AMBASSADORS OF THE ALBAYZÍN:

Moroccan vendors of La Calderería in Granada, Spain

by

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Abstract

The Lonely Planet advises visitors to Granada, Spain to "turn off...into the cobbled alleys of Calderería Vieja or Nueva and in a few steps you've left Europe behind." La Calderería is known for its Arab influences and North African immigrant businesses. A tourist's ability to easily step off one continent and enter another realm demonstrates an imagined border between Europe and the Orient, especially North Africa, that is created by historical narratives, policy discourses and daily practices. The antagonism between an imagined white, Catholic and European Spain vis-à-vis its North African Muslim neighbors is fundamental to the history of the Spanish nation. This East/West divide has recently been recast as Moroccan immigration, inspired by proximity and colonial legacies, since the 1980s has made Moroccan the largest immigrant group by nationality in Spain. Supranational borders, neighborhoods and specific streets participate in an intense debate about cultural difference, based on a complicated mixture of racial, ethnic and religious categories. Concurrently, more regional autonomy within the Spanish state has led Andalusia to reclaim its Islamic heritage, especially in Granada where tourism is important economically. This has dovetailed with gentrification of the Albayzín. Both the appropriation of the Islamic period of Iberian history and the contemporary social exclusion of Moroccan immigrants are realized through Orientalism. In La Calderería, tea, souvenirs, male Moroccan vendors, Western female tourists, pavement, cultural conservation, public space ordinances and police surveillance create a site where public and private space blurs and ‘practical orientalism’ constitutes subjects performing and resisting the identities prescribed to them.
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Introduction

“We are decorations from Al Andalus,” cracks Mustafa\(^1\), a Moroccan immigrant, who has lived in Granada, Spain for over a decade. He is part owner and the full-time vendor for a tiny, narrow shop at one entrance of La Calderería. Standing at the base of Calle Calderería Vieja on a calm afternoon looking up into the historic Albayzín neighborhood I would have to agree. Seated on small benches or stools many North African men chat, joke and watch international tourists wander by. The shops which they manage are framed by intricate displays of the merchandise which is repeated at nearly every store. Baskets and racks neatly jut out into the cobblestone pedestrian street where the men are sitting. In the Albayzín, the first settlement area of Muslim dynasties which ruled Andalusia from the eighth century to the fifteenth century, there are hundreds of narrow, winding streets which intersect, dead end and climb up a steep hill from the center of Granada. The streets of the La Calderería, as it is popularly known, Calle Calderería Vieja and Calle Calderería Nueva,\(^2\) are just two in this capillary network and they have attracted alternative cultural consumption, new residents and businesses and garnered diverse reputations.

\(^1\) I have picked pseudonyms for all of my Moroccan subjects with the exception of Alejandro, which was chosen by the subject. Almost everyone I knew told me I could use their name. However, after doing research into the subject I am concerned about the level of surveillance targeted at Moroccan immigrants and some subjects’ discomfort with legal forms in Spanish. Therefore, pseudonyms are the best method to avoid any negative repercussions. I chose pseudonyms from lists of Moroccan Arabic names. The Spanish and Canadian names used are the legal names of these subjects who all signed consent forms written in their first language, which made it very clear that they were consenting to the use of their names.

\(^2\) Old Metalworkers Street and New Metalworkers Street. “Calderería” is related to the word ‘caldero’ or cauldron, one of the items that were probably made and sold in the medieval streets. However, it is also used for contemporary soldering, steel framing and a variety of metal work.
Illustration 1: The streets of La Calderería in relation to popular tourist sites in Granada, Spain.

Map prepared by Jose Aparicio, University of British Columbia Department of Geography

Entering La Calderería from the center of Granada there is a discernible change. Coming from Gran Vía de Colon, passing along the Carcél Baja and crossing Calle Elvira the streets contract gradually. Bland, uniform grey cement sidewalks and asphalt streets give way to tiny cobbled pedestrian lanes gradually curving uphill. The streets are shaded all day, which in the middle of an Andalusian summer creates an appreciated soothing sensation. The stones of the street make a striped mosaic, light alternating with dark, running uphill vertically, enhancing the skinny, crookedness of the street. Steps appear at seemingly random intervals, helping pedestrians climb the hill. The steps are lined with light, rectangular stones, which have been worn to a shiny slick by countless feet. The central light stripe creates a trough which carries water down to various grates. There are grates at differing distances and in unexpected places. Large areas of loose or lost cobbling and stone create hazards and a timeworn look. The general impression
is a lack of uniformity and ancient infrastructure. It is clear from the materiality of the streets that one has passed into a section of town which is different from the majority of contemporary Granada.

The cobblestone, incline, shade and nonlinearity of the street are not what first catch my attention. Initially, it is the colors. Fuschia, burgundy, royal blue, teal, orange, gold, pistachio green, dark purple - a veritable rainbow of leather, cloth, sequins, metals, wood, glass and chiffon obscures large sections of the walls of the two-storey buildings on either side of the street. At first glance it seems like a kaleidoscope. It is difficult to take in all of the objects, guess their possible uses or admire individual pieces. Only later, after serious attention do the meticulously organized sections of shoes, leather ‘pouffes’, alternativa clothes, leather bracelets, embroidered pillows and tapestries emerge. The merchandise sticks out from the open front shops and is placed neatly on the street in front of the shops - easily touchable with an immediacy that is not felt when window shopping in the modern section of the city. The vendors give a sense of immediacy as well, because they are very active and literally in the street. It is as though the street is part of their shop, not merely an extension of the ground level stores with garage doors enticing the curious with a receding cacophony of even more colors and glittering merchandise. The merchandise in the stores represents artesania/handicrafts which run an ‘Oriental’ gamut from Pakistan and Iran to Egypt and Morocco. Cachimbas (hookas), leather floor pillows, sequined belly dancing costumes, glass perfume bottles, pointy bright slippers, hand drums, peacock inspired dresses and luxurious velvet pillows, everything embellished with swirlly geometric patterns in deep colors give the shops a timeless, placeless “Oriental” exoticism. A majority of the shop owners and most of the shop workers are Arab, largely Moroccan. I hear Arabic, Spanish and English being spoken, the call to prayer from a local mosque, pealing church bells, Arabic pop and classical music as well as flamenco, Spanish talk radio and rock n’ roll. The smell of mint in lemonade, fruity tea and sesame and pistachio pastries teases me. The non-linear sensation of the crooked street is heightened as I have to dodge vendors, shoppers, dog excrement and residents, as well as water washing down the central canal, all the while craning my head left, right, up, down, forward and backward trying to register it all.

3 I would call these clothing styles “hippie”, but the vendors always referred to them as “alternative look”.
Illustration 2: Calle Calderería Nueva


**Research objective, Ethnography and Organization**

This thesis examines how pre-modern history in the Iberian Peninsula continues to effect contemporary discourses about Moroccan immigration in Spain. There is an intriguing contradiction between international tourism and gentrification actors within the Albayzín who celebrate, preserve and appropriate Granada’s Moorish heritage, while the Moroccan vendors, essential “decorations” of this historic neighborhood, are socially excluded and vilified by Spanish society more generally. The central objective in this thesis is to investigate how various gentrification and tourism actors rationalize the appropriation of Moorish heritage yet at the same time discriminate against Moroccan business people who actively promote Granada’s symbolic economy. Some of the strategies examined in La Calderería highlight historic racialization via evolv-
ing ethnic identification, Orientalist imaginary geographies mixed with “cultural difference” and territorialization. All of these larger processes localize in particular, intersecting forms in the two narrow streets.

While in Granada during the summer of 2007 I was fortunate to meet a group of young, male Moroccan vendors willing to entertain my attempt at ethnographic research. Although my research was initially marked by suspicion, struggles with language and hostility from the municipal government, these young men allowed me to hang out in their section of the La Caldereria for hours at a time and ask them personal questions. Fortunately for me they were an opinionated group and when I began to pay attention to the details of their love lives, their reactions to tourist women, their distrust of the municipal government and their frustration with Orientalist rhetoric and the wars on terror and Iraq I was able to stitch together narratives where young men tactically resist and appropriate Orientalist imaginative geographies, both local and international, while critiquing Spanish history and culture in order to participate in the Iberian Peninsula and confront a society that is not welcoming. Sitting on a small stool, in the publicly regulated street between four shops, I watched the vendors of these shops swirl around each other and their clients grabbing moments to sit and talk to me, then jumping up to sell an item or talk to a tourist. It was like theater in the round at times and did not generate long, linear or self-reflexive interviews. However, this style of ethnography provided more reciprocal conversations which were often filled with off hand comments, jocularity and outbursts of anger. I saw and heard only a small portion of these men’s lives and my unchanging status as an outsider posed challenges and rewards. Throughout the thesis I will detail instances where my positionality was clearly an issue, both for my subjects and for my own reactions to their opinions and actions.

My research is embedded in a very small area of public space which is centuries old. To trace its roller coaster history, I have incorporated a variety of archival material from local newspapers, contemporary municipal urban planning documents and urban history archives. By focusing on a particular space rather than a single concept, I am connecting phenomena that act upon or work within a specific location and have developed in a similar timeframe but are rarely
viewed as related. From 1980-2007, gentrification, Orientalist tourism, and immigration patterns and policy surrounding the Albayzín have developed interdependently.

The chapters in this thesis are organized thematically with methodological notes interwoven with ethnographic data. History from the fifteenth, sixteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty first century is crucial to understanding how the themes fit together. Therefore, the history necessary for each theme accompanies each thematic chapter, it not presented in one chronological chapter. The second chapter, Conflictive Convivencia, is devoted to the long historical relationship between North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. History from the eighth to the sixteenth century informs ideological framings of contemporary immigration. Spanish colonial history from the nineteenth and twentieth century, however, is more critical to understanding contemporary political responses to immigration. The chapter traces how these ideological framings and political responses enter symbolism used in popular discourses, such as editorials and festivals. It is important to note the distinction being made in the next two chapters between Spanish Orientalism, which is focused on Morocco, and the British, French and American Orientalism identified by Said (1979). The third chapter, Modern Moro, brings the historical tracings into contact with current Moroccan bodies caught between a Spanish archetype, el moro, and self-empowerment with “Arab”. This chapter critiques Spanish immigration integration policy, primarily through ethnographic accounts from Moroccans and municipal social workers. “Practical orientalism” as identified by Haldrup et al. (2006) wedded to “cultural difference” becomes an effective othering technique formalized by varying levels of the Spanish state. In Time traveling and teleporting tourists, powerful foreign actors are added to the colorful Calderería. Imperialist nostalgia and Orientalist tourism are interrogated as well as the history of the neighborhood prior to its gentrification in the 1990s. Western appropriations of the classical Orient rationalize tourists’ and gentrifiers’ encroachment in the Albayzín. The resulting tensions are examined in Chapter 5, “Resisting Reterritorialization.” The confluence of displacement, real estate speculation and cultural capital questions, “who is invading the Albayzín?” In this chapter issues of ethnic/racial profiling are territorialized and tenuous multiculturalism is examined. Throughout the thesis arguments build from chapter to chapter, sometimes tying together only in the conclud-
ing chapter. The following sections of this introductory section preview the main arguments threaded throughout the chapters.

**Historic Racialization to Contemporary Discrimination**

Specific historically constructed perspectives on ethnicity, race and national identity accumulate in the material heritage of the Albayzín and La Calderería and are used to reinforce entangled ethnic designations which relate contemporary Moroccan immigrants to pathologies of sexuality, criminality, poverty and insularity. Throughout this thesis the terminology used to describe people originating from North Africa at some time in their ancestry and those used to describe people with ancestry from the Northern Iberian Peninsula or Europe will vary, but it is important to highlight that although the terms may vary the binaries do not. The fortitude of what Said identified as “latent Orientalism” is abundantly clear by considering the table of ethnic designations below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Ethno-religious</th>
<th>Ethno-linguistic</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moro</td>
<td>Musulmán</td>
<td>Mudéjar</td>
<td>Arabé</td>
<td>Marroquí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghrebi</td>
<td>Católico</td>
<td>Morisco</td>
<td>Castellano</td>
<td>Español</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeo</td>
<td>Cristiano viejo</td>
<td>Mozárabe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Ethnic terms of the Iberian Peninsula

*Arabé:* Arab

*Castellano:* Castillian makes reference to the predominant Spanish dialect in Spain as well as being a tribal/feudal affiliation. The Castillian-Aragonian (Northern Iberian Christian kingdoms) alliance of 1469 lead to the resumption of the Reconquest which culminated in the Capitulation of Granada.

*Católico:* Catholic
*Cristiano viejo:* Someone or their ancestors who were Christian prior to the Reconquest. This became a signifier of pure Spanish blood lineage.

*Cristiano nuevo:* Someone or their ancestors who became Christian after the Reconquest. This became a signifier for Spaniards with Jewish or Moorish ancestry.

*Español:* Spaniard or Spanish language

*Maghrebí:* Someone or something from the *Maghreb*. *Maghreb* come from Arabic to describe the setting of the sun in the furthest area of Islamic conquest in the seventh century. It is now used by many North African states to describe North African regional alliances.

*Marroquí:* Moroccan is a nationality, but because of Moroccan laws it is officially also a signifier for Muslim unless a Moroccan can prove Jewish ancestry.

*Moro:* People who trace their ancestry from the area that is now Mauritania. Contemporarily, a derogatory slur used against North African immigrants.

*Moor:* A term in English to describe Muslims of Al Andalus, especially their architectural legacy.

*Morisco/a:* A Muslim who was forcibly converted to Christianity post Castilian-Aragonian conquest of different parts of the Iberian Peninsula. This term is linked to genetic ancestry as well as *cristiano nuevo*.

*Mozárabe:* A Christian living under Muslim rule in the Iberian Peninsula

*Mudéjar:* A Muslim living under Christian rule in the Iberian Peninsula

*Musulmán:* Muslim

These terms highlight that while people living in the Iberian Peninsula changed their religious affiliation (often by force) or had geopolitical boundaries change around them, religious and ethnic affiliations were consistently reduced to genetic history in times of transition. This will be further examined in chapter 2. This informs contemporary racializations of Spaniards and Africans in the Iberian Peninsula. While all of these terms are necessary to describe people throughout the centuries who have moved through the Iberian Peninsula, I am primarily concerned with only a few, *Arabé, Español, Moro* and Moor. The difficulty of transparently translating between *moro* and Moor highlights a constructivist perspective on ethnicity whereby ethnic designations
are interpreted as “not a thing in the world, but a perspective on the world.”

Ethnic constructions are historically situated and their histories are key to understanding the motivations and issues which enabled the constructions. Also, ethnic designations can be generated by the group whom they describe, or by a dominant group regulating a minority group. The double edged quality of ethnicity is clearly seen by the differences between _Arabé, Español, Moro_ and Moor. _Arabé_ and _Español_ are generated by and celebrate the groups which claim the terms in Granada. However, through vilification and romantization the terms _moro_ and Moor are used differently to maintain the same belief in a great difference between the East and the West. Contemporarily, Moor and _moro_ generate different imaginative geographies, but they both incorporate, without asking, Moroccan immigrants.

Daily discrimination against Moroccans is not often explicit. The most constant complaints from the men with whom I spoke were about housing, Western women, media representation, verbal insults and assimilationist immigration integration plans. Discrimination against vendors in the La Calderería takes indirect form using surveillance, municipal ordinances which regulate sound, consumption patterns and the use of public space. These methods target La Calderería because it is considered an “Arab area,” but the public space is still controlled by the state. The “elbow to elbow” interactions, as they are often called in Spain, with “internal others” challenges differentiation by distance. “Practical orientalism” emerges at instances of banal, daily proximate frictions perceived as emblematic of ‘cultural difference’ which resonate with the larger claims of Orientalism. The East is in the West and the South wants to participate in the North and this destabilizes the decisive division which created and legitimizes Western entitlement. It is not a surprise that the debates are so shrill.

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6 Ibid.
**Immigration, National Identity and Postcolonialism**

Spanish Orientalism is narrowly focused on Morocco, the area of the Islamic Orient where colonial ties have been the strongest. It takes incredible effort to maintain an imagined Spanish identity in the face of transnational immigration from an historic other, namely Morocco. Physically, the division of the world into West and East is difficult in Andalusia, which practically kisses Morocco. In Andalusia, identity politics are a tightrope walk around eight centuries of North African Muslim sovereignty and the unfurling of violent, nascent Spanish and European colonialism. Since the fifteenth century Spain has engaged in colonial projects in North Africa leading to contemporary post colonial migration from regions within previously Spanish Morocco to Spain. Domestically, recent political decisions to decentralize Spanish state power after the end of the Francoist era lead to new identity projects. Long suppressed regionalism challenges what was long enforced as a Castillian-Catholic-white Spanish identity. For example, the ethnic-nationalism in both Catalonia and the Basque region resulted in autonomous communities on the grounds of linguistic difference.

Parastatal developments, such as Spain’s entry into the European Community in 1986, also had a great effect on the national imaginary, reinserting it into European liberalism, both politically and economically after years of poverty and dictatorial rule. Both imagined borders and physical borders were renegotiated, especially with Morocco. Spain entered into the Schengen Treaty and began to shoulder Fortress Europe’s security hysteria. As a result Spain has become a depot for immigrants from the developing world trying to access the burgeoning Spanish economy and the rest of Europe. Spain is relatively new to high rates of immigration. In 1980 there were 182,045 foreign born residents in Spain. These came from primarily wealthy European countries and were largely retirees. In 2007 there are 5,214,390 foreign born residents. In 2005 foreign born residents were 10 percent of the national population and three fourths of them came from non-EU countries. The introduction of the Schengen Information System in 1995 linked

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8 Ibid., 321.
immigration to drugs, sex trafficking, crime and security. The Spanish government’s response to the new role of host country has been to focus on border security and treat immigration as a threat. Billions of dollars have been spent on infrared technology to surveil the Strait of Gibraltar and construct fences in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

Moroccan immigration, which saw a steady increase from 1985 to 1995, continues to be strong and presents special dilemmas because of the diplomatic ties and historic relationship between the Moroccan state and the Spanish state. As of January 1, 2006 there were 606,000 Moroccan immigrants making them the largest immigrant group by nationality. They were 16 percent of the total for all immigrant nationalities excluding those from EU countries. The Spanish national origin myth portrays the Moors as Spain’s eternal enemy against which colonial sins can be rationalized or ignored. Granada is significant as the last Iberian Peninsula city to fall to Spanish colonialism in 1492. Local and tourist narratives celebrate Granada’s special role as Europe victorious over the Orient, but tend to forget the subsequent centuries of Spanish colonialism in North Africa.

The colonial ties have engendered new forms of labor exploitation and discrimination. The Spanish economy counts on low-skilled labor while the Moroccan government pushes emigration and relies on migrant remittances. For instance, from 1996-2005 six million new jobs were created and 80.5 percent of active men were employed in Spain. The Spanish labor market has successfully absorbed four million immigrants in fifteen years. Moroccan workers globally sent 3.3 billion dollars home in 2001. In 2003 the Morocco was ranked fourth as the largest remittance receiver. There is a vital connection between the two countries, yet Moroc-


10 González Enríquez, 326.

These statistics come from the National Institute of Statistics in Spain and include figures for illegal immigrants who have registered in municipal registers where there is no penalty for illegality.

11 Ibid., 327.


can immigrants to Spain experience more discrimination than other immigrant groups. From 1997-2002 4,000 migrants, many Moroccan, drowned in the Strait of Gibralter trying to cross on tiny rafts.\textsuperscript{14} Statistics on deportations, unemployment, homelessness, access to legal status and social services and public opinion polls send a clear message of distrust. After the Madrid train bombings in 2004 public opinion polls showed a steep increase of rejection towards Moroccans. Many of the convicted terrorists were from Morocco and many were residing in Spain legally. Moroccans are ninety percent of the Muslim population in Spain and the association of this demographic with terrorism has had serious repercussions.\textsuperscript{15} However, I focus on the purported “cultural differences” which cause quotidian discrimination against young Moroccan men because these are used to reinforce greater debates about the primordial, insurmountable differences between the Occident and Orient.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.,702. The actual amount is probably much higher and this figure is only for one of the myriad crossings in the Mediterranean.

\textsuperscript{15} González Enríquez, “Spain,” 330.
The banal, daily frictions in the Albayzín are illustrative of how cultural difference rationalizes passive aggressive discrimination. The Albayzín is known as the “Moorish” barrio/ neighborhood of Granada. The barrio plays a significant role in local Granadine identity as well as being internationally renowned for its cultural heritage. Since its designation as an UNESCO World Heritage site in 1994, it has become a popular tourist area. Massive cultural tourism combined with gentrification processes unevenly develop the barrio, creating conflicts over the use of public space and public resources. The appeal of the Albayzín is its ability to mix seemingly incongruent temporal and spatial imaginary geographies. Tourists and gentrifiers are largely educated and middle class, although they bring differing perspectives on Granada’s symbolic economy. Imaginary geographies of a romantic Arabia, North Africa and Al Andalus Albayzín come
into conflict with imaginary geographies of the Albayzín as a humble, close knit, very Spanish neighborhood. Many of these imaginary geographies exist through a lack of historic continuity which makes room for legends which parade as history. They exist simultaneously for different groups attracted to the area, resulting in the re-packaging of a previously aging, inaccessible blue-collar neighborhood through the correct sets, props and actors. John Urry’s “tourist Gaze” is re-examined in a setting where the tourism operators are stationary gazers and the tourists rush past. In one decade the Albayzín became an alternative, historic and trendy place to live instead of decaying, dangerous and inconvenient. Critical to this revival is a growing international concern for the preservation of a classical, historic Orient. This is especially necessary if the crumbling remnants of an ancient and brilliant Islamic civilization, such as the Alhambra, are in the Occident. Through Imperialist nostalgia (Rosaldo 1989) and Said’s (1979) identification of a Western separation between a classic Orient and a contemporary Orient I link the motivations of gentrifiers and tourists although they come from different Orientalist traditions.

Since the early nineties, La Calderería has become a very visible manifestation of the processes of Moroccan immigration, international tourism and gentrification. Large debates surrounding all three use the streets as a tangible illustration. This has generated reputations which oscillate between threatening, sensuous and alternative. Most of the stereotypes of the streets are underscored by a belief that La Calderería is being reterritorialized by the descendants of its ancient Moorish inhabitants who were expelled from Granada in 1569. Rosón Lorente and Dietz (2007) examine what they see as an increasing ethnogenesis between different groups within the Albayzín through territorialization. Ethno-religious territory occurs when a “group of actors appropriate a part of this space for their exclusive use... The process of territorialization forms the space, marking and defining limits of differences which previously did not exist.”16 While I certainly observed these processes occurring in the Albayzín, I maintain that it is largely through the actions of local Spaniards and international tourists who construct La Calderería as a place apart rather than being a mysterious ethnic enclave. The Moroccan vendors I met did not live in

the Albayzín. In fact, Moroccan immigrants are nearly evenly distributed throughout Granada’s neighborhoods and their highest concentration is not in the Albayzín. The identity politics in conflict have very little to do with the many Moroccan vendors who work in the La Calderería; they are tied to larger national and international debates which are trying to maintain distance and difference between the Orient and the Occident. Territoriality combined with Orientalist stereotypes have been brought into high relief by contemporary tourism and gentrification which tangibly affect the vendors’ livelihood, confidence and desire to integrate.

The visibility of La Caldereria creates a site of incredible hybridity against a backdrop which offers seamless Orientalisms. The “constructed visibility” of the streets should be regarded as a “precarious and conditional achievement,” which mobilizes bodies, food, tea, cobblestone, souvenirs, tables and umbrellas. The focal actors are the Moroccan vendors who on one hand provide a unique counter to national media portrayals of North African immigration, however the ambience of the streets and their performances also reinforce and willingly appropriate orientalist narratives that are used to promote Granada’s erratic symbolic economy. The streets provide a dramatic sensual demarcation between Spain and the West and North Africa and the East creating what Zukin (1995) calls “urban oases” where,

visual delectation... is not just a game of representations: developing a city’s symbolic economy involves recycling workers, sorting people in housing markets, luring investment, and negotiating political claims, for public goods and ethnic promotion... the narrative web spun by the symbolic economy around a specific place relies on a vision of cultural consumption and a social and ethnic division of labor.18

Key to the production of La Caldereria as a gentrified and touristic site is the willingness to consume culture as well as a willingness to be consumed. The Moroccan vendors are willing to participate in the social and ethnic division of labor, albeit with complaints. They are victims of institutional racism and arbiters of ethnicized essentialisms. To clarify Mustafa’s statement, “we are decorations of the Albayzín,” and several other allusions by him to the very conscious per-

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formance vendors enact for an audience of gentrifiers and tourists at the entrance to a historic neighborhood, I asked Mustafa if he felt like a “small ambassador” in La Caldereria. He laughed hard, hunching over and giving me a high five, “exactly! we are free small ambassadors.” This ambassadorial role is difficulty negotiated and begs the question, ‘ambassadors of what, when and for whom?’
Being Albayzín ambassadors is a delicate matter because the identity of the Albayzín exists mostly through emotive legends and myths. Once examined, different legends and myths are contradictory and conflict with each other, causing stress fractures in conventional Spanish history and nationalism while destabilizing a larger European identity project. The parameters and origins of the Albayzín have shifted and been redrawn over the centuries. It has been both a site of incredible convivencia and some of the most violent episodes of Granadine colonial history. That Moroccan immigrants, many of them recently arriving to Granada, can play such an ambassadorial role for a neighborhood within Spain requires several framings of history which resonate with contemporary issues.

Stretching northwest from the centre of Granada the Albayzín is visually breathtaking and as a newcomer to the area I spent many hot days clinging to shady spots up and down its tiny, labyrinthine streets of rough stones, whitewashed buildings, foliaged villas, Moorish cisterns and conserved morisco houses and mudéjar religious monuments. The neighborhood’s greatest charm is walking; seeing the play of light at different times of the day illuminating the textures and making shadows on the walls, while turning at intervals to breathtaking views of the Alhambra, Sierra Nevada mountains and la Vega, the Granadine agricultural plain. The contemporary Albayzín, as delimited by the municipal government, encompasses the hill which is thought to be the foundational sight of Granada, possibly stretching back into Roman and Visigoth societies conjectured to have settled in the area prior to Al Andalus. The North African Berbers with some

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19 There are two accepted spellings of Albayzín. Albaicín is used by the municipal government while Albayzin is used by UNESCO. I have chosen to use the spelling I think easiest to pronounce by English speakers.

20 Convivencia translates as “coexistence.”
leading Arabs who came to Granada built their first small defensive settlement on top of the Al-bayzín hill in the middle of the eighth century before moving the royal and administrative seat to the opposing hill where the Alhambra now sits. During the Zirid and Nasrid dynasties the Alhambra was built on an opposing hill and Muslim Granada’s commercial hub grew in the valley between the two hills. The settlement on what is now called the Albayzín hill dwindled in political eminence and it was considered an economically vibrant suburb.

During my fieldwork the etymology of the name ‘Albayzín’ was discussed amongst different Arabic speakers. I heard two prevalent claims to its origin. A vendor had heard the tour guides who walk people through La Calderería say that it means “suburb of the falconers” referring to a craft guild which trained birds of prey. The other definition, which appears in scholarly work, traces the name from “the suburb of Baeza” referring to exiles from Baeza, an Al-Andalus city conquered by Castilian-Aragonian forces, who sought refuge on the outskirts of Granada. A less common, but popular belief told to me by a Moroccan immigrant was that Albayzín meant, “the ones who cry” referring to the conquered Muslim population. Yusuf, one of my most consistent conversationalists, was full of Arab pride and it was clear in several comments he made that he identified personally with the Moorish heritage of Granada. He waved his hand dismissively at La Calderería and said, “this is all Arab” when I was asking him what he knew about the history of the Albayzín. Rashid, who worked the shop next to Yusuf’s, was more accommodating, countering Yusuf with a hybridity between what he called ‘Granadine’ and Arab influence of the neighborhood. It is difficult to trace the origin and evolution of the Albayzín from the present back to the past because the neighborhood as it is now delimited by the municipal government includes a much larger area than that which was labeled the Albayzín in ancient history.

The Albayzín is the object of a tug of war between groups who react strongly to identity politics grounded in Granada’s geopolitical ambiguity as the “Bottom of Europe or Top of Afri-


22 Emilio Jiménez Núñez, El Albaicín de Granada: La vida en un barrio (Sevilla: Fundación Cruzcampo, 1999), 23.

23 Yusuf in personal interview with author. Granada, Spain.
Gentrifiers are ‘new’ residents (meaning that they have lived in the neighborhood for less than fifteen years) who celebrate the Albayzín as a living remnant of Al Andalus and are incredibly concerned with the Albayzín’s historic preservation. They reformulate conventional history by idolizing Moorish Granada and Al Andalus. The gentrifier group is certainly diverse, however youth, white collar professions and post secondary education set them apart from “traditional” residents. Two groups of these gentrifiers examined in the fifth chapter are Western Muslim converts who live and worship in the neighborhood and visibly promote more religious freedom and equality and the Lower Albayzín Neighborhood Association which emphasizes historic preservation and residential security. ‘Traditional’ residents (those who have lived in the neighborhood for more than fifteen years) are much older and usually living off small pensions. They are threatened by the encroachment of gentrification and tourism as the area experiences massive investment. They are much more concerned with the Albayzín’s connection to familial history than its cultural capital. Their unease with the rapid change wrought by gentrification and tourism generates misplaced fears of a ‘Return of the Moor’ because of the highly visible Calderería where Moroccans work and own businesses.

To understand the symbolism each group uses a brief tour of Andalusian and Granadine history is necessary. All the groups laying claim to the battle over public space and historic buildings to claim territory which has been governed by Romans, Visigoths, Moors, Spaniards and most recently UNESCO. The current groups fight through democratic means to protect identities which have been fragmented by large historical processes at regional, national and global levels which rewrite the boundaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’ every couple of centuries. The Albayzín is an exemplar of territory where space and time are cut up and reorganized physically and symbolically. Here, both space and time are “far from becoming immutable categories, they


25 These groups were defined by Juan Carlos de Pablos Ramírez and Ligia Sánchez Tovar, “Significación de la Calidad de Vida y Revitalización del Espacio Urbano. Un Estudio de Caso,” Fermentum, 12 no. 34 (2002): 441.
will be subject to historical change.”

La Calderería, a site of constant change rests in a specific regional, municipal and neighborhood context which cannot be ignored. Numerous histories co-exist with modernity throughout Andalusia, Granada and the Albayzín and the histories must be examined to understand contemporary global, regional, municipal and neighborhood claimants.

**Al Andalus to Andalucía**

In 1978 the Spanish nation state system was restructured after decades of fierce, centralized control under the Francoist regime. This caused two opportunities in the territory which had been Al Andalus and is now known as **Andalucía**. On one hand, regions in Spain could claim the rights of an ‘autonomous community’. To lobby for this status Andalusia needed to prove an historic regional difference in contrast to the hegemony of nationalist historic, cultural and linguistic identifiers of Spain. This proved difficult in Andalusia because the Franco regime had appropriated many of Andalusia’s regional traditions such as flamenco and bull fighting as part of a nationalist tourism marketing campaign, effectively disqualifying much of Andalusia’s special regional culture for consideration of autonomous community status. Since Andalusians speak Castilian Spanish, the only recourse left was to make a claim as historically unique. Therefore, the legacy of Al Andalus, which had previously been avoided or suppressed, was reclaimed. The celebration of Al Andalus has also become Andalusia’s most lucrative industry, massive cultural tourism. On the other hand, the 1978 Constitution also protected the right to practice religions other than Catholicism, which has become increasingly relevant as Andalusia receives unprecedented immigration flows and negotiates a burgeoning autochthonous Muslim convert community. Reformulating Al Andalus heritage for use in Andalusia’s symbolic economy, diversity

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26 F. Javier Rosón Lorente and Gunther Dietz, “El 'retorno del Islam' y la apropiación del patrimonio en el Albayzín de Granada (España): un barrio multicultural entre la etnificación de la diversidad religiosa y la gentrificación turística.”

27 F. Javier Rosón Lorente and Gunther Dietz, “El 'retorno del Islam' y la apropiación del patrimonio en el Albayzín de Granada (España): un barrio multicultural entre la etnificación de la diversidad religiosa y la gentrificación turística.”
planning and regional identity is a process which allows for great improvisation and embellishment by citizens, immigrants, foreigners and scholars.

Illustration 4: Capitulación de Granada by Francisco Pradilla & Ortiz (1882)

Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Reconquista-rendicion-granada.jpg

From the eighth century to the fifteenth century great portions of the Iberian Peninsula were ruled by North African Berber dynasties, which are referred to as the Moors. The convivencia idyll frames Al Andalus as a rare moment of religious plurality in Europe’s Dark Ages. People of the Book, Muslims, Jews and Christians lived together without great persecution for hundreds of years. The convivencia idyll’s origins are with historian Américo Castro (1948) and his controversial revision of Spanish culture and identity’s growth out of ‘the three cultures’ rather than in opposition to Muslim and Jewish influences as conventional Spanish history claims. Anthony Pym (2003) summarizes several perspectives which historians have used to frame Al Andalus’s influence in Spanish identity. Castro (1948) and Dozy (1861) are emblematic of “Al Andalus as a new beginning” which sees the Muslim period in Spain as a disjuncture.

28 Migrants from wealthy countries are often called foreigners while migrants from poor nations are called immigrants in Spain.

with Iberian, Roman and Visigothic cultures. This view Semiticizes the Iberian Peninsula and touts the brilliance of Al Andalus and Hispania’s superiority over Europe at this time. This viewpoint leads to an identification dilemma, is Spain therefore fully European? This framing came under sharp criticism by Claudio Sánchez Albornoz (1962) who frames “Al Andalus as interlude.” This view holds that a Christian Hispania existed cohesively prior to, throughout and after Muslim Al Andalus. Rather unsupported claims by Olagüe (1969) see Al Andalus as a “historical continuation” which had very little to do with Arabs or Islamic empire, but rather grew out of Visigothic society. Finally, Al Andalus as “paradise lost” has been forwarded by Barceló (1998) on the basis of irrigation systems and bemoans the loss of an extraordinary social organization at the hands of a brutish Spanish conquest. All of these historical framings are then connected to contemporary political ends.

Conventional Spanish history has most in common with “Al Andalus as interlude” while those celebrating a hybrid of “Al Andalus as paradise lost” and “Al Andalus as new beginning” celebrate the convivencia idyll. Castro’s remarkable challenge to Catholic Spanish purity has been recycled into multiple popular discourses which hope to reclaim plurality and hybridity in Spanish history to parallel trends of increasing ethnic, religious and cultural diversity in current Spain. The use of the convivencia idyll often reaches far beyond the complexity that Castro tried to introduce and constructs Al Andalus, which lasted for nearly eight centuries, as a multicultural dream. This is highly contestable because while Jews and Christians were allowed to live fairly peacefully in Al Andalus under the various Muslim sovereignties they were restricted to religious quarters, paid heavy taxes to ensure their religious freedoms and experienced discrimination in civil employment. Al Andalus had a varied history of social administration and hierarchy throughout the centuries; the closest to multiculturalism was in the tenth century during the first caliphate of Cordoba. Multiculturalism waned during the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties (this is when the Alhambra was built) due to increasing pressure from the Christian-Northern


Iberian Reconquest and evolution of Islamic perspectives regarding religious plurality.\textsuperscript{32} However, this does not deter contemporary commentators from waxing over the complex and vacillating arrangements during Al Andalus to transpose their own idealized *convivencia* hopes on the Albayzín.

The *convivencia* idyll tacitly contrasts with the violence of the Catholic Monarchs’ intolerant cleansing of the Iberian Peninsula in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Preceding North African (Berber with key Arab leaders) Muslim influence the Iberian Peninsula had been home to Phoenician, Carthaginian, Roman and Visigothic kingdoms, outposts and settlements. During Al Andalus the frontier between the furthest western reach of differing Islamic empires, caliphates and kingdoms and feudal European Christian areas oscillated greatly. The wars for the Iberian Peninsula sounded the approach of European hegemony as it slowly usurped centrality from the Mediterranean Basin. The Spanish Reconquest was comprised of multiple campaigns on the part of feudal northern Iberian kingdoms to conquer the entire Iberian Peninsula.

It is contested whether this conquest of territory and subsequent expulsion of ethnic-religious minorities should be called a ‘re’conquest. Using the ‘re’ prefix signals an ambitious national origin reformulation based on exclusion. Both the territory and the people who lived in southern Iberian Peninsula are imagined to have been primordially Christian. The period of Muslim Al Andalus is therefore framed as an aberration in the linear formation of Spain. The southern Iberian Peninsula was inhabited by many societies, but none were exactly Iberian-Catholic-Castillian-European Spaniards. Mainstream Spanish history strategically includes Roman and Visigothic societies and Spain’s relationship to Europe, while excluding Al Andalus Muslims as invaders and enemies. It is therefore easier to rationalize, or better yet, ignore colonial violence.

Ancient history and contemporary symbolism

A multifaceted example of how differing historical framings jostle for authority is the annual celebration of the Capitulation of Granada which is funded in part by the municipal government. *El Día de la Toma de Granada* / The sack of Granada Day (la Toma) which is held every January 2 illustrates how historical interpretations enter into contemporary debates. The festival commemorates the “sack” of Granada in 1492. In the last several years it has become an event where differing opinions about nationalism, religious territorialism, immigration and regionalism manifest clearly amongst symbolic actions, discourses, objects and institutions.

La Toma follows the conventional Spanish historical reformulation of the “Sack” of Granada as a defining moment in the creation of a Spanish nation state. The events of la Toma bring together the military, the tombs of the Catholic Monarchs and the Spanish flag through highly ritualized theater. A procession of municipal councilors, the public and the military and municipal bands make their way to the main Cathedral. In the Cathedral, which is next to the Royal Chapel where the tombs of Ferdinand V of Aragon and Isabella I of Castilla lie a Catholic mass is held and homage is given to the tombs of the Catholic Monarchs by the Archbishop of Granada. The pendant of Castilla is waved in the Cathedral. The parade continues until it reaches the Plaza de Carmen outside City Hall, where municipal council members ascend to a balcony. In the plaza there is a military procession accompanied by federal, regional and municipal dignitaries. National, regional and municipal hymns are played by the military and municipal bands to federal, regional and municipal flags as the youngest council member waves the pendant of Castilla from the balcony. He then begins a ritualized call and response cheer with the public below which includes rallying cries in the following order,

“Granada for the eminent Catholic Royalty don Fernando V de Aragon and Isabella I de Castilla”;

“Long live Spain!”;

“Long live the King!”;

“Long live Andalusia!”;
“Long live Granada!”

The tone of the festival is remarkably militaristic considering that the “Sack” of Granada was a fairly pacific capitulation with bilateral negotiations. Two opposing responses to the event, the zealous supporters and the dissenters cause great consternation amongst the mainstream attendees and centrist political agendas because they force critical thinking about an event which is supposed to maintain conventional narratives of Spanish history. The zealous supporters attend the festival with banners, petitions and nationalist slogans. The dissenters boycott the event and hold alternative events in symbolic locations such as the Mosque of Granada. Interestingly, neither of these groups are lead by or make reference to Moroccan immigrants, but they are used as signifiers for history by both groups.

The zealous supporters:

The loudest and most intrusive protesters in 2006 and 2007 were an amalgamation of far right political groups. The groups that are identified in the press are Democracia Nacional, Falange, Fe Jons, Espana 2000 and Alianza Nacional.33 The representatives of these groups made themselves visible at the climax of the festival in the Plaza de Carmen. They were very supportive of the symbolism of the festival, clapping for the military processions, singing nationalist songs and waving historic Spanish flags. Two of these zealous supporter groups give detailed accounts on their respective websites.

*Alianza Nacional* proclaims itself a militant fascist brotherhood. Their website touts their participation in the 2006 *Toma*. The website decries the socialist federal administration which allegedly wanted to curtail the festival. The festival according to *Alianza Nacional* is a commemorative act of great relevance to Spain, which is threatened by the current political parties. The website, in the section about the *Toma* proclaims, “Spain won a war of blood and fire against barbarous communism and Spain was liberated from a Muslim invasion and centuries of

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It also says “we have to defend our true historic identity and our common heritage.” The Alianza joined with other militant groups to yell “Viva España”, “History doesn’t go away” and “No Moors” to which they received spontaneous applause from the crowd. A picture on the website shows men holding a sign with the slogan, “Por una nueva Reconquista! For a New Reconquest.”

The ideology of the group Falange Espanola de las Jons is a complicated mix of national syndicalism, fascism and Catholicism founded in 1934. Their website features la Toma as an incredibly important event to attend because “today more than ever the celebration acquires new tints because it is the objective of Islamic collectives to end it with the complicity of politicians who want us to forget our history...For Isabella and Ferdinand! For Spanish identity and for the truth of Christ!”

The Dissenters:

There are several groups which protest any commemoration of la Toma, seeing it as overly militaristic, exclusionary or historically misrepresentative. However, these groups tend to appeal to contemporary issues as reasons la Toma should not be a municipally funded annual event. The diverse subject positions within the dissenter group is indicative of post-Franco identity politics. Catholic priests, historians, liberal Spaniards, and Western Muslim converts all take the messages of la Toma very personally.

The group Granada por la Tolerancia has been organizing a protest outside the press association office on January second for several years. They lobby to change the events of January 2 to a festival titled ‘Commemoration of Cultures’ instead of la Toma. They claim that la Toma

34 This is a rhetorical conflation of communism and Muslim invasion as the enemies that have threatened “Spain”. The statement refers to the Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s as well as Muslim Al Andalus from the eighth to fifteenth century. It is very ahistorical statement.


is “neofranquista”, meaning that it is neo-fascist. Francisco Vigueras, a representative of the group was quoted in the press, “the event disunites and gives an inaccurate image of the city. For ten years la Toma has been controlled by fascist groups which stain the image of the city.”

They want a festival that promotes solidarity and convivencia. The political party Izquierda Unida/United Left (IU) calls the Toma a violation of constitutional rights and regional autonomy statutes. They disagree with the exclusion of the pluralism that existed in Al Andalus. La Toma, “exalts some values that can enter in contradiction with this spirit of advance towards an understanding between distinct cultures.”

In 2007 the fourth annual Fiesta de las Culturas /Party of Cultures was celebrated as an alternative to la Toma. Held later on the same day, the Fiesta de las Culturas celebrated music from Austria, Morocco, India and Andalusian flamenco at a dinner held in the Mosque of Granada. The Fiesta originally celebrated the three cultures present in fifteenth-century Andalusia, Christian, Muslim and Jewish.

Two editorials in the Ideal newspaper question the historical framing of the la Toma and the current festival’s symbolism. A Catholic priest questions the association made symbolically in the festival between Catholicism and the Reconquest. Jose Maria Cantal Rivas asks, “What is really celebrated: the life, death and resurrection of Christ for all humanity or the conclusion of a political project which included territorial conquest, war and expulsions?”

Alfredo Leyva Almendros on the other hand mocks the ‘Re’ conquest and calls la Toma a farce. “In the case of Granada, the celebration of January 2 and the waving of the pendant, praises ostentatiously the victors over the victims.” He finishes the article by writing, “my true vocation is Granada and the fight for a reacknowledgement of an Arab-North African cultural legacy, without religious


prejudices, nationalists or other controversies, without reviving distinctive signs of victors against victims...”

Both the zealous supporters and the dissenters are concerned with how power is distributed in contemporary Spain and who is entitled to power. Using different historical narratives which focus on different moments and their consequences the groups essentially have different objectives. The zealous supporters who use islamophobic slogans are really concerned with celebrating the foundation of Spain and are agitating for a strong, centralized nation-state identity while the dissenters decry colonial violence and mourn the loss of Al Andalus. It is important to remember that the members of both groups are overwhelmingly the benefactors of Spain’s colonial process, not Moroccan immigrants.

Bringing ancient history into this contemporary festival reinforces a popular historical framework which pits Islam against Christianity in the Iberian Peninsula which has worked its way into mainstream Spanish and Western accounts and coincides nicely with rhetoric about a ‘clash of civilizations.” However, these centuries long conflicts cannot be deployed as examples of a clash between civilizations because neither the Islamic societies in the Iberian Peninsula nor the northern Christian kingdoms were united enough to be seen as monolithic civilizations doing battle against a coherent adversary. Muslim Al Andalus was torn apart in the eleventh century by feudal wars between Muslim kingdoms within Al Andalus while the remnants of Visigothic feudalism struggled to unite kingdoms in the north. The campaigns to expel Muslim political power were protracted over centuries - stopping and starting - far from a linear project. The corollary to the ‘Re’ conquest is the subsequent expulsion of thousands of Jews and Moors from the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon from 1492-1608. This is often portrayed as a religious cleansing in many accounts. This obscures the ethnic arrangements of Moorish and Castilian-Aragonian relations over several centuries, which underscore current issues in Spain. Granada’s conquest illustrates the role ethnicity played in deciding who would be part of Catholic Spain.

Granada’s Geopolitical Identity Crisis

The conquest of Granada pivoted the course of history towards European colonial expansion sped by beliefs in biological superiority and entitlement. With the end of a costly campaign for the Peninsula, Queen Isabella felt her coffers could support Columbus’ sea faring ventures and the same territorial possessiveness and emphasis on sanguinity followed him to the Americas eight months after the capitulation of Granada in 1492. Dominant historical framings of this shift from the Mediterranean Basin to an Eurocentric imperialism make Granada an attractive site for cultural tourism. Rather than being simply a site of national history, Granada becomes symbolic of the Occidental domination of the Orient. The Occident and Orient, both constructions, are strengthened by framing inevitable, epic battles between them because of fundamental incompatibility. The abandoned monuments of Al Andalus are comforting reminders of Western supremacy. For instance, Tom Haines writing for the Boston Globe travel section ruminates about the lesson to be learned from Granadine history.

...the expulsion of Muslims and Jews from Christian lands - stands as a grand case study in the inevitability of difference. To travel here is to frame these issues in a tangible place, whether the intricately carved walls of a palace or the hidden rise of a minaret long since converted to a church steeple (emphasis mine)... 43

The thousands of foreign tourists, largely British, French and American beeline for the Alhambra which has been reconstructed for mass cultural heritage by the Spanish state. The municipal economy has shifted to a service economy catering to tourists and students as more industry and political power is relocated in Málaga and Sevilla. To promote this essential economic sector the ghosts of princesses, kings, queens, knights, warriors, sorcerers and the vanquished still stalk the streets of Granada weaving lithely through centuries of change to persist for tourists today. However, the seemingly contradictory popular celebrations of Muslim Al Andalus and the ‘Re’conquest avoid the details which this transitional process entailed. The history used to promote contemporary Granadine tourism is painted with a broad brush and follows Tom Haines’ framing of inevitability. A more detailed view of Granadine history rather than large regions such as, Spain, Andalusia or North Africa shows that there was nothing inevitable about
inter-religious conflict. David Coleman (2003), in an examination of municipal archives from the fifteenth and sixteenth century, reconstructs a steady accommodation, collaboration and passivity to colonial Castilian-Aragonian policies by Granadine Moors and later moriscos. However, the power, brutality and injudiciousness of the colonizers is not washed out in his attempt to show the complexity of the processes from the time of conquest in 1492 to the expulsion of Granada’s entire morisco community in 1569. Simply because the situation is complex does not absolve a constellation of power with similar interests from accountability.

Granada had been a frontier society for centuries prior to conquest. The final blow to Muslim political power in the Peninsula, while decisive, did not solve the ongoing issue of how to govern a heterogeneous population with diverse ethnicities tied to religious affiliation. Boabdil, the sultan of the Granada kingdom, foresaw the violence, privation and eventual loss that his kingdom would endure. He decided to negotiate a peaceful capitulation, which would secure safe passage and civil rights for his people. The subsequent century was a time of incredible migration, social formation and unease for Moorish natives as Granada became an incubator for Spanish, Castilian, Catholic and European identity. The rights agreed upon in the 1492 Capitulations were steadily transgressed in accordance with local interests as well as the crown’s larger project to assimilate and convert colonized communities. In the same year the crown revoked the right to bear arms from Moors. Throughout the Kingdom of Castile Jews were mandated to convert to Christianity or leave. In 1498 the residential segregation accord visibly stamped Christian power onto Granada and opened up large areas for Christian migrant settlers. In 1499 elches, or Castilian prisoners of war who had converted to Islam in captivity, were forcibly reconverted to Christianity or imprisoned. By 1500 mass baptisms of Moors were held and once “converted” these newly called moriscos were not allowed to emigrate out of the Kingdom of Castile. Constant missionary work took place in morisco areas and Christian observance was obligatory. This sparked rebellions in the Albayzín giving the Catholic Monarchs grounds to dismiss the capitulation agreements of 1492, a short eight years after being signed. In 1501 Muslims were not legally allowed to enter Granada, making emigration difficult and harboring a
Muslim a crime.\textsuperscript{44} Starting in 1508 a series of ordinances prohibited “Moorish customs” regardless of their connection to Islamic practice in an effort to assimilate moriscos who were suspected of only outwardly converting to Catholicism.

The steady erosion of civil liberties and the attempt to erase a collective morisco identity lead to a series of armed conflicts in the province of Granada from 1499-1569. The moriscos living in the city of Granada were relatively passive and accommodating compared to the rebellions in the Alpujarra mountains surrounding the city. In 1569 the Crown and municipal government gave up hope of assimilating the moriscos and issued a general expulsion decree for all moriscos regardless of their Christian piety or pacific history. Granada served as a pilot program for the subsequent kingdom wide expulsion campaigns of the 17th century. In June of 1569 soldiers went from house to house in the Albayzín and ordered men from 10-60 years old to report to their parish church (ironically where they had practiced Catholicism for sixty nine years with their northern Castilian immigrant neighbors). The morisco community was not expecting such an extreme reaction from the crown because they were not participating in the rebellions and no preparations had been made between their families or about their capital. No one knew if they were headed to slaughter or exile. After a tense night in the churches the men were escorted out of the city. The next day groups of morisco men were forcibly marched into the surrounding countryside to be redistributed throughout Andalusia. Many of them died on the march. With ruthless efficiency the crown had previously decided that logistically only the majority of productive men in the morisco community needed to be dispersed and those left behind would emigrate as well. The plan was effective. In 1569 there were 15,000-20,000 moriscos living in Granada, by 1571 there were only 3,000-4,000. A third of the city’s population vanished in two years.\textsuperscript{45}

This abrupt and radical measure is easily portrayed as a battle between incompatible religious cultures, which squares well with recent fears about religious wars. While it is often claimed that Muslims were expelled by the Catholic Royalty, making the emphasis seem to be


\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 181-184.
religious, the emphasis was on ethnicity based on genetic heredity. By the time the *moriscos* were expelled many had been living as Catholics for seventy years and Coleman, through last will and testament archives, documents personalized demonstrations of Catholic piety. It certainly cannot be proven what percentage of *moriscos* were secretly Muslims or actively Christians or more than likely a syncretization of the two. More importantly, neither could the Crown nor Church, therefore the entire *morisco* population was grouped together regardless of their religious affiliation, demonstrated loyalty or pacific relationship with Catholic-Castilian Granada. It is noteworthy that upon conversion to Catholicism *moriscos* and *judeoconversos* (Jewish converts) and their descendants, while relabeled, were still marked by special ethnic designations which kept them separate from their Castilian-Catholic northern Iberian neighbors. As oral historian Jiménez Núñez (1999) states, “the religious problem was always united with the racial problem.”

**Historical continuity: From the Moors to the Moroccans**

This transitional period over five hundred years ago is germane to issues of contemporary Muslim, North African immigration because there is striking parity between the list of unacceptable quotidian customs which were controlled in the Albayzín quarter by the Christianizing ordinances of the sixteenth century and examples of “cultural difference” debated in relation to Spain’s largest immigrant community by nationality, Moroccans. Butchery practices, dress codes, especially women’s cloaks, domestic and personal hygiene, communicating in Arabic, traditional music and dances and a fear of Moorish men’s sexuality in public space continue to differentiate ethnic groups. The legacy of massive expulsions of *morisco* and Jewish communities is not forgotten in constructions of local identity. In an *Ideal* editorial from October 19, 1999, Francisco Izquierdo vehemently denies any Moorish/morisco heritage, either biological or cultural, amongst contemporary Granadines. His article displays the contrast between celebratory and phobic responses to the Al Andalus legacy. He goes to very sarcastic and xenophobic lengths to resist any Moorish influences in response to an unnamed Italian reporter who was re-

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searching crypto Islamic culture which had survived the Castilian-Aragonian conquest of Al-Andalus and subsequent centuries of Spanish-Catholic governance. Summing up the finality of Moorish/morisco expulsion from Granada and the Iberian Peninsula Izquierdo writes,

We told her that since the end of the 15th century no trace of these practices remained nor did an individual with pure agarena blood survive, despite surname labels, almost always spurious or imported from other Spanish kingdoms or fiefdoms and some adulterous features, like reclusiveness in our homes, social arrogance and envy without just cause, habits fed by too much speculation rather than genetic transference.

Showing an incredible insensitivity to Muslims who underwent forced baptisms in newly Christian Granada he jokes, “I told her myself, I feel morisco, they poured baptismal water on my head without my express intent.” He ends with a biting, “I lament [dear Italian friend] that granadines with turbans and almalafas don’t persist, we don’t wear them. Some other time perhaps.”48

Three ways of differentiating between Spaniards and agarenas, genetics, habits and time, are aptly captured here. The term agarena adds another to the list of jumbled, ethnic identifiers used to create degrees of difference between the people who lay claim to Granada’s territory at some point in time. Agarena is an old term that refers to the people who were related to Agar, or Hagar, who was cast out by Abraham’s wife Sara. Ishmael, the son of Hagar and Abraham was a leader of the Ishmaelites, pagans who lived in Arabia and worshipped in Mecca. People now described as “Arabs” and the original Muslims come partially from this lineage. Depending on perspective the term has derogatory implications. In the Bible Hagar is not Abraham’s wife and Ishmael is born out of wedlock, while in the Koran Hagar is Abraham’s second wife. In this context it is a signifier for Muslim Arabs who conquered North Africa, but also has a genetic, bastardized connotation.49 This connotation is repeated when Izquierdo calls habits of reclusiveness, social arrogance and envy without just cause, allegedly genetic Arab traits, “adulterous” amongst Spaniards.


Izquierdo’s comments display an acute knowledge of ancient history, but fail to observe historical continuity. For him agarena people existed in Granada in the distant past and are no longer a threat to contemporary, purely Spanish residents. The term almalafa is also an ancient and accurate term for women’s cloaks similar in use to chadors. Izquierdo’s relegation of Arab Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula to ancient history is probably more accurate than the Italian reporter’s romantic desire to uncover a secret Islamic community stretching back for five centuries. However, his unwillingness to allow colonial history to enter into contemporary politics shows blindness to the prolonged relationship between the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa which stretches back throughout all of their history, not solely the fifteenth and sixteenth century. This is a common trend in popular rhetoric which connects ancient Moors to current Moroccans.

**Colonial History**

The reduction of Moroccans to Moors or vice versa serves two interests. First, it helps temporally fix, vilify and other Moroccans. Second, it weaves nicely into Granada’s tourism sector, e.g. Mustafa’s joke about being “ornaments” of a historic, Moorish Albayzin. Moroccan immigrants “decorate” a city trying to promote a symbolic economy based on Moorish heritage. This historical leapfrogging jumps simplistically over the centuries of colonial relationships between Spain and Morocco which have lead to very tense diplomatic situations and an unequal economic relationship. While the demise of Al Andalus and the rise of Catholic Spain are essential to understand the ideological stand off perceived between the East and the West, the intertwined economic and political ties between the contemporary Spanish and Moroccan governments are more critical to contemporary migration than fifteenth and sixteenth century history.

Spain has engaged in colonial projects in North Africa since 1497 when the Catholic Monarchs took Melilla. A series of incursions starting in 1859 and spheres of influence in Tetuan and Tangiers led to shared Spanish-French colonization of Morocco (1912-1956).\(^5\) This left Spain with a diplomatic debacle, Western Sahara, and pockets of sovereignty in North Africa -Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands. Spain is Morocco’s second strongest commercial partner

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and Morocco receives the largest proportion of Spanish foreign aid.\textsuperscript{51} Marrero Rocha (2005) argues that contemporary developments between the two states have led to an increase in xenophobia and discrimination against Moroccans living in Spain, rather than simply long-standing historical symbolism. Economically, disputes over fishing rights are a demonstration of centuries of colonial exploitation coming into conflict with post colonial Morocco. This has negatively affected the Morocco’s diplomatic relationship with both the EU and Spain. In 2001, the Moroccan government rejected a long standing neocolonial relationship which let EU, primarily Spanish, boats fish its rich waters in exchange for money. Instead, the Moroccan government asked for assistance to develop its own fishing sector while reducing the amount of foreign fishing on its shores. This was met by harsh condemnation by the Spanish government. Marrero Rocha argues that the Spanish government knew Morocco would seek a more advantageous agreement, but rather than proactively support the Spanish fishing sector hurt by the new agreement, they framed the crisis as the sole responsibility of a selfish Moroccan government. Some of the areas most affected by the change in fishing rights are Andalusia and the Canary Islands, both of which receive many Moroccan immigrants. To add to the friction in Andalusia, Moroccan agricultural products are cheaper and have recently threatened Spanish products due to increasing free trade between Morocco and the EU.

Politically, sovereignty over Western Sahara Ceuta and Melilla are contentious. The Spanish government wants Morocco to hold a self-determination vote to resolve the sovereignty of Western Sahara, while the Moroccan government continues to hold it as an annex. The Moroccan government contests Spanish sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla, which Spain claims were Spanish long before the establishment of a Moroccan nation-state. In 2002, a bizarre display of militant posturing between the two governments over a tiny, uninhabited, rocky Mediterranean island necessitated strict U.S. diplomatic intervention.\textsuperscript{52} The Spanish government and increasingly the EU have castigated the Moroccan government for illegal drug, human trafficking and


\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 423-431.
migrants departing from its shores for Spain and access into the Schengen countries. The Moroccan government feels especially victimized on this issue as Morocco has become a de facto immigrant destination for other North African, Sub Saharan and Asian countries. From 2000-2004 illegal migrants trying to emigrate from Morocco and caught by the Moroccan government included very large percentages of non-Moroccans. In 2000 non-Moroccans caught attempting to illegally migrate were 61 percent of those caught. In 2001 they were 49%, 2002 49%, 2003 69% and 2004 65%. Certainly illegal immigration is an increasing problem within Morocco. The government argues that it does not have the resources to control all of its borders - north, east, west and south. Also, because Morocco is one of the few countries to sign a re-admission agreement many illegal migrants are returned from Spain to Morocco, even if the migrants are not Moroccan nationals. As long as it is proved that the illegal migrant left Morocco to come to Spain they can be sent back. This situation has strained the limited resources of the developing nation, led to human rights abuses by both countries and is a painful thorn in Moroccan-Spanish diplomatic relations. These political tensions reached a breaking point in 2001 as Spain suspended a bilateral treaty designed to protect Moroccan temporary workers in Spain rights and grant 20,000 more legal temporary work contracts. Diplomatic relations froze as Morocco recalled its ambassador to Spain and annual summits were postponed until 2003.

Moors on the hill

In his editorial Izquierdo is boldly ignoring the North African immigrant community in current Granada. He includes La Calderería as an example of the “return of the Moor” by using a play on words, “Cast off your delusions, we told her, here ‘solo hay moros en la cuesta/ there are only Moors on the slope’, although they are starting to occupy other zones in the capital, and all of them are from recent invasion.” The Moors on the slope in this case refer to the North Af-

55 Ibid., 311-324.
rican inspired business along both Caldererías. He is making a play on words from a common and old proverb in Spanish, “No hay moros en la costa / There are no Moors on the coast” which is used popularly to say “the coast is clear.” By twisting the proverb from costa to cuesta he reveals three responses to Moors in Granada. First, the old phrase clearly infers that Moors on the coast are a problem. Therefore, it infers similar feelings towards La Calderería, made clear by his emphasis on the word “invasion”. Second, he cleverly connects the ancient Moors with contemporary Moroccans. Third, his sly word play also reveals a deep desire to localize North African immigration in Granada to the very visible Calderería, while by 1999 it was clearly a city, regional and nation wide issue. Although the use of “invasion” is melodramatic, he is correct that Orientalist fantasy in La Calderería is a very current trend, which is not necessarily representative of the Albayzín for the last five hundred years. The revival of interest in the Albayzín as “Moorish” is very recent.

The “Oriental Islamic culture” on display in the streets was originally developed by Spanish converts to Islam (conversos) who were inspired by trips to Morocco. Leyla Nura opened As Sirat, the first tea house in La Calderería, in 1982. She was followed by several other tea house businesses opened by another local Granadine, a Spanish and Moroccan couple, an Islamic convert from Málaga and someone from Holland. Increasingly, Moroccan businessmen moved into the area because prior to the nineties La Calderería rents were cheaper than other areas of the city. The vendors I knew claimed that the handicraft shops are owned largely by North Africans while many of the teahouses and restaurants I visited are owned by Spaniards and some Lebanese immigrants. A recent report by a team from the Universities of Almería and Granada found that fifty percent of the businesses are owned by Moroccans, thirty by Spanish Muslim converts and twenty by other nationalities from predominately Muslim influenced countries.57 These developments led demographer Julio César Cabrera Medina to mix the groups together into “the Islamic community.” He expresses a common opinion about the enclave vibe of the La Calderería.

... the Islamic community present in the Albayzín has taken advantage of the architecture of the settlement developed by their ancestors and gradually has developed an economy related very narrowly with their culture, exhibiting to all the visitors and residents in Granada its products and its traditions.\textsuperscript{58}

The Albayzín provides a vertiginous perspective from which to view post colonial identity politics. From colonizer (711 A.D.-1492), to colonized (1492-1956 A.D.), to transnational immigration (1985-2007) descendants of North African Muslim traditions have never ceased to shape Spanish and European identity through absence and presence within the Iberian Peninsula. The \textit{convivencia} idyll resonates for some in a multi-ethnic and religiously plural Andalusia. Fear of ‘Moors on the coast and on the hill’ respond to a variety of actors and processes which have transformed the Albayzín since the early nineties. With such a dramatic and geopolitically fickle history the Albayzín has become a neighborhood where differing political agendas physically, rhetorically and symbolically inscribe imaginative geographies. The following two chapters investigate the divergent, but fundamentally similar claims between imaginative geographies of ‘\textit{moros}’ and ‘Moors’. This has led popular and scholarly discourses to posit a reterritorialization of the Albayzín by latter day Moors.

Modern Moro

There are several imaginative geographies which find illustration in the La Calderería. Andalusian territory has played an axial role between the formation of East, West, North and South political, economic and metaphoric boundaries, thus being a symbolic territory on which to inscribe imaginative geographies. Differing imaginative geographies conjoin spatially, ethnically, nationally, religiously and temporally disparate identities to create timeless characters. Some of these can be loosely arranged around the complex use of the Spanish term moro. While its translation in English, ‘Moor’, refers to medieval history and invokes images of architecture, exoticism and romance, in Spanish moro is a contemporary and politically charged word. Moro incorporates language, religion, class, geographic origin and genetic heredity. Hall (1996) writes that there are no universal structures of racism, but “historically specific racisms.”

Moroccan immigrants feel, resist and appropriate very specific racializations by both local native Spaniards and foreign, predominantly middle class, Western tourists. Racialization occurs not solely through physical criteria, but incorporates culture, class, religion and ethnicity. Individual Moroccans are expected to embody certain characters - criminals, womanizers, terrorists as well as adjectives - arrogant, violent, insular, rigid, temperamental, and masculine. Contemporary Granadine society carries the weight of historical antagonisms which are transferred to very current issues such as, religious freedom, immigration and ethnic diversity.

While the relationship between Morocco and the EU has evolved greatly in a post colonial, but neocolonial environment, resulting in unfamiliar transnational exchanges of people and capital, the framing of identities in Granada has maintained a gaping distance between West and East. Despite the novelty offered by hybrid identities engendered by migration, global tourism and EU membership, the foundation of both Moor and moro imaginative geographies is what

Said (1979) identifies as “latent Orientalism.” Said (1979) investigates the various stages of Orientalism’s development from the eighteenth century tracking the shifts from a philological and literary approach generated by British and French scholars to a social science and administrative approach promoted by Anglo-American scholars. While being sensitive to the nuance and change within Orientalism he keeps his sight on “latent Orientalism” which uncritically undergirds the “manifest Orientalism” that is evinced in Orientalist discourses, representations and policies. Spanish Orientalism follows many of the tenets of Orientalism identified by Said, but its focus is almost exclusively on Morocco. Spanish municipal workers, social welfare departments’ integration planning for immigrants and local rumors use very current aspects of Orientalist constructions - terrorism, aggressiveness and irrationality - to cope with new neighbors. Tourists and local groups use consistent Orientalist strategies of timelessness, sexuality and a disjunction between the classic and contemporary Orient to enjoy a Spanish Orient comfortably. However, both the moro and Moor imaginative geographies rely fully on a belief in immutable cultural differences between Moroccans and Europeans/ North Americans. Ultimately, this obscures historical changes and continuity and the possibility of hybridity and transition in people, cultures and places.

**Defining Moro**

Izquierdo, in his 1999 *Ideal* editorial attempts to gloss over how strongly ancient historical antagonisms enter into contemporary perceptions about immigration. He writes reassuringly, “the nickname moro is not degrading, its origins are in the Latin word maurus, people from North Africa, from around Mauritania. Moro is a geographical identifier and not a dismissive nickname.” To ruffle one of my earliest interviewees I asked what moro meant. I was talking to Gabriel Martinez Martinez, a psychologist for the office of Planning, Evaluation and Studies in the Family, Social Welfare and Equality department, who oversees the municipal planning for immigrant integration assistance. I grew frustrated with the overly politically correct and cau-

61 Ibid., 206.
tious answers which hardly deviated from the department’s web page copy and avoided addressing any specific immigrant communities, such as Moroccans. Towards the end of a very boring hour, which he wouldn’t let me tape record because of ‘nerves’, I played my outsider, Spanish as a second language status tactically. Gabriel Martinez Martinez was reluctant to answer the question; he gave a few examples - the religion, a radical image, the history of confrontation, the language and Arab ethnicity. The question was so successful at moving the conversation to less scripted topics that I started asking all the people I talked with to comment on moro. Questioning moro generated multiple definitions, none of them benign or positive.

The most startling response to a question about moros came from the municipal government’s intercultural mediator at the Immigration Services office, Pepa Pratts. She was the most helpful and open municipal worker I met. She was willing to talk about the difficulty of dealing with a wide variety of immigrant communities, all of which experienced daily discrimination and difficulty integrating into Granada for different reasons. While her job allowed her to help Senegalese, Latin American and Romanian communities, she admitted she had very little interaction with the Moroccan immigrant community. She was conscious of her political incorrectness and she tried to be very honest. In her job she often saw the messiness of creating convivencia. She said towards the end, “I am speaking personally about myself because in a certain way I am an example of someone who is middle of the road sensitive.” She was aware that she had specific prejudices about Moroccans. Her reactions illustrate distrust, ethnicization and cultural determinism based on country of origin and religion.

I asked Pepa what moro meant. She got very flustered and decided to call a colleague to see how she should respond. She called an unnamed male colleague and I caught part of the conversation on tape. This is a tidied up version of what Pepa said in response to her colleague. “In the first it is a racist aggression...?” She tries out a popular saying, ‘Here moro, come over here moro.’ Responding to her colleague’s apparent surprise about her question she laughs, ‘No, it’s just this girl just asked me this question and it has blocked me. It is a trick question. It is a

trick question, I don’t know...but it is... a racist reason no?” After hanging up the phone she sums up the definition they have agreed upon.

He says that there are *moros* that say *moros* between themselves and also there are people that say *moro* because they are very old-fashioned because there are people that say “she goes about looking like a gypsy” and they are not saying, “I am racist against the gypsies.” What happens is that it makes you reflect on the importance of the language or the use of the language. What he says, it depends on the context. How it is said, who says it, it can signify nothing or it can signify a lot.

The image of the moro is in her opinion a mix of the “physical root, the accent and the authoritarian manner most... less the women than the men, the women are more noticeable for the veil issue and the manner of dress.” I asked if dark skin was the most immediate visible indicator.

Yes...[pause]...What happens, for example here in the immigrant services office, many times you don’t know who is in front of you until he starts... questions... you don’t know if you are talking with a Brazilian or with... when he starts to talk yes, but at the start when they simply see them you don’t know very well whom you are attending in front of you. But yes, the *moros*, they have a special image and it has lived a considerable increase in dislike from the rejection regarding [terrorist attacks on 11 March and 11 September].

Rosón Lorente and Dietz, through interviews with Spanish Muslim converts, document widespread local opinions which see Islam as a linear regression back to the Middle Ages. Many of the converts interviewed dealt with highly racialized comments about becoming ‘*moro*’ and reverting to medieval behavior. Temporal parallels were drawn between contemporary Arab Islamic societies and Al Andalus. This is corroborated by the current status of North African nations which struggle with postcolonial governance, economics and emigration. A municipally funded report in 2006 by the University of Granada’s Center for Political and Electoral Analysis

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65 I did not initially understand what she said here, so I stopped her to clarify. I asked if she was alluding to the Madrid and New York attacks and she responded yes.


and Documentation in Andalusia shows that North Africans are on par and often integrating slightly better than other large cohorts of immigrants (Latin Americans, Eastern Europeans, Sub-Saharan and Asians). They have average to higher rates of legal work status, registering with the municipal government, family reunification and permanence in Granada for over five years. They send less remittance money back to their country of origin, less frequently than all the other groups. However, they continue to be one of the most distrusted and under appreciated groups. Spanish Granadines thought that North Africans are the least appreciated after Eastern Europeans. When asked which immigrant group would cause the people polled the most concern if one of their children wanted to marry a non-Spaniard, North Africans are the least liked by a significant margin. In a telling tangent to a question about immigrants who had been in Granada for several years and do not feel accepted by mainstream society, Pepa began talking about her personal perspective on having a Moroccan boyfriend.

It is true that with a Moroccan boyfriend myself... I don’t think that I will ever have one in my life because I am not willing to step fifty years back in order to maintain a relationship with a man, no? And the topic of machismo if they won’t get over it... soon they will have it very bad because, here we are not going to simply have... that if they are going to have the women with scarves but I will never, for me, I would never like a life...

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68 Sixty-nine percent of all African immigrants in Granada are Moroccan. In 2004 the National Institute of Statistics recorded 2,594 Moroccans in Granada city.

69 Immigrants with legal work status by area of origin are as follows: North African 70%, Sub-Saharan 52%, Asian 83%, Eastern European 65%, South American 70%

70 Municipal registration by area of origin rates are as follows: 82% North Africans, 71% Sub-Saharan, 90% Asian, 68% Eastern Europeans, 80 South Americans. It is important to note that immigrants can register with the municipal government and be illegal without incurring any penalty.

71 The percentage of immigrants who live with their children in Granada by area of origin are as follows: North African 77%, Sub-Saharan 17%, Asian 100%, Eastern Europeans 44%, South Americans 50%.

72 Future permanence expectations by area of origin are as follow: 1-5 years: North Africans 17%, Sub-Saharan 10%, Asians 7%, Eastern Europeans 10% and South Americans 29%. More than 5 years: North Africans 51%, Sub-Saharan 48%, Asians 62%, Eastern Europeans 61% and South Americans 43%.

73 Proportions of those who send remittances based on area of origin area are as follows: North Africans 23%, Sub-Saharan 57%, Asians 35%, Eastern Europeans 52% and South Americans 22%.

74 It is noteworthy that 56.5% of Spanish Granadines declared that it did not matter to them based on country of origin. Concern about North Africans comprised 30% of those polled.

this is a question of prejudices that I have. But they make me afraid... It made me afraid
this, that actually a terrorist allegation could be made about him [hypothetical Moroccan
boyfriend]... or... because terrorism is not far away I think of what has happened to all
that have fallen in Madrid and we know that in Granada they have detained people and
other curious things and such. I, I never... In the end I think that yes it is the religion. ... it
is that it is very dangerous. Myself about mistreatment of women...from the religion I am
very sorry but I am an intermediary here and they don’t produce confidence in me.75

Liliana Súarez Navaz (2004) observed while doing ethnographic research in a rural area of the
province of Granada that gender is one of the most important distinctions that are made in immi-
grant - Spaniard interactions. Africans have the reputation of being dangerous, over-sexed men.
They are supposed to be sexist and sexually aggressive.76 She also documented when the term
moro was used to categorize immigrants. Moro characterized people as hypocritical, fickle, dis-
honest, underdeveloped, cruel and lazy.77

Class, criminality and dark skin

The Moroccan vendors I asked about this word were very familiar with the term moro.
They often used the word moro to make fun of each other for doing something silly, rude or un-
couth. They used the term ironically to describe the owners of the handicraft shops along La
Calderería. They had a variety of definitions for moro, which I’ve classified into class and
criminality to highlight where they saw distinctions between themselves and moro characteriza-
tions.

Berrechid thought that moro was a poor North African immigrant while arabé was used
for rich North African. Discrimination, he thought, was based on class. He said that there is a
lot of discrimination against moros. Moros are infamous. In his opinion it is racism. Berrechid
counts his time living in Spain by days, “2 years, 4 months and 6 days.”78 Although he is aware
of general racism against Moroccan immigrants, he believed that because he has money he never

76 Liliana Suárez-Navaz, Rebordering the Mediterranean: Boundaries and Citizenship in Southern Europe (Oxford:
77 Ibid., 53.
faced discrimination. It was Moroccans who needed help that experienced racism and increased racism. This viewpoint was often repeated by others. Yusuf tried to distance himself from the daily barrage of poor immigrants which appeared in the news trying to cross the Mediterranean on rafts, rowboats or dinghies (*pateras*). He thought that they were uneducated and uncouth in their Islamic practice. He teased Berrechid about coming over on a *patera* when it was apparent that he had not.

Later when I knew Yusuf better he confessed that he had originally lived in Murcia, a city where many poor, newly landed immigrants go to find agricultural labor and that he did not have papers then. He said that seeing the poverty and racism in Murcia put him off living there. Berrechid told me that his family was upset with him for failing out of school the first year. They didn’t want him to be in Spain as an “immigrant” but rather as a student. Hassan’s cousin also told me that being a “student” rather than a working “immigrant” has much higher social status.

Sometimes vendors would use *moro* as a criminal character. At the very end of my time in Spain I told them that people took more note of me when I was walking with a Moroccan. I noticed this acutely while walking around with Hassan, Mustafa and Alejandro. Normally no one seemed to notice me; I was just another tourist. However, when walking around with Moroccans people stared at me, the police watched us carefully and waiters seemed even more surly than usual. In a multiple person discussion several vendors agreed, “it’s because they see you with a *moro*” and they conjectured that people might think that the Moroccans accompanying me were drug traffickers or criminals. They thought the police were especially aggressive about enforcing municipal ordinances because, as they jokingly put it, La Calderería’s streets are *moro* streets. Finally, ethnographers have detailed fetishization of ‘the papers’ amongst immigrant communities.

The vast majority of immigrants in Spain are caught in a difficult cycle of retaining legal status. Citizenship is based primarily on *jus sanguinis*, or blood relatives; if a person’s parents are Spaniards, regardless of where any member of the family lives they are Spanish. However, if the child and only one parent were born in Spain then the child has to prove legal residence in Spain for one year after birth before receiving citizenship. Immigration policy is split between EU migrants who enjoy EU citizenship and open borders and non-EU migrants. To better deal with non-EU immigration an allowance, based on *jus soli*, was made. This allows foreign born, non-EU immigrants to receive citizenship after certain years of proven legal residence in Spain. In this system there is a clear preference for immigrant groups other than Africans. Migrants from former colonies in Latin America, Philippines, Portugal, Equatorial Guinea, Andorra and Sephardim Jews have to prove two years of legal residence before applying for citizenship. The rest of the non-EU migrants must prove 10 years of legal residence. This is especially interesting in the case of Morocco, which was a Spanish colony. That immigrants can receive equal citizenship is far more accommodating towards non-European migrants than many European countries at the moment, however proving legal residence is a difficult task for specific groups of immigrants. Besides legal residence, ‘good civic conduct’ and ‘integration into society’ are ambiguous criteria for receiving citizenship. Social integration is often determined by Spanish fluency, putting African and Asian migrants at a disadvantage compared to Latin American immigrants. Moroccans experience great labor discrimination and since legal papers are often based on employment contracts it can be difficult to maintain seamless legality for ten years. Add to this the whims of civil servants and strict deadlines often not met by a slow bureaucracy and unsurprisingly from 1992-2004 one percent of non-EU immigrants received citizenship. Since large scale immigration to Spain has persisted since the mid eighties, there is a disconnect between immigrants who have lived in Spain for over a decade and the citizenship system. The legal papers necessary to live and work in Spain become incredibly important for racialized immigrants who are very visible to law enforcement. A man who began working at Hassan’s shop part way


through the summer did not have his papers and he and Hassan lived in fear that the police would find out. Pepa was also aware of police aggression using the papers as a pretext, “many times immigrants have recounted to me that [they walk] through the streets of Granada with their regularized\textsuperscript{86} papers with their authorization to work and the police, without saying anything throw them to the street...”\textsuperscript{87}

When I asked Osama what \textit{moro} meant he did not even ponder for a moment, “A \textit{moro} is a person without race, religion or country.” The vendors were very aware that \textit{moro} was used by Spaniards and in Spanish sayings to denote stupidity, danger and dark skin. Hassan, who was keen to integrate and had an incredibly positive attitude about nearly everything, was very upset one day because a passerby had called him \textit{moro}. He wanted to formally complain about the passerby and kept saying, “The government gives me rights not him. I am legal here; he has to treat me like the Spaniards.”\textsuperscript{88} Many of the men I talked with did not experience overt or face to face discrimination. The use of \textit{moro} directly at Hassan is more rare than its use in quotidian phrases which are can be written off as simply old ideas which have remained with the language. The vendors I spoke with certainly did not self identify as \textit{moros}.

\textbf{The Arab alternative}

The vendors often used Arab rather than \textit{moro} or Moroccan for group identity. It was obvious that Arab was an empowering word which inserted them into the Iberian Peninsula’s history and Al Andalus heritage and connected them to Arab Muslims, especially in Iraq. While the North African dynasties which ruled Andalusia were largely of Berber extraction the intervening centuries and equally complex ethnic arrangements between self identifying Berbers and Arabs lead to very assertive claims to Al Andalus heritage. Significantly, most of the men with whom I talked were from areas of Morocco once colonized by Spain rather than France. Most of the men were from urban areas as well. Both of these characteristics reflect in their identification with

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86 Regularization means that the immigrant has legal residency in Spain. Being irregular or regular is similar to saying being legal or illegal.


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Arab rather than Berber. Berber ethnic nationalism is greater in the southern areas of Morocco and rural areas. Arab also made the men I met authorities on Islam. They were “Muslims from birth” which gave them a certain cachet vis-à-vis other Muslim groups in Spain. The multifaceted, but overwhelmingly negative assumptions made about moros highlights two processes, vilification but also resistance. “In a relational process shaped by inequality, identity comes to the forefront as a cultural expression of forms of domination and of regulation, and also a form of resistance.” Arab is a strategic identity deployed in order to avoid the negative representations of Moroccans in the media and moros in colloquial speech.

Yusuf, a very defiant, proud cynic expressed a great deal of sadness about how Moroccans are portrayed in Spanish and global media. In a moment of earnestness he said, “it makes you ashamed to say that you are Moroccan.” He lamented on another occasion that Moroccans were beginning to believe many of the prejudices against them. Several of the vendors commented on lopsided representations of Moroccans by the media. Hassan, decried media images of Morocco on cable TV. To him all the images are of poor, sick people in Western Sahara or the Lower Atlas mountains. “Where are the fashionable people? Where are the workers?” Demonstrating with his hands, “this is all people in the world get of Morocco, this box, television. There is so much more to know.” Yusuf thought that media is one of the greatest powers shaping the world today. In his opinion other immigrant communities had more links to gangs and theft, but they did not get as much negative attention. He said that a common perception about Moroccans is that they mistreat women. This puzzled him and he argued that he treats his Spanish girlfriend like a “princess.” He cited examples of how the media would cover crimes committed against women by Moroccans, sometimes when they were drunk, and conflate one Moroccan’s crime with the entire community. “They can make an angel or demon when they want.”

There is nothing primordial about being Moroccan Arab, just as there is nothing biologically inherent about my self-identification as a “white” American. But, this is not to say that the conjunction of these domains is not a strong, guiding belief among the people which the categories describe. For my Moroccan friends both Moroccan and Arab are conjunctions of ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional and national domains. Their use of the word “Arab” allowed them to identify strongly with Al Andalus’s material and cultural heritage. Every Moroccan that I met in Granada had visited the Alhambra, but knew very little about other historic sites in the city. When I reflect on positionality it seems to me not enough to say that I am a white, American, female of middle class opportunities and that I am an agnostic who believes in the deep faith of others. These are the registers of myself that I have been taught through academic training to tease out and reflect upon. What seems more germane to how my vendor friends reacted to me is the conjunction of these registers into varying stereotypes, many of which I did not realize until near the end of my research. To them it was more important that I was a young female, non Muslim, American and in many ways a tourist. In all of these perspectives I can find the echoes of the registers I have been taught to sort out, but viewed very differently. While positionality is important to reflect upon it is also to important to note how much the young, Arab, Muslim lower class immigrants differed in opinion. Often some of the men agreed with my opinion more than one of their countrymen. While I came to La Calderería with many assumptions and stereotypes and met with new ones directed at me my interactions with the men changed greatly over three months and not all the stereotypes survived the exchange. My nationality became the most interesting topic of discussion usually. All the vendors were very aware of the geopolitical imbalance between their country of origin and mine and it was often a topic of conversation and joke. A young Moroccan came to one of the shops in La Calderería after he had been robbed to seek help from the vendors. The vendors sent him to Granada Acoge, a local pro-immigrant NGO. We discussed what would happen to us in a similar situation. Yusuf said that while I could just go to the American Embassy, Spain wouldn’t want a Moroccan embassy. One day I arrived in the streets and interrupted a debate about what American passports say. Yusuf believed that American passports somewhere had a passage along the lines, “You cannot arrest, harm or touch this

94 Both Morocco and the United States have one embassy in Madrid and several consular offices all over Spain.
person. You must take them immediately to an American embassy” and other highhanded statements. I pulled out my passport and let the vendors look at it. My passport photo is from when I was a teenager, not particularly flattering. Yusuf started to laugh, “Look! You couldn’t find a more American person.”

The Orient within the Occident

An editorial in Ideal, the most venerable local mainstream newspaper, makes fun of both tourists’ and locals’ fears of contemporary ‘Moors.’ Manuel Pedreira recounts an event where tourists (presumably British because he uses British pseudonyms and jokes that the tourists have turned the color of shrimp after vacationing on the Costa del Sol) flying from Málaga to Manchester refused to let the airplane take off because there were, as Padreira calls them, ‘Moors’ on board and the British tourists were afraid they might be terrorists, simply because of their darker skin, long hair and Arabic conversation. The ‘Moors’ were forced to get off the plane and were interrogated. When it was found that they were not terrorists they were allowed to board a different flight. In an article titled “For the face dies the Moor” Pedreira responds sarcastically to this event,

The psychosis unleashed by the attempts in New York and their successive and painful replicas runs the risk of converting this world into hell. The quantity of mistakes and propitious situations for panic are infinitely foreseeable: enough with putting a Moor near a departure gate...in line for the bus or in the supermarket, so what. The truth is, myself, every time I pass through La Calderería I start to sweat and I don’t breathe until the San Gregorio Church door. For the types that walk from here to there, Al Qaeda should have its official address there. For sure. I’m not exaggerating. Did they not catch one of their sleeper cells in Albolote? It’s been said, that beneath each jilaba is squeezed a belt of explosives, I refer to the proofs. Granada is full of them, and the greenhouses of Motril...How scary.”

While Padreira is being sarcastic about the real threat posed by Arabs in La Calderería, his editorial gives insight into ethnic stereotyping and racial profiling, the visibility of Arabs, mostly Moroccans, in La Calderería and hyperbolic reactions to this visibility. Nowhere in the article is it

identified where the erroneously alleged terrorists are from but he calls them, “moros” rather than “Arabs”, while it is doubtful that British tourists on their way back to Manchester used the term “Moor.” In Padreira’s article he is addressing a local Granadine audience and a distinctly Spanish Orientalist preoccupation with Moors is the butt of his sarcasm.

Incidents of hyperbolic ethnic stereotyping and racial profiling create high levels of mistrust and skepticism about anyone doing research regarding the ‘Arab streets’. My research was greatly affected by the vendors’ fear of surveillance from unknown entities and hostility from the municipal government. The first potential subject I met was a Moroccan who completed medical school at the University of Granada, but now manages a café. Due to his time constraints I did not interview him, but we talked over my proposed ethnographic field work. Tape recording would be a snag in his opinion. He thought many other Moroccans would not agree to be recorded, because ‘the people around here think strange things.’ After two weeks I finally understood that these ‘strange things’ were related to prior bad press and constant surveillance directed at Arab Muslims by what Osama, a very politically conscious Moroccan student at the University of Granada who also worked many hours at the shops, constantly called “secret services.” The “secret services” seemed to incorporate multiple levels of governance, the local police, Spanish national intelligence, Interpol and perhaps the CIA. Zacaria Maza, the director of ATakwa mosque, a humble organization just off La Calderería which caters to Muslims who follow maliki Islamic jurisprudence, has complained in print about the pressure mosques face from the security forces of the federal government which have recently reformed the religious freedom law to allow more regulation in the name of national security post 9-11 and 3-11. The Spanish government wants to monitor who attends which mosques, who organizes the mosques, the money mosques receive and translations of religious services or speeches given in mosques. In an article which appeared in El País, a national newspaper, Zacaria points out some of the hypocrisy of this regulation, “In Spain no one gives us help. Compared to the thousands of millions that the Catholic Church receives from the State, we don’t receive even a bit, and then it seems punishable that we are financed by other Arab countries.”

96 AtTakwa and the Mosque of Granada (which will be discussed later) are both funded in part by the government of the United Arab Emirates.
subsidies, no one tells us to say this or that. What would happen if the government got involved in what priests preach?”

Granadine imams refuse to do their prayers or speeches in Spanish because Arabic is the direct expression of Allah’s message; to translate it is to interpret it.

Osama was the most vocal in his belief that Moroccans are being surveilled so that the U.S. government could get to “know the Arab mind.” His fears were somewhat more paranoid than the other vendors, who actively disagreed with him, but Yusuf who was more level headed in general, joked that if he said “Al Qaeda” in the La Caldereria he would be grabbed off the street, presumably by the “secret services.” He agreed to participate in my study as long as I did not ask him “trick questions.” I asked repeatedly what a trick question would be and never got a clear answer. When I talked to Berrechid about the study he was especially caught by the tape recorder, “que fuerte!/how strong!” The concern about surveillance and the polemics surrounding Islamic presence in the Albayzin forced me to pick questions that would not make my Moroccan subjects nervous. For instance, I never asked about their legal status in Spain. The fear of the tape recorder extended to Gabriel Martinez Martinez who allowed me to take notes during our interview. The ‘trick question’ reappeared in the interview with Pepa.

I gave up on the tape recorder soon after arriving. This made me rather insecure because I had a very distinct idea of how my research should go and the format it should produce. I expected long quotes and hours of agonizing transcription and translation. Instead, I ended up sitting on a stool, reading daily newspapers and joking with six vendors for a few hours everyday, then running back to my computer to record it all in notes. This meant that I faced several new issues - language, memory and tone. Without the tape recorder I had to remember tone, sequence, timing and context which can be difficult when holding a three hour conversation with six people. A variety of topics were covered erratically, interspersed with jokes, commentary on soccer matches, news stories and often Arabic which I don’t speak. I have used double quotes only when I am sure that I took verbatim notes or actually had a tape recorded interview.

The way I looked and what it was imagined I represented - young, female, American tourist - caused many frustrating moments. People assumed I did not speak Spanish, especially Spaniards, and my desire to contact Moroccans and or leaders of Muslim communities met with confusion or disbelief. Often when asking a very simple and concrete question people responded with a question rather than an answer. Very soon upon arrival to La Calderería I was looking for AtTakwa, which is popular amongst Moroccans. I knew that it was very close to the streets. That day I just hoped to find where it was so that the next day I could try and talk to the director. I asked a young man at a shop if he knew where the mosque was located. He didn’t speak Spanish all that well and seemed quite confused that I wanted to find the mosque. “Why do you want to go there? The mosque is for Muslims.” I tried to explain that I wanted to talk to someone in the administration. He seemed fairly skeptical but then he saw an older man coming up the stairs and motioned for him to come talk to me. It turns out that he was Zacaria, a Spanish convert who is the president of the AtTakwa mosque. Zacaria looked me up and down with skepticism and what seemed like disapproval at my shorts. At first he seemed fairly suspicious until I gave him a letter explaining my research and then he agreed to be interviewed.

This brief exchange, which required me to get past others’ assumptions about my reasons for being there, was repeated on a number of topics. Often when I went to the Urbanism Management branch of the municipal government and asked to see certain documents, such as planning documents regarding the Albayzin, public works in La Caldereria or archives about zoning and complaints filed, rather than an answer to questions about how to request information I was met with questions along the lines, “why would you want to know this, see this?” I don’t know if this was a reaction generated by apathy, disorganization or a reluctance to give access to information which is related to controversial subject matter, namely Moroccan immigrants in La Caldereria. I spent hours waiting in department foyers, clutching little pieces of paper with my number on them as though I was in line to buy food at the deli, with little success. So, I decided to focus on library archives and vendors in La Caldereria. It took nearly daily visits to La Caldereria, answering as many questions as I asked and letting the vendors lead the conversations before some of the vendors were willing to talk about more difficult and controversial issues.
What really makes an impression in Padreira’s article about alleged terrorist *moros* is the immediacy of them - in the bus line, the supermarket and La Calderería. The Moors are too close for comfort. They are not somewhere “over there” in the other half of the world, separated by bodies of water and continents, but living within Europe. La Calderería becomes a challenging site for local, Spanish identity because representatives of an historic Other are close, visible and not temporary. The increasing proximity between the ‘Orientals’ and ‘Occidentals’ is a grave threat to Orientalism as identified by Said. Haldrup et al. (2006) identify “practical orientalism”, which is experienced in banal, daily situations with visceral reactions to difference, as a strategy deployed to create difference without physical distance. Practical orientalism supports Said’s latent Orientalism, reinforcing the discourses of timeless, primordial difference between the Orient and Arabs and the Occident and Europeans. “Orientalism... is also centrally performed, practiced and (re)negotiated in daily life.”

Haldrup et al. highlight incidences where cultural difference is experienced without the gaze. They provide examples of how body space, touching, diet, smells, sounds and dress incited xenophobia and misunderstanding in Denmark. Many of the examples hold true in Spain as well. For instance, they detail the public outrage over changing the Danish meatball, which has pork, so that it could be served in public schools, which Muslims attend. This became a battle of cultural integrity, “our” meatball v. “their” illogical dietary restrictions. Similar complaints have been made by Spanish teachers and public administrators and is a daily concern for Muslims living in Spain and eating in public establishments. For instance, in the Albayzín a group of convert Muslim women developed a pilot project with a public school. Two special classes were offered to Muslim students, one on Islam and the other on Arabic language. An agreement was also reached in the school cafeteria to serve alternative menus that meet Islamic dietary restrictions. While the convert Muslim women applauded the success of the program it was rejected by non-Muslim parents who feared that such a program would attract more Muslim students and turn the neighborhood into a ghetto. The program was cancelled by the Education Ministry.

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98 Haldrup et al., “Practical Orientalism- Bodies, everyday life and the construction of otherness,” 176.

the “citationary structure”\textsuperscript{100} of Said’s Orientalism and translates it to an “intimate” neighborhood level, allowing it to enter “common sense” and inevitability. This embodied orientalism does not rely as heavily on representation as on “sense, observation and participation.”\textsuperscript{101} It is especially useful for analyzing neighborly interactions, such as those in the Albayzin.

Gabriel Martinez Martinez aims to promote integration at a neighborhood level. The municipal government has released several campaigns with the slogan, “ciudad de convivencia/city of coexistence.” The shift in integration planning hopes that neighborly interaction will lead to awareness and tolerance. However, the promotion plan faces some conflicting perspectives which do not favor neighborly interaction. Marrero Rocha summarizes several national opinion polls in 1998 to highlight the discrepancies between conjecture and experience. In 1998 the Sociological Research Centre found that 53 percent of Spaniards polled believed Moroccans were treated with suspicion while 69 percent of those polled did not have contact with Moroccans, 92 percent had never been to Morocco. In 2003 a poll conducted by the Institute for International Issues and Foreign Policy found that 62 percent of the people polled believed Morocco to be Spain’s primary imminent military threat.\textsuperscript{102} This is prior to the Madrid train bombings which generated incredible rejection of Moroccans and an increase in surveillance and control of Muslim religious activities. Specifically in Granada, the municipally funded report in 2006 by the University of Granada’s Center for Political and Electoral Analysis and Documentation in Andalusia shows a discrepancy between Spaniards’ perception of immigration as having generally positive or negative effects and a question about how immigrants have affected Spanish culture. The Spanish Granadines polled in the first question reflect a negative perspective toward immigration, while the answers to the second question are generally more positive. I asked Gabriel Martinez Martinez how this discrepancy of perspective occurs. He responded that the public is confused by news media. From one side the public sees many news incidents where immigrants are criminalized or appear radical. However, there are other news stories which celebrate the

\textsuperscript{100} Gregory, “Colonial Nostalgia and Cultures of Travel: Spaces of Constructed Visibility in Egypt,” 112.

\textsuperscript{101} Haldrup et al., “Practical Orientalism- Bodies, everyday life and the construction of otherness,” 180.

\textsuperscript{102} Marrero Rocha, “The Implications of Spanish-Moroccan Governmental Relations for Moroccan Immigrants in Spain,” 432. It is significant that this poll occurred right after a near military crisis over a rocky island in the Mediterranean.
contribution immigrants have made to the economy by doing jobs that Spaniards don’t want to do. I then asked, “So immigrants in the role of worker are a benefit but in the role of neighbor not so much?” He responded, “Yes.”

**Integration and cultural determinism: State responses to unprecedented immigration**

An immigrant’s status within Spain depends on many levels of government. Beginning with the EU, which sees Spain as an important southern border and narrowing through federal, autonomous community, provincial and finally municipal money is designated for integration programs. The amount of emphasis placed in political discourse and funds on integration is much less than for security and border control. Starting at the federal level immigration integration planning in Spain follows assimilationist trends. Sandra Gil, in a series of online summaries, critiques the Spanish Social Ministry’s Document on the Development of the Plan for Integration from 1999-2000. Gil claims there is an underlying assumption that Moroccan culture is less similar to Spanish culture than Latin American or EU migrants. According to the Integration Plan new cultures, i.e. Moroccan, must adapt to the old, Spanish, culture. Nationally bounded definitions of culture become a tool of individual discrimination; “cultural difference...is defined as an impediment, a discapacity [sic] or a deficiency. An obstacle of origin-cultural roots which some immigrant groups drag as if they were uprooted trees will act as a barrier on the road to the adaptation to democratic values.”

In Granadine provincial integration planning Súarez Navaz sees a similar assumption. Cultural difference is perceived as inherent and constant not as something constructed and changing. In daily interactions culture is assumed to be present a priori and predict cross cultural interaction, rather than intercultural construction in reaction and adaptation to a situation.

Combine this alleged primordial cultural difference with Spanish citizenship laws and immigrants are excluded in three ways - legally, genetically and culturally. The historic exclusion of Muslim Andalusians from Spanish history carries over into contemporary definitions of

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citizenship. Spanish nationality rests on *jus sanguinis*, neatly sidestepping any common history based on territory or colonial legacy.\(^{105}\) Alscher (2005) traces cultural difference criteria to practical immigration policy based on nation of origin. He documents government policy decisions to grant greater proportions of visas to Latin American immigrants over North Africans because Latin Americans are more culturally similar to Spaniards.\(^{106}\) As Súarez Navaz points out North Africans migrants are doubly excluded, “historically constituted notions of cultural difference were systematically re-inscribed, both in terms of a so-called traditional biological hierarchy of cultures and races and in the purportedly new imagining of the insurmountability of equally valuable cultural differences.”\(^{107}\)

The first immigration law was passed in 1985 as a prerequisite for EU membership. The success of Spanish democracy and its economy quickly made Spain an attractive country for immigrants from developing countries. The 1985 law, which was written at a time of very little immigration into Spain, was quickly obsolete due to the steady increase of North African immigration from 1975 to 1996. Since the early nineties immigration restrictions between Morocco and Spain have become stricter.\(^{108}\) Short sighted citizenship definitions and laws have created untenable situations as thousands of immigrants live in Spain without rights or legal status. Subsequent government administrations have instituted reactive measures in the form of mass regularization programs that do not significantly change the definitions of citizenship or immigration laws, but act as floodgates to be dropped on undesirable immigrant groups. Visa requirements testify to perspectives which privilege some groups over others.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Entry</th>
<th>Stay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European (EU and non-EU).</td>
<td>Free, no visa.</td>
<td>Free, no permits required; automatically granted permanent residency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America, Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand.</td>
<td>Free except for nationals of Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.</td>
<td>Visa required for stays longer than three months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of countries</td>
<td>Visa required for most cases. Exceptions: nationals of Iceland, Israel, Malaysia, Malta, Poland, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao.</td>
<td>Visa required for stays longer than three months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Visa Requirements

Through legalization campaigns in 1991, 1995, 2000 and 2005, 1,041,000 immigrants were regularized. Immigrant regularization does not equal citizenship, but does give immigrants legal status and many protective rights. However, legal rights certainly do not equal societal integration or acceptance. Under an assimilationist integration agenda, legal status is seen as a possession while cultural identity remains as a primordial attachment. Due to this regime Súarez Navaz interprets citizenship as a marker not simply of national inclusion but as a possession of civilized people while the maintenance of culture is left to illegal and uncivilized immigrants. “Migrant workers exposed to this double strategy experienced the de facto denial of their status as legal subjects in the Spanish civil sphere, together with the imposition of normalizing public programs that inscribed their cultural difference as an impediment to modernization.”

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112 Ibid., 163.
The assimilationist underpinnings of the municipal government’s approach to integration are very similar to the federal level. This was clearly outlined to me by Gabriel Martinez Martinez. He said in the opening sentences of our conversation, “The autochthonous culture is the one that should remain.” In response to the question “why do immigrants reject the integration programs?” he taught me a Spanish rhyme, “Donde fueras haz que vieres/ Where you go do what you see,” which is similar to the English saying, “when in Rome do as the Romans do.” He explained Spain’s theoretical approach towards greater religious and ethnic diversity as interculturalism. According to him interculturalism is a compromise between monoculturalism and multiculturalism without the excess of French style assimilation. However, Granada, in Martinez Martinez’s opinion, is not quite ready for interculturalism and his department has the more humble objective of “mediation to favor convivencia.” Sáurez Navaz found that Granadine municipal social workers have a narrow view of convivencia, namely preventing problems. This is a far cry from integration. Pepa explained that many times when she arrives at a site to do intercultural mediation her basic job is to explain to the ‘abnormal’ immigrants the way things are ‘normally’ done in Spain. It was very clear from her explanation that immigrants are expected to conform to local norms. Gabriel Martinez Martinez’s example of the motivation and need for convivencia stood out for its portrayal of immigrants as burdens to the system. Communication is the initial step towards convivencia because the newly arrived immigrants often don’t speak Spanish and they become a “chronic bother” to municipal government workers. So, his department has a translation service so that immigrants don’t frustrate municipal workers.

In the documents he gave me to read which were commissioned by his office and researched by the University of Granada the onus was on immigrants to integrate. This is in contradiction to the empirical data in the report which shows immigrants completing many of the necessary steps to be productive, long term, legal contributors to Spanish society. Conversely, the Spanish Granadine public polled has inflated views of the effect immigrants have on society.

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113 Ibid., 152.
concerns about overcrowding\textsuperscript{114} and opinions which have become more negative towards migrants from developing countries from 2003-2006. The conclusion of the report is that Spanish Granadines need to be more welcoming, but the burden falls heavily on the immigrant groups to integrate. I asked him why the study ended with this conclusion. He laughed and said, “it is a bit contradictory no? Remember the politicians live by the votes of the autochthonous population.” However, throughout the interview he departed from questions without prompting to make comments about victimization by immigrants. “There is the risk that the immigrants put themselves on a ‘victim plan’ and lobby for more rights than the autochthonous citizens and this is not just. Everyone must do their part” and “the immigrants cannot take a passive or victim role, they have to implicate themselves also.” This would apply directly to the Moroccan community where he sees a “lack of integration. There is a type of segregation, micro communities and micro cultures. It [the Moroccan immigrant community] has to connect with others, the segregation doesn’t help integration.”

The municipality’s version of integration differs from one of my Moroccan friends and helps explain the polarization between municipal efforts and the communities they hope to reach. In the same University of Granada municipally funded report from 2006 almost none of the immigrants polled knew about or prevailed upon municipal immigration services (93%).\textsuperscript{115} These services are sparse, there are three people who work in the office that deals directly with immigrants. They offer valuable intercultural mediation, juridical and family regrouping advice, assistance with finding housing, accessing municipal resources and monetary assistance and translation. In July 2007 I had a very charged exchange when I first met Saleh. Initially he refused to participate in my research which I accepted peacefully. Still, he wanted to tell me why. He kept talking about how he had participated in similar studies, but he thought that all of them where

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{114} Centro de Análisis y Documentación Política y Electoral de Andalucía (CADPEA), “Percepción de la inmigración en la ciudad de Granada.”

Significantly the report found that while immigrants most commonly lived with an average of three people per residential unit and only comprise 4.58% of the total Granadine population, the biggest concern amongst the Spanish Granadine polled was that there are “too many” immigrants and overcrowding. When asked to estimate what percentage of the population was comprised of immigrants Spanish Granadines largely thought it was somewhere between 10-20%.

\textsuperscript{115} Centro de Análisis y Documentación Política y Electoral de Andalucía (CADPEA), “Percepción de la inmigración en la ciudad de Granada.”
\end{footnotesize}
pretending to be tolerant while really being about assimilation. He seemed to think that the only two options available to him were segregation or assimilation and that a third path, which was more logical to him was integration.

He felt that topics of the studies were very personal [I initially proposed to do a project about voting rights] and that he was tired of “feeling like a bug”. He believes people from the West are trying to assimilate Muslims and said he wasn’t going to help people learn how to get inside and change things. Studies which targeted Arab Muslims in Western countries were racist and he wanted to see one that went the other way around. He talked about people in Spain having a double face - saying in public the things that they were supposed to say while saying other things in private. Basically, he wants to be left alone to live and made a comparison with homosexuals. It does not matter to him what they do and he could work with them, share a flat and study with them without needing to know anything about their lives. He said that after September 11 the world had changed and he had changed when he saw the reality of things.

While he initially said that he did not want to participate in my research he was always very eager to talk to me when I came to the La Calderería. After the other men explained that what I wanted was his opinion rather than facts about him he said he was happy to give me his opinion.116 A different evening when several of the men were teasing me for being too skinny and complaining about how Westerners don’t know enough about Morocco or Muslims I pointed out that I was interested and willing to learn but they mostly complained to me about Westerners’ lack of education rather than rectifying misconceptions or teaching me new things. Saleh hastened to explain that they did not have anyone else with whom to vent about very large issues of discrimination and inequalities, so they were venting to me. Essentially many of their bitter complaints which occasionally hurt my feelings were them letting off steam. Knowing this I did a great amount of listening to topics which ranged far from my research interests, but which they wanted explanations to and apologies for. Saleh’s vehemence about assimilationist objectives at a municipal, national and international level are well-founded. A neighborhood perspective on

the vagaries between definitions of multiculturalism, segregation, interculturalism and cultural difference will be provided in the fifth chapter and conclusion.

**Religion**

An unbroachable topic with both municipal workers was religion. Both Gabriel Martinez Martinez and Pepa Pratts see religious plurality as far too complicated and risky to include in integration planning. Martinez Martinez justified this by appealing to the secular Constitution while Pepa claims that it is out of respect. However, religion seems to be one of the greatest differentiators between immigrant groups and the autochthonous population and according to Pepa it is also a major issue for integration.

They integrate in light of religious issues, of their level of fundamentalism, something like this, of their religiosity. It is the students who are the most Occidental, they are open, they are a little more in another place... in parties and like this they are integrating. The [associations] from Morocco that I have are more strict... and there is a lot of secrecy in these with this topic. When I coincide with people that I know from Moroccan associations in discussion groups or places they normally have an impressive rejection towards the municipal government. They believe much more in a NGO, in S.O.S. Racismo and Granada Acoge than in this [her services]. If they can come they don’t...No, they hate me, it’s impossible. And really here is a lesser known issue - I’ve never been able to accept it myself really, for aspects of religion, for their culture and religion requires much more work to understand everything.117

This is a confession not of respect, but of avoidance and fear. Gabriel Martinez Martinez explained simplistically that his integration planning could not incorporate religious difference because it would be unfair to other immigrant groups living in a secular nation; everyone must get exactly equal treatment, dealing with issues of specific religions would be making a caveat for Muslim immigrants. This refusal to deal with religion, which is a very visible tenet of cultural differentiation, makes the discrimination it generates invisible to the very institution which could affect policy targeted at specific changes. It is hypocritical to claim secular society norms and not act to create them. In an interview with Zacaria, a Spanish convert who works primarily with

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a Moroccan Muslim community, I asked specifically about discrimination against Muslims in Granada. His response brings racism into the religious differentiation debate.

What a shame that the Muslims from birth\(^\text{118}\) don’t appreciate, don’t value, really... they don’t give Islam its just value. Sometimes they feel a little... they feel inferior. That should be totally the opposite. They feel on another side ashamed to be Muslim, I think, in an ancient culture of the old people, so here I try so that they don’t notice much. No, this is the question then, I try to instill in them, pride that they have come to this country, a modern Western country, not so that they will be treated worse because they are Muslims; NO.

We representatives also fight so that there isn’t discrimination in terms of belief. Although constitutional law gives us religious freedom and we also have some legal agreements - lawyers! lawyers!- with the Ministry of Justice... it is difficult for them to apply them in practice, it is also difficult for the people to rise up. Little by little they are realizing that they have to see space for the whole world, for all beliefs, but still racism remains. There are still racist spots. Also there is a lot - perhaps because of the history, because of the past - there is hate, there is rancor that still remains. So, I try to motivate the Muslims from birth.\(^\text{119}\)

\textit{Moro} is a vilified characterization which has been used to describe a multitude of people for over eight hundred years. Its longevity in the face of vacillating intercontinental civilizations, economic systems and constant migrations speaks to unerring latent Orientalism. Racialization of the \textit{moro} must take into account multiple registers of differentiation not solely physical features. Religion, insularity, aggressiveness, violence, criminality and irrationality are combined with cultural determinism and used to separate sites, objects and bodies into assumptions which create specific reinforcing interactions between ‘others’. In the next chapter new ‘others’ intervene in a Spanish/Moroccan dichotomy to create very different, but fundamentally still racialized connections between Moroccan vendors and Moorish ghosts.

\(^{118}\) ‘\textit{Musulmanes de nacimiento}/ Muslims from birth’ is phrase that I heard repeatedly from Moroccans, European and North American Muslims and Muslim leaders to describe people who grew up in countries with predominately Islamic societies. It was also often used as short hand for Arab Muslims. I am unsure how it would be used to describe Muslims from Indonesia or Senegal for example.

Time Traveling and Tele-porting Tourists

Turn off bustling Elvira into the cobbled alleys of Caldereria Vieja or Nueva and in a few steps you've left Europe behind.\(^{120}\)

The Lonely Planet, a prevailing tourist guide for backpackers, offers this bewildering intercontinental journey in no more than a few steps and without the hassle of customs. All the travelers must do is get to Granada, Spain. International tourists bring parallel imaginative geographies which are divergent from moro. ‘Moor’ includes many of the same criteria as moro with less emphasis on class and contemporary politics and more on legend, territory and architecture. La Calderería’s “manifest Orientalism”\(^{121}\) provides an ideal site for the construction of Moor imaginative geographies. These temporal, spatial and corporeal geographies set La Calderería “outside” of contemporary Europe despite its physical location within Granada, Spain. A British journalist commented, “the Caldereria Nueva resembles a cross-section through a Moroccan souk that has strayed across the Mediterranean to Granada.”\(^{122}\) The area is referred to in some accounts as “Little Morocco.”\(^{123}\) The spatial implications of this imaginative geography are troubling, considering many of the Moroccan vendors in this area do not live or shop along the two streets. It is not an ethnic enclave, but rather a lucrative production of what tourists expect to find sold by Muslim Arabs in Andalusia.

Arabs in the Albayzin are not interchangeable with the moros of Spanish Orientalism, but become signifiers for a general Orient. The jumbling of times, places, historical figures and even


\(^{121}\) Said, Orientalism, 206.


ethnicities fits Said’s latent Orientalism. Tourists are very active *albaicínero* actors despite being just as foreign as Moroccan vendors. This is due to a disjuncture between the classic and contemporary Orient and the seductiveness of nostalgia. Since Spain’s reemergence in Western entitlements post Franco, tourists find it easier to claim Granada as part of a European imaginary. Besides the Moorish sites in Granada there are many Catholic monuments of interest. Granada is doubly symbolic as a medieval frontier with the Orient and now as a southern border of the EU. The production of Orientalist fantasy in *La Calderería* dovetails with processes of de facto preservation since the *morisco* expulsion in 1569 and romantic revival of Moorish heritage in the nineteenth and twentieth century.

**The marginalization and deterioration of World Heritage**

During Moorish rule the hill which is now the Albayzín was well populated and economically vibrant. However, after Castilian-Aragonian conquest, due to the dramatic demographic decline from emigration, expulsion and a devastating flood in 1629, the neighborhood suffered economically, politically and structurally. In 1587 there were 11,230 residents in the Albayzin while by 1752 there were 9,618 people.¹²⁴ The barrio continued to be marginalized by the federal government, which was busy developing a modern city in the valley and agricultural plain. The area which became the contemporary Albayzín was marked by poverty up until the twentieth century.

Upheaval in the twentieth century reverberated loudly in the Albayzín. The Spanish Civil War, Romantic movement, workers’ movements and tourism worked together in surprising ways to change the barrio’s status. The process from poor, deteriorating, worker’s barrio to gentrifying tourist site has occurred unevenly and has several motivations. Emilio Jiménez Nuñez, an ethnographer and devotee of the barrio, did oral history with long term residents in the 1990s and followed the tensions between the Albayzín as a reified object by outsiders and the Albayzín as a residential neighborhood by long time residents. “There is a great abyss between the artistic and historic Albayzín and the Albayzín made up by its living population.”¹²⁵

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¹²⁵ Ibid., 262.
The Albayzín’s fame far surpasses its importance demographically. In 2000 the barrio contained 3.56% of the total Granadine population.\textsuperscript{126} The Albayzín entered an international imagination at the turn of the century when Romantic poets and writers fell in love with the “alternative” Albayzín. Through the works of such internationally renowned poets as Federico García Lorca the neighborhood’s seediness was celebrated as “mysticism and lust”\textsuperscript{127}, contrasting its legacy of historic tragedy and architectural deterioration with the modern, industrializing parts of the city. Many of these Romantic writers had Communist sympathies and idolized the blue-collar albaicineros during a period of tension between political ideologies which eventually culminated in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Trina Mercader, an Andalusian poet, chose La Calderería as her home after Moroccan independence because it reminded her of Morocco, where she lived for many years during Spanish colonialism.\textsuperscript{128} The Albayzín as an area of shared cultural heritage literally exploded in the early 1930s when iconoclasts burned several churches. The burned churches sparked the formalization of a preservation movement in affluent Granada and many committees sprouted to “save the Albayzín.”

While the embers of the conservation movement were being stoked the residents of the Albayzin were filing complaints with the municipality asking for running water, pavement, transportation into the city, policing, a market and a public library.\textsuperscript{129} The barrio continued to use an irrigation and water rationing system inherited from the Moors and families hauled their water from small cisterns, aljibes, until after the 1940s when running water was installed. By the end of 1936 only 24 of the two hundred and twenty four streets in the Albayzín were paved. It was at this time that a morisco inspired artistic cobblestone was chosen for the barrio’s streets.\textsuperscript{130} In the same year the Albayzín was barricaded off from the city and bombed Republican forces (political right forces which eventually culminated in the Franco era). The Albayzín, due to its working

\textsuperscript{126} Julio Cabrera Medina and Juan Carlos de Pablos, “Metamorphosis del Albaicín (Granada). Del Aislamiento de la Interdependencia,” Cuadernos Geográficos 32 (2002): 76.
\textsuperscript{127} Emilio Jiménez Núñez, El Albaicín de Granada: La vida en un barrio, 71.
\textsuperscript{128} Victoria Fernandez, “Trina Mercader, in memoriam,” Ideal, 8 April 1985, 21.
\textsuperscript{129} Emilio Jiménez Núñez, El Albaicín de Granada: La vida en un barrio, 71.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 102
class demographic had gained the reputation of being dangerously “red” during the Spanish Civil War.\footnote{131}

During the tumultuous 1930s the motivations of residents and conservationists differed greatly. The working class residents were lobbying for better infrastructure and amenities while conservationists were concerned with protecting and restoring public property, such as churches. Ever since this era, the conservation movement has steadily taken precedence over the residents’ basic needs. An ironic example is one preservation campaign in 1938 titled, “color, clarity and chalk” and encouraged residents to fix up the exterior of their houses for prizes at a time when running water was not common in the barrio.\footnote{132} From municipal archival data it is clear that the Albayzín was in deep deterioration in the twentieth century. The houses appear in municipal archives most often as in need of demolition or various complaints of disrepair. By 1990 and 1991, 31.6% of Albayzín housing was in ‘deficient’ condition compared to the city average of 13% and the Albayzín’s percentage of ‘good’ condition housing was 46% compared to the Granadine 80.2%.\footnote{133} The lack of infrastructure and adequate modern housing and transportation access caused a demographic nose dive in the Albayzín which lost 50% of its total population from 1970-1987 as younger generations were attracted to industrial jobs and cheaper, new housing opportunities in the suburbs.\footnote{134} From 1987-1991 22-28% of the Albayzín’s housing was unoccupied.\footnote{135} The legacy of deterioration and marginalization ripened the neighborhood for eventual gentrification in the nineties, which will be discussed further in chapter 5. The Albayzín’s clandestine, rebellious and alternative reputation spared it from the urban modernization trends started by the Catholic Monarchs which reorganized Granada’s valley bottom settlement between wide, rectilinear avenues with large plazas and later the development of highways. It

\footnote{131 Ibid., 71.}
\footnote{132 Ibid., 102.}
\footnote{133 Cabrera Medina and Carlos de Pablos, “Metamorphosis del Albaicín (Granada). Del Aislamiento de la Interdependencia,” 94.}
\footnote{135 Cabrera Medina and Carlos de Pablos, “Metamorphosis del Albaicín (Granada). Del Aislamiento de la Interdependencia,” 83.}
also created a movement to “save” what was envisioned as an empty, pre-modern and dying neighborhood allowing gentrification actors to encroach despite the existence of a close knit, pre-existing, long term community.

**Clarification of the “collective memory of humanity”**

In 1994 this still populated neighborhood of 101 hectares\(^{136}\) became an object of global concern and international entitlement. The spike in tourism, gentrification and conservation of the Albayzín because of this acceptance by the international community has caused the re-imagining, reconstruction and re-valorization of a barrio that for nearly five hundred years had been left to rot. In 1993 the Spanish government applied to inscribe the Albayzín as an extension to the Alhambra’s status as an UNESCO World Heritage site. Becoming a World Heritage site is advantageous for tourism marketing as well as funding restoration. For example, besides funding from the regional and municipal government the Granada UNESCO World Heritage area received funding from the federal government, the EU FEDER Funds, EU ERDF Funds, the European Investment bank and some private foundations by 2006.\(^{137}\) The Albayzín extension serves as a buffer zone for the Alhambra complex and compliment Granada’s reputation as the premier site for Moorish cultural tourism. In 1994 the Albayzín was added and became more than Spanish, it entered shared “universal value” as a cultural site “which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity.” Further, its “permanent protection...is of the highest importance to the international community as a whole.”\(^{138}\)

The most persistent imaginative geography of La Calderería is that of Al Andalus, a temporal geography which rewrites Granada as an ancient, tolerant Moorish center of culture, architecture and fusion between East and West. Said explains the appropriation of Muslim glory by

\(^{136}\) Ibid., 75.
Western scholars as a key element of Orientalism. “Faced with the obvious decrepitude and political impotence of the modern Orient, the European Orientalist found it his duty to rescue some portion of a lost classical Oriental grandeur in order to ‘facilitate ameliorations’ in the present Orient.”139 This classical Orient is only accessible and appreciated by Western scholars and because of their superior evolution, “…the ‘classical Orient was a credit to them and not to the lamentable modern Orient.”140 Al Andalus heritage becomes Spanish and Western, not simply because it took place in the same territory and has had lasting effects on both Spain and Morocco, but because contemporary Spaniards and Western tourists can appreciate the pluralism, creativity, affluence, intelligence and coexistence which occurred in Al-Andalus and is seemingly absent from contemporary Islamic societies, namely Moroccan society. The challenging state of immigrants’ lives in Spain and global media portrayal of Arabs and Morocco, both products of lengthy Orientalist traditions, contribute to the perception that contemporary Moroccans do not have much in common with the beautiful Alhambra. Therefore, even though Spanish and other Western tourists are informed by differing Orientalist traditions they still tend to other Moorish heritage and Morocco as a means to self identify. So, while Spaniards are concerned with contemporary moros and French, British and Americans are concerned with Arabs more generally all groups are invested in constructing the Orient in order to be Western. Moorish heritage in Granada is the classical Orient, claimed by the West, but not of the West. The Reconquest in the fifteenth century resonates not only for Spanish history, but with European and Western history which constantly seeks to rationalize and naturalize hegemony in various parts of the Orient.

The Albayzín is a unique UNESCO site because it is not empty; it is still in use by thousands of private property owners. “The Albayzín is still a residential town, it is also a rich repository of Moorish vernacular architecture, with which the traditional Andalusian architecture, almost as old, blends harmoniously. The body of secular architecture is absorbed into the original urban fabric, that of the medieval Moorish town.”141 Somewhat contradictory to the alleg-

139 Said, Orientalism, 79.

140 Ibid, 204.

edly abundant Moorish and Andalusian architecture, the application claims that the “fundamental authenticity of the Albayzín quarter is contained in its street pattern and townscape. Many individual buildings preserve substantial original elements, but the lack of an overall policy until recent years has meant that in many cases repairs and extensions have been carried out using unsympathetic materials and techniques.” After its designation as a World Heritage Site, the municipal government at last paid attention to the Albayzín, trying to regulate building aesthetics, signing and pavement while reducing evidence of modernity in what was conceived as a medieval neighborhood. Work in 1993 started to “remove as much as possible of the external manifestations of modern life, such as electrical installations, television aerials, etc. which tend to debase the perfect picture of the traditional Spanish-Moorish settlement...” The regional government of Andalusia took a currently inhabited neighborhood, which is historically significant for its colonization at the hands of nascent Spanish nationalism and tried to reverse five centuries of marginalization, deterioration and evolution without looking modern while avoiding any responsibility for the decline of a Moorish or working class Albayzín.

**Dismantling Imperialist nostalgia**

‘Imperialist nostalgia’ as identified by Rosaldo (1989) is found in the various campaigns to “save the Albayzín” waged since the 1930s and culminating in its designation as a World Heritage site. Rosaldo’s description of imperialist nostalgia is applicable to Granadine, Spanish and international tourists’ interest in Al Andalus because he includes not only the direct colonizers, but also those have benefited from ideologies that enable imperialism. These nostalgic people mourn the “loss” of traditional cultures through colonial encounters. It is at once a way of contrasting what is imagined to have been stable, static traditional cultures with the seemingly inevitable, frightening momentum of modernity as a means to avoid deep reflection on the violent agency necessary to perpetuate colonial patterns. Representations of an elegant, ordered, paternal dominance by colonizers over the colonized creates, “a mood of nostalgia [which]

142 Ibid.

makes racial domination appear innocent and pure.”

The more dependent a colonized culture becomes on the colonial system, the more it is resented and kernels of wishful revisionism are found in imperialist nostalgia. Imperialist nostalgic narratives especially mourn exotic differences.

“Authenticity”, for the nostalgic, also has the assuaging effect of clarification. It offers official measures of the traditions lost and stabilizes a modern/traditional binary. Claims of authenticity need to be viewed with extreme caution, however, as authenticity often serves contemporary interests. UNESCO therefore takes authenticity very seriously,

In a world that is increasingly subject to the forces of globalization and homogenization, and in a world in which the search for cultural identity is sometimes pursued through aggressive nationalism and the suppression of the cultures of minorities, the essential contribution made by consideration of authenticity in conservation practice is to clarify and illuminate the collective memory of humanity.

A “collective memory of humanity”, if one does or should exist, is difficult to achieve in the southern Iberian Peninsula where myths and legends play to an array of political and personal agendas. A singular historical perspective is stymied by contemporary claims. Most agendas seek different ways in which to rationalize colonial ideology and are being revisited due to immigration from past or current colonies. Rosaldo (1989) counsels, “it is in their inconsistent plenitude that memories eventually unravel the ideologies they so vividly animate.” Rather than demystifying imperialist ideology which is sanitized by nostalgia he advocates dismantling it by scrutiny. “Evoke it and thereby make it more and more fully present until it gradually crumbles under the weight of its own inconsistencies.”

144 Ibid., 107.
146 Rosaldo, “Imperialist Nostalgia,” 121.
Selective Time travel: Al Andalus in the present

Territory and history are what complicate and produce tourism to La Calderería, and Andalusia for that matter. Crang (2006) points out that tourism “trades in presence”\(^{147}\) and without the Al Andalus legacy La Calderería would not be nearly as successful. Mustafa, for instance, was very aware that tourists were interested in La Calderería because of the Moorish heritage in Granada, especially the Alhambra. It must be remembered that Granada’s use of its Moorish heritage also depends on large absences, waxing over colonial violence almost completely. The most popular imaginative geography being inscribed onto the cobbles of the La Calderería comes from legend. La Calderería is billed by the municipal government as part of the walking tour “secret Granada.”\(^{148}\) This is similar to what Gregory (2001) observed about an ancient Egypt which existed alongside contemporary Egypt and was ‘rationalized’ for tourism and “codified as a series of imaginative geographies through which its landscapes were made visible as a panoramic totality: ‘timeless’, ‘authentic’ and ‘real’.”\(^{149}\) The ways in which La Calderería is timeless, authentic and real requires historical contortions.

In the nineteenth century Washington Irving galvanized English speaking tourism to the Alhambra and ensured its preservation. In the introduction to one reprint of his book, Tales of the Alhambra, Elizabeth Robins Pennel claims that, “by day and night alike, it [the Alhambra] belonged to Irving; he saw it before it had degenerated into a disgracefully managed museum and annex to a bric-à-brac shop for the tourist; and he had heard all its stories...”\(^{150}\) He found the old defensive palatial compound crumbling and looked after by a ragtag group of plebeian Spaniards. He lived in several of the rooms of the palaces and wrote the book, which was originally published in 1832. It is a mix of local legends, historical conjecture and travelogue. His stories are filled with chivalric duels of love and war between Moors and Christians and he is unerringly


\(^{149}\) Gregory, “Colonial Nostalgia and Cultures of Travel: Spaces of Constructed Visibility in Egypt,” 115.

sympathetic to the plight of the Moors. His descriptions of the Alhambra are romantic with ghosts and visions of beautiful dark Moorish women beckoning from different corners of the Alhambra. His principal sources for the book were local Spaniards who hastily assured him that they were “Cristianos viejos, old Christians, without any taint of Moor or Jew.”151 Their legends are filled with buried Moorish treasure, black magic and vanquished ghosts who await a Moorish reconquest, “as fondly and confidently as did the Christian Crusaders to the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre.”152 The book recounts popular traditions and makes no great claim to ‘history’, but it is alarming how ubiquitously its legends are repeated by tourist discourses in contemporary newspapers, magazines, audio guides and blogs. Irving’s casting of the ancient Moors as a magical lost civilization has been respun into popular framings of diametrically opposed cultures or in his words, “the opposite and irreconcilable natures of the two warlike people who so long battled here for the master of the Peninsula.” He saw the Moors as a “...a nation without a legitimate country or name”153 and buys into a Spanish nationalist framing of Iberian Peninsula history when he writes,

the Moslem empire in Spain was but a brilliant exotic, that took no permanent root in the soil it embellished. Severed from all their neighbors in the West by impassable barriers of faith and manners, and separated... from their kindred in the East, the Morisco Spaniards were an isolated people. Their whole existence was a prolonged, though gallant and chivalric struggle for a foothold in an usurped land.154

Irving’s ghosts are still a romantic attraction for Granadine visitors. González Alcantud (2001) illustrates the blending which occurs in the creation of local heroes. He points out that Boabdil, the last Muslim leader who capitulated to the Catholic Monarchs in 1492, gets only passing notice by the historical scholarship of the area. In fact, Boabdil is often remembered in legend, recounted by Irving, weeping while his mother reproaches her son for capitulating, “You do well... to weep as a woman over what you could not defend as a man.”155 However, other historic ac-

152 Ibid., 158.
153 Ibid., 104.
154 Ibid., 169.
155 Ibid., 169.
tors play a larger than life role in local narratives. The “true modern heroes of the city are the Spanish Monarchs, especially Queen Isabella.” González Alcantud points out that Isabella’s connection to Granada is circumstantial, just as the conquest of Granada was a small part of a much larger northern Iberian-Catholic agenda. However, the durability of both the figure of Isabella and the conquest of Granada cannot be taken lightly. The tombs of the Catholic Royalty rest in Granada’s main cathedral and many of the major streets and several monuments are devoted to them. Their ghosts and Boabdil’s still stalk the city, especially for the sake of tourism. “The memory of the Zirid and Nasrid city is lost in the fogs of legend... the re-founda\-tions acquires juridical dimensions, but also phantasms.”

**Appropriating Oriental heritage**

To view imaginative geographies which return American, French, Danish, British and Spanish tourists to ancient Al Andalus, tourism literature is essential. Imperialist nostalgia undergirds La Calderería as tourists reminisce about the sensuality, luxury, opulence and difference between modern Spain and Europe and the timeless, lost Orient. Washington Irving famously wrote, “... we crossed the threshold, and were at once transported as if by magic wand, into other times and an oriental realm, and were treading the scenes of Arabian story.” Variations on this theme are still reproduced in English-language tourist literature about Granada. As recently as 1999, phantasms came to life for a British family which rented a villa in the Albayzín and literally dressed the part for imaginative geography of Al Andalus.

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157 Ibid, 162.

158 These were some of the nationalities which the vendors linked together as “Occidental” tourists with which they interacted in La Calderería.

The ghosts of Islam haunt huge parts of Granada. There are remnants of ancient Islamic keyhole arches and Moorish drinking fountains in the Albayzin, and couscous restaurants as well as modern Arab tea houses along the narrow streets of Calderería Nueva and Vieja... And for a last-day treat, we splashed out on a group photo of the family dressed as Moorish royals - a kalif and his family. Clad in silks and turbans, heavy jewelry and leather slippers, and with the Alhambra behind us, we dutifully assumed haughty expressions for the photographer.160

Similarly, Wendy H. King described her séance with a glass of tea saying that her “soul merged with the ancient Moorish world” after drinking a blend marketed as Sueños de la Alhambra (Dreams of the Alhambra). She does not specify where in Granada she found the teahouse that lead to such a metaphysical moment, but chances are high that it was in As-Sirat, the original Calderería teahouse on Calle Calderería Nueva.

The magical, milky liquid coursed down my throat and through my body, gently sedating me with its calming waves. Surely this was the beverage that revived and quenched the thirst of the sultans so many centuries ago...the warm brew—combined with the calming music, floating incense, and tranquility of the teahouse—connected me to the Moorish culture. I felt the power of the empire, the heart of its people, their reverence for beauty...

Earlier in the day I had experienced the majesty of the Alhambra and the loveliness of its lush gardens from a visual, exterior perspective. The tea enabled me to experience the culture from within... I ordered another pot, not wanting the moment to end. A type of communion occurred that... afternoon: the Moors and I became as one (emphasis mine).161

Her identification between the teahouse, tea and a sensuous experience is an exemplar of the imaginative geography of Al Andalus combined with a sensuous practical orientalism. King’s experience is deeply personal and yet connects her to an overwhelming array of people stretching across time, reduced to “their” and “its”. For Jacobs (2006), who studies Western women’s tourist experiences in the Sinai Peninsula, “premodernity allow[s] the holder to experience the persistence of an old time in the present and facilitates the finding and creating of a space for differ-


ence by bringing older time into the present.”

Essentialism in La Calderería’s hybrid, swiftly transitioning context relies on these complicated temporal contortions and on the minutia of individual interactions.

**Oriental Tele-portal: Interchangeable places and people**


La Calderería is a sensuous site; its appeal is sensuous difference, marked by olfactory, auditory and tactile experiences rather than the perspectival gaze. Tourists and locals can magically teleport between regions of the world easily, creating a distance free world. Joanna Eedge, a travel writer for *The Observer*, takes this one step further by attributing religious affiliation to regions and putting the Moorish in Arabia.

The pealing bells of the Iglesia de Santa Ana draw me into a beautiful Renaissance church. Inside, at the ornate gilt altar, several nuns shrouded in white sheets kneel below a statue of the Virgin Mary. I’m back in a Christian world.

Five minutes later, I'm once again in an Arabic souk. The Calle Calderería Vieja is heir to the Moorish tradition...One of the most compelling things about Granada is this mix of cultures; you *walk from Europe to Arabia* without it really registering (my emphasis).

**Sexy Stereotypes**

A timeless aspect of practical orientalism, Arab sensuality, bridges a very large temporal gap between the Moors of Al Andalus and the Moroccans of La Calderería. As the *Daily Mail*

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164 Joanna Eedge, “All about Andalucia: Short breaks in southern Spain: Granada: In the midst of an Arabian tale: Granada enchants visitors today just as it has for centuries. The Moors loved it so much, they stayed for 800 years. Their influence can be seen in the city’s architecture, its markets, food and traditions and, of course, in the dazzling Alhambra Palace,” *The Observer* (England), 28 October 2007, 4.
saw it, “The Moors sounded a pretty sensuous lot - constantly dipping their fingers into bowls of rose water, sniffing at myrtle bushes and popping off to the harem.” Sensuality often finds its way to sexual innuendo and the harem is an easily understood marker of Arab sexuality and gender roles. For some tourists a sexual experience seems to be the greatest draw. While she was doing fieldwork in the Albayzín, Bahrami (1998) overheard her hostel neighbors, both Moroccan immigrants, referring to the sexual reputation of the area. She records,

They were looking for a good time, especially with Spanish and European women. Each night the men left their room at midnight and returned around five or six in the morning. One evening I heard one say, “Let’s go to the Albayzín. I have a friend who lives there and he assures me that we will meet many people, especially women who are attracted to Arabs like ourselves!” upon their return they would speak of the Albayzín as a happening place: “So many beautiful women who spoke with us, maybe we can entice a few into [doing] more! Ah, these European women are so easy (emphasis mine)!"166

One of the most enduring aspects of latent Orientalism according to Said is that through processes of representing Arabs they come to count simply because of their “number and generative power.” Indeed this is the primary emphasis in Spanish daily papers such as Ideal and 20minutos. There are daily reports on the sheer number of Moroccans trying to cross the Strait of Gibraltar. ‘Avalanche’, ‘waves’ and ‘flood’ are used to describe what is seen as an invasion. The second way in which Arabs count according to Said is their “generative power”. Said argues that the fundamental claim that Orientalism makes is “what is really left to the Arab after all is said and done is an undifferentiated sexual drive.” The Arab is then reduced to “sexual exaggeration: the Arab produces himself, endlessly, sexually, and little else.”168

My first day wandering through La Calderería I did not have to wait long to meet a Moroccan immigrant. I stepped inside a tiny store and the vendor followed me inside from outside. He immediately told me that I was guapa (beautiful) and wanted to have a drink with me some-

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165 Roddon, “Live like a Kalif in Glorious Granada.”
167 Said, Orientalism, 311.
168 Ibid., 311.
time. I hastily retreated because he made me uncomfortable. Five steps down Calle Elvira, the street that runs in front of La Calderería, I was whistled at and stopped by another young Moroccan man. He refused to be shaken and insisted that he would walk to an overlook with me. He asked my name and started to walk with me. He got really close to me and I moved away- he laughed and asked why I was acting so spooked. So began my afternoon with Alejandro who works in a pub and discotheque during the night. He was from Casablanca, but has lived in Spain for eight years, Granada six. Alejandro was my first interviewee and throughout the brief encounter that day he persistently tried to hold my hand, put his arm around me, caress my knee, invite me into his house, confess his love for me and finally grabbed my ass. At that point I ended any association with him and felt deflated. Alejandro assumed that I would be interested in him sexually and my protestations about my serious boyfriend and professionalism were just coyness that needed to be overcome. He alluded to other American women he had met while being a bouncer at a discotheque, and encouraged me to be less serious and more like them.169

Another day I met a young Moroccan vendor who tried to get me to go out with him. After hearing about my serious boyfriend he responded that he had a casi (almost) girlfriend in New York and that if my boyfriend was far away in Canada what was the problem? These embarrassing and awkward accounts, which are not exclusive to me, fuel sexual stereotypes. I had been warned to be very careful around Moroccan men by well intentioned Spaniards. A series of encounters with European Muslim convert women confirmed a generalized perception that Arab men were players. One of the most outspoken of the European Muslim women was clear in her dislike for Moroccan men generally. She claimed that the Moroccan men she knew were unfaithful. This sentiment was often repeated in other forms - Arabs being hot blooded, while Europeans were colder, calmer.

Fortunately, shortly after these incidents I met a group of young, Moroccan vendors in La Calderería. They were respectful, went out their way to be caballeros (gentlemen) and were genuinely interested in topics besides my gender. This in no way means that my positionality as a privileged, young American female receded, it was constantly a topic of conversation. After

two months of knowing the vendors Saleh confessed that when young women, such as myself, come to talk to them all they are thinking about is sex and therefore they don’t want to talk about religion. Yusuf said that he was crazy and some of the other vendors disagreed with Saleh. In August after I had been visiting the vendors for three months Khalid’s cousin came by and started to act out a flirtatious performance with me. Khalid immediately got up and said, ‘no, no’ and hustled his cousin off to lunch, apologizing to me. I saw his cousin another day and he acted very differently, conversing with me calmly and not making advances. I presume that Khalid made it clear that I was not interested in flirtation but conversation, so different was his cousin’s reaction to me in such a short time. The counter these young men offered to my overtly sexualized interactions with some Moroccan men demonstrated clearly that Alejandro’s approach is not inherent to Moroccan masculinity, but rather a pattern that was successful for certain Moroccan men who are sexually curious. The assertive advances which some Moroccan men employed are successful precisely because of orientalized visions of Arab sexuality by Western women. This success relies on a repertoire of fantasies, imagery and expectation which become “constructed visibility.” As Gregory points out “constructed visibility” is always a “precarious and conditional achievement.”

The picturesqueness of the streets draws together not simply a grand fiction - they are so vivid and successful precisely because they blend intimacy and immediacy with timeless fantasies. Rather than grant all agency to the large scale processes which enable tourism, Gregory incorporates locals of varying status who work together in order to present modern Egypt coexisting nearly seamlessly with ancient Egypt.

The construction of ‘Egypt’ in these ways was not the pure product of European dictation in which capitalism and colonialism inscribed their marks on an empty surface, filling a blank space awaiting its object. The investment schemes of international banks, the operating strategies of tour companies...[were] involved in the formation of these partitioned spaces and in the mobilization and accumulation of the knowledges, skills and labours of countless local merchants, interpreter guides, boat-owners, sailor and donkey boys.”

170 Gregory, “Colonial Nostalgia and Cultures of Travel: Spaces of Constructed Visibility in Egypt,” 117.
In short, “Oriental” bodies are required and there are plenty of young unmarried Moroccan men to stock La Calderería. Sex was a common topic amongst the young Moroccan male vendors who I interviewed in La Calderería in 2007. It was clear that the stereotypes about Arab men’s sexuality have not diminished. More interesting are individual Arab men’s use, rejection and mystification with the stereotype. Enter Rashid, a twenty year old Moroccan who is short, muscular, energetic and attractive. He was always dressed in hip clothes with his hair gelled into spikes - he looked like he is going somewhere. Constantly joking, speaking very adept English, quizzing me on the latest pop culture and U.S. regional jokes - there was always the air of friendly flirtation and animation. One day, after the men were more relaxed with me around, he made an exaggerated show of checking out the women passing through the street. Another afternoon talking with Rashid and Yusuf the conversation turned to women. Yusuf commented in an aside that Rashid has a different girlfriend (usually American) each season. I asked where they met women and Rashid laughed and confessed ‘everywhere’. They do meet women at work and it doesn’t matter to their bosses if they flirt with women as long as there is money in the cash register. I asked if a lot of women came to flirt with them and they said yes. They explained that tourist women sought out Arab men because Arab men had the reputation of being ‘powerful’. Rashid thought that the Arab reputation occurred because Western, especially American, men lose their virginity around twelve years old, which is much earlier than Moroccans. So, by the time Western men are in their twenties they are like forty year old men who are not very excited about sex. However, for the Moroccan men who grew up not having sex until they were eighteen to twenty years old seeing a naked women and having sex is really amazing. He explained that talking about sex to his friends was like talking about a wonderful novelty. It was one of the rare times that I saw Rashid not joking - he was extremely worked up about how wonderful having sex is. Rashid complained that American men seemed very immature compared to American women because they would say rude things and be ungentlemanly towards the women. Yusuf said he didn’t know much about Americans, but that Rashid spent a lot of time with them.

Yusuf’s reactions to the sexual tensions on the street were very different. While he chucklingly supported Rashid’s comments about Arab men’s potency and even encouraged me to

sleep with an Arab man, in different conversations he censured the women who came to the street. He made the vivid comment, “they [tourist women] only come here to piss us off.”\footnote{Yusuf and Rashid in interview with author, 29 July 2007. Granada, Spain.} In his opinion the relationships were only sexual. Women’s clothing was a dispute as well. After knowing him for awhile he told me that good girls shouldn’t dress the way that the tourist women dressed, including me. He said that some of the male vendors enjoyed the constant parade of scantily clad women, but that he “did not ask to see naked people all day.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The stark dichotomy between the Western women shoppers and the male Moroccan vendors was clear on a daily basis. The overwhelming majority of the shops’ clients are women, with Spanish and American being the most notable nationalities. After hanging out on the street for long periods of time I started to commiserate with Yusuf. The parade of shoppers is a smorgasbord of cleavage and skin. It is unmercifully hot in Granada during the summer and women wear tiny shorts, skirts and tank tops. A woman walked by with the middle portion of her bra visible. I perceived this as a style statement, similar to bikinis with tank tops. Saleh, however, was confused and asked me if he should tell her so that she could readjust her shirt. Laughing, I told him “I think she knows what she is doing.” Saleh then asked me why tourist women would pull up and readjust their clothes when they came to La Calderería stores? He didn’t see them doing it in the rest of the city. I responded that it might have something to do with the tourists’ awareness that the vendors are Muslims and consciousness about different cultural dress codes. Saleh did not seem overly convinced. Berrechid countered that they also saw women who spread their legs open and acted very immodestly. Saleh agreed and asked, “but why don’t we get just normal?” He insisted that I should follow the girl that had provoked the adjusting comment and ask her what she was thinking.

I also offered the possibility that since their stores were open front and the vendors were outside and very solicitous, maybe the women were surprised and felt watched. This prompted a discussion about the mirada (look or gaze). The looks that flew between women shoppers and the vendors were laughably overt. Many women would steal a charged gaze with one of the
vendors and then look demurely or coquettishly at the ground. This exchange of sexually tense looks was common knowledge; Yusuf made the comment that whenever he looked at a woman walking in the street she tripped on one of the many oddly placed grates. Saleh was irritated that men could not gaze at women without censure. He claimed that in a liberal democracy, Spain, everyone had the same rights and that he believed in the law. What was at stake with the gaze, in his opinion, came down to whether or not women liked the gazer. It only seemed to be a problem when the woman did not appreciate the gaze. How could she know what the man was thinking? She couldn’t, so it was not fair to get upset about it.

Berrechid chimed in that one time he was dancing at a discotheque with a girl. She asked where he was from and when he said Morocco she said “I can’t, I can’t” and stopped dancing with him. He thought that if she hadn’t known he was Moroccan she would have gone to bed with him. It was obviously a traumatizing experience for Berrechid which had been discussed amongst the vendors. Saleh and Berrechid were mystified by the strange behavior of tourist women relative to La Calderería and to their Moroccan-ness. It is a unique take on Urry’s (1990) tourist gaze. His roving and internationalized yet culturally specific and subjective “tourist gaze” gives incredible agency to tourists at the expense of those gazed upon. Urry is largely studying the structures of tourism rather than embodied performances of tourism. Most of his examples are from large scale, well organized Western sites with Western tourists. In his chapter “Working Under the Tourist Gaze” it is worrisome that there are only two reference to the opinions of low level service workers. Very little attention is paid to the role that front line service providers, e.g. vendors, guides, hotel staff, entertainers, play in shaping tourists’ experience. The example given of a flight attendant’s smiles gives the attendant little agency. Their smile is a product demanded by the client and therefore regulated by management. What happens when tourists find an action, site/sight or experience that they do no expect and cannot provide an easy meaning? A provoking, but underdeveloped realization that tourists do not exercise all the power in tourist/non-tourist interactions is found in the final chapter. Urry writes that the tourist gaze seeks “appropriate others” which tourists “expect to look at in different places...different expec-


tations are held by different social groups about who are appropriate others to gaze at oneself.”

Perhaps a better response to Saleh’s question about the coquettish and self-conscious actions of ‘tourists under the gaze of service providers’ is that his gazing undermines the imagined unilateral power of the tourist gaze. It makes tourists’ curiosity less rarefied; perhaps it reminds tourist women that they are just as much an ‘other’ as the Moroccan men are to them. It is discomfiting to learn that the gaze is not solely an affluent, middle class or Western privilege. More than likely it occurs to tourists that their gazers may engage in the same intrusive, reductive stereotyping, systematizing and organizing that they use for others, but not for themselves. Saleh clearly perceives the “gaze” is appropriate and desired sometimes, just not in his interactions with women in La Calderería where he is considered an appropriate other, but not an appropriate gazer.

La Calderería also challenges the singularity of “the gaze”. First, all five senses get to play. Taste, smell and tactility are as important to enjoying La Calderería as seeing. The narrowness of the streets, the overwhelming amount of people, merchandise and speed at which they all pass by do not favor an aloof and rationalizing gaze. La Calderería is difficult to capture by photograph. The Moroccans are the fixed observers while the tourists move swiftly past, rather than the tourists gazing for long periods of time at a panorama of difference. Using multiple senses to explain tourist sites also highlights how quickly the distance of gazing is transgressed. The sexual relationships which blossom from La Calderería certainly originate from initial gazes, but the gazing is apparently not enough. These men perceived very clearly that tourist and local Spanish women overtly gazed or averted their gaze precisely because the vendors are Moroccan/Arab. At the same time, the Moroccan men are active gazers, as curious about the quirks of others as the tourists are. This exchange between tourist and quasi-rooted immigrant worker changes slightly the oft commented upon tourist-local encounter.

While interviewing Mustafa, a Moroccan immigrant vendor in his forties, the presumed sexualization of Moroccan men and tourist women was very apparent. We were walking around Plaza Nueva getting drinks and tapas. When we saw some Spanish acquaintances of his they

177 Ibid., 141.
bantered with him alluding to an assumed relationship with me. Mustafa mentioned that a lot of Spanish men were jealous of him because he had lots of pretty girls.\textsuperscript{178} We went to a famous local bar very close to La Calderería which Mustafa frequented regularly. However, we could not get service. After trying to order a drink three times he said that we should leave. He was fairly angry and started talking about the racism in Granada and discrimination against Moroccans, which contradicted his previous claim that discrimination wasn’t in his personal vocabulary. He said that he had been going to that bar for sixteen years and he had spent lots of money there. He later explained that because I was with him people had come to check him out and make sure that he wasn’t doing something bad. We went to another bar where people knew him. They obviously didn’t realize that I spoke Spanish and the waiter started to joke with Mustafa that he was always with pretty girls and he was jealous. Mustafa responded grumpily having come from the other bar and knowing that I spoke Spanish. The same waiter seemed upset and several minutes later started telling me that Mustafa always came with beautiful women and started to insinuate things. I responded negatively and the waiter hastily pretended to draw a mock zipper across his mouth, “I didn’t say anything.”\textsuperscript{179} It was a startlingly personal lesson about the immediate assumptions made about a friendship between a tourist woman (me) and a Moroccan immigrant simply on sight. Based on the accounts of my Morocco friends, the Spanish bartenders had good reason to assume that Mustafa had more than a friendly, platonic relationship. The sexualization of Moroccan men ties into sexualization of Arabs by Westerners more generally.

**Occidental Expectations**

Jacobs researched the amorous relationships between European women tourists and Egyptian and Bedouin “local” men in the Egyptian Sinai. Caution must be taken when comparing the experiences of Egyptian and Bedouin men in the Sinai and Moroccan men in Spain; their lives, culture and ethnicity differ greatly. However, the similarity between their experiences with Western women tourists relies on the reduction of all that variety to “Oriental”. The ability to

\textsuperscript{178} Mustafa in interview with author, 29 July 2007. Granada, Spain.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
condense the Orient into one vast tableau is evidenced in jokes La Calderería vendors tell about tourists who see people and places of the Islamic Orient as interchangeable. Yusuf met a female tourist who offered him condolences on the death of his king. Yusuf, confused, explained that Hassan II had died several years ago. The woman argued with him, “no, I saw it on TV just recently, your king died.” After awhile it became clear that she was referring to the death of Yasir Arafat. Berrechid followed this up with a story about a young, female client who he encouraged to travel to Morocco. Her response was, “No, I would be too scared of the Taliban.” In this way Jacobs’ Egyptian examples and my Moroccan friends are, as Said sums up, “subordinate to the sheer, unadorned, and persistent fact of being an Arab.”

Jacobs interviewed Western European women and some American women who had traveled to the Sinai because it was cheap, but had all the amenities that they expected with a splash of exoticism. La Calderería serves a similar purpose with well regulated exoticism, e.g., the streets are kept very clean by vendors in contrast to many other streets in Granada which are littered with dog excrement, there is nearly constant police presence, UNESCO guidelines mandate aesthetics while a neighborhood association makes sure they are followed and the municipal government has invested large sums to maintain the streets’ infrastructure and enforce municipal zoning laws in the area. Zukin (1990) points out the necessity to create a “shopping experience” whereby middle class women are empowered to seek “sensory delights” safely. Essential to La Calderería’s cohesive motif and consumption experience are the Moroccan vendors who mediate consumption. They are emblematic of and give cultural credibility to the goods and services; they are underpaid and help form a taste for the “Orient”. I remember several times a vendor having to explain the utility of a souvenir. For instance, a couple asked, ‘what is this for? Is it a scalp massager?’ Answer, ‘No those are meat skewers bound together with a rubber band. We

180 Members of the Taliban can hardly be said to be “Arab”, however, it is clear that this woman had confused an ethnic Pashtun movement with predominantly Arab Morocco.


use those often during the celebration of Eid Al Adha. A Moroccan restaurant manager who I chanced upon in a teahouse explained that La Calderería is so successful because tourists can experience Morocco without the hassle of traveling to dangerous Morocco. A tourist blogger writes, “If you love Arab culture but are too freaked out by the region's instability to visit, Granada's Alhambra is the best compromise” and goes onto describe the Moorish spots of Granada, La Calderería included. Many of the women seeking ‘sensory delights’ safely in Jacob’s study had long term relationships with Egyptian and Bedouin men, sometimes even marrying them and settling in the Sinai. Three of Jacobs’ conclusions match the imaginative geographies that I observed in La Calderería. The first is that the women commented on the manliness of Arab and Bedouin men in comparison to Western European men. The second is that economic and cultural status/power played a large role in the women’s understanding of “exotic” and finally, the various, but simultaneously existing, temporal situations that the women imagined the Arab/Bedouin men to symbolize.

The women described the Sinai men, who have often migrated from other parts of Egypt, as “real men” who made the women feel like “real women.” In La Calderería I was constantly told that I had to take a seat even it was already occupied by a vendor, because the vendors are caballeros/ gentlemen. Berrechid would never let me buy him coffee, always going himself and bringing it back. When I was protesting this arrangement he said, “I am going to go get the coffee so that you write in your report that we are caballeros.” What I perceived as a highly unfair and sexist arrangement was to them a symbol of their character and positive masculinity. Being caballeros was of utmost concern to the vendors, Berrechid said it was easy to be a caballero in Spain because he made money and could send it home. Unanimously they often confessed wanting to get married so they would have someone at home to take care of the cooking and cleaning. Once, I asked Osama why so few women worked in the shops and he replied that it was too

183 This religious celebration occurs the day after the ending of Haj in Morocco. It commemorates Abraham/ Ibrahim’s test of loyalty to God when he was asked to sacrifice his son.


much manual labor and that the inventory tasks required are too complicated.\textsuperscript{186} These differing definitions of masculinity and femininity can lead “liberated” Western women to conclude that Arab men are not “progressive”. This has negative consequences in the case of the moro imaginative geography, but can also stimulate attraction in the case of the Moor imaginative geography. For Jacobs’ women going to the Sinai was a way of escaping the constraints of “modern” Europe. They felt trapped by spirituality-less, mediocre and unnatural lives. They all confessed having preconceived ideas about the desert and Egyptian culture which came from movies, books and childhood stories. Many had constructed the Sinai as ‘unmodern’, others as ‘premodern’ and some as ‘antimodern’.\textsuperscript{187} These temporal imaginative geographies exist simultaneously despite the “glaring inconsistencies and impossibilities of being so many times and places”.\textsuperscript{188} However, as Jacobs poignantly reminds, the men will “fail in this impossible task of representing the past, hypermasculinity and the ‘unmodern,’”\textsuperscript{189} which will ultimately hurt them more than the tourists. It is similar in Granada and La Calderería, where tourism is more interested in legend than history.

La Calderería’s attraction is based on what it is imagined not to be - European, Spanish and modern, which allows both the moro and Moor imaginative geographies to be incongruent. What the tourist narratives are really saying is summed up by Fred Mawer of the Mail on Sunday, “the [Albayzin] quarter retains a sense of un-European exoticism and mystery (emphasis mine).”\textsuperscript{190} The attraction to or rejection of vilified and romanticized representations of people which subsist through racialized expectations indicates the resilience of imperialist nostalgia to rationalize colonial regulation and constructs while appropriating specific static, bounded chunks of non-Western heritage and culture.

\textsuperscript{186} Moroccan immigrant women work largely as domestic workers.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 125.

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid, 152.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 152.

The differing representations of *moros* and Moors combined with the confluence of gentrification, tourism and immigration fuels fears that the Albayzín is being reterritorialized by descendants of its ancient Moorish inhabitants. It is unclear if this ethnic-religious enclave is supposed to be Moroccan, Arab or generally Muslim - the ethnicization of Muslims is not complete or tidy. A Spanish reporter went to the La Calderería on September 11, 2003 to interview Muslims. That he picked La Calderería as a significant site on that significant date speaks to its visibility and the *moro* imaginative geography of the streets. His article is sensationally titled, “Granada 1492-2003, Two Reconquests. Five centuries later, the Muslims come back to populate the city.” In the article he claims that “The Reconquest of the Muslim barrio started with some Calderería teahouses, together with the AtTaqwa mosque...The minaret of the new Mosque of Granada rises to the sky in the Upper Albayzín, practically dominating the city of Granada. This is surrounded by houses, streets and parts of the barrio with the memory of the Arab occupation of Spain.”

This article bundles together several elements of a very diverse ‘Islamic community’ in the Albayzín which does not work in concert. Some of the differences between Moroccan immigrants and Western European/North American Muslims are important to dismantling this ‘Islamic community.’ The highly visible Calderería and the racialized Moroccan vendors there are easy targets for islamophobia. Groups threatened by an alleged Moorish reterritorialization use indirect methods of discrimination to control what they see as a foreign, criminal population en-

croaching on 'their' space. La Calderería’s role in Granadine immigration integration is important because of its economic success and notoriety. While it appears a safe tourist destination it also has a reputation for crime, drugs, mafia (trafficking), terrorism and theft since the 1980s until today. Hopes of a convivencia idyll reconciled with the municipality's assimilationist underpinnings are challenged as 'old' albaicineros reject the La Caldereria's success as a tourist destination and the Moroccan vendors who play a leading role.

Illustration 6: Minaret of the Mosque of Granada

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Crystallizing construction

An accessible example of one of ‘new’ groups to arrive and appropriate albaicinero history is the converso community of the Mosque of Granada. The building of a mosque in the Plaza de San Nicolás crystallizes the clash between groups who make the Albayzín an object of identity struggles. The mosque, which opened in 2003, serves a sufi community of mostly European and North American Muslims, largely converts. It is considered the ‘Spanish mosque’ by the Moroccans with whom I spoke. The site of the mosque was picked both because it allows for
beautiful views of the Alhambra and it ties into the Muslim history in the area. The San Nicolás Church which stands kitty corner to it was originally a mosque which was rebuilt as a mudéjar church during the deterritorialization campaign of the Catholic Monarchs after conquest of the city. As the principal page of the mosque’s website states, “The Mosque of Granada signals, after a hiatus of 500 years, the restoration of a missing link with a rich and fecund Islamic contribution to all spheres of human enterprise and activity.” This community celebrates Al Andalus convivencia and claims to be the inheritors of a suppressed morisco legacy. Heavily influenced by Shayk Dr. Abdalqadir As-Sufi, who founded the mosque and has a large European following, the members of this mosque come from multiple countries within Europe and North America. Often known as the Murabitun this global community actively seeks to spread Islam through teaching and demonstration. The Mosque of Granada complex, constructed to blend with the rest of the buildings in the Plaza San Nicolas, contains a garden, prayer hall and Centre for Islamic Studies. There is a vibrant community with a variety of public outreach and scholarly conferences which bring a diversity of Muslim and non Muslim people together in the foundation. I spent time with a group of very friendly Murabitun from Germany, Britain, Spain, France, the U.S. and Canada. I interviewed one recent convert from Canada who has taken the name Tasnim. She spoke glowingly of the revival of Islam in Granada. She claimed that European leaders were too afraid of Islam as an outside threat to see that it was growing within Europe. She said multiple times, “it is really an exciting moment in history!” I attended a reading of the Prophet’s names in the mosque’s prayer hall, a conference on the dangers of usury and an Islamic fair featuring North African goods and local crafts.

The mosque construction faced an uphill battle. The land was bought by the community in 1981. Two decades of struggle with the municipal government followed. The municipal government reversed its permit to construct the mosque after neighborhood pressure. Construction resumed in 1991 after persistent lobbying by the community. Then, in 1994, construction was held up for nine years by an archeological assessment and salvage project which many in the

community felt was ‘unnecessary’ and perhaps fictitious. A young Irish-German Muslim living in Granada with whom I talked believed that the archaeological concerns were a screen to obstruct the mosque. Tom Haines, interviewed a small handful of Moroccan and Murabitun Muslims for his travel article in the Boston Globe. He recounts a local Spanish reaction to the new mosque. “People are not happy about the mosque,’ the [hotel] clerk, Luis Bueno Jordan, told me. ‘You know, the Albaicin is a symbol of Granada.’... Especially in the Albaicin, he said, ‘Building a mosque is a little bit dangerous, maybe provocative.’”

The local rejection of the mosque is well stated in an article titled “More mosques in Granada than churches in Saudi Arabia” which first appeared in ABC Diario in 2006 and then was reprinted in minutodigital.

The number of mosques in the city is infinitely greater than churches in Saudi Arabia, the kingdom which maintains, among others, the mosque of the M-30 terrorists in Madrid. Not satisfied with these six mosques, the Mohammedans also complain for permission to pray in the Cordoba cathedral...

The city has six mosques, where the greatest shines splendidly in the heart of the Albaicín while looking directly at the Alhambra. This way, contemporary Islam dominates the most privileged site of the whole city.

The Muslims of Granada have constructed, connected to San Nicolás - in the most beautiful site of the world - their Great Mosque... It is a demonstration of the penetration of Islam in the capital of the Alhambra, where five more mosques spread out to the corners of the city. If Boabdil raised his head today he would leave off sighing.

The author here uses a strange, rhetorical comparison between Granadine mosques, which serve a variety of nationalities and schools of Islam to the existence of churches in the entire country of Saudi Arabia. Throughout my research I have often stumbled across islamophobic websites which make similar comparisons between European countries and officially Muslim countries. What seems to missing in these apples and oranges comparisons is the realization that Saudi Arabia makes very clear that it is an Islamic country while Spain claims to be a secular country in its


194 Haines, “Echoes under the arches the legacy of Islamic rule still shapes Andalusia, where a new mosque rises,” M1.

1978 Constitution. The underlying assumption in the article seems to be that Saudi Arabia and Spain are comparable if Spain is held to be a Christian country. This article signals a religious territoriality which is very much at stake in the “Moorish” barrio. The concerns leveled at La Calderería however, incorporate another component, ethnicity which is caught in both processes of empowerment (Arab) and racialization (moro and Moor). The fears raised by the Mosque of Granada are transferred to the most easily recognizable popular signifier for Muslims, Arabs. Bundling up all Muslim actors in the Albayzín is a common theme in scholarship and popular writing about the area.

The “Islamic community” in the Albayzín

One of the most erroneous conflations that is made about the ‘new’ Muslim presence in the Albayzín is the alleged ‘Islamic culture’ which works in concert between the two different mosques and La Calderería businesses. There are large differences between the convert community and Arab ‘Muslims from birth’ immigrants. These differences are within the groups’ different ways of perceiving Islam as well as very different socioeconomic status. The Murabitun are much more similar in motivations, resources and ambitions to gentrifiers than Moroccan immigrants. Dietz (2004) records a neighborhood social worker’s frustration with the barrio’s ‘Islamic community’s’ lack of political confluence, “they will never be able to achieve anything until they choose, until they strategically choose a common path, in order to become real counterparts of ours.” This begs the question, are the needs, complaints, motivations and resources of those that attend the Mosque of Granada and AtTakwa mosque the same? The unifier between Muslim groups is Islam, not ethnicity, socioeconomic status or even culture, which makes their desires in the civil sphere very different. However, many of the fears surrounding Western Muslim conversion, the Mosque of Granada community and the reterritorialization of the Albayzín are transferred to Moroccans because of the historic ethnicization of Islam.

Many of the Moroccans with whom I discussed Muslim practice in Spain pointed out that I should also talk to the Murabitun community. There seemed to be little interaction between the

groups. Several of the Moroccans, especially Yusuf, were very dismissive of Sufism. Multiple Moroccans were very surprised by the convert community. Alejandro grudgingly admired Spanish women who had successfully completed Ramadan. Being a Muslim from birth comes with complicated identity politics as the convert community becomes more successful and dominant representing Islam. Alejandro said,

At the Albayzín mosque you encounter people that are Spanish, Americans - they are Muslims. Just like the past year I knew a boy from the United States that had changed his name and now it is another. There are many different things that you feel. You see a person that comes from a Catholic country, I don’t know which, and practices Islam. It is shock to the heart. I was born Muslim and all this and I don’t practice and you feel that you are deep down an asshole, that’s the truth... Because your religion from birth is Muslim but you don’t practice, but a boy that comes from a Christian country goes in, is there and practices it perfectly. He practices it, he practices it.197

Many Moroccans complained that practicing Islam in Spain is harder. The working hours, diet, social life and living independently all took a toll on their practice. Both Yusuf and Berrechid said that many young Moroccans were losing their Muslim practice because of migration. Each of them were engaged in some practices which are not considered being a ‘good’ Muslim, but both confessed that if they wanted they could be ‘good’ Muslims in Spain. Berrechid basically said, ‘where there is a will there is a way.’ Hassan claimed that being Muslim in Spain was a “little bit terrible.”198 Many of the people I talked to lamented youthful transgressions associated with their transnational migration. Hassan abashedly told me that he had sex for the first time after immigrating. He was ashamed of this and wanted to wait until marriage in the future. Many young vendors partied at discos and drank alcohol. Alejandro, who was a bouncer, lamented that it was too difficult to be a good Muslim in Spain and that he did not have the time. Later in his life he hoped to quit drinking so much and return to prayer and fasting. All the Moroccans that struggled with practice were sure that maturity would lead to the return of piety.

The young women I met who attended the Mosque of Granada were from all over the globe, predominantly Western European countries. It was striking to me that they always intro-

duced themselves and others by their nationality. Very often it was a dual nationality such as, Irish-German, Syrian-British or Senegalese-German even though many of them had lived in one of the two countries all of their lives. I started to think that the dual nationality also was shorthand for ethnic-national-cultural influences. Some of the women had converted to Islam recently while many had been part of Muslim communities their whole lives. The general impression that I got from them about Moroccan immigrants was not one of great fellowship. While the Moroccans are also Muslims the two groups practiced very differently, traveled in different circles and were very obviously of different classes. Very few Moroccans attend the Grand Mosque of Granada. Many of the European Muslim women expressed distrust of Moroccan men. Speaking to Tasnim about her experiences with diverse groups of Muslims in the neighborhood brought out some of these divisions. She was bubbling with happiness, curiosity, opportunity and reflexivity over her life change. Over a very long interview which covered many topics I asked her to comment on the differences between convert Muslims and Muslims from birth. She said Arab Muslims are very poetic when they talk about Islam. Using flourishing hand gestures she explained that they give it a mystical twist and it seems so much more grandiose. She drew on her experiences talking to Muslims in Tunis where she lived for a time. She thought that Arab Muslims talked about Islam with a deep reverence as something much larger than themselves and as a separate entity from themselves and their lives. They gave the sense that they were still at a distance from Islam as an idea. This is different from convert Muslims who are more rational and intellectualize Islam. The Muslims from birth really have taken Islam into their hearts. She insisted that the “goal” was the same - to better oneself, but that the challenges were different. She really enjoyed talking with Muslims from birth because they offered a different perspective. She expanded to talk about how any person or culture made Islam richer. When I asked about her experiences talking with Moroccans she said that they were always really happy that she was taking up ‘their’ religion. They were always really helpful and enthusiastic.

I questioned her about the role of class in relations between Moroccans and European-North American Muslims and she did not think that class was really an issue between Muslims. She felt that most of the adherents to the Mosque of Granada were of average socioeconomic
standing in Spain. However, when I asked Tasnim if she talked to any of the Moroccan vendors in La Calderería class was an issue. She said that she didn’t know very many of the vendors, but that she had occasionally talked to some who wanted her to buy things. They were excited when she said that she was Muslim, but they were still mostly interested in business. She commented that she hadn’t found many vendors that she would be too interested in talking with and not many “true” Muslims around there. To her "true" Muslims were at peace with themselves and she could sense their "subtle energy." "False ones" would be defensive about their practice and egoistic. She thought that there was a lot of pressure on immigrant Muslims to make money and that had interfered with their Islamic practice. Zacaria, the director of AtTakwa mosque, repeated this opinion. I asked if immigration was affecting the practice of Moroccans coming to Spain.

Yes, but these are young people! This has always happened not just now, always. There are ideas amongst Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, okay, the majority Moroccans that have them, the thought or the immigration from their countries to Europe produces a period at the beginning. They have a condition there [in Morocco], an economic situation in their houses, no? Few, few possibilities to prosper economically in their countries. What happens? They know their own condition, their practice, they have grown up in their families with a concrete practice. When they left their countries...there are those that see this world in a specific manner and they think that here their lives won’t fit, their customs, their practice which they did with their family, that they have to live like the rest of the world. They think that these are things that the ancients did, no way. Here they see that he [a Spaniard] treats you better if you speak like him, if you drink alcohol, smoke... so this is a question we have, why do you forget? Because I really don’t know, I have many reasons because some forget and others don’t... The Muslims from birth hurt more than the other Muslims. Those from birth are pressured living here to make a better life, a better economic level, another familial situation.199

Economic push

Throughout my three months in Spain class was the greatest differentiator between me and the vendors. They were very conscious of the difference between themselves and people from developed countries such as, Spain, the U.S. or Canada. They were constantly complaining

about having to work so much, while Spanish students and tourists enjoyed a lot of leisure time. I was often asked if I had been at the pool all day when I arrived in the afternoon to talk to them. Usually I had been working in the library archives or petitioning at the municipal government, but they did not see that as work. In several different conversations it was apparent that the Moroccans saw the contradiction between Spain’s economic need for low skilled labor and immigration policy and societal perspectives which tried to regulate this need without allowing low-skilled workers rights, opportunities or permanency. Hassan claimed, “Spaniards don’t know how to work, that’s why they need us.”

Right after meeting Berrechid he asked me if I was rich, “You have the look of someone rich.” While I don’t feel particularly rich, on a global scale and certainly on a Moroccan scale, I am. This point was driven home by an off hand comment by Osama. He was explaining why the merchandise in the stores did not come from Morocco, but mostly India and China. He thought that Moroccan industries made really expensive high quality work and therefore sold to big department stores like Zara, a popular Spanish department store chain. Within the first days of arriving in Spain and losing my luggage the Spaniards that I met counseled me to go to Zara because it was economical. During Zara’s annual sales, at my socioeconomic level, it seems fairly cheap. The vendors constantly joked about unemployment in Morocco, telling me multiple stories of people that they knew who had high level degrees and were working at low skilled jobs unrelated to their education. Yusuf, who has a degree as a computer technician joked several times that it qualifies him to be a carpenter. Khalid has a post secondary degree in Arabic poetry and believes that he will work somewhere in Europe at some unspecified job similar to the shops in the foreseeable future. Returning to Morocco seems difficult for most of the vendors and even Osama, who will have his doctorate in economic law from UGR, is uncertain about going back. He wants to live in Morocco, but says he will try to retain his legal status in Spain and monitor the situation in Morocco.

During my summer of fieldwork I went with Hassan to Tetuan, Morocco to attend his cousin’s wedding. Hassan’s preparation for going home was lengthy and involved a lot of consumption and a make over. He got a very stylish short, spiky haircut and bought a lot of new
preppy clothes before returning. I noted how differently he acted in Tetuan than in Granada. While in Tetuan he was confident - spending lavishly on his friends, renting his family a beach house and dominating the role of household head even though his father and uncle still live together in the family house. In Granada by contrast he was quieter, lived in an average two-bedroom apartment with a roommate and was very concerned about his lack of Spanish and how his neighbors perceived him. None of this is surprising; he has recently come to Spain, speaks broken Spanish and hangs out with other family members of his who have immigrated. What is noteworthy is the change in status that working in Spain can bring. Speaking with Osama about the transnational ties that many of the vendors maintain he poked fun at Moroccans immigrants to Spain who portrayed their lives in Spain glamorously upon return to Morocco. He thought that they were looking for Moroccan wives and so acted as though they had found wealth and success in Spain. He joked that some took cars and the women fell in love with the glittering car, not the man. In his opinion the unfortunate effect of this performance was that it made more Moroccans want to emigrate without realizing how difficult being a Moroccan immigrant in Spain can be.

**Whose Reterritorialization?**

The diversity between the Muslims who live, work or worship in the Albayzín causes many misunderstandings. Tourist discourses, local popular perspectives of the area and some academic scholarship portray the barrio as an ethnic enclave. However, the ethnicities of Muslim actors in the Albayzín is greatly varied. Leyla Nura, the initial tea house pioneer, resents the association with ‘moros’. “They [the municipal government] have it in their heads that what we do is moro, they don’t understand that this is Al Andalus over again.”

The gentrifying sufi community lays claim to the Albayzín via morisco heritage which they try to distance from North African immigrants. Moriscos can be Spanish/European rather than Arabs and the Sufi converts claim that this long suffering identity can now, post Franco, flourish in an Andalusian autonomous community without the headaches associated with immigration. The Albayzín is

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pivotal in their identity construction because of its unique ethnic constructions in the transitional period from Al Andalus to Spanish Empire from 1492-1569.

1498 Residential segregation accord

The formation of a Spanish Empire during this period, both in the Iberian Peninsula and the Americas, stressed genetic heredity and racialized Others. The Crown's emphasis on physicality rather than spirituality manifested visibly in the creation of the Albayzín as “the Moorish neighborhood.” One of the least recounted details of post-conquest Granada is the segregation of native Moorish residents into the ethnic Albayzín quarter in 1498. The Albayzín was institutionalized as a *morería*, or Moorish area with support and input from the conquered Moorish community. Coleman emphasizes that while the agreement was bilateral, the power differential was considerable and the Moorish native residents, the numerical majority, were confined to a much smaller space than before conquest. Still, he wisely points out that the Moorish community desired an area of its own, which could be governed by some of its own laws. The agreement gave the Muslim community a tiny portion of residential housing in the center of Christian Granada next to the main market, or *Alcacería*, plus the Albayzín suburb. An overwhelming majority of the Moors were segregated within the Albayzín. This uprooted many Moorish families and cramped the community into a fraction of the space which they had previously occupied. From documentation about the agreement it seems that the Moorish negotiators were keen to be contained within the old walls of the original Moorish fortress and thereby control who and what entered. Coleman (2003) also recounts how the Moorish and later *morisco* community sought to insulate itself from influences and miscegenation with northern Castilian Catholic settlers who flocked to Granada seeking economic and social mobility. Of special concern to the Muslim community was alcohol; Muslim representatives filed a petition with the municipal government to forbid alcohol establishment licensing in the Albaiçín. 201 This tenuous attempt at accommodation of difference by the new Castilian-Aragonian Catholic colonizers was short lived and is ironic in light of the Albayzín’s contemporary role as a nightlife center in Granadine tourism. A

reputation of insularity and reclusiveness continues to plague contemporary North African Muslim immigrant groups in Granada.

Illustration 7: 1498 Segregation Accord

The residential segregation accord of 1498 poses some painful historical questions about post conquest Spain. It is a very abrupt precursor to the later massive expulsion of native Moors and Jews from the Iberian Peninsula in 1608. It is also an insight into which groups and on what criteria new members of the Castilian-Aragonian empire were differentiated and persecuted. These criteria entangle language, religion, genetic heredity, cultural customs and geographic origin. Significantly, these entanglements have withstood incredible historical and geographical change to operate in categories used in contemporary immigration debates. Segregation highlights not only shifts in power, but the solidification of otherness based on multiple registers of ethnicity rather than solely religious affiliation. This history is rarely recounted in local or tourist narratives of the barrio. One imaginary geography of the barrio is that it is “Moorish”, which is difficult to uphold because it only became a uniquely Moorish barrio because of the 1498 residential segregation accord and very quickly afterward became a morisco barrio. However, the intervening centuries have allowed two dynamic processes, gentrification and tourism, to culminate in the reformulation of the Albayzín and its importance in Andalusian-Granadine cultural identity.

Cauldrons to cachimbas: Gentrification & tourism in an historic barrio

They [local Spanish society] have more attractions [from Muslim presence] than things to reject. They have more attractions in the Muslim souk, no? A lot of people come to this souk, La Calderería, it is well known here, well, in the whole world and parts of Spain and also the new mosque of the new Muslims up above.202

Starting in the 1980s and accelerating around 1990, gentrifiers have trickled into the Albayzin to participate in what they see as a close knit filial community, as an escape from the hectic, impersonal environment of modernized Granada and the social cachet of living in an historic barrio. From 1987-2000 the demographic decline has slowed as gentrification processes have increased. Conservation, which ties together tourism and gentrification, has played a leading role in revitalization processes. Zukin (1990) claims that while gentrifiers could often buy modern housing further from city centers their desire for historic districts, “implies more... It confronts the plane

of modernity with the rich and varied temporality of the past- but which past and whose culture?"203 Due to the history of the Albayzín this becomes contentious.

Starting in the early nineties there was a striking change in a short amount of time in education levels, primary economic activities and the age structure of the neighborhood. Matching this with a precipitous jump in real estate values in remarkable coincidence with the Albayzín’s induction into the register of UNESCO World Heritage Sites and gentrification is clearly occurring in the Albayzín. Investment by the municipal and regional government has restored streets, monuments, historic houses and policing, waste removal and graffiti eradication campaigns have been successful cleaning up public spaces. The municipal government has two redevelopment plans, Interior Protection and Reform Special Plan known as PEPRI, which target the historic Centro district and the Albayzín-Sacramonte district. Due to the increasing popularity of the neighborhood for students, professionals and foreigners since the 1990s, housing prices have increased in response to restoration by private owners and developers. The real estate market is now as high as other desirable central zones such as Recogidas. This means high prices for old real estate considering 42% of the housing was constructed prior to 1920, in stark contrast to the rest of Granada where 62.6% of the housing was built after 1920.204 The cultural reproduction frenzy fed on itself between early nineties and 2000. Municipal permits for ‘large works’ almost tripled with ‘rehabilitation of houses’ the predominant objective, far surpassing public works or municipally managed conservation projects.205

Data from 1962-1975 shows a marked decline in jobs such as shoemakers, bakers, public market vendors and medical and military personnel while there was a notable emergence of painters and flamenco musicians. Amenities and resources within the barrio were leaving, causing more dependency on the city, while at the same time “artistic” jobs probably catering to tour-

204 Cabrera Medina and Carlos de Pablos, “Metamorphosis del Albaicín (Granada). Del Aislamiento de la Interdependencia,” 190.
205 Ibid., 112.
ism were cropping up. Since 1987 a general economic shift away from internal neighborhood amenities such as green grocers, corner stores, tobacco shops, clothes and shoe stores, workshops and home goods stores towards bars, boutique shops and hospitality services signals gentrifying trends and an increased dependence on large scale amenities in downtown Granada. For instance in 1990 La Calderería along with Calle Elvira was profiled as an emerging antiques shopping area and in 1993 it hosted a vegetarian restaurant, which is rare in Spain. In 1999 the largest categories within the service sector, which comprises 89% of the Albayzin’s economy, were bars (19.87%), licensed professionals (21.64%) and small shops not including pharmacies and grocers (7.63%).

The shift in amenities parallels the shift in demographic profile. Prior to the nineties the Albayzin suffered chronically low education rates relative to the Granadine average. The barrio had much higher amounts of illiteracy and people with no formal schooling than the Granadine population from 1970-2000. Due to gentrification, in 1991 the amount of people with university degrees was almost at par with the city average. From 1988 to 2000 the amount of educated, professional residents rose from 3.7% to 50.93%. Largely represented in this 50.93% are technicians, directors, administrative bosses and teaching staff. Another link to the Albayzin’s new economy is small business and hospitality services staff.

The demographic decline of the sixties and seventies and the gentrification processes of the nineties have created conflictive age groups. The barrio has a higher proportion of people

206 The flamenco musicians and artists were still very small categories, but much larger than previously.


208 This category is called minorista in Spanish economic statistics.


212 Ibid., 82.
over 65 years old than the rest of Granada. In 1970 the neighborhood's largest demographic group was 0-19 years old, while in 2000 the largest group is female residents over 75 years old. In 2000, the second largest cohort by age were 20-29 year old men and women.\textsuperscript{213} Unsurprisingly, from 1996-2000 the amount of complaints made to the municipality more than doubled.\textsuperscript{214} Areas that have recently caused clashes between the old, new and visiting residents of the Albayzín are what Cabrera Medina and Carlos de Pablos (2002) deem, “hinge axes.”\textsuperscript{215} These areas connect the Albayzín to the rest of Granada and increasingly property value, amenities, economic opportunities, tourism and residential density agglomerate around these nodes. Most tourists do not venture far from the fringe of the Albayzín and uneven gentrification has followed and taken advantage of this trend. La Calderería is one of these hinge axes.

La Calderería is part of the “Lower” Albayzín and holds an enviable spot as the entrance of the barrio from the centre of Granada as well as being in the center of other tourist sites such as, Paseo de los Tristes, Sacramonte, the Cathedral and Plaza Nueva. It is also a “nocturnal frontier”\textsuperscript{216} creating conflict over appropriate use of public space. La Calderería is one of the most visited parts of what is now officially labeled the Albayzín. It has some of the highest rents and most renters, highest education levels, highest residential density and highest percentages of old residents in the barrio.\textsuperscript{217}

A survey of a mainstream local paper, Ideal, from 1980-2000 reveals a sharp change in La Calderería’s notoriety. By indexing every time La Caldereria was mentioned in any section of the newspaper during this time it becomes increasingly clear that in the early nineties real estate speculation, Orientalist cultural events and businesses and immigrant presence converged to


\textsuperscript{214} Juan Carlos de Pablo, “Uso Residencial del Albaicín,” in El Albaicín en la encrucijada, ed. Juan Carlos de Pablo (Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 2005): 112.

\textsuperscript{215} Cabrera Medina, “La Economía del Albaicín,” 86.

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 86.

\textsuperscript{217} Bernués Dieste, ‘La Población del Albaicín,” 86.

Carlos de Pablo, “Uso Residencial del Albaicín,” 88-89.
make the neighborhood famous. An editorialist in *Ideal* reminisces about an old Granadine man’s nostalgia for La Calderería prior to tourism and gentrification, “He still remembers the atmosphere of the old bars, the modest barbers, the workshop where everyone took their shoes to be repaired, the tiny shops, the fruit stands.”218 This is in sharp contrast to an *Ideal* article featuring La Calderería in 1998,

Locales to drink tea, Arab food and Andalusian pastries provoke the senses and bring us closer to an exotic world of flavors and smells in Calderería Street. If there is a place with enchantment in Granada, in which one seems to submerge oneself in another world, it is Calderería Nueva Street. The passerby ... is seduced by an inebriating odor of spice, of essences from strange herbs, that without asking permission takes over our noses and brings us closer to the Arab world.219

A snapshot of gentrification based on cultural production becomes clear by noticing the shift in classifieds and cultural events. From 1980-1990 there were fourteen classified advertisements. These classifieds were largely about renting business space and just a few for residential rent. From 1990 to 2000 there were 103 real estate classified advertisements for properties along La Calderería’s streets. Many of these advertisements were repeats for the same property. This signals the increase in corporate speculators who can afford to advertise heavily and who were buying up deteriorating real estate and selling the properties as residential rehabilitation projects. The types of properties being advertised had changed from humble shops and rentals to 3-5 bedroom townhouses with patios and balconies for sale. The 1990-2000 advertisements use more marketing techniques like, “unbeatable views”, “premier quality,” “views of the Alhambra, place in the sun.” One of the companies which rents and sells rehabilitated Albayzín properties is Oasis Real Estate. Their web page is offered in English and Spanish with the tag line, “Live in a place with a taste of History.”220

Besides real estate speculation, La Calderería fits very well into the strongest economic opportunities in the Albayzín. It was one of the hot economic zones of the barrio according to

the Granada Chamber of Commerce in 1999. It is unique to the other economic generators because a majority of its businesses are oriented around “Islamic culture”. Out of forty eight businesses in the La Calderería thirty were inspired by ”Islamic culture”. In 1999 there were eleven small folk art shops, ten tea houses, two restaurants, four Arab sandwich shops, two Arab bakeries and one halal butcher.222

Cultural capital, according to Zukin (1990) is elastic and through mobile consumer goods it makes a specific place tangible. It has real economic value and power as well as creating new labor demands.223 The Albayzín’s economy is almost completely dependent on the service sector. It is driven by cultural consumption grounded in specific spatial distinction. Moreover, the businesses of La Calderería have savvily created a “cohesive motif” for consumption which mobilizes objects, materiality and bodies to create a picturesque representation of Orientalist imaginative geographies. Archives from Ideal also document the development of Orientalist fantasy in the barrio. It is important to note that this "cohesive motif" is enjoyed by local Spaniards as well as tourists. The Ideal newspaper ran multiple articles from 1990-2000 extolling the cosmopolitan and intercultural flavor of the area. The tea houses are especially popular amongst university aged Spaniards. From 1980-1990 La Calderería hosted just four cultural events and numerous Catholic parades passed through it. In the next decade it hosted 22 cultural events, many of them making explicit reference to “Oriental” cultures, especially Moroccan culture. A ‘Feista Tamazight’225, numerous live music performances at Café Rick’s, a theatrical dance program called “reflections of the Alhambra”, and an Al Andalus art exhibit culminated in La Cal-

221 “Arab” here was chosen by the demographer Julio César Cabrera Medina and could denote either Arab ownership or food and merchandise that is considered Arab such as herbal teas, Moroccan pastries, couscous, falafal, schwarma, etc. My guess is that “Arab” businesses are labeled this way because of the food or merchandise sold rather than ownership.

222 The other twelve businesses of the area were diverse (watch shop, another restaurant, massage center, printing shop, pharmacy, etc.)

Cabrera Medina, “La Economía del Albaicín,” 139-140


224 Ibid., 52.

225 The more politically correct ethnic designation for Moroccan Berber groups. Berber activist groups in Morocco use this as a pan-Berber identifier.
derería being included in the “secret route” walking tour of Granada by the municipal government. The mixture of cultures and Oriental symbolism reveal sensuality and an attachment to colonial encounters between the East and the West.

For instance, Café Rick’s refers to the bar in the movie Casablanca. A female music and dance group called, Saida was featured weekly. They performed a variety of dances “brought from the Orient”, especially Egypt, the Maghreb and Lebanon until two p.m. in the morning. An advertisement for a music and dance event, ‘Reflejos de la Alhambra/Reflections of the Alhambra’ in 2000 promises “Oriental Fantasy and Arab-Flamenco Fusion.” The advertisement pictures a woman in a white flowing dress holding her arms out in the beguiling arc of a belly dancer with her body turned three quarters towards a flamenco dancer. The male flamenco dancer is dressed in black - stiff and rigid in a recognizable flamenco dance position - slightly turned away from the woman. The combination of body positions, colors and genders is stark. The man and the woman look as though they have been caught in the midst of a flirtation. The symbolism is rife with sexual imagery between a sensuous, soft, inviting and feminized Orient and a rigid, masculine Spain which will presumably meld together to create ‘Arab-Flamenco Fusion’. The caption reads, “let me form part of your dream...”.

**Neighborhood convivencia**

Locating specific, visible manifestations of cultural difference, such as La Calderería, bring specific immigrant group stereotypes and ethnic assumptions to the fore. Using a popular space allowed me perspective on what Suárez Navaz calls “sociospatial mechanisms of power that traditionally have shaped the production of difference of local disadvantaged groups inhabiting physical and material allocation within a particular locality or territory.”

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227 Arabic word for female happiness.

228 This event did not take place in La Calderería. The event was at the Teatro Isabel La Católica, but tickets were sold at Centro Cultural Dar Ziyab in La Calderería.


a site, often acts as short hand for immigrant issues. Two *Ideal* articles use it as an illustration of positive immigrant influences which have helped turn the area into a prominent tourist attraction. However, it also gets a lot of press for crime, delinquency, noise and conflict.

I asked Pepa, is La Calderería an example of multiculturalism? Her answer was hesitant to celebrate multiculturalism. “Well... yes... it is an example of multiculturalism... But, here we don’t like to talk of multiculturalism no, we like to talk about interculturalism, that [multiculturalism] is a minimum part. Interculturalism supposes more a mix of cultures.” She compares this to Ecuadorians who put on public volleyball games where their children play with non Ecuadorian children. In La Calderería however, “they are them and they are Moroccan men who don’t integrate for anything and ... you see them but well it is like a spectacle of their things and shops.” Two assumptions are made in her opinion, first a definition of multiculturalism is given which sees multiculturalism as incomplete integration and a belief that she continued to repeat throughout the interview that Moroccan men do not want to integrate. Later in the interview I asked Pepa what she thinks a generalized local perspective of the area is. It is surprising that her answer seemed to be in direct contradiction to the municipality’s goal of *convivencia* at a neighborhood level.

It depends on many things, Granadines are going to see this community like a threat if they are neighbors of the area, if they live in this street further along because they are going to think ‘next year they are going to drive us out of here.’ Well, they can think that it is drugs... they invent things, I don’t know. Those that are the furthest away, well, they can see it like a positive thing. Another person simply because they are Moroccans are going to think that this cannot ever be positive; they are Moroccans. I think it depends. In general I have the impression that the people don’t think too much about this. That they are there and that it is like something exotic and Granadines go to the tea houses in general...In general it seems good to the people... they like it there, they like the bakeries there.232

Spatial to ethnic discrimination

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While searching for historical information to document the recent transformation of La Calderería at a local library I asked a librarian for help. She claimed that the area had changed a lot and that many residents were unhappy and distrustful of the Arab presence. She confided that the stores are rumored to be fronts and that residents of the area are concerned about their daughters living in such close proximity to young Arab men. This reputation was repeated by Pepa when I asked if La Calderería is an example of integration.

I don’t know, I don’t know. Because I [pausing] I don’t know them. I think that yes it is a good way to integrate because not only is it a good way to integrate, it is the fact that they are earning a livelihood and they are earning a livelihood with their businesses and such. The problem is it is cutting their culture to fit a little bit because here there is benefit... because they [tourists] come from all sides of Spain, they pass by there. I think that yes, but well, there are people that don’t like it and also behind this there is mafia and we don’t know what, I don’t know them, but well...

In La Calderería where the Moroccans are in their own business supposedly legal, supposedly paying their taxes, supposedly with papers - which I don’t know, but apparently like this - this yes, I see as an example of integration and what you are saying, it is multiculturalism. Because they are guys over there, they are closed although the whole world enters into their businesses and buys. They are a group of Moroccans that have put up a whole street or two streets of businesses there.233

I never defined multiculturalism, earlier in the interview I had used ‘multiculturalism’ to talk about integration goals and she told me that her department does not use multiculturalism and does not see multiculturalism as her integration objective. She preferred to talk about interculturalism. In this statement she is obviously using a definition which sees multiculturalism as segregated, non communicating groups. However, she sees the visibility and success of Moroccan businesses in La Calderería as a type of integration albeit with negative consequences. While her opinions express widespread prejudiced perspectives about Arabs, especially Moroccan, such as insularity, sexualization and criminality, daily incidents of discrimination are rarely direct. It is difficult to identify specifically ethnic discrimination against Moroccan businesspeople in the La Calderería. Many of my Moroccan friends said that they had never personally experienced discrimination when I initially met them. Over time it became clear that much of the discrimination leveled against them is impersonal and passive aggressive, however it has very

233 Ibid.
individual repercussions. Rather than viewing discrimination as a person to person event I began to research discrimination leveled at space and objects in La Calderería. La Calderería is an exemplary medium for social construction. As Súarez-Navaz observed in rural Granada, “Spatial segmentation is an outcome of a more subtle move toward the disciplination of the immigrant population. Immigrants might have a right to a place, but only if they acknowledged the tacit village rules for every day use and occupancy of the space.”

To understand how space could become an illustration of ethnicized cultural difference I investigated the Lower Albayzín Neighborhood Association. The organization’s website documents a litany of complaints filed with the municipal government, manages a community crime blotter and offers resources to help residents file their own complaints.

Practical orientalism is thinly veiled in several of the ‘Denuncias/ Formal complaints’ the association makes to the municipal government. Criminality is a constant concern in the Albayzín and La Calderería in newspaper articles from 1980-2007. The Association of Lower Albayzín Neighbors agitates for greater security forces and spatial surveillance in the area to help with crime, noise regulation, street vending and loitering. The association has taken issue with several aspects of the development of the La Calderería. They are especially concerned with obstructions in the public way along the two streets of the La Calderería - one complaint worries that people are risking their lives walking through the area. Five years of complaints and lobbying culminated in a very strongly worded complaint in 2006. The complaint claims that the business people in the streets have an “abusive attitude” and use tricks to keep their display stands in the street. The complaint places the blame for gentrification and speculation in this area on the ‘new’ businesses of the La Calderería. “La Calderería has been the commercial street of the Lower Albayzín, business that has been disappearing due to among other causes, the strong increase in price of commercial establishments after the arrival of this type [Arab/Islamic] of establishment... The pharmacies, perfumeries, bookstores, fruit and food shops are disappear-

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234 Suárez-Navaz, Rebordering the Mediterranean: Boundaries and Citizenship in Southern Europe, 90-91

ing... These types of [new] businesses, the majority with diminutive shops, convert the street into their place (emphasis mine).”

Correlating with these official Association complaints is a list of legal resources which give detailed information on what constitutes a legal transgression so that residents can file their own complaints. It is interesting that all these complaints and their correlating ordinances have inanimate objects as actors and subjects. Tables, display stands, price tags and 80-100 centimeters of public cobblestone are dangerous and invasive. A casual reader would not be aware that the majority of the ‘new’ businesses in these complaints are owned or worked by Arabs. Burgess and Gould (1985) argue that place stereotypes are a way to organize, simplify and make sense of spatial knowledge and identity. Place stereotyping hardens and immobilizes when it enters the realm of commonsense. The power of public discourse, lies in repetition and an unexamined national cultural framework. She writes that “commonsense ... knowledges are appropriate for the practical struggles of everyday life because they represent the assimilation of contradictory views without discomfort.”

This leads to the naturalization of discriminatory perceptions. Place stereotyping is a technique which allows individual and government actions to be couched in terms of places rather than people, transferring aggressive person to person discrimination to the logics of accessibility, good citizenship and tradition. The Association of Lower Albayzin Neighbors seems to have no shortage of institutions and objects to complain about all over the Albayzin. Their principal agenda is fairly contradictory; they defend the neighborhood’s universal cultural heritage and watchdog conservation money and projects while at the same decrying displacement of the ‘old’ community and real estate speculation. La Calderería is only one of many areas in the Albayzin which concerns them. The Association’s principal neighborhood wide complaints seem to be noise regulation and crime reduction. While reading their web-page I wondered if I was being overly paranoid about their seemingly indirect vilification of Arab businesses via objects and space. However, after reading the following section in the 2006 com-

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plaint the spaces and objects are clearly ethnicized. “We neighbors understand that La Calderería is not an Arab souk, it is a street of Granada abusively occupied by commercial activity in detriment to citizens’ rights to safe transit conditions and in discrimination of other businesses.238

This is startling in its direct opposition to tourist imaginative geographies which literally call La Calderería an “Arabic souk”. Still, there is no direct accusation against ethnic actors in the complaints. Then, after reading the Association’s on line crime blotter it became clear that the criminalization of North Africans is not distant from that of display stands. The ‘Register of insecurity problems in the Albayzin’ is a list of crimes that residents have reported to the Association. A long list of reports is then used to lobby for greater police presence in the neighborhood. The only alleged perpetrators in the entries with an ethnic or geographical identifier are *maghrebís*, or North Africans. There are other criminals recorded, but an ethnic description of the perpetrators is not given, except for one occasion when the perpetrators were identified as Spaniards and another where the perpetrators “appeared to be Spaniards”.

Two reports illustrate assumptions used. A report from March 22, 2007 states, “yesterday around five in the afternoon next to San Nicolás, two violent young men (not Arabs) tried to take the bag of an elderly woman.” Another report from 2007 makes clear that the criminal *maghrebís* are assumed to be Moroccans. A young woman found a *maghrebí* man trying to climb into her window at night. The *maghrebí* man was so startled that he fell from the window and ran away. The complaint gives a personal opinion of what this incident portends. “I don’t want to imagine what could have happened if this guy had successfully entered, but if we thought the worst I think that we would come up short!!” The complaint then blasts the police for not doing enough, leaving *albaicíneros* “undefended, vulnerable and at the mercy of what a little group of Moroccan boys wants to do to us, without anyone using methods to stop the gratuitous violence that these brainless men practice.”

238 Navarro Lamolda, “Ocupación abusiva de la vía pública en Calderería.”
Repercussions: Targeted ordinances, reputations and surveillance

Both ethnic and spatial profiling have tangible, measurable repercussions on the Moroccan vendors. Local policemen patrol the intersection between La Calderería Nueva and Calle Elvira for drug trafficking. The vendors and Zacaria Maza are very aware that they are under surveillance because of the conflations made between Islam, Moroccans, human and drug trafficking, robbery and terrorism.

The most recent rounds of complaints are petitions for the municipal government to release a ‘map of sounds’ study, which they did recently. This map demonstrates which streets of the city are the loudest. Since 1997 groups of Calderería businesspeople have been negotiating with municipal laws which regulate both the amount of sound and the sound schedule permissible in the area. In 1997 new restrictive municipal licensing curtailed live music in all teahouses on the basis of noise restriction. A group of businesspeople called, Las Caldererías, lobbied against the targeted enforcement or “arbitrary application” of the ordinance, claiming that radios, televisions and other noise makers are allowed in many small bars throughout the city.\textsuperscript{239} Botel-lones, or street parties, which bring people en masse to the area have been banned city-wide, prompting Mustafa to bemoan that Granada is becoming boring. None of these things are specifically targeted at Moroccans, but they do hurt business. Sounds which are inappropriate are picked based on cultural acceptability. Zacaria complained that neighbors fussed about the call to prayer from the mosque at midday, “some neighbors go out, ‘ayy!’ they protest, and they don’t protest because the church bells, ‘clang! clang! clang! clang! clang! clang!’\textsuperscript{240} in the morning, in the afternoon and at night.” Interestingly, the ‘map of sounds’ study found that the Albayzín is

\textsuperscript{239} Amina Nassar, “La Policía Local precinta enchufes, radiocassettes y televisores por supuesta contaminacion acústica,” Ideal, 23 May 1997.

\textsuperscript{240} Zacaria in interview with author, 3 July 2008. Granada, Spain.
not a particularly loud neighborhood and La Calderería is one of the quieter areas within the Al-
bayzín. It falls below the desired decibel levels during the day and night.  

On August 28, 2007 I visited the shops early in the morning to find few vendors and even less merchandise. The streets looked naked because there were no display stands in front of the store. The police had been by the evening before and told the vendors that they would be enforcing a new municipal decree which keeps objects out of public space. This meant that none of the shops had their regular outdoor displays. Osama said that it meant one less vendor was needed to work the store because one vendor always stayed outside. This meant less remittances going back to families in Morocco. On my way to La Calderería I had seen other handicraft-tourist shops with street merchandise displays which jutted out very far into public space. Why was this such a concern here and why now when La Calderería shops had been displaying merchandise for the three months prior? Yusuf answered quickly, “these are Arab streets, moro streets. Now that they [police] are done with the tourists they will turn back to us.”

In the mid eighties La Calderería was included in areas of the city where daily streets markets were allowed. Regulatory ordinances exempted La Calderería from a city wide anti-street vending ordinance. Vendors were allowed to sell textiles and handicrafts on weekends.

On November 19, 2006 the Urban management branch of the municipal government decreed new street management guidelines which require vendors in La Calderería and la Alcaicería (another area with many Moroccan and Arab managed or owned businesses) to take their merchandise off the streets and off the walls of buildings. The two areas were specifically targeted because, as one article claims, the problems between the municipality and vendors in the areas have

241 Unidad de Acústica Física y Ambiental, “Mapa Estratégico y Dinámico de ruido de la ciudad de Granada: Memoria,” Construcción del mapa sonoro e implantación de un sistema de vigilancia y control dinámica del ruido en la Granada historica (Granada: Universidad de Granada, January 2008).


243 "La venta ambulante queda prohibida en el centro comercial de la ciudad por la nueva Ordenanza municipal," Ideal, 10 January 1984, 17.

increased because the vendors are increasingly Moroccan and they use Moroccan business practices.\textsuperscript{245} Another similar battle over cultural business practices has been waged over price tags. In a 2001 complaint the president of the Lower Albayzín Neighbors Association details the Royal Decree 3423/2000 of December 15 which requires all units for sale to have “unequivocal, easily identifiable and clearly legible” prices so that consumers do not need to ask for more information. This complaint was leveled at food stores in the Elvira-Calderería intersection, especially butcher shops.\textsuperscript{246} This is a jab at the haggling which is an important part of cultural mediation between tourists and Moroccan vendors in production of an “Arabic souk.” In an interview for \textit{Ideal Digital} the owner of a shop, Hicham, complains about municipal regulation, “since we businesspeople have been here, the streets are clean, there are no security problems and the whole world loves to wander through here, even though it is very narrow.”\textsuperscript{247} I heard a similar appeal from Osama on the day that he and Yusuf had to set up shop without street and wall displays. He argued that the Moroccan inspired businesses in La Calderería had turned it into a fitting "door to the Albayzín."

Peering up through hubbub of diversity at the ‘door’ to the contemporary Albayzín I would have to agree ironically with the UNESCO Advisory Body Evaluation, “At the present time, five hundred years after the Reconquest, the Albayzín remains a remarkable example of a Spanish Moorish town.”\textsuperscript{248} The strangeness of the phrase ‘Spanish Moorish town’ continues to perplex those who are subjected to these contradictory labels and the historical antagonisms which divide them despite their close interactions. Misguided assumptions about Islam as a religion, culture and political system in opposition to Spain, the West or the Global North allows diversity to be overlooked. This turns \textit{albaicinero} Muslims into a monolith and ignores their very practical divisions in terms of socioeconomic status, aspirations and political power. The


\textsuperscript{248} UNESCO Advisory Body Evaluation “World Heritage list Granada 314bis.”
construction of the ‘Islamic community’ monolith falls heavily onto the Moroccan vendors and businesses in the La Calderería because of wider racialization processes seeking to stabilize post-Franco, democratic, EU Spain. The reterritorialization hype uses very visible objects and sites which pertain to different Muslim groups who identify in diverse ways with the Albayzin to regulate what is perceived as a single threat.
Conclusion

Early in my research a Spaniard asked me, “how will you know if the Moroccans are lying?” The question was asked earnestly and without malice, but is full of assumptions about the ‘other’. It caught me off guard and I continued to reflect on its deceptive simplicity throughout my conversations with Spaniards, Moroccans and North Americans. What really fuels this question is a desire to know one, objective truth, which my research cannot deliver. Certainly in the differing perspectives swirling around La Calderería I found that “there is no underlying truth to be discovered in interviews, only a series of narratives that people tell, performances offered at distinct moments for distinct reasons.”\(^{249}\) The diverse narratives told by tourist discourses, local press and institutions and ethnography with Moroccan immigrants and students are not seamless. An effort inspired by Rosaldo to evoke, scrutinize and dismantle the contradictions and forgetfulness of imperialist nostalgia through its own inconsistencies highlights several conflictive theories generated by purveyors and consumers of Granada’s symbolic economy. The appropriation of ancient Islamic material heritage and sociopolitical legacies (convivencia) by an audience which is busy reinforcing Western historical framings, OECD entitlements and Orientalist binaries is complicated by contemporary transnational migration from the Orient. The strategies for reconciling Al Andalus appropriation by tourists, gentrifiers and the regional government with Moroccan immigrants who are imagined in varying ways to be the descendants of Moors are incredibly confusing.

**Reterritorialization**

The hyperbole surrounding two skinny crooked streets is unjustified. The Albayzín is not being re-territorialized by Moroccan immigrants. La Calderería is not an example of an ethnic enclave or even an “anti-ghetto”.250 Most of the vendors do not live near their shops. La Calderería’s clientele is overwhelmingly tourists rather than Arab, Moroccan or Muslim immigrants, foreigners or Spaniards. Even a halal butcher along the street with whom I spoke briefly had overwhelmingly non-Muslim clients. The Moroccan residential population is distributed throughout Granada’s districts. The Albayzín hosted 10.4% of the Moroccan population in 2004. After Genil it had the least Moroccan residency in the city. The only district which has disproportionately high levels of Moroccan residency is Norte. Many of the Moroccan vendors complained about discrimination in the central housing market. Despite being willing and able to pay for centrally located housing many of the men I spoke with had great difficulty finding landlords willing to rent to them. Osama, who was legally studying and working nearly full time, complained that he had to hire a real estate company to help him find housing in a good location because of discrimination. He and many other had settled in the Realejo district, which is close to the Albayzín, but not as gentrified. Berrechid attributed landlord discrimination to moro imaginative geographies of criminality.

The Albayzín’s largest foreign resident contingent comes from Europe.251 The neighborhood is in danger of incredible displacement of an aging, close knit filial Spanish community through gentrification and tourism by middle class or affluent foreigners and locals. Both international tourism and gentrification within the Albayzín use the ideology which Said identified as a disjuncture between a classic and contemporary Orient to justify their appropriation of ancient (or reconstructed) material heritage regardless of their connection to anyone who has lived in the Albayzín for the last two thousand years. Within this gentrifying group, Western Muslims, predominantly converts, bring attention to religious plurality. The Albayzín as “Moorish” and La

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Calderería as “Little Morocco” are caught in a maelstrom of larger debates which use them as an illustration of specific political identity projects. La Calderería as a manifestation of Morocco, Arabia, Al Andalus or a generalized Orient is constructed by the groups which bring imaginary geographies rife with Orientalist expectation. All the groups laying claim to the Albayzín battle over public space and historic buildings to claim territory which has been governed by some of the greatest empires in world history. The groups mobilize souvenirs, tea, telephone cables, price tags, decibel levels and precious centimeters of cobblestone to protect identities which range from European, Spanish, Andalusian, Western, Muslim or Arab.

**Cobblestone Reality**

La Calderería’s elevation to visible signifier for Moroccan presence and cultural difference in Granada is a bizarre turn of events. When the shops close, the vendors go home, people disperse and the merchandise is hidden behind heavy metal garage doors the streets look banal and interchangeable with other streets in the Albayzín, Granada, Spain, Europe and Morocco. In the quiet, empty streets it is obvious that La Calderería’s material heritage is not sufficient. It underscores the achievement of Orientalist representations to create an Orient within the Occident. It is produced with splashes of color, some sequins, belly dancing costumes, spices, tea names and substantially by the willingness of vendors, tourists and locals to participate in imaginative geographies. La Calderería’s imaginative geographies are not false, but temporally and spatially unmoored which helps them survive detail and momentous change. MacCannell (1976) argues that tourists seek out an unattainable authenticity; this is not the case in La Calderería. Post 1492 the barrio endured centuries of marginalization and deterioration. Materially, La Calderería has little to no connection with Moorish or morisco heritage. It has no hispanic-muslim or morisco style buildings. Seventy-one percent of the buildings are stylistically symbolic of architecture from 1850-1991 or eclectic styles.252 The charming artistic cobblestone pattern was chosen in the 1930s, when the streets of the Albayzín were first paved. Its adorable cobblestone, medieval sewage system, picturesque water fountain and antique style light fixtures were all restored by the municipal government in 2006 in accordance with heritage guidelines for Albayzin.

252 Carlos de Pablo, “Uso Residencial del Albaicín,” 75.
restoration which were determined around 1994 when it was inscribed as an UNESCO World Heritage site. The souvenirs for sale are largely imported from India and China and many have no connection to Moroccan, much less Moorish culture. There is very little documentation on the ancient history of the La Calderería and it is non existent in popular literature. The streets once were home to metalworkers who probably made cauldrons amongst other things. Knife makers street, seamstress street, butcher street, etc., many of the surrounding streets are named functionally based on the services once found there. The Albayzín became, through the 1498 residential segregation accord, “the Moorish neighborhood” at the demise of Moorish settlement in Granada. However, La Calderería was not part of this original Albayzín. According to maps from Coleman (2004) it would have fallen into the Alcazaba area of mixed ethnicities. La Calderería has no great historical significance. It is, by all measures, an inauthentic site. I asked Berrechid if he ever bought things from his store to take to his family in Morocco as gifts. He seemed a little uncomfortable and then confided that no, his family all requested gifts from the big department stores. Another vendor, whom I chanced upon, told me that all the things in his store were “just shit”. When I asked Khalid if La Calderería held any special importance to him, he responded, “no, it is just where I work, but tourists seem to really like it. Why?”

To maintain an Orientalist imaginary, there must be a timeless, naturalized and stable tableau. It always stood out to me that the young male vendors were dressed in the latest Spanish styles, well groomed and with all the gizmos of globalization for instance, cellphones which allowed them to check their emails and play virtual soccer games. How did people imagine them to be anything but modern? Material authenticity would more than likely ruin the romance and make La Calderería less successful. Historical accuracy is also not highly desirable for La Calderería. What would the vendors sell? Cauldrons? All this does not rip a veneer of tourism off a boring reality. La Calderería is a very real site; it is not simply a fiction being pulled over on tourists. What is fascinating about La Calderería is that it is only tangentially related to a Moorish Albayzín, yet it is an exemplary manifestation of Orientalist representations.

253 There are many beautiful items from Iran and several items which are Moroccan made and more that are Moroccan inspired, however I noticed that these items were often at the back of the stores and they were much more expensive.
Representations and their histories

These messy, painful historical details are not part of the current Albayzín tourism industry. Said (1979) offers two powerful counters to the reductions and policies generated by latent Orientalism on offer in La Calderería. First, rigorous history becomes dangerous to beliefs in an unchanging Orient. It introduces a challenge to the smooth essentialism in formulas of Orientalist description and policies. “History and the narrative by which history is represented argue that vision is insufficient, that ‘the Orient’ as an unconditional ontological category does an injustice to the potential of reality for change.”254 Granadine tourism trades in absence as equally as it trades in presence; the lesson to be learned is that Orientalist legends and historical framings are not seamless or holistic.

However, La Calderería is an especially cogent site for Orientalism because its lack of historical distinction makes it easy to avoid or ignore historic critiques. Said’s second incisive intervention focuses on representations. Orientalist representations about a vast area of the world, which gain authority and clout through expertise and repetition, can then be seen not as objective and transparent reality but as wrapped up in the motivations and desires of those who generate them. Said does not call on scholars or tourists to dig for a better, more authentic version of Oriental realities, but to confront the desires and motivations which engender such radical othering. La Calderería is uniquely suited to this task. In tourist narratives La Calderería is described as part of Arabia, Morocco, Al Andalus, the Orient and Islamic civilization. This is a tall order of places and times for two humble streets within the European continent to fulfill. Its inauthenticity, inaccuracy and ahistoricity are not what make it a special place in Granada. It is not emblematic of Moroccan, Moorish, Arabic Islamic or Oriental past or present realities. Its attraction is based on what it is imagined not to be - European, Spanish and modern. The Orientals are not somewhere “over there” in the other half of the world, but living within Europe. Haldrup et al. (2006) provide an important bridge between Said’s Orientalism writ large and the daily, banal frictions created by transnational immigration within Europe. Al Andalus and the legacy of the Orient within what is now Europe is increasingly fascinating to a variety of Westerners because

254 Said, Orientalism, 240.
the physical distance between the ‘Orient’ and the ‘Occident’ is difficult to maintain, just as it was five centuries ago. The current attraction to Al Andalus history and heritage is well stated by travel writer Tom Haines of the Boston Globe. “Such relics, particularly in the province of Andalusia, provide easy access to one chapter of Islamic history at a time when the religion and its culture are on American minds.”

Al Andalus, especially as it exists in legends, dovetails nicely with rhetoric about a ‘clash of civilizations’. The history of Orientalist representations in Granada are selfish ruminations by various benefactors of Western hegemonies. The diminution of physical distance between the Orient and Occident doesn’t necessarily diminish cultural differentiation of “Oriental” bodies, objects and sites in the Occident. These representations of the Orient in contrast to the Occident do not remain solely in fantasy, however. They have tangible effects on the livelihoods and opportunities of Moroccan vendors in the La Calderería.

**Between moro and Moor: racialized constructions**

The sixteenth-century representation of Moorish men’s sexuality in public space, Arabic speaking, personal hygiene, butchering practices and women’s dress are very similar to the cultural differentiation which is used to make La Calderería “Moorish” or “Arab” and causes romanticization and vilification of Moroccan vendors. The highly lucrative imperialist nostalgia which reifies Al Andalus causes many Moroccans to fulfill varying roles which reinforce ancient racializations, whether they are generated by Spanish, Western European or North American Orientalisms. Throughout the centuries the terms which are necessary to describe people experiencing the Iberian Peninsula’s dramatic geopolitical upheavals have varied greatly, but the latent Orientalism which separates people who are from Oriental places or who are descendants of so-called Oriental people - whether they were Berber, Arab, Andalusí, North African or the equally jumbled, complicated ethnic identifiers used in the eighth to fifteenth century - survives to give

255 Haines, “Echoes under the arches the legacy of Islamic rule still shapes Andalusia, where a new mosque rises,” M1.

us moros, Moors, Moroccans and Arabs today. The production of La Calderería, which is negotiated by all the actors along the streets, simply provides a distinct, sensationalized backdrop for wider processes of racialization (pathologies of sexuality, criminality, poverty, irrationality) which use culture as an inherent, primordial and unchangeable differentiator. The ethnicization of Islam and the cultural attributes which are alleged to go with it create a culturally deterministic vision of Moroccan immigrants’ capacities to live in Spain. ‘Cultural difference’ is thoroughly embedded in genetic heredity making moro and Moor racial characters via ethnic criteria. This creates an impasse considering federal, provincial and municipal integration planning which proposes an assimilationist strategy for immigrant groups who are facing presumed insurmountable cultural differences, especially those at the marginal ends of a linear cultural scale such as Moroccans.

The convivencia idyll is an example of an Andalusia appropriation of Al Andalus which does not recognize Moroccan immigrants’ possible claims to it. If ancient history is called upon to fix contemporary issues how accurate should it be? Bernabé López García (2002), a preeminent scholar of both morisco and Moroccan migration, warns that using history to value some immigrant groups over others, as in the case of Latin American migrants, is itself a form of discrimination. He cautions, “it is good to make reference to common history, creator of identities. But the use and abuse of history can easily fall into ideology.”257 This is especially critical for the recent appropriation of convivencia by the municipal government. Convivencia in Al Andalus certainly was admirable when successful. However, over the time span of eight hundred years it was more often than not a dystopic multiculturalism - segregation and official ethnic-religious discrimination along with pacific intercultural exchange - not very similar to the municipal government’s hopes to fundamentally assimilate ‘guests’ into the values, ideologies and juridical systems of dominant ‘hosts’ while allowing immigrants to retain some cultural aspects as long as they are not in conflict with Spanish identity.

Exorcise the ghosts

Exactly how will Moroccan immigrants escape their allegedly predetermined cultural identities to become acceptable intercultural subjects? This is the seemingly insurmountable task. López García advises that a true integration of Islam, one of the greatest threats culturally according to public opinion, is to acknowledge it as an important influence in Spanish identity and history without jumping to the conclusion that it is indicative of the ‘other’ or that its promoters aspire it to be more than a religion. I have tried to walk very closely in the footsteps of history because ancient history enters so strongly into contemporary debates. While the parallels are sometimes shocking I agree with López García when he writes, “the danger, as in the Spain of *moriscos*, would be to conceive of it [Islam] ... as an old foreign empire. At the beginning of the twenty first century something we should have learned is not to see ghosts.”\(^\text{258}\) Ancient history, while important to understanding the construction of very specific representations and prejudices, does a poor job of fully explaining the continuing dislike and marginalization of Moroccan immigrants. The vendors with whom I talked are as distant culturally, genetically and ideologically from the people who criss crossed the Mediterranean during the rise and fall of Al Andalus as contemporary Spaniards. However, they are still held accountable for the events of ancient history as well as a contemporary clash of civilizations. Their relegation to marginal housing, type cast jobs, sexualized masculinity, illegality and criminality makes them incomprehensible to ‘middle of the road sensitive’ Westerners who believe the repetitious Orientalist representations of *moros* and Moors.

One young Moroccan tea shop waiter I conversed with briefly told me eagerly, “If you study the history of Andalusia you will see true Arabs, it is only a few that give them a bad name.” He liked La Calderería because there wasn’t a clear dichotomy between Moroccan and Spanish due to all the diversity. It was truly a place of *convivencia* in his opinion. He is onto something with this definition of *convivencia*. Whether it is a kaleidoscope of gentrifiers, tourists, immigrants, locals or the ‘Arab streets’ La Calderería continues to be a hinge axis where all of these identities are improvised, resisted, put to the test and renewed pacifically, usually with a

\(^{258}\) Ibid., 143.
great sense of humor. Viewed as site of great hybridity despite its Orientalist trappings, La Calderería is an achievement and the vendors are truly fitting ambassadors of the Albayzin.

Illustration 8: La Calderería at night

Source: David Tickle
Works Cited


## CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL - MINIMAL RISK

**PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:** Derek J. Gregory  
**INSTITUTION / DEPARTMENT:** UBC/Arts/Geography  
**UBC BREB NUMBER:** H07-01200

### INSTITUTION(S) WHERE RESEARCH WILL BE CARRIED OUT:

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Other locations where the research will be conducted:  
The research proposed will occur in the field. From June 11-August 15, 2007 Elisabeth M. Hicks will live in Granada, Spain and work with subjects there. From Sept. - April, 2007 there may be follow up consultation with subject from fieldwork via email or a second session of fieldwork.

### CO-INVESTIGATOR(S):

Elisabeth M. Hicks

### SPONSORING AGENCIES:

N/A

### PROJECT TITLE:

Strategic Segregation: The Moroccan Muslim community and voting rights in Granada, Spain

### CERTIFICATE EXPIRY DATE: June 13, 2008

### DOCUMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS APPROVAL:

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The application for ethical review and the document(s) listed above have been reviewed and the procedures were found to be acceptable on ethical grounds for research involving human subjects.

Approval is issued on behalf of the Behavioural Research Ethics Board and signed electronically by one of the following:

Dr. Peter Suedfeld, Chair  
Dr. Jim Rupert, Associate Chair  
Dr. Arminee Kazanjian, Associate Chair  
Dr. M. Judith Lynam, Associate Chair  
Dr. Laurie Ford, Associate Chair