{"@context":{"@language":"en","Affiliation":"http:\/\/vivoweb.org\/ontology\/core#departmentOrSchool","AggregatedSourceRepository":"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/dataProvider","Campus":"https:\/\/open.library.ubc.ca\/terms#degreeCampus","Creator":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/creator","DateAvailable":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/issued","DateIssued":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/issued","Degree":"http:\/\/vivoweb.org\/ontology\/core#relatedDegree","DegreeGrantor":"https:\/\/open.library.ubc.ca\/terms#degreeGrantor","Description":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/description","DigitalResourceOriginalRecord":"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/aggregatedCHO","FullText":"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2009\/08\/skos-reference\/skos.html#note","Genre":"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/hasType","IsShownAt":"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/isShownAt","Language":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/language","Program":"https:\/\/open.library.ubc.ca\/terms#degreeDiscipline","Provider":"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/provider","Publisher":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/publisher","Rights":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/rights","ScholarlyLevel":"https:\/\/open.library.ubc.ca\/terms#scholarLevel","Title":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/title","Type":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/type","URI":"https:\/\/open.library.ubc.ca\/terms#identifierURI","SortDate":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/date"},"Affiliation":[{"@value":"Arts, Faculty of","@language":"en"},{"@value":"Geography, Department of","@language":"en"}],"AggregatedSourceRepository":[{"@value":"DSpace","@language":"en"}],"Campus":[{"@value":"UBCV","@language":"en"}],"Creator":[{"@value":"Denike, Clifford Charles Eric","@language":"en"}],"DateAvailable":[{"@value":"2011-09-29T20:41:33Z","@language":"en"}],"DateIssued":[{"@value":"1964","@language":"en"}],"Degree":[{"@value":"Master of Arts - MA","@language":"en"}],"DegreeGrantor":[{"@value":"University of British Columbia","@language":"en"}],"Description":[{"@value":"This study examines the Uralian iron and steel industry distribution, its changes through time and the reasons for these changes. At present, this is one of the important iron and steel producing regions in the world. At one time it was the most important.\r\nIn order to obtain the information on which to base this study, it was necessary to resort mainly to published materials, largely Soviet. The American Iron and Steel Institute also supplied some non-published material.\r\nIn order to collect the published materials it was necessary to make use of the libraries of the University of British Columbia the University of Washington and the Geographical Branch of the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys in Ottawa. Other Ottawa libraries, the personal collections of Dr. Hooson and Dr. Jackson, various bookstores, notably Kamkin's bookstore in Washington, D. C, the bookstore at the United Nations in New York and Davis bookstore in Montreal, were also very useful.\r\nThe primary problem when conducting a study of this nature is the collecting of sufficient relevant materials for a balanced appraisal of the phenomena being examined. A knowledge of Russian is mandatory and an acquaintance with French is also useful. The information gathered was organized into tables and plotted on maps. These bodies of data were then described and analyzed.\r\nAnalysis of the Uralian iron and steel industry indicated that this industry was initially essentially located on the iron ore supply. But none of the major plants are at present located on iron ore resources that are large enough to amortize the plant. Also the major plants are on the whole, based on low quality ores.\r\nThe major economic advantage of the Uralian iron and steel industry production is its association with the Eastern coal supplies. But this advantage is common to all Eastern plants. Expansion at Magnitogorsk will result in more expensive production than the construction of new plants would, even though Magnitogorsk is the most efficient Uralian plant.\r\nThe Urals is well located for the introduction of natural gas into its metallurgy. This is proceeding. Nevertheless, the use of natural gas is only a partial solution to the fuel problem because it can not completely replace coke. Therefore, the Urals will have to continue bringing in coking coal over great distances.\r\nThe de-emphasis of iron and steel announced in 1962 will help the Urals to perpetuate its present status as a producer (it supplies about one-third of the Soviet production). On the other hand, no significant increase in its relative importance can be expected.\r\nThe bulk of the Uralian iron and steel production is located in the Eastern Urals, more particularly in the South Eastern Urals. In 1956, the three largest plants: Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk in the South Eastern Urals, and Nizhne Tagil'sk in the Central Urals produced 77 per cent of the Uralian pig iron and 67 per cent of the steel smelted. This has not significantly changed subsequently.\r\nConsiderable expansion, based on Kachkanar ores, is planned for Nizhne Tagil'sk. But, all things considered, most of the expansion will be located at the major South Uralian plants.","@language":"en"}],"DigitalResourceOriginalRecord":[{"@value":"https:\/\/circle.library.ubc.ca\/rest\/handle\/2429\/37696?expand=metadata","@language":"en"}],"FullText":[{"@value":"THE URALIAN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY by Clifford Charles Eric Denike B. A., The University of British Columbia, 1960 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Geography We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard. The University of British Columbia Apri l 1964 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of \u2022 B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study, I f u r t h e r agree that per-m i s s i o n f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by.the. Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t ; c o p y i n g or p u b l i -c a t i o n .of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission*' Department of G e o g r a p h y The U n i v e r s i t y . o f ' B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8v, Canada Date. \u2022 A p r i l , 1964\u00bb ABSTRACT This study examines the U r a l i a n i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y d i s t r i b u t i o n , i t s changes through time and the reasons f o r these changes. At present, t h i s i s one of the important i r o n and s t e e l producing regions i n the world. At one time i t was the most important. I n order to o b t a i n the i n f o r m a t i o n on which to base t h i s study, i t was necessary to r e s o r t mainly to published m a t e r i a l s , l a r g e l y S o v i e t . The American I r o n and S t e e l I n s t i t u t e a l s o s u p p l i e d some non-published m a t e r i a l . I n order to c o l l e c t the published materials i t was necessary to make use of the l i b r a r i e s of .the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia the U n i v e r s i t y of Washington and the Geographical Branch of the Department of Mines and T e c h n i c a l Surveys i n Ottawa. Other Ottawa l i b r a r i e s , the personal c o l l e c t i o n s of Dr. Hooson and Dr. Jackson, v a r i o u s bookstores, notably Kamkin's bookstore i n Washington, D. C , the bookstore at the United Nations i n New York and Davis bookstore i n Montreal, were a l s o very u s e f u l . The primary problem when conducting a study of t h i s nature i s the c o l l e c t i n g of s u f f i c i e n t r e l e v a n t m a t e r i a l s f o r a balanced a p p r a i s a l of the phenomena being examined. A knowledge of Russian i s mandatory and an acquaintance w i t h French i s a l s o u s e f u l . The i n f o r m a t i o n gathered was organized i n t o t a b l e s and p l o t t e d on maps. These bodies of data were then described and analyzed. A n a l y s i s of the U r a l i a n i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y i n d i c a t e d that t h i s i n d u s t r y was i n i t i a l l y e s s e n t i a l l y l o c a t e d on the i r o n ore supply. But none of the major p l a n t s are at present located on i r o n ore resources that are l a r g e enough to amortize the p l a n t . A l s o the major p l a n t s , are on the whole, based on low q u a l i t y ores. The major economic advantage of the U r a l i a n i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y production i s i t s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the Eastern c o a l s u p p l i e s . But t h i s advantage i s common to a l l Eastern p l a n t s . Expansion at Magnitogorsk w i l l r e s u l t i n more expensive production, than the c o n s t r u c t i o n of new p l a n t s would, even though Magnitogorsk i s the most e f f i c i e n t U r a l i a n p l a n t . The Urals i s w e l l located f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of n a t u r a l gas i n t o i t s metallurgy. This i s proceeding. Nevertheless, the use of n a t u r a l gas i s only a p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n to the f u e l problem because i t can not completely r e p l a c e coke. Therefore, the Urals w i l l have to continue b r i n g i n g i n coking c o a l over great d i s t a n c e s . The de-emphasis of i r o n and s t e e l announced i n 1962 w i l l help the U r a l s to perpetuate i t s present s t a t u s as a producer ( i t s u p p l i e s about o n e - t h i r d of the S o v i e t p r o d u c t i o n ) . On the other hand, no s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n i t s r e l a t i v e importance can be expected. The bulk of the U r a l i a n i r o n and s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n i s l o c a t e d i n the E a s t e r n U r a l s , more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the South E a s t e r n U r a l s . In 1956, the three l a r g e s t p l a n t s : Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk i n the South E a s t e r n U r a l s , and Nizhne T a g i l ' s k i n the C e n t r a l U r a l s produced 77 per cent of the U r a l i a n p i g i r o n and 67 per cent of the s t e e l smelted. T h i s has not s i g n i -f i c a n t l y changed subsequently. C o n s i d e r a b l e expansion, based on Kachkanar o r e s , i s planned f o r Nizhne T a g i l ' s k . But, a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , most of the expansion w i l l be l o c a t e d a t the major South U r a l i a n p l a n t s . ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writer wishes to acknowledge the invaluable aid given by Dr. D. J . M. Hooson i n the preparation of this study. The writer i s also indebted to Dr. J . D. Chapman, Dr. W. A. Douglas Jackson and Dr. R. M. Bone fo r encouragement, advice and materials. Messrs. Ronald Boyes, James BateE and Denis Kerfoot helped with c r i t i c i s m of the techniques used i n the study and i n the gathering of materials. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION..... 1 II. THE CHARCOAL IRON INDUSTRY. 10 BEGINNINGS 10 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 12 RELATIVE DECLINE 22 ABSOLUTE DECLINE......... 48 SUMMARY. 61 III. THE RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY.. 63 IRON ORE... 63 The Nature of the Ores 63 The Nature of the Deposits.. 66 Production. 67 Evaluation of Supply... 71 COAL. *................... 76 General.. 76 Local Supply.... 77 Reserves .... 77 Production 78 Import of Coal 79 Production of Coke 81 AUXILIARY MATERIALS 81 Alloying Agents 81 Refractory Materials 91 Water. 93 ( i i ) CHAPTER PAGE III.(cont'd) Flux .... 94 Scrap 94 SUMMARY. ... , 96 IV. THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY USING COKE 98 BEFORE WORLD WAR II 98 WORLD WAR II 108 POST WORLD WAR II........ ...112 SUMMARY. 116 V. INDIVIDUAL PLANTS ...... 121 MAGNITOGORSK 121 Iron Ore Supply........ .121 Iron and Steel Production... 126 NIZHNE TAGIL'SK... 131 Iron Ore Supply 131 Iron and Steel Production 133 CHELYABINSK. 137 Iron Ore Supply 137 Iron and Steel Production ..140 ORSK-KHALILOV.SK 143 Iron Ore Supply .....143 Iron and Steel Production ..145 SMALL PLANTS. 148 SUMMARY ...... 154 ( i i i ) CHAPTER PAGE VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE URALIAN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 137 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 157 RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY 161 V I I . CONCLUSIONS 175 BIBLIOGRAPHY 180 (iv) LIST OF MAPS MAP PAGE 1 LOCATION OF THE URALS. 6 2 ELEVATION AND DRAINAGE IN THE URALS.............. 7 3 URALIAN DEPOSITS IMPORTANT TO FERROUS METALLURGY 8 4 URALIAN WATERWAYS 14 5 RUSSIAN PENETRATION OF THE URALS 15 6 LOCATION OF MAJOR PLANTS, 1631-1696 16 7 BASHKIR UPRISINGS, 1705-1755. 23 8 LOCATION OF OPERATING PLANTS, 1701-1735 24 9 PROBABLE FOREST COVER IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.-. - 26 10 INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE URALS DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 27 11 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION-1800........... 29 12 THE COMING OF THE RAILWAYS-1873-1898. 42 13 MAJOR PLANTS - 1913 44 14 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION -1913 46 15 MAJOR IRON AND STEEL PLANTS -LATE 1930'S 57; 16 CHARCOAL PIG IRON PRODUCERS-1940-1956 59 17 CHIEF IRON ORE PRODUCERS -1955 74 18 MAJOR DEPOSITS OF COAL IN WESTERN USSR OF COKING QUALITY..;.... 82 19 URALS-KUZBASS-THE SECOND METALLURGICAL BASE 1935-1938 85 \u2022?v) MAP PAGE 20 MAJOR OPERATING PLANTS - 1938.. 105 21 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION -1938 ..107 22 CONSTRUCTION IN FERROUS METALLURGY IN THE URALS DURING WORLD WAR II. 113 23 FERROUS METALLURGICAL PLANTS-1956. 122 ( v i ) LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE I . INTRAREGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IRON AND STEEL, 1800-1913...... .......... 47 I I . THE URALIAN IRON ORE SUPPLY.... 73 I I I . MINERALIZATION OF THE FUEL BALANCE OF THE URALS METALLURGY. 84 IV. COAL PRODUCTION IN THE URALS 84 V. INTRAREGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IRON AND STEEL, 1913-1938.....*....*.* .- 110 VI. PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL IN THE URALS, 1940-1945 *.. 120 V I I . INPUTS IN ONE TON OF PIG IRON-1956 120 V I I I . INPUTS IN ONE TON OF STEEL -1956 120 IX. IRON ORE RESOURCES-1 JANUARY 1956.... .....167 X. TOTAL GEOLOGICAL RESERVES OF COAL BASINS PRODUCING METALLURGICAL COKING-COALS IN THE USSR. ..*............,. 167 XI . IRON CONTENT IN ORES UTILIZED-1956 ........168 X I I . YIELD OF METALLURGICAL COKE 168 X I I I . PROPORTION OF TOTAL OUTPUT OF VARIOUS IRON ORE BASINS AND DEPOSITS 169 XIV. PROPORTION OF COKING COAL SUPPLY OF VARIOUS COAL BASINS FOR-FERROUS METALLURGY in-%......169 XV. DISTANCES BETWEEN MAJOR IRON ORE AND COAL DEPOSITS. ................... 170 XVI. AVERAGE TON-KM ASSEMBLY OF RAW MATERIALS FOR THE LARGEST PLANTS......................... 170 ( v i i ) TABLE PAGE XVII. PRODUCTION OF IRON AND-STEEL-SELECTED PRODUCERS-1955......,......................... 171 XVIII. INPUTS IN ONETTON OF STEEL-MAKING PIG - IRON-1956. .. ..... ...... 172 XIX. OPERATING DATA ON BLAST FURNACES USING HIGH SINTER BURDENS....... ..173 XX. COMPARATIVE COST OF OPEN HEARTH CARBON STEEL IN 1958......................... ...... 174 XXI. REGIONAL COST OF PRODUCTION OF PIG IRON FOR STEEL MAKING............. 174 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The general aim of t h i s study i s to examine the d i s t r i -b u t i o n of the U r a l i a n i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y . An a n a l y s i s of the d i s t r i b u t i o n i s to be attempted both as to i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e and r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n i n the world i r o n and s t e e l p a t t e r n . On t h i s b a s i s some conclusions are to be drawn as to the nature of the U r a l i a n i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y and i n what manner i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n i s l i k e l y to change. In 1955, the Urals was the seventh p i g i r o n smelting r e g i o n i n the world. I t was surpassed by the Donets-Krivoy Rog r e g i o n , the Pittsburgh-Youngstown r e g i o n , the United States Eastern r e g i o n , the Chicago r e g i o n , the Rhine-Westphal r e g i o n , and Great B r i t a i n . By 1958, the U r a l s f e r r o u s metal production surpassed a l l f o r e i g n nations except the United States of America, the F e d e r a l Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.*-Yet t h i s major i n d u s t r i a l phenomenon has been only super-f i c i a l l y o r incompletely t r e a t e d i n Western geographical l i t e r a -t u r e . P a r t of the reason f o r t h i s l a c k i s that the Urals covers an area l a r g e r than most c o u n t r i e s and i t s i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y *T. V. Komar, U r a l . Ekonomlka-Geograficheskava  K h a r a k t e r i s t i k a . Moskva: I z d a t e l ' s t v o Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959, pp. 180, 199; and M e t a l S t a t i s t i c s 1960. New York: American Me t a l Market, 1960, pp. 34, 103. 2. has attained a state of considerable complexity with wide vari-ations from unit to unit. In addition i t i s necessary to examine a time span of over three hundred years. The Uralian iron and steel industry f a l l s into two great overlapping periods - the charcoal era and the coke era. The pre-eminent locational factors changed with technological change. Only one of the old charcoal locations was suitable for massive expansion i n the coke era. In the charcoal era the prime require-ments were ready access to transportation routes and a good timber supply. In the coke era the prime requirement has been a very large raw material supply. It is necessary to evaluate the raw material supply before the present distribution can be adequately examined. The develop-ment of the coke based industry i n general i s further amplified when the most significant plants are individually examined. Only when a l l the preceding material has been gathered can a worth-while analysis of the Uralian iron and steel industry distribution be attempted. There is an appalling lack of detailed Soviet studies on the distribution of their iron and steel industry. The best 2 source i s undoubtedly Livshits (1958) but this book does not contain a single map. Some other sources are of considerable R. S. Livshits, Razmeshchenie Chernov Metallurgii SSSR. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1958. 3. interest i n explaining the distribution of the Uralian industry. 3 Bardin (1960) provides an authoritative account of the economic rationale behind the Uralian iron and steel distribution. Clark 4 (1956) i s the best comparable Western source. Roepke (1956)\"* i s an invaluable model of the format for 6 such a study. Pounds (1952) i s not very useful because his area is so restricted i n size as to have l i t t l e relevance for a study on the areal scale of the Urals. Furthermore, he deals with a coalfield location which was never very significant in the char-coal era. Historical material on the Uralian iron and steel industry i s more plentiful than most other types of information. Nolde (1952)^ i s an excellent source for material dealing with the eighteenth century. Kafengauz (1949) treats the development of 3 I. P. Bardin, Ekonomika Chernov Metallurgii SSSR. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoe Izdatel'stvo Literatury po Chernoy i Tsvetnoy Metallurgii, 1960. 4 M. G. Clark, The Economics of Soviet Steel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. **H. G. Roepke, Movements of the British Iron and Steel  Industry - 1720 to 1951. Urbana: The University of I l l i n o i s Press, I l l i n o i s Studies i n the Social Sciences: vol. 36, 1956. N. J. G. Pounds, The Ruhr. A Study i n Historical and  Economic Georgraphy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1952. ^B. Nolde, La formation de 1*Empire russe. etudes, notes  et documents. Paris: Institut de'etudes slaves, tome Premier,1952. 8 B. B. Kafengauz, Istoriva Khozvaystva Demidowkh v XVIII- XIX w. opyt Issledovaniya po I s t o r i i Ural'skoy Metallurgii torn 1: Moskva-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1949. 4. g the Demidov industrial interests in depth. Scott (1942) provides an extremely detailed account of the early development of Magnitogorsk. Lipatov (1960)^ thoroughly covers the expansion during World War II. 11 12 Komar (1959), Ponomaryov (I960), and Ostinsev (1960) supply important background material necessary for any valid appreciation of the environment in which the Uralian iron and steel industry developed. Unfortunately Osintsev is prone to errors apparently through inefficient proofreading. Also he is an economist and deals with the actual distribution of the in-dustry i n a most cavalier fashion. Virtually a l l the data was gathered from published sources excepting only some materials supplied by H. C. Rossrucker, Satistician, The American Iron and Steel Institute. Livshits supplied a fund of statistics as did Komar. Other useful sources 9 J. Scott, Behind the Urals. An American Worker in Russia's  City of Steel. Cambridge Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1942. \"^\u00b0N. P. Lipatov, Chernava Metallurgiva Urala. v godv  Velikov Otechestvennov Vovnv (1941-1945). Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1960. *\"^ B. N. Ponomaryov, History of the Communist Party of the  Soviet Union. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960. 12 A. S. Osintsev, Chernava Metallurgiva Urala. Sverdlovsk: Sverdlovskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1960. 5. were: Nolde, Osintsev, Kutaf'ev (1959), 1 3 Khlebnikov (I960) 1 4 15 and Minakov (1961). These materials were then reduced to maps and tables, and the study was based on the explanation and inter-pretation of these materials. Russian; names have been transliterated rather than trans-lated unless common English usage has otherwise indicated. The transliterated form used is that of the root of the words as opposed to the nominative singular form unless usage has otherwise indicated. The transliteration system used i s essentially that of the United States Board on Geographic Names. S. A. Kutaf'ev, Rossivskava Sovetskava Federativnava  Sotsialisticheskava Respublika. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Geograficheskoy Literatury, 1959. 14 V. B. Khlebnikov, \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy, During 1959-1965,\" from Sovetskava Chernava Metallurgiva 1959-1965. Moscow: Gosplanizdat, 1960, pp. 3-7, 50-243 (In Joint Publications Research Service, 12,474, 7 February 1962). ^M. Minakov, \"Problems of Raising the Efficiency of Interregional Industrial Links,\" Voprosy Ekonomiki. No. 3, 1961, pp. 121-129 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (11), Joint Publi-cations Research-Service* 10,046, 6 September 1961, pp. 5-21). 7. E L E V A T I O N A N D D R A I N A G E IN T H E U R A L S \/ MAJOR M O U N T A I N R A N G E S 80 0 80 160 KM. 8. URALIAN DEPOSITS IMPORTANT TO FERROUS METALLURGY - 1956 MAP 3 N r 75 0 75 150 225 KM. \u2022 \u2022 1 0 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 TONS OF R E S E R V E S \u00a9 I R O N ORE \u2022 COAL \u2022 MANGANESE 9. URALIAN DEPOSITS IMPORTANT TO FERROUS METALLURGY - 1956 - LEGEND S-I \u2014 Serovo-Ivdel 1sk B = Bakal Ki = Kizelovsk Coal Basin Z = Zigazinsk Ka = Kachkanar M = Magnitogorsk T-K Tagilo-Kushvinsk K = Kustanay A = Alapaevsk Kh = Khalilovsk V-P Visimo-Pervoural* sk Sources: Komar, op. c i t . . foldout map facing p. 28, Fig. 3 -\"Greatest Raw Materials\"; and I. P. Bardin, Zhelezorudnava Baza Chernov Metallurgii S S S R t Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1957, p. 317. 10. CHAPTER II THE CHARCOAL IRON INDUSTRY The Uralian charcoal iron industry was the precursor to the modem Uralian iron and steel industry. To trace the develop-ment of this industry i t i s necessary to rely primarily on major published sources, both Soviet and non-Soviet. Books were used as opposed to periodical materials. The Uralian charcoal iron industry was developed during the eighteenth century, underwent a relative decline in the nineteenth century and an absolute decline i n the twentieth century. I. BEGINNINGS The bulk of the Urals was captured by the Russians between 1552 (the f a l l of Kazan) and the end of the seventeenth century. This included a l l of the Urals North and West of the Ural River. Therefore, by the end of the seventeenth century the Russians more or less ruled a l l of the area to develop metallurgy in the next two hundred years. The f i r s t significant development of iron working i n the Urals occurred on the Nitsa River i n 1631,^ just thirty-three 2 3 years after the area had f i r s t been settled by Russians. *Komar, pj>. c i t . . pp. 82-83. 2A settlement, Verkhotur'e was established on the Tura in 1598, the Nitsa is a tributary of the Tura. jc C\/, JB. Nolde states that the natives had worked iron ore for some time. La formation de l'Empire russe. etudes, notes et  documents. Paris: Institut d'etudes slaves, tome I, 1952, pp.238-9. 11. In 1676, Czar Alexis sent two Germans, Samuel Fitsch and Harms HeroId, to search for copper and iron. They reported occurrences of these minerals but stated that the country was too wild to develop. Therefore no systematic development was attempted at 4 this time. By 1696, when Peter I promulgated his ukase concerning the intensification of the search for Uralian iron ore, four signi-ficant and many minor operations had been established, 1 in spite of serious Bashkir uprisings.\"* During this period, the ever present threat of h i s t i l i t i e s with the Bashkirs made the Urals south of a line along the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset\u2022 rivers impractic-able for the establishment of metal-working. Although the f i r s t penetration into the Urals had occurred, no government south of this line had been established, other than the small post of Ufa founded in 1585.^ The earliest plants established were: the above-mentioned Nitsa Plant in 1631; the Neiva Plant i n the 1660's on a tributary of the Nitsa; the Krasnoborsk plant i n the 1660*s on the Kama; and the DaLmatovsk Plant i n the 1680's on the Iset 1 . Therefore, from the earliest developments there was a preference for the Nolde, loc. c i t . ^Serious uprisings occurred during 1662-1667 and 1676-1683. Atlas I s t o r i i SSSR. Chast' I, Fig. 22. 6 Nolde, op. c i t . . p. 191. 12. Eastern slopes of the Urals, because of more suitable ore resources. The early expansion of the iron working industry i n the Urals was limited primarily by the lack of demand but other factors played a part i n hindering development. For example, deposits of easily processed ore (limonite)^ were rare, much of the area was occupied by hostile peoples, and the number of suitable sites was limited by the necessity of using river trans-port . II. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY Iron-working was an important aspect of Peter I's plans to bring Russia out of i t s backward state. Prior to Peter's reign iron for 'fabricating military equipment was imported through Archangel - hence, the development of a home industry became imperative after the Swedish war cut off supplies. New plants were i n i t i a l l y set up i n established areas of the Center, close to the regions of consumption. But the short-age of wood was already c r i t i c a l i n the Center, and measures were taken to reduce even the old-established small-scale iron indus-t r i e s . New works were set up i n North Western European Russia (in the Olenets Gubernia), but fuel and iron ore were running\" short there, even more so than i n the Center. ^Easily fusible limonite, chiefly i n small reserves, served as the i n i t i a l raw material base of the iron working industry of the Urals. Komar, op. cit.. pp. 217-218. 13. Peter was forced to turn to the Urals; an area which was distant, poorly-developed, and sparsely populated. In this area, g however, ore, wood and water power were available. In 1697, 9 Andre Vinius, the son of a Dutchman discovered iron ore of as high a quality as Swedish ore along the Tagil River. Besides these deposits, there were enormous forested areas which could be u t i l i z e d for charcoal, a prime requirement for the smelting of pig iron. The metal could be exported down the Kama and i t s tributaries, the Chusovaya and Belaya. At the urging of Vinius, Peter hired some Saxon engineers for the task of developing the Urals iron industry. Prince Cherkasski was ordered to develop iron works. Between 1698 and 1704, he had six constructed. The most successful early govern-ment iron works were the Nev'yansk works (begun i n 1699), Kamensk (1700) and Alapaevsk (1704). Nikita Demidov, who had caused significant production of iron ore and armaments at Tula was sent to organize Uralian production. He was granted the most successful government plant - Nev'yansk. State serfs, established i n Siberia as farmers in the seventeenth century, were used as labour.^Somewhat later entrepreneurs began to construct iron g R. S. Livshits, Razmeshchenie Chernov Metallurgii SSSR. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1958, pp. 555-556. 9 10 Nolde, on. c i t . . p. 240; Nolde, ooj. c i t . . pp. 240-245. 15. R U S S I A N P E N E T R A T I O N O F T H E U R A L S MAP 5 75 0 75 150 225 KM \u2022 i 1 1 Sources: Atlas I s t o r i i SSSR, Chast' I, f i g . 1 8 , 27; Chast' I I , f i g . 6 , 11+; and Nolde, p. 1 9 1 . 16. LOCATION OF MAJOR P L A N T S , 1631-1696 MAP 6 KRASNOBORSK ( 1660's) Sources: Vvedenskiy, B.S.E.; Komar, pp. 82,85; and Atlas I s t o r i l SSSR, Chast' I, f i g . 23. 75 0 75 150 225 KM. \u00bb \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 j i J 17. works. The f i r s t private development was i n 1728 by Gabriel Osokin and associates at Irginsk. This was a copper and iron plant. Once Peter's ukase (1696) had been promulgated strenuous efforts were made to expand iron production, but by 1733 the only extension south of the former Kama-Chusovaya-Iset1 river line was 12 to the Sylva, a tributary of the Chusovaya. The Bashkirs had risen again, i n 1705-1711, overrunning the Iset' where the 13 Karaensk and Uktussk plants were located. Nonetheless, i n 1733, 14,000 metric tons of pig iron, or more than a,third of the 12 Russian total, were produced i n the Urals. In 1735 Nev'yansk 14 and Nizhne Tagil'sk were the centers of the iron industry. In 1735-1740, the Bashkirs rose again as far as the South banks of the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset1. *\"** Thus l i t t l e progress had been made toward pacifying the Southern Urals by 1740, although Ufa had a population of 19,266 by 1739. In 1736, K i r i l o v after taking the f i r s t effective steps to occupy Bashkiria founded a copper foundry at Tabynsk. In 1744 the plant was ceded to Tverdyshev along with a large concession. By 1762 Tverdyshev *\"*\"Nolde, op. c i t . . p. 252. \u2022*-2Komar, op. c i t . . p. 86. ^A t l a s I s t o r i i SSSR. Chast' II, f i g . 2. ^Nolde, pp. c i t . . p. 247. 13 14, 15 16 'Atlas I s t o r i i SSSR. Chast' II, f i g . 3. 3Nolde, opj. c i t . . p. 199. 18. was operating two iron furnaces and two other blast furnaces were under construction. There were several other blast furnaces 17 operating i n the Southern Urals by 1762. 18 By 1750, 23,000 metric tons were produced i n the Urals. The 1755 Bashkir uprising covered a considerably less extensive area, 1^ thus by that time their power was on the wane. Virtually a l l the South banks of the Kama-Iset' line were not concerned and the uprising was localized i n the Belaya-Ufa system basin. This was the last major Bashkir uprising as such, and hence after 1755 a l l of the Urals North and West of the Ural River and the Iset' and i t s tributaries was effectively i n Russian hands. Then the only limit on the extent of iron working was the forest areas that could supply charcoal, which was approximately along the Belaya and the tributaries of the Iset 1. The great expansion i n the eighteenth century thus was i n two major phases: 1 - from 19 20 1701 to 1754 with a l l construction along or to the North of the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset'; and 2 - from 1755 - 1800 with construction throughout the forested area. 17 18 Nolde, op. c i t . pp. 259-262. Komar, op. c i t . . p. 90 19 The f i r s t result of Peter's program, the Nevyansk Plant, was completed then,a lag of five years after the ukase. 20 The f i r s t plant constructed well to the South of the Kama-Iset' line was Zlatoust in 1754. Atlas I s t o r i i SSSR. Chast' f i g . 3; and B. A. Vvedenskiy, Bol'shava Sovetskava Entsiklopediva. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatel'stvo Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1952, vol. 17, p. 103. 19. The prime factor limiting the spread of the iron industry through the Urals i n the pre-Petrine period had been the lack of demand. Demand increased once Peter's ukase of 1696 came into effect. Lack of demand was not a problem again u n t i l after the end of the eighteenth century. It was s t i l l not possible to develop some large areas populated by hostile peoples, and only sites along accessible rivers were capable of being brought into production. By 1733, a l l of the production of the Urals was i n the Western and Central Urals, concentrated along the Kama, Sylva, Chusovoy, Iset', Tagil and Neiva. Thus the early production was located f i r s t i n regard to transport because a l l of these plants were relatively accessible to the Kama transport route to the West. They were also located i n reference to easily worked limonite ore deposits, and a l l had abundant stands of forest around them. After the Bashkir power had been broken, the great Pugachev revolt overran a l l of the area of the former Bashkir uprisings in 1773-4, as well as the North bank of the Kama to Perm', across the Chusovaya and half way between the Iset' and Tura. That i s to say, two-thirds of the area where iron working had been developed or about three-quarters of the area of the Urals then under Russian jurisdiction was lost. A considerable number of important plants, notably Avzyma-Petrovsk, Beloretsk, Zlatoust, 21 Satkinsk, Votkinsk and Izhevsk were seized. 20. Notwithstanding this exceptional revolt, after the des-truction of the Bashkir power by 1755, a whole new area had been thrown open for development. The prime limitation became the avai l a b i l i t y of trees, which more or less coincided with the Belaya-Iset' river systems. The industry was s t i l l tied to river transport and thus i t rapidly spread to the limit of the trees to the South, but i t achieved penetration North of i t s previously established plants only after 1758 because of d i f f i c u l t i e s of transport. By 1770 there were furnaces at four locations i n the 22 region, but the region remained isolated. The Uralian plants were large for that time and had f a i r l y modern technical equipment. Each plant had a dammed pond with a head of water which was u t i l i z e d as motive force for i t s equipment, Thanks to the Urals Russia at the end of the eighteenth century was the world's largest producer of iron, which was ex-ported i n great quantities to foreign countries, particularly England. V. V. Danilevskiy, i n Russkava Tekhnika. even claims \"the fact of worldwide hi s t o r i c a l significance - the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century i n England - was based to a significant extent on the u t i l i z a t i o n of the labour of the 23 Russian people, producing ore, smelting pig iron and coking in 2 I A t l a s I s t o r i i SSSR. Chast' II, f i g . 5, \"Rossiyskaya imperiya s 1762 po 1800 g.\" 22 Nolde, op. c i t . . p. 263. 23 A term used to signify charcoal burning i n this instance. 21. the Urals for iron, shipped to England\". The combination of good, easily accessible ore reserves, forest resources, cheap labour, and numerous rivers, convenient for water power and the export of products provided the Urals plants significant advantages relative to the metallurgical 24 plants of the central guberniyas and Olenets Kray. There were twenty works i n the Urals by the end of Peter's reign; this had increased ,to 115 by the end of the eighteenth century. Two-thirds of Russian blast furnaces were i n the Urals, producing over two-thirds of the pig iron. In 1760, 45,000 metric tons were produced, i n 1770 - 65,000 tons, and i n 1800 - 130,000 25 tons. In 1767, 56,000 tons of pig iron were produced i n the Urals, twice as much as i n Britain. Exports of iron from the Urals were: 1762, 19,000 tons; 1773, 44,900 tons, and 1794, 63,600 tons. Only hemp and flax were more important Russian exports at 26 that time.. Iron went mainly to Britain, which was short of wood. By 1800, three major subregions had developed i n the Urals. These were the-Central Urals, South Central-Urals and Western Urals. The Central Urals was the most important accounting for 70 per cent of the pig iron and 48 per cent of the refined iron. This was the oldest region and had numerous limonite deposits. 24 Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . , pp. a555.-556. 25i 'Livshits, op. c i t . . p. 110. 3Komar, op. c i t . , p. 90. 26T 22. Next most important was the South Central Urals, the newest region, which supplied 23 per cent of the pig iron and 25 per cent of the refined iron. Conditions here were similar to the Central Urals. The Western Urals supplied only 6 per cent of the pig iron, but 26 per cent of the refined iron. This was the most accessible region but i t lacked abundant suitable ore reserves. Considerable amounts of pig iron were refined here while being transported to the West along the Chusovaya-Kama route. This region had ample fuel, and as i t was common practice to refine pig iron at a different plant than the pig iron was smelted i n any case, this was a rational development. III. RELATIVE DECLINE ' Between 1800 and 1913, the Uralian ferrous- metal industry entered the modern period. The large scale smelting of steel was introduced, production became concentrated into relatively few producers, and production became more strongly differentiated by region within, the Urals. During the f i r s t part' of the period, from say 1800 to 1870, the Uralian iron and.steel industry expanded slowly because foreign coke based production made i n -27 roads on i t s world markets. 27 The bulk of the national market was retained but i t s demands were not sufficient to maintain a growth rate remotely comparable to the Western coke based producers. In England pig iron smelting from 1796 to 1860 increased from 128,000 to 3,827~,000 tons or by almost thirty times j i n the Urals during 23. BASHKIR UPRISINGS, 1705-1755 MAP 7 Source: Atlas I s t o r i i SSSR, Chast' I I , f i g . 2,3. 75 0 75 150 225 KM. 25 LOCATION OF OPERATING PLANTS. 1701-1735 -LEGEND N = Nevyansk (1701) E = Ekaterinburg (1723) K = Kamensk (1702) N-T = Nizhne-Tagil'sk (1725) U = Uktussk (1702) C = Chernoistochinsk(1728) A = Alapaevsk (1703) I Irginsk (1728) S = Shuralinsk (1716) Ut = Utkinsk (1729) B = Byngovsk (1718) Bi = Bilimbay (1733) V-T = Verkhne-Tagil'sk (1718) R = Revdinsk (1734) Sha = Shaytansk (1721) Sources: Komar, OP. c i t . . pp. 85-86; Atlas I s t o r i i SSSR. Chast' II, f i g . 2, \"Rossiyskaya Imperiya p r i Petre I (Evropeyskaya Chast')\"; and Nolde, OP. c i t . . pp. 241-253 and Carte 3-\"L,? industrialisation de l'Oural au course du x v i i i e siecle.\" 26 I i i i r I I I 1 27 \u2022 major plants ^ Central Urals ^ South Central Urals ^ N o r t h e r n Urals 75 0 75 150 225 KM. ^Western Urals U~ L J- L j ' ' ' 28. INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE URALS DURING THE 18TH CENTURY -LEGEND I = Izhevsk Ukt = Uktussk V = Votkinsk V-I = Verhhne-Isetsk Ir = Irginsk Sys = Sysert\u2022 P = Petropavlovsk Ka = Kamensk B Bogoslovsk NS - Nizhne Serginsk T = Turinsk VS = Verkhne Serginsk N-P = Nikola-Pavdinsk R - Revdinsk VT = Verkhne Turinsk Se \u2014 Seversk K = Kushvinsk Po = Polevskoy Ba = Barantshinsk N-Pe - Niaze-Petrovsk NT Nizhne Tagil 1sk Uf = Ufaleysk Ch = Chernois tochinsk Kas = Kasli By = Byngovsk Ky = Kyshtym N = Nevyansk Z = Zlatoust V-Ta = Verkhne-Tagil 1 sk Sat = Satkinsk Sh = Shuralinsk Sim = Simsk S = Suszansk U-K = Usf-Katavsk Si = S inyachikhinsk Yu Yuryuzan1 A = Alapaevsk K-I Katav-Ivanovsk Sy - Sylvinsk Be = Beloretsk U \u2014 Utkinsk Uz = Uzyansk Bi = Bilimbay A-P = Avzyano-Petrovsk Sha = Shaytansk Kag = Kaginsk E = Ekaterinburg Sources: Komar, opj. c i t . , pp. 85, 87, 92-93; I s t o r i i Atlas. Chast* II, f i g . 2,3,5; Bol'shava Sovetskava Entsiklonediva. various vol.; Kratkava Geograficheskava Entsiklonediva. vol. 1, 2; and Nolde, op. c i t . , carte 3 - \"Llndustriali-sation de 1* Oural au cours due x v i i i e sieele\". 2 9 . REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION - 1800 MAP II % C E N T R A L AND NORTHERN URALS \u00ae SOUTH C E N T R A L URALS @ WESTERN U R A L S SOURCE^ KOMAR, OR CIT., PP. 9 2 - 9 3 .  \u2022 PIG IRON \u2022 IRON 30. The impact of foreign coal based iron and steel production had a profound but not an immediate effect on the Urals. No appreciable inroads on Uralian prosperity were made u n t i l the discovery of the puddling process of iron refining i n 1781 i n Britain. Pig iron had been smelted on coke since 1709 but there 28 were many technical as well as traditional objections to the widespread adoption of this process. Britain was an exception i n having the conditions necessary for the adoption of this process-forest exhaustion, good coking coals and relatively large furnaces. Pig iron so produced was, even so, generally of a low quality and charcoal based production could s t i l l effectively compete* The puddling process did not actually require coal as such but i t demanded vast quantities of fuel which was much more dif -f i c u l t to supply with wood or charcoal than with coal. Any type of coal could be used, i t did not have to be coking coal, but i t had to be abundant. Abundant coal resources were exactly what 29 the Urals lacked. Puddling spread rapidly i n Britain, and was rapidly established i n .Continental Europe although i t did not really get there u n t i l after 1815\"^ at the end of the Napoleonic 31 wars. J- \u2022 . , the same period i t rose from 102,000 tons to 242,000 tons. Komar, op. c i t . . p. 96. 28 For example injurious impurities of sulphur were imparted to the metal rather than being oxidized as happens in today's blast furnaces. N. J. G. Pounds, The Geography of Iron and Steet. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1959, p. 18. 29 Pounds, op. c i t . . p. 19. 31. Therefore, although the Urals did not change i n this period i t s competitors adopted the new more effective technology and the Urals entered the doldrums. By 1760 coke pig iron ac-32 counted for the preponderance of British production. With the advent of coke pig iron and puddling Britain's production expanded from the low of about 10,000 tons i n 1750 to more than 3,000,000 tons by 1854. In the face of such competition the Urals declined to the role of, a second order supplier', i n world markets, which were flooded by the cheaper coke pig iron. In 1801-1805, the British annual average export was 132,000 tons of iron, by 1856 Britain 33 exported 1,275,000 tons of iron. Exports of Russian (essenti-a l l y Uralian) iron declined from 30,000 - 50,000 tons i n the f i n a l decade of theeighteenth century to 12,000 tons i n 1850. The high quality of Uralian iron aided in the retention of a partial market. It was purchased by England (3900 tons i n 1850) for the manufacture of steel, and the USA (1700 tons i n 1850) in the form of sheet iron. Then, i n the latter part of the 19th century, the Urals lost i t s dominant position within Russia because of the appearance of new producing regions based on coal. In 1860, the Urals supplied 80 per cent of the Russian smelt of pig iron, 85 per cent 30 There was a 1785 puddling furnace at Le Creusot, in Central France, but this was exceptional. ^Pounds, op. c i t , , p. 97. 32. 34 of the finished iron, and 90 per cent of the steel. By 1880 i t supplied 79 per cent of the pig iron, but only 45 per cent of the steel because of the emergence of the Center and North West 35 steel producers. From 1800 to 1880 the Uralian pig iron pro-36 duction increased from 130,000 tons to 300,000 tons. Its steel production had reached 220,000 tons by 1880. After 1880 the Urals relative position declined consis-tently. By 1890 the Urals produced only 58 per cent of the pig iron and 43 per cent of the steel. In 1880 the South produced 5 per cent of the pig iron and 6 per cent of the steel. In 1890 these figures increased to 28 per cent of the pig iron, 21 per cent of the steel. From then on u n t i l the First World War the 37 Southern share increased and the Urals declined. Until the 1890*s development was hampered by the lack of 38 suitable transport to the main consuming centres of Russia, especially St. Petersburg. There was some new construction (26 plants during the f i r s t half of the nineteenth century for 32 H. G. Roepke, Movements of the British Iron and Steel  Industry - 1720 to 1951. Urbana: The University of I l l i n o i s Press, I l l i n o i s Studies i n the Social Sciences, vol. 36, 1956, p. 19. 33 34 Ibid.. p. 24; Komar, op. c i t . . p. 96. 35 Livshits, op. c i t . . table 18 \"The Distribution of the Production of Pig Iron i n Russia i n 1860 - 1913\", p. 116. 36 37 Komar, op. c i t . . p. 90; Livshits, op. c i t . . p. 116. 3 8 I b i d . . pp. I l l - 112. 33. instance), but this was essentially auxiliary to and replacement for pre-existing plants. Therefore, there was no significant change to the preceding distribution pattern. The Central Urals remained the leading subregionj actually i t s position was some-39 what improved. 40 From 1870 growth revived with considerable new con-struction and rationalization of existing plants v i r t u a l l y a l l of which were based on charcoal. The larger more efficient char-coal producers were able to compete with coke based production. Thus this period saw two major phases, f i r s t the disappearance or fossilization of the less efficient plants, and then new growth on the more favourable sites, some of which were occupied by existing plants. This growth occurred after the depletion of forests around the long established plants caused them to become less economic, and also i n conjunction with the construction of railroads which made the export of metal easier. Komar, op. cit... p. 97 40 Holloway claims that the spur to development was r a i l -road construction which became important from 1868, There were two major phases - 1868 - 1874 when 8,200 miles of track were lai n and from 1890 - 1900 when 13,700 miles were lain. In the latter period this has been calculated to amount to 7,200,000 tons of pig iron. By 1890 the Urals was rapidly losing i t s im-portance, but up u n t i l 1880 i t supplied about 80 per cent of the production or the bulk of that required in the earlier period. Robert J. Holloway, \"The Development of the Russian Iron and Steel Industry\", Stanford: Stanford University Graduate School of Business: Business Research Series: No. 6, 1952, p. 3. 34. Up to the 1890's when the Urals were linked up with the nation's r a i l network, Ural iron was quite incapable of competing with Southern metal on the markets of the Center and North West. It mainly supplied the needs of i t s own and neighboring areas, which were quite small. The Urals declined relatively during the latter part of the nineteenth century, partly for lack of coking coal, partly because of i t s position. Growth continued to be exclusively on charcoal, which meant that furnaces could not be as big as on coke, and that the industry depended on ever-diminishing forests. Nonetheless, production increased from the 1880 totals of 300,000 tons of pig iron and 220,000 tons of steel to 450,000 tons of pig iron and 290,000 tons of steel by 1890. But after the railways were built from 1885 - 1893 from Samara (Kuybyshev) to Chelyabinsk, and from 1894 - 1896 the con-42 necting link from Chelyabinsk to Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk) and the pre-existing (1873-1878) Uralian mine plant railroad, 43 Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk)-Kama , the possible market for Uralian iron became larger, though there was the problem of competition 44 with the highly organized rapidly growing industry in the South. 41 41 Actually a l i t t l e inferior coal was mined inthe Kizelovsk Basin from the 1870's. Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . . pp. 557-559; and Livshits, OP. c i t . . pp. 115-129. ^TComar, OP. c i t . . p. 117. 4 3 I b i d . , p. 108; and Atlas I s t o r i i . Chast' II, f i g . 17. 44 Livshits, ojg, c i t . . pp. 115-129. 35. The Russian demand for metal had grown to such an extent that considerable expansion was instituted i n the Urals even with the overshadowing growth of the South based on cheap coke fuel, and in spite of the paucity of suitable coking coal i n the Urals, and the economic unfeasibility of importing coal from other regions based on the then existing railway technology. Thus the bulk of the new growth was on charcoal despite the i n i -t i a t i o n of coal mining i n the Kizelovsk basin i n the 1870's which supplied only marginal coking coals. In the f i n a l quarter of the nineteenth century ten new plants were bui l t , noteworthy among which were Chusovsk (1879), Teplogorsk (1884)4\"* and most important, the Nadezhdinsk plant 46 (1884). By 1900 the Urals produced 820,000 tons of pig iron and 670,000 tons of steel. By 1913, production had reached a prerevolutionary peak of 900,000 tons of pig iron and a like amount of s t e e l . ^ Costs were often s t i l l below those of the South i n 1913. Even at Nadezhdinsk, supplied mainly with ore over a considerable distance (mainly from Goroblagodat1 near Kushva some 150 lcilo-48 meters away), ore costs i n 1913 were less than 40 per cent of those i n the South, while charcoal cost l i t t l e more than coke. 4^Komar, op. c i t . . p. 107; 4*Wedenskiy, o p . c i t . . vol.38,p.596, 47 48 Livshits, OP. c i t . . table 18, p. 116; Ibid.. p. 121. 36. Technological development remained at a low level i n the Urals throughout this period - partly due to the lack of large rivers for cheap transport, a factor which helped s p l i t the pro-cesses i n the industry into separate undertakings on small rivers which provided water. The average Southern works had 4.3 times as many workers as a Urals works or 14 times as much output of pig iron. Output from the South was much more varied than from the Urals, which concentrated mainly on sheet iron, necessary for the 49 production of consumer goods, i n which the Urals specialized. In 1913 i n the Urals there were 125 iron works, of which 96 were i n operation.\"^ In the same year, the average cost of assorted rolled iron in the Urals was 20 per cent more than i n Southern plants.\"' 1 The more recently equipped and relatively large plants of Nadezhdinsk and Chusovsk could compete with Southern metallurgy because of their nearness to the local metal market i n the Urals and Western Siberia. But, by and large, the Urals were hampered by the retention of obsolescent practices and equipment. Furnaces built i n the eighteenth century were 49 Livshits, o\u00a3. c i t . , pp. 115-12r9. \"^A. S. Osintsev, Chernava Metallurgiva Urala. Sverdlovsk: Sverdlovskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1960, p. 12. \"^Ibid., p. 18. 37. retained, which required manual charging and other such operations. The 1880-1913 period was a period during which Uralian metallurgy underwent considerable absolute growth, but continu-ously lost ground relatively to the then emerging South. In this period the Urals tripled i t s pig iron production from 300,000 to 900,000 tons, but underwent a decline i n i t s proportion of the Russian smelt from 79 per cent to 21 per cent. The South i n the same period increased from 5 per cent to 68 per cent. The Urals relative decline i n steel production was not so marked because the output quadrupled i n this period (from 220,000 tons to 900,000 tons), and by 1880 i t had already lost i t s 1860 hegemony when i t produced 90 per cent of the Russian steel smelt. Therefore, the Urals declined from 45 per cent to 21 per cent of the total steel smelt, while the South increased from 6 per cent to 63 per.cent i n the same period. In 1913, the remainder of the steel produced, 16 per cent, was supplied by the Center and North West which had 53 accounted for 49 per cent i n 1880. By 1913 with the development of the Nadezhdinsk Plant, the Northern Urals became much more important. It produced about one-f i f t h of the pig iron and one-sixth of the steel of the Urals. Of _____________ Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . . pp. 557-559. 53 Livshits, op. c i t . . p. 116, table 18. 38. the Northern Uralian pig iron total of 199,600 tons, 169,000 were 54 produced by Nadezhdinsk, as was a l l of the steel and rolled metal. Thus i t was by far the largest plant i n the Urals. It was then possible to develop such a plant that could not have existed earlier because of progress i n three directions: transportation, technology and finance. Nadezhdinsk was founded i n 1894 just as the Urals was being linked by railway to the major metal markets of Russia. Technology had by then advanced to such a stage that i t was feasible to build such a large plant, and supply a market for the metal therein produced. It was possible to finance such a venture through the joint stock company as opposed to the family enterprise which had preceded i t . The Central Urals - the oldest region - lost some of i t s relative position with the emerging of the new region and the greater proportional development of the other regions. Nonethe-less, i t s t i l l experienced the greatest absolute growth i n this period. It started the period as the most important area and finished i t i n the same manner. None of the then existing areas have ever replaced i t as a pig iron producing region. The abso-lute gap of production was actually widening between i t and each of the other three regions. The Central Urals production i n this period quadrupled and certain plants emerged as major ^producers while others disappeared. 54 Livshits, op. c i t . , table 20 \"The Distribution of Ferrous Metallurgy i n the Urals i n 1913\", p. 120. 39. Alapaevsk, Kushvinsk, Nizhne Tagil*sk and Nizhne Saldinsk emerged as the most important pig iron producers i n this region. They were associated with superior ore resources - the Alapaevsk deposit and the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group of deposits. These four plants produced 34 per cent of the total Central Urals pig iron smelt by 1913, more than the total 1800 smelt. They produced 44 per cent of the steel as well in 1913. If the two other major steel plants - Verkhne Isetsk and Verkhne Saldinsk - are added, the total for steel reaches 61 per cent. Verkhne Isetsk was located at Sverdlovsk with i t s major market and was a steel only plant. Verkhne Saldinsk was also a steel only plant associated with the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group of iron and steel plants, notably Nizhne Tagilsk which had excess pig iron capacity. Thus by 1913 the iron and steel industry i n the Central Urals had proved most successful where iron ore resources were the most suitable except i n the case of the Verkhne Isetsk plant which served the Sverdlovsk steel market. The South Central Urals underwent a sevenfold increase i n the smelt of pig iron. Three plants emerged as major pig iron 55 producers - Zlatoust, Satkinsk and Ashinsk. By 1913, they pro-duced 54 per cent of the pig iron of the region or over three This was the Zlatoust metallurgical plant which pro-duced a l l of the Zlatoust pig iron as compared with the Zlatoust mechanical plant which produced the steel. 40. times the 1800 total. A l l were associated with the major Bakal'sk iron ore deposit. They were on the Ufa to Chelyabinsk portion of the Trans Siberian Railway which had been completed to 56 Chelyabinsk i n 1893. There were only two major steel plants i n this subregion i n 1913 - Ashinsk and Beloretsk. Between them they smelted two-thirds of the total steel. Ashinsk was one of the three major pig iron producers and Beloretsk was linked by a direct r a i l line to them, but was one hundred kilometers further South. The reasons Beloretsk was im-portant was that i t had a highly developed metal r o l l i n g operation and the steel plant supplied i t . It was one of the oldest plants i n the Urals, but by 1913 had lost most of i t s significance as a pig iron producer: and the other operations remained important largely through inertia and the i n i t i a t i v e of the local manage-_ 57 ment. The Western Urals underwent a twelvefold increase in the smelting of pig iron. Three plants emerged as significant pig iron producers - Chusovsk, Teplogorsk and Pashiysk. Between them they accounted for 84 per cent of the subregional pig iron smelt. These plants were close to the Tagilo-Kushvinsk ore reserves on the most direct r a i l line between the deposits and Perm1. There 56Komar, op., c i t . . pp. 107-108, 117. 57 Vvedenskiy, op. c i t . , vol. 4, p. 464. 41. were four major steel plants i n the Western Orals by 1913, the Chusovsk plant, Lys'vensk and Chermozsk and Dobrayansk. These four accounted for 71 per cent of the regional steel smelt. Chusovsk was also an important pig iron producer and i t , and the neighboring Lys'vensk were both near Perm' as were Chermozsk and Dobryansk. Thus three of the four major steel plants were market oriented. This was the only region where steel production ex-ceeded pig iron production, and i t was three times as great as pig iron production. Its production was predominantly market oriented and the major producers grew up adjacent to the major market - Perm' and also along transportation routes - the Chusovaya and Kama rivers. The Northern Urals, for a l l intents and purposes, was inaugurated i n 1894 when the Nadezhdinsk plant was started into operation. The Nadezhdinsk plant was located far from the esta-blished metallurgical centres, i n the North LUrals, near the remaining forest reserves. This was the largest and technically most advanced metallurgical works i n the Urals before the revolution. By 1913, Nadezhdinsk was producing 19 per cent of the iron and 16 per cent of the steel of the Urals. It was based on char-coal production but because i t employed modern technology, had an efficient scale of operations and depended on an abundant wood 58 Livshits, op. c i t . . pp. 115-129. 2 k2. THE COMING OF THE RAILWAYS, 1873-1898 \u2022 MAJOR PLANTS BUILT DURING THE L A S T Q U A R T E R OF T H E N I N E T E E N T H CENTURY w 1873-1878 \u2014I\u2014 1885-1893 I89I4.-I896 43. THE COMING OF THE RAILWAYS-1873-1898 LEGEND Ch Chusovsk (1879) T Teplogorsk (1884) S Sos'vinsk (1880-5) N Nadezhdinsk (1894) Z Zigazinsk (1890s) A Ashinsk (1898) Sources: Komar, op. c i t . . pp. 107, 108, 117; Atlas I s t o r i i . Chast* II, f i g . 17, \"Rasvitie Kapitalizma v Rossii s 1861 po 1900g.\"; Kratkava Geograficheskava Entsiklopediva. vo. 1, p. 172; and Bol'shava Sovetskava Entsiklopediva. vol. 38, p. 596. M A J O R P L A N T S . - 1 9 1 3 MAP 13 150,000 TONS l Q 3 0 , 0 0 0 TONS \u2022 OTHER MAJOR P L A N T S 7.5 , . .0 75 150 225 KM. CENTRAL URALS \u00bb SOUTH CENTRAL URALS C D WESTERN URALS ^ NORTHERN URALS Sources: L i v s h i t s , p. 120; Komar, p. 129\u00bb 45 MAJOR PLANTS - 1913 LEGEND N = Nadezhdinsk (Serov) E = Eka t erinburg(Sverdlovsk) P = Pashiysk Ash= Ashinsk (Asha-Balashovsk) NT = Nizhne Tagil 1sk S = Satkinsk NS = Nizhne Saldinsk Z = Zlatoust A = Alapaevsk B = Beloretsk 46. R E G I O N A L D I S T R I B U T I O N O F P R O D U C T I O N Sources: L i v s h i t s , p. 120; Komar, p. 129. 47. supply i t was very economical, being one of the better operations i n Russia. This is the most clear cut example of a plant being esta-blished in relation to a fuel resource, rather than an ore re-source or a market. It is the only major plant i n the Urals that is so located, being some 150 kilometers from i t s original ore source and at least as far from any potential market at that time. TABLE I INTRAREGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IRON AND STEEL, 1800-1913 SUBREGION 1800 1913 pig iron iron pig iron steel 1,000 tons % 1,000 tons % 1,000 tons % 1,000 tons % Central Urals 91 70 48 396 44 325 36 South Central Urals 30 23 25 207 23 132 15 Western i, Urals - ' 8 6 26 92 10 287 32 Northern Urals - - - 198 22 146 16 TOTAL 129 99 99 893 99 890 99 Note: Percentage totals do not quite equal 100 per cent because some production i s unassigned as to region; and also because of rounding. Sources: Komar, op. c i t . . pp. 85, 87, 92-93; and Livshits, op. c i t . . p. 120. 48. IV. ABSOLUTE DECLINE During the First World War production increases were ordered and new construction was undertaken. However the total pig iron smelt declined from 920,000 tons i n 1913 to 750,000 in 1916, and 720,000 i n 1917. Substantial changes occurred i n the product assortment with c i v i l production (roofing iron, r a i l s ) being strongly curtailed and military production (variety rolled products, wire, rolling stockoetc.) increased. The total quantity of workers rose, however their productivity f e l l 59 sharply. The main reasons for this were conscription and des-ertion which by 1915 had caused the loss of 60 per cent of the experienced workers.^ Thus this period began with a gradual decline i n production caused by the dislocations of war. By 1914 the production of pig iron had declined to 720,000 tons or 80 per cent of i t s 1913 level, and steel to 830,000 tons or 92 per cent of i t s 1913 level. Then i n 1918 came a collapse of production associated with the uncertainties of c i v i l war and the breakdown of c i v i l admini-stration during the institution of War Communism. Thus in 1918 production of pig iron f e l l to slightly over one-third of the previous year's total and production of steel f e l l to less than one-fifth of the previous year's total. From 1919 to 1922\/23 59 Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . . pp. 557-559. 60 Osintsev, op. c i t . . p. 21. 49. inclusive, the production of pig iron was below 20 per cent of the 1913 level; and the production of steel was below 20 per cent of the 1913 level from 1918 to 1921\/22 inclusive. With the establishment of NEP (New Economic Policy) i n 1922, and the reinstitution of c i v i l order, production steadily climbed back toward the 1913 level. Pig iron production increased by about 100,000 tons per year. Steel recovered at a somewhat faster rate, due to the abundance of scrap and the possibility of using i t as a raw material in steel making. Thus by 1923\/24 iron production had reached 250,000 tons or 28 per cent of i t s 1913 level and steel had reached 310,000 tons or 35 per cent of i t s 1913 l e v e l . 6 1 1924 and the f i r s t switch to Kuznets coke marked the be-ginning of the permanent decline of charcoal metallurgy. For some years after 1924 charcoal production was augmented i n absolute terms but i t continually lost relative position. By 1928 iron and steel production had approximately re-gained the 1913 level, iron was s t i l l somewhat short of this but steel production had more than made good the former level. The explanation behind this difference i n rate of recovery was the greater use of scrap i n steel making partly because of techno-logical changes but essentially accounted for by the super-abundance of scrap resulting from the c i v i l war (1918-1920). 61 Livshits, op. c i t . , table 27, \"Production of Pig Iron and Steel by Regions of USSR i n 1913-1921\"; and table 30\/Pro-duction of Pig Iron and Steel i n 1913-1927\/28\", pp.134-140-141. 50. It is doubtful i f any scrap occasioned by the German in -vasion ever got as far as the Urals, and as a matter of fact, there was l i t t l e serious fighting i n the Urals during the c i v i l war, but the period of stagnation and unrest occasioned by this caused a great deal of plant to become -^unusable because of lack of maintenance. This was the primary source of scrap for the Urals i n the immediate post c i v i l war period. In 1928, the First Five Year Plan was initiated with the crippling German advance into the Ukraine a recent memory. To for e s t a l l the repetition of such an experience, i t was deemed advisable to develop another major metallurgical region and the Urals seemed to be the obvious choice for several reasons. It had sizable proven ore resources, was distant from the frontiers, but f a i r l y close to the major industrial regions of the Soviet Union. Rapid absolute decline in charcoal metallurgy set i n after 1935 when 850,000 tons of charcoal pig iron were produced. By 1940, this was down to less than 360,000 tons. There was a con-siderable shift i n the old plants from charcoal to coke technology. The production of charcoal pig iron declined from 870,000 tons i n 1913 to 470,000 in 1938. Coke pig iron production increased from 29,000 tons to 370,000 tons i n the old plants during this 62 period. In 1936, 36 blast furnaces operated on charcoal, by 62 Livshits, op. c i t . . p. 167. 51. 1940, this was down to 8. One of the old regions - the Central Urals, and one of the major producers i n the Western Urals -Lys'vensk were converted from charcoal to,coke. In areas where the wood supply was better, charcoal metallurgy persisted. Some of the plants even underwent consi-derable expansion, although i n some cases this was on the basis of coke. But for charcoal metallurgy to co-exist with coke metal-lurgy in the same plant indicates a not too unfavorable cost structure. Regions which retained charcoal metallurgy i n signi-ficant plants were: the South Central Urals, the Northern Urals and the Western Urals. The South Central Urals had experienced some relative decline with the inauguration of the Magnitogorsk Plant, but had actually managed to slightly increase i t s share of metal r o l l i n g . The regional smelt of pig iron had increased from 205,000 tons (23 per cent of the Urals) to only 215,000 tons (9 per cent) i n 1938, and i t s smelt of steel had increased from 130,000 tons (15 per cent) to 400,000 tons (14 per cent). Concentration of production proceeded. The major plants - Zlatoust, Ashinsk, Satkinsk and Beloretsk increased their share of the pig iron production from 59 per cent to 100 per cent. Actually Zlatoust produced 19 per cent i n 1913 and later dropped production entirely. Therefore, Ashinsk, Satkinsk and Beloretsk increased from 40 per cent to 100 per cent of the almost station-ary production. Ashinsk and Satkinsk were associated with the 52. superior Bakal'sk ore source which was slightly better than the Tagilo-Kushvinsk ore supply i n regard to ore quality. Satkinsk was only a few kilometers from Bakal'sk and Ashinsk was a 63 relatively new plant, having been constructed i n 1898, which was within reasonable distance of Bakal'sk. Beloretsk was associated with the Zigazino-Komarovskoe ore source which con-tained adequate reserves of 40 per cent limonite. These were the only two major ore sources in the region. In the production of steel the four major plants had i n -creased from 75 per cent of the total to 97 per cent. Actually Satkinsk had dropped steel production, but i t had only produced 5 per cent of the regional total i n 1913 i n any case. Ashinsk had increased a scant 10,000 tons for a relative decline from 37 per cent to 14 per cent and Beloretsk had more than doubled, but declined from 33 per cent to 27 per cent; and Zlatoust had risen from 0 to 214,000 tons (53 per cent) to make i t by far the largest producer i n the region. Thus Satkinsk produced only pig iron and Ashinsk produced a surplus of pig iron. Both plants supplied Zlatoust with pig iron. The capacity of Satkinsk Was augmented by 70,000 tons of pig iron and Zlatoust by 230,000 tons of steel, instead of establishing one entirely new integrated works. 63 A. A. Grigor'ev, Kratkava Geograficheskava Entsiklo- pediva. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatel'stvo \"Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya\", 1960, vol. I, p. 172. 53. These piecemeal additions to capacity helped perpetuate both of these plants rather than the alternative establishment of one more efficient plant which was certainly feasible, even given the d i f f i c u l t y of finding a suitable site i n this moun-tainous area. As Satkinsk was i t s e l f about 15 kilometers distant from i t s ore source, and twice as much new capacity was added to i t s existing plant, i t could have been otherwise situated. Zlatoust, even more than Satkinsk, could have been other-wise located because a l l of i t s steel capacity was newly built i n this period. There i s no question that major increases i n cap-acity were desirable in the general Bakal'sk-Chelyabinsk area, given the local ore and market situation. This need was not properly supplied u n t i l the 1940's when the Chelyabinsk plant was developed to succeed the earlier inefficient piecemeal measures. Beloretsk had a balanced pig iron and steel production. Beloretsk, on the basis of i t s location, would appear to have been the obvious plant to link up with the new Magnitogorsk plant but at the time i t was not linked by a-direct..-rail line and i t s local ore source was adequate for i t s own needs. Therefore, other plants, notably Zlatoust and Verkhne Isetsk, had much closer relations with the superior Magnitogorsk pig iron supply, which was not completely u t i l i z e d at site. The Northern Urals pig iron production increased from 199,000 tons (22 per cent of the Urals total) i n 1913 to 236,000 54. tons (1G per cent) i n 1938. Therefore, i t s growth was not impressive and with the emergence of Magnitogorsk i t s relative 64 position declined. Its steel production doubled in the same period, but also experienced a relative decline from 16 per cent to 10 per cent, which was not as large as i n pig iron. Possibly the most significant development i n the region was the alteration of the name Nadezhdinsk to Serov, which indicates that this plant was s t i l l a showpiece of sorts. The Western Urals smelted i t s pig iron on charcoal throughout the 1913-1938 period. Production only increased from 92,000 tons to 110,000 tons and experienced a relative decline from 10 per cent to 5 per cent of the Urals smelt. The Chusovsk Plant increased i t s share pf the Western Uralian total from 25 per cent to 85 per cent and thus became the predominant producer. It managed to displace i t s 1913 rivals - Teplogorsk and Pashiysk because i t was much better situated with regard to the Lys'vensk and Perm' markets. Lys'vensk required pig iron for steel making and Perm' required finished steel. It was also an integrated plant which made i t a more efficient producer. The steel production of the Western Urals experienced a decline from 287,000 tons to 267,000. Nine thousand tons of the 1913 total came from Omutninsk, which through boundary changes \u2014 Production increased from 146,000 tons i n 1913 to 286,000 tons i n 1938. 55. ended up outside of the Urals, therefore, the figures are not entirely comparable. But when the coke based Lys'vensk is subtracted from the 1938 total, that leaves only 148,000 tons of charcoal steel. Of this 148,000 tons, 81,000 or, 55 per cent, was produced by Chusovsk, where in fact, production had increased less than 5 per cent. The other two large steel plants Chermozsk and Dobryansk had experienced a similar increase. These three supplied a l l of the charcoal steel of the region. Thus they had increased from 63 per cent of the non-Lys'vensk total to 100 per cent because the other steel plants had all:;.ceased production during this period. In the Western Urals the charcoal steel smelting declined with the disappearance of such plants as Votkinsk not being com-pensated for by the marginal increases in the plants retained. The plants retained were near the important Perm1 market and were relatively large, but they had to work on scrap and imported pig iron to a considerable degree, there being no suitable iron ore source closer than the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group. By 1940, there were only eight charcoal blast furnaces l e f t . The Central Urals had one at the Verkhne-Sinyachikhinsk Plant producing casting pig iron. The South Central Urals had five furnaces; two at Satkinsk smelting high quality pig iron for acid open hearth steel making, two at Belorets and one at Ashinsk smelting regular pig iron for open hearth steel making. 56. The Northern Urals (the Serov Plant) contained one charcoal furnace which smelted chrome pig iron and the Teplogorsk Plant 65 in the Western Urals had one smelting chrome nickel pig iron. The only region that contained more than a single charcoal blast furnace i n 1940 was the South Central Urals which had five, three of which were producing common pig iron. The reason for this is that charcoal smelting was developed in this region later than the Central Urals and the Western Urals. Thus this appears to be the most backward iron and steel region prewar. The six plants, retaining charcoal blast furnaces to 1940, were i n the less accessible parts of the Urals, away from the earliest major routeway along the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset1. Only in the more mountainous and remote areas did sufficient timber survive to supply i t . The Urals output of charcoal-based iron continued to drop after the war. In 1956, only two charcoal producing units were l e f t . One blast furnace i n the Staro-Utkinsk Plant in the Central Urals smelting chrome nickel pig iron, and one blast furnace i n the Serov Plant smelting forging iron. These two blast furnaces smelted in a l l 78,000 tons of charcoal pig iron, or 0.6 per cent 66 of the total Uralian pig iron production. 65 Livshits, op. c i t . . pp. 165-166 6 6 I b i d . . p. 209. 5 7 MAJOR IRON AND STEEL PLANTS - LATE 1930's <D H00.000 TONS CHARCOAL AND COKE <jp FOREST COVER O c l O O . O O O TONS CHARCOAL AND COKE 58 MAJOR IRON AND STEEL PLANTS - LATE 1930s LEGEND s = Serov (Nadezhdinsk) V-I = Verkhne-Isetsk Ch = Chusovsk Sa = Satkinsk L = Lys'vensk Z = Zlatoust NT = Nizhne Tagil'sk B = Beloretsk NS = Nizhne Saldinsk Sources: Komar, oj>. c i t . , map facing p. 52; Balzak, op. c i t . . f i g . 33, p. 249; Livshits, op. c i t . , p. 167; Geograficheskiv  Atlas diva 7 & 8 Klassov Srednev Shkoly. op. c i t . . p. 36; and Bol'shava Sovetskaya Atlas Mira. op. c i t . , pp. 69-70. 59. CHARCOAL PIG IRON PRODUCERS - 1940-1956 60. CHARCOAL PIG IRON PRODUCERS - 1940-1956 - LEGEND S = Serov B = St a r o u t k i n s k T = Teplogorsk St = Satkinsk V-S = Verkhne-Sinyachikhinsk Sa = Ashinsk A = Be l o r e t s k Source: L i v s h i t s , op. c i t . , pp. 165-166, 209. 61. Since 1940, five of the six plants then operating to some extent on charcoal had ceased to do so and the one remaining -Serov - had switched from producing chrome pig iron to forging iron. The other 1956 charcoal producer, Staro-Utkinsk had not been operating -inco. 1940. V. SUMMARY In the charcoal era the location of production altered for several reasons. Easy access to transportation routes was always necessary as was a good supply of timber. A ready avail-a b i l i t y of iron ore was desirable but not s t r i c t l y necessary as i s illustrated by the development of iron refining along the Chusovaya transportation route based on Central Uralian pig iron. In the early period the Bashkirs made penetration into the Southern Urals impossible. After the Bashkir power was destroyed (by approximately 1755) the smelting of iron spread to the tree limit along the Belaya-Miass river systems. Production pene-trated to the Northern Urals at about the same time because transportation d i f f i c u l t i e s had retarded i t s development. Forest exhaustion and advances i n coke technology caused the price of charcoal iron to become no longer competitive. But i t was not u n t i l the 1920's that common grades of charcoal pig iron became uneconomical to produce. Specialty grades remained competitive with coke smelted metal considerably longer. Forest 62. exhaustion affected the Central Urals and the Western Urals regions f i r s t . These were the earliest established regions. Thus coke began replacing charcoal i n the Central Urals and the Western Urals regions before the introduction of large scale coke metal-lurgy at Magnitogorsk. But charcoal metallurgy persisted i n the more remote areas such as the South Central Urals and the Northern Urals long after Magnitogorsk appeared. These regions had better forest supplies because of the more recent establishment of charcoal metallurgy within their borders. They were also more d i f f i c u l t to supply with coking coals because of their location away from the major r a i l routes. The last remnants of charcoal metallurgy persisted at those plants that produced specialty metal. The charcoal plants that had suitable ore bases were converted to coke, those that did not were closed. CHAPTER III 63. \"THE RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY The raw material supply i s the most important locational factor i n the Soviet iron and steel industry. In order to de-termine the nature of the raw material supply in the Urals extensive use of Soviet materials, both book and periodical,is necessary. This examination is organized topically into iron ore, coal and auxiliary materials supplies. I. IRON ORE The Nature of the Ores In 1959 the probable Uralian iron ore reserves were estimated to be 5,900,000,000 tons, but the average iron content of these ores was only 23 per cent.** The bulk of the increase in ore reserves from the 1938 figure of 2,400,000,000 tons was accounted for by considering as ore, lower content iron bearing bodies. If only the better ores are considered, the reserves in 1956 were only 1,800,000,000 tons or considerably less than the 1938 figure. The Uralian ores are extremely varied as to genesis, age and composition. They include magnetite, limonite, titano -magnetite and complex ores. In 1955 the reserves of magnetite together with martite and semimartite amounted to 860,000,000 .. *V. B. Khlebnikov, op. c i t , . p. 16. 6It. tons or 15 per cent of the total probable reserves. Magnetite and associated ores are worked at Magnitogorsk; Mount Blagodat1 and Mount Vysokaya of the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group; and the Perv, Vtoro and Tret' Severn mines of the Serovo-Ivdel'sk group among others. These deposits have relatively high iron contents (generally 40 to 50 per cent Fe). Limonites are also widely worked in the Urals. Limonites provide the basis of the Bakal'sk, Komarovo-Zigazinsk (Bashkirsk), Alapaevsk, and Kamensk-Sinarsk groups of deposits and many small deposits scattered throughout the Gorno-Ural and i t s slopes. Its iron content i s somewhat less than magnetite, but a s i g n i f i -cant proportion of the ores has 40 to 45 per cent and higher Fe content (for example, the Bakal'sk group). In conjunction with the limonite occur larger lean iron siderites (primary ores). In 1955 the reserves of the siderites and limonites amounted to 400,000,000 tons or 7 per cent of the Uralian ore reserves. The largest deposits of titano-magnetite are: the Kachkanarsk group, Visimsk, Pervoural'sk, Kusinsk and Kopansk deposits. The Uralian titano magnetites are a mixture of magne-t i t e iron with ilmenite and contain besides iron, titanium and vanadium^ They have only recently been u t i l i z e d with preliminary beneficiation of ores resulting in the production of iron (magnetite) and titanium (ilmenite) concentrates. The reserves of titano magnetites i n the Urals are enormous - in 1955 65. 2 estimated to be 4,200,000,000 tons or 74 per cent of the total Uralian ore resources. The richer iron, vanadium and titanium deposits are of solid ores (Kusinsk), but the preponderance of titano magnetite consists of impregnated ores with a small iron content, (17 per cent). The Urals have an abundance of complex iron ores including chromium, nickel, copper and cobalt admixtures. Iron i n i t s turn occurs as a component of copper, aluminum, pyrite and other com-plex ores. A peculiar industrial ore of the Urals i s the iron-chrome-nickel ore of the Khalilovsk group of deposits. In 1955 complex iron ores accounted for 230,000,000 tons or 4 per 3 cent of the Uralian reserves. Uralian ores are frequently troubled by a high sulphur content, but some of the ores are conspicuously free from harmful admixtures. The better Bakal'sk ore i s almost sulphur free and contains only one thousandth part phosphorus. The titano-magne-t i t e has an extremely low content of sulphur and phosphorus as well. S t i l l almost a l l of the iron ores of the Urals require some type of preliminary preparation for smelting - screening, By 1962 Kachkanar reserves were estimated to be eight b i l l i o n tons. P. Kazakov, \"Establish More Quickly the New Ore Base for the Metallurgy of the UralsJ\" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. Moskva, 15 January 1962 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (24)\", Joint Publications Research Service, 13,018, 16 March 1962, p. 5. 3 In addition to these, there are the recently discovered complex Serovsk ores which contain iron, chromium and nickel and, what is more, are comparatively free of phosphorus. In 1957 66. washing, roasting, magnetic separation, sintering and so forth. The Nature of the Deposits The iron resources of the Urals occur i n a large number of various sized deposits scattered throughout the region. In the Urals there are in total about 2000 deposits, 1200 of which are located i n Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Permsk Oblast's. However, 99 per cent of the reserves are concentrated i n ten iron ore regions or groups of deposits. The chief deposits are located along the boundaries of the Central Urals Anticline and the Magnitogorsk-Nizhne Tagil'sk Syncline. Thus the preponderance of reserves - 1955 over five b i l l i o n tons 4 (88.3 per cent) - are on the Eastern slopes. Although characteristic earlier, this predominance was reinforced by the exploration of the titano -magnetite deposits. Important shifts have occurred between the iron ore re-serves of the Southern and Central Urals. In the prewar period (in 1938) the Southern Uralian reserves were estimated to be 1,500,000,000 tons (64 per cent) and the Central Urals -850,000,000 tons (36 per cent); by 1956, the Southern Uralian reserves had experienced an absolute decline to 900,000,000 tons, these reserves were estimated to exceed a b i l l i o n tons, but new treatment methods must be found before these ores can be used. 4 The American b i l l i o n of 1,000,000,000 i s used here and throughout the study. 67. but the Central Urals had increased to 4,800,000,000 tons. But for an accurate appraisal of the raw material basis of metallurgy i t i s necessary to take into account the proximity of the Southern Urals to the Kazakhstan iron ore regions. The iron ore reserves are very concentrated i n the Urals. The Kachkanar, Gusevye (Kachkanarsk group), Magnitnaya, Blagodat', Vysokaya, Shaytansk Magnit and the group of ore-bearing mountains of Bakal' contain more than nine-tenths of a l l the iron ore re-serves, of which more than two-thirds of the reserves are in Kachkanar. In addition there are a series of iron ore regions composed of a great number of small deposits which complicates their ex-ploitation (Alapaevsk, Kamensk-Sinarsk, Bashkirsk, and Serovo-Ivdel'sk regions).\"* Production One of the more pronounced features of the Uralian mining industry during the Reconstruction Period (1922-1928) was mine enlargement. Three hundred minute open pit mines were replaced by 22 mines of only 60,000 tons average annual output each. Effort, was concentrated on the development of industrial iron ore reserves i n the Tagilo-Kushvinsk region, in the Bakal'sk Komar, op. c i t , pp. 217-219. 68. Alapaevsk, Magnitogorsk and Sinarsk deposits. Then a series of large concentrators were constructed.^ Uralian iron ore pro-duction increased from 1,800,000 tons in 1913 to 8,100,000 tons in 1940. Ore production reached 25,000,000 tons of dressed ore or 34,800,000 tons of crude ore i n 1955. In 1955, the production of magnetite and the products of i t s modification amounted to more than 24,000,000 tons or over 70 per cent of the total iron ore output. Limonite and siderite accounted for about seven million tons (20 per cent), titano-magnetite - three million tons (8 per cent) and complex ores - less than a million tons (2 per cent). The most noteworthy economic reserves are the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group, Magnitogorsk deposit, Bakal'sk, Khalilovsk and Kachkanar groups. The f i r s t three with reserves of about one b i l l i o n tons (16.8 per cent of Uralian reserves i n 1955) provided 29,100,000 tons or 83.7 per cent of the ore output i n 1955 and the fourth was just commencing operations. No other reserves were extensive enough to be considered good sources except the Visimo-Pervoural'sk group which was of marginal quality. In 1955 the production of ore was very differently d i s t r i -buted than the reserves. Almost half of the output (46.5 per cent) ^Osintsev, op. c i t . . pp. 33, 41. ^For example the Magnitogorsk, Goroblagodatsk, Lebyazhinsk, Serovsk and Kusinsk operations. 69. came from Magnitogorsk (with only 5.7 per cent of the total reserves). It was producing ore at a rate (sixteen million tons g a year) that would exhaust the probable reserves (three hundred 9 million tons) i n about twenty years. The Tagilo-Kushvinsk group supplied another 25 per cent, or about eight million tons, but i t s known reserves would last over f i f t y years at that rate, ample time to amortize the equipment based on i t . The Bakal'sk group supplied 12.2 per cent or about four million tons a year and could u t i l i z e this reserve for f i f t y years at that rate. The Khalilovsk reserves were just coming into production, therefore, these reserves were not being effectively u t i l i z e d . The Visimo-Pervoural*sk titano magnetite was supplying about 1,500,000 tons, and could keep production going at that rate for some two hundred years, but with rather low quality ores. The Kachkanar reserves were not being u t i l i z e d at a l l because of their low quality. Therefore, most of the suitable reserves were being either f u l l y u t i l i z e d or over-utilized except for Orsk Khalilovsk which was more marginal, and where major production was just beginning, and Kachkanar where development began i n 1957. In 1955, 34,800,000 tons of crude ore were produced which Komar, p_>_ c i t . . pp. 216-219, 221-222; and Kutaf'ev, OP. c i t . . pp. 574-576. 9 Osintsev, opT c i t . . p. 134. 70. were reduced to 25,000,000 tons of either high grade or bene-ficiated o r e . 1 0 On the basis of this about 13,000,000 tons of pig iron were produced. 1 1 The average iron content in the ore was low by Soviet standards. But the Uralian ore was compara-tively cheaply produced (i. e . considerably cheaper than Krivoy Rog ore, which on the average was richer, but deeper and more d i f f i c u l t to extract), and supplied a good raw material base for the 1955 level of production. No appreciable expansion could be undertaken without either turning to low grade 17 per cent ores of bringing i n raw materials because a modem iron and steel plant requires something i n the order of three hundred million to four hundred million 12 tons of ore for amortization purposes and only Kachkanar had that much uncommitted reserves. The course taken was to both bring i n Sokolov-Sarbaysk ores to the Southern Urals and to use the Kachkanar deposits in the Central Urals. By 1959 the supplying of ores from the neighboring Kustanay deposits had reached an appreciable level for the Chelyabinsk Plant, and the Magnitogorsk Combine was to 1 0Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . . p. 576 \u2022^In the Urals 11,900,000 tons were produced and about 1,000,000 tons of Kuznets production was based on Magnitogorsk ore. Twenty per cent of the ore requirements were supplied by Uralian ore in 1953, but as the ore was much richer than local ore, i t probably accounted for about 40 per cent of the output total of some 2,600,000 tons i n 1956. 1 2 L i v s h i t s , opj. c i t . . p. 32. 71. 13 use i t to supplement the local deposits. By July 1961, the Sokolov-Sarbaysk deposits had supplied ten million tons of ore, 14 mostly to Chelyabinsk. Construction had started at Kachkanar in 1957 but the Kachkanar plant did not produce i t s f i r s t con-centrate u n t i l mid-1963.^ Evaluation of Supply Originally the iron and steel industry was established in the Urals because of i t s iron ore resources. But now the Urals i s becoming an iron ore deficiency area. The greater part of the substantial increase of reserves in the past twenty years i s due to the consideration of ever poorer sources. A l l the same, exhaustion of resources i s just becoming a major problem because the only really large scale production has been i n the last few decades. Also the over optimistic appraisal of quantity and quality of resources has helped i n this matter -for example at Magnitogorsk, where trouble is becoming acute. This has forced the use of the best ores i n Northern Kazakhstan to supply the Southern Urals. This should tend to enhance the position of these plants. Also i t w i l l be possible to use the existing type of plants. The export of Magnitogorsk ores, which presently aggravates the problem, to the Kuznets 13 Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . . p. 577. 14 V. Buresh, \"Posrednik i i i R a s p o r y a d i t e l ' I z v e s t i v a . Moskva, 4 July 1961, p. 3. 72. Metallurgical Combine, which started more than a quarter of a century ago, i s slated to be decreased, being replaced by Siberian 16 ores, with possible use of Sokolov-Sarbaysk ores i n the interim. 1 7 The development of Kachkanar w i l l enable the Central Urals to stop importing ore, a measure i t has been recently forced to adopt. Therefore, in the long run Nizhne Tagil'sk w i l l be well provided with ore from the Kachkanar and Tagilo-Kushvinsk sources, and Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk w i l l increasingly depend on Sokolov-Sarbaysk ores. The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine w i l l in a l l probability never reach the status of the three largest oper-ations. Serov w i l l increase i t s share of the total output because of i t s chrome nickel iron ores and Chusovsk w i l l become more important with the supply of raw material from Kachkanar. In the f i n a l analysis there w i l l be a worsening i n the Uralian iron ore supply. Both the Sokolov-Sarbaysk and Kachkanar ores w i l l be more expensive than the sources they w i l l augment i 18 and replace. ^P. Kazakov, op. c i t . , pp. 5, 6; and D. Markish, \"Kachkanar - Town for Trail-Blazers,\" Soviet Union. No. 163, 1963, p. 18. 16 17 Komar, op. c i t . . pp. 220-221; Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 19. *\"^ V. B. Khlebnikov, pp. c i t . . pp. 131-132. 73. TABLE II THE URALIAN IRON ORE SUPPLY REGION DEPOSIT TYPE OF ORE IRON CONTENT (in worked ore) RESERVES (Millions of tons-1956) PRODUCTION (millions of tons -1955) Northern Urals Serovo-Ivdel'sk magnetite & limonite 37-57% 60 1.5 Central Urals Tagilo-Kushvinsk magnetite martite & semi-martite 30-40% 440 8.7 Visimo-Pervoural' sk titano-magnetite 17-50% 300 1.9 Alapaevsk limonite 38-41% 50 0.45 Kachkanar titano-magnetite - 3,900 -Kamensk-Sinarsk limonite \u2014 60 \u2014 Southern Urals Magnito-gorsk magnetite 34-59% 300 16.2 Bakal 1sk limonite siderite 32-45% 210 4.25 Khalilovsk complex iron-chrome-nickel ores 30-40% 260 0.6 Bashkir limonite 41-42% 110 0.5 Other Deposits - - 60 0.7 Kazakh Kustanay magnetite limonite 36-60% 34-38% 4,900 -TOTAL 10.650 34.8 Sources: Komar, op., ext., pp. 216,219; Osintsev, op. c i t . . pp. 125-139; Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . , p. 576; and I.P. Bardin, Zhelezo- rudnava Baza Chernov Metallurgii SSSR. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1957, pp. 315-317. 7k. CHIEF IRON ORE PRODUCERS - 1955 i i \u2022 ^ 8 , 000 ,000 TONS \u00a3 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 TONS ^ 1 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 TONS \u2022 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 TONS \u2022\u00bb ORE FLOW FROM M I N E TO O C H I E F M A R K E T S M A R K E T 75 CHIEF IRON ORE PRODUCERS - 1955 - LEGEND M = Magnitogorsk deposit O-Kh = Orsk-Khalilovsk T-K = Tagilo-Kushvinsk group Z-K = Zigazino-Komarovskoe B = Bakal'sk A = Alapaevsk P = Pervouralsk I = Ivdel'sk Bo = Bogoslovsk Sources: Kutaf'ev, OP. c i t . . pp. 574-575; Ekonomicheskaya Karta Urala - \"Rossiyskaya Federatsiya\", Geografgiz, Moskva, 1959; and Livshits, op. c i t . p. 64. 76. I I . COAL General The Urals i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y depends on imported c o a l from the Kuzbass and Karaganda Basins. The Kuzbass c o a l u n f o r t u n a t e l y has a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n of coking c o a l i n 19 20 i t s m i x t u r e , and Karaganda s u f f e r s from a h i g h ash content. A p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t e source, the Pechora B a s i n , i s c o n s i d e r a b l y c l o s e r to the Northern U r a l s at l e a s t , than e i t h e r of these, but 21 i t s c o a l i s expensive to mine. This e x p l a i n s why t h i s c o a l has not been u t i l i z e d i n the Urals before t h i s , and, i n f a c t , there i s s t i l l not d i r e c t r a i l l i n k i n s p i t e of much t a l k on the matter. The U r a l s could a l s o conceivably be s u p p l i e d from the Donbass, 22 but these are high-sulphur, and by now expensive coals to 23 mine, and markedly i n f e r i o r to Kuzbass and somewhat i n f e r i o r to 19 N. Jasny, \"Prospects of the I r o n and S t e e l I n d u s t r y \" , S o v i e t S t u d i e s . January 1963, p. 290. 20 I . P. B a r d i n , Ekonomika Chernov M e t a l l u r g i i SSSR. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoe I z d a t e l ' s t v o L i t e r a t u r y po Chernoy i Tsvetnoy M e t a l l u r g i i , 1960, p. 227. 21 Jasny claims the Vorkuta (Pechora Basin) coke ( o r the r e s p e c t i v e amounts of coking c o a l ) costs not l e s s , and p o s s i b l y more, to produce at the mine than the p r i c e of Kuznetsk coke d e l i v e r e d to the U r a l s . Jasny, op. c i t . . p. 291. 22 The i n s i g n i f i c a n t sulphur content of the Kuznetsk coke makes i t p o s s i b l e to smelt i r o n without i n t r o d u c i n g manganese ore i n t o the b l a s t furnace charge, w h i l e about 100 kg of manganese are used per ton of i r o n when Donets coke i s used i n the b l a s t furnace process. Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 7. 23 Donbass coking coals cost 55 to 60 rubles more to mine than Kuzbass and Karaganda c o a l s . I b i d . . p. 8. 77. Karaganda c o a l s . ^ Local Supply Reserves. Uralian coking coal i s only of minor signi-ficance, but for a balanced appraisal of the energy base i t must be kept in mind that the Urals ars: located more favorably in relation to the zone of cheap fuel and energy of the USSR, than the largest old industrial regions (the Center and the North West). In 1938, the Urals (with Kurgansk Oblast') had possible coal reserves estimated at 7,700,000,000 tons. Since then new deposits have been explored and overstated estimates of reserves have been reduced. In 1955, the total possible reserves of the Urals were estimated at 5,500,000,000 tons with probable reserves of 4,000,000,000 tons. Since almost 80 per cent of this i s brown coal, there is only approximately 800,000,000 tons of bitumi-nous coal. Coal deposits are scattered on both slopes of the Uralian mountains. Bituminous coal i s related basically to coal bearing deposits of lower carboniferous age. These deposits trend i n discontinuous strips through the Western slopes of the Northern and Central Urals, and also through the Central and Southern parts of the Eastern foothills. The calo r i c i t y of coal reaches The average consumption of coking coal per ton of cast iron at the plants of the South in 1957 was 1.3 tons, while i t was about 1 ton at the modern plants of the Urals. Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 7. 78. 5,500 - 6,000 calories i n worked fuel. But the deposits are characterized by complexity of geological structure, brokenness of beds, and on the Eastern slopes strongly metamorphized coal changing here and there into anthractie, and also into graphi-tized and ironized coals. The coals of the Kizelovsk Basin (possible reserves of one b i l l i o n tons) are the most significant. These deposits are located i n the transitional zone from the Urals folded structure to the Russian Platform. The coals are suitable for coking, but because of high sulphur and ash content can be used for pig iron smelting only i n conjunction with high quality coals. Amongst the remaining deposits of the lower carboniferous age are Egorshinsk (97,000,000 tons), Makhnevsk (185,000,000 tons), Poi-tavo-Bredinsk (55,000,000 tons), and Domberovsk, situated i n the 25 Eastern foothills of the Urals. Production. The Kizelovsk Basin started production i n 1797, but the f i r s t coal used for coking was extracted i n 1880. In 1957 Kizelovsk produced 11,600,000 tons of coal of which 17.8 26 per cent was used for coking. Thus some 2,000,000 tons of coking 25 Komar, op. c i t . . pp. 202-203. 26 V. P. Ponomarev, Kizeloviskiy Kamennougo11nw Basseyn. Perm1? Permskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1958, pp. 4-5, 7-8. 79. coal were produced, but Kizelovsk coal has an extremely low yeild 27 of coke from coal. Therefore, the proportion of production based on local supply was even lower than would f i r s t appear. Furthermore, this coke i s high i n both sulphur and ash content, consequently i t is not very desirable. The total production i s sufficient to supply less than 2 per cent of the Uralian pig iron production. The approximately 200,000 tons of coke yielded are 28 used mainly i n Nizhne Tagil*sk and Chusovsk mixed with a pre-ponderance of coke made from Kuzbass coals. Import of Goal In spite of the considerable local production of lignite, more than two-fifths of the total and even approximately one-fourth of the energy coal consumed i s imported. Local sources supply only approximately 20 per cent of the fuel used i n metallurgy. Around 1959, the annual flow of coal into the Urals was more than thirty million tons. Almost two-thirds of this came from the Kuzbass and one-third from Karaganda. In i t s turn, the Urals sends part of i t s coal, chiefly from the Kizelovsk Basin (the only extensive, i f marginal, coking coal deposits), into the European USSR aggravating the fuel deficiency. In recent It requires 10.2 tons of Kizelovsk coal to produce one ton of very inferior coke as opposed to 1.6 tons for Kuznets coke. Bardin, op. c i t . . p. 227. 28 Vvedenskiy, op. c i t . . vol. 20, p. 610 80. years these shipments have reached 25 - 30 per cent of the total output of the Kizelovsk Basin, but this export of coal from the 29 Urals shall be gradually eliminated. Every effort has been made to increase the use of Karaganda coals i n the Urals. The reason behind this i s that the increase i n the ferrous metal production has caused an increasing strain 30 to be placed on the Donbass and Kuzbass coals. In 1961, although the Kuzbass delivered sufficient coal overall, i t did not supply sufficient quantities of the best grades. Because of this, the quality of the coke was lowered, and i t was impossible 31 to intensify the blast furnace process. Extensive use of Karaganda coal would to a significant degree relieve the strain that has been placed on the coking coals balance. 3 0 Because of the strain i t i s very tempting for the coal suppliers to ship inferior coal i n less demand to make up their quota. But the Karaganda coal i s not as good as the Kuzbass and i t tends to have too high an ash content to be used by i t s e l f . 29 Komar, op. c i t . . pp. 205-206 30 Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 8. 31 \"Raw Material Shortages in the Iron and Steel Industry,\" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. No. 13, Moscow, 26 March 1962, p. 2 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (41)\", Joint Publications Research Service, 13,939, p. 2. 81. Production of Coke Although some 80 per cent of the coking coal is imported, the overwhelming part (99 per cent) of a l l the Uralian pig iron i s smelted on coke which is locally produced. The local pro-cessing of coke permits the u t i l i z a t i o n of the wastes of coking (gas etc.) for chemical and energy purposes. The rest of the coke i s brought from Siberia, from the Kemerovo Chemical Combine. The average cost of one kilogram of metallurgical coke i n 1959 was twenty kopeks in the Urals. This is identical with the Donbass and cheaper than the Center (twenty to thirty kopeks), the North West (twenty to thirty kopeks) and the Far East (twenty-five to thirty), but more expensive than Kazakhstan (fifteen to 33 twenty kopeks) and Western Siberia (twelve kopeks). III. AUXILIARY MATERIALS Alloying Agents The Urals has a ready supply of the special alloy materials such as chrome, nickel, titanium and vanadium, but i t is not so well provided with manganese, the most important alloying agent. 32 Komar, op. cit... pp. 220-221. 33 L. A. Melent'ev and E. 0. Shteyngauz, Ekonomika  Energetiki SSSR, Moskva-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Energeticheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1959, p. 132. CD ro 83. MAJOR DEPOSITS OF COAL IN WESTERN USSR OF COKING QUALITY LEGEND K = K i z e l o v s k B a s i n E = Egorshinskoe M = Magnitogorsk B = Bulanashskoe Ch= Chelyabinsk South Western Boundary o\u00a3 s i g n i f i c a n t permafrost formation \u2022 d e p o s i t s u t i l i z e d f o r the U r a l s \u00a9 d e p o s i t s not u t i l i z e d f o r the U r a l s \u00ae > The U r a l s . 0 Bukhara-Ural P i p e l i n e t e r m i n i - Bukhara-Ural gas supply Sources: B. I. Andreev, D. V. Kravchenko, Kamennougo1'nye  Basseynv SSSR, Moskva, 1958, loose map i n s i d e cover: \" F i z i c h e s k a y a K a r t a SSSR\" G e o g r a f i c h e s k i y A t l a s dlya 7  e -8 \u00abE1956opp*32S3.Kand. T a b l i t s a K a r t Rayonov SSSR, MoskvaV GUGIK MVD SSSR, 1955; and Aytmatov, Ch. and Mukimov, Yu. \"'Trassa Druzhby \" B u k h a r a - U r a l 1 \" , Pravda 5 November 1963, p.. 2.-TABLE III 84. MINERALIZATION OF THE FUEL BALANCE OF THE URALS METALLURGY (in percentages) 1913 1922\/23 1926\/27 Wood 56.0 55.0 25.3 Charcoal 36.3 20.4 25.7 Coal 7.7 24.6 47.7 Substitute Fuels (coniferous needles, s tumps, s awdus t) - - 1.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Osintsev. op. c i t . . p. 32 TABLE IV COAL PRODUCTION IN THE URALS (in million tons) Coal Basins 1913 1916 1940 1950 1955 Proportion of total output i n 1955 Chelyabinskiy 0.13 0.15 5.60 12.40 17.70 37.6 Bogosloviskiy 0.18 0.30 1.40 9.10 15.30 32.5 Kizelovskiy 0.80 1.00 4.60 10.20 11.10 23.6 Southern Urals - - - - 1.80 3.8 Other Deposits 0.09 0.05 0.40 0.80 1.20 2.5 Total 1.20 1.50 12.00 32.50 47.10 100.0 Source: Komar, op. c i t . . p. 205. U R A L S - K U Z B A S S (1935-1938) - THE SECOND METALLURGICAL B A S E \u2014 < 1,500,000 TONS c = < 3,000,000 TONS C D < 6,000,000 TONS b u l l I I I I I S C A L E 1 = 10,000,000 1\/4 1\/4 SQ. MM. IRON I MILLION TONS R E S E R V E S SQ. MM. C O A L : 250 , Ml L L I ON TONS R E S E R V E S \u2022 IRON ORE D E P O S I T S O MAJOR COAL D E P O S I T S O MAJOR IRON AND S T E E L S M E L T E R S \u2014 C O A L IRON DIRECTION OF FLOW S M A L L O T H E R COAL DEPOS C E N T R E S TS \u2022 M A J O R C O A L PRODUCERS 86, URALS-KUZBASS - THE SECOND METALLURGICAL BASE 1935-38 - LEGEND DEPOSITS I = Ivdelsk-Serovsk-Severouralsk T-K s Tagilo-Kushvinsk A = Alapaevsk KU = Kamensk Uralski B = Bakal Z = Zigazinsk M = Magnitogorsk O-Kh = Orsk-Khalilovsk K = Kizelovsk E = Egorshino D = Dombrovka Ka = Karaganda Kuz = Kuznetsk TT = Temir Tau CITIES 1 = Kizel-Gubakha 8 2 = Serov 9 3 = Lys'va-Chusovoy 10 4 = Nizhne Tagil-Nizhne Salda-Kushva 11 5 = Alapaevsk 12 6 = Sverdlovsk 13-14 7 = Verkhne Ufaley 15 = Satka = Zlatoust = Chelyabinsk = Magnitogorsk = Karaganda = Anzhero-Sudzhensk, Kemerovo, Leninsk Kuznetskiy, Kizelovsk, Prokop1evsk = Stalinsk Sources: Bol'shava Sovetkava Atlas Mira. vol. II, section 40, \"Skheme Uralo-Kuzbassa (1935-1938 gg)\", p. 79. 87. Since the preponderance of Uralian steel i s of the common variety - only during World War II were quality steels an important proportion of the total output - the existence of these materials i s not very significant to the operation or competitive position of the Uralian iron and steel industry. Manganese ores are important because ferro manganese, the most widely used reducing agent, accounts for 0.7'rl.O per cent of the inputs i n a l l smelted steel and also in greater quantities as an alloying additive i n many special steels. The Urals contain many deposits of manganese ores, but these are not extensive and are generally of poor quality gravelly 34 ores. The better deposits - the Polunoch and Marsyatsk deposits i n the Northern Urals - were extremely important during World War 35 II. But at present a l l the manganese used in the Urals i s 36 imported. It is planned to reintroduce production at Polunoch. The tendency i n the Urals has been to find substitutes for man-37 ganese rather than to bring i n manganese ores. There are deposits of chrome iron ore (chromite) but these 34 Bardin, op_j. c i t . . pp. 207-208. 35 \u00b0 Ibid. 3 6 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 24. 37 Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 7; and N. Dunaev, \"Chugun bez margantsa-VygodneeJ\" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. No. 12, Moskva, 19 March 1962, p. 31. 88. are predominantly low grade, suitable for the chemical and re-fractory industries, but only to a minor degree for the production of ferroalloys. The most important reserves are concentrated in the large Saranovsk deposit located i n the axial zone of the Central Urals among Serpentine rocks. Quality chromite metallurgy in the Urals i s supplied from the extremely large Kimpersaysk deposit (Khrom Tau) i n Kazakh SSR. Ferrochrome for the Urals is 38 produced at the Chelyabinsk and Aktyubinsk ferroalloy plants. In the Urals or near i t also occur deposits of other alloy metals - nickel, vanadium and titanium for example. Nickel is i n 39 short supply i n the Soviet Union. This i s the reason behind the fabulously expensive development of Noril'sk. The Urals has ready access to a disproportionate share of the meagre Societ nickel supply. The smelting of nickel in the USSR was f i r s t started in the Urals i n 1934 at the Verkhne Ufaleysk Plant u t i -40 l i z i n g the Ufaleysk nickel ores. Nickel production was started 38 V. Zhuravlev, \"Problems of the Ferroalloy Industry\", Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. Moscow. No. 18, 4 December 1961 (in Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (28), Joint Publications Research Service^ 13, 633, 2 May 1962, p. 16. 39 N. Klunichenko, \"New Type of Steel for High Pressure Equipment\", Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. Moscow, 2 Ap r i l 1962, p. 43, (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (41),\" Joint Publications Research Service, 13,939, 31 May 1962, p. 16. 40 - Komar, op. c i t . . pp. 225, 227. :, 89. so recently because the raw material supply was poor, but the desire for self-sufficiency necessitated such a development. Subsequently the center of nickel production moved South (the 40 Orsk Plant). The bulk of the Uralian nickel resources are i n the form of iron-chrome-nickel ores and in Orsk there is a competition between producing naturally alloyed pig iron and refining nickel i t s e l f . 4 1 The smelting of naturally alloyed pig iron has not been very successful, which aggravates this problem. Newly discovered iron-chrome-nickel ores in the v i c i n i t y of Serov 4 2 are supplying 43 the basis for the development of ferroalloy production. Nickel 44 ore. is also brought i n from the Aktyubinsk Oblast' in Kazakhstan. The only supplier of ferrovanadium i n the Urals i s the 45 Chusovsk Plant. In the future Chusovsk is to use Kachkanar ores which contain vanadium as a side product. The Kachkanar ores also contain titanium and w i l l supply Nizhne Tagil'sk and 45 Chusovsk with titanium and magnetite ores. 41 L. Gol'denberg, \"Orsk-Khalilovo Combine is Making Poor Use of Its Naturally Alloyed Ferronickel Ores\", Ekonomicheskava  Gazeta. Moscow, 5 February 1962, p. 11 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (40,\" Joint Publications Research Service, 13,768, 15 May 1962, pp. 4-5. 42 Komar, op. c i t . . p. 218. ^3G. Garbuzov, \"The Ferrous Metallurgy Industry in 1962\", Stroitel'nava Gazeta. Moscow, 27 December 1961 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (27)\", Joint Publications Research Service, 13,340, 4 A p r i l 1962, p. 15. 44 Komar, op. c i t . . pp. 225, 227. 90. 47 Ferroalloy plants are receiving increased investment i n connection with the desire to increase the proportion of high grade steel. These plants suffer from being supplied with mat-erials that do not meet their stringent requirements. The main reason for this is that they usually depend on suppliers who deliver only a small proportion of their output to the ferroalloy plants. The bulk of the suppliers' materials are intended for other users whose requirements are not nearly so demanding. Furthermore, there is no tendency to raise the standards. The Orenburg Sovnarkhoz for instance i n 1961 lowered the technical specifications of the limestone supply to the Aktyubinsk Ferro-alloy Plant. The waste rock content was increased from one to three per cent and the permissible percentage of phosphorus pent-oxide was almost twice as high as the actual level experienced during 1960. The phosphorus content of the limestone i n i960 permitted the production of standard refined ferrochrome alloy close to the upper limit of tolerance. The lower standards w i l l necessitate further and hence more expensive processing with 48 greater scrap output. 45 G. Zabaluev, G. Sapiro, Ye. Odinstov, Ye. Ivanov, G. Derevyanko, V. Bulgakov, \"My Mozhem Rabotat' Pribyl'no, Problemy Metallurgii Zapadnogd Urala\", Izvestiya. Moskva, 27 A p r i l , 1962, p. 3. ^^Kazakov, op. c i t . . p. 5. 47 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . pp. 59-60. 48 Zhuravlev, op. c i t . . pp. 11-16. Refractory Materials The common refractory materials are: quartzitic materials (dinas quartzite and molding sand), refractory clay, magnesite, dolomite, ferrochrome (chromite), talc and talcose rock, carbon-iferous bricks and blocks, carborundum and graphite. Refractory materials are extensively used in metallurgy and are f a i l y ubiquitous, hence local deposits located near exis-ting transport f a c i l i t i e s are usually developed. The Urals i s especially well endowed in dinas sandstone, refractory clay, magnesite and chromite. Although used extensively, refractory materials account for only a small proportion of the total cost of metallurgical production. In open hearth production, for 4' example, they amount to 2 - 3 per cent of the cost of the steel. In 1961 the Urals was somewhat short of refractory pro-ducts. This i s explained by the fact that the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Sovnarkhozes were delaying the commissioning of new shops and installations at the enterprises of the refractories industry. Furthermore, during 1961 the funds which had been allotted for the reconstruction of existing and construction of new cap-acity in the refractory departments of the Magnitogorsk Combine, and Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant and at the Bogdanovich -49 Bardin, op. cit... pp. 210-211. 50 \"Raw Material Shortages in the Iron and Steel Industry\", OP. c i t . . p. 2. 92. Refractory Plant were not properly u t i l i z e d . The construction of the chrome-magnesite and fosterite departments of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Metallurgical Combine lagged considerably behind the completion date. Nonetheless, during 1961 the refractory plant of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine produced more refractory clay and the Pervoural'sk Plant produced more refractory brick than planned.^ 1 In addition the position of the refractory department of the Magnitogorsk Combine, i n spite of i t s unfavorable expansion record, is s t i l l unusually good. The cost of current repairs of open hearth furnaces is 27 per cent lower at Magnitogorsk than at the Kuznets Combine and 51 per cent lower than at the Dzerzhinsk 52 Plant's No. 3 shop. On the other hand, through inefficiency, Beloretsk and Zlatoust refractory production suffers heavy losses from rejects. Beloretsk produces approximately 3 per cent and 53 Zlatoust over 2 per cent rejects. During the Seven Year Plan an appreciable increase i n the \"Production of Refractory Materials After the 22nd Party Congress,\" Ogneuoorv. No. 12, 1961, pp. 541-544 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallury (22)\", Joint Publications Research Service, 12,884, 9 March 1962, pp. 12, 15. 52 G. N. Sergeyev, \"Production Costs at Magnitogorskk Steel Combine are the Lowest i n Industry,\" Ekonomicheskava  Gazeta. Moscow, No. 15, 9 Ap r i l 1962, p. 12 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (49), \" Joing Publications Research Service, 14,006, 5 June 1962i p. 5* 53 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 128. 93. capacities of the Bogdanovich, Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk refractory clay production i s to be added. To supply the re-fractory clay plants high grade refractory clay the Turgay Re-fractory Clay Burning Plant i s being developed i n the Kustanay Oblast* using Novoselitsa kaolins. The capacity of the Pervoural'sk s i l i c a brick plant i s being increased and the production of burned metallurgical dolomite i s being expanded by putting into operation dolomite burning shops at the Magnitogorsk and Orsk-Khalilovsk Metallurgical Combines. The Nizhne Tagil'sk Metallurgical Combine refractory production 54 w i l l also be improved. Water Water is used for cooling and steam generation in the iron and steel industry, i t is a permissive rather than an attractive factor. The water supply position i n the Urals i s adequate on the whole. In the Southern Urals water supply becomes a problem. In Magnitogorsk for example, the Ural River flowing past the ore deposits at a distance of less than ten kilometers provided a water supply which, though seasonally inadequate, could be made to suffice by the construction of two a r t i f i c i a l lakes.*'\"' But even in the Southern Urals there i s nowhere the problem 54 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . pp. 110-111. j . Scott, Behind the Urals. An American Worker i n  Russia's City of Steel. Cambridge Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1942, p. 68. 94. of Kazakhstan where otherwise suitable sites are rendered un-desirable for this very reason. The development of Kazakhstan's ferrous metallurgy i s being delayed by the inadequacy of i t s water reserves. Owing to the arid nature of Central Kazakhstan, the major part of the iron ore resources of this region must be shipped to metallurgical plants i n the Urals and Siberia. Construction of the Irtysh-Karaganda Canal could prove to be the cardinal solution to the problem of supplying Central Kazakhstan 56 with water. This, of course, would be an extremely expensive undertaking. Flux Flux materials, or for a l l intents and purposes - limestone and dolomite - are f a i r l y ubiquitous. Consequently, deposits are developed in close proximity to plants, and often i n conjunction with existing transportation f a c i l i t i e s . They account for approxi-mately 3 - 5 per cent of the cost of pig iron and only 0.4 -1.0 per cent of the cost of open hearth steel. The Urals i s not especially well endowed i n this regard, but i t does not matter very much. Scrap Scrap is one of the more important raw materials of modern steel production by the open-hearth method (as opposed to the Bessemer converter which does not require scrap for efficient 56 Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 8, 5 7Bardin, o\u00a3_ c i t . . pp. 210-211. 95. 58. operations ). In 1956 the Urals had a d e f i c i t of, or in other words, imported 2,600,000 tons of scrap or over half of the total con-sumed (4,900,000 tons) i n this region. This i s the third largest deficiency of the Urals (after coal and iron ore) as a metallur-gica l producers. But in one way i t is worse than both the other problems. The Urals can obtain both coal and iron ore at compe-t i t i v e prices, but scrap costs as much as i t does elsewhere plus the added cost of transporting i t into the Urals. The South does not suffer from nearly as great a deficiency - 900,000 tons, or 59 less than a quarter of the tonnage consumed (4,300,000 tons). About one million tons of scrap are shipped from the Central Volga area, the Center and the North which tend to gravitate toward the Urals plants on the principle of the shortest shipping distance. The use of this quantity of scrap at the plants of the South and the Center could reduce the total steel production cost by about eighty million rubles - an amount muhh larger than the increase in shipping costs (ten million rubles). Therefore, most of the scrap metal collected in the European part of the Soviet Union should be directed to the Southern plants. The scrap metal shipping routes should be taken into 58 \"The use of enriched a i r makes i t possible to decrease the nitrogen content of steel, to increase the quantity of steel scrap which can be re-melted in converters, and to increase the productivity of the converter.\" United Hations, Long-Term Trends  and Problems of the European Steel Industry, Geneva: Economic Commission for Europe, 1959, p. 110* 96. account i n determining the development of blast furnace and steel smelting production at the plants of the various metallurgical regions. In 1957, the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine, for example, used 365 Kilograms of scrap per ton of steel for a direct cost of 266 rubles per ton of iron; at the \"Azovstal\"' Plant, the specific consumption of scrap was 252 Kilograms while the direct cost of 6b the iron came to 332 rubles. IV. SUMMARY The Soviet iron and steel industry has a pronounced 61 prejudice toward raw material location (as opposed to, say, market or break of shipment of materials). This is so because of three main forces: government intervention, the cost structure of the iron and steel industry, and the inland location of raw materials. Even in pre-Soviet times there was an unusual amount of government intervention in the iron and steel industry with the general aim of self-sufficiency. This was effected by the govern-ment operating plants, setting import t a r i f f s and supporting pricing policies which collectively discouraged imports of cheap foreign finished products and raw materials, although the latter \"^Livshits, op. c i t . . p. 367; ^Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 14. 61 At the present time 67 per cent of pig iron i s smelted in such locations. M. Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 16. 97. was definitely a side effect. But the net result was the pro-duction based on imported materials never developed on any scale i n Russia. Gnce the Soviets seized power this drive for self-sufficiency was intensified. The bulk of the costs of iron and steel production i s 62 involved i n the procurement of raw materials, consequently the most efficient procurement of these items w i l l i n most cases result i n the cheapest production. The location of the domestic raw material resources i s such that possibilities of cheap water transportation of materials are very rare, consequently transportation of materials must be by the same expensive r a i l media as for finished goods, and as these materials do not have the unit value of the finished product they are obviously at a disadvantage i n absorbing r a i l transport charges. In addition, although transportation costs are not a large proportion of total production costs they tend to be re-garded as of an elastic, and hence minimizable nature, and there-fore, have probably had a greater effect on the location than their proportion of the total costs would indicate at f i r s t glance. Once a plant i s established, inertia takes over, and thenceforth, materials are increasingly imported to i t , especially because in the Soviet Union there has been a marked tendency to be exceedingly optimistic i n the appraisal of deposits of resources. 62 In metallurgical production costs, material expenses form two-thirds of a l  production expenditure . Khlebnikov, op.cit..p.219. 98. CHAPTER IV THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY USING COKE It i s necessary to trace the his t o r i c a l development of the coke iron and steel industry before the present i n distribution can be meaningfully examined. In order to do this main recourse i s to Soviet sources with some consultation of Western materials i n order to arrive at a balanced appraisal of this development. This industrial development i s divided into three stages - before World War II, World War II and post World War II I. BEFORE WORLD WAR II The use of coke in the iron and steel industry of the Urals began i n the 19th century, but did not become significant u n t i l Kuzbass coal was supplied during the rehabilitation period. There was no pressing need for such a development, in any case, u n t i l 1925-26 when the increasing cost of wood fuel caused the cost of Uralian charcoal pig iron to exceed that of the Southern coke pig iron for the f i r s t time. The f i r s t use of coke from the Kuzbass, 1800 kilometers away, i n tfeeaUrals blast furnaces occurred i n 1924 in the Nizhne Saldinsk Plant. By 1926\/27, some 180,000 tons (27 per cent of the total) were smelted on coke, as opposed to 30,000 tons (3 per cent) i n 1913. In 1926\/27 coal supplied almost 50 per cent of the overall fuel consumption, but most of this was not coking coal and was used i n heat treatment furnaces, open hearth gas 99. generators and other auxiliary uses. By 1940, 2,300,000 tons of pig iron (86 per cent of the total) were smelted on coke.\"\"\" Once the f e a s i b i l i t y of using Kuznets coal had been demonstrated, a new phenomenon began to appear - the metallurgi-cal plant for which fuel was imported by r a i l . Formerly, r a i l had only been extensively used in the transport of finished products. With the evolution of more efficient railways and the determination to become self-sufficient in iron and steel at a l l costs, the large scale movement of low unit value raw mater-i a l s became a rational proposition. The South's coal extraction costs had been climbing with the depletion of easily worked reserves making Eastern development s t i l l more attractive. The main consideration i n choice of site for new plants was the size of ore deposits, which had to be very large by Urals standards, and i f of high quality and easily worked, so much the better. Magnitogorsk was chosen f i r s t . It had the additional 2 advantages of a level site and an ample water supply. The decision to construct the Magnitogorsk Plant was passed by the XIV party congress (1925) and the f i r s t plans were \u2022\"\"Livshits, op. c i t . . pp. 138, 160; and Osintsev, op. c i t . . pp. 31-32. 2 Magnitogorsk, being developed during a depressed period in the American iron and steel industry, had the additional advantage of experienced American design and direction of con-struction. Holloway, op. c i t . . p. 10. 100. drawn up i n 1926-1928. These provided for 656,000 tons pig iron, 662,000 tons steel and 574,000 tons rolled metal capacity. Although this scale of production was greater than Tsarist prac-tice, i t was s t i l l far below the then current world level. Therefore, i t was f e l t that the realization of these plans would slow the technical development of the Soviet iron and steel industry, and consequently they werecrejected. New plans were executed which increased the previous 3 capacity figures by over five times. Magnitogorsk came into operation in 1932, immediately becoming the largest iron producer in the Urals. It rapidly became the leading steel and rolled metal producer as well. In 1937, a similar unit, the Novo Tagil'sk Plant started operations i n Nizhne Tagil, the site of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Plant dating from 1725. This plant was based on the ore supplies of Mount Vysokaya which were much larger than the pre-existing plant required. Novo Tagil'sk had a less desirable ore base in size, quality and ease of mining than Magnitogorsk. The main reason for the development of the East was the belief that the Ural-Kuzbass scheme would produce cheaper steel 4 than the South. Another matter considered in the allocation of - -Bardin, op. c i t . . p. 91. 4 Holzman claims that provided a l l normal cost elements, besides the absence of differ e n t i a l rent which could be regarded as a_legitimate aspect of the relative low cost of combine coal and steel, had been taken into account the combine would not have appeared attractive enough on economic grounds alone, to have 101. investment was that the South had proven more susceptible to foreign interference than the Urals, but this was more than com-pensated for by the fact that similar investment added to Southern 4 plants would have provided more steel which was regarded as the highest priority at that time.*' Meanwhile, the long established plants had been changing. Their number was being gradually reduced, and most of those retained had substantial increases i n capacity. The large steel only plants were closely associated with the larger urban areas, Verkhne Isetsk was in Sverdlovsk, Zlatoust was near Chelyabinsk, and Lys'vensk was near Perm'. The iron only plant - Satkinsk - was in the v i c i n i t y of Zlatoust, and supplied i t with pig iron, Satkinsk was also near Bakal from which i t derived i t s ore supply. The f u l l y integrated plants of Serov and Magnitogorsk were associated with large ore reserves. The Chusovsk plant was f u l l y integrated but was not near any large ore reserves. It was f a i r l y close to Perm' though, and thus could be regarded as the only s t r i c t l y market oriented integrated plant. Nizhne Tagil 1sk and Nizhne Saldinsk both produced more iron than steel, but as they were associated with the superior Mount Vysokaya and merited the emphasis i t received i n the f i r s t two Five Year Plans. Holzman, op. c i t . . pp. 375-376, 398, 401; and Livshits, op. c i t . . p. 31. \" ' B. N. Ponomaryov, History of the Communist Party of the  Soviet Union. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, p. 453. 102. Blagodat 1 ore sources this i s not surprising. Both of these plants had undergone disproportionate increases of iron produc-tion since 1913 which also is not too surprising because many steel only plants required the iron they produced. Therefore, by 1937, two types of plants had appeared, the raw material and the market oriented. But the raw material oriented did not tend to be larger as might be expected (except Magnitogorsk of course) or even consistently more integrated. The advent of coke metallurgy changed the distribution of the Uralian iron and steel industry more profoundly than any other event since the introduction of factory smelting. For the f i r s t time the Central Urals lost i t s leading position, being replaced by a single plant - Magnitogorsk. Although one of the f i r s t regions to be converted to coke, the Central Urals experienced a worse relative decline than any t other region i n the prewar period. Its forests had been exploited more intensively than any other region and thus forest exhaustion was more severe here, and there was a lag i n the change from charcaol to coke. The regional smelt of pig iron had actually decreased from 400,000 tons (44 per cent) to 280,000 tons (12 per cent), and the smelt of steel had only increased from 320,000 tons (36 per cent) to 400,000 tons (14 per cent). Within the region a redistribution of production had occur-red. Certain plants experienced considerable growth with three of 103. them producing over 100,000 tons. Two of these - Nizhne Tagil'sk and Nizhne Saldinsk - were associated with the superior Tagilo Kushvinsk group of ore deposits. This ore only averaged 30-40 per cent Fe content, but the reserves were ample, easily worked and chemically suitable. The other - Verkhne Isetsk - was located at Sverdlovsk with i t s large market and ready scrap supplies. Nizhne Tagil'sk quadrupled and Nizhne Saldinsk more than doubled i t s pig iron production. Neither plant's steel production was significant throughout the period, being capable of u t i l i z i n g no more than 40 per cent of the pig iron output even i f no scrap were added. Verkhne Isetsk on the other hand, was a steel plant which produced no pig iron whatever. These three plants accounted for two-thirds of the pig iron and 43 per cent of the steel produced i n the Central Urals by 1938. These figures had increased from one-fifth of the pig iron and 30 per cent of the steel i n 1913. If Verkhne Isetsk i s considered by i t s e l f , i t s share of the pro-duction of steel had increased from about 10 per cent to over 30 per cent. Beside the Magnitogorsk Plant and the major Central Uralian producers, the Lys'vensk Plant i n the Western Urals was an early coke based producer. It smelted only steel but i t was the biggest steel producer and, furthermore, i t was the only Western Urals Livshits, opf c i t . . pp. 120, 162, 167. 104. steel plant to show a significant increase in i t s steel smelt from 1913 to 1938, almost doubling i t s output. In 1913, i t had pro-duced 22 per cent of the regional smelt, by 1938 this had increased to 45 per cent. Thus Lys'vensk had doubled both i t s output and i t s relative position by replacing the production of charcoal plants that were closed down. Lys'vensk is a good example of the replacement of charcoal by coke based production. It should be noted that the replacement occurred through an increase of capacity at one plant and a decline at others, not by the direct replacement or conversion of furnaces at the same plant. The Lys'vensk Plant had, besides i t s cheaper coke technology, an extremely good location i n re-lation to the Perm' market. 106. MAJOR OPERATING PLANTS - 1938 -LEGEND s = Serov (Nadezhdinsk) P = Pervoural'sk Ch = Chermozsk V-I = Verkhne-Isetsk D = Dobryansk R = Revdinsk L = Lys 1vensk Sev = Seversk Chu = Chusovsk NSe = Nizhne Serginsk T = Teplogorsk U = Ufaleysk K = Kushvinsk Zl = Zlatoust NT = Nizhne Tagil\"sk Sa = Satkinsk V-S = Verkhne-Saldinsk Ash = Ashinsk NS = Nizhne Saldinsk B = Beloretsk V-Si = Verkhne-Sinyachikhinsk M = Magnitogorsk A = Alapaevsk Sources: Livshits, op_, c i t . . p. 162; and Komar, op^ . cit,map facing p. 201. 107. 108. TABLE V INTRAREGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IRON AND STEEL 1913-1938 SUBREGION 1913 1938 pig iron steel pig iron steel 1,000 tons % 1,000 tons % 1,000 tons % 1,000 tons % Central Urals 396 44 325 36 278 12 406 14 South Central Urals 207 23 132 15 216 9 403 14 Western Urals 92 10 287 32 110 5 267 9 Northern Urals 198 22 146 16 236 10 286 10 South Eastern Urals - - - - 1,549 65 1,495 52 TOTAL 893 99 890 99 2,389 101 2,857 99 Note: Percentage totals do not quite equal 100 per cent because some production is unassigned as to region; and also because of rounding. Source: Livshits, pp. c i t . . pp. 120, 162. II. WORLD WAR II Frpm 1936 tp 1941 the effect pf the purges pn management 7 perspnnel was f e l t and preductipn stagnated. Cpnstructipn was N^. P. Lipatpv, Chernava Metallurglva Urala. v gpdv  velikpy ptechestvennpy vpynv (1941-1945). Mpskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1958, p. 31. 109. pushed during the war with large new units being added to Mag-nitogorsk, and Novo Tail'sk coming into production. During the war,2,433059 tons of pig iron production and 2,600,000 tons of steel production were added. The wartime additions to capacity were large, but not of a different scale to those of the Second Five Year Plan (1932-37). In addition the bulk of the wartime capacity addition was based on prewar construction. Also the Second Five Year Plan had started from a much smaller base, and, in fact, the earlier period's rates of growth had been higher, 9 very much so i n steel. It should be remembered that although i t i s easier to add capacity to existing capacity, this must be added i n large blocks i f rapid substantial increases are to be achieved, and consequently, there was no pronounced advantage i n increasing production during the war over the Second Five Year Plan. But even provided this proviso is introduced, the point i s that the increase in pro-duction was not markedly larger than the comparable prewar period, which i s the view generally held. The main reason for this mis-conception i s a misunderstanding of the nature of the problem of increasing ferrous metal production. 8 During the Second Five Year Plan, 1,400,000 tons of pig iron and 2,600,000 tons of steel capacity were added. 9 The comparable rates were 110 per cent and 96 per cent for pig iron, and 220 per cent and 71 per cent for steel. 110. The basic iron and steel units, the blast furnace and steel furnace, which essentially determine the level of production, are of such a size as to preclude either their rapid movement or rapid construction. Also they are extremely expensive and require major investment, which can be ill-afforded i n wartime. Conse-quently, no suitable plant was rescued from the area overrun by the Nazis,^ and although intensive efforts were exerted to i n -crease capacity, these only succeeded i n adding capacity at the prewar scale, which was a considerable achievement, but i t i s false to imagine that the wartime period was a time of unusually rapid increase of capacity in the Urals. The Urals gained so dramatically on the capacity of the South during the war because of the South's destruction, and 11 through no acceleration of i t s own growth. The wartime capacity additions were mainly on the Magnito-gorsk and Novo Tagil'sk plants, with the Chelyabinsk, Chusovsk and Zlatoust plants gaining major additions. Some of the i n i t i a l construction was undertaken on the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine, but \"\"\"^Holloway, op. c i t . . p. 14. For example, the Stalin Metal Works in Stalino, in one of the last areas occupied by the Germans, managed to evacuate only 1500 of 10,000 employees, and none of i t s blast furnaces or other similar equipment to the Urals. S.\" M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union. Syracuse University Press, 1951, pp. 227-228, 11 Holloway states that US Lend Lease supplied the USSR with war materials but did not provide-her with steelmaking equip-ment. Holloway, op. c i t . . p. 15. 111. this did not come into operation u n t i l long after the war (in 1955). These plants - Magnitogorsk, Novo Tagil 1sk, Chelyabinsk, Chusovsk and Zlatoust - along with Serov - were the major plants at the end of the war. Magnitogorsk and Novo Tagil'sk were in the million ton class, with Chelyabinsk being brought to i t . The others were in the 200,000-500,000 ton range. A l l of these plants were inte-grated, with the exdeption of Zlatoust which only produced steel, Zlatoust, of the major plants, was the only really old plant, dating originally from 1754. Thus by 1945, none of the pre -nineteenth century plants were major pig iron producers, and since Zlatoust's steel capacity was post-revolutionary, i t was for a l l intents and purposes a twentieth century plant. During 1941-1945 the distribution of production had altered less than between 1932-1937 because wartime exigencies had re-quired increases i n production capacity by a l l possible means. Therefore, small uneconomic producers experienced growth that otherwise they would not have. By and large, additions to their capacity did not make them efficient producers, i t just increased the amount of uneconomic production. This tended to introduce inertia into the distribution and made the postwar ideal economic distribution that much more d i f f i c u l t to approximate. By 1945, the South Eastern Urals, thanks to Magnitogorsk, remained pre-eminent, the Central Urals, thanks to Novo Tagil'sk was next most important. The other three regions, the Northern 112. Urals, the South Central Urals and the Western Urals had a l l become secondary with no large plants and only a single second order producer each. They a l l lacked a suitable ore base for a major development, III. POST WORLD WAR II With the end of the war, the bulk of the Soviet Union's efforts to increase capacity were directed toward reconstruction of the metallurgical regions that had been devastated during the war, especially the South. This de-emphasis of the Urals lasted u n t i l 1950. Capital construction i n the Fif t h Five Year Plan (1951-55) continued to concentrate on the South and Center and to a slightly greater extent that i n the preceding Five Year Plan, on the Urals. This latter trend resulted from the fact that earlier projects for the enlargement of Magnitogorsk and other plants had not been carried out during the Fourth Plan period (1946-1950) and were therefore transferred to the Fifth . Actually a significant proportion of the open hearth con-struction was located in the Urals from 1949, when 28.7 per cent of total Russian capacity installed was in the Urals. This rose to 52.4 per cent in 1950. By 1950, the Urals Production reached 7,200,000 tons of pig iron, an increase of 2,100,000 tons over 1945, or about 40 per cent. This was somewhat smaller than i n the preceding five year period and came from wartime installed capacity coming into 1 1 3 . CONSTRUCTION IN FERROUS METALLURGY IN I T H E URALS DURING WW K MAP 22 \u2022 IRON ORE MINING \u2022 COAL MINING O PIG IRON SMELTING D S T E E L SMELTING AND 75 0 75 150 225 KM. METAL ROLLING \u2022 1 1 1 114 CONSTRUCTION IN FERROUS METALLURGY IN THE URALS DURING WORLD WAR II -LEGEND s Serov Si = Sinarski K Kizel Vu = Verkhne Ufalale Chu = Chusovoy Nu = Nizhne Ufalaeys D Dobryanka Ku = Kusa Cher= Chermoz Ch = Chelyabinsk M Maykor Cheb = Chebarkul' 0 Omutninsk Z l = Zlatoust L = Lys 1va Sa = \u2022 Satka VT = Verkhne Tura Ba = Bakal V Vysokaya T = Turgoyak NT = j Nizhniy Tagil K-I Katav-Ivanovsk NS = Nizhne Salda Mi = Min'yar VS = Verkhne Salda A = Asha Al = Alapaevsk B Beloretsk Le = Lebyazh1ya Z = Zagzinsk SU - Staro Utkinsk Mag = Magnitogorsk Bi = Bilimbay E Egorshinsk P Pervoural 1sk Br - Bredy R Revda Dom = Dombarovskiy N Se= Nizhne Sergi Kh - Khalilovo Sev = Seversk G = Gremyachinsk Sources: Lipatov, OP. c i t . . p. 15; and Geographic Atlas for Middle School. 1954, pp. 34-35. 115. production to a considerable extent. Steel reached 10,700,000 tons, from 6,500,000 for an increase cf9,200,000 tons or about 65 per cent, considerably better than the wartime increase i n absolute terms. This was the result of wartime construction plus continual addition to open hearth units, which became especially significant in 1949, but had never fallen below 10 per cent of the total Russian additions, even i n 1947 and 1948, the lowest 12 years. Rolled metal production increased to 7,800,000 tons, a 3,400,000 tons or 77 per cent increase over 1945. This was better not only i n absolute terms, but also in relative ones, which to a large degree reflected the greater ease of switching from a war-time assortment to a peacetime one, rather than vice versa. By 1955, the Urals was producing 11,900,000 tons of pig iron, for an increase of 4,700,000 tons or about 65 per cent over 1950, a considerably better performance than in the Fourth Plan. The Urals produced 16,400,000 tons of steel or 5,700,000 tons or 53 per cent more steel than i n 1950. It produced 12,600,000 tons of rolled metal, or 4,800,000 tons or 62 per cent more than i n 13 1950. This production was concentrated essentially into three major operations, Magnitogorsk, Novo Tagil'sk and Chelyabinsk, 12 Livshits, op. c i t . , table 58 \"Introduction of New Metal-lurgical Capacity by Region of USSR i n 1946-1950\"; table 62 \"Distribution of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR i n 1940-1950\", pp. 197, 204, 206. 13 Komar, op. c i t . , p. 221. 116. which together in 1956 produced 9,900,000 tons of pig iron, or over 77 per cent of the total Urals output as well as 11,800,000 tons of steel or over 67 per cent of the steel. Orsk Khalilovsk, the fourth major operation was just coming into production and other significant plants were Zlatoust, Chusovsk and Serov which a l l produced 500,000 tons of steel or more, and Serov produced 500,000 tons of pig iron. Thus the four biggest pig iron pro-ducers supplied 82 per cent of the pig iron and the six biggest steel producers supplied 91 per cent of the steel. Thus by 1956 there were only six important plants with one new one i n the process of being constructed.*\"4 IV. SUMMARY The Urals iron and steel industry's distribution has changed down through the years. From 1631 u n t i l 1750 the Bashkirs forced a l l construction to occur North of the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset\u2022 line, that i s , i n the North and Central Urals. Very l i t t l e of this development occurred i n the Northern Urals because of d i f f i c u l t y of transport of finished product. Therefore, v i r t u a l l y a l l pro-duction down to 1755 occurred along the middle reaches of the Kama, the Chusovaya and in the Tura and Iset' basins. From 1755 onwards, with the destruction of the Bashkir power, the South Central Urals i n the Belaya basin, that area of __ Livshits, op. c i t . , table 12 \"Significance of Plants of Various Productivity i n the Production of Pig Iron and Steel i n the USSR in 1956\", p. 64. 117. the South where trees and:iron deposits coincided, was developed as a metallurgical region. It never became more important than the leading Central Urals region, but i t diminished the Central Urals' preponderance. The next important stage in the development of the present distribution began i n the 1880*s when Sos'vinsk and Nadezhdinsk were developed i n the formerly very distant North. Rail trans-portation did not reach these plants, but i t reached the Urals, and thus made access to these plants for the movement of metal much easier. Thus by 1913 ,there twere essentially four metallurgical regions. First and foremost, the Central Urals, then the Northern Urals, then the Western Urals and f i n a l l y the South Central Urals. Soviet developments have added a f i f t h , and now largest region. This is the South Eastern Urals which includes Magnitogorsk Chelyabinsk and Orsk-Khalilovsk, three of the four major oper-ations. The fourth, the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine is in the Central Urals. On the basis of this, the Central Urals is in the second region. The South Central Urals and the Northern Urals, which consists of only Serov (Nadezhdinsk) which i s a second order plant, are next i n rank. Serov produces more pig iron, but less steel and rolled metal than the South Central Urals. The Western Urals 15 is the f i f t h region. Three of the four major plants are associated with major *\"\"'Komar, op. c i t . . pp. 223-224. 118. ore sources, which are lo c a t e d i n the Eastern h a l f of the U r a l s , and the Chelyabinsk P l a n t i s w e l l s i t u a t e d to get ore from e i t h e r Bakal or Kustanay. The second order p l a n t s are r a t h e r ambiguously l o c a t e d . Z l a t o u s t which has the best access to a major ore source (Bakal) i s the one that produces no p i g i r o n at a l l . Chusovsk produces some s t e e l and i s not too f a r from the Kushvinsk group of d e p o s i t s which a l s o support the Nizhne T a g i l ' s k Combine. Serov has f a i r l y c l o s e l o c a l ore sources, but they are not very good. Yet t h i s i s the l a r g e s t p i g i r o n producer of the three. Of the three only Z l a t o u s t i s w e l l s i t u a t e d f o r ore supply but i t i s overshadowed by the neighboring Chelyabinsk P l a n t which i s s l i g h t l y b e t t e r s i t u a t e d f o r the import of Kuznets coking c o a l and Kustanay ores, but f u r t h e r from the Bakal d e p o s i t . As the Bakal deposit i s not lar g e enough to adequately supply Chelyabinsk there i s no good raw m a t e r i a l reason to develop p i g i r o n pro-d u c t i o n at Z l a t o u s t although an i n t e g r a t e d works would be able to produce a cheaper f i n a l product. Production has been concentrated i n a few very l a r g e pro-ducers. This i s due to the g r e a t e r e f f i c i e n c y of l a r g e u n i t s i n the i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r y . There are four such p l a n t s : the Magnitogorsk, Nizhne T a g i l ' s k , O r s k - K h a l i l o v s k combines and the Chelyabinsk P l a n t ; which now produce more than f o u r - f i f t h s of the 16 p i g i r o n and a s l i g h t l y lower p r o p o r t i o n of the s t e e l and r o l l e d *\"^Komar, op. c i t . . p. 222. 119. metal of the Urals. Also significant and of long standing has been the general intensification of the preponderance of the Eastern slopes of the Urals. The main reasons for this are i t s relatively rich, easily accessible reserves of raw materials and closer location to the Kuzbass and Karaganda fuel sourcesi Of some interest has been the North-South shifting of the center of gravity. Between 1932-1940, the center of gravity moved from the Central Urals, southwards to Chelyabinsk Oblast'.\"\"7 This move reflected the advent of Magnitogorsk which came into production i n 1932 and by 1940 accounted for more than half of the production of pig iron, steel and rolled metal of the Urals. After 1940 this process was arrested with the advent of the Novo Tagil'sk' plant i n Sverdlovsk Oblast'. Since that period, two more major plants, Chelyabinsk and Orsk-Khalilovsk, have appeared, both i n the Southern Urals. Livshits, op. c i t . . table 43, p. 162 TABLE VI PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL IN THE URALS. 1940-1945 PRODUCT 1940 1945 Growth by Absolute 1,000,000 tons % of USSR Absolute 1,000,000 tons % of USSR 1945 as % of 1940 pig iron 2.7 1318.2 5.1. 58.1 18844 steel 3.9 21.4 6.5 53.0 165.5 rolled metal 2.8 21.5 4.4 51.6 155.6 Source: Promvshlennost' SSSR. Moskva, 1957, pp. 112-114. TABLE VII INPUTS IN ONE TON OF PIG IRON -1956 Plant Ore and Agglomerate (kg) Coke (kg) Total Cost (rubles) Manitogorsk 1,754 665 169 Novo Tagil'sk 1,805 706 253 Chelyabinsk 2,053 807 282 Source: Livshits, op. c i t . . pp. 224, 226-9. TABLE VIII INPUTS IN ONE TON OF STEEL - 1956 Plant Pig Iron (kg) Iron (kg) Fuel (kg) Total Cost (rubles) Magnitogorsk 669 301 144 229 Novo Tagil'sk 700 343 150 358 Chelyabinsk 702 366 217 422 Source: Ibid.. pp. 230-231. 121. CHAPTER V INDIVIDUAL PLANTS The present distribution of the Uralian iron and steel industry is the crux of the examination of the industry. In order to study this distribution extensive use of both Soviet and non-Soviet materials i s necessary with wide use of periodical materials i n order to bring this examination reasonably up to date. The distribution is treated by individually examining the major plants - Magnitogorsk, Nizhne Tagil 1sk, Chelyabinsk and Orsk-Khalilovsk - and collectively treating the small plants. I. MAGNITOGORSK Iron Ore Supply Magnitogorsk was originally founded to exploit the high grade ore of the Magnitogorsk deposit. This deposit was formed with two layers of ores - an upper rich one and a lower poor one - with total reserves of three hundred million tons i n 1956. This was the largest deposit of rich ores i n the Urals but the high grade ore has been a l l but exhausted by now. The rich ores had a high iron and a low phosphorus and sulphur content. The poor ores on the other hand, not only have a modest iron content but also a high sulphur content - usually over 2 per cent. 1 Hi. Gardner Clark quotes an American authority E. W. Davis \"Iron Ore Mining, Beneficiation and Reserves,\" ABC of Iron and  Steel. Cleveland, 1950, pp. 5, 6., who states \"for metallurgical 1 2 2 . FERROUS M E T A L L U R G I C A L PLANTS - 1956 ^> \\ MAP 23 A 1 ,500 ,000 TONS CENTRAL URALS # SOUTH CENTRAL URALS \u00ae A 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 TONS WESTERN URALS 0 \u00a3 OTHER PRODUCERS NORTHERN URALS (f) 75 Q 75 150 225 KM.SOUTH EASTERN URALS Q) Magnitogorsk - M - 5,000,000 tons 123. FERROUS. METALLURGICAL PLANTS - 1956 LEGEND S = Serov K-U = Kamensk-Ural'sk I = Izhevsk Se = Seversk N = Nytva VU = Verkhne Ufaleysk Chu = Chusovsk Ka K a s l i L = Lys 1vensk Ch = Chelyabinsk K = Kushvinsk Cheb a Chebarkul' NS = Nizhne Saldinsk Z l = Zlatoust NT = Novo Tagil'sk Sa Satkinsk A l = Alapaevsk Mi = Min'yarsk B i = Bilimbay A = Ashinsk P = Pervoural'sk B Beloretsk R = Revdinsk M = Magnitogorsk SV \u2014  Sverdlovsk O-Kh = Orsk-Khalilovsk Sources: Ekonomicheskaya Karta Urala - \"Rossiyskaya Federatsiya\" Geografgiz, Moskva, 1959; and L i v s h i t s . op. c i t . . p. 64. 124. Magnitogorsk ore is mined i n two open pits. The ore is prepared for smelting by the following methods: rich oxidized ores are subjected to crushing and sorting; lean oxidized and a l l u v i a l ores are enriched by gravity beneficiation with some magnetic separation; and sulfide ores are enriched by magnetic separation. The resulting concentrates are then subjected to 2 agglomeration. In 1955, the sixteen million tons of ore produced supplied the needs of the Magnitogorsk Combine and also to some 3 extent those of the Kuznets Combine. The shipment of Magnitogorsk ore to Kuznets has been a subsidiary, but significant factor in the depletion of the rich ores. Twenty million tons of ore have been shipped out in the postwar period alone. This quantity of ore would have been suf-fi c i e n t for two to three years' operation of the Magnitogorsk Combine. It i s judged expedient to reduce these shipments and make up the iron ore shortage of the Kuznets Plant with Sokolov-Sarbaysk ores u n t i l the local Gorno-Shorskaya and Khakasskaya ore bases are completely developed. This supply scheme w i l l make reasons they (the operators) want the ore's sulphur content as low as possible, certainly not over 0.10 per cent.... shipments from the Lake Superior d i s t r i c t over the past 20 years have averaged 0.02 per cent sulphur.\" M. G. Clark, The Economics of Soviet Steel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, p. 173. 2 Osintsev, oo. c i t . . pp. 134,135. 3 Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . . p. 574. 125. i t possible to avoid duplication of shipments over the Tobol-4 Magnitogorsk r a i l line as well. The capacity of the Magnitogorsk mine is slated to decline during the Seven Year Plan in connection with the gradual ex-haustion of resources and narrowing the front of mining operations at Mount Magnitnaya.^ By 1960 the share of sinter in Magnitogorsk's blast charge had reached 90 per cent. In other words over 90 per cent of the ore used was of the lower poorer quality type. With the exhaustion of the rich Magnitogorsk ores two substitu-tions have been attempted. They are the switching to the poorer local ores and the use of Sokolov-Sarbaysk ore from the adjacent part of Kazakhstan. In 1961, Sokolov-Sarbaysk was just coming into operation and only ten million tons of ore had been shipped^ mostly to the Chelyabinsk Plant. Therefore, i t is impossible to say what the exact effect of the use of these ores w i l l be. But i t is certain that the Sokolov-Sarbaysk ore w i l l cause the ore charge to be somewhat more costly, and consequently w i l l raise the cost of g Magnitogorsk's pig iron. The substitutions for the rich 4 Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 19. \u2022^Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 17. Osintsev, op. c i t . . p. 91. ^Buresh, op. c i t . . p. 13. Se geyev, op. cit.., p. 6. 126. Magnitogorsk ore were not completely s a t i s f a c t o r y by 1961 because the Magnitogorsk Combine was unable to f u l f i l l i t s p l a n f o r the 9 f i r s t time. I r o n and S t e e l Production Magnitogorsk i s one of the great m e t a l l u r g i c a l producers of the world. In 1932, Magnitogorsk produced 26 per cent of the U r a l i a n p i g i r o n p r oduction, but no s t e e l at a l l . By 1937, i t produced 60 per cent of the Urals p i g i r o n and 37 per cent of the s t e e l . By 1940, i t managed to increase i t s share to 63 per cent of the p i g i r o n and 53 per cent of the s t e e l . At t h i s time Magnitogorsk had a c a p a c i t y of 2,300,000 tons of both p i g i r o n and s t e e l . I t s a c t u a l production was lower because of discon-tinuous and below c a p a c i t y o p e r a t i o n . \"\"^  The Novo T a g i l ' s k P l a n t came i n t o o p e r a t i o n i n 1940, and the Chelyabinsk P l a n t was j u s t s t a r t i n g operations i n 1945. But by the end of the war, the Magnitogorsk Combine was producing about 55 per cent of the Urals i r o n and 58 per cent of the s t e e l . Therefore, i t had experienced a s l i g h t r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e i n p i g i r o n p r oduction and had gained s l i g h t l y i n s t e e l . By 1958, Magni-togorsk was producing about 5,800,000 tons of p i g iron,\"\"*\" (two-9 B. Beloborodov, \"Production Disrupted at the Magnitogorsk M e t a l l u r g i c a l Combine,\" Sovetskaya Rossiya. Moscow, 7 January, 1962, p. 2 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous M e t a l l u r g y (26),\" J o i n t P u b l i c a t i o n s Research S e r v i c e , 13,510, 18 A p r i l 1962, p. 26. \" \" ^ L i v s h i t s , op. c i t . . p. 163. *\"*Jasny, op. c i t . . p. 72. 127. fif t h s of the Urals total) and a similar amount of steel (about a third). In 1959, both the Sparrows Point and Gary Plants i n the USA had considerably more steel capacity than Magnitogorsk 12 with about eight million tons each. Nonetheless, in 1960 the Magnitogorsk Combine exceeded the iron producing capacity of the 13 largest US plant - Sparrows Point. The reason for this state of affairs i s the greater use of scrap i n steel making in the USA because of i t s more ready availability. Magnitogorsk i s s t i l l the largest single concern, and is undergoing considerable absolute expansion, but i t is declining relatively because of the emergence of other large units. At present i t provides more pig iron, steel and rolled metal, than were produced i n 1913 in a l l Russia. During the Seven Year Plan (1959 - 1965) new large units are to be introduced. As a result the production of steel shall rise by 50 per cent and pig iron -double by comparison with 1956. Rolled metal i s to increase from 5,200,000 to 8,500,000 tons during the Seven Year Plan. In India Premier Khruschev indicated that in the next few years the capacity of the Magnitogorsk Combine w i l l be brought to 12 G. Alexandersson, \"Changes in the Location Pattern of the Anglo-American Steel Industry: 1948-1959,\" Economic Georgraphv A p r i l 1961, vol. 37, no. 2, p. 107. 13 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 77. 128. 14 ten million tons, but no date for completion of this expan-sion was announced.*\"\"' In 1961 i t was predicted that Magnitogorsk wouldvjeach a capacity of twelve million tons before the end of 16 the Seven Year Plan. The Magnitogorsk blast furnace production is developing at a slower ratd than the steel smelting and ro l l i n g operations. This has caused the proportion of liquid pig iron in the smelt to decrease, while the proportion of scrap metal has risen. The scrap always arrives light weight. To counter this d i f f i c u l t y a faggoting press was procured i n the summer of 1961, but had not been put into operation by January of 1962. *\"7 Therefore, i n 1961 i t was planned to smelt a large quantity of steel from imported pig iron, the import of which was projected to increase in 1962. It complicates the work of the Magnitogorsk open hearth furnaces. The bringing in of Sokolov-Sarbaysk ore and external pig w i l l result in a somewhat higher cost of 18 smelted steel. In 1961, as a result of the above-mentioned d i f f i c u l t i e s , i n spite of supplying more metal than ever before, the open 14 Osintsev, op. c i t . . pp. 101, 102; and Komar, op. c i t . pp. 222, 225. l^x. Shabad, \"News Notes,\" Soviet Geography; Review and  Translation. May 1960, p. 89. 1 6V. Khvostovets, \"Pyl\" Nad Gorodom,\" Trud. Moskva, 18 March, 1961, p. 2. 1 7 \u2022\"-'Beloborodov, \"Production Disrupted....\", p. 27. \u2022^Sergeyev, op. c i t . . pp. 6-7. 129. hearth production of Magnitogorsk ended up thousands of tons of steel i n arrears. Because the open hearth production lagged, i t was necessary to bring in steel ingots from outside. But to preheat the imported cold ingots before rol l i n g is not the same as internal metal. The internal metal has to be heated i n the soaking pits only three and a half hours, while eight hours are required for the ingots from Nizhne Tagil'sk or Kuznetsk. It was found that the existing soaking pit capacity 19 was insufficient and a second group of pits had to be built . Magnitogorsk is the cheapest producer of iron, steel and rolled metal in the Soviet Union. This is largely the result of economies of scale but hinges to some extent also on the 20 relative cheapness of Kuzbass and Karaganda coal and the cheapness of both the local and Kazakh iron ores. In 1960, Magnitogorsk steel production costs were the lowest in the Soviet Union. Other leading major plants were a l l considerably more expensive. The main reason for this i s that Magnitogorsk has the cheapest charging materials. Furthermore, i t consumes twenty to thirty kilograms less of them per ton of 19 Beloborodov, \"Production Disrupted....\", pp. 26-28. 20 Holzman states that because of their poorer quality. Karaganda coals are mixed with Kuzbass coal. He does not state in what proportion. Holzman, op. c i t . . p. 386. The import of Kuzbass coal was s t i l l continuing to Magnitogorsk i n 1961. Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 16. 130. output than most other enterprises. A considerable effect i s also exerted by the comparatively low cost of converting pig iron for steel making purposes. One f i e l d in which Magnitogorsk i s not pre-eminent is i n the consumption of the metallic ore charge, the expense of which amounts to at least three quarters of the production cost of steel. \"Azovstal 1\" uses thirty kilograms less of metallic ore per ton of steel. In Magnitogorsk i t i s feasible to save fifteen to twenty kilograms or 2 per cent of the metallic ore consumption. This would require the reduction to approximately one-half the iron lost i n the slag i n the form of oxides and metallic regulus, and the elimination of accidental formation of unfit metal and the loss of metal i n the slag cups. This 21 would not require large capital expenditures. As mentioned above, i n 1961, for the f i r s t time in i t s history Magnitogorsk ended up in arrears. The main reason for this was that new construction was not completed according to 22 plan:. Because of this 1961 lag Magnitogorsk was included i n the projects that received increased emphasis i n 1962. A 40 per 23 cent increase in capital investments was planned. 2 1Sergeyev, OP. c i t . . pp. 1,2,7,8. 2 2Beloborodov, \"Production Disrupted.....\" , pp. 26,30. 23 ' Garbuzov, op. c i t . . p. 14. 131. During the Seven Year Plan appreciable expansion of iron, steel and rolled stock production is planned at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine. Six b i l l i o n rubles of capital investments were earmarked for industrial construction at the Magnitogorsk Combine, with the intention of putting into operation the main industrial units by 1965. This includes two blast furnaces, eight open hearth furnaces, three coking batteries and two r o i -,. 24 ling mills. II. NIZHNE TAGIL1SK Iron Ore Supply The Nizhne Tagil 1sk Combine was constructed to u t i l i z e the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group of deposits. In 1956, the Tagilo-Kushvinsk probable reserves were estimated to be 440,000,000 tons. These ores have a widely ranging, but generally low iron content and significant admixtures of sulphur and phosphorus. They are largely magnetite with smaller deposits of martite and semi-mar t i t e . In view of their low iron content they are concentrated 25 through wet magnetic separation. In 1955, the more than eight million tons of ore produced were.used to supply the Nizhne 26 Tagil'sk Combine and the Nizhne Saldinsk and Kushvinsk plants. 24 Khlebnikov, ap. c i t . . p. 65. 25 Osintsev, op. c i t . , p. 129. 26 Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . . p. 575. 132. The Kachkanar deposit i s being developed to augment the ore supply of Nizhne Tagil'sk and the other operations of the 27 Central Urals (also Chusovsk). Kachkanar, not far from Nizhne Tagil, i s the biggest deposit of iron ore in the Urals with reserves estimated at eight b i l l i o n tons. The Kachkanar ore is relatively low grade - containing on the average 16 to 17 per cent iron. But because i t occurs essentially on the surface, i t is economic to exploit by open strip mining. The Kachkanar ores are to be concentrated by magnetic separation which w i l l yield concentrates containing 63 to 64 per cent iron and 2 to 3 per cent s i l i c o n dioxide. The pig iron cost w i l l be partially offset by the slag formed during i t s smelting which w i l l contain a great deal of valuable vanadium. The ore concentrating combine is being built i n two sec-tions. The f i r s t section is designed to extract 33,000,000 tons of ore annually i n the Gusevorsk Pit which w i l l yield 6,000,000 tons of sinter and pellets. After the second section i s com-pleted, with raw material also being mined from the Kachkanar Mountain, the enterprise w i l l yield sixty million tons of raw ore annually. Once f u l l capacity is reached the shipments of iron ore from other regions to the metallurgical enterprises of the Northern and Central Urals w i l l be discontinued. Zabaluev, op. c i t . . p. 3 133. The f i r s t builders arrived i n the Kachkanar Mountain 28 region i n the spring of 1957. The schedule provided for putting into operation the so-called minimal complex of the ore mining combine (approximately one-fourth of capacity of the 29 stage) i n 1961. It is designed to extract 7,500,000 tons of raw ore and produce 1,500,000 tons of concentrate annually. By 1961, five years after the beginning of construction not one object was yet released for regular operation. Therefore, the target date for activating the minimal one-fourth of the f i r s t section of the combine was f i r s t postponed u n t i l 1962, then to 28 1963. The Kachkanar Plant produced i t s f i r s t concentrate in June 1963. 3 0 Iron and Steel Production Nizhne Tagil 1sk, the second largest metallurgical oper-ation in the Urals, is the only major plant to be located i n the Central Urals. I n i t i a l l y developed during the Second Five Year 31 Plan, i t went into operation i n 1940. In 1957, the new Novo Tagil'sk Metallurgical Plant was combined with the old Nizhne 28 Kaz kov, op. c i t . . pp. 5-6, 9, 12. ^y\"The Kachkanar Ore-Concentration Combine,\" Ekonomicheskava  Gazeta. Moscow, 28 January 1961 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (8),\" Joint Publications Research Service, 9869, 21 August 1961, ' P- 4 i 30 Markish, op. c i t . . p. 18. J iLipatov, op. c i t . . pp. 17, 169. 134. Tagil'sk Plant and ore deposits i n the neighborhood, and the new 32 enterprise received the name of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine. In 1945, the Novo Tagil'sk Plant smelted some 1,800,000 33 tons of pig iron, and 300,000 tons of steel. By 1958, the 34 Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine was producing 2,600,000 tons of pig iron and a similar amount of steel. Nizhne Tagil'sk is experiencing d i f f i c u l t i e s i n expanding i t s production. By January 1962, Nizhne Tagil'sk was a f u l l year 35 behind the schedules specified by the Seven Year Plan. The main causes for this state of affairs are: the expansion of the ore supply has been lagging, the scrap metal supply is poor, rationalization of production processes has not been achieved and possible technical innovations have not been implemented. The construction of the Kachkanar Ore Concentration Combine is not proceeding satisfactorily. The original mining enterprises of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine are also slow to expand. Because of the lag i n the construction of mining based on local ore 3 2V. P. Petrov, \"Soviet Industry,\" Washington, W. P. Kamkin, 1960. In this study only the Novo Tagil'sk portion of the combine w i l l be examined prior to the 1957 union, conse-quently the nomenclature of this operation w i l l not be consistent. 33 Lipatov, op. c i t . . p. 169. 34 Jasny, opT c i t . . p. 151; Soviet Geography: Review and  Translation, vol. 1, no. 1-2, p. 72. 35 v > Biryukov, and A. Uryashev, \"Pokazanaya Kopiya Pyl'nogo Originala,\" Izvestiva. Moskva, 25 January 1962, p. 3. 135. d e p o s i t s , l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of ore from other regions are being 36 brought i n . The d e l i v e r y of such ores i s expensive. Furthermore, the i r o n making m a t e r i a l s s u p p l i e d to Nizhne T a g i l ' s k are i n f e r i o r . The i r o n r e c e i v e d f o r smelting contains twice as much sulphur as s p e c i f i e d by the norm. L i k e w i s e , the s i n t e r used i s not s u i t a b l e f o r open hearth furnaces. I n 37 a d d i t i o n the limestone i s poor i n calcium oxide. But i n s p i t e of the above mentioned d i f f i c u l t i e s , the s t e e l making component of Nizhne T a g i l ' s k i s very e f f i c i e n t . I n 1961 the open hearth shops of Nizhne T a g i l ' s k and \"Zaporozhstal'\" achieved the best u t i l i z a t i o n of open hearth production f a c i l i -38 t i e s i n the Soviet Union. In 1962, the Nizhne T a g i l ' s k M e t a l l u r g i c a l Combine s t a r t e d the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a large converter shop equipped w i t h 39 oxygen converters. I t w i l l c o n t a i n the l a r g e s t converters i n the Soviet Union, each one of them r e p l a c i n g the c a p a c i t y of 40 s e v e r a l large open hearth furnaces. The f i r s t s e c t i o n of 36 \"Ore Mining Lags Behind Requirements,\" Ekonomicheskaya  Gazeta, Moscow, 28 January 1961 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous M e t a l l u r g y ( 8 ) , \" J o i n t P u b l i c a t i o n s Research S e r v i c e , 9,-869 21 August 1961* p. 2. 37 Yu. Ploskonenko and A. Morogov, \"How to E x p l o i t the P o t e n t i a l f o r Increasing S t e e l Output at-the N i z h n y y - T a g i l ' rs Combine, \" Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Moscow, 7 February 1961 ( i n \" S o v i e t Ferrous M e t a l l u r g y (10), \" J o i n g P u b l i c a t i o n s Research Service,-10, 036, 7 September 1961,-pp. 4-5. 38 A. Ryasnoy, \"Metallurgy, an Important L i n k , \" A g i t a t o r Moscow, No. 24, December 1961, pp. 10-13 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous M e t a l l u r g y (23),\" J o i n t P u b l i c a t i o n s Research \u2022 Service,- 12,818, 6 March 1962, p.-4. 136. this shop was planned to be put into operation i n the f i r s t 41 quarter of 1963. This shop makes i t possible to e f f i c i e n t l y 39 u t i l i z e the ores of the Kachkanar deposit. By early 1964 42 Nizhne Tagil'sk was producing oxygen converter steel. Because of i t s inferior raw material supply the cost of production at Nizhne Tagil'sk is considerably higher than at Magnitogorsk. In 1958, the overall cost of a ton of pig iron 43 was 60 per cent higher at Nizhne Tagil'sk than at Magnitogorsk and in 1956, the overall cost of a ton of steel was 56 per cent 44 higher. During the Seven Year Plan at the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine a new blast furnace, and an open hearth furnace have been put into operation, and r:.v. 1-operation of two open hearth furnaces 45 and two coking batteries i s planned. This is in addition to the 39 N. I. Sheftel, \"New Equipment of the Metallurgical Plant of the RSFSR i n 1962,\" Metallurg. Moscow, No. 3, March 1962, pp. 1-3 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (42),\" Joint Publi-cations Research Service, 14,025, 6 June 1962, p. 6. 40 N. Il'inskiy, \"Moshchnyy Konvertornyy Tsekh,\" Pravda. Moskva, 22 January 1962j p. 1. 41 \"Kislorodnye Konvertory dolzhny byt' v srok.'\" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. 15 December 1962, p. 16. 42 I. Peshkin, \"Molodef Staryy Ural,\" Ekonomicheskava  Gazeta. 18 January 1964, p. 42. 43T Bardin, op. c i t . . p. 522. 4 4 L i v s h i t s , op. c i t . . pp. .230-: ^Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 65. 137. converter shop mentioned above. III. CHELYABINSK Iron Ore Supply The Chelyabinsk Plant u t i l i z e s the Bakal'sk deposit which 46 is 270 kilometers distant. In 1956, probable reserves were estimated at 210,000,000 tons. These ores, having a low Fe but insignificant sulphur and phosphorus content were of two types -limonites with 85,000,000 tons and siderites with 125,000,000 tons. The limonites are prepared by crushing and sorting and especially phosphorus free ores are derived through roasting as well. The siderites are similarly prepared by crushing and sorting, 47 but in the future some of the siderites w i l l be agglomerated. The Bakal'sk ore is not uniformly deposited, and i t s iron content varies sharply - from 35 to 50 per cent. A good grade of agglomerate could be obtained by \"neutralization\" - the mixing of rich and poor ores together. This can produce a good blast furnace charge after the mixture i s sintered. It is usually performed i n special intermediate warehouses where the ore is delivered, mixed, and sent to an agglomerating factory. This is at present not done at the Bakal'sk deposit. 46 V. Azbukin, V. Beloborodov, \"The Fate of the Bakal Iron Ore Deposits,\" Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow,-29 January 1961 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (8)\", Joint Publications Research Service, 9869, 21 August 1961, p. 18. 47 Osintsev, op. c i t . . p.136. 138. Largely because of the lack of neutralization of ores, the agglomerating plant of Bakal i s much less productive than at Chelyabinsk i t s e l f - based on imported ores. Similar equipment at Chelyabinsk is 48 per cent more productive. A suggested solution to this problem is the formation of a Chelyabinsk Combine including the Bakal'sk ore source with the Chelyabinsk Plant. This is considered to be quite feasible because : a similar organization i s successfully operated at the Kuznets Combine which includes the Gornaya Shoriya mines some distance removed from the p l a n t . 4 8 In 1955, the 9,300,000 tons of ore produced were utilized 49 by the Chelyabinsk, Satkinsk and Ashinsk plants, but i n fact, provided less than half of the requirements of these plants. In the Seven Year Plan i t i s intended to increase production by 40 per cent.5\u00b0 Numerous disorders, obsolete f a c i l i t i e s , and poor organi-zation have led to deplorable results. Bakal did not f u l f i l l the plan in 1961. The Novo-Bakal mine should have been put into operation during 1960 to produce one half a million tons of ore but was not in operation by 1961. Further, labour turnover was -, \u201e 48 also extreme. 48 Azbukin, Beloborodov, op. c i t . , pp. 16-18. 4^Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . . p. 575. 50M. Leshchiner, \"Perspektivy Razvitiya Chernoy Metallurgii -Chelyabinskogo Ekonomicheskogo Administrativnogo Rayona,\" Planovoe Khozyaystvo. XXXVI year of issue, No. 12, December 1959, p. 78. 139. Possible auxiliary supplies of ore for the Chelyabinsk Plant are the Akhtensk and Techensk deposits, but their total probable reserves only amount to some 65,000,000 tons. Therefore, even with the development of these deposits Chelyabinsk would be deficient i n ore supply. The large scale use of Kustanay ores . . 5 1 i s proceeding. The f i r s t section of the Sokolov-Sarbaysk mining combine 52 was scheduled to start operation in 1961 and to be completed in 53 1962. The development of the import of ores from Central Kazakhstan (around Karaganda) is to some extent desirable because this region i s arid and lacks an adequate water supply for i n situ 54 smelting, but this region i s considerably further removed from the Urals than the Kustanay reserves. The Sokolov-Sarbaysk Ore Concentration Combine is building a factory for treating sulfide ores. When i n f u l l production i t w i l l process 26,500,000 tons of ore annually. The f i r s t stage w i l l have an annual capacity of 12,000,000 tons of crude ore.*'*' 51 Osintsev, op. c i t . . p. 137. 52\"Shock-Work Construction Projects of the Third Year of the Seven-Year Plan, \" Pravda, 4 January 1961, p. 3 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (6)\", Joint Publications Research Service, 10,032, 1 September 1961, p. 2. JGarbuzov, op. c i t . . p. 17. 54 Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 8. 55 V. Martem'yanov, \"Samaya Moshchnaya v mire,\" Izvestiva. Moskva, 27 April 1961, p. 3. \u2022 \u2022 140. In 1960, the f i r s t part of the Sarbaysk ore mine with an annual 56 capacity of 1,500,000 tons was completed. In 1961, the capacity of Sokolovka and Sarbaysk mines was slated to increase by 3,500,000 tons of o r e . 5 7 Iron and Steel Production Chelyabinsk, the third major metallurgical operation in the Urals, specializes in high quality metallurgy. This is not surprising because i t is the only major Uralian plant located on a major metal market as opposed to directly on an ore source as the other three are. Its raw material supply i s the least satisfactory of the major plants and i t was the f i r s t to import major quantities of iron ore. Chelyabinsk's f i r s t steel was poured i n 1942, but construc-tion, had been started in 1935, and the plant was not really 58 integrated u n t i l later. Chelyabinsk produced some steel before the end of the war but was only getting into production in a big way by 1956 when i t produced about two million tons of pig iron and three million tons of steel. Because i t specializes in high 56\"Rudnyy,\" Komsomolskava Pravda. 1 January 1961, p. 1. 7^\"New Metallurgical Projects i n Kazakhstan,\" Kazakhstanskaya  Pravda. Alma-Ata, 3 February 1961, (in Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (10), Joint Publications Research Service, 10,036, 7 September 1961, p. 12. 58 Lipatov, op. city, p. 170. 141. quality steel making i t i s supplied with electric furnaces as well as the usual open hearth ones. It is also planned to develop a converter shop which was to have gone into production in 1961. 59 Construction had not even begun by this date. In mid 1961 Chelyabinsk pig iron production was well above the planned level, but steel and rolled products were lagging below i t . Defect losses were high, as was the cost of production. Open hearth furnaces and blooming mills had excessive down times. Ordinary steel is s t i l l smelted i n the electric furnaces. The reasons for this undesirable state of affairs are that the ferroalloys, and special scrap for the electric furnaces are in-adequately supplied. 6 0 The essential feature of the ferroalloy problem is that ferroalloy plants do not as a rule have their own mines, quarries or supply bases. They are forced to depend on outside sources for their raw materials. As they are secondary consumers, the producers do not take sufficient pains to ensure that the raw 61 material supplied reaches their exacting specifications. Scrap 59 S. Afanas'yev, \"Konvertoru - Dorogu v Metallurgiyu, Eto Vygodno, Progressivno, \" Pravda. 13 December 1961, p. 3. 60 V. Beloborodov and N. Kartashov, \"Crisis at Chelyabinsk\", Sovetskava Rossiva. Moscow, 20 July 1961 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (12),\" Joint Publications Research Service, 10,286, 2.October 1961, pp. 3-4, 6. 61 Zhuravlev, op. c i t . . pp. 11-12. 142. i s i n limited supply throughout the Soviet Union, and therefore, i t i s not surprising that special scrap should be i n acute short supply. Especially since complaints concerning lack of i n t e l l i -gent handling of scrap are general.^ Steel smelting production i s being developed more rapidly than blooming production. The existing blooming capacity cannot process the entire output of metal coming from the open hearth and electric smelting furnaces. In 1961, the Chelyabinsk blooming m i l l being of inadequate capacity, about 70,000 tons of metal were piled up i n the cold ingot storage area. This occurs while the rolling mills at Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk work only intermittently because of shortages of b i l l e t s and slabs. This situation w i l l probably even deteriorate in the next few years, when new electric steel smelting furnaces and a new sheet rolling m i l l w i l l go into operation. There i s also a wide discrepancy at the Chelyabinsk Plant between the growth of the basic f a c i l i t i e s and that of the maintenance services. During recent years the basic plant has increased five fold while the maintenance services have only 63 doubled and are now quite inadequate for good practice. The cost of production at Chelyabinsk i s higher than at Nizhne Tagil'sk let alonja Magnitogorsk. In 1956, the overall 62 Ploskonenko and Morogov, op. c i t . . p. 4; and \"Raw Material Shortages in the Iron and Steel Industry,\" Op. c i t . . p . l . 63 Beloborodov and Kartashpv. pp. c i t . . pp. 6-7. 143. cost of a ton of pig iron was 68 per cent higher at Chelyabinsk than at Magnitogorsk, and the overall cost of a ton of steel was 84 per cent higher. 6 4 During the Seven Year Plan significant development of the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant was planned. For industrial con-struction at this plant in the current seven year period, i t was planned to earmark four b i l l i o n rubles of capital investments, putting into operation new blast furnaces, coking batteries, converters, open hearth furnaces, electric furnaces, sheet ro l l i n g m i l l , cold rolling m i l l , blooming m i l l with a continuous 65 b i l l e t m i l l and structural and commercial mills. IV. ORSK-KHALILOVSK Iron Ore Supply The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is based on the nearby deposits of Akkermanovsk, Novo-Kievsk and Novo Petropavlovsk. In 1956, the total possible reserves were estimated to be 260,000,000 tons. The Khalilovsk ores are largely limonites with low iron content; containing nickel and chrome, but besides being friable, they have a high content of hygroscopic moisture - from 20 to 25 per cent. 66 64 Livshits, ozu c i t . . pp. 226-229, 230-231. 65 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 65. 66 Novo-Kievsk is only some 40 km distant from Novo-Troitsk, the site of the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine. 144. The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is being developed to ease the Soviet nickel situation. There is quite a severe shortage and great efforts are being made to develop other alloys with pro-68 perties similar to nickel steel. Also there i s competition for the Orsk ore for the production of nickel i t s e l f . In 1956, the Novo-Kievsk deposit was in production with an open pit mine and a crushing sorting plant and the Akkermanovsk 6 7 deposit was being prepared for production. In 1955, the Novo-69 Kievsk Deposit produced six hundred thousand tons of ore. The processing of the Khalilovo ores, which contain titanium as well as nickel and chrome, is much more d i f f i c u l t than ordinary iron ores. More fuel must be consumed i n their blast furnace smelting and this of course increases the cost of the metal. Rolling i t costs 18 to 25 per cent more than carbon ores. The Combine also has a bloomery iron shop. A pig con-taining iron and nickel is obtained from the ore by direct reduction. But this pig is greatly contaminated by slag inclu-sions, sulphur, and in part, phosphorus. Attempts to use pig containing nickel in the production of steel have not been very successful. Consequently the pig goes into the blast furnace charge to increase the nickel content i n the alloyed pig iron. 67 Osintsev, op. c i t . . pp. 138-139. 68 Klunichenko, op. c i t . . p. 16. 69 ^Kutaf'ev, op. c i t . . p. 145. This use of i t , however, is not advisable, inasmuch as the existence of nickel in Khalilovo iron does not actually result in an improvement in the Soviet nickel situation. Moreover, to obtain the pig Novo-Troitsk nickel ores are used which are destined for the nonferrous metallurgical industry, i . e., for the production of metallic nickel. The Central Scientific Research Institute of the Iron and Steel Industry has developed a process for refining the pig, which makes i t possible to obtain conditioned commercial ferronickel, i.e. a nickel-iron alloy. This method was successfully tested i n 1960 at Novo-Troitsk i t s e l f , but has not been followed up by the commercial production of ferronickel at the bloomery shop. 7 0  Iron and Steel Production The fourth major plant - Orsk-Khalilovsk - i n the process of being developed - i s , l i k e Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk, located in the Southern Urals. It i n i t i a l l y began production in 1955, but construction had started as early as 1943. The construction of the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine was not undertaken because rich iron deposits had been found, but because they contain a valuable metal - nickel - which is i n scant supply in the Soviet Union. 7 0 It is worthy of note,that although generally considered important, the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is not a priority project ^Gol'denberg, op. c i t . . pp. 2-5. 146. of the Seven Year Plan. The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine has been under construction for more than twenty years now, but many more recent enterprises, for example, the Cherepovets Metallurgical Plant, are more ful l y in operation. Because of poorly integrated construction, the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is forced to send seven ton steel ingots to the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine in order to obtain slabs for r o l l i n g steel sheet. The transportation of the slabs for ro l l i n g steel sheet to Magnitogorsk and back to Novo-Troitsk i s extremely costly. To circumvent this problem i t was decided to stop sending metal to Magnitogorsk and instead to make small ingots and r o l l sheet steel from them i n situ. But the transition to teeming steel into small molds reduced the productivity of the open hearth furnaces. Moreover, i n view of the forthcoming opening of another open hearth at the open hearth furnace shop there i s a shortage of: molds again. Hence i t w i l l be necessary again to cast seven ton ingots and dispatch them to Magnitogorsk for ro l l i n g into slabs. The finances allocated to the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine to insure the construction and opening in 1961 of the blooming m i l l , heat treatment department and the f i r s t section of the sintering factory f e l l 139,000,000 rubles short of the required sum, including 61,000,000 rubles for assembly operations. The 147. Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is also adversely affected by delays in deliveries of equipment necessary for expansion. Part of this problem stems from the Combine's need for considerable and varied, non-standard equipment - racks, frames, fastenings, etc. The Combine underfulfilled i t s 1960 yearly plan. Its out-put f e l l short of the goal by thousands of tons of steel, rolled stock and iron ore. The open hearth and rol l i n g shops greatly overspent their wage funds. The plan on construction and assembly operations at the sintering factory was only 16.9 per cent f u l -f i l l e d - at the heat treatment department, 57.3 per cent; This 71 did not improve i n the early part of 1961. Khalilovsk steel resists metal fatigue about twice as much as ordinary steel and i t s impact strength i s about nine times greater. This steel has both great strength and good weldability. In producing metal products made of this type for transportation uses, i t was possible to u t i l i z e the whole complex of elements contained i n Khalilovsk ore with sufficient effectiveness. The experience acquired i n obtaining stronger metal from Khalilovsk ores has long since failed to be reflected in the production by the Combine. Over a number of years, i t has been smelting low quality steels designed for products which do not 72 require great strength. 71Rudenko, op. c i t . . p. 1. 72 Gol'denberg, op. c i t . . pp. 3-4. 148. The essential problem of the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is that the production of naturally alloyed steel has proven much more d i f f i c u l t than i t was originally supposed. This is the reason why more concerted effort and investment have not been forthcoming to establish this combine as a f u l l fledged metal-lurgical unit. Technology and economic conditions are only now becoming ripe for this operation to become really economically viable. In the current seven year period, the construction of the Orsk-Khalilovsk Metallurgical Combine is to be finished essentially, putting into operation a new blast furnace, seven open hearth furnaces and one converter, two coking batteries, 73 and four r o l l i n g mills. V. SMALL PLANTS The small metallurgical plants i n the Urals invariably predate the large ones and also the revolution. They were renovated i n the modern period because the demand for metal has always exceeded the supply i n the Soviet Union. Thus although these plants are often less efficient and only a few of them produce unusual products d i f f i c u l t to duplicate in the large plants, some twenty of them continue i n operation. The small \u2014 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 65. 149. plants produced the entire production of iron and steel u n t i l 1932 when Magnitogorsk came into operation. Since that time, their share of the total production has progressively decreased, but their absolute production has increased to a considerable extent; more than doubled for pig iron and quadrupled for steel by 1956. The larger old plants, are quite competitive with the more expensive major plants. In 1956, for example, three of the old plants, Satkinsk, Kushvinsk and Ashinsk, spent less on the metallic part of the pigiron charge than Chelyabinsk, which was the highest cost major plant, but only Ashinsk was cheaper than Novo Tagil'sk. No plant even approached Magnitogorsk. A l l of the old plants consume more and pay more for fuel than the major plants. The diffe r e n t i a l i n fuel expenses is great enough that none of the old plants have as low total raw material and fuel costs as the major operations. The total cost of a ton of pig iron at Satkinsk was 320 rubles as opposed to 284 i n Chelyabinsk and 253 in Novo Tagil'sk. 7 4 Actually these old plants were not even as competitive as their pig iron costs would seem to indicate because they often lacked the volume of production necessary for efficient further processing. For example, a modern continuous hot strip m i l l Livshits, OPJ. c i t . . pp. 226-229, 236-237 150. requires a capacity of 1,250,000 tons in order to operate e f f i -75 ciently, none of the older plants produced this much metal. The Serov Plant depends on the local Serov-Ivdel'sk ore sources. It has been altered from charcoal to coke and derives i t s coal from the Kuzbass, there being no direct r a i l link with the relatively close, but expensive Pechora Basin. In the early Soviet period, Serov (Nadezhdinsk) was exceptional among the Tsarist plants i n that i t was f a i r l y modern, relatively large and quite efficient. L i t t l e effort to expand or alter i t was carried out before the war, but during the war both pig iron and steel capacity were added to i t . It is isolated to the North of the rest of the Urals plants but i s situated on an adequate ore base with promise of much augmented supply i f some recently dis-covered ore finds are firmed up. The newly, discovered ores contain appreciable amounts of 76 chrome and nickel which the Soviets are short of. Therefore, a Serov ferroalloy plant was considered among the most important construction work being done i n 1961,and investment was increased i n 1962. This was i n accordance with the general program of channelling 1962 investment toward the most important construction Long-Term Trends and Problems of the European Steel Industry, op. c i t . , p. 110. 76 Komar, op. c i t . . p. 218 151. 77 p r o j e c t s that had been i n i t i a t e d e a r l i e r . I t i s planned to f u l l y modernize the b l a s t furnace shop, w i t h the c o n s t r u c t i o n of new b l a s t furnaces to r e p l a c e the o l d furnaces to be 78 demolished. This unusual s i t u a t i o n i n d i c a t e s that Serov i s to i n c r e a s e i n importance, p o s s i b l y even to r i v a l O r s k - K h a l i l o v s k e v e n t u a l l y . The Chusovsk P l a n t draws i t s ore from Tagilo-Kushvinsk which has other important p l a n t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t . Chusovsk's c o a l supply i s derived from the K i z e l o v s k and Kuznetsk basins. What i s somewhat unusual i n S o v i e t p r a c t i c e i s that i s i r o n pro-d u c t i o n has been considerably increased s i n c e 1913, because i t i s the only producer of ferrovanadium, and i t s s t e e l production has not n e a r l y kept pace. Chusovsk s u p p l i e s p i g i r o n to the l o c a l p l a n t s , e s p e c i a l l y the L^s'vensk s t e e l p l a n t , which s p e c i a l i z e i n q u a l i t y m etallurgy. Chusovsk i s unfavorably s i t u a t e d w i t h regard to c o a l supply - i t i s one of the most d i s t a n t p i g i r o n producers s u p p l i e d from the Kuznets Coal Basin (Serov i s s l i g h t l y f u r t h e r removed), and Garbuzov, op. c i t . , pp. 14-15. i Khlebnikov, og. c i t . , p. 66 152. the Kizelovsk coal supply i s of generally inadequate quality. Chusovsk's unfavorable coal supply coupled with i t s concentration oti production of high quality metal has induced the Soviets to 79 experiment with the introduction of mazut into i t s furnaces. The larger old plants are to be retained for: the foreseeable future. In the Seven Year Plan i t is planned to modernize Serov, 80 Zlatoust, Verkhne-Isetsk and Chusovsk. Certain of the other old plants supply unusual products and hence w i l l probably be retained for some time to come. The Lys'vensk Plant produces valuable grades of thin steel sheets, black iron plates, and t i n plate; the Nytva Plant i s a prominent supplier of a wide assortment of 81 bimetals and other important products. In 1962, the Beloretsk Metallurgical Combine was to have been given a special department for precision alloy r o l l i n g and strip alloy production was being 82 organized at theMin'yar and Izhevsk plants. 83 Other plants undergoing additions are Ashinsk Omut-84 ninsk and Pervoural'sk. The Pervoural'sk new tube manufacturing plant i s the largest automated tube ro l l i n g m i l l in the Soviet 85 Union. The f i r s t batch of tubes were rolled by January 1962. 79 a petroleum residue. ^\u00b0Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 66; 8\"\"Zabaluev, etc.. op.cit..p.3, 82 Sheftel, op. c i t . . p. 9. 83 N. V. Matyushin, \"The Trend i n Standardization of Metallurgy,\" Standartizatsiva. Moscow, No. 1, 1962, pp. 30-34 (in-\"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (31),\" Joint Publications Research Service, 13,311, 3 A p r i l 1962, p. 8. 153 Plants l i k e Ashinsk, Saldinsk, Nizhne Serginsk, Kushvinsk, Seversk and Alapaevsk, oh the other hand, do not appear to have a very bright future. Furthermore, Ashinsk i s to cease i r o n smelting i n i t s own blast furnaces and be converted to cheaper imported i r o n f o r s t e e l making. Iron smelted i n the old b l a s t furnaces of the Ashinsk Plant costs 42 per cent higher than aver-86 age. Seversk, i n s p i t e of considerable l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e i n 87 r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of production, i s s t i l l an extremely high cost 88 producer. Alpaevsk i s plagued by d i f f i c u l t i e s with i t s i r o n ore source, which requires considerable investment i f an e f f i c i e n t 89 production i s to be attained. This i s extremely u n l i k e l y because even the more favorable plants such as Chusovsk have considerable d i f f i c u l t y i n acquiring investment c a p i t a l for new 8 4 O H\"Garbuzov, op. c i t . . p, 15. 8 5 \"Prokatany Pervye Truby ,\" Trud. Moskva, 13 January 1962, p. 1. 86 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 132. 87 A. Rusin, P. K o l o t i l o v , I. Mamontov, P. Yakupov, V. Toropov, V. Medvedev, V. Mershinin, \"For Larger Production and Fewer Expenditures,\" Sovetskava Rossiya. Moscow, 29 March 1961 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (13),\" J o i n t Publications Research Service, 10,432, 11 October 1961, pp. 16-20. 88 I t i s much more expensive than Lys'vensk f o r instance. Zabaluev, op. c i t . . p. 3. 89 The Alapaevsk Combine mines i t s ore by s e l e c t i v e ex-p l o i t a t i o n of a system of small mines. The r e s u l t of giving preference to sectors containing r i c h ore i s an impoverished deposit area and t.:a:; reduced mining front. Such a method of 154. equipment to decrease the lag behind the leading major plants. Chusovsk produces open hearth steel cheaper than Makeevka, Cherepovets, Orsk-Khalilovsk and Chelyabinsk do. Yet the only important work done on i t from 1946-1960 was the modernization of one blast furnace.^ VI. SUMMARY The erection of major metallurgical plants i n the Urals was deemed desirable for a large number of reasons, but the main points are: the general belief that the larger the unit the more efficient i t would be, which to some extent at least is supported by the mineralization of the fuel balance, the intro-duction of integrated plants, the processing of furnace charge, the necessity to import fuel, and the great size of the Urals. Most of these items have been dealt with to some extent earlier i n this study, but to recapitulate:- The belief i n size being a good thing i s self-explanatory; the mineralization of the fuel balance enabled, and, i n fact made desirable the increase i n size of blast furnaces - the basic unit i n an iron and steel works; the introduction of integrated plants allowed economies of materials through better u t i l i z a t i o n of inputs, which in turn exploitation increases the cost of mining the ore (up to nine-ten rubles per ton). It is possible to indiscriminately mine a l l of the ore and reprocess i t by the bloomery method. But this requires capital investment. P.V. Vlasov, MThe Ferrous Metallurgy Section of the Engineering and Economic Council of the Sverdlovskiy Sov-narkhoz.\"Byulleten 1 Tekhniko-Ekonomicheskoy Informatsii. Moscow, No-.__2_, pp. 83-84 (in \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy(44),\" Joint Publications Research Service, 13,843, 22 May 1962, p. 26. 155. was most readily arrived at i n the form of big units; the pro-cessing of furnace charge made the u t i l i z a t i o n of huge, but formerly substandard deposits of ore practicable, and these deposits supplied the raw material bases for such plants; and the necessary import of fuel was easiest arranged to a limited number of locations eliminating the necessity of duplication of transport f a c i l i t i e s , maintenance of said f a c i l i t i e s and such units as coking plants, that otherwise would be necessary. It is worthwhile to elaborate on the great size of the Urals area. The immense size of the Urals causes i t to be, not a closely knit region like, for example, the Ruhr, but much more like the North Eastern United States. Consequently the distances involved in internal transportation generate more force toward integration of units - both horizontal and vertical - than i n a smaller area. Therefore, the Urals iron and steel industry evolved very large integrated units. By 1959, the bulk of the production was concentrated into three producers; the Magnitogorsk, Nizhne Tagil*sk, and Chelyabinsk plants; and one other major operation 91 was developing - Orsk-Khalilovsk - i n Novo Troitsk. These plants are supplied with ore from the mines of Magnitogorsk, the Zabaluev, etc., pp. c i t . . p. 3. 91 Orsk-Khalilovsk started operation in 1955, but has not yet reached the level of the other three. 156. Tagilo-Kushvinsk, the Bakal'sk, the Khalilovsk, the Kachkanar, .92 and the Sokolov-Sarbaysk deposits. In 1932 the major plants (at that time only Magnitogorsk was i n operation) accounted for 26 per cent of the Uralian pig 9 3 iron production, and no steel. Byl937 this had increased to 62 per cent of the pig iron, and 38 per cent of the steel. By 1956 the proportion was 77 per cent of the pig iron and 67 per cent of the steel. \"^TSomar, op. c i t . . pp. 221-222. 93 Nizhne Tagil'sk was producing a l i t t l e pig iron and steel, but this was on the basis of plant predating the later Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine, and had l i t t l e to do with the latter, but the same site. 157. CHAPTER VI AN ANALYSIS OF THE URALIAN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY The distribution of the Uralian iron and steel industry is distinguished essentially through i t s hi s t o r i c a l development and raw material supplies. Therefore, an analysis on these bases is included. I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT It should be borne in mind.j.as a limiting factor that when metallurgy was introduced i n the Urals the whole region had just entered the Russian sphere of influence. Ivan IV had only cap-tured Kazan i n 1552 and the land North and West of the Ural 1 River was annexed at the end of the seventeenth century. The whole area of the Urals was l i t t l e visited and virt u a l l y unsur-veyed by 1696 when the great expansion began. This was certainly one of the most successful gambles ever undertaken by a nation trying to industrialize i t s e l f by i t s bootstraps. If i t had failed, Russia would have had extreme d i f f i c u l t y i n emerging as the great modern power i t did i n the 1700*8. Although most of the cannon in this period were s t i l l made of brass, the bulk of the accoutrements and a l l of the muskets were of iron, consequently, an assured supply was necessary to a leading power. \"\"P. I. Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of  Russia, to the 1917 Revolution. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949, p. 232 and map facing p.214.\"Moscow State i n the XVII Century 1600-1694\". 158. The f i r s t period was followed by a period of stagnation partly engendered by the rising Western European nationalism and the protectionism this gave rise to i n some traditional Uralian iron markets. It was also partly attributable to the lack of progress i n charcoal technology, the only type of operation the Urals had any advantages in at that time. This was due to the scarcity of local coking coal and the d i f f i c u l t y of importing i t because of the rudimentary state of transport i n that period. On the basis of the existing technology 200,000 tons was about the optimum size of production, a l l of the most advantageous sites were operated as well as a great number of marginal ones. Some of the locations that persisted have had remarkable longevity in the industrial scale of time, an indication of the appropriateness of their location. A singular example is the Alapaevsk Plant founded in 1701, which was s t i l l i n operation in 1959, although admittedly rebuilt from time to time; there were some twnety other examples that persisted well over 150 years. Consequently, i t i s reasonable to regard the original siting of these plants as remarkable achievements, although admittedly they were only the extreme examples of success. It i s now regarded by the Soviets that i t takes forty years to amortize equipment, and probably in the earlier period this time was sub-stantially less, therefore, a great number of plants that have 159. long since disappeared were, a l l in a l l , quite profitable ventures. The period of equilibrium lasted u n t i l about 1870 when improved technology and the increased demands of the expanding Russian Empire caused another growth period to set i n . But the new surge of growth was markedly different i n nature from the i n i t i a l one. It was based primarily on the consolidation of production into a relatively few producers. Average pig iron smelt per plant had only increased from 2,500 tons i n 1800 to 2 9,000 tons in 1913 but by 1913 the largest plant (Nadezhdinsk) produced 170,000 tons of pig iron or 19 per cent of the total 3 output and i n the eighteenth century the largest plant, Nizhne Tagil'sk, produced only 7,000-9,000 tons or from 16 per cent in 4 1763 to 6 per cent i n 1799. After 1913, production was disrupted by the First World War, then by the c i v i l war, and only after c i v i l order was restored i n the early 1920's was i t possible to receover the prewar level of production, largely by simply renovating pre-existing plant. The possibility of a general coke technology which this development indicated supported the concentration of production 2 Lyashchenko, op. c i t . . p. 330; Livshits, op. c i t . , table 23, pp. 125-126. 3 Livshits, op. c i t . . table 46, p. 167. 4 B. B. Kafengauz, Istoriva Khozvaystva Demidovykh v  XVIII-XIX W.. Qpvt issledovaniy po i s t o r i i Ural'skoy Metallurgii Tom 1. Moskva-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1949, pp. 315, 336-337; and Komar, op. c i t . . p. 90. 160. into units of a size hitherto unknown. These major producers required large suitable ore sources which were limited in number. Thus the few suitable ore sources provided the best sites for these major plants. Once established (providing the present level of technology i s assumed) inertia assures these plants of a protracted and increasing role in the iron and steel industry of the Urals. In 1955, the Uralian production of iron and steel was exceeded by only three foreign countries. There are eight other comparable units in the world of which one (the South) is also i n the USSR, four i n the United States (Eastern, Pittsburgh-Youngstown, Chicago and Cleveland-Detroit) and the sovereign states of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, are the remaining three. A l l but Cleveland-Detroit and France exceed the Urals in output. 5 At the beginning of the seven year plan i t was accepted that during this period the Urals was to increase i t s iron and steel production but decline relatively. By 1980 i t was to double i t s production but undergo a relative decline of 15 per cent. A l l of the increase was to be obtained through most economical -ways: expansion and reconstruction of existing enterprises, 5A letter from H.C. Rossrucker, Statistician, The American Iron and Steel Institute; Long-Term Trends and Problems of the  European Steel Industry.op* c i t . . pp. 52-53, 64-65; Komar, pp. c i t . . p. 221; and Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie p r i Sovete Ministrov USSR, Promvshlennost1 SSSR. Statisticheskiv Sbornik. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Statisticheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1957, p. 113. \"Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 65. 161. equipping them with improved units and introducing new technical 7 units. With the de-emphasis of iron and steel i n favour of chemi-g cals i t i s probable that the planned expansion at least u n t i l the end of the Seven Year Plan w i l l take place in the Urals, but not in the new regions. Therefore, the Urals w i l l probably not experience the decline predicted for i t , at least not to the f u l l extent indicated previously. II. THE RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY The present Uralian raw material supply i s very good, at least in so far as the major plants are concerned. It is doubtful that this situation w i l l continue with the steady appreciable 9 diminution of the extremely limited high quality local resources, which are being progressively replaced by imported materials. With the increasing import of raw materials the Urals is losing i t s advantages of cheap supply over the areas i t is importing from. For example, the Kuzbass and Karaganda i n coal, Northern Kazakh-stan i n iron ore and the Center in scrap. S t i l l , because of i t s location i t i s better situated for 7S. M. F i l l i p o v , \"Results and prospects in Metallurgy,\" Metallure T Moscow, No. 2 4 February 1962, pp. 1-4 (in \"Soviet \u2022 Ferrous Metallurgy (34),\" Joint Publications Research Service, 13,560 24 April 1962, p. 21. Q T. Shabad, \"Soviet to Put Mote Funds Into Agriculture for 1963,\" The New York Times, vol. CXII, No. 38, 290, November 24, 1962, pp. 1, 3. 162. the import of cheap raw materials than is the South. In 1956, Magnitogorsk had the cheapest supply of pig iron raw materials, being almost 25 per cent cheaper than i t s nearest competitor -Kuznetsk - which depended largely on very inferior local iron ores,*\"**1 and imported the more bulky ore rather than coal.\"\"\"*'\"\"3 Magnitogorsk has been efficient partly because of being developed on iron ore rather than coal. At present this is f a i r l y typical in the Soviet Union where 42 per cent of the production comes from plants located near iron ore bases, as 12 opposed to only 25 per cent fuel base oriented. But a l l of the previous large plants had not been located on iron ore be-cause when they were developed there was a pronounced advantage to coal location because of the greater amounts of i t needed. By the time Magnitogorsk was developed, the amounts of coal needed 14 had been drastically reduced per unit of output, and more iron 9 Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 9. Jasny, op. c i t . . p. 281; and Holzman, op. c i t . . p. 386. Holzman states that 80 per cent of the Kuznetsk requirements were locally met in 1953. \"**Tn 1940 transport costs per ton of pig iron produced on the basis of imported ore at Kuznetsk were 65 rubles, and on imported coal at Magnitogorsk - 25 rubles. Livshits, op. c i t . . p. 234. 12 Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 16. 13 Jasny claims that the development of Kuznets at the same time as Magnitogorsk was inadvisable because of the inefficiencies of having two such major competing projects going forward at once. Jasny, OP. c i t . . p. 279. 14 In early times seven or eight tons of coal were used per 163. was needed because of depletion of the limited extremely rich ore sources. At present the amount of iron ore used to produce one ton of iron is always 0.5-1 ton higher than the consumption of coking c o a l . 1 5 Novo Tagil*sk had the third cheapest supply of pig iron raw materials and Chelyabinsk the fourth. A l l the large Southern plants were more expensive, being almost twice as expensive as Magnitogorsk. Since the cost of the raw material supply accounts for two-thirds of the net cost of pig iron, i t is readily under-stood why the Urals appears so favorable. It is important to note that cheapness of raw material supply i s not directly correlated to the i n i t i a l quality of mater-i a l s . Much more important, within limits of course, are the ease of mining and the industrial characteristics of the material 16 attained. After these two fundamental qualities come quality of materials extracted and the distance they must be shipped to the consumer. Magnitogorsk has the cheapest supply of raw materials because i t i s situated on a large relatively easily mined rich ore ton of iron produced. Now only 1.2-1.4 tons, or 2-2.5 tons including coal for fuel etc. are used. 1 5Minakov, op. c i t . . p. 16. 16 Khlebnikov states \"The cost of iron ore i s basically determined by the condition of occurrance of the iron ore, volume of i t s production, method of mining, system of extraction, mechanization of operations and moisture content in the ore; p. 127. 164. 17 resource adjacent to large easily mined, but not particularly 18 rich auxiliary iron sources in Kustanay. It is partly supplied by cheaply mined, but rather inferior coking coal over a consi-derable distance, and partly with superior coking coal over a-\/very long distance.\"\"^ Nizhne Tagil'sk and Chelyabinsk are based on inferior iron ore sources and import coal over greater distances than Magnito-gorsk. They also have poorer and more expensive ore sources than the Krivoi Rog based plants. On the other hand, Nizhne Tagil'sk and Chelyabinsk are based on Kuznets coking coal, the best metal-lurgical coking coal i n the Soviet Union. The cheapness of the 20 coal more than compensates for the high cost of the iron ore, and Nizhne Tagil'sk and Chelyabinsk were third and fourth in cost of raw material and fuel. This carried over to total cost of pig 17 In 1958, at the Magnitogorsk Combine the cost of iron i n one ton of crude ore mined was 10 rubles, whereas at the Beloretsk Combine, i t was 140 rubles and at Lipetsk and Tula underground mines, i t was over 180 rubles. Cost per ton of iron in agglomer-ate at the Magnitogorsk Combine was 46 rubles, at the Zakavkazskiy Plant, 146 rubles, at the Lebezhdinskiy Mine, 222 rubles and i n the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly, 253 rubles. Cost of iron i n agglomer-ate is especially high i n enterprises which use.ores and concen-trates transported over great distances. The cost per ton of iron i n the agglomerate at the Abagur Factory at the Kuznetsk Combine was 335 rubles and at the Cherepovets Plant, 248 rubles. ^Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 127; and Jasny, op. c i t . . p. 280. 18 Jasny, op. c i t . . p. 283. 19 Magnitogorsk is the only Uralian plant to use Karaganda coal, which is mixed with Kuznets coal. Holzman, op. c i t . p. 386. i n the early 1950's Karaganda coal was mixed with 60 per cent Kuznets coal. Holloway, op. c i t . . p. 37. 165. iron as well. In 1956, Magnitogorsk also had by far the cheapest supply of steel making materials, with Kuznetsk second, and Novo Tagil'sk third, but Dzerzhinsk in the South had a cheaper supply than Chelyabinsk. This was attained by the greater substitution 21 of scrap for pig iron, and underlines one of the basic weaknesses of the Uralian raw material supply. The major pig iron producing nations in the world are: The A Federal Republic of Germany, France, The United Kingdom, The United States of America and The Soviet Union. In 1955, the Urals had a higher ratio of iron ore to pig iron production than the major producing nations with the exception of the United Kingdom. If crude ore is considered the Urals required 2.9 tons of ore for every ton of pig iron produced as opposed to 1.6 for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1.7 for the United States, 2.2.for the whole _( Soviet Union, 218 for France and 3.0 for the United Kingdom.. If only rich and concentrated ores are considered, this reduces the requirements to 2.1 tons which i s s t i l l greater than either the Federal Republic of Germany of the United States, both of which,of course, work to a considerable degree on rich imported ores. 22 S t i l l , a l l i n a l l , iron ore i s cheap i n the Urals, there-20 Khlebnikov, pp. c i t . . p. 63 21 Livshits, ppj. c i t . . table 76, pp. 230-231. 22 Jasny, op. c i t . . p. 285166. fore, these figures tend to be misleading, the point being not that the Urals has rich ore, but that i t has cheap ore, which is quite a different matter. The coke supply i s better than most in the Soviet Union, where theuse of inferior coking coals i s the rule, not the ex-23 ception. On the other hand, the Urals steel making raw material 24 supply i s somewhat less favorable because of a scrap deficiency. Jasny, OP. c i t . . p. 286. 24 In 1956, the Urals imported 2.6 million tons of scrap out of i t s total requirements of 4.9 million, whereas the South imported only 0.9 out of a total requirement of 4.3 million tons. The North West and Center were net exporting regions. Livshits, jap. c i t . . table 105, p. 367. 167. TABLE IX IRON ORE RESOURCES - 1 January 1956 (in % - omitting KMA and Krivoy Rog quartzites) Geological Reserves Industrial Reserves Center and European North 10.6 15.5 South 42.7 35.7 Urals 17.3 19.2 Siberia, Far East, Central Asia 29.4 29.6 100.0 100.0 (57 b i l l i o n tons) (30 b i l l i o n tons) Source: Bardin, op. c i t . . p. 164. TABLE X TOTAL GEOLOGICAL RESERVES OF COAL BASINS PRODUCING METALLURGICAL COKING-COALS IN THE USSR\u2014 1 JANUARY 1958 (billions of tons) Kuznetsk Basin 905.0 Donetsk Basin 240.0 Karaganda Basin 51.0 Pechora Basin 344.0 Kizelovsk Basin 1.1 Coal Deposits of Georgia SSR 0.7 Source: Ibid.. p. 221. 168. TABLE XI IRON CONTENT IN ORES UTILIZED -1956 REGION PLANT % RANK Urals Magnitogorsk 56.6 1 Novo Tagil'sk 50.5 9 Chelyabinsk 46.4 10 South Azovstal' 53.9 2 Zaporozhstal' 52.5 4 Krivo Rog 53.3 3 Makeevsk 52.5 4 Dzerzhinsk 52.1 5 West Siberia Kuznets 51.6 7 Center Novo-Lipetsk 51.4 8 Novo-tul'sk 51.8 6 Source: Livshits, op. c i t . . p. 224. TABLE XII YIELD OF METALLURGICAL COKE Coal Basins % Ash in Coal % Ash of Charge Tons of Coal in 1 tons of Metallurgical Coke Donetsk 17.0 7.6 2.0 Kuznetsk 12.0 7.6 1.6 Pechora 14.0 7.6 1.8 Karaganda 21.0 7.6 3.6 Kizelovsk 20.0 7.6 10.2 Source: Bardin, op. c i t . . p. 227. 169. TABLE XIII PROPORTION OF TOTAL OUTPUT OF VARIOUS IRON ORE BASINS AND DEPOSITS Producer 1932 1940 1950 1955 1957 Krivoy Rog 65.8 64.3 53.0 50.3 52.2 Kerch 4.3 3.4 - 4.0 3.7 Central Regions 4.2 3.7 2.3 2.7 2.0 Olenegorsk - - - - 1.8 Magnitogorsk 11.1 19.0 19.4 17.5 16.2 Tagilo-Kushvinsk group 3.8 4.0 9.7 7.9 6.8 Bakal'sk 4.9 1.5 6.1 5.7 5.2 Gornaya Shoriya and Abakan 0.4 1.7 5.5 5.2 4.6 Others 5.5 2.4 4.0 6.7 7.5 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Bardin, op. c i t . . p. 418 TABLE XIV PROPORTION OF COKING COAL SUPPLY OF VARIOUS COAL BASINS FOR FERROUS METALLURGY\"IN % Basins 1927\/28 1940 1950 1955 1958 Donetsk 100.0 74.7 59.0. 56.3 58.0 Kuznetsk - 19.9 32.2 27.0 27.4 Karaganda - 3.1 4.2 9.3 7.0 Kizelovsk - 2.3 4.6 2.7 2.4 Gruzinsk - - - 2.5. 2.5 Pechorsk - - - 2.2 2.7 T022AL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Ibid.. p. 418. 170. TABLE XV DISTANCES BETWEEN MAJOR IRON ORE AND COAL DEPOSITS Ore Deposits and Basins Coal Basins Distance, km (by r a i l ) USSR Go may a Shoriya Kuznetsk 150 Abakansk Kuznetsk 250 Group Atasa Karaganda 360 Krivoy Rog Donetsk 480 Kerch Donetsk 650 Magnitogorsk Karanganda 1180 Khalilovsk Karaganda 1330 Bakal'sk Kuznetsk 1970 Tagilo-Kushvinsk Kuznetsk 1910 Kola Peninsula Pechora 2660 USA Great Lakes Pennsylvanian 1500-1800 (the bulk of the distance is by water) EUROPE Lotaring Ruhr 325-400 Source: Bardin, op. c i t . . p. 412 TABLE XVI AVERAGE TON-KM ASSEMBLY OF RAW MATERIALS FOR THE LARGEST PLANTS Plant Ton-KM Southern Plants Magnitogorsk Chelyabinsk Orsk ^ Kuznetsk 900-100 1800 2850 3750 500 1-By working completely on local ores. Source: Ibid.. p. 413. 171 TABLE XVII PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL - SELECTED PRODUCERS - 1955 (in millions of metric tons) PRODUCER PIG IRON STEEL Urals 11.9 16.4 France 11.1 12.6 United Kingdom 12.7 20.1 Federal Rep. of Germany 16.6 21.3 Belgium 5.4 5.9 Italy 1.7 5.4 Sweden 1.2 2.1 Japan 5.4 9.4 China 3.6 2.8 Ukraine 16.6 16.9 Soviet Union 33.3 45.3 Pitts burgh-Youngs town 24.5 37.3 Chicago 14.5 23.6 Eastern 14.5 22.7 Detroit-Cleveland 8.2 10.9 United States 70.9 106.4 Sources: Long-Term Trends and Problems of the European Steel  Industry, op. c i t t . pp. 52-53,64-65; Komar, op. c i t . . p. 221; Promyshlennost1 SSSR. Statisticheskiy Sbornik, Moskva: Gosstatizdat, 1957, p. 113; and. a letter from H. C. Rossrucker, Statistician, The American Iron and Steel Institute. 172. TABLE XVIII INPUTS IN ONE TON OF STEEL-MAKING PIG IRON -1956 - Raw Mat- Total Total Plant Metallic Charge Fuel in Charge erials Plant Plant - and Fuel Cost Cost as % of MMK tons rubles tons rubles rubles rub les Magnitogorsk 1.769 39.25 0.618 119.02 159.46 169.13 100 Novo 1.842 106.47 0.640 126.90 240.29 252.73 149 Tagil'sk Chelyabinsk 2.080 117.68 0.713 134.37 265.10 284.24 168 Satkinsk 2.055 108.53 0.819 154.53 269.45 320.27 189 Kushvinsk 1.9.89 109.41 0.926 184.57 304.21 351.18 208 Nizhne 2.102 118.84 0.838 174.00 208.28 354.29 210 Tagil'sk Serov 1.973 142.10 0.800 150.75 301.79 359.13 212 Ashinsk 2.135 100.26 0.832 173.28 283.80 367.31 218 Chusovsk 2.330 138.46 0.933 212.84 360.40 399.57 236 Nizhne 2.287 128.95 1.031 203.97 342.91 414.39 245 Saldinsk Alapaevsk 2.392 145.39 0.998 172.29 339.69 422.13 250 Verkhne Sin- 2.508 164.26 1.205 214.30 405.14 522.62 309 yachikinsk Beloretsk 2.317 196.60 0.994 250.12 460.83 529.94 313 Source: Livshits, op. c i t . . pp. 226-9, 236-7. 173. T A B L E X I X O P E R A T I N G D A T A O N B L A S T \" F U R N A C E S U S I N G H I G H S I N T E R B U R D E N S Furnace Sinter Slag Total Bur- Coke Con-- % Vol- den sumption ume kg\/ rank kg\/ton rank kg\/ ton ton WESTERN EUROPE - SWEDEN Elagersta 100 230 1600 1 570 3 Domnarvet 100 375 1700 2 550 1 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY Phoenix-Rheinrohr-Ruhrort -works: Huttenbetriebe open -hearth iron 67 353 1803 8 675 15 open hearth iron 61 409 1816 9 630 8 Thomas iron 53 579 2000 13 672 14 Hoesch 70 400 1864 10 619 5 August-Thyssen 53 472 1975 12 652 10 Huckingen 52 828 2499 18 818 20 Salzgitter 63 1123 2691 20 814 19 Dillingen 100 890 2300 17 720 18 BELGIUM Seraing 95 820 2194 16 687 17 UNITED KINGDOM Appleby-Frodingham \u2022 100 1300 2607 19 855 23 FRANCE Knutange 66 1015 2775 21 830 22 Mt. St. Martin 44 1100 2880 22 815 21 Chiers 52 1200 2960 23 885 24 NORTH AMERICA - UNITED STATES OF AMERI CA Sparrows Point 94 - 520 1700 3 665 13 Garry1 80 470 1900 11 660 12 Fairless 50 350 - - 680 16 CANADA Steel Co. of Canada2 \u2022 100 400 1715 4 635 9 Hamilton 96 485 1750 6 625 6 A S I A - J A P A N Kokura 96 440 1750 5 550 2 USSR Magnitogorsk 94 510 1801 7 630 7 Kuznetsk 77 590 2025 14 652 11 Cherpovets 100 707 2047 15 589 4 1 ? sinter & pellets ^self-fluxing Source: Long-Term Trends and Problems of the European Steel  Industry^ op. c i t . . p. 91. 174. TABLE XX COMPARATIVE COST OF OPEN HEARTH CARBON STEEL IN 1958 Plants Cost as % of Magnitogorsk Integrated Plants Magnitogorsk 100.00 Kuznetsk 132.5 Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine 133.6 Dzerzhinsk 157.0 Zaporozhstal' 164.0 Petrovsk 166.7 Enakievsk 177.4 Stalinsk 196.6 Kons tantinovsk 204.4 Ashinsk 264.3 Non-integrated Plants Krasnyy Oktyabr' 176.8 K. Libknekht 182.4 Serp i Molot 191.5 Revdinsk Metizno-Metallurgical 196.9 Zlatoust 204.4 Amurstal' 238.9 Omutinsk 245.0 Source: Bardin, OP. c i t . . p. 534. TABLE XXI REGIONAL COST OF PRODUCTION OF PIG IRON FOR STEELMAKING as a % of the USSR average as a % of Western Siberia USSR 100.0 133.2 South 112.3 149.5 Urals 82.9 110.3 Western Siberia 75.1 100.0 Center 178.0 237.1 Source: Livshits, op. c i t . , p. 238. 175, CHAPTER VII CONCLUSIONS The Uralian iron and steel industry was i n i t i a l l y essen-t i a l l y located on the iron ore supply, but none of the major plants are located on iron ore resources that are large enough to amortize the plant according to Livshits\" estimate of four hundred million to five hundred million tons for an economic sized operation. Also, the major-plants are, on the whole, based on low quality ores. This in part, can be accounted for by the inst i t u -tional optimism of the Soviets - more reserves would turn up -and partly to inflated i n i t i a l estimates of reserves. Once the plants were established, the rational thing to do was to import supplies to them because of the economies of adding to existing plant over building new plant. But i t i s questionable i f these plants should have been established in the f i r s t place, at least, i n the Urals. If a more rigorous and exhaustive inventory of re-sources were carried out f i r s t while adding capacity to Southern plants, instead of starting new operations, possibly only Magnitogorsk would have been established to u t i l i z e the Uralian ores. The most questionable development is the existence of both the Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk plants when their relatively close ore supplies could adequately supply one major plant very nicely, but not nearly two. On the other hand the Nizhne Tagil 1sk and Orsk-Khalilovsk combines are considerably removed from these 176. deposits and make use of other reserves, that are probably worth developing. But although the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine i s worth developing, the use of Kachkanar 16 per cent Fe ore is more expensive than i t s traditional supply. Nizhne Tagil'sk is also located in reasonable proximity to the possible, i f expensive, Pechora coal supply. .The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine has always experienced d i f f i - . culties with the expansion of i t s production f a c i l i t i e s and the present is no exception. The fundamental reason i s that the pro-duction of naturally alloyed steel has proven much more d i f f i c u l t than i t was originally supposed. The major economic advantage of the Uralian iron and steel production i s i t s association with the Eastern coal suppliers.\"\" But this advantage is common to a l l Eastern plants, and i t is argued by some that a coal location is preferable to an iron location when a l l the supplementary associated industries are considered. Furthermore, the parallel shipments of ore and coal on the Tobolsk-Magnitogorsk r a i l line are only ju s t i f i a b l e because 2 Magnitogorsk is an efficient plant i n being. Expansion at Magnitogorsk w i l l result in more expensive production than the construction of new plants would, even though Magnitogorsk is the most efficient Uralian plant.*\" \"khlebnikov, oo. c i t . , pp. 63, 80. ^Minakov, op. c i t . . pp. 16-17. 177. One mitigating factor for the Urals i s the introduction of natural gas into ferrous metallurgy. The Urals i s well located 2 f o r this development but was not converted to i t u n t i l a f t e r theDneper Region, Donbass, the Central Zone and the Transcaucasus were.*\"\" The Bukhara-Urals gas pipeline was completed on November 3 1, 1963. I t i s to supply the Magnitogorsk, Orsk-Khalilovsk and Chelyabinsk plants. A furnace at Magnitogorsk was converted to the use of t h i s gas at the beginning of 1964. A f t e r the f i r s t two weeks of operation, i t was calculated that t h i s economized on 4 up to 200 tons of coke d a i l y . Nevertheless, the use of natural gas i s only a p a r t i a l solution to the problem because, although natural gas can be used f o r technological purposes i n the smelting of i r o n , as well as f o r power purposes, i t i s only possible to replace something i n the order of 25 per cent of the coking coal needed.*' The Urals w i l l have to continue to import coking coal and the Southern Urals w i l l be increasingly supplied with i r o n ore from Sokolov-Sarbaysk. The de-emphasis of i r o n and s t e e l announced i n 1962^ w i l l help the Urals perpetuate i t s present status, but no 3 Ch. Aytmatov, Yu. Mukimov, \"Trassa Druzhby 1 Bukhara-Ura1 1\", Pravda. 5 November 1963, p. 2. 4 Peshkin, op. c i t . . p. 42. \"'Minakov, op. c i t . . pp. 17-18. I. S. Senin, \"0 Gosudarstvennom Plane Raxvitiya Narodnogo Khozyaystva SSSR na 1963 god, 0 Gosudarstvennom Byudzhete SSSR za 178. significant increase in i t s relative importance can be expected. Large scale development within the Urals is best located at the major Southern Uralian plants which are most accessible to the relatively cheap Kazakhstan ore sources and to the major Eastern coal basins. Considerable expansion i s also planned for Nizhne Tagil'sk, but this w i l l produce pig iron that w i l l be 10 per cent more expensive than at Chelyabinsk, 7 although based on the nearby Kachkanar ore source. Important second order developments w i l l be related to quality metallurgy especially at the Serov and Chusovsk plants. It is doubtful i f Orsk-Khalilovsk w i l l ever seriously r i v a l the leading three plants, or w i l l any of the others for that matter, barring some unforeseen developments i n metallurgy. Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk were i n i t i a l l y founded for sound reasons. Magnitogorsk to u t i l i z e the high quality Magni-togorsk ores and Chelyabinsk to supply the Chelyabinsk metal market. Now because of inertia they are both worth retaining, being large efficient operations, but they do not express the most efficient distribution i n the present circumstances. The local 1961 God.\" Sodoklad Predsedatelya Byudzhetnoy Komissii Soveta Soyuza. Pravda. 11 December 1962, pp. 6, 7.; T. Shabad. New York  Times. op. c i t . . November 24, 1962; and N. S. Khrushchev, Doklad na Plenume TsK KPSS 19 November 1962 - \"Razvitie Ekonomiki SSSR i Partiynoe Rukovodstvo Narodnym Khozyaystvom,\" Pravda. 20 November 1962, pp. 1-8. 7 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 63. 179. metal market cannot absorb a l l of their production and more than half of i t is shipped out of the Urals after only preliminary r o l l i n g . If they both did not exist only one would be desirable, preferably Magnitogorsk because of i t s better location for the obtaining of materials. 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Pokovskiy, M. \" P r i o r i t y Expansion of the USSR Ore and M e t a l Base,\" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta, Moscow, 2 A p r i l 1962, p. 24 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous M e t a l l u r g y (41),\" J o i n t P u b l i c a t i o n s Research S e r v i c e , 13,939, 31 May 1962, pp. 8-14. \"Production of R e f r a c t o r y M a t e r i a l s A f t e r the 22nd Party Congress'!, Ogneupory, No. 12, 1961, pp. 541-544 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous Me t a l l u r g y (22),\" J o i n t P u b l i c a t i o n s Research S e r v i c e , 12,884, 9 March 1962, pp. 12-17). \"Prokatany Pervye Truby,\" Trud, Moskva, 13 January 1962, p. 1. \"Raw M a t e r i a l Shortages i n the Ir o n and S t e e l Industry,\" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta, No. 13, Moscow 26 March 1962, p.2. ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous M e t a l l u r g y (41),\" J o i n t P u b l i c a t i o n s Research S e r v i c e , 13,939, pp. 1-3). Rudenko, I . \"Eto Vas Kasaetsya, T o v a r i s h c h i i z Gosplana RSFSR i Orenburgskogo Sovnarkhoza,\" Trud, Moskva 12 February 1961. p. 1. \"Rudnyy,\" Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1 January 1961, p. 1. Rusin, A., K o l o t i l o v , P., Mamontov, I . , Yakupov, P., Toropov, V., Medvedev, V., V e r s h i n i n , V., \"For Larger Production and Fewer Expenditures,\" Spyetskaya R o s s i y a , Moscow, 29 March 1961 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous M e t a l l u r g y ( 1 3 ) \" , J o i n t P u b l i -cations Research S e r v i c e , 10,423, 11 October 1961, pp.16-20. Ryasnoy, A., \"Metallurgy, an Important L i n k , \" A g i t a t o r , Moscow, No. 24,-December 1961, pp. 10-13 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (23),\" J o i n t P u b l i c a t i o n s Research S e r v i c e , 12,818, 6 March 1962, pp. 1-8. Senin, I . S., \"0 Gosudarstvennom Plane R a z v i t i y a Narodnogo KhozyaystVc SSSR na 1963 god, 0 Gosudarstvennom Byudzhete SSSR na 1963 God i ob I s p o l n e n i i Gosudarstvennogo Byudzheta SSSR Za 1961 God.\" Sodoklad Predsedatelya Byudzhetnoy K o m i s s i i Soveta Soyuza. Pravda, 11 December 1962, pp. 6,7, 186. Shabad, T. \"News Notes,\" Soviet Geography: Review and  Translation. ' \"Soviet to Put More Funds Into Agriculture for 1963,\" The New York Times, v o l . CXII, No. 38,290, November 24, 1962, pp. 1,3. Shef t e l , N.I. \"New Equipment of the M e t a l l u r g i c a l Plants of the RSFSR i n 1962,\" Metallurg. Moscow, No. 3, March 1962, pp. 1-3 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (42),\" Joint P u b l i -cations Research Service, 14,025, 6 June 1962, pp.1-9. Vlasov, P. V. \"The Ferrous Metallurgy Section of the Engineering and Economic Council of the Sverdlovskiy Sovnarkhoz,\" Byulleten' Tekhniko-Ekonomicheskov Informatsii. Moscow, No. 2, pp. 83-84 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (44),\" Joint Publications Research Service, 13,843, 22 May 1962, pp. 24-29. Zabaluev, G., Sapiro, G., Odintsov, Ye., Ivanov, Ye., Derevyanko, G., and Bulgakov, V. \"My Mozhem Rabotat\" Pribyl'no, Problemy M e t a l l u r g i i Zapadnogo Urala,\" Izvestiya. Moscow, 27 A p r i l 1961, p. 3. Zhuravlev, V. \"Problems of the Ferroalloy Industry,\" Ekonomiches- kaya Gazeta. Moscow, No. 18, 4 December 1961 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (28),\" Joint Publications Research Service, 13,633, 2 May 1962, pp. 9-18. OTHER SOURCES Rossrucker, H. C., S t a t i s t i c i a n , The American Iron and Steel I n s t i t u t e , l e t t e r on the production of various American iro n and s t e e l regions. Petrov, V. P. \"Soviet Industry,\" Washington: W. P. Kamkin, 1960, (mimeographed). ADDENDUM (PERIODICALS) Isard, W. \"Some Locational Factors i n the Iron and Steel Industry Since the Early Nineteenth Century,\" The Journal of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, LVI (June, 1948) Khlebnikov, V. B., \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy, During 1959-1965,\" from Sovetskaya Chernaya Metallurgiya 1959-1965, Moscow: Gosplanizdat, 1960, pp. 3-7, 50-243 ( i n Joint Publications Research Service, 12,474, 7 February 1962). Sergeyev, G. N. \"Production Costs at Magnitogorsk Steel Combine are the Lowest i n Industry,\" Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Moskva, No. 15, 9 A p r i l 1962, p. 12 ( i n \"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (49),\" Joint Publications Research Service, 14,006, 5 June 1962, pp. 1-9). 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