changes in cultural practices and have implications for understanding the changing nature of Coast Salish power and sociopolitical organization. First, I return once again to these periods of warfare, comparing both through the lens of power, practice, and anarchism. I begin with the colonial period increase in warfare to assess dynamics that might be shared with the previous upsurge in warfare, about 1600 BP, as well as the dynamics that might have differed from it.
New Forms of Capital: The Development of the *Nouveau Riche*

As many have acknowledged, the postcontact period introduced new tools, resources, and avenues to wealth to Northwest Coast peoples. Metal items and firearms had increased efficiency and durability over traditional tools. These tools and other items became resources in themselves as trade items and altered the traditional value of some items such as sea otter or beaver skins. Wolf (1982) described how the fur trade opened up economic avenues for those of lesser status in some societies. These individuals were able to short-cut the traditional method of status acquisition by acquiring wealth through external contacts in the fur trade. The fur trade provided an additional source of commodities for lower status people, beyond those resources already controlled by high-status elites within the society. In the interior, such trading undercut the authority of chiefs who acquired wealth through the traditional methods, by prestige-enhancement through their organization of caribou hunts. In Interior B.C., Bishop (1983:155) demonstrated that the fur trade allowed individuals to trade directly with the forts, bypassing traditional trade networks, initially limiting the power of elites. In the Northwest Coast, the sea otter trade initiated by Cook in 1778 spurred the growth of new economic opportunities. Wike (1951:92-93) argued that this “exceptional prosperity” was instigated through the introduction of iron tools, guns, and a corresponding increase in slave-raiding—a way to further increase one’s labour potential. Such wealth proliferated so much that in 1829, one Haida chief claimed that “We are all chiefs” (Green 1915:45-46). In a sense, the fur trade allowed a path for the *nouveau riche*; a term used by Collins (1950:338), Wike (1951:94), Drucker (1955:138), and Gibson (1991:271) to describe this social development. Drucker (1955:138) described how a unique title was formed for these *nouveau riche* at Fort Rupert who had risen quickly to wealth and prominence in untraditional ways.

...the attitude that was developed in Fort Rupert—that great expenditures were sufficient to validate any sort of claim—[is] exemplified by the unique institution which those people created. This was the title of “Eagle.” An Eagle was a person who had the special right

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to receive his gift before the highest-ranking chief was presented with his. At one time there were twelve Eagle titles at Fort Rupert. Investigations have revealed that most of these Eagles were not chiefs at all, but were men of intermediate or even common status who through industry or clever trading amassed great quantities of material wealth. Some of them, in addition, were backed by certain chiefs who recognized them as potential tools to assist in the downfall of some high-ranking rival (Drucker 1955:138).

The fur trade also allowed “old money” elites to further increase their own power. Maschner (1997:292), in discussing the northern coast, has stressed that it was often the wealthy who were most combative as they had more resources to sustain their combative actions. Martindale (2003) provided a concrete example of such a case, arguing that for a brief period of time after the onset of the fur trade—from about AD 1825 to 1840—Ligeex (or Legiac) of the Gispaklo’ots Coast Tsimshian achieved the status of paramount chief. Similarly, in analyzing the oral histories and archaeological record of Fort Kitwanga in Kitselas Canyon, MacDonald (1989) argued that the warrior, Nekt, achieved greater status through his control of access to trade items that began to flow along a traditional eulochan grease trail, on which the fort is situated. Prince (2001) determined from his excavations at Nekt’s fort that European trade items were initially commonly distributed among the households, however, trade items in later components came under the control of elite households. The expansion (and destabilization) of new economies seems to have been a liminal period allowing for multiple contestants, both elites and non-elites. Suttles (1987b [1957]:197) described how the fur trade perhaps led to “internal causes of social disruption;” moreover:

[The fur trade] permitted hunters and trappers to accumulate wealth more rapidly than before and probably enabled them to rise socially at the expense of the hereditary owners of fishing locations and other productive sites. This increase in social mobility may have stimulated others to seek other sources of prestige and authority.

However, the fur trade alone did not cause all of this disorder. As Miller (2001:77) pointed out, the disarray also resulted from widespread deaths of high-status people through epidemics and from raids, whose absences created opportunities for the rise of “newly rich people.” Collins (1950:337) remarked:
Warfare also increased between neighboring villages. This was attendant on the break-down of the old social controls which had effectively operated to reduce conflict of this kind. As control of the old over the young weakened, they could no longer always check aggressive acts....

These tensions were persistent enough to manifest in the stories Coast Salish peoples told. In analyzing the oral histories of Skagit peoples, Sally Snyder (1964) found repeated points of tension and conflict inherent within their social relationships, particularly between the traditional elite and the newly rich. Snyder undertook an analysis of over sixty Skagit stories and she emphasized how many tales reveal an upper-class bias against the newly rich; in these stories, the *nouveau riche* are shown to be undeserving of their wealth and they flounder back to the class they deserve. Because of their lack of training and inexperience in potlatching, they were quick to err and offend, more apt to worsen relations than enhance them; such offenses or accidental insults could lead to demands of face-saving money, and possibly to conflict. Snyder (1964:131) found this to represent an elite ideology of the “immutability” concerning one’s class. These types of stories, Bierwert (1996:104) also found to be common, referring to these as a genre of “bungling host” theme. In these stories: “The bungling host invites a guest for whom he tries, and humorously fails, to provide food by supernatural means.” Because they are unable to provide the food, the implication is that the hosts are not worthy of their wealth and do not have a true wealth power. The prevalence of these stories mocking the newly rich indicates the resistance of traditional “old money” elites to changes in the colonial period, wherein earlier social practices and protocols no longer functioned as they once had.

Some of the *nouveau riche* pursued new avenues of wealth through productive means, such as beaver hunting; others sought more destructive methods such as raiding.

68. Furthermore, Bierwert (1996:104) noted that there is a general “scrutiny” of those in wealth for how they carry themselves: “In Lushootseed literature ... stories that concern people of wealth and rank are often vehicles for social criticism. It is almost as if a character’s possession of wealth automatically brings to bear upon him the narrator’s scrutiny as to his deportment and probity.”
Not only was a new economic avenue presented with the onset of the fur trade, but a new period of warfare also ensued. Perhaps, this period of warfare, initiated or influenced by the opening of a new economy in the fur trade and other introduced commodities, does have parallels for the beginnings of large-scale warfare before contact, at other moments of archaeological liminality, such as the decline of Marpole Phase and the Late Period transition. This earlier transition may also have created opportunities for non-elites to seek prestige through alternate methods, such as disrupting existing status hierarchies by force. For the Coast Salish region, I propose that raiding and warfare, as indicated in the Late Period defensive sites are important indicators of changes in sociopolitical organization.

To evaluate the development of warfare, a comparison will need to be made in conjunction with the development of social inequality as understood through the culture history of the region. In reviewing prominent theories for the origin of social complexity on the Northwest Coast, Matson (1992) determined that the base of the stored salmon economy began during the Locarno Beach Phase (3,500 to 2,500 BP) in the Gulf of Georgia region, but that evidence of social stratification and large winter villages occurred only later, during the Marpole Phase (2,500 to 1,000 BP).69 This “developed Northwest Coast pattern” continued during the following Gulf of Georgia or Late Period (1,000 BP to contact). According to the model outlined above, defensive sites would begin to appear close to the Marpole/Late Period transition, a point argued by Matson and Coupland (1995:298) who have stated that “this [defensive] site type indicates that the hostile intergroup interactions testified to in the historical record, and argued as integral parts of Northwest Coast society by Donald (1985) and Mitchell (1984) were present by at least by the beginning of this period.” Moreover, as Thom (1998) detailed, there appear to be shifts in the nature of economy and subsistence, elite mortuary ritual, and symbolism at this time. Thom (1995, 1998) argued that the

69. Clark (2000) has proposed that the Marpole Phase began around 2000 BP, considering the Old Musqueam Subphase as more appropriately associated with the Locarno Beach Phase.
elaboration of burials indicated that elites were trying to reinforce their status. These changes indicate new opportunities for those vying for prestige. Indeed, one avenue may have been the resource acquisition through raiding and warfare, particularly as the cohesion of Marpole declined, indicating the rise of more autonomous groups with their new associations, symbols, and practices.

The Balkanization of Marpole

Thompson (1978) provided insight into the substantial settlement pattern changes that occurred from the end of Marpole to the Late Period, such as the expansion of sites into numerous microenvironments. However, a host of other changes also occurred, reflecting the adoption and implementation of other practices (Thom 1998). People switched projectile technology from unilaterally barbed harpoons to toggling harpoons, and darts were mostly dropped in preference for the bow and arrow; they dropped chipped stone for ground stone and increased the use of bone tools and points; they stopped burying their dead in middens and switched to cairn and mound burials; and after 1000 BP, they shifted entirely to above-ground mortuary sites. Lastly, the Marpole art style, with a distinctive style of anthropomorphic and zoomorphic imagery, commonly displayed on stone bowls (Duff 1975), became more “conservative,” as Thom (1998) put it, with geometric angular and linear art. A similar pattern took place with basketry styles, which Bernick (1995) argued was an indication of a decline in craft specialization.

During Marpole, the practice of cranial deformation, in which an infant’s skull was shaped, was only practiced among only a subset of the Marpole populations. This marker appears to have served as identification within those groups. Some archaeologists, such as Mitchell (1971:54); Burley and Knüsel (1989), Matson and Coupland (1995:215) argued that the introduction of cranial deformation indicated the beginnings of class stratification, a period of increasing sociopolitical inequality. For these reasons, the developments of inequality might be assumed to be continuous until
the colonial period. However, I argue that the discontinuity of all these changes introduced in the Late Period indicates that there was shake-up of the hegemony of Marpole elites.

Jonathan Friedman (1998) has provided a historical model contrasting hegemonic dominance with fragmentation, and centralization with decentralization. He defined periods of hegemony to be associated with: (1) relative social stability, (2) increasing cultural homogenization of symbols and practices, and (3) the concretization of differences in identity, including divisions of class. To adapt his model to an archaeological analysis, I argue that each of these traits are present within the Marpole Phase. There are no indications of widespread warfare during Marpole Period, indicating a degree of stability. The artistic styles (e.g., stone bowl imagery, basketry weaves) and practices indicate a broad sharing of practices and ideology in a Coast Salish interaction sphere, indicating increasing cultural homogenization. Also, the introduction of cranial deformation introduces a marker of identification that concretizes the differences in the population—cranial deformation is perhaps the foremost example of concretization as it imparts the identity markers upon an infant’s skull, and such a marker cannot be removed from the individual.

Accordingly, periods of hegemony are contrasted with periods of fragmentation marked by (1) social instability, (2) increasing heterogeneity of cultural symbols and practices, and (3) the dissolution of concretized differences. These combined traits indicate period of contestation. I argue that the changes in the Late Period are indicative of a period of fragmentation and instability. The Late Period is marked by the presence of warfare, indicating a degree of sociopolitical instability. A contest of identity, Thom (1995) argued is what occurred after Marpole, with above-ground burial forms allowing for a greater individuality of display in mortuary sites, for instance, if accompanied in part by a decline in artisanal specialization (Borden 1983:158-159; Thom 1998; Bernick 1995). A dissolution of concretized differences occurred as well, I argue, with the changing contexts for the presence of cranial deformation. In the following, I will
further describe the contrasts between periods of stability versus instability, or periods of increased elite power versus balkanization. These contrasting periods, Friedman (1998) noted, can also be seen as expressions of centralization as opposed to decentralization. A limitation of Friedman’s model is that it is primarily descriptive of historical changes. The theory of anarchism provides principles that help illuminate the dynamics that lead to increased fragmentation and decentralization, as I will discuss. First, an examination of changing practices from Marpole to the Late Period and their implications for the power of individuals and households.

**Short-Cutting Traditional Practices to Higher Status**

Near the beginning of both the Late Period and the colonial period, there are indications for the introduction of changing practices, or the destabilization of traditional practices. In the colonial period, new avenues for wealth creation enabled the development of a *nouveau riche*. These newly rich people were able to acquire wealth through non-traditional means available due to the fur trade. That is, these *nouveau riche* were able to take a short-cut to wealth and prestige, contravening traditional paths of wealth as epitomized in Coast Salish ideology.

In the Coast Salish world, an individual’s path to high social status begins with “good birth” (social capital) and then proceeds with the “training” of character, or gaining what Suttles (1951:393-397; 1987 [1958]) has called “advice” and “private knowledge” (cultural capital) (Figure 49). Those with such training, or *habitus*, were predisposed and able to spend more time questing for spirit power or “wealth power” (spiritual capital), which once acquired brings an accrual of wealth—often this is also buttressed by inheritance and loans from kin (economic capital), as Elmendorf (1993:335-336) noted. This amassed wealth is then publicly formalized by the recognition, or “witnessing,” of the individual’s status and prestige (symbolic capital). Elmendorf (1993:336) also connected an individual’s status and marriage to a similarly high status partner (social capital), which of course reproduces “good birth” in the next
Figure 49: Elmendorf’s (1960:336) sequence of social class evolution among the Twana.

generation. It is clear that some forms of capital, according to Elmendorf’s model, include means that are not available to all—particularly “good birth.” As he noted:

Such a sequence could not be actualized in the case of a lower-class individual, since some of the key factors would be lacking or deficient. Good birth was equated with upper-class birth, without which acquisition of a wealth power was impossible. Proper training and resultant personal character were also apt to be wanting in lower-class families, while since these were also “the poor,” inheritance, loans within the kin group, or any other transmission mechanisms could not operate in the accumulation of goods.

The Twana upper class was a rich class whose status was in part hereditary and which was recognized as such by all neighboring peoples. The upper class was in a very real sense an “intertribal set” of persons whose kinship and marriage relations and whose sponsored ceremonies operated in a much wider context than that of the village community unit (Elmendorf 1960:336).

The cycle offered by Elmendorf is one that perpetuates and reproduces the elite, which would make it difficult for lower-class individuals to gain wealth and prestige—they do not start with “good birth,” and they do not have the available sources of capital that come associated with high-class birth. As Elmendorf (1993:335-336) has shown, the cycle reinforces itself since those who gain prestige are able to reproduce “good birth” in their children. This reinforcing dynamic has an internal contradiction in that the upper-class individuals reinforce their own high-status positions. The ideology, shared practices, and habitus of upper class people implicitly is one that favours the status quo, or stable sociopolitical relations. For an ideology and its hegemonic practices to be
effective, it needs to be shared or tolerated by the majority of the community. In this Coast Salish ideology, this cycle of reinforcement also led to the concretization of differences between upper-class people and lower-class by the marker of “good birth”; archaeologically, during Marpole, the symbol of cranial deformation appears to be such a marker of “good birth” since it is a practice applied to infants.

I consider the reinforcement of this ideology and its associated practices to be indications of the entrenchment of upper-class position and power. The traditional methods have reproduced for generations such that lower class individuals came to be blocked out of opportunities to gain wealth and prestige (à la Fried 1967). I argue that individuals opted to break these patterns of entrenchment by attempting to gain wealth through alternate means. In other words, they took a short-cut to wealth through warfare.

The warriors cross two principles in Coast Salish tradition that typically were separate paths (chiefs, after all, are typically not warriors—“a chief didn't know how to fight!” [Collins 1974:36-37]). They cross the ideology that wealth is in itself indicative of great spirit power against that of the spirit power of the warrior, also sought through questings, but which is normally to be used in defense ("What [power] he gets has to protect his people" [Suttles 1948[3]:64]). In so doing, a warrior makes a short-cut on the path to wealth and status by directly acquiring wealth through force. In so doing, a warrior bypasses “good birth,” “advice” and character and gains wealth directly. Hence, warriors could become “newly rich people.” They would be “newly rich” because they were not of “old wealth” or were not born with it. Given that this short-cut also involved warfare, it could also be viewed as a short circuit, sending a shock through the system as it bypasses older paths.70

The traditional path is predictable in that it comes from “good birth” and training, while the short-cut is its opposite, dangerous and unpredictable—just as the

70. “A short circuit occurs when there is a faulty connection in the network—faulty, of course, from the standpoint of the network’s smooth functioning” (Žižek 2006::ix).
warrior having to live apart from the village, in part because lightning could strike from
the opening of his eyes (Suttles (1949[5]:90). Warrior powers were typically described as
good for fighting, strength, and bravery—these powers were for protecting their
community. However, through raiding, a warrior could directly acquire wealth or
economic capital. To gain prestige, the wealth needs to be distributed through the
potlatch, which is a conversion of economic capital into symbolic capital, for higher
status. This route bypasses, not only the conversion of natural capital into economic
capital, but the route of “good birth” and training. The short-cut also circumvents the
traditional method of industrious productivity that is gained through gathering and
working materials from one’s own territories, berry areas, or fishing grounds. As Henry
Allen, Elmendorf’s (1993:128) Twana informant, related in discussing a Cowichan
warrior, named č'ux̱é'ləm, who raided into Hood Canal: “Killers like that used to get
rich. They got slaves and goods of all kinds.”

Once acquired, this gifting or potlatching of acquired goods also has the added
benefit in Coast Salish society of being “witnessed.” Those who are invited or see the
gifting occur and accept the gifts—actually are validating the status that the warrior has
achieved, if they do not challenge it. This is how the new status is justified; it is the
public acknowledgment of that wealth and status. As there is a Coast Salish aversion to
warfare for some groups, described by some ethnographers (e.g., Collins 1974), perhaps
this suggests that such actions would not have been acceptable, that the witnesses would
not come, that the gifts would not be accepted—all of which would ensure that the
status is not validated. In any event, it appears that after contact, if such limits were in
place, this was no longer operational and warfare became a valid practice, not
challenged in witnessing, but only now perhaps through the tensions revealed in stories
mocking the newly rich (Snyder 1964; Bierwert 1996).

71. A warrior could also gain wealth from successfully defending a village or household, just as
the Duckabush warrior (Elmendorf 1993:126-127), when from his hidden lookout, devastated
whole canoes of approaching Skagit warriors. He was able to gain canoes, some slaves, and
weapons and other supplies they had brought.
Also, if a warrior acquired slaves, one can put them to work productively, such that one actually attains the ability to produce wealth. That is, the wealth and slaves obtained from raiding could be a way to provide an individual with the means to try to build wealth in traditional industrious practices, a potential switch from a mode of destruction to a mode of production.

There are two opposed dynamics at work between a mode of production and the mode of destruction, or raiding. Production by a network of households, allows for the equal status creation for each household. In the abstract, all households in a village or even on a larger scale could productively build capital from their territories and industrious efforts; in practice, however, as mentioned above, having social capital or owning the means of production (e.g., reef nets, a fish weir, and so on) would lead to inter-household variation in wealth. With salmon as a seemingly inexhaustible resource, perhaps there is enough to help increase the wealth of all households, particularly as people redistribute their surplus in feasts and potlatches. However, Elmendorf (1993:336) stated that it was practically impossible: “Such a sequence [to wealth and prestige] could not be actualized in the case of a lower-class individual since some of the key factors [e.g., “good birth,” training] would be lacking or deficient.”

Also, natural resources were not ubiquitously present for all to harvest. While perhaps plentiful, resources were still distributed unevenly or in patches throughout the region (Matson 1983, 1985). The control and inheritance of resources would lead to a “positive feedback loop” (Matson and Coupland 1995:152; Wood and Matson 1973) leading to greater wealth concentration. The control of such resources led to sedentism and ultimately to the development of greater concentrations of wealth, and thus greater inequity.

The other dynamic, destruction or conflict, works, not in a “positive feedback loop” that continues to “enrich all households.” Rather, warfare and raiding are forms of negative feedback: one’s gains in capital are another’s losses. Whereas positive feedback causes the escalation of both, negative feedback provides a more equilibrating
Anthropologists have described that when tensions arise among hunter-gatherers or when someone attempts to dominate others, groups can split off and live elsewhere, thereby minimizing conflict or resisting the assertions of power by an aggrandizer. In Wolf’s (1990) terms, people who resist like this increase their own power (i) while undermining the aggrandizer’s (ii). In such scenarios, the escalation of the aggrandizer’s power (and subsequently the demise of the submissive’s) is checked.

This social checking should be apparent in the archaeological record, where we might see a decline in inter-household inequity. Matson (2003) argued that during the colonial period, there was an apparent materialization of the *nouveau riche*. Following Gibson’s (1991) discussion of fur trade *nouveau riche*, Matson (2003:101) argued that “the fur trade strengthened the role of traditional leaders but then later allowed untitled individuals to gain power and prestige. Would this not lead to a reduction in average size of households?” In a comparison of postcontact versus precontact houses, predominantly from the Coast Salish area, he determined a reduced compartment width (the distance between rafters) within households: whereas precontact houses such as Shingle Point and Ozette ranged from 4 to 6 m, postcontact houses (Charles, Old Man, Sbabadid) exhibited rafter distances of 3 to 5 m, with most concentrating between 3 to 4 m. Matson (2003:101) argued that events after contact seems to have affected house compartment size. Pointing to the *nouveau riche* is reasonable—in that analysis, the growing presence of the newly rich had a somewhat equalizing effect, checking the rise in social inequities.

Notably, as this is the *nouveau riche*, this form of checking is not the same as a “levelling mechanism” of hunter-gatherers wherein attempts at aggrandizing power are checked, maintaining an egalitarian distribution of resources, as Blake and Clark (1999) had described. Such a pattern would result in more equitable or egalitarian distributions of wealth and space, in theory. Rather, the material pattern that results from the introduction of a *nouveau riche* is quite different—*nouveau riche* are aspirants to
wealth and elite status, not activists for communal equality. These individuals try to gain wealth for themselves or their household. It so happens that the effect they produce manages to reduce the overall inequity, as capital becomes less concentrated among traditional elites. This is more accurately a redistribution of elite goods and symbols among a broader base of elites, both “old money” and *nouveau riche*, and is not an egalitarian redistribution to all. Inequities are deepened in other ways—the increase in warfare in the colonial period led to a greater number of slaves. However, the threshold for upper class inclusion has broadened—but not without resistance, if only in the mocking stories told by the traditional elites (e.g., Snyder 1964; Bierwert 1996).

**Limiting or Enhancing Social Mobility—The Poles of Entrenchment and Flexibility**

While a new class of *nouveau riche* developed in the colonial period, I argue that a similar development appears to have occurred in the Late Period, when a network of elites appeared to have become entrenched. There also are indications for the development of a *nouveau riche*, that marked itself in similar manners to the elite. I discuss how cranial deformation was a marker of upper-class identity that blocked avenues for lower class social mobility. Furthermore, in the Late Period, there are markers of the expansion of the elite and a reduction, or checking, of overall social inequity. Before I detail the results of the changing contexts of cranial deformation throughout these two periods, I discuss the various interpretations of cranial deformation.

Beginning with the Marpole Phase, the concretization of identity appear to have been carried out through the elite display of cranial deformation. As mentioned above,

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72. Lepofsky et al. (2005:267; emphasis added) offered that the climate may have contributed to changes in the environment and subsequently contributed to strengthening elite power. A period of increased fire activity associated with droughts, creating more marginal zones with berry bushes and areas for hunting. These factors increased some resource availability in areas and the existing “social and economic networks throughout the Gulf of Georgia [became] solidified during the Marpole phase.”

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several archaeologists have argued for its association with eliteness and the establishment of social stratification (Mitchell 1971:54; Burley and Knüsel 1989; Matson and Coupland 1995:215), while others suggest it only indicates social ranking (Carlson and Hobler 1993:48; Weston 2000). Nothing, perhaps, signals an entrenchment of eliteness more than the permanent marking of hereditary status by shaping an infant’s skull. The use of cranial deformation during the Marpole Period contrasts with the previous period, Locarno Beach (3500 to 2400 BP), when elites wore labrets (Matson and Coupland 1995:215). Labret use, according to La Salle (2008:43) is a form of body modification and a striking marker of identity: “[a]s such, the labret would not be readily adopted by others simply for its aesthetic properties, but rather its use would be restricted to only those meeting the culturally shared and enforced criteria....” While culturally restricted to a certain group, it is a bodily modification that can be adopted well into adulthood, unlike cranial deformation. As Matson and Coupland (1995:215) asked:

Is this the point where ascribed status—as opposed to achieved status—becomes dominant in this society? After all, labrets can be adopted in adulthood, but cranial deformation must be produced during infancy by one’s parents.73

Others have challenged any associations of cranial deformation with status, arguing that the practice was too widespread to be a useful marker of status. Thom (1992) found that approximately half of individuals during both Marpole and the subsequent Late Period had evidence cranial deformation. Curtin (1991), in her analysis

73. La Salle (2008:43) has conducted some recent research on labrets in the Northwest Coast. She found that it is often part of an “exclusionary tradition,” however, labret use and symbolization needs to be considered in both local and regional settings. While labrets may not be a marker of high class in all situations, Locarno Beach is regarded as having elites particularly displayed in elaborate burials (Carlson and Hobler 1993). For this discussion, the main distinction here is between markers of stratified class (upon infants) as opposed to elite markings upon adults, where that rank can be earned, which is missing throughout the Locarno Beach Phase. This is the main point of Matson and Coupland’s (1995:215) statement about the differences between these types of body modifications. Part of the difficulty in establishing status differences with labrets is due to fact that the practices can be adopted (or discarded) throughout an individual’s life; this flexibility of status marking may have led Marpole elites to pursue a medium of symbolization with less flexibility in practice.
of burials at Tsawwassen, also found that cranial deformation was too common to be of use analytically. She pointed out that, historically, nearly everyone bore the marks of cranial deformation. Barnett (1955:75) noted that “There was no clearly conceptualized association of the deformed head with aristocratic attributes. Everybody had it, with the possible exception of the born slave....” For these reasons, analysts in the region have focused on other aspects of mortuary analyses, such as grave good inclusions or mound construction, to assess social inequality (Beattie 1980; Thom 1995; Curtin 1991). Indeed, arguments for the emergence of ranked society in the Northwest Coast have been made through the use of house-size discrepancies (Coupland 1985; Archer 2001); through a switch to above-ground mortuary monuments as cairns and mounds (Thom 1995); or through labret wear (Ames 2001). I find most of those interpretations are reasonable in suggesting expressions of social inequality, however, each of those examples can be applied to people who have earned such status in their lifetimes. Of the traits proffered, only practices applied to the very young individuals suggest the inheritance of social status. Such youths may be buried in elaborate graves or with grave goods, and the practice of cranial deformation is applied to infants.

Cranial deformation, in other parts of the world, has also been interpreted as an indicator of status (Boada Rivas 1995; Torres-Rouff and Yablonsky 2005). Others emphasize it as a marker of identity (e.g., Gerszten 1993, Blom 2005) or simply as an aesthetic choice (e.g., Dingwall 1931; Trinkaus 1982; Blackwood and Danby 1955). These claims of identity marking and aesthetic choice need to be put in the culture’s context and seen as a part of changes over time. With the largest such comparative study of cranial deformation, Torres-Rouff and Yablonsky (2005) argued that cranial modification in both the Andes and the European Steppes was a marker of higher status. They argued that “The use of the human body to create differences and similarities in a society where they do not necessarily exist biologically is a crucial conception for understanding the use of intentional head shaping in prehistory” (Torres-Rouff and Yablonsky 2005:4-5). Similarly, I argue cranial deformation is a signifier of inherited
status. Therefore, the changes in the patterns of cranial deformation from the Marpole Period to the Late Period should be indicators of the changing composition of the elite.

An analysis Gulf of Georgia burials for the presence or absence of cranial deformation indicates that cranial deformation was restricted to a few within the Marpole Period (Angelbeck and Grier 2009; Figures 50 and 51). The study included all burials with notes for skull details from 32 sites, including 260 burials. Prior to 2000 BP, we found that a small minority (n=4; 5.7%) exhibited cranial deformation; the earliest case of cranial deformation has been identified at Pender Canal, dating to 2620 ± 50 BP (Carlson and Hobler 1993:39; Weston 2000); this is apparently the only pre-Marpole case. Between 2000 and 1600 BP, during the Beach Grove subphase of Marpole, cranial deformation continued to be exhibited by a small minority of burials, less than 1 in 6 (n=17; 15.7%). A change occurred during the Marpole/Late Period transition (1600 BP to 1000 BP): burials commonly exhibit cranial deformation (n=41; 70.7%). This pattern continues through to contact (n=12; 60%), although fewer burials date to this later time. According to historic descriptions, all Coast Salish except for slaves exhibited the trait, and it is stated that it was merely for beauty, “to make them handsome,” according to Gibbs (1877:211); Barnett (1955:75) stated “Everybody had it,” but slaves. Even so, other ethnographers found that cranial deformation was still a marker of high class (e.g., Collins 1974:219; Elmendorf 1960:425, Duff 1952:91).

The contexts of cranial deformation changed from Marpole to the Late Period and through to historic contact. Both Gibbs (1877:211) and Barnett (1955:75) offered that the Coast Salish practiced it for aesthetic reasons, in the colonial period; however, they each mentioned that this aesthetic option was only available to non-slaves. This is a significant qualification that indicates that it was still a marker of class, distinguishing

74. Lambdoidal deformation, a flattening of the upper back of the skull was apparent earlier (Carlson and Hobler 1993), however, this may have been unintentional, the byproduct of use of cradles for infants (Beattie 1980:60, Weston 2000). It may be that, early on, cradleboards were used by elites; Elmendorf’s (1960:425) informant, Henry Allen, remarked that “If [a child’s] folks were so poor that they had no cradle, he’d grow up without a flattened head.” Accordingly, lambdic flattening was merely associated with eliteness, and then subsequently may have become an identifying marker on its own.
Figure 50: Number of radiocarbon-dated burials according to presence/absence of cranial deformation.

Figure 51: Cranial deformation in burials by period, including those dated by radiocarbon association, interpretation, or radiocarbon dates.
free from slaves. Other ethnographers found that it was a marker of the high class (e.g., Collins 1974:219; Elmendorf 1960:425; Duff:1952:91). So, the interpretation that cranial deformation was a marker of group identity (e.g., Gerszten 1993; Blom 2005) does apply for the Coast Salish. However, for the colonial period Coast Salish region, it is a marker of identity not towards other external groups but is a symbol of division within groups, between classes. There were other such markers of class distinction: differences in where they slept in the house, the length of their hair, and even in the nature of their daily routine activities. However, the ability to exhibit cranial modification is the most permanent—everything else at least has the potential for change.

If it is minimally a marker of class, between free and slave, in the colonial period, then this sentiment likely has its origins long ago. This appears as such a scenario during Marpole for this marker of inherited status. According to Roscoe (1993), this is an indication of the institutionalization of power. Elites, during Locarno Beach, acquired high levels of status, although all forms of its expression could be applied during one’s lifetime. They had earned their wealth and expressed—not only personal power (i), power over others (ii)—but great organizational power (iii). In Marpole, these elites wanted to maintain that power beyond their own lifetimes, to pass it on to their children. They wanted to take the power they had earned and organized (iii) and institutionalize it in such a way as to hand it to whom they chose, without those individuals even having to earn that power. They even wanted to deliver such power to an infant. Cranial deformation excluded others in such a striking way that it controlled the settings, the social arena in their favour; that is, the power was structural power (iv).

If we accept that Marpole elites distinguished themselves through cranial deformation, the increase in the number of people in the Late Period exhibiting the trait can be seen as *nouveau riche*, individuals emulating elite traits. This produces a similar effect to that described by Matson (2003) in household compartment size: that an influx of people into the elite would have effect of reducing the degree of overall inequity.
Here, as argued elsewhere (Angelbeck and Grier 2009), the changing nature of the evidence for cranial deformation indicates that the power of Marpole elites was challenged by the subordinate population, by those blocked out of avenues to social mobility. However, this is not an example, as Marxist theory would apply, of an exploited class attempting to overthrow an elite. Instead of class versus class, this is a conflict between factional households, not those aiming to better their whole class, but rather their own household. Rather, the sudden increase from 15.7% to 70.7% in late Marpole indicates that more individuals emulated the elite with many attaining the right to deform the heads of their own children and thus to bear the markers of elite status. The practice became so widespread and commonplace that even the archaeologists studying the periods regard cranial deformation as unreliable for a marker of status.

An anarchist analysis can readily encompass the changes that are described above, changes that cannot be understood with the simple dichotomy of class versus class, or egalitarianism versus elitism. For example, the forms of cranial deformation began to differentiate into various head-shaping styles (e.g., lambdoidal, bifronto-lambdoidal, fronto-lambdoidal, fronto-occipital [e.g., Beattie 1980:59]), just as the shift to above-ground burial forms allowed new expressions of individual power and status (Thom 1995). Anarchism is more effective in explaining the above changes because its framework allows for and encourages complex displays of authority and status. By applying cranial deformation to a broader number of free Coast Salish, they broadened the limits to social mobility to encompass a great number more. They effectively democratized eliteness, creating what has been termed an “elite demographic transition” (Angelbeck and Grier 2009). The threshold for elite inclusion has lowered. The pattern appears, as Suttles (1987d [1958]:6-7) famously described for the Coast

75. McGuire (2002:viii-ix), a Marxist archaeologist, has also emphasized that exploitation does not just occur along class lines. Rather social contradictions and conflicts need to be recognized as having other primary sources of tension (i.e., race and gender), which is similar to what anarchists have advocated. An anarchist perspective adds that the sources of conflict are also factional within classes.
Salish, to exhibit the shape of the “inverted pear,” where there are more elites than commoners.

I suggest that the structure of Native society was not that of a pyramid. There was no apex of nobles, medium-sized middle class, and broad base of commoners. Instead, Native society had more the shape of an inverted pear. The greater number of people belonged to an upper or respectable class, from which leaders of various sorts emerged on various occasions.

As Miller (2001:117; emphasis added) has observed of the Coast Salish, “The concentration of ethnographic material that shows the persistence of concern for social status suggests that issues of social hierarchy must have been significant and that \textit{limits to social mobility were deeply felt and the source of conflict}.”

**The Centrifugal Nature of Coast Salish Warfare**

There is a long-standing principle for anarchists to resist the concentration of power and authority. Such is its importance, Sebastien Faure even claimed that “Whoever denies authority and fights against it is an anarchist” (Woodcock 2004 [1962]:11). His sentiments are shared with other anarchist thinkers, while they may disagree on how that struggle is conducted, with proposals ranging from civil disobedience to violence. Faure’s notion of authority itself, as stated here, is more simplistic than other senses of authority, such as Bakunin’s, which recognizes just and unjust authorities (or natural versus artificial authorities), but the sentiment to fight against such concentrations of power is an anarchist strain of thought and action. Taking an anarchist perspective, warfare can be seen as a factor contributing to decentralization, an attack on the hegemony of Marpole Period elites. If elites were entrenched, then I argue that warfare served to fragment their hold on exchange networks, allowing others to participate. Clastres (1994) argued this point for South American groups, that warfare was an act that negated centralization. Warfare does not occur because of fragmentation; rather, it instigates fragmentation, or as Clastres (1994:164) put it: “the dispersion of local groups ... is thus not the cause of war, but its
effect, its specific goal.” He used it to account for dispersion, similar to the effects of fissioning of groups, as limiting concentrations of power. For Clastres, warfare exists, accordingly:

To assure the permanence of dispersion, of the parceling out, of the atomization of groups. Primitive war is the work of a centrifugal logic, of a logic of separation which expresses itself from time to time in armed conflict. War serves to maintain each community in its political independence (Clastres 1994:164; emphasis original).

The “centrifugal logic” of warfare acts against the “centripetal logic” of the state, or against any hegemonic entity trying to concentrate or institutionalize power; a concentration of power, is, by its very design, a centripetal dynamic. For Clastres (1997:202), the birth of the state is the great “rupture” (“coupure”), an event more significant in human evolution than technological developments, sedentism, agriculture, or storage—those are merely practices while the state is a human political formation that institutionalizes power. Gledhill (1994) considered Clastres’ contribution quite significant, viewing this as a variant of Sahlins’ (1972; also Lee 1988) original affluent society which overturned economic anthropology. Clastres did something similar, demonstrating the “affluent politics” of hunter-gatherers, who were often richer in individual and local freedom than peoples in more centralized chiefdoms and states. This is perhaps somewhat idealizing, but still challenges ethnocentric notions wherein centralized Western societies are the paragon from which to compare others.

Here, I argue that Marpole exhibited these hegemonic, homogenizing traits, as with the standardization of its ideology; at any event, in comparison to the following Late Period, the unification or homogenization is greater. It has been argued by many that warfare is central to the formation of states—that it is a centralizing or centripetal force. Carneiro (1970) proposed that warfare unified groups within territories in a coercive model of state emergence. Accordingly, as populations were circumscribed by other groups, the ability to fission was limited—a group could not simply move to another territory to avoid the unification of the chiefdom or state. There are cases where
warfare was a method of concentrating authority, however, it is not a general law. In the Coast Salish region, warfare was a centrifugal force, dispersing and redistributing power concentrations. Periods of warfare ensued after periods of increasing entrenchment of elite power, and these allowed for the shake-up of elites and the creation of *nouveau riche* (Figure 52). The *nouveau riche* that appeared after contact indicates a similar period of entrenchment that likely began in the decrease in warfare about 500 BP (See Figure 45, pg. 262); Schaepe (2009) similarly has documented the rise of chiefs or *siya:ms* in the Fraser Valley through housepit-size analysis beginning 550 BP.

The beginnings of both periods of warfare also correspond to the introduction of new technological weapons. At about 1600 BP, the bow and arrow becomes commonly used and after contact firearms are acquired. This should not be viewed as a type of technological determinism, rather these new technologies offered opportunities and
more power to individuals (i) to challenge existing power structures. They were able to
deploy new practices associated with these technologies to the challenges they faced,
enabling greater assertions of autonomy.

Among complex hunter-gatherers, as Clastres (1997) argued, warfare can serve to
atomize and retain autonomy, a check on the power of a chief who attempts to gain
more wealth or power than others allow; this is similar to Helbling’s (2006) discussion of
the effect of alliances, discussed above. If one chief attempts to gain too much power, it
only requires two (or three) other chiefs to ally and sack that chief and nullify his wealth
and status. A chief would have to institutionalize his power in a manner that would be
resistant to such threats, requiring a solid network of subordinate chiefs. In a region
where the pursuit of status and prestige is a goal of most individuals, subordination to
another chief would have to be under terms that would enhance their own status. A
paramount chief in such conditions would increasingly come under pressure to enhance
the wealth of subordinate chiefs. Therefore, the greater power one tries to attain, the
more difficult it is to retain.

Clastres (1987:208-212), found among South American groups, that leaders were
able to pursue status through warfare. They led because of their ability to organize
expeditions and engineer victories. Thus, these chiefs were allowed their superior
positions, permitted to pursue prestige and status, as long as it brought wealth to their
supporters. Accordingly, for any group, the chief in this scenario is “nothing more than
the appropriate tool for implementing its will” (Clastres 1987:209-10). Once their own
goals are fulfilled, support for additional power of the chief may be seen as overstepping
one’s mandate, an extension of one’s authority beyond what is justified by the members
of a household or village. Using Nietzschean terms, Clastres (1987:210) argued that an
autonomous group “does not permit the desire for prestige to be replaced by the will to
power.” Therefore, among complex hunter-gatherers, it is exceedingly difficult for a
chief to institutionalize his will to power. Such is the strength of resistance to such
measures that Clastres (1987:214) concluded (using archaic terms) that “it is not possible
for the State to arise from within primitive society.”

The scheme outlined here has similarities to Blake and Clark’s (1999) concept of the power of egalitarian levelling mechanisms, discussed above. Blake and Clark argued that for aggrandizers to acquire power, they must first subvert all of the egalitarian control mechanisms that maintain equality. Accordingly, the key components or drives for inequality (power, wealth, status) are present in all societies, even hunter-gatherers, but an ideology or strategy of egalitarianism is quite effective in maintaining a surficial equality. Egalitarianism is maintained in hunter-gatherer societies through numerous factors: needs for group mobility (seasonal aggregating/fissioning); the under-exploitation (or broad or increased availability) of resources; social ostracism or witchcraft accusations; cross-cutting social organizations; and so on. These common practices make it difficult for “aggrandizers” to claim status or build wealth. To do so requires the suppression or undermining of these practices practically in total, as each levelling mechanism is powerfully effective. These mechanisms are, in Clastres’ terms, centrifugal forces.

I argue that, once societies are ranked, like those of the Coast Salish region since Locarno Beach Phase, there is an additional level or dimension of societal control mechanisms that were difficult to surmount in order to establish a stratified society (à la Fried 1967). That is, justified authorities were allowed and encouraged among complex hunter-gatherers, however, there are mechanisms of resisting those who pursue power beyond their mandate. Clastres (1987) argued that these centrifugal forces were “unquestionably an effective means of preventing the establishment of socio-political groupings that would incorporate the local groups” and these forces were the primary form of resistance to the “emergence of the State,” (Clastres 1987:213).

It is said that the history of peoples who have a history is the history of class struggle. It might be said, with at least as much truthfulness, that the history of peoples without history is the history of their struggle against the State (Clastres 1987:218).

His statement applies not just to the State, but to the centralization or
concentration of authority itself. Warfare amongst complex hunter-gatherers seems to have accomplished this quite well—at least for the Coast Salish. During the Late Period, there was a diminishment of such elite expression as seen in Marpole. Eliteness continued to be expressed at local levels, however, not to the same degree as during Marpole times. Status continued to be expressed—mound and cairn construction until 1000 BP, for example, or even with defensive site construction—but it was not nearly as entrenched as before; it was much more flexible, exhibiting greater social mobility.

**Oral Histories and Accounts Concerning the Abuse of Power**

There are oral histories told by the Coast Salish that indicate the precariousness of having too much wealth and power. Concentrations of power were often challenged. Miller (2001:141) found that:

> Greed was described as a state of alienation and the opposite of generosity; it isolates people from the community.... The reciprocal movement of goods and services through the community is the glue holding people together on a practical basis, both in mundane giving of food gifts to relatives or the distribution of gifts in potlatches.

Sonny McHalsie related a story to Miller (2001:142) from the time of transformation that related to the greed for power:

> [A] warrior had heard that he would have more power if he killed a Xexá:l [one of the Transformer brothers]. So he stood at the mouth of the river [Pitt River] waiting for the Xexá:l. The Xexá:l knew he was there so he came around on land and tapped him on the shoulder and asked him what he was doing, and the warrior, not knowing this was the Xexá:l, told him he was waiting to kill Xexá:l. Xexá:l asked “why?” and the warrior said so people would recognize that he had more power than Xexá:l. The upriver story said that Xexá:l transformed him into a stone; the Musqueam story says that he took the warrior’s spear and broke it up into his face and transformed him into a blue heron, saying that from now on people will hunt you and use you for food.

Q: So this is a story of pride or greed or misuse of power?
A: Greed for power (Miller 2001:142).

The stone remains there to this day, a continual reminder to those who know the story, revealing the consequences of being greedy for power. There are other Coast
Salish stories that attest to this. The Cowichan chief, Tzouhalem, was a great warrior who led many victorious raids and battles for his people; he even led the Cowichan to victory in the Battle at Maple Bay. However, with his power and success he felt he had rights to take any wife he wanted from other Cowichans, but this was not countenanced, and for this, he was beheaded by his own people (Ts’umsitum and Cryer 2007 [1930]). In burial, his head was kept separate from his body: power, it seemed, had gone to his head.

A similar historical account of the treatment of excessive power involves the rise of Slabebtikud, a religious leader among the Upper Skagit after European contact. The first salmon ceremony, a rite typically performed on a household or village scale, was “modified” unilaterally, when Slabebtikud demanded that he perform one first salmon rite for all the Skagit. As Collins (1950:340) noted:

Since authority in these realms had earlier been limited to the control of elders over younger persons within the family, this concentration of authority was a marked departure from former procedures. In the hands of Slabebtikud it aroused resentment, as did the irresponsible acts of certain war leaders. For Slabebtikud, this disapproval became strong enough eventually to cause his death, when members of one family ambushed and murdered him.

Yet another story recounts how a Memontok Cowichan chief wanted to prevent any usurpers from threatening his power (Maedel n.d. [1970s]). He demanded all sons be killed among his people. One couple thought the command was unjust. They were expecting a child and refused. The husband was killed by the chief’s supporters, but the wife escaped deep in the woods with their infant son, and she raised him there. Upon reaching manhood, the son Keesac, exacted revenge on the Memontok, and they were all killed—not just that chief, but all who obeyed him. Intriguingly, Keesac himself became arrogant because of his successes, and Xá:ls, one of the Xexá:ls or great Transformers,76

76. Xá:ls is a later term that indicates one great Transformer, as opposed to the more common use of Xexá:ls, indicating four original Transformers, three brothers and one daughter of Red-Headed Woodpecker and Black Bear. McHalsie, Schaepe, and Carlson (2001:6) argued that the reduction to one transformer represents a postcontact Christian influence, since he was often equated with Jesus, another figure of transformative powers. Thus, even in their creation stories, the Transformers originally were not centralized under one figure, but were shared among four great figures of power, just as a village would have been under the
appeared before him to show a small, remote island that would be his destiny, just as his childhood in isolation. He also revealed that the power Keesac had, was given to him by X:áls himself. Keesac then came to a realization: “I have taken great power from you and used it unwisely; now I give it back.” He then disappeared into the ocean waters. It is a story that seems to remind its listeners that the power one has, is not inherent, but is bestowed by higher powers. Put another way, fitting with our discussion here, rank is bestowed upon a person—one earns or is given the right for power.

influence of several household chiefs.
Chapter XI: Conclusion

In this investigation I have attempted to understand the nature of Coast Salish warfare in the past and to examine the conditions and settings in which war occurred. I also evaluated the implications of warfare for insights into Coast Salish sociopolitical organization. To do so, I used the framework of power, practice, and anarchism as an interrelated set of theoretical tools. Wolf’s (1990) modes of power provided a scale in which to assess the intensity of conflicts. Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) practice theory provided a rubric for evaluating the array of defensive features at archaeological sites throughout the region. The practice approach emphasizes strategies and tactics employed as individuals strive for capital. Anarchism provided a set of principles for evaluating how societies operate without formal governments. In this final chapter, I summarize the main interpretations that result from the framework of power, practice, and anarchism for warfare in the Coast Salish past.

Summary of Inquiry and Arguments

For this inquiry, I employed several avenues of research beyond archaeology, including ethnohistory, oral history, and ethnography in the manner of Trigger’s (1989) holistic archaeology. These non-archaeological sources were not used simply as background information. They were integrally included for evaluations of the changing dynamics throughout the past. For example, the bow and arrow was not just a new technology, resulting in new artifact traits, rather it was associated with practices that helped to spur warfare and alter sociopolitical organization. These historical and ethnographic sources also were implemented in a direct historical approach (i.e., Wedel 1938) that did not merely try to document archaeologically the traits of the ethnographic present. Rather, the information on colonial period Coast Salish warfare was also useful
for understanding how practices had changed throughout the past, as with the changing meaning and contexts of palisaded forts or cranial deformation from the Marpole Phase to the colonial period.

The archaeological aspects of this investigation also contributed to research on warfare in the Northwest Coast. Investigations were conducted at several defensive sites in the Coast Salish region and focused on surface mapping and core sampling. The recent growth in three-dimensional surface mapping adds significantly to our understanding of the settings of sites. These allow for a compilation of topographic data in a way that is obscured even in field visits, as surface features cannot be viewed in total due to vegetation or other obstructions. This proved especially useful for defensive sites, as surface maps showcased the natural defensiveness of the landforms many of the sites occupied but also highlighted cultural alterations made to those sites.

I provided an archaeological treatment of the underground refuges, or “fighting houses.” These had been ethnographically described by Barnett (1944, 1955), but these have not been the subject of much archaeological treatment. One exception is Bryan (1963:79-80) who had proposed it as a possibility for a site on Whidbey Island. However, the semisubterranean features at Smelt Bay (EaSf-2) meet the descriptions of Barnett in shape, depth, and position relative to plankhouses; plus, this site received particular mention from Barnett’s informants as a location for such defensive features.

In a discussion of the variety of defensive fortifications, I have stressed that a distinction needs to be maintained between trench-embankment fortifications and residential stockades. Archaeologists like Bryan (1963) often have conflated the two types, using historic descriptions of stockades to understand trench-embankment sites. However, this investigation has indicated the substantial differences between the two defensive structures regarding setting, form, content, and function: Late Period trench-embankment sites were smaller and were used temporarily as refuges on naturally defensive landforms, while colonial period stockades were larger, surrounding residential villages in more accessible settings. Further, I argued that this distinction has
implications for the sociopolitical relations that predominated during the periods of their use, with trench-embankment refuges indicating foreknowledge of attack, likely resulting from the breakdown of negotiations or escalating feuds with other Coast Salish groups. With residential stockades, a different sociopolitical setting was in place, as households organized to build full-time defensive structure, indicating that sociopolitical relations were less predictable and less subject to resolution through negotiation; that is, these full-time protections suggested increased warfare with non-Coast Salish groups. This corresponded with the expansion of the Lekwiltok, as well as documented conflicts with Chilcotin, Nlaka’pamux, and Nuu-chah-nulth groups. The Coast Salish organized in new ways to meet these threats.

Another finding from this research is that there are defensive site practices that are distinct to the Coast Salish, such as rock-wall fortifications, underground refuges, and trench-embankment fortifications. However, no defensive site type is uniformly implemented by Coast Salish groups. Instead, there are numerous regional variations and no defensive feature is found throughout the Coast Salish area as a whole. Therefore, the array of defensive site practices revealed both Coast Salish distinctiveness of styles but also suggested local autonomy of communities regarding which defenses to implement in their region. Moreover, the distribution of each of these types appears to indicate the sharing of practices across networks of affinal allies.

Throughout this inquiry, I have stressed that defensive sites should not be studied in isolation, but within regional contexts. There is a scale to the various defensive sites from small household defenses to larger fortifications. Given the close proximity of many of these sites and lines-of-sight from one to another, these sites appear as a network of defensive sites, as provided with the example of the Northern Gulf Islands area around Smelt Bay. This indicates that the network organization of rock-wall fortifications in the Fraser Canyon, as argued by Schaepe (2006), extended to other defensive types and other regions in the Coast Salish area. I contended that this is consistent with the networked defenses discussed by several ethnographers of lookouts,
scouts, and messengers (e.g., Smith 1940; Suttles 1951; Stern 1934). It was also reflective of network approaches to combat documented in written and oral histories of the battles at Maple Bay and Lamalchi Bay.

Finally, the archaeological component also drew together the various investigations on Coast Salish defensive sites into a comprehensive treatment. These investigations indicate that a new demarcation is likely warranted for the Late Period, ending about 500 BP, which coincides well with the beginning of the Siyâ:m period as proposed by Schaepe (2009) about 550 BP.

I have tried to demonstrate through several lines of evidence and argument—from archaeology, ethnohistory, ethnography, and oral histories—that the transition from the Marpole Phase to the Late Period was quite marked, that it was not simply the establishment of the “Developed Northwest Coast Pattern” that persisted in gradual continuity until contact. The social complexity that developed continued, however, the nature of that sociopolitical complexity mutated through time, resulting in varying practices that were implemented, differing dynamics of power, and changing structures of social relations—all of which helped to transform markers of identity and their meanings. Much of this dynamic revolved around the fulcrum of social mobility and the poles of entrenchment and flexibility.

There are many traits that suggest a Coast Salish tendency to flexibility, concerning their practices and social organization, and it influences their conceptions of power. Throughout much of the Coast Salish past, they have implemented sociopolitical structures that provide some degree of social mobility rather than entrenchment. I have discussed flexibility in regard to their warfare practices, types of armour, and even in the type of canoes chosen to use. There was great flexibility in Coast Salish houses where planks were removed for transport to seasonal sites, perhaps even to defensive sites; also, households easily could add on sections, or even aggregate households into one large extended plankhouse for better protection. Suttles also discussed the role of the Coast Salish shed-roof house, which maintained characteristics distinct from the
northern groups. He remarked that it “seems that increased authority would be
inhibited by the flexibility of the house itself, the existence of alternate homes in several
other villages, and even the existence of an almost unlimited number of building sites”
(Suttles 1990b:150). As with fissioning or Clastres’ centrifugal fragmentation, the
household is flexible and can enable voluntary associations with other houses or not.
Suttles noted that geography contributed to this as there was more available space for
groups to occupy in the flats of Vancouver Island and the Fraser Delta. Furthermore,
there was a flexibility to how individuals could identify themselves, a degree of freedom
to associate with one household or another. Collins (1979) described how the Coast
Salish kinship system, with its bilateral or “multilineal” descent, was “a Coast Salish
strategy” that maintains individual flexibility; it enhances voluntary associations with
households and augments an individual’s personal power (i) and autonomy.

Flexibility extended to subsistence practices as well. In describing Coast Salish
subsistence practices, discussed above, Suttles (1990b: 151) also described how many
practices involved one or two people, noting that “subsistence activities and relations
were not leading the Central Coast Salish toward a greater concentration of authority.”
Even reef-netting, a complex activity involving multiple people, did not lead to a greater
concentration of authority. Straits Salish reef-netting was arguably was the most
economically productive endeavour on the Northwest Coast. It involved captains and
crews of up to twelve to fourteen men (Suttles 1951:160). While reef-netting spots were
often owned and inherited, the crew was not limited to household members (Suttles
1951:161). Captains “hired” their crew and those individuals could come from any
group. While household members and relatives “probably received first consideration
... non-relatives were certainly hired as well” (Suttles 1951:219); one of his informants
from Becher Bay described the crews as changing every year and could include
members from “Sooke, Klallam from the mainland, and even Nootka” (Suttles
1951:219). There would have been flexibility on which team to join.

77. For the productive catch, the owner or captain partitioned the fish much as the head of a
Above, I mentioned that Suttles (1990b) considered Coast Salish subsistence activities as practices that heightened individual and household autonomy. However, Suttles’ descriptions applied to the decades after contact, or the ethnographic period. During Marpole, such subsistence practices may have been restricted, and technologies such as the bow and arrow (and later firearms after contact) acted to enhance individual flexibility of action, both productively and destructively.

Practices shifted after Marpole, as widespread warfare introduced practices that allowed for a short-cut to immediate acquisition of wealth through destructive, rather than productive, means. Many warriors may have considered their attacks upon another’s wealth justified, that the other’s concentration of wealth and power was unjustified. In calling others in potlatch ceremonies in which the loot is redistributed, the new claim is “witnessed” by others in the community and the claim validated—as is their new social capital (relations through giving to others) and symbolic capital (prestige and status) from the gifting or exchange of economic capital.

Also, the construction of defensive sites would have been, not only warranted in times of tension, but also an avenue of status for those household leaders that helped spearhead their construction. Given the amount of labour involved and the costs—the necessary timber and other resources, including food stores (and time directed away from subsistence activities that build surpluses)—these investments allowed for demonstrations of leadership, wealth, and alliances well beyond the limits of the household. The combined efforts of households is an example of shared ties beyond that of potlatching and feasting. The fortification becomes a physical embodiment in fortification of an alliance in shelter—a unity of those households within. As Coser (1956) maintained, conflict between factions allows for greater bonds and increased cooperation within groups. Given the liminal and intense nature of warfare as must be experienced under an attack, the effect on those within would be to heighten

Penelakut sea-mammal hunting expedition (Suttles 1987a [1952])—although after a certain point, the surplus fish was his (Suttles 1951:180).
communitas, just as Victor Turner (1969) argued had occurred among soldiers and others in crisis and catastrophe. He proposed communitas as horizontal bonds between people, just as alliances, where one bonds to another as one's equal; this is in contrast to Durkheim's (1949 [1893]) solidarity, which Turner argued represented the powers that maintain social hierarchy in social structures.

It has been argued that warfare is a method for concentrating power in chiefdoms (e.g., Carneiro 1970; Earle 1997), however, the settlement pattern of defensive sites in the Coast Salish territory does not exhibit patterns of concentration or centralization. Instead, the pattern is one of distributed power, local expressions of power, and networks of alliances. The pattern here, after Clastres (1987), is a centrifugal one, not a centripetal one, indicating practices that heightened the power of local household chiefs, to be sure, but generally limited the concentration of that power, perhaps a power that was maintained to levels viewed as justified or tolerated by others.

The Coast Salish operated without an overarching government, and the theory and principles of anarchism have been used here on the premise that anarchism might be useful in understanding a society without a formal government. Anarchism provided principles useful in evaluating dynamics and tensions within a society, such as local and individual autonomy, voluntary association, mutual aid, network organization, decentralization (and active resistance to centralization), and justified authority. Each society implements or constrains these principles in some manner to match circumstances of time and place. Anarchist theorists emphasize, not a blueprint or model for societies to apply, but principles that have to continually be maintained and adapted to changing situations. That is, practices can be altered, adopted, and implemented that further these anarchic principles. I have argued throughout that certain practices were adopted and used to enhance autonomy and decentralization, particularly when periods of local entrenchment of power occurred, which was assessed as the establishment of unjustified authorities. In any case, a nouveau riche appeared in postcontact period—and I argue, during the Late Period—altering the nature of elite
inclusion. It is perhaps in this manner where anarchism has proved most fruitful, as it is a model that readily addresses the long-standing quandary of the Coast Salish. Matson and Coupland (1995:29) described that there is great social complexity but little political complexity. Anarchism provides a framework that readily addresses such a scenario, indicating how principles allow for great local and individual expressions of status while resisting and constraining the development of centralized authorities.

A final point I would like to address is that Marxist-based or Marxian archaeologies have been, I consider, among the most useful approaches. It is a materialist approach but one that is not “vulgar,” meaning that it does not limit its interpretation to the material artifacts, but provides a theoretical framework that readily allows for interpreting from the patterns of material artifacts to material forces: to an understanding of economy, means of production, sociopolitical relations of production, and even ideological superstructure. Marxism provides avenues of analysis through division of labour, concentrations of capital, class, a dialectical method, and more; anarchists typically accept and use such analysis,78 albeit not without criticisms—particularly of its overriding teleology, its orientation on the state, and its weak incorporation of power, among others.79 Anarchism also provides additional avenues of

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78. For example, Bakunin admired Marx’s work so much he translated much of Das Capital into Russian. Anarchists and Marxists fought together against the Fascists in the Spanish Civil War, or revolution. Anarchists, for the most part, accept and use Marxist analyses of economy, and both share an ultimate aim of communism. However, they often pursue different practices. One could use the term, anarcho-Marxism, to indicate their shared interests. Some would find the term redundant, as there has long been a dialogue and debate in which each has influenced the other; others would see the term as repugnant, minimizing the significant differences.

79. Recent forms of Marxism (or post-Marxism) have incorporated new elements that often address these criticisms from anarchist theorists. For instance, the autonomism of Antonio Negri (1999) emphasizes the coordinated bottom-up actions of autonomous local groups rather than classes. With Michael Hardt, they have stressed the composition of the proletariat as a “multitude,” or social complexity (Hardt and Negri 1994; 2001; 2004). This is similar to Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) argument against the simplification of the worker class, instead advocating for pluralism, incorporating student, environmental, and feminist movements—in part, they included non-labourers in the traditional sense. Antonio Gramsci (1971 [1929-1935]) also reinvigorated Marxism, critiquing many of his contemporary Marxists as too nomothetic and ahistorical; he redirected the heavy orientation on economy and ideology towards cultural practices in place for particular historical conditions with the concept of hegemony; that is, he added a better understanding of power. Gramsci also recognized that leaders could not be of an intellectual vanguard but must come from local groups or the grass-roots to be seen as valid and effective. Finally, Žižek (1989; 1994) offered
analysis that can reveal internal contradictions or tensions along the lines of the
principles above. Here, I have focused primarily on the changing natures of autonomy
(versus dominance), voluntary (versus involuntary) association, decentralization (versus
centralization), and network forms of organization (versus hierarchical) within the Coast
Salish, although the other principles conceivably could be developed into other forms of
analysis for other places and times.

Anarchism has been especially useful in this analysis of complex hunter-
gatherers of the Northwest Coast, which have otherwise ill fit into models of
egalitarianism or centralized chiefdoms and states (Sahlins and Service 1960; Johnson
and Earle 1987). However, the theory also has utility for other societies, such as
egalitarian foragers and even centralized states. Anarchist theorists often regard these
principles of organization as simply natural, or human; these are social principles that
are always at play. No matter the type of society there are individuals constraining or
enhancing the freedoms of identity, association, and authority.

Suttles’ Quandaries

Throughout this inquiry, I have repeatedly consulted the productive work of
Wayne Suttles to understand Coast Salish warfare in the past. In the introduction, I
forefronted a quote of Suttles’ (1989:251) regarding his own “unanswered questions”
about the Coast Salish, particularly stating that “Two of the most important of these
have to do with authority and conflict.” Both of these, according to the theory of
anarchism, are related. Authority cannot be viewed as simply the identification of who
is the chief and who is the follower, or to determine the ideal, abstract roles for each.
Conflict also cannot be viewed separately, treated simply as a trait or activity that is

a revamping of Marx’s concept of ideology in part because of widespread contemporary
cynicism and skepticism of governmental authority, or what could be rephrased as
integrating antiauthoritarian counter-ideologies into its analysis. The list could go on, but it
is clear that anarchist critiques such as that provided by Bakunin, Kropotkin, Bookchin, and
others have been incorporated into sharpening forms of Marxist analysis.
present or not. To do so, is to regard both authority and conflict ahistorically and without situational contexts. Both must also be considered, not just in theory, but also in practice. For Bourdieu and for anarchists, authority—just as the nature of political alliances—must be constantly maintained and renegotiated, lest the sense of justification for one’s authority appear unwarranted. Conflict, according to anarchism, can serve within societies without formal governments as a form of justice. When individuals are seen as outlasting their mandate or to be abusing their authority, it can be viewed as justifiable to remove those those individuals from positions of authority, by force if necessary. In such cases, the individual in power is viewed no longer as an authority but instead more as an authoritarian. Through the very acts of rebellion and conflict, the authority of those in power is cast off, and independence is declared.

The recognition of authority also plays a part in conflict. Foreign policy analysts have employed the concept of anarchy to describe conflict situations because there is no one polity or group in power—in the engagement of conflict, authority is being questioned and contested. Similarly, for the Coast Salish, a group may no longer recognize the authority of another household to control a fishing station or hunting ground. If “taken over,” the successors will attempt to justify their claims before “witnesses” in a potlatch ceremony. If those in attendance accept the gifts, show no opposition, the claim is validated and recognized, and a form of authority is established.

An anarchist perspective, as I have used here, helps to situate authority and conflict within a broader theoretical framework that indicates their dynamic, or how authority and conflict relate. An anarchist analysis also helps to explain how the Coast Salish organized their autonomous households into broader coalitions. Suttles had similarly expressed puzzlement about the Battle at Maple Bay. He commented that “Evidently tribes from the Nanaimo to the Suquamish and the Skagit participated; the degree of cooperation and basis of organization, in what appears to be a rather loosely organized society, presents an interesting problem which has yet to be solved” (Suttles 1954:46). The problem for Suttles relates to wondering how such independent
households could cooperate so readily into such broad groups. The theory of anarchism readily encompasses such dynamics, indicating how autonomous, not atomistic, households could align into broader alliances and coalitions. The theory provides principles that can provide indications for how seemingly disparate and autonomous aspects of Coast Salish social organization work in changing contexts. In viewing the Coast Salish as an anarchic society, we can understand how there was not a centralized chiefdom, but a heterarchy of many powerful chiefs and a society composed broadly of elites or “high class” people.
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Appendix A: Sources for defensive sites listed from north to south from archaeological, ethnohistoric and ethnographic sources.

Site No.: Site numbers in parentheses are possible associations of ethnographic or ethnohistoric sites with archaeological sites.
Source Types: Archaeological = ARC; Ethnographic = ETG; and Ethnohistoric = EH.
Type: For trench-embankment type defensive sites, landforms noted if known:
Rocky Headlands = RH; Bluff Settings = BLF; and Peninsular Spits = PS.
Lat./Long.: Only general coordinates given for latitude and longitude for matching from map figures.
References: The references for archaeological sites with site numbers include the Archaeology Branch of British Columbia or the Office of Historic and Archaeological Preservation, Olympia, Washington.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site Name</th>
<th>Site No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Lat.</th>
<th>Long.</th>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salmon Bay</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade / Underground Houses</td>
<td>50.44</td>
<td>-124.66</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Barnett 1955:49; 1944:266</td>
<td>Stockade i associated with tunnels to underground houses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toba Lookout 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout</td>
<td>50.42</td>
<td>-124.51</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Black, Urbanczyk, and Weinstein 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toba Lookout</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout</td>
<td>50.42</td>
<td>-124.50</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Black, Urbanczyk, and Weinstein 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaya-klaya-klye</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>50.20</td>
<td>-123.98</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Peterson 1990:27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whaletown</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout</td>
<td>50.10</td>
<td>-125.05</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Bouchard &amp; Kennedy 1983:155; Black, Urbanczyk, and Weinstein 2000</td>
<td>&quot;T'ik'tn&quot; translates as &quot;place where you get discovered.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Spit</td>
<td>EaSh-6</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (PS)</td>
<td>50.10</td>
<td>-125.18</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Mitchell 1968; Buxton 1969 [5]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desolation Sound for</td>
<td>EaSd-3</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (PS)</td>
<td>50.09</td>
<td>-124.39</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Menzies 1923 [1792]; Angelbeck 2008a</td>
<td>Visited by Menzies on Vancouver’s expedition in 1792. No real trench remaining (past logging activities), although embankments before and on rampway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marina Island N</td>
<td>EaSg-2</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>50.09</td>
<td>-125.05</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [4]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorge Harbour</td>
<td>EaSg-6</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>50.08</td>
<td>-125.00</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Newcombe n.d.</td>
<td>Possible former trench-embankment; evidence of “terracing” (likely embankments) leading up to high point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manson’s Landing</td>
<td>EaSf-1</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (PS)</td>
<td>50.07</td>
<td>-124.98</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2008a; Buxton 1969 [2]</td>
<td>Outer trench mostly filled in; trail cuts through inner trench; High midden outside of protected area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortes Bay</td>
<td></td>
<td>Underground Refuge</td>
<td>50.06</td>
<td>-124.92</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Barnett 1944</td>
<td>This is a likely location for Barnett’s location for southeastern Cortes Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EaSh-9</td>
<td>EaSh 9</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>50.05</td>
<td>-125.10</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [6]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marina Island S</td>
<td>EaSg-1</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>50.05</td>
<td>-125.05</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [3]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painter’s Spit (Tyee Spit)</td>
<td>EaSh-11</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (PS)</td>
<td>50.05</td>
<td>-125.25</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [7]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Smelt Bay</td>
<td>EaSf-2</td>
<td>Underground Refuges</td>
<td>50.03</td>
<td>-125.00</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2008a; Barnett 1944; Bouchard and Kennedy 1983; Buxton 1969 [59]</td>
<td>Buxton (1969) listed this as trench-embankment (although unnumbered), but it is a residential village.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hernando Island East</td>
<td>DISF-3</td>
<td>Trench-embankment</td>
<td>49.99</td>
<td>-124.89</td>
<td>ARC</td>
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<td>Site No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Lat.</td>
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<td>Source Type</td>
<td>References</td>
<td>Comment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hernando Island Earthwork</td>
<td>DISf-5</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>49.98</td>
<td>-124.90</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [9]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Boulder Point</td>
<td>DISf-4</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>49.96</td>
<td>-124.91</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [8]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emmonds Beach</td>
<td>DISe-13</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)/High Ground</td>
<td>49.94</td>
<td>-124.70</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Brolly 1996; Buxton 1969 [55] A deep midden, about 1 m, is east of the trench.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Scuttle Bay</td>
<td>DISd-7</td>
<td>Underground Refuge</td>
<td>49.90</td>
<td>-124.63</td>
<td>ARC ETG</td>
<td>Barnett 1944</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grief Point</td>
<td>DISd-7</td>
<td>Underground Refuge</td>
<td>49.80</td>
<td>-124.53</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Barnett 1944</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Skamain</td>
<td>DISe-13</td>
<td>Underground Refuge</td>
<td>49.77</td>
<td>-123.17</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Reimer pers. comm. 2005; Barnett 1944, 1955</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mamquam River</td>
<td>(DkRs-9)</td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>49.74</td>
<td>-123.13</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Reimer pers. comm. 2005</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Castle Peaks refuges</td>
<td>DkSf-6</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>49.67</td>
<td>-124.95</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>McMurdo 1980; Buxton 1969 [10]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Xelhnäh</td>
<td>Rock-Wall Fortification</td>
<td>49.56</td>
<td>-121.40</td>
<td>ARC ETG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q’alelilkél 1</td>
<td>Rock-Wall Fortification</td>
<td>49.56</td>
<td>-121.40</td>
<td>ARC ETG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q’alelilkél 2</td>
<td>Rock-Wall Fortification</td>
<td>49.56</td>
<td>-121.40</td>
<td>ARC ETG</td>
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<tr>
<td>iyem</td>
<td>Rock-Wall Fortification</td>
<td>49.59</td>
<td>-121.41</td>
<td>ARC ETG</td>
<td>Just north of village of iyem.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexwts’ō:kw’em</td>
<td>Rock-Wall Fortification</td>
<td>49.60</td>
<td>-121.41</td>
<td>ARC ETG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Skwokwilalà</td>
<td>Underground Refuge</td>
<td>49.57</td>
<td>-121.43</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>McHalsie 2001:140 “Pithouses here were specially constructed for protection and security during raids”; translates as “hide/container” or “hiding places.”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thormanby Island Spit</td>
<td>DIRx-6</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (PS) (or Stockade)</td>
<td>49.49</td>
<td>-123.99</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Steep silt peninsula. Site form notes “ideal defensive position,” but erosion due to exposure and silt composition; trench may have been eroded, filled, or unneeded.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Mellon</td>
<td>DJRu-5</td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>49.49</td>
<td>-123.47</td>
<td>ETG ARC</td>
<td>Peterson 1990 Kay-kahy’key’ahm means &quot;little fence.&quot;</td>
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<td>Site Name</td>
<td>Site No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Lat.</td>
<td>Long.</td>
<td>Source Type</td>
<td>References</td>
<td>Comment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boyle Point</td>
<td>DSe-2</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>49.47</td>
<td>-124.68</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Smith n.d.; Buxton 1969</td>
<td>No information. Buxton may have placed location generally, and may refer to other such sites in the Sechelt area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sechelt</td>
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<td>Trench-Embankment</td>
<td>49.47</td>
<td>-123.86</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [57]</td>
<td>Buxton calls this a Trench-Embankment bluff-type site, but her description is of a “low sandy peninsula.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kay’kah-lah-kum</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade / Lookout</td>
<td>49.46</td>
<td>-123.74</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Peterson 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mapleguard</td>
<td>DSD-16</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (PS)</td>
<td>49.46</td>
<td>-124.68</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Smith 1934; Newcombe n.d.; Buxton 1969</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Davis Bay</td>
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<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>49.44</td>
<td>-123.73</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Smith 1934 Buxton 1969</td>
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<td>Lighthouse Point</td>
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<td>Lookout</td>
<td>49.33</td>
<td>-123.26</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Reimer pers. comm. 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homulchesum</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>49.32</td>
<td>-123.13</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Matthews 1955:100, 187</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwókwechiwel</td>
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<td>Lookout</td>
<td>49.31</td>
<td>-121.69</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>McHalsie 2001:139, 142</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Point Grey</td>
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<td>Lookout</td>
<td>49.28</td>
<td>-123.25</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Reimer pers. comm. 2005; see also Suttles 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keekullukhun</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>49.25</td>
<td>-123.25</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>MacDonald 1990; Suttles 2004; McHalsie 2001:138, 145</td>
<td>q’i:əłəxən “little fence”; Qiqelexen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill-Tout Mound</td>
<td>DhRI-24</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment</td>
<td>49.25</td>
<td>-121.95</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>Also, mound at site excavated by Hill-Tout. No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kullukhun</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>49.24</td>
<td>-123.23</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>MacDonald 1990; Suttles 2004; Matthews 1955:393</td>
<td>q’i:əłəxən “fence” or “stockade”; Kulluhun; Q’üluxun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musqueam Area</td>
<td></td>
<td>Underground Refuge</td>
<td>49.24</td>
<td>-123.21</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Barnett 1944, 1955</td>
<td>Location is general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alámex</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout</td>
<td>49.24</td>
<td>-121.81</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>McHalsie 2001:139, 141</td>
<td>Name means “babysit”; “container of lookout”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pópkw’em</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout / Signal Station</td>
<td>49.19</td>
<td>-121.75</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>McHalsie 2001:139, 144</td>
<td>Name associated with “puff balls,” noted as likely associated with smoke signals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwótsesleg</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout</td>
<td>49.10</td>
<td>-122.79</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>McHalsie 2001:136, 142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qoqóllaxel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout / Signal Station</td>
<td>49.09</td>
<td>-121.96</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>McHalsie 2001:137, 139; 145</td>
<td>Possible signal by water noise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DgRI-30</td>
<td>DgRI-30</td>
<td>Underground Refuge</td>
<td>49.07</td>
<td>-121.84</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Depressions noted as likely underground refuges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedder’s Crossing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout</td>
<td>49.07</td>
<td>-121.84</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Lerman 1952:144-145; McHalsie 2001:139, 149</td>
<td>Associated with a “tower” that was constructed.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Site Name</td>
<td>Site No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Lat.</td>
<td>Long.</td>
<td>Source Type</td>
<td>References</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwökwechíwel</td>
<td>DgRv-2</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>49.05</td>
<td>-123.39</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>McHalsie 2001:139, 142 (Map D)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shingle Point</td>
<td>DgRv-2</td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>49.04</td>
<td>-123.64</td>
<td>EH ARC</td>
<td>Gordon 1853; Theodore 1939:187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Fort Site</td>
<td>DgRt-5</td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>49.04</td>
<td>-122.88</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2008a Buxton 1969 [12]; Simonsen 1970; Smith n.d. [ca. 1915]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardale Point</td>
<td>DgRv-1</td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>49.02</td>
<td>-123.61</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2008a</td>
<td>Apparently this fort was built by same Lummi man that constructed the fort at Gooseberry Point, according to Suttles’ informants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaine Fort</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>49.00</td>
<td>-122.75</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Suttles 1951</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sti el</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refuge Area</td>
<td>48.96</td>
<td>-121.07</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Snyder 1950-54</td>
<td>“A huge rock, about 30 x 70’ that slid down and had space under it for a camp. It was a steetathl hiding place during raids.” Location is broad general area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamalchi Bay</td>
<td>DfRv-10</td>
<td>Refuges / Lookouts</td>
<td>48.94</td>
<td>-123.64</td>
<td>ETH</td>
<td>Arnet 1999</td>
<td>Also refuge areas behind, where women were sent during the battle in 1863.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulford Harbour</td>
<td>(DfRu-4)</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.86</td>
<td>-123.49</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Newcombe n.d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquilar Point</td>
<td>DfSg-3</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.82</td>
<td>-125.17</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [17]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maple Bay Lookouts</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>48.81</td>
<td>-123.57</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Angelbeck and McLay 2008</td>
<td>Two or lookouts, both north and south of battle site; Locations general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khenipsen</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.78</td>
<td>-123.67</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Jenness n.d.:64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Tzouhalem</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refuge Area</td>
<td>48.77</td>
<td>-123.62</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Jenness n.d.:64</td>
<td>Barricaded with rocks; location general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeRt-41</td>
<td>DeRt-41</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.76</td>
<td>-123.26</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [13]; Cassidy et al. 1974; Wilson 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marietta</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>48.76</td>
<td>-122.61</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [56]; Smith 1907:303</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tikotas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.74</td>
<td>-123.64</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Curtis 1970 [1913]</td>
<td>“Twenty families” within.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gooseberry Point</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.73</td>
<td>-122.67</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Suttles 1951; Stern 1934</td>
<td>Trench outside with poisoned stakes; oral histories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuckanaut Mountain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout</td>
<td>48.69</td>
<td>-122.47</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Snyder 1950-1954</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Site Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goodell 3</td>
<td>45WH490</td>
<td>Rock-Wall Fortification</td>
<td>48.68</td>
<td>-121.27</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Kennedy 1992; Mierendorf pers. comm. 2008</td>
<td>Two rock-wall features: one appears to face a mountain goat hunting trail, while the other possibly is a lookout as it overlooks the confluence of Goodell Creek into the Skagit River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saanich Area</td>
<td></td>
<td>Underground Refuge</td>
<td>48.64</td>
<td>-123.43</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Lugrin 1932</td>
<td>Refuges used prior to Battle of Maple Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell Point</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (PS)</td>
<td>48.59</td>
<td>-123.15</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Smith 1934; Buxton 1969 [54]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saanichton</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.59</td>
<td>-123.38</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Suttles 1951:278, 322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edison Creek</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.56</td>
<td>-122.45</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Sampson 1972:26</td>
<td>Noo-wha-ah fort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blakely Island</td>
<td>(45IS154)</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.55</td>
<td>-122.82</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [21]; Carlson 1954</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandma’s Hump</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.55</td>
<td>-122.33</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Sampson 1972:26</td>
<td>Noo-wha-ah fort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guemes</td>
<td>45SK13</td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.53</td>
<td>-122.64</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Suttles 1951; Bryan 1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squaw Bay</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.46</td>
<td>-122.58</td>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Munks 1938:178</td>
<td>Fort area is near midden that is &quot;seven feet deep.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis Point</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.45</td>
<td>-122.92</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Smith 1907; Buxton 1969 [19]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart’s Farm</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.45</td>
<td>-123.44</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Smith 1934; Newcombe n.d.; Buxton 1969 [42]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yacht Club, Cadboro Bay</td>
<td>DcRt-14</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (PS)</td>
<td>48.45</td>
<td>-123.29</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [15]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Site Name</td>
<td>Site No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Lat.</td>
<td>Long.</td>
<td>Source Type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dyke’s Point</td>
<td>DcRu-77</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.45</td>
<td>-123.44</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [41]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadboro Bay North</td>
<td>DcRt-14</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment</td>
<td>48.45</td>
<td>-123.29</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [30]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiqalaxad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.45</td>
<td>-122.57</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Waterman et al. 2001:347-348</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mackaye Harbor</td>
<td>45SJ205</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>48.44</td>
<td>-122.87</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Bryan 1963:75; Buxton 1969 [18]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dunn’s Nook</td>
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<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.44</td>
<td>-123.45</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Gibbs 1877; Newcombe n.d.; Buxton 1969 [43]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Island</td>
<td>45IS184</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.44</td>
<td>-122.92</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Carlson 1954:121; Buxton 1969 [22]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ashe Head</td>
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<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.43</td>
<td>-123.43</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Newcombe n.d.; Buxton 1969 [40]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime Bay</td>
<td>DcRu-123</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.43</td>
<td>-123.38</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Keddie 1983; Buxton 1969 [37]</td>
<td>Historic artifacts present in portions of Layer 2, indicating postcontact use as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemming Beach</td>
<td>DcRu-20</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.42</td>
<td>-123.42</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Keddie 1996; Buxton 1969 [39]; Newcombe n.d.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MacAuley Point</td>
<td>DcRu-21</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.42</td>
<td>-123.42</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [38]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacAuley Point II</td>
<td>DcRu-22</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment</td>
<td>48.42</td>
<td>-123.41</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>No information.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland Point</td>
<td>DcRu-24</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>48.41</td>
<td>-123.38</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Smith 1934; Newcombe n.d.; Buxton 1969 [36]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Finlayson Point</td>
<td>DcRu-23</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.41</td>
<td>-123.36</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Keddie 1996; Buxton 1969 [33]; Smith 1934</td>
<td>A postcontact component is present as well; villagers wiped out by smallpox epidemic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clover Point</td>
<td>DcRu-11</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.40</td>
<td>-123.35</td>
<td>ARC</td>
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<td>Site Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weirs Beach</td>
<td>DcRv-12</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)/High Ground</td>
<td>48.37</td>
<td>-123.53</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Mitchell pers. comm. 2006; Buxton 1969 [16]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DcRv-138</td>
<td>DcRv-138</td>
<td>Lookout / Rock-wall Fortification</td>
<td>48.35</td>
<td>-123.54</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Mathews 2004</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pedder Bay</td>
<td>DcRv-1</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.35</td>
<td>-123.57</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Keddie 1996; Buxton 1969 [48]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DcRv-104</td>
<td>DcRv-104</td>
<td>Lookout / Rock-Wall Fortification</td>
<td>48.35</td>
<td>-123.54</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Mathews 2004:20-22 Semicircular rock wall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manor Point</td>
<td>DbRv-13</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.33</td>
<td>-123.55</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Angelbeck 2008d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanwood</td>
<td>45SN1</td>
<td>Blockhouse</td>
<td>48.24</td>
<td>-122.37</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Bruseth 1973:11-12; Bryan 1963</td>
<td>Small “stronghouse”; with trench.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn Cove Manor</td>
<td>45IS52</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF) Top</td>
<td>48.24</td>
<td>-122.69</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Bryan 1963; Buxton 1969 [24]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Penn Cove Park</td>
<td>45IS50</td>
<td>Underground Refuge</td>
<td>48.24</td>
<td>-122.68</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Bryan 1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billings Point</td>
<td>DcRw-17</td>
<td>Trench-embankment</td>
<td>48.23</td>
<td>-123.41</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witty’s Lagoon</td>
<td>DcRv 5</td>
<td>Trench-embankment</td>
<td>48.23</td>
<td>-123.30</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tower Point</td>
<td>DcRv-58</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (RH)</td>
<td>48.38</td>
<td>-123.50</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Snatelum Point</td>
<td>45IS13</td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.22</td>
<td>-122.63</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Bryan 1963; Wilkes 1845 Trench with spikes around Stockade; “several hundred” people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrona Beach</td>
<td>45IS10</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>48.20</td>
<td>-122.54</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [28]</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Site Name</td>
<td>Site No.</td>
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<td>Lat.</td>
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<td>Source Type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dungeness Spit Stockade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Newcombe n.d.; Pickering 1854:15</td>
<td>Visited by Pickering (1854:15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I'eni's (I-eh-nus)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.13</td>
<td>-123.47</td>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Kane 1971 [1847]; Haeberlin and Gunther 1927</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocky Point (Whidbey)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.10</td>
<td>-122.52</td>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Bryan 1963:77; Wilkes n.d. [ca. 1840s]:30</td>
<td>Wilkes noted “stockade” on high bluff at entrance to Holmes Harbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenbank</td>
<td>45IS16</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>48.09</td>
<td>-122.57</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Bryan 1963; Buxton 1969 [25]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suxtcikwi'ih Stockade</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.08</td>
<td>-123.05</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Gunther 1927:183-184</td>
<td>Klallam stockade around upper class houses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qa'laaxad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.08</td>
<td>-122.56</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Waterman et al. 2001:354</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequim Bay</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>48.06</td>
<td>-123.04</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Smith 1907:390-91; Buxton 1969 [51]</td>
<td>Postcontact occupation is present according to settler as of 1860; the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>length and area approximated according to “20-m radius” by Thacker (Smith 1907)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quilceda Creek</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.05</td>
<td>-122.20</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Bryan 1963; Gibbs 1877</td>
<td>Snohomish Fort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebolb</td>
<td>45SN17</td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>48.01</td>
<td>-122.21</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Haeberlin and Gunther 1930; Tweddel 1953</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double Bluff</td>
<td>45IS25</td>
<td>Trench-Embankment (BLF)</td>
<td>47.97</td>
<td>-122.54</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Buxton 1969 [27]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitter Lake</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refuge Area</td>
<td>47.73</td>
<td>-122.35</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Thrush 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haller Lake</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refuge Area</td>
<td>47.72</td>
<td>-122.33</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Thrush 2008</td>
<td>seesáhLtub, or &quot;calmed down a little&quot;, which Thrush (2008:220) noted was likely associated with its function as a refuge area during raids.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hócbale</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>47.70</td>
<td>-122.60</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Snyder 1968:133</td>
<td>“Mat houses were inside.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Káxtyo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>47.66</td>
<td>-122.59</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Snyder 1968</td>
<td>Site was visited by two settlers as ruins, &quot;poles ten to twelve feet high&quot;; today called “Battle Point.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duckabush Lookout</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout</td>
<td>47.65</td>
<td>-122.91</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Elmendorf 1993:126</td>
<td>A hole was dug in bluff to provide cover.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand Fort Hill Stockade</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>47.64</td>
<td>-121.93</td>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Tollefson 1996:154-155</td>
<td>A pond was nearby that supplied fresh water for prolonged seiges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site Name</td>
<td>Site No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Lat.</td>
<td>Long.</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>References</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snoqualmie Falls Refuge</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refuge Area</td>
<td>47.54</td>
<td>-121.84</td>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Tollefson 1996:155</td>
<td>“When an enemy was sighted and the warning was given, warriors would gather at Sand Fort Hill while the women and children retreated to the steep-walled basin some 286 feet below Snoqualmie Falls, to join a few older warriors who guarded the narrow entrance into the basin.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H̱p̱ṯx̱s</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td>47.35</td>
<td>-123.07</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Elmendorf 1960:169, 47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ṭ atū'sō</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lookout / Signal Station</td>
<td>47.27</td>
<td>-122.45</td>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Haeberlin and Gunther 1930:13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>