
by
Laura Madokoro

B.A. (Honours) University of Waterloo
M.A. University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

This project traces the history of population movements out of “Red China” during the Cold War and investigates how certain Chinese migrants came to be treated as refugees when the vast majority did not. From 1949 to 1989 thousands of people left the People’s Republic of China. The settler societies of the British Commonwealth offered refuge to only a few.

Contrary to the politics surrounding the flight of individuals and groups from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, no discourse of “Cold War warrior” or “freedom fighter” attended the movement of people leaving the Chinese mainland after the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. In investigating the reason for this marked difference, this project connects the mediating role played by humanitarian actors and officials in Hong Kong with longstanding histories of racist exclusion in the settler societies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. States were confronted with the challenge of reconciling notions of universal human rights, liberty and freedom with their persistent reservations about the desirability of Chinese migrants. As a result, there was an inconsistent and fractured response to the idea advanced by NGOs, churches and Chinese community organizations that the people leaving China were refugees in need of assistance.

States responded to the movement of people and pressure from humanitarian actors by carefully delineating the ways and means in which people would be identified as refugees. They proffered aid accordingly. Questions of assistance and protection were deeply entwined with the elaborate migration controls and regulation that characterized the international migration regime of the late twentieth century. Authorities frequently defined people as illegal in order to reject calls to provide assistance or protection. While the discourse of illegality undermined claims to refugeehood, the growth in the number and variety of official migration categories meant that people simply moved according to whatever category, or discrete resettlement program, was available to them. This movement subverted state efforts at regulating migration and further undermined the work of religious and secular humanitarians who consistently depicted refugees as abject and helpless. Humanitarian actors were therefore only modestly successful in their efforts to secure consistent state engagement with refugee issues. For most of the Cold War, refugees from China were unwanted in the settler societies of the British Commonwealth.
PREFACE

This work was supervised by Dr. Henry Yu and Dr. Steven Lee.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC  African National Congress
ANZ  Archives New Zealand
ARCI Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals Inc.
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCC  Canadian Council of Churches
CORSO Council for Overseas for Relief Services Overseas
FCRA Free China Relief Association
HKPRO Hong Kong Public Records Office
IAB  Immigration Appeal Board
ICEM Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IOM  International Organization of Migration
IRO  International Refugee Organization
ISS  International Social Service
IRB  Immigration and Refugee Board
LAC  Library and Archives Canada
MCC  Mennonite Central Committee
MUa  McMaster University Archives
NAA  National Archives of Australia
NASA National Archives of South Africa
NAUK National Archives of the United Kingdom
NCC  National Council of Churches in New Zealand
OXFAM Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PRC People’s Republic of China
RSAC Refugee Status Advisory Committee
UNAG United Nations High Commission for Refugees Archives (Geneva)
UNLG United Nations Library (Geneva)
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNREF United Nations Refugee Fund
WCC  World Council of Churches
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have looked forward to writing this section for a long time. Wanting to save the best for last, this is the final bit of scribbling I am doing. The past five years have been extraordinary and I owe tremendous thanks to my two supervisors. Henry Yu inspired and challenged me and then gave me the freedom to find my own way. His refreshing outlook on issues big and small meant that our conversations were always interesting and thought provoking. Steve Lee was unfailingly supportive as I worked my way through various incarnations of this project. His eye for detail and his thoughts on crafting compelling arguments were invaluable. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the other two members of my doctoral committee, Tamara Myers and Catherine Dauvergne. Tamara gave me much needed reassurance and inspired me with her own work as did Catherine, whose patience as I fumbled my way around the finer points of refugee law knew no bounds. Eagle Glassheim saw me through my comprehensive exams and I am glad that I had a chance to think through the history of forced migration with him.

I found a happy home at UBC and I am so grateful to the friends and colleagues who shared this journey with me. I was greatly helped by many of the faculty in the History Department. Bill French first contacted me to tell me I had been admitted to the program. Glen Peterson generously mentioned my name to the organizers of the Refugee in the Postwar World conference at Arizona State University in 2010. The discussions there challenged my thinking and greatly enriched my work. Timothy Brook and Diana Lary shared their views on China with spirited generosity. Michel Ducharme edited some critical pieces and provided much-needed perspective on all things academic. Coll Thrush inspired. Tina Loo provided friendly counsel. My PhD experience was better for my wonderful classmates who became good friends along the way. Heidi, Jan, Ruth, Gabriella, Noa (and Beni), Birga, Phil, Nick, Brendan, Cameron, Kelly and Jamie, thank you. I am especially grateful to my writing buddies, Patrick and Chelsea, who were great motivators and provided pointed, critical and ultimately very helpful feedback. I also benefited from conversations with the wider community of scholars at UBC. I am particularly indebted to Sarah Zell, Luna Vives, Lawrence Santiago and Dan Hiebert in the Department of Geography who shaped some of my early thinking on migration issues. Special kudos to Shauna Labman at UBC Law, with whom I have shared many fine coffees and even richer conversations about refugee issues and who graciously read some very painful early drafts.

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My deepest gratitude goes to my family. To Tom, for seeing me through the good times and the bad times and for providing much needed objectivity and levity. Special thanks to the extended Madokoro and Rothfels clans, especially to my aunts Mary and Marlene (the true family historian). Along with thousands of other Japanese Canadian families, the Madokoros were interned during the Second World War. There is also a history of displacement on my mom’s side of the family as my maternal grandfather came to Canada as a Jewish refugee from Germany. It is a quite a history and one that I am very proud of, especially because it has been an important influence but by no means a defining one. Finally, I could not have done this without the love and affirmation of my mom and brothers. We have been through a lot together and I cherish our good times, so filled with laughter, as much as our strength in adversity. I am especially grateful to Mike for his stoic support and timely hugs and to Dave for sharing wisdom beyond his years. My mom has been a constant source of support, love, strength and inspiration. I am truly grateful. My dad, Ken, was with me in spirit every step of the way.
INTRODUCTION

“RICE REFUGEES”? 

Introduction

The title of this introduction comes from a comment made by a Canadian immigration official in the spring of 1962. Thinking over the recent movement of over one hundred thousand people into Hong Kong and noting the pressure from missionaries and NGOs in the British colony to intervene, the official noted disparagingly that it was unlikely that the people in question were “genuine” refugees. Rather, he believed them to be “rice refugees,” economic migrants in search of economic opportunity.¹ In public, however, the Prime Minister of Canada presented a very different viewpoint. John Diefenbaker suggested that the exodus represented a flight from communism and declared that countries such as Canada had a responsibility to assist people in need. Diefenbaker’s unilateral initiative to resettle one hundred Chinese families from Hong Kong, announced without any consultation with the Department of External Affairs or the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, captured the imagination of the general Canadian public. For Chinese Canadians, however, the initiative appeared disingenuous. They had been lobbying the federal government for over a decade for permission to sponsor their relatives to Canada, with limited success. They were outraged that the “refugees” in Hong Kong were being privileged.

This brief episode captures all that is at stake in discussing the subject of refugees from the People’s Republic of China during the Cold War: the “authenticity” of the refugee experience, the global humanitarian agenda of the postwar period, the politics and public rhetoric around possible refugee flows and the legacy of race-based exclusion that shaped immigration and refugee policies throughout the twentieth century. All of these threads inform the focus of this thesis, which looks at the settler societies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and traces their response to refugees from the People’s Republic of China from 1949 to 1989.²

¹ Special Movement of Chinese Refugees from Hong Kong – Operational Control, RG 76, Volume 861, File 555-54-526-3, Part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).
² To clarify, this is not a project about “Asian refugees” or refugees from Asia, although there are appealing merits to pursuing such a study. The partition of India in 1947, the Korean War (1950-53) and China’s invasion of Tibet in 1950 all triggered large movements of people that scholars have characterized as forced migrants, refugees or displaced people. Folding these events into a single analytical framework would provide an interesting opportunity
Embracing historian Peter Gatrell’s strategy of looking at the interaction between refugees, officials and observers to establish the “contours of refugee history,” this project explores the shifting dynamics and perceptions that governed the movement of refugees from the People’s Republic of China as well as the nature of assistance provided by citizens and settler society states of the British Commonwealth. It does so by deconstructing various silences, absences and gaps in the manner in which the history of the postwar international refugee regime has been understood.

The genesis for this project was a single sentence in a standard Canadian immigration textbook. In describing the government’s 1962 resettlement program, authors Michael Trebilcock and Ninette Kelley declared, “this movement represented the first time that Canada served as a haven for non-European refugees.” This sentence struck a chord with me for several reasons. First, I was familiar with richly celebrated resettlement schemes involving people from Hungary and Indochina in 1956 and 1979, respectively, but not this one. Second, I was perplexed by the date. 1962 seemed both rather early and rather late for the first “non-European” refugees to arrive in Canada. Early, because the Canadian state only began to universalize its immigration program in 1962. Refugees were only defined in Canadian law in 1976; seven years after Canada ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the associated 1967 Protocol. Late, because the event took place fifteen years after the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947, an Act that had effectively banned the entry of Chinese migrants for over two decades.

to compare the conditions under which people decided to move and the nature of their trajectories, as well as the kinds of responses that attended their movements. See Joya Chatterji, The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Sahr Conway-Lanz, “Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 1 (2005): 49-81, accessed April 15, 2009, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00459.x. However, this broad focus would take away from the specific dynamics and history of ethnic Chinese migration, the perpetuation of settler colonial mentalities through immigration and refugee policies, the transnational network of humanitarian actors that paralleled state-based relations and the role of Hong Kong as a transformative site of transit. For these reasons, I pursued a more focused research agenda with the hope that this project might contribute to larger research programs in the future.

4 The term international refugee regime refers to the array of institutions and legal mechanisms developed after the Second World War to address refugee situations first in Europe and then around the world. These include the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Organization of African Unity’s 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa is related, but distinct, from the refugee regime considered here.
Moreover, the movement took place after the Sino-Soviet split when it was becoming clear that the People’s Republic of China was pursuing its own version of communism.\(^6\) One might imagine that Canada would encourage refugees from “Red China.” Finally, why Hong Kong? It seems shameful to confess it now, but until I read that single sentence I was unaware that hundreds of thousands of people had moved from the Chinese mainland to Hong Kong after 1945, creating intense population pressures in the British colony. All of this suggested that there were larger issues at play than what was revealed in a lone sentence. There were silences, deliberate and inadvertent, to be probed.

The period under consideration spans the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the massive economic and political devastation wrought by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which respectively triggered massive famines and extreme political persecution. It encompasses the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the flight of over a million people from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos over the subsequent decade. It ends with the tragic events in Beijing in the spring of 1989 when the world watched as soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army opened fire on unarmed protesters in Tiananmen Square, killing thousands. Throughout the four decades under study, people leaving communist China were rarely assisted as refugees, despite the suspected, and on occasion confirmed, persecution on the mainland.\(^7\) The yawning silence around their potential refugeehood, the neglected role of religious and secular humanitarian actors as well as unspoken state resistance to elaborating notions of assistance and protection in the twentieth century, structure this project. In addition to the silencing dynamics that attended the movement of migrants out of the People’s Republic of China throughout the Cold War, gaps in the historical record exist as a result of how scholars have approached major historiographical issues in this period.\(^8\) These include the imposition of official categories of migration on existing population movements; the legacy of settler colonialism practices and structures; the fluid yet complicated nature of migration from the Chinese mainland; the fragile essence of the postwar humanitarian agenda; Hong Kong’s role as a site not only of transit but


\(^8\) For an elaboration of the various forms of silence that are engendered by the historical project in various forms, see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, \textit{Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).
also of transformation and, finally, the evolving position of the People’s Republic of China in the
global Cold War. Uncovering the hidden impulses in each of these realms informs the history of
unwanted Chinese refugees.

**Categorical Erasures**

The manner in which states categorized migrants after the Second World War erased the
complex motives at play as individuals decided to move near or far, for short or long terms. 9
Until theories of governmentality and migrant agency respectively became part of the academic
canon, scholars relied on the official record as a starting point for their research, ignoring the
manner in which states used categories as a form of control and how migrants used these same
categories to fulfill their own objectives, regardless of the category’s stated purpose. 10 Scholarly
acceptance of official categories of migration as normative has had a profound silencing effect
on the history of refugees during the Cold War.

Stephen Castles and Mark Miller describe the post-1945 era as “the age of migration” and
emphasize two defining traits of the age. The first is the growing number of migrants on the
move. The second is the diversity of both migrants and destinations. 11 They see liberalized
immigration rules and greater freedom of movement as the defining characteristics of this period.
Yet as John Torpey has demonstrated, the twentieth century is best characterized as the

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9 Scholarship that takes migrant agency as a focal point of analysis underscores the gulf between formal categories of
migration and the lived experience. See Lisa Mar, *Brokering Belonging: Chinese in Canada’s Exclusion Era*
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Madeleine Y. Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home* (Stanford,

10 Michel Foucault theories on govermentality have been widely influential. See Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon
and Peter Miller, eds. *The Foucault Effect: Studies on Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991). Nikolas Rose has advanced a research agenda on governmentality that looks at power relations in various
The focus on migrant agency stems from the influence of the transnational turn in social science research that began
in the late 1990s. See Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. “From Immigrant to
Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 68, no.1 (January 1995), 48,
Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized
Nation-States* ([S.l.]: Gordon and Breach, 1994). The use of official categories as the framework analysis has
characterized public policy research in Canada in particular. See Freda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration: Public
Policy and Public Concern* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); Ravi Pendakur, *Immigrants and
the Labour Force: Policy, Regulation and Impact* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); Gerald

culmination of over a century of bureaucratic rationalization that delineated what he calls the “legitimate means of movement.” People may have been able to move faster, further and to more destinations than ever before, but the parallel growth in required documentation and biometric controls meant that an individual’s capacity to move “legitimately” was constrained accordingly. In what Anthony Richmond refers to as the “global apartheid,” tightened controls led to people being labeled “illegal” or “undesirable” when they would have previously “been welcomed either as useful workers or as escapees from oppressive regimes.”

Refugee movements after 1945 took place in an era where states were pursuing ever more creative ways of limiting, regulating and restricting entry. Regulating movement according to strictly defined categories became one of the most effective ways for states to control, and restrict, the entry of people. This same philosophy shaped the development of the international refugee regime after the Second World War. As historian Adam McKeown has observed of migration controls, they “did not emerge as a logical or structural necessity of the international system, but out of attempts to exclude people from that system.” This same philosophy underpinned the development of the postwar international refugee regime. As Aristide Zolberg and others have demonstrated, one of the main concerns for the drafters of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was how to limit state responsibility vis-à-vis refugee populations.

Over the course of the twentieth century, refugees went from being described according to ethnicity (as in the case of Armenians and Russian refugees under the terms of the League of Nations) to being defined on the basis of their individual experiences. The refugee definition

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enshrined in the 1951 Convention focused on the personal and the fear of persecution in particular. In providing a limited definition of who and what constituted a refugee, states established the parameters by which an individual would be eligible for assistance and protection. Official definitions of refugeehood have come to define scholarship on refugee movements and the field of refugee studies in particular. As a result of the Convention’s focus on state protection and territorial integrity, refugeehood has come to be understood almost entirely in terms of the political relationship between citizens and the territorial nation-state.

Scholars such as Peter Nyers, inspired by Giorgio Agamben’s theories on homo sacer and bare life, explore how states position refugees as threats to safeguard their own authority. Nyers argues that the position of the “threatening outsider” works “to sustain constitutive practices that stabilize and reproduce sovereignty’s resolution to questions of political identity, community and world order.” Emma Haddad echoes this sentiment, suggesting that in the position of outsider, the refugee subject has come to be seen as a pervasive and constant “threat to state sovereignty.” In stressing the political relationship between refugees and countries of asylum, refugees are understood as “both disruptive (problematic) and recuperative (resourceful) of sovereignty practices.” In such analyses, refugees are reduced to political pawns in larger nation or state-building enterprises, problematized by the state to create “the conditions in which responsible responses can be given.” Their presence is understood entirely in the context of power, governmentality and state sovereignty. They have been removed from the world of the migrant.

21 Cited in Ibid., 16.
The problem with treating refugees as political subjects is that refugeehood is conceived as an *a priori*, self-evident reality that states have only to recognize. There is insufficient attention to how the refugee identity is embraced, negotiated and ultimately adopted by migrants themselves. With scholars focusing on officially designated categories of migration to describe the nature of postwar migration and the character of the international refugee regime, exclusions born of rigid definitions have been overlooked. This is troublesome for the existence of refugee categories as a category of migration is a relatively recent development. Only in the 1970s did states begin to incorporate the definitions of refugees into domestic legal frameworks. Prior to official designations, refugees simply moved according to whatever category was available to them (legal or illegal).

In pursuing research for this project, I had repeated conversations where I was told for various reasons that there was no such thing as a Chinese refugee. One colleague accused me of constructing an “exotic, Orientalized category.” An official at Citizenship and Immigration Canada dismissed my research out of hand because to her knowledge, there had never been mass displacement from the People’s Republic of China. Many of the interviewees I spoke with, including Sandra Wilking (a former Canadian citizenship judge), pointed out that the forty-year postwar timeframe I was looking at covered the increasing movement of professionals and skilled workers who did not think of themselves as refugees because of their elite status. Diana Lary, a noted historian of twentieth century Chinese history, cautioned me about how I was using the term “refugee.” While noting that people leaving China after 1949 could be thought of as refugees, Lary also pointed out that they were moving within the orbit of a “Shanghai world”, with many of the entrepreneurs and business people reconnecting and reestablishing their networks in Hong Kong. All of these discussions were reminders of how suggestive and influential official labels are in conjuring expectations around various categories of migrants.

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24 Diana Lary, telephone interview with author, 11 January 2012. E-mail correspondence, 10 May 2012.
The challenge of how to define and characterize the people in this study perplexed me from the outset. Were the people leaving the People’s Republic of China refugees? Were they migrants? Both? Neither?

In the end, these questions led me to think about the process by which categories and labels are produced and under what circumstances. Rather than assuming that the nature and character of Chinese migration could be explained through official statistics and official categories of migration, I decided to take the existence of migration categories as an end point, rather than a starting point. In doing so, I explored what Nezvat Soguk calls a “refugeeing process” and investigated the contingencies that influenced when, and how, Chinese migrants were inscribed with, or adopted, a refugee identity after 1949. Embracing Bruno Latour’s definition of the social as something “assembled”, I conceptualized refugees as social subjects rather than political ones. At the same time, I moved away from Latour’s focus on the “umbrella of society,” which is often nation-based, to consider the global space in which the refugee subject was produced and mediated. With this framework, I delved into local, national and global contexts to understand the dynamics that animated settler society responses to Chinese refugees during the Cold War.

**Chinese Migration in the Long Twentieth Century**

From the late nineteenth century, settler society authorities justified the imposition of immigration controls as necessary to prevent too many Asian migrants from entering and, most worryingly, staying permanently. This rhetoric endured in the postwar period despite the significant barriers to emigration for those Chinese resident in the People’s Republic of China. The silence about the gulf between the actual numbers of Chinese migrants and the level of fear and anxiety that their limited presence generated in the settler societies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa is one of the historiographical entry points of this study. From the

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25 Ibid., 1121.
26 Soguk, *States and Strangers*, 253.
28 When the Canadian prime minister, Mackenzie King, declared in the House of Commons in 1947 that “the people of Canada do not wish as a result of mass immigration to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population” and “large scale immigration from the Orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population,” he was not only reflecting what he perceived to be the public’s view on migration from China: King was setting the tone for decades to come.
late nineteenth century, the majority of Overseas Chinese (generally defined as people of 
Chinese descent who live outside of the Greater China Area, which since 1949 has consisted of 
the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) were to be found in Southeast 
Asia.\textsuperscript{29} In 1955, there were 3,690,000 Overseas Chinese in Thailand, 893,400 in Singapore and 
2,452,128 in Malaysia. This compared with 32,355 Chinese in Canada, 13,174 Australia, 7,000 in 
New Zealand and 4,179 in South Africa in the same year.\textsuperscript{30} Despite these relatively 
insignificant numbers, the presence of Chinese migrants in settler societies and the possibility of 
“thousands of refugees from Red China” fostered an extraordinary sense of insecurity.\textsuperscript{31} The 
chasm between perception and reality is of great importance for it conceals the very real 
challenges confronting people who wanted to leave the People’s Republic of China and 
dermines the language of threatening “swarms” that continued to characterize discussions of 
Chinese migration amongst British and settler society officials in the postwar period.\textsuperscript{32} It was 
very difficult for Chinese migrants to leave the Chinese mainland after 1951 due to a state-
imposed ban on emigration. People had to obtain permits to leave and these were issued only on 
on occasion. This ban remained in place until 1978.

Despite the ban on emigration, we know people did leave the People’s Republic of China after 
1951. The question is, how many? And where did they go? Detailed statistics were either never 
maintained by authorities or never made public by the central government. Recently, the \textit{Xinhua} 
newspaper reported that between 1970 and 2000, eight million left the People’s Republic of 
China. Though no annual statistical breakdown was provided it is likely that most of the migrants 
in question left the People’s Republic of China after 1978 when the state lifted the ban on 
emigration.\textsuperscript{33} Statistics in the four settler societies under study are similarly unhelpful. Canadian 
authorities compiled statistics on Chinese migration beginning in 1950, but only in 1965 did they 
begin to differentiate amongst various countries of origin to record China, Hong Kong and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{31} Australia. 24\textsuperscript{th} Parliament, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 1962, First Period, \textit{Hansard}, 2213, 2217.
\textsuperscript{32} See correspondence in FCO 21/209 Hong Kong / China border incidents, 1967, NAUK.
\end{flushleft}
Taiwan.\textsuperscript{34} Statistics from New Zealand are similarly difficult to interpret.\textsuperscript{35} South African authorities categorically denied the existence of any Chinese migration after 1953, the year they imposed almost total restrictions on entry. Government publications in Australia after 1951 simply referred to Chinese immigrants, providing no details about country of origin. Only in the early 1980s did the government in Canberra begin documenting arrivals based on the country of last residence and by 1986, the government was documenting the “birthplace of settler arrivals,” making it possible at last to identify the number of migrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China respectively.\textsuperscript{36}

The only quasi-reliable means of estimating the size of population flows from the People’s Republic of China after 1949 is to look to statistics on entry in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, where the majority of people transited through or settled after leaving the mainland. Early estimates put the number of people moving to Taiwan at two million. However, recent research suggests these numbers were inflated due to the propaganda value attendant in being able to claim significant migration from the People’s Republic of China.\textsuperscript{37} Meanwhile, Ronald Skeldon estimates that in the 1950s, 40,000 people made their way into Hong Kong from the Chinese mainland each year. This number dropped to about 10,000 a year in the 1960s, with the exception of the tumultuous events in the spring of 1962.\textsuperscript{38} While these are significant numbers considering the ban on emigration, they hardly constitute a threat to the settler societies under study. One must therefore consider the living legacy of earlier, foundational, structures of discrimination. These structures endured in the postwar period, distressed but buoyed by the established custom of referencing like-minded practices in other settler societies. Instead of disappearing, they were buried by national narratives that celebrated the postwar period as an age

\textsuperscript{35} In New Zealand, the government’s annual \textit{Yearbook} refers to country of birth as “China” for much of the period under study. \url{http://www.stats.govt.nz/yearbooks}, accessed March 23, 2011. No distinction appears between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
\textsuperscript{38} Ronald Skeldon, “Migration from China,” \textit{Journal of International Affairs} 49, no. 2 (1996): 43-65, accessed December 3, 2009, \url{http://search.proquest.com/docview/220699589?accountid=14656}. I did not find any reliable statistics on population movements into Macau though I consulted UNHCR records on the refugee population in the Portuguese colony. It seems that many of the same dynamics that animated movement into Hong Kong were repeated here. Outgoing Correspondence, Memoranda, Notes to the File, Box 1, Fonds 23, UNHCR Archives (Geneva).
of enlightened liberalism. In such accounts, the racism of the early twentieth century appeared to vanish from the public realm along with the removal of blatantly discriminatory immigration regimes.  

**The Living Legacy of Settler Colonialism**

While scholars often perceive of immigration issues as sovereignty’s last stand, in practice immigration policies are interconnected and deeply contingent on establishing norms across borders. In developing strategies from document control to extra-territoriality to prevent unwanted admissions, settler societies benefited from being able to look to shared histories and traditions to rationalize or defend their positions, especially if they chose to proceed with exclusionary or discriminatory practices. For Canadian authorities, the preferred reference points were the United States, Australia and New Zealand (and South Africa until apartheid became embedded after 1948). Given the established practice of looking to other states at moments of crisis or of potential reform, I embraced a connective rather than a comparative approach in pursuing research for this study. This was a deliberate decision so as to better understand how responses to migration from the People’s Republic of China were the product of local and national dynamics and the extent to which more global currents of concern were negotiated. Although the United States could be explored as a settler society, America’s engagement with migrants from the People’s Republic of China was so bound up with its Cold War campaigns and

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so different from that of other settler societies, it is generally excluded from the scope of this study.42

Settler colonialism is defined as the movement of migrants to a colony with the express purpose of securing control over the colony and expanding the empire.43 I use the terms settler colonialism and settler society to explore how foundational ideas of the appropriateness of certain people for settlement endured and informed refugee policies in the postwar period. In doing so, I acknowledge the interventions by Adele Perry and Annie Coombes, who charge that the historiography of settlement tends to neutralize the devastating effects of colonialism by erasing the presence of previously settled Indigenous populations and the violence of the settler-Indigenous encounter.44 At the same time, I accept Patrick Wolfe’s claim that “invasion is a structure, not an event.”45 Nineteenth century settler colonialism and its “structures of privilege”

45 Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology (London: Cassell, 1999), 163.
persisted well into the twentieth century, as did the political and psychological vulnerabilities at the core of settler colonial projects.46

The manner in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa addressed refugee issues after the Second World War was deeply informed by a persistent settler mentality that privileged certain people for full membership in the nation.47 It was an outlook that was, at its core, deeply insecure, clouded by doubts about the legitimacy of the colonial project. As Matthew Connelly has argued, “it was ironic but perhaps inevitable that...settlement colonies, built on the graveyards of their original inhabitants, were home to the most strident opponents of wholly unrestricted movement.”48 Ongoing concerns about populating the nation manifested themselves most visibly in the selection of migrants to fulfill idealized notions about the desirable racial character of the nation. The use of immigration to build the nation, or what Australian Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell once described as a strategy of “populate or perish,” had particular resonance in settler societies as they sought to reconcile the racial hierarchies that structured the British World with the emerging universal human rights agenda of the postwar

Assembling Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and their shared heritage of settlement projects into one study allows for the possibility of seeing the pervasive presence of a settler colonial mentality as these countries contended with the end of the formal British Empire, migration from the People’s Republic of China and the novel concept of a Chinese refugee. Structural connections such as communication and transportation networks and self-referential and self-affirming practices perpetuated national identities seeped in a settler mentality that privileged admission based on desirability.

While some scholars suggest that migrants and refugees can be cast as participants in an ongoing colonial project that denies Indigenous peoples full membership in the nation, I maintain that it was the state’s persistent belief in the desirability of certain groups as full citizens that most accurately characterized how settler colonialism was perpetuated in the late twentieth century. Arguments that position more recent immigration as a form of ongoing settler colonialism ignore how migrants are subjected to extensive controls and regulations. If anything, settler colonialism

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49 Although historian Samuel Moyn suggests that the human rights movement, and its utopian agenda, only manifested itself in the 1970s, I suggest that the groundwork for this shift began in the immediate postwar period through incremental efforts by the disenfranchised to obtain equality on immigration issues. This periodization frames the structure of this project. Campaigns on immigration issues strike me as a preview of the larger questions around statehood and self-determination that Moyn addresses in his work. See The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2010), 10.

50 Philip Buckner and Douglas R. Francis describe the post-Empire relationship as the outgrowth of a British World, “a world held together more by a sense of belonging to a shared British culture than by ties of commerce and trade.” See Canada and the British World (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 6. This project stresses that this glue was not natural but rather, that it needed to be produced and safeguarded. Sonya O. Rose, “Who Are We Now? Writing the Post-War ‘Nation’, 1948-2001,” in Catherine Hall and Keith McLelland, eds. Race, Nation and Empire: Making Histories, 1750 to the Present (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 158; Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, eds. Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 2005), 7.


is perpetuated on the very bodies that continue to seek entry as states alternatively restrict or permit entry depending on idealized notions of nation.\textsuperscript{53} Despite geographic disparities and local particularities, the living legacy of a racialized colonial mentality manifested in the language of migrant “desirability” and “absorptive capacity” embraced by settler society authorities and publics alike after the Second World War. States clung to this rhetoric despite objections by concerned observers that there were vast open spaces suitable for the resettlement of refugee populations from Asia.\textsuperscript{54}

It mattered deeply that the people at the heart of this project were Asian and not European or African. The long history of exclusionary policies directed at Asian migrants by authorities in settler societies created entrenched and systemic discrimination that persisted well into the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{55} In his work on institutionalized racism, historian Henry Yu argues, “Human bodies matter. They have been defined by historical processes and rethinking what they mean in the present cannot wish away how they have been controlled in the past.”\textsuperscript{56} This is especially true of those migrants, including Chinese migrants, who were excluded from the settler societies at the very moment when states sought to consolidate their authority over the political project of the nation.

\textsuperscript{53}These ideals shape permanent and temporary migration streams where certain groups are desired for their labour but not permanent residence in the community. See Nandita Sharma, \textit{Home Economics: Nationalism and the Making of 'Migrant Workers' in Canada} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).

\textsuperscript{54} Sherene H. Razack, \textit{Race, Space and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society} (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002), 3-4. Activists seeking to advance resettlement programs out of Hong Kong made frequent allusions to the unpopulated space available in settler societies. See Human Rights Council of Hong Kong, 5 May 1962, HKR5545-1-23-1, HKPRO.


\textsuperscript{56} Henry Yu, \textit{Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 199.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Chinese migrants made their way to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In each of these “Gold Mountain” countries, they faced harsh and repressive measures. Anti-Chinese sentiment led some of the earliest lawmaking in these transitioning colonial societies. Exclusion in one country was repeated around the globe as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa enacted “great white walls,” establishing exclusionary practices that shaped the historical developments of these nations. After the Second World War, Chinese migrants remained in many ways the “quintessential outsiders,” subject to ongoing restrictions. However, national narratives that celebrate the progressively liberal manner in which settler societies responded to the movement of people from various parts of the world after 1945 concealed the breadth of these persistent barriers.

Although the legacy of settler colonialism in terms of national identity politics is often overlooked in studies of postwar immigration and refugee policies that privilege economic and geopolitical considerations as primary policy determinants, the manner in which a nation narrated its identity and history influenced how, and when, states came to the assistance of people in need. There is a reason why “Canadian nation-building was predicated upon the view that certain races were better suited for citizenship.” As Prasenjit Duara cautions, we must

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therefore “attend to the politics of narratives – whether these be the rhetorical schemas we deploy for our own understanding or those of the historical actors who give us their world."61 The perpetuation of racist hierarchies through national narratives and the production of particular collective memories had important repercussions for how states perceived and assisted Chinese refugees.

After the Second World War, the countries under study, with the important exception of South Africa, moved incrementally from embracing a settler identity born of the British imperial project to a more inclusive multicultural framework, where the idea of being a “nation of immigrants” gained greater foothold.62 It was a precarious transition and one that states negotiated at every turn. Part of the transition involved disguising structures of privilege with the benevolent language of humanitarianism. In confronting the postwar discourse on universal human rights and contending with the advent of the global Cold War, settler societies came to embrace the idea of being humanitarian nations and the philosophy that immigration programs should be based in part on humanitarian principles. Humanitarianism became a marker of enlightened, liberal nations that were “good, prosperous and generous” yet it perpetuated hierarchies of inequalities.63 Only certain groups were to be assisted on terms set out by the state. Significantly, South Africa never defined itself as a nation of immigrants.64 Without a narrative that reified the state’s efforts in welcoming the poor and downtrodden, South Africa’s humanitarian obligations as a member of the international community were ignored. Its history therefore offers an important contrast to the gymnastics evidenced in other countries around


64 Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 171.
questions of identity and attendant responsibilities and expectations with regard to global population flows.

**A Fragile Agenda: Humanitarianism during the Cold War**

As discussed previously, scholars have focused primarily on refugees as political subjects, defined by their relationship to states and citizens. As a result, scholars have overlooked the critically important role that humanitarian actors, from local church groups to international NGOs, played in advancing the cause of the modern refugee subject.  

There therefore exists a profound silence around the work of these actors in advancing a humanitarian agenda that extended assistance and protection to refugees in all parts of the globe. It was a fragmented and inconsistent agenda yet it ultimately transformed the relationship between refugees and potential countries of reception.

Humanitarians of all kinds shaped conceptions of refugees during the Cold War through interventions on their behalf. The work of these actors, particularly faith-based organizations with longstanding ties to Asia, has been neglected in the periodization of the postwar humanitarian impulse and definitions of humanitarianism that privilege the work of specifically-mandated institutions such as the Red Cross. The extant literature largely overlooks various religious influences on late twentieth century humanitarianism, identifying it primarily with Enlightenment principles. As a result, the continued and important work undertaken by missionaries and religious organizations in advancing what has conventionally been understood

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66 Historian Samuel Moyn disagrees with conventional wisdom that identifies discussions of universal human rights as an immediate response to the devastation of the Second World War. He therefore dismisses the importance of the human rights discourse on shaping an increasingly global humanitarian agenda in the postwar period. Moyn, 7.


as a secular human rights agenda has been ignored.\textsuperscript{69} Focusing on the work of faith-based organizations in particular and thinking of humanitarianism as both a vocation and an instrument allows for an exploration of how a cast of actors cared for Chinese refugees and advanced programs on their behalf.

Adopting a transnational perspective, this project links the work on the ground with the humanitarian agendas advanced domestically in settler societies.\textsuperscript{70} Scholars have traditionally framed and assessed the role of humanitarian actors on immigration and refugee issues in terms of settlement and integration activities.\textsuperscript{71} For instance, historian Franca Iacovetta has focused on the complicity with which non-state actors perpetuated citizenship norms and ideals in their interactions with newcomers.\textsuperscript{72} Andrew S. Thompson begins to fill in the wider context in his recent work, \textit{In Defence of Principles: NGOs and Human Rights in Canada}, where he traces NGO interventions in cases heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. Critically, Thompson suggests that the inability of NGOs (including the Canadian Council of Churches) to effect change through conventional advocacy channels led them to use the courts to effect change.\textsuperscript{73} However, Thompson frames his study within a national context and pays little attention to how humanitarian advocacy in Canada was shaped by transnational currents.

Churches and NGOs operated with, and within, transnational frameworks. Aiwha Ong describes


\textsuperscript{71} Andrew S. Thompson and Stephanie Bangarth, “Transnational Christian Charity: The Canadian Council of Churches, the World Council of Churches, and the Hungarian Refugee Crisis, 1956-1957,” \textit{American Review of Canadian Studies} 38, no.3 (2008): 295-316, accessed June 14, 2011, doi: 0.1080/02722010809481716; Roberto Perin, “Churches and Immigrant Integration in Toronto, 1947-65,” in Michael Gauvreau and Olivier Hubert, eds., \textit{The Churches and Social Order in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Canada} (Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006): 274-291. In the American context, Stephanie Nawyn underscores the significant role that religious institutions play in American public life, suggesting that their activism on social justice issues is more pronounced than in other secular societies. “Making a Place to Call Home: Refugee Resettlement Organizations, Religion, and the State,” (PhD Diss., University of Southern California, 2006), 17. Moreover, humanitarian work is often assigned the supporting role in a much larger drama when in fact it has a structuring effect. See Linda Hitchcox, \textit{Vietnamese Refugees in Southeast Asian Camps} (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1990), 120.

\textsuperscript{72} Franca Iacovetta, \textit{Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada} (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006).

\textsuperscript{73} Thompson looks at the role of the Canadian Council of Churches in the case of \textit{Singh et al. vs. Canada} in one of his case studies. The Singh decision ultimately led to the creation of the Immigration and Refugee Board. Andrew S. Thompson, \textit{In Defence of Principles: NGOs and Human Rights in Canada} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 22.
these as “transnational systems of power in their own right.”74 These were distinct from the policies and politics that bound nation-states to one another. These formative humanitarian networks shaped the history of refugee resettlement in settler societies. Through their work in the field, their communications with each other along with petitions directed at their home audiences and congregations, missionaries and the staff of NGOs and voluntary agencies played a critical role in advancing a global humanitarian agenda around Chinese refugees.75 Since the work of humanitarian actors overseas has been marginalized in domestic accounts of reform, the longstanding influence of church organizations and NGOs on immigration and refugee issues has consequently been overlooked. In the Canadian case, advocacy on behalf of refugees is alternatively dated to the 1973 Chilean coup when Protestant churches lobbied the Liberal government to provide assistance or to efforts on behalf of Indochinese refugees in the late 1970s.76 In fact, religious actors were critical to finding solutions to the plight of displaced people and refugees after the Second World War. Along with ethnic organizations seeking to sponsor relatives from Europe, church groups, and NGOs worked in the camps to identify eligible migrants and offered important settlement services upon arrival.77 As the crisis of displaced people and refugees in Europe abated and upheaval resulting from decolonisation efforts in Asia and Africa grew in intensity, the focus of many humanitarian actors shifted to providing relief in other parts of the world. As a result of this work, they gradually came to promote refugee resettlement as a viable solution to easing suffering around the world. It was a position that states often rejected. Even though the work of humanitarian actors on behalf of refugees was rather norm-oriented and corporatist in nature, it still ran counter to the state’s perceived interest in refugee issues.78 Settler society governments consistently resisted sprawling

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77 Ethnic groups were particularly effective in securing state attention to humanitarian issues. Lobbying by the Canadian Jewish Congress ultimately led to the development of the Oppressed Minorities Program run by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.
78 Neil J. Smelser famously defined norm-oriented movements as attempts to “restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a generalized belief.” See “Theory of Collective Behaviour” in *Social Movements: A Reader,*
humanitarian agendas so that any assistance provided to refugees was ultimately a contest between states, humanitarian actors and migrants over need, merit and obligation.

While scholars have drawn attention to transformations born of “nationalisms, decolonisation, race struggles, and the concerns of indigenous churches” in the Global South and “ecumenism, liberation theology, and accelerating secularization on the religious plane” in the Global North, they have ignored how the humanitarian project of the postwar period was deeply implicated in, and shaped by, the politics of the Cold War.79 Efforts on behalf of refugees were both implicitly and explicitly affected by the contest between the “free West” and the “oppressive East.”80 The fear and anxiety aroused by life in the nuclear age and the growing awareness of global inequalities, transformed the scope and breadth of humanitarian activities.81 At the same time, there was significant tension between liberal democratic principles and notions of freedom advanced by Western states and humanitarian actors alike and perennial state concerns about the threat that migrants and refugees, as outsiders, posed to the nation. This tension was acute in discussions around refugee assistance and resettlement where rhetoric was confronted by the reality of having “outsiders” within. Structural and normative protections, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the language of universal human rights, created the possibility of empathizing with distant strangers in an unprecedented manner.82 Transforming this possibility into a reality required concerted efforts. The capacity to extend compassion to people beyond the immediacy of an individual’s daily routine was a marked difference in the humanitarianism of the late twentieth century. So too was the postwar emphasis on humanitarianism on behalf of others regardless of nationality, race and/or religion.83

81 Richard Cavell, ed. Love, Hate, and Fear in Canada's Cold War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, c2004).
Missionaries and religious groups based in Asia were critical in making theoretical advancements a practical reality.\textsuperscript{84}

In discussing how a humanitarian agenda developed on behalf of refugees from the People’s Republic of China this project identifies two kinds of humanitarianism: instrumental and vocational. Chinese community organizations in various settler societies used a discourse of humanitarianism to lobby for incremental migration reforms, most obviously on family reunification and sponsorship issues. This humanitarianism was largely instrumental in nature. Similar instrumentality was evident in the manner in which authorities in Beijing and Taipei intervened on the Chinese refugee issue in Hong Kong after 1949. Their interventions in response to devastating fires amongst squatter settlements in the colony were born of politically inspired motives and the idea that humanitarian relief could be used to strategic advantage in the ongoing contest over which authority was the legitimate government of China. Vocational humanitarianism, by contrast, was an embodied humanitarianism. It was evident in the approach and practice of humanitarian actors in Hong Kong in the immediate postwar period and to a certain extent, in the work of refugee sponsors in Canada and New Zealand in the late 1970s. In these instances, people actively worked to improve the lives of people they perceived to be in need. Humanitarian principles were not merely the means to an end. Journalists occupied a middle ground between the practice of instrumental and vocational humanitarianism. As mediators of a message, when they paid attention to a refugee story, their influence could be profound. When they did not produce a narrative or visual account to accompany the movement of an individual or group, the ensuing silence was equally compelling, though for different reasons. The lack of an associated narrative meant that an individual or group’s experiences were sidelined completely.

This project further distinguishes between four categories of humanitarian actors engaged with Chinese refugee issues whose engagement was defined by geography as well as philosophical outlook; church organizations and missionaries in Hong Kong; secular humanitarian actors (organizations in Hong Kong working on behalf of refugees in the colony as well as their

branches or affiliated associations in the settler societies under study); home congregations and national church organizations in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa; and finally, Chinese community groups in the settler societies under study who approached the issue of Chinese refugees from the vantage point of immigration reform and family reunification issues. The convergence of assorted humanitarian and community agendas and the way in which the groups’ various objectives were communicated transformed perceptions of Chinese migrants as refugees throughout the Cold War.

**Hong Kong: Migration and Humanitarianism at the Crossroads**

Of the silences attending the history of refugees from the People’s Republic of China after 1949, the silence around the transformative role played by sites of transit is one of the most glaring. In conceptualizing the historical contours of refugeeing processes, the places that migrants left, transited through and settled assume greater significance. Hong Kong is therefore of paramount importance for understanding how migration from China was perceived by observers in the years under study. For migrants, Hong Kong was not simply a staging point to an onward journey; it was a place where humanitarian actors worked on their behalf and where perceptions of them as migrants, refugees or illegals coalesced. As historian Elizabeth Sinn and scholar Yuk Wah Chan argue, Hong Kong’s “in-betweenness” meant it was not just an uneventful stage in a longer journey. The colony was a node of connections, which transformed the conditions under which people moved or stayed. Pausing to consider the transformative role that authorities and humanitarian actors in Hong Kong played in shaping the global humanitarian agenda around refugees in the colony transforms the manner in which the development of the postwar international refugee regime has been previously understood.

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In the early Cold War, Hong Kong was the site of the most important humanitarian activity on behalf of migrants from the People’s Republic of China. It was here that a diverse group of missionaries, local and international NGOs as well as Chinese civic associations worked with the resident Chinese populace and arriving migrants. There was a close alliance between church elites and colonial elites based initially on “the cultural affiliation of Christian missionaries with the imperial power” and after 1949, as a result of the churches’ obvious anti-communism. Missionaries were active in providing education and health services and in tending to the social welfare needs of the colony’s residents. It was a deeply collaborative enterprise and, until the 1960s, missionaries and churches were primarily invested in the delivery of services. To achieve their objectives in Hong Kong, missionaries directed appeals to home congregations in settler societies to obtain support and foster interest in their programs of compassion and concern. In communicating need, their appeals became part of an accidentally progressive reform agenda, particularly when organizations such as the National Council of Churches in New Zealand (NCC) and the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) started to conceive of resettlement as a possible solution to some of the suffering in the colony.

In communicating need from Asia across the Pacific, calling for donations of food and money and proposing adoption and refugee resettlement projects, missionaries advanced a humanitarian agenda that would not have existed otherwise. The work of missionaries such as James Atkinson (who was a member of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Hong Kong Christian Welfare and Relief Council) and the Roman Catholic Maryknoll Sisters, whose surviving records inform much of this study, involved more than providing relief and spiritual guidance to new arrivals and victims of devastating fires that racked settler settlements in the colony in the 1950s. In their efforts to build schools, training centres and sanitariums, missionaries advanced an agenda of care that initially ran counter to the colonial government’s

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88 Lem Burnham to Miss Wilna Thomas (Associate Secretary, Board of World Mission), May 21, 1962, 82.060C File 2-14, United Church of Canada. General Council. Committee on Overseas Relief and Inter-Church Aid. Hong Kong, United Church of Canada Archives (UCCA); On the importance of missionary communications to the development of state policies see, *Canadian Churches and Foreign Policy*, Greene, ed., 9.
objectives of discouraging settlement in the colony. This agenda ultimately became institutionalized throughout the 1960s as the government of Hong Kong became more invested in providing social welfare services to residents of the colony and the nature of their advocacy work evolved accordingly.\(^{89}\)

By the 1960s, the missionaries’ humanitarian agenda on behalf of refugees in Hong Kong had been embraced by home congregations and many of the political elites in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Yet churches were no longer able to obtain sufficient funding from overseas supporters. Instead of traditional relief work, there was growing interest in development projects and donors were directing their support elsewhere.\(^{90}\) Missionaries and NGOs became increasingly dependent on the colonial government for financing to support social welfare programming.\(^{91}\) Moreover, concerns about security in the colony in the aftermath of the 1966-67 riots prompted the government of Hong Kong to assume greater responsibility for social welfare provision. It hoped to prevent future social distress and tie the resident Chinese population more closely to the colonial project.\(^{92}\) While churches and missionaries continued to advocate for social change, increasingly their social reform message (inspired by the spirit of Vatican II, 1962-1965, and the progressive agenda of the Ecumenical movement) targeted the operations of the colonial government itself.\(^{93}\) Advocacy focused on reforming the colonial government. Meanwhile, as the humanitarian agenda resonated more globally, the work of the missionaries and church organizations in Hong Kong shifted from advocating for the mere possibility of such

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\(^{89}\) Leo F. Goodstadt, “Foreword: Faith, Citizenship and Colonialism in Hong Kong,” in Beatrice Leung and Shun-hing Chan, Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), xi; Hong Kong Council of Social Services, Hong Kong Council of Social Services – 40th Anniversary: A Commemorative Issue (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Council of Social Services, 1988); Working Together: A Survey of the Work of Voluntary and Government Social Service Organizations in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Council of Social Services, 1958).

\(^{90}\) As noted previously, South Africa was an exception as a result of the state’s preoccupations with advancing an Apartheid agenda and the churches uncomfortable relationship with the state during this era. Non-European affairs in South Africa, “apartheid,” General, BDH, 23, 170/12, vol.1, National Archives of South Africa (NASA).

\(^{91}\) Goodstadt, xi.


\(^{93}\) Goodstadt, xi.
movement to actually facilitating migration and refugee resettlement. They would be some of the few to speak up on behalf of Indochinese refugees arriving in Hong Kong in the late 1970s.

**China and the Cold War**

Finally, this project considers the evolving position the People’s Republic of China occupied in the global Cold War and considers the marked silence surrounding migrants from its shores. Migrants from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc were regularly referred to as “Cold War warriors,” “freedom fighters” or were described as “voting with their feet.” There was no parallel rhetoric for migrants from Communist China. This final silence requires thinking through the relationship between settler societies and the People’s Republic of China and theorizing how bilateral relations shaped perceptions about migrants from China. Here, I investigate what historian John Price calls the “resilience of race” to understand both the nature of relations with China and the position it occupied in the thinking of immigration officials and diplomats in settler societies.

While scholars have suggested that debates over refugees and displaced people in Europe after the Second World War contributed to the structure of the postwar order and sharpened the divide between East and West during the Cold War, no such comparisons are drawn with regard to refugees in, or from, Asia. This difference stems in part from discrimination enshrined in the burgeoning international refugee regime that directed attention and resources on Europe. Settler

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94 American missionaries were the leaders in this field. They facilitated refugee resettlement and general migration to the United States beginning in the 1950s. Beatrice Leung and Shun-hing Chan, *Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 40.


96 Price argues that the “resilience of race” facilitated imperial anti-communism in the United States. He maintains Canada was complicit in this enterprise. John Price, *Orienting Canada: Race, Empire and the Transpacific* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 317. In emphasizing the role of race in limiting understandings of Asia, Price draws slightly different conclusions from earlier work on the role of race in foreign relations. For instance, historian Sean Brawley (looking at an extended historical timeframe) suggests that although foreign relations enabled the perpetuation of the White Australia policy, they also played an important role in bringing it to an end. See *The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America, 1919-1978* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1995), 3. Matthew Jordan argues that Brawley was mistaken in looking to the foreign policy influence of like-minded countries. In his 2001 doctoral thesis, Jordan suggests that the greater impetus was growing Asian displeasure with the policy. “The Reappraisal of the White Australia Policy Against the Background of a Changing Asia, 1945-66,” (PhD Diss., University of Sydney, 2001).

societies were further focused on Europe in terms of immigration issues. This difference also resulted from the position that China appeared to occupy in the landscape of the global Cold War. In the West, the Soviet Union was understood to be the leader of the Communist camp while China was understood to be a lesser player, largely dependent on Russian support. The major refugee movements out of Eastern Europe, namely refugees from the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the brutal suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, resulted from Soviet interventions. Although scholars now acknowledge the significant independence with which Mao operated from his Soviet colleagues, this dynamic was less recognized at the time. The Soviet Union remained the primary target of Western energies in the Cold War and the propaganda value of refugees from the European bloc as opposed to the Asian bloc was assessed accordingly.

For settler societies, negotiating official recognition, resolving Chinese representation at the United Nations, and integrating the People’s Republic of China into the work of the international community against the backdrop of a polarizing global Cold War defined their approach to authorities in Beijing. Despite pronounced fears about the Cold War moving within, particularly in Australia, most Western leaders were cognizant of the danger that an isolated

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China posed to international stability. The “mish kids” in Canada, the children of former missionaries who became leading politicians and diplomats (including Lester B. Pearson, Chester Ronning, Arthur Menzies, Herbert Norman and John Small) generally approached the question of relations with the People’s Republic of China with the idea of engagement over isolation. The willingness to engage with the People’s Republic of China, even if only on economic terms, was reflected in ongoing efforts at recognition, United Nations representation and the sale of various products (including wheat, barley and wool) by Canada, Australia and New Zealand beginning in the 1960s. After 1978, when Deng Xiaoping liberalized parts of China’s economy and declared the country open for business, most of the countries under study sought to gain a foothold in the lucrative Chinese market. As economic interests gained preeminence in Canadian, Australian and New Zealand relations with the People’s Republic of China, human rights issues were often set aside, except in extraordinary circumstances such as the events in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989.

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102 The desire to engage China was most evident in Ambassador Chester Ronning’s efforts to keep the lines of communication open after 1949. Alvyn Austin, Saving China: Canadian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom, 1888-1959 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 310. By contrast, biographer John English underscores Lester B. Pearson’s moderate interest in China and in particular, his hesitation over recognition. The Worldly Years: Life of Lester Pearson 1949-1972 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1992), 286. Meanwhile Peter M. Mitchell argues “the evidence is too inconclusive to prove direct missionary influence on Canada’s China policy.” However, he does suggest that the “acute interest” that senior diplomats expressed with regard to China can be explained in part by their missionary connections with the country. See “The Missionary Connection,” in Paul M. Evans and M. Bernard Frolic, eds. Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 28, 33.


104 South Africa was once again the exception as it turned to Taiwan, which likewise occupied international pariah status, to pursue trade negotiations.
Methodology

Ann Stoler argues that scholars should read both along and against the “archival grain,” and consider simultaneously what is documented and what is absent. In conducting research for this project, I paid attention to the volume and pitch at which the individual Chinese migrant experience was documented in the four state archives I consulted. In doing so, I uncovered an important absence. In the National Archives of South Africa, there is a profound silence on the relationship between the federal government and Chinese communities in South Africa after 1953. Following the ban on Chinese immigration introduced in that year, Chinese population numbers declined significantly and the focus of the state project shifted from the regulation of outsiders to the imposition of apartheid rules and regulations. While there is substantial documentation about the Group Areas Act and the segregation of black, coloured and white communities, there is little that reflects the state’s concerns with the Chinese community. This silence informs the manner in which the South African state’s response to the movement of people out of the People’s Republic of China after 1949 is understood in this study. It further informs how Chinese community agency is assessed. After the election of the National Party and its apartheid agenda, Chinese communities across South Africa were preoccupied primarily with local issues. Questions of family reunification and protecting Chinese migrants who entered the country illegally fell to the side. As a result, the politics at play in South Africa nurtured much of the thinking behind this project even if, as a case study, it appears only at the periphery of the analysis.

In comparison to the sheer volume of state materials produced to document early Chinese migration to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the amount of documentation produced

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105 With Frederick Cooper, Ann Laura Stoler discusses the role of colonial archives in the production of knowledge and the evolution of particular national imaginations as evidence of “how much political and cultural energy went into defining dichotomies and distinctions.” See “Introduction: Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda” in Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 16. Stoler and Cooper maintain “that every document in a colonial archives – no matter how ignorant its author was of indigenous society or how unimportant his ideas were to future policy – is layered with the received account of earlier events and the cultural semantics of a political moment.” Stoler and Cooper argue that “what is excluded from (the archives), what nomenclatures signal at certain times are themselves internal to, and the very substance of, colonialism’s cultural politics.” Ibid., 17-18. As such, I needed to think through the very contents of the archives I was investigating before I could proceed with tracing how conceptions of the modern refugee subject evolved in terms of migration from the People’s Republic of China after 1949. See also Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

106 See correspondence in Position of Chinese in the Union, Part 3, 1955-1961, BTS, 19/2/1, NASA.
explicitly about Chinese migrants dwindled noticeably over the course of the twentieth century. Chinese migrants went from some of the most scrutinized groups in the late nineteenth century, subject to capitation taxes, dictation tests, registration and photo documentation requirements, to a more standardized status over the course of the postwar period. By the 1960s in Canada and a decade later in Australia and New Zealand, Chinese migrants were no longer subject to exceptional documentary requirements but were generally normalized, ruled by the same practices of regulation and control as other migrants. The manner in which documentation about individual Chinese migrants has been acquired and preserved in the state archives speaks to this attendant normalization.

In the Canadian context, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) preserves the General Registers documenting the payment of head taxes from 1885 to 1923 (Exclusion Era) and any surviving individual case files from this period. However, after the 1970s, LAC ceased to acquire individual immigrant case files as the volume of Chinese migrants increased so significantly that it was no longer feasible, or deemed to be of sufficient “national significance” to acquire individual records. Similarly, neither the National Archives of New Zealand nor the National Archives of Australia maintain individual immigration case files for the postwar period although they preserve reams of information about individuals who migrated from China in the late nineteenth century. As a result, information about individual migration experiences is largely absent from state documentary records.

With the formalization of refugee determination processes in Canada in the 1960s, the state began to produce the kind of documentation previously associated with Chinese migrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Individual files contained details about the individual, their claim and documentary evidence about country conditions that proved or disproved their allegations of persecution. This rich body of information has not survived the passage of time in any kind of accessible manner. Many of the records of formal decision-making bodies in Canada, such as the Immigration Appeal Board, Refugee Status Advisory Committee and early Immigration and Refugee Board cases can now be found in 14,000

unmarked boxes in a Toronto warehouse.¹⁰⁸ No file lists exist for these records and there is no way of determining what the boxes contain, short of physically consulting the records. The close scrutiny and documentation that characterized Chinese migration to Canada in the late nineteenth century and the careful preservation of this history does not exist for refugees to Canada. Here too, scholars must heed the silences and consider what the neglect of these records and the lack of documentary evidence says about the history of refugees and the history of migrants more generally from the People’s Republic of China in the late twentieth century. The carelessness with which records documenting individual lives are preserved is perhaps a reflection of Zygmunt Bauman’s notion of liquid modernity where the focus on production creates wasted humanity, a population that is “‘excessive’ and ‘redundant.’”¹⁰⁹ The silences, gaps and absences in the archival record are incorporated into this project’s analytical framework.

Concurrent to paying attention to silences in the archives, I also incorporated criticisms of refugee voicelessness into my methodological approach. A complicating factor in seeking to make “refugee voices” heard and identify “authentic” refugee experiences is that as the humanitarian agenda of the postwar period became embedded alongside more formal refugee determination processes, people learned to speak to the expected discourses of persecution and fear. As David Farrier proposes, “to request asylum necessarily requires the speaker to identify himself/herself as the object of sovereignty’s desire.”¹¹⁰ Similarly, Roger Zetter argues, “labeling refugees as outsiders reinforces their own sense of alienation, so they too politicize their own identity in various ways to reflect prevailing discourse.”¹¹¹ Migrants therefore learned how best to present their experiences to the people who would determine their futures.

In his work on speech communities, Jean-François Lyotard has proposed that one of the great challenges of modern society is for outsiders or “Others” to make their voices understood by the

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¹⁰⁸ E-mail exchange with Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information Division, July 27, 2011.
¹¹⁰ Farrier, Postcolonial Asylum, 7.
“community of speakers.”

Rather than thinking of the performative element of the refugee process as disingenuous, this project embraces it as a natural outcome, given the issues at stake; resettlement and/or migration opportunities in an era of convoluted, and often obscured, restrictions. Performativity, in this study, is a question of what Lyotard describes as the “effort of translation” that is “endlessly renewed” so that any self-representation on the part of migrants is understood to be in dialogue with the benefit structures of the modern international migration regime.

To understand the practice of translation in the migration context, I interviewed ten first-generation Chinese community members in Canada and Australia. I sought to uncover the rationales at play in their decisions to move and the often circuitous manner in which they found themselves in the countries under study. Significantly, in recruiting migrants for interview purposes, I did not ask that they self-identify as refugees. Rather, I asked only if they, or their families, had left the People’s Republic of China between 1949 and 1989. I was curious to explore the processes behind their movement and how they themselves conceptualized of a refugee identity. I was also interested in understanding the degree to which they associated their own life experiences with their impressions of who and what constitutes a refugee or a refugee experience. Ultimately, none of the people I interviewed self-identified as refugees. The all felt they were fully capable of moving on their own terms, without need of assistance or protection.

These conversations, which were infused with assumptions about refugees based on the decision-making authority of formal refugee determination systems and humanitarian images of desperate,
helpless individuals, informed the kinds of research I pursued and the very structure of this project. They led me to interview another group of individuals whom I deemed to be critical in producing impressions of the modern refugee subject. These were officials and diplomats who worked at headquarters and in the field, respectively developing and delivering immigration and refugee programs. The conversations I had with seven retired officials from the Department of Manpower and Immigration (Canada) and Department of External Affairs (Canada) formed a light version of the ethnography of the state undertaken by Alison Mountz in Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border. They critically enriched my understanding of performativity and authenticity from the vantage point of the state.\footnote{116 Alison Mountz, Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).}

With this amalgamation of research sources, I inadvertently heeded Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper’s demand that we create our own archives to destabilize the official production of knowledge.\footnote{117 Stoler and Cooper, “Introduction” to Tensions of Empire, 16.} The result of the snowball approach to recruiting potential interviewees and the confluence of events, signposts, good fortune and dogged access to information requests can be found in these pages. I am very aware of the constructed nature of this project, as I am sensitive to the constructed nature of the modern refugee subject and the ease with which it can be deconstructed in multiple different ways. Nevertheless, I believe that it is important to make an effort to understand the constructed, and on occasion produced, nature of the modern refugee subject if we are to have any chance of seeing the people behind delineated categories of migration and limiting one-dimensional labels.

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following on this introduction, the first chapter establishes the theoretical framework of the project by exploring the world of the migrant as it intersects with the world of the global humanitarian. Subsequent chapters explore the incremental institutionalization of refugee relief and resettlement practices in the postwar period and the contested nature of this change. The project is divided into three parts. The first section, consisting of Chapters Two to Four, explores the creation of an agenda around refugees and traces the work of humanitarian actors in advancing the cause of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong
after 1949. The second section, Chapters Five to Six, looks at the reactive nature of state strategies to control the movement of people, including the production of discourses of illegality as well as attempts to define the legitimate means of movement through the administrative and judicial institutionalization of refugee issues. The third part looks at the consequences of humanitarian activism in Asia over the course of three decades. Chapter Seven examines the politics surrounding the response to the Indochinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s. Many of the people who left North Vietnam in 1978-79 were ethnic Chinese. This chapter traces the manner in which their flight was perceived and received amongst settler societies to trace the parallels and differences in earlier approaches to refugees from the People’s Republic of China. The final chapter, a mix of conclusion and coda, considers how authorities in settler societies responded to the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989 in order to explore how conceptions of Chinese migrants, the modern refugee subject and norms about appropriate humanitarian solutions evolved in relation to one another in the forty years under study.

This first chapter introduces the project’s conceptual framework and explores the genealogies of the world of the migrant and the world of the global humanitarian and how they intersected in the postwar period. It sets the stage for the later analysis of state responses to refugee flows out of the People’s Republic of China. After suggesting the need to return refugees to the world of the migrant, this chapter establishes the defining characteristics of the world of the migrant as well as the postwar humanitarian agenda, which required recipients to conform to certain expected norms in order to obtain benefits and assistance. Furthermore, this chapter considers how humanitarian actors suppressed the migrant nature of the refugee experience and instead exploited perceptions of helpless victims to garner support for their activities on behalf of refugees. This chapter suggests that the movement of people undermined these representations. The physical presence of refugees in countries of asylum or resettlement resulted in public confusion around the authenticity of claims to refugee status in part because of the expectations around refugeehood created by humanitarian representations.

Chapter Two focuses on the local history and the specific contingencies that led the colonial government in Hong Kong to produce an inconsistent and contradictory discourse that painted newly arriving migrants as refugees from 1949 until the mid-1950s. The meaning of the term
“refugee” as used in Hong Kong in the immediate postwar period was distinct from that adopted by the United Nations in 1951. In Hong Kong, the colonial government used a refugee discourse to underscore the temporary nature of the migrants’ stay and minimize its obligations towards new arrivals from the Chinese mainland. The state subsequently depicted refugees as a problem to facilitate the introduction of unprecedented border controls. With the emergence of a refugee regime in Europe, the discourse on refugees assumed new aesthetic qualities, humanitarian actors (most particularly the UNHCR and those representing the governments in Beijing and Taipei) began to embrace the refugee issue in Hong Kong as grounds for all kinds of intervention. Their approach was diametrically opposed to the policies pursued by the colonial state and contrary to the discourse advanced by the colonial state.

The third chapter focuses on the critical role that humanitarian and non-governmental actors in Hong Kong played in bringing the refugee situation in the colony to international attention. The efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Hong Kong Council of Social Services and a variety of faith-based organizations in the colony stand out in this respect. Along with pressure from the Nationalist government in Taiwan, which used the Chinese refugee issue in Hong Kong for propaganda purposes, the campaigns by these various organizations encouraged the United Nations to dispatch a team of experts to Hong Kong in 1954 to investigate the refugee situation and later, to include Chinese refugees as a key priority during World Refugee Year (1959-1960). Through their campaigns for refugee assistance in Hong Kong, non-governmental, religious and secular humanitarian actors took the lead in pressing for progressive change. At the same time, the images civil society actors and missionaries used to advance the cause of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong and the narratives they produced of helplessness and destitution suppressed the agency of the migrants and created an enormous gulf between their target audiences and their intended beneficiaries. Humanitarian actors eroded the capacity for sovereign rule in Hong Kong while paradoxically supporting settler society aspirations to safeguard a particular vision of the nation by perpetuating official discourses that cast refugees as the perennial outsiders.

Events in Hong Kong in the spring 1962 marked the high point in terms of international recognition of refugee populations from the People’s Republic of China. For a brief few weeks,
Chinese authorities relaxed the border controls between Hong Kong and China and hundreds of thousands of migrants attempted to move to the British colony. Chapter Four explores the mixed responses in Hong Kong and settler societies to this dramatic moment. The unprecedented media attention on the movement of people from the People’s Republic of China created a searing visual moment that prompted remarkable levels of public concern for Chinese refugees. The visuality of the spring exodus and the perceptions it engendered were critical to this shift.\textsuperscript{118}

While the governments of Canada and New Zealand resettled small numbers of people they identified as refugees, an intimate exploration of their responses reveals how continued reservations about the desirability of admitting Chinese migrants and novel concerns about sovereignty inspired by the emerging global agenda for refugee resettlement resulted in a charade of humanitarianism that reinforced powerful stereotypes of refugee desperation and countered possibilities for progressive resettlement activities.

Chapter Five analyzes how authorities in Canada, Australia and Hong Kong actively used a discourse of illegality to counter migration pressures and unwanted calls for humanitarian intervention. By looking at three instances in the 1960s when states engaged a discourse of illegality to alternately reject refugee claims or normalize illegal migrants, this chapter explores how the public use of this discourse reinforced the authority of the state to determine the legitimate means of movement and suppressed any sense of humanitarian responsibility or obligation. This chapter looks first at the debate around the deportation of Willie Wong to the People’s Republic of China from Australia in the spring of 1962. It then looks at how authorities advanced a discourse of illegality in Hong Kong in 1967. It underscores the colony’s mediating role in shaping perceptions of migrants from the People’s Republic of China. This chapter then concludes with an assessment of how the Canadian state addressed the issue of illegality upon the discovery of smuggling rings operating out of Hong Kong in 1959. Instead of casting out migrants who had entered the country through fraudulent representations, the state introduced a Status Adjustment Program to normalize the status of all Chinese migrants. In the process, the Canadian government reinforced its authority to determine the legitimate means of movement,

similar to the strategies employed in Hong Kong and Australia but with a focus on inclusion rather than exclusion. States developed a discourse of illegality as a dynamic “othering” strategy that reinforced their authority by transforming migration, or the threat of migration, into a problem. States then resolved the “problem” through inclusive and exclusive solutions, which had the attendant effect of suppressing or erasing the possibility for migrants from the People’s Republic of China to be perceived and assisted as refugees.

Chapter Six surveys the changing legal landscapes in Canada and New Zealand from 1962 and 1976. It juxtaposes the progressive incorporation of humanitarianism in Canada and the preservation of executive discretion in New Zealand to consider how migrants navigated this shifting terrain. Humanitarian actors engaged and shaped both of these processes. In Canada, humanitarianism was progressively incorporated into the state’s legal framework. With the development of mechanisms such as the family reunification agreement with People’s Republic of China and the Designated Classes category established in the 1976 *Immigration Act*, the Canadian state sought to direct the character of humanitarianism and its scope of responsibility in multiple arenas. In New Zealand, the government preserved executive discretion on refugee admissions in large part because it continued to be concerned about the impact of Chinese migration on the racial character of the nation until the 1970s. Humanitarianism was therefore a mix of priorities and concerns. Action was often based on how it would affect the nation’s sense of self and both its domestic and international priorities. In the pursuit of closer relations with the People’s Republic of China, the governments in both Ottawa and Wellington avoided sensitive subjects such as refugee movements. Instead, New Zealand dealt with humanitarian issues on a case-by-case basis while the Canadian state sought to regularize migration with a family reunification agreement. Migrants learned to navigate this shifting terrain.

In terms of content and framework, Chapter Seven, which focuses on the response to the Indochinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s, is an exception to the overall thrust of this thesis. Instead of looking at migrants from the People’s Republic of China, it examines how settler societies responded to the movement of ethnic Chinese and various other groups out of the conflagration in Indochina as a way of understanding the impact of the humanitarian agenda born in Hong Kong in the early postwar period. This chapter hones in and looks explicitly at the
Canadian case while furthering the discussion of Hong Kong as a place where refugee identities are mediated. This was done purposively, as a reminder that local and national contingencies as well as broader currents of thought about responsibility and obligation mediated state responses to refugee populations throughout the Cold War. In considering the Canadian response to the Indochinese refugee crisis within the context of three decades of state and humanitarian confrontations over responsibility for refugees leaving mainland China for Hong Kong, the quality and character of the humanitarian response to the end of the Vietnam War and the flight of hundreds of thousands of boat people is better understood. The local politics that governed the response to refugees in Hong Kong informed notions of responsibility and obligation that circulated more globally. The Canadian response was shaped in part by these local politics. It was also a product of the humanitarian agenda advanced throughout the Cold War. Yet the state’s humanitarian response was ultimately limited. The desire to categorize, regulate and control the size of population flows remained stubbornly enduring.

The conclusion of this thesis, Chapter Eight, is designed as a coda to hint at what followed the partial and inconsistent incorporation of humanitarian principles into the immigration regimes of the settler societies under study. In the spring of 1989, the Chinese government violently suppressed a pro-democracy movement led by workers and young, enthusiastic students. The world watched as the People’s Liberation Army opened fire on thousands of protesters in Tiananmen Square. In the aftermath of the “June 4 incident,” the Chinese state proceeded to detain and arrest hundreds of suspected protesters. There was no official refugee resettlement in response to the crackdown. Instead, states used established migration categories to meet perceived humanitarian needs without upsetting relations with the People’s Republic of China. The concluding chapter demonstrates how the nature of the humanitarian appeal and the migrants’ perceptions of accessible avenues changed in the four decades under study and how the politics around claims to refugeehood by migrants from the People’s Republic of China evolved concurrently. The conclusion returns to the introductory themes of the project and revisits how legacies of exclusion, postwar humanitarian agendas and the migrant mobility of the late twentieth century contributed to shifting perceptions of Chinese migrants and attendant claims to refugeehood in the four decades under study.
CHAPTER ONE

WORLDS COLLIDING: MIGRANTS AND HUMANITARIANS, 1945-1989

Nobody knows more about giving back to a country that welcomes them than an immigrant or a refugee. I know that from experience. At the age of three, I arrived in Canada with my parents and my brother, who was seven at the time. We came to this country during the war, in 1942, after an extraordinary journey from Hong Kong, encountering great dangers and being taken care of by the Red Cross. We arrived with one suitcase apiece and nothing else. I was very fortunate that my family never thought of themselves as having lost anything of real value. We only lost material things: we didn't lose ourselves. We didn't lose our sense of ourselves. We didn't lose what we really believed in as human beings.

Adrienne Clarkson, former Governor General of Canada

Introduction

The former Governor General of Canada’s refugee story contains some of the most recognizable tropes in late twentieth century refugee narratives, that of people losing their material possessions, encountering danger and then reaching freedom in the West. Clarkson mentions, but does not dwell, on her family’s contact with the Red Cross. This mention is significant for humanitarian actors were, and remain, central to the process of “refugeeing” migrants. In contrast to states, which consistently treated refugees as a kind of migrant (selecting and then regulating their admission), secular and religious humanitarian actors ignored the social networks and active decision-making that informed refugee movements throughout the Cold War. Instead, they privileged victimhood over all other signifying aspects of an individual in motion. This project returns refugees to the world of migrants to better understand the character of the important, if uneven, humanitarian advocacy on behalf of refugees in the postwar period.

This chapter establishes the theoretical framework of this study by looking at how two different dynamics, or “worlds” collided during the Cold War, and how nation states responded to the forces that resulted. The first world was that of migrants, a world of people in motion; moving as they had for years but with the benefit of improvements in transportation and communications technology, moving faster and to more varied

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locations. The second world, was that of humanitarians, people of secular and religious inspiration, who embraced and contributed to the emerging universal human rights and global humanitarian regimes and lobbied nation states to do the same. As these two worlds intersected, the environment in which people moved was transformed. Pressure from humanitarian actors, initiated by missionaries in Hong Kong and channeled by local congregations as well as national and international church bodies, contributed to the establishment of refugee resettlement and sponsorship programs. Their vision of humanitarianism reflected the dual concerns of securing admission for people in need and demonstrating a nation’s capacity for extending generosity. States, however, remained determined to control the size and shape of immigration flows. Confronted with appeals to a shared universal humanity, settler society authorities sought to engage with refugee issues in a manner that reinforced their authority to determine the size and shape of immigration intakes while simultaneously giving support to the blossoming universal human rights and global humanitarian agendas. The refugee subject as an “ethical figure” was central to these tensions.

States adopted a variety of strategies to control both the movement of people and the breadth of their own humanitarian response to refugee situations, most particularly through the introduction of officially sanctioned migration categories that delineated the “legitimate means of movement” and the creation of discrete and discretionary opportunities for the resettlement and sponsorship of refugees. Such occasions were rare. As a result, people moved regardless of pervasive controls and limited resettlement opportunities. Global refugee numbers began to climb in the 1960s reaching 9.76 million in 1969. While the numbers have risen and fallen intermittently since then, in 2010 the

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3 Catherine Dauvergne assesses the humanitarian character of a nation based on the degree to which the state is willing to make exceptions for people who do not meet the legal requirements for entry. Humanitarianism, Identity and Nation: Migration Laws of Australia and Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 72.

4 Aihwa Ong, Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 79.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the global population of displaced people at 43 million, including both refugees and the internally displaced. Refugee resettlement solidified as a viable solution to protracted refugee situations in Europe and ideological Cold War confrontations at the very moment when refugee situations in China (including Chinese refugees and White Russians who had fled the Soviet Union after the 1917 Revolution) began to engage the efforts of humanitarians, especially missionaries, in the field. As a result, the humanitarian impulse encountered the restrictive immigration regime of the twentieth century in an extraordinary fashion. While humanitarians imagined refugees as the most forlorn and victimized of human beings, describing them as “risking their lives” for a better future and “the showing sore of the most bitter sickness of our time,” settler society states viewed refugees within the context of twentieth century nation-building projects. The tension between states’ desires to retain control over immigration flows while concurrently lending support to global humanitarian efforts resulted in refugee policies that critics have called the equivalent of “calculated kindness.”

The World of the Migrant
At its core, migration is about movement and as historian Donna Gabaccia has argued, it is “an ordinary, rather than exceptional, dimension of human life.” While refugees are people in motion they are often treated as distinct from other migrants because they are seen to move under more difficult, coerced conditions. As a result, refugees are often

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treated as political subjects, defined in terms of their relationship to the nation states they flee or those they seek protection from. Even when scholars treat refugees as migrants, as Catherine Dauvergne does in embracing the term “humanitarian migrant” to describe “those who are admitted to, or allowed to remain in a country for reasons that tap into a notion of compassion in some way,” they privilege the manner in which migrants are received over the initial act of moving. The world of the migrant conceptualized here focuses on the decision to move and movement itself. It encompasses refugees in order to uncover the hidden migrant histories behind the refugee rhetoric.

The act of moving, regardless of distance covered or the circumstances under which people move, entitles refugees to be considered migrants. It is this baseline definition that this project adopts. Recasting refugees as a kind of migrant, instead of divorcing them from the world of the migrant as occurs in humanitarian representations or studies that politicize their movements, offers a critical avenue in which to explore how and why people move and the processes by which certain came people to be seen as refugees while others did not.

What did the globe look like to people in motion in 1949? How was mobility facilitated? How were destinations chosen? These questions point towards how one might investigate the world of the migrant. Inspired by Benedict Anderson’s work on imagined

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12 For instance, legal scholar James Hathaway argues that refugees are not only distinguished, but are defined, by their special legal status, ignoring how this status is obtained and the activism and advocacy involved in securing such status for individuals or groups of people. “Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree Just to ‘Date’?” Journal of Refugee Studies 20 (2007), 350, accessed June 3, 2010, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fem019. Similarly, Jeremy Hein acknowledges that like other migrants, refugees move with the help of networks. However, he believes they are by definition distinct from other migrants because of their relationship to the state. “Refugees, Immigrants and the State,” Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993), 44, accessed May 25, 2010, doi: 10.1146/annurev.so.19.080193.000355. For a similar critique to the one advanced in this project, see Hakan Sicakkan, “The Modern State, the Citizen, and the Perilous Refugee,” Journal of Human Rights 3, no.4, (2004), 445, accessed April 15, 2011, doi: 1475483042000299705. The author refutes the usefulness of adopting a single definition for a refugee, and suggests that a comprehensive definition attends to both context and case sensitivity and responds to historical and ahistorical criteria for defining refugees. According to Sicakkan, the definition should be open to “social groups’ and individuals’ different perceptions of, and relationships to, time, space, community, and politics.” 460.

13 Dauvergne’s definition encompasses refugees and asylum seekers as well people who are allowed to remain even if they don’t meet existing legal requirements out of the state’s “sense that to reject or expel them would contravene a nebulous sense of humanity.” Humanitarianism, Identity and Nation: Migration Laws of Australia and Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 6.
communities and historian Gerald Friesen’s experimental work on communication and the bonds of citizenship, this project suggests two key components that defined the world of the migrant (and continue to do so) to stress how and why refugees should be considered as full-fledged members of this world.¹⁴ The first element consists of the personal intelligence networks, and the subsequent availability of information, that shaped the social life of the migrant.¹⁵ Information has always been a critical element of a migrant’s social capital, which Bourdieu and Waquant describe as the “sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”¹⁶ Networks and access to intelligence information influenced decisions to move and importantly, the details of where and how to do so. As these networks evolved, characterized most vividly by what David Harvey calls the time-space compression of the late twentieth century, the speed and ease with which migrants made decisions about far-flung locations increased as did their ability to remain connected with homelands and other members of the diaspora after their departure.¹⁷

The second element that structured the world of the migrant was the active-decision making that sprang from information about migration strategies, opportunities and destinations. While on the surface this seems self-evident, it is actually along the

¹⁷ David Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Writing in a post-9/11 environment, Brinkerhoff argues that the strength of connections established digitally threatens the security and sanctity of the nation-state. This is a refrain that is frequently echoed by scholars who work with refugees and illegal migrants. Zai Liang and Wenzhen Ye argue that the growth in knowledge about migration and the visible impact of remittances in Fujian has encouraged residents of the province to pursue migration opportunities, even illegal ones, in increasing numbers so that the area has now become synonymous with smuggling networks. “From Fujian to New York: Understanding the New Chinese Immigration” in David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, eds. Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001): 187-215.
decision-making fault line that observers, often sympathetic ones, divorced refugees from the world of the migrant.\textsuperscript{18} Too often, refugees were portrayed as hapless victims who had no choice but to flee and who exerted no agency about their future. Anticipating danger or uncertainty undermined perceptions of refugeehood as did exercising preferences about places of refuge.\textsuperscript{19} As UNHCR expert Jeff Crisp observes, “even those asylum seekers who merit refugee status have clear preferences in relation to their ultimate destination.” The argument that their migration was “often facilitated by means of transnational social networks” has never sat well with policymakers or humanitarian activists.\textsuperscript{20} This is largely because arguments for assistance depended on evidence of demonstrable need. States were reluctant to provide extra-ordinary assistance to people who appeared to have the means to improve their situations or secure protection themselves. Similarly, humanitarian actors relied on being able to cast their intended beneficiaries as helpless victims in order to galvanize support and obtain assistance.\textsuperscript{21} A demonstrated capacity for agency, as suggested by the existence of networks that helped people move and decisions about available options, undermined humanitarian claims about need and protection that were meant to secure assistance from states and engagement amongst the general public.

\begin{quote}
\textit{Who and What You Know}

As scholars including David Held have demonstrated, migration is a critical and complicated part of the modern globalization phenomenon in part because the information and technology networks associated with the globalization of capital also
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\textsuperscript{18} Gil Loescher, \textit{The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 41.
\textsuperscript{19} Anthony Richmond divides migration into an axis of reactive and proactive decisions. See \textit{Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism, and the New World Order} (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994), 55.
facilitated the movement of people, even when state policies did not. In the four decades under study, people encountered greater and greater barriers to official mobility all the while personal networks reproduced and disseminated intelligence and information in a variety of formats and at far greater rates than ever before. Networks were therefore an important structuring aspect of the world of the migrant and a key determinant in the decision to move. They offered valuable intelligence about how to navigate the onerous restrictions on movement imposed by states around the globe.

Early research on immigration issues overlooked, or glossed over, the value of information circulating amongst networks of people, assuming that people moved primarily as a result of financial and political incentives (or disincentives). Yet as recent scholarship contends, assessing the precise impact of a policy decision on any given migration flow is extremely difficult to ascertain. There are similar difficulties in determining the level of coercion involved in a refugee’s decision to move. Rather than focusing on causes of movement, which are invariably multiple, looking at how movement is facilitated through the presence of networks and the circulation of information (as transnational scholars have done), reveals the inner workings of the world of the migrant and offers an important counter-narrative to the discourses produced by states and humanitarian actors alike.

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Adam McKeown defines a network as “the transnational institutions, organizations, and personal connections that (make) migration into a viable economic strategy and stable system for the circulation of goods, people, information, and profit.”\(^{28}\) As such, migrant networks provided essential information and support to people in motion. As McKeown remarks of early Chinese networks, they “were remarkable for their strength, scale, and resilience.”\(^{29}\) Given that Chinese migrants encountered restrictive regimes and exclusionary policies in settler societies beginning in the late nineteenth century, it was critical that they know how and when to move if they were to successfully gain entry. There was a variety of information available about how to do this. Some of it was official, provided by state actors to recruit migrants of choice such as the Chinese labourers who toiled on the national railway line in Canada or in the gold mines of South Africa. Other information was provided by a multitude of actors from brokering agencies to smuggling rings that profited from supplying intelligence to those seeking to migrate.\(^{30}\) Perhaps most importantly, there was the invaluable intelligence of friends and family who had moved previously.\(^{31}\)

The first migrants learned about the system and its challenges and then imparted this information to others. This was as true of the nineteenth century Chinese migrants who left poetry on the walls of their detention cells at Angel Island in the United States or who returned home to tell others about their experiences as those who moved in the late twentieth century and transmitted information through letters and phone calls.\(^{32}\) Recent studies suggest that for every one hundred refugees added to the refugee stock in a country in a single year another eight applications are generated.\(^{33}\) This does not mean that subsequent applications are necessarily fraudulent or illegitimate but rather that intelligence had circulated about the means of navigating the complex web of


\(^{29}\) Ibid.


regulations. The UNHCR has also observed that the number of refugee claims increases once individuals become familiar with how to lodge a claim in any given country. Access to intelligence was essential for those who desired to move or to claim refugee status and it was often a contributing factor in selecting where, when and how to do so. This continues to hold true. Khalid Koser and Charles Pinkerton have shown that refugees flee primarily to places about which they have actual information. Another study, conducted in the United Kingdom, found that where there were no connections with residents or citizens, the likelihood of asylum seekers presenting themselves for protection was greatly reduced. Such evidence serves as a reminder that personal networks were, and are, critical vehicles for intelligence upon which migration decisions were based.

Consider the following example:

Douglas Lam is a bus driver in Sydney, Australia with a twinkle in his eye and a contagious passion for connecting with students and members of the Overseas Chinese community. Douglas was born in Antang (On Tong), a small agricultural village in Guangdong province, China. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many of its residents became members of the Overseas Chinese or huaqiao (sojourner) communities in North and South America and Australia. Many also went to Hong Kong. After the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, Douglas’ family was designated as part of the landlord class and although he was too young to be affected, his older relatives were subsequently forced to labour in the fields. During my time with him, Douglas referenced brutal incidents of persecution. He mentioned people being taken

34 Koser, “Social Networks and Asylum Seekers,” 600.
away in chains as well as memories of his grandmother being made to kneel on broken glass in the midday sun because of her landlord class status.

The terrible conditions in China prompted Douglas’ family to leave for Hong Kong in 1956, under the guise that his grandmother needed medical treatment. He and his grandmother along with one of his young aunts obtained a two-way permit from the authorities but everyone in the village knew they weren’t coming back. The “visit” to Hong Kong was an opportunity to escape difficult living conditions and uncertain prospects in China. Importantly, their departure was made possible because family members in Hong Kong provided information about gaining entry and offered accommodation upon their arrival. Douglas stayed in Hong Kong for five years. His grandmother passed away during that interval and he worked a series of difficult jobs. When his uncle died, his aunt was left to care for four young children. She could no longer provide for Douglas and he was left with nowhere to live. Douglas maintains that he did not plan on moving to Australia but he had few options. As he says, “It was that or an uncertain future in Hong Kong.”

Returning to China was not an option. Australia became his destination of choice largely because an uncle and his grandfather’s younger sister lived in Sydney. Douglas moved to Australia on a student visa (one of the only legitimate means of entry for Chinese migrants under the White Australia policy of the early 1960s) based on information he garnered from his Australian relatives. He had no intention of going to school, however, and was intended as a labourer in his family’s market garden business. Still, posing as a student seemed easier than trying to get into Canada where his grandfather lived. Douglas recalls:

There was a “plot” to have me go to Vancouver in the late 1950s. A scheme was hatched to have me pose as a son of a woman who was going to marry my grandfather in Vancouver. That was the length grandfather and others would go to in order to have a secure future for me. I was coached to answer questions by Canadian immigration officials in Hong Kong. It was all very complicated. I am glad it fell through because it would be quite untenable if the plot succeeded, and I had to call my grandfather step dad, and grandmother was still very much alive. It would be a secret hard to keep, and open to extortion or blackmailing if we caused offence to anyone.

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39 Douglas Lam, interview with author, 11 July 2010, Sydney Australia.
What defined Douglas’ experience more than anything else was how his migration path was shaped by the information provided by family connections and his pursuit of mobility regardless of restrictive categories of migration in both Canada and Australia. Douglas’ ability to move and his capacity for navigating categories of entry were largely contingent on his family connections around the globe. Along every step of his journey, there was a relative to help him navigate his entry and residency. Douglas’ story exemplifies how the information obtained through personal connections was a critical element in how migrants selected their destinations. In interview after interview, I learned about the haphazard manner in which destinations were chosen once a decision had been made to move. Often, the deciding factor was the information provided by an individual familiar with the destination being considered. Since information moved freely, more freely than people, it was a powerful determinant of movement regardless of whether it came from official or unofficial sources.40

While states relied on official categories to delineate the legitimate means of movement and therefore restrict migration, migrants and their families saw these same designations as channels of mobility. In an era of significant migration restrictions, migration categories represented potential openings and migrants learned to tailor their applications and personal suitability to the categories most likely to facilitate entry. As states refined their use of immigration controls over the course of the twentieth century, moving from blanket exclusion and quotas to competitive selection processes, the value of personal intelligence networks increased, offering aspiring migrants critical information about which migration categories to use and how to negotiate the growing number of bureaucratic controls.41

Certain classes of migrants, such as the cosmopolitan Chinese business elites who informed much of Aihwa Ong’s work on flexible citizenship, possessed significant social capital. They therefore enjoyed considerable flexibility in making decisions about

40 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 44; Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, c1996).
migration. Others possessed significantly less and so their migration opportunities were crippled by what Doreen Massey calls “power geometry” and in particular by the quality and availability of information they had about migration. As Douglas Lam’s story illustrates, connections provided aspiring migrants with concrete, detailed intelligence about the best strategies for pursuing entry. Douglas cared very little about the actual categories he was confronted with, nor what they were meant to designate. At no time did he or his relatives think of themselves as refugees. Rather, they were looking for opportunities to move and they obtained information from relatives that enabled him to do so successfully on repeated occasions. Although Douglas entered Australia under false pretenses, he is now an Australian citizen and recently visited the Chinese mainland he once called home.

**Drawing Distinctions: Migrants, Refugees and the Freedom of Choice**

In choosing to leave difficult circumstances, refugees (like all other migrants) made conscious decisions about their future based on the information available to them about opportunities abroad and the fall-out or repercussions of staying in place. Contrary to conventional representations, individuals did not decide to be refugees and then move. As David Farrier suggests, the definition of a refugee was, and remains, “declaratory rather than constitutive.” Refugee identities were assigned or embraced during and after movement was undertaken, if at all. The officially designated refugees who moved to Canada from Hong Kong in 1962 did so after seeing newspaper advertisements about resettlement opportunities (explored in detail in Chapter Four). They decided to apply for refugee status and exploit their departure from the People’s Republic of China in order to gain access to migration avenues that would otherwise have been unavailable to them. Other migrants, who might have been considered refugees in some circles and under certain immigration regimes, simply moved under whatever existing category was available to them, suppressing the refugee-like aspects of their lived experience.

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Although the following example was shared by someone who did not leave the People’s Republic of China in the period under study, it is used in this chapter to draw attention to the manner in which any kind of decision-making suppresses the possibility of refugeehood, particularly in the eyes of the state.

In 1967, Peggy Lai and her husband and their two children moved from Johannesburg to Vancouver. The family had been factory-owners in South Africa but life under apartheid was difficult for Chinese residents as they occupied an uncertain position in the country’s polarized racial atmosphere. The Chinese in South Africa were at the periphery of apartheid’s racial agenda. They were officially designated as “non-whites” and subject to severe limitations on their freedoms as a result. However, unlike their black neighbours, they could apply for exemptions from many of the restrictions on freedom imposed by the governing National Party. In theory, they were better off than others, but as Peggy noted when I spoke with her, there was no guarantee of exemptions and the Chinese community was denied basic rights such as education and internal mobility.\(^{45}\) When Peggy’s husband attempted to expand his factory in the mid-1960s his application was refused and his efforts to bribe the authorities were rebuffed. As a result, the Lai family decided to move and Mr. Lai proceeded to conduct a world tour to determine where the family should relocate. He was determined to move to an English-speaking country and since Australia and the United States both had rules that were more restrictive than Canada’s, the family settled on Vancouver. Peggy had a brother in Toronto, which also made Canada an attractive option.

Mr. Lai never thought of himself as a refugee, nor it seems, did his wife and children. Yet the Chinese in South Africa were denied basic human rights and freedoms and lived in a climate of uncertainty; unsure about the force with which apartheid’s race-based policies would be applied to their situations. There was no new Chinese immigration under apartheid and the community struggled to survive, using an array of intelligence networks to bypass and overcome rules prohibiting access to such basic necessities as education and health care.\(^{46}\) Still, it is difficult to conceptualize of the Lai family as refugees, given

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\(^{46}\) For instance, parents learned to send their children to private religious schools since the public system banned attendance by Chinese children.
their obvious affluence and evidence of their conscious decision-making in deciding to leave South Africa and move to Canada. While in South Africa, I interviewed two Chinese community historians who contemplated my question about whether the Chinese South Africans who left the country as the apartheid program became increasingly severe could be considered refugees. They conceded it was possible but emphasized that people such as the Lai family left “because they could.” One of the historians suggested to me that the “real refugees” were those Chinese who fled Mozambique in 1972 as the violence of the war of independence in that country worsened. Those migrants truly had “no choice.”

This comment is significant because it points to the strong expectations that refugees should have no choice about their movement if they are to meet social expectations of what constitutes a refugee experience.

Importantly, at the time that the Lai family left South Africa for Canada, a legal category for the admission of refugees to Canada did not exist. The Canadian state only ratified the Convention and associated 1967 Protocol in 1969. Until then, the refugee “category” existed on a discretionary basis alone and asylum was at the government’s prerogative. As such, the Lai family simply moved through the existing system and how authorities might have perceived their degree of refugeehood can only be left to speculation.

Similarly, how humanitarian actors might have considered the Lai’s situation is unknown. By the 1960s however, humanitarian actors, both of religious and secular orientation, were some of the most vocal proponents of idealized notions of refugees that divorced them completely from the world of the migrant. For humanitarians, refugees and migrants occupied two very different worlds.

Humanitarian actors, including Chinese community groups, missionaries, religious organizations and secular NGOs (and on occasion, journalists), were instrumental in popularizing and extolling the image of the desperate refugee. They used idealized notions to generate sympathy and support for the people they were concerned about. Addressing an audience of fellow aid workers and potential donors, Reverend Stumpf of the World Lutheran Service described the Chinese refugee situation in Hong Kong in 1959 as follows:

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Dianne Leong, interview with author, 21 September 2011, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.
…the simple, honest, friendly, patient Chinese refugee who is ready to earn his living, willing to work, who makes every possible effort to support his family and to give primary education to at least one of his children…does not appeal to the emotions or excite the sentiments. His name gets never into the newspaper, not even when he marries or dies. He seldom gives trouble and seldom grumbles. Many very heavy burdens have fallen upon him but few are there to help him carry them…The Chinese refugees are desperately fighting for a way to carry on, regardless of how hard it may be. What they want is the opportunity to help themselves, to work out their own solutions, to have a hand in shaping the future of their family and of their children. This opportunity to them means to have true liberty. And to us they look for this opportunity.48

As Peter Nyers points out “refugees are subjected to a wide variety of Othering strategies.”49 In this instance, the refugee was made into a “speechless emissary” to whom the audience was intended to offer support and compassion.50 Such tactics separated the modern refugee subject from images of rational, capable migrants and divorced them even further from representations of the desirable, self-sufficient and accomplished citizen extolled by settler societies.51 These personifications served the humanitarian agenda extremely well but they denied the inherently migrant nature of the modern refugee phenomenon, enabling states to capitalize on romanticized notions of hapless refugees to buttress restrictive immigration systems that relied on enforcing the legitimate means of movement by creating expectations of what authentic refugees should look and act like.

A Collision of Worlds

The twentieth century was characterized simultaneously by the sheer quantity and variety of immigration restrictions, in the forms of visas and quotas, and tremendous movement as the world’s historic migration patterns shifted course and people began to move in increasing numbers from the Global South to the Global North.52 While refugees fled terrible situations around the world for much of the twentieth century, only in the late 1950s did the international community begin to acknowledge and attend to refugee

49 Nyers, xvi.
52 Castles and Miller, 7.
situations in Africa and Asia, most notably in Algeria and Hong Kong. When the Convention on the Status of Refugees was developed in 1951, it dealt explicitly with the refugee situation in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War and ignored the plight of hundreds of thousands of other people around the world. Europe alone was defined as the emergency. In subsequent decades, the refugee regime expanded to encompass all parts of the globe and the legal and political grounds for refugee protection, assistance and resettlement shifted concurrently. How did this change occur? In particular, given the parameters of this study, how did migrants from China move from being excluded from permanent membership in settler societies of the British Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century to being included in the institutional refugee landscape of these same countries seventy years later?

While scholars point to the changing nature of the global economy and the dispersal of warfare and political violence in the post-Cold War period and more recently to environmental catastrophes as a means of explaining the growing size and shifting composition of the world’s refugee population, these analyses ignore how social and political contingencies affected the likelihood of an individual or a group of migrants being identified as a refugee or refugees, or the penchant for those in power to produce a discourse around refugee subjectivities. The capacity to seek refuge internationally has fluctuated over time. Historically, particular ethnic groups and socio-economic categories of people were privileged. For instance, for much of the twentieth century, the resettlement of “non-European” refugees to Western states was not considered an appropriate solution to the flight of people from war, devastation or political oppression. While scholars tend to point to the Indochinese refugee movement of the late 1970s as the critical turning point in the internationalization of the contemporary

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53 After the Second World War, the situation in the Middle East received early attention because of the politics surrounding the creation of the state of Israel and the forced relocation of Palestinian refugees. In different ways, Peter Nyers and B.S. Chimni have both critiqued the emergency origins of the contemporary refugee regime for the manner in which it imbues refugees with exceptional meaning and suggests the need for exceptional treatment. Peter Nyers, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency (London: Routledge, 2005); B.S. Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South,” Journal of Refugee Studies 11, no.4 (1998): 350-375, accessed November 5, 2010, doi: 10.1093/jrs/11.4.350-a.
54 Hatton and Williamson, 265.
international refugee regime, this shift actually began decades earlier - at the very height of the Cold War. It began at a time when East and West were still firmly opposed and where the resettlement of refugees was seen as a political victory against the other side.\textsuperscript{57} The geopolitical machinations of the Cold War therefore offer some insights into the shifting refugee paradigms of the postwar period but state politics alone do not explain how conceptions of refugees in need expanded from the narrow European focus of the early postwar years to include refugees in other parts of the world, including Communist China.

A more nuanced and comprehensive explanation lies in the global humanitarian impulse that emerged in tandem with the universal human rights agenda after the Second World War. Numerous religious organizations and secular NGOs envisioned a different kind of world than the one torn apart by racism, hatred and loathing and wanted to make this aspiration a reality.\textsuperscript{58} Many of the religious and secular actors who participated in advancing the cause of universal human rights did so as a result of their experience on the ground; working with the victims of war and persecution and providing humanitarian relief whenever possible.\textsuperscript{59} Their work on behalf of refugees around the world was a major factor in communicating a humanitarian agenda to a variety of audiences. Their work also compelled settler society states to engage with refugee issues, and particularly the question of resettlement, at a time when governments were doggedly attempting to limit the numbers and types of migrants they accepted for permanent settlement.\textsuperscript{60} The humanitarian world existed independently of nation-states for much of the postwar period and in many ways its inhabitants were subversive agents, operating at cross purposes to

\textsuperscript{57} Howard Adelman, \textit{Canada and the Indochinese Refugees} ([Toronto]: L.A. Weigl Educational Associates, 1982).


\textsuperscript{59} The earliest example of this, and perhaps the best known, is Henri Dunant’s reaction to seeing suffering on the battlefields of France during the Napoleonic Wars. He went on to establish the International Committee for the Red Cross. Henri Dunant, \textit{A Memory of Solferino}, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1986). More recently, aid workers such as Fiona Terry and Tony Vaux have presented eloquent and prescriptive cases for international humanitarian assistance. See Fiona Terry, \textit{Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action} (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002) and Tony Vaux, \textit{The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and War} (London: Earthscan, 2001).

\textsuperscript{60} Acting Director of Immigration to Acting Deputy Minister, Sponsorship of 50 Chinese Youths by the Anglican Church – Philosophy of Immigration, October 18, 1963, RG 26, Volume 125, File 3-33-7, Part 3, Chinese Immigration, LAC.
government efforts to regulate and control migration. Only in the 1990s did governments begin to explicitly identify and exploit the global humanitarian agenda for political ends. As such, governments found themselves managing two impulses after 1945: the movement of people from diverse places around the world and the pressure from humanitarian actors to provide relief abroad and refugee resettlement opportunities at home.

**The Humanitarian World**

After the Second World War, the world of the migrant became populated with individuals who wanted to help refugees and displaced persons. These “agents of compassionate domination” were members of the humanitarian world, a world where individuals sought to assist those perceived to be in need or unable to help themselves. In working on behalf of refugees and displaced people, humanitarian actors almost single-handedly produced a narrative of victimless people who had lost everything and required the international community to intervene. This meant suppressing the agency of the refugees with whom they were concerned in order to demonstrate grounds for assistance and convince the international community that it shared some responsibility for the fate of the individual or group in question.

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62 The post-Cold War period is seen by many as a new era in international humanitarian interventions largely because states have used the cover of humanitarianism to insert themselves into conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, breaching conventional notions of state sovereignty. David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2002).


65 If there was evidence of agency, states could reject calls for assistance. States used demonstrations of active-decision making, or the use of personal networks to improve a situation to discount claims to refugeehood and critically, to reject any sense of obligation. Contrary to humanitarian actors, states were, and remain, very cognizant of refugees as migrants. They selected refugees for resettlement using variations on the standard criteria for skilled worker and family class migrants. They also developed
James D. Fearon defines humanitarianism as “almost any activity motivated by the desire to improve the conditions of those considered less well-off.” As advanced by *Empire of Humanity* author Michael Barnett, humanitarianism is an umbrella term for various forms of compassion. The humanitarianism of the postwar period is generally assessed as a product of 18th century Enlightenment principles and colonial enterprises that sought to both convert and “civilize” beneficiaries. This legacy, inherited from “diplomats, missionaries, and commanders of imperial hill stations” was appropriated by “aid workers, reporters, lawyers for war crimes tribunals, human rights observers.” One could add journalists to this list. While traces of the colonial antecedents of...
international charitable work persisted, the nature of humanitarian assistance changed after the Second World War in two important respects; its global reach was increasingly penetrating and it grew to encompass the traditional work of religious congregations and their missions along with the activities of several new secular organizations inspired by a burgeoning human rights agenda embodied in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  

The establishment of a global human rights regime founded on the principles of universality, dignity and equality has been described as nothing short of a revolution. While a number of scholars and activists have rightly questioned the universality of rights that privilege the individual over the community, the so-called “Rights Revolution” unquestionably altered expectations about the rights and responsibilities of states around the world vis-à-vis individual human beings. In the aftermath of the Second World War, governments around the world, with the support of national and global humanitarian organizations such as the American Jewish Committee and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), came together and enshrined the principle of human dignity in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with the goal of ensuring that the massive violations to the sanctity of the individual that took place during the Holocaust would never be repeated. As one representative told the American delegation:

If you make a fight for these human rights proposals, there will be glory for all. If you make a fight for it and lose, we will back you up to the limit. If you fail to

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74 Samuel Moyn rejects the idea that the Holocaust led to the advancement of universal human rights as a kind of utopic vision for how humankind might progress and prosper. Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2010), 7.
make a fight for it, you will have lost the support of American opinion – and justly lost it.\(^75\)

The dawn of the Cold War and the threat of Communism further encouraged Western democracies to advance the cause of protecting individual rights. For the first time, international legal protection was offered to individuals, not only nation states. The ICRC, CARE, and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (renamed Oxfam in 1965), pursued their foundational mandates of providing relief although their practices were also influenced by the language and commitments of the postwar human rights agenda.\(^76\)

Ultimately, organizations such as Amnesty International (established in 1961) and Human Rights Watch (established in 1978) were set up by private citizens determined to promote and protect the new rights agenda. As such, the impact of religious and secular influence on the postwar human rights and humanitarian agendas was felt not only institutionally but also in the overall climate in which immigration and refugee policies were developed after 1945.\(^77\)

Although the modern human rights regime and the parallel humanitarian regime are closely linked, a complicated relationship exists between the two in the field of refugee assistance and protection.\(^78\) Refugees are often seen as rights-less, having lost the protection of nation states, and therefore as symptomatic of the shortcomings of the postwar human rights agenda and the nation-state system more broadly.\(^79\) Writing almost half a century ago, Hannah Arendt rightly perceived that the language of human rights did very little for refugees in flight. Arendt argued that the world finds “nothing sacred in

\(^75\) Ibid., 37.
\(^78\) I define the humanitarian regime as the collective of laws and executive actions that make exceptions based on humanitarian grounds and facilitate assistance and advocacy on behalf of people in need.
\(^79\) Andy Lamey, Frontier Justice: The Global Refugee Crisis and What to do About It (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2010).
the abstract nakedness of being human.” She maintained, “the great danger arising from the existence of people forced to live outside the common world is that they are thrown back, in the midst of civilization, on their natural givenness, on their mere differentiation.” Without state protection, Arendt believed that refugees had essentially lost the right to have rights. Sadly, the past sixty years have demonstrated that once an individual is in flight, the language of human rights is indeed practically useless to them. Only a few states have experimented with the idea of a guaranteed right to asylum and these explorations have been short-lived. More often than not, refugees find themselves “between sovereigns” and at the mercy of nation states that remain the sole guarantors of their theoretically universal and inherent human rights. Still, the rights revolution has had some tangible effects on modern refugee issues and the world of the migrant.

The universal human rights program gave leaders such as the first High Commissioner for Refugees, G. J. van. Heuven Goedhart, language in which to lobby for refugee assistance, including the right to asylum and the right to citizenship even if the work of the UNHCR itself was never driven entirely by humanitarian issues. Gil Loescher has pointedly observed that much of the UNHCR’s work was, and continues to be, political in nature in terms of securing state cooperation on refugee issues. The discourse of rights also enabled humanitarian actors to make links and forge alliances across national

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80 Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, 1979), 299. Julia Kristeva makes similar arguments about the “foreigner” more generally. See Strangers to Ourselves, translated by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Kristeva asks, “If consciously, one grants foreigners all the rights of man, what is actually left of such rights when one takes them away from the rights of the citizen?,” 98. Sharon Sliwinski suggests that this focus on an a priori existence of human rights, and by consequence divisions between citizens and others, is misplaced and that the perception of rights and difference is the result of viewing tragedy and atrocity. Sliwinski argues, “individuals must be judged human in order to enjoy the benefits associated with this title.” “The Aesthetics of Human Rights,” Culture, Theory & Critique 50, no.1 (2009), 24, accessed May 17, 2012, doi:10.1080/14735780802696336.
81 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 302.
82 Lamey, Frontier Justice, 184.
divides so that states were forced to engage with refugee situations around the world. This was largely a reluctant engagement, encouraged mostly by non-governmental actors of both religious and secular persuasion and evolving ideas of charity, relief and development at home and abroad.

After 1945, as many Western liberal governments assumed responsibility for the welfare of their citizens within the territorial confines of the nation state, support for charities with a more global humanitarian mandate gradually increased. By the mid-1950s, citizens felt progressively more secure at home and this sense of comfort and privilege encouraged many to contribute to overseas relief efforts through voluntary work and charitable donations. In the case of the refugee agenda, many of the early efforts at relief and protection had the consequence of keeping refugees abroad by having them cared for in situ, as was the case in Hong Kong. There was security in offering assistance to fellow human beings in need if part of the aid ensured that they would be kept safely away. However, as the language of universal human rights began to pervade all aspects of postwar humanitarianism, particularly in the discourse missionaries and secular actors used to transmit need to home congregations and national audiences, the work of religious and secular groups in providing basic relief evolved into significant activism aimed at refugee resettlement and immigration reform.

Long before the 1951 Convention was expanded beyond its initial geographic and temporal limits in Europe under the terms of the 1967 Protocol, humanitarian activists adopted the language of universal human rights to advocate for relief and later for

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resettlement opportunities for displaced populations around the world. This concern for individuals abroad and a willingness to bring them within the embrace of national communities marked a significant transformation in the history of charity. As Michael Ignatieff observes:

> For most of human history, the boundaries of our moral universe were the orders of tribe, language, religion or nation. The idea that we might have obligations to human beings beyond our borders simply because we belong to the same species is a recent invention, the result of our awakenings to the shame of having done so little to help the millions of strangers who died in this century’s experiments in terror and extermination.\(^91\)

The shift to humanitarian assistance that encompassed the resettlement of strangers to the internal social and political space of the nation is therefore deeply significant, for it marked not only the identification of a need amongst strangers but a willingness to bring the “stranger” or the “other” within. While observers such as Ignatieff and Amy Gutmann emphasize the role that the rights revolution played in this regard, the quotidian transnational work and outlook of missionaries abroad and their congregations at home (as well as that of secular NGOs) was a also crucial aspect of this change.\(^92\) Chinese community groups in the settler societies under study also played an important role in advancing the humanitarian agenda on behalf of Chinese refugees in the postwar period. Their humanitarian interventions however, were largely instrumental in nature and bound up with larger preoccupations.

Since the settler societies under study continued to restrict family sponsorship opportunities well into the 1960s, the focus of advocacy work undertaken by Chinese

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\(^91\) Ignatieff, *The Warrior’s Honor*, 4.

community groups was on humanitarian considerations in terms of family reunification. This was important work and too often the significance of their lobbying has been limited to the effects of this advocacy on the communities themselves. Yet when Chinese community groups used the discourse of humanitarianism to lobby for family sponsorship issues or compassionate terms of entry, and occasionally for refugees directly, they were contributing to larger reform projects taking place within the societies under study. Where there was silence, the reform impulse was also dulled. For example, in South Africa, where Chinese community activism on immigration issues was generally muted, so too were any calls for assistance to refugees in Hong Kong. The immediacy of inequalities and repression under the apartheid regime meant that any advocacy by communities in Cape Town, Durban or Johannesburg was related to their domestic situation. Chinese community engagement with refugee issues in South Africa, and indeed in all the settler societies in question, was uneven and interrupted but nevertheless significant in terms of how we understand the impact of the humanitarian agenda. It was an agenda advanced by a variety of actors in numerous ways.

Several faith-based organizations were established during the war or in the immediate postwar period. These included the Lutheran World Service, the Church World Service, and Caritas International. The number of secular organizations operating in the international community blossomed after the Second World War. According to Barnett and Weiss, in the 1970s the number of secular organizations began to multiply rapidly so that by 2001, they could calculate approximately 2500 “humanitarian organizations” (of both religious and secular varieties) in operation worldwide. NGOs and missionaries

alike advanced a progressive humanitarian agenda that states were ultimately compelled to address. There was a cross-pollination of ideas and churches’ growing embrace of an advocacy role in terms of migration and refugee issues was deeply informed by secular emphasis on universal human rights and social justice programs. For instance, Kathleen Ptolemy observes that by the 1980s the objectives set by the World Council of Churches included “not only to provide material assistance to refugees, but also to assist in the struggle for a more just world characterized by fewer refugees.” The work of secular organizations and religious organizations was mutually constitutive. Longstanding missionary work in the field based on ideas of universal solidarity and moral obligations to help those less fortunate informed the work of secular organizations while the discourse of universal human rights and the later development agenda advanced by secular organizations influenced the work of missionaries and church organizations. As Drew Christiansen argues, “the ethical issues in pastoral care of migrants and refugees arise to a significant degree because of the intersection of the global human rights ethic found in Catholic social teaching with the political realities of the nation system.” Other scholars have drawn attention to the idea of “mission partnership” as it emerged in the late 1950s, which created “structures through which relief could be sent to the ‘less fortunate people overseas.’” Ruth Brouwer has made same similar arguments about the evolution in Protestant mission activity in the 1960s to faith-based developmental activities. Since scholars generally characterize the 1960s as one of growing secularity in the West, enduring religious impulses are often overlooked. Part of this oversight

97 Ptolemy, “From Oppression to Promise” in Canadian Churches and Foreign Policy, 140.
98 David Rieff observes that as recently as the 1930s, “it was only missionaries intent on saving souls and Communists intent on fomenting revolution who acted on the basis of an ethos of universal solidarity.” Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 47.
100 Bonnie Green, ed. Canadian Churches and Foreign Policy (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Limited, 1990), 89.
stems from the fact that the significant religious component of the humanitarian enterprise was built on work that took place overseas in the early postwar period. Missionaries and relief workers communicated a progressive social agenda to congregations at home through correspondence and presentations while on furlough. In subsequent decades, this agenda was increasingly channeled by journalists and photojournalists in the field.

Scholars including Franca Iacovetta have made important contributions to understandings of the multi-dimensional way in which churches and secular institutions in sites of reception have communicated citizenship norms and settlement expectations to arriving migrants.\textsuperscript{102} Indeed, much of the available church literature on migrants and refugees is concerned with their settlement and adaptation.\textsuperscript{103} However, the focus on charity and “good works” has over-shadowed the important advocacy role that churches and humanitarian actors in Canada, New Zealand, Australia and to a lesser extent, South Africa, played in advancing progressive immigration reforms. This resulted from their intimate engagement with the delivery of services and support on behalf of refugees and migrants. Attention to the work of missionaries and churches in the field of refugee relief and resettlement, where they operated both within and beyond the boundaries of individual nation-states, as well and their solidarity with secular organizations working in the same field alters previous assessments of their declining influence over the course of the twentieth century. Inspired by Ruth Compton Brouwer’s observation that missionary work abroad led to an interest in helping migrants upon arrival and building on Roberto Perin’s argument that in postwar Canada, churches “were forceful lobbyists and intermediaries in the crisis involving millions of displaced persons confined or not to special camps in Central Europe,” I argue that the churches played a similarly important role in advancing a broader, and more universal, resettlement agenda globally in the later


postwar period. However, it is important to distinguish between the progressive element in missionary activities and the more conservative church congregations and national associations. While recognizing the inherent conservatism amongst many Protestant and Catholic congregations domestically, I suggest that communications from missionaries overseas alerted domestic audiences to the conditions of refugees in Hong Kong. Over time, the simple receipt of information turned to advocating for resettlement as an appropriate solution to prolonged refugee situations.

**Missionary Work in Asia and the post-1945 Religious Impulse**

Few general histories exist about the continued presence of missionaries in Asia beyond the end of the China Inland Mission in mainland China in 1951 when the central government in Beijing expelled Western missionaries from the country. Much of the literature in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa consists of narrative accounts of mission work in China. There are also numerous biographies of individual missionaries up to the 1940s. Yet there is little attention to how the ongoing presence of missionaries in Hong Kong shaped impressions of Asia and built the foundations for Western states to engage with development and humanitarian issues in the region after

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the Second World War. The “missionary impulse” in Canadian foreign policy is largely recognized as one that stems from the important role that missionaries assumed overseas when Canada had no formal diplomatic relations or when the state’s international outlook was deeply isolationist. The sheer number of missionaries sent abroad by Canadian churches in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, proportionally more than “any other country in Christendom,” according to Alvyn Austin, is further evidence of this missionary impulse, which also appeared in other settler societies of the British Empire.

Research on the work of missionaries overseas has moved through various terrains. While early scholarship focused on the work of the missionary enterprise, charges of cultural imperialism meant that interest in studying missionary activity waned in the 1950s and 1960s. A pivotal turning point was the 1969 address by China expert John K. Fairbank and his admonishment that missionaries were “the invisible man of American history” and that historians were neglecting missionaries’ instrumental role as cultural ambassadors and societal interlocutors. Alvyn Austin, Jamie Scott and Daniel Bays all point to Fairbank’s address as single-handedly rejuvenating the study of missionary activities. In the decades that followed this address, scholars proceeded to investigate a wide array of missionary activities across the globe. The resulting scholarship provided

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109 Austin and Scott consider Canadian missionaries the equivalent of Canadian foreign policy beginning in the 1880s “in the absence of formal diplomatic relations.” See Alvy Austin and Jamie S. Scott, *Canadian Missionaries, Indigenous Peoples: Representing Religion at Home and Abroad* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 4. See also Robert Wright, *A World Mission: Canadian Protestantism and the Quest for a New International Order, 1918-1939* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991), 5. Historians have also detected the missionary impulse in the composition of Canada’s diplomatic elite due to the fact that some of Canada’s most influential diplomats, most notably Lester B. Pearson, were born of missionary parents.


111 Austin and Scott, *Canadian Missionaries*; Daniel Bays, ed. *Foreign Missionary Enterprise at Home*.
assessments of missionary activity through class, race, and gendered lenses, often by focusing on the missionaries themselves. More recent works such as the essays in *Foreign Missionary Enterprise at Home: Explorations in North American Cultural History* explore the experience of those subject to missionary focus, indicating that the history of church outreach and missionary activity have also been influenced by social history’s emphasis on research and analysis from the ground up. Moreover, attention to imperial space as a “sphere of a multiplicity of trajectories” has led scholars to situate missionary work within a broader archetype of transnational networks. While a number of studies investigate proselytization as the vanguard of imperial projects, I am more concerned with how missionaries and church organizations in Hong Kong communicated a progressive social agenda to settler society audiences at home.

The first missionaries arrived in Hong Kong alongside the British military in 1842. They represented the London Missionary Society and the Anglican Church and were closely associated with the colonial elites charged with administering the colony on behalf of the British Crown. According to Leung and Chan, there was a “working relationship from the start” between missionary enterprises and the colonial government in Hong Kong. The number of missionaries in Hong Kong increased significantly after the Chinese Communist Party came to power and the central government expelled Western

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missionaries from the mainland in 1951. Many relocated to Hong Kong where they joined more established missions such as the American Maryknoll Sisters (established in 1911).\textsuperscript{117} The newly arriving missions brought material resources as well as an abundance of human resources.\textsuperscript{118} Missionaries established a number of organizations dedicated specifically to refugee needs from 1951 to 1960. These included the World Council of Churches Hong Kong Office of Migration Services, Christian Welfare and Relief Council, Church World Service’s Hong Kong Office, Lutheran World Federation’s Department of World Service, Methodist Committee for Overseas Relief and the Presbyterian Mandarin Casework Centre. Their work was so significant that Cindy Yik-Yi Chu calls them a “third force” in Hong Kong society.\textsuperscript{119}

Protestant and Catholic missionaries in Hong Kong were some of the first people to alert the global community to desperate conditions and to suggest that resettlement in the West was an appropriate and effective means for alleviating the suffering of individuals in China and Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{120} Reverend Alan Brash was at the forefront of these efforts. An influential leader of the worldwide Ecumenical movement, Brash was Secretary General of the National Council of Churches in New Zealand before he assumed a position with the East Asian Christian Conference in 1957. Brash was exemplary in his determined efforts to open the doors in his country to the resettlement of Chinese refugee children and families from Hong Kong (see Chapter Five). While the Reverend was only moderately successful, he was later decorated for “having changed New Zealand’s image of Asia.”\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[117] At its height, the United Church of Canada had fifteen missionaries working in Hong Kong. The Anglican Church had anywhere from four to six. Most missionaries worked with the Church of Christ in China, which was based in Hong Kong after 1951. See Tom Newnham, \textit{New Zealand Women in China} (Auckland: Graphic Publications, 1995).
\item[118] \textit{Hong Kong Council of Social Services – 40th Anniversary: A Commemorative Issue} (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Council of Social Services, 1988), 30.
\item[121] The missionary influence in Australia was also significant in terms of shaping perceptions of China. As in Canada, Australian church leaders and missionaries were at the forefront of working with, and for, refugees and migrants in the postwar period. With the exception of South Africa, communication from missionaries, churches and humanitarian organizations in Hong Kong, was instrumental in advancing the cause of Chinese refugees in the settler societies under study. See Lachlan Strahan, \textit{Australia's China: Changing Perceptions from the 1930s to the 1990s} (Cambridge; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press,
While churches in Canada, Australia and New Zealand were inherently conservative in their dealings with immigration and refugee issues in the postwar period and rather slow to embrace migrant diversity within the boundaries of the nation-state, missionaries in Hong Kong were a progressive element in church engagement with refugees in the postwar period. Employing a transnational and networked perspective brings the impact of missionary work in Hong Kong into greater focus and complicates previous understandings of church engagement with immigration and refugee issues after 1945. Missionaries, faith-based organizations and secular actors in Hong Kong were leaders in the push to globalize the scope of the international refugee regime in the postwar period.

By the 1960s, the philosophical underpinnings of the postwar humanitarian agenda began to shift from offering basic relief to providing the instruments such as education and infrastructure for clean water to effect what David Rieff describes as “development-based” change. At the same time, secular organizations such as the UNHCR and religious organizations alike were embracing and perpetuating the image of a refugee as a victim in need of protection and whose human dignity needed to be restored, fusing the discourse of human rights and equality with religious conceptions of sanctuary to encourage developed nations to open their doors to people in need. As humanitarian...
work evolved during the postwar period, so too did the need for states to manage the pressure for reform that emanated from missionaries, their congregational supporters and their secular counterparts. So great was the pressure generated by humanitarian interest in the plight of people around the globe that after 1945, states found themselves managing more than just growing numbers of migrants; they were also negotiating a progressive humanitarian impulse that sought to alleviate the needs and suffering of strangers in an unprecedented manner.

Conclusions
This chapter opened with an appeal to conceptually return refugees amongst their migrant peers and some musings about the world of the migrant and how it was structured over the course of the four decades under study. What did the globe look like to people in motion? How was mobility facilitated? How were destinations chosen? In the brief analysis that followed, two defining elements of the world of the migrant were highlighted. These included the reality of people making active decisions about their futures and doing so on the basis of information garnered from personal networks that educated them about possible destinations and the strategies required for gaining access to these places. The stories shared by Douglas Lam and Peggy Lai testified to the


127 Drew Christiansen in Today’s Immigrants and Refugees: A Christian Understanding (1988). While Christiansen argues that people have a moral duty to help people in need, including advocating for change when immigration laws are discriminatory, other Catholic voices take a more pragmatic approach. For instance, during World Refugee Year, the National Catholic Welfare Conference Administrative Board in the Name of the Bishops of the United States, declared “when migration becomes an impractical solution because of the sheer numbers involved, then heroic measures must be taken to alleviate present misery and to institute long-range reforms, designed to raise the standard of living.” People on the Move: A Compendium of Church Documents on the Pastoral Concern for Migrants and Refugees (Bishops’ Committee on Priestly Formation: Bishops’ Committee on Migration, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1988).
importance of personal connections in providing intelligence about where, when and how to move were key determinants of movement.

Douglas Lam and the Lai family chose destinations that were relatively hostile to their arrival. Hong Kong was overcrowded, Canada retained discriminatory legislation until the 1960s and the White Australia policy was solidly entrenched until the early 1970s. Yet they moved to these destinations regardless of the presence of both overt and subtle racist hostility and physical and economic barriers to inclusion, sheltered as they were by networks of family, friends and associates. Information about how and when to move was a critical consideration in their decisions to embark on temporary or permanent journeys. The migration stories that Douglas Lam and Peggy Lai imparted contained elements of coercion and “forced” movement yet neither of them moved as refugees or ever thought of themselves as such. Still, it is possible to imagine that by simply framing their experiences in slightly different ways, they might have become credible refugees in the eyes of the state and the people who inhabited the humanitarian world.

Humanitarian actors ignored the inherently migrant nature of the refugee experience in favour of creating sharp divides between refugees and other people in motion. In furthering an internationalist outlook that championed the idea of charity abroad, humanitarian actors fostered the idea of a refugee as a helpless victim; one who was desperate for assistance and relief. They looked to states to redress this wrong. However, when the world of the migrant collided with the world of the humanitarian, states generally responded by privileging only certain individuals for resettlement, developing a discourse of illegality for undesirable migrants and using the potential threat of overwhelming refugee influxes to protect inherently restrictive immigration regimes and safeguard their sovereign authority. State resistance to the growing humanitarian agenda of the postwar period and the movement of people from increasingly diverse places was clearly demonstrated in the contested politics surrounding assistance to refugees from the People’s Republic of China from 1949 to 1989.
CHAPTER TWO
PRODUCING A LOCAL REFUGEE DISCOURSE, HONG KONG, 1949-1956

Introduction
Many of the migrants in this study moved to Hong Kong before ever thinking of moving on to other parts of the world. Generally ignoring Hong Kong’s colonial status, migrants viewed the territory as part of a larger Chinese canvas and moved accordingly. Until 1951, there were no formal border restrictions and as a result, there was a history of casual refuge in both Hong Kong and China. As one British Foreign Office publication observed, “like a sponge Hong Kong draws in population and squeezes it out, and the hand that does the squeezing is China’s. If conditions are good in China, people stay there, if they are uncomfortable they rush to Hong Kong.” This freedom of movement spawned a unique and locally-situated refugee discourse after 1949. It was an exceptional discourse that ran counter to the totalizing and universalizing elements in the refugee discourse born of the postwar situation in Europe.

The lack of attention to local productions of refugee subjects as a discursive strategy, and the manner in which these local discourses intersected with the circulation of ideas more globally results in a situation where the modern refugee subject occupies a “historiographical nowhere land.” When we use the term refugee we appear to be signifying some universally bleak

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1 Officials believed that Hong Kong was the ultimate destination for many migrants. Sir Robin Black Transcript, Interview with Steven Tsang, 6 February 1989. Mss. Ind.Ocn.s.348, Rhodes House Library, Oxford University. This sentiment is affirmed in the structure of many of the narratives in Out of China: A Collection of Interviews with Refugees from China, Francis Harper ed. (Hong Kong: Dragonfly Books, 1964).
3 Harold Ingrams, Hong Kong (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1952), 64.
condition, when in fact, the language around refugees is deeply informed by place, space and time and references very specific situations that become lost in the larger humanitarian chorus. Moreover, as Emma Haddad suggests, the refugee label “will always be shaped in part by the view from which it is being defined.”

So what, exactly, made someone appear to be a refugee in Hong Kong in 1949? Standard histories of Hong Kong in the postwar period generally mention flows of “sojourners, economic migrants or refugees,” “refugees, migrants and transients” or “mainland refugees” with little attention to the term refugee itself. In a book produced for the British Colonial Office in 1950, Harold Ingrams observed, “there are hundreds of Chinese who cross the frontier back and forth every day, smuggling something out of China or something back into it, and in the aggregate these activities swell Hong Kong’s trade figures considerably. But most are refugees.” Why did Ingrams feel the need to randomly append his account with “but most are refugees”? The people moving into Hong Kong were certainly not refugees under international law. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees had not yet been drafted. Even after it was established in 1951, unless states expressly chose to expand its terms, the scope of its protection applied only to refugees and displaced people originating from wartime conditions in Europe. So why the refugee label?

The short answer is that authorities and observers such as Ingrams thought the migrants moving into the colony were doing so on a temporary basis. The term refugee was meant to designate this fleeting temporal character and more importantly, to emphasize the lack of responsibility the

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9 Ingrams, Hong Kong, 62.
colonial state felt towards the new arrivals. Initially, the term refugee was one that officials and humanitarian actors alike deployed with equanimity. However, the story became more complicated as the local discourse became bound up in Cold War politics and the emerging global consciousness around refugee issues. It also became enmeshed with that Roxanne Doty calls practices of statecraft, which served to produce “the state's powerful image and simultaneously conceal this production.” Ultimately, the specific character of the official refugee discourse in Hong Kong intersected, and was lost, in refugee discussions born of the postwar European situation. Part of this loss was due to the humanitarian agenda advanced by missionaries and international NGOs in the colony.

The refugee identity produced in Hong Kong during the Chinese civil war and its immediate aftermath was very specific to the colony. As people moved across the border to Hong Kong between 1949 and 1956 they were assigned, or assumed, a refugee identity, in what Nezvat Soguk describes as a “refugeeing” process. Highlighting this process reveals the local contingencies that shaped the refugee subject, contrary to the universalizing arguments advanced by scholars including Emma Haddad who suggests, “the refugee moves across borders as an inherently polluting person who defies the order that the border would like to dictate.” Rather than an ahistorical outsider, the refugee subject that emerged in Hong Kong was the result of specific anxieties engendered by the communist regime in Beijing and its possible aspirations to reclaim the colony along with the fear that difficult social conditions in the colony might breed dissent from within.

Initially, the refugee discourse in Hong Kong was a rather innocuous one. However, it soon became the rationale for unprecedented border controls and early state interventions in the domain of public housing that were largely designed to coerce departures and reinforce the

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11 Agnes Ku and Ngai Pun suggest that the colonial government used the excuse of the “transient mentality” to avoid granting citizenship to Chinese residents of Hong Kong. Agnes Ku and Ngai Pun, eds. Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), 3.
13 Soguk, States and Strangers, 253.
14 Emma Haddad, “Danger Happens at the Border” in Prem Kumar Rajaram, Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory’s Edge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2008), 119.
authority of the state. A number of scholars (including Alan Smart, David Drakakis-Smith and Beatrice Leung and Shun-hing Chan) have traced the evolution of Hong Kong’s increasingly interventionist social welfare agenda in the latter half of the twentieth century in terms of fostering economic growth through the provision of a stable labour force. However, they did not draw explicit connections between practices of statecraft that were directed at the border and those turned within. This project brings the literature on the history of social welfare in Hong Kong into conversation with scholarship on the “ambiguous and contradictory” nature of borders to investigate how colonial authorities created a locally contingent refugee subject. Attempts to control the border and later efforts to alleviate the squatter situation in the colony were undertaken in part with the intention of discouraging migration. These strategies simultaneously served to regulate the population and strengthen the authority of the state. Migrants were problematized in such a way to enable officials to refer to a refugee “invasion,” and in turn develop what Michel Foucault calls “the conditions in which possible responses (could) be

15 Alan Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatters, Fires and Colonial Rulers in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 2006); David Drakakis-Smith, High Society: Housing Provision in Metropolitan Hong Kong, 1954 to 1979: A Jubilee Critique ([Hong Kong]: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1979); Beatrice Leung and Shun-hing Chan, Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003).


In anxiety-ridden colonial Hong Kong, these responses included regulating political associations and the freedom of expression, regulating the border in an unprecedented manner, segregating problem populations and then expanding state-funded social welfare services to simultaneously stabilize the political situation in the colony and depoliticize the humanitarian agenda. It was an instance where the refugee subject was “both disruptive (problematic) and recuperative (resourceful) of sovereignty practices.”

In the early 1950s, when the government of Hong Kong determined that the situation had stabilized, the discourse on refugees abated locally. However, it was perpetuated by various actors inside and outside the colony who perceived instrumental benefits from marrying the situation in Hong Kong with the new aesthetic qualities embodied in the emerging international refugee regime. The UNHCR and actors representing the governments in Beijing and Taipei used the refugee situation in Hong Kong as grounds for all kinds of intervention. Their approach was diametrically opposed to the policies pursued by the colonial state. As a result, the refugee subject became an increasingly contested and troublesome figure for authorities in Hong Kong.

The Colonial Context

British officials were surprised to obtain the return of Hong Kong in 1945 after Japan’s wartime occupation of the colony. Though they were pleased to have the important port city once again in their colonial holdings, they were acutely cognizant of the precarious and fragile nature of their position given the devastation in the colony and the escalating civil war in China. Humanitarians and officials alike described the situation in the early postwar period as “pretty grim.”

Hong Kong was almost entirely dependent on outside sources for military protection and basic life provisions such as food and water. The strength of decolonisation movements elsewhere further contributed to the deep sense of insecurity that pervaded the colonial project in Hong Kong after the Second World War. The Malay Emergency (the war of independence fought between the British and the Malayan National Liberation Army from 1948 to 1960) was

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19 Nezvat Soguk, States and Strangers, 15.
21 Foreign Office to Nanking Embassy, April 28, 1950, FO 371/83515, NAUK.
particularly shocking for those who believed in the inviolability of the imperial project. Authorities in Hong Kong worried about the loyalty of Chinese residents in its territory.\textsuperscript{22} Anxious British officials therefore desired to rebuild the economy while keeping Hong Kong politically removed from the civil war on the mainland. It tolerated the presence of both Communist and Nationalist factions so long as they did not violate any of the colony’s laws on political expression.\textsuperscript{23} The colonial government would continue to embrace a position of official throughout the Cold War, despite pressure from American authorities.\textsuperscript{24}

Revolutionary types were particularly unwelcome in Hong Kong. Authorities worried that the presence of Nationalist refugees such as T.V. Soong (Chiang Kai-Shek’s brother-in-law and one of the richest men in China) would cause problems, especially if the individuals in question engaged “in counter-revolutionary activity from the shelter of the colony.”\textsuperscript{25} It introduced tight controls on the freedoms of expression and association in the hopes of preventing the politicization of the majority ethnic Chinese populace. The government was also troubled by the frequent incursions made by Communists and Nationalist troops into Hong Kong territory in search of deserters or to seek shelter themselves.\textsuperscript{26} In response, the colonial government introduced the \textit{Deportation of Aliens Ordinance} on 4 February 1949. The \textit{Ordinance} targeted political activists and definitive categories of “undesirables.”\textsuperscript{27} Those who were identified as

\begin{itemize}
  \item Alan Smart observes this anxiety in Governor Grantham’s attitude to Chinese residents in particular. He elaborates on the theme of trust, loyalty and citizenship in “Unreliable Chinese: Internal Security and the Devaluation and Expansion of Citizenship in Postwar Hong Kong,” in Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert, eds. \textit{War, Citizenship, Territory} (Routledge: New York, 2008).
  \item In theory, this tolerance was extended evenly to all political factions in the colony but in the early 1950s the behaviour of the Guomindang agents was often “more reprehensible than that of their Chinese Communist Party adversaries” making it difficult to enforce a policy of balance. “Annex: The Value of Hong Kong to the Chinese Communist Party,” CO 537/3718, NAUK. See also Steven Tsang, “Strategy for Survival: The Cold War and Hong Kong’s Policy towards Kuomintang and Communist Activities in the 1950s,” \textit{Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History} 25 no.2 (1997), 317, accessed January 4, 2010, doi: 10.1080/03086539708583002.
  \item Report, 3 February 1949, CO 537/4814, NAUK. The analysis was compiled based on documents found at the home of Lin Kun, raided 11 December 1948.
  \item Hong Kong Weekly Political Report, 10 November 1950, FO 371/83241, NAUK.
  \item On the limits to freedom of political association and expression including press censorship and bans on union membership see Ming K. Chan, “The Legacy of the British Administration of Hong Kong: A View from Hong Kong,” \textit{The China Quarterly}, 151 (September 1997), 569, accessed May 21, 2010, \url{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000046828}; Letter to Sir A. Creech-Jones from Sir Alexander Grantham, 6 September 1948, CO 537/2774, NAUK.
\end{itemize}
politically active were targeted. Generally speaking however, as long as people were not political operatives, the government was amenable to their seeking temporary refuge in the colony. Many people did just that.

In the final days of the Chinese civil war, thousands of people moved into Hong Kong. From November 1948 to December 1949, 210,423 people “poured into the colony.” Some were returning from the refuge they had sought on the mainland during the Japanese occupation, while others made their way to Hong Kong for the first time, escaping the conflict and turmoil in China. At first, the colonial government paid little notice to the motives that prompted the movement and referred broadly to the migrants as “refugees.” The term reflected the assumed temporary nature of the migrants’ stay in the colony. This assumption resulted from historic refugee flows into the colony such as those that occurred during the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s and during the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1937. In both these instances, the population influx was largely of a temporary nature. Governor Alexander Grantham was almost alone in observing that it was a “misnomer” to apply the term refugee to everyone coming into the colony from the mainland. He believed many of the migrants were “ordinary travelers and petty traders.” Nevertheless, the refugee label persisted. It was a term largely used out of convenience and importantly, it was a term that did not yet have the heavy ideological implications that would later be captured in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

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28 During the 1950 tramway strike, there were violent clashes between police and protesters. The Governor blamed outside forces for the disturbance and resolved to remove disruptive elements from the colony. Several people were deported under Section 3(1)(c) of the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance. The intention was for “measures and firm display of force” to put an end to labour unrest. Telegram from Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 January 1950, FO 371/83260, NAUK.
29 Telegram from Hong Kong to Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, 5 May 1949, CO 537/4802, NAUK.
31 John Carroll, Edge of Empires (2005), 48; Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 30 May 1938, CO 129/570/2, NAUK.
32 Governor of Hong Kong to Commissioner-General’s Office, Singapore, 11 July 1949, CO 537/4802, NAUK.
33 The British government ratified the Convention in 1951 but excluded its colonial holdings, including Hong Kong, from the scope of its coverage. Although the 1951 Convention was initially limited temporally and geographically to the situation in Europe, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees later dispatched a fact-finding mission, led by Edward Hambro, to Hong Kong in 1954 (discussed in Chapter Three) to determine whether migrants into the colony fell under the terms of the 1951 Convention and warranted UNCHR intervention. The results of the mission were inconclusive however Dr. Hambro did determine that the refugees were of “international importance” and urged the High Commissioner to assist in some way. Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong: Report Submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1955).
Between 1949-50, 700,000 new immigrants arrived. The colony’s population increased to over two million people and hundreds of thousands people resorted to making their homes in “grossly overcrowded” squatter settlements. “Refugees” became cause for concern. The refugee label had been used in Hong Kong with relative equanimity in previous decades, with the exception of 1937 when there was some concern about “absorptive capacity.” By the 1950s however, humanitarian actors were focusing intently on the needs of the refugee population and were calling on the government to do more. In response, the colonial state came to characterize refugees as a problem in both political and physical terms in order to resist calls for broad social programs and to justify the introduction of unprecedented border controls. They knew that any border control they introduced would be potentially infuriating to Chinese authorities and they therefore needed ample justification for introducing any such marker of sovereignty.

Squatter settlements began to appear in Hong Kong beginning in 1946. The situation worsened dramatically after 1949. Squatters could be “found on the roofs of houses, in derelict buildings, in catacombs excavated below basements, in alleys and conduits (and) under bridges.” Others slept in the open air or in makeshift huts. By 1950, the squatter population was estimated at 330,000. Most of the squatters were concentrated in the colony’s urban areas, imposing a tremendous burden on Hong Kong’s physical and social resources. Water shortages were frequent and the desperate living conditions in the settlements made them appear to be “harbouring places for criminals and vice-peddlars of all kinds.” The government blamed “refugees” for the squatter situation though studies later showed that many of the squatters were

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35 Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 May 1938, CO 129/570/2, NAUK.
38 Extract, *Hong Kong Annual Reports* 1950-1951, Medical and Health Services Department, CO 1023/164, NAUK.
39 “Housing Hong Kong’s 600,000 Homeless” by Sir Alexander Grantham in *Geographic Magazine*, April 1958. Republished in “Hong Kong – As Others See it,” CO 1030/782, NAUK.
long-standing residents of the colony. Nevertheless, the state used the language and pretext of refugees to justify the introduction of unprecedented immigration and border controls that simultaneously served to reduce population flows into Hong Kong and assert the government’s control over the colony’s territorial and political boundaries.

To address growing population pressures, the colonial government introduced two pieces of legislation to limit and control the number of people entering Hong Kong. Neither had any direct impact on the worsening squatter problem as people continued to occupy whatever makeshift housing they could find or create. Still, the legislation marked an escalation in the government’s concerns about continued migration from the mainland and introduced a new, contested element into relations with the People’s Republic of China. The Registration of Persons Ordinance required everyone in the colony to register for, and carry, a Hong Kong identity card, which identified whether the holder as a British subject. The psychological ties created by the requirement to register marked the beginning of a separation between the residents of Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China that would become more entrenched with time. The second piece of legislation directed at controlling the swollen Hong Kong population was the Immigrant Controls Ordinance, introduced in the spring of 1949, and placed under the administration of the Hong Kong Police Force. The Immigrant Controls Ordinance required everyone coming into Hong Kong to apply for, and carry, an entry permit. The government believed that by imposing documentation requirements, people would be deterred from seeking shelter in the colony. Due to the tradition of open movement between Hong Kong and China and fears about upsetting authorities in Beijing, Chinese migrants entering or leaving the colony

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40 Studies of Hong Kong in the 1950s rely heavily on data from 1931 to establish a demographic picture of the colony. This data is undoubtedly inaccurate given the significant population movements between China and Hong Kong during the Second World War. A 1931 government report revealed that 56 per cent of Chinese had been in the colony for 10 years or under and 35% of the Chinese had been there for less than five years. At the time of the report 33% of residents the colony’s residents were born in Hong Kong, compared to 46% in Canton. R. H. Hughes, “Hong Kong: An Urban Study,” The Geographical Journal 117, no.1 (1951), 14, accessed March 12, 2010, doi: 10.2307/1789788.

41 The only exemptions were members of the military who had identity cards, members of the Hong Kong Police force, bona fide travelers in transit (in possession of a passport), and children under the age of twelve.


43 See Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary State for the Colonies, 6 November 1954, CO 1030 / 382, File 418/403/02, NAUK.
for a destination on the mainland and Macao were initially exempt from this clause.\textsuperscript{44} The government therefore relied quite heavily on the associated \textit{Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance}, introduced in the same year, to regulate and ideally limit the numbers of people in the colony.

Difficult to effect, deportations were also a sensitive issue. American authorities became concerned after fourteen people were deported for distributing anti-Communist propaganda. In the United States, the action appeared “somewhat undemocratic and to American eyes, out of line with Western resistance to Communism.” The Governor of Hong Kong, however, believed the material they were disseminating was “provocative and disruptive.”\textsuperscript{45} Internal security trumped Cold War optics. Similarly, officials in London worried about the possible repercussions of a broad application of this legislation, fearing Beijing’s response if the government in Hong Kong used the \textit{Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance} to get rid of “hundreds or even thousands.”\textsuperscript{46} Following the introduction of the \textit{Ordinance}, the number of expulsions rose from 3,046 in 1949 to 4,431 in 1950. However, in 1952 only 1,096 people were expelled when Beijing and Taipei both stopped accepting people, except “certain political deportees.”\textsuperscript{47} Relying on deportations became an unstable way to control population numbers in Hong Kong and yet the colonial government worried about backlash from Beijing if it was perceived to be over-stepping its efforts to control immigration. Authorities in Hong Kong therefore avoided imposing controls on mainland migrants for as long as possible. Instead, they pursued a series of alternative options to reduce the size of the colony’s population, including possible resettlement to Southeast Asia, before determining that the colony had reached its “saturation limit” and that immigration restrictions were necessary.\textsuperscript{48} When the government observed a “sharp upswing” in the number of arrivals over departures at the end of March 1950, officials concluded that they

\textsuperscript{44} Telegram from Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 May 1949, FO 371/83515, NAUK. British officials in Beijing, particularly the Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Hutchinson, had great affinity for the idea of traditional ties and lobbied against the controls contemplated by Hong Kong.

\textsuperscript{45} Deportation from Hong Kong of Fourteen Members of the “Chinese Anti-Communist National Salvation Youth Corps,” 1953, FC 2041/2, FO 371/10532, NAUK.

\textsuperscript{46} Telegram from Beijing to Foreign Office, 6 January 1950, FO 371/92371, NAUK.

\textsuperscript{47} Royal Hong Kong Police, \textit{Annual Review / Commissioner of Police, Hong Kong} (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1949-1950 and 1950-1951).

\textsuperscript{48} Immigration Control: Chinese Refugee Influx 1949, Cabinet Discussions, Noted 5 May 1949, CO 537/4802, NAUK.
were at a point where it was “necessary to consider tightening up all immigration control to cover Chinese travelers to and from the mainland.”

On 28 April 1950, the government of Hong Kong introduced a quota system for migrants from the People’s Republic of China. The novel controls led to the construction of fencing, the permanent presence of border guards and a whole new philosophy about what the border between Hong Kong and China represented. Hong Kong’s borders became demarcations of legality and illegality as quota and permit systems outlined the legitimate means of movement. The quota and permit systems amounted to processes for classifying migrants, of the type that scholars argue serve to order societies “by marking off limits, assigning positions, and policing boundaries.” The system introduced in Hong Kong distinguished between the local residents of Canton and Chinese “foreigners.” Cantonese migrants wanting to cross into Hong Kong were required to possess either a Chinese-issued re-entry permit or a Hong Kong identity card and their entry was subject to a quota of fifty people per day. By contrast, non-Cantonese had to obtain an entry permit or a re-entry visa issued by the Hong Kong Immigration Office or the British authorities in Beijing or Shanghai. Permit-holders were not subject to quota but the policy governing the issuance of these permits “was extremely restrictive.” The informal target, never announced publicly, was to have five departures from the colony for every four arrivals.

The refugee subject therefore became bound up with larger practices of statecraft that were specific to the colonial project in Hong Kong. Border controls heightened the apparent legitimacy of the colonial state and impaired the Chinese government’s ability to claim an unbroken lineage between the people of the two territories and undermining its claims to Hong Kong as a result. The Chinese state objected to the introduction of the permit system calling the controls “unreasonable and unfriendly.” Authorities in Beijing declared:

For more than one hundred years, Chinese nationals entering or leaving Hong Kong have never been treated as foreign immigrants, nor have the British authorities in Hong Kong

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49 Report by Security Liaison Officer, March 1950, FO 371/83267, NAUK.
51 Note by the Immigration Officer on Border Controls, CO 1030 / 383, NAUK.
52 Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office to Hong Kong re. Restrictions on the Entry of Chinese into Hong Kong, 7 April 1955, DO 35 / 10411, NAUK.
any justification whatsoever to treat Chinese nationals in the same way as other foreign immigrants.\(^{53}\)

It is difficult to convey the degree to which introducing restrictions produced a fundamental transformation in the historically open relationship between Hong Kong and China and the manner in which migrants were viewed by authorities on both sides and indeed, how migrants themselves viewed their own decisions to relocate.\(^{54}\) Until 1950, border controls between Hong Kong and mainland China were unheard of. Throughout their colonial rule in Hong Kong, British authorities administered the colony with the full knowledge that Chinese officials considered the territory to rightfully belong to China. For this reason, the British pursued their economic interests almost exclusively, avoiding any kind of social or political reforms including immigration controls that might provoke Chinese authorities or hint at the possibility of independence or separation for Hong Kong.\(^{55}\) After the introduction of quota and permit systems, migrants from the Chinese mainland were no longer free to move as they wished; only state-sanctioned entries were permitted. The new border controls introduced the possibility of a migrant from the mainland being marked as illegal and as James Scott has demonstrated such “typifications are indispensable to statecraft,” enabling officials to “comprehend aspects of the ensemble” by reducing people “to schematic categories.”\(^{56}\)

Despite the public protest issued by the government in Beijing, Hong Kong’s border controls actually coincided with China’s growing interest in preventing departures from the mainland. Perhaps taking a cue from Hong Kong’s efforts at managing the border, the Chinese state banned emigration in 1951. This ban remained largely in place until 1978. After 1951, anyone wanting to enter or leave the Chinese mainland had to carry a permit issued by the Public Security

\(^{53}\) Telegram, Beijing to Foreign Office, 10 May 1950, FO 371/83515, NAUK.

\(^{54}\) Alan Smart and Josephine Smart argue that 1950 was a significant turning point because up until then “borders were less significant for Hong Kong than for most other political territories.” “Time-Space Punctuation: Hong Kong’s Border Regime and Limits on Mobility,” Pacific Affairs 81, no.2 (2008), 181, accessed January 5, 2010, http://www.pacificaffairs.ubc.ca/files/2011/09/smart.pdf.

\(^{55}\) For a more elaborate explanation of Britain’s approach to Hong Kong and China see John Darwin, “Hong Kong in British Decolonisation” and Brian Hook, “National and International Interests in the Decolonisation of Hong Kong, 1946-97,” in Judith Brown and Rosemary Foot, eds. Hong Kong’s Transitions 1842-1997 (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). See also Richard Hughes, Hong Kong: Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time (Hong Kong: Andre Deutsch, 1976), 43.

Authorities. These permits were issued in limited numbers and applicants were subject to lengthy interrogation.\textsuperscript{57} The effects of these Chinese regulations were uneven and migrants continued to move into Hong Kong illegally, by bribing their way into the colony, or by leaving under false pretences (such as extended “shopping trips” that allowed temporary entries to become more permanent ones).\textsuperscript{58} One individual told an interviewer in 1950 how he got to Hong Kong by boat:

I paid $1,200 for my passage. Some of the others paid as much as $3,000 – it all went to the younger brother of my relative, who operated the junk….Several of us borrowed it from relatives in Hong Kong, and some of the others had their savings with them in gold. They were rich people in the old days and must have carefully hidden their treasure for such an emergency as this.\textsuperscript{59}

Significantly, China’s ban on emigration and its determined enforcement of rigid border controls meant that Hong Kong could relax its vigilance over the quota and permit systems, which fell into abeyance by 1952 – only a few short months after they were first introduced.\textsuperscript{60} However the squatter situation, which had been used to justify the initial efforts to limit migration, remained.\textsuperscript{61}

Part of the problem was born of international pressure for the government of Hong Kong to open up transit facilities for thousands of Europeans stranded in China upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. This group was generally referred to as White Russians (people who had opposed the Russian Revolution of 1917 and fled in its aftermath) but it also encompassed Jewish people who had fled central Europe for Russia during the Second World War and so-called “Old Believers,” descendants of religious migrants who had broken with the Russian Orthodox Church in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century and settled in China. Observers in the United States and the UNHCR, which had assumed responsibility for the refugees given their European character, worried about a mass expulsion of refugees from China and pressed the colonial government to facilitate the movement of people out of China. The UNHCR’s John Alexander argued that international opinion could not comprehend how a “British territory abutting on a Communist country closed its frontiers to refugees when all other countries in this situation were expected to
keep theirs open.” He urged that there “be considerable moral pressure on the British authorities to permit large numbers of the remaining refugees to be taken into Hong Kong temporarily for selection.” The colonial government resisted, concerned as it was about the population pressure that additional migrants into the colony might create. Only after developing a system whereby European refugees obtained their visas for other countries (most often the United States, Australia or Brazil) before entering Hong Kong, did colonial authorities facilitate the resettlement of this group out of mainland China. The case of the White Russians in China, who were included under the auspices of the emerging refugee regime, illustrates in concrete terms how the growing interest in refugee issues operated distinct from the postwar issues involving the movement of people from mainland China to Hong Kong. At the same time, the political seepage and the physical proximity of a population deemed of interest to the international community informed the context in which discussions about refugees in the colony took place. The “problem of people” in Hong Kong was born of population movements as well as the political interest that certain groups of migrants generated amongst internal and external parties.

Although the number of migrants moving into Hong Kong dwindled after 1950 as a result of the *Immigrants Controls Ordinance* and the related permit and quota systems, population pressures remained. In 1952, the Hong Kong Police observed, “the determination of the Chinese not to return to China on any account has crystallized the squatter problem. The population which regarded itself as refugee and transient is now putting down roots.” The colonial government attributed this new rootedness, in part, to the work of humanitarian actors in the colony. There were so many organizations engaged in charity work that in 1947, the colonial government established the Hong Kong Council of Social Services as an umbrella organization to coordinate relief efforts in the colony. Chinese voluntary organizations undertook much of this work, as did Western missionaries who relocated to the colony after being expelled from China in 1951.

62 J.G.S. Beith letter to Leonard Scopes (United Nations Department, Foreign Office), 25 June 1952, FO 371/99374, NAUK.
64 Royal Hong Kong Police, *Annual Review / Commissioner of Police, Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1951-52), 46.
Colonial authorities did not readily appreciate the enthusiasm of newly arrived missionaries whom they believed “were seeking to justify their existence.” Authorities held that providing wide-scale relief in Hong Kong would simply compound the squatter situation by encouraging a more sedentary population and perhaps stimulating additional movement from the Chinese mainland. The presence of American missionaries in particular distressed authorities who believed that humanitarian work in the colony might assume propaganda value and provoke the ire of the Communist regime in Beijing. When the Lutheran World Service proposed to distribute large amounts of relief in the colony (using goods originally intended for China), Governor Grantham objected, declaring that most of the people who would receive support were not “genuine political refugees.” He claimed:

The majority have come here purely for economic motives hoping for work and better pay than they would get in China. They are responsible for unhealthy squatter colonies which have grown up. If relief is given here we will never get rid of these people and we will merely attract more from all over South China.

In his view, there was “no reason for turning Hong Kong into a glorified soup kitchen for refugees from all over China.” In fact, what the Governor wanted to do was send food into China, giving people incentive to stay there rather than seek out “food and work in Hong Kong.” It is not clear from the archival record if the Governor ever followed through with this plan, but it is evident that in the years following his initial outburst, the activities of missionaries and church organizations in the colony grew, rather than receded.

As the colonial government set about rebuilding the colony after the Japanese occupation, voluntary organizations including *kaifong* and Western churches and missionaries addressed the immediate, emergency needs of the colony’s residents. Robin Black (an official in the colonial administration in the early 1950s, later Governor of Singapore and then Hong Kong) describes the environment as follows:

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65 Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 May 1950. Handwriting in margin by J.D. Anderson. CO 537/6068, NAUK.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
There was a great voluntary effort under way, coping as well as possible with the problems created during the period of reconstruction after the war, aggravated, after 1949, by the large influx of refugees. The prospect was horrendous. We had to define a social policy; we had to find money; we had to engage and train staff for a prolonged commitment.\(^69\)

Yet as numerous studies have demonstrated, the government was unwilling to provide too much in the way of social welfare, hoping instead that inhospitable conditions would encourage people to return to the mainland. David Trench (Governor of Hong Kong from 1964-1971) recalled that when he first arrived in the colony as a colonial officer, he was educated to the fact that the government colonial government’s strategy was to ensure that social conditions in Hong Kong were not “so much better than they were in China so that all you did was drag in immigrants.”\(^70\)

Until the 1960s, social welfare in Hong Kong (including resettlement to public housing facilities) was the result of “hesitant, often unplanned social policy initiatives.”\(^71\) Humanitarians in the colony found the situation deplorable and worked to alleviate the plight of refugees and squatters, occasionally unearthing “pockets of misery on rooftops and in alleyways of the kind the authorities were loath to admit existed.”\(^72\) Housing conditions were appalling and, on occasion, outright dangerous.

From 1950 to 1954, 100,000 people lost their homes to fire.\(^73\) The crowded conditions and the flimsy construction of the huts made squatter settlements vulnerable to large-scale destruction. The government of Hong Kong was rarely prepared for such tragedies and often failed to provide the social support required to assist victims. If a squatter settlement was devastated by fire or typhoon (a regular occurrence during the rainy season), victims were required to register with the Social Welfare Department to obtain relief. However, much of the substantive support came from Western humanitarian actors in the colony as well as local kaifong. Relief workers in the colony were kept busy, for as one missionary quipped, “Hong Kong can pretty well count on

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\(^69\) Sir Robin Black Transcript, Interview with Steve Tsang. Mss. Ind.Ocn.s.348, Rhodes House Library, Oxford University, 64.

\(^70\) Sir David Trench Transcript, Interview with Steve Tsang, 23 April 1987, Mss. Ind.Ocn.s.337, Rhodes House Library, Oxford University.


having emergencies every year of violent proportions, either from fire, water, or typhoon!” The activities of the Lutheran World Service alone included “clothing distribution, vocational training for teenagers, roof-top schools, medical care, flood relief, and community services for the inhabitants of the new refugee apartment blocks.”

The Red Cross was also active in providing relief well into the 1960s. One worker wrote home in 1961 and explained:

There have been two quite big fires in the last couple of weeks…I feel Hong Kong is always a disaster area…The weird animal shapes we have also been getting from Canada and America have been tremendously appreciated and these are ideal for distribution after any disaster…(After one fire) there was the most dejected looking lot of people I have ever seen. An old Grandmother hardly able to walk she was so miserable, children sniveling round parents’ legs, gloom and depression everywhere. And then we produced one of these prehistoric shaped stuffed toys and the change of mood that swept through that group of people was electric….

Such reports reflect the kinds of support organizations in Hong Kong were receiving from benefactors overseas who perceived a desperate situation in the colony. Letters home affirmed the value of donations of all kinds. One of the most active organizations on behalf of refugees in Hong Kong was the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief under the leadership of Frank Carter, who was appointed as the committee’s first organizer of local appeals in 1953. Carter was “an evangelical Christian lay preacher, and Old Testament figure with a flowing patriarchal beard.”

According to Maggie Black (author of A Cause for Our Times: OXFAM, The First Fifty Years), the refugee situation in Hong Kong became Carter’s “personal crusade” even though he did not set foot in the colony until 1961. Instead, Carter “studied Hong Kong until he knew it like the back of his hand (and) his descriptions in local newspapers sounded as if they came from the very pavements of the colony, elbow to elbow with the tin-shack dwellers.” Carter was instrumental in raising funds for Mrs. Donnithorne, the wife of an Archdeacon and a leading member of the West China Evangelistic Board. The Oxford Committee was very supportive of

74 Diary Entry, 19 April 1959, Diary of Captain James B. Atkinson, MSS. Eng. misc. c. 510/2, New Bodleian Library, Oxford University.
75 Maggie Black, A Cause for Our Times, 50.
76 Correspondence, 5 January 1961, File 76/27(2) – Hong Kong (Overseas File, 1957-77), British Red Cross Society Archives.
77 Black, A Cause for Our Times, 50.
78 Ibid.
her work, “if (Mrs. Donnithorne) wanted to buy some sewing machines to help some girls use their bedspace as a trouser-making venture; if she wanted to set up an old people's home; if she wanted to find a dwelling place for a family flooded out by Hong Kong's notorious downpours” she would simply write a letter home and the Oxford Committee would rally to support her efforts.79 This vocational humanitarianism aggravated the colonial government’s efforts to dissuade people from moving into the colony. When these efforts failed, the government was forced to become much more active in terms of social welfare issues, especially housing.

Initially, the government sought to address the squatter settlement program by simply clearing settlements. From 1950-51, nearly twenty thousand huts were destroyed, resulting in “the dispossession and removal” of approximately one hundred and twenty thousand people.80 Any attempt to resettle was “vigorously repressed” with “all property found on an illegally occupied site being confiscated after twenty-four hours notice.”81 In the drive to resettle and organize the colony’s population, the government also sought to rid itself of some of the most political “refugees” in the colony: soldiers and supporters of the Kuomintang. Governor Grantham identified “deserting or defeated Nationalist soldiers” as the greatest danger to the colony.82 In a hierarchy of undesirables, ex-Guomingdang soldiers, referred to as “refugee soldiers” or “Nationalist refugees,” probably ranked highest in Hong Kong in the early 1950s.83 Many were blind or disabled. Most were totally impoverished. Governor Grantham wanted them disarmed and pushed “back over the frontier as quickly as possible,” before they could cause any trouble. However he soon discovered that despite the Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance it was very difficult to expel people as authorities in Beijing or Taipei often refused their entry. Authorities in Beijing refused admission outright and the government of Taiwan only accepted soldiers case

79 Ibid., 51.
80 Extract, Hong Kong Annual Reports, Urban Council and Sanitary Department (1950-51), CO 1023/164, NAUK.
81 Ibid.
82 File Note to Mr. Paskin, 14 October 1949, CO 537 / 5024, NAUK. Legal counsel in London maintained that the government of Hong Kong could not send able-bodied soldiers to Taiwan, regardless of their political persuasion because they had come from villages and cities across China and should be sent back there. Telegram from Foreign Office to Governor of Hong Kong, 21 March 1950, CO 537/6314, NAUK.
83 The Hong Kong police blamed the ex-soldiers for problems in the colony. “The Civil War across our borders let loose upon the Colony numbers of unscrupulous men supplied with arms and well skilled in their use.” Foreword. Royal Hong Kong Police, Annual Review / Commissioner of Police, Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1949-50).
by case, refusing to do so on a “mass basis.”

The solution was to create a space for these undesirable migrants within Hong Kong.

The Hong Kong Government established Rennie’s Mill Camp in 1950 when the Social Welfare Department resettled almost 7,000 Nationalist refugees who were squatting in the Mount Davis area to Rennie’s Mill, located in the Sai Kung District next to Junk Bay. It was part of the government’s initial efforts to deal with the squatter situation in the colony by simply clearing people from their homes. The government provided the camp’s residents with basic rations and little else. The intent was to “segregate” ex-Nationalist soldiers and their families from the rest of Hong Kong society in the hope that with a little bit of intimidation, they would leave the colony of their own volition. At first the camp was isolated, accessible only by boat-launch or footpath but voluntary agencies soon became active amongst the population.

The Free China Relief Association (FCRA) was established in Taiwan in 1950 to assist famine victims in China and garner support for the regime in Taipei amongst the overseas Chinese. The FCRA became the organ through which the government of Taiwan brought relentless pressure to bear on the United Nations to act on behalf of the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. Although it presented itself as a “civil charity organization” it received financial support from the American and Taiwanese governments and its activities were closely aligned with those of the Taiwanese state. In Hong Kong, it operated as the Rennie’s Mill Camp Refugees Relief Committee. The committee was responsible for the “resettlement of refugees in Taiwan and provision of funds, rice and education to the residents in the Camp.”

The committee also became a vocal advocate on behalf of Nationalist soldiers and supporters in Hong Kong, making frequent representations

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84 Correspondence, 24 February 1950, CO 537/ 6314, NAUK.
85 Extract, Hong Kong Annual Reports, Urban Council and Sanitary Department (1950-1951), CO 1023/164, NAUK.
86 Kenneth On Wai Lan, “Rennie’s Mill: The Origin and Evolution of a Special Enclave in Hong Kong,” (PhD Diss., University of Hong Kong, 2006), 12.
87 Telegram from Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 June 1961, CO 1030/1321, NAUK.
88 Trench to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 October 1957, CO1030/ 778. Cited in Wong Yiu Chung, “The Policies of the Hong Kong Government towards the Chinese Refugee Problem, 1945-1962,” (PhD Diss., Hong Kong Baptist University, 2008). The FCRA “became” a private voluntary organization after 1950 in order to continue operating in countries that no longer recognized the government of Taiwan.
to the United Nations and the UNHCR on their behalf. The archival files of both organizations are replete with requests for aid and complaints from the Relief Committee about the treatment of residents of Rennie’s Mill Camp. Instead of resettling migrants to Taiwan, the Nationalist government encouraged the development of Rennie’s Mill as a permanent enclave, providing both political and financial support to sustain the residents. It discouraged residents from attempting to move to Taiwan, which had its own population pressures to contend with. While a total of 10,000 people left the colony for Formosa between June 1950 and June 1954, a significant number of people rejected this option as the camp became more prosperous while conditions in Taiwan deteriorated. The camp quickly developed into a “state within a state.”

As the camp became more permanent, the Hong Kong Government set about trying to eliminate the very situation it had created, worrying about the camp’s growing potential to become a magnet for “Guomingdang disaffection.” The government attempted to propel the residents of Rennie’s Mill into leaving by cutting off electricity and water supplies. External support, which shored up the camp, stopped this from happening and undermined other coercive efforts to eliminate the camp. Most famously, in 1953, residents sabotaged government efforts to withdraw free rations for one quarter of the camp’s residents. Although a one-day hunger strike staged by 6,000 of the camp’s 10,000 residents failed to reverse the government’s decision, religious organizations and secular NGOs stepped in to provide a week’s supply of rice to the inhabitants. When they refused to shoulder the long-term burden of feeding so many people, international organizations such as the Red Cross and the American Committee to Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals Inc. (ARCI) intervened and provided funds for the immediate and on-going...

90 The influence of the Free China Relief Association on these organizations is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.  
91 Joshua Fan, China's Homeless Generation: Voices From the Veterans of the Chinese Civil War, 1940s-1990s (New York: Routledge, 2011).  
93 Sir David Trench Transcript, Interview with Steve Tsang, 23 April 1987, Mss. Ind.Ocn.s.337, Rhodes House Library, Oxford University, 25.  
95 Kenneth On Wai Lan, “Rennie’s Mill: The Origin and Evolution of a Special Enclave in Hong Kong,” (PhD Diss., University of Hong Kong, 2006).  
96 Reuters Report, 31 January 1953, CO 1023/117, NAUK.
operations of the camp. In an important propaganda coup, the Mainland Refugee General Relief Association of Taiwan sent $300,000 for direct distribution to residents of the camp. The camp remained in place until it was cleared in 1996 in advance of the colony’s return to Chinese control. As the foregoing reveals, humanitarian actors and outside interests limited the government’s efforts at coerced migration, fostering a politicized discourse around refugee issues.

The government’s efforts to manage the population in the colony were made more difficult by the fact that people had limited options about where to go once they were cleared from one of the colony’s squatter settlements. As noted previously, Taiwan refused to accept refugees in any significant numbers after 1950 and hardly any of the squatters went back to China. The World Council of Churches hoped that with their relief efforts, “refugees” might “have a chance for a new life in Hong Kong or elsewhere.” A few British parliamentarians shared this sentiment, hoping the squatters might go overseas but the Colonial Office knew that few countries were opening their doors to Chinese migrants. They maintained that countries such as Malaysia, where authorities had battled the Communist Malayan National Liberation Army for over a decade, “didn’t want any decanting of surplus population from Hong Kong.” Resettlement to former British dominions barely registered as an option as this might have demanded resettlement to the United Kingdom as well.

97 According to historian Glen Peterson, ARCI was “was intended to be the equivalent in Asia of the National Committee for a Free Europe, a joint CIA and State Department creation for promoting the ‘rollback of communism’ in Europe.” See “To Be or Not to Be a Refugee: The International Politics of the Hong Kong Refugee Crisis, 1949-1955,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36, no2. (2008), 177, accessed March 14, 2010, doi:10.1080/03086530802180924; Telegram from Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 January 1953, CO 1023/117, NAUK.
98 $20 was given to each of the 12,880 refugees who had registered for relief. The rest was held in reserve to provide food for the camp. CO 1023/117, NAUK.
99 Alan Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatters, Fires and Colonial Rulers in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 2006), 53.
100 Refugee Questions in Various Countries, 1946-1954, 425.02.09.025 Commission of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service (CICARWS), World Council of Churches Archives, Geneva.
101 Selwyn-Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, observed that between June 1954 and June 1955, 2741 refugees were settled abroad. Of these, 2703 went to Formosa. “Memorandum for the Executive Council: The Squatter Problem,” CO 1023/164, NAUK.
Instead of leaving, squatters competed for settlement options internally. As a result, the government was forced to become progressively more involved in the provision of public housing. In 1952, the government introduced a resettlement program in response to the “descent of refugees” on the colony and the failure of immigration controls to reduce the size of the population in any significant measure. The program cost one million (HK$) a year, including $7,000 for the cost of screening squatters to determine if, and where, they should be resettled. The resettlement program extended at such a rapid pace that by 1954 the government was running out of land. Ongoing population pressures and a devastating fire at the Shek Kip Mei squatter settlement in 1953 coincided with dawning doubts about the durability of the resettlement program and pushed the government towards offering some kind of more permanent housing. The fire at Shek Kip Mei marked a turning point in how colonial authorities thought about the residents of the colony, both the long-standing and newly arrived varieties, and affected how authorities proceeded to conceptualize of refugeehood and its attendant solutions.

The massive fire that broke out at Shek Kip Mei squatter settlement in December 1953 left more than 53,000 people homeless. In response, the Hong Kong government spent almost $16 million (HK) in emergency relief alone. On this occasion, government efforts overshadowed those of the regular army of missionaries and voluntary organizations who attended to fire victims in the squatter settlements. This shift to an interventionist approach was largely born of the grudging acceptance that the so-called refugees of the immediate postwar period were establishing themselves in the colony. This change in attitude meant that after the fire, when people could actually see a “great burned out space,” the colonial government was more willing to invest in public housing and it also had the public support to do so. Robin Black, then a colonial officer, remembers that after Shek Kip Mei fire, he tried “to dodge the use of the word refugee to men and women who were becoming part of the population, and, instead, admit(ed) that we were giving rehabilitation to immigrants.”

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104 Ibid.
105 Appendix. Department of Resettlement, 10 January 1955, CO 1030/390, NAUK.
106 Daily Information Bulletin, 7 February 1954, CO 1030/390, NAUK.
107 Sir Robin Black Transcript, Interview with Steven Tsang, 6 February 1989. Mss. Ind.Ocn.s.348, Rhodes House Library, Oxford University, 74.
In Black’s conceptualization of the situation, “immigrants” were more permanent settlers than “refugees” and more deserving of aid as a result. Relatedly, Glen Peterson argues that by the early 1950s, the government of Hong Kong was refusing to use the term refugees outright, referring instead to squatters to denote illegal encroachment and worrying that organizations such as the UNHCR would want to intervene in the colony if they could single out a “particular immigrant group and (assign) them privileged status and treatment as ‘refugees’.” The refugee discourse advanced in Hong Kong in the immediate postwar period had proven open to scrutiny and interest from outside parties. This notice operated at cross-purposes with the government’s intention to limit the scope of its responsibilities vis-à-vis the residents of the colony and new arrivals in particular.

Part of the outside interest came from authorities in Taipei and Beijing. Their interventions following terrible fires in the colony were politically motivated, fuelled by the belief that offers of humanitarian relief could be used to strategic advantage in the ongoing contest over who represented the legitimate government of China. While Taiwanese authorities directed their assistance to the residents of Rennie’s Mill Camp, the communist government in Beijing offered aid more broadly with the specific intention of sowing confusion about the source of authority and comfort in Hong Kong and undermining the colonial government’s influence over Chinese residents in the territory. Although the government of Hong Kong monitored the Federation of Trade Unions (supported by the People’s Republic of China) closely to ensure that relief was distributed only to those registered by the Social Welfare Department, the federation nevertheless issued special registration tickets, contributing to confusion about the source of relief in the colony. In this manner, Beijing’s provision of aid was an effective means of undermining the authority of the colonial government as well as scoring important propaganda points. The left wing press in the colony praised China for “giving so much when the country is undertaking major reconstruction works.” Authorities in Beijing exploited their offers of

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108 Glen Peterson, “To Be or Not to Be a Refugee,” 182.
109 Telegram from the Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 January 1954, CO 1030/390, NAUK.
110 Meanwhile, the right wing press published letters from fire victims saying they would not accept blood money from China. Telegram from the Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 January 1954, CO 1030/390, NAUK.
humanitarian assistance while at the same time recognizing that population pressures presented an ongoing challenge to the authority of the colonial state.\footnote{111} In 1956, as the Great Leap Forward (an economic restructuring program to industrialize the nation that ultimately created massive famines and deprivation) unfolded on the Chinese mainland, the regime in Beijing sought warmer relations with authorities in Hong Kong. The colonial state was receptive to these overtures and in February 1956, the two governments coordinated the lifting of quota restrictions for three weeks so that people could celebrate the Chinese New Year with their families, either in Guangdong or Hong Kong.\footnote{112} When the Chinese government requested an extension of the suspension beyond the holiday celebrations, the government of Hong Kong agreed, given its demonstrated faith in the effectiveness of immigration controls if they were the product of a shared effort. Cooperating on border issues seemed like a strategic way to maintain good relations with the People’s Republic of China. However, the colonial government warned Chinese officials that if “a fair proportion” of the new entrants did not return to China upon the expiry of their permits “quota restrictions would be re-imposed in the interests of the Colony.”\footnote{113}

The effect of the extended suspension, as far as authorities in Hong Kong were concerned, was disastrous. 81% of the Chinese travelers who entered Hong Kong over the following eight months failed to return home after their permits expired. By the summer of 1956, Hong Kong had a net population gain of 55,000 people.\footnote{114} The squatter population jumped to 450,000 and

\footnote{111}{In 1952, a fire at Tung Tau village burned for four hours and razed fifteen acres of homes. In response, authorities in Guangdong arranged for a “comfort mission” to provide assistance to the fire victims. Glen Peterson describes the purpose of these missions as the protection of Chinese nationals in Hong Kong. See “To Be or Not to Be a Refugee,” 180. The 1952 mission consisted of eleven people and was charged with collecting information on the situation in the colony while simultaneously distributing $100,000 (HK) in aid. Officials in Hong Kong detected the political nature of this assistance and prohibited fanfare of any kind - speeches, banners and flags were all banned. When the comfort mission was refused entry riots broke out along Nathan Road, which the Hong Kong government suppressed. After the colonial government proceeded to shut down sympathetic left-wing newspapers in the colony, which criticized how the comfort mission issue was handled, the matter became the subject of significant diplomatic tension between London and Hong Kong. See Kenneth On Wai Lan, “Rennie’s Mill: The Origin and Evolution of a Special Enclave in Hong Kong,” (PhD Diss., University of Hong Kong, 2006), 111; Daily Information Bulletin, 3 June 1952, CO 1023/164, NAUK; Chi-Kwan Mark, “Problem of People,” 1153.}

\footnote{112}{The Hong Kong government was also responding to pressure from left-wing sentiment in the colony, which actively opposed any kind of immigration restrictions. Intelligence Report, 28 February 1956, CO 1030/250, NAUK.}

\footnote{113}{Intelligence Report, 28 February 1956, CO 1030/250, NAUK.}

\footnote{114}{Governor’s Public Announcement on Immigration Control, 31 August 1956, CO 1030/384, NAUK.}
the housing situation was understated as “gloomy.” The bitter pill for Hong Kong authorities was that Chinese officials appeared to have deliberately increased the number of exit permits it issued to its citizens, including visiting school children, during these critical months. It seemed that Chinese officials had purposely attempted to sabotage the security of the colony by letting large numbers of migrants leave the mainland. When the Chinese government refused to reintroduce controls on its side, the government of Hong Kong unilaterally re-imposed the quota system in September 1956, a few short weeks before the violence broke out in Kowloon.

The government in Beijing challenged the decision by authorities in Hong Kong to unilaterally impose quota measures or to claim any kind of ownership over the hearts and minds of the Chinese populace. China featured Hong Kong’s immigration controls in its propaganda, which reflected Mao Zedong’s increased radicalism following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The regime in Beijing broadcast films and recordings that showcased devastated people, including weeping women and children, who only wanted cross to Hong Kong to see family and friends. The government of Hong Kong downplayed the attacks, suggesting that authorities in Beijing were probably thankful for the quota system given the “face lost” when large numbers of people tried to leave China. It was a strange game. The movement of large numbers of people threatened the stability of the colony and created strategic advances for the Chinese government but at the same time, it was a propaganda risk for the government in Beijing. Yet the government

115 Telegram from Ashton (Foreign Office) to Comfort (Colonial Office), 16 June 1956, FO 371/121165, NAUK.
116 Note from Willan to de la Mare, 3 October 1962, CO 1030/1114, NAUK.
117 In 1956, riots broke out when the government banned Nationalist supporters from displaying some of their flags during Double Ten Day celebrations, which were always a time of heightened tension in the colony (October 10 was celebrated by Nationalist factions as China’s national day while Communist supporters commemorated October 4 as the country’s foundational moment). In anger, the Nationalists attacked known Communist sympathizers. The government’s failure to intervene immediately caused the violence to spread. Sixty people were killed, including the wife of the Swiss consul, and five hundred people were injured. The Chinese government was angered by the manner in which the colonial government dealt with the rioters. Zhou Enlai, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, accused Hong Kong of acting irresponsibly and implied that British authorities were not fit to govern, declaring that the residents of Kowloon had a right to self-defence and that China could not tolerate such outrages on its doorstep. Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 23 October 1956, CO 1030/250, NAUK.
118 Lorenz Luthi, **Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World** (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c2008), 78. Mao was dismayed by the Soviet response, in part out of concern for his own ambitions.
119 There were frequent appeals in the local Hong Kong press for the return of students and intellectuals to China. Intelligence Report, 25 September 1956, CO 1030/250, NAUK.
of Hong Kong rarely capitalized on the possible discourse of people voting with their feet, although they were keenly aware of the potential value of such rhetoric.\textsuperscript{120} For authorities in Hong Kong, the primary imperative was to manage the population so as to prevent political infiltrators and to safeguard physical and social instability in the colony. The discourse on refugees was critical for this insulating purpose.\textsuperscript{121} The government used “refugees” to justify border controls and introduce quota systems and regulations that permitted the categorization of people and facilitated deportations. The state then distanced itself from the refugee label and its implicit humanitarian obligations in order to proceed with massive internal resettlement and social welfare projects and depoliticize the humanitarian agenda in the colony.

**Conclusions**

The refugee discourse produced by the colonial state in Hong Kong after 1949 was a highly localized one, born of anxieties about relations with the newly-established communist regime in Beijing and the threats to the internal stability of the colony posed by unstable living conditions. Fears of refugees did not exist in Hong Kong for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The majority of the people who moved between the Chinese mainland and the British colony shared a common language and ethnicity and their free movement was accepted as the norm. People described as refugees had moved to Hong Kong from as early as the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), yet authorities had never really viewed or described refugees as a problem.\textsuperscript{122} This changed dramatically in the postwar period when the advent of larger and more permanent population movements caused colonial authorities to re-conceptualize of refugees as a problem. The result was an effort to use refugees as the justification for border controls and then reject the refugee label (and its growing associations with humanitarian responsibilities) so as to avoid any responsibilities for the large migrant population in the colony. The government wanted

\textsuperscript{120} Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 May 1950. Handwriting in margin by J.D. Anderson. CO 537/6068, NAUK.

\textsuperscript{121} The state’s desire to shelter itself from any kind of outside disturbance was further reflected in the great reluctance with which authorities permitted the transit of White Russians from China in the early 1950s. The International Refugee Organisation was forced to campaign aggressively to facilitate passage for migrants destined to Australia and other parts abroad. Correspondence from UNHCR to Foreign Office, 16 April 1953, CO 1023/117, NAUK.

\textsuperscript{122} Until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1937, which created a flow of people into the colony and led to a housing shortage that triggered warnings about the colony having reached its “saturation point,” the term refugee was rarely viewed in a negative light. Thomas Wong, *Colonial Governance and the Hong Kong Story* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998), 6.
to simultaneously discourage permanent settlement, dissuade additional movement into the colony and suppress outside interventions in the life of the colony’s residents.

The colonial government’s instrumental use of the threat posed by “refugees” provided the rationale for the introduction of border controls and justified its intervention into housing issues to an extent that was previously inconceivable for a laissez-faire government. The lack of attention to the socio-economic and migrant status of the squatters meant that the government could refer to the serious housing shortage in Hong Kong, “of which the refugees were the chief cause and also the victims”¹²³ without ever having to prove that it was recently arrived migrants who were occupying the colony’s streets and hillside squatter settlements or draining the colony’s health, education and welfare resources. Their generalized presence alone was a problem. The fate of Chinese migrants who moved to Hong Kong from 1949 to 1956 was therefore intimately bound up with questions of authority and territoriality that were specific to the colonial and Cold War contexts in which the government of Hong Kong operated. Rather than being by-products of this framework, “refugees” contributed to its basic foundation. The fact that the government of Hong Kong viewed the migrant population specifically as a refugee population engendered specific discourses and policy responses including incremental border controls.

Initially used in a cavalier manner by authorities discussing the large numbers from the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the state’s refugee discourse became complicated by the growing numbers of Western missionaries and secular organizations who sought to provide relief efforts to the colony’s residents after their expulsion from the mainland in 1951. By the time the government initiated public housing programs in the early 1950s, its own refugee discourse had dissipated, replaced by discussions of “squatters” and “residents.” The refugee population it had considered a temporary problem was reconstructed as a permanent population that required stable housing situations to ensure that residents did not fall prey to Communist or Nationalist propaganda. The refugee label evolved concurrently. This evolution reinforced the unique and specific genealogies that shaped the refugee discourse in Hong Kong. By the mid-1950s, it was one whose signification and more importantly perhaps, its attendant obligations, diverged from

¹²³ Extract from UK Delegate’s Speech re. Refugees in Hong Kong (1957), CO 1030/778, NAUK.
evolving ideas about refugeehood and responsibilities as enshrined in the 1951 Convention and advocated by the UNHCR. Nevertheless, as Western actors became progressively more interested in the refugee situation in the colony, the local contingencies that shaped Hong Kong’s unique refugee discourse were lost in refuge discussions born of the postwar situation in Europe.
CHAPTER THREE
FROM REFUGEE CONTAINMENT TO A GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN AGENDA, 1959-1962

Introduction

Within a few short years of introducing the entry permit system in 1951, the government of Hong Kong became fully cognizant of the economic potential latent in the large numbers of labourers that had moved into the colony since the 1940s. The introduction of large-scale public housing and the provision of social services by voluntary and charitable organizations relieved a pressing population problem and ensured a stable and readily available workforce.¹ The introduction of border controls further encouraged the Shanghai industrialists who had brought their families out of China in 1949 to become more rooted and make a firmer commitment to a future in Hong Kong.² By the late 1950s, it appeared that the government of Hong Kong had successfully managed the presence of a large population on its territory through the border controls and public housing projects discussed in the previous chapter. Authorities viewed the residents of the colony as relatively settled. The state was therefore determined to halt politicized discussions being advanced by Taiwanese authorities, missionaries and NGOs in the colony about a refugee population. As such, it was despite attempts by the Hong Kong government to contain refugee issues within the colony that Chinese refugees garnered international attention and were included in the four priorities for the United Nation’s World Refugee Year (1959-60).

Building on the foundations laid by Michael Barnett, who traces the history of activist humanitarianism to the immediate postwar period,³ this chapter looks at how sustained interest in refugee issues after 1945 by the UNHCR and other NGOs in Asia led to conflicts with the government of Hong Kong over responsibility for refugee issues in the colony. While the nature of sovereignty in Hong Kong was somewhat atypical given its position as a crown colony, this

² Ibid., 37.
chapter embraces the historiographical approach pursued by Ann Laura Stoler, Frederick Cooper and Tony Ballantyne who underscore the manner in which imperial projects simultaneously shaped, and were shaped by, the metropole.\(^4\) Colonial Hong Kong was not a sovereign space, ruled as it was by authorities in London, but local authorities demonstrated considerable influence on the imperial project and critically, “an enhanced discourse of stateness, expressing ideas of sovereignty, boundary, planning, and control.”\(^5\) In engaging with UNHCR administrators who represented a growing international interest in the refugee situation in Hong Kong, colonial officials took the lead in attempting to shape external engagement with matters that they deemed to be of sovereign, and local, concern.

This chapter examines how the issue of Chinese refugees moved from being politically and geographically contained to a prominent feature of how Western nations promoted a global refugee agenda during World Refugee Year. While scholars tend to focus on the efforts of the United Nations and organs such as the UNHCR or UNDEP in broadening the postwar refugee agenda, the role of these institutions in the history of this internationalization is far more complex than is generally allowed for.\(^6\) The politics that played out at the United Nations both advanced and hindered the internationalization of the refugee situation in Hong Kong. The United Nations and the United Nations Refugee Fund’s (UNREF) Executive and Advisory Committees were venues in which the Taiwanese government elevated the profile of the refugees in Hong Kong as it sought to secure support for its claims to be the legitimate government of China. The refugee issue was of paramount instrumental value for political purposes. However, the question of whether the People’s Republic of China or Taiwan represented the legitimate government of China limited the scope of the High Commissioner’s mandate vis-à-vis the Chinese refugee issue. Attempts by the United Nations and the UNHCR to expand their


involvement in Hong Kong (in part to ensure that the initial three-year mandate they were given in 1951 was renewed) were hampered by a colonial government that desired to retain control over its internal affairs, including immigration issues. As such, one must look beyond international organs to identify more fully the growing international attention to Chinese refugees in Hong Kong throughout the 1950s. The agenda for intervention came in part from humanitarian organizations, including the World Council of Churches, operating on the ground in Hong Kong. Their influence in drawing attention to the refugee situation in the colony was visible in meetings at the United Nations and especially in UNREF discussions. Despite the indeterminate legal status of Chinese migrants in the eyes of the United Nations and the colonial state’s efforts to suppress the refugee discourse, humanitarian actors and the government of Taiwan continued to use the term “refugee.” Their insistence on a refugee situation in Hong Kong created outside interest despite efforts by colonial officials to contain the issue.

The government of Taiwan used the term refugee strategically. Hoping to obtain political benefits, the government deliberately pointed to refugees in Hong Kong as evidence of Communist oppression. Meanwhile, missionaries, churches and secular NGOs used the term refugee freely to generate support for their humanitarian efforts, often universalizing and dehistoricizing the refugee experience in Hong Kong in order to elicit compassion and support amongst their Western supporters. The manner in which non-state actors depicted refugees is critical to understanding the manner in which migrants in Hong Kong came to be viewed as a refugee population. Too often, the analytical emphasis is on state strategies that use refugees to create outsiders and reinforce bonds of citizenship.7 During World Refugee Year, it was an army of humanitarian actors who advanced and defined notions of refugeehood. Through their fundraising and promotional campaigns, groups such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) promoted the image of refugees as “pure victims.”8 In so doing, they perpetuated the perception of refugees as different from other migrants, and more critically, from the territorialized citizens of settler societies. Refugees were separated from national communities by a gulf of empathy and need.

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7 The most influential approach in this respect is perhaps Hannah Arendt’s *Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, 1979), 299.
Taiwan at the United Nations: Pushing a refugee agenda

After 1949, the United Nations became a frequent forum where the contested politics of recognition between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan played out. The question of who should represent China in meetings of the General Assembly and in the committees of various UN organs was a perennial test of where each country stood in the eyes of the international community.9 For the Nationalist government in Taiwan, the refugee issue in Hong Kong became a critical platform upon which its claims to legitimacy could be built.

At the end of the Chinese civil war, an estimated 900,000 to two million people fled to Taiwan.10 Many were former soldiers and Nationalist supporters. Chiang Kai Shek’s government encouraged their movement in much the same way that Western governments publicized the defection of high profile individuals from the Soviet bloc during the Cold War; it was a sign of people voting with their feet. However, after the initial influx in 1949, the government of Taiwan’s desire to resettle large numbers of Chinese migrants ebbed due to the depressed economic situation on the island.11 By the early 1950s, the government was no longer encouraging people to move to Taiwan and was instead using the issue of refugees from the mainland, including those who moved to Hong Kong, to promote itself in international forums including those of the United Nations Refugees Fund (UNREF), which had responsibilities for UNHCR operations.

The movement of large numbers of people into Hong Kong prompted the Taiwanese government as well as humanitarian actors in Hong Kong to lobby for their inclusion within the UNHCR’s

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9 This debate culminated with a General Assembly resolution in 1971 that expelled representatives for the Republic of China and declared the People’s Republic of China to be the “sole legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.”
11 Of this number, 125,000 refugees were admitted to Taiwan from Hong Kong as a result of efforts by voluntary organizations such as the Free China Relief Association. Chi-Kwan Mark, “The ‘Problem of People’: British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 1949–62,” Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 6 (2007), 1161, accessed February 5, 2010, http://digirep.rhul.ac.uk/items/919d118d-10ad-5583-20c7-20db29f3fe31/1.
mandate despite the fact that the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees applied only to situations in Europe prior to 1951. The possibility of tangible UNHCR involvement in Hong Kong was first raised in 1951 by a group of students in Rennie’s Mill Camp. With support from the Free China Relief Association (FCRA), the students petitioned the High Commissioner for Refugees for assistance in relocating to Taiwan. This request, along with representations from Ambassador Ku (Taiwan) in Rome, led to extended discussions amongst the High Commissioner’s staff about what kind of aid could be offered and under what authority. Thomas Jamieson (UNHCR Special Representative to Hong Kong) argued for inclusion of the migrants in Hong Kong as refugees under the Commissioner’s mandate. His counterpart, Paul Weis (UNHCR legal counsel) conceded, “Chinese refugees are undoubtedly in need of assistance.” However, he remained in doubt as to whether they were in need of protection. The debate turned on the status of Taiwan and whether Chinese migrants from the mainland could conceivably seek protection from the Taiwanese government. The legitimacy of both the Taiwanese and Chinese communist governments was therefore at issue. John Alexander, UNHCR Director of Operations, argued that there was “nothing to stop Chinese going to Formosa or otherwise seeking and obtaining the protection they may need.” In his mind, there was no reason for the UNHCR to become involved. If the government of Taiwan needed help, Alexander believed its officials should approach the ICRC or the League of Red Cross Societies for funding and transportation assistance. The High Commissioner, Gerrit van Heuven Goedhart, himself a self-identified former refugee, disliked Alexander’s blunt solution and sought alternative options. He had few supporters. British officials, not wishing to upset newly established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (negotiated in 1951), argued that the migrants were beyond the High Commissioner’s mandate. It was a convenient argument as it also served to protect governance in Hong Kong from external scrutiny and forgive any sense of obligation amongst

12 P. Weis to High Commissioner re. Eligibility of Chinese Refugees, 22 February 1952. Fonds UNHCR 11 Records of the Central Registry, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1970 15/2/HK, Box 262, 15/2/HK/1 Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, UNHCR Archives.
13 According to the findings of the Hambro Mission, to those states who recognized Taiwan as the legal government of China, “the so-called refugees from China are not refugees within the terms of the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner, since they can be legally protected by the Government of Taipei.” Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong: Report Submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1955), 33.
14 John Alexander to the High Commissioner (through the Deputy High Commissioner), 23 April 1952, Fonds UNHCR 11 Records of the Central Registry, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1970 15/2/HK, Box 262, UNHCR Archives.
15 Ibid.
British authorities. Nevertheless, the FCRA and Taiwanese officials persisted in their efforts to establish the Chinese refugee question as an international issue.

Through the FCRA, the Taiwanese government produced volumes of correspondence as it sought to engage UNHCR staff and national delegations to the United Nations on the refugee situation in Hong Kong, all the while condemning the Chinese Communists for creating the problem in the first place. In a letter to Thomas Jamieson at the UNHCR, the FCRA declared:

> The refugee problem in the Far East, like those in some other areas, is chiefly an outgrowth of Communists’ persecution…The refugee problem would never have assumed so grave an aspect, nor would it have been a real problem, had the Chinese Communists not followed the pattern of the Communist International in purging and massacring.  

The FCRA viewed the refugees as innocent victims of communist oppression. Others suggested that the UNHCR should be involved as a matter of equality. There was pointed concern about the optics of an organization whose mandate excluded large blocks of humanity. From Bangkok, United Nations’ Representative Aami Ali wrote the High Commissioner and reported on the harsh criticism he was hearing. He suggested that the UNHCR was “soft pedaling” the problem of Chinese refugees and argued that it was hard to explain “to people in Asia why (the) UNCHR refuses to recognize the only Asian refugee problem which might fall within its scope…” Such observations were repeated at the United Nations where Dr. Yu Tsune-Chi, the Taiwanese delegate, declared, “refugees in Europe and refugees in Asia should be given equal attention.” These arguments appear to have had some effect. Along with determined efforts by the FCRA officials to get appointed to UNREF’s Executive and Advisory Committees (eventually succeeding in 1958) and calls for assistance by various humanitarian actors in Hong Kong, pointed critiques about a refugee situation the international community appeared to be ignoring because of the race of those involved led to the first UN intervention in Hong Kong, much to the

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16 Loescher, *Beyond Charity,* 93.
17 Fang Chui to Thomas Jamieson, 28 July 1952, 15/2/HK/1 Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong. Fonds UNHCR 11 Records of the Central Registry, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1970 15/2/HK, Box 262, Part 2, UNHCR Archives.
18 Ali, UNCHR Branch Office (Bangkok) to Hoveyasa, UNCHR (Geneva), 23 September 1953. Fonds UNHCR 11 Records of the Central Registry, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1970, 15/2/HK, Box 262, Part 2, UNHCR Archives.
19 Statement by Dr. Yu Tsune–Chi, Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 7 January 1952. Fonds UNHCR 11 Records of the Central Registry, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1970 15/2/HK, Box 262, UNHCR Archives.
dismay of governing authorities in the colony. In 1953, the Taiwanese government introduced a motion during meetings of the High Commissioner’s Advisory Committee to have refugees in Hong Kong included within the scope of the High Commissioner’s mandate. After much discussion, it was agreed that the question of eligibility could only be addressed if more concrete information was obtained about conditions in the colony. The committee proposed a survey to investigate the situation and a $50,000 grant from the Ford Foundation enabled the mission to proceed. The mission was tasked with ascertaining the size and composition of the refugee population, investigating all possible solutions and establishing “the necessary facts” required to make a determination about whether or not the refugees came within the High Commissioner’s mandate. There was an implicit assumption that the people in Hong Kong were indeed refugees and the Hambro Mission was tasked only with determining whether the group fell under the UNHCR’s mandate, not whether they were actually refugees. There was a great deal at stake. The survey’s findings had the potential to radically affect the fate of the migrants in Hong Kong and future UNHCR operations. If the mission found that the migrants were eligible under the High Commissioner’s mandate then a new program would result and, as one American authority indicated, it would probably result in an extension of the High Commissioner’s mandate beyond 1958. However, it would also mean a United Nations presence in Hong Kong, which authorities in both London and Hong Kong opposed. One Foreign Office official considered it “politically embarrassing to

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20 These efforts were unsuccessful. Fonds UNHCR 11 Records of the Central Registry, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1970 15/2/HK, Box 262, Part 2, UNHCR Archives.
21 Falling under the UNHCR’s mandate meant that the High Commissioner would be “empowered to defend the interests of the refugees, to act on their behalf in respect of the British authorities in Hong Kong and, in collaboration with the British Government, to take all the necessary steps for emigration and other measures to relieve the situation.” Dr. Hambro in Conversation with Governor Grantham, 30 June 1054, Fonds 23, Box 1, UNHCR Archives (Geneva). Debates over the UNHCR’s mandate were bound up with debates over the legitimacy of governments in Beijing and Taiwan and whether refugees could seek protection from either regime.
22 I.H. Harris to Mr. Sidebotham, 19 October 1953. CO 1023/117, NAUK.
23 The Ford Foundation had also been under some pressure to do something about the refugee situation in Hong Kong from Senator Judd, whose brainchild, the Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals Inc. (ARCI), was actively publicizing the plight of refugee intellectuals from China and working to resettle them in Taiwan and the United States. J. Read to M. Pages, 24 February 1953. Fonds UNHCR 11 Records of the Central Registry, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1970, 15/2/HK, Box 262, 15/2/HK/1 Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, UNHCR Archives.
24 Progress Reports to Headquarters, Fonds 23, Box 1, Jaeger to B.G. Alexander, UNCHR Geneva, 5 May 1954, UNHCR Archives.
have outside bodies administering camps or making relief payments in the colony.”

Governor Grantham’s response to the suggestion of a refugee survey was “lukewarm.” Grantham was loath to accommodate any kind of outside interference. He only begrudgingly accepted the Hambro mission and insisted that no distinction be drawn between refugees and residents in terms of financial assistance. Preferential treatment for refugees would only sow discontent in the colony. Officials in London shared the Governor’s reservations about the mission, but they confronted considerable pressure at the United Nations and therefore warned the Governor against “carrying his ‘caginess’ too far.” Growing international attention to the situation in Hong Kong as a result of communications by humanitarian actors in the colony and ongoing discussions in various United Nations forums meant that authorities had to be careful about how they presented their views on the refugee question. For authorities in London and Hong Kong, this meant walking a fine line between safeguarding the insular operations of the colony and cooperating with the United Nations initiative as good global citizens.

From the outset, Dr. Edward Hambro (the UNHCR’s pick to lead the survey) and his team took an expansive view of their mission’s mandate. They deemed the definition of a refugee according to the 1951 Convention too limiting and decided to place the situation in Hong Kong as understood “in the juridical sense” against “a broader and more comprehensive background.” As a starting point, the mission staff decided to “examine the situation of all the people who had left the mainland of China and felt that they could not return on account of fear of political persecution.” At early staff meetings, the team deliberated over how best to define the term “Chinese refugee” before abandoning this approach completely and pursuing research on “the position of the various groups which compose the present Chinese population of the Colony.”

The broad liberties Hambro assumed in interpreting his mandate were later reflected in the survey’s recommendations, which dodged the question of UNHCR eligibility by declaring

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25 Background Briefing to Advisory Committee Meeting, 1954, CO 1030 / 382 File 418/403/02, NAUK.
26 Harris to MacIntosh, 26 April 1955, CO 1030 / 382, NAUK.
27 Ibid.
29 Summary Record of the 1st Staff meeting, 3 May 1954, Fonds 23, Box 1, Summary Records of Staff Meetings, UNHCR Archives.
Chinese refugees in Hong Kong to be of “international concern” regardless of their actual legal status. Hambro then proceeded to carve out a role for the High Commissioner for Refugees despite arguments by officials in Hong Kong and London that it was impossible to draw distinctions between refugees and other residents of the colony in terms of social welfare needs and that UNHCR interventions would only create unfair bias. Hambro disagreed, declaring that although British officials considered the refugees “merely Chinese people living in a British colony,” from the international point of view, “they were political refugees and as such, should be helped.”

The Hambro Mission considered three types of solutions to the refugee situation in Hong Kong: repatriation, emigration or resettlement in another country of asylum or “firm establishment” in the colony. For each of these solutions, the mission envisioned some kind of international or UNHCR intervention in the form of either administrative and / or financial support. On the question of emigration, the mission concluded, “the prospects of resettling Chinese refugees abroad are very limited, owing to the immigration policies practiced by most Governments.”

The only exception was in the United States where the 1953 Refugee Relief Act allowed for 209,000 “non-quota” immigrant visas to be issued up to 31 December 1956 and included room for up to 3,000 Asian refugees in the Far East and 2,000 visas specifically for Chinese refugees. The mission therefore envisioned a role for the High Commissioner’s office whereby it could intervene with other potential receiving countries to determine whether they would be willing to

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30 Hambro, Problem of People, 134.
31 Hambro address to High Commissioner for Refugees Advisory Committee, Fifth Session, 6 December 1954, CO 1030 / 382 File 418/403/02, NAUK. Hambro never defined the term “political refugees.” In his final survey report, he wrote “there has been a widespread belief that hundreds of thousands of Chinese people are living not only in poverty, but in misery and on the verge of starvation; and it has been suggested that a great number of them are political refugees (1).” A few paragraphs prior to this, Hambro wrote, “a great number of people left the mainland apparently either because they were opposed to the new regime or because they had lost their means of livelihood, or for fear of persecution and suppression; and a large part of these people fled to the British Colony of Hong Kong.” A chapter later, Hambro wrote, “in well-informed circles, which are naturally restricted in number, a reasonable concept prevails: there must be a political reason for the refugees leaving China or for the fact that they continue to reside outside China (22).” It may be inferred that Hambro was thinking of political refugees as people who were opposed to the new regime or who feared persecution but his exact meaning is unclear.
32 Hambro, Problem of People, 69.
33 Ibid., 79.
34 Ibid., 83. “Asian Refugees in the Far East” were defined as “refugees, including Chinese persons, who: a) At the time of application for a visa are residing within the district of an American consular office in the Far East, and 2) are attributable by as much as one-half of their ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous in the Far East.” “Chinese refugees” were defined as “refugees who: a) are of Chinese ethnic origin, and 2) whose passports for travel to the United States are endorsed by the Chinese Nationalist Government or its authorized representatives.”
broaden their existing categories of migration or introduce special measures akin to those in the United States. Hambro and his staff believed that the immigration policies of Australia, New Zealand and Canada in particular “could conceivably be modified” although as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, this optimism was misplaced.

The vast majority of the mission’s conclusions and recommendations dealt with the question of refugee integration in Hong Kong where the economic and social problems of “poverty, overpopulation and unemployment” abounded. Instead of an enhanced role for the government of Hong Kong, the mission suggested expanding the practice of using voluntary agencies such as the International Social Service (ISS), the World Lutheran Service and the World Council of Churches to meet the needs of refugees. At the same time, Hambro and his team acknowledged that the voluntary agencies were unable to carry out a large rehabilitation scheme with the means currently available to them. The inference seemed to be that the international community had a role to play in producing the estimated 35 million (HK$) required to care for the refugee population in Hong Kong on an annual basis.

On the related question of housing policy, Hambro proposed the creation of a refugee credit fund that could be used, in part, for grants and credits for housing purposes. The fund was to be available to refugees only, contrary to the policies enunciated by authorities in Hong Kong and London. The Governor of Hong Kong disliked such discussions and reiterated, as he had from the outset of the survey, that no distinction could be drawn between refugees and the rest of the population. By the early 1950s, the government of Hong Kong was intentionally blurring the line between refugees and residents in the colony, obscuring any special needs that a refugee populace might have. Authorities repeatedly represented the entire population as “decent, hardworking folk who only want to be left alone and they are self-reliant in so doing.” The government wanted financial assistance with “no strings attached” so that officials could direct money where, and to whom, it was most

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35 The 1953 Refugee Relief Act created quotas for refugee admissions from Europe and Asia to the United States.
36 Ibid., 128.
37 Ibid., 130.
38 The international social service was established in 1924 with the objective of assisting migrants moving across international borders. In the postwar period it became deeply involved with family reunification issues in Europe and in facilitating international adoptions through the documentation individual cases.
39 Hambro, Problem of People, 112.
40 It was a view shared by senior colonial administrators as well as authorities responsible for security in the colony. See Annual Report. Hong Kong Police. 1951-52. Chapter XV, “Special Problems,” 46.
Discussions of the Hambro Report in UNREF’s Advisory Committee achieved very little of substance. The Taiwanese delegate lobbied intensely to have the refugees included under the High Commissioner’s mandate. He cited verbatim the various sections of the report where Hambro inferred that although the refugees were not technically and legally under the mandate of the High Commissioner, their humanitarian situation was comparable to that of many others in the world who were receiving UNHCR attention and their need alone was sufficient reason to engage international action. The resolution that eventually passed was an empty one, requesting only that the High Commissioner “give sympathetic encouragement to Governments and organizations with a view to their assisting in alleviating the problems of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong and to report to the Committee, when he deemed it necessary, any progress made in the implementation of the Resolution.”

Although the Hambro Report failed to produce any substantial action at the United Nations, it garnered significant interest amongst charitable organizations, which picked up the report’s recommendations and referenced them in lobbying national governments for support and assistance to the refugees in Hong Kong. In England, the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief published advertisements in newspapers such as the Manchester Guardian, calling on the British government to address the situation in Hong Kong. Frank Carter, the organization’s head of local appeals, also lobbied the British Council for Aid Refugees, established in 1951 by Dame Anne May Curwen. Curwen was appointed the British delegate to UNREF in 1954 and she believed that Mr. Carter was behaving like “all fanatics – not appreciative of what is done and over sentimental about what is not.” Yet those on the ground remained genuinely frustrated by the failure of the responsible authorities to act on any of the report’s recommendations. Two

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41 Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 March 1955, CO 1030 / 382 File 418/403/02, NAUK.
43 In fact, it was private funding that ensured publication of the final report. 15/2/1 Survey of the Position of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong (Part 3), Fonds UNHCR 11 Records of the Central Registry, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1970 15/2/HK, Box 262, Part 6, UNHCR Archives.
44 Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 July 1955, CO 1030 / 383, NAUK.
45 British Council for Aid to Refugees to United Kingdom Delegation, 21 August 1957, CO 1030 / 777, NAUK.
years after the report was published, Dr. Elfan Rees of the World Council of Churches accused the British government of failing to address the situation in Hong Kong and demanded to know what action was being taken. The answer, it seems, was very little.

In the years following the publication of the Hambro Report, the Taiwanese government and the FCRA were the only voices heard at the United Nations on the question of Chinese refugees and the High Commissioner’s mandate. In the field, humanitarian actors continued their work in communicating the needs of the Hong Kong populace to audiences outside the colony. In circulars and letters home, missionaries and social workers stressed the terrible living conditions in which people lived and the need for critical social services. Secular NGOs in particular sought not only financial support but also political engagement to ensure that the refugee issue in Hong Kong was not forgotten. Organizations such as the Civic Association and the United Nations Association of Hong Kong were particularly taken with the idea of a financial fund for the Chinese refugees in the colony. In August 1957, organizations engaged with the refugee question in Hong Kong banded together to establish the “All Hong Kong Appeal to the United Nations for Relief to Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong,” whose main purpose was to petition the United Nations for a $100 million relief scheme for the refugees in Hong Kong.

Neither the Hong Kong nor the British governments liked the idea of a dedicated fund for refugee issues although they were increasingly open to the idea of obtaining international funds to support the massive and costly public housing schemes in the colony. Nevertheless, it remained official British policy not to provide the Hong Kong government with any money to address the refugee issue specifically. As such, discussions of a potential fund in an international

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46 Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor of Hong Kong, 29 May 1957, CO 1030 / 777, NAUK.
47 Letter from H.U. Willink, Master of Magdalene College (Cambridge) to Alan Lennox-Boyd, regarding the Oxford Famine Relief Committee’s work in Hong Kong, 17 September 1956. CO 1030/384, NAUK.
48 Geneva to Foreign Office, 11 December 1956, CO 1030/ 384, NAUK.
49 These groups also recommended that the Chinese refugees be brought under the High Commissioner’s mandate, that adequate funds be provided to deal with the refugee question and that countries liberalize their immigration policies so as to alleviate the population pressures in Hong Kong. Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 August 1957, CO 1030 / 778, NAUK.
50 Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 August 1957, CO 1030 / 778, NAUK.
51 Jaeger to Alexander, 16 November 1956, Fonds UNHCR 11 Records of the Central Registry, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1970, 15/2/HK, Box 262, Part 3, UNHCR Archives.
forum such as the United Nations risked potential embarrassment. The British delegation was unsure about how it could lend support to the question of relief for Hong Kong without committing its own government to making targeted financial contributions. For its part, the government of Hong Kong was concerned about its ability to retain discretionary control over the internal resettlement of the colony’s squatter population and the delivery of social services if it accepted funds from the international community. The Governor of Hong Kong also worried about the possible political repercussions that deliberating and establishing a refugee fund might have on the colony’s somewhat precarious relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Nevertheless, Governor Grantham conceded that it would be “most difficult to decline offers of assistance from any source” and therefore hoped that funds would come from private agencies and not national governments so that relief schemes would not be “complicated by conditions and special provisions.” When the matter of the refugee fund was raised in meetings at the United Nations in the spring of 1957, delegates failed to reach a decision and a US-sponsored resolution referred the matter to the General Assembly. In November 1957, the General Assembly recognized the refugee situation in Hong Kong as being of “international importance.” The migrants remained beyond the scope of the mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees, but the resolution enabled High Commissioner Auguste Lindt (appointed in 1956) to use his “good offices” to issue financial appeals in aid of the migrants.

The “good offices” compromise was an important milestone in the growing international interest in the refugee situation in Hong Kong. The government of Taiwan and non-governmental organizations had exerted sufficient pressure to keep the issue of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, if not at the centre of the world’s gaze, then far enough from the outer periphery to ensure that the situation was not completely forgotten. Although the High Commissioner was never able to obtain much in the way of funding for Hong Kong (the Holy See’s contribution was the largest at $500), the “good offices” resolution did focus attention on the situation in the colony. Dr. Elfan Rees announced that in response to the resolution, the World Council of Churches

52 Handwritten marginalia. Correspondence, 29 May 1957, CO 1030 / 778, NAUK.
53 Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 September 1957, CO 1030 / 778, NAUK.
54 Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 August 1957, CO 1030 / 778, NAUK.
56 Loescher, Beyond Charity, 97; C. Ivor Jackson, Refugee Concept in Group Situations, 7.
“intended to intensify its relief programme in Hong Kong.” The British Red Cross Society also considered taking up an appeal on behalf of the Chinese refugees but abandoned the plan in its infancy after consultations with representatives from the Colonial Office. The Society’s leadership concluded that it was not “suitable to make a Red Cross emergency appeal for Hong Kong because it is now a chronic situation in which the chief need is housing and the indigenous population is equally affected.” The inability to distinguish between the needs of residents and those of refugees curbed enthusiasm for an emergency appeal. The British Red Cross chose to donate material goods instead. Though the substantive response to the “good offices” campaign was disappointing, the energy exerted by the government of Taiwan, the FCRA and other actors involved with the refugee question in Hong Kong was critical in keeping the issue on the world stage for years. These determined efforts help explain how Hong Kong became such a prominent part of the United Nation’s World Refugee Year (1959-1960).

In the spring of 1958, Christopher Chataway, Colin Jones and Trevor Philpott and Timothy Raison (four young British lawyers) published an article titled “Wanted: A World Refugee Year” in Crossbow, an influential London publication. They posited, “The refugee is the showing sore of the most bitter sickness of our time” and proposed a worldwide campaign to alleviate the suffering of refugees in Europe, Hong Kong and the Middle East. Their call to action had an almost instantaneous impact. Officials in the High Commissioner’s office were enamoured with the concept as they were mindful of the protracted refugee situation in Europe and of their own program’s precarious financial situation: the annual pledging conference only raised 50% of the funds required for the UNHCR’s 1959 program. World Refugee Year seemed like a wonderful way to raise awareness and money and move people out of desperate living conditions.

When the possibility of sponsoring a World Refugee Year was raised at the United Nations, governments tabled their support but also their reservations. The Canadian delegation expressed

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58 Letter to Colonial Office from British Red Cross Society, draft of correspondence to Mr. Henry W. Dunning, Secretary-General of the League of Red Cross Societies, CO 1030/780, NAUK.
59 International Affairs: Social Affairs - Refugees - Admission of Refugees to New Zealand and New Zealand Participation in World Refugee Year, ABHS 950, W4627, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington.
its sympathy but stated that it “did not want to take a national lead.” The Australian delegate indicated that his government supported the initiative “subject to the understanding that the activities, which individual Governments may undertake, (are) a matter for determination by those Governments on an individual basis.” Many delegations echoed this concern. No government wanted to be bound by a commitment to World Refugee Year to modify its immigration or refugee policies. Settler societies, still clinging to notions of white supremacy, insisted that refugee needs were best met by alleviating local conditions. As such, even before World Refugee Year was launched in June 1959, the UNHCR’s ambitions were being curbed. While the organization had intended to pursue the twin goals of sensitizing the general public to ongoing refugee situations and alleviating the plight of refugees through resettlement, the thrust of the year’s energies shifted early on towards fund-raising to help refugees in situ as opposed to orchestrating large-scale resettlement programs.

In preparing for World Refugee Year, there was considerable debate at the United Nations about which situations should be targeted and whether efforts should be limited to “mandated” refugees; an approach that would have excluded groups such as the migrants in Hong Kong. British officials made a dramatic u-turn on their stance regarding the international status of the Chinese refugees asserting “that Her Majesty’s Government have always considered this group of refugees to be eligible under the mandate of the High Commissioner” and expressing the hope that World Refugee Year “would provide an opportunity for further assistance” to Hong Kong. The British policy reversal resulted from heightened tensions within the newly constituted

60 Jamieson to Read, 5 March 1959, ARR88, Box 8, Country Files, “Canada,” United Nations Archives, Geneva (UNAG).
61 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the First Meeting of the Special Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Commencing on the 15th June, 1959, dated 5 June 1959, UNHCR Executive Committee - First Special Session - June 1959, A446, 1959/65585, 1957224, National Archives of Australia (NAA), Canberra.
62 Optics required that racist hierarchies be couched in diplomatic language. Australian officials therefore referred to “psychological and environmental influences” in suggesting “certain categories of refugees in Europe” should be resettled to “a country which can provide, through its established and highly developed social services, appropriate institutional care and after-treatment.” Australia considered itself one of these countries and prioritized resettlement efforts for the special needs of people in European camps. Brief for the Australian Delegation to the First Meeting of the Special Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Commencing on the 15th June, 1959, dated 5 June 1959, UNHCR Executive Committee - First Special Session - June 1959, A446, 1959/65585, 1957224, NAA (Canberra). For its part, New Zealand also prioritized the European refugee situation and only started contributing to the relief of refugee situations in Hong Kong and Korea once the situation in Europe had improved. See correspondence in Refugees - General (1961-1976), AAFD, 811, W3738, 895, CAB 69/1/1, ANZ.
63 Verbatim Statement made at the First Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 28 January 1959, ARR, Box 37, File 65 World Refugee Year 10, UKa. UNAG.
UNHCR Executive Committee, which included a delegate from Taiwan after the elections in 1958. With a Nationalist representative on the committee, British and Hong Kong officials worried about how the situation in the colony would be treated in committee. Robin Black told the Foreign Office that the Nationalists “will probably take the initiative in such a way to exploit the Cold War aspects of the refugee problem and spoil the chances of our doing something constructive.”  

He worried that this would cause problems for Hong Kong with the Communist government in Beijing and urged the Foreign Office to make a real show of support for Hong Kong. For this reason, the British government flipped on the question of the High Commissioner’s mandate and made an initial commitment of £100,000 to World Refugee Year, the bulk of which was to be directed to Hong Kong. The UNHCR’s Executive Committee eventually decided that since the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong had been ruled of “international concern” in 1957, they should be included in the targets for World Refugee Year along with Arab refugees in Palestine and the European refugees in China in addition to the main target, the camps in Europe.

A total of ninety-seven countries participated in World Refugee Year. National committees orchestrated a dizzying array of fund-raising activities. There were candy sales and special ballet productions of *The Exile* in New Zealand, fund-raising film screenings of *The Camp* in Australia, charity jazz concerts and amateur boxing tournaments in Hong Kong and lavender sales and sponsored competitive boat races in England. The actor Yul Brynner lent his star-studded celebrity status to the World Refugee Year cause and musicians Edith Piaf and Bing Crosby contributed hit songs to the “All-Star Festival” album, which sold over a million copies in Europe alone in its first three months of sales. All of the participating countries set ambitious fund-raising objectives. The United Kingdom aimed for $5,600,000, Canada hoped to raise $3,300,000, Australia’s goal was $1,120,000 and New Zealand’s was $490,000. Taiwan aimed for $300,000 and proposed to dedicate 75% of the funds raised to support Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. World Refugee Year was a major undertaking and it had a profound impact on the general public’s engagement with refugee issues. States remained in the background in terms of

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64 Black to Wallace, 6 August 1958, CO 1030/781, NAUK.
65 Statements on World Refugee Year, Meeting 871 of 13th General Assembly, ARR, Box 37, File 65 World Refugee Year 10, UK a, UNAG.
66 All figures in US dollars.
advocating on behalf of refugees. If anything, they sought to dissuade humanitarian actors from going too far in elaborate representations of “refugees and the begging-bowl.” Charitable and humanitarian organizations assumed the lead in presenting refugees to the public. Their fundraising efforts internationalized the refugee agenda, raised expectations and contributed to the paradoxical position of the modern refugee subject as both victim and threatening outsider.

Nowhere was the paradox more manifest than in the United Kingdom, which because of the refugee situation in Hong Kong, was both a donor and recipient of aid.

As preparations got underway, British officials became increasingly enthusiastic about World Refugee Year in part because it offered them the opportunity to regain some of their previous stature on the world stage. Officials in the Colonial Office attempted to raise interest about World Refugee Year amongst new Commonwealth countries. UNHCR officials were likewise hopeful that the British government could use its influence on other governments and convince them to act on behalf of refugees across the globe. It was thought that the World Refugee Year campaign in the United Kingdom could “be stimulated without difficulty in Australia, Canada and New Zealand,” and could be used in South African and the Rhodesian Federation “to arouse their interest.” In a strategy that was duplicated in other countries, British officials placed the burden of responsibility for the success of the campaign almost entirely on the shoulders of the voluntary community. However, that was the extent of Britain’s influence. Settler societies considered World Refugee Year within the framework of their own evolving identities and their own desire to select on the basis of “assimilability,” “absorptive capacity” and labour market needs. They had little or no appetite for undertaking massive resettlement schemes. The

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67 Memo from Burgess to Wallace, 21 May 1960, FO 371/150430, NAUK. On government reservations about dramatic fund-raising schemes see correspondence in File 1, Box 4, Canadian Committee for World Refugee Year Fonds, McMaster University Archives.
69 David Ormsby-Gore to J.R.D. Kelly, 17 July 1950, ARR, Box 37, File 65 World Refugee Year 10, UKa, UNAG.
70 J.D.R. Kelly to L. Carver, Deputy Director UNRWA, 15 April 1959, ARR, Box 37, File 65 World Refugee Year 10, UK a, UNAG.
71 Statements on World Refugee Year, Meeting 871 of 13th GA, ARR, Box 37, File 65 World Refugee Year 10, UK a, UNAG.
72 Sherene H. Razack, Race, Space and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002), 3-4. Activists made allusions to the unpopulated space available in settler societies on numerous occasions as they sought to advance resettlement programs out of Hong Kong. See Human Rights Council of Hong Kong, 5 May 1962, HKR5545-1-23-1, HKPRO.
responsibility for generating support and interest in the refugee enterprise was left to the voluntary sector.

Happily for the organizing committee in London, the story of World Refugee Year in the United Kingdom was one of unbridled success and deep public engagement. The chair of the National World Refugee Year Committee was Baroness Elliott of Harwood and she transformed World Refugee Year events into grand affairs. The inaugural dinner was held at Guildhall, a London landmark, where Prime Minister Macmillan made a televised address and declared, “helping refugees is not only an act of generosity; it is in the interests of world peace and of progress for all peoples that we help the up-rooted to return to a productive and active life.”

To excite the general public about the campaign, the national committee went to amazing lengths to publicize refugee situations around the world. Migrants in Hong Kong featured prominently in these efforts.

One of the most elaborate publicity stunts was constructed at Trafalgar Square and consisted of forty huts, such as would be found in the squatter settlements in Hong Kong. Organized by the World Council of Churches and built by volunteer Rover Scouts, the huts featured “typical” refugee possessions that had been specially shipped from overseas. The designers also borrowed the replica of a Hong Kong street from the British Pinewood film studios to create an authentic atmosphere in the square. The space was organized so that the street led to the “open space where the shacks (could) be seen against a huge backcloth of the colony’s hillsides.” The whole point was to demonstrate how refugees lived on a daily basis, with the ultimate objective of raising funds for a vocational training centre. Combined with an exhibition of photographs on display in nearby St. Martin in the Fields (organized by the Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service), the British public was left with an absolutely desperate picture of life in the colony. This same public subsequently gave over £200,000 to help people in Hong Kong.

Displays such as the ones in Trafalgar Square and St. Martin in the Fields reveal how humanitarian actors took a very different approach from officials in London and Hong Kong to the question of

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73 Jamieson to P. de Zulueta, 14 May 1959, ARR, Box 37, File 65 World Refugee Year 10, UK a, UNAG.
74 Correspondence, 7 July 1959, WCC, 1c WRY, 1960, 425.02.09.018 Commission of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service (CICARWS), World Council of Churches Archives, Geneva.
75 Recommendations of Executive Committee to General Committee on Allocations, United Kingdom Committee for World Refugee Year, ARR, Box 38, File 65 WRY 10, UK b, UNAG.
Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. Government policy had been to manage the refugee situation within the political and geographical borders of Hong Kong. During World Refugee Year, voluntary organizations took the lead on disseminating information and images of the refugee situation in the colony with seeming disregard for the careful dance of containment that officials in London and Hong Kong had executed in previous years.

Around the world, images of refugees were instrumentalized for fund-raising purposes so that the refugee became a commodity that could be bought and sold.\textsuperscript{76} Unable (or unwilling) to rely solely on rational arguments to appeal for donations and expenditures on behalf of refugees, charitable organizations used vivid descriptions and images that touched on cultural codes and conventions to tug at the heartstrings of would-be donors.\textsuperscript{77} The creation of empathy was geared to the generation of funds. In Australia, the state of Victoria’s Committee for World Refugee Year decided that sheer emotion was the only “weapon” when it came to helping refugees in Hong Kong. Their appeal highlighted the plight of “children, sleeping in streets, ragged, cold and hungry through no fault of their own.”\textsuperscript{78} In Canada, the national committee used the an image of a young refugee girl with dark eyes holding an empty bowl in their fund-raising efforts as there was “evidence from a number of countries” suggesting that this image had “a unique power of appeal.”\textsuperscript{79} The CBC and the National Film Board were essential conduits for stimulating interest and empathy amongst the Canadian public on refugee issues. The CBC undertook to produce special documentaries such as \textit{A Canadian Visits A Refugee Camp}, featuring Reuben Baetz of the Canadian Red Cross returning to a camp where he had worked ten years previously.\textsuperscript{80} Mr. Baetz called the return a “very moving experience” and applauded the film because it “translated ‘refugees’ into human beings.”\textsuperscript{81} The network also aired a documentary titled \textit{The People Between}, which featured Ingrid Bergman narrating the thoughts of a refugee mother. The film’s

\textsuperscript{77} On photography as representative of, and informed by, specific historical conditions and circumstances that reinforce particular conventions, see James Ryan, \textit{Picturing Empire: Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire} (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), 9.
\textsuperscript{78} Richard Donald Malcolmson Fonds, Box 2825, Folder 3, State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia.
\textsuperscript{79} Duckworth-Baker to Jacobson, 26 August 1959, ARR88, Box 8, Country Files, “Canada,” Verbatim record of 88\textsuperscript{th} meeting of ICEM, UNAG.
\textsuperscript{80} Baetz was also deeply engaged with the work of the World Council of Churches.
\textsuperscript{81} Minutes of Meeting, 25 January 1960, Box 6, File 5, Canadian Committee for World Refugee Year Fonds, McMaster University Archives (MUA).
recurring theme was “refugees are, in fact, human beings who have much to give, if only the free
nations – and free individuals – will give them a chance.”

Meanwhile, the World Council of Churches hired Baden Hickman to cover the events and
activities of World Refugee Year. As the WCC’s journalist, Hickman’s sole task was to
disseminate information about refugee situations to the international public. In October 1959,
Mr. Hickman went to Hong Kong and dispatched an account of the typical daily diet of a
Chinese refugee. According to his report, refugees ate “nothing but two bowls of watery rice
(congee) as they cannot afford to buy vegetables or beans.” He suggested that this “inadequate
diet” led to malnutrition, which was “one of the causes of the epidemic-type of tuberculosis in
over-crowded Hong Kong with its near 1,500,000 Chinese refugees (an exaggerated figure).”

How appropriate, then, that one of the projects for which the World Council of Churches was
collecting funds was a tuberculosis sanitarium in Hong Kong.

Not surprisingly, officials in Hong Kong had mixed opinions about such efforts. Claude Burgess,
the Colonial Secretary, thought that voluntary agencies were rather quick to “get their facts
wrong and their publicity crooked” but the global interest generated by World Refugee Year
causd the government of Hong Kong to see the so-called refugee population in its territory in a
new light.

The government of Hong Kong welcomed the inflow of cash that World Refugee Year
portended and developed a wish list of projects to be funded. The grand sum totaled
$7,280,000 (US). Many of the projects were left over from earlier discussions in 1957 about a
possible fund for refugees in Hong Kong. Potential projects included a rehabilitation centre
($5,250,000), primary schools in resettlement areas ($175,000), a technical secondary school
($375,000), library and teaching equipment, medical supplies and expert assistance for the
reclamation of land upon which refugee housing was to be constructed (estimated at $1.75 – $4.2
million US). The chosen projects were designed to contribute to the overall health and welfare
of the colony and they were chosen strategically. When foreign governments suggested

82 Press Release, “The People Between,” 1 February 1960, Box 6, File 5, Canadian Committee for World Refugee
Year Fonds, MUA.
83 World Council of Churches Briefs, 21 October 1959, 1b World Refugee Year, 1960, UNAG.
84 Correspondence, October 1959, CO 1030 / 782, NAUK.
85 Statement by the High Commissioner, Letter of Appeal Sent 12 February 1958, Press Releases, UNHCR
Archives.
alternative projects that were perceived to be politically sensitive, they were rebuffed. For instance, when the government of Norway proposed to fund the construction of a sanitarium in Rennie’s Mill Camp, Governor Black objected, indicating, “proposals are welcome in so far as the money is to be spent otherwise than in Rennie’s Mill…” He wanted to avoid directing funds to projects that could serve the interests of the Nationalists in Taiwan or upset the Communists on the mainland. Grants such as the $200,000 from the United States, which was handed directly to the government of Hong Kong, were most appreciated.

Ironically, given the previous success that the Free China Relief Association and the governments of Taiwan had enjoyed in keeping the Chinese refugee issue on the world stage, World Refugee Year lessened their influence on the refugee question in Hong Kong. The worldwide outpouring of financial support meant that Taiwanese authorities could no longer claim to be the sole benefactor to Chinese refugees. Moreover, the British and Hong Kong governments worked carefully to minimize political opportunities in Hong Kong during World Refugee Year. When Claude de Kemoularia, the special UN Delegate for World Refugee Year, visited Hong Kong, he was met by a demonstration from Rennie’s Mill. Protesters carried Nationalist flags and were rather disruptive. Dismayed, the Colonial Office and the government of Hong Kong both advised Auguste Lindt, the UN High Commissioner, against making his own visit. They were concerned that the government in Beijing might find further demonstrations provocative and wanted to avoid encouraging “exaggerated expectations” on the part of the Chinese Nationalists. Lindt stayed away, illustrating the dynamic that established itself as World Refugee Year unfolded in Hong Kong. Money flowed in and people moved (or were moved) internally, but few migrants left and political actors stayed away. As in the United Kingdom, settler societies raised funds for the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, but none offered to modify their immigration regulations to permit increased migration possibilities. Nor did they suggest large-scale resettlement as a solution to the overcrowded conditions in the British

86 Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 March 1960, CO 1030 / 1309, NAUK.
87 Correspondence in CO 1030 / 782, NAUK.
88 It is unclear from the archival record whether this was part of the British government’s strategy in supporting World Refugee Year. Still, there is ample evidence that British authorities were perennially unhappy with the Taiwanese delegation’s lobbying at the United Nations. See FO 371 / 110379 Problem of European refugees from mainland China in Hong Kong: survey by UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Far Eastern. China (1954), NAUK.
89 Colonial Office to Political Adviser, Colonial Secretariat (Hong Kong), CO 1030 / 782, 4 November 1959, NAUK.
colony. This was an option that colonial authorities and British authorities in London alike sought to discourage.  

The enormous publicity and fund raising operated at cross-purposes to the persistent limitations on entry in countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Enduring structural limitations were a great disappointment to UNHCR officials. Although they had privately conceded from the very beginning of World Refugee Year that many authorities in countries of potential resettlement might claim depressed economic conditions to avoid accommodating refugees, they still hoped some progress might be achieved. As the year advanced, however, it became clear that while countries were willing to resettle select and limited numbers of refugees, including the difficult to resettle cases of tubercular and handicapped refugees, they were still opposed to large-scale resettlement as a solution to protracted refugee situations, particularly those outside of Europe. World Refugee Year highlighted the deep contradiction between raising funds to help with resettlement and deterring resettlement to one’s own country. For instance, while British officials declared, “if World Refugee Year succeeds in its objects…all the refugees in Europe and the Far East can be resettled in the next two to three years,” they were only willing to resettle four hundred European refugees to England and took no steps to make long-term changes to their immigration program. No resettlement schemes were proposed for refugees in Hong Kong. Similarly, Australian officials supported resettlement as an option but they were only interested in resettling refugees that they believed would be able to integrate into Australian society. In the Australia of the late 1950s, this meant European refugees only. The Australian state refused entreaties by the UNHCR for it to expand its categories of eligible migrants during World Refugee Year. In Canada, the government paid for the resettlement of one hundred European refugees suffering

90 See correspondence in CO 1030 / 384, NAUK.
91 Notes to be attached to Statistics on Refugee Movements to be forwarded to Mr. de Kemoularia, ARR 88/Box 40 File 70/WRY 10 Canada a, 6 March 1959, UNAG.
92 Draft Speech, House of Lords (undated), CO 1030/781, NAUK.
93 Personal Impressions of UNHCR Meeting, Executive, Third Session, 4-10 April 1960 (R.V. Metcalfe, Delegate, April 14, 1960), Executive Committee - Third session - April 1960, A446, 1959/67087, 1957341, NAA (Canberra).
95 État d’avancement du Mouvement Pour L’année Mondiale du Réfugié, ARR88, Box 1, Country Files, “Australia,” 15 July 1959, UNAG.
from tuberculosis (normally grounds for exclusion), along with their families. A total of three hundred and forty-four people moved to Canada under this program. The government also directed extra energy towards selecting people from those countries in Europe that were burdened with protracted asylum situations. The government accepted an additional five hundred migrants in the regular immigration stream in a bid to ease the refugee situation in Italy. In Austria and Germany, refugees were provided opportunities for resettlement under labour recruitment schemes. For its part, New Zealand re-settled one hundred “hard core” refugee families, including those where one member was handicapped as long as all the other members of the family met regular immigration requirements. The South African state did not resettle any refugees during World Refugee Year. Government efforts amongst settler societies were therefore limited in comparison to the vast fundraising and publicity campaigns initiated by the voluntary sector, some of which focused explicitly on the situation in Hong Kong.

The Council for Overseas for Relief Services Overseas (CORSO) was the coordinating body for New Zealand’s World Refugee Year efforts. It was established during the Second World War with the intention of helping war-torn countries rehabilitate. Greece was a primary focus and China also ranked high on its list of priorities in the immediate postwar period. For World Refugee Year, CORSO’s goal was to raise £100,000. £50,000 was to support their regular operations and the rest was to be divided between the UNHCR (£39,000) and ICEM, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, (£11,000). Any surplus was intended for specific targets established for World Refugee Year. CORSO’s fundraising efforts were so successful, it was able to contribute to the construction of cottages for indigent residents of Hong Kong under the auspices the Chinese Methodist Church at Chai Wan. The Rotary Club in Wellington raised £300 for three cottages and school groups also focused their energies on raising money for the construction of huts. CORSO organizers believed “the practical nature of this help to Chinese refugees appealed to New Zealanders.” In South Africa, the national committee for World Refugee Year included representation from the Methodist Church, the South African National Committee for Child Welfare and the South African Refugee

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96 Summary of the Main Resettlement Opportunities Attributed to World Refugee Year, UNHCR, 23 May 1960, ARR, Box 38, File 65 WRY 10, UK b, UNAG.
98 Russell Thurlow Thompson, New Zealand in Relief: The Story of CORSO’s Twenty-One Years of Relief Service Overseas (Wellington, N.Z.: N.Z. Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, [1965]), 82.
Organization. One of the most vocal supporters of World Refugee Year was Mayor Goshel of Johannesburg who believed that the campaign presented a wonderful opportunity for South Africa to make a name for itself.\(^99\) The Committee wanted to demonstrate that refugees could be good labourers to counter the “disgusting apathy” they perceived amongst policymakers and the general public. One of the committee’s most ambitious plans was to build a refugee village in South Africa, modeled after Father George Pire’s Nobel-prize winning work in Europe where he organized the construction of “refugee villages” after the Second World War. Organizers hoped to get land the size of a Township where an architect could design residences. The idea was that refugees would then help in the construction of this village. Noting that they would need government permission to get the refugees in South Africa, and that this might be problematic, the committee nevertheless maintained:

> True to our humanitarian ideas we must do all we can to get permission for the entry of an average cross-section of a village population. No average village ever consists only of able-bodied, first class artisans with 100% fit families within the specified immigration age groups. Existing legislation allows the entry of relatives and dependents of “sub-standard quality” and full advantage should be taken of that.\(^100\)

The committee felt that putting the refugees altogether in one place would permit them to “feel at home among their own kind and although the process of assimilation will be slower it will no doubt be easier.”\(^101\) This plan, like many of the committee’s efforts to publicize World Refugee Year, did not amount to much. The government gave £5,000 to ICEM to assist with the cost of moving refugees however it is unclear how many refugees, if any, moved to South Africa during the year.\(^102\)

In Australia, the priority was convincing a conservative public that World Refugee Year was an initiative that warranted their support. As one organizer explained, “because there is no refugee problem in this country, many Australians have false ideas about refugees, thinking them shiftless, incompetent people, seeking other people’s charity rather than work.”\(^103\) As a result, Australia’s World Refugee Year publicity campaigns elaborated the idea of “deserving refugees”

\(^100\) Ibid.
\(^101\) Ibid.
\(^102\) Ibid. The government contributed regularly to ICEM, with half of its annual allocation being used for the transportation of migrants to South Africa.
\(^103\) Immigration - World Refugee Year [Box 109], C3939, N1959/75125 PART 1, NAA (Sydney).
along two themes, “Close the Camps in Europe in 1960” and “Rescue the Europeans from China.”104 This latter campaign referenced the plight of White Russians caught in China at the end of the Chinese civil war. All levels of society were engaged in efforts for World Refugee Year including the Good Neighbour Councils, which were established in 1950 to smooth relations between new migrants and more established communities. Girl Guide groups, Rotary and Lions Clubs participated in the fundraising and educational efforts. As a result, local and regional voluntary agencies and the Australian government raised more than £880,000, with over £100,000 directed to Hong Kong to support hospitals in the colony and the construction of a housing settlement bearing the name “Australia Village.”105

Although fundraising efforts in Canada were rather disappointing, World Refugee Year had the important effect of stimulating public interest in sponsorship and adoptions. Individuals inspired by the year’s publicity and information campaigns sometimes attempted sponsorships only to discover that the people they wanted to help, such as refugees in Hong Kong, were not eligible for entry under Canadian immigration law, which still severely limited the entry of migrants from Asia. 106 Public pressure to expand sponsorship categories to enable private sponsorship was generally rebuffed by politicians and policymakers. The editorial staff of the Globe and Mail (a leading Toronto newspaper later to become a national edition in 1965) criticized the government’s lack of leadership and observed, “private organizations and individuals are anxious to help” but they were receiving “very little encouragement from the immigration department.”107 The pressure for reform led to a small but significant change when, in January 1960, the government permitted non-church groups to sponsor refugees for the first time. The Canadian Committee for World Refugee Year was designated as the coordinating body for this special sponsorship program and seventy additional refugees were resettled to Canada during World Refugee Year as a result.

104 World Refugee Year, Public Relations Assistance, ARR 88/Box 41 File 84 World Refugee Year 10, Australia b, UNAG.
105 Secretary- Administrator for Australian National Committee for World Refugee Year, September 1962, Report of the Australian National Committee for World Refugee Year for the period 1 July 1961 to 30 June 1962, Box 2825, Folder 5, Malcolmson Fonds.
106 Pierre Berton, “One Suburb’s Vain Try to Sponsor a Sick Refugee,” Toronto Daily Star, Box 8, File 4, Newspaper Clippings – Community Sponsorships, Canadian Committee for World Refugee Year, MUA.
The other area in which public opinion affected government policies was in the field of international adoptions. In Australia, the success of World Refugee Year created tremendous interest in the possibility of adopting children from Hong Kong. The International Social Service was so overwhelmed by proposals to adopt refugee children and accommodate refugee families that it worried about the potential for disappointment given the limits on what the government was willing to do in contrast to the interest shown by a very eager public. The ISS wanted to discourage adoption offers, given that adoption from China was not within the parameters of acceptable policy and hopeful parents were devastated when their offers were refused. In Canada, there was a similar contest over the merits and appeal of encouraging international adoptions, many of which were inspired by the rhetoric and visuals that circulated in support of World Refugee Year. The Canadian Welfare Council, a member of the Canadian Committee for World Refugee Year, channeled public interest and urged the federal government to facilitate the adoption of orphan refugee children. The federal government rejected the proposal to allow for the adoption of “oriental” children but the Minister for Citizenship and Immigration, Ellen Fairclough, left members of the Canadian Welfare Council with the impression that individual applications “might receive favourable consideration.” As a result, the Council encouraged interested Canadians to proceed and advised individuals and groups who supported the idea of an adoption program “whether under public or private auspices” to make their views known to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues. Public interest followed and by 1965 the Canadian Welfare Council was organizing the first series of overseas adoptions from Hong Kong and Korea.

In assessing the impact of World Refugee Year, it is clear that the publicity and fundraising campaigns undertaken by voluntary organizations around the world were very successful financially. However, other than the incremental progress towards obtaining approval for adoptions and sponsorships, very little changed structurally in terms of admission criteria and the overall philosophy amongst settler societies about the desirability of opening up migration streams to greater numbers of Chinese migrants. By contrast, non-governmental and charitable

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108 Report of the Australian National Committee for World Refuge Year for the period 1 July 1961 to 30 June 1962, Folder 5, Box 2825, Richard Donald Malcomson Fonds, Victoria State Library.
109 Canadian Welfare Council Publications, 30 March 1960, Box 9, File 6, Canadian Committee for World Refugee Year, MUA.
110 Ibid.
organizations working on the ground in Hong Kong believed that states should be resettling
refugees rather than simply directing funds towards their continued in situ conditions. In part,
this position was inspired by statements out of Taiwan to the effect that more could be done with
regard to the resettlement of Chinese refugees.\textsuperscript{111} Taiwanese officials urged “immigration
countries with virgin areas still available to make room for Chinese refugees who may desire to
settle in those areas.”\textsuperscript{112} More critically, however, the humanity of the population in question was
conspicuously evident to those who worked amongst the needy in Hong Kong. As a result, the
perceptions of unbridgeable otherness that inhibited reform in settler societies did not exist
amongst humanitarian workers in Hong Kong. The President of the Standing Conference of
Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees, Jean J. Chenard, proposed that resettlement was the
only real solution for the situation in Hong Kong. He stated, “Everyone knows that Hong Kong
is crowded up to and beyond saturation point. Everyone knows that the only real solution would
be to resettle the Chinese refugees elsewhere.” Chenard admonished the international community
for not providing more in the way of resettlement opportunities, saying his organization “had
hoped for better things from the Governments of the free world.”\textsuperscript{113} The World Council of
Churches also pushed emigration as the ultimate solution to the problem of people in Hong
Kong. In a document titled \textit{Observations on Emigration as a Solution to the Chinese Problem in
Hong Kong}, the WCC declared:

\begin{quote}
Even though the majority of Hong Kong refugees may never get to some other place, it is
psychologically very important that a few are able to emigrate. The hope of resettlement
abroad helps to reduce the despair and unrest at being hopelessly blocked in Hong Kong.
While we stress that emigration cannot be the solution for the hundreds of thousands, we
would like to press for a more generous attitude on the part of all countries so that the
openings which exist can be made wider to admit, not a trickle, but a stream of refugees
from this very-crowded city.\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{111} Press Release, REF / 613 8.10.600 “Executive Committee Concludes World Refugee Year Discussion, Hears
Appeal from Chinese Delegate and Takes Note of Progress Report on Hungarian Refugees and Report of UNHCR
Mental Health Adviser,” Press Releases, UNHCR Archives.
\textsuperscript{112} Problem of Chinese Refugees – Item 8, Working Party Agenda, UNHCR Executive Committee - Third session -
April 1960, A446, 1959/67087, 1957341, NAA (Canberra).
\textsuperscript{113} Statement by Mr. Jean J. Chenard, President of the Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies Working for
Refugees, at the Conference for World Refugee Year National Committees Convened by the ICWRY, Geneva,
\textsuperscript{114} Observations on Emigration as a Solution to the Chinese Problem in Hong Kong, World Council of Churches.
CO 1030/1683, NAUK.
For its part, the ICRC believed that governments should use the momentum created by World Refugee Year to liberalize their immigration restrictions, both in terms of eligible categories of migrants and in the application of “artificial” age barriers that restricted mobility. States rebuffed such suggestions. The British government maintained that there was “very little indication” that Chinese refugees wished to leave Hong Kong. Instead, it emphasized the importance of contributing monetarily to projects in the colony. In this way, the British government revealed its disinterest in modifying its immigration program to address the refugee issue in Hong Kong. Settler societies shared this sentiment.

Governments had committed to supporting World Refugee Year on the grounds that they would not be required to reform their respective immigration policies. The massive information and fund-raising campaigns for World Refugee Year affected the public perception of refugees but the international campaign failed to convince governments or the broad public of the merits of large-scale refugee resettlement to their shores. The images of refugees used to raise money for World Refugee Year therefore reinforced a sense of distance between citizens and refugees and perpetuated the impression of refugees as others. The notion of over a million Chinese refugees desperately trying to eek out an existence in Hong Kong was a scary one for immigration officials in settler societies concerned about managing population flows. It was similarly menacing for publics vulnerable to the idea that refugees embodied threats to their health and welfare. There was therefore a disconnect between the ambitious objectives set out for World Refugee Year by the United Nations and what the intense fundraising and promotional campaigns actually accomplished for people in Hong Kong. The refugee situation was brought to international attention in an unprecedented manner and there were tremendous fundraising efforts (totaling five million $US) on behalf of people in the colony. However, the mobility potential for migrants in Hong Kong did not increase concurrent to the public profile of the Chinese refugee subject.

When it came time to prepare for the ICEM Conference that followed on World Refugee Year, UNLG.

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the question of whether to use the leftover funds from the year’s fundraising activities to resettle Chinese refugees arose. Australian officials indicated that they would only participate in discussions if they were not pressured to modify their immigration policies to accept Chinese refugees.\textsuperscript{117} Similarly, Canadian officials informed the UNHCR that they “would not want to accept a quota of Chinese immigrants” though “naturally they would not want to admit this publicly.”\textsuperscript{118} For their part, staff in New Zealand’s Department of External Affairs stated frankly, “any proposals for bringing Chinese to New Zealand would of course be out of the question.”\textsuperscript{119} Governor Trench, for his part, returned to the earlier British position insisting that there was no room for an expanded UNHCR mandate in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{120} Having secured substantial funds for many development projects, the government of Hong Kong desired to reassert its authority over the management of people in the colony. “Refugees” had once again served their instrumental purpose in Hong Kong.

Despite the colonial government’s quick retrenchment, the impact of World Refugee Year on the manner in which the international community viewed the refugee situation in Hong Kong cannot be underestimated. In assessing the impact of World Refugee Year, Reverend Stumpf (Director of the Lutheran World Service) called it a “real source of improvement,” particularly because it focused the interest of many countries that had been “unaware” of the refugee situation in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{121} Auguste Lindt, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, suggested World Refugee Year built upon a trend of thinking about refugees beyond purely legalistic terms, which not only strengthened the role of his office but also recognized the “refugee question as a whole as a social and economic problem which is, on a purely non-political basis, of international concern.”\textsuperscript{122} In awarding the Nansen Medal (given annually since 1954 for outstanding service in the cause of refugees) to the four Englishmen who first proposed the concept, Lindt opined, “the real merit of World Refugee Year may prove in the long run to be that in an entirely non-

\textsuperscript{117} Extract from a letter to H.R.E. Browne from J.M. Dutton, 27 January 1960, CO 1030 / 1309, NAUK.
\textsuperscript{118} Extract from a letter to H.R.E. Browne from R.H. Davies, 25 February 1960, CO 1030 / 1309, NAUK.
\textsuperscript{119} Extract from a letter to H.R.E. Browne from J.K Hickman, 2 January 1960, CO 1030 / 1309, NAUK.
\textsuperscript{120} Burgh (Colonial Office) to Governor Trench (Hong Kong), 29 September 1960, CO 1030 / 1310, NAUK.
political, in a social and humanitarian spirit, it awakened the conscience of the world to this great problem of modern times.”

**Conclusions**

Awareness about the refugee issue in Hong Kong grew at varying intensities over the better part of a decade. While charitable and religious organizations were invested in the issue of refugees leaving the Chinese mainland as early as 1949, states were slower to act, inhibited in part by the dynamics of the Cold War as they played out at the United Nations. The government of Taiwan and its work through the Free China Relief Association introduced, and kept, the situation in Hong Kong on the agenda of UNREF meetings. The UNHCR welcomed this attention as it sought to expand its mandate in the postwar period. As a result of the government of Taiwan’s (and the FCRA’s) continuous interventions as well as the promotional efforts of humanitarian actors in Hong Kong, the United Nations established a survey to assess the refugee situation in the colony and the General Assembly later passed a resolution mandating the High Commissioner to use his “good offices” to appeal for funds on behalf of refugees in Hong Kong. In turn, this important resolution laid the groundwork for the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong to be recognized as a key priority during the United Nations’ World Refugee Year.

With World Refugee Year, the situation in Hong Kong came to the world’s attention in an unparalleled manner. School groups, community organizations and church congregations raised funds on behalf of the refugees and cultural and political elites did the same. But the outpouring of support came at the expense of potential mobility. Refugees in Hong Kong were to be helped in Hong Kong and no country, other than Taiwan and two countries in Latin America, offered to resettle Chinese refugees during World Refugee Year. Ironically, the publicity surrounding the situation in Hong Kong cemented the international public’s perception of refugees generally, and Chinese refugees in particular, as a problem best addressed from afar. Existing narratives in settler societies about the impossibility of integrating or assimilating Chinese migrants,

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compounded by images of total destitution, meant that resettlement was never a viable option for those in Hong Kong. Still, when a population influx threatened to destabilize the colony two years later, the legacy of World Refugee Year affected the manner in which governments responded to the arrival of thousands of people from the mainland. By 1962, the global agenda around refugees, which was cemented during World Refugee Year, meant it was impossible for states such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand to ignore the crisis in Hong Kong. South Africa would once again prove the exception to the growing engagement with refugee issues in Asia.
CHAPTER FOUR

REFUGEE FAMILIES, ORPHAN ADOPTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION AND RESETTLEMENT, HONG KONG (1962)

Introduction

If World Refugee Year involved the carefully managed visual representation of refugee situations across the globe, the events in Hong Kong in the spring of 1962 represented a less successful attempt to do the same. At the beginning of April, reports began to circulate indicating that large numbers of people were making their way across the frontier, seemingly without detection or impediments by Chinese officials. Then, for a solid six weeks, the border area teemed with migrants. Streams of people tried to make their way into Hong Kong. Confusion abounded about who the migrants were and why they were leaving the mainland. At first the majority of the migrants seemed to be farmers and peasants. Then, as the weeks passed, the composition of the group appeared to change, consisting more of students and urban workers. While there were reports of Chinese soldiers and police officers among the escapees, these were never confirmed. ¹ Rumours of food shortages abounded but the constraints on Western travelers in the People’s Republic of China made it difficult to verify with any accuracy what was causing the movement. After some initial hesitation about how to respond, the government of Hong Kong’s approach became blunt and uniform. All arrivals detected at the border were expelled indiscriminately. The wire fence that had demarcated the border since 1950 was reinforced and the Hong Kong police as well as the British army were dispatched to patrol the border and prevent incursions. When migrants tried to enter, they were physically pushed back through the fence. Those that made it further into the colony were captured, detained and later shipped back by the truckload to what some observers considered “certain death.”² Although the government banned journalists from the frontier and imposed a publication ban, images of the situation circulated regardless. Photography would prove to be a powerful medium in creating a “visual encounter” with refugee suffering.³ By mid-May, the world was aware of the large population

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¹ Harry Redl, Exodus from China (Hong Kong: Dragonfly Books, 1962), 3.
² Diary Entry, 19 April 1962, Diary of Captain James B. Atkinson, MSS. Eng. misc. c. 510/3, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. By May 15th, of the 17,656 Chinese migrants arrested on the land frontier, 75% (13,411) had been returned to the mainland. 93% of those intercepted at sea were returned. Telegram from Foreign Office to UK Delegation in Geneva, 15 May 1962, CO 1030/1312, NAUK.
flow as well as the government of Hong Kong’s forceful, and in the views of many critics, unjustifiable response.

Reaction to both of these developments was quite varied. Humanitarian actors in Hong Kong feared for the health and welfare of the migrants. Missionaries and NGO leaders pressed authorities abroad to lend assistance or provide resettlement opportunities. The suggestion to resettle refugees marked a progressive moment in the humanitarian agenda of the postwar period; heralding a new phase of activity that bridged sites of humanitarian need with countries of potential assistance. At the same time, the humanitarian discourse proved incapable of penetrating certain enduring social structures. South African authorities ignored the crisis. The only Chinese migrants they contemplated during the spring of 1962 were the illegal migrants found on Union soil. Australian authorities, dealing with their own controversies around deportations to the People’s Republic of China (discussed in Chapter Five), downplayed the significance of the movement and the government of Hong Kong’s reaction. By contrast, the Canadian government made the unprecedented offer to formally resettle one hundred Chinese refugee families, puncturing a history of discrimination with a proactive effort to welcome Chinese migrants. The government of New Zealand also made a novel commitment, enabling the adoption of fifty Chinese orphans from Hong Kong. The careful containment of the refugee situation that authorities in Hong Kong and London attempted to restore subsequent to World Refugee Year was therefore breached. In response, they chose to portray unauthorized migrants as illegal in order to buttress the authority of their response.

As governments in Canada and New Zealand identified the instrumental value of the refugees and developed solutions that suited larger domestic political agendas, accompanying narratives about their respective resettlement programs took on a life of their own. Migrants became caught up in state efforts that focused more on being good humanitarians in responding to the growing global humanitarian agenda rather than the actual refugee crisis in Hong Kong. The impetus for this approach lay with the visual spectacle surrounding the events in Hong Kong. Daily news

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reports conditioned Western publics to think of the 1962 population flow as a refugee situation. In a precursor to the intense media coverage of the Vietnam War, photojournalists defied the government of Hong Kong government’s ban on approaching the frontier. The images they subsequently captured and disseminated created a swell of public empathy and advocacy. These images enabled advocates in Hong Kong, along with their supporters in local churches and national church organizations in Canada and New Zealand, to push for programs such as refugee resettlement and orphan adoption as the optimal solutions to the crisis despite the discourse of illegality produced by the government of Hong Kong in response to the springtime influx.

Scholars Prem Kumar Rajaram and Lisa Malkki offer pointed critiques of representations that objectify refugees and reduce them to symbols of victimization or persecution. Rajaram believes that humanitarian representations of the refugee “amount to a blanketing and generalizing depoliticized depiction of refugees as helpless victims, thereby obscuring the particularity of different sorts of refuge experienced.” The resulting “consignment to visuality” means that refugees and their experience become a site where Western ways of knowing may be reproduced and recycled.” Similarly, Malkki argues that the “dehistoricizing universalism” to which refugees are subjected “creates a context in which it is difficult for people in the refugee category to be approached as historical actors rather than simply as mute victims.” As “speechless emissaries” refugees are vulnerable to manipulation and distortion by those who attend to their situations. While these interventions are helpful, the analyses put forward by Malkki and Rajaram minimize the complex environment in which refugee representations are produced and disseminated and the manner in which competing discourses intersect to produce highly contingent refugee images. Critiques of refugee representations may be too quick to consign the refugee subject to passive isolation, forgetting that the views of readers and viewers are informed by a multitude of images, contexts and genealogies and that migrants themselves may be playing to imagined audiences and performing expected roles.

Visual representations of refugees in Hong Kong invited plural readings and exposed their

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7 Ibid.
subjects to multiple layers of scrutiny, analysis, and rendering. Representations of refugees must therefore be considered in the context of a wide range of simultaneously circulating discourses. Scholars of visual culture emphasize the dialogical relationship between viewer and subject. Their analyses emphasize how the encounter between the two is mutually transformative where “the seeing and the seen are merged” and “mutually implicate each other.”\(^9\) The visual encounter, or what Nicholas Mirzoeff calls a “visual event” that results from the interaction between the viewer and viewed helps explain the wide variations in the international response to the perceived refugee crisis in Hong Kong.\(^10\) The images triggered uneven and fractured sensibilities around rights, justice and responsibilities amongst observers whose fields of perception were structured by pervasive concerns about the spiraling effect of admitting Chinese migrants.

The people who moved into Hong Kong in 1962 came to be considered as refugees in part due to “the intersection between the agent of sight and discourses of visuality.”\(^11\) While scholars have extensively documented the “othering” effect that such an interaction creates, the manner in which seeing an “other” in an impoverished or destitute position creates or triggers the impetus to want to assist or aid in some way that has yet to be fully theorized.\(^12\) In her analysis of photography as an interpretive medium, Abigail Solomon-Godeau suggests, “dominant social relations are inevitably both reproduced and reinforced in the act of imaging those who do not have access to the means of representation themselves.”\(^13\) Anna Szorenyi, writing on the subject of border controls, echoes this approach and maintains, “access to the position of recognizable subject worthy of compassion can apparently only be achieved through an intrusive and objectifying process of verification and authentication,” a process that Szorenyi claims is


\(^10\) Pang, 4.


intimately tied to the historic projects of colonisation and deterritorialization.\textsuperscript{15} Observers in settler societies assessed the refugee crisis in Hong Kong at a distance (and largely from a perspective that measured the migrants’ desirability) rather than in the intimate border control zones that Szorenyi explores. Sharon Sliwinski meanwhile, points to how the observation of an absence (of rights, protection or justice) in a photographic image leads to “a discourse of rights to mitigate the traumatic timing of this perception.”\textsuperscript{16} Sliwinski’s approach comes closest to explaining how encounters with visual representations of refugees might engender humanitarian actions.

Photographs of the refugees leaving China in 1962 convinced some people that action was required but the nature of this action was unformed and when it took shape, it was fragmented and largely disconnected from the reality of the people in motion. Impressions were interwoven with local histories and local presents. There was no opportunity to verify and authenticate information first hand. This responsibility fell to the journalists and missionaries who, acting as mediators, communicated a symbolic refugeehood using images and narratives about the migrants leaving China. The images of population flows into Hong Kong in daily newspapers and glossy newsmagazines such as \textit{Life} were critical in creating a desire amongst certain publics, such as church congregations in New Zealand and politicians in Canada, to assist the perceived refugees.\textsuperscript{17}

While documentary photography played a critical role in constructing the migrants into Hong Kong in 1962 as refugees, its contribution was largely in the form of a “veiled visuality,” where the subject was both visible and invisible, present and silenced.\textsuperscript{18} The refugee subject was visible but the historical contingencies and the personal life stories that led to the subject’s encounter with a Western photographer were not. In emphasizing the silence that surrounds refugees, Rajaram and Malkki point to two dominant facets of refugee representation. The first is the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Sliwinski, 356.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright, eds. \textit{Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50.
\end{itemize}
“groupness” of refugees. Refugees are consistently depicted as components of a mass of people in flight. Even images of refugees in isolation are usually juxtaposed against larger group photos. Numbers are meant to testify to need and the scale of the problem. The second element is the anonymity of the refugee. Images erase life histories and become shorthand for the presumably desperate circumstances that lead to an individual’s flight.¹⁹ Both of these elements were central to the manner in which multiple audiences, through various gazes and vantage points, viewed the situation in Hong Kong in the spring of 1962. Photographs of anonymous groups of refugees dominated the newswires but photographers also captured several images of lone individuals, often children, with looks of abject despair on their faces. Their feelings were presumably meant to signify the emotions of the larger group. The names of individuals rarely accompanied the photographic images. Only when a refugee had been safely received in a country of resettlement was their name provided to the press.²⁰

News of the movement of large numbers of people from communist China into Hong Kong first reached Western audiences in the form of newspaper accounts that described a “flood of illegal migrants”²¹, a “lemming-like invasion of people”²² or as the Cape Argus in South Africa announced, a “Red Refugee Flow.”²³ Much of the coverage consisted of speculation about what had caused the influx, pointing to the many unknowns surrounding life in China during the inward-looking years of the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath. Many journalists, such as Canadian Frederick Nossal, speculated that authorities in Beijing were deliberately trying to embarrass the West, which did not want to return the migrants to a communist regime but did not know what to do with them given the overcrowded situation in Hong Kong.²⁴ Authorities in London and Hong Kong tended to think that the loosened border controls were the result of “connivance of local officials in anticipation of serious famine conditions.”²⁵ Newspaper accounts preferred the narrative of escape. The Globe and Mail’s first headline about the events read,

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²⁵ Telegram from Beijing to Foreign Office, re-transmitted from Colonial Office to Hong Kong, 20 May 1962, CO 1030/1114, NAUK.
“Troops Said Fleeing China Food Storage.”26 In New Zealand, The Dominion framed its initial coverage of the story under the heading “Getting Out of China.”27 As the situation intensified, textual accounts were replaced with visual images of the migrants. Invariably, there was a mix of dramatic group shots and stark individual portraits. Group images were consistently framed at a distance, often showing large numbers of people at the border, either attempting to cross into Hong Kong or preparing to be sent back. Individual faces could not be discerned. This was of no concern. The photographs were meant to testify to the size of the flight and the scope of the problem. It mattered little who the people were.

For me, the most dramatic representations were the series of photo essays Life magazine ran during the six-week crisis. Co-founded by Henry Luce, a child of Protestant missionaries in China Life, “America’s weekly picture book,” featured harsh images of the people at the heart of the six-week crisis.28 On 8 June 1962, Life ran a three-page spread using images captured by photographer Larry Burrows (who later achieved fame for his coverage of the Vietnam War) under the heading “Hong Kong: Refugees Rejected.” As with all of the magazine’s photographic spreads, the short narrative was secondary to the dramatic photographs. Along with group shots depicting the mass of refugees, there were close-up images of people whose faces and bodies were covered by a landscape of human emotion: fear, anxiety, hope.

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27 “Getting out of China,” The Dominion, 5 May 1962, 15.
28 Robert Edwin Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, Time and The American Crusade In Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9. I consulted a copy of the magazine while seated in a reading room at the National Gallery of Canada, overlooking a 30.5 metre tall sculpture of a tree trunk by American artist Roxy Paine. The blue sky in the distance, dotted with white fluffy clouds, reinforced the sense of disconnect between my viewing space and the images in the magazine.
Captions accompanying group images (Figure 1) narrated the drama:

Bedraggled retreat: Hedged in by barbed-wire coils, refugees are escorted to train which will take them deep into Red China, discouraging them from other attempts. Some had tried two, three, four times.

Figure 1 (Photograph by Larry Burrows, Life 8 June 1962, by permission)

The essay included a full-page image of a small boy (Figure 2) with the caption:

Alone and Scared: A little boy weeks after getting separated from his father the night before while crossing the Hong Kong border. Now, trying to hide with a group of strangers in some bushes, he refuses to eat, drink or speak to anybody, believing that if he does he will never see his family again.
The hand and lower leg of an anonymous individual are discernable in the upper left portion of the image. This disembodied presence seems to confirm the caption’s claim that the boy is with strangers though there the visual encounter here is particularly open to multiple readings given the only partially revealed nature of the juxtaposition.

Another image showed only the face and torso of a man, hidden by dense foliage (Figure 3). The accompanying text read:

Animal Fear: Tensed to run, a refugee hides inside the British border, not knowing what to do next. Some luckier refugees made contact with relatives who provided clothes and money to help them to safety.
The images and the accompanying narratives were intended to present the migrants as victims of the communist regime in Beijing, made “animal-like” by their fear of returning to the mainland.29 In highlighting flight, desperation and human suffering, the images implicitly condemned life under the Chinese Communist Party. A week after running the photographic essay about the desperate conditions in Hong Kong, Life concluded its series on the refugees with an image of a happy family, reunited in the United States after young Deanna Chu was admitted as part of the government’s special quota. Deanna’s father is seated in the middle of the couch. Deanna and one of her sisters sit on either side of him. Mrs. Chu is posed behind the

couch along with another one of her daughters. All the women are wearing simple cheongsams. What appear to be the stars and stripes of a large American flag are visible in the uppermost corner of the image. Everyone appears to be bursting with joy. None are looking directly at the camera.

On this occasion, the caption read: “Refuge for a lucky few from Hong Kong.” The text related the story of how Deanna was able to join her family in America after President Kennedy introduced a quota for 5,000 refugees from Hong Kong. Deanna’s success story embodied the conventional tropes about fortune and gratitude, which audiences expected to hear from newly arriving refugees. Deanna told Life readers, “I cannot…express my feelings at being here.” The contrast between the narratives, from the despair and hopelessness of the initial essay about the 1962 crisis to the joy and euphoria of the second one, speaks to the manner in which the media’s visual representations of refugees pre- and post-resettlement sustained international attention and shaped how the crisis in Hong Kong was perceived by state authorities and publics around the world. It also points to the kinds of falsehoods that could be propagated in visual accounts of the spring influx. Deanna Chu’s was one of the many applications approved as a result of the influx in the spring of 1962 but she had been waiting for years to gain entry into the United States. The quota of 5,000 refugees introduced by the American administration in the spring of 1962 did nothing for the new arrivals to Hong Kong other than free up space in the processing backlog. The refugees who left Hong Kong had been there for months and sometimes years. Unsolicited media attention was a novel element that the government of Hong Kong had to manage during the crisis. It was one that radically shaped the government’s discourse on who the migrants were and how they should be treated.

Preoccupied by concerns about the possible social and physical impact that large numbers of migrants might have on the health and welfare of the colony, British officials perceived only trouble in the movement of thousands of people to the border. The migrants themselves barely registered. Instead, in determining how to respond to the influx, decision-makers in Hong Kong

30 Life Magazine, 15 June 1962, 44C.
32 Life Magazine, 15 June 1962, 44C.
focused on the range of problems that a major influx would create for the colony and in particular, for its relations with the Communist regime in Beijing. This diplomatic concern, as well as officials’ desire to safeguard the physical and social stability of the colony, merged with the belief that Great Britain was not for “coloured” subjects and that resettlement anywhere was therefore not a viable solution to the crisis.\(^{33}\) It would have been hypocritical for the British government to call on other countries to assist the refugees when they themselves were unwilling to do so. The government of Hong Kong, supported by authorities in London, therefore determined to handle the situation unilaterally and keep international interest at a distance.\(^{34}\) This decision, more than any contemplation of the migrants themselves, dictated the manner in which officials in Hong Kong and London decided to respond to the situation on the border.

The aftermath of the 1956 Kowloon riots (discussed in Chapter Two) marked some of the most difficult years in Sino-Hong Kong relations. China’s truculence and threatened aggression undermined the stability of the colony. In response, the government of Hong Kong became more aggressive in removing people under the guise of ensuring the colony’s internal security. Deportation orders were executed rapidly and the practice of “informally expelling” people from the border area became widespread. In such instances, people caught just inside of the frontier area were immediately returned to the mainland without any formalities or paperwork. Departures from the colony were often secret, taking place at night by land or sea. From the early 1950s, thousands of people were returned to China using this illicit method, one that ran counter to the spirit of non-refoulement enshrined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The genius of this system, according to Claude Burgess, Principal Assistant to the Colonial Secretary, was that there was no possibility of publicity as people were “returned so quickly after their illegal entry” they didn’t have time “to find their feet and start protesting.”\(^{35}\) Officials in London disapproved of this practice. Although the British government had ratified the 1951 Convention with the caveat that Hong Kong was to be exempt from its scope, officials in the Foreign Office nevertheless found the expulsion strategy “questionable” in terms of

\(^{33}\) The 1962 *Commonwealth Immigrants Act* severely restricted entry to Britain from non-white sections of the Commonwealth including the Caribbean, Asia, South Asia and Africa.


\(^{35}\) Memo from Burgess to Wallace, 21 May 1960, FO 371/150430, NAUK.
international law. The moral weight of the Convention caused officials in London to further question the appropriateness of the colonial government’s actions. Still, under sustained criticism from the international community, the interests of authorities in Hong Kong and London tended to converge. This is exactly what happened in the spring of 1962. Both governments committed to expulsing new arrivals and used a discourse of illegality to defend their actions in the face of unprecedented international and domestic attention and condemnation.

Confronted with a large population movement, the government of Hong Kong, with approval from London, dispatched army officers and policemen to the border to return migrants to the mainland. The expulsions alarmed the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Félix Schnyder, and his staff who feared “bona fide” refugees were being expelled. The UNHCR’s attention was unwelcome as was that of foreign governments such as those of the United States and Taiwan (the latter offered food and monetary assistance). The Taiwanese government understood immediately the political significance of what was happening on the frontier and repeatedly attempted to inject itself into possible solutions to the crisis, with a view to probable political gains. Colonial officials brusquely rebuffed offers of resettlement to Taiwan along with gifts of rice supplies. The government of Hong Kong’s overarching preference was to handle the issue unilaterally to minimize the political implications of the influx. Dissuading outside interest required the government to convince the international community that the migrants were not refugees. Without refugees, outside intervention from Taiwan, the United States and the UNHCR was unnecessary. Yet as the world absorbed images of people streaming across the border with gaunt faces and bony hands reaching out for food and medical aid, such a pretense was difficult to maintain. The most potent weapon in the government of Hong Kong’s arsenal therefore became the discourse of illegality, which erased the refugeehood of migrants and created the conditions in which authorities could justify the mass expulsion of migrants.

Soon after news of the influx began to spread, the government ceased referring to the migrants as refugees and referred instead to “escapees” or “illegals.” The government of Hong Kong pointed to the permit and quota systems in place to argue that not only were the migrants not

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36 Memo from Dalton to Wallace, 23 October 1959, CO 1030/723, NAUK.
37 Special Groups of Refugees – Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 15/HK/CHI, UNAG.
38 Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 May 1962, CO 1030/1312, NAUK.
refugees, they were “illegal” and had to be dealt with accordingly. At UNHCR meetings in Geneva, the British delegate argued that these “would-be immigrants are not all political refugees in the normal sense of the word” as they had a number of reasons, including the presence of close relatives in Hong Kong, for leaving the mainland. Root causes of refugeehood were dismissed and the issue was presented as a “population problem,” not a refugee problem.  

British officials in both Hong Kong and in London deliberately and strategically refused to see the migrants as refugees so as to shift their actions into a realm they hoped was beyond the reach of potential critics. In the Legislative Council in Hong Kong, Colonial Secretary Claude Burgess declared:

> When we decided some seven years ago…when we decided to integrate every immigrant into our community, we were in effect making a decision that put the word ‘refugee’ out of our dictionary. Refugees live in camps; they do not normally earn their keep; by definition they believe that ‘home’ is somewhere other than where they are now; their well-being depends on someone else’s charity; perhaps because they do not expect rice or bread on someone else’s charity to come to them from the conscience of humanity, but it comes nevertheless; and it brings with the humiliation of the zoo...This we would not have. The new people became our people…We have accepted our heavy burden to be intolerably increased, and we must be allowed to pursue our policy of containment in the immigration sphere.  

The new migrants were cast as illegals, which had the effect of undermining their claims to refugeehood. It also placed responsibility for the violation of Hong Kong’s territorial integrity on the migrants themselves, rather than the shifting practices that governed migration into the colony. It was a discourse that humanitarian actors and journalists in particular did not accept and their narratives, visual representations and communications had a pronounced impact on the manner in which governments and publics around the world perceived the crisis on the border.

Missionaries and journalists were a major source of information for Western publics about what was happening in Hong Kong in the postwar period and as such they played a critical role in disseminating information during the 1962 influx. Yet even they were confused about what was happening on the frontier since journalists and European civilians were banned from the area.  

As such, the narratives and images they conveyed were often as much a product of the events on

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39 Statement by Colonial Secretary, Claude Burgess, to Legislative Council, 13 June 1962, HKR5545-1-23-1, HKPRO.
40 Ibid.
41 “Hong Kong Tense as Chinese Refugees Pour in,” *Globe and Mail*, 18 May 1962, 3.
the border as their own perspectives on life in communist China. A member of the Order of Maryknoll Sisters recorded the following observations about the spring influx:

We still do not understand what happened, and we were here to watch it. One bright morning early in the month, there arrived at our border a vast number of refugees from China…Every night for about 15 nights thousands would sneak in, be rounded up by the Hong Kong Police, be given a hot meal and then sent back…The Prison Ward was filled with [people who] attempted suicides [and they were those] who had been caught by the Police at the border. One woman, who had cut her throat when she knew she could not cross over safely, cried when she saw Sister [Maria Crucis] and would not release Sister’s hand….

Missionaries sympathetic to the migrants’ plight disputed the government’s assessment of the situation. The missionary James Atkinson (who was a member of the World Council of Churches and the Hong Kong Christian Welfare and Relief Council) wrote:

A lot of rubbish is talked by the government, tardily realizing the shameful position it has got itself into but too stubborn to back down, about the refugees showing “no signs of malnutrition” but anyone at Sheung Shui now could see the truth for themselves…the hunger in Po On country that drove them to swarm over must be truly appalling…

Yet Atkinson’s own account was contradicted by assessments from representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross who observed “the relatively good physical condition of a large number of these refugees” and wondered “whether one should look for other motives behind this sudden displacement of the population.” By contrast, the Human Rights Council of Hong Kong expressed its concern “at the continuously large number of refugee-immigrants, men, women and children alike, seeking to enter …at great personal peril.” The Council recommended that those “countries with vast open spaces and unexploited resources, such as Canada and Australia, amend their immigration laws to absorb at least a few thousand refugee-immigrants from Hong Kong every year.” Discussions amongst humanitarian and charitable organizations about the nature of the influx paralleled the debate in official circles about the circumstances that caused the migrants to flee and relatedly, the degree to which they could

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43 Diary Entry, 20 May 1962, Diary of Captain James B. Atkinson, MSS. Eng. misc. c. 506-11, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.
44 J.P. Maunoir, Delegate of the ICRC to Paul Calderara, Delegate of the ICRC (Hong Kong), 25 May 1962, IB AG 234048-008.03 Réfugiés Chinois à Hong Kong, 15 May 1962 to 30 September 1963, International Committee of the Red Cross Archives, Geneva.
45 The Council was an affiliate of the International League for Human Rights, a United Nations Consultant Agency.
46 Human Rights Council of Hong Kong, 5 May 1962, HKR5545-1-23-1, HKPRO.
legitimately be considered refugees, confirming John Berger’s observation that the way we see things “is affected by what we know and what we believe.”\footnote{John Berger, \textit{Ways of Seeing} (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1972), 8.} The inclination to see the migrants as refugees was moderated by the vantage point assumed by particular individuals or organizations. Those who were especially interested in condemning the regime in Beijing were quickest to perceive the migrants as persecuted refugees.

In a volume published by Dragonfly Press in Hong Kong a few months after the crisis, entitled \textit{Exodus from China}, the Canadian journalist and rabid anti-communist Harry Redl sought to depict the migrants as desperate refugees:

> Those who entered Hong Kong brought with them an authentic and desolate picture of these conditions: a grey, barren landscape of hardship and scarcity, of failing food and dwindling hope, of hungry uprooted thousands, either conscripted to farm work or wandering in search of greener fields and happier lives.\footnote{Harry Redl, \textit{Exodus from China} (Hong Kong: Dragonfly Books, 1962), 2.}

American news outlets were especially determined to use the crisis to pursue campaigns against “Red China.” The editors at \textit{Life} magazine observed, “by the hundreds of thousands, Chinese refugees keep trying to get away from the unnatural calamity of Communism.”\footnote{\textit{Life} Magazine, 4 May 1962, 4.} In the narrative that accompanied its major pictorial spread on 8 June 1962, \textit{Life}’s editors insisted on the refugee-like qualities of the migrants:

> It was in their faces for all the world to read – the hunger for enough food and a little joy. Both were just out of reach. Over the border into British territory flooded thousands after thousands of refugees from Red China. They struggled in crowds by day down hot, bare mountainsides, and by night lost their families and friends in the confusion of the dark. They cowered bewildered in the underbrush, listening to Chinese from Hong Kong hopefully calling out the names of relatives who might be in hiding.\footnote{\textit{Life} Magazine, 8 June 1962, 40.}

Significantly, the voices of the 1962 migrants were barely heard in the English-language press until after they were resettled and could speak of their gratitude and good fortune at being selected.\footnote{\textit{Life} Magazine, 15 June 1962, 44C.} In the interim, the images of the migrants and refugees and the narratives produced by those documenting the crisis were meant to represent their situations. In South Africa’s major newspapers, the crisis appeared only as small wire stories. In Australia, news of the crisis was subsumed by the domestic controversy surrounding the deportation of illegal Chinese migrants.

49 \textit{Life} Magazine, 4 May 1962, 4.
50 \textit{Life} Magazine, 8 June 1962, 40.
51 \textit{Life} Magazine, 15 June 1962, 44C.
Only in Canada and New Zealand did the crisis in Hong Kong resonate domestically. The images of distress and displacement and the accompanying narratives captured the imagination of the Prime Minister of Canada and church organizations in New Zealand. Yet when the programs in Canada and New Zealand were subsequently established under the pretense of refugee relief, it was clear that the programs were intended to serve domestic political needs rather than substantially relieve the situation in Hong Kong or address the needs of migrants from the Chinese mainland.

On 12 May 1962, the *Globe and Mail* carried its first news story about the crisis. It was a rather lengthy report (inside the front section) that claimed that military troops were leaving China because of a food shortage.\(^{52}\) By the following week, events in Hong Kong were front-page news. On 22 May 1962, the *Globe and Mail*’s top headline read “Hong Kong Police Take Panic Steps.” Journalist Frederick Nossal reported that the colony’s morning papers showed “ugly pictures of a young British police detective-inspector in plainclothes drawing his pistol against a defenseless crowd at Shengshui Township.”\(^{53}\) Nossal reported, “during the weekend a Hong Kong resident found his impoverished and hungry wife who had escaped from China with their child, after searching for her for three days in the hills. Colonial authorities allowed the man to keep his son but sent the weeping, shouting wife back into China.”\(^{54}\) Discerning political opportunity, Prime Minister Diefenbaker, who was in the thick of a federal election campaign, announced (without any prior consultation with officials in Ottawa) that Canada would set an example to the world by resettling one hundred refugee families. A lawyer, born and raised in rural Saskatchewan, Diefenbaker had a strong sense of social justice and a fervent dislike of communism.\(^{55}\) The initiative that resulted from his campaign promise has since been commemorated as “the first time that Canada served as a haven for non-European refugees.”\(^{56}\)

While small in numbers, the 1962 resettlement was significant given that only fifteen years prior, \(^{52}\)“Troops Said Fleeing China Food Shortage,” *Globe and Mail*, 12 May 1962, 2.
\(^{53}\)“Hong Kong Police Take Panic Steps,” *Globe and Mail*, 22 May 1962, 1.
\(^{54}\)Ibid.
migration from China to Canada was still banned almost entirely. In 1947 the government repealed the *Chinese Immigration Act* (commonly referred to as the Chinese Exclusion Act) of 1923. The 1962 Chinese Refugee Program, as it was known, was therefore a significant marker in the history of Chinese migration to Canada for it marked the first time that the government proactively facilitated the entry of Chinese refugees. Yet it marked only modest progress. While church leaders in Canada applauded the prime minister’s announcement and subsequently lobbied for an even more expansive effort, public servants in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration disapproved of Diefenbaker’s political promise and administered the refugee program with reluctance. The parameters they developed were completely inappropriate for relieving the refugee crisis and the government ultimately had difficulty finding one hundred families to resettle as a result of the narrow selection criteria developed by officials in Ottawa. The workings of the Chinese Refugee Program characterized the gulf between intent and practice that consistently characterized state humanitarian efforts in the postwar period.

Immigration officials in Canada viewed Chinese refugees as a problem based on decades of efforts at limiting the overall size of Chinese migrant flows to Canada. When the Prime Minister announced the Chinese Refugee Program, officials immediately cast their thoughts to the potential for fraud and abuse (see Chapter Five for discussion of illegal migration to Canada and Status Adjustment Program). As a result of the concerns expressed by immigration officials about the desirability and viability of Diefenbaker’s initiative, the Chinese Refugee Program was strictly off limits to Chinese Canadians and their families in China. Officials wanted to prevent Chinese Canadians from using the refugee resettlement program to sponsor relatives who had previously been deemed inadmissible. This news was poorly received amongst the Chinese in Canada who had been campaigning for faster, more expedient and broader family sponsorship opportunities. Until 1967, Chinese Canadians were subject to limitations on family sponsorship rights when other Canadians were not. They worked hard in the decades following the end of exclusion to obtain equality on sponsorship and other issues.

Beginning in 1950, Foon Sien Wong, President of Vancouver’s Chinese Benevolent Association,

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57 Special Movement of Chinese Refugees from Hong Kong – Operational Control, RG 76, Volume 861, File 555-54-526-3, Part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).
58 Memorandum to the Minister, 10 January 1963, RG 76, Volume 861, 555-54-536, Volume 2, LAC.
made an annual pilgrimage to Ottawa to petition the government on immigration reform and family reunification issues in particular. In 1958, Foon Sien’s annual petition to Ottawa focused explicitly on the refugee question. Citing the American precedent (the 1953 Refugee Act), Foon Sien proposed that five hundred Chinese refugees in Hong Kong be admitted to Canada over the next five years and that they all be relatives of Chinese Canadians. He described the refugees as follows:

There are many outstanding professional men living under conditions which are most deplorable. These include doctors, dentists, engineers, technicians, artists, writers, newspapermen and men whose talents and genius would contribute in a large measure to the future progress of Canada. It would seem tragic that these minds should be condemned to a life of poverty and suffering when they could be used so extensively to enrich the new world. Some of these men are relatives of Chinese Canadians.59

Officials in Ottawa contemplated Foon Sien’s request at length, since the issue of refugees from China had come up intermittently in previous years. In 1949, the federal government confronted the possibility that members of the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) might seek asylum in Canada following their defeat at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party. Not wanting to encourage requests for asylum from China, the Cabinet approved temporary entry permits for former government officials while urging private citizens to return home.60 A year later, the immigration department received an application from twelve Trappist monks who had fled the Chinese Communists and wanted to settle in Canada temporarily. On this occasion, department officials were anxious about the kind of precedent that might be established if they permitted the monks to enter. As a result, their entry was initially refused. Petitions from Guomindang officials followed and the government eventually conceded, despite misgivings that accepting the monks would appear at best inconsistent and at worst hypocritical, given the government’s ongoing refusal to expand family sponsorship opportunities for Chinese Canadians.61

In thinking over Foon Sien’s requests to have refugees resettled from Hong Kong, some immigration officials thought Canada could derive great benefits from such an initiative,

59 1958 Brief by the Chinese Benevolent Association, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-33-7, Part 3, LAC.
60 Draft Memorandum to Cabinet Re. Immigration Policy regarding Chinese Political Refugees, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-33-7, Part 2, LAC.
61 Minister to Mr. Viau, 22 November 1949, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-337, Part 1, LAC.
particularly if a family member became responsible for the migrant’s care. However Deputy Minister Laval Fortier did not regard the proposal as “practical” under the Canadian system and objected in particular to blurring the distinctions between refugees and family class migrants. Other departmental officials concurred, suggesting that if a refugee movement “were authorized and based on [the] relationship to a Canadian sponsor, it would simply open up another area for misrepresentation.” They pointed to difficulties in identifying bona fide refugees and mused, “the most desirable refugees now in Hong Kong will not necessarily be relatives of Canadian residents.” Foon Sien charged that the government’s decision meant “families of Chinese Canadians who are refugees in Hong Kong may have to return to China where an alien political philosophy and possibly severe punishment or death awaits them.” Raising the possibility of persecution or danger at the hands of the People’s Republic of China appears to have had little effect on the Canadian state’s determination to tightly control migration from China. Not surprisingly, the 1962 resettlement efforts met with a mixed response amongst Chinese communities in Canada. Chinese Canadians resented the fact that people with no ties to Canada would gain entry before their own family members. According to Mrs. Jean Lum, President of the Chinese Women’s Association in Toronto, “There (were) hard feelings among Chinese about these refugees…It’s a crime refugees who have been waiting in Hong Kong so long are still there, while these recent refugees are admitted.” Yet they were also some of the first groups to receive the refugees upon their arrival in Canada.

To recruit applicants for the Chinese Refugee Program, the government advertised in local Hong Kong newspapers. Wui Shun Lau, who was eventually resettled to Canada, told journalist Val Werier, “At first we were scared,” says Lau. “We thought it was a trap. Then the word got around that it was legitimate and thousands applied.” He added, “We knew nothing of Canada…except that it was extremely cold. We also heard from people that if you were willing to work you would never starve.” The Canadian program was highly selective. It targeted family units that were altogether in Hong Kong, where the head of the family had skills that

62 Comments on Chinese Benevolent Association Brief, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-33-7, Part 2, LAC.
63 Memorandum from Laval Fortier to Minister, 27 July 1955, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-33-7, Part 2, LAC.
64 Comments on Chinese Benevolent Association Brief, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-33-7, Part 2, LAC.
65 1957 Brief by the Chinese Benevolent Association, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-337, Part 1, LAC.
would facilitate integration to Canada. Desired skills included experience as a market gardener, chef, tailor or restaurant worker. Individuals could not apply. It program was only open to people who moved to Hong Kong after 1 May 1962. Ultimately, 3,500 applications involving 8,000 people were received. However, few applicants met the stated selection criteria and officials feared a public relations fiasco. The problem was that the people the government wanted to resettle (specifically-skilled workers with families) were not the people who had fled China in the spring of 1962. As a result, the criterion for eligibility was amended to 1 January 1962.

Individuals also became eligible to apply. The government eventually resettled 109 individuals and families, totaling 259 people. It remains questionable how many of those selected conformed to Diefenbaker’s original conception of a refugee from the Chinese mainland. At no time during the selection process were applicants asked about their fear of persecution at the hands of Communist officials. Rather, all of the applicants were required to fill out an “Application for Admission to Canada” form. They had to provide details such as their name, birth, height, weight, ethnic origin, family and dependents, present address and address questions such as “Can you pay your own passage to Canada? Why do you wish to migrate? Why did you select Canada?” They were also required to list any languages they could speak as well as any training, practical experience or employment they had gained. There was no box to check about the kind of persecution they might have endured.

Given that the resettlement of refugees from Asia was unprecedented, the government relied heavily on local media to generate positive impressions of the refugee program and the affected migrants. Press conferences and interviews were organized immediately upon entry, often in the arrivals hall of the airport, and immigration officers reported with pleasure when local media gave prominence to the public receptions that greeted refugees upon arrival. Press clippings were carefully preserved at immigration headquarters in Ottawa. Often, images and stories featured smiling families and innocuous comments about young children trying spoons for the first time or exemplary behaviour on the part of the refugees. Images of children, nuclear family units and hopeful young couples were frequently produced. Invariably, all of the individuals were attired in Western dress and were shown smiling for the camera. Accompanying narratives further emphasized the “high-quality” of the refugees and the potential for their integration into Canadian life. One reporter recounted how on “the day they left the immigration hall, Moy Kam
Moy, Lau’s wife, asked for an interpreter. She wanted to know where she could wash the sheets and linens the family had used.\textsuperscript{68} News accounts were meant to leave readers with a feel-good feeling, both about the kinds of refugees who were being resettled to Canada and their own generosity. In the mid-1950s, journalists in western provinces had supported the Chinese community efforts to obtain parity on family reunification issues.\textsuperscript{69} In 1962, they once again played an advocacy role on progressive immigration issues, simply by depicting the arrival of Chinese refugees as a positive event. An \textit{Edmonton Journal} news piece recounted the following anecdote to its readers:

Five-year old Kuen Szeto, whose family arrived in Edmonton from Hong Kong Monday, is bewildered. Momentarily left alone during welcome ceremonies at the CPR station, a rag doll and a little bouquet failed to bring reassurance in her strange surroundings. Her tears soon were brushed away in the warmth of the welcome staged by Edmonton Chinese.\textsuperscript{70}

Most of the news reports made a point of referencing the extensive support provided by local churches and Chinese community organizations and provided readers with incredible details about the nature of the government’s assistance, including the $5 that all refugees from Hong Kong received upon arrival. Yet only a few refugee families were profiled in detail, making the select stories that were transmitted to the Canadian public symbolic of the whole. The scarcity of profile stories may have been due to the lack of interpreters but there was also a discernible tendency amongst the media to simply use certain, carefully selected narratives as representative of the entire group’s experience.\textsuperscript{71}

One of the few profile pieces was of Mr. Kam Hung Fung who arrived in Winnipeg in August 1962 with his wife and two children.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} For example, see “Editorial,” \textit{Regina Leader Post}, 26 May 1955; “Leave Him to the Communists,” \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 18 October 1954. The article in the \textit{Vancouver Sun} expressed outrage that the relative of a Chinese Canadian was not being permitted to leave Communist China.
\textsuperscript{70} “It’s a Big, Big World,” \textit{Edmonton Journal}, 23 October 1962.
The article featured a photograph of the family (Figure 4), with the mother foregrounded along with their two small children. The mother’s face exudes strength and determination and there is the sense that she is firmly focused on the future for her family. Her husband appears in the background and he too seems to be intent only on what lies ahead. The children gaze away from the camera and appear bewildered and overwhelmed by their experiences. The caption described them as “fugitives” from Red China. The *Winnipeg Free Press* ran a story that detailed their flight from China, explaining “the Fung family was brought to Canada by the Canadian immigration department in order to give them a new chance in life and the children a future…”

The news story continued:

Mr. Fung was separated from his wife for almost two years. “We managed to escape from interior China to the city of Canton in 1957,” his wife said. “We waited for the opportune time and then after paying border guards 1,000 HK dollars, myself and the children went to ‘visit’ in Hong Kong and did not bother to return. Last June my husband made his bid for freedom, walking over treacherous roads and mountains from Canton to Hong Kong past armed border guards, for four days without food.” The Fungs have to start building their home from the beginning. “The Communists took everything away,” Mr. Fung explained.
The article concluded by highlighting Mr. Fung’s qualifications. He “has five years of primary education and has been a qualified electrician for five years.” The reporter indicated that immigration officials would try and find him a job.\textsuperscript{72} Often community groups and religious organizations assisted in this endeavour.

The state’s initiative to resettle refugees excited church groups in Canada who believed in the humanitarian value of the government’s overture and hoped that the project would be the beginning of a much larger resettlement effort. During World Refugee Year (1959-1960), an assorted collection of church and social groups arranged for the private sponsorship of seventy refugees from Europe.\textsuperscript{73} On the same day that Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced the government’s program for the Chinese refugees, the Canadian Council of Churches issued a call for the government to take in 10,000 refugees, calling it Canada’s “fair share” of the refugee burden in Hong Kong. While the government rejected the Council’s demand, the church’s action and public lobbying inspired other groups that had maintained missions in China prior to the expulsion of Western missionaries from the mainland in 1951.

In October 1963, the Anglican Church of Canada asked the federal government for permission to sponsor fifty orphaned children from Hong Kong. Church leaders had in mind young, single men between the ages of 18-21 who had been deserted or were “foundlings in their earlier years” and who had no family in Hong Kong. They knew “British authorities in Hong Kong (did) not see in emigration schemes a means of solving their over-population problem” but church representatives said they were “seriously concerned over the welfare of Chinese in Hong Kong and would like to be of concrete help to even a number of youths.”\textsuperscript{74} The desire to produce tangible, concrete results was manifest in the engagement of all the Canadian churches moved by the situation in Hong Kong perhaps because it was difficult to ask for financial or moral support from Canadians without being able to show returns on investments. Almost inadvertently therefore, the churches contributed to a more progressive immigration landscape.

\textsuperscript{72} Winnipeg Free Press, 13 August 1962. Located in anonymized case files. RG 76, 1984-1985/041, Box 134, LAC.
\textsuperscript{73} Report on Private, Voluntary Action in Canada During World Refugee Year, Box 4, File 9, Canadian Committee for World Refugee Year Fonds, MUA.
\textsuperscript{74} Acting Director of Immigration to Acting Deputy Minister, 18 October 1963, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-33-7, Part 3, LAC.
The Anglican Church promised the government that congregations would provide each refugee “with complete care and maintenance, educate him and help him to become successfully established and integrated into the community.” The Acting Director of Immigration, Don Reid (a highly respected and influential civil servant), deemed the proposal worthy of support but he expressed reservations as he saw the situation in Hong Kong as more of a population problem than a refugee one. He argued, “Canada cannot hope to solve the over-population problems of the world by immigration.” Discussions about how to respond to the Anglican Church’s request for sponsorship dragged on for months. Immigration officials worried that if they rejected the church’s proposal the Minister for Citizenship and Immigration would be tarred as a racist whereas if they accepted it, they would be opening the door to even more petitions.

While officials stalled on responding to the Anglican Church’s resettlement proposal, the United Church officials approached the government with a private sponsorship proposal of their own. Characterized as “ultra-liberal” by historian Ruth Brouwer, the United Church’s leadership proposed a pilot project to sponsor one hundred families for a total of three to four hundred people. In contrast to the government’s 1962 program, which had expressly distinguished between Chinese family migration and Chinese refugees, the United Church intended its pilot project to be a family reunification one even though they had no information about whether the spring influx included any relatives of Chinese Canadians. Nevertheless, the movement of large numbers of people to Hong Kong in 1962 effectively created an opening for organizations to pursue larger program objectives. They did so with great enthusiasm. Eleven congregations across Canada expressed an interest in sponsoring the refugee relatives of members of their assemblies. Reverend Ernest E. Long (who later became a vocal advocate on behalf of American draft dodgers and their right to claim refuge in Canada) claimed that only by sponsoring family members could the congregations help so many refugees. He explained that as a matter of “face” the Chinese in Canada “could not ask non-relative refugees to accept crowded living

75 D.A. Reid to Acting Deputy Minister, 18 October 1963, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-33-7, Part 3, LAC.
76 Ibid.
conditions nor the ordinary family fare whereas they would not hesitate to explain the necessity for this treatment to relatives.” The Chief of the Policy & Liaison Division insisted the proposal “be viewed with extreme caution.” He believed that the families the United Church wanted to use in its pilot project were “relatives who have been found, or are, inadmissible under the Regulations.” The prospect of illegal migration, which persistently haunted so many of Ottawa’s policy decisions on Chinese migration, loomed large and the launch of the Status Adjustment Program in 1960 (discussed in detail in Chapter Five) to normalize the status of Chinese migrants who entered Canada illegally in the previous decades paradoxically confirmed doubts among many people about the integrity of migrants from China. The department ultimately refused the United Church’s request to resettle more refugees. Furthermore, when the first four individuals the Anglican Church proposed to sponsor turned out to have “fairly substantial families” in Hong Kong and China, formal support for that refugee resettlement program also evaporated. Officials assumed the refugees would want to sponsor their relatives to Canada if they were admitted and this would lead to more Chinese migrants than the government deemed desirable. Expanding refugee resettlement opportunities that would result in the sponsorship of more Chinese relatives was not an option the government wanted to endorse.

On the surface, Canada’s humanitarian efforts of 1962 seem deserving of celebration. The public was convinced that resettling Chinese refugees was a desirable activity given the perception of life in Communist China, the qualities of the individuals involved and the example that Canada was setting for other nations. But given the restrictive sentiment that governed the operation of the program, it is difficult to reconcile the state’s actions with the public discourse and the visual representations of refugees in particular. Interest in the humanitarian situation in Hong Kong dissipated quickly, especially after the government of Hong Kong reinforced border patrols and the visible movement of people ceased. Migrants would continue to move into the colony by land and sea but the cameras were no longer there to capture their movements. By the end of 1962, 13,529 water vessels had been searched and 2,841 illegal migrants arrested.

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79 Memorandum from General Executive Assistant to Director of Immigration, 12 June 1962, RG 26, Volume 125, File 3-33-7, Part 3, LAC.
80 Memo to File, 10 December 1963, RG 26, Volume 125, File 3-33-7, Part 3, LAC.
81 Memorandum to the Minister, 23 December 1968, RG 26, Volume 126, File 3-33-7, Part 4, LAC.
82 Acting Director of Immigration to Deputy Minister, 6 March 1964, RG 26, Volume 126, File 3-33-7, LAC.
83 Carol Jones and Jon Vagg, Criminal Justice in Hong Kong (New York: Routlege-Cavendish, 2007), 342.
Canadian government had no desire to pursue an ongoing resettlement program. Canadian officials told church groups they should focus on the adoption of orphans, rather than the sponsorship of refugees. The government preferred this option because orphans were by their very definition, alone, and their resettlement would not create any significant family reunification pressures.\(^8^4\) The government of New Zealand pursued this same strategy in the spring of 1962 as it too confronted pressure from church groups to address the refugee situation in Hong Kong. In the New Zealand case, the optics of orphan adoption schemes intersected with the visuality of migrants on the Hong Kong border to create the illusion of timely and important humanitarian assistance.

**Orphan “Refugees” in New Zealand**

Unlike in Canada, the first Chinese refugees officially admitted to New Zealand arrived decades before the 1962 situation in Hong Kong. In February 1939, the New Zealand government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Michael Savage, decided to allow the entry of Chinese wives and children affected by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the spreading conflict in China. Historian Robin Galienne describes this group as the first Chinese in New Zealand to “approximate refugee status.”\(^8^5\) However, because the government had no intention of encouraging substantial or permanent migration from Asia, the entry of the women and children was intended as “a special, one-off, temporary permit concession.”\(^8^6\) The refugees were granted entry for two years only, they were responsible for their own fares and the adult parties had to pay a £200 bond each, agreeing to return to China at the end of the conflict along with their children and any new children born to them in New Zealand during the period of refuge. The economic and social burden on the state was minimal but the offer of refuge still lasted only a few short months. The government stopped issuing entry permits in the beginning of 1940 after complaints that the women and children were working in shops while Chinese assistants started their own businesses, exploiting opportunities made available by the departure of white New

\(^{84}\) Memorandum to the Minister, 8 September 1964, RG 26, Volume 126, 3-33-7, Part 4, LAC. Tarah Brookfield, “Protection, Peace, Relief and Rescue: Canadian Women’s Cold War Activism at Home and Abroad, 1945-1975,” (PhD Diss., York University, 2008).


Zealanders who enlisted to fight. 249 wives and 244 children moved to New Zealand in the short period the program was in operation. After the war, they were scheduled to return to China but effective lobbying by churches and Chinese community organizations, which coincided with the establishment of a communist regime in China, led to a reprieve for the wartime refugees and to additional, if incremental, concessions on the categories of migrants who would be accepted from China.

Over the course of the postwar period, there was growing pressure on the New Zealand government to help relieve the postwar refugee situation in Hong Kong by opening up resettlement opportunities for people from China. The bulk of this pressure came from the National Council of Churches in New Zealand (NCC) and its leader, the Reverend Alan Brash (a leader of the worldwide Ecumenical movement and who embraced an activist, redistributive vision of social justice). Chinese community groups focused on family reunification issues while Brash advanced a refugee resettlement agenda. Brash was supported by Protestant and Catholic missionaries who had been active in China both before and after the Japanese invasion and who were equally passionate about their work in Hong Kong after their expulsion from the mainland. Reports about poverty and suffering in Hong Kong encouraged church congregations in New Zealand to think about the various ways in which they could assist the refugee population. By the late 1950s, church groups were actively promoting the idea of refugee resettlement to New Zealand with the idea that local congregations across the country could support refugee children and families and ensure their successful integration into New Zealand society.

In 1957, the NCC proposed the resettlement of Chinese refugee families from Hong Kong. Inspired by American initiatives such as those undertaken by Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals

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88 Manying Ip, “Redefining Chinese Female Migration,” 156.
89 R. Thurlow Thompson, New Zealand in Relief: The Story of CORSO’s Twenty-One Years of Relief Service Overseas (Wellington, N.Z.: N.Z. Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, [1965]), 59.
90 Resettlement of Chinese refugees from Hong Kong and Macao, Secretary of Labour to Minister of Immigration, 25 March 1957, Immigration - Policy and General - Chinese, 1946-1957, W5182, Box 93 File 22/1/115, Part 1, ANZ.
Inc. (ARCI).\textsuperscript{91} Reverend Brash argued that even a “token response” of two or three families would be important in alleviating the situation in Hong Kong. This was hardly the case. Nevertheless, Brash’s arguments were compelling to some and his proposal split government opinion. Authorities did not want to encourage the active resettlement of Chinese refugees but at the same time the NCC’s appeals based on notions of Christian charity and obligations were difficult to reject. Appeals to humanitarianism resonated with the government’s self-described postwar identity as a welcoming, progressive society (evidenced in particular by its resettlement of handicapped refugees during World Refugee Year).\textsuperscript{92} At the same time, the government of New Zealand remained committed to the general principle of a White New Zealand.\textsuperscript{93} Unlike Australia, where a series of laws ensured the exclusion of Asian migrants, discrimination in New Zealand was not as rooted legally but it persisted nevertheless, most obviously in the discretion enjoyed by the executive on refugee admissions. The perception of Chinese nationals as unassimilable aliens remained and official suspicions about the Chinese community were compounded by an awareness that the Communist regime in Beijing was seeking to foster better relations with Overseas Chinese communities. Amongst authorities, there was significant concern about the loyalty of the Chinese in New Zealand. As a result, Chinese workers and labourers were permitted entry on a temporary basis only and family sponsorship opportunities were limited.\textsuperscript{94} Refugee resettlement from China therefore was viewed with considerable suspicion in official circles.

The NCC nevertheless proved persuasive despite these structural and philosophical barriers. The government preferred to initiate a refugee movement under the auspices of the NCC rather than open the doors to family reunification, as requested by the Chinese New Zealand Association.\textsuperscript{95} Believing that the program could be better controlled and less open to abuse if administered by


\textsuperscript{92} Galienne, “The Whole Thing Was Orchestrated,” 4.


\textsuperscript{94} Shand to Mr. G.W. Lowes, 1 June 1961, Immigration - Policy and General - Chinese, 1960-1962, W5182, Box 94, File 22/1/115, Part 3, ANZ.

\textsuperscript{95} New Zealand Chinese Association to Prime Minister, 6 June 1962, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
the churches, the government eventually agreed to a trial sponsorship program for three families on the condition that the NCC find sponsors and employers for the group.96 There was no mass publicity for this initiative and information about the program was disseminated through local congregations. The NCC subsequently submitted for official consideration the dossiers of twelve families it had identified in Hong Kong all of whom had “valuable occupations” and a “good command” of the English language. Candidates deemed to have too many relatives or not enough English were rejected. Selection was difficult because few candidates met the language and employability criteria along with the expected levels of refugeehood. H.C.J. Thompson, Assistant to the Secretary of Labour, observed, “technically these people might be refugees because they are no longer on the main-land but their circumstances are much better than any of the European refugees we generally accept.”97 Next to the names of potential candidates, immigration officials scrawled notes such as “Not a pressing case but more needy than others” or “the only pressing case.”98 The government ultimately selected three professionally qualified individuals and their families. One of the chosen, Lai Kwong-Chun, 54, was not considered a pressing case at all but as he was a business manager and could speak and write English. He and his wife and three children were chosen for the program.99

It took four years to arrange for the three families to arrive in New Zealand.100 The NCC struggled to find appropriate employers and sponsors. Many people were reluctant to provide assistance without having met the individuals in person. The amount of work involved and the degree of trepidation with which the government of New Zealand approached questions of refugee resettlement initially discouraged everyone involved from expanding the program beyond the original three test cases. Moreover, the trial program coincided with the discovery of illegal immigration practices involving the sale of passports in Hong Kong for as much as £1,200. This made the government cautious about the people being resettled and the authenticity

96 Handwritten notes, 13 March 1957, Immigration - Policy and General - Chinese, 1946-1957, W5182, Box 93, File 22/1/115, Part 1, ANZ.
97 Mr. Thompson to Mr. Parsonage, 23 April 1957, Immigration - Policy and General - Chinese, 1946-1957, W5182, Box 93, File 22/1/115, Part 1, ANZ.
98 Immigration - Policy and General - Chinese, 1946-1957, W5182, Box 93, File 22/1/115, Part 1, ANZ.
99 Ibid.
100 Rev. Brash to Mr. Shand, 26 July 1963, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 2, ANZ.
of their qualifications. The government was disinclined to pursue further resettlement programs from Hong Kong. It was not a message that missionaries in Hong Kong or church congregations in New Zealand were prepared to receive. In Hong Kong, the Reverend Robert Sprackett (of the Presbyterian Case-Work Centre in Kowloon) carried the torch lit by Reverend Brash. After visiting a home with ninety abandoned children in August 1960, Sprackett wrote to Norman Kirk, the Member of Parliament for Lyttleton, to inquire whether the government would follow the lead of countries such as the United States and permit the entry of fifteen to twenty-five Chinese orphans for adoption. Sprackett described the children as “fine looking,” asserting that they could be “integrated into New Zealand family and social life” and “become useful New Zealanders.”

Officials in New Zealand were sympathetic to the growing inter-country adoption movement (having resettled European children during the Second World War as well as Anglo-Indian orphans from institutions in India). They perceived a convincing range of ancillary benefits to inter-country or transnational adoption, including receptive publics who welcomed the opportunity to be heroes to the rescued children (a phenomenon documented by scholars looking at adoptions in other Western countries in the postwar period). According to one church official, families were “motivated by a desire to give one of these unfortunate children the care and comforts which their own family enjoy.” The government believed in adoption as a way of satisfying public opinion while simultaneously ensuring the successful development of the nation (policymakers tended to regard children as more assimilable than other migrants). Still, the government remained uncomfortable with the idea of actively increasing the Chinese population in New Zealand. The government committed to giving the matter further consideration but from all evidence, officials simply let Reverend Sprackett’s initiative quietly

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102 Bob Sprackett, Presbyterian Case-Work Centre, Kowloon to Mr. N. E. Kirk, House of Representatives, New Zealand, 17 August 1960, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
whither. It appears that on the basis of reports from Hong Kong, officials in Wellington were fully confident of the colonial government’s ability to care for abandoned children. According to reports, “there were very active organizations attending to their welfare and the orphans were generally very well cared for.”

When the Reverend returned to Christchurch the following year, he renewed his appeal to the government, this time providing a detailed proposal outlining the rationale for an adoption program for twenty-five children from Hong Kong. He told officials that thirty babies a month were being abandoned in the colony and claimed that there were over two thousand Chinese babies and children in Hong Kong’s “baby homes” and orphanages. Reverend Sprackett argued:

> It would be a humanitarian act to meet the need of some of them. We are a Christian country with a growing Asian relationship…It would be a token of friendship and goodwill not only to Hong Kong, a member of our Commonwealth, but also to Asia. Such acts of goodwill are part of the answer to communism.

Again, immigration officials debated the merits of Reverend Sprackett’s proposal, eventually approving a plan for twenty orphans in late 1961. Up until then, the adoption of Chinese children from Hong Kong was entirely at the discretion of the Secretary of Immigration and few prospective parents were approved. The government of New Zealand preferred to give assistance *in situ* as evidenced by its efforts during World Refugee Year. This type of intervention was only moderately satisfactory to religious leaders and humanitarian actors in New Zealand who were interested in demonstrating concrete results to their congregations and donors. The events in the spring of 1962 encouraged the impulse amongst civil society actors in

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105 Letter to Mr. R. Downham, 1 December 1961, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
106 Letter from Rev. C.R. Sprackett, Minister of St. Martins Presbyterian Church, Christchurch, to Prime Minister, 9 February 1961, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
107 For instance, in August 1961, Minister T.S. Shand gave Mr. and Mrs. Norman Perry rare permission to adopt a child from China because of Mr. Perry’s “special interest” as a result of his active involvement in the Ecumenical movement and his wife’s earlier work as a missionary in China. Mr. Shand declared, “I consider that this case is quite outstanding and need not be regarded as a precedent. Mr. Perry has been an outstanding worker in the field of race relations; his work for the Maori people and for the integration of Maori and European in this country is well known….Mrs. Perry was for some years a missionary in China. When the Communist Government began imprisoning Europeans in the area where she was working, she was hidden by local Chinese friends at great risk to themselves and smuggled out of the country. It is the special position of Mrs. Perry which I feel distinguishes this case from all others which have come to my notice.” News of the Perry’s adoption initiative appeared in the newspapers and encouraged other applicants however most were ultimately dissuaded from their efforts. Mr. Shand, Memo for File, 29 August 1961, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
New Zealand to broaden the scope of the country’s asylum program. The Reverend Alan Brash declared, “New Zealand ought to make some practical effort to help. If we were to accept even 50 families it would be a token response at least and would be appreciated.”\(^{108}\) The pressure from the churches intensified to the point that the government felt compelled to act in some capacity, even though general public opinion seemed rather indifferent to the issue of resettlement. A letter in *The Dominion* on 10 May 1962 proposed that assistance be provided in Hong Kong through the Red Cross Society. The author (a “Thankful New Zealander”) stated, “I am willing to subscribe £5…I haven’t a lot but what I have is a fortune compared to what these unfortunate victims of Communist tyranny have.”\(^{109}\) The *New Zealand Herald* declared, “the United States, Canada and other countries have been moved to consider offering homes to refugees. This is a humanitarian gesture, but it is utterly impractical as a solution to a massive exodus from China.”\(^{110}\) It was therefore the work of churches in New Zealand and their missionary colleagues in Hong Kong that successfully advanced the resettlement agenda in New Zealand in 1962.

On 12 June 1962, Prime Minister Holyoake announced that the government of New Zealand would resettle twenty orphans, “most of whom would be of refugee origin.”\(^{111}\) The announcement implied that the orphan adoption program was a direct response to the 1962 spring influx. In fact, the government had been working on the program for months in response to Reverend Sprackett’s appeals.\(^{112}\) Officials in External Affairs explained to their Australian counterparts that the decision to admit the orphans was taken two months prior as a “gesture to the many church organizations and private individuals” who were pressing the government to resettle Chinese orphans. The decision to publicize the program in the spring of 1962 “was taken because of press interest in the plight of refugees in Hong Kong and numerous representations to the Prime Minister that Government should admit some Chinese refugees.”\(^{113}\) The government was fully aware that the orphan adoption scheme did nothing to address the fate of migrants who

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\(^{108}\) Immigration - General - Refugee - International Refugee Organisation - Policy, 1961-1962, W5182, Box 26, File 22/1/27, ANZ.


\(^{111}\) Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, RG 76, Volume 861, File 555-54-536, Volume 2, LAC.

\(^{112}\) Mr. Shand, Minister of Immigration, to Mr. Hallyburton Johnstone, 3 August 1962, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.

\(^{113}\) External Affairs to High Commissioner for New Zealand, Canberra, 12 June 1962, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
had moved into Hong Kong in the spring of 1962. The Minister himself acknowledged, “the attempted large scale immigration into Hong Kong from China has not led to any increase in the number of children abandoned or placed in the care of institutions there.” Privately, he affirmed, “the problem of resettlement of these orphan children is not of the magnitude or urgency generally believed.”\textsuperscript{114} The government pursued the public promotion of the adoption initiative regardless.

The optics of the adoption program enabled the government to deflect increased calls for humanitarian relief by taking an initiative already in place and using it for political advantage. In particular, the adoption program helped the government evade campaigns by Chinese New Zealanders to obtain permission for their relatives in Hong Kong to join them in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{115} When the government faced renewed calls to resettle refugees from Hong Kong, it responded by expanding the orphan adoption scheme from twenty to fifty children even though it knew that it was an inappropriate gesture.\textsuperscript{116} It had been difficult for the government to find the first twenty orphans and J.P. Costello, New Zealand’s Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, later confirmed to officials in Wellington that there were not enough orphans for the new program.\textsuperscript{117}

With the help of the International Social Service, the orphan adoption quota was eventually filled. Forty-nine of the fifty children resettled to New Zealand were female, largely because Chinese families in Hong Kong preferred to adopt boys.\textsuperscript{118} Their ages ranged from two to eight. Many of the two hundred and seventy five families who expressed an interest in adopting children were from the Chinese community. However, the government worried about placing the orphans with Chinese families since they believed this would affect their capacity to assimilate into New Zealand society. One official feared that they might simply “become labourers in

\textsuperscript{114} Mr. Shand, Minister of Immigration, to Mr. Hallyburton Johnstone, 3 August 1962, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
\textsuperscript{115} New Zealand Chinese Association to Prime Minister, 6 June 1962, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
\textsuperscript{116} Mr. Shand to W.S. Goosman, 26 July 1962, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 2, ANZ.
\textsuperscript{117} J.P. Costello, Trade Commissioner to Director of Labour, 27 July 1962, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
\textsuperscript{118} On the work of the ISS see Tara Zahra, \textit{The Lost Children, Reconstructing Europe's Families after World War II} (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2011). In 1958, with financial support from the American government, the ISS initiated a program to match prospective American parents with Chinese orphans. It resettled five hundred children from Hong Kong in three years.
market gardens or shop assistants in fruit shops with the result that they would be denied the opportunity that the greater majority of our children are given.”\(^{119}\) Ultimately, only five children were placed with Chinese families. Children were adopted and sponsored along religious lines, with Protestant congregations obtaining the bulk of the sponsorships (a total of forty).\(^{120}\) Generally, applicants who demonstrated a strong sensibility to the challenge of raising a Chinese family in a European home were selected. According to official assessments, Mr. and Mrs. Malpas of Remuera had “a genuine concern for race relations and see this adoption as a possible contribution to breaking down barriers.”\(^{121}\) They were desirable parents. By contrast, officials refused Mr. and Mrs. Donegan because they had “little conception as to the problems which may beset them in bringing up a Chinese child, and are only motivated by a desire to give one of these unfortunate children the care and comforts which their own family enjoy.”\(^{122}\) As in Canada, journalists were often on-hand at the airport when the children arrived, although in New Zealand, officials were dismayed by the press attention and tried to keep news of the arrivals secret so as to protect the privacy of the children and parents. Only a few news stories ultimately circulated as a result. One surviving clipping, preserved by Archives New Zealand, featured the headline “Doorway to Happiness.”\(^{123}\) The article contained minimal text but featured a series of ten portrait shots of the orphans.

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\(^{119}\) Department of Labour to Immigration, 16 September 1960, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, W5182, Box 96, File 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.


The un-narrated images (Figure 5) were exceptionally vulnerable to multiple interpretations. Viewing publics in New Zealand may have been charmed by the innocence of the dark-eyed and dark-haired children or they may have been taken aback by the invasion of foreignness on display in the article. Alternatively, the blank backgrounds might be understood as a representation of the emptiness that filled the children’s lives before their arrival. They were *tabula rasas*, blank slates. Their new families and New Zealand society more generally would be able to fill the emptiness. Whatever the reading, it was certainly difficult to connect and reconcile the images of adult refugees and groups of families that circulated at the onset of the crisis in Hong Kong in 1962 with the portraits of the children resettled to New Zealand. The images revealed the discrepancies that the government’s own narratives and spoken words sought to conceal. The refugees depicted at the border with Hong Kong were not at all the equivalent of the orphans resettled to New Zealand in the spring of 1962 and yet they were meant to be one and the same. The government of New Zealand sought the appearance of humanitarianism in its response to the 1962 refugees from mainland China. The orphan adoption scheme was a strategy for avoiding additional responsibilities and overtures that might open the doors too wide to Chinese migrants. However, its response was far more limited than that
envisioned by advocates in New Zealand and Hong Kong. Nevertheless, it is commemorated as one of the milestones in New Zealand’s history of refugee assistance and is incorporated in the permanent “Passports” exhibit in the country’s national museum, Te Papa, in Wellington.

Conclusions
Despite the limited humanitarian response amongst settler societies, the events in Hong Kong in the spring of 1962 marked a critical juncture in the experience of Chinese migrants seeking refuge in Hong Kong or abroad. The visuality of the event suggested large-scale human need. Critically, audiences could connect in an empathetic way with images and narratives that captured specific individual experiences. As a result, the refugee story in Hong Kong became far more immediate and intimate than in previous years. This individualized humanity resonated with public sensitivities around refugee issues, which had been nourished during the intense media and fundraising campaigns of World Refugee Year. Settler society publics were therefore attentive to the situation in Hong Kong. This willingness to think of people crossing the border as refugees was furthered by the obscurity in which people lived out their daily lives in Communist China.

The lack of reliable factual information about what was going on in China fed anti-communist sentiment and how Westerners envisioned life under communist rule. Rumours and speculation about life behind the Bamboo Curtain enlarged the space in which interested parties could depict the 1962 migrants. This freedom of interpretation led to the framing of the migrants in a variety of ways, from illegals to innocent victims in need of compassion. The result was an intersection between the gazes that humanitarian actors leveled at the situation in Hong Kong and those assumed by state actors. In the complicated and sometimes conflicting understanding of refugees that resulted, a few select migrants in Hong Kong were offered resettlement opportunities in Canada and New Zealand. These offers were an explicit attempt to gain political advantage domestically in the Canadian case and to limit the scope of obligation in New Zealand. In each case, the response became more about the state’s efforts to reconcile humanitarian action with ongoing reservations about migration from China. Rather than establishing a precedent for continued assistance, the response to the 1962 crisis was a minor interruption in the general trend of ignoring human displacement out of China. The visuality of the events in Hong Kong in the
spring of 1962 was unique in the history of population flows out of the People’s Republic of China. It would not be repeated again, not even during the spring of 1989 when Chinese authorities violently suppressed pro-democracy activists at Tiananmen Square (discussed in the concluding chapter).

Without the spectacle of large numbers of people moving across the border, associations of refugeehood with migrants from China diminished. Instead, perceptions of migrants from China became bound up with the formalization of various immigration categories. Migrants moved through official, and increasingly delineated, categories of migration and navigated discrete humanitarian opportunities for resettlement. These legal and channels were largely invisible to the general public. Illegal migration was especially obscured and it became a canvas upon which state efforts to regulate and control migration, refuse humanitarian obligations and limit Chinese migration unfolded.
CHAPTER FIVE


Introduction

As the preceding chapters demonstrated, governments and humanitarian actors increasingly treated refugees as a distinct category of people over the course of the twentieth century. With the introduction of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, fear of persecution became the defining characteristic of a refugee in legal terms, but the Convention’s definition never had exclusive hold on how states and humanitarian actors conceptualized of refugees. The history of earlier migrations contributed to the manner in which governments, humanitarian actors and the general public received later claims to refugeehood. In the case of migrants from the People’s Republic of China, the discourse of illegality produced by officials as a result of their efforts to exclude Chinese migrants for much of the early twentieth century, shaped the political landscape in which claims to refugeehood were made and received.¹ In the postwar period, states intermittently, and intentionally, conflated the discourse on refugees with the issue of illegal entry creating a discourse of illegality, through the use of particular descriptors, that diminished the possibility of refugee claims being received sympathetically by advocates, the general public and the state.²

The concept of illegality derives from a violation of the sanctity of the nation-state and its legal regimes rather than a crime against a person or entity.³ Illegality in the context of global migration is generally understood as “the state of being in violation of a country’s established

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¹ Of the US case, historian Mae Ngai observes, “It seems no accident that illegal aliens also emerged in the wake of World War I, produced by hypernationalist immigration controls and in the same juridical no-man’s land as refugees and the stateless.” She believes the “the rush after World War I to legislate restriction in Congress, while argued in the domestic political language of racial nativism, was a direct response to the specter of millions of destitute war refugees seeking entry into the United States.” Impossible Subjects; Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 10.

² Frances Henry and Carol Tator, Discourses of Domination: Racial Bias in the Canadian English-Language Press (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 145.

³ In the Hobbesian tradition, crimes against the state are considered more serious than those against an individual because they have an impact on the collective. Marshall Missner, ed. Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan (New York: Pearson Education, Inc, 2008), 210.
immigration law.” From this perspective, migrants who entered a territory illegally represented an offence to society as a whole, triggering allegations that they had “no right to be present.”

Illegality as an issue of statecraft is intimately connected to the nation-building thrusts of the late nineteenth century when the introduction of passports and other documentary controls enabled states to regulate and restrict the movement of migrants. With these controls in place, states could regulate their borders and begin to discuss the issue of illegality. Many of these controls were directed at migrants from Asia.

When states realized that their efforts to exclude or limit the entry of migrants from China were being undermined by people purchasing forged documents, claiming false relationships or deserting from passing vessels, they ascribed illegality and deviance to Chinese migrants as if they were primordial traits as opposed to strategies developed to overcome the inherent injustice of restrictive immigration regimes such as the White Australia policy. Illegal entry enabled states to produce rhetoric around illegality that perpetually excluded Chinese migrants from the nation. As historian Madeleine Hsu has shown, the “crime that marked their entry ensured that they became even more deeply embedded in the existing networks of kinship and native place that made it possible for them to arrive.” Illegal migration has been incorporated into many studies of Chinese migration. Erika Lee’s *At America's Gates Chinese Immigration During the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943* traces how the regimes developed in response to unwanted numbers of Chinese migrants invited additional illegality and more recently, Lisa Mar’s *Brokering Belonging: Chinese in Canada's Exclusion Era, 1885-1945* traces the manner in which networks enabled the migration of people who were ineligible for entry. These works thoroughly document the existence of illegal migration and the manner in which migrants overcame...
restrictions. However, they pay little attention to the construction of the term “illegal” itself.\(^9\) This pursuit has fallen to legal scholars and criminal justice experts who attend to the manner in which states constructed illegality in response to the movement of people, often with larger security and control paradigms in mind.\(^10\)

The emphasis on Chinese migrants of the late nineteenth century as the “first illegal immigrants”\(^11\) and contemporary discussions on illegal migration (most notable in the Canadian context around the arrival of boats of migrants from China in 1999 and Sri Lanka in 2011), underscores how race and conceptions of desirability contributed to development of laws that rendered particular groups of people illegal and perpetuated their position as outsiders to the nation.\(^12\) In Mae Ngai’s groundbreaking work, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (2004), she maintains that by defining illegality, the nation defined itself.\(^13\) This continues to be true.

Ngai addresses illegality as a nation-building instrument and her emphasis is on the manner in which illegality is constructed and targeted. Catherine Dauvergne looks at illegal migration in the context of globalizing migration trends and suggests, “The worldwide crackdown on illegal migration is a reaction to state perceptions of a loss of control over policy initiatives in other areas.”\(^14\) The instability of the nation-state project underlies much of their analysis. Ngai and Dauvergne both assume a wide gaze in their research on illegal migration; looking at a variety of


migrant groups and the diverse ways in which migration laws operated historically, and in Dauvergne’s case in more contemporary ways, to create illegality. In structuring their studies, Ngai looks at the way illegality translated into the lived experiences of different “ethno-racial minority groups”\textsuperscript{15} in the United States while Dauvergne considers how globalization enables nation states to work together in casting migrants as illegals. While Ngai examines the manner in which illegality was made visible in the form of stereotypes and biases, which “unambiguously situated (illegal aliens) outside the boundaries of formal membership and social legitimacy,”\textsuperscript{16} Dauvergne situates illegal migration as a largely invisible phenomenon.\textsuperscript{17} This study fuses the approaches taken by Ngai and Dauvergne to look at how discussions about illegality operated against migrants from the People’s Republic of China in different political and geographic contexts. In so doing, the focus of this inquiry is on the term “illegal” itself and the manner in which its use has evolved over time.\textsuperscript{18} With this approach, the constructed dimensions of illegality are emphasized as a practice of statecraft that enabled authorities to pursue larger nation-building objectives by either embracing or excluding particular groups of migrants. It was a practice that further served to reject any sense of obligation to provide humanitarian assistance.

In considering the concept of illegality as a dynamic element of modern statecraft, wide variations in the approaches states employed to “resolve” the “problem” of illegality are uncovered. The terms resolve and problem are highlighted as being deeply ambiguous. In producing a discourse of illegality, governments were essentially attempting to fix a problem they created through discriminatory measures that prohibited Chinese migrants from entering in ways that other migrants could. By ignoring the root causes of illegal entries, namely discriminatory and exclusionary legislation, governments did not “solve” anything by targeting migrants as illegals. Rather, rhetoric about illegal migrants enabled them to create the conditions upon which practices of enforcement could be constructed and supported.

\textsuperscript{15} Ngai, 3.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{17} Dauvergne, 8.
In Australia and Hong Kong, governments used the discourse of illegality to justify the deportation or the expulsion of migrants to the People’s Republic of China. In Australia, the government’s focus on illegality in the 1960s had a significant pre-history as it was linked to the issue of wartime evacuees and refugees who refused to leave the country at the end of hostilities in 1945. In Hong Kong, the discourse was of a more recent pedigree, one that crystallized during the spring of 1962 in the face of large numbers of migrants seeking entry into the colony. Considering the Australian and Hong Kong examples together, with their markedly different histories of Chinese migration (one closed, one open), illustrates how the production of illegality enabled states to pursue enforcement objectives and create the impression of authority. In Canada, the state manipulated the issue of illegal migration to very different ends. The discovery of human smuggling rings channeling people to Canada from Hong Kong in the late 1950s propelled the federal government in Ottawa to recognize the long-standing issue of Chinese migrants who arrived in the country illegally. Illegal migration was a facet of the exclusion era from 1885 and it continued after the official end of the era in 1947 as a result of ongoing restrictions on admission to Canada. In a bid to suppress the continued trade in illegal documentation and resolve the long-standing issue of non-citizens living in the political margins of Canadian society, the government made the issue of illegal migration public and introduced a Status Adjustment Program in 1960 that remained in place for over a decade. Under the terms of the program, individuals could confess to their illegal entry, have their status “normalized” and obtain the same rights of citizenship as enjoyed by other Canadians.

The Canadian solution to the issue of illegal entry appears to stand in opposition to the strategies adopted by authorities in Australia and Hong Kong because the Canadian state made it explicitly clear that Chinese migrants had entered illegally but chose not to refer to permanently define them as illegal migrants. Yet a closer examination reveals that the government’s efforts were essentially a variation of the same practices that officials in Hong Kong and Australia used to

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19 Little research has been done on the history of illegal immigration to the United Kingdom. In her work on the history of deportation practices in Britain, Jordanna Bailkin suggests that by the 1960s, British authorities were relying more and more on deportations to remove people who had entered illegally or who had overstayed their permits instead of the initial vice crimes for which deportation had been envisioned. See “The Politics of Deportation in Postwar Britain,” *Journal of British Studies* 47, no. 4 (October 2008), 881, accessed March 27, 2012, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/590168](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/590168). Given that this time period coincides with the introduction of the restrictive *Commonwealth Immigrants Act*, it seems that, as in other countries, British authorities targeted illegal migrants at specific historical junctures when there were larger issues of control and authority at stake.
legitimize their authority in determining the legitimate means of movement, the conditions of settlement and the appropriate punishments for illegal entry. In examining the evolving manner in which illegality was constructed and the ends to which it was utilized, the powerful discourse of illegality produced by various states marginalized the targeted groups of migrants and crippled efforts by humanitarian actors, including churches, Chinese community organizations and NGOs, to present alternative realities to the state-directed discourse on illegality and its proposed “solutions.” States shifted the contents of their discourse as necessary. Discussions of illegality could range from deeply racialized to legalistic and categorical, depending on the circumstances. In all instances, the way in which states used the discourse of illegality to pursue larger nation-building and legitimizing objectives affected the capacity and desire of the public and humanitarian actors alike to discern the presence of refugees from the People’s Republic of China and to respond to claims to refugeehood sympathetically. For the state, strategic statements about illegality were instrumental for denying claims to refugeehood by migrants from the People’s Republic of China and rejecting any sense of humanitarian obligation.

Given the variety of ways in which the categorical rationalization of migrants could be achieved, when and how states resorted to the discourse of illegality is one of significant historical interest; as is the question of how notions of illegality reverberated in other spheres of control once it was employed against a particular group of migrants. Tracing the use of illegality as a discourse of exclusion after the Second World War reveals the continued bias against migrants deemed socially, politically and economically undesirable at a time when the emerging discourse of universal human rights made discrimination on other grounds such as race, class or gender difficult to rationalize. Public conversations about illegality existed above and beyond the legal systems that delineated the legitimate means of movement and importantly, it was entirely state-produced. No other social body or entity could assign the label of illegality to an individual or group with such serious ramifications in terms of social and physical exclusion. Ironically, states wielded the discourse of illegality to mask fault lines in their system of control. Discussions of illegality surfaced when initial control mechanisms such as border point checks and passport and visa requirements failed to produce the intended exclusion or when states came under pressure to facilitate migration in ways they deemed undesirable.
Charges of illegality and the attendant vilification of the migrant in the public’s imagination legitimated the state’s authority to proceed with the punishment it deemed most fitting for the crime. The potency of the discourse lay in the capacity of its agents to create grounds for exclusionary practices and to condemn subjects without due process or full consideration of their conditions. The nature of the grounds for exclusion shifted depending on the politics of the moment. In South Africa, the focus of the discourse of illegality that emerged in the 1920s was concentrated largely upon the large Indian population that arrived and settled in the early twentieth century. Upon the discovery of illegal migration from China in the 1960s, which coincided with political tensions in the apartheid project, the discourse shifted to the smaller Chinese community. Shifting and fluid discussions of legality, deployed during times of heightened political tensions or upon the arrival of significant numbers of migrants that states perceived as portending the arrival of still others, came to signify a state of emergency. The use of illegality as a discursive strategy implied a situation of such gravity that states had to pursue extraordinary means to address and rectify the problem.

When authorities in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and Hong Kong determined that certain groups of Chinese migrants had entered their territories illegally, and when they subsequently chose to discuss the issue publicly, they did so in order to affirm their own authority in the face of transgressions and to ensure the exclusion of those targeted as illegals. By publicly responding to the issues of illegal entry or violations of the terms and conditions on entry, these governments sought to demonstrate their authority and legitimize the various solutions they put forward on illegal immigration by obtaining public acquiescence. Through the discourse of illegality, states made their targets visible to the general public. These were selected targets. As Catherine Dauvergne has argued of the discourse’s more recent subjects, residents of Western liberal democratic countries do not think of a European businessman whose tourist visa expires in Thailand as an illegal migrant. Our associations are much more aligned with those we

21 Position of Chinese in the Union, 1955-1961, BTS 19/2/1, Part 3, NASA.
perceive to be at the margins of global society and therefore undesirable. Historically, the association of illegality with certain migrants, and most particularly Chinese migrants for much of the twentieth century, enabled the state to proceed with the enforcement measures it desired, virtually unchallenged. When protests did erupt, as in Australia in 1962, states simply employed the discourse with determined intensity.

The discourse of illegality that the Australian state produced to defend the deportation of Willie Wong in April 1962 was the culmination of a history of state efforts to retain control over migration to Australia and in particular to protect the foundational principles of the White Australia policy. There was no room for Chinese migrants in Australia under the terms of the White Australia policy, except as temporary, cheap labour, and so Chinese migrants and their contributions to Australian society were consistently marginalized and misrepresented throughout the twentieth century. Even with entry controls, safeguarding the White Australia policy proved difficult and in times of duress, the Australian state resorted to colourful rhetoric about illegal migration to reinforce its authority in restricting the entry of undesirable migrants or pursuing their deportations.

During the Second World War, the Australian government opened the country’s doors to thousands of “non-Europeans” from Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Malaya, Nauru, Singapore and the Indonesian archipelago. The offer of refuge was a temporary one. There was no question of permanent residence under the terms of the White Australia policy. In addition to the official evacuees, a number of uninvited refugees (sometimes called “temporaries” or “illegal immigrants” by officials) entered Australia during the war. The resettlement of the evacuees and the acceptance of refugees, albeit on a temporary basis, represented a brief opening in the historically closed attitude to Asian migration to Australia. Although the historian Sean Brawley

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23 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, 16.
24 Klaus Neumann, Refuge Australia: Australia’s Humanitarian Record (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004), 98.
26 Most of the so-called refugees were deserting seamen who were able to gain access to Australian territory through their work on passing vessels. They were permitted to remain for the duration of the war with the understanding that they would have to leave once normal shipping routes resumed and berths became available for them. On a few exceptional occasions, wealthy Chinese merchants were able to pay their way into Australia to wait out the end of the war. However, they too were required to depart at the end of the hostilities. Telegram from Australian Legation (Chungking) to Department of External Affairs, 11 January 1942, [Re Entry of Temporary Refugees (Chinese) from Singapore], MP729/6, 67/401/67, 384550, NAA (Melbourne).
argues that the wartime offer of refuge marked the beginning of the end of the restrictive White Australia policy, the determination demonstrated by Australian authorities in countering evacuee attempts to remain in Australia at war’s end points to the enduring strength of the policy as a guiding nation-building principle.27 Wartime resettlement could have been a progressive moment but the government’s inability to control the end of the evacuation program sowed doubts about its ability to manage migration to Australia more generally. The result was a postwar clampdown on Chinese migrants deemed to be illegal by virtue of the manner of their entry into Australia or the fashion in which they conducted themselves in the nation’s internal space.

At the end of the Second World War, there were over 5,000 evacuees and refugees in the country when the government announced that it was time for them to leave. While many did depart, about eight hundred wartime evacuees and refugees did not want to go, insisting they had established themselves in the country and should not be expelled.28 Australian officials viewed these protests as a challenge to their authority and a threat to the White Australia policy that had governed immigration to the country since 1901. In response to the evacuees and refugees’ demonstration of defiance, the Chifley government introduced an Aliens Deportation Act in 1948, with the specific goal of removing non-British residents from Australia. Despite criticism from Australia’s Asian neighbours and from the friends and supporters of evacuees in the country, Australian officials were determined to pursue the deportation of evacuees and reinforce the message that Australia only had room for certain kinds of people.29 Efforts to deport wartime evacuees expeditiously were frustrated by the government of Hong Kong’s decision to limit transit facilities due to the over-crowded conditions in the colony (many of the resistant wartime evacuees were destined for Guangdong on the Chinese mainland) and by a series of court proceedings.

challenges that disputed the legitimacy of the *Aliens Deportation Act*. The case of Annie O’Keefe, an Indonesian woman who married an Australian national during the war, gained international notoriety after she was ordered to leave. She asked to stay on humanitarian and compassionate grounds because of her young family but the government refused her request. Alexander Downer, the Immigration Minister, argued that if such grounds became the basis for admission and entry, Australia would have to “let the starving millions of China in.”

O’Keefe’s case went all the way to the Australian High Court before the judges ruled that she could not be deported.

In response to the court’s ruling in the O’Keefe case, the government introduced the 1949 *Wartime Refugees Removals Act (WRRA)*, which gave it the power to counter the “impudent challenge” presented by those who refused to leave. With the *WRRA*, police assumed the power to investigate, seek out, and detain those who were in violation of their terms of entry. The searches subsequently undertaken gave authorities unprecedented access to Chinese businesses and private premises and heightened the suspicion with which policy makers, law enforcement and the general public, viewed the Chinese in Australia. Chinese communities in the country responded by taking on the case of Kwan Ng and thirteen other deserter seamen who arrived in Australia during the war. Their legal challenge took them all the way to the High Court where their appeals were rejected. Only a change in government saved the remaining 853 wartime evacuees and refugees from deportation. The new Immigration Minister, Harold Holt, announced that the group could stay as a “wartime legacy.” Rather than a legacy however, the treatment of non-European wartime refugees and evacuees was a precursor to the controls introduced to

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32 KWAN Ng and Others Versus The Commonwealth of Australia and Others, A10072, 1949/25, NAA (Canberra).

manage Chinese migration in the postwar period, which eventually resulted in heightened rhetoric that facilitated the deportation of Chinese migrants when initial entry controls failed.

The fear of mass numbers of Asian migrants looking for a place to settle that characterized the early rationale for a White Australia policy returned after the Second World War. Demographic projections that indicated Australia’s birthrate was not at replacement level and evidence that migration from the United Kingdom was on the decline, precipitated new calls to guard against Asian migration. The Australian government recruited migrants and refugees from the United Kingdom and Europe aggressively, inspired by Arthur Calwell’s declaration, “we will either fill this country or we will lose it.” From 1945-1952, over 170,000 people were resettled from camps in Europe and another 90,000 were resettled between 1952 and 1970 as result of agreements with the International Refugee Organization (IRO). The intense recruitment was meant to boost numbers and guard against the turmoil and potential population flows from decolonizing nations nearby - Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. Unrest in these countries and in China sowed fears amongst Australian officials and the public about the security of the nation.

Chinese migrants, who had long been regarded with suspicion, were subject to further scrutiny following the establishment of a communist regime in the People’s Republic of China in 1949. As Stephen Holmes, Mark Dober and Donna Hellier have shown, the Cold War in Asia perpetuated Australians’ fears of being physically attacked or invaded by their Asian neighbours. Migrant bodies became “the fundamental site upon which territorial politics (were) constituted.” The fear of a physical invasion led to recriminations against those who were already in motion.

In 1952, officials in the Department of External Affairs urged that all migration from the Chinese mainland be banned for security reasons. Their immigration counterparts, well-versed in the

34 Chris Oliver and Harry Bardwell, Executive Producers, Admission Impossible, Film Australia, 1992.
35 Anna Haebich, Spinning the Dream Assimilation in Australia (Fremantle: Fremantle Press, 2008), 163. The only groups resettled from China were 13,000 White Russians and Old Believers.
practice of attempting to control Chinese migration, believed that a total embargo would be difficult to achieve operationally. Immigration officials preferred to extend temporary entry permits for some, most notably the wives and children of domiciled Chinese, and to discourage new migration from the communist mainland. No special consideration was given to “political refugees” as such and individuals could only be admitted to Australia under the standard terms of admission.\(^{39}\) For Chinese migrants, admission was on a temporary basis only. Even more onerous was the fact that the government believed that during their stay in Australia, Chinese migrants should meet strict reporting and registration requirements. The 1947 *Aliens Registration Act*, which opponents called a “fascist measure” and the “first step in the creation of a police state” led to workplace inspections and the surveillance of politically active individuals in the community.\(^{40}\) It required all aliens, European and Asian alike, to register with authorities and to request approval before proceeding with any name change or shift in employment. Yet the enforcement of the *Act* was far more severe for Chinese migrants in terms of the inspections to which they were subjected.\(^{41}\) If workers attempted to improve their situations by switching jobs, they quickly slipped into the realm of illegality. In a 1996 interview, Arthur Locke Chang (founding member of the Chinese Seamen’s Union) recalled that as a result of a lack of mobility Chinese migrants were “virtually slaves” and vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of corrupt employers.\(^{42}\) The very act of dedicating resources to manage the entry and existence of Chinese migrants suggested there was a problem with the Chinese character and perpetuated their position as outsiders. Reward money for tips on illegal activity further reinforced the perception of the Chinese community as a problem.\(^{43}\)

The layers of rules and regulations gave corrupt individuals on all sides, including immigration officials, an opportunity to exploit the system. In 1954, information emerged suggesting that a certain Officer Cayley was accepting pay-offs to facilitate the entry of Chinese workers. The

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\(^{39}\) These terms were extremely limited. The only Chinese migrants permitted entry until 1956 were temporary workers, students and merchants. No permanent migration was permitted. In 1956, exempt categories of migrants were permitted to sponsor their wives and children for the first time.\(^{40}\) Mr. Lang (Representative for Reid), “Aliens Bill 1947, Second Reading,” *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, House of Representatives, 16 March 1947, 1177.\(^{41}\) European aliens could apply to be naturalized after five years while Chinese aliens remained ineligible for permanent residence.\(^{42}\) Arthur Locke Chong, Shirley Fitzgerald - interviews with members of the Sydney Chinese community, 1996, Mitchell Library, MLOH 273, Sydney.\(^{43}\) Memorandum to Mr. Furler, 14 November 1962, A6908, S250019, 1120263, NAA (Canberra).
department investigated and found that Cayley had clearly lied in his reports on the operation of market gardens in Sydney. Instead of finding fault with one of their own however, immigration officials blamed the corruption on the Chinese proclivity for offering “not only money, but goods and entertainment,” in the hope of a “quid pro quo.” Critics viewed migrant strategies to navigate the complex immigration regime as evidence of immoral and un-Australian behaviour. The Under-Secretary of Immigration, H. McGinness, alleged that Chinese “even men of standing,” think “nothing of making false statements to officialdom.” The system meant to control and regulate the entry and behaviour of Chinese migrants in Australia created grounds for their social ostracization. However, it proved very ineffective in actually controlling the temporally limited entries of migrants from China.

Many migrants who arrived illegally, or violated their conditions of entry, were ultimately never punished because deportations were difficult to effect, especially after 1949, when there were no diplomatic relations between Australia and the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, loopholes gave migrants who were initially granted admission on a temporary basis an opportunity to extend their time in Australia, especially if they could manoeuvre their way around various categories of admission. For instance, Jap Kuan Wong first entered the country as a student in 1938. When his permit expired, he successfully evaded immigration officials. Instead, he ended up running a small business in Sydney. His illegal status was discovered in 1954, sixteen years later, and it is not clear from the archival record whether or not he was deported. As such, while the language of illegality continued to frame Chinese migration to Australia in the postwar period, in practice, many the state deemed illegal were permitted to stay, blurring and complicating the frontiers of legitimacy.

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45 T.H.E. Heyes to Chief Migration Officer, New South Wales, 9 November 1959, Box 106, C3939, N1962/75101, 1052236, NAA (Sydney).
46 Memorandum to The Secretary for Immigration from H. McGinness, Assistant Secretary, 2 March 1959, Chinese and Other Asian Illegal Immigrants - Deportation Policy, A698, S250019, 1120263, NAA (Canberra).
The Chinese in Australia opposed efforts to deport members of their community to the point of hiding suspects from officials and taking their cases to the media to argue their cases on humanitarian grounds. In 1952, local residents established the Chinese Workers Association when Sydney’s Chinese community was hit with a wave of deportation orders. Students found with corns on their hands were accused of working in market gardens and shopkeepers who changed jobs for restaurant positions were allegedly harassed and ordered to leave. The Chinese Youth League, Chinese Seamen’s Union and the New South Wales Chinese Society, led by the ubiquitous William Liu (the English-speaking Secretary of the Chinese Consulate in Melbourne who dedicated his life to improving Chinese-Australian relations) also came to the defence of the migrants. The Chinese Youth League charged the Immigration Department with “punishing the victims of all the system instead of tracing the cause of all this trouble.” All of the groups urged the government to cease the practice of deportations and made effective use of print media to alert the public to the deportation of their friends and neighbours. William Liu also lobbied supporters such as Bishop Burgmann (an outspoken Anglican Bishop who opposed Prime Minister Menzies’ efforts to ban the Australian Communist Party in 1951) about the plight of individual migrants. In 1957, Liu took up the case of Ng Chuck You who worked at the Eastern Restaurant in Sydney. According to Liu, “whilst on a few days visit to Brisbane to seek another position from a friend, he was arrested and deported…without being given a chance again to see his aged Father.” Liu called the deportation “a most unfortunate mistake,” speculating that You had probably been returned to the mainland. Liu imagined, “this man being over there carrying that bitter experience with him for the rest of his life.” Such lobbying humanized the deportation issue and complicated the question of illegality, attaching faces and life stories to the names of deportees. Nevertheless, it had little effect in curbing the government’s enthusiasm for deporting Chinese migrants found to be in violation of their conditions of entry or without the proper documentation. From 1953-1962, 255 Chinese migrants

were deported to the People’s Republic of China.\textsuperscript{52} This number reflected the Australian state’s
determination to pursue deportations despite the cost and complications associated with this
practice.

In the early 1950s, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong all began to restrict
the number of deportees they were willing to accept and the conditions by which people could be
returned. In 1951, as a result of border control issues in Hong Kong, authorities in Beijing
decided to only accept the re-entry of those migrants to whom its government had issued permits.
The identifying documentation for those Chinese from the mainland who had moved to Australia
before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China was suddenly invalid.\textsuperscript{53} Many
stowaways carried no documentation whatsoever, making it difficult to convince Chinese
officials to accept their return. In response, the Australian government decided to ban all new
entries from the People’s Republic of China and to further restrict the entry of Chinese from
Hong Kong unless they held authority to re-enter Hong Kong within a period of twelve months.
Officials wanted to ensure that when “the time came for Chinese to leave Australia, they would
have somewhere to go and we would not be obliged to let them stay here indefinitely.”\textsuperscript{54} The
Taiwanese government also put limits on the numbers of people it would accept into its territory.

Collectively, these measures made it difficult for Australia to deport Chinese nationals.
Restrictive re-entry policies in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China meant
that Australia’s whole system of entry based on temporary exemptions guaranteed by the ability
to deport became rather precarious. The legitimacy of both the immigration program and the
authority of those charged with enforcing it were thus called into question. The new obstacles to
depортation forced Australian officials to re-evaluate their approach. Should Chinese migrants be
admitted on a permanent basis? Could deportation still be an effective tool for managing the
Chinese populace in the country? Advocates such as William Liu pressed the government to
grant Chinese migrants permanent residence but the government’s desire to retain Chinese
workers on temporary entry permits and to use deportation as an enforcement tool remained

\textsuperscript{52} Statistics Relating to Deportation of Chinese since 1\textsuperscript{st} July 1953 to date by T.A. Smith, 18 April 1962, A6980,
S25050, 7115768, NAA (Canberra).
\textsuperscript{53} Correspondence, 24 February 1950, CO 537/6314, NAUK.
\textsuperscript{54} The Entry of Chinese from Hong Kong, Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council, 26-27 July 1956, A2169,
1956, 1955269, NAA (Canberra).
firm. Officials maintained that Chinese migrants would “behave better” if it were “known that we had the power to deport.”\textsuperscript{55} As such, throughout the 1950s, the Australian government remained quite cavalier about the implications of deporting individuals to communist China. Its foremost concern was with ensuring the integrity of its immigration program and affirming its authority. When the Taiwanese Consul General approached the Australian government in 1954 with a request that no Chinese nationals be deported to the Chinese mainland, as they were “liable to be executed,” the Australian government refused to cooperate, expecting that such a commitment would lead to an increase in desertions “and further defiance under exemption of our immigration requirements.”\textsuperscript{56} The Australian government desired to retain deportations to the People’s Republic of China as an enforcement tool; one that would discourage other migrants from attempting to make their way into the country illegally.

Aside from protests by Chinese communities in Australia and their supporters, there was little public protest about deportations to the People’s Republic of China in the immediate post-1949 period. By the late 1950s however, the Australian public was becoming increasingly aware, and increasingly uncomfortable, with the issue of deportations to Communist China. Certain sectors of the Australian public were virulently anti-communist and as much as they feared infiltrators amongst migrants from communist countries they were nevertheless concerned about the fate of individuals returned to these same countries. In the United States, where the People’s Republic of China was the country’s “number one enemy” by the mid-1950s and where President Eisenhower perceived overseas Chinese “as a fifth column for China,” there was still a desire amongst officials to resettle Chinese refugees under the US Escapee Program.\textsuperscript{57} There was no comparable impulse amongst Australian officials to address refugee issues. Instead, it was the Australian public, which having absorbed anti-communist rhetoric depicting the brutality of the Beijing regime, proved somewhat more sympathetic to the plight of those leaving the People’s Republic of China.\textsuperscript{58} In 1959, the Australian public was scandalized by the so-called “Taiyuan

\textsuperscript{55} Memo to the Minister, Deportation of Chinese Nationals to Formosa, 29 June 1954, 62/66130, 196202, NAA (Canberra).
\textsuperscript{56} H.L. Nutt to the Minister, 16 March 1954, Deportation of Chinese Nationals to Formosa, 62/6613, 1962025, NAA (Canberra).
\textsuperscript{57} Ngai, 208.
\textsuperscript{58} It was also the Australian public, not politicians, who proved more inclined to liberalize the White Australia policy. Ken Rivett, \textit{Immigration: Control or Colour Bar?: The Background to "White Australia" and a Proposal for Change} (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1962).
incident” when two Chinese migrants seeking entry suffocated while hiding from immigration officials. Their bodies were later unceremoniously dumped into the Sydney Harbour by the smugglers and found floating in the water a few days later. The result was growing public pressure not to punish illegal entrants. This pressure, along with the case of Wong Yew, which came to light shortly after the Taiyuan incident, sparked a modification in Australia’s deportation policy.

Yew was a ship deserter who had been in Australia for eleven years. When he was apprehended, officials argued that since he had entered the country illegally, he deserved to be deported. They deemed that Yew “himself had little in his personal favour,” given that he flitted from job to job. Moreover, they maintained that “a policy of allowing Asian illegal entrants to stay posed difficulties of principle and administration generally.” Yet Tasman Heyes, the Secretary for Immigration, who defended deportations to the People’s Republic of China in 1954, was one official who came to believe that deportations to the Chinese mainland were damaging Australia’s reputation domestically and internationally and were, in fact, hampering the state’s ability to manage its immigration program effectively. The difficulties inherent in deporting Chinese migrants (most particularly the need to secure identification, documentation and acceptance in the territory of return) were a growing concern for immigration officials. Heyes therefore recommended that Yew be permitted to stay and that those Asian deserters who had been in Australia for five years or more and who could only be sent back to communist countries be permitted to remain as long as they were of good character and there were no security objections. His recommendations were accepted. Yet despite these modifications, deportation remained an important enforcement tool and nation-building instrument. When this state practice was criticized, the language of illegality resurfaced as a way of legitimizing exclusionary practices. The sensational case of Willie Wong brought all of the problems inherent in a discretionary immigration program based on limited concessions and occasional deportations to

59 A.L. Nutt, Memorandum to the Minister, re. Chinese (and other Asian) Illegal Entrants – Policy as to Deportation, 4 March 1959, Chinese and Other Asian illegal immigrants - Deportation policy, A6980, S250019, 1120263, NAA (Canberra).
60 Correspondence in Deportation of Chinese Illegal Entrants - 1962 Billy Wong Case, A6980, S250503, 7115768, NAA (Canberra).
61 Memo to the Minister, Deportation of Chinese Nationals to Formosa, 29 June 1954, 62/66130, 196202, NAA (Canberra).
the fore. Wong’s case demonstrated how the discourse of illegality was a secondary, but effective, recourse in the Australian state’s repository of enforcement strategies.

Willie Wong was apprehended in Matraville on 9 February 1962 and charged with being a prohibited migrant. When he was caught, he had no identification papers, no possessions (except for his work clothes) and little money. He claimed he had been in Australia for seven years (sufficient time to be protected from deportation under the 1959 policy decision championed by Heyes) and produced income tax returns to prove his case. The immigration department viewed this antic as an “old ruse,” given that the returns were all in the same handwriting and had only recently been completed.63 The court agreed and ordered Wong deported, an instruction that was summarily executed. Wong’s lawyer went to the press with impressive results. Although editors did not contest the court’s decision, commentary after commentary cast doubt on the wisdom of the government’s actions in sending Wong back to the Chinese mainland.64 Juxtaposed against anti-communist rhetoric, the deportation revealed the contradictions inherent in a supposedly enlightened Western country that still proved willing to send people back to an uncertain fate. The public outrage over the deportation exhibited by respected parliamentarians, Kent Hughes and Bill Wentworth, enhanced support for Wong’s cause. Some Australian media outlets proved sympathetic to Wong’s situation given their antipathy for communism and their general mistrust of the Chinese regime.65 An editorial in the Sunday Telegraph raged:

Does Mr. Downer seriously believe there is ANY freedom in China? Does he seriously believe Wong arrived back over the border with no Red welcoming committee to greet him? The Immigration Department must be told that humanity is more important than the strict letter of the law.66

The government retorted that stowaways such as Willie Wong were not refugees and had no grounds for contesting deportation. Stowaways were “more in the nature of ‘economic refugees’ who, in seeking a better life, leave China and its privations.”67 To move for economic reasons was portrayed as a crime against all law-abiding and hard-working Australians. It was presented

63 Ibid.
65 Neumann, Refuge Australia, 99.
67 Memo, Comment on News articles, 16 April 1962, A6980, S250503, 7115768, NAA (Canberra).
as a crime against the collective and the language of illegality circulated freely. Editorials such as the one in the *Hobart Mercury* (published in Tasmania) lent support to the government’s approach. In one editorial, the paper declared:

> Wong was smuggled into this country…if it were known that an illegal migrant could get round the law by establishing “squatter’s right,” it would be an open invitation to smuggling activities on a far larger scale. From every point of view the act of deportation was justified…like all other illegal migrants who enter Australia, Wong was an economic refugee.  

In such formulations, economic refugees were illegal migrants. The focus on unscrupulous economic motives was an important shift for it opened up the space in which the government could continue to defend deportations, especially as vulnerable migrants seized upon public sensibilities about deportations to communist China to make a case for their admission. Five stowaways successfully remained in Australia immediately after the Willie Wong case when they expressed fears about being returned to the People’s Republic of China and received significant media attention as a result.  

> Confronted with renewed opposition, immigration officials buckled in this instance, despairing of the new potency that the rhetoric of Chinese migrants as “refugees from Communist tyranny,” had on the Australian public. Yet, this concession was short-lived. In the longer term, the outcry over Wong’s deportation and subsequent deportations to the mainland only caused the Australian government to become more determined in its efforts to use deportation and the discourse of illegality as enforcement strategies to prevent claims for admission based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds from gaining too firm of a foothold. The Australian state appeared ready to deport wherever and whenever necessary to defend the principles central to the White Australia policy. In May 1962, weeks after Willie Wong was deported to the People’s Republic of China, Cabinet affirmed “as a matter of principle, that if people refuse to go to Formosa (Taiwan), they should be sent to the Mainland.” The enforcement and deportation program against illegal entry by migrants from the People’s Republic of China continued and, in fact, became more sophisticated. Two years after Willie Wong was deported, the Australian state recruited additional manpower to organize a

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69 26-year old Fun Cheong Wong told lawyers that he was afraid of being sent back to “Red China” from which he had fled after famine conditions limited him to two bowls of rice a day. “Talks on Fate of 5 Chinese,” *Daily Telegraph*, 18 April 1962, A6980, S250503, 7115768, NAA (Canberra).
formal investigation section to deal with what their British correspondents called the “wily Oriental” and ensure that they could more efficiently secure the identity of the migrants and ensure their deportations.\textsuperscript{71}

The impact of the wartime accommodation of refugees and evacuees from the Pacific had an enduring impact on the Australian government’s approach to migrants it considered undesirable or threatening to the physical and social security of the nation. In the immediate postwar, the Australian state fought hard to expel the wartime refugees and evacuees, perfecting the use of deportation tactics and notions of illegality as enforcement tools to physically and conceptually cast out those deemed objectionable. The concept of illegality proved to be a flexible discursive strategy that the state could use to target a variety of unwanted migrants. In the immediate postwar period, illegality was bound up with the racial make-up of the nation as authorities fought to reinforce the White Australia policy. Migrants who entered illegally or overstayed their permits in the 1930s were described as “prohibited immigrants.”\textsuperscript{72} The wartime evacuees who refused to leave were “illegals,” representing their wholesale exclusion from the nation. By the early 1960s, the discourse on illegality assumed a more pointed tenor, that of “economic migrants.” As Australia negotiated changing relations with Indigenous peoples and slowly moved towards notions of assimilation instead of exclusion, barriers to entry based on race became increasingly unacceptable.\textsuperscript{73} Although the contents and subjects of the discourse of illegality in Australia transformed over the course of the twentieth century, all of its various incarnations had the effect of suppressing the potential refugeehood of migrants from the People’s Republic of China.\textsuperscript{74} Although Australia ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1954, the government did not establish a formal refugee determination process in the country until the late 1970s. Until then, the migrants who sought political or economic refuge in Australia were at the mercy of state selection programs and state discourses about the legitimacy of their claims to refugeehood. In the case of Chinese migrants, the discourse of illegality negatively influenced their capacity to be seen as fellow Australians. The discourse of

\textsuperscript{71} Handwriting by W.R. Bickford, 20 July 1964, DO 126/4 Deportation of Chinese from Australia to Hong Kong, 1964, NAUK.

\textsuperscript{72} William Liu Papers, 6294/1, State Library of New South Wales.


\textsuperscript{74} The engagement by these groups was genuine but they also took on the issue of Chinese refugees (particularly the wartime evacuees) with the hope of effecting larger immigration reforms.
illegality assumed a different guise, and different purpose, in Hong Kong in 1967 when the violence of the Cultural Revolution in the People’s Republic of China spilled over to the British colony of Hong Kong and left officials scrambling to reassert their authority in the face of perceived internal and external threats.

Building on the discourse of illegality established in 1962, officials in Hong Kong used the alleged threat posed by illegal migrants to justify repressive controls on freedom of movement and the expense of policing of the border. In the five years following the spring influx, illegal migrants became a fearful concept for the increasingly settled Hong Kong populace as the government persistently defended regular deportations with arguments about illegal migration that painted migrants as desperate and undesirable. This authoritative discourse of illegal migration as a threat and “problem” to Hong Kong society was very different from the practice of deporting and expelling people from the colony. Deportations were difficult and messy to execute. In 1966, border officials reported the case of an illegal migrant who was detained prior to being returned to the mainland. He “barricaded himself in his cell by using bed-boards to block the door” and refused to eat. Officials “tricked him into coming quietly” but he “screamed and fought all the way.” According to the report, “it required three men to restrain him on the lawn.” He “struggled and cried.” But what made the situation worse was the presence of “three European travelers and a party of Japanese crossing to China.” The “incident was most embarrassing to Police and Immigration officials.” Generally however, deportations were invisible while deliberations about illegality were purposively public.

The heightened tensions of 1967, which Robert Edward Mitchell describes as the “reign of terror,” when many people feared that Britain might abandon the colony, facilitated quiet discussions of illegality to rationalize the state’s response to violence. In the aftermath of the 1962 spring influx, the government of Hong Kong was determined to control population flows

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75 Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies (Nigel Fisher), British House of Commons, Hansard, 15 May 1964, 832.
76 D.J.Collins to D/S/F, 20 July 1966, HKRS437-1-4, HKPRO.
from the mainland and to address illegal migration in particular. To give weight to the discourse of illegality introduced in the spring of 1962, Governor Black established an Anti-Illegal Immigration Branch supported by the police, navy and army. While surveillance numbers indicated a decline in migrants moving into Hong Kong illegally through territorial frontiers after the spring 1962, there was concern about the size of the migrant population accessing the colony illegally by water. There were numerous reports of people swimming to Hong Kong or coming across from mainland China across Mirs Bay. By November, the government estimated that despite enforcement efforts there were still 10,000 illegal migrants arriving in the colony each month. Although the immediate conditions leading to the spring exodus in 1962 had been resolved, there were ongoing population pressures and difficult economic conditions in Guangdong that caused people to seek entry into the colony. The government therefore remained vigilant on the question of illegal migration, fearing both major population influxes and the presence of communist agitators. Deportations continued regularly after 1962. In press releases and debates in the Legislative Council, officials defended migration controls as necessary against the threat of large illegal immigration movements that undermined security in the colony. Controls created illegality but did little to inhibit movement. In 1973, 30,000 illegal migrants were detected in Hong Kong, the largest number since 1962. Ironically, it appears that some of the policies pursued by Canadian authorities in particular, which required migrants to make their way to Hong Kong to apply for admission to Canada, increased the flow of illegal migrants. Until the regime in Beijing loosened exit controls in 1978, people often had to leave the People’s Republic of China illegally to pursue immigration opportunities abroad.

In Hong Kong, approved entries were administered on the basis of permits and quota systems established over the course of the previous decade. If someone arrived in the colony, or was

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78 Colonial officials had been aware of illegal entries prior to 1962. However, the numbers were not significant enough to necessitate a public defence of the colonial authorities’ policy of deporting unauthorized migrants back to the People’s Republic of China. Shanghai to Foreign Office, 15 May 1957, FC 1822/4 FO 371/127429, NAUK.
79 Jones and Vagg, Criminal Justice in Hong Kong, 342.
80 Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 October 1962, CO 1030 / 1313, NAUK.
81 “Why Illegal Migrants Must Return to China,” Times, 3 December 1974, HKR5545-1-23-1, HKPRO.
82 New Immigration Section Planned to Check Illegal Immigrants, Press Release, 24 June 1975, HKR5545-1-23-1, HKPRO. Two years later, the government set up a research section to “strengthen its daily operations against those who try to sneak into Hong Kong illegally. “1400 ‘Illegal Migrants’ From China Have Been Arrested in Nine Months,” article from Le Monde in HKR5545-1-23-1, HKPRO.
83 Memo to the Minister, 6 June 1973, RG 76, Volume 992, 5855-1-526, Part 3, LAC.
found without proper documentation, they were apprehended and returned to the People’s Republic of China. Importantly, the government operated from the position that everyone arriving from the People’s Republic of China was an illegal migrant unless they had documentation to prove otherwise. Governor Black argued, “In view of our population problem and the size of the threat from illegal immigration no other attitude is practicable.”

Concerned observers, including Lord Killearn (a member of the British Parliament) protested the practice of deportation, worrying that so-called “genuine refugees” were being deported along with the others. Killearn told staff in the British Foreign Office:

> It does revolt many of us that any of these wretches on flight from the mainland should be handed back over to the communist frontier to what must be certain death. I don’t think anybody can really like that. I certainly do not.

He raised the issue repeatedly in Question Period much to the annoyance of officials in London and Hong Kong. Authorities defended their approach on the grounds that any change to the expulsion policy “would entail the risk of a flood of illegal immigrants which might prove disastrous to the Colony’s public services, housing and economy.” Significantly, they claimed they were willing to provide asylum to “real refugees.” However, there were heavy expectations around what being a “real refugee” entailed. After 1951, the archetype was increasingly that of a persecuted individual. People needed to be able to express their fear using language and vocabulary that resonated with officials. Governor Black believed that most migrants from the mainland were “completely unfamiliar” with the concept of claiming asylum and yet it was the state’s policy not to volunteer information about such a possibility. The government feared that if the possibility of claiming political asylum became common knowledge, returning people to the mainland would become more difficult and the colony’s “position would become impossible.” If “special circumstances” came to light, or if people refused to return, then officials in Hong Kong undertook a more detailed investigation. Such instances were rare. In the first half of 1964, 134

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84 Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 March 1964, CO 1030/1685, NAUK.
85 Killearn to Adams (Foreign Office), 7 July 1964, FO 371/175911, 1821/5, NAUK.
86 Governor of Hong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 January 1964, CO 1030/1685, NAUK.
87 Ibid.
people were caught crossing into British territory without documentation. Only ten refused to go back, obtaining the right to stay in the colony.\textsuperscript{88}

The dual enforcement system operated by the government of Hong Kong, consisting of physical deportations and the rhetoric of illegality, informed the context in which colonial officials responded to the violence and tensions of 1967 when the Cultural Revolution spilled over from the Chinese mainland into Hong Kong. The Cultural Revolution (discussed in greater detail in the next chapter) was essentially a political project to revitalize the communist program. It inadvertently resulted in tremendous upheaval and widespread persecution.\textsuperscript{89} In 1967, the Cultural Revolution spread to Hong Kong. Described as an “anti-colonial movement led by local leftists,” it marked one of the rare occasions when the politics of the mainland manifested themselves visibly in the colony. For weeks, Hong Kong’s youth demonstrated and rioted in the streets.\textsuperscript{90} Propaganda was broadcast from loudspeakers on communist-owned buildings. Large character posters and slogans championing Maoist thinking appeared everywhere. Bombs and decoys were planted in urban areas. By the end of the year, fifty-one people had been killed in the violence and another eight hundred injured. 5,000 people were arrested. The violence and unrest created great uncertainty amongst the populace who looked to colonial authorities to restore peace and security. Many left the country, seeking safer futures in countries such as Canada and Australia.\textsuperscript{91} The government responded by restricting the display of propaganda materials, limiting inflammatory speeches, imposing curfews, providing additional police presence on the streets of Hong Kong and militarizing the border as a precaution against both individual agitators moving into the colony and the possibility of a potentially destabilizing influx akin to the movement that occurred in the spring of 1962.\textsuperscript{92} A new fence was constructed

\textsuperscript{88} Trench to Landsdowne, 21 July 1964, CO 1030/1686, NAUK.
\textsuperscript{91} Sandra Wilking, Kelly Ip and Maggie Leung, whom I interviewed for this project, all referenced the uncertainty in Hong Kong in 1967 as a contributing factor in their decisions to either leave the colony or in the case of Kelly and Maggie, to stay in Canada.
on an alignment from the Shun Chun river immediately north of San Tin to Sha Tau Ko. Thirty-
feet wide, made of Dannert wire and built at a cost of £165,340, the fence was intended to be a
“substantial obstacle.” Military and police forces were posted permanently to the frontier and
they defended the border against illegal entries on a daily basis as well as responding to threats
of major population movements in subsequent years. In hindsight, one British official observed
“as far as we know, there were no refugees or attempts at illegal immigration,” but, he concluded
“the danger was there and the Hong Kong government planned against this contingency.

The militarized border proved relatively effective in preventing illegal entries, at least in the case
of those who attempted to transgress the territorial frontier. The government therefore eased its
policies on deporting illegal migrants, scaling back the resources invested in pursuing illegal
migrants as the overall numbers from the People’s Republic of China declined. The discourse
of illegality abated accordingly and only resurfaced in other periods of crisis such as the early
1970s when the ongoing Cultural Revolution led to new heights of economic turmoil and in 1978
when the government began to loosen controls on movement and establish Special Economic
Zones, some of which were near the border with Hong Kong. On these occasions, growing
numbers of illegal migrants prompted officials in Hong Kong to restore deportations to the
People’s Republic of China that had ceased as a result of the largely successful military patrols
and barbed wire barriers introduced in 1967. The discourse of illegality resurfaced accordingly.

The character of this discourse was born in part from Hong Kong’s increasingly formalized
immigration regime akin to those operating in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Various
categories delineated the legitimate means of movement, shaping the nature of the government’s
response to legal and illegal migrants. In 1971, the government introduced an *Immigrants*

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93 The government also lay the groundwork to detain migrants and screen migrants so that they could send back those “found to be undesirable.” T 225/3778, NAUK.
94 These occurred most obviously at three-year intervals between 1973 and 1979. In 1973, when there was an initial surge, the Governor immediately introduced new restrictions on illegals on the grounds that the colony needed to defend against possible disturbances on the border and possibly within the colony.” Stuart to Youde, 7 November 1973, FCO 40/812, NAUK.
95 Arnold to Scholar, 27 July 1967, T 225/3778, NAUK.
96 Stuart to Youde, 17 November 1973, FCO 40/812, NAUK.
97 Jones and Vagg, *Criminal Justice in Hong Kong*, 465.
98 “Why Illegal Migrants Must Return to China,” *Times*, 3 December 1974; “900 Troops Going to Hong Kong: Refugee controls to be tightened,” *Telegraph*, 26 June 1979 in HKR5545-1-23-1, HKPRO.
Ordinance, defining for the first time the residents of Hong Kong who lived in the colony. These included Hong Kong Belongers (all British subjects born in Hong Kong) and Chinese Residents (persons “wholly or partly” of Chinese race who had lived in Hong Kong continuously for at least seven years). The Ordinance marked a significant shift in the permanency with which authorities regarded the population in the colony.\(^9^9\) It was also the product of changing immigration structures in Britain and as a result, the Hong Kong Belonger became a unique category of citizenship.\(^1^0^0\) By contrast Chinese residents remained designated as more transient. “Residents” were subject to deportation. As Albert Chen observes, the “Ordinance took away the unfettered discretion of the immigration authorities in the granting or not granting of permission to enter into Hong Kong with respect to those who enjoyed a right to land in Hong Kong.”\(^1^0^1\) The system also prevented anyone falling outside of these categories from legally establishing themselves in Hong Kong. John Burns suggests that the distinctions created a sense of responsibility amongst government officials specifically for those identified as Belongers.\(^1^0^2\) This strategy contributed to the sense of “settled residence” embraced by previously transient migrants and unsettled residents in Hong Kong after the Cultural Revolution.\(^1^0^3\)

In 1972, the government in Beijing issued a series of instructions to district authorities that they help people who wished to emigrate. The reasons for this decision remain obscure, but the result in Hong Kong was a tangible increase in both legal and illegal entries.\(^1^0^4\) Many of the people moving into Hong Kong in the early 1970s were Overseas Chinese from Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam who had returned to China a decade prior, heeding appeals from Beijing to help rebuild the motherland. They were disillusioned by the Cultural Revolution and massive

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\(^1^0^0\) Ibid.


\(^1^0^3\) Ku, “Immigration Policies,” 329.

xiafang campaigns, which sent urban youth to the countryside, and wanted to leave. The communist regime issued them with exit documents and they became part of the official, and legal, flow of migrants out of the mainland.\textsuperscript{105} According to one man who left legally, “there was a long waiting list, but from gossip and a few concrete examples it appeared that almost everyone who applied eventually received an exit visa, although in some cases it took over a year.”\textsuperscript{106} The illegal flow also grew in these years. It stemmed from the same unhappy conditions on the mainland that were encouraging people to pursue legal methods of departure. One survey reported in the \textit{Hong Kong Standard} suggested that many of the illegal migrants were “discontented young people from the towns and cities who had been forced to leave homes to the communes to work and village youngsters near the border who came to Hong Kong to look for a job, or with the intention of sending money home to their families who were suffering from the effects of two bad harvests.”\textsuperscript{107} In November 1974, after negotiations with Chinese officials, Hong Kong authorities announced that all illegal migrants caught in the territory would be repatriated. Previously, those who made their way to urban areas were protected. The new policy applied to people found within the colony’s urban centres as well as the frontier areas.\textsuperscript{108}

The government of Hong Kong’s approach affected how other countries, including Canada, understood the nature of migration out of China. Categorizing people as “illegal” biased any inclination on the part of states and humanitarian actors to come to the assistance of so-called illegals. It was harder to justify assisting illegal migrants than it was to argue for the protection and care of refugees. In Canada, officials continued to heed British caution on proposing large-scale resettlement schemes based in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{109} In my conversations with Raph Girard, former Director of Refugee Policy in Canada, he alluded to the fact that the Canadian government would have done more to assist refugees who made their way in Hong Kong in the late 1970s but they were dissuaded by British officials who did not want to create a “tidal wave” of movement into the colony, an outcome they deemed likely if resettlement became a known

\textsuperscript{106} Frolic, \textit{Mao’s People}, 119.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Hong Kong Standard}, 18 November 1974, cited in Cheung Tak-Wai, “Illegal Immigrants in Hong Kong,” 42. See also Frolic, \textit{Mao’s People}, 42.
\textsuperscript{109} See correspondence in CO 1030 / 384, NAUK.
option amongst migrants from mainland China.\textsuperscript{110} Hong Kong therefore played an important buffering role in shaping the size and character of migration from the Chinese mainland. Still, local histories and imperatives also factored in to how countries chose to deal with the issue of illegal immigration. The manner in which the Canadian state addressed the issue of illegal Chinese migration to Canada contrasted dramatically with the strategies employed in Hong Kong and Australia.

Rumours of illegal migration from China first appeared in Canada in the early 1900s. They fostered negative opinions amongst the Canadian public about the suitability of admitting significant numbers of Chinese migrants as permanent residents.\textsuperscript{111} Yet while police raids to crack down on gambling, drug use and prostitution were frequent in Chinatowns across the country in the early decades of the twentieth century, it was only in the late 1950s that the Canadian state confronted the issue of illegal entries directly. The discovery of fraud coincided with an acknowledgement about the probable size of the population in the country illegally and concerted efforts to rationalize the immigration system into migration categories that would direct much-needed workers to the labour market. As a result, the government felt compelled to take some kind of action.

The focus on illegality in the Canadian case resulted from false representations on landed-immigrant applications where people claimed to be the relatives of Canadian citizens to gain admission. Immigration officials viewed this fraud as deeply subversive because a significant component of the controls imposed on Chinese migration depended on limiting family sponsorships to specific categories of relatives. If these categories were compromised, officials feared that an undesirable level of migration from China would result. In 1959, an investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) exposed an organized ring that profited from the sale of identity documents to hopeful migrants. Through the sale of fake documents, “paper families” and “paper sons” were created so that the Chinese in Canada could sponsor family members who were otherwise ineligible for entry under the terms of the 1952 Immigration Act.

\textsuperscript{110} Raph Girard, interview with author, 9 January 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.
A few months later, the RCMP, aided by plainclothes officers from the Royal Hong Kong Police Force, raided the homes and businesses of Chinese in Canada (including the Chinese Benevolent Association in Vancouver, which the RCMP believed was overseeing the paper son scheme), in search of additional documentary evidence.

Many Chinese Canadians felt unjustly discriminated against (much like the Chinese Australians whom police and immigration officials subjected to intense scrutiny as a result of provisions contained in the *Aliens Registration Act* and the *Wartime Refugees Relief Act*). The very acts of being monitored and investigated cast doubt on the character and integrity of the Chinese community. As Mae Ngai has observed of the 1956 Chinese Confession Program in the United States, "sensationalized investigations against fraud reproduced racialized perceptions that all Chinese immigrants were illegal and dangerous."\(^{112}\) While Australian officials rejected criticisms of their workplace investigations on the grounds that they needed to secure the integrity of the immigration program, Canadian officials were more responsive to the lobbying conducted by Chinese communities across the country.\(^{113}\)

As the investigation into illegal migration proceeded, the Canadian government recognized that the migrants themselves were victims of sorts and should not be the targets of criminal proceedings, although there was some internal speculation about whether the Canadian public would tolerate a mass deportation program.\(^{114}\) The conclusion was a negative one so instead of punishing paper families, the government introduced a Status Adjustment Program in 1960 (modeled on the 1956 Chinese Confession Program in the United States) whereby all those who had come to Canada illegally could confess and then apply to be naturalized, receiving all the rights of other naturalized Canadians (including family sponsorship rights). The only exceptions were those found guilty of organizing the illegal immigration schemes; they were subject to criminal proceedings and deported.\(^{115}\) By the 1960s, the cost of enforcement was sufficiently high to convince authorities that prosecution and deportation were no longer the most desirable

\(^{112}\) Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 223.
\(^{113}\) Correspondence regarding prohibited immigrants working in Chinese market gardens at Camden, SP244/2, N1950/2/16653, 7299347, NAA (Sydney).
\(^{114}\) Memo to James Bissett from Laval Fortier, 21 January 1960, RG 26, Volume 125, 3-33-7, Part 3, LAC.
\(^{115}\) Forty-five people were arrested in the initial raids. See Patricia Roy, *The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 278.
solutions to the problem of illegal entries. The government therefore invested significant energy and resources to ensuring the success of the program, advertising in newspapers across Canada and convincing officials in Hong Kong to halt their own prosecutions to encourage illegal migrants in Canada to confess. Governor Black cooperated, indicating that he had “no wish to jeopardize the Canadian amnesty programme” and would therefore “overlook offences which are uncovered as a result of the programme unless there is some serious aspect to a case over and above the deception of the Canadian authorities.”

The significance of the Status Adjustment Program has been under-estimated in general immigration histories and accounts of Chinese immigration to Canada. Having first described illegal Chinese migration as a “fascinating problem,” Freda Hawkins then surveys the program before assessing it as having “limited value” given the problems of investigation and enforcement. Similarly, in the *Making of the Mosaic*, Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock describe the program as “unsuccessful” in the first two years of operations as a result of the Chinese communities’ mistrust about the government’s motives and guarantees. Yet the Status Adjustment Program marks an important juncture in the history of Chinese migration to Canada and the manner in which the state and the public perceived them. Under the Status Adjustment program, which operated until 1974, 12,000 Chinese Canadians were normalized, obtaining the rights to participate as full citizens. This figure included individuals who lied about their marital and familial status to gain access to the 1962 Chinese Refugee Program from Hong Kong. One gentleman, who worked as a dry cleaner in Toronto, confessed the following:

I came to Canada as a Refugee. When I was examined in Hong Kong, I told the Canadian Immigration officials that I was single, when in fact, I was married and the father of two children. I told this lie to the Canadian Immigration officials because I thought it of no use to tell them the truth as my wife and children were on the mainland of China with very little chance of ever being able to get away.

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116 Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 January 1964, HKMS158-1-301, HKPRO.
119 2 May 1966, Chinese Case Files in Accession 1984-1985/041, LAC (additional reference details cannot be provided due to privacy agreement with LAC under Section 8(2)(j) of Canada’s *Access to Information Act*, February 2, 2012).
With the confession, the gentleman was able to sponsor his family to join him in Canada. On behalf of Minister Jean Marchand a form letter was sent to each participant in the Status Adjustment Program and read in part:

I wish to thank you for volunteering the information which has enabled us to adjust your status in Canada. I am certain that, having taken this important step, you have paved the way for a much happier life in this country of your choice.\(^\text{120}\)

Normalization marked a fundamental departure in the way the Canadian government managed migration from China. By normalizing the status of Chinese Canadians, the government knowingly facilitated the possibility of family sponsorship and increased Chinese migration.

Historian Patricia Roy has demonstrated how positively the program was received in Canada and how most Canadians tended to sympathize with the migrants instead of perceiving them as criminals.\(^\text{121}\) The careful distinction the government made in differentiating between the organizers of smuggling rings and those who used their services appears to have reverberated with the general public. The positive reception also hints at the broader shifts taking place in terms of Chinese migration to Canada. Unlike in Australia, where the liberalization of immigration programs only began in 1956 with concessions on family for long-term residents, Canadian nods to normalization, beginning with the end of exclusion in 1947 and the granting of Canadian citizenship were important (if incomplete) steps in redressing the discrimination embodied in Canadian immigration legislation. This incremental liberalization enabled the introduction of the Status Adjustment Program and the universal selection criteria advanced in the 1962 immigration regulations.

The Status Adjustment Program had obvious benefits for those who entered the country illegally. In a 2009 interview with me, Sid Chow Tan, a community activist in Vancouver, chuckled about being shepherded through the adjustment process as a young boy. His humour seemed to disguise more troubling emotions, however, as he then talked openly about his fear of being deported until he was “normalized” in 1964.\(^\text{122}\) Douglas Lam (whom we met in Chapter One) moved to Australia in part because of his fears about becoming a paper son in Canada. He

\(^\text{120}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{122}\) Sid Chow Tan, interview with author, 22 October 2009, Vancouver, British Columbia.
worried about possible “snitches” in the Chinese community in Vancouver and the complications of trying to pretend that his grandfather was his father. He worried further about being deported.\textsuperscript{123} As Douglas and Sid’s stories illustrate, entering the country illegally made migrants vulnerable to prosecution and deportation while the state-proffered solution to their liminal status made them vulnerable to state scrutiny and dependent on state generosity. The authority of the state was therefore reinforced even as the initial act of illegal entry was forgiven. The Status Adjustment Program served as an important reminder to the Chinese in Canada and the Canadian public generally that it was the state that had the authority to determine the means of entry and to enforce it. The “double-sided” nature of the program, meant “the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers almost simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order.”\textsuperscript{124}

**Conclusions**

Discussions of illegality enveloped migrants in different ways in the postwar period. On occasion, the state used a discourse of illegality to target Chinese migrants specifically. In Australia and Hong Kong, governments publicly discussed illegality in relation to Chinese migration to dissuade migrants from the People’s Republic of China from claiming refugee status in their territories. In Canada, the state suppressed earlier charges of illegality so that the government could normalize the status of migrants who had previously entered the country illegally. In both cases, where the discourse of illegality was used for instrumental aims and where it was disregarded in favour of a normalizing discourse, the concept of illegality and of people living outside the margins of normal society legitimized the state’s role as the arbitrator of the legitimate and illegitimate means of entry. This official discretion affected the capacity for humanitarian actors and the general publics to discern the presence of refugees from the People’s Republic and influenced the degree of sympathy that any claims to refugeehood generated. In Hong Kong in particular, the discourse of illegality and the practice of deporting Chinese migrants as an enforcement strategy, crowded out calls for humanitarian compassion for migrants from “Red China.” It was evidence of Charles Taylor’s theories on the relationship between social forms and social content, where “understanding makes the practice possible” and

\textsuperscript{123} Douglas Lam, interview with author, 11 July 2010, Sydney, Australia.

“it is the practice that largely carries the understanding.”¹²⁵ In Australia however, the battle over hearts and minds was more contested and the state was clearly in a defensive position in arguing for the propriety of deportations to the People’s Republic of China in 1962.

The manner in which Australia’s immigration program was structured and enforced after the Second World War (particularly the state’s heavy reliance on limited temporary entry permits reinforced by deportations when the permits expired), ensured that Chinese migrants remained intimately linked with illegality and rejected as outsiders by the conservative, law and order norms of Australian society. While the government actively selected and resettled thousands of displaced people from Europe, it insisted on the expulsion of non-European wartime evacuees and restrictions on Chinese migration more broadly. As unwanted arrivals on Australian shores and outsiders in the “White Australia built on the twin pillars of Anglo-Celtic origins and cultural heritage,”¹²⁶ the wartime evacuees and postwar Chinese migrants were marginalized by attempted deportations and associated accusations of illegality. Efforts to resist the state’s deportation tactics only confirmed suspicions about the character and reliability of Chinese migrants and residents. The resulting association of illegality with Chinese people in Australia was so powerful that as legal scholar Catherine Dauvergne has shown of the current discourse on illegality, it became “established as an identity of its own… replicating layers of disadvantage and exclusion.”¹²⁷ Deportation practices reinforced pervasive discrimination as Chinese migrants came to physically embody an illegality that allegedly threatened Australia’s sovereign space and the stability of the nation. The investigations undertaken as a result of the Aliens Registration Act and the Wartime Refugee Relief Act in Australia reproduced this very effect. The investigations in Canada generally did not (at least after the initial police raids), largely because the government took great pains to ensure that the Chinese community as a whole was not targeted.

The living legacy of state deliberations about illegal migration to Australia played out during the crisis over the deportation of Willie Wong in 1962. The public outcry over Wong’s deportation

¹²⁷ Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, 19.
to Communist China was met by a stubborn rebuttal from government officials who testified to Wong’s illegality and the need to pursue deportations in order to ensure that unwanted migrants did not abuse Australia’s immigration system. The government defended the deportation on two grounds: first that Wong was in no real danger as a result of being returned to the Chinese mainland and secondly, by implying that he deserved his fate because he was illegal and motivated by economic gain. The term “illegal economic migrant” represented a fusion of both illegality and the state’s position that people had to move through officially sanctioned categories of migration to be considered for entry.

Suffocating ideas of illegality left little space for the concept of assistance for Chinese refugees to develop amongst politicians and policymakers in Australia in the postwar period. In Hong Kong, government officials used the discourse of illegality to deliberately snuff out any claims to refugeehood. Charges of illegality fostered a public climate that was amenable to the physical expulsion of migrants found without the proper documentation, regardless of their possible refugeehood. In Canada, by contrast, the state’s decision to normalize the position of the Chinese migrants who entered the country illegally in previous decades meant that the state suppressed the language of illegality in public discussions of the adjustment program. Instead, the state vilified those who had orchestrated the illegal immigration rings while carefully ensuring that migrants themselves were not targeted. By embracing the so-called victims, the state ensured fuller participation in the Status Adjustment Program and advanced its objective of reducing the number of resources that went into surveying and tracking the “paper family” phenomenon. The Canadian state conveyed its authority on admissions to the country by dictating the terms upon which migrants could be normalized at the very moment when it appeared to be losing control over the integrity of its immigration program given the rampant fraud detected in Hong Kong.

By deciding the legitimate means of movement, the Canadian state privileged existing categories of migration. None of these categories were open to those migrants who left the People’s Republic of China on the basis of being refugees. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the lack of a designated refugee category did not inhibit movement. Rather, migrants simply learned to navigate their way through complex categories that designated the legitimate means of movement and through discrete opportunities for resettlement to countries such as New Zealand that otherwise remained relatively closed to Chinese migrants.
CHAPTER SIX

NAVIGATING DISCRETION AND THE LEGITIMATE MEANS OF MOVEMENT,

1962-1976

Introduction

Over the course of the twentieth century, states responded to increased population flows, and the movement of refugees in particular, with efforts to control and regulate the entry of large numbers of people through the use of formalized categories that designated what John Torpey has coined the “legitimate means of movement.”\(^1\) Migrants were required to be properly documented and to meet established selection criteria in order to move legally. Rigidly defined categories such as skilled worker, student, family class and refugee came to define the legitimate means of movement as well as the people who moved. Despite the existence of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, refugees were one of the last groups of migrants to be defined in legislation. Canada defined refugees in law for the first time in 1976. New Zealand did so in 1999.

The development of various categories to designate the legitimate means of movement did not stop people from moving. Rather, they adapted and moved through whatever categories existed. When no category was available to them, many opted to move illegally. People seeking to move learned to navigate not only state designated categories of migration but also opportunities for resettlement created by the advocacy of interested humanitarian actors. These opportunities were limited, discrete and were often more fickle in their eligibility requirements than regular immigration programs. The social networks and intelligence that migrants relied upon to navigate both legitimate and illegitimate means of movement were often interrupted by the appearance of isolated resettlement opportunities. On such occasions, migrants relied on the goodwill of humanitarian actors to assist them with migration opportunities.

In surveying the changing legal landscapes in Canada and New Zealand from 1962 to 1976, it is

possible to see how migrants navigated the progressive incorporation of humanitarianism in Canada and the simultaneous preservation of executive discretion in New Zealand, which remained almost untouched until 1987. In both countries, non-state actors continued to play a critical role in advancing an agenda around refugee assistance in the late twentieth century. States responded to humanitarian appeals in various ways. In Canada, humanitarianism was progressively incorporated into the state’s legal framework. With the development of mechanisms such as the family reunification agreement with People’s Republic of China in 1973 and the Designated Classes established in the 1976 Immigration Act (which also elaborated the grounds for admission on humanitarian and compassionate grounds) the state sought to direct the character of humanitarianism and its scope of responsibility in multiple arenas. In New Zealand, the government retained discretion on humanitarian assistance in large part because until the 1970s it continued to be concerned about the impact of Chinese migration on the racial character of the nation. Humanitarianism was therefore a mix of priorities and concerns. Action was often justified by how it would affect the nation’s sense of self and both its domestic and international priorities. In the pursuit of closer relations with the People’s Republic of China, governments in both Ottawa and Wellington sought to avoid sensitive subjects such as refugees. Authorities in New Zealand dealt with humanitarian issues on a case-by-case basis while the Canadian state sought to regularize migration with a family reunification agreement. Migrants learned to navigate all of these various developments.

The standardization of immigration controls around the world has been explained in two main ways. One school of thought, of which historian Adam McKeown is a good example, sees this development as a project of globalization. McKeown describes standardization as a kind of coerced standard of behaviour where states desiring to be thought of as enlightened and civilized used technologies such as the passport to indicate that they too were part of the modern world.\(^2\) The other school of thought is born of Michel Foucault’s theories on governmentality where the state achieves political objectives through the use of diffuse power structures that envelope

individuals in the larger project of reinforcing the authority and legitimacy of the state. In this light, immigration control is not simply about physical admissions. It is about power and specifically, the power of the state.\textsuperscript{3}

This project is sympathetic to both schools of thought. However, it also seeks to assess the work of humanitarian actors in transforming both the domestic and international refugee regimes of the postwar period. It therefore attempts to understand the role of non-state actors in the context of globalization and governmentality in a manner that recognizes that these actors were “transnational systems of power in their own right.”\textsuperscript{4} Humanitarian actors mediated the refugee experience. They shaped perceptions of refugees and also influenced the incorporation of humanitarian principles into national immigration frameworks. Thinking through the activities of non-governmental actors creates an opening in which consider to the conditions under which practices of governmentality were conceived and applied. This means moving away from thinking of migrants as victims of state practices of control and addressing how migrants, particularly those with critical social networks at their disposal, navigated various options. For Chinese migrants, these included both state-designated categories of movement as well as exceptional humanitarian opportunities forged by concerned observers.

**Humanitarian Engagement in Canada and New Zealand**

Up until the late 1960s, refugee policy in Canada was an \textit{ad hoc} affair: admission, resettlement and refugee determinations were made almost entirely at the discretion of the state. This situation lasted even longer in New Zealand, with the executive branch retaining control over refugee admissions until 1987. In both cases, humanitarian exceptions to restrictive laws on entry and other forms of assistance were born of energetic lobbying by non-state actors.


\textsuperscript{4} Aihwa Ong, \textit{Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 9.
In 1941, the National Council of Churches (NCC) was established in New Zealand to coordinate the work of churches and the Salvation Army. Three years later, the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) was founded to coordinate programs amongst member churches and to advance the worldwide Ecumenical movement. In Canada, the work of the CCC quickly became incorporated into the state’s relief activities in Europe. By 1948, 40,000 displaced persons had arrived in Canada from camps in Europe. In response to determined lobbying by the CCC, the federal government established a formal Church Assistance Program in 1951. The CCC coordinated selection and sponsorship, submitting the names of potential migrants (based on commendations from the World Council of Church (WCC) staff in the field) to authorities in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. About forty new migrants were selected each month under the Church Assistance Program. Despite this successful resettlement, the program was cumbersome, awkward and time-consuming. Lay interests were primarily invested in reconstruction efforts at home through support to returning veterans and broken families and there was little concrete interest in sponsoring refugees apart from immediate relatives. Moreover, as the rhetoric of the Cold War thickened, the general public regarded the movement of displaced persons with considerable apprehension in terms of the physical, psychological and moral health of the people arriving. As a result, early efforts to resettle European refugees met with only tepid support from congregations across the country. Disappointed, church leaders sought out sponsors amongst unions and farmers’ associations (the latter sponsored refugees in part to meet labour needs). Given the difficulties involved in finding interested sponsors, there was earnest debate amongst religious leaders about the role that churches should play in the sponsorship and support of refugees.

In order to advance the twinned objectives of refugee sponsorship and successful settlement, an

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5 The government also responded to lobbying from the Canadian Jewish Congress, later developing an Oppressed Minorities Program that offered discretion in admitting people on humanitarian grounds from overseas.
6 Department of Ecumenical Affairs Minutes - Committee on the Immigration of Refugees, 37-7, Canadian Council of Churches Fonds, MG 28, I 327, LAC.
8 Franca Iacovetta, Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006), 50.
9 Immigration Conference, 11 January 1950, 37-7 Department of Ecumenical Affairs Minutes - Committee on the Immigration of Refugees, Canadian Council of Churches, MG 28, I 327, LAC.
10 Committee on Immigration of Refugees, “A Report to The Churches,” Fred N. Poulton, October 1953, CCC Fonds, LAC.
elite cadre of advocates developed amongst church organizations in Canada, including Reverend Lesley Cooke (Associate Secretary, WCC) and Fred Poulton (Secretary of the Department of Social Affairs, CCC). They worked to raise awareness about the need for broad-based support to refugees. Their attention was almost exclusively on the situation in Europe. As a number of scholars, including John Webster Grant, have observed, church groups ignored the issue of persistent racism in Canadian immigration policies and focused primarily on supporting displaced persons who matched the existing dominant racial make-up of the country and who could add to the size of congregations across the country.¹¹ For instance, a 1952 “Resolution on Immigration” issued by an organization of Canadian churches declared that given the “grave difficulties,” faced by “the British people at home,” the federal government should give greater encouragement of, and assistance for, the immigration of settlers from the British Isles.”¹² The churches’ geographic gaze was therefore limited, fixed primarily on Europe and the United Kingdom. When they looked beyond Europe to China, it was often out of concern for their own missionaries.¹³ As noted in previous chapters, Canadian church engagement with refugee issues in Hong Kong became more pronounced only in the late 1950s as a result of initiatives such as World Refugee Year. In the interim, Canadian churches pursued formal refugee resettlement schemes from Europe and contended with the government’s ultimate discretion in the approval or rejection of recommended migrants.

In 1953, the Canadian government introduced proposals to modify the terms under which displaced persons in Europe were accepted for entry to Canada. The new focus was on recruiting workers to meet labour shortages. Up until then, people were selected for resettlement to Canada based upon humanitarian grounds, which usually meant some kind of family reunification arrangement. Those who did not have any family members in Canada were admitted based upon

¹² 1952 Resolution on Immigration, 37-7 Department of Ecumenical Affairs Minutes - Committee on the Immigration of Refugees, Canadian Council of Churches, MG 28, I 327, LAC.
¹³ Notes on Political Conditions in China, February 1948, G.S. 75-103, Box 76 Series 3-3 Leonard A. Dixon Files, Anglican Church of Canada Archives (Toronto).
“special provision” at the discretion of the government. They were subject to the same selection criteria as other migrants, except that in their cases, the criteria were applied more liberally. The proposed 1953 changes meant that the kinds of people the churches were sponsoring would have to change. The CCC was dismayed, observing, “economic interest has now become the paramount concern of our Canadian immigration policy.” The CCC membership proceeded to unanimously reject the government’s proposals on the grounds that tying resettlement to a list of occupations produced by the Canadian state would rule out “the humanitarian element now present in the programmes of the voluntary agencies.” It was important to the churches that the programs for displaced persons in Europe be humanitarian in character and this meant a priority on family reunification and related leniency in the application of immigration selection criteria. Church and state positions on this issue proved irreconcilable and the sponsorship program faltered, only to be temporarily revived as a result of World Refugee Year and then eventually formalized in the 1976 Immigration Act (discussed below).

**Exceptions and Discretion in New Zealand**

A parallel story unfolded in New Zealand, except that unlike the Canadian case, discretion on refugee admissions remained the purview of politicians until 1987. Similar to the CCC in constitution and approach, the National Council of Churches (NCC) in New Zealand was instrumental in providing assistance to displaced people from Europe after the Second World War. As was the case for the CCC, the NCC only gradually became interested, and then involved, in campaigning for refugee sponsorship opportunities from Asia. As discussed in Chapter Four, the NCC first started campaigning for the resettlement of refugee families from Hong Kong in the late 1950s. The St. Vincent de Paul Society joined the NCC in lobbying for the resettlement of refugees, though it focused exclusively on orphan adoption schemes. As a result, the work of refugee sponsorship was split denominationally in New Zealand with the NCC representing Protestant interests and the St. Vincent de Paul Society representing those of

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14 Fortier to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 29 January 1952, RG 25, Volume 6452, 5475-EA-1-40, UNHCR, Part 1.1, LAC.
15 Committee on Immigration of Refugees, Meeting with Department of Citizenship and Immigration on 3 March 1954, CCC Fonds, LAC.
16 Ibid.
the Catholics. Both organizations were part of transnational networks; working with the WCC and the International Catholic Migration Committee respectively.

Reverend Alan Brash, appointed General Secretary of the East Asian Christian Conference in 1957, was at the forefront of advancing the activities of the WCC. While New Zealand accepted five thousand European refugees after the Second World War and several hundred more during World Refugee Year, the government only reluctantly admitted Chinese refugees. Three families arrived from Hong Kong in 1961 and fifty orphans were resettled a year later. Operating with a view of immigration policy that historian Sean Brawley describes as whiteness by stealth, successive governments proved reluctant to open the door too wide to permanent Chinese emigration.  

The fundamental premise that New Zealand could only accept so many Chinese migrants without endangering the British character of the country meant that the government consistently rejected requests from the Chinese community to facilitate the entry of relatives. As T.P. Shand, the Minister of Labour with responsibility for immigration, observed:

> The (Chinese) community would increase their numbers very quickly if we allowed them to but it is necessary to operate our immigration policy in such a way that we do not build up our racial minorities so quickly that we jeopardise our future race relationships in this country.

He was thinking in particular of evolving relations with the Maori and Pakeha, whom the government was seeking to incorporate into mainstream New Zealand life. In correspondence with Reverend Brash, Minister Shand explained,

> The government has another problem…which would be aggravated by the acceptance of refugee families of the type available from Hong Kong. We have an average of 1600 to 2000 rural Maoris, unskilled and inadequately educated for city life, to absorb each year into our industrial structure. Added to this we have a responsibility to take increasing numbers of our own island peoples and the people of Samoa. Every Chinese refugee of the type available from Hong Kong aggravates this problem with which we are scarcely coping adequately as I am sure you will agree.

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20 Shand to Brash, 30 July 1962, regarding visit to Hong Kong and discussions with Mr. Sedgwick, Commissioner of Labour and Immigration in Hong Kong, Immigration - Policy and General - Chinese, 1960-1962, ABKF, 947, W5182, 94, 22/1/115, Part 3, ANZ.
The NCC was attuned to government concerns about Chinese migration and the admission of refugees from Hong Kong. It implicitly acknowledged the government’s fears of “upsetting the ethnic balance of the population” by championing both the character of the refugees as well as that of the New Zealand nation. For instance, in 1962, the NCC wrote:

Amongst the Hong Kong refugees there are many whose skills, language abilities, and even cultural and religious traditions are such that the problems of integrating them into our community would be considerably less than might be imagined… We believe that it would be to the long-term enrichment of our peoples.

Similarly, the St. Vincent de Paul Society advanced arguments on the basis of how adoption programs benefited New Zealand. The Society openly conceded that their scheme was of “no significance in the overall situation in Hong Kong.” Nevertheless, the Society’s chairman felt “strongly” that New Zealand “should be doing this sort of thing for our own sakes.” He argued:

It is an encouragement for us to realize the great desire to be personally involved in the problems of the millions of poor people overseas, which resides in the hearts of so many New Zealanders…by our assistance to refugees and migrants as they arrive in New Zealand, we believe we are doing something to fulfill the Christian Commandment to “love one another.”

Refugee resettlement and assistance became a response to situate New Zealand amongst other nations that considered themselves “good, generous and prosperous.” It was a fragile construction however, as Minister Shand (who had almost sole discretion on humanitarian admissions) was repeatedly confronted by requests from Chinese New Zealanders for permission to sponsor their relatives. Shand consistently refused these requests out of fear that “too much” migration would result. When one childless couple applied to sponsor their niece and nephew from Hong Kong to raise as their own, Shand refused, “Most of the Chinese families here have many relatives resident in China and Hong Kong.” From his perspective, to make an exception would be to open the doors to similar, and likely excessively numerous, petitions.

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21 Shand to Mr., G.W. Lowes, 1 June 1961, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, ABKF, 947, W5182, 96 22/1/115/1, Part, ANZ.
22 National Council of Churches to Shand, 1962, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, ABKF, 947, W5182, 96 22/1/115/1, Part 1, ANZ.
23 J.R. Gaynor, Chairman, Immigration Committee to Shand, 4 May 1965, Immigration - General - Chinese Orphans, ABKF, 947, W5182, Box 96, 22/1/115/1, Part 2, ANZ.
Shand’s position was compromised somewhat by the NCC, which proved relentless in its determination to sponsor refugees from Hong Kong to New Zealand. In 1963, six families were approved for resettlement from Hong Kong. As a result, the NCC’s sponsorship efforts became progressively formalized. In 1964, it established an office in Christchurch and hired a resettlement officer from the WCC.26 Through its connections in Hong Kong and its work in New Zealand, the NCC became increasingly part of the machinery of transnational resettlement efforts. The WCC and the UNHCR would refer cases to the NCC, which would then submit them to the New Zealand government for approval. Once approved, the NCC matched sponsors with refugees.27

Following on their initial success in resettling six families from Hong Kong in 1963, the NCC approached the government in 1966 with another request for sponsorship.28 The government considered this request sympathetically. They liked the fact that the NCC coordinated the work of individual congregations who accepted responsibilities for the refugees’ accommodation, welfare, and in some cases, employment.29 It appears that the government was also pleased with the quality of the individuals recommended by the NCC:

> The acceptance of six refugee families from Hong Kong has proved to be quite successful, because in practically all cases the breadwinners have possessed the occupational skills that we need here. For instance, one man was a qualified medical practitioner and is now completing a qualifying period at Otago University so that he can obtain New Zealand registration. Two other Chinese are working as accountants. The entry of six families like this over a period of eighteen months to two years at a time is not likely to create any problem.30

The government was so delighted with the skilled individuals being resettled that when the NCC recommended another twelve families for resettlement in 1969, Minister Shand unilaterally approved the program. Shand did not consult with his Cabinet colleagues as he had in previous years, since the merits of approval had become self-evident. The only condition was that the

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26 The position later became permanent and was filled by Reverend O’Grady for many years.
28 Sponsorship by the National Council of Churches of Migrants Including Refugees, 10 February 1966, Refugees - General (1961-1976), AAFD, 811, W3738, 8, 95, CAB 69/1/1, ANZ.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
resettlement effort be limited to six families. The department felt it “would be less difficult to resett...ing that very few of the cases fell within the department’s stated parameters. It seemed that most of the recommended families had “established themselves quite well” and had “a standard of living equal to the local residents” of Hong Kong. To reconcile the contradiction between refusing applications for family sponsorship from Chinese New Zealanders with ongoing refugee resettlement initiatives from Hong Kong, the government insisted that the individuals the NCC sponsored had to be clearly, and unquestionably, refugees in need of assistance.

The government therefore needed to find a way to distinguish between the people being resettled and the people that Chinese communities wanted to sponsor. It was critical that the refugees being resettled to New Zealand from Hong Kong be “genuine refugees” so as not to further offend the Chinese community. This dilemma resulted in serious discussions amongst officials in New Zealand about how they should be defining refugees and how they should be evaluating the merits of the cases promoted by the WCC. It was a difficult task. One official explained to a colleague, “we have always understood a Refugee to be a person who has been forced to leave his homeland in order to escape from oppression etc.” Nevertheless, the sheer number of people who left the Chinese mainland after 1949 convinced the government that limits had to be put on the definition of a refugee. The government considered the WCC “naïve” in suggesting “that the many thousands who have left mainland China since 1949 should be eligible for the fourth quota per se with no other qualification than that they are refugees.” Instead, the government proposed that refugeehood be defined in relation to others who had left in similar circumstances. This meant identifying “persons who are suffering genuine hardship compared with their contemporaries in the country of residence.” Admission on humanitarian grounds was not to apply to those who had successfully established themselves in a second country.

31 Immigration - General - International Refugees Organization - Chinese in Hong Kong 1967 – 1984, ABKF, 947, W5182, 33, 22/1/27/17, Part 1, ANZ.
35 Ibid.
especially if they seemed to be doing as well as (or better than) their fellow residents.\textsuperscript{36} Officials cautioned the WCC “that the success or otherwise of continuing our refugee quota must be restricted to genuine refugees” and that “New Zealand should not be a dumping group for people who have been registered with the World Council of Churches as alleged refugees…”\textsuperscript{37}

In 1971, the NCC proposed a fourth quota and submitted thirty cases for consideration based, in theory, on the selection criteria established by the department. The criteria included the following four elements:

- a) The applicants should be \textit{genuine refugees} (emphasis added) who are having difficulty in establishing themselves in Hong Kong;
- b) The head of the family should not be more than 45 years and should have not more than four children;
- c) He should be able to engage in a worthwhile occupation in New Zealand; preferably as a tradesman, technician or as an experienced factory operative;
- d) All members of the family must be of good health and character.\textsuperscript{38}

The Commissioner in Hong Kong, C.S. Crawford checked the list for possible candidates based on the government’s criteria. He found none but because of what he later called the WCC’s “sob story” he felt compelled to select six possible candidates.\textsuperscript{39} When the list was forwarded to the Department of Labour, they rejected all of the chosen candidates. They too found nothing refugee-like about the six families. Officials were adamant that the people chosen for resettlement to New Zealand meet the government’s standard for genuine refugees, which, (significantly) included criteria for employability in New Zealand.

When news of the rejection was communicated in Hong Kong, WCC staff were very upset, especially because some of the families involved had already begun to make preparations to


\textsuperscript{37} This intervention was warmly received. The Minister of Labour annotated the memorandum with the following comment: “I couldn’t agree more. I have long felt sure that there must be more deserving cases in Hong Kong than the type of case usually put forward by Rev. O’Grady, 23 August 1971.” External Affairs to Crawford, 30 August 1971, Immigration - General - International Refugees Organization - Chinese in Hong Kong 1967 – 1984, ABKF, 947, W5182, 33, 22/1/27/17, Part 1, ANZ.

\textsuperscript{38} See Immigration - General - International Refugees Organization - Chinese in Hong Kong 1967 – 1984, ABKF, 947, W5182, 33, 22/1/27/17, Part 1, ANZ.

move to New Zealand. The government in Wellington soon learned that Mr. Ng Kao Chiang had
resigned his position in anticipation of an imminent departure from Hong Kong. Officials
suspected that Reverend O’Grady, the NCC’s Resettlement Officer, had been too enthusiastic in
his communications with the families. Torn between the government and twinned interests of the
NCC and WCC, the Commissioner in Hong Kong suggested there were valid grounds for
considering Mr. and Mrs. Chiang as refugees:

He was born in Macao in 1938, went to China in 1947 and escaped from China in 1950
when he returned to Macao and completed his studies there in 1957 prior to coming to
Hong Kong. Mrs. Ng was born in China in 1938. Her father fled from China about 1955
leaving behind a wife and three children. Mrs. Ng managed to escape from China in 1961
when she came to Hong Kong. Her mother and two sisters still live in China and her
father died in Hong Kong in 1969.40

In this case, Crawford proposed that merely leaving the Chinese mainland was sufficient
evidence of refugeehood. It was the kind of broad argument advanced by the WCC that
authorities in Wellington had come to suspect and reject. Undeterred, Reverend O’Grady
petitioned on behalf of two other refused cases. He described Kin Yip Peter Chan as “an orphan
who has endured considerable hardship under the Communists in China. His salary is not
sufficient to support himself without help from a cousin. He has a sponsoring church, and
guaranteed employment in his own field of motor mechanic.” The second case involved Mr. and
Mrs. Bernard Hui. Reverend O’Grady explained that Mr. Hui had “long been unable to find
steady employment in Hong Kong, and although both he and Mrs. Hui work their combined
earnings are insufficient to keep the family. In addition the baby has to be boarded out so Mrs.
Hui can work.”41 It was difficult for officials in Wellington to determine what was so exceptional
about these cases that they required resettlement to New Zealand. Officials in Wellington
believed the applicants to be “suitable as migrants” but could not ascertain on what grounds they
had been presented as refugee cases.42

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40 External Affairs to Crawford, 30 August 1971, Immigration - General - International Refugees Organization -
Chinese in Hong Kong 1967 – 1984, ABKF, 947, W5182, 33, 22/1/27/17, Part 1, ANZ.
41 Neugebauer to O’Grady, 10 May 1972; External Affairs to Crawford, 30 August 1971, Immigration - General -
International Refugees Organization - Chinese in Hong Kong 1967 – 1984, ABKF, 947, W5182, 33, 22/1/27/17, Part 1, ANZ.
42 Coveny for Secretary of Labour to Crawford, 29 July 1971, External Affairs to Crawford, 30 August 1971,
Immigration - General - International Refugees Organization - Chinese in Hong Kong 1967 – 1984, ABKF, 947,
W5182, 33, 22/1/27/17, Part 1, ANZ.
It is not clear whether the WCC, the NCC and the Commissioner in Hong Kong ever convinced officials in Wellington to accept the fourth quota. It is amply evident however that the NCC, the WCC and the New Zealand government all tread a fine line in pursuing the resettlement of families from Hong Kong. It is doubtful whether any of the families resettled were the most needy people in Hong Kong. The selection criteria designed by the government meant that those selected for resettlement had to have some capacity for successfully establishing themselves. This created an opening for people seeking to move. However, it seems that in 1971, the WCC misjudged where the dividing line between desirable migrant and burdensome refugee was located. After 1971, there were no further resettlement schemes for Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the incremental progress made by the NCC in getting the state to consider refugee admissions from Asia contributed in part to the character of New Zealand’s 1974 Immigration Act that removed much of the legal infrastructure that initially fostered the possibility of pursuing a White New Zealand policy.43

Formalizing Humanitarianism

New Zealand’s reforms were part of a larger shift in the regulation of migrants. Informed by decolonisation movements around the world and an increasingly potent universal human rights discourse, the advocacy of groups such as the CCC and the NCC contributed to evolving immigration norms amongst settler societies. Beginning in Canada in 1962, most of the settler societies under study began to remove overtly anti-Asian clauses from rules and regulations governing permanent entry, opening up categories of migration that had previously been closed to migrants from Asia. The White Australia policy was gradually dismantled from 1966 to 1973.44

43 The law required that people should have needed skills, be between 18 and 45, have no more than four children, be able to settle satisfactorily in the community, and have a community of the same race already in New Zealand. Robin Galienne charges that the Act was still applied more liberally to British and Europeans than to Asians, while Sean Brawley maintains that it was favourable to the Chinese in particular because it allowed for Chinese New Zealanders to sponsor their relatives. See Galienne, “The Whole Thing Was Orchestrated,” 15 and Brawley, “White New Zealand,” 34.

44 The exception, once again, was South Africa. Melanie Yap and Dianne Leong, Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), 351. Significantly, the liberalization of immigration regimes amongst settler societies stands in stark contrast to restrictions introduced in Britain in 1962. Migration to the United Kingdom was restricted following the passage of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. The controversial legislation capped entry on migrants from South Asia and the Caribbean by limiting arrivals to those holding employment vouchers. The difference in approach between British and settler society authorities reflects historic disjunctures in how migration was understood in the colonies and metropole. On the contested nature of change in Great Britain for instance, see Alice Bloch, The Migration and
In Canada, the introduction of “race-neutral” immigration regulations in 1962 fundamentally altered the landscape in which people were selected and admitted to the country. This landscape shifted further in 1967 when a universal points system was introduced to select skilled workers. The system was meant to regulate, and in many ways limit, the number of entries and the kinds of people admitted for permanent settlement. It also became a mechanism for deflecting humanitarian responsibilities because the system itself was assessed as a fair and just instrument.

As the Minister for Manpower and Immigration, Richard Bell, explained to one newspaper correspondent:

> It is felt that the orderly and normal movement of qualified immigrants under the new Regulations is preferable to specific movements of large blocs of people of the same ethnic group, especially where such groups might face difficulties in establishment. It is expected that the new Regulations will enable Canada to make a significant contribution to the relief of refugees everywhere in the world.

In the same year, the Immigration and Appeal Board, which had operated since 1956, became a fully independent tribunal. The Board’s original mandate was to review all deportation orders, including those where there existed compelling humanitarian or compassionate grounds for permitting an individual to remain in Canada. In 1967, this mandate was expanded. The Board was given the authority to halt deportations if there was evidence of “reasonable grounds for

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believing that if execution of the order is carried out, the person concerned will be punished for activities of a political character, or will suffer unusual hardship.” Ministerial discretion was greatly reduced and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration could only sign a security certificate to bypass the Board’s decision in instances where the individual in question was deemed to be a national security threat. The term refugee remained undefined in Canadian law. People could move to Canada as skilled workers, as a result of family class sponsorships or temporarily as visitors or students. There was no category for asylum-seekers.

Although the existence of various migration categories was meant to regulate and limit the number of migrants entering Canada (providing the opportunity for the government to deflect responsibilities as suggested by Minister Richard Bell’s previous comment), the numerous categories created opportunities for those who could navigate the system. Sandra Wilking came to Canada in 1967 in part because of the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong. As Wilking explains, “I had hoped to be able to stay in Canada after my student visa expired. This was made possible as the immigration rules towards foreign students at the time made it very easy to gain permanent residency in Canada.” Similarly, Maggie Ip, founder of SUCCESS (an immigrant settlement agency in Vancouver) came to Canada as a student in the early 1960s and planned to return to Hong Kong upon the completion of her studies. When the riots erupted in Hong Kong in 1967, her plans changed and she too ended up staying up in Canada. Confronted with difficult circumstances, Sandra and Maggie did not wait to be assisted by the Canadian state or Western humanitarian actors. They never petitioned the Immigration Appeal Board to let them stay. They simply chose to move or stay depending on the categories of migration available to them.

The legal landscape changed further in 1969 when Canada acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the associated 1967 Protocol, which removed the geographic and temporal limitations of the Convention. In doing so, Canada followed the lead

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49 Sandra Wilking, e-mail correspondence with author, 7 May 2012.
51 There was considerable ambivalence globally about how the Protocol should be structured. Sara E. Davies

External Affairs took the lead on ratification, with little consultation with their colleagues in the Department of Manpower and Immigration. More than anything else, the decision to ratify was a reflection of the generally confident mood with which the Canadian state, at the height of Trudeaumania, viewed itself and its place in the world. Canada’s ratification on 4 June 1969 went largely unnoticed in media outlets such as the Globe and Mail despite the fact that the ratification fundamentally altered the landscape for individuals claiming refugee status in Canada. Specifically, ratification marked a steep limitation on the discretion Canadian governments had previously enjoyed in discussing refugees and in determining who was, and who was not, a refugee.

The Convention established the legal parameters for defining a refugee and encouraged the Canadian state to establish formal refugee determination procedures. The first definition of a


David Palmer has assessed the limited humanitarianism in Australia’s ratification of the Convention. In his assessment, “the intention was less to avoid granting refuge to non-Europeans, than to ensure Australia had the power to remove them when they were no longer in need of protection, and so avoid a grant of asylum being automatically equated with permanent residence.” See “The Quest for ‘Wriggle Room’: Australia and the Refugees Convention, 1951–73,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no.2 (2009), 305, accessed May 2, 2012, doi:10.1080/10357710902895178.


Mike Molloy, e-mail correspondence with author, 12 May 2012.

Bryan Palmer, Canada’s 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 142. The term “Trudeaumania” refers to the excitement generated by Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s entry into the 1968 leadership race for the Liberal Party of Canada. It crested during Trudeau’s early years as prime minister.


Raoul Sylt, “Asylum in Canada: A Socio-Historical Analysis and an Analytical Study of Present Law and Selected Policies,” Vol. I. Found in MG31 H158, Imrich Rosenberg Fonds, Volume 8, LAC. For instance, the government proceeded quickly to resettle people fleeing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They were evaluated according to their capacity for successful settlement in Canada rather than any refuge definition.
refugee in Canadian legislation would follow from ratification, reshaping the manner in which people moved and the contours of the state’s humanitarian assistance to refugees. The Canadian government proceeded to develop mechanisms to address cases that required humanitarian and compassionate response but did not mesh with the Convention’s framework. It was in the 1976 Immigration Act that the character of state humanitarianism on immigration issues would come to be defined in the Canadian context. In the interim, the government developed alternative mechanisms to address the movement of people from the People’s Republic of China. These mechanisms, specifically the 1973 consular agreement (initiated at the behest of authorities in Beijing) focused on the reunification of families. No special measures were taken with regard refugees fleeing the Cultural Revolution for nearby Hong Kong. Refugees in the British colony were largely ignored, or unrecognized in the West, cloaked in the discourse of illegality that enveloped the movement of people from the mainland throughout the 1970s.

Refugees from the Cultural Revolution
Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in May 1966 as a result of his concerns that the communist project was being corrupted by “bourgeois elements.” What was intended to be a controlled revitalization became an unexpectedly tumultuous upheaval.58 Cadres of Red Guards formed across the country and people were physically and psychologically persecuted for failing to uphold the class struggle.59 Top leaders from the Communist Party were purged, along with senior military officials and university educators. Thousands of people were displaced as urban youth were sent to the countryside to labour on collective farms. Many people saw their physical property destroyed or taken from them. Political scientist Yan Jiaqi calls the Cultural Revolution “unprecedented” and argues that it’s “total absence of democracy and rule of law...touched everyone, enveloping the entire Chinese population of a nearly a billion people.”60 Hong Yong

Lee suggests, “political persecution on the basis of personal vendetta was widespread,” particularly during the “mass stage” of the revolution from 1966 to 1969. Only with Mao’s death in 1976 and the arrests of the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen) for the excesses of the revolution, did the decade of upheaval finally conclude. At the 11th Party Congress in 1977, the Chinese Communist Party declared the Cultural Revolution officially over.

Paradoxically, all of this internal turmoil was taking place as China was formally rejoining the international community; assuming the “China seat” at the United Nations in 1971 and negotiating diplomatic relations with several Western countries, including Canada in 1970, Australia and New Zealand in 1972 and the United States in 1979. Much of the violence taking place in China was unknown in the West as the regime in Beijing stage-managed visits to the country and shielded outsiders from the worst of the violence. The blind ignorance that resulted prompted M. Bernard Frolic, author of *Mao’s People*, to write a book based on interviews with people who left the mainland during the Cultural Revolution. He explains his decision as follows:

Too many people were returning from three-week trips to China, pen in hand, ready to tell the world what they had found. As a result, a spate of decidedly sympathetic accounts of Chinese life and politics emerged, the product of a “China fever” reminiscent of the similarly misguided pilgrimages made to the Soviet Union in the early 1930s.

This rose-coloured perception of China meant there was little room for the image of persecuted refugees, fleeing out of fear. People either couldn’t, or didn’t want to, believe the refugees’ stories. As Frolic observed:

Refugees complained about elitism, lack of responsiveness to mass needs, inept policies, over politicization, unnecessary political purges, harsh life in forced labor camps, and so on. These complaints were often dismissed as sour grapes and made us question the

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62 While Mao declared the Cultural Revolution over in 1969, the political fallout continued and some historians suggest that a more appropriate periodization is 1976, with Mao’s death and the purge of the Gang of Four (radicals charged with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution). At the 11th Party Congress in 1977, the Cultural Revolution was declared officially over. Charles Taylor, ed. *China Hands* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984); B. Michael Frolic, *Mao’s People: Sixteen Portraits of Life in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
credibility of such accounts.  

Only later, with the dissemination of knowledge about what took place during the Cultural Revolution, would the refugees’ concerns come to be accepted as legitimate. Referees from the Cultural Revolution were therefore ignored in resettlement programs such as the ones organized by the NCC in New Zealand from 1957 to 1971. The staff of the WCC, which was responsible for finding suitable candidates for sponsorship by New Zealand churches, ignored newly arriving migrants. This may have been due in part to the intense discourse of illegality produced by colonial authorities (discussed in the previous chapter) and the lack of a visual narrative to accompany people leaving the mainland. It may have also been due to the fact that newly arriving migrants did not meet expectations about employability and settlement in New Zealand. In Canada, the state’s focus was on normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China, including the negotiation of a family reunification agreement in 1973. Authorities were not heeding refugee issues.

**Family Reunification**

Prime Minister Trudeau came to office determined to advance Canada’s presence and influence on the world stage. A cornerstone of his policy was the establishment of official diplomatic relations with China, an event that occurred with great fanfare in 1970. Three years later, the Prime Minister made his first state visit to China. He had visited previously as a young man and been enthralled by the country. Excitement and interest in the visit abounded. The *Globe and Mail* carried front-page stories about every aspect of the trip from the gift of four beavers to be accommodated at the Peking Zoo to the warm reception that greeted the Prime Minister and his meetings with Chairman Mao. One of the few concrete outcomes of the visit was an agreement on family reunification. This agreement recalibrated the nature of migration between the two countries and became a symbol of the new, collaborative relationship between Canada and the People’s Republic of China.

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64 Frolic, *Mao’s People*, 4.
66 The government preserved news clippings on illegal migration from China. See HKR5545-1-23-1, HKPRO.
From the repeal of the so-called Chinese Exclusion Act in 1947, Chinese communities in Canada lobbied the federal government to permit the entry of various categories of relatives. As discussed in Chapter Four, Foon Sien Wong, President of the Chinese Benevolent Association in Vancouver, made an annual pilgrimage to Ottawa from 1949 to 1960 to press the federal government to facilitate the entry of fiancés, fiancées, children, brothers and sisters of Chinese Canadians. Change was snail-paced and Foon Sien repeatedly accused the federal government of discrimination in the realm of family sponsorships. Even after equality was formally established in the 1967 immigration regulations, family reunification remained slow. The lack of Canadian processing facilities on the mainland meant that the relatives of Chinese Canadians had to make their way to Hong Kong to be interviewed and processed. Severe exit restrictions limited the ease with which this could occur. Canada’s Hong Kong office was poorly resourced and staff frequently lagged behind in processing cases. Delays were sometimes as long as eight months. By January 1973, there were 1200 family sponsorship cases pending processing. Four months later, the number of cases to be processed had jumped to 2100. Art Lee, Member of Parliament for Vancouver East from 1974 to 1979, brought case-by-case pressure to bear on the government. It was one of his main preoccupations as a parliamentarian. Yet the federal government consistently avoided tackling the troubling question of facilitating family sponsorships head on. Chinese officials initiated negotiations about the family reunification agreement and turned it into a priority issue during Trudeau’s visit to China. Following on Canada’s lead, Australia signed a family reunification agreement with the People’s Republic of China in 1976. New Zealand debated following suit in 1977 but ultimately opted for case-by-case petitions given the “handful of immigrants” involved. As one official suggested, discretion was preferable because of New Zealand’s “important political relations with Peking (Beijing).”

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69 Lepitre to Collins, 27 July 1966, RG 76, Volume 992, 5855-1-526, Part 1, LAC.
70 First Secretary to Hong Kong to Director General, Foreign Service, 24 January 1973, RG 76, Volume 992, 5855-1-526, Part 3, LAC.
71 Counselor (Hong Kong) to Second Secretary (Administration), Canadian Embassy, Peking, 10 April 1973, RG 76, Volume 992, 5855-1-526, Part 3, LAC.
72 Art Lee, telephone interview with author, 29 March 2010.
73 G.M. Mitchell, Director of Operations to Director General, Foreign Service, 30 April 1973, RG 76, Volume 992, 5855-1-526, Part 3, LAC.
74 For discussions, including impact on New Zealand’s relations with countries in Southeast Asia, see Immigration General - International Refugee Organization - European Refugees in China, 1968 – 1977, ABKF, 947, W5182, 94, 22/1/115, Part 8, ANZ.
Within twelve months of the Canadian agreement, 15,000 people had applied to sponsor their relatives. Yet progress in making the sponsorships a reality was slow. Processing conditions in the People’s Republic of China remained unpredictable and Canadian officials hesitated to characterize the “degree of success we can expect to have in reuniting Chinese – Canadian families.” The first Chinese relatives arrived in Canada in August 1974. In October 1974, Chinese families complained after learning that it would take 12 months for nominated relatives (a government term that referred to more distant relatives such as brothers or sisters) to even receive an interview let alone be approved to migrate to Canada. A total of 11,000 family class migrants came to Canada between 1974 and 1981, but the majority of these came only after China relaxed exit controls in 1978. The “opening” of the People’s Republic of China under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership coincided with new skilled worker and investor programs in Canada and the Canadian government quickly opened up a visa office in Shanghai to complement the work of its Beijing and Guangdong offices. After 1978, when bans on emigration were lifted in the People’s Republic of China, the number of people moving to settler societies increased significantly (with the exception of South Africa).

Depending on the official in charge of the program, selection criteria were applied by officers in the field with varying degrees of generosity. Those inclined to increase intakes from the People’s Republic of China were known to apply criteria leniently. Gerry Campbell, former Assistant Deputy Minister of Employment and Immigration, recalls how Chinese applicants from Guangdong were routinely assessed as poultry farmers by Canadian visa officers based out of Hong Kong in the late 70s and early 1980s. According to Campbell, “All these applicants were in the nominated category, usually with siblings in Canada who had sponsored them, and with limited education and no English or French. Few would have qualified if assessed in lower demand occupations.” Visa officers made the decision to assess them in the higher occupational category and thereby facilitated their movement to Canada. This was evidence of

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76 Second Annual Meeting of the Canada / China Joint Trade Committee, Ottawa, February 1975, Canada-China Consular Relations, RG 76, Volume 992, 5855-1-526, Part 3, LAC.
77 South Africa only opened its doors to migrants from Taiwan in the 1970s. Migration from the People’s Republic of China did not officially resume until the 1990s. For details, see Melanie Yap and Dianne Leong Man, Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), 418.
78 Gerry Campbell, e-mail correspondence with author, 18 April 2012.
79 Ibid.
humanitarianism in practice and reflected the kind of worldview that immigration officials shared by the late 1970s. Most were university educated, had written the foreign service exam and deliberately chosen to work as visa officers. They brought an unparalleled passion to their work. The desire to “do good” was similarly reflected in the provisions of the 1976 *Immigration Act*, which was introduced after extensive public consultations about what Canada’s immigration and refugee policies should consist of.

**1976 Immigration Act: Formalizing Humanitarian Principles**

The 1976 *Immigration Act* defined the term refugee for the first time in Canadian law. According to the *Act*, a refugee as someone who "by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion…is outside his own country and cannot, or fears to, return there." The *Act* also established the first dedicated refugee determination body in Canada, the Refugee Status Advisory Committee (RSAC). RSAC’s mandate was to ensure that “no person claiming refugee status is deported in contravention of the provisions of the UN Convention.” The Minister of Employment and Immigration appointed officials from his department, External Affairs and from the public. The UNHCR representative in Canada was permitted to attend as an observer with a modest advisory role. Refugee claimants, their lawyers, churches, NGOs and the general public were not allowed to assist at the committee’s deliberations.

In employing the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee to grant admission to Canada, RSAC

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80 Much of the debate was over the 1974 Green Paper, which suggested potential negative impacts if the Canadian state admitted too many migrants. Kelley and Trebilcock, 389.

81 Prior to the Act, refugees were selected according to a decision made in 1970 by the Cabinet Committee on Social Policy. The Committee decided to use the Convention definition for the purposes of resettlement. It then declared that refugees should be selected on the basis “of the norms of assessment (re) set out in the Immigration Regulations on the understanding that examining officers have the discretion to admit such refugees notwithstanding their inability to meet these norms, when the information available indicates that there is sufficient private and / or government assistance available, to ensure the applicant’s successful establishment in Canada.” Cabinet Committee on Social Policy, 15 September 1970, RG 76, Volume 947, SF-C-1, Part 4, LAC.

82 The impact of the ratification of the Convention and Protocol in Canada was felt most concretely in 1973 when in response to its international legal obligations and the growing number of refugee claims in Canada, the federal government amended the 1967 *Immigration Appeal Board Act* to create the first statutory basis for refugee admissions. Andrea Clarke, “The Structure and Operation of the Immigration Appeal Board,” (MA Thesis, University of Guelph, 1990), 64. Applicants who were refused admission to Canada could appeal to the Board on the basis that they were Convention refugees. Failed claims at the Immigration Appeal Board were then heard either by the Minister or the Federal Court. This process was described as an “ad hoc system of refugee protection.” See Preliminary Report – H.G. Plaut, RG 82, 1995/96-137, Box 2, LAC.
was using a definition that privileged “individualized persecution” at the expense of all others. The Convention was a mixed bag, a product of arguments in favour of protection and resistance to excessive obligations on the part of signatories. Legal scholars Goodwin-Gill and McAdam observe that when the Convention was drafted in 1951, the “general criterion of fear or persecution, neither narrow nor excessively restricted,” was deemed “broad enough for post-Second World War and future refugees.” James Hathaway notes that persecution was framed in the (narrower) context of civil and political rights, rather than social and economic ones. As such, he argues:

The intention of the drafters was not to protect persons against any and all forms of even serious harm, but was rather to restrict refugee recognition to situations in which there was a risk of a type of injury that would be inconsistent with the basic duty of protection owed by a state to its own population.

As a result of this focus, the situation of individuals living in states of more generalized fear was excluded from the Convention. This omission had important repercussions. People living in conditions where violence was diffuse and widespread, as would have been the case for citizens of the People’s Republic of China during the Cultural Revolution, were rarely identified as refugees and continued to be held at the periphery of refugee assistance.

Two general summaries survive that hint at what appellants before RSAC and the Immigration Appeal Board might have experienced as they stated their cases for why they should not be returned to the People’s Republic of China. On April 25, 1979, the Board heard the case of Jut

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87 Details about the boxes were acquired as a result of an Access to Information Request to Immigration and Refugee Board on 28 July 2011. Of the thousands of Chinese migrants who came to Canada in the period under study, only two cases survive in sufficiently substantial form to determine that the issue at stake in their appearance before the Immigration Appeal Board was one of refugee status. The story of other refugee claimants from the People’s Republic of China has been lost. The legacy of RSAC’s operations is to be found in the fourteen thousand unmarked boxes of case file records presently stored in several Toronto warehouses. The contents of the boxes are a mystery. There are no surviving file lists nor did RSAC track the demographics of the cases it considered. The
Wong Cheung who arrived in Canada as a member of a ship’s crew and then deserted. The Board refused Cheung’s claims because the members doubted the legitimacy of his asserted persecution. The Board declared: “the appellant’s desire to stay in Canada as a refugee is prompted not by persecution but by the fact that he does not agree with the political ideologies of the Red Chinese regime and does not approve of the existing social economic base of their society.” The fact that it took him four years to make a refugee claim after his arrival in Canada cast suspicion on the veracity of his allegations. Yet it is significant that the generalized violence deliberately omitted by the Convention’s drafters was the grounds for rejection in both this case and in the only other surviving case where a migrant from the People’s Republic of China appeared before the Board.

Hua Kien Hui’s claim was heard on March 8, 1988. Hui claimed Convention refugee status “for reasons of his family background and political opinion.” Hui was a landowner and was therefore forced to undergo political re-education involving forced manual labour and mandatory indoctrination classes. He claimed that he was frequently arrested and insisted, at the time of his appearance before the Board, that the police were still looking for him. He told the Board that if he was returned to China, “he expected to be treated as a traitor for having left the Communist system and to be jailed for a long period of time.” The Board ruled against Hui on the grounds that “political re-education through manual labour combined with indoctrination classes is carried on in many countries and for many large social groups.” The Board concluded that Hui’s treatment was neither “so onerous or unpleasant as to amount to a basis for well-founded fear of persecution.” As for the frequent arrests, the Board did not “regard such questioning as unusual in a heavily regimented Communist society” and determined that it did not form the basis of a
well-founded fear of persecution. Ultimately, the Board declared that there was “little doubt that Hui was likely to be subject to some disciplinary action as a result of leaving China without proper authority” but the Board was not overly concerned about this possibility. The decisions in the Cheung and Hui cases are quite striking, especially considering the grounds upon which the Board rejected their claims. These were the very same grounds upon which missionaries, humanitarian actors and the UNHCR had argued the refugee nature of migration flows out of China from 1949 to 1962. Twenty years later, the shifting norms of humanitarianism, the altered bounds of discretion and evolving Cold War dynamics reversed the terms upon which the refugeehood of migrants from the People’s Republic of China were perceived in Canada.

At the same time, the 1976 Immigration Act enhanced the capacity for the state to act in a humanitarian manner, giving it wide powers for discretion on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.\(^{89}\) The Act also formalized refugee policy through the introduction of formal sponsorship programs, Designated Classes and an annual refugee plan.\(^{90}\) Under the terms of the 1976 Act, refugee sponsorship was enshrined in law for the first time. Groups of five or more individuals obtained permission to sponsor qualified refugees to Canada.\(^{91}\) This measure, born of the postwar work in Europe by Catholic, Protestant and Jewish settlement organizations and sponsorship efforts during World Refugee Year effectively channeled the activities of humanitarian actors into a formal, contractual process.\(^{92}\) The sponsorship program institutionalized the humanitarian impulse of community groups. Their advocacy role was further channeled as a result of the establishment of formal humanitarian migration categories to address the historically \textit{ad hoc} nature of humanitarian and compassionate grounds for admission and resettlement.

\(^{90}\) An annual refugee resettlement plan (a quota-like system based on geographic categories such as Asia or Latin America) was established for individuals who met the Convention definition and were deemed likely to “successfully settle” in Canada. Significantly, according to Mike Molloy, successful settlement was conceived largely in terms of labour market concerns. Mike Molloy, interview with author, 29 July 2011, Ottawa, Ontario.  
\(^{91}\) Tanya Basok suggests that sponsorship was one of the few ways that civil society managed to insert itself effectively in the refugee determination process and de-centering the state focus. “Refugee Policy: Globalization, Radical Challenge, or State Control?” \textit{Studies in Political Economy} 50 (1996): 136-137; accessed June 12, 2011, http://spe.library.utoronto.ca.  
\(^{92}\) Randy Lippert, \textit{Sanctuary, Sovereignty, Sacrifice: Canadian Sanctuary Incidents, Power, and Law} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 59; Mike Molloy, interview with author, 29 July 2011, Ottawa, Ontario.
Finally, the 1976 *Immigration Act* introduced the concept of Designated Classes to the Canadian public. Designated Classes were state-created categories for groups in humanitarian need who did not meet the Convention’s definition of a refugee. According to Mike Molloy, former Director of Refugee Policy, the legislative drafters did not have any particular groups in mind when they drafted the law. However, they were aware of the growing need to rationalize Canada’s approach to refugee issues, and “wanted to be able to cut definitions to meet specific situations.” He says, “They knew they were going to need alternatives to the Convention Refugee category, given what was happening in the world.” Molloy mentioned refugees from Chile and Uganda in 1973, whose movements further internationalized the postwar refugee regime. The Designated Classes introduced in regulations in 1978 included Indochinese Refugees (discussed in the next chapter) and Self-Exiled Persons (for individuals fleeing communist-controlled countries in Europe). When I asked Raph Girard, who was instrumental in designing the Designated Class system, why the Self-Exiled class did not include people from the People’s Republic of China, he inferred that they simply weren’t part of the government’s conceptual field. The dominant paradigm that situated Cold War refugees within a European context endured.

Despite the significant scope for humanitarian action enshrined in the *Act*, it was limited compared to the humanitarianism envisioned by Protestant churches in Canada. Leaders of the Anglican and United Churches in particular were dismayed by the government’s narrow field of vision. In 1974, following on their active involvement with the resettlement of 6,990 Chilean refugees (a result of the coup led by General Pinochet in 1973), the Anglican and United Churches presented a joint brief to Parliament as part of the discussions around reforming Canada’s immigration regime. They proposed “new legislation (that) will make it easier for those seeking asylum to be admitted to Canada.” Specifically, they wanted a special asylum category to address occasions of “special crisis in the lives of nations and of individuals which plead for special movement.” The churches recommended an expansive understanding of what constituted

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93 Mike Molloy, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 April 2012.
a political refugee. They argued that the term “political” should be understood in the “widest sense” to include those who are suffering due to “war or changes in government, those who find themselves in an environment where legislation or (illegible) curtail their freedom of movement and speech, thus preventing their living up to the dictates of their conscience as well as those who are the victims of a revolutionary or military coup.” Manifesting their disappointment with the manner in which the federal government had responded to the Chilean situation, they expressed their concerns about racial equality on immigration issues, noting that there was a single permanent processing office for all of Latin America. Significantly, for the purpose of this project, the brief made no mention of refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention. The narrow legal definition did not mesh with the churches’ expansive vision.

Even after the Immigration Act came into force in 1978, the CCC continued to lobby and petition the government on both in-land claims and overseas selection issues. Having incorporated humanitarianism as a core tenet of the immigration program, government officials resented efforts to reform refugee determination processes and overseas selection programs. Former immigration officials Gerry Van Kessel and Raph Girard both expressed exasperation with what they perceived to be the excessively expansive approach that humanitarian actors assumed on questions of refugee determination. Girard, in particular, paints a contentious picture of the state’s relationship with humanitarian actors in the 1970s, observing that humanitarian actors believed the government’s policies were “elitist and self-serving” while the government, in turn, found their expansive approach “unrealistic.” Groups such as the CCC and later the Canadian Council for Refugees, struggled to translate the language of humanitarianism into an effective counter to the bureaucratic imperative to process refugee claims expeditiously. As a result, says political scientist Andrew S. Thompson, “the mistrust arising from competing priorities within the resettlement system” became the “defining feature” of the CCC’s relationship with the federal government by the 1970s.

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95 Human Rights Consultation, 1974 - constitution and bylaws, MG 28 I37, Volume 185, File 8, Canadian Council of Churches Fonds, LAC.
97 Thompson, In Defence of Principles, 19.
Conclusions

Over the course of the postwar period and from the 1950s to the 1970s especially, diverse opportunities emerged for migrants to move “legitimately” to Canada and New Zealand. Some of these emerged as governments nuanced and refined various categories of migration. Others emerged as a result of humanitarian interventions that created discrete opportunities for those seeking to leave Hong Kong. While the regulation of migration categories and limited resettlement efforts were meant to restrict and regulate movement, migrants moved according to whatever means were available to them. Sandra Wilking and Maggie Ip both moved as students with plans to return to Hong Kong. However, deteriorating conditions at home led them to more permanent stays. Changing immigration regulations enabled them to do so.

The development of official categories of movement as well as institutionalized humanitarian exceptions, such as the Designated Classes in Canada, multiplied the options available to people seeking to move. They created opportunities for those with access to intelligence about how to migrate and networks to assist them in doing so. Perhaps even more significant, in terms of the evolving agenda around refugee issues, was the impact of incorporated humanitarianism on advocacy in Canada. Prior to the ratification of the Convention and Protocol and the 1976 Immigration Act, which defined a refugee in Canadian law, humanitarian actors used the term refugee rather loosely in order to direct attention to the plight of particular individuals or groups. For instance, in the case of Chinese migrants in Hong Kong, humanitarian actors emphasized their refugee-like characteristics during World Refugee Year to generate public goodwill and support for relief efforts. They did so without knowledge of the particulars of the individuals with whom they were concerned and with little regard for any legal conception of refugee status. The 1976 Immigration Act undermined the authority of the existing, and rather expansive, discourse on refugees and limited discussions of refugeehood to the narrow definition of a refugee enshrined in the 1951 Convention. The situation was very different in New Zealand where immigration staff and politicians retained the discretion to conceptualize of refugeehood. Officials were guided by the fact that New Zealand was a signatory to the Convention but because its primary impact was in terms of preventing non-refoulement, they retained significant freedom in deciding the scope of their responsibilities for refugees overseas. Ultimately, the humanitarian discretion exhibited by officials in New Zealand was driven primarily by a sense of
what the nation should represent, more than a response to critical need.

In Canada, “humanitarianism” in the hands of immigration officials translated most often into the sympathetic consideration of family reunification issues. With the 1973 family reunification agreement between Canada and the People’s Republic of China, officials increased their faith in the existing system’s capacity to address situations they believed required a humanitarian response. As far as Canadian authorities were concerned, there was no need to discuss the possibility of special assistance for refugees in China. There was a refugee determination process in Canada and a humanitarian selection process in the People’s Republic of China and as such, nothing further was required.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE CRISIS IN CONTEXT, 1975-1989

Introduction

In 1986, the Nansen Award Committee awarded its annual medal to the Canadian people. In 1960, it had been given to the four authors of “Wanted: A World Refugee Year.” It was the first time that the award, named after the League of Nation’s first High Commissioner for Refugees, was given to an entire nation. Canadians were recognized for their “past and present role in protecting and providing assistance to refugees fleeing persecution around the world” but the primary impulse for the award was their response to the flight of Indochinese refugees in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. In 1975, with the fall of Saigon, thousands of people left South Vietnam. Within four years, coercive policies introduced by the new Vietnamese government, which specifically targeted the Hao (ethnic Chinese community), prompted the flight of thousands of others. The size of the population in motion grew with Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and political programs in Laos that targeted the US-backed Hmong people, among others. Hundreds of thousands crossed the border into the People’s Republic of China or Thailand or took to small, un-seaworthy boats, some making it as far as Australia. An estimated 40 to 70% of the boats that left never landed.¹

Images of the refugees’ suffering broadcast around the world generated an unprecedented level of outpouring and compassion and a compulsive feeling that unless someone “did something” an even greater human tragedy would unfold. This empathy ultimately translated into the resettlement of over a million refugees from camps established in Hong Kong and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries in the region.² On this occasion, the Western

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¹ Kristen Grim Hughes, “Closed Camps: Vietnamese Refugee Policy in Hong Kong,” (PhD Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1985), 51. Larry Thompson embraces a more conservative estimate at 10-50%. He proposes, “it will never be known how many of the Vietnamese boat people perished at sea of hunger, thirst, shipwreck and pirates.” He observes that even at 10%, it still means close to 50,000 people perished in their flight from Indochina. Larry Clinton Thompson, Refugee Workers in the Indochina Exodus, 1975-1982 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Inc., 2010), 169.

² The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was established in 1967 to promote trade and political cooperation in the region. At the time, members included Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Membership has since expanded to include Vietnam, Lao, Cambodia and Burma. Indochinese refugees sought refuge in all of the original ASEAN countries. By 1979, their sheer numbers triggered threats of “push-backs” and
response was very different from the ones that attended the movement of people out the People’s Republic of China for three decades after 1949. Still, the politics of both responses were formulated in the context of the Cold War and evolving ideas about global responsibility and obligation. Why was the response in 1979 so different? Was it the height of humanitarianism on behalf of refugees? Did it mark the culmination of efforts to create a humanitarian agenda on behalf of people in need? What role did ideology play? Given that the international response to the Indochinese refugee crisis has been celebrated as a great humanitarian moment, these questions suggest that further analysis of the response is required.³ This is especially true in countries of resettlement such as Canada. In this particular settler society, the resettlement of Indochinese refugees is remembered as a “splendid operation” and a “heartwarming” initiative with little consideration of the complicated politics that governed the depth and breadth of the humanitarian response, particularly amongst church groups, the Canadian state and its counterparts in Asia.⁴

This chapter examines the international response to the Indochinese refugees from 1975 to 1989. In many ways, this chapter is an exception to the general thrust of this thesis with its focus on refugees from the People’s Republic of China. This chapter focuses on a different group of ethnic Chinese refugees, this time from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. This chapter also narrows the lens of the project, focusing on the particular dynamics that animated the response to the crisis in Canada. Unlike Australia and New Zealand, which were physically closer to the crisis (the first boat carrying refugees from Vietnam arrived in Darwin, Australia on April 26, 1976), Canada remained geographically removed from the drama unfolding in Indochina. As such, the state’s response was informed by many of the same factors that governed its response to refugees from the Chinese mainland in the previous three decades. This involved negotiating significant public pressure “to do something” to alleviate distant suffering while protecting ongoing concerns about regulating and managing the resettlement of refugees into the country. There were also key differences, including a new cast of humanitarian actors, intense media coverage, decidedly sympathetic immigration officers (particularly those working in the field) and

considerable psychological proximity to the crisis because of the United States’ efforts to salvage the situation in Indochina after 1975. The policies adopted by the United States are included in this chapter in order to understand the manner in which Canada responded to the crisis. Australia and New Zealand shared many of Canada’s preoccupations (particularly since both Australia and New Zealand sent troops to Vietnam) however geography was also of paramount concern. Following on the formal end of the White Australia policy in 1973 and quiet end of the informal White New Zealand Policy in 1974, the Indochinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s, and the sheer proximity of the crisis, was a test of how liberal these settler societies had become. A measure of this liberalism is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Instead, this chapter focuses on the government of Hong Kong’s policies vis-à-vis the Vietnamese boat people and connects this history with resettlement policies developed in Canada. Of all the territories of first asylum, Hong Kong was the one most closely allied with the Western project, remaining a British colony until it returned to Chinese control in 1997. There was therefore an expectation amongst Western observers that authorities in the colony would adopt responses in keeping with the liberal democratic project. Although they did so initially, their policies became more restrictive in 1982. Resettlement efforts in the West evolved in tandem. Embracing the idea of Hong Kong as an “in-between place,” as a mediating hub where the migration experience was transformed, this chapter considers how the local politics that governed the response to refugees in Hong Kong informed notions of responsibility and obligation circulating more globally.

Instead of conventional place-based narratives that situate the response to the crisis within national frameworks, this chapter rethinks the Indochinese refugee crisis in terms of transnational connections negotiated within uniquely national contexts. The ongoing role of

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5 See Hughes, “Closed Camps”, 74.
6 Nation-based narratives focus primarily on how the response to the crisis shaped the national character of the countries involved or, in turn, how the national character informed the response. For instance, Nancy Viviani authored several texts on the Australian response to the Indochinese crisis. Viviani attributed considerable importance to Australia’s foreign policy concerns (particularly its strong opposition to the Vietnamese government). She was critical of the government’s initial lacklustre efforts while placing the onus for the resettlement on public opinion. See Nancy Viviani, *The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia* (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 1984); *Australian Government Policies on the Entry of Vietnamese: Record and Responsibility* (Griffith University: Centre for the Study of Australian – Asian Relations, 1982). Meanwhile in the Canadian context, philosophy professor Howard Adelman, who was actively involved with Operation Lifeline

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NGOs and church engagement with refugee issues is considered with attention to how responses from this sector were shaped by contested notions of responsibility and obligation. In Hong Kong, Caritas was a leading NGO in the provision of assistance in the refugee camps, remaining involved from 1975 to 1993. In Canada, the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) was critical to refugee resettlement efforts. As one of the few Western organizations in Vietnam, the MCC was uniquely placed to create bridges between people in need and people willing to help. As a result of its longstanding connections, it was also far more anxious than its counterparts in the Anglican and United Churches to render assistance. Finally, this chapter builds on previous discussions about how the formalization of immigration and refugee policies fundamentally altered the manner in which refugees were assisted in the late twentieth century. In 1978, stories of people buying their way out of Vietnam cast doubts on the authenticity of the refugees leaving the country. A year later, the images of people fleeing in rickety, flimsy boats and stories of pirate attacks and passing ships abandoning them to their fate created a desire amongst many around the world to help. In Canada, the existence of Designated Classes and institutionalized sponsorship mechanisms provided the means to do so. The existence of formal mechanisms to channel compassion contributed to the size and depth of the Canadian response. However, they also served to ultimately limit the scope of humanitarian efforts after 1989 when the government determined that exceptional humanitarianism was no longer required.

Although there were significant differences in how Canada responded to the Indochinese refugees and migrants from the People’s Republic of China after 1949, there were also significant parallels. Efforts to curb, regulate and manage the crisis in Indochina were deeply

imbued with the impulses that informed earlier efforts to regulate the movement of people. Humanitarian actors repeated many of their previous arguments about compassion and global responsibilities. The Canadian state expressed familiar refrains about its capacity to absorb significant numbers of refugees and the questionable authenticity of the refugee population. In Hong Kong, authorities again asserted the need to maintain a stable population through controlled entries and exits. Their view of the Indochinese migrants was heavily influenced by three decades of addressing population flows from mainland China. There was, therefore, initial resistance to the idea of providing extraordinary assistance to the Indochinese migrants. However, the sheer size of the exodus, and the perceived instability of the states receiving the bulk of the “boat people,” “bus people” and “land people” drew the attention of the international media and the wider international community in an unprecedented manner. Stories of ships refusing to offer rescue, along with threats of shootings and forced returns, tipped the balance in favour of liberal humanitarian assistance. In Canada, humanitarian obligation took the form of financial assistance to the UNHCR and refugee resettlement programs.

Resettlement combined both legal protection and generous elements of humanitarianism. For most countries, the response to the Indochinese crisis was not about scoring ideological points, although for the United States this certainly played a part. Rather, it was about human rights, humanitarianism and contested notions of responsibility. The size of the population flows out of Indochina in the late 1970s and the build-up of decades of discussion about humanitarianism, development and human rights, meant that the international response by states and humanitarian actors was both a legacy of, and a break from, earlier Cold War approaches to refugee issues. The response in 1979 resulted from transformations wrought by the humanitarian agenda advanced throughout the Cold War. Nevertheless, it was also one where the desire to categorize, regulate and control the size of population flows remained stubbornly enduring.

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7 The terms “land people” and “bus people” were coined after the term “boat people” emerged. There was a sense that too much attention was being paid to the dramatic flights of people at sea when in fact many people were leaving via overland routes. Raph Girard, telephone interview with author, 18 April 2012.
8 New Zealand and Australia pursued similar policies though their response was also informed by the physical proximity of the crisis.
There is a large and varied body of literature on the Indochinese refugee crisis, but very little of this material has been produced by historians. Shortly after the crisis emerged, a number of journalists, including Australia’s Bruce Grant and the American Barry Wain, produced sensationalized, emotive accounts of the crisis.\(^\text{10}\) The refugees’ flight was described as “biblical” in proportion and both journalists condemned the West’s efforts on behalf of the refugees.\(^\text{11}\) Wain called the international response “pathetic” and referred specifically to the British approach as “niggardly.” He reserved his harshest criticism for the United States for its failure to respond promptly and effectively to the developing crisis.\(^\text{12}\) Numerous oral histories and first-person accounts of flight and resettlement were also produced in subsequent years. These shed light on the experience of people as they left their homes and sought refuge elsewhere.\(^\text{13}\) Still, the bulk of the existing literature consists of studies relating to the adaptation and acclimatization of refugees resettled to the United States, Canada and Australia.\(^\text{14}\)

The resettlement of such a large, and discrete, refugee population created a unique opportunity for social scientists to investigate the impact of camp life on the physical and mental health of individuals, the formation of diasporas and the labour market success of resettled migrants.\(^\text{15}\) Governments commissioned major studies on the resettlement efforts and the mechanics of intervention.\(^\text{16}\) Many organizations involved with the resettlement efforts produced histories of their involvement. With titles such as *Gift of Freedom*, the majority of these are celebratory in tone and shy away from adopting excessively self-critical or self-reflective approaches to the kinds of interventions that were developed.\(^\text{17}\) The bulk of the literature about the Indochinese

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\(^{11}\) Wain, *The Refused*, 7.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 174, 217.


\(^{17}\) Brian Buckley, *Gift of Freedom: How Ottawa Welcomed the Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian Refugees* (Renfrew: General Store Publishing House, 2008); W. Courtland Robinson, *Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese*
refugees is therefore Western-focused and seeks to explain the Western response. The policy story from the perspective of Chinese and Vietnamese authorities has yet to be disseminated to Western audiences.

Much of the history that has been produced has been nation-based, focused primarily on policy development within particular geographic contexts. Given US involvement in the Vietnam War for instance, there exists a unique historiography on the American response to the Indochinese crisis. Questions of imperialism and colonial expansion loom large in these discussions.\(^\text{18}\) Many scholars frame American involvement in terms of efforts to salvage its reputation in Southeast Asia and restore faith in the “inherent goodness” of their society.\(^\text{19}\) Alexander Betts suggests that by saving refugees, the United States was demonstrating an ongoing anti-communist commitment.\(^\text{20}\) Gil Loescher and John Scanlan maintain that the American response was shaped by a deep sense of responsibility, particularly amongst officials who had been stationed in Vietnam.\(^\text{21}\) In *Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War*, Carl Bon Tempo looks at the response in terms of evolving human rights norms. Rejecting the dominant paradigm of the US response to Vietnam as one shaped by Cold War imperatives, Bon Tempo argues that the American approach was influenced by the idea that states had a responsibility and an obligation to protect people’s basic human rights.\(^\text{22}\) This is an important and persuasive argument, but it suffers from the narrow national focus in which Bon Tempo pursues his analysis. There is no consideration of the global context in which discussions of human rights and humanitarianism were taking place.

Similarly, accounts of Canadian interventions fail to consider the manner in which actions were

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21 Loescher and Scanlan, 104. Mike Molloy expressed a similar sentiment in recalling his work with US officials. E-mail correspondence with author, 29 April 2012.

informed by shared intellectual currents and the activities of transnational actors such as churches and NGOs. Instead, comparisons generally consist of measuring the intake of refugees on a per capita basis.\textsuperscript{23} In a recent volume, Yuk-Wah Chan takes issue with the conventional narrative that emerges from these nation-based analyses. Chan charges that even in the accounts that are critical of the delayed response, the ensuing analysis is inevitably one of triumph for the West, where liberal democracies came to the rescue of millions of desperate people in need when the countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia were no longer able, or inclined, to do so.\textsuperscript{24} Chan argues this narrative is fundamentally flawed because people did not just move through places of first asylum such as Hong Kong. Many people stayed in Hong Kong, often marrying local residents. Others returned to Vietnam, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Not everyone moved to the West.\textsuperscript{25}

**Prelude to Intervention**

The Vietnam Wars displaced millions of people within North and South Vietnam, and beyond. Upon the defeat of French forces in 1954, 900,000 civilians fled the communist zone for the south.\textsuperscript{26} By 1971, there were an estimated six million refugees within South Vietnam as a result the strife and violence in the country.\textsuperscript{27} The fall of Saigon in 1975 marked a new, and distinct, phase in the movement of people. American authorities, “loyal to their comrades in arms” provided refuge to thousands of people who had worked or sided with American forces and were at risk under the new Vietnamese regime.\textsuperscript{28} In April 1975, President Ford authorized “Operation New Life” and admitted 130,000 Vietnamese refugees to the United States. Distinct categories were established to designate eligibility. These included 4,000 orphans under “Operation Babylift,” relatives of American citizens or permanent resident aliens, and high risk Vietnamese, (government employees, cooperatives, people who knew about US intelligence operations,

\textsuperscript{23} Robinson, *Terms of Refuge*, 151.
\textsuperscript{25} Chan estimates about 14,000 people settled locally. See *The Chinese / Vietnamese Diaspora*, 7.
\textsuperscript{27} Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate*, 145.
vulnerable political or intellectual figures, Communist defectors and the employees of American firms). Operation New Life was born of a sense of obligation to rescue people rendered vulnerable because of the war and a related belief that the evacuation would discredit the new Vietnamese regime. The operation was therefore entirely American in spirit and intent. Nevertheless, US officials sought to broaden support for the evacuation program and urged other countries, including Canada, France and Australia, to participate.

Authorities in Ottawa found the pressure awkward. They recognized their American allies had “special residual moral and political obligations to the Vietnamese following the 1975 collapse.” However, given the degree of opposition in Canada to the war, officials were loath to appear unequivocally supportive of American evacuation policies. Nevertheless, they also believed that some show of support on their part might encourage Vietnam’s Asian neighbours to become involved in the resettlement program, manifesting a “boy scout” approach to international affairs. Moreover, the Vietnamese in Canada were petitioning elected officials to help their families caught up in the turmoil. Although there were very few Vietnamese in Canada at the time (about 1,500 and most of these were students at Quebec universities), petitions to ensure the safe exit of relatives in Indochina proved remarkably effective. In May 1975, Cabinet authorized the entry of 3,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees in what has been called a demonstration of “token solidarity” with the United States.

30 Keely, “The International Refugee Regime(s),” 309.
31 Gil Loescher and John Scanlan maintain “the decision to evacuate Vietnamese through US bases and Guam would make later efforts to internationalize the subsequent resettlement of Indochinese refugees more difficult.” See Calculated Kindness, 109.
32 Hughes, “Closed Camps,” 50.
33 Indochina Refugees: Future Canadian Policy, RG 76, Volume 1835, File 8700-0, LAC.
34 This strategy did not play out. As one official later observed, “Asian countries seem to have perceived that the best way to avoid involvement was to continue to be very tough on the boat people, thus forcing Western countries to take ever increasing numbers.” Indochina Refugees: Future Canadian Policy, RG 76, Volume 1835, File 8700-0, LAC.
35 Louis-Jacques Dorais, “From Refugees to Transmigrants: The Vietnamese in Canada” in Wanni G. Anderson and Robert G. Lee, Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in the Americas (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 170. In 1976, the government began negotiations with Vietnamese officials to secure the exit of the relatives. The negotiations were “a long and uphill struggle” but eventually 26,000 people were sponsored out of Vietnam under family class designations. See Address Prepared by W. T. Delworth for Minister’s Speech to the UN Association meeting, RG 25, Volume 12489, 85-29-4 INDOCH, Part 15, LAC. This policy foreshadowed the approach that would characterize the Canadian and Australian response to the violence at Tiananmen Square in 1989.
36 See Adelman, Refugee Policy in Canada and the United States, 139.
decision was for “independent” refugees, the government proceeded to give considerable priority to refugees with family ties to Canada. Most of the refugees were screened and selected from camps established in the United States such as those in Pendleton and Indian Town Gap. Raph Girard recalls:

> We sent selection missions into both and took people who had established connections with Canada. Immediately prior to the fall of Saigon, we had blitzed the Vietnamese community in Canada providing facilities for them to sponsor immediate and extended family. Our Consulate in Saigon was snowed under with about 15,000 applications in the dying days before the Viet Cong victory. The Consulate simply issued "promise of visa letters" to all of the people named assuring them of rapid processing if they could find their way to a Canadian visa office outside Vietnam. Thousands made the connection over the following 10 years.

The initial selection from US camps went well although there was considerable American pressure for Canada to speed up its processing activities. However, the admission of General Dang Van Quang caused the Canadian government a fair bit of distress. Van Quang was a South Vietnamese general whose wife lived in Montreal and had applied to sponsor him. He was permitted entry on a special ministerial permit, one of the special cases authorized by the Cabinet decision. When background checks revealed that he had been heavily involved in the narcotics trade in Vietnam, Canadian authorities ordered him deported. It took years for this to take effect (Van Quang left Canada for the United States in 1989) and created considerable negative publicity in Canada at a time when the government was seeking public support for its resettlement efforts. In early 1977, American authorities once again pressed Ottawa to do more in response to the emerging phenomenon of people leaving Vietnam on small, un-seaworthy boats. On the advice of officials in the department, the Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Allan Gotlieb, suggested that the government use the outstanding balance of 350 people from the original 1975 Cabinet decision to help Cambodian refugees. Gotlieb cited “the likelihood of pressure from the public” as they grew aware of the “brutal repression in Cambodia.” For similar reasons, Gotlieb further advised the resettlement of an additional 100 Laotian refugees. Cabinet approved this recommendation.

37 Dirks, *Indifference or Opportunism?*, 252.
38 Raph Girard, e-mail correspondence with author, 14 April 2012.
39 Memorandum, 9 September 1975, RG 76, Volume 1835, File 8700-1, Part 1, LAC.
40 “Ordered out of the country 4 months ago, Quang still in Quebec,” *Globe and Mail*, 31 October 1975, 9.
41 Memorandum, 8 August 1977, RG 76, Volume 1835, File 8700-1, Part 1, LAC.
42 Memorandum to the Minister, 5 October 1978, RG 76, Volume 1835, File 8700-1, Part 1, LAC.
Early Canadian responses to the growing refugee flows out of Indochina were therefore a mix of concern over the American retreat from Vietnam, attention to various kinds of domestic public pressure and an evolution in how officials perceived their responsibilities towards refugees. The situation in Hong Kong and the countries of Southeast Asia would only become of interest when the crisis deepened. In 1978, warning signs of an impending crisis emerged. The number of refugees departing over land and sea increased sharply. The persecution of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnamese forces and repressive programs being pursued in Laos all contributed to the growing numbers of people in flight. By mid-1979, over 700,000 people had left Indochina. 130,000 people had been resettled in the United States, 235,000 had fled north into China, 277,000 had fled by boat and 21,000 had gone overland to Thailand.\textsuperscript{43} Importantly, the flight of people out of Indochina, particularly those on flimsy crafts, was drawing the attention of the international media. There were images and stories about perilous deaths and escapes at sea in newspapers and on television screens on a daily and nightly basis.

\textit{Crisis Years}

The plight of the \textit{Hai Hong} consolidated the humanitarian nature of the situation for many while providing fodder for critics who questioned the authenticity of the refugees as a way of undermining calls for assistance. The controversy over the \textit{Hai Hong} was symbolic of the kinds of tensions and arguments that emerged alongside the movement of people out of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The ship arrived in Malaysia in the fall of 1978, carrying over 2,000 refugees. Malaysian authorities refused the boat entry on the grounds that the people aboard were not real refugees but rather had “paid handsomely” to be on the “profit ship.”\textsuperscript{44} Reports indicated that Vietnamese authorities were persecuting ethnic Chinese who were relatively affluent and then charging an exit tax before allowing their departure. Organized syndicates profited from the traffic in refugees by organizing boats such as the \textit{Hai Hong}.\textsuperscript{45} Some estimates suggest that Vietnamese authorities garnered $115 million in 1978 alone with this strategy.\textsuperscript{46} According to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} Robinson, \textit{Terms of Refuge}, 50.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Pappone, \textit{The Hai Hong}, 11.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Hughes, “Closed Camps,” 61.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Copy of USA White Paper: Indochinese Refugees, 20 July 1979, MFNUM 3627, RG 25, Volume 9780, LAC.
\end{itemize}
contemporary accounts:

Refugees are exploited at every turn once they declare their intention to leave... They generally sell all their personal property or forfeit it to the state. The price of passage does not include a safe conduct pass to the point of embarkation, so bribes must be paid at each check-point along the way.

The cost of passage ranged from $1800 to $3000. Critics, particularly in Southeast Asia where countries were bearing the bulk of the responsibility for the refugee traffic, used the Hai Hong incident to argue that people who were paying to leave were not genuine refugees and should therefore be returned. Ultimately, Western countries including Canada committed to the resettlement of the Hai Hong’s refugees, breaking the deteriorating impasse. Significantly, amongst the countries bearing the brunt of the initial flight out of Indochina, Hong Kong was the only government that did not threaten “push-backs” or advocate some kind of exclusionary strategy. It was marked as a liberal territory by countries of resettlement and migrants alike.

Over 200,000 Indochinese migrants arrived in Hong Kong from 1975 to 1993. The government of Hong Kong’s immediate response to the increased, and very visible, arrival of Vietnamese refugees in the mid-1970s was formulated almost entirely by decades of experience in attempting to limit and regulate the size of population flows from the Chinese mainland and its ongoing efforts in this regard. Even with a major cholera outbreak in the colony in 1979, an average of 495 people were caught trying to get into Hong Kong from the mainland on a daily basis. There were frequent reports of bloated corpses found in the harbour as “freedom swimmers” sought to leave the People’s Republic of China illegally, only to lose their lives at sea. Reinforcements were brought into the colony so that additional British soldiers could patrol the colony’s territorial borders and waters. 77,000 illegal migrants were discovered and returned in a twelve-month period. Meanwhile, an estimated three quarters of the illegal migrants were never

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47 Ibid.
48 Pappone, The Hai Hong, 11.
51 “900 Troops Going to Hong Kong: Refugee controls to be tightened,” Telegraph, 26 June 1979, 1.
52 “Hong Kong Authorities Open Fire on Refugees,” 7 December 1979 in 325-11, HKPRO.
The government of Hong Kong continued its policy of returning illegal Chinese migrants upon detection and in fact, enforced this policy even more severely after 1980. Against the backdrop of growing legal and illegal migration, Vietnamese boat people began to arrive in increasing numbers in Hong Kong. The first numerically significant group arrived in 1974.

The colonial government was not happy about their arrival. The 119 Vietnamese who tried to gain entry in June 1974 were arrested and returned to Vietnam, sparking considerable public outcry.\(^{54}\) While it was a policy consistent with the government’s approach to illegal migration from the Chinese mainland, it did not sit well with those concerned about the ongoing conflict in Vietnam. The government’s approach shifted with the fall of Saigon. With the end of the war and the urgency of the humanitarian situation, the politics of repatriation changed and Hong Kong adopted a more liberal attitude. Residents of Hong Kong confronted the reality of greater numbers of refugees and different kinds of political optics when a Norwegian ship arrived in the harbour on 4 May 1975 carrying 3740 refugees. Instead of repatriating the people aboard the \textit{Clara Maersk}, the government housed them in temporary camps and most were eventually resettled to the United States.\(^{55}\) Arrivals continued. In 1977, approximately 1000 people arrived in Hong Kong from Indochina. This number jumped to over 9,000 people in 1978 including the \textit{Huey Fong}, which arrived in December 1978 carrying 3318 passengers.\(^{56}\) 68,749 Indochinese refugees arrived in 1979 alone.\(^{57}\)

Despite the size of the arriving population, the colonial government initially adopted a relatively liberal policy. Rather than screen and select amongst the arrivals, the government assumed all of the boat people to be refugees and provided temporary accommodation until they could be resettled abroad. The government operated on the assumption that other countries would, and should, offer more permanent solutions.\(^{58}\) By 1979, there were thirteen camps in Hong Kong. They were operated by various Hong Kong government departments as well as the Hong Kong

\(^{53}\) Hughes, “Closed Camps,” 195.
\(^{54}\) Ibid., 181.
\(^{56}\) Skeldon, “Hong Kong’s Response,” 91.
\(^{57}\) Hughes, “Closed Camps,” 185.
\(^{58}\) Chan Kwok Bun, “Hong Kong’s Response to the Vietnamese Refugees,” 95.
Civil Aid Society with services delivered on the ground by an array of voluntary agencies including the Red Cross, the International Rescue Committee, Caritas and the YMCA. The UNHCR was present though too thinly staffed to provide substantial assistance.\(^{59}\) In comparison, Caritas proved so efficient it soon began operating the Kai Tak East Transit Centre on behalf of the government.\(^{60}\) Until 1982, most of the camps were open. Refugees could work in Hong Kong and send their children to local schools. This generous policy towards Indochinese refugees stood in stark contrast to the government’s approach to illegal migration from the People’s Republic of China where people found without the proper documentation were summarily, and regularly, returned to the mainland throughout this period.

Hong Kong’s contradictory strategies with regard to arrivals from Vietnam and those from the mainland resulted from American pressure on Hong Kong and ASEAN countries to provide temporary asylum until a more permanent solution could be found. They also resulted from the fact that Hong Kong had no formal refugee policy and so its response to arriving migrants was very much a reactive one, constructed in the immediacy of the moment and informed by decades of population controls at the border. When I asked Gordon Chu, former Director of Immigration in Hong Kong, about the difference, he pointed out that the refugee category did not exist as a legal status in Hong Kong. As a result, colonial officials sought to reconcile the expectations of the international community (and the Western camp in particular) with their own interests in managing the population.\(^{61}\) According to Roda Mushkat, a “mixture of pragmatism and moral restraint” led the Hong Kong government to focus on temporary asylum with the expectation that other countries would resettle the refugees permanently.\(^{62}\) This approach was contingent on the government receiving adequate support from potential countries of resettlement. This did not occur.

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\(^{59}\) The UNHCR’s insistence on complicated screening procedures would later hamper the government of Hong Kong’s efforts to repatriate refugees after 1988. While Gordon Chu recalls a very collegial working relationship with social service agencies in the camps, he is critical of the UNHCR. When asked about their working relationship, he declared bluntly, “they weren’t helping at all.” Gordon Chu, telephone interview with author, 18 April 2012.


\(^{62}\) Mushkat, 450.
Significantly, the government of Hong Kong received very little support from the British government. Between 1975 and 1993, the British resettled only 13,000 refugees from Hong Kong. In the same period, the government of Hong Kong spent an estimated 635 million US$ on the care and maintenance of the refugees. Rather than engaging with the refugees on a humanitarian plain, Prime Minister Thatcher viewed the boat people as a political problem. Her immediate reaction to the growing numbers of refugees in 1979 was to seek a way out of assuming responsibility. The Iron Lady dispatched staff to investigate the possibility of withdrawing from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Persistent lobbying from the shipping lobby, which was reluctant to rescue people at sea if they were not able to deposit them in a country of first asylum, made the British government eager to find a solution to the crisis without assuming significant responsibility of its own. At the same time, the British government objected to any suggestion of simply returning people to sea for fear of international reprimand. Although scholars generally credit the United States with taking the leading role on convening the first Geneva Conference on Indochinese Refugees in 1979, the important pressure levied by the British government should not be underestimated. Thatcher’s calls to “internationalize the situation” were critical in convening the first Geneva Conference on Indochinese refugees in 1979.

Sixty-five countries participated in the first Geneva Conference, which was held in July 1979. The atmosphere was hostile as countries of first asylum and those involved in resettlement efforts engaged in heated debates in the lead up to the conference about the degree to which Vietnamese authorities should be held publicly responsible for the crisis. The UNHCR maintained that public condemnation would discourage Vietnamese authorities from even attending. American and British officials believed that public criticism would embarrass the government and elevate the moral authority of the Western camp. In the end, their criticism was muted and participants simply noted that the Vietnamese government had a “responsibility” in

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63 Skeldon, “Hong Kong’s Response,” 104.
64 VIETNAM. Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong; Resettlement in UK, Part 1-2, PREM 19/130, NAUK.
65 Ibid.
66 Chan Kwok Bun, “Hong Kong’s Response to the Vietnamese Refugees,” 98.
67 See discussions in Gil Loescher and John Scanlan, Calculated Kindness, 140.
68 VIETNAM. Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong; Resettlement in UK, Part 1-2, PREM 19/130, NAUK.
managing the crisis. Critically, the conference established a system whereby Hong Kong and receiving countries in Southeast Asia would provide temporary asylum to people fleeing Indochina with the understanding that resettlement countries would then facilitate the relocation of people to their shores. The Orderly Departure Program, which the UNHCR negotiated with Vietnamese authorities in May 1979, was supported as a mechanism for easing the crisis despite reservations about the extent to which Vietnamese authorities could be trusted to cooperate in these arrangements. The Orderly Departure Program was essentially a family reunification program whereby people who were sponsored by relatives abroad were given permission to leave and did not have to resort to choosing dangerous escape routes. The conference was critically important in securing relief for the countries of first asylum and in ensuring that they did not return boats to sea or deny admission to vulnerable migrants.

**Spheres of Responsibility**

As a result of the 1979 Geneva Conference, the lines of responsibility were drawn between countries of first asylum and potential countries of resettlement. Canada was clearly a resettlement country. The Canadian government’s commitments in Geneva were shaped by a strong sense of global responsibility that emerged as the severity of the crisis deepened. Over the course of 1978 and into 1979, immigration officials and elected politicians not only came to believe that something needed to be done, but that they had the capacity to make a difference. Sections of Irving Abella and Harold Troper’s book, *None is Too Many*, circulated amongst immigration officials at the height of the crisis. The authors detailed in dramatic terms the failure of the Canadian state to come to the aid of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution. Minister Atkey made the work required reading and Jack Manion, the Deputy Minister, informed officials that nothing akin to the *St. Louis* was to occur on his watch.

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69 Copy of USA White Paper: Indochinese Refugees, 20 July 1979, MFNUM 3627, RG 25, Volume 9780, LAC.
70 The impulse to assist was pronounced and generated ambitious, creative ideas about how to resolve the situation. One senior manager suggested securing a large boat to bring refugees from the camps in Southeast Asia to Canada. The idea was that over the course of their long journey they would be instructed on Canadian life and receive language lessons so that much of the “settlement work” would be done by the time they arrived. Officials never secured an appropriately large boat. On another occasion, Canadian officials heard rumours of Greek vessels refusing to rescue people at sea. Dismayed, Raph Girard suggested to the Greek delegation at the UNHCR that if their boats would pick up people at sea, the Canadian state would ensure that all of the refugees were resettled. The Greek government never replied to this offer. Interviews with Gordon Barnett, 11 April 2012 (Ottawa, Ontario) and Raph Girard, 18 April 2012 (telephone).
Prior to the Geneva Conference, in response to public pressure in the aftermath of the *Hai Hong* incident and concern about the “ugly overtones” detected in countries of first asylum, the Canadian government created an Indochinese Designated Class to facilitate the resettlement of people even if they did not meet the strict definition of a Convention refugee. On 31 January 1979, Cabinet approved a plan to resettle 5,000 refugees to be selected according to Designated Class regulations. Pressure persisted from critics who charged that the government should be doing more.

Just prior to the start of the Geneva Conference, the Conservative government announced that it would resettle 50,000 people in a private-government partnership called the Indochinese Refugee Program. Due to government sponsorships already in place, an outstanding quota of 21,000 slots was dedicated to private sponsorships. The announcement of the quota, which was contingent on a matching program whereby the state would sponsor one refugee for every individual sponsored privately, was met with a mix of optimism and suspicion. Much of this negative sentiment came from the leadership of the Anglican and United Churches who mistrusted the government’s intentions and suspected that they were being asked to assume excessive responsibilities for the refugees.\(^71\) As the Indochinese Refugee Program rolled out, so too did the contest over who should bear responsibility for refugee assistance. Leaders such as George Cram of the Anglican Church were adamant that the government should be ultimately responsible for the welfare of the refugees.\(^72\)

The Indochinese refugee crisis emerged at a time when relations between the federal government and Protestant organizations in the country were at a nadir. The churches were disappointed with the government’s response to the violent right-wing coup in Chile in 1973. Protestant organizations had lobbied intensely for the Canadian state to take action on behalf of refugees fleeing the Pinochet regime and were dismayed when swift action never came. While over 6,000 refugees were eventually admitted to Canada, the whole episode soured the relationship between the Protestant churches and the Trudeau government. One government report observed:

> Certain elements of the Canadian Council of Churches, reflecting the views of certain national officials of the Anglican and United Churches, including those who continue to

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\(^71\) Memo to the Minister re. Refugee Sponsorship, 18 June 1979, RG 76, Volume 1832, 8630-6C, Part 2, LAC.

\(^72\) Mike Molloy, interview with author, 13 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.
criticize the government for not doing more, have to date been decidedly lukewarm… (this) reflects the strongly held view, on the part of a few influential officials at headquarters, that refugees from rightist regimes, e.g. Chile, are somehow more deserving than those from leftist regimes like Vietnam.\(^\text{73}\)

Relations were so poor that officials were literally differentiating between “good churches” that wanted to help and those they considered obstructionist.\(^\text{74}\)

Senior officials in the Department of Manpower and Immigration, including Cal Best (the formidable Assistant Deputy Minister) resented the combination of public pressure “to do something” about the Indochinese refugees and the lack of progress with the CCC.\(^\text{75}\) There was a sense amongst officials that the churches were only prepared to criticize the government but were not willing to actively participate in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees. Frustrated, Best instructed Gord Barnett (a senior bureaucrat and skilled negotiator) to test the churches and essentially pawn off as much responsibility as possible in order to “let them flounder.”\(^\text{76}\) The instruction coincided with an overture by the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) to work with the government on the sponsorship issue.\(^\text{77}\) The MCC had been active in Vietnam since 1954, was opposed to the war and was deeply invested in doing something to alleviate the plight of the refugees.\(^\text{78}\) Unlike the CCC, and the Anglican and United Churches in particular, the MCC had long been concerned about the plight of people caught up in the conflict. In 1965, as the US government intensified its efforts, one MCC worker observed, “escalation of concern in Vietnam is not difficult, but escalation of response has been and will continue to be difficult.”\(^\text{79}\)

Gord Barnett began meeting with Bill Janzen of MCC’s Ottawa office in early 1979 and discovered a sincere and profound desire to help. Barnett returned to Assistant Deputy Minister Best and argued that burdening sponsoring organizations with too much responsibility would be

\(^{73}\) Memo to the Minister re. Refugee Sponsorship, 18 June 1979, RG 76, Volume 1832, 8630-6C, Part 2, LAC.

\(^{74}\) Gordon Barnett, interview with author, 11 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.

\(^{75}\) Howard Adelman, telephone interview with author, 18 April 2012.


\(^{77}\) This chapter represents somewhat of an exception in terms of the source of the refugee population and the cast of humanitarian actors involved. The Mennonite Central Committee and World Vision were central to the relief efforts in Indochina. In Hong Kong by contrast, it was the work of the World Council of Churches and missionaries from various denominations that shaped the humanitarian agenda.

\(^{78}\) Until 1963, MCC operated out of the United States. The MCC’s intervention was therefore particularly important because the subject of the Vietnam War had been the focus of much internal discussion.

\(^{79}\) MCC – Requests and Appeals, MG 26 N4 Pearson Papers, Volume 108, 3133.312D, LAC.
wrong, given the sincerity with which the MCC was negotiating the agreement.\textsuperscript{80} Best relented and the MCC became the first organization to sign a master agreement with the federal government on March 5, 1979. Under the terms of the agreement, the national organization guaranteed the sponsorship of smaller independent congregations. The master agreement alleviated the considerable paperwork and processing inefficiencies that would have resulted from individual congregations and sponsorship groups submitting individual applications to sponsor refugees to Canada. Critically, the national organization accepted the legal liability that would otherwise have been left with individual sponsors. The MCC eventually covered the sponsorship of over 300 Mennonite congregations as well as one hundred secular sponsorship groups. Importantly, Bill Janzen recalls that in terms of legal liability, the master agreement “didn’t cost the national committee a dime.”\textsuperscript{81} Even more critically, the MCC set the example for others to follow. Janzen recalls a public meeting in an Ottawa church basement, attended by some 150 people, where several representatives from other national churches challenged Best vigorously. Frustrated, Best finally roared: “I see Bill Janzen from the Mennonites back there. Bill, would you stand up and tell the people that it is possible to work with us!” Janzen recalls the challenge of then explaining their new Master Agreement and what it represented in terms of cooperating with the government, without appearing to denigrate representatives from the other churches.\textsuperscript{82}

The government eventually signed over fifty master agreements, the majority of which were with religious organizations. The Christian Reformed Church, under the leadership of Reverend Arie van Eck followed on the MCC’s lead and Barnett recalls that the whole atmosphere around the undertaking was “joyous and positive.”\textsuperscript{83} The two churches had powerful memories of persecution and were sensitive to what was unfolding in Indochina. Mennonites had fled the Soviet Union in the 1920s and as Bill Janzen notes, “they had quite a feeling for the Communist threat.”\textsuperscript{84} For its part, the Christian Reformed Church had been active in attempting to save Jews during the Second World War. The Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada also became involved in the resettlement for Indochinese refugees, for similar reasons. Other denominations

\textsuperscript{80} Gordon Barnett, interview with author, 11 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.
\textsuperscript{81} Bill Janzen, interview with author, 16 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.
\textsuperscript{82} Bill Janzen, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.
\textsuperscript{83} Gordon Barnett, interview with author, 11 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.
\textsuperscript{84} Bill Janzen, interview with author, 16 April 2012, Ottawa Ontario.
required more persuasion and Barnett used his personal connections with the Roman Catholic Bishop in Pembroke to encourage the participation of the Canadian Council of Catholic Bishops. The participation of the “big churches” was important to the government. There were some misgivings that early sponsorships were being pursued by organizations with a more fundamentalist bent.\footnote{This sentiment was compounded by the eager and active participation of World Vision in the camps. American Dr. Bob Pierce established World Vision in 1953 to help children orphaned by the Korean War. There was concern that World Vision was pushing a religious agenda in the camps. Howard Adelman, \textit{Canada and the Indochinese Refugees} (Regina: L.A. Weigl Education Associates Ltd., 1982), 123.} Eventually, the Anglican and United Churches signed master agreements although the level of participation amongst their congregations was never as great as it was amongst the Mennonites and the Christian Reformed Church.

The practical reality of the Designated Class mechanism and the master agreements has been lost in the celebration of the Indochinese refugee resettlement as a spontaneous and self-perpetuating humanitarian moment. Scholars tend to treat the resettlement program as a uniquely grassroots initiative, resulting from “shared values.”\footnote{See Buckley, \textit{Gift of Freedom}, 28.} It certainly had a critical community component but by the 1970s, the state also incorporated humanitarian principles and structures into its immigration program. Mechanisms were in place to enable large-scale sponsorships and this had a significant impact on the scope of the humanitarian response in Canada. In Ottawa, Mayor Marion Dewar read about the unfolding crisis and established Project 4,000 to sponsor refugees to the city. Only later did she realize there were institutional tools available to facilitate her public commitments. Similarly, Howard Adelman recalls returning from a writing retreat in northern Ontario to news that the Indochinese refugee crisis had been unfolding for six weeks. In a spontaneous gathering at his home, religious and community leaders met to discuss how they might help. The gathering was surprised by a knock at his door and the sight of an official from the government of Ontario’s settlement branch and a public relations officer from Ottawa. It was through them that the group learned about the sponsorship mechanism. Operation Lifeline was born.\footnote{Howard Adelman, telephone interview with author, 18 April 2012.}

The government as well as humanitarians of secular and religious persuasion contributed to the

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largesse of the Indochinese Refugee Program. There is no doubt, however, that the various players were motivated and constrained by distinct dynamics and differing ideas about the extent of their responsibilities and obligations. In managing the Indochinese Refugee Program, the Canadian state retained a sense of responsibility for the larger immigration and settlement program in Canada. This sense of responsibility entailed selecting the candidates “most in need of our assistance” and who could at the same time successfully establish themselves in Canada. Often, having relatives in Canada was the key determinant in the selection process since officials believed that the presence of relatives helped with the acculturation process. Kirk Bell, a veteran official in the Department of Manpower and Immigration with special responsibility for refugee issues, argued that many would face “loneliness and isolation” if they were resettled alone to Canada. Canadian officials preferred to select people with relatives in Canada or to resettle entire family units.

News about the Canadian preference soon circulated amongst the camps in Hong Kong and South East Asia and there were clearly some cases of fraudulent representations put forward by people hoping to be resettled as a family unit. In some instances, this led to awkward discoveries by church groups who sponsored families only to discover that some of them included two wives. The Canadian government eventually adopted the use of family trees in Hong Kong, akin to those constructed during the 1960-1974 Status Adjustment Program for Chinese migrants, which operated from 1960-1974. These family trees enabled them to establish “true” relations amongst those in the camps. Even as the government pursued a humanitarian enterprise the desire to manage and regulate the program remained. Significantly, the emphasis on regulating the program and the preference for families and family reunifications meant that the most difficult cases were not necessarily assisted. Mennonite workers in Thailand told their colleagues in Ottawa that the lowland Laos were least in need of resettlement since they were middle-class.

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88 Howard Adelman recalls that for several months, he gave media interviews on a daily basis about the work that Operation Lifeline was undertaking. In each interview, he referenced the leadership of the federal government in providing and supporting the mechanisms for private sponsorship. According to Adelman, this part of his narrative was never printed or aired. The media, which was critical in galvanizing public support, wanted the story to be about public pressure. They wanted it to be a spontaneous grassroots tale and rejected the Indochinese resettlement as a “government story.” Howard Adelman, telephone interview with author, 18 April 2012.

89 Canada’s Refugee Strategy, RG 76, Volume 1835, File 8700-0, Part 1, LAC.

90 Memorandum from Bell to Molloy, 16 November 1979, RG 76, Volume 1839, File 8703-1, Part 2, LAC.

91 Ibid.

92 Gerry Campbell, telephone interview with author, 14 April 2012.
and educated and capable of making their own way out of the camps. Yet the MCC’s final statistics revealed that 60% of those resettled were lowland Lao.\textsuperscript{93}

The Canadian state provided the mechanisms and infrastructure for resettlement but communities and sponsorship groups made the program a reality. Institutionalized sponsorship for Convention refugees and Designated Classes was based on the state’s resettlement philosophy that refugees should “be cared for in the community by volunteer groups with the cooperation of government welfare agencies but that they become financially self-supporting as quickly as possible.”\textsuperscript{94} Sponsorship required caring for the refugees upon arrival: securing accommodation, providing basic furniture, household essentials and warm clothing. Sponsoring groups were informed that their role was to provide “general orientation and moral support.” According to one government publication:

The welcome for refugee families will start when sponsors meet them on arrival in the community and explain the role the group will be playing in helping them get established. Sponsors will assist refugees to adjust to their new surroundings, advising them of the various community and government services available to them, helping the working family members find employment, introducing them to Canadian shopping habits, transportation and entertainment, as well as schools for their children. Members of the sponsoring group must be prepared to devote their time on a regular basis to help refugees learn about Canada and get settled in their new community.\textsuperscript{95}

Despite a downturn in the Canadian economy, and some backlash against the resettlement of thousands of Indochinese refugees, the number and generosity of the sponsors soon outpaced the capacity of the federal government to select and transport refugees to Canada. By July 1979, the government was resettling refugees at a rate of 3,000 a month. Many of these refugees were being moved out of Hong Kong.

Hong Kong’s relatively liberal approach to the refugee situation meant that it both suffered and benefited exponentially from international resettlement efforts. Given the relative stability and the colony and the relatively humane way in which the refugees were treated (compared to Malaysia and Indonesia where authorities were threatening to shoot at arriving boats), the

\textsuperscript{93} Bill Janzen citing MCC report “Welcoming Strangers,” interview with author, 16 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.  
\textsuperscript{94} Memorandum, 4 December 1979, RG 76, Volume 1835, File 8700-1, LAC.  
\textsuperscript{95} Sponsoring Refugees: Facts for Canadian Groups and Organizations, July 1979, RG 76, Volume 1839, File 8703-1, Part 2, LAC.
Americans did not consider the refugees in Hong Kong to be a priority for resettlement. The United States was far more concerned about the stability of countries in Southeast Asia and directed its resettlement efforts there. Moreover, the United States largely refused to accept any refugees from North Vietnam out of concern about potential infiltration.\(^96\) Many of the refugees in Hong Kong were ethnic Chinese from the North, having been drawn to the colony due to the presence of relatives and a certain degree of linguistic and cultural affinity. By contrast, Canadian officials appreciated the liberal approach with which Hong Kong approached the arrival of refugees from Indochina as well as the manner in which authorities operated the camps. Upon disembarkation, files were opened on each refugee to record pertinent biographical details. These files greatly eased the screening and sponsorship process. A number of Canadian church groups also had representatives in Hong Kong and this further facilitated the identification and sponsorship process. The Canadian government operated a continuous resettlement program out of Hong Kong after 1979 as a result of its desire to support British authorities and out of appreciation for the efficiency with which the camps in Hong Kong were being operated. The program unfolded so well that Canadian officials ultimately thanked their Hong Kong colleagues with a case of beer for their good work.\(^97\)

In the fall of 1979, officials in Ottawa discerned the capacity for an even larger sponsorship program than the one initially announced. However, they cautiously identified several factors that inclined them against expanding the program. These included the capacity for overseas selection (which required negotiating and working with host countries that were not as efficient as Hong Kong) and the availability of flights and the size of Canadian staging centres at CFB Longue Pointe (Montreal) and CFG Greisbach (Edmonton). Despite these limitations, the sponsorship numbers continued to increase and by October 1979 officials believed that the quota for 21,000 private sponsorships would soon be reached. The dilemma for the government was what to do about the sponsorship program when there was clearly so much interest on the part of Canadians to be involved but where an ongoing resettlement program would be costly and might simply perpetuate movement out of Indochina.\(^98\) According to the relevant Memorandum to

\(^{96}\) Gerry Campbell, telephone interview with author, 14 April 2012.

\(^{97}\) Gordon Chu to John Maclachlan, 13 August 1979, RG 76, Volume 1835, 8700-I, Part 2, LAC.

\(^{98}\) Memorandum the Minister re. Indochinese Refugees Program, 10 October 1979, RG 76, Volume 1839, File 8703-1, Part 2, LAC.
Cabinet:

Some groups are already sponsoring their second or even third family. While the refugee outflow continues at a much reduced level, sponsorship interest may well increase should the situation in Indochina produce a new surge of refugees requiring overseas resettlement.  

The danger, if sponsorship levels continued, was that it would simply encourage more people to leave. Officials were thinking according to the conventional push-pull paradigm that dominated much of the thinking in immigration circles at that time and perceived both push and pull factors to be in operation.

Cabinet debated allowing sponsorships to continue while deferring the actual arrival of refugees until 1981 but soon realized that this would politically be very unpopular. The preferred solution was to allow the number of refugees sponsored privately to exceed the allotted figure of 21,000, while reducing the number of government supported refugees proportionately to keep the intake figure for 1979/80 at 50,000. Since public attention was increasingly focused on Cambodia, Minister Ron Atkey suggested that criticism of the government’s decision to end of the matching program could be deflected by mentioning new initiatives and a plan to provide food aid to Cambodians through UNICEF or the Red Cross. When the change in policy was announced at an infamous “breakfast meeting” on 6 December 1979, church groups and NGOs were, not surprisingly, dismayed. Mike Molloy recalls that the announcement was received like a “slap in the face.” To the cynics in the crowd, the government’s reversal on the matching agreement confirmed allegations of the government “off-loading” responsibilities. The reality was that the government was seeking to manage an outpouring of support for a crisis that it believed was

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99 Memorandum to Cabinet, 1 November 1979, RG 76, Volume 1839, File 8703-1, Part 2, LAC. Robin Galienne argues that the outpouring of public support for the Indochinese refugees similarly came as a surprise to the New Zealand government. He suggests that New Zealand might have accepted many more refugees had the government not been so “conservative and cautious.” See “The Whole Thing was Orchestrated,” 201.

100 Handwriting on Memorandum to the Minister re. Indochinese Refugees Program, 10 October 1979, RG 76, Volume 1839, File 8703-1, Part 2, LAC.

101 Memorandum, 6 December 1979, RG 76, Volume 1835, File 8700-1, Part 2, LAC.

102 As recalled by Mike Molloy, interview with author, 13 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario. Molloy attended the meeting along with Kirk Bell and the Director of Refugee Policy, Doug Hill. They bore the brunt of the room’s displeasure following the Ministers’ abrupt departure.

103 Memorandum to the Minister, 10 December 1979, RG 76, Volume 1839, File 8703-1, Part 2, LAC. When Joe Clark’s Conservative government fell and Trudeau’s Liberals returned later in 1979, the new Immigration Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, “corrected” the Conservative mistake of walking away from the matching agreement. The resettlement target was increased by 10,000 people, all of whom were to be government sponsored.
abating.

Restrictions and Recriminations

After 1980, with support for resettlement dwindling amongst official circles in the West, Hong Kong was faced with a growing imbalance in resettlement figures.\textsuperscript{104} Resettlement efforts slowed but people continued to arrive, making camp stays longer and longer and straining the public’s tolerance for ongoing support to the refugees. In the pursuit of “humane deterrence” options, the government of Hong Kong established closed camps in July 1982. Refugees were no longer permitted to work outside of the camps and any refugee housed in an open camp found guilty of an infraction could be sent to a closed camp. The intention of the closed camps was to deter new migrants from seeking refuge in Hong Kong and encourage “longstayers” to return to Vietnam. The staff of various voluntary agencies and church representatives considered the closed camps inhumane and lacking in dignity. Humanitarians worried especially about the “effects of confinement on the individuals involved,” particularly if they were detained for lengthy periods of time.\textsuperscript{105} Voluntary agencies suggested local settlement as a preferred solution to the closed camps, however the government of Hong Kong rejected this idea. Authorities believed such a policy would only encourage the movement of more people, an effect they were seeking to counter.

The closed camps proved to be an additional financial burden for the government of Hong Kong, which covered the cost of constructing new buildings, security perimeters and hiring additional security staff. The camps were located on outlying islands, far away from Hong Kong’s urban centres. With this novel strategy, the government “compartmentalized” the refugee problem.\textsuperscript{106} Chan Kwok Bun observes that closed camp policy essentially created scapegoats out of the refugees: “they were classified, labeled, and stigmatized; they became a category of their own, totally disposable and dispensable.”\textsuperscript{107} Still, the government was seen to be doing something and this met with approbation from the local populace. Western countries were unhappy with the

\textsuperscript{104} In 1981, the United States announced that it was decreasing its resettlement quota from 140,000 to 100,000, a move which Kristen Grim Hughes calls “indicative of a new mood” amongst all the resettlement countries. See Hughes, “Closed Camps,” 85.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 223.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 274.
\textsuperscript{107} Chan Kwok Bun, “Hong Kong’s Response to the Vietnamese Refugees,” 106.
policy however, since it seemed to contradict the humanitarian efforts on behalf of Indochinese refugees and undermined American efforts to demonize communist regimes in Asia.  

Nevertheless, officials could say little without committing themselves to larger and more expansive resettlement programs.

When another increase in refugee flows was observed in the late 1980s, the government of Hong Kong’s policies became even more restrictive. In the summer of 1987 alone, 7,000 people snuck over the border from mainland China. Many were ethnic Chinese from Vietnam who had crossed into China during the border war in 1979 and had been living in Guanxi and Guangdong. They were compelled by the same forces that had encouraged earlier generations of South Chinese migrants to leave the mainland for Hong Kong. Chinese officials did little to dissuade people from Vietnam from moving on to Hong Kong and authorities in Hong Kong were frustrated by the lack of control on the Chinese side of the border. The situation was exacerbated when people in Hong Kong wrote letters to people on the mainland informing them that there would be a liberalization of the camps and people would be resettled overseas, to the United States and other countries. Migration from the mainland increased as a result. Arrivals from Indochina also increased as the Orderly Departure Program in Vietnam slowed down and people sought other avenues of escape. Hong Kong authorities recorded a new influx of 5,000 people in the early months of 1988. In June of the same year, the government introduced a screening process for newly arriving migrants. Genuine refugees would be permitted to stay in the camps to be resettled. However after 16 June 1988 those found not to be refugees were to be repatriated. It was a unilateral decision and one that had profound implications for countries of resettlement that were seeking to preserve the humanitarian nature of their efforts.

With this manoeuvre, Hong Kong went from the most liberal country of first asylum to the most restrictive. It took the lead in adopting the long-debated and much-criticized refugee screening procedure and in promoting regional discussions about voluntary as well as forced

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108 Memorandum, 9 November 1988, 85-29-4 INDOCHINA, Part 3, RG 25, Volume 12498, LAC.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., 96.
repatriation.” Part of this impulse in securing an “Asian solution” came from pressure from Chinese authorities who demanded that Hong Kong clean up the Indochinese problem before 1997, when the colony was to revert to Chinese control. More immediately, however, the change in policy coincided with a shift in how the arriving migrants were being perceived. There were growing suspicions that the people leaving Indochina were no longer “genuine” refugees but were instead economic migrants searching for opportunity. While these arguments had only minimal impact at the height of the crisis in 1979, this perception deepened as the urgency of the crisis abated. By the late 1980s, the conventional dichotomy used to remove obligations towards a migrant population was being employed to full effect. The colonial government claimed that only 10% of the migrants were “real refugees.” The logical corollary of this claim was that 90% of the arrivals were not refugees and therefore not deserving of accommodation in Hong Kong. American officials however remained committed to helping anyone who left Indochina, regardless of their formal refugee status. Officials objected to forced repatriations to communist countries and maintained that the “principle of first asylum must continue to be the cornerstone of our, and others’, approach to continuing refugee flows.”

British authorities disagreed, believing that different mechanisms, including screenings and repatriation, were required to stem the continued movement of people out of Indochina. They were supported in this stance by the Australian government, which also believed that the urgency of the crisis had abated. Officials in Canberra were doubtful about the degree to which later arrivals were truly in need of protection. Canadian officials also supported the screening process, albeit reluctantly. The Canadian state had its own doubts about the optics of the screening and repatriation option but it also had deep reservations about the desirability of continuing the resettlement program in perpetuity. Canadian officials shared the impression that refugees out of Indochina were no longer “genuine.” Moreover, there was growing discomfort about the resettlement program being used as a family reunification program. Although the Canadian state had relied on the resettlement of family units and relatives to ensure the successful establishment

112 Ibid.
113 Yuk Wah Chan, The Chinese / Vietnamese Diaspora, 7.
114 Chan Kwok Bun, “Hong Kong’s Response to the Vietnamese Refugees,” 95.
116 Briefing materials. RG 25, Volume 25391, 47-4-ICIR 9371, 47-4-ICR MF9371, LAC.
117 See Ottawa Consultations, 7-8 April 1988, RG 25, Volume 26038, 47-4-UNHCR-1-INDOCHIN, LAC.
of the new arrivals, by the late 1980s the Indochinese Refugee Program was becoming “unsustainable” and redundant as public pressure shifted the scope of the program. Newly arrived refugees in Canada were petitioning their sponsorship groups to assist relatives who were still in the camps. Officials believed this practice undermined the original intent of the Indochinese Refugee Program. The Family Class and Assisted Relatives categories existed for the purpose of family reunification. The Designated Classes were for people in need.\textsuperscript{118} By 1989, the diminishing character of the refugee population and pressure from newly arrived Indochinese refugees, which was turning the resettlement program into a family reunification program, convinced the Canadian state that screening and repatriation were necessary to prevent the refugee flow from continuing in perpetuity.

The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) that was established at the 1989 Geneva conference was a compromise of sorts. It established the mechanisms for a region-wide refugee determination process based on the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee. People found to be non-refugees were to be repatriated. At the same time, the CPA sought to encourage the use of the Orderly Departure Program in Vietnam and to improve conditions in Indochina so as to discourage future migration. As a result of US insistence, screenings only began in 1990 (except in Hong Kong where the mechanisms were already in place). The Canadian government committed to the CPA in the hopes that involuntary repatriations could be avoided and that more emphasis would be given to the ongoing Orderly Departure Program. The solution to the suffering caused by dangerous escapes seemed to lie with managing the way people were leaving Vietnam. Moreover, this program was a central component of finding an “Asian solution” to the crisis so that resettlement countries would not face as many demands for assistance.\textsuperscript{119}

As a result of the CPA, Canada amended the Designated Class regulations. People from Vietnam and Laos were no longer eligible for sponsorship under this category. Only Cambodians remained as a scheduled class.\textsuperscript{120} This had an immediate impact on the sponsorship program. People screened before the cut-off date were still eligible to be sponsored. However, sponsorship groups were told they should not try to help people who had not yet been screened. Officials in

\textsuperscript{118} Mike Molloy, interview with author, 13 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.
\textsuperscript{119} Indochina Refugees: Future Canadian Policy, RG 76, Volume 1835, File 8700-0, LAC.
\textsuperscript{120} OM IS 434 Changes to IC DC Regulations, 20 April 1990, RG 25, Volume 12350, File 47-1-1-17, Part 1, LAC.
the field also requested that sponsors be told about the challenges they faced in accessing populations in an effort to diminish sponsorship pressures more generally. The embassy in Bangkok explained:

Access to persons in refugee camps is controlled by the host government. Under the CPA an individual who is determined not to be a refugee in the screening process, or who has not yet been screened, is not eligible for third country resettlement. Even when such an individual has close family links with persons in Canada our visa officers have no access.\(^{121}\)

With the CPA, screening and voluntary repatriation with local settlement became the priority solutions. Resettlement and forced repatriation were secondary options. In light of this approach, the MCC in Canada ceased its efforts to resettle refugees from Southeast Asia in March 1990. In a press release, the MCC observed that given the changing patterns of migration, it saw the ongoing resettlement of Vietnamese abroad as having unwittingly enabled the “the U.S. government to continue its war against Vietnam…by luring people out of the country.”\(^{122}\) The MCC believed that most of the people leaving Indochina were now economic migrants and declared that it would cease its resettlement efforts out of concern that people were “dying in their attempts to flee in small boats” and that those who survived would “face years of awful conditions in camps.” The MCC had facilitated the resettlement of 5,000 people since 1979 and their efforts were highly regarded by the federal government which described them as “one of the most serious and effective groups in the resettlement of refugees in Canada.”\(^{123}\) The MCC’s announcement was therefore a powerful statement about the manner in which the organization had come to see its responsibilities and obligations towards the Indochinese refugees. By the time the CPA was negotiated in Geneva, the MCC no longer believed that it was improving the plight of the refugees. Rather, it felt complicit in a program that was no longer effectively humanitarian in practice.

**Conclusions**

When I asked Bill Janzen how he felt about the Canadian people being awarded the Nansen Medal in 1986, he recalled being “happy for it. I thought it would help to nurture an attitude of

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\(^{121}\) Ibid.

\(^{122}\) This accusation apparently came from Rick Berube, an MCC worker in Vietnam. See Memo to the Minister, 7 March 1990, RG 76, Volume 2010, File 8700-15, LAC.

\(^{123}\) Memo to the Minister, 7 March 1990, RG 76, Volume 2010, File 8700-15, LAC.
helping people to assist others.”124 A little later in our conversation, Janzen paused and reflected, “humanitarian efforts to do good are often more complicated than they appear.”125 It is an important and telling reflection, at once applicable to the ordinary citizens, humanitarian actors activists and government officials in countries of first asylum and resettlement that responded to the reality of thousands of people leaving Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos from 1975 to 1989.

The size of the refugee crisis that emerged in Indochina after the Vietnam War and the intensity with which the media documented the plight of the “boat people” meant there was unprecedented global awareness of refugees in Asia. The outpouring of support was at once a departure as a result of particular circumstances and a continuation of the evolving Western approaches to the issue of refugees in Asia. The crisis was unique in terms of the size and scale of the response. Hong Kong and ASEAN countries exerted considerable influence in engaging Western countries on the continued movement of people out of Indochina. Hong Kong did not play the important buffering role it had in earlier years when it had absorbed the movement of thousands of the People’s Republic of China. Rather, Hong Kong became a critical node between countries of resettlement, such as Canada, and countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia. Authorities in Hong Kong were able to pursue questionable practices such as closed camps, screening and repatriation because to international observers they were liberal at their core and were simply responding to extraordinary circumstances with extraordinary measures. As a result of Hong Kong’s initiative, after 1989 a region-wide screening and repatriation mechanism was in place, monitored by the UNHCR. Through such interventions, Hong Kong elevated its “in-betweeness” to new heights.

The dynamics of the Indochinese refugee crisis meant that Western countries were therefore confronted with the issue of refugees from Asia in a much more immediate manner than had previously been the case. The government of Hong Kong adopted a liberal approach to arriving boat people, accepting everyone as a refugee and then waiting for them to be resettled abroad. Western countries were more selective. Canada selected refugees not only on determinations of need but also on the basis of family ties and their capacity to successfully establish

124 Bill Janzen, interview with author, 16 April 2012, Ottawa, Ontario.
125 Ibid.
themselves. As the refugees out of Indochina increasingly assumed the characteristics of economic migrants or family class migrants, Canadian officials worried about unnecessarily operating a resettlement program in perpetuity. By 1989, they were willing to concede on the issue of involuntary repatriation as were authorities in Britain and Australia. American officials were not. The United States was unique in the depth of responsibility it felt for the crisis and determined negotiations were required to convince American authorities to accept repatriation for non-refugees as a possible solution after 1989.

In Canada, the Indochinese refugee crisis marked the first concurrent use of the Designated Class and master agreement sponsorship mechanisms. The results were remarkable. Over 50% of the sixty thousand refugees resettled to Canada under the Indochinese Refugee Program benefited from private sponsorship. The response might have been even larger but for operational concerns and a desire to ensure that migrants were properly categorized and channeled. Leaning on formal categories of migration to shape the response to the crisis meant that the resettlement program was inherently limited in its scope. Even at its most expansive, the Indochinese Refugee Program in Canada was shaped by authorities’ strong interest in rationalizing and categorizing all aspects of the government’s immigration program. Categorization ultimately became the solution to ongoing arrivals in Hong Kong and the countries of Southeast Asia. In 1988, the government of Hong Kong introduced a screening process so that non-refugees would be denied resettlement opportunities and repatriated to their countries of origin. The introduction of a screening mechanism served to limit the scope of responsibility to “real refugees.” Those whom states believed were simply taking advantage of an opening in an otherwise restrictive global immigration regime were excluded from the resettlement program. The new screening and repatriation mechanism, adopted in all the territories of first asylum, effectively limited the number of people eligible for resettlement. It was a policy reminiscent of earlier strategies that directed migrants to certain categories of migration. Those that fell outside of these categories became illegal and unwanted.

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126 Making sure that the planes were sufficiently full also became a priority for the selection officials. Empty charters landing in Canada generated bad press. E-mail correspondence with Mike Molloy, 29 April 2012. Telephone interview with Gerry Campbell, 14 April 2012.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

In 1989, Dora Nipp was a law student at the University of Windsor. On June 4, she heard on CBC Radio that the Chinese Army had opened fire on unarmed student and worker demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. The Red Cross estimated that thousands of people were killed and thousands more were injured. Dora’s immediate reaction, like that of many people in Canada, was one of shock and disbelief.¹ It was one shared by observers around the world.

The government’s crackdown, and the images of tanks and armed soldiers attacking student protesters left a harsh impression amongst publics in the West about what life in China was like and how citizens were treated by the regime in Beijing. The events in the spring of 1989 administered a visual shock globally, akin to the visceral effect of thousands of boat people fleeing Vietnam in the late 1970s. Human rights activists deplored the lack of freedom in the People’s Republic of China and the violent suppression of the peaceful protests and lobbied governments to cut diplomatic ties and impose sanctions. Chinese community groups sympathetic to the democracy movement, such as the Committee of Concerned Chinese Citizens Supporting the Movement for Democracy in China (Canada), were dismayed at the treatment of the students and workers and feared for the health and safety of their friends and relatives. As a result of the violence, Dora Nipp became co-chair of the Toronto Association for Democracy in China and a leading advocate of sanctions to condemn the actions of the communist regime in Beijing.

While the events of 1989 and the crackdown in Tiananmen Square have been assessed in terms of China’s revolutionary history, the potency of transnational student organizing, the nature of China’s “special relationships” with Canada, Australia and other Western democracies and the effectiveness of sanctions in coercing change, there has been little attention to the significance of the crisis in terms of evolving norms around refugee assistance and humanitarianism in the late twentieth century.²

¹ Dora Nipp, telephone interview with author, 9 January 2012.
This concluding chapter explores the immigration and refugee policies adopted by officials in Australia and Canada in response to the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in China in the spring of 1989. It considers the evolution of settler society engagement with China, in the context of the global Cold War, and argues that the chosen policies reflected four decades of fragmented engagement with political persecution in the People’s Republic of China by states, humanitarians and community groups alike. Within the diversity of responses to the crackdown in China, one finds the kernels of concern that animated state, humanitarian, and community responses to refugee movements from China in the decades following 1949.

At the same time, the context in which states responded to the events in China in 1989 had altered over the course forty years. Race-based discrimination was no longer acceptable and the anti-communist rhetoric of the Cold War had abated. The legal and humanitarian context in which people moved had also evolved. The legitimate means of movements were clearly delineated as were formal refugee determination processes. The existence of these processes meant that in theory, “genuine” refugees who presented themselves for protection in either country would be protected. As a result, refugees were not the paramount concern in formulating responses to the violence at Tiananmen Square. There were mechanisms in place to address issues of protection. Rather, states deemed people already present within the nation and especially university students who had supported the protests in China, to be most at risk.

**Spring in Beijing**

In April 1989, students in the People’s Republic of China gathered to mourn the passing of Hu Yaobang, a former Chairman and General Secretary of the Chinese Community Party, who died of a sudden heart attack while attending meetings on education reform. His death provided a rare opportunity for people to gather en masse. Students had been protesting the poor conditions at Chinese universities for some time and Hu’s death coincided with growing calls for political and economic reforms. Protests across China, such as hunger strikes and organized marches, grew as demonstrators called for democracy, freedom and an end to corruption. They staged hunger
strikes and organized protests in cities across the country. On May 20, 1989 the government imposed martial law. Despite this, protests continued. On June 4, the People’s Liberation Army moved into Tiananmen Square with tanks to clear the protesters. The international media was in Beijing at the time, to cover the visit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. As a result of the footage they captured, the world watched as soldiers opened fire on unarmed protesters, killing hundreds and injuring thousands. Another estimated 4,000 were arrested and human rights groups believe that fifty to one hundred people were executed for their role in the protests. The numbers remained disputed.\(^3\) The image of a lone man standing in front of a column of tanks in the square, disseminated worldwide, embodied the character of the confrontation for observers outside of China.

There are no detailed statistics about the number of people who tried to leave the People’s Republic of China following the crackdown on the protests.\(^4\) Several high-profile dissidents managed to escape the country and avoid arrest. Generally, however, it was quite difficult for activists to leave as the government reinforced border controls and refused to grant exit permits. At the Canadian embassy, Canadian nationals flocked to get out of China. The federal government organized special flights to facilitate their departure. A few of the Chinese who worked at the embassy were offered refuge but they declined the Canadian state’s offer, fearing for the security and safety of their families if it became known they had left the country.\(^5\)

There was therefore no major population outflow as a result of the violent suppression of the pro-democracy movement. Instead, an organized smuggling ring, akin to an underground railroad, was organized by business people in Hong Kong to help dissidents on the state’s twenty-one most wanted list to leave the mainland. “Operation Yellowbird” operated covertly out of the British colony, with the local government permitting the private operation to take place on the condition that dissidents not remain for any significant length of time nor make any political


\(^5\) Earl Drake, telephone interview with author, 10 August 2011.
statements during their time in Hong Kong.⁶ Some of the people smuggled out of mainland China as a result of Operation Yellowbird, resettled in Canada.⁷

Even though the violence in the People’s Republic of China in June 1989 did not produce a massive outflow of people claiming refugee status, the shock generated by the events at Tiananmen Square led Canadian and Australian authorities to shelter students and temporary visitors who were in their countries at the time of the crackdown.⁸ These policies were the product of strong disillusionment with the regime in Beijing, exaggerated by the great optimism that had attended relations with the People’s Republic of China in the previous decade.

Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1978 heralded a new hopefulness amongst Western states about the possibility of engaging and effecting change in China. Business, cultural and academic contacts grew following indications that Beijing was opening up. The Canadian state initiated major investments in the People’s Republic of China and the government began funding substantial development programs through the Canadian International Development Agency, spending $200 million in China annually from 1987 to 1992.⁹ Similarly in Australia, officials collaborated more openly and closely with Chinese officials over the course of the 1970s, frequently referring to the existence of a “special relationship.”¹⁰ As Canada’s ambassador reflected upon his return to Ottawa for consultations after the crackdown, “in some respects we were naïve.”¹¹ Jan Wong, the Globe and Mail’s Beijing correspondent echoed this sentiment in her memoirs, written a decade after the tumultuous events. She declared, “No one believed the People’s Liberation Army would shoot the Chinese people in cold blood.”¹² The disillusionment in the spring of 1989 was palpable.

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⁶ Wong, 15.
⁷ When I asked Dora Nipp if she could put me in touch with the migrants in question, she indicated that they would not be willing to speak with me despite the passing years out of concern for their security. Telephone interview with author, 9 January 2012.
⁸ Although there was no mass outflow as a result of the crackdown in the spring of 1989, the violence sparked an increase in emigration from Hong Kong as people worried about the impact of the colony’s reversion to Chinese control in 1997.
¹¹ Earl Drake, telephone interview with author, 10 August 2012.
¹² Jan Wong, Jan Wong’s China: Reports from a Not-So Foreign Correspondent (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1999), 14.
The challenge for many Western officials was how to reconcile their public commitment with human rights issues and democratic ideals with their interests in pursuing, and safeguarding, economic investments in China. The Conservative government in Ottawa assembled a series of high-level meetings between ministers and interested stakeholders including Amnesty International, Chinese community groups from across the country and business interests. While the business community was opposed to sanctions, other groups demanded that the government take a strong stand against the violence in China. As one participant recalls, “The 500,000 plus Canadian Chinese community appeared embarrassed, angry and appalled at what had happened.”\(^\text{13}\) Chinese community groups lobbied for sanctions and for assistance to Chinese students and scholars who were in Canada at the time of the crackdown.\(^\text{14}\) Dora Nipp recalls their efforts were buoyed by the outpouring of public support. She believes that at one point, the Canadian government was receiving seven hundred letters a week from concerned individuals.\(^\text{15}\) In the end, the Canadian government cancelled high-level visits, delayed the signing of agreements and cancelled export permits for military sales. The Australian government also held consultations with Chinese community groups in the country and similarly cancelled high-level visits. Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s government also provided $200,000 to the Red Cross for relief efforts in China.

Importantly, both Canadian and Australian officials incorporated immigration issues into their policy responses, which according to Australian scholar Ann Kent “were carefully targeted and timed to keep as much of the relationship intact as possible.”\(^\text{16}\) There were 8,000 Chinese students in Canada and 10,000 in Australia at the time the pro-democracy movement was suppressed.\(^\text{17}\) The university students were considered “new migrants” by the People’s Republic of China and were part of Beijing’s efforts to modernize China’s economy. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Chinese government encouraged overseas studies in the hopes that students would obtain much-needed expertise and “return to serve the motherland.”\(^\text{18}\) The students in Canada


\(^{14}\) Ibid.

\(^{15}\) Dora Nipp, e-mail exchange with author, May 23, 2012.


\(^{17}\) There were also thousands of visitors on temporary entry permits. There were at least 4,000 in Australia alone.

and Australia were on temporary visas and were scheduled to return to the People’s Republic of China upon the completion of their studies. Many of these students openly supported the pro-democracy movement in China, particularly after the images of the crackdown in Tiananmen Square circulated in the international media. 30,000 people, including many university students, gathered in Toronto (in the largest such gathering outside of Hong Kong) on June 5 to protest and similar demonstrations were held in Vancouver, Halifax and other Canadian cities in the days that followed. Writing in the *Globe and Mail*, Angus Tse-Kit Wong (Vice-President of the Chinese Student’s Association at York University) declared:

> It is hard for us students, Chinese students abroad, just to sit and watch while the killings in China continue. We are, to say the least, awestruck at the courage and determination of our Beijing colleagues. The bond that unites us around the world is the knowledge that the students in Beijing are right – and the Chinese government knows it.\(^\text{19}\)

Authorities in Canada and Australia were acutely aware of the potential danger that students returning to China faced, particularly if they were known to Chinese authorities as active supporters of the pro-democracy movement.\(^\text{20}\) Newspaper stories revealed that Chinese authorities were compiling lists of names of people involved in the protests, raising concerns about the safety of these individuals upon their return to China. The Canadian government therefore announced that it would extend student visas for one year for those who desired to stay in Canada. Moreover, the government gave priority to those students who wished to apply, along with their families, for permanent residence. In Australia, the government announced a similar program, granting temporary visa extensions for those who were in Australia as of 4 June 1989.\(^\text{21}\)

The Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, Robert Ray, said his government had “enormous sympathy for the PRC (People’s Republic of China) students” and that he considered the offer of temporary refuge to be consistent with Australia’s history of

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showing “compassion in circumstances where human rights are blatantly violated.”\textsuperscript{22} The use of temporary extensions carried on until 1993 when as a result of a High Court ruling, more than 2000 students and 20,000 Chinese nationals were granted permanent residence.\textsuperscript{23}

While the Canadian and Australian responses were certainly similar, there were some important differences; most notably in the extent of lobbying required to obtain temporary and then permanent reprieve from the requirement to return home. Chinese students in Canada were granted temporary extensions and then encouraged to apply for permanent residence. In Australia, Chinese students only obtained permanent residence if they could demonstrate that they would be persecuted if they were returned to the People’s Republic of China. They were forced into the refugee determination process while their Canadian counterparts were largely kept apart from this stream. Gordon Fairweather, Chairman of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board, invited students to apply for refugee status on 7 July 1989, but his initiative was overtaken by the government’s offer two weeks later of temporary extensions and priority in the processing of permanent residence applications.\textsuperscript{24}

In Australia, continued anxiety about the numerical impact of large-scale immigration from the People’s Republic of China shaped the government’s response to the crisis. While Prime Minister Bob Hawke emphasized that no student would be sent back against his or her will, he also emphasized the importance of students having the time and the opportunity to decide their futures.\textsuperscript{25} Australian officials never encouraged Chinese students to stay permanently, they simply ensured that they were protected until they decided to go back. It was student and community lobbying along with decisions by the High Court that created openings for more permanent residence in 1989. According to Jia Gao, by mid-June students were writing Australian Members of Parliament and government departments seeking humanitarian protection. Gao observes that the students “became very active, not only organizing their own

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unions in each state, but also repeatedly advertising a series of seminars on how to apply to stay.”

The students worked hard to obtain extensions to their temporary protection and when these efforts failed, they used the refugee-determination process to secure permanent residence in Australia.

Part of the Australian government’s approach can be explained by the arrival of several large boats of refugee claimants at the time that Canberra was determining how to address the situation created by Beijing’s crackdown on public dissent. The arrival of the boats seemed to tap into the country’s sense of vulnerability and this contributed in part to the relatively conservative nature of the government’s overture to Chinese students and visitors in the country. Concerns about growing numbers of asylum-seekers prompted the government to introduce a series of two hundred new regulations under the *Migration Legislation Amendment Act*, which resulted in tighter border controls and major limitations to the on-shore humanitarian program (including mandatory detention for Vietnamese, Cambodian and Chinese asylum seekers). Jia Gao suggests, “the removal of the onshore humanitarian program from proposed migration regulations in 1989 left most students with only one chance to apply to stay in Australia – through the refugee system.” To prove their refugee claims, students became members of international networks of activists such as the International Federation of Students and Scholars and the Federation for a Democratic China. They then included this membership information in their application for refugee status as evidence that they faced potential persecution and retribution if they were returned to China.

It is deeply revealing that no formal refugee program was introduced for people escaping from the People’s Republic of China in either Canada or Australia. In conversations with Canadian policymakers and officials involved with the Tiananmen Square response, it appears that this option was never seriously considered. The lack of large-scale flows and the incredibly delicate politics around condemning China while at the same time protecting investments and economic

26 Gao, “International Networks,” 299.
31 Earl Drake, telephone interview with author, 10 August 2011.
interests meant that the humanitarian response had to be carefully calibrated and delicately contextualised. The programs introduced to protect the students were deemed sufficient for protection purposes. There was little to be gained from deploying the highly politicized rhetoric of refugeehood as was the case for European refugees at the height of the Cold War. Other than the cases heard by the Immigration and Refugee Board, the only time the Canadian state or national media referenced refugees from China in June 1989, was in discussions of the specially-chartered aircraft to bring Canadian nationals to Canada.  

Australian and Canadian officials extended temporary residence to Chinese students using the criterion of a fear of persecution as rationale for their programs but without ever using the term “refugee” to describe the students’ situation. The significant humanitarian gray area, which existed alongside the formalization of refugee decision-making processes over the course of the postwar period, expanded in 1989 to enable governments to offer sanctuary without overtly politicizing the issue. The general approach by Western governments to the events at Tiananmen Square was to seek middle-ground so that the violence could be condemned but productive engagement could be maintained. The existence of formal refugee decision-making processes facilitated this response. As the policies of the governments of Australia and Canada reveal, with legal mechanisms in place to respond to refugee claims, authorities could address demands from human rights activists, community groups and student leaders for a generalized humanitarian approach without politicizing the refugee issue and alienating authorities in the People’s Republic of China. The existence of an international refugee regime in no way compromised the enduring discretion and creativity available to states on occasions when they perceived political and economic advantages to protecting certain groups of people. Formal refugee determination mechanisms simply operated alongside the expanding or contracting humanitarian space of the postwar period, enabling or inhibiting other political strategies.

Along with offering students permanent residency in Canada, the federal government announced in June 1989 that it would stop deporting people to China, including failed refugee claimants. The amnesty was scheduled to expire after two months; the time government expected it would take for the situation to normalize.  

In the end, the temporary amnesty remained in place for

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33 Paul Gecelovsky, “The Canadian Response to the Tiananmen Square Massacre: An Interactive
almost two years as officials attempted to determine the state of internal conditions in China. The Australian government took a similar decision although in an effort to curtail abuse of the system, people who arrived in Australia after June 20, 1989 were subject to deportation.\footnote{Canberra to External, 13 November 1990, RG 25, Volume 12439, 85-20-3 CHINA, part 1, LAC.}

In discussions about resuming deportations, the Canadian embassy in Beijing reported that it had little information about what was happening to people upon their return other than that they were met by public security officials and debriefed. Nevertheless, officials explained “most potential returnees are economic migrants from the South who will be returning to a relatively unregulated urban work environment or to unemployment in the countryside. In these environments there is little scope or will for official reward or punishment.” The 1990 report noted, “higher profile cases such as state sponsored visits and some academics may face criticism, fines and barriers to future professional advancement.”\footnote{Beijing to Ottawa, 11 November 1990, RG 25, Volume 12379, 47-7-4-5, LAC.}

Embassy officials encouraged Ottawa to resume deportations given the “flood of INADPAX (inadmissible passengers) from China. China is now the principal source (of inadmissible passengers) and its numbers will increase under pressure of declining economic growth, population pressure, and weakening of control both in China and Hong Kong.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Barbara McDougall, Minister for Employment and Immigration Canada, was reluctant to resume deportations but a growing backlog meant the Canadian government formally, and quietly, did so in November 1991. By then, six hundred removal orders had accumulated, including sixteen for criminality.\footnote{The memorandum that announced the resumption referred to deportees as “non-refugees”….“inadmissible to Canada because they have committed criminal acts (and) have exhausted all the remedies provided for by the Act.”\footnote{Although twenty-one people, including a student suffering from schizophrenia, had been deported during the amnesty and without media fanfare, to the government’s relief. Memorandum, 14 November 1991, RG 25, Volume 12439, 85-20-3 CHINA, Part 1, LAC.} 

In deciding to resume deportations to the People’s Republic of China, Canadian officials did so in large part because of their confidence in the refugee determination processes of the Immigration and Refugee Board to ensure that no “genuine refugee” would be sent back to dangerous conditions in the People’s Republic of China. As early as 7 June 1989 the Immigration and Refugee Board had been factoring the massacre at Tiananmen Square into its
decisions regarding refugee claims. Dr. Timothy Brook, author of *Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement* (a detailed account of the events of 1989 based on participant and observer interviews) became an expert witness for the Board. In his self-described capacity as a “neutral observer,” his responsibilities involved interviewing refugee claimants and advising counsel on the authenticity of their claims. By late 1990, Brook was identifying growing numbers of fraudulent claims as smugglers and migrants in Fujian province in particular became cognizant of the Board’s hearings and viewed them as a potential migration avenue. For those in the know, formal refugee determination processes had become a possible entry point to Canada and the Board’s decisions began to reflect this trend. According to T.A. Keenleyside and Paul Gecelovsky, the acceptance rate for Chinese nationals fell by 40 per cent between 1989 and 1992.

Writing in *Saturday Night*, former *Globe and Mail* bureau chief to Beijing, John Fraser, declared that the Board’s decisions reflected “a pattern of such consistent cultural incomprehension and smug ignorance that anyone with a tendency towards paranoia might think there was a special animus against Chinese refugee claimants.” Rather, it seems that the Board was thoroughly investigating the authenticity of the claims, aided by expert witnesses and a slew of documentation compiled by the staff in the Board’s Documentation Centre. The belief that the Board was able to identify genuine refugees gave the government the confidence to proceed with deportations after offering clearly demarcated humanitarian programs that focused on student needs.

**Tiananmen as Coda**

Examining the Canadian and Australian responses to the repression of the pro-democracy movement by communist authorities in the People’s Republic of China in 1989 serves as a coda to the story of four decades of migration, Cold War conflict and humanitarianism that defined the perception and reception of Chinese refugees in settler societies from 1949 to 1989. In 1989, the overriding concern for Canadian and Australian officials was the question of how to demonstrably condemn the violent crackdown while simultaneously engaging the Beijing regime in a productive dialogue and protecting their economic and business interests in China. States

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40 Timothy Brook, telephone interview with author, 23 January 2012.
believed that providing temporary or permanent refuge without producing an accompanying public rhetoric about refugees was one means of accomplishing both of these objectives. In Australia, these policies were the product of the tension around how to offer humanitarian assistance without compromising controls on the size of migration flows from the People’s Republic of China.⁴³ In Canada, they were a reflection of the Conservative government’s profound desire to maintain “productive dialogues” with the central government in Beijing and recognition that the Canadian public was sympathetic to the students’ plight and desired to have them remain in Canada. In both cases, policies were also the product of four decades of instrumental and selective state engagement with the issue of Chinese refugees from the People’s Republic of China. In 1989, Canadian and Australian officials successfully provided refuge to thousands of individuals without ever discussing the issue of refugees.

The following sections summarize how the events of 1989 inform our understanding about the relationship between migrants and the officially-designated categories designed to structure their movements, the nature of postwar humanitarianism, the evolution of the Cold War with China and the enduring, if fragmented, legacy of imperialism and race on identity and nation-building pursuits in the settler societies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Over the span of forty years, official migration categories appeared, evolved and collapsed in the various jurisdictions under study. The discourse on Chinese migration changed concurrently; shifting from an exclusionary and discriminatory approach to one that gradually embraced Chinese migrants as the norm, rather than the exception. The one constant was the movement of people.

When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 there were few opportunities for migrants to move legally into the countries under study. The Canadian government repealed its exclusionary legislation in 1947 but only in 1962 did Chinese migrants gain access to the skilled worker stream and only in 1967 did the government universalize its family sponsorship rules. After 1953, no new legal migration was permitted from the People’s Republic of China to South Africa as the National Party pursued a sweeping apartheid agenda. Only in the 1970s did the South African government officially sanction Chinese migration. Even then, entry was limited to Taiwanese (Republic of China) nationals and residents of Hong Kong. Concern about communist infiltration and the lack of diplomatic relations between Pretoria and Beijing made it impossible

for Chinese migrants from the People’s Republic of China to migrate legally to South Africa until the 1990s. In New Zealand, family sponsorship became a possibility in 1951 under a restrictive quota system. Controls remained for all other categories. Economic migrants only began to arrive in significant numbers in the 1980s. In Australia, a patchwork of rules and regulations permitted the temporary entry of students and certain categories of workers but permanent residence only became available to Chinese migrants beginning in 1966 and more broadly in 1973 with the official end of the White Australia policy. Exit controls imposed by authorities in Beijing from 1951 to 1978 further restricted the capacity for people to leave the People’s Republic of China. Even entry to the traditionally open territory of Hong Kong was limited after 1951. Constraints on both ends of the international migration spectrum structured the capacity for migrants to move, but in no curtailed the ingenuity with which migrants undertook their departures and settlement.

For most of the period under study, the refugee category did not exist as a legitimate means of movement for migrants from the People’s Republic of China. The migrants identified by the Canadian state for group resettlement from Hong Kong in 1962 and the orphans and refugee families resettled to New Zealand in the same period were the only ones officially sanctioned as refugees for resettlement purposes until the Indochinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s, which involved many ethnic Chinese. People therefore moved according to whatever means was available to them. As a result, their degree of refugeehood was not necessarily captured by official statistics or formal categories of migration. There was a rationale at work as to how people moved out of the People’s Republic of China and it was not necessarily one that meshed with how states viewed migration. We must therefore be vigilant about the use of official categories and labels to explain the nature of twentieth century migration, particularly since the overriding context in which people moved was a restrictive one. For Chinese migrants from 1949 to 1989, categories and labels concealed more than they revealed. For while governments intended officially designated migration categories to delineate the legitimate means of movement, in reality, people selected the migration category that best suited their own pursuits and adapted themselves accordingly, subverting state efforts to categorize and regulate migrants in the process. This was as true for so-called economic migrants as it was for so-called refugees.
The manner in which Chinese migrants used various categories of official migration in pursuit of their personal dreams and ambitions subverted the authority of the migration process that was meant to categorize and legitimize various means of movement. Government exceptionalism also destabilized official migration streams. Every time a government made an exception on humanitarian grounds, either on an individual basis or for an entire group of migrants, it undermined the authority of formal migration processes.

Simultaneously, humanitarian exceptions reinforced the state’s authority in directing opportunities for sanctioned movement. This had important repercussions on the nature of public compassion and the level of public support for refugees in need. As the international refugee regime became more established in the postwar period, it increasingly shaped the nature of state humanitarianism with regard to refugee crises around the globe. With legal refugee determination processes in place, states could either direct people towards the system or use certain humanitarian situations for instrumental purposes. On such occasions, as with the Indochinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s, they developed programs that worked in conjunction with, but remained separate, from formal refugee determination processes. By 1989, authorities in Canada, Australia and New Zealand could rely on a range of formal refugee determination processes to redefine and reshape the scope of their humanitarian actions. As such, the relationship between church, secular actors and community groups who advocated for human rights and equality on immigration issues and encouraged state engagement with Chinese refugee issues evolved from a rather conflictual dynamic in 1949 to quite an incorporated one four decades later. This change occurred as their agendas were gradually absorbed into state-directed humanitarianism that protected the discretion of authorities to address or inspire the public’s compassionate gaze.

Humanitarianism was both an argument for state engagement with refugee issues and a vocation for many of the people who acted on behalf of refugees and encouraged others to do the same. For the leaders of Chinese community groups in settler societies (with the exception of South Africa), family reunification was the priority issue in the years under study. Until family sponsorships were permitted, the focal points of campaigns to create equality of opportunity in immigration were families separated by unjust and discriminatory migration laws. The language of humanitarianism was central to arguments for the right to sponsor relatives and be reunited.
with family members. On occasion, Chinese community groups also used the language of humanitarianism with regard to refugees from the People’s Republic of China but the refugee issue was never the priority for these groups. Rather, it was the implication of refugee movements on the family sponsorship issue that preoccupied Chinese activists.

In Vancouver, the Chinese Benevolent Association’s President, Foon Sien Wong twinned sponsorship issues with the refugee populace in Hong Kong arguing that since the relatives of many Chinese Canadians were in Hong Kong the government should resettle refugees to Canada. In New Zealand, the temporary admission of Chinese wives and children during the Second World War became permanent after Chinese communities lobbied the government to allow them to stay on humanitarian grounds. Similar arguments about humanitarianism became the basis for later arguments about expanded family class and skilled worker migration in New Zealand. In such instances, refugees and their humanitarian plight became instrumental to larger objectives of family reunification and increased settlement opportunities. It is telling therefore that in South Africa, where Chinese communities were disenfranchised and subject to many of the apartheid barriers that targeted “coloured” and “non-European” residents of South Africa, the discourse of humanitarianism never ballooned to include the issue of refugees from the People’s Republic of China. The primary preoccupation for Chinese South Africans was the survival of their own communities. Even family sponsorship campaigns were muted until election of the African National Congress in 1994.

The language of humanitarianism employed by missionaries in Asia and by local congregations at home, along with the strand adopted by national and international church organizations, was different than that employed by Chinese community groups. Missionaries and faith-based organizations advanced a brand of humanitarianism that spoke to the moral obligations of those in privileged positions to assist those who were less fortunate. It was a humanitarianism that preceded the legal reforms undertaken in settler societies throughout the 1960s and 1970s, which ultimately made immigration legislation more universal. The discourse of humanitarian obligations employed by missionaries and church groups helped advance these legislative reforms. In South Africa however, the delicate relationship between the churches and the apartheid regime meant that the immediate preoccupation for most religious authorities after 1948 was how to position themselves vis-à-vis the ruling National Party’s policies and black
congregations who bore the brunt of the regime’s hostilities.\textsuperscript{44} There was little freedom for religious authorities in South Africa to create the sort of groundswell around international refugee issues seen in Canada, Australia and New Zealand (although there was some attempt to do so, most notably during World Refugee Year). Yet the initiative for assistance to Chinese refugees from the People’s Republic of China and particularly those who made their way into over-crowded Hong Kong came largely from missionaries and secular organizations on the ground in Asia. It was their vision of assistance and engagement that was channeled to home congregations who were variously inspired by the issues presented.

The diverse ends to which proponents put the language of humanitarianism to use testifies to the intermittent and fractured manner in which community groups, churches, NGOs and religious organizations engaged with the issue of refugees from the People’s Republic of China over the postwar period. It is perhaps worthwhile noting that in the literature on twentieth century social movements, scant attention is paid to the refugee agenda that was advanced by people around the globe after the Second World War. In many ways, this absence is surprising given that the campaigns on behalf of refugees were intertwined with larger issues of equality, human rights and human dignity; many issues at the core of “model” social movements such as the campaigns for civil rights, women’s liberation and the environment.\textsuperscript{45} Yet while the subject matter may have paralleled that of some of the other movements, campaigns around refugee issues were distinguished by the fact that they were largely initiated by people lobbying on behalf of others. As a result, the campaigns were less about collective identity-building and recognition than about changing the scope of state humanitarianism to ensure that the needs of those who were persecuted or displaced were attended to. People who worked towards the recognition and resettlement of Chinese refugees tapped into some of the language adopted by other activists, but unlike social movements that were deeply conflictual in their engagement with the state, advocates of refugee rights and protections worked within the political processes structured by the state, optimizing opportunities as they arose but rarely operating outside of the system. As a result, the contours of their efforts were shaped not only by their perception of humanitarian

\textsuperscript{44} Non-European Affairs in South Africa, “Apartheid,” General, BDH, 23, 170/12, vol.1, National Archives of South Africa.
crises but by the procedures states introduced to address refugee issues. Once there were legal mechanisms in place to determine refugee status, activists and church groups increasingly directed their efforts at ensuring that the system was fair and accessible rather than championing the refugee qualities of particular groups.

Efforts on behalf of Chinese refugees by the various groups under study were at their core, deeply conservative, and their reactive, fragmented nature disguised the integral role that advocates played in effecting changes to perceptions of refugee situations beyond Europe. As campaigns on behalf of refugees in Hong Kong advanced, particularly during World Refugee Year, governments absorbed the lobbying of discrete groups of people and initiated humanitarian programs of their own. State programs for refugees from the People’s Republic of China transformed the meaning and significance of humanitarianism. State engagement was informed by a settler colonial mentality and was consistently constrained by foreign policy considerations, broader immigration objectives and operational concerns including health and security examinations and other facets of program integrity. This array of concerns meant that any humanitarian initiative necessarily rested on a slew of political and operational considerations that often emptied the gesture of its humanitarian origins. Nevertheless, in the context of the Cold War, being able to ascribe to a humanitarian identity was important to those settler societies sensitive to demonstrating the superiority of their way of life over the communist alternative.

Each of the countries in this study engaged slightly differently with the arrival of a communist regime in Beijing in 1949 and the similarities and divergences in their approaches are equally informative. For its part, the Canadian government came very close to negotiating recognition in 1950 until the eruption of the Korean War altered the political landscape. In subsequent decades, successive Canadian governments retained a desire to engage the People’s Republic of China rather than isolate it internationally. In 1960, the Canadian government began to export millions of dollars of wheat to the People’s Republic of China, solidifying the relationship and increasing the frequency and substance of official contacts. While the missionary presence in China declined after the expulsion of Western missionaries in 1951, there were important academic and cultural contacts that persisted throughout the Cold War and these increased significantly after 1978 when the People’s Republic of China “opened” its doors. Anti-communism was an

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46 Similar exchanges were undertaken by the New Zealand China Friendship Society, established in 1952, under the
important element in Canadian political life after the Second World War but it was not the defining element in Canada’s approach to the world, and particularly with regard to its engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

By contrast, Liberal governments in Australia, which were in office for much of the postwar period were rabidly anti-communist and this worldview had a significant effect on how Australian officials approached their engagement with the People’s Republic of China.\textsuperscript{47} Like St-Laurent’s government in Canada, Robert Menzies’ administration came close to securing official recognition of the People’s Republic of China after the British government extended recognition in 1950 but its plans were also frustrated. Importantly, the strength of the anti-communist movement, twinned with Australia’s visceral fears about an Asian invasion (both of the military and demographic variety), meant that Chinese migrants from the People’s Republic of China were subject to double scrutiny. They were viewed as racially undesirable and politically so as well. A similar pattern of thought was evident in how officials in New Zealand responded to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

The concerns in Australia and New Zealand were amplified in South Africa. Chinese migration from the People’s Republic of China was banned after 1953. South African officials associated communism with the anti-apartheid efforts of groups such as the ANC, which shared a membership list with the South African Communist Party.\textsuperscript{48} With the resumption of “normal” relations by most of the countries under study by 1972 and the opening of China for business in 1978, the Cold War with China essentially ended, as did the freeze on population flows. Amongst settler societies, there was a rapid increase in cultural and academic exchanges and business investment in the People’s Republic of China after the late 1970s. This occurred later in South Africa, which did not recognize the People’s Republic of China until 1998. Migration numbers also increased but the desire to discuss refugees from the People’s Republic of China leadership of Rewi Alley, a New Zealand writer and long-time resident of China.


remained muted. With the establishment of refined migration categories, family reunification agreements and refugee determination processes, any inclination to produce a refugee discourse around migrants from the People’s Republic of China was muted. When the Chinese state cracked down on the pro-democracy movement in the spring of 1989, killing its own citizens in the process, authorities in settler societies offered humanitarian solutions that were informed by the international refugee regime but did not actually reference the exiles and asylum seekers who were making their way out of the People’s Republic of China.

The visual history of refugees from the People’s Republic of China was also a critical element in shaping an agenda of care and concern. For the most part, refugee flows out of the country were invisible to audiences in settler societies. On only a few occasions did a visual narrative accompany discussions around refugees from the Chinese mainland. During World Refugee Year, audiences around the world were presented with images of overcrowded conditions in Hong Kong. These visuals were meant to signify the depth of antipathy the refugees felt towards the Communist regime, suggesting that people were prepared to live in terrible conditions because they were so desperate to leave the mainland. In 1962, the international media coverage introduced audiences to the sight of people leaving the mainland _en masse_ for Hong Kong. Individual representations displayed the despair of people at the border. The visual event of the 1962 exodus tapped into the empathy generated by World Refugee Year and was critical in triggering resettlement programs in Canada and New Zealand. Yet at the same time, authorities in South Africa and Australia were unmoved by the visuality of the crisis. Their lack of engagement speaks to the limited capacity for visual encounters to create enduring concern, particularly when the images conflict with overarching nation-building objectives.

Persistent notions of racial superiority and doubts about the desirability of any significant, permanent migration from Asia, constrained the production of a refugee discourse for people leaving the People’s Republic of China from 1949 to 1989 in the settler societies of the British Commonwealth. The historical trajectories of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa were all imprinted with British imperialism and ideas of white supremacy where other racial groups existed as disenfranchised labourers or the subjects of civilizing missions. Although, the formal British Empire essentially came to an end after the Second World War as decolonisation movements led to the independence of one colony after another in Africa and Asia, the
affectionate bonds of empire amongst settler societies endured and in some instances, solidified in the face of a rapidly changing world. The inherited identities of settler societies were practically enforced by laws and communication networks. Reference to other “like-minded” countries could easily be used to justify the lack of assistance to refugees in Hong Kong after 1949, for instance, or to the retention of discriminatory legislation.

National identities in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa were to varying extents constructed upon settler narratives that were deeply embedded in national imaginaries by the end of the Second World War. Foundational narratives fed the authority assumed by elected officials to develop nation-states along particular ethnic and cultural lines. The sense of entitlement embodied in the act of selection went far beyond mere practices of immigration control conventionally understood as the last bastion of state sovereignty. The very fact that authorities felt entitled to discuss issues of absorption and assimilability speaks to the sense of privilege and authority born of a settler colonial mentality. Yet it became more difficult for leaders to justify this sense of entitlement after the Second World War. The creation of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the social justice discourse it inspired meant that overt discrimination was indefensible, even in the immigration realm. In Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the postwar period witnessed a gradual loosening of overtly racialized barriers to migration and citizenship so that from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, the discourse on “nations of immigrants” began to embrace a multicultural dimension (having first moved through gradations of exclusion and assimilation as settlement strategies). Migrants of all backgrounds, including Asia, were increasingly included in national histories and in processes that define present-day national identities.

The story in South Africa is a very different one. After 1948, with the election of the National Party with an expressly apartheid agenda, the only legitimate national identity became an Afrikaaner one. The histories of all other settlement in South Africa, including that of Africans, Chinese and even British, were suppressed. Alongside this erasure was the disappearance of any sense of being a nation of immigrants. This erasure had important ramifications in terms of the impact of humanitarian appeals issued by the United Nations and the UNHCR or by Chinese South Africans on family reunification issues. Without the compelling narrative of a nation of
immigrants, these appeals had little traction. There was no historical tradition to call upon to spur
the government to open its doors to new migrants.

Into this mix of crumbling empire and threatened ideals emerged the figure of the Chinese
refugee. Discussions about refugees from the People’s Republic of China originated in Hong
Kong where the history of open migration combined with anxiety about Beijing’s aspirations to
regain control over the colony created a peculiar refugee discourse that was intended to ensure
the migrants’ presence was a temporary one. It was a specific, local discourse, which was
complicated by the expanding discourse around refugees as persecuted individuals. As a result of
campaigns by faith-based organizations, secular actors and other interested parties, the situation
in Hong Kong became part of a global refugee agenda, highlighted by its inclusion in World
Refugee Year. The publicity campaign that ensued demonstrated in a visible manner the level of
need in Hong Kong. Still, settler society states proved reluctant to actively address the possibility
of refugees from the People’s Republic of China until governments legitimized the means of
movement, believing this would enable them to control the size and character of migration flows
from China and other parts of the world. Only then did they begin to engage with the
resettlement of Chinese refugees albeit in an extremely careful manner, and on a very small
scale. The results of these early efforts were mixed. In some cases, governments were reassured
about their capacity to manage refugee resettlement. In other instances, revelations about fraud
and abuse in the system nourished enduring fears about what migration from Asia portended.

By the late 1970s, decisions about refugee status for migrants from the People’s Republic of
China were increasingly left to administrative tribunals. States once again pulled back from any
kind of active engagement with refugee issues from the People’s Republic of China. Importantly,
there was no accompanying visual narrative to compel intervention. Depending on how these
bureaucratic entities treated the nature of persecution in China migrants were, on occasion, able
to avail themselves of asylum in the countries under study. Significantly, the Convention’s
emphasis on individual persecution (and the exclusion of generalized violence from the scope of
protection) meant that the sheer size of the population in the People’s Republic of China
frequently excluded Chinese migrants from the sheltering embrace of protective refugee regimes.

Protection often took place parallel to the UNHCR’s framework. The establishment of the
Designated Classes and sponsorship mechanism in the 1976 Immigration Act meant that the
Canadian state and the Canadian people were able to respond in an unprecedented manner to the flight of migrants from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos after 1979, regardless of their refugee status. The resettlement operation was far from smooth and there were contests amongst humanitarian actors, states of resettlement and countries of first asylum about their respective responsibilities and obligations. Eventually, migrants were screened using liberal interpretations of the Convention definition. Those who did not meet the threshold of refugeehood were repatriated from countries of first asylum. In 1989, Chinese students in Canada and Australia were sheltered without reference to the Convention and its protection regime. Operation Yellowbird facilitated the emigration of dissidents but by and large, there was no discussion of refugees despite known political persecution. On this occasion, it was the refugee subject rather than the Chinese migrant that proved most troubling as countries sought to reconcile humanitarian obligations with their desire to protect economic interests in China.

The history of Chinese migration during the Cold War and its complicated intersection with the emerging global humanitarian agenda is not just a question of social construction and historical contingencies, it is also one of deliberate production on the part of states, humanitarian actors and Chinese community groups, with journalists playing an important mediating role. Humanitarian actors produced the refugee subject. States, by and large, did not. Instead, states managed an emerging situation. The state’s authority and sovereignty were challenged not only by the movement of people but also by the advocacy and lobbying on behalf of refugees. In looking at how states, humanitarian actors and migrants themselves engaged with changing ideas of refugeehood in the postwar period, the incredible instrumentality of the refugee concept comes to the fore while the possibility of any authentic refugee subject recedes into the background. The modern refugee subject appears as an additional layer of experience superimposed on deeper migration patterns.

The production of the modern refugee subject in the context of migration from the People’s Republic of China during the Cold War, depended on local histories and imperatives as well as the degree to which migrants conformed to Western ideas of refugeehood and persecution as enshrined in the 1951 Convention and associated 1967 Protocol. Rather than recognize refugeehood amongst migrants from the People’s Republic of China, authorities either ignored
the movement of large numbers of people into Hong Kong or categorized their movements as illegal to avoid any sense of obligation. They subsequently enforced the legitimate means of movement and the authority of the state accordingly. Migrants were expelled, physical barriers were erected and a stain of illegality enveloped entire communities of people. Over the course of the four decades under study, the idea of a Chinese refugee shifted repeatedly. On occasion, Chinese refugees appeared as temporary migrants as defined by colonial officials in Hong Kong or signified desperate, helpless individual abandoned to humanity as identified by humanitarian actors. In other instances, refugeehood was suppressed by discourses of illegality. The refugeehood of migrants became largely invisible as refugee determination processes that took place behind closed doors became the means of deciding the nature of proffered refuge in the late twentieth century. The production of the modern refugee subject in the context of migration from the People’s Republic of China throughout the Cold War was fragmented and rife with contradictions. It was a production that made it easy for states to undermine the integrity of the individual migrant with rhetoric about “rice refugees.” Such dismissive language, evidenced in state discussions of humanitarian assistance for migrants from the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1989, suggests that more than anything else, the migrants in question along with the humanitarians who sought to assist them were ultimately unwanted.
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